

**THE UNENDING NAXALISM:
INTERROGATING DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN
UTTAR PRADESH**

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
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
DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "THE UNENDING NAXALISM: INTERROGATING DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN UTTAR PRADESH" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.



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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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PREFACE

This study tries to explore the dynamics of Naxalism. Its inception from the semi-feudal set up to the existing globalised order, of late modernity and early post-modernity in Indian society. The focal point for analysis, as the title indicates, is the issue of development. Uttar Pradesh lags far behind in the human development index and the status of its eastern belt is much inferior and so of the people, who suffers from acute deprivation. The present study attempts to shed some light on the structural conditions which are giving impetus to such movement. This work is dedicated humbly to all the innumerable people who struggle for creating a humane social world.

In this endeavour, I am highly honoured to get the supervision of my respected Prof. Anand Kumar and obliged to him for his painstaking guidance since the conception of my research problem. I am indeed indebted to all my teachers, the faculty members of the Centre for the Study of Social Systems, who introduced me to the world of Sociology. And, I am forever thankful to the liberal space of Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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Nonetheless, the whole credit goes to my family members: Maa & Papa ji, Didi and Bhaiya, and my loving nephew Raja, who are constant source of inspiration for me and I am fortunate to have their immense faith, love and care.

However, I am alone responsible for any factual, linguistic and ideological mistakes in the present work.

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INTRODUCTION

‘THE PHILOSOPHERS HAVE ONLY INTERPRETED THE WORLD IN VARIOUS WAYS;
THE POINT IS, TO CHANGE IT.’

- MARX

It may be that the 'spectre of Communism' no longer haunts Europe from the pages of *The Communist Manifesto*. But, it continues to scare the power elites of India from its vast and volatile rural hinterland – in the shape of Naxalism¹. The Prime Minister of India in his speech, addressing the Chief Ministers of the naxal affected states recently put across that the ‘Naxalism is single biggest threat, our country has ever faced’ he goes on to label it as “virus”. The armed movement carrying that name which was born in the turbulent 1960s, still survives in India. It has an abiding appeal among the dispossessed and underprivileged rural poor in several parts of India, who see in it a hope to free themselves from their present miserable conditions.

Revolts, social unrests, rebellions, protests and oppositions against an oppressive government have been the hallmark of every age. The masses have rallied together and raised their voice against any autocratic, despotic and anti-people government. The transformation sometimes has been a smooth one, yet, at others pretty violent. Nevertheless, a change came about with the overthrow of the former and with a new regime being established, in instances like France (1879), Russia (1917), India (1947), China (1949) and South Africa ('90s). One such uprising in post-independent India from the land of ‘Naxalbari’ is reaction to state’s negligence in development [people-centric], precisely human & social development.

¹ Naxalism or the Naxalite movement owes its genesis to the village of ‘Naxalbari’ in the West Bengal state of India. It was the outcome of mobilisation carried out by the Communists at the ground level since the early 1950s. By the mid-Sixties though, a group of radicals led by Charu Mazumdar within the Darjeeling District Committee of the CPI(M) wanted to carry out an armed mass struggle. The slogan was: **Land to the Tillers**. Hundreds of peasants and tea garden workers, agitating for land ownership in the Naxalbari region, killed a police inspector with arrows on May 24, 1967. The following day 11 people, including six women and two children were killed in police firing. In the wake of Naxalbari, Sumanta Banerjee writes: "While the police version of the incident was that the rebels had attacked them from behind a wall of women and children, forcing the police to open fire, the dissident Marxist leaders alleged that the police deliberately killed the women and children." Kanu Sanyal of CPI(ML) says, "It was a revenge killing." Naxalites commemorate May 25 as Martyr's Day. Old-timers insist that the Naxalbari peasant uprising wasn't an event but a process that started back in the early 1950s. But that day Naxalbari exploded into the **national consciousness**. And in a few years, Naxal became synonymous with any Red extremist evoking fear among landlords and policemen alike.

Back in 1967, the Naxalbari insurrection made China's *People's Daily* go euphoric in its July 5 editorial. "A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India. ...Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red area of rural revolutionary armed struggle has been established in India...The spark in Darjeeling will start a prairie fire and will certainly set the vast expanses of India ablaze." The newspaper was off the mark. Radical mass politics appears comatose in Naxalbari.

The fact is that 'objective conditions' in certain pockets of the country are no different from what they were in 1967. Those who believe that economic reforms has delivered millions out of poverty should qualify their optimism. Amidst a steady reduction in poverty in the 80s and 90s, defined in terms of calories consumed or expenditures made, there is an alarming prevalence of malnutrition, as indicated by the government's National Family Health Surveys and NSS data on protein intake.² More recently, Arjun Sengupta Committee set up by the Government of India found that 77 per cent of working people in our country get Rs.20/- per day per person or less. A triumphant media, soaking in the success of India's economic growth, has missed or chosen to ignore these statistical gaps.

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that a section of urban India does not understand the causes of Naxalism. Even if we take the current methodology of poverty estimation at face value and accept that the absolute numbers of the poor have fallen over decades, the statistics, being averages, do not capture the intensity of distress in certain pockets despite high growth in recent years. These are precisely the regions — eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bastar, interior Orissa, parts of West Bengal, Vidarbha — where the influence of Naxalism has increased. To be poor is one thing, and to seem condemned to one's fate is quite another. Rising incomes in post-reform India have created a rapidly growing aspirational class, but they have also contributed to an army of socio-economic orphans — those who have been rejected by all mainstream political parties and adopted by a parallel network of Naxalites, Gandhians and Socialists.

² This should lead us to broaden our definition of poverty to include access to healthcare, education and basic consumer goods. Health spending, in particular, contributes to a swift transition from subsistence or even comfortable existence to poverty, pushing families into debt; hence, focusing more on incomes than assets to measure poverty can be misleading. Calorie intake norms should be supplemented by measures of protein and vitamin intake, so that lower calorie consumption is not taken to mean that people have moved on to superior substitutes.

Left-wing extremism is acknowledged, by Prime Minister of India, as “an even greater threat to India than militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast.”³ Nearly, 40% of the country’s geographical area and 35% of India’s population is already affected by some form of Left-wing extremism.⁴ At least 192 districts in 16 States, out of a total of 625 districts in the country, were affected by various levels of Maoist mobilisation and violence by July 2007⁵. The Red Corridor, extending from ‘Tirupati to Pashupati’ (Andhra Pradesh to Nepal), has long been passé in the Indian Maoists conception. The idea of Compact Revolutionary Zone within India’s hinterland, which appeared utopian, has now become a virtual reality. They have not only established their near hegemony in the originally conceived North-South corridor but also expanded their tentacles towards the East and West, on the notion of “Fish in Water”.⁶

In the last four years there has been an accretion of 40 per cent in its cadre.⁷ It has a massive social base on the issues ranging from feudal to neo-colonial setback. They want a regime change albeit through violence; the vested interests that control the levers of powers, regulate the wheel of industry and have a feudal iron grip over the agrarian economy, coerce them to do so. In a sharply unequal society, the line between peaceful and violent politics can turn into a blur. The Naxal movement came to be compared with the Huks of Philippines, the Al Fatah of Palestine and the Tupamaros of Uruguay (Singh 2006: ix). D Bandyopadhyaya (2007: 14) on the line of attack finds it analogous to the rural movement in the Philippines, South Africa, the Zapatistas in Mexico, MST in Brazil and FARC in Colombia which tends to fuse Marxism with the local brand of ethnic and racial discourses.

³ Prime Minister’s speech at the Annual Conference of DGPs/IGPs and heads of CPOs, New Delhi, November 4, 2004, Prime Minister’s Office, <http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm>

⁴ A study by Ajit K Doval (Former Director, Intelligence Bureau) published in *Hindustan Times*, March 26, 2006.

⁵ *Institute for Conflict Management – South Asia Terrorism Portal* estimates. Whereas the Government sources, at the end of the Coordination Committee of Naxalite Affected States on April 26, 2007, conceded that the number of Districts afflicted was 182 across 16 States.

⁶ Mao Zedong propounded the thesis of “Fish in Water”. “Fish” were rural militants. Disgruntled disaffected and resentful poor peasantry, agricultural workers, forest dwellers, displaced persons and the like constituted the “Water”.

⁷ Estimated, in the study of Ajit K Doval, cadre strength from 5,000 in 2001 to over 7,500 in 2005 (in the last year alone over 1,000 new cadres joined the Naxalite movement). Whereas, the Ministry of Home Affairs in its Annual Report, 2004-2005 noted that the “Naxalites have an assessed strength of 9,300 hard-core underground cadres.” Somini Sengupta, writing for the New York Times and quoting Indian security officials as well as Maoist leaders’ sources, has placed this figure around 20,000. The estimation of cadres of highly secretive rebel organization that engages in wide range of activities – and not just violent actions – for mobilization and consolidation of its mass base, it is natural to expect some divergence.

Nonetheless, the violence by state and oppressed forces, since ages on tribals and dalits in Indian society, can't be ignored. Tribals, more than any other oppressed category, have got nothing out of the Indian state, before or after globalisation. There has been continuous attack on their cultural autonomy, threat to their livelihood, and encroachment into their habitat. Dalits have always been at the receiving end: landlessness; their dignity denied in the social structure. Furthermore, mal-governance amplifies the catastrophe.

"You are not considered a man at all. Born a slave, your life is strictly tied to spade, sickle and the lord's feet. You produce everything that the lord boasts of, yet your children are drumming the aluminum plates. Everyday one landlord or the other takes away your wife and daughters... How long, you will ask yourselves, will I live like this? Is this my fate? No! And that means Naxalbari.... 'Naxalite' had become, in the vocabulary of the police and landlords, a word to describe any landless or poor peasant walking with his head high and talking like a man, not as a slave" (Naxalbari and After, 1978).

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

60 years after India's independence there is still widespread unrest, discontent and conflicts among a large swathe of the population. Nearly half of India is affected with one form of violence or the other. The manifestation of Naxalism is to draw the attention of responsible authority. But, even after four decades of its emergence, latent function of the movement is not acknowledged properly. And, in retaliation, the phenomenon of Naxalism has been spreading in an unprecedented manner in some form or the other and in particular, where the issue of development is ignored and not taken up seriously by the state.

Particularly, the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh, where in past naxal activities was unheard of, has in the recent years proved to be a breeding ground. Caste conflicts and social unrest have been going on for ages but it is only now, since the millennium that Naxalite-activities are more visible. Nearly, one third of the eastern belt is under the Naxalite influence, of which three districts are on the forefront. The Naxalites have a social base despite a variety of repressive measures pursued by the state. Concerned reports alarm its growing tentacles with the adjoining states and international border.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The living world is the habitat of all—host, pest, prey and predator. The endurance and recurrence of resistance is due to the doggedness of the structures of hierarchy, inequality and dependency in society. It operates in everyday life by the weak and subordinated sections of society. It is the existence of the consciousness of injustice, deprivation and denial that stir the subordinate sections to resistance. Aristotle saw the prime cause of revolution as being inequality. Inequality took different forms according to the nature of government.

Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs under the idea that they are unequal claim too much, which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution.⁸

The prime cause of revolution, inequality, therefore, manifests itself in different states in different ways. Aristotle rightly perceived, immediate social factors, as the existence of electoral intrigues; carelessness among the ruling elite; neglect by them of trifling matters giving rise to discontent; and the dissimilarity of the elements within the state.

Indian society has been experiencing threats emanating from regional and social imbalances, which have given rise to fuel insurgencies, terrorism, sub nationalism and communalism. Economic disparities have created social tensions, urban unrest, rural despair and youth disenchantment. Problems of deprivation, unemployment, poverty, hunger and food shortage, lack of housing, degradation of basic amenities have given rise to anger and extra-constitutional means which unfold the *legitimation-crisis*.

⁸ *Aristotle's Politics*, trs. Benjamin Jowett, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1931. Book v, ii. 3 – 5 as quoted in Peter Calvert (1970), *Revolution*.

Indian Sociology has so far studied the elements of continuities and linkages in the social structure and traditions more thoroughly than the elements of discontinuities and ruptures (Rajendra Singh 2001). It has largely been inattentive to recognize and thus to record and analyse the massive social data of growing ruptures.

Social movements have the same Durkheimian *sui-generis* autonomy and transcendence as the phenomenon of society itself. Both society and social movements are constructions, and each validates the authenticity of the other's existence. Rajendra Singh (2001) posits that the representation of movements illuminates the contemporary nature of Indian society. He further insists that studying social movements inescapably involves making a study of society as well.

It would be my endeavour to explore the entire gamut of problems in eastern Uttar Pradesh and understand the ramification that people's voice has for the society.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Edwards (1927), in the *Natural History of Revolution*, offers a framework built on the sequential phases of a revolution. He saw revolutionary movements as starting slowly and requiring a relatively long period of development. The initial phases of the revolution are led by moderates and after preliminary success, the radicals seize powers. In turn, this second phase gives way to a new equilibrium of a more moderated outcome. Edwards offers a variety of hypothesis about the problematic issues in this type of natural history. The outbreak of revolution implies that the underlying economic, social, and political processes of change are clearly in motion.

The revolutionary situation is not the result of deprivation, which is of course, an essential prerequisite, but the result of a crisis of legitimacy – that is, “legitimacy aspirations and ideals are being repressed or perverted” (p. 30). He emphasizes the role of the “outsider” and “stranger” in supplying symbolic leadership, and of the necessity of enlisting elements of the exiting upper class if the revolution is to succeed. The intellectuals are a key in providing this transfer of allegiance. The militant phase develops when there is a “marked increase of wealth, intelligence, and power in the repressed portion of society.... With this gradual increase of their wealth and knowledge comes a corresponding change in their beliefs and

opinions, sentiments and feelings. Conditions of life which were previously tolerable become intolerable” (pp. 33 and 34).

He presses the analysis further, anticipating the work of many political scientists and psychologists. “An essential step in the development of revolution is the gradual concentration of public dissatisfaction upon some one institution and the persons representing it” (p. 46). He deals the role of the peasants in revolutionary situations, and with their primary interest in land reform. His analysis of the greater role of the peasants in the French versus British revolution foreshadows the type of analysis presented by Barrington Moore in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (p. 81). In his analysis of armed revolutionary conflict, he stresses as essential elements the fusion of radical symbols with national patriotism in a manner which is directly relevant to the understanding of contemporary wars of national liberation (p. 162). Fundamentally, Edwards sees revolution as a “collective action” in which underlying social context interacts with the conscious efforts of intellectuals and dedicated agents of change.

Gurr (1970), in *Why Men Rebel*, sees three stages in the coming into being of political violence: the development of discontent; the politicization of that discontent; and its actualization in violent action against political targets. The primary force behind discontent is relative deprivation, which Gurr defines as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities” (p. 13). In other words relative deprivation is the felt gap between what people think they should have and what they are going to get. It is prospective frustration.

Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation is a very broad one, broad enough to incorporate such other emphases as the importance of the gains of the other groups for a given group’s level of discontent and the promise of new opportunities for a given group. With a number of conceptual variations and embellishments, the notion of relative deprivation has been elementary to the theory of revolt at least since Tocqueville’s *Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Specifically he treats the connection between relative deprivation and violence, some determinants of the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, some sources of rising expectations, and a few determinants of value

capabilities, i.e., the value positions men perceive themselves capable of attaining and maintaining.

Gurr gives a central place to symbol systems as a way of understanding why discontented people frequently look to the political process for satisfaction. He notes that modern discontents are not so much *political* as they are *politicized*. His analysis of the symbolic level of political action includes a look at the role of cultural context in the rate of violence as well as a good deal of attention to the role of ideology in the political definition of social needs. Political violence, he argues, depends very much upon the availability of normative and utilitarian justification for such behavior among the members of a collectivity. Men must see it as a meaningful and reasonable option, and this they are likely to do only if they see the political regime as unworthy of their respect because lacking legitimacy.

The final chapters of the book mainly deal with the how men rebel and how regimes manage to cope with rebellion under various circumstances. Here Gurr deals with the organization and operation of coercive control by the regime, and by the rebels, and the interaction between the two. Besides forms of coercion, he considers the forms of organizational life that contribute to the survival and success of regimes and rebels.

James Scott (1985) in the *Weapons of the Weak*, attempts to understand class relations in a peasant society. The data is drawn from a Malay village. Recalling his field experiences, Scott describes the puzzle posed by the poor and dependent villagers who offered divergent accounts of land transactions, wage rates, social reputations, and technological change. He realized that much of the contradictions arose among the poorer and most economically dependent villagers, loosely referred to as peasants. In this regard, Scott noticed that dependency and the subordinate position of the peasant was as important as poverty. He discovered that, “the poor sang one tune when they were in the presence of the rich and another tune when they were among the poor. The rich too spoke one way to the poor and another to themselves” (1990: ix). The search for the key to the puzzle led to the major social science finding of the existence of a hidden script of the various forms of resistance by the *poor* and *subordinate* (dependent) peasants in everyday life.

According to Scott, the interest in the analysis of power processes and political action, both from the liberal democratic as well as radical view of development have generally been confined to the study of formal, open political activity and to the role of the elite. ‘What they miss’ writes Scott, “is the nearly continuous, informal, undeclared, disguised forms of autonomous resistance by the lower classes: forms of politics that I call *everyday resistance*” (Scott 1989: 4). The hegemonic values of the rich and dominant class is the subject of opposition and conflict. The poor class too has hegemonic values against which the rich class continually struggles. The forms of resistance of the powerless include such as acts as “foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous threats, and so on” (ibid.: 5).

These techniques, in Scott’s thesis, constitute the means of class struggle. These are the technique of struggles of “first resort” in those circumstances where open defiance is impossible or dangerous. “When they are practiced widely by the members of an entire class against elite or the state” observes Scott, “they may have aggregate consequences out of all proportion to their banality when considered singly”. Scott goes on “No adequate account of class relation is possible without assessing their importance” (1989: 5). The major theoretical import of the volume *Weapons of the Weak* is its ability to expand and alter the conventional paradigms of conflictual action studies in social sciences. Lets us reproduce Scott’s comment.

That they have been absent or marginal to most accounts of class relations is all too understandable. The purpose of many such techniques, after all, is to avoid notice and detection. Resistance of this kind is, ironically, abetted by both elites and social scientists whose attention is largely concentrated on those forms of resistance that pose a declared threat to power-holders: social movements, dissident sects, revolutionary groups, and other forms of publicly organised political opposition. Such groups, of course, are far more likely to leave written records- manifestos, membership lists, journalist’s descriptions, and police reports- that help ensure them a firm place in the historical records (ibid).

The poor and the dependent, however, do not leave records of their everyday forms of silent, clever, persistent, unseen and mostly unrecognized struggles against the

dominant. The art and methods of resistance are part of peasant socialization and these arts exist as socially inherited elements of peasant consciousness generally characterized by deprivation and denial. Scott says “When, however, such activities become sufficiently generalized to become a *pattern* of resistance, their relevance to class conflict is clear” (ibid.: 7).

In his *Weapons of the Weak* (1985), Scott defines peasant resistance as, “*Lower class resistance among peasant any act(s) by member(s) of the class that is (are) intended either to mitigate or to deny claims (e.g. rent, taxes, deference) made on that class by superordinate classes (e.g. landlords, the state, owner of machinery, money lenders) or to advance its own claims (e.g. to work, land, charity respect) vis-à-vis these superordinate classes*” (ibid.: 290).

The model of everyday forms of peasant resistance brings the poor and their conflictual acts to the notice of social sciences and marks their presence as a fact of history. These are three general consequences. First, the resistance behavior brings a sense of welfare to peasants. Second, it contributes to the erosion of the normative principles supporting the structures of domination. Third, everyday forms of peasant resistance prepare the ground for the open expression of peasant political action. Scott’s poetic insight into the ‘private transcript’ of the subordinate poor of the countryside and his success in bringing to light for social science analysis the whole range of massive and hidden data of the oppressed is indeed a major contribution to the domain of knowledge.

For **V. S. Naipaul** (1992), whose grandfather had come to Trinidad from India as an indentured worker, India represented two things. It represented a great classical past and the sense of a kibbutz identity. At the same time, it also represented “poverty and an abjectness too fearful to imagine” – all the frightening things his ancestors had tried to escape and which he himself continued to find threatening. Although *India: A Million Mutinies Now* is filled with scenes of wrenching poverty (a family of 10 living in a room 10 feet by 10 feet) and horrifying injustice (brides being set on fire by their husbands' families for failing to bring a sufficient dowry), Naipaul emphasizes that the country seems to have embraced “the idea of freedom” and immense spirit in its people for ‘liberation’. He reports noticing not only increased wealth but also a new confidence and pride among the poor.

Indeed "A Million Mutinies Now," which is made up of dozens of overlapping profiles, leaves the reader with a powerful sense of people's dedication, perseverance and passion. Seemingly selected at random, these individuals may not be entirely representative of the country, but they come from a variety of religious, social and economic backgrounds. What they have in common is a willingness to brave enormous hardships to realize their ideals or their dreams. Some lead existences light – years removed from those of their fathers and grandfathers; others resolutely attempt to preserve tradition and ritual in their lives.

Among the people whom Mr. Naipaul introduces are Namdeo, a poet whose childhood experience with caste prejudice fostered his decision to found the Dalit Panthers (a group dedicated to liberating India's so-called untouchables); Dipanjan, a member of the Bengali gentry, whose awareness of the poverty and misery around him led him to join the Communist Party and live among the very poorest of the village peasants; and Kakusthan, an employee of a large company, who tries to live as "a full Brahmin" -- meaning that he cannot eat or drink anything that he has not already offered up to his God and that he must wear religious marks on his forehead and traditional attire at all times. In fact, two overarching themes occur in many of these profiles. The first is the pervasiveness in India of religion and faith (be it faith in God, ritual or ideology). The second is the conflict in so many people's lives between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern.

Rabindra Ray (1988) have the first-hand experience; he joined a pro-Naxalite student organization while a graduate student in St. Stephens College, New Delhi in 1969, and “preached revolution” with Naxalite comrades in North Bihar in the 1970s. Ray finally renounced Naxalism for a small Trotskyite group and later on, went to Oxford University where he obtained Doctorate in Sociology for the work, on which the present book *Naxalites and Their Ideology* is based.

Ray describes the ideology of the Naxalites as “existential” and “fundamentally... nihilist,” consisting of “immediate experience of the devaluation of the highest values” and “in an existential sense only a conceptualization of a fundamentally anti-political stand” (p. 16). The Naxalites claim to have established a viable political organisation in the area around Naxalbari (in West Bengal), Ray states, “is largely hot air” (p. 22). In Ray’s views this does not tarnish the Naxalites claim to be revolutionaries, even in the Leninist state, because the

Naxalite did make prominent an aspect of revolution that Marxists and Leninists commonly ignore, i.e., “the need for the complete disintegration of the legal fabric and the breakdown of the order” (p. 22).

The most striking aspect of Naxalism, Ray points out, was its commitment to agrarian mass revolution while being intimately involved in the exercise of urban terror. The emergence of Naxalite terrorism Ray sees as, “governed by conditions and values in Bengal but not determined by them” (p. 52). His discussion of the “disjunction between enlightenment in public life and orthodoxy in private” in Bengal, described as, “the bane of bhadrakol radicalism” and analyzed as it relates to caste, social class, blood and kinship ties, landlessness, and many other extremely complex facets of Bengali society (chap. 3).

Ray traces the origins of the Naxalites to the adoption of the ideas generated by the Cultural Revolution in China, which Charu Mazumdar called “an exploding moral atom bomb from which splinters flew out to various parts of the world” (p. 84). The distinguishing feature of Mazumdar’s thought, Ray says, was “the technician reduction that made it possible to arrive at a line of action from concerns that were principally symbolic” (p. 130).

As Ray points out, the Naxalite metaphysic “has the air of shadow-boxing,” the opponents being “real enough [while] the protagonist himself is a thing of air, a creature of the imagination” (p. 152). Shifts in Chinese politics and the Bangladesh liberation war, in Ray’s words, “cut the moral ground from under the Naxalites’ feet” (p. 175) leaving Mazumdar to view the so-called “annihilation line” as his “distinctive achievement to the course of the Indian Revolution” (p. 170). Ray concludes that, among Naxalite leaders and followers, “guilt was not altogether absent from their enthusiasm for the agrarian poor who were exploited, since certainly few if any of them suffered from the sense of personal injustice as cause for the joining the movement” (p. 210).

The review of the selected literature put forward with an understanding of the natural phases and reason of revolution; various modes of resistance; the immense potential of human idea and quest for a change; and particularly one of such experience in Indian site.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of the study is to analyze the relation between the development and discontent. The hypothesis is drawn that the factor behind the discontent is prevailing under-development. On this premise, to understand the unending Naxalism and its growing tentacles in the eastern Uttar Pradesh the study is carried out with certain objectives to interrogate the development:

- 1) To find out the backwardness of Uttar Pradesh in relation to the other states in India, on the line of development indicators.
- 2) To find out the socio-economic regional disparities in eastern Uttar Pradesh.
- 3) To find out the condition of Peasant class.
- 4) To find out the status of Tribals.
- 5) To find out the society and the state apathy towards the deprived communities.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The presented study has some general and specific limitations. These are as follows:

- The study of social movement requires extensive field study which is rarely possible at the 'M.Phil. level'.
- There is limited literature available on the 'Naxalite movement in Uttar Pradesh', specifically.
- The observation of this highly secretive movement is difficult due to the varying facts and opinions.
- Nonetheless, the 'subjectivity' cannot be overlooked while analysing the social movements which is based on 'ideology'.

METHODOLOGY

The present *exploratory research* is done primarily on secondary analysis followed by a fieldwork. An analysis of available information is done related to the study: review of available literature: books, articles, reports; analysis of the content (both *manifest* and *latent*) of communication: print media and internet.

An *expert survey* is also conducted to discuss on the issue with experienced and knowledgeable people; involving informal interview.

The case study of the three Naxal-affected districts of the eastern Uttar Pradesh was followed by a fieldwork: carried out with the help of unstructured interviews to understand and familiarize with the problem of my study. These three districts, Sonbhadra, Mirzapur and Chandauli, are equally backward districts of the region and at the same time have greater influence of Naxalism.

CHAPTER SCHEME

The study is presented in five chapters. The present chapter has introduced the central hypothesis and the area of study, outlining the major focus of study. The following chapter deals with the theoretical approaches and conceptual framework, highlighting the sociological perspectives in understanding the conflict and social change. The third chapter draws up the socio-economic profile of eastern Uttar Pradesh and development challenges, focusing on the factors of growing discontent. The fourth chapter analyses the trajectory of Naxalism and the approach of the State, highlighting the case of Sonbhadra-Mirzapur-Chandauli region. Finally, the fifth chapter concludes with the reason of revolution, introducing further research problem in studying social movements.

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SOCIOLOGICAL IDEAS ON CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

'WITHOUT THEORY, NO REVOLUTIONARY PRACTICES'

-LENIN

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Society is not necessarily presented as a secure and stable site for living a routine everyday life. On the contemporary face of Indian society, one can easily read the outlines of its hidden tensions and open conflicts. Its 'body social' is pockmarked with issues of conflict and competing struggle of classes and communities. This section elaborates the paradigm of the extreme left-wing movements' practice of 'Marxism-Leninism-Maoism'. It figures out the different schools which study social conflict and change in the world of Sociology. In order to understand the social world, the science of society offers variety of theoretical frameworks. The theory in its practice which claims a change in the society is vice-versa, where the theory also gets re-defined in the course of time and space.

