


# **UNITED STATES - EUROPE AND IRAQ WAR**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the  
degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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Date: 30<sup>th</sup> July, 2007

DECLARATION

*I declare that the dissertation entitled "United States-Europe and Iraq War" submitted by me for the award of degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.*

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CERTIFICATE

*We recommended that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACC</b>	Arab Cooperation Council
<b>AOU</b>	Aid Organisation and the Ulema
<b>ASEAN</b>	Associations of South East Asian Nations
<b>AWACS</b>	Advanced Warning and Control System
<b>CEE</b>	Central European States
<b>CJTF</b>	Combined and Joint Task Force
<b>CNTF</b>	Counter Narcotics Task Force
<b>DHS</b>	Department of Homeland Security
<b>EC</b>	European Council
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EOM</b>	Election Observation Commission
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EUFOR</b>	EU Force
<b>FATF</b>	Financial Action Task Force
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terrorism
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>ICAO</b>	International Civil Aviation Organisation
<b>IMO</b>	International Maritime Organisation
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>MEP</b>	Members of European Parliament
<b>MND</b>	Multinational Division
<b>MTCR</b>	Missile Technology Control Regime
<b>NAC</b>	North Atlantic Council
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>NCTC</b>	National Counter Terrorism Centre
<b>NRF</b>	NATO Response Force
<b>NSE</b>	New Security Environment
<b>NSS</b>	National Security Strategy
<b>NSSP</b>	National Security Strategy Paper
<b>OIF</b>	Operation Iraqi Freedom
<b>OPEC</b>	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
<b>OSCE</b>	Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PATRIOT Act</b>	Providing Appropriate Tools Require to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
<b>PFP</b>	Partnership for Peace
<b>PIF</b>	Pacific Island Forum
<b>QDR</b>	Quadrennial Defence Review
<b>RAM</b>	Rapid Action Mechanism
<b>SACEUR</b>	Supreme Allied Command of Europe
<b>UNMOVIC</b>	United Nations Monitoring, Verifications and Inspection Commission
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNSCOM</b>	United Nations Special Commission
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destructions
<b>WTC</b>	World Trade Centre

## PREFACE

The history of the United States began with the arrival of the Europeans, though it is shrouded with mystery. The relationship between America and Europe is a historical significance. The composite relation passes through the different phases and constant struggle for existence. In most of the time, the situation and circumstances bent down their long standing relations but they again tactically rebuilt it. Since the Spanish American war to the long reach Cold War, the USA showed its foreign policy priorities around the globe. During the time of the Cold War era, especially at the out set of the East-West tussle, the Middle East regions became a source of confrontation between the US and European countries, because the location of this region has strategic importance. The relation between the United States and European allies made a distinct phenomenon in the post-World War II period. Throughout the Cold War they were tactically defending the threats of the Soviet Union. The regional allies' formations and the commitment to protect the allied nations became their prime concern. Before the end of the Cold War, especially the relations of the US-European allies were fractured. It germinated the strained economic relation due to clash of economic interests.

The first chapter deals with two distinct areas, first: the conflict in the Middle East, especially, the strained relations between Iraq and Iran and the engagement of US and Europe for their own benefits. Economic interests were the major concern for them and they adopted either Iraq or Iran as their ally; and the second major factor was the national interest of the individual countries. So the national interests plus increasing European consciousness resulted in the growing desire of European countries to coordinate their policies in the Persian Gulf regions. The Cold War ended and a major international crisis erupted with Iraq's invasion on Kuwait. The displacement of millions of people from Kuwait and Iraq created a worldwide economic and financial uncertainty. The European countries, especially the British, approached the international community to challenge the Iraqi aggression. The Arab world was deeply divided in its response to Iraq, reflecting divisions noticeable prior to the invasion. As the desire to form a wide diplomatic coalition behind its leadership, the US sought to build up a multinational military coalition. The most important theme of the chapter is how the US gained goodwill and military aid from its allies and the UN's help to save Kuwait from Iraq.

The world history teaches us over the past five years how different states and groups chose to respond to the global crisis. The most important and powerful lessons we should take from the experience of September 11, 2001, attacks in the heart of the US and how this events led to a change in the global order.

Chapter two provides a tactical analysis of the reactions of the world and the close allies of the US, and the role of the UN and existing multilateral institutions. European co-operation and strategic support was manifold to US for its “global war on terrorism.” Almost all countries of EU provided their full solidarity to capture the culprit (Osama bin Laden) behind the attacks and to save Afghanis form the control of Taliban regime. The first target of the global war on terrorism achieved an unprecedented success, but the next goal set by the US to the regime change in Iraq as a part of the war on terrorism resulted in great discontent around the world and it was quite evident in Europe. Countries like Germany, France and Belgium were a part of the US led coalition in Afghanistan, but they refused to go along with the US in its plan to invade Iraq. The study focuses on how the anti-war movements were blocking the way of Anglo-US forces mobilization against Iraq. Diplomacy surrounding the commencement of the war in Iraq illuminated the complex relationship between the US and EU. The central European nations constituted a quarter of coalition members of the US. On the other hand, the French and Germans were able to create a strong anti-war bloc.

Chapter three surveys and describes a debate over “old Europe” and “new Europe”. Commenting on the stands of the European countries, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld gave a famous distinction between “new” and “old” Europe. The study also stresses on how Rumsfeld’s remark was followed by a long wave of commentary on a Europe-American divide. It was also widely perceived that 9/11 has only revealed NATO’s relevance. For the first time in 52 years of its existence, it defined its commitment to defense guarantee mentioned in Article 5. It played a very vital role in the war in Afghanistan, but it became riddled when its partners staged an anti-war protection on US’s pre-emptive war against Iraq. The NATO’s relevance is a focal point of the third chapter.

The fourth chapter reveals the behaviour of public and media of both continents after 9/11 and during the time of the Iraq war. It assesses how the security policies and



directives were challenged in the outside of the institutionalized settings. During the war, a carefully crafted media policy was designed in order to win public confidence and garner popular support for the war. Paradoxically, the war in Iraq attracted more media coverage than any war in history. It also analyses the sentiments of the reactions of Muslims in the Arab world and US-Europe. Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one. The survey of European public opinion highlights the sharp difference over the global leadership and how the Middle East crisis threatened the future of the last century's most successful transatlantic alliance. The chapter also traces the post-Iraq war cordial engagement of Europe in Iraq for reconstruction and to secure the Middle Eastern regions.

In the conclusion an overall assessment of the factors that contributed to the US-European alliance in the post 9/11 period has been attempted on the basis of the findings of the study in the preceding chapters.

My study of this topic is based on certain objectives; they are: to find out the problems of the US-EU relations, inter European division, Anti-Americanism and Anti-Europeanism, Anglo-US coalition mobilization, NATO's relevance prior to attack on Iraq as a part of the "global war on terrorism", and examining their relations with Iraq, especially with the Middle East since the Cold War period.

The study makes use of the following hypotheses: the US war on Iraq promoted division among EU members; and the Iraq war has helped Europe to challenge the US hegemony and seek multilateralism.

The study is based on the available primary and secondary literature. The primary sources included the reports of the US Congress, Departmental Reports, US-EU joint declaration, UN Resolutions and NATO Summit Declarations and available official web sites of both the US and EU. The secondary material includes Books, Journal Articles, and News Papers articles. Historical and analytical methods have been used for the study.

## CHAPTER- ONE

# US AND EUROPE RELATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

History is not a good basis for prediction, since every event is unique and since, despite all the back listing, we do make progress understand world and dealing with its problems. Nevertheless, used with care, history can teach important lessons and alert us to the possibilities and limits of successful action. The first lesson of it is that, in thinking about foreign policy, we need to distinguish between partners and allies. Allies are for temporary objectives but the partners are for the long haul, and war between partners are unthinkable; future wars between allies remain possible just as important as shared values in converting allies into partners and this is the second lesson suggested by the war time alliance is asymmetry of power. The relation between the United States and Western Europe especially Britain reached this point by the end of the World War II. Europe was severely weakened during the First World War and the Second World War was also led to the failure of European strategy and diplomacy as a global power. Less than a decade into the Cold War, European ceded both colonial holdings and strategic responsibilities in Asia and the Middle East to the US. That was sometimes willingly and sometimes the American pressure, as the Suez crisis. <sup>1</sup>In the area of decision making elites and culture, American foreign policy has always been strongly affected by the origins of Americans. The US is a nation of immigrants, and that shows in foreign policy posture. The fact that, even with the growth of Hispanic and other minority populations, two-thirds Americans still claim European ancestry which continues to have an important affects on American relations with Europe. Moreover, in a larger sense, the US shares the values of democracy and human rights more thoroughly with the majority of European countries than with most other states. The values matter in American foreign policy and the commonality of values between the USA and Europe is an important force in keeping the two sides' together. The US is the progeny of certain island European power, the legacy of which evident in US political structures, legal mechanisms and civil protections, and language. It may be true that in the age of information, the coherence in foreign policy is difficult for democratic government to maintain, but in case of US and Europe the permeability and transparency has proved to be an asset in the sense of this leads to border and wider transnational channels of communication. In this sensate role of the Britain in Europe remains a unique asset to the cause of European–American comity. A Europe in which Britain continues to look both across the channel and across the Atlantic, which emphasizes the outward

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p.17

looking aspects, helps to reinforce the overall US-European relationship.<sup>2</sup> Looking up to the existing relations between the US and Europe one cannot say that there are no problems in their relations. The major difference is the burning issues of US unilateralism, what sometimes called the arrogance of power?<sup>3</sup> During the cold war, Americans paid considerable heed to Allied sensitiveness because of the need for a common front against Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the US has been more arrogant about multilateral institutions and more likely to indulge in legislation with extraterritorial effects and often less attentive to the detailed concerns of the allies. In the 1990s, the US wanted to reestablish the war devastated Europe and hoped that Europe could be 'third force' in the world, strong enough to hold its own against the Soviet Union. Europe was dependent on the US for its own security and for global security. Europe's vital strategic mission during the cold war was to stand firm and defend its own territory against any soviet offensive until the American arrived. However, European willingness to spend as much on their as American administration believed necessary was content source of transatlantic tension since the establishment NATO, to the days of Kennedy's doctrine of "flexible response" depended on a significant increase in European conventional forces, to the Reagan years, when the American congressman clamored for Europe to do more to 'share burden' of the common defense.<sup>4</sup> But the circumstances of the Cold War created a perhaps unavoidable tension between American and European interests. America's Cold War strategy was built around the transatlantic alliance. The great partnership was consolidated between the United States of America and Europe in the NATO treaty during the Cold War and is now unbreakable. In any partnership, there will always be an awkward member. In the western alliance, this part has been played by France with great elegance and to the frequent irritation between the US, but with some benefits to the partnership on a whole by making it appear as not wholly subservient to US wishes. Russia and China were allies in the Grand Alliance and are allied with the US in the coalition against terrorism today The generosity of the Marshall Plan which was to rebuild not just the economies of Western Europe, but also nurtured the damaged political systems during the Cold War. Through the Cold War, Western Europe and the USA had a common enemy in the Soviet Union. NATO provided a collective security arrangement where everyone had a voice, and the threat

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The US-Europe and Continental Drift?" , *International Affairs*, (76, 1, 2000), pp.54-55

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.p.57

<sup>4</sup> Kagan, No.1, p.18

was clear. If there was occasional tension, it often sprang from European worries about whether the US might return to isolationism; or American irritation with lack of European investment in defense. The decade of the 1990s was extraordinary and the fall of the Berlin Wall led successively to the reunification of Germany, the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the new freedom for the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. While there was some concern about the future of NATO without a clear enemy, the instability stemming from the break up of the former Yugoslavia gave plenty of work for Alliance forces. Indeed in 1999, NATO found itself in its first war as it carried out the Kosovo campaign.<sup>5</sup> The Kosovo war was the result of NATO's geo-political type of selective expansion on the basis of mistaken and rather hypocritical ideological- political premises.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the Cold War successive US administrations consistently sought to pursue a two stand policy in the Middle East: to exclude or minimize Soviet presence and influence in the area and to ensure the free flow of oil to Western countries. The process was complicated by the creation of the state of Israel, which in turn led to several Arab states embracing increasingly hard line radical and nationalist agenda. These agendas, combined as they were with the regional militarization and polarization through arms sales, further hardened support among national leaders for violent means to realize political objectives. Consequently, the Middle East area ensured that diplomatic solutions to both domestic and regional problems were undermined as the level of inter communal violence in the region increased, so did the state security measures, and the result was that the regimes became extremely strong at the expense of their populations. These regional developments produced high authoritarian and deeply entrenched régime that were not always in harmony with US objectives. In the Iraqi case unprecedented problems followed in the wake of the war in Iran, and this at a time when the hitherto relatively close relationship with Washington was deteriorating. The Iraqi predicament, which culminated in the invasion of Kuwait, came at a period when the increased US defense budget of the Reagan years materialized the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States found itself as the sole super power.

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<sup>5</sup> Vassilis K. Fouskas, "*Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East*", (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 60

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

## I

### US-EUROPE AND IRAQ DURING THE COLD WAR

The contact between the United States and the Arab world, in the early part of the nineteenth century, can hardly be said to have been auspicious, even if 'the shores of Tripoli' were remembered to this day in the marine corps' hymn.<sup>7</sup> Through the remainder of the century, the US interested involvement in matters Middle Eastern was minor even though the area experienced great changes and instability at that time. But from the early 1880s onward the region, specifically Egypt and the fertile areas of the Arabian Peninsula, increasingly fell under British way. After 1919 and the elimination of the Ottoman Empire Britain and France were without rivals of that area though in this inter war period the US, on account of its oil interests, became increasingly involved in the Persian gulf. It was the Second World War, however, that gave expression to only undeviating overland line of communication with the Soviet Union. The US entry into the WW-II redefined the importance of the Middle East, according to the Daniel Yergin, as oil became the critical commodity for the conduct of the war itself, for national power and international predominance.<sup>8</sup>

The various matters came together in the immediate post-war period as the victorious Allied powers confronted one profound truism: allies are not successfully friends, a fact never more evident than when the common threat that ensured their previous solidarity was gone. So the Cold War was in shape, the Washington sought to build a security system interregional that the world serves as a check upon perceived Soviet expansionism. The weakening of the British position in the region and the perceived soviet threat led to the Eisenhower administration in July 1953 to define US interests in terms of having access to the region's resources and strategic positions while denying them to the Soviet Union. With the US primacy in Iran, established when Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi replaced Muhammad Mosaddiq in the American supported coup of 1953, the Turkish-Iraqi alliance of 1955 became the basis of the Baghdad pact, formed when Britain, Iran and Pakistan adhered to the already established bilateral agreements. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, together with Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi prime minister, was the real founder of the Northern Tier

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<sup>7</sup> John Andreas Olsen, *Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm*, (Portland: frank Class Publishers,2003), p.

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<sup>8</sup> Daniel Yergin, the Prize: *The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, (New York: Simon and Schuster,1991), p.393

concept of area defense against perceived Soviet aggression.<sup>9</sup> As reliance on military power increasingly became part of US policy, president Dwight D. Eisenhower came to regard as 'a bulwark of stability and progress in the region'.<sup>10</sup>

Iraq was ironically only Arab state in the Baghdad Pact, but in the t period of the Hashmite kingdom, it was one of the US closest associates in the Arab Middle East. The Eisenhower administration went beyond the terms of reference supplied by its predecessor by actually encouraging a regional security system. the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 widened US involvement in the region by starting as willingness to use armed forces in defense of the any country in the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism'.<sup>11</sup> The basic objective of this Doctrine was to declare a very strong commitment even to use armed force to eliminate Soviet influence in the gulf region.

During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the US security policy towards West Asia, for various reasons, was overshadowed by events in South East Asia. Both administrations were unable to pay much attention towards the Gulf region due to the American involvement in Vietnam. Throughout the 1960s, the US provided huge arms aid and assistance to friendly Gulf States. Since the Arab-Israel conflict and the victory of Israel in 1967, the two main features are characterized US-European roles in the Arab-Israel dispute. The first was the preeminence of the US in regional diplomacy. Through it global super power status, military strength, close ties with Israel and huge amount of economic and military aid to key regional powers, the US has been privileged interlocutor of all parties in the region. Even most Arab leaders have agreed with the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's famous suggestion that the US held '99 percent of the cards'.<sup>12</sup> If the US has had a rival for influence over the Middle East since 1960s, it was not Europe but the Soviet Union, whose exclusion from the region was a primary US goal throughout the Cold War. When Moscow's influence was declined in the 1980s, and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991, the US was left as the unrivaled outside power in the Middle Eastern politics.

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<sup>9</sup>John Andreas Olsen,no.3,p.11

<sup>10</sup> Olsen,no.3.p.11

<sup>11</sup> Stephen J. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol.II, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp.381-86

<sup>12</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, "Can NATO Survive?", *Washington Quarterly*, (Vol.19, No.2, Spring 1996), pp.79-86

The second main feature of US and European involvement in the Arab- Israeli conflict has been the US alignment with Israel, while the European took a position closer to that of the Arab states. While often critical of Israeli government policies and, at times, willing to exercise diplomatic or economic leverage over the government, Washington's backing for Israel in its conflict with its Arab neighbors has been ambiguous. The US has provided Israel with unparalleled amounts of economic and military aid, helped to ensure its military superiority over its neighbors and to protect it with military assistance during wartime, and excused or defended its behavior when it violated international norms, laws, or UN Security Council resolutions.

While the US aligning itself with Israel, Europe was moving closer to the Arab states. Whereas, the October 1973 attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria led the US adopt a greater role as Israeli's protector, European's aligned themselves with the Arab side in the conflict, in part for fear of alienating the regime on whose oil they depended. In the November 1973, as part of its Middle East policy under the rubric of 'European political cooperation', the European community (EC) acknowledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinians' and called on Israel to end its 'territorial occupation' on Arab lands. The reversal in American and European positions began with the 1967 Middle East War, as the French government moved from a pro-Israeli to the pro-Arab stance and as the US moved to become the major source of political, financial and military support for Israel. But the 1973 Middle East war took this development further, with the US providing crucial support and re-supply for Israel, and the member governments of the European community responding by a 'Euro-Arab Dialogue', despite the disapproval of the US administration.<sup>13</sup> In the wake of the 1973-74 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo, subsequent economic recession and increased Palestinian terrorism in Europe, the EC developed a 'Euro-Arab dialogue' designed to improve relation with the Arab world and to distinguish the community policies of from those of the US. These shifts did not, whatever their justification or merit, enhance European influence in the region, particularly with Israel. Americans and Israeli alike would remember Europe's reluctance during the 1973 war to help the US to airlift equipment and supplies that could have been crucial to Israeli's survival. Both Israel and the US henceforth sought

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<sup>13</sup> Costanza Musu and William Wallace, *The Middle East*. In John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (ed.) *Europe, America and Bush*, (New York: Routledge Publications, 2003), p.100



to limit not only Soviet, but also European influence in the region. Over nearly three decades since then, different approach to the Middle East have lay behind many of the most delicate transatlantic relations on the terms of political and security relationship. Europeans generally followed a policy of engagement with the difficult regimes of the Gulf ranging from an increasing economic restriction on the trade with Iraq to 'Troika Format' dialogue with the Iranian leaders.<sup>14</sup> The US worked with and through a succession of strategic partners within the Middle East: first Iran, until the overthrow of the Shah, then Saudi Arabia, and increasingly with Israel and Turkey. European governments perused active trade policies towards the oil producing states of the Gulf, in particular, seeking to offset their oil-dependence through exports of manufactures, arms, technology and services. But the successive US administrations made it clear that it was for Washington to define Western security and political priorities to the region, and for its European partners to provide support, and if necessary financial assistance.

Divergence of the political approaches to region has reflected divergent domestic contexts for policy since the 1970s, as well as the divergent political interpretations of the region. The divergent approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict have often been at the core of US-European difference; but the different assumptions about regimes in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya have also divided transatlantic allies. The European approach has rested on 'civilian soft power' instruments: diplomacy, trade, financial assistance. The American approach has rested all these and the ability to protect credible military power. In the 1980s there was a separate dialogue with the Gulf States. There was separate view drawn that the international politics of the Gulf region are only partly linked to the Arab-Israeli tension of the Middle East, but for the US, the Mediterranean has been the southern flank of NATO, and the essential West-East corridor through which to project power across the Middle East. The project around energy resources coupled with competing financial and military interests of Western states have impelled the US to start on its battle to secure the upper hand. The war against Iraq in 1990-91 was directly linked to energy interests, as will be any future US intervention in the Iraq-Iran-Syria-Kurdistan zone.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The Atlantic Council Report, 2002, [http://www.acus.org/docs/021213U.S.\\_Challenges\\_Choices\\_Gulf\\_Unilateral\\_Sanctions.pdf](http://www.acus.org/docs/021213U.S._Challenges_Choices_Gulf_Unilateral_Sanctions.pdf), 13<sup>th</sup> March, 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Vassilis K. Fouskas, No. 5, p. 119

It is important for the world to examine the potential of the EU to become an independent political actor in the world affairs. This potential is limited because the US-EU partnership goes back a long way, as the hegemony of the US over EU political affairs was established during the Cold War years. In the late 1970s witnessed a substantial change in the political affairs in the Gulf region with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the fall of the Shah, who had been the main pillar of the US led Gulf security arrangement. The same year, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan brought the Communist influence closest to the Gulf since the 1950s. The US brokered the Camp David accord in 1978 between the Israel and Egypt. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in January 1980, President Jimmy Carter adopted a new course of action for securing the US vital interest in the Gulf. In the State of the Union Address, he articulated a plan of action which comes to be known as the 'Carter Doctrine'. In his own words: "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as the result of the 'vital interests' of the US and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."<sup>16</sup> The main intention of the 'Carter Doctrine' was to restore the American political leverage; to secure the cooperation of the regional states; to check the growing Soviet influence; to contain the spillover of Iranian Revolution; and to encourage closer relations between the Arab and Israelis. The doctrine also incorporated the idea of direct US intervention in the Gulf. The US threatened to use "all means", including nuclear weapons, to protect the gulf from adversaries. It created the rapid deployment of force in February 1980 which subsequently transformed into the Central Command (CENTCOM) in January 1983.

## II

### US-EUROPE'S RESPONSE DURING THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR

The triumph of the new Islamic regimes in Iran in February 1979 deeply shocked Saddam Hussein. He was particularly concerned about the belligerent propaganda of the new revolutionary leadership and its explicit call for the overthrow of the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. He worried that this might appeal to his own Shiite population and might encourage rebellion from the south of the country.

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<sup>16</sup> Department of the State Bulletin, March 1980. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1295/is-12-68/ai\\_n8582775](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1295/is-12-68/ai_n8582775), April 13, 2007

Sensing that the military balance of the forces was now in favor of Iraq, he felt confident that he could win a short and limited military campaign, and teach the Iranian clerics a lesson in real politics. By the time Saddam Hussein formally became the president of Iraq in 1979, his strategy for securing and maintaining power had been proved to be successful. He had created a totalitarian state structure with no significant opposition to his exercise of absolute power. It was a clearest analogy like Stalin's rise to power. As with his dealing with internal challenge, Saddam had acted towards the outside world pragmatically and with the little concern for ideological considerations. With the converse of this political pragmatism and flexible ideology, when Saddam Hussein considers himself sufficiently strong, he had no hesitation about using force to further his objectives. Against the hostile world, Saddam was more than willing to capitalize on the weakness of his neighbors so as to foster a more favorable international position. War is the only another instrument of diplomacy, corresponding to the use of violence within the state. Saddam's invasion of Iran in September 1980 was an attempt to use his tool to modify the behavior of Iran to the dictates of his will.

Iran was the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf during the 1970s. Its strength was partly due to its large population (roughly three times that of Iraq) and its oil reserves, but it is also stemmed from the strong regime of Shah of Iran and Iraq was in no position to defy Iran's regional dominance. Iran put constant pressure on Saddam's regime during the early 1970s, mostly by fomenting unrest among the Iraq's sizable Kurdish minority. Iraq finally persuaded the Shah to stop meddling with the Kurds in 1975, but only by agreeing to cede half of the Shatt al-Arab water way to Iran, a concession that underscored Iraq's weakness. It is not surprising that Saddam welcomed the Shah's ouster in 1979. Iraq went to the considerable lengths to foster good relations with Iran's revolutionary leadership. Saddam did not exploit the turmoil of Iran to gain strategic advantage over his neighbor and made no attempt to reverse his earlier concessions, even though Iran did not fully comply with the terms of the 1975 agreement. Ruhollah Khomeini, on the other hand, was determined to extend his revolution across the Islamic world, starting with Iraq. By late 1979, Tehran was pursuing the Kurdish and Shiite populations in Iraq to revolt and topple Saddam, and Iranian operatives were trying to assassinate senior Iraqi officials.

Border clashes became increasingly frequent by April 1980, largely in Iraq's instigation.

Facing a grave threat to his regime but aware that Iran's military readiness had temporarily disrupted by the solution, Saddam launched a limited war against his bitter foe on September 22, 1980. His principal aim was to capture a large slice of territory along the Iraq-Iran border, not to conquer Iran or topple Khomeini. "The war began," as military analyst Efraim Karsh writes, "because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbor, Iran, to reshape the regional status quo according to its own image."<sup>17</sup>Iran and Iraq fought for eight years, and the war cost the two antagonists more than 1 million casualties and at least \$150 billion. Iraq received considerable outside support from other countries- including the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and France- largely because these states were determined to prevent the spread of Khomeini's Islamic revolution. Although the war cost of Iraq far more than Saddam expected, it also thwarted Khomeini's attempt to topple him and dominate the region. War with Iran was not a reckless adventure; it was an opportunistic response to a significant threat.<sup>18</sup>

Saddam hopes to success in a limited war proved to be a massive miscalculation. As with the French and Russian revolutions, the new revolutionary leadership in Iran seized the opportunity of external threat to mobilize domestic support and to engage in total war to prove the power of their expansionist ideology. Instead of agreeing to a limited engagement to define a new balance of power, the Iranian theocrats expressed their explicit objective of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. After a short period of Iraqi military successes, Iran succeeded in consolidating its forces and, for the next eight years, all of Iraqi energies were focused on containing and repelling direct Iranian threat. At times, Iran seemed on the point of achieving its objectives. In the end, Iraq did manage to prevent an Iranian victory, but only at enormous resources. Despite such costs, the Iraq-Iran war ironically contributed to the strengthening of Saddam's hold on power and enhanced his personal legitimacy.

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<sup>17</sup> John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War", *Foreign Policy*, January-February 2003,p.53

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. No.10,p.53

The revolution of Iran in 1979 led to the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran. This unexpected collapse put a severe impact of American position in the Gulf region. The humiliation of the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, for 444 days with American diplomats taken hostage, and the failure of the US military operation to rescue them all were a great set-back for the US. Therefore, American support flowed to Iraq in its ten years war with Iran, with its tacit approval of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Kuwait, though there were clandestine exchanges with Iraq's enemy in the 'Iran-Contra affair'.<sup>19</sup> American ships patrolled in the Gulf through out the 1980s, protecting Kuwait and other oil tankers. The partnership with Saudi Arabia had now expanded into substantial military build-up and the Washington looked to Riyadh to replace Teheran as the bastion of Western-sponsored stability in the Gulf area. European political influence, in contrast had shrunk with the withdrawal of European forces. West European governments had hoped in the 1960s to shift from a coal-based energy economy to nuclear power. But the rising costs and uncertainties of nuclear energy and the ready availability of chief oil from North Africa and Middle East had led instead to dependence on imported oil.

In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, West European disquiet with the quality of US foreign policy leadership provoked one further attempt at collective diplomacy towards the Middle East, culminating in the Venice Declaration agreed by the European Council (EC) foreign ministers in June 1980.<sup>20</sup> Oil was the major factor for the involvement of the US and Europe in the Gulf regions. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was marked a greater shock to American and European alike.<sup>21</sup> It set their basis of some of the tensions over the Gulf that would later emerge between the allies. The removal of the US backed Shah, the seizure of the US hostages a new regime's support for terrorism and opposition to Israel combined to leave a venomous legacy that would mark US-Iranian relations into the 1990s. When the Reagan administration entered into the office, made its opposition to autonomous European diplomacy in the Middle East even clearer leaving successive foreign ministers in the routing EC Council presidency to conduct fact finding tours to the region without attempting more. European relation with the Arab world therefore continued to be conducted primarily through the trade policy: managed by the

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<sup>19</sup>Costanza Musu and William Wallace, No.13, p.103

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp.104-105

<sup>21</sup>Philip H. Gordon, *The Transatlantic Alliance and Changing Middle East*, *Adelphi Paper*, (New York, 332, 1998, p. 46

European Commission, rather than by national governments. So the pattern of Western relations with the Middle East that we observe today had thus already been set before the end of the Cold War. The US defined political and security policy, backed up by military forces with active diplomacy. European governments attempted to use economic relations as an indirect route to political partnership. But they stumbled over the conflicting interests of the EU's southern member states and their trans-Mediterranean competitors, over attempts to introduce political conditions into economic agreements, and over the inclusion of Israel in their global approach. American leadership was more dominant in the Gulf, in spite of European hesitations over the degree of US hostility to Iran's post revolution regime. By the end of the 1980s, minesweepers and frigates from several European navies were assisting the US in keeping in the Gulf open to shipping. With different degrees quiet dissent or open criticism, European governments disagreed with the American bias towards Israel, and its anti-Iranian engagements in the Gulf. American policy makers in their turn criticized the pro-Arab bias of European governments, and their interdependence on American power to maintain the flow of oil through the Gulf.

