SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND ETHNICITY IN KAZAKHSTAN

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PUNIT GAUR

Central Asian Studies Division
Center for South, Central, South East Asian
and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi 110067
India
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CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN & SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067

Phone : 2670 4350
Fax : 91-11-2671 7586
91-11-2671 7603

Date: 30.07.2007

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Social Stratification and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

PUNIT GAUR

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners of evaluation.

Prof. P. SAHADEVAN
Chairperson

CHAIRPERSON
Centre for South, Central, South East
Asian and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Prof. K. WARIKOO
Supervisor

SUPERVISOR
Centre for South, Central, South East
Asian and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

TO

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PREFACE

Kazakhstan, the republic of over "a hundred nationalities", has been uniquely more diverse than other central Asian states. Ethnic relation in Kazakhstan, however, is much more complex than they appear. They can not simply be divided into two ethnically stratified categories such as indigenous people, Muslim Kazakh and Slavs. The current Kazakh social stratification does not result only from the bipolar relationship between Kazakhs and ethnic Russians. The stratification is taking on many different dimensions, such as language and clan. This study seeks to identify various dimensions of the social stratification and ethnic conflict in the Kazakh society.

The study consists of five chapters. First chapter introduces the land and peoples of Kazakhstan-historical to present time. It also deals with the climate and culture of the region as well as resources of Kazakhstan. The second chapter provides the definitional and conceptual perspective about ethnicity and stratification. It also looks into several theories and concepts related with ethnicity and stratification.

The third chapter discusses about several ethnic groups existing in Kazakhstan. It also provides the profile of all these ethnic groups from a historical perspective. Fourth chapter examines the social, political and economic status of different ethnic groups. It analyzes the privileges and deprivation in various Kazakh groups and clans as well as in non- Kazakh minorities. Fifth chapter concludes with the overall assessment of the ethnicity and stratification in Kazakhstan.

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

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

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Kazakhstan is situated in Central Asia between the Ural River and the lower courses of the Volga River to the west, the Ala-Tau Mountains to the east, the west- Siberian plateau to the north and the Tienshan mountain chain to the south. The territory of the republic stretches 1,600 kilometers north to south and more than 2,800 kilometers, west to east occupying an area of 2,717 kilometers (Giampaolo, 2000:12-14).

In terms of area, the Republic is the 9th largest country in the world. The republic of Kazakhstan, until December 1991, was the second largest of the former soviet republics. Kazakhstan is bordered to the north, northwest and west by Russia, to the southeast by china and to the south and southwest by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There is a long border in the north with the Russian federation (6,447 km) and a coastline of 2,320km on the Caspian Sea in the southwest. It also borders with the people's republic of china (1,460 km), Kyrgyzstan (9800km), Turkmenistan (380 km) and Uzbekistan (2,300 km). Most of the area of Kazakhstan is flat and low lying. Steppes occupy 26 percent of the territory of Kazakhstan. Deserts cover 44 percent of the total territory. The climate of the Republic is deeply continental and extremely dry. It is severely influenced by the arctic region and eastern Siberia (Paksoy, 1994: 2-5).

Nearly all rivers of Kazakhstan eject into the Caspian and the Arabian seas or the balkhash, alakol and tengriz lakes except for the rivers Irtysh, Ishim and taboo which flow into the Kara Sea. The biggest river is the Irtysh which stretches for 1,700 km within the area of republic. Kazakhstan is politically divided into 14 oblasts and five economic regions. They are Aktyubinsk, Aturau, western Kazakhstan and Mangistau oblasts in western Kazakhstan, Kostanai, Northern Kazakhstan oblasts in Northern Kazakhstan, Akmola, and Karaganda oblasts in southern Kazakhstan. Despite its vast territory, the population of Kazakhstan is not considerable. According to the 1999 census data, 14,953 million people live in Kazakhstan. Population density is as low as 6 persons per square kilometer. Citizens of more than 100 ethnic groups live in the

country. Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, Tatars, Uzbeks, Belarusians, Uighurs comprise the majority of the population.

In Kazakhstan, the ethnic problem is complicated by the fact that there have been many Russians in Kazakhstan as the Kazakhs. However, as per latest census of 1999 kazakhs have emerged as the largest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan with 53% of the total population and the Russian have came down to 30%. Others are the Ukrainians (3.6%), Uzbeks (2.5%), Germans (2.3%), Tatars (1.6%) and Uighurs (1.4%) (Nysanbaev, Arynov and Yesekeyev, 1996; 26-28). In the last ten years, the increase in the number of ethnic Kazakhs has occurred due to Kazakh Diaspora coming back to the native land and also the out-migration of Slavs and other ethnic groups from Kazakhstan for various reasons. According to the constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakh is the official language and Russian is the language of business and of inter-ethnic intercourse. Tenge (KZT) is the national currency of Kazakhstan which was introduced on November 15, 1993. On December 10, 1997 the city of Astana was established as the new capital of Kazakhstan replacing Almaty (Alma-Ata). Regarding the confessional status of Kazakhstan, Islam is the most predominant religion. The Muslims of Kazakhstan are mainly Sunni adherents of Hanafi-Islam. The second largest confession in Kazakhstan is the Russian Orthodox Church with over 60 percent of the Slavic population in Kazakhstan practicing it. Thus the Republic of Kazakhstan presents a unique multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society.

Historical Perspective

The process by which Kazakhs became an ethnic group or a nation involves a long term and complicated historical ethnogenesis. Therefore, three historical phases can be seen in the territory of Kazakhstan: the pre-Turkic (18^{th} century B.C. to 4^{th} century A.D.); the Turkic (4^{th} century A.D. to 13^{th} century) and the Turko-Mongolian period from (13^{th} century to till 15^{th} century) (Soucek Svat, 2000: 14-17).

The pre-Turkic period started in the Bronze Age and includes the period of andronov tribes and the early nomads or "Saka period". The pre- Turkic time also included the Usun and Kaugli tribes. These societies were essentially nomadic. Archaeological evidence from Neolithic sites in northern Kazakhstan confirmed that the first inhabitants on the territory of Kazakhstan were nomads. Kazakh nomadism and

clusters as they existed in the late nineteenth- early twentieth centuries provides the necessary contextual references for understanding the Kazakh intelligentsia's social and economic programs. Kazakh national identity, both pre- revolutionary and Soviet, was configured by the intelligentsia around the cultural symbols (real and imagined) of a nomadic past. Kazakhs were pastoral nomads whose social, economic, and political structures were tightly interconnected with their specific way of life and to 2,500 years of central Asian nomadic heritage (Steven Sabol, 2003: 1-3). The Sakas were the first ever horseman in the world to master arrow shooting at full tilt. In 4^{th}-2^{nd} centuries B.C. the Sakas set up their first state with its center in the Semirechje region (Rashid Ahmed, 1994: 132).

The Turkic period began in the middle of the first millennium A.D. with a mass access of turkes. From that time, Turkic tribes became predominant stretching from north Mongolia to the lower course of Amu-Daria River. From 4^{th} century to the beginning of the 13^{th} century, the territory of Kazakhstan was the field of west Turkic, Tyurgesh, Karluks. There were also states formed by the Oguzes, the Karakhanids, the Kimeks and the Kipchaks. These states successively replaced one another up to the very Mongol invasion. The year 622 A.D. was a benchmark in the history of Central Asia. The principal empires at this time were Tang China, Sasanian Iran and Byzantium. The Turks had established their Qaghanate in the middle of the sixth century. The empire of Kok Turks ruled from 522 to 744A.D. Thus, the empire had two branches. The senior branches ruled northwestern Mongolia and were called eastern Turks and the junior branch ruled in the west including the region of Semireche as its principal home and was called western Turks. Later (after 622A.D.), Islam played a substantive role in the history of Inner Asia. During the same period, Muslim armies under the Arabs entered Central Asia, after the rapid conquest of Persia by 651 A.D. The Arabs were driven by the idea of Jihad (Bakhytnur Otarbaeva, 1998: 34).

The Samanids are also remembered for the jihad and missionary propagation of Islam in Turkestan, Semireche and west Sinkiang. In this region, many Turkic chieftains chose to adopt the new religion and effected wholesale conversion of their tribes. Modern historiography labeled these chieftains as Qarakhanids, a family dynasty whose origins are sought among the tribes of Qarluq of the Kazakh region. The

Qarakhanids were Turks, however, and their arrival signaled a definitive shift from Iranian to Turkic predominance in Central Asia. They ruled a confederation of tribes living in Semireche (south, west Kazakhstan), Tianshan (present day Kyrgyzstan) and western Sinkiang. Central Asia over the centuries became to a considerable degree Turkicized. Seljuks and Ghaznanids also pursued large scale Turkicization of the population. By 1218 A.D. the Qarakhanids and their overlords- the Qarakhitay in Semireche were overthrown by Kuchlug. With the arrival of Mongol generals Kuchlug son later got killed while seeking refuge in the Pamir Mountains. Now Genghis khan marched into Inner Asia. This brought the turning point of Inner Asian history- the rise of Mongol empire (Akiner Shirin, 1983: 112-114)

The effects of Mongol invasion varied from cross- cultural exchange to horrifying massacres and devastation in Central Asia. Temujin was born in 1167 in Mongol region. By 1206, he emerged the leader of growing coalition of clans and tribes of Mongolia and later embraced the little of Genghis Khan meaning "world embracing". Mongols who looked like a rescue party to help Qarliq ruler of Almaliq, controlled all of Central Asia by 1223, and then Genghis khan returned to Mongolia. Later the conquered territory was distributed among his four sons Juchi, Chaghatay, Ogedey and Toluy to administer, of which Chagatay received Central Asia region consisting of Transoxania, Semireche and Sinkiang. Chagatay died in 1242 A.D. and was succeeded by his grandson Qarahulcgu and thus begun a new stage in Central's history as Chagatayid dynasty (Adel Abhishev, 2002: 6).

The Mongols brought a chain of destruction in Central Asia. The Mongols plundered most of the cities of this area and decimated their population. In the Semireche region, not only cities but settlers were attacked by the forced conversion of a territory with a thriving urban and agricultural civilization into a nomad's steppe land. After a century of Mongol invasion, some Chagatayid Khans began to convert to Islam as they chose to live not in Semireche but in Transoxania, which was largely under the impact of Islam. In contrast, the Semireche and other adjoining territories had developed a special identity- that of a Mongol homeland (Dawson, 1995: 117-118).

After the Mongol interlude, the Timurid period (1370-1507) could be viewed as the glorious period for the history of Central Asia. Timur, founder of this dynasty

engaged much of his life in military campaigns and destruction, who spared Central Asia. It is during this period that Islamic culture and art rose to new heights in this area. After Timur's death in 1405, the territory of Transoxania and Khawarezm was succeeded by his son Sharukh whose reign witnessed the pride of Islamic civilization and later by Sharukh's own son Ulugh Beg. Zahir ul-din Babur (1483-1530) succeeded Ulugh Begh, and later founded the great empire of Mughals in India (Svat Soucek, 2000: 126-129).

Although Kazakhstan was not directly ruled by Timur or Timurids, it was during this period that the region witnessed the revival of Islam and its wide propagation under Sufi Silislah. It was the time when the Kazakh region- which had developed a special Mongol identity i.e., Moghulistan under the long devastating Mongol influence- started amalgamating itself into the larger Islamic tradition of central Asia. The last Timurids were pale personalities owing to which some native nomadic group especially- Uzbeks and Kalmyks started asserting their position in central Asia. Abul Khyar having Genghised ancestry, was a Muslim and linguistically and culturally a Turk (Bakhythur Otarbaevaop, 1998: 144-147). The tribe under his leadership, most of which spoke the Kipchak form of Turkic had their own lineage, but they were also known by general name of Uzbek, swept down beyond the Syr Darya and captured Urgench and Samarkand. The Uzbek Khan's move made him the immediate neighbours of Timurid Transoxiana and put him close to Chaghatayid Moghulistan. However, this situation was suddenly thrown into confusion by the interruption of Kalmyks from the east.

The Kalmyks were Mongol but were different from Genghis khan in the dialects and were called the "western Mongols". They briefly rose to supremacy in Mongolia but Great fortunes awaited them farther west in the Kipchak steppe. In 1456A.D., the Kalmyk Khans entered Moghulistan and the Kipchak steppe and defeated Chagtayid Khans and later the Uzbek chieftains of Abul khair. These constant wars led to the withdrawal of many Uzbek tribesmen from Abulkhyar's authority and joined one follower of the two other Genghisids Janibeg and Girey, who had recently established the basis of a new Khanate in the territory of White Horde what is now central Kazakhstan (Paksoy, 1994: 32-34).

Between, 1465-66A.D. they had formed the Kazakh Khanate. By the end of the 15th century, the protracted process of the formation of the Kazakh nation had been completed. These rebel Uzbeks came to be known as Kazakhs for the first time. Later they were called as Kyrghyz by the Russians to be finally reverted to Kazakh in 1925 by the Soviets. However, the Timurids dynasty could not survive long. In the fifteenth century, the Shaybanids Khans united the Uzbek clans into the Shaybanids Ulus and defeated the last Timurids and replaced it with Shaybanids, thus restoring Genghisid rule in Central Asia. The Shaybanids were Turks like the Timurids, sufficiently exposed to Arabo-Persian Islamic culture, although they spoke a different dialect Kipchak. This ensured a basic continuity than change in this area.

During this time, the trans-continental Silk Road was losing importance as against the European maritime route. Europe including Russia was undergoing a technological and economic revolution. The Safavids, who were Shia, started a new dynasty in Iran in 1501 and they developed antagonistic relations with Sunni Shaybanids. This deadlock isolated Central Asia from orthodox Iran right up to its conquest by Russia in the 19th century.

Apart from this, a segment of Shaybanids Ulus later split away and sought refuge with the Chaghatai tribes on the Xinjiang- Kazakhstan border. These tribes, who lived beyond the Shaybanid control, came to be known by outsiders as 'Kazakhs' possibly from the Arabic word Qazac which means 'outlaws'. They started forming a distinct Kazakh nationality which really took shape during the sixteenth century. Political structure in the Dasht-i-Kipchaks of Kazakhs had become much looser than the Mongol empire. The most constant feature was the uneasing ebb and flows of alliances and conflict. Although by the sixteenth century Kazakhs had established their distinct identity, they were yet to establish political structure of a Khanate. Their first chief Burunduk Khan (1488-1509) and later Kasim Khan (1509-18) achieved their distinct identity by resisting Uzbek advances and they could with some legitimacy claim to speak for all Kazakhs. For the first time, the Kazakh border with the Uzbeks was strung out along the SyrDarya River, with the Uzbeks to the south of the river and Kazakhs to the north.

From the seventeenth century however, these nomads only seldom and for brief periods recognized the authority of a single Khan. Usually they formed three separate tribal confederation or hordes. Called by the Russians (Orda) but known as Juz (hundred) in Kazakh: the lesser horde in western Kazakhstan, the middle horde in central Kazakhstan and the greater horde in southeastern Kazakhstan. Each horde was composed of tribal, clan and family units ruled by Khan. The Kazakh Khanates frequently warred against each other.

It is during this period that the Oirots embraced Buddhism. Oirots (Kalmyks) as early as in the 15th century had also invaded Dasht-i-Kipchak, after the defeat from Altan Khan some of the disordered tribes together known as "Jungar" undertook second wave of raids in Kazakh area. Kalmyk incursion into the Kazakh area produced confrontation such as the defeat of Taoke Khan of middle horde in 1698 and his successor Pulat Khan in 1723. The Oirots raided Kazakh territory all the way to the right bank of Syr Darya sacking the city of Sayram, Tashkent and Turkestan.

By 1730, the Kazakhs had asserted themselves as a distinct group of nomadic tribes living in the eastern part of Dasht-i-Kipchak, speaking a distinctive Kipchak Turkic idiom but lacking overall political unity. The tribes had coalesced into three confederations, the Greater, Middle and Lesser Hordes. Except for brief period early in their history, the Kazakhs never managed to build a united Khanate in the manner of their medieval Turkic and Mongol predecessors. One of the reasons for this may have been the proliferation of Sultans claiming Genghisid descent- still holding positions of prestige and authority but the rise of a truly charismatic leader able to repeat the exploits of his great ancestor. On the other hand, the prestige enjoyed by the steppe aristocracy of Genghisid ancestry may have been a factor in the peculiar vertical division of Kazakhs society into two layers the so called "white bone" and "black bone". However, certain other credentials such as descent from eminent Muslim ancestors could also entitle some individuals to claim "white bone" status (Soucek Svat, 2000: 162-164).

The rise of Russia as modern power, which began under Ivan 4th (1547-84 A.D.) and was quickened by Peter the great (1682-1725), made Russia overwhelmingly stronger than any of her Asian neighbors. In view of this new growing disparity, the Russian penetration of the Kazakh steppe was only a matter of time and determination. The

Russians at first contended themselves with accepting offers of vassal dom from various Kazakh leaders, without actually acquiring military or administrative control over their territory. This complex process started in 1730 when Abul Khayar, Khan of Lesser Horde expressed his wish that the tsar be his suzerain and the request was granted. Later Russia received similar assurances of loyalty from the other Kazakh leaders and by 1740 the Middle Horde and in 1742 the Great Horde signed treaties with Moscow (Ahmad Rashid, 1994:111).

During the next fifty years, the decline of their nomadic life style caused by the devastation of the wars led to a series of revolts by Kazakh nomads against their own Khans, the most far reaching being the revolt of Batyr Sryn in 1792. These revolts encouraged the Russians to abolish the Khanates and between 1822 and 1848 the entire Kazakh territory was incorporated into the Tsarist russian empire. The Russian conquest of Central Asia was completed by 1884 with the acquisition of Merv. The conquest of central Asia, however, bore all the hallmarks of 19th century Europe's colonial expansion the motivation of acquiring abundant and cheap raw materials such as cotton for the Russian textile industry and inversely, of gaining a privileged position for Russia's commerce.

Russia devised a new administrative structure for the newly acquired Central Asia region. The entire Central Asian region (except Kazakhstan) was divided into five regions (Syrdarya, Semireche, Fergana, Samarkand and Zukaspie) and two Protectorates (Bukhara and Khiva) and was administered by Governorate-General of Turkestan residing in Tashkent. However, owing to geographical and historical linkage with Russia proper and with Siberia, Kazakhstan was divided into three regions (oblasts). The western most part the area of Lesser Horde now become oblast of Uralsk, whose administrative centre was the city of Uralsk and whose Governor reported directly to Russian ministry of Interior. The area of Middle Horde become the oblast of Turgai whose governor also repoted to the ministry of interior. The oblasts of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblast covered the territory of the Greater Horde.

The Russians encouraged the settlement of Cossacks in the Kazakh grazing and farming lands. Along with 1783 to 1870 there were at least eight major revolts by the

Kazak tribes against these Russian settlers but they were defeated by the Russian armies. However, Central Asia's natives, having lost their political and economic independence retained their religion and remained Muslims in their religion, culture and way of life.

However, on the eve of the First World War, the Tsarist regime had to contend with two dangerous opponents- one its own socialist dissident and revolutionaries of various hues and another strong latent nationalism and bitter resentment persisting against Russia. The policies pursued by the tsarist regime in Central Asia brought more discontent and clashes between the Russian Tsarist authorities and the Kazakhs and their subsequent revolts against Moscow's policy. The parallel process of massive emigration of peasant from the European part of Russia to Kazakhstan took place. In 1891, one million Russian peasants were shifted to northern Kazakhstan (Abhishev, 2000: 12).

The simmering discontent exploded in 1916 when the great revolt of Kazakh nomads against Tsarist regime took place which was brutally crushed by the Russians. This revolt was the first nationalistic protest by native Kazakhs against the Russian empire. In 1905, a handful of Kazakh intellectuals had set up Alash Orda, an informal underground party that was the first nationalist party calling for a free Turkestan in Central Asia. These intellectuals were to lay the first seeds of Kazakh nationalism and their writings today are playing and important part in the re-emergence of Kazakh identity.