Foucault (1982) says "...my...objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." The first mode of objectification of the subject is somewhat cryptically called '*dividing practices*'. "...the subject is objectified by a process of division either within himself or from other" (ibid). Essentially '*dividing practices*' are modes of manipulation.... The increasingly efficient and diverse applications of these combined procedure of 'power' and 'knowledge' mainly, although not exclusive, to dominated groups or to groups formed and given an identity through the dividing practices. The second mode for turning human beings into objectified subjects is '*scientific classification*'. Foucault's third mode of objectification represents his most original contribution i.e. '*subjectification*'. It concerns the "way a human beings turns him-or-herself into a subject" (ibid). This self-formation has a long complicated genealogy, through variety of "operations on (people's) own bodies, on their own conduct." Those operations entail a process of self-understanding but one which is mediated by an external authority figure (Rabinow 1991).

With the Renaissance, new links between the state (formed by the great territorial monarchies that arose in Europe from the fragments of feudal states) and the individual (whose soul and salvation were given renewed prominence as a political issue in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation) gave rise to a new type of political reflection. From the middle of the sixteenth century, a series of treatises on the “art of government” began to appear. These treatises spoke directly of the “governing of a household, souls, children, a practice, a convent, a religious order, or a family.” Political reflection was thereby tacitly broadened to include almost all forms of human activity, from the smallest stirrings of the soul to the largest military maneuvers of the army. Each activity in its own specific way demanded reflection on how it could best be accomplished. “Best”, Foucault tells us, meant “most economical.” “The art of government... is concerned with... how to introduce economy, that is the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family,... how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family, into the management of the state” (Foucault 1978). A concern with the nature of the state to introduce economy and order (i.e., government) from the top of the state down through all aspects of social life. Society was becoming a political target (Rabinow 1991).

MARXISM-LENINISM-MAOISM

The science of society offers broadly two theoretical frameworks to study order and progress – the functionalist perspective and the conflict perspective, fundamentally opposed to each other. The main criticism of Conflict school against the Functionalism is that it overemphasizes order, stability and integration of society, ignoring the fact of social change, which is a perpetual process. Moreover, the justification of stratification becomes a convenient mode to perpetuate the hegemony of the powerful over the powerless. The Marxian conception of society sees the rules of stratification as a device to maintain the rule of the powerful.

Hegel argued that changing people’s consciousness could change the social, political and economic conditions. Whereas Marx argued that the material conditions determine all the other conditions of human life, hence to transform society, material conditions have to be altered. It is the place that people have in existing conditions of society that determines their consciousness. In his major work, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx

propounds the basic tenet of his 'materialist conception of history' – or 'historical materialism or dialectical materialism' as later Marxists termed it – as follows:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations, that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage in the development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx and Engels 1977: I, 503)

Marx maintained that successive generations by their actions build up particular forms of society.

Marx is concerned not about the meaning of history but about how history progresses. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. In his view:

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman,, in word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (ibid: 108-9)

In the existing social structure individuals form parts of either of these contending classes – the class of the landlords and the class of the agricultural labourers. Those who are born as lords may try to maintain the existing feudal system while those who born as serfs will try to change the present system. The struggle of these classes against each other creates history. The members of a class can contribute to the making of its history through class struggle.

The material base becomes the foundation through which human beings express themselves.

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., – real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process. (ibid: 24)

The process of change operative in society occurs on account of the dialectics between the production of forces and production relations:

At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production or with property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation of the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. (ibid: 503)

In Marx's view, the relations of production fetter the potential for production. Revolution negates this negation and frees the forces of production. But once again the relations of production negate the present forces of production. Revolution in its turn negates this negation. This is how revolutionary transformation of society ensues. This revolutionary transformation brings about various modes of production, forming different types of societies. 'In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society' (ibid: 504).

Discussing the reality of the cultural impact of the ruling class on society, Marx said:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. (ibid: 47)

Marx goes on to argue that when class consciousness emerges, the disadvantaged class – that is, the proletariat – realizes that its own and society's emancipation and liberation can be achieved only by overthrowing the powerful ruling class. In other words, class consciousness means the awareness of the need to radically transform society. But this revolution is not a one-time affair: it is a long-drawn-out struggle. The proletariat has to carry on the struggle till it achieves its objective, meanwhile being wary of the designs of the petty bourgeois:

While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands, it is our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. (ibid: 178)

The dictatorship of the proletariat will lead to a classless society:


What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society. (ibid: 528)

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In this process, violence is inevitable:

The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. The more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat. (ibid: 118)

Marxian thought thus highlights that in all societies there are basic contradictions between the forces of production and relations of production. These contradictions result in struggle between various groups involved in the process of production. The nature of



relationship between social groups is one of exploitation and domination. Those who control the means of material production also control social, political, cultural, and religious ideas. Hence, their class interest is the determining factor of social life. Any challenge to this existing structure will lead to a protracted struggle for liberation.

Lenin defines classes as large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people, 'one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy' (Lenin 1977: III, 172).

The fundamental law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions and especially by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: for a revolution to take place it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realize the impossibility of living in the old way, and demand changes; for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the 'lower classes' do not want to live in the old way and the 'upper class' cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph. This truth can be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis affecting both the exploited and the exploiters. (ibid: 343)

Way back in 1921, Lenin had advised the communists of the Eastern countries to work out their own strategy basing on the general lessons of Russia's Bolshevik revolution. He had warned them that they might not get the answers to their problems in any communist book (A CPI (ML) Document, 1986: xiv).

The 1917 Bolshevik Russian Revolution, led by Lenin, advanced the Marxist theory of revolution in two important senses. First, while classical Marxists portrayed revolution as an inevitable breakdown of class society that would occur when objective conditions were ripe, Lenin grasped the point that revolutions have to be *made* with his firm commitment to the 'insurrectionary road to socialism', developed in *State and Revolution*. Second, Lenin

recognized the need for political leadership in the form of a 'vanguard party', outlined in *What is to be Done?* Armed with Marxism, the party claimed that it was able to perceive the genuine interests of the proletariat and thus guide it to the realization of its revolutionary potential. This theory became the cornerstone of 'Leninist Democracy' in the USSR, and it was accepted by all other communist regimes as one of the core features of 'Marxism-Leninism'.

Following the Marxian framework of analysis Mao differentiated five classes in the rural area of China, using as his criteria ownership of land, labour power to work on his land, appropriation of the surplus, and exploitation of the labour power:

The *landlords* own land but do not engage in labour themselves. They live by exploiting the peasants and labourers. They may also engage in money-lending. Their principal form of exploitation is extracting land rent at an exorbitant rate.

The *rich peasants* own considerable amount of land. Some of them may own only part of the land and may lease out land. Their main form of exploitation is through hiring of labour and also through land rent.

The *middle peasants* also own land. Some of them lease land. Some hire labourers while some others hire themselves out. In general they do not exploit labourers but some do.

Among the *poor peasants* some own part of their land and own a few farm implements; others own no land but only few farm implements. They have to pay land rent and interests on loans and hire themselves out to some extent.

The *labourers* own neither land nor farm implements. They make their living wholly or mainly by selling their labour power. (Mao 1975: I, 137)

Mao undertook the two fundamental questions of 'tactics' in relations with the peasantry and with the bourgeoisie. When the militant peasant organizations declare that their objective is 'to intensify class struggle', it is this element of mobilizing and organizing the toiling masses to band together and to resist and revolt against the oppression.

Since Marx focused himself to analysis of the industrial society, hence, the peasants were only peripheral to his purview. From this perspective, he considered the role of peasants as only being a natural ally of the industrial workers in the evolutionary struggle. Along with the industrial proletariat, the peasants were the most alienated and exploited social groups in a society, but their revolutionary potential was doubtful. The French peasantry, for example, could be identified only by the unity of economic interests: they were not politically conscious of their collective class interest and hence were not able to play a vanguard role in revolution. Just 'as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes' the peasants formed a class and remained an 'epitome of backwardness' but did not form a revolutionary class of peasants (Marx and Engels 1977: I, 478-9). The peasants were a 'class in itself', living under economic conditions of existence that separated their mode of life, their interests and their cultures from other classes, but they had not been mobilized to become a 'class for itself'.

Initially, Lenin too considered the peasantry to be more of an ally to the working class than being the vanguard of revolution. He stated, 'the proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying itself with the mass of the peasantry' (Lenin 1977: I, 493-4). But the decisive contribution of the peasantry in the Russian revolution established beyond doubt the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. In the light of this experience, Lenin observed that the peasantry would be attracted to revolution not only because of the radical agrarian programme but its general and permanent interests as well. When the peasantry became more enlightened it would consistently and resolutely stand for a through going democratic revolution.

In the Chinese revolution of 1949, the peasantry played a heroic role under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao, while talking about the peasant movement in Hunan, eulogized the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. On the strength of their extensive organization the peasants went into action, and within four months of struggle brought about a great revolution in the countryside, he said, a revolution unparalleled in the history. The poor peasants, who formed 70 per cent of the rural population, were the backbone of the peasant associations, the vanguard in the overthrow of the feudal forces. Without the poor peasant class, the revolution would have been impossible. Not only did they form the major segment of revolutionary cadres, but they also provided leadership of the peasant revolutionary associations (Mao 1975: I, 24-32).

The Peasant Marxism of Mao Tse Tung

The Chinese revolution is indisputable one of the most important of twentieth century history. The doctrine, known as Maoism, has accordingly become one of the chief elements in the contemporary war of ideas, irrespective of its intellectual value.

Maoism in its final shape is a radical peasant 'Utopia' in which Marxist phraseology is much in evidence but whose dominant values seem completely alien to Marxism. Mao's two philosophical essays – 'On Practice' and 'On Contradiction' – are popular and simplified expositions of what he had read in the works of Stalin and Lenin, plus some political conclusions adapted to the needs of the moment.

In 1937, during the period of guerrilla warfare, Mao delivered two philosophical lectures to the party's military school at Yen-an. In the lecture 'On Practice' he states that human knowledge springs from productive practice and social conflict, that in a class society all forms of thought without exception are class determined, and that practice is the yardstick of truth. Theory is based on practice and is its servant; human beings perceive things with their senses and then form concepts by means of which they comprehend the essence of things they cannot see. In order to know an object one must bring practical action to bear on it: we know the taste of a pear by eating it, and we understand society only by taking part in the class struggle. The Chinese began by fighting imperialism on the basis of 'superficial, perceptual knowledge', and only afterwards reached the stage of rational knowledge of the internal contradictions of imperialism and were thus able to fight it effectively. 'Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action' (Mao 1966: 14).

Marxists must adapt their knowledge to changing conditions or they will fall into right-wing opportunism; while, if their thinking outstrips the stages of development and they mistake their imagination for reality, they will fall victims to pseudo-Leftist phrasemongering. The lecture 'On Contradiction' is an attempt to explain the 'law of unity of opposites' with the aid of quotations from Lenin and Engels. The 'metaphysical' outlook 'sees things as isolated, static and one-sided' (ibid: 25) and regards movement or change as something imposed from without. Marxism, however, lays down that every object contains

internal contradictions and that these are the cause of all change, including mechanical motion. External causes are only the 'condition' of change, while internal causes are its 'basis'. 'Each and every difference already contains contradiction, and difference itself is contradiction' (ibid: 33). The world is full of contradictions, but some are more important than others, and in every situation we must discern the main contradiction from which the other, secondary ones derive – for example, in capitalist society, that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. We must understand how to unravel and overcome contradictions.

'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People', he declares that we must distinguish carefully between contradictions among the people and contradictions between the people and its enemies. The latter are resolved by dictatorship, the former by democratic centralism. Among 'the people' freedom and democracy prevail, 'But this freedom is freedom with leadership and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance, not anarchy... Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end not a means. Democracy sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means. Marxism teaches us that democracy is part of superstructure and belongs to the category of politics. That is to say, in the last analysis it serves the economic base. The same is true of freedom' (ibid: 84-6).

Mao enumerates six criteria (ibid: 119-20) for distinguishing right from wrong. Views and actions are right if they unite the people instead of dividing it; if they are beneficial and not harmful to socialist construction; if they help to consolidate and not weaken people's democratic dictatorship; if they help to strengthen democratic centralism; if they help to support the leading role of the Communist party; if they are beneficial to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

The importance of Chinese Communism does not depend on the intellectual level of its dogmas. Mao was one of the greatest, if not the very greatest, manipulator of large masses of human beings in the twentieth century, and the ideology he used for the purpose is significant by reason of its effectiveness, not only in China but in other parts of the Third World (Kolakowski 1978).

Marxism advances a theory of *horizontal* organization based on international class.¹ Lenin in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, argued that imperial expansion reflected domestic capitalism's quest to maintain profit levels through the export of surplus capital, and that this turn, brought major capitalist powers into conflict with one another, the resulting war (the First World War) being essentially an imperialist war in the sense that it was fought for the control of colonies in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

A further important shift in Marxist theory was the displacement of the proletariat by the peasantry as the 'revolutionary class'. Lenin has hinted at this in 1917 in talking about an alliance between the urban proletariat and the peasantry, but it was more clearly established by the Chinese Revolution (1949) under the leadership of Mao Zedong.

CONFLICT SCHOOL

Another precursor to a true union of Marxism and sociological theory was the development of conflict-theory, as an alternative to structural-functionalism. Social functionalism was accused of being politically conservative, unable to deal with social change because of its focus on static structures, and incapable of adequately analyzing social conflict. One of the results of this criticism was an effort on the part of a number of sociologists to overcome the problems of structural-functional theory by integrating a concern for structure with an interest in conflict. The first effort of note was Lewis Coser's (1956) book on the functions of social conflict (Jaworski, 1991). This work clearly tried to deal with social conflict from within the framework of a structural-functional view of the world. Although it is useful to look at the functions of conflict, there is much more to the study of conflict than an analysis of its positive functions (Ritzer and Goodman 2003).

The biggest problem with most of conflict theory was that it lacked what it needed most – a sound basis in Marxian theory. After all, Marxian theory was well developed outside of sociology and should have provided a base on which to develop a sophisticated sociological theory of conflict. The one exception here is the work of Ralf Dahrendorf.

¹ Although Marx was concerned primarily with analyzing the structures of national capitalism, and particularly the antagonistic relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, an internationalist perspective was implicit in his work. This was evident in his proclamation, 'workers of all countries unite' in the *Communist Manifesto*.

Ralf Dahrendorf is the main exponent of the position that society has two faces (conflict and consensus) and that sociological theory therefore should be divided into two parts, conflict theory and consensus theory. Consensus theorists should examine value integration in society, and conflict theorists should examine conflicts of interest and the coercion that holds society together in the face of these stresses. Dahrendorf recognized that society could not exist without both conflict and consensus, which are prerequisite for each other. Thus, we cannot have conflict unless there is some prior consensus. Conversely, conflict can lead to consensus and integration.

Despite the interrelationship between consensus and conflict, Dahrendorf was not optimistic about developing a single sociological theory encompassing both processes: “It seems at least conceivable that unification of theory is not feasible at a point which has puzzled thinkers ever since the beginning of Western philosophy” (1959: 164). Eschewing a singular theory, Dahrendorf set out to construct a conflict theory of society.² Dahrendorf began with, and was heavily influenced by, structural functionalism. He noted that to the functionalist, the social system is held together by voluntary cooperation or general consensus or both.

However, to the conflict (or coercion) theorist, society is held together by “enforced constraint”; thus, some positions in society is delegated power and authority over others. This fact of social life led Dahrendorf to his central thesis that the differential distribution of authority “invariably becomes the determining factor of systemic social conflicts” (ibid: 165). Because authority is legitimate, sanctions can be brought to bear against those who do not comply.

His argument is that society is composed of a number of units that he called *imperatively coordinated associations*. Authority within each association is dichotomous; thus two, and only two, conflict groups can be formed within any association. Those in positions of authority and those in positions of subordination hold certain interests that are “contradictory in substance and direction.”

² Dahrendorf called conflict and coercion “the ugly face of society” (ibid: 164). We can ponder whether a person who regards them as “ugly” can develop an adequate theory of conflict and coercion.

For purpose of the sociological analysis of conflict groups and group conflicts, it is necessary to assume certain *structurally generated* orientation of the actions of incumbents of defined *positions*. By analogy to conscious (“subjective”) orientations of action, it appears justifiable to describe these as *interests*.... The assumption of “objective” interests associated with social positions has *no psychological implications* or ramifications; it belongs to the level of sociological analysis proper.

(ibid: 175)

Within every association, those in dominant positions seek to maintain the status quo while those in subordinate positions seek to change. A conflict of interest within any association is at least latent at all times, which means that the legitimacy of authority is *always* precarious. The *latent interests* are unconscious and objective: reflected in expectations (roles) attached to positions, individuals are “adjusted” and “adapted” to their roles. When latent interests become conscious it is *Manifest interests*. Nevertheless, actors need not to be conscious of their interests in order to act in accord with them.

Common modes of behavior are characteristic of *interest groups* recruited from larger quasi groups.³ Interest groups are groups in the strict sense of the sociological term; and they are the real agents of group conflict. They have a structure, a form of organization, a program or goal, and a personnel of members.

(ibid: 180)

Out of many interest groups emerge *conflict groups*, those who actually engage in group conflict. In contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf did not feel that the *lumpen proletariat*⁴ would ultimately form a conflict group, because people are recruited to it by chance. However, when recruitment to quasi groups is structurally determined, these groups provide fertile recruiting grounds for interest groups and in some cases, conflict groups. Dahrendorf recognized the importance of Lewis Coser’s work, which focused on the functions of conflict

³ *quasi group*, or “aggregates of incumbents of positions with identical role interests” (ibid: 180).

⁴ Marx’s term for the mass of people at the bottom of the economic system, those who stand below even the proletariat.

in maintaining the status quo. Dahrendorf felt, however, that the conservative function of conflict is only one part of social reality; conflict also leads to change and development. Dahrendorf argued that once conflict groups emerged, they engage in actions that lead to changes in social structure. When the conflict is intense, the changes that occur are radical. When it is accompanied by violence, structural change will be sudden. Whatever the nature of conflict, sociologists must be attuned to the relationship between conflict and change as well that between conflict and the status quo.

Dahrendorf, well versed in Marxian theory, sought to embed his conflict theory in the Marxian tradition. However, in the end his conflict theory looked more like a mirror image of structural functionalism than like a Marxian theory of conflict. Dahrendorf operated [in the presented work] at the same level of analysis as the structural functionalists (structure and institutions) and looked many of the same issues. In other words, structural functionalism and conflict theory are part of the same paradigm.

CRITICAL SCHOOL

In the 1950s and 1960s, conflict theory provided an alternative to structural functionalism, but it was superseded by a variety of Neo-Marxian theories. The basic problem with conflict theory is that it never succeeded in divorcing itself from structural-functional roots. It was more a kind of structural functionalism turned on its head than a truly critical theory of society. In the end, conflict theory should be seen as little more than a transitional development in the history of sociological theory. It failed because it did not go far enough in the direction of Marxian theory.

It was still too early in the 1950s and 1960s for American sociology to accept a full-fledged Marxian approach. But conflict theory was helpful in setting the stage for the beginning of that acceptance by the late 1960s (Ritzer and Goodman 2003). The late 1960s were the point at which Marxian theory finally began to make significant inroads into American sociological theory. American theorists were particularly attracted to the critical school, especially because of its fusion of Marxian and Weberian theory.

Marx spoke of the 'laws' of capitalist development and believed that he was founding a more through-going science of society than had any of his predecessors or contemporaries.

Marx's close associate, Friedrich Engels, regarded Marxism as what he called 'scientific socialism'. According to Engels, Marx showed that the transition from capitalism to socialism was inevitable – determined by causes as compelling as forces of nature. At the same time, it should be noted, Marx's legacy was to some extent ambiguous. 'Scientific socialism' was the keynote of orthodox forms of Marxism, including those which became the official ideology of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. Other authors claiming to draw inspiration from Marx (such as those associated with the Frankfurt School), however, interpreted Marx differently. They saw Marxism less as a science than as a method stressing the historical and cultural character of human social organization (The Polity Reader).

Habermas is perhaps the most influential thinker today with an explicit allegiance to Marxist thought. His ideas, however, diverge very substantially from Marx's picture of modern social development. Habermas substitutes his own theory of social evolution for Marx's historical materialism; and his theory of modernity draws just as heavily upon Weber as upon Marx himself.

The movement of modern institutions, according to Habermas, is towards an 'uncoupling' of the dominant political and economic orders from their grounding in the practical world of everyday life. They invade day-to-day life and denude it of its symbolic and normative content. This process of the 'colonization of the life-world' creates new strains and tensions within modern capitalism, more significant than associated with class division as such. Peace movements, ecological movements and the feminist movements represent various forms of engagement with these tensions and contradictions.

Other leading theorists of modernity have broken with Marx more completely. The French theorist Michel Foucault, for example, came to see Marxism as a flawed and limited doctrine steeped in its nineteenth century origins. Although Foucault's methodological standpoint is very different from that of Weber, Foucault reiterates some Weberian themes in his writings on the modern era.

For Foucault the rise of modern society is bound up with the intensifying of surveillance. 'Surveillance' means the use of direct supervision and the control of

information to create what Foucault calls a ‘disciplinary society’⁵. Foucault avoids use of the term ‘postmodernity’ and was skeptical of some ideas associated with it. Yet his writings have influenced authors who claim that today we are at the ‘end of modernity’. Modern industrial society, they say, has been supplanted not by socialism – which has become a lapsed and failed project – but by a new form of social order, a postmodern one.

French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard speaks of the end of ‘grand narratives’ – the end of attempts to make some kind of overall sense of ‘history’. The theories of Hegel or Marx would be prime examples of such narratives. ‘History’, according to Lyotard, has no definite form; moreover, the kinds of generalizing knowledge stressed as both desirable and necessary within ‘Enlightenment thought’ are declared to be incoherent or impossible.

In postmodern thought, there are no universal criteria of truth and claims to knowledge are always contextual. The postmodern image of contemporary social institutions sees the emergence of a consumer society, replacing the old productivism. The consumer society has no fixed roots and everyday experience within it is influenced by a diversity of sources of communication, particularly by electronic communication; it is and inherently pluralistic order.

Nevertheless, Marxism remains important in critical discourse for the ‘very idea of social science as critique’ since social theory should not only analyze social reality but should offer ways of transforming it in the interests of human betterment. Ideals of Socialism, whether for or against it, seemed the main issue on the agenda when likely future transformations of the current social order were addressed (ibid).

Western Marxists⁶ sought to redefine the place of the subject in Marxist theory by confronting Marx’s positions with recent intellectual developments such as psychoanalysis

⁵ Social discipline, based upon the control of the body as well as the mental outlook of individuals, is epitomized by the emergence of the prison and mental hospital from the late eighteenth century onwards. In these organizations people’s lives are confined, regulated and administered; such systems of control mirror wider processes in the economy and political order.

⁶ Western Marxism, a term coined by Merleau-Ponty in the postwar period, is defined most often as a response to the theoretical limitations of Leninism and the Social Democracy of the Second International. Its origin goes back to Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci, but its chief manifestations were the work of the Frankfurt School in Germany and the existential Marxists in France after Second World War.

and existentialism. They also examined the epistemological difficulties in the Marxist dialectic by reassessing its Hegelian roots and restricting more than Marx had done the metaphysical scope of dialectical thought. Finally, they shifted the attention of critical theory away from the means and relations of production toward issues of everyday life and culture.

The events of May 1968 in France changed everything, because in these events a radical movement emerged outside the parameters of the Marxist parties, providing a political basis for a new critical theory. It signified that an oppositional stance towards the existing society was possible beyond the confines of contemporary Marxist orientations.

During the month of May new groups participated in the protest movement, groups not traditionally associated with the proletariat. The events were sparked by students, continued by professional and technical workers, and supported by young factory workers who were not the mainstays of the Marxist organizations. These groups relied on new methods of action, such as the tactic of provocation which served to reveal the weaknesses of the established order rather than to overthrow authority and take power. They developed new organizational forms, notably the Action Committee which was radically democratic and was oriented toward the enactment of new kinds of social relations rather than toward mobilizing the strength of the revolt.

And finally they formulated a set of demands in their wall posters that constituted a post-Marxist critique of society. The ideology contained in the wall posters spoke not only against capitalism, but also against bureaucracy and all non-democratic forms of social organization. It contested not so much exploitation, but alienation. Its focus was not only simple factory, but all sectors of everyday life. It demanded not so much an equal share for all in the spoils of capitalism, but an active participation and creative role in all social action. For most Leftist intellectuals, May 1968 constituted a break in the traditions of revolution (Mark Poster).

This section broadens the understanding of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism which highlights the point of departure among their approaches on various levels. Furthermore, it accounts for the development of various schools infused with Marxism in the discipline of social sciences.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The Oxford dictionary of Sociology describes social movements as 'one of the basic elements of living democracy, and may be catalyst of democracy and change in authoritarian societies'. The goals may be as narrow as legalizing marijuana, or as broad as destroying the hegemony of the capitalist world system. The means ranges from non-violence to bloodbath and mayhem. Alan Touraine⁷ proposes that 'the concept of social movement [should be] at the centre of Sociology'. Rajendra Singh (2001) writes that social movements always leave their imprints on social structure, and it is task of Sociology to read and assign meaning to those prints.

The main theories which try to explain the structural conditions and motivational forces which give rise to a movement are: theories of relative deprivation, strain theory and revitalization. **The theory of relative deprivation** has developed on two different lines: social mobility and social conflict. The former line of development is represented by Merton (1950) and Runciman (1966). Although the authors of *American Soldiers* (1949) were the first to use the notion of relative deprivation, it was Merton who systematically developed the concept in relation to *reference group theory*. Merton applied the concept to analyze social mobility. Later, Runciman, following Merton, developed the concept in relation to *reference group* and problems of *inequalities* and *social justice*. In this approach, relative deprivation is made the basis of a study of social mobility as occurring through emulation and positive reference group behavior (Rao 1979).

As against this approach, Aberle (1966), defining relative deprivation as a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality, treated it as the bed-rock for a study of social movements. He analyzed relative deprivation in terms of material possession, status, behavior and worth.

Gurr (1970) defined relative deprivation as a gap between expectations and perceived capabilities involving three general sets of values: economic conditions, political power and

⁷ In *The Return of the Actor*, 1988.

social status. The gap may be caused when expectation remain stable but capabilities decline (decremental deprivation); expectations rise but capabilities decline (progressive deprivation); and expectations rise while capabilities remain the same (aspirational deprivation).

The strain theory propounded by Smelser (1962) treats structural strain as the underlying factor leading to collective behavior. Structural strain occurs at different levels of norms, values, mobilization, and situational facilities. While strain provides the structural condition, the crystallization of a generalized belief marks the attempt of persons under strain to assess their situation, and to explain the situation by creating or assembling a generalized belief. Both strain and generalized belief require precipitating factors to trigger off a movement. Smelser's analysis of the genesis of social movements is in the structural-functional framework. Smelser considers strain as the impairment among parts of a system leading to the malfunctioning of the system, and includes deprivation under strain. However, the relative deprivation theory emphasizes the conflict element which is productive of change, and does not consider conflict as leading to the malfunctioning of the system.

