

**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

**STRATEGIC DISHARMONY**  
**A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS**

# **STRATEGIC DISHARMONY**

**A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS**

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## PREFACE


This thesis makes a modest attempt to construct a theoretical framework of the concept of strategic disharmony through a case study of Soviet Japanese Relations from 1945 to early 1978. The researcher is fully conscious of his limitations in the matter. The first chapter endeavours to define the nature and types of strategic disharmony between the two neighbouring states and suggests some propositions of general relevance. The second chapter provides a historical perspective. The third chapter deals with the attitude of USSR and Japan towards the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the question of repatriation of prisoners-of-war, and normalization of relations in 1956. The fourth chapter is concerned with the relations between the two countries since normalization. The fifth chapter examines the problem of northern territories. The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters deal with trade and economic relations, the fisheries question, and cooperation in Siberia respectively and examine their impact on strategic disharmony. Chapter nine discusses Soviet-Japanese relations in the 1970s. Chapter ten presents the concluding observations.

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New Delhi

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Rajendra K. Jain". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.

RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN

## Chapter One

### STRATEGIC DISHARMONY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The phenomenon of strategic disharmony characterizes much of contemporary bilateral and multilateral interstate relationships. Its dimensions may be global (US-Soviet), regional (West Europe-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), or bilateral (China-Soviet Union), or a combination of one or more of these.<sup>1</sup>

The term "strategy," from the Greek strategus, was defined as "the art of the general." This narrow definition has, however undergone considerable change with the change in the nature of warfare and with society becoming more complex. Nations have found it necessary to adjust and correlate political, economic, technological, and psychological factors, along with military elements in the management of their national policy.<sup>2</sup> Strategy may be defined as a plan whereby a state seeks to advance its own interests while preventing other states from impinging on such interests. This necessarily involves an assessment of the gains and losses advantages and disadvantages which would accrue in pursuing a particular policy. .

By disharmony, we mean a situation of a conflict of interests -- either economic, political or military/security -- which is discernible between two or more states. Disharmony may be the outcome of one or more of the following factors: a) conflicting national economic and security interests; b) variant socio-economic systems; c) ideological differences; and d) divergent perceptions about each other, which are often the result of history and the nature of bilateral interactions, past and present. Each

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1 This would be especially true of the super Powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- who have global interests and who compete for global influence.

2 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.21,p.289.

of these factors interacts with one another, influencing, reinforcing, or modifying the others in varying degrees. The lesser the identity and the fewer the communication, economic, military, or political ties between two states, the greater is the divergent political perception and dissimilar political behaviour between two states likely to be.

Disharmony may be total or partial. By total disharmony we mean when it is comprehensive and deep-rooted, encompassing political, economic, security, and ideological interests, which makes it difficult for disharmony to be removed in the near or distant future, e.g. the Sino-Soviet relationship. By Partial disharmony we mean when it is the outcome of certain specific and limited issues and consequently it tends to be transient.

Disharmony may also be defined as the absence of harmony, which is the result of a similarity of interests -- ideological military, security, political, and economic. The absence of harmony does not, however, necessarily imply the existence of disharmony. Similarly, the prevalence of diverse socio-economic systems and ideological differences do not necessarily result in strategic disharmony because international actors having the same socio-economic political systems and professing the same ideology are also characterised by both partial (USSR-Rumania) and total strategic disharmony (USSR-China).

Harmony may not be possible in spite of a long common historical, cultural, racial, and linguistic, background. Thus, despite geographical continuity, demographic homogeneity, structural stability of the social and political set-up between India and Pakistan, harmony continued to elude the two neighbours.

The basic elements which make for strategic disharmony between the Soviet Union and Japan are, firstly, unpleasant historical experiences. The national psyche of Japan is such that the Japanese have deep-seated suspicion and fear of the northern "Russian bear". Russia's role in inspiring the Triple Intervention (1895), its subsequent seizure of the splendid strategic harbour of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula, and the renunciation of the 1941 Neutrality Pact and the subsequent declaration of war on Japan in 1945, which it considered a stab in the back, are historical precedents which are deeply ingrained in the Japanese mind.

Secondly, domestic pressure groups, who influence the policy-making processes in varying degrees, constitute a significant determinant of the extent to which harmony is desirable or feasible. Historical legacies, cultural affinity, and other linkages, the character of socio-economic and political systems, ideological similarities or differences, and psychological factors like deep-seated distrust and fear among the body politic are some of the factors which influence the attitudes of pressure groups. The Japanese most certainly cannot be said to share the same close or sentimental relationship with the Russians as they do with the Chinese, with whom there exists a deep sense of cultural affinity and similar racial origin. In fact, public opinion polls have repeatedly shown a deep-seated aversion and apprehension of the USSR. This is especially accentuated, among other things, by the so-called Northern territories issue. There is some possibility that the development of closer economic cooperation and increased trade between the two countries, there might come into being a "Soviet lobby" of influential business and

government circles to counter balance the powerful "China lobby". However, this does not seem likely in the near future.

Thirdly, Soviet military threat to Japan also contributes to strategic disharmony between the USSR and Japan. It was largely because of the Communist Powers' threat that Japan sought to insure itself by concluding a defensive alliance with the United States, with the Korean War having a catalytic influence.<sup>3</sup> The "threat" of attack from Soviet forces is probably that contingency around which defence plans of the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) are based. The US-Japanese Security Treaty was "a product of shock and fear over the conclusion of the Sino-Russian alliance treaty", which was specifically directed against Japan<sup>4</sup>, and the outbreak of the Korean War that immediately followed.<sup>5</sup> The Treaty serves as "a counterbalance to the Sino-Soviet alliance" and it was "absolutely necessary to guarantee the peace and security of Japan"<sup>6</sup> exposed as it was to Communist nuclear threats.

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida said the ~~main~~ reason for concluding the military alliance with the United States was that an "unarmed Japan is obliged to seek protection with other nations."<sup>7</sup>

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3 In fact, from 1948 onwards US Occupation policy moved towards rehabilitation and rearmament instead of retribution and reform primarily because of increasing tensions of the Cold War in Europe in 1947-48 and as the future of Nationalist China became increasingly doubtful. With the outbreak of the Korean War, American policymakers decided to utilise the geographical position, manpower, and industrial potential of Japan in its global efforts to contain alleged Soviet expansionism. Japan, thus, became the northern anchor of the American defence system and the corner-stone of its East Asian policy.

4 The relevant article is as follows: "Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly in acts of aggression."

5 Morinosuke Kajima, Modern Japanese Foreign Policy (Tokyo, 1971), p.60.

6 Ibid., p.18, 22.

7 Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's speech in Japanese Diet on

The US-Japanese alliance, until recently, was considered by all concerned as a coalition of reciprocal advantages: the US being dependent on Japan for bases and the latter on the former for nuclear protection.

Soviet forces in the Far East include 43 divisions in eastern Siberia, 55 amphibious ships (plus escorts), around 300 medium bombers, and growing numbers of new tactical fighters (SU-17s, SU-19s, MiG-23s). Other forces that might be used to reinforce those in the Far East include some 70 amphibious ships, 7 airborne divisions, and, 1,000 heavy and medium bombers. Also, about 30 per cent of all Soviet strategic nuclear missiles are deployed in Siberia and in the submarines belonging to the Pacific Fleet. To counter this threat, Japan has the 144 ships of the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), the 13 divisions of the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), 4 of which are in Hokkaido, the Japanese island most exposed to attack, and the 350 intercept~~or~~ aircraft of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). American air units in Japan and the US 7th Fleet also have to be considered, together with reinforcements that could be sent from the US.

Japanese strategy at present is for a capability to hold out against an all-out conventional attack for 15 to 30 days. The Japanese White Paper on Defence for 1977 recognizes the need to improve air surveillance systems (especially in view of the recent Mig-25 incident) and go in for <sup>the</sup> more sophisticated F-15s besides selecting the next generation anti-submarine aircraft and improving its overall naval capabilities.<sup>8</sup>

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12 October 1951. See Contemporary Japan, July-September 1951, pp.26-7.

8 Japan, Defense Agency, White Paper on Defense, 1977, Defence Bulletin, (Tokyo), vol.1, no.3, September 1977, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol.7, no.12, December 1977, pp.60,74-6.

Fourthly, the fisheries question is another factor giving rise to strategic disharmony and a potential source of conflict in Soviet-Japanese relations. In Asia, the Northwest Pacific is acknowledged to be the most productive area and it is here that Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets compete with each other for the catch. In 1973 Prime Minister Tanaka stated that the Soviet authorities so far detained 12,000 <sup>Japanese</sup> fisherman and 1,400 fishing boats.<sup>9</sup> Most of these incidents have occurred in the north and east of Hokkaido, an area especially rich in fish, ~~xx~~ clams and edible seaweed, where the Russians maintain a 12-mile, and since March 1977 a 200-mile, zone around waters ~~xx~~ of the Northern territories. An intensification of fishing disputes can sour relations between them and may provide a catalyst for greater conflict.<sup>10</sup> But, it also illustrates Japan's vulnerability to Soviet arm-twisting and the pressures by domestic fishery lobbies on the political leadership to seek an amicable solution.

Strategic disharmony can be totally or substantially removed if the more powerful state resorts to a military solution of outstanding problems (especially when bilateral negotiations, arbitration, or the involvement of third Powers is deemed neither feasible nor desirable) and brings under its control the territory of its ~~xxxxxx~~ perceived adversary. However, the USSR does not apparently consider this to be a desirable national option in the case of Japan

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<sup>9</sup> New York Times, 23 October 1973.

<sup>10</sup> See Geoffrey Kemp, "Threats from the Sea: Sources for Asian Maritime Conflict," Orbis, Fall 1975, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol.6, no.6, pp.30-2.

since this might lead to a wider conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons, in which there would be no victors, no vanquished. The continued effectiveness of the US-Japanese Security Treaty would continue to deter Moscow, from resorting to such an action. Moreover, the tremendous expense involved in keeping hostile territory under forcible subjugation would not make such a course of action truly remunerative. Thus, given the present international environment, the resort to a nuclear, or perhaps even a conventional, attack to dilute the element of disharmony between Japan and the Soviet Union seems most unlikely in the near future. In fact, it is increasingly realized nowadays that national objectives must be achieved, to the extent possible, primarily with political, economic, and propagandist means.

It is perhaps more reasonable to argue that strategic disharmony may be removed partially or totally depending on the extent to which its basic determinants cease to operate. Obviously, it seems extremely unlikely that any basic transformation in either the Japanese or Soviet socio-economic and political system, or ideology would take place in the near future. Whether other factors -- threat perception, the northern territories dispute and the fisheries problem -- would dilute or aggravate strategic disharmony is discussed in subsequent chapters.

It is relevant to examine what options Japan has to reduce strategic disharmony. Hypothetically, there are at least four, conceptualized as follows:

- a) abrogate the US-Japanese Security Treaty;
- b) seek alternate alliances with the Soviet Union, China, or West European countries;
- c) adopt a policy of neutrality; and
- d) ~~acquire~~ acquire nuclear weapons.



Let us now examine each of these options in some detail.

a) Abrogate the US-Japanese Security Treaty:

In recent times greater tensions are evident in US-Japanese Relations owing to American irritations with Japan over economic issues and Tokyo's reluctance to increasingly share its defense burden. Japan is also displeased at Washington's tough approach towards bilateral economic matters and concerned about a gradual American retrenchment and retrenchment in East Asia. Unless carefully handled such conditions could cause a serious erosion in their mutual confidence, leading to the drifting apart of two important allies.

Japan's phenomenal economic growth after the Second World War gave a fillip to greater economic competition and rivalry with the United States the world over so much so that even in bilateral economic relations Japan has a substantial trade surplus with the United States.<sup>11</sup> The "Nixon shocks" of the early 1970s -- not informing or taking Japan into confidence about the American President's visit to China and the imposition of a surcharge on Japanese exports in order to correct the trade imbalance and avert a dollar devaluation -- annoyed the Japanese. More important, however, have been Japanese perceptions of the implications of the Nixon doctrine. According to Muraoka, this doctrine essentially "a policy aimed at balancing the external role and interests of the

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11 Robert Strauss, the American Special Trade Ambassador told a Senate International Trade Sub-committee on 1 February 1978 that it would probably be eight years before the United States broke even with the Japanese trade surplus of more than \$10 billion. Asian Recorder, 5-11 March 1978, p.14202.

United States as a super Power with her domestic priorities; with the immediate objective of reducing the costs of overseas involvement by mobilizing her allies."<sup>12</sup> It suggests the need for a critical re-evaluation of what constitutes America's vital interests in the region. It is also symptomatic of a general reduction of the American politico-military presence in East Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle. Despite the affirmation that existing alliances will be honoured, President Nixon<sup>13</sup> stated that "we are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."<sup>13</sup> This seems to have ushered in an "era of indeterminacy" about the American commitment. Japan is worried because the guarantee by President Nixon left unanswered the question of which states may be deemed "vital", and as to how the US "shield" is to be interposed. This change in the arms and priorities of American policy constitute an acid test for the US-Japanese alliance. Moreover, as Soviet long-range nuclear forces have grown, questions have arisen in Japan, as elsewhere, about the efficacy of the American nuclear guarantee.

Americans generally feel that Japan, a thriving nation with great Power potential, has got a "free ride," that it is receiving all the benefits of its alliance with the US without sharing burdens and responsibilities for either its own defence or the security and stability of Asia. Washington wants if the Japanese will not be pushed into breaching the sacred one per cent of GNP

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12 Kunio Muraoka, Japanese Security and the United States (London, 1973), Adelphi Paper No.95,p.5.

13 Richard M.Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Report to the Congress (Washington,D.C., 1971),p.13.

devoted to national defence, then at least they should contribute more towards the upkeep of those same US bases in Japan that provide the disincentive for Japanese rearmament.<sup>14</sup>

It cannot be denied that the Security Treaty has been highly advantageous for Japan. It has served as "an international incubator insulating Japan from war and upheaval."<sup>15</sup> It has kept Japanese military costs to a minimum while giving them much greater security than they alone could have provided even at much higher costs.<sup>16</sup> In fact, the Treaty has facilitated Japan's rapid economic growth. Tokyo, however, finds that its manoeuvrability and independence is severely circumscribed by the security treaty. The presence of American military bases in Japan has been a political irritant which has been much exploited by Japan's Opposition parties.<sup>17</sup> US bases in Japan and Okinawa were considered an irritating hang over from the days of American occupation. Bases occupied valuable space in land-short Japan; but more importantly it was feared by many Japanese that the use of these bases by the USA to support its military actions elsewhere in East Asia might draw Japan into a war against its will.

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14 Japan plaintively complains that it is already contributing US \$500,000 a year towards American base costs and has spent US \$ 8 billion on base improvement over the past eight years. The Americans point out that they maintain 40,000 men in Japan, each costing US \$50,000 a year. That alone works out at US \$2 billion just for bodies. Times of India, 16 March 1978.

15 Donald C.Hellmann, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik'" in James W.Morley, ed., Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's (Princeton, N.J., 1972), p.137.

16 Edwin O.Reischauer, "China and Japan: Rivals or Allies?" in Francis O.Wilcox, ed., China and the Great Powers (New York, 1974), p.45; Martin E.Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy - 1947-1968 (New York, 1971) p.2.

17 The Japan's opposition Parties have been staunch critics of the US-Japan Security Treaty relying primarily on popular aversion to war and rearmament. They argued that there were considerable possibilities of Japan being involved in a major war in the Far East. Through the use of Japan's bases and the deployment over-

There are also certain differences between the American commitment to Europe and Japan. Japan apparently is not of the same material, political, and cultural importance as Europe is. ~~Consequently~~ Consequently, the United States is bound to its alliances in the Asian Pacific region by a series of individual pacts, not an overall treaty, so that there is no common will<sup>ing</sup>ness to aid one another, no automatic involvement of one nation in the event of an attack upon another. Even if an Asian Treaty Organisation existed, the geographic dispersal of the possible participants and their inadequate naval and air forces would probably require the United States to assume a larger share of the defence burden than it does in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.<sup>18</sup> The Japanese

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seas of American forces stationed in Japan in conformity with the Security Treaty, eventualities which Japanese would be helpless to avoid. However, many Japanese seek to retain the security-link with the United States but would make it more specifically defensive than the present one to self-deterrent purposes.

In fact, there prevail two commanding views regarding the future of Japanese-US relations among the Japanese. Firstly, it is argued that Japan should continue to remain in special relationship with the United States because even today, despite the major changes in the international power relationship, Japan needs the military protection of the United States as it ~~needs~~ needs the special economic relationship with that country if it is to survive in the midst of worldwide insecurity and economic chaos.

The second view advocates that Japan should now declare its "independence" from the United States in the military-security as well as the economic sectors. Behind this lies the fear that Japan's policy toeing the American line may well involve Japan in military or economic disputes which Japan, for its own supreme national interests, must avoid at all cost.

18 J.J.Coffey, Strategic Power and National Security (Pittsburg, 1971) pp.118-9.

defense experts are also agreed that American protection would not be forthcoming in all cases.

A related question which would confront Japanese policy-makers is whether US disengagement from South Korea also reduced its defence commitment to Japan as well. Historically, the Korean peninsula played an important role in securing its security and even now stability of the Korean peninsula is essential for Japan's security since it "thrusts itself, like a menacing dagger, from the continent towards the vital parts of Japan."<sup>19</sup> This was acknowledged in the 1969 Nixon-Sato communique<sup>20</sup> and was reiterated in Japanese White Paper on Defence of 1977.<sup>21</sup> Tokyo considers the security of the Korean peninsula to be largely dependent on the presence of American troops.

Japan is seen as having four basic and hierarchically arranged interests in Korea: 1) the dominant concern being to have continued peace in Korea; for this its intent is to rely on the US to keep the peace; 2) a policy which does not evoke hostility in Peking and Moscow, 3) a non-hostile South Korea; and 4) the enjoyment of maximum economic and political benefits from the Korean peninsula.<sup>22</sup> Thus, evidently it is in the interests of Japan if Korea to remains divided. It is pointed out that as Japan's economic stake in South Korea grows, so will Japanese concern for that country's security. In any event, it seems extremely unlikely that Japan will insert itself militarily into the Korean situation: because for one thing the South Koreans are unlikely to welcome Japanese military role; for another, the

19 Quoted in Contemporary Japan, October-December 1950, pp.351-2.

20 For text see Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers of Japan, 1970-71 (Tokyo, 1972), pp.94-7.

21 Summary of 1977 Japanese White Paper on Defence. Defence Bulletin (Tokyo), vol.1, no.3, September 1977, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol.7, no.12, December 1977, p.59, 61; also see Japan, Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (n.p., n.d.), p.12.

22 N.White, "Japan's Security Interests in Korea," Asian Survey, vol.16,

utter divisiveness of the issue in domestic Japanese politics, the potential harm to Japan's international reputation. More importantly, the Self-Defense Forces could not bring to bear any significant military capability if war did break out, militate against such an eventuality. Japan will, consequently, continue to be an interested, but essentially powerless, bystander.<sup>23</sup> It is also evident that neither China nor the Soviet Union would gain from the precipitation of a conflict situation in the Korean peninsula.<sup>24</sup>

A total withdrawal of troops from South Korea would be also have a number of disadvantages for the United States itself: it

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~~22~~ no.4, April 1976, pp.299-318.

23 James H. Buck, "The Role of Korea in Japanese Defense Policy," Asian Affairs (New York), vol.4, no.4, March-April 1977, pp.230-1.

24 China is likely to act as a restraining force on Kim Il Sung and give precedence to its national interests over ideological considerations. Peking is unlikely to encourage North Korean military adventurism in South Korea because of the drain of resources -- in men, money and material -- involved in any large-scale military and economic assistance programme for underwriting a war. Secondly, Peking would not like to jeopardize Sino-US rapprochement and its policy of continued support for an American presence in Asia to counter the Russians. Thirdly, with Hanoi's precedent before it, China might not be interested in seeing a more powerful and more independent-minded (and for that matter less amenable to Chinese influence) Korea on its northeastern border (like Vietnam now is on its southern periphery) though both of them might be communist countries. Fourthly, Peking might feel that the Soviet Union would be the chief beneficiary if Washington becomes freshly embroiled in East Asia. In such a situation, ... Moscow would be at liberty to apply pressure on China and the latter would, thus, be playing into Moscow's hands. Finally, Kim's military victory in South will greatly disillusion Japan as regards US commitment to Japan's Security. This could possibly lead Japan into an ambitious programme of military armament which would hardly be in Chinese interests. J.P. Jain, China in World Politics (New Delhi, 1976), p.80.

The Soviet Union would also have to take into consideration the China and Japan factors and, above all, the problem of endangering detente with the United States. Possibilities of securing economic assistance from Washington and Tokyo for the development of Siberia would also decline. Thus, one interest all of the Powers interested in the Korean peninsula share is the prevention of Japan's rearmament, which can be insured by reducing tension in the peninsula. See Joseph M. Ha, "A Korean Settlement: The Role of the Four Powers," East Asian Review, vol.4, no.2, Summer 1977, p.196.

would increase the possibilities of renewed conflict there since the deterrent value of preventing forcible unification by North Korea of South Korea would no longer be there; rearmament of Japan is likely to increase because of the feeling that the US no longer concerned itself about an area so closely related to Japan's security could not be relied on to defend Japan.<sup>25</sup> In view of these considerations, total US troop withdrawal does not seem likely in the near future.

The United States will not apparently prefer a drastic reduction in commitments because in most cases this cannot perhaps be effected without unacceptable political cost. The United States will apparently refrain from such steps which directly challenge the credibility of alliance arrangements for the reason that it might lead Japan to take to large scale rearmament in "a nationalistic, anti-American mood."<sup>26</sup> The decks would also be cleared for a possible alignment of a nuclear-armed Japan with either China or the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Even if Washington resorted to political accommodation with zeal, it would be unlikely to promote compromise and conciliation. Moreover, the American presence in Asia has been a stabilizing force and can in the future be an indispensable constraint on Japan's ambitions as a growing super Power.<sup>27</sup> The United States, therefore, would not like to have the Security Treaty abrogated by Japan.

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25 Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C., 1975) pp. 178-80.

26 Ibid., pp. 50-1.

<sup>27</sup> T. C. Rhee, "Implications of the Sino-American Detente," Orbis, Summer 1972, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1971, p. 26.

Both the People's Republic of China<sup>28</sup> and the Soviet Union would also not welcome the abrogation of the US-Japanese Security Treaty. Both seem to regard it as a convenient device for putting a check on Japan from becoming a military great Power. Consequently, both the Communist countries have stopped bringing accusation to the Security Treaty. However, this does not imply that Moscow's long-term goal does not remain the achievement of the loosening of Japan's political, military, and economic links with the United States, apparently because then Japan would be more open to Soviet influence and pressure.

b) Seek alternate ~~with~~ alliances:

Alliances and other forms of coalition exist for the advancement of the self-interest of the parties to it. If a state feels that the alliance/coalition no longer serves its self-interest, it will leave it or form a new one that does serve them. The Japanese alliance is no exception to this general rule.

The desire to exercise greater manoeuvrability and independence in its foreign policy and the gradual erosion of the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee might impel Japan to enter into alternate alliances to safeguard its interests, especially those of security. The possible candidates would be China, the Soviet Union, or Western Europe.

Despite cultural affinity and widespread popular sentiment, both among the people at a large and especially influential business

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28 Notwithstanding Peking's repeated accusations against America's role in Asia since the 1940's, China of late has come to appreciate the enormous "balancing" value of the residual presence of the United States in the region, irreplaceable until the Chinese possess an effective nuclear capability and have made greater progress in economic growth. Ibid., pp.14-5. Chinese leaders have repeatedly told Japanese visitors that Japan should keep the US-Japanese Security Treaty vis-a-vis the USSR until she has enough self-defence power. See remarks by Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei to visiting Japanese Dietmen, Japan Times,



and political circles, towards improved relations with China, a Sino-Japanese alliance does not seem a likely occurrence because (i) it would essentially be an alliance between two divergent political and economic systems and consequently less likely to be enduring; (ii) it would be "an alliance of two military weaklings against a military superpower and would be more likely to provoke than ~~against~~ to deter Moscow,"<sup>29</sup> and (iii) whatever economic gains might be achieved from an alliance with China are already being realized by the Japanese without such an alliance. Thus, such an alliance would give Japan no added security from the Soviet Union, the one country it might fear, but it would embroil Japan in the Sino-Soviet confrontation and would therefore make conflict with the Soviet Union more, ~~the~~ rather than less, likely. It could only worsen Japan's relations with the United States. China would not gain substantially, if at all, from such an alliance. At any rate, it would appear to require "a significant US disengagement as a condition and a Soviet effort to fill the vacuum as a stimulus."<sup>30</sup> Both competition and cooperation will continue to characterise Sino-Japanese relations and Pan-Asianism - desired by some, feared by many -- will not be created in this or any other form.<sup>31</sup>

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19 January 1973.

29 Donald S. Zagoria, "The Soviet Quandry in Asia," Foreign Affairs, no.1, January 1978, p.314.

30 A.M. Halperin, "China and Japan since Normalization," X in Chun-tu Hsueh, ed., Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations (New York, 1977), p.123.

31 Robert A. Scalapinio, "China and the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, January 1974, p.375.

An alliance with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, holds possibilities of greater potential benefit than an alliance with China. The Soviet Union could provide the same security guarantees as the United States and scope of benefit accruing from intensified economic interaction continues to tickle the imagination of Japanese entrepreneurs. However, a Soviet-Japanese alliance is most improbable because, firstly, historical distrust and deep popular emotional resentment of the Russians evident in all strata of Japanese society, a ~~resentment~~ resentment fed by a territorial dispute, worsening fishing disputes and seizures of Japanese fishing boats, and repeated violations of Japanese territorial waters and air space militates against this. Indubitably, the Japanese incline more towards the Chinese rather than the Russians. But, then, feelings and emotions do not always dictate the shaping of foreign policy and this is true even in the case of the Japanese. At any rate historical and emotional restraints are likely to be of some consequence. Secondly, the same variance in economic and political institutions exists as is the case with China.

The scenario of fuller Japanese interaction with West European countries and, on occasion, side with them against American policies when Japanese interests so dictate first is subject to two serious limitations: Western Europe is neither capable nor interested in underwriting Japan's security and second, protectionist ~~politicized~~ policies to restrict Japanese economic inroads considerably reduce the possibilities and interest in West Europe in close collaboration with Tokyo.<sup>32</sup> Thus, during his 1973 tour of European countries

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32 Robert A. Scalapino, "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1977), pp.406-7.

Premier Tanaka found that few of them were in the mood to respond warmly to Japan's wishes to join a revamped Atlantic alliance. The anxiety that Tokyo might prove to be "a Trojan horse within such an organization, spewing out economic samurai who threaten its European associates," was no doubt the main reason for their lukewarm attitude.<sup>33</sup>

Another possibility is a triangular American-Japanese-Chinese alliance to contain the Soviet Union. It is difficult, Halperin points out, to establish under foreseeable conditions, the compelling advantages to the three countries of a formal alliance as against ad hoc coordination in case of need.<sup>34</sup>

Evidently, Washington would not welcome the prospect of the harnessing of the substantial economic power, military potential of an estranged Japan by either China or the Soviet Union since this would upset the global strategic balance and bring about an international configuration which would tend to be detrimental to American national and security interests. Thus, George F. Kennan points out:

The United States has a vital interest in assuring that the immense industrial potential of the Japanese archipelago does not become associated, through any relationship of dependence or undue influence, with the vast manpower of mainland China or the formidable military potential of the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, in view of Japanese excessive economic dependence on the United States (in 1970 the USA accounted for nearly 30 per cent of

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33 Times of India, 31 October 1973.

34 Halperin, n.30, p.123.

35 George F. Kennan, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970s," Foreign Affairs, ~~vol.~~ no.4, October 1972, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, December 1972, p.10; Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p.381.

total Japanese trade and for the USA it constitutes only 4 per cent), Washington might compel Japan to "behave" like a "loyal ally" by resorting to economic pressures.<sup>36</sup> Japan, thus, is an interesting example of how economic interdependence can ~~produce~~ political interdependence. Thus, dependence on the US market will constrain any radical realpolitik measures.

c) Adopt a policy of neutrality:

Thus, no easy or satisfactory substitute to the US-Japan security treaty is apparently possible. The viability of an alternate bilateral alliance being slim, whether Japan, having rejected the American alliance, might opt for a policy of neutralism has been a subject of ~~x~~ some debate among ~~scholar~~ scholars. There seems to be a consensus among them that it does not represent a meaningful alternative for this would leave Japan without much reduced leverage on ~~R~~ Russia and China, as well as on the increasingly powerful minor states in the region such as North and South Korea and Taiwan.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, its geographical situation -- its close location to Siberia, the Korean Peninsula, and the Chinese mainland -- gives Japan a great strategic value and its being on the point of contacts between the oceans and the continents makes it extremely difficult for it to maintain a neutral position. Further as Singer points out, neutrality works only so long as more powerful neighbours are willing to respect it, and/or are not interested in taking what the neutral state may have to offer. In addition,

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36 It would foster "growing protectionist sentiment in the United States and thus ~~pose~~ pose grave consequences for Japanese economic interests." Zagoria, n.14, p.315. Reischauer remarks, "A coolness on the part of Japan towards close co-operation and interdependence with the United States could easily produce a much cooler response." Edwin O. Reischauer, "Japanese-American Relations in the 1970s," Pacific Affairs, April 1971.

37 Zagoria, n.29, p.315.

neutrality some disputes offers no protection from involvement in others.<sup>38</sup> Thus, it is difficult to believe that a state as important as Japan could long continue in a state of unarmed or **lightly** armed neutrality.

d) Japan: A Nuclear-Weapon Power<sup>39</sup>

Finding the American nuclear guarantee unreliable and failing to find an effective substitute alliance will Japan attempt to safeguard its interests by building its own nuclear forces? Japan's economic power, its advanced level of science and technology and Japanese predilections of pursuing a more independent foreign policy are the main reasons advanced for the likelihood of Japan going nuclear. The arguments to justify that Japan will not opt for an independent nuclear option are as follows. Firstly, because Japan is a small insular country with a large, heavily concentrated population and industrial and economic power located in two or three major cities. Japan can never be a military nuclear Power due to its geographical liabilities (especially lack of depth) and concomitant vulnerability to nuclear attack.<sup>40</sup> Secondly, neither the Soviet Union nor the United

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38 Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York, 1972), p. 274.

39 For recent discussions by Japanese scholars of Japan's nuclear weapons option, see Saburo Kato, "Japan: Quest for Strategic Compatibility," in Robert Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Wichita, 1974); Takeshi Muramatsu, "Japan's Choice," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfatzgraff, Jr., eds., SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburg, Pa., 1973); and Kei Wakaizunu, "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act," Foreign Policy, Fall 1974.

40 See Junnosuke Kishida "Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," Survival December 1973, pp. 15-20.

States are likely to welcome the prospect of Japan going nuclear: Moscow because of fear of its possible alignment with the Chinese and the Americans because it would seriously upset their anti-proliferation policy. Peking also despite its position that nuclear proliferation is theoretically desirable, would in practice be likely to feel a grave threat from a nuclear-armed Japan.<sup>41</sup> Japan faces a definite dilemma: it is most unlikely that it could unilaterally become armed with nuclear weapons without a patron, due to its extreme dependence on foreign suppliers for uranium. Also to do so without the benefit of a nuclear shield would expose the nation to possible pre-emptive strikes during the most vulnerable early stages.<sup>42</sup> Thus, a Japan which has moved out of the American defense system and goes it alone as a nuclear Power is bound to arouse hostilities of such magnitude that these may well nullify its potential gains in becoming a nuclear-weapon Power. Thirdly, going nuclear would also tend to complicate Japan's political and economic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia and Oceania where there still remains a widespread fear of Japan's revival as a military Power. Fourthly, economic regeneration and material welfare plans might also suffer some setbacks, should more resources be pumped towards developing nuclear weapons. Fifthly, there are some technical obstacles, e.g. of finding suitable locations for testing, which have to be solved.


<sup>41</sup> This led Wakaizuni to remark: "If nuclear armament is a means to assure a nation's security against international tension, then what is the "tension" that requires nuclear armament that will create a new tension?" Kei Wakaizunii, "Japan's Role in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs, January 1973, p.

<sup>42</sup> John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Options (New York, 1975), p.237.

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Sixthly, legal constraints, namely Article 9<sup>43</sup> of the Japanese Constitution<sup>44</sup> as well as Japan's ratification (in June 1976) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>45</sup> But in view of Article 10<sup>46</sup> of the NPT and the fact that Japan signed it with some reservations<sup>47</sup> do not make such limitations of considerable significance. Seventhly and

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43 Article 9 has been both expedient and obstructive. Successive Japanese governments have found it expedient to point to this legal restriction in their efforts to resist US pressures to rearm and to put their resources into economic expansion instead. But the Article has also been an obstacle to convincing the Japanese public that renouncement of war does not preclude a capacity for self-defense. Makato Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1977), p.342.

44 The 1970 Japanese White Paper on Defense indicated that while the Japanese government will for the present refrain from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons, it would "not be impossible (under the Constitution) to possess small nuclear weapons, the capability of which is within the minimum limits required for self-defence." See notes on the White Paper on Survival, vol.13, no.1, January 1971, p.5.

45 See George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Asian Survey, vol.10, no.9, September 1970, pp.765-78. For a Japanese perspective see, Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1969.

46 It reads:

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

47 Japan signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 3 February 1970 with some reservations. It said it would withdraw if its security is threatened by nuclear build-up of any of its neighbours, or if its security treaty with the United States guaranteeing American nuclear protection, is terminated. See Statement of Japan Government on the occasion of the signing of the NPT. Text in Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers, 1970-1971 (Tokyo, 1972), pp.97-9.

Japan apparently acceded to the NPT in order to ensure assured supplies of nuclear fuel for its growing nuclear power/programme. Tokyo has many objections to the existing inspection system which places West European countries at an advantage. It would also like to see a security guarantee system for non-nuclear weapon states and distinct progress in nuclear disarmament.

lastly, the people's deep-rooted pacifist sentiment, stemming from the experience of suffering the devastation of a nuclear holocaust, is a significant factor which politicians cannot easily ignore. Moreover, the political opponents of the Liberal Democratic Party - the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party - also oppose any overt moves towards a nuclear weapons programme.<sup>48</sup> While Japan does possess the requisite technical infrastructure and is developing appropriate missile technology, it is likely to remain a latent nuclear power which will refrain from exercising its nuclear option in the near future. Consequently, most Japanese defence analysts, at the moment agree that while the US-Japan security treaty might not guarantee Japan against attack in all circumstances, most of them doubt that an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent would be better protection.<sup>49</sup> It is, therefore, likely that a decision to acquire nuclear weapons will be undertaken same as the last policy alternative and only in a situation when a serious international threat poses a grave danger to the physical security of Japan which cannot be countered by existing bilateral or multilateral mechanism.<sup>50</sup> Thus, Japan's renunciation of nuclear weapons is dependent on the credibility, efficacy and political acceptability of the US guarantee.

Evidently, there is apparently no realistic alternative to an alliance with the United States, and that in the ultimate analysis, Japan "cannot purchase its own national security in purely independent terms,"<sup>51</sup> for even if it developed a nuclear system, this

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48 Endicott, n.4, pp.41-101.

49 Clough, n.25, p.60.

50 Endicott, n.42, p.235.

51 Morton A.Kaplan, "Japan and the International System," in Morton A.Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji, Japan, America, and the Future World Order (New York, 1976), p.24.



system could not effectively be used to prevent the disruption of the commercial activities of Japanese ships at sea, trade barriers, or exchange controls that threatened its access to food, energy, and raw materials. Thus, despite the fact that the one-sided defence relationship of "a defense satellite under a hegemonial alliance arrangement" has undergone changes in recent years, the United States continues to hold "the key to Japan's security policy."<sup>52</sup>

Japan also recognizes that its relations with the United States are more important than its relations with any other nation. For Japan's geo-political position and national strength are inadequate for Japan to maintain its security on its own. The Government's policy, therefore, is to maintain a defense capability at appropriate a level as possible and make up for the insufficiencies through the Japan-United States Security Treaty.<sup>53</sup> Since Japan needs the United States militarily, some Americans who are disturbed by Japan's posture on trade suggest that Washington should use its military leverage to bring Japan into line. According to Selig S.Harrison, this reflects a misunderstanding of the way Japan views its security relationship with the US. That relationship, he argues has been politically supportable not in military terms but as a part of a tacit trade off -- one in which military facilities are provided in Japan in exchange for solicitous economic treatment.<sup>54</sup>

Even though there are differences between the United States and Japan in their way and degrees of involvement in the international

<sup>52</sup> Donald C.Hellman, "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert A.Scalapindo ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, Calif., 1977), pp.321-2.

<sup>53</sup> Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers of Japan, 1970-71 (Tokyo, 1972), p.88.

<sup>54</sup> Selig S.Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (1978), excerpts in Newsweek, 1 May 1978, p.7.

community, no drift apart has yet occurred. Thus, while Japan is desirous of widening its foreign policy options and increasing its manoeuvrability and flexibility in the international arena for this is perceived to be beneficial to its national interests. However, it is suggested that "in opening new options, nations are well advised to consolidate gains already achieved and not break loose from their moorings,"<sup>55</sup> and that "for most nations, if not all, there is a core relationship which is sought to be kept intact."<sup>56</sup> For Japan, this core relationship is with the United States as signified by the US-Japan Security Treaty. Though Japan, understandably enough, seeks to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy in the 1970s it will seek to do so without qualitatively weakening its core relationship with the United States.

We can now proceed to construct several propositions.

Proposition 1. Strategic disharmony does not preclude transient mutual accommodation/cooperation for tactical reasons. This may happen when an identity of views about certain regional and/or global developments facilitates joint action against a common foe; in such circumstances, a temporary halt to mutual bickerings and conflicts may be deemed desirable. However, this does not imply a permanent halt to deep-seated rivalries. Each international actor even in this situation constantly jockey for a more advantageous position vis-a-vis its adversary. In the long run, the international configuration will be influenced by the reaction and changes in policy postures of other states (especially those having an interest

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55 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Normalization and the Core Relationship," Journal of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (New Delhi) October-December 1976, p.145.

56 Ibid., p.136.

in the region concerned) who after all, are also active respondents to changes in international politics--the repercussions of such policy changes on the bilateral or multilateral relationship. The historical precedents of this in Soviet-Japanese relations are the treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 and the Neutrality Pact (1941) between the two countries. A desire to counteract perceived unwelcome changes of 1971, especially, Sino-American rapprochement, greater bilateral exchange and interaction was evident between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Proposition 2. A state may, at times, resort to pressure tactics in order to browbeat another state into making desirable modifications in its strategic, political, and economic posture, and thereby reduce the element of disharmony. However, such attempts may not be necessarily successful because the affected state may either singly or with the assistance of other states/allies devise commensurate strategy and tactics which it feels will nullify or counteract such demarches. Thus, the Soviet Union agreed to return Habomai and Shikotan islands when a peace treaty was concluded with Japan. However, failing to prevent the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in January 1960 Moscow declared that the two islands could not be returned until all US forces were withdrawn from Japan. Such sabre-rattling tactics may be counterproductive; a Soviet hard-line approach only brought Japan closer to the USA.

Proposition 3. A state will seek to evolve, co-opt, or seek the active participation of other states in such bilateral, regional, and/or global plans which in its view will reduce the element of strategic disharmony. An additional, or perhaps more important functional,

attribute of such schemes may be to bring about an international configuration whereby its own position - political, economic, and military -- will significantly improve vis-a-vis its primary adversary -- the nation from whom an international actor perceives the most significant security (and perhaps ideological) threat.

Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System is one such plan, whose implicit objective is the containment of China and at creating the environment that could accelerate the reduction of American power in the Pacific. Japan, understands the wider ramifications of this scheme. Consequently, in guarded statements it has expressed serious reservations in the matter. Tokyo's vital national and security interests are adversely affected because the Soviet plan seeks the reaffirmation of the territorial status quo in Asia. This would entail renunciation of the Northern Territories. Moreover, for Japan, the dissolution of military alliances and bases as a precondition for the realization of the Soviet plan is a further precarious issue. Its fulfillment would end the defense alliances between the United States, South Korea, and Japan and indeed leave the two countries without protection. Indeed, the Russians are very vague as to what is intended to provide physical security in its place.

Proposition 4. If a state finds estrangement or hostility between two or more states desirable, it will refrain from such policies and actions that will tend to reduce or eliminate such estrangement or hostility altogether. Admittedly, Japanese interests are served in more ways than one by the continuance of the Sino-Soviet cleavage. For, not only does this forestall the accumulation of potentially hostile power in the region (and a possible revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan); it also enables Japan to profit from

Communist divisions, both economically and politically. The Sino-Soviet conflict has placed Japan in a strategically favourable position. Given the Sino-Soviet rivalry, Japan does not fear the excessive pressure of either China or the Soviet Union or both Powers in an anti-Japanese alliance; Tokyo pursues a policy of deriving advantages from both China and the Soviet Union, establishing closer relations with both without antagonizing either.<sup>57</sup> Given the combination of past grievances, border disputes, great Power rivalry, and competition for ideological leadership in the world, there seem less likelihood of a reconciliation between the Soviet Union and China. But the conflict between the two communist giants also tends to create some problems for Japanese policy on specific issues.

Proposition 5. Even if a state may be disposed to reduce the element of disharmony and, to that end, prefer to make concessions or more "acceptable" proposals or compromises a hard line or tough approach may be the preferred alternative in view of the perceived adverse reactions in other areas. To that extent, the manoeuvrability of the state is circumscribed on the international plane. It may also be because an international actor is a status quo Power and therefore is opposed to any modifications in existing relationships, especially boundary re-demarcation. This seems to partially explain Russian intransigence on the northern territories.

