EXCLUSION, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMARTYA SEN AND IRIS MARION YOUNG

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Exclusion, Democracy and Justice: A Comparative Study of Amartya Sen and Iris Marion Young"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to

My Parents,

who are my source of Inspiration.

Acknowledgement

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INTRODUCTION

Man lives in society. The social life is lived in a framework of relationship within which people seek aspects of their social life, a sense of belongingness and inclusion. In fact much of the social life is about what we are, how we include and how we do certain kind of things. In fact, the instinct to seek belongingness and be a part of the social activity drives the individual's urge to live life in its most fulfilling form. Aristotelian account of 'life in terms of activity' takes into consideration such a view of life that values active engagement of the individual in the social processes, so that he or she can live a capable and life. But, lack of enjoying a fulfilling social life can deprive individuals and exclude them from effective participation in the social activities. Such forms of exclusion could be cultural, economic, political and social. These forms of exclusion may arise, due to a variety of reasons, but, the level and context of exclusion faced by the individuals varies depending upon the context of exclusion. . Their final effects are essentially social and inhibit the individuals from making effective participation in the society. That is why, the concept of 'social exclusion' emerges as a broader 'umbrella concept' that takes into consideration a variety of exclusions, each having its own specific characteristic. In this work, I have tried to make a comparative study of the perspectives of Amartya Sen and Iris Marion Young, on the problem of exclusion. But, first of all it is necessary to deal with the relevance of the concept and why as a concept, it is more comprehensive than poverty, in understanding the nature of oppression and deprivation

Theoretically, 'social exclusion' draws upon a diverse set of roots. Originating in France in 1970s, and diffusing throughout the Europe, as an extension of the study of 'Marginalization', social exclusion has been interpreted in many different ways. Lenoir was the first to give the concept, as a compliment to the older concept of market based discrimination. Lenoir categorized the excluded as mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal individuals, aged invalids, abused children, substance users, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal and asocial people, and the other social

misfits. The categorization moved beyond description of poverty, as the only means to deprivation and suffering.

Hilary Silver has defined 'exclusion' as 'rupturing of the social bonds'.[1] She has given certain characteristics of social exclusion and has said that " Social exclusion is (1) multidimensional or socio-economic and encompasses collective as well as individual resources (2) Dynamic or processual, along a trajectory between full integration and multiple exclusion(3) relational, in that exclusion entails social distance or isolation , rejection, humiliation , lack of social support network and denials of participation, (4)active, in that there is a clear agency doing that, and(5) relative context".[2] "Social exclusion is a relational process of declining participation, solidarity, and access".[3]It takes different meanings, depending upon the context or the form of exclusion.[4] The problem of 'social exclusion' based upon various contexts has drawn universal attention. She has stressed on a variety of definitions of the concept, depending upon the context of the 'exclusion'.[5] Hilary Silver has defined social exclusion in terms of the rupturing of the 'social bonds', which is cultural and moral between the individual and society. This definition is in sync with the French Republican tradition of the study of 'social exclusion'.[6] She also talks about, Anglo Saxon tradition which draws from the liberal thinkers like John Locke, who perceives social actors primarily as individuals who are able to move across boundaries of 'social differentiation" and 'economic division of labor'. In this approach, unenforced rights and market failures are the most important causes of 'exclusion'.

Another model, about which she is talking about is liberal model of exclusion. Liberal models of citizenship emphasize the contractual exchange of rights and obligations. The paradigm thus reflects exclusion as 'discrimination', the drawing of

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[1] See, ibid, pp.539.
[2] See, Hilary Silver and S.M. Miller, The European Approach to Social Disadvantage, Indicators,vol.2, no.2, Spring 2003, pp. 8.
[3] Ibid, pp. 3.
[4] Ibid.
5 See, Silver Hilary, Social Exclusion and Social solidarity: Three paradigm, International Labour review, vol.133, 1994/5-6, pp.539-549.
[6] See, ibid,541-542.

group distinction, that denies individuals full participation in exchange or interaction.[7] 'Monopoly Paradigm' is the third paradigm about which Silver is discussing in her works It draws on the work of Weber and is particularly influential in North European countries and in Britain. Unlike the liberal tradition, it emphasizes the existence of hierarchical power relation in the constitution of a 'social order' and in which the 'group monopolies' are seen as responsible for 'exclusion'. Powerful groups restrict the outsiders through 'social enclosure'.[8] The concept of 'social exclusion' defines itself as the process through which the individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live and complete 'social exclusion' is the final culmination of a series of specific 'exclusions'. It is a multidimensional concept which states that people may be excluded from livelihood, employment, earnings, property, housing, education, citizenship, personal contacts, and respect etc.[9]

Bill Jordan has discussed about the relationship of poverty with social exclusion and has stressed that "the relationship of poverty and exclusion should focus on the dynamics between markets and states".[10] He further argues that "the question raised by poverty is therefore, how human beings interacting under conditions of scarcity in all kinds of collectivities (from household to nation states) come to include some vulnerable individuals and exclude others from the benefits of the membership and at what costs to the rest of the members".[11]

Buvinic summarizes the meaning of social exclusion as the inability of the individual to participate in the basic political, economic, and social functioning of the society, and further adds that social exclusion as "the denial of the equal access of the opportunities imposed by certain groups of society on others". This definition captures three basic characteristics of the social exclusion. First, its effect on the culturally defined 'groups, due to its inherent characteristics. Second, it is embedded in the he further adds that the groups' focus on social exclusion recognizes that people are excluded because of the

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[7] See, ibid, 542-543.

[8] See, ibid, pp.543-544.

[9] See, Silver Hilary," Social Exclusion: The European Approach to social disadvantage." (with S.M.Miller), Indicators,vol 2, no.2, Spring, 2003,pp.11.

[10] Bill Jordan : A theory of Poverty an Social Exclusion . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.5

[11] ibid., p.5.

ascribed rather than achieved features, beyond individual agency and responsibility. The relational understanding of the exclusion takes into account the functioning of economic institution through a network of social relations and its effect in the outcome of social exclusion in terms of low income and high degree of poverty. Social exclusion makes a deep impact on individual's access to the social opportunities if social interaction occurs between group's in power-subordinate relationship.[12]

Arjan de Haan has defined the concept of social exclusion as a process through which individuals and groups are wholly or partially are excluded from full participation in the society in which they live, and finally, it delineates the consequences of exclusion.[13]

Amartya Sen described those people as excluded who are denied " a livelihood, secure permanent employment, earnings, property, credit or land, housing, consumption levels, education, and cultural capital, the welfare state, citizenship and legal equality, democratic participation, public goods, nation or dominant race, family and sociability, humanity, respect, fulfillment, and understanding". He also draws attention to the various dimensions of the notions of social exclusion and draws a distinction between the situation when, some people are kept out and when, they are included on unequal terms. He describes the first as infavourable exclusion and the second as infavorable inclusion.

He also differentiates between "active and passive exclusion". Sen argues, "It is important to distinguish between 'active exclusion- fostering of exclusion through the deliberative policy intervention by the government and or by any other willful agents (to exclude some people from some opportunity) and 'passive exclusion', which works through the social process in which there are no deliberate attempts to exclude, but nevertheless, may result in exclusion from a set of circumstances." He further distinguishes the "constitutive relevance" of exclusion from that of its "instrumental importance". In the former, exclusion has an intrinsic importance of its own, while in the latter, exclusion in itself is not impoverishing, but can lead to the impoverishment of

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[12] Mayra Buvinic, "Social Inclusion In Latin America', in social exclusion and economic development , Mayra Buvinic and Jacquiline Mazza, Eds, pp- 3-32.
[13] Arjan de haan, "Poverty and Social Exclusion : A comparision of debates on Deprivation ", Working paper No:2, Poverty research unit at Sussex, Bringhton: University of Sussex.

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human life. Sen, has argued that the concept of social exclusion can cause severe capability deprivation and vice versa, and it can severely affects the well-being of the individuals and their loss of agency freedom. Amartya Sen, has discussed the relevance, nature and reach of the idea of social exclusion. He described social exclusion in terms of 'capability deprivation' and loss of freedom of action and choice of the individuals.[14] Deprivation leads to the triggering of various kinds of the loss of 'capabilities' which leads to the failure of the person to live a normal social life. 'Capability deprivation' leads to the rupturing of 'social bonds' which leads to the 'social exclusion' of the individual. The concept focuses on the 'multidimensionality' of deprivation and recognizes that people are often deprived of different things at the same time and that 'exclusion' can be analyzed in terms of 'relation' and 'process' that causes deprivation. The concept takes us beyond from mere description of deprivation and focuses attention on social relations, the processes and institutions, causing deprivations. The concept of 'social exclusion' being 'relational' is quite closer to 'vulnerability' and it means insecurity and exposure to 'risks' that are caused due to various 'social arrangements'. Sen's work on 'capability' and 'entitlements' stresses, relational feature of social exclusion.[15] He argues that capabilities and entitlements are not what an individual possesses, but what it enables them to do. It enables them to meet social conventions, participate in social activities and retain self respect. Sen appreciates the 'social exclusion' framework, because it focuses on 'relational' roots of 'deprivation', concentrates attention on features of 'deprivation and the role of 'relational' features in deprivation.[16] He believes that a 'social exclusion' framework reinforces the understanding of poverty as capability deprivation. "The relational nature of the capabilities links the two concepts - capability failure and social exclusion".[17] Sen argues that focus on 'relational' features has great merit to attach to the concept of 'social exclusion', because "the causal factors that are seen as influencing such capabilities will

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[14]See, Amartya Sen, "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny," Office of Environment and SocialDevelopment, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 1 (June 2000), pp.3-6
[15] Ibid., pp., 8-9.
[16]16Ibid. pp. 6-8.
[17]Ibid. p.07

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be inescapably social".[18] , Amartya Sen states that 'freedom' based approach to the concept of social exclusion can help reduce the extent of exclusion and lead to greater inclusion. He states quoting Arrow's "impossibility theorem", that under the collective choice making conditions, the situation of the liberal paradox can be never and it is quite possible that the individual preferences couldn't get reflected in the collective decisions. However he argues that , the 'liberal paradox' could be resolved up to a certain extent by increasing the 'informational base' upon which social decision making process is based. Such an expansion of the informational base will lead to the greater inclusion at collective decision making levels. Informed formulation of the collective choices and social values require, open and free communication based upon reasoned arguments and freedom is a prerequisite for the attainment of such socio-political arrangements which supports free and fair communication.[19] Informed formulation of the social values require, open and free communication based upon, reasoned arguments and freedom is a prerequisite for the attainment of such socio-political arrangements which supports free and fair communication.[20] Democracy, by the guarantee of political freedom ensures free and fair construction and articulation of values and collective decisions and safeguards the conditions and circumstances that ensure the range and reach of such informed and reasoned collective choices . Democracy is a major source for such social, political and economic opportunities and plays an important role in ensuring justice. Democracy's constructive aspect provides institutions and processes in which people can learn from each other and construct social value and choices, which can be used for public policy and social responses.[21] Sen, thus opens up the door to an explicit engagement between the - capability approach and deliberative democracy. The ideals of deliberative democracy like reciprocity, publicity and accountability ensures cooperation among the equal and free members, so that transparent, informed and accountable interaction should happen among the interacting individuals.[22]

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[17]Ibid.p,8.

[19] See, ibid, p.158.

[20] See, ibid, p.158.

[21] Ibid, pp. 153-154.

[22] Amartya Sen , "Development as Freedom" , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000),

Iris Marion Young has given a comprehensive critique of the universal notion of citizenship and distributive justice, how and why the specificity of differences leads to 'exclusion', and how the difference can be used as a 'resource' for political communication leading to 'political inclusion' as the realization of justice. Young has discussed critically about the 'structural' nature of oppression throughout her work. She has given a critique of the essentialist notion of identity and argues that a 'relational' understanding of identity can be a better option for more inclusive restructuring of the society. Structural injustices can cause 'oppression' and domination. Young proposes five different forms of oppression, which either leads to or reinforces exclusion in its various forms. These are; Exploitation, Marginalization, Powerlessness, cultural Imperialism and violence.[23] All oppressed people suffer from suppression of their ability to develop and exercise their 'capacities' and express their needs, thoughts and feelings, which leads to the exclusion of the oppressed people from decision-making structures.

Young recognizes, essentialist assumption about identity as a major cause of exclusion.The essentialist meaning of difference submits to the 'logic of identity',when, one group occupies the universal position against which all other positions are measured. The drive to unify the particularity and multiplicity of practices, cultural symbols and ways of relating in clear and distinct categories turns difference into exclusion.[24] According to Iris Marion Young, the idea of impartiality generates a dichotomy between universal and particular, public and private reason and passion. It is because, the view of detachment are abstracted from the particular situations, but the particularities do not 'cease' to exist and thus exclusion and oppression becomes obvious. [25]

Moreover, the decisions arrived at by the impartial decision maker is not arrived at under impartial decision-making procedures, under circumstances of mutual respect and equal power. If there are significant differences of power, resources, access to publicity etc,

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23Ibid. pp. 40.
24Ibid, page 169, also see,Young, Iris Marion, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," Ethics: A Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 99, no. 2, January 1989, pp. 117-142;
25Ibid, pp. 101. also see, Young, Iris Marion, "Equality of Whom? – Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice," Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, no. 1, March 2001, pp. 1-18

then the impartial decision usually yields outcomes in the interest of the more powerful.[26] So, Young concludes that, where differences exist in the form of social groups, where some groups are privileged and others are oppressed, the tendency to universalize the particular usually produces severe forms of exclusion.

This dichotomization of the differences often produces hierarchy where the oppressed is seen in direct contradiction to that of the dominant and often considered as inferior. The latter is often seen as devoid of 'completeness' and 'wholeness' of its identity and it is always made to seek in the 'universal' the meaning of its existence.[27] Here, the difference always means the 'absolute otherness' Young argues that the group difference should be seen as relational rather than 'substantive' categories and 'attributes'. "A relational understanding of group difference rejects exclusion. Difference is then not seen as negation and it does not imply that one group lies outside another group".[28]The specificity of each group requires a specific set rights for each and for some a more comprehensive system of rights. The forms of oppression being 'varied' and 'different', then requires an inclusive understanding of group specific action.[29]

She further adds, that such group specific actions need inclusive political comunication that can ensure better inclusion. . However it is frequently seen that, the effective channels of communication usually remain distorted and the norms of political inclusions are frequently violated. The accepted and privileged means of communication, often, ignore the local and specific voices either consciously or unconsciously. This distortion of the effective and inclusive means of communication leads to the exclusion of the oppressed at the decision making level in the form of 'external' and 'internal' exclusion.[30] Another form of exclusion is called 'Internal exclusion' in which, although the individuals and groups are nominally included in the debate and the decision making process, they are consistently excluded from the whole process, in the sense that either, they do not have any say over the terms and the conditions of the discourse or the

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26op.cit. p. 112.
27Ibid, 117.
28See, Young, Iris Marion, *Justice and the Politics of difference*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990), pp. 171.
29Op.cit. 184.
30See, ibid, page. 53

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interaction privileges specific styles of expression and the participation of some people is simply ignored in the whole process

According to Young, a democracy, particularly may work positively to ensure that these forms of oppression should be limited or eradicated as far as possible. Democratic practice is a means of promoting justice and the norm of 'inclusion' is one of the most important ways of ensuring the effective eradication of oppression and exclusion, because the legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision making process and the opportunity and capability they have to influence the outcomes.

The deliberative democracy promotes a form of communicative model of democratic inclusion in which differentiated social segments struggle and engage each other and across their differences rather than putting those differences aside to invoke a common good. When the members of a democratic republic speak to each other, they know they are answerable to the plurality of others.

I have selected Iris Marion Young and Amartya Sen for a comparative study, because, both of them view exclusion as a relational concept and recognize the specific characteristics and contingencies attached to the specific forms of exclusion. They recognize the fact that the failure to take into account the specific contingencies and specificities could lead to disastrous results and they can produce exclusion at various levels. Both of them believe in the instrumental importance of the deliberative models of democracy, and find that the specificities of the 'situated knowledge' and 'positional objectivity' actually needs to be taken into consideration and more just and inclusive policies could be arrived at. They emphasize on the inclusive political communication and put their emphasis on the democratic procedures, that makes it possible for specific perspective and requirements to get reflected in the collective decision-making processes. It can address the specific requirements of the excluded and the oppressed groups by taking their perspective in the decision making procedures, which can produce substantial changes in their living conditions. Their argument for inclusion of the oppressed in the decision-making procedures is based on the democratic processes that makes the process of inclusion more smooth and fair. Their criticism for the essentialist assumption of

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identity actually opens up the identity for a more comprehensive and relational understanding that allows more 'fluid' articulation of the identity based exclusions.

In my work, I will deal with the concepts of exclusion and the various contingencies which remain associated with the problem. Exclusion of the individuals, remains deeply contingent on the specific circumstances of his or her existences and affects the freedom of the individuals to act and to choose from the 'possible livings'. The exclusion arising due to the neglect of those possible contingencies at decision making levels leads to the shrinkage of the informational base, upon the basis of which collective decisions are arrived at. Such a constrained informational base, fails to make complete evaluation of the extent of exclusion. Structural forms of injustices faced by the individuals further complicates the situation and excludes certain groups from undertaking effective participation in the decision making procedures This leads to the further shrinkage of the informational base, leads to the failure in mapping out the specific causes of exclusion. Universalisation of the dominant group's perspectives, norms and interests, further constrains the informational base, that defines the different as 'deviant' and excludes the individual from the structures of decision making. Such exclusions affect the agency aspect and the well-being aspects of individual's freedom and restricts him from participating in the society freely. The capability deprivation of the individuals, seriously affects his freedom to choose from the possible livings. Essentialist assumption about the identity of the oppressed or the excluded, further adds to the problem of exclusion and leads to the systemic as well as systematic forms of oppression and exclusion. The constrained informational base misses the valuable and important information, that leads to the partial conceptualization of the notion of justice that fails to address such exclusions effectively. . Exclusion from the effective participation in the decision making processes, leads to a vicious circle of injustices which further reinforces the structures of exclusion. This produces structural injustices like domination and oppression and it can severely undermine the capacity of the individual to self development and self determination. My work will try to address these specific concerns and I will try to explore the possibilities of inclusion that is based upon the deliberative model of democracy.

SCHEME OF CHAPTERS

In the First chapter, I have made a study of the relationship between the capability of the individuals and social exclusion and I have tried to explain how, the capability deprivation of the individual leads to the loss of command over various functioning vectors that leads to the loss of the well-being aspect and agency aspect of the individuals' freedom. I will also discuss about the various factors which causes the capability deprivation or the exclusion from active engagement in public sphere, due to essentialist assumptions. I will also discuss about the role of democracy that can expand the informational base for the conceptualization of a more enabling notion of justice, Role of other agencies like market and public action will also be discussed which can promote the inclusion.

In the Second chapter, I will deal with Iris Marion Young's concerns over the structural forms of injustices and insufficiency of distributive notion of justice to address such concerns. I will also discuss about Young's criticism of the universal motion of citizenship and impartiality and how, these assumptions lead to the exclusion and oppression of the "deviant' or the 'other' group. I will also discuss about Young's criticisms of essentialist assumption of identity, and how it causes exclusion. I will discuss about the instrumental role of deliberative democracy, that takes a relational view of social groups' and turns difference into a resource for arriving at more informed and inclusive decisions.

In the Third Chapter, I will make a comparative analysis of the perspectives of both these thinkers on the issues of exclusion, democracy and justice and I will discuss about the crucial role of democracy in expanding the informational bases for arriving at a more comprehensive notion of justice that can address the problem of exclusion by taking the contingencies and differences into account. I will also discuss about the importance of deliberative democracy while arriving at inclusive collective decisions.

CHAPTER- 1

Social Exclusion As Capability Deprivation

"The adversity of exclusion can be made to go hand in hand with the gifts of inclusion".

-Amartya Sen.

Concept of 'social exclusion' is a radically innovative concept in the discipline of social sciences to describe deprivation. The concept's advantage is that it focuses attention on central aspects of 'deprivation' and takes into account those aspects of 'exclusion which remain equally relevant to analysis and policies. The invention of the term 'social exclusion' is attributed to Rene Lenoir, Secretaire d'Etat a l' Action Socale, in Chirac government of France, who published 'Les exclus Un Francais sur dix' in 1974, claiming that 1/10th of the French population is socially 'excluded' such as "mentally and physically challenged, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance abusers, delinquent single parents, multi problem households, marginal, asocial persons and other such outfits."[1]

Amartya Sen, has discussed the relevance, nature and reach of the idea of social exclusion. He described social exclusion in terms of 'capability deprivation' and loss of freedom of action and choice of the individuals.[2] Deprivation leads to the triggering of various kinds of the loss of 'capabilities' which leads to the failure of the person to live a normal social life. 'Capability deprivation' leads to the rupturing of 'social bonds' which leads to the 'social exclusion' of the individual.[3] Amartya Sen has asked some fundamental questions regarding the relevance of the concept in terms of 'capability deprivation', like; does it contribute to our understanding of the nature and causes of poverty? Does it help in the formulation of policy and action that can help in alleviating poverty? How would be our understanding of poverty be influenced by the concept of social exclusion? How the policy formulation be any different?

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1 See, Silver, Hilary, Reconceptualizing Social Disadvantage: Three Paradigms of Social Exclusion, in Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality and Responses, edited by George Rodgers, Charles Gore, and Jose Figueiredo, Geneva, International Institute for Labor Studies.1995, pp. 60.

2 See, Sen Amartya, "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny," Office of Environment and SocialDevelopment, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 1 (June 2000), pp.3-6

3 Ibid, pp.3-6 .

These questions are fundamental and require 'capability' based approach to answer them. According to Amartya Sen, Poverty is not merely a loss or shortage of income. It is a complete failure of the individual to exercise his 'capability' that the individual may command and causing the loss of freedom to live the life the way, one has reason to live or to choose.[4] 'Social exclusion' due to 'capability deprivation' causes severe damage to the 'well-being' and 'agency-aspect' of the individual's 'freedom' and make him devoid of his 'capabilities' to act or to choose.[5]

The concept focuses on the 'multidimensionality' of deprivation and recognizes that people are often deprived of different things at same time and that 'exclusion' can be analyzed in terms of 'relation' and 'process' that causes deprivation. The concept takes us beyond from mere description of deprivation and focuses attention on social relations, the processes and institutions, causing deprivations. The concept of 'social exclusion' being 'relational' is very closer to 'vulnerability' and it means insecurity and exposure to 'risks' that are caused due to various 'social arrangements'. Sen's work on 'capability' and 'entitlements' stresses, relational feature of social exclusion.[6] He argues that capabilities and entitlements are not what an individual possess, but what it enables them to do. It enable them to meet social conventions, participate in social activities and retain self respect. Sen appreciates the 'social exclusion' framework, because it focuses on 'relational' roots of 'deprivation', concentrates attention on features of 'deprivation and the role of 'relational' features in deprivation.[7] He believes that a 'social exclusion' framework reinforces the understanding of poverty as capability deprivation. "The relational nature of the capabilities links the two concepts - capability failure and social exclusion".[8] Sen argues that focus on 'relational' features has great merit to attach to the concept of 'social exclusion', because "the causal factors that are seen as influencing such capabilities will be inescapably social".[9]

He makes two distinctions within the concept of social exclusion. First, he

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4 Ibid, p.4.
5 See, Sen,Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000)
6 See, Sen Amartya, "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny." Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 1 (June 2000). 8-9.
7 Ibid, p. 6-8.
8 Ibid, p.07
9 Ibid, p 8.

distinguishes the 'constitutive' relevance of exclusion (analyzing 'exclusion' due to intrinsic importance of own) from its 'instrumental' importance (exclusion in itself as non impoverishing but can lead to impoverishment).[10] Second, he differentiates between 'active' and 'passive' forms of 'exclusion'. 'Active exclusion' occurs because of the deliberate attempt to exclude whereas in the 'passive exclusion' this deliberation is absent.[11] 'Active exclusion' uses deliberate measures to exclude some people or group of people to keep them from the sharing of 'resources', such as, immigrants or refugees being not given a usable political status.[12] Such exclusion restricts the 'freedom' of the individual by restricting the 'range', in which the individuals can make choices, thus reducing his 'freedom' to act freely. 'Passive exclusion' is a process in which the deprivation comes about through social process in which there is no deliberate attempt to exclude, but the 'exclusion' happens due to the 'relational effect' and nature of the social exclusion.[13] It could be the poverty and isolation of the individual generated by the poor economy. Although the 'passive exclusion' doesn't occur due to deliberate attempts, yet the responsible democratic authority cannot withdraw from its responsibility to act and remove the capability deprivation by increasing the freedom of the individuals.[14] In fact active political exclusion has had the effect of helping further social exclusion. These forms of 'exclusions' have deep 'relational' roots with 'capability failures' which leads to such different forms of deprivation. They can be used to analyses the nature and reach of 'social exclusions' arising due to 'capability deprivation'.

Taking into account the Aristotelian idea of 'richness of human life', which was explicitly, linked to 'necessities of life in the sense of activity', Sen advocates that the individuals cannot be excluded from social relations. Impoverished life is one which is without the 'freedom' to undertake important activities that a person has reason to choose. Being excluded from social relations can lead to other 'deprivations' which can further limiting the 'living opportunities'. It is upon the idea of freedom to live the life one wishes to live or to choose, the concept of exclusion can play havoc. Some of the effects of the breakdown of social relations could be understood from the respective of

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10 Ibid, pp.12-14.
11 Ibid, pp. 14-17.
12Ibid, pp.14-17
13 Ibid, pp. 16-17
14 Ibid, p. 15

'social exclusion' like, skill loss and long run damages, loss of freedom, psychological harm and damages, ill health and mortality, loss of human relations and weakening of social values.[15] It leads to the loss of the cognitive capabilities and makes people unfit for the enterprise and labor. Loss of freedom to exercise the capabilities leads to the loss of capacity to make decisions and participate actively in the society.[16] This can directly affect the morale and dignity of the individual leading to intense suffering. Prolonged 'social exclusion' is extremely bad for the individuals as well as families and makes it very difficult to maintain healthy social relations. It causes the weakening of general harmony and coherence within the family that leads to the loss of the self confidence of its family members and their access to organized working life. This leads to the failure of individual in accessing the social security network and health facilities necessary for the well being of the individuals.[17] 'Social exclusion' is dangerous for the society due to its inherent tendency to weaken the social values. Continued 'capability deprivation' could lead to dissatisfaction about the social arrangements. Social cohesion gets ruptured in such conditions producing an unsafe and vulnerable environment that reinforces the oppressive structures of exclusion. In his book 'Development as Freedom' Sen has analyzed the concept of 'social exclusion' that is caused by the 'capability deprivation'. "Development requires the removal of the major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states".[18] 'Capability' approach to the problem of relational nature of social exclusion could serve the various contingencies that are involved in the process of development. The production of 'unfreedom' due to the failure or breakdown of the social relation has procedural as well as consequential effects. By increasing the informational base, upon which, the decision-making process is based, capability expansion through the process of development could be a possible answer.[19] Amartya Sen's capability approach to the problem of social exclusion investigates various possible causes of exclusion, which may arise due to the capability failure of the individuals. Such a capability failure affects the

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15 Ibid. pp. 6-7.
16 Ibid. pp. 20-21.
17 see, Silver, Hilary and Daly, Mary, "Social Exclusion and Social capital: A comparison and Critique", Springer, 37:537-566.
18 see, Sen, Amartya., *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000),pp.3.
19 See,ibid,p.14.

well-being and agency freedom that causes exclusion.