Whereas, Wallace (1956) posited that social movements develop out of a deliberate, organized and conscious effort on the part of members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture for themselves. Wallace analyzed the dynamics of revitalization movements in four phases: period of cultural stability, period of increased individual stress, period of cultural distortion and consequent disillusionment and period of revitalization. **The revitalization theory**, however, propounds that adaptive processes are employed to establish equilibrium situations. Although social movements develop a positive programme of action, they tend to be double-edged. On the one hand they express dissatisfaction, dissent, protest against existing conditions, and on the other, they offer a positive programme of action to remedy the situation (Rao 1979).

Rao (1979) claims that the Relative deprivation theory offers a more satisfactory explanation of the genesis of social movements for it is pivoted around conflict and cognitive change, motivating people and mobilizing them around certain interests and issues. Secondly, it offers the best explanation for the change-orientation of movements rather looking at movements as adaptive mechanisms restoring functional unity and equilibrium.

The nature of the changes that a social movement brings about or intends to bring about is a crucial criterion in the classification of movements. Scholars have propounded a variety of typologies to classify movements. For example, Turner and Killian's value-oriented, power-oriented and participation-oriented movements; Aberle's transformative, reformative, redemptive and alternative movements; Smelser's value-oriented and norm-oriented movements (Wilson 1973).

Aberle (1966) classifies social movements along two dimensions: the locus of change sought (society or individuals), and the amount of change sought (partial or total). The four categories derived from this classification are *transformative*: complete restructuring of society; *reformative*: some limited aspects of the existing orders; *redemptive*: to lead members away from a corrupt way of life; and *alternative*: particular traits of the individual member are altered. The first two of these are therefore aimed at changing (all or part of) society; the latter pair at changing the behavior only of individual members.

Mukherji (1977) evolves a classification of movements on the basis of quality of change it intends to bring about or the kind of change that has already been accomplished. These are: *accumulative*: changes within the system; *alternative*: creating new structures; *transformative*: to replace one structure and substitute it by another. On the basis of change in the social system, he categorized the first variety as quasi-movements, whilst those of the second and third variety, are *social movements*. He further terms the collective mobilization aims at effecting wide-ranging and far-reaching changes in the major institutional systems comprising the whole society a *revolutionary* movement.

M.S.A. Rao (1979) distinguished three levels of structural change: *reform*: partial changes in the value system and consequential change in the quality of relationships; *transformation*: middle level structural changes in the traditional distribution of power and in the system of differential allocation of resources, rights and privileges; and *revolution*: radical changes in the totality of social and cultural systems. The changes are wholesale and sudden and are often associated with violence, characterized by class conflict.

For studying social movements, Rajendra Singh (2001) observes that the challenges of *post-society*⁸ call for a post-sociological perspective⁹, a new disciplinary enterprise aiming at restoring the actors to their actions, structures to the processes and the representation of post-society to the plural forms of the new social movements. He further proposes that it is not the total rejection of the classical outfit of the old Sociology but an addition to it a qualitative reflexive perspective in order to understand the subject of new Sociology¹⁰.

Social Movements logically belong to the area of processes having connection with structure and change. As an instrument of social change it emphasizes on contradiction and conflict. The social mobility and change that are brought about by social movements are based on challenge, protest, confrontation, aggression and revolt and it lead to transformation thereby changing the traditional balance of power.

REVOLUTION

To the Hegelian, the revolutionary idea is equated with irresistible change – a manifestation of the world spirit in an unceasing quest for its own fulfillment. Similarly, the Marxist, although opposed to Hegelian idealism, sees revolution as a product of irresistible historical forces, which culminate in a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Hannah Arendt (1963) interprets the revolutionary experience as a kind of restoration, whereby the insurgents attempt to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as the result of the government's temporary despotism. Tocqueville (1955), on the other hand, defined it as an overthrow of the legally constituted elite, which initiated a period of intense social, political, and economic change.

Crane Brinton (1952) differentiated between the *coup d'état*, as a simple replacement of one elite by another and major revolutions such as the French or Russian, which were

⁸ The classical conception of 'society' is in the process of being replaced by the new conception of 'post-society'. For an analytical handling of the conflictual data of contemporary Indian society, the conception of post-society is treated as an assemblage of weakly connected classes, groups and communities sewed up into larger social cluster, what conventional Sociology refers to as *society*.

⁹ The post-sociological treatment of social issues makes reference to history, to human consciousness and ultimately, to their subjectivities.

¹⁰ A phrase used as serviceable synonym for the term post-Sociology.

accompanied by social, political and economic changes. The distinction between two forms of revolution may provide a basis for the development of further classifications. Samuel Huntington (1962) classified revolution into four categories: the internal war (mass revolution), the revolutionary coup, the reform coup, and the palace revolution.

The intensions of the insurgents may be critical to the form of revolution as well as its eventual outcome. If the successful insurgents are ideologically committed to certain goals, then they may initiate changes in the societal structure to effect the realization of these goals. If, on the other hand, the insurgents have no particular ideological orientation, then they might intend to replace the incumbents in the structure of political authority without recourse to change in the societal structure. The following table contains the categories of revolution with respect to mass participation, duration, violence, and the intensions of insurgents.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Revolution

Types of Revolution	Mass Participation	Duration	Domestic Violence	Intensions of the Insurgents
Mass Revolution	High	Long	High	Fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and the social system
Revolutionary coup	Low	Short to moderate	Low to moderate	Fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and possibly some change in the social system
Reform coup	Very Low	Short, sometimes moderate	Low	Moderate changes in the structure of political authority
Palace Revolution	None	Very short	Virtually none	Virtually no change

A successful revolution occurs when, as a result of a challenge to the governmental elite, insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of the political authority. Changes in the personnel of the governmental elite often are the

precondition for meaningful changes in the political and social structure. If the insurgents intend major political and social changes, they must first occupy these roles within the political structure.

Nevertheless, the 'mass participation' as well as the 'intensions of the insurgents' are problematic variables in the measurement at empirical level. Mass participation might range from popular dissatisfaction without direct involvement, on the one hand, to overt participation and active support of the insurgents, on the other. Similarly, the intentions and ideological directions are subject to change.

Plato (1951) proposed that differences in economic interests led to factionalism in politics and contributed to the instability of the city-state. Poverty, according to Plato, produces revolution, meanness, and villainy, while riches produce luxury, idleness, and villainy. Aristotle (1962) also proposed that poverty may be a cause of political revolution. Tocqueville (1955), however, suggested that the French peasant prior to 1789 enjoyed a considerably high degree of economic independence than did the remainder of the European peasantry. Because of this independence and security, those aspects of feudalism still remaining in French society, such as the *corvée* (a form of periodic forced labour), appeared all the more odious and contemptible. Crane Brinton (1952) concluded after study of four major revolutions that one uniformity in the occurrence of these revolutions was that the societies under investigation were all on the upgrade economically before the outbreak of revolution.

The theories of Plato and Aristotle appear to contradict those of Tocqueville and Brinton. The first set asserts that poverty leads to revolution while the second set claims that revolutions are preceded by a significant increase in economic development. James C Davies (1962) suggests that a partial synthesis of these approaches may provide a more comprehensive explanation than either of the two alone; major revolutions may be preceded by steady long-term increases in economic development, followed by a sharp reversal just before the outbreak of revolution. The so-called 'J-curve' or a period of increasing prosperity terminating in a situation which gives rise to demands which the government can no longer fulfill. It is this concept that lies at the basis of the economists' term the 'revolution of rising expectation', which has minimal political connotations.

Further, Seymour M Lipset (1959) has found that the occurrence of revolutions is associated negatively with the level of educational attainment. Lipset categorized nations according to their stability and degree of democratic or totalitarian control and found that Latin American dictatorships, which are notoriously amenable to the occurrence of palace revolutions, are also societies which rank lowest on his scale of educational attainment (Tanter and Midlarsky 1967).

IDEOLOGY

A point that is conceded by relative deprivation theorists is that a position of relative deprivation alone will not generate a movement. The structural conditions of relative deprivation provide only necessary conditions. Sufficient conditions are provided by the perception of a situation and by the estimate of capabilities by certain leaders that they can do something to remedy the situation (Rao 1979). Shah (1979) argues that the theory of relative deprivation ignores the importance of consciousness and the ideological aspects of the participants. Ideology is considered to be a crucial aspect of any social movement. In social movements ideology and the kind of identity the concerned groups establish is an important factor (Rao 1979). According to Shah (2004) objectives, ideology, programmes, leadership, and organization are important components of social movements.¹¹ Furthermore, they are interdependent, influencing each other.

While Marx located ideology within the class structure, Mannheim (1960) considered it as a means of discrediting as adversary. In the context of the sociology of knowledge, his treatment of ideology acquired a pejorative connotation. However, Geertz (1964) lifted it out of this connotation by viewing it as a system of interacting symbols. As a symbolic system it acts as a bridge between source analysis on the one hand, and consequence analysis on the other. It interprets the environment and projects self-images. It codifies and organizes beliefs, myths, outlook, and values, defines aspirations and interests and directs responses to specific

¹¹ Some scholars in USA have theorized social movements as a 'resource mobilisation' model within the rational choice theory. It is a rational action of some 'entrepreneurs' who take initiative of their own, develop mechanisms and structures, calculate costs and advantages of mobilisation. It is a model of interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organisation of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet the demands of the people (McCarthy and Zaid 1987: Rule 1989).

social situations. Thus it is not only a 'framework of consciousness' but also a source of legitimizing action.

Antonio Gramsci (1973) pointed out that the class-struggle is largely struggle between intellectual groups [of capitalist and of workers]. He highlighted the role of hegemony [through political coercion and ideological means] for the ideological domination of the working class. In order to break the hegemony of capitalist class, he suggested that the workers must establish their own ideological supremacy derived from revolutionary consciousness.

The leaders of a movement select different elements of relative deprivation and combine them in a different ways to formulate an ideology. The organizational principles so selected depend upon the objective conditions of deprivation, the way the leaders perceive the situation in the context of wider interacting forces, and the assessment of their resources or capabilities to meet the challenges. The ideology also provides the source of Legitimation of the new values, norms and relationships envisaged by the leaders. It provides the basis of interest articulation and of establishing a new identity. An important aspect of the ideologies based on relative deprivation is establishing identity in relation to other groups. The concerned deprived sections draw boundaries based on the ideology of their movement. While the boundaries tend to be soft with regard to cognate groups, they tend to be hard with regard to their reference groups to which the deprived sections are opposed. The latter is opposition reference groups¹² (Rao 1979).

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Collective mobilization, which is crucial in a movement, is not only related to ideology but to the nature of organization and leadership. Antonio Gramsci (1973) talks of organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. 'Organic intellectuals are formed in the

¹² Opposition reference group implies that the deprived sections do not just imitate the styles of life and adopt the privileged customs of the reference groups, but they attack the monopoly of the reference groups in the use of economic, educational, political and religious goods and services. They attempt to take away these privileges from them. They not only attempt to lower the ceiling of the privileges enjoyed by the upper castes and classes but also raise their floor level through a conflict relationship with the privileged sections. It is not a situation of social mobility characterized by gentleman passing, but one involving confrontation and conflict which is a characteristic of the notion of opposition reference groups.

process of the formation of new historical classes, and traditional intellectuals are those who carried out their intellectual activities in traditional intellectual institutions like Church and the academy’.

Gramsci is of the view that ‘working class’ carries dual consciousness; one is inspired by the capitalist class and other by their everyday experience of life. The commonsense knowledge (of worker’s everyday experience of world) is potentially revolutionary. And to make it an effective force for radical change it requires the development of revolutionary consciousness by party intellectuals.

Leaders are responsible for translating objective causes into subjective consciousness and mobilisation. Many social movements tend to be characterized by collective leadership with a division of labour among different types of elites. Normally, social movements tend to develop a loose federal structure with the central and regional associations being held together by relationships of local autonomy and external links based on common interests. Associations based on primordial ties or relations of production form the over-arching organizational framework for a movement (Rao 1979).

One may identify different levels of commitment on the part of leaders and others, from faith to fanaticism. They also operate thorough the idioms and symbols familiar to people, besides creating new units of organization. Rao (1979) further observes that when the organization of a movement becomes more formal and rigid there is a tendency for schisms to develop and splits to occur: the patterns of rift that might occur during the course of a movement can be due to personal rivalries or divergent ideological differences; other conflicts are based on complementary ideological differences, which generally lead to splinter movements.

CASTE AND CLASS

The concept of class was developed by Marx in his magnum opus *Das Capital*. It was designed for analysing the dynamics of industrial and not the agrarian societies. Later, the success of the Chinese revolution reinforced the belief of Indian Marxists in the soundness of the class approach to the study of agrarian problems. Mao Zedong had brought the peasantry

to the centre of attraction and had made it his mission to transform them into a revolutionary class (Béteille 2007).

K L Sharma (1986) notes, 'caste and class are real dimensions of India's social formation, and by and large inseparable from each other'. In his view, classes are not abstract entities but they are existential structural components like landowners, poor peasants and landless labourers as the upper castes, backward castes and lower castes are also existential realities. Caste and class to a great extent represents the same structural reality. Hence, for Sharma, caste conflicts are also class conflicts as the gap between the upper and lower castes is similar to the one between the upper and low classes.

Further Rajendra Singh (2001) observes that the empirical situation of the contemporary countryside is such that it demystifies the theoretical relevance of social structural conceptions of caste and class, especially at the behavioural level, as these structural categories, in the life of the pragmatic peasants, acquire a remarkably smooth interchangeability.

PEASANTS

The term 'peasant' is ambiguous and used differently by different authors or variously by the same author in different studies.¹³ On the one hand, it is used for those agriculturalists who are homogenous, with small holdings operated mainly by family labour, and on the other hand, it includes all those who depend on land including landless labourers, as well as supervisory agriculturalists (Shah 2004).¹⁴

¹³ Eric Wolf emphasised in 1955 that ownership of land was critical criteria for defining 'peasants'. In 1966, he defines peasants as those who are 'rural cultivators' whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers. In this latest book (1970) the emphasis is on neither ownership nor exploited surpluses, and peasants are defined as: 'populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the process of cultivation'. The category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as well as owner-operators as long as they are in a position to make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown. It does not, however, include 'fishermen or landless labourers'. See, for an interesting discussion on the definition, Henry Landsberg (1974).

¹⁴ See Daniel Thorner (1980). André Béteille (1974) feels that the term 'peasantry' is misleading in the Indian context.

Béteille (1974) further states that in ordinary usage 'peasant' has several closely related connotations, among which he identifies three: (1) The peasant is attached to the land. He not only lives on the land but by his labour makes the land bear fruit. He might be owner, a tenant or, in the limiting case, a labourer without any right of ownership or occupancy. (2) Peasants are viewed as occupying a low position in most societies. (3) Peasants are opposed with the workers. A peasant household in the true sense is one in which all its active members, both men and women, work on the farm.

Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) in his celebrated work *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* questions the revolutionary potential of Indian peasantry. Peasant rebellions in pre-modern India were 'relatively rare and completely ineffective and where modernization impoverished the peasants at least as much as in China and over as long a period of time' (Moore 1967). The Indian peasant, to Moore, is traditionally docile and passive. He further attributed this situation to the peculiar Indian social 'structure, i.e. the caste system¹⁵ and the village structure.

Shah (2004) remarks, that Moore's 'reading on caste and generalization thereon is more textual than empirical.' Moore's contention regarding the 'passive' and 'docile' character of Indian peasants, however, has been challenged by Kathleen Gough (1974),¹⁶ A.R. Desai (1979),¹⁷ Ranajit Guha (1983),¹⁸ D.N. Dhanagare (1983)¹⁹ and others. They argue

¹⁵ In the caste system, the individual's duty to the caste system was emphasised, not his rights within the society. The lower castes were taught to accept their place in the social order, so as to obtain a better position in the next life thorough religious ceremonies and rituals.

¹⁶ Kathleen Gough argues that peasant revolts have been common during the last two centuries in every state of present-day India. She has counted 77 revolts, and further states that a number of movements were led by lower-caste Hindus.

¹⁷ A.R. Desai observes that, 'the Indian rural scene during the entire British period and thereafter has been bristling with protests, revolts and even large scale militant struggles involving hundreds of villages lasting for years'.

¹⁸ Ranajit Guha observes that agrarian disturbances of different forms and scales were endemic throughout the first three-quarters of the British rule, i.e., until the very end of the nineteenth century. There were no fewer than 110 known instances of revolts during 117 years.

¹⁹ Dhanagare argues that Moore's conclusion, 'is not deduced from any systematic theory but is only a reiteration of certain stereotypes of the Indian peasant and society, and that his empirical generalization is questionable.

that historians have overlooked a number of peasant rebellions before or during the British rule (Shah 2004).

Nevertheless, it still remains to be explored as to why Indian peasants could not achieve what the Chinese and European peasants did. Shah (2004) poses the question, was it because of the greater revolutionary potential of the Chinese or European peasants? Or was it due to factors outside the peasant society, which helped the Chinese and European peasants to attain their objectives?

Peasant movements in India are generally classified as pre-British, British or colonial, post-independence.²⁰ The post-independence period is classified by some scholars into pre-Naxalbari and post-Naxalbari periods, or pre- and post-green revolution periods (Desai 1986). The latter period is further divided into pre- and post-Emergency (Balagopal 1988). Oommen (1985) observes that there are certain movements which have continuity despite the change in political power.²¹

The consciousness of the 'community' [peasant]²² also leads to shift and change according to context and circumstance. Hardiman (1992) explains, 'in a conflict between moneylenders and peasants, the 'peasant community' would include all those who are exploited by the moneylenders. Subsequently, in the same region, there might be a conflict between a dominant landed peasantry (a category which coincides with a caste or congeries of castes) and agricultural labourers (who tend to be from a congeries of subordinate castes and outcastes).

Kathleen Gough (1968) identifies the poor peasants and agricultural labourers as having the potential for organising revolutionary movements in India. Dhanagare also takes

²⁰ Daniel Thorner (1956) divides peasants of post-independence into three classes on the basis of 'the kind rights and of services' they receive or offer: *malik*, *kisan* and *mazdoor*. Rudolph and Rudolph (1984) divide the rural population into four agrarian economic classes: (a) agricultural labourers; (b) small landholders; (c) bullock capitalists; and (d) large landholders.

²¹ The classification of peasant movement is based on time span, since it is believed that the agrarian structure has undergone changes during different periods, and that the nature of peasant movements varies under different agrarian structures (Shah 2004).

²² David Hardiman clarifies, 'community' does not mean social group. It is a form of social consciousness.

the same position. He argues that they form 'an overwhelmingly large section of the rural society but have also demonstrated their transformative potential from time to time (Dhanagare 1983). Kapil Kumar (1984) in his study observes that 'the poor peasantry of Oudh emerged as a potential revolutionary class'. T.K. Oommen (1985) also asserts that in independent India the poor peasants and agricultural labourers play a leading role in peasant movements. For Arvind N. Das (1983) also, the poor peasants and agricultural labourers have the potential to lead revolutionary struggles.

TRIBALS

Tribals are ethnic groups, also known as Adivasis, aboriginals, 'sons of the soil'²³, etc. Social scientists have largely followed the government categorization of the term 'tribe'.²⁴ Different tribes have their own cultures – dialects, life styles, social structures, rituals, values, etc. – differing somewhat from those of the non-tribal peasant social groups. At the same time, most of them are settled agriculturalists and social differentiations have developed among them. Their agrarian problems were and are, to some extent, the same as those of other non-tribal peasants (Shah 2004).²⁵

The rebellious history of Indian tribes, on the other hand, has been one of a fight in defense of autonomy and social and cultural freedom. Rajendra Singh (2001) observes, 'the crisis-core, which, in the case of peasant movements, was generally confined between the two agrarian classes of cultivating tenants and ruling landlords, in the case of tribal collectivities,

²³ The 'sons of the soil' thesis of Myron Weiner (1978).

²⁴ Article 366(25) of the Constitution of India has defined 'Scheduled Tribes' as 'such tribes or tribal communities or parts or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of this constitution'. By the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, issued by the president in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of the Article 342 of the Constitution of India, 212 tribes have been declared to be Scheduled Tribes. 'Isolation, backwardness and cultural distinctiveness', of a social group, though undefined in legal and sociological terms, have guided the state for inclusion to a community in the 'schedule'. Later, by an act of Parliament, some other groups were also included in the 'schedule'.

²⁵ Studies show how the tribals have, in course of time, become peasants. Many scholars treat tribal movements as peasant movements. Peasant leaders like Ranga and Sahajanand Saraswati described tribals as aboriginal *kisans*. Some of the champions of Hindutva ideology consider tribals as *vanvasi* or forest-dweller caste-Hindus. While, K.S. Singh (1985) argues, 'such an approach tends to gloss over the diversities of tribal social formations of which tribal movements are a part, both being structurally related'.

shifts to the site of confrontations between the tribe and state'.²⁶ Assertion of social, cultural, economic and political autonomy constituted the kernel of the tribe's stakes, and the adversary used to be the system of colonial governance. Further, Rajendra Singh (2001) clarifies, 'the nature of most tribal revolts was basically *non-class* and *non-materialistic* in the sense that they neither struggled for share in land nor for land-ownership,²⁷ as peasants movements did'. Tribal movements have traditionally been in defense of the *community*, i.e., for the preservation of their social, cultural, symbolic heritage and their exercise of control and power in everyday life.²⁸

The contemporary system of exploitation of tribal societies around forest rights and environment, and displacement of tribals due to development programmes [so-called] of the state and market tuned them to reassert their voices. Subsequently, the typologies of tribal movements attributed by different scholars need to reformulate it.²⁹ By the turn of twentieth century, K.S. Singh observes,

In recent years, with the rise of the international movement of indigenous people in the post-modernity phase, the focus has shifted to self-determination or self-management of the resources, identity, and ethnicity. The environmental movement has focused on communities *in situ*, their relationship to resources, their rapport with nature, their world-view. Therefore, with the growing concern for environment, particularly bio-diversity, pluralism, ethnicity, and identity – all

²⁶ Many accounts of the struggles of tribal groups against the tightening grip of the colonial administration and the expanding political control and interference of the British, highlight the specific nature of tribal movements as different from conflictual mobilisation of peasant movements.

²⁷ The concept of private 'ownership' and legal 'title' has been alien to tribal society.

²⁸ The generic term 'diku' fused the meaning of exploitation and oppression in the meaning of the 'outsider'. The cognitive construction of intergroup relations thus got divided between 'we', the local tribals and 'they', the oppressing outsiders. The articulation of 'we' and 'they', the oppressed and the oppressor, and the subsequent psychological divide characterized by the relation of oppressions, unites the oppressed tribal against the diku, the oppressor from the outside.

²⁹ Shah (2004) proposes the typologies as follows: (1) ethnic movements which include culture/religion identity; (2) agrarian and forest rights movements; (3) environmental movements; (4) involuntary displacement and rehabilitation movements; and (5) political movements around the nationality question for a separate state. He further states, 'not only is there a great deal of overlapping among all five types, but they are also interconnected, and one leads to the other.'

are now interrelated – the tribal movements are assuming a new character. They are all now becoming more and more identity-based movements, with various issues concerning control over resources etc. being considered as ramifications of this central issue (1998).

The forces of development and modernisation further push the tribals into the process of peasantisation. Consequently, it adds a new dimension of tribal struggles against the local landholders. Land alienation, usury, forced labour, minimum wages, land grabbing, etc. continued to be the main issue of tribal movements on the eve of independence and thereafter. Tribals and peasants movements are expression of revolts against the structures of domination and social injustice.

DEVELOPMENT

The first sociological account of development was ‘modernisation’ theory. Based largely on the theoretical premises of structural functionalism, modernisation theory conceptualized development as a staged transition from tradition to modernity.³⁰ Later, it was criticized for its ethnocentrism and further displaced by the dependency approach³¹ in the world of Sociology, to analyse the social effects of development (usually in the Third World).

The process of internal colonialism³² further widened the gap between haves and have-nots. Under the neo-liberal economy, the state is retreating on the one hand, and the oppressed classes have limited ‘political oppourtunity’. For many marginalized sections the concept of development is merely a step towards losing land, income and employment. There

³⁰ To be brought about at the economic level by the operations of the market and foreign investment; at the social level by the adoption of appropriate western institutions, values, and behaviours; at the political level by the implementation of parliamentary democracy (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology).

³¹ The theory of dependency can be understood as a critical response to the *laissez-faire* model of international trade and economic development. Dependency theory was advanced by P. Baran (1957) and it was further elaborated by A.G. Frank (1969), who analysed ‘underdevelopment’ in terms of global network of exploitation between metropolis and satellite societies (The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology).

³² This concept was used by Marxists like Lenin and Antonio Gramsci to describe political and economic inequalities between regions within a given society. In ‘colonialism’, the relationship between metropolis and colony is unequal and exploitative; whereas in ‘internal colonialism’, the relationship between the core and its geographical periphery is also exploitative (ibid).

are of course exceptions, yet overall the picture painted is one in which development for the nation occurs at the expense of the country's poor.

Within a broad frame of dialectical processes, Indian society is caught in a double contradiction. On the one hand, India lags behind the West on the path of modernity and development. A massive chunk of its teeming population is made up of the world's poor and illiterate. Its political and economic institutions limp behind those of developed democratic societies. Its modernity is late and its developmental success is slow.

On the other hand, Rajendra Singh (2001) observes that, without being modern, India seems to be quick to produce cultural conditions of the early emergence of post-modernity and post-modernist struggles in society. Its contemporary struggles are not so much about seeking material gains as such the ownership of land or a share in industrial products, as about the redefinition of norms and values; acquisition of cultural goods and collective symbols; political rights and social justice; and a contest for seeking a public space to act and to be recognised as actors.³³

The universal morality and ethics broaden the consciousness of people. Consequently, many direct actions³⁴ in pursuit of the: quest for freedom; equality of opportunity; and demand for social justice, are facts of everyday life. Rajni Kothari (1960) argued that 'direct action' is inevitable in the context of India's present-day 'parliamentary democracy'.

The general climate of frustration, the ineffectiveness of known channels of communication, the alienation and atomization of the individual, the tendency

³³ The contradictions of late modernity and early post-modernity in India are accentuated by the pervading revolution in the field of information and technology and the mushrooming of institutions and agencies that produce, control and disseminate its contents. Communication not only offers knowledge about universal morality and ethics, and rational and secular knowledge about the Nature, the Human and the World to the rich and poor in India, but also brings, at a group level, a specific form of a narrowly defined localist cultural orientation which is often oppositional in articulation.

³⁴ The direct actions of a group of people confronting authority, in David Bayley's words, it is 'illegal public protest' (1962). Shah (2004) comments, 'the term 'illegal' raises many questions and it is a matter of interpretation of law and the constitution. He further claims that a particular action can be interpreted as 'illegal' by those who are in authority or support the status quo, but the same action may be interpreted as legal by those who strive for social change.

towards regimentation and the continuous state of conflict (which may remain latent and suppressed for a time) between the rulers and the ruled – all these make the ideal of self-government more and more remote and render parliamentary government an unstable form of political organisation (ibid).