Soviet Kazakhstan

The Alash party was formed at the first all Kazakh Congress in Orenburg in July 1917. The Congress demanded that (1) all land seized by the Russians be returned to the Kazakhs. (2) Russian migration into the Turkestan is stopped. (3) Education should be in native Kazakh language and (4) Kazakhs should stop helping the war effort. At the time these demands were the most radical nationalist demands towards greater autonomy in Kazakhstan. They were seen as major threat by both the reds and the whites who were fighting against each other to control the Russian empire. Alash remained crushed between these two forces and vacillated between them. Ahamed Baytursun wrote about the unpleasant choice facing the Kazakhs in 1918, "the

Kazakh received the first revolution (February 1917) with joy and second with consternation and terror. The first revolution had liberated them from the oppression of the tsarist regime and the second was accompanied by violence, Planter and establishment of a dictatorial regime" (Ahmad Rashid, 1994: 113).

On 10 July 1919, Lenin signed a decree creating a "Kazakh- Kirghiz revolutionary committee" and with the help of Red Army liquidated all its nationalist opponents. On 26 august 1920 the Kazakh autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created and in October the first constituent Congress of Soviets of the new Republic was held with the participation of many Alash leaders. Unlike Turkestan ASSR, the Kazakh ASSR was for the first time based on the ethno-linguistic factor of a native nationality, the Kazakhs. Later, the Republic became Kazakh ASSR in 1925 and on 5 December 1936, it became a full Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR. However, all the expectation of seeking larger autonomy for Turkestan and Kazakhstan by the Alash leader under the new Bolshevik regime was belied and all these nationalists were to die by 1930 as victims of Stalin's purges.

In 31 January 1924, a decision was made to carry out national delimitation of Central Asia. This led to the transformation of Turkestan into a region of five national units, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Each of the five Republics acquired the status of a Union Republic- Kazakhstan got it in 1936 and a new constitution was adopted by parliament of every Republic in 1937(to be replaced by, the last Soviet constitution in 1978). Most striking privilege, explicitly stated in the 1937 constitution was to leave the Soviet Union altogether and become an independent country. Additional symbols of each- Republic's sovereignty were its own flags, symbol and national anthem.

Since the national delimitation of 1924, soviet officials worked hard to increase the distinctiveness of Central Asian nationalities. Most remarkably, the end results of this linguistic, Cultural Revolution was the creation of six new literary languages (Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajik) in a society that had previously used Chaghatay Turkic or Persian for written expression (Soucek Svat, 2000:174-176). During Stalin's time, Kazakhstan was heavily industrialized and communication and infrastructure were greatly improved. However, Kazakhstan was one of the worst affected regions

during Stalin's campaigns in the early 1930s, to collectivize agriculture and settle nomadic peoples.

According to informal estimates, the ugliest toll of Stalinism was felt in Kazakhstan during this time as one in every three people died as a result of forced settlement of the nomads that accompanied collectivization. One million people were estimated to have died as a result of starvation and the percentage of the Kazakhs in their own republic fell to 29 percent. The 1930s was the period of establishment of totalitarianism in Kazakhstan which entailed massive political repression. All the leaders of Alash were Executed during Stalin's purges of which Ahmed Baythrsun was first to be executed in 1925.

In the pre world war-II period, mass deportation of many nationalities like Germans, Chechenns, Bashkirs, and others had begun. Thousands of Kazakhs left without roof over their head and means of subsistence and died in Kazakhstan. In this time Kazakhstan lost nearly 425,000 people (Europa Year Book, 1999: 2019-2020). During that period, practically all Kazakh enterprises put out exclusively defense produce. The war years were filled with millions of Soviet people in industries and agriculture. The Republic played host to hundreds of thousands of evacuated people. In the post war period, under Khrushchev (1953-64), Kazakhstan entered the era of intensive economic development. Inauguration of the Academy of sciences of the Kazakh SSR took place in 1946. In order to boost agricultural production in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev announced his Virgin Lands scheme in February 1954. The Kazakh steppes were declared virgin territory. The economic wisdom of this policy was questioned by many experts on the ground that lack of adequate rainfall in this region, may create soil erosion and desertification of the area if put under intensive ploughing. Some 62 million acres out of the 104 million acres ploughed between 1954 and 1960 were in Kazakhstan. The scheme become unsuccessful, due to widespread storms and wind erosion between 1960 and 1964, which ruined 4 million hectares of farmland were ruined and damaged. This campaign entailed a new influx of people into Kazakhstan. The ethnic Russian population in the total population of Kazakhstan increased from 19.7% in 1926 to 42.7% in 1959.

In the political arena, Khrushchev dismissed all Stalin era party leadership. The failure of Virgin Land plan led Khrushchev to replace Brezhev in July 1955 as Secretary in Kazakhstan. it was Brezhnev's ability to present Virgin Lands scheme as a modern economic miracle and his successful suppression of Kazakh protests against it that were later to bring him to prominence in Moscow. With the accession of Brezhnev as the supreme leader (1964-82), the party elites of the local nationalists came to dominate the political life of Kazakhstan (Martha Brill Olcott 1950; 24-27). The Brezhnev years were a period of remarkable political stability throughout Central Asia. In 1964, Dinmuhamad Kunayev, a Kazakh and Brezhev loyalist was made party chief in Kazakhstan. Gradually Kunayev who stayed in Kazakhstan until December 1986 started building his own power base by putting members of his clan great Ord into powerful bureaucratic positions. During his tenure, a new Kazakh political mafia developed owing complete allegiance to Moscow but at the same time consolidate Kazakh nationalism.

By mid-1980, an expediency of radical changes in the Soviet policy became obvious and compelling as ever before. One problem was corruption among high officials. Soviet government was fully aware of the surge of native power in Kazakhstan but could not do anything to remedy the situation. The Kazakh leaders of the final Soviet era were thoroughly nationalist Kazakh. The family, the clan, the tribe, the horde had traditionaliy been the avenues through which power and position of comfort were distributed by the time Kunaev became the nation's number one communist, these traditions had reasserted themselves despite the structure imposed by Moscow. The doubts burst into the open only with the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union. After Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the position of General Secretary in 1985, concerted attempts were made to clean up the Central Asian party and state organs.

The rampant corruption of the Kynayev regime and his mafia style politics led Mikhail Gorbachev to dismiss him in December 1986. He was replaced by Gennadi Kolbin, an ethnic Russian- an outsider to clean up the communist party of Kazakhstan (CPKZ). In sum, replacing Kunayev with Kolbin sharpened the contradiction that had existed between the center and the periphery, strengthening Kazakh nationalism even

within the Kazakh ranks of the CPK. On December 1986, a few days after Kolbin took over; anti-Russian riots against Kolbin's appointment broke out in Alma-Ata.

On 17 December, 1986 some 10,000 people took to the streets in Alma Ata. A great number of protesters mainly young people and students gathered on the main square of Almaty and staged demonstration against Kolbin- what was viewed as an assault on their nationality. They carried placards saying, "We are for Kazakhstan", "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs". The event was a watershed in the history of Kazakhstan, giving birth to a party called Jeltoksan (literally December), the Decemberits. Kolbin showed sensitivity towards the Kazaks throughout his nearly three year tenure in the republic. He was responsible for legislation mandating that Kazakh became one of the two official languages of the Republic and he himself learned some Kazakh and used it publicly. The Alma Ata riots of 1986 foreshadowed growing nationalist sentiment against emigrant labour to the oil fields.

In the spring of 1989 word went around in the cities of western Kazakhstan that the refugees from Armenia, which had suffered a devastating earthquake in December, were being offered inadequate housing. This triggered riots which were quickly suppressed. The event which was symptomatic of rising resentment especially among youth provided Gorbachev with a rationale to return the top Republican Party job to a Kazakh. This happened in June 1989 when Nursultan Nazarbayev was elected as First Secretary of the CPKs central committee replacing Kolbin, a step which cooled Kazakh passion, but did not guarantee peace. Nazarbayev emerged as the most important leader because of his ability to handle the crisis that was to follow in the Soviet Union and in Kazakhstan itself. He played local politics skillfully balancing Kazakh clan interests with Moscow's directives

In September 1989, Kazakh Supreme Soviet passed a law making Kazakh the official language and limiting certain civil service post to Kazakh speakers. To meet the rising demand for autonomy, Kazakh Supreme Soviet declared the primacy of Kazakh legislation over Soviet laws. This provided the framework within which parliament could translate Kazakh nationalism into specific legislation. Since the bloody episode of December 1986, the balance started shifting in favour of the ethnic Kazakhs (Ahmad Rashid, 1994: 117).

As the crisis grew in the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev remained loyal to Gorbachev's dream of political and economic change to be carried out without redrawing the map of the Soviet Union. He was Gorbachev's chief ally during negotiation over the new union treaty in 1991 and argued with Gorbachev against the breakup of the Soviet Union. He very well knew that if the Soviet state brokeup, Kazakhstan's Russian population in the North would be irrevocably antagonized and peace in the region could be jeopardized. Apparently the hard line centralists in Kremlin felt that too much power was being conceded to the Republics by the new union treaty to be signed on 20 August 1991 and that spurred them under Yeltsin to mount a coup against Gorbachev. Unlike most Central Asian leaders, Nazarbayev came out against the coup and its failure was enthusiastically received in Alma Ata. Once the coup was crushed, Nazarbayev moved fast. On 26 august 1991, he resigned as First Secretary of the CPK, saying the party had discredited itself in the eyes of the people.

Post-Soviet Kazakhstan

In October 1991, Kazakhstan signed with seven other Republics, a treaty to establish an economic community. With presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine abstaining. The new agreement was meant to provide a guideline for a similar setup in the political arena, the two together producing the union of sovereign states to replace USSR. When the presidents of three Slav Republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced the creation of Commonwealth of Independent States by adopting the Belovezhskoye agreement on December 8, 1991, they aborted Gorbachev's attempts to form a new confederation replacing USSR. After initial reluctance, Kazakhstan agreed to join the new Commonwealth. On 16 December1991, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet became the last body of its kind in the region to declare its Republic an independent sovereign state.

Finally, the agreement that was to breakup the Soviet Union and change the map of the world was agreed by all the Republican leaders at Alma Ata on 21 December 1991, with Nazarbayev presiding. The republic of Kazakhstan emerged on the political map of the world with a bitter noting by its vice-president Yerlik

Asanbayev,"we became independent by a process of elimination, we were the only ones left. They left us independent".

In the new commonwealth, all the member states became truly independent and their membership in the CIS resulted from a decision made by the indigenous leaders in Central Asia, not the Russian ones in Moscow. Despite their newly "imposed" independence, Nazarbayev was well aware of 48% of its European population living in Kazakhstan. This late declaration of independence was attributed to Nazarbayev's concern to preserve the delicate interethnic balance between Russian and Kazakhs also to prevent further discussion of the termination of Kazakhstan's northern territory to the Russian Federation. The independence of Kazakhstan also witnessed the resurgence of Kazakh Nationalist groups like Adalat and Alash- who were strongly anti-Russian and wanted preferential treatment for native Kazakh in their own republic. The Russians were also opposed to discrimination against non-Kazakhs and contested to guarantee equal status with Kazakhs in the new constitution.

Taking cue from this Nazarbayev visualized Kazakhstan as a bridge between Russia and Central Asia. Despite initial reluctance over the Russian demand for inclusion of northern Kazakhstan in Russia, both Russia and Kazakhstan signed an economic and military cooperation agreement on 26 may 1992. The new constitution adopted in January 1993 established Kazakh as the state language with Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication. The document also required that the President of the republic should be a fluent speaker of Kazakh. On 7 March 1994, Kazakhstan's first multi-party elections were held with the participation of the 74% of the electorate in which ethnic Kazakhs won in Majority (59%). In November 1997 the new capital was officially inaugurated by Nazarbayev and a joint session of both chambers of parliament was held for the first time in Akmola in the following month. In May 1995, Nazarbayev ordered the establishment of a special council to prepare a new constitution (Ahmad Rashid, 1994: 119).

An election to the Senate and Majlis were held in December 1995, Nazarbayev undertook several far reaching measures to restructure and nationalize state administration in March 1997. In 1998, the parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of a parliamentary amendment in order to hold presidential election before the

expiry of his extended mandate in 2000. Despite appeals for postponement, voting for the presidential election proceeded on 10 January 1999 and Nazarbayev was re-elected for a new term with 81.77% of the total votes. Nazarbayev was sworn in for a new term of office on 20 January 1999.

The republic of Kazakhstan has completed over 15 years as an independent nation. The ethnic factor in the future stability of Kazakhstan is closely linked with the revival of Islam. Historically, the Kazakhs are the least Islamized of the central Asian republics. Nevertheless, Islam now holds a fascination for Kazakhs, not just for religious reasons but because it is a part of historical and national identity which they want to assert making them decisively different from Russians. Until January 1990, Kazakhstan's Muslims were governed by Soviet-backed Muslim religious boards based in Tashkent. The Qazi of Alma Aty staged a coup on 12 January 1990. By setting up his own religious board. He opened Kazakhstan's first madrasa in 1991 (Rashid Ahmad, 1994: 121).

Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has emerged as a leader in many policy areas. The first country in the world to unilaterally close the former Soviet nuclear test site and disarm its nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan has been hailed as a model state for international non-proliferation efforts. By promoting and protecting the equal rights of its citizens, Kazakhstan is developing as a strong, democratic society based on the rule of law. There are sixteen political parties in Kazakhstan (nine-formally registered as per the new 2002 law on political parties), four of which sit in the parliament. More than 3,500 NGO are operating in areas such as politics and civic development, business, environment, education, health care, gender, policy etc.

A bi-cameral parliament and independent court system function as part of the process of incremental reform, which is expected to soon include the introduction of jury trials. Kazakhstan has established diplomatic relations with more than 120 countries and is a member of 64 international organizations. Over 1,300 international and inter-governmental instruments have been signed by Kazakhstan. About 70 foreign diplomatic missions and offices of international organizations are accredited in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has more than 50 embassies, diplomatic and consular stations abroad.

Kazakhstan acts as an anchor of stability in an often unpredictable region threatened by extremist forces of religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Kazakhstan plays an important role in securing stability in the unstable central Asian region and beyond. During the first dozen years of independence, the government of Kazakhstan has made strong strides toward stability and institution of free-market democratic processes. Kazakhstan's macro-economic picture is positive with a stabilized and fast-growing economy, low inflation and strong banking institutions.

Economic perspective

Kazakhstan has been enjoying a 10 percent annual growth in GDP on an average since 2000. This is attributed both to favorable international market conditions and to results of earlier innovative economic reforms. The GDP grew 2004 by 9.4 percent. In may 2003, the government approved a new "industrial innovation policy" aimed at building a post-industrial, high-tech, English-speaking economy with capabilities in aerospace, biotechnology, software technologies, peaceful uses of atomic energy and other sectors. In 2000 and 2002, Kazakhstan was granted market economy status by European Union and United States respectively.

With an excellent macro-economic reform record, 100 percent currency convertibility and abundant natural resources, Kazakhstan has enormous potential for foreign investment and long-term economic growth. With potential oil reserves on par with Kuwait, Kazakhstan has the potential of an alternative energy source, to be delivered via multiple pipelines. The Kazakhstan government is creating a National Oil fund, now at about US$4.7 billion, intended to help promote development across the broad spectrum of social and economic life.

Kazakhstan's per capita FDI, is the highest among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members. Net FDI has been consistently above 5 percent of GDP in the last 5 years, in excess of any major emerging market economy. FDI levels will remain fairly constant in the years to come, as commitments towards major oil projects have been made for the next several decades.

During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan was an agrarian raw materials supplier of the former all union economy, where the military industry played the major role. The main economic content of 15 years of independence has become transition from the central command planning to a market system. During these years, Kazakhstan has made considerable progress in implementing complex political economic and social reforms to establish a democratic state with a market economy.

While the country has not experienced political disturbances during this period, it has faced numerous economic, social and environmental challenges. The first few years of Kazakhstan's independence were characterized by an economic decline (mostly due to the destabilizing force of disintegration of the Soviet Union): By 1995 real GDP dropped to 61.4 percent of its 1990 level. This economic deterioration exceeded the losses experienced during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Since 1999, Kazakhstan has actively pursued a programme of economic reform designed to establish a free market economy through privatization of state enterprises and deregulation and is more advanced in this respect than most other countries of the CIS.

Kazakhstan has experienced impressive economic growth over the past four years, buoyed by increased oil exports, as well as by bold economic reforms, prudent fiscal policies and economic initiatives that were instituted in 1999. The results included a sharp reduction of inflation, which was 6.8 percent in 2004 (January-September), a budget surplus, a stable currency, and a decreasing unemployment rate (8% in third quarter of 2004). After having a moderate growth of 2.7 percent in 1999 as a whole, Kazakhstan's real gross domestic product (GDP) rose to9.6 percent in 2000 and 13.2 percent in 2001, easily the country's best year of economic performance since independence, 9 percent in 2002, and 9.1 percent in 2003. The GDP growth in January-September of 2004 was 9.4 percent. The main driver behind Kazakhstan's economic growth has been foreign investment, mainly in the country's booming oil and natural gas industries.

Hard currency reserves of the National Bank have increased by 44 percent to US$7.2 billion and reserves of National oil fund –US$4.7 billion. Real income during January-September 2004 grew by 12.7 percent in comparison with the corresponding

period of previous year. Average wages in 9 month of 2004 were up by 13 percent on the year. Also the social payment has seen a significant increase by the state.

Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has been in the midst of a remarkable transition from communism to free markets. When completed, this transformation could bring Kazakhstan into the global marketplace. Kazakhstan's current leaders are laying the foundation for its integration into the global economy. At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had a promising resource base, from its sizable hydrocarbon reserves to its well-educated workforce. In a little over fifteen years, Kazakhstan implemented a series of broad-based reforms that brought the country from planned to market economy.

Kazakhstan undertook a process of demonopolization, privatization, debt restructuring, price liberalization, customs reform, and tax restructuring. Kazakhstan established a securities and exchange commission, liberalized trade, enacted laws on investment, established a new government procurement process, and reformed the banking system. The United States, in March 2002 accorded Kazakhstan the status of a market economy. The Government of Kazakhstan has privatized much of the economy. The banking sector has flourished. Unemployment, while still high in Western terms, is lower than elsewhere in the region. These impressive reforms took place against a background of internal political stability and gradual advance of democratic reform and a civil society.

Kazakhstan, as a country leading the region in terms of social and economic growth, is poised to play a key role in the region, In October 2000, the European Union raised Kazakhstan to the status of market economy. On March 26, 2002, the U.S. administration represented by the Department of commerce decided to withdraw the status of non-market economy from Kazakhstan under US Anti-Dumping Act. Based on the analysis of such indicators as, convertibility of national currency, free level of wage, foreign investment, public control, and control of production, corruption and barter business, human rights etc., U.S. Department of commerce raised Kazakhstan's status to market economy. This happened due to constructive cooperation between the Kazakh government and the U.S. administration, as well as successful social and economic reforms undertaken in the country.

Conclusion

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was considered the most potentially unstable post- Soviet state. Despite certain difficulties of first few years, Kazakhstan has managed to ensure economic and social development based on democratic priorities. Barring few incident of inter-ethnic strife, it has managed to preserve stability of the country and unity of the people and happily celebrated the tenth year of their independence. Long cherished sense of Kazakh nationhood and "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs" are largely gaining ground which Nazarbayev could hardly afford to ignore. Russians may be welcome and even encouraged to continue living in the new Republic but no longer as privileged community.