1.1. Capability, Freedom and Social Exclusion

'Exclusion' has been seen by Amartya Sen as capability failure. According to Sen, the 'capability' of the individual is related to the 'well-being' of the individual as well as the freedom to pursue the 'well-being'.[20] Well-being aspect of the individual represents the concerns of the individuals which are related to his own existence and related to achievement of those conditions which are related to one's own constitutive objectives. The 'well-being' of a person could be seen as the quality of the person's life.[21] The quality of any persons' 'well-being' is directly related to the 'functioning' that the person commands. A person's achievement depends heavily upon the 'functioning vectors' that the individuals can command.[22] The relevant 'functionings' can vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, premature mortality etc, to complex functionings such as being happy, having self respect, and taking part in the community life and so on.[23] The assessment of the persons 'well-being' depends upon the command of the person over these 'functionings'. A 'functioning' is an achievement of a person, what he or she manages to do or to be. It reflects a 'part' of the 'state' of the person. It has to be distinguished from the 'commodities' which are used to achieve those 'functionings'. It is different also from the happiness generated by the functioning.[24]

'Capability' is thus determined by the set of the 'functioning vectors' that the individual commands and it represents the person's freedom to live one life or another.[25] It enables the individual to select from 'possible livings'.[26] It is important to note here that the achieving of these functionings is dependent on the process through which the individual achieves various functionings.[27] 'Functioning' is always defined in terms of some

20 see, Sen,Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000)
21 See, ibid, p. 59.
22 See, Sen, Amartya, Commodities and Capabilities,(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999), pp.12-21.
23 see, Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000),pp. 74-75.
24 See, Sen, Amartya , Commodities and Capabilities, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999),pp. 07.
25 Ibid, p. 7
26 Op.cit, p. 76.
27 See, Sen, Amartya, *Rationality and Freedom* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000)pp. 583-622.

particular 'focal variables'.[28] These 'spaces' could vary from 'commodities', 'incomes', 'utilities' etc, and 'capability' depends heavily upon the 'freedom' of the individual to choose from the set of such 'spaces'. 'Freedom of choice' can be of direct importance for the person's 'quality of life' and 'well-being'.[29] Ideally, the capability approach should take note of full extent of 'freedom'' to choose from the set of the 'functioning bundles' and these 'functioning bundles' could comprise of 'utilities', 'incomes', 'commodities' etc.[30]

But, there is a problem with all these 'commodity bundles' to be evaluated for 'functioning' and 'capabilities'.[31] According to Amartya Sen, 'socially excluded' and 'marginalized' people often adjust themselves to their living conditions and do not find 'deprivation' against their 'utility' and 'desire fulfillment' and it may not show up at all in the metric of utilities and desire fulfillment or taking utility as the 'space' for capability evaluation, even though they may remain quite unable to be adequately nourished, decently clothed, minimally educated or poorly sheltered.[32] The problem of 'entrenched deprivation' remains particularly serious in many cases of 'inequality' and it applies particularly to differentiations of class, community, gender, caste etc.[33] Taking income as a 'functioning' for 'capability evaluation' is equally misleading and its effectiveness depends heavily upon the 'contingent' conditions of the individuals life and his ability to convert those 'functioning' into his capabilities for exercising 'freedom' in his acts or choices[34]. Individuals may differ in age, sex, physical and mental health, bodily capacities, intellectual abilities, climatic circumstances, social surroundings and in many other respects. According to Sen, The extent of the real inequality of opportunities that people face cannot be deduced from the magnitude of inequality of incomes, since it depends upon the individuals contingent conditions that determine his or her capacity to convert income into capabilities.[35]

The 'positioning' of the individual in 'social arrangements' depends upon

28 See, Sen, Amartya, *Inequality Reexamined*,(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999), pp.20
29 Ibid, p. 51.
30 see, Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), pp. 74-76.
31 Ibid, ch. 4
32Iibid. pp 50.
33 See, Sen, Amartya, *Inequality Reexamined*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999), p. 16.
34 Ibid, p. 112.
35See, Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), 88-110.

the 'actual achievements' of the individual and upon his 'freedom' to achieve the possible 'functionings'. 'Achievement' is concerned with what the individual manages to accomplish. The 'freedom' to achieve attaches itself to the 'real opportunities' that the individual values to accomplish. This 'freedom' to achieve in turn, depends upon the 'means to achievements' such as Rawlsian concern to the distribution of 'primary goods', Dworkinian concept of distribution of 'resources' and so on.[36] But this dependence is not absolute and "equalizing ownership of the resources or holding of the primary goods need not equalize the substantive freedom enjoyed by the different persons, since there can be significant variations in the conversion of the primary good and resources into freedom".[37] The 'conversion process' involves some extremely complex social issues as well as variations in the physical differences. Deprived and excluded individuals can be guaranteed 'primary goods' and 'resources' but due to the complex social processes as well as his own properties like low metabolic rates, gender, pregnancy, climatic environment, vulnerability to diseases, he could not convert those 'functionings' effectively into his 'freedom' in the same way as any affluent person will do.[38] 'Functioning' could be a 'means to freedom' but the 'achievement' and 'freedom to achieve" depends upon the 'contingent conditions' of social and individual properties. Thus it can be viewed that a person's 'capability' is directly related to his 'well- being' in at least two ways. First, "if the achieved functioning constitutes a person's well-being, then the capability to achieve functioning will constitute the person's freedom to have well-being (i.e , all other alternative combinations of functionings a person can choose to have) will constitute the freedom to have well-being".[39] Second, the connection between 'well-being' and 'capability' depends on the 'capability' to function. Choosing is an important part of exercising 'freedom' and has intrinsic importance of its own which in turn depends upon the 'capability' of the individual to function.[40]

The 'capability' to choose affects both the 'well-being' aspect as well as 'agency' aspect of the individual's 'freedom'. While 'well-being' aspect depends is

36 Op.cit. p. 33.
37 Sen, Amartya, "Capability and Well-Being," in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).pp.34-38.
38 Op.cit, p.44.
39 Ibid, p 41.
40 Ibid. 36. also see, Sen, Amartya, "Capability and Well-Being," in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 35-40.

concerned with the individuals constitutive objectives and existence, the 'agency aspect' of the 'freedom' represents the realization of goals and values one has reason to pursue , whether or not they are committed with ones 'well-being'.[41] A person may not be guided by his 'well-being' aspect of 'freedom' only and 'agency achievement' refers to the persons success in the pursuit of the 'totality' of the considered goals and objectives.[42] Social exclusion affects the achievement of both the aspects of 'freedom' and this failure to achieve the well-being as well as agency aspects of freedom often produces frustration and deprives the individual of his control over his life. It is particularly important for the notion of 'freedom' to have a control over the bringing of the outcomes.[43]

'Social exclusion' as 'capability deprivation' weakens these aspects of the individuality by reducing the 'freedom' of the individual through a reduction in the 'functioning choices' and 'capabilities' of the individual. The 'well-being' of the individual has great importance for the analysis of the 'social inequality' and assessment of public policy. Problems of social injustice and the assessment of the 'inequality' between different groups relates strongly to the extensive disparities in the 'well-being' of the individuals.[44] . Society may provide the relevant personal features like 'liberties', and 'primary goods', 'resources', 'commodity bundles' and various other mixed 'spaces', but the conversion of these functionings depends upon the 'well-being' of the individuals and his potential to convert them into 'capabilities'.[45] These 'functionings' are means to 'freedom' and not 'freedom' in themselves and 'capability expansion' demands empowerment of the 'well-being' aspect of the individuals 'freedom'. 'Social exclusion' due to the 'capability deprivation' of the individual makes the individual unfit for converting these 'functionings' into 'capabilities'.

The structures of capability deprivation could be analyzed through the Arrow's 'impossibility theorem'. Arrows impossibility theorem has tried to relate the collective preference to the set of the individual preferences.. Arrows 'impossibility theorem' states that even a set of very mild looking conditions, including 1) 'Pareto efficiency', 2) 'non dictatorship', 3) 'independence' and 4) 'unrestrained domain' could

41 See, Sen, Amartya, *Inequality Reexamined* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,), pp. 57.
42 Ibid, p.56.
43 Ibid, 58-60.
44 Op.cit, p. 49.
45 See, Sen, Amartya, *Inequality Reexamined* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,), pp. 39-42.

not be satisfied simultaneously and completely.[46] 'Choice problem' for the society comes in many different forms and when distributional issues come into consideration, people seek to maximize their own shares with the concern for other, producing 'inconsistency' at the policy and decision making levels. It is not possible under general circumstances to satisfy these conditions simultaneously. Thus 'preference' based exclusion is quite possible in such circumstances at discussion and decision making levels.[47]

But, it is quite possible to reduce this exclusion through 'informational broadening', in one form or the other, so that the impossibility of the 'social choices' could be resolved 'partially'. 'Formal reasoning' based upon the upon the enhanced 'communicative process' as well as 'informal' understanding of the values and norms arising out of' situational differences can help in reducing the levels of 'exclusion' at decision making levels. This consistency of the varying choices requires an exhaustive understanding and broadening of the 'informational bases'upon the basis of which decisions are arrived at. It should take into consideration the 'excluded' as well as 'included information'.[48] According to Amartya Sen "each evaluative approach can be characterized by its informational basis: the information that is needed for making judgments using that approach and the information that is excluded from a direct evaluative role in that approach. The excluded information is not permitted in to have any direct influence on the evaluative judgment and the whole process remains insensitive to the excluded information."[49] In fact A theory of justice could be understood to a great extent from its 'informational bases' and it needs to take into account both, the 'excluded' as well as 'included' 'information' for arriving at social choices at policy making levels.[50] In fact, the reach and the limits of justice could be understood upon the basis of the basis of the 'informational bases'.. The 'informational bases' could comprise of a variety of information regarding the 'functionings' like 'utility', 'resources', 'primary goods' etc as well as the information about the 'contingent' conditions regarding the 'well-being' of the individuals.[51] For the broadening of the 'informational

46 See, Sen, Amartya,"The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, 89(3), June 1999; also in Les Prix Nobel 1998 (The Nobel Foundation, 1999)
47 See, Sen, Amartya , "Rationality and Freedom"(New delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 117-119.
48 see, Sen, Amartya,"Justice: Means versus Freedoms," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (Spring 1990).
49 see, Sen,Amartya, Development as Freedom, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000),pp. 56.
50 Ibid,pp. 76-78.
51 Ibid, p.81.

bases', an 'interpersonal comparison' of the 'functioning vectors' is required and then the available 'information' could be used for practical evaluation and policy analysis,. For this, purpose, Amartya Sen proposes three different models that may be considered in giving practical shape to the 'foundational concern'.[52] These are as follows:

Direct Approach

"This general approach takes the form of directly examining what can be said about respective advantages by examining and comparing vectors of functionings or their collective bundles as capabilities".[53] The variant in such measurements may include 'total comparison', 'partial ranking' and 'distinguished capability comparisons'. Total comparison involves the ranking of all such vectors vis-à-vis each other in terms of poverty and inequality. Partial ranking requires ranking of some vectors in comparison to others, depending upon the completeness of the evaluative ranking. Distinguished capability "comparison comprises of some particular capability chosen as the focus, without looking for completeness of coverage".[54]

Supplementary Approach

Supplementary approach "is relatively non radical and involves continued use of traditional procedures of interpersonal comparison income spaces, but supplements them by capability considerations".[55] The supplementary approach may focus either on direct comparison of functionings themselves or other factors that may affect or influence the capabilities. Such factors are availability and reach of health care, evidence of gender bias in family allocations and the prevalence and magnitude of joblessness. "Such extensions can enrich the overall understanding of the problems of inequality and poverty".[56]

Indirect approach

Indirect approach "remains focused on the familiar spaces of incomes,

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52 I bid. p. 81
53 Ibid, p81.
54 Ibid,p 61.
55 Ibid, p 81
56 Ibid,pp 82-83.

appropriately adjusted".[57] This approach allows stricter measurement as it is a familiar concept. This approach is distinct from mere of incomes in three different ways. First, in assessing the values of equivalent incomes, one has to consider how income influences the relevant capabilities. Second, it is difficult to take income to measure the inequality and income as a vehicle of inequality reduction. Third, even if the 'distance' between the spaces of income and between the two alternative values may be rather little, but it may produce large impacts under different circumstances.[58]

These three different approaches can be used in different ways, depending upon the context and on the 'information' that is available for consideration. The capability approach takes into consideration all these three different methods for analyzing the concept of justice and analyzing social exclusion as 'capability approach'.. The 'capability deprivation' could be seen at more fundamental levels with the broadening of the 'informational bases'. "The reduction of income poverty alone cannot be the ultimate motivation of anti poverty policies and deprivation should be understood in terms lives people actually lead and freedoms they actually have."[59] It is important to understand that the varying 'contingencies' do affect the process of conversion of 'functionings' into 'capabilities' and it should be given due consideration at policy making levels so that the 'overall freedom' of the individual could be enhanced. The enhancement of the freedom will empower the individual to overcome social exclusion as capability deprivation.

The concept of 'freedom' can cater to the process of 'capability expansion' by increasing it in two ways, i.e. as 'primary end' and 'principal means'.[60] The 'primary end' of freedom relates to the importance of 'substantive freedom' for enriching human life. "Substantive freedom includes elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations such as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality as well as freedom that are associated with being literate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on".[61] The second aspect of freedom as 'principal means' for restricting capability deprivation can be called 'instrumental

57 Ibid, p. 84.
58 Ibid, p. 84.
59 See, Sen, Amartya, *Inequality Reexamined* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,)
60 Op.cit, 36.
61 See, Sen,Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press),2000, 36.

freedom', which concerns the different kinds of rights, 'opportunities' and 'entitlements' that contribute to the expansion of 'freedom'. The importance of 'instrumental freedom' lies in the facts that, advancement of one aspect of 'freedom' can lead to the advancement of other.[62] 'Instrumental freedom' includes 'political freedoms', 'economic facilities', 'social opportunities', 'transparency guarantee's and 'protective security' and 'social security networks'.[63] Democracy can play an important role here. Democracy can cater best to the enhancement of interconnected 'freedoms' as it can "develop and support plurality of institutions, including democratic systems, legal mechanisms, market structures, educational and health provisions, media and other communication facilities".[64] Democracy can ensure 'public arrangements' as well as 'private initiatives' and also 'mixed structures' such as non governmental organizations and cooperative entities. "The issue of public discussions and social participation is thus central to the process of enhancement of freedom and the use of democratic prerogative- both liberties and civil rights- is a crucial part of it."[65]

According to Amartya Sen, it is necessary to demarcate between the 'incomes inequalities' to that of the 'economic equality'. Empirically, the relationship between 'income inequality' and 'inequality' in other relevant 'spaces' can be contingent because of the various economic influences other than income that affect inequalities in individual advantages and substantive freedoms.[66] Different types of contingencies lead to variations in the 'conversion' of incomes into the 'functionings' that can be achieved. It depends upon the democratic framework and the opportunities available in that sphere that the individual could escape deprivation despite the income based economic inequality and thus democracy becomes important due to its 'instrumental role'. It is because, "our conceptualization of economic needs depends crucially upon public debates and discussions and enormous freedom to exercise our basic political liberty and civil rights". It is possible only in a democratically framework that such kinds of 'freedom' could be exercised. Sen has argued that "democracy's urge to guarantee the preeminence of basic political and liberal rights has three different considerations: it's

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62   Ibid ,p. 37.
63 Ibid .,p. 38
64   Ibid, p 53.
65   Ibid, p. 110.
66 See, Sen, Amartya,"From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality," Southern Economic Journal, 64 (1997).,108.

direct importance in human living associated with basic capabilities, it's instrumental role for people in expressing and supporting their claims to political attentions and it's constructive role in the conceptualization of "needs".[67]The exercise of basic political rights and the 'capability' to exercise various opportunities offered by democracy, not only guarantees policy response to 'economic needs' but also the conceptualization of such 'economic needs' itself depends upon the exercise of such rights. Thus the concept of freedom as the exercise of 'procedural' and 'consequential' freedom demands active engagement of democratic institutions with the people to avoid 'capability failure'. The process of framing 'socially inclusive' policies needs the inclusion of the individual preferences at policy levels and requires a 'reasoned social assessment'

In this context, particular importance has to be attached to the role of public decisions and interactions in the emergence of 'shared values' and 'commitments'. 'Preference information' through social interaction can reduce the degree of exclusion at various levels of policy making and the ultimate impact of the policy over the individuals. It is important here to note that "agreed social arrangements and adequate public policies do not require that there should be a unique "social ordering" that completely ranks all the alternative social possibilities. Partial arrangements will separate out acceptable options (and weed out unacceptable ones) and a workable solution can be based on the contingent acceptance of particular provisions, without demanding complete social unanimity."[68]. Political discussions for "informational broadening" help in having coherent and consistent criteria for social and economic assessment. Increased social interaction and social consensus provides the conditions for making social decisions sensitive to the development of individual preferences, norms as well as capabilities.[69]

However, Amartya Sen doesn't give complete responsibility to the society for taking the responsibility of capability formation of the deprived individuals. In *Development as Freedom*, he has argued that the use of socially responsible reasoning and of ideas of justice relate closely to the centrality of individual 'freedom' and can lead to the larger inclusion of the people, "but a division of responsibility that places the burden of looking after a person's interest on another person, can lead to the loss of many

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67 See, Sen,Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000) p. 157
68 Ibid. p.253.
69 Ibid, pp. 279-281.

important things in the form of motivation, involvement and self knowledge that the person himself may be in a unique position to have. Any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces individual responsibility can be counterproductive as there is no substitute for individual responsibility."[70]

But this sense of individual's responsibility is not independent of social context and 'social value'. The recognition of injustice in 'preventable deprivations' is an important and necessary step to make more inclusive policies,and 'socially responsible reasoning' comes into play. Social values can play and have "played an important part in the success of various forms social organizations, including the market mechanisms, democratic politics, elementary civil and political rights, provisions of basic public goods and institutions of public action and protest". Different persons may have very different ways interpreting ethical ideas including those of social justice. The requirements of social justice tend to see individuals as responsible but deprived individuals bearing one's own responsibility and the prerequisite of any effort of inclusion. But, this sense of bearing one's own responsibility largely depends upon the 'substantive freedom' that the individual person enjoys and the requirement of this 'substantive freedom' needed to exercise our responsibilities, are extremely contingent on personal, social and environmental circumstances. Thus; the argument for social support in expanding people's 'freedom' can be seen as an argument for individual responsibility, not against it. The linkage between justice and responsibility works both ways. Without the 'substantive freedom' and the 'capability' to do something, it is quite inevitable that the person may get excluded. Bringing 'freedom' and 'responsibility' to do something requires 'capabilities'. Hence it can be conclude that 'responsibility' should be accompanied with 'freedom' to act and to choose. "The social commitment to the individual's 'freedom' need not operate only through the state but it must involve also other institutions like political and social organizations, community based arrangements, non-governmental agencies of various kinds, the media and other means of public communication, the institutions that allow the functioning of market and other relations". Individual's responsibility cannot be seen in isolation and thus the 'capability deprivation' based

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70 Ibid, p.283.

exclusion needs active engagement of several agencies beyond the state also[71].

Thus, Amartya Sen states that 'freedom' based approach to the concept of social exclusion as capability deprivation can help reduce the extent of exclusion and lead to greater inclusion. The 'liberal paradox' could be resolved up to a certain extent by increasing the 'informational bases' upon which social decision making process is based.[72] The role of public discussion to debate conventional wisdom on both practicalities and valuations can be central to the acknowledgment of injustice and the freedom to participate in critical evaluation and in the process of value formation is among the most crucial elements of social existence.[73] Thus 'freedom' can take care of the 'process aspect' and 'opportunity aspect' itself. The reflection of rationality of individual gets more inclusive in social choice and lesser exclusion with higher degree of inclusion is possible with the enhancement of the individual's 'capability' and hence the freedom has an 'intrinsic' importance attached to the process of development and 'freedom'.

1.2. Social values, Identity and Exclusion

The use of socially responsible reasoning relates closely to the centrality of the individual freedom as it fosters the articulation of social values. The social values play important role in the formation and sustenance of various forms of social organizations, market mechanisms, democracy, provision of basic public goods and institution for public action and protest. Different people may have different ideas and different commitments to values that guide the individual's behavior at different levels. According to Prof. Sen, the values which guide an individual may emerge in quite different ways, depending upon the prevalent contexts. First, it may emerge from the reflection and analysis that may relate directly with the people concern and responsibilities. Second, it may emerge from our willingness to follow conventions. Third, public discussion can have strong influence on value formation. The democratic discussions do affect individual processes and can change the process of decision

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[71] See Sen, Amartya, *Development As Freedom,(* New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000*)* ch.3
72 Ibid, pp261-263.
73 Ibid, p.263

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making. Fourth, values may erupt during the evolutionary selection. [74]

Social exclusion being a relational concept, has deep links with the social values that prevail in the particular context in which the capability deprivation takes place and if these values are taken into consideration at discussion and decision making levels , it is quite possible that exclusion could be reduced up to a great extent, due to inclusive policy making. Amartya Sen argues that the values retain their relevance during the policy formation due to their intrinsic importance. First, informational bases for particular approaches to justice are generally based upon values and taking them into consideration is particularly important for the cogency and reach of the public policy. Second reason is that all public policies are based and dependent on how individuals and groups behave in a society and these values are understood and interpreted under the influence of the prevailing social ethics. For making just and inclusive policies it is required to understand both, the reach and relevance of the objectives and priorities of the people as well as their understanding of justice . Thus it is quite important to take into consideration the value factor while formulating and implementing socially just policies. Capability deprivation needs urgent attention of the public policies and such policies try to implement the priorities that emerge from the social values and their affirmations. These value inclusive public policies should facilitate and enhance public discussions so that the articulation of the policies as well as the values that support them could be kept under constant scrutiny. Active public participation upon equal terms leads to the formulation of socially just policies that can help the individuals to overcome social exclusion due to capability deprivation. [75]

It is important to note here that these social values are deeply related to the identity of the individuals and constitute the most important part of it, Social exclusion upon the essentialist assumption of identity, can deprive the individual from commanding various functioning vectors that can affect his capabilities and freedom to act the way he wants. The most common expression of the exclusion comes out in the form of violence, done by one social group against another that affects the individual's freedom severely and restricts his access to various functionings. These assumptions are based upon the particularistic and essentialist assumptions about the individual's identity.

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74 See, Amartya Sen, *Rationality and Freedom* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,)

[75] See, Sen.Amratya, *Development As Freedom,(* New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000) p.158

Amartya Sen argues against such essentialist assumption of identities which breeds violence and discrimination, only to deprive the individuals, of their capabilities to act and their freedom to choose the way they want to live. He further argues that "the assumption that the people of the world can be uniquely categorized according to some singular and overarching system of partitioning" can lead to some of the most oppressive forms of exclusion and deprivation.[76]

The solitarist approach to identity misinterprets the reality and suppresses the plural dimension of identity.[77] Essentialist and promoted sectarian hatred becomes a powerful weapon to 'brutalize' one group of people against another. If the identity can hold people together, and can make life better, in a community through the use of the social capital, it can also be used to firmly exclude others, if based upon the essentialist assumptions.[78] A person's citizenship, residence, geographic origin, gender, class, politics profession, employment, food habits and social commitments etc, simultaneously belongs to an individual and none of them could be characterized as his only identity. The identity exists in its plurality and with its relational attributes and none of the singular characteristics can represent an individual in his totality.[79] According to Amartya Sen, "the dominant discourse communicates and overemphasizes the communal identity as a matter of self realization and assumes that a person really has no choice in deciding what relative importance to attach to the various groups to which he or she could belong simultaneously".[80] In fact, "we all constantly make choices, if only implicitly about the priorities to be attached to our different affiliations and associations. The freedom to determine our loyalties and priorities between different groups to which we may belong is peculiarly important liberty which we have reason to recognize value and defend".[81] However these choices are always made under particular limits and feasibility of which will depend on individual characteristics and circumstances that determine the alternative possibilities open to the individuals.

The freedom to exercise the plural dimensions of one's identity can

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76 See Amartya , Sen, *Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny* (London: Allen lane, Penguin
      Books, 2006), see, prologue.
77 Ibid, xii.
78 Ibid, p.2.
79 Ibid, xvi.
80 Ibid., p. 25
81 Ibid. p.5

sometimes be extraordinarily be limited by others due to the differences in the perceptions. The individual may remain unaware of the perception of the others towards him which may differ from the self perception of the individual. Such a difference often decays into denigration and decay and this causes the incitation of violence against the vulnerable people. "Charged attributions can incorporate two distinct but interrelated distortions: misdescription of the people belonging to a targeted category and an insistence that misdescribed characteristics are the only relevant features of targeted person's identity".[82] This duality of external imposition of perspective by the dominant discourse of the society creates mistrust among the people and results in identity based exclusions. The foundation of such degradation not only includes misdescription, but also the illusion of singular identity that others must attribute to the person to be demeaned.[83] Even, when, the circumstances change, the identities, which, were meant to demean an individual may remain and get carried over history, only to 'lock' the individuals into their demeaned 'singular identity'. Such demeaning of one's existence, causes severe pain to the stigmatized individuals and serious damage to one's dignity and honor, that seriously affects his capabilities.