Indian society at present, is a strange site of competing conflicts: universal, local and individual. This mix of forces sets people on different paths, and generally, in antagonistic pursuits.

The whole range of key concepts discussed above provides an understanding of various dimensions to explore the conflict and social change in a society. Some of the specific concepts viz. caste and class, peasant, tribals and development are dealt here in relation to Indian society. This further offers a framework to study the social data of conflictual Indian situation. The following chapter draws up the socio-economic profile of eastern Uttar Pradesh, highlighting the developmental challenges. In addition, it observes the condition of Indian peasantry and tribals, evaluating the government schemes to analyse the development dynamics.

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INTERROGATING DEVELOPMENT DYNAMICS

“Revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social and psychological.”

- Mao Tse-tung on 'Guerilla Warfare'

One of the ancient civilizations situated around the river Ganga has been a witness to much continuity and change. This is the land where Buddha gave his first sermon on rightful duties; Kabir took the critical appraisal of orthodox nature of the society. The first revolt took place from this land against the *British-Raj*. The resistance for the status quo and quest for change (for a just social order) are sharp observable facts in the region. The state of Uttar Pradesh has the largest population of the country and it constitutes the largest constituency which decides the power in centre to a large extent. Yet, democracy fails here [for the people] and it falls under the BIMARU state category. The belief here is that every sin can be removed by taking a dip into the pious Ganga. But the belly of river might not be able to absorb the harsh reality of its people.

THE STATUS OF UTTAR PADESH

The status of Uttar Pradesh, which was at its zenith, and had been the centre of attraction of the whole country in the past, has become an issue of serious concern both at the state as well as national level for its present deplorable economic and social backwardness. Per capita income being the single composite index of development, it would appear pertinent to refer to this as a criteria of development in the state. Prior to the beginning of planning era (1950-51) in the country, its per capita income (Rs 260), at the constant prices of 1948-49 was above that of the national average (Rs 248). But ominously enough, it slid down year after year so much so that it is, at present, placed almost at the lowest ebb among

the major states of India (14th Rank of UP among 14 Major States with per capita income Rs. 10289 in 2002-03 against the national average of Rs. 18912) [Table 3.1].

The State's economy is pre-dominantly an agrarian one. Agriculture sector still commands the highest share both in terms of the state income as well as in employment. However, there exists imbalance of a high order in these shares. Its share in the total work force is unproportionately higher than its share in the state's income. A far higher segment, nearly three-fourth of state's workers with a much lower share in state's income, is engaged in the agriculture sector and growing imbalances in the distribution of income whereby the average income per worker of the agriculture sector, with largest work force having to support the largest section of population, is far less as compared to the average income per worker in manufacturing and rest of the sectors of the economy (Jha 2007).

This is not a healthy sign for the State economy that heavily depends on agriculture. As the demand for goods and services, which is deplorably sluggish and discouraging from the largest segment of the state's population, whose mainstay is obviously agriculture and allied activities. Agriculture sector of the state's economy is characterized by predominance of marginal and uneconomic and non-viable holdings less than hectare, which is about 73 per cent (ibid). Availability of irrigation in time as well as inadequate magnitude is considered inevitable for agriculture. More than one fourth cultivated area in the State, even after more than five decades of planned development, being devoid of assured irrigation, has to desperately look for the mercy of Rain God.

The industrial base of the State is weak and there is a general slowdown in the industrial sector. During 1991-98, it grew by a mere 21% against 137% during 1979-91. Employment generation in manufacturing also fell from 2.6% in the seventies to 1% in the beginning of the nineties. Rural industries particularly handloom and handicraft are decelerating and workers engaged in those industries also suffer from under-employment.

Growth rate in the manufacturing sector is not adequate and that too it is mainly confined to western region of the State. The share of this sector in the State income is increasing but comparatively the employment generation has been very low. The expansion of manufacturing activity, barring Noida and some neighbouring centres, has not been

possible in the rest of the state leaving them mostly undeveloped. However, there is a vast potential for the development of rural industries which needs appropriate attention.

Amongst different regions of Uttar Pradesh viz., Western, Central, Eastern and Bundelkhand, there exists a large disparity in their geophysical condition as well as in the level of development. Eastern and Bundelkhand regions, which account for about 48% of the total area and 45% of the total population of the State, are chronically backward in almost all critical parameters of development (ibid). Uttar Pradesh in national scenario lags behind to all major states in almost all development indicators.

Table 3.1: Important Indicators of Development in U.P. and India

Item	Year	Unit	Uttar Pradesh	India	Rank of U.P.*
Per capita income	2002-03	Rs.	10289	18912	14
Per capita consumption of electricity	2002-03	Kwh	188	373	13
Road length per lakh population	1998-99	Km	63.6	85.6	12
Holding below one ha.	1995-96	%	75.4	61.6	11
Per capita net area sown	2000-01	Ha.	0.10	0.14	10
Area under commercial crops	2001-02	%	15.4	24.6	11
Literacy: Person	2001	%	57.4	65.4	13
Male	2001	%	70.2	75.8	-
Female	2001	%	42.9	54.2	-
Birth Rate	2002	Per'000	31.6	25.0	14
Death Rate	2002	Per'000	9.7	8.1	12
Infant Mortality Rate	2002	Per'000 live birth	2.80	3.64	12

Source: Annual Plan, 2004-05- Uttar Pradesh Vol-1.

*Rank of U.P. in 14 major states of India.

POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The problems of poverty and unemployment are inter-related. Broadly speaking, the twin problems have cause and effect relationship i.e., latter is the cause and former is the effect. According to 55th round of NSS the number of persons below poverty line indicates a substantial decline of about 10 percentage points from about 41% in 1993-94 to about 31% in 1999-2000. The corresponding percentages in rural and urban areas were 31.22% and 30.89%. Of the total 530 lakh persons living below the poverty line in U.P., the share of rural and urban population was 412 lakh and 118 lakh respectively. The achievement of the State in this regard is undoubtedly laudable but the relative position of other states emerges far better. The corresponding magnitude was found to be about 6% in Punjab, 9% in Haryana, 13% in Kerala, 14% in Gujarat and 15% in Rajasthan.

It may also be mentioned that number of persons below the poverty line in 1973-74 was 535.73 lakh in the State, after 26 years i.e. in 1999-2000, the number remains almost the same being 530 lakh. Thus, the problem of poverty in the State emerges as the chronic one. A study done by the Perspective Planning Division of the State Planning Institute, U.P. brought out that low literacy rate, higher population growth, excessive dependence on agriculture coupled with a very high percentage of small holdings and lower growth rate of food grains production than that of population are the crucial factors, which have led to a high incidence of poverty in Uttar Pradesh.

Table 3.2: Rate of Unemployment as Percentage of Labour Force

NSS Rounds	Unemployment Rate (Age group 15-59) [in per cent]
27 th (1972-73)	3.75
32 nd (1977-78)	4.33
38 th (1983)	4.71
43 rd (1987-88)	3.73
50 th (1993-94)	3.46
55 th (1999-2000)	4.48

Source: Concerned Reports of NSS

The data depict the increasing trend in the rate of unemployment. Although, it did decline in 1987-88 (3.73%) and in 1993-94 (3.46%) but again increased to 4.48% in 1999-2000. Here, it needs to be mentioned that decline in unemployment rate does not necessarily mean an improvement in the State as NSS approach is directly related to intensity in terms of work, but not wages for employment. There's also a situation of under-employment and from the pragmatic point of view, there its hardly any difference between unemployed and severely under-employed.

Table 3.3: Estimates of Job Requirement in Different Plan Period

(in Lakh)

Five Year Plan	Backlog of unemployment at the beginning of the plan	New entrants to labour force	Total job requirement (2+3)
1	2	3	4
Fifth (1974-79)	19.00	35.00	54.00
Sixth (1980-85)	13.44	48.00	61.44
Seventh (1985-90)	20.77	51.24	72.01
Eighth (1992-97)	16.00	54.00	70+76*=146.00
Ninth (1997-02)	18.00	48.00	66+93*=159.00
Tenth (2002-07)	23.00	59.00	82+112*=194
			*severely under-employed

Source: Concerned Plan Documents, Uttar Pradesh

It is a general observation that there is no work for about 100 days in the rural areas and so about 27% agricultural workers have practically no work. Obviously enough, the size of the problem of under-employment is much bigger than that of unemployment. The problem of unemployment and under-employment when taken together pose a serious challenge (Jha 2007).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGIONAL DISPARITIES

The State is divided into four economic regions, viz., Eastern, Western, Central and Bundelkhand comprising 27, 26, 10 and 7 districts respectively. There are sharp regional disparities among these regions in respect of various socio-economic parameters (Annexure – 1).

The density of population, according to 2001 Census, was the highest at 776 persons per sq. km. in Eastern region against the state average of 689 per sq. km. Eastern region also registered the highest population growth (26.35%) during the decade 1991-2001. The level and pace of urbanization is also a significant indicator of economic development. The 2001 Census figures reveal that the degree of urbanization is the highest at 28.25% in Western region followed by Central region and Bundelkhand with urbanization ratio of 25.11% and 22.46% respectively. Eastern region lagged considerably behind in this respect with an extremely low level of urbanization at 11.78%.

As regards literacy rates, Eastern region stands at the bottom with 55.22 percent as against the state average of 57.36 percent which itself is below the national average of 64.8 percent. Female literacy rate is also the lowest (39.54 percent) in Eastern region. The number of Junior Basic Schools per lakh of population is relatively low in Eastern region (48). Similar disparities also exist in case of Senior Basic Schools per lakh of population.

Economic infrastructural facilities are of great importance for the development of any area. Roads are also a very critical requirement of economic growth in a region. The length of pucca roads per lakh of population is lowest in Eastern region (56.55 km.) as compared to the other three regions. And in terms of length of pucca roads per thousand sq. km. of area Bundelkhand region is at the bottom with a road length of 279.97 km. Western region with a road length of 455.41 per thousand sq. km. is the most developed region in terms of road facilities. Per capita electricity consumption which is a very important indicator of development, was the highest at 186.5 kwh in Western region followed by Central region (170.0 kwh), Eastern region (169.1 kwh) and Bundelkhand region 155.0 kwh.

The percentage of net irrigated area to net sown area during 2000-2001 was below the state average of 73.7 percent in Eastern region with only 69.2 percent and the lowest in Bundelkhand region (42.3 percent). All the regions of the State are predominantly agricultural economies. The proportion of agricultural workers to total workers is highest in Bundelkhand region (78.4%) followed by Eastern region (77.3%) and Central region (72.9%). Western region is relatively more diversified with 66.7% of workers in the agricultural sector.

Agriculture in all the regions is characterized by the dominance of size holdings. The major proportions (83.00%) of farmer household in the Eastern region have size holdings less than one hectare as compared to the Western region (68.80%). At the same time, the average size of holding is also the lowest in the Eastern region (0.65 ha.). Land-man ratio is quite adverse in all the regions. Thus, per capita net area sown is only 0.10 ha. in Eastern region and 0.14 ha. in Western and Central regions respectively.

In terms of agricultural productivity the Western region is the most developed region in the State and Bundelkhand the least developed mainly, due to lack of irrigation facilities. Thus, gross value of agricultural output (1999-2000) per hectare of gross cropped area was only Rs.13,031 in Bundelkhand in 1999-2000. The condition of Eastern region (Rs.19,388) is also unsatisfactory against Rs. 25,572 in Western region and state average of Rs. 21,398.

Availability of banking facilities is also the lowest in the Eastern region (4.6 branches per lakh of population). The credit-deposit ratio is very low in all the regions, especially in the Eastern region where the ratio is only 22.32 percent. The level of industrial development in a region can be judged by the number of working factories. The Western region is industrially the most developed region with 5.2 working factories per lakh of population in 1996-97, followed by Central region with 3.6 working factories per lakh of population. The corresponding figures are lowest at 1.1 and 0.9 in Eastern region and Bundelkhand respectively.

Per capita net domestic product is most frequently used as a comprehensive indicator of development. Per capita net output from commodity producing sector at current prices in 1999-2000 was Rs. 12,385 in Western region, followed by Rs. 9,637 in Central region, Rs. 9,267 in Bundelkhand and Rs. 6,995 in Eastern region against Rs. 9,765 in the State as a whole. Per capita net output in the Eastern region is only 43.5% of the Western region. Thus the Eastern region registers the poorest status of the State.

Within all the four regions there is considerable intra-regional variation in the levels of development at the district level. In general, the districts with a higher urban population are relatively more developed as compared to districts with higher proportion of rural population. Ajit Kumar Singh (2001) in his study has ranked the districts of the State on the basis of composite index of development on the basis of a large number of indicators pertaining to agricultural, industrial and infrastructural development and classified the districts into four groups according to the level of development, that is, developed, moderately developed, less developed and backward (Box 3.1).

It is observed that there is a concentration of developed districts in the Western region. Thus, out of the then existing 21 districts of the Western region as many as 8 were in the category of developed districts and another 7 in the category of moderately developed districts. In Central region only 2 districts were in the category of developed districts and remaining were in either less developed or backward category. In Eastern region, on the other hand, only two districts were in the moderately developed category, while 12 were in less developed category and 5 in backward category. In case of Bundelkhand, out of 5 districts 3 were classified as backward and 1 each as less developed and moderately developed.

Box 3.1: Region-wise Distribution of Districts According to Category of Development

Developed	Moderately Developed	Less Developed	Backward
WESTERN REGION			
Ghaziabad	Rampur	Ferozabad	Badaun
Meerut	Moradabad	Farrukhabad	
Muzaffarnagar	Bulandshahar	Shahjahanpur	
Saharanpur	Bareilly	Etah	
Mathura	Aligarh	Etawah	
Bijnore	Pilibhit		
Hardwar	Mainpuri		
Agra			
CENTRAL REGION			
Kanpur Nagar		Rae Bareli	Fatehpur
Lucknow		Kheri	Kanpur Dehat
		Barabanki	Sitapur
			Hardoi
EASTERN REGION			
	Varanasi	Deoria	Pratapgarh
	Gorakhpur	Mirzapur	Maharajganj
		Ballia	Gonda
		Allahabad	Siddharthnagar
		Sultanpur	Bahraich
		Jaunpur	
		Sonebhadra	
		Faizabad	
		Ghazipur	
		Azamgarh	
		Mau	
		Basti	
BUNDELKHAND REGION			
	Jhansi	Jalaun	Hamirpur
			Lalitpur
			Banda

Source: Ajit Kumar Singh, **Uttar Pradesh Development Report 2000**, New Royal Book Co., Lucknow, 2001.

- Notes: 1. Analysis is confined to 63 districts as they existed in the undivided U.P. in 1991.
2. Districts in each category have been arranged in order of rank.

THE PROFILE OF SONBHADRA-MIRZAPUR-CHANDAULI

The above mentioned statistics depicts a general idea of prevailing socio-economic disparities in the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh and the backwardness of districts in each economic zone. To understand the degree of conflict and violence which is inherent in the structure of society, let us now have a glance on the situation in particular Sonbhadra-Mirzapur-Chandauli districts, which are on the forefront of Naxalite menace.

Table 3.4: Demographic features of Chandauli, Mirzapur & Sonbhadra (2001)

	Chandauli	Mirzapur	Sonbhadra
Persons	16,43,251	21,16,042	14,63,519
Sex Ratio (F/1000M)	922	897	898
Sex Ratio (0-6 year)	936	928	956
Growth (1991-2001)	28.63	27.62	36.13
Rural	14,69,693	18,29,536	11,88,089
(% of total Pop.)	(89.44%)	(86.46%)	(81.2%)
Urban	1,73,558	2,86,506	2,75,430
(% of total Pop.)	(10.56%)	(13.54%)	(18.8%)
Scheduled Caste	3,99,174	5,66,160	6,13,497
Percentage of S.C.	24.29	26.76	41.92
Scheduled Tribe	253	1,302	493
Percentage of ST	0.02	0.06	0.03
Literacy Rate	59.72	55.31	49.22
a. Males	74.04	69.59	62.95
b. Females	44.13	39.26	33.70

Source: Census of India (2001)

The demographic features (Table 3.4) of these three districts alert us about the low sex-ratio in the region as low against the national average of 933. The decline in sex ratio (age 6 +) particularly in Mirzapur and Sonbhadra districts is quite disturbing. The level of urbanization in all the three districts is far below from the state average of 20.78 percent. Chandauli district with only 10.56 percent of urbanization rate lags behind even of the zonal average of Eastern Uttar Pradesh (11.78%).

The literacy rate situation is also unsatisfactory. The condition of people in Sonbhadra is much more disturbing than Chandauli and Mirzapur on this count. It is significant that all the three districts have a much larger population of the Scheduled Caste than the national average of 15 percent and state average of 21 percent. In fact, with nearly 42 percent of the total population is constituted by the Scheduled Caste Sonbhadra becomes one of the very few districts in India where every 2 out of five persons are from the dalit communities.

On the other hand, all the three districts demonstrates a negligible presence of the Scheduled Tribe population. But the reality is that many tribal communities have their substantial presence in this belt since the ages. It is only due to the state ignorance, they have not been brought under the protective umbrella of the Constitution of India by declaring them Scheduled Tribes. Many anthropologists including Nadeem Hasnain (1991) assert the fact that they inhabit the southern plateau of Uttar Pradesh. Thus **Mirzapur** (including **Sonbhadra**: earlier the same part of district, when cited), Allahabad, Varanasi (including **Chandauli**: earlier the same part of district, when cited), Banda, Jhansi and Lalitpur are such places inhabited by the people who are primitive tribes in all respect. The members of the same tribes in the neighbouring Madhya Pradesh and Bihar are recognized as Scheduled Tribes and their condition is better than their counterparts living in Uttar Pradesh. Furthermore, their population estimated about 3 lakhs of 12 Tribal communities and the largest of these, the Kols constitute around sixty thousand populations.

The relative backwardness of these districts in terms of sex-ratio, literacy level, urbanization with significant concentration of deprived Dalit communities and ignored Tribals has to be kept in mind while exploring the causes of the rise of left extremism in the region.

Table 3.5: Infrastructural Facilities in Chandauli, Mirzapur & Sonbhadra (2001)

	Chandauli	Mirzapur	Sonbhadra
Total Inhabited Villages	1419	1767	1363
Safe Drinking Water	1363	1726	1340
Electricity (Power Supply)	927	1198	555
Electricity (Domestic)	530	673	456
Electricity (Agriculture)	341	276	68
Primary Schools	748	1096	744
Middle Schools	231	207	139
Secondary/ Sr. Sec. Schools	54	67	51
College	15	12	8
Medical Facility	282	318	207
Primary Health Centres	21	36	17
Primary Health Sub-Centres	28	54	24
Post, Telegraph & Telephones	341	659	265
Bus Services	194	162	114
Paved Approach Road	878	1002	566
Mud Approach Road	999	1401	1108

Source: Census of India (2001)

A glance at the infrastructural condition (Table 3.5) of these three districts indicates the backwardness of the region. The basic right of safe drinking water is yet to be met for the villagers in these three districts and the situation of Chandauli is relatively the poorest. It is well known that this is the zone of power generation but less than 30 percent villages have been provided electricity for domestic use. Despite the major electric power stations in the

region: which include the power plants of National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) at Shakti Nagar and Rihand Nagar and the other power stations are at Anpara, Obra, Renusagar and Pipri Hydro; it fails to provide to the surrounding inhabitants.

The right to education is overlooked in these regions since the beginning. There is little infrastructure for the educational opportunities for the people of Sonbhadra-Mirzapur-Chandauli. Moreover, it is reported that the figure merely shows the structure of bricks which is hardly functional in reality. They have no teacher; the proportion of teacher in respect to the students is very low; even the teachers recruited on vested interest lack the interest in imparting knowledge to the deprived sections. The regret situation is prevalent at all level from primary school to college, which is answerable for the hindrance in the occupational diversification and social mobility to the youth of this region.

The status of health facilities is much worse which explains the high rate of infant mortality and maternal mortality in the area. There is hardly any preventive measure seriously carried out for the villagers. The case of non-availability of medicine in the government health centres is often noticed. The expensive affair of medicine and treatment compel the poor of the region to stay unhealthy.

It is claimed that India is going through Information-Communication-Technology revolution since the days of Shri Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister (1984-89). But the districts of south eastern Uttar Pradesh have extremely insufficient connectivity in terms of post, telegraph and telephone. The bus transport services have reached only 10 percent of the villages. The villages of these districts are mostly without all weather roads. Although the government is sanctioning huge funds for the development of special infrastructure in the region, it is merely in concern to combat the Naxal menace. Local people doubts whether these are going to benefit them. Only making roads so that the police can reach on time during an attack is not the solution. It may be further added that this region has rich resources and potential to realize through people-centric process of development.

The sorry state of affairs in the region is *raison d'être* for the people to raise their voices against the existing social order. These underlying facts provide the commonsensical basis to understand the causes of the social movement.

CONDITION OF INDIAN PEASANTRY

Mahatma Gandhi's first public action in India after returning from South Africa was to fight for the cause of peasants of Champaran in Bihar. He did understand the unfair condition of the peasants and called the nation for Champaran Satyagraha in 1917. Even after the 90 years of that historical voice there is still growing discontent among the peasant class. They constitute the major workforce, engaged in Agriculture and allied activities.

The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) of the Ministry of Statistical and Plan Implementation undertook a comprehensive survey for the assessment of the situation of farmers in the country during 2003 at the request of the Union Ministry of Agriculture. The survey called the Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers (SAS) was conducted by the NSSO during January to December, 2003, as part of its 59th round. The main objective of the survey was to assess the state of the farming community of the country. The relevant areas covered by the survey were the level of living of farmer households¹ as measured by consumer expenditure, their income and productive assets, their indebtedness, farming practices and preferences, resource availability, their awareness of technological developments and access to modern technology in the field of agriculture.

The NSSO in its reports of the Situation Assessment Survey of the Farmers,² bring out some disturbing facts about the state of affairs in the farming sector, the dissatisfaction of the farmers with their profession, their ignorance about matters most important for their future, and the dismal failure of government and cooperatives and other agencies. The reports also point out the almost complete irrelevance of the NGOs either in increasing the knowledge base of the farmers or in becoming agents of change.

The situation of farmer households in Uttar Pradesh is much disappointing. The following statistics [Table 3.6] reveals the condition of peasantry in India and Uttar Pradesh in particular (adopted from NSSO data).

¹ In all the reports, farmer households were defined as those households which were engaged in farming activities, which include cultivation of field or horticultural crops, growing trees or plants such as rubber, cashew, coconut, pepper, coffee, tea, etc; animal husbandry, bee keeping, vermiculture, sericulture etc. (NSSO, SAS, 2003).

² The five reports released are: Consumption Expenditure of Farmer Households (495), Some Aspects of Farming (496), Income, Expenditure and Productive Assets of Farmer Households (497), Indebtedness of Farming Households (498), and Access to Modern Technology for Farming (499).

Table 3.6: Situation of Farmer Households in UP and India

		Uttar Pradesh	All-India
% of farmer households (<i>hhs</i>)		77	60
% of farmer households awareness of various institutions	Bio-fertilisers	15	18
	Minimum Support Price	33	29
	WTO	5	8
% of farmer <i>hhs</i> with at least one person belonging to	A Regd. Farmer's Org.	1.0	2.2
	A Self-Help Group	1.5	4.8
% of <i>households</i> members of Cooperatives and nature of services availed of	Not members of Cooperatives	80	71
	Members but did not avail services	7	10
	Kind of service most commonly availed	Seeds/ Fertilisers (SF)	Credit & SF
		12	9
% of farmer <i>hhs</i> reporting availability of testing facility for Fertilisers & Pesticides	Fertilisers	Available	2.3
		Not available	59
		Don't know	39
	Pesticides	Available	1.7
		Not available	55
		Don't know	43
Poverty Among All Rural Persons and Farmers (2003)	All Rural	29.98	23.99
	Farmers	37.39	30.73
	Poverty Line Consumption Rs/month	357.75	347.96

Incidence of Indebtedness	% of indebted farmer households		40.30	48.60
Average monthly income (Rs.) per farmer household from	Wages		559	819
	Cultivation		836	969
	Farming of animals		53	91
	Non-farm business		185	236
	Total		1633	2115
Average monthly income from all sources & consumption per farmer household 2002-03 in Rs. by size class of land possessed (hectares)	<0.01	Income	1150	1380
		Consumption	2235	2297
	0.01 to 0.40	Income	1148	1663
		Consumption	2354	2390
	0.41 to 1.00	Income	1278	1809
		Consumption	2831	2672
	1.01 to 2.00	Income	2428	2493
		Consumption	3728	3148
	2.01 to 4.00	Income	3978	3589
		Consumption	4948	3685
	4.01 to 10.00	Income	7974	5681
		Consumption	6732	4626
	>10.01	Income	7850	9667
		Consumption	6776	6418
	All Sizes	Income	1633	2115
		Consumption	2899	2770

Source: Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, NSSO, 2003.

The level of awareness of the farmers about various institutions like the WTO and Minimum Support Price, etc. which is of vital importance, is quite dismal. Only 15% of the farmers in Uttar Pradesh and 18% in all-India are aware of what bio-fertilisers are. Again, 67% of the farmers in Uttar Pradesh are not aware of the minimum support price or where they could sell their produce and among the 33% of them who know about the concept hardly know where to sell. At the all-India level, only 8% of the farmers had heard about the World Trade Organisation and had some idea about its objectives and in Uttar Pradesh the disappointing figure is 5% only.

The very disturbing results were reported regarding farmer's membership of societies etc. Only 2.2% of farmer households in rural India had a person who is a member of a registered farmer's organisation and in the case of Uttar Pradesh it's far below only 1%. The situation regarding self-help groups which have recently attracted a great deal of attention is also not very encouraging. Only 1.9% of the farmer households belong to self-help group against the national average of 4.8% which itself is below par.

The membership of cooperatives in Uttar Pradesh is below the national proportion of 29% (included 10% who are the members but did not avail any service) as well, where only 20% of households are associated and these included 7% who did not avail of any of the six kinds of services namely credit, marketing services, services relating to seeds/ fertilisers, agricultural implements, inputs and consumer goods. The situation regarding testing facilities for fertilisers and pesticides is very serious. In Uttar Pradesh 59% of farmer households reported that the testing facility for fertilisers is not available and 39% don't know about it. The similar severe case about the testing facility for pesticides is where 55% said about no availability and 43% are not aware of it.

The most disturbing finding is that the incidence of poverty in farmer households is higher than the other rural households. In case of Uttar Pradesh this unevenness is higher than the national average of 23.99% (all rural) & 30.73% (farmer households) to 29.98% (all rural) & 37.39% (farmer households) with the poverty line consumption of Rs. 357.75 per month. The misery condition of peasantry is very much unveiled with the reported 48.6% farmer households indebted of all-India 60% households, dependent on the agriculture livelihood.

An analysis of incidence of indebtedness among farmer households given by the SAS brought out that about half of them (48.6%) were indebted and that 42.3% of their debt was from non-institutional sources. But 58.4% of the borrowings were for capital or current expenditure in farm business and another 6.7% on non-farm business. The rest, that is, 34.9% of loan was used for consumption purposes or for marriages and other ceremonies. The state of affairs in Uttar Pradesh is worse where more than half of the farmer households are indebted with the figure of 50.10%. Going by principle source of income, 57% farmer households were cultivators. Among them 48% were indebted. Households with 1hectare or less land accounted for 66% of all farmer households. About 45% of them were indebted.