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57 Tang Tsou, Tetsuo Najita and Hideo Otake, "Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1970s," in Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji, Japan, America and the Future World Order (New York, 1976), p. 65.

Proposition 6. If strategic disharmony is likely to remain a more or less permanent feature of bilatera/multilateral relations, a rational state will seek to reduce the element of disharmony to the maximum extent possible by cultivating closer cultural, economic relations and more frequent political contacts. A state will not, generally speaking, foreclose possibilities of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. This may be done for several reasons: a) to have access to more sophisticated and advanced technology;; b) help meet domestic demand or boost domestic production; c) perhaps strive to establish an influential lobby of economic interests who favour closer economic collaboration; d) to develop a source for raw materials; e) develop a market; or a combination of any of these. In this context, however, two points must be noted. Firstly, strategic implications, if any, on other neighbours or other interested or affected international actors and the susceptibilities of significant domestic interest groups are taken into consideration by the political leadership. Moreover, alliance constraints may also influence policy postures, especially if it does not conform to the global or regional strategic/security interests of the alliance as a whole or of the primary sponsoring member/s. Thus, the Japanese in regard to the Tyumen oil project took due note of Chinese susceptibilities since that (alongwith the construction of a railway line in Siberia) would strengthen the overall Soviet position along the Chinese border and increase the manoeuvrability of the Russian Pacific Fleet.

Proposition 7. Given strategic disharmony, a state will endeavour to avoid undue economic dependence - be it either as a source of vital raw materials, trade avenues or market outlet - with such state/s with which it perceives it is at disharmony. In the aftermath of the oil embargo and its adverse impact on its economy, Japanese international economic policies reflect an increasing desire for resource and trade diversification. But, at the same time wiser by the oil crisis, it seeks to offset similar occurrences to the maximum extent possible. A constraining factor about Japanese collaboration in Siberia is its fear of possible political pressures should it become extremely committed in financial terms in its development. To that end, it seeks the involvement of third Parties, especially the United States, in such ventures.

Proposition 8. Given strategic disharmony a state will seek to improve and systematically strengthen indigenous defence capabilities, especially conventional.<sup>58</sup> It might prefer to do so gradually lest it arouse the apprehensions of other, especially neighbouring, states. Should a state rely on an alliance 'big brother' for ~~the~~ its security qualitative and quantitative improvement of defense forces will ensue if it begins to entertain doubts about the credibility of the guarantee, preception of enhanced future threats from

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58 Hitoshi Ashida, former Japanese Premier and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, wrote in 1951 that the right of self-defence is "God-given right" and that a country which has no self-defence is "an irresistible temptation for an invader." He illustrated Japan's vulnerability by asserting that "it is possible to land 20,000 air-borne troops in Tokyo in a single night; and the power of 20,000 men is great enough to occupy vital points." Contemporary Japan, January-March 1951, pp.15-24.

neighbours, diminished 'big brother' interest or diminished active military role in the region coupled with a desire to pursue a more independent foreign policy commensurate with its increasing economic power, may also make for a sustained and prolonged programme to boost defense capabilities. Thus, a combination of perceived Soviet threat on an expanded scale and the sustained decline of American credit-ability could lead Japan into rapid rearmament and a higher political-military posture, or conversely, into a reliance upon pacifist nonalignment.<sup>59</sup> Since Japan's survival as a modern industrial state is dependent, and will continue to be dependent in the near future as well, on overseas energy sources and upon world seaborne trade, it is apprehensive of expanding Soviet naval capabilities in critical regions like Northwest Pacific and Northwest Indian Oceans which pose a serious challenge to the vital sea routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe, North America, and Japan. Japan, therefore, is actively considering improving its maritime forces in order to take out some insurance against future threats and diminished US role, which according to some, seems likely in East Asia.

The Defence Agency and the ground, maritime, and air Self-defence Forces were formally set up on 1 July 1954 partly due to US pressure and partly because Japanese leaders' recognition of the need for a certain force to maintain internal order. Initially, the Japanese had resisted the American suggestion in 1953 during the negotiations for the Mutual Security Treaty, that Japan maintain a 325,000-men land force on the plea of Article 9, antimilitary sentiment, low national income, and low recruitment rate. Ultimately, 180,000-man ground force was settled upon.

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Congress,  
 59 United States, Hearings, 95th Congress, session 1st, Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China: Political Implications (Washington, D.C., 1977), p.33.



Generally speaking, Japanese postwar defence policy has been of "minimal rearmament and American alignment."<sup>60</sup> The modest Japanese build-up programme is based on two convictions that Japan is under no immediate military threat; secondly, that time is on Japan's sides that is, the longer Japan refrains from a massive rearmament, the greater its capacity to do so on a crash basis if the need grows, and therefore, provided there is adequate warning for it to prepare, the greater in fact will be ~~its~~ its military strength when and if a crisis does threaten.<sup>61</sup> It is unlikely that the Self-Defence Force establishment will be in a position to press for rearmament on a faster scale because it is not a particularly influential group within the context of power and politics in Japan and does not exercise much influence on policies relating to military strength.<sup>62</sup>

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60 Martin E. Weinstein, "Strategic Thought and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in James W. Morley, ed., Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's (Princeton, 1972), p.35.

61 James W. Morley, in *ibid.*, p.213.

62 See Gaston J. Sigur, "Power, Politics, and Defense," in James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, 1975), pp.181-95.

## Chapter Two

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of Russo-Japanese relations before the Second World War is marked by recurrent crisis, conflict of interests and war. It gives one the impression of "a pendulum swinging back and forth between the extremes of amity and enmity."<sup>1</sup> The two countries had been major contestants for control and domination of Northeast Asia, particularly Korea and Manchuria. Russia established permanent settlements in Kamchatka by the end of the 17th century, occupied some of the northern Kuriles in 1711, and made several attempts to open trade with the secluded Japanese in the first half of the 19th century. The Treaty of Shimoda, 7 February 1855 fixed the boundary between Uruppu and Etorofu islands in the Kuriles the whole island of Uruppu and other Kuril islands to its north were declared Russian possessions but left Sakhalin Karafuto in joint occupation of Russia and Japan. The undetermined boundary line on the island of Sakhalin gave rise to recurring incidents. This necessitated the Treaty of St. Petersburg (7 May 1875) by which Japan received the group of the Kuril islands from Russia in exchange for recognition of Russian control of all of Sakhalin.<sup>2</sup> With the establishment of trade and the delineation of the frontier, tsarist Russia's preoccupation with the Near Eastern question, which precluded active involvement in Far Eastern politics and Japan's concern to industrialize and modernize itself rather

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1 G.A. Lenson, "The Russian Impact on Japan," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on Asian Peoples (Stanford, Calif., 1972), p. 339.

2 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (London, 1974), pp. 237-8. For a detailed discussion of Soviet-Japanese relations upto 1875 see G.A. Lensen, Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875 (Princeton, N.J. 1959).

to expand overseas made for peaceful relations between the two neighbours for the next two decades. It was during this period that the seeds of future conflict were sown as both Russia and Japan industrialized. On the whole, Russian policy towards Japan during this period was passive, seeking to conciliate the Japanese in the hope of preserving as long as possible the general status quo in the Far East. This was partly because Russia considered China to be the stronger and potentially more dangerous neighbour and partly because Russia was weak economically and politically in the Far East, its navy depended on Japanese harbours for year-round operation.<sup>3</sup>

With the revival of Russia's interest in the Far East, which was evident from the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway during 1891-1902, the conflict of interests between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea came to the fore. The Japanese civil and military leaders viewed Russian construction of the Siberian railroad as a potential threat to Japan's national security and expansion. Thus, the two Japanese memoranda written in 1890 by Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo and Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo, drew attention to the possible build up of Russian military strength in Siberia and recommended acceleration of the building of Japan's military strength and diplomatic overtures seeking cooperation not only with Britain and Germany against Russian expansion but also with China in order to oppose Russian imperialism and to expel Russian power from eastern Siberia.<sup>4</sup>

Towards the end of the 19th century the contention between Japan and Russia was focussed on the Liaotung Peninsula -- a-portion of southern Manchuria. Growing imperial aspirations, the desire to extend Japanese commercial interests in central and south China, as well as to

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3 Lensen, n.1,p.340.

4 Hosoya Chihiro, "Japan's Policies Towards Russia," in James W.Morley, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941: A Research Guide(New York, 1974)p.351.

gain control over the sea approaches to the home islands led Japan to place the highest strategic value on the Korean peninsula on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Japan's smashing victory in the war with China and the magnitude of Japanese demands alarmed the Russians. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Liaotung Peninsula, containing Port Arthur and Dairen(Dalny), as well as island of Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded by China to Japan. This would have given the Japanese a beachhead for further expansion on the continent. The acquisition by Japan of a strategic area in Manchuria was interpreted in St.Petersberg as an obvious menace to its interests. The Russians deliberated whether they should accept the situation and demand from China an ice-free port for itself as "compensation", or it could side with China and block the Japanese advance, Left to itself, Russia, Lensen opines, would probably have made common cause with Japan.<sup>5</sup> Russia, France, and Germany joined hands and Japan was compelled to renounce its territorial rights in the Liaotung Peninsula. In doing so, Russia ostensibly sought to keep Japanese forces at a distance while it strengthened its armaments and to bolster its own prestige and influence in China. Since Russia was perceived to have played a leading role in this tripartite intervention, Japanese national indignation was mainly directed against Russia. Japanese national indignation increased when in 1898 Russia occupied the Liaotung Peninsula--the very territory that it had denied Japan--and obtained leases at Port Arthur and Dairen. The Russian occupation of this Peninsula was undeniably a setback to Japanese expansion and an affront to Japanese public opinion. It

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<sup>5</sup> Lensen, n.1, p.340.

should be viewed against the conclusion of a Sino-~~Japanese~~ Russian defensive alliance of 1896 against Japan<sup>6</sup> whereby all Chinese ports were opened to Russian warships in the event of hostilities with Japan (Article III), and the construction of the Trans-Manchurian railway was authorized to expedite the movement of Russian troops (Article IV).

The conflict of interests over Korea was at first sought to be regulated by the Yamagata-Lebanov Agreement of 9 June 1896.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently in March 1898 Japan submitted a proposal to the Russian Minister in Tokyo that if Russia would recognize Japan's freedom of action in Korea, Tokyo would reciprocate by considering Manchuria as lying outside Japanese interests. St. Petersburg, reluctant to abandon its hold in Korea,<sup>8</sup> refused to settle for the quid pro quo. Meanwhile, the Russian government pressed its claim over Manchuria in their dealings with the Chinese government. Japan resented it; it lodged a protest and sought to strengthen itself. The desire to counterbalance the Russian challenge to Japanese interests in Korea and Manchuria prompted Tokyo to conclude the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (30 January 1902)<sup>9</sup> with Britain, also distressed by Russia's expansive drive in the Asiatic mainland. The Treaty (renewed in 1905 and 1911) became the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy for the next two decades. In substantive terms, safeguarded Japan from a possible repetition of the 1895 Triple Intervention. Greater appreciation of the Japanese of the strategic importance of the peninsula; the growing military capabilities of the Russian forces in East Asia constituted two pressures in favour of a

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6 Article I of the Treaty provided: "Any aggression directed by Japan against the Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or territory of China or that of Korea shall be considered as necessitating the immediate application of the present treaty.

In such case the two High Contracting Parties engage to support reciprocally each other with all the land and sea forces they may be able to dispose of at that moment." See text in Victory Yakhantoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (London, 1932), pp. 365-6.

7 Chihiro, n.4, pp. 353-4.

8 Ibid., p. 355.

9 See I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of the

decision to go to war. Moreover, Japan's ability to wage war against Russia was rooted in the naval security provided by the Anglo-Japanese alliance as well as in its own intrinsic military prowess.<sup>10</sup> In part, it was the desire to avenge the humiliation of Japan by Russia and its allies in 1895 which motivated the Japanese attack on Russia in 1904.<sup>11</sup> The Treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905),<sup>12</sup> which concluded the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05,<sup>13</sup> not only awarded southern half of Sakhalin to Japan but also seemed to clear the way for Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.<sup>14</sup> The Treaty, according to Witte, was a Russian diplomatic victory; the negotiations apparently ended in a psychological crisis which forced Japan to capitulate on Japanese terms.

During the period 1905 to 1917, the two countries attempted to demarcate their spheres of interest in Northeast Asia in order to

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Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London, 1966), Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley, Calif., 1923), and Chung fu Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore, 1931).

- 10 James B. Crowley, "Japan's Military Foreign Policies," in James W. Morley, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941: A Research Guide (New York, 1974), pp. 19-20.
- 11 See Ernest Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1966), p. 4.
- 12 See text in John van A. MacMurary, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, Vol. I (New York, 1921), pp. 522-5.
- 13 There is some controversy among scholars as to the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. Marxist scholars have interpreted it variously. They lay stress on domestic causes: it was primarily the product of the bureaucratic-militaristic oligarchy, which linked the economic needs and aspirations of the capitalist class to its policies; that it was a true imperialistic war inspired by the objective needs of the capitalist economy that had matured between 1895 and 1905; and it was a war of "monopoly capitalist rank." Critics of such Marxist explanations of the Russo-Japanese War, argue that the international situation was more decisive. The compromise offered is that it is in the allure of the "China market," the conflicts among the Powers, and the domestic situation that the causes of the Russo-Japanese War lie. See Crowley, n. 10, p. 105-7.
- 14 According to Article II, "The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possessed in Corea paramount political, military and economic interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Corea." *Ibid.*, p. 522.

remove this major cause of trouble and to work together to prevent a third Power, especially the United States, from penetrating the region. The partnership took initial form in the Motono-Iswalsky Agreement of 30 July 1907, which stipulated mutual recognition of each other's spheres of interest in Manchuria, Russian recognition of Japan's control over Korea, and Japanese recognition of Russia's special interests in Outer Mongolia.<sup>15</sup> This was for the first time Russia and Japan envisaged "common action." The entente between Russia and Japan was further expanded by the agreements of 4 July 1910<sup>16</sup> (the second Motono-Iswalsky Agreement), 8 July 1912 and 3 July 1916.<sup>17</sup> The last of these agreements<sup>18</sup> bound the two countries into an alliance treaty in as much as the two contracting parties not only recognized that ~~the~~ their vital interests demanded that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan and agreed to confer in order to take measures to prevent such a situation being brought about (Article 1) but also committed themselves to come to the assistance by each other in case "war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the third Powers" contemplated in the treaty. (Article 2) Thus, the fourth Russo-Japanese accord extended the two countries sphere of influence to the whole of China and contained a provision stipulating that the two Powers would wage war in common against any other Power trespassing

15 See Articles I, II, and III. For English text see E.B.Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), Appendix B, pp.107-8.

16 For English text see *ibid.*, Appendix C, pp.113-4; for English Text of supplementary Agreement to the Convention see MacMurray, n.12, vol.I, pp.803-4.

17 For English text see MacMurray, n.12, vol.II, pp.1327-8 and Price, n.15, Appendix E, pp.121-2.

18 See Peter A. Berton, The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956).

19 Through this treaty, the respective Russian and Japanese "special interests" evolved into their combined "vital interests" which could be realized only at the expense of China as a whole and which

on their vital interests.<sup>19</sup> In the words of Mornosuke Kajima, the fourth agreement was, for all intents and purposes, a defensive and offensive alliance.<sup>20</sup>

The preoccupation of European Powers in the great European conflagration (World War I) and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Russia, which resulted in the collapse for Japan to expand in Northeast Asia, afforded an opportunity for Japan to expand its power and influence over the continent and Oceania.<sup>21</sup> Thus, Japan not only presented its stringent Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915, and took over German rights and possessions in China and the Pacific. It is also interesting to note that during the War Russia became partly dependent on Japanese rifles, guns, and equipment as it was cut off from the Western suppliers.<sup>22</sup> The magnitude of Russian needs boosted the Japanese economy and by the time the Revolution broke out Japan had acquired a significant economic stake in the Russian Empire.<sup>23</sup> In fact, Japan endeavoured, by means of armed force, to eliminate the Russian menace, to extend its own economic interests in Northeast Asia and to forestall the spread of Bolshevism.

Japanese economic and imperial interests were adversely affected when the Bolshheviks denounced all secret treaties concluded by the tsarist regime including those in which Russia and Japan had defined their respective interests and refused to honour the Tsarist debts. The Japanese government reacted granting de facto recognition

~~20~~ ~~21~~ led them to unite in order to oppose the possible hostile intervention of any third Power. Price, n.15, p.86.

20 Mornosuke Kajima, A Brief History of Modern Japan (Tokyo, 1965), p.51.

21 "Russia's preoccupation with the war in the West (World War I) held tremendous advantages for Japan, for it drained Russian strength and reduced Russia's capacity for resisting Japanese pressures on the Asiatic mainland." George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, vol. I, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, N.J., 1956), p.276.

22 The aggregate value of war equipment of all types, including machine guns, small guns, field guns, clothing, swords, shoes, etc., supplied to Russia reached the high figure of Yen 300,000,000. Kikujiro Ishii, Diplomatic Commentaries (Baltimore, 1936) p.106, cited in *ibid.*, p.278.

23 Japan had purchased over a quarter of a billion yen worth of Russian



to the Kolchak regime in Western Siberia on 16 May 1919 and even after its collapse towards the end of 1919 toyed with the idea of establishing a buffer state or cordon sanitaire against the advance of Bolshevik power in the east.<sup>24</sup> The Japanese armed intervention in Siberia<sup>25</sup> (1917-1922) was a fiasco.<sup>26</sup> It came to an end only in October 1922 when the entire Japanese expeditionary force was withdrawn from Siberian soil.<sup>27</sup>

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government bonds. She had a prosperous trade with Vladivostok and Harbin, and there were branch offices of Japanese companies with Japanese nationals in major cities in Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Japan had received "nothing else than the surrender of the vast Far Eastern region to full exploitation." V.I.Nemirovich-Danchenko, Elliny Velikago Okeana (Hellenes of the Pacific Ocean) (St.Petersburg, 1916), p.260. Cited in Lensen, n.1, p.342.

24 Chihiro, n.4, p.389.

25 Morley argues that the Japanese interventionists advocated intervention in support of a pro-Japanese regime in order to establish Japan's political and economic hegemony in the Amur region. The anti-interventionists, on the other hand, he points out, believed that Japan's security lay in cultivating an understanding with the Western Powers, and extended their support only when the United States also indicated its willingness to intervene militarily. See, James W. Morley, The Japanese Thurst into Siberia, 1918 (New York, 1957). White also describes the developments leading to the Siberian intervention and explains the motives of the Japanese decision-makers in this expedition as an attempt to transform the Japan Sea into a Japanese "inland sea." See his The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950).

26 According to Lensen, it cost the Japanese two-thirds as much as the Russo-Japanese war and netted them little. This defeat not only discredited the military temporarily at home, but in later years, when the military were in power again, the memory of it dulled their appetite for Siberia and contributed to the decision to expand southward. Lensen, n.1, p.343.

27 Besides excessive economic cost, other reasons which motivated the Japanese to withdraw from Siberia was the collapse of the Kolchak regime and the political failure of the Russian Cossack leaders whom the Japanese had employed as the principal puppets of their power in eastern Siberia, which left them void of a political basis for their presence in Siberia. Moreover, Japanese occupation of a hostile territory served as a serious impediment to regularization of Japan's relations with the Western Powers and China. George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (New York, 1960) p.68.

The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 20 January 1925, by which the two countries agreed to establish normal intercourse between themselves, did not bring about any change in the Japanese attitude of distrust, suspicion and hostility towards the Soviet Union. Soviet aid to the then illegal Japanese Communist Party and to anti-Japanese forces in China was resented in Japan. Thus, Japan rejected in August 1926 Soviet proposal for a neutrality pact and in May 1927 Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact.<sup>28</sup>

Throughout the 1930s, the Japanese menace remained probably the dominant foreign political reality on the Moscow horizon.<sup>29</sup> In 1932 Japan had conquered the entire Manchurian region, taking advantage of the weakness of both Russia and China. By 1935 it had wiped out all gains made by the Russian policy in Manchuria since the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the nineteenth century. The Soviet government, in the face of a disorganized economy and military unpreparedness, could do no more than to guard its own frontiers and to strive desperately, by every means at its disposal, to stimulate the Chinese, the British, and the Americans to resist Japan's expansionist policies and thus to lead Japanese energies into another direction.

The Russians reacted by resuming relations with China in December 1932, intensified their efforts to win American recognition in the hope that this might have a restraining effect upon the Japanese, pursued a vigorous development of its own armed forces in eastern Siberia, and issued sharp warnings to Japan that any violation of Soviet frontiers would mean full-fledged war. While this served to

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28 For a detailed study of Soviet Japanese relations from 1921-1930, see G.A.Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R. (Tokyo, 1970).

29 Kennan, n.27, p.77.

avert any further Japanese penetration into Siberia, it could not, however, preserve Russia's rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway,<sup>30</sup> which though still under Russian management, could now operate only by Japanese tolerance. Russia eventually reluctantly decided to sell the Russian stake in the Railway in order to avoid a war in which it was not prepared and, perhaps, soften the blow to its prestige.<sup>31</sup> Japan entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936 which was mainly directed against the Soviet Union. One writer has described it as a new version of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.<sup>32</sup>

The Soviet government reacted by cancelling the signing of a Japanese-Soviet fisheries convention. It also detained Japanese fishing vessels, hindered the work of the Japanese oil concession in Northern Sakhalin, and closed the Japanese consulates at Novosibirsk and Odessa. Recurring border disputes, which had begun in 1933 along the Soviet Manchukuo frontier, increased in intensity after 1936 and verged on all-out war in the Changkufeng Incident (1938) ~~near~~ near Vladivostok and the Nomonhan Incident (1939) on the border of Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.<sup>33</sup> These serious border battles with the Soviet troops convinced Tokyo that any new Siberian expedition, as requested by its German ally, in 1940, would be a costly affair.

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30 On the Russian political, military, economic and other advantages of the Chinese Eastern Railway, see Peter S. H. Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931 (Durham, N. Carolina, 1959), pp. 67-114.

31 Kennan, n. 27, pp. 76-7.

32 Chihiro, n. 4, p. 398.

33 See Larry W. Moses, "Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia," The Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol, Journal of Asian History (Waisbaden), 1967, vol. 1, pt 1, pp. 64-85 Kennan opines that the Japanese provoked clashes in order "to probe Soviet strength and the seriousness of the repeated Soviet declarations that Siberian and Outer Mongolian territory would be defended." Kennan, n. 27, p. 98.

A number of Japanese military and anti-Communist nationalist leaders clamoured for an active policy of war against the USSR. But since the Japanese military rulers had embarked on a course of subjugating Chiang Kai-shek regime in China ever since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 7 July 1937, Japan was, indeed, in no position to engage in an all-out war with Soviet Russia. Even though Army Minister Itagaki Seishiro and Vice-Army Minister Tojo Hideki seemed confident of Japan's military capability to engage in a two-front war, there was a general feeling among Japanese decision-makers that as long as the China War lasted, Japan must avoid war with the Soviet Union at any cost. The increased tendency within Japan in the late 1930s toward pushing the drive for southward expansion also acted as a restraining influence on the move toward a military attack or any other active steps against the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup>

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 shocked Japan's decision-makers and gave rise to fears that the Russians would now exert added pressure on Japan in Northeast Asia. Japan gradually moved in the direction of seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As early as July 1940, a proposal for a neutrality pact with the USSR was mooted by Japan followed by a scheme of a four-Power alignment between Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The four-Power entente was designed to demarcate each nation's respective spheres of interest and to prevent American interference in their efforts to bring a "new order" to the world. Deterioration of German-Soviet relations, however, made it impossible to effectuate this grand design and, therefore, Japan reverted to the original idea of a neutrality pact as a means of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Thus, the

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34 Chihiro, n.4, p.400.

Japanese-Soviet neutrality Pact, which pledged both parties to neutrality in the event of war with a third Power, was signed in Moscow on 13 April 1941. While fear of Hitler's Germany was a prime motivating factor on the Soviet side, Japan deemed it necessary to secure its northern outposts before driving toward the south.

In fact, the perception of the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union determined Stalin's and the Comintern's attitude towards the Chinese Communists until the end of the Second World War. The Soviet objective was two-fold: first, to diminish the Japanese threat by diplomatic compromises, avoiding anything which would aggravate the situation, while gradually building up industrial and military strength in the Khabarovsk region bordering on Manchuria and second, to encourage Chiang Kai-shek to resist the Japanese and strengthen his government, constantly challenged by ambitious warlords heading unruly KMT factions. To that end, the Comintern consistently sought to dampen the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary spirit and to dissuade it from hampering efforts to resist Japan.<sup>35</sup>

After the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, there was heated debate in Japan's ruling circles about whether to join the German action by attacking Asiatic Russia or to stay out of the war. Finally, Japan's leaders decided not to go to war with the Soviet Union at that time but to make extensive preparations, such as the build up of the Kwantung army, to enable Japan to take up arms against the USSR at an opportune moment and assigned priority to its ambition of establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere in Southeast Asia.

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35 Introductory essay by V. Petrov, "The Soviets and World Communism: Sources of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," in O.B. Borisov and B.T. Kolskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970, edited by Petrov (Bloomington, Ind., 1975), pp. 18-20.

The Japanese involvement in the war against the United States after the Pearl Harbor attack of 7 December 1941 inhibited Japan from opening another front in Siberia. After the Pacific War, the Japanese army clearly could no longer consider opening another front in Siberia.<sup>36</sup>

From Hitler's onslaught on Russia in June 1941 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and also during the disastrous summer and autumn months of 1942, the Soviet Union was extremely worried about the possibility of Japanese invasion (forty Soviet divisions were accordingly kept tied up in the Far East), but as the Pacific War began to take an adverse turn for Japan, Tokyo became keen to secure continued goodwill on the part of the USSR and to keep it out. Thus, in September 1944, Japan thought of sending a special envoy to Moscow to place Soviet-Japanese relations on a firmer basis and, was inclined to make some concessions to the Soviet Union in order to bring it into the war on its side or, if, this were not possible, in order to restrain it from participating in the Pacific War.<sup>37</sup>

The Japanese Government was prepared to concede the Soviet demand for the recognition of its right of navigation in the Tsugaru Straits; to revoke the Soviet-Japanese Basic Agreement of 1925; to abandon the fishery concessions it had wrested; to transfer the Northern Manchurian Railway; to tolerate the peaceful activities of the Soviet Union in China, Manchuria, and other Japanese areas; to admit the Soviet sphere of influence in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria; to abolish all defence alliances; to abrogate the Tripartite Alliance of 1940 and the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936; and to transfer South

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<sup>36</sup> Chihiro, n.4, p.404.

<sup>37</sup> See G.A.Lensen, The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941-1945 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1972).

Sakhalin and North Kuriles.<sup>38</sup>

The Soviet Union turned down Japanese overtures for mediation<sup>39</sup> in the war, denounced Neutrality Pact<sup>40</sup> on 5 April 1945 and declared War on Japan, defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army,<sup>41</sup> and occupied not only South Sakhalin and North Kuriles which Japan was promising but also South Kuriles as well. The Soviet annexation of South Kuriles, including the two tiny islands of Habomai and Shikotan near Hokkaido, created considerable hardship to Japanese fishermen and continues to

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38 Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Susen Shiroku (Tokyo, 1952), pp. 1-21 and 71-2. Cited in Savitri Vishwanathan, "Peace with Honour Through Soviet Mediation: An ~~Aborted~~ Abortive Attempt by Japan," International Studies (October 1973), p. 585.

39 See S. Woodburn Kirby et. al., The War Against Japan, vol. 5, The Surrender of Japan (London, 1969), pp. 173-4 and 178-9.

40 Soviet writers argue that Japan was consistently violating the Neutrality Pact. Thus total losses to Soviet shipping in 1941-45 amounted to 636,993,570 roubles. Groups of saboteurs were frequently infiltrated into Soviet territory from Manchuria, where the Japan built military bases and strategically important railroads and highways. Moreover, Japanese intelligence regularly supplied Berlin with espionage information about the Soviet Union. See O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1973: A Brief History (Moscow, 1975), p. 16 and B. Ponomaryev, A. Gromyko, and V. Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945 (Moscow, 1969), p. 490.

41 Soviet writers maintain that it was the rout by Soviet forces of the strongest group of Japanese ground forces, the Kwantung Army and not the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which "predetermined" Japan's complete defeat and brought about the speedy capitulation of militaristic Japan. Further, they point out that Soviet "liberation" of Manchuria served as a dependable military and strategic base of operations for the Chinese Communists against the Kwamintang regime. Borisov and Koloskov, n. 39, pp. 20-1, 35 and A.A. Grechko, ed., Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War (Moscow, 1975), p. 413.

← this day to stand in the way of concluding a peace treaty between the two countries. The detention of Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet-occupied territories and their trial was much resented in Japan. The seizure of Japanese fishing vessels in the northern seas and the harassment of Japanese fishermen also caused irritation while the outstanding territorial dispute over the ownership of Southern Kurile Islands continued to embitter the relations between the two countries.

Russo-Japanese relations from the beginning took the shape of mutual distrust and dislike (Russia's role in inspiring Triple Intervention, 1895; subsequent seizure of Port Arthur, a splendid strategic harbour; and was reinforced by Russian penetration in Korea (1895-96). During these years the Japan just had to bide their time since it was not yet strong enough to protest vigorously and unwillingly had to submit.

Thus, in the past, the Soviet Union and Japan, the former enemies in the war of 1904-05, became virtually allies for tactical reasons partly through the adjustment of their respective interests, partly through the delimitation of their spheres of influence: the rationale being: the spoils were enormous, why not divide them? There was tacit acceptance about counteracting third Power, primarily American, interference in North China, Manchuria in particular.<sup>42</sup> The milestones of this alliance were the four Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912 and 1916. The objective apparently was to restrain in ally by limiting

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42 Kennan argues that the Russo-Japanese treaty was directly primarily against the United States with a view to neutralize the effects of a possible adverse American action to some new change in the status quo in Manchuria, especially in view of Knox's plan for the economic and political penetration into China. George F. Kennan, Soviet American Relations, 1917-1920: vol. I, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, N.J., 1956), p. 310.



its political options and deflecting it from an opposing alliance. They did not at all represent the elimination of strategic disharmony. It was "an alliance of expansion and conquest...based on the premise of eventual conflict between the two."<sup>43</sup> The Neutrality Pact of 1941, too, was also a direct result of considerations of expediency and signified a momentary agreement on moratorium in the rivalry over East Asia.<sup>44</sup>

Ever since Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, Moscow had considered Tokyo a power to be reckoned with and had always endeavoured to avoid war on two fronts as it would have exposed its flanks to serious risks. Thus when Germany was becoming too powerful in Europe and began to pose a threat to the Soviet Union, Moscow had entered into a neutrality pact with Tokyo in order to neutralise Japan and safeguard its eastern flank. Communists held Japan as a key to the victory of Marxism in Asia. More than forty years ago, Gregory Zinoviev, the leader of the Cominform had declared, at the first Congress of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow that "the only thing that really can solve the Far Eastern question is the defeat of the Japanese bourgeoisie and the final victory of the revolution in Japan."<sup>45</sup> Since the October 1917 revolution, Soviet policy toward Japan had undergone many phases, but the Russians never lost the hope of communising that country.

<sup>43</sup> David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia (London, 1950) p. 90, see also Victor Yakhantoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (London, 1932), p. 104, 109.

<sup>44</sup> George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (London, 1961), p. 371.

<sup>45</sup> Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 13.

In 1941 the Soviet Union, in the face of a dire threat to its security both in Europe and in the Far East, tried to minimize the Japanese threat to its eastern flank by entering into a neutrality pact with that country. When Germany was on the verge of ~~defeat~~ defeat and Japan showed unmistakable signs of surrender, the Russians reversed their policy toward Japan. Realizing that continued neutrality in the Pacific war would restrict its role in the Far East, the Soviet Union agreed at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 to declare war against Japan.

Both Japan and the Soviet Union have also tried to associate themselves with other states either to counterbalance the other's economic, primarily military superiority and thereby insure themselves or to bring to bear international pressure on the other, e.g. Russia and the Triple Intervention (1895) and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902.

Strategic disharmony was obviously the result of a basic conflict of interests - economic, military and security. Russia was guided<sup>46</sup> by the sheer geo-political necessities of protecting from foreign penetrations and domination, those areas of Asia - Manchuria, outer Mongolia and Sinkiang - which lie adjacent to the Russian border.<sup>47</sup> Initially, it was divergent materialistic designs of Korea which fostered strategic disharmony. Subsequently, however, it was over the control of the strategic routes and potential resources of Manchuria - the strategic key for the whole of the East Asia, which embittered relations between the two neighbours for several decades. Thus at no stage does it seem that the feelings of mutual distrust and suspicion were removed though often they were diluted or there were seemingly parallel interests or similarities in approaches.

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46 Dallin contends that Russian expansion into eastern and central Asia pursued no strategic purpose, was not motivated by a need for resettlement of population nor by a desire for trade expansion. It was axiomatic, he feels, that the goal of Russian foreign policy was aggrandizement of Russia. Dallin, n.42, p.16.

47 Kennan, n.43, p.261.

## Chapter Three

## SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY AND NORMALIZATION

After the Second World War, the previous struggle for political dominance in East Asia was replaced by American-Soviet rivalry. The United States firmly rejected the Soviet suggestion to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido.<sup>1</sup> As the whole of Japan came under American occupation, Soviet policy was to minimize American influence in Japan by controlling the occupation policy on the one hand, and, on the other, to weaken Japan economically and politically by insisting that the terms of surrender should be strictly applied and the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal. The Soviet Union calculated that a weak Japan would turn to Communism. This accounted for Soviet acquiescence in policies aimed at weakening Japan by subjecting it to heavy reparations, curbing its industrial-military potentialities, etc., thereby paving the way for economic plight and unemployment. Soviet objectives were, however, frustrated because of the changes in American policy towards Japan during 1948-49, when Japan began to be treated as a potential ally in the world-wide confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The United States was unwilling to tolerate any obstruction or challenge to its administering authority. Thus the Soviet proposal that the new Japanese constitution must receive the approval of the

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1 In a secret message on 16 August 1945 to President Truman, Stalin proposed that Hokkaido should be divided into northern and southern sectors by a "line running from the town of Kushiro on the East coast of the island to the town of Rumoi on the west coast of the island" and that Soviet troops should occupy the northern sector by accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in it. Government of the USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 (London, 1958) Vol. II, p. 266. See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I Years of Decisions (Garden City, 1955), p. 440.

Far Eastern Commission(FEC)<sup>2</sup> was not accepted by the USA. American post-war policy was described in the Soviet newsmedia as "a policy of turning the country [Japan] into a colony of the American monopolies and a strategical base for American expansion in the East." The "perilous feature" of this policy was said to be that it presumes and postulates the resurgence and consolidation of the reactionary forces of imperialism and militarism and that Japan was being coached for the role of "gendarme of the peoples of Asia."<sup>3</sup>

In view of the emerging US-Japanese alignment, the Soviet Union forged a firm alliance with Communist China "jointly to prevent the revival of Japanese imperialism and repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may joint in any way with Japan in acts of aggression" and took a strong stand for imposing stiff terms of peace on Japan -- entailing demilitarization of the entire Japanese archipelago and the withdrawal of all American bases and troops. Washington, on the other hand, sought to create a small nucleus of defence force rather than keep Japan ~~permanently~~ permanently demilitarized, and to restore Japan to an independent status through a peace settlement which alone could keep it satisfied.

### Peace Treaty

When in July 1947 the United States raised the question of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union insisted that this task

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2 Eleven countries were original members of the Far Eastern Commission, namely, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, UK, USA and USSR. Burma and Pakistan became members of the Commission in November 1949.

The Far Eastern Commission was established in Washington to exercise substantial control over the overall direction of the occupation and in which the Big Four enjoyed the power of veto. Although the Soviet proposal was in conformity with the Moscow Agreement of Big Four Foreign Minister in December 1945 it was not acceptable to the United States.

3 New Times (Moscow), no.37, 8 September 1948, p.2.

should be entrusted to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four (UK, USSR, USA, and China) where the Russians would enjoy the right of veto.<sup>4</sup> While Washington conceded the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers to negotiate peace with Germany it did not think that peace with Japan was a matter for this body to undertake. It proposed that it should be the FEC which should examine the question and decide by two-thirds majority without requiring the concurrence of the Big Four. Given the composition of the FEC, it was no difficult task for the US to obtain a two-thirds majority. Since this modification in the FEC's voting procedure (whereby a majority could decide provided the Big Four concurred) deprived Moscow of its veto power, the Russians argued their case on the basis of the Potsdam and other wartime Allied agreements, while the Americans endeavoured to refute those arguments.<sup>5</sup> However, disagreement between the two Super Powers on procedural issues regarding a peace treaty with Japan was only symptomatic of a global struggle for power between them, a struggle in which Japan was important, especially in East Asia. In the emerging conditions of Cold War the New York Times called for an early peace settlement with Japan, with or without the Soviet Union, as early as 16 August 1947.<sup>6</sup>

The Chinese Government proposal of 17 November 1947, based on the recognition of special interests of the Big Four and requiring their consent in all decisions on a peace settlement with Japan but contemplating the convening of a special preliminary conference of FEC members,<sup>7</sup>

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4 See reply of the Soviet Government, 22 July 1947. Soviet News, 25 July 1947.

5 See Soviet notes of 22 July 1947 and 29 August 1947 and the US note of 12 August 1947. For the Soviet notes, see Soviet News, 25 July 1947 and 2 September 1947. For the American note, see Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.), 24 August 1947, p. 395-6.

6 New York Times, 16 August 1947.

7 See Chinese Note of 17 November 1947. China Newsweek, 27 November 1947 and United States, Department of State, A Foreign Relations, 1947, Vol. VI, The Far East (Washington, D.C., 1972), pp. 568-9.

was not acceptable to the USSR. Moscow insisted that the preparation of a peace settlement should be considered at a special session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It proposed that the session should be convened in China in January 1948.<sup>8</sup>

The subsequent exchange of notes between the Chinese and Soviet Governments hardly made any difference to the Soviet stand. Moscow believed the Chinese view that the functions of FEC were directly related to the peace conference for Japan was not quite justified because the Commission was specifically debarred from trying to settle territorial problems, which evidently constituted "one of the important component parts of the future peace settlement for Japan". The participation of FEC members, other than the Big Four, who had made their contribution to the cause of the common victory over Japan, in the preparatory work of the Council of Foreign Ministers, could be arranged by enlisting their cooperation in the work of the committees, the corresponding subcommittees and the information and consultative conference, the Russians argued. This participation would safeguard "in the necessary degree of the interests of those powers in the period preceding the peace conference."<sup>9</sup>

The USSR advocated the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan from 1948-50 onwards ostensibly with a view to bring about the speedy termination of the US occupation of Japan, which was considered prejudicial to its interests. Initially, American reforms at democratizing Japan had enjoyed tacit Soviet support. However, as the United States, with the intensification of the Cold War, embarked upon a policy of economic rehabilitation of its former enemy with a view to build it into a potential ally to contain communism, the Russians became

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8 See the Soviet Note of 27 November 1947. Soviet News, 29 November 1947.

9 See Chinese Note of 5 December 1947 and Soviet Note of 30 December 1947. Soviet News, 5 January 1948.

increasingly critical of the increase in American occupation forces in Japan and the conversion of the former Japanese naval base at Yokosuka into a modern naval base,<sup>10</sup> the suppression of the legal activities of Japanese trade unions and other democratic Organizations,<sup>11</sup> the manner of handling labour problems in Japan.<sup>12</sup> It also formally protested against Circular No.5, entitled "Clemency for War Criminals" issued on 7 March 1950 by MacArthur.<sup>13</sup>

Moscow was extremely critical of American directives of 5 June 1950 to "remove and exclude" from public office the 24 members of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party and the ban

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10 The Soviet Union argued that this was in contradiction to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations as well as the decision of the FEC. The US reply was that the allegation that Yokosuka was being converted into a modern naval base was "not true" notwithstanding the fact that the use of the base by US naval forces for supporting the objectives of the occupation was regarded as "both necessary and proper." United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1948 Vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia (Washington, D.C. 1974), p. 879 and 887.

11 MacArthur dismissed this as "routine Soviet propaganda" which completely unmasked "the Soviet role as incitor of disorder and violence in an otherwise orderly Japanese society." He said that since the Russians themselves followed totalitarian concepts, it was hypocritical on their part to speak of derogation of labour in Japan and of "democratic rights." United States, Army Department, Civil Affairs Division, 183rd Weekly Report on Japan, Appendix A, pp. 7-8. Cited in Raymond Denet and Robert T. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. XI (Princeton, 1950), pp. 182-4.

12 In response to criticism of the Soviet member of the FEC on 23 June 1949, the US member of the Commission denied the charge in a statement of 13 July 1949. See Department of State Bulletin, 25 July 1949, pp. 107-8.

13 Soviet Note of 11 May 1950. See Department of State Bulletin, 10 July 1950, pp. 60-1. For US reply see Ibid., p. 60.

imposed two days later on 17 members of the staff of the Akahata (Red Star) -- the Communist Party newspaper. Soviet protests went unheeded and on the outbreak of the Korean War MacArthur ordered indefinite suspension of the entire Communist press in Japan. An extensive purge of Communists and sympathisers on the staff of newspapers and broadcasting stations started at the end of July 1950.<sup>14</sup>

In retaliation Soviet commentator V.Kudriavtsev bitterly attacked US policy on Japan and Japanese "reactionary" forces headed by the Yoshida Government, which was seen as "readily joining in all the criminal plans and designs of American imperialism." The purpose of the policy US ruling circles pursued towards Japan throughout the postwar period was "to convert Japan into a military base of American imperialism in the Far East and to revive the Japanese army as a shock troop of the aggressive forces of US imperialism in Asia." American armed intervention in Korea had completely exposed the aims of the US in Japan while Yoshida's article in Foreign Affairs of January 1951 was sufficient proof of the fact that the Japanese Government had "irrevocably" thrown in its lot with US imperialism, he said. He criticized Japanese rearmament, the wholesale exemption of war criminals, and the alleged persecution of democratic organisations.<sup>15</sup>

As the United States decided to initiate discussions on a peace treaty with Japan in the fall of 1950 Moscow submitted an aide-memoire on 20 November 1950 in which it sought clarification

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14 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950-52, p.10920.

