POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN: 1991-2003

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Declaration

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Political Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: 1991-2003"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Certificate

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to the loving memory of my Mother and Brother,

Dikhamliu Riamei and Languangpou Riamei

Contents

Preface

Since the establishment of the state system in West Asia, the Kurds have effectively been located geographically in the sensitive boundary regions of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Kurdish politics have often focused upon the relation of Kurds as a minority people with state/ external involvement in their political development. This work briefly examines the history of Kurdish issues and the political dimensions since the Gulf War in Iraq. Since 1968, the Iraqi Baathist government attempted many times to achieve a political understanding with the Kurds concerning their status in northern Iraq. The inability to establish and implement an effective political forum acceptable to both sides contributed to a widespread Kurdish armed rebellion, encouraged by covert Iranian and American assistance. The rebellion faltered as conventional Iraqi military units dislodged the Kurdish irregulars and forced their retreat to peripheral border regions in Iraq's rugged mountains. When the Iraqi government consolidated its internal position and attracted significant Kurdish support, the revolt collapsed altogether. The demise of the Kurdish revolt and the granting of limited autonomy to the Kurds in Iraq can be viewed as a victory for the Baathist government and a step toward intraregional accommodation and stability. It was also an indication of Iraq's growing strength, of the country's consolidation of power. However, during the period of 1992-2003, geopolitical realities have promoted a further development of the Iraqi Kurdish situation in which the Kurdish leaders articulated and experimented the issue of self governance. The study explains the Kurdish situation within the Iraqi state, their uprising at the end of the Gulf War and the establishment of no-fly-zone over their territory. It also analyses the chronological development of Kurdish political parties throughout the 1990s leading to the reconvening of the Kurdish National Assembly (KNA) in October 2002. This work shows the development of a political grouping from that of a guerilla movement to modern political parties controlling sophisticated governmental apparatus.

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Lungthuiyang Riamei

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Glossary of Abbreviations

ADM	Assyrian Democratic Movements
GoI	Government of Iraq
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
IDP	Internally Displaced Person/People
IKF	Iraqi Kurdistan Front
ILP	Independent Labour Party
INC	Iraqi National Congress
IMK	Islamic Movement of Kurdistan
IMIK	Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan
INC	Iraqi National Congress
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
KCP	Kurdish Communist Party
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KDP-I	Kurdistan Democratic Party- Iran
KHRP	Kurdish Human Right Projects
KLF	Kurdish Liberation Front
KNA	Kurdish National Assembly
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRP	Kurdish Revolutionary Party
KSDP	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party
KSP	Kurdistan Socialist Party
KTP	Kurdistan Toilers' Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRC	National Council of Revolutionary Command
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PASOK	Party of Socialism in Kurdistan
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SCR	Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPK	Unity Party of Kurdistan
US	United States
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

Introduction

The Kurds are the ancient race who inhabited the contiguous mountain regions that fall under the eastern part of modern Turkey, the north and eastern part of Iraq and north-west of Iran for some 3000 years (or longer, some historians insist), retaining their own language, customs and culture. A fierce, independent collection of wild mountain tribes, they had ferociously defended their terrain, managing somehow to survive the succession of conquering armies including Assyrians, Persians and Greeks that marched and countermarched across Anatolia and Mesopotamia over the centuries. Prior to World War I, Kurdish territories were divided between the Persian and the Ottoman Empire. In order to maintain their exploitation in the colonised areas, the colonising powers especially the British resorted to the divide and rule strategy, pitting one ethnic group against the other. This policy heightened ethnic conflict and fragmentation. The world system as externally activating variable has played a critical role in politicising ethnic differences and the resulting political conflicts. British imperialism provoked Kurdish nationalist aspirations for an independent Kurdistan, but pitted Armenians and Kurds against each other to block its actualisation. Since the goal of imperialism was to appropriate the oil fields of Kurds in the south, the creation of a centralised neo-fascist and imperial state was the critical solution. It was not an accident that the British set up the puppet state of Iraq designed to control the *villayets* of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. While the first two *villayets* were seized from the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the latter occupied by British after the Armistice was signed between the Allied forces and the Sultan of Turkey in 1918. Iraq was created by the British. Oil rich provinces like Basra, Mosul, Kirkurk and Khanagin were conveniently situated inside Iraqi boundaries, instigating hostile feelings of intense nationalism between the Kurds and the Arabs.

Immediately after World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's support for the principle of national self-determination for the non-Turkish nationalities living under the Ottoman control gave upheaval to the Kurdish people. The Versailles Peace conference of 1919 provided the first forum whereby Kurdish national aspirations were acknowledged by the international community, but this acknowledgement proved to be short lived. Upon the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, an ancient race composed of tribes, tribal confederations and feudal groups with martial traditions were promised for

the first time in the long history an independent state in their own mountainous homeland under the Treaty of Sevres, 10 August 1920[1]. But a vigorous nationalist uprising under the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk forced the allies to accept a revised agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, which omitted all references to an autonomous or independent Kurdish state. The Sevres-Lausanne period presented what might be called a tragic incident in the Kurdish struggle and aspirations. Moreover, the Treaty of Sevres, the creation of new boundaries leading to distribution of the Kurds among several countries-Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, further complicated Kurdish plans.

Traditionally Kurdish life was nomadic, revolving around sheep and goat herding throughout the Mesopotamia plains, the highlands of Turkey and Iran. Although the Kurds lived in Kurdistan for centuries, they never had a state of their own nor formed an independent political entity. In the modern times they achieved two short-lived semi-independent entities: the Kingdom of Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan under Sheikh Mahmoud (1922-1924), and the Mahabad Republic under Qazi Mohammed (January-December 1946), which is now Iranian Kurdistan. Throughout their history they have been ruled by outsiders, including the Armenians, the Persians, the Byzantines, and later the Turks and Arabs.

Since the end of the First World War when the great powers imposed their ill-suited solutions to the problems of the West Asia; the Kurdish people have constantly suffered from various forms of national oppression in each of the newly constituted states. In some cases this oppression was brutal, as in Kemalist Turkey while in others it was cunning, suppressed as in Iran. Iraq on the other hand has allowed the existence of a Kurdish nationality; allowed a limited use of Kurdish language; provided for at least a nominal degree of autonomy in Kurdish inhabited areas which also included a policy of Arabisation involving the mass deportation of Kurds and implantations of Arabs on their lands.

Kurdistan's physical geography

Kurdistan lies at the mountainous transition belt of the fertile crescent, with the Taurus and Zagros mountains forming an arc encircling the Mesopotamian region. The mountain

[1] For details of the Treaty see, Eagleton, William (1963), *The Kurdish Republic of 1946*, London: Oxford University Press: 11-12.

`chains of Iraqi Kurdistan run in a north-west to south-easterly direction along the border territories with Iran and Turkey. The territory of Kurdistan had no recognised international boundaries and even internal administrative boundaries within states are sometimes controversial and commonly ephemeral. This problem was compounded by the normative viewpoints of neighbouring states refusing to acknowledge the existence of a contiguous Kurdish geographical entity or in the case of Turkey denied the existence of the Kurds as a distinct and discrete people and culture. The Kurds have a legitimate, possessive claim to vast homeland that consists of roughly 200,000 square miles, an area equal to France, or slightly smaller than the state of Texas (Manafy 2005:5)[2]. Figure 1.1 illustrates the Kurdish areas in West Asia.

Kurdistan is an oasis in a water-starved region. The abundant rainfall which is common over the Zagros and Taurus Mountains has made Kurdistan one of the few watersheds of West Asia, home to the source of two of the world's major river systems, the Tigris and Euphrates.



Figure 1.1 Kurdistan identified by population distribution.

Source: "An introduction to the Kurdish People of Iraq and elsewhere". http://www.eurolegal.org/neoconwars/kurdsiraq.htm

Population and Society

Stephen C. Pelletiere asserted that in Kurdistan, tribalism and nomadic life are largely replaced by growing feudalism and semi-capitalistic development. However, the *Aghas*,

[2] Also see, Washington Post Company (1999) *Who are the Kurd?*, (Online: web), Accessed 30 October 2005, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurd profile.htm

who were encouraged by the British to secure and privatize tribal lands, still command Kurdish loyalty in some parts of Kurdistan, and in the remote and primitive regions of Kurdistan tribalism still persists (Pelletiere 1984:18). In terms of numbers, the estimates of Kurdish population vary (see Figure 1.2 population estimates).

Country	Percentage	Total Population	Kurds
Turkey	19%	57,000,000	10,800,000
Iraq	23%	18,000,000	4,100,000
Iran	10%	55,000,000	5,500,000
Syria	8%	12,500,000	1,000,000
USSR	NA		500,000
Elsewhere	NA		700,000
		Total	22,600,000

*Estimates in round numbers

Table *1.2* Population Estimates for 1991*

Source: Adopted from Mcdowall, David (1992), *The Kurds, A Nation Denied*, Minority Right Publications, London: 2.

Yavuz and Gunter approximated the Kurdish population in Turkey as 7 million (making up between 12 to 15 percent of population), 6 million in Iran (11 percent), 3 million Iraq (between 20 to 23 percent) and 800,000 in Syria (7 percent). The Kurds are largely Sunni Muslims divided tribally, geographically, politically, linguistically, religiously and ideologically (Yavuz and Gunter 2001:33). However, the accuracy of Kurdish population estimates are difficult to determine.

Unlike many other minority groups in West Asia, the Kurds failed to adopt a lingua franca. This hindered inter-Kurdish communication. It also reduced the importance of language as a symbol of ethnic identity for the Kurds. Kurdish belongs to the family of Iranian languages and, like other Iranian languages, has an Indo-European origin; Kurdish is therefore more akin to Persian than to Arabic. There are three major Kurdish languages and several dialects. In brief, the three languages are:

- *Kurdi*, which includes the *Gurani* and *Sulaymani* dialects. *Gurani* is spoken mostly by the Kurds in Kermanshah (Bakhtaran) in Iran and is very similar to

Lori, an Iranian language spoken by Lors, who along with the Kurds constitute the two major ethnic groups in Kermanshah. *Kurdi* is also spoken by some Iraqi Kurds.

- *Kurmanji*, spoken by the largest number of Kurds, especially those in Turkey. It is, for all practical purposes, the literary language of the Kurds and as such is considered the most prestigious of all Kurdish vernaculars. *Kurmanji* is divided into North and South *Kurmanji*. The former dialect is spoken by most Kurds and those Kurds living in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union, while the latter corresponds to the people of central Kurdistan.
- *Zaza* dialect predominate in the north and northwest sectors of Kurdistan. It is also used by some Kurds in the Iranian province of Western Azerbaijan and Central Turkey. *Zaza* is the least developed Kurdish literary language.

However, the very existence of linguistic differences has had an inhibiting impact on the development of a common Kurdish identity. Nor was religion a uniting factor. The majority of Kurds follow Sunni Islam, while the remainders are divided between Shia, Alevi (strong in Central Anatolia), the Ahl-i-haqq and Yezidi. But most of the Kurds with whom the British and Baghdad regimes had to deal with in post-1920 Iraq were Sunnis or Yezidis, with smaller intermingling of other Islamic groups (Edmonds 1957:34).

Several factors contributed to the Kurds' isolation in the mountainous terrain that formed a geographic and cultural barrier between them and their neighbours, their ferocity in defending their own territory and their largely self sufficient economy which reduces their dependence on outsiders. The fact that most Kurdish areas are remote and inaccessible has fostered the independence of even the small villages. The scarcity of arable land and pastoral range lands increases the struggle for water and pasture. The village isolation in their tribe-oriented and class-ridden society has remained very strong, despite modern influences. The Kurds lived in a variety of settings as urban dwellers, but the vast majority lived in small villages. The number of nomads and semi-nomads steadily decreased, although that way of life still exists. Small working class and middle class groups have begun to emerge in the cities, but in most rural areas the basic form of social and political organisations are still based

on descent, clans and ownership of land. In the villages, leaderships are divided between the *mir* or *beg*, who leads the tribe (or the *agha* who leads one of the clans that form a tribe) and the sheikhs or mullahs who are the religious leaders.

There were other major divisions within Kurdish society. A basic distinction was between what can loosely be called tribal and non-tribal Kurds. In principle most Kurds belonged to one or another of the many tribes, defined by Chaliand as 'a territorially fixed social and economic unit founded on real or imagined blood ties which give the group its structure'. But not all were tribal by the twentieth century; many lived in towns or had become tenants or labourers on land in the plains. By 1918, many Kurds had chosen to live in Kurdistan having taken service with the Ottoman government in the army or civil services (Chaliand 1994:19). For sheer survival, smaller tribes had to ally themselves to larger ones or with each other, or enter federations which in turn dissolved or changed in composition dictated by the fortunes of war and other circumstances. Tribes were subdivided into clans and groups of families, each always being on the defensive even suspicious of the others. Each man owed complete allegiance to his family and tribe, and to the tribal sheikh, who settled dispute in accordance with Islamic, tribal law and Kurdish customs.

Iraqi Kurdistan

Kurdistan in Iraq is often referred to as Southern Kurdistan but in fact it occupies a more or less central position in the Kurdish territories. It is the link between what is variously known as Turkish, Northern or Western Kurdistan to the north and north-west, and so-called Eastern or Iranian Kurdistan to the east and south-east, and also borders Kurdish areas of the Syrian Jezireh. This part of Kurdistan is a rich country which extends over a partly wooded region of mountainous terrain curving from the River Zagros in Iranian Kurdistan to the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is well endowed with a broad spectrum of natural resources, in particular oil and water. However, the control of such resources, whether in terms of dams, oil refineries or mines has rarely been in the hands of the Kurds. The peoples of Kurdistan have never directly benefited from the exploitation of the resources but have only received its benefits indirectly through the Government of Iraq.

The area of northern Iraq where the Kurds predominate is a region about 83,000 square kilometers to the north of Hamrin Mountain (see figure 1.3). The area is roughly the size of Jordan or Austria. Smaller ethno-linguistic communities of Assyrian Chaldeans, Turkomans, Arabs and Armenians are also found in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkomans shared the same religious belief as the Kurds, but the Christians display a different religion, as well as being of a different ethnic origin. The Christian community in Iraqi Kurdistan used to be the Armenians but after assimilation with the surrounding peoples and conversion to Islam, the development of a Kurdish identity in the late nineteenth century and the mass deportation and massacre of Armenians in the Kurdish region in 1915, there are few Armenians left in Iraqi Kurdistan. The largest Christian communities are the Assyrians. Other Christian community included the Chaldeans. Both of these spoke the Aramaic language and have a strong cultural identity. There are about 3.7 million Kurds in the Kurdish northern safe haven area and between 1 and 2 million in the rest of Iraq. That comprises roughly 16 to 20 percent of Iraq's population.

Figure 1.3 The Iraqi Kurdistan.

Source: "An introduction to the Kurdish People of Iraq and elsewhere", http://www.eurolegal.org/neoconwars/kurdsiraq.htm

Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been one of underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Saddam Hussein's regime implemented large scale nationalization and land distribution programme after crushing the 1975 Kurdish insurgency which was followed by Arabisation of the regions around Kirkurk and Mosul. Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing until the eve of the 2003 war on Iraq, Baghdad expelled hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans and Assyro-Chaldean Christians from areas around Mosul, Kirkurk and Khanaqin. Sunni and especially Shiite Arabs from south were then brought in with economic incentives (Romano 2005: 432). The major saga affecting the Kurds was the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Both countries subverted and used the other's Kurdish factions. The Baghdad government paid Iranian Kurds to fight against the Tehran government, while the Tehran government paid Iraqi Kurds to fight against that in Baghdad. Kurds were also conscripted into the armies of both sides, and generally gave a good account of themselves in battle. When war ended through military exhaustion, both the governments set settling accounts with their rebellious Kurdish factions. In Iraq, the government launched punitive military expeditions into its northern Kurdish mountains, but only met with partial success. In Iran, the revolutionary guards who were responsible for internal security strove to bring rebellious Kurdish factions to heel, while a covert assassination campaign was mounted against insurrectionary Kurdish political leaders in exile. Both in Iran and Iraq, Kurdish factions fought against each other on their home ground. During the later stage of the war, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran, but these were deployed with greater intensity against his own rebellious Kurds, then fighting in the pay of the Tehran government. *Al-Anfal* (The Spoils) was the codename given to an aggressive, planned, military operation against Iraqi Kurds. It was also a part of an ongoing, larger campaign against Kurds because of their struggle to gain autonomy from the Republic of Iraq. The main attack was against the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, where thousands of Kurds perished form chemical weapon effects. Arabisation programme and *Anfal* campaign led to the greatest numbers of Iraqi internal displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in the country's history. The problem of displacement in Iraq, at its core stems from an authoritarian state and a fascist, exclusionary Arab nationalist state ideology (Ba'athism).

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, an Allied coalition was formed under UN authority to oust him, a task accomplished by March 1991. Kurds played no part in the Gulf War except as conscripted soldiers. Anticipating the defeat of Saddam Hussein and his fall, an impromptu Kurdish uprising occurred in Iraq in March 1991. This had not been anticipated by Kurdish leaders, who were carried along with it. However, it was a popular uprising in which the people led the way rather than factional or tribal leaders. Soon after Saddam Hussein had dealt with a southern Shii revolt, he moved northwards to wreak vengeance on Kurds, causing mass exodus from cities, towns and villages. Fear that Saddam Hussein might once again use chemical weapons caused panic among fleeing Kurds, who sought refuge in remote mountains and in Turkey and Iran.

The international media spotlight settled on Kurdish families freezing to death on snow-covered mountainsides, evoking a swell of sympathy in Western countries. Tardily, the American, British and French governments were pressed by public opinion to help the Kurds. 'Operation Provide Comfort' was activated to provide aid and safe haven camps for Kurdish refugees. Iraqi troops were ordered to remain south of the 36th Parallel, and Allied combat planes monitored what became a no-fly zone over Kurdish terrain.

Under Allied and then United Nations encouragement and help, the Kurds held elections within the safe haven zone in 1992. The two main groups-Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) jointly formed an administration to govern which became known as Kurdish Regional Government. Both the parties entered into an equal power-sharing arrangement with 5 of the 105 seats allocated to members of the Assyrian Chaldean Christian community. They began to build a *de facto* state and government. However, this cooperation did not last long. The KDP and PUK broke up in 1994 and a civil war which ensued threatened the very existence of everything that they had achieved. It is undeniable that conflict in 1994 and 1996 resulted in the division of the administration into two separate factions based in Arbil and Suleimaniyah, dominated by the KDP and PUK respectively. It could be argued that the weakness in the political system stems from the rivalry which exists between the PUK and KDP. Until 1997, neither party displayed the ability to manage rivalries in a peaceful manner and therefore resorted to military options, often with the

assistance of foreign national governments making the possibility of any stable joint government unlikely. When they separated into a divided political system, they were paradoxically strengthened due to the increased efficiency in the activities of the *de facto* governmental institutions. Furthermore, a unified administration presented a regional geopolitical instability, particularly to Turkey and Iran. These countries and other powers pursued active destabilising policies with their own national interest in mind, prompting tensions within the *de facto* state. The government of Turkey in particular referred to the Iraqi Kurdish region as being a power vacuum with no effective government characterised by lawlessness.

Despite some disagreement between PUK and KDP, there were some positive political developments in the late 1990s. In September 1998, the United States brokered a formal peace agreement between representatives of the PUK and KDP in Washington which provided for a unified regional administration, the sharing of local revenues and cooperation in implementing the UN sponsored 'oil for food' programme (UNSCR-968). Despite differences, the Iraqi Kurdistan experienced self-rule in democratic form of government. This emerging democratic forms allowed Kurds, Assyrian Chaldeans and Turkomans to maintain their respective ethno-linguistic identities, while simultaneously establishing a wider sense of collective identity based on three key factors: first, common geography, second, the ongoing experiment in self rule, democratisation and cultural tolerance and last, their shared experience as non-Arab Iraqis who have all known repression and marginalisation within the modern state of Iraq.

A joint session of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) was convened on 4 October 2002 in Arbil. At a further session held on 12 November 2002, a joint committee was established with the aim of preparing for parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, these elections were postponed following the US-led campaign to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The reconvening of the Kurdish National Assembly was a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq. Despite various internal difficulties and constraints, including a strong opposition of neighbouring countries and both external and internal embargoes on the region by the Iraqi government, all basic services were

provided to the extent the resources permitted. Freedom of speech and free movement was respected. According to Human Rights Watch, the leadership of the region made notable progress in promoting and protecting the basic rights of the people of liberated Iraqi Kurdistan.[3]

Theoretical analysis

Many of the Kurds, Assyrian Chaldeans and Turkomans suggested that a new sense of Kurdish identity is taking root precisely because it accommodates pluralism or cultural diversity by not threatening deep-rooted ethno-linguistic identities. The Kurdish Democratic Party established in 1946 and renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1953 supported a broad-based political platform for all people in the region regardless of ethnic identity. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party advocated the same view since its creation in 1975. It was therefore, expected that a possible interim solution would be a variant of a consociational model of multi-party elite, political accommodation within a divided administrative and territorial system.

The theories of consociational political system can be used as a basis to analyse the reasons behind political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan, in the first half of the 1990s and the subsequent stability that has been apparent particularly towards the end of the 1990s.With its clearly divided society and political structure, between the factional areas of the KDP and PUK, as well as older tribal and linguistic divisions, a model attempting to analyse the political structures of deeply divided societies, with a proscriptive element for future sustainable political development, obviously has a significant value. The multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious people inhabit the Kurdish region.

The model of consociational political system was developed in the 1960s in relation to the Third World by Arend Lijphart to describe how a culturally diverse country ensured that all significant groups were incorporated into government without any being frozen out by a crude majoritarianism. He defined his model as 'government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy'. The role of leaders of rival groups is therefore of paramount importance in

[3] For detail see the Human Right Watch/ Middle East website "Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan", (Online: web), Accessed 15 March, URL: http://www.hrw.org/

societies where political culture is deeply fragmented. The elite must possess the ability to accommodate divergent interests which exist within the society, and also understand the perils of political fragmentation. The elite must also have the ability to transcend cleavages (Lijphart 2003:142-43, Lijphart 1969: 218). The system recognises society as consisting of these distinctive groups based on language, race, culture and religion. Therefore, future development of the political system of the Iraqi Kurdistan could be achieved by the adopting a consociational model.

Conclusion

The history of Iraqi Kurdistan before 1991 is a history of destruction and displacement. Hundreds and thousands of citizens were detained and killed. Tens of thousands were forced to live in "collective towns" controlled by the Iraqi government. Many were injured in years of warfare.