Wages and Cultivation constitute an important source of income. For all farmer households at the all-India level, the income level of farmer's household from all sources namely cultivation, wages, and animal husbandry and from non-farm business was on the average less than the consumption of farmer households.³

Both income and consumption of farmer households varied with the size of holding. At the all-India level and in Uttar Pradesh, a farmer household had to possess 4.01 hectares or more to be able to meet both ends meet. The proportion of such farmers was only 5.2% and the rest namely 94.8% were incurring a deficit. The situation differed in various states but on the whole a large proportion of small and marginal farmer households possessing less than 2.01 to 4.01 hectares were unable to earn enough to meet their consumption needs. At the all-India level, farmer households below 2 hectares accounted for above 80.5% of total farmer households. It is therefore no wonder that the farmer households had to borrow extensively not only for investment in productive assets but also for consumption as well as for social ceremonies.

The Situation Assessment Survey of the farmers has clearly brought out the rather dismal state of affairs regarding knowledge and awareness of farmers. It has also brought out that the agricultural sector is in deep crisis and that during 2003 a vast majority of small and marginal farmer households in most of the states were hardly able to make both ends meet.

³ Regarding Income, Expenditure and Productive Assets of Farmer Households, it is found that the ownership of productive assets differed according to social classes as well as size of holding. There was only one tractor per 100 ST or SC farmer households, while there were three per 100 OBC farmer households and 5 per 100 'other farmer households' (Bhalla 2006).

Table 3.7: Distribution of class and indebted farmer households by farm size

Land Possessed (Hectares)	% of Farmer households in each Size Class	% of Indebted farmer households	Prevalence rate of indebtedness (%)	Average Out- standing Loan (Rs.)
<0.01	1.41	1.31	45.35	6121
0.01 – 0.40	32.78	29.96	44.43	6545
0.41 – 1.00	31.74	29.76	45.56	8623
1.01 – 2.00	17.97	18.87	51.01	13762
2.01 – 4.00	10.46	12.53	58.19	23456
4.01 – 10.00	4.77	6.39	65.12	42532
10.00 +	0.87	1.19	66.45	76232
All sizes	100	100	48.60	12585

Source: Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, NSSO, 2003.

In India, 80% of the farmer households are engaged in the agricultural livelihood, with the less than 2.01 hectares land holding, unable to make their both ends meet. These large proportions of small and marginal farmer are in constant deficit. Both income and consumption varies by the size of land holding. Report reveals that at the all-India level holding 4.01 hectares or more are only able to meet their consumption. The proportion of such farmer is merely 5.2% and the rest 94.8% are incurring deficit. Though situation differs in the different states of India on the whole farmer household with less than 2.01 to 4.01 hectares size are in the dire condition.

The sources of income vary as well with the size of land holding (Table 3.8). Income from wages contributes a major proportion for those with the lowest size-class of land holding whereas their income from the cultivation is nominal. As the size-class of land holdings increase, it is to mark the shift, as there is decrease from wages and increase from cultivation in income. And it can be observed that the highest land holding class have the

main source of the income from cultivation while small amount from the wages. It is note here that the size-class of land possessed more than 10.00 hectares are only 0.87%, which attest the disproportion holding of property by a few elites. Moreover the other sources of income like farming of animal, non-farm business and their investment in productive assets also vary as per size-class of holdings.

Table 3.8: Net receipts from various sources by size-class of holdings in Rs.

Size Class of land possessed (hectares)	Income from wages	Net receipts cultivation	Net receipts from farming of animals	Net receipts from non-farm business	Total Consumpt. expend.	Net Invest in produc- tive assets
<0.01	1075	11	64	230	2297	40
0.01 - 0.40	973	296	94	270	2390	37
0.41 – 1.00	720	784	112	193	2672	96
1.01 – 2.00	635	1578	102	178	3148	151
2.01 – 4.00	637	2685	57	210	3685	387
4.01 – 10.00	486	4676	12	507	4626	685
>10.00	557	8321	113	676	6418	737
All sizes	819	969	91	236	2770	124

Source: Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, NSSO, 2003.

If we observe the situation of farmer households with holdings less than 1.01 hectares, their source of income is mainly from wages; huge gap in their income and consumption; less investment in productive assets; constitute more than 60% of all indebted farmer households, this size class constitute 60% of all farmer households as well. At the all-India level 60% of rural households are also reported as engaged in farming which is a larger picture of Indian society representing village-India (see Annexure – 2). And if the condition of 60% farmer household (by the size of less than 1.01 hectares holding) is so bad then the future of India can never be expected as shining.

Table 3.9: Incidence of Indebtedness in major States

State	Estd. Number of indebted farmer households	% of indebted farmer households	All
Andhra Pradesh	49493	82.00	23965
Arunachal Pradesh	72	5.90	493
Assam	4536	18.10	813
Bihar	23383	33.00	4476
Chhattisgarh	11092	40.20	4122
Gujarat	19644	51.90	15526
Haryana	10330	53.10	26007
Himachal Pradesh	3030	33.40	9618
Jammu & Kashmir	3003	31.80	1903
Jharkhand	5893	20.90	2205
Karnataka	24897	61.60	18135
Kerala	14126	64.40	33907
Madhya Pradesh	32110	50.80	14218
Maharashtra	36098	54.80	16973
Manipur	533	24.80	2269
Meghalaya	103	4.10	72
Mizoram	184	23.60	1876
Nagaland	294	36.50	1030
Orissa	20250	47.80	5871
Punjab	12069	65.40	41576
Rajasthan	27828	52.40	18372
Sikkim	174	38.80	2053
Tamil Nadu	28954	74.50	23963
Tripura	1148	49.20	2977
Uttar Pradesh	69199	40.30	7425
Uttaranchal	644	7.20	1108
West Bengal	34696	50.10	5237
Group of UTs	372	50.80	10931
All-India	434242	48.60	12585

Source: Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, NSSO, 2003.

In the Union Budget 2008, the Government of India turns up with the much hyped policy of loan waiver for the agriculture sector. The loan waiver plan of UPA government is not the enough to solve the agriculture crisis. Neither in the concern of future nor of the present crisis. There is nothing in this plan which can lead to the increase in the income of agriculture.

P. Sainath, a noted journalist observes that this kind of loan waiver is not the first time in history as claimed. Even in the British Rule, many a times loan were waived and that included the loan given by private money-lenders as well (there was no nationalized bank at that time).

The present loan waiver plan doesn't touch the money-lenders, which is a major part of agriculture indebtedness. Farmers in the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra are indebted as much as two third of their loan to local money lenders and in some places its three fourth of the part too. In true, there is no initiative for these deprived millions.

Moreover in critique to the self acclaimed state scheme of first time loan waiver P. Sainath (2008) put a question mark on the loan waiver which has been given to the big capitalists not for the single time but every year in tune of thousands crores Rupees. The banks show this money as bad debts. In year 2000-2004 banks waived the loan of 44,000 crores Rupees for rich and capitalist class. One beneficiaries of such scheme was Ketan Parikh Group of Company whose loan of Rs 60 crores waived alone (Indian Express, 12 May, 2005). But this kind of process takes place quietly.

He further writes (translation mine) that in 2004, the last year of National Democratic Alliance Government the loan waive for the capitalist class has increased to 16% and since then there is no curtailment in this kind of loan waive scheme. This is, besides the yearly relief of 40,000 crores rupees to corporate sector. Since the last ten years of the yearly budget it remained the same. In addition there are many direct reliefs. 'Tax-Holidays', other relieve and other constitute a very huge figure whereas the agriculture loan waiver is in name only.

The double standard approach of the state unveils its prime interests towards the big capitalist class and paying only a lip-service to peasants, leaving behind the large swathe of the country side in acute distress.

THE STATUS OF TRIBALS

Way back in 1942 Mahatma Gandhi wrote in Harijan (18-01-1942) “The Adivasis are the original inhabitants whose material position is perhaps, no better than that of Harijans and who have been victims of neglect on the part of so called high classes. The Adivasis should have found a special place in the constructive programme” (M.K. Gandhi 1947). Only Mahatma could have the moral courage during the freedom struggle to own up that the society had neglected the Adivasis.

Uttar Pradesh has traditionally been centre of diverse castes, tribes, communities, religions and traditions. However, the tribal segment has been occupying the fringes of consciousness of the people living in this state. It is true that the culture of the ‘elites’ does not fit into the realm of the tribal culture but it is also correct that the so called elite culture has sprung from several of these tribal communities. The cultural evolution, thus, has seen ups and downs.

It may sound strange to many but the fact remains that in only 1967 five tribes were declared as Scheduled Tribes under the Article 342 of the Constitution of India. These were: Tharu, Bhoksa, Jaunsari (*Khasha*), Bhotia (*Shauka*), Raji (*Banravat*).

Apart from these Scheduled Tribes a substantial population of tribes also exists in the state (as discussed above). They inhabit the southern plateau of the state, primitive tribes in all respect but have not been brought under the protective umbrella of the Constitution. These tribes are: (1) Agaria, (2) Baiga, (3) Bhuiya/Bhuiyar, (4) Chero, (5) Gond (Dhuriya, Nayak, Patahri, Ojha, RajGond), (6) Kahirwar, (7) Korwa, (8) Kol, (9) Majhwar, (10) Oraon, (11) Parhhathiya, (12) Sahariya (Sahariya Rawat).

Except the Sahariya, almost all of these tribes are found in Mirzapur (including Sonbhadra district, earlier part of it) district. Their total population is about 3 lakhs and the Kols are the largest of these tribes, whose population is around 60 thousand only. Interestingly, while many of these tribes are included in Scheduled Tribes in the neighbouring states of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, they have not given the same status in Uttar Pradesh (Hasnain 1991).

Further, after the formation of the Uttaranchal state, the number came down to two viz. Tharu and Bhoksa (Buksa), in the scheduled list of the state. However, the list of Scheduled Tribes in UP was revised in 2003 by the Government of India and that included ten tribes with region specific are as follows (Table 3.10):

Table 3.10: The List of Scheduled Tribes in UP

S.No.	Tribe	Districts in which these tribes live
1.	Gond, Dhuria, Naik, Ojha, Patwari, Raj-gond	Maharajganj, Gorakhpur, Siddharthnagar, Basti, Deoria, Mau, Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Ballia, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Mirzapur, Sonebhadra
2.	Kharwar/Khairwar	Deoria, Ballia, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Sonebhadra
3.	Shariya	Lalitpur
4.	Pankha, Panika	Sonebhadra, Mirzapur
5.	Chero	Sonebhadra, Varanasi
6.	Parahiya	Sonebhadra
7.	Baiga	Sonebhadra
8.	Agaria	Sonebhadra
9.	Pathari	Sonebhadra
10.	Bhuia/Bhunia	Sonebhadra

Source: Uttar Pradesh – 2005, Information and Public Relations Department, Uttar Pradesh.

Even though the state included the above mentioned ten tribes into the list of Scheduled Tribes in the year 2003. But out of the twelve (12) tribes as mentioned [earlier] by anthropologist Nadeem Hasnain four tribes viz. Kol, Korwa, Majhwar and Oraon of this region are left out again. Moreover, in the revised list of 2003 the district Chandauli is not mentioned in the Government Order (GO). Since earlier it was the part of Varanasi district. Thus the tribals of Chandauli are still facing difficulties in getting their Constitutional rights.

The Tribal communities could not be assimilated with the mainstream populace. Tribals are being pushed up the hills because of illegal incursion of outsiders in their traditional domain. Poverty ratio among the SCs and STs continue to be much higher at 35 per cent and 44.2 per cent respectively as against the national average of little over 26 per cent. They have been totally by-passed with Neo-liberal development process, invasion on the forestry.

DEVELOPMENT AND DISPLACEMENT

Victims of development – the project affected people (PAP) – add another unpleasant dimension to the scenario of alienation and turmoil. There is no firm official figure regarding the total number of PAP rendered landless due to coercive acquisition of land by the State for “development” purposes.⁴ Scholars have made various estimates. The generally accepted figure (calculated by Walter Fernandes) is that between 1951 and 2005, 50 to 60 million persons were forcefully evicted from their hearth and home. It is a colossal figure. It is more than the total population of majority of the member countries of the United Nations. Among the PAPs tribals constitute 40 per cent. The absolute figure would be 20 to 24 million out of the total tribal population of a little over 80 million.

It appears that the main brunt of the adverse effects of development had to be borne by the tribals who had the least sustaining power. Not only that, it is estimated that of the 50 to 60 million PAPs only 28 to 30 per cent has been properly resettled and rehabilitated. This is bad enough. The situation in the case of tribals is far worse. It is estimated that only 18 to 20 per cent of them had been properly rehabilitated. Thus a vast number of displaced, homeless, landless, and jobless tribals are roaming about as flotsam and jetsam of the cruel development process. They are depressed and dejected, irritated and angry (Bandyopadhyay 2007).

They often protest against the forced displacement. Their protests have taken the form of organised movements in some areas. In recent years, the Narmada Bachao Andolan has been struggling against the construction of the dam which has displaced a large number of tribals. In some places they demanded more compensation and a better rehabilitation policy

⁴ Displacement on account of ‘development’ projects like irrigation project, mines, thermal power plants, wildlife sanctuaries, industries, etc.

and sometimes they raised the issue of ‘development’ which deprives them from their rights over natural resources (Baviskar 1995).

At the macro level, Meenakshi Hooja (2004) gives the account of affected population in 18 major irrigation projects in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and Himachal Pradesh. Where alone, 9.12 lakh people have been displaced of whom 5.49 lakh, i.e. 60.2 per cent are tribals (see Annexure – 3).

Similarly, in Sonbhadra districts of Uttar Pradesh the establishment of electricity generation centre at Singrauli, is better known as the “energy capital of India” for its highest power generation capacity and the construction of the Rihand Dam in 1964. This was following Nehru’s belief that ‘dams are temples of development’ led to an enmasse displacement and alienation of the tribals in that area. This resulted in large tracts of fertile land getting inundated and loss of homes and livelihood of a large number of people. The area around the dam today harbours fly ash and has converted this reservoir into a poisonous well. It has become a dumping ground for the coalmines, 6 powerhouses, industries and their townships. The people located at the rim of this dam are forced to consume the highly radioactive water and inhale the toxic gases which are sounding death knell for these poor tribals. Those who are displaced and are fighting for a fair share under the sun are brutally being punished or else entangled in false criminal cases to the extent of declaring them as “Naxalites”.

LAND ALIENATION

Tribals did not have any concept of “exclusive title or possession within community. Ownership was best understood as mutual respect and recognition of access of an individual or family to a separate plot of land to be used for special requirement of the family” (Prabhu 2002).

The land records are generally in a bad shape, where share cropping is widely prevalent and tenants are unable to assert their rights, or where land has been recently allotted by the government. In Central India, communications were poor, shifting cultivation was practised, and the identification of individuals with particular plots was weak. These factors worked against proper establishment and maintenance of land records. Lands under the

possession of tribals got recorded as government lands and were often transferred to the Forest Department. Thus the poor tribals have become defined as encroachers even on lands which were cultivated by their ancestors. In such cases, no compensation was given to the poor farmers, because their land rights were not properly recorded.

The southern part of Sonbhadra district has a substantial population of tribals living below the poverty line. The tract is dry, drought-prone, rocky, undulating with poor tree cover, and highly susceptible to soil erosion. During the pre-independence period no settlement or recording operation was ever done in this area. Land records were also not maintained. As the soils were inferior and pressure on land was low, people practised shifting cultivation without ever bothering about getting their rights recorded.

N.C. Saxena in his study for UNDP describes that when the Zamindari abolition took place in Uttar Pradesh in 1952, the people in this area got no rights, and most land of the two tehsils in South Sonbhadra was recorded as Government land, which was, in 1953, transferred to the Forest Department, ignoring the existing land rights of the people. The maps of the villages of the tehsil show that land declared as reserved forest under Section 4 of the Forest Act is interspersed with lands owned or occupied by the people in such a manner that contiguous plots of forest land over a large area cannot be formed. A very large number of government projects have been established in this region, but the experience of Vanvasi Ashram, a NGO working in that area is that very little justice was done to the tribals in providing them either compensation or in rehabilitating them.

Extension of general laws and their accompanying institutions to the Scheduled Tribal areas created a hiatus between the “modern” laws and their agencies and the traditional mode of tribal life and living style. This resulted in a conflict between the traditional systems and the formal institutions, especially with regard to the rights of tribal people over land and resources on which they had subsisted for centuries without formal ownership deed or title.

Beginning with the colonial time and continuing in the post colonial era, the intrusion of formal economy with privileged individual rights and individual or corporate profit motive has systematically undermined or subverted the informal communitarian system of the tribals and their livelihood. This crisis has been further aggravated by the recent influx of

individuals and corporate bodies into the tribal domain and their take over of tribal lands and other natural resources which traditionally gave sustenance to the tribals.

FOREST RIGHTS

Tribals lost their control of traditional livelihood resources through several state actions. First is the forest reservation policy which declared forests, degraded forests, waste lands on the periphery and even partly arable lands as reserved forests where human habitation was prohibited. These reserved areas sometimes included villages which were allowed to continue without any right or title and which supplied free or cheap labour to Forest Department and / to forest personnel.

The declaration of all forests as either reserved or protected by the government has further marginalized the people. According to Section 4 of the Forest Act, the people have to be served a notice by the Government in the wake of declaring any forest area as Reserved so that the people can file their claims. However, no such procedure was followed in this region and without settling any of these claims, the land was declared as forestland and since 1997, the Forest Department has been trying to chase away these people using all kinds of methods of eviction. As a result, even today 500 villages in Sonbhadra are part of this dispute.⁵

According to the people of the region, a mafia gang of contractors with political backing and the support of corrupt officials are responsible for carrying out the illegal activities. The unintended consequences of the Forest Act have given the local officials and forest guards an opportunity to exploit and harass the people. Corruption among Government officials and employees is well known, but in these remote areas far from the scrutiny of city-based media and human rights organisations, exploitation of any sort goes unnoticed and the cries of the poor and the marginalised remain unheard.

The further means of alienation was the leasing of forest lands to the corporate sector for the mining, processing industries, agri or forest based business, logging, and timber felling or for tourism ventures. Tribals were denied access to pasture lands and forests which had been providing them with livelihood.

⁵ A Report by the UP Agrarian Reform and Labour Rights Campaign Committee

There were draconian laws regarding wild life protection and national parks and sanctuaries which forcefully excluded all habitations from vast areas notified under these laws. By a sly of hand of the forest authorities local rightful residents become interlopers or encroachers on their own lands. The traumatic reversal of the position from rightful owner – occupiers to illegal encroachers pushed the affected people to desperation to use any means to vent their resentment. In some places this deep human tragedy was compounded by the extinction of the species for which such cruel methods were used. Ranthambore provides an example where with the exclusion local tribals the tiger population also disappeared. The story of Sarsika is not different, either.

In south eastern hinterland of Uttar Pradesh the same kind of cruel methods as Forest Act result in a massive exploitation of forest wealth. Forest trees, sand from the banks of the river Son and stone from the surrounding hills are being removed. Illegal felling of trees has increased tremendously since 1980. In the Naugarh region of Chandauli district, the forest had decreased from 45% to 40% between 1960 to 2001. Illegal mining of sand from the banks of the River Son has resulted in the lowering of the ground water level and cracks in the upper layer of the ground. Further, stones are cut from the surrounding hills for profit making.

As already noted the coercive acquisition of land for “development” purposes has already displaced about 80 to 90 million tribals turning them homeless, landless, resourceless and jobless. D. Bandyopadhyay (2007) asserts that it is not surprising, therefore, that social unrest has emerged in the affected areas. It manifests itself in form of demanding right of community management of forests to militancy. The state cannot avoid the responsibility of creating conditions in which sheer desperation and rage, tribals resorted to violence.

Half way across the globe in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico indigenous people declared in 1980 “we demand absolute respect for our communitarian self-determination over our lands, over all our natural resources and over the forms of organization that we wish to give ourselves.... We are opposed to have our natural resources plundered in the name of a supposed national development” (Barta A & Otero. G, 2005).

Bandyopadhyay further claims that the demands of the Chiapas indigenous people in Mexico fully represent the aspiration and demands of 80 million tribals of our country as well.

FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHEMES

The Plans and Schemes by the government usually fail at the grass-root level due to various complexities. The height of corruption and malpractice coupled with the vested interests of the affluent groups of society become a hindrance to its appropriate reach. The disadvantaged people of these backward districts in particular have many harsh experiences. To understand the problem at the implementation level, let us examine the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY)⁶ programme launched by Government of India in 2001 and its reason of failure to the reach of people in Sonbhadra.

The quick evaluation study⁷ in Uttar Pradesh covered only SC beneficiaries in two districts, Sonbhadra and Bijnor. District Sonbhadra has the highest percentage of SC population (41.91%) in the state, and district Bijnor is close to the state average (21.14%). There were not enough beneficiaries and assets under the Individual Beneficiary scheme for SC/ST in the 30 Gram Panchayats covered.

⁶ Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana was launched with effect from 25 September 2001, with an annual outlay of Rs.10000 crore. The scheme was formulated by merging the earlier Employment Assurance Scheme (the only Additional Wage Employment Scheme for rural areas) and Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (a Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme). It envisages generation of 100 crore mandays of employment every year and gives thrust to additional wage employment, infrastructure development and food security. It is implemented with the primary objective of providing additional wage employment in all rural areas, thus providing food security and improving nutritional level. The secondary objective of the scheme includes creation of durable community, social and economic assets and infrastructure development in rural areas.

The scheme, self-targeting in nature, is open to all rural poor who are in need of wage employment and desire to do manual and unskilled work in and around their village/habitat. For wage employment, preference is given to agricultural wage earners, non-agricultural unskilled wage earners, marginal farmers, women, members of SC/ST families, parents of child labour withdrawn from hazardous occupations, parents of handicapped children, and adult children (above the age of 16 years) of handicapped parents who are desirous of working for wage employment.

SGRY has special safeguards for the weaker sections of the community i.e. the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Resources are earmarked under both the streams for taking up activities exclusively for SC/ST families and communities. The first stream reserved 22.5 percent of the total allocated funds for individual beneficiary programs and 50 percent must be utilised under the second stream for taking up activities in the SC and ST habitations.

⁷ Based on the 'Quick Evaluation of Beneficiary Oriented (SC/ST) Program of SGRY', Ministry of Rural Development by Organisation for Applied Socio Economic Systems, New Delhi, November, 2005.

In Sonbhadra district, the works carried out for general castes have been shown as for SC/ST. Assets created in Sonbhadra district are reportedly not SC/ST specific. Individual assets like sanitary latrines have not been constructed completely and quality of assets is also poor. Village Panchayats face political influence in selection of beneficiaries. Zilla Parishad and BDC members interfere in beneficiary selection. The selection of beneficiaries done by the Panchayat members was not without bias and corruption. The program is marred with corruption, particularly the housing component. For getting SGRY houses, beneficiaries have to bribe Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 5,000. Generally, the beneficiaries were relatively better off farmers. In block Borawal (Sonbhadra), several cases came out that showed that the beneficiaries were not needy BPL of the village, but affluent relatives of PRI members.

Since the *Arthik Sarvekshan* register is prepared by the Panchayat and proof of income in a village is not permanent it is possible to manipulate it and favour one's own people. Thus those who were linked to the elected members could garner more benefits. Sarpanch and Panchayat secretaries are not fully involved in the spirit of the scheme. Their only concern is to carry out the works – maintaining/constructing assets. The prime objective of providing economic asset is ignored. As a result, the assets and works sanctioned are not fulfilling the objective of providing income generating economic assets. The funds of Individual Benefit Oriented Program for SC/ST of SGRY are being used for creating community assets particularly in the interests of affluent members, overlooking the objective of providing sustainable source of employment and income to the poor Dalit and Tribal people.

Another case of the failure of the government schemes result in the series of starvation death in the region of eastern Uttar Pradesh.⁸ This accounts the failing delivery mechanisms particularly the Public Distribution System (PDS) and ignorance or non-compliance in other related development programmes. People's Vigilance Committee for Human Rights and the Asian Human Rights Commission revealed that the state has very high child malnutrition. It is estimated at 51-55 per cent, but it spends just Rs 30-50 on nutrition programmes per child, while other states like Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana spend Rs 90-100, and northeastern states spend more than Rs 500 per child. Moreover it is observed that there

⁸ See chap. 4 (in the case study section 'Hunger Death in Sonbhadra') for further detail, this is one of the reason of discontent among the people of Sonbhadra.

is no proper functioning of Mid-Day Meal Scheme. The eastern Uttar Pradesh witnessed the 62 hunger death reported in 2004 and further increased the toll to 93 in 2005.

The available information on food schemes implemented in the districts of eastern Uttar Pradesh presents a very grim picture. In Varanasi, Sonbhadra, Jaunpur, Khusinagar and Mirzapur, from where the malnutrition deaths are reported, only 31 per cent of the children under 0-6 age group are covered by Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS). Reports claimed that seventy-one additional ICDS projects (in addition to the existing 64 projects) are required to cover the population as per existing norms. Even among the existing 64 projects nearly 9 per cent of the anganwadi centres are not reporting to the Department of Women and Child Development. Furthermore, the staffing in these projects is also very poor with non-appointment of 19 per cent of the sanctioned anganwadi workers (AWWs) and 30 per cent of the sanctioned anganwadi helpers (AWHs) in Mirzapur and 11 per cent of the sanctioned AWWs and 12 per cent of the sanctioned AWHs in Jaunpur.

In the case of employment related schemes, the five aforementioned districts have utilized only 78 per cent of the allocated funds and 56 per cent of sanctioned food grains under the SGRY. Again Mirzapur performed worst with only 39 per cent utilization of food grains. This is despite the fact that Mirzapur is a poor district, and here the percentage of agricultural labour to main workers is 33.78 per cent (as against 21.4 per cent for UP) and percentage of marginal workers to main workers is 3.39 per cent (as against 2.94 per cent for UP). Except Jaunpur in the other three districts Varanasi, Sonbhadra and Khusinagar also the proportion of agriculture workers and marginal workers to main workers is much higher than that in Uttar Pradesh on average.

Though in addition to SGRY, the National Food for Work Scheme was also in operation in districts of Sonbhadra, Mirzapur and Khusinagar, only 7.5 per cent and 8.6 per cent of the funds and food-grains were utilized in these districts. Another fact which is distressing is that in districts of Varanasi, Jaunpur and Khusinagar, women beneficiaries under SGRY constituted of only 13%, 4% and 18% of the total beneficiaries, which is much

below the norm of 30 per cent, which is the proportion of reservation for women in employment schemes.⁹

However, the seriousness of the depressed face has been outlined time to time by the concerned activists. The hard fact of increasing number of hunger deaths due to failure of the government schemes and unfair implementation received the attention of civil society and media. Unfortunately, single acts of charity by the state do nothing to alleviate long-term conditions of poverty and hunger caused by malpractices of government officers and centuries-old social inequities. In this case it is necessary to ensure that the tribals and other deprived communities of the region obtain viable land for cultivation and other support needed to ensure its productivity. This in turn requires consistent monitoring and commitment to the principles of social justice on the part of the state. Nonetheless, it also requires the cooperation of other privileged sections of the society.