During the 1990s containment was the explicit US policy for dealing with both Iran and Iraq. It reflected the perceived success of the containment of communism. After it, European implosion and its embrace of capitalism in Asia it followed on from the explicit decision not to overthrow Saddam or to support Shia/Kurd insurrection at the end of the 1991 war. This in turn reflected the belief, stronger in the case of Iraq than Iran, which the regime would collapse from within. There was also prudent understanding of the risks involved in taking responsibility for the governance of potentially turbulent and fractious countries. But at the same time Iraqi behavior provided a further basis for building up of a dominant US military presence in the region. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, which took place just a month after the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, only reinforced the trend. It led the US to issue the 'Carter Doctrine', declaring that an attempt by any outside force to gain control over the Persian Gulf region would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the US.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Kagan, No.1, pp.56-58

During the 1980s, the general Western agreement on Gulf policy was evident in the attitudes and policies towards the 'first Gulf war'<sup>23</sup> between Iran and Iraq in 1980-88. While some states such as France were more explicit than others in their 'tilt' towards Iraq during the conflict. Americans and Europeans alike claimed formal neutrality and were relatively disinterested in the war as long as it did not affect shipping in the Gulf, and Iran responded in kind. The US and European reaction was again a common one. Beginning in July 1987, a number of US allies followed the US lead in providing military escorts for tanker traffic in the Gulf water.<sup>24</sup> But the outbreak of the second Gulf war, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, only strengthened the general transatlantic consensus on policy in the region. Whatever the different biases and an interest of the American and Europeans, Iraqi aggression was so blatant that it forced all the West, and indeed most Arab governments, into the same camp. While nearly all the NATO allies eventually joined the coalition, the various Western reactions to the invasion of Kuwait revealed much about their respective positions. The US took the lead, emphasized the international coalition and provided the overwhelming majority of the forces. The UK lent it immediate and steady support, and provided the most significant European military contribution. France, traditionally both less willing to stand unquestioningly by the US, cautious about offending the Arab world, wavered before becoming involved. The eventual development of 12,000 troops followed much agonizing, the resignation of the Defense Minister, Jean Pierre Chevenement, and several last minute attempts to mediate between Iraq and the coalition.<sup>25</sup> Germany, again typically, stood midway between the French and the British positions. Constrained by its past and by interpretation of its constitution that prevented it from deploying military forces abroad, Germany strongly supported the US financially, but did not take part in the military coalition. Other European states have also acted as expected, supporting US leadership of the coalitions. When another crisis emerged seven years later over UN arms inspections, the US and Europeans reactions would be remarkably similar to those during 1990-91.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Iraq has been seen as a matter of national interest. The differences of opinion among the members of the international community reflect

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<sup>23</sup> Philip H. Gordon, No. 21, p. 47

<sup>24</sup> Hanns W. Maull, 'Alliance Cooperation and Conflict in the Middle East in Hanns W. Maull and Otto Pick (ed.), *the Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions*, (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 146-47

<sup>25</sup> Olsen, No. 3. pp. 93-94

the different histories of these nations had with the pre-Gulf war Iraq. Both the US and Europe came across the severe stress over Iraq during the 1980s. All these three nations had various economic interests in Iraq. After the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 Saddam Hussein ejected the British influence from the Iraqi Petroleum company. But France remains retained a quarter shares in the oil company and also increased its sales of arms to the Iraqi army through the first of the decade. In 1976 Iraq and France signed a Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, and France built a nuclear reactor at Osirak. The situation was quite cordial during 1980s. But when the US, the UK, and France provided military aid to Iraq, which was used to fight Iran all three nations were more concerned by Khomeini's Islamism than Hussein's internal repression of dissent. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War. France was Iraq's greatest Western creditor, with debt totaling over 24 billion Francs (2). Among Western nations, France had the most to lose from a sanctioned Iraq.

### **III**

#### **THE FIRST GULF WAR AND US-EUROPE STAND**

With the end of the Cold War, the transnational conditions that made traditional Atlanticism possible collapsed. That shift, however, was not fully understood and internalized by policy makers on either side of the Atlantic until the crisis over Iraq made it potentially clear. Washington, given its preponderant hard power- and the will to use it without the hindrance of international constraints- assumed that Europe would eventually follow in any case. The European assumed their own ability to exercise international influence by either bandaging with the US with the preference of 'Euro-Atlanticists'- or counterbalancing. It is fair to say that the first Bush administration in 1990s faced stiff disagreement, when the transatlantic allies found themselves confronted with significant decisions over Iraq; they realized that the familiar mechanisms to contain the damage were gone.

#### **US perceptions of Threat**

The invasion of Kuwait was most catastrophic event in the annals of world history. Though the great power rivalry was ended with the disintegration of Soviet Union but the regional security situation remains a question mark (?). The most important danger came to the forefront of the world security environment was *the Gulf crisis*. The crisis outraged an international coalition to save Kuwait from the occupation of



Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with the Iraq's continued vulnerability. Saddam Hussein confronted extreme uncertainties with the ending of the Iran-Iraq war and the cold war. Iraq's supposed victory in the prolonged and highly destructive war with Iran created a temporary sense of official euphoria in Baghdad. Saddam continued to his arm build up and "Iraqi news papers were filled with self-congratulation, as Iraq began to portray itself as a new super power."<sup>26</sup> Iraq's economy badly damaged by its war with Iran and continued decline after the war ended. An important cause of Iraqi difficulties was Kuwait's refusal both to loan Iraq \$ 10 billion and to write off debts Iraq had incurred during the Iraq-Iran war.<sup>27</sup> From the beginning of the Iraqi nationhood Iraqi people believed that Kuwait is part and parcel of Iraq. On the eve of the invasion of Kuwait Saddam believed that Iraq was entitled to additional aid because the country helped protect Kuwait and other Gulf states from Iranian expansionism. To make matter worse, Kuwait was overproducing the quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which drove down the world oil prices and reduce Iraqi oil profits. Saddam tried using diplomacy to solve the problem, but Kuwait hardly budged. Saddam reportedly decided go on war sometimes in July 1990, but before sending his army into Kuwait, he approached the US to find out how it would react. In a famous interview with an Iraqi leader, US ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam," we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like border disagreement with Kuwait."<sup>28</sup> The US State Department had earlier conveyed impression to it, because Saddam that had "no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait". The US may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that effectively what it did.<sup>29</sup> Saddam invaded Kuwait in early August 1990. This act was an obvious violation of international law, and the United States was justified in opposing the invasion and organizing the coalition against it. The coalition got victorious in the first Gulf war but the history of the international relations turn in different ways. The evidence during the war demonstrates that Saddam is deterrable. First he launched conventionally armed Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War, but he did not use chemical or biological weapons at the coalition forces that were destroy the Iraqi military. In the words of deputy Prime

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<sup>26</sup> Elaine Sciolino, *the Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), p. 186

<sup>27</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, No.14, pp.54-55

<sup>28</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, No.14, p.54

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

Minister Tariq Aziz and the former head of the military intelligence, general Wafiq al-Samarrai- have declared that Iraq refrained from using chemical weapons because the Bush Sr. administration made ambiguous but unmistakable threats to retaliate if Iraq used WMD. Second, in 1994 Iraq mobilized the remnants of its army on Kuwaiti border in an apparent attempt to force a modification on the U.N. Special Commission's (UNSCOM) weapons inspection regime. But when the US reinforced its troops in Kuwait, Iraq backed down quickly.<sup>30</sup> In both the cases, the allegedly irrational leader was deterred. On December 1989, Iraq announced that it had launched a rocket, called the al-Abid, which was said to be capable of putting satellite into space. Seven days later, Iraq made further announcement that it had developed two more rockets with a range equivalent to 2,000 kilometers.<sup>31</sup> It can carry a large nuclear weapons or large chemical or biological weapons against any target in Israel or Iran. The second announcement was made virtually at the same time as Western members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) were holding a meeting in London. It evoked grave concerns over Iraq's missile development program and general ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East. It created a focal concern for West over the growing of Saddam's power to destabilize the region. A few days later, a US Department of State report cleverly criticized Iraq for its appalling human rights record and the US congress responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq. But Saddam's response was characteristically aggressive. At a meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1990 Saddam presented his personal analysis of the implications of the ending of Cold War and the subsequent challenge posed by the US to the Arab world. He stressed that the decline of the Soviet Union had not meant that the US would be sympathetic to Arab concerns. Its naval presence in the Gulf and its support in the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel showed that it ignored Arab interests and would continue to do so. Since its policy so far as no red lines warning to the concerned sides in the US treat beyond them where Arab interests are concerned.<sup>32</sup>

Saddam's remarks were intended to galvanize a mood of confrontation in the Arab world. As he made clear that the US might temporarily be unchallenged dominant power but the Arabs poses an extraordinary ability to celebrate the creation of an

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<sup>30</sup> Walt, No.14,p.55

<sup>31</sup> Philip H. Gordon, No.20, p.68

<sup>32</sup> Elaine Sciolino, No.23, p. 189

international balance', primarily because they have the 'possession of a source of energy unparalleled in the world'. The implication would have to take the lead in challenging US hegemony and Iraq would be in the vanguard of the struggle. Saddam's assertion of primacy was made manifest when, in a private gathering during the ACC meeting, he demanded that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should write off Iraq's debt and advance further 30bn. It was swift and brutal. In another private meeting again Saddam demanded an extra 30bn from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and also made clear that over production of oil by some of the Gulf States beyond the quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was harming Iraq's economic position. Although the acquisition of this region was implicated on the UAE as well as to Kuwait and this was due to variety of features. First, Iraq had always questioned the legitimacy of the statehood of Kuwait and the right to the rule of the al-Sabah dynasty. Periodically, the Iraqi government asserted its claim to that country, arguing that Kuwait had been a part of the Basra Vilayet during the Ottoman occupation. As a result the borders between the Iraq and Kuwait had never been demarcated by a bilateral agreement. More substantively, Iraq had been frustrated by Kuwait's refusal to cede or to lease the two Northern islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, which would have given Iraq greater access to the Gulf. This dispute became particularly bitter during the Iraq-Iran war, when Iraq was denied access to the Gulf through its only other outlet at the Shatt-al Arab water way. Kuwait's refusal to reach any sort of compromise in this period was not forgotten by Saddam Hussein. The Cold War was the way to understand the threat. Saddam dealt these threats with uncertainty by assimilating developments of 1989-90 to his long standing belief that Iraq was threatened economically, politically, and militarily by an international conspiracy.<sup>33</sup> With the removal of the Soviet Union, it became losing a counter weight for Saddam; he feared that the US would come to control the Gulf. In a speech just before his attack on Kuwait, Saddam warned the Arabs that if they were "not careful, the Arab Gulf region would be governed by the US" and the prices of oil would be set at levels determined by Washington.<sup>34</sup>

The first Gulf War was fought in 1991 with a coalition of countries led by the United States which was able to destroy the military capability of Iraq and drove out the Iraqi

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<sup>33</sup> Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: US Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 181

<sup>34</sup> Janice Gross Stein, *Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf*, *International Security*, (Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992), p. 162

army from Kuwait. It was the first armed conflict after the Cold War between Iraq and a coalition of thirty two nations including the US, Britain, France , Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The war broke out when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August, 1991. Iraq wanted to annex Kuwait, which it had long claimed but the Iraqi president declared that the invasion was a response to over production of oil in Kuwait. The overproduction had cost Iraq an estimated \$14 billion a year when oil prices fell. Hussein also accused Kuwait of illegally pumping oil from Iraq's Rumaila oil field. The UN Security Council called for Iraq to withdraw and subsequently embargoed most trade with Iraq. On 7 August, U.S. troops moved into Saudi Arabia to protect Saudi oil fields. On November 29, the United Nations set 15 January, 1991, as the deadline for a peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein refused to comply, Operation Desert Storm was launched on 18 January, 1991, under the leadership of U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf. The U.S.-led coalition began a massive air war to destroy Iraq's forces and military and civil infrastructure. Iraq called for terrorist attacks against the coalition and launched Scud missiles at Israel (in an unsuccessful attempt to widen the war and break up the coalition) and at Saudi Arabia. The main coalition forces invaded Iraq to restrain Saddam. On 24 February and, over the next four days, encircled and defeated the Iraqis and liberated Kuwait. When U.S. President George H. W. Bush declared a cease-fire on 28 February, most of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait had either surrendered or fled. Although the war was a decisive military victory for the coalition, Kuwait and Iraq suffered enormous property damage, and Saddam Hussein was not removed from power.<sup>35</sup> In fact, Hussein was free to turn his attention to suppressing internal Shiite and Kurd revolts, which the U.S.-led coalition did not support, in part because of concerns over the possible breakup of Iraq if the revolts were successful. Coalition peace terms were agreed to by Iraq, but every effort was made by the Iraqis to frustrate implementation of the terms, particularly UN weapons inspections.

In 1993 the United States, France, and Britain launched several air and cruise-missile strikes against Iraq in response to provocations, including an alleged Iraqi plan to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush. An Iraqi troop buildup near Kuwait in 1994 led the United States to send forces to Kuwait and nearby areas. Continued resistance to weapons inspections led to bombing raids against Iraq, and trade

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<sup>35</sup> Olsen, No.3, p. 141

sanctions imposed on Iraq remained in place, even though with an emphasis on military-related goods until the second Gulf conflict.

#### WESTERN RESPONSE TO IRAQI CHALLENGE

It was not that the western leaders were ignorant about either Saddam's repressive regime or his aggressive foreign policy. In the 1970s, Iraq found no favor with the West due to its support of terrorism, its close relation with the Soviet Union and its aggressive stance towards Israel. However, the Iran-Iraq war led to a complete transformation in the West perception of Iraq: Iraq for its part, reciprocated by moderating its radicalism, most notably by expelling the terrorist leader Abu Naidal from Baghdad.<sup>36</sup> It also became a strong advocate of peaceful relation with Israel and allied itself with the moderate and the post-Western Egyptian-Saudi-Jordanian axis. By the end of the Iraq-Iran war the Western governments viewed that Iraq as a close ally of the West.<sup>37</sup> The indulgence remained remarkably resistant to all the countervailing evidence of Iraq's antagonism to Western interests during the next two years. It was only in 1990 that the western allies finally became aware that it might be facing a serious challenge. The plethora of uncomplimentary human rights reports received much attention in the western press, as it did the seizures of military parts such as the nuclear triggers and the 'supergun' pipes. The execution of Bazoft, the threat to burn up half of Israel, and the alarming developments against Kuwait similarly produced widespread unrest. These threatening developments did not result in fundamental revision of western policy toward Iraq. The West continued to adopt an attitude of conciliation rather than confrontation. In February 1990, the US Assistant Secretary of State for north eastern and south Asian affairs, John Kelly was sent to Baghdad and praised Saddam for being a force for moderation in the region.<sup>38</sup> However, it would be quite unfair to focus exclusively on the failing of American diplomacy, as many accounts of the causes of Iraq invasion of Kuwait had tended to.<sup>39</sup> Other western governments adhered to similar policies of conciliation. British governments had perhaps greater justification to act more decisively, since many of Iraq's aggressive acts, such as the execution of Bazoft were directed pointedly at the UK. However, the European governments felt constrain from initiating more vigorous

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<sup>36</sup> Paul Lewis, Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, *International Herald Tribune*, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1991.

<sup>37</sup> Martin Fletcher, the Plan for Gulf Policing after Victory, *Times*, 16<sup>th</sup> September 1990.

<sup>38</sup> Adam Bronstone, European Union-United states Security Relations, (New York : St. Marti's Press, Inc. 1997), pp.173-175

<sup>39</sup> Stanley W. Cloud, 'Exorcising an Old Dream', *Time*, 11 March 1991.

action because of the large debts Iraq had accumulated with European business and firms but the US had few business interests in Iraq.<sup>40</sup>

All the considerations meant that there was little desire, either in the US or in Europe for the decisive confrontation with Iraq. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shattered the comforting illusions. The fact that the invasion caught the West completely by surprise was a considerable political and intelligence failure. The West realized that a unified response needed to tackle the real challenge of actual Iraqi ambitions. The imposition of sanctions, as US Congress recommended, would not have found international agreement, nor was support from Europe, the Soviet Union or the Arab world for harsh measures. Nevertheless, it was realized by the US and European states that they had to challenge and what actual matter came to the surface that Saddam is diminishing the US and Western influence in the Middle East, and consider as Iraq's position as the regional hegemon. Saddam believed he had performed an irresistible *fait accompli*, that the Gulf States were now his vassals, and the west would not have the political will to reverse his aggression.<sup>41</sup>

#### **COALITION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES**

The National Defense Strategies and allied forces perceptions in the peace time will determine how effective coalitions are in war.<sup>42</sup> The core of Atlantic Allies all acknowledge that the strategic necessity of conducting military operations as part of multilateral coalitions. However, each has found it difficult to make adequate preparations. The UK's standing military commitments and inadequate investment in personnel cast doubt on whether it can shoulder new coalition responsibilities. The multinational coalition was formed to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was one of the most successful in recent history. The dominant US role in the forming the coalition and in planning and combating it was vital to ensuring that the mission succeeded. The Gulf war followed the long tradition of the coalition operations, where the US consulted closely with its core allies throughout the crisis. The US retained the prerogatives of command and controlled the planning process. The US conducted extensive, unilateral contingency planning before Iraq's invasion

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<sup>40</sup> Bronstone, no. 36, p. 177.

<sup>41</sup> Pierre Salinger. *The Hidden Agenda behind the Gulf War*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p.107

<sup>42</sup> James P. Thomas, *Adelphi Paper*, 333, (New York, 2000), p. 13

of Kuwait and it build up to the counter-offensive, with little or no Allied military involvement until the last stage of preparation.<sup>43</sup> Even key allied heads of the state had little access to detailed planning and were only notified of the US's decision to begin the immediately prior to the start of the air campaign in January 1991. In contrast with the level of US pre-planning for a war with Iraq none of the core European Allies had national contingency plans for conflicts in the Persian Gulf. France, the UK and Germany all lacked the pre-existing command structures and staff to create such plans, or to form nucleus of any national contribution to a multinational expeditionary force. This lack of specific planning was only partially mitigated after the crisis began. In late 1990, the multinational coalition forces were joined in the coalition coordination, communication and integration centre and by the end of the year, the British RAF officers had joined the secretive 'black hole' staff cell responsible for targeting and mission planning for the air campaign.<sup>44</sup> France played no role in the planning process, largely as a result of political decisions taken before the conflict. Paris originally insisted that its air craft would only be used in support of French ground forces and agreed to attack targets in Kuwait, not in Iraq. These positions were swiftly modified after the resignation of Defense Minister Jean Pierre Chevenement on 29 January 1991.<sup>45</sup> The unilateral planning was politically unsatisfactory to major allies such as France; it was frustrated by its lack of influence and by its dependence on US strategic intelligence and command structures. There was a clear correlation between military capability and political influence. The UK, which contributed over 35,000 personnel, had much greater influence over the course of the operation than France, which contributed less than half as many troops, or Germany, which did not participate militarily but made a substantial financial contribution to the war effort.<sup>46</sup>

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#### MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE

<sup>43</sup> US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense, 1992), p. xxvii

<sup>44</sup> Keaney and Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report*, p. 158

<sup>45</sup> Peter C. Hunt, *Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998).p. 220

<sup>46</sup> Bruse George and Joe Sanderson, *Financial and Military Support for the Coalition*, in Bruce L. Watson (ed.) *Military Lesions of the Gulf War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1991) p.221 and Peter Tsouras, Elmo C. Wright Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, *Ground Forces*, in *ibid.*, pp. 240-241. The US provided 1,376 combat air craft and 532,000 ground troops; the UK 69 combat aircraft and approximately 35,000 troops; and France 42 combat aircraft and approximately 13,000 troops. Germany contributed \$8.9 billion, as well as over \$2bn in aid to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Israel. Germany also provided field medical facilities and road, rail, air and sea transport for Allied forces moving from Germany to the Gulf.

The Gulf War coalitions benefited from the NATO'S war-lifting doctrine, which America formulated and doctrinal cohesion of alliance members- with the notable exception of France. Nevertheless, the First Gulf War in 1991 pulled the US into the unipolar hegemony. The Gulf War marked beginning of a pax-Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a beginning American hegemony.<sup>47</sup> The premise is correct that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the world with only one super power, but the hegemonic conclusion does not follow. However, anything is clear, that the world economy is tri-polar and has been since the 1970s. Europe, Japan and USA account for two third of the worlds product. In economies, at least, the US cannot exercise hegemony.<sup>48</sup> The facts that the Arab leaders in the region remained relatively calm in the face of Saddam's challenge undoubtedly infuse the assessment of the crisis by the western leaders. President Bush Sr. prided himself of his close personal contacts with the moderate Arab leaders and when they maintained that the west should not intervene in an essentially Arab dispute, he was inclined to defer their judgment. In this situation, though Israel provided a more pessimistic assessment of the Iraqi challenge but it never found enough support in Washington to disturb the sense of gratification in the face of Iraq's argumentative behavior.<sup>49</sup> The Iraqi invasion on Kuwait caused a great deal of uncertainty in the international oil markets. There were fears of a new oil crisis. The feeling of deep unease spread to the general public, especially in the first three weeks after 2<sup>nd</sup> August. Iraq's actions were viewed as a direct attack on the democratic revolution in Europe.<sup>50</sup> There was sense of foreboding that a new fragile consensus on collective security, which had hold only after the four decades of the cold war. However, the unambiguous criminality of Iraq aggression did help the early attempts to forge a unified international response. The illegality of the Iraqi invasion was given formal international expression by UN Security Council Resolution 660, which condemned Iraq's invasions only a few hours after it had taken place and four days later it imposed a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq.<sup>51</sup> The Iraqi challenge threatened the vital security interests of the US and it stressed to prepare an extensive contingency plans to deal with such threats. Ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

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<sup>47</sup> Joseph Nye Jr., *Foreign Affairs*,( Vol.71, No.2, Spring 1992),p.108.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*p108-9

<sup>49</sup> Saki Ruth Dokrill, the Transatlantic Challenge in the Iraq Crisis in John Baylis and Jon Roper (ed.),*The United States and Europe*,(New York, Routledge,2006), pp.124-25

<sup>50</sup> Vassilis K. Fouskas, No. 5, pp.50-51

<sup>51</sup> Lewis A. Dunn, *Adelphi Papers*, IISS, (New York 263, Winter 1991),p. 23



1980, the security of oil supplies in the Gulf had become the most important national security interest out side of the containing Soviet expansion in Europe. The accumulation reasons, however, tended to emphasize the pragmatic arguments for intervention, particularly the need to protect oil supplies. In the UK and France, these abstracts principles were given greater prominence.

As early as August the Bush administration announced that it was a confrontation which the US could not afford to lose.<sup>52</sup> The immediate task that the US had to face was the cementing of a sufficiently broad international coalition which would provide a solid political base to underpin the US decision to confront the Iraqi threat. This task was greatly facilitated by US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Moscow one day after the invasion, which elicited an unprecedented joint US-Soviet statement condemning Iraq.<sup>53</sup> From the Western community, the US obtained significant contributions, especially from UK and France. The British government under the leadership of Thatcher committed to reversing the Iraqi aggression and had no difficulty in acceding to US request for a military contribution. The British historical role as a military power in the Gulf, and its close ties with Kuwait, strengthened its resolve to rise to its international responsibilities.<sup>54</sup> The contribution was initially more ambiguous. Like the UK, France had a tradition of involvement in the Middle East and now of being a great power (US). Unlike the UK, however, France had traditionally been reluctant to be seen to be acting in concert with the US. France was determined that, at least outwardly, its forces in the Gulf would maintain their operational independence. It was also anxious to preserve its policy of close ties with the Arab world, especially in the Maghreb.<sup>55</sup> The most important factor was the building of the military coalition to defend Saudi Arabia represented only one element in the strategy to contain Iraq. The US and the UK wanted to act quickly to close this potential loophole but there was a lack of consensus within the UN Security Council regarding the legality on interception. This initial US-British position was that they had the right to intercept shipping on the basis on an appeal from Kuwait for assistance, guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter.<sup>56</sup> The Bush administration

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Salinger, No.38, p.111

<sup>54</sup> Peter c. Hunt, No.47,p.27

<sup>55</sup> Paul Webster, "French set out to Explain their Policy", *The Gurdian*, 14<sup>th</sup> August, 1990.

<sup>56</sup> Edward Mortimer, "Legality of Blokade", *The Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> August 1990.

actively managed to mobilize the coalition and within the very short span of time the coalition forces able to achieve victory.

It is obvious to say that no single power even a group of powers could meet the defense power of the United States of America. The US Air Force is extremely powerful than its Navy and Ground forces. In the end of the Cold War, it holds the direct responsibility of the Gulf crisis. In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1990, a small team of air power advocates in Pentagon, meeting in the office space occupied by an organization known as Checkmate, proposed a conventional strategic air campaign to liberate the Emirate. The team, which was under the guidance of Colonel John Ashley Warden III, sought to force Saddam Hussein's army out of Kuwait by applying airpower directly against the sources of Iraqi national power. The massive air attack started from the northern Iraq, flying from a small NATO base in southern Turkey. The US led coalition waged largely secret warfare during the Operation Desert Storm. Employing strike 'packages' of as many as 60 aircraft, it targeted Iraqi nuclear facilities, defense installations and anti-aircraft batteries. Composed of fighters, bombers, electronic jammers and anti-radar aircraft, these packages virtually crippled the Iraqi air force in the first 72 hours of the war.<sup>57</sup> A year later the Operation Desert Storm, the UN inspectors said that the Iraqi leader almost certainly has kept vital portions of his nuclear programmes hidden in defiance of UN sanctions. The inspectors also said there are strong indications that the Iraq still had a cache of weapons-grade uranium that probably came from either China or the former Soviet Union.<sup>58</sup> The UN inspector said it would be dangerous if they were forced to end their search mission to Iraq permanently.<sup>59</sup>

#### **POST-GULF WAR US-EUROPE**

The first Gulf war transformed the perception of the US conventional strength. Though the war was one-sided but it provided an opportunity to display in a most flattering light the potential of modern military systems. The US, British and French forces participated in the Desert Storm were professionals. The quality of communication was impressive. As well as the first 'information war'. Desert Storm has been proclaimed as the world's first 'space war', although no battles took place in

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<sup>57</sup> J. Levine, *US News*, January, 1992, p.45

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

space and no shots were fired from space.<sup>60</sup> In the mid of 1990s, the attitude of the US-European allies was quite diverge because of the US action over the Arab-Israeli conflicts and US's leaning towards Israel. The Middle East peace talks in October 1991, was organized after the US-led coalition victory in the Gulf War against Iraq. It underlined most clearly Europe's exclusion from the Middle East peace making. Europe's role, however, was limited to providing the venue for the opening round talks. The post Gulf war intervention strategies towards Gulf was shaped by Washington alone. It developed a major base in eastern Saudi Arabia to contain Iraq. Pentagon had developed the concept of 'rogue states', which linked Iraq with Iran, Syria and Libya, as threats to regional order, supporters of terrorist groups, and investors in Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>61</sup> The incoming Clinton administration in May 1993 articulated the doctrine of 'Dual Containment', justifying its deeper engagement with Saudi Arabia in countering threats from both Iraq and Iran.<sup>62</sup> Since the mid 1990s the general transatlantic consensus how to contain the Iraqi regime started to break down, and some European countries notably France, began to distance themselves from the US policy. In this situation, one can observe, factors that segregate the Americans from the Europeans, and often some European from others. Generally the political and economic reasons, but both the powers outlined their strategies to bring about common transatlantic policies to realize shared of EU-US interests in the Gulf.

Since the First Gulf War the Western response was to maximize the peace process in the world. However, the Gulf war brought both Europe and US to analyze their mutuality in exclusive ways. Europe came forward and became the integral part of the Middle East peace process. It meant that whatever peace process goes in the future, the US-European cooperation and coordination are essential. America's problems with terrorism have historically been international in nature. Through out the Cold War, especially in 1970s and 1980s the Gulf region was the goal point of both the US and the Europeans countries. The divergence and convergence of their relations with the Gulf countries was a matter of concern of Gulf's geo-strategic location and energies. During the Iraq-Iran war the policy differences among the allies were minimal, despite the fact that the US relation with Iran was worse than Europe's. The

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<sup>60</sup> Lawrence and Freedman, "The revolution of strategic Affairs", *Adelphi Paper*,(332, 1998), p. 30

<sup>61</sup> M. Karle, "Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: American Search for a New Foreign Policy", (New York: Hill and Wing Press, 1995), p.106

<sup>62</sup> Costanza Musu and William Wallace, No.13,p. 106.