The strength of the post Soviet Kazakhstan will depend on its mature leadership and citizenship and a civil society that is mindful of its common interest, democratic principles. So that different ethnic groups are harmoniously allowed to participate in building the political and economic future of the Republic along with the conviction that multi- ethnic and stratified nation is not a fault but an advantage of the society.

CHAPTER 2

It takes at least two somethings to create a difference. (...) Clearly each alone is - for the mind and perception - a non-entity, a non-being. Not different from being, and not different from non-being. An unknowable, a Ding an sich, a sound from one hand clapping.

Gregory Bateson (1979: 78)

An important reason for the current academic interest in ethnicity and stratification is the fact that such phenomena have become so visible in many societies that it has become impossible to ignore them. In the early twentieth century, many social theorists held that ethnicity and stratification would decrease in importance and eventually vanish as a result of modernization, industrialization and individualism. This never came about. On the contrary, ethnicity and stratification have grown in political importance in the world, particularly since the Second World War. In this chapter the following questions are discussed:

- How do ethnic groups remain distinctive under different social conditions?
- Under which circumstances does ethnicity become important?
- What is the relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic political organization?
- Is nationalism always a form of ethnicity?
- What is the relationship between ethnicity and other types of identity, social classification and political organization, such as class and gender?
- What happens to ethnic relations when societies are industrialized?
- In which ways can history be important in the creation of ethnicity?
- What is the relationship between ethnicity and culture?

Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a social identity (based on a contrast vis-a-vis others) characterized by metaphoric or fictive kinship (Yelvington, 1991: 168). When cultural differences regularly make a difference in interaction between members of groups, the social relationship has an ethnic element.

Ethnicity refers both to aspects of gain and loss in interaction, and to aspects of meaning in the creation of identity. In this way, it has a political, organizational aspect as well as a symbolic one. Ethnic groups tend to have myths of common origin, and they nearly always have ideologies encouraging endogamy.

Ethnic issue like ethnic identity, ethnic nationalism, ethnic conflicts etc. are definitely not new phenomena, yet they are being regarded as most pressing problems facing many countries of the world in contemporary times. They concern basically with the question of relationship between diverse groups of people often characterized by distinct place, culture and religions living to wish in the political boundaries of a state (Kook Rebecca, 2000: 42-43). The state of relationship between various groups varies in each country depending upon such variables as its historicity, political process and many socio-economic configurations in it. The relationship ranges from a relatively harmonious from to one of antagonism and open hostility of conflictual type. The rapid political transformation and economic liberalization unleashed in the former Soviet Union since mid-1980s set the stage for the re-emergence of ethnic identity, ethnic dissensions and conflicts in this part of the world. The culminations of the first phase of this process were the dissolution of Soviet Union and second the creation of 15 independent states in December 1991(Frkhod, 2001: 183-185). It was long felt among political discussions and theories that along with the onset of the process collectively known as "modernization", all the primordial identities including ethnic and confessional categories will shrink away. Scholars tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as nearly one of a number of minor impediments to effective state integration (Connor walker, 2000: 26-27).

However, the tendencies of ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the developed world including the former Soviet Republic are at sharp variance with the facts and have contributed to the undue optimism that has characterized so much of the literature on "nation building". Ethnicity and ethnic identity have, therefore, become crucial variables in the formation reformation and consolidation of state structure in all the Soviet successor states including Kazakhstan Inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflict appear to have acquired a marked intensity.

The rise of ethnic nationalism and formation of ethnic political moments in many of the states can largely be attributed to the legacy of European colonization and de-colonization which created sovereign states incorporating many ethnic groups by ignoring existing ethnic and cultural divisions and popular political aspirations (Phadnis and Ganguly, 1989: 16-17). Until de-colonization was complete, this ethnic plurality was by and large manageable since the national organization that existed in these states could and did generate a common political agenda of achieving independence from colonial rule. Consequently, different ethnic groups found little in common to bind them together once independence was achieved. In their post-colonial political history, it was often assumed that the process of modernization, development of modern communication technologies and primordial identities and pleading them with common state centre identities. However, this optimism was quite unwarranted. The rice of ethno-nationalistic feeling is growing hard in hard along with the process of nation-building and modernization. Lock of internal cohesion, ethnic polarization, social fragmentation, civil discord is making plethora of problems in the task of nation-building and governing in such states, the demand for recognition as 'Nations' on the basis of ethnic self-determination has symbolized revolt against state and its power structure.

Despite several theoretical assumptions, the concepts of ethnicity and nation building are closely intertwined in the evolutionary process of a political community (S.C. Nayak, 2001: 2). At present, all the Soviet successor states including Kazakhstan are in the grip of hectic nation-building amidst rising ethnic assertions. Against this background, an attempt is be made here to examine the role of ethnicity in the Central Asian Republics with particular focus on Kazakhstan in theoretical prospective. This study seeks to focus on various approaches of ethnicity.

Ethnicity-A Theoretical Perspective

The term 'ethnicity' which was used to be acknowledged as "the positive feelings of belonging to a cultural group" (Sponley, 1988: 4-5), has come to disrepute containing negative aspects since the collapse of communist regimes. Unlike viewed by the theoreticians, ethnicity is playing a vital role in modernizing states. There is a wide

divergence among scholars regarding the meaning and interpretation of the term ethnic group" or "ethnic community." Keeping in view the growing importance of the concept "ethnic" in plural modernizing society like Kazakhstan, it is quite imperative to address the theoretical perspective in this regard.

The term 'ethnicity' is etymologically derived from the Greek word 'ethnos' which means 'nation'. This concept has undergone several modifications. In the contemporary social science discourse, ethnicity refers to a combination of both biological and cultural attributes (S.C. Nayak, 2001: 24). Scholars like Shibulani Warner and Kwan consider ethnic characteristics as derived from common descent and have denied role of culture in it. On the other hand scholars like Glucknam, Mitchel and Epstein put emphasis on culture as the basis of ethnicity. According to Parsons, "ethnicity is a primary focus of group identity, that is, the organization of plural person into distinctive groups and of solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups. the members of the ethnic group have a distinctive identity of their own which is rooted in a distinctive sense of its history- this identity is basic to the idea of ethnicity."

Gordon is credited with the formulation of the idea of sub-structure and sub cultures of the ethnic groups-it viewed sub-structure as a web of social relationships which allows the members of an ethnic group to remain confined to in so far as all of their primary and secondary relationships are concerned. Sub-culture for him, is the cultural patterns of a sub-society that has parallels with the wider society in the sense that it provides for network of institutions and organizations for the members of the ethnic group for the whole of their life. The sub-culture of an ethnic group is distinct from that of the wider culture as well as from other ethnic group.

Despress has treated ethnicity as a mechanism for social organization of competition over resources in the context of plural societies. Morris, felt that the self definition of the ethnic group may be based on the criteria of race of cultures or nationality. Max Weber called ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both or because of memories of colonization or migration."

Omens has related ethnicity with the role played by a particulars group i.e. the group upholding the mainline culture. According to him, the peripheral communities have ratified their primordial collectivism in response to the process of expansionism and expansivism practiced by majority community; this involves tension between the community that claims it to be the cultural mainstream and the other primordial collectivities that are at a peripheral position.

Ethnicity is a sense of ethnic identity which has been defined by Devos as consisting of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. An ethnic group that uses cultural symbols in this way is a subjectively self-conscious community that establishes criteria for inclusion in to and exclusion from the group-ethnicity also involves, in addition to status and recognition either as a superior group of as a group equal to other groups. Ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class (Paul Brass, 1991: 19).

The soviet tradition of interpreting ethnicity is heavily dominated by primordial approach. Shirokogorov, Hev Gumilev, Yulian Bromley and others gave "Soviet theory of ethnos" which remained a dominant theoretical paradigm for the study of ethnicity in former Soviet Union. According to Snirokogorov, "the ethnos are a group of people, speaking the same language, who recognize their shared heritage and have a shared complex of social mores, mode of life, retained and sanctified traditions which differentiate them from other groups" (Tishkov, 1997: 1-4). For Bromely, "ethnos is a historically stable entity of people developed on a certain territory and possessing common relatively stable features of culture (including language) and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity and of shier difference from other similar entities fixed in a self name." Ethnicity was considered natural, native and inescapable and ethnos as an 'Ethno-Social Organism' (ESO). ESO is the basic category and archetype, with its highest manifestations expressed through being a nation.

Due to the confusion over meaning and interpretation, a working definition refers to an ethnic group as "either a large of small groups of people, in either back ward of advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited culture, racial similarity,

common religion and belief in common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group." This feeling of group solidarity and togetherness sharing common symbols and a structure of discourse are understood to provide the intimate cohesion so much essential for a distinct ethnic identity. In recent years, the concept of ethnicity has been advanced as a generic term conversing conflict and tension arising out of the cultural diversity in a territorial state.

Ethnic Identity

A further problem for the theory of ethnicity is posed by the use of term 'ethnic identity.' As Antonym Conch put it 'ethnicity has come to be regarded as a mode of action and of representation, it refers to a decision people make to depict themselves or others symbolically as a bearers of certain cultural identity (Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 4-5). Scholars are divided in their opinion regarding how ethnic identity is formed and why it persists. To some ethnic identity is part of the archaic and primordial history and to some it is purposely constructed in its effort to gain material or political advantage. Even in the Post-Soviet Central Asian Republics, ethnic identities are reoriented so as to help them in state and nation building.

From the perspective of the primordialist school, ethnic identity is a biologically 'given' 'natural' phenomenon. To them it is subjectively held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criteria. Anthony Smith exemplifies this approach by referring to six bases or foundations of ethnic identity. A distinct group name in order to be recognized as a distinct community must have a shared belief by group members in the myth of common ancestry and descent, the presence of historical memories among groups members, a shared culture, an a attachment to a specific territory and a sense of common solidarity (Phadnis and Ganguly, 1989: 23).

On the other, the constructivist school categorically rejected the primordial argument that ethnic identity is a biologically natural phenomenon. To them ethnic identity is socially constructed. Max Weber viewed ethnic groups as human groups whose belief in a common ancestry is so strong that it ideas to the creation of community. Paul Brass asserts that ethnicity should be view as the social and political creation of elites, who draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the

groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well being as to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves.

Ethnicity is seen as part of the collection that is calculated and chosen consciously by an individual of a group in order satisfy certain interests and to achieve certain goals. They regard ethnicity as a modern phenomenon. They can emerge or reemerge as a result of changing power structures. For the social constructivists; cultural markers can even be manipulated to rationalize the identity and organization of the ethnic group. Ethnic sentiment is seen as the result of purposeful efforts of elites who are professional producers of subjective visions of the social world. They pay special attention to mentalities and language as key symbols around which a perception of ethnic distinctiveness crystallizes (Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 7-8). As evident in Kazakhstan, elements of culture live language, religious belief systems, historical monuments and heroes and history are being consciously articulated and rewritten in an attempt to satisfy certain interests and politically legitimize the newly gained independence and nationhood. The ethnic identity is thus constructed to match the doctrine of nationalism in Kazakhstan.

Ethnicity and Nation State:

Nation-state in principle demands congruence of cultural nation as well as political nation and insists that in an ideal state the national community will not split into cultural and political spheres. The nationalist can exploit this perpetual ambiguity. Indeed ambiguity is a strong card in the hands of nationalists. They can build up the nation from different materials and feed it from different sources. The one could be ethnic component as it is evident in Kazakhstan.

The relationship between nation-state and ethnicity is made clear by Oomen. To him, ethnicity is due to the rupture between territory and other primordial attributes. The process through which a nation is transformed, into an ethnic group and an 'ethnic' takes the shape of a nation, is an important subject of analysis because an 'ethnic' having legitimate authority over a territory gives rise to a nation-state. A nation undergoes the process of "ethnification" when it lacks the territory and legitimate claim to political authority over it. To Oomen, ethnic nation and state name a

processual relationship with the legitimate claim over a particular region, an ethnic takes the form of a nation and with the possession of political rights, a nation becomes a political entity called state (S.C. Nayak, 2001: 30-31).

An ethnic group can remain within a nation-state or be spread over more than one nation-state. However, with the interaction and co-existence of various ethnic groups and nations certain new attributes may spring up that will give a "collective self-definition" and a new meaning to then. The concept of pluralism is based on the multi-national or poly ethnic character of a social system. The ethnic groups in a plural society mix but do not combine as they exist separately within the same political unit. Vander Bergne defines plural society as a compartmentalization into quasi independent sub-system on the basis of cultural and social segmentation. In addition, he listed down some more characteristics frequently associated with pluralism such as (Kook Rebecca, 2000: 43-48):

(a) Relative absence of value consensus
(b) Relative presence of cultural heterogeneity.
(c) Relative presence of conflict between the significant corporate groups
(d) Relative autonomy between parts of the social system
(e) Relative importance of coercion and economic interdependence as basis of social integration and
(f) Political domination by one of the corporate groups over others.

Multiculturalism and ethnification are expressions of progressive differentiations within modern nation-state; they each lead to specific politics of identity. Many a times the notion of culture' and 'ethnic' are intensively reconstructed by political elites, to legitimize their power and to strengthen statecraft. Modern nationalism and to predict its future can be limited, irrational and even misleading.

Ethnicity, Race and Nation

A few words must be said initially about the relationship between ethnicity and "race". The term race has deliberately been placed within inverted commas in order to stress that it has dubious descriptive value. Whereas it was for some time common to divide

humanity into four main races, modern genetics tend not to speak of races, and this has two main reasons. First, there has always been so much interbreeding between human populations that it would be meaningless to talk of fixed boundaries between races. Secondly, the distribution of hereditary physical traits does not follow clear boundaries. In other words, there is often greater variation within a "racial" group.

Concepts of race can nevertheless be important to the extent that they inform people's actions; at this level, race exists as a cultural construct, whether it has a "biological" reality or not. Racism, obviously, builds on the assumption that personality is somehow linked with hereditary characteristics which differ systematically between "races", and in this way race may assume sociological importance even if it has no "objective" existence.

Should the study of race relations, be distinguished from the study of ethnicity or ethnic relations? Pierre van den Berghe (1983) does not think so, but would rather regard "race" relations as a special case of ethnicity. Others, among them Michael Banton (1967), have argued the need to distinguish between race and ethnicity. In Banton's view, race refers to the categorization of people, while ethnicity has to do with group identification. He argues that "ethnicity is generally more concerned with the identification of 'us', while racism is more oriented to the categorization of 'them'" (Jenkins, 1986: 177). However, ethnicity can assume many forms, and since ethnic ideologies tend to stress common descent among their members, the distinction between race and ethnicity is a problematic one, even if Banton's distinction between groups and categories can be useful. Ideas of "race" may or may not form part of ethnic ideologies, and their presence or absence does not seem a decisive factor in interethnic relation.

The relationship between the terms ethnicity and nationality is nearly as complex as that between ethnicity and race. Like the words ethnic and race, the word nation has a long history (R. Williams, 1976: 213-214), and has been used in a variety of different meanings in English. Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents, and by implication, it draws boundaries vis-a-vis others, who thereby become outsiders. The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its relationship to the state. A nationalist holds that political boundaries

should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state. When the political leaders of an ethnic movement place demands to this effect, the ethnic movement therefore by definition becomes a nationalist movement. Although nationalisms tend to be ethnic in character, this is not necessarily.

Ethnicity and Class

The term ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive, and these groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society. It is therefore necessary to distinguish clearly between ethnicity and social class.

Theories of social class always refer to systems of social ranking and distribution of power. Ethnicity, on the contrary, does not necessarily refer to rank; ethnic relations may well be egalitarian in this regard. Still, many poly-ethnic societies are ranked according to ethnic membership. The criteria for such ranking are nevertheless different from class ranking: they refer to imputed cultural differences or "races", not statuses to property or achieved.

There may be a high correlation between ethnicity and class, which means that there is a high likelihood that persons belonging to specific ethnic groups also belong to specific social classes. There can be a significant interrelationship between class and ethnicity, both class and ethnicity can be criteria for rank, and ethnic membership can be an important factor for class membership. Both class differences and ethnic differences can be pervasive features of societies, but they are not one and the same thing and must be distinguished from one another analytically.

From Tribe to Ethnic group

While one formerly spoke of "tribes", the term "ethnic group" is nowadays much more common. Ronald Cohen remarks: "Quite suddenly, with little comment or ceremony, ethnicity is an everywhere presence" (R. Cohen, 1978: 379). This switch in terminology implies more than a mere replacement of a word with another. Notably, the use of the term "ethnic group" suggests contact and interrelationship. To speak of

an ethnic group in total isolation is as illogical as to speak of the sound from one hand clapping (Bateson, 1979: 78). By definition, ethnic groups remain more or less discrete from each other, but they are aware of - and in contact with - members of other ethnic groups. Moreover, these groups or categories are in a sense created through that very contact. Group identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are not in other words, in relation to non-members of the group.

The terminological switch from "tribe" to "ethnic group" may also mitigate or even transcend an ethnocentric or Eurocentric bias. When we talk of tribes, we implicitly introduce a sharp, qualitative distinction between ourselves and the people we study; the distinction generally corresponds to the distinction between modern and traditional or "primitive" societies. Ethnic groups or categories, such a sharp distinction becomes difficult to maintain. Virtually every human being belongs to an ethnic group. In this sense, the concept of ethnicity can be said to bridge two important gaps. It entails a focus on dynamics rather than statics, and it relativists the boundaries between "us" and "them".

Social Stratification

The notion of an encompassing social system, like the contemporary notion of the global world system, for instance, poses central questions to social stratification research, including the following:

(1) What is the social structure of this world system and how does it change over time?

(2) What is the impact of a particular structural position in this encompassing System for social stratification within nation-states, and how does location in a Specific position affects the upward and downward mobility of a particular nation-state?

Men have long dreamed of an egalitarian society, a society in which all members are equal. In such a society men will no longer be ranked in terms of prestige. No one will experience the satisfaction of occupying a high social status; no one will suffer the

indignity of being relegated to a position which commands little respect. No longer will high status evoke deference and admiration or envy and resentment from those in less worthy positions. Wealth will be distributed equally amongst the population. The rich and poor, haves and have-nots will be a thing of the past. Words such as privilege and poverty will either change their meaning or disappear from the vocabulary. In an egalitarian society, the 'phrase power to the people' will become a reality. No longer will some have power over others. Positions of authority and the obedience they command will disappear. Exploitation and oppression will be concepts of history which have no place in the description of contemporary social reality. Men will be equal both in the sight of God and in the eyes of their fellow men.

Clearly the egalitarian society remains a dream. All human societies from the simplest to the most complex have some form of social inequality. In particular, power and prestige are unequally distributed between individuals and social groups. In many societies there are also marked differences in the distribution of wealth. Power refers to the degree to which individuals or groups can impose their will on others, with or without the consent of those others. Prestige relates to the amount of esteem or honour associated with social positions, qualities of individuals and styles of life. Wealth refers to material possessions defined as valuable in particular societies. It may include land, livestock, buildings, money and many other forms of property owned by individuals or social groups.

It is important at the outset to make a distinction between social inequality and social stratification. The term social inequality simply refers to the existence of socially created inequalities. Social stratification is a particular form of social inequality. It refers to the presence of social groups which are ranked one above the other, usually in terms of the amount of power, prestige and wealth their members possess. Those who belong to a particular group or stratum will have some awareness of belong to a particular group of stratum will have some awareness of common interests and a common identity. They will share a similar life style which to some degree will distinguish them from members of other social strata.