The present chapter has sketched the development dynamics of universe of the study. The backwardness of the state Uttar Pradesh in national scenario with the existing both inter and intra-regional disparities is quite unhealthy. The miserable condition of the peasant class and tribals who are continuously on the margins add another dark side of the society. Moreover, the failed development programmes aggravate the agony among the people of eastern Uttar Pradesh. This background helps to understand the reason of unending Naxalism and its growing tentacles in the eastern Uttar Pradesh. The following chapter analyses it, in detail with the case study of Sonbhadra, Mirzapur and Chandauli districts. It also attempts to observe the course of extreme left-wing movement since its outbreak in Naxalbari. This also points out the approach of the Indian state in tackling naxal problem.

⁹ From the letters of the Indian Supreme Court Commissioner on the right to food to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, 'Non-compliance of Uttar Pradesh government with Supreme Court orders, Hungercomp/311/UP, Dated: 05.06.2005', as posted by AHRC for an Urgent Appeal-Hunger Alert.

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NAXALISM IN EASTERN UTTAR PRADESH

ANYONE CHALLENGING THE ESTABLISHED FEUDAL PRACTICES IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE IS BY DEFAULT BRANDED A NAXALITE.

The genesis of Naxalism in Eastern Uttar Pradesh can be traced to Charu Mazumdar's assessment that "every corner of India is like a volcano" about to erupt. His message was "expand anywhere and everywhere"; such expansions were particularly noticed in Palia and Lakhimpur district of Uttar Pradesh (Singh 2007: 24), mainly frequent in the hilly terrain which is now part of the Uttarakhand.

The Naxalites have been active in the eastern part of the state since 1969. The then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh C B Gupta accepting their presence in different parts of the state, attributed their activities to the irregularities and injustices committed by some village headmen in the distribution of land. Although the government realised it as a socio-economic problem, it treated the issue as a law and order problem by deploying armed constabulary (PAC) squad to curb the activities of Naxals (Nayak 2004).

Particularly, the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh, which in past had unheard of naxal activities, has in recent years proved to be the breeding grounds. Caste conflicts and social unrest have been going on for ages but it is only now, since the early years of the twenty first century that Naxalite activities are more visible.

The recent spurt of naxal activities can be traced back to the ill-fated day of 9th March, 2001 in Bhavanipur; a remote village in south-eastern hinterland of this biggest state of India. This day witnessed the cold blooded rapacious killing of 16 rural poor militants and innocents by the police most of whom were tribals and dalits. The *raison d'être* for this killing according to the police and the local administration was that these people were naxalites and had been a constant source of menace and posed a threat to the law and order situation in the area (see p.114).

According to a long time observer and analyst of the Naxal movement in India, Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty (2005), the Naxalite challenge rests upon i) the issues of agrarian transformation, ii) tribal people's rights, iii) the nationality movement, and iv) resisting imperialism and globalization. Because of the issues they pursue, the Naxalites have a social base which sustains them despite a variety of repressive measures pursued by the state. He stresses that "In fact, over the past decade the movement has spread to new areas such as southern districts of Orissa and West Bengal as well as parts of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan".

Another incident from 16th to 18th May, 2001 in Narketi: a village surrounded by hilly dense forest, located in Eastern Uttar Pradesh. A majority of people here are *adivasis* (tribals) and backward castes, engaged in collection of *tendu patta* (leaves used for the making of *beedi* or indigenous cigarettes) honey, dry twigs and herbs, to make the two ends meet. On May 16th few members of MCC held meeting with the villagers concerning their low wages and non-payment of dues for collecting *tendu* leaves.

The police getting wind of this meeting entered the village. There were several rounds of firing. Though the police was forced to retreat and the MCC activists took to the jungles, it was not the end of the battle. Large scale police violence took place in the nearby village; people were randomly beaten up and innocent were picked up and put into custody. On 17th May two dead bodies of Forest Department employees were found near Narketi. The following day i.e. 18 May 2001, the police, PAC, CRPF swooped down on the village in large numbers. The brutality unleashed by them cannot be measured in words. While beating the people, the police rebuked them for holding a meeting with the "Naxalites" (see p.110).

Uttar Pradesh has witnessed stirrings of Naxalite activities in the eastern belt in Sonbhadra, Gorakhpur, Ghazipur, Ballia, Chandauli and Mirzapur districts (Singh 2007). According to Nihar Nayak (2004), the Naxals have influence over Sonbhadra Mirzapur and Chandauli districts in Uttar Pradesh, while Gorakhpur, Ghazipur and Ballia are targeted as potential district to be brought under their influence. He further points out that at least seven districts of the state are connected to Maoist affected regions of Nepal and another seven with Bihar. Other estimates that eight districts of Uttar Pradesh are under Maoist influence besides the Sonbhadra-Mirzapur-Chandauli districts which are in the forefront; the other five districts are Ghazipur, Mau, Ballia, Deoria and Kushi Nagar.

Latest update alerts that Chitrakoot district is all set to emerge as second Sonbhadra – in Naxal domination, both having similar topography. “Left wing extremism” has made inroads into different parts of eastern Uttar Pradesh, including Allahabad and its surrounding areas, Home Secretary Mahesh Gupta also admitted (Indian Express, June 16, 2008). Naxals are trying to garner support from the people by raising slogans like ‘*Jal, Jangal Aur Jamin — Hamari Hai* (Water, Forest and Land belong to us).

The prevailing discontent and state apathy is the *raison d'être* for the left-wing extremism to uphold the legitimacy among people of the land. On November 20, 2004 Naxalites blew up the combing Police and Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) with a landmine, killing seventeen (13 PAC and 4 Police) personnel in Chandauli district. This incident was first major attack on security forces in India after the merger of two dreaded left wing extremist outfits, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG). The growing influence of the newly formed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), the Naxal outfit, along the Uttar Pradesh's eastern borders and the rapidity with which they are expanding their organisation in the State is undoubtedly alarming.

M.S.A. Rao (1979) suggests that any social movement tends to develop an event structure over a period of time. A past event influences the choice of strategy in the events that follow in the context of interaction with other groups and opposition reference groups. Occasionally, an event within a movement gets connected with an event or events that occur elsewhere. A set of events centred around an issue constitutes a phase, and the course of a movement consists of several phases. It would be necessary not only to identify these events and phases but also to analyse why a movement takes a particular course and not another in the context of relevant alternatives.

In the light of this, the following section traces the genesis, phases and the course of Naxalism.

THE NAXALISM IN INDIA: SINCE THE 'SPRING THUNDER'

Naxalism or the Naxalite movement is called after the village of Naxalbari – a place on the north-eastern tip of India situated in the state of West Bengal, where the movement originated in May 1967, and had a fiery mix of committed ideologues as well as local brigands. Driven by Mao Tse-tung's ideology for peasant revolution, these insurgents were a direct outcome of class struggle in India where extreme poverty exists side by side with dazzling islands of wealth and prosperity.

The Naxalbari peasant revolt owes its origin to the dying waves of *tebhaga* movement in Bengal in the forties. In an agrarian system, which had evolved from a *feudal jotedari system* to a *semi-feudal jotedari-adhiari system* in the context of money market forces, a small group of communist cadres inspired by the *tebhaga* struggle, began systematically unweiling the contradictions between labour and capital that was increasing the burden of exploitation on the poor and marginal peasants. Over a period of time numerous struggles against such exploitation led to the emergence of a strong *Krishak Sabha* with increasing membership. Interestingly enough, it is the peasant leadership that initiated the unionization of the plantation labour, which constitutes nearly 30 percent of the population in that area. The unionization of plantation labour was considered necessary not merely for the plantation labour but also for the peasant struggle. There developed, since the mid-fifties an alliance between the peasants and workers which is remarkable in as much as it was unique. Naxalbari struggle like the *tebhaga* is yet another instance of the use of non-institutionalised means for securing intra-systematic changes (Rao 1979).

Applying the Path of Maoist People's War

Before Naxalbari, the communist movement in India was dominated by revisionism (phony communism). The revolutionary internationalist journal *A World to Win* (1987/9) explained that 'The Communist Party of India (CPI) had long before abandoned even the pretext of revolution in favour of the 'parliamentary road' to power. Under the pressure of the criticism of revisionism begun by Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China in the early 1960s, a section of cadres and members of the CPI had split off and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPM. In West Bengal, especially, a great number of

genuine revolutionaries took part in the formation of the CPM as a result of the latter's vocal criticism of the CPI revisionist leaders'.

The CPM even took control of the state government in West Bengal. But as *A World to Win* pointed out that 'it soon became apparent that the CPM itself had not really broken with revisionism. On an international plane, the CPM tried to steer a 'middle road' between Soviet revisionism and the Marxist-Leninist line that was represented at the time by the Communist Party of China... On the practical front the CPM was content to uphold the necessity of armed struggle in words while making the 'tactic' of participating in the parliamentary arena its actual main focus of work'.

It was in this context that in 1965, Charu Mazumdar began developing a revolutionary opposition to the revisionist CPM leadership. He began training the cadre of the Darjeeling district committee of the CPM in a radically different line. In his writings, Mazumdar stressed that the revolution in India must follow the path charted by Mao for revolution in oppressed countries – the path of protracted people's war and surrounding the cities from the countryside (Revolutionary Worker, 1997).

The armed Communist revolutionaries, who two years later were to form a party – the CPI(M-L), or the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). Under the leadership of their ideologue, a 49-year old Communist, Charu Mazumdar, they defined the objective of the new movement as 'seizure of power through an agrarian revolution'. The strategy was the elimination of the feudal order in the Indian countryside to free the poor from the clutches of the oppressive landlords and replace the old order with an alternative one that would implement land reforms. The tactics to achieve it was through guerilla warfare by the peasants to eliminate the landlords and build up resistance against the state's police force which came to help the landlords, and thus gradually set up 'liberated zones' in different parts of the country that would eventually coalesce into a territorial unit under Naxalite hegemony – *a la* Yenan of China!

The Outbreak of Armed Struggle

The result of the revolutionary line was the outbreak of armed struggle in Naxalbari in the spring of 1967. Sumanta Banerjee (1980) described it, 'from March 1967 to April 1967 all the villages were organized. From 15,000 to 20,000 peasants were enrolled as whole-time activists. Peasants' committees were formed in every village and they were transformed into armed guards. They soon occupied land in the name of the peasants' committees, burnt all the land records 'which had been used to cheat them of their due', canceled all hypothecary debts [mortgages], passed death sentences on oppressive landlords, formed armed bands by looting guns from the landlords, armed themselves with conventional weapons like bows and arrows and spears, and set up a parallel administration to look after the villages....

'By May that year, the rebels could claim as their strongholds Hatighisa under the Naxalbari police station, Buraganj under the Kharibari police station and Chowpukhuria under Phansidew police station, where no outsider could enter without their permission'.

For few liberating months, the old way in Naxalbari was driven out by the Spring thunder. In the villages, revolutionary mass organization of peasants held political power, administering affairs according to their revolutionary interests under the leadership of communist revolutionaries. In July, the government's military encirclement and suppression campaign finally snatched back the political power that the masses had seized. But the Naxalbari uprising sparked a revolutionary movement that flared throughout India.

The fact is that despite the continuing use of the most repressive methods by the police to crush its cadres and in spite of a series of splits that had fissured the movement – during the last three or four decades, Naxalism as an ideology has become a force to reckon with in India. Its continuity can be explained by the persistence and exacerbation of the basic causes that gave it birth – feudal exploitation and oppression over the rural poor (who constitute the majority of the Indian people), and the Indian state's repressive policies to silence them whenever they protest.

Global Impulse

The birth and development of the Naxalite movement under the leadership of the CPI (M-L) should also be located in the contemporary global context of the 1960s.

This was the period in Europe, Asia and America, when new radical struggles were breaking out, marked by the rereading of Marx, the rediscovery of the sources of revolutionary humanism and the revival of the ideals that inspired individual courage and the readiness to sacrifice for a cause. These trends were reflected in the national liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people; in the civil rights and anti-war movements in the USA; in the students' agitations in Western Europe; in Che Guevara's self-sacrifice in the jungles of Bolivia in pursuit of the old dream of international solidarity of all revolutionaries; and in China's Cultural Revolution which, in spite of being derailed by excesses, errors and crimes committed in the name of 'class-struggle', initially began as a campaign for putting an end to bureaucratic authoritarianism and transforming the individual.

The Naxalite movement was a part of this contemporary, worldwide impulse among radicals to return to the roots of revolutionary idealism. In the Indian context, it took the form of going back to the source of all revolutions in the Third World – the peasantry, which had a long tradition of fighting against imperialism and feudalism. The Naxalite leaders drew inspiration from the Indian peasant jacqueries of the 18th and 19th centuries (which were directed against the British colonialists and their Indian landed agents), and the more modern organized armed peasants' struggles led by Communists in Telengana in south India in the late 1940s, as well as the contemporary Vietnamese war of liberation and other global demonstrations of protest.

Spread of Revolutionary Idea

Ironically enough, although the uprising in Naxalbari in May 1967 was crushed by the police within two months, the Naxalite ideology gained rapid currency in other parts of West Bengal and India within a few years. By the early 1970s, the Naxalite movement had spread from far-flung areas like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala in the south, to Bihar in the east, and Uttar Pradesh and Punjab in the north. Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh in particular became a mini-'liberated zone' for a brief spell, when Naxalite guerillas drove out the landlords, and

set up alternative institutions of administration in several hundreds of villages. In parts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the Naxalites succeeded in mobilizing the peasantry to recover lands that they had lost to the moneylender-cum-landlord class (to whom they had mortgaged their properties in lieu of money) and carry their harvested crops to their homes. In Punjab rich landlords and policemen were targeted by bands of Naxalites. In West Bengal itself - the birthplace of the Naxalite movement – armed peasants' struggles broke out in Midnapur and Birbhum, where some villages passed over to total Naxalite control during the 1969-70 period. Incidentally, in Andhra Pradesh and in West Bengal, the Naxalites found their main support among the aboriginal tribal communities, who had been the most oppressed and marginalized in Indian society – the *Girijans* in Andhra Pradesh and the *Santhals* in West Bengal.

While the Indian countryside saw extensive guerilla actions, Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) in West Bengal, became the center of Naxalite urban violence from the beginning of the 1970s. Young cadres of the CPI (M-L) targeted police personnel and political rivals. They planned to build up an arsenal by mass scale snatching of arms and ammunition from police stations. These youth were mainly middle class Bengali students who had been inspired by the Naxalite ideology of agrarian revolution. Some went to the villages, lived and worked with the rural poor among whom they propagated the Naxalite ideology, fought shoulder to shoulder with them against the police, and laid down their lives. Those who remained in Calcutta hoped to supplement the rural movement with such violent urban actions that would keep the police and para-military forces fully bogged down in Calcutta, and thus cripple their capacity to intervene in the rural areas. But they underestimated the military strength of the Indian state.

State Action

The situation was alarming enough for the Indian government to investigate into its causes. It set up a committee to compile a report. Prepared in 1969, and entitled '*The Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian Tensions*', the report acknowledged that '*The basic cause of unrest, namely, the defective implementation of laws enacted to protect the interests of the tribals, remains... It further added, 'unless this is attended to, it would not be possible to win the confidence of the tribals whose leadership has been taken over by the extremists.'*

(emphasis added). The term *extremist* is still being used by the Indian officials to describe the Naxalites, or any one resorting to armed resistance against the Indian government.

The police and bureaucrats of at least eight Indian states (Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, which comprise a large chunk of the Indian land mass, and accounts for more than half of the Indian population), met at regular intervals to devise ways and means to check the armed guerillas who operate in a narrow belt of Naxalite pockets that stretches across these states.

Instead of fully implementing land reforms to alleviate their grievances – as suggested by many impartial observers as well as its own previously mentioned committee of 1969 – the Indian government chose the simplistic path of military suppression of peasant grievances. It unleashed a reign of terror on the Naxalite bases and the villagers who supported them. In Srikakulam, para-military forces swooped down upon *Girijan* villages, arrested thousands of young tribals, captured and killed their Naxalite leaders, and resorted to the policy of setting up ‘strategic hamlets’ (as the US did in Vietnam) where entire tribal villages were removed, so that the mass base of the CPI(M-L) could be dispersed. In Birbhum in West Bengal, the Indian army was deployed to encircle the Naxalite-controlled villages, close in and kill the leaders. Thousands of their *Santhal* tribal followers were thrown behind bars.

Split in Left Revolutionary Organization

Apart from the state repression, several splits within the Naxalite movement in the 1970s weakened its capacity to resist the police and army offensive. Many among Charu Mazumdar’s comrades and followers became critical of his tactics of assassination of individual ‘class enemies’, his indifference to mass fronts like trade unions (that led to the isolation of the Naxalites from the industrial workers), and the growing bureaucratization of the party organization. As a result, the CPI(M-L) split into several factions – often fighting among themselves. This fragmentation in the Naxalite ranks helped the Indian state to suppress them – for the time being.

Activists Behind the Bar during Emergency & Voices from Intellectual and Human Rights Organization

By 1972, the Indian state had succeeded in defeating the Naxalite rebellion to some extent – its main trophy being the capture of the ideologue Charu Mazumdar from a Calcutta hideout on July 16, 1972. Mazumdar died in police custody 12 days after his arrest – raising suspicions about the treatment meted out to him by the police. The movement continued even after his death – with sporadic battles between the police and the Naxalites in far-flung villages in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and other states. But it faced increasing repression from the state. By 1973, the number of Naxalite activists and supporters held in different jails all over India had swelled to 32,000.

News of their ill-treatment compelled more than 300 academics from all over the world including Noam Chomsky and Simone de Beauvoir to sign a note protesting against the Indian government's violation of prison rules, and send it to New Delhi on August 15, 1974 – the 27th anniversary of India's Independence Day. A month later, Amnesty International released a damning report, listing cases of illegal detention and torture of Naxalite prisoners in Indian jails. Such attempts by academics and human rights organizations – whether in India and abroad – to highlight the plight of these prisoners, were soon snuffed out by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, when she declared Emergency on June 26, 1975, which imposed censorship on publication of news, apart from clamping down upon public demonstrations of protest. With military suppression of their bases in the villages, dissemination of their leaders by the police, dissensions within their ranks, and choked out from any democratic avenue of expressing their grievances, the Naxalites reached the end of a phase of their movement in the late 1970s.

Post-Emergency

It was only after the lifting of the Emergency and the coming to power of the Janata Party (an alliance of non-Congress and anti-Indira Gandhi parties) at the Centre in New Delhi after the 1977 elections, and following a wide scale movement organized by various human rights groups in India and abroad, that the Naxalites were released from jails. The different Naxalite factions and their leaders found an opportunity to meet and chart out their new path

of action in the light of their past experiences. Although committed to the original strategy of eliminating the feudal order in rural India, they parted ways on the question of tactics – one group of followers deciding to lay stress on the parliamentary path of elections (e.g. the Liberation group of the CPI - M-L, concentrated in Bihar), and the others preferring to go back to the path of guerilla warfare, like the PWG – People’s War Group - in Andhra Pradesh, and MCC - Maoist Communist Centre - in Bihar. During the last two decades since the 1980s, these two different streams of the Naxalite movement drifted along with their respective tactics – often fighting among themselves.

During this period, it was these armed groups which have emerged as the main challenge to the Indian state. They had also expanded their area of operations (from their old pockets in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s) to new guerilla zones in other states like Orissa, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in the new millennium. Their main support base in these states were the poorest and the most deprived classes – the landless and tribal people who are ousted from their homes by up-coming industrial projects, are being denied access to their traditional forest resources, regularly exploited by landowners and money lenders and persecuted by the police, and who continue to suffer from non-availability of education and health facilities in their far-flung and inaccessible villages.

Sumanta Banerjee (1980) observes, ‘The small peasants, to begin with, were gradually being pauperised. They were too poor to feed themselves, let alone the soil, which needed inputs like irrigation and fertilizers that were too expensive for the subsistence peasants. At first they mortgaged their small plots to the big landlords, and later had to sell them, reducing themselves to the position of tenants or sharecroppers.

‘Dispossessed of the land, and reduced to a tenant, the erstwhile small peasant now entered an even more precarious stage of existence. In many states, his rights were not even nominally defined by law, and the rent he had to pay to the big landlord was exorbitant, ranging between one-half and two-thirds of the crop he produced. In some places, it was as high as 70-80 percent of the crop....

‘Forms of exploitation of the tenants were varied. ‘Begar’ or forced work for the landlord's private chores, and imposition of levies on the tenants to make them bear the costs of ceremonies in their employer’s house on special occasions, were fairly common in the countryside.

‘But at the lowest rung of the rural hierarchy were the rural laborers or landless peasants.... Besides poverty, the rural poor also suffered from social exploitation and oppression, since a large number of them also belonged to lower castes [a form of class and social division in India] and the aboriginal community....’

Dalits are still living in segregated communities. Their locality has no modern facilities with regard to education, health, etc. All governmental development schemes are cornered by dominating higher caste. After 60 years of independence, none of the privileges of living in a democratic state seems to have been given to the Dalit community. This has taken place in a country that, on paper, has one of the finest Democratic Constitutions in the world; a Constitution where Dalits are entitled to special concessions and privileges. The reality, in villages across Uttar Pradesh, and other parts of the country, is quite harsh.

Antonio Gramsci (1973) noted that ‘When the hegemonic position of the ruling class is threatened, it organizes and reorganizes to defeat the threat’. While the agricultural labourers and peasants were getting organized, the landlords formed retaliatory senas. From the early 1980s, central Bihar has witnessed the emergence and outrages perpetrated by the private caste militia, such as the Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, and the Ranvir Sena. Prakash Louis (2002) observed that the three decades of revolutionary agrarian movements have been an interplay between the upper-caste landed gentry’s attempt to maintain the status quo and the lower-caste toiling masses’ challenge to it.

While some Naxals of the 60s and 70s did an about-turn in their political beliefs and practices, the movement seems none the weaker for that reason. True, the far Left landscape is a minefield of splinter groups, but for all their differences these organisations pose a serious threat to state power. Therefore, when one takes stock of 40 years of Naxalism, one should understand it as a phenomenon of the present rather than the past.

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: EXPANDING HORIZON

A movement which had its genesis in the womb of a completely lopsided land reform system in India,¹ one finds that today over 1/3 of India is affected by Naxalite violence and in a span of 40 years comprises of 30 odd leftist groups. The issue at stake is so huge that today the movement spans in almost 16 states of India and affects 182 districts by various levels of Maoist mobilization and violence.² In Bihar alone, the Naxalites run a parallel government in 32 out of the total 40 districts (Harivansh 2008:19). The Naxal cadres have increased in strength³ despite the government's efforts to suppress their demands and send their aspirations and dreams to the gallows. Numerous state sponsored guerilla squads were formed to free the Naxalite affected zones but met with limited success.⁴ In their strongholds, which cover 55 districts in 12 states, the Naxalites run a parallel government.⁵ Far from being contained, Naxalite ideology seems to be spreading like the prairies set on wild fire. It has gained new grounds, momentum and thrust so much so that the entire area under naxal influence has been dubbed in the officialdom as the "Red Corridor" (Map 4.1, p.108). The current trends of the overall Naxal related incidents and resultant deaths in the country during the last six years have been as follows (Table 4.1):

¹ P. Bidwai in "Meeting the Naxal Challenge" says that 1.3% of agricultural land has been redistributed through tenancy reforms and land ceilings in India as compared to 43% in China, 37% in Taiwan, 33% in Japan, and 32% in S.Korea at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/Oct/11bidwai.htm>

² According to the Government sources at the end of the Coordination committee of Naxalite affected states on April 26, 2007 conceded that the number of districts affected by Naxalite incidents was 182 across 16 states. However, Institute for Conflict Management- South Asia Terrorism Portal puts the number of Naxalite affected districts to be 192. According to a report published in Hindustan Times on 26.03.2006, Ajit K.Doval says that Maoist rebellion has already affected nearly 40% of the country's geographical area and 35% of it's population; nearly 4 times the combined area of J&K, the North-East, Punjab and 8 times the population.

³ In a report published by Daily Mail; daily news from Pakistan by Momin Iftikhar in "Red Storm Rising", says that according to Mr. Ajay.K. Doval, Former Director, IB, in the last four years (that is from 2001-2005), there has been an increase of 40% in the Naxalite cadre. Putting a concrete number, Somini Sengupta, writing for the New York Times and quoting Indian security officials as well as Maoist leaders' sources, has placed the cadre strength at around 20,000. It reports that the Maoist organizational prowess has been improving and acquiring sophistication with every passing day. According to the study, the number of training camps was numbered at 48 during 2001 that increased to over 78 in 2005, registering an increase of over 55%..

⁴ Operation Crossbow in July, 1967 at Naxalbari in West Bengal (Mukherjee 2007); Operation Steeplechase in 1971, jointly by the army and the police in the bordering districts of the West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa (Singh 2006); In Jharkhand alone, the government started various measures like Operation Eagle, Operation Shikhar, Operation Hill Top, Operation Thunder etc. but none provided the expected result (information available at <http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1894&status=article>).

⁵ However, Ajay K. Mehra (2007) observes, 'only thing prominently known about their parallel government so far is the *jan adalat*, basically kangaroo courts. He further adds, '...and their brutal summary punishments that keep the people in the area adequately terrified'.




Table 4.1: Naxal Violence in India (2002-2007)

Head	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2007 (31.03.07)	2008 (31.03.08)
No. of Incidents	1465	1597	1533	1608	1509	1565	403	358
Total	896	731	653	902	950	837	263	208
Death								
Civilians Killed	382	410	466	524	521	460	119	89
Naxalites Killed	414	216	87	225	272	141	53	74
Policemen Killed	100	105	100	153	157	236	91	45

Source: Report of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (as on 31.03.2008).

The talk of converting “Guerilla Zones” (areas of maximum activities) into “Liberated Zones” is common and CPML-PW and MCC expansionist designs include spreading into new areas to carve out a “Compact Revolutionary Zone” spreading from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh. This is in pursuance of a decision in September 1998 taken by them and the Nepal based CPN (Maoist). In pursuance of this aim MCC has been exchanging visits with fellow cadres from Nepal and expressed solidarity with the people’s war being waged by CPN (Maoist). CPML-PW and MCC have also agreed to impart training to CPN (Maoist) cadres in exchange of weapons (Nayar ‘India 2025’).

The Maoist of India has significant fraternal linkages with the Nepalese counterpart. The Nepalese Maoist and the then PWG had their first meeting in 1995. On a number of occasion, the then PW and the CPN-M had issued joint statements. These date back to as early as 1995, a year before the CPN-M launched its people’s war.⁶

In February 1996, the MCC Central Committee published a paper welcoming the Maoist movement in Nepal. In October 1996, the MCC Congress condemned the repression of the Maoist movement in Nepal. According to reports in April 2000, the MCC and Maoists were holding joint training camps in Hazaribagh and Aurangabad. In September 2000, Pramod Mishra [a leader of the then MCC] visited Nepal and had extended discussions with Maoist leaders. In August 2001, Nepalese Maoist leaders and Indian Naxal groups had a meeting in Siliguri where they discussed strategies to achieve the goal of the CRZ (Jha 2003).