The role of reasoned choice in such 'misinterpretations' is often neglected which could have prevented such misconceptions. "If choices exist and yet it is assumed that they are not there, the use of reasoning may well be replaced by the uncritical acceptance of conformist behavior, no matter how rejectable it may be. Typically, such conformist tends to have conservative implications and works in the direction of shielding old customs and practices from intelligent scrutiny".[84] Such acceptance of unreasoned practices often intensify the structures of oppression and exclusion and traditional inequalities such as unequal treatment of women, discrimination against the members of other racial groups, caste lass etc, survive by unquestioned acceptance of received beliefs.[85] Questioning the established facts and traditions through public discussions and deliberation has the potential to change the biased past practices and assumed misconceptions of any group's demeaned identify. 'Choiceless singularity' of human identity impoverishes the power of social and political reasoning and often

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82 Ibid. p.7.
83 Ibid, p. 8.
84 Ibid. p.92.
85 Ibid, p.9.

reinforces the structures of oppression and exclusion.[86] A person enjoys plurality of membership of different social groups and each of these membership stands in relational position to each other. When they compete for attention and priority over each other, then it is the individual, who attaches priority or relative importance to respective memberships of different social groups. Thus, two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, identities are relational as well as plural and second, it is the individual who makes the choices about what relative importance to attach to different 'loyalties' and 'priorities'. [87]

A different kind of reductionism that is often seen in contemporary economic theory is 'Identity disregard'.[88] Amartya Sen. states that this 'reductionist' approach considers human beings as 'rational' agent that seeks to maximize one's own welfare without taking into consideration the values, perspectives and interests of others. However, many 'experimental games' and 'behavioral tests' have denied this assumption and have proved that mutual perceptions and understanding of each other based upon reasoned arguments and arrived at through public discussions, should be taken into consideration while arriving at any collective decision.[89] The inclusion of consideration of identity with other members in a shared group can powerfully influence the individual conduct as well as their mutual interaction.[90] According to Sen, both of the 'reductionist' approaches to human identity, have a tendency to ignore all affiliations and loyalties other than those emerging from a restrictive identity. This has exclusionary potential and may contribute to violence. The representation of plural forms of identity demands reasoned arguments that can help an individual to escape the imposed 'choiceless singularity' of his social identity. This can help the individual to escape the oppressive structures of exclusion that the biased and uninformed decisions of the society may impose upon him, only to curtail his freedom to act.

Although, Amartya Sen talks about the importance of reason in arriving at informed decisions but the 'reason' remains sensitive to the local knowledge, regional

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86 Ibid, pp.16-17.
87 Ibid, p. 25.
88 Ibid, p. 20.
89 See, Amartya , Sen,, *Inequality reexamined* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).
90 Op.cit, p. 22.

norms and particular perceptions and values.[91] It demands for their consideration and inclusion while formulating collective choice for the society as ignoring them may lead to exclusions of various kinds due to its intrinsic character. Local culture determines the nature of reasoning at least in partial forms and can have significant influence over the process through which people arrive at collective decision.[92] Such choices are not always contrary to the informed choices and at times supplement them. Thus, it is quite possible that choices, regarding the relative determination of the values to be taken into consideration, while formulating the collective decisions, depends upon the encumbered position of the individual and can play important role in arriving at informed decisions.[93] The plurality of individuals identity stands opposed to the 'choiceless singularity' of his 'projected' and 'imposed' identity. The articulation of such 'plurality' is best possible in a deliberative model of democracy, as it takes into account the subjective positions, while arriving at any collective decision. . Public discussions and debates helps to arrive at informed and reasoned choices and thus, offers more inclusion at discussion and decision making levels.[94] Greater inclusion means greater access to the functioning vectors like primary goods and resources, which helps the individual to overcome his or her capability deprivation leading to the enhancement of the individual's freedom. This freedom helps the individual to escape the structures of exclusion and oppression that the society imposes on him or her, in the form of 'choiceless singularity' at social interaction levels.[95]

Feminine identity is such a form of exclusion that is produced due to the substantial 'anti-female' bias in the traditional as well as modern societies. Male dominated world has 'systematically' as well as 'systemically' excluded women from the public and the private spheres of the society. This has severely affected the well-being as well as 'agency' aspects of the women's freedom and consistent oppression and exclusion has damaged her capabilities to live a descent and respectful life in the public as well as private spheres of her existence. Male dominance has subordinated the women to their male counterparts and her true potential to achieve her well-being and freedom

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91 Ibid, p. 34.
92 Ibid, p. 34.
93 Ibid, p. 35.
94 Ibid, p. 52-53.
95 Ibid, pp.176-186.

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remains unrealized in most of the cases. Women are more vulnerable to exploitation and deprivations than their male counterparts, under similar circumstances due to their biological differences, reproductive capacity, differences in physical strength and various other factors that put her in a disadvantaged position regarding the conversion of functionings into capabilities.[96] Moreover, the construction of gender codes in the society has further disadvantaged her and has reinforced the structures of exclusion and has confined the women to the private sphere of family, closing her options of paid employment and her freedom to work outside the family. The traditional structures of work division inside and outside of home may disfavor women in comparison to the male. The real roots of exploitation and oppression of the women lies in the private sphere of the household, where the whole process of deprivation starts and takes extremely complex forms of deprivations in the public sphere.

According to Amartya Sen, cooperative conflicts takes particularly important but complex forms of gender relations at family levels, such as the distribution of just benefits between men and women at the family and society level.[97] Women and men stand in conflicting as well as converging interests' relation but due to the superior economic independence of the male in the family structure, it is usually the women's interest that gets dominated. The portion of the individual contribution in economic terms plays a important role in the division of power and family's joint benefits between men and women. As a result the circumstances that influence these perceptions and contribution and entitlements (such as, women's ability to earn an independent income, working outside home, to be educated and to own property) can have deep impacts on such divisions of benefits.[98] This asymmetrical division of labor and benefits at family and society levels deprives the women of several important 'functionings' and culminates in the form of her capability deprivation and loss of freedom to act on her own will.[99] Higher rates of mortality, undernourishment, illiteracy, economic dependence, subordination as a whole, vulnerability to rape and violence are some of the effects of the

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96 See, Amartya Sen, "Hunger and Public Action"(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,), co-authored with Jean Dreze, ch-4
97 See, Amartya Sen, "Co-operation, Inequality and the Family," in G. McNicoll and M. Cain, eds. RuralDevelopment and Population: Institutions and Policy, a supplement to Population andDevelopment Review, 15 (1989).
98 See, Amartya Sen, " Hunger and Public Action"(New Delhi: Oxford University Press)
99 Ibid, p. 34.

capability deprivation that seriously undermines the well being as well as agency aspect of her freedom.[100] Even, if she succeeds in getting some of the functioning vectors such as primary goods and resources, she fails miserably in converting these functionings into capabilities due to the loss of her well being aspect as well as agency aspect of freedom.

He further argues that the well being aspect and agency aspect of the women's freedom have 'substantial interconnection' and 'intersections' and the improvement in the agency aspect of the freedom leads to the improvement in the well being and vice versa.[101] At times, they remain contrary to each other but, they agree in several conditions. Agency aspect of her freedom can influence the nature of public discussions on a variety of 'social subjects', which determine the articulation of social values that affects the well being aspect of her freedom.[102] Higher levels of agency and 'well-being' aspect of her freedom can give women a better control over her life and enhances her ability to convert functioning vectors into capabilities. Empowered women can greatly affect the capability of the family members as she can have a better independence and control over determining the birth rates, child health and child mortality rates, and capacity of the family due to her ability to bring additional income in the family, by working outside of the household.[103] Higher birth rates, high child mortality rate and economic subordination to men, due to her inability to work outside, deprives the women of her 'instrumental' as well as 'substantive' freedom.[104] This seriously affects the child's health, education and other aspects of development, triggering a cyclic process of poverty and capability deprivation in the structure of the family. 'Gendered inequalities' in such circumstances generate severe forms of 'capability deprivation' for the women and this reduces the 'quality' of her life and deprives her of the completeness of life, that she has reason to live.[105]

The inequality in the capabilities produces asymmetrical power relations between men and women and masculine construction of social expectations makes her

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100   See, Sen Amartya, Development as Freedom (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 190.
101   Ibid, pp. 190., 192.
102   Ibid, pp. 193.
103   Ibid, pp. 199-201.
104   Ibid, p. 194.
105   Ibid. ch-4

task of capability building even more difficult.[106] She remains totally oppressed and excluded from effective participation in the public sphere and this leads to the silencing of her voices and concerns at discussion and decision making levels. Illiteracy, poor health, and unawareness toward her rights and entitlements remains unnoticed and unheard at policy making and policy execution levels, which is dominated by the economically superior male.[107] Thus capability building requires the enhanced participation of women at socio-political and economic levels, literacy, good health and education so that she could bring improvement in her well- being and agency aspects of freedom. A capable and empowered women will stand for her rights and get her voices heard at discussion and decision making levels, that can liberate her of her subordination to men. Her social exclusion in the form of capability deprivation demands active public participation, government initiatives and change of mind sets through public discussion and reasoned argument, so that she can get rid of her capability failure to lead a dignified and respectful life that she is entitled to live.

1.3. Capability Expansion as Justice: Democracy, Market and Public action.

As it has been discussed, 'social exclusion' is deeply related to the process of 'capability failure', when, capability can be defined as a set of alternative 'functioning vectors' that may remain available to the individuals under a given social context. The set of functioning vectors are determined and constructed within the choices that a particular social structure offers to the individuals. This set of 'functioning vectors' is deeply affected by the prevailing democratic norms, market structures and social security network based on public action. Democracy, market and public action can together create conditions, necessary for the inclusion of the deprived individuals in the process of deliberation, discussion and decision making.[108] The harmonic functioning of these institutions and agencies ensures political liberty and freedom as it enables the people to get an opportunity to draw attention of the authorities to their state of exclusion and deprivation.

Amartya Sen has discussed about the 'instrumental' and 'constructive' role of political freedom for enhancing the capabilities of the individuals. He states

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106 Ibid,ch-4
107 Ibid, p.194.
108 See, Sen, Amartya, "Public Action for Social Security," in E. Ahmad et al., "Social Security in Developing Countries", (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,).p.24

political freedom is an important requirement, "which ensures unrestrained participation in the political and social activities".[109] Also, informed formulation of the social values require, open and free communication based upon, reasoned arguments and freedom is a prerequisite for the attainment of such socio-political arrangements which supports free and fair communication.[110] To express publicly what an individual values, requires the freedom of speech. The constructive role of freedom ensures that the informed and reasoned choices remain available to the individual so that the individual remains in a better position to control the outcomes of any collective choice.[111] Recognition of the immediate and structural causes of exclusion requires a constructive role of political discussion with free and fair expression of the individuals concerns.

The constructive and protective role of democracy plays an important role in enhancing the choice range of functioning vectors that remain available to the individual at a particular instant of time, as well as, in creating conditions favorable for the efficient conversion of these functioning vectors into capabilities.[112] However, the role of democracy need not be seen as mechanical, as their use depends on the values and priorities that the society characterizes. These priorities and values are conditioned and articulated through public debates and discussions.[113] They remain under the process of constant scrutiny, so that informed and reasoned choices could be arrived at collective levels. Democracy, by the guarantee of political freedom ensures free and fair construction and articulation of such values and safeguards the conditions and circumstances that ensure the range and reach of such informed and reasoned collective choices and values. Democracy is a major source for such social, political and economic opportunities and plays an important role in ensuring justice.

Amartya Sen portrays democracy as a 'demanding system' of governance which ensures broader and wider participation by the individuals.[114] Democracy is intrinsically important and provides every citizen with 'agency freedom' and , 'agency

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109 see , Sen, Amartya, "Development as Freedom" , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), pp. 38.
110 See, ibid, p.158.
111 see, ibid, p. 152.
112 See, ibid, p. 158, Also see, Sen, Amartya, "Democracy as a Universal Value," Journal of Democracy, 10, (1999).
113 Ibid, p. 158.
114 See, Crocker, David.a, "Sen and Deliberative democracy", in, Kaufman, Alexander,edited "Capability Equality: Basic issues and Problems",(New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165-168.

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achievements' as democracy provides its citizens to select their leaders and their policies. Good development provides social arrangements, including democratic processes, in which human beings are free to express their agency, shape their own destiny and be in charge of their own well being.[115] Because an individual's agency or autonomy is one basis for his or her dignity, it becomes clear that, it is important because, it respects people's dignity and their right of 'self determination'. Moreover democracy ensures its citizens with equal respect, status, freedom and opportunities. Democracy becomes important, also, due to the 'procedural fairness' as it provides a fair and equitable procedure for social choice. Citizens command agency and process freedom and they remain free to invoke and utilize procedures that remain equitable.[116]

Democracy's 'instrumental' and 'constructive' roles provide safe guard to the citizens against capability failures by responding to their demands. According to Sen, Democracy's constructive aspect provides institutions and processes in which people can learn from each other and construct social value and choices, which can be used for public policy and social responses.[117] He discusses about various kinds of choices which are guaranteed by the 'constructive' role of the democracy that helps an individual in constructing social roles and values for the attainment of his capabilities. David. A Crocker has identified several merits in the deliberative model of democracy that has been proposed by Amartya Sen. First, it provides a choice of agents and participation and assures that those people should be included in the decision making process which are most affected by the decision. Second, it provides a choice of the process of decision making and guarantees a choice from among several collective choice decision-making procedures. Third, it provides a choice between the well being and agency aspects of freedom. They can remain conflicting at times, and maximization of the agency aspect of the individual can affect the well being aspect of the individual and vice-versa. The constructive role of the democracy can help the individual to priorities from among the well being aspect and agency aspect of the individual keeping the contingencies of the context in view. Fourth, It helps in weighting and choosing of valuable functionings and

115 See, Sen, Amartya, "What's the Point of Democracy," American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, LVII, 3 (Spring 2004).
116 see , Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom* , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000),
117 Ibid, pp. 153-154.

capabilities.[118] Sen states that the society has the freedom and responsibility to choose, which capabilities and functiong are most valuable and to weigh or prioritizes them for diverse purposes in different contexts. This articulation depends upon the social values that determine our choices. Lastly, it offers a choice of distribution and other values. Communities should choose about the pattern of distribution and other such values and various possible interpretation of available alternatives. Every body has the freedom to choose and priorities from just and fair procedures of distribution and to prioritize other values like, efficiency, 'social cohesion', 'social stability' etc.[119]

Thus. Sen opens up the door to an explicit engagement between the capability approach and deliberative democracy. The ideals of deliberative democracy like reciprocity, publicity and accountability ensures cooperation among the equal and free members, so that transparent, informed and accountable interaction should happen among the interacting individuals.[120] This will help the society to arrive at informed and reasoned collective decisions that will facilitate the 'instrumental', 'procedural' and 'constructive' aspects of democracy. The mutual strengthening of the involved institution and procedures will ensure greater participation, engagement and inclusion of the deprived section of the society. Thus, democracy can play a very important role in the eradication of social exclusion which is caused due to the failure of the capabilities of the individuals by enhancing the well-being aspect and the agency aspect of the freedom of the individuals.

Another important agency for enhancing the capability formation is market, as, it has an instrumental role to play in enhancing the efficiency of the freedom of the individuals as well as supplementing the constructive and instrumental role of democracy. According to Amartya Sen, despite the inherent dangers and risks of the market, it has an effective role to play in the process of capability formation as it has direct as well as indirect influence upon the basic functioning vectors like income, utilities, and resources and so on.[121] The market guarantees the freedom of free and fair

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118 see, See, Crocker, David.a, "Sen and Deliberative democracy", in, Kaufman, Alexander,edited "Capability Equality: Basic issues and Problems",(New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165-168.

119 Ibid. p.268

120 See, , Sen, Amartya, "Development as Freedom" , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), Ibid, pp. 272-274.

121 Ibid,p.112.

interaction and provides for arrangements to the individuals so that they can use their entitlements through fair transactions.[122] "Market mechanism, which arouses passion in favor as well as against, is a basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other and undertake mutually advantageous activities."[123] Market fosters the efficiency as well as freedom to the individuals, to act and provides for the arrangement which increases the overall acheivement of the individuals.

Amartya Sen has extensively discussed about the role of market in achieving efficiency and freedom. Taking into account the ' Pareto optimality results' which proves, that, given some circumstances and preconditions, the results of the market mechanisms are not improvable in any way that would enhance everybody's freedom or enhance the utility of some without reducing the utility of anyone else,[124] Amartya Sen has proved that such efficiency results can be achieved in the domain of the freedom also. He states that "with some plausible characterization of substantive individual freedom, an important part of the Arrow-Debreu' efficiency results readily transforms from the space of utilities to that of the individual freedom, both in terms of freedom to choose commodity bundles and in terms of capability to function".[125] With these results, he concludes that for a 'compelling' characterization of the individual freedoms, competitive market equilibrium ensures that no one's freedom can be increased any further while maintaining the freedom of anyone else, unless the mechanism takes informational broadening into consideration while arriving at collective decisions, which increases overall freedom of the individuals.[126] The analogy also states that the importance of substantive freedoms should be judged not only in terms of the numbers of the options one has, but also to take into consideration the available options.[127]. The self-interest maximization logic of market mechanisms may at times, limit the suitabilty of the 'space' of freedom, to Arrow-Debureu theorems convertibility, but, Sen argues that this limitation can be substantially avoided examining the demands of efficiency in terms of

122 Ibid, p. 128.
123 Ibid. p. 142.
124 Ibid, p.117.
125 See, Sen, Amartya, "Markets and Freedoms," Oxford Economic Papers, 45 (1993).
126 See. Sen, Amartya, "Development as Freedom" . (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), pp.118. Also see, Sen, Amartya, " Rationality and Freedom", (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002),pp. 116
127 Ibid, 118 , also see, Sen, Amartya, "Markets and Freedoms," Oxford Economic Papers, 45 (1993).

individual's freedom rather than considering the 'utility' space functions.[128]

Markets take into consideration the process aspect as well as opportunity aspect of the individual's freedom, but due to its self-interest maximization logic, it succeeds only partially in fulfillment. Process aspect of freedom raises issues of decisional autonomy and immunity from encroachment of liberty to act and to choose and market mechanism ensures better efficiency in this domain by enhancing the range of functionings like income, resources etc, that fosters the decisional autonomy"[129]. The opportunity aspect of freedom emphasizes upon the "respective individual preferences and to the corresponding assessment of choices".[130] But the welfarist efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium extends to weak efficiency in terms of opportunities freedom. This extension happens in three steps: " i) moving from welfare achievement to preference fulfillment, ii) moving from preference fulfillment to opportunity freedom in commodity space, iii) moving from commodity space to that of actual opportunities of functioning and capability to function".[131]

The weaker efficiency may be the result of the 'self-maximizing' behavior of the market and due to the possibility of the 'coupling' of the income disadvantage with the disadvantage of converting the incomes into opportunities of 'functionings' and capabilities.[132] But, the market ensures that free and fair procedures to participate in the economic activities which are directly related to the well being aspect as well as the agency aspect of the individuals. It promotes the liberal values of rights, liberty and equality of opportunity that sustains the individuals claim over the control of his own life. The problem arising out of the market functioning are not due to the result of the existence of the market itself but "due to the reasons like inadequate preparedness to meet the use of market transactions, unconstrained concealment of the information or unregulated of the activities that allow the powerful to capitalize on asymmetrical advantages".[133] The overall achievement of the market is deeply contingent on the socio-political arrangements like basic education, the presence of elementary medical facilities,

128 See, Sen, Amartya, " Rationality and Freedom", (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002),pp.
129 Ibid. pp. 510-512.
130 Ibid, pp. 525.
131 Ibid, pp.525.
132 Ibid,p.526
133 See, Sen, Amartya, "Development as Freedom" , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), pp. 142.

the 'availability' of the resources and 'appropriate'public policies.[134] The efficiency results of the market need to be coupled with the guarantee of distributional equity in order to meet the conditions capability enhancement. "The far reaching power of the market mechanisms needs to be supplemented by the creation of the basic social opportunities for social equity and justice".[135] Market should take into consideration the well-being and agency aspects of the individual's freedom to remain inclusive in character. The market mechanism contributes to the expansion of the economic expansion, provides effective means of matching supplies to demand, and yields widespread entitlement generations (through employment generation) and has the potential to become an effective ally in providing social security through public action.[136]

Public action by the act of providing social security to the deprived individuals can play a very important role in protecting and promoting the capabilities of the socially excluded people. Public action need not mean only what is done by the state for the public. It also means what is done by the public for their own well-being.[137] Social security has two strategic goals to meet with. First, it has to work for the 'protection' of living standards from serious decline and secondly, it has work for the 'promotion' of these living standards to permanently higher levels like, eliminating 'endemic' hunger, 'chronic hardship' and 'frequent morbidity' etc.[138] While the former is concerned with preventing a decline in living standards in general and in the basic conditions of living in particular, the later is concerned in dealing with famine prevention and other kinds of sudden economic crises and sharp recessions. While the objective of protection and promotion are different the pursuits of their objectives are not independent of each other. Protection aspect of social security is concerned with the protection of entitlements incomes etc, the promotional aspect is concerned is concerned with the promotion of the functioning vectors so that the capability could be enhanced.[139]

Here it is to be noted that the public action for social security is not an

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134 Ibid, pp.142.
135 Ibid, pp.143.
136 See, Sen, Amartya, "Public Action for Social Security," in E. Ahmad et al., Social Security in Developing Countries(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,),p. 29.
137 Ibid, 28.
138 Ibid, pp.3-4, 31.
139 See, Sen, Amartya, " Hunger and Public Action"(New Delhi: Oxford University Press)

issue related only with state activity, charity, or 'kindly' redistribution.[140] The activism of public, the unity and solidarity of the concerned population, and the participation of all those who are involved are important features of public action for social security. The absolute objective of such public action for social security could not be determined by any single actor, and constant articulation of the foundational issues concerning the whole idea of social security is to be articulated in the light of public debates, discussions and interaction.[141] The idea of social security is deeply concerned with the choice of 'evaluative spaces', and the failure and the success of such social security networks is to be judged on the basis of such variables. It focuses on those 'evaluative spaces' which focuses on the capability of the people to achieve 'valuable functionings' and help the people to achieve the 'valued living conditions'.[142] The success and the failure of the social security would have to be judged in terms of what it does to the lives that people are able to live. The strategy to counter the exclusions produced due to the capability failure thus, remains extremely contingent upon the context of the affected individuals.

Public action for social security has to play an important role in eradicating the capability deprivation even when the society has a high economic growth rate, because social exclusion as capability deprivation is a relational concept and can happen despite a comparatively high income in the developed societies. Even among the poor countries today, some have achieved a great deal in terms of providing social security to the deprived section of the society through deliberately planning the strategy for such security and expanding public support.[143] The social security network can platy a very important role in protecting the entitlements of the people.[144] Public action has to be directed to the variety of economic and social influences that determine the ability of the people to command and use the various functioning. Public action through the social security should look to its power of informal communication channels and political activism in precipitating early action that can lead to the prevention of the capability failure of the individuals. Thus not only the 'growth-led security' but also the 'support-led security' is required for the comprehensive protection of the individuals from the

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140Op.cit,p.2
141 Ibid, pp. 4.
142 See, Sen, Amartya, "Public Action and the Quality of Life in Developing Countries," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 43 (November 1981). pp.31.
143 Ibid, pp.32.
144 See, Sen, Amartya, "Hunger and Public Action"(New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 275-281.

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entitlement failures.[145] Growth can be an engine for the promotion of social security , if the fruits of growth are fairly used for 'social objective'. Here too, there is a positive role for the public action in ensuring the productive use of the fruits of growth in enhancing the living condition of the people and achieving the social security.[146] The public action for social security should be supported by the governmental as well as non governmental organizations and vice-versa and it needs a comprehensive understanding between various civic and governmental bodies.

These three mechanisms are the three different ways which can be combined together to ensure a better kind of social arrangement that can work to ensure that the individual shouldn't suffer from the capability deprivation and their effective freedoms should remain functional. The freedom will, then, ensure that the individuals are getting their due share from the society, who otherwise remains confined to suffering from various forms of injustices. Democracy, market, and social security network through public action can bring opportunity and procedural freedom to the individuals, if, they work in a mutually supplementing and reinforcing manner. Democracy has to play , the most important result here, as it can bring the other two mechanism to work together to ensure capability expansion of the deprived individuals. Social excusion due to capability deprivation, demands active engagement of the social security network, through public action, market and other governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. Only the collective effort of the all these agencies, can ensure capability expansion of the deprived and socially excluded individuals, that can help them to overcome those deprivations, which 'demean' their existence as a respectable human being.

CONCLUSION

Social exclusion as capability deprivation can play havoc to the life of the individual in the form of the losses of freedom of well-being as well as agency aspect of the individuals and if not given proper attention and support through the mechanisms of market, civil society and democracy, it can deprive the individual of his basic rights of living a life with dignity and self respect. Identity based, capability based, gender based

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145 Op.cit, pp. 32.
146 See, Sen, Amartya, "Public Action for Social Security," in E. Ahmad et al., Social Security in Developing Countries" , (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,).p. 32.

and choice based exclusions can happen to the individuals as well as social groups as a whole, that can deprive them of taking active participation in the discussion and decision making processes. This deprivation can cause the individual to loose the control over the various functioning vectors and vice-versa, and thus a vicious circle starts from which it is very difficult for the individuals to get out. In such circumstances, the capability formation of the individual is required through the agencies of democracy, market and public action that can ensure that individual is not getting deprived of his basic capabilities like health, nourishment, education, food, literacy and to live life with dignity. Capability expansion thus becomes an important necessity to fight social exclusion as capability deprivation.

Chapter-2

Difference and Exclusion: Political Inclusion as Justice

Difference is a resource for democracy. Differences of opinion, caste, creed, sex, race, are often seen as specific categories and quite often, they become sites of exclusion due to the existence of a universal notion of citizenship. The formal equality granted by the liberal tradition often negates the specificity of difference and become a reason for the oppression of the marginalized people. Not only this, formal equality granted by the universal notion of citizenship reinforces the structures of oppression and finally leads to exclusion. In this chapter, I am going to discuss about Iris Marion Young critique of the universal notion of citizenship and distributive justice, her conceptualization of the 'politics of difference', how and why the specificity of differences leads to 'exclusion', women 'experiences' and her 'subject positions' and finally how the difference can be used as a 'resource' for political communication leading to 'political inclusion' as the realization of justice.