The Kurdish safe haven lasted more than a decade. The autonomous region was not affected by the US-led coalition's invasion of Iraq and subsequent removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Many Arabs and Muslims considered the Kurds collaborators for having supported the United States in the 2003 war. Arab media accused the Kurdish *peshmerga* of being American mercenaries trying to subdue the Arab people. On the other hand, the Kurds see the Arabs as chauvinistic nationalists who oppose Kurdish rights as it means detaching territory from the Arab patrimony. However, Kurdish politics mainly focused upon the relations of Kurds as a minority people within the state

Chapter 2

Emergence of the Kurdish Political Party System

2 The Emergence of the Kurdish Political Party System

The Kurds have waged a long struggle to develop and sustain an identity of their own. Though often described as harsh, convulsive rebels, they are one of the oldest communities in West Asia. Because of their readiness to revolt against chastisement, regional and international powers have exploited them habitually and incited them to assume a militaristic role in destabilising regional regimes. The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan has its origins in the feverish state-building which characterised West Asia in the aftermath of the First World War. After failing to secure a nation-state of their own in the Treaty of Sevres 1920, the Kurds found themselves divided between the states as they are in today. Kurdish rebellions, whether tribal or nationalist, became commonplace in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, with all of them being successfully repressed. Military attacks by state authorities against the Kurds were combined with policies of assimilation and /or dispersion in an attempt to weaken the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Organised political groupings in Iraqi Kurdistan have a powerful variable in the dynamics of the region since the foundation of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946, and this has especially been the case since 1991. After 1991, an opportunity was given to the principal political groupings to present them as an organisation capable of mobilising widespread popular support, military personnel and substantial financial resources. In effect, they were presented with the opportunity to behave as political parties rather than guerrilla movements. The political system in Iraqi Kurdistan displays bewildering complexity and possesses parties of considerable sophistication.

The Kurds under the British Mandate

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 forced Britain to re-consider its West Asian policy in response to Turkey's entry into the war in support of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Britain, France and Russia concluded the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916) to partition the Ottoman territories according to their own interest. This agreement divided the Mosul *villayets* (southern Kurdistan) into French and British spheres of influenced (Eskander 2000:141).The consolidation of Britain's strategic, economic and political position in the region affected the Kurdistan's political structure.

Kurdish uprisings occurred long before Iraq's creation in 1920 and occurred sporadically during the monarchy. These uprisings had been influenced by the fact that Iraq was created by the British out of three Ottoman *villayets* or provinces: Baghdad and Basra which were overwhelmingly Arab, and Mosul which contained a large Kurdish minority. The Kurds in Mosul province sought their own independent state following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, only to see their aspirations dashed by the victorious western powers, namely British and France (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 70-71). The British were very keen to gain control over Mosul because of its oil, and being the Mandate power, the British prevailed. In December 1922, "an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Declaration of the Council of the League of Nations" recognised a Kurdish right to a degree of autonomy in Iraq:

> "His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognise the right of the Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government within those boundaries and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between themselves as to the form which they wish that Government should take and the boundaries within which they wish it to extend and will send responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations with this Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq".[4]

The British Mandate which was imposed on Iraq, did not ignore the existence of Iraq as Article 16 of the Mandate law stated that "there is nothing in this Mandate that prohibits the mandated from establishing an administratively independent government" which was a reference to the special status of the Kurdish people. In 1930, when a treaty was signed between Iraq and Britain, it terminated the British Mandate over Iraq and relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government began to deteriorate as the new arrangement cleared the way for further transfer of power in the north to the Iraqi government (Ghareeb 1981:30). During the years of British Mandate, limited steps were taken to placate the Kurds. As a result, there were many small Kurdish uprisings and the Kurds proved politically unruly.

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[4] For details see, *An Introduction to the Kurdish People of Iraq and elsewhere*, (Online: web). Accessed 7 February 2007, URL: http://www.eurolegal.org/neoconwars/kurdisraq.htm

The Kurds of northern Iraq greeted the advent of British rule after the First World War with traditional tribal revolt. Seeking to resist the imposition of firmer control from Baghdad than they previously knew, Sheikh Mahmud, a major Kurdish leader rose first in 1919 and in broader move in 1922. It took the British authorities two years to put down his last insurrections; even the unrest remained endemic in the Kurdish region (Harris, 1977:118). He was followed in the latter part of the 1920s by Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, another tribal and religious leader. However, these revolts fell short of being nationalist ones. Both Sheikh Mahmud and Sheikh Ahmad were more interested in gaining the sort of autonomy which the tribal leaders of the remote areas had enjoyed in Ottoman Empire (Kelidar 1979:171). The Kurds proved politically and militarily ineffective, however, because the tribally factionalised nature of their society-accentuated by poor transportation networks and mountainous terrain-prevented them from presenting a united front.

The rise of Kurdish Nationalism

Nationalism is a method whereby consciousness is raised, a consciousness of a people's political identity, of their very existence. The belief on the part of a mass of people that they are distinctive, set off from their fellows, and by virtue of their distinctiveness entitled to a state of their own are not something that arises spontaneously or that individuals are born with. People assign their primary loyalty to a tribe or a village of a sect quite naturally. The appeal of nationalism is based on a more mature awareness, and it proceeds from the recognition that a unit of protection greater than any tribe or village or sect is an absolute necessity (Pelletiere 1984:24-25).

Kurdish nationalism emerged as an ideology long before the formation of the Kurds as a nation, not in a middle class milieu but in a largely agrarian society with a powerful tribal component. From the 16th century to the mid 19th century, much of Kurdistan was under the role of independent and autonomous Kurdish principalities that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in the 17th century. Kurdish destinies changed radically around this time, when the Ottoman and Persian empires divided Kurdistan into spheres of influence, agreeing on a border in 1969. In order to protect their sovereignty, the principalities supported one or the other power, and for most of the next three centuries a

prevailing war economy destroyed the agrarian system, devastated villages and towns, precipitated massacres and led to forcible migrations of Kurds and the settlement of Turkish tribes in parts of Kurdistan. All of this inhibited further growth of urban areas and settled agrarian production relations, reinforcing tribal ways of life (Hassanpour 1994:3).

Although the war economy retarded the consolidation of the Kurds as a nation, the destruction and suffering stimulated a political consciousness that was unprecedented in the region. This emerged first in the realms of language and literature when, in the 16th century, Kurdish *Ulama* broke the monopoly of Arabic and Persian languages over literary production. In 1597, Sharaf Khan, prince of the powerful Bidlis principality, compiled the first history of Kurdistan, *Sharafnameh* . Although written in Persian, this text presents historical data on the degree of independence enjoyed by different Kurdish states (Hassanpour 1994:3).

Nationalism, whether Kurdish or Turkish, is always constructed by the cultural elite and shaped by political context. The major difference between Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, or Syrian nationalism and Kurdish nationalism is the presence of the state. Since Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran has evolved in response to modernizing nation-states, it constantly stresses its ethnic difference and has used it to historicize itself. Although the Kurdish cultural elite tend to identify Turks as their other half in the construction of Kurdish nationalism, major tribal, linguistic, religious, and regional fissures exist within Kurdish identity itself. The Kurds are a nation in formation at the crossroads of the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish worlds. The sources of these divisions are socio-historical and have prevented the emergence of a full-fledged Kurdish identity (Yavuz and Gunter 2001:33). By the early 1920s the political geography of the Kurdish areas had begun to assume the general shape that it has today, with the Kurds divided between the states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Turkish policies towards the Kurds in the 1920s and 1930s were extremely repressive, and the risings led by Shaikh Sai'd in 1925, the Khoybun revolt in 1929-30, and the Dersim rebellion in 1937 were all put down with great ferocity. In Iran, the early 1920s were filled with uncertainty, as the continuing anarchy in the country encouraged some Kurdish leaders there to think in terms of a separate state or at least an autonomous province, though these ambitions were

finally dashed after their defeat by a revitalized Iranian army in July 1922 (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:25-26).

The Kurds have never been aggressively nationalistic. Kurdish life remains tribally structured in most areas and is based on local, tightly knit rural communities under a tribal-religious leader known as *sheikh* or *seyid*. Traditionally, local power in northern Iraq had been wielded by the tribal chiefs, of *aghas* and to a lesser degree by the Muslim Sheikhs. (Prince 1993:18). For them, the effective unit of allegiance has remained the tribe. A tribe is a community, or a confederation of communities, that exists for the protection of its members against external aggression and for the maintenance of the old customs and standard of living. This tribal structure has played a dual role: impeding the formation of Kurdish unity by keeping Kurds fragmented, and preserving a heightened Kurdish attitude toward the Turks, Iranians, and Arabs. Tribal structure has constituted the core depository of Kurdish identity, has facilitated mobilisation against centralising governments, and has also kept a modern concept of nationalism from developing until the mid-twentieth century (Yavuz and Michael M Gunter 2001:33-34).

In many parts of the world the tribe has died out, but it has persisted in Kurdistan because of the extremely rugged mountainous terrain that has often separated one community from another and also from those of the Arabs, Iranians, and Turks. But in fairly recent times, the tribal system has been largely undermined by a penetration into Kurdistan, not of men but of the concept of private property. The British and the Turks before them made it possible for tribal chiefs to take legal possession of land that free-holding tribesmen became tenants. Later on, many of these tenants were driven off the land. Thus, by the early part of the twentieth century when the whole Kurdish society came under assault by the Turks, later by the Arabs, and to a certain degree by the Iranians, the society was already in disarray. To withstand the assaults upon it, the Kurds needed a mobilizing idea, and this was what Kurdish nationalism was meant to be (Pelletiere 1984:25). Besides, diverse Kurdish dialects have dominated the regions and until recently sub-ethnic identities were more powerful than Kurdish consciousness.

The early focus of Kurdish nationalism was the KDP-I of Iran. During the period of the Second World War, the focus of Kurdish national aspirations was in the city of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurds including Barzani and his militia supported

the fledging Kurdish identity. But the republic of Mahabad only lasted for as long as the Soviet forces were present in Iran, and once they withdrew Mahabad fell to the Iranian army. As a result KDP- I fell apart, leaving a small clandestine rump with little influence. However, unrest became increasingly apparent in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan between Kurdish peasants and landlords and the 1960s witnessed a re-emergence of Kurdish nationalism (Bruinessen 1992: 26).

Kurdish Orientation and the Rise of Nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan

The Kurdish question started in Iraq since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921. A decision by the provisional council of ministers of the Iraqi government, which appointed Faisal the First as king of Iraq, included a reference to the participation of Kurds in the elections of the founding council, as was stipulated by the Sevres Treaty. But the sweeping majority of the Kurds took a negative position on the establishment of the Iraqi state because of its position on their rights.

The failure of the Iraqi Kurds in the past to present a united front has also been a factor in their lack of success in pressing claims for a wider degree of autonomy of independence. Tribal or extended family loyalties continue to predominate in some cases over a broader concept of civic identity, whether it is toward the Iraqi state or towards a Kurdish nation. Political parties have emerged gradually among the Iraqi Kurds, and have become superimposed to some degree over the older tribal structure. These parties frequently disagree on a variety of issues, including ideology, leadership goals and international orientation. Differences among Kurdish nationalist leaders have provided Iraqi governments with opportunities to divide the movement by supporting one group over another. Since 1975, the dearth of an overarching charismatic leader has contributed further toward fragmentation within the Kurdish movement.[5]

Within Iraq, there was a waking of a national consciousness among the first generation of secular educated and urban Kurds (Mcdowall 1996:288). Informal groupings, such as *Komala-i-Liwen* (Young Men's Organisation), were formed by young

[5]. Prados, Alfred B (May 6, 1991), *Kurdish separatism in Iraq: Developments and Implications for the United States*, CRS Report for Congress:15

urban Kurds in Baghdad, but, in the absence of any recognized Kurdish nationalist party, many joined the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) when it was formed in 1934 (Gunter 1993:9). Following the *coup d'etat* by Bakr Sidqi, and subsequent anti-Kurdish feeling amongst Arab Iraqis, more radical clandestine Kurdish nationalist groups began to form such as *Komala Brayeti* (Brotherhood Organisation), and *Darkar* (the Woodcutters) in Suleimaniyah. *Darkar* had strong links with the ICP's Kurdish wing, but soon fell into disagreement through its overt promotion of Kurdish rather than Iraqi nationalism (Mcdowall 1996:288). From *Darkar*, a new more populist party was formed named *Hiwa* (Hope) in 1939, which was intended to solidify Kurdish nationalist sentiment. *Hiwa* was a fairly loose grouping that included both left and right wing factions; that is, those who held that revolution and socialism were essential preconditions for the attainment of Kurdish national rights. In addition to *Hiwa,* the Iraqi communist Party had become active in Kurdistan almost since the time of its foundation in 1934 (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:27).

Kurdish crisis before the Ba'ath

The Kurdish separatism presents different problems for a peripheral strategy. Kurdish separatism is the result of a Kurdish search for autonomy or independence with a long and bloody history. Iraqi Kurds have often revolted when the government seemed weak or when they could obtain foreign support. They have also taken advantage of any weakness in the central government, or its preoccupation with other pressing domestic or foreign issues, to pressure Baghdad by bringing up demands for autonomy.

The role of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1943 revolt

By 1927, the Barżani clan had come to the fore as the leading Kurdish dissidents. In the years that followed, the Barzanis earned a reputation for activism and boldness in resisting the central government in Baghdad. In 1929, they demanded the formation of an all Kurdish province embracing their core area in Iraq, a demand they repeated in 1943. Under this stimulus, in 1930-31, notables petitioned the League of Nations to set up an independent Kurdish government (Longrigg 1953:193-96, 324-27). The main demands of Barzani were that an autonomous province consisting of Kirkurk, Suleimaniyah, Arbil,

Dohuk and Khanaqin should be created and placed under a minister of Kurdish affairs. Upon the rejection of these demands, fighting broke out (Gunter 1993:9). Their main motives however, appeared to be securing concessions from the Arabs to permit the establishment of local autonomy and the use of Kurdish as a language of education as well as to demand a greater share of Iraq's revenues for the development of the northern region. When the Barzani agitation elicited a determined thrust from the Baghdad government backed by the British in 1945, Mullah Mustafa Barzani fled with a group of followers to Iran (Harris 1977:118). He offered his service to the new Kurdish Republic. Whether Barzani's 1943 rebellion could be called nationalist is debatable. McDowall points out that:

> Although sometimes described as a nationalist rebellion, the evidence indicated that it as not... there is little solid evidence that Barzani has espoused the Kurdish cause during the course of his revolt..... If one looks at his actions.... It is plausible that..... like any good tribal leader, he was constantly seeking to widen his regional authority (Mcdowall 1996:290-93).

While it is difficult to identify the motivation behind this rebellion, it would appear to be the case that if Barzani did not choose nationalism, the nationalist would chose him (Mcdowall 1996:293). Perhaps the most useful way to view the historical significance of the Barzani rebellion of 1943 is that of a watershed in Kurdish politics. The 1943 revolt was the last time that tribal elements exploited nationalism with no opposition. From 1943 onwards, it became increasingly apparent that the nationalists were less inclined to be used as pawns in tribal politics, and attempted to exploit tribalism for their own agenda. This conflict between the two groups has become a characteristic of Kurdish politics ever since (Stansfield 2003:63).

When secessionist minded Kurds within Iran established the short-lived Marxist-dominated Republic of Mahabad in 1945 under the presidency of Qazi Muhammad[6]. The Iranian government of Mohammad Reza Shah recaptured the town of Mahabad in January 1947 and eliminated the Kurdish leadership with the exception of Mullah Mustafa who fled to the USSR. Unable to return to Iran or Iraq, Barzani spend the next

[6] For details see Roosevelt Jr, Archie, "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.) (1978), *People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, London: Zed Press, 135-52. Also see, William Eagleton (1963). *The Kurdish Republic of 1946*, London: Oxford University Press.

eleven years in Soviet Union where he was commissioned as a Brigadier General in the Soviet Army. In 1946 he established a political organisation known as the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) modelled along the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.

The Kurds and Republican Iraq

In 1958, a group of military officers under the titular leadership of Abdul Karim Qassem, overthrew the Hashemite monarchy and declared the establishment of a new republican political system in Iraq. Qassem's action in deposing the monarchy on 14 July 1958 was a turning point in the history of Iraqi Kurds. It led to the fortification of the Kurdish nationalist movement as manifested in the armed eruption of the Kurds for autonomy between 1961 and 1975 (Nehme and Lokman 1995:44).

The new regime promised to bring about a drastic transformation in the condition of the Kurds. A provisional constitution was promulgated for the first time, which acknowledged the Kurds as a legitimate ethnic group with national rights. The 1958 constitution, after reaffirming Iraq's place as an integral and inseparable part of the Arab nation, stated that 'Arabs and Kurds are considered partners in this nation'. Qassem himself was intent on improving the lot of the Kurds. His mother was purportedly a Shia Kurd, and several Kurds were appointed to prominent positions after Qassem's accession to power (Nader 1984:917). Kurdish activities suddenly increased under Qassem. Kurdish publications were freely circulated and many Kurdish intellectuals joined the ICP or cooperated with it. For this reason Kurds supported the Qassem regime.

In 1958, Barzani was invited back to Iraq by the revolutionary and republican regime of General Abdul Karim Qassem to participate in the building of a new and progressive Iraq. Iraq was defined for the first time as a state comprising of two nationalities: Arab and Kurd.

In the early years of Qassem regime, a symbolic relationship developed between the government and the Kurds. While allowing Kurdish political and cultural activities to flourish, Qassem used the Kurds to keep his enemies (the monarchists, the Ba'athist and other Arab nationalists) at bay. Furthermore, Barzani's political ascendancy and new alliance with Baghdad allowed him to settle 'old scores' with other Kurdish tribes, 'especially the Bardosts, who had helped the Iraqi government in the 1930s and 1940s

against Barzani'. And Barzani's principal aim seems to have been to gain power over his opponents and to unify Kurdish forces under his control as the future representative of government authority in the northern area. Politically, Barzani was seeking control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which had come under Marxist influence during his exile (Ghareeb 1981:39).

The formation of Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).

There were other groups active in Kurdish politics besides Barzani's followers, including the *Hiwa* party, founded in 1939 and composed mainly of professionals and officers. *Hiwa* was in touch with Kurdish organizations in Iran, Syria and with the Iraqi communist party. Essentially a nationalist coalition, *Hiwa* began to weaken after 1940 when its leadership became tribal and its membership embraced rightist and militarist supporters who alienated the leftist intelligentsia, a major element in the nationalist movement. This led to a split in 1944. The rightist faction was unable to survive by itself and the party collapsed (Longrigg 1953:234-36).

In the fall of 1945, a Kurdish Communist Party *(Shurish)* was formed under the leadership of Salih Haidari. *Shurish* later split over the attempt to attract pro-Barzani tribal leaders, and the more radical elements under Haidari joined the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) instead. In the meantime, *Shurish* helped found Razgari Kurd (the Kurdish Liberation Front) which became a Kurdish nationalist front (Ghareeb 1981:35). Komala, the first Kurdish nationalist political party was created by a group of Kurdish activists in Mahabad, Iran. But later the Kurdish Democratic Party incorporated all Kurdish nationalist movements (including *Komala*) under its umbrella.

The pre-eminent party in modern Iraqi Kurdish history, the KDP, was established in 1946 in response to the earlier creation of the Iranian KDP of the Mahabad. At its first congress in Baghdad, on 16th August 1946, Mullah Mustafa Barzani was elected President and Hamza Abdallah Secretary-General. Two landlords, Sheikh Latif Barzinji (son of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji of Sulaymaniyah, an earlier prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader who had fought against the British in the 1920s) and Sheikh Ziyad Aghaz, were chosen as Vice-Presidents (Gunter 1996:226). In the KDP, the Kurds had for the first time, a vanguard party that sought to achieve the Kurdish national aspirations within the

framework of Iraqi national unity. It also stressed the brotherhood between the Kurds and Arabs. The programme also advocated reform of the political and social structure, nationalisation of heavy industries and the banks, and the elimination of illiteracy, including the establishment of a Kurdish university and making Kurdish the official language in the schools and government offices in the northern Iraq. The party addressed the Kurds' nationalist goals and their desire to live in a state of their own. But it lacked any social or economic substance.

With the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in early 1947, the closure of the KDP-I branches in Iraqi Kurdistan allowed the urban intelligentsia of the KDP to dominate the direction of the party. After the fall of Mahabad, Barzani's Brigade was attacked by the Iranian military (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:28-29). Barzani crossed back into Iraq in April only to face repression from the Government of Iraq (GoI), with the deprivation of property and land, and ultimately, the execution of four tribal leaders in May and the condemning to death of Barzani himself (O'Ballance 1996:34). Barzani had little option but to fight his way out of Iraq and seek sanctuary in the USSR. Meanwhile, the ICP *Azadi* faction grew rapidly as a result, and, in response, Barzani pursued an overtly nationalist line in appealing for Kurds to support KDP. The Second Congress was held in Baghdad in March 1951, which elected Ibrahim Ahmed as Secretary-General, with Barzani remaining leader in-exile. The Second Congress was devoted to mending relations between its feuding members. One observer concluded that the KDP of those days "was more of a social and cultural gathering than a well-defined political party". (Jawad 1981:20). During these early years, an intra-party struggle developed between supporters of Secretary-General Hamza Abdallah, an apparent opportunist, and Ibrahim Ahmad, who at first headed the Iraqi branch of the Iranian KDP.[7] In retrospect, this early party division partially heralded the future split between the KDP and the PUK.

The Third Congress of 1953 changed the name of the party to the Kurdistan Democratic Party as a gesture towards nationalism, and adopted a leftist programme calling for agricultural reform and recognition of peasants' and worker's rights. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed, the KDP worked among students and intellectuals, but

[7] Ahmad thought he had a greater chance of leading the Kurdish national movement of Iraq be remaining head of the original mother organization's Iraqi branch in the Iranian KDP.

received little support from rural areas, which remained dominated by tribal leaders (Sluglett and Sluglett 2001:30). While some tribal discontent was still apparent among the remaining Barzanis and other tribes, the main source of unrest in Iraq during the 1950s was of a socio-economic nature rather than tribal, allowing the KDP under the leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed to increase its strength (O' Ballance 1973:58). The trends manifested in the Third Conference programme reflected the need for joint Arab-Kurdish cooperation and the opposition to secession or chauvinism as well as the need to link the Kurdish national movement with other liberation movements throughout the world. As a result, a number of leaders who had left the KDP and joined the Kurdish branch of the ICP, returned to it. However, the Kurds maintained on the whole their normal relationship described by Stephen Longrigg as "the effective alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish separatism from the Aghas to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniyah with an uneasy succession of arrest, releases, and re-arrests" (Longrigg 1953:353).

The effect of improved economic conditions in Iraq, brought about by increased oil wealth, was not trickling down to the lower social echelons of the country, particularly in the Kurdish regions, with the result that many Kurds were migrating to urban areas in search of employment in the oil industry (O'Ballance 1973:58). Throughout the 1950s the need for agriculture development was urgent, yet the mechanisation of the agricultural sector put peasants out of work and gave more wealth to the landlords, thereby exacerbating class divisions. The KDP and the ICP therefore were able to secure an increased support base in the rural areas of the region, and the KDP under Ibrahim Ahmed adopted a closer relationship with the ICP (O'Ballance 1973:58).

In 1956, with Barzani's support, Abdallah briefly replaced Ahmad as Secretary-General, and many ICP members joined the KDP. For a while, to indicate these additions, the KDP became known as the United-KDP (U-KDP). The U-KDP had a Central Committee of twenty-one members, and an inner Political Bureau of five, which included some names who were going to become important actors in the future of the Kurdish struggle, namely Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, Omar Mustafa, Nuri Shawas and Ali Abdullah. The U-KDP maintained close contact with the reviving ICP

(O'Ballance 1973:61). The orientation of the party remained clearly socialist, even though Barzani remained as president in exile (Mcdowall 1996:300). In the meantime, Abdallah grew too close to the Iraqi Communist Party, and apparently even proposed transferring various KDP organisations to its control. Later that year, he was permanently removed from the KDP leadership and Ahmad was reinstated. The nascent intra-Kurdish split was set between the more conservative and traditional, tribal wing of the KDP associated with Barzani, and the intellectual Marxist wing (the so-called KDP politburo) led by Ahmad, and increasingly by his son-in-law, Jalal Talabani (Gunter 1996:227). Changing social conditions in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan and leftist expressions of Arab and Kurdish nationalism encouraged the Kurdish tribes to distance themselves from the Iraq Monarchy. By 1958, the KDP had been in touch with the Free Officers of Iraq, chaired by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem, who sought the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy and establish a democratic state in Iraq (O'Ballance 1973:61-62).

