

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NONALIGNED COUNTRIES
AND
THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT, 1971

NONALIGNED COUNTRIES
AND
THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT, 1971

PRIYANKAR UPADHYAYA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & ORGANIZATION
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI

1978

C O N T E N T S

		Pages
	PREFACE	i - v
CHAPTER I	INTRODUCTION: NONALIGNMENT : THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CONFLICT	1 - 18
CHAPTER II	THE CONFLICT-REDUCING FUNCTION OF NONALIGNMENT	19 - 37
CHAPTER III	THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971 : A CASE STUDY	38 - 61
CHAPTER IV	THE PROJECTION OF THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT INTO NONALIGNED ARENA : RE- ACTIONS AND RESPONSES	62-93
CHAPTER V	CONCLUSION	94 - 113
	APPENDICES	i - xxvii
	SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	xxviii - xli

PREFACE

The nonaligned countries played a crucial role in the preservation of international peace and security, against the backdrop of a rampant cold war between the two Power-blocs. However, with the advent of detente, the danger of a major conflict between the two thermo-nuclear states, the Soviet Union and the United States of America has considerably receded. This phenomenon was matched by a remarkable increase in the tensions and conflicts, involving the countries of the 'Third World'. Nonalignment has widely been understood, studied and analysed, in the context of the East-West global conflict. However, not many efforts have been made to study the varied responses of the different nonaligned countries to the regional conflicts.

What precisely has been the attitude of non-aligned countries towards the regional conflicts? Have they acted in unison to diffuse the regional tensions and conflicts, in accordance with their proclaimed policy objectives? The present study is a modest attempt to answer these questions, illustrated by a case study of Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, to analyse the responses of the different nonaligned countries towards the conflict.

The circumstances leading to the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 and the issues involved therein, had a close bearing on the general principles of the policy

of nonalignment. Having assumed the dimension of the War of Liberation, it represented, as it did, an unprecedented human tragedy, wherein a majority was struggling against a vicious form of neo-colonialism. India, the premier nonaligned country was drawn into this civil war through the indirect aggression by Pakistan which took the form of the exodus of nearly ten million refugees, into its territory.

The reaction of the nonaligned countries was highly ambivalent. The ^ucasual factors of the conflict were ignored - the real dimensions of the conflict unheeded. The plight of the people of Bangladesh, over the period of March-December 1971, failed to register any impact on the policies of many nonaligned countries. Their supreme nonchalance is reflected in their voting pattern during the 'Uniting for Peace' exercise in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which went against the interests of the fighting people of Bangladesh. Basic issues which formed the cornerstone of the policy of nonalignment, such as human rights, national freedom and justice, were consistently evaded. Domestic jurisdiction, inadivisability of the use of force in defence of freedom and justice and other shibboleths were resorted to by the nonaligned countries to look away from the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. The result was a near unanimous

support of the nonaligned countries to Pakistan, especially within the United Nations.

Thus it is germane to the present study to explore the compulsions, motivations and priorities of nonaligned countries and to speculate as to why they reacted in the manner they did. The analysis may not be precise and specific but it outlines the nature, possibilities and limitation of the policy of nonaligned countries towards the regional conflicts.

The present study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one discusses the emergence and growth of non-alignment, as a response to the East-West global conflicts. It also outlines certain salient aspects of the nonaligned countries. Further on, an attempt has been made to place the policy on nonalignment, in the context of growing tensions and conflicts, within the less stable countries of the 'Third World'. Chapter second, after a brief discussion of the political objectives of the policy of nonalignment, reviews the role of nonaligned countries vis-a-vis various contemporary conflict situations. Efforts have been made to see, as to how the nonaligned countries contributed to the settlement of international conflicts. Chapter third outlines the historical, political and diplomatic background to the Bangladesh crisis and the subsequent war of 1971. It highlights certain basic issues

involved therein, in-as-much as, they are relevant in the present study. Chapter fourth presents an account of the perceptions and attitudes that were generated in the non-aligned countries as a response to the subcontinental disturbances in 1971. Drawing heavily on the United Nations documents, this chapter attempts an analytical exposition of the nonaligned responses towards the conflict. In the concluding chapter, an attempt has been made to explain the behaviour of nonaligned countries towards the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971.

The present study draws heavily on the available secondary sources. Needless to add, it inevitably profits from the works of many scholars and every care has been taken to acknowledge them. I have also referred to the official documents of the Government of India and Pakistan, the United Nations documents and the documents of the conferences of the nonaligned countries.

I owe thanks to many people who have helped me in the preparation and writing of this dissertation. I am extremely grateful to Professor Sushil Kumar, who has taken a keen interest in my work and has ensured by his kind persistence, the completion of this dissertation, under his guidance. I also express my gratitude to Professor K. P. Misra and Professor S. C. Gangal, for encouraging me at various stages of the work.

I have received much help from the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library and the Library of Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. My thanks are due to the Librarians and the staff of these Libraries for their many courtesies.

Priyankar Upadhyaya.
(Priyankar Upadhyaya)

Dated: 10 July 1978

NEW DELHI-110067

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

NONALIGNMENT : THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CONFLICT

The emergence and growth of nonalignment, as a foreign policy orientation has been one of the most outstanding features of the post-war international relations. Nonalignment has not only enabled the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, to preserve their independent identity, but also to play a vital role in world affairs which in the past has been the exclusive preserve of Great Powers. Nonalignment also emerged as a movement which refers to the concerted activities of the newly independent nonaligned countries and has now established itself as a distinguished grouping of like-minded states, in the contemporary international relations. As observed by Lars Nord "...by constituting a loose but nevertheless distinct international gathering of countries, the Movement has been and still is a source of identity for any state which might otherwise lack the power or courage to resist pressures from one of the Cold War blocs".¹

1 Lars Nord, "The Movement of Nonalignment : Harmony and Dissent", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo), vol. 7, no. 1, 1976, p. 92.

Nonalignment : Response to the East-West Conflict:

The post-war world was dominated by the two Super Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Each one of them was identified in terms of its own political ideology and bloc of supporters. The result was that most of the independent nations came to be grouped into two mutually antagonistic blocs. It was not practically possible for any nation to keep aloof from these power blocs. Against this deteriorating situation, in the international arena, a number of nations of Asia and later Africa achieved national independence. Their emergence to independence was expedited by a strong upsurge of nationalism and anti-colonialism in these regions. This formed the general background for the emergence of nonalignment, as a response to the post-war international situation.²

With the exception of Pakistan, Thailand and Philippines, all the newly emergent nations of South and South-East Asia subscribed to the policy of nonalignment.

2 For a detailed exposition, see, John W. Burton, International Relations : A General Theory (Cambridge, 1965), especially part V; also, Leo Mates, Nonalignment : Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade, 1972), and also Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya, "The Nonaligned Movement and International Relations", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. XXXIII, (April-June 1977).

Referring to the various motivations leading to alliances and nonalignment, Robert Osgood has observed that,

Nonalignment reflects the tendency of new and weak states to be far more concerned with their internal problems... than with the cold war which they viewed as distraction. If they join an alliance under circumstances other than imminent threat to their security, it is likely to be for the sake of gaining tangible Great Power support in their contest with a local adversary, as in the case of Pakistan's joining SEATO to increase its power against India.³

With the decolonisation of a large number of African nations the phenomenon of nonalignment also proliferated in the African continent. There was substantially the same tendency to preserve national independence, avoid involvement in the Cold War blocs and to ensure a more favourable position for the African nations. Explaining the raison d'etre of non-aligned posture, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya observed that, "When two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers and when East and West are struggling in Africa, it is Africa that suffers".⁴ In the early 1950's, the Afro-Asian countries were joined by Yugoslavia which formulated a similar foreign

3 Robert Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1968), p. 84.

4 L. W. Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York, 1962), p. 93.

policy based on an anti-bloc attitude toward the East-West conflict. In this way, nonalignment gradually came to be accepted by the nations, ranging from Southern Europe through Africa and Asia to Latin America, as a foreign policy, as well as a political doctrine.⁵

/The concept of nonalignment has been amenable to diverse interpretations. Western scholars and statesmen, initially approached it, as a foreign policy aberration;

5. The proliferation of the nonaligned movement is evident from the following table:

Year	Conference of the Nonaligned Nations	Members		Observers		Guests	
		Count- ries	Orga- niza- tions	Coun- tries	Orga- niza- tions	Coun- tries	Orga- niza- tio- ns
1961	Belgrade Summit Conference	25	-	3	-	-	-
1964	Cairo Summit Conference	47	-	10	2	-	-
1970	Lusaka Summit Conference	53	-	12	1	-	5
1973	Algiers Summit Conference	75	-	9	-	3	12
1976	Colombo Summit Conference	86	1	9	13	7	-

Source: Compiled from the Documents of the Conferences.

an irrational cluster of viewpoints and policies.⁶ On the other hand, within the nonaligned group itself, nonalignment has been interpreted from multifarious angles. The semantic confusion regarding nonalignment is a sufficient evidence of the international muddle concerning its actual connotation. Some of the synonymes of nonalignment, popular in the nonaligned nations, have been mentioned by Crabb, Jr., viz. "active independence, non-identification, discretionary alignment, neutralism and active formal neutralism. He, himself, uses the term neutralism and nonalignment, interchangeably".⁷ With reference to this, Leo Mates has observed that "it is safe to say that there are atleast as many possible definitions of nonalignment as there are nonaligned countries. Probably there are even more. In fact, every statesman in such countries would consider his view of world problems as the most pertinent definition of nonalignment."⁸

6 For a fuller exposition of the Western viewpoint, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (Philadelphia), vol. 362 (November, 1965), pp. 2-5.

7 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephant and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York, 1965), pp. 4-5.

8 Leo Mates, "Origins and Role of Nonalignment", in Ljubivoje Acimovic (ed.), Nonalignment in the World of Today (Beograd, 1969), p. 154.

As nonalignment grew into a movement, the problem of clearly defining the criteria for nonalignment had to be grappled with, because, such criteria were needed to serve as a basis for extending invitations to the conferences of the nonaligned nations. For Afro-Asianism which the Bandung Conference (1955) represented, the criteria for inclusion was, the geographical location. Therefore, several aligned nations viz. Pakistan, China, Thailand, Philippines, also participated in the Bandung Conference. But soon it transpired that the aligned nations would subvert the very purpose of the movement of the newly emergent countries. Hence, these aligned nations were excluded from the movement and at the nonaligned meeting at Brioni (1956) between Tito, Nasser and Nehru, the regional framework for membership was replaced by a broader framework, based on an anti-bloc policy. By taking Cold War, as its reference point, non-alignment was initially operationalized, as a policy of non-participation, in the East-West global conflict. and accordingly, a five-point political yardstick was formulated, at the Preparatory Meeting in Cairo, held between July 5-15, 1961.⁹ These criteria for nonalignment were formalized at

9

The criteria of nonalignment were:

1. A country should follow an independent policy based on peaceful co-existence and nonalignment or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.

F.N. continues on next page

the First Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Nations in Belgrade (1961) and were reinstated in Cairo (1964). There has been divergence of opinion within the nonaligned movement about the viability of the Belgrade criteria. But, till now, the framework based on an anti-bloc attitude remains the most vital mark of non-aligned orientation, as evidenced by the rejection of Pakistan's application for membership and Romania's request for observer status, in the nonaligned movement.

However, the gradual erosion of military blocs and the growing cooperation between the 'Third World' and the nonaligned nations within the economic sphere ~~has~~ further diluted the Five-Point framework of nonalignment. "The raison de'tre of nonalignment is replaced by the

Previous F.N.

2. It should consistently have supported movements for national independence.
3. It should not be a member of multilateral military alliances concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
4. If it had conceded military bases these concessions should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.
5. If it were a member of bilateral or regional defence arrangement, this should not be in the context of Great Power conflicts.

c.f. G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Nonalignment (London, 1966), pp. 285-6. For a fuller exposition, see, Dr Ranko Petkovic, "Yardstick for Nonalignment", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade, 1975), no. 610, pp. 10-14.

criteria of being developing country whose alignment or not with a Great Power is of secondary importance".¹⁰ Now, the nonaligned movement has evolved to a stage wherein it only bans direct participation in such military arrangements as the Warsaw Pact, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but tolerates less direct military arrangements, such as Rio Pact, Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Cooperation (1971) and the Soviet-Egypt Treaty (1973). Describing this phenomenon, Anton Bebler has observed that,

The movement denounces, not the institution of politico-military alliances as such and still less the principle of collective self-defence but only a particular variety of alliances - connected with the Great Powers - perceived as the main and self-perpetuating instrument in the hands of the Great Powers for the continuance of their dominance in international relations.¹¹

In the present context, the nations which are the members of the nonaligned movement do, in fact, create temporary blocs and diplomatic coalitions. Hence, some states are nonaligned more by virtue of public declaration than their foreign policy actions. Others are nonaligned

10 Nord, n. 1, p. 92.

11 Anton Bebler, "Security Aspects of Nonalignment", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 14, (April-June 1975), p. 291.

because the governments of some leading nonaligned states say they are.¹² In practice, there is no definite yardstick to judge whether a nation is, in fact, following a nonaligned orientation in its foreign policy.

The Factors in the Response and the Setting of the Non-aligned Nations

The International Setting:

"Nonalignment", according to John W. Burton, "has been one of the responses of states to the failure of alliances and collective security and unlike the others, it is not a defensive response".¹³ The policy of non-alignment has been successful, to an extent, in preventing the Super Powers, from dictating their policies, on the newly independent countries, against the backdrop of the Cold War. But the loosening of global bipolarity and the advent of an age of 'overkill', greatly affected the traditional type of military alliances and reflected, in a diminishing urge on the part of the Super Powers to force new states into their respective military alliances.

12 K. J. Holsti, International Politics : A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey, 1967), p. 106.

13 John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge, 1972), p. 96.

Nevertheless, the interest of the Super Powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America continue to be sufficiently strong. Both, the Soviet Union and the United States are interested in acquiring, from the 'Third World', vital sources of strategic raw materials (i. e. oil, chromium, bauxite etc.). The Third World countries are also significant to the Super Powers; inasmuch as they are located at important strategic positions at land, sea and air junctions (i. e. Gibraltar, Suez, Malacca Straits and Indian Ocean). These geo-political factors along with the traditional economic interests are responsible for the growing desire of the Super Powers to influence the Third World countries and to establish military bases there. Describing this trend, Romesh Thapar has observed that:

The international order continues to be unreformed and the Super Powers despite allegedly differing ideologies adopt almost identical postures to protect and extend their sphere of influence, particularly in strategic regions whether they be land or ocean. These activities of Super Powers are backed by the massive sale or gift of essentially outdated armaments to non-aligned, creates the sparkling points of conflicts or wars in the territories of nonaligned.¹⁴

The extent to which the Super Powers influence the behaviour of the Third World countries and create conflicts depends on the receptivity and vulnerability of these countries. This calls for an enquiry into the internal setting of such countries.

Internal Setting:

Nonalignment, as a long term policy was a spontaneous outgrowth of the anti-colonial revolution which swept over Asia and Africa. As former colonies, the newly freed countries were seized of the fact that their resources in men and material had been used in wars by their imperial masters, for their own ends. This caused a strong reaction in Afro-Asia, against the power-politics which the two Super Powers were held to represent. Reflecting the Afro-Asian attitude toward the Cold War, a Yugoslav writer has stated that "the schema was the continuation of the division of the world into civilized and uncivilized nations, except that the former were sub-divided into two politico-military groups and the latter were expected to remain object and pawns in the game of Big Powers".¹⁵

15

Dr Ranko Petkovic, "Nonalignment and the Third World", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 638 (November, 1976), p. 42.

Nonidentification toward Cold War politics may also be attributed to the nature of nationalism prevalent in the newly emergent countries.

The political ideas to which the leadership of Asian nations owed allegiance, indicated that they could maintain stability in their political systems only through a synthesis of the economic doctrine of socialism and political doctrine of democracy. Hence, the leadership preferred not to take sides in Cold War, primarily based on ideological struggle between the proponents of Parliamentary Democracy and Socialism.¹⁶

Being mostly new, weak and underdeveloped, the nonaligned nations also hoped to obtain maximum economic aid and concessions from both the blocs. These countries were not in a position to restrict their sources of supply and market to the countries of a particular bloc. The non-aligned nations also wanted to evolve an indigenous mode of development without let or hindrance from outside powers.

The policy of nonalignment has also been useful in generating diplomatic and political power in a given configuration of forces.¹⁷ National defence and security

16 K. P. Karunakaran, "Domestic and Afro-Asian Requirements", in Paul F. Power (ed.), India's Nonalignment Policy (Boston, 1967), p. 60.

17 For a detailed discussion, on this aspect of nonalignment, see, A. P. Rana, Imperatives of Nonalignment (Delhi, 1976), especially part I, of the work, pp. 9-124, and also, Bebler, n. 11, pp. 289-302.

considerations also played a vital role in the creation and development of nonalignment. India along with many other nations of Asia and Africa saw in nonalignment a compatible and converging national security doctrine. Outlining the strategy of nonalignment, Jawaharlal Nehru declared, as far back as in 1946, "We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power-politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters."¹⁸

With the international system moving toward multipolarity, the danger of a major conflict between the two thermonuclear states, the Soviet Union and the United States of America has been correspondingly reduced. This development has profoundly affected the less stable nations of the Third World, wherein, tension and conflicts have been growing, within the present diffuse pattern of international system. The twin phenomena viz. political instability and growing militarization are largely responsible in creating an atmosphere in the 'Third World', wherein, the internal conflicts started spilling over the

18 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy,
Selected Speeches, (September 1946-April 1961),
Publication Divisions, Government of India
(New Delhi, 1961), p. 2.

external borders. As a result, there have been many local conflicts and tensions in the 'Third World' and hot-beds of war seem to have shifted from Europe to Asia, Africa and Latin America. During last two decades more than 100 conflicts have been settled by threat or use of violence which took place in or between developing countries.¹⁹

It is a fact that most of the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are far from being well established and stable states. In their young communities, unresolved cultural, social and ethnic problems tend to create social unrest and political instability. Economic underdevelopment is also a prominent factor which aggravates their instability. Moreover, "the leadership in the 'Third World' countries is faced with a crisis of modernization - transforming their traditional, agrarian communities into modern industrialized societies... threatening to split up and communalize the countries concerned."²⁰

The process of militarization has affected the developing nations of the 'Third World', internally and externally. In the nonaligned nations, armed forces have been often employed to suppress social unrest and secessionist

19 Ulrich Albrecht and others, "Arming the Developing Countries", International Social Science Journal (UNESCO), vol. XXVIII, no. 2 (1976), pp. 326.