US had no diplomatic ties with Iran. However, since 1987 US maintained a ban on imports from the country but it did not prevent European firms from doing business there. The US oil companies remained heavy buyers of Iranian oil on the open market. In 1980s Iran was a most powerful country in the Gulf but it soon lost its regional dominance. Because of the 'theory of containment' during the time of the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq received considerable outside support from other countries like the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and France, largely because it was determined to prevent the Islamic Revolutions led by Khomeini. The situation was very different in late 1980s. Saddam Hussein's aggressiveness and the attack on Kuwait made the matter worse; it hurt the sovereignty of Kuwait and the geo-strategic importance of US in particular and Europe in general. When all the diplomatic efforts failed, the US arranged an international coalition to check the Iraqi invasion. Once the US air campaign had seriously damaged Iraq's armed forces, however, Saddam began searching for diplomatic solutions that would have allowed him to retreat from Kuwait before the ground war began. In both the situation, though the European countries were confronted certain extent but their potential capabilities to solve the world problems never minimized. The transatlantic coalitions of the 1990s capitalized in the military relationship forged through the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War. However, achieving an operationally active coalition today poses some challenges. To sustain international and domestic political support, modern coalitions need more discriminate in their use of force so as to minimize allied, civilian and even enemy military casualties. As military operations became more complex during 1990s the US and the major European allies remained another's most important potential coalition partners. There were differences in US and European capabilities and operational concepts, as well as disagreements over political aims and rules of engagement. Yet, the immense role of coalitions in the multinational operations in 1990s was quite effective. However, the longstanding relations of the multinational coalitions took an ignominious phenomenon during the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century manifested in the form of Gulf War-II.

## CHAPTER- TWO

### US-EU AND 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS

I

**9/11 AND BUSH DECLARATION ON ‘GLOBAL WAR ON  
TERRORISM’**

The year 2001 was an unprecedented one in the history of the United States due to the surprise attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001. Ever since the 7<sup>th</sup> December 1941 Pearl Harbour episode, this was a direct physical attack on the American homeland. The US and the other parts of the world encountered the real danger of terrorism. The US presumed a great danger of linkage between terror and mass destruction weaponry that underscored the need for a new grand strategy. It was also not surprising that a relatively untested American president and his advisors elected to respond by launching a global campaign against the new enemy or threat. The attack badly affected the American national politics and its foreign policy.

When the first plane hit the WTC, it was believed an accident but when the second plane hit later on, it was widespread that America was under attack. For the first time in history, camera captured a president at the exact moment; he told that his country has been attacked. Bush said to his aides, “we are at war”.<sup>1</sup> The image of a poll taken shortly after the attacks by the Pew Research Center found a remarkable disagreement among opinion leaders, around the world about what September 11 attacks represented. In Western Europe, 76 per cent of those polled said the events had mounted a turning point in world history.<sup>2</sup> The attacks crippled the global trade, capital flows, and the movements of the people across the globe. If there was a day that changed the world forever, it was fifteen years ago, on the New Year eve of 1991, when the Soviet Union finally threw in the rub, dissolving itself and an end to the Cold War. From that movement on, the US regained supreme- “the sole super power,” “the hyper power,” the global hegemon”. The tragedy of 9/11 was a manifestation of the unipolar disorder what the world had already entered a decade earlier. But it is not true; the attacks cast these long familiar issues in a different light. In the words of

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<sup>1</sup> Bill Sammon, *Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush Whitehouse*, (Washington D.C., Regnery Publications Inc., 2002).p.94

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Image up Slightly, But Still Negative, American Character Gets Mixed Reviews. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247> The attacks, Accessed on 12.4.2007

John Gaddis, “the United States found itself living in suddenly more dangerous world”.<sup>3</sup>

Before these attacks, terrorism seems to be a distant activity directed against the isolated targets by fringe individuals carrying inexplicable grudges. There had been the terrorist attacks on the WTC in 1993, but it appeared to be a one time event of limited success, not over alarming. Political terrorism apparently was not perceived as a problem of national concern during the Clinton administration. The horror of the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers of the WTC and the Pentagon has changed everything. The collapse of building once recognized as among the most powerful symbols of the wealth of a great city and might of a great nation was shattering to the nation’s psyche.

Terrorism now became a national threat for the US. The main architect behind the attacks came into the surface, Osama bin Laden and its Al-Qaeda directed from Taliban (Afghanistan). According to Stephen Nathanson, the issues of terrorism seldom addressed about the ethics of international behavior.<sup>4</sup> Since the beginning of the American history every American president during the war time has had to ‘balance in the interests of national security with the liberties of the people’. Reacting to the disaster, the French intellectual Dominique Moisi told the Financial Times of London, “from the Paris to Madrid, from Berlin to Rome, the terrorists who struck at America have recreated the strong sense of western solidarity loosened by the end of the cold war”.<sup>5</sup> The French news paper Le Monde expressed the sentiments of many European’s in a now famous headline that read “we’re all Americans”.<sup>6</sup>

### **George W. Bush and the “us versus them”**

No where the transformation of life after 9/11 greater than at the White House. Like other presidents whose terms of office have been defined by historic challenges, Bush immediately realized that his response to this new strain of international terrorism would define his place in the history book. Showing his resolve, he employed a familiar baseball analogy, saying to friends that the terrorists were not ‘going to steel

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<sup>3</sup> Steven E. Miller, The Iraq Experiment and US National Security, *Survival*, (Vol.48, No. 4, Winter 2006-07)pp.18-19

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. No.3

<sup>5</sup> R.W. Apple, “No Middle Ground”, *New York Times*, September 14

<sup>6</sup> Nancy Gibbs, “Morning of America”, *Time*, September 24

home on me'.<sup>7</sup> Publicly Bush declared, "We wage a war to save civilization itself".<sup>8</sup> The catastrophic attacks also gave republicans an unparalleled opportunity to recast US politics by redefining "us" and "them". Republicans have been skilled practitioners of "us versus them" politics for years. During the Cold War, the GOP helped to create an image of the free world led by the US (us), while those who fortunate enough to reside behind the iron curtain were led by the Communist run Soviet Union (them). Now the President Bush would seize upon the American citizen's love of liberty by turning the war on terrorism into the first "us versus them" conflict. Using the earthy language of the Wild West, he declared that he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or alive".<sup>9</sup> Bush did more than simply make bin Laden the most wanted man in the world. Addressing to the nation on the night on 9/11, he declared: "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world".<sup>10</sup>

Ironically, a scholarly view led by Hall Gardener that it is still not clear that a real "global strategy" capable of dealing with the full extent of the global crisis has yet to evolve.<sup>11</sup> The US military intervention against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan obtained UN, NATO, EU and Russian support- in what appeared to represent a new US-led "multilateralism". The positive worldwide support and sympathy for the US after the 11 September attacks rapidly fade as a result of its unilateral intervention in Iraq- an action taken against the consent of the UN Security Council and the key NATO allies, France, Germany, as well as Turkey.<sup>12</sup> On an Oval Office address on the evening of September 11, Bush said, 'these of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed, 'our country is strong. A great people have been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorists can shake the foundations of biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation

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<sup>7</sup> Frank Bruni, "For Bush, A Mission and Defining Moment", *New York Times*, September 22

<sup>8</sup> Bush's Address to the Nation, Atlanta, *The Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 2001, p.5

<sup>9</sup> Bush' Remarks to Employees at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA, *International Herald Tribune*, September 17, 2001

<sup>10</sup> Bush's Address to the Nation, Washington D.C., September 11, 2001,

<http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2001/01-09-12b.shtml>. Accessed on 22.6.2007

<sup>11</sup> Hall Gardener, "American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism", (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p.2

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



of America'.<sup>13</sup> From the beginning of George W. Bush's campaign for the Whitehouse, he was aware of terrorism as a threat to the US. In his hallmark defense speech at the Citadel in the fall of 1999, he mentioned counter- terrorism, homeland defense and the need to prevent WMD from the falling into the hands of terrorists would be held responsible. Once elected, the president focused on his domestic agenda. Al- Qaeda activities became terrible by its anti-American activities. It was also surfaced their global recruits of Islamic terrorists. In a Fatwa in 1998 Osama bin Laden called it "the individual duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and its allies".<sup>14</sup> While Laden won the first round, his fateful tryst with September 11 changed the priorities and the intensity of the Bush presidency. In just a few weeks after the attacks on New York, the Pentagon, and over the skies of Pennsylvania, Bush fundamentally changed the definition and perception of his presidency he was now a 'war president'.<sup>15</sup> After the incident, it was widely realized that Bush would go on to write an entirely new script for world politics. It is not true to suggest that the al-Qaeda attack against the US civilians came as a complicit surprise- there were intelligence worrying in general and a good deal of the government activity in response. Bush first (financial year 2002) which was boosted funding on missile defenses to over \$8 billion, kept the counter-terrorist entry still higher at \$13.6 billion. In fact there was a 'stunning continuity', as Richard Armitage told the 'National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the US during its hearings in early 2004, between Clinton's and Bush's on counter terrorism in the first eight months of the Bush administration.<sup>16</sup>

In late 2001, the US did obtain the UN Security Council support for the war against al-Qaeda, which had allied with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the period 2002-03, the US appeared to engage in a multilateral approach through the UN summits of 2002-03, but Washington refused to heed the friendly counsel and warnings of its won allies, France and Germany, as well as that of Russia, in respect to the potentially destabilizing regional and global consequences of military intervention in Iraq. In

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<sup>13</sup> "Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation, Office of the Press Secretary September 11", 2001, [http://www. Whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html](http://www.Whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html), Accessed on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Alexander Moens, *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), p.121

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Armitage in Testimony before the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the US, March 24, 2004, <http://www.9-11 commission.gov/hearings/hearing8.htm>, Accessed on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2007.

chastising France in particular for its opposition to so called “pre-emptive” US-UK military intervention in Iraq, Washington largely ignored the fact that it was the Quai d’Orsay that had first led the charge to Kabul in October 2001 in support of UNSC Resolution 1368.<sup>17</sup> The latter had provided international legitimacy for a military operation in Afghanistan led essentially by the US, with more assistance from the UK.

On prior to the 9/11 attacks, the NSS proclaimed that ‘The US is fighting a war against terrorism of global reach’ and warned that other nations could not sit on the fence, “history will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act”.<sup>18</sup> Subsequently and repeatedly the president and his administrative officials used the terms “global war on terrorism,” “war on global terrorism,” “war on terrorism,” “war on terror,” and “battle against international terrorism.”<sup>19</sup> The “global war on terrorism,” complete with its acronym, GWOT, soon became the most often used term. The Bush administration has assumed the multiplicity of enemies, including rogue states, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferators, terrorist organizations, and terrorism itself. It has also, at least for the purposes of mobilizing and sustaining domestic political support for the war on Iraq and other potential preventive military actions.

The events of 9/11 changed the entire face of the American security system. In 2002, the national security advisor Condoleezza Rice said of the time following sept.11: “I really think this period as analogous to 1945- 1947 in that the events started shifting the tectonic plates in international politics.”<sup>20</sup> The US was a target on September 11 because it was perceived to be the global hegemon. Al Qaeda’s efforts to overthrow the Arab regimes had been a terrible failure in the 1990s. Unable to accomplish his objectives in the Arab world, Osama bin laden plotted to strike on “far away enemy”, the USA.

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<sup>17</sup> Gardner, No.9, p.10

<sup>18</sup> Jolyon Howorth, “The US National Security Strategy: European Reactions in the Book Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations,(ed.), Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, ( New York:Routledge,2006),p.38

<sup>19</sup> Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Dec03, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/bounding/bounding.htm>, Accessed on 20.5.2007

<sup>20</sup>Jolyon Howorth, No,18, p.25

### **America's Reaction on the Global Situation.**

Immediately after the September 11, 2001, the country with military might come forward to crush the potential emerging and potential rivals. The attacks embarked a 'global crusade' ostensibly directed 'against terrorism' but in fact threatening more than eighty countries, according to the top secret 'world-wide matrix' prepared by the CIA director George Tenet on September 15 at a Camp David meeting with the president and his national security team.<sup>21</sup>

The actual terror in the international system began in 1990s. It was in 1993 the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center by causing one tower to topple into other, with the aim of killing all those in towers as well as in adjacent buildings and in the street. The earlier attacks did not set whether all these attacks were the work of al-Qaeda but it was nearly convinced that one or more of the conspirators in each of these cases sojourned in Afghanistan had contact with the senior al-Qaeda leaders.<sup>22</sup> According to the previous threats and the dare statements against the US assured that Osama bin Laden was the main culprit of the WTC and Pentagon attacks on 9/11. Once he said that the only Muslim military power capable of challenging this Christian and Jewish onslaught. In a fatwa, February 1998 he proclaims 'the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holly mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim'.<sup>23</sup> Osama bin Laden reprises the distinction between the near and the far enemy, but shifts the focus and perceiving the need to attack both, or, if that is not possible, to go far enemy, which he see as the adversary whose military power is essential to the survival of the near by foe. A second on his predecessors' strategy is bin Laden's pursuit of a multi-front campaign extending to all the 'fields of jihad'.<sup>24</sup> For bin Laden, this geo-religious conflict as he fights to recoup the territorial losses Islam has suffered since the high water mark of its early medieval advance. Nothing is

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<sup>21</sup> Come Carpentier De Gourdon, September 11 Events and the Resulting Global Situation, *World Affairs*, Vol.6, No2, Apr-Jun 2002, pp.104-05

<sup>22</sup> G. John Ikenberry, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror, *Survival*, Vol.43, No.4, Winter 2001-02, p.19

<sup>23</sup> Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, The Terror, *Survival*, Vol.43, No. 4, Winter 2001-02, p. 8

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life'.<sup>25</sup>

There has been a wide range of arrangements carried out by the strategists of the US. Long before the 9/11 the US Department of State developed a list of international terrorist groups. The first such list appeared in October of 1997 during the presidency of Bill Clinton and was completed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In the list Albright identified 30 groups. In 1999, Secretary Albright recertified 27 groups, removed three from the list and added a new group (which happened to be al - Qaeda). The administration of George W. Bush continued the list, which Secretary of State Colin Powell recertifying 26 of these groups in the Albright's list in his 2001 report.<sup>26</sup>

### **Mechanism of American 'War on Terror'**

According to Bush administration terrorism is multifaceted problem and it required an aggressive, multifaceted and long term solution. Because of its nature any war against terror requires collaboration among the governments world wide, as well as the collaborations of the governmental units domestically. The Bush administration also decided to support the establishment of a gigantic new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It was authorized in November 2002, and designed to coordinate the fight against domestic terrorist attack, the new department consolidated 22 federal agencies.<sup>27</sup>

There are many sides of the American war on terror, as it being fought on the military, diplomatic, financial, homeland security and the other fronts. The military attacks that routed the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan in late 2001 and the war against Iraq in 2003 are only the most visible and noteworthy facets of the war against terror. President Bush signed the Anti-Terrorism Act on 26 October 2001, expanding the powers and the tools available to the nation's intelligence and law enforcement communities; the US department of state under the direction of the secretary of state in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury, periodically

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<sup>25</sup> Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, No.7, pp.8-9

<sup>26</sup> Patrick Haden, Tom Lansford and Robert P. Watson, (ed.), *America's War on Terror*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p.xiii

<sup>27</sup> Outline of US History, Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State, 2005, p.334

develops a foreign terrorist lists.<sup>28</sup> Diplomatically the US works with the other countries and international organizations to combat international terror. For instance, the US sent a delegation to the inter-American committee against terrorism which met in San Salvador in March of 2003. The US also participated in the conference on combating money laundering and terrorist financing, which was held in Bali, Indonesia in December 2002. The presidential executive order 13224 was signed on 23 September 2001, blocked the ability of people who commit terrorist acts or aid or support terrorist activities from conducting various financial and property transactions in the US. Furthermore, the US Department of State submits an annual report titled 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' to congress on the activities of terrorists and membership of the terrorist organizations.<sup>29</sup> The office of the coordinators of the counter terrorism has Foreign Emergency Support Team to quickly respond to terrorist attacks and preparing official to deal with terrorists and terrorism. Counter terrorism policy workshops were convinced for the purpose of bringing together US Officials and their counterparts in other countries to discuss policy responses and cooperation in combating terrorism. For instance, on 21 January 2003 a two day counter terrorism finance workshop was hoisted by Singapore and the US and held in Singapore for senior official from over 20 countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).<sup>30</sup>

Bush also categorically drew a bright line between the twisted thinking the terrorists and those who love freedom: "every nation in every region, now has a decision to make either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists... freedom and fear are at war the advance of the human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of our time – non depends on us".<sup>31</sup>

### **The Congress after 9/11**

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<sup>28</sup>[http://search.state.gov/search?q=cache:V4dTL01MIl8J:fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61519.pdf+Bush+doctrine&access=p&output=xml\\_no\\_dtd&ie=utf8&lr=lang\\_en&client=stategov\\_frontend&sitestategov%7Coig%7Cfpc%7Cbmena%7Cusawc%7Cmepi%7Ctravel%7Cexchanges%7Ccareers%7Cfoia%7Caiep%7Cpepfar&proxystylesheet=stategov\\_frontend&oe=UTF-8USA\\_PATRIOT\\_Act](http://search.state.gov/search?q=cache:V4dTL01MIl8J:fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61519.pdf+Bush+doctrine&access=p&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=utf8&lr=lang_en&client=stategov_frontend&sitestategov%7Coig%7Cfpc%7Cbmena%7Cusawc%7Cmepi%7Ctravel%7Cexchanges%7Ccareers%7Cfoia%7Caiep%7Cpepfar&proxystylesheet=stategov_frontend&oe=UTF-8USA_PATRIOT_Act), (accessed on 3.6.2007).

<sup>29</sup> Jonathon Stevenson, *Pragmatic Counter-Terrorism, Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2001-02, pp. 35-36

<sup>30</sup> Patrick Haden, Tom Lansford and Robert P. Watson, No.5,p.xiv

<sup>31</sup> President Address to the Nation, Washington D.C., September 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2001/0/20010920-.html>, Accessed on 21.6.2007

The Congress moves quickly to respond the terrorist attacks. By October 2001 the Congress passed an Omnibus Patriot Act. The congressional response to 9/11 included the passage of the (Providing Appropriate Tools Require to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) US PATRIOT Act.<sup>32</sup> The president of the US conveniently articulated that “The law allows our intelligence and law enforcement officials to continue to share information. It allows them to continue to use tools against terrorists that they used against that they use against drug dealers and other criminals. The legislation strengthens the Justice Department so it can better detect and disrupt terrorist threats. And the bill gives law enforcement new tools to combat threats to our citizens from international terrorists to local drug dealers.”<sup>33</sup>

The Patriot Act was signed into a law by the president on October 26, 2001,<sup>34</sup> is difficult to evaluate in the context of the normal legislative power. Since its enactment in October 2001, the Patriot Act has been vital to winning the War on Terror and protecting the American people. It was very powerful bill that redistributed power within the government and authorized a series of action. Later, the Bill was authorizing in the Cabinet level department of homeland security.

The war on terrorism is catchy- indeed catch all, the phrase to describe the determination of the US and some allies to resist the terrorist onslaught. In President Bush’s words, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorism, and every government that support them”. It was not concocted in wake of 9/11. President Clinton addressed to the nation on 20 august 1998 declared: “let our action today sent this message loud and clear: there are no expandable American targets; there will be no sanctuaries of terrorists; we defend our people, our interests, and our values; we help people of all faiths in all parts of the world who want to live fear and violence; we persist and prevail.”<sup>35</sup>

### **National security strategy after 9/11**

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> President George W. Bush, March 9, 2006, US PATRIOT Acts.

<http://search.state.gov/search?q=cache:V4dTL01MlI8J:fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61519.pdf>, Accessed on 3.6.2007.

<sup>34</sup> William Cotty, “On the Home Front Institutional Mobilization to Fight the Threat of International Terrorism in “The Politics of Terror: the US Response to 9/11”,(Boston: North-Eastern Printing press,2004), p.198

<sup>35</sup> Allan O. Day, “ war on terrorism”, ( Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), p.xi

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The words of the 9/11 commission report (2004: XV), “September 2001 was day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the US. The nation was unprepared”. It has been estimated that fewer than three thousand people died in the combined attacks.<sup>36</sup> The report outlined the words of the President George W. Bush, on September 11, 2001, 19 men armed with knives, box-cutters, mace and pepper spray penetrated the defense of the most powerful nation of the world. The commission has recommended setting up a National Counter terrorism Center (NCTC) to unify all counter-terrorism intelligence and operation across the foreign-domestic divide in one organization. It also need unity of effort in the intelligence community that organize itself to do joint work in National mission Centers.<sup>37</sup>

What made this attack so different from the previous surprised attacks on the US that of Pearl Harbor in 1941 was its very active, seeming not from a nation state but rather from a small bond of transnational territories, and consequently seeming, and in some ways more devastating<sup>38</sup> Arguably, the most important policy document to arise from the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s attack was the national security strategy of the US. President Bush revealed that, “today, the US enjoys a position of unparallel military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we don’t use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom. The situation created a new security environment where the most radical aspect of the NSS concerns into the conception of the New Security Environment (NSE), and how old ideas such as

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<sup>36</sup> Bob Woodward, “Plan of Attack: National Security Strategy After 9/11”, (London: Simon and Schuster,2004),p.24

<sup>37</sup> Public Statement Release of 9/11 Commission Report, the Hon. Thomas H. Kean and Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report\\_Statement.pdf](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Statement.pdf), Accessed on 28.5.2007.

<sup>38</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, <http://www.faqs.org/docs/911/911report-356.html>, Accessed on 16.7.2007

deterrence are inappropriate for the “new deadly challenges” posed by rogue states and terrorists”.<sup>39</sup>

### **The UN Initiative on Terrorism**

The General Assembly of the United Nations held an unprecedented five-day debate on terrorism for the first time more than 170 member states and observers have participated in a debate on a single agenda item. In the meeting General Assembly President, Han Seung-soo of the Republic of Korea said: “countries to adhere to UN anti-terrorism treaties and urging member states to accelerate work on pending conventions on international terrorism”. The member states condemning the September 11th massacres ‘unequivocally’ and in the strongest terms and adopted the resolution of 1373.<sup>40</sup> The resolution also called on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorism and stressing that anyone who aids, supports or harbors them will be held accountable. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: “I would also hope that when the heads of states and the ministers come here for the (Assembly's) general debate in November, most of them will be ready to sign and work for ratification of these conventions, and above all, work hard to implement them” . During the five days of the debate delegates were able to highlight the previous treaties on terrorist bombings and financing and now work to elaborate separate conventions on the elimination of terrorism and the acts of nuclear terrorism.<sup>41</sup>

### **Security Council Terrorism Committee**

The Security Council formed a terrorism committee in the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities. The committee was headed by Richard Ryan of Ireland, Vice-chairmen Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso of Colombia, Ambassador Jugdish Koonjul of Mauritius and Ambassador Sergey Lavrov of the Russian Federation. The committee implemented the resolution of 1373 which bans all forms of support for terrorism and compels States to co-operate in rooting out the terrorist threat and the Council

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<sup>39</sup> White House Report 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsrelease2002/02print/20030226-11.html>, Accessed on 16.7.2007

<sup>40</sup> Anna Sabastianski, *The UN Actions Against Terrorism, the Resolution of 1373, Patterns of Global Terrorism*, US Department of State reports (Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing Group LLC, Volume One, 2005 ), p.146

<sup>41</sup>The UN's Stance on Terrorism, <http://www.europaworld.org/issue52/theunstance121001.htm>, Accessed on 28.5.2007



invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows for the use of force.<sup>42</sup> Sir Jeremy said: “We will be working very closely with the Secretary-General, with the Secretariat and with a certain amount of outside expertise in that business.” The committee would work by consensus.<sup>43</sup>

### **Eradicating Sources of Terrorists**

The United States continues to work with friends and allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism by identifying and blocking the sources of funding, freezing the assets of terrorists and those who support them, denying terrorists access to the international financial system, protecting legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and preventing the movement of assets through alternative financial networks. On September 23, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224, freezing the U.S.-based assets of individuals and organizations involved with terrorism, and authorizing the Secretaries of State and Treasury to identify, designate, and freeze the U.S.-based assets of terrorists and their supporters.<sup>44</sup> The latest case focuses on Executive Order 13224, which is aimed at cutting off financing to alleged terrorist groups and is based on the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Twenty-seven groups and individuals were initially named as “specially designated global terrorists” under the order -- including the PKK and the Tamil Tigers -- and hundreds more since have been added to the list.<sup>45</sup> Since September 11, 2001, 209 of the 212 countries and jurisdictions in the world have expressed their support for the financial war on terror; 173 countries have issued orders to freeze the assets of terrorists; terror networks have lost access to nearly \$200 million, which have been frozen or seized in more than 1,400 terrorist-related accounts around the world; of that total, over \$73 million has been seized or frozen due to the efforts of the United States. Over 100 countries have

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<sup>42</sup>Philip H. Gordon, NATO After 11 September, *Survival*, Vol.43, No.4, Winter 2001-02, p.95

<sup>43</sup> Briton Named as Chairman of Security Council Terrorism Committee, <http://www.europaworld.org/issue52/britonnamed121001.htm>, Accessed on 15.5.2007

<sup>44</sup> State Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Executive Order 13224, US department of state, Washington, DC, December 20, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm>, Accessed on 12.6. 2007

<sup>45</sup> Dan Eggen, Strikes down Parts of Executive Order on Terrorism, Washington Post Staff Writer, Wednesday, November 29, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801438.html>, Accessed on 23.5.2007.

introduced new terrorist-related legislation, and 84 countries have established Financial Intelligence Units.<sup>46</sup>

## II

### EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE ‘GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR’

The US and its European allies played very vital role during and in the post-Cold War military operations. The trans-Atlantic coalitions of the 1990s capitalized on the military relationship forged through the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War the military operation have become less linear, faster and more complex, the importance of orchestrating the movements of coalition forces to these new demands have done so at different rates and in different ways . There has been insufficient coordination between them regarding how they should collectively prepare to meet the new operational criteria. For the estimated future, the US and the major European states- the UK, France and Germany – will, for both political and military reasons, remain one another most important potential coalition partners; some combinations of these countries will probably be at the core of any future Western coalition. In the eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the great shift of relation between the US and EU came into being. The 11 September 2001, the policy focuses of the trans-Atlantic and the internationals were transformed by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the subsequent declaration of the war on terror by the Bush administration. The initial effects of the attacks was to unite the US and Europe in a common struggle against terrorism as well as in other international endeavors.

These sentiments ring true enough, given that the US and EU share common interests in democracy, rule of law and security. However, despite early notions of solidarity after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, best characterized by the now infamous ‘Le Monde’ headline, “We all are Americans,”<sup>47</sup> the Atlantic Alliance has been of marginal use in the war on terror, contrary to what more optimistic Atlanticists might insist. Initial European sympathies for the US as a wounded friend simply have not been sustained for the US as a superpower fighting back. After 9/11, the Bush administration identified the dangerous link between terrorists and those states that support them, and fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of that

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Colombani, J.-M. (2001). We Are All Americans. *Le Monde* September 12, reprinted in English translation at World Press Review Online (2004): [http://www.worldpress.org/1101we\\_are\\_all\\_americans.htm](http://www.worldpress.org/1101we_are_all_americans.htm), Accessed on 17.4.2007

broader “war on terror”. European critics quickly concluded that the US was overreacting to the 9/11 attacks, and public polling, fuelled by the anti-American rhetoric employed by some European leaders, indicates that Europeans have a less favorable impression of the United States in 2004 than they did in 2002.

### **Europe Stands with the United States**

Soon after the “operation enduring freedom” launched in October 2001 against terrorist and Taliban targets in Afghanistan, the European Union issued a strong statement endorsing the action taken. European Commission President, Romano Prodi, said that at this difficult, solemn and dramatic moment, all Europe was standing steadfast with the United States and its coalition allies to pursue the fight against terrorism. He said Europe was united and would remain united in the struggle against those who attacked the very foundations of civilization. He went out of his way to stress that the actions should in no way be seen as an attack against the Islamic faith or against Muslims as a whole. “Our fight is not against religions or peoples”,<sup>48</sup> Said Mr. Prodi. “This is a moment for unity. The international community stands in solidarity in this struggle, resolved to build a future of peace and development for all peoples on Earth”, the Commission President concluded.<sup>49</sup>

The events of 9/11 transformed the environment in which trans-Atlantic internal security cooperation was conducted. Whereas in this area, cooperation had been of low political silence, the enormity of the attacks on New York and Washington and the wave of sympathy it elicited from the European countries reversed this priority. The US declaration of a ‘war on terrorism’ had the effect of galvanizing US–European cooperation across the spectrum of security threats. The diplomatic and security relations severely tightened. For the first time in history the NATO alliance activated its Article 5 collective defense guarantee.<sup>50</sup> This led to Advanced Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft from Europe being sent to patrol the eastern seaboard of the US and American forces being given the right to use European ports and bases for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. European countries offered substantial military contributions to assist the US its fighting against Taliban. The UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all offered assets but, with the exception of some

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<sup>48</sup> Briton Named as Chairman of Security Council Terrorism Committee.