As exemplified by caste, social stratification involves a hierarchy of social groups. Members of a particular stratum have a common identity, like interests and a similar

life style. They enjoy or suffer the unequal distribution of rewards in society as members of different social groups. Social stratification, however, is only one form of social inequality it is possible for social inequality to exist without social strata. For example, some sociologists have argued that it is no longer correct to regard western industrial society, particularly the USA, as being stratified in terms of a class system. They suggest that social classes have been replaced by a continuous hierarchy of unequal positions. Where there were once classes, whose members had a consciousness of kind, a common way of life and shared interests; there is now an unbroken continuum of occupational statuses which command varying degrees of prestige and economic reward. Thus it is suggested that a hierarchy of social groups has been replaced by a hierarchy of individuals. Many sociologists use the terms social inequality and social stratification interchangeably.

Before looking at some of the major issues raised in the study of social stratification, it necessary to examine certain aspects of stratification systems. There is a tendency for members of each stratum develop their own subculture that is certain norms, attitudes and values which are distinctive to them as a social group. When some members of society experience similar circumstances and problems which are not common to all members, a subculture tends to develop. For example, it has often been suggested that distinctive working-class and middle-class subcultures exist in Western industrial societies. Similar circumstances and problems often produce similar responses. Members of the lowest stratum in stratification systems which provide little opportunity for the improvement of status tend to have a fatalistic attitude towards life. This attitude becomes part of their subculture and is transmitted from generation to generation. It sees circumstances as largely unchangeable; it sees luck and fate rather than individual effort as shaping life and therefore tends to encourage acceptance of the situation. Members of a social group who share similar circumstances and a common subculture will be likely to develop a group identity. They tend to have a consciousness of kind, a feeling of kinship with other group members. They will therefore tend to identify with their particular stratum and regard themselves, for example, as middle or working class.

Strata subcultures tend to be particularly distinctive when there is little opportunity to move from one stratum to another. This movement is known as social mobility. Social

mobility can be upward, for example moving from the working to the middle class, or downward. Stratification systems which provide little opportunity for social mobility may be described as 'closed' those with a relatively high rate of social mobility as open'. In closed systems an individual's position is largely ascribed. Often it is fixed at birth and there is little he can do to change his status. Caste provides an example of a closed stratification system. An individual automatically belongs to the caste of his parents and, except in rare instances, spends the rest of his life in that status. By comparison, social class, the system of stratification in capitalist industrial society, provides an example of an open system. An individual's class position is largely achieved. It results from his personal qualities and abilities and the use he makes of them rather than ascribed characteristics such as the status of his parents or the co lour of his skin. By comparison with the caste, the rate of social mobility in class systems is high.

Theories of Stratification

Dr. Lamberty cited the fact that racial, ethnic, and social class disparities exist in morbidity and mortality rates and noted that many causal explanations have been offered to account for these disparities. Among them are: biological pre-disposition, group position in the social structure, or a combination of biological and social factors. Dr. Lamberty reviewed seven propositions that make up the theory of social stratification:

- Ascription to social class, ethnicity, and race is overlapping with resultant additive and multiplicative effects depending on the degree to which an individual occupies specific combinations of these social positions. Gender further complicates the situation.
- A social position such as social class, ethnicity and race carries with it varying degrees of segregation in the spatial, social and psychological environments.
- There are physical, social, and psychological environments that go along with the social position an individual is born into. Being born white or black, or being a working or upper class family entails a set of givens such as who one can marry what neighborhood one can live in, the quality of the home, etc.

- Occupancy of social positions for a sizeable portion of the population is fixed at birth. This greatly magnifies the significance of the environments into which an individual is born and to which he/she may be exposed for an entire lifetime.
- Social positions such as social class, ethnicity and race are ascribed statuses- individuals are born into them.
- The effects of social stratification are shaped practically unimpeded over the life course of individuals.
- In socially stratified societies, individuals develop a hierarchical attribution system that consists of attitudes and beliefs about the self, as well as the person both above and below the social ladder. These stereotypes are quick to be activated and are likely to influence lay as well as professional judgment and decision-making.

Two classic approaches to social stratification provide interesting insights into this phenomenon, structural-functionalism and social-conflict theories. A third approach, dependency theory, has roots in and extends Marxist thought and conflict theory by applying that approach to the world at a global/international level.

Structural-Functionalism

The structural-functional approach to social stratification asks the same question of social stratification that it does of the other components of society: What function or purpose does stratification serve? Underlying this question is the assumption that stratification serves some purpose because it exists in virtually every society (though it is almost non-existent in hunter-gatherer societies). The resulting answer is often that it must exist in society in order to facilitate stability and equilibrium; some level of hierarchical organization must be necessary in order for complex societies to function. Additionally, the structural-functional approach argues that positions higher in the social hierarchy must be of more functional importance to the society, which is why they result in greater rewards.

Social-Conflict Theory and Marxism

The social-conflict approach to stratification sees social hierarchies, like most other elements of society, as embodying inequality. The conflict theory approach argues that individuals at the top of social hierarchies are there at the expense of people in lower positions. Additionally, people higher up in the hierarchy will use their power to strengthen both the hierarchy and their standing in it.

A particularly clear example of the social-conflict perspective is Marx's early analysis of capitalism. Marx argued that positions in the social hierarchy were directly related to an individuals' relationship to the means of production. Individuals in the upper-class are the owners of the means of production or bourgeoisie. Those who use the means of production to produce goods (or services) and own only their labor power, the proletariat, are members of the lower or working classes.

Dependency Theory of Global Stratification

Dependency theory is the body of theories that propound a worldview suggesting the wealthy countries of the world need a peripheral group of poorer countries to remain wealthy.

Wealthy nations are seen as the core countries; poorer nations are seen as the peripheral countries (with some countries falling in between). Core countries extract resources from the periphery countries and eventually return those resources as manufactured goods. This works to maintain the superiority of the core countries by stripping the periphery countries of their natural resources and forcing them to buy manufactured goods at high prices - the proceeds going to the people and corporations of the core countries. Thus, poor nations provide natural resources, cheap labour, a destination for obsolete technology, and markets to the wealthy nations. Without the poorer, peripheral nations, the wealthy, core countries could not have the standard of living they enjoy.

The theory contends that core countries actively, but not necessarily consciously, perpetuate a state of dependency through various policies and initiatives. This state of dependency is multifaceted, involving economics, media control, politics, banking and finance, education, sports, and all aspects of human resource development. Any attempt by the dependent nations to resist the influences of dependency will result in

economic sanctions and/or military invasion and control. While military invasion is somewhat rare, dependency of the periphery countries on the core countries is strongly enforced by the wealthy nations setting the rules of international trade and commerce.

Forms of Stratification

Classifying the various types of stratification systems that have appeared in past and present societies-The first panel of pertains to the "primitive" tribal systems that dominated human society from the very beginning of human evolution until the Neolithic revolution of some 10,000 years ago. Although tribal societies have of course assumed various forms, the total size of the distributable surplus was in all cases quite limited; and this cap on the surplus placed corresponding limits on the overall level of economic inequality. Some observers have treated tribal societies as examples of "Primitive communism," since the means of production (tools) was owned collectively and other types of property were typically distributed evenly among tribal members. Moreover, insofar as positions of power emerged (shamans), these were never inherited but instead were secured by demonstrating superior skills in the relevant tasks. While meritocratic criteria are often seen as prototypically modern, they were in fact present in initial form at quite early stages of societal development, no doubt because the surplus was too small to permit the luxury of less adaptive forms of allocation.

With the emergence of agrarian forms of production, the economic surplus became large enough to support more complex and less meritocratic systems of stratification. The "Asiatic mode," which some commentators regard as a precursor of advanced agrarianism, is characterized by a poorly developed proprietary class and powerful state elite that extracted surplus agricultural production through rents and taxes. This mode provides the conventional example of how a "dictatorship of officialdom" can flourish in the absence of institutionalized private property. Whereas political assets were thus dominant in the Asiatic mode, the ruling class under Western feudalism was, by contrast, very much a propertied one. The distinctive feature of feudalism was that the nobility not only owned large estates or manors but also held legal title to the

labor power of its serfs. If a serf fled to the city, this was considered a form of theft: The serf was stealing that portion of his or her labor power owned by the lord. With this interpretation, the status of serf and slave differ only in degree, and slavery thereby constitutes a limiting case in which workers lose all control over their own labor power.

The historical record makes it clear that agrarian stratification systems were not always based on strictly hereditary forms of social closure. The era of classical feudalism (post twelfth century) was characterized by a rigid stratification of classes, but there was far greater permeability during the period prior to the institutionalization of the manorial system and the associated transformation of the nobility into a legal class. The most extreme example of agrarian closures can of course be found in caste societies. The Indian caste system, for example, is based on (i) a hierarchy of status groupings (castes) that are ranked by ethnic purity, wealth, and access to goods or services, (ii) a corresponding set of "closure rules" that restrict all forms of inter-caste marriage or mobility and thereby make caste membership both hereditary and permanent, a high degree of physical and occupational segregation enforced by elaborate rules and rituals governing inter-caste contact, and a justifying ideology (Hinduism) that induces the population to regard such extreme forms of inequality as legitimate and appropriate. What make this system so distinctive, then, are not merely its well-developed closure rules but also the fundamentally honorific (and non-economic) character of the underlying social hierarchy. The defining feature of the industrial era has been the emergence of egalitarian ideologies and the consequent "delegitimation" of the extreme forms of stratification found in caste, feudal, and slave systems. This can be seen, for example, in the European revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that pitted the egalitarian ideals of the Enlightenment against the privileges of rank and the political power of the nobility. In the end, these struggles eliminated the last residue of feudal privilege, but they also made new types of inequality and Stratification possible.

Under the class system that ultimately emerged, the estates of the feudal era were replaced by purely economic groups ("classes"), and closure rules based on heredity were likewise supplanted by (formally) meritocratic processes. The resulting classes were neither legal entities nor closed status groupings, and the associated class-based

inequalities could therefore be represented and justified as the natural outcome of competition among individuals with differing abilities, motivation, or moral character. The class structure of early industrialism had a clear economic base, so much so that Marx defined classes in terms of their relationship to the means of economic production. The precise contours of the industrial class structure are nonetheless a matter of continuing debate; for example, a simple Marxian model focuses on the cleavage between capitalists and workers, while more elaborate Marxian and neo-Marxian models identify additional intervening or "contradictory" classes (Wright, 1997), and yet other (non-Marxian) approaches represent the class structure as a continuous gradation of income, prestige, or socioeconomic status.

Whatever the relative merits of these models might be, the ideology underlying the socialist revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was of course explicitly Marxist. The intellectual heritage of these revolutions and their legitimating ideologies can again be traced to the Enlightenment, but the rhetoric of equality that emerged in this period was now directed against the economic power of the capitalist class rather than the status and honorific privileges of the nobility. The evidence from Eastern Europe and elsewhere suggests that these egalitarian ideals were only partially realized. In the immediate post-revolutionary period, factories and farms were indeed collectivized or socialized, and various fiscal and economic reforms were instituted for the express purpose of reducing income inequality and wage differentials among manual and non-manual workers. Although these egalitarian policies were subsequently weakened through the reform efforts of Stalin and others, inequality on the scale of pre-revolutionary society was never reestablished among rank-and-file workers (Lenski 2001).

There nonetheless remained substantial inequalities in power and authority; most notably, the socialization of production did not have the intended effect of empowering workers, as the capitalist classes was replaced by a "new class" of party officials and managers who continued to control the means of production and to allocate the resulting social surplus. This class has been variously identified with intellectuals or intelligentsia, bureaucrats or managers, and party officials or appointees (Gouldner 1979). Regardless of the formulation adopted, the presumption is that the working class ultimately lost out in contemporary socialist revolutions, just

as it did in the so-called bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Whereas the means of production were socialized in the revolutions of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the capitalist class remained intact throughout the process of industrialization in the West, even as ownership and control separated and a distinct managerial class emerged (Dahrendorf 1959). The capitalist class may nonetheless be weakened by the structural changes of post- industrialism, with the most important of these being the rise of a service economy and the consequent emergence of technical expertise, educational degrees, and training certificates as new forms of property. By this formulation, a dominant class of cultural elites may be emerging in the West, much as the transition to state socialism (allegedly) generated a new class of intellectuals in the East. This is not to suggest that all theorists of advanced industrialism posit a grand divide between the cultural elite and an undifferentiated working mass. In fact, some commentators (Dahrendorf 1959) have argued that skill-based cleavages are crystallizing throughout the occupational structure, with the result being a finely differentiated class system made up of discrete occupations (Grusky and Sorensen 1998) or a continuous gradation of socioeconomic status (Hauser and Warren 1997).

Davis-Moore mentioned a rough tripartite classification of types of rewards occurring in stratified positions. Tumin says these may be unequally employed, that one society may emphasize one type more than another. This is true; we said nothing to the contrary. Tumin goes on to say that societies give approval to behavior that conforms to norms. Davis has given a name to it-esteem, the kind of approval that comes with the faithful fulfillment of the duties of a position. The approval that comes with having a position, i.e., approval attached to the position and not to the degree of faithfulness in performing its duties, is called prestige. Whatever the words used, the distinction is important, but Tumin has confused the two. A social system, though it certainly utilizes esteem, is not entirely built on it, because there must be motivation not only to conform to the requirements of positions held but also to strive to get into positions. Esteem alone tends to produce a static society, prestige a mobile one.

Tumin's statement that the position of the parent vis-a-vis the child is not part of the stratified system is true, but it agrees perfectly with Davis' distinction between stratified and non-stratified statuses, already mentioned as an essential part of the theory overlooked by Tumin.

Stratification in Socialist Societies

Socialist or communist societies are societies in which the forces of production are communally owned. Marx believed that public ownership of the forces of production is the first and fundamental step towards the creation of an egalitarian society. This would abolish at a stroke the antagonistic class of capitalist society. Classes, defined in terms of the relationship of social groups to the forces of production, would disappear. All members of society would now share the same relationship-that of ownership-to the forces of production. Social inequality would not, however, disappear overnight. There would be a period of transition during which the structures of inequality produced by capitalism would be dismantled. Marx was rather vague about the exact nature of the communist utopia which should eventually emerge from the abolition of private property. He believed that the state would eventually 'wither away' and that the consumption of goods and services would be based on the principle of 'to each according to his needs'. Whether he envisaged a disappearance of all forms of social inequality, such as prestige and power differentials, is not entirely clear. One thing that is clear, though, is that the reality of contemporary communism is a long way from Marx's dreams.

Eastern European communism has not resulted in the abolition of social stratification. Identifiable strata, which can be distinguished in terms of differential economic rewards, occupational prestige and power, are present in all socialist states. Frank Parkin identifies the following strata in East European communist societies.

1. White-collar intelligentsia(professional, managerial and administrative positions)
2. Skilled manual positions.
3. Lower or unqualified white-collar positions.

4. Unskilled manual positions.

Although income inequalities are not as great as in capitalist societies, they are still significant. For example, the average monthly earnings in 1966 in the former USSR for engineering and technical workers were 150 rubles; for technically unqualified manual workers, 104 rubles; and for routine white-collar workers, 88 rubles. Mervyn Matthews has estimated that in the early 1970s, the basic earnings of the small occupational elite in Russia (about one employed person in 500) were roughly four times the average wage and in some cases considerably higher. If various 'extras' or fringe benefits are included, they add at least 50 to 100% to top incomes. Studies of occupational prestige in communist societies produce generally similar results to those from capitalist societies. Top administrators, managers and professionals are accorded the highest prestige with unskilled manual workers forming the base of the prestige hierarchy. Frank Parkin argues that, as in the west, there is a fairly close correspondence between inequalities of occupational reward, hierarchies of occupational prestige and levels of skill and expertise.

The polish sociologist Wlodzimierz Wesolowski presents the following analysis of social inequality in communist societies. Although social stratification exists, the disappearance of classes in the Marxian sense has removed the basic source of conflict. No longer does a small minority exploit the mass of the population. There are no serious conflicts of interest between the various strata since the forces of production are communally owned and everybody is working for the benefit of society as a whole. Although economic inequalities remain, they are determined (and justified) by the principle, 'to each according to his work'. Wesolowski claims that 'the share of the individual in the division of the social product is determined by the quality and quantity of his work.... Wages are a function of the quality of work, that is, they are a function of the level of skill and education necessary for carrying out a given job'. While admitting the difficulty of measuring such factors, Wesolowski argues that they form the basis on which governments fix wage differentials. This argument is similar to the views of Western functionalists and is open to many of the same criticisms.

Wesolowski explains power differentials in communist society in the following way. Social life, particularly in large, complex societies, would be impossible without 'positions of command and subordination'. This inevitably involves power differentials, 'for as soon as the positions of authority are filled, those who occupy the positions have the right (and duty) to give orders, while the others have the duty to obey them'. Wesolowski implies that in communist societies, those in positions of authority use their power for the benefit of society as a whole. Again his arguments are similar to those applied by western functionalists to the analysis of capitalist society.

A very different picture is presented by the Yugoslavian writer, Milo van Djilas. He argues that those in positions of authority in communist societies use power to further their own interests. He claims that the bourgeoisie of the west have been replaced by a new ruling class in the East. This 'new class' is made up of 'political bureaucrats', many of whom are high ranking officials of the communist party. Although in legal terms, the forces of production are communally owned, Djilas argues that in practice they are controlled by the new class for its own benefit. Political bureaucrats direct and control the economy and monopolize decisions about the distribution of income and wealth, in practice, the result is, 'He who has power grabs privileges and indirectly grabs property'. Wide income differentials separate the new class from the rest of society. Its members enjoy a range of privileges which include high quality housing at modest rents, the use of cars which are in short supply, haute cuisine food in exclusive restaurants at subsidized rates, the right to purchase scarce goods in special shops, excellent holiday accommodation in state-run resorts, special medical facilities, access to the best schools for their children and a variety of cash payments over and above their basic salaries. In this way Djilas claims that members of the new class 'handle material goods on behalf of their own interests'.

Djilas sees the new class as more exploitive than the bourgeoisie. Its power is even greater because it is unchecked by political parties. Djilas claims that in single party state political bureaucrats monopolize power. In explaining the source of their power, Djilas maintains the Marxian emphasis on the forces of production. He argues that the new class owes its power to the fact it controls the forces of production. Other has reversed this argument claiming that in communist societies economic power derives

from political power. Thus T. B. Botomore argues that the new class 'controls the means of production because it has political power.

In certain respects, the overall picture of stratification in communist societies in similar to that of the West. Stratification systems in all industrial societies, whether capitalist or communist, are becoming increasingly similar. This view, sometimes known as 'convergence theory', argues that modern industrial economies will necessarily produce similar systems of social stratification. In particular, modern industry requires particular types of workers. In the words of Clark Kerr, one of the main proponents of convergence theory, 'the same technology calls for the same occupational structure around the world-in steel, in textiles, in air transport'. Kerr assumes that technical skills and educational qualifications will be rewarded in proportion to their value to industry. Since the demands of industry are essentially the same in both East and West, the range of occupations and occupational rewards will become increasingly similar. As a result the stratification systems of capitalist and communist societies will converge.

So far, communism has failed to live up to the expectations of many of its supporters. It may be that Eastern European societies are still in the process of transition and are moving towards an egalitarian goal. There is some evidence of a decline in income inequality within the mass of the population during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, there is little indication of a reduction in the privileges of the elite. From his study of elite life styles in the former USSR. Merlyn Matthews concludes that not only is privilege accepted at the top, but it is 'actively promoted'. It is built into administrative practices and so institutionalized. While communal ownership of the forces of production may be essential for the creation of an egalitarian society, other changes are clearly necessary.

CHAPTER 3

Ethnic Groups in Kazakhstan

Among the fifteen national republics that constituted the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was the most "multiethnic" republic in that it contained a large number of Slavs and numerous other nationalities and did not bear a distinct ethnic face. It was hailed as a "planet of a hundred nationalities" and a "laboratory of peoples' friendship" during the post-War II period. It was the only Soviet national republic in which the titular ethnic group (the Kazakhs) did not constitute a majority upon gaining independence in 1991. The Slavs, along with ethnic Germans, formed a majority from the early 1950s until 1989, when the last Soviet era census was held (Aleksander, 1998: 5).