15 News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.10, no.40, 19 February 1951, pp.6-10.



of a number of points in the US memorandum of 26 October containing a brief general statement of the kind of treaty Washington wanted.<sup>16</sup> Moscow also declared that it had not at any time conducted negotiations with the United States on a draft peace treaty.<sup>17</sup>

In a detailed study of the US draft, the Soviet Union in its remarks in a memorandum of May 1951 asserted that a real, ~~with~~ peaceful settlement in the Far East was "not possible" without the participation of the People's Republic of China. On substantive points, Moscow stressed the restoration of Formosa and the Pescadores to China. It considered "wresting away" the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands from Japan and placing them under UN trusteeship with the US as the sole administering authority wholly unjustified. It expressed deep concern over the future rebirth of Japanese militarism. Moscow also criticised the draft for not laying down a time limit for the withdrawal of occupation troops and for permitting American military bases in Japan even after the conclusion of a treaty. The Soviet Government proposed convening a session of the Council

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16 Department of State, Press Release 1180, 24 November 1950.

17 See Soviet statement of 3 March 1951 in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collection of Official Foreign Statements on Japanese Peace Treaty, Vol. II (Tokyo, 1951), p. 121. In response to this statement, the State Department issued a press release on 5 March 1951 drawing attention to Dulles discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Jacob Malik on 16 October 1950 and 13 January 1951 and the two governments. The Soviet Government declared on ~~the~~ 10 June 1951 that at no time had it conducted any negotiations with the US on a draft peace treaty and that the "personal meetings" between Dulles and Malik did not fall within the purview of such negotiations. Department of State Bulletin, 19 March 1951, p. 453 and *ibid.*, 23 July 1951, pp. 138-43.

of Foreign Ministers in June or July 1951 to prepare a treaty, which could be drafted on the basis of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and the Yalta Agreement. It should be governed <sup>by</sup> the aims and considerations mentioned above.<sup>18</sup>

Moscow's views were reiterated in its long memorandum of 10 June 1951.<sup>19</sup> The military agreement between the United States and Japan, inter alia, was criticized as one with "an obvious aggressive character," which was likely to push Japan even more towards militarism; it was "a shameful weapon for carrying out the aggressive plans of the United States in the Far East." The note concluded by stressing the need for an overall peace settlement with Japan on the basis of Cairo, Potsdam and Yalta and proposing that a peace conference of representatives of all the states which participated with their armed forces in the war against Japan should be called in July or August 1951 to consider the available drafts for a treaty.<sup>20</sup>

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18 Specifically, these were:

1. Japan should become a peace loving, democratic, independent state.
2. The democratic rights of the Japanese people should be guaranteed.
3. Restrictions should be imposed on the size of the Japanese armed forces.
4. No limitations should be placed on developing a peaceful ~~and~~ Japanese economy.
5. All limitations in Japan's trade with other nations should be removed.
6. Japan should not enter any coalition directed against any power which had participated in the war against it.
7. All occupation troops should withdraw from Japan within one year, and no foreign power should be allowed to station troops or hold military bases in it. Ibid., 28 May 1951, pp. 856-8. For the views of Japanese political parties on this memorandum see Contemporary Japan, April-June 1951, pp. 238-41.

19 Department of State Bulletin, 23 July 1951, pp. 138-43.

20 Ibid.

At the San Francisco Conference the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko raised the question of Chinese participation in the Conference, but he was ruled out of order by the Chairman of the conference, Dean Acheson.<sup>21</sup> In a statement on 5 September 1951 Gromyko declared that the proposed peace settlement contained insufficient guarantees against a revival of Japanese militarism, no assurance on the democratisation of Japan and the suppression of "fascist tendencies" in it, and that it made no provision for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. The Soviet delegate took strong exception to the fact that the joint Anglo-American draft did not prevent Japan from participating in "aggressive blocs" in the Far East created under the aegis of the US.

Gromyko criticised the territorial provisions of the draft treaty for their gross violation of the indisputable rights of both China and the Soviet Union and for its "arbitrary and illegal" arrangements in regard to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The economic provisions of the treaty safeguarded the economic privileges the American monopolies had obtained under the occupation and placed the Japanese economy "in a slavery-like dependence" on those foreign monopolies. Gromyko was not satisfied with the reparations clauses in the draft because they ignored the legitimate claims of nations which had suffered from Japanese occupation in World War II. The provision for redeeming losses direct through the labour of the Japanese population imposed "a slavery-like form of reparations" on Japan. Gromyko summed up his long statement by asserting that the

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21 The Chairman's ruling, when put to the vote, was approved by a vote of 35 in favour and three against (Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). Fourteen states did not participate in the voting. Dean Acheson, Present at the creation: My years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 545.

American-British draft was "not a treaty of peace but a treaty for the preparation of a new war in the Far East."<sup>22</sup>

The attempts of the Polish delegate to have a thorough discussion of the rules of procedure were also frustrated by the majority. Consequently, participants were allowed only to record their view without discussing any possible modification or ~~or~~ proposing amendments to the terms of the treaty. Accordingly, Gromyko put forward amendments on behalf of his government as part of his statement.<sup>23</sup> Had these amendments, 13 in number, been accepted they would have transformed the very nature and purpose of the treaty as the United States had conceived it.

These amendments sought Japanese recognition of the sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic over Manchuria, Formosa, the Pescadores and various other groups off the China coast such as the Paracels and Spratlys which are now the subject of dispute; recognition of full Soviet sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles; recognition of Japanese sovereignty not only over the four main islands of Japan but also to the islands of Ryukyu, Bonin, and other clusters which formed part of Japan prior to 7 December 1941 and which were administered by the US; withdrawal of all Allied forces from ~~in~~ Japan within 90 days of the coming into force of the treaty, after which no ~~foreign~~ Power was to be allowed to maintain troops or military bases on Japanese territory; and ~~an~~ undertaking by Japan to remove all

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22 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collection of Official Foreign Statements on Japanese Peace Treaty, Vol.II(Tokyo,1951),p.121.

23 When the Chairman asked the Soviet delegate whether he was proposing to move amendments Gromyko replied that he was making a "declaration" and was defending his position.

obstacles to the revival and strengthening of "democratic tendencies"; and undertaking not to permit the resurgence of fascist or militaristic organisations and a further undertaking not to enter into any coalitions or military alliances directed against any Power which had taken up arms against Japan.<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet Government sought an undertaking from Japan to pay compensation for damage caused by its military operations, the amount and the sources of such payment being settled at a conference of concerned states, including those which had been subjected to Japanese occupation, namely, Burma, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The amendments restricted the size of the Japanese forces and armaments.<sup>25</sup>

The amendments imposed no restrictions on developing Japan's peaceful industries or its trade with other states and of access to raw materials necessary for a peaceful economy. The Straits of Japan along its entire coasts were to be demilitarised and open to merchant ships of all countries, while warships belonging only to Powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan had the right of passage through those waters. The treaty should come into force only after a majority of certain specified states, including the US, the Soviet Union, China and Britain, had deposited their instruments of ratification.<sup>26</sup>

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24 Keesings, 1950-1952, p. 11722.

25 The army should be limited to 150,000 men, the navy of 25,000 men and a total of 75,000 tons, and the air force, including the naval air arm, to 200 fighter and reconnaissance planes and 150 transport and training aircraft, with a total manpower of 20,000. Japan was not to have bombers and its medium and heavy tanks were not to exceed 200. It was also prohibited from possessing, constructing or experimenting with any atomic weapon or other means of mass destruction, including bacteriological and chemical weapons, self-propelled or guided missiles, guns with a range or more than 20 kilometres, sea mines or torpedoes of the non-contact type or manned torpedoes.

26 Ibid.

Gromyko's subsequent statement of 7 September at the San Francisco Conference was a reiteration of the Soviet position.<sup>27</sup> When Gromyko insisted that his amendments should be considered and voted upon he was ruled out of order by the chair, and this ruling was upheld by a vote of 46 to three -- the ~~dissident~~ being the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The representatives of these three countries tagged a five-minute walkout in protest. Speaking at a press conference after the signing ceremony, Gromyko denounced the treaty as an "aggressive" pact aimed at Russia and China, declared that no peace was possible in the Far East without the participation of those countries, and described the treaty as calculated to "sow the seeds of new war in the Far East."<sup>28</sup> Pravda described the Treaty as "a deal between American imperialism and Japanese irredentism."<sup>29</sup>

When the Treaty came into force on 28 April 1952 the United States announced that the Allied Control Council in Tokyo and the Far Eastern Commission in Washington ceased to exist. Moscow denounced this "illegal act" in its memorandum of 28 April and asserted that the conclusion of a separate peace treaty showed how far the US Government had gone in its policy of converting Japan into "a military bridgehead of the United States in the Far East."<sup>30</sup>

On 30 May 1952 Yukihiisa Tamura, Chief of the Protocol Section of the Japanese Foreign Office, delivered a verbal notification to the

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 338-40 and 346-9.

<sup>28</sup> Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1950-52, p. 11724.

<sup>29</sup> Soviet Press Translations, vol. 6, 15 October 1951, p. 554-5.

<sup>30</sup> Memorandum of A.S. Panyuskin, the Soviet spokesman in the 14-nation Far Eastern Commission to the US representative and Chairman of the FEG, Soviet News, 10 May 1952.

Soviet mission that it had lost its official status in Japan by virtue of ~~the~~ the termination of the Allied Council for Japan when the treaty became effective on 28 April 1952. The Soviet Government responded in a note to the Japanese Foreign Minister on 11 June 1952, which asserted that the effectuation of the treaty could not serve a "legal basis" for Tamura's statement.<sup>31</sup>

#### Repatriation of Japanese POWs

The question of the repatriation of Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union remained an irritant in the relations between the two countries for a number of years. Japan unsuccessfully tried to keep the repatriation question separate from the conclusion of a peace treaty. It considered the settlement of this question "a prerequisite to normalization of relations with the Soviet Union."<sup>32</sup> The Soviet Union seemed bent on delaying repatriation apparently with a view to pressurize the Japanese government into an early normalization of relations.

At the end of the war there were 2,726,000 Japanese nationals in ~~territory~~ taken over by Russia - Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. The formal repatriation of Japanese nationals from Soviet areas was initiated by virtue of the US-USSR Provisional Agreement of 27 November 1946 and US-USSR Agreement of 19 December 1946, which stipulated the rate of repatriation at 50,000 a month.<sup>33</sup> However, this could not be maintained.<sup>34</sup> Approximately 471,700 persons were repatriated before group repatriation ~~in~~ from Soviet territory came to an end in April 1950.<sup>35</sup>

31 See Nippon Times, 13 June 1952. See also Japanese Foreign Office statement of 12 June 1952 criticizing the Soviet position. Ibid.

32 Statement by Sunao Sonoda, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Special Repatriation Committee of the House of Representatives, 17 June 1955. Gaimusho Bulletin(Tokyo), vol.4, no.85, 17 June 1955, p.1.

33 Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, p.8375.

34 See United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol.VI, The Far East and Australasia (Washington, D.C., 1974) pp.757-60, 924-5.

35 Sonoda, n.30, p.1.

The repatriation question also became a Cold War issue between the United States and the USSR as was evident from the exchange of several notes between the two governments.<sup>36</sup> The Mainichi also admitted that negotiations tend to become clouded by ideological problems and therefore delayed.<sup>37</sup> According to the statement of the Representative of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Repatriation Affairs dated 20 May 1949, ~~in~~ of the total number of 594,000 Japanese war prisoners, 70,880 men were immediately released in 1945 in the zone of combat operations and 418,166 had been repatriated by May 1949. Thus, there remained in the Soviet Union unre<sup>+</sup>repatriated 95,000 men.<sup>38</sup> Subsequently, Tass announcements of 22 April<sup>39</sup> and 9 June 1950<sup>40</sup> stated that the repatriation of the 95,000 Japanese POWs, who remained by May 1949 in the territory of the Soviet Union, had been completed with the exception of 1487 war prisoners sentenced or under investigation for war crimes committed by them, 9 war prisoners who were subject to repatriation after the completion of their medical treatment and 971 men, who committed serious crimes against the Chinese people and "who are placed at the disposal of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic."<sup>41</sup> The allegations about a large number of Japanese POWs still remaining in the Soviet Union were said to be of

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36 See US notes of 30 December 1949 and 9 June 1950 and the Soviet note of 16 July 1950. Department of State Bulletin, vol.23,14 August 1950,pp.256-7.

37 The Mainichi, 17 November 1953.

38 *Ibid.*,vol.23,11 september 1950, p.433. See also UN Document A/1339.

39 Documents on International Affairs,1949-50(London,1956),pp.611-2.

40 Department of State Bulletin, Vol.23,11 September 1950,p.433.

41 *Ibid.*



a "maliciously slandering nature" and having as its aim "to distract the attention of the Japanese people from the policy of the U.S.A. directed toward the economic and political enslavement of Japan."<sup>42</sup>

In a resolution adopted by both the houses of the Japanese Parliament on 2 May 1950, the Diet expressed concern about more than 300,000 Japanese whose fate was unknown and who still remained in the Soviet Union and in the areas under Soviet influence (including Siberia, Sakhalin, Northern Korea, Dairen and Chinese Communist areas). The Diet resolution also desired an investigation through a team of the United Nations or neutral or humanitarian body "to investigate in the Soviet Union and in the areas under Soviet control the situation of life and death of our interned nationals."<sup>43</sup> On 11 December 1950 the Japanese Foreign Office declared that it possessed the names of 316,339 out of the approximate total of 370,000 Japanese prisoners who were believed to be still in Soviet hands.<sup>44</sup> The Soviet representative on the Allied Council, Major General Kislenki, refused<sup>45</sup> to discuss the matter. In the Cold War atmosphere, the Soviet Union accused United States of remilitarizing Japan while the USA criticized USSR for the missing Japanese prisoners.<sup>46</sup> In this atmosphere, it was hardly surprising if a rumour was floated that some of these Japanese soldiers had been indoctrinated by the Soviet authorities and enlisted in the Soviet army, to be used as the spearhead of an invasion force.<sup>47</sup>

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42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.,p.434.

44 Contemporary Japan(Tokyo),January-March 1951,p.109.

45 Ibid.,p.42.

46 Ibid.,p.113.

47 Ibid.,p.47.

Subsequently, in November 1953 talks on the repatriation of Japanese POWs took place in Moscow between the representatives of the Red Cross Societies of Japan and the Soviet Union and repatriation was resumed. From 1953-1957, a total of 2,664 POWs were repatriated from the USSR.<sup>48</sup> In February 1956 during the London talks the Soviet Government presented a list of 1,364 Japanese nationals serving prison terms in the USSR; but the Japanese said that there were still 11,177 unrepatriated Japanese nationals who were not referred to in the list. This number was reduced to 9,961 by January 1957.<sup>49</sup> In March 1957 the Soviet Union informed Japan that after conducting investigations they found that 793 persons of Japanese nationality were residing in Japan without citizenship and 146 members of their families who were of Korean nationality.<sup>50</sup> The discrepancies in Russian figures on the total number of prisoners as well as Japanese-Russian discrepancies caused grave doubt within the Government of Japan as to any serious intentions of the Russians to satisfactorily account for, or even acknowledge all of the Japanese nationals held prisoner in the Soviet Union or adjacent territory. Apparently, the problem was that no one knew exactly how many prisoners were involved. The confused conditions prevailing after the war made the task of compiling

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48 Statement by Japanese representative Ichiro Kawasaki to the 7th session of the UN Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War (established vide UN Document A/1749, 14 December 1950). Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bulletin (Tokyo), vol.4, no.18, 15 September 1957, p.9-11. See also Pravda, 26 August 1956, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1956, vol.8, no.34, p.19.

49 Kawasaki, n.45.

50 Pravda, 17 March 1957, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1957, vol.9, no.11, 24 April 1957, p.24.

an accurate list impossible. Moreover, the fact that many Japanese prisoners in order to avoid detention and forced labour had passed themselves off as North Koreans and had married Korean or Russian women and decided not to return.<sup>51</sup>

### Towards Normalization

That the final status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had apparently still to be decided and the Japanese commitment to a military alliance caused considerable difficulties in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Stalin's New Year's Message to the Japanese people in 1952 reflected an attempt to exploit the budding anti-American sentiments in that country.<sup>52</sup> In these circumstances, Japan's application for membership of the United Nations was vetoed by the Soviet Union in June 1952.

A soft line and change in attitude of the Russians was evident in January 1953 when they indicated willingness to reopen negotiations with Tokyo for granting Japanese fishing rights off Kamachatka in an apparent bid to wean Japan from the West and neutralize it.<sup>53</sup> Prime Minister Malenkov in mid-1953 expressed readiness to resume diplomatic relations with Japan if Japan so desires. Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki said in the ~~Foreign Minister Katsuo~~ House of Councillors that Malenkov's proposal would be acceptable "if the Soviet Union intends to join the San Francisco peace treaty or conclude with Japan a separate but virtually the same treaty as the San Francisco one." Granted this, Japan would welcome Russian overtures but meanwhile preferred to await developments.<sup>54</sup>

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51 Asahi, 20 October 1956, as cited in Savitri ~~Vish~~ Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945-1970 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1973), p.87.

52 For text, see Soviet News, 5 January 1952.

53 New York Times, 17 February 1953.

54 The Mainichi and The Times (London), 11 August 1953.

In a reply to a questionnaire from Chubu Nippon Shimbun Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated on 11 September 1954 that his country was ready to normalize relations with Japan, provided that Japan shows the same readiness. However, the "main obstacle" in the fulfilment of this objective, he pointed out, was that "certain Japanese circles are following the diktat of U.S. ruling circles, which are trying to keep Japan in a dependent position."<sup>55</sup> He replied that Japan's right to have sufficient armed forces to defend itself alone in keeping with any sovereign state's right to self-defense. The joint Sino-Soviet declaration of 12 October 1954 also expressed the desire of the two Communist neighbours to normalize relations with Japan.<sup>56</sup> Molotov reiterated the desire in a statement of 16 December 1954.<sup>57</sup> The Japanese acknowledged that the change in Moscow's past attitude, but since it was not quite clear what was the intention that had prompted such a change, they decided that they would "watch" how the Soviet policy will actually develop in this regard.<sup>58</sup>

The Russians realized that normalization would be rendered more difficult and that threats would only push Japan further into the American embrace, rather than facilitate luring it out of the American security system. Accordingly, a commentary in Izvestia of 22 December 1954 described as "sheer absurdity" the statement that

<sup>55</sup> Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, pp.339-41.

<sup>56</sup> Japan, Embassy in India, Information Bulletin (New Delhi), 20 October 1954, pp.4-5.

<sup>57</sup> News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.13,no.288, 20 December 1954, pp.3-4.

<sup>58</sup> Remarks by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on Molotov's statement of 16 December 1954, 17 December 1954. Gaimusho Bulletin, vol.3,no.113, 17 December 1954.

Moscow and Peking would normalize their relations with Japan on condition that Japan should sever its ties with the United States. Moscow also clarified that the ~~R~~ Peace Treaty was not necessarily a roadblock to restoring normal ties with Japan. The article categorically denied that it was false to claim that the Soviet Union demanded the rejection of the treaty and related pacts as a preparatory step towards adjustment of relations with Japan.<sup>59</sup>

On 25 January 1955 Domnisky, deputy chief of the former Soviet delegation in Tokyo, who had remained in the Japanese capital after the delegation had been abolished, presented a document to members of the government suggesting that the Soviet Union would be willing to undertake unofficial negotiations for the purpose of normalizing diplomatic relations. In January-February and April 1955 a number of notes were exchanged between Japan and the Soviet Union regarding the venue of negotiations.<sup>60</sup> Moscow offered to nominate representatives to start negotiations in either Moscow or Tokyo. Japan, however, did not consider either capital as the appropriate location for talks, since there was no Japanese mission in Moscow and no official Soviet mission in Tokyo. It proposed New York, but the Russians remained adamant about Moscow or Tokyo being the venue of negotiations. As a compromise, London was chosen.

Soviet-Japanese peace negotiations began in London on 1 June 1955 and continued until March 1956 for 23 sessions and proved rather difficult and protracted, the territorial questions being the main

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59 Y. Nikolaev, "Reasonable Demand of Japanese Public Circles," Izvestia, 22 December 1954, in News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.13, no.297, 31 December 1954, pp.2-3; also Information Bulletin (New Delhi), vol.2, no.13, 1 July 1955, p.2-4.

60 For the notes exchanged see Contemporary Japan (Tokyo), vol. 23, nos.7-9, 1955, pp.593-6.

hinderance. At the outset of the talks Prime Minister Hatoyama announced that Japan would seek the reversion of southern Sakhalin and all the Kuriles. But Japan's Plenipotentiary Matsumoto Shunichi was instructed to accept the return of Shikotan and the Habomais if that would secure a general settlement. The southern Kuriles were to be claimed for historical reasons, but their reversion was not deemed essential to a peace treaty. The northern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin ~~were~~ to be used as bargaining counter~~s~~.<sup>61</sup> Japan consistently maintained that the territorial question remained undecided and that the Yalta Agreement was merely a statement of common purpose and not an international agreement formally determining territorial dispositions. On 5 August the Russians expressed their willingness to return Habomai and Shikotan. The Japanese, however, on 30 August demanded the retrocession of not merely Habomai and Shikotan but Etorfu and Kunashiri as well. They also asked that the question of north Kurile sovereignty be referred to an international conference.<sup>62</sup> Hellmann points out that this volte face might have been due to domestic considerations: when the Democratic and Liberal parties merged in July, Premier Hatoyama agreed to incorporate the latter's more stringent territorial platform into the government's policy.<sup>63</sup> This only made for greater rigidity in the Soviet attitude. They now asserted that the return of Habomai and Shikotan was conditional on Japan's undertaking not to

61 Matsumoto Shunichi, Moscow ni kakeru niji (A Rainbow Bridge to Moscow) (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 29-32, cited in Vishwanathan, ~~42~~ n. 47, pp. 72-3.

62 J.J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontiers in the Pacific (London, 1974), p. 201.

63 Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreements with the Soviet Union (Berkeley, Calif., 1969), pp. 59-60. In a speech before the 23rd Extraordinary session of the Diet on 2 December 1955, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu said that his government intended "to carry out the verdict of public opinion (on the territorial issue) and achieve the desired ends by insisting on what is right and just." Press Release (Tokyo), vol. 4, no. 146, 2 December 1955.

have any military bases on these islands. Khrushchov, evidently displeased by the Japanese attitude, told a visiting Diet delegation in September 1955 that Japan did not have any legal claims even to Habomai and Shikotan and that Moscow's offer to return them had been due purely to its desire to promote good-neighbourly relations with Japan.<sup>64</sup> In December 1955, the USSR again vetoed Japanese admission in the United Nations. It became obvious that Japan's admission to the UN depended on normalization of relations. Japan's adamant attitude on the territorial question led to a complete stalemate. Because of internal agitation, Japan could not afford to surrender Kunashiri and Etorofu unconditionally, but neither could she afford to let the talks break off at this point. They continued indecisively for a time until Hatoyama at length decided to shelve the territorial issue in order to break the impasse.<sup>65</sup>

Negotiations were resumed on 31 July 1956 but could not make much headway because of the territorial question, with Japan continuing to press for the return of the southern Kurils. John Foster Dulles, in an apparent bid to prevent Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles, asserted in a news conference on 28 August 1956 that if Japan accepted the Soviet proposal, it would be granting to the USSR more concessions than envisaged by the San Francisco Treaty. Accordingly, ~~in~~ in keeping with Article 26 of the Treaty, the United States would be entitled to claim comparable benefits, namely, that of exercising American rights in Okinawa so long as it considered that there is a danger to international peace and security in Asian theatre.<sup>66</sup> The United

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64 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1955, vol. 7, no. 37, pp. 3-6.

65 Masataka Kosaka, 100 Million Japanese: The Postwar Experience (Tokyo, 1972), p. 133.

66 Department of State Bulletin, 10 September 1956, p. 406.

States State Department endeavoured to bolster Japan's position in an aide-memoire to Tokyo on 7 September 1956 wherein it discounted the legal validity of the Yalta Agreement by asserting that it was simply "a statement of common purpose" and that the northern territories have always been part of Japan proper.<sup>67</sup> The gesture, however, merely reinforced rather than softened Soviet intransigence.

In order to avoid a deadlock on the territorial question, Japan deemed it advisable to adopt a modus vivendi, namely, to reestablish diplomatic relations quickly by leaving the territorial issue to further discussion.<sup>68</sup> Hatoyama conveyed this suggestion to Bulganin in a note of 11 September 1956, which the Russians accepted. Negotiations were reopened in Moscow on 13 October and on 19 October 1956 the Peace Declaration and a trade protocol were signed.<sup>69</sup> In

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67 Ibid., 17 September 1956, p.484; Information Bulletin, 1 October 1956.

68 Shigemitsu's Explanatory Remarks on the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration, delivered before the 25th Extraordinary session of the Diet on 16 November 1956. See Contemporary Japan, vol.24, nos.7-9, 1956, pp.550-1.

69 For text of Joint Declaration, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.263, 1957, pp.114-6; Information Bulletin, 15 November 1956, pp.1-4; also News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.15, no.82, 23 October 1956, pp.2-3. The Declaration and the trade protocol were ratified by the two countries on 8 December and entered into force on 12 December 1956. Communique on Exchange of Instruments of Ratification, 12 December 1956. See Information Bulletin, vol.4, no.1, 1 January 1957, p.1.

On his return from Moscow, Hatoyama acknowledged that the result of negotiations may not have been "fully satisfactory", but he decided upon a settlement after weighing "the stern reality of international relationships with utmost objectivity." Information Bulletin, vol.3, no.22, 15 November 1956, p.1, and Policy Speech before 25th Extraordinary Session of the Diet on 16 November 1956 in Contemporary Japan, vol.24, nos.7-9, 1956, p.545.



May 1956 a treaty relating to fishery and an agreement relating to sea rescue had been signed. Without waiting for China the Soviet Union normalised its relations with Japan by the joint declaration of October 1956. The state of war between the two countries was terminated and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives was agreed upon. The Soviet Union waived all reparations claims against Japan. It also agreed to support Japan's application for UN membership and to return Habomai and Shikotan Islands at the time of signing a formal peace treaty. No treaty has been signed so far because there is no agreement between the two countries regarding two other islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu. Japan became a member of the UN on 12 December 1956. Jen-min Jih-pao editorially observed that the Soviet-Japanese joint declaration was beneficial to Japan's independent development, for strengthening Far Eastern peace, and also proved that no force can stop them in the normalisation of relations.<sup>70</sup>

Thus, Soviet-Japanese relations were normalized after approximately a year and a half of on and off negotiations and the 11-year technical state of war between the two countries finally came to an end. Japan sought to normalise relations with the Soviet Union in order to open a channel for direct discussions for the early solution of the repatriation<sup>of POWs,</sup> fisheries, territorial questions, and to secure Soviet support for admission into the United Nations and thereby join the international society and increase its international stature and prestige.<sup>71</sup> The realization that the Soviet Union is a close powerful neighbour with whom it has to coexist also led

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70 Jen-min Jih-pao, 21 October 1956.

71 See Statement by Premier Hatoyama on the eve of his departure for Moscow for Re-opening the peace talks, 2 October 1956. Information Bulletin (New Delhi) vol.3, no.21, 1 November 1956, pp.1-2.

the Japanese to seek an end to the anomalous state of affairs. The desire to open trade possibilities and explore prospects of economic cooperation and domestic pressures to seek an amicable and speedy settlement of the fisheries and repatriation problems in particular also motivated Tokyo to seek speedy normalization.

In the wake of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis, fears began to appear in Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow did not hesitate to normalise relations with Japan by ending the state of war much ahead of Peking, thereby leaving China in the lurch. Soviet leaders also realized that if the sinister cordon sanitaire -- the ring of hostile countries and bases -- that the United States had erected through a series of bilateral and multilateral treaty arrangements around it was a basic reason why the Russians began to criticize Chinese zeal for the inevitability of war and began to emphasize the necessity of peaceful co-existence between the Western and Eastern blocs and that socialism might be realized in each country through peaceful means. Thus normalization of relations with Japan was a way to allay fears of neighbours and increase prospects of Soviet influence in areas adjacent to its borders. Weise opines that the major objective of the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence as applied to Japan was to separate it from the western alliance. Peaceful co-existence did in fact create a new relationship in which Japan could negotiate changes in its western relations. In effect, it freed Tokyo from some of the more restrictive aspects of these ties.<sup>72</sup>

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72 Ronald Erie Weise, Japan and Postwar International Organization, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1971, p.43.

Soviet overtures towards normalization of relations with Japan, according to Ronald E. Weise had three objectives: firstly, it was directed as a means to the end of drawing Japan away from the United States alliance and if possible into the non-aligned or Soviet bloc. Secondly, it sought to enable the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to grow in strength through normal political processes. During the Korean War, Soviet bellicosity was reflected in the policies and activities of the JCP. The result was a marked anti-Russian attitude and finally the barring of the Soviet-supported JCP from all political activity.<sup>73</sup> ~~Soviet-supported~~ Lastly, it was more attuned to the pacifist aspirations of many influential non-communist Japanese than the policy of their own government.<sup>74</sup>

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73 Ibid., p.32.

74 Japan Times, 15 and 20 October 1956.

## Chapter Four

## AFTER NORMALIZATION, 1956-1970

Although the Soviet Union did not totally boycott the San Francisco Peace Conference, it championed the cause of China by pleading for the return of Taiwan and by demanding Peking's participation in the peace-making process. Indeed, the Soviet Union was one with China in its denunciation of the American-imposed peace treaty and refusal to sign it. However, the unilateral termination of the state of war with Japan and normalisation of relations with that country by the joint declaration of October 1956 indicated that the Soviet Union was oblivious, if not totally ignorant, of the interests of China. After normalisation, Soviet-Japanese relations showed gradual and steady improvement.

In his foreign policy speech before the Diet in February 1957 Japanese Foreign Minister Kishi referred to the territorial issue and other pending issues such as repatriation of Japanese prisoners, fisheries and trade being solved by stages.<sup>1</sup> In his interview with the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun in June 1957, Premier Khrushchov spoke of having "a friendly Japan as our neighbour" and observed: "Our economic interests do not clash with Japan, but your interest do clash with those of America because you are rivals." He, thus, sought to draw attention to the complementary nature of the economies of Japan and the Soviet Union and the competitive nature of Japanese economy with the United States. On the question of Soviet attitude towards the Japanese Communists, the Soviet leader adopted a low key posture by speaking of only sympathy and impermissibility of outside intervention in the affairs of another country. He emphasised the establishment of good neighbourly relations, the development of

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1 See Contemporary Japan, vol.23, nos.10-12, April 1957, pp.726-29.

cultural and other ties and appeared soft even on the question of fisheries by saying that the Soviet Union would approach that question "in the common interest". He even went to the extent of declaring that he would approach his government with a proposal to hand over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan even before the peace treaty was signed, provided the Americans returned the island of Okinawa to Japan.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding the question of prohibition of nuclear tests, the Japanese Government successively on 9 March, 15 April, 2 September, and 11 October 1957 requested the Soviet Government through its embassy in Moscow to halt nuclear weapon tests immediately from the humanitarian standpoint. In addition, Premier Kishi sent a letter ~~to~~ on 24 September 1957 to Premier Bulganin and the leaders of USA and Britain appealing strongly for an end to nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet side, however, reiterated its views in reply to Japan's appeal that the Soviet Union could not suspend the tests unilaterally as long as other countries were continuing them and added that this problem should not be linked with the various other disarmament issues. In May 1958 Premier Khrushchov also pledged that if there are no military bases in Japan, the Soviet Union would refrain from using atomic or hydrogen weapons against Japan.<sup>3</sup>

In their statements the Japanese government leaders continued to talk of the South Kuriles and the Habomai Shikotan group

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2 Pravda, 30 June 1957, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.9, no.26, 7 August 1957, pp.3-7; also News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.16, no.66, 2 July 1957, pp.2-9.

3 See Khrushchov's letter to Haraguti Yukitaka, Chairman, General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, 21 May 1958, in *ibid.*, vol.18, no.58, 27 May 1958, pp.2-3.

of islands as "an inherent and integral part of the territory of Japan"<sup>4</sup> and the Soviet Union continued to speak of "no unresolved territorial question" between the two countries and of Japan having "neither a legal nor a moral basis" for its territorial demands on the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> This did not, however, impede the development of economic cooperation and trade relations. China, on the other hand, not only tore off the fourth unofficial trade agreement with Japan but also severed all contacts and relations even with the so-called friendly firms in Japan, gave consistent and active support to "peace forces" in that country, and lent a helping hand in building up of a mass movement against the government. Sino-Japanese relations reached an all-time low in the post-war period.<sup>6</sup>

The unyielding toughness displayed by Peking during the period 1958-60 was in marked contrast to Soviet behaviour towards Japan. While the two Communist Powers appeared to have acted towards Japan during this period largely without reference to each other, as separate entities rather than as members of a "single socialist bloc" - separate ways in weightier policy matters like the strengthening or loosening of severing of economic, political, and cultural ties with Japan<sup>7</sup>. There was yet a parallelism of interest in so far as the elimination of US influence in Japan and the promotion of "neutralist" trends in Japan were concerned. For instance, a New Times editorial of April 1959 advised Japan to adopt a policy of neutrality and lent

<sup>4</sup> See Premier Kishi's address at the National Press Club, Washington, 21 June 1957. Information Bulletin (New Delhi), 15 July 1957, pp.6-9; see also Foreign Minister Fujiyama's speech before the Diet, 29 January 1958, ibid., 15 February 1958, pp.4-6.

<sup>5</sup> Pravda, 23 March 1958, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 30 April 1958.

<sup>6</sup> see R.K.Jain, China and Japan, 1949-1976 (New Delhi, 1977).

<sup>7</sup> Kurt London, ed., Unity and Contradiction (New York, 1962), pp.227-9.

its helping hand to the mounting movement of labour and democratic forces within Japan.<sup>8</sup>

In an effort to effect a rapprochement with Peking by a show of solidarity and partly to pressurize Tokyo to refrain from signing a new security treaty with USA, Moscow adopted a stiff attitude in 1960-61 and even went to the extent of withdrawing its offer about Habomai and Shikotan islands, whose transfer was promised in 1956. Thus, when the US-Japan Security Treaty was revised in 1960, Khrushchov remarked that unless Japan abrogated that treaty and cleared its territory of any US military bases, the Soviet Union would not hand over Habomai and Shikotan, even if a peace treaty was concluded because the return of these islands would only "accelerate the expansion of territory which might be used by foreign ~~x~~ [i.e. American forces]." <sup>9</sup>

Despite the seemingly joint stand with China and vehement criticism of the new security treaty between Japan and the United States during 1960-61, the Soviet leaders continued to frequently talk of establishing friendly relations with Japan. Thus, in his new year message to the Japanese people in the beginning of 1960, Khrushchov expressed the hope that ways would be found to achieve confidence and mutual understanding between the two countries and radically improve Soviet-Japanese relations which would serve not

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8 New Times, No.14, April 1959, p.23; International Affairs (Moscow) no.5, May 1959, pp.68-9; see also Khrushchov's interview with Ryosuke Honda, Director-General of Japan Press Service, April 1958, in News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.18, no.40, pp.3-4.

9 Pravda, 29 January 1960, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.12, no.4, 1960, pp.19-20; also in News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.19, no.11, 30 January 1960, pp.11-3.

only the interests of both countries but also the interest of ensuring a lasting peace throughout the Far East.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, a Tass statement of 18 November 1960 while laying blame on the Japanese side for the non-conclusion of a peace treaty by artificially boosting the so-called territorial issue, did not forget to mention the Soviet desire to establish truly friendly and truly good neighbourly relations between the two countries.<sup>11</sup>

On the occasion of the conclusion of a new US-Japan security ~~xxxxx~~ treaty in 1960, which was a revision of the earlier 1951 treaty, a number of notes and aide memoires were exchanged between the Soviet and Japanese governments.<sup>12</sup> In these notes the two governments reiterated their well-known positions in the matter. The Japanese government spoke of its security arrangement with the United States being defensive in nature which was based on the Charter of the United Nations, while the Soviet Union found fault with Japan, for embarking on the path of remilitarisation and for allowing foreign military bases in the country meant for hostile action against the Soviet Union, thereby undermining the foundations of peace and good relations between the two countries.<sup>13</sup> The Soviet government also issued a statement on the ratification of the US-Japanese military treaty on 29 June 1960, strongly criticising the said treaty and blaming

10 News and Views from the Soviet Union(New Delhi)vol.19,no.1, 5 January 1960,pp.2-4.

11 Ibid.,vol.19,no.107,22 November 1960,pp.5-6.

12 <sup>For</sup> Japanese Government aide-memoires of 5 February and 1 March 1960 and those of the Soviet Government of 27 January, 24 February and 22 April 1960, see Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release and other Materials; July 1959-December 1960,pp.154-7, and ibid.,pp.158-9 respectively; and for the Soviet notes of 27 January see Pravda,29 January 1960, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,vol.12,no.4,1960,pp.19-20; also in News and Views from the Soviet Union,vol.19,no.11,30 January 1960,pp.11-3. For those of 24 February and 22 April 1960 see News and Views from the Soviet Union, see ibid.,vol.19,no.24,1 March 1960, pp.9-11 and ibid.,vol.19,no.44, 28 April 1960,pp.6-8.

13 See Soviet Government note of 20 May, in ibid.,no.54,29 May 1960, p.8.



the Kishi government for pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union in subordination to the interests of American monopolies and Pentagon. However, even this strong denunciation of Japan did not forget to mention the Soviet Government's desire and efforts towards complete normalisation of relations between the USSR and Japan, ensuring broad development of mutually advantageous trade, economic, cultural and other contacts for which "there exist all pre-requisites."<sup>14</sup>

The two countries also exchanged a number of notes on the question of suspension of nuclear weapon tests.<sup>15</sup> The Japanese government constantly appealed to the Soviet government as also to the governments of the United States and Britain in regard to suspension of tests and expressing great disappointment at the resumption of such tests by the Soviet Union in 1958 and again in 1961.<sup>16</sup>

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14 Ibid., vol.19, no.66, 2 July 1960, pp.2-5.

15 See Soviet note verbale of 10 December 1957 and the Japanese Government's reply of 25 February 1958. Information Bulletin, vol.5, No.6, 15 March 1958, pp.1-2; For Japanese Government's Note verbale of 4 April 1958, Soviet Government's reply of 24 April 1958, see Information Bulletin, vol.5, No.9, 1 May 1958, pp.1-2, and Ibid., vol.5, no.12, 15 June 1958, p.2. For Premier Khrushchov's letter of 4 April 1958, and Premier Kishi's reply dated 17 May 1958, see Ibid., pp.2-3. After the Soviet Government issued statement of 30 August 1961 on the resumption of nuclear tests, the Japanese Government clarified its standpoint in four note verbales presented to the Soviet Government. Further exchange of letters between the two Prime Ministers followed. See Khrushchov's letter of 24 October 1961, Ikeda's reply of 28 October 1961, and another letter by Ikeda to Khrushchov regarding resumption of nuclear weapon tests dated 10 March 1962, see Contemporary Japan, vol.27, no.2, March 1962, pp.377-9, Ibid., 379-81, and Ibid., vol.27, no.3, November 1962, p.590; For Khrushchov's letter of 4 April 1962 see News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.21, no.24, 10 April 1962, pp.1-3. For Khrushchov's letter of 12 Jun 1962, see ibid., vol.21, no.40, 23 June 1962, pp.4-5.

16 See Statement by the Director of Public Information Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests in October 1958 in Information Bulletin, vol.5, no.21, 1 November 1958, pp.1-2; See also Statement by Prime Minister Ikeda at the 39th Ordinary session of the Diet, 28 September 1961. Contemporary Japan, vol.27, no.2, March 1962, p.374.

The visit of the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, A.I. Mikoyan in August 1961 on the occasion of the opening of the Soviet trade and industrial exhibition in Tokyo was an important step taken by the Soviet government to foster further development of mutually advantageous trade and economic ties with Japan. In his letter of 12 August 1961, handed over personally by Mikoyan to Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, Khrushchov described the Soviet exhibition and Mikoyan's visit to Japan as "an important landmark on the road to the establishment of good neighbourly relations and mutual understanding between the USSR and Japan." He expressed the opinion that there existed every possibility for the development of mutually advantageous links and cooperation in all fields: political, commercial and economic, scientific and cultural. Reference to the US-Japan military alliance was mild, devoid of any denunciation. He only expressed the pious hope that the time would soon come when Japanese territory will be rid of all foreign troops and bases. Khrushchov's letter laid emphasis on the positive aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations and the geographical proximity of the two countries. He spoke of placing trade on a more stable, long-term basis and of a possible increase to three-four times or more during the next few years.<sup>17</sup> The whole tenor of Khrushchov's letter, thus, was conciliatory.

Premier Ikeda's reply letter of 28 August 1961 to Khrushchov, while expressing satisfaction at the development of trade relations between the two countries in recent years and reciprocating the desire to extend it further in the future, took objection to the

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<sup>17</sup> International Affairs(Moscow), no.11, November 1961, pp.3-4.