2.1. Universal Citizenship, Structural Injustices and Exclusion

Young has discussed critically about the 'structural' nature of oppression throughout her work. She has given a critique of the essentialist notion of identity and argues that a 'relational' understanding of identity can be a better option for more inclusive restructuring of the society. Relational nature of identity has better potential of delivering justice as it is coextensive with the political.[1] "Politics in this sense concerns all the aspects of institutional organization, public action, social practices, and habits, and cultural meaning insofar as they are potentially subject to collective evaluation and decision-making".[2] The relational nature of the identity does not 'close' identity in the body of the 'specific'. Rather it 'opens' and offers more 'space' for the accommodation

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[1] See, Young, Iris Marion, *Justice and the Politics Of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990),

[2] *Ibid*, p.9. *Ibid*. page.41,. Also see, *"Five Faces of Oppression,"* The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XIX, no. 4 Summer,1988, pp. 270-290

of the politically oppressed through 'communicative action'. Taking justice at the center of her argument, she proposes a model of democracy where difference acts as a 'resource' for 'political communication'. Her conceptualization of difference as a resource is based upon the Habermasian model of 'deliberative democracy' based upon the notion of 'communicative action'. According to Young, justice should refer to not only distribution, but also the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacilities and collective communication and cooperation.[3] Based upon this notion of justice, injustice refers primarily to two forms of 'disabling constraints', oppression and domination.[4] If one goes beyond the distributive notion of justice, injustice has three other forms also which are 'structural' but not 'distributional' in character. These three forms of injustices emerge due to decision-making procedure, division of labor and culture.[5] So taking these forms collectively, young proposes five different forms of oppression, which either leads to or reinforces exclusion in its various forms. These are; Exploitation, Marginalization, Powerlessness, cultural Imperialism and Violence.[6] *All oppressed people suffer from suppression of their ability to develop and exercise their 'capacities' and express their needs, thoughts and feelings.* In this sense, oppressed people face a common condition. But beyond that the forms of oppression vary and to give an essential form of oppression will be an reductionist approach to the issue of exclusion and oppression.

Oppression could be 'systemic' as well as 'systematic'. It could be visible in the form of tyranny as the systematic oppression of the particular social groups. But the structural notion of oppression is taken into consideration, the systemic character of oppression. Causes of systemic oppression remain embedded in "unquestioned norms, habits and symbols, in the assumptions underlying rules and the collective consequences of following those rules."[7] The systemic form of oppression in this sense refers to injustices suffered by some groups because of "unconscious assumptions and reactions of citizens in ordinary interaction, media, cultural stereotypes and structural features of

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[3] Ibid ,pp.3-9.
[4] Ibid, p., 40.
[5] Ibid, p.,41.
[6] Ibid. *p.,* 40.
[7] Ibid. page.41. Also see, "Five faces of Oppression," *The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XIX, no. 4 Summer,1988, pp. 270-290*

bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms".[8] According to young, it becomes difficult to get rid of structural oppression as it is produced and reproduced in major economic, political and cultural institutions. The forms of oppression arise due to the viewing of social groups as 'essentialist' and 'deterministic' leading to the formation of differentiated hierarchies in the society.[9] To assert that it is possible to have social group difference without oppression, Young argues that it is necessary to have a 'relational' and 'fluid' conceptualization of social groups for creating a more inclusive social and political structure. But, in order to understand the 'relational' and 'non essentialist' understanding of social groups it is necessary to have an understanding of various forms of oppression that Young considers as the foundation of her conceptualization of differentiated group oppression.[10]

Exploitation

The central insight expressed in the concept of exploitation is that this form of "oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to benefit another."[11]The concept of exploitation is based upon the Marxist understanding of exploitation and it enacts a structural relation between various social[12] groups existing in a differentiated hierarchical form. Marxist theory states that every commodity's value depends on the labor time necessary for its production. Labor power is the commodity, which in the process of being consumed produces new value and profit comes from the difference the value of the labor performed and the value of the capacity to labor which the capitalist purchases.[13] It is through the systematic transfer of this profit to the bourgeois from the proletariat that the exploitation takes place. Young use the Marxist understanding of exploitation to explain the exploitation-taking place in the group differentiated society. She states that the relations of oppression are produced and reproduced through a systemic process in which the energy of the oppressed is continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status and wealth of the dominant groups. As a feminist, she uses the concept to explain the exploitation of

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[8] Ibid,p., 41.
[9] Ibid,p.49
[10] Ibid. p.49.
[11] Ibid. p.49,
[12] Ibid.,p.51.
[13] Ibid.,p.51

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women, where the unpaid labor of the women's work performed at domestic level, augments and maintains the patriarchal hegemony.[14] Bringing in, Ann Ferguson's argument she identifies another form of exploitation, where gender socialization of women prepares them for moral and emotional support and women receive little benefit and satisfaction from their overall interaction with men.[15] Women are exploited through the institutionalized mechanism of oppression by the men and remain excluded from the influential participation at the decision-making level. She is excluded systematically as well as systemically from active participation in the public sphere. Similarly, the category of race is also used augment the 'superior' race's claims and status in the society and the jobs performed by the 'inferior' race is supposed to be menial and supportive. Young further argues that, although, this form of oppression called 'exploitation' is structural to asses the extent of injustice, just upon the basis of distributive understanding would be insufficient. "The injustices of exploitation cannot be eliminated by the redistribution of goods, for as long as institutional practices and structural relations remain unaltered the process of transfer will recreate an unequal distribution of benefits. Bringing about justice where the exploitation requires reorganization of institutions and practices of decision making, alteration of division of labor and similar measures of institutional, structural and cultural change."[16]

Marginalization

According to Iris Marion Young, marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression, because "a whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe mental deprivation and even extermination".[17]Material deprivations, which can be addressed by redistributive social policies, cannot reduce marginalization sufficiently. Marginalization produces two other forms of injustice, in which the provisions of welfarist policies deprive the dependants of their rights and freedom and it also blocks the opportunity to

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[14]Ibid., p. 52. For detailed account, see, Delphy, Christine, *"Close to Home; A Materialistic Analysis of Women's Oppression"*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984)
[15] Ibid.,p.,52
[16] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), p.,53.
[17] Ibid.,p.,53.

exercise capacities in 'socially defined and recognized'.[18]The exclusion of dependent persons from the equal citizenship rights is caused due to the exposure of those dependants to "patronizing, punitive, demeaning and arbitrary treatment by the policies and the people associated with welfare bureaucracies".[19] Dependency causes the suspension of basic rights to privacy, respect and individual choices. The notion of dependency is considered inferior as the dominant norm of respectability is constructed around the masculine experience, which values competition and solitary achievements. "Even if the marginals are provided a comfortable life within institutions that provide freedom and dignity, injustice of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness, boredom and lack of self-respect".[20] Thus marginalization represents not only material deprivation but also involves deprivations of cultural, and institutional conditions for exercising their respective capacities in a context of recognition and interaction.

Powerlessness [21]

'Powerless' are those who lack authority or power to decide policies and results. The powerless are situated in such a position in a society where they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labor and the social hierarchy that gives people little opportunity to develop and exercise their skills. "They have little or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity and judgment in their work, have no technical expertise, express themselves awkwardly and do not command respect".[22] Powerless people generally belong to non-professional class of working people who generally lack the long and expensive training to command authority and progressive developments of capacities. Secondly, they do not come at par with the norms of respectability, which is created upon the lines of the dominant culture. All this makes them powerless and they have little or no option to exercise their options.

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[18] Ibid., p.,54.
[19] Ibid., p.,54.
[20] Ibid., p.59.
[21] Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[22] Ibid.,p.57.

Cultural Imperialism[23]

To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meaning of a society renders a particular perspective of one's group invisible, which at the same time they stereotype one's group and mark it out as other .[24]It involves the universalisation of dominant group's experience and culture and its establishment as the norm. Due to the exclusive access to communication and interpretation in a society their cultural products became dominant, most widely circulated and projects itself as universal norm of behavior.[25] An encounter with the other group challenges the dominant groups claim to universality. Due to its normality and universal appeal to its transcendence, the dominant groups' culture constructs the difference. The group that varies from such standards becomes marked as the other. The culturally marked and dominated group then undergoes a paradoxical situation where they are both marked out by the stereotypes and at the same time they remain the 'opposed invisible other'.[26] This paradox creates a strange situation and a state of double consciousness and the opposed group "starts looking at itself through the eyes of other, measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. This 'double consciousness' arises "when the oppressed subject refuses to coincide with this devalued, objectified, stereotyped vision of her or himself, where the subject desires recognition as human, capable of activity, full of hope and possibility. She receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is different, marked or inferior".[27] This leads to the cultural imperialism and the group feels itself being oppressed and excluded.

Violence

Violence has cast depth in its meaning and it covers a wide range of the forms of oppression. According to Young, violence could be systematic as well as systemic. Systematic violence occurs directly and its danger is immediate. It "includes several incidents of harassment and, intimidation and or ridicule simply for the purpose of

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[23] Ibid., p.60.
[24] Ibid,,p.59.
[25] Ibid., p.59.
[26] Ibid., p. 60.
[27] Ibid., p. 60 .

degrading, stigmatizing or humiliating the group members".[28]It is systemic, because, "it is directed at the members of a group simply because they are the members of that group".[29] It exists as a social practice and always exists as the horizon of social imagination as a constant possibility. Thus, to some extent it starts getting legitimacy in the public. Cultural imperialism also leads to violence when it faces challenge to its claims of universality. Violence has its own effects and it is institutionalized through various 'positioning'. Distributive notion of justice fails to understand this form of oppression due to its systemic character and its own failure, of including the systemic character of violence in the broader understanding of providing justice.[30] Violence may emerge out of the situation of material inequality and unequal and inappropriate distribution of goods in the society, but distributive understanding of justice fails to take into account. Violence through its immediate as well as prolonged effects has the power to exclude the oppressed.

These five forms of oppression make it possible to compare 'oppression' and 'exclusion' without reducing them to a common essence or, claiming that one is more fundamental than the other. The recognition of these forms of oppression is the best possible way of avoiding such exclusions. These oppressions occur to social groups, which are based upon the oppressive meaning of group difference. "The oppressive meaning of group difference defines it as absolute otherness, mutual exclusion and categorical opposition".[31] The essentialist meaning of difference submits to the 'logic of identity', one group occupies the universal position against which all other positions are measured. The drive to unify the particularity and multiplicity of practices, cultural symbols and ways of relating in clear and distinct categories turns difference into exclusion.[32]

All the processes of exclusion start with the assumption of the idea of impartiality and universal citizenship. According to Iris Marion Young, the idea of impartiality generates a dichotomy between universal and particular, public and private reason and

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[28] Ibid., p. 61.

[29] Ibid., p.61.

[30] Ibid., p. 63.

[31] Ibid., p.169.

[32] Ibid.., page 169, also see, Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," Ethics: A Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 99, no. 2, January 1989, pp. 117-142;

passion. It is because the view of detachment and dispassion are abstracted from the particular situation, but the particularities themselves do not cease to exist and thus exclusion and oppression becomes obvious. [33]

It is by their idea of impartiality, the dominant group 'universalizes' their own particular perspectives and this helps in justifying the oppressive nature of the decision-making structures. According to Young, the idea of 'impartiality' denies difference in three different ways. First, it denies the particularity of the situation. "Whatever be his or her particular position, any subject can reason from universal point of view according to universal principles and then apply to all moral situation in the same way".[34] Second, "in its requirement of dispassion, impartiality seeks to eliminate heterogeneity in the form of feelings"[35]. Third, "the most important way the idea of impartiality reduces particularity to unity is by reducing the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity".[36] In its will to reduce plurality to unity, impartiality seeks one transcendental moral subjectivity. Later on, she argues that it is almost impossible for anyone to have an impartial reasoning. Reducing difference to unity means bringing them under a universal category and thus creating a hierarchical position between what lies outside the category and valuing more what lies inside.

According to Young, the idea of universal standpoint is not only impossible, but the commitment to this ideal has adverse ideological consequences. By assuming, that reason stands opposed to desire, affection, and the body, it 'excludes' the 'bodily' and 'affective' aspects of human existence. It 'enforces' homogeneity over the public, 'excluding' from the public those groups who do not fit the model of the rational citizen. Attaching her arguments with the feminist concern, Young states that masculine construct of the universal notion of citizenship, 'excludes' the feminine experience, needs, desires, and affection."Modern normative reason and its political expression in the idea of civic republic, then attains unity and coherence through the expulsion and confinement of everything that would threaten to invade the polity with differentiation:

[33] Ibid., pp., 101. also see, Iris Marion Young, "Equality of Whom? – Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice," Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, no. 1, March 2001, pp. 1-18

[34] Ibid.,pp. 101. for detailed account, see, See, Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," Ethics: A Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 99, no. 2, January 1989, pp. 117-142;

[35] Ibid., p. 101.

[36] Ibid., p. 101.

the specificities of women's bodies and desires, difference of race and culture, the variability and heterogeneity of needs, the goals and desires of individual's, the ambiguity and changeability of feelings ".[37] Thus, it is quite evident that commitment to this ideal of universality has 'exclusionary' consequences.

The dangers of universal moral point of view have oppressive structural consequences too. According to Young, it legitimizes bureaucratic authority and hierarchical decision-making process. It reinforces oppression by universalizing the privileged group's norms of rational citizenship. "The idea of impartial decision maker actually functions in the society to legitimize an undemocratic, authoritarian structure of decision-making".[38] The decision arrived at by the impartial decision maker is not arrived at under impartial decision-making procedures under circumstances of mutual respect and equal power. If there are significant differences of power, resources, access to publicity etc, then the impartial decision making under the banner of equal formal opportunity usually yields outcomes in the interest of the more powerful.[39] So , Young concludes that, where differences exist in the form of social groups, where some groups are privileged and others are oppressed, the tendency to universalize the particular usually produces severe forms of exclusion. The members of the privileged group generally occupy decision-making authority. These groups use the authority to 'silence', to ignore and 'construct' the abilities, needs, and norms of others as deviant. The idea of impartiality is projected as civic public, where the public represents universal citizenship and the private individual's difference is represented as deviation, which result in the exclusion of the group from the public.[40]

This dichotomization of the differences, often produces a hierarchy where the oppressed is seen in direct contradiction to that of the dominant and often considered as inferior. The latter is often seen to be devoid of completeness and wholeness in its identity and it is always made to seek the universal meaning of its existence.[41] Here, the difference always means the 'absolute otherness'.

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[37] Ibid.,,p. 111.
[38] See, Iris Marion Young , "How to Think about Making Institutions Just," Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. XXII, no.3, Winter 1991, pp. 92-99.
[39] op.cit. p. 112.
[40] Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990), pp. 116.
[41] Ibid, p.117.

The 'categorical opposition' of the groups represses the difference within the group. Fixing the attributes of the difference is sometimes required for making a positive assertion of the identity and it will be difficult to articulate the positive elements of the group affinity without essentialising them.[42] This essentialisation of the group identity has its own benefits as it can be used to construct group specific affirmative action policies in order to cater to specific requirements, however, such group based affirmative action policies can lead to the emergence of another kind of exclusion as the dominant group oppressed at various levels.[43] The danger in affirming the difference is that the implementation of the group specific policies will reinforce stigma and 'exclusion' and this stops the oppressed group from making a positive assertion of their group identity. One possible way to avoid this situation is to see the difference as relational variation.[44]

Young argues that the group difference should be seen as relational rather than 'substantive' categories and 'attributes'. "A relational understanding of group difference rejects exclusion. Difference is then not seen as negation and it does not imply that one group lies outside another group".[45] They share 'overlapping experiences' and they are always similar in some respects and always share some 'attributes', 'experiences' and 'goals'. Groups may have some common or fixed attributes, which mark these that belongs to the specific groups. Young calls it 'affinity'. "Affinity names the manner of sharing assumptions, affective bonding and networking that recognizably differentiates groups from one another, but not according to some common nature".[46] The group identity is constructed from a 'flowing process' in which the group members mutually identify each other. This group identity remains 'fluid' and keeps 'shifting' with the changes in the 'social processes'.[47]

This relational character of the 'group specificity' gives it strength to become a resource for the democracy. According to Young, a relational approach does not create

[42] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, (London: New Left Books, 1976). p, 45.
[43] op.cit. p. 174
[44] Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 100.
[45] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990), p. 171.
[46] Ibid,,p.172. Also see, "Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict,*Political Theory Newsletter*, vol. 4, 1992, pp. 11-26.
[47] See, op.cit.,171-173. Also see, Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," Ethics: A Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 99, no. 2, January 1989

clear, conceptual and practical borders that distinguish one group member from another. "Conceiving the group differentiation as a function of relation, comparison and interaction allows for the overlap and interdependence among groups and their members".[48] Non-essentialist, 'relational' nature of 'differentiated social group' advocates the idea that these groups exist in a 'social structure', which "can be recognized as a multi dimensional space of differentiated social positions".[49] "Individuals occupying varying positions in the social space stand in determinate relation to one another".[50] All the differences that are created because of these variation are the results of the structured variation. Jean-Paul Sartre calls this aspect of social structure, the 'practico inert'.[51] Most of the conditions under which the people act remain socio-historical with a dynamics of their own. The differentiated social structure remains fluid in its dynamics and it often depends upon the relational character of the groups acting in the matrix of social process. Thus, the individuals and the social groups act according to rules and expectations and the relationally constituted positions 'make' or 'unmake' the certain resources available to them. Anthony Giddens also theories how people's action are based on preexisting structures and in doing so they reproduce those structures.[52] The 'positioning' of the individuals occurs through the process of 'communicative interaction' in which the persons identify one another as belonging to certain 'categories' and standing in 'specific' relation to themselves and the others.

Relational form of identity can be a resource for democracy, but the relational understanding of identity sometimes fails to overcome the visible attributes of the 'subject' in the form of 'scaling' of the 'bodies'. In her book, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Young argues that the body based 'aesthetic judgments' exposes the oppressed people to body based 'exclusion' in which the dominant discourse defines them in terms of bodily characteristics and constructs them as ugly bodies. Pulses of attraction and aversion modulate all interactions, with specific consequences for experience of the body. When the members of the dominant culture define some group as

[48] Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press,2000), p. 91
[49] Ibid., p.93.
[50] Ibid., p., 93.
[51] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, (London: New Left Books, 1976), p.172
[52] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

different, as the other, the members of the group are imprisioned in their bodies".[53] The construction of the bodies as ugly exposes them to harassment and violence and endangers the peace and happiness of their private as well as their public life. She traces the root of sexist and racist exclusion to the structure of the modern reason and its 'self made' opposition to desire, body and affection. "Modern subject represents itself as a self-present origin, standing outside and opposed to the object of knowledge-autonomous, neutral, abstract, and purified of particularity".[54]

According to Foucault, the 'gaze' of the modern scientific reason remains a 'normalizing gaze'. A gaze produces hierarchy among its objects. It measures the subjects, according to the scales that reduce the plurality of attributes to unity, devaluing the particular and defining them as deviant in relation to the norm.[55] "Foucault summarizes five operations that this normalizing gaze brings into play: comparison, differentiation, hierarchisation, homogenization and exclusion".[56] These five operations of normalization ultimately exclude the 'deviant' and the 'universalistic' modern subject, abstracted from the 'material reality' and 'sensuous', 'fluid' living existence rules the 'objects'.[57]

Besides the 'Postmodernist' critique of the universal subject, Young also brings in, Anthony Giddens', 'three-leveled theory of subjectivity' that stands opposed to the 'unified' view of modern 'subject' and which works as an instrument for the 'systemic' exclusion.[58] Actions and interactions, says Giddens, involve 'discursive consciousness', 'practical consciousness' and a 'basic security system'. "Discursive consciousness refers to those aspects of action and situation which are either verbalized or easily verbalizable".[59] 'Practical consciousness' refers to those aspects of actions and situations which involve complex 'reflexive monitoring' of the relation of the subject's body to those of other 'subjects' and the surrounding 'environment', but which remain on the

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[53] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990),p. 123.

[54] Ibid, p. 125.

[55] See, Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of Prison*, Tr. By, Sheridan, Alan,(New York, Pantheon Books,1977), pp- 182-183.

[56] op. cit. p. 126.

[57] Ibid., p. 127.

[58] Ibid., p. 131.

[59] Ibid., p. 131.

'fringe' of 'consciousness', rather than the focus of the 'discursive' attention.[60] 'Practical consciousness' refers to 'habitual awareness' that enables the person to do 'immediate purposive action'.[61] 'Basic security system' refers to the basic level of identity security and a sense of requirement of for any coherent action in social contexts. It is subject's ontological integrity.[62] During the process of the personality development, some experiences are 'repressed' at all the three levels to construct a 'basic sense of autonomy'.

According to Iris Marion Young, racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and other forms of oppression and systemic exclusions take place at the level of 'practical consciousness' and 'basic security system'.[63] Judgments of body based exclusions and oppression originate at these levels. The oppressed and dominated group is stereotyped and is insulted in the public sphere. This whole encounter fills their 'discursive consciousness' with a feeling of exclusion and "throws them back into their group identity, making them feel noticed, marked, conversely invisible, not taken seriously, or worse, demeaned".[64] What is even worse is that, those practicing these forms of exclusion remain unaware of their practices, and they try to suppress such feelings from their discursive consciousness. The worse thing is that, such a public insult and exclusion remains unspoken, as the form of practice remains systemic and unconscious and the oppressed group is 'silenced' and is asked to "not disturb routines by calling attention to forms of interaction".[65] When they do so, they are accused of being overreacting or completely 'misperceiving' the situation. "The courage to bring to discursive consciousness behavior and reactions occurring at the levels of practical consciousness is met with denial and powerful gestures of silencing, which can make oppressed people feel strange and oppressed".[66]

Young tries to explain the fear of which is also responsible for body based

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[60] Ibid., p. 131. Also see, Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 1977.)

[61] Ibid.,p. 131.

[62] Ibid., p.131.

[63] See, Iris Marion Young "Abjection and Oppression: Dynamics of Unconscious Racism, Sexism and Homophobia," in Arlene Dallery and Charles Scott, ed., The Crisis in Continental Philosophy, Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, SUNY Press, Albany, 1990, pp. 201-214.

[64] Iris Marion Young , *Justice and the Politics Of Difference*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990).

[65] Ibid,p.134

[66] Ibid. p.134.

exclusion, through Julia Kristeva's conceptualization of the 'abject'.[67] "Abjection is the feeling of disgust, which, the subject has in encountering certain matters, images, and fantasies the horrible, to which it can only respond with aversion, nausea and distraction".[68] Abject is 'meaningless', 'repulsive' and 'irrational' in unrespectable ways. It is prior to the emergence of the subject in opposition to an object and makes possible the distinction. It is the border, next to subject, that separates it from the object. This border is fragile, as considered by the subject and the subject reacts to this abject with aversion as the means of restoring the border separating self and the other. The meaning of the abject explains an understanding of body aesthetic that defines some group as ugly, fearsome and produces aversion in relation to other groups. Racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and ableism are structured by abjection. The association between the groups and abject matter is socially constructed and locks these groups into the subject's identity and anxieties. The subject then, reacts with fear, nervousness and aversion to the members of these groups because they represent a threat to the identity of the 'self' and to the' basic security system' of the self.[69]

When racism, sexism, hetrosexism and ableism exist at the level of discursive consciousness, the affected group is objectified. However, when group based claims of superiority and inferiority recede from the discursive level, the affected group no longer faces a dominant subject at discursive level.[70]Liberal democracy may provide commitment to principles of equal respect and equal treatment for all persons. At the same time forms of identification, interactive behavior and rules of social conduct clearly differentiates groups at conscious, subconscious and unconscious levels. "There exists a dissonance between the group blind egalitarian truism of discursive consciousness and the group focused routines of practical consciousness. This dissonance creates the sort of border crisis made ripe for the appearance of the abject".[71]. The possible way to avoid the culturally defined racism and sexism is to push all the subjects to an understanding of

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[67] Ibid, p.142.
[68] Op cit. p. 143.
[69] Ibid, p. 143-145.
[70] See, Iris Marion Young , *Justice and the Politics of Difference*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990),p.133
[71] See, Iris Marion, Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).p.146.

themselves as 'plural', 'shifting' and 'heterogeneous'. [72]

It is important to understand here, that the normative political philosophy ignores the aspects of oppression enacted in practical consciousness, as it does not take into account the feelings, desires and affection. According to Young, "If the contemporary form of oppression is enacted through a body aesthetic, through the nervousness and the avoidance motivated by threats to the basic security system and through images and stereotypes that simultaneously feed such behavior, legitimite it, and allay the fears it expresses, then normative reflection to such justice include attention to such phenomena"[73]. A conception of justice should break the limitation of engaging only the discursive consciousness. If the unconscious actions and behavior reproduce the structure of oppression, then they should be judged as unjust and should be brought under the purview of the concept of justice. The agents of oppression, however, should not be blamed for their unconscious and unintended actions that contribute to oppression.[74]

Young proposes that the social change to break the cycle of oppression should be aided by the law and the courts should become willing to count unconscious and unintended actions as responsible for the act of oppression and systemic exclusions. The behavior, stereotypes and images that contribute to oppression of bodily marked people are 'mutually reinforcing and regenerating'. Thus, unless, people do not become aware of their cultural habits, they will not change them. This act of making people aware of their cultural practices that contribute to the unconscious and unintended forms of oppression and exclusion and to change it for the betterment of the society has been called 'cultural revolution' by Iris Marion Young.[75] She further argues that the aesthetic judgement done by the people at the conscious and unconscious level needs to be 'politicized' if it has to be changed for the betterment of the oppressed. Political, cultural discussions, forums and the media should provide for the alternative 'cultural experiment' and 'play'. The subjects should be aware of its 'split' and 'heterogeneous' character and they should try to be comfortable with the heterogeneity within themselves and the heterogeneity of subjects around them.[76] The process of politicizing habits, feelings,

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[72] Ibid.,p.146.
[73] Ibid., p.149.
[74] Ibid., p.150
[75] Ibid.,p.152
[76] Ibid.,p.152

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expressions and desires fosters cultural revolution and leads to politicized personal discussion that leads to 'consciousness raising'.[77] Due to consciousness raising, the aspects of social life that seem to be given and natural come into the question and appear as constructed.[78] The process by which the oppressed group defines their condition of oppression and politicizes the culture that has silenced them, is an important step in countering and reducing the oppression and exclusions. The oppressed should go for the affirmation of its positive group identity and then it can confront the dominant group for the demands of 'specificity'. The specificity of each group requires a specifically set rights for each and for some a more comprehensive system of rights. The forms of oppression being varied and different it, then requires an inclusive understanding of group specific action.[79]

Such group specific actions need inclusive communicative actions that can ensure political communication . However it has been frequently seen that, the effective channels of communication usually remain distorted and the norms of political inclusions are frequently violated. The accepted and privileged means of communication, often, ignore the local and specific voices either consciously or unconsciously. This distortion of the effective and inclusive means of communication leads to the exclusion of the oppressed at the decision making level in the form of 'external' and 'internal' exclusion.[80]

'External exclusion' are those forms of exclusions in which some individuals or groups are kept out of the debate and decision making process and allows some groups to dominate over what happens in them. According to Young, such forms of exclusion basically arises out of the ability of the socially, economically and politically powerful actors to exercise political domination through the deliberate construction of the agenda which they then introduce to the public as an accomplished fact. Such activities violate the most basic norms of democratic participation and remain dangerous for the oppressed, as the oppressed remains unaware of the oppression that they are suffering from, The public authority too, remains biased towards the oppressed and formulates

[77] Ibid., p.153.
[78] See, Iris Marion Young, " *Moral Judgment and Unconscious Prejudices,*" Yeager Hudson and Creighton Peden, ed., *Revolution, Violence and Equality,* the Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. 297-310.
[79] Op.cit.. 184.
[80] See, ibid., p. 53

decisions, which remain oppressive and exclusionary in its outcomes. The benefit usually goes to the dominant group. [81]

Another form of exclusion is called 'Internal exclusion' in which, although the individuals and groups are nominally included in the debate and the decision making process, they are consistently excluded from the whole process, in the sense that either, they do not have any say over the terms and the conditions of the discourse or the interaction privileges specific styles of expression and the participation of some people is simply ignored in the whole process. Young discusses that though formally included in the decision-making structure or processes, people may find that their claims are not taken seriously and may find that they are not being treated with equal respect. The dominant group simply ignores their ideas and perceptions and finds them not worthy of consideration. People's contribution to the discussion in the debate is excluded from the serious consideration, not because of what is said, but because how it is said.[82] The universal and privileged style of expression, which is considered to be devoid of emotional forms of expression and is considered to be based upon reason and arguments, denies any acceptance or space to the emotional forms of expression. These forms of expression are considered to be less respectable forms of communication and the facts represented through these forms of communication are not given due respect in the important discussions by the dominant groups. They project their own styles and form of expressions as superior to those of the oppressed and they project their expressions to be usually based upon the universal norms of reason, and those of the oppressed as irrational and emotionally charged.[83] Masculine biasness at the discursive levels finds the 'feminine' emotional expressions as irrational and disruptive to the whole process of the discourse. This form of exclusion is related to the rejection of the popular or local modes of expression over the dominant groups' mode of expression.