It was only in 1989 that the Kazakhs emerged as the largest ethnic group (Table 3.1), forming 39.7 percent of the population and thus acquiring an edge over Russians who then formed 37.8 percent. Since independence in 1991, the share of Kazakh in the population has continued to increase as a result of emigration of non-Kazakhs, mainly Slavs and Germans, and higher birth rates among Kazakhs (Table3.2). The first post-independence census of 1999 confirmed that Kazakhs constituted a majority with 53.4 percent, whereas the share of Russian dropped from 37.8 percent in 1989 to 29.9 percent. Kazakh ruling elites and nationalists who had decried the reduction of Kazakhs as a minority in their "own" historical homeland over the past 60 years of Soviet rule had most apprehensively awaited the official recognitation of Kazakhs as the majority.

Table 3.1: Ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's population in 1989

Ethnic group	Thousands	Percentage of population
Kazakhs	6,534.6	39.7
Russians	6,227.5	37.8
Germans	857.5	5.8
Ukrainians	896.2	5.4
Uzbeks	332.0	2.0
Tatars	328.0	2.0
Uighurs	185.3	1.1
Belorussians	182.6	1.1
Koreans	103.2	0.6
Azerbaidzhanians	90.1	0.5

Source: The 1989 population census.

Table 3.2: Ethnic composition in Kazakhstan, Census Data 1959-1999

Nationality	1959(%)	1970 (%)	1979 (%)	1989 (%)	1999 (%)
Kazakh	30.0	32.6	36.0	39.7	53.4
Russian	42.7	42.4	40.8	37.8	29.9
Ukrainian	8.2	7.2	6.1	5.4	3.7
Belorussian	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.1	0.8
German	7.1	6.6	6.1	5.8	2.4
Tatar	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.7
Uzbek	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.5
Uighur	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.4
Korean	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
Combined* Turkic/Muslim	39.7	42.7	45.5	50.2	61.0
Combined* Slavic/European	60.3	57.3	54.5	49.8	39.0

*figures are estimates and include other smaller ethnic groups.

Source: Post-Soviet Geography.

During the first post-independence decade, Kazakhstan has also become more Turkic or Muslim in its composition, which has diluted its Slavic or "European" ethnic profile. The major Turkic groups (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Uighurs, Karakalpaks, and Tatars as the main groups) together form about 61 percent of the population, up from 48 percent in 1989, and continue to have a higher birth rate (Rogers Brubaker, 1996: 411-412)

President Nursultan Nazarbaev has hailed Kazakhstan as a Turkophone state (Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 2000). However, he has also continued to project Kazakhstan as "Eurasian" state, which is home to Slavic and "European" ethnic groups as well. At the same time, the growing number of Kazakhs in the country affirms the vision of Kazakhstan as a homeland of Kazakhs. Furthermore, the ongoing emigration of Slavs and

Germans and the rapidly growing share of Kazakhs have strengthened the nationalizing trends, culminating in a higher representation of Kazakhs in state bureaucracy, government and virtually all state-controlled sectors.

Ethnic Groups in Soviet period

Most ethnic or cultural communities in Central Asia did not see or imagine themselves as members of a distinct nation or state, or as belonging to a specific ethno-linguistic group before the advent of the Soviet rule. The term "nationality"—the Russian and Soviet equivalent for "ethnicity" – was a fluid and shifting category in the Tsarist era on the eve of 1917. The national delimitation of Central Asia, executed by the Bolsheviks during 1924-25, forged a sense of territorial nationhood by identifying distinct nationalities from a plethora of ethnic, sub-ethnic, clan, and religious groupings. The Kirgiz (Kazakh) Autonomous SSR, created within the RSFSR in 1920, was enlarged by including the mainly Kazakh-inhabited Syr Darya and Semirech'e regions in the south, which had earlier been placed under the administration of the Turkestan Autonomous Republic. However, the Cossack-dominated region of Orenburg, the capital of the Kirgiz (Kazakh) Autonomous SSR since 1920, containing sizeable Kazakh populations, was transferred to the RSFSR (Anatoly M. Khazanov, 1991).

As the Bolsheviks sought to build a national consciousness among the agrarian and nomadic groups of Central Asia, they sought to elevate the 'tribal' or *zhuz*-based consciousness into a sense of Kazakh nationality. The forging of a sense of Kazakh identity, in which clan and region-based differences were co-opted, has been a significant outcome of the nation-building policies promoted under the Soviet state.

The constituent Soviet republics were named after a "titular" or "indigenous" nationality. At the same time, they were institutionalized as bi-ethnic and bilingual units, in which Russians had a strategic role. The category 'nationality', referring to one's ethno-national affiliation, was stamped on the passport and recorded on all identity or employment documents. Nationality referred to a biologically-inherited ethnic affiliation and not territorial belonging and was distinct from citizenship.

The Soviet socialist state promoted the ideology of "internationalism," which implied a rough parity and a proportional representation of other nationalities in the party and administrative infrastructure of the republic, on a symbolic plane. However, mobility within "their" national unit was a prerogative of the titular nationality, often regulated by the strategic presence of members of Slavic nationalities, largely Russians, sent from the "European" regions of the Soviet Union. These representatives of the centre wielded substantive control, often occupying the positions of Second Secretary of the Communist Party in the republics, or serving as deputies to the titular figureheads. On the whole, while titular representatives held symbolic leadership positions, the de facto authority was wielded by the Slavic emissaries of the centre who often occupied the less visible position of the deputy or second-in-command.

An outcome of the "international" or multiethnic profile of Kazakhstan was the fact that the titular Kazakhs did not necessarily occupy visible leadership positions. Dinmukhamed Kunaev was the only Kazakh to hold the position of secretary of Kazakh communist party for a prolonged period. His two Kazakh predecessors had held office for no more than a year. The removal of Kunaev in December 1986 by the Soviet communist party chief Mikhail Gorbachev on generalized charges of 'corruption' and 'clanism', and the appointment of Gennadi Kolbin, an ethnic Russian who was then serving in Georgia, led to waves of protests and riots in the capital Almaty (known as Alma-Ata then). This was the first ever incidence of public insolence of Moscow in a Central Asian republic. By official account 3 people died though unofficial counts range from 50 to 500. The protests at that time were routinely dismissed as acts of "hooliganism" committed by drunken youth. No independent inquiry of the incident has been published to date, largely because the current president Nursultan Nazarbaev, who succeeded Kolbin as the head of Kazakh communist party in 1989, was a leading contender for the position and is seen as having accepted to Kunaev's immediate removal. Furthermore, the Nazarbaev leadership remains deeply concerned that a public discussion of the event could potentially open up the Pandorra's box and disrupt the existing stability and calm between ethnic communities. The riots cannot be simply viewed as clashes between ethnic groups or between Moscow and a peripheral republic. The demonstrators were protesting against what they saw was a dismantling of an affirmative action structure favouring Kazakhs that had been erected during the Kunaev period.

Rogers Brubaker has argued that virtually all post Soviet states are nationalizing states, institutionally-geared to function as the states of and for the particular ethno-cultural nations, based on claims of an exclusive ownership of their land, but incomplete and insufficiently "national" in a substantive sense. Its leaders and members see their nations not as vibrant, prosperous, and cohesive ethno-cultural communities, capable of integrating and assimilating their various national minorities, but as threatened cultures and languages, which had been marginalized in their own historical homelands by the demographic and economic might of the dominant nations. The belated acquisition of sovereign statehood offers them a legal framework and an organizational tool for executing a "remedial political action" (Brubaker, 1996: 410) and to erect safe havens for their indigenous culture and language and redress their historical injustice.

Demography and Kazakh language have served as two salient tools of promoting nationalization and attaining Kazakh ethno-national hegemony in the new state since independence in 1991. Consistent with the Soviet nationalities theory, Kazakhs, as the titular or eponymous nationality, see themselves as the sole indigenous nation of the sovereign republic.

Kazakh Ethnic Group

The term Kazakh means a nomad. Kazakhs as nomads distinguished themselves from other settled Muslim communities, mainly Uzbeks, Tatars and Uighurs. Kazakhs identified themselves primarily by genealogy, i.e., membership of a particular clan (ru in Kazakh, rod in Russian). Genealogy or clan membership always indicated the regional affiliation or identity of the Kazakh in question. Subsequently, the three major Kazakh hordes (*zhuz*) each composed of a number of clans claiming common ancestry and inhabiting a shared territory came to be organized along territorial basis. The Elder horde (ulu *zhuz*) roughly inhabited the southern territories; the Middle horde (orta *zhuz*) occupied the territory of the central steppe region and northern and eastern parts, whereas the Younger horde (kishi *zhuz*) occupied the western regions between the Aral and Caspian seas. The leaders of these three hordes had sought protection from Russia against attacks by other nomadic tribes from time to time (Anatoly M. Khazanov, 1995: 252-254).

According to the Russian imperial census of 1897, Kazakhs numbered 3.39 million and formed 79.8 percent of the total population in the pre-Soviet borders (Table 3.3). The first Soviet census of 1926 recorded Kazakhs as constituting 57.1 percent of the population in their newly-constituted national republic whereas the Slavic groups formed 31 percent of the population. Neither the 1897 or 1926 census was complete, given the lack of transport network and the difficulties in offering a reliable count of a mobile population.

Table 3.3: The Kazakh population in Kazakhstan

Year	Thousands	Percentage of total population
1830	1,300	96.4
1850	1,502	91.1
1860	1,644	?
1870	2,417	?
1897	3,000	79.8
1926	3,713	57.1
1939	2,640	38.2
1959	2,755	30.0
1970	4.234	32.6
1979	5,289	36.0
1989	6,531	39.7
1992	7,297	43.2
1999	7,985	53.4

Sources: Bekmakhanovs, 1989 (Post-Soviet Geography)

In 1926 only about a fourth of the Kazakhs led a sedentary mode of life, the remaining were dependent on the livestock economy and seasonal agricultural farming. As part of the collectivization policies implemented by the Soviet state in the late 1920s, the Stalinist regime believed that an immediate settlement of the nomads was the only means of intensifying agricultural production. The forced settlement of Kazakhs led to the perishing of almost 90 percent of all cattle the only source of livelihood for the nomads. The ensuing famine resulted in a catastrophic human loss. Estimates of loss of Kazakh lives vary from 25 to 40 percent and most Kazakh historians and demographers refer to this period as "genocide" of the Kazakhs (Bhavana Dave, 1996: 57-59).

The depopulated lands of Kazakhstan soon became the 'dumping ground' for deportation of various 'enemy' nationalities as well as for convicts sentenced to hard labor. In 1937, a special decree issued by Stalin led to the deportation of 95,241 ethnic Koreans to Kazakhstan from the Far Eastern regions of the RSFSR bordering with Korea. They were moved to prevent a possible alliance with the Japanese during the Second World War. Similar fears of a possible collaboration between the Soviet Germans and the Nazis propelled Stalin to abolish the Volga German autonomous republic in 1941 and deport most Germans from the Volga region and other parts of the European regions of the USSR to Siberia and Central Asia. During the period 1941-42, 444,000 Volga Germans had been deported to Kazakhstan. An estimated 478, 479 Chechens were moved out of their homes in 1944 and most of these were brought to Kazakhstan as the Stalin suspected their loyalty to the Soviet Union during the War. By 1949 Kazakhstan had become home to at least 820,165 deportees, which included 444,000 Germans, 302,526 Chechens and Ingush, 33,088 Karachai, 28,130 Poles, 28,497 Meskhetian Turks, 17,512 Balkar and numerous smaller nationalities (Bess Brown, 1990: 19-20).

The 1959 census unveiled a totally transformed ethnic profile of the Republic with the Kazakh share reduced to a mere 29 percent of the population and the Slavic and European nationalities together forming nearly 60 percent of the total. The Slavic influx into Kazakhstan had slowed considerably by 1970 with the economic downturn in Central Asia. For the period 1966-1979 the number of arrivals to Kazakhstan from other republics decreased by sixty percent, and Kazakhstan encountered the highest loss as a result of inter-regional migration between 1970 and 1980 (Alekseenko, 1998: 105). Altogether, between 1970 and 1989, the number of the Slavs and Germans in Kazakhstan decreased by 940,000.

Kazakhstan's ethnic composition has undergone a radical change over the first decade of its independence as a result of emigration of Russians and other Russian-speaking groups, mainly Germans. Kazakhstan's ethnic German population dropped sharply, from 946,900 people in 1989 to 353,400 in 1999. Overall, nearly 2 million Russian-speakers have left Kazakhstan over the last decade.

According to 1999 census data, Kazakhstan's population decreased by 7.7% from the 1989 levels (Table 3.4). All the northern *oblasts* bordering Russia, dominated by Slavic

groups, experienced negative population growth. Akmola, North Kazakhstan, and Karaganda lost almost a fifth of their population, with a slightly smaller drop in Kostanai, Pavlodar, and East Kazakhstan. The four Kazakh dominated *oblast*s of South Kazakhstan, Kyzyl orda, Almaty and West Kazakhstan as well as the new capital Astana and former capital Almaty gained in numbers during the same period. Uighurs and Uzbeks are the two major groups that experienced a growth of 15 and 12 percent respectively.

The lowering of the birth rate among Kazakhs, relative to other ethnic groups in Central Asia, has also slowed the growth of Kazakhs. The birth rate among Kazakhs, at 1.6 percent in 1999, is lowest among the major Central Asian ethnic groups. The slowdown in birth rate is largely a consequence of higher levels of education and urbanization among Kazakhs who were incorporated earlier in the Soviet-led modernization relative to other Central Asians.

Table 3.4: Population of Kazakhstan, 1999 census data

Ethnic groups	1999	1989	1999 as percentage of 1989	Ethnic group as a percentage of total population in 1999
Total population	14,953,126	16,464,464	90.82	100.0
Kazakhs	7,985,039	6,534,616	122.19	53.40
Russians	4,479,618	6,227, 549	71.93	29.95
Ukrainians	547,052	896,240	61.03	3.65
Uzbeks	370,663	332,017	111.63	2.47
Germans	353,441	957,518	36.91	2.36
Tatars	248,952	327,982	75.90	1.66
Uighurs	210,339	185,301	113.51	1.40
Belarusans	111,926	182,601	61.29	0.74
Koreans	99,657	103,315	96.45	0.66

Source: Post-Soviet Geography

Clan and Zhuz

It is generally known that clan-based society is a functional consequence of the exchange of information and property among nomadic Kazakhs. The extreme living conditions in the arid zone the living in realistically possible only on the basis of the practices of several generations of nomads, over several centuries, given the ecological environment and the highest degree of professional skill required to be a nomad and a herdsman.

Therefore, survival in the harsh conditions of the arid zone was possible only through specialized knowledge gathered and transmitted to an individual by his ancestors, because the competition among nomads for pasture and water supplies was so harsh that this experience of adaptation and the knowledge of natural resources could not become universal. Consequently, information circulated according to patriarchal channels and in no other way. Property was also circulated in this manner, passed on from generation to generation by patriarchal lineage. No one could receive, obtain, or maintain property (mainly livestock) in any other way. Hence, the genealogical system of origin and genealogical organization predominated in the overall system of the social aggregation of nomadic communities.

Kazakh nomadic society was broken down into three *zhuz:* Elder, Middle, and Younger; these are names that ought to be understood and regarded solely in the context of genealogical origin, that is, seniority. Under no circumstances should they be considered in the sense of "Big" or "Great" (of the Elder *zhuz*) or Small of the (Younger *zhuz*) as was frequently done in Russian pre-revolutionary and Western historiography. Practically all of the genealogical legends of Kazakhs interpret their origins exclusively in the context of genealogy. There is the famous but less well-grounded view of tri-axial organization of Kazakh society at the heart of the *zhuz:* a left flank, a center and a right flank (Iu. A. Zuev, 1981: 63-65). The origin of the Kazakh *zhuz* was geographically conditioned: that is, by the natural division of Kazakhstan into three parts: Semirechie, Western Kazakhstan (from Mugodzhar), and Eastern Kazakhstan from (from the southern Ural hills).

These characteristics naturally contributed to the specific character of cultural and historical processes in the respective zones. The comprehension of these characteristics of historical and ethno-cultural development in the form of genealogical relationship led to a public consciousness of the *zhuz* organization. The first mention of *zhuz* in sources is found at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Traditionally, the Elder *zhuz* occupied the territory of southeastern Kazakhstan (Semirechie). The territory of the Elder *zhuz* falls within the pre-revolutionary administrative borders encompassing Kopal, Dzharkent, and Vernyi uezds of Semirechie *oblast* and Syr-Daria *oblast.* These fall within the contemporary borders of Taldy- Kurgan, Almaty, Dzhambul, and Chimkent *oblasts.*

The approximate population of the Kazakhs of the Elder *zhuz* at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was seven hundred thousand persons. As of the 1989 census, within Kazakhstan's contemporary borders the population of Kazakhs of the Elder *zhuz* was no more than two million; including Kazakhs in China and Central Asia, the total is no more than two and half million. Such a significant increase in population of Elder *zhuz* Kazakhs is related to their having suffered least of all from the famine of 1931-32. Zhalairs, numbering approximately one hundred to one hundred and ten thousand before the revolution, were considered the oldest group among Kazakhs of the Elder *zhuz.* Kazakh shezhere says: A boy from the Zhalair clan sits higher than an old man from any other clan. And this is so in the society of Kazakhs. The Elder *zhuz,* which bears the general name Uisun, comprised eleven groups in all: Dulat (250,000); Suan (30,000), Alban (100,000), the Kanly and Shanyshkly groups (50,000), Sary-Uisun (10,000), Shaprashty (50-60,000), Srgeli (40,000), and the Ysty (40-45,000).

Kazakhs of the Middle *zhuz* traditionally occupied the territory of central, northern, and eastern Kazakhstan, and they formed a belt across the middle of the Syr-Daria, wedged between southern Kazakhstan and Middle Asia. Nomad camps could be found throughout this area, from the west to the east – from Mugodzhar and the watershed Irgiz – Turgai – Tobol to the Western Altai, Tarbagatai, and partly Dzhungar Alatau. Up until the revolution, the Middle *zhuz* within the administrative and territorial boundaries of the Russian empire occupied the following areas: Right now, the above areas are contained within the following *oblasts*: Eastern Kazakhstan,

Northern Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, Karaganda, Akmola, Kustanai, and portions of Almaty, Southern Kazakhstan, and Kzyl-Orda. At the turn of the nineteen and twentieth centuries, the total number of Kazakhs of the Middle *zhuz* was approximately 1.2 to 1.3 million. At present (as of the 1989 census), the number of Kazakhs of the Middle *zhuz* can be put at approximately 3 million. Before the revolution, the largest tribal grouping among Kazakhs was the Argyn: about 500,000. They were followed by the Naimans, more than 400,000; the Kypchak, 140-150,00; the Kerei, 100-110,000; the Uak, 55-60,000; the Tarakt, 10,000; and the Konrad, 40-45,000 in Kazakhstan, and more than 100,000 in Middle Asia.

Traditionally, the Younger *zhuz* occupied the territory of western Kazakhstan from Mugodzhar and the Irgiz-Tobol-Turgai watershed, up to the eastern extreme of the Caspian Sea and from the lower reaches of the Amu Daria and the Syr Daria rivers, to Ural and Tobol. It encompasses the northern part of the Ustiurt plateau and Mangyshlak, the eastern part of the Caspian plain and heights, and the Greater [Obshchii] Syrt, Emben and western portion of the Turgai plateau, as well as the northern part of the Aral and Turan plain. In the administrative borders of pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan, this territory encompasses the following areas: Ural, Guryev, Lbishchensk, and Temir uezds (Ural *oblast*); Irgiz and Aktiubinsk uezds (Turgai *oblast*), Mangyshlak uezd (Caspian *oblast*); Perov and Kazalinsk uezds (Syr Daria *oblast* and the Interior Orda of Astrakhan guberniia). In contemporary terms, these are the *oblast*s of Western Kazakhstan, Guryev, Mangyshlak, and portions of Kzyl-Orda *oblast*.