Soviet criticism of the foreign and defence policies of Japan and asserted Japanese claim to its "age old territories."<sup>18</sup> This led Khrushchov to reiterate in his subsequent letter of 25 September 1961 the well-known Soviet position on the US-Japan security treaty and on the question of nuclear weapon tests.<sup>19</sup> The Japanese Premier replied to this on 15 November 1961. He referred to the occupation of the Kurile islands by the Soviet Union at the end of war and of the step-by-step settling of its citizens on those islands to which the Japanese government could not remain indifferent.<sup>20</sup> Replying to that on 8 December 1961, the Soviet Prime Minister dwelt at great length on the historical and other justifications for the Soviet case in regard to the territorial question between the two countries. However, he did not forget to express his confidence that notwithstanding the existing divergencies, relations between the two countries would really become good neighbourly and complete normalisation would be accomplished by measures for removing the obstacles in the way.<sup>21</sup> In spite of some manifestation of divergent viewpoints, the exchange of notes between the Soviet and Japanese Premiers during August-December 1961 reflected a common desire of the two countries to expand trade and cultural relations.

During his sojourn in Japan, Mikoyan constantly harped on the theme of establishing truly good neighbourly relations, on expanding mutually advantageous trade, cultural and other relations and the rapprochement of both countries in the interests of the Japanese and Soviet peoples. Pursuit of good relations with neighbours was described by him as the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and the

18 Ibid., pp.4-6.

19 Ibid., pp.6-8.

20 Ibid., no.1, January 1962, pp.5-7.

21 Ibid., pp.3-5.

Soviet people were stated to entertain the kindest sentiments for the Japanese people and the Japanese state. The suave Soviet diplomat made every effort to influence Japanese public opinion. He stated that the Communist society in the Soviet Union could be built only in conditions of peace and peaceful co-existence. He desired to see Japan become prosperous and trade between the Soviet Union and Japan to develop on a wider scale. He assured, on behalf of the Soviet people and the Soviet government, that Moscow wanted to maintain "the very best relations with their Eastern neighbour, the great Japanese nation."<sup>22</sup>

The policy of Soviet reasonableness aimed at developing mutually beneficial relations was continued by the Soviet Union in 1962. In his conversations with Minoru Oda, editor of the Japanese paper Chubu Nippon on the New Year's eve of 1962, Khrushchov expressed confidence that despite the existing difficulties, relations between the two countries could be substantially improved and that there was every possibility for further expansion of mutually advantageous trade, cultural, and scientific contacts.<sup>23</sup> In the autumn of 1962 the Soviet Union was seen endeavouring to woo Japanese businessmen for credits -- offering contracts worth up to \$180 million in the next year. There was also talk of Japanese capital and even timber workers for Siberia, establishment of a joint airline, exchange of ~~Soviet~~ Gosplan, and Gosbank officials with Japanese businessmen, and exchange of electronic expertise.<sup>24</sup> However, the exchange of letters between

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22 See News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.20,no.61, 22 August 1961,pp.6-10; ibid.,no.62, 26 August 1961,pp.4-7.

23 Ibid.,vol.21,no.1, 4 January 1962,pp.7-8; see also Japan Times, 3 January 1962.

24 W.A.C. Aide, "China's Bomb," The Spectator (London),no.7006, 5 October 1962,p.469.

the Prime Ministers of the two countries in the summer of 1962 indicated divergence of viewpoints on the question of arms control and suspension of nuclear weapon tests.<sup>25</sup>

As the Sino-Soviet rift became more pronounced, the Soviet Union showed greater flexibility in its approach, probably with a view to counter the increasing influence of China in Japan. In June 1963 Moscow agreed to allow Japanese fishermen to collect edible sea-weed around the Soviet-held island of Kaigara and to release all Japanese fishermen still held in the Soviet Union. Later, it also agreed to let Japanese citizens visit the graves of their relatives in the Habomai and Shikotan islands.<sup>26</sup>

In his replies to Japanese editors and publishers in August 1963, Premier Khrushchov referred to very favourable conditions existing for the development of Soviet-Japanese commercial and economic relations. The rapid economic construction in Siberia and the Far East on the one hand and progress of Japanese economy on the other, he stated, could contribute substantially to the expansion of Soviet-Japanese trade in the years ahead. Of great interest to both countries, he added, was the question of using Japanese technical means and materials in industrial construction in

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25 See Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's letter of 20 April 1962 and the Japanese Embassy Note of 5 May 1962 and Khrushchov's reply of 10 June 1962 and Soviet Government Note of 29 June 1962. News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.21, no.40, 23 June 1962, pp.2-4 and *ibid.*, vol.21, no.45, 10 July 1962, pp.5-7.

26 See P.A.N. Murthy, "Japan's Changing Relations with People's China and the Soviet Union," International Studies, vol.7, no.1, July 1965, pp.14-5.

SSiberia and the Far East. The Soviet Union could built these enterprises for the production of goods needed by Japan, if the Japanese companies agreed to provide USSR with the technical means and other materials needed for that on a deferred payment basis. He considered the conclusion of an extensive cultural agreement useful and described the opening of a permanent air line between the two countries as "expedient and profitable for both sides."

Khrushchov even told a group of Japanese newspapermen:

The Soviet people have a deep respect for the Japanese people who have shown immense vitality and talent in raising up their country from the ashes and devastation of war. We wish only good to Japan and hope that her progress will serve the aims of strengthening peace... Japan is free to choose allies to suit her taste, and we are no way against her having good relations with other countries including the United States.<sup>27</sup>

Simultaneously with Khrushchov's conciliatory remarks, the Soviet Government announced the release of Japanese fishermen who had been jailed by the Soviet Union on charges of poaching.<sup>28</sup>

The widening Sino-Soviet rift was not only coming more and more into the open but was soon spilling over to Japan. The Soviet Union has already stepped up its propaganda in Japan. Since the opening of an information office in Tokyo in 1962, efforts have been made to increase the circulation of the magazine Soviet Union Today.

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<sup>27</sup> International Affairs (Moscow), no.9, September 1963, pp.3-9.

<sup>28</sup> Times of India, 27 August 1963.

Peking is also publicising Chinese views. The Hsinhua reported on 27 September 1963 that "a campaign for improving friendship between Japan and China is in full swing in Japan." The two-month campaign was launched by the Japan-China Friendship Association on 1 September 1963. "To acquaint the Japanese people with the situation in China," said the Hsinhua News Agency, "the Association has decided to offer People's China, China Pictorial and Peking Review for sale."<sup>29</sup> Tass, the Soviet news agency, complained on 27 September 1963 that the Japanese edition of Peking Review "gloats over individual shortcomings in Soviet life" and alleged that the "foremost" subscribers to the Chinese weekly were "bourgeois newspaper offices, Trotskyite groups and the American Embassy." Tass said the Peking Review was conducting "unbridled and totally unwarranted anti-Soviet propoganda," but was sure that the Japanese people would "not fall for this ill-smelling bait."<sup>30</sup>

The concentrated Soviet move to woo Japan seems to have begun in 1963-64 as it had become by then clear that any rapprochement with China was out of question. Whatever hopes were there of patching up the ideological rift with Peking were dashed to the ground by the release of the Chinese Communist Party letter of June ~~1963~~ 1963. Japan, unlike China, in dealing with the USSR did not face any such intricate problem as choosing between two Chinas and normalization of relations had already taken place. As a result, Soviet-Japanese relations recorded an upward trend beginning 1963, when the May 1958 trade agreement was extended for an indefinite period.

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29 Hsinhua News Agency, 27 September 1963.

30 Tass statement of 27 September 1963.

The second visit of the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, A.I. Mikoyan, at the head of a parliamentary delegation to Japan in 1964 played an important part in the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. He brought with him a letter from the Soviet Premier, N.S. Khrushchov, to the then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda. This letter was couched in soft words. According to a Japanese Government spokesman, Khrushchov's letter contained "more substance" than the Japanese Government had expected and on the whole, the tone of the letter showed a "forward-looking" attitude. In essence the letter touched on three important problems, namely, discontinuance of nuclear tests, in whatever form, the peace and security in the Far East and the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup> Premier Khrushchov praised Japan's Constitution for its disavowal of all war potential and the statements of the Japanese Government ~~that it~~ to the effect that it would not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. He expressed the hope for increased trade and cultural relations between the two countries. It might be recalled here that the Soviet Union had earlier criticized Japan in strong terms for having given foreign troops the right to bring in and use nuclear weapons. Thus, it was apparent that Moscow was now prepared to abandon such criticism and desired to

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<sup>31</sup> Patriot, 16 May 1964; see also Times of India, 23 May 1964.



increase bilateral intercourse with Japan. Mikoyan went to the extent of asserting that the annual trade turn-over between the two countries could be increased from the existing \$300 million (in 1963) to \$1000 million. It was reported that Mikoyan had offered to buy \$350 million worth of plant and equipment from Japan and brought new proposals to ~~re~~enable the early conclusion of an aviation agreement so that a direct Tokyo-Moscow air link could be started<sup>32</sup> which would save Western travellers about £285 on round trip passage to Tokyo for the Olympic games.<sup>33</sup> Mikoyan also proposed the establishment of a Japan-Soviet Economic Committee for studying the problems of economic cooperation between the two countries. This proposal was subsequently agreed upon and the Joint Committee, thus established had held regular meetings since 1966. During his visit to Japan in May 1964, Soviet Deputy Premier, A. Mikoyan, expressed hopes about Tokyo playing a greater role in the world and as a gesture of goodwill visited the graves of the Japanese prisoners-of-war, who had died in Russian camps in Siberia.

The Soviet Deputy Premier hinted that the Soviet Union might restore to Japan the two tiny islands of Habomai and Shikotan. In short, Mikoyan's mission in Japan was aimed at projecting the Soviet Union as a peace-loving country and presenting USSR as a market equally important as China for Japan in the coming years.<sup>34</sup>

Before leaving Tokyo, Mikoyan, in a statement, remarked that during his stay in Japan he did his best to further strengthen the

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32 The Hindu, 26 May 1964.

33 Hindustan Times, 2 June 1964.

34 Ibid

friendship between the Soviet Union and Japan. He also noted with satisfaction that the tendency to accelerate the exchange in various fields between the two countries was being speeded up in Japan.<sup>35</sup>

In his replies to the Japanese Kiudo Tsusin Agency General Director, Mikoyan referred to Japan as "our closest neighbour" with whom the Soviet Union was trying "to maintain the best of relations." He strongly pleaded for the development of friendly contacts at all levels, including all-round expansion of cultural and scientific exchanges and expansion of trade relations. While expressing himself in favour of continuing talks on a final peace settlement, he emphasized that the opportunities of developing relations between the two countries "even under present conditions" should in no case be missed but utilized to the full.<sup>36</sup>

On his return home, talking to a Moscow News correspondent, Mikoyan spoke of "marked progress" having been made in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan as a result of Soviet parliamentary delegation's visit and observed that a favourable atmosphere existed for strengthening these relations.<sup>37</sup>

Closely following Mikoyan's visit to Japan, the Soviet Union eased somewhat its restrictions on Japanese access to these islands. For instance, the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo has informed Japan of Moscow's readiness to permit "in principle" visits by Japanese to family graves on Habomai and Shikotan (the Japanese would like this permission extended to Kunashiri and Etorofu as well). The Russians also apologised for refusing shelter to Japanese boats in Etorofu during a heavy storm and said this would

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35 Contemporary Japan, September 1964, p.221.

36 See Soviet Documents(New York), vol.2, no.21, 25 May 1964, pp.20-4.

37 Moscow News, 6 June 1964, p.3.

not happen again. It might be recalled that in the previous year, the Soviet Union had agreed to permit 300 Japanese boats to come near the Habomai group to collect seaweed. Moreover, on 23 May 1964 the Soviet Government informed Japanese Foreign Office that it would release some 55 Japanese fishermen detained by the Russians for violating territorial waters, the first mass release of Japanese fishermen since September 1963.<sup>38</sup> The most likely interpretation of these gestures was to remind the Japanese of the real benefits they could gain by signing a peace treaty.

The Soviet moves towards Japan were made only after the Sino-Soviet rift was widening and Peking began to cultivate good relations with Japan starting with trade which was reflected in the signing in November 1962 of a five-year barter trade agreement (known as Takasaki-Liao memorandum) fixing the trade turnover to an annual figure of US \$100 million and the opening of trade liaison officers in Peking and Tokyo and exchange of newspapermen that was effected in 1964. Moscow responded to these Chinese moves towards Japan in May 1963 by extending the May 1958 trade agreement for an indefinite period. Moscow gave evidence of its desire to improve relations with Japan by taking a number of concrete steps including the signing of agreements with Japan on fishery and seaweed gathering, the terms of which pleased Tokyo. On trade, the USSR agreed to balance its favourable account within a period of three years by increasing its imports by 7 to 8 per cent. Tokyo was particularly interested in the expansion of

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<sup>38</sup> Times of India, 24 May 1964.

coastal trade between Japanese sea ports and the Soviet ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok. Such trade involving exports of consumer goods was considered of great help in developing the economy of the Japanese Sea coastal regions.

During 1964, apart from A. Mikoyan, a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a number of government officials also visited Japan. A number of Japanese delegations, from the Socialist Party, from business circles and from the Diet, also visited USSR. In his discussions with the visiting Japanese delegations, Premier Khrushchov was reported to have told them that Moscow would return Habomai and Shikotan without waiting for the conclusion of a peace treaty if the USA withdrew from the Ryukyus and the Bonin islands, returned Okinawa to Japan and removed all US military bases from Japan.

Probably with a view to counter-acting the influence of Mikoyan's visit to Japan, the Chinese leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in their discussions with a group of Japanese Socialists in July 1964, were reported to have supported Japanese claims over the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu in the Kuriles.<sup>39</sup> This support was certainly disturbing to Moscow as Washington had earlier, in its aide-memoire of 1956, declared that the four islands Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai had "always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty."<sup>40</sup> Kremlin, therefore, deemed it necessary to deepen its relations with Japan, particularly in the economic field.

Thus, towards the end of 1964, Premier Kosygin in a letter to Sato, his Japanese counterpart, expressed a desire to have increased

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39 See The Hindu, 14 July 1964.

40 Information Bulletin (New Delhi), October 1956, pp.1-2.

commercial relations, conclude a consular and a civil aviation treaty and an exchange of visits with the Japanese Prime Minister. Kosygin's letter was described by informed sources as a model of reasonableness replete with friendly--if imprecise--overtures for cooperation in the settlement of outstanding problems, and avoiding all political controversy. Particularly flattering to the Sato Government was apparently a suggestion by Kosygin that both Governments should join in seeking solutions to important international problems. Those close to Sato were satisfied that this was tantamount to an encouragement to Japan to play a more important role in the world. According to official sources, the letter contained five points:

1. Further confirmation of the standing invitation to Japanese Prime Ministers to visit Russia.
2. An assertion that the outlook for increased trade was by no means gloomy, and an undertaking to pursue the promotion of economic and trade relations.
3. A suggestion that representatives should be chosen for negotiation, of a consular agreement, as desired by Japan.
4. An invitation, if the Japanese wished, to continue negotiations for an aviation agreement, with an expression of endeavour to work for success.
5. An assertion that Russia would exert herself to inspire mutual confidence, and an invitation to join efforts to solve world problems.

If imprecise, the letter was said to impress the Japanese with its "forward looking", practical approach. Sato would undoubtedly like, the London Times correspondent remarked, to hear more about the territorial issue of the Russian-occupied offshore islands before undertaking a visit to Moscow, and to know more of Russian intentions towards developing eastern Siberia. There was, however, no mistaking the Japanese desire for an increase in trade and for an air agreement that would open a trans-Siberian route.

The letter was the first real approach to Japan for cooperation from the new Russian leaders, and it was particularly gratifying to Tokyo to find no mention of American forces "in occupation" or of visits of nuclear powered submarines. The letter was seen as an astute reminder of Russian moderation on the eve of Sato's ~~xxx~~ first visit to Washington as Prime Minister, and it contrasted vividly with the denunciations that he has been receiving incessantly from Peking.<sup>41</sup>

In his New Year message to the Japanese people on 1 January 1965, Premier Kosygin spoke of the common desire of the two peoples to preserve strengthen peace and of "very favourable prospects for economic cooperation." He expressed himself in favour of putting trade on a long-term basis and substantial expansion of mutually advantageous trade relations and reciprocated Sato's feelings about further development of good-neighbourly relations.<sup>42</sup> The Japanese Minister for International Trade, Takeo Miki, visited the Soviet Union and returned with greatly enhanced prospects of Japanese-USSR trade and industrial cooperation.

It required considerable intensive efforts on the part of Moscow and the active help of India to persuade Tokyo agree to abstain at least from openly opposing USSR's candidature for membership of the then forthcoming 2nd Asian African Conference in Algiers in 1965. Later in that year, an important industrial delegation led by Shigeo Nagano returned from the Soviet Union full of enthusiasm for the prospects of developing Soviet-Japanese trade, industrial exchange

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41 See The Times (London) 31 December 1964.

42 New Times, no.1, 1 January 1965, p.3.

and collaboration on a massive scale, particularly for the development of Siberia. The goodwill mission of the speaker of the House of Representatives, Naka Funada, also returned equally enthusiastic about the favourable political climate obtaining in USSR for bringing about a rapprochement between the two countries. Washington seemed to be positively encouraging Japan to develop its relations with the Soviet Union.

The Japan-Soviet Economic Committee for Business Cooperation was set up in 1965 and the consular convention was signed in 1966, on the basis of which Soviet general consulates were opened in Sapporo and Osaka and Japanese general consulates in Nakhodka and Leningrad and mutually advantageous commercial, economic, cultural and tourist ties between the two countries were promoted. An agreement on direct air traffic between Moscow and Tokyo was also signed in 1966 and Japan, thus became "the first capitalist state permitted to make transit flights over the territory of the Soviet Union." Regular shipping and passenger services were opened in 1961 between Nakhodka and Yokohama. Since 1965, meetings of representatives of the Soviet and Japanese peoples have been arranged under the slogan "for Peace and Friendship between the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union" and since 1966 the Soviet-Japanese Trade Union Commission has been working successfully and regular Soviet-Japanese trade union meetings are held. In January 1966 the former Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina visited Moscow while Soviet Fishery Minister Ishikov and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Japan in June and July 1966 respectively.

The agreement on air services and the five-year trade and payments agreement for the period 1966 to 1970 were signed during

Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to the Soviet Union. The two sides also agreed to continue developing cooperation in various spheres of fisheries and to make efforts to settle all questions in that field. While there was no common meeting point on the question of Vietnam, the two nations expressed great satisfaction over the signing of the Tashkent Declaration "which opens up the road to a normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and the establishment of stable peace in Hindustan."<sup>43</sup>

Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to the Soviet Union reflected the Japanese desire to cultivate relations with the USSR while keeping good relations with the United States. It proved a remarkable success. In his introductory remarks to Shiina, Foreign Minister Gromyko had observed that the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations must not be carried out in such a way as to worsen their relations with other nations. This remark showed a pragmatic awareness of the realities of the situation on the part of the Soviet Union and had relevance not only to USSR-China-Japan triangle but also signified that Moscow did not want ~~to~~ or expect Japan to do anything that would adversely affect US-Japan relations but desired to do business with an ally of the United States.

During Gromyko's visit, a consular convention was signed and both countries agreed to hold periodical meetings of Cabinet Ministers to exchange views. They also agreed on the extension of travel facilities, and on an expansion of cultural and educational exchange programmes. The steady development of cooperation in the field of fishing was noted with satisfaction and the two sides agreed that in

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43 Joint Soviet-Japanese Communique on Foreign Minister Shiina's visit, 24 January 1966. Pravda, 23 January 1966, as translated in Daily Review, 24 January 1966.



order to place relations on a more stable basis it was necessary to conclude a peace treaty. On the latter question, the two sides voiced their opinions just as they set forth their positions in connection with the situation in Southeast Asia,<sup>44</sup> indicating lack of agreement between the two countries on both these counts.

That China felt very much disturbed by Gromyko's visit to Japan, the signing of a consular treaty, the agreement to hold periodic consultations at ministerial level and growing economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan was evident from Observer's article entitled "US-Japanese-Soviet Holy Alliance' cannot stem Revolutionary Torrent in Asia," in People's Daily of 31 July 1966. The mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party criticized Soviet leaders for throwing the door wide open to the infiltration of Japanese monopoly capital and observed that the vicious plan for "U.S.-Japanese-Soviet co-operation for the domination of Asia," which the Soviet revisionist leading clique was vainly attempting to realize, was a component part of the capitulationist line for "U.S.-Soviet co-operation for world domination."<sup>45</sup>

The tenth anniversary of re-establishment of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations on 19 October 1966 was marked by a number of articles in the Soviet press to show development of relations between the two countries "sharing a common border." The signing of the recent five-year trade agreement was considered as a further step in the expansion of trade which had grown ten times in the last ten years.

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44 Joint Soviet-Japanese Communique on Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit, 30 July 1966. Pravda, 31 July 1966, as translated in Daily Review, 1 August 1966.

45 Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 July 1966, see Peking Review, 5 August 1966, pp. 17-8.

The renewal of the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Pact signed ten years ago and due to expire in 1967 and the revision of the Treaty on Maritime Rescue Disaster Operations were under negotiation.

By the autumn of 1966, discussions had also reached a final stage on the development of the natural gas resources in Sakhalin under which Japan would construct a pipeline which would be paid for by supply of gas by the Soviet Union. While there was disapproval of foreign military bases in Japan and their use by the United States as "trans-shipping points for expansion of the dirty war against the people of Vietnam," the Soviet Union was well aware of the value of establishing better relations with Japan in the economic and political interests of both countries.

The Soviet newsmedia criticism of Japanese support for American policy in Vietnam and accusations of hegemonistic aims in Southeast Asia of the Sato Government were seen by mature persons in Japan as routine manifestations of the Russian ideological orthodoxy and Moscow's competitive need for not seeming to lag behind Communist China in its anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist fervour. Accordingly, bilateral Soviet-Japanese relations were not allowed to be disturbed by these fulminations in the Soviet press. The first regular Ministerial level consultations were held in July ~~1956~~ 1967 during Japanese Foreign Minister Miki's visit to USSR. While no progress could be made towards the settlement of the northern territories question<sup>46</sup> (the reopening of the question of post-war frontiers with Japan was liable to seriously compromise Soviet Union's position with

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46 See Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki at the 58th ordinary session of the National Diet, 27 January 1968, Embassy of Japan in United States, Japan Report (Washington, D.C.), 31 January 1968, p.8.

regard to its other territorial problems with Romania and Finland, not to speak of the post-war German frontiers), the Soviet interest in enlisting Japanese cooperation in the development of Siberian natural resources -- timber, gas, and mineral ores--was quite evident.

As a result of the visit of Nikolai Baibakov, Soviet Deputy Premier and Chairman of State Planning Committee, in early 1968, an agreement was finalised in July 1968 for a \$150 million credit for supply of plant and machinery for developing forest resources in Siberia and for supply of consumer goods in exchange for imports of lumber over the next five years by Japan. While Tokyo fully reciprocated Soviet desire for trade and working relations, it nevertheless continued to regard Soviet Union much the greater menace than China to its interests. Thus, the vehement denunciation of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was more an expression of this traditional distrust and dislike of the USSR than a sense of moral outrage.

In his foreign policy report to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 June 1968, A.Gromyko spoke of successes having been registered in the development of economic cooperation with such "a major neighbouring country as Japan" and declared that the Soviet Union stood for the strengthening of political relations with that country as well. He, however, referred to considerable difficulties in that being created by Japan's stand on certain questions. One of them, he pointed out, was the utilisation by the United States of Japanese territory in connection with "the aggressive war against the Vietnamese people."<sup>47</sup>

China was getting extremely worried about the growing Soviet-Japanese collaboration in economic and other fields and what Japanese

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<sup>47</sup> Soviet Review, 9 July 1968, p.25.

Prime Minister Sato called the deepening of Soviet-Japan friendship based on good-neighbour policy. Thus, even before the Sino-Soviet border conflict broke out in the open in 1969 the People's Daily commentator lashed out at the counter-revolutionary collusion between Soviet revisionist renigades and Japanese reactionaries. The relations between the two countries, he stated, had developed from economic cooperation to political and military collusion and that attempts were being made to speed up the formation of a "Moscow-Tokyo axis" and rig up a counter-revolutionary alliance against China under the signboard of "good neighbourliness and friendship." The Chinese commentator strongly denounced the Soviet leaders for blatantly conniving at and encouraging the military alliance between the United States and Japan, taking further steps to ally themselves with the US and Japanese reactionaries to encircle China militarily, and for throwing ground, sea and air space of Siberia wide open for possible exploitation and plunder of the Soviet people by the Japanese monopoly capital.<sup>48</sup> Soviet commentators did not lag behind in replying in kind to Chinese attacks on their country. Thus, L.Kirichenko, writing in New Times, referred to China's orientation of its economic relations on the imperialist Powers, so much so that more than 80 per cent of its foreign trade was with capitalist countries -- the major trading partners of China being Japan, West Germany, and Britain. The Soviet commentator did not forget to mention Japan's close economic links with Taiwan and its espousal of the "two China" concept in the United Nations.<sup>49</sup>

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48 Jen-min Jeh-pao, 20 December 1968, p.20.

49 New Times, no.17, 28 April 1971, pp.4-5.

After the Sino-Soviet armed clashes on the banks of Ussuri in 1969, Moscow appeared more inclined towards wooing Tokyo. A conciliatory gesture by Moscow was the agreement to open the Siberian route for the Japan Air Lines flights to Europe. This was the first concession to any foreign airlines by the USSR. Japan-Soviet trade expanded from \$643 million in 1968 to \$729 million in 1969 and Tokyo showed willingness to invest in Siberia.

Foreign Minister Aichi, who visited Moscow in September 1969, found Soviet leaders reasonable on economic matters but adamant on the question of Northern territories. In July 1967, Prime Minister Kosygin, in his talks with Foreign Minister Takeo Miki proposed an "interim arrangement," and, thereby creating the impression in certain quarters in Japan that the Soviet Union had softened its stand on the territorial issue. But in September 1969, in his talks with the then Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, Premier Kosygin contended that "any tampering with territorial issues would spread to other countries," and that the present boundaries of the Soviet Union, established since World War II, were "sacred and inviolable," thereby ruling out the return of the four islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu.<sup>50</sup> Again, soon after the signing of Soviet West Germany Treaty on renunciation of force on 12 August 1970, Moscow told Japan that the "demand for the return of territories is extremely dangerous not only to peace in the Far East but also to world peace."<sup>51</sup> In the spring of 1971, while speaking before the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary

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50 See Rinjiro Harako, "Japan-Soviet Relations and Japan's Choice," Pacific Community, vol.4, no.1, October 1972, p.94.

51 Cited in Rinjiro Harako, "Prospects for Relations with the USSR," Survey, Autumn 1972, p.51.

of the Soviet Communist Party, criticized "a certain stratum of people in Japan" for exploiting the "territorial problem," which was not in the best interests of Japan-Soviet relations.<sup>52</sup>

The Okinawa reversion agreement in 1970 with USA gave a new encouragement to the Japanese Government to broach the subject of the Kurile islands but it made no impact on the Kremlin. In his address before the UN General Assembly in October 1970, Premier Sato expressed his regret that "talks" with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories were not succeeding.<sup>53</sup> The Soviet resentment to this reference was indicated by postponement of fisheries talks for three months. Japan had intended to request USSR at these talks to allow Japanese fishermen to reach within four miles of the shores of these northern islands. The Soviet Union had recognised a ten-mile territorial waters limit for these islands. Moscow ultimately rejected the Japanese request.

The Soviet Union participated in Expo-70 in Osaka and in 1970 an agreement on cooperation in designing of a Soviet port and supplying equipment for building it was signed. The Soviet-Japanese trade doubled as a result of the fulfilment of the 1966-70 trade and payments agreement, reaching a total of 2600 million roubles. The second Soviet-Japanese agreement on trade and payments for 1971-75, initialled in April 1971 and signed in Tokyo in September 1971, envisaged practically a doubling of that figure in the next five years -- upto 3500-4000 million roubles.

Thus, it was not surprising that in his statement before the UN General Assembly in October 1970, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato spoke of great improvement having been made in Soviet-Japanese

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52 Cited in Harako, n.50, p.83.

53 For text of statement see Pacific Community, January 1971, pp.4-5.

relations since the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1956 and of friendship between the two countries based on good neighbour policy being deepened constantly.<sup>54</sup> Subsequently, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi described the maintenance and development of amicable friendly relations with the Soviet Union as not only beneficial to both countries but also contributing to the peace and stability of the Far East. He expressed his intention to intensify Japan's relations with the Soviet Union in various fields such as trade, economy and culture. However, in all their statements, the Japanese leaders could not but ritually make reference to the territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>55</sup>

Though political and ideological differences existed with no early solution of the territorial question in sight and the traditional Japanese suspicion of the Soviet Union lingered on, there was considerable improvement, in both depth and range, in the bilateral relations of the Soviet Union and Japan in the sixties. US-Soviet detente and the Sino-Soviet conflict had made it possible and desirable for the Soviet Union to get closer to Japan. Moscow desired to neutralise both Chinese and American political influence in Japan and sought to find alternative commercio-economic partners in the Far East for the loss of Chinese trade. Japan too was keen to have closer economic relations with USSR and acquire a foothold in the Soviet markets. Tokyo also wished to emphasise its independence of American tutelage by cultivating closer relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, ~~detente~~ detente with Moscow was considered necessary in order to neutralise the domestic leftist criticism as well as to balance the impact of China on Japanese politics.

54 See Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in the General Assembly, 21 October 1970, in *ibid.*, pp.4-5.

55 See Foreign Policy speech by the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Diet, 22 January 1971, *Ibid.*, vol.2, no.3, April 1971, pp.604.

## Chapter Five

## PROBLEM OF NORTHERN TERRITORIES

Controversy over the sovereignty of the Kurile Islands, namely, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai, and Shikotan Islands, which comprise 4,996 square kilometers, has complicated Soviet-Japanese relations for two centuries and prevents the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty for over three decades since World War II.

Genesis and Evolution

Divergent frontier claims regarding the northern territories arise out of Russia's and Japan's convergence on the Kuriles in the late 18th century. The Treaty of Shimoda of 7 February 1855 provided, inter alia, for the first demarcation of a frontier in the Kuriles, whereby Japan got Etorofu, Kunashiri and other islands south of the Uruppu Channel and Russia obtained the islands to its north.<sup>1</sup> In 1876 Japan brought the Kuriles under the jurisdiction of the Hokkaido Colonization Board. Twenty years later, by the Treaty of St.Petersburg (7 May 1875) Japan received full title to "the group of the Kuril islands" in return for Sakhalin.<sup>2</sup> Supplementary articles to the treaty were signed in Tokyo on 22 August 1875 dealing with the new status of Sakhalin and Kurile inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> The treaties of Shimoda and St.Petersburg, however, only temporized but did not solve the issue.

The Soviet Union has consistently asserted that the so-called territorial problem is a non-issue concocted by reactionaries and

1 See Article 2. For text see Japan, Foreign Office, Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and other Powers together with Universal Conventions, Regulations and Communications since March 1854 (rev.ed., Tokyo, 1884), p.585; J.J.Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford, 1974), p.237.

2 Article 2. George A.Lensen, The Russian Push toward Japan (Princeton, 1959), pp.501-4.

3 Ibid., pp.505-6.



militarists and that the sovereignty of the Kuriles was rooted in history, decided at Yalta, confirmed at Postdam, and finalised at San Francisco. The Soviets<sup>4</sup> are convinced that the entire Kurile archipelago belongs to Russia by right of "prior discovery and prior settlement." Soviet publications maintain that there is no unresolved territorial question and that Japan has no genuine historical or legal claim<sup>5</sup> to any of the Kuriles because the Japanese first reached the arc in 1799 by which time it had already become Russian. The treaties of 1855 and 1875 (which awarded Japan the southern and northern parts of the chain respectively) lost their validity at Portsmouth in 1905 because Japan had started the Russo-Japanese war in pursuance of its aggressive policy and thereby forfeited the right to invoke them. By reneging on her promise to liquidate north Sakhalin oil and coal concessions and by aiding Germany in an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, Japan forfeited all assurances (of respecting each other's "territorial integrity and ~~inviolability~~ inviolability") contained in the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.<sup>6</sup> In accordance with the Cairo Declaration<sup>7</sup> (which provides that Japan shall be expelled from all territories which it has taken by "violence and greed"), and in fulfillment of the obligations agreed upon at Yalta (11 February 1945) (wherein Soviet entry into the war against Japan was made

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4 Official Soviet views on Kurile sovereignty were spelled out during the course of an exchange of letters between Premier N.Khrushchov and Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda during November-December 1961. For the correspondence, see International Affairs (Moscow), no.1, January 1962, pp.3-7.

5 Pravda, 23 March 1958 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 30 April 1958.

6 See Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III (London, 1953), pp.486-7; also G.A.Lensen, The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941-1945 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1972), pp.277-8.

7 United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, the Conferences of Cairo and Tehran (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp.448-9.

conditional on the restoration of southern Sakhalin as well as all islands adjacent to it; this shall be "unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated,"<sup>8</sup>), the Soviet Union attacked imperialist Japan and regained possession of the Kuriles. Furthermore, Japan irrevocably acknowledged this territorial transfer by accepting the Potsdam Declaration, paragraph 8 of which provided that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such other minor islands as we determine."<sup>9</sup> This was also reaffirmed by Article 2(c) of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty,<sup>10</sup> which it had signed.

Japan's position is that the northern territories are 'inalienable' and 'inherent' Japanese lands. To that end, the Japanese adduce arguments based on historical associations and international law, namely, that Japanese maps depicted the Kuriles in the seventeenth century, that Japanese merchants and officials visited Kunashiri and Etorofu before any Russians, and that Russia recognized Japan's title to these islands in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and did not question that title until 1945, seventy years later. The Cairo Declaration, Tokyo maintains, reinforced Japan's rights to the Kuriles, for the arc does not fall under the category of lands "taken by violence and greed."<sup>11</sup> The Yalta Agreement is not binding or valid, because it was concluded without Japan's participation or knowledge.

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8 Ibid., The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955), p.984.

9 Ibid., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol.2 (Washington, D.C., 1960), p.1281; United States, Department of State Publication, no.2671, Far Eastern Series, pp.17 and 53.

10 The relevant article reads: "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin, and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905." See Department of State Bulletin, 27 August 1951, pp.349-54.

11 Shigejiro Tabata, "Re-examination of Japan's Territorial Claims," Chou Kuron, May 1955, in Contemporary Japan, vol.23, nos.7-9, 1955, pp.569-72.

The Yalta Agreement was merely "a statement of common purpose." It was not an international agreement formally determining territorial dispositions. In attacking and annexing the Kuriles, the Soviet Union violated the Neutrality Pact of 1941 and violated the principle of non-aggrandizement contained in the Atlantic Charter to which Moscow had subscribed. The Potsdam Declaration limited Japan to the four main islands but added the reference to "such minor islands as we determine" which could well include the Kuriles. Moreover, Japan does not feel that any such determination has been made by the Allied Powers as constituted in August 1945. In renouncing all title and claim to the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan did not renounce any "inherent" territorial rights, that it did not compromise its claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu, for the latter two are legally not part of the Kuriles as defined in the treaties of 1855 and 1875. The final status of the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin has yet to be decided under international law because the USSR did not sign the Treaty and was not named as the beneficiary to Japan's renunciation of these lands at San Francisco.<sup>12</sup>

Convincing at face value, the Japanese arguments, according to John J. Stephan, suffer from inaccuracies, discrepancies, and omissions. They ignore early Russian associations with the southern Kuriles and avoid mentioning that until 1798 the Tokugawa shogunate and

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<sup>12</sup> See Statement by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu at first session of the Japan-Soviet Conference on normalization of relations, 31 July 1956. Embassy of Japan in India, Information Bulletin (New Delhi), 10 August 1956. Also see his statement of 6 August 1956; in Ibid 13 August 1956; Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, The Northern Territorial Issue: Japan's Position on Unsettled Questions between Japan and the Soviet Union (Tokyo, 1968).

many scholars considered the Kuriles to be outside Japan, he says.<sup>13</sup> Russia did claim Kunashiri and Etorofu before 1855 but agreed to concede sovereignty over the two islands to Japan during the hectic months of the Crimean War. The Soviet Union subscribed to the Atlantic Charter with reservations that left the door open for territorial acquisitions.<sup>14</sup> Potsdam's 'minor islands' can be construed as the Kuriles only by stretching the imagination, for the authors surely had in mind Sado, Tsushima, Oki, and Inland Sea islets. When Japan renounced all rights to the 'Kurile Islands' at San Francisco, 'Kurile' was universally understood to include Kunashiri and Etorofu.<sup>15</sup>

Japan's first postwar claim to the Kuriles came in the form of petition signed by 30,000 Hokkaido residents, submitted on 1 December 1945 by the Mayor of Neumor to General Douglas MacArthur and to the Allied Council. Subsequently, however, demands focused on the southern Kuriles, because 90 per cent of the arc's former inhabitants had lived there and because the Japanese felt more confident about claiming lands that Russia had never ruled. On 22 December 1949 the government read its first position paper on the northern territories in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet's House of Representatives. The statement denied Yalta's legality and asserted Japan's claim to the southern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida reaffirmed this stand a month later, thereby becoming the first Japanese head of state to make an issue of northern irredentism.

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13 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford, 1974), p. 211.

14 Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maiskii, conveyed his government's adherence to the Charter with the qualification that "the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries." Quoted in Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, N.J., 1957), p. 24n.

15 Stephan, n. 13, p. 211.

In the October 1956 Soviet Japanese declaration Moscow had promised to return Habomai and Shikotan on the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, shortly after the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on 27 January 1960 that the islets would be held until American forces had completely withdrawn from Japan.<sup>16</sup> In 1964, Khrushchov stated that if the United States returned Okinawa to Japan and if all American military bases were removed from Japan, Moscow would return Habomai and Shikotan without waiting for the conclusion of a peace treaty.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Russian conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty and thereby the return of Habomai and Shikotan

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16 For text of Soviet memorandum of 27 January 1960, see Pravda, 29 January 1960, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.12, no.4,1960,pp.19-20; also in News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.19,no.11, 30 January 1960,pp.11-3. The Soviet Union reiterated its views in its notes of 22 April, 15 June, and 29 June 1960. For texts, see News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.19,no.24, 1 March 1960, pp.9-11; Ibid.,vol.19,no.44, 28 April 1960, pp.6-8; Ibid.,vol.19,no.61,18 June 1960,pp.6-7; and ibid., vol.19, 2 July 1960,pp.2-5 respectively. For the Japanese replies see notes of 5 February, 1 March, and 1 July 1960 in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release and Other Materials, July 1959-December 1960, pp.154-7; also in Press Releases, ibid.,pp.158-9; and ibid.,pp.160-4 respectively.

17 At present, even this condition is not mentioned any more. In the most recent edition of the Diplomatic Dictionary which is edited by Gromyko, the reference to the possible reversion to Japan of Habomai and Shikotan as it was still printed in the 1964 edition has been cancelled. Diplomatic eskij Slovar' (Diplomatic Dictionary),vol.3,(Moscow,1964,1973),p.293 and p.386 respectively. Cited in Joachim Glaubitz, "Some Aspects of Recent Soviet Policy toward East and Southeast Asia," in Lawrence L.Whitten,ed.,The Political Implications of Soviet Military Power (New York,1977), p.131.

have varied and at one time included the demilitarization of the entire Japanese archipelago and the withdrawal of all American bases. In July 1967, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, in his talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki proposed an "interim arrangement," and, thereby creating the impression in certain quarters in Japan that the Soviet Union had softened its stand on the territorial issue. However, in September 1969, in his talks with the then Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, Premier Kosygin contended that "any tampering with territorial issues would spread to other countries," and that the present boundaries of the Soviet Union, established since World War II, were "sacred and inviolable," thereby ruling out the return of the four islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.<sup>18</sup>

In December 1969, Prime Minister Sato urged adopting the Okinawa Formula by securing Soviet recognition of Japan's residue sovereignty in the Southern Kuriles as the first step towards retrocession. Again, soon after the signing of Soviet-West German Treaty on renunciation of force on 12 August 1970, Moscow told Japan that the "demand for the return of territories is extremely dangerous not only to peace in the Far East but also to world peace."<sup>19</sup> Japan raised the northern territories issue for the first time

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18 Elizabeth Pond, "Japan and Russia: The View from Tokyo," Foreign Affairs, October 1973, p.94.

19 Cited in Rinjiro Harako, "Prospects for Relations with the USSR," Survey, Autumn 1972, p.48.

in the General Assembly in 1964 and several times thereafter. In October 1970 Premier Sato appealed to the United Nations to convene a conference to consider its claims over the islands. The Russians dismissed the move as unfriendly and revanchist. Premier Sato also expressed his regret that "talks" with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories were not succeeding. The Soviet resentment to this reference was indicated by postponement of fisheries talks for three months. Japan had intended to request USSR at these talks to allow Japanese fishermen to reach within four miles of the shores of these northern islands. The Soviet Union had recognised a ten-mile territorial waters limit for these islands. Moscow ultimately rejected the Japanese request. In the spring of 1971, while speaking before the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, criticized "a certain stratum of people in Japan" for exploiting the "territorial problem," which was not in the best interests of Japan-Soviet relations.<sup>20</sup>

During his visit to Japan in 1972, Gromyko said that as the question of the "Northern territories" was very complicated, it was necessary to consider it "carefully", a remark that seems a clear indication of a departure from the former position of maintaining that the "territorial question has already been settled" as Rinjiro Harako put it.<sup>21</sup> As things stand today, there has been a hardening of positions among the involved parties. During Foreign Minister Miyazawa's January 1975 visit although Gromyko did not take

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<sup>20</sup> Cited in Rinjiro Harako, "Japan-Soviet Relations and Japan's Choice," Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.4, no.1, October 1972, p.83.