Rebelling against the Iraqi government in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the KDP became perhaps the single most influential Iraqi anti-Saddam group. Its *peshmerga*, or militia fighters, were able to operate with relative impunity in the 'no-fly zone' of northern Iraq. The KDP has jointly administered northern Iraq (which the Kurds call the free Kurdistan, because of its semi-independent status). The KDP became the leading party in the Kurdistan Regional Government in Arbil. The party has its wings in every part of Kurdistan, the KDPI (Iran), in Syria (Al Party), in Turkey (PDK-Bakur) and even in Lebanon.[8]

The September 1961 Revolution

When the Free Officers took over in July 1958, the KDP, in common with other political organizations, was not directly involved, but welcomed the Revolution in the belief that the new regime would be generally sympathetic to their cause. But the Free Officers had no special interest in or commitment to finding a solution to the Kurdish question. However, the Kurds themselves were by no means of one mind or one voice, and splits soon emerged, notably between Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish 'tribal', who had an

[8] For detail see, *Kurdistan Democratic Party*, (Online: web), Accessed 27 February 2007, URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Democratic_Party_of_Iraq

army of Kurdish irregulars to back his leadership, and Ibrahim Ahmad who represented the more sophisticated and more directly 'political' aspirations of the urbanized Kurds. Furthermore, in spite of a general unity of aims, tensions soon broke out between the KDP and the ICP, especially as the KDP claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist party, which led to a good deal of confusion over their respective role (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:79-80).

The Kurdish Revolt began to gather momentum from March 1961, when Mullah Mustafa took hold of the mountainous areas in the Iraqi Kurdistan by fighting his old enemies, the *Lolani* and *Zebari* tribe (Mcdowall 1996:309-10). The revolt escalated when Barzani's allies, the Arkou tribesmen under Abbas Mohammed, who was incensed by Qassem policy of land reform, attacked an army column in Bazyan, on the route to Kirkuk and Suleimaniya, causing casualties. Qassem's response of the indiscriminate aerial bombing of rural areas, including Barzan villages, resulted in the Barzanis and other tribes rebelling (O'Ballance 1973:75). It is likely that Barzani's motives for fighting were, first, more tribal than nationalist. Apart from a few isolated cases over which Barzani had little or no control, neither the Barzanis nor their allies made concerted attacks against the Iraqi army. Qassem's forces encountered little difficulty in retaking the urban areas and connecting roads. Qassem, therefore, targeted the rural infrastructure by bombing the mountain villages, resulting in the destruction of almost 300 villages before the end of the year. However, Barzani retained the mountainous areas (O'Ballance 1973:75).

While Barazni's power within the KDP increased, relations between Qassem and the Kurds began to deteriorate. Neither Qassem nor his government was willing to give the Kurds the administrative self-rule they aspired to. The Kurds were led to believe that the reference to Arab-Kurdish partnership in the Constitution meant they would receive larger social and cultural roles in the country. Qassem seemed to have become suspicious of the Barzani leadership, particularly after the growth of its influence in the north (Ghareeb 1981:39).

In July 1961, Barzani submitted a memorandum to the government, demanding a substantial degree of autonomy for the Kurdish region (Ghareeb 1981:39). Qassem became increasingly uneasy over the extent of the concessions the Kurds had wrung from

his regime and began to view them as a threat to his rule, while the Kurds thought they had not received enough benefits. Tensions rose following the government's deportation of Kurds from the oil-rich Kirkuk area and the movement of military forces to the north. A full-fledged rebellion headed by Barzani broke out in September 1961. At first, Barzani fought alone against the government and the Kurdish tribal faction. But in 1962, the KDP joined the Barzani faction. This change took place largely because Kurdish nationalist feeling had increased, partly through communist influence and also partly in reaction to Arab nationalist agitation. In addition, Barzani gained supporters when Qassem alienated some traditional Kurdish leaders by pushing agrarian reform (Ghareeb 1981:40). The revolt therefore continued. In the process the Iraqi Army was debilitated. Its attempts to curb the Kurdish rebels failed. This failure raised many questions concerning the wisdom of depleting Iraq's resources in a never-ending Iraqi-Kurdish war.

Even though Qassem fell from power in 1963, the Kurdish insurrection was to last almost uninterrupted from 1963 to 1975, a period of twelve years. The KDP's fighting strength rose from about 1,000 ill-trained *Peshmerga* [9] guerrillas in late 1961 to about 20,000 seasoned guerrillas by late 1963. Throughout the 1960s, military dominated Arab nationalist regimes in Baghdad proved unwilling to grant the Kurds the autonomy they sought and were also unable to subdue them militarily (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 72).

The Kurdish position *vis-a-vis* the Iraqi government was weakened as a major split occurred within the leadership of the KDP. There had been great discussions concerning the role of the party in the uprising. Jalal Talabani believed that the KDP should attempt to take over the leadership of the rebellion and use it for nationalist purposes, whereas Ibrahim Ahmed believed that the rebellion was totally contrary to the aims and ideals of the KDP. Furthermore, Ibrahim Ahmed still had the experience of Mahabad on his mind and believed that the KDP might disintegrate under the strain of war, particularly as neither the mountainous tribesman nor outside support could be guaranteed (Stansfield 2003:70). The younger and intellectual elements of the KDP politburo, particularly Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim, challenged Barzani's handling of ceasefire negotiations with the

[9] *Peshmerga* in Kurdish means those who face death.

government (Entessar 1984:916). Barzani's announcement of the ceasefire without prior consultation with the KDP created friction between him and his party.

The formation of the Peshmerga

Even though the KDP allied itself with Barzani, he forbade it from operating in his spheres of influence and instead operated between Raniya and Suleimaniyah. This division of territory was a reflection of the territorial division between the support bases of Barzani, on the one hand, and the Political Bureau of the KDP on the other. Mullah Mustafa was reluctant to form an organised army, being satisfied with his partisan organisation, which was improving and developing. So, KDP established a standing force in their sector, which became known as the *Peshmerga*. As more officers and soldiers deserted the Iraqi Army to join the rebels, the *peshmerga* developed and swelled, and by September 1962, it had amounted to some 15000 armed men (O' Ballance 1973:79).

The *Peshmerga* was divided into small groups of just a few fighters known as *'desteh'* (platoons), which were, or could be, merged to form a larger one known as *'pel'* (companies), which could in turn be grouped into a larger formation for operational purposes known as *'sarpel'* (battalions), which usually had between 200 and 250 men. The organisation of the *Peshmerga* was extremely sketchy and units and sub-units were known by the names of their leaders. There were no formal headquarters at any level, not even the highest, as Mullah Mustafa constantly moved from place to place. It is important to note the impact of the formation of the *peshmerga* on the structure of the KDP and, subsequently, PUK. Due to the location of the KDP in the mountains of Raniyah, the initial intake of the new force was predominantly tribal, with Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi army giving it some semblance of regular military organization. To this group was gradually added a mix of urbanized Kurds which provided the germ of Kurdish nationalism promoted by the urbanite KDP. The *peshmerga* had many problems at first, particularly as the tribal Kurds were reluctant to accept military discipline. However, the army cadres managed to develop them into a rough mountain fighting force with the result that the *peshmerga* of the KDP were more politically and ideologically motivated than Barzani's tribal militia (O' Ballance 1973:85-86).

By 1962 the war was going the way of the rebels, and Qassem was becoming politically isolated. The KDP had identified the Free Officers movement and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party as being the best placed to stage a coup against Qassem, and assured the Ba'ath Party would not exploit the weak Iraqi army in the north while the coup was underway. In return, the KDP received assurances regarding autonomy (Mcdowall, 1996: 312-13; O' Ballance 1973: 95-96).

The Kurdish question under Abd al -Salam Arif.

The coup against Qassem was carried out by the group of Free Officers on 8th February 1963, with the involvement of the Ba'ath Party. The victorious junta, named the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), appointed colonel Abdul Salam Arif as President and Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr as Prime Minister (Stansfield 2003:71). In the subsequent meetings between Barzani and the Government of Iraq (GoI), Barzani increased his demands for an autonomous province to include the governorates of Arbil, Suleimaniyah and Kirkuk, and parts of Mosul and Diyala; that one third of oil revenues be devoted to the Kurds, and that the Vice-President of Iraq be Kurdish; that one third of all seats in the GOI go to the Kurds: and that the Deputy Chief of Staff be a Kurd (O'Ballance 1973:79). President Arif concluded that there was no alternative but to fight.

In the middle of February, Jalal Talabani and Salih al-Yusufi began negotiations on the Kurdish question with the new government, but little progress was made. Barazani, who was still in the north of Iraq, declared that he would not hesitate to start fighting again if the government did not declare its positive commitment to Kurdish autonomy. Arif now approached Barzani secretly to explore a possible ceasefire, which was negotiated on 10th February 1964. By this time, however, the latent divisions within the Kurdish rank between the 'tribals' and the political had broken through the surface, and Barzani was forced to take up the challenge to his authority being posed by the KDP. Hence, when Arif bypassed the KDP and began to negotiate directly with him, Barzani seized what appeared to be a golden opportunity to dispense the KDP, whose leaders, notably Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, immediately denounced the ceasefire as a sell out and refused to cooperate (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:103). The situation was made worse when the new provisional constitution offered far less to the Kurds than previous

agreements. Barzani had put his name to an agreement, which omitted any mention of self- administration, let alone Kurdish autonomy, which infuriated the Political Bureau. The actions of Barzani created serious tensions in the ranks of the KDP. Whether Barzani did this to create a division and thereby have reason to attack the left wing of the KDP is unknown.

During the revolt, which started in 1961, Barzani conducted negotiations on and of with the Iraqi authorities concerned, proposing an end to the revolt in exchange for relative autonomy. He approached Premier Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz in 1965. An uneasy ceasefire was in effect between Barzani and the GoI. Barzani used it to again consolidate his position in Kurdistan, increasing his demands to the GOI, and it was at this time that the infamous link to Israel and also to Iran was developed. The link to these ideological enemies of the Iraqi regime proved to be devastating for the GOI. Faced with the Kurdish *Peshmerga* benefiting from Israeli assistance and the capacity given by Iran to the *Peshmerga (*they could evacuate to safe areas at times of attack by the Iraqi forces) resulted in the Iraqi military unable to deal with the Kurds.

On 12 July 1966, Premier Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz offered a twelve-point programme, which Barzani accepted. But the Bazzaz government fell before it could implement the programme. Bazzaz's successor, Naji Talib, felt that Barzani did not represent a majority of the Kurds (Ghareeb 1981:41). The military elite within the Government of Iraq accused al-Bazzaz of betraying the Constitution. Al-Bazzaz's Government was ousted right after the agreement with the Kurds (Mcdowall 1992:88-89). An uneasy truce with minor clashes prevailed during the remaining period of the Arif's government control, until the return of the Ba'ath to power in 1968 under the leadership of Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr.

The March Agreement 1970

The 11th March 1970 agreement was the direct result of the long struggle waged by the revolutionary forces of the Kurdish people. It was the outcome of labourious negotiations between the two belligerents. However, it was not presented to the Iraqi people as a joint declaration bearing two signatures, but as a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) communiqué concerning a change in policy by the Iraqi regional directorate, in other

words by the Ba'ath party (Chaliand 1980:168). The March Agreement was the best deal ever offered to the Iraqi Kurds. Although Barzani still did not trust the Ba'ath, Kurdish opinion was strong enough for him to sign the agreement. The agreement was widely accepted by the Kurdish community and fighting ceased, thus ending a war which had proved costly to Iraq and had seriously delayed the national development programme. The Kurdish settlement introduced an element of stability into Iraqi life and allowed a number of reforms to be initiated. In October 1970, the state of emergency in operation almost continuously since July 1958 was lifted. Many political detainees, including former ministers, were released. According to Al-Bakr, the congress had defined the party's ideological and theoretical position on the Kurdish problem and had delineated its solution by passing a series of resolutions. The government of Iraq chose to negotiate, although there was some opposition from within the military. Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein, then Vice President and President al-Bakr negotiated an accord with Barzani on 11 March 1970. This agreement led to the adoption of the following fifteen articles:

- The Kurdish language shall be, along with the Arabic language, the official language in areas with a Kurdish majority, and will be the language of instruction in those areas and taught throughout Iraq as a second language.
- Kurds will participate fully in government, including senior and sensitive posts in the cabinet and the army.
- Kurdish education and culture will be reinforced.
- All officials in Kurdish majority areas shall be Kurds or at least Kurdish speaking.
- Kurds shall be free to establish student, youth, women's and teacher's organisations of their own.
- Funds will be set aside for the development of Kurdistan.
- Pensions and assistance will be provided for the families of martyrs and others stricken by poverty, unemployment or homelessness.
- Kurds and Arabs will be transferred to their former place of habitation.
- The Agrarian reform will be implemented.
- The constitution will be amended to read "the Iraqi people are made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality".

- The broadcasting station and heavy weapons will be returned to the government.
- Appointment of a Kurdish Vice President.
- The Governorates (provincial) law shall be amended in a manner conforming to the substance of this declaration.
- Unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit.
- The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population of Iraq.[10]

A list of steps taken by the Iraqi government between 1968 and 1970 to guarantee Kurdish rights was included in the Manifesto. These provisions included recognition of Kurdish nationalism, the establishment of Sulaymaniyah University, the teaching of Kurdish in all schools, the recognition of *Nawruz* (a traditional new year celebrated by Zagros of the Iranian plateau people) as a national holiday, the promulgation of a Governorates Law emphasizing decentralization, the establishment of a Duhok Governorate incorporating the Kurdish areas of the Mosul province, and general amnesty for all soldiers and civilians who fought in the conflict in the North (Ghareeb 1981:87-88). The Government of Iraq kept to its word in the implementation of the agreement and a commission comprised of four Kurds and four Arabs was established. President Al-Bakr reshuffled his cabinet appointing five Kurds in the process and Barzani-KDP members were appointed as governors of Suleimaniyah, Arbil and Dohuk. By the end of April, the Kurdish language was starting to be used in Kurdistan. Kurdish journals appeared and public organisations were established (Mcdowall 1996:326-7). Kurdish unity was boosted in February 1971 by the merger of the Kurdish Revolutionary Party (KRP) and the KDP, led by Barzani, and in July a new Provisional Constitution encapsulated many of the points contained in the 1970 settlement. But the Kurds, who held positions in the central government, were powerless. Meanwhile, President Ahmed

[10] Quoted by Mcdowall, David (1997). *Modern History of Iraq*, New York: I.B.Tauris, 328. See also, Sheriff Vanly, Ismet "Kurdistan in Iraq," in Chaliand ,Gerard (ed.) (1978). *People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, London: Zed Press, 168-70.

Hassan Al-Bakr announced the Autonomy Law enacted by the Revolutionary Command Council for the implementation of autonomy in the region of Kurdistan[11].

However, the trust between the KDP and the Ba'ath Party did not last long. Towards the end of the 1970s, an attempt was made upon the life of Barzani's eldest son, Idris, in Baghdad, and arguments raged throughout 1971 concerning the demographic alteration of Kurdish areas by government "Arabisation" policies (Mcdowall 1996:329). Conversely, the Ba'ath suspected the Kurds of settling Kirkuk with Kurds from Iran and Turkey. Relations between the Ba'ath and Barzani deteriorated to the point when Barzani advocated taking up arms over the status of Kirkuk, and the Government of Iraq (GoI) attempted to assassinate Barzani himself in September 1971 (Stansfield 2003: 75). Between March 1974 and March 1975 the Kurdish *Peshmerga* took to arms again, despite the fact that the government had declared the Kurdish areas as an autonomous region. The KDP felt that the Iraqi offer did not fulfill its demands for full government representation, which included membership of the RCC, but minority Kurds, principally the KRP, welcomed the proposals. Differences over the interpretation of the Manifesto and Kurdish claimed the plans for autonomy getting approval, were the main reasons behind the eruption of fighting. Other reasons were the continued Kurdish claims for the oil-rich province of Kirkuk to be included in the autonomous region, over the extent of powers to be given to the autonomous region, and over the Kurds' participation in the central government (Jawad 1979:180). By August 1974, the Kurdish war had reached a new level of intensity; the Government in Baghdad was directing large military resources against the *peshmerga*, deploying tanks, field guns and bombers. The Kurdish rebellion, however, collapsed after Iraq and Iran signed an accord on 6 March 1975 at the meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Algiers. Both the countries formally settled all outstanding border differences, with both the parties agreeing to maintain border security and end infiltrations.

The Kurdish forces were devastated by the Algiers Accord of March 1975. Saddam Hussein was the key negotiator of this accord, and it is scarcely surprising that it left him with a permanent suspicion of the Kurds and of their loyalty to the Iraqi state. Following

[11] With the failure of the March 1970 Manifesto, Iraq issued an Autonomy Law in March 1973, which significantly reduced the concession originally offered in 1970. For details see, *Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq*, Ath-Thawra Publications: Baghdad.

the collapse of the Kurdish insurgency, Mustafa Barzani fled with thousands of other Kurds to Iran. Barzani then moved to USA, where he died in 1979. This left the leadership of the KDP in the hands of his two inexperienced sons, Massoud and Idris, and established the Kurdish Democratic Party- Provisional. Meanwhile, back in Iraq itself a mixture of ruthless force and occasional incentives kept the Kurds relatively peaceful from 1975 to 1980. Moreover, the Kurdish movement itself weakened when it fragmented following the formation in 1976 of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) by Jalal Talabani, a left leaning urban intellectual and long-time ideological antagonist of the more conservative Mustafa Barzani (Cordesman and Hashim 1997:74). However, it did not bring about a permanent cessation of Iraqi-Kurdish hostilities.

Early in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah Reza Pahlevi and established an Islamic Republic in Iran. This new regime did not want to, and could not; enforce the provisions of the Algiers Agreement of 1975 between Iraq and Iran to prevent cross-border Kurdish activities. Once again the KDP began to establish bases in Iran to challenge Baghdad, a situation that led to the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. Following the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq War in 1980, the two major Kurdish groups both the KDP and PUK fought the Iraqi government on the side of Iran. Divisions within the Kurdish resistance movement in Iraq in the wake of Mullah Mustafa's departure resulted in the deterioration of the Kurdish position *vis-à-vis* the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. However, the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 profoundly affected the Kurdish struggle and offered opportunities and constraints that have affected the course of the Kurdish struggle.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

The period after the collapse of the Kurdish Revolution can be seen as a watershed. With the loss of the omnipresent influence of Mustafa Barzani from the region, and the evacuation of the KDP leadership to Iran, the field was left open for left-wing groupings. Some remnants of the KDP were active, but were now under the influence of a new-leftist programme developed by new decision-makers within the party (Stansfield 2003:79). Shortly after the Ba'athists crushed the old KDP in March 1975, Jalal Talabani mobilised Kurds who had been able to escape from Iraq and had gone to Damascus. In

June 1975, he announced the formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Damascus.

Although the PUK adopted the same slogan as the old KDP, namely, "autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq", it advocated Marxist principles and denounced the Barzanis as "reactionary". In 1976, the PUK became the first Kurdish party to return *peshmergas* to Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDP followed, and soon the two groups had several hundred highly mobile fighters mounting raids. In the fall of 1977, the PUK moved its headquarters from Damascus to the Sorani-speaking areas of the Sulaymaniyah region. The KDP, feeling threatened, fought Talabani's guerrillas and dealt a bitter defeat to the PUK, whose fighters did not know the terrain (Gunter 1996:230). The two groups also disagreed on external relations, Barzani's KDP generally favouring ties with Iran (both Shah's and Khomeini's regimes) and Talabani's PUK leaning toward Syria. With regard to fellow Kurdish organizations in countries, first the KDP and later the PUK formed tenuous alliances with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) in Turkey. However, the Iraqi Kurdish parties have tended to be more moderate and less prone to indiscriminate violence than the more radical PKK.

Talabani's leadership has been marked by a series of unlikely alliances between the PUK and other countries and groups in the region. Talabani has maintained cordial relations with Syria since the founding of the PUK. In 1979, the PUK provided support to the Iranian *Komala* when it was under siege by Iranian forces. However, the staunchly Marxist-Leninist Iranian *Komala* has remained aloof from the PUK because of ideological differences. In 1981, Talabani formed a loose alliance with Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou's KDPI, primarily to offset the support given to the KDP-Provisional Leadership by the Islamic Republic. This resulted in major clashes between the KDP-Provisional Leadership and PUK *peshmergas* and substantially weakened Kurdish unity in Iraq (Entessar 1992:78-79).

The composition of the PUK allowed it to generate a great deal of popular support upon its formation. The three parties within the umbrella of the PUK represented three major groupings of the populace of Iraqi Kurdistan. *Heshtigishti* was a natural focus for the more established intelligentsia; *Komala* was attractive for the new style of nationalists inspired by the teaching of Mao; and *Bezutnawa* became increasingly associated with the

middle classes. By 1977, the PUK had developed mass democratic organisations of different groups of people (e.g. farmers, students), which would later develop into the representative structure of the PUK of the 1990s. The establishment of *Komala* has had significant impact on the political development of Iraqi Kurdistan. The majority of the decision-makers of the PUK were its originally members. However, the extreme leftist sentiment which characterised their actions from the outset, combined with their rejection of the right of an individual family, the Barzanis, to head the Kurdish national movement, magnified the division which existed between urban and rural areas, and particularly between the Sorani and Bahdinis regions. The enhanced segmentation of Iraqi Kurdistan was a major obstacle to the unification of the region and administration (Stansfield 2003:85-86). [12] PUK struggles for democracy, freedom and equality, seeks to establish a democratically elected Kurdistan National Assembly which would be the highest power in Kurdistan.

Conclusion

Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Iraq, although unique in many respects, represents dilemmas faced by most multi-ethnic societies in terms of conflict management in their societies. Historically, autonomy demands by ethnic groups like the Iraqi Kurds have elicited complete or near rejection of such demands, followed by a period of varying degrees of repression by the dominant ethnic cultural group. For better or worse, ethnic affirmation has been largely identified with separatist tendencies, disintegration of the political system and the concomitant disorder and chaos. This has been historically true in the case of the Iraqi society which, in addition to the Kurds, comprises several ethnic nationalities.

The characteristic of the current political system can be seen to have developed directly from events which occurred after 1961. At that time, the KDP could not be described as a unified party representing a particular grouping. Instead, it was an uneasy alliance between the feudally minded Barzanis and the radical intellectuals characterised by the Ahmed-Talabani faction. Certain events can be identified as being influential in

[12] For detail of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also see, "About the PUK", (Online: web), Accessed 27 February 2007, URL: http://www.puk.org/web/htm/about.htm.html

forming the contemporary political system. The division within the KDP in 1964 led to the expulsion of the Ahmed-Talabani faction, and the events of 1975, which saw the KDP of Barzani leaving Iraqi Kurdistan, witnessed the re-emergence of Talabani with the formation of the PUK.