20 Nord, n. 1, p. 93.

movement, to settle the border disputes, to wage local wars and to topple governments. South and Southeast Asia which gave birth to the policy of nonalignment are littered with the examples of use of violence between various nations viz. - Sino-Indian War (1962), Indo-Pak War of 1965 and 1971, Indonesia-Malaysia conflicts and many others. It is indeed easy to establish that the nonaligned like any other country are subject to the perception of hostility.²¹

The steep rise in military expenditure also indicate the phenomenal growth of militarization in the Third World.²² It has been established that the steepest rise in the rate of armaments and conflicts was, in those countries, in which serial conflicts were notably sharpened and social inequalities more marked.²³ Clearly, the

21 See, Burton, n. 13, p. 97.

22 "The money spent by the developing countries in arms in 1973 was 15% of total military expenditure in the world. This was directly three times their percentage in 1953... rising in cash term from 12.3 billion to 30.5 billion \$. Their armed forces consist of about seven million soldiers. For details, see, Albrecht and others, n. 19, pp. 326 ff; and also, Asbjorn Eide, "Arms Transfer and Third World Militarization", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 8, no. 2 (1977), pp. 99 ff.

23 See, Asjoorh Eide, "The Transfer of Arms to the III World and Their Internal Use", International Social Science Journal (UNESCO), vol. XXVIII, no. 2 (1976), pp. 307 ff.

direct and indirect military help from the Big Powers to the militarism in the 'Third World' ensures the undemocratic and oppressive regimes to sustain against their own populations and is largely responsible for the majority of insurgencies in the world.

Relevant in this context are some of the findings of a study conducted by Istavan Kende, which points out that out of ninety-seven wars fought between 1945 and the end of 1969, ninety-three occurred in Asia, Africa and Latin America involving fifty-nine countries.²⁴ Clearly, a formal distinction between aligned and nonaligned nations resting on the existence of certain formal treaties with Great Powers does not reveal much about the policy of non-alignment, in the context of the contemporary international conflicts. The nonaligned like any other country, are still resorting to the traditional techniques of power politics especially when dealing with the countries of immediate environment. "So many of those who speak of nonalignment or who played a major or decisive role in building the ramparts of the nonaligned are today themselves involved in the peripheral manoeuvring of the war games."²⁵

Hence, whenever confronted with a stronger and superior opponent, the nonaligned have little choice but

24 Bebler, n. 11, p. 29

25 Thapar, n. 14, p. 13.

to seek help from the external powers in the form of mutual defence and security pacts etc. The intensive military and paramilitary penetration of the Great Powers, in the Third World, makes it ample clear. According to Istavan Kende, France has signed forty such military agreements with the nonaligned nations, the Soviet Union has signed thirty-three, the United Kingdom has seventeen, the United States fifteen and People's Republic of China twelve. Yet another evidence of the Super Power intervention, is the high correlation between the foreign participation and the duration of war and conflicts in the 'Third World'. The wars with foreign participation accounted for 62.4 per cent of all events and for 69.6 per cent of the total duration of such events. The United States alone participated in twenty-five wars.²⁶

Describing the present dilemma of the nonaligned nations, John W. Burton, whose conceptual understanding of the subject is outstanding, has observed critically that, "In practice, a policy of nonalignment is frequently not practical because internal political struggles and demand for a change tend to lead new states into accepting external military aid. Their nonaligned status is thereby compromised".²⁷ Clearly, for the successful operation of

26 Bebler, n. 11, p. 295.

27 Burton, n. 13, p. 96.

nonaligned orientation in the conduct of foreign policy sphere, there must be reasonable political stability and the capacity to resist outside incursions and pressures.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFLICT-REDUCING FUNCTION OF NONALIGNMENT

Nonalignment, as a response to the East-West global conflict, is a policy strategy of "maximum involvement" in the major conflicts of the contemporary world.¹ While it is articulated in terms of various objectives and goals - political, economic, military, cultural - the activities of the nonaligned nations have been directed primarily towards the safeguarding of international peace and security and to oppose imperialism in all its forms.² These nations have individually and collectively, acted upon various issues concerning international peace and security; disputes involving the Super Powers and other countries, military interventions and similar other problems.

The nonaligned nations being underdeveloped and weak are inevitably interested in maintaining internal and external conditions, for a peaceful development. Their concern for peace and security is thus, an expression of their own national interests. Their need is to safeguard

1 Ivo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men : An Introduction to International Politics (Illinois, 1975) III edn., pp. 488-9.

2 See, Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya, "The Nonaligned Movement and International Relations", India Quarterly, vol. xxxiii (April-June 1977), p. 139.

themselves from the damaging effects of the East-West and other international rivalries. Their effort has been directed towards "bridging the bloc divisions, putting an end to local conflicts, achieving disarmament, establishing zones of peace and cooperation and strengthening the United Nations".³

The principles of active and peaceful co-existence are an important component of nonalignment. The First Conference of the Heads of State of Nonaligned Nations held at Belgrade in 1961, adopted ten such principles: five principles of Panchsheel and five pronounced principles of the UN Charter. These principles underline the tolerance of different ideologies, respect for the right of each nation to determine its own political and economic system and reliance on negotiations for resolving global and regional conflicts.⁴

It is significant to note that the policy based on peaceful co-existence is in no way opposed to the right of national self-determination. "The principles of peaceful co-existence include the right of the peoples to self-

3 Dr Bojana Tadic, "Nonalignment and Neutrality in the Contemporary World", Review of International Affairs, no. 653 (November, 1977), p. 12.

4 For the Ten Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, see Appendix 1 of this work.


determination, to independence and to a free determination of forms and methods of cultural development".⁵ In this way, nonalignment stood for the values of national freedom and justice. Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized on these values when he said, "We are not blind to reality nor do we acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral".⁶

The twin phenomena of anti-imperialism and concern for international peace and security manifested in all the conferences of the nonaligned nations. Cairo Conference (1964), which was held after the Belgrade Conference, noted that imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace and security and condemned all neo-colonialist and imperialistic policies applied in various parts of the world.⁷ Despite its economic overtone,

-
- 5 N. Parmeshwaran Nair, "Nonalignment History, Ideology, Prospects", in K. P. Karunakaran (ed.), Outside the Contest (Delhi, 1963), p. 49.
- 6 Address to the East-West Association, New York, 19 October 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53 (Delhi: Publication Division, 1954), p. 125.
- 7 Main Documents Relating to Conferences of Non-aligned Countries, (From Belgrade 1961 to Georgetown 1972), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Georgetown, 1972), p. 19.



TH-145



the Lusaka Conference (1970) also took cognizance of the fact that détente, has not contributed to the security of the small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented the danger of local wars. The forces of racism, apartheid and imperialism continue to bedevil world peace. It also passed a resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination (NAC/CONF. 3/RES. 2).⁸ At the Algiers Conference (1973), the representatives of the seventy-three participating nations agreed to apply diplomatic and economic measures against Israel which was condemned for refusing to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, to support insurgent movements in Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique by starting a fund to help finance those movements armed forces.⁹ This affirms that the policy of nonalignment has never lost its essentially "anti-imperialistic" and "anti-racist" character in the sense that they always regarded imperialism and racism as the basic causes of international conflict.

There are different opinions about the potentials of the nonaligned nations for reducing and resolving international conflicts. It is easy to find statements and

8 Ibid., pp. 66-7 and 69.

9 Duchacek, n. 1, pp. 490-1.

assessments which bear witness to a high appreciation of the role of nonaligned movement for its peace efforts in various international conflicts. It is equally easy to find opinions to the contrary, reducing the nonaligned movement, as an insignificant force. The Soviet-American Cuba Crisis (1962), the Middle East Conflict (1967 and 1973), Sino-Indian War (1962), the American War in Vietnam, and various Indo-Pak wars - these are all events in which the role of the nonaligned nations could be dismissed as rather insignificant.¹⁰ In arriving at a verdict, it is indeed difficult to deny that "...neither the nonaligned have the means for solving, nor do they solve problems. International problems are settled through United Nations, through direct talks between the parties concerned or on the battlefield through the balance of strength and definite principles".¹¹ The nonaligned nations have all along been

-
- 10 See in particular, Lars Nord, "The Movement of Nonalignment : Harmony and Dissent", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo), vol. 7, no. 1 (1976), p. 92. He further opines, "At all events, during a crisis or other circumstances when vital national interests are at stake, Great Powers are in a position to - and do usually, if not always - ignore actions and opinions which are not backed by physical power. And despite their other capabilities, the non-aligned countries do not have power in this sense."
- 11 Miljan Komatuna, "Dilemma and Perspective : The Need to Strengthen the Unity and Effectiveness of the Nonaligned Countries", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 653, (5 June 1977), p. 3.

active in strengthening the United Nations, in general, and the peace keeping role of the world body, in particular, in addition, they influence the behaviour of major nations by expressing their individual opinions on the merit of each case. A cursory look at the major international conflicts would be helpful in coming to certain broad generalizations about the nonaligned behaviour, in relation to contemporary international conflicts.

It was the Korean Crisis (1950-53) which for the first time highlighted the active content of the policy of nonalignment in solving the international conflicts. It was a typical East-West dispute. India took this opportunity to demonstrate the conflict-reducing function of the policy of nonalignment. India effectively played the role of an active mediator between the United States on the one hand and China and Soviet Union on the other. India and Yugoslavia, both then members of the Security Council played a key role in arranging a cease-fire and in resolving the tricky issue of the exchange of prisoners of war.¹²

The Indo-China Crisis (1954) represented a peculiar case where the basic question related to liquidation of colonialism, came to be entangled with Cold War politics.

12

For a detailed account, see R. P. Kaushik, The Crucial Years of Nonalignment (USA Korean War and India), (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 132-193 and 194-238.

Basically, it was a classic case of nationalism versus colonialism. The nonaligned nations for a long time remained passive. Despite repeated appeals from Ho-Chi-Minh, India did nothing substantial to support the struggling people of Vietnam, although on a similar occasion (Dutch intervention in Indonesia, 1947), India had taken strong diplomatic measures to help the Indonesian nationalist movement.

India's ambivalent attitude towards the Vietnamese liberation movement, at its initial stages was due to its preference to its immediate national interests.¹³ Nonetheless, the Indo-China crisis again gave India an opportunity to demonstrate the plausibility of a nonaligned posture in an East-West dispute. Krishna Menon's peace-making efforts at the Geneva Conference (1954) contributed to cease-fire agreement there and India was made chairman of the International Control Commission on Indo-China.

The Suez Crisis (1956) is significant in the present context, inasmuch as it represents a case wherein both the Super Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union and the nonaligned nations were hand-in-glove in opposing the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. The indignant and united voice of the nonaligned nations was ~~very~~ largely responsible in protecting the freedom of Egypt during

13

See D. R. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 6-27.

the crisis.¹⁴

The Hungarian Crisis (1956) did not evoke the same response among the nonaligned nations as the Anglo-French action had done. The failure of the nonaligned to condemn the Soviet action in Hungary evoked severe criticism of their policy. In the United Nations also the nonaligned remained passive.¹⁵ It is pertinent to recall that most of the leading nonaligned had received or were getting active support from the Soviet Union on certain questions of national interest to them. For instance, India was getting open support on the Kashmir issue and on the question of Goa, Indonesia on the West Irian issue and Egypt for its stand on Suez Canal.

During the Congo Crisis (1960) the nonaligned nations acted in different ways but there has been a basic

14 See Nair, n. 5, pp. 37-8.

15 The most controversial thing in this context was the voting on the Resolution (1005-ES-11) and as amended by sponsors (A/3316). The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 November 1951. India and Yugoslavia were the only countries to vote against the resolution with the nine communist countries. Most of the other nonaligned nations like Egypt, Indonesia, Burma etc. abstained. For details of the debate and text of resolution see, Year Book of the United Nations (New York, 1957), pp. 71-72, 85.

tendency to oppose imperialistic designs, in the region. All the nonaligned, individually and collectively lauded the need to establish democratic norms in Congo, through the United Nations. Initially, Ghana, the UAR, Guinea, Morocco and Ethiopia sent their armed forces under the auspices of the United Nations. Following the assassination of Lumumba Ghana, Guinea, Morocco withdrew their forces and expressed dissatisfaction with the policy of the UN. India, at this juncture, agreed to send her forces which subsequently formed the largest contingent of the UN Forces.¹⁶

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 provides an excellent case for highlighting the limitations of the nonaligned nations in conflicts involving one of them. Describing the dilemma faced by the nonaligned in such a conflict situation, the Prime Minister of Ceylon stated, "If the nonaligned states have endeavoured to play a positive role for the cause of preserving peace in respect to the Cold War issue, what could be our duty when we face a dispute among ourselves and between friendly nations".¹⁷

While most of the nonaligned countries accepted the Egyptian standpoint that "Red China's attack was a

16 See Nair, n. 5, p. 40.

17 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephant and Grass : A Study of Nonalignment (New York, 1965), p. 88.

blow to the concept of nonalignment",¹⁸ their response towards the Chinese aggression was conspicuously lukewarm. During the first seven days after the Chinese aggression only Malaysia and Cyprus expressed their sympathy and support for India while Nasser offered his services for mediatory talks. The remaining nonaligned countries which had participated in the Belgrade Summit (1961) observed silence. On the other hand, it was the United States and Britain which came to India's help.

A week after the aggression, Nehru sent a circular message to all governments of the world asking for their support. It took seven days for the remaining nonaligned countries to respond to Nehru's appeal. Malaysia was the only nonaligned, which instantly supported India while Ceylon, Tunisia, Libya and Yugoslavia merely expressed their concern. The nonaligned which offered mediation were the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Liberia and Tangyanika. Ghana at first opposed British military assistance to India but later withdrew its objection. Nepal, Ceylon and Burma were extremely cautious in their attitude towards both India and China; the Indonesia's reaction was perhaps most openly anti-Indian. Of the twenty-two countries which participated in the nonaligned Conference of Belgrade (1961),

only one nonaligned, - Malaya - extended diplomatic support to India. Twelve countries did so on request, that too after fourteen days of studied reticence.¹⁹

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 also brought out the limitation of the nonaligned mediatory capabilities. A conference of six nonaligned countries was held in December 1962 with a view to mediate between India and China. The participants were: Egypt, Ghana, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ceylon and Burma. It soon transpired that with the exception of Egypt the remaining five nonaligned had decided to sit on the fence for "they had a dragon close behind them and it was treading on their tail".²⁰ The Colombo Conference was unable to produce a solution acceptable to both the sides. The resolution which emerged finally incorporated certain compromises with the subsequent reluctance of the six governments to stand resolutely thereby. Finally in February 1963 China rejected the proposals and the non-aligned powers too, lapsed into silent inactivity.

19 For a detailed account, see G. S. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Nonalignment (London, 1967), pp. 330-351.

20 Ibid., p. 334.

In an official publication the Egyptian Government stated, "Why among the nonaligned countries has the UAR alone stood firmly behind India in her gallant fight against Chinese aggression? Why at the Colombo Conference did the UAR alone come out with clear-cut proposals for the vacation of Indo-China by Chinese aggression".²¹ Clearly the nonaligned countries remained rigidly neutral between India and China although India was nonaligned and China was not and even though India was the founder of the policy of non-alignment.

The lukewarm attitude of the nonaligned countries was mainly attributed to the influence of the Soviet Union which in the wake of Cuban crisis had moved nearer to the China and it was not before the 12th December 1962 that it had come out openly in favour of India. Soviet Union was an important factor to the nonaligned such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Algeria and partly to the UAR. Second factor which may be said to have affected the nonaligned countries was the fear of a belligerent China, all the more since in countries such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Ceylon, the communist movements were controlled by China.

21

Ibid., p. 349.

The twenty-two days war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, evoked varied responses from the non-aligned. But there was a general tendency among the non-aligned to keep aloof from this bilateral dispute between the two neighbouring countries. Hence, their role in the conflict remained mostly inconspicuous.

The nonaligned countries of South and South-East Asia followed a cautious and noncommittal policy. Nepal did not take note of the aggression committed by Pakistan on India. The only comment made by its government was that "India and Pakistan should settle their disputes in an atmosphere of peace and friendship". It tried to maintain a diplomatic neutrality on the issue of Kashmir. The slant in favour of Pakistan was of course there which was the result of Chinese and Western propaganda. Ceylon also expressed the need "to settle the dispute in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations or by other peaceful means". But the Ceylonese Government took note of the "acts of sabotage caused by the Pakistani infiltrators" and also turned down a request from Indonesia for permission to take a military aircraft with personnel from the Indonesian Staff college to Pakistan. Burma also preferred a neutral stand on the issue of Kashmir but was against any foreign interference. Its reaction is perhaps best reflected in a statement by her Minister for Foreign

Affairs, U. Thi Han. He stated, "No one should interfere in the Indo-Pak Conflict (referring to probably Chinese intervention)."²² In Security Council debate on Indo-Pak war, Malaysian representative Radhakrishna Ramani, categorically supported Indian charges of aggression by Pakistan. Pakistan charged Malaysia with 'immoral position' in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and severed its diplomatic ties with her. On September 26, 1965, Tunku Abdul Rahman rejected the Pakistani charge: "Malaysia must regard her international ties as more important than her religious ties with other countries." The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, described Pakistan as one side of a nut-cracker and Indonesia the other. He said India and some of the smaller countries of South-East Asia were caught in between. Lee's motive primarily was to ingratiate himself with India to strengthen a multiracial image for his State (probably, on account of the presence of about 25,000 Indians in Singapore).

On 7 September, President Soekarno of Indonesia, ^{Indonesia} declared that India was taking sides with Pakistan. Foreign Minister Subandrio stated that it was the obligation of all nations belonging to the newly emergent forces to give

help to Pakistan to face Indian aggression. On 21 September, Indonesia nationalized Indian properties thereby dispossessing all Indian nationals, their assets without any compensation.²³ Indonesia's active opposition to India was largely the result of Indonesia's excellent relations with both China and Pakistan. India's recognition of Malaysia and its advancement of Malaysia's case in Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria was another factor which led to the formation of a Peking-Jakarta-Rawalpindi axis.