<http://www.europaworld.org/issue52/commissionpresident121001.htm>, Accessed on 10.5.2007

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.54

Special Forces and units from the UK, the US mostly choose to conduct the war alone. European offers of assistance were not taken up until US Central Command was ready to invite the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to undertake peace keeping duties in the capital Kabul. The US expressed its diplomatic support that the Europeans provided over the conflict in Afghanistan, such as the part helping to form an interim Afghani government at the Bonn Conference and the mobilization of financial help for reconstruction at the Tokyo Conference.<sup>51</sup>

### **European Declaration against Terrorism**

Heads of State and Government of the EU, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy issued a declaration marking the anniversary of 11 September. The declaration was evoked the dead of the 9/11 and September 11 reminded all of us that security and democracy can never be taken for granted but must be defended actively and ceaselessly. It also made clear that the scourge of terrorism, in itself a denial of common democratic values and principles, must continue to be met through steadfast international co-operation. Those who perpetrate and sponsor terrorist acts will be brought to justice and punished. The terrorist attacks of 11 September have given rise to the most comprehensive international co-operation in decades. Countries all over the world have united in the common cause against the kind of cynical contempt for human lives that lies behind it. The EU was not slackening its resolve to contribute to the international community's fight against terrorism. It stands side by side with the United States and all the other countries and seek to build a just international order that promotes peace and prosperity for all".<sup>52</sup>

### **Counter-Terrorism Strategies of EU**

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005. The main objective of this EU policy is to confront "the networks of terror with networks against terror". The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005, reflects the EU's aim of forming a network of the member states' foreign and domestic policies in the fight against terrorism. The accompanying action plan contains 160 separate measures in the four

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<sup>51</sup>Wyn Rees, No.11, p.54

<sup>52</sup> European Declaration against Terrorism Marks Anniversary of 11 September.

<http://www.europaworld.org/week96/europeandeclaration13902.htm>, Accessed on 16.5.2007

strands of work of the EU strategy (prevent, protect, pursue and respond). The main objective of this EU policy is to confront “the networks of terror with networks against terror”.<sup>53</sup>

### **European defense and security policy**

The EU plays a vital role across the world in promoting peace and security both through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the other military endeavors. Implemented outside the scope of ESDP, the European Assistance efforts in Afghanistan played a critical security role. Twenty three out of the EU’s 25 member states contributed to the UN mandated and the NATO commanded National Security Assistance Force (ASIF) that helps Afghan authorities to maintain securities in Kabul and surrounding areas. In addition, several EU member states provided troops to the US led coalition and Operation Enduring Freedom that toppled the Taliban regime and is continuing anti-terrorist operations as well as the training of the Afghan National Army and National Police.<sup>54</sup> However, despite early notions of solidarity after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, best characterized by the now infamous *Le Monde* headline, “We all are Americans,”<sup>55</sup> the Atlantic Alliance has been of marginal use in the war on terror, contrary to what more optimistic Atlanticists might insist. Initial European sympathies for the US as a wounded friend simply have not been sustained for the US as a superpower fighting back. After 9/11, the Bush administration identified the dangerous link between terrorists and those states that support them, and fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of that broader “war on terror.”

### **Police and Judicial Cooperation**

A Part from the military and diplomatic relationship, more innovative forms of cooperation came into stay alive were judicial and internal security measures that were agreed between the allies following the attacks on America. Both the continents posed that the terrorism is a common challenge for them. The situation was

<sup>53</sup> Annegret Bendiek, US Strategy on Countering Terrorism: Steps Towards Coherent Network Policy, SWP Research Paper 2006/RP 12, November 2006, [http://www.swp.berlin.org/en/produkte/swp\\_studie.php?id=6593&PHPSESSID=148c99d87dc7ba36f86d3e35aa9234f8](http://www.swp.berlin.org/en/produkte/swp_studie.php?id=6593&PHPSESSID=148c99d87dc7ba36f86d3e35aa9234f8), Accessed on 4.6.2007

<sup>54</sup> Special EU Advertising Supplement, Beyond the European Security and Defense Policy, *Foreign Policy*, (January-February, 2006 ), p. 17

<sup>55</sup>Functional Issues, The US, Europe and the War on Terror, *New York Times*, 22 September 2003

categorically supported by the political will of the both sides. The most principal cooperation was police and judicial cooperation. The Europol was allowed to sign an agreement with the US authorities that facilitated the sharing of intelligence information.<sup>56</sup> The US was allowed to send officials to attend the meeting of working groups that were dealing with terrorist issues. This was of much of the potential benefit as offered the US access to the international criminal intelligence files and knowledge base that European states pooled within Europol. At the US-EU summit in May 2002 discussions were begun over a multilateral legal agreement between the EU and the US that would supplement the bilateral agreements already in existence. The summit bring the result President Bush told journalists that he and President of the Government of Spain Jose Maria Aznar, representing the current presidency of the European Union, and European Commission President Romano Prodi had a good discussion “on the common challenges facing the United States and the European Union, including the urgent need to fight terror and to promote peace in the Middle East.” He said that when the United States and the EU work together “we multiply our effectiveness” and that he and Aznar and Prodi had discussed “our desires to continue working together.”<sup>57</sup> In the lead up to the summit it was envisaged that judicial cooperation could be extended to joint investigation teams and to the creation of single points of contact for exchange information. The EU determined that issues pertaining to extradition and the exchange of criminal evidence with law enforcement authorities would take place if the death penalty were involved.

The ability of the EU to offer closer police and judicial cooperation with the US was built upon progress that was agreed amongst the member states in the period following the 9/11 attacks. The EU agreed upon both a common definition of terrorism a goal that had long proved obscure and a list of organizations that were regarded as the perpetrators of terrorism. . The acceptance of EU-wide arrest warrant was a major step forward. The endorsement of the arrest warrant makes it possible for a suspected offender to be arrested on the territory of the member state based upon a judicial document issued by another. On the other hand, the US and the EU agreed

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<sup>56</sup> Heniz Gartner, *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan and Iraq* in Heniz Gartner and Ian M. Cuthbertson (ed.), *European Security and Transatlantic Relations*, (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.198-99

<sup>57</sup> Washington Summit May 2 2002, the UN Mission to the European Union ,Bush Says U.S., EU to Fight Terror, Promote Peace Together, <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=E4A82D05-08E6-4E42-AFE8-6C490D084440>, Accessed on 24.5.2007

to target terrorist financing. This applied to the suppliers of funds and the accounts by which terrorist organizations move resources around the world.

### **US co-operation with the European countries and institutions**

The European Union has been a solid partner in sustaining the global coalition against terrorism. Following 9/11, the European Council adopted an Action Plan to identify areas, such as police and judicial cooperation, humanitarian assistance, transportation security, and economic and finance policy, to help fight terrorism.<sup>58</sup> The Madrid and London bombings provided additional impetus for the European Union into action.

At the U.S.-EU Istanbul Summit 2004, European partners renewed their commitment to further develop cooperation against terrorism and agreed to work together: to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism.<sup>59</sup> Most of the thrust areas they concentrated like: to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other economic resources; to develop measures to maximize capacities to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks; to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control; to develop further capabilities to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their advantage; and to target external relations actions towards priority developing countries where counterterrorism capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced. The US also made a multilateral counter terrorism effort shared by the G-8 partners. The two frontline allies always concentrated on two point stand: first, the acknowledged global nature of the challenge and; second, the realization that a comprehensive strategy to ‘combat’ terrorism was needed.<sup>60</sup>

### **The war on terrorism in Europe:**

Through different multilateral institutions the European nations have made contributions to their counterterrorism efforts. The member nations taken into considerations their own institutions collaborating with multilateral organizations the G-8, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and

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<sup>58</sup> William P. Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, European Cooperation With the United States in the Global War on Terrorism, Remarks to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, Washington D.C., *New York Times*, September 14, 2004

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Simon Duke, “CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No.7, 2002,p.154

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). These institutional arrangements led Simon Duke to categorize that the EU provided a solid front and its response was immediate and practical.<sup>61</sup> European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that have made contributions in counterterrorist efforts; the capabilities of Western European partners have been excellent. European intelligence and security forces are well aware of the threat posed by Islamic extremism and generally do an effective job of monitoring extremists.

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks in Europe remains a source of concern, however; as we all know, much of the planning for 9/11 took place in Europe, and terrorist support networks continue to exist on the continent despite the best efforts of security services and European governments. It would note that in Germany, for example, the Office for the Protection of the Constitutions annual report concluded that Islamic extremists represent the largest threat to that country's internal security and remain the main focus of German authorities. The position sited that it should now be clear to the British, French and German leaders that European influence in Washington can only be sustained through close cooperation, and through having a coherent message to deliver. The first requires a stronger EU, which alone can recapture American attention and respect- with the real foreign policy capabilities and the projection of military power.<sup>62</sup>

Despite these contributions of European countries in sharing vital information, arresting members of terrorist cells, interdicting terrorist financing and logistics, and assisting in rebuilding Afghanistan have been and continue to be vital elements in the war on terrorism. Both the US and EU remain concerned about the activities of state sponsors of terrorism in supporting some of the world's deadliest terror organizations. It is the policy of the United States to see that these nations cease their support for international terror. They also continue to urge EU and G-8 partners to keep the pressure on state sponsors to change their behavior. This strategic partnership is producing results worldwide, in support of freedom and democracy, advancing prosperity, and building global security. President Bush said my job is to find ways for America and Europe to work together to advance freedom and address common

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> The Threat to Global Order, *The World Today*, Vol. 59 , No.5 , 2003, p.83



challenges, in order to make the world a better and safer place.<sup>63</sup> It is very important to note that how the U.S. and Europe are taking concrete actions to meet those challenges. But in the long run, both the country has been facing a serious threat of transnational terrorism. To prevent circumvention of national measures, there has been agreement in applying restrictions on payments and capital movements within the European Community.<sup>64</sup> Both sides agreed to freeze accounts of known groups and sympathizers through a variety of channels. By the middle of 2002 the EU claimed to have suspended accounts worth over 100 million euro. Furthermore, the transatlantic allies committed themselves to improve airline security in the light of the technique of the terrorists in the 9/11 attacks.

### **Importance of European Co-operation.**

European cooperation is critical to the success of the Global War of Terrorism. The attacks on 9/11 highlighted the necessity of sharing information in a timely manner. Information is critical to fight terrorism because the other elements of national power depend on its success. If one does not know the simple questions of: when, where, why and how, it will be difficult to defend against an attack, much less defeat it. It is important to remember that many of the terrorists responsible for 9/11 lived or operated in Europe. This European base was vital to their success and remains critical to terrorist networks today from a diplomatic, informational, and economic standpoint. Europe views the Middle East as important to their security, economies and future. Over 13 million Muslims of Middle Eastern descent live in Europe. Many of these Middle Easterners migrated to Europe to find economic opportunities. Most of these immigrants promote European policies that encourage support for their countries of origin. This is part of the reason Europeans view the strategy for fighting terrorism differently than the United States. The EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, recently stated, "There are old wounds in some geographical regions which as long as they are not healed will continue to create a fertile ground for terrorism to develop."<sup>65</sup> He specifically cited the "Arab-Israeli" conflict. This view has led

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<sup>63</sup> Kurt Volker, the United States and the European Union: A Renewed Partnership Delivering Results, Remarks at the Conference on "New Instruments of International Governance: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives", Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria, May 11, 2006, Costanza Masu, "European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of 'Converging Parallels'", *European Foreign Affairs Review* Vol.8, No. 3, 2003, pp.36-37

<sup>64</sup> EU Acts to Freeze Potential Terrorist Funds, <http://www.europaworld.org/issue51/euactstofreeze51001.htm>, 5/10/2001, Accessed on 14.5.2007

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17

Europeans to focus on some of the causes of terrorism, including poverty and job opportunities. Over the last three decades, the EU worked to find a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict. The European premise is a negotiated settlement will help solve the underlying ideological and financial support for terrorism in the Middle East.

On May 3, 2002, the European Union and the United States took coordinated actions against the assets of several terrorist groups and individuals - including seven individuals and one group related to ETA, the Basque terrorist group. This follows the EU's actions, which we joined, in late December of 2001. On April 19th, the G-7 Finance Ministers joined in Washington and jointly designated nine individuals and one entity as terrorist supporters or financiers related to al-Qaida. Among those designated were The Aid Organization of the Ulema (AOU), headquartered in Pakistan, which was previously operating as al Rashid Trust, an entity that was among one of the first organizations named as a terrorist financial facilitator in September 2001. This organization has been raising funds for the Taliban since 1999. In addition, the G-7 designated two prominent individuals, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, who have been facilitators of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaida. This action was the first multilateral joint designation, which marks a new stage of information sharing, collaboration, and coordinated action in this field.<sup>66</sup>

### **EU Policy and Strategy Focus.**

To understand European cooperation on the Global War of Terrorism, there is not a better place to begin than with the EU and the launch of the institutionalization process for cooperation through out Europe involved specific changes in the approach to the problem of terrorism.<sup>67</sup> The EU has grown into an alliance of 25 nations. Traditionally, the EU focused on curbing U.S. global influence from an economic and political standpoint, while NATO worked with the United States on security cooperation. Today, with the U.S. position in the world, one can state that much of the

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<sup>66</sup> James Gurule, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement  
Statement Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Cooperation in the War on Terrorism: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
Washington, DC, May 8, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/10028.htm>, Accessed on 25.5.2007

<sup>67</sup> Pietro Gargiulo, "The organization for security cooperation in Europe" in Giuseppe Nesi (ed.) international cooperation in counter terrorism (Burlington: Ashgate publishing company, 2006), p. 197

EU, and ultimately Europeans in general, will resist a single state imposing its will on the continent or more importantly the world. With this in mind, when developing a global information campaign where cooperation is the key, careful consideration needs to be used in developing global rhetoric. The statement that one is “either with us or against us” conveys an arrogance which sabotages U.S. efforts to express its desires to the world. The encouraging news in Europe’s cooperation with the GWOT is that the EU’s policy of promoting global peace, stability, and democracy has much in concert with the U.S. policy. On June 26, 2004, the United States and the EU signed a formal declaration to combat terrorism.<sup>68</sup> This agreement represents a comprehensive policy that includes the information, legal, intelligence, and economic elements of national power. In Iraq, this economic and financial emphasis is evident with the EU pledging 1.25 billion euro and spending 305 million euro in 2003- 04.<sup>22</sup> This pledge is relatively small in comparison to America’s commitments, but it is shaped by the Europeans negative view of the Iraqi War.<sup>69</sup> By contrast, the EU delivered billions of euros to the Palestinian Authority in the last decade to promote economic development. This demonstrates the European attempt to solve the causes of terrorism, while benefiting from the economic trade. The EU is winning the diplomatic and informational campaign. The EU is the “biggest trading partner and donor of development assistance for nearly all the countries” in the Arab World. The latest EU effort has been the development of a military arm under the auspices of European Security and Defense Policy. This military component started in 1992 with the creation of Eurocorps, a French and Germany initiative to develop a European military headquarters. In 1993, Euro corps grew to five nations and started its initial NATO coordination. The organization’s rising importance came in 1999 when it added a crisis response capability and in 2003 when it established it’s out of area deployable headquarters. The success of Eurocorps has led to a broader EU concept called EU Force (EUFOR), which in December 2004 took over responsibility from NATO for all peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a clear policy shift for the EU, which prior to 1993 focused primarily on economic and diplomatic matters. The reason for this shift falls into two schools of thought. One school feels it represents an attempt to separate itself from a NATO dominated by the United States. The other school believes its purpose is to take more responsibility for European

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<sup>68</sup> US-EU Joint Actions, <http://www.quaker.org/qcea/briefings/terrorism/terrorismbp7.pdf>, accessed on 11.6.2007

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., No.68

security matters, specifically peacekeeping missions. The truth probably falls somewhere in between. Viewing the major policy initiatives and critical conflict dates of 1993 (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 1999 (Kosovo), and 2003 (Iraq), there is a strong argument that suggests this shift resulted from disagreements between the EU and the United States on policy, specifically when to use military force. In the broader perspective of the GWOT, this new peacekeeping role would be a much welcomed one, if the units assigned to European Union Force (EUFOR) were not the same ones assigned to NATO. The only real difference between the EU and NATO headquarters is the lack of U.S. participation. From a positive standpoint, this is one less mission for the United States. Additionally, it takes the burden off NATO for the same reasons. When the EUFOR took over the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina in December 2004, this action freed up some NATO staff, including U.S. personnel. The long-term implications of the EU's expansion of its charter and what this means for NATO's future role is yet to be determined. The immediate impact in the Global War on Terrorism stress the EU brought immediate relief for U.S. planning and manning requirements in Bosnia/Herzegovina. It has allowed NATO to focus on other areas, including Afghanistan, Iraq and other problematic areas.

### **III**

#### **EU CO-OPERATION ON THE WAR AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

After 11 September 2001, the majority of the EU stood up to be counted and gave their immediate and unconditional support to the US. NATO invoked Article 5, its collective defense Article, for the first time in its history. The transatlantic alliance has risen to the challenge of international terrorism and proved itself to be a fundamental cornerstone of international security. This unwavering support has been maintained ever since and throughout the campaign in Afghanistan until the US announced its intention to use of force to ensure the disarmament of Iraq.

#### **EU's Role in the War on Terrorism**

Many of the EU countries have offered military contributions and other practical back up. Britain deployed ground troops to Afghanistan. France, Spain, Italy and Belgium have all made substantial offers of support. And Germany is also mobilizing its

forces, a truly historic decision and the first deployment of German troops outside Europe since 1945. The EU also contributed \$500million US of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.<sup>70</sup> This will help both those in immediate need as a result of the conflict, and build a new Afghanistan once the conflict is over. Through its unwavering solidarity with the US. Since 11 September, the EU is emerging through this crisis as a force to be reckoned with on the global diplomatic stage. It has earned the right to be taken seriously in Washington and the rest of the world.

### **The EU's Anti-terrorist Measures**

Following to the 11 September, the EU has acted with unprecedented pace to ensure that neither terrorists nor their funds can find any hiding place in Europe. Within ten days after the attacks on the US, the EU leaders had agreed an action plan to fight terror across Europe and beyond. That plan is based on closer co-operation among the EU's member states themselves and closer co-operation with the US. The EU candidate countries are also keen to associate themselves with these measures. EU Justice and home affairs ministers have agreed a common definition of terrorism in each member state's laws which will put an end to the days when terrorists could avoid justice through legal loopholes; The EU members countries agreed upon a EU-wide arrest warrant, which was ensured that there is no place for terrorists to hide in Europe.<sup>71</sup> The EU also geared up to introduce legislation for quicker freezing of assets and seizure of evidence, through mutual recognition by each member state of each other's court orders. EU has also agreed to chase terrorist funds. It increased information exchange between financial intelligence units and a commitment to sign and ratify as a matter of urgency the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The EU's improve intelligence sharing between members states are united in tracking and pre-empting any planned terrorist action across the Europe as well as the other parts of the world. They have also moved to strengthen EU-US security co-operation, through a new proposed intelligence-sharing agreement between Europol (the EU's police intelligence body) and American law enforcement authorities. The EU has also moved to improve aviation security and restore the confidence of the flying public. In October 2003, the EU transport ministers initiated a package of measures to improve airline safety. These include common rules on

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<sup>70</sup>EU Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan, [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_2126\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2126_en.htm), Accessed on 27.5.2007

<sup>71</sup>An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs, *Strategic Survey*, 2002/2003, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 9-10

banned weapons, improved crew training, stricter luggage checks, protected cockpit access and the introduction of 'Sky Marshals'. These stringent measures - many of them already in place in the UK - will ensure a high level of security for passengers wherever they fly in Europe.<sup>72</sup>

European Council called for closer co-operation in fight against terrorism and civil protection. The appointment of Dutchman Gijs de Vries to the position of 'Mr. Terrorism',<sup>73</sup> on 29 March, following the recent meeting of the European Council, kicks off a series of measures taken by the European Union to combat terrorism. One of the first, and most controversial, decisions made under his supervision will involve the exchange of airline passenger information with immigration and law enforcement authorities in the US. Data will include the names, travel documents used, nationality, date of birth plus point and time of departure and arrival. The new rules, initially proposed by Spain, specify that carriers would be fined for failing to transmit the requested passenger data in advance of departure for an EU destination. Not everybody supports this decision. In the European Parliament, MEPs adopted in plenary by 229 votes against 202 a resolution opposing the transfer of personal passenger data on 31 March.<sup>74</sup> They do not agree with the Commission that the transfer of passenger data is compatible with EU laws on data protection. The Parliament's reporter Johanna Boogerd-Quaak said: "We are not satisfied with the privacy safeguards secured by the Commission, and we now expect them to withdraw their decision and come back with better safeguards". MEPs have warned that they will appeal to the Court of Justice if the Commission does not take into account their demands. The US mission to the EU has indicated that it wants to implement the agreement as it stands now. Another measure facilitates the exchange of information within the EU to enable anti-terrorist services to do their job more effectively. This initiative also opens the way for a future "European court record".<sup>75</sup> Information is to be exchanged on all offences, convictions and disqualifications linked to terrorism, including any form of financing of terrorist activities. The Commission proposes that

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<sup>72</sup> Alan Bell, *British and European Perspectives on the War on Terrorism*, <http://www.europaworld.org/week169/europeancommission19304.htm>, March 13, 2003, Accessed on 17.5.2007

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Strengthening and sustaining the international fight against terrorism.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/strength.html>, Accessed on 4.6.2007

the Member States be equipped with systems for registering bank accounts which would facilitate the gathering of evidence, especially where financing of terrorism is suspected. Antonio Vitorino, European Commissioner responsible for justice and home affairs, said: “The exchange of information is a major key to winning the fight against terrorism together”.<sup>76</sup> The Commission's proposal widens the scope of the exchange of information to all terrorist offences within the meaning of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.<sup>77</sup> The Commission has also set ideas on how to reinforce Europe's civil protection capacities, alerted not only by the bombings in Madrid, but also by recent natural disasters like floods and forest fires in Europe. The Commission suggests action on three fronts. Firstly, Member States must be made more aware of and exploit more effectively existing EU-wide expertise and resources, both human and technological, which can be mobilised rapidly in response to an emergency situation. Secondly, national and EU-wide response capability needs to be built up by increased training of expert intervention teams. In this way, available resources can be better used and expert teams from across the EU can work hand in hand to protect citizens more effectively on site as a truly European civil protection force. Thirdly, the Commission underlines the need for more funds to be made available to support the EU's overall response capability.

#### IV

### **EU'S STRATEGIC SUPPORT DURING THE US LED INVASION IN AFGANISTAN**

Most of the European leaders were quick to make televised statements of support following the lunch of the US attacks against the Taliban. Expressing French solidarity with the American position, the president, Jacques Chirac said in a short televised address that the US had “made renewed demands for French military participation.” He said that the Bush administration had asked him to send a senior French adviser to Washington for discreet and concrete consultation just prior to the strikes. The European Commission has decided to finance a EUR 4.9 million (1 EUR=\$0.89) program to kick-start the political, economic and social reconstruction in

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<sup>76</sup>Bruce Hoffman, "Defining Terrorism," in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (ed.) *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 22.

<sup>77</sup>European Council Calls For Closer Co-Operation In Fight Against Terrorism And Civil Protection, <http://www.europaworld.org/week171/europecouncil2404.htm>, Accessed no 12.6.2007.

Afghanistan and the neighboring countries in the post-Taliban era, using the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The main objectives: to provide rapid support for the interim Afghan administration, this will take up its functions on December 22, and to build confidence among the Afghan population and its different ethnic groups. In addition, the program will address the spillover effects in neighboring countries.<sup>78</sup>

Mr. Chirac said an aircraft carrier was already on its way and that France would give other military support as and when it was required. The defense minister, Mr. Alian Richard, revealed that special French commando units were already operating within Afghanistan, cooperating and acting together with similar British and American forces. France has deployed 1500 men in Egypt and the red sea.<sup>79</sup> In an interview Mr. Richard said, "we have discussed the division of tasks with our allies, the Americans. The US knows that we can swing into action with dozen of planes and ships and thousands of men to take part in operations against terrorist targets on Afghan territory. It's a matter of days."<sup>80</sup> In Italy, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi resolutely pro-US conservative Prime Minister said: "Italy is beside the US and with all those who are fighting terrorism." Italy has been placed under high alert after US intelligence services warned that it could be the next target for terrorist attacks. The presence in Rome of the former ruler of Afghanistan, Mr. Zahir Shah was a distinct source for Italian authorities. The former monarch has lived there for past 28 years, ever since from losing power in 1973 in a coup. Maurizio Calvi, director of the Center for Research on Terrorism said: "the diplomatic activity around the former king, his continued presence in Rome and the fact that he has reached an agreement with the Northern Alliance to form what could be described as a government in exile could be dangerous."<sup>81</sup> The European Union issued the statement of solidarity saying "the afghan people deserve a government which is truly representative." The Prime Minister, Mr. Guy Verhofstadt, said: "the EU on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 considers this riposte to be legitimate."<sup>82</sup> The EU Commissioner for foreign policy, Xavier Solana of Spain, said the EU's supports for the strikes was

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<sup>78</sup> EU Support for Afganistan: European Comission Launches Quick Impact Actions [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_1072\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1072_en.htm), Accessed on 2.6.2007.

<sup>79</sup> Franz Oswald, *Europe and the United States: Emerging Security Partnership*, (West Port: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.), pp.78-79

<sup>80</sup> Vaiju Naravene, Europe rallies behind U.S., *The Hindu*, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2001

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Vaiju Naravene, No.24



‘unambiguous’. The Taliban, he said, was facing the consequence of their actions. In Spain, the Prime Minister, Mr. Jose Maria Azner, was vociferous in his support of US action, describing it as “an act of legitimate self defense.”<sup>83</sup>

Apart from the defense and strategic assistance, EU concentrated for upgrading in four key areas- health, rural recovery, infrastructure, and the public administration reform. The EU has been engaged in de-mining activities, building civil society, and fostering human rights and also provided support for Afghanistan’s national election in October 2004.<sup>84</sup> In addition, the EU is helping fight the drug trade in Afghanistan, which was responsible for more than 80 per cent of global heroin production and a source of violence, corruption and destabilizing the country. According to the EU High Representative Javier Solana, “the EU started as a peace project. And in many ways it still is. Promoting peace and cooperative security is exactly what we are doing in the Balkans, the Middle East, in Africa, and elsewhere. The EU will always favour negotiation over confrontation. But all of us also know that to secure peace and protect vulnerable, it is sometimes necessary to intervene, and in extremis, to coerce.”<sup>85</sup>

### **Europe’s Support for Military Action in Afghanistan**

The European Union Governments gave their full and unequivocal support for the actions being taken to combat terrorism and also reaffirmed their total solidarity with the United States. Meeting as the European Council, the Governments confirmed their 'staunchest' support for the military actions that began on 7 October which it said were legitimate under the terms of the United Nations Charter and Security Council Resolution 1368. “The Council is determined to combat terrorism in every form, throughout the world,” said the communiqué.<sup>86</sup> In addition to defeating terrorism, the Council believes that the coalition should work under the aegis of the United Nations towards the emergence of a stable, legitimate and representative government in Afghanistan that also respects human rights. The Council also reviewed a series of concrete proposals for improving co-operation with United States authorities,

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Foreign Policy, No.23, p.17

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, pp.17-18

<sup>86</sup> Anna Sabastanski, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 September 12, 2001, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1985-2005: US Department of State Reports with Supplementary Documents And Statistics,(Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing Group LLC, Volume One, 2005) , p. 146

including actions in the difficult areas of extradition and mutual judicial assistance. A great change came into being after the NATO taken over of the AJSF forces, commanded by a Briton, Lt Gen David Richards. It has developed a four-stage expansion of its role to assume security for the whole of Afghanistan. Mr. Richards said: “The unity of command that today’s transition brings should enhance the effectiveness of the overall operation. ISAF has shown it has the resolve to meet the challenges of its expanded mission.” The handover of mainly US troops to NATO command will bring the NATO force to between 32,000 and 33,000, the largest ground operation it has ever mounted. The move leaves about 8,000 US troops in Afghanistan outside NATO command, mainly focusing on counter-terrorism and air support operations. NATO officials said the accelerated move to the east should give NATO commanders more flexibility to move troops around inside the country. They also provide vital equipment for the alliance.<sup>87</sup> Other measures being pursued with the USA include enhancing joint efforts to control the spread of weapons and chemical, biological and nuclear materials that terrorists might seek to acquire. Europe and America will also co-operate to improve the security of travel documents.