Therefore, Iris Marion Young proposes that the informal forms of communications like, greeting, rhetoric and narrative should be taken into account. These three different forms of communication may supplement a great deal to the effective form of political communication and can help in positively describing the specific

[81] See, Iris Marion Young , Inclusion and Democracy, (New York: Oxford University Press,2000),53-54.
[82] Ibid,pp. 55-56.
[83] See, Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, edited by Seyla Benhabib, Princeton University Press, 1995.

particularities that can produce trust, respect, and a more comprehensive understanding across structural and cultural difference for motivating acceptance and action at discussion and decision making level. All these three modes of communication aid the making of the arguments and enable the understanding and interaction in ways that argument alone cannot. Details of these three forms of political communication will be discussed in later part of the chapter, where it will be shown how these forms of communication can accelerate and enhance the process of political inclusion.[84]

Both these forms of exclusion, internal as well as external, are dangerous can enhance the systemic and structural forms of oppression. Democracies operate through the policies in order to cater to the collective needs of the people and if the people are excluded at the policy discussion and decision making levels, it could lead to marginalization and exclusion of the people to severe levels.

2.2. Universal citizenship, Women and Exclusion

The idea of universal citizenship, which claims to give equal opportunity, rights and equal status to everyone has failed to address the feminist aspirations of emancipation and freedom. Recent feminist analysis of modern political theory and practice increasingly argues that ideals of liberalism and contract theory, such as formal equality and universal rationality, are deeply marred by masculine biases about what it means to be human and rational in a society. According to Iris Marion Young, the deontological tradition of moral theory excludes and devalues women's specific experiences as mere particularistic and 'affective experience of moral life'. The idea of impartial and universal expresses what Theodore Adorno calls a 'logic of identity' that denies and represses differences. The will to unity produces the opposition between reason and desire or affection and oppresses the logic of impartiality which expels desire, affection and the body from reason in order to achieve a transcendental subject which remains deontologised.[85] The deontologised reason then expresses the logic of identity by

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84 See,Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (NewYork:Oxford University Press), p-52.
85 See, Young, Iris Marion. "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory." Praxis International, Vol. 5, no. 4, January 1986

eliminating otherness or differences of subjectivities. However, this totalizing tendency often fails to accommodate the differences and leaves a remainder. After failing to accommodate the remainder. This idea of universal reason dichotomies and puts the particulars in a hierarchical position , with the one confirming to normative reason as superior while the rest as inferior, deviant, irrational and subordinate.[86] The reason, which is considered as a masculine feature then, suppresses the 'feminine' qualities like desire, affection, love and care as inferior to reason and confines it to the private sphere of the household. The logic of impartiality finds emotions, affection, love as dangerous, and damaging for itself and the normalized public order and thus confines it to the household level whereas keeping the masculine universal reason in the public sphere of the society.[87] The value of reason then upheld by the masculine power thereby takes the control of the actions in the public sphere and through the logic of impartiality produces the structures of oppression that exclude women from active participation in the public sphere. In Iris Marion Young's words " By assuming that reason stands opposed to desire, affection and the body, the civic public must exclude bodily and affective aspect of human existence. In practice, this assumption forces the homogeneity of citizens upon the civic public. It excludes from the public those individuals and groups that do not fit into the model of rational citizens who can transcend the body and sentiment. This exclusion is based on two tendencies which the feminist's stress: the opposition between reason and desire and the association of these traits with the kind of person".[88]

She further argues that the social scheme of Rousseau and Hegel in which they have pointed that women should be keep charge of the private sphere of life and shouldn't enter into the public realm as they can fragment it's unity with desire and affection. Their sexuality must be oppressed to keep them chaste and enclosed and to maintain a separate unit of family. This chaste woman will then take care of private life in the family and they should ensure that man's impulses do not remove them from universal the norms of universal reason. Thus, woman was confined to the private sphere in order to remain controlled, oppressed and excluded from participation in the public. In order to further promote the structures of oppression, the state promotes 'intact two

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[86] See, Young, Iris Marion, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (Oxford University Press),page-52.
[87] See, *Impartiality and Civic Public: Some implications of feminist critique of Moral and Political theory*, Iris Marion Young, Praxis International, issue: 4/1985,p.386
[88] Ibid,p. 389.

parent' family, as these families promote the state held values and enable the children to become good citizens. Young however criticizes the notion of 'intact two parent' family and states that it reinforces the subordination of woman as a mother.[89] In such families, it is usually the male that takes care of the economic aspects of the family, protects it and takes the responsibility of both child and the mother whereas the woman as the mother takes care of the child's basic requirements and provides affection, love and cultivates those values in the child which makes them good citizens. Good citizen posses liberal virtues upheld by the state, which are "courage, law abidingness', loyalty, independence, tolerance, willingness to work and delay gratification, adaptability and the ability to discern the right of others".[90] Two parent families are promoted by the state, as it is relatively more independent economically in child upbringing as compared to single parent family.

The state thus actively discourages divorce and single parenthood and thus makes a woman subordinate to a man in a single parent family. It is usually seen that men and women do not share power equally in a family, not because women are passive and traditional, but because they remain dependent on their husband's income for their whole life. This asymmetrical power relation puts women in subordinate position to the male counterpart and this oppression, structured at family level excludes women from active participation at public level.[91] Beyond this the state, which upholds independence in terms of economic needs as civic virtues of utmost importance in a liberal democratic framework, frames policies with masculine bias and treats dependent people as second class citizens. According to Iris Marion Young holding independence in the sense of self sufficiency as a primary form of citizenship accounts for the devaluation of women as subordinate or second class citizen.[92] A society that hold all citizens as equal should must support the contribution of dependency works, recognize it as important and must take into account in framing the gender accountable policies. Single parenthood should must be supported by the state as it helps the women to evade the oppressive structures of subordination in an 'intact two parent' family and policies should support women at

[89] See, Iris Marion Young ,"Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values," Ethics, Vol.105, April, 1995, pp. 535-556
[90] Ibid,, p.543.
[91] Ibid,,pp.546-549
[92] Ibid,,p.548

primary as well as secondary levels of society also.[93]

Family as site of exclusion and oppression of women is responsible for the subordination and suppression of feminine potentialities primarily. However, there are other sites of exclusion also, which are no less oppressive. Iris Marion Young elaborately discusses about the ontological concerns of feminine existence and finds a range of reasons responsible for the oppression and exclusion of women at various levels of society. One of them is about thinking of women as a social group. Young argues that the project of conceptualizing women as a social group and searching for the common characteristics of women or of women's oppression leads to normalization and exclusions"In Foucouldian mode, Butler argues, the idea of gender identity and attempt to describe it, has a normalizing power. The act of gender identity excludes or devalues some bodies, practices and discourses."[94] Thus, it is very difficult as well as oppressive to view women as a social collective. The idea of 'women' as single, coherent, already constituted group considers all women as equally suppressed and powerless. The point, in viewing woman as a social collective has some merits as it helped the feminist movement from getting itself distorted and helped to keep various parallel movements against women's oppression, alive and productive. But, the essentialisation of 'feminine' or 'womanly' characteristics has normalizing effects as it fails to recognize various other forms which refuse categorization.[95]

In order to resolve the dilemma that the questions of feminist movement and the issue of identity of women often faces, Young Proposes to view women as a social collective in the form of Sartrian 'seriality'. She states that naming women as series resolves the dilemma that has developed in the feminist political theory, as it does not claim to identify specific attributes that all women have. "There is a unity to the series of women , but a passive unity, one that doesn't arises from the individuals called women but rather positions them through the material organization of social relations as enabled and constrained by the structural relations of enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of labor. The context of these structures varies enormously from one social

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[93] Ibid.,p.549.

[94] See, Iris Marion Young , Gender as seriality:Thinking about Women as a Social Collective, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society1994, vl.19, no.3.715.

[95] Ibid., p.716

context to the next".[96] Thinking about gender as seriality, disconnects gender from identity. Sartre has distinguished between group and seriality, upon the basis of the fact that unlike group, subjects structured in the seriality, do not identify with one another, do not affirm themselves as being engaged in a shared enterprise and or identify themselves as engaged in a shared enterprise or identify themselves with common experiences. In seriality, a person not only experiences others but also himself or herself as an other. "Everyone is the same as the other insofar as he is other than himself".[97]

Using the concept of seriality as a certain level of social existence and in relation with others, Young draws her argument that, "as a series 'woman' is the name of a structural relation to the material objects as they have been produced and organized by a prior history".[98]Women are the individuals who are positioned as 'feminine' by the activities surrounding those structures and objects. The idea of seriality, here, saves the women from the inherent dangers of essentializing tendencies and projecting women as one homogeneous category, felt as equally oppressed, and giving enough possible space to define the possible contingent existences. Young recognizes woman as, "a serial collective defined neither by any common identity nor by any common set of attributes that all individuals in the series share and but, rather, it names a set structural constraints and relations to practico inert objects condition action and its meaning".[99] The gender structures have only passively united them but at deeper levels, they may be suffering from varying forms of exclusion and oppression, that is produced by the totalizing tendencies of essentialisation and the masculinist logic of rationality and state protection.[100] Young also discusses about the exclusion and commodification of women's body due to the market structures and the suppression of feminine sexuality and privileging of the masculine notion of sexuality that aims to control and use it for its own pleasure and excluding it from the public to further maintain the status quo and control.[101]

[96] Iris Marion Young, Gender as seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1994, vol.19, no.3. p. 733.

[97] Jean Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Trans, Alen Sheridan Smith, ed Jonathan Ree, (London: New Left Books, 1976) p.260.

[98] Iris Marion Young, 'Gender as seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1994,vol.19, no.3, pp,728.

[99] Ibid, p.737.

[100] Ibid, p.743-735.

[101] See, Iris Marion Young, "Sexual Ethics in the Age of Epidemic," Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Summer1993.p.191

Feminist movements need to be more sophisticated and diverse to deal with this.

She is also discussing the structural constraints, the body of a woman puts on her and how it puts her in a position of being less efficient in doing certain kinds of work that can be easily done by the male due to their natural physical construction. It puts women at a disadvantaged position in doing or performing certain works that leads to the construction of certain gender roles in the society that perpetuates the division of labor.[102] At another place, Young also discusses the exclusion of women from the sports that are considered to be masculine and exclude women from those sports due to the certain spatiality and construction of the female body. The norms, rules and standards are framed in such a manner that they remain conducive for the male body's construction and difficult for the female body to excel. Such an exclusion of women is characterized by the unconscious biasness of the sports designed against the woman.[103] Another kind of exclusion that happens to the women happens due to their body construction, ability to give birth. The pregnant women may suffer from such disabilities, as drug abuse that can seriously hamper her ability to live a happy and normal life.[104]

Political Inclusion as Justice

Oppressions and exclusions produced due to the conflict between the universal notion of citizenship in a democracy and the difference that it negates or excludes has inhuman consequences, which can lead to severe deprivation in terms of capabilities that the individual may suffer in the form of loss of dignity, respect, equality and justice in various other forms. Marginalization, cultural imperialism, violence, powerlessness, exploitation etc, are some of the most prominent forms of Oppressions that some sections of the society face inevitably and there has been limited alternatives to escape these forms of oppressions and exclusion. A democracy, particularly a welfarist, may work positively to ensure that these forms of oppression should be limited or eradicated as far as possible, but these forms of democracies have their own limitations. In fact, it is a kind of paradox now days that nearly everyone favors democracy, but

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[102] See, Iris Marion,Young "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," Human Studies, Vol. 3, 1980, pp. 137-156

[103] See, Iris Marion Young, "The Exclusion of Women from Sport: Conceptual and Existential Dimensions," Philosophy in Context, Vol. 9, Fall 1979, pp. 44-53

[104] See, Iris Marion Young, "Punishment, Treatment, Empowerment: Three Approaches to Policy for Pregnant Addicts", Feminist Studies, Vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 33-58

apparently few believe that democratic governments can do anything. Using democratic process to promote legal, administrative and social changes in moving toward towards a greater justice, is a hard work. However, there is no point in being pessimistic about the utility of democracy in eradicating the existing forms of exclusions and oppressions in a particular society. Existing democracies are democratic about some issues and institutions and societies may vary in both the extent and intensity of their commitment to democratic practices. Democratic practice is a means of promoting justice and the norm of 'inclusion' is one of the most important ways of ensuring the effective eradication of oppression and exclusion, because the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision making process and the opportunity and capability they have to influence the outcomes. Democratic discussion and decision-making promote political inclusion that can work very effectively to reduce difference-based exclusion in a liberal democratic framework. According to Young, "democratic discussion and decision making can be theorized as a process in which a differentiated social group should attend to the particular situation of others and be willing to work out just solutions to their conflicts and collective problems from across their situated positions".[105]The relational nature of their structured difference can often act as an important resource for democratic discussion and decision-making, thus helping to pluralize and democratize the whole process of arriving at just solutions for the members. Thus, the concept of political inclusion could be an effective, democratic and socially just way to deliver justice to most oppressed and excluded people of the society.[106]

Young has discussed elaborately the various forms of political inclusion that can help the oppressed to have increased participation at discussion and decision making levels. Issues of justice varies for structurally different groups and it is important to take notice of differences in opinion, social positions, structured power, and cultural affiliation in political discussion and decision making that aims to promote justice.[107] She puts forward various alternatives that can provide effective means to better decision making. The deliberative model of democracy may offer a solution to this problem as it

[105] Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy,(New York :Oxford University Press, 2000), Page.07.
[106] Ibid, pp.1-15, (introduction)
[107] Ibid, p.34-37.

guarantees political equality to a great extent by including the affected into the process of decision making by giving free and equal opportunity to speak and by ensuring that none of the participants in the ideal process remain in a position to coerce and threaten others into accepting proposals and outcomes. It recognizes the disagreement but also believes that some kind of agreement is possible between them. Democracy has an important an instrumental role to play here as the citizens expect the government and the democratic public to redress injustice.[108] Thus the deliberative democracy is most conducive to provide justice as it is based on inclusion, political equality, reasonableness and publicity.[109]

The deliberative democracy promotes a form of communicative model of democratic inclusion in which differentiated social segments struggle and engage each other and across their differences rather than putting those differences aside to invoke a common good. When the members of a democratic republic speak to each other, they know they are answerable to the plurality of others. They should try to explain their particular differences, experiences and interests in order to substantiate their arguments and make others aware of these specific natures of their respective problems and disagreements. Since the public engaging in the deliberation remains reasonable and approaches the democratic discussion with an open mind, they keep their initial opinions or preferences always open to revision in relation to ongoing deliberation and discussion.[110] Through the process of communicative rationality, people often come to find that their initial opinions are founded on prejudice or ignorance and they should learn the different experiences of others in order to reach a just political decision and outcome. The claims made by the participants are then justly modified to fit the norms of public expression of their claims that can remain compatible with justice.[111] However, it is always not possible to formulate or sustain a model of democratic communication that remains totally fair without any kind of privileging or biasness, in either determining the structures of discourse or the way discourse is conducted. The existing democracies are deeply structured upon the lines of inequality of wealth, social and economic power, access to knowledge, etc and these inequalities perpetuate institutional conditions, which

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[108] Ibid, p. 178.
[109] Op.cit,pp.23-25.
[110] Ibid,pp.43-47.
[111] Ibid,pp.43-47

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support domination and structures the terms and conditions of discourse in the favor of the dominant.[112] Not only this, even if the members are formally included in the process of communication, they are excluded on the grounds of stereotypes and the way they put their expressions. Reason Based arguments are privileged and a shared premise with a shared discursive framework is modeled which can effectively exclude the expressions of needs, interests and sufferings of injustices as they cannot be voiced in the operative discursive framework. Jean-Francois Lyotard calls this the problem of 'differnd'.[113]

Better and effectively articulated arguments, which require a long training in order to frame it and a lot of expenditure, cannot be easily designed in the accepted norm by the oppressed as it is framed upon the lines of privileged arguments. Moreover, the articulateness of the arguement usually remains culturally specific and those who exhibit such qualities are usually socially privileged. Thus, the norm of articulateness usually privileges the well informed and the well educated and excludes the marginalized from the process of effective democratic communication. In order to overcome the this problem of 'internal inclusion'. Iris Marion Young proposes to incorporate the informal modes of communication, like rhetoric, greeting and narratives which takes into account the specificity of the situated knowledge and can be an effective way of political inclusion as it doesn't privileges' the argument alone as an accepted mode of communication in a deliberative democracy.[114]

The above three forms of communication may help to foster inclusive democratic communication and may emerge as helpful tools to ensure the legitimate, inclusive and comprehensive discussion and decision-making. Young gives importance to formal as well as informal means of communication and equally in the democratic sphere of discussion, as the universalistic conception of rational argument may at times be silencing and oppressive and in that situation only the informal means of communication like greetings, rhetoric and narrative may give voice to the unexpressed and unrecognized at discussion and decision making levels. Thus, effective communication is key to prevent internal and external exclusions and if taken care of, it is quite possible to

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[112] Op.cit, pp.36-37.

[113]See, Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Differend:Phrase in Dispute,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988),p.9.

[114]For detailed account of these concepts, see, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.57-74.

formulate politically just outcomes. The enhanced form of political communication will then not suppress the differences that different groups exhibit during the process of deliberation and discussion. With effective forms of political communication, these differences serve as a resource for the democracy. [115]

According to Young, some scholars, however, do not see the group based politics of difference as a resource for the democracy. The reason is that, they take it with the logic of identity and view identity as substantial and existentialist. Some eminent scholars like David Miller, Tod Gitlin and David Harvey have made a critique of the politics of identity upon the basis of the fact that it destroys the common good.[116] According to them, the politics of difference has turned politics into self-interested demands for recognition and interest promotion. Moreover, this has made the process of dialogues, a very different task as the terms of negotiation are usually interest guided and hence colliding. David Miller argues that the group-based movements are usually, the claims of minority ethnicities for recognition in the nation state. Miller does not entirely reject the idea of politics of difference, but if taken too far, this politics of difference can endanger the national identity.[117] Scholars like David Harvey, however, criticize the politics of difference upon different lines. They argue that the politics of difference freezes different groups into one another rather than uniting them against the power of corporate imperatives that is fundamentally responsible for the misfortune of most of the people. The group-based claims are particularistic and self-regarding fractures the unity of working class and its vision of universal emancipation.[118]

All these claims against the politics of difference are based upon the 'logic of identity' for conceptualizing the groups. However, it is not true, as the relational understanding of the social group differentiation refuses all these claims up to a large extent and states that instead of being a hurdle, group differentiation is a resource for the democracy. Relational understanding of group differentiation, states that social group is a collective of persons differentiated from others by cultural norms, practices, capacities structure of power and privilege. Instead of having essentialist characteristics, the groups are positioned in the social structures through the process of communicative interaction in

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[115] See, ibid, pp.80-83.
[116] See, ibid, pp.83-85.
[117] See, David Miller, On nationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)132.
[118] See, David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996),ch. 12.

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which the persons identify each other standing in specific relation to each other and enforcing norms and expectations in relation to one another, but not under the conditions they chose, but under the structural conditions, they are provided with. Sartre's concept of servility provides an explanation of structural positioning of social agents without constituting their identities[119]

Most of the group conscious claims, however, are not claims to the recognition of identity, but claims for fairness, equal opportunity, and political inclusion. The claims that these group based movements and the politics of difference are merely guided by self-interest competition is also not justified on the grounds that in a deliberative democracy with effective forms of formal as well as informal forms of means of communication, the claims of common good must be subject to deep scrutiny and can be validated only if, it specifically attends to the differentiated social positions perspective.[120] The society where there are structural relations of privilege and disadvantage, explicit inclusion and recognition of 'differentiated group social positions' [121]provide experiential and critical resource for democratic communication that aims to promote justice. Inclusion promotes the oppressed groups to modify the structures of discourse and make available the situated social knowledge of all positions, so that effective discussions and efficient decision-making could be arrived at. Listening to the differentially situated teaches the participants, partiality of their own perspectives and a larger understanding of justice. Inclusion not only acknowledges differentiated social perspectives and divisions but also encourages differently situated groups to give voice to their needs and interests that meets the conditions of reasonableness and publicity.[122]

It is quite possible that in such circumstances, good political communication will be established between the participating actors if they have to make a good understanding of each other's perspectives. Differently situated knowledge may come to each other's knowledge and then they can work together to have a better political outcome. However, such kinds of political communications are not possible in large democracies where public officials, citizens, and citizens with themselves could meet themselves face to face

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[119]See, Sartre, Jean Paul, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, (London: New left Books, 1976), ch.3.

[120] See, Iris Marion Young, "*Justice and Communicative Democracy*," in Roger Gottlieb, ed., *Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics: Dimensions of Radical Philosophy*, Temple University Press, 1993.

[121] See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000,pp.109.

[122] See, ibid., p. 126.

or directly. "In a complex polity of millions of political actors, democratic communication remains fluid, overlapping, diverging and spread over time and space".[123]

Communication in large democracies usually takes place through formal and informal representatives. People who remain oppressed usually complain that they are not properly represented in the influential decisions and decision-making bodies, legislations, commission, boards, task forces and different kinds of Medias. For these reasons, greater inclusion in the democratic process argues for measures that encourage more representation of under- represented, groups, and those groups who are subject to structural inequalities. Iris Marion Young, conceptualizes such representation as a 'differentiated relationship among political actors' engaged in a 'process' extending over 'space' and 'time' and argues that rather than viewing such representation as representation of identity or substitution, political representation should be thought of as a process involving a mediated relation of constituents to one another and to some representatives.[124]

Taking Derrida's concept of 'differance', to formulate another account of representation, she proposes a form of representation that does not require identity to exist in its existentialist form.[125] The 'metaphysics of presence', reduces many identities to one. However, thinking about entities in terms of 'difference' leaves them in their 'plurality' and does not seek for the unity of the identity. Derrida proposes that the opposition such as 'cause and effect', 'presence-absence', 'reality-sign' etc should not be seen as such and it should be thought of in terms of the idea of 'trace', a movement of 'temporalization' that carries the past and the future with it.[126]

Young states that, defining the relationship between the constituents and the representatives and between the constituents themselves, in terms of 'difference', means the 'temporality' of the past and the future that leaves their 'traces' in the actions of each. Thus, the representation as a differentiated relation among plural actors dissolve the paradox of, how, one person can stand for the experience and opinion of many. Young states that the representation is a cycle of anticipation and recollection between

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[123] See, ibid.,p.121.

[124] See, ibid, pp.120-123.

[125] See, ibid, p.127.