The Kurdish movement faced a number of serious defects and problems in spite of the dramatic increase in financial and military resources. The consolidation by the Ba'ath party of its authority inside Arab Iraq and the establishment of a strong political organisation capable of implementing leadership decisions had weakened the Kurdish insurgency. The prevention of Kurdish intellectuals and high KDP members from participating in the decision-making process had created an incumbency (Ghareeb 1981:174-76). But the development of the party political system in Iraqi Kurdistan is best described as being characterised as punctuated equilibrium, with the steady development of the system being changed by extraordinary events. Thus, the Kurdish political histories, which may be termed as guerrilla movements, have developed to political groupings, which have modern political parties.

Chapter 3

The Kurds and the Baathist Regime

3 The Kurds and the Ba'athist Regime

A period of harsh suppression of the Kurdish minority followed the collapse of the insurgency, and the Kurdish movement was weakened further by internecine feuding between the KDP and PUK. During this period, the Government of Iraq went ahead with the implementation of the Autonomy Declaration and found enough docile Kurds to constitute the legislative and executive organs envisioned under the plan. By 1981 the institution of Kurdish self-rule was in operation, albeit with limited authority. However, the Kurds fought alongside the Iranians during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War. The policy of depopulation and relocation was a drastic and radical one that has imposed much hardship on the Kurds, with Baghdad determined to press ahead despite its unfavourable impact on world public opinion. The Iraqi army promptly launched a large scale offensive against the Kurds and drove thousands of them into Turkey and Iran using poison gas.

One reason why the Iraqi government was particularly incensed against its Kurds is that, apart from their alliance with Iran, they continued to maintain their hostility against Iraq after two offers of limited autonomy, in 1970 and 1974, which were much more than anything offered by Turkey or Iran (Jansen 1989:12). Saddam Hussein thought that the Iraqi Kurds were not only traitors, but ungrateful traitors. Also, the Kurds had always depended on foreign assistance from the West, though they had consistently been let down.

After the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party successfully came back to power in 1968, it declared its intention to find a fundamental solution to the Kurdish problem. The Party was committed to nationalist, humanist, socialist and democratic development, and also appreciated the Kurdish people's hope to have their rights recognised. This intention, however, met with the same old obstacles.

The origins of Ba'ath Party in Iraq

The Ba'ath Party was founded at a time when Syria was still under French mandate, and developed partly as a national liberation movement in opposition to the French. The party was founded in Damascus in 1944 by three French-educated Syrian intellectuals, Michel

Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian, Salah al-Din Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, and Zaki al-Arsuzi, an Alawite. The expansion of Ba'ath into a mass political organisation dates back to the end of the Second World War and more particularly to the defeat of the Arab armies in Palestine, for which 'the older generation' of Arab politicians were held responsible (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:87-88). At the core of Ba'athism is pan-Arabism, a doctrine that posits the existence of a single Arab nation and demands the establishment of one Arab state. Iraqi Ba'athism in particular had translated its stability and durability into legitimacy, the principles underlying which arose out of Ba'athist doctrine and tradition of pan-Arabism as experienced twice in the history of modern Iraq: 1918-41 and 1958-68 (Al-Khalil 1989: 149).

Ba'athist ideas were first brought to Iraq by a few Syrian teachers late in 1949 and in 1951 by Fu'ad al-Rikabi, a Shi'i engineer from Nasiriya, who had taken control of an organisation of about fifty people. Most of the early Ba'athists was Shi'i and friends or relatives of al-Rikabi himself. This was primarily because recruitment had as much to do with family and social networks as with ideology. In 1957, al-Rikabi took the Ba'ath into the opposition National Front, a grouping that consisted of the Communists, the National Democratic Party and Istiqlal (Independent) Party, which had welcomed and supported the Revolution of 1958 along with other parties. The main polarisation of political forces, which had emerged after the revolution, was between Abdul Karim Qassem and the Communists and their supporters on the one hand, and the nationalists, Ba'athist and their supporters on the other (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:90). However, the Communist Party in Iraq was the largest in West Asia: its doctrine appealed to the poor Shi'i of the south who were separated from the mainstream by their religion, to the Kurds and other ethnic minorities who were separated from the state by their race.

The Pan-Arabist doctrines of the Ba'ath, however attracted poor and radical-minded Sunni Arabs, such as Saddam Hussein, who did not enjoy stake in the pre-1958 regime. Just as the minority Alawites embraced Ba'athism in Syria, so did the minority Sunni Arabs in Iraq. Thus, in the early 1950s, Ba'athism made inroads into the Sunni heartland north of Baghdad, in town such as Samarra and Falluja and Saddam's hometown of Tikrit (Bulloch and Morris 1991:64). Under the Ba'ath political dialogue, national political parties, spontaneous public activity, and even mundane gossip about public affairs

disappeared as an outcome of repression and the pervasiveness of fear in people's lives. Ba'athism as a movement, according to its critics, attracted outsiders, misfits and people who saw violence as a path to political power. Indirectly, Ba'athism heightened religious sectarianism in the social and private domain as a direct consequence of its total control over the public realm.

Ba'ath ideology towards the Kurdish problem

The new republic government of Abdul Karim Qassem was supported by the Kurdish Democratic Party. In the first Republic constitution, the Kurds were named as part of the new state and Kurdish rights were guaranteed. Kurds were allowed to broadcast in Kurdish and to publish books and periodicals as well. Elementary schools in Kurdish speaking areas were allowed to use Kurdish as the medium of instruction, and Kurdish departments were established in some of the Iraqi universities. But beginning in 1960 the Iraqi government carried out an extended campaign of "Arabisation" of the Kurdish areas, which included tactics such as the destruction of villages and mass deportation of Kurds, the moving of Arabs into Kurdish areas, and other measures like imprisonments and torture of Kurdish nationalists and their persecution, especially after the US-supported Ba'ath coup of 1963.

After the Saddam-Bakr partnership came to power in 1968, the original ideals of pan-Arabism began to take second place to a policy of Iraqi nationalism. The 1968 coup prompted an undeclared civil war between the Ba'athist and their Communist rivals. The Ba'ath retained a commanding role in government and banned all political organisations within the armed forces except Ba'ath (Bulloch and Morris 1991:64). By the end of 1969, the party organ, *Al-Thawra al-Arabiyya*, published a major editorial entitled "How to Resolve the Kurdish Question." In this article the Ba'ath government revealed its criteria for a solution to the problem. One of the first points was the recognition that the Kurds were a nation divided by international boundary lines. It further declared:

> "The Kurdish question is a national one and our current era is one of oppressed and persecuted nationalities who struggle to affirm and develop their national personalities and to liberate their homelands from imperialist domination. The revolution of the oppressed and persecuted nationalities is

an essential part of the world revolution, which must work against every form of exploitation and enslavement toward the building of socialism. The Kurdish question, being a national question, is a natural phenomenon in harmony with the spirit of the age and its movements. It has a liberating and progressive content"[13].

The Arab Socialist Party's views on the Kurdish question and its efforts to solve it were based on three fundamental considerations. First, in spite of aberrant moments in the history of the Kurdish movement and isolationist tendencies sometimes linked openly to imperialism and reaction, it was essentially justified in claiming legitimate national rights, primarily autonomy for the Kurdish people in the framework of the Iraqi Republic. Therefore, within this framework, it was an essential part of the national movement of Iraq. Secondly, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party is nationalist, humanistic, socialist and democratic, and thus very naturally appreciates the Kurdish people's hope to have their rights recognised and is willing to fight for them. As leader of the revolutionary government since July 1968, the Party accepts responsibility for realising these rights, constitutionally, legally and administratively. Thirdly, the Party's policy for achieving and guaranteeing these rights is a peaceful, democratic programme of sincere and positive co-operation with well-disposed Kurdish national and progressive forces, in the framework of the National Progressive Front.[14]

However, the ideological position that was adopted by the party leadership following its assumption of power revealed that it was seeking to find a radical and permanent solution to the Kurdish problem, and not merely a temporary or transitional solution within the framework of the party's socialist and nationalist ideology (Ghareeb 1981:82).

The Ba'athist doctrine expounded by Michel Aflàq made Arab nationalism and Arab Socialism interdependent. While giving a special cultural place to Islam, he also broadened Ba'athist philosophy to embrace a union of all sects and religions in a common Arab nationalism. But the Ba'athist ideology failed to adjust itself to the

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[13] *Al- Thawra* (Baghdad), December 17, 1969. Cited in Edmund Ghareeb (1981), *The Kurdish Question in Iraq*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press: 82

[14] *The 1968 Revolution in Iraq: Experience and Prospects*, The political Report of the Eighth Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Iraq, January 1974, (1979), London: Ithaca press: 61.

conditions of what was a bi-national state. For them, Iraq as a whole and all the territories within the boundaries approved of in the Mandatory period was essentially an indivisible part of Arab nation. This claim appeared inadmissible to the Kurds. They felt as intensely about and would hold as tenaciously to the idea of Kurdish nationalism as any Ba'athist would to Arab nationalism, and they were a more cohesive community. To them, Iraq must be a bi-national state if it was to endure within the boundaries drawn up after the Second World War. The more vehemently Arab nationalism was proclaimed the greater were the reservations of the Kurds. The wider the scope of 'Arab unity' in the sense of the coalescence of Arab states, the greater would be the superiority of the Arabs over the Kurds and the lesser would be the chances of safeguarding Kurdish national rights (Penrose E.F and Edith 1978:306-307). After the military seizure of power, moderate members of the party and radical groups presented a great obstacle to concession to Kurdistan. In this context the Ba'athist dogma of 'unity' went beyond the scope of reason. Whatever tactical and practical qualifications were made from time to time, the Ba'athist sentiment tended to ignore the existence of any other national groups in the community and assumed that the peoples composed were Arabs, or at least should consider them as part of the Arab world. Occasionally, the claim was made that Kurds were in reality of Semitic or Arab origin.

Not only the ethnic, tribal and sectarian loyalties but also the trans-national identities of Arabism and Islam have competed with Iraq identity. Thus an Iraqi citizen could profess a strong Shi'i loyalty while identifying himself with some clan or tribe and still have a sense of being an Arab. The existence of such overlapping loyalties had afforded the Iraqi ruling elites countless opportunities to define and redefine the country's identity in accordance with their political interest and the dictates of policy at any given time (Dawisha 1999:554).

The Kurds since 1975

On 11th March 1975, the Ba'ath regime had begun implementing its own autonomy plan, which stated that Kurdistan was to be autonomous, while also being an integral part of Iraq; the administrative capital was to be Arbil; and the region was to be governed by an elected legislative council and an executive council, to be elected by a majority vote of

the legislative council. The president of the executive council was to be appointed from among the members of the legislative council by the Iraqi head of state. The Baghdad government maintained final control through a provision giving the President of the republic the right to dismiss the Kurdish president and to dissolve the assembly. A number of departments with authority over local affairs were established, but foreign affairs, oil and defence were left to the central government (Marr 1985:234). Meanwhile, a number of Kurds were appointed to positions in the central government and the National Progressive Front. To accomplish this, three pro-government Kurdish parties were formed. One group, led by Aziz Aqrawi (who later defected to Syria), Hashim Aqrawi, and Ismail Aziz, formed a new KDP; another, headed by Abd al-Sattat Tahir Sharif formed the Kurdish Revolutionary Party; a third, led by Abd Allah Ismail Ahmad, constituted the Progressive Kurdish Movement. There is little evidence that any of the three had widespread support among the Kurds, but they gave the Ba'ath the Kurdish apparatus needed to put its own autonomy plan into effect. The Ba'ath moved equally resourcefully to settle the refugee question and to begin economic reconstruction in the north. By the end of 1976, all but 30,000 of the refugees from Iran had been repatriated. In 1976, the Kurdish areas were given a budget of ID 329 million ($1.1 billion). Much of this went into industrial projects, dams and barrages, agrarian reforms, schools, and hospitals, as well as for roads and communications network, which were expected to improve the government's capacity to control the area (Marr 1985:235).

These positive achievements were accompanied by drastic negative measures taken to assure that no further organised rebellion would take place. The measures included large scale deportation and relocation of Kurds. Some were sent to the south and others to the central plains of the north, where they could be watched and controlled. The estimated number of Kurds affected by the Ba'athist policy of deportation in the aftermath of Mullah Mustafa's defeat ranged from 50,000 to 350,000 (Al-Khalil 1990:24). The Ba'ath regime took this opportunity to settle the demographic balance in the disputed areas near oilfields. Arabisation begun in 1960s was reinvigorated. More than one million Kurdish, Turkoman and Assyrian residents were forced out of the disputed districts of Khanaqin, Kirkurk, Mandali, Zakuh and Sinjar. They were replaced with Egyptian and Iraqi Arab settlers enticed northward with housing and property

incentives. Anyone caught trying to return home was summarily executed. Laws were altered to make it difficult for Kurds to hold property or gain employment. Arabs were rewarded financially for marrying Kurdish women. Kurdish civil servants were moved out of Kurdistan to work in Arab districts. Kurdish faculty at the new university in Sulaimaniyah were dismissed. Kurdish names were changed to Arab names. The city of Kirkurk, for example was changed to al-Tamin (Zanger 2002:42). In these areas, Kurdish was not permitted as the primary language of instruction as was supposed to be the case in the autonomous zone. Renewed guerrilla acts in the north began as early as March 1976, particularly after the resettlement schemes.

Kurdish leaders who had conveniently ignored the political meaning of dependency perpetuated the captivity of their people. The KDP and the PUK distrusted each other. According to Chaliand, Idris led KDP-Iraq felt that PUK's leadership was negotiating with Iraq to gain superiority over KDP-Iraq from the very beginning of the PUK's formation. Instead of uniting against their common enemy, the party *peshmergas* in 1978 violently attacked one another in the Badinan area. Many Kurdish activists, including Ali Askari were killed. This was another example of Kurds killing Kurds (Chaliand 1994: 64-65). The Kurdish organisations were ineffective due to their internal divisions and subordination to foreign powers. It was the Communists who maintained their commitment to the Kurdish struggle, but were ignored by the Kurdish leaders. Kurdish leaders preferred to accommodate the aggressive imperial forces.

The Kurdish leaders continued to rival one another and remained disunited. They frequently gave support to regional or external forces to defend their own stated purpose. In April 1983, the KDP, ICP and KSP (Kurdish Socialist Party) attacked the PUK in Arbil. The PUK launched a counter-attack in May and inflicted serious damage; fifty Communists were killed and seventy were captured (Mcdowall 1997:347). In December, following this attack, the PUK and Baghdad concluded a cease-fire agreement designed to create a united national government. This PUK-Iraqi alliance also included the ICP, who had been attacked in May of 1983. Surprisingly, from December 1983 to October 1984, the PUK supported the Iraqi government's war against Iran (Manafy 2005:94).

Kurds during Iran-Iraq War

A period of harsh suppression of the Kurdish minority followed the collapse of the insurgency in 1975, and the Kurdish movement was weakened further by internecine feuding between the KDP and PUK. During this period, the government went ahead with the implementation of the Autonomy Declaration and found enough docile Kurds to constitute the legislative and executive organs envisioned under the plan. By 1981 the institutions of Kurdish self-rule were in operation, albeit with limited authority.

On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a full-scale offensive against Iran.[15] The initial offensive focussed in the south of the country, stalled and resulted in a conflict which would last eight years. This war saw the internationalisation of the Kurdish struggle with inputs capable of making a difference to the strategic map and balance of power in West Asia.[16] After the outbreak of the war with Iran in 1980, the Government of Iraq began to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the Kurds in order to minimise domestic problems that would complicate the war effort. One of the principal Kurdish groups, Jalal Talalbani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had been in frequent contact with the Ba'ath in Baghdad and was evidently behind a joint attack, along with Turkish Forces, on a Kurdish and Communist stronghold in Julamerk in May 1983 (Sluglett and Sluglett 1987:264). The KDP was certainly active within Iraqi Kurdistan throughout the 1980s under the leadership of Massoud Barzani. However in structural terms, the PUK underwent numerous changes.

The renewed KDP-Iranian alliance prompted the Ba'ath regime to take political measures to neutralise the KDP. Saddam Hussein turned to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Jalal Talalbani. The PUK militia was to be transformed into an army and allowed light and heavy arms to defend the north against foreign enemies (Marr 1987:307). In a special session of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam Hussein interjected a Kurdish dimension to his justification for abrogating the Algiers Agreement by stating that the Islamic Republic, like the Shah's regime before it, had embarked upon a policy of supporting Kurdish mutiny inside Iraq (Ramazani 1988: 60-61). Contrary to

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[15] For comprehensive assessment of the Iran-Iraq War, see Tahir-Kheli, Shirin and Shaheen Ayubi (ed.) (1983). *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts*, New York: Praeger Publishers. Also see Grummon, Stephen R (1982), *The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled*, New York: Praeger Publishers.

[16] The Kurdish problem in Iraq had a history of internationalisation.

Saddam Hussein's assertion, it seems unlikely that the Islamic Republic had the necessary resources or the organisation support to continue the Shah's Kurdish policy towards Iraq, especially in view of the fact that the Islamic Republic was already in the throes of combat with its own Kurds. In fact, Iraq had turned the tables and was fomenting a Kurdish revolt inside Iran. According to Eric Rouleau, a correspondent for the influential Paris daily, *Le Monde*, who interviewed the KDPI's (Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran) Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Iraq was a major source of foreign assistance to the KDPI (Entessar 1992:129).

As part of an overall agreement on the resolution of the Kurdish problem that was to follow, Talabani demanded an extension of the Kurdish autonomous region to include parts of Kirkurk, the allocation of 20 to 30 percent of Kirkurk oil revenues for the economic development of Kurdistan, a halt to Arabisation and deportation of Kurds, the formation of a Kurdish defence force comprised of forty thousand men, and release of all political and military prisoners by both sides. But the Iraq-PUK agreement was never publicly reported as obstacles began to develop before implementation. Concurrently, relations between Talabani and Saddam Hussein became tense when pro-government troops killed Talabani's brother and his two daughters. More important, the demise of the agreement between the PUK and the Iraqi government was attributed to Turkish pressure put on Saddam Hussein not to grant any significant concession to the Kurds. In mid-October 1984, a Turkish delegation led by Foreign Minister Vahit Helefoglu visited Iraq. According to the PUK, Helefoglu threatened Iraq economically, if Baghdad granted major concessions to the Kurds. Obviously, Turkey was worried about the spill over effects that concessions would have on its own restive Kurdish populations (Mcdowall, 1989:25). As the relationship between the PUK and the Ba'ath Party deteriorated and attacks both on the PUK and the *Komala* increased, the pro-Iraqi faction seized the opportunity to destabilise the PUK and created a party named *Alay Shoresh*.[17] An extensive propaganda campaign was undertaken against the PUK and Komala leadership, and *Alay Shoresh* members proceeded to leak plans and decisions of the PUK. The PUK subsequently arrested Mulla Bakhtiyar and his compatriots, but Imad Ahmed escaped and managed to lead *Alay Shoresh* from Iran, where he merged with the Toilers' Party of

[17] *Alay Shoresh* translated as 'Revolutionary Flag'

Abdul Khaliq Zangana. In 1992 both Mulla Bakhtiyer and Imad Ahmed rejoined the PUK leadership (Stansfield 2003:91).

The Iraqi-KDP lost its legitimacy because of its alliance with the Iranian government. The Iranian government had clashed with the Baghdad assisted KDP-Iran. The PUK lost its support due to the party's arbitrary cooperation with the anti-Kurdish liberation Iraqi government. In additions to these problems, three thousand Talabani supporters defected to the Idris-Barzani led KDP. The Talabani led-PUK lost Syrian and Libyan support because of its alliance with Iraq. Talabani was criticised for betraying the Kurdish struggle. An isolated Talabani sought reconciliation with Iran and the Idris-KDP, which culminated in the 1986 agreement among the competing factions: the KDP, PUK, and the ICP. A joint statement called for a united front against the Iraqi government. By 1986, the KDP led by Barzani and the PUK led by Talabani, received financial and military support from the Iranian government against the Ba'athist regime in Iraq (Mcdowall 1997:345).

Between late 1984 and the beginning of 1986, the Iran-Iraq War entered a relatively quiet phase in which both sides launched only limited ground offensives. However, during this period Iranian support for the KDP increased allowing a number of raids against Iraqi and PUK targets. On 8 September 1985, Iran and its Kurdish allies launched an attack against Iraqi forces and captured over 240 square kilometres of territory in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although the new territory, which was located west of the Iranian city of Piranshahr had little strategic value for the conduct of war, it clearly showed that Iran "now dominated the battle for the Kurds and could exploit its alliances to achieve limited gains of Iraqi territory" (Cordesman and Wagner 1990:207). The apparent success of Iranian-Kurdish cooperation compelled Saddam Hussein to order the destruction of hundreds of "hostile" Kurdish villages.

The September 1989 parliamentary elections in the Kurdish autonomous region were billed by the Ba'athist authorities as the dawn of a new era in Iraqi-Kurdish relations and the government called upon its Kurdish population to turn out in full force. The government later announced that the elections were evidence of success of its Kurdish policies; it reported almost 100 percent participation by the people of the three Kurdish provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, and Dahuk. The elections resulted in the

Ba'ath party winning thirty seats in the fifty-member legislative council for the autonomous region. The other seats were won either by independent candidates or members of pro-government Kurdish parties.[18] Neither Jalal Talabni's PUK nor Massoud Barzani's KDP contested the elections. In November 1986, the PUK and the KDP-Iraq agreed to an accord with the Iranian government in Tehran. The Government's repression of the late 1980s appeared to have brought an unprecedented degree of unity to the often divided Kurdish movement in Iraq. In May 1988, Massoud Barzani's KDP and Jalal Talabani's PUK formed a coalition called the Kurdistan Iraqi Front or Iraqi Kurdistan Front, which included five other smaller Kurdish organisations. Their militias known as *Peshmerga* were combined under the command of Barzani (O' Sullivan 1991: 4-6). Apart from the KDP and the PUK, the new front consisted of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (SPK), and the People's Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDPK), the United Socialist Party of Kurdistan (USPK) and the predominantly ICP-Kurdish branch.

Iraqi Suppression of the Kurds: The Anfal Campaign.

Since the creation of modern state of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been one of under-development, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Al-Anfal[19] was the codename given to an aggressive, planned, military operation against Iraqi Kurds. It was part of an ongoing, larger campaign against Kurds because of their struggle to gain autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. Anfal took place during 1988 under the direction of Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's Hussein's cousin. He became known as "Chemical Ali" because of his use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and villages.

In August 1988, a cease-fire agreement between Iran and Iraq frustrated Kurdish aspirations for liberation. The agreement abruptly ended Iranian support and freed the Iraqi army front. Supported by the Kurdish *Jash* group, the Iraqis responded by launching a full attack against Kurdish forces. The West, the so-called champions of human rights, supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons. The United States sold "sensitive

[18] *Al-Thawra*, (September 10&11, 1989), cited in Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 141.