It has been reported widely that the Nepalese Maoists had trained together with the then PW and MCCI. ‘Over the years, this association has evolved into a strategic alliance with a steady exchange of men and material, extension of training facilities and safe havens, and facilitation and procurement of arms and explosives’ (Chaudhary 2003).

In the past, the Nepal Maoists had sent a delegation in March 2001 to attend the 9th Congress of the then PW held in the Abuz Marh forests of Bastar district in Chattisgarh. On another occasion, on 25 January 2002, the politbureau of the CPN-M condemned the Indian government’s proscription of the then PW and the then MCCI under the now defunct POTA,

⁶ At that time, they had issued a joint-statement signed jointly by Nepal Maoist chief Prachanda and a senior functionary of the then PW, Suresh.

2002. It expressed its resolve to work together with the Indian Maoists to oppose the ban, as well as to build opinion against it (Ramana 2008). The January 2005 issue of *People's March*, carries the statement by the CPI (Maoist) against Indian assistance to the [then] Nepal government [in its fight against the Maoists]. Apprehending that the Indian government might increase military assistance to Nepal, the CPI (Maoist) asked the Indian troops 'not to involve themselves in killing their class brethren by participating in the unjust military campaign of the Indian government.'⁷

Apart from expanding their guerilla zones within India, the PWG, MCC and other small armed Communist groups have been able to build a network with similar Communist revolutionary organizations in the neighbouring states of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal under the banner of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). Their representatives met in a guerilla zone in eastern India in July 2003, to chalk out future strategy of coordination of their activities. All these South Asian Maoist parties are also members of a larger international organization called the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement.

We communists are internationalists... one of our important duties is to establish strong relations with all genuine Maoist parties in the world... both the erstwhile MCCI and the erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] have continued bilateral relations with Nepal, Peru, [the] Philippines, Turkey and other countries at the international level. The erstwhile MCCI had even joined the RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), while the erstwhile PW had decided to further deepen its relations with [the] RIM. Now... the party (CPI-M) has decided to continue its deep relations with [the] RIM and all other genuine Maoists... the unity of India's two important revolutionary organisations – the erstwhile MCCI and PW – will definitely have a very positive impact at the international plane.– Kishan, erstwhile General Secretary, MCCI⁸

⁷ The statement can be accessed online at http://cpnm.org/new/English/statements/stop_usa_2june04.htm and was signed by Ganapathy, the General Secretary of the CPI (Maoist).

⁸ Kishan stated this in a joint interview with Muppala Lakshman Rao 'Ganapathy', the erstwhile General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [People's War], CPI(ML)[PW], published in *People's March*, Ernakulam, Vol. 5, Nos. 11-12, November-December 2004, under the title 'Joint Interview of the General Secretaries of The Erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and the MCCI, on the Occasion of the Merger of the Two Parties and the Formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)'.

Gen. V K Nayar (India 2025) observes that Naxalite groups like CPI-ML (Peoples War Group) in Andhra Pradesh and Marxist Communist Centre (MCC) the CPI/ML (peoples unity) and CPI/ML (Vinod Mishra Group) in Bihar have been getting weapons from arms bazars in South East Asia and from Pakistan and Afghanistan and have achieved high level of sophistication in the use of land mines and state of the art triggering devices. PWG linkages which were earlier limited to South American Guerillas and LTTE, have recently expanded to ISI connections and increasingly networking with militant organisations around the country.

Statements indicating PW-ISI links have emanated in the past from responsible Indian leaders. West Bengal Urban Development Minister Ashok Bhattacharya said in an interview (subsequently posted on the official website of India's External Affairs Ministry) that, '[the Maoist insurgents of Nepal] with the help of [the] ISI, [are] trying to establish... links with the India-based Naxalite outfits... using the Siliguri corridor. The [then] Prime Minister [Sherbahadur Deuba] and our chief minister [Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee] discussed the problem threadbare... We are maintaining strict vigil on the situation'⁹ (Ramana 2008).

The Indian Maoists are, however, unwilling to admit to any links with the ISI. The [PW] General Secretary Ganapathy denied any such links in an interview to www.rediff.com. He said: "We deny the ISI part. We do not have any relation with them. That's state propaganda to discredit us" (ibid: 126).

Ramana (2008) further goes on that it is difficult to believe him, especially when, even as recently as on 10 January 2005, a media report from Jagdalpur held that the Maoists had received sophisticated arms from Pakistan-based terrorist groups.¹⁰


When questioned, during an interview in 1998, on the reports about LTTE instructors conducting training camps for PWG squads, Ganapathy said: "They were not [from the] LTTE. They were ex-LTTE. What happened was that these people came to India after leaving their organisation and formed communist groups. The PW had relations with these groups. As part, of that, they held training camps for us". Ganapathy went on to add: "We have had no relations with the LTTE till now. But we are not against having relations with

⁹ See the official website of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.mea.gov.in>.

¹⁰ See P. V. Ramana, "The Rediff Special – AP Maoists: The Party is Over!", www.rediff.com, 25 January 2005.

them. We will certainly have links with them if an opportunity arises. We feel that such a relation would be conducive to the revolutionary movement”.¹¹

Map 4.1: Naxalite Affected Areas in India



The current trends of Naxalism in India portrays a serious condition of Indian society in large and of its people in particular. Their expanding horizons with internal and external linkages at one level signify ‘mass base ‘among the deprived people and secondly, the fraternity with the people of other nations echoes the Marxian critique of ‘nationalism’ as a false consciousness.

¹¹ See the Rediff Interview/Ganapathy, <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/07gana1.htm>.

THE CASE STUDY OF SONBHADRA-MIRZAPUR-CHANDAULI

An International Communist journal, 'A World to Win' writes, "*No proletarian internationalist can be indifferent to the development of the revolution in India. Its immense population, the intensity of class contradictions, its existence as a weak link in the world imperialist system all mean...*"

It is the exploitation of common people and the absence of law and justice that brought about the so-called 'Naxalite menace'. The governmental administration uses the excuse of curbing the naxal menace to unleash a reign of terror and violate basic human rights like the freedom of expression and the freedom of association of these people. The cause of the people was taken up by the Left parties and by a people's organisation called the Mazdoor Kisan Morcha & Voice of Partners (VOP). Between 1980 and 1990 the CPI (Communist Party of India) and the CPM (Marxist Communist Party) stepped in. Near Chakia, close to the Majirathi Bandh, the Communists forcefully occupied 4,000 *bighas* of land. In Naugarh, South Chopan and North Duddhi area, the influence of the CPI (ML), CPM and Maoist Communist Community (MCC) has been increasing. In Sonbhadra, the influential CPI (ML), MCC and PWG has taken up the cause of the people.

The mafia gangs of dishonest contractors are earning crores of rupees from this region through unhindered exploitation of forest wealth. They do this under the very nose of the administration and police officials, who are given a percentage of this illegal earning. The mafia of contractors makes large contributions to politicians and political parties, to ensure patronage of their illegal activities. Even the collection of tendu leaves is in the hands of the contractors who pay a very nominal amount to the wage labourers while they themselves make big amount.

The naxal presence in this region is a great hindrance to the illegal activities and the exploitation of the people, which is why the police have been asked to eliminate the naxalites. However, a corrupt police force led by corrupt police officials, without any knowledge of the forest or jungle warfare, is no match for the trained MCC cadres. Thus to please their political bosses, they turn on the innocent villagers. This is precisely what seems to have occurred in Narketi between 16 and 19 May 2001.

THE CASE OF NARKETI VILLAGE

Socio-Economic Condition of Narketi

Narketi is located in Eastern Uttar Pradesh surrounded by hilly dense forest. A majority of people here are adivasis and backward castes like Kols, Manji, Chamar, Mushar and Kalvaar. The people are engaged in collection of *tendu patta* (leaves used for the making of *beedi* or indigenous cigarettes) honey, dry twigs and herbs, to make their two ends meet. Some families have small land holdings where they grow mostly paddy, and at times grow vegetables. Dependence on seasonal work, landlessness, and lack of education have plunged these villagers into poverty. There is no road in the village, no school, no water for irrigation, no health centre for at least 25 kilometers. It is surprising that the local government has not ensured that even the most basic facilities have reached the village and when the village raised a legitimate demand of wage increase, the State unleashes a reign of terror.

Incidents from 16th May to 19th May, 2001

As narrated by the Villagers of Narketi, on 16 May 2001, a few MCC members came to Narketi village and summoned all the villagers for a meeting. Around 100-150 villagers were present at the meeting. The meeting was held under the tree near the village temple. The purpose of the meeting was to call for a strike, on the collection of *tendu patta*, which the villagers sold in the market to supplement their income. The purpose of calling a strike was due to non-payment of dues owed to the villagers by the Forest Corporation over the past year. The Forest Corporation owed the villagers of Narketi Rs. 50,000/-, while in the entire block the balance due to the people was approximately Rs 17/- lakh. Another demand was for a raise in the wages paid for the collection of the leaves from Rs. 32/ to Rs. 40/- per bundle. (Each bundle consists of 100 bunches of 80 leaves each). The MCC told the villagers that the Uttar Pradesh government was giving far less than other states like Madhya Pradesh and Bihar where the wages are as high as Rs Rs. 50/- to Rs. 60/- per bundle.

Three persons from the Forest Department were also present in the meeting. When the meeting ended with the villagers, the MCC continued to hold discussions with the Forest Department personnel. The police getting wind of this meeting entered the village. The villagers stated that the police began firing without giving any warning. There were several

rounds of firing. The MCC people who were present fired in retaliation. The MCC took along the three Forest Department personnel and left the village. Though the police was forced to retreat and the MCC activists took to the jungles, it was not the end of the battle. Large scale police violence took place in the nearby village; randomly people were beaten up badly and innocents were picked up into custody.

It may be mentioned here that on 17 May 2001, the bodies of two of the employees of the Forest Department, who appeared to have been abducted by the MCC the previous day, were found about 9 km away from the village. The violent rampage that the police went on the next day appears to have been in retaliation to the death of the Forest Department employees.

The following day i.e. 18 May 2001, the police returned to the village. The villagers hide in their houses out of fear. But the police forced their way into the houses, went on a rampage, beating people, destroying everything that was in sight and looted whatever was of worth. While beating the people, the police rebuked them for holding a meeting with the 'Naxalites', by which they meant the MCC. They used abusive language and beat everyone.

Without giving any reason they used force on the young and old, men and women mercilessly. Even pregnant women and young girls became their victims. Children were so terrorized that they ran away if any stranger approached the village. Police destroyed the houses of the villagers and took away livestock, farming implements, bicycle, and damaged household items and their few possessions (Table 4.2).

The police took twelve people of the village into custody. They were interrogated several times, and also beaten. Some of them were released the following day after being tortured in custody and rest were detained and put behind the bar for a long period. Time to time police would interrogate the innocent villagers for the information of Naxalites and torture continued.

The only thing people of the village requested from the administration was peace and freedom from the exploitation of the police. An incredibly small demand from the people of village, from the state that had not even provided them school, irrigation facility, road or a health centre.

Table 4.2: List of Belongings of People of Narketi, damaged /destroyed by the police on 18 May 2001

S. No	Name	Father's Name	Caste	Livestock	Damaged/ Destroyed articles	Value
1.	Punvassi	Ramvriksh	Kol		Cot - 1, Pitcher - 2, Axe- 1, Potatoes - 100kg	1080/-
2.	Bholanath	Devshankar	Kol	25 hens and roosters	Wheat - 5 qtl, Rice - 1 qtl, Onions - 4kg, Cots - 5, Cycle - 1, Bucket - 1, Plates - 2, Purse - 1, Glass - 2, Ramma - 1, Axe - 1, Dolchi - 1, Box - 1, Attachee - 1,	92,950/-
3.	Ramkrit	Lalji	Kol	3 roosters	Doors - 5, and entire house damaged with roof slabs, Pitcher - 3, Axe - 1, Attachee - 1	645/-
4.	Bateshwar	Bachau	Kol	15 roosters	Mango - 1 qtl, Axe - 1, Rickshaw License Certificate	2350/-
5.	Purrushottam	Sampat	Kol		Axe -1, Tiles - 1000	550/-
6.	Arjun	Dev Shankar	Kol	3 roosters and 8 Hens	Rice 1 qtl, flour 10kg Wheat - 2 qtl, Dalda - 2kg, Mahua oil - 10kg, Mustard Oil - 2kg, Mahua- 150kg, Potatoes - 1 qtl, Cot - 4, Plates - 2, Purse-1, Glass-5, Tiles(new)-2000, House with tiles Destroyed	88,300/-
7.	Ramvarat	Kallu	Kol		Axe -1, Pitcher-3	95/-
8.	Shyama	Laxmi	Kol		Axe - 2, Torch -1	300/-
9.	Ram Shakal	Ramji	Kol		Mahua - 2 qtl, Pitcher - 2, Bucket - 1, Mustard oil - 1kg, Salt 10kg, Surti (Snuff) - 1kg, Jeera 500gm, Pepper 500 gm And other grocery items.	2025/-
10.	Dhanukdhari	Ramnarain	Kol		Rice 2 qtl, Wheat 1qtl, Plates - 5, Bucket - 1, Pitcher - 5, Table - 1, Cycle - 1, Box - 1, Tiles (new) - 2000, Sarees - 4, Four Houses destroyed/demolished	71,060/-
					Total	2,59,355/-

Source: PVCHR, 'An Investigation into Caste based Atrocities in Varanasi and Surrounding Areas in Uttar Pradesh' by the Indian People's Tribunal (IPT) on Environment and Human Rights, June 2002.

The Role of Civil Society: *The Indian People's Tribunal (IPT) on Environment and Human Rights* was invited by the *People's Vigilance Committee on Human Rights (PVCHR)* to conduct an inquiry into the atrocities committed by the police and the State against the dalits in and around the areas surrounding the district of Varanasi.

The Tribunal¹² could find no justification for the detention (in prison) of six people from the 16th of May 2001 till date (as on 17th February, 2002). The Panel further stated that the villagers of Narketi have been needlessly made to suffer and been reduced to a state of penury by the police. An immediate investigation must be instituted and the villagers must be compensated not only for the injuries caused but also for the mental trauma undergone and the loss of property and livestock. If the government does not pay attention to its most deprived people, they will lose faith in the rule of law and be pushed to take up other means to achieve justice.

Fake Encounter of Innocent by Labeling Naxalite: The case of fake encounter was also reported. Mukundilal, an elderly man who deposed before the Tribunal during the public hearing on the 17th of February, 2002 at the Gandhi Vidyapeeth tearfully narrated how he had lost two of his sons in fake police encounters. He said that the police were killing innocents in the guise of claiming them to be naxalites. Out of fear he now lives in a distant village and has to look after the large families of his murdered sons.

Perception of State: The only association with the state is in the form of the police - the villagers used the word '*Prashasan*' (administration) when referring to the police. Their only encounter with the state has been in the form of violence and repression, not in the form of any manner of welfare or service. For these people, the state does not mean a post office, a hospital or even a ration shop. The state represents itself to them in the form of police who invade their homes, rob their poultry and cattle, and destroy their resources and terrorise.

¹² The Indian People's Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights panel headed by Justice K Sukumaran (Retired Judge, Kerala and Mumbai High Courts) accompanied by Dr. Kusum Singh (Professor in Gandhian Studies, Media and Social Change), Deepika D'Souza (Co-convenor of the IPT), Sunil Scaria & Devlyn Newnes (Joint Coordinators of the IPT) visited Varanasi & Chandauli districts between February 16 - 17, 2002. They visited the villages of Narketi, Babatpur and Belwa. On February 17, 2002 a public hearing was held in Varanasi.

BHAVANIPUR MASSACRE

The another violent suppression of the people's voice by the state, just ten weeks prior to the Narketi village case, scared the neighbouring district of Mirzapur. On the ill-fated day of 9th March, 2001 in Bhavanipur; a remote village in southeastern hinterland of Uttar Pradesh witnessed the cold blooded killing of 16 poor villagers by the police most of whom were tribals and dalits. The raison d'être for this killing according to the police and the local administration was that these people were Naxalites and had been a constant source of menace and posed a threat to the law and order situation in the area. The state was operating under the aegis of the then Chief Minister.

The state encouraged the police for this act by rewarding the 'brave' policemen with cash and a promotion in their ranks. Questions were raised by the furious villagers of Bhavanipur as well as the left parties specially the radical left CPI (ML) to give reasons regarding the killing of a 14 year old boy, a student of VII standard who had gone to visit his relatives to attend a function. The police as well as the state administration came up with flawed answers every other time. In fact one of those killed by the police in the police records came out 'live' in one of the protest meetings. In a desperate effort to save the government from further embarrassment and containing the situation from growing even worse, the officials released the names of those killed after three weeks of this fierce incident when there were no police records against any of them. On the other hand, political parties in the state as well as the centre maintained a coldhearted silence in this entire episode.

This event became the turning point in the political life of the people of Sonbhadra, Mirzapur and Chandauli districts, and there has been a new trajectory of Naxal activities with many implications for the relation between the state administration and marginal and poorer sections of these districts. The tribals, dalits and poorer of the deprived communities were being exploited by the hierarchical structure of the society since the ages. Now becoming prey to the repressive act of the state. This mayhem exploded into the consciousness of the people. The incident of March' and May' 2001 multiply the growing discontent and loosing legitimacy in the state-order. The spark of Narketi and Bhawanipur sets the prairie fire... [Table 4.3].

Table 4.3: Major Events of the Naxal Narrative in Eastern Uttar Pradesh

S.No.	Date	Event	District
1.	08-03-2001	Basmati Kol elected Block Pramukh of Naugarh	Chandauli
2.	09-03-2001	Killing of sixteen villagers in Bhawanipur	Mirzapur
3.	16-18 May 2001	Narketi Case: Two Forest Personnel Killed & Police Atrocities in the village	Chandauli
4.	25-08-2001	Conflict between Police and People in Chiruin Markundi village	Sonbhadra
5.	22-11-2001	Attack on PAC camp at Khora Dih village	Mirzapur
6.	23-11-2001	Police raid on Takia and other villages	Mirzapur
7.	25-11-2001	Arrest of CPI(ML) Party leaders	Mirzapur
8.	27-11-2001	State wide protest day against police	Many districts of UP
9.	01-12-2001	All Party Dharna at district headquarter	Mirzapur
10.	05-12-2001	Mirzapur Chalo rally	Mirzapur
11.	2002	Electoral campaign of CPI(ML)(L)	Eastern UP
12.	11-08-2002	PUCL visit about famine conditions in Naugarh	Chandauli
13.	05-08-2003	Hunger death of eighteen children (<i>Amar Ujala</i>)	Sonbhadra
14.	19-11-2004	Killing of two forest guards	Chandauli
15.	20-11-2004	Killing of seventeen policemen in landmine blast	Chandauli
16.	10-01-2005	Naxal affected Samagra Gramya Vikas Yojana in eight districts of eastern UP	Eastern UP
17.	01-11-2005	Conflict between People and Police in Palhari village	Sonbhadra
18.	01-11-2005	AHRC & PVCHR reported 93 starvation death	Eastern UP
19.	18-04-2007	Naxalite leader Sanjay Kol killed in encounter	Chandauli
20.	2007	Electoral campaign in UP elections by CPI(ML)(L)	Eastern UP
21.	March 2008	Ten Thousand Tribals including Seven Thousand Tribal women demanded Forest Rights, Medha Patkar addressed the Rally	Sonbhadra

HUNGER DEATH IN SONBHADRA

About 19 children died of hunger in the village of Raup in Sonbhadra district within a month in the year 2003. Asian Human Rights Commission through the Hunger Alert campaign described that Social Development Foundation, Delhi visited the area in August, 2004 and found that despite the headline attention being directed to the area after starvation deaths occurred there in 2003, severe widespread malnutrition persists throughout the region. The affected villagers are all adivasis, or tribal people, who have been involved in a land dispute with the forest department. Most of the group work as labourers for farmers; they have either been distributed barren land by the authorities, or have been only promised for the land but not given it.

The village of Raup is typical of those inhabited by tribals facing slow death from malnutrition. It was only after a petition on the deaths was filed to the National Human Rights Commission, it issued notices to the state government, which in response sent officials to investigate. Subsequently, the government fulfilled its obligation to ensure the food availability of the families in the village by giving each 5kgs of wheat, 2 liters of kerosene, 2.5kgs of rice and 2.5kgs of potatoes. Similarly, civic groups made a number of short-term interventions. But the conditions remain unchanged as a result of these activities, and numerous people are still suffering from life-threatening hunger.

A group of some 40 adivasi villagers had travelled over 40kms through the monsoon months on foot to the district headquarters in Robertsganj to complain about food shortages to the district magistrate. The tribal women at the district office displayed the roots and leaves (of forest produce) which they would eat. They had to survive on the wild and poisonous grass like 'chakwar', wild mushrooms many of them being not fit for consumption. The adults were somehow able to survive the poisonous nature of the intake but the children were too unable to tolerate its poisonous contents. As such the children became sick without any medical facilities nearby.

The tribals in the district of Sonbhadra in eastern Uttar Pradesh had been suffering from food shortages, severe malnutrition and starvation deaths due to a land dispute with the local forest department that had been dragged on for some 10 years. The area where the

tribals are located has been the subject of lengthy and complicated land disputes, and massive corruption, involving the forestry and revenue departments, and local government officials. A Supreme Court order ten years ago instructed officials to conduct a survey into land in the region for the purposes of recognising the land rights of local tribal populations, but the responsible officials have dragged out the process and subjected it to various malpractices for their own advantage. Meanwhile, the plight of the villagers has attracted the interest of numerous non-governmental groups, but most have done little other than make occasional interventions and a few charitable gestures that have no long-term effect.

The Public Distribution System (PDS) responsible for distribution of rationed articles within the country has ignored the plight of this community. In spite of having enough knowledge about severe malnutrition and deaths due to starvation, the district medical officer or other officials attached to the medical services have not taken any effective steps to attend to the immediate requirement of this community. The irony is that even the tragic deaths of those innocent children in dearth of food could not deter the state functionaries. The administration has failed to either allot land or provide ration cards. Mid-day meals which have been declared as mandatory by the central government to all school-going children in the age group of 0-5, were only promised a month late in this region. Also, the insensitivity of the District Health Department can be gauged by the fact that they were unable to take note of these malnourished children while they had gone to implement the Polio immunization programme in this area. The denial of basic human rights by the state for the people is one of the main reasons for seething discontent in the naxal affected region.

The Union Minister of State for Home Sri Prakash Jaiswal rightly identifies Naxalism with poverty and unemployment, addressing a press conference in Allahabad he stated, “Naxalism is the outcome of unemployment, hunger and poverty and to combat this, the state government must implement certain unique strategies” (UNI, 15 June, 2007).

The Naxalite leadership continues to pursue their ideology to wage protracted people’s war through the armed struggle to capture political power, while they have a mass base among the deprived people who are in a hope of social revolution. The people of the region are expressing discontent for the development lag in these backward districts.

THE TRAJECTORY OF LEFT-WING MOVEMENT

The border districts of UP also emerged as safe haven for the Maoists of Nepal. The intelligence sources indicated a strong Nepalese Maoist-Naxalite nexus that has emerged in the region as a serious threat to the internal security of India as a whole and in particular to five states— UP, Bihar, Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Sikkim. These states are connected to the Himalayan kingdom along the 1751 km border. It is observed that there has been regular exchange of men and material between the Maoists in Nepal and Naxalite outfits in India (Nayak 2004).

The extremists work to consolidate and expand their power, repeatedly declaring their commitment to 'armed struggle' and rejection of India's 'bourgeois democracy'. Madhya Pradesh MCC in its bid to spread to new areas, it has formed border areas committee with its headquarters at Sarguja to function in conjunction with the UP MCC Area Committee (Sonbhadra) under the overall Bihar-UP-MP *Simant* Regional Committee. In UP MCC is making its presence felt in Mirzapur, Chandauli and Sonbhadra Districts (Nayar, 'INDIA 2025').

Uttar Pradesh witnessed eleven (11) incidents in the year 2004 only. In the year 2004 five hundred twenty two (522) villages and twenty three (23) Police stations were reported as Naxalite affected.¹³ Whereas the conservative estimate by Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India put the Uttar Pradesh in national scenario with only seven (7) Police stations affected.¹⁴ The variation in estimation itself contradicts the proper consideration by the state agencies. Moreover this moderate portray of Naxal influence in UP among other states unable to draw the attention of intellectuals. Nevertheless the nature and course of problem persists here needs a careful concern.

'A World to Win' writes: 'if you're talking about world revolution, you're talking about India.... It is certain that the next high tide of struggle will not be a mere repetition of the movement of the past--it must and can be deeper, richer and more powerful...'

¹³ Source: Uttar Pradesh 2006. Information and Public Relation Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh.

¹⁴ State-wise spread of Naxal violence in terms of Police Stations. Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs.

On November 20, 2004 Naxalites blew up the combining PAC and Police with a landmine, killing seventeen (13 PAC and 4 Police) personnel in Naugarh, the Chandauli district. And the previous day they killed two forest officials in the same district Chandauli. This was seen as a major Naxalite incident and caught the national consciousness through the media. This was the first major attack on state security forces after the merger of two dreaded left wing extremist, naxal outfits, the PWG and MCC into CPI (Maoist). The joining hands also publicize the Naxalism and Naxalite with a new lexis, the Maoism and Maoist. Since, they practice the revolutionary ideology of Mao Zedong, struggling for a new social order through the barrel of a gun.

However, the CPI(ML) state secretary condemned the incident of killing police personnel in Chandauli district and stated that this was the result of 'frustration' by the PWG and MCC leaders, who were now trying to shift their focus to Uttar Pradesh after Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand. Further he alleged the then ruling Samajwadi Party, Congress and BJP, responsible for the recent spurt in Naxalite activities in the eastern parts of the state. 'Direct support of these political parties to the land and forest mafias has demoralised the local people, particularly the tribals leading to some Naxalite organisation taking the benefit,' He further claimed that only CPI(ML) could solve the basic problem of the masses (UNI: The Hindu, 26 November, 2004). He said the police action cannot contain the growing resentment among the people and it was forcing the masses to move towards the Naxalite organisations.

Mohanty (2005) points out that it will be factually incorrect to think that the merger of two Naxal organizations - the Peoples War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Coordination Committee (MCC) in October, 2004 has created an all united Maoist political party. Because a number of Maoist groups with significant regional pockets of influence are not included in it. For example, the CPI-ML (Liberation) which condemns the People's War Group (PWG) as left adventurists pursuing squad actions which invite further state repression. He further lists Janashakti (Andhra), the CPI-ML (New Democracy) (Jharkhand, Assam, Orissa and Punjab) and the CPI-ML (Provisional Committee) as examples of continuing divisions and lack of togetherness among the followers of the Naxal way or Maoist ideology.

The limits of Maoist or Naxalite unity has been underlined in the approach paper of the CPI(ML) also. While completing another step of unification where CPI(ML) and CPI(ML) Red Flag got merged into a single organization at the Vijayawada Unity Conference from January 27th to February 1st, 2005, the CPI(ML) document laments that there is no Communist Party capable of providing leadership to people's movements. The communist revolutionaries are divided and splintered into numerous groups causing deep frustration among the masses. According to Kanu Sanyal, the General Secretary of CPI(ML), the challenge of relentless struggle against right reformism, left adventurism and dogmatism of all hues and kinds for uniting the communist revolutionaries is still a major task for the CPI(ML) (Sanyal 2008: 7).