The Yugoslav President, Joseph Broz Tito, unequivocally extended its support to India and condemned China for its role in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.²⁴ In a joint communique issued at the conclusion of President Radhakrishnan's visit to Yugoslavia, he declared Kashmir to be an internal affair of India. Never before India has received such unequivocal support on Kashmir.²⁵ Yugoslav support proved to be a major asset for India in the Third World in which Yugoslavia occupied a most significant place.

The attitude of the Arab nonaligned toward the Indo-Pak war of 1965 was manifest in the Casablanca Conference of Arab Heads of States held in September, 1965.

23 The National Herald (New Delhi), 22 September 1965.

24 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 5 October 1965.

25 Indian Express (New Delhi), 6 October 1965.

On the 16th it passed a resolution concerning Indo-Pakistan war. It mentioned only two lines about the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. The original draft was anti-Indian in spirit but President Nasser stood against it and got it considerably softened. President Nasser of Egypt also responded to the request of Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri to exercise his influence with China against resorting to military force in the Sikkim region. On the other hand, Jordan, drawn by religious fanaticism, took a flagrant anti-Indian stand within and outside the United Nations. Algeria meted out insult to the Indian delegation at the instance of China. Syria took a pro-Pakistani attitude for two main reasons; Chinese pressure on it and to oppose Egypt. Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, ~~Algeria~~, were not swayed by the current of religious fanaticism and exercised restraint in criticizing India. In the United Nations, only Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Singapore and Malaysia supported India. No African country supported India and even the UAR, Afghanistan, Nepal and Ceylon tried to hold the scales between India and Pakistan.²⁶

On the basis of the foregoing account of the role of the nonaligned countries in different conflict

26

These reactions have largely been taken from Hari Ram Gupta, India-Pakistan War, 1965, vol. 2, (Delhi, 1968).

situations, certain generalizations can be made about their behaviour pattern vis-a-vis international conflict.

Most striking feature of nonalignment is, its pre-occupation with global issues such as East-West disputes, anti-colonialism etc. The problems relating to bilateral disputes, regional and local conflicts have been given very low priority. The nonaligned nations have preferred not to get entangled with the bilateral conflicts which are not of direct concern to them.

On such matters which are not of direct concern to all ~~individual~~ nonaligned nations, they are free to pursue divergent policies, so long as these do not undermine the general approach of nonalignment towards international affairs. In this context, Ljubomir Radova says:

Such affairs are the internal business of every nonaligned country, and all that is required of them from the standpoint of nonalignment when the narrower national interests are concerned is, that the fulfilment of these interests should not be at variance with the general principles of the policy.²⁷

It is evident that on concrete issues such as regional and local conflicts which directly affect their national interests, the nonaligned nations take divergent and mutually exclusive stands. Their actions and reactions

often do not show any conformity to the general principles of nonalignment. This makes it ample clear that nonalignment does not represent the entire foreign policy of any country, but it is only a way of approaching foreign policy. Every country has certain foreign policy goals in the pursuit of which nonalignment or alignment has no particular relevance.

It is also apparent that amongst the nonaligned there are nations such as India, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Egypt, Indonesia which have been more active, and have expressed their views quite forcefully on almost all the issues affecting freedom and peace in the world. On the other hand, most of the African nations have been less active because of their other pre-occupations. But activists and nonactivists among the nonaligned, all have contributed to the cumulation of international conflicts by keeping apart from the Cold War hostilities and secondly, through the exercise of their votes in the various bodies of the United Nations.

The detailed formulation and implementation of the policy of nonalignment vis-a-vis various conflict situations has manifested in a variety of forms and in certain cases has differed from its basic predicates too. This variation has been largely due to the myriad factors which impinge upon the foreign policy making in the non-

aligned nations. These factors arise out of their unique geo-political positions, economic backwardness, political instability, leadership and ideological leanings.

As brought out in the previous chapter, most of the nonaligned nations are dependent on some or the other major power for the supply of military equipments and have been maintaining a broad range of military ties with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and many other countries. Hence, the politico-military ties of the nonaligned with the major powers have been a significant foreign policy compulsion.

In short, it can be concluded that the diplomatic behaviour of a nonaligned nation vis-a-vis contemporary conflict situations cannot be comprehended on the basis of its proclaimed objectives alone; the emphasis should rather be on discerning the internal and external compulsions which determine the varied response.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971 : A CASE STUDY

One of the objectives of nonalignment has been to reform the international system in accordance with the principles of human rights, national freedom and justice. The circumstances leading to Indo-Pak war of 1971 had a close bearing on these principles. Hence, the case study of this war in the context of the responses of nonaligned nations towards it, is likely to show the constraints on various nonaligned nations in the furtherance of these principles.

Historical Background:

The antecedents of Indo-Pak disputes can be traced back to centuries of Hindu-Muslim religions antagonism. This antagonism became more intensive during the Indian independence struggle. National Congress led by Gandhi and Nehru was staunchly against the vivisection of India, on the basis of religion. They wanted to secularise and democratize the political life of India, while the Muslim League led by Jinna propagated the theory of two nations which considered Hindu and Muslim as two separate entities. In 1947, the political division of the Indian subcontinent was made by the British

Government on the basis of religion. Both India and Pakistan were founded on the mutually incompatible principles. "The concepts of All-India secularism and modernization which underlie the Indian Union implicitly deny the claims of Islamic nationality upon which Pakistan was erected".¹ Hence, the partition of the Indian subcontinent further aggravated the traditional Hindu-Muslim antagonism. The conflictual relationship between the two countries, has been described as a state of the Cold War - a state of tension between the states which has the seeds of overt armed conflict within it.²

The unyielding antagonism between India and Pakistan spilled into open hostilities, ^htrice before the 1971 war. First conflict occurred in 1947, no sooner the partition was accomplished. The second conflict took place in 1965 which was a prelude to a larger conflict in the same year. The 1971 war lasted only for fourteen days but it was the most violent among all the Indo-Pak conflicts. It was also far more intense than the previous three, in terms of the Super Power involvement.

1 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis (India-Pakistan-Bangladesh), (London, 1975), p. 148.

2 See in particular, Mohammad Ayoob, "India and Pakistan : Prospects of Detente", in K. P. Misra (ed.), Foreign Policy of India : A Book of Readings (Delhi, 1977), p. 213.

As James Reston has ^{pointed} ~~pointed~~ out, "Back of all this [Indo-Pak War of 1971], there was a power struggle between China and Soviet Union and a strategic struggle between Moscow and Washington".³ Hence, before expatiating on the normative aspect of Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, it is necessary to highlight the alignment of international forces in the subcontinent and the policy-responses of both India and Pakistan, inasmuch as they are relevant in the present study.

Pakistan : Policy of Alignment:

Pakistan's foreign policy has always been conditioned by its hostile relations with India. Its quest for military and political parity with India boiled down to borrow political and military power from external sources. Initially, Pakistan sought diplomatic and political help of the Moslem nations and during this period (1947-54) also tried to maintain a nonaligned posture like India.⁴ But in the middle of fifties,

3 James Reston, "Who Won in India", New York Times, December 17, 1971.

4 "Sometimes we agree with the Western bloc and sometimes with the communist bloc as the situation and the matter under discussion demanded. Pakistan could pursue such an independent course because it was not under obligation to any foreign country" (Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's Statement). For details, see, B. C. Rasgoti, Rastogi "Uneasy alignment", in K. P. Karunakaran (ed.), Outside the Contest (New Delhi, 1963), p. 163.

she became aligned to the American alliance system.⁵

Commenting on Pakistan's alignment, Werner Levi says:

National interest, friends and foes, the usefulness of political instrument, were all judged according to their bearing upon Pakistan's aim in Kashmir. This made Pakistani criterion of foreign policy needs and how to satisfy them entirely different from that of all her fellow Asian states in the region.... Her government claimed that alignment and alliances were inevitable in this world and by entering them one did not mortgage one's judgement or curtails one's freedom of action for ever.⁶

After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Pakistan realized the limitations of American alliance system in fulfilling its foreign policy objectives. This led to an understanding with China and its efforts to win sympathy for its cause in the wider and largely non-aligned Afro-Asian nations. According to an official Pakistani document, "The post-1962 phase was of building an independent though not necessarily neutral image of Pakistan in special relations with the Afro-Asian region."⁷



-
5. Pakistan signed a military pact with the United States on 19 May 1954, entered the South-East Treaty Organization (SEATO) on 8 September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization) in 1955.
6. Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Englewood N.J., 1968), p. 77.
7. President Ayoob's manifesto, quoted by, Gunnar Mrydal, Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 1 (London, 1972), p. 251.

The Indo-Pak war of 1965, saw the emergence of a special relationship between Pakistan and China. China provided Pakistan with the necessary military hardware.⁸ In the words of G.V. Choudhuri:

China's special relationship with Pakistan from 1960 through 1970 was based on mutual advantages and pragmatic reality... their relationship was of the same intensity as that between the United States and Pakistan in the mid-1950's.⁹

Pakistan was found to be valuable to President Nixon, as a go-between, in his grand American strategy vis-a-vis China and gulf countries. Pakistan, in fact, played a vital role in bringing about the Sino-American detente. Hence, the United States announced the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan in October 1970. "The United States and Pakistan revived to some extent their old alliance... Detente with China contributed to the revival of an alliance initiated to further the containment of China. This marked the completion of a Washington-Rawalpindi-Peking axis".¹⁰

8 China supplied Pakistan military hardware worth \$ 133 million between 1965 and 1971. For details, see, Ayoob, n. 2, p. 222.

9 Golam Wahed Choudhuri, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers (Politics of a Subdivided Continent), (New York, 1975), p. 196.

10 Ibid., p. 202.

India: Policy Strategy of Nonalignment:

While Pakistan encouraged maximum involvement of the external powers in the subcontinent, India being the larger and with its 'in-built' superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan, opposed such policy. "India's overall security against Pakistan was based on nonalignment as a general strategy in the Cold War to shield her military-oriented unilateral defence policy of the containment of Pakistan especially over Kashmir issue".¹¹

The unilateral defence policy based on the strategy of nonalignment suffered a severe blow in 1962 when China attacked India. "The rest of nonaligned nations did not support the Indians; and indeed turned nonalignment against India (i.e. being nonaligned between India and China)."¹² Since then, India paid greater attention to its security imperatives and was given valuable assistance by the Soviet Union, in fulfilling its defence requirements. Hence, a definite pattern of relationship existed between India and Pakistan wherein, Pakistan

11 A. P. Rana, Imperatives of Nonalignment : A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy, in the Nehru Period (Delhi, 1976), p. 62.

12 Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong (The Developing Countries in the International System), (New York, 1977), p. 125.

strove to bolster its power with the external help while India relied upon the policy strategy of nonalignment, at times augmented by the Soviet diplomatic support.

I. The Normative Aspects of Indo-Pak Conflict, 1971:

The Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, arose from the internal crisis within Pakistan itself. It was the result of the externalization of an internal conflict. Commenting on this phenomenon, Lars Blinkerberger critically observed:

Once again a special issue pertaining to one of the two countries, in conflict / India and Pakistan / soon became a problem common to both, thus affecting the continuous Indo-Pakistan confrontation; India also had to suffer the human, social and economic catastrophe of the huge influx of refugees.¹³

The antecedents of the crisis which culminated in the Indo-Pak war can be traced back to the day when the demand for an independent Moslem state was raised. The Lahore Resolution (23 March 1940) which formalized the demand had clearly stated that, "the area in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India shall be grouped to constitute

13

Lars Blinkerberger, India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts (Copenhagen, 1972), p. 303.

independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".¹⁴ But after the independence East Bengal was never allowed to assert its autonomy and sovereignty.

Moreover, there was hardly anything in common between an East and West Pakistan, except the religion. Both the halves of Pakistan were separated by a distance of more than 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. The people had different languages, traditions and cultural background. All these incongruities between the two wings posed a serious challenge to the federation in Pakistan. Unlike India, Pakistani authorities did not tap the integrative power of democracy in resolving these disparities. As a result Pakistan failed to achieve a national identity and a viable political order, in which the people of both East and West Pakistan could live together as equal partners. Referring to the lack of common nationhood in Pakistan, Hans J. Morganthau stated, as far back as

14 Pakistan meant: P - Punjab, A - Afganistan (Part), K - Kashmir, I - Indu (Sind), S - Sarhad (Frontier Province), Tan - Baluchistan. Bengal was not a separate state, independent and sovereign like Pakistan. For details, see, Shri Ram Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy Annual Survey, 1971 (Delhi, 1977), p. 291.

in 1954 that, "Pakistan is not a nation, and hardly a state. It has no justification in history, ethnic origin, language, civilization or the consciousness of those who make up its population."¹⁵

The Exploitation of a National Community:

Over the years a military-bureaucratic-industrial complex had developed within the Pakistani political system and was concentrating political and economic power in one half of the country [West Pakistan] to the detriment of the other [East Pakistan]. The people of East Pakistan were constantly subjected to political, economic and socio-cultural exploitation reminiscent of the traditional relationship between an imperial power and a colony. Describing the exploitative nature of the relationship between the two wings, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman pointed out, "Even 200 years' rule by the colonial British could not exploit the people to such an extent, as the unchallenged exploitation of this wing [East Pakistan] of the country during the last 23 years

15

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangla Desh : Documents (New Delhi, 1971), p. 4.

by the vested interests from West Pakistan".¹⁶ Any objective analysis of the racial, cultural, economic and political equations between the two wings during twenty-four years of Pakistani federal union will lead to the inescapable inference that East Bengal was transformed into a colony of West Pakistan.¹⁷ As observed by a Yugoslav scholar, "no one is even trying to deny that the more developed West Pakistan by the logic of economic ascendancy dictated unequal relationship in which East Pakistan bore many features of a raw material supplying colonial province".¹⁸ It is, however, necessary to point out some of the conspicuous features of this exploitative relationship.

In all the crucial sectors of decision making - economic, military and administrative, East Pakistan's representation was extremely small, if not completely

16 K. P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (Delhi, 1973), p. 9; also see K. P. Misra, "Intra-State Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), no. 1, 1972, pp. 27-39.

17 See Appendix 2^a for a widely circulated statement by Harvard economists Edward S. Mason, Robert Dorfman and Stephen A. Marglin which expatiates on the background of economic domination by the West Pakistan over the East Pakistan.

18 Dr Ranko Petkovic, "The Crisis on the Sub-continent", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 520 (5 December 1971), p. 9.

non-existent.¹⁹ Since independence, the real transfer of resources from the East to West Pakistan has been to the tune of some 10,000 millions dollars. And in line with the standard pattern of all colonial systems, East Pakistan was utilized as a dumping ground for the over-priced goods of West Pakistani industrialists who, thus, enjoyed monopoly rights over this huge protected market.²⁰ Important commodities such as jute were exported to earn foreign exchange which was then utilized for the industrial development of West Pakistan.

The same exploitative relationship in favour of West Pakistan marked the allocation of developmental expenditure and foreign aid. For more than two decades seventy per cent of Pakistan's invisible funds went to West Pakistan and only thirty per cent to East Pakistan; forty-five per cent of the national revenue was spent in West Pakistan and only twenty-five per cent in the East. Still more apparent, as an instance of exploitation, was the way in which foreign aid collected in the name of one hundred and ten million people of Pakistan was always

19 For details, see Appendix 3 of this work.

20 For details, see, Bangla Desh ; Documents, n. 15, pp. 16 and 17.

spent in such a way that the seventy-five million people of East Pakistan were deprived of eighty per cent of it.²¹

Democratic Challenge to a Military Dictatorship:

The first serious political challenge to Pakistani military dictatorship was given by the United Front in 1954, when it contested the election, on the basis of a twenty-one point programme and the slogan 'Bengal for Bengalis'. The United Front trounced Muslim League in the eastern wing by winning 223 out of 237 seats. But the West Pakistani military clique crushed the democratic expression of Bengalis by dismissing the newly formed ministry and the legislative assembly. Since then, their participation in the political process was never allowed on the basis of democratic norms. "The internal divisions naturally engendered by the geographical separation of the two wings and by their difference of culture and language were deepened first by a political grievance on the part of the Bengalis and then by the development among them, a sense of social and economic deprivation relating to West Wing."²²

21 For details, see, S. Irshad, "Bangladesh : A National Liberation Struggle", Review of Internal Affairs, no. 521 (20 December 1971), p. 5.

22 Jackson, n. 1, p. 147.

A National Liberation Movement: x

It is against this backdrop that in 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman came out with his Six Point Formula which contained the demands of maximum regional autonomy and a new balance of political and economic power between the centre and the province.²³ Meanwhile on 12 November 1970, East Pakistan was hit by a massive cyclone causing 200,000 deaths and phenomenal damages to the already feeble economy of East Pakistan. On the face of such grave crisis, Pakistani authorities did nothing substantial to alleviate the miseries of Bengalis. The callousness of Pakistani Government resulted in the development of Bengali nationalism to its pitch. Expressing the sentiments of Bengalis, Sheikh Mujib observed that, "The new experience had only brought into sharp focus the basic truths that every Bengali felt in his bones, that we have been treated so long as a colony and a market".²⁴

President Yahya Khan, announced elections on 7 December and also promised to hand over power to the

23 See Appendix 2^b, which contains the Six Point Formula.

24 S. M. Burke, Maⁿspringsof Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 204.

elected representatives of the people. The demand for autonomy as manifested in the Six Point Manifesto of the Awami League was accorded a unanimous support by the people of East Pakistan. The Awami League won 167 seats out of 313 taking all but two seats in East Pakistan, in the National Assembly polls (17 December 1970).

But the military coterie led by President Yahya Khan was again not willing to accept the demand of provincial autonomy. On 1 March 1971, Yahya Khan postponed the first session of the National Assembly to an unspecified date. "By this stage it seems almost certain that the intention of army leadership was either to bring about a split between the different elements in the Awami League - as had been achieved in the case of Bengali United Front (1954) - or to win time to complete the preparation of a new military action against the Bengali secessionism."²⁵ In the meantime Awami League continued a non-violent, non-cooperative movement to press its demands.

On 25 March 1971, West Pakistan unit of army which had been raised upto a strength of 40,000 men, moved up against the 5,000 Bengali Police and East Pakistani Rifles. Mujib and his partymen were arrested

subsequently and Martial Law was imposed. "Pakistan army", according to Sheikh Mujib, "slaughtered 3 million Bengalis, rendered 25 million homeless and caused 10 millions to take refuge in India".²⁶ Hence, what had started as a movement for greater economic and political autonomy, within the framework of a united Pakistan was transformed into a movement for an independent Bangladesh.