[19] The word is religious in origin; it is the name of eight *sura*, or chapter of the Koran. In this *sura* the Arabic word 'al-Anfal' means 'spoils' as in the spoils of battle.

equipment" to Iraq hoping to defeat the Iranian revolution. For them the success of Iranian revolution would have threatened the interests of imperialistic forces in the region. Neither the Iraqi leadership nor the Kurdish forces understood (or ignored) the imperialist intent (O'Ballance 1996:169-70). The Iraqi government's attack on the Kurds became steadily more violent between early 1987 and the fall of 1988. Iran's defeat in the spring of 1988 allowed the government to concentrate on the Kurdish rebellion and it conducted a brutally effective pacification programme in the north. The result was the so-called Al-Anfal Campaign of 1988, in which tens of thousands of Kurds lost their lives, and which is the most prominent example of the mass political killing of dissidents by the Iraqi regime.

During the Al-Anfal operation, some 1,200 villages were destroyed. More than 180,000 persons went missing and were later presumed dead. While the Iraqi government was motivated partly by the fact that some Kurdish groups cooperated with Iran during Iran-Iraq war, documentation recovered in the Kurdish safe haven in 1991 reveals that this operation was part of a larger campaign undertaken by Saddam Hussein throughout his time in power. Many now regard this operation as proof of genocide against Iraqi Kurds. In all phases of the ethnic cleansing programme, which began when the Ba'ath Party first seized power in 1963 and culminated in the Al-Anfal operation, it is estimated that more that 4,000 villages in rural Kurdistan were destroyed and perhaps 300,000 people perished (O' Leary 2002:2).

The best-known chemical attack occurred at Halabja on 16 March 1988. This town is located in the mountains near Sulaimaniyah, about 11 kilometres from the Iranian border. Between 40,000 and 50,000 people were living there at that time. The Iranian army had previously pushed Iraqi forces out of the area. During three days, the town and surrounding districts were attacked with conventional bombs, artillery fire, and chemicals including mustard gas and nerve agents (Sarin, Tabun and VX). At least 5,000 people died immediately as a result of the chemical attack and it is estimated that up to 12,000 people died during those three days.[20] Throughout the second half of 1988 and the first

[20] See the Washington Kurdish Institute website <http://www.kurd.org/> for links to human rights organisations that have documented the ethnic cleansing, Arabisation campaign against the Kurds of Iraq, as well as the Anfal campaign and use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and villages, including Halabja. See also "The March 16 Chemical Attack on Halabja", (Online: web), Accessed 13

half of 1989, Iraq focused on deflecting international condemnation of its use of poison gas against the Kurds, while announcing a major amnesty programme for Kurds wishing to return from refugee camps in Turkey and Iran. The Ba'ath regime continued to deny that it had used chemical weapons against the Kurds. At times, Turkey issued supportive statements denying Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Ankara was concerned mostly with repatriating Iraqi Kurdish refugees and did not want any more. It also appeared that the Turkish government had reached a tacit understanding with Saddam Hussein to deny the UN team's full access to refugee camps in south-eastern Turkey to interview victims of poisonous gas attacks (Entessar 1992:140).

Almost fifteen years later, there is still not much knowledge about the impact of these agents on the people and environment. Christine Gosden, a professor of Medical Genetics at the University of Liverpool, working with the Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI), helped establish the Halabja Post-Graduate Medical Institute (HMI) to understand the impact of weapons of mass destruction on civilian populations. The researchers identified high incidence of cancers, cardiopulmonary disease, congenital anomalies and other major medical disorders were the contributing factors, to at least a 14% loss of children under the age of 16 since 1987. Furthermore, widespread population displacement damaged housing, poor sanitation and water supplies were also viewed as having adverse affects on the overall health status of the population especially those living in Halabja.[21] It offers both research and medical help for thousands of survivors living in the area.

On 26 August 1988, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 620 condemning the use of Chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. However, Iraq was not censured by name and continued to deny that it was using weapons against the Kurds. On 6

September 2006. URL: http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ ANFAL3.htm. also see, "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds" (July 1993), Human Right Watch and Middle East Watch, Report: New York. (Online :web), Accessed 13 September 2006, URL: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal

[21] See the Washington Kurdish Institute website (24 July 2000), "Halabja Post-Graduate Medical Institute Initiate Medical Treatment and Humanitarian Relief Programs for WMD survivors in Iraqi Kurdistan", (Online: web), Accessed 13 September 2006, URL: http://www.kurd.org. Also see, "Whatever Happened to the Iraqi Kurds"? (11 March 1991), Human Rights Watch, Publications: New York, (Online: web), Accessed 13 September 2006, URL: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/iraqi

September 1988, with its army effectively in control of the border with Turkey, the Iraqi Government offered a full amnesty to all Iraqi Kurds inside and outside the country (excluding only Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK), inviting those Kurds living abroad to return within 30 days and also promising to release all Kurds held on political grounds. The offer was generally dismissed by Kurds as a propaganda ploy, although the Government subsequently claimed that more than 60,000 Kurdish refugees had taken advantage of the amnesty to return to Iraq.

The Gulf War and the Kurdish Uprising

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait after several weeks of acrimonious charges by Saddam Hussein against the rulers of Kuwait for overproducing oil, lowering prices, and thus "impoverishing" Iraq, which needed higher oil revenues to finance reconstruction projects after eight years of war with neighbouring Iran. After occupying Kuwait, Saddam Hussein revived the old Iraqi claim to Kuwait and declared it to be nineteenth province of Iraq. For Saddam, the Gulf War was an opportunity to solve his pressing economic problems and become master of 40 percent of the world's oil reserves while staking an old claim for leadership of the entire Arab world (Mazarr *et al* 1993:1-2). For George Bush Sr, Saddam's aggression created a clear need to respond to unprovoked aggression and in so doing to begin the redefinition of the US role in the world in the aftermath of the Cold War, a necessary exercise for which the admininistration was ill-prepared. President George Bush ordered the deployment of a large number of US air, naval and ground troops in and around Saudi Arabia under Operation Desert Shield. When Operation Desert Shield was transformed into Operation Desert Storm with the start of the Allied war against Iraq in January 1991, the United States had deployed over 500,000 troops in the Arabian Peninsula. The Iraqi regime, which had been courted and supported by the United States throughout the 1980s was turned overnight into a demonic entity with superpower ambitions. Reports of Iraq using chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians, which had been ignored, were publicised in US print and electronic media as if they were novel revelations (Entessar 1992:145).

The success of Operation Anfal led the Kurds to change their strategy between the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Along with a number of smaller Kurdish groups, the PUK and KDP formed the Iraq Kurdistan Front (IKF) to better coordinate their activities and their demands in dealing with Baghdad. The IKF stressed autonomy for Kurdistan within the framework of a democratic Iraq as their goal. The Kurds did this in order to allay the suspicions of other Iraqi opposition groups with whom they were seeking closer relations for the first time (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 76). With the Allied Forces attacking Iraq, the Kurds feared that they might become the victims of war. The IKF moved cautiously once Iraq invaded Kuwait. It was aware that international pressure against Iraq was mounting, but it also realised that Saddam would have no qualms about using troops and chemical weapons against any rebellion. Notwithstanding Massoud Barzani's initial hesitation to open a second front against Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Kurds revolted in March 1991 after the defeat of Saddam's military at the hands of the US-led forces in southern Iraq. A CIA-run radio (The Voice of Free Iraq) operating from Jedda, Saudi Arabia, had been encouraging a Kurdish revolt for several weeks and the Kurds were led to believe that they would receive outside assistance if they led an uprising against the Iraqi government.[22]

The Impact of Desert Storm

The coalition's massive air bombardment of Iraq aimed not only at the Iraqi military, its oil supply pumps and its communications lines but also at a wide array of economic and industrial targets. The bombing amplified the economic impact of sanctions, incited the Iraqi people to oppose Saddam Hussein, degraded Iraqi's ability to sustain itself as an industrial and military power and created leverage over post-war Iraq which would not be able to repair extensive damage without outside help (Hashim 1992: 13-14). Iraq suffered particularly extensive damage in critical areas such as the national electric power grid, telecommunications and the oil industry.

The Allied Campaign against Iraq, following its invasion of Kuwait, provided the Kurds with yet another opportunity to press their claims against the Iraqi Government.

[22] *Iran Times*, April 12, 1991, cited in Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 146.

Both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslim leaders associated themselves with the Iraqi opposition group formed in Damascus, Syria in December 1990. The unified Kurdish forces launched a more organised revolt that briefly achieved unprecedented success

The IKF took the risk of creating new uprising after Saddam's shattering defeat in the Gulf War and the uprising soon became a mass movement. The Kurds had little military strength, but they were able to take advantage of the paralysis of the Iraqi Army and disorganisation within the security services. In fact, the various pro-government tribal militias often persuaded the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan to leave virtually without a fight. As a result, the Kurdish revolt rapidly expanded to cover most of the rural and urban areas with large Kurdish populations. Neither Barzani nor Talabani were fully prepared for the scale and success of this uprising, but they acted quickly to take control of an inchoate rebellious mass and engaged their veteran *Peshmerga* guerrillas who took over several major urban centres, including the oil-centre of Kirkurk. In the process they defeated ill-motivated troops who surrendered in droves, joined guerrillas, or fled south. Large quantities of heavy military equipment including several tanks, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, artillery and mortars fell to the rebels. By mid-march, the IKP declared that 75% of Kurdistan was in their hands (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 77). The group rapidly moved to restore essential services and civil administration in the "liberated" areas. This Kurdish success, however only occurred because of the power vacuum created by the Gulf War.

On 6 April 1991, Baghdad accepted the terms for a permanent cease-fire in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which stipulated continuing an arms embargo for the indefinite future; UN-supervised destruction of all chemical and biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and nuclear infrastructure; Iraqi compensation to Kuwait and other countries for damages incurred during the war; an unequal demilitarised zone along the border with Kuwait extending 6 miles into Iraq and 3 miles inside Kuwait to be patrolled by UN observers; and UN demarcation of the border between the two countries (Hashim 1992:11).[23] Controversially, the Coalition did not take steps to dismantle the Saddam Hussein regime. This vague and inclusive end to

[23] For details of the Resolution 687 (1991), 2 March 1991, see Weller, M (ed.) (1993), *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath*, Cambridge International Document Series, Cambridge, Grotius Publications Ltd. Vol.3, 7-12.

the 1991 Gulf War proved tragic for the people of Iraq, and in particular for the Kurds in the north of Iraq and for the Shia population in the south of Iraq.

Depopulation of Kurdish areas

Initially, the Kurds gained control of a few cities, but they were driven back by Iraqi forces attacking them from the air and land. Neither the IKF nor the international community expected what happened as the revolt collapsed. As a consequence, Kurdish villages were devastated once more and another mass exodus of Kurdish refugees started. As the Republican Guard proceeded, well over a million Kurds fled in unprecedented numbers to the Turkish and Iranian borders. An estimated 500,000 Kurds fled to Turkey and 1.5 million to Iran when they realised they were defenceless. Thousands of people died because of cold weather or lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exodus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by government forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they had been in 1988. In addition to terrorising the civilian population, Saddam Hussein's crackdown on the Kurdish uprising left deep rifts in the opposition. Some members of the Kurdish opposition made matters worse when they began to harass and threaten Kurds who worked for the government as civil servants or who worked in the oil refineries. In any case, the effectiveness of the Iraqi forces in putting down the Kurdish rebellion and the plight of the refugees compelled the two leading groups within the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, the PUK and KDP, to seek peace with the Iraqi regime (Entessar 1997:147).

Many Kurds felt that with a defeated Saddam Hussein, the time was right to sign an agreement that would maximise their prospects of gaining autonomy within a federated Iraqi state. Furthermore, the Kurds reasoned that if another person or group came to power in Baghdad, there would be no guarantee that they would not behave the same way toward the Kurds as Saddam Hussein. Without a peaceful settlement, some Kurdish leaders also thought that there would be a permanent refugee problem, creating fertile ground for outside powers to exploit the Kurdish situation and "for all sorts of negative tendencies" to develop within the refugee population (Lahoud 1991:18). Another impetus for an Iraqi-Kurdish rapprochement was the high price Kurdish soldiers had paid by serving in the Iraqi army during the Gulf War. According to one estimate, two hundred

thousand Kurds were members of the Iraqi occupation army in Kuwait. Although no casualty figures are available, it is safe to assume that they were among the several thousands Iraqi soldiers who died during the saturation bombing runs of Iraqi targets during the war.

The first round of Iraqi-Kurdish negotiations was held in late April 1991 in Baghdad between Ba'athi authorities and a team of Kurdish negotiators representing the Iraq Kurdistan Front headed by Jalal Talabani. The other members of the Kurdish team included Rasoul Mamand, Secretary General of the Kurdish Socialist Party, Sami Abdul Rahman, Secretary General of the People's Party of Kurdistan, and Nashirawan Barzani, a nephew of Massoud Barzani, representing the KDP. The inclusion of representatives of various Kurdish groups as members of the negotiating team was intended to demonstrate that the Kurds were a united front (Entessar 1997:148). The Talabani-led team of Kurdish negotiators did not sign an agreement with the Iraqi government. However, another round of Iraqi-Kurdish talks began in June 1991. This time, the negotiations were led by the KDP's Massoud Barzani, whose talks with Saddam generated optimism that peace was at hand when the KDP announced the impending signing of an agreement on Kurdish autonomy. The status of Kirkuk which had derailed many previous negotiations remained an unresolved issue causing opposition to the impending deal with Saddam Hussein. However, Jalal Talabani's PUK rejected Barzani's plan. Instead, Talabani made a surprised announcement from Turkey, proposing that Turkey take a more active role in solving the Iraqi Kurdish problem (Entessar 1997:149).

In July 1991, talks on Kurdish autonomy were moved from Baghdad to the Kurdish city of Arbil, where Kurdish leaders met with Izzat Ibrahim, Saddam Hussein's second in command in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. In addition to the autonomy demands made in prior talks, the Kurds put forward a new proposal for establishing democracy in Iraq that would involve the oppressed Shi'i majority (Muir 1991:8). Although no agreement was reached, the Iraqis perhaps by default, allowed more armed Kurds in the region, including the major cities of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah.

Role of United States and its Allied Forces in Northern Iraq

With rare exceptions, the United States had avoided major involvement with the Kurdish question. The distribution of Kurdish territory took place well before the United States became involved to a significant degree in West Asia. Since World War II, close US relations with Turkey and with Iran (until 1979) tended to discourage US support for Kurdish nationalist movements which were opposed by important regional allies. For instance the Richard M Nixon-Shah of Iran dumping of the Kurds in 1975 after Iraq accepted to Shatt al Arab waterway settlement. That ended the Kurdish rebellion (Khergamvala 1999: 11). The United States was not specifically associated with the abortive allied arrangements for an autonomous or independent Kurdistan immediately after World War I. Though President Woodrow Wilson's support for the principle of national self-determination included non-Turkish people for autonomous development. The United States withdrew from post-war peace negotiations before the agreement that determined the disposition of former Ottoman territories was concluded. Consequently, the United States was a signatory neither to the 1920 Treaty of Sevres which called for an autonomous Kurdish state with an option to seek independence, nor to the revised 1923 treaty of Lausanne which dropped all references to a Kurdish state.[24] Moreover, since the United States did not join the League of Nations, it was not a party to the mandate system that created the present state of Iraq or the arrangements that led to the incorporation of the Kurdish-inhabited Mosul province into the new Iraqi state (Prados B 1991: 27-28). But the emergence of a left-wing, pro-Soviet regime in Iraq in 1958 and the resumption of Kurdish insurgency against the Iraqi Government altered the bases of US policy both toward Iraq and Kurdish movement.

As the Kurdish crisis intensified after the Gulf War, Turkey's President Turgut Ozal proposed that the United Nations take over territory in Northern Iraq and establish a 'safe haven' for the Kurds, but this did not proceed. The West was reluctant to intervene on the Kurds' behalf, viewing the Kurdish question as the internal affair of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and afraid, in particular of upsetting the sensibilities of Turkey, a NATO ally (Bradshaw, 1991:79). However on 8 April 1991, a proposal by the British Prime Minister, John Major that an UN-supervised enclave should be created in northern Iraq

[24] The United Sates did have observers at the conferences leading to both of these Treaties.

for the protection of the Kurdish population was approved by the leaders of the member states of the EC (European Community, now European Union-EU). The operation which resulted from the John Major government's proposal was known as 'Operation Provide Comfort' and essentially it involved declaring the area of Iraq above the 36th parallel, which includes Arbil, Mosul, Zakho and Dohuk, as a 'no fly zone' to prohibit any Iraqi aircraft. The 'no-fly zone' was regularly patrolled by aircrafts from the US, Great Britain, France and Turkey, mainly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base in Turkey. The initial operation was titled "Operation Provide Comfort" which was in time replaced by "Operation Northern Watch".[25] On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which approves the establishment of "safe havens" north of the 36th parallel that would be protected by coalition forces; Kurdish civilians were encouraged to return to these protected zones (Hashim 1992:13, Avineri 2005:32). The Resolution condemned 'the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq' and demanded that the Iraqi Government permit the immediate access of international humanitarian organisations to persons in need of assistance.

The Kurdish zone covers 36,000 square miles (18% of the total area of Iraq), running from the river Tigris in the west- eastward to the border with Iran, and including the Cizre-Dohuk-Amadiya triangle that made up the original safe haven; it also extends along the Iranian border south to Halabja and west of Suleimaniyah and Arbil. The liberated area created by the northern 'no-fly' zone, covered about two-thirds of Iraqi Kurdistan. The remainder of the Kurdish population remained at the mercy of Saddam Hussein. However, the zone remained under the UN embargo of Iraq as well as an internal Iraqi blockade (Prince 1993:17).

The unprecedented 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 688 played an important role by condemning "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population... in Kurdish population areas" and demanding "that Iraq.... immediately end this repression." (UN 1996:199).[26] The Secretary General announced that the UN was negotiating with the

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[25] For details see, "An introduction to the Kurdish people of Iraq and elsewhere", (Online: web), Accessed on 7 February 2007, URL: http://www.eurolegal.org/neoconwars/kurdsiraq.htm.

[26] United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991. Also see M Weller (ed.) (1993), *"Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath"* Cambridge International Document Series, Cambridge. Grotius Publications Ltd. Vol.3, 12-13.

Iraqi government over the deployment of a 'UN police force' to safeguard the Kurdish enclave. By mid-June UN agencies and other non-governmental organisations were reported to have assumed responsibility for the provision of essential services in the Kurdish enclave, and the transition from military to UN-backed security.

Despite their commitment to overthrow Saddam, the defeated Kurds had no choice but to negotiate. Baghdad balked at many of the Kurds' demands: it adamantly refused to cede Kirkurk, arguing that the city did not have a Kurdish majority; it also had no intention of losing control over a substantial part of the country's oil. The Kurds believed that the government was not negotiating in good faith and they were not impressed by the political programme proposed by the government. The Kurds were reluctant to sign an agreement and there were reports of a growing rift between Barzani and Talabani. Barzani distrusted international guarantees and wished to conclude an agreement with Baghdad, while Talabani supported the mainstream opposition's belief that Kurdish autonomy and democracy in Iraq would develop if Saddam were overthrown (Hashim, 1992:13).

Following the failure of the autonomy talks with the KDP and PUK, Baghdad implemented a blockade against the Kurdish north in October 1991 by constructing a 350 miles long militarised line that cut off Kurdistan from the rest of the country. The new line was fortified with tanks, artillery, infantry, and extensive minefields. Iraq then prevented even the smallest quantity of food and fuel entering the blockade north. Saddam wanted to show both the Kurds and the outside powers that Baghdad could not be discounted when it came to the Iraqi north, and that it held cards of its own. On the other hand, emergence of Kurdistan's *de facto* autonomy forced the Kurds to set up their own administrative and legislative organs to avoid chaos and a further decline in public security (Hashim 1996:13). But the Kurdish experiment in freedom revealed deep-seated differences and splits within the Kurdish movement and attracted the intervention of their Turkish and Iranian neighbours.

United States policy towards the Iraqi Kurds has been interpreted variously. The covert involvement of the US in Iraq's internal affairs is fully illustrative of the Machiavellian spirit. US encouragement to the Kurds to resort to war has twice eliminated all possible opportunities for the Kurds to live peacefully within a united Iraqi

state (Nehme and Lokman 1995: 54). The Kurds never learnt to avoid their being used in the deadly game.

Turkish Factor

The Kurdish uprising in Iraq and the subsequent refugee problems in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War presented a major challenge to Turkey. The turmoil encouraged Turkey fearing from its own Kurds and determined to stop the safe haven for Iraqi Kurds, being used as an embryo Kurdish state or even as haven by PKK, to try and carve out a slice of northern Iraq as its own security zone (Dadwal 1996:1212). The Turks were not pleased with the flood of over 500,000 Kurdish refugees into their country. In fact, they were opposed to the mass entry of Kurds into Turkey and closed its borders for a few days immediately after the first surge of refugees entered south-eastern Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish government continued a secret dialogue with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, mindful of the fact that promoting autonomy for Iraqi Kurds would have unpredictable repercussions for Turkey's restive Kurdish populations (Entessar 1997:150). Furthermore, the Turks wanted to prevent the creation of permanent or semi-permanent refugee camps and the kind of "Palestinianisation", in which the camps would become breeding grounds for Kurdish guerrillas who would fight alongside PKK *peshmergas* against Turkey. Also, Ankara feared that refugee camps would become "a new source of discord between Turkey and the West, if the West supported Kurdish nationalist aspirations."[27]

Turkey has been pursuing a brutal war of suppression against the Kurds of south-east Turkey for decades, disguised as a counter-insurgency war against the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). In the aftermath of the 1991 war against Iraq, the US and Britain were forced to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan and as a result, the Kurds of northern Iraq were able to carve out their own autonomous zone, outside of Baghdad's control. This was deeply troubling for the Turkish authorities; in part because of the unwelcome encouragement this gave the Kurds of Turkey, in part because the autonomous zone provided a safe haven not only for the Iraqi Kurdistan organisations but also for the

[27] *Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1991as cited in Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 150.

Turkish Kurdish (PKK). The Turkish authorities sought and gained permission from London and Washington to intervene in northern Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK groups and to attack the organisation. The first major attack came in August 1991. From 1991 onwards, the Turkish army continued to shell and bomb border areas, periodically resorting to large scale ground offensive backed by air strikes. The no-fly zone barred Iraqi, but not Turkish aircrafts from attacking Kurds in northern Iraq (Rai 2003:132). Turkey's policy of intervention was based on its well-known fear of Kurdish separatism and in particular the assumption that if Iraqi Kurds gained control of the oil wealth concentrated in the cities of Mosul and Kirkurk, they would have the wherewithal to establish an independent Kurdish state. Having fought against the insurgencies of the Kurdish separatist organisation, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) for more than a decade and having thousands of casualties, Turkey was seriously concerned with the possibility of the proclamation of a Kurdish state in the northern part of neighbouring Iraqi territory.[28] Turkey fears such form of autonomy gained by the Kurdish group in Iraq would lead to the Turkish Kurds demand the same (Kibaroglu 2005:254). However, even when some degree of autonomy was ceded to Kurdish political groups in northern Iraq, there are no guarantees that those entities represent desires or interest to all Kurdish citizens.