### **EU Support Makes a Real Difference in Afghanistan**

The European Union (EU) has been a key supporter of Afghanistan’s transition, providing substantial political, military and humanitarian and reconstruction aid. The EU has been and continues to be one of the major donors backing the transition process in Afghanistan. At the Tokyo and Berlin conferences on Afghanistan (January 2002 and March 2004), the EU collectively pledged \$3.8 billion (€3.1 billion) for reconstruction over the period from 2002 to 2006. This accounts for 30% of the \$12.5 billion (€10 billion) in grant assistance which international donors pledged in Tokyo and Berlin in total. At the Tokyo conference, the Commission pledged €1 billion in reconstruction aid over 5 years (2002-2006).<sup>88</sup> Key sectors are public administration

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<sup>87</sup> Stephen Fidler, NATO to command US troops in Afghanistan, the Financial Times Limited 2007, International Security Assistance Force, <http://press.jrc.it/NewsExplorer/entities/en/61419.html>, Accessed on 15.6.2007

<sup>88</sup> Afghanistan: How the EU is making a difference MEMO/04/33 - Brussels, 13 February 2004, The European Union (EU) has been and continues to be one of the major donors backing the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Taking together contributions from the Community Budget and Member States, the EU provided over €850 million in 2002 and €835 million in assistance to Afghanistan in 2003 to help in its reconstruction efforts. At the Tokyo donors' conference in 2002: Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group (ARSG) Ministerial Pledging Conference-Tokyo 21-22 January 2002. [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/afghanistan/intro/memo\\_04\\_33.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/memo_04_33.htm), Accessed on 16.6.2007

reform; rural development, alternative livelihoods and food security; infrastructure and health. Other activities have included support for demanding, human rights, civil society and media. Since 2002, the Commission has provided over €657 million to Afghanistan in reconstruction aid. The capacity within the Afghan administration to deliver services remains uneven. While some Ministries have improved, others are still weak. Despite improvements in the capabilities of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, projecting government control into the regions and ensuring continued improvements in security remains another key challenge.<sup>89</sup>

The EU is contributing to these state building efforts both through aid and military contributions. German-led efforts assist with police reform and Italian-led efforts assist in the reform the justice sector. A number of EU Member States are also contributing to improve security through the NATO-led and UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and through their Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). EU member states currently supply around two-thirds of the 8,400 troops in the ISAF.<sup>90</sup> NATO has also taken charge of Afghanistan's eastern provinces which have been under the control of US forces since the Taliban were ousted five years ago. (10,000 coalition troops more moved under NATO command. 31,000 ISAF troops are now in Afghanistan. 8,000 US troops continue training and counter-terrorism separately).<sup>91</sup> Strengthening state institutions and improving security are critical elements in combating the continuing problem of narcotics that undermine stabilization and feed crime. Afghanistan has once again become the largest producer of opium poppy in the world with bumper crops in 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 2004, this activity was estimated to account for as much as 60% of Afghanistan's GDP. This year, poppy cultivation has dropped by 20%, although opium production only fell by 2%. This is a major concern for the EU, since around 90% of the heroin on Europe's streets now comes from Afghanistan. The Commission welcomes the renewed commitment of the Afghan Government to deal vigorously with this problem, as expressed in the Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan

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<sup>89</sup> European Union's News Release no. 17/04, February 13, 2004 Afghanistan: How the EU is Making a Difference, <http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2004/20040017.htm>, Accessed on 28.5.2007.

<sup>90</sup> Anna Sabastanski, *NATO Press Release*, 12 September 2001, No.92, p.142

<sup>91</sup> NATO forces in Afghanistan, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_Security\\_Assistance\\_Force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force), Accessed on 18.6.2007.

adopted earlier this year and remains committed to supporting counter-narcotics efforts in the future.<sup>92</sup>

### **The European Commission Reconstruction Programme**

The European Commission has contributed substantially to international support for government reform efforts in 2002-2004. Around €125 million has been devoted to reforming the administration and strengthening the government, through reform of the public sector, capacity building within key government institutions, and continued financial support for the government's recurrent budget. This helps the Afghan government deliver services, which are urgently required by the population. Within this envelope, the Commission has also provided significant funding to support the presidential election which took place on 9 October 2004 (€21 million for the elections themselves plus €3 million for security). The EU as a whole financed approximately half of the total budget for the Presidential election and also deployed a Democracy and Election Support Mission which assessed key aspects of the election, provided technical assistance to civil society groups and issued recommendations for future elections and for the wider democratisation process. For the 2005 parliamentary elections, the EU has contributed €17.5 million dedicated to deploy an Election Observation Mission (EOM) and to prepare the elections and €3 million for institutional development of the new Parliament.

To assist Afghanistan in its fight against the traffic of narcotics, the Commission has provided from 2002 to 2004 €75 million to the new Afghan National Police, key component in this fight, and a further €15 million in 2005 to the Counter Narcotics Task Force (CNTF). Afghanistan also must be better able to stop smugglers on its borders if the drugs trade is to be controlled. To this end, the Commission is financing a separate €3 million project to strengthen border control on the Afghan-Iran border so that the authorities are better able to interdict and stop drug smugglers.<sup>93</sup>

Three-quarters of the Afghan population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The Commission dedicated from 2002 to 2004 €175 million and a further €10 million

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<sup>92</sup> Heniz Gartner, *European Security and Transatlantic Relations After 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* in (ed.) Heniz Gartner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, *European security and transatlantic relations after 9/11 and the Iraq war*(New York: Palgrave Macmillan publishers, 2005),pp.135-37

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.europaworld.org/week236/commissionstatement9905.htm>, Accessed on 12.5.2007.

in 2005 to develop the rural economy: promotion of food security and underpinning the growth that is necessary to provide alternative livelihood opportunities for rural communities who might otherwise depend on illicit poppy cultivation. In addition the Commission is making an important contribution to the regeneration of the national economy by helping to repair the roads network (€91 million), boost public health (€42 million) and remove mines and unexploded ordnance (€35 million). The Commission's assistance programmes are making a real difference to Afghans' lives: Infrastructure development key to Afghanistan's recovery. Reconstruction of the Kabul-Jalalabad road (142 km) is underway and has already cut travel times by up to half.<sup>94</sup> Afghanistan inherited an almost non-existent state system in 2001, which greatly hindered delivery of medical, health and police services. Assistance delivered by the Commission has been critical to supporting the restart and running of essential public services, specifically financing the return to work of 220,000 public sector workers (including doctors and nurses) and 60,000 police officers. During 2004, 30 schools and 21 kindergartens were rebuilt and 2 fire stations were rehabilitated. Seven bridges were constructed, 97 k.m. of canals and drainage were cleared, walls and barriers constructed. Support for the health sector has ensured delivery of health services in six provinces, covering 20% of the population. A number of projects to help boost civil society and to facilitate the role played by women in Afghanistan's recovery have been financed, for instance the rehabilitation of the women's park in Kabul, plus humans across many urban centers. For the first time women can gather together in public without being accompanied by a male family member. Media centers and the first independent newspaper in the country have been financed. During 2004, training was provided to 615 journalists, local experts and students.<sup>95</sup>

The war on terrorism will not be won by military action alone. Nor will it be won just with enhanced extradition arrangements. Nor will it be won just with improved airline security - important though all these elements together. When the Global War on Terrorism turned towards the regime change in Iraq, a number of differences between

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> European Union, European Union's Delegation to the USA, No. 103/06, November 30, 2006, European Commission Completes €1 billion Pledge to Afghanistan. <http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2006/20060103.htm>, Accessed on 15.5.2007

the United States and the Europe surfaced. As far as peace is concerned, the deep differences over the Arab-Israeli conflict were probably the biggest challenge over U.S. policy towards Iraq. During the time of the Iraq invasion most of European scholar believed that something that the US can cling on as a super power in the world. The destabilization Europe always seems to be in the eyes of other people and therefore it enabling the U.S. to remain as the single superpower. The other issues are remain in the front which is looming very large in the U.S.-European context and that is farm subsidies, WTO negotiations, towards removing farm subsidies, in the interest of free and fair trade etc. The biggest issue is ultimately going to be one on which the U.S. and Europe will find themselves largely on the same side, which will be market access for the developing countries. But now the both the continents are very tactically urge cooperation and international support for the fight against terrorism. Terrorism became an international crime and fighting this ill and evil only international co-operation is inevitable. The European draws the conclusion that the fighting against terrorism is an important task for all the member countries by sidelining minor issues for the cause of greater one.

## CHAPTER- THREE

# UNITED STATES' IRAQ INTERVENTION AND EUROPEAN DISCONTENT

## I

### **THE OLD EUROPE VERSUS NEW EUROPE DEBATE**

Since the beginning of the Cold War era, the established relation between the United States and Europe tried to bring peace to other parts of the world. The shared interest in common values were link them together than pulling apart, but history is always continuing and history always causes changes to take place. The US emphasis on multilateralism during the cold war and beyond has always faced both democratic and international constraints. The “burden sharing debate” was an important phenomenon between the US-Europe relations during the period of Cold War but after it the US managed to mobilize though the existing institutions, like NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) etc. Most of the time, the bilateral relations also provided the US with a greater degree of flexibility and its institutional frameworks. During the time of the First Gulf War in 1991, George H.W. Bush had minimized the direct role of NATO and fully concentrate on the “coalition of willing”. The coalition of willing became formalized within NATO through the creation of a Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) system.<sup>1</sup> But the situation was quite contrast after the 9/11 attacks on WTC and Pentagon, unprecedented solidarity was poured as the US and its allies came forward catch Osama bin Laden the main culprit behind the WTC attacks. The national security strategy formulated a broad strategy, but this strategy was different from previous allied operations. Tactically Philip H. Gordon described that “The US saw multilateral support as politically useful but not militarily.”<sup>2</sup>

The outpouring of the public and official support for the US in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks proved to be temporary as policies on both sides of the transatlantic continued to be reflect the national interests and the performance of the individual states. The Bush administration gained political and diplomatic support for its campaign against Afghanistan. It has sought to form a coalition of coalitions that would contribute very different and many fronts. The main purpose of this was military contribution. Unlike the gulf war the Bush administration did not seek substantial troop requests until the main combat operation in Afghanistan was over, in the word of Phillip H. Gordon: “The US saw multilateral support but not particularly

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Crag, *The Combined and Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Concept of the Alliance's Adaptation*, *NATO Review*, (Vol.44, No. 4, July 1996), pp. 8-9

<sup>2</sup> Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after September 11”, (Vol.43, No.4, *Survival*, Winter 2001), p.ix



significant militarily. In this case it was reinforced by what many Americans saw as a key 'lesson' of Kosovo. Whereas many Europeans saw the Kosovo air campaigns excessively dominated by the US and its generals, most Americans, particularly within the military, saw just the opposite; excessive European meddling, with French politicians and European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and compromising official security and this time the Bush team determined would be different. The key difference was that the development of what would be termed the "Afghan Model" which was tactical level combined the use of precision weaponry with special operation forces and on a strategic level emphasized the use of forces and assets for direct combat and multilateral troops for the humanitarian and national building exercises.

The division of labour led the Chirac government to object being forced to 'clean up' after the Americans. The US-Afghan model was not based on unilateralism, but it was the reflection to bypass the constraints of the inherent interests of multilateralism, shared leadership and the use of military force to achieve security interests. In his state of the union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush announced that the US would take preventive actions to counter threats to the US and its core allies. He mentioned that "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. USA will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes which threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."<sup>3</sup> Bush's Doctrine of preemption was formalized as a part of the US security strategy which stated that "while the US will certainly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists."<sup>4</sup> The first use of the preemption doctrine would be Iraq and the use of the strategy would lead to a deep crisis in the transatlantic relations and in the "New-Old Europe debate".

### **IRAQ AND THE OLD AND NEW EUROPE:**

The 2003 US led invasion of Iraq created a range of diplomatic and strategic tensions in the transatlantic security alliances and it exacerbated differences in the US over cooperative versus militant multilateralism. Within the administration Secretary of

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<sup>3</sup>*The Wall Street Journal*, February 2, 2002, P. 23

<sup>4</sup> Jonathan Monten, "The Root of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in the US Strategy", *International Security*, (Vol.29, No.4, Spring 2005), pp.140-141

State Collin Powell emerged as a foremost proponent of cooperation, while vice president Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld led the drive for immediate action, even without strong international support. Powell and his cooperationists initially held sway and during the fall of 2002, the administration worked to develop an international coalition and secure both UN backing and bilateral support from the major European allies.

### **Old Europe and New Europe Debate**

The Iraqi crisis has surfaced a great debate on Europe's place and role on the world stage and the future of the European Union (EU), given the deep divisions that surfaced among its members even before American bombs and missiles started raining down on Iraq. Deep historical, political and cultural differences that underlie the relatively recently forged European unity surfaced as the members of the European Union were confronted with the tough choice of whether to support or oppose the military action against Iraq under Washington's new doctrine of preemptive strike against potential threats posed by hostile states. The divided European response was not so much over what the EU could collectively do, or over the role of the UN Security Council, and most members had gone along with resolutions in the UNSC. Instead it became a row between European nation-states over their respective perceptions about the role of the US, and whether they should restrain the unilateral expression of American power. In this tussle of perceptions, the deep-seated divisions between 'old' and 'new' Europe surfaced in a big way.

As the US and its British ally mobilized for war, there was a natural tendency for elite and public attention in America and Europe to focus on the immediate question of whether to undertake military action against Iraq. The challenge is that although Europeans and Americans have different interests, values and sensibilities, both sides still need one other hand must work toward a new modus operandi. But the situation was different; Europeans have always found it difficult to understand Americans. Today, for many Americans Europe is neither a subject nor an object of history. Europe's view of America has changed too. In the recent years America's activity has created an irksome to the Europeans. The disagreement among the European

countries put a crucial impact of this internal division within the EU. Differences of opinion over the US-led military action against Iraq exposed a tectonic shift in the inner dynamics of European politics, one likely to have huge consequences for the future of America-EU relations, the NATO military alliance and the prospects for the European Union. US Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld summed it up as a tussle between a fading 'Old Europe' – France and Germany, in particular - and a dynamic grouping of countries farther to the east. He said 'you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't, I think that's old Europe.'<sup>5</sup> The US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said that France and Germany were 'a problem', but insisted that many other countries in Europe were willing to join a coalition to disarm Iraq.

The bitter debate between some key European states and the US over Iraq revealed a profound difference in the eve of the Iraq war. During this, living in close proximity in relatively small, vulnerable countries, the European have grown accustomed to believing that there to manage rather than to eliminate the security risks. The outcome a collections of European nations which instinctively prefer diplomacy to all costs, pretend that they no longer have national interests and believe that some international crises simply do not have any solution. The US, however, stands dramatically opposed to every one of these concepts. Nevertheless, the Iraq crisis is different in many respects from all the previous transatlantic disputes and, as such, will not sweep under the carpet so easily. The absence of an overwhelming, single enemy facing both sides of the Atlantic is the chief reason why the dispute over Iraq was so acrimonious. Efforts to coordinate Europe's joint position are not necessarily always to be translated into a different position from that of the USA. This was clear in the Iraq dispute, where those who supported the US were either regarded as 'poodles' or as simply 'un-European'. The military gap between Europe and the US has grown so wide that the idea of joint burden sharing is quickly becoming a burdensome fiction. The terrorist attacks on the US have merely accelerated this growing divide in military capabilities.

### **European security system and Iraq war**

The Iraq war of 2003 caused great split in the European security system. The Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld,

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<sup>5</sup> "West's Rift Deepens Over Iraq", BBC, January 23, 2003 , Judy Dempsey, "In Europe, Divisions among Old and New", *International Herald Tribune*, June 3, 2005

termed the Atlanticist states those nations that were part of the western European system after the second world war- 'old' Europe. They tended to disagree with the US policy towards Iraq. In contrast, the European and central European states that were once part of the communist bloc were defined as the 'new' Europe and tended to support US policy. Keeping these views Mira Duric rightly argued that, is this 'atlanticist' and 'Europeanist' split in short term aberration or is it the beginning of a long term transformation of the European- Atlantic security system?<sup>6</sup> As Rumsfeld further highlighted, 'If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east, and there are a lot of new members.' Rumsfeld's reference was to the recently inducted eight new members to the European Union including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The EU debate on action against Iraq started in January 2002, when the US President, George Bush in his State of the Union speech referred to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the 'axis of evil'. The labeling thus of these states by President Bush had drawn a lot of criticism by some European countries, while others had supported the US position. The pro and against stand clearly showed a split among the major European countries of the 'old' guard, as well as the new entrants. Both Italy and Spain welcomed the 'axis of evil' speech, with Jose Maria Aznar (the EU Presidency incumbent from January-June 2002) comparing the position taken by President Bush to that of Harry Truman's rallying of the West against Soviet Communism.<sup>7</sup>

During the time of the Afghanistan invasion almost all European governments wholeheartedly supported the US both logistically and militarily. Being a long term strategic partners the US was also expected a lot from the European countries, especially the powerful countries like Germany and France. The British support was unforgettable. The situation made a turn when the US appealed its coalition partners for the war against Iraq they disagreed. In 2003, on the eve of the joint US and British invasion of Iraq, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously criticized France, Germany and Belgium for opposing their operation by calling them 'old Europe', by contrast praising as the 'new Europe' those countries which supported that US policy- above all Britain, but also Spain, Poland and some east European

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<sup>6</sup> Mira Duric, "Russia and the Old Europe Versus New Europe Debate: US Foreign Policy and the Iraq War 2003" in Tom Lansford and Bagovest Tasev, (ed.), *Old Europe New Europe and the US: Renegotiation Transatlantic Security in the Post 9/11 Era*", (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), p.56.

<sup>7</sup> 'America and Europe, Who Needs Whom?' *The Economist*, March 9, 2002.

countries.<sup>8</sup> Many European did a double-take at this characterization, which obviously had a number of implications. To some extent, 'new Europe' clearly meant countries that had recently been won over to liberal democracy and free market economies, a categorization which fits Spain and the countries east of the former Germany. But 'new Europe', in Rumsfeld definition, also included Britain, a country whose successive governments had stood shoulder to shoulder with the US on most major security policy issues since the second world war.<sup>9</sup> The implication was also that Britain was a country whose present government clearly understood the new rules that US opinions dominated the 'game' now that the cold war was over, and that it was European countries inclined furthest towards the US. The EU has now capable to manage its own defense, social security and economic stability. In the mean time the statement of Rumsfeld was a deliberate snub to those in France and Germany who thinks the EU the more advanced and prospers.

The European debate on Iraq intensified as a result of the US National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP) issued on September 20, 2002, followed by Tony Blair's dossier on Iraq on September 24, 2002. Both documents had provided evidence that Iraq had begun to make chemical and biological weapons again, and made the case that Iraq had even restarted its attempts to make a nuclear bomb since the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998,6 thereby threatening international security. In the same period, the UN debates over Iraq led to the adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, directing that from November 27, 2002, the IAEA director general, Mohammad El Baradei and the Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, were to conduct an enhanced inspection regime for Iraq's disarmament.<sup>10</sup> In their preliminary reports presented to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, Hans Blix had clearly stated that Iraq had started to cooperate with the weapon inspectors to a great extent and it had also started to destroy its Samoud-2 missiles, and further indicated that enhanced weapons inspections would require more weeks, and he had also stated that till that point of time the weapons inspectors had found no material evidence of chemical and

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<sup>8</sup> Beatrice Heuser, "New Europe and Old Europe: American Screen Images of Britain and France", in John Baylis and Jon Roper, (ed.), *The United States and Europe: Beyond the Neo-Conservative Divide?*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 193

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p.196

<sup>10</sup> "UN Security Council Resolution 1441", November 8, 2002, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02110803.htm>. Accessed on 2.6.2007

biological weapons in the possession of Iraq. The US and UK, on the other hand, in order to make a case for their planned action in the months ahead, had alleged non-compliance by Iraq to the UNSC Resolution 1441, and since it amounted to a violation had called upon the international community to take military action against the violating state. As a result, there was a lot of retaliation from France and Russia who are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as from Germany, who had become a non-permanent member of the Council from January 2003. In fact, France had threatened to veto any resolution that called for a military action against Iraq. France and Germany had argued that as per the Blix reports, Iraq had not crossed the red line and that while inspectors were at work, there should be no talk of war. The chancellor charged, a war against Iraq would distract from the war against terrorism and might result in uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties, as well as further estrangement between the Arab world and the West.<sup>11</sup>

### **British support and European crisis**

The main powers set up their base to solve the global terrorist problem were the US and the Britain. The British contribution was so significant during the operation enduring freedom and the operation Iraqi freedom. While analyzing the situation, the question comes that if Britain kept away its country from the coalition, does the US proceed to attack Iraq? Perhaps not! It was of the long standing 'special relationship' with the US and constructive relationship with the Europe. He also sees foreign policy as best way to secure his role in history. In his review essay Stephen F. Szabo maintained that the new system would have to run by a new concept of powers which would replace competing alliance and the old balance of power.<sup>12</sup>

There were critical comments made by the premiers of European countries. They tactically opposed the unilateral invasion of US against Iraq, French Foreign Minister; Hubert Vedrine criticized the American approach as simplistic.<sup>13</sup> German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said that European allies 'won't be treated as satellites'. Chris Patten, though a Briton, in his capacity as the EU's Foreign Affairs Commissioner observed that America was going into a 'unilateralist overdrive'. Despite Britain being a staunch ally of the Americans, the British public opinion was

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<sup>11</sup> Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf war: the German resistance", *survival*, (Vol.45,No.1, Spring 2003), p. 99

<sup>12</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, "Visionary or Operator?", *Survival*, (Vol.46,No.3, 2004), p. 178

<sup>13</sup> "Allies at Odds – All Around", *The Economist*, April 13, 2002, pp.48-49

strongly critical of the current display of US unilateralism. In the early part of the 2002, the British Government had to retract support to any proposed military action due to the highly critical, anti-war British public opinion. A no-confidence motion was signed on September 24, 2002, by 70 MPs in the British House of Commons against the Blair administration's support to military strikes against Iraq.<sup>14</sup> The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, ruled out Berlin's participation in any US-led attack on Iraq. After the United States, Germany is the largest contributor of troops for international operations. Overall, the European countries supported re-engagement with Iraq through the United Nations and opposed any further military action against that country.

The Iraq war remains the Bush administration's defining movement and legacy. In Bob Woodward's inside account of how the Bush administration went to war, he mentioned the critical importance of Blair's support to Bush, who cites, 'absolutely had to have Blair on board'.<sup>15</sup> Blair supported the war because of his desire to maintain the 'special relationship', and to lock the US into a broader multilateral system. He also believed it was the right thing to do, which would be based on both the cruelty of Saddam's regime and need to maintain the credibility of the UN. However, the rationale for the war differed substantially to replace Saddam Hussein and create both new dynamic in the Middle East and new opportunities for American power in the region. But the situation turned apart, as the American march towards war gathered momentum in 2002, Europe was split into two camps. One camp headed by France under Jacques Chirac and Germany under Gerhard Schroeder. They challenged the American administration by creating a counter to the unipolar world approach of the neo-cons and their allies. In the other camp was Tony Blair, Jose Maria Aznar of Spain and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, part of the Rumsfeld's 'new Europe'.

Blair's European policy was in shambles; both Chirac and Schroeder saw Blair as their main challenger for the leadership of Europe. Thus, they used the Iraq issue to reestablish the Franco-German partnership. Most of the time Blair stressed to engage himself with Europe, but his bridging role was rightly dismissed by Schroeder. Working in one direction, from Europe to the US Blair failed to make the European case in Washington. The fact that Blair worked with Berlusconi, Aznar, and others to

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<sup>14</sup> "Labour MPs split over Iraq Dossier", *The Times*, September 25, 2002, p. 32

<sup>15</sup> Bob Woodward, "Plan of Attack", (New York: Simon and Schuster Publications, 2004), p.162

further split Europe and pushed Germany deeper into the French camp compounded this failure, to undercut his European policy and the pivotal power role he wished for Britain.<sup>16</sup>

The intra-European differences came into the force in late 2002 and early 2003 as the US prepared its case for an attack on Iraq. The UK was willing to give its support to military action, preferably with a clear UN mandate. France and Germany expressed position to any such action. When president Chirac declared that France would veto a second UN mandate, the UK sided with the US over intervention. The result was an Anglo-American action which was rejected by most of the EU-15. The UK's relations with the 'core Europe' were damaged and America's relations with France and Germany seemed to be shattered. President Chirac implied that British approach undermined the EU's foreign policy. Yet, far from isolating it, the UK's position accorded with those of several of the accession states, notably Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Spain and Italy. Europe was certainly divided, but for once France and Germany were in majority. Nevertheless the fact that the UK had demonstrated its Atlanticism and was included in defense secretary Rumsfeld's concept of 'new Europe', namely the states that supported the US position. Despite the bridging policy of the British, the relation with several of the founding member states deteriorated further with the so-called 'chocolate summit' at which France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg sought to create a European military planning 'nucleus', which appeared to be a challenge to NATO.<sup>17</sup> It did not take long for the UK to rebuild its links with France and Germany, however, and to do so in a way that would antagonize small, medium size and even larger member states, not least Italy: namely, through trilateral cooperation.

The Iraq crises shock the Atlantic alliance more deeply than any crisis in its history. The legitimacy of argument itself can be broken down into several components. While it is always a case where military action is necessary without Security Council approval, winning a consensus for action for America's allies will greatly facilitate US actions. The great example of it is the 1999 Kosovo war was a case in point, opposed by Russia on the Security Council, but approved by America's NATO allies.

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<sup>16</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, No.7, pp.179-180

<sup>17</sup> European Press Review, *BBC News*, 30 April 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2987439.stm>. Accessed on 23.6.2007



The demoralization of France in US political discourse has been particularly ugly and damaging to US interests. Those who engage in it need to face this hard question: where they imagine are the legions of potential allies if they cannot even bring a like minded, albeit proudly independent, democracy to their side.

### **Inter-European crisis**

During the time of the war France was the first European country to take a strong position against any planned military action against Iraq by the US, starting from its criticism of the US President's 'axis of evil' speech. In a joint declaration issued at the Schwerin Summit of July 30, 2002, both France and Germany considered it necessary to obtain a UNSC mandate before undertaking any military intervention against Iraq. In the press conference after the Summit, French President, Jacques Chirac reiterated that any military attack against Iraq would have to be justified by a decision of the UNSC.<sup>18</sup> France's policy on the Iraq question was determined by a couple of factors. Firstly, as a permanent member of the UNSC, France took up the responsibility for speaking up in upholding the principles of international law and the sanctity of the United Nations.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, economic interests also directed the French position against any military action against Iraq. Within Europe, France had maintained the closest trade links with Iraq. A major portion of the French oil imports comes from Iraq. On regional priorities, France has been clearly wary of US intentions. According to a French diplomat, while the Bush administration is obsessed about Iraq 'we are obsessed about achieving peace between Israeli and Palestinians'; and that 'the important thing is to build a coalition for peace in the Middle East, not to build a coalition for war in Iraq'.<sup>20</sup> Thirdly, France's reservations about the war had as much to do with pragmatism as high principles: Not only is it a country with long established commercial connections with Iraq, it is a country with the largest population of immigrant Muslims in Europe, and thus with more reason than most to wish to avoid a conflict that may have divisive domestic consequences. Fourthly, the French leadership did represent the position of a large majority of France's citizens. Polls had shown consistently that more than three quarters of French were against the

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<sup>18</sup> Tumos Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd, "Divided West: European Security and The Transatlantic Relationship", (London: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2006), pp.68-69.

<sup>19</sup> Christopher Nesshover, 'Germany, France, America in the Iraqi Conflict,' *American Institute of Contemporary German Studies*, [www.aicgs.org/c/nesshover](http://www.aicgs.org/c/nesshover) accessed on 13.6.2007

<sup>20</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, "European Splits with US on Need for Iraq Attack", *The New York Times*, July 21, 2002

war on Iraq. In case of Germany the war against Iraq was almost as the same as that of France. The French foreign minister statement shown that a peaceful disarmament of Iraq was possible and that there was a real alternative to war. Germany was stressed more to resolve the long standing violent Israeli-Palestine confrontations rather than that of Iraq. Germany believed that Iraq posed no threat to Europe. In this point the British position was varied from France and Germany, which sided with the US, as the Prime Minister stated that Iraq had a usable chemical and biological weapons capability, in violation of UNSC Resolution 687, which called for the disarmament of Iraq.<sup>21</sup> Also that Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against Iran as well as against his own people in the past. Tony Blair had made clear that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed a serious threat to the British national interest. The case for urgency of the British participation in the disarmament of Iraq was supplemented by the fact that brutal and aggressive regimes like that of Saddam Hussein could use these weapons against any countries in the world.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, it is important for Russia in the emerging framework of European divisions as it has been an important role against the war in Iraq. Since the Bush administration came to office, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was able to improve relations bilaterally and personally with President Bush. But the war against Iraq brought out the differences over perceptions of national interests. The Russian President, from the beginning of the UN debates on Iraq, had sided with France and Germany. There was a consensus developed within the three European members of the Security Council to deter the war against Iraq. Russia, France and Germany did not want to sanction war on Iraq without giving diplomacy a chance.

### **Response of the East European countries**

The countries of Eastern Europe comprising Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania were ardent supporters of the US war against Iraq. The East European bloc played a very important role in the dividing of the European position on the Iraq conflict. The first blow came when the letter of eight was signed by leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on January 30, 2003, in

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<sup>21</sup> Anna Sabasteanski, "Patterns of Global War on Terrorism 1985-2005, US Department of State Reports With Supplementary

Documents and Statistics", (Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing Group LLC, 2005), p. 150

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 137.

support of US policy in Iraq.<sup>23</sup> Six days later on February 5, 2003, the Vilnius Ten group composed of leaders of ten East European countries comprising of Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia issued a signed letter in the Wall Street Journal in support of the American military intervention in Iraq. But later this group ten mentioned that the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell's position in the UN Security Council that Iraq had clearly violated UN resolutions as the reason for its support.<sup>24</sup> The signatories also expressed their willingness to participate in the international coalition for the disarmament of Iraq. The Western media saw the letter as evidence of European disunity on Iraq and of the deepening isolation of Germany and France.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, the 'Old Europe' and 'New Europe' dichotomy has become a popular catch phrase but it has its problems too. It obscures the fault lines of 'New Europe', its points of tension and cleavages and also its inability to be wholly Atlanticist or to remain uncritical of the US. As Dominique Moisi has argued, "The categorization of "old" and "new" is not only intellectual false, but politically offensive."<sup>26</sup> The notion of 'New Europe' as a monolithic atlanticist bloc within an enlarged EU and as representing first and second echelon NATO members conditioned to support US foreign policy appears compelling, but it is in fact an illusion.<sup>27</sup> The countries of so called 'New Europe' now as the full members of the EU, they are now actively involved in EU decision making process. Germany and France's active engagement with them, especially Poland, has demonstrated their intention to make a special effort to mend fences with CEE states. The impact of the 'New Europe' on the EU has not radically transformed the latter's approach to transatlantic relations. Some of the new member states do demonstrate a greater understanding of and sympathy for US positions, but it does not translate into a unified Atlanticist bloc.