Clearly, it was not East Pakistan which cut itself off from the West but it was West Pakistan which through perpetual domination and exploitation left no alternative for the East, other than to counter the Pakistani militarism through an organized movement. Pakistani Government always labelled the movement as a secessionist attempt being supported by India. "The army", according to Pakistani stand, "foiled the secessionist bid to break up the country and the situation would have been returned to normal very soon, but for the interference and incitement by India."²⁷ The fact remained that it was not an attempt to secession as made clear by Sheikh Mujib, when he stated that, "We have the larger population so how can a majority secedes

26 Burke, n. 24, p. 207.

27 Blinkerberger, n. 13, p. 313.

from a minority?"²⁸

The Plight of the Uprooted People:

Following the internal strife in East Pakistan and the inhuman atrocities let loose by the Pakistani army, large number of refugees started entering the border states of India. From the third week of April and onwards, the number of refugees - 'displaced persons' in Pakistan's terminology - started to mount up. The rate of influx reached 60,000 per day and by the first week of May, Indian Government had already spent Rs 100 million on shelter, food and clothing for the refugees.²⁹

The unprecedented exodus of the refugees and the grave problem it posed, seriously affected India. Indian Government sent out official and non-official delegations to many nations to apprise their governments and people of the plight of the millions of Bengali

28 The Times (London), 4 July 1971.

29 The pace at which the influx has built itself up will be evident from the following figures:

(i)	Week ending	17.4.71	1,19,566 persons
(ii)	Week ending	24.4.71	5,36,308 persons
(iii)	Week ending	1.5.71	12,51,544 persons
(iv)	Week ending	7.5.71	15,72,220 persons
(v)	Week ending	14.5.71	26,69,226 persons
(vi)	Week ending	21.5.71	34,35,243 persons

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangladesh Documents, New Delhi, 1971, p. 675.

refugees.³⁰ Mrs Indira Gandhi also wrote to many Heads of States that by pushing out millions of people from its territory, Pakistan has turned its problems into India's problem. India concentrated on building up world public opinion in favour of a political settlement between the West Pakistani authorities and the elected representatives of East Pakistan. The central theme of Indian diplomacy, then, was that Pakistan was entirely responsible for creating such conditions and it is her responsibility to provide credible guarantees for the safety and well-being of the refugees.

As the time passed, the plight of East Bengalis increased and the burden of refugees on India also increased proportionately. On the other hand, Pakistan had not released Mujibur Rahman which would have been the first step towards further negotiations with the elected representatives of East Bengal. Meanwhile, the dramatic rapprochement between China and the United States as Pakistan playing the go-between redoubled the pressure on India. The United States not only started supplying arms to Pakistan but also conveyed to the Indian Government that it did not want to see India involved in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

30

For further details, see, Bangladesh Documents, n. 15, pp. 669-713.

Henry Kissinger reportedly told the Indian official that, "if China entered the fray between India and Pakistan, India must not expect any help from the United States".³¹ This was the immediate background to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, signed in New Delhi on 9 August 1971. Space limitations do not permit a full discussion on Indo-Soviet treaty. Suffice is to say that irrespective of the title of the treaty and Soviet recognition of Indian nonalignment, it was a defence pact.³²

II. The Debate in the United Nations:

The Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 raised many issues which are relevant from the point of view of the policy of nonalignment. We have already established that the movement in East Bengal was a liberation struggle

31 Quoted by Sudershan Chawla, "Indian Foreign Policy : Developing a New Role in the World Affairs", in Peter Jones (ed.), The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis (London, 1974), vol. 1, p. 136.

32 India was not the only nonaligned nation with whom the Soviet Union has entered into a defence treaty. Other prominent nonaligned nations are the United Arab Republic (on 27 May 1971) and Iraq (on 9 April 1972). For details, see, K. Subrahmanyam, "Indo-Soviet Treaty", Journal (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis), 4(2), October 1971, 182-95.

and not a secessionist effort. Also relevant in the present context are certain issues which were raised primarily through the various forums of United Nations.

The issue of human rights was raised by India before the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] of the United Nations, as early as in May 1971. During the discussions on the Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Samar Sen, India's representative called on the world community to prevent Pakistan from committing inhuman atrocities and violation of fundamental human rights in East Pakistan.³³ In a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mrs Gandhi also observed:

The root of the problem is the fate of 75 million people in Bengal and their inalienable rights. To sidetrack this main issue and to convert it into an Indo-Pakistani dispute can only aggravate tensions. The problem of East Bengal can be solved only by peaceful negotiations between the military rulers and the elected and accepted leaders of East Bengal.³⁴

Pakistan's policy of suppressing the fundamental freedoms and human rights was also brought before the world

33 Samar Sen made two statements on 12 and 17 May, 1971. For the full statements, see, Bangla Desh: Documents, n. 15, pp. 618-25.

34 Jackson, n. 1, p. 93.

community by the international mass media - newspapers, radio, and television.

Another significant issue which was raised before the United Nations was the issue of domestic jurisdiction. Pakistan claimed that impugned acts were matters essentially within her domestic jurisdiction and external powers have no rights, whatsoever to interfere in her internal affairs.³⁵ Aga Shahi, the Pakistani representative contended:

In violation of its solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations, India not only refuses to honour its commitments with regard to the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes between Pakistan and itself, but is also openly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan... no political, economic, strategic or ideological considerations may be invoked by one State to justify its interference in the internal affairs of another State.³⁶

~~Although~~ The relationship between the matters falling within domestic jurisdiction and the human rights has been a controversial one. But in the United Nations the observance of human rights is not normally considered

35 For a detailed discussion, see, Kamal A. Faruqui, "India's Role in the East Pakistan Crisis : Legal Aspects", Review of International Affairs, no. 516, 5 October 1971, pp. 24-5.

36 See, UN Doc. S/PV. 1606, p. 52.

a matter falling within domestic jurisdiction.³⁷ The massive violation of fundamental human rights in East Pakistan and the subsequent flight of millions of refugees on Indian soil had definitely made the issue of Bangladesh, an international problem. Hence, the international community had the right and duty to interfere and press Pakistan to respect the fundamental human rights of the Bengalis and their elected representatives.³⁸

Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, also represented a typical conflict situation wherein, an aggressor could not be identified in terms of UN Charter. "It was a situation where threat to peace was fantastically complex set of iniquities passions and tragic happenings which Charter provisions had not taken adequate note of while laying down the ground rules of inter-state relations in 1945."³⁹

37 See, M. S. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (Calcutta, 1958), pp. 392, and also H. Lauterpascht, International Law and Human Rights (London, 1960), p. 470 ff.

38 See, Misra, n. 16, pp. 132-5.

39 ✓ K. P. Saksena, United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis (Delhi, 1974), p. 322.

There is a conflict of evidence as to who really converted a dangerous situation into open hostilities. Pakistani stand was that on 22 November, India launched a massive attack in the eastern sector. According to a statement made by Aga Shahi, its permanent representative in the United Nations, "direct Indian aggression" persisted in the eastern sector during the two weeks preceding 3 December.⁴⁰ India accepted that its armed forces marched in on 22 November to support the guerrillas of Bangladesh but it also pointed out the fact that the wider conflict erupting on 3 December or the military initiative of 22 November should not be viewed at in isolation from the course of events which had occurred between March and December 1971. The influx of nearly ten million refugees from East Pakistan had created a grave problem for India. As the Prime Minister of India, pointed out, "What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem of India". She further stated that, "Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil".⁴¹ When the influx of refugees continued unabated

40 For details see, UN Documents S/PV. 1606, pp.41-42.

41 Bangla Desh : Documents, n. 15, pp. 673, 674.

India blamed Pakistan for waging a "civilian invasion" and a "civil aggression". During the debates in the Security Council, India representative, Samar Sen, highlighted it. He said:

If aggression on another foreign country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its finances, that it has to give up its territory for sheltering the refugees, that its hospitals have to be closed, that its administration is to be denuded. What is the difference between that kind of aggression and the other type, the more classical type when someone declares war or something of that sort.⁴²

On the basis of above stated facts, it is reasonable to conclude that Bangladesh crisis was essentially a product of Pakistan's internal contradictions. It spilled over due to the indefensible method of suppressing the fundamental human rights of Bengalis. The influx of millions of refugees into India raised a problem which transcended the internal framework of Pakistan and became an international problem. Pakistan's allegation to accuse India of 'creating' a liberation movement in

42

See, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangladesh and Indo-Pak War : Speeches by India's External Affairs Minister, Shri Swaran Singh and India's Permanent Representative Shri S. Sen at the United Nations (New Delhi, 1972), p. 71.

Bangladesh, is devoid of any logic in view of the plebiscitary determination of the Bengalis in favour of Awami League's Six Point Formula. Under these circumstances, it would have been legitimate for the international community to intervene in the matter. It remained nonchalant towards the plight of Bengalis. India patiently bore the excruciating burden of refugees for several months till the internal war in Pakistan erupted into a war on India on 3 December 1971.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROJECTION OF THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT, 1971 INTO ~~THE~~ NONALIGNED ARENA : REACTIONS AND RESPONSES

The emergence of Bangladesh in the wake of a war which developed between March and December 1971, posed difficult choices before the nonaligned nations. A premier nonaligned nation, that is, India was in the grip of an indirect aggression which the influx of refugees symbolized. The social and economic burdens of it were bound to be of a far-reaching consequence to India. The crisis ~~also~~ posed a serious threat to international peace and security. The American connection of Pakistani militarism was ^{also} significant from the point of view of the global strategy of the nonaligned movement.

The Indo-Pak war of 1971 also embodied the liberation struggle of Bengalis against a vicious form of 'intra-colonialism' perpetuated by the West Pakistani military junta. It may be recalled here that support for national liberation movements is an important plank for the joint activities of the nonaligned nations. The freedom struggle of the Bengalis also represented certain ideals and values which form the core of the policy of nonalignment - the right of self-determination, secularism and democratic values.

Moreover, being mostly small and underdeveloped nations composed of multifarious ethnic and language

groups, the nonaligned were also affected by such issues as national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The sensitivity of the nonaligned nations to these issues became all the greater as a result of Pakistani propaganda to project the liberation war as a secessionist attempt.

The present chapter purports to collect the responses of the nonaligned nations towards the nine months crisis in the Indian subcontinent and the subsequent Indo-Pak war which culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh. It should be noted at the very outset that the reactions and responses of the nonaligned nations were expressed primarily in the United Nations. On one occasion only did the nonaligned nations express their attitude outside the UN; it was in their own Ministerial Conference.

The Nonaligned Responses during the First Phase of the Crisis:

The civil war in Pakistan took the shape of an international conflict in March 1971. Indian diplomatic efforts at this stage were to arouse world opinion against the brutal genocide let loose by the Pakistani military junta. The flight of millions of refugees to India had made the situation all the more grave from

the Indian viewpoint. Under these circumstances pressure from the world public opinion was very much warranted. The Guardian wrote, "Pakistan can be moved but only by the unrelenting diplomatic attack. Governments must keep the diplomatic pressure".¹

This was the backdrop against which the non-aligned nations could play a role especially within the United Nations. It is to be noted that due to its very nature as an inter-governmental organization, the United Nations depends entirely upon the member states for its effective functioning. The nonaligned nations have also regarded the United Nations as the primary arena for action for reducing and resolving international conflicts.

The issue of Bangladesh was first raised during the Ministerial Consultative Meeting of Nonaligned Nations, held in New York on 16, 17, 18, 20 and 30 September 1971, in order to hold consultation on developments in the world situation requiring urgent consideration at the 26th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It was attended by fifty-three full-fledged nonaligned countries, out of which thirty delegations were headed by the foreign ministers. In all, the

1 Editorial, The Guardian (London),
6 October 1971.

following countries were represented in the Conference:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameron
Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Congo
(Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
Yemen, Yemen (Sanna), Yugoslavia, Zambia.²

The meeting acknowledged the unity of the nonaligned countries as it manifested itself particularly during the 25th session of the General Assembly and issued a communique in which the joint action in the 26th session of the General Assembly was envisaged. The consultative meeting also took note of the worsening

2 Countries that participated in the Lusaka Conference but were absent from this meeting were: Botswana and Togo. Burma and Mauritius which were not represented in the Lusaka were present at this meeting. In this very Conference, Chile was accepted as full-fledged member and Barbados had submitted a request for membership. For details, see, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 516, 5 October 1971, pp. 15-8.

of the internal crisis in East Pakistan and its repercussion on India. Paragraph seven of the communique reflected the attitude of the nonaligned countries towards the problem:

A humanitarian problem of unprecedented dimension has arisen as a result of refugees which is still continuing imposes tremendous burdens on India and calls for early and effective action, including action at the international level, to stem the flow of these refugees to alleviate their suffering and promote all the conditions necessary which would create confidence and ensure the inalienable rights of the refugees and their return to homeland safely and speedily.³

The nonaligned nations whose delegations expressed reservation on this resolution were: Jordan and Kuwait.⁴

Subsequently the problem of Bangladesh came up for discussion in the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly during September/October, 1971. On hundred and seventeen countries participated in the General Debate including fifty-three nonaligned countries.⁵ Only twenty-four nonaligned nations (excluding India) referred to the problem during the General

3 Main Documents Relating to Conference of Non-aligned Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Georgetown, Guyana, August 1972), p. 96.

4 Ibid., p. 101.

5 Following nonaligned countries were represented during the General Debate:

Debate. They were:

Afganistan, Algeria, Ceylon, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

On the basis of the formal statements of the delegates of these twenty-four countries, a classification of their responses can be done under the following five categories:

(1) Thirteen nonaligned countries stated that the problem should be tackled from the humanitarian point of view and made no reference to political aspect of the problem. The countries were:

Chile, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen (Aden), and Yemen (Sanna) and Zambia.

Previous F.N.

Afganistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameron, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen, Yemen (Sanna), Yugoslavia and Zambia.

(ii) Four nonaligned countries stated that the primary concern should be from the humanitarian point of view and called for the restoration of normalcy in East Bengal as a pre-requisite for the return of the refugees. These countries were:

Afganistan, Ceylon, Nepal and Yugoslavia.⁶

(iii) Two nonaligned countries, apart from expressing humanitarian concern, specifically stated that a political solution should be evolved to meet the situation in East Bengal. These countries were:

Cyprus, Guyana.⁷

(iv) Four nonaligned countries, while acknowledging the humanitarian aspect of the problem, stated that it should be settled between India and Pakistan with or without the assistance of the United Nations. These countries were:

Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone.

(v) Ethiopia made only a passing reference to Bangladesh crisis.

6 Ceylonese delegate spoke in favour of "accelerated democratic constitutional procedures."

7 Cyprus singled out the origin of the conflict "humanitarian problems has roots in political situation and the Secretary-General has put the proper emphasis on this issue".

The nonaligned countries which completely observed silence during the General Debate were the following:

Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Singapore, Sudan, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo, Tunisia.

Also relevant in the present context is to note that some countries, outside the group of the non-aligned were more inclined to regard the problem as one, sparked off by violation of the fundamental human rights.

Ten countries specifically stated that the situation in East Bengal involved human rights or took the line that political solution in East Bengal should be reached in consultation with the elected representatives of the people.⁸

⁸ Such statements can be classified in the following two categories:

- (a) Eight countries specifically stated that East Bengal situation involved human rights:

F.N. continues....

During the early phase of the crisis the nonaligned countries were far more pre-occupied with the social and humanitarian aspect of it. No nonaligned country demanded a meeting of the Security Council to look into the political aspect of the problem. This formed the backdrop against which U Thant found both India and Pakistan equally responsible for mounting military tension in the subcontinent, as was manifested in his letter of 28 October to India. The Secretary General did not make any reference to the violation of fundamental rights in East Pakistan or to the plight of ten million refugees in India. As the crisis developed, it appeared more and more that the effectiveness of the United Nations is an issue and the international community watched yet another crisis leading to a war.

previous F.N.

Belgium, Ecuador ("protest against massacres in East Pakistan which are a violation of the sacred nature of human life....") Ireland, Malta ("the refugees camps are "the direct result of political and military action" and the refugees "have their inalienable human rights"), Madagaskar (called for "humaneness in the conduct of repressive oppressions".)

(b) Four countries specifically stated that a political solution should be reached in consultation with the elected representatives of the people.

France ("political solution based on the consent of the Pakistani people"), Mongolia ("settlement in accordance with the interest of the people"), New Zealand and Sweden ("political solution based on the will of the people as expressed through the ballot"). For details, see, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangla Desh: Documents (New Delhi, 1971), pp. 374 ff..

During the crisis which developed between March and December 1971, three prominent nonaligned countries also referred to the problem outside the United Nations. They were Indonesia, Nepal and the Yugoslavia.

Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs, paid an official visit to Indonesia from the 12th to 15th August 1971. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Foreign Minister referred to their faith in the policy of nonalignment, in the maintenance of universal peace and security and took cognizance of the worsening situation in East Bengal. It stated that,

The two Foreign Ministers discussed the situation arising out of the flow of refugees into India from East Pakistan and expressed concern at the tragic events which had led to this situation. They agreed on the urgent need to work for the creation of such conditions as would be conducive to the return of the refugees to their homes. ... the Government of Indonesia will spare no effort to assist whenever possible in the attainment of peaceful and subtle conditions in this part of the world.⁹

The Indo-Nepal joint communique, which was issued at the conclusion of Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh's visit to Nepal, on 5 September 1971, also referred to the Bangladesh crisis and its impact on India. It stated that "The Prime Minister of Nepal noted the

social and economic implication to India as a result of facing the problem of millions of refugees from East Pakistan. The two ministers agreed on the urgent need for the creation of conditions for the return of the refugees to their homes".¹⁰

Marshal Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia, paid a friendly state visit to India from October 16 to 20, 1971. The visit provided an occasion for the manifestation of traditional India-Yugoslav friendship and common dedication to the ideas of the policy of nonalignment. The Indo-Yugoslav joint communique at the conclusion of the visit of the President Tito to India expressed the Yugoslav support for Indian standpoint on the issue of Bangladesh. It stated that,

The Yugoslav side shared India's deep concern over the serious social and political tensions engendered in India and the strains placed on India's economy, by the presence in India of many millions of refugees, whose number is daily increasing by many thousands. Both sides agreed that the problem could only be solved by a political solution acceptable to the representatives who had been elected by the people. This would enable the normalization of the situation in East Bengal, put an end to the exodus, and enable the refugees to return to their homeland in safety and honour, irrespective of their race or religion.¹¹

10 Ibid., p. 160.

11 "Communique on Yugoslav-Indian Talks", in Documentation, Review of International Affairs, no. 518, 5 November 1971, pp. 16-7.