There were more than 60,000 Turkish troops and heavy artillery stationed near the border of South Kurdistan. Turkish troops often violated international human rights and humanitarian law during cross-border incursions into northern Iraq. There are documented cases of mutilations and killings committed by Turkish troops in northern Iraq. Kerim Yildiz, Kurdish Human Right Projects (KHRP) Executive Director said,

> "There must be human rights monitors on the ground to observe the military's conduct. Turkish incursions into south Kurdistan would concern Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey provoking further instability in the region. History has shown us that there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East without resolving

[28] Turkey was concerned with the possibility of proclamation of independence by the Kurds in Iraq with the close support of the US.

the Kurdish situation. We hope that the rights of Kurds will be guaranteed and fully recognised within the new Iraq"[29].

United States policy was not much different when the Turkish government launched its war against Kurdish insurrection within its own borders. The PKK-the Kurdish Leninist guerrillas used assassinations and bombs in public places both in Turkey and in Europe to further its cause. Its terrorism was comparable to that of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Yet the United States never confronted Turkey's harshly repressive response to these tactics for obvious reasons. European public opinion was equally silent. Israel's one brutal incursion into Palestinian territories elicited more outcries in Europe than years of systematic Turkish counter-terrorism measures against the Kurds, which emptied hundreds of villages of their occupants and caused tens of thousands of casualties (Avineri 2005:31-32).

There were approximately 14,000 Turkish Kurds in northern Iraq who fled civil strife in south-eastern Turkey. The UNHCR was treating these displaced persons as refugees. However, many support the PKK and there is no way to tell when Turkey would attack northern Iraq. Any Iraqi Kurdish effort to build ties with the PKK would alienate Turkey and quite possibly lead to at least tacit military cooperation between Turkey and Iraq in suppressing all Kurdish resistance.

Conclusion

The Kurds came a long way in healing their internal rifts. In Iraq, the half dozen Kurdish parties, led by the Kurdish Democratic Party and the PUK, stopped fighting each other in 1997 to form the Kurdistan Democratic Front, with commitment towards democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan. The unfolding tragedy of the Kurds of Iraq attracted more international attention to the Kurdish question than ever before and elicited an unprecedented surge of Western sympathy about the Kurds' fate. The failure of Western governments to support their cause, after urging them to rise up against Saddam Hussein in 1991, could be compared with Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Of course, the Kurds feared that international sympathy would fade, as it did after the Iraqi

[29] For details see, Kurdish Human Rights Projects (16 December 2006), "War in Iraq and the Kurds", (Online: web). Accessed 15 March 2007. URL: http://www.khrp.org/news/pr2003/wariniraq.htm

army's chemical attack which killed thousands of Kurds in the town of Halabja in 1988. But the very scale of the present tragedy produced a critical breakthrough, turning the Kurdish question into an international political and moral issue (Bradshaw 1991:79). In future Iraq, Iran and Turkey will find it harder to suppress their Kurds.

The scale of the tragedy which drove 2 million Iraqi Kurds to flee into snow-covered mountains with little more than the clothes they stood in, turned it from a humanitarian into political issue. Outrage among the Western public forced their governments to seek radical ways of protecting the Kurds. There were even suggestions of linking the lifting of sanctions against Iraq to its treatment of the Kurds and other minorities. As international diplomacy sought to create secure conditions for Iraqi Kurds within Iraq, the leaders of Kurdish groups began negotiations with the Iraqi Government on the future status of Iraqi Kurds. But by June 1991, negotiations with the Iraqi government began to develop over the question of the frontiers of the Kurdish Autonomous area. At the end of August, leaders of Kurdish groups announced their decision to suspend further negotiations with the Iraqi Government until various issues relating to an autonomy agreement had been clarified.

However, it was only in the post-1991 period that the people of Iraqi Kurdistan gradually experienced self-rule and democratisation despite having differences.

Chapter 4

The Kurdish Regional Government: KDP and PUK

The concept of autonomy is seen as a solution to the political problems of minorities seeking socio-political and economic justice within multi-ethnic societies. David Held defines the concept of autonomy in the following way:

> Persons should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the framework that generates and limits the opportunities available to them. That is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their lives, so long as they do not employ this framework to negate the rights of others (Held 1991:228).

The right to participate in the process of political collective decision making should not be limited be distinctions of creed, political persuasions, colour, sex or minority status. However autonomy is based "on the deliberations of all". It is crucial to distinguish between the state sovereignty and popular sovereignty. Advocates of state sovereignty vest ultimate power in the state to determine the normative code of behaviour and define for citizens their rights. Supporters of popular sovereignty assign to the state the role of class mediation, and its crucial function is to implement "will of all" (the general will). In fact, both of these approaches involve tyranny and jeopardize individual autonomy and liberty. Hence, both must be integral to each other. The supremacy of one or the other can pose threat to democratic ideals (Held 1991:227-232). Government (or power) and freedom do not mix, one is the anti-thesis of another. Yet, both are critical values for human interaction: a government that is effectively in control and a government that is effectively controlled. Increase in one will come only at the cost of the other. Government control would be legitimate only if people in turn controlled government (Bramsted and KJ Melhuish .1978:274-277). Thus for democratic autonomy to be realised, it has to be enshrined in a legitimate framework that enables and limits the sovereignty of the state and its citizens. The survival of civil society can only be insured within a constitutional system, with a bill of rights, free and competitive elections, and a constitutionally limited freedom of democratic states (Held 1991:232). Autonomy without democracy cannot be realised. The fragmented traditionalistic political culture, tribal affiliations, informal group politics, and conservative mode of thinking undermined

the realisation of the Kurds' desire for autonomy. The most debilitating contradiction between the Kurdish traditionalistic leadership and the desire to liberate Kurdish society from externally created internal domination was Kurdish dependence on imperial forces for liberation; a reliance on the oppressors. This logic prevented the development of Kurdish class solidarity and political consciousness for a long time. The Kurdish quest for political autonomy and self-determination, especially in Iraq, had been consistently reactionary. This mode of behaviour and political factionalism had played a key role in defeating the idea of political autonomy for the Kurds.

Following Saddam's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War and their own failed uprising that had ensued, Iraqi Kurds nevertheless began increasingly to move toward the creation of a *de facto* state and government in northern Iraq. This was accomplished under the protection of the US-led Allied forces stationed in south-eastern Turkey (northern Iraq) and a United Nations presence sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 688 that condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population.[30] The economic blockade Baghdad began imposing against the Kurds on October 1991 ironically had the effect of hardening rather than weakening the Kurdish revolt. In the political environment of Iraqi Kurdistan, the development of the KRG cannot be separated from the status of the relationship between the KDP and PUK. The election held in May 1992 led to the formation of the KRG which encompassed the decade divided geographically and politically between the cities of Arbil and Suliemaniyah, mirroring the division of the KDP and PUK respectively.

Structure and Programme of the Kurdistan Regional Government

The Kurdistan Regional Government exercises executive power according to the Kurdistan Region's laws as enacted by the democratically elected Kurdistan National Assembly. The government coalition consists of several political parties. The coalition reflects the diversity of the region's people who are Chaldeans, Assyrians, Turkomans, Yazidis, Kurds and others living together in harmony and tolerance.

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[30] For detail of the UNSRC 688 see, United Nations (1996), *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, Department of Public Information vol.9, New York: 199. Also see UNSRC 688(1991), Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991, (Online: web), Accessed 2 June, URL: htt://www/fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm

The KRG determined to establish strong constitutional institutions to support the democratic process in Iraq. Its main task was to form a system of good governance through the participation of all groups with transparency and accountability which means a modern professional government. The cabinet worked at all socio-economic levels of Kurdistani society. The KRG looked forward to a democratic federal system in Iraq, based on agreement and respect for all nationalities and religions.[31] It therefore, supported democratic consensus in the political process.

The Kurdistan Regional Government, 1992-1996

In the absence of a negotiated autonomy agreement with the Iraqi Government, the KIF (Kurdistan Iraqi Front) organised elections to a 105-member Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly. Both Talabani and Barzani hoped that the elections would result in the establishment of a legitimate, constitutional and legal entity embodied in a council that would represent the Kurdish people and would be the political decision making body in the Iraqi Kurdistan. Kamal Fuad, the official in charge of foreign relations in PUK, added that "the only solution to Iraqi Kurdistan is through parliamentary elections for the people of Kurdistan. The Kurdish parliament will form the civil administration and will act as the Kurdish northern government" (Gunter 1993:297). Faced with the administrative vacuum and double embargo, the Kurdistan Iraqi Front- an alliance of diverse political groups in the Kurdistan region held a general election. The internationally supervised election was held on 19 May 1992 in which virtually an estimated 1.1 million strong electorate participated in the Kurdish areas. Their goal was to establish an administration to provide for essential public services and to meet the basic needs of the people. The people expressed a strong desire to choose their representatives. Men and women over the age of 18 were eligible to vote. The legislative candidates had to be citizens and residents of Kurdistan for at least 30 years. Barzani and Talabani were the two leading candidates for the supreme leadership position. However, the election for an overall Kurdish leader was inconclusive, Massoud Barzani the leader of the KDP, received 50.22% of the votes cast and Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK,

[31] See, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), "About the Kurdistan Regional Government", (Online: web), Accessed 5 June 2007, URL: hhtp://www.krg.org/articles/article_detail.asp?RubricNr=93&AricleNr=48&LangNr=12&L....

49.78%.[32] This regional election led to the formation of the first Kurdistan National Assembly and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The leadership and the people of Kurdistan decided to remain part of Iraq, adopt and abide by all national laws except for those that violated human and universal rights. And after decades of dictatorship, the people in Kurdistan were able to vote for their representatives.

The two socialist parties, the Kurdish Socialist Party (KSP) and the Party of Socialism in Kurdistan (PASOK), both of which called for an independent Kurdish state, ran on the same ticket in the 1992 elections garnering 2.6 percent of the total vote; they did not win any seats in parliament since a party must receive 7 percent of the vote to be represented. A few months after the polling, the parties merged with Abdulrahman's Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP) to form the Kurdistan Unity Party, under the leadership of Abdulrahman and Mahmoud Osman. The Islamic Party of Kurdistan which believed that Iraq should become an Islamic state captured 5.1 percent of the vote in the election and sent no members to parliament. The northern branch of Kurdish Communist Party received 2.2 percent. The number of Christian Assyrians in northern Iraq was in dispute, but to forestall international criticism and local disapproval, the IKF allocated the Assyrian Democratic Movement five seats in parliament regardless of the party's electoral showing; theoretically these were the swing votes in the body (Prince 1993:19).

Apparently only seven of the eight reputed members of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front participated in the elections. The names of the Front's parties were listed in alphabetical order and according to a special colour:

- Yellow for the KDP
- Blue for the SPKI and PASOK
- Black and blue for the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP)
- White with a red star for the Kurdish Toilers Party (KTP)
- Red for the Kurdish Section of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)
- Indigo for the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) and
- Green for the PUK

[32] For detail see, Kurdistan Regional Government (4 July 2005), "A Brief History of Iraqi Kurdistan: The Kurds and Kurdistan". (Online: web), Accessed 22 October 2006, http://www.krg.org/articles/article_detail.asp?

On the other hand, the Iraqi National Turkoman Party (IMTP), which was not a member of the Kurdish Front, decided not to participate in the elections (Gunter 1993:298). None of the smaller Kurdish parties achieved representation. After much negotiation, the Kurdish Front decided that the KDP and the PUK would be given 50 seats each in the National Council. The remaining five would be given to the Christian minority with four of them going to the Assyrian Democratic Movement. The elections contributed to the KDP and PUK working even closer together. As a part of the agreement, it was decided that the chairman of the National Council would be from the KDP, while his deputy would be from the PUK. Conversely, the chairman of the Executive Council would be from the PUK and his deputy from the KDP. The design adopted, which effectively divided all executive and legislative positions equally with real power being unofficially vested in the political bureaus of the PUK and KDP which became known as the 50:50 system (Stansfield 2003:145).

The establishment of power-sharing system

In order to alleviate the ever-present tensions apparent in the political arena, the 50:50 system was dependent upon the goodwill and support of the sources of the tension. The aim of the system was to achieve, at least on the surface an even division of power between the KDP and PUK in all government offices throughout the territory. Such a balance was deemed to be particularly appropriate as the two leaders of the parties remained out of the official government equation, postponing dealing with the most problematic of who was to be President. The Presidium of KNA was divided between KDP and PUK personnel, with Jawher Namiq Salim of the KDP becoming the Speaker, and Mohammad Tawfiq his deputy. An identical division was then applied to the cabinet, with the minister being from one party and the deputy from the other. However, the decision making process of the administration was still ultimately dominated by the PUK and KDP, thereby preserving the influence of the parties's elites (Stansfield 2003:146). Hence, the power sharing system perhaps acted as catalyst rather than a constraint.

At the ministerial level, the deputy enjoyed the same power and influence as the minister needed the support of the other to advocate policies and important programmes, with each possessing veto. This typology of division existed throughout the governmental

structures, from the cabinet to the town councils, and also including schools, health facilities and internal security positions.

The First Cabinet of the KRG

The first cabinet of the KRG (*Table 1.1*) was presented with the unenviable task of attempting to govern the newly formed *de facto* state. Within the territory, UN sanctions and the GOI embargo were creating immense socio-economic problems, in addition to the unease created by the tense political environment. Furthermore, the first cabinet had managed several internal and structural problems.

Table 4.1 The First Cabinet of the Kurdish Regional Government (4 July1992)

Name	*Position*	*Party*
Fuad Massoum	Prime Minister	PUK
Roj Nuri Shawaise	Deputy Prime Minister	KDP
Amin Mawlud	Industry and Power	PUK
Amin Abdulrahman	Deputy	KDP
Sherko Bekass	Culture	PUK
Ahmed Salar	Deputy	KDP
Mohammad Tawfiq	Humanitarian Aid	PUK
Kamal Kirkuki	Deputy	KDP
Idris Hadi Saleh	Transport and Communication	KDP
Feyeradim Rafiq	Deputy	PUK
Younadim Yousif	Housing and Public Works	ADM
Tayyib Jabir Amin	Deputy	PUK
Nasih Ghafour	Education	KDP
Uthman Hasan	Deputy	PUK
Qadir Aziz	Agriculture	KTP
Akram Izzat	Deputy	KDP
Kamal Mufti	Peshmerga Affairs	PUK
Azad Fattah	Deputy	KDP

Marouf Rauf	Justice	Independent
Salah al-Din Hafidh	Finance and Economic Affairs	PUK
Salah Dalo	Deputy	KDP
Kaffia Suleiman	Municipalities and Tourism	PUK
Salih Ahmed	Deputy	KDP
Kamal Shakir	Health and Social Affairs	KCP
Abd al-Ahad Afram	Deputy	KDP
Mohammad Mullah Qadir	Islamic Affairs(Awqaf)	KDP
Mohammad Salih	Deputy	PUK
Maamoon Brifkani	Reconstruction and Development	KDP
Husssein Sinjari	Deputy	PUK
Younis Rosebayani	Interior	KDP
Ahmed Sharif	Deputy	PUK

Source: F. Kakai, " The Kurdish Parliament," 1992, pp. 123-4, cited in Stansfield, Gareth R.V. (2003), *Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy*, London: Routledge Curzon, 147.

The first cabinet targeted the problem of massively over-staffed and under-skilled personnel in the administration. However, its achievements have often been overlooked due to the subsequent breakdown of inter-party relations and the formation of the second cabinet under the premiership of Kosrat Rasoul of the PUK. The greatest problem the first cabinet presented to the decision making process was the equality of power which existed between ministers and their deputies, creating an administration effectively hamstrung by the contrary political motivations of its highest executive members. The actual decision making process of the cabinet therefore appears to have been managed by some form of coordination between the two political bureaus. However, there was a problem with achieving a balance within the governmental structure with regard to the inclusion of civil servants trained by the GOI, and those Kurds who had spent their lives fighting in the *peshmerga* brigades (Stansfield, 2003:149). The attempts at achieving a balance between these two groupings created the first signs of tension between the KDP and PUK, with both sides accusing the other of placing *peshmerga* personnel into positions which required a technocrat.

The Second Cabinet of the KRG

Towards the end of 1992, the first cabinet of the KRG became increasingly embattled. Faced with increasing partisan problems caused by the seemingly inextricable difficulties of revenue control, the leadership of the cabinet attempted to become more technocratic in the face of the politicisation of the governmental structures by the KDP and PUK. In March 1993, the Kurdish cabinet elected in 1992 was dismissed by the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly for its failure to deal effectively with the crisis in the region. An important shift in government positions saw the PUK place some of its senior leaders into the cabinet. Korsrat Rasoul Ali, a leading member of the PUK politburo, replaced Faud Massoum who was more a technocrat as Prime Minister (see Table 1.2). Tension began to rise as the government became more partisan. Moreover, in the summer of 1993, Sami Rahman's Kurdistan Unity Party- an alignment of three smaller parties that had previously all been members of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front-joined the KDP (Gunter 1996:232). The change in Kurdish politics in favour of KDP sent shock waves in the PUK camp.

Table 4.2 The Second Cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government

Name	*Position*	*Party*
Kosrat Rasoul Ali	Prime Minister	PUK
Roj Nuri Shawaise	Deputy Prime Minister	KDP
Younis Rosebayani	Interior	KDP
Khadir Aziz Mohammad Jabari	Justice	PUK
Idris Hadi Saleh	Transport and Communication	KDP
Muhammad Amin Mawlud	Industry and Power	PUK
Shirko Fayk Abdu-Allah Bekar	Culture	PUK
Dara Sheikh Nuri	Finance and Economic Affairs	PUK
Sa'adi Ahmed Pira	Agriculture and Irrigation	PUK
Kaffia Suleim	Municipalities and Tourism	PUK
Kamal Shakir Mohammad	Health and Social Affairs	KSP
Jabar Farman	Peshmerga Affairs	PUK

Ma'amoon Brifkani	Reconstruction and Development	KDP
Mohammad Tawfiq Rahim	Humanitarian Aid	PUK
Mohammad Abdullah Kadir	Awqaf and Islamic Affairs	KDP
Nassih Ghafur Ramadan	Minister of Education	KDP
Younadam Yousif Kana	Public Works and Housing	ADM

The second cabinet of KRG included members only from the KDP, PUK and one Christian. There was no representative from the newly combined three leftist parties (SPKI, KPDP and PASOK, a group that began as the 'Unity Party of Kurdistan') because they had unsuccessfully demanded one of the three main ministries namely, Interior, *Peshmerga* Affairs or Humanitarian Aid as well as one governor, several districts officers and sub-district directors (Gunter, 1996:302).

The partisanship of the governmental structures was considered a primary reason of the subsequent fall into conflict which occurred in 1994. As a renowned *peshmerga* commander with an infamous fighting reputation, Kosrat Rasoul remained an easy task for members of the KDP to describe him as uneducated and volatile. However, he proved able to mobilise public support behind his cabinet and his premiership far more effectively than the more technically minded Fu'ad (Stansfield 2003:150-51). But the KDP had deep-rooted feelings regarding Kosrat and attributed much of the failures of the 50:50 system of government to him.

Civil War within the Kurdish Enclave

The KRG formed in 1992 after the Gulf War was weakened from its inception by Masoud Barzani's and Jalal Talabani's decision not to participate themselves. This denied the government valuable credibility and left it in the hands of mere lieutenants of the KDP and PUK. By 1993, the 50:50 principle that split power between the two parties in each ministry had further paralysed its initiative while fuelling partisanship (Gunter 1996:302). In May 1994, supporters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan clashed with supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, leaving 300 dead. Relations among the groups soured in March 1995 when KDP backed out of an attack on Saddam's front lines led by Iraqi National Congress. A new burst of Kurdish infighting erupted in August

1995 when the PKK suddenly attacked the KDP because the KDP, as part of a deal the United States was trying to broker, had agreed to police the border to prevent PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) raids from northern Iraq into Turkey.[33] Syria and Iran covertly supported the PKK in attempting to prevent the United States from gaining further influence in the area, while the PUK supported the PKK in an attempt to open a second front against the KDP (Yavuz and Gunter 2001:38). Clashes between the PUK and KDP were matched by vitriolic war of words, heightened by PUK accusations that the KDP received arms from Baghdad in order to tilt the military balance of power in favour of KDP. The suspicions between these two largest Kurdish factions did not dissipate and Iraqi Kurdistan's socio-economic situation and stability showed no sign of improvement (Hashim 1996:14).

On the other hand, the Iraqi National Congress (INC)[34] had achieved its moment of maximum success and popularity when it had acted as a mediating force between the warring Kurdish groups. It was only after Saddam made an offer of mediation that both sides decided to accept a cease-fire brokered by the INC which called for a return to the status-quo ante in Arbil (i.e., cessation of fighting) and a separation of the forces of the two rivals by the INC militia (Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn 2000:239). A tenuous cease-fire between the KDP and the PUK was held until April 1995, although minor clashes between the KDP and PUK took place. This cease-fire broke down when Turkish forces advanced into Iraq. The Turkish attack on the PKK triggered a fresh wave of fighting between the two factions, and this resurgence in intra-Kurdish fighting virtually paralysed the Kurdish Regional Parliament in Arbil, whose mandate was due to expire in early June 1995 (Cordesman and Hashim 1997:82). The conflicts converged in November 1996 when Turkish paramilitary joined the KDP to force the PUK and the PKK to return to the established intra-Kurdish cease-fire line.

The United States tried to mediate between the two groups in a series of talks conducted in Drogheda, Ireland from 9-11 August 1995 (Barkey 1997:2). These talks

[33] PKK (Kuridistan Workers Party) was founded by Abdullah Ocalan. The policies of the Turkish military, regional developments in Iraq and Iran consolidated Kurdish separatism led to PKK launched an armed uprising to defeat the Turkish state in 1984. The PKK's main goal was to destabilise Turkey and create an independent Kurdish state.

[34] Iraqi National Congress, an opposition political party in Iraq. It was a multi-party coalition political party. Ahmad Chalabi was its president. INC played a crucial role to topple the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

were aimed at resolving the deep-rooted differences between the two leading Kurdish groups. The Iraqi National Congress participated and Turkey sent observers. The two agreed to cease media attacks against each other, to respect the rights of the other followers and to release detainees captured during the hostilities between them. This agreement had the following terms:

- The KDP and PUK will strive to finalise a permanent peace.
- Arbil, the administrative centre of the Kurdish zone which has seen its share of violence during intra-Kurd strife will be demilitarised. Forces of both sides in the environs of the city will be reduced.
- A neutral commission to mediate between the KDP and PUK will be formed under the auspices of the INC.
- No later than 48 hours following the certified demilitarisation of Arbil, customs and revenues collected by the parties will be deposited in banks to be used in the name of the regional authority.
- The elected regional parliament will be reconvened within 48 hours of the demilitarisation of Arbil.
- Following the restoration of order, the regional authority will work with all possible haste to fashion a new broad-based administration for the area.
- All of this will be carried out within the framework of the recognition of the legitimacy of Iraq's territorial integrity and will take into consideration the legitimate security interests of Turkey (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997:82-83).