<sup>21</sup> See Harako, n.19, pp.51-2.

the attitude that the issue was already settled, he insisted that Japan should settle the issue by taking a realistic attitude, perhaps thereby suggesting that Tokyo reconcile itself to the return of Habomai and Shikotan only.

According to Stephan, the "Kurile problem" involves far more than postwar bilateral diplomatic negotiations, suggests and includes far-reaching strategic and economic considerations, modes of Soviet-Japanese mutual perception, Japanese domestic politics, and the involvement of the United States and the People's Republic of China which is turning the Kuriles into a quadrilateral rather than a bilateral issue.<sup>22</sup> Moscow's insistence on retaining the Kuriles at the expense of alienating all sections of Japan's political opinion including the Japanese Communist Party (JCP),<sup>23</sup> is not based

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22 John J. Stephan, "The Kurile Islands: Japan versus Russia," Pacific Community, vol. 7, no. 3, April 1976, pp. 311-30.

23 In December 1971 the USSR publicly criticized JCP Chairman Kenji Miyamoto's statement in September 1971 for asserting that Moscow contemplated the return of not only Habomai and Shikotan on the conclusion of a peace treaty, but Kunashiri and Etorofu as well if Japan terminated its military ties with the United States, Japan Times, 12 December 1969. The "JCP formula" for the reversion of the Kurile Islands after a peace treaty is signed is that Japan should fulfill two preconditions before it enters into negotiations with the Soviet Union: annual Article 2, paragraph C of the San Francisco Treaty and abrogate the US-Japan Security Treaty and pursue a policy of neutrality. Akhata, 6 March, 3 June, and 20 December 1969. Pravda report of 21 July 1977 hit out at the Japanese Communist Party for continuing to demand the return of the Kurile islands, among other things. It wished to see closer cooperation with the CPSU and the JCP and thereby put an end to demands for the return of the Kurile Islands.



purely on reluctance to surrender any territory, however obtained. Apparently, the Russians have weighted the importance of the islands against that of improving their relations with Japan in the context of the emerging power balance in East Asia. A status quo Power, which has acquired 680,000 sq.kms. from the Baltic to Bessarabia to the Kuriles, Soviet leaders have no desire to open "a Pandora's box" by making even a minor concession on the extremity of Siberia.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet leaders fear that any concessions to Japan would encourage China's irrendentist grievances in its territorial dispute with the USSR and would also result in the Soviet position being undermined on European frontiers.<sup>25</sup> Thus, countries like Rumania (in respect of Bessarabia) and Finland would be emboldened to press their territorial claims against the Soviet Union. Boundary-stabilisation, interestingly enough, is also a significant feature of Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System.

There are also strong strategic and economic reasons for holding fast to the northern territories. They were extremely important for Japan's Far Eastern plans during the Second World War<sup>26</sup> and Stalin recognised their special security role in 1945.<sup>27</sup> Moscow

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24 Stephan, n.13, p.205.

25 See Peking Review, 15 February 1972.

26 During the Second World War they were used as the base for Japanese operations at Pearl Harbour and the Aleutians and were crucial in provisional plans for invading the Soviet Far East. They were one of the first targets on Japanese territory for US bombers and discussions were held in 1942 to consider invading Japan through landings in the Kuriles.

27 Stalin asserted that the Kuriles were to play a special role for Russia as gates to the Pacific and as a wall guarding the Soviet Far East.

values the Kurile chain not only as a protective line between the Sea of Okhotsk (they lie across the entrance of this Sea) and the Pacific, but also as providing maritime bases for expanding its naval presence in the Far East. The strait separating Etorofu and Kunashiri from Hokkaido allows the Soviet fleet safer access to the world's oceans, and massive fortifications now protect extensive airfields and radar installations. Of the possible routes for Soviet warships to take from Nakhodka and Vladivostok the Tsushima Straits (between Hokkaido and Honshu) can be closed during hostilities, but it would be extremely difficult for the US and Japan to prevent a Soviet task force passing through the Soya Strait (between Sakhalin and Hokkaido) and continuing to the Pacific via the Kuriles.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, the islands are rich in crabs, salmon, codfish, sharks, scallops, kelp and fishing and whaling in the waters off their coasts provides abundant yields. On 1 March 1977 the Soviet Union put into effect the exclusive 200-nautical miles fishing zone, thereby severely restricting Japan's fishing and unilaterally revoking the bilateral fishing agreement with Japan. Thus the Soviet Union is unlikely to make any concession to Japanese Kurile irredentism. Brezhnev himself recently declared that "in bilateral Soviet-Japanese relations, there are no so-called unsettled territorial questions."<sup>29</sup>

In Japan, there exists a popular consensus, encompassing all people and political parties<sup>30</sup> including the Japanese

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28 Soviet Analyst (London), vol.6, no.15, 28 July 1977, p.2.

29 Pravda, 7 June 1977, cited in Ibid.

30 For the attitude of the Democratic Socialist Party, the Komeito Party, the Japan Socialist Party, and the Japanese Communist Party, see Stephan, n.13, pp.212-4.

Communist Party, that the Kuriles are historically Japanese and should be returned. However, no intense emotional commitment as was stirred by Okinawa characterises the question of Northern Territories. While conceding the injustice of the status quo, some Japanese (particularly academics and businessmen) feels that their country should be realistic and drop claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu in order to reap economic and political benefits from improved relations with the Soviet Union. Others are reconciled to territorial losses as a fruit of overweening ambitions that led to disaster in the Pacific War. Then there are those (most noticeably in the younger generation) who have little knowledge of or interest in the problem.<sup>31</sup>

Japan desires the return of the northern territories partly because of their extensive fishery resources<sup>32</sup> (it is also a source of livelihood for thousands of small fishermen) the need to secure the safety of fishing vessels operating in the Northern seas, and partly because of the belief that their return signifies a manifestation of their sense of national identity. The Russians, according to Farrell, have used the northern territories issue as "a lever to exert political pressure on Japan,"<sup>33</sup> apparently because of its

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31 Stephan, n.13, p.209.

32 "The economic importance of the islands is due almost entirely to the fishing industry, whose output in 1938 was estimated to about \$9,000,000." See Memorandum of the Division of Territorial Studies prepared by Professor George H. Blakeslee of Clark University, 28 December 1944. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, the Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp.379-80.

33 Harako, n.19, E.C. Farrell, "The Northern Territories in Japanese-Soviet Relations," Asian Affairs, vol.3, no.5, May-June 1976, pp.305-13.

relationship with the question of fisheries. Harako fears that if Japan concludes a peace treaty with the Soviet Union the return of Habomai and Shikotan, then the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu may never be returned. It is for this reason, he adds, that Japan has continued to demand the return of all four islands and refuse to conclude a peace treaty that does not stipulate their return.

Chinese involvement in the northern territories problem is because, like Japan, it is not entirely satisfied with the status quo. The Chinese also support the Japanese demand for the return of the southern Kurile islands for a strategic/security reason. Peking would probably feel less threatened with naval encirclement by the USSR if the mobility of the Soviet fleet in the Far East was further constricted by Japanese control of the Kunashiri Strait, one of those through which the Soviet fleet at Vladivostok gains access to the open waters of the North Pacific.<sup>34</sup>

During the early 1950s Peking expressed unqualified support for Soviet claims on the Kuriles. But since 1964<sup>35</sup> China has supported Japan's viewpoint on the issue, its trade against the Russians intensified further in the aftermath of the 1969 Sino-Soviet

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34 See Francis J. Romance, "Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element," Orbis, Summer 1976.

35 Chairman Mao Tse-tung expressed his support in a widely publicized interview which he gave on 10 July 1964 to the leader of a visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation. See The Hindu, 14 July 1964. For abridged translation of article entitled, "Chairman Mao Tells the SPJ Delegation: the Kuriles Must Be Returned to Japan," Shekai Shuho, 11 August 1964, in Soviet Review (New Delhi), vol. 23, no. 59, pp. 1366. For Pravda editorial criticising the Chinese attitude, see Pravda, 2 September 1964, in ibid., pp. 1-12.

Ussuri clashes. By 1973, Peking was openly linking the Kuriles with Soviet expansionism.<sup>36</sup> Not merely does China seek to irritate and harass Moscow and cultivate Tokyo, but through its support of Japan's right in the Kuriles, it seeks to underline its own claims to Taiwan. The Soviets have accused the Chinese of being a "sower" of discord between neighbouring states and of pushing Japan on to an incorrect road.

Japan has misgivings about Chinese support on two counts: firstly, it feels that claims should be confined to Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomais. Secondly, it prefers to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a strictly bilateral basis. The Chinese move is probably "more embarrassing than helpful" to Tokyo.<sup>37</sup> Japan considers Peking's support for the recovery of the islands as "interference" in its internal affairs and "not helpful for amicable settlement of the dispute" with the Soviet Union. It recognises China's sympathy with Japan, but it does not approve of the "anti-hegemony" stance of the Chinese against the Soviet Union on this issue.<sup>38</sup> Thus, Chinese involvement is seen as alarming to the Soviet Union and thereby jeopardizing the delicate process that may ultimately yield a satisfactory territorial settlement. It stiffens the Soviet attitude and thus complicates the solution of the problem. Conscious of the

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36 See Peking Review, no.36, 8 September 1972, p.20; *ibid.*, no.19, 8 December 1972, pp.19-20; *ibid.*, no.5, 2 February 1973, p.27; *ibid.*, no.11, 16 March 1973, pp.16-7.

37 Ralph N.Clough, East Asia and U.S.Security(Washington,D.C.,1975) p.89.

38 See statement by Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in the Diet, 9 July 1976. Mainichy Daily News, 10 July 1976.

the strained relations between China and USSR, Tokyo it seems would not try to take unfair advantage of Russia's difficulties with the Chinese. The Times of India editorially stated that the dispute with Moscow enables Peking to insist on its own terms in respect of the proposed peace treaty.<sup>39</sup>

The Northern Territories problem is undeniably a complicated problem, with domestic considerations on both sides making its solution difficult.<sup>40</sup> The guidelines for a solution, however exist and the Soviet Union is committed to return Habomai and Shikotan. Therefore a modus vivendi is possible should the Japanese be reconciled to settle for these two islands, and not insist on the return of the other two. At any rate, both Japan and the Soviet Union have been living with this state of affairs ever since the Second World War. At any rate, neither country would gain anything by exacerbating issues. Japan cannot take them back by force. Moreover, high-level economic and political and cultural exchanges have been going on for the several decades despite the northern territories question. Furthermore, if Japan feels that it is more than compensated by substantial economic cooperation especially collaboration in the development of Siberia, the northern territories issue would tend to become one of secondary, not primary, importance, which, in turn, is likely to dilute strategic disharmony.

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<sup>39</sup> Times of India, 15 January 1976.

<sup>40</sup> A scholar opines that it is rather advantageous ~~to~~ ~~considering the~~ to leave the territorial issue unresolved but continue at the same time to demand its solution. By these tactics, Japan establishes an alibi for the amelioration of its relations with China. In other words maintaining this relaxed confrontation provides the Japanese policy with a greater scope of maneuverability towards the Kremlin. Glaubitz, n.3, p.136.

## Chapter Six

## TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

While the Russian push towards Japan in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had been motivated largely by economic considerations - as a source of convenient supply of needed commodities to the thinly inhabited and underdeveloped regions of the Russian Far East and of Russian America -- bilateral trade did not expand to the extent expected. At the beginning of this century (1902) Russia ranked eighth in exports to Japan and ninth in imports from Japan.<sup>1</sup> A steady rise in Japanese exports from 1904-05 to 1919 was due to the accelerated industrialization of Japan and to Japan's concerted effort to export, as well as to the various economic privileges obtained by Tokyo in the wake of its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. On the eve of World War I, trade with...amounted still to only one per cent of Japan's total foreign trade. It was the First World War, however, which made Russia Japan's number one customer. After the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, trade relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were based on the fundamental treaty of 1925 which opened up relations with the two countries. The peak in trade was reached in 1930 when Japan's exports reached the value of 13 million yen and imports \$19 million.<sup>2</sup> It declined thereafter. Except for Japan's export surplus from 1935-1938, which was attributable to the fact that the payment of the transfer of the Northern Manchurian Railway was settled by means of exports,<sup>3</sup> Japan had had an unfavourable balance of trade during the pre-war days.

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1 G.A.Lensen, "The Russian Impact on Japan," in Wayne S.Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on Asian Peoples (Stanford, Calif., 1972), pp.345-6.

2 Embassy of Japan in India, Information Bulletin (New Delhi), vol.4, no.3, 1 February 1957, p.6.

3 Ibid., vol.2, no.17, 1 September 1955, pp.4-6.

Japan's post-World War II relations with the Soviet Union can be divided into three phases from 1946 to 1949.

First ~~is~~ the period from 1946 to 1949, during which Japan's foreign trade was under the direct control of the General Headquarters for the Allied Occupation. Trade was carried out under an open account established between the Occupation Headquarters, and the Trade Representative of the Soviet mission in Tokyo. The open account formula was adopted in 1948, suspended in 1951, and again resumed in 1952. Total exports and imports, however, amounted to only about \$5 million because transactions were conducted on a strict individual barter basis. Major exports were wooden fishing boats, ship repairs and rolling stock, while principal imports were coal and ~~pot~~ pottasium.

Although Japan's foreign trade was relieved of occupation control and was restored to civilian management late in 1949, little trade was conducted with the Soviet Union. Among the reasons were firstly, Japan's refusal to recognize the Soviet Mission in Tokyo with the coming into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952 and the resultant negative attitude of the Soviet Union concerning trade with Japan. Secondly, Japan's export control in line with the United Nations embargo resolution against the Soviet-block countries following the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. Thirdly, Japan's establishment of claims regarding the quality of Sakhalin coal imported in fiscal 1950; and its decision not to permit the entry of Soviet technicians in connection with the repair of Soviet vessels. Forthly, there was general disinclination on the part of large Japanese firms in trading with Moscow, thus only several small firms engaged in this activity. Finally, the Soviet Policy of autarky and the linkage of trade with the question of a conclusion of a peace treaty hindered development of trade relations on a large,



scale.

The conclusion of a provisional 1954-55 trade agreement, effective June 1954 envisaging \$80 million trade between Soviet trade representatives and private Japanese trading firms was initially expected to increase trade between the two countries. However, because of Japanese dissatisfaction with the types, quality, and prices of Soviet exports contracts concluded till the end of July 1955 amounted to less than a quarter set in the provisional agreement.<sup>4</sup> The Joint Declaration of 19 October 1956 provided in Article 7 for the commencement of negotiations for a Commercial Treaty. A trade protocol signed at the time gave to the Soviet Union and Japan most-favoured-nation treatment in the import and export of goods and the entry of ships into each other's harbours, and made detailed provisions for the quantity of trade, exchange regulations, and payment procedures.<sup>5</sup> Thus, a beginning was made in trade and economic relations between the two neighbours.

Trade talks were conducted in Tokyo from 12 September to 6 December. And on 6 December 1957, a five-year Treaty of Commerce,<sup>6</sup> in effect on 9 May 1958, including an annex concerning the legal status of a trade mission granting most-favoured-nation treatment in respect to custom duties, levies, procedures, and regulations. The treaty of commerce was the first to be concluded between the two countries and stabilized their relations in the fields of trade, shipping, etc. An Agreement on Trade and Payments<sup>7</sup> providing for payment in pounds sterling, with barter trade to be allowed in exceptional circumstances, was also-signed the same day. Subsequently, on 3 June 1958 an

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4 Ibid.

5 For text see Contemporary Japan, vol.24, nos.7-9, 1956, p.544; also The Japanese Annual of International Law, 1957.

6 For text see Contemporary Japan, vol.25, no.2, April 1958, pp.292-7; Information Bulletin, vol.5, no.3, 1 February 1958; also The Japanese Annual of International Law, 1958, pp.173-83.

7 For text see Contemporary Japan, vol.25, no.2, April 1958, pp.297-9; also Information Bulletin, vol.5, no.1, 1 January 1958.

agreement establishing a sea route between the ports of Yokohama and Nakhodka and between Japan and the Black Sea was signed.

The effects of the two agreements were immediately apparent in 1958. Exports and imports jumped to about \$50 million or two-and-a-half times of those of the preceding year \$20 million and more than 10 times the 1956 figure \$4 million. Though the rate of expansion recorded in trade with the Soviet Union in 1958 was impressive, it accounted for less than one per cent of the total Japanese exports and imports (\$6,000 million) in that year. The relatively small volume of trade with the Soviet Union in the first year after the conclusion of the two trade accords was due mainly to the fact that both countries lacked knowledge about each other's commodities, market conditions, and export and import procedures. Japanese trading firms were unaccustomed to the Soviet trade mechanism under the control of the State. The Soviets on their part could not understand market fluctuations in Japan, and the multiform trade set up of that country.

The Japanese side felt that trade with the Russians could have attained a higher level than it did actually, if the latter had not insist on an exact exchange of commodities and on Japanese conformity to Soviet customs concerning inspection and shipment. It cannot be denied that the rigid policies of the Soviet state trading agencies have often prevented some Japanese firms from seizing business opportunities while others became overly cautious.

The second Soviet-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in May 1958. The Soviet Union also profited by the relaxation of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control) restrictions, which had come to be instituted in the wake of the Korean crisis. The relaxation of restrictions by the United States facilitated Soviet-Japanese

economic intercourse as it made possible for Japan to agree to provide goods and credits desired by the USSR. It particularly boosted the export of large freighters. Curiously when Moscow was entering into mutually advantageous trade deal with Tokyo in May 1958, Peking broke off all contacts with Japan (China had entered into four unofficial trade agreements with friendly Japanese firms prior to that date) as a retaliation to its flag having been pulled down in Nagasaki by a Japanese citizen.

During the talks for trade in 1959 held in Moscow during November-December 1958 Japan felt that it could not expect the Soviet Union to buy more than it buys from the latter in view of the Soviet emphasis on balancing exports and imports with individual foreign countries. Tokyo maintained that 1959 should be spent in consolidating and preparing for future trade rather than planning a major expansion in Japan-Soviet trade. Moreover, considering the depressed state of domestic business then and a multitude of obstacles encountered in the actual business transaction with the Soviet Union in the previous year, the two countries should decide on a trade level modest enough for them to achieve with ease rather than setting an ambitious goal. The three main problems encountered were that Soviet trade organizations insisted that they import a certain amount of a Japanese commodity in return for a corresponding Japanese import of Russian commodities; they also desired to balance the values of such linked exports and imports on an individual basis and that the Soviet Union apparently maintained that the two countries were obligated to export or import the commodities included in the list up to the volume and value specified in the list. Japan insisted that the spirit of the agreement and the list is that the two countries may buy or sell any of the listed commodities freely in pound sterling. It also demanded the Soviet side to take remedial steps to insure the standard quality of Soviet

export goods, to firm up delivery schedules and to abolish an inspection system unilaterally favourable to the Soviet side.

The Soviet Union replied that the Soviet trade agencies were forced to take the 'linking' trade policy in the latter part of 1958, after transactions in the earlier part of the year resulted in a large import surplus on the part of the Soviet Union. It was designed to restore equilibrium in trade with Japan. The Soviet side described it as a "special phenomenon in 1958" and promised that it would avoid a direct linking of an import deal with exports. The Soviet representative explained that it was the policy of their Government to keep exports and imports in balance each year not only with Japan but with all other foreign countries. They, however, assured the Japanese delegation that the Soviet Government would not carry out in future that policy so completely as to balance an individual import with an export transaction in value. Furthermore, the Soviets said they had treated and would treat the volume or total value figures as the obligatory targets for the two countries to achieve.<sup>8</sup>

The talks concluded with the signing of a trade protocol on 4 December 1958, whereby the two countries agreed on a one-way trade with each other totalling some \$35 million in the year 1959. This represented an increase of more than 40 per cent over the previous year.<sup>9</sup> New Japanese exports included oxidized titan production equipment and wide-diameter steel pipes. During the talks the Soviet Union strongly pressed for the export to Japan of Sakhalin coal in a mass quantity; this was limited to 350,000 tons, excluding those for home consumption. However, a few problems concerning Japanese exports of certain mechanical equipment sought by the Soviet Union persisted because of technical tie-up contracts with firms in third countries.

<sup>8</sup> Information Bulletin, vol.6, no.4, April 1959, pp.2-3.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.5.

Other problems were related to the technical inability to meet Soviet specifications. Soviet-Japanese trade got a further filip with the conclusion of a three-year trade and payments agreement on 2 March 1960.<sup>10</sup> Already, trade had arisen from \$21 million for exports and imports combined in 1957 to \$140 million in 1960.<sup>11</sup> The 1961 agreement provided for Soviet imports, including steel products, mining, light and food industry equipment, and industrial plant facilities for the chemical industry, worth \$85 million and Japanese imports, including timber, coking coal, oil, other raw materials and machinery and equipment worth \$75 million.

In 1960 a Japanese trade fair was held in Moscow and in the summer of 1961 a large Soviet fair was held in Tokyo, which was opened by First Deputy Prime Minister A. Mikoyan. Regular shipping and passenger services were opened in 1961 between Nakhodka in the USSR and Yokhama in Japan.<sup>12</sup>

In September 1962 during the visit of a high-level Japanese economic delegation to USSR, contracts for the delivery of tankers, motorships, ~~dredges~~ dredges, fishing boats, and floating cranes worth about \$100 million were ~~signed~~ signed. A whole flotilla of 45 ships and other floating facilities was to be built at Japanese yards for the Soviet Union. A long-term contract for the delivery of Sakhalin timber was also signed in Moscow. In an article in New Times in September 1962 V. Spandaryan praised the efforts of Japanese businessmen in undertaking bold exploration of new markets and ways of developing foreign trade despite the efforts of West European countries to make it more difficult for them. The article tried to impress upon Japan the necessity of ~~expanding~~ expanding trade with the Soviet Union, "two neighbouring states" into a broad bilateral exchange of goods on a long-term basis. It said that the clear-cut and business-like Soviet proposals would not make

10 News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol. 19, no. 26, 5 March 1960, p. 4.

11 Hindustan Times, 9 May 1961.

12 S. Leonidov, "An Important Milestone in Soviet-Japanese Relations." International Affairs (Moscow), December 1971, p. 8.

Japan "dependent" on the Soviet Union but lessen its dependence on the United States.<sup>13</sup>

Towards the end of December 1962 Japanese steel mills stopped export of steel pipes to the USSR,<sup>14</sup> as did other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) primarily due to American pressure. Khrushchov expressed his sympathies with these businessmen "who will have to think of how not to get into trouble on account of these pipes, which would delight their competitors."<sup>15</sup>

Greater expansion of bilateral economic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union was discernible after the Sino-Soviet split became wide open and Peking began to cultivate good relations with Japan starting with trade, which was reflected in the signing in November 1962 of a five-year barter trade agreement, known as Takasaki-Liao memorandum, fixing the trade turnover to an annual figure of US \$100 million, the opening of trade liaison offices in Peking and Tokyo and exchange of newspapermen in 1964. Moscow did not wish to lag behind. It gave evidence of its desire to improve relations with Japan by taking a number of concrete steps, including signing agreements with Japan on fishery and seaweed gathering the terms of which pleased Tokyo. As regards trade, the USSR agreed to balance its favourable account within a period of three years by increasing its imports by 7 to 8 per cent. Tokyo was particularly interested in the expansion of coastal trade between Japan sea ports and the Soviet ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok. Such trade involving exports of consumer goods was considered of great help in developing the economy of the Japanese sea coastal regions.

<sup>13</sup> New Times, no.37, 12 September 1962, pp.11-2.

<sup>14</sup> Hindustan Times, 28 December 1962.

<sup>15</sup> N.S.Khrushchov's election speech delivered at the meeting of the electorate in Moscow's Kalinin constituency, 27 February 1963. Soviet Review (New Delhi), vol.22, no.16, 9 March 1963, p.18.

On 28 ~~R~~ January 1963 the USSR and Japan signed a three-year Trade and Payments Agreement for 1963-1965. It provided for exchange of commodities valued at \$670 to \$700 million both ways during the period.<sup>16</sup> The trade agreement concluded between the two countries in February 1964 envisaged a trade exchange to the tune of \$270 million, i.e. an increase of 14 per cent on the 1963 figure.<sup>17</sup> Japan's first silk mission visited USSR in May 1964 to negotiate for the exports of raw silk to Russia.<sup>18</sup>

First Deputy Premier A.I. Mikoyan during his visit to Japan in May 1964 expressed the hope that the trade between the two countries could be increased to an annual level of \$1000 million from roughly \$300 million in 1963. He also proposed the establishment of a Japan-Soviet Economic Committee to study the problem of economic cooperation between the two countries. In defiance of American opposition Japanese firms went ahead with the sale of a \$10 million urea fertilizer plant, with payment deferred through eight years, the terms being 20 ~~yr~~ per cent down cash payment with interests at the five per cent.<sup>19</sup> In fact it was the first export credit contract to Russia in excess of five years to be underwritten by the Government.

Concrete approaches on economic cooperation were made during Foreign Minister E. Shiina's visit to the USSR in 1965, and Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan in July 1966. The signing of a consular convention in 1966, which facilitated the establishment

16 The signing of the agreement was somewhat delayed because of Soviet insistence on Japan's increasing its purchases of Soviet raw materials. Dawn, 9 January 1963.

17 Moscow News, 9 May 1964, p.5.

18 Patriot (New Delhi), 19 May 1964.

19 The Times (London) 4 September 1964.

of a Soviet consulate general in Sapporo and Osaka and Japanese consulates general in Nakhodka and Leningrad, whereby mutually beneficial commercial, economic, cultural, and tourist ties between the two countries were also promoted. The Consular Treaty, the aviation and long-term trade agreement had been the subject of lengthy discussions between the two countries.

On 21 January 1966 a civil aviation agreement was signed on the establishment of a direct Moscow-Tokyo air link. The new service route is the shortest between Europe and Japan. It takes ten hours less than the southern route and four hours less as compared to flights across the North Pole.<sup>20</sup> The opening of a direct trans-Siberian air route was expected to save \$9 million annually for Japan.<sup>21</sup> Japan, thus, became the first non-communist country permitted to make transit flights over the territory of the Soviet Union. On the same day a five-year trade agreement for 1966-1970 was concluded. It was anticipated that under it the total exports for the year 1966-1970 would amount to 1100 million dollars and the total imports to 1 billion dollars. As in the period from 1963 to 1966, however, actual trade exceeded expectations and reached almost 3 billion dollars.<sup>22</sup> Japan's exports specified in the agreement were ships, plants and equipment, steel, chemical products and textiles; imports continued to be confined to raw materials and ~~fuels~~ fuel. It is significant that Japan's exports turned from a leveling-off trend witnessed so far to a marked increase in 1969 and 1970. This was attributable largely to machinery exports for the forestry development

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<sup>20</sup> Daily Review, 22 January 1966.

<sup>21</sup> Times of India, 23 May 1964.

<sup>22</sup> Japan Times, 29 April 1971.



project in the Far East. Japan's trade with the USSR, therefore, registered big import surpluses for Japan, and thereby posed a serious problem in Soviet-Japanese trade.<sup>23</sup> On 6 October 1967 the shipping interests of the two countries signed a contract under which the Siberian railway system would serve as a "land bridge" for Cargo transport from Japan to Europe and the Middle East.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet Union also participated in Expo-70 held in Osaka.

The Soviet-Japanese agreement on trade and payments for 1971-1975 was initialled on 28 April and signed in September 1971. It listed the same commodities and envisaged a trade turnover of \$5 billion or 3500-4000 million roubles during the period with a projected annual increase of 12.7 per cent, reflecting Japan's increased participation in various Siberian development projects.<sup>25</sup> But even this annual increase rate was outdone in 1972 when bilateral trade was over \$1 billion, an increase of 26 per cent over the figure for 1971.<sup>26</sup> The volume of bilateral trade topped 1500 million roubles in 1974. And between 1965 and 1973 the amount of coastal trade increased more than fifty times over to reach the sum total of upwards of 20 million roubles.<sup>27</sup>

In May-July 1974 the Prime Ministers of the Soviet Union and Japan exchanged aide-memoires on concrete aspects of economic cooperation. Under a 9,500 million yen contract signed in November 1974, the Komatsu Ltd. agreed to supply some 170 bulldozers to the Soviet Union by the end of 1975.

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23 Japan, Institute of International Affairs, "White Papers, 1971-72" (Tokyo, 1973), p.72.

24 Japan Times Weekly, 4 November 1967.

25 Japan Times, 29 April 1971.

26 Soviet Review, vol.10, no.48, 4 October 1973, p.30.

27 Georgi Krasin, "Road of Good Neighbourship," New Times, no.8, February 1975, p.8.

In an interview with Izvestia correspondent in February 1975, the Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki described the development of exchange between Japan and the Soviet Union in the trade and economic sphere as "quite logical and natural" because the two countries are neighbours and supplement each other in the economic field.<sup>28</sup> On 14 July 1975 Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a loan agreement whereby the former agreed to ~~expend~~ a loan of \$240 million to help finance Russian purchase of plant equipment for production of ammonia at four places.

On 28 October 1975 the two countries initialled a trade agreement covering the next five years. The agreement consisted of nine articles and specified some 90 trade items as well as provisions ~~related~~ relating to payments. It aimed to double the trade volume during 1976-1980 from the 1971-1975 figure to \$8,800 million.<sup>29</sup> Notes concerning coastal trade aiming at an annual trade volume of about \$70 million were also exchanged during the negotiations.

Soviet-Japanese economic relations, continued to develop during 1976 and acquired a stronger foundation and basis. In January 1976 Japan sent a business delegation to discuss in detail the concrete terms for a projected sale of ten atomic energy generators, capable of one million kw output ~~and~~ worth about 400 million yen, to be purchased by two units a year, to the USSR. This would involve the supply of reactors, a set of peripheral equipment, including steam generators, but excluding containers for nuclear fuel.<sup>30</sup> If the deal materializes it would be the first such sale by Japan.

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28 Izvestia, 21 February 1975, as translated in Daily Review, 24 February 1975.

29 Embassy of Japan in India, Japan Review (New Delhi), November 1975, p.22.

30 The Japan Economic Review, 15 February 1976.

In February 1976 two leading Japanese firms, Toyo Engineering Corporation and Mitsui & Co. signed a contract with the Soviet Machinery Import Corporation to export four ammonia plants, each with a daily capacity of 1360 tons, and combined value of about 6.5 billion yens (approximately \$220 million). With this import, the Soviet Union's import of ammonia plants from Japan would reach the figure of twenty. The four plants will be completed in 1980. The Export-Import Bank of Japan agreed to extend a loan to cover 85 per cent of the contract value, which was subsequently approved by the Government.<sup>31</sup>

In July 1976 a loan contract between the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank for extension was signed for extension of a loan of 113,000 million yen to be used for financing purchases of fertiliser, synthetic rubber, and petrogas processing plants. However, another important development which might impair future economic relations is that keeping in line with the United States and West European countries which have been perturbed by growing debts incurred by the USSR and East European countries, the Japanese Finance Ministry also decided to limit increasing Soviet debts by curbing the issuance of any future credits. However, the hard line of the Finance Ministry does not appear to have had any effect on Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) which sent a high-level delegation led by its President Toshiwo Doko (Doko Mission) to Moscow in August 1976 to discuss possibilities of Japanese cooperation in the Soviet Union's Five-year Plan. In fact, Japan today is largest foreign collaborator in capital projects in the Soviet Union.

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., April 1976, p.20.

The year 1977 witnessed a Japanese loan of \$280 million to help finance Soviet imports of Japanese equipment. Nikolai Patolichev during his visit to Japan signed a new Japan-Soviet Trade and Payments Agreement on 30 May 1977 and exchanged notes on coastal trade between the Soviet Far East and Japan. His visit also led to the reactivation of economic co-operation between the two countries which had cooled down considerably following the MiG-25 incident primarily because of which the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Committee meeting scheduled for November 1976 was not held. Ultimately in mid-September 1977 the meeting of the Committee was held during which several agreements on further Japanese cooperation in Siberia and the Far East were signed. Commenting on the Soviet Japanese economic Cooperation talks in mid-September 1977, Soviet newsmedia asserted that the development of business ties would have been more successful had it not been for anti-Soviet elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party whipping up nationalism and hostility to the Soviet Union.

Japan signed a scientific and technical cooperation agreement with the USSR in July, for the production of textile fabrics. Japan also won a £80 million order from the Soviet Union to build what was claimed to be the largest floating dock for ship repairs in the world, to be delivered to the USSR in September 1977. The Japanese Tokyo Engineering Company and the Mitsui & Co. Trading Company signed a \$380 million contract for the construction in the Soviet Union of three ammonia plants and ten fertiliser plants in the next five years. And in October 1977 a Japanese oil construction which had an exploratory agreement with Russia made a major oil strike in the Sea of Ohtsk off Russia's east coast. Japan would receive upto 50 per cent of the oil produced at an 8.4 per cent discount below world prevailing

prices. On 19 November 1977, the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum and the Soviet Atomic Energy Committee signed a five-year private agreement calling for cooperation in nuclear engineering development, including nuclear reactors and fusion.<sup>32</sup> The accord might lead to an agreement at government level.

Soviet-Japanese economic relations during the past two decades have grown more than 70 times over. Already Japan shares with West Germany the second and third places in the list of major trade partners of the USSR among the developed nations. In turn, the USSR ranks among the first ten trade partners of Japan. In December 1977 the Soviet Union expressed readiness to conclude a 10-or 20-year economic cooperation agreement, with Japan to ensure "a solid foundation for the dynamic expansion of mutually disadvantageous business relations between the two countries."<sup>33</sup>

/ The above discussion shows that Japan has moved purposefully but cautiously, to increase its trade with the Soviet Union and to broaden generally its economic relations with that country. This is facilitated by an overlapping of the two countries' interests. Thus while Japan's aims to diversify its export markets and supply sources of raw materials, especially after the traumatic experience of the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is interested in further economic development and in further upgrading of its economic structure and imports of machinery and capital goods and the procurement of credit on favourable terms. Moreover, the Soviet,

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32 Japan Times Weekly, 26 November 1977.

33 British Broadcasting Corporation, Survey of World Broadcasts. The USSR, Part 1, SU/5687, 8 December 1977, A3/1.

Union is endowed with many of the raw materials which Japan needs. In fact, Japan is the Soviet Union's largest<sup>t</sup> trading partner among the developed nations. However, the same cannot be said to be true of Japan, which still continues to be significantly dependent in economic terms on the United States.

For the Soviet Union, economic collaboration with Japan enables it not only to have access to advanced technology but involve the latter more closely, formally and on a more durable basis economically with the Soviet Union. This serves to check the influence of the pro-Peking elements in decision-making processes which could be prejudicial to its interests. Apparently, Moscow realises that the judicious use of the economic carrot sugar-coated with promises and good intentions will impress upon the Japanese political leadership the need to maintain amicable relations with its powerful northern neighbour and to refrain from developing too close a relationship, whether political or economic, with the People's Republic of China. A long-term Soviet objective of the Soviet Union might even be the development of business interests who will tend to be more favourably oriented towards the Soviet Union and would be in a position to somewhat counterbalance the influence of pro-Peking groups.

The Soviet opening also helps the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to curb the pro-Chinese influence within Japan. At the same time, it improves its bargaining position vis-a-vis China and improves prospects of benefitting from the competitive bidding between the two Communist giants ~~xxx~~ arising out of their desire to cultivate Japan. In the past, Soviet efforts to increase trade with Japan helped to convince the Chinese to ease their pressure on Japan. Similarly, Moscow did not wish to lag behind in the wake of Peking's bid to strengthen economic and political relations

with Japan. As a result of this counting of Japan by both China and the USSR, Tokyo seems better off. Sheer pragmatism also dictates that Japan does not lag behind in having access to the Soviet market because Moscow can manage get the technology that interests it from its competitors -- the United States and West European nations.

However, can the Soviet Union offer Japan a genuine alternative in terms of trade outlets and supply sources? Moreover, can the further consolidation of trade and economic relations reduce strategic disharmony? These questions need to be examined.

Undeniably in view of increasing protectionist sentiments in the United States and West Europe coupled with the desire to reduce its economic dependence on the American market and avoid possible American pressures or arm-twisting in economic matters, Japan aims to diversify its foreign trade-structure. To that end, the Soviet Union offers some possibilities. This should not be minimised. Thus, during the recession in the initial phases of the recovery pursuant to the oil crisis, trade with the Soviet Union proved to be an economic help. But it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union will prove to be a genuine substitute. In 1975, for example, Russia absorbed 3.9 per cent of China 4 per cent of Japan's exports. At present, somewhat more than 5 per cent of Japan's raw materials supplies and somewhat more than 8 per cent of Japan's exports are accounted for by the socialist countries.<sup>34</sup> Since the Soviet Union cannot provide an effective and sufficient alternative to Japanese trade needs, it is unlikely therefore, in the near

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<sup>34</sup> Werner Handke, "Japan's International Economic Options," Aussen Politik, vol.28,no.2, 1977,p.148.

future, that there will be any substantial reduction in Tokyo's excessive dependence on trade with the United States.

A moot question is whether trade and economic relations foster harmony or contribute to strategic disharmony, whether they promise to ratify areas of agreement rather than of conflict. While trade does increase the volume of official, and ~~x~~ to a lesser extent that of unofficial, contacts. It can, however, be disputed whether it tends to counteract or reduce suspicions, tensions, and frictions. Thus, while increased trade and enhanced economic interaction does not necessarily prevent wars<sup>35</sup>, it cannot be said to cause war either. History is witness to the fact that intense economic interaction does not necessarily lessen or preclude political and military conflict. But since trade must be based on agreement it ratifies common interests, emphasising ~~agreement~~ areas of agreement rather than of disagreement. Moreover, economic relations, successfully developed invite subsequent functional and political cooperation. Trade, therefore, if it is perceived to be mutually advantageous economically is self-reinforcing. Against the argument that raw-material dependence on a state with which it has a relationship of strategic disharmony is inadvisable, one may mention that dependency in technology may provide a leverage as great as or greater than raw material dependency.

In so far as trade implies and demands cooperative behaviour, it tends to establish common purposes, however limited. Therefore, one cannot perhaps justifiably contend that expansion of economic

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35 This is evident from a high volume of trade between Germany and England right up to the outbreak of the First World War or the nature of US-Japanese trade in 1941.



relations necessarily expands areas of agreement, or eliminates previously existing areas of disagreements or disharmony.<sup>36</sup>

Expanded trade with the USSR, it may be argued, increases Soviet military capabilities vis-a-vis Japan and consequently detrimental to Tokyo's interests. It is more likely, however, that the marginal assistance is likely to be very small and is outweighed by the compensating advantages. The advantages of expanded trade do not include the necessary modification of domestic structures or policies in either country or of those bilateral and international issues that continue to divide the Soviet Union and Japan. Therefore, too much should not be expected from increased economic interaction; for, trade is not going to dramatically or suddenly transform strategic disharmony for the better, though it will tend to lessen and reduce it. So perceived, trade is an asset but no guarantee that strategic disharmony will be totally removed.

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36 See David D. Finley, "Detente and Soviet-American Trade: An Approach to a Political Balance Sheet," Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring/Summer 1975.

## Chapter Seven

## FISHERIES QUESTION

Soviet-Japanese squables and differences over the fisheries question have been a contributory factor in fostering strategic disharmony. The Japanese have historically clamoured for unrestricted fishery rights in Russian-controlled waters since the products of the nourish Japan. Consequently, access to the fishing grounds of Northeast Asia has been a vital Japanese objective. The placing of various restrictions on these resources is "a matter of life and death" to the Japanese.<sup>1</sup> Soviet policy objectives in allowing or forbidding the Japanese to exploit Russian waters have been both economic and political as a means of ~~conservation~~ conservation in view of accusations of reckless Japanese fishing; the gradual decrease in the amount of fish caught showed that Russian fears of depletion were not groundless. Politically, the fishery question has given Moscow some leverage in persuading the Japanese to realize the need for maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union. Interestingly enough, it was one factor which influenced Japan to seek a rapid normalization of relations with the Russians.

Prior to the Second World War, the Japanese had consistently sought long-term leases and reduced duties. The Soviet Union lacking the requisite capital and expertise proved no match for the highly competitive and highly organized Japanese fishing industry.<sup>2</sup> With

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1 Embassy of Japan in India, Information Bulletin (New Delhi), vol.5, no.10, 15 May 1958, p.1.

2 By 1909 the Japanese had in Russian waters 221 fishing vessels with a displacement of over 40,000 tons, as compared with 6 Russian vessels with a tonnage of 4,600. The Japanese employed 6,000 crewmen and fishermen, the Russians 300. The Japanese caught over 70 million pounds of fish worth almost 3 million roubles. For this they paid to the Russian treasury a little over 100,000 roubles in lease money. G.A.Lensen, "The Russian Impact on Japan," in Wayne S. Vuchnich, ed., Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on Asian Peoples (Stanford, Calif., 1972), p.

the entry of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, Japanese fishery came to a standstill. The return of South Sakhalin and the surrender to the Soviet Union of the entire Kuril archipelago by defeated Japan made the Japanese more dependent than ever on Soviet territorial waters. Without any agreement they resumed fishing forays into waters near the shores of Kamchatka and the Kurile islands. Big Japanese fishery companies made repeated private efforts in the early 1950s to secure Soviet permission, but they were of no avail.<sup>3</sup>

In January 1953 the Soviet Union adopted a soft line towards Japan in order to wean Japan from the West when it indicated willingness to reopen negotiations with Tokyo for granting fishing rights off Kamchatka to Japan.<sup>4</sup> But partly to protect her salmon fishery<sup>5</sup> and partly as a sign of annoyance at the lamaduck fashion in which Japan was seeking normalisation, the Soviet Union in March 1956 announced regulations limiting the amount of salmon that could be caught during the spawning period in the Bering Sea, in the Pacific Ocean adjoining the Kamchatka peninsula, and in the Sea of Okhotsk,<sup>6</sup> popularly known as the "Bulganin Line." The Northern fisheries talks were held in Moscow from 28 April to 14 May<sup>1956</sup>. After difficult negotiations, the two countries concluded a new ten-year fishery convention and a three-year rescue agreement<sup>7</sup> that went into effect

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3 These include discussions in January 1952 with the Soviet representative in Tokyo; Government refusal to permit them to attend the World Economic Conference in Moscow; and through their own association (the Greater Japan Fisheries Society), and at the meetings of the Association for Promotion of Trade with the Soviet Union and China.