At the turn of the nineteen and twentieth centuries, the total number of Kazakhs of the Younger *zhuz* numbered some 1.1 million people. At present (as of the 1989 census), this number is no greater than 1.5 million. This is indicative of huge losses to the Younger *zhuz* due to the famine of the 1930s. The general term for Kazakhs of the Younger *zhuz* is Alshyn. They were subdivided into large tribal groupings: Alimuly, Baiuly, and Zhetyru.

This is how Kazakh society was traditionally divided into three *zhuz*: Elder, Middle, and Younger. This division was based on the principle of genealogical seniority: elder, middle, and youngest brothers. In accordance with this rather complex and

multifaceted system, every *zhuz* (in Kazakh, *zhuz* means hundred) was divided into ancestral groups, which were in turn divided into still smaller clan groupings. In the end, such clan differentiation extended to every specific individual from generation to generation. According to customary law, every Kazakh should know his ancestors right down to the fortieth generation. On the basis of this or another level of genealogical patrimony, exogenous norms were established, norms for making property claims, norms for levirate [a marriage when a widow marries deceased husband's brother], etc.

NON –KAZAKH ETHNIC GROUPS

Russians and other Slavs

Although Russians formed an absolute majority in the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan between 1950s and 1990s, they do not constitute a homogeneous ethnic group. The predominant identification among Russians in Kazakhstan was with the Soviet Union, rather than Russia in its present territorial framework. Russian nationality was never consciously homogenized or consolidated by the Soviet state in a manner that the various non-Russian nationalities were. In many ways, the category 'Russian' remains, conscious of its historical role as a state-forming nation as well as Kulturtrager in the 'backward' Asian regions.

The cultural, linguistic and "civilizational" gap between the two groups, the deeply-ingrained image among Russians of themselves being the Kulturtrager act as psychological barriers to integration of Russians in the Kazakhstan state. On the one hand Russians decry their loss of status and on the other Russians are also at unease with their reduction into a minority and underprivileged status which is discontinuous from their historical status. This cultural and ideological resistance to referring to Russians or Slavic groups as "minorities" is common among Kazakhs as well. References to Russians as 'diaspora', 'settlers', or as 'guests' in state-sponsored press and academic circles denotes attempts at affirming their "non-indigenous" status as well as weakening their territorial claims in Kazakhstan. Overall, the terminology and concepts used to characterize ethnic

relations are very much rooted in Soviet nationalities theory (John Mcgarry, 1998: 13-15).

In the early 1990s, the Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote a polemical article calling for the "restructuring" of Russian's present borders by reclaiming the numerous Russian-dominated areas along its borders. He especially singled out the Russian-dominated regions in northern and eastern Kazakhstan, which he saw as ceded to Kazakhstan in the 1920s as a result of Bolshevik 'affirmative action policies'. In his reasoning—which also reflects a widely-shared Russian view—the nomads had no territorial attachment. Although Solzhenitsyn's proposals for a restructuring of Russian state have fuelled Russian nationalist sentiments, they have not had any backing from the Russian government. Contrary to widely-held expectations, the Russian state has lacked the will, resources or a plan to intervene or to aid the Russian diaspora across its borders.

Russians in Kazakhstan vary in terms of the degree of rootedness in the region as well as regional markers. Russians in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan tend to identify themselves more closely with Russians in the Far Eastern regions in Siberia (the Altai Krai, Tomsk for example), rather than the 'mainland' Russians. Kazakhstani Russian historian Irina Erofeeva has pointed at the strong regional and local attachments among Russians in East Kazakhstan, which often override their sense of belongingness to Kazakhstan or Russia. Russians in southern Kazakhstan on the whole are more acculturated into Kazakh culture and have a familiarity with Kazakh language.

Overall, 'Russian' is a composite, multi-layered identity and a simplifier for the profound ethnic mix in Kazakhstan, especially the virgin land regions, where Soviet-style internationalism flourished. A Russian saying "my mother is Tatar, Father a Greek, and I am a Russian" rings true for a large number of Russians in Kazakhstan. A high incidence of mixed ethnic marriages offers testimony to this internationalism, although these marriages were by and large among people of Slavic and 'European' nationalities rather than between Slavs/Europeans and Kazakhs. According to Soviet laws (Kazakhstan has retained this feature), a child of mixed parentage can choose his/her nationality at the age of 16. Children of mixed parentage, in which one of the parents was a Russian, tended to opt for Russian nationality. However, in cases involving a marriage between a Kazakh

and a Russian (or another ethnic group), the general tendency was to opt for the titular nationality.

Altogether, about one to 1.4 million Russians have left Kazakhstan between 1989-1999. 'Exit' has been the dominant response by culturally and politically discontented Russians who perceive the nationalizing course as irreversible and see little future for their children in the ethnically reconfigured landscapes of Caucasus and Central Asia. A progressive identity shift among the Russian diaspora communities in Kazakhstan has reduced the potential for separatism.

Ukrainians

The Ukrainian population in Kazakhstan has also declined from 5.4 in 1989 to 3.7 percent in 1999. A vast majority of Ukrainians of Kazakhstan are linguistically and culturally Russified. Efforts to promote knowledge of Ukrainian language have been undertaken only after 1991 though success with limited.

The Ukrainian Cultural Centers in Almaty, Astana and a few other *oblasts* have actively sought to promote Ukrainian language. These centers are mainly organized by the activists of Western Ukrainian extraction who came to Kazakhstan after the Second World War and do not have intimate ties with the historical Ukrainian diaspora in Kazakhstan dating to late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The independence of Ukraine and the adoption of Ukrainian as the sole state language have injected a certain degree of ethnic differentiation from Russians and desire to learn Ukrainian, although the Ukrainian state has little financial means to help its diaspora and sustain the national-cultural centre.

The Kazakh state has encouraged a separation between Russians and Ukrainians (and other Slavs) by defining the latter as minorities and encouraging the formation of official 'national-cultural centers' to safeguard their cultural and linguistic claims. The Ukrainian national cultural centre broke away from the Slavic movement *Lad* in the early 1990s. The personal background of the activists of the Ukrainian Centre and the patronage-based ethnic segregationist policy of Kazakhstani state may have facilitated the exit of the Ukrainian cultural centre from the Slavic movement *Lad* in the early 1990s.

Some 20 to 30% of the population in North Kazakhstan, Akmola, Pavlodar, and Kokshetau *oblasts* belongs to nationalities other than Russians or Kazakhs. A vast majority of these non-titular, non-Russian people are linguistically assimilated into Russian culture and no significant cultural differences exist between them and 'passport' Russians. Marriages involving a Kazakh and a 'European' ethnic group are relatively rare (though much higher than other Central Asian nationalities). Over a third of all Russian-speakers, who include 'passport' Russians as well as Slavs, Germans, Koreans, Tatars and numerous small groups still identify the former Soviet state.

Germans

In 1959, Germans formed 7.1 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan, numbering almost a million. Their share was reduced to 5.8 percent in 1989 and 2.4 percent in 1999 mainly due to emigration to Germany. Presently, there are about 300,000 Germans in Kazakhstan though this number is likely to drop further.

A vast majority of Germans living in Kazakhstan were deported from the Volga German Autonomous republic in 1942 after the Nazi forces invaded the Soviet Union. Stalin feared a possible collaboration between the Nazis and Soviet Germans and abrogated the autonomy of the Volga German republic and order that they be deported to the landlocked regions of Central Asia. Almost half a million Germans are estimated to have arrived in Kazakhstan during the World War II. A majority of these were settled in Akmola, Kostanai and North Kazakhstan *oblasts*.

The German community has been fairly well integrated into Kazakhstan's economy and social structure. This is partly due to the fact that Germans did not have any other territorial homeland within the Soviet Union. The upsurge in emigration to Germany since late 1989s is mainly a result of Germany's policy of extending citizenship to a person of German descent and the prospects of economic amelioration upon obtaining German citizenship. However, a vast majority of Kazakhstan's Germans are primarily a Russian-speaking group though the older generation retains a proficiency in German. In recent years, Germany has introduced more rigorous conditions for granting German citizenship and has offered significant financial help to enable the shrinking German community to remain within Kazakhstan (Markus Wolf and Alexander Frank, 1993:153-155).

Koreans

Koreans constitute a small (129,000) but highly visible and well-knit ethnic community in Kazakhstan. In 1937, a special decree issued by Stalin led to the deportation of 95,241 ethnic Koreans to Kazakhstan from the Far Eastern regions of the RSFSR bordering with Korea. Koreans have settled largely in southern Kazakhstan. The Taldy Korgan *oblast* in the south as well as the city of Almaty has a sizeable Korean population.

Koreans are a Russified group. Hardly any Koreans under the age of sixty have a Korean first name or any facility in their purported native language. The 1999 census shows that 25.8 percent of Kazakhstan's Koreans claimed knowledge of Korean. Thus those who claimed proficiency in Korean were endorsing the symbolic salience of language for ethnic identity and not claiming actual proficiency. 97.7 percent of Koreans are fluent in Russian (second language), which suggests the extent of their assimilation into Russian. Gennadii Mikhailovich Ni, the president of the Korean Association of Kazakhstan, unhesitatingly referred to Koreans as a `Russian-speaking nation' ('Russkoiazychnaia Natsiia').

Uighurs

Uighurs have historical roots in Kazakhstan and have inhabited areas bordering China in the Almaty *oblast*. The total number of Uighurs in Kazakhstan is about 220,000, which is 1.4 percent of the total population. Although member of Kazakh diaspora from Xinjiang are automatically entitled to citizenship, these rights are not extended to Uighurs whose families fled from Kazakhstan to China during the Soviet period. Uighurs from China visiting Kazakhstan encounter bureaucratic obstacles in both countries and are looked upon with suspicion. A few thousand Uighurs from Xinjiang are estimated to be living in Kazakhstan illegally though many have family ties in Kazakhstan.

Although all ethnic groups are formally encouraged to set up their national cultural centers, Uighurs have faced a significant interference and regulation from the state authorities. The official Uighurs centre is expected to disassociate itself from the demands of Uighur separatists in China. Various Uighur rights advocacy groups have faced greater difficulties in obtaining registration, as well as maintaining their legal

status. Many have complained about the widespread social stereotyping of Uighur activists with "separatists" or "terrorists".

The close economic and trade partnership between Kazakhstan and China has had a profound impact on the Uighur question. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have signed treaties with China in which they have pledged support to China to combat the problem of 'Uighur separatism' and not to provide any shelter to suspected terrorists. In February 1999, the Kazakh authorities promptly returned to China three wanted Uighur separatists who were later executed in China. The decision to deport the three men without considering their asylum claims evoked significant criticism by local and international human rights groups (Nurlan Amrekulov, 1995).

Chechens

The Russian academic Valery Tishkov (1997, 193) refers to popularization of an 'official' myth during the Soviet years about exceptional love of Chehens for their primordial homeland and graves of ancestors and indomitable desire to return to Chechnya. Chechens deported to Kazakhstan, as elsewhere to Central Asia, continued to suffer through the Soviet characterization as "enemy people" as well as local perception of them as a belligerent and unruly people. The intolerance and distrust of the Chechens propagated by official Soviet ideology, which came to be internalized by the Kazakhs and other Central Asians, contributed to a steady marginalization of Chechens from economic and political affairs of the region. As Chechens found it increasingly difficult to integrate into the local economy, political and social sphere, informal and unofficial economic and trade activities remained a major outlet. This has contributed to the widespread perception among Russians and other ethnic groups of Chechens as predominantly engaged in 'mafia' or other criminal activities the strong desire on the part of the deportees to return to their homeland during the Soviet period was primarily a result of their overall marginalization under Soviet rule. A vast number of Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya only after the liberalization of the Stalinist order under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev (1956-64). According to 1989 census, some 49,000 Chechens had remained in Kazakhstan.

The war in Chechnya has led many Chechens to flee to territories outside of the Russian Federation. The number of refugees from Chechnya is estimated at 30,000 at least. The number of illegal residents, or those living with relatives or acquaintances without proper documentation, is believed to be much higher than the estimates suggest. This is partly due to the fact that the prevalent Kazakhstani laws make it very difficult to obtain registration as a refugee.

In 1999, Kazakhstan acceded to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention though it has been slow in enacting and implementing legislation to aid refugees or asylum seekers. Kazakhstan applies different procedures for asylum seekers from Soviet republics and citizens of other countries. The Ministry of Interior registered former Soviet citizens such as Chechens and Tajiks, while the refugee section of the Agency for Migration and Demography registers all others.

Ethnic Control and Corporation

The failure of the state to promote democratic institutions after an initial phase of liberalization in the early 1990s has deprived ethnic minorities of a voice and autonomy to organize them as a group. A relatively liberal constitution adopted in 1993 and an active parliament promised political liberalization. However, a new constitution adopted through a referendum after the dissolution of the parliament has vested unlimited powers in the president and stripped the parliament of any real authority. The promise of ethnic harmony and stability made in the early 1990s appear hollow in the backdrop of large-scale emigration of Slavs and the absence of any meaningful democratic participation. The regime has continued to characterize the absence of public activism or civic action, including any form of group mobilization, as symptomatic of "stability" and overall support for its policy. The intimidation and buy-off of media, opposition and prominent ethnic leaders have made it extremely difficult for individuals or group to mobilize any social action. Since 1996 prominent figures among the ruling elites have sought control over all major central and regional newspapers and television and radio channels. Media are under sustained state pressure to portray ethnic relations in a harmonious light and refrain from reporting any event which may be seen as having a negative impact on the existing ethnic harmony. Numerous Russian-language newspapers, most prominently Karavan,and Soldat (21st Century), all critical of the regime, have been accused of

inciting inter-ethnic hatred and faced reprisals. At the same time pro-governmental newspapers expressing anti-minority sentiments such as the Russian language paper (dozhivem do ponedel'nika) and Kazakh language paper Kazakhskaia Pravda (the latter propounds extreme Kazakh nationalism and blatant anti-Semitism) have not experienced any state control.

Kazakhstan has attempted to pursue both 'ethnic' and 'civic' visions of nation-building simultaneously, without creating the necessary legal basis to promote either of the two goals fully. It has focused primarily on providing a symbolic ethnic representation by sponsoring institutions such as national-cultural centers and the Assembly of Peoples (Assembleia Narodov) of Kazakhstan. The term narod (people, or narody - plural) in the Soviet (and post-Soviet) understanding has an ethnic connotation. Narod was used in the Soviet times to refer to territorially dispersed ethnic groups who did not have their own territorial homeland. From this standpoint, minorities such as Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Koreans, Tatars and Uzbeks are 'nationalities' and cannot be referred to as narody as they do have their purported ethnic homelands. There is no official elaboration on why it was decided to call it 'Assembly of People' (and not 'nations' or 'nationalities'). As the hierarchical ordering of Soviet nationalities theory clearly showed that 'nations' are a more consolidated and developed units than 'narody' this choice reflects a demotion of the status of various non-titular ethnic groups or minority.

The Kazakhstan case shows how the state elites have justified remedial action favouring the Kazakhs by framing the language issue in terms of justice and survival of the titular group. By providing minorities with symbolic support but at the same time depriving them of any institutional or legal framework for organization, the state has sought to deter any form of direct ethnic competition or mobilization. Covert discrimination against Russians has not evoked resistance primarily because Russians as a group remain deeply acculturated into seeing themselves as civilizationally superior and do not covet an inclusion in the ethnic hierarchy. The emigration of Russian-speakers, as well as the political disempowerment of non-titular groups has accelerated the transformation of Kazakhstan into a Kazakh national state. Ethnic 'stability' has come at a high cost the principle of ethnic equality and pluralism.

Although Kazakhstan has managed to steer clear of conflict along ethnic lines, the top-

down management of ethnic relations has intensified a deep sense of alienation of the citizenry from the state, bringing about a massive population flight and a steady deterioration of the quality of life and norms governing public sphere. The 1999 census states the population to be 14.9 million, down from 16.7 million in 1989, and declining further. Such a high drop in population is especially alarming for a country that has not been subject to any ethnic turmoil or civil strife and has taken pride in preserving ethnic 'stability'.

The development of democratic institutions and representation of minorities through elections is a critical requirement for safeguarding interests of various ethnic groups in any multiethnic system. The ideological legacy of Soviet nationalities theory, especially its penchant with 'stability' and avoidance of any form of ethnic conflict is further compounded by the growing authoritarianism of the Nazarbaev regime. To some extent the Kazakhstani state has managed to co-opt proposals for minority representation by the OSCE and other Western institutions into a top-down system of ethnic management. However, such measures have so far enhanced widespread apathy and distrust of the regime and led minorities to pursue their survival by avoiding or bypassing the state structure.

CHAPTER 4

Social Stratification in Kazakhstan

In the sociological literature, the study of inter-ethnic relations has been dominated either by the problem of the black-white conflict in the U.S.A. or by the controversy over whether social relations in colonial and ex-colonial countries are 'pluralistic'. The history of the former Soviet Union provides quite a different context in which various ethnic groups, each with peculiar traditions and languages and at various levels of social, political and economic development, have interacted one with another. Study of the former Soviet Union enables one to compare the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in an ethnically mixed community with the usual examples of the impact of religious and 'imperialist' belief systems, and it may help to clarify whether 'ethnic group' is a useful analytical category or whether 'ethnic relations' can be explained in terms of the more traditional classifications of class, status and power.

Leo Kuper argued that in plural societies-the relationship to the means of production does not define the political struggle, and class conflict is not the source of revolutionary change' (Leo Kuper, 1972: 400). In this way he criticized the Marxist theory of revolutionary change. According to Kuper the 'Racial or Ethnic structure itself', is 'the crucial variable in the analysis of revolutionary change in these societies'. If Kuper's argument is not to be circular then it must be shown that analysis of class conflict is incapable of explaining revolutionary change in societies which are racially or ethnically plural like Kazakhstan. A 'racial group' is one which is socially defined by reference to physical criteria (e.g. skin colour); an 'ethnic group' means one defined in terms of cultural criteria (e.g. language, religion). Both groups may in practice overlap but they are not analytically the same thing.

According to many advocates of this theory, changes in the relationship between units in a pluralist system cannot be explained in Marxist terms. We shall consider the relevance of pluralist and Marxist theory to Kazakhstan which has been subjected to Russian imperial (before 1917) and Soviet rule. First we shall examine that Marxism does provide a framework for the understanding of social change in ethnically divided

societies embracing different levels of development. Second, we shall consider empirically the impact of revolutionary change on the class and ethnic structure of Kazakhstan in the period of Soviet rule. We shall conclude that the ethnic composition of the population provided resistances which were not experienced in the European areas of Russia and that many features which might superficially be considered 'ethnic' were derived from class attributes. Third, we shall discuss the process by which the plurality of society in Soviet Kazakhstan was broken down and we shall show how important class interests were in that process.