Despite the accord, the situation continued to deteriorate in late 1995 and early 1996. The agreement seems to have unravelled before it was even implemented. The crisis that exploded in 1996 began in 1994 when Barzani's KDP refused to hand over to the Kurdish government customs revenues from the Turkish-Iraq border point. These revenues, estimated at US$ 35 million annually and the chief source of Kurdish government revenues, were collected at the Ibrahim al-Khalil checkpoint near Zakho-a KDP stronghold. The KDP argued that they were retaliating for the disappearance of some US$19 million from the coffers of the Central Bank of Kurdistan under the direction of PUK. Following several bouts of fighting between May 1994 and July 1995, Barzani controlled around one-third of Iraqi Kurdistan's territory and population. The

PUK's two-thirds included the major cities of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah leaving Barzani with only Dohuk and the less developed western part of the region (Al-Khafaji 1996: 36). The situation further degenerated in August 1996 when the PUK began to use arms received from Iran to threaten the KDP's existence. Desperate Barzani did the unthinkable and invited Saddam Hussein to intervene in the war. Saddam sent at least 30,000 troops into the UN-protected Kurdish region, re-captured the KDP stronghold of Arbil. The KDP was immediately installed in power again (Cordesman and Hashim 1997:88). Turkish forces entered Iraq several times during the year to combat the PKK.

The ceasefire did sharply reduce the number of civilian casualties and the use of torture on those detained or arrested. Northern Iraq, as a result was further divided between a KDP-controlled northern zone and a PUK-controlled southern area. The stalemate between the two Kurdish rivals also created opportunities for Iran, Iraq and Syria to jockey for influence with the KDP, PUK and other smaller Kurdish militia further aggravating the divisions among the Iraqi Kurds.

The fighting left over a thousand people dead and forced thousands of civilians from their homes. The KDP estimated that 58,000 KDP supporters were expelled from Suleimaniyah and other PUK-controlled areas from October 1996 to October 1997; the PUK said that more than 49,000 of its supporters were expelled from Arbil and other KDP-controlled areas from August through December 1997. The UN reported that more than 10,000 persons were forced from their homes when fighting broke out between the Kurdish factions along their cease-fire line in October 1997. It also documented over 16,000 cases of persons who disappeared in the Iraqi sector of Kurdistan[35]. The euphoria of 1992, when the Kurds engaged in free and democratic elections had given way to despair and a desire on the part of young Kurds to escape from Kurdistan. Clearly, the PUK-KDP fighting presented a serious setback for democracy in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

[35] For detail see, Military, "Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)", (Online: web), Accessed 27 February 2007. URL: http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kdp.htm/

The division of Iraqi Kurdistan

On August 1996, the combined forces of the KDP and GOI invaded Arbil, expelling the PUK from the city. A further round of serious fighting took place in 1997 before a ceasefire was reached and the division between the KDP and PUK reverted to the status quo *ante*. Particularly after the 1997 conflagration, the two political areas of Iraqi Kurdistan developed into two administrative zones, dominated by the KDP in Arbil and Dohuk Governorates and by the PUK in Suleimaniyah and New Kirkurk Governorates. Both sides claimed legality for themselves and scorned the illegality of the other, with the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan becoming characterised by two separate, almost identical, political and administrative systems (Stansfield 2003:153-54).

This system proved to be a stable alternative to the previous power-sharing arrangement. It managed to preserve the influence of the political elite of both parties and allowed governance and administration to take place with less consideration for party politics than when all political groupings were located in Arbil. Furthermore, the divide in the system implied that the overt potential for the *de facto* state becoming more institutionalised was somewhat diminished, thereby reducing the necessity for neighbouring states to promote stability within a unified structure. However, it was argued that the cabinets of the divided administration were the most effective of the Kurdish political institutions formed since 1991. The ability of the two main factions to dominate the administrations within their strongholds enabled both entities to relax somewhat and promote a more effective system of governance.

Iraqi Kurdistan was therefore divided geographically and politically between a KDP dominated axis of Arbil-Dohuk and a PUK dominated axis of Suleimaniyah-Kirkurk. The creation of this system enabled smaller parties to enjoy more political power as both the KDP and PUK realised the dangers of being seen to be too overly dominant, both to the Iraqi Kurdistan populace in particular and the international community at large. Whilst the administration remained divided between Arbil and Suleimaniyah, the judiciary remained unified and was headed by the Supreme Court of the Iraqi Kurdistan region based in Arbil (Stansfield 2003:155). It was the presence of this unified institution and unwritten agreement not to alter the interim status of the position of President that

seemed to exist between Talibani and Barzani, which provided a small degree of unity to Iraqi Kurdistan.

The emergence of Kurdistan's *de facto* autonomy forced the Kurds to set up their own administrative and legislative organs to avoid chaos and a further decline in public security. But the Kurdish experiment in freedom has revealed deep-seated differences and splits within the Kurdish movement and attracted the intervention of their Turkish and Iranian neighbours (Hashim 1996:13).

The Kurdistan Regional Government (Arbil)

The KDP-dominated KNA convened on 1 September 1996 in Arbil, dissolved the previous cabinet and asked Roj Nuri Shawaise to accept the position of Prime Minister (see Table 1.3). The design and structure of the administrative system did not deviate from that prescribed by the earlier laws of IKF and KNA. The third cabinet (Arbil) clearly reflected that KDP dominated its composition in terms of holding all of the key ministerial portfolios.

Table 4.3 The Third Cabinet (Arbil of the Kurdistan Regional Government

Name	Position	Party
Roj Nuri Shawaise	Prime Minister	KDP
Nechervan Barzani	Deputy Prime Minister	KDP
Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen	Finance & Economic Affairs	KDP
Younadim Yousif Kana	Public Works & Housing	ADM
Khadir Jabari	Justice	KDP
Abu Hikmat	Agriculture & Irrigation	ILP
Jerjees Hasan	Minister of Education	KDP
Shafiq Qazzaz	Humanitarian Aid	KDP
Idris Hadi Saleh	Power & Industry	KDP
Sheikh Ma'amoon Brifkani	Reconstruction & Development	KDP
Fadhil Merani	Interior	KDP

Falakadin Kakai	Culture	KDP
Hussain Sinjari	Municipalities & Tourism	KDP
Hameed Aqrawi	Transport & Communication	KDP
Kamal Shakir	Health & Social Affairs	KCP
Kawa Mahmoud Hafeed	Awqaf & Islamic Affairs	KDP
Za'eem(Rafiq Ali)	Peshmerga	KDP
Jasim Elias	Minister of Region	KDP

Source: cited in Stansfield, Gareth R.V. (2003), *Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy*, London: Routledge Curzon, 158

Other parties which participated included the ADM and ILP (Independent labour Party). Each of these parties had reasonably strong links with the KDP, either through their inclusion in the KNA (as was the case with the ADM), or simply from hoping to benefit from the increased legitimacy offered by securing a seat in the regional executive (as in the case of the ILP). Massoud Barzani did not have an official position within the post-1996 governmental structure. However, it was undeniable that he exerted a significant influence over the actions of the administration through the Political Bureau of the KDP, of which many of the ministers were also members. The relationship between the Political Bureau and the cabinet and structures of government was the key issue.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (Suleimaniyah)

After the evacuation of Arbil by the PUK and the subsequent counter-attack in the autumn of 1996, the PUK part of the KRG resurrected itself in Suleimaniyah. While seemingly similar in terms of possessing an identical executive structure, the KRG in Suleimaniyah displayed some considerable differences in comparison to the previous system left behind in Arbil. The PUK suffered from a lack of revenue, compounded by the fact that it now had a full government structure, albeit substantially reduced in size, due to the large body of pro-PUK civil servants who had fled Arbil. This problem of finance and imbalance in party personnel structure was added to the simple fact that Suleimaniyah, whilst being a cultural and educational centre for Iraqi Kurdistan, did not possess the necessary infrastructure to support an administration.

The position of the PUK with regard to the establishment of the third cabinet was that, as the previous cabinet had not been legally dissolved by the KNA, Kosrat Rasoul was still the Prime Minister of the KRG and due to the invasion of Arbil, had the legal right to establish any administration in the new political situation. The PUK therefore, proceeded to establish the third cabinet in late 1996 (Stansfield 2003:161-63). This cabinet was a coalition of parties, but parties already in the Arbil coalition were not included (see Table 1.4). Parties included in the Suleimaniyah cabinet were the PUK, KTP, Conservatives and later the IMK.[36] The PUK held all the major portfolios, although many deputy positions were awarded to the coalition partners, including the Ministry of the Interior which was handed to the IMK.

Table 4.4 The Third Cabinet (Suleimaniyah) of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Name	*Position*	*Party*
Kosrat Rasoul Ali	Prime Minister	PUK
Kamal Fu'ad	Deputy Prime Minister	PUK
Dara Sheikh Nuri	Finance & Economic Affairs	PUK
Adil Nasr	Public Works & Housing	PUK
Abdul Rahman Nawrisi	Justice	IMK
Salar Aziz	Agriculture& Irrigation	PUK
Arsalam Bayaez	Education	PUK
Sa'ad Pira	Humanitarian Affairs	PUK
Bahman Hussein	Reconstruction & Development	KTP
Mu'alizim Omer Abdullah	Interior	PUK
Jamal Abdullah	Culture	PUK
Kaffia Suleiman	Municipalities & Tourism	PUK
Najim Hussein Surchi	Transport & Communication	Conservative

[36] KTP: Kurdistan Toilers Party; Conservatives: led by Agha Surchi, this party was directly opposed to Barzani and the KDP. When the IMK joined the Suleimaniyah cabinet in 1997, the KDP expelled the IMK from the third cabinet (Arbil).

Ihmad Ahmed	Health & Social Affairs	PUK
Mohammad Abdul Aziz	Awqaf & Islamic Affairs	IMK
Kamal Mufti	Peshmerga Affairs	PUK

Source: Adopted in Stansfield, Gareth R.V. (2003), *Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy*, London: Routledge Curzon, 163.

The parties in the cabinet were a mix of those directly aligned with the PUK, as in the case of the KTP and those with little in common with the PUK apart from opposition to the KDP. As was the case with the Conservatives, or those forced into coalition and which had to join due to the strength of the PUK in their geographic area, such as the case with IMK.

Many of the previous ministers of the second cabinet retained their posts and were joined by a number of resourceful technocrats, including Bahman Hussein of the Toilers' and the Yezidi, Adil Nasr. As was the case with Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani did not have an official position within the reconstituted cabinet.

Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK)

Iraqi Kurdistan was predominantly Islamic, so it should not be surprising that Islamist political parties have steadily developed. Some of these were formed as early as the 1970s, benefiting from the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and fought against Saddam's regime during the 1980s. However, it was the development of the de facto Iraqi Kurdish state and its instability in the mid-1990s which gave the Islamist parties the space and opportunity to become a force in the region. The most popular was the Kurdistan Islamic Union led by Salahadin Baha'adin. Part of the Muslim Brotherhood, it had no militia and enjoyed good relations with the KDP and PUK (Stansfield 2003:11). As a non-combatant party, it had a great deal of support among the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Established in 1978, Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) another Islamist party differed from the PUK and KDP in its fundamental goal, which was not for the creation of Kurdish state but, rather the replacement of the Iraqi regime with an Islamic regime. IMIK was led by Mulla Ali Abd al-Aziz and Mulla Ali Bapir's Islamic Group of Kurdistan (IGK) (Stansfield 2003:11). As part of a coalition agreement with the PUK

brokered by Iran, IMIK controlled an enclave between Halabja, Tawela and Panjwin, in the southeast of Suleimaniyah, near Iran. It was politically close to the Iranian government and received support from Iran to extend Islamist influence. In late December 1993, armed conflict was reported to have taken place between fighters of the PUK and the Islamic League of Kurdistan (ILK, also known as the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan-IMIK). The two parties were reported to have signed a peace agreement in February 1994, following mediation by the INC. In June 1995 the IMIK withdrew from the INC, accusing its leadership of incompetence and corruption. In 1996, IMIK began to enforce Islamic Punishment Law within the enclave. Islamic dress codes were strictly observed, even a car carrying a foreign female aid worker who did not have her hair covered was shot at and all residents were forced to attend the mosque on Fridays (Carver 2002:72).

Both KDP and PUK had been keen to clamp down on Islamic activity. Within the city of Arbil (in the KDP-controlled areas) several new groups and Islamic charities had been formed. The relationship between these groups and the KDP had steadily deteriorated. Heavily influenced and financed by the al-Qaeda organisation, a militant breakaway faction of IMIK known as the *Fund-al-Islam* (soldiers of Islam) began fighting the PUK in September 2001. The *Fund-al-Islam* took control of the Iranian border regions of Tawela and Biyara, and attacked several non-Muslim settlements.[37] But by mid-October the PUK had regained control of the region and a ceasefire was declared

Sanctions and Humanitarian Intervention

The damage Iraq suffered in its war with Iran between 1980 and 1988 pales in comparison with what it has suffered as a result of sanctions, the allied air campaign and the insurrections. The trade sanctions that the UN approved on 6 August 1990, seriously affected food stocks. Economic sanctions had a severe impact on local industry, which relied heavily on foreign suppliers for spare parts, raw materials, machinery and expertise. By the end of 1991, the private sectors suffered from shortages of materials and goods. According to the head of the Iraqi industrial association, 16,000 private ventures

[37] Human Rights Watch, March 2002 as cited in Natasha Carver (2002), "Is Iraq/ Kurdistan a State such that it can be Said to Operate State Systems and thereby Offer Protection to its 'Citizens'?" *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 14 (1):72.

were either working at reduced capacity or on the verge of halting operations (Hashim1992:13).

The social impact of the Iraq crisis revealed a shocking human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of people died prematurely from the health disaster that swept Iraq in the wake of war and during the more than eight years of comprehensive sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 1999:744). Sanctions targeted the weakest and most vulnerable members of the Iraqi society-the poor, elderly, newborn, sick and young. Many equated sanctions with violence. The sanctions, coupled with pain inflicted by US and UK military attacks, reduced Iraq's infrastructure to virtual rubble. Water sanitation plants and hospitals remained in dilapidated condition. Surveys by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) noted a marked decline in health and nutrition throughout Iraq. UNICEF reported in 1996 that 4,500 children under the age of five were dying every month in Iraq from hunger and disease (Arnove 2003:85). The situation in northern Iraq became worse with double sanctions by the Saddam's regime.

The economic and military situation of the Iraqi Kurdistan became steadily grimmer, and more were involved in the fighting between Kurdish factions. Many foreign relief workers were forced to leave Iraq. And in August 1992, Iraq continued to harass relief workers in the north. The Iraqi regime maintained an ongoing internal embargo of the north which included necessities such as food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. After August 1993, the embargo also included massive electric power cut-offs in specific areas, causing the spoilage of medicines, breakdown in local water-purification systems, and the loss of certain hospitals (Leezenberg 2005:636). A disaster was averted only by the prompt action of the United Nations and donor governments, who imported and installed temporary generators to alleviate the crisis. The embargo of the north had an impact on the Kurds and various other minorities such as Turkomans who lived in the area.

Kurdistan became an economic shamble as a result of civil conflict and the internal embargo imposed by Baghdad which cut off north from the markets. Supplies from the centre and south of Iraq were prevented from entering the Kurdish-controlled territories. The region had no viable commercial or financial infrastructure. The only source of

revenue came from the import/export customs duties imposed on goods coming from Turkey on their way south of Mosul and the rest of the country or on Iraqi oil smuggled out via KDP-controlled territory. But this revenue was more of a bane than a benefit to Kurdistan as the KDP and the PUK fought and quarrelled over control of customs points and division of revenue. Nor did the Kurds use this revenue to build up their administrative infrastructure. This helped the semi-permanent state of militarization in the Kurdish enclave because the largest and best equipped militias belonged to the KDP and PUK and represented the only major source of large-scale employment for young Kurdish men (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997:86-87). The Government of Iraq (GoI) economic blockade of the Iraqi Kurdish region was an attempt to force the Kurds to consider a political settlement.

The oil-for-food programme (SCR-986) that began functioning in 1997 continued to provide to the region substantial resources from Iraq's public oil wealth.[38] The KRG directly cooperated with thirteen UN agencies in the region, including ten involved in the management of the oil-for-food programme. At its own expense, the KRG supported the programme by providing the services of thousands of government staff (teachers, health, workers, electricity staff, water and sanitation workers, etc). The KRG also provided warehousing and other building facilities as well as transport, security and telecommunication services. In managing the programme, the UN literally ran on KRG-built and maintained roads. KRG funds were obtained from unstable sources, mostly road taxes, and taxes levied on imports.[39]

Iraqi officials have opposed the oil-for-food programme as overly intrusive and a violation of national sovereignty. They rejected the programme because they saw it as providing the basis for the United Nations sanctions indefinitely. The Iraqis insisted that the only proper humanitarian response was to lift sanctions and allow the country to repair its oil industry, resume trade and re-build its shattered economy and society. But if the oil-for-food programme had been accepted when first proposed in 1991, much of the

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[38] For detail of the UNSRC 686 see, United Nations (1996), The United Nations and the Iraq- Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information vol.9, New York: 182-183.

[39] For detail see, Kurdistan Regional Government (4 July 2005) "A Brief History of Iraqi Kurdistan: The Kurds and Kurdistan", (Online: web). Accessed 22 October 2006 URL: http://www.krg.org/articles/article_detail.asp?

suffering of the Iraqi people in the intervening years might have been avoided (Cortright and Lopez 1999:744).

There was a serious problem with landmines in Iraqi Kurdistan despite the fact that the KDP and PUK stated irrevocably that they were against the use of landmines. Landmines killed up to 3,000 people from 1991 and casualties remained high. Furthermore, in mid-2000 the UN reported that there were instances of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields. The landmines also prevented agricultural activities in large swaths of the country and prevented displaced families from returning to their homes. About 80% of population in Iraqi Kurdistan was unemployed and chronic malnutrition remained a serious problem. It was estimated that there were around 600,000 displaced people, 100,000 of whom had been expelled from government-controlled areas. Many of these people lived in tents, open spaces, or unheated public buildings (Carver 2002:78-79). It should be noted that many Kurds who sought asylum in Europe actually came originally from areas not inside the 'safe haven'.

The protection and the very existence of the 'safe haven' of Iraqi Kurdistan were entirely dependent on the US-British forces. No guarantees existed as to how long that protection would remain and the protection was extremely inadequate. Furthermore, neither the KDP nor PUK had the resources or the will to effectively protect those in need. Nor should it be forgotten that it was the KDP who openly invited the Iraqi government forces to enter the 'safe-haven' in 1996.

Iraqi Kurdistan existed under a kind of double rule: a weak Kurdish Regional Government and a collection of international relief agencies. Donor states continued to deal with Kurdish administration in so far as necessary to clamp social unrest and prevent refugees. Given the deepening economic crisis and growing interference of neighbouring states, the situation of the Iraqi Kurds did not differ substantially from that of the Kurds in Turkey, whose oppression continued with the knowledge and even support of the leading NATO states (Ofteringer and Backer 1994: 41).

International NGOs (INGOs) had been operating in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992. The Kurdistan Regional Government had cooperated with these organisations as much as possible to benefit from their experience and assistance. There were about 28 INGOs operating in the Kurdish area from eleven countries, such as Save the Children or Help

Age International from the UK, Qandil from Sweden, and Emergency from Italy which involved in all types of projects. The emergency situation had settled down and the humanitarian needs were largely looked after under the UNSCR-986 programme. Many were also involved in various construction projects such as IDP housing, water projects, or access roads funded under the UN programme. The Ministry of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation was responsible for overseeing the activities of INGOs operating in the region.[40] The Ministry aimed to have better coordination of services, less duplication of projects and easier operation in the area for the INGOs.

The comprehensive embargo on Iraq had a major effect on food availability, nutrition and health, especially for children. This remained true even following implementation of the oil-for-food resolution. The western media frequently ignored or downplayed the many accounts of major nutritional problems. Even when consideration was reluctantly given to the human costs of sanctions, attention was often diverted by claiming that deaths and deprivation in Iraq were caused not by United Nations actions but by the Iraqi government (Arnove 2003:198). A country that once profited from its great oil wealth and talented, skilled and well-educated people was devastated by years of war and economic sanctions. Iraq was self-sufficient in agriculture and proud of its modern health and educational system but after the sanctions, Iraqis were unable to send their children to school or treat all sick people. It was the capital of the Arab-Islamic empires during the Golden Age of the Abbasids, when Arab culture, science, medicine, literature, mathematics and philosophy flourished from the eight to the thirteenth century (Yaphe S 2003: 7). Iraq could have been a model for the more equitable distribution of resources to its people in a region known for its profligate spending; instead it became a model for a republic of fear. Iraq proved to be failing state.

Russia, China and France were resentful of American and British use of the sanctions to continue pressure on Iraq until Saddam fell from power. Hoping to rebuild their lucrative political and economic relations with Iraq and unable to understand the America concept of Iraq as a "rogue" state, these countries insisted that the Security Council

[40] For details see, "Kurdistan Regional Government" (15 October, 2002), *Kurdistan Today*, (Online: web), Accessed 8 June 2007, URL: http://www.old.krg.org/docs/KT021015_full.asp

should acknowledge the increase in Iraqi cooperation and that it should be rewarded by easing or lifting sanctions (Hashim 1996:12).

Sanctions were designed to produce deprivation and poverty; hence it was not surprising that they brought about widespread malnutrition and increased mortality. Sanctions had not succeeded in their stated aim of overthrowing the regime. Indeed, they probably strengthened the position of Saddam Hussein, not only within Iraq but throughout the region.

Washington Agreement of 1998

In January 1998, the PUK leader Jalal Talabani proposed peace and reconciliation and the establishment of a transitional government, in which both the PUK and KDP would be represented to assume sole responsibility for customs duties on cross-border trade. However, the KDP did not respond following its military success against the PUK. Iran continued to offer some support to the PUK, but appeared unwilling to become more directly involved in the Kurdish enclave.

Under the auspices of the Ankara peace process the two parties met again. The first meeting took place on 12 February 1998 in Shaqlawa (territory controlled by the KDP). The KDP delegation was led by Sami Abdul Rahman, and also included Jawher Namiq Salim (Speaker of the KNA), and Bruska Nuri Shawaise (Central Committee). The PUK delegation was led by Kamal Fu'ad and also included Omar Sa'id Ali and Arsalan Bayaez (all Political Bureau). This meeting formulated confidence-building measures, including the enforcement of ceasefire, ending of media attacks, the release of prisoners, ending of the expulsions, establishment of a joint committee to ensure the implementation of SCR 986, and the promotion of increased coordination between public service ministries. The specialised sub-committees formed to coordinate the public service sectors proved to be reasonably successful and resulted in the reduction of checkpoints between cities and the easing of travel restrictions between Arbil and Suleimaniyah (Stansfield 2003 :100). By mid-1998, the fragile peace process between the PUK and the KDP appeared to be holding and after a number of meetings between representatives of the two factions, agreement was reached on exchange of prisoners and the establishment of a joint committee to promote co-operation in public health,

education and energy. Meanwhile, the issue of KDP control over customs duties on cross-border trade from Turkey which had thwarted previous attempts to reconcile the rival factions remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the two factions continued to hold regular meetings and both parties pledged to co-operate to secure a permanent settlement with Baghdad leaders and stated that all Kurdish factions were prepared to make peace with the Government of Iraq. The Washington Accord reached in September 1998 between Barzani and Talabani, halted their infighting and obligated both to prevent the PKK from using northern Iraq as a base from which to attack Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds conceded to the accord because they needed Turkish acquiescence for their own local administration (Gunter 2001:609). United States support gave the Kurds increased security against potentially destructive policies of the governments of Turkey and Iraq. The agreement was expected to draw the two political parties into closer cooperation and in the formation of an interim administration in Arbil followed by multi-party elections to unify the KNA and the KRG.