[126] For detailed account see, Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays: Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press,1973),

constituents and representatives, in which the discourse and action at each moment bears traces of others. It is always done through the process of anticipation and recollection in the moments of authorization and accountability. [127] The process never gets completed and the cycle of authorization and accountability always leaves the traces of each other in the representatives and the political actors. The relation is then, further strengthened through the process of active deliberation and varying modes of representations. Through the means of institutional representation and discussion, criticism and evaluation at discussion and decision-making levels, citizens keep their representatives accountable and in lieu of that, grant authority to their representatives. Representatives should listen to the people and be able to convey reasons for their judgments.[128]

According to Young, there are several modes of representation in the system that can keep this cycle of authorization and accountability intact and thus leading to form an accountable representation. This representation will take into account, maximum possible perspectives. Representation of perspectives seems to be a more feasible idea than representation of the individuality, as it is a reflection of the situated collective knowledge that frames individuals' own perspective up to a large extent.[129] Young states that although there are various modes of representation that can satisfy the individual's concern of representation, but out of them three are the most important. First, whether, the interests of the individuals are represented in the collective decisions or not. Second, the principles, values and priorities that a person feels important should guide and be voiced in the political discussion. Finally, the person feels represented when those framing the policies should understand and express the kind of social experiences that person has due to his social group positions and history of social group relations. If these three conditions are satisfied that he has been represented at decision-making levels. She calls the first as representation of opinions, second as the representation of interests and the third one as the representation of perspectives. Out of these, representation of perspectives is most important of all.[130]

Group representations arise due to the existence of group differentiation in the

[127]See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), page.129.
[128] See, ibid, p.131.
[129] See, ibid., p. 133.
[130] See, Ibid,..p. 133-138.

society, because differently positioned people have different experiences, history, and social knowledge derived from that 'positioning'. Young calls this "social perspective".[131] The difference in the 'structural location' of different people produces particular location relative experiences and a 'specific knowledge' of social processes and consequences. If the 'situatedness' of the differing group positioning is taken into account , then the idea of social 'perspective' suggests that the agents who are 'close' in the 'social field' have a similar point of view of the 'field' and occurrences within it while those who are distant are more likely see thing differently. "Each social perspective is particular and partial with respect the whole field and from each perspective; some aspects of the reality are more visible than others".[132] Thus, a social perspective does not contain 'determinate specific' content. Thus it becomes more inclusive to promote the representation of group perspective as it is less confrontational than interests and opinions. [133]

Politically marginalized and excluded groups' perspective should must be considered at the decision-making and discussion levels as they need better form of group representation in legislatures , committees, boards, corporate governing bodies, civic association ad state institutions. That is why, the varying forms of 'situated knowledge' must be taken into account and the polity should remain 'plural' in its character.[134] The oppressed and marginalized people may remain politically apathetic and passive due to their prolonged suppression and may not have a substantial perspective at discussion levels. Group representation in its specific and pluralized forms promotes and encourages the participation and engagement of the marginalized. Moreover, such kind of group representation also promotes structurally oppressed groups to question and change the already existing political biasness at discursive levels.[135] These biasness perpetuate injustices that excludes the oppressed from important decision–making structures. This questioning of political biasness, then demands the inclusion of varying forms of perspectives into account. Plurality of social differences takes into account the maximum possible available social knowledge and thus it ensures "the process of authorization and

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[131] See, ibid., p. 137.
[132] See, ibid.,p., 136.
[133] Ibid., p. 139.
[134] See, ibid, p., 142.
[135] See, ibid, p., 143-145.

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accountability that constitutes the representative functions".[136] For enhancing the consolidation and expressions social perspectives and plurality at discussion and decision-making levels, civil society could be an important site. Organization and agitation in the public sphere of the civil society promotes differing forms of social perspectives to come to the surface and creates a bond of mutual accountability through process of deliberation and subject recognition. Strong, autonomous and plural activities of civic associations promote greater inclusion and diversity to be represented in the public life and decision-making levels.

Civil society promotes trust, choice, and democracy and through the self-organization of the marginalized groups into affinity groups in a possible sphere of civil society, people can develop a language in which to voice experience and perception that cannot be spoken in the prevailing dominant forms of political discourse. Civil society emerges as a sphere in which the differentiated social groups express their feelings, experiences and formulate their perspectives for effective group representation. It makes power more accountable to the people, as it has the potentials to expose the injustices in the state. Young argues for the effectiveness of the civil society in eradicating the exclusion and asks for the empowerment of the civil society so that the varied forms of injustices like domination and oppression could be reduced to significant levels through better representation.[137]

Civil society has the potential to promote self-determination and self-development for the affirmation of the oppressed peoples' rights. Oppressed and the marginalized who remain politically dominated and structurally exploited can improve their lives through mutual aid and articulation of group consciousness in the public sphere of the civil society. The public sphere although dominated by the privileged group has enough political space for subaltern counter politics, which becomes a site for the subordinated groups to express their concern. Civil society also becomes a sphere where public exposure, protest and showing of injustices done to the oppressed ,is exposed and power is questioned for its accountability. Social justice requires a mutual limitation of state, economy and civil society and the balance of these three, then promotes the groups in the

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[136] See, ibid, p.,153.
[137] See, ibid., p. 153-156.

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process of self-development and self-determination.[138] The self-determination and self-development of the people will empower them and enhance their capabilities so that as an agent, they can exercise their freedom.

The process of inclusion can further be enhanced through the promotion of decentralization of power. Due to the structurally differentiated locations social political and economic exclusions take place, as the dominant group suppresses the local. The structurally differentiated groups feels equally suppressed and affected by the structural and the environmental conditions that affect them all and bring them together to form a common obligation to fight for justice. Young calls this phenomenon as, differentiated solidarity.[139] She affirms that through the process of democratic decentralization, this differentiated solidarity can be used to enhance the capabilities of the individuals as well as groups through active power sharing at local levels. The idea of differentiated solidarity aims to balance the values generalized inclusion and respect with more particularistic and local self-affirmation and expressions. At the local levels, citizens have easier access to meeting, hearings and local power structures that implement decision. These local sites of politics and governance encourage and enable the active participation in raising issues, shaping political agenda, making decision decision and implementing them. This ensures better participation and inclusion leading to better attainment of justice because people stand in relation of justice to one another. The smaller political unit leads to better enforcement of various forms to justices.[140] The decentralized forms of democracy thus ensure a better and effective redressal of injustices that the oppressed and the marginalized face. But decentralization alone cannot handle the exclusion and most of the time it requires a kind of coupling with the centralized nation state's organized authority to eradicate exclusion.

Nation states have the potential to combat structural injustices within their boundaries, but most of the nation states exclude non-citizens and do not find any accountability for them. States and its citizens claim that they do not have any obligation to enhance the well-being of anyone outside the borders. This idea of active exclusion becomes contested in the current global context, due to the increasing mutual

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[138] See, ibid., p. 156.
[139] See, ibid., p. 197.
[140] See, ibid, p. 221-225

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interdependence among the nation states. Under the contemporary condition of global interdependence, obligation of justice should extend globally. "Wherever people act within a set of institutions that connect them to one another by commerce, communication or the consequences of the policies, such that the systemic interdependencies generate benefits and burdens that would not exist without those institutional relationships, then the people within that set of interdependent institutions stand in relation of justice".[141] The present world system stands in such relational understanding of institutional interdependencies that the need for global justice becomes inevitable. This claim for global justice is not something loosely conceptualized. Rather it has local roots and better global justice requires fulfillment of the political claims for strong local autonomy and the right of oppressed people for self-determination.[142] This argument for a concept of self-determination should be understood in terms of the relational autonomy and in the context of non-domination in which people can exercise their maximum freedom and autonomy in determining their existences.[143] Self-determination for the people means that they have the right to their own governance institutions through which they decide their goals, since people stand in interdependent relation to one another and they are accountable to one another in ensuring the mutual obligation to justice.[144]

Thus global governance is required as an alternative to ensure that nation states do stand in isolation to the injustices happening to the people beyond its borders, as the whole world system stands in mutual obligation to justice to one another due to its interconnectedness. Social movements for global democracy and justice should try to not only build on and create legal and regulatory institutions, but also to create possibilities for transnational associations and public spaces. Coupling of global governance with the local autonomy can ensure global justice and enhanced inclusion of the oppressed and the marginalized sections of the world. Global actors , through their enormous resources and capacity, can ensure that the forms of domination and oppression do not exist at the local levels .

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[141] See, Iris Marion Young, "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,"in Journal of Political Philosophy,2004.

[142] See, Iris Marion Young, See, Young, Iris Marion, *Inclusion and Democracy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),p.261.

[143] See, Ibid, p.258-260.

[144] See, Iris Marion Young, *"Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,"* in. Journal of Political Philosophy, 2004.

CONCLUSION

The idea of universal citizenship and the impartial civic republic has the potential to produce exclusion through the systemic as well as systematic forms of structural oppression. Negation and suppression of the particularities and situated differences due to the privileging of the dominant political normative discourse based upon the idea of impartial reason, can lead to severe forms of exclusion and oppression in the private as well as public spheres. The differences should be given voice at the discussion and decision-making levels through the active process of deliberation and inclusive decision-making and effective means of communications, which includes formal as well as informal forms of communication, helps the excluded group to form a language of its own in which the oppressed group can express its grievances. Moreover, conceptualizing identity in its relational forms has better potentials for accommodating the inclusive policy measures rather than understanding it in its essentialist forms. The politics of difference should understand the mutual obligation of the differently situated groups towards justice and should be directed towards the political representation and inclusion of the excluded and oppressed people at discussion and decision making levels. Higher the level of participation, higher will be the level of inclusion. Therefore, through the process of deliberation, it should be ensured that effective representation of the marginalized groups' interests, opinions and perspectives takes place and tendency of the dominant groups to exclude the weaker section should not succeed. State, civil society as well as economic powers should work together to ensure better inclusion and higher levels of participation through the coupling of their collective power with the decentralization of governance and decision making authorities. Enhanced participation is, thus, the only key to bring justice to the most vulnerable, oppressed and excluded portion of our society.

Chapter-3

Democracy and Exclusion:
Comparing Amartya Sen and Iris Marion Young

In this chapter two different perspectives on the concept of exclusion will be discussed that deprives the individual of his dignity and produces such social condition that severely undermines the individual's ability to live life with self-respect. Amartya Sen's capability approach and Iris Marion Young's appeal for the recognition of group specific rights through the politics of difference, in fact, point in the same direction and provides for the attainment of justice. Their analysis of the problem could be different but their aim is the same. Both of them argue for the greater inclusion of the affected and marginalized section of the society in the discussion and decision-making processes, in those issues, which affect their life, either directly or indirectly. Such an inclusion demands strong democratic institutions and social procedures that can play 'instrumental' as well as 'constructive' role in ensuring justice to the socially excluded portion of the society. Both express their deep faith in the significance of democracy and endorse its spirit of promoting free and fair discussions and inclusive procedures that takes into account the instrumental as well as procedural aspects off freedom. Such fair procedures promotes the participation of the individuals in the democratic methods of bringing change in the society and through constant discussion and argument, it ensures the efficient , inclusive and comprehensive understanding of arriving at informed and reasoned choices at collective levels. These kinds of democratic exercises demand public forums, where such discussions and deliberations on a variety of issues could take place on issues that affect the life of the people. So, both of them agree upon the instrumental importance of deliberative democracy in ensuring that, social exclusion arising due to capability deprivation or due to the privileged position of some dominant group should be avoided. The biased social arrangements that promote and sustain such structures of 'domination' and 'oppression' should be dissolved through the active engagement of the affected people in the process of discussion and decision-making. This chapter deals with these particular concerns. In the chapter it will be argued, how, both these thinkers agree on a range of issues that causes social exclusion to take place that deprives the individuals of their most fundamental

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capabilities and how democracy can play an important role in ensuring active participation of the people, which then ensures justice to everyone.

3.1. Exclusion: a comparative study of Young's and Sen's Perspectives.

In this section of the chapter, a comparative study of Amartya Sen's and Iris Marion Young's Perspectives will be made and it will be discussed how both of them agree on the fact that exclusion dehumanizes the individual's life. Their respective analysis differs on some perspectives, but overlaps up to a great extent on a range of issues that determines that exclusion happening to the individuals actually makes them unfit for effective participation. While Iris Marion Young views exclusion as essentially political in nature and arising due to the universalistic assumptions of citizenship, Amartya Sen is basically concerned with those forms of exclusions which arises due to the failure of the individuals ability to command and exercise basic capabilities. However both of them agree on a range of issues which causes such forms of deprivation and oppressions that denies the individuals the basic conditions for a dignified existence.

Amart Sen has analyzed the problem of exclusion as arising due to the capability deprivation of the individuals that causes the rupturing of those social bonds which hold the individuals within the limits of the respectable acceptance in social life.[1] He analyses social exclusion as the loss of the well being aspect as well as the agency aspects of the individual's freedom, restricting the person from living a life that he has the reason to live.[2] Social exclusion as capability deprivation has been seen by Amartya Sen as the failure of the individuals to command the various functioning vectors like, 'primary goods', resources, utilities etc that eventually leads to the loss of the individual's control over his own life. The command over these various 'functionings', allows the person to choose from 'possible livings'.[3] Exclusion occurs not only due to the loss of the individual's access and command over various functioning vectors but also due to the inability of the person to convert those possible 'functionings' into capabilities which can enable the deprived person to

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[1]See, Amartya Sen, Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny," Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 1 (June 2000), pp.3-6
[2] See, Amartya ,Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000),
[3]See, ibid, p.76.

get rid of poverty, hunger, premature mortality and morbidity.[4] Poor health, illiteracy, loss of income etc, are some of the possible factors that can undermine the ability of the person to convert the functioning vectors into capabilities.[5] This loss of capability can also be caused due to the failure of the individual to command the 'endowments' and 'entitlements' which makes vulnerable to exclusion and non-participation in the public sphere of the society and in bringing out the changes that can affect and improve his condition of life.[6] Such kinds of exclusion are relational in character and mutually reinforcing. Amartya Sen's conception of the social exclusion is basically concerned with the quality of life that an individual commands and the deprivations arising due to the poor quality of life that restricts the individual's freedom to choose and to act.

But Iris Marion Young's characterization of exclusion, arising due to the oppression of the deprived individuals, recognizes a plurality of conditions that contributes to the process of 'systemic' as 'systematic' forms of exclusion. She analyses exclusion arising due to the oppressive structures, which is controlled and dominated by the privileged groups of the society.[7] According to Young, various forms of oppression arise due to the structural arrangements which results in constraints upon the individuals as well as social groups.[8] Exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence are the five most oppressive forms of exclusion that arises out of the dominant and biased structures of the society.[9] These forms of exclusions cause people to suffer from suppression of their abilities to command and exercise their capacities and, express their needs, thoughts and feelings.[10] Young's understanding of the processes and consequences of exclusion are based upon three basic foundations: structural causes of oppression, identity based exclusion and exclusion arising due to the failure of effective and inclusive communication at discussion and decision making levels. According to Young, The structural forms of oppression and exclusion arise due to the injustices suffered by the social groups, which could be .based upon the conscious as well as

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[4]See, Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999), p.34.
[5]Ibid, pp.88-110
[6]See, Amartya Sen, *Hunger and Public Action* New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 22-25.
[7] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), p.40.
[8] Ibid, p. 41.
[9] Ibid, p.40.
[10] Ibid,p. 40.

unconscious assumptions and reactions of the people, ranging from ordinary interactions, media and market to state institutions.[11] Such oppressions are produced and reproduced out of the structures and it becomes difficult for the people to get out of those oppressive structures producing constant exclusions. These forms of oppression are produced and reinforced in the major economic, political and cultural institutions.

The structural forms of oppression arise due to the universalistic notions of citizenship that fails to take into account the situated differences among its citizens. Such 'universalistic' assumption is based upon the universalisation of the dominant group's values, cultures and interests that gets manifested, articulated and expressed though the seemingly neutral, but dominant and oppressive forms of structures.[12] The assumption of transcendental reason that claims to be neutral and impartial, is actually the universalisation of the dominant group's values, desires and interests. Such a claim actually has the tendency to exclude desires, emotions and feelings and situated knowledge from the discussion and decision making procedures.[13] These assumptions deeply negate and affect the interest of racially stigmatized people, women, refugees, migrants etc. Thus, Iris Marion Young recognized that the universal reason is, actually, based upon the dominant group's values, desires, and its claim to remain impartial is misleading and oppressive.

Amartya Sen also states that the construction of reason is affected by the societal norms and values and this virtue can be used in both ways, i.e, constructive as well as exclusionary. Arrow's 'impossibility theorem' states that individual reasoning and collective reasoning can remain in mutually conflicting relationship with each other and thus the reason cannot claim itself to be impartial, transcendental and absolute. Collective reason can subordinate the individual reason only by minimizing his 'freedom' and undermining his personal capacity to reason, which, may need not remain totally in resonance with the collective reason.[14] The construction of collective reason happens through the process of discussion among the people, having different interest, desire, values and powers. According to Amartya Sen, "Positionally

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[11] Ibid, p. 41.

[12] See, Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," Ethics: A Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 99, no. 2, January, 1989,pp.117-142.

[13] See, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990), p.103.

[14] See Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom ,(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2002),p.60

dependent observation, beliefs and actions are central to our knowledge and practical reason, the nature of epistemology, decision theory and ethics has to take adequate note of the parametric dependence of the observation and inference on the position of the observer.[15] Positional objectivity can be used to reason critically the concept of subjectivism and that of cultural relativism.[16] Moreover, positional objectivity is central to the decision theory, since a person has to take decisions upon the basis of the positional objectivity of his own.[17] "Self-assessment of the ethical acceptability of a person's actions must take note of the special positions of the person's vis-à-vis his own actions and state of affairs that include those actions".[18] It should keep into consideration the 'agent relative' moral values. Thus, it can be summarized that the idea if impartial transcendental reason is not recognized by both the thinkers, in totality and both of them agree that it has the potential to exclude people from the structure of decision making as it doesn't take into consideration the 'situated knowledge' and 'positional objectivity'. The 'construction' of reason as impartial view, transcending the 'situated knowledge' and 'positional objectivity' will only lead to the universalistion of the particular experiences and the perspective of the privileged group, who retain greater resources, power and control over the discursive processes. This will only lead to legitimization of the authoritarian hierarchy at decision making levels.

Amartya Sen has further criticized 'impartiality' in relation with 'inequality' and states that impartiality in terms of the measurement of the inequality, can lead to the misleading results. Such universal standards for measuring inequality can lead to insufficient and inefficient results at policy making levels.[19] Human beings differ from each other in many ways. They have different characteristics and circumstances and due to this difference in physical, social, natural and political circumstances it is absolutely misleading to measure the inequality by remaining impartial to the contingent circumstances associated with the individuals.[20] The relative advantages and disadvantages that people have, compared with each other, can be judged in terms of many variables, e.g. their respective income, wealth,

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[15] Ibid. p.463.
[16] Ibid, pp. 474-475.
[17] Ibid, p. 465.
[18] Ibid, p.465.
[19] See Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*,(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999), pp.16-19.
[20] Ibid, pp. 20-21.

utilities, resources, liberties, rights, quality of life and so on.[21] This problem of choice of the 'evaluative space' and the selection of the relevant 'focal variables' is crucial to analyzing inequality, as inequality in one space tends to go with inequality in other spaces due to the consequences of 'human diversity'.[22] Thus the idea of taking an 'impartial' view of the measurement of the inequality is not possible and the measurement of inequality for the purpose of improving the well-being and agency aspect of the individual should take into account the contingencies associated with diversity of the human existence.[23] Thus both of these thinkers agree that the idea of 'impartiality' is actually misleading, and in order to arrive at socially inclusive decisions, it is required that the contingencies, variations and differences should be given due respect and importance failing which will lead to the exclusion of the individual's in social, political, cultural and economic spheres. This will also lead to the reinforcement of the structures of oppression and the dominance of the privileged group as it becomes easier for them to bypass the contingent and specific requirements of the excluded and oppressed and excluded group at decision-making levels.

Another factor that causes exclusion of the individuals from the active participation in the public sphere is the essentialist assumption of an individuals or group identity that makes them vulnerable to violence and cultural imperialism. Both the thinkers have provided a critique of the 'essentialist' assumption of the identity. According to Young, the essentialist idea assigns fixed attributes and characteristics to a particular group of people and through the assumptions of the impartiality, dichotomies and puts them into hierarchy. These characteristics transform themselves only to produce superior-subordinate relationship.[24] The stigmatization of the group characteristics makes them inferior and averts them from making a positive assertion of their group's identity. They fear that any admission by the oppressed groups that they are different from the dominant group will only reinforce the subordination, 'special marking' and exclusion from the public sphere.[25] Seemingly neutral rules and policies, ignore group differences and often perpetuates the disadvantages of those whose difference is defined as deviation. The oppressive meaning of the group

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[21] Ibid, p. 20.

[22] Ibid, p.20.

[23] Ibid, pp. 32-33.

[24] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), p. 103.

[25] See, ibid, p.174.

difference defines it 'absolute otherness, 'categorical opposition' and 'mutual opposition'.[26] The essentialist meaning of difference submits to the 'logic of identity', where one group occupies the position of the norm against which all other are measured. This drive to unify the particularity and the multiplicity of the positions, values and cultural symbols, thus causes exclusion. The dominant group is assigned a 'malleable' objectivity while the excluded group is marked with an 'essence' and 'imprisoned' in a given set of possibilities.

Amatrya Sen also criticizes the essentialist assumption of identity that reduces the vulnerable group's identity to a 'choiceless singularity' only to articulate it as inferior to the dominant group's value culture and identity.[27] According to Sen, the assumption that the people of the world can be categorized uniquely according to the singular and categorized system of portioning can produce some of the most oppressive forms of exclusion.

'Solitarist approach' to identity can brutalize the people against one another and can cause systemic as well as systematic forms of exclusions.[28] A person can simultaneously belong to different social groups, and reducing him to just one dimension of the identity, violates the plurality of one's identity. The dominant communication principle puts communal identity at the center stage and finds it as a matter of self realization, restricting other dimensions of his affiliations to other group of people.[29] Moreover, the freedom to express the possibilities of one's existence is seriously constrained by the 'descriptive misrepresentation' of any particular group which may arise due to the degeneration of the differences in the perception of the suppressed group to that of the dominant group.[30] Such degradation of the individuals is caused due to the illusion of the singular identity that the dominant group attributes to the oppressed group. Such kinds of demeaning can rob the individuals of his capabilities and his ability to live a decent and respectful life that could lead to severe forms of deprivations.

Both the thinkers agree that the relational and pluralist understanding of identity is a better and more inclusive option and prevents such essentialist assumptions. According to Iris Marion Young, a relational understanding of group

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[26]See, ibid, p. 169.
[27] See, ibid. pp. 16-17.
[28] See, ibid. p.85.
[29] See, ibid. p. 5.
[30] See, ibid, p.7.

differences rejects exclusion. Different groups are always similar in some respects and always potentially share some attributes, experiences and goals.[31] In the relational understanding, the meaning of the difference also becomes 'contextualized' Such 'contextualized' assumptions of differences undermine the essentialist assumptions and liberates the individuals from the possible stigmatization. The relational understanding of the social positions and differences demands the need to understand the social structures in terms of the "multidimensional space of differentiated social positions within which a population is dispersed".[32] A social group positions the individuals and the person creates the identity by remaining active in relation to the social positions.[33] "A person encounters an already existing structure of power, resources allocation, status norms, and culturally differentiated positions".[34] The positioning of the individuals occurs through the process of the communicative interaction in which mutual identification of the individuals takes place. Agents, who remain similarly 'positioned', face similar constraints or 'enablement' and the 'social field' locates the individuals in terms of given meanings, expected activities and social consequences. Such a conceptualization of the individuals doesn't see the identity in its essentialist forms and opens up the possibilities of challenging the dominant group's claims of superiority and puts them in relative rather than universal positions.[35] The politics of difference promotes the oppressed group to assert a positive meaning of their identities and through the relational understanding of the identity, it should get recognized in the public sphere that difference is not deviance.[36] Thus the relational understanding of group differences actually promotes the inclusion, by breaking the dichotomization of the identity in superior-inferior relationship, and puts the social groups in relation to each other, where the action of one affects the other.

Amartya Sen takes the same position while defending the group rights against descriptive misrepresentation of the deprived and culturally stigmatized groups.[37] The

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[31] See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.93-99.
[32] Ibid, p.94.
[33] Ibid, p.95.
[34] Ibid, p.100.
[35] Ibid, p 109.
[36] See, Iris Marion Young,, *Justice and the Politics Of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), pp. 157-191.
[37] See, Amartya Sen, *Identity and Voilence* ,(London: Allen Lane, Penguin books,2006), p.7.

plurality of the individuals' affiliations demands recognition and reducing him to 'choiceless singularity' of identity actually reduces the capabilities of the individuals and affects their well-being as well as agency aspects of freedom. Such a plural understanding of the plurality of one's identities, opens up the possibilities of correcting the biased practices by allowing the individuals to prioritize the different affiliations and group representations.[38] Such a plural and relational understanding of the identity remains open to the public discussion and 'communicative rationality'. The social values that determine the relative positions of different groups can be articulated and changed through the process of active deliberation which can then itself lead to the change in the relative position of the individuals.

Thus it is quite clear, that, relational understanding of the differences is a better way of representing the identity and due to its inclusive character it gives the individuals a greater voice, inclusion, and recognition at the discussion and decision making levels through the process of 'communicative action'. The excluded group like women, homosexuals, racially categorized people, disabled and mentally challenged people and other such groups which were dichotomized in a hierarchical opposition to that of the dominant group, can shed their stigmatization which remains based upon the essentialist assumptions and through the process of 'communicative action', relocate the social positions to achieve higher levels of inclusiveness at discussion and decision making levels.

Another area, where both these thinkers overlap, is regarding their concern for the exclusion of the women from active participation in the public sphere that goes unquestioned in most of the societies. Both the thinkers agree on this fact that women have never got her due share from the society and the male dominated society, has always put the women at a subordinate and inferior position to themselves. Iris Marion Young's analysis of the problems of exclusions faced by women is more comprehensive and detailed, than, Amartya Sen's capability based analysis of the women's subjection to the man. For Iris Marion Young, the idea of impartiality of universal citizenship is actually a masculine construct that excludes the 'feminine' characteristics like desire, affection and body from the transcendental subject.[39] This exclusion of the desire, affection and body puts the woman in a 'strange' position, by

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[38] Ibid, pp. 24-27.
[39] See, Iris Marion Young,, "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory," Praxis International, Vol. 5, no. 4, January , pp. 385-386.

puzzling her, to find herself as inferior in this transcendental reason. This impartial, universal subject is actually the universalisation of the male desires and values that regard emotions, feelings and desires as weaknesses, which should be prevented from entering the sphere of society as they can destabilize the 'order'.[40] This exclusion stigmatizes women as being 'weak' and 'inferior' as these virtues of emotion and feelings are said to be possessed by them, more than their male counterparts, due to the natural biological construction of their body. Amartya Sen also criticizes the logic of 'deontologised subjectivity' and calls for the inclusion of the 'positional objectivity' and contingent circumstances that determine the perspective of the individual at the discussion and decision making levels.[41] Keeping the 'positional objectivity' in consideration at discussion and decision making levels will help the female experiences, desires and interests to get reflected at the level of collective choice making and that can prevent the exclusions from happening, due to the conceptualization of transcendental reason as the norm against which all other norms, values, experience and practices are to be measured.[42]

The subjection of a woman starts at the family level. Both the thinkers agree that the structure of the family is highly patriarchal, that transfers power, benefits, and 'unpaid' labor of women, to the economically independent male of the family, controls her by not allowing her to work outside of the household and by keeping them dependent on the male. This transfer of power, resources and unpaid labor to the male head of the family further consolidates his position and domination over the women. According to Young, family has oppressed the sexuality of women and has confined her to the separate unit of family so that she could remain 'controlled', 'confined' and dominated by the male in the private sphere and remain excluded from actively participating in the public sphere.[43] The promotion of the 'intact two parent' family structure by the society as well as the state, actually reinforces the oppression and subordination of women. In such families, it is usually the males who take care of the economic aspects of the family, 'protects' it and provides security to the family

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[40] Ibid, pp. 387-390.