While, the merger of Communist Party Marxist Leninist-People's War (CPML-PW) and Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCCI) into CPI (Maoist) in September, 2004, are reported to be trying to woo other splinter groups and have also consolidated their front organisations into 'Revolutionary Democratic Front' (RDF) and People's Democratic Front of India (PDFI) to intensify their mass base contact programme.

Since, a major criticism against the Naxalite movement was that it did not build up a 'mass line'. The leaders of the movement failed to mobilize and organise a substantial number of poor and landless peasants (S. Banerjee 1980). And that led to changes their strategy and participation in electoral politics (Mukherji 1987; Banerjee 2002).

Parliamentary Path

The official narrative of the naxal activities has been focusing on only extra constitutional left wing extremist events and episodes. But, there is growing engagement of the Communists in the constitutional and electoral processes as part of their official approach towards the target of 'radical democratic transformation of the Indian society'. The following table (4.4) presents the electoral profile of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation) in terms of the votes received in the constituencies of the Chandauli, Sonbhadra and Mirzapur districts during the two assembly elections of Uttar Pradesh in 2002 and 2007.

Table 4.4: Electoral performance of CPI(ML)(L) in Eastern UP (2002-2007)

Constituency	(Percentage of votes polled)	
	2002	2007
Chandauli(SC)	1.31	NC
Chakia(SC)	3.41	1.09
Mughalsarai	6.8	1.19
Dudhi(SC)	0.76	2.74
Robertsganj(SC)	1.29	0.85
Rajgarh	3.45	2.74
Chunar	1.35	1.09
Majhwa	0.33	0.52
Mirzapur	0.71	0.48
Chhanvey (SC)	NC	NC

Source: Election Commission of India

NC – not contested

SC – Reserved for the Scheduled Castes

The presence of the CPI(ML)(L) candidates in almost all the constituencies signifies that the so-called extreme left radicals have not ignored the arena of electoral mobilization. According to the above figures the electoral performance of the CPI(ML)(L) candidates began in the assembly elections of 2002. They put up candidates in nearly all constituencies of the south eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh. They again entered the electoral process in the state wide elections of 2007.

Comparing the percentage of votes received by the so-called Naxals or Maoists candidates we can make three generalizations. First of all, the presence of CPI(ML)(L) candidates received only marginal support in most of the constituencies except Chakia(SC), Mughalsarai and Rajgarh in 2002. Secondly, there was overall decline of the votes polled by this party in the next election of 2007 except in Dudhi(SC) and Majhwa constituencies. Thirdly, there was polling of more than one percent of votes in six constituencies in 2002 and five constituencies in 2007 elections.

It suggests that the left wing radical candidates were able to create a limited space in terms of electoral identity in this region of Uttar Pradesh in spite of their political distance from the major coalitions and significant left parties. It also shows that the left wing radicals are not exclusively engaged in promoting the politics of bullet against the processes of ballot. It is unfortunate that the approach paper of the government of India has been failing in taking note of the complex strategy of the Naxal formations in its effort to present the picture about the so-called challenge number one from the perspectives of internal security. At the same time it is interesting that one of the mass leaders of North India Ms. Mayawati has been more careful in analyzing the causes of spread of naxal activities in Uttar Pradesh.

The new Chief Minister Ms. Mayawati made a major departure about the states attitude towards the naxal activities in Uttar Pradesh by arguing that the naxal problem is caused by wrong policies of the previous governments. She further asserted that the politicians are responsible for the rise of naxal challenge in Uttar Pradesh. (See Box 4.1)

Box 4.1: Maya blames politicians for growing Naxal attacks

Sunday, January 20, 2008 20:19 (IST)

Bhubaneswar: Expressing grave concern over spurt in Naxalite violence in various parts of the country, BSP leader and Uttar Pradesh chief minister Mayawati today blamed politicians who were at the helm of affairs for a long time for it.

Kicking off her party's campaign here for the next Lok Sabha elections due next year, Mayawati said Naxalite violence continued to be a major problem for the last 15-20 years. This was because more and more people were joining the Naxalite cadre thus strengthening their outfits, she said. "People mainly youth are joining naxal cadres out of frustration and other compulsion," she claimed adding no one was joining the cadre on his own to become a Naxalite or a terrorist. "Politicians and parties in state and at the centre were responsible for the growth of Naxal menace", she said.

Since the state governments ignored the people living in forests and remote areas, the people support Naxalite to get benefits. "The state governments which have deprived the poor people of their genuine rights are witnessing Naxalite activities," she said.

THE APPROACH OF THE INDIAN STATE

Concerning the gravity of the situation, the Government of Uttar Pradesh has launched a 'Naxal Affected Samagra Gramya Vikas Yojana' in the affected districts with 18 developmental programmes since 10th January, 2005 to 'thwart' the Naxalite activities in these areas. The statement of the objectives of Dr. Ambedkar Gramin Samagra Vikas Vibhag which is implementing the 'Naxal affected Gramya Vikas Yojana' is very significant for exploring the relation between failures of the present system of development and administration and their consequences for the common people in the villages. It says, "about 79% of the population of U.P. lives in villages. They are socially and economically backward. There is a need to make them a part of developmental process and make the life of rural people better. To convert the above vision in reality, rural people must be facilitated with rural infrastructure development, hygienic living, better housing, better health services and family welfare, social security's, land reforms and employment etc."

Speaking at the Chief Minister's Conference on Internal Security at New Delhi on Dec.20, '07 the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has remarked, "I have said in the past that Left wing extremism is probably single biggest security challenge to the Indian State. It continues to be so and we cannot rest in peace until we have eliminated this virus. We need a coordinated response to this challenge. The answers to the problems are well known. We need to cripple the hold of Naxalite forces with all the means at our command. This requires improved intelligence gathering capabilities, improved policing capabilities, better coordination between the centre and the states and better coordination between states and most important, better leadership and firmer resolve. Improving policing capabilities requires better police infrastructure, better training facilities, better equipment and resources and dedicated forces."¹⁵ This view of the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh is related with the analysis of 'the Naxal Problem' presented by the Ministry of Home Affairs through 'Status Papers' tabled in Parliament from time to time.

The government view recognizes in the Status Paper of 2006 that (a) 'the naxalites' operate in vacuum created by absence of administrative and political institutions, (b) espouse the local demands and take advantage of the disenchantment prevalent among the exploited

¹⁵ <http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/>

segments of the population, and (c) seek to offer an alternative system of governance which promises emancipation of these segments from the clutches of 'exploiter' classes through 'the barrel of a gun'. The government promises to address the problem through a dual approach – i) pursuing effective police action against naxalites, and ii) accelerate programmes of progress and development in the Naxal affected areas.¹⁶ The Status Paper had further underlined a 10 point counter-measure for the dual approach so that the Naxal affected regions can be taken out of 'the trap of a vicious cycle of a poor law and order situation coupled with slow economic development'. Because 'one situation feeds on the other and it becomes increasingly difficult to pull these areas out of the rut they are caught in as pointed out by the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in his speech about it.

It is also significant that the Government of India is aware that there is positive link between failed development and the 'Naxalite Menace'. Therefore, the Central Government has launched the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). It was introduced in 55 Naxal affected districts in the 9 states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh involving a total of Rs.2,475 crores. Under this scheme, an amount of Rs.15 crores per year has been given to each of the districts for 3 years so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social development in the Naxal affected areas. Furthermore, the Planning Commission was requested to include other Naxal affected areas under their proposed scheme of Backward Regions Grant Funds (BRGF) for which an outlay of Rs.5,000 crores was set apart for the fiscal year 2005-06 onwards.

Similarly, the land reforms and infrastructural development are given a fresh priority by the states in the making of their approach to the Naxal activities. It is admitted in the 'Status Paper 2006' that 'If land reforms are taken up on priority and the landless and the poor in the Naxal areas are allotted surplus land, this would go a long way in tackling the developmental aspects of the Naxal problem'. Secondly, 'the States have been requested to focus greater attention on this area as also accelerate developmental activities and create employment opportunities in the Naxal affected areas with special focus on creation of

¹⁶ Status Paper on the Naxal Problem, tabled in Parliament on March 13, 2006 by the Union Home Minister Shri Shivraj Patil. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/06March13_Naxal.

physical infrastructure in terms of roads, communication, power as also social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, etc.’

The developmental approach of the state can be best understood as the result of the analysis of social movements on intellectual plane and ground realities. The discourse on Naxalism suggests that without socio-economic development, repressive measures will not be able to succeed even with the strongest possible draconian law.

Ajay K. Mehra (2007) remarked that the socio-economic area needs to be attended by the Indian state. He further affirms that whenever the question of development was attended, the support to Maoism has also declined. In instances from the very outset, popular support to Telangana movement started dwindling after Mahatma Gandhi’s disciple and *Sarvodaya* leader Acharya Vinoba Bhave toured Telangana extensively and realizing the importance of land, launched his famous *Bhoodan* movement from there.

Charu Mazumdar too realised this when the CPM-led United Front government in West Bengal launched its land redistribution policy in 1967 in the wake of Naxalbari. Reacting to its impact, he observed:

‘...wherever there have been movements on vested land, the peasant who gets the possession of the vested land and the license to occupy it, does not remain active any longer on the peasant movement. He further added ...within a year (of the possession of the land), the class character of the poor peasant changes and he becomes a middle peasant. He no longer shares the economic demand of the poor and landless peasant. Thus, economism drives a wedge in the unity of the fighting peasants and plunges the landless and poor peasants in despondency’.

Panchayat Raj Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar at three day conference on Panchayats at Vigyan Bhavan (June, 2006) claimed that in tribal areas where the Panchayat Extension to Schedule Area Act (PESA) is effective, and where there is respect for traditional institutions, customs and usages as stipulated in PESA, there is an absence of Naxalism. Hence, he further suggested that the implementation of PESA and the Tribal Advisory Council as stipulated in

the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution is 'critical to ending the Naxalite menace.'¹⁷ An Expert Group set up by Planning Commission recently also recommended the extension of Panchayati Raj to the Scheduled Areas.

Ajay K. Mehra (2007) points out that 'no wonder, the Naxals today resist any move by the governments in the respective States to carry out any developmental work in the area under their control. For, even developmental work has seen to have weaned away from the revolutionary path, aside from providing the state with greater access to these areas.' He further comments that obviously, the government, the parties, and the leadership running the juggernaut of the Indian state have faltered, may failed, in their basic responsibility. And, if the reports about the Naxals running some of the essential state functions like health, education and justice are true, then the Indian state has faltered in a big way.

In quite a large swathe of inaccessible territory, the state's writ does not run, and the Naxalites have been able to establish a parallel and alternative order that has largely benefited the poor – especially the Dalits and Adivasis (Banerjee 2008). From the investigation carried out by the Planning Commission Group of Experts in the Naxalite areas, it appears that the Naxalites (or the Maoists) are actually carrying out the reforms that the executive ought to have implemented, and are replacing the judiciary and police in ensuring law and order for the poor and the oppressed.¹⁸

¹⁷ Aiyar concluded on haunting note: It is a horror that while in terms of millionaires* Indian ranks 8th in the world, in terms of the Human Development Index it ranks at 127 (Jain 2007). Currently, India ranks 128 in world (Human Development Report 2007/08). *The Constitutional mandate (Article 39) to prevent concentration of wealth in a few hands is ignored in policy making.

¹⁸ For instances: In Bihar, the government had taken under its possession land which had been declared as beyond the ceiling that a landlord can own. The report states that the 'government has the power to redistribute such land to the poor, but has failed to do so'. On the other hand, 'the Naxalite movement has succeeded in helping the landless to occupy a substantial extent of government land whether for homesteads or for cultivation; Similarly, in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra, Orissa and Jharkhand, the Naxalites have led the adivasis to occupy forest lands that they should have enjoyed in the normal course of things under their traditional recognised rights, but which were denied by government officials through forest settlement proceedings that have 'taken place behind the back and over the head of the adivasi forest dwellers'; While the government remained indifferent to the need for paying minimum wages to the adivasi tendu leaf gatherers in Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites by launching a movement have secured increases in the rate of payment for picking the tendu leaf; The practice of forced labour ('begari') in the same state, under which the toiling castes had to provide free labour to the upper castes - and which should have been abolished by the government under Articles 14 to 17 of the Constitution - was done away with due to a 'major upsurge led by the Naxalites in the late 1970s and early 1980s of the last century; Commenting on the 'people's court (*Jan Adalat*), set up by the Naxalites in their areas of control, the report observes that 'disputes are resolved in a tough and ready manner, and generally in the interest of the weaker party'.

Sumanta Banerjee (2008) puts across that the state should recognise this reality and legitimize the positive Naxalite contribution to the implementation of the pro-poor laws – which state had failed to carry out.

As the responsibility of the State for providing equal social rights recedes in the sphere of policymaking, we have two worlds of education, two worlds of health, two worlds of transport and two worlds of housing, with a gaping divide in between. With globalisation of information, awareness of opportunities and possible life styles are spreading but the entitlements are receding. The directional shift in Government policies towards modernisation and mechanisation, export orientation, diversification to produce for the market, withdrawal of various subsidy regimes and exposure to global trade has been an important factor in hurting the poor in several ways.¹⁹

Unfortunately, land reform does not figure in the agenda of the Indian state in the post-liberalisation era. The Union as well as the state governments, including the Left Front government in West Bengal, are busy wooing FDI, obviously in a bid to cash in on the ‘advantages’ of globalisation. Indeed, globalisation is as much a policy-oriented and planned process as it is fortuitous one in the era of increased international travel and the IT boom, but a government can push the agenda of the forces of globalisation by being oblivious of its own ground realities only on its own peril. If a large part of the Indian populace is tied to land and forests and dependent on it for livelihood, this reality has to be part of the government’s globalisation oriented policies too (Mehra 2007).

The contrast between the forces of globalisation and Naxalism in India, explains the prosperity-poverty dyad that coexists. Bhonsle (2007) observes that the reality is that both these trends are significant for national development. For without integrating with the global economy, India cannot acquire the resources to develop its, ‘others’ in which the Naxals operate and without developing the, ‘others’ we cannot call ourselves citizens of a developed world, an aspiration of every Indian. He further asserts that the Naxalism thus needs to be understood as a phenomenon of ‘nation-building’, as its failed dimension, needing urgent palliatives essentially at the grass roots level.

¹⁹ Remark by the authors of “Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas”; An Expert Group Report of Planning Commission of India, 2008.

Mehra (2007) reminded that the Naxal violence has not caused dysfunction of the Indian state's governance machinery, their malfunctioning (inefficiency, corruption, exploitation and violence) leading to the retreat of governance has created a power vacuum as well as the space for the Naxalites (or the Maoists) to take root and find legitimacy amongst the impoverished.

The editorial of Yojana (February, 2007) writes that the government has admitted now that its writ no longer ran in parts of 160 districts affected by Naxalites converting them into "Liberation Zones" and taking upon themselves the functions the state administration and police.

The National Common Minimum Programme of the UPA says that the Union Government does not consider the Naxal violence to be a mere law and order problem and it needs to be tackled as a socio-economic problem. Unless the grievances of the poorest of the country are addressed speedily, their resentment and anger would continue to fuel the Naxalites. Addressing the meeting of the Chief Ministers of Naxalism affected states, the Prime Minister said that 'our strategy to handle Naxal menace has to walk on two legs – one, to have an effective police response and at the same time focus on reducing the sense of deprivation and alienation'.

As Tilak D Gupta (2006) says, 'Naxalism or Maoism would continue to remain an attractive proposition to tens of millions of our impoverished and oppressed masses so long as the unfinished business of agrarian reforms and solution to elementary livelihood problems remain incomplete in vast parts of India. The massive transfer of forest and agricultural land planned by various state governments for developing industry, mining, infrastructure facilities, as well as for agri-business, may only add fuel to the Maoist fire'.

It should be noted that radical groups do not operate in a vacuum but are residues of the structural violence that is implicit in the social and economic system. Naxalism in the study of social movement can be best categorized as a transformative movement. A quest for radical transformation is on, both among the Naxalites (or the Maoists) and those who subscribe to struggle for a structural change in the society. The movement is kept alive certainly to walk out from the acute sense of deprivation to development.

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CONCLUSION

'A PRINCE CANNOT LIVE SECURELY IN A STATE SO LONG AS THOSE LIVE WHOM HE HAS DEPRIVED OF IT.'

- MACHIAVELLI

*On their shoulders they carried a lag of ancient anger,
lit with a recent fuse.*

*There was an edge to this anger that was Naxalite, and
new.*

- Arundhati Roy (*The God of Small Things*).

While the *varna* order ensured for centuries that the 'polluted' and the 'non-complying' dalits and tribals live at the periphery of the society, the same people still continue to stand at the very same place where they were earlier. Devoid of dignity, livelihood and respectable living conditions, they are constantly subjected to inhuman exploitation and torture by the nexus of local administration and contractors. Further, the development schemes for the betterment of their lives exist only on papers, as evident from the development indicators of the region. This causes an acute legitimacy crisis for the state.

When attempts are made by them to get their legal (constitutional) demands like better living conditions, minimum wages, etc. fulfilled, the state machinery which is unable to bring any positive transformation in their lives, resorts to terror tactics and unleashes violence, pushing the system ahead to a more deeper and persistent legitimacy crisis. Since, the very primary conditions of entering into a state contract i.e. security of life and livelihood are breached, the people start looking for other options and in this wake, the mainstream political alternatives get rejected because of their lack of concern and cunning silence. Competing with the state for the same space of legitimacy are the naxal groups. One of their greatest strengths is the simplicity and accuracy of their language of politics and the wide

range of issues covered by them. They have learned to talk to tribals, dalits and the poor in the language of their own necessities. The state in these respects stands at stark contrast.

While the GDP – share market – SEZ centred idiom of development is promoted by state which means impoverishment and displacement of these people in an economy of increasing disparities, the naxalite groups present a far more radical political agenda before them. The restoration of '*Jal, Jangal aur Jamin*' to the indigenous poor find a fascinated target audience among the landless – rightsless tribals and dalits. While the state fails in its repeated assurances of land redistribution and abolition of the untouchability, the naxalite groups get them done in greater magnitude, in their areas of influence. Their integration with the daily lives of these common people bring them closer to them and the diversity of their issues of struggle encompass all aspects of their lives – be it the struggle for minimum wages, or for forest and land rights, or gender equality and health services.

On the other hand, since the state remains absent from the sphere of welfare and development of the common poor, they perceive it as a coercive encroacher, entering in their lives to exploit and torture them [as evident from the use of word 'prashasan' for policemen by the common folk]. The naxalite groups use their earned legitimacy to fan his perception and transform the anguish of people into a political force aimed at the destruction of current socio-economic-political system. Thus improvements in the living conditions of these people are extremely necessary which will require the state machinery to change its stance towards them, amend its understanding of development and transform its images from that of an abusive policeman to a concerned civil servant. Till the time these tasks are accomplished, Naxalism will continue to thrive in such deprived areas as a potent means of social change and transformation.

The reason of the prevailing discontent is observed due to the 'development lag'. The development lag is the gap between material and non-material being. The growing consciousness (which is non-material) of one's rights without any change in their material condition. Furthermore, the so-called development process also gets encountered with the people's resistance in the case of 'incoherent development'.

In contemporary phase, Naxalism got infused with the 'new social movement'. The issue of material gains like ownership of land is not the only thing as in the case of classical 'old social movement' but at the same time it echoes the characteristics of 'new social movement'. The issue of individual rights, dignity, gender, environmentalism [as evident from the voices of tribals against the exploitation of natural resources by 'outsiders'], cultural autonomy, political rights and social justice, public space to be recognised as an actors in the social world is implicit on their manifestation.

Further, despite its pan-Indian colour the social data ranging from different issues in different geo-space confirms the particularism of the movement along with its universalistic characterites of 'class struggle'. The experience of late modernity (where the process of modernity and development is slow) and early post modernity (growing consciousness of human ethics in Indian society without being 'modern') has given rise to the complex conflictual site. The insurrection of globalised order not only widened the gap between haves and have nots but at the same time it increases (unintended) the consciousness of its deprivation among the dispossessed; which can be best understood in Marxian notion, that 'every order and society has seeds of its own destruction'.

Annexure – 1

Level of Economic Development in various Regions of U.P.

Development Indicator	Eastern	Western	Central	Bundelkhand	U.P.
1	2	3	4	5	6

Population

1.	Density of population (per sq.km.) (2001)	776	765	658	280	689
2.	Decennial growth in population (%) (1991-01)	26.35	26.05	24.73	22.32	25.80
3.	Percentage of urban population to total population (2001)	11.78	28.25	25.11	22.46	20.78
4.	Percentage of Scheduled Castes population to total population (1991)	20.70	18.55	26.40	25.70	21.24
5.	Percentage share in State's population (2001)	40.11	36.76	18.17	4.96	100.00
6.	Percentage of villages having population less than 200 to total villages (1991)	14.79	8.95	5.48	9.98	11.07

Health and Education

7.	No. of Allopathic Hospitals/Dispensaries including PHC's per lakh of population (2000-01)	2.87	2.76	2.84	4.20	2.88
8.	No. of beds in Allopathic Hospitals/ Dispensaries (including PHCs) 1998-99 per lakh of population (2000-01)	38.38	33.95	54.67	47.76	40.17

9.	No. of PHCs per lakh of population (2000-01)	2.13	1.85	1.96	3.17	2.05
10.	No. of Maternity and Child Welfare Centre/ Sub-centre per lakh of population (2000-01)	12.29	10.58	11.40	16.30	11.72
11.	Literacy percentage Total (2001)	55.22	58.44	59.04	60.32	57.36
12.	Literacy percentage [Female] (2001)	39.54	44.64	47.12	44.18	42.98
13.	No. of Schools per lakh of population (2001-02)					
	(a) Junior Basic School	48	53	57	72	53
	(b) Senior Basic School	11	12	13	19	12
14.	Teacher pupil ratio (2001-02)					
	(a) Junior Basic School	44	43	45	42	44
	(b) Senior Basic School	31	31	27	24	30

Infrastructural Facilities

15.	Length of PWD Roads per lakh of population (km.) (2000-01)	56.55	59.72	58.86	100.26	60.30
16.	Length of PWD Roads per thousand sq.km. of area (km.) (2000-01)	440.31	455.41	387.66	279.97	415.63
17.	Per capita power consumption (kwh) (2000-01)	169.1	186.5	170.0	155.0	175.0
18.	Percentage of electrified villages to total villages (2001-02)	77.90	88.81	72.55	69.94	79.27
19.	Percentage of net area	69.2	88.01	73.9	42.3	73.7

	irrigated to net area sown (2000-01)					
20.	Percentage of water logged area to total Kharif area (2000-01)	10.22	0.06	0.71	0.00	3.92

Agriculture And Allied

21.	Percentage of holdings of less than 1.0 hectare area (1995-96)	83.00	68.80	76.55	70.30	75.40
22.	Average size of holdings (in hect.) (1995-96)	0.65	1.02	0.83	1.72	0.86
23.	Fertilizer distribution per hectare of gross cropped area (kgs) (2000-01)	116.86	140.60	109.40	36.27	117.05
24.	Gross value of agricultural output per hectare of gross cropped area (1999-2000) (at current prices) (Rs.)	19388	25572	20703	13031	21398
25.	Net sown area per capita rural (hect.) (1999-2000)	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.31	0.13
26.	Productivity of major crops (qtls.hect.) (2000-01)					
i.	Total Foodgrains	20.05	26.18	19.77	10.91	21.04
ii.	Wheat	24.17	32.34	25.54	19.47	27.24
iii.	Rice	20.02	21.58	17.36	9.79	19.77
iv.	Potato	182.10	242.79	168.79	213.12	213.11
v.	Oilseeds	6.39	11.19	7.12	5.52	8.25
vi.	Sugarcane	474.48	578.7	512.79	427.37	547.2
27.	Per capita foodgrains production (kgs) (2000-01)	235.82	288.36	233.39	289.79	257.36

Industry and Minerals

28.	Number of persons employed in registered factories per lakh of population (1996-97)	198	484	723	415	393
29.	Per capita gross value of industrial output (Rs.) (1996-97)	2226	4964	4218	1173	3539
30.	Number of registered working factories per lakh of population (1996-97)	1.1	5.2	3.6	0.9	2.9

Banking and Finance

31.	Credit Deposit ratio (2001-02)	22.32	33.52	32.53	31.13	29.4
32.	No. of Scheduled Commercial Bank per lakh of population (31 March, 2002)	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.3	4.5

Employment and Manpower

33.	Percentage of main workers to total population (1991)	29.5	28.3	30.6	32.7	29.4
35.	Main workers engaged in agriculture to total main workers (1991)	77.3	66.7	72.9	78.4	72.8
36.	Per rural person gross value of agricultural produce. (Rs. at current prices) (1999-2000)	5675	5675	4304	4814	4179
37.	Per capita net output from commodity producing sector. (Rs. at current prices) (1999-2000)	6995	12385	9637	9267	9765

Source: Annual Plan 2003-04, Planning Commission of Uttar Pradesh.

Annexure – 2

Inter-state differences in % of rural households engaged in farming activity

State	% of farmer households
Andhra Pradesh	42
Assam	60
Bihar	61
Chhattisgarh	76
Gujarat	60
Haryana	62
Jammu & Kashmir	91
Jharkhand	77
Karnataka	58
Kerala	44
Madhya Pradesh	67
Maharashtra	56
Orissa	64
Punjab	62
Rajasthan	76
Tamil Nadu	35
Uttar Pradesh	77
West Bengal	57
All-India	60

Source: NSSO (1999-2000).

Annexure – 3

State-wise Displaced Persons including Scheduled Tribes due to Construction of Dams

Sl. No.	States	Name of Project	Total Population facing Displacement	Number of Tribals	% to Col. (4)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1.	Gujarat	Karjan	11,600	11,600	100
2.	Gujarat	Sardar Sarovar	200,000	113,200	56.6
3.	MP	Maheshwar	20,000	12,000	60.0
4.	MP	Bodhghat	12,700	9,387	73.9
5.	Bihar	Icha	30,800	24,640	80.0
6.	Bihar	Chandil	37,600	33,058	87.9
7.	Bihar	Koel Karo	66,000	58,080	88.0
8.	Rajasthan	Mahi Bajaj Sagar	38,400	29,291	76.3
9.	A Pradesh	Polavaram	150,000	79,350	52.9
10.	Bihar	Maithon & Panchet	93,874	53,001	56.5
11.	Orissa	Upper Indravati	18,500	16,502	89.2
12.	HP	Pong	80,000	45,000	56.3
13.	AP & Maharashtra	Inchampalli	38,100	29,063	76.3
14.	Maharashtra	Tultuli	13,600	7,019	51.6
15.	Gujarat	Daman Ganga	8,700	4,237	48.7
16.	HP	Bhakra	36,000	12,514	34.8
17.	Bihar	Masan Reservoir	3,700	1,147	31.0
18.	Gujarat	Ukai Reservoir	52,000	9,838	18.9
Total			911,574	548,927	60.2

Source: Satyajit Singh, Taming the Waters, OUP, 1997 and Government of India. (cited in Meenakshi Hooja)

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