However, its implementation was characterised by limited cooperation on issues previously agreed at the Shaqlawa meetings. The implementation of some of the greater initiatives such as the unification of the KRG and KNA proved to be problematic and subsequent disagreements resulted in a significant increase of tension between the KDP and PUK characterised by the resumption of media attacks and aggressive political manoeuvring. The main problem with the implementation of the Washington Agreement was one of interpreting the key provisions particularly with regard to:

- The normalisation of the situation of Arbil, Suleimaniayah and Dohuk with both parties able to operate in all cities.
- Revenue-sharing particularly with regard to the crossing-point of Ibrahim Khalil.
- The establishment of a temporary unified government.
- The re-unification of the KNA.
- Security issues, especially with regard to the PKK.
- The return of the IDPs (Internally Displaced People).
- The timing of multi-party elections.

However, the PUK stated that the promotion of peace in Iraqi Kurdistan required the following to be undertaken under the auspices of the Washington Agreement:

- A normalisation of the situation in the capital Arbil, then in Suleimaniyah and Dohuk.
- A fair distribution of revenues.
- The formation of a temporary government and the transferring of legislative authority.
- After forming the government, ensuring the security of the borders with Iran and Turkey, and developing a policy regarding the position of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- Return of the IDPs to their places of origin, with both the KDP and PUK releasing all prisoners.
- The setting of a date for the next democratic elections to be held no later than three months after the normalisation of the situation in Arbil.

The interpretation of the Washington Agreement by the KDP proved to be somewhat different from that of the PUK. The following were their main areas of concern.[41]

- The normalisation of the situation in Arbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk and all other cities and towns at the same time.
- The sharing of revenues between the KDP-controlled area and the PUK-controlled area should be dependent upon the current differences in revenue, and that such funding should only be used for the public service ministries.
- The necessity of forming a government and parliament according to the results of the election of 1992(officially, the result suggested that the parliamentary division should be 51:49 in favour of the KDP, although this is a point of disagreement between the two).
- That no concessions would be granted to the PKK and that they should not be allowed to be based in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- Financial and material compensation for IDPs.
- Elections should take place only after the normalisation of relations in the major cities.

[41] Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahdin, 9 September 1999, as cited in Stansfield, 2003:102.

- Issues regarding the composition of security forces are optional and no decision need be made.

Such disagreements posed considerable problems to the leadership of both parties. The PUK chose to focus mainly on the reliability of the results of the elections of 1992 and the size and eventual destination of revenue from Ibrahim Khalil. The KDP chose to focus on the issues of normalisation between the cities and the necessity of having a system of government based on the official results of the elections (51:49), rather than 50:50 system employed in the previous first and second cabinets of 1992 and 1994 (Stansfield 2003:102). An interpretation of the agreement included potential areas of coordination in public service ministries, followed by a joint national assembly, possibly of a unified regional executive. However, Washington's interest in Iraqi Kurdistan derived from the Kirkurk's oil (Geoff 1996:304-305).

Re-convening of the Kurdish National Assembly

A major step in the implementation of the 1998 Washington Agreement was taken on 4 October 2002, when all members took their seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly in Arbil for the first time since 1994. Roj Nuri Shawaise, President of the Parliament opened the session. Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani addressed the Parliament where both stated in clear and unequivocal terms, their total commitment to making the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly function for the benefit of all the people in the region. New members of Parliament were sworn in during the session. Members unanimously voted to accept the terms of the Washington Agreement. They reaffirmed their position on the future of Iraq. All parties remained in agreement that Iraq should be a free, democratic, federal and pluralist country.

Free and fair local elections were held in dozens of municipalities in the KDP administered areas in May 2001. According to KDP sources, to select 571 officials, KDP candidates received 81 percent of vote cast and the rate of voter participation was recorded at 79 percent. A second session of Assembly was held on 8 October 2002 in Suleimaniyah, further strengthening solidarity and unity. Government and party officials of KRG remained very positive and people in the local community were very pleased that

the Parliament was unified again. More steps were taken and aimed at normalising the situation in the Kurdish area. At a further session held on 12 November 2002 a joint committee was established with the aim of preparing for parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held in Iraqi Kurdistan within nine months. However, these elections were postponed following the US-led campaign to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein (O'Leary 2002:3).[42] The reconvening of the KNA was a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK. In particular, the KDP and PUK were unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq.

Despite various internal difficulties and constraints, including a strong opposition of neighbouring countries and both external and internal embargoes on the region, all basic public services were again provided. Freedom of speech and free movement was respected. According to Human Rights Watch, the leadership of the region made notable progress in promoting and protecting the basic rights of the people.

On 19 March 2003, the United States launched a war on Iraq which quickly drove Saddam Hussein from power. Its goal was to gain access and control of the region's vast petroleum and natural resources with the complicity of a clutch of UN collaborators (Clairmont F 2003:3983). Many Arabs considered the Kurds traitors for having supported the United States in the 2003 war. On the other hand, many Kurds saw the Arabs as chauvinistic nationalists who opposed Kurdish rights because they would end up detaching territory from the Arab patrimony (Gunter and Yavuz 2005:122). The fall of Saddam's regime in April 2003 gave displaced Iraqis an unprecedented opportunity to return to their places of origin particularly in northern Iraq. Saddam's authoritarian regime and its policies of ethnic cleansing were responsible for huge numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The US-led war to depose Sadddam Hussein, criticism of its legality and justification not withstanding, allowed for an organised programme anchored within a humanitarian approach. The ponderously legal return process, along with inter-communal tensions and the uncertain political future of Iraq, derailed the entire programme. At the same time, unregulated and rushed returns in the

[42] Also see, Kurdistan Regional Government" (15 October, 2002). *Kurdistan Today*. (Online: web), Accessed 8 June 2007. URL: http://www.old.krg.org/docs/KT021015_full.asp

wake of the war of March 2003 created a new group of IDPs, which gradually increased in number (Romano 2005:430-431).

Faced with harsh realities, the Iraqi Kurds turned to federalism as their best realistic hope in a post-Sadddam Hussein Iraq. Turkey however saw federalism as simply another step toward the Kurdish independence. The Kurds who enjoyed *de facto* government since the establishment of the northern no-fly zone have been adamant in demanding a democratic Iraq with a federal system of government (Dawisha and Dawisha 2003: 38). Federalism was seriously broached as a solution to the Kurdish problem in Iraq following the Gulf War in 1991. On 4 October 1992, the parliament of the *de facto* Kurdish state in northern Iraq declared Iraqi Kurdistan a constituent state in a federal Iraq (Gunter 2005:47-48). Both the two main Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani endorsed the concept. However Iraq's lack of a democratic culture since its inception would make actual federalism very difficult to implement.

Conclusion

The Kurds had lived in and successfully governed an autonomous 'safe haven' in northern Iraq for more than a decade. The area was created with the help of the United States and its allies after Saddam's forces were crushed during the Gulf War which was followed by Kurdish uprising. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a unified organisation at the beginning of the 1990s, could not sustain and was divided in two separate systems. The joint system of the first and second cabinets brought together two political parties which were separated by the quest of power. Furthermore, the joint system was of concern to neighbouring states as the *de facto* state also possessed a structure of governance which had the potential to promote the Kurdish national movement in a unified manner. This was unappealing for Turkey and Iran as well as for Iraq itself. The result of the collapse into conflict in 1994 was a direct manifestation of internal and external factors. However, the divided system of government which characterised Iraqi Kurdistan since 1996 was responsible to a significant degree for the maintenance of fragile peace. In addition, the socio-political tensions created by having both sides could address the domestic affairs of the de facto state in more efficient way, without worrying about the activities of their counterparts.

Iraqi Kurdistan had benefited from the establishment of a unified system of governance since 2002. The credit for the progress enjoyed by the people of Iraqi Kurdistan was shared between the international community and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Despite occasional severe constraints and setbacks during the decade, the KRG made notable progress in addressing the critical needs of its people. When security was assured the region received a fair share of the country's public wealth. The public interest remained the KRG's primary preoccupation.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The colonial forces freely imposed their own arbitrarily defined boundaries on the people of the West Asia region and created political and cultural problems. The abuse of Kurdish rights has been systematic. The suppression of the Kurdish nationalist movements by strong central governments in Iran and Turkey during first half and end of the twentieth century left only Iraq as the arena for Kurdish nationalistic activities. Moreover, the weakness of the former Iraqi governments, the geographic terrain of Iraqi Kurdistan and the high percentage of Kurds in the country made it possible for a *de facto* functional autonomy to exist in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.

Direct confrontation between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish movement became inevitable following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy. The new regime emphasised the need to create a strong central government and advocated Arab nationalism to supersede local and parochial feelings. The threat of direct control by Baghdad instilled a sense of unity among the Kurds. The tribal and traditional elements viewed the central authority as a threat to their way of life and the secular nationalist saw it as a threat to their goal of establishing an autonomous or separate Kurdish entity. The failure of the central government to defeat the Kurdish revolt became a major source of instability and contributed in no small measures to the overthrow of the three Iraqi governments since 1958.

However, the situation began to change with the return of the Ba'ath party to power in 1968. Advocating what is considered to be the most attractive ideology in West Asia, the Ba'ath combined the appealing principles of Arab unity and socialism. Guided by their socialist and Arab nationalist ideology, the Baathist implemented measures to ward off threats to the regime, put an end to inter-party factionalism, offered to cooperate with the Iraqi Communist Party and made generous and far-reaching proposals to the Kurdish, Turkoman and Assyrian minorities. The proposals to the Kurds as expressed in the March Manifesto 1970, acknowledged the existence of the Kurdish people as a distinct national group within Iraq possessing their own language and culture.

It further recognised the existence of a "Kurdish area", which by virtue of the majority of its population gave it the designation of the Iraqi Kurdistan.

The defeat of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's Kurdish rebellion by the Iraqi Baathist government brought to an end the Barzani type of Kurdish struggle for independence in Iraq. Divisions within the Kurdish resistance movement in Iraq in the wake of Mullah Mustafa's death resulted in the deterioration of the Kurdish position *vis-à-vis* the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Iraqi government followed a policy of combined severity with leniency in dealing with the Kurds. Tough security measures were adopted in which thousands of Kurds were deported and resettled in Arab areas leading to the creation of a strategic border zone cleared for all Kurds.

The Kurds, in their endless struggle for nationhood and independence, have been systematically repressed and cynically manipulated by states with little interest in minority rights. The persistent efforts of the Kurdish people have yielded a short-lived Republic (Mahabad) and ended up with many autonomy agreements in Iraq. Besides, the British government has repeatedly misused the Kurdish people. To secure access to the valuable oil resources in West Asia, Britain utilised regional government to inflict harm on their adversaries or balance the region's conflicting demands. And whenever the internationally dominant powers wanted alteration, equation, or restoration of regional balance of power, they have used the Kurds. Once this goal was achieved, the Kurds were abandoned. For instance, Iran supported the Kurdish political movement in Iraq during the mid-1960s. The political objective of the Shah of Iran was to weaken Iraq's position on border disputes and navigation rights. In return, Massoud Barzani, the leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq, committed his forces to create stability in Iranian Kurdistan by executing the Kurdish rebels who had supported the rebellion against the government of Iran under the Shah. States outside the region, especially the United States have seen advantage in pressing Kurdish claims. During the Gulf War the United States instigated the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein which only led to the suppression of Kurds by chemical attacks. Washington, with its interventionist policy of unilateralism, instead of providing moral leadership seeks domination by pitting one group against each other.

The Kurdish movement faced a number of serious defects and problems in spite of the dramatic increase in financial and military resources. The consolidation by the Ba'ath party of its authority inside Arab Iraq and the establishment of a strong political organisation capable of implementing leadership had further weakened the Kurdish insurgency. Moreover, the long eight years of Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait have profoundly affected the Kurdish struggle. It also offered opportunities and constraints that have affected the course of Kurdish struggle.

The credit for the progress enjoyed by the people of Iraqi Kurdistan is shared between the international community and the Kurdish Regional Government. Despite occasional severe constraints and setbacks during the past decades, the KRG made notable progress in addressing the critical needs of its people. From 1991, the major political parties of the KDP and PUK were forced to acknowledge the necessity to encourage more democratic procedures and actions in order to gain the support of the international community. There was a delicate balance in existence between the need to promote democratic, civil ideals, and undertaking those measures which could preserve the levels of elite accommodation. In May 1992 the Kurdish Iraqi Front (KIF), an alliance of several Kurdish factions including the two largest, KDP and PUK organised elections to a new 105- member Iraqi Kurdish National Assembly (KNA). The development of the party political system in Iraqi Kurdistan is best described as being characterised by punctuated equilibrium with the steady development of the system. The impact of the UNSCR 986 resolutions on the development of the administrations was immense. It took a great task away from the fledging administrations by ensuring that the population of the region is fed and provided basic provisions. When the Gulf War Coalition forces set up the 'safe haven' in northern Iraq for the Kurds, they hoped to prove their ability to run their own affairs while waiting for the Iraqi regime to fall. But their hopes were shattered by the fratricidal war. It is undeniable that conflict in 1994 and 1996 resulted in the division of the administration into two separate territories based in Arbil and Suleimaniyah, dominated by the KDP and PUK respectively.

The result of the collapse into conflict in 1994 was a direct manifestation of the pair of internal and external stresses and strains. Subsequently, the divided system which

emerged in 1996 allowed the KDP and PUK to govern their respective region without problems of internal competition and without antagonising the neighbours. But the developments of the separate administrations were not straightforward, with political considerations haunting the actions of both administrations. The economic and military situation of the Iraqi Kurds became steadily grimmer. Iraqi Kurdistan became an economic shambles as a result of civil conflict and the internal embargo imposed by Baghdad which cut off the northern Iraq from the markets it had depended on in the rest of the country. The oil-for-food programme supported the administrations in a technical sense, with UN agencies able to assist and implement humanitarian projects in the Kurdish region.

The KRG developed from a united organisation at the beginning of the 1990s into two separate administrative systems till 2002. The joint system of the First and Second Cabinets brought together two political parties which were separated by the quest of power. To have them together in a power-sharing situation worsened this rivalry. Furthermore, the joint system was of concern to neighbouring states, and not least the Government of Iraq, as the *de facto* state possessed a structure of governance which had the potential to promote the Kurdish national movement in a unified manner. Until 1997, at least, neither party displayed the ability to manage these rivalries in a peaceful manner, and therefore resorted to military options. However, with the reconvening of the KNA on October 2002 presented a clear growing cooperation within the Iraqi Kurdistan. But a unified administration presented a regional geopolitical instability, particularly to Turkey and Iran. These countries and other powers pursued active destabilising policies with their own national interests in mind, prompting tensions within the *de-facto* state. The government of Turkey in particular referred to the Iraqi Kurdish region as being a power vacuum with no effective government and therefore characterised by lawlessness.

Between 1997 (the year of the last major round of PUK-KDP fighting) and mid-2002, Iraqi Kurdistan enjoyed a period of enhanced political stability, economic development and growing international recognition. It further benefited from the United States containment policy against Saddam Hussein. Relations between the KDP and the PUK were generally improved following the Washington Agreement of September 1998.

The Agreement provided for a unified regional administration, the sharing of local revenues and co-operation in implementing the UN- sponsored oil-for-food programme.

The increased in unification could be achieved in a more technically oriented manner under a consociational approach of elite accommodation with focus more on the coordination of the activities of the separated local authorities. With its clearly divided society and political structure between the factional areas of the KDP and PUK as well as the older tribal and linguistic divisions, a consociational model of attempting to analyse the political structures of the deeply divided societies. For instance the first two cabinets of the Kurdistan Regional Government between 1991 and 1996 can said to have the consociational system with shared ministerial portfolios.

Precedents have already established where federal structures combined with elite accommodation within the political decision-making process ultimately produced stable political structures existing alongside a vibrant national economy. Such examples include Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium where in each of these cases, ethnic heterogeneity and cultural diversity was protected by the checks and balances which are implicit within a system. In a country which has been devastated by decades of authoritarian rule, it would seem to be distinct, humane and a possibility to learn and build upon the good and bad experiences of the Kurdish political system in the 1990s. A system characterised by the inclusion of the major ethnic/confessional groups of the country in an attempt to rid of the political system of some of the inhumanity which has characterised since its inception. An extremely important consequence of the Kurdish safe haven's existence was that considerable portions of the Iraqi population (the Kurds) have actual experience with self rule, civil rights and a transition to democracy. A consociational system may be seen as an interim solution. A federal structure combined with elite accommodation within the political decision-making process could have produced stable political structures in Iraq. Moreover, Both Barzani and Talabani accepted that a federal model would be a suitable model for a future Iraq.

Kurdish rights to self-determination will be realized when the artificially drawn boundaries are re-defined in the colonized Balkans and West Asia. However, re-definition of the boundaries in the region would be a radical structural transformation of the prevailing conservative and status quo order. It is unlikely that this change would be

acceptable to current political cultures and structures due to conflict between Kurdish autonomy, the continuity of a stable world system, and the balance that favours the dominating internal and external political structures. Najmaldin Karim, President of the Washington Kurdish Institute, a non-profit organisation that promotes the rights of Kurdish people worldwide, stated that Kurds will not press for an independent Kurdistan as some elements in Iran and Turkey fear. But he strongly endorsed the creation of democratic federal Iraq that respects the rights of its citizens and which is at peace with its neighbours (Castiel 2003:2). Iraqi Kurds had a consistent political movement despite measures taken by the central government. Moreover, Iraq has recognised Kurdish national rights to a greater extent than either Turkey or Iran.

Most important perhaps, outsiders were more aware that a comprehensive West Asian settlement must address the question of the Kurds, as well as Palestine. Until Kurds got a better deal there can be no stability in Iraq, Turkey or Iran, or indeed in the wider West Asia. There was long a debate within Kurdish circles over whether they should follow the Palestinians and use terrorism; after all, the Palestinians have embassies in over a hundred countries, the Kurds have none.

Why do the Arabs so rightfully demand a state for the Palestinians, but hypothetically deny one for the Kurds? Why the Turks demand self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots but deny same for the Kurds? Noam Chomsky claimed that the West used the Iraqi Kurds as sabotage for the prevailing Iraqi system. The goal was to create Western-style stability by installing a government in Iraq that would comply with Western desires (Chomsky 2001 58-59). Why did the West support the Iraqi Kurds, but referred to the Kurdish political movement in Turkey as a terrorist organisation? The Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds have the same culture, the same identity, and the same desire for an autonomous Kurdistan. Why didn't the West take action against Turkey's atrocities against the Kurds? It was not logical; it was not fair. The Kurds are by far the largest group of people in the world without their own nation-state. Kurds are often known as a nation without a country.

Chronology of the Kurdish National Movement in Iraq

1918 President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson (President of United States) was committed to the ideal of self-determination for all people. The Twelfth Point stated that non-Turkish nationalities living under Ottoman control "should be assured an undoubted security of life and be given opportunity of autonomous development".

1920 The Treaty of Sevres: At the end of World War I, the Allied powers met to determine the political future of lands and peoples in the defeated Ottoman Empire. The Treaty provided for independence from Turkey in those parts of Anatolia where Kurds were in a majority and set forth a political mechanism for the establishment of a Kurdish state that was to have encompassed the *villayet* of Mosul. The Treaty of Sevres was signed but never ratified.

1923 The Treaty of Lausanne: The Treaty of Lausanne superseded the Treaty of Sevres. The Kurds were not given autonomy and the areas where they lived were distributed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union. The greatest number found themselves either under the control of the Turkish state or under British rule in the newly created state of Iraq.

1924 British view: The British High commission issued a statement on 24 December 1924, "Recognising the right of the Kurds living within the frontiers of Iraq to establish a Kurdish government inside these frontiers."

1932 Iraqi Independence: In 1932, Iraq was granted full independence by the British and the Kurdish question was left unresolved.

1946 Republic of Mahabad: In Iran, Kurds established a short-lived Republic of Mahabad, which survived from January 1946 until December 1946.

1946 Creation of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq: This party changed its name to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq in 1953 to emphasize the inclusion of the non-Kurdish communities of Iraqi Kurdistan.

1958 Iraq under Abd-al Karim Qassem: After the monarchy was overthrown, Qassem encouraged participation of Kurds in the new government until his power was consolidated. In 1959, the new government began to clamp down on all dissident groups including the Kurds.

1963 Phase I of the Ethnic Cleansing and Arabisation Campaign: The ethnic cleansing and Arabisation campaign began when the Ba'ath party first came to power in 1963 and lasted until the temporary removal of the Ba'ath leadership in 1964.

1970 Autonomy Agreement between Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Government of Iraq: On 11 March 1970, an autonomy agreement was worked out between the KDP and the central government which acknowledges the existence of Kurds and granted certain rights.

1974 Kurdish Revolt against the Iraqi Government: By 1974, relations between the Kurds and the central government had deteriorated to the point of armed rebellion. During this period, Iran and Iraq were involved in extensive border disputes.

1974 Phase II of the Ethnic Cleansing and Arabisation Campaign: After the collapse of negotiations between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime in 1974, the Ba'ath government implemented the ethnic cleansing and Arabisation policy begun in 1963 to reduce the pre-dominantly Kurdish population in areas deemed of strategic economic or political importance to Iraq.

1975 Algiers Accord: In 1975, the border disputes were settled under the Algiers Accord and the United States and Iran withdrew their support of the Iraqi Kurds. As a result, the

rebellion collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled the country to refugee camps mainly in Iran.

1975 Creation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): It was established in June 1975 in Damascus, Syria after the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion the same year.

1980 The Iran-Iraq War: While many Kurds fought against the Iranians during the war, others continued the rebellion against the central government often with Iranian support.

1984 Phase III of the Arabisation Campaign: After another failed attempt at negotiation in 1984, the regime began systematic destruction of villages, homes, in the Kurdish areas. Its operation reached a final stage in the *Al-Anfal* campaign of 1988.

1988 Halabja: In March 1988, Iraqi government attacked the town of Halabja using a mix of chemicals that resulted in the deaths of around 5,000 civilians immediately and many more over the next few years.

1991 The Gulf War: Kurds were encouraged by the United States to rise up against the government and overthrow Saddam Hussein. The uprising began in March 1991 but coalition forces did not help the Kurds. At first, the Kurds were successful in driving out the Iraqi army from their territory but the Iraqi army regrouped and crushed the rebellion. United Nations adopted resolution 688, which stated that Human rights of Kurds must be protected. Safe haven established with no-fly-zone above 36th parallel established.

1992 Elections: In May 1992, elections were held in the newly established Kurdish safe haven with international observers. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was formed and 105 members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (the Parliament) were elected.

1994 KDP-PUK Split: The fifty-fifty (50-50) government split between these two parties fell apart and fighting broke out between them.

1996 Ceasefire: The KDP gained control of Arbil and the PUK withdrew to Suleimaniyah. The two parties have maintained separate administration.

1996 UNSCR 686: Oil-for-Food programme implemented the beginning of development in Iraqi Kurdistan.

1998 The Washington Agreement: KDP and PUK representatives met in Washington in the fall of 1998.Both the parties accepted the Accord. However it has not been fully implemented.

2002 Reconvening of the Kurdish National Assembly: For the first time since 1994, the full Kurdistan National Assembly convened in Arbil on 4 October 2002.

2003 War on Iraq: United States and its ally invaded Iraq led to the downfall of Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

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(* indicates a primary source)

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