4 New York Times, 17 February 1953.

5 On 10 February 1956 the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union expressed concern about the depletion the salmon and trout resources by reckless Japanese fishing. Pravda, 11 February 1956, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.8, no.6, pp.33-4.

6 Ibid., 21 March 1956 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.8, no.10, p.30.

7 For text see The Japanese Annual of International Law, 1957, pp.119-27.

upon the official termination of the state of war and the resumption of diplomatic relations in October of the same year. The signing of these agreements was made possible only by Japan's consenting to resume peace talks by 31 July 1956. Tokyo, thus, had to accept the unilateral Soviet action in controlling fishing on what the Japanese considered part of the high seas. The Japanese point out the question of the volume of salmon catch- the most important task of the Fisheries Commission - cannot be said to have been settled within the Commission on a scientific basis; it was rather settled politically outside it.<sup>8</sup>

In keeping with Article 3 of the High Seas Fisheries Convention a Northwest Pacific Fisheries Commission which met annually and consisted of three Japanese and three Soviet members was established. Four topics overshadowed the annual fishery talks: (1) the extension of areas where fishing for salmon and eventually crab was prohibited; (2) the maximum annual catch; (3) the duration of the fishing season; and (4) the length of the drift-nets, the distance between them, and the size of their meshes.<sup>9</sup> Negotiations on these issues proved extremely controversial, were usually prolonged, and heated exchanges often followed. The real problem, however, was not solved. These negotiations have been marked by compromises by both parties, but as has so often been the case, it was Japan who accepted a smaller quota in 1964 of negotiations as it had in each year before. But in 1965 Japan's salmon quota in the north-western Pacific was fixed at 115,000 tons or 5,000 tons more than previous year's quota.<sup>10</sup> The negotiators expressed considerable disappointment in the Soviet attitude which

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8 Information Bulletin, vol.5, no.3, 1 February 1958, p.5.

9 See Savitri Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945-1970 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1973), pp.121-6.

10 The Times (London), 1 April 1965.

tended to disregard the negotiation procedures agreed upon and the surveys to determine plentiful years, which almost invariably resulted in a quota reduction for Japan each year.<sup>11</sup> In the discussions the Japanese were at an unavoidable disadvantage since the regulations applied only to the Japanese because the fishing was done exclusively by their vessels (the Soviets confined themselves to the rivers within the USSR). Therefore, if the Japanese disputed Soviet depletion claims, the resultant delay would fatally delay the departure of the fishing fleets.<sup>12</sup> They, therefore, usually succumbed to Soviet pressures.

#### PETER THE GREAT BAY

The Soviet Union on 20 July 1957 closed Peter the Great Bay in order to more effectively maintain maximum security in the approaches to Vladivostok.<sup>13</sup> Japan reacted by stating that this action contravened the general principles of international law. Since the Soviet Union never mentioned in the past anything about Peter the Great Bay being a historical bay, Tokyo argued, the said bay did not possess the internationally approved long-term practice which is the requirement for the said bay to be recognized as a historical bay.<sup>14</sup> The value of the fisheries in the said area was considered very large to the Japanese people, who depend greatly on maritime resources, and especially to the fishermen on the coast of the Japan Sea.<sup>15</sup>

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11 Japan Times (Tokyo), 24 April 1964.

12 Vishwanathan, n. 2, p. 121.

13 For text see, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bulletin (Tokyo), vol. 4, no. 16, 15 August 1957, p. 4.

14 See Note verbales delivered by Japanese ambassador Kadowaki to USSR of 26 July and 6 August 1957, in *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

The Soviet Union has in the past linked the fisheries question with the settlement of various pending diplomatic issues between the two countries, especially the conclusion of a peace treaty.

And that the ~~time~~ time was "not yet ripe" for negotiations.<sup>16</sup> For instance, when in June 1957 the Japanese Government requested the USSR government to permit Japanese fishermen to fish in the coastal waters of the Kurile Islands, Moscow said the question could be "favourably examined" provided the Japanese government displayed readiness to enter into negotiations on the peace treaty. Since it had not done so it was "premature" to discuss the request.<sup>17</sup> Japan, on the other hand, has sought to keep economics and politics apart by insisting that it was improper to tie in the problem of the livelihood of small fishermen with the political question of the conclusion of a peace treaty.<sup>18</sup>

An important source of friction between the Soviet Union and Japan had been the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels by the Soviet patrol vessels for alleged trespass in Soviet waters. According to the New York Times, from 1946 to 1970 Soviet patrol boats seized 1,336 Japanese fishing boats with crews totalling 11,316; twenty-two boats were sunk and thirty-two fishermen lost their lives<sup>19</sup> in the North Pacific. Former Prime Minister Tanaka stated that Soviet authorities had detained so far 12,000 Japanese fishermen and 1,400 boats.<sup>20</sup>

In 1963 Japan and the Soviet Union signed an agreement permitting,

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16 See, for example, letter of 5 February 1958 of A.A. Ishkov, Chief of the Fishery Department, Gosplan to Ambassador Kodawaki in Moscow, Japan, Embassy in India, Information Bulletin(New Delhi), vol.5, no.5, 1 March 1958, p.2.

17 Pravda, statement, 23 March 1958, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 30 April 1978.

18 Information Bulletin, n.16, p.2.

19 New York Times, 12 January 1971.

20 Ibid., 23 October 1973.

Japanese fishermen to gather tangle off Kaigarashima island off Hokkaido.<sup>21</sup> On 24 April 1964 a fishery agreement was signed between the two countries which established Japan's fishing catch and the waters in which the fishing was to be carried on outside Japanese waters. On 2 April 1965 an agreement fixing Japan's 1965 quota of salmon fishing in the north-western Pacific at 115,000 tons or 5,000 tons more than last year's quota. The two countries agreed earlier this month on crab catch quotas for this year in an area west of the Kamchatka peninsula. Japan's crab quota was set at 240,000 cases, 72,000 cases fewer than last year; Russia's was fixed at 420,000 cases, compared with last year's 378~~8~~,000.<sup>22</sup>

In July 1966 an agreement of fishery cooperation was initiated for a period of three years. This provided for cooperation between the two countries in increasing their fish catch in inland waters and in research on fishing resources as well for technical cooperation. A joint communique issued at this time announced that the Fishery Agreement of 1956 would be renewed.

Not only did the Russians consider as unfriendly and revanchist, Premier Sato's call in the United Nations in October 1970 for convening a Conference to discuss their claim to the northern territories issue they also postponed fisheries talks for three months. Tokyo had intended to request the USSR at these talks to allow Japanese fishermen to reach within four miles on the shores of these northern islands. Moscow eventually rejected the Japanese request as it had recognized a ten-mile territorial waters limit for them.

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21 Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1964.

22 The Times (London), 1 April 1964.

In 1971 the USSR decided to temporarily prohibit hering fishing in the spawning period throughout the Sea of Okhotsk and off the east coast of Kamchatka on the ground that the Japanese were for years fishing for herring during the spawning period the Japanese quota of Salmon catch was reduced from 120,000 tons in 1963 to 87,000 in 1972.<sup>23</sup> Salmon fishing was forbidden in the Sea of Okhotsk and some parts of the Sea of Japan and temporary out-of-bounds zones have been established in various parts of the waters covered by the Convention. This was done to protect the Salmon's migration to the spawning grounds in Soviet Far Eastern rivers and coastal waters. Apparently in view of the recent realignments that were taking place in the world arena and the shared perceptions that had been fostered in the wake of Nixon's China visit between Tokyo and Moscow led the Russians to adopt a conciliatory tone in explaining the need for these measures. Thus a commentary in International Affairs in July 1972 stated that in attempting to preserve the fishing resources in the North Pacific it was "guided not only by its own interests but by the interests of Japanese fishermen and all mankind" and "certain quarters" in Japan sought to incorrectly persuade Japanese public opinion that the Soviet Union wants to push Japan out of the main fishing areas in the region. It also said that during the course of the talks in Moscow in February 1972 the USSR displayed its readiness for cooperation and businesslike solution of all problems relating to the "rational utilisation" of fishery resources of the region.<sup>24</sup> When Minister of Fisheries Alexander Ishkov visited Tokyo later that year he had not only ~~signed~~ initialled an agreement on "tsubu" shell fishing by the Japanese off the eastern coast of the Sakhalin Island and in the

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23 International Affairs (Moscow), no.7, July 1972, p.99.

24 Ibid.



northern part of the Sea of Okhotsk but letters were also exchanged on joint supervision of salmon fishing in the convention area and an agreement was signed on Japanese sea-kale fishing off Signalny Island.<sup>25</sup> This was reflective of a Soviet desire to woo Japan.

During his visit to the Soviet Union in October 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka stressed "the need for long-term stabilization of fishery in the northern Pacific, including the question of setting annual salmon and trout catch quotas spared over two or more years,"<sup>26</sup> rather than holding bitter negotiations over salmon and trout catch quotas, etc; each year. As a result, both countries agreed to hold consultations on this problem between the Cabinet ministers concerned of both countries, as mentioned in the Japan-Soviet joint statement. However, no final agreement could be reached on the question of safe fishing operations.

On 7 June 1975 Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a fisheries agreement which was largely aimed at settling troubles arising from the operations of Soviet fishing vessels in waters close to the coast of Japan. The two countries also agreed to set up scientific testing facilities in Southern Sakhalin for joint salmon breeding and also to hold a ministerial conference on fishery problems every year.<sup>27</sup> The agreement, which went into effect on 23 October 1975, also sought to prevent damage or provide compensation in case of damage done to Japanese travellers and gear by larger Soviet ships. In January 1976, however, the Japanese Maritime Safety Headquarters responsible for the area said that there had been 80 reports of further incidents. Three

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25 New Times, no.30, July 1972, p.15.

26 Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers of Japan, 1974-75 (Tokyo, 1976), p.83.

27 Japan Review (New Delhi), June 1975, p.20; Moscow Radio, 24 December 1975.

Japanese fishermen were killed when a Soviet patrol boat collided with their vessel in November. In the last 30 years the Soviet Union estimated to have seized 1,500 Japanese fishing boats with 12,500 men for violating the 12-mile limit, mostly around the disputed islands. At the time of Gromyko's visit the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that 42 boats and 32 men were still in Soviet hands. The Soviet-Japan fishery talks finally concluded in April 1976 in Moscow with a slash in Japanese quota for 1976 to 22,000 tons of herring and 80,000 tons of salmon.

This was followed by the Soviet decision to declare a 200 nautical mile fishery zone, which alarmed the Japanese. In January 1977 Japan formally announced extension of its territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles and the regular Japan-Soviet Ministerial talks scheduled to be held in Moscow in January 1977 were postponed at the request of Tokyo. Japan also protested against the Soviet declaration of the 200 mile economic zone in February 1977 which went into effect on 1 March on the ground that it covered the sea around the four Northern Islands in dispute between the two countries.

In these circumstances, it was not easy to reach an interim fisheries pact between Japan and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union demanded that Japan agree to its establishment of a 200-mile zone around the four Soviet occupied islands off eastern Hokkaido, thereby clubbing the fisheries issue with the territorial issue. The Soviet Union also demanded that Japan permit Soviet fishing boats to operate in Japanese waters between Japan's 3 to 12 mile zone and insisted about its right to try disputes within its 200-mile fishing zone. With a view to breaking the stalemate in the fisheries negotiations, the Japanese Government took the initiative by sending Chief Cabinet Secretary Sonoda as Prime Minister's special

envoy to Moscow. The Japanese political parties also united themselves in the face of a tough Soviet posture and a supra-partisan 15-member Dietmen's group led by Sakurauchi was despatched to Moscow on 16 April 1977. The Japanese attempts seemed to have no effect on the Soviet Union which on 30 April 1977 abrogated the 20-year old fishery treaty with Japan, thus rendering the question of negotiating a fresh agreement still more urgent. Since Japan depended on the Soviet North Pacific for roughly one-sixth of its total annual catch or about 1.7 million tons, Japan was suffering a huge financial loss by the delay in reaching interim fisheries pact with the Soviet Union. Unofficial estimates set the toll from suspended operations up to end of April 1977 at about 300 billion yen or US \$1084 million. In order to strengthen Japan's ~~own~~ bargaining position, the Japanese Diet unanimously passed on 2 May 1977 bills to extend Japan's territorial sea-limit from the present ~~2~~ 3 to 12 miles and also set up a 200-mile Japanese fisheries zone.

The talks continued for nearly three months while hundreds of Japanese fishing boats waited vainly to go to work in their traditional fishing grounds and the price of fish rose steeply in Japan, partly as a result of hoarding the speculation. The Japanese finally gave in under mounting pressures from impatient consumers and fisherwomen at home.<sup>28</sup>

Eventually, Japan and the Soviet Union initialled in Moscow on 24 May 1977 a bilateral interim fisheries agreement regulating Japan's fishing operations within the newly-established Soviet 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. The nine-article interim agreement valid until the end of December 1977, was a product of compromise on both sides. Article ~~1~~ 1 of the interim pact stated that the arrangement was aimed at deciding procedures and conditions for fishing by the

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<sup>28</sup> Times of India, 7 June 1977.

Japanese people and fishing boats in waters adjoining the Soviet coast in the Northwest Pacific set forth in article 6 of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet protection of 10 December 1976 concerning protection of living resources in waters adjoining the Soviet coast and controls on fishing. It recognised the right of each country to declare a 200-mile zone which meant Japan's agreement to the inclusion of the four disputed northern islands within the Soviet demarcation line of the 200-mile fishing zone, in accordance with the Soviet legislation. Article 2 of the agreement offered a reciprocal assurance for the people and fishing boats of the two countries to operate within each other's 200-mile sea zone. Article 8, which was originally inserted on Japanese insistence stipulated that none of the provisions of the agreement should be regarded as prejudicing the position or views of the two Governments concerning problems of the Law of the Sea which were being studied at the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea or "other" (word subsequently deleted) problems mutual relations. By implication this sought to separate fisheries matters from the territorial issue as desired by Japan. But even in agreeing to have this article included in the agreement, Moscow succeeded in having the word "other" deleted from the article. While the handling of the MiG-25 incident might have given Tokyo some confidence in dealing with its Soviet neighbour, the fisheries negotiations brought home Japanese weakness (under mounting pressures from impatient consumers and fishermen at home) and Soviet capacity at arms-twisting. Yet by accepting limits on the catches and subjecting fisheries operations to Soviet inspection, the Japanese tried to get the best out of a bad bargain.

Following the signing of the fisheries agreement, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a protocol on Japanese salmon fishing operations in waters outside the Soviet 200-mile fishing zone. The signing of the protocol, under which Japan's salmon catch quota in Northwestern Pacific waters outside the Soviet zone was set at 62,000 tons during 1977, brought to an end the 21-year-old history of the Japan-Soviet Fishery Commission formed under a bilateral fishery treaty to decide catch quotas and restrictive measures for salmon fishing operations. The protocol was signed between Iwao Arakatsu and Ivan Nikonorov, ~~Chinese~~ ~~Top~~ Chief Japanese and Soviet negotiators to the salmon fishing talks. Besides setting Japan's catch quota at 62,000 tons, the protocol limited the waters to be covered to those outside the Soviet zone.

An interim agreement on Soviet fishing within 200-mile Japanese sea zone was reached on 4 August 1977. The Soviet-Japanese talks on salmon fishing were held in Moscow in February 1978 to replace the existing arrangements which were due to expire in April 1978. With the impending fishing season round the corner, the Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Nakagawa hurried to Moscow in April 1978 to break the deadlock in the ongoing negotiations. After considerable bargaining, a five-year fishery cooperation agreement was signed under which the Soviet Union was allowed the right to inspect Japanese fishing boats and Japan agreed to contribute to schemes designed to further develop

salmon breeding grounds in the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> The agreement contained a clause for its automatic extension after five years unless either side gave notice of its abrogation. A protocol was also signed by which the salmon catch quota of Japan for 1978 was reduced to 42,500 tons, as compared to Japanese catch of 65,000 tons during 1977.

The fisheries dispute has continued to bedevil Russo-Japanese relations even after normalization of relations in 1956. Undeniably, Russian policy regarding the fishery question has been of vital importance to Japan. Soviet control of fishing areas important to Japan, therefore, remains a potential source of either friction or rapprochement. It may either reduce or aggravate strategic disharmony.

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29 In March 1978 the Japanese proposed to construct 12 salmon hatcheries in the Kamchatka peninsula with their financial and technical assistance Sakhalin and some of the Kurile Islands which would annually incubate a total of 60 million salmon eggs at a total cost of 10,000 million yen. They would be able to produce 1 million salmon fries annually for release in the sea. Of them, 60,000 grown salmon should come to the hatcheries each year. Kyodo News Agency, 16 March 1978. See British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/5776, 17 March 1973, A3/1.

## Chapter Eight

## COOPERATION IN SIBERIA

Siberia is a region of immense proven and enormous potential natural, especially energy, resources. Rapid development and qualitative improvement of fuel and energy resources are important objectives of current and long-term developmental planning of the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union has attributed top priority to the region, particularly because the raw materials and energy supplies of other areas are ~~now~~ nearing exhaustion. Thus, by 1980, the European part of the USSR is expected to satisfy no more than three-fifths of its energy requirements from its own resources, and by 1990, only two fifths.<sup>1</sup> Likewise, it is the resources of Soviet Asia which increasingly must help meet the critical hydrocarbon fuel needs of the Soviet Union's East European allies and partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Soviet Motives

The Soviet Union has several policy objectives in the development of Siberia and in seeking foreign financial and technological participation therefor. It would prove a most valuable reinforcement of the Soviet energy position and meet the energy needs of a growing economy and increasing energy consumption. Secondly, the export of Siberian and Far Eastern resources will enable it to earn significant amounts of foreign exchange ~~to~~ facilitate imports of advanced machinery and consumer goods. The Soviet desire to do

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1 G.A.Yermakov, et al, "Trends in the Development of Nuclear Power Industry," Ninth World Energy Conference, Transactions, Detroit, 1974, vol.5, p.279, cited in Lestie Dienes, "The Soviet Union: An Energy Crunch Ahead?" Problems of Communism, September-October 1977 as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol.8, no.2, February 1978, p.59.

so will increase with the increase in world market prices although it is doubtful whether Moscow will ever renege on its commitment to deliver oil to Eastern Europe. Thirdly, the development of giant complexes in Siberia is motivated by the desire to achieve a wider dispersal of industrial centres extending from European Russia to Siberia so as to make the Fatherland less vulnerable in the event of a nuclear attack.<sup>2</sup> Western technical participation is also sought to overcome technological lag in different sectors, such as drilling - probably the most backward sector of the Soviet oil economy<sup>3</sup> - , extracting, liquifying<sup>3</sup>, and in manufacturing and transporting in pipelines of large diameters,<sup>4</sup> and thereby accelerate the development of the region. Western participation might help to relieve the pressure on limited Soviet domestic investment resources, and it might also help Soviet engineers to overcome the technological problems of exploration, extraction and transmission of oil and gas in the difficult climate and terrain conditions of Siberia.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, since schemes already negotiated and those

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2 Soviet Defence Minister Grechko wrote in 1971: "The movement of production forces to the East, bringing them closer to the sources of raw materials and fuel and their dispersed location by economic districts significantly raise the defense capability of the Soviet Homeland and make our industry less vulnerable in the event that the imperialists initiate a missile nuclear war." United States Congress. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economic Outlook, 93rd Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C., 1973), p.131.

3 Robert W. Campbell, The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas (Baltimore, Md., 1968), p.22.

4 See Guy F. Bernheim and Reinhard Furthmayr, "Soviet Siberia and its National Resources," Aussen Politik, vol.28, no.3, 1977, pp.322-4.

5 John P. Hardt, "West Siberia: The Quest for Energy," Problems of Communism, vol.22, May-June 1973, p.32.



under negotiation are based on a product-sharing formula, this will tend to automatically increase trade and build a stable market for surplus resources, besides securing the required capital from abroad. Moreover, it is more economical to import from Japan rather than transfer of products from European Russia because of the considerable distance involved.

### Japanese Motivations

Japan is perhaps the country most interested in the development of Siberia for several significant reasons. In a time of raw material shortages, rapidly escalating prices, and the traumatic experience of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, Japan, extremely dependent as it on imports of raw materials, seeks diversification in terms of region and country. It seeks to ensure access to reliable and economical supplies of industrial raw materials and energy resources - channels which are unlikely to be disrupted by international disputes. Moreover, it is drawn to participation by a desire to expand its export trade which is of critical importance to it if it seeks to sustain a high rate of growth while maintaining a favourable balance of payments.<sup>6</sup> Siberian development projects are regarded as a good way to increase exports of machineries and consumer goods. Moreover, geographical proximity is an important ~~fa~~ factor affecting costs. It is therefore natural ~~x~~ that keen interest is centred on the prospect of cooperation in the development of the resources of Siberia and Far East as a promising means of assuring long-term and stable sources

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<sup>6</sup> Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," Problems of Communism, vol.21, May-June 1972, p.4.

of many critical supplies at favourable prices. For instance, Japan pays about 18 US dollars per ton for transporting coal from the United States compared with about 3 US dollars per ton for transporting coal from the Soviet Far East. Japan is presently importing coal from West Virginia. The Yakutsk project would constitute an enormous saving in transportation. It costs 1,000 yen to transport a ton of crude oil from the Middle East. The cost from Nakhodka to Japan would be only about one fifth of this cost.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, influential industrial and business groups favour Japanese collaboration in Siberia but the extent to which they may be prepared to go and on what terms shall be discussed subsequently.

To facilitate study and discussion of possible joint undertakings concerning various projects in the Russian hinterland, an institutional framework - the Joint Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee was established in 1965. It is a non-official<sup>8</sup> consultative body, composed of leading Japanese businessmen and their Soviet counterparts. Its meetings have been regularly held alternatively in Tokyo and Moscow (14-25 March 1966, 12-17 June 1967, December 1968, February 1970, 21-24 February 1972, October-November 1974 and September 1977) to discuss various projects for long-term economic cooperation, particularly those concerning the exploitation of natural resources in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. As a result of its work, the first general agreement was signed on 24 July 1968, under which a group of Japanese companies agreed to supply \$133 million in machinery, technical assistance, etc., and \$30 million in consumer goods over a three-year period starting in 1969 for the development of forest resources in the Soviet Far East. The USSR repayed by delivering more than eight million cubic meters of timber to Japan for the five-year period,

7 Young C. Kim, Japanese-Soviet Relations: Interaction of Politics, Economics and National Security, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 68.

8 The Japanese Government is not directly involved but it provides

from 1968 to 1973. The terms of the Japanese credit for the equipment were 20 per cent deposit with repayment of the balance over a five-year period at 5.8 per cent interest. Deferred payments were arranged on Japanese exports of \$30 million in consumer goods.<sup>9</sup>

Under the July 1974 contract for the second Far Eastern forest resources development project, Japan agreed to provide equipment, machinery, materials and ships on yen credits totalling \$550 million at 6.375 per cent interest between 1975 and 1978 while the USSR agreed to supply 17.5 million cubic meters of lumber in the five-year period 1975-79. However, Nihon Keizai Shimbun pointed out that the pace of Russian purchasing has greatly fallen during the past one or two years partly because the USSR has revised its economic plan, such as giving priority to boosting food output and developing energy resources. Thus, it was estimated that the Soviet Union still had one fourth (about 40 billion yen) still to spend. At the seventh meeting in September 1977 the Economic Committee agreed to study the feasibility of developing forestry resources in the Soviet Far East and areas along the Baikal-Amur railway line in southern Siberia.

On 18 December 1970, Japan agreed to supply \$80 million worth of equipment, machinery and materials on credit repayable in cash over seven years at six per cent interest for the construction of Vostochny port in Wrangel Bay near the city of Nakhodka. Unlike the other general agreements this one does not provide for direct compensation through deliveries of any particular products from the Soviet Union, but in a way this credit is compensated through services transit transportation of Japanese container freight over Soviet territory, faster handling of Soviet-Japanese bulk commercial freightage, etc.

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advice and consultation.

<sup>9</sup> Saeki. n.6.p.6.

A third agreement was signed in December 1971 wherein the Nihon Chip Boeki Company advanced \$45 million credit for the purchase of equipment, machines, and materials of technological chips and pulpwood for a six-year term to be repaid in 1972-1981 in deliveries of 8 million cubic metres of chip and 4.7 million cubic metres of pulpwood of leaf-bearing trees.<sup>10</sup>

Several projects have been under intense negotiations since 1966 but agreement on a few of them has not so far been reached due to economic and political reasons.

On 22 April 1974 Japan concluded the largest long-term bank credit arrangement in the history of the Soviet Union. The protocol provides for an Export-Import Bank credit of \$1050 million in tied loans at 6.375 per cent interest for eight years. This credit is earmarked for the development of South Yakutia coking coal, commercial prospecting of Yakutia natural gas, and the exploitation of Siberian timber resources. This included \$450 million for Soviet purchase of machinery, ships, construction material, and consumer goods related to this project from and will repay the loan by supplying Japan, in the course of 20 years (1979-1998) with 104.4 million tons of coking coal from southern Yakutia.<sup>11</sup>

A Soviet commentator justified this unprecedented decision to borrow such a large sum abroad to domestic audiences by stating that "the export of Yakutia's coal alone will allow our country to

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10 V. Spandaryan, "The Development of Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations," Foreign Trade (Moscow), 4 November 1975, p.26.

11 N. Nikolayev, "Expansion of Soviet-Japanese Relations," International Affairs (Moscow) August 1973.

net a sum approximately four times more than the Japanese credit. This means that we will be able not only to pay it off but also to buy (Japanese) goods necessary for the Soviet economy."<sup>12</sup> Japanese reports of the negotiations stressed that the USSR agreed to provide six million tons of coal annually at the current price for 20 years beginning in 1979. The total cost is estimated to be \$4 billion.<sup>13</sup> At the seventh meeting of the Japan-Soviet Joint Committee, Japan agreed to provide a further loan of \$90 million for the project. This new loan brings to \$540 million Japan's total bank credits for the project which includes construction of a railway required to transport coal between Bum and Berkakit.<sup>14</sup> The Soviet Union had asked for additional credits of \$150 million to help finance the project.

The first joint US-Japan economic development venture in the Soviet Union was also initiated on 22 April 1974 when the three countries signed a memorandum on natural gas exploration with the USSR requesting \$200 million loans from Japan and USA to finance Soviet machinery imports. On 14 July 1975, Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a loan agreement, inter alia, for another Export-Import Bank loan of \$100 million for the joint development of natural gas at Yakutsk in eastern Siberia. The loan for the gas project is repayable in eight years after a three-year grace period with annual interest at 6,375 ~~■~~ per cent. In the project, Japan is to eventually provide \$1,700 million in bank loans to be matched equally by American banks. After the project is completed both the US and Japan are to be supplied 10,000 million cubic meters each of liquified natural gas ~~for~~ a year ~~■~~ for a total of 25 years.<sup>15</sup> In March 1976, ~~■~~ Japan and the

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12 Moscow Domestic Service, 24 April 1974.

13 Kyodo, ~~★~~ 22 April 1974.

14 Asian Recorder, 15-21 October 1977, pp.13987-8.

15 Japan Review (New Delhi) August 1975, p.19.

Soviet Union signed an agreement which provided for credits to the extent of \$25 million for five years for natural gas prospecting in the Yakutia region.

In April 1976 the Russians signed an agreement under which Bank of America, Japan's Export-Import bank and 23 Japanese commercial banks will put up 50 million dollars, split evenly between the Americans and the Japanese for exploration and development of gas in the Yakutia area. The sum was reduced from the original 200 million dollars asked by the Soviets partly because they already have done a lot of the exploration work and partly because they balked at paying commercial interest rates in the absence of low-cost US Export-import bank financing cut off in 1974, by Congress.<sup>16</sup> Under this agreement, the gas exported from Siberia would go to Japan through a pipeline from the Yakutsk region. Japan then would take half the gas, with the remainder going to the United States as liquified natural gas (LNG).

At the seventh meeting of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee in September 1977,<sup>17</sup> the two countries agreed to resume talks with the United States in November 1977 regarding the natural gas project in Yakutsk. The success of the project hinges on American cooperation because Japan has made it clear that it would not be a party to it without active American participation.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Business Week, 19 April 1976, p.50.

<sup>17</sup> It was originally scheduled to be held six months earlier, but it was called off by the Russians apparently in a show of anger at the way Japan handled the MiG-25 defection affair in 1976.

<sup>18</sup> Asian Recorder, 15-21 October 1977, pp.13987-8.

On 28 January 1975 a protocol was signed, pursuance of the one signed on 10 December 1974, involving Japanese financial assistance to the Soviet Union for the development of oil and natural gas in the continental shelf off Sakhalin. Eventually three formal agreements were signed in October 1975 (initialled earlier in Tokyo in July 1975) by the Sakhalin Petroleum Development Corporation of Japan and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank providing for a US \$100 million credit at 6 per cent interest by the former for five years in finance plus additional ~~amounts for by the former in finance plus additional~~ amounts for equipment and field outlays. In return, it will get access to a 50 per cent share of the output from any oil and gas desposits discovered and developed over a ten-year period.<sup>19</sup> The agreements provide for the extension of credit and purchase of "permanent facilities." By another protocol signed on 25 December 1976, the two countries agreed on a full fledged joint exploration of oil in the continental shelf off the Sakhalin Island beginning March 1977.

#### Tyumen Oil Project

In 1966 at the inaugural meeting of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee, the Soviet delegation proposed that Japan participate in a project to develop the petroleum resources in the Tyumen region of western Siberia. However, it was only in April 1971 that they took the suggestion seriously and requested the Russians to present a concrete proposal at the fifth session of the joint committee scheduled for February 1972. At the fifth meeting of the Committee,

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<sup>19</sup> Kyodo News Agency, 24 July 1975.

the Soviet Union proposed that Japan provide a bank loan of over one billion dollars to enable the Soviet Union to purchase large pipes and other equipment and materials necessary for constructing 4,400 kilometers<sup>20</sup> of pipeline from Irkutsk to Nakhodka, for constructing large storage facilities and a shipping terminal, and for increasing the capacity of the existing pipeline between Tyumen and Irkutsk. In return, the Soviet Union offered to supply crude oil to Japan at the rate of 25 to 40 million tons annually over a twenty-year period. Since the February 1972 meeting, however, the Soviet Union has changed the terms of its offer several times.<sup>21</sup> Thus in September 1973 Moscow announced that instead of its initial offer to supply upto 40 million tons of crude oil, it would only supply a maximum of 25 million tons. Thereafter in March 1974 the Soviet Union indicated it now wanted to transport the oil part of the way over a second trans-Siberian railroad, which the Japanese must help construct, instead of entirely through a pipeline from Tyumen to Nakhodka as proposed earlier. This would have involved an investment of US \$3.3 billion instead of the US \$1 billion if it had been transported through a pipeline. In view of the increased investment and the reduced quantity of oil offered, Japan no longer considered the project attractive enough. Its experts also had doubts about the technical feasibility of transporting oil by rail. More importantly, the construction of the pipeline

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20 This was because by 1972 the USSR had already completed a 3,400 kilometer portion from Tyumen to Irkutsk of the 7,800 km pipeline from Tyumen to Nakhodka.

21 For details see Gerald L. Curtis, "The Tyumen Oil Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, Calif., 1977), pp. 156-8.



Had "important military implications, since Soviet forces in isolated Siberian border areas adjacent to China could tap the ~~pipe~~ pipeline for otherwise scarce petroleum and the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok would have a reliable flow of oil ~~in~~ on a large scale for the first time, greatly aiding Soviet operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans." The Japanese businessmen had agreed to seriously consider the project because the increase of 8.5 per cent in price effected on western oil companies by Persian Gulf countries had affected Japan badly and Tokyo businessmen wanted to explore all the possibilities of obtaining oil and other natural resources critically needed by Japanese industry at somewhat cheaper prices on long-term basis with guarantees against arbitrary future price increases from the Soviet Siberian regions near at hand.

A second trans-Siberian railroad would have considerably increased the military capabilities of the Soviet ground forces employed along the Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, its location, northeast of the present trans-Siberian Railway made it less vulnerable to China's attack and thereby, weakening Chinese strategic position, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Chinese anxieties were particularly heightened by the statement of the Soviet Oil Minister that "you can only send Oil through a pipeline, but by rail you can ship anything you want," presumably including soldiers and military ~~x~~ hardware.<sup>27</sup> The building of the second Siberian railroad would also have increased Soviet ~~conventional~~ conventional capabilities in the region closest to Japan, creating thereby problems for Japanese defence planning. Moscow

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22 Oil and Gas Journal, 10 June 1974, p.43, cited in Curtis, n.21,p.169.

sought to counter the political arguments against the railway system by asserting that timber and coal required Haulage facilities.<sup>23</sup> But the Japanese undoubtedly realized the wider ramifications of the proposal.<sup>24</sup> The business community, however, advocated that the political issues - implications for China, and its linkage with a peace treaty or the retrocession of northern territories - be kept separate. But tug and pull between businessmen eager to bring about a successful resolution of the negotiations and a government exceedingly wary of being drawn into a project with the military and political implications of the Ryumen proposal continue to characterize government-business relations on the issue.<sup>25</sup>

In view of the significant political and strategic implications of Soviet-Japanese ventures in Siberia, the Chinese have reacted to the phenomenon by making competitive offers to the Japanese by offering to supply increased quantities of Taching Crude oil, often well below the price charged by the member states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. That the Chinese capacity to

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23 Times of India, 7 April 1974.

24 Japan entertains no illusions regarding Soviet motives in ~~XXXXX~~ courting Japan about Siberian development as witness the carefully detailed study of Siberia issued by the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry in October 1967. It said: "In view of the recent confrontation of China and the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet political objective is to remove Japan from the ~~x~~ umbrella of the United States and at the same time to encircle China." Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs Bureau, "Siberia". Cited in Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (London, 1970), pp.128-9.

25 Curtis, n.21, p.160.

supply oil was limited in comparison to the Soviet Union was apparent from the fact that while Moscow could in certain circumstances cover anything upto 15 per cent of Japan's oil requirements, Peking could promise only 200,000 tons a year in 1972. Yet in a determined effort to counter Soviet moves towards Japan, China increased its oil deliveries to Japan from 1 million tons in 1973 to 4 million tons in 1975 and over 8 million tons in 1975. In an attempt to forestall a major Japanese investment in the Tyumen project, Peking was seen offering to sell as much as fifty million tons to Japan by the year 1981.<sup>26</sup>

According to Gerald L. Curtis, there are several possible reasons for Soviet moves to raise the cost to Japan for participation in the project: it has calculated that Japan has become so desperate for new and diversified sources of energy that it will pay a much higher price for Tyumen oil than was earlier anticipated; as the Tyumen negotiations have developed, conflicting views within the Soviet ~~negotiations have developed~~ decision-making hierarchy have emerged forcing ad hoc adjustments in the Soviet proposal to satisfy various domestic constituencies concerned with the project, and in the aftermath of successful OPEC efforts to raise the price of oil, the Soviet Union has become increasingly concerned with its own long-term energy needs and with the problem of maintaining a sufficient supply of oil to Eastern Europe.<sup>27</sup>

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26 See R.K.Jain, China and Japan (New Delhi, 1977), pp.121-2.

27 Curtis, n.21, p.161.

Japan has also been reluctant to go it alone in regard to participation in the Tyumen project. They seek to enlist American participation in the venture. The desire is based on pragmatic considerations of minimizing risks. American participation would reduce the staggering financial burden, moderate Japanese anxieties about increased Soviet military capabilities in the Far East and increasingly deter possible Soviet attempts to exert undue political pressure and/or to reduce or cut off supply. Curtis opines that it is an effort to reinforce the American commitment in Northeast Asia.<sup>28</sup> It also perhaps seeks to prevent intense mutual competition among the advanced industrial West European countries. The Chinese have also recently<sup>29</sup> expressed approval of American participation in Soviet-Japanese ventures, presumably because such participation would dilute a potentially more intimate bilateral partnership. But there are several factors that inhibit such a development. American companies, Curtis points out, are extremely skeptical of the economic merits of the Tyumen project, and the American government has been reluctant to encourage them to cooperate with Japan. For American foreign policy, the Tyumen project is but part of the larger issue of US policy concerning Siberian development and US Soviet economic intercourse. Unless and until this issue is resolved in favor of expanded trade and investment with the Soviet Union, he adds, it is unrealistic to expect any US government encouragement of American participation in the Tyumen project.<sup>30</sup> After the meeting of the Soviet-Japan Economic Committee in Tokyo in June 1975, it was revealed that the Tyumen oil project had been effectively abandoned and that there was "no prospect of negotiations being resumed".<sup>31</sup>

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28 Ibid., p.168.

29 Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1975.

30 Curtis, n.21, p.172.

31 Kvodo News Agency, 12 June 1975.

### Problems

In spite of the tempting advantages for Japan arising from cooperation in Siberian ventures, it has not been forthcoming in financial commitments to the extent Moscow desires.

Economic ~~in~~ inhibitions include difficulties of determining the feasibility of various projects. The uncertainty and the lack of the data concerning the sizes of the deposits of the natural resources presented by the Soviets make it difficult for Japan and other Western countries to estimate their economic costs and therefore calculate the prices for making these investments profitable. Severe climatic conditions along with a lack of satisfactory infrastructures and transportation facilities have caused an exodus of labour from this region. If the Soviet Union really wants to develop Siberia at a faster pace, they have at least to stop this migration trend and possibly to offer tremendous incentives to settle a population in Siberia.

Another significant issue of Japanese (as well as American and West German) criticism is the pricing issue. The Soviets want to sell the project-associated outputs at world market prices. The Japanese, on the other hand, argue that they will buy these outputs at prices sufficiently below world market prices to reimburse the Japanese developer for his development costs - investments, depreciation, and interest -- as well as to provide a small margin of profit to the developer when measured against the cost of alternative sources of these materials.<sup>32</sup>

The Japanese are sensitive to the Soviet demands for low-cost, long-term credit arrangements for a number of reasons. For one thing, they prefer to set a maximum repayment period of five years without

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<sup>32</sup> Saeki, n.6, p.10.

any grace period. They argue that Japanese-Soviet trade has consistently exceeded negotiated levels and has shown a consistent excess of Soviet exports over imports. It has, consequently, represented an implicit Japanese extension of credit. Secondly, Japan suffers from a persistent capital shortage in its rapidly growing economy and does not have a reserve capacity to grant credits in such a large scale. Further, Japanese firms have borrowed large amount of money from Western countries on 3-to-5 year terms at 9 per cent interest. Service on this debt totals some \$500 million annually. Hence, there is little inclination to offer Soviet agencies more lenient terms.<sup>33</sup> The Japanese banks are also reportedly getting edgy about the mounting Soviet foreign debt, and the Japanese Export-Import Bank has decided not to open new credit lines for Russia until the next financial year as loans to the Soviet Union are in danger of becoming disproportionately large.<sup>34</sup>

Another obstacle is the Soviet preference over their own development cooperation formula - they like to handle their own pre-investment surveys and project management. Japanese Cooperation is confined to technical assistance and equipment with ownership and management of the projects remains entirely in Soviet hands. The inertia of the Soviet management system leads to the view that a given volume of investment will produce a smaller result in terms of actual output than it would be calculated to do in Western countries.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, Soviet priorities do not necessarily coincide with Japanese developmental priorities in Siberia.

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33 Ibid.

34 The Economist, 4 September 1976.

35 Ibid., 23 February 1974, p.47.

Prospects

Siberian development is extremely vital for the Soviet economy. Consequently, Moscow is determined to develop the infrastructure there in keeping with its policy of spreading its industrial complexes in order to make them less vulnerable and since this would allow the Soviets to reinforce the integration of the Eastern Republics with European Russia.<sup>36</sup> ~~It~~ goes without saying that future large-scale exploitation of mineral resources will require substantial imports of sophisticated and efficient machinery from the West. However, in view of the vital importance of Siberian natural resources. Moscow will go ahead with its plans, with or without Western involvement. Thus though Western involvement is important, because it will mean a more efficient, less time-consuming, and less costly development of Siberia, it is not critical to the Soviets.<sup>37</sup>

The Soviet Union is surely vexed by the cautious or negative attitude of the Japanese. Besides the various economic and political factors discussed above, this seems to be due to the Japanese fear that once developed, the resources will largely go for use of the Soviet side. Though the northern territories issue will continue to bedevil Soviet-Japanese relations in the future it is not ~~not~~ likely to lessen Japanese interest in Siberia. The very

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36 Bernheim and Furthmayr, n.4, p.324.

37 Ibid., p.325.

nature of the proposed US-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet projects highlights the prospect of competition between the US and Japan as competing consumer nations. It might also lead to an intensification of Japanese efforts to ensure that future Soviet supplies will not be pre-empted by Soviet firms. The Soviet Union is aware of this fact, and can be expected to exploit its economic and political advantages.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, Government guarantees or the competitive extension of bank loans by members of the European Economic Community can perhaps stimulate Japan to extend increasing amounts of credit for Siberian development. Japan is most likely to further invest in Siberia, but its attitude will continue to be linked to the development of Sino-Soviet, Sino-Japanese, US-Japanese, and Soviet-American relationships.

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38 Isaiah A. Litvak and Christopher J. Maules, "Japan's Overseas Investments," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1973, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol.4, no.1, January 1974, pp.66-7.