## II

### **NATO and European Support for Intervention in Iraq**

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<sup>23</sup> Iraq Pacification Operations, [www.globalsecurity.org.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org.htm). Accessed on 27.6.2007

<sup>24</sup> Gerald Dorfman: "Blair Places His Bet", *Hoover Digest*, Stanford University, No. 1, Winter 2003, p.37

<sup>25</sup> John C. Hulsman: "New Europe Proves Rumsfeld Right Over Iraq", *The Heritage Foundation*, January 31, 2003, pp.7-8

<sup>26</sup> Dominique Moisi, "Reinvesting the West", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.6, November-December 2003, pp.69-70 (pp.69-73)

<sup>27</sup> Tumos Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd, No.27, p. 69

The North Atlantic Alliance that emerged and developed during the last half of the 20th century was not solely based on the need for defense against an outside threat. By late 1960s, particularly with the prospect of the Soviet invasion in the borders of Western Europe was highly distrustful for the existing of this alliance. The notion of Atlantic alliance was clearly sustained by something more than a European need for American military power. The very success of alliance had created a belief in the idea that NATO might serve as the military foundation of a security community among the democratic nations and eventually could extend its gifts of security, stability, and democracy through out the world. After some soul searching evidences in the early 1990s the belief of NATO's ultimate persistence, expansion, and first operational deployments in the Balkans after 1995 had encouraged the notion that the Atlantic alliance had over time out grown any need for the Cold War contingencies.<sup>28</sup> But the recent Iraq crisis tore the alliance apart. During 2002-2003 the member countries had brutally reopened old questions about the role of the Cold War formation and maintenance of the alliance. The sense of ritualized brinkmanship of transatlantic disputes remains, but with Europe no longer directly dependent for its security on the US, and with the key issues of American foreign policy now outside of Europe, the ability of the alliance to weather such disputes is no longer guaranteed.<sup>29</sup>

The Europeans and Americans view on the Middle East through a historical lens of different hues. Their different experiences of the region and differing priorities and interests greatly contributed to the transatlantic rift over the war in Iraq and other issues in 2003. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said the new members of NATO are taking the lead in confronting new threats to security and in injecting a fresh vision to the old Atlantic alliance. Correspondents say his remarks echo a controversial statement made in the run-up to the Iraq war (the old and new Europe). He was speaking in Germany a strong opponent of the war in Iraq and a country which Mr. Rumsfeld has described as part of "old Europe". Mr. Rumsfeld gave a major speech at the Marshall Center for European Studies, a joint US-German project at Garmisch in Germany. "Many nations in Europe, but not all, correctly see the nexus of terror and weapons of mass destruction as the biggest threat and recognize that transatlantic unity is more critical than ever if we are to successfully deal with

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<sup>28</sup> Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, "Allies at War : America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq", (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004),p.20

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.p.21

that threat", he said. "Some want to define themselves by their opposition to the United States as some sort of 'counterweight' to America".<sup>30</sup> Most rejected the argument that they must choose between Europe and America and recognize that a robust transatlantic relationship is not only compatible with European integration, but critical to our mutual security". BBC Pentagon correspondent Nick Childs argued, 'despite Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks, he tried to play down some of "the differences with older NATO allies that arose over the Iraq war'. There may be arguments from time to time, said Mr. Rumsfeld, but Americans and Europeans were joined together by more than common interests".<sup>31</sup>

During the time of the Afghanistan invasion, NATO finds new strategic relevance through a wider global role. Afghanistan was proving ground for it. NATO's assumption of its command of the International Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has been very challenging operationally and more forces are needed to expand its work outside Kabul. According to de Hoop Scheffer, "Our first and immediate priority is to get Afghanistan right. We cannot afford to fail. NATO's Afghanistan mission may be halfway around the world, but its success matters to our security right here. If the political process fails, that country will become, once again, a haven for the terrorists who threaten us, for the drugs that end up on our streets". Afghanistan is a demanding proving ground for NATO's remote peacekeeping capabilities. On an address NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said, "I want to reiterate that the US can rely on the full support of its 18 NATO Allies in the campaign against terrorism".<sup>32</sup>

### **NATO's Evolving Role in Iraq**

The role of the NATO and the allied national forces in operation Iraqi freedom (OIF) has been controversial and multifaceted. During the time of the invasion twelve NATO member countries participated in OIF, and other Allies provided transit approvals and access ports and airbases to facilitate the movement of U.S. and other Coalition forces into Iraq. The alliance was sidelined during the initial phase of the war on terrorism. Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution and former

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<sup>30</sup> Rumsfeld revisits 'old Europe' debate, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2980538.stm>. Accessed on 28.6.2007

<sup>31</sup> Daniel Nelson, "Three Fictions of Transatlantic Relations", in Heinz Gartner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, (ed.), *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War* (New York: Palgrave macmillan;2005), pp.126-127

<sup>32</sup> Anna Sabastianski, No.24, p. 243

deputy secretary of state, said NATO is the best mechanism for a U.S.-led war against Iraq and that unless NATO is given a role, "the alliance might never recover, since NATO must be taken seriously by its strongest member if it is to be taken seriously by anyone".<sup>33</sup> Supporting Talbott, James Kitfield said "If the alliance is not part of an Iraq war, European allies have made clear they cannot then be relied upon to help pick up the pieces in Iraq after a war they had little part in initiating". The Bush administration nonetheless is expected to request direct military assistance from selected NATO allies and to run the campaign through the U.S. command structure. Conventional wisdom maintains that Britain is the only European allied country that would join the United States in a war on Iraq, but several European countries, including the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland and Spain, already may have pledged logistical, basing rights and other support.

Not all NATO nations supported Coalition operations in Iraq. The Alliance undertook a number of measures in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which notes that NATO will consult, and could implicitly take actions to address, threats to the security of any member state with no geographic limitation, to ensure the security of Turkey. So, the Operation Active Endeavor, whereby elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces have monitored shipping in the eastern Mediterranean in support of counter-terrorist efforts, was expanded in early March 2003, in response to a U.S. request and to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. On May 21, 2003, the Alliance agreed to support Poland in its leadership of a Multi-National Division (MND) in Iraq. This includes help with force generation, communications, logistics and movements. Spain is a major troop contributor, drawing on its long experience in remote international operations to support the Poles.<sup>34</sup> Thus, it was noted that the NATO procedures for collaboration among multinational forces are working well in Iraq. NATO's decision-making process in support of Poland's Iraq mission was also seen as effective.

The operations of the Polish multinational division in Iraq were explored. Polish armed forces benefited from important logistical and other support from the U.S. and the UK, as well their experience in Afghanistan. Planning of the multinational division made a careful assessment of requirements and the equipment and training of

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<sup>33</sup> Louis R. Golino, "NATO role in Iraq vital: U.S. Likely to Rely on Alliance for Post-war Peacekeeping", *The Washington Times*, November 18, 2002

<sup>34</sup> Coalition Operation and Iraq, *International Herald Tribune*, April 23, 2003

units. This planning has proven quite effective over the six months of operations, only small losses have been suffered by the contingent. Force protection and sustainability have proven fairly challenging. Spain, which was preferred to be a part of the NATO force in Iraq, and it guided over command of the MND. In the Istanbul summit, NATO proposed to develop a unified command structure like NATO Response Force (NRF). The summit debated over NATO's role in Iraq and turn on a number of military assessments, including the capability of European Allies to generate and sustain forces that can undertake this difficult mission. Ultimately, participants agreed, this is also a political and resource question, since the Alliance has over 2 million of the best-trained and equipped armed forces in the world.<sup>35</sup>

Millions in the United States, allied countries and elsewhere around the world watched the stark scenes of 9/11 unfolding before their eyes. At NATO headquarters, Secretary General George Robertson recognized that the events of September 11 constituted an act of war against the United States, and therefore against the entire Alliance.<sup>36</sup> On September 12, the permanent representatives on the North Atlantic Council agreed with the Secretary General's suggestion that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty be invoked if it were determined that the attacks were directed from abroad. The NATO nations had declared that the Alliance had been attacked, and each ally pledged to aid the United States by taking "such action as it deems necessary".<sup>37</sup> In the wake of the invasion, the US government became much more willing to assert openly categorical imperatives, to directly deploy US military power against enemies, and to insist upon compliance and cooperation from allies without prior consultation. Multilateral support was flowed into the US. Despite this rapid saw of support, the Bush administration decided that it did not want to risk future delays or diminish US control by accepting too much international assistance. Indeed, on September 26, at the first high level briefing provided by Washington to NATO Defense Ministers after 9/11, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz ruled out using any international or NATO structures. He also made clear that Washington was not planning to rely heavily on European forces either, instead nothing that the effort

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<sup>35</sup> "NATO and the Challenges of Global Security, 2004 European Symposium", January 28-29, 2004, Sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/europe2004/agenda.html>. Accessed on 16.7.2007

<sup>36</sup> Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment Of European Forces", *Survival*, Vol.46, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.165-66

<sup>37</sup> NATO's Special Report, "War on International Terrorism", *The Times*, July 14, 2002, p.20

“would be made many different coalitions in different part of the world. When secretary of defense Rumsfeld was later asked whether NATO might be involved in the action against Iraq, his response was revealing: “I can’t imagine it., it hasn’t crossed my mind”.<sup>38</sup> Though most of the NATO members supported to the US efforts to invade Iraq but providing military assistance was delayed. The NATO delay reflects a deepening public divide, and sharpening of tension among the alliance nations on Iraq. Washington and London accused Baghdad of concealing banned programmes for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and missile to deliver them. British had strongly backed the bush administration’s tough approach. Spain and Italy was also dedicated for support.<sup>39</sup>

The Iraq war led the European participants expressed their concern on the discourse in the U.S. of cooperation “with NATO” in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ardent supporter of US was Italy had no conflict between its commitments to NATO and the EU. Indeed, ESDP is consistent with longstanding U.S. insistence that Europe make a greater contribution of capabilities to Euro-Atlantic security. Any temptation within the EU to decouple European security from its transatlantic security bonds or to suggest that the EU should serve as a counterweight to the U.S. was unacceptable to Italy. This is one reason why Italy was concerned by the circumstances and results of the April 2003 defense-related Brussels summit of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg.<sup>40</sup> While not opposed to the idea of “autonomous” EU operations, it is the general view in Italy that such operations should not be the first EU option. If the EU considers undertaking military missions, Berlin Plus should be the first option. As a rule, Italian forces committed to the NATO Response Force should be available to the EU only if released by the North Atlantic Council. So the Anglo-US position on Iraq was viewed sympathetically by the pro-atlanticist governments of Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland, as well as the most East European countries. On the other hand, the governments of France, Germany and Belgium led the anti-war Euro-opposition group. There was angry debates in Brussels over Iraq in February 2003 prompted a former American ambassador to NATO to remark that it was ‘the worst split I’ve never seen in NATO’, but eventually there was a

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<sup>38</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz’s Remarks on Coalitions in Judy Dempsey, et al., “White House Avoid Seeking NATO-Wide Aid”, *Financial Times*, September 27, 2001

<sup>39</sup> Brian Knolton, “Allies Delays Decision on US, Requests: NATO Wavering on War With Iraq”, *International Herald Tribune*, January 23, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Peter H.Merkel, “The Rift Between America and Europe”, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.41



compromise: the US scaled down its request, abandoning the use of European forces. Belgium and Germany, for their part agreed to prepare NATO for the defense of Ankara.<sup>41</sup> The relation between US, Europe, and the utilization of NATO never come to an end but it re-evolve the institutional reorganizations, the threat perceptions and ability to mobilize the combat force. The core of the Atlantic alliance recommitted to their transatlantic partnership.

### III

#### **NATO stands on prior to the Iraq war**

Anxious to get European allies on board for a possible Iraq war, the US in November 2002 began to consider how NATO might be involved in a possible operation. On December 4, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited NATO Head Quarters to lay out four possible options. These included assistance to Turkey in context of Iraqi threat to Turkish territory (covered by NATO's Article V defense guarantee); technical support to allies involved in a war; an actual military role in a war; or a post war role for the alliance.<sup>42</sup> During the time of the Operation Iraqi Freedom NATO forces helped to defend Turkey, using NATO naval forces, to defend US ships heading to the Persian Gulf through the Mediterranean Sea enlisting NATO troops to guard US and other bases in Europe and elsewhere. Initially no ally objected to the planning taking place so long as it was not made public. In mid January, however, word leaked to the press about possible NATO involvement, and France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg insisted to stop such planning immediately. On January 22, the day Chirac and Schroeder were jointly pledging to oppose war in Iraq during the 40th anniversary celebrations of the Elysee Treaty, France and Germany formally blocked planning at NATO from taking place.<sup>43</sup> Ignoring the fact that Turkey itself was lukewarm about possible NATO role, the American pressed NATO to act, especially on the issue of Turkey's defense. Invoking the NATO Treaty Article IV, which allows for consultations whenever one ally's security might be threatened, the American insisted that the alliance prepare to come to Turkey defense in the event Iraq retaliated against Turkey during a possible war. The official of the US mission to NATO wanted to see the alliance played a greater role.

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<sup>41</sup> Saki Ruth Dockrill, "The Transatlantic Alliance in the Iraq Crisis, John Baylis and Jon Roper, (ed.) *The United States and Europe: Beyond the Neo-Conservative Divide?*" (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 127

<sup>42</sup> Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, No.32, pp.136-137

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* p.137

The dispute about NATO's potential role came to a head at a February 10 Meeting of NATO ambassador in Brussels, which led to angry exchanges and even shouting matches not formally heard at meetings of the North Atlantic Council. The meeting pitted representatives of France, Germany, and Belgium, all of whom have argued that NATO planning was unnecessary and unnecessarily provocative, against representatives of other allies, led by those of the US and Great Britain, who argued that the defense of an ally should not be ignored. In this meeting the officials of US were quiet furious, the US ambassador to NATO Nicolas Burns called to French, German, and Belgian position at NATO "most unfortunate" and also said that it created a "crisis credibility" for the alliance. Powell feared that the alliance was "breaking itself up because it will not meet its responsibilities".<sup>44</sup> The other option was to have the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) use his "delegated authority" to defend Turkey if no collective NATO decision were made. Neither the scaled-back plan nor the threat to go around the North Atlantic Council (NAC), however, was enough for Belgium and France, which continued to insist that a NATO decision to protect Turkey was an implicit acceptance of the case for war. A French government spokesman asserted: "We cannot, via a decision of NATO, give our implicit support to an armed intervention in Iraq and thus prejudge decisions which belong to Security Council of the UN."<sup>45</sup> Apart from the opposition of the West European countries, the US has been helpful in bringing the Eastern Europeans (New-Europe) into the fold of the prestigious North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This dependency on US support established the American influence into a complicated power game in the expanding European Union.<sup>46</sup> The Prague Summit of November 2002 invited seven new members to join NATO. Out of the ten to join the EU by May 2004, five countries including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia are to join the NATO by May 2004. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are already NATO members.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Paul Ames, "France, Germany, Belgium Block NATO Plans to Protect Turkey; Ankara Calls for Emergency Consultations", *Associated Press*, February 10, 2003

<sup>45</sup> Thomas Fuller, "US Backs Deals to Salvage NATO Aid to Turkey", *International Herald Tribune*, February 13, 2003

<sup>46</sup> Charles Grant: "Europe Will Pick up the Pieces", *International Herald Tribune*, March 24, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> "The Road to NATO Membership", [www.nato.int/docu/comm](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm). Accessed on 24.6.2007

The NATO dispute demonstrated just how tense Atlantic relations and showed how difference over Iraq could spill into other areas of supposed allied cooperation. And as on many other occasions, there was plenty of blame to go around. Knowing that several NATO members were not yet willing to proceed with NATO plans for Turkey's defense, The US could easily have avoided the controversy and ensured that the defensive measures were taken on a bilateral basis. And given Washington's snubbing of NATO in Afghanistan little more than a year earlier, it was hard to argue that it pushed a NATO role this time out of devotion and loyalty to the alliance. The Brookings Institution provides a detailed data about the relations about NATO role in Iraq. For the first time allies members discussed the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction and began developing a common policy on how the European Union should deal with countries that possess such weapons. All the analysts at the Brookings forum agreed that Europe must enhance its military capabilities, and develop a strategic doctrine and shared-threat assessment.

The U.S. relations with the EU since the early 1990s, in both crisis management in the Balkans and in non-military sectors, have injected a note of caution and even occasional skepticism regarding NATO-EU relations. For example, there are signs that non-military political criteria have played a disproportionate role in EU decision-making affecting ESDP capabilities and operations. It was quite anxious to launch its first military operation at a time when political divisions over Iraq had become as evident in the EU as in NATO. The EU reportedly pressured the Government of Macedonia to invite it to organize an EU-led follow on to the NATO-led Operation Harmony in early 2003, even though the military rationale for such an operation seemed weak. Since its inception over a decade ago, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program has been an unqualified success in building cooperation with countries on NATO's periphery and preparing certain partners for membership. In the post-9/11 era, PFP confronts new security challenges and potential missions over a wider geographic area. NATO's still fledgling partnership with Russia could bolster efforts to address certain security problems, such as combating terrorism. NATO activities in Central Asia and the wider Middle East will also evolve more smoothly if the Alliance has effective political dialogue and operational cooperation with Russia. According to one NATO insider, on 22 January, 2003, the 'two groups of NATO

members were opposed to the Anglo-American coalition and it preemptive engagement with Iraq, France and Germany, backed by Belgium and Luxembourg, declared not to be ready to approve the US request, fearing that a premature decision would impact negatively on the work being carried out by UN weapons inspectors.<sup>48</sup>

On the other side, the majority of NATO members stressed the Alliance's obligation to take measures to protect a member who might be threatened, pointing out that the UN's work and that of NATO are not incompatible. The Alliance will probably take a final decision after assessing the report presented to the UN Security Council on 27 January by the UN chief Weapons Inspector and the State of the Union address by President Bush on 28 January. The intelligence evidence meant that the US's response to the Security Council will also be crucial in shaping NATO's position. The general consensus at NATO HQ seems to be that the Alliance will eventually support Washington's request. While the Allies did not manage to approve defensive measures for Turkey, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson declared that 'there is disagreement over timing at the moment by small number of nations, but no disagreement at all on substance'.<sup>49</sup> More importantly, as one official put it, 'the issue is very much related to the debate about the Alliance's relevance: if NATO wants to remain relevant in American eyes, it has to support such requests'. Another more bluntly stated that 'if NATO does not want to do only housekeeping in the Balkans, it has to support the US'. Clearly, if NATO had reached an early agreement on military action, it would have helped to keep pressure on Iraq and would have sent a strong signal of unity. This disharmony is perhaps not surprising, as the Alliance failed to protect Turkey and other Allies from the threat of a chemical and biological attack from Iraq in a virtual crisis management exercise last year. Although the current situation is less serious, expectations should not be too high for NATO to act as one in any military intervention in Iraq. As was the case with Afghanistan, support will largely be negotiated bilaterally with members, and not through the Alliance as a whole. The antagonistic division between 'old' and 'new' Europe, as coined by Donald Rumsfeld, underscores the uncertainty of the transatlantic relationship as well as the ambiguous roles of NATO, its new members and Partnership for Peace (PFP) partners. This antagonism became exacerbated by the war in Iraq and, even as the

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<sup>48</sup> CESD Exclusive Report, [www.cesd.org/natonotes/notes42.htm](http://www.cesd.org/natonotes/notes42.htm). Accessed on 12.6.2007

<sup>49</sup> Annalisa Monaco, "Iraq: Another test for NATO? ISIS Europe", *NATO Notes*, Vol. 5 No. 1, 31 January 2003.

'major hostilities' ended in Iraq and the guerrilla counter-insurgency against US-led coalition forces accelerated, significant security rifts persist between 'old' Europe and the US, with 'new' Europe caught in the middle and forced to take sides. Transatlantic divisiveness largely detracts from the strategy America wants its allies to perform in the world. The Polish command of the Multinational Division (MND) in Iraq exemplifies the 'new' European impact on NATO, even without the deployment of a NATO force. The remarkable evolution of Poland and the other new and future NATO members and long-term PFP nations working in the MND demonstrates the rapid progress in Poland's leadership role in NATO and globally. For NATO, it illustrates how the Alliance's planning; training and implementation abilities are still relevant, despite the transatlantic rift. In early June 2003, NATO's North Atlantic Council approved giving military support to Poland and its sector by "providing intelligence, logistics expertise, movement co-ordination, force generation and secure communications support."<sup>50</sup>

#### **NATO in the post war Iraq**

The Bush administration has asked NATO to consider sending peacekeeping troops to postwar Iraq. Defense experts say there would be many benefits to a NATO deployment in Iraq. These include enabling the United States to share the burdens of postwar stabilization with its NATO allies. A NATO role in Iraq would also help revitalize the alliance, which has been largely sidelined in the U.S.-led wars on Iraq and terrorism. And as Mr. Daalder said at Brookings: NATO "knows how to do peacekeeping. It knows how to do stabilization. It knows it better than the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps or indeed anybody else." Moreover, NATO has considerable experience coordinating peacekeeping missions that involve non-NATO countries, which would be useful in putting together a multinational peacekeeping force in Iraq.<sup>51</sup> Such a force is likely to be perceived by Iraqis and the rest of the Arab and Muslim world as more legitimate than a mostly U.S. military presence. U.S. officials have also suggested that NATO might be tasked to oversee the disarmament of Iraq that the United Nations started.

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<sup>50</sup> "Poland Assumes Command in Iraq with NATO Support,"

[http://www.pagineidifesa.it/2003/nato\\_030904.html](http://www.pagineidifesa.it/2003/nato_030904.html). Accessed on 2.7.2007

<sup>51</sup> "Iraq is Chance for U.S. to Fix its Relations; Country Seeks New Stance with EU", April 27, 2003, <http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/2003/03an14.htm>. Accessed on 4.7.2007.

Negative evaluations of the U.S. can be expected to reduce support for NATO and accelerate the movement of Europeans toward a collective security solution built around the European Union. Support for NATO in Western Europe had been eroding since the end of the Cold War. From 1997 to 2004, there has been a marked decrease in preferences for a NATO based defense policy. In France and the UK, this erosion in support was momentarily reversed in 1999 with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and in 2002 at the height of U.S.-NATO cooperation in the War on Terror. But with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the erosion in NATO support resumed. Though, NATO was not formally involved in the invasion, the perception that NATO is an instrument of American foreign policy, reinforced by intense American efforts to obtain NATO involvement, created strong link between NATO and U.S Iraq policy. The popularity of the alliance suffered as a result. The low level of support for NATO in 2003 and 2004 are more than the extrapolation of preexisting trends in eroding post-Cold War support for NATO.

On the NATO's involvement in Iraq, the United States has encouraged the alliance to consider a direct role but has not pressed the issue until Iraq regains self-rule. NATO's new secretary-general insisted the alliance should not rule out a role in Iraq. "If a legitimate Iraqi government asks for our assistance, and if we have the support of the United Nations, NATO should not abdicate from its responsibilities".<sup>52</sup> The Alliance's evolving policy of Partnership has been enormously successful in helping to alter the strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. By promoting political and military interoperability, Partnership has helped to create a true Euro-Atlantic security culture a strong determination to work together in tackling critical security challenges, within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As the 26 Allies and 20 Partners continue to grow together, they will increase their ability to meet these common challenges with common responses. The Istanbul Summit will confirm this trend and point the way ahead. Allies' security can only be assured by close collaboration with Partners in Central and Eastern Europe and the Greater Middle East as well as with

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<sup>52</sup> Robert Burns, "Rumsfeld defends Iraq war at NATO meeting MUNICH, Germany (AP) -- Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, defending the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to a skeptical international audience, said Saturday he is confident Saddam Hussein's removal eventually will spread "Seeds of Freedom" Through the Middle East. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told the conference". Feb. 7, 2004, <http://www.salon.com/news/2004/02/07/nato/index.html>. Accessed on 12.7.2007.

each other.<sup>53</sup> The pre-existing 'Old' and 'new' Europe must join Washington in investing in key security institutions so that they remain relevant by demonstrating how they can evolve productively and cooperatively. Specifically, one strategy for grappling with the global war on terrorism is to create a joint NATO-EU counter-terrorism planning initiative for civilian police and military operations. In this way, transatlantic allies would better anticipate, coordinate and synchronize how to re-establish basic government functions before the tremendous tasks of post-war infrastructure construction. Rebuilding police capability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq requires international cooperation to oversee public security, complement military forces and organize and train a new indigenous police force. The new NATO and PFP nations provides a crucial support for the potential NATO-EU relationship, and the United States of America now reinforcing the geo-strategic bridges in East Central Europe that have seemingly overcome centuries of animosity.

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<sup>53</sup> Chris Donnelly, "Building a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East, examines how NATO's experience with the Partnership for Peace might help build a comparable Programme in the Greater Middle East", *NATO Review*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3>. Accessed on 21.6.2007

The world has been changed after September 11, 2001, as well as a great transform came into being on the long standing relations between the United States and Europe. By carrying the attack to the heartland of the US, to the icons of powers of finance and government, 9/11 proved a catalyst in the strategic thinking of the administration of George W. Bush and marked a sombre opening to the new millennium. On the consequence of 9/11 was reordering of priorities, Afghanistan replaced Iraq as the first 'rogue state' that had to be dealt with. A 'rogue state' according to Bush Doctrine, was a state aiding and harboring terrorists or threatening the world with of mass destruction. In Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden had established a base for al-Qaeda terrorists, Muslim fundamentalists dedicated to the waging war against the US and the Jews.<sup>1</sup> With the Taliban oust from Kabul and al-Qaeda driven out from Afghanistan, the Bush administration turned its attention in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was defying the UN which demanded verification of the complete destruction of the weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear. Until satisfied Iraq was placed under sanctions and only permitted to export a limited quantity of oil to pay for food and medication. The UN inspectors from 1991 to 1998 searched for the secret weapons and destroyed large quantities of chemical installing equipments that could no longer be replaced without UN knowledge. The change of administration in Washington and 9/11 broke the charade of UN resolutions and Saddam non-compliance. Intelligence sources were receiving reports that he was developing and hiding weapons of mass destruction. Now for three years no one could be sure that what was going on? The US and some of its allies calculated and presumed as these WMD would be ready and Saddam would threaten the west with his missiles, biological and chemical weapons or pass than on to a group of terrorists, even al-Qaeda.

In January 2002 Bush warned that the US would not simply wait to be 'attacked but would strike first'.<sup>2</sup> He signaled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea, 'the states like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world': constraints are no longer enough while WMD were believed to be readied for use. The count don for Saddam Hussein, 'regime change', had begun. A reluctant Bush was persuaded by the secretary of state Collin Powell and the British Prime

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<sup>1</sup> J.A.S Grenville, *"A History of the World: From the 20<sup>th</sup> Century to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century"*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 930

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



Minister Tony Blair, who flew to meet Bush at Camp David in September 2002, to follow the UN route and put maximum pressure on Saddam to disarm. President Bush was skeptical whether Saddam would give way.

The counter terrorism efforts expanded beyond the borders of Afghanistan in 2002 towards the Middle East. On 19 March 2003, the United States and its coalition forces launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Along with freeing the Iraqi people of a vicious dictator war also shut down the salmon Paktraining Camp, where members of al-Qaeda had trained, and disrupted the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi network, which has established a poison and explosive training camp in the north eastern Iraq. The OIF removed the prospective threat to the international community posed by the combination of an aggressive Iraqi regime, weapons of mass destruction capabilities, and terrorists. Iraq is now the central front for the global war on terrorism.<sup>3</sup>The military invasion of Iraq by the US in the spring of 2003 triggered a wide spread movement of protest in Europe across the globe. Active protesters occupied the public squares and demonstrated against the war assumed in unequivocally anti-American tone. A great international crisis came into exist when the US unilaterally prepared to invade Iraq. Though the anti war movements did not check the way of US led occupations of Iraq but it opened the inherent and hidden problems between the US and Europe.

## I

### **Role of public opinion and media during and after the war**

The media's role in a democratic society in general is to provide the public with an informed basis upon which they can exercise their democratic rights to lobby and express their views on what should happen to their elected representatives. And nothing changes during wartime. It is clear that during the Second Gulf War the media not only had to contend with censorship much of which was self-imposed but also with a serious amount of what is called information warfare. The 2003 war with Iraq marks the first time world public opinion has been strongly arrayed against the United States on a major issue. The world has disagreed with America on specific

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<sup>3</sup> Anna Sabastanski, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1985-2005", US Department of State Reports with Supplementary Documents and Statistics,( Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing Group LLC,2005) .p.237

issues like the banning of landmines during the Clinton administration and South African sanctions on Apartheid during the Reagan administration. But at no time were there concerted efforts involving mass demonstrations and world leaders allied against this nation. In addition, the events during March of 2003 involving the United Nations Security Council made it impossible for this country to muster even majority support for its resolution to go to war.