Both sides called for urgent measures to achieve this objective in accordance with the wishes, inalienable rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal. It was agreed that any attempt to bypass the so clearly expressed wishes of the people would further aggravate the problem.

As a consequence of Pakistani attack, India could take the initiative in the United Nations by lodging a complaint with the Secretary-General on the evening of 3 December. At the same time it was stated in Delhi that India did not propose to take the matter to the Security Council because of her past unhappy experience with UN intervention in the case of previous Pakistani aggression.¹² On 4 December, Security Council was called into emergency session at the initiative of nine countries including two nonaligned countries - Burundi and Somalia. The other nonaligned countries then member of the Security Council, were Sierra Leone and Syria.

The Security Council discussed the conflict on the Indian subcontinent for over 20 hours, on 4th, 5th, and 6th December, but, due to lack of unanimity between its permanent members, it failed to reach any

12

Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis (India-Pakistan, Bangladesh), (London, 1975), p. 124.

accord. The debate and the diplomatic activities in the Council unfolded the attitude of its nonaligned members towards the basic issues arising out of Indo-Pakistani war.

The debate commenced with Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative making two proposals. First, he demanded the circulation of Justice Choudhary's letter as a Council document, which was addressed to the President of the Security Council.¹³ Secondly, he also asked the Council to send an invitation to the representative of Bangladesh, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. The Soviet argument was that since the conflict pertains to the people of East Bengal, only a representative of Bangladesh could enlighten the members of the Council on the actual happenings there.

Somalia and Syria participated in this initial discussion and along with Italy, Japan and the United States agreed with the first proposal. Farah

13

The crux of the letter was that "there can be no proper evaluation of the present situation, its causes, present state and a further solution, without Bangladesh being given a hearing".

For details, see, K. P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (Delhi, 1973), p. 63.

of Somalia and Tomeh of Syria, taking a pro-American stand, supported the ruling of the President to defer consideration on the question of giving hearing to the representative of Bangladesh (the Soviet Union had challenged that ruling).¹⁴

On account of the difference of opinion, the Security Council did not invite the representative of Bangladesh and the issue of Bangladesh was discussed without having any representation of the Bengali people.

The representative of India and Pakistan made diametrically opposite statements before the Council. The Pakistani representative, Mr Aga Shahi, argued that his country was being forcibly dismembered by the deliberate intervention of India, and the demand of political solution as espoused by India is tantamount to an "instrument to Pakistan to dismember herself". Pakistani efforts were to sidetrack the basic causes of the war by exalting the consequence of it. On the contrary, Samar Sen, the Indian representative expatiated upon the type of aggression Pakistan had committed. He declared that "Bangladesh was now a nation with its government,

14

For a detailed description of the debate, see, UN Document S/PV. 1606, p. 67.

duly constituted by representatives freely chosen in the election held in Pakistan in December 1970".¹⁵

After the opening speeches were made, the United States Ambassador, George Bush, submitted a resolution before the Council.¹⁶ The resolution called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel to their own side of the border. It also insisted upon placing of UN observer along one or both sides of the frontier. The American resolution ignored the root causes of the conflict and the burden which India had to bear due to ten million Bengali refugees.

The Soviet Union and Poland voted against the resolution. Britain and France abstained and eleven nations, including all the four nonaligned countries voted in favour of the resolution. The representative of Somalia, Abdul Rahim Abby Farah, while supporting the call for a cease-fire asked the Council "to come to grips with some of the issues that have given rise to this conflict."¹⁷ The representative of Burundi wanted the

-
- 15 For the text of the statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan, see, Bangladesh Document, n. 8, pp. 412-431.
- 16 See, UN Document S/10416, also in Appendix 6 of this work.
- 17 UN Document S/PV. 1606, p. 88.

Council to "dispel anything which might lead to antagonism between the two adjoining belligerent Republics and to work towards the achievement of an immediate cease-fire."¹⁸ The Syrian representative, ~~Mr~~ George Tomeh, while identifying the need for the immediate cessation of hostilities, also emphasized that "Pakistan should immediately take all efficacious and comprehensive measures necessary to secure the return of the refugees. At the same time he espoused for respecting "the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan".¹⁹ The representative of Sierra Leone, Ismael Taylor, did not make any substantive point in the discussion while associating himself with the American proposal.

On 5 December, the Soviet Union submitted a resolution as a counter draft which required 'a political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities'.²⁰ The resolution gave top priority to the question of securing a political settlement in East Pakistan, as a pre-condition for a cease-fire. Poland and Soviet Union voted in its favour

18 Ibid., p. 142.

19 Ibid., pp. 111-115.

20 For the text of the resolution S/10418, see, Appendix 7 of this work.

while 12 nations (including all the four nonaligned members) abstained and China vetoed it. The abstention of the majority was tantamount to opposition of the resolution.

Finally, yet another resolution was sponsored by eight non-permanent members - Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia (Document S/10423).²¹ The resolution which was supported by three nonaligned countries called upon the governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces and urged to intensify the efforts to bring about speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistani refugees to their homes. As expected, Poland and the Soviet Union voted against it while France and Britain abstained and the remaining members supported it.

Syria was the only nonaligned country which did not sponsor any resolution during the three-day debate in the Security Council. Although, at times, it voted with the remaining nonaligned countries in the Council. Appreciating the Indian standpoint, Syrian

21

See, Appendix 8 of this work.

representative, George Tomeh, singled out three interwoven problems in this conflict - the problem of securing a cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces and the return of the refugees to their homes.²²

Uniting for Peace and the Nonaligned:

Frustrated in their attempt to get the Security Council order a cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh when they were there to assist the war of liberation against West Pakistan, eleven members of the Council invoked the Resolution 377(V), which is generally known as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The Resolution (S/10429) was formally sponsored by six countries including three nonaligned countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone and Somalia.²³ Again, Syria did not join the nonaligned nations in moving the resolution. Two of the nonaligned nations - Nicaragua and Somalia - played a significant role when the issue of invoking the Uniting for Peace resolution came up during informal discussion in the Security Council. It was Nicaragua's representative, Sevilla - Sacasa, who initially referred

22 See, UN Document S/PV. 1606, pp. 198-200.

23 See, Appendix 9 of this work.

to the possibility of the transferring the matter to the General Assembly. He stated that "if we do nothing, then the General Assembly can act".²⁴ Somalia, spearheading the formal proposal argued vehemently for it. Hence, this resolution indirectly helped the Pakistan and its allies, who were trying to use United Nations as an 'effective-shield' to forestall the growing strength of the Liberation Movement with Indian help.

It was only the fifth time that the "United for Peace" procedure has^{been} evoked to transfer an issue from a deadlocked Security Council to the General Assembly.²⁵ This was done with a view to undo the Soviet veto which had prevented the Security Council from enforcing the kind of ceasefire that the eleven members had called for. It must be recalled here that Soviet proposal for ceasefire was coupled with a political settlement in East Bengal.

With the increase in the membership of the United Nations, from original 50 to 117, the balance was

24 Misra, n. 13, pp. 81-2.

25 The Resolution 377(V), known as the Uniting for Peace, was earlier resorted to only four times in the history of the United Nations. In 1950 to facilitate the intervention of the UN forces in Korea. In 1956 to stop the invasion of Suez by Britain and France, again the same year on Hungary and in 1958 to deal with the Lebanon crisis.

held by the Afro-Asian bloc, by largely the nonaligned nations. This enhanced the potentialities of the non-aligned countries whose number in the General Assembly was then fifty-three. Moreover, the fact that for the implementation of "Uniting for Peace" a 2/3 majority was needed, made their role all the more significant.

The debate over the escalation of armed conflict in the Indian subcontinent continued for over ten hours. In sum, fifty-eight member states took part in the debate; including twenty-one nonaligned countries. The nonaligned participants were the following:

Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, Jordan, Kuwait, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

The African nonaligned countries were the main contributors to the debate. Most of the Asian nonaligned preferred to observe reticence on this issue. Yugoslavia, the only European nonaligned, contributed substantially to the debate. Chile, a new-comer to the nonaligned movement from Latin America also actively participated in the debate.²⁶ A continentwise break-up .

26

Chile was given a full-fledged membership of the nonalignment movement in the Ministerial Consultative Meeting held just before the 26th session of the General Assembly, see, Review of International Affairs, no. 516 (October, 1971), p. 15.

of the nonaligned countries participating in the debate, is as follows:

Africa: Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Ghana, Kuwait, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Tunisia.

Asia: C^eylon, Cyprus, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, and Jordan.

Europe: Yugoslavia.

Latin America: Chile.

Soon after the convening of the Assembly, fourteen countries headed by Argentina introduced a draft resolution which was virtually the same as one defeated by a Soviet veto in the Security Council. Following nonaligned countries were also a party in sponsoring the resolution:²⁷ Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. Its main features were, a demand for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces to their own sides of the border. It also insisted that efforts should be intensified in order to bring about speedily and in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter

27

For Resolution (A/L. 647) December 7, 1971, see, Appendix 10.

of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistani refugees to their homes.

Thirty countries sponsored the earlier resolution with slight modification.²⁸ The following non-aligned countries also took part in sponsoring the revised resolution: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and Zambia.

The Resolution (A/L. 647/Rev. 1), sponsored by sixteen nonaligned ignored four vital points raised earlier by India and the Soviet Union. First, there is, but, a crumbling Pakistani military presence left in East Bengal and no political presence whatsoever. Secondly, Bangladesh is a reality that no one and nothing can undo now. Thirdly, the genesis of the problem has to

28 . Revised Draft Resolution A/L. 647/Rev. 1, December 7, 1971, was sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Guetmala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen, Zaire and Zambia in the General Assembly, for text, see, Appendix 11.

be seen in Pakistan's brutal genocide and fourthly, the mass migration to India by a number larger than the population of more than two third's members of the General Assembly. India, therefore, suggested that the issue should be referred to the Assembly's Steering Committee to consider whether it should be put on agenda, but no one from the large Afro-Asian nonaligned bloc came forward for its support. Later, India withdrew its proposal when President Adam Malik offered to put Indian view to vote.

The African nonaligned were relatively active in the sponsoring of the Revised Draft Resolution (A/L. 647/Rev. 1) and also in the debate which followed. The attitudes and policy statements of some of them, merit mention here. To begin with, Mr Abdel Latif Rahal (Algeria) pointed out that the war could not settle the problem. "What was needed now was an end to the hostilities so that efforts could begin on settling issues on the basis of the United Nations Charter". He further suggested that "a solution of these problems must be sought within the framework of a number of clearly enunciated principles of the Third World, namely, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for mutual sovereignty and territorial inte-

grity".²⁹ Burundi's representative also supported the draft resolution and treated the problem as an Indo-Pakistani dispute.³⁰ The representative of Chad supported Pakistani standpoint categorically and compared the situation in East Bengal with that of Katanga and Biafra. He stated:

Knowing what the consequences of a blind application of the principle of self-determination may be, my Government has said 'No' to Katanga and 'No' to Biafra, and cannot say 'Yes' in the present situation, namely, the disintegration of the national unity of Pakistan.³¹

In consonance with the stand taken by Chad, the representative of Ghana, Richard Maxmillan also took a legal and formal attitude and stated that,

The Organization of African unity knows that once intervention in the affairs of a member state is permitted, once one permits oneself the higher wisdom of telling other member state what it should do with regard to arranging its own political affairs, one opens a Pandora's box. And no continent suffer more than Africa when such a principle is thwarted.³²

29 See, UN Document A/PV. 2003, pp. 6-10.

30 Ibid., pp. 156-160.

31 For the full text of the statement, see, ibid., pp. 132-134.

32 Ibid., pp. 28-32.

Among the African nonaligned countries only Sierra Leone openly supported Indian standpoint during the debate in the General Assembly. Although Sierra Leone was one of the sponsors of the revised resolution (A/L. 647/Rev. 1), its representative referring to the draft resolution introduced by Soviet Union pointed out that the two resolutions if adopted would certainly have advanced the task of the General Assembly in bringing normal conditions of peace and security in Bengal. He also mentioned the right of self-determination of the Bengali people.³³

Six Asian nonaligned countries took part in the General Assembly debate during the "Uniting for Peace" exercise. They were: Ceylon, Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia and Nepal. On the other hand, some of the prominent nonaligned countries did not express themselves publicly. These included: Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia and Egypt.

Ceylonese representative contributed substantially to the debate by making a lengthy statement. He underlined the need for an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from East Bengal as a precondition to a political solution. He stated that, "We cannot

reasonably expect the Government of Pakistan to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged leader of Pakistan, as long as foreign troops which for whatever reason, remain on Pakistan's territory". Discrediting the Liberation Movement in East Bengal, he further said that "Pakistan cannot reasonably be expected to negotiate with avowed or prospective secessionists". But, to vindicate the much professed Ceylonese neutral stance vis-a-vis Indo-Pak war, he also suggested that "Pakistan should enter into immediate consultation with the acknowledged leaders in Pakistan".³⁴

The statement made by Khatri, the representative of Nepal, reflected a relatively neutral attitude. He supported the draft resolution moved by Somalia and others, inasmuch as it calls for an immediate cease-fire and for the withdrawal of troops. But Khatri also took note of the root causes of the conflict, when he stated that, "The end of the current fighting alone does not solve problems which led to the fighting."³⁵

Jordan and Lebanon were the only two non-aligned from the Arab world who participated in General

34 Ibid., pp. 11-20.

35 for the full statement, *ibid.*, p. 131.

Assembly debate on Indo-Pakistan conflict. Jordan came out openly on the side of Pakistan and denounced India's armed intervention in the Pakistani territory. Ignoring the causes of the conflict, the Jordanian representative remarked that: "Regardless of merits and origin of the present conflict, there can be no justification for the armed intervention of one state in the territory of another".³⁶

The statement made by the representative of Lebanon showed a fairly neutral stand on this issue. He underlined the need of stopping the armed conflict, at once and expressed his faith in the Charter of the United Nations. The statement said: "The attitude of my Government is based on principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and a just, humanitarian settlement of the Pakistani refugee problem.³⁷ Cyprus only expressed its support to the draft resolution contained in UN Doc. A/L. 648.

Yugoslavia had come out in the open during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war in favour of India's Kashmir policy. During the 1971 war also, Yugoslavia appreciated

36 For details, *ibid.*, pp. 62-65.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

Indian standpoint. In the General Assembly debate, its representative Lazor Mojsove stated that "the true cause of the hostilities was in political situation in East Pakistan and armed repression by West Pakistan there. This, however, was not time for reculmination. The crisis should be resolved". He supported the proposal for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the troops but categorically stated that the "effective measures should be taken immediately to solve the crisis in East Pakistan in cooperation with the elected representative there". He also underlined the need of making some improvements in the resolution moved by Argentina to emphasize the need for a political settlement. He also accused the international community "for insufficient engagement and commitment in defining and ascertaining the real causes of the crisis and for failing to take measures to overcome them in time".³⁸

Chile was the only nonaligned from South American region which took an active part in the debate. The representative of Chile adopted a balanced approach towards the conflict situation and proposed an extensive programme for its elimination. The statement made by the representative of Chile emphasized the need for

38

For the text of the statement, *ibid.*, pp. 56-61.

adopting "a type of draft resolution that would be based on the principles which are all called upon to respect, principles that are interlinked among themselves and that would be valid both individually and in the inter-connection that exists between them: cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, protection of human rights, the adoption of immediate measures for the solution of the political problem in the area in question in order to ensure the return of the refugees, non-interference, free self-determination, territorial integrity, the active presence of the United Nations - these and other principles stressed in the past as fundamental to international security".³⁹

After the debate the resolution, moved by Argentina and others, contained in Document A/L. 647/Rev. 1, was put to the vote. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal, with 104 members voting for the motion, only 11 against it and 10 abstaining.⁴⁰ The voting pattern of the non-aligned countries can be classified under following categories:

In favour: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameron, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo, Cyprus,

39 For the text of the statement, *ibid.*, pp. 117-20.

40 For details of the voting, see Appendix 12 in this work.

Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, ^bLiyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Cuba, India.

Abstain-
ing: Afghanistan, Chile, Nepal, Senegal,
Singapore.

Absent: Burma was absent and Mauritius declined to participate in the voting.

On December 7, the General Assembly voted along the above mentioned lines thereby approving the American approach. The resolution was passed. Its aim was to halt India's participation in the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistani occupation forces. But as a General Assembly resolution, it only took the form of a recommendation, - unlike a Security Council resolution which would have been legally binding on the nations concerned.

India did not respond to the recommendatory resolution because it did not show any awareness of the reality in East Bengal. Hence, the war could not be stopped, and the crisis was again placed before the Security Council. No new resolution could be finalized there because of the Soviet opposition to any solution that did not debar West Pakistan from further domination of East Bengal against the will of the local population.

Only when the liberation of Bangladesh was accomplished and India's offer of armistice had been accepted, a resolution was moved by Argentina, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia (S/10465),⁴¹ confirming that no further warfare was necessary. The resolution also demanded that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be strictly observed. There was no mention about a political settlement and thus left to the parties concerned. This was the only substantive resolution passed by the Council during the entire conflict on the Indian subcontinent.

Burundi, Sierra Leone and Somalia, the non-aligned members of the Security Council played a signi-

41

For the text of the resolution which was moved on 21 December 1971, see, n. 13, pp. 120-21.

ficant role in the passing of the resolution (S/10465). Specially the efforts made by Farah, the Somalia's representative, were formally acknowledged and appreciated by a large number of UN members. Farah, the President of the Council taking note of the realities of the changing situations refused to accept Pakistani standpoint on this issue. While interpreting the resolution, on behalf of the sponsors, he took an approach which was relatively favourable to India.⁴²

42

For a fuller exposition of the debate, see, Misra, n. 13, pp. 120-24.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The part played by the nonaligned nations in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 and their responses to certain main aspects of the war should be helpful in drawing certain conclusions about the policy of nonaligned nations towards regional conflicts.