[41] See, Amartya Sen, *Rationality and Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 480-483.

[42] Ibid, pp. 471- 474.

[43] See, Iris Marion Young,, "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory," Praxis International, Vol. 5, no. 4, January, p.389.

from all possible threats. Women, in such families, remains confined to the household activities like, taking care of the children, providing love, affection and emotional support to all the members of the family and other such private activities.[44] She is discouraged actively from participating in the public arena and taking independent economic stands by working outside the home. States, also promote such families, because, such families remain relatively more independent in terms of income and other economic needs and the state gets the 'excuse' to skip his duties to provide additional and required support to the 'single parent' families. The 'intact two parent' families are characterized by the asymmetrical power relation between the male and female members of the family that remains oppressive for the female of the society as a whole.[45] The notion of self sufficiency in terms of economic gains, puts the women at a devalued position and stigmatizes them as second class citizens, that affect her capacity to live a comprehensive and fully accomplished life. An essentialist assumption about the feminine existence adds further to the chronic problem of deprivation and subordination that women face.[46]

Amartya Sen's idea about the subordination and oppression of the women, hold similar views and he argues that women's 'well-being' is substantially affected by male dominance. Due to their biological differences, reproductive capacity and differences in the physical strength, social construction of the gender roles occurs at the discursive levels and such value formation leads to the forgoing of 'asymmetrical' power relations in the society between males and females. Women is subordinated to the private sphere of the family and her capability to command the range of 'functioning vectors' gets severely reduced . This leads to the loss of her well-being and agency aspects of her freedom, that causes her social exclusion, due to capability deprivation.[47] Relatively less capable and economically subordinate women come under the control of the male dominance in the public as well as private spheres of the society more easily. Family as an institution reinforces the oppression due to the biased and asymmetrical division of the labor and benefits of the family. The labor

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[44] See, Iris Marion Young," Mother, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values," Ethics, Vol.105, April, 1995, pp. 535-536.

[45] Ibid, p.545.

[46] See, Iris Marion Young, 'Gender as seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collectiv'e, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society,1994,vol.19, no.3, p.717.

[47] See, Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1993), p. 51

of women remains unpaid and instead benefits the male .The cooperative conflict at family levels leads to this asymmetrical relation between man and woman.[48] Due to capability deprivation women looses her control over her own life and this makes women more vulnerable to higher rates of mortality, undernourishment, rape, violence and loss of dignity. The increased vulnerability discourages women from taking active participation in the public life and to get reflected in discussions and decision making procedures and institutions.

The comparative study of both these thinkers makes it clear that they agree on viewing family as a patriarchal institution and due to its male dominant characteristics reinforces the oppression and exclusion of the women. This seriously affects the capability of the women to exercise her 'well-being' and 'agency' aspects of her freedom, that can reduce the possibilities of her attainment of 'self-development' and 'self-determination'.

There are other forms of exclusion also, which have been discussed in the earlier chapters. Some exclusion takes place due to the conscious efforts by the dominant and privileged group while other kinds of exclusion may occur due to unconscious acts of people at ordinary levels also. Active and passive exclusion as conceptualized by Amartya Sen and internal and external exclusion discussed by Iris Marion Young, are based on such conscious and unconscious acts of the dominant social groups. Amartya Sen's idea of active exclusion discriminates people actively, due to the non-obligation of the people and the government towards the particular population like refugees, and displaced people. In such cases the nation state's systematically exclude a particular portion of the society and do not show any willingness to work against the deprivation and exclusion of such people.[49] Iris Marion Young has given a critique of such deliberate acts of exclusion in her conception of global notion of justice and cosmopolitanism, and states that such discrimination will affect other sections of the world also, as problem in one part of the world can affect the other parts of the world also due to the interconnected nature

[48] Ibid, pp.56-57.

[49] See, Amartya Sen, "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny," Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 1 (June 2000), pp.14-15.

of the international structures.[50] Interconnectedness of the world events and structures makes it politically wrong for the nation states of the world to practice 'active' forms of exclusion.

The structures which are responsible for the legitimacy of decision making procedures are usually dominated by the dominant and privileged groups and the nation states in most of the cases become an instrument for such groups to provide legitimacy to their biased and oppressive interests. These dominant groups deliberately keep those people out of the decision making structures who are directly or indirectly affected by such decisions. Such forms of exclusion have been called external exclusion by Iris Marion Young.[51] The privileged group excludes systematically those people, who remain oppressed so that they cannot make any claims of assertions on their rights, and the dominance of the privileged group remains maintained. External exclusion constraints the capability of the individual, due to the loss of agency aspects of his freedom, that affects his or her well-being freedom.

Amartya Sen, with the help of arrow's 'impossibility theorem' proved that through the informational broadening for taking collective decisions, such exclusions could be prevented.[52] Arrow's impossibility results, state that the conditions of 'Paretian optimality', 'independence', 'non-dictatorship' and 'unrestricted domain' cannot be satisfied simultaneously, even under very mild looking conditions.[53] This may explain the situation of group dominance at decision making levels, when, the 'Paretian optimality coefficient's efficiency is maximized by the dominant group through a reduction in the 'efficiency' of all other three coefficients, by systematically excluding all other individual preferences. The privileged group while arriving at the collective choices and decisions reduces the efficiency of the coefficients of 'non dictatorship', 'independence' and 'unrestricted domain' for maximizing the false and disfigured 'Paretian efficiency', so that the interest and preferences of the privileged group could be maximized, by excluding the

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[50] See, Amartya Sen, "Responsibility and Global labor justice". *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2004.

[51] See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (Oxford University Press), pp. 81-84.

[52] see, Amartya Sen, *"Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), pp.279-281.

[53] See, Amartya Sen, " Rationality and Freedom". (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p72.

preferences of the deprived section of the society. Such 'Paretian efficient social choices,' best serves the interest of the dominant class as it helps them in universalizing their 'individual preferences' over all others by significantly reducing and excluding the 'unrestricted domain' of choices out of the available 'preferences'.

Such Paretian efficient results could be reduced and reviewed up to a great extent by expanding the informational bases upon the basis of which such decisions are taken. Such forms of choice based external exclusions could be reduced by "taking an evaluative view of the acceptable priorities between personal liberty and overall desire fulfillment and by remaining sensitive to the information regarding the trade-offs on this that the person may themselves endorse".[54] This calls for an informational broadening by expanding the bases upon the basis of which such results are obtained. According to Sen, impossibility results, indeed, question the legitimacy of the universalistic and impartial decisions that seem to be neutral. In his own words,

> "The impossibility results certainly desire serious study. They often have wide, indeed sweeping reach , not merely covering the day to day politics, (where we may be rather used to incongruity), but also questioning the possibility of any assured framework for making social welfare judgments for the society as a whole. Impossibilities thus identified also militate against the general possibility of an orderly and systematic framework for normatively assessing inequality, for evaluating poverty, or for identifying intolerable tyranny and violations of liberty. Not able to have a coherent framework for these appraisals or evaluations would indeed be most damaging for systematic political, social and economic judgment. It would not be possible to talk about injustices and fairness without having to face the accusations that such diagnoses must be inescapably arbitrary or intellectually despotic".[55]

Thus the impossibility theorem has to play a very important role in eradicating and exposing the despotic, universalistic claims of the dominant group's claims of neutrality of the policies, constructed in accordance to their values, preferences and interests.[56] Lack of adequate political communication is one of the major reasons for such kinds of 'external exclusion' and preference exclusions.

The problem of exclusion demands procedural fairness also and, ignoring it could lead to another kind of exclusion which has been called 'internal exclusion' by Iris Marion Young.[57] Even if, the individuals or groups are formally included in the process of discussion and decision making, they may find that their

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[54] Ibid, p. 94.
[55] Ibid, p. 95.
[56]Ibid, p. 95.
[57]See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* ,(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000), p. 82.

claims are not being taken seriously and they may believe that they are not being treated with equal respect. In this form of exclusion people may get excluded from the process of discussion and decision making levels due to their differences of perspectives, experiences and the method of their communication in relation to that of the dominant groups. The idea of rational, dispassionate and logical speech which is constructed along the lines of the dominant group's perception, values and experiences, often 'dismisses' the 'embodied' forms of expression, emotions and 'figurative' speech.[58] People are excluded from serious consideration not because of what is said but how it is said. Thus, the internal form of exclusion excludes the local, 'specific' 'situated knowledge', due to the 'way' it is expressed in the process of discussion.

So, Young promotes a theory of democratic communication that promotes the different modes of 'informal' communication like 'greeting, rhetoric and narratives' which can take care of the situated knowledge without taking into consideration how it is expressed.[59] The values guiding the norms of acceptance can always be articulated and reevaluated in the light of the democratic discussions and deliberations. Both Young and Sen agree on the utility of democracy in promoting such inclusive practices.

3.2. Deliberative democracy and Exclusion: Young's and Sen's Perspectives.

In the earlier section, it has been discussed that how social exclusion as a process and consequence takes place in a public sphere dominated by the privileged group's interest and desires. In this section, relationship between the democracy and exclusion will be discussed and it will be argued that Amartya Sen and Iris Marion Young, agree upon the fact that, democratic values and institutions can play a very important role in increasing the inclusiveness of the deprived and oppressed people into the structures of discussion and decision making, which will give them a better control over their lives. Their faith in democracy is deep and their idea of providing justice to a larger section of the society is totally dependent on the democratic values and beliefs. In this section it will be discussed how deliberative model of democracy is necessary for the eradication of exclusion and oppression of the marginalized

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[58] Ibid, p.56.
[59] Ibid, pp.57-74.

sections of the society.

According to Amartya Sen, democracy offers basic political and liberal rights to the individual which are important for three reasons.[60] First, their direct importance in human living being is associated with basic activities like that of political and social participation. Second, their instrumental role in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to the political attention, and third, their constructive role in the conceptualizations of 'needs'. The articulation of social values leads to the re conceptualization of the prevailing values.[61]

Sen argues that, democratic governance is important for the intrinsic, instrumental and what he calls 'constructive reasons'.[62] He argues for a wider notion of democracy and calls for not seeing democracy as a majority rule only. Democracy has complex demands which require the protection of rights, liberties, respect for legal entitlements, the guarantee of free discussions and measured distribution of political connection. Democracy is a demanding system, rather than a mechanical system that depends upon the active and constant engagements. It is demanding because in democracy there is widespread actual participation that includes most disadvantaged but also an equitable distribution of power. It is also demanding because it requires most robust modes of participation than just majority rule and calls for free discussion and reasoned arguments.[63]

Democracy is intrinsically important because it enables the citizens to participate politically and has direct importance in 'human living' associated with basic capabilities. Opportunities for political participation helps the individual to exercise procedural freedom as, to be prevented from participation in the political life of the community are a major deprivation.[64] It has an intrinsic importance of its own because democracy provides each citizen with agency freedom that provides its citizens with opportunities to select their leaders and their policies.[65] Social arrangements which include state, market, legal system, political parties, media, interest groups etc, "are investigated in terms of the contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing their substantive freedom of individuals seen as active agents of change,

[60] See, Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000), p.296.
[61] Ibid,p.30.
[62] Ibid, p. 153.
[63] See, A Crocker David. "Sen and Deliberative democracy", in, Kaufman, Alexander, edited Capability Equality: Basic issues and Problems (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165-168.
[64] Ibid, p. 160.
[65] Ibid, p. 161.

rather than passive recipients of dispersed benefits".[66] Because individual agency or autonomy is one basis for his or her dignity, democracy is important because it respects people's dignity and their right of self determination.[67] Intrinsic importance has direct relation with the members of the groups as having equal status and freedom. In democracy, citizens have agency and well-being freedom.[68]

Democracy has instrumental value because it has a "good role in enhancing the hearing that people get in response to their claims to political attention".[69] The political and liberal freedom that the democracy offers has high value in enhancing the capabilities of the individual.[70] The third aspect, deals with the constructive role of the democracy in enhancing the freedom of the participating individual. It is good for democratic governance as it produces institutions and processes in which people (from each other and) 'construct' or decide on the values and priorities of the society.[71] Thus, it is important to note that "value formation is as much democratic activity as is the use of social values in the determination of public policy and responses".[72]

Iris Marion Young has stressed upon the role of democracy for political inclusion, especially, due to its instrumental reason primarily. Only in a democratic political system all the members of a society in principle have the opportunity to try to influence the public policy. Therefore she formulated a model of deliberative democracy that emphasizes the ideal of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness and publicity.[73] The deliberative model helps the individual in breaking the vicious circle of the influence of unequal control of powerful group over the policy making. This model of deliberative democracy promotes political movements of participation and helps the individual. to attain greater inclusion in the decision making process as a means of promoting just outcomes.

According to Young, the form of ideals of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness and publicity are deeply related to deliberative model of democracy.

[66]See, Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," Journal of Democracy, 10, (1999).

[67] See,. David A Crocker., "Sen and Deliberative democracy", in, Alexander Kaufman, edited Capability Equality: Basic issues and Problems ,(New York: Routledge, 2006),p. 162.

[68] Ibid, p.163.

[69] See, Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000p.24.

[70] Ibid, p. 152.

[71] Ibid, p. 153.

[72]See, Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom , (MA: Harvard university Press, 2002), p.25.

[73] See, Iris Marion Young," Inclusion and Democracy",(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000), pp.23-25.

The ideal of inclusion ensures that a democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision making.[74] It ensures a norm of moral respect and ensures the participants to abide by the norms and adjust their reactions to decisions from where determination of their values and interest has been excluded. Together with political equality, inclusion allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions and perspectives relevant for the discussion and legitimate decision making.[75]

Political equality, which is another ideal, ensures that these affected in the process of deliberation should be included in equal forms. Participants should remain equal in the sense that "none of them should remain in a position to coerce or threaten others into accepting certain proposals or outcomes".[76] The ideal of political equality ensures that all the interests, opinions of criticism should get a place in discussion and the result arising out of the discussion should be based upon good and democratic reasons rather than coercion.

Reasonableness, the third ideal of deliberative democracy, ensures that the participants should remain willing to listen to others and should explain to each other why their ideas are incorrect. Reasonable people enter the political discussion with the aim of reaching agreement with an open mind. They remain willing to change preferences because through the debates and discussions one comes to know about biasness or incompleteness of one's ideas.[77]

Fourth ideal of a good deliberative model is publicity which ensures that the participants should remain acceptable to one another. Public speaking requires the participants to express themselves in ways acceptable to all. It should clarify its position or standpoint to all others participating in the discussion and should tend to come to the terms of agreement only after unbiased and fair discussions.[78]

These deliberate ideals of democracy not only help in achieving the goals of political inclusion but also correspond to other purposes that people express for valuing democracy such as promoting cooperation, solving collective problems and furthering social justice. It stands for greater comprehensiveness in decision making. In the words of Iris Marion Young,

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[74] Ibid, p. 23.
[75] Ibid, p.140.
[76] Ibid, p. 23.
[77] Ibid, p. 24.
[78] Ibid, p. 25.

"This model conceptualizes the process of democratic discussions as not only expressing ones ideas or preferences but also transforming the interests, preferences, beliefs and judgments of participants. Through the process of public discussion with in a plurality of difficulty opined as situated others, people often gain new information, learn of difficult experiences of their collective problems or find that their own initial opinions are founded on prejudice or ignorance or that they misunderstood the relation of their own interest to others."[79]

The deliberative model of democracy, although fosters the process of political communication but it can also lead to exclusion due to the intrinsic characteristics of its own. Iris Marion Young has provided two forms of privileging that excludes the other relative positions. First, it stands for privileging arguments.[80] By argument it means an orderly chain of reasoning from premise to conclusion. So far, any deliberation to start it is required that the participants should share a mutually accepted premise with discursive frameworks and with such premises there is always is a danger of privileging one argument over one another. Under such conditions it is always possible that in order to reach for such a premise, the privileged argument always "excludes the expression of some needs, interests and sufferings of social justice, because these could not be expressed in operative frameworks".[81] Lyotard called such problems as the problem of 'differend'.[82] Moreover, such norms of deliberation privileges speech which is dispassionate and disembodied. The emotional experiences of speech are considered to be a sign of nervousness and a person's lack of objectivity and control.[83] Thus, such forms of communication may often exclude the people from effective participation. Second criticism comes in the form of privileging the unity.[84] Commonness as a prior condition of deliberation is a problematic idea and seeking the common good is equally contestable. This may cause problem in pluralist societies where one cannot assume that all people share the interests, contexts and life experiences sufficiently. Most political units, even at unit level remain multicultural. So, in such assumptions these people have different levels of life experiences which will automatically get excluded from the understanding of

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[79] Ibid, p. 26.

[80] Ibid, p. 37.

[81] Ibid, p. 37.

[82] See, Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrase in dispute* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 9.

[83] See, Iris Marion Young," *Inclusion and Democracy* ",(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000), p. 39.

[84] Ibid,p.38

shared unity.[85]

Despite the criticism of deliberative democracy, Iris Marion Young states that, it remains an efficient tool of political communication and inclusion. The above two criticisms of deliberative democracy can be remedied, if the participants make the process of communication more inclusive and take a relational approach towards understanding identity, rather than assuming an essentialist approach. The forms of exclusion arising due to the privileging of argument can be resolved through the broadening of the premises upon the basis of which the arguments are to be constructed.[86] In addition to that, adequate recognition to emotional forms of expression should be given in the process of communication. Such recognition of the emotional forms of exclusion requires the broadening of the forms of communication and including the alternative modes of communication like greeting, rhetoric and narrative that enrich the process of deliberation by providing it with more inclusiveness and greater reflection of the situated, specific experiences and knowledge in the process of deliberation, so that more enriched and inclusive decision can be arrived at.[87]

The idea of deliberative democracy also challenges the universalistic assumptions of impartial citizenship that excludes the particularities. Deliberative democracy recognises the politics of difference that provides the 'deviant' individuals, the required political space for struggle against such forms of oppression.[88] Impartiality fortifies the essentialist assumptions of the dominant groups against the dichotomized and subordinated identity of the oppressed which leads to marginalisation, exploitation, cultural imperialism and violence against them.[89]

Deliberative democracy questions such assumptions and denies the dichotomization and hierarchy of identities. In fact, it locates the individuals in relational positioning to each other in the dispersed 'social field'.[90] Such a relational understanding of the social positioning of the individuals opens up the possibility of their repositioning in the social structures through articulation and discussion, wherein

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[85] Ibid, pp. 40-44.
[86] Ibid, p. 49.
[87] Ibid, pp. 57-74.
[88] Ibid, pp. 81- 119.
[89] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990),pp. 96-121.
[90] See, Iris Marion Young," *Inclusion and Democracy*",(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000),p. 100.

the participatory members will come to know their incomplete understanding and their biasness towards each other.[91] The moment, one comes to know about his biasness towards others and his own incompleteness of ideas, he will recognize the importance of the different perspectives in the formulation of decisions at collective levels. This will enhance the process of inclusion at the discussion and decision making levels and will ensure that differing social perspectives are getting reflected in the supreme decisions. [92]

Amartya Sen agrees with Young about the instrumental importance of deliberative democracy for making socially just and inclusive policies. He states that through the broadening of the informational bases, it is possible to control the various irregularities and inefficiencies at the level of collective choice making, which is possible only in a deliberative model of democracy.[93] Such inclusive practices are required to be sustained through the active participation of those affected by the decisions in the process of discussion and deliberation. Such discussions will lead to the articulation of values and this can change the social arrangements as the arrangements are themselves guided by the social values.[94] Public institutions, markets and civil society cannot remain independent and untouched by the social values and they affect as well as get affected by them. Functioning vectors that determine the capabilities of the individual are determined by the social arrangements and the social value of the society.[95] The distributions of primary goods, resources, utilities etc are affected by the arrangements of various institutions and values of the concerned society. Articulation of the social values is possible only in an open society based on the deliberative model of democracy which promotes political communication and gives enough political space for discussion to everyone affected by the decision. In fact, in a deliberative model of democracy, any decision gets political legitimacy only when it includes all those into the process of deliberation who can be affected by the outcome of such decisions.[96]

Deliberative democracy through informational broadening ensures better

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[91] Ibid, pp. 108-110.
[92] Ibid, p.111.
[93]Young, Iris Marion Young," Inclusion and Democracy",(New York: Oxford niversityPress,2000),pp. 279-281.
[94] Ibid, pp. 30-31.
[95] Ibid, pp. 88-89.
[96] See,Iris Marion Young," Inclusion and Democracy",(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000),p. 158.

participation reduces the chances of deprivation and exclusions arising due to the biased collective decisions in the interest of the dominant groups, as it have been discussed earlier. Such informational broadening actually requires a deliberation process so that the process of authorisation and accountability could be maintained at local as well as, at higher levels of democracy.[97] Participatory planning can be actually highly enabling for the people as it takes into account the procedural as well as consequential aspects of freedom during the process of discussion and decision making.

Iris Marion Young, also argues about the implications of deliberative model of democracy at regional levels and states that regional democracy is related to the self- determination and self-development and enables an oppressed individual to overcome the various forms of oppression like exploitation, marginalisation and domination.[98] These small units of democratic governance offer more opportunities to know and directly interact with other members in the association and communication networks. The citizens have easier access to knowledge, meetings, hearings and offices that implement decisions. According to Young, local governance units can best encourage and enhance the active participation of citizens in raising issues, shaping political agendas, making decisions and implementing them , Thus a greater degree of authorisation and accountability is possible in local levels of deliberative democracy.[99] However, there is a limit to the efficiency of the local self governing units in providing the well-being and agency aspects of achievements and freedom and higher forms of deliberative democracy are required at intermediate and global levels. It is important to note Young's argument regarding the role of global democracy in strengthening the local forms of deliberative democracy. Global democracy is required to enhance the efficiency of local governance units in the possible cases of oppression and domination by the regional and state level democracy models that can endanger the autonomy of the local governing units.[100] According to Young, a major purpose of the global regulatory regimes is to protect the local units and their members from domination by the nation states in the form of active and external exclusion towards the constituting members. In such cases, the

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[97] See, ibid,p.128

[98] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference,* (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), pp. 196-235.

[99] Ibid, pp. 228-234.

[100] Ibid, pp. 268-269.

global regulatory regimes should take effective steps to ensure non-domination, self-development and self determination to the members at the local levels. Thus, Young proposes a comprehensive view of democracy that ensures democratic governance at local, regional, state and global levels.[101]

Deliberative model of democracy has instrumental and constructive role to play regarding the gender based exclusions also and both the thinkers agree on the usefulness of the concept in fighting such exclusions. The oppression of women occurs due to the norms and the practices that have been constructed to maintain the dominance of males over the female. Deliberative model of democracy puts such norms and practices for questioning and relevance. Deliberating people will then explore the biasness at the level of the norms, practices and other social structures that excludes women systematically as well as systemically from participating actively in the public sphere. Deliberative democracy by ensuring equal political liberties and freedom to everyone, promotes higher levels of participation by women at discussion and decision making levels and this can help her in acquiring a better control over her life. Such changes will promote women to come out from the private sphere of the household to the public sphere and gain higher literacy, economic equality and freedom and effective participation in the decision making and decision implementing levels. It will also help in reducing the high birth rates, under nourishment, child mortality, illiteracy and improving maternal health will substantially increase the quality of women's life. Thus both the thinkers argue for a deliberative model of democracy that can ensure a better life condition for women by engaging them actively in the discussion and decision- making processes and in determining the outcomes that affect her wellbeing. It will lead to better understanding among the participating members and will change the way the gender roles have been constructed in the society.

3.3. Capability and Politics of Difference: An Idea of Justice.

In this section of the chapter, a comparative study of the idea of justice will be made in which, perspectives of Amartya Sen and Iris Marion Young will be juxtaposed. Both of them agree that bringing justice to the oppressed, deprived and excluded section of the society should be the prime goal of democracy and it has a

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[101]See Ibid,pp. 236-275.

major role to play in ensuring that, the procedural as well as opportunity aspect of an individual's freedom are fulfilled in bringing justice to him or her. Both of them disagree with the idea of completeness of distributive justice and they have provided a critique of the idea of justice. Both of them have given a critique of Rawlsian, Dworkinian and Nozick's conception of bringing justice.

Iris Marion Young has argued that instead of focussing on distribution, a conception of justice should rather engage with the concepts of domination and oppression as the two forms of severe injustices brought to an individual.[102] Such a shift brings out issues of decision-making, division of labour, culture etc. which have a deep impact on the conception of justice and takes into account the social group differences rather than overemphasising on the unity of subjects. Social groups do exist and some groups are more privileged than others in terms of distribution and decision-making and social justice should attend to such group differences in order to undermine oppression and exclusions of such groups.[103] However, Iris Marion Young refrains from giving a theory of justice as it " denies fundamental principle of justice that applies to most or all societies , whatever their concrete configuration and social relation, from a few general premises about the nature of human beings, the nature of societies, and the nature of reason".[104] Such a theory of justice, according to Young, intends to be self standing, shows justice in the unity and is 'detemporalized' and constructed by 'abstracting' from a particular circumstance of social life that gives it a claim of claim of justice, as it claims to be impartial and possess an objective standard against which all other institution and relations are evaluated.[105] Young further criticizes such a conception of justice and says that it fails in its objectives in at least two ways. First, if the theory is universal and independent and claims to be independent of social situation, there is a danger of getting too abstract and useless.[106] In order to be meaningful, it must contain some substantive premises about the social life. Secondly, discourses about justice however, shouldn't be seen as knowledge in the 'mode' of 'seeing' or 'observing', where a person who theorises is seen as master of the known. According to Young, the sense of justice arises not from looking but,

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[102] See, ibid, p. 3, (introduction).
[103] Ibid,p.4
[104] Ibid, p. 3.
[105] Ibid, p.4.
[106] Ibid, p.5.