Since after the WTC attacks, television enhanced the growing sense of national community, as millions gathered around the campfires of the continuous network news programming. Not since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 had the country been so raft by the horrific events unfolding before its eyes. The constant televised replays of the scenes of the devastation reminded Americans that they were being tested in ways even more intimidating than the challenges previous generations had faces. Following 9/11, many reasoned that what worked for the global public opinion during the cold war would so again. They may be right. During 2002 campaign, 52 per cent of the respondents to one poll said that they trusted the Republicans to make the right decisions when came to dealing with terrorism; a mere 20 percent picked the democrats. Likewise, 66 per cent said Republicans were more likely make sure the US defense was strong; only 18 per cent chose the Democrats.<sup>4</sup>

Media was at the forefront of the battle ground since the first gulf war. It was world's first televised war, but the Gulf War II could well be go down in history as the world's first tele-constructed war, with each broadcasted word visual deemed a contribution to the US-British effort. As Pentagon's vision melds with television, reality is deconstructed and reconstructed, defined and refined until it takes on the consistency and hour full to the audiences around the world and around the clock.<sup>5</sup> A poll indicated that not only do 77 per cent of all Americans support the decision to go to war; half of the population wants military action against Iran, if it continued to move toward nuclear development and 42 per cent said that the US should take action against Syria if it is helping Iraq.<sup>6</sup> For the observers on both sides of the Atlantic have been lamenting the crisis in US-European relations. The Iraq war has placed greater stress on the trans-Atlantic partnership than at any time in recent memory putting the

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<sup>4</sup> CBS News/ New York Times Poll, *New York Times*, October 2002

<sup>5</sup> Pamela Philipox, *Indian Express*, 11 April 2003

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

United States against many of its allies. But the trans-Atlantic partnership is not a zero-sum game. By the time the war against actually began in March 2003, the Iraq crisis was no longer just a result transatlantic differences, but a significant cause of them.<sup>7</sup> The crisis reinforced many of the worst transatlantic stereotypes depicting the US as unilateralist and militaristic in European eyes, and Europeans are unreliable and ungrateful allies in American eyes. Though the clear majorities of Europeans still had a favorable opinion of the US as late as summer 2002, by March 2003 such opinions were sharply down crossed the board from 75 to 48 per cent in Britain, 70 to 34 per cent in Italy, 63 to 31 percent in France, 61 to 25 per cent in Germany, 61 to 28 per cent in Russia, and 30 to 12 per cent in turkey and had solid majorities in nearly all European countries expressed support for “more independent” foreign policies.<sup>8</sup> American opinion about the European countries that opposed the war was similarly affected. Between February 2002 and spring 2003, the number of Americans with favorable views of France fell from 79 to 29 per cent, and those with favorable views of Germany fell from 83 to 44 per cent. Through out the spring of 2003, calls, instigated by commentators in the media and members of congress, proliferated throughout the US for the boycott of French and German goods. And even after the war’ conclusion, Bush administration officials warned that there would be “consequences” for allies like France that failed to follow the Washington’s lead. By the summer of 2003, even mainstream columnist like Thomas L. Friedman of the New York times were suggesting that French opposition to the war and the US policy after the war meant that France was no longer just “our annoying ally” but actually becoming an enemy of the United States.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, huge demonstrations erupted in major European and U.S. cities on Saturday to protest the unfolding war in Iraq where U.S.-led forces pounded Iraqi targets with massive air bombardments and attacks on the ground. The antiwar protesters, rallying and marching in streets of New York, Paris, Berlin, Madrid and other U.S. and European cities, criticized the U.S. war effort and demanded an immediate end to the conflict. In New York, tens of thousands of people marched in Manhattan to protest the war, while opposing crowds holding American flags rallied in support of the conflict. The antiwar protesters, estimated at 200,000 stretching over many blocks in midtown Manhattan, chanted

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<sup>7</sup> Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), pp. 2-3

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* p.3

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* pp.3-4

antiwar slogans and slammed President George W. Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq. Some demonstrators held placards the word "Lunatic" emblazoned on Bush's portrait. Some antiwar protesters say they support the U.S. troops sent to fight the war in Iraq but not the war itself. In Germany, about 150,000 people staged rallies in Berlin and other cities calling for an immediate end to the war in Iraq. In Berlin, some 40,000 demonstrators marched around the U.S. Embassy and the Brandenburg Gate, carrying antiwar placards such as "Stop the war". About 10,000 Kurds from various parts of Europe rallied in Frankfurt to protest the war in Iraq and called for the freedom and independence of the Kurdish people.<sup>10</sup>

A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war's conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America's credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the U.S.-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans called for foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States. In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the United States remains pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for the war on terrorism has inched up. Majorities in all four Muslim nations surveyed doubt the sincerity of the war on terrorism. Instead, most say it is an effort to control Middle East oil and to dominate the world. There has been little change in opinion about the war in Iraq except in Great Britain, where support for the decision to go to war has plummeted from 61% but later it fall to 43%. In contrast, 60% of Americans continue to back the war. Among the coalition of the "unwilling," large majorities in Germany, France and Russia still believe their countries made the right decision in not taking part in the war. Moreover, there is broad agreement in nearly all of the countries surveyed – the U.S. being a notable exception – that the war in Iraq hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism.

### **Division of public opinion**

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<sup>10</sup> Richard Mayne, "Size Matters", *The World Today*, Vol.59, No.5, May 2003, pp.20-21

Public opinion was sharply divided among the member of the coalition on whether the Iraq war was worth the eventual loss of lives and other costs. According opinion surveys conducted in 2003 by the German Marshall Fund, the highest level of the support was in Britain where 45 per cent of the respondents supported for the war efforts compared with 55 per cent who were opposed. Corresponding figures were 41 per cent in favour and 59 per cent opposed in Netherlands and only 28 per cent in favour and 73 per cent opposed in Italy.<sup>11</sup> Governance rather than Public Opinion was thus decisive in determining west European support for American actions. But the later part of the year 2004, the primacy of domestic politics in determining continental west European responses to the application of Bush Doctrine to Iraq was dramatically underlined in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist train attacks that killed more than 200 people on 11 March 2004 in the Spanish capital Madrid. According to the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in November 2004, aggregate public belief in the 15 west European states of the EU that the US 'positively contributes' to world peace declined from 30 to 21 per cent from the previous year.

The Iraq invasion had changed the public perception of the world; the important factor in world opinion about America was that the U.S. acts internationally without taking account of the interests of other nations. Large majorities in every nation surveyed (except the U.S.) believe that America pays little or no attention to their country's interests in making its foreign policy decisions. This opinion is most prevalent in France (84%), Turkey (79%) and but even in Great Britain 61% say the U.S. pays little or no attention to the British interests. The table manifested a great variation of American views in Europe during the time of the Iraq war and post Gulf War.

Table IV. 1: American views in Europe rating of the US

		Favorable	Some what unfavorable	Very unfavorable
Great Britain	March 2004	58	17	10
	May 2003	70	14	12
	March 2003	48	24	16
	Summer 2002	75	12	4

<sup>11</sup> Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, "Transatlantic Trends 2003, Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Transatlantic Divide", (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2004), p.8

France	March 2004	37	42	20
	May 2003	43	38	20
	March 2003	31	45	22
	Summer 2002	63	26	8
Germany	March 2004	38	49	10
	May 2003	45	42	12
	March 2003	25	41	30
	Summer 2002	61	31	4
Russia	March 2004	47	29	15
	May 2003	36	32	23
	March 2003	28	43	25
	Summer 2002	61	27	6
Turkey	March 2004	30	18	45
	May 2003	15	15	68
	March 2003	12	17	67
	Summer 2002	30	13	42


Sources: U.S. Image Still Poor, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=796> accessed on 12.7.2007.

The corresponding percentage of those who have negative attitude towards the US role jumped from 42 to 61 per cent.<sup>12</sup> Among the larger west European states the most negative opinions were predictably voiced in France, Germany and Spain. Public attitudes towards the US in Italy and the UK were somewhat more balanced, although negative opinions outweighed positive ones in both countries. The west European attitudes towards the role of the US in combating international terrorism were relatively more supportive, although negative opinions continue to dominate in the countries that most vehemently opposed the Iraqi invasion. Again, public attitudes in the UK and Italy were more favorable.

Most of the factor which was responsible for the areas of disagreement between the European and American publics is significant. The four critical issues were the threat perception, leadership, defense spending, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, both European and American harbor the mutual acrimony of their respective elite commentators. American and Europeans always disagreed on these four issues. However, the transatlantic alliance held together during the cold war because these differences in perception and priorities were subordinated to the fight against a common enemy but now these points of conflict have moved from the background to the center stage. Moreover, American and Europeans want their governments to work together as much as possible. Almost 80 per cent of Americans want Europeans to exert strong

<sup>12</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 28 December, 2004

leadership in the world.<sup>13</sup> European critics of the US have often argued the US is isolationist, but a large majority of Americans and Europeans chose an active role in international affairs. The dangerous outcome of the transatlantic relations erupted during Iraq war. The public opinion data suggested that the transatlantic cooperation could become much more difficult. First, American and European may have a shared understanding of global threats, but they disagree on their severity. Second, Americans and Europeans have yet to agree on a formula for sharing global leadership. Third, Americans and Europeans have different ideas of appropriate levels of defense spending. And fourth, Americans and Europeans have starkly dissonant views in the Middle East conflict.



Each of these areas is critical to these formation, operation and focus of effective transatlantic alliances. Disagreement above all four is cause for significant concern. In Russia, Germany, Great Britain and France, public opinion is much more divided, with a large proportion sympathizing with neither side. German and British attitudes on the conflict have remained largely unchanged from two

years ago.

Sources: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=608> Press, <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=608>

### Changes in public opinion during and after war

The fundamental differences within the transatlantic relations came into being on prior to the Iraq war. Germany was the first European country provided full solidarity to the US after the WTC attacks. But during the invasion against Iraq the changes in German public opinion have created critical incentives for the government to keep some distances from the US, while strengthening a distinctly 'European' alignment. Well before the Iraq crisis, the shift towards a more skeptical view of America's international role was evident. The Iraq confrontation sharpened the

<sup>13</sup>Craig Kennedy and Marshall M. Bouton, "The Real Atlantic Gap", *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2002, p.68

narrow national interests. The share of German holding view that a strong US leadership role in the world affairs is desirable declined 45 per cent in June 2003 from 68 per cent the year before. In June 2003, 70 per cent of Germans (up from 48 per cent the year before) wanted the EU to become a super power. A growing number prefer a more independent European course in diplomatic and security affairs.<sup>14</sup>

Table-IV.2: Public views of the US-European alliance 2003.

	US-Europe alliance should remain close	Our country should be more independent
France	23	76
Spain	28	62
Italy	37	61
Germany	42	57
Britain	51	45
US	53	39

Sources: Pew global attitude project, 'views of the changing world', June 2003

The table indicates that there is a little doubt that Europe's political culture is more self consciously different from and hostile to the US. The substantial majorities in France, Spain, Italy and Germany now favour a more independent (less American influenced) European policy. This undoubtedly a consequence of widespread public disapproval of the US led war against Iraq.<sup>15</sup>

Partly as a consequence of widespread skepticism towards the US foreign policy in the aftermath of the Iraq war, a majority of the west European citizens expressed increased confidence in the EU as an international political actor. According to the data released by the Eurobarometer in December 2004, 61 per cent of respondents viewed the EU as making positive contribution to peace in the world. Nearly identical 59 per cent accorded the EU a positive role in the international fight against

<sup>14</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and Press, "Mistrust of America in Europe ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists", Washington, March 2004, p.28, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3/reportID=206>, Accessed on 12.5.2007

<sup>15</sup> Views of the Changing World, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf>. Accessed on 23.6.2007



terrorism.<sup>16</sup> The public attitudes contribute to an important source of support for and constraints on policy choices, but actions by national elites in the absence of revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary popular upheavals against their authority determine both immediate and intermediate political outcomes.

A general perception exists that the issue of war against Iraq has opened a massive rift between the US and Europe. Giant anti-war demonstrations, public opinion polls and the behavior of key powers seem to confirm this view, but the reality is actually much more complicated and very different. The majority of European governments support the US on the Iraq issue. Though public opinion certainly opposes war, the European populace also is extremely concerned about Europe's economy, issues of national sovereignty and the effect of French and German power over both. Governments generally have chosen to side with the US, not because they are suicidal, but because they understand that on election day, the Iraq war will be a side issue and the power of the Franco-German bloc will be a central issue. The US is much less isolated in relation to Europe than is generally believed.<sup>17</sup>

The media did virtually nothing to fill the gap between the public opinion and the government. For reasons that are not entirely clear, they were happy to be co-opted or to volunteer to ensure that no serious domestic debate on international affairs was stimulated. In Poland, the decision to commit troops to the "coalition of the willing" was made mainly by the president and premier in consultations with the ministers for foreign affairs and defense. The US viewed it as a trustworthy ally and active participant in the international undertakings and it maintains at a high level strategic partnership with other NATO members. Poland was by far the most important contributor of CEEC (central and east European countries) forces in Iraq, both in numbers and in significance in the role played. Poland was given responsibility for an occupation zone in which the military from the countries listed participated.

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<sup>16</sup> Public Attitude as a Source of Support, Eurobarometer 62, December 2004, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62first\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62first_en.pdf), Accessed on 16.7.2007

<sup>17</sup> Alan Bell, British and European Perspectives on the War on Terrorism, March 13, 2003 <http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/terror030803.htm>, Accessed on 14.6.2007

## Media position in Iraq

The media played very vital role in its post war development findings. During this time, the key findings of transatlantic trends were: while 60% of American believed that the partnership between the US and the EU should become closer, and 58% of the European believed that EU should take more independent approach to security affairs. In one hand the support for the UN remains high in the US and Europe, on the other, American was more willing to bypass the UN when vital interests are at stake. Both American and European believe international approval is essential to check the further crisis like Iraq. In support for troops 57% of Americans supports troops in Iraq but the European are divided. Majorities in France, Germany and Spain would like to make their countries participation in a UN mandated peacekeeping force in Iraq, despite their governments' resistance. This time 71% European felt that they should become a super power like US and 41% American agree that there should be an EU super power.<sup>18</sup> Most of general questions formulated for the public on the support or opposition for the Iraq war, vary before of the war, during war or after war. The nature of evidence was discovered by the UN was quite crucial for the war preparations. Only a minority of Americans are unaffected by these considerations. From a quarter to a third of the public supported using force without qualifications; fewer than one-in-five Americans oppose military actions in all cases.

Table -IV. 3: Recent Polls on the General Question of using Force in Iraq

Organization	Dates	N	Question	Favor/Yes	Oppose/No	DK
Pew Research Center	1/8-12/03	611	Would you favor or oppose taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule?	68	25	7
Fox News/Opinion Dynamics	1/14-15/03	900 RV	Do you support or oppose U.S. military action to disarm Iraq and remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein?	67	25	8
CBS/NYT	1/19-22/03	997	Do you approve or disapprove of the United States taking military action against Iraq to try to remove Saddam Hussein from power?	64	30	6
Newsweek	1/23-24/03	1001	In the fight against terrorism, the Bush Administration has talked about	60	35	5

<sup>18</sup> *Post war media developments,*

[http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:MH6AXHYgisIJ:www.compagnia.torino.it/english/comunicazione/pdf/PressRelease%2520TT2004.pdf+US-](http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:MH6AXHYgisIJ:www.compagnia.torino.it/english/comunicazione/pdf/PressRelease%2520TT2004.pdf+US-Europe+and+iraq+war&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=11&gl=inaccessed on 25.6.2007)

Europe+and+iraq+war&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=11&gl=inaccessed on 25.6.2007

			using military force against Saddam Hussein and his military in Iraq. Would you support using military force against Iraq, or not?			
Time/CNN	1/15-16/03	1010	Do you think the U.S. should or should not use military action involving ground troops to attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq?	60	33	7
ABC/Washington Post	1/16-20/03	1133	Would you favor or oppose having U.S. forces take military action against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein from power?	57	41	3
NBC News/Wall Street Journal	1/19-21/03	1025	Do you think that the United States should or should not take military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq?	56	36	8
Gallup/CNN/ USA Today	1/23-25/03	1000	Would you favor or oppose invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power?	52	43	5

Sources: Pew global attitude project, 'views of the changing world, [Ahttp://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=796](http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=796) accessed on 15.7.2007

The presence of media was criticized in the first year of the Iraq invasion. The most important phenomenon in this year was it covered the looting that followed the fall of Baghdad. Secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and vice president Dick Cheney have often asserted that the media have a proclivity to overemphasize violence and to dwell on negative news stories.<sup>19</sup> The complaint that public hears only the bad news has become increasingly prevalent among members of the US armed forces as well. The problem is potentially serious. Many critics of the media believe that negative coverage could cost the US the war.<sup>20</sup> Given the facts, the US public view of the situation in Iraq is arguably just about where it should be. The public exceptionally impressed by US troops but depressed about the general lack of significant progress on the ground. They were upset, moreover, with the Bush administration for over promising and under preparing in regard to the war. Since the two years after the war in Iraq, it seems that the people of the US remain committed to the efforts in Iraq. But in the year of 2004, George W. Bush's personal popularity among the US population has declined to well below 40 per cent; a pew poll conducted in the spring of 2006 found that 54 per cent of the US citizen still expected some level of success of

<sup>19</sup> Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, Is the Media Bring Fair in Iraq ?, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.29, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p.7

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

democracy in Iraq.<sup>21</sup> Most of the medias specifically were, the New York Times, the wall street journal, NBC news, the Washington times, USA today, ABC news , BBC news and the Fox news were provided raw data that could help to provide answers of the basic questions of the public. The standard media search engines obtain with the head lines as positive, negative, or neutral. The television network may have had a somewhat greater proclivity to show bad news than news papers had to report it. Another point to consider that the news paper grab the attention with headlines, whereas television speaks most loudly with images. Violent imagery makes a greater impression on audiences than words or even photographs in newspaper.

The role of media has been greater in the post Saddam period. They find out some untold stories like the over all realty of economic progress, problems of communications, consumer subsidies, countries infrastructures, ,oil production, electricity production and distribution, health, water and sanitation services, transportation, and the problem areas of the insurgencies etc.. The data gathered, and provided a great support for the post Saddam relief and rehabilitation work by the US – European allies. This natural and generally accepted role of the media as the Fourth Estate of the political life of the US underscores why coverage of the Iraq war should be critical. The war has gone far worse than the Bush administration had predicted or led the country to believe it would. The more the public learns about the administration's over confidence that Iraq would remain peaceful after saddam was overthrown, an overconfidence that conflicted with the predictions of the most outside experts and that led the government to under prepare for the difficulty of the mission, the more natural it is for the Fourth Estate to be tough in reporting the operation.<sup>22</sup>

The Support for U.S. military missions among Central and East European States (CEE) remains shallow. Even though most of these governments have backed Washington, all political factions monitor public opinion in their countries carefully. If public opinion were to be transformed into political action, it seems increasingly less likely that the new allies would support future U.S.-led missions unless they are approved by NATO or the EU. Indeed, in the region, support for military involvement

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<sup>21</sup> The Pew Global Attitude Project, "America's Image Slips, But Allies Share US Concern over Iran, Hamas," Washington D.C., 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf>. Accessed on 13 .6.2007

<sup>22</sup> Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, *Hard Power: News Politics of National Security*,( New York: Basic Books Pub.Inc., 2006),p.86

in Iraq has been steadily declining. In December 2004, 27 percent of the Polish population backed their country's troop deployment, placing additional pressure on the already weak center-left government.<sup>23</sup> In Slovakia, 75 percent of the public oppose their country's involvement in the U.S.-led coalition, despite the pro-Washington position of both countries' incumbent administrations. In November 2004 Hungarian parliament lacked the two-thirds majority vote necessary to extend its troops' mandate in Iraq by three months. A public opinion poll that same month showed that 54 percent of Hungarians supported their troops' return, while 37 percent approved an extension of their duty. Even in Romania, one of the staunchest advocates of U.S. Middle East policy, public support has been steadily falling. Favorable views of the United States more generally have also been diminishing among the new allies during the past year, a development that Washington should find especially troubling. This shift is related to what has been widely perceived as a faltering mission in Iraq and insufficient reciprocity from the United States for the new allies' involvement in the "coalition of the willing." In Poland, 86 percent of those surveyed in 2000 held a positive opinion about the United States; this figure dropped to 79 percent in 2002 and to just more than 50 percent in March 2003.<sup>24</sup> One opinion poll conducted in Poland on the eve of the U.S. presidential election in September 2004 indicated that, for 40 percent of respondents, Bush's foreign policy had worsened their view of the United States.<sup>25</sup> In addition, although young people in the CEE states have traditionally held a positive view of the United States, support among members of this generation could steadily decline as their exposure to the influence of the EU intensifies.

### **The post-war media and developments**

In France, huge crowds poured into the streets in Paris and other major French cities to protest the war. Several tens of thousand protesters many of them college and high school students assembled at the Republique Plaza in Paris to denounce the war in Iraq. Protesters also marched on the streets of Paris, holding antiwar placards like 'no B-52 bombers over French airspace.' In Marseilles, the second largest French city in

<sup>23</sup> "Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post Saddam Iraq", Brooking Institution, Washington, D.C., <http://brokings.edu/iraqindex>. Accessed on 15.6.2007

<sup>24</sup> John Springford, "Old' and 'New' Europeans United: Public Attitudes towards the Iraq War and U.S. Foreign Policy", (Background brief, Centre for European Reform, London, and December 2003), p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Public Opinion Research Center (Warsaw), "The Polls about the U.S. Presidential Election," September 2004, [www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl), p.1, accessed on 12, 6.2007.

southern France, about 10,000 people held protest marches, chanting anti-U.S. slogans and calling Bush “the assassin.” In Spain, an estimated 200,000 people demonstrated in Madrid, shouting antiwar slogans and demanding the resignation of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, a key supporter of the U.S. decision to launch the war against Iraq without U.N. blessing.<sup>26</sup> In Barcelona, tens of thousands of people also held antiwar rallies. There were also reports of antiwar protests in other Spanish cities. France and Russia blasted the U.S.-led war on Iraq which began the same day, while Spain and the Netherlands showed support and Arabs expressed sorrow. French President Jacques Chirac said that France regretted the outbreak of war in Iraq and saw serious consequences no matter how long the conflict lasted. In a televised address he said that France, which staunchly opposed United States and British efforts to have the United Nations authorize the attacks, “regrets this action taken without the approval of the United Nations”, adding, “I hope these operations are as fast as possible, with the least fatalities, and that they do not lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. ‘No matter how long this conflict lasts, it will have serious consequences for the future”, he said. Chirac said France had made efforts until the last minute to persuade members of the U.N. Security Council that it would be possible to disarm Iraq peacefully through U.N. inspections but such efforts were not rewarded. “We must join with our allies and the whole international community to deal together with the challenges that await us”, he said.<sup>27</sup> Greek Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou also said it is regrettable that international society failed to bring the Iraq crisis to a peaceful solution. Russian President Vladimir Putin told an emergency meeting of cabinet ministers, “We should not allow the law of the jungle to challenge international law”.<sup>28</sup> Turkish President Ahmet Sezer also cast doubts on the legitimacy of the U.S.-led war on Iraq, calling the action “unilateral”. Noting that the U.N. Security Council process on Iraq should have been allowed to finish, Sezer told reporters in Ankara, “I do not find it right that the U.S. behaved unilaterally before that process ended”. Meanwhile, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar said in an address to his people that Spain will support the U.S. attack on Iraq to disarm the country, while Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende issued a statement saying he politically supports the U.S.-led attack but hoped the war would come to an end soon. The statement said the Netherlands will not participate in the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 15 April, 2003

<sup>28</sup> New York Times Poll, October 2003

military attack but it will give maximum support for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. Amr Mahmoud Moussa, secretary general of the Arab League, issued a written comment saying the day has become a very sad day for all Arabs and Arab states “as the state of Iraq and its people are exposed to military attacks”. Moussa also urged the U.N. Security Council to convene an emergency meeting on the attacks on Iraq and take concrete action to stop them and to settle the situation.<sup>29</sup> Iraq, of course, demonstrated the limits of US and European or at least a French and German willingness to join together on such operations but the situation worsened the picture of alliance cooperation considerably.

The broad argument voiced by the critics of the media in the US is often badly overstated. Even though the overall image of Iraq conveyed by the mainstream media may be some what more negative than reality, it is not incredibly dissimilar from the situation on the ground. Iraq is war zone in which progress has been largely illusive. Given this reality, accurate reporting naturally places more emphasis on the negative aspects than on the positive ones. International communication provides clues to the predominant model of global organization, as well as potential means of solving problems of international cooperation and conflict resolution.

## II

### **The division within Europe regarding Iraq War**

Less than a year and half after the war on enduring freedom, the US Europe clash over Iraq led the most serious deterioration of the transatlantic relations in recent memory. The dispute shook the alliance to its core and appeared to confirm the growing impression among the scholars and policy makers alike that the US and European perspective, interests, and even values had seriously diverged in the end of the wake of the Cold War. The dispute over Iraq ran so deep that it posed a challenge not only to transatlantic relations, but also to the main institutions underpinning world order through out the post World War II period. The united nations security council, the supposed arbiter of international peace security, failed in March 2003 to reach a consensus on what it do about Iraq and was denounced as “irrelevant” by

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<sup>29</sup> Richard Bernstein, “Europe Response Upsets the Allies”, *Wall Street Journal*, October 3 , 2003

many Americans.<sup>30</sup> NATO, the most successful and enduring military alliance in the history of the world, not only failed to unite over Iraq, but had great difficulty responding even to a request from one of its members, Turkey, to plan for its defense.<sup>31</sup> The European Union, although in the midst of a constitutional convention to consolidate the continent's political unification was profoundly divided. Indeed, the Iraq crisis exposed serious internal rifts among European governments over the future European integration and the issue of how to deal with the US. Bitter US-European differences on matters of policy and global strategy are nothing new, of course. Episodes such as the 1956 Suez crisis, the French expulsion of American troops in 1966, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the debate over the "Euromissiles" to the central America in 1980s, are all reminders that the Atlantic alliance has always had to confront deeply divisive issues. But the greatness of the bond is that the alliance is never finished. Former Clinton official Anthony Blinken has written of a "false crisis over the Atlantic",<sup>32</sup> but the optimist recognized that the real problems and the challenges lie ahead. The long time proponents of transatlantic cooperation, such as analyst Ivo Daalder, have begun to talk about the "end of Atlanticism" and warn that transatlantic relations are in "very serious trouble".<sup>33</sup>

The west European response to the Iraq crisis divided governments and their domestic constituencies. One group of nations led by the United Kingdom (UK) joined the American efforts to achieve regime change. A second group dominated by Germany and France, raised their voice in determined opposition to the Iraqi invasion. A third group of nations also voiced their opposition, but in less strident language of internationalism.

### **Differing European Responses**

The people across Europe and all levels of the government had vehemently condemned the September 11 attacks. However, the west European officials had demonstrated strong support within NATO for subsequent American military actions against the Taliban regimes in Afghanistan. But the fissure began to surface within the Trans-Atlantic partnership during the summer of 2002 when the Bush administration

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<sup>30</sup> Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, "Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq," (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), p.2

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Gordon and Shapiro, p.4.

<sup>33</sup> Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.2, Summer 2003, p.47



declared its determination to launch a unilateral attack against Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein and destroyed his alleged WMD. Alongside Italy and Spain, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced his government's early support for an American led pre-emptive strike. In contrast, most of the other EU member states, including several crucial NATO allies favored a diplomatic approach to the escalating crisis, advocating the resumption of UN weapons inspections to ensure the destruction of possible WMD should be considered a major only at last resort. One of that should necessarily be sanctioned by the UN Security Council.<sup>34</sup> On 4th September 2002 Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder openly declared Germany's opposition to the American positions on the grounds that pre-emptive attacks would amount to "submission to US policy goals".<sup>35</sup> Schroeder's announcement signaled an open split within the Atlantic alliance between opponents and proponents of the Bush's doctrine. These cleavages carried over into the highest policy counsels of the EU, whose leaders proved unable at an emergency summit meeting in Brussels in February 2003 to forge a joint position on the Iraq crisis in the context of the EU's common foreign and security policy.<sup>36</sup> The resumption of UN Weapons inspections, the Bush Administration's rejection of the team's findings and threatened Veto by France, Russia and China of a proposed British-American security Council Resolution sanctioning the use of the military means to enforce the Iraqi compliance with disarmaments constituted a rapidly spiraling prelude to the American side as the most visible member of an Ad-hoc "coalition of willing". Other west Europeans contingents in descending order of the number of troops they eventually developed to Iraq- included Italy, Spain (until 2004), the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal. Ireland lent verbal, but no material support to the Anglo-American position.<sup>37</sup> For the UK, it has mentioned the "special relationship". Historically, both the countries had worked together in the most 21st century's international conflicts. The other problems like the historical rivalry with Iraq pulled it to come along with the US. One of them was it Britain guarantee of an independent Kuwait, which helped the US to take action against Iraq in the gulf war of 1991. Britain is the only country consistently supports the Bush administration's policy against international terrorism in general and the Middle East in particular. Blair endorsed the invasion of Iraq as a 'just cause', just as the

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<sup>34</sup> New York Times, 20 April 2004.