In December 1971, the internal struggle between the two wings of Pakistan developed into a renewed conflict between India and Pakistan ending in a brief but vicious war. The Indo-Pak conflict had been the result of an unprecedented human tragedy wherein a majority was struggling against a new form of neo-colonialism. India was drawn into the vortex of civil war in Pakistan not through her activities but through the mere fact that it had become an asylum for the ten million refugees from East Pakistan.

Despite the wide publicity given by the international mass media to the gross violation of human rights in East Pakistan and the impending threat to international peace and security, the nonaligned countries remained nonchalant towards the nine months crisis in East Pakistan. From the very beginning, they looked to the problem with indifference, as had been

evident by the evasive manner in which the issue of Bangladesh was dealt with, at the Ministerial Consultative Meeting of the Nonaligned Countries in New York. While the global problems, such as anti-colonialism and the new economic order were discussed in detail by foreign ministers, the issue of Bangladesh was given a very low priority, on the agenda. It remained rather an appendix of the final document which was released after the meeting. However, all the nonaligned except Kuwait and Jordan supported the resolution which had called for "an early and effective action, at the international level to stem the flow.. of the refugees, to alleviate their sufferings and promote all the conditions necessary which would create confidence and ensure the inalienable rights of the refugees and their return to their homeland safely and speedily".

When the issue of Bangladesh came up for the discussion in the United Nations, only twenty-four non-aligned countries participated in the debate and the remaining thirty-one were silent. Out of these participants only six referred to the political aspect of the problem and none found it worthwhile to mention the violation of fundamental human rights in East Bengal. On the contrary the countries of Soviet bloc and some of the Western industrial democracies, such as France

and the United Kingdom spoke in clear terms, against the gross violation of human rights and genocide in East Pakistan.

After the outbreak of war, all the four non-aligned members of the Security Council remained indifferent to India's plea for a political solution as also for restoration of normalcy in East Bengal as a pre-condition for cease-fire. They seem to have been only concerned with the preservation of unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Burundi for instance, equated India and Pakistan and called them adjoining belligerent republics. Syria was almost silent and Somalia and Sierra Leone did not make any substantial point. Moreover, all the four nonaligned members directly or indirectly supported the United States, going for the invocation of Uniting for Peace resolution.

In the General Assembly of the UN the balance was held by Afro-Asian bloc which had been largely non-aligned but their role vis-a-vis Indo-Pak conflict remain rather insignificant. Out of the fifty-three nonaligned members only twenty-one participated in the debate and sixteen joined hands with Argentina in sponsoring a resolution which ignored the real issues and whose aim was to stop the liberation of Bangladesh. Their spokesmen mostly contented themselves with the statement that the

events in East Bengal are internal matters of Pakistan wherein they had no locus standi to intervene. A few other nonaligned like Yugoslavia, Cuba which substantially took the same position, went a step further and regretted or deplored the events in East Pakistan but nevertheless said they would respect Pakistan's domestic jurisdiction. When the Argentinian resolution was put to vote, thirty-nine nonaligned voted for it. Cuba and India were the only nonaligned, which voted against it, while some of the nonaligned such as Afganistan, Chile, Nepal, Senegal, Singapore abstained.

India was naturally disappointed by the ambivalent attitude of the nonaligned nations. Their unwarranted support to the Pakistani cause was ~~in~~ no way in accordance with the policy of nonalignment which was predicated on the basic values such as anti-imperialism, secularism and self-determination. Giving vent to India's sentiments, M. C. Chagla remarked, "Look at the nonaligned countries. We have prided ourselves of our nonalignment. What have the nonaligned done? Nothing".¹ President

1

Dr N. M. Ghatate (ed.), Bangladesh Crisis and Consequences, Proceedings of Deendayal Seminar (Delhi, 1971), p. 85.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan also described the support of the Third World countries to Pakistani cause as a moral victory for Islamabad and a proof of India's isolation.² In sum, the passive attitude of nonaligned nations was largely responsible for the inactivation of the United Nations.

How do we understand the attitude of the non-aligned nations vis-a-vis Indo-Pak conflict of 1971? Why was it that majority of them completely ignored the real issues and directly or indirectly supported an aligned Pakistan against a nonaligned India? Although, theoretically the policy of nonalignment entails an independent and objective assessment of international crises - to decide each issue on its merits.

The answer obviously lies in the particular phases of policy evolution of the nonaligned nations which have emerged from their response to the internal and external compulsions, in which they seek to preserve their strategic interests and maintain their internal stability. It may not be possible to ascertain the

2

See, Jalal Hamid and Hasan Khalid, Marching Towards Democracy : A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1970-71), (Rawalpindi, n.d), p. 258.

compulsions, motivations and priorities of each and every nonaligned nation and to speculate as to why they reacted in the manner they did. But on the basis of facts in hand, certain conclusions may be drawn. This analysis may not be precise and specific but it outlines the nature, possibilities and limitations of the policy of nonaligned countries towards the regional and local conflicts in the contemporary world.

The policy of nonalignment as discussed elsewhere is intimately connected with the domestic problems of the nonaligned nations.³ In the case of Indo-Pak conflict also the nonaligned responses were primarily shaped by their internal compulsions. To start with, the hostile attitude of the nonaligned nations towards the liberation movement in East Pakistan is generally

3 "The policies of the new developing countries", according to F. S. Northedge, "are bound to be dominated by certain economic problems, which they cannot afford to forget; and their social unity is bedevilled by tribal and deep-seated divisions. For many of these states foreign policy tends to be rather more an external projection of internal requirements than a rational reaction to international events".

For a fuller discussion, see, F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London, 1976), pp. 171-2.

attributed to legal-political inertia of states which normally operates against any demand of change in the existing state system. "The states - atleast in words, if not in deeds - are always prone to take a moral and formal legal position in situation of the kind that was developing in East Bengal".⁴ This largely explains as to why the nonaligned nations perceived in the Indo-Pak conflict, a kind of threat to the state system and, hence, attached a great importance to the preservation of territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan.

The truth, indeed, is that most of the non-aligned nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America have in them a plethora of plural societies, whose religion, language and cultural affinity do not coincide.⁵ Moreover, these countries are based on arbitrary demarcating boundaries drawn by the colonial powers in the past, ignoring the basis of ethnic, geographic and historic factors. The result is that in many of such nations, there are minorities which are striving to preserve

4 K. P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (Delhi, 1973), p. 49.

5 See, Appendix 13, for the ethnic divisions in the nonaligned nations.

their cultural cohesion. All such nations are faced with the problem of national integration, in creating a balanced representation of various ethnic groups to curb sectional dissatisfaction to potentially fissiparous tendencies or forces. Their vote against the Argentinian resolution might have set a dangerous precedent that could one day be cited against them. This pre-empted a clear-cut response from them.

These internal compulsions are clearly discernible in the voting pattern of African nonaligned nations. Of the forty African nonaligned, all except Senegal and Malawi, who abstained, voted for the Argentinian resolution, calling for a cease-fire without any political settlement. Nations which were confronted with problems of dangerous divisions and possible disintegration, such as Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Chad, Zaire, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zambia argued vehemently for the preservation of territorial integrity of Pakistan. On the other hand, Senegal and Malawi which abstained from voting had hardly to face the problem of secession.⁶

In fact over the years, after independence, African nations have tended to become increasingly

6 See, "African Vote in United Nations : Ghost of Biafra", in Indian Express (New Delhi), 11 December 1971.

hostile to the idea of intervention challenging the integrity of state frontiers. As observed by Immanuel Wallerstein, "Every African nation... has its own Katanga. Once the logic of secession is admitted there is no end except in anarchy".⁷ Hence, the vote of African non-aligned for the Argentinian resolution was a vote against the secession and dissociative movement. In this, they seem to have essentially gone by the general policy stand taken by the Organization of African Unity on its commitment to respect the existing frontiers, and the territorial integrity of the states.

The main systemic factor, superimposed on the domestic compulsions, was the involvement of major powers. This profoundly influenced the policy of non-aligned nations vis-a-vis Indo-Pak conflict of 1971. While in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, both the Super Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union, were more or less consonant in finding a solution to put an immediate end to the hostilities, in 1971 they were far more split than ever. The United States was

7 Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa : The Politics of Independence, cited in Kamal A. Faruqui, "India's Role in East Pakistan Crisis : Legal Aspects", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 576, October 1971, p. 26.

providing military and diplomatic help to Pakistani military junta to perpetuate its oppression in East Pakistan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union bounded by the Treaty of Peace and Cooperation was opposing each and every attempt to bring cease-fire without evolving a political settlement as acceptable to the elected representative of East Pakistan.

The Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, also saw the emergence of Washington-Peking-Pindi axis, which seriously affected the conflict perspective of the nonaligned nations. The debate at the Security Council was featured by a confrontation between the United States and China, on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, while the United Kingdom and France stood out as neutrals. As against such unprecedented alignment, the nonaligned became all the more passive and indifferent toward the happenings in East Pakistan and the subsequent Indo-Pak war. China's involvement was another vital factor in the calculations of many nonaligned nations of South and South-East Asia such as Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries decided not to antagonise China by supporting the liberation movement in East Pakistan and maintained a neutral stance towards the conflict.

Religion also played an important role in shaping the attitude of some of the nonaligned nations of West Asia and North Africa. Their behaviour during the crisis in Bangladesh and the subsequent war makes it ample clear. These nations have defined their national identity in religious terms and the subsequent failure to appreciate India's secularism, influenced their behaviour within and outside the United Nations.

Even the prominent nonaligned of the Middle East viz Egypt, Algeria and Syria who claim to have set progressive secularism also refused to recognise in East Pakistan, one kind of national imperialistic struggle and a movement of liberation. Egypt, which in the past had given valuable support to India in all its confrontations with Pakistan, turned its back on India in 1971 and showed more sympathy for a united Pakistan to survive than for a secular Bangladesh to be born. In fact, after the Middle East conflict of 1967, Egypt had not remained an active member of the nonaligned movement because of its primary preoccupation with the regional politics. Naturally, it wanted not to hurt the strong religious feelings of its allies by supporting India's stand in the name of the nonaligned solidarity. President Sadat also wanted to establish a less pro-Indian policy than that of his predecessor Nasser. Syria was more

sympathetic to Indian concern both in the Security Council and the General Assembly largely because of the Soviet influence.

In sum, the unwillingness to see a sister Pan-Islamic nation dismembered was primarily responsible for the way Arab-African nonaligned voted. But this was not the only reason. The West Asian countries could not be normally expected to vote against a formula (cease-fire and withdrawal) which they themselves got the United Nations to adopt in their continuous struggle with Israel. Moreover, the monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan were hardly expected to appreciate the democratic values and the right of self-determination in East Pakistan as espoused by India.

Yugoslavia, the leading nonaligned nation and a staunch supporter of the liberation movement acted in the most ambivalent fashion vis-a-vis Indo-Pak conflict of 1971. In the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Yugoslav delegate while speaking of the armed suppression by the Pakistani authorities of the representatives of the people of East Pakistan, casted his vote in favour of a resolution that would have the effect of encouraging the very armed suppression, he was decrying. Yugoslav decision came as a shock to Indian Government and public both, more so, because President

Tito had come out in the open in favour of India in the 1965 war with Pakistan. Later on, President Tito also admitted the mistake he had committed by not supporting the Indian stand on Bangladesh. In an exclusive interview with the Zagred daily Vjesnik on 22nd February 1977, he admitted that,

Self-determination was our principle and the people of Bangladesh had the right of self-determination. India only helped this nation to put an end to further slaughter.... Ten million refugees, the horrible massacre, which started in Bangladesh and the arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman left no alternative. India played a positive role in the affair. We think so.⁸

Clearly, the Yugoslav vote at the General Assembly was not an objective judgement on the issues involved in the Indo-Pak conflict. It was rather guided by its internal compulsions and a demonstration of Yugoslavia's independence of Moscow. It is important to recall that at the time of Bangladesh crisis, Yugoslavia was undergoing a phase of internal instability due to the growing demand of autonomy in Croatia. Therefore, the Yugoslav decision makers looked at the Indo-Pak war arising out of a dissociative movement and it was found necessary not to take a stand which could have

certain implications on the internal conflicts of nationalities of the Yugoslav federation.⁹ The Yugoslav attitude was also influenced by the inter-Soviet bloc dynamics. The Yugoslav leaders might have thought of bolstering the prestige of the party and government by showing their independence of Soviet directions.¹⁰

In sum, the nonaligned nations acted in the United Nations to affect an immediate termination of war without worrying much about how any subsequent peace is to be maintained in the absence of a lasting political settlement. The role of the nonaligned movement remained rather inconspicuous due to the absence of any positive initiative to solve the crisis which had developed in East Pakistan between April and December 1971, and to stop the war once it had started. It transpires that the nonaligned nations wanted to avoid unnecessary entanglement with the Super Powers especially, with a strange Sino-American combination, in the events which do not affect them directly.

9 For detailed discussion, see, M.L. Sondhi, Yugoslavia and Romania : Why They Voted in the Manner They Did", Motherland (Delhi), 15 December 1971.

10 See, Lars Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan : The History of Unsolved Conflict (Copenhagen, 1972), p. 375.

Our inquiry into the nonaligned behaviour vis-a-vis Indo-Pak war of 1971 brought into sharp focus the motives, priorities and compulsions of the non-aligned countries toward a leading international conflict and is also helpful in comprehending the nature, possibilities and limitations of conflict reducing function of the nonaligned movement in the contemporary international system.

The events of 1971 made it ample clear that the much professed declarations of nonalignment are only relevant in the context of grand global issues viz East-West conflict and threat from the Super Powers. The political meetings of the nonaligned nations exclusively deal with the issues which concern the entire global system and thus project an image of a common-front of nonaligned countries. But when it comes to the concrete issues viz regional and local disputes and conflicts, the nonaligned behaviour not only vary from country to country but at times it is totally different from the general policy statement of the non-aligned movement. The difference between the declarative aspect and the behavioural aspect of the policy of nonalignment has been made ~~ample~~ clear by the preceding description of the nonaligned behaviour in Indo-Pak war of 1971.

The attitude of nonaligned countries toward the Indo-Pak war has also demonstrated the divergencies which characterize the nonaligned nations, inspite of their common attitude to the global issues viz East-West conflict. In fact, the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 has proved that the foreign policy of any nonaligned, to a great extent, is predetermined by the political circumstances in its immediate environment. The experiences of 1971 have also confirmed that the nonaligned mostly being weak and instable are largely guided by their internal compulsions, especially, in the sphere of foreign relations.

Hence, for each nonaligned nation the traditional attitudes and the immediate interests have proved to be more important than their commitment to the general principles of nonalignment. Their behaviour and attitude in terms of foreign policy decisions have been in no way different from those of other countries when the fundamental national interests are thought to be threatened. In fact, every country has certain foreign policy goals in the pursuit of which nonalignment or alignment does not have much significance. The nonaligned like any other nation cannot ignore, circumvent or evade the political, social and economic forces which determine the policies

of governments. Therefore, the distinction between nonalignment and alignment, in practice, when one brings to bear the actual behaviour on concrete issues such as local or regional conflicts seem to be only superficial.¹¹

Why was it that the nonaligned movement failed to make any imprint in the context of the contemporary international conflicts? For, it became clear during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 that small powers are merely pawns in the relationship of Big Powers and that any particular conflict which involves the interest of Great Powers, smaller powers are powerless, unless the Great Powers wish the conflict to be resolved. That fact is that most of the nonaligned nations are so weak in capabilities that even if they are vitally interested in a problem there would be little they could do directly to affect the outcome unless they form a common attitude towards international conflicts and direct their concerted activities to resolve them.

11 For a useful discussion on this aspect of nonalignment, see, Bimla Prasad, "The General Experience of Nonalignment and Its Prospects for the Future", in Ljubimoje Acimovic' (ed.), Nonalignment in the World of Today, International Symposium, Petrovaradin 16-18 January, 1969 (Beograd, 1969), p. 104.

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this work, nonalignment had emerged against the backdrop of an East-West conflict and served an important function by reducing the tension between the two Power blocs. But the global system of the 1970's is characterized by greater pluralism as contrasted with a bi-polar world. Within such an international system the danger of a major conflict between great nuclear powers is correspondingly reduced. These changes in the international system have profoundly affected the less stable nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America and has led to phenomenal increase in tension and conflicts in these continents. Indo-Pak conflict brought to the fore the problem of growing militarism in the Third World and its relationship with Great-Power interventions. In fact, the traditional colonialism has ended in the world except in the Southern part of Africa but decolonisation has not ended the struggle for freedom. In a good number of 'Third World' countries, the minorities have been agitating for autonomy and due participation in decision making at national level and are victim of socio-economic injustice. Hence, "...almost everywhere in the 'Third World', there are tensions in the relation of state to community that are analagous to those brought about the disintegration

of Pakistan".¹² These internal tensions at the local level invariably lead to the involvement of the Great Powers and are responsible for majority of insurgencies and conflicts in the 'Third World'.

Nonalignment movement which emerged as a vanguard of the struggle against neo-colonialism has so far not addressed itself to the problems arising out of internal instability and socio-economic oppression which account for most of the regional and local conflicts in the present day world. The truth, indeed, is that after the formation of an anti-bloc system against the backdrop of a rampant East-West conflict, the nonaligned nations have not converted their common viewpoint into effective political action on the basis of some viable and well-defined political goals.¹³ This has resulted in progressively diminishing basis of common identity within the nonaligned movement. In the words of M.R. Singer, - "They ~~the~~ nonaligned nations ~~are~~ have not established channels of communication through which perceptions, values, goals and strategies can flow

There
can be
none!

12 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis : India-Pakistan-Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1978), p. 161.

13 For further discussion, see, Lars Nord, "The Movement of Nonalignment : Harmony and Dissent", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo), vol. 7, no. 2 (1976), pp. 92-5.

regularly and continuously*.¹⁴

In summing up, it may be concluded that the nonaligned movement which played a historic role in the context of the East-West global conflict may again serve an important conflict-reducing function by contributing to the process of developing an international order of moral responsibility and legitimization of defined procedure around the United Nations. What is needed is to redefine the political goals of nonalignment in the light of contemporary international conflicts and develop a collaborative spirit, within the movement, so as to take urgent actions on the concrete problems encountered by the member countries. ✓

14 See M. R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (London, 1972), pp. 70.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Ten Principles of Peaceful Co-existence

- (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
- (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
- (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
- (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (6) (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;
- (7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
- (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;
- (10) Respect for justice and international obligations.

Source: Foreign Policy of India : Text of Documents 1947-1959 (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1959), pp. 173-181.