## Chapter Nine

## RELATIONS IN THE 1970S

Since 1905 the Soviet policy in the Far East had been to help strengthen China as a counter-poise to Japan but after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, particularly the border conflict on the banks of Ussuri in 1969, the Soviet Union began to think in terms of developing Japan as a potential counter-poise to China and possibly to Sino-US rapprochement which began to appear on the horizon in the wake of Nixon's visit to Peking. Obviously, the Soviet Union could not remain unconcerned about President Nixon's visit to China, an important landmark in the political scene of East Asia and the Pacific in the post-war period, which was accompanied by China's admission in the United Nations and was followed by the normalisation of relations between China and Japan. These developments indicated that the balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific, static for two decades, had shifted in favour of China<sup>1</sup>, the main adversary of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Moscow became more inclined to accelerate the process of deepening friendly relations with Japan -- a beginning for which had been made in the sixties. Not surprisingly, therefore, there appeared in the wake of Nixon's visit to China, a change in the rigid Soviet attitude on the territorial question, which was evident during Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan in January 1972.

Tokyo's apprehensions about Sino-US relations put Japan in a better frame of mind to consider improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Yet many in Japan did not like to risk antagonizing USA and China by developing excessively close relations with the

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1 W.Klatt, "Economic Survey of the People's Republic of China," in Europa Yearbook, The Far East and Australasia 1977-78 (London, 1977), p.311.

USSR. Special Envoy Tsarapkin visited Tokyo in October 1971. From Japan, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister Munemori Akagi and Zentarō Kosaka, the influential Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party visited USSR. But the formidable obstacles in the Soviet-Japanese relations could not be overcome. A deep seated anti-Russian prejudice permeated the Japanese polity. Nevertheless, there was a desire to have a more balanced foreign policy and a willingness to keep the Soviet option open as a lever against the American and the Chinese. The lure of the rich natural resources of Siberia-particularly oil-was also there.

Dwelling on the impact of the Sino-US diplomatic break-through in the summer of 1971, an Indian commentator observes:

The July 15 announcement that President Nixon would visit Peking in early 1972 on his own initiative shocked Moscow as much as it unnerved Tokyo. As the United States and China turned to one another over the divide of 22 years, the Soviet Union and Japan also turned toward one another, as if in a spontaneous reaction.<sup>2/</sup>

At the United Nations the chief Japanese delegate Aichi, sought a meeting with Gromyko in September 1971 to find out if Moscow were willing to back, directly or indirectly, the Japanese effort to keep Taiwan a member of the world body while conceding the China seat to Peking. Gromyko reaffirmed the Soviet stand on the question of Chinese representation but was quite impressed with the insight ~~he~~ obtained into the Japanese nervousness about a Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Aichi invited Gromyko to visit Japan. In less than three weeks the Kremlin notified the Japanese ~~ex~~ government that the Soviet foreign Minister would be in Tokyo in January 1972 to attend the second bilateral ministerial conference.<sup>3</sup>

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2 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond (New York, 1976), p. 286.

3 Mainichi, 28 September 1971.

Between the announcement of the visit and Gromyko's arrival in Tokyo, Soviet-Japanese mutual perceptions became largely parallel. Both had genuine apprehensions about a Sino-US rapprochement; but each saw the other in a predicament that was worse than its own. The Soviet leaders saw Japan as brutally jolted by the humiliating way it had been treated by its mentor, the United States. Japan was not only informed, much less consulted, about the American demarche towards China but was also subjected to severe restrictions in economic relations. The Soviet leaders, therefore, concluded that Japanese-US relations had reached a turning point and that the shaken Japanese trust in the United States would not be easily restored. The Kremlin also saw Japan as deeply disturbed and hurt by the exaltation of China, by one stroke of US diplomacy, to the level of a world power. They had a vision of a Japan genuinely afraid that the United States, would use its friendship with China to limit its economic and political influence in Asia. At a slight remove from these images lurked the Soviet leaders' own fear of the emergence of a compact by the United States, Japan, and China to contain the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

There was a lurking suspicion in the Soviet mind that because of its close economic ties with the United States and the neighbourly pull of China, Japan may not only try to fill the place which the USA occupies in Southeast Asia but also gang up with Peking.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it was considered necessary to send Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan to soothe Japanese feelings and to probe Japanese mind in the wake of impending Sino-US rapprochement and the likely Sino-Japanese normalisation of relations.

There there was a change in the Soviet Government attitude towards Japan in the beginning of 1972 was apparent from a long commentary

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4 Sen Gupta, n.2, pp.286-7.

5 Times of India, editorial, 29 January 1972.

on Soviet-Japan relations in Izvestia. Rather than laying ~~emphasis~~ stress on the revival of Japanese militarism or imperialist economic expansionism, favourite themes of Soviet publicity media, the Izvestia commentary painted a rosy picture of future Soviet-Japan relations, which, it said, could be "improved both qualitatively and quantitatively" through economic exchanges between the two countries.<sup>6</sup>

It was also significant that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko gave precedence to a Tokyo visit over attendance at the Warsaw Pact summit talks in Prague. It seemed to indicate the importance attached by the USSR to Gromyko's visit and the new policy lines towards Japan. In his talks with Japanese leaders in Tokyo, Gromyko said that, as the question of the "northern territories" was very complicated, it was necessary to consider it carefully, a remark that seemed a clear indication of a departure from the former position of maintaining that the "territorial question has already been settled;" as Rinjiro Harako put it.<sup>7</sup> Soon afterwards, under the impact of growing Sino-Soviet schism, Moscow modified its attitude on the US-Japan Security Treaty too. Thus, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that the existence of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Assistance and the fact that friendly relations between Japan and the United States were built on the basis of such a treaty "did not in any way obstruct the furtherance of Japan-Soviet friendship and that these two separate relations could coexist side by side." This remark was considered "reasonable" by the Japanese Ambassador Takeso Shimoda, in view of the principles of

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<sup>6</sup> Izvestia, 14 January 1972, cited in Rinjiro Harako, "Prospects for Relations with the USSR," Survey, Autumn 1972, p.51.

<sup>7</sup> See Harako, n.6, pp.51-2.

mutual recognition of the right of collective defense and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs enshrined in the Soviet-Japan Joint Communiqué of October 1956. China, on the other hand, was criticized for sticking to its "unrealistic and inflexible attitude towards Japan" and for continuing to criticize the US-Japan Security Treaty.<sup>8</sup>

Gromyko's visit in January 1972, clearly signalled a new Soviet interest in Japan, for ever since 1968 the Soviet Foreign Minister had postponed the return engagement in connection with "annual" ministerial talks. The last round of ministerial consultations was held in 1967, when Takeo Miki, the Foreign Minister at that time, visited Moscow. It was intended then that these meetings become an annual affair. Gromyko's visit, thus, led to the resumption of bilateral consultations after a lapse of four years. The Soviet Union wanted to improve its relations with Japan in the hope of using it as a possible bastion against China ~~or~~ or at least of preventing it from inclining towards China. The agreements reached during Gromyko's visit marked a major breakthrough in their bilateral relations. Both Japan and the Soviet Union desired the conclusion of a peace treaty, for which negotiations would take place later during the year, and agreed on the promotion of mutual trade, technical and scientific cooperation by Japan in the Soviet Union. Letters on cultural exchange were exchanged between the two Foreign Ministers.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps, the most significant achievement of Gromyko's talks with Premier Sato was the agreement to open negotiations for the

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8 Takeso Shimoda, "Approach to China Problem," Pacific Community, April 1971, p.421.

9 Pravda, 28 January 1972, as translated in Daily Review, 28 January 1972.

conclusion of a peace treaty on which there had been a total stalemate since October 1956. During his discussions with Japanese leaders, Gromyko was reported to have stated that the question of the "northern territories"(the four islands in dispute) was very complicated and that it was necessary to consider it carefully. This remarks signified flexibility in the Soviet approach on the question as earlier Moscow had ~~declared~~ that the territorial question was already settled and there was nothing to discuss in the matter. The Soviet flexibility in the matter was seen as the direct outcome of increasing prospects of Sino-US rapprochement and intensification of Sino-Soviet confrontation.

In the wake of Sino-US rapprochement, ~~the~~ Soviet Union felt that Japan, in view of the "Nixon's Shocks" would be inclined to measures to improve Soviet-Japanese relations. The timing of Gromyko's visit was significant in that it reflected Soviet recognition of the "extraordinary need" to send Gromyko even when a Summit Conference of Warsaw Pact countries was being held in Prague.

Nixon's visit to China was a development which seriously upset Soviet plans of encircling or containing China, a strategy in which Washington was to have played a leading role. In order to avoid being isolated and in order to nip in the bud the possibilities of an anti-Soviet alliance between China and the United States, the Soviet Union stepped up its cooperation with the United States. Moscow felt the necessity of consolidating a diplomatic foot-hold in Asia in order to counter balance China by sounding out the possibility of Japan taking the place of the United States in the strategy of encirclement of China and prevent any Sino-Japanese collusion aimed at the Soviet Union. Moscow sought to accomplish this by deepening

Soviet-Japan economic cooperation which would give it increased influence and leverage in Japan. In view of Japan's popular emotional prejudice to the Soviet Union, Moscow sought to off-set the development of closer Sino-Japan relations. Since Soviet intransigence on the northern territories question was stimulating the latent anti-Soviet emotions of the Japanese people, the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to express its willingness to discuss the territorial problem, whereas Moscow had previously taken the position that no such problem existed. The Russians believed that Japan would be receptive to their diplomatic demarches in view of serious economic friction between Japan and the United States and the consequent Japanese desire to lessen economic reliance of Washington by seeking other overseas trade markets.

The agreement to discuss the issue during Gromyko's visit had also marked a deviation from Tokyo's earlier stand that negotiations for a peace treaty could reopen only after the USSR agreed to ~~the~~ the return to Japan of the four islands now in Soviet hands. An obvious reason for the volte-face on the part of Japan in agreeing to de-link the two major issues was the desire to avoid being friendless in the event of an impending Sino-US rapprochement. Equally compelling were the economic and trade factors, especially exploitation of Siberian resources. With the growing Sino-Soviet confrontation as well as prospects of a Sino-US detente, Tokyo also envisaged greater flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union on the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan. It was generally believed that Moscow might agree to the return of two or three or the four islands now in Soviet occupation while the USSR might obtain from the Japanese, in return, an undertaking to ensure that these islands do not, in future, become a military threat to Russia. The Japanese, however,

might still insist on the return of all the four islands.

Soviet stance of goodwill, friendship and sweet reasonableness towards Japan was continued after Gromyko's visit and was discernible in Soviet behaviour and commentaries. In February 1972 the Deputy Foreign Trade Minister led a Soviet delegation to the 5th Conference of the representatives of the Soviet and Japanese Economic and Commercial Organisations held in Tokyo. It discussed the question of extension of a Japanese credit for the supply of pipes and equipment for construction of the proposed Tyumen Nakhoda oil pipeline; Japan's participation in prospecting for oil and gas in Sakhalin through deliveries to the Soviet Union on credit of vessels, machinery and equipment.

In April 1972, the annual fisheries agreement proceeded more smoothly and concluded more swiftly than in the past, thus reflecting improvement in Soviet-Japanese political atmosphere. An Activist Mission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by F.A. Tabeyev visited Japan in the same month at the invitation of the Japanese Socialist Party.

Thus a Soviet commentator, N. Shriyaev, laid stress not only on the expansion of trade relations but also on promoting scientific and technical cooperation, credit relations, the conclusion of general agreements, the development of coastal trade, business contacts between governmental and private organisations and firms, etc. He emphasised the need of concluding long-term agreements and referred particularly to the efforts of the Japanese-Soviet Economic Cooperation Committee which, he said, was playing "an important part in strengthening interstate relations". The development of mutually beneficial trade and commercial and economic cooperation was considered to be of "great



importance" for the development of relations between the two countries.<sup>10</sup> Another commentary by G.Nikolin on Soviet-Japanese cooperation in fishing stated that the Soviet Union was guided not only by its own interests but also by the interests of Japanese fishermen as well and observed that in the course of Moscow talks the Soviet Union had displayed its readiness for cooperation and the businesslike solution of all problems relating to the rational utilisation of food resources in the seas and oceans washing the shores of the Soviet Union and Japan. He again emphasised the need of promoting closer cooperation in trade, scientific, technical and cultural fields.<sup>11</sup>

At the 15th Trade Union Congress, the Soviet leader Brezhnev spoke of Soviet willingness "to establish and develop broad mutually advantageous cooperation with Japan both in the economic and political fields." Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Minister of Fisheries Alexander Ishkov referred to the successful development of Soviet Japanese cooperation in fishing which was said to play an important role within the general framework of inter-state relations. During the Soviet-Japanese discussions on fisheries which was continued in Japan, the two sides agreed to initial an agreement on "tsubu" shell fishing by the Japanese off the eastern coast of Sakhalin island and in the Northern part of the Sea of Okhotsk. In addition letters were also exchanged on joint supervision of salmon fishing in the convention areas and an agreement was signed on Japanese sea-kale fishing off Signalny island.<sup>12</sup>

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10 N.Shriyaev in International Affairs (Moscow) No.4, April 1972, pp.77-8.

11 G.Nikolin's article in ibid., July 1972, p.99.

12 New Times, no.30, July 1972, p.15.

Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to China in September 1972, the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations and the excitement over China which characterised the Japanese political scene through the summer and autumn of 1972, caused a certain degree of ~~x~~ coolness in Moscow. This was reflected in the failure of Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira to get an appointment with Brezhnev when he visited Moscow in October 1972. He, however, had discussions with Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko in which, apart from ~~the~~ opening negotiations for a peace treaty, sought to assure them that Japan's normalisation of relations with China was not directed against the USSR.

Given Chinese hostility towards the Soviet Union and Peking's critical and denunciatory attitude towards any signs of improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, Moscow could not but be expected to be apprehensive of Sino-Japanese rapprochement, though on the surface, the Soviet Union considered normalisation of relations between China and Japan 27 years after the end of World War II as "a perfectly natural fact" under conditions of the general tendency in the world towards relaxation of tension. The Soviet Union was particularly p~~er~~turbed because the new trends in Sino-Japanese relations had come so soon after Nixon's trip to Peking. This was evident from V.Kudryavtsev's article in the Soviet Government paper, Izvestia of 2 November 1972 in which he observed that the somewhat belated fact of Sino-Japanese normalisation was possibly caused not so much by the internal natural laws of Japanese politics (although they undoubtedly had some effect) as by the "detonation" from the change in relations between the United States and China. Referring to different assessments of the event in the Japanese press, the Soviet commentator remarked that there was no conviction

that the content of the joint statement outlining new paths for Japan was in line with its truly national interests. The lurking ~~was~~ suspicion in the Soviet mind about the Sino-Japanese rapprochement was also apparent from the Soviet commentator's examination of the anti-hegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese joint statement which, as he said, naturally meant that the two signatories to the joint statement - China and Japan - would not be considered as striving to establish hegemony in Asia and the Pacific and the United States, which is linked by a security treaty with Japan, would also be ~~excluded~~ from among the claimant's to hegemony. To the Soviet writer, it was quite obvious that Japan would involuntarily become "a political instrument" or tool for the Maoist rulers of China, "who are not averse to using Japan for their own selfish aims."<sup>13</sup>

With a view to cautioning the Japanese public opinion about entertaining high hopes concerning Sino-Japanese normalisation, the Soviet commentator referred to the assessment in the Japanese press that the normalisation was effected as a sort of "vengeance" against the United States for the fact that Japan was not given advance information of Nixon's visit to China and also in connection with the American economic measures against Japanese exports. The Soviet writer also sought to caution the Japanese businessmen about China being an inexhaustible source of industrial raw-materials and as a market, just as unlimited, for the sale of Japanese industrial goods. The present day China, he said, was considerably different from pre-war China because it had begun to consume more of its native

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<sup>13</sup> Izvestia, 2 November 1972, as translated and broadcast over Moscow Radio on the same day, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, 7 November 1972, pp.C1-4.

raw-material and the market was now under strict governmental control which would hardly become too pliant in the face of the mass of Japanese goods.<sup>14</sup> Because of the development of its own industry, the Chinese goods were also stated to be competing increasingly with Japanese goods on the markets of Asia.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet writer also criticised Chinese leaders for their unprincipled concession with regard to Taiwan and drew attention to the fact that the Japanese Government had not recognised Taiwan as part of the Chinese territory and that Tokyo had not abandoned its agreement with USA (reached between Japanese Premier Sato and US ~~Press~~ President Nixon at the end of 1969) on the question of including Taiwan in the region of operation of the US-Japan security treaty and that Japan continued to maintain close relations with Taiwan.<sup>16</sup>

In October 1972 Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira visited Soviet Union to set at rest Soviet misgivings and fears about Sino-Japanese rapprochement but it seems that Moscow was not fully satisfied with the assurances given by the Japanese Minister. The Soviet press resumed criticism of Japan's "growing militarism" and laid stress on a "mighty wave of opposition" within Japan to Premier Tanaka's policies. Izvestia criticised Japan, ~~as~~ a "country of great possibilities", for pandering first to the United States of America and now to the People's Republic of China. The Soviet

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14. Ibid.

15 See V. Mayensky's article "In Search of a New Course," in Pravda, 17 December 1972, as translated and broadcast over Moscow Radio, ibid., 27 December 1972, p. C1-5.

16 Izvestia, n.13.

paper hinted that the anti-hegemonic clause in the joint Sino-Japanese declaration of September 1972 was aimed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet paper also rejected the "unsubstantiated and absurd territorial demands" of Japan in regard to return of the Kurile islands which the Soviet Union had taken over in 1945.

V. Mayevsky's commentary in Pravda of 17 December 1972 referred to the serious disagreements between the USA and Japan in the economic field, in trade and in financial affairs and to the highly complicated position over Taiwan where Tokyo did not want to lose its economic and military-strategic positions by fighting for an "independent Taiwan." The Soviet commentator then referred to the expanding trade relations between the Soviet Union and Japan and the development of relations in the political field. He, however, noted that the peace treaty between the two countries had not been concluded. In that connection he found fault with those Japanese circles in or out of the Government who believed that until the Soviet Union adopted a softer line on the territorial question it was impossible to expect a rapid development in relations with the Soviet Union. The Pravda commentator considered the inflammation of the artificial territorial question, which hindered the development of good neighbourly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union dangerous because it drew inspiration from the US-Japan security treaty and placed definite hopes on support from the great-power hegemonist elements in Peking. The Soviet writer chided Japanese ruling circles for

adopting a cool attitude towards the Soviet proposal of collective security system in Asia, warned the Japanese people against the policy of militarism of pre-war times and the policy of one-sided orientation during the post-war years, and pinned his hopes on Japan following a new, genuinely independent foreign policy.<sup>17</sup>

Boris Pischik's commentary in New Times quoted Japanese Professor Shinkichi Eto's opinion that while there were no political disputes between Japan and China apart from Taiwan and the Senkaku islands, the two countries would have to fight seriously both for the Asian markets and for political influence in Asia. The Soviet writer, thus, sought to draw attention to the conflicting interests of the two countries.<sup>18</sup>

Japanese Premier Tanaka, speaking at a session of the House of Councillors Budget Committee in March 1973, made it clear that the Siberian project and the Japanese claim to northern Pacific islands "should be handled separately in order to promote the interests of the two countries." Tokyo, he said, would accept a Soviet request, if it was made, that Kunashiri and Etorofu be "demilitarized" as a condition for their reversion. "But such an idea is not in my mind now," he added. Foreign Minister Ohira stated that there were "no definite signs" that the Soviets were more conciliatory on the territorial issue than they were in 1956. While reiterating his willingness to visit ~~in~~ Moscow to "improve communication between the two ~~n~~ nations," Tanaka observed

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17 Mayevsky, n. 5.

18 New Times, no. 41, October 1972, pp. 13-4.

that the national demand for the return of 6 northern territories could not be put aside.<sup>19</sup>

Prime Minister Tanaka visited Soviet Union from 7 to 10 October 1973. During the visit, agreements on scientific and technological as well as cultural exchanges and a treaty on the protection of migratory birds were signed. At the end of the visit, a joint communique was issued. On the territorial issue, which remains the main obstacle in Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, a compromise was struck by referring to "outstanding question, a legacy of the Second World War" in the words of Soviet journal Soviet Review or "unresolved problems remaining since World War II" to cite from Japan Times. This phrase was widely interpreted in Japan to include the territorial issue between the two countries. The two sides agreed to continue the talks on the signing of a peace treaty at an appropriate time in 1974.<sup>20</sup> While Japan Times described it as a reaffirmation of the agreement reached during Gromyko's visit in January 1972,<sup>21</sup> there can be little doubt that the reference in the joint communique to the desire of the two sides to settle "outstanding questions, a legacy of the Second World War," which Japan has interpreted as reference to the territorial problem, represented in advance over the phraseology used in the 1972 joint communique issued on Gromyko's visit and this is evident from the fact that subsequently Japanese leaders, in their

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19 Japan Times, cited in Asian Recorder, p.11443.

20 Soviet Review, vol.10, no.50, 18 October 1973, pp.92-5.

21 Japan Times, editorial, 12 October 1973.

statements, had placed greater reliance on the 1973 communique than on the 1972 communique. Since no progress in the matter had been made, some person interpreted the 1973 reference to unresolved ~~pro~~ problems as only a face-saving formula which the Soviet leaders had helped Tanaka to take back to Japan with him.

Even though the Joint communique on Tanaka's visit could be considered as somewhat vague and general in its phraseology, the Japanese Prime Minister's visit in 1973, the first such visit by a Japanese Premier in 17 years to the Soviet Union, was an important event in Soviet-Japanese relations. During his visit, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of science and technology, a treaty for protection of migratory birds and a cultural agreement. Apart from the agreement to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, the joint communique of 1973 recorded unanimity of views on the need ~~the~~ to develop natural resources of Siberia and on the promotion of cooperation in such sectors as trade, transportation, agriculture and fishery. The two sides confirmed that the development of the natural resources of Siberia did not rule out the participation of third countries. The two sides also agreed to take appropriate measures concerning the issue of fishing operations on a long-term and stable basis in Northern Pacific waters and agreed that discussions should be conducted between the Ministers concerned as soon as possible.



Moreover, the Soviet Union confirmed its readiness to make a careful study of the problems of the Japanese still to be repatriated to Japan and on visits by the Japanese to the places in the Soviet Union where their relatives are buried.<sup>22</sup>

The Japan Times, in its editorial, expressed satisfaction at the joint communique making no mention of the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system. Commenting on the provision in the joint communique on cooperation in the development of Siberia's natural resources, the Japanese paper observed that it did not exclude participation of third nations. It added: "The enormity of the projects proposed would naturally call for international efforts, but it is also obvious Japan has an eye on the Chinese reaction, should the Siberian development rest on a purely bilateral effort."<sup>23</sup>

Often Japan has felt compelled to lodge protests with the Soviet Union on such issues as violation of its air space, the carrying out of nuclear weapons tests or the missile tests in the Pacific. But, as compared to the territorial question, these are minor matters in the political relations of the two countries. On these matters the Soviet Union was seen somewhat more conciliatory. For instance, while Japanese protest over violation of Japanese air space in August 1967 was ignored, in February 1974 an apology for the air space violation was conveyed by Moscow to the Japanese authorities.

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22 See Joint Soviet-Japanese Statement, 10 October 1973, in Soviet Review, n.20; see also Japan Review (New Delhi), October 1973, p.12.

23 Japan Times, n.21.

Viktor Mayevsky's article in Pravda of 18 August 1974 expressed satisfaction that a number of important agreements on long-term economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan had been signed and talks on important problems for the purposes of reaching ~~new~~ new agreements were continuing. However, he pointed out that certain circles in Japan were seeking to inflame chauvinist passions on the so-called "question of the northern territories." In this connection he remarked that the inflammatory statements made in Peking were "now inspiring certain people in Tokyo" in the matter. These statements were considered by him "a highly doubtful source of inspiration." The Soviet writer then quoted commentary in Tokyo Times that the conclusion of a peace treaty and a treaty on the non-use of force between Japan and the Soviet ~~un~~ Union were becoming "an urgent and great political task in ensuring Japan's security and the future development of economic co-operation between both countries" as also for creating stable political relations between the two countries.<sup>24</sup>

The negotiations on the proposed Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, initiated during Masayoshi Ohira's visit to Moscow in October 1972 and renewed during Premier Tanaka's visit a year later, were continued during Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's

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<sup>24</sup> Pravda, 18 August 1974, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 November 1974, pp.16-7.

visit to the Soviet Union in January 1975, but no progress seems to have been made. On the thorny question of Northern territories, there were no signs of either side relenting on its stated position. During Miyazawa's visit, Gromyko emphasized that L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, repeatedly and in no uncertain terms had spoken in favour of developing and deepening Soviet-Japanese relations."<sup>25</sup> But on the territorial issue the Soviet Foreign Minister held out no hopes of an early settlement. In fact, Foreign Minister Miyazawa also drew a blank on that question. Apparently the disputed islands were considered non-negotiable by the Soviet leaders because they had been legally incorporated in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders stuck to their firm stand that they could not accept the territorial issue as the basis for any negotiations for a peace treaty. Accordingly, Japanese efforts to include a reference to the Northern Territories in the joint statement was firmly rejected by the Soviet Union. In the joint statement, therefore, the two sides merely considered it "desirable to conclude a peace treaty as soon as possible so that relations between the two countries could develop on a firm and stable foundation and agreed to continue talks on this matter."<sup>26</sup> In his foreign policy statement before the Diet on 6 September 1975, Foreign Minister Miyazawa, while affirming that the promotion of good neighbourly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union was the constant policy

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25 Pravda, 17 January 1975, as translated in Daily Review, 17 January 1975.

26 Fortext of the Joint Statement see Pravda, 19 January 1975, as translated in Daily Review, 20 January 1975.

of Japan, expressed "profound regret" over the fact that the territorial problem of the four northern islands off Hokkaido had remained unsolved 30 years after World War II. He comforted himself by saying that the Japanese Government would make further efforts to solve the territorial issue and conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup>

Partly because of the strategic value of the islands which are useful for monitoring and observing US military activities in Japan and in the northern Pacific,<sup>28</sup> and partly because any concession on the territorial issue might open Pandora's box of territorial claims on the Soviet Union (Poland, Germany, Finland, Romania and most important of all the Chinese demand for border adjustments), the Soviet Union has taken a firm attitude about the Japanese claims to the northern territories. Moreover, the Soviet leaders fail to understand that while the territorial issue (Senkaku) between China and Japan could be bypassed, why the same could not be done in the case of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Soviet Union had offered to conclude a "friendship" treaty, which could have the distinction of setting aside the territorial issue. This proposal of the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Miyazawa told a parliamentary committee, was inappropriate until a peace treaty was signed between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> It was reported that in February 1975 the Soviet

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27 Japan Review, October 1975, p.8.

28 The Times (London), 20 January 1975.

29 See Asian Recorder, p.12498.

1975 nearly 65,000 Japanese visited the USSR during these three years as tourists or members of official and unofficial delegations. Some of the big business houses, especially those in the fields of steel, shipbuilding, construction, machine tools, refrigeration, electric power, and oil exploration, became supporters of Siberian development. The Japanese-Soviet Trade Association set up in 1973 became a lobby of some importance. By early 1975, 22 Japanese firms opened offices in Moscow. Several hundred medium-sized and small Japanese enterprises formed associations of their own to press for major shares of Siberian business. The USSR-Japan Association had 15 chapters in 1975 in the Soviet Union, from Sochi on the Black Sea to Nakhodka in the Far East. Its counterpart in Japan is said to have as many chapters. The Dietmen's League to promote Friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union, which was set up in 1973, is said to have 500 members. The agreements for scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges have enabled thousands of Japanese, including scientists, technicians, university professors, architects, composers, writers, actors, and artists, to visit the USSR. There is even a Japanese-Soviet expert committee for peace in Asia, which held its second session in Moscow in 1974.<sup>31</sup>

The occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan was utilised by Moscow in February 1975 to emphasise the importance of strengthening mutual relations for the benefit of the peoples of both the countries. The Soviet party paper Pravda, however, noted with concern the difficulties and obstacles which still existed in the way of Soviet-Japanese good neighbourliness. It criticised the Japanese

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31 See Sen Gupta, n.2, pp.299-300.

Japanese press for paying too much attention to the "boring territorial question". It also accused some Japanese politicians of trying to strike a balance between the Soviet Union and China and attempting to derive "doubtful profits" from the current Sino-Soviet differences. The Literaturnaya Gazeta took note of Chinese attempts to involve Japan in its anti-Soviet policy. The Soviet paper also warned that if the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty contained provisions directed against the Soviet Union Moscow would be compelled to change its attitude towards Japan. Soviet commentator G.Krasin went to the extent of declaring that Peking politicians were seeking to fill the Japanese-Chinese treaty with a military content. This, he said, was evident from the Chinese draft of the treaty, submitted to the Japanese side on 14 April 1975, which included a point envisaging the establishment of a 'system of consultations' between the governments of Japan and China with the view to implementing the proviso set forth in the clause of 'hegemony.'<sup>32</sup>

Izvestia Commentator V.Kudryavtsev expressed Russian apprehensions about peace treaty talks between China and Japan. He said the Maoist leadership hoped thereby to effect a split in Soviet-Japanese relations, involve Tokyo in Peking's policy of hostility towards the USSR, and encourage the Japanese "hawks" who were urging a revision of the results of the Second World War, including territorial problems."<sup>33</sup>

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32. Cited in Ibid., 501-2.

33 News and Views from the Soviet Union, vol.34, No.100, 26 April 1975, p.3.

The Soviet leaders have clearly indicated, through diplomatic channels<sup>34</sup> and through Tass statement of 18 June 1975, that should the Japanese agree to the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony clause" in the proposed Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, it would have the major effect of being "detrimental" to the development of cordial relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup> I. Latyshev's commentary in Pravda on 26 November 1975 not only cautioned the Japanese Government against Peking's machinations to draw Japan into the stream of its "militant anti-Soviet policy," but also warned against any "compromises" in regard to the inclusion of the "notorious point on 'opposition to hegemony'" in the proposed Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty. Any "clever manipulation ~~in~~ in the wording of the treaty," such as the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause on the condition that the concept of "hegemony" be interpreted in a more abstract and diffuse manner would mean "capitulation to Peking's current anti-Soviet foreign policy" that "could only be interpreted as...an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union."<sup>36</sup>

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34 In a statement addressed by the Soviet Government to the Japanese Government and handed over to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow on 12 June 1975, attention was drawn to Peking's attempts to involve Japan in one way or another, in its anti-Soviet policy, and the hope was expressed that the Japanese side would refrain from taking any steps which would harm the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. See V. Karsis, "Peking's Pressure Tactics" Izvestia, 30 June 1975, as translated in Soviet Review, vol. 12, no. 33 (17 July 1975) pp. 46-8, see also Japan Times, 19 June 1975.

35 Tass, 18 June 1975.

36 Pravda, 26 November 1975, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 47, 17 December 1975, p. 16.

If the Soviet Union was an important factor in Sino-Japanese relations, China too remained a major factor in Japan's calculations about relations with the Soviet Union. Just as Soviet attacks on the anti-hegemony clause compelled the Japanese leaders to adopt a cautious attitude in that matter, so also Tokyo took into consideration Chinese susceptibilities about the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system (which is regarded by Peking as essentially anti-Chinese in nature) and felt reluctant to endorse it. Foreign Minister Miyazawa was reported to have expressed the view that in the unsettled state of Asia, the idea of Asian collective security system was premature and that the Soviet concept of maintenance of the territorial status quo was in conflict with the Japanese claim for the return of the four southern Kurile islands to Japan.

Towards the end of 1975 the Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki indicated his willingness to accept a mutually agreeable draft of the anti-hegemony clause in the proposed treaty of peace and friendship with China, which had been intermittently under negotiation since November 1974. This made Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko hurry to Tokyo in January 1976. His five-day visit from 9 to 13 January 1976 had two-fold purposes: to promote the idea of a preliminary friendship treaty pending the conclusion of a peace treaty and to emphasise Soviet objections to references to hegemony in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. In order to dissuade the Japanese Government from succumbing to the Chinese pressure about

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the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese treaty, Gromyko warned the Japanese Premier that the Soviet Union might have to review its relations with Japan if it complied with Chinese demands in the matter. Gromyko also reportedly offered in contrast to 1972, to return two of the four disputed islands and all that he asked for in return this time was a firm commitment on the part of Japan that it would not be a party to the anti-Soviet moves of China.<sup>37</sup> The idea of an interim Soviet-Japanese friendship treaty which would have not only put into the background the territorial issue between the two countries but would also have had the effect of implicitly drawing Japan closer to the Soviet concept of an Asian Collective Security System was not acceptable to Japan. In his press conference on 13 January 1976, Premier Miki declared that his government would not sign a peace or friendship treaty with the Soviet Union before the northern islands were returned to Japan. He expressed the hope of concluding a peace treaty with China as soon as possible.

No progress on the territorial question could be made during Gromyko's visit. The brief joint communique, issued at the end of the visit on 13 January 1976, merely referred to the "yet unresolved problems" remaining since World War II between the two countries and recognised the need to continue further talks in that regard. On the question of the anti-hegemony clause, it is difficult to say how far Gromyko succeeded in his mission. However, to the extent the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty was delayed and Gromyko's visit helped

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37 See Sen Gupta, n.2, p.302.

in inducing further cautiousness in regard to the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in that treaty, his visit could be considered as a limited success.

During Gromyko's visit, the two sides exchanged opinions on bilateral problems, including fisheries, and some international problems of mutual interest. The two sides agreed to extend the 1972 cultural agreement and to cooperate on nuclear fusion techniques. Moreover, the Soviet Minister offered to free 32 Japanese fishermen seized for alleged violation of the Soviet territorial waters in the North Pacific. In the joint communique, the two sides acknowledged that trade and economic cooperation were developing smoothly and expressed their intention to further expand such relations.<sup>38</sup>

A Soviet commentary in *New Times* by G.Krasin soon after Gromyko's visit spoke of "marked progress" having been achieved in the Soviet Japanese bilateral ties in the past few years. The growing interest of the Japanese business circles in developing economic relations with the Soviet Union, he said, was evidenced by the agreements on credits worth \$1000 million signed in the summer of 1974. The implementation of large-scale long-term agreements involving tremendous expenditures of money and materials on both sides, he added would have been impossible without a general improvement in the atmosphere of their relations and the strengthening of mutual trust. The Soviet commentator warned Japanese leaders against Peking's attempts to involve Japan in its anti-Soviet policy, to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Japan.<sup>39</sup>

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38 Japan Review, January 1976, pp.17-8.

39 New Times, No.3, January 1976, p.6.

The Soviet-Japanese relations became strained after a Soviet pilot of MiG-25(Foxbat) aircraft landed at Hakodate Airport on 6 September 1976 and defected to the United States. In its statement of 9 September 1976 the Soviet Government demanded the immediate return of the plane and the pilot and appealed to the good sense of the Japanese government in the matter keeping in view the spirit of good neighbourly relations between the two countries. Since Tokyo refused to return either the plane or the pilot to the Soviet Union, the Soviet government was constrained to issue another strongly-worded statement on 28 September 1976 in which Moscow criticised the Japanese government for deliberately aggravating relations with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin characterised the Japanese action as "unfriendly" which was bound to affect Soviet-Japanese relations. In conclusion the Soviet Government statement advised Tokyo not to allow hostility to take the upper hand over realism and a sober assessment of the mutual interests of the two countries and reminded Japan of Soviet Union's constant endeavours and readiness for building its relations with Japan on a good neighbourly basis.<sup>40</sup> Not content with the strongly worded statements, the Soviet Union adopted retaliatory measures which took the form of arrest of Japanese fishermen off the coast of Hokkaido. Since the fishermen constituted a powerful lobby, whose influence in domestic elections the ruling LDP could not afford to ignore, Foreign Minister Miyazawa ~~issued~~ issued a statement that Japan did not need China's help in solving a purely bilateral issue with the Soviet Union concerning the return of the four northern islands. Although the Japanese Foreign Ministry notified

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40 Soviet Review, Vol.13, no.46, 7 October 1976, pp.5-6.

its readiness to return the aircraft after 15 October 1976, the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continued ruffled. On 28 October 1976 it was announced that the Seventh Conference of the Japan-Soviet Economic Co-operation Committee ~~was~~ scheduled for November 1976 had been indefinitely postponed at the request of Moscow.

Although it was apparent~~x~~ that progress in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations in the political field was not encouraging, Moscow was not disheartened. Thus, N.Nikolayev's article in the Soviet journal Far Eastern Affairs, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations, acknowledged difficulties in the way of developing political relations with Japan as "they had to be started from scratch", but expressed satisfaction at their progress so far. The Soviet writer observed:

Nevertheless, in this period ~~x~~ it has been possible to lay a definite foundation for treaties and agreements aimed not only at regulating relations and ties in individual spheres but also at stimulating their further development.<sup>41/</sup>

In that connection, the Soviet commentator referred to such agreements as the trade treaty, the Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention, agreement on direct air and shipping lines, the consular convention, agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, etc. Other helpful developments, had been (i) an understanding in 1966 on regular consultations between the foreign Ministers of the two countries; (ii) exchange of parliamentary delegations; and (iii) the visit to the Soviet Union of the Japanese Prime Minister in October 1973, which was described as signifying

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41 Cited in Seth, n.30,p.493.

"confirmation of the mutual desire of the two countries to seek not only a consolidation of the contractual basis of relations but also their substantial improvement and further development in all spheres without exception...."<sup>42</sup>

Pravda of 29 April 1977 criticised the Japanese refusal to recognise the southern islands of Kuriles as part of Soviet territory as a "patently unacceptable approach". The Japanese attitude was stated to be linked to domestic political considerations. By focusing public attention on anti-Soviet territorial claims, it said, certain quarters in Japan seek to incite in the population nationalistic sentiments and thus secure a "favourable political situation on the eve of the elections."<sup>43</sup> In a sharp rebutal to the Japanese Communist Party's statement asserting Japan's sovereignty over the four Kurile islands, the Pravda editorial of 12 June 1977 lashed out at the Japanese Communist Party(JCP) leadership. The JCP stand on the territorial question was described as a departure from proletarian ~~revolutionary internationalism~~ internationalism and attempt to upset the post-war boundaries which had come to be accepted internationally. Miyamoto was singled out as the one leader responsible for deterioration of relations between JCP and the CPSU. The JCP leaders, it was stated, strove even to surpass the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in its unlawful territorial claims on the Socialist State. Pravda denied existence of any territorial disputes between the USSR and Japan and viewed JCP's statements in the light of stepped up activities on the part of Japan's militaristic circles and further involvement of the Japanese Government in the system of US military strategy directed against the Soviet Union.

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42 Ibid.,p.494.

43 Pravda, 29 April 1977.

The editorial denounced JCP for adopting a nationalist chauvinist posture on the border question.<sup>44</sup> Commenting on the Japanese elections to the House of Councillors, Pravda of 21 July 1977 remarked that the JCP should have made a significant success if the Socialists had supported them.<sup>45</sup> The election results had turned out to be unfavourable both for the communists and socialist parties. Commenting on Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to ASEAN countries, Tass observed that Japanese foreign trade policy in the region was to buy cheap raw materials and to sell expensive manufactures. Such ~~an~~ a policy brought enormous profits to Japan but undermine the economies of the member states of ASEAN. The visit was stated to be mainly designed to meet Washington's demands to invigorate ties with the ASEAN states.

In his statement before the Diet on 30 July 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda spoke of his determination to consolidate the good-~~an~~ neighbourly and friendly relations between China and Japan "for many years to come". Regarding Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, he said: "We will make further efforts for the conclusion of a treaty as soon as possible in a manner satisfactory to both sides." It might be recalled that China favours Japan maintaining a reliable defence capacity and strong ties with the United States, for Peking desires that Japanese leaders should not compromise their stand in negotiations over 200-mile fishing zone or return of northern territories.<sup>46</sup> Subsequently in November 1977 it was reported that Fukuda had agreed to include the controversial clause on anti-hegemony in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty provided it was not directed against any specific third country. He favoured scrapping of the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 12 June 1977.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 21 July 1977.

<sup>46</sup> Peking Review, no.27, 1 July 1977, pp.23 and 25.

The Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to either anti-Soviet activities of China or the forging of closer ties between Japan and China. Accordingly, Soviet scholar G.Krasin, writing in New Times, while drawing attention to the signing of a provisional fishing agreement and a new long-time trade and payments agreement ~~between~~ between the Soviet Union and Japan, referred to certain forces both in Japan and beyond its borders exploiting the Soviet-Japanese fishing talks as a pretext and again putting forward unlawful territorial claims to the Soviet Union. He warned Japanese leaders against the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese Treaty, by which, he said, Peking hoped "to tie Japan to its war-chariot and exploit it in order to implement its hegemonic designs." Japan, he added, had hardly hoped to get anything out of it. The Soviet commentator also pleaded for an early conclusion of a treaty of good-neighbourship and cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>47</sup>

In another commentary, G.Krasin referred to 70-fold increase in trade between 1957, when the first post-war trade treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Japan, and 1976, when the trade turnover reached 2,000 million roubles. Japan, he said, had become one of the Soviet Union's biggest trading partners among the developed capitalist countries and there was reason to expect that as a result of the third Soviet-Japanese agreement of trade and payments, signed in June 1977, the over-all volume of trade would exceed 10,000 million roubles by 1980. The Soviet writer favoured

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47 Georgi Krasin, "U.S.S.R. - Japan: The Correct Choice," New Times, No.30, July 1977, p.12.

drawing up of an economic cooperation programme extending over 10-15 years and conclusion of an Agreement on the principles of such cooperation. The Soviet Union, he said, would like to lay the foundation for good-neighbourly relations with Japan "for a long time to come." However, he wanted Japanese leaders to adopt a sober approach towards the conclusion of a peace treaty by taking into account "post World War II realities," "Not to advance" "patently unacceptable conditions," and not to seek to reduce negotiations to a discussion of some "outstanding territorial issue". Describing unilateral interpretation of the peace treaty problem by Japanese sides as "completely ~~a~~ erroneous," the Soviet commentator remarked: "peace treaties cover the entire ~~xxx~~ range of political economic and other aspects of bilateral relations. They not only sum up results but also outline the perspectives and future course of development of bilateral relations." He advised Tokyo to overcome the residue of distrust and ensure a steady development of all-round mutually advantageous cooperation and establishment of "genuinely good relations," by discussing and signing of a treaty of good-neighbourliness and cooperation.<sup>48</sup>

In his statement on the Japanese T.V. network in November 1977, the Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev spoke of the complementary nature of Soviet and Japanese economies and of considerable experience having been gained in the establishment of large-scale economic cooperation.