<sup>35</sup> Ivo H. Daalder, No.37, p.52

<sup>36</sup> M. Donald Hancock and Brandon Valeriano, Western Europe in the book Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, (ed.), "The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism", (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.33

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p.34

subsequently supported American strategies of post war reconstruction and democratization.<sup>38</sup>

### **German and French opposition**

Most of the western European countries predicted that the invasion of Iraq was nothing but the extension of Bush Doctrine. The strong opposition erupted within the government and public against the US and its coalition led Iraq invasion. Chancellor Schroeder had voiced his government's position to American policies as early as August 2002 an invasion of Iraq as 'an adventure' that could destroy the international alliance against terror' assembled by the US after 9/11.<sup>39</sup> President Chirac and other officials were initially more ambivalent in their response to the escalating crisis, indicating that France might join the military intervention if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) determined that Iraq had blatantly violated Security Council Resolution 1441 which regard to the existence of WMD. France shortly joined the Germans, however, in condemning Anglo-American determination to engage in pre-emptive action.<sup>40</sup> Opinion surveys indicated massive citizen opposition to the impending Iraq war. In the large sense, Schroeder 's anti-war campaign rhetoric expressed deeply felt beliefs among the most adult German that war was unsanctioned by the UNSC resolution was not legitimate policy option.<sup>41</sup> French position was largely paralleled that of Germany. After considering with and than rejecting possible French participation in a military campaign against the Saddam's regime, Chirac joined Schroeder in issuing a joint statement in Paris on 22 January 2003, opposing immediate military action. Chirac asserted: France and Germany have the same point of view on this crisis. Any decision belongs to the Sc and the SC alone'.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, between the extremes of the British led support for military action against Iraq and adamant German-French opposition, a number of west European countries embarrassed on international opposition on the

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Facts and File, Worlds News Digest, 'Germany: Chancellor Rejects US War on Iraq; 22 August 2002, Germany had Previously Demonstrated its Supported for the International Anti-Terrorist Campaign by Committing 4.000 troops to Afghanistan, www.Facts.Com. Accessed on 26.6.2007

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> M. Donald Hancock and Brandon Valeriano, No.12, p.36

<sup>42</sup> Facts on File, Worlds News Digest, France, Germany Oppose Military Action Against Iraq', 23 January 2003, pp.2-3

conflict. These included Sweden, Finland and Austria (all of which are officially non-aligned) as well as NATO members Luxemburg and Greece.<sup>43</sup>

The nab of the US pragmatists' position is that the Iraqi leadership has developed and used chemical and biological weapons and might to so again, or make them available to non state actors. In effect, the US administration was calling to remove the potential danger. The case put forcefully to the security council by secretary of state Colin Powell is that Iraqi subterfuge is making a mockery of UN authority and the council needs to contemplate 'serious consequences'.<sup>44</sup> Powell's position was some what undermined, however, by chief weapon inspector Dr. Hans Blix in his February report.<sup>45</sup> His team cannot substantiate US claims that Iraqis are spying on them and clearing sites of incriminating evidence ahead of inspections. Indeed, Blix's account of improvements in the level of Iraqi cooperation was sufficient for the French to contend that the process was working well enough to warrant giving it more time.

The challenge was to counter these emergent or actual threats using all means, including military intervention if to avoid direct threats to US territory and national interests. Such intervention would manage the underlying causes that had generated terrorists and tyranny: endemic despotism, corruption, poverty and economic stagnation. In this way, failed states (Afghanistan) and rogue states (Iraq) would no longer be able to threaten other regional states or the US, by extension, transatlantic strategic interests. The transatlantic relationship was reinforced by European participation in operation enduring freedom. The UK and other transatlantic states supported the operation, as did the 'core European' states that were to oppose the Iraq war. Germany for example supposedly disabled by a powerful combination of pacifism and the anti- Americanism a determination to use a Franco-German axis to counter balance the US and its atlanticist values, took command of the international security assistance force (ISAF) operation in 2003. ISAF consisted of 6.500 troops, and further 2000 were added after the June 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit.<sup>46</sup> ISAF and

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<sup>43</sup> Hancock and Valeriano, No.12, p.37

<sup>44</sup> Rosemary Hollis, "Opening Options", *The World Today*,(Vol.59,No.3, March 2003),p.9

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Germany with 1.909 troops, and Canada, with 1.576, is the most generous of the NATO contributions French ranks next with 565. The remaining 23 NATO countries, plus 11 outside NATO, have contributed about 2500 combined. George Gedda, "disillusionment widespread in NATO role", associated Press, 4th July 2004. Afghanistan has the lowest trop-to- population ratio of recent invasion- 1:1, 115 as compared to 1:161 in Iraq.

US combined joint task force 76 cooperation has continued to 2006. It operates with the full support of 'Atlantic Europe', 'Core Europe', 'New Europe', non-aligned Europe and even periphery Europe.

The divide was even clearer when respondents were asked to pick between two statements about 'the way in which the war on Iraq should be conducted.' Fifty-nine percent of Republicans as opposed to just 33 percent of Democrats chose 'The US must remain in control of all operations and prevent its European allies from limiting the States' room to maneuver.' By contrast, 55 percent of Democrats and just 34 percent of Republicans chose 'It is imperative that the United States allies itself with European countries, even if it limits its ability to make its own decisions.' Anti-Europeanism is not symmetrical with anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is a real obsession for entire countries—notably for France, as Jean-François Revel has recently argued. Anti-Europeanism is very far from being an American obsession. In fact, the predominant American popular attitude toward Europe is probably mildly benign indifference, mixed with impressive ignorance. Anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism are at opposite ends of the political scale. European anti-Americanism is mainly to be found on the left, American anti-Europeanism on the right. The most outspoken American Euro-bashers are neoconservatives using the same sort of combative rhetoric they have habitually deployed against American liberals. There is some evidence that the left-right divide characterizes popular attitudes as well. In early December 2002, the Ipsos-Reid polling group included in its regular survey of U.S. opinion a few questions formulated for the purposes. It asked to choose one of four statements about American versus European approaches to diplomacy and war, 30 percent of Democratic voters but only 6 percent of Republican voters chose "The Europeans seem to prefer diplomatic solutions over war and that is a positive value Americans could learn from." By contrast only 13 percent of Democrats but 35 percent of Republicans (the largest single group) chose "The Europeans are too willing to seek compromise rather than to stand up for freedom, even if it means war, and that is a negative thing."<sup>47</sup>

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<http://www.eariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/807DE26591B5D2DF87256ED100417CAC?OpenDocument>

<sup>47</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, "Anti-Europeanism in America," <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058211.html>, Accessed on 26.7.2007

There was disunity within the European Union marked on prior to the Iraq war. The division between EU members on policy for Iraq was very serious. The situation led to the damage of the NATO in particular. The implications for the development of an EU common foreign and security policy became more and more difficult. According to Timoty Gorden stated that these sorry developments perhaps affect one nation more than any other.<sup>48</sup> Britain has cast itself as a bridge between America and the mainland of Europe, but the transatlantic bridge collapses. London was finding it difficult to take a lead in Europe when it is regarded as a military dependency of the US. The likely lack of any movement towards the monetary union will reinforce this irrelevance to the rest of Europe. The new US strategy calls for a much more proactive global intervention policy. This will be an expensive tiger for Britain to ride. With tiny armed forces spread between Northern Ireland, firefighting duties, domestic counter terrorism, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, it is already “punching above its weight”.<sup>49</sup>

The transatlantic frictions arising from European efforts to build an independent military capability flared again during the Iraq war. For many European policy makers and analysts, the key lessons learned from this war is that Europe can support its diplomacy with its own hard power capabilities, Washington will pay little heed to European views on international political issues. As the invasion phase of the Iraq war was winding down, France and Germany (along with Belgium and Luxemburg) met to lay the foundations for an independent European military capability, including a European military headquarters. It was built around the Franco-German core of ‘old Europe’.<sup>50</sup> Explaining this initiative, president Chirac stated that the purpose was to begin the process as the building a pool of power capable of playing its role in a multicolor system and balancing the US.<sup>51</sup> In October 2003 the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, voiced the Bush administration’s hostility towards the EU’S initiative, calling it “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”.<sup>52</sup> US policy makers’ reaction to the ESDP initiative reflects long standing American fears of an equal and independent Europe and Washington’s pervasive suspicion that, in

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<sup>48</sup> Timoty Gorden, “NATO Decline and Fail,” *The World Today*,(Vol.59,No.3, March 2003),p.5

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Judy Dempsey, “EU Leaders Unveil Plan for Central Military HQ,” *Financial Times*, (London), April 30, 2003.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Judy Dempsey, “US Seeks Showdown with EU over NATO,” *Financial Times*, April 24, 2003.

this regard, ESDP is the ‘camel nose in the tent’, in other words that it will become a rival to NATO’s supremacy in European security affairs. It to be sure, contrary to the prediction of Waltzian balance of power theorists, unipolarity persists.<sup>53</sup>

### **The choices between the US and Europe**

The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia are gradually redefining their strategic objectives within a transatlantic context that has been recently strained over a number of issues including the war in Iraq, the U.S.-led campaign against Islamist terrorism, and disagreements over the appropriate measures to eliminate the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Each of these eight countries has had to perform a precarious balancing act between Washington and several major EU capitals, most notably in January 2003 just prior to the Iraq war, when U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld infamously divided Europe into “old” and “new” members.<sup>54</sup> The CEE countries—the “new” Europe—had by that time all been invited to join NATO. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been NATO members since 1999, while the other five states along with Bulgaria and Romania were invited to enter in November 2002 and officially joined NATO on March 29, 2004. In March 2003, the European Parliament voted in favor of EU accession for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These nations officially became EU members on May 1, 2004. Bulgaria and Romania have also now completed their accession preparations and are expected to enter the EU in early 2007. All of these states had displayed solidarity with the United States despite concerns that this support could jeopardize their entry into the EU. The now notorious warning by French president Jacques Chirac that the candidate countries missed a good opportunity to “shut up” while threatening that their planned EU membership could be in jeopardy did not have the impact in the region that Paris had hoped. All the CEE

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<sup>53</sup> Christopher Layne, “the unipolar illusion Revisited: the coming end of the United states’ unipolar movement”, *International security*,(Vol.31,No.2, Fall 2006),pp.36-37

<sup>54</sup> Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, “Washington’s new European allies: durable or conditional partners?”, *The Washington Quarterly* (Vol. 28, No.2, spring 2005), p.98

capitals underscored their solidarity with Washington, even though none of them wanted to make such a stark choice between Europe and the United States again.<sup>55</sup>

### **To bring allies into reconstruction of Iraq**

The most important issue in the post Saddam situation was how to bring allies into Iraq and engage in the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. Despite the sweeping military victory of spring 2003 and the capture of Saddam Hussein, Americans would be deeply mistaken to believe that Europe's Iraq debate or the Europe's America debate is now over. While the desire to side with the powerful United States did lead most European governments to override public opinion and back the war, it has not led to the widespread faith in the quality and integrity of the American leadership that the Bush administration believe it deserves. By the end of 2003 there were nonetheless signs that France and Germany were beginning to consider ways to help with the stabilization of Iraq. Concretely, in mid-December, just days after the capture of Saddam Hussein, French president Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder welcomed president Bush's envoy James A. Baker III with pledge support substantial debt relief for Iraq.<sup>56</sup> The French and the German governments also said they were prepared to consider other ways they might help, including providing training for Iraqi police and security forces, funding humanitarian and reconstruction projects in Iraq, and possibly even providing troops in the context of an eventual NATO role. For all, Bush's talk on a broad coalition in Iraq, at the start of 2004 the US was still providing more than 80 per cent of the coalition troops, and the US troops has suffered more than 90 per cent of the casualties.<sup>57</sup>

This cooperation remains effective, but the very visible divides between the US and the other members of the antiterrorist coalition over Iraq present a long term challenge to that coalition. The United States and the Europeans did work extensively and cooperatively together on the Middle East during the 2002-2003 preparation of the "road map"; a jointly sponsored US-EU-UN-Russia plan designed to chart a course towards a two state solution. Keeping in views the Iranian nuclear programme has the potential to divide America and Europe apart much as Iraq did, with the Americans

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, No.36,pp.200-204

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.p.203

potentially perusing regime change or military strikes while Europeans appeal for engagement or containment. A matter of official and unofficial dialogue arrived among the Americans and the Europeans could help yield a new understanding for the principle that should apply to use the force in the twenty-first century.<sup>58</sup>

### **New U.S. Approach to Alliances**

The recent change in the composition and mode of interaction of U.S. relations with its new set of bilateral alliance partners serves as at least an early indication of a significant departure from the past practices that have put NATO at the center of U.S. global diplomatic enterprises. The new U.S. approach, albeit still largely undefined, has allowed Washington to overcome some of the typical burdens of multilateral military alliances and enabled it to assemble coalitions rapidly as well as dictate the terms for members to complete urgent tasks. Evident risks and difficulties, however, come with this approach.<sup>59</sup> There is clearly a stark difference, for example, between the coalitions of willing that is currently operating in Iraq and the coalition that operated in the 1991 Gulf War. The basic realist understanding is as Kagan has argued, that transatlantic strategic interests have diverged after the end of the cold war because the uneven distribution of capabilities.<sup>60</sup> America strong and Europe weak, thus either side thinks differently about the international order and the management global problems.

The differences in approach are likely to manifest themselves irrespective of changes in political control in the US congress and Whitehouse in continuing transatlantic disagreements over how and what pose to pursue peace in the Middle East. The designation of what constitutes a terror group and a US emphasis on defensive counter measurers versus strategies for engagement. Secondly, the EU nationals and officials are trying to export into the world stage the lessons learned within Europe no the beneficial aspects of national sovereignty to international institutions and agreements like the Kyoto protocol on climate change and the international criminal court bring two notable recent examples. The US however, retains the resources and instincts of a traditional great power. It remains absorbed on the protecting its

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid. p.217

<sup>59</sup>Kurt M. Campbell, p.161

<sup>60</sup> Kagan, Paradise of Power, 2003,p.23



sovereign prerogatives against supranational intrusion and frets about changes in the balance between the world's major states. The third structural obstacle to a successful transatlantic partnership concerns the lack of an effective venue for the US –EU dialogue or process for decision making on strategic challenges to their common interests. NATO has traditionally served as forum for US European dialogue on the political as well as military aspects of their security. The occurrence of Iraq has also scorched into the minds of the politicians in capitals of the both sides of the Atlantic the enormous potential costs of Europe and the US falling out again over a major question of international security.

NATO has always been at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance. Both the US and Europe manage to build efforts to further streamlining its command structure and creating a rapid deployment force that can respond to emergencies around the world. The exact balance between the EU and the NATO forces became less important than reaching agreement and for EU to offer a coherent policy and an effective force to its American partners. However, other than these, the US and EU undertaken to stabilizing Iraq, combating international terrorism, transforming the Middle East, and institutions , and to face the new challenges with which the US and Europe are faced.

## CHAPTER- FIVE

## CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 9/11, 2001 forced the United States of America to marshal its power and foreign policy strategies around the world. Within a very short span of time the intelligence agencies identified the main culprit behind the attacks. The US galvanised a full-size coalition forces including the UN to take military action, first against the Osama bin Laden and its safe heaven Taliban in Afghanistan and later against Iraq to oust the tyrant Saddam Hussein. The US military action against Afghanistan attracted a broad support from all parts of the world. Almost all nations recognized that the US had the right to destroy the al-Qaeda and its training bases wherever it found. But, one and half year after the invasion of Afghanistan when the US requested international community to take action against Iraq, the Security Council refused to back to authorize the military action and prime power coalition partners like France, Germany, Russia, Turkey etc. withheld their support.

The US and the Europeans had long history of alliances but most of the time both the allies confronted when their strategic interests came under strain, and afterward they reengage again. It is as usual in their foreign and strategic lives, what has been rightly seen since the attacks of 9/11, 2001 and till Iraq war and after. During the war against global war on terrorism, the United States finds it difficult to take unilateral military action. At the same time, European coalitions are widely perceived by their country's military strength and the general public led a protest to restrict US action in conducting operations. This irony helps to explain US Defense planners' ambivalence as to how they viewed with coalitions and how they prepared for them. Several important steps have been taken to achieve this. Although it made clear that the US would be unilateral, if necessary, to defend its vital interests, the US Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997 stressed that the coalition would be likely to pre-condition in defense of lesser interests. It, thus, directed the US military to 'plan, train and prepare to respond to the fulfill spectrum of crises in coalition with the forces of other nations'.<sup>1</sup> The part of the problem lies with the strategy itself, which requires US forces to be able to fight and win, unilaterally if necessary, two nearly simultaneous major theatre wars like the first and second Gulf War.

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<sup>1</sup> William S. Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review", (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), pp.8-9

The United States and the Europeans have a history of long term engagement in the Gulf. Economic constraint was the major source of rivalry for the US-European existence. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 gave a shock to the Americans and the Europeans alike. It set a basis for some of the tensions over the Gulf that would later emerge between the allies. The removal of US-backed Shah, the seizure of US hostages and the new regime's support for terrorism and opposition to Israel combined to leave noxious legacy that would mark US-Iranian relations in the 1990s. In addition, by undermining one of the regional pillars on which US influence in the region rested, the revolution led Washington to move closer to Iraq, thereby, inadvertently fuelling Saddam's appetite for dominating the region. The debate about how to contain Saddam's aggressive regime would later cause friction between the US and Europe. However, at same time, Iraqi behaviour provided a further basis for build up a dominant US military presence in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place just a month after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, only reinforced the trend. It led to the US to issue the 'Carter Doctrine', which declared that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the US.

During the 1980s, the general western agreement on Gulf policy was evident in the attitudes and policies towards the 'First Gulf War' between Iraq and Iran in 1980-88. While some states such as France were more explicit than others in her 'tilt' towards Iraq during the conflict. The American and the Europeans alike claimed formal neutrality and were relatively disinterested in the war as long as it did not affect shipping in the Gulf. When flow of oil was affected due to Iraq's aggression in targeting the tankers that carried most of Iran' oil out through the Gulf and Iran responded in kind, the US-European reaction was again a common objective i.e. to bring stability in the Persian Gulf.

The outbreak of the First Gulf War in August 1990 strengthened a general transatlantic consensus on policy towards the region. During this period whatever the different biases and interests of the Americans and Europeans had, Iraqi aggression was so blatant that it forced the entire West, and indeed most Arab governments, in the same camp against Saddam. In the mean time all the NATO allies eventually

joined to save Kuwait against any aggression from Iraq. As the Middle East peace process came into being, the US and European policies in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War converged and the UN Security Council resolutions outlined the basic policy towards the region. The US led coalition approached the international institutions for a strict containment against Saddam. On the other hand, on top of Iran the policy differences among allies were minimal, despite the fact that US relations with Tehran were worse than Europe's.

The origin of the transatlantic divergence on the Gulf dates back to the beginning of the first Clinton administration, and its new approach of 'Dual Containment'. As initially outlined the Dual Containment did not breed any major rift with the Europeans, but it was in mid-1990s the general transatlantic consensus on how to contain the regime started to break down. Some European countries, notably France and Germany, began to distance themselves from the US policy. They opposed America's stance and became explicit in 1997-98 of linking the eventual lifting of sanctions on Iraq by the UN due to the pressure of the US, which caused Washington to change its policies and it undermined the UN. None in Europe was as yet arguing for unrestrained dialogue and openness with Saddam or claiming that Iraq did not pose a potential regional threat.

The assessment focuses the factors that divide the US from the EU and the members of EU themselves. The domestic politics have also played a critical role in both US and European approaches towards the Gulf, and especially with Iran and Iraq. The other factors also surfaced; when Iraq remain a strict Security Council economic sanctions, some European countries, particularly France and Italy, maintain an important trading relationships with the country that predate of the Gulf War. The other reason on why the US takes a harder line on rogue states than Europeans is that Americans see themselves as more responsible for containing threats to international order. The event of 9/11 compelled the US to focus as never before on the issues of terrorism as a national security priority. The US declared a "war against international terrorism" after the devastating attacks on WTC and Pentagon. The international society provided spontaneous and wholesome solidarity before the US appealing to them. The first stage of the war dominated the destruction of the al-Qaeda network a safe heaven provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite a grand techno-centric

war the coalition forces were unable to trace the location of Osama bin Laden. For the multidimensional war on terrorism, the US arranged a broad based international coalition. In making the coalition partners, president delivered two choices: 'to be on the side of the US or to be with the terrorists'. Not only the US but both the side of the Atlantic greatly committed their transatlantic law enforcement and intelligence cooperation to avoid further attacks.

Whatever the obstacles the Europe and US may face in securing their territory against transnational terrorist threats, both the European and the American governments made all efforts to keep their homeland secure from further terrorist attacks. The US-EU institutional cooperation, intelligence sharing and especially *the US Patriot Act* prepared all shorts of arrangements to root out terrorist threats. One and half year after the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, the war on terrorism extended towards Iraq to bring peace across the region. During the time of the invasion of Iraq, a great discontentment was found among the old European allies of the US. They questioned the legitimacy of the war; according to them, the US wages a war against Iraq without obtaining a minimum requirement of international institutional norms. But it was for the US, the necessity of the using military action and regime change in containing threat from Iraq and other states. Though the other East and Central European countries (new NATO members) supported, the United Kingdom was an ardent supporter of the US led coalition forces from the beginning of the war against international terrorism.

On the eve of the Iraq invasion a stage of anti-Americanism mounted across Europe to pressurize America for not attacking Iraq, but the US smoothly used its diplomacy to invade Iraq. The anti-war states led by France, Germany, and Russia actively worked to prevent states from supporting the US. Most of the countries from East and the Central Europe supported the America led alliance. The eight members NATO issued an open letter in support of the US. On 30 January 2003, on the letter they marked the battle against terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and demand of freedom and democracy. Rumsfeld stated that the policy of the US is trying to develop a coalition of willing in the European states. He did not bother of the "old Europe" (Germany and France) and concern on NATO Europe. The division among the European states demonstrated the continuation of the Europeanist versus Atlanticist (Old Europe and

New Europe) debate related to the upcoming transatlantic security. The public opinion and media played a critical role since the 9/11 attacks and Iraq war. During the inter-war period the media day to day developed positive pictures of the real phenomenon of the activities of the US and its coalition countries. Though the officials and military planners criticized the media but its role was very serious. The media policy chosen by the coalition began to yield desired dividends like coalition victories, Iraqi resistance, and coalition casualties. The war in Iraq attracted more media coverage than any war in history. The regular public polls provided a spontaneous data of the American and European publics. Most of the time media coverage went against the coalition policy formulations, so the restriction was apparent. It happened during the time of the Afghanistan war, the reporters were restricted in their ability to report independently. There was also a media controversy during the time of the Iraq war; the military official said that the media coverage in Iraq was more negative than the positive and media officials said that whatever they drew that is natural and appropriate. The media role was important tools to access the reality of war to the masses of the world. Gaining international legitimacy for the post-war situation became very crucial, but the UN and the European countries, even Germany and France extended their participation to minimize violence and to further reconstruction process.

However, till the end of the 20th century, the difference between Europe and the US on the Middle East were unfavorable to common interests because they limit the effectiveness of transatlantic policies towards the region, undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and threaten transatlantic commercial relations. The crisis over Iraq did not just reflect differences over how to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime, but in fact revealed wider divides between the US and Europe over issues of world order and the legitimate use of force. One important lesson of all parties should take from this experiences is that it make sense to begin now to address basic disagreements that have emerged over world order before the next crisis begins. The most important statement provided by Robert Kagan, that, "Europe's evolution into its recent state occurred under the mantle of the US security guarantee and could not have occurred without it".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Robert Kagan, "Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order", (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p.72

**The foregoing analysis can be pinned down by highlighting the following points:**

The unprecedented impact of the September 11, 2001, changed the strategic culture of the Bush administration. It never agreed with the wait and watch policy to remove the threats through the institutional setups. To avoid further threat the US came forward to strengthen its alliance to defeat global terrorism and to prevent attacks on America as well as its allies. It felt further attack would be more catastrophic than 9/11 and the imminent threats by anthrax and biological weapons. The Bush administration has forcefully made the point that the old laws and institutions established during post-World War II and Cold War realities are not effective in today's world. The combination of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the rogue states mean that the world can no longer define aggression in a simple cross border terms, nor does it have the luxury of waiting for threats to definitely manifest them before it reacts with purpose and resolve. Before the Iraq crisis, Europeans paid some lip service to these notions, they generally refused to take concrete actions to reform the institutions of international order to count for their implications.

- The coalition assembled by the Bush administration to fight the war on terrorism was perhaps the broadest group of nations ever jointly committed for a single and pragmatic purpose. Only such coalition, which included the key European states and US, could hope to effectively counter the transnational threats of global terrorism. It revealed the importance of coalition culture, relevance of multilateralism and it diminish the concept of unilateralism.
- It also reflects the general American frustration that the institutions of the world are too slow and too ineffective to confront the immediate problems of the 21st century. The main problems of the idea of anticipating threats and preventing them through the use of force are always controversial. To define the threat perceptions, a mature official and unofficial dialogue among Americans and Europeans could help to yield a new understanding of principles that should apply to the use of force in the twenty-first century.
- NATO has always been at the heart of the transatlantic alliance. If that alliance is to survive and prosper, the US and its European partners must recognize and reinstitutionalize NATO. So, it can be a useful



tool for the future problems likely to face. The vital role played by NATO during the Balkan peace keeping operations is highly appreciable. It gave NATO a sense of purpose and dynamism and demonstrated the organization's continued relevance. Since its creation NATO has fully outlined the commitment of its Article 5 which postulates defense guarantee and technical support to the allies involved in a war and post-war role for the alliance, what it evoked after 9/11. Since 1990s the military forces of NATO nations contributed a lot to the combat operations of the coalitions but the division among the coalitions during the Iraq war created an uncertainty to the commitment and the stability of the alliance.

- The invasion and occupation of Iraq created deep divisions within and among the countries were even not contested. The greater Europe became many Europe like Old Europe, New Europe, Atlantic Europe, Non-Aligned Europe, Core Europe and Periphery Europe, but the US concentrated on NATO Europe. Relevance of NATO has been justified, though NATO does not directly fought war, but its peacekeeping missions and strategic supports highlights in Afghanistan after the demolition of Taliban regime and in the post-Saddam Iraq reconstruction process.
- In Europe, NATO and EU have provided a vital political and military framework and the majority of Central and Eastern European countries were supportive.
- There have been major changes in patterns of international defense diplomacy; military cooperation and assistance have been used for real political purposes for strengthening allies against common enemies.
- Before the war in Iraq, the US government felt modest need to respond to allied concerns over the conduct of the war on terrorism, or even to specifically define who the enemy was. The divisions among the traditional allies are memorable on the wake of the war, but after war reassessment and the realization of faultliness pressed both parties to come together to engage not only in Iraq but also to bring peace and stability across the Middle East region are significant.

- The US unable to bring its all European traditional allies to get support, only a handful of the East European countries supported the US over Iraq. This situation created a wide scale division among the European countries. This division hurt the European passion of unity and integrity. Germany was the first country who departs from alliance norms, fully surprised by the joint consensus of the EU. Germany's decision was to stand with France in blocking NATO's preparation for the possible defense of Turkey and elsewhere in Europe.
- The main cause behind the support of the East European countries to the US during the time of the Iraq invasion was, the Eastern European countries did not have any bilateral or multilateral agreements with Saddam Hussein. Perhaps, they thought that supporting the US would be beneficial for them than oppose it.
- Franco-German attempt to define the common position as opposition to military intervention provoked first joint counter statement from eight EU (NATO) member governments. But the US confirmed its war in Iraq a coalition of willing, where the UK was its most important strategic partner. Possibly the US got everything from Europe when the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair extended its unflinching support with the largest, sophisticated, modernized military powers.
- The internal division has overturned the old assumptions about the creation of a European security and defense policy. The blocism during the Iraq war shown that in the near future it would have very difficult to keep up US influence elsewhere if the great powers like Germany, France, Russia, china and India would form such an alliance against the US.
- The US and Europe must stand with the great approach of President Abraham Lincoln, "United we stand, divided we fall, so we stood united". The term very appropriate for the maintenance of US-Europe traditional alliance, and to maintain the future crisis managements.

America's popular attitude towards the Europe is probably mildly beginning differences, mixed with impressive arrogance. Before 9/11, the average American was only vaguely aware of the existence of anti-American sentiments in Europe. Since the

Bush administration took office the power gap became too complicated, when Europe favoured negotiations to achieve its goals and the US favoured using coercive approach in international affairs. The Bush administration typifies the tendency to use power that can be overbearing namely unilateral tactics and disobeying the international norms. The unilateral attack on Iraq led a grave discontentment particularly between the Western European countries (strongly from France and Germany) and the US.

There is, nonetheless, scope for greater European dialogue and lobbying, which could at least provide an opportunity to prevent some of the more damaging transatlantic splits. Transatlantic agreement on contentious issues in the Middle East can never be guaranteed. Countries' specific national interests must some time take priority over the general goal of good relations between the partners. The benefits of compromise in the name of common policies will some times be worth the sacrifice. Finally, perhaps most importantly, Europeans need to find a way to open a dialogue with key members of the US Congress and the source much of the transatlantic friction over the Middle East. There should be no illusions that Congress will pay more attention to the arguments of the Europeans than to perceived interest of its constituents. Here, one thing reflected that the Europe needs American military might and America needs European civil power, which would be a reason for value predictable relationship to induce moderation, self restraint, and greater accommodation in advance military action as well as keeping ahead historical dynamics of political, cultural and economic relationships. The crisis of legitimacy would be the most important element for both the American and the European allies for future detection of threats and resolution of threats.

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