Jean François Lyotard says, from listening.[107] She states that justice is not a theorem to be demonstrated, rather they are calls, plea, claims that needs to be heard and attained. Justice should attend to the specific situation and it should take into consideration, the possible contingencies of life.[108]

Further, she argues that the modern conception of justice is too much dominated by the distributive conception of justice, which tends to focus on material goods and social positions. The distributive theory of justice sometimes tends to extend the distributive paradigm to cover such non material concepts such as self-respect, opportunity, power and honour. She criticizes such a conception of justice that extends the distributive paradigm to such non material aspects, and often obscures the issues of domination and oppression, which requires a more process oriented and relational conceptualisation.[109] Young says, justice is 'coextensive' with the political and it cannot be seen in isolation.[110] So any conception of justice should take into account wider and specific premises of politics, as politics cannot remain concerned with the distributive aspects of social life only. It cannot remain impartial while recognising and attending to the structural forms of injustices and should take into consideration the possible contingencies.[111] The conception of justice should not only talk about the distribution of goods, wealth, income and other material goods, but it should also take into account issues like, decision-making power and structures of the division of labour.[112] The distribution of non material goods produces confusion that they are static things instead of a function of social relations and process of happenings. Justice should take a broader, comprehensive and more inclusive approach towards the social processes and relations. In Young's words,

> "I wish rather to dispense talk of justice that regards persons as primarily as possessors and consumers of goods to a wider context that also includes actions, decisions about actions, and provision of the means to develop and exercise capacities. The concept of social justice includes all aspects institutional rules and relations in so far as they are collective social decisions. The concepts of domination and oppression, rather than the concept of distribution , should be the starting point for a conception of justice."[113]

She provides a critique of Rawlsian notion of justice and the fundamental distribution

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[107] Ibid, p 4.
[108] Ibid, p.5
[109] Ibid, p.8.
[110] Ibid, p.9
[111] Ibid, p.5.
[112] Ibid p. 15.
[113] Ibid,p.16.

of rights and duties and states the main problem with such a conception of rights is that it doesn't recognises the limits of application of logic of distribution.[114] This conception of justice "precludes the thinking about what people are doing and, according to what institutional rules, how their doings and havings are structured by the institutionalised relations that constitute their positions and how the combined effects of their doings have recessive effects on their lives".[115]

Providing a critique of the idea of distribution of rights she states that rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions. Rights are relationship and shouldn't be seen as things.[116] They are, instead, institutionally defined rules which states what people can do with each other. Rights refer to doing more than having and to social relationships that enable or constrain actions. It refers to be enabled to certain things. Being enabled or constrained from doing certain things could be defined only in the broader terms of structural possibilities and produced by the confluence of various actions and practices.[117]

Evaluating a person according to whether the person has opportunities doesn't means distributive outcomes, but it is in examining whether the person remains enabled or constrained in a particular situation.[118] Similar arguments are being given by Young regarding the conception of self respect, as a primary good which all in the society must have for the society to be just. Self respect is not an entity or a measurable aggregate.[119] According to Young, while Rawls himself does not speak for something like self-respect, which can be distributed, he talks about the social arrangements that determine the background for self-respect. Self respect could be a 'function' of the material goods but it also depends upon how a person spends his time, amount of autonomy and how much decision making power they have in their activities.[120].

Another fault with such an understanding is that the distributive paradigm must conceptualise all issues of justice in terms of patterns.[121] It implies a 'static social ontology,'[122] that ignores the social processes. In such an understanding

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[114] Ibid, p. 24.
[115] Ibid,p.23
[116] Ibid, p.25.
[117] Ibid,p.26
[118] Ibid, p. 25.
[119] Ibid, p. 27.
[120] Ibid, p. 27.
[121] Ibid, p. 28.
[122] Ibid, p. 28.

individuals or the agents are seen as points in 'social fields' around which larger or smaller packets of social goods are distributed.[123] The evaluation of justice occurs by comparing the total size of the goods that the individuals possess. Robert Nozick, gives a critique of such a conception of end-state approach to justice as if "the social goods magically appear and get distributed".[124] Nozick states that such conception of justice ignores the process that creates the social goods and produces the distributive patterns, which they find irrelevant for evaluating distribution. If the individuals begins with the 'holdings' they are justly 'entitled' to and undertake 'free exchange', then the distribution will be just, no matter whatever they may be. According to Young the entitlement theory shows a 'possessively individualist ontology' and doesn't take into account structural effects of the actions of the individuals.[125]

So, Iris Marion Young criticizes the distributive conception of justice and instead gives a conception of justice derived from the conception of communicative ethics.[126] This idea of justice shifts the focus from distributive patterns to the procedural issues of participation in deliberation and decision making.[127]It helps to promote political inclusion However, Young refrains from giving any particular definition of justice because defining the concept of justice will lead to the devaluation and the exclusion of some contingent conditions that may play important role in determining the specific context of justice.[128] According to Young,

> "As doers and actors, we seek to promote many values of social justices in addition to the fairness in the distribution of goods: learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings; playing and communicating with others, and expressing our experiences, feelings and perspectives on social life in contexts where others can listen". [129]

Young states that, there is a connection between justice and the values that determine a good life and she further mentions two such values.[130] First, the value of developing and exercising one's capacities and expressing ones expression and second, participating in determining one's action. The violation of these two general

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[123] Ibid, p.28.
[124] Ibid, p. 28.
[125] Ibid, p. 29.
[126] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), ch.1
[127] See, ibid,p.37
[128] See,ibid,p.33
[129] Ibid, p. 37.
[130] Ibid, p.37.

values corresponds to two different social conditions that define social injustices.

First is, oppression which refers to the institutional constraints on self development that define injustice and second is domination which refers to the institutional constraints on self determination.[131] According to Young, "oppression consist in systematic institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognised settings or institutional social processes which inhibit people's ability to play and communicate with each others or to express their feelings and perspectives on their social life in contexts where others can listen".[132] It inhibits people's ability to determine their own self development.

Second form of structural injustice that happens to people is domination that inhibits the ability of people towards self development. Young defines domination as "institutional conditions which inhibit and prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions".[133] Both these forms of structural injustices are deeply disabling and leads to the exclusion of individuals from effective and efficient participation. While such structural injustices can arise out of unequal distribution, it can also happen due to biasness in the decision making procedures, division of labor and culture.[134]

Young proposes that in order to address these two forms of oppression, it is required that the concept of justice should move beyond mere distributional concerns, to that of 'institutional conditions' necessary for the development and the exercise of the individual's capacities through the process of communicative action.[135] Young proposes to see the individual or group differences in relational terms rather than viewing such differences existentially. She provides a critique of the existential notion of viewing identity and finds it to be against the idea of justice, as it fosters the structural forms of injustices and 'locks' people in their specific identity that can lead to exclusions. For avoiding such injustices, Young proposes for the politics of difference that takes into account the structural concerns of providing justice by ensuring a better participation and inclusion of the oppressed and the marginalized. She calls for the group representation of people in discussion and decision making

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[131] Ibid, pp. 37-38.
[132] Ibid, p. 38.
[133] Ibid, p. 38.
[134] Ibid, p. 38.
[135] Ibid, p. 39.

procedures so that their distinct voices and perspectives could be taken into consideration for arriving at socially just outcomes.[136]

. Young argues that the politics of difference promotes 'group analysis' and 'group generation' of policy proposals in institutional contexts, while decision makers remain accountable to deliberations taking place and to the group's perspectives, thus, ensuring justice.[137] Such an understanding of the specific representation of oppressed groups in the decision-making procedures of the democratic public promotes justice better. It prevents biasness from getting erupted in the decision making procedures by allowing deliberations to take place in 'unconstrained' conditions. Moreover, it assures that the voice of the oppressed and the excluded should be recognized in democratic deliberation so that the goals of self development and self determination could be attained for these groups.[138] The politics of difference recognises the group differences and converts them into resources that can enrich the social knowledge that remain available for taking inclusive and socially just decisions. Furthermore, the process of authorisation and accountability will ensure better representation for all and will ensure that the structural forms of injustices can't take place.[139]

Young proposes a more comprehensive and inclusive picture of justice that doesn't recognise the boundaries of nation states and calls for international justice.[140] It advocates going across the boundaries of the nation states so that justice can be ensured to all across the world so that the structural forms of injustices could be addressed. In this conception of justice, Young presupposes a strong notion of moral responsibility between agents in different nations and political communities According to Young, individuals actions are partially based on the actions of others, because they depend on each other's conditioning tasks and formulate institutional conditions and outcomes that affect and condition each other's conditions. In today's world of globalized markets, independent states, rapid and dense communication, the actions always remain interconnected and thus individuals cannot evade the

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[136]See, Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* ,(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000), pp. 134-137.

[137] See, Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1990), p. 184.

[138] Ibid, pp. 185-190.

[139] Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*,(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2000), pp.128-132.

[140] See, Iris Marion Young, "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," *Journal of Political Philosophy*,2004.

responsibility to justice that such a relation puts on.

Onora O' Neil argues that in such an interconnected world individuals have obligations to those who condition and enable their actions. A kind of asymmetry exists in these relations insofar as some people are more vulnerable to coercion, domination and deprivation by the institutionalised relations. While everyone in the system of structural and institutional relations stands in circumstances of justice that give them obligation with respect to all others, those institutionally and naturally situated to be able to do more to affect the conditions of vulnerability have better obligation. In the words of Iris Marion Young,

> "I share responsibility with many others who also contribute by their actions to
> the process that counts us just because I cannot disentangle my particular actions
> from the complex process in which some people are made particularly vulnerable
> to deprivation or domination."

She also brings in Pogge's argument that persons who live in more affluent parts of the world act within a common institutionalised scheme with person who live in less industrialised parts of the world. She also brings in Hannah Arendt's contribution of distinction between collective responsibility and legal responsibility and argues about the applicative aspect of moral responsibility that brings individuals in a relation of justice to each other even if they have not met each other. Young calls it as collective responsibility. Bringing in Arendt's argument she states that political responsibility is a kind of collective responsibility and "one who take responsibility borne collectively is not dissolvable to the self conscious collaborative acts of the individuals". Whereas legal responsibility assign responsibility according to what the agent has done, but the model of political responsibility states that individuals are responsible precisely for these things they themselves have not done.

However, unlike legal responsibility, members are not blamed or made guilty of these consequences, but they remain responsible under a different assumption. It doesn't mark out and isolate those held responsible. Taking political responsibility thus often entails in the question those institutional relations and actors which produce and reproduce injustice. Different persons stand in different position in structures that produce unjust outputs which assigns them different opportunities and capacities influencing those outcomes. So we stand in determinate structural relation to each

others and individuals have a responsibility to justice towards such forms of structural inequalities.

Amartya Sen's conception of justice starts with capability approach and states that justice should be understood in terms of the substantive to be taken into consideration. Sen's approach to social justice states that justice requires fair provision of freedom' or capability to function in important ways to all persons. According to Sen, "the case of social justice is based on capability equality, a state of affairs in which persons have equal capability and have access to important basic 'functionings".[141] Sen focuses on 'doings' and 'beings' of the individuals, which Sen calls 'functioning' and his real freedom to choose on from these different combinations of doings and beings.[142] The success of a society in terms of providing justice to its members of that society is based upon freedoms, which the members of the society enjoy. Greater freedom enhances the ability of the individuals to achieve better quality of life.

Justice can be ensured to the deprived, by bringing two forms of freedom to the individuals called 'substantive freedom' and 'instrumental freedom'. "Substantive freedom includes the elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivation as starvation, undernourishment, premature mortality and escapable morbidity, as well as the freedom that are associated with being literate and enumerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on".[143] Development should ensure that, these conditions should be fulfilled. The 'instrumental freedom demands civil and political rights, and freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security.[144] Both these aspects of freedom are required for the effective activity of the individuals that can ensure a better life conditions for all.

Amartya Sen is giving a critique of the conceptions of rights and justice, propounded by John Rawls, Robert Nozick and utilitarianism. Amartya Sen argues that all these approaches suffer from the exclusion of important information upon the basis of which the conceptualisation of their respective notions of justice is based.[145] According to Amartya Sen, the real evaluation of the theory of justice could be

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[141] see, Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2000
[142] Ibid, pp. 75-77.
[143] Ibid, p.38.
[144] Ibid,p.45
[145] Ibid, p.56.

understood from its informational base and on the calculation of what is taken or not taken to be directly relevant. All these theories go in different directions, largely driven by the informational base they take as being central to judging the justice or the acceptability of different social scenarios and has important implications for the debate on practical policies.[146]

Regarding the utilitarian approach towards justice, Sen argues injustice consists in the aggregate loss of the utilities compared with what could have been achieved. This approach has some important merits that can be attached to it for the consideration of conceptualisations of justices. First, "the importance of taking account of the results of social arrangements in judging them"[147] and second, "the need to pay attention to the well being of the individuals involved when judging the social arrangements and their results".[148] But Sen argues that some serious flaws in the utilitarian approach to justice can arise due to the informational base that it takes into consideration. First, flaw arises due to the distributional indifferences, when the approach tends to ignore the inequalities in terms of the distribution of happiness.[149] Second, reason lies in the "neglect of right, freedom and other utility concerns".[150] Utilitarian approach attaches no intrinsic importance to claims of rights and freedom, they are valued only indirectly and only to the extent up to which it influences the utilities. The third flaw arises due to the "adaptation and mental conditioning"[151] when the individuals adopt themselves to the prevailing conditions. Concentrating exclusively on mental characteristics could be misleading when making the interpersonal comparison of wellbeing and deprivations. The above mentioned facts make it difficult for the conceptualisation of justice to identify and address the concerns of the individuals.[152] According to Sen, a broader conceptualisation of justice requires a larger informational base that focuses on the capability of the individuals to choose the life they have reason to choose.

Regarding the Rawlsian conception of Justice, Sen raises the concern that, it overemphasises "priority of the liberty "in case of a conflict with other social goals.[153]

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[146] Ibid, p. 57.
[147] Ibid, p. 60.
[148] Ibid, p. 60.
[149] Ibid, p. 62.
[150] Ibid, p. 62.
[151] Ibid, p. 62.
[152] Ibid, p. 62.
[153] Ibid, p. 64.

It goes for the absolute priority to liberties and puts it on a plane that that remains different from that of the procedures that are devised to guarantee these rights. Sen, however, states that the priority of liberties is not a subject to be debated unless it overlooks the economic needs of the affected people.[154] For Sen, what is important, is whether the significance of the liberty for the society is adequately reflected by the weight that the person would himself tend to give it in judging his overall advantage. It is not adequate to see liberty simply as an advantage that can ensure overall advantage to the individuals.[155] The political advantage of giving priority to the rights and liberties far exceeds the personal advantage of the holders of those liberties and hence a kind of asymmetry exists between the personal and political advantage of this priority.[156]

Regarding the insufficiency of the libertarian approach towards the conceptualisation of justice, Sen states that the 'uncompromising' priority of the libertarian 'rights' can substantially undermine the 'substantive freedom' of the individuals as it believes that the 'entitlements' that the people exercise through the exercise of these rights cannot be outweighed because of their results, no matter whatever those results may be. The proposal for consequence-independent results of political priority remains indifferent to the substantive freedoms that the individual enjoys and accepting the procedural rules irrespective of the consequences of consideration can lead to disastrous results.[157] According to Sen, consequential consideration can attach great importance to the fulfilment or violation of the individual liberties without ignoring other considerations like freedom and hence, consequence-independent approach of libertarianism towards justice is actually a much narrow approach in terms of information consideration.[158] What is required is a broader conception of justice that takes into account a broader conception of justice.

Amartya Sen, here proposes that neither utility nor primary goods is a complete evaluative space that can provide a sound and compete informational base for evaluating justice to individuals. Rather, it is the substantive freedom and the capability that can provide a reliable and just informational base to evaluate justice. If the objective of justice is to concentrate on the individual's real opportunities to

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[154] Ibid, p. 64.
[155] Ibid, p. 65.
[156] Ibid, p. 65.
[157] Ibid, p. 65.
[158] Ibid, p. 65.

pursue his or her objectives, then not only the functioning vectors like utility, primary goods etc, should be taken into consideration, but also the relevant personal characteristics that govern the conversion of those objectives into the person's ability to promote his ends.[159] Capability approach to justice, thus provides an arrangement in terms of the substantive freedoms that can enable a person to achieve the alternative functioning combinations that can enable the individual to achieve whatever he values to achieve.[160] Capability approach thus emphasise upon the broadening of the informational bases so that maximum possible choices from the set of alternative functioning vectors could be made possible for the individual to achieve whatever he or she values to achieve, thus presenting a broader and comprehensive conception of justice.[161] It also takes into consideration the 'consequential' as well as 'procedural' aspects of freedom and provides a comprehensive foundational base upon the basis of which it can be evaluated as to how the individual's advantages are best judged and interpersonal comparisons are most sensibly made. Thus, capability approach to individual's freedom can provide a comprehensive approach for understanding and ensuring justice to all.

Therefore, what is common between Iris Marion Young and Amartya Sen regarding the conceptualisation of justice is that they agree on viewing it as enabling in nature and view it in the procedural as well as consequential fairness. Both of them disagree with traditional conceptualisation of justice given by Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian argues that it does not represent a comprehensive and inclusive conception of justice. Whereas, for Iris Marion such a conception of justice remains too abstract and doesn't takes into consideration the structural forms of injustices like domination and oppression, for Amartya Sen these theories of justice remain too constrained and exclude valuable and important information from its informational bases, resulting in the conceptualisation of only a partial conception of justice. Both of them agree that these theories of justice exclude the contingent information and circumstances while formulating a conception of justice and emphasis, either too much on distribution or on the procedural aspect of such a distribution. Looking at the constructive aspect of their conception of justice, one can find that, both of them agree that a theory of justice should remain enabling and it should ensure such social conditions in which

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[159] Ibid, pp.70-72.
[160] Ibid, p. 81.
[161] Ibid, ch.3.

the individuals can remain in a position to achieve self-determination and self-development through the exercise of the instrumental as well as substantive freedoms. Both of them agree that merely the attainment of the well-being aspect of individual's freedom is not sufficient. Wider and comprehensive view of justice should take into consideration the agency aspect of the individual's freedom also, so that the structural injustices like oppression and domination can be avoided by the freedom of the individuals to self-development and self-determination. Young bases her conception of justice on a relational understanding of group representation and politics of difference that works through the deliberative model of decision-making, in order to attain political inclusion so that the structural forms of injustices could be avoided. She also proposes the concept of political responsibility that calls for the attainment for global justice so that structural injustices could be avoided even if the agents are not consciously related to each other. Sen's capability approach also emphasises on deprivations caused due to the failure of the individual to exercise his capabilities in terms of substantive freedom, in particular social arrangements. Capability approach to justice takes into consideration a wider informational base for offering various combinations of possible functioning vectors that gives an individual the freedom to live a capable and free life. Exclusion arising either due to the structural injustices or due to the capability failure brings injustices to the individual and it requires a deliberative model of decision making that can promote inclusion and justice by ensuring procedural as well as consequential fairness.

Conclusion

It is possible to address the exclusion caused due to the structural injustices and capability deprivation by ensuring a deliberative model of democracy that takes into account the relational understanding of the various group differences and ensures fairness in procedural as well as consequential aspects of justice by enhancing the freedom and decisional autonomy of the individuals. This leads to the capability expansion of the individual that helps him or her in the process of self-development and self-determination, that can address the problem of social exclusion due to capability deprivation.

CONCLUSION

It is really difficult to conclude on such a multidimensional concept like 'exclusion' due to the range of the factors being responsible for such conditions of exclusion. Reducing them to one single cause will actually be an injustice to the relevance and comprehensiveness of the concept. In my work, I have tried to discuss the various causes of exclusion, which may arise due to the capability deprivation, essentialist assumption of identity, universal citizenship, structural injustices and lack of effective forms of political communications. Amartya Sen's analysis of exclusion, finds capability deprivation as the root cause of exclusion, whereas Young's analysis finds universal citizenship, impartiality, and lack of effective forms of inclusive political communication as the prime cause of happening of the condition called 'exclusion. Although, their respective analysis of the causes of exclusion is different, both of them agree on the fact that, exclusion produces such conditions of existence that severely undermines the dignity of the individuals and their capacity to live a fulfilling and capable life. .

Loss of the capabilities of the individual can severely undermine his well-being, leading to the loss of the substantial freedom, that he can use to avoid the conditions of starvation, undernourishment, illiteracy, premature mortality, and sickness as well as the loss of the agency aspects of his freedom. Capability deprivation, then, leads to the rupturing of the social bonds that the individual needs for active participation in the decision making procedures. Command over the various functioning vectors like, resources, utilities and primary goods etc, gives the required control over his or her life and provides him with the freedom to choose from the possible livings that is required for the fulfillment of Aristotelian notion of 'life in terms of activity'. The loss of command over these possible 'functionings' leads to the social exclusion of the individuals due to the capability failure and inhibits him or her from participating effectively in the decision-making procedures, which can severely affect his condition of existence. The conversion of these possible functioning vectors remains deeply contingent on the living conditions of the individuals. Individual's own well-being, social structures, institutions and cultural practices etc, determine the level of conversion of these functioning vectors

into capabilities and freedom. The social structures plays an important role in determining the command of the individuals over the possible functioning vectors and existence of the oppressive forms of structures that can seriously undermine the well-being aspect and agency aspect of the individual's freedom.. Such loss gives rise to the structural forms of injustices that will produce the condition of deprivation, domination and exclusion that can undermine the capacity of the individuals towards self determination and self development.

Structural injustices produced due to the universalistic assumptions of impartiality and citizenship produce the condition of marginalization, exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence that can exclude the individuals from effective participation in the decision-making structures. Such a universalistic assumption produces dichotomization of the social groups in superior-subordinate relationship and stigmatizes the different as 'deviant'. The oppression produced due to the structural injustices produces systemic as well as systematic forms of exclusion and may arise due to the conscious as well as unconscious practices of exclusion at discussion and decision making levels. Such assumptions arise due to the essentialist assumptions about the excluded group's identity and the dominant group assigns certain fixed attributes to the oppressed and the excluded group. Universalisation of the dominant group's norms, values and expectations is projected as neutral and impartial and gets articulated through the social structures. The dominant group, then, excludes the oppressed group from the discussion and decision-making structures through the external and internal forms of exclusion and undermines his quest for self-development and self-determination.

In order to overcome such forms of exclusion, a relation and plural understanding of the group differences can ensure inclusion at decision-making levels, as it negates the essentialist assumptions about identity and group differences. Such a relational understanding actually, traces similarity among different groups and enriches the collective decisions' quality, efficiency and inclusiveness, by taking into account the 'situated knowledge' through the recognition of different groups' perspectives. 'Positional objectivity' of the individuals should be given due recognition at discussion and decision making levels, so that the inclusiveness of the decision-making structures

can be increased. Such an inclusion of the group's perspectives increases the quality and efficiency of the collective decisions.

Young's conceptualization of the politics of difference and Sen's conceptualization of the 'capability expansion' is actually based upon the idea of such inclusion, that takes into account the communicative action and inclusive political communication for addressing the various forms of injustices and exclusion faced by the deprived and excluded group. Exclusion of the individuals due to the capability deprivation can be resolved up to a great extent by increasing the informational base of the available possible contingencies, while arriving at the collective conditions. The inclusive political communication will take into account the relational and plural features of group differences and the collective decisions will happen through the process of communicative rationality. Such an inclusive political communication will break the dichotomization of the group identity of superior-subordinate relationship and the participants will come to know about their respective biasness as the respective deliberation remains based upon the ideals of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness and publicity. It makes possible, the reflection of various interests, values, opinions and perspectives in the collective decisions, and ensures that group-specific and individual-specific exclusions like, oppression, domination and capability deprivation gets addressed through the inclusive procedures and policy-making. It helps the excluded group to modify the structures of discourse through the process of value formation and interest articulation.

Such an inclusive political communication and communicative action demands democracy. Democracy can play intrinsic, instrumental and constructive role for addressing the injustices, suffered by the excluded and marginalized group. Democracy offers political rights and can play an instrumental role in ensuring the substantial freedom and instrumental freedom. This model of democracy takes into account the consideration of the 'situated knowledge' and the 'positional objectivity' into consideration while making discussion and arriving at the collective decision. Opportunities for participation, in public activities, ensure the procedural and consequential freedoms to the concerned individuals. It promotes the agency freedom of the individuals and allows him to choose from possible livings. It respects the persons

autonomy and thus, it ensures people their right to self-determination and self-development. Its constructive role helps to prioritize their preferences and bring out change in the oppressive structures of the society through the articulation of values in the society in the light of informed public discussion and debates. Various other agencies of inclusion like, public institutions, market and civil society are substantially affected by the articulation of the social values. Moreover various functioning vectors, that determine the individual's freedom are deeply related to the values of the concerned society and distribution of the primary goods, resources and utilities etc, is deeply affected by the social arrangements and values, that guide them. So, exclusion arising due to the capability deprivation, universal citizenship, identity, and poor forms of political communication can be addressed, up to a great extent by promoting deliberative model of democracy. Formation of informed, inclusive, transparent and accountable decisions promotes the well-being aspect and agency aspects of the individual's freedom and helps in formulating group specific policies and programs that can meet the specific requirements of the specific forms of exclusion. It will ensure justice to the excluded group, as it remains enabling in its outlook and allows the excluded to have the freedom to choose from various 'beings' and 'doings' and possible conditions of existence. Active participation and deliberation rescues justice from getting too abstract to be useful and being too constrained to restrain its scope, by being only concerned with just distribution of utilities, primary goods and resources. Politics of difference demand forms of inclusive and democratic forms of political communication for ensuring justice to the excluded and oppressed through the representation of the group's perspectives in the decision-making procedures. Capability approach to justice takes into consideration the 'broadening' of the informational bases for arriving at collective decision, which requires comprehensive sharing of information through social interactions while arriving at collective decisions. So, it can be safely concluded that, ensuring justice to the excluded demands representation of diverse perspectives and informational broadening, so that informed, accountable, transparent and inclusive decisions could be arrived at, which will, then address the specific forms and conditions of exclusion. Democracy, thus, becomes an inevitable condition for addressing exclusion and ensuring justice to the affected. After all, society exists for everyone.

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
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