He added:

We want to live with the Japanese people as good neighbours so that nothing should mar our relations, which should be relations of confidence, goodwill and cooperation.

There are good objective opportunities for this. They exist in all areas of Soviet-Japanese relations without exception - political, commercial, economic, cultural, scientific, technical, ~~z~~ etc.<sup>49</sup>

48 G. Krasin, "U.S.S.R.-Japan: For Good-neighbourship," New Times, No. 51, December 1977, p. 10.

49 Soviet Review, vol. 14, no. 54, 24 November, pp. 8-9.



The annual ministerial level bilateral talks which should have been held in 1977 had to be called off in the wake of the Foxcat(MIG-25) incident. The delayed visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda took place in January 1978. The visit was described as "both useful and fruitful" and the mutual understanding was said to have been deepened through the exchange of views on bilateral and international issues.<sup>50</sup> In their luncheon speeches, the two Foreign Ministers referred to marked successes in the development of mutually advantageous trade and economic ties and exchanges in the areas of science, technology and culture. The two Foreign Ministers also expressed their hopes that there was scope for further development of cooperation in various fields.<sup>51</sup> Although the 1972 cultural accord was extended by agreement of the two sides, the failure of the talks was evident from the fact that no joint communique was issued this time.

No progress could be made either in regard to the disputed northern territories issue or concerning the proposed interim good-neighbourliness and friendship treaty on which the Soviet Union was insistent. The Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his speech at the luncheon on 9 January 1978, sought to impress upon his Japanese colleague the need to solve the problems between the two countries on the basis of "political realism -- and, of course, with due regard for one another's interests" and urged upon Japan to act accordingly. Being a realist in politics, he added, meant

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50 See statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda, 12 January 1978. Japan Review, January-February 1978, p.14.

51 See Current Digest of the Soviet Press, # vol.30, No.2, 8 February 1978, p.18.

that one should be able to see what constituted the common ground in the sides' positions and not allowing considerations of a transient nature to divert one from the mainstream of Soviet-Japanese relations. After dwelling on Soviet Union's good relations with India and other countries of Asia, Gromyko desired Japan to contribute towards "dependable security and broad cooperation on the Asian continent", advising Tokyo thereby to accept the Soviet concept of collective security in Asia.<sup>52</sup>

In his statement to the press on 12 January 1978, Japanese Foreign Minister stated that he had gone to Moscow in order to continue negotiations for the conclusion of Japan-Soviet peace treaty as well as to conduct regular consultations with his counter-part. In his discussions with Soviet leaders, he said, he made it clear that in order to establish a genuinely friendly relationship between the two countries it was imperative that all the four northern islands be returned to Japan so that the peace treaty could be concluded. He expressed his regret that the Soviet Union was not prepared to conclude the peace treaty on the basis of the Japanese claim on the territorial issue, thereby unilaterally negating the 1973 agreement between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. He consoled himself by saying that through continued dialogues the way would be paved for the ultimate solution of the basic question between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>53</sup>

After Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow, the Soviet press criticised Japanese purchase of 100 F-15 fighter bombers and 45 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft from the USA at a cost of \$4.5 billion over a 10-year period. The strengthening of the military and political role of Japan was seen by the Pravda commentator as "a counter-weight

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Japan Review, n.49.

to the National Liberation Movement of Asiatic Peoples" and to Japanese efforts to follow the path of independence and ~~social~~ <sup>social</sup> progress.<sup>54</sup> In Izvestia commentary of 10 February 1978 criticized increased military expenditure in Japan (for 1977-1981 it is estimated to be US \$50 billion, i.e. two and a half times as much as in the previous years) and concluded that continued militarization would worsen its relations with Southeast Asian nations.<sup>55</sup> Peking was accused of pushing Tokyo into militarization.<sup>56</sup> There was increasing opposition in Japan to the country's mobilization.<sup>57</sup>

In February 1978 the Soviet government published the text of the draft treaty on good neighbourliness and cooperation between USSR and ~~and~~ Japan which it desired to conclude. The draft appeared to be the masterpiece of Soviet diplomacy as it not only shelved the territorial question and sought to blunt the edge of both the US-Japan security treaty and any possible military alliance between China and Japan but also had the attributes of a formal peace treaty and the trappings of a security arrangement. It made no mention ~~of~~ of the territorial issue, but, on the contrary, sought to bind Japan that it would settle its disputes with the USSR "exclusively by peaceful means" and would refrain from the threat of force or its use. Article 3 of the proposed treaty committed Japan not to allow the use of its territory for any actions which could prejudice the security of the other party. Under Article 4 of the draft treaty, the contracting Parties undertook to refrain from any actions which could encourage any third party to take aggressive actions against either of them.

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<sup>54</sup> Vsevolod Kalinin, "Contrary to Interests of Detente," Pravda, 16 January 1978, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.30, No.3, 15 February 1978, p.19.

<sup>55</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I, The USSR, Second Series, SU/5736, 10 February 1978, A3/4.

<sup>56</sup> Radio Peace and Progress, 15 February 1978, Ibid., SU/5742, 17 February 1978, A3/2.

<sup>57</sup> Moscow Radio broadcast of 17 Feb 1978. Ibid., SU/5747, 23 February 1978. A3/1

Article 9 declared Japan to broaden its cooperation and the preservation and rational utilisation of the biological resources and to pay due regard for the laws of the contracting parties in the matter. Article 13 stated that the treaty would not affect the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded by either of the two contracting parties and that it was not directed against any third country, the idea advanced by Japanese leaders in their talks with Chinese leaders on the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty. The good neighbourliness and cooperation aspects were delineated in other articles of the draft treaty which spoke of improving trade relations, scientific and technical cooperation, etc. Significantly, the draft treaty did not contain any unilateral concessions on the part of the Soviet Union to Japan even in regard to fishing for it required both the Soviet Union and Japan that they would continue to broaden cooperation in that field paying due regard to the "preservation and rational utilisation of biological resources" and "for the laws of the parties."<sup>58</sup>

The failure of Japanese Foreign Minister's mission to Moscow in January 1978 and his inability to make any headway on the territorial issue with the Soviet leaders led to frustrations in the minds of the Japanese leaders. Prime Minister Fukuda, thus, announced on 23 March 1978 that Japan had decided to resume talks with China on the proposed ~~with China on the~~ peace and friendship treaty.<sup>59</sup> It might be recalled that China had made it quite clear that it would sign the proposed

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58 For text of the Draft Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the USSR and Japan, 23 February 1978, see Pravda, 24 February 1978, as translated in Soviet Review, No.13, 16 March 1978, pp.46-8.

59 Times of India, 25 March 1978.

treaty \* with Japan only if the controversial anti-hegemony clause was included in the treaty. Following Fukuda's announcement, a spate of criticism was mounted in the Soviet newsmedia against the dangerous change in Japanese policy and attacking Japanese nuclear ambitions.

Despite continuing Soviet criticism of the Japanese hobnobbing with China, the two countries continued their cooperation in economic and cultural spheres. Thus, bilateral talks on scientific and technical cooperation were held in January 1978 and a protocol on cultural and scientific exchange for 1978 was signed on 4 April 1978. It signified that while mutually advantageous cooperation in scientific, cultural, trade, and other fields was being constantly strengthened, a stalemate persisted on the territorial question which continued to bedevil their political relations.

Soviet policy towards Japan is to be seen against the background of an unfriendly USA and a totally hostile China. Accordingly, before the announcement of a breakthrough in Sino-US relations was made in July 1971, Moscow denounced Japan for acting as Americans cat's paw in Asia, by trying to take over some of the US ~~peace~~ peace-keeping role in Asia with "growing Japanese militarism". This was considered particularly harmful to the small developing countries of Asia. However, Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 brought a change in Moscow's policy towards Japan. The Soviet Union tried to make use of Japanese frustration and disappointment with the USA for keeping Japan out from America's new policy of rapprochement towards China. Moreover, the Soviet Union reneged on its attacks on ~~Japan for its so-called militarism~~. *Not only that, the Chinese attacks on*

Japanese militarism were considered unwarranted by the Soviet Union. It thus tried to play soft w towards Japan in marked contrast to its own earlier policy on Japanese militarism. Gromyko's visit to Japan in January 1972 was the product of such circumstances.

The normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in the autumn of 1972 caused dissatisfaction and a certain amount of misgivings in the USSR and this appeared to dampen Soviet enthusiasm for Japan. However, the considerable gains made by the left and generally pro-Soviet forces in the elections in Japan, held in December 1972, as also the unawareness of the fact that the euphoria generated in Japan over rapprochement with China was fading very fast led Moscow to revive its interest in Japan. Howsoever much, Moscow might disown the theory of balance of power there seemed little doubt that the Soviet Union was pursuing a balance of power policy to the new developments in East Asia. Besides, there were other compulsions for wooing Japan, particularly the vital need of attracting Japanese technology for the development of the vast untapped resources of East Siberia, for which Japan was particularly well situated geographically and otherwise financially and technologically. Moreover, Japan was considered to be in a great need of importing raw materials for its burgeoning industry and fast developing economy. It was believed that the USSR had much more to offer to Japan in the form of raw materials than China in return for Japan's technology and investments. In these circumstances, the Soviet press gave considerable publicity to the periodic meetings and discussions between the business and trade organisations of the two countries. The developing economic collaboration between the Soviet Union and Japan was stated to be in mutual interest. The Soviet efforts were not in vain as Japanese banks granted a loan of \$1050 million for gas, coal, and timber products in Siberia. Some other projects, including the Tyumen

project, were also discussed. Japan became USSR's second largest trading partner outside the socialist bloc in 1974. Though no progress could be made in regard to the territorial dispute, the differences in political matters were not allowed to obstruct the development of mutually beneficial economic relations. Since 1975, the two communist Powers - the USSR and China - had been jockeying over the anti-hegemony clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with a view to enlist Japan to its own side or at least to prevent Japan from aligning itself too closely with its rival nation. Soviet-Japanese relations were strained in September 1976 over the flight of the MiG-25(Foxbat) plane to a Japanese airport. Tokyo refused to return either the plane or the pilot to the Soviet Union and allowed American experts to dismantle and study the Soviet aircraft. Moscow issued a strongly worded statement on 28 September 1976 warning Japan against the unfriendly act which could affect Soviet-Japanese relations. The Foxbat incident was a reminder that the US-Japanese security link was alive and kicking, and Tokyo would be prepared to risk damaging its relations with the USSR to maintain its special ties with the United States.<sup>60</sup> In spite of the severity of Soviet criticism in this matter and a temporary coolness being visible in their relations no fundamental damage was done to the relations. Japan was too important to the USSR both politically and economically and systematic efforts had been made in the past few years to develop closer and friendly relations with Japan, which Moscow cannot afford to alienate for good.

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60 Seth, n.30,p.500.

## Chapter Ten

## CONCLUSION

Japan, while trying to strengthen its defence capabilities, is expected to rely for its vital security needs on the US-Japan military alliance and follow a policy of equi-distance, i.e. of balancing its relations with China and the Soviet Union. This is necessitated by its vulnerability to nuclear attack and the consequent obligation to avoid hostile relations with these two Great Powers of the region. Besides, such a policy would enable it to have a significant degree of diplomatic manoeuvrability in international affairs~~x~~ as well. Furthermore, this policy pacifies left-wingers at home and soothes those critics who lash out at Japan's intimacy with the United States and clamour for a more independent foreign policy posture. Japan is ~~exp~~ected to keep aloof from the quarrels of its two Communist neighbours, ~~xx~~ unwilling as it is to take the risk of alienating either of them by affiliating itself too closely or constantly with the other. It is, therefore, likely to refrain from committing itself exclusively to either of them. In dealing with China and the USSR. Japan hopes that it can separate economics and politics, and thereby participate in the modernisation drives of both<sup>1</sup> in order to reap economic benefits. Racially and emotionally Japan might feel more inclined towards the Chinese than the Russians. But, since feelings do not always dictate the shaping of foreign policy, the Japanese, as a pragmatic people, are likely to carefully make their calculations about the estimates of strength, both present and potential, of the two Communist Powers. The superior military strength of the Soviet Union, added to the economic potentialities of Siberia, especially as a source of supply of vital raw materials,

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1 US Congress, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st session, 20 September 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1977), p.33.



Richard Storry points out, "makes it inadvisable for Japan to court China at the risk of offending the USSR".<sup>2</sup> In fact, antagonistic relations with the Soviet Union would be counter-productive for Japan, particularly if it wants to pursue a multipolar diplomacy and keep up its leverage vis-a-vis China. Both China and the Soviet Union are likely to compete for the friendship of Japan so long as rivalry and confrontation between the two Communist Powers lasts. As part of the balancing game Japan may use its developing detente with China as a leverage for attracting the best possible terms (primarily with respect of the ~~xxxxx~~ northern territories) from the Soviet Union just as it will use its Soviet option as a leverage to ensure that China and the USA do not act in a manner inimical to its national interests. Japan will also bear in mind Chinese reaction and the impact on its own security of any accretion to Soviet strength in the Pacific region which the economic development of Siberia may bring about. It seems vital that Japan maintain its close links with the United States. In fact, they are absolutely necessary for Japan's security, economy, and technological progress in the near future.<sup>3</sup> Tokyo is, therefore, likely to pursue a policy of equidistance and friendly relations with all the three Powers. Takeo Miki, the Prime Minister of Japan, rightly observed in the beginning of 1973:

In the case of Japan, China and the United States, it is now possible to construct friendly triangular relations between the three countries as a result of the thaw in US-China

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2 See Conflict Studies (London), August 1974, p.17.

3 As of 1968, 83% of Japan's consumption of soyabeans, 75% of its scrap steel, 50% of its wheat, and 25% of its raw cotton were imported from the United States. One-third of Japan's trade was with the United States and every year \$30 million in American technology was imported. A rupture in friendly US-Japan relations would, thus, be disastrous. Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and America in Asia During the Seventies," The Japan Interpreter (Summer-Autumn, 1972), p.252.

relations and the restoration of Japan-China relations. But in the case of Japan, China and the Soviet Union, we cannot expect the same happy outcome because of the problems existing in China-Soviet relations. Concrete details of the Soviet Union's concept of Asian security have not as yet been revealed; but if that concept envisages a state of confrontation with China, it will fail to win China's approval. If, on the other hand, China's concept of Asian security includes policies aimed at checking the Soviet Union, it will not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Japan must take full cognizance of these realities of China-Soviet relations, and must seek a path of friendship that does not favour one over the other...It could be that Japan might be able to play the role of a middleman in adjusting relations between the two countries.<sup>4</sup>

China's over-riding objective is the containment (or counter-containment) of the Soviet Union including prevention of the growth of Soviet influence in Asia, because "the menace from the bear in the North" is more pronounced than the dangers of "US imperialism".<sup>5</sup> To that end, it seeks to dissuade Japan from siding with the USSR or from being drawn into Russian security system and economic schemes. It also finds American military presence in Asia desirable and positively tolerates the existing security relationship between Japan and the United States. The Chinese motive in repeatedly emphasising that the Soviet Union should return the northern territories, in characterising Siberian ventures as an attempt by the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan, ~~in~~ and in drawing attention to threats to Japan from the repeated violations of Japanese air space and territorial waters by Soviet planes and warships apparently is to sour Soviet-Japanese relations, impede their successful development and draw Japan closer to itself as against the USSR.

The principal objectives of the Soviet Union in East Asia, According to Ralph N. Clough, appear to be to deter or contain any

<sup>4</sup> Takeo Miki, "Future Japanese Diplomacy", Japan Quarterly (January-March 1973), pp. 20 and 22.

<sup>5</sup> Hsinhua News Agency, 8 July 1974.

possible Chinese threat to the Soviet frontier, preserve or improve the Soviet position relative to China with governments and major communist parties in East Asia, and keep open the possibility of improving relations with the post-Mao leadership; to improve the Soviet position in East Asia relative to the United States; ~~the Soviet~~ ~~is~~ and to improve Soviet relations with Japan and to keep Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Soviet preoccupati~~o~~ion, military and political, by their conflict with China and present conditions in Japan, and by the nature of US-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations, is to rely more heavily on the carrot than the stick in seeking closer relations with Japan.<sup>7</sup> Moscow is also keen to cultivate Japan as a potential counterpoise to China and/or a Sino-American detente.

If Moscow succeeds in co-opting Japan in its plans to isolate and contain China in East Asia, it could turn its attention and shift its ~~x~~ resources to other parts of the world. In the rather unlikely ~~and~~ event of Soviet-Japanese-American "collusion" against China, Peking might find it necessary to make the best possible deal with the Soviet Union while Moscow would again move to the middle position where it could exploit the Sino-American impasse over the Taiwan issue and China's traditional fear of Japan.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union is aware of the advantages which it has over Japan. Russia stands militarily unchallenged by Japan. It controls the northern fisheries and Siberia's vast untapped resources which can be developed with or without the cooperation of Japan whose bargaining advantages of

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6 Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C. 1975) p. 147

7 Ibid., p. 157.

8 See Tang Tsuo, Najita and Hideo Otake, "Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1970s," in Morton A. Kaplan, Japan, United States, and World Order (New York, 1977), p. 64.

capital and technology have been eroded by the deepening energy crisis and the scramble for depleting natural resources. Politically, Europe's move towards detente and frontier stabilisation in the wake of the Helsinki Conference, bodes ill for Japan's claims over the northern territories. Soviet-American rapprochement may cool American residual sympathy for Japan's territorial claims.<sup>9</sup> A solution, therefore, of the territorial problem with the signing of a formal peace treaty with the Soviet Union still seems remote. The two countries have to put up with that thorny problem unless there is a substantial change in the configuration of international situation, compelling one or the other side to ~~px~~ compromise or Japan feels more than compensated in economic gains so as to give up its insistence about the return of Etorofu and Kunashiri islands. The general picture which is emerging is that both Japan and Soviet Union have recognised the necessity of forging political ties to which more meaningful economic, scientific and cultural exchanges would give greater depth.

The Soviet-Japanese relations are characterized by partial, not total, strategic disharmony. The disharmony is of a bilateral, and perhaps regional, nature. The four basic factors which foster strategic disharmony between the two countries are unpleasant historical antecedents and psychological dislike of the Soviets, owing to divergent socio-economic and political systems and ideology, problem of Northern Territories, the perception of a Soviet military threat to Japan, and the perennial fisheries question.

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<sup>9</sup> See John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (London, 1974), pp. 235-6.

What are the prospects of strategic disharmony being diluted? It is unlikely that any basic change will occur in the social economic, and political systems or ideology of either Japan or the Soviet Union in the near future. There is also unlikely to be any marked decline in the Soviet military and strategic predominance in East Asia, especially vis-a-vis Japan. Tokyo's defence capabilities against external attack of a conventional type, however, are likely to improve further as the qualitative improvement of its Self-Defence Forces progresses. Soviet intransigence over the Northern Territories in view of their economic, and strategic, significance will continue to be a permanent feature of their relationship. As regards the fisheries question, Moscow will apparently continue to use it, as in the past, as a kind of a pressure tactic to impress upon the Japanese the need to maintain cordial relations with its northern neighbour. However, if the Soviet Union apprehends that the international configuration in East Asia is becoming detrimental to its interests, it might seek to placate Japan by acceding to its demands for increasing its quota. Haggling over catches, will, therefore continue. This should not, however, be construed as implying that disharmony will not be reduced to any appreciable extent in the years to come. Increased economic interaction, the development of trade, and greater Japanese collaboration in Siberian economic development will apparently contribute to promoting harmony. Since Japan is a nation which must trade to live, Soviet-Japanese economic relations have continued to expand steadily. But, as already noted, it is

unlikely that trade will dramatically or suddenly transform strategic disharmony, though it will tend to lessen and reduce it. While greater economic collaboration is desirable, it is no guarantee that disharmony will be totally removed. Owing to domestic compulsions, Japanese leaders cannot perhaps be expected to easily reconcile themselves to the return of only Habomai and Shikotan.

Since the 1905 Russo-Japanese War Soviet policy in East Asia has been to help strengthen China as a counterpoise against Japan but in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split both the Communist giants aim to use Japan as a counterpoise against the other. The dilemma of both Communist countries is that in their attempts to use Japan against the other, the chief beneficiary of such a policy might be Japan, *it*self. To some extent, Japan's ability to maneuver between Moscow and Peking is enhanced by its defence ties with the United States for they permit Tokyo to remain aloof from the security pressures of both.

APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

### EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN, 1953-1978

(Note: C stands for Cultural, E for Economic, and P for Political)

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|--|-----------------------|
| 1 Japan Red Cross representatives in USSR. Soviet Red Cross hands them a complete list of names of the remaining 1047 Japanese POWs; convicted as war criminals, they were detained after the repatriation of 1274 POWs and civilians was effected | 29 Nov 1953P          |
| 2 The first group of 811 repatriates from USSR, including 420 former military personnel and 391 civilians arrive at Maizuru  | 1 Dec 1953P           |
| 3 Three-member trade delegation in Japan to conclude a barter trade pact of \$40 million each way  | Aug 1954E             |
| 4 Foreign Minister M. Shigemitsu in USSR   | Jul-Aug 1956P         |
| 5 Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama in USSR   | 13-19 Oct 1956P       |
| 6 Soviet fisheries delegation in Japan   | 15Feb-6 Apr 1957E     |
| 7 Japanese Socialist Delegation headed by Tetsu Kotayama in USSR   | Oct 1957P             |
| 8 Japanese fishery delegation led by Tsunejiro Hiratsuka in USSR   | Jan-Mar 1958E         |
| 9 Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Munenori Akagi in USSR to resumed deadlocked fishery negotiations  | Mar-Apr 1958E         |
| 10 Soviet Fishery delegation in Japan for Third Soviet-Japanese Fishery talks  | Jan 1959E             |
| 11 Economic delegation in Japan  | Feb-Mar 1960E         |
| 12 First Deputy Prime Minister A. Mikoyan in Japan   | Aug 1961P             |
| 13 S.A. Zhukov, Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign <del>M</del> Countries, in Japan   | 20Mar-8 Apr 1962<br>C |
| 14 Soviet cosmonaut Major Yuri Gagarin in Japan  | 21-29 May 1962C       |
| 15 Economic delegation in USSR   | Aug-Sep 1962E         |
| 16 A 40-member trade mission led by Tokutaro Kitamura in USSR to negotiate for trade expansion   | Jun 1963E             |
| 17 Supreme Soviet delegation led by First Deputy Premier A. Mikoyan in Japan   | 14-27 May 1964P       |
| 18 Japan's first silk trade mission led by <del>Mr</del> Jirohachi Ishibashi in USSR   | May 1964E             |
| 19 Japan Socialist Party delegation led by Secretary-General Tomomi Narita in USSR   | Jun-Jul 1964P         |
| 20 First Japanese Parliamentary delegation in USSR   | Sep 1964P             |



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|--|--|
| 21 Liberal Democratic Party Dietmen delegation led by Arichiro Fujiyama in USSR                                      | Oct 1964P  |
| 22 Takeo Miki, Minister for International Trade, in USSR   | Jul 1965 E   |
| 23 Youth delegation in Japan   | Oct-Nov 1965C  |
| 24 Foreign Minister E-Shiina in USSR   | 16622 Jan 1966P                                      |
| 25 Soviet Fishery Minister Ishikov in Japan  | Jun 1966E  |
| 26 Foreign Minister A.Gromyko in Japan   | 24-30 Jul 1966P                                      |
| 27 Foreign Minister Takeo Miki in USSR   | Jul 1967P  |
| 28 N.Baibakov, Soviet Deputy Premier and Chairman of State Planning Committee in Japan                               | early 1968P  |
| 29 M.A.Suslov in Japan   | 31 Jan-7 Feb 1968P                                   |
| 30 Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi in USSR  | Sep 1969P  |
| 31 Japan Socialist Party delegation in USSR  | Jul 1970P  |
| 32 Supreme Soviet delegation led by Y.S.Nasriddinova, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, in Japan              | 5-17 Sep 1970P                                       |
| 33 Zentarō Kosaka, Chairman of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, in USSR                                    | Aug 1971P  |
| 34 Nikolai Patolichev, Soviet Foreign <del>Minis</del> Trade Minister, in Japan                                      | Sep 1971E  |
| 35 A Soviet Trade Union delegation in Japan  | 17-30 Oct <del>1971P</del> <del>1972P</del><br>1971C |
| 36 Foreign Minister A.Gromyko in Japan   | 23-28 Jan 1972P                                      |
| 37 Soviet Peace Committee delegation in Japan  | Apr 1972P  |
| 38 Minister of Fisheries A.Ishkov in Japan   | Jul 1972E  |
| 39 Foreign Minister M.Ohira in USSR to assure Russians on Sino-Japanese rapprochement and open talks on peace treaty | Oct 1972P  |
| 40 Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions(AUCCTU) in Japan   | Oct 1972C  |
| 41 A Japanese Confederation of Labour delegation in USSR   | May-Jun 1973P  |
| 42 Business delegation led by Doko of Toshiba in USSR  | 4 -14 Jun 1973E                                      |
| 43 Foreign Trade Minister Ossipov in Japan   | Jun 1973E  |
| 44 Sports delegations in USSR  | Aug 1973C  |
| 45 Joint meeting of the Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee in Tokyo  | 29 Aug 1973E   |
| 46 A 12-member parliamentary delegation in USSR  | Aug-Sep 1973P  |

- 47 Trade delegation led by Ivan Semichastnov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Trade, in Japan Aug-Sep 1973E
- 48 Tokuyasu Fukuda, Chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs Research Council in USSR to prepare for Tanaka's visit 10 Sep 1973P
- 49 Prime Minister Tanaka in USSR 7-10 Oct 1973P
- 50 Agriculture and Forestry Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi in USSR 19 -27 Oct 1973E
- 51 Chairman Mikhail S.Solomentsev of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic in Japan to attend the opening ceremony of the Great Siberian Fair 20-29 Dec 1973P
- 52 Kogoro Uemura, President of the Federation of Economic Organizations(Keidanren) and Shigeo Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in USSR for discussions on Japanese participation in themassive Siberian development projects Mar 1974E
- 53 Deputy Foreign ~~Min~~ Trade Minister V.Alkhimov in Japan Apr 1974E
- 54 An education delegation in USSR Sep 1974C
- 55 A 11-member Komeito delegation led by Yoshikatsu Takefiri in USSR 26 Sep-2 Oct 1974P
- 56 Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions delegation in Japan Oct 1974P
- 57 A textile delegation in Japan Nov 1974E
- 58 A women's delegation in USSR 18-29 Nov 1974C
- 59 Trade Union delegation in USSR Dec 1974C
- 60 Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in USSR 15 -17 Jan 1975P
- 61 A 13-member Soviet delegation led by V.N.Sushkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, in Japan 28 Jan -6 Feb 1975E
- 62 S.A.Losev, Deputy Director-General of Tass, in Japan 4-17 Feb 1975C
- 63 Trade Union delegation in USSR 19-25 Feb 1975C
- 64 A six-member fishery delegation in Japan Mar 1975E
- 65 Fishery delegation led by Yoshihide Uchimura, Director-General of Japanese Fisheries Agency, in USSR 11 -15 Mar 1975E
- 66 Hiroki Imazoto, President of the Sakhalin Oil Development Company, in USSR Apr 1975E

- 67 A delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, led by F.A.Tabeyeb in Japan Apr 1975P
- 68 A delegation of the Soka Gakkai Society in USSR 23-30 May 1975C
- 69 Minister of Fisheries Aleksandr Ishkov in Japan 2-8 Jun 1975E
- 70 A four-member Soviet delegation led by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Semichastnov in Japan 6-12 Jun 1975E
- 71 Buddhist delegation in USSR Jun 1975C
- 72 A delegation from Hyogo prefecture visits Khabarovsk Jun-Jul 1975C
- 73 Japanese businessmen's delegation in USSR Jul 1975E
- 74 A Government trade delegation led by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhiniov in Japan Jul 1975E
- 75 Japan Socialist Party delegation in USSR Jul 1975P
- 76 Food industry trade Union delegation in USSR Jul 1975E
- 77 An electrical workers' Union delegation in USSR Jul-Aug 1975C
- 78 Democratic Socialist Party delegation in USSR 10-19 Aug 1975P
- 79 Friendship delegation in USSR Aug 1975C
- 80 A 52-member Japanese graves registration mission visits Suisho and Shibotsu islands 19-21 Aug 1975C
- 81 Trade Union delegation in USSR 22-23 Aug 1975E
- 82 Munemori Akagi, a senior Liberal-Democrat Dietman and Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association in USSR 22-28 Aug 1975P
- 83 Japan Socialist Party delegation in USSR Sep 1975P
- 84 Supreme Soviet delegation in Japan Nov 1975P
- 85 Trade Union delegation in USSR Dec 1975C
- 86 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Japan 9-13 Jan 1976P
- 87 Japanese business delegation in USSR Jan 1976E
- 88 A 14-member atomic energy consortium delegation in USSR Jan-Feb 1976E
- 89 Economic delegation led by Toshio Doko, President of the Federation of Economic Organisations, in USSR Aug 1976E
- 90 A eight-member fishery mission in Japan Jan 1977E
- ~~91 A delegation of the National Council of Japanese Governors in USSR Jul 1977P~~
- ~~92 Office contact secretary Souda in USSR Apr 1977P~~

- 91 Fishing delegation in Japan for annual discussions Mar 1977E
- 92 Chief Cabinet-Secretary Sonoda in USSR Apr 1977P
- 93 A 15-member Dietmen's delegation in USSR Apr 1977P
- 94 \* \* Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev in Japan May 1977E
- 95 Japanese Labour Minister, Hirohide Ishida in USSR 12-16 Jun 1977E
- 96 Toshiwo Dokó, President of the Keidanren  
in USSR 20-24 Jun 1977E
- 97 Soviet fishery delegation led by Ivan Nknorev in  
Japan Jun 1977E
- 98 Minister of Labour and Chairman of the Soviet-Japan  
Parliamentary Friendship Association in USSR Jun 1977P
- 99 A delegation of the National Council of Japanese  
Governors in USSR Jul 1977P
- 100 Japan-USSR Friendship Association Chairman ~~Minister~~  
Munehori Akagi in USSR 13-21 Jul 1977P
- 101 First Deputy Trade Minister Semichestnov in Japan  
to participate in the Seventh Japan-USSR Joint  
Economic Committee Meeting 12-17 Sep 1977E
- 102 Foreign Minister Sunao Sunoda in USSR 8-11 Jan 1978P
- 103 Japanese delegation of "friendly" organizations  
in USSR Feb 1978C
- 104 Agriculture-Forestry Minister Ichiro Nakagawa  
in USSR Apr 1978E

## Appendix 2

## Agreements between the USSR and Japan, 1956-1978

1	Ten-Year Fisheries Convention	14 May 1956
2	Three-year rescue agreement	14 May 1956
3	Protocol concerning Development of Trade and Mutual Granting of Most-Favoured Nation Treatment	19 Oct 1956
4	Fisheries Agreement	6 Apr 1957
5	Treaty of Commerce	6 Dec 1957
6	Trade and Payments Agreement	6 Dec 1957
7	Postal services agreement	Jan 1958
8	Agreement for promotion of tourism	18 Apr 1958
9	Fisheries Agreement setting <sup>Japanese total catch</sup> ceiling at 110,000 tons	22 Apr 1958
10	Second Trade Agreement	May 1958
11	Agreement establishing a sea route between the ports of Yokhama and Nakhodka	3 Jun 1958
12	Trade Agreement providing for \$35 million worth of goods each way during 1959	4 Dec 1958
13	Fishery agreement setting Japanese Salmon catch quota at 85,000 metric tons	13 May 1959
14	Three-year Trade and Payments Agreement providing for \$440 million total trade both ways	2 May 1960
15	Fishery Agreement	18 May 1960
16	Moscow Trade Fair of Japan opens at Sokoliniki Park	16 Aug 1960
17	Trade plan for 1961, totalling \$160 million	21 Dec 1960
18	Private cultural agreement	17 Jan 1961
19	Agreement providing for Soviet imports of \$85 million and Japanese imports of \$75 million	1961
20	Fishery Agreement setting Japan's Salmon catch quota for 1961 at 65,000 tons, or 2500 tons less than that of 1960	21 May 1961
21	Soviet Commerce and Industry Exhibition in Tokyo	Aug 1961
22	Protocol for trade during fiscal 1962 providing for Japan's exports of \$120 million and imports of \$105 million to adjust trade imbalance of 1961	23 Feb 1962
23	Fishery Agreement	12 May 1962

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|----|--|-------------|
| 24 | Contracts for delivery of tankers, motorships, fishing boats etc.worth about \$100 million   | Sep 1962    |
| 25 | Three-year Trade and Payments Agreement envisaging total trade of between \$670-700 million for 1963-65  | 28 Jan 1963 |
| 26 | Fishery Agreement on Japan's salmon catch quota in the northern Pacific at 120,000 tons, 5000 tons more than that of last year   | 4 Apr 1963  |
| 27 | Agreement on Tangle Fishing  | 7 Jun 1963  |
| 28 | Trade Agreement envisaging \$270 million both ways for 1964  | 4 Feb 1964  |
| 29 | Trade protocol   | 10 Feb 1964 |
| 30 | Fishery Agreement for 1964   | 28 Apr 1964 |
| 31 | Tangle Agreement   | 29 Apr 1964 |
| 32 | Agreement on Japan's 1965 salmon catch quota at 115,000 tons   | 30 Mar 1965 |
| 33 | 8-year deferred payment contracts for exports to USSR approved by Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry  | 9 Sep 1965  |
| 34 | Civil Aviation Agreement allowing the two countries to open flight services between Tokyo and Moscow   | 21 Jan 1966 |
| 35 | Five-year Trade Agreement for 1966-70 envisaging total exports of \$1100 million and total imports of \$1000 million   | 21 Jan 1966 |
| 36 | Cultural Exchange agreement  | 3 Feb 1966  |
| 37 | Fishery Agreement providing for Japan's salmon trout fishing quota at 96000 tons, 19000 tons less than the last years, and its crab catch quota at 240,000 cases during the new fishing season | 14 Apr 1966 |
| 38 | Three-year fisheries cooperation agreement   | Jul 1966    |
| 39 | Consular Treaty  | 29 Jul 1966 |
| 40 | Technical cooperation agreement  | 5 Jun 1967  |
| 41 | Contract on Cargo transport  | 6 Oct 1967  |
| 42 | Agreement for supply of \$150 million worth of machinery etc. for development of forest resources in <del>Khabarovsk</del> Siberia   | 24 Jul 1968 |
| 43 | Agreement to supply \$80 million worth of machinery and equipment for construction of Vostochny port   | 18 Dec 1970 |
| 44 | Trade Agreement for 1971-1975 envisaging trade turnover of \$3.5 to \$5 billion  | Sep 1971    |
| 45 | Agreement for Japanese credit of \$45 million for the Soviet purchase of equipment and machines etc.   | Dec 1971    |

- 46 Plan of Cultural Cooperation for 1972 24 Mar 1972
- 47 Annual fisheries agreement Apr 1972
- 48 Scientific and Cultural exchange pact for 1973 signed 8 Mar 1973
- 49 Treaty concerning the protection of Migratory Birds and Birds on the verge of Extinction and their Living Environment 10 Oct 1973
- 50 Agreement concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation 10 Oct 1973
- 51 Agreement on Cultural Exchanges 10 Oct 1973
- 52 Protocol under which Japan Export-Import Bank agreed to extend a credit of \$1050 million to USSR for the development of the South Yakut Coking Coal, the Yakut natural gas and Siberian timber resources projects. The credit will be in Yen and will carry an interest of 6.375 per cent per annum. 22 Apr 1974
- 53 Memorandum on natural gas prospecting in Yakut under which USSR is expected to supply 10,000 million cubic meters of natural gas each to the USA and Japan annually over a 25-year period 22 Apr 1974
- 54 Memorandum on the joint South Yakut coking coal project by which Japan agreed to provide yen Bank credits equivalent to \$450 million to be used to purchase coal mining and railway building equipment. USSR, in turn, is to export coking coal to Japan beginning with 3.2 million tons in 1983, graduating to 4.26 million tons in 1985 and going up to 5.5 million tons from 1985 to 1998. 30 Apr 1974
- 55 Contract for the second Far Eastern forest resources development project, under which Japan agreed to provide equipment, machinery, materials and ships on Yen credits totalling \$550 million between 1975 and 1978 while the USSR agreed to supply 18.4 million cubic meters of lumber in the five-year period 1975-79. 30 Jul 1974
- 56 Soviet-US-Japanese Agreement on prospecting Yakut gas deposits signed in Paris whereby US and Japan would grant credits of \$100 million to USSR to purchase machinery and facilities for prospecting, to be repaid by supplying Japan and USA with 10,000 million cu-m. of Yakut gas each year. Nov 1974
- 57 Contract for Japanese supply of some 170 bulldozers worth 9500 million yen by the end of 1975 Nov 1974
- 58 Fishery agreement on ways of settling fishery disputes 5 Dec 1974

- 59 Protocol for Japanese financial assistance to Soviet Union for crude oil and natural gas development of Sakhalin 10 Dec 1974
- 60 Agreement on the extension of \$100 million Japanese loan to USSR for development of oil and gas reserves off Sakhalin 28 Jan 1975
- 61 Three-year Fisheries agreement 7 Jun 1975
- 62 Protocol on scientific and technical cooperation 19 Jun 1975
- 63 Protocol on \$100 million loan to Vneshtrogbank ~~in~~ by the Japan Export-Import Bank ~~to~~ finance gas exploration in Yakutia. 14 Jul 1975
- 64 Agreement on 71,419 million yen loan by Japan Export-Import Bank to Vneshtrogbank to enable Mashinimport to purchase four complete Japanese ammonia manufacturing plants 22 Jul 1975
- 65 ~~A~~ Trade Agreement for 1976-80 envisaging trade turnover of \$8800 million 28 Oct 1975
- 66 Agreements providing for Japanese credit of \$100 million for development of Sakhalin oil and gas resources Oct 1975
- 67 Agreement to extend 1972 cultural agreement Jan 1976
- 68 Agreement to cooperate on nuclear fusion techniques Jan 1976
- 69 Contract for Japanese sale of four ammonia plants worth \$220 million Feb 1976
- 70 Agreement for Japanese credit of \$25 million for natural gas prospecting in the Yakut region Mar 1976
- 71 The tenth annual exchange programme in culture and science 9 Apr 1976
- 72 Agreement for loan of \$50 million by US and Japanese banks for development of gas in the Yakutia area Apr 1976
- 73 Contract for Japanese loan of 113000 million yen Jul 1976
- 74 Agreement on joint exploration of oil in the continental shelf off the Sakhalin island 25 Dec 1976
- 75 Interim fisheries agreement 24 May 1977
- 76 Trade and Payments Agreement 30 May 1977



- 77 Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement Jul 1977
- 78 Interim agreement on Soviet fishing within 200-mile Japanese sea zone 4 Aug 1977
- 79 Contract worth \$380 million for the construction of three ammonia plants and ten fertilizer plants in USSR Sep 1977
- 80 Five-year fishery cooperation agreement Apr 1978
- 81 Protocol setting Japanese salmon, catch quota for 1978 to 42,500 tons, as compared to 65,000 tons during 1977 \* Apr 1978

## Appendix 3

USSR-Japan Trade, 1946-1975  
( in million US dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports from USSR</u>	<u>Exports to USSR</u>
1946	-	.02 <del>0.02x</del>
1947	2.0	.1 <sup>*</sup>
1948	2.7	4.3 <sup>*</sup>
1949	1.9	7.4
1950	.7	.7
1951	.03	-
1952	.5	.1
1953	2.1	.007
1954	2.2	0.0
1955	3.1	2.1
1956	2.9	0.8
1957	12.3	9.3
1958	22.16	18.10
1959	39.48	23.02
1960	87.02	59.97
1961	145.01	65.38
1962	147.07	149.39
1963	161.94	158.13
1964	226.72	181.81
1965	240.19	168.35
1966	300.36	214.02
1967	453.95	157.70
1968	463.54	179.03
1969	461.60	268.26
1970	481.02	340.96
1971	495.92	377.74
1972	593.90	504.18
1973	1076.23	484.58
1974	1418.89	1101.69
1975	1168.61	1625.19

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Source: Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Sengo Nihon no boeki nijunen shi (Tokyo, 1967), pp.442-43; Tsusho hakusho 1969 (Kakuron), pp.625-27; 1971. (Kakuron), pp.708-710; and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics of various years

## Appendix 4

MEETINGS OF THE JAPAN-SOVIET JOINT ECONOMIC  
COMMITTEE, 1966-1977

First Meeting: Mar 1966

Second Meeting: 12-14 Jun 1967

Third Meeting: Dec 1968

Fourth Meeting: Feb 1970

Fifth Meeting: 21-24 Feb 1972

Sixth Meeting(Moscow): 29 Oct 1974-1 Nov 1974

Seventh Meeting(Tokyo): 12-17 Sep 1977

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