APPENDIX 2(a)

Extract from a Report by Edward S. Mason, Robert Dorfman and Stephen A. Marglin

The basic facts seem to support the East Pakistan charge of economic domination by the West. The economic disparities between East and West Pakistan have been so serious for so long that the Pakistan government's highest planning authority has been forced to take official note of them.

A recent¹ report by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan provides authoritative documentation of the widening of economic disparities in the two regions. The most striking fact in this report is the widening gap between the income of the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East.² Over the next ten years, the annual rate of growth of income of West Pakistan was 6.2% while it was only 4.2% in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70 the per capita income of the West was 61% higher than in the East. Thus, in ten years the income gap doubled in percentage terms; it increased even more in absolute terms.

East Pakistanis blame three instruments of Central Government policy for their plight:

1. Pakistan's scant investible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan — to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.

2. In particular, East Pakistan's foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.

3. Economic policy favours West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specifically, tariffs, import

1 Reports of the Advisory Panels for Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, Vol. I; Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July, 1970.

2 Ibid., p. 2, Table 1. As the report notes, these estimates of disparity are understatements because of a lack of adjustment in the basic official data for the generally higher prices which prevail in East compared to West.

controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world market.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. First, it is indisputable that the bulk of public investment has been in West Pakistan, though the majority of the population lies in the East. With 60% of the population, East Pakistan's share of Central Government development expenditure has been as low as 20% during 1950/51-1954-55, attaining a peak of 36% during the Third Five Year Plan period 1965/66-1969-70. East Pakistan has received an even smaller share of private investment, less than 25%³.

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan Government policy claim, that the great bulk of worthwhile investment opportunities have been in the West, though the relative attractiveness of the West may be more the effect of overall government policy than a cause. In any event, the fact remains that investments in the West have done little or nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades, East Pakistan's share of total Pakistan export earnings has varied between 50% and 70%, while its share of imports has been in the range of 25% to 30%.⁴ Until 1962/63, East Pakistan has shown significant surpluses on foreign account, which has changed in recent years to small deficits. By contrast, the West's foreign trade has shown a substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid.

3 Ibid., p. 6, table 2.

4 Total foreign exchange available for imports is made up of export earnings and foreign aid. All data on trade are compiled from official statistics issued by the Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

With respect to the third point, general economic policy has clearly favoured West Pakistan. The West's preponderant share of imports and investments might have provided inexpensive necessities for all of Pakistan's people. In fact, it has allowed the development of inefficient⁵ industries, which, ironically, have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that have made East Pakistan a captive market. 40% of all exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan; in 1968/69, the West sold 50% more to the East than it bought from the East.

An analysis of foreign trade data reveals that a net transfer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to the official report referred to above, East Pakistan has transferred approximately \$ 2.6 billion to West Pakistan over the period 1948-49 to 1968-69.⁶

In short, Pakistan's economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. "Exploitation" may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan's economic interests have been subordinated to those of the West, and that the East Pakistanis have had good cause to resent that fact.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Government. The military regime in Pakistan has existed, with modifications, since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani, and of the senior officers in the central civil services, 87% were West Pakistani in 1960,⁷ and the proportion has not changed

5 Lewis, Stephen R., Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Policies, O. E. C. D., Oxford University Press, 1970.

6 Planning Commission, op. cit., appendix 3.

7 Rahman, A., East and West Pakistan: A Problem in Political Economy of Regional Planning, Occasional Paper No. 20, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1968. By 1966, among all Class I officers in the Central Government East Pakistan's share was only 20 per cent.

much since. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and the central Finance Minister, key individuals in resource allocation, have always been West Pakistanis.

The location of the Central Government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concentration of industry and the entrepreneurial class in West Pakistan.⁸ Such a concentration is to be expected in an economic system where direct allocational control of resources by the government makes direct access to government authorities a prime business asset.

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division; Bangladesh : Documents, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 11-12.

APPENDIX 2(b)

The Awami League's Six Points

EXTRACT FROM AWAMI LEAGUE MANIFESTO

Pakistan shall be a Federation granting full autonomy on the basis of the six-point formula to each of the federating units:

Point No. 1:

The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which the election to the federal legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.

Point No. 2:

The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign affairs and subject to the conditions provided in (3) below, currency.

Point No. 3:

There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional federal reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another.

Point No. 4:

Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided and on

the basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that federal government's revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the governments of the federating units.

Point No. 5:

Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of the federating units. The foreign exchange requirement of the federal government shall be met by the governments of the federating units on the basis of a ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the constitution. The regional governments shall have power under the constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility of the federal government.

Point No. 6:

The government of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.

Source: The Government of Pakistan White Paper. The full text of the Awami League's 1970 Election Manifesto can be found in the collections of Bangla Desh Documents, pp. 66-82. On pp. 23-33 can be found a detailed exposition of the Six Points, made by Sheikh Mujib in March 1966.

APPENDIX 3

Representation in Civil, Military and Other Services
(Average)

	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Central Civil Service	84%	16%
Foreign Service	85%	15%
Foreign Head of Missions(numbers)	60	9
Army	95%	5%
Army: Officers of General Rank (Numbers)	16	1
Navy Technical	81%	19%
Navy non-technical	91%	9%
Air Force Pilots	89%	11%
Armed Forces (Numbers)	500,000	20,000
Pakistan Airlines	7,000	280
P. I. A. Directors	9	1
P. I. A. Area Managers	5	none
Railway Board Directors	7	1

Source: "Why Bangladesh"?, A study prepared by a group of Viennese scholars. Reproduced in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangladesh Documents, New Delhi, 1971, p. 20.

APPENDIX 4

Percentage of Allocation of Funds
for Development Projects

Item	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Foreign Exchange for various Developments:	80%	20%
Foreign Aid (excluding U. S. AID):	96%	4%
U. S. Aid:	66%	34%
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation:	58%	42%
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation:	80%	20%
Industrial Development Bank:	76%	24%
House Building:	88%	12%
	<hr/> 77% <hr/>	<hr/> 23% <hr/>

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs, External Publicity Division,
Bangladesh : Documents, 1971, p. 17.

APPENDIX 5

FOREIGN AID TO PAKISTAN

Chinese loan to Pakistan U. S. \$ 60 m in 1965 mostly spent in West Pakistan including a Heavy Machinery Complex costing U. S. \$ 9 m, but only U. S. \$ 125,000 for East Pakistan Water & Power Development. But the loan is to be repaid by exporting jute and jute products.

World Bank credits in 1954 \$ 14 m and in 1965 \$ 15 m for Sui Gas Project in West Pakistan. Same source supplied \$ 17 m in 1964 for Karachi Port Development and \$ 30 m to Pakistan Investment and Credit Corporation to finance mostly projects in West Pakistan. International Development Association (U.N. Agency) gave a credit of \$ 8.5 m to West Pakistan and \$ 4.5 m to East Pakistan in 1964 for educational projects.

Russian Aid of £ 11 m to £ 18 m was given to West Pakistan in 1965 for oil prospecting.

U.K. loan during the period 1947-1965 amounted to £ 64 m has been spent mostly in West Pakistan.

U. S. Aid of \$ 3.6 billion -- \$ 2.7 billion spent for Mangla Dam & Tarbela Dam in West Pakistan and only \$ 0.9 billion for control of flood in East Pakistan. These loans no doubt converted the barren lands of West Pakistan into fertile ones whereas very little was done to tackle effectively the flood problem of East Pakistan -- the most fertile land in the world. The people of East Pakistan had been allowed to suffer from recurring cyclones and flood disasters since 1953.

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangladesh : Documents, 1971, p. 17.

APPENDIX 6

Draft Resolution Moved in the Security Council by
the United States

The Security Council

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Convinced that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the cease-fire and troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP personnel;

4. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;

6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary-General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the subcontinent;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.

Source: U.N. Doc. S/10416, moved on 4 December 1971.

APPENDIX 7

Draft Resolution Moved in the Security Council by
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

The Security Council

Having considered the letter of nine members of the Security Council (S/10411) and the report of the Secretary-General (S/10410),

Calls for a political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities;

Calls upon the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which have led to deterioration of the situation.

Source: U.N. Doc. S/10418, moved on 4 December 1971.

APPENDIX 8

Draft Resolution Moved by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi,
Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia

The Security Council,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add. 1 and S/10412) of 3 and 4 December 1971,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and effect a withdrawal of armed forces to their own side of the India/Pakistan borders.

Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India/Pakistan borders;

2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution;

5. Decides to follow the situation closely and to meet again as soon as necessary.

Source: U.N. Doc. S/10423, moved on 5 December 1971.

APPENDIX 9

Draft Resolution Moved by Argentina, Burundi, Japan,
Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia

The Security Council

Having considered the item on its agenda as contained in document S/Agenda/1606,

Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 1606th and 1607th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Decides to refer the question contained in document S/Agenda/1606 to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of 3 November 1950.

Source: U.N. Doc. S/10429, moved on 6 December 1971.

APPENDIX 10

Draft Resolution Moved by Argentina, Burundi, Cameroon,
Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan and Tunisia

The General Assembly,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 and the letter from the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of Council resolution 303(1971) of 6 December 1971,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side to the India-Pakistan borders,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the General Assembly's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly resolution 377A(V) of 2 November 1950,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. Decides to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand;

6. Calls upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in the light of the present resolution.

APPENDIX 11

Revised Draft Resolution moved by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen, Zaire and Zambia

The General Assembly,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 and the letter from the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraph 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the General Assembly's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of 3 November 1950,

1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. Urges that every effort be made to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area of conflict;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Decides to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand;

7. Calls upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in the light of the present resolution.

Source: UN Doc. A/L. 647/Rev. 1, moved on 7 December 1971. The Resolution was adopted by the Assembly the same day - 2793(XXVI).

APPENDIX 12

The Following is the Full Record of the Voting on the Draft Resolution Contained in Document A/L.647/Rev. 1, Moved by Argentina and Others in the General Assembly on 7 December 1971

- IN FAVOUR:** United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rumania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda.
- AGAINST:** Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- ABSTAINING:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Chile, Denmark, France, Malawi, Nepal, Oman, Senegal, Singapore.

APPENDIX 13

ETHNIC DIVISIONS BY CONTINENT AND COUNTRY FOR NONALIGNED
COUNTRIES IN 1971

Africa

COUNTRIES WITH NEARLY HOMOGENEOUS ETHNIC COMPOSITION

LESOTHO	SWAZILAND
Total: 1,040,000	Total: 410,000

COUNTRIES WITH A SINGLE DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUP

MAURITANIA	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
Total: 1,170,000	Total: 33,330,000
Moors 72.0%	Arab Muslims 92.0%
Fulani 4.6	Coptic Christians 7.7
Non-Africans 11.0	
TUNISIA	
Total: 5,140,000	
Tunisians 94.5%	
Muslim Foreigners 2.6	
Other Foreigners 3.3	

COUNTRIES WITH TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

ALGERIA	CHAD ¹
Total: 14,100,000	Total: 3,710,000
Arabs 81.5%	
Berbers 17.9	

1 No exact data available, but major division exists between black Africans and Arabs, with blacks slightly outnumbering Arabs.

Africa (continued)

COUNTRIES WITH TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS (continued)

BURUNDI		LIBYA²	
Total: 3,600,000		Total: 1,900,000	
Hutu	84.0%		
Tutsi	14.0		
MAURITIUS		SIERRA LEONE	
Total: 810,000		Total: 2,790,000	
Indians	67.0%	Tenne	33.0%
Creole (Afro-India and Afro-European)	25.0	Mende	30.0
Chinese and Euro- peans	5.0	Eleven Other Small Groups	37.0
MOROCCO		SOMALIA	
Total: 15,530,000		Total: 2,790,000	
Arabs	64.3%	Somale	84.5%
Berbers	33.4	Sab	15.5
Non-Moroccans and Others	2.3		
RWANDA		SUDAN	
Total: 3,590,000		Total: 15,700,000	
Hutu	81.4%	Blacks	43.2%
Tutsi	17.5	Arabs	38.9
		Mixed (Beja and Nubian)	9.5

2 No exact data available. Arabs are in great majority, but there are large groups of Berbers as well.

Note: Country population totals are 1970 figures. Subgroup percentage in most cases reflect data recorded in the 1960s. A few of the percentages refer to ethnic composition in the mid-1950s. Where ethnic subgroups are listed for a given country, the percentages of the entire population represented by the subgroups often do not add up to 100 percent of the total. In such cases varying numbers of small subgroups have not been included in the enumeration. In some cases religious or linguistic rather than ethnic subgroups are listed.

Africa (continued)

COUNTRIES WITH SEVERAL MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

BOTSWANA

Total: 650,000

Bamongwato	34.2%
Bakwena	13.6
Bangwaketse	13.2
Batawana	13.2
Bakgatla	6.8

CAMEROON

Total: 5,840,000

Kirdi	33.0%
Beti-Pahouin	19.8
Bamileke	14.7
Fulani	15.2
Tikar	9.1
Bissa-Bakoko	5.9

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Total: 1,520,000

Banda	21.8%
Baya	20.9
Mandla	18.1
Ubangi	10.4

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

Total: 940,000

Kongo	45.0%
Bateke	20.0
Boubangui	16.0
Gabonais	15.0

ETHIOPIA

Total: 25,050,000

Abyssinians	31.6%
Galla	31.0
Somalis	18.4
Blacks	13.2
Others	5.9

GHANA

Total: 9,030,000

Akan	44.1%
Mole Dagbani	18.4
Ewe	13.0
Ga-Adangbe	8.3

GUINEA

Total: 3,920,000

Mande Groups	47.0%
Peul Groups	28.6
Forest Groups	18.1

NIGERIA

Total: 55,070,000

Hausa-Fulani	40.0%
Ibo	24.0
Yoruba	20.0

SENEGAL

Total: 3,930,000

Wolof	36.0%
Peul	17.5
Serer	16.5
Tukolor	6.5
Diola	9.0
Mandingo	9.0

TOGO

Total: 1,860,000

Cabrai	18.2%
Ewe	17.8
Watchi	14.6
Moba	6.4
Cotocoli	5.5
Other Small Groups	36.1

Africa (continued)

COUNTRIES WITH MANY SMALL ETHNIC GROUPS (FRAGMENTED)

LIBERIA

Total: 1,170,000

Kpelle	8.6%
Gola	7.5
Bassa	5.0
Kru	5.0
Mandigo	5.0
Loma	5.0
Americo-Liberians	2.0
Nineteen Other Small Groups	62.9

MALI

Total: 5,020,000

Bambara	22.1%
Fulani	12.3
Marka	5.7
Songai	5.3
Malinke	5.1
Tuareg	5.0
Seventeen Other Small Groups	44.5

TANZANIA

Total: 13,270,000

Sikama	12.4%
Nyamwezi	4.1
Makonde	3.8
Haya	3.7
Chagga	3.6
Five Other Tribes Over 200,000 Each	15.4
Thirteen Other Tribes Over 100,000 Each	23.0
Ninety-seven Other Tribes Under 100,000 Each	34.0

UGANDA

Total: 9,760,000

Baganda	16.2%
Banyankole	8.1
Iteso	8.1
Basoga	7.8
Bakiga	7.1
Banyaruanda	5.9
Lango	5.6
Acholi	4.4
Bagisu	5.1
Eleven Other Small Groups	31.7

ZAMBIA

Total: 4,300,000

Tonga	11.0%
Bemba	8.0
Chewa	5.7
Nsenga	4.4
Sixty-nine Other Small Groups	70.9

North, Central, and South America

COUNTRIES WITH TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

CHILE		GUYANA	
Total: 9,780,000		Total: 760,000	
Mestizos	68.0%	East Indians	51.0%
Whites	30.0	Blacks	31.0
Amerindians	2.0	Mixed	12.0
		Amerindians	5.0
CUBA		TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	
Total: 8,390,000		Total: 1,070,000	
Whites	73.0%	Blacks	43.5%
Mulattoes	14.5	East Indians	36.5
Blacks	12.5	Mixed	16.3
Chinese	1.0	Whites	2.0

Asia

COUNTRIES WITH NEARLY HOMOGENEOUS ETHNIC COMPOSITION

JORDAN		YEMEN	
Total: 2,320,000		Total: 5,730,000	
SOUTH YEMEN			
Total: 1,280,000			

COUNTRIES WITH A SINGLE DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUPS

BURMA		SYRIA	
Total: 27,580,000		Total: 6,100,000	
Burmese	75.0%	Arabs	90.0%
Karens and Kayahas	12.0	Kurds	4.8
Shan	6.0	Armenians	3.2
Indians and Pakistani	3.0	Turkomans, Circassians, Assyrians	2.8
Chinese and Others	4.0		

Asia (continued)

COUNTRIES WITH TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

AFGHANISTAN

Total: 17,120,000

Pushtun	60.0%
Tajiks	30.0
Uzbeks	5.2
Turkomans, Kirghiz, and Others	4.8

CEYLON (SRI LANKA)

Total: 12,510,000

Sinhalese	70.0%
Tamil (Ceylonese, Indians, and Pakistanis)	21.0
Ceylon Moors	5.0
Veddas and Others	4.0

CYPRUS

Total: 630,000

Greeks	78.8%
Turks	17.5
Others	3.7

INDIA

Total: 550,380,000

Linguistic Groups:

Hindi	30.0%
Telugu	8.6
Bengali	7.7
Marathi	7.6
Tamil	7.0
Urdu	5.3
Gujarati	4.6
Kannada	4.0
Malayalam	3.9
Bihari	3.8
Oriya	3.6
Rajasthani	3.4
Punjabi	2.5

Ten Other Groups
with Over 1,000,000

Each 3.7

Twenty-five Other
Groups with over

100,000 Each 2.0

INDONESIA

Total: 121,200,000

Javanese	45.0%
Sundanese	14.0
Madurese	8.0
Coastal Malays	8.0
Makassarese-	
Buginese	4.0
Menangkabau	3.0
Balinese	2.0
Batak	2.0
Atjehnese	1.0
Others	13.0

KUWAIT

Total: 710,000

Kuwaitis	51.0%
Jordanians	9.4
Iraqis	8.5
Iranians	5.5
Syrians and Egyptians	5.1
Lebanese	5.0
Omanis	4.2
Indians and Pakistani	4.5

LEBANON

Total: 2,790,000

Ethnoreligious Groups:

Maronites	30.0%
Sunnis	22.0
Sh'is	18.0
Greek Orthodox	10.0
Greek Catholic	6.0
Druzes	6.0
Other Christians	8.0

MALAYSIA

Total: 10,080,000

Malays	42.0%
Chinese	35.0
Indigenous Tribes	7.5
Tamils	

Europe

COUNTRIES WITH SEVERAL MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

YUGOSLAVIA

Total: 20,530,000

Serbs	42.0%
Croats	20.5
Slovenes	8.6
Macedonians	5.6
Montenegrans	2.8
Others	11.0

Source: Richard W. Sterling, Macropolitics : International Relations in a Global Society (New York, 1974), pp. 604-19.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES:

Parliamentary Publications:

India, Lok Sabha, Debates, 1971-72.