Stratification in the Soviet Period

Marxist theorists do not attribute any independent significance to racial or ethnic factors in the process of social change. While it cannot be denied that groups are socially differentiated by physical attributes and by culture, the relationships between them in terms of power and wealth are, for Marxists, derived essentially from class relationships. To explain the social structure of plural societies, in the sense used here, Soviet Marxists see various ethnic groups at different stages of class evolution. Classes in a plural society with heterogeneous class systems are distinguished by *not* being 'located within a common division of labour' (D. Lockwood, 1970: 64); rather the division of labour is dependent on different modes of production, giving rise to parallel systems of labour division. Historical materialism hypothesizes that societies go through several stages (primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, and communist). In a static analysis of social stratification, each of these is at a successively 'higher' stage of development, and the level of each civilization is progressively superior in terms of adaptive capacity. Marxism is a deterministic and dynamic belief system in the sense that social groups living at a 'lower' stage of evolution may be expected to advance economically and socially to the level of the more developed group. There is no supposition in the theory of Marxism that backward societies or peoples should remain so, and therefore the ideology is not compatible with the stratification of peoples on the basis of 'racial' type, ethnic origin or national allegiance. But it does not follow that any particular society must experience each one of the stages described above. A necessary condition, however, for any one country to jump a stage is the existence of a higher stage in another country. We might simplify by saying that the history of one country may miss out a stage but the history of civilization may not

do so. In addition, it is possible for the relations of production to develop in a society without the formation of a corresponding superstructure (both in an institutional and value sense). Before any one cycle is completed through endogenous processes of change, new and more advanced forms may be introduced exogenously. Thus economic and cultural transfer is possible from the more to the less advanced society.

The Communist Party as the political instrument of the working class is a political institution carrying out these transformations by following Marxist laws of development. It must be seen as playing an important role in the historical process, a role which cannot be separated from Marxist-Leninist theory.

We might contrast the Marxist with the plural society approach. Marxists, like pluralists, are able to demarcate distinct types of societies which may have 'non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions' but they would make a distinction between the basis and the superstructure. To the latter would be consigned the kind of characteristics which are typical of 'ethnic groups' in a strictly cultural or social sense. One should distinguish also between unitary-class plural societies and heterogeneous-class plural societies. A unitary-class plural society is one which is distinguished by one mode of production and by one set of class relations (e.g. capitalists and proletariat); a heterogeneous-class plural society is one which has in coexistence at least two modes of production and two sets of class relations (for instance, a capitalist/proletariat and a feudal lord capitalist). In a society with a unitary class structure (like Belgium), 'pluralism' has a social and cultural basis (in language, religion and tradition) which may complement elements of class division coinciding with ethnic boundaries. Where there is a heterogeneous class system, different modes of production and systems of class relations help shape the institutional structure of plural societies. Settler colonies coexisting with indigenous tribal communities are examples here. Kuper takes issue with Marxist theory because he believes that it teaches that under conditions of capitalism, revolution may be expected to originate from the exploited class of the dominated ethnic group. But under conditions of a heterogeneous-class plural society, it might equally be argued that revolution may take the form of a dominant ruling (capitalist) class instigating or supporting a (bourgeois) revolution in the dominated ethnic group. Or it may use its superior economic power to decapitate and massify the dominated group. In a socialist

country, however, backward and advanced peoples should have a quite different relationship. Rather than perpetuating a complementary role structure of inferiors and superiors, the goal is to create actively a unitary economic and political society with a differentiated role structure. According to Soviet theorists of development, the Asian areas of the former U.S.S.R. could, during the transition from tribalism (or feudalism), move straight to the socialist stage without experiencing the capitalist class system. In this case bourgeois nationhood and class conflict would also be omitted. The pattern of social change would involve the breaking down of pre-capitalist relations and the abolition of the lingering effects of colonialism where they are present.

In Dzhunusov's view this involves the settling of nomads and the creation under state direction of the material technical bases of socialism; that is, all-round economic and social development. Dzhunusov points out that under these conditions parts of the institutional superstructure (for instance, the Communist Party) play an important role in creating the preconditions for socialism. It should be noted that this theory involves a policy which is quite uncompromising on the issue of various non-socialist property forms, including those based on kin. It opposes the maintenance of strong kin relations *as* found in Kazakhstan because they perpetuated private property and also prevented the development of production relations to a higher level. Hence any kind of 'communism' which existed under tribalism was founded on an insufficiency of production relations and could not be the basis of the higher stage of socialism (Dzhunusov, 1997: 109-110). The idea of a non-capitalist path of social change wedded to the notion of cultural and economic identification with a Soviet nation brings out the fact that Marxism-Leninism is an ideology quite incompatible with pluralistic notions of separateness based on race or local political allegiance.

Soviet Marxism-Leninism is an ideology providing a frame of reference for a homogeneous type of society; it in no way legitimates colonial conquest in the sense of allocating roles to the conquered menial, though it is able to accommodate various cultural forms (J. Rex, 1970: 52). But it does not sanction indifference by the advanced nation to the backward ones: at a theoretical level, it calls for a policy of economic growth, cultural change, political development and social integration.

Marxism-Leninism is a value system which seeks to include all nonbelievers in a similar way as did Catholicism in countries of Latin America. Its adherents cannot be reconciled to accept the coexistence of any competing faith, and it utilizes indigenous languages to transmit its values. It does not have an elitist view that salvation is limited to one nation, and its driving ethic of proletarian internationalism seeks to incorporate all strata and all peoples. The understanding of revolutionary change under Soviet power is not furthered, as suggested by Kuper, by 'and emphasis on the racial structure and mode of racial incorporation' (Kuper, 1972: 415). While it is true that ethnic structures played a role to some extent independent of class, the dynamic of social change in Kazakhstan was provided by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and by the political institution of the Communist party, and one cannot universally contrast as some writers suggest 'class revolution' and 'conflict in plural society' (D. Lockwood, 1970 : 64). In the example under discussion, the conflict between Russians and Kazakhs had a class origin which often appeared as a form of ethnic antagonism.

Before turning to consider the impact of Soviet power on Kazakhstan, we might briefly describe the social structure of this area. Under the Tsars, the penetration of Russians into Asia had created a type of 'frontier situation' in which the dominant Russians encountered an indigenous population at a lower level of technology and culture. The present area of Kazakhstan was populated by Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs. Approximately a quarter of the population was nomadic and more than half was partly nomadic and lived in the aul (a kind of mobile village). The aul was typically constituted of some ten families and headed by the eldest member of the largest family. Several auls formed a tribe which in turn formed a Khanate headed by rulers who claimed descent from the Chinghiz Khan. The traditional bays (rich cattle owners having as many as 12,000 animals) were not only exploiters in an economic sense but were also the heads of kin groups. Despite considerable seizure of Kazakh pasture under the Tsars and the disruption of nomadic life, the Kazakh traditional way of life remained fairly intact into the Soviet period (Irene Winner, 1963).

Some industrial development had taken place but the exploitation of the considerable mineral resources of the area was hindered by the lack of transport and the indigenous working class remained very small. The census of 1926 shows clearly the inequality of the national groups. Kazakhstan is compared with the Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The columns are divided into non-manual and manual groups and sub-divided to indicate the total republican population and that of the native nationalities (i.e. Ukrainians in the Ukraine, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in Kazakhstan). In this period, the non-native population (including that of the Ukraine) was over-represented both in non-manual and manual occupations. The unequal levels of social development are also clearly demonstrated by rates of literacy. Obviously, women and the two non-Russian nationalities were severely backward. Cultural 'pluralism' at this time therefore entailed considerable cultural inequality between the Russian people and the Kazakhs. A necessary condition for the improvement of the subordinate native population was a radical change in the class structure. This would break the political and social hold of the traditional ruling classes and would enable a cultural revolution to take place.

The unevenness of development of the various areas and peoples of the former U.S.S.R. had important implications for policy. The relatively economically advanced areas of the former U.S.S.R. (particularly the Russian Republic) which, after 1917 in Leninist theory, had already superseded the capitalist stage, had the obligation to bring about a major social change in the Soviet areas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The crucial agent of change here was the Communist Party which provided the leadership and organized the personnel. Socialism was to be built by the indigenous peoples but with the assistance and guidance of the Russians. Stalin's formulation of the nationalities' policy emphasized the importance of using the native language, of recruiting the local nationalities to positions of power in the administration and, while destroying the pre-industrial class system, of preserving the customs and way of life of the indigenous peoples. In the short run, Soviet policy involved attacking the leading anti- Soviet classes in the areas, the recruitment of indigenous masses in support of the Soviet cause and the despatch of leaders from the European Soviet Republics to Asia. In the long run, the pattern of internal authority among the native population was to be undermined by changes in property relations and by the political mobilization of the masses through the Party and the Soviets. The class structure was changed not only by dispossessing the traditional ruling classes but also by the

development of industry and by the systematic creation of a working class. Social institutions, particularly the Soviet school system, were closely geared to the values of the Soviet elites and they sought to change the fundamental values of the indigenous population. Identification with the 'Soviet proletarian nation' was to replace allegiance to tribal and Muslim religious values. Elements of pre-socialist culture were to be retained but only if they could be reconciled with the dominant values of industrialism and Soviet power. Following 1917 decrees were passed in Asia nationalizing land and water supplies. But in practice land and water remained as private property and were bought and sold freely. In the immediate post-revolutionary period there was 'almost no change in agrarian relations' (E. Zel'kina, 1928: 151), whereas in the European land areas significant land reforms and seizures of large estates occurred during the revolutionary transformations of 1917 and its immediate aftermath. In the Central Asian areas and Kazakhstan strong solidarity between kin segmented the social structure and 'class' feeling was less strong. These areas before the Revolution had been subject to colonial rule by the Russians. The political dominance of the Russian Tsar as well as the presence of Russian settlers had strengthened the ties between the strata of the indigenous population.

The system of social stratification in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s was one of class differentiation and ethnic pluralism. While ownership rights defined the objective forms of class conflict between communists and their opponents, ethnic forms of identification played an important role in defining the perception of forms of conflict. However, it is impossible to understand the political elite's actions independently of class interests. The class interests of the (Russian) working class and Communist Party were opposed to those of the indigenous native ruling class and hence some forms of class and ethnic conflict in fact coincided. In this case the Communist Party sought to undermine the whole fabric of the traditional society. Unlike in capitalist-type colonial situations, the European communists had a definite policy of economic and cultural change and Soviet Marxism-Leninism also provided an ideology of supra-national integration. The policy of settling and of collectivization provided a basis for social change and for a movement away from institutional pluralism to functional differentiation and to a common division of labour. Taking M. G. Smith's three levels of pluralism (structural, social and cultural), it was the first that

came under attack in the ensuing class conflict. The other two were modified by the Cultural Revolution.

The aims of the Cultural Revolution were three-fold: first, overcoming the ideology of the previous ruling classes; second, bringing up the educational level of the backward nations to that of the most advanced, and third, the formation of a common Soviet value system. The cultural revolution, therefore, is closely linked to changes in the pattern of social stratification; it seeks to elevate previously deprived strata to a position of equality and it attempts to change the status of the indigenous peoples by influencing their aspirations and capabilities for certain occupational roles; it tries to alter values, to facilitate both cultural assimilation and the creation of a common identity. The educational system and the development of mass media are the central agents performing these changes. The first aim of the Bolshevik government was to introduce universal literacy which would reduce the population's dependence on personal traditional communication and would enable directed change to occur through the medium of the printed word. By the end of the 1920s, a wide network of schools, offering only 1 or 2 years' instruction in reading and arithmetic, had been founded, but by 1935 only three-quarters of the Kazakhs were in such schools. The standards were low: of the teachers even, some 70 per cent had only primary education (M. S. Dzhunusov, 1961: 152-3).

One must therefore distinguish between the ways different ruling *classes* of dominant ethnic groups behave towards dominated ethnic peoples. This factor seems the most important single variable which may be used to explain ethnic relations in Kazakhstan compared to those in capitalist societies. While it is true, as Kuper has emphasized, that race and ethnicity are in some ways independent of class analysis, this study leads one to reject Kuper's view that 'the racial divisions are the propelling force in the revolutions, the predisposing factors are those that affect racial status in any of its many dimensions and the dialectic of conflict is essentially racial' (Leo Kuper, 1971: 105-106). The dialectic of conflict in Kazakhstan was of a class character. But even if we take into account the heterogeneous nature of class division in Kazakhstan giving rise to parallel systems of labour division, ethnic factors undoubtedly have been shown to exercise their own peculiar dimension to the system of stratification and class conflict.

POST-SOVIET STRATIFICATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

Regional Stratification

Kazakhstan is a centralized and unitary state. The Nazarbaev leadership has resisted all pressures to introduce elections of local or regional (oblast) heads, as well as introduce some form of cultural or territorial autonomy.

Whereas independent Kazakhstan state has not officially undertake full-fledged "demographic engineering", i.e., settling the favoured ethnic group in a region dominated by the minorities in order to enhance the power and status of the favored group, it has nonetheless pursued such policies by means such as transferring the capital Almaty, located in the Kazakh-dominated south to Astana in the Russian-dominated heartland, besides declaring Kazakh as official language. The motivations to wanting to transfer the capital were multiple. The official reasons cited were proximity of almaty to China's border (and the argument that the capital should be located in the geographical 'centre' of the republic), Almaty's location on the seismic belt, and the alleged physical limits on its growth as a major city. In reality, the transfer of capital to Astana, announced in June 1994 and completed in December 1998, was guided by ethnic as well as political considerations. First and foremost, it was governed by the desire to exercise a greater vigilance over the Russian-dominated regions and to deter any possible irredentist or separatist claims on part of the regions bordering Russia. The move has also sought to secure the loyalty of the Russified Kazakhs in these territories, who had been under-represented in governmental positions in Almaty, which were seen largely as prerogative of southern Kazakhs. Finally, the transfer of capital has allowed the state to channel a significant movement of ethnic Kazakhs to Astana and surrounding regions.

Further consolidating its unitary and centralized structure, Kazakhstan undertook a significant reconsider of its internal territorial boundaries in 1996-98. The Semipalatinsk and Zhezkazgan oblasts, containing 54 and 49 percent ethnic Kazakh respectively, were merged with East Kazakhstan (67 percent Slavic in 1989) and Karaganda (63 percent Slavic in 1989). Parts of Kokshetau (the Kokshetau town and the surrounding areas) were incorporated within Akmola and North Kazakhstan. Similarly, the Kostanai oblast was enlarged to include parts of Torgai. The changes, affecting all Russian-dominated border

regions (except Pavlodar), enlarged the size of these oblasts and increased the ethnic Kazakh share in the reconstituted units. The decision was presumably guided by the calculations that their large size and high share of Kazakhs would serve as a cure to any potential secessionist claims. These changes were still not able to offset the population loss as a result of large-scale Russian emigration. Notwithstanding the alteration of borders and policy of channeling Kazakhs to the Russian-dominated areas, North Kazakhstan, Akmola, Kostanai and Karaganda regions experienced the most significant reductions in population as a result of emigration of the Russian-speaking population.

Kazakhstan has rapidly transformed itself from a multiethnic Soviet republic to a nationalizing Kazakh state. This transformation, however, is neither a clear outcome of a self-conscious manifestation of a collectively shared sense of nationalism, as in the Baltic States, nor a result of any pre-existing sense of cultural distance between the two dominant ethnic communities. Bureaucratic-administrative measures, such as territorial gerrymandering, have produced Kazakh majorities in the newly constituted regions and thus undermine any potential irredentist threat. The changes, affecting all Russian-dominated border regions (except Pavlodar), enlarged the size of these oblasts and turned Kazakhs into majorities in the reconstituted units. These changes were presumably guided by the calculations that the large size of these oblasts with titular majority would undermine the basis for a potential secessionist claim.

The administrative mergers, the implantation of Kazakh officials from the southern regions into the city and oblast offices of the reconstituted units in the north-eastern regions, and above all, an extensive surveillance by Interior Affairs Ministry and Kazakh national security officials over public and private life have weakened the mobilization potential of Russians. However, the integration of northern and eastern regions into the central structure is far from a fait accompli. Russian claims over entire north-eastern regions of Kazakhstan, as articulated by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, are no doubt grounded in nationalist thinking than in a differentiated knowledge of historical facts. These have found little political support from within Russia or of Russians within Kazakhstan. However, as a Kazakhstani historian Irina Erofeeva notes that an undisputed belief in their civilizational superiority and deep-seated historical claims over the region prevail among local Russians though they lack any political or cultural mechanisms for articulating these views. Erofeeva also points out that the north-western parts of the East

Kazakhstan oblast, along the right bank of river Irtysh, including the city Ust-Kamenogorsk, belong to the Siberian ecological landscape (not the Kazakh nomadic pastures) and were under the West Siberian Governorate all through the Tsarist Russian period until their inclusion into the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan in the 1920s. These points undermine the validity of Kazakh 'historical' claims over the region.

Linguistic stratification

The demographic preponderance of Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan turned Kazakhs into the most linguistically and culturally Russified of all Central Asian ethnic groups. An Uzbek proverb, "if you want to become a Russian, first become a Kazakh," captures the profound impact of Russian language and culture on the Kazakhs. Furthermore, the traditional nomadic culture in the 1920s and the elimination of Kazakh national intelligentsia and literary elites under the Stalinist purges generated a sharp dislocation among the Soviet era Kazakhs from their traditional cultural heritage. The new Kazakhs, reared in Soviet values, had little option but to adapt to the dominant Russian-speaking environment. Proficiency in Russian served as a vehicle of social mobility and integration into a 'world' civilization (Dave, 1996).

Abduali Qaidarov (1992), a Kazakh linguist and the head of the language revival society Qazaq Tili, estimated that some forty per cent of Kazakhs were not able to speak the language. Ethnographic observations during the period 1992-95, Almost two thirds to three fourths of Kazakhs living in urban settings spoke Russian almost exclusively though many of them claimed to understand Kazakh and speak it if necessary (Dave, 1996). Few of them felt a necessity to read or write in Kazakh.

At the same time, official data, as reflected in the 1989 census statistics, indicated that 98.5 percent of Kazakhs claimed Kazakh to be their 'mother tongue' The Soviet era census contained a question about 'mother tongue'. This was a means of recording ascriptive ethnic self-identification and not of measuring actual proficiency in the language. There were widespread disparities between language statistics compiled by the state and the real language situation pertaining to an ethnic group (Tishkov, 1997: 88). The fact that 98.5 per cent of Kazakhs claimed Kazakh to be their 'mother tongue' (1989

census) and 99.4 did so in 1999 did not mean that they use Kazakh as their 'first language', and presumably, speak it most of the times.

The Soviet state, from 1970 onwards, asked its citizens to designate not only their native language but also any (though only one) other language of the peoples of the USSR in which they were fluent. Russian was invariably the 'second language' chosen by non-Russian nationalities due to the Soviet ideological emphasis on 'bilingualism.' The Soviet state was interested in promoting proficiency in Russian as 'second language' among non-Russians while formally recording the attachment to the native language. The higher the numbers who claim proficiency in the 'second language' (invariably Russian for non-Russian groups), the greater was the use of Russian in native language. While the European ethnic groups, on the whole, felt little need to speak Kazakh and saw it as an inferior language, Kazakhs experienced a great deal of pride in attaining fluency in Russian.

In 1989, only one percent of Russians (and Slavs) had proficiency in Kazakh, which was the lowest level of proficiency in the language of the titular nationality among Russians inhabiting that republic. In contrast, 64 per cent of Kazakhs claimed fluency in Russian, defined as their 'second language' in 1989.

The state launched an active campaign of Kazakh language revival by mobilizing the support of linguists and cultural intelligentsia. Kazakh was proclaimed as the sole state language in 1995 following an acrimonious debate over the language issue. Proponents of Kazakh as the sole state language prevailed over advocates of bilingualism, i.e., recognition of both Kazakh and Russian as state languages. Kazakh language proponents argued that given the highly unequal status and development of both languages, Russian would further push out Kazakh as the state language. In their view, only the recognition of Kazakh as the sole state language, and ensuing financial, legal and ideological support to its development can eventually enable Kazakh to regain its status.

The 1995 language law established a clear hierarchy of languages with Kazakh being granted a higher status as state language and Russian placed in the less equal position as "language of interethnic communication". An amendment passed in 1996 recognized Russian as the "official language" in 1996, operating on a par with the state language.