India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, 1971-72.

United Nations Documents:

General Assembly Official Records, session 26, 1971.

Security Council Official Records, mtgs., 1971.

Government Documents:

Bangla Desh : Documents (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, 1971).

Indo-Pak Conflict : As Others See It (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972).

Main Documents Relating to Conferences of Nonaligned Countries (Georgetown, Guyana Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972).

Memoirs, Official Speeches and Statements, etc.

Ayub Khan, Field Marshall Mohammad, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Gandhi, Indira, India and Bangladesh : Selected Speeches and Statements, March to December 1971 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972).

Jalal, Hamid and Hasan Khalid, Marching Towards Democracy: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 1970-71 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy : Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (Delhi: Publication Divisions of the Government of India, 1961).

Sawarn Singh and Sen S., Bangla Desh and Indo-Pak War, India Speaks at the United Nations : Speeches (Delhi: Publication Divisions of the Government of India, 1972)

SECONDARY SOURCES:

Books

Acimovic, Ljubivoje (ed.), Nonalignment in the World of Today, International Symposium, Petrovaradin 16-18 January 1969 (Beograd: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1969).

Barnds, William J., India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

Bhagat, G. S. (ed.), Shield and Sword : India 1965 and After - The New Dimensions (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1974).

Bhargava, G. S., Their Finest Hour - Saga of India's December Victory (New Delhi: Vikas, 1972).

Bhutto, Z. A., Myth of Independence (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969).

_____, The Great Tragedy (Karachi: Pakistan Peoples Party, 1971).

Blinkerberg, Lars, India-Pakistan : The History of Unsolved Conflicts (Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigs-politisk Institute, 1972).

Brines, Russell, Indo-Pakistan Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).

Brown, Norman W., United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

- Burke, S. M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
- _____, Main Springs of India and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974).
- Burton, J. W., International Relations : A General Theory (New Delhi: Allen and Unwin, 1971).
- _____(ed.), Nonalignment (New York: James H. Heineman, 1966).
- _____, World Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
- Campbell, J. C., Tito's Separate Road : America, Yugoslavia and World Politics (New York: N.Y. Harper and Row, 1967).
- Chari, A. S. R., Bangladesh Struggle (New Delhi: I.M.H. Press, 1972).
- Chopra, Pran, India's Second Liberation (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1973).
- Choudhury, G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan (London: G. Heurst & Co., 1975).
- _____, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers : Politics of a Sub-divided Continent (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1975).
- Choudhury, Subrata Roy, The Genesis of Bangladesh : A Study in International Legal Norms and Permissive Conscience (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972).
- _____, Alliances and Neutrality in War and Peace (New Delhi: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1966).
- Choudhary, Sukhbir, Indo-Pak War and Big Powers (New Delhi: Trimurthy Publishing House, 1972).
- Costa, Benedict, Dismemberment of Pakistan (Ludhiana: Kalyani Prakashan, 1972).
- Crabb, Cecil V., The Elephant and the Grass : A Study of Nonalignment (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1965).

- Edwards, Michael, Asia in the Balance (Middlesex: Penguin, 1976).
- Finer, S. E., The Man on Horse Back : The Role of Military in Politics (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1962).
- Ghatate, N. M., Bangladesh Crisis and Consequences (Proceedings of the Seminar), (New Delhi: Deendayal Research Institute, 1971).
- Gupta, Hrabani Sen, The Fulcrum of Asia : Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR (New York, N.Y.: Pegasus, 1970).
- Hodson, H. V., The Great Divide : Britain, India, Pakistan (London, Hutchinson, 1969).
- Jackson, Robert, South Asian Crisis : India-Pakistan-Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978).
- Jansen, G. H., Afro-Asia and Nonalignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966).
- Jones, Roy E., Analysing Foreign Policy : An Introduction to Some Conceptual Problems (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
- Kapur, Harish, The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations : The Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy Towards India (London: Michael Joseph, 1972).
- Kashyap, Subhas C., Bangladesh : Background and Perspective (Delhi: National, 1971).
- Kaul, B.M., Confrontation with Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1971).
- Kaushik, Devendra, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1971).
- Kaushik, R. P., The Crucial Years of Nonalignment (New Delhi: Kumar Brothers, 1972).
- Khan, Irshaad Shaheen, Rejection Alliance ? A Case Study of U. S.-Pakistan Relations 1947-1967 (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1972).

- Levi, Werner, The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Englewood, Cliffs, N. J.: Bentice-Hall, 1968).
- Loshak, David, Pakistan Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1971).
- Louard, Evan (ed.), The International Regulations of Civil War (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972).
- Lyon, Peter, Neutrality (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963).
- Mankekar, D. R., Pakistan Cut to Size (New Delhi: India Book Company, 1972).
- Martin, Lawrence (ed.), Neutrality and Nonalignment: The New Stage in World Affairs (New York, N. Y.: Praeger, 1962).
- Mates, Leo, Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade, The Institute of International Politics and Economics, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 1972).
- Mathisen, T., The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers (Oslo, et al, Universitetsforlaget, 1971).
- Maxwell, Neville, India's China War (Bombay: Jaico, 1971).
- Menon, K. P. S., The Indo-Soviet Treaty: Setting and Meaning (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1971).
- Misra, K. P. (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969).
- _____, The Role of the United Nations in Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1973).
- Mukerjee, Dilip, Yahya Khan's Final War (New Delhi: Times of India, 1972).
- Mukerjee, S. K., Bangladesh and International Law (Calcutta: The World Press, 1971).
- Muttam, John, U. S., Pakistan and India: A Study of U. S. Role in the Indo-Pak Arms Race (New Delhi: Sindhu Publications, 1974).

- Naik, J. A., India, Russia, China and Bangladesh (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972).
- Nixon, Richard M., U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s : The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972 (Washington D. C., 1972).
- Northedge, F. S. (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968).
- _____, International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976).
- Northedge, F. S. and Grieve, M. J., A Hundred Years of International Relations (London: Duckworth, 1977).
- Ogley, R. (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: Barnes n' Noble, 1970).
- Osgood, Robert E., Alliance and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
- Peters, J. G., Yugoslav Foreign Policy Towards the Non-aligned Countries (The American University, 1970, mimeo).
- Petkovic, R., Nonalignment in the Contemporary World, Studies, No. 26, 1968 (Beograd: Medjunarodne Politika, 1968).
- Power, Paul F. (ed.), India's Nonalignment Policy (Boston: Heath & Co., 1967).
- Potichnyj, Peter J., and Shapiro, Jane P. (ed.), From the Cold War to Detente (New York, N. Y.: Praeger, 1976).
- Quaderi, Fazlul Quader, Bangladesh Genocide and World Press (Dacca: Alexandra Place, 1972).
- Radovanovic, Ljubomir, The Policies of Nonaligned Countries (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1964).
- Rehman, M. M., The Politics of Nonalignment (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1969).

- Rosenau, James N., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1967).
- _____, (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, N.Y.: Free Press 1st and 2nd editions, 1961, 1969).
- Rossi, M., The Third World, The Unaligned and the World Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Funk and Wagnalls, 1963).
- Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1968).
- _____, The Weak in the World of the Strong : The Developing Countries in International System (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1977).
- Rubinstein, A. Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).
- Sagegh, F.A. (ed.), The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World : A Symposium (San Francisco : Chandler Publishing Co., 1964).
- Sen, Chanakya, Against the Cold War (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962).
- Shah, A. B. (ed.), India's Defence and Foreign Policies (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1968).
- Sharma, Shri Ram, Indian Foreign Policy : Annual Survey, 1971 (New Delhi: Sterling, 1977).
- Shepherd Jr., George W., Nonaligned Black Africa: An International Sub-System (Mass., Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co., 1970).
- Simons, Richard, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1949).
- Singer, M.R., Weak States in a World of Powers (New York, N. Y.: The Free Press, 1972).
- Sinha, K. K. (ed.), Problems of Defence of South and Southeast Asia (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1971).

- Skurnik, W. A. F., Foreign Policy of Senegal (Evanston: North Western University, Press, 1972).
- Sterling, Richard W., Macro Politics : International Relations in a Global Society (New York: N.Y. : Alfred A. Knoph, 1974).
- Stoessinger, J. G., The Might of Nations (New York: N.Y. : Random Book House, 1975).
- Vital, David, The Survival of Small States : Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- _____, The Inequality of States : A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
- Wilcox, W. A., Rose, L. E., and Boyd, G. (eds.), Asia in the International System (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1972).

Articles in Periodicals:

- Alexander, John, "Attitude of Dulles Towards India's Policy of Nonalignment", Indian Journal of American Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 1971, pp. 81-5.
- Anand, R. P., "Attitudes of the Asian African State Toward Certain Problems of International Law", The International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 15, January 1966, pp. 55-57.
- Anant, Santokh S., "Effect of Political Re-alignments during an Armed Conflict on Ethnic Stereotypes", International Journal of Psychology, vol. 9, no. 2, 1974, pp. 139-44.
- Armbhuster, Frank E., "The New Diplomacy and the Power Balance in East Asia", Insight, vol. 1, no. 11, November 1971, pp. 18-22.
- Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, "Neutrality : Varying Tunes", Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, October 1956, pp. 56-56.

- Asirvatham, Eddy, "Nonalignment in Peace and War", Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 1, March 1963, pp. 69-71.
- Babaa, Khalid I., "Nonalignment and Neutralism Revisited", Middle East Forum, vol. 4, no. 43, 1967, pp. 43-6.
- _____, "The Third Force and the United Nations : Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 362, November 1965, pp. 81-91.
- Bala Subramanyam, V., "India and Bangladesh", Eastern Economist, vol. 57, no. 26, 31 December 1971, pp. 1113-14.
- Bandyopadhyaya, J., "Nonalignment and Indian Foreign Policy", Indian and Foreign Review, vol. 10, no. 8, February 1973, pp. 17-19.
- Barnett, Doak A., "The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia : Implications for United States Policy", Annals (American Academy of Political and Social Science), vol. 390, July 1970, pp. 73-86.
- Bebler, Anton, "Security Aspects of Nonalignment", International Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, April-June 1975, pp. 289-302.
- _____, "The Historical Significance of Bangladesh", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 522, 5 January 1972, pp. 10-2.
- Bell, C., "Nonalignment and the Power Balance", Australian Outlook, vol. 17, August 1963, pp. 117-129.
- Blovski, Dimce, "Influence of Nonaligned on International Relations", Review of International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 566, 5 November 1973, pp. 1-5.
- _____, "Nonaligned in a Changing World", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 536, 3 August 1972, pp. 1-3.
- Brecher, Michael, "Neutralism : An Analysis", International Journal, vol. 17, September 1962, pp. 343-52.

- Bowles, Chester, "America and Russia in India", Foreign Affairs, vol. 49, no. 4, July 1971, pp. 636-651.
- Budhraj, Vijay Sen, "From Tashkent to Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation - A Study of Recent Trends in Moscow's South Asian Policy", Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 4, October-December 1971, pp. 487-501.
- Burke, S. M. "The Sino-Indian Conflict", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1963, pp. 200-11.
- _____, "Sino-Pakistani Relations", Orbis, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, pp. 391-404.
- Burton, John W., "Rights and Obligation of Nonalignment", Australian Outlook, vol. 16, no. 3, December 1962, pp. 292-303.
- Chandola, Harish, "Reactions to the War", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 6, no. 52, 25 December 1971, p. 2545.
- Chopra, Pran, "Collision Course : An Indian View", Pacific Community, vol. 3, no. 1, October 1971, pp. 154-70.
- Chintamani, C., "Soviet Proposal for Collective Security for Asia - Asian Reaction", China Reporter, vol. 6, no. 3, May/June 1970, pp. 49-55.
- Choucri, Nazli, "The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States : Policy, Perception and Behaviour", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 11, March 1969, pp. 1-17.
- Crabb, Cecil V., "India, Egypt and New Patterns of Non-alignment", World Affairs, vol. 134, no. 4, Spring 1972, pp. 289-303.
- Das, Sitanshu, "India's emergence from the Clinch", Venture, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1972, pp. 10-13.
- Debrah, E. M., "Will Most Uncommitted Countries Remain Uncommitted?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 336, July 1961, pp. 83-93.

- Desai, Ranjit, "Arms Need and Nonalignment", Mainstream, vol. 1, no. 17, 22 December 1972, pp. 10-2.
- Deshingkar, G. D., "Bangladesh and Manchuko : A Wrong Historical Parallel", China Report, vol. 7, no. 6, November/December 1971, pp. 8-11.
- Deshpande, G. P., "Rage, Rage Against the Dying of the Light!" Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 6, no. 18, 1 May 1971, pp. 907-8.
- _____, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 6, no. 34, 21 August 1971, pp. 1802-1803.
- Dinh, Tran Van, "Nonaligned but Committed to the Hilt", Pacific Community, vol. 7, no. 1, October 1975, pp. 118-31.
- Dutt, V. P., "The Changed Context", Seminar, no. 145, September 1971, pp. 35-40.
- Faruqui, Kamal A., "India's Role in the East Pakistan Crisis - Legal Aspects", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 516, 5 December 1971, pp. 11-4.
- Friedman, Edward A., "Nixon Mao Pact?" Indian Left Review, vol. 1, no. 6, September 1971, pp. 35-40
- _____, "Why America Fights in Asia?" Pacific Affairs, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 1970, pp. 258-267.
- Goldberg, Arthur J., "India-Pakistan War", New Republic, vol. 165, no. 25, 18 December 1971, pp. 7-9.
- Gopal, Krishna, "India and Bangla Desh", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 6, no. 33, 14 August 1971, pp. 1749-51.
- Guha, Ashok Sanjay, "Bangla Desh and Indian Self-Interest", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 6, no. 20, 15 May 1971, pp. 683-5.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "The Soviet Union and India and Bangla Desh - Grand Asian Concord," Point of View, vol. 2, no. 45 and 46, 12 February 1972, pp. 27-29.
- Gupta, Sisir, "India and Bangladesh", Mainstream, vol. 10, no. 17, 25 December 1971, pp. 13-14,42.

- _____, "Indo-Soviet Treaty", African Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, October 1971, pp. 225-231.
- _____, "Sino-U. S. detente and India", India Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, July/September, 1971, pp. 179-84.
- Hariharan, A., "India-Pakistan : War Clouds Mass", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 27, no. 18, 1 May 1971, p. 7.
- Hussain, T. Kurki, "Sino-US detente and India's Options", Ventures, vol. 23, no. 8, September 1971, pp. 179-184.
- Irshaad, S., "Bangladesh - A National Liberation Movement", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 521, 20 December 1971, pp. 10-2.
- Jain, Girilal, "Asian Power Balance", Seminar, no. 149, January 1972, pp. 338-50.
- Jayaraman, T. V., "India, Bangla Desh and South-East Asia", United Asia, vol. 23, no. 2, March/April 1971, pp. 69-72.
- Jevremovic' Pavle, "The New Situation on the Indian Subcontinent", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 522, 5 January 1972, pp. 12-4.
- _____, "Outlook for Stabilization of the Indian Subcontinent", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 528, 5 March 1972, pp.
- Kardelj, Edvard, "Historical Roots of Nonalignment", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 84-9.
- Karunakaran, K. P., "The Revolt in Pakistan and the Politics of Indian Subcontinent," Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 514, 5 November 1971, pp. 11-14.
- Kochan, Ran, "Changing Emphasis in the Nonaligned Movement", World Today, vol. 28, no. 11, November 1972, pp. 501-8.
- Kuzmanic, Nila, "Universal and Regional Aspects of Non-alignment", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 342-43, November 5-20, 1972, pp. 10-2.

- Lall, M. B., "The Asian Cauldron - Implications of Growing Turmoils", Capital, vol. 166, no. 141, 29 April 1971, pp. 760-1.
- Lazerevic, Stanimir, "Nonalignment and Liberation Movement", Review of International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 558, 5 July 1976, pp. 26-7.
- Menon, P.K., "The Nonaligned Countries in the Global Arena", Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 3/4, July/December 1966, pp. 37-47.
- Naik, J. A., "The Why and What of the Bangla Desh Movement", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 508, 20 March 1971, pp. 13-15.
- Narasimhan, V. K., "Realignment of Nonalignment", Seminar, no. 56, April 1964, pp. 17-20.
- Nord, Lars, "Movement of Nonalignment : Harmony and Dissent", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 90-5.
- Pavic', R., "Political Geographical Characteristics of Modern Pakistan", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 509, 5 April 1971, pp. 22-3.
- , "Geostrategic Aspects of the Bangladesh Liberation Struggle", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 523, 20 January 1972, pp. 14-6.
- Petkovic', Ranko, "The Crisis on the Subcontinent", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 520, 5 December 1971, pp. 7-9.
- Rajan, M. S., "Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's Nonalignment", Australian Outlook, vol. 26, no. 2, August 1972, pp. 204-15.
- Rajput, A. B., "Pakistan Today", Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 532, pp. 20-22.
- Rana, A. P., "Detente and Nonalignment : A Conceptual Study", International Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, October-December 1974, pp. 751-74.
- Sarbadhikari, P. R., "Note on the Domestic Crisis of Non-alignment", Co-existence, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1967, pp. 37-8.

Sardesai, S. G., "Achievement and Difficulties of Non-alignment", Problems of Peace and Socialism, vol. 2, no. 3, March 1974, pp. 84-93.

Shelvankar, K. S., "Nonalignment and Sino-Indian Conflict", Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, vol. 12, 1963, pp. 435-45.

Newspapers:

Al-Ahram (Cairo).

Daily Telegraph (London).

Dawn (Karachi).

The Hindu (Madras).

Hindustan Times (New Delhi).

Indian Express (New Delhi).

Izvestia (Moscow).

Morning News (Karachi).

The Motherland (Delhi).

New York Times

Times of India (New Delhi).

The Times (London).

Vjesnik (Zagred).