The law served to mollify not only various Russian-speaking nationalities who had little competence in Kazakh, but a sizeable number of urban Kazakhs as well who could no longer function effectively in their native language.

The language law did not affect Russian-speaking Kazakhs as adversely as it affected other Russian-speaking nationalities. Because of the inextricable linkage between nationality and native language, it is easy for any Kazakh in theory to claim proficiency in Kazakh as his or her native language. Virtually all Kazakhs (99.4 per cent) claim knowledge of Kazakh. In a state where Russian remains the dominant lingua franca (language of interethnic communication) as well as the preferred language of communication among a vast majority of Kazakhs who are more at ease with functioning in Russian at all levels, these data do not reflect the actual command of the language and simply indicate the formal endorsement of Kazakh language as a key symbol of Kazakh national identity. The past Soviet censuses directly inquired about knowledge of Russian as well as "native language."

Despite keen requests by Kazakh nationalists, the government has refused to introduce any language proficiency tests. A proposal introduced in 1995 to make Kazakh mandatory for numerous positions in the state administration was rejected. The requirement that state officials learn Kazakh within a ten-year period was dropped. Key political positions, such as presidency, the chair of both the lower (Majilis) and upper (Senate) houses of parliament require the incumbent to be fluent in Kazakh.

The ten-year state programme on language policy introduced in early 1999 emphasizes 'increasing the demand for the use of the state language' and 'creating conditions for learning it.' It lays down how these objectives are to be realized through administrative and bureaucratic measures, while steering clear of any discussion of 'political' or 'ethnic' dimension of the language issue.

Since non-Kazakhs were unlikely to be proficient in the Kazakh language, the proclamation of Kazakh as the sole state language and the ensuing policy of Kazakhization generated profound anxiety among Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan about their status and prospects for their children in a Kazakh-dominated state. Psychological anxiety over the deterioration of their political status following the

adoption of the language law is the most crucial factor triggering a mass departure of the Russian-speaking population from Kazakhstan since 1991. The official governmental position is that emigration is motivated largely by "economic" considerations and is thus "non-political" in nature.

The 1999 census judiciously avoided questions that could assess the knowledge of Kazakh in distinct domains: speaking, reading, and writing—or deployed to legitimate the state agenda of promoting Kazakh as the state language as well as demonstrating the "success" of such a policy by showing that almost all Kazakhs know the state language whereas the Slavic groups, although lagging behind, are indeed "learning" the language. If in 1989 just about one percent of the Slavic and European nationalities claimed any knowledge of Kazakh, just a decade later almost 15 percent of them claim to know it.

In practice, there is a wide gap between the goals of the state language policy and their actual implementation. Almost all Kazakhs recognized the rhetorical value of an ability to issue basic pleasantries in Kazakh, but many city residents would quickly return to a more comfortable Russian. Informants consistently reported that this was quite common, even in the absence of non-Kazakhs.

Another law requires that at least 50% of all media broadcasts be in Kazakh language. Numerous independent central and regional TV channels have periodically been fined or shut down for alleged violation of this law. However, political, rather than linguistic considerations have influenced the decision to penalize them. The Kazakh-language media received consistent state subsidies, although data on their extent is not available.

The language law has appeased Kazakhs who primarily speak Russian. In December 2000, Nazarbayev's claimed that the language issue has been "solved" in Kazakhstan. At the same time he called upon Kazakh elites to speak with their children and grandchildren in Kazakh and reminded ordinary citizens of their "duty" to learn the state language. Indeed the 1997 language law states that it is the "duty of every citizen" to learn the state language, "which is a most important factor in the consolidation of the people [*narod*] or Kazakhstan". The statement by Nazarbaev suggests that the state is not the sole agency responsible for promoting Kazakh. The responsibility for advancing the cause of the

language has been shifted to the intelligentsia and the people. Thus we can see how language creates stratification in Kazakhstan.

Educational stratification

Since the declaration of Kazakh as the state language, efforts have been under way to promote education in Kazakh in schools and universities. Official data suggest a 28.5 increase in the number of monolingual Kazakh-medium secondary schools in the period 1989-1996 and a 37% drop in the number of Russian-medium schools in the same period (Nauryzbai, 1997) Between 1992 and 1996 in institutes of higher learning, the proportion of Kazakh-medium students rose from 22.1% to 30.9%.

The quality of instruction in the Kazakh language sections is poor given a lack of Kazakh-medium specialists as well as absence of good quality textbooks and academic or technical literature in Kazakh. Almost all textbooks are translations from Russian or English. Many of the translations are done by under-qualified staff and do not have a standardized technical or scientific vocabulary. As the state-funded universities tend to favour students of Kazakh nationality, especially those desirous of studying in Kazakh medium sections, more qualified students, irrespective of ethnic background, have opted to study in a quickly proliferating network of private institutes for a better quality education that comes with a price.

The new history of Kazakhstan, taught in school and portrayed in museums, downplays or ignores the multiethnic heritage of Kazakhstan and seeks to portray it as a Kazakh state all through its history. The exhibits in the new museum (called the Cultural Centre of the President), the ethnographic museum in Kazakhstan, and the exhibits in the newly-constructed modern building of the Eurasian University in Astana as well as numerous history textbooks mark growing efforts to show the central place of Kazakhs in world civilization. Military and political accomplishments of various Turkic tribes and other people who inhabited present day territories of Kazakhstan are attributed to Kazakh people.

Clan/lineage stratification

Intra-Ethnic Relations

The increasingly more monoethnic character of Kazakhstan is creating intra-ethnic tensions. Many in Kazakhstan, regardless of nationality, are becoming more nervous about the rise of another type of ethnic problem, clanism, which they see as exaggerated by the country's economic problems and the current level of corruption (Tishkov, 1997: 88). As for sub-ethnic lineage identities, the nomadic society of the pre-Soviet Kazakh steppe was segmentary. Kazakhs generally divided themselves into three zhuz (tribal confederations) and further sub-divided into various ru and taipa. Russian and Soviet ethnographers equated ru with 'clan' and taipa with 'tribe'. In practice, Kazakhs never made such a clear distinction, preferring the term ru (or the dialectical variation uru) for both. These sub-ethnic identities, which called collectively lineage identities, were traditionally based on precise genealogical kinship. During the Soviet period these lineage identities were not erased in Kazakhstan; they were simultaneously preserved and profoundly transformed by the material and discursive practices of the Soviet state.

While it is true that the Soviet period preserved the raw material for a later reconstitution of lineage identities, the primordialist thesis-that long-suppressed identities were finally given free expression with the lifting of Soviet domination-ignores the politics, and the unintended consequences of this politics, of the nation-building moment (Martha Brill Olcott, 1949: 185). In the pre-revolutionary period, clan affiliation played a particularly important role in determining the status of individuals and various social groups. If, according to the traditional system of mutual relations, the first question that Kazakhs, as nomads, naturally asked one another was "How is your herd doing?", and then the next question would be: "What tribe do you belong to?" This practice was based on the traditional Kazakh mentality, which, owing to the specific manner in which information was transmitted as property and as private knowledge intended solely for one's own people (from father to son, from son to grandson, etc.), served as a natural carrier of the "virus" of clan identity, the position of the individual within the clan, and clan identification of social space. In

Kazakhstan, the zhuz-clan was first and foremost a manner of thinking and a manner of interpreting, through the prism of the genealogical extraction of a person or group of persons, the processes and phenomena that occur in space. This is a manner of explaining and regulating the processes of a society's social consolidation.

In Soviet times, this principle of integrating social phenomena, originally indicative of an ancestral characteristic to all Kazakh traditionalists, was transformed into a universal method for comprehending and identifying the country's political processes and for personnel advancement in Soviet and party-economic organs. Thus, a priori, Kazakhs determined a particular zhuz's influence and authority through the personnel representation in government structures. Put another way, the positions held by a zhuz member determined the status and influence of a particular zhuz. Kazakhs of the Middle and Younger zhuz would never, on the level of internal ethnic relations, regard him as one of their own. The so-called clan factor remains quite important right now in contemporary Kazakhstan, but it is hardly the single manner for integration and characterization of the sociopolitical processes and personnel advancement. More than anything, it is a psychological factor that influences a society's political life and, most significantly, influences the career path of various bureaucrats and their choice of a job and chances for advancement. This relates to the fact that people frequently regard their resources and opportunities through the prism of certain peremptory characteristics of their zhuz-clan affiliation (Steven Sabol, 2003: 16-17).

There are widespread perceptions about the role that the zhuz plays in Kazakh political life. These are rather simple and understood by every Kazakh. Their characteristics depend on both genealogical seniority and size. "The Elder zhuz, like the older brother, has the legal right to govern"; "the Middle zhuz, as the largest in number and the most highly educated, is also within its rights to demand power"; "the Younger zhuz, like the youngest brother, is the smallest in number and has no right to demand power"; etc. From this it follows that the clan factor defines the supposed appropriateness of an individual's claim to a particular position. This feeds his ambitions, determines the legitimacy of his place in organs of power, and influences the possibility of his playing an independent role in political life. It is the clan factor that frequently determines, among other things, the boundaries of a bureaucrat's

authority, his power, his advancement in the civil service, his room for maneuvering, his social circle, and the limits and length of his stay in power. It is worth noting, however, that no single zhuz is sufficiently consolidated. Among Kazakhs, competition not only between but also within clans is widespread. Much depends on concrete regions and persons, but the competition is quite well known, for example, within the Middle zhuz of Argyn, Naiman, and Kypchak, some of which cannot tolerate one another. In the Younger zhuz, the Alimuly and the Baiuly have a haughty attitude toward the Zhetyru. In the Elder zhuz, the Shaprashty and Dulat, who hinder the advancement of other clans, are more influential than others (Anatoly M. Khazanov, 1995: 248-249).

In the oblast of Chimkent (present-day Southern Kazakhstan), there has always been competition among the Elder zhuz Dulat and the Middle zhuz Konrad. In Kazakhstan, where President Nursultan Nazarbaev has established a personal regime, clan factor is extraordinarily important for manipulating social consciousness, personal positions, and assignments in the personal interests of the president so as to eliminate competition, corporative solidarity, and consolidation, as well as political opposition, in organs of state.

Frequently, the clan factor becomes a means of opposing one ambition to another; it serves as a unique and traditional mechanism for restraint and balance. Recently, the current president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, developed his personnel policy in pretty much the same way. After Kazakhstan achieved independence, Nazarbaev, who understood the dissatisfaction and ambition of the political elite and intelligentsia of the Middle zhuz (the biggest and most urbanized zhuz), always kept in his ranks a formal representative of the Middle zhuz as a public testament to the balanced character of his personnel policy. Former Vice President Erik Asanbaev fulfilled this role effectively until 1996. He now serves merely as Kazakhstan's ambassador to Germany. Later, the formal testament to the President's idea of zhuz-clan balance was supposed to be Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who, in the eyes of the Middle zhuz intelligentsia and political elite, however, never represented such balance, because he was from the smallest lines of the Middle zhuz: the Uak. Put another way, the Middle zhuz bureaucracy, during the regimes of D. Kunaev and N. Nazarbaev, should have fulfilled the role of an obedient follower in order to

symbolize to public opinion the idea of equal representation of zhuz-clan in the organs of high government. In reality, however, the most important and crucial positions in the country were reserved for either representatives of the Elder zhuz, primarily the close relatives of Nazarbaev, or representatives of the Younger zhuz, whom society does not regard as legitimate or competitive candidates for power and who are incapable of playing any kind of independent political role in society. This tendency, which was less notable in the first years of Kazakhstan's sovereign development, is now receiving greater emphasis and, as power becomes concentrated in the hands of Nazarbaev, it is becoming more obvious (Jigger Janabel, 1996:14-15)

At the present time, the ten or fifteen most influential persons in Kazakhstan who actually affect the making of important decisions on the state level, besides the president himself, are mainly his closest relatives and fellow-tribesmen from the Elder zhuz. In particular, these are S. Kalmyrzaev, chief of the presidential administration; state Chairmen and former Prime Minister Prime Minister K. Tokaev; Zh. Tuiakbai, speaker of the Mazhilis (lower chamber of the parliament); N. Abykaev, an extremely influential unofficial presidential assistant and adviser; O. Baigeldi, deputy chairman of the Senate [upper chamber of the parliament]; A. Sarsembaev, minister of information, culture, and civic accord; Z. Nurkadilov, the akim of Almaty oblast; A. Musaev, the head of the Committee for National Security (former KGB); S. Tokpakbaev, minister of defense; D. Nazarbaeva, the president's elder daughter and head of the largest media holding company; the daughter's husband, R. Aliev, the deputy chairman of the Committee for National Security; and K. Satybaldy, the president's nephew and the director of Kazakhstan's petroleum industry; T. Kulibaev, the president's second son-in-law; and so on. Members of the Younger zhuz have a smaller but sufficiently significant representation in the organs of higher government. These include N. Balgimbaev, former prime minister; Kekilbaev, state secretary; M. Tazhin, secretary of the National Security Council; I. Tasmagambetov, vice premier; and others.

The president's appointment to key government posts of civil servants from the Younger zhuz who do not enjoy public legitimacy serves to strengthen his influence and is an extremely effective way to eliminate potential opponents from political life. The Middle zhuz, which now lacks a serious, authoritative representation in the

structures of higher power, received an entirely unique and, as always, purely symbolic form of compensation with the transfer of the capital from Almaty, which is situated in the traditional territory of the Elder zhuz, to Akmola/Astana, situated in the traditional territory of the Middle zhuz Kazakhs. Another example of compensation was the appointment of O. Abdykarimov, a person loyal to the president, to chairmanship of the Senate, a position that is formally of secondary importance. A unique patroness of the Middle zhuz is Nazarbaev's wife, Sara. With respect to serious personnel, political leaders from the Middle zhuz who are at all well-known have been dispatched to honorable "exile" as ambassadors (e.g., the president's former key opponent, O. Suleimenov, was sent to Italy; former vice president Ye. Asanbaev was sent to Germany); or they have been retired (e.g., former Prime Minister A. Kazhegeldin).

In this way, at the present time, Kazakh zhuz have asymmetrical and disproportionate representation in government structures, with a blatant tilt in favor of the Elder zhuz for higher ranks of power (Table 4.1). In other words, as a measure of the concentration of political power in the hands of Nazarbaev, the clan factor is increasingly undergoing a transformation from a symbolic means and manner of balanced representation of zhuz-clans in the upper ranks of power — a unique mechanism of checks and balances during Soviet times and the first three to four years of sovereignty — to a means of dispersing political opponents and making the President's close circle illegitimate. The purpose was to create a "desert" around the President where he could be completely dominant and there would be no room for opponents and competition. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the clan factor is of primary importance mainly to the rural and the marginal part of the population that has moved from aul [village] to city. This is because they are carriers of group mentality and think only in the categories of group, clan, and ethnos. They realize themselves on a personal level only in a group, by means of a group, and not in any other way (Edward Schatz, 2000: 501-502).

Table 4.1: Ethnic composition of Parliament, 1996

Ethnic Group	Total		Party/Self-Nominated		State List	
	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected
Kazakhs	567(75%)	105(59%)	530(77%)	80(59%)	37(58%)	25(60%)
Russian	128(17%)	48(27%)	113(16%)	39(29%)	15(23%)	9(21%)
Others	61(8%)	24(14%)	49(7%)	16(12%)	12(19%)	8((19%)
Total	756(100%)	177(100%)	692(100%)	135(100%)	64(100%)	42(100%)

Source: Post-Soviet Geography.

Clan differentiation of the society into Elder, Middle, and Younger zhuz is one of the most obvious examples of Kazakh marginality. Characteristic of this marginality is the 95 percent of the Kazakh agrarian and marginal population. This is alien to the small group of Kazakh hereditary city-dwellers who maintain an individualistic manner of living and mentality.

Gender stratification:

In statistical terms, Putnam has remarked, 'women are the most underrepresented group in the political elites of the world. In most areas of the world –"developed" or "underdeveloped"- there seems to be marked incompatibility between the female role in society and certain occupational roles, especially that of the politician.' The data for Kazakhstan does not contradict this finding, despite supposed soviet-era emancipation. Of the elite in 1995 and 2000, 94 percent are male, with only a 1 percent rise in women by 2000. There was not much variation across institutions, although women tend to be found more frequently in government or parliament. There was only one female minister in 1995, and three in 2000. All 54 regional governors have been male. (Table 4.2)

Table 4.2: Gender and Elite

GENDER	1995	2000
Male	94	93
Female	6	7

Source: Post-Soviet Geography.

There is a large distinction between work and the home in Kazakhstan's society. Women occupy very important roles in the Kazakhstan's workforce. Women are, for example, school principals, bank presidents, teachers, accountants, police officers, secretaries, and government workers and make up almost half of the workforce. This may be a carryover from Soviet times when women were very important parts of a system that depended on every citizen to work and contribute. Women are often the best students in a school and more qualified than men for many of the jobs in Kazakhstan. However, often women have not been promoted to the top positions in national government and the private sector. With alcoholism on the rise, especially among men, and educational performance among men often lower than average, women may play an even more significant role in the future Kazakhstan's economy.

But at home Kazakh culture is traditionally a patriarchal one, with much respect being given to men, especially elderly men. Symbols in the culture often represent power and warrior like behavior, often associated with men. This can be seen in many Kazakh households. In villages and small towns women always prepare the food, pour the tea, and clean the dishes. Men will often lounge on large pillows or stand outside and smoke while women prepare food or clean up after a meal. Men do work around the house, but it is usually with the horses, garden, or car. There are many marriage and courtship customs that further assert the male as dominant in Kazakh society.

Role of Islam in Ethnic Stratification

The society is ethnically diverse, and many religions are represented. However, due to the country's nomadic and Soviet past many residents reject religious labels or describe themselves as nonbelievers. Ethnic Kazakhs, who constitute more than one half of the national population, historically are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School. In a 1998 government survey, 80 percent of them described themselves as Muslims, although government and independent experts believe that a large number of these are nonobservant. Other traditionally Sunni Muslim groups, constituting approximately 5 to 10 percent of the population, include Tatars, Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Turks, and Chechens. Slavs, principally Russians and Ukrainians, are by tradition Eastern Orthodox and constitute about one-third of the population. The 1998 government survey found that 60 percent of ethnic Slavs identify themselves as Orthodox

Christians. An independent expert estimates that two-thirds of Slavic citizens would say that they belong to no religion or are indifferent to religion. Ethnic Germans, largely Lutheran and Catholic, constituted approximately 5 percent of the population when the country became independent in 1991, but the majorities of these are thought to have immigrated to Germany. A small Jewish community is estimated at well below 1 percent of the population.

As part of the Central Asian population and the Turkic world, Kazakhs are conscious of the role Islam plays in their identity, and there is strong public pressure to increase the role that faith plays in society. At the same time, the roots of Islam in many segments of Kazahk society are not as deep as they are in neighboring countries. Many of the Kazahk nomads, for instance, did not become Muslims until the eighteenth or even the nineteenth century, and urban Russified Kazaks, who by some counts constitute as much as 40 percent of the indigenous population, profess discomfort with some aspects of the religion even as they recognize it as part of their national heritage (Marth Brill Olcott, 2002: 206-208).

Soviet authorities attempted to encourage a controlled form of Islam as a unifying force in the Central Asian societies while at the same time stifling the expression of religious beliefs. Since independence, religious activity has increased significantly. Construction of mosques and religious schools has accelerated in the 1990s, with financial help from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. Already in 1991, some 170 mosques were operating, more than half of them newly built; at that time, an estimated 230 Muslim communities were active in Kazakhstan.

In 1990 Nazarbayev, then party first secretary, created a state basis for Islam by removing Kazakhstan from the authority of the Muslim Board of Central Asia, the Soviet-approved and politically oriented religious administration for all of Central Asia. Instead, Nazarbayev created a separate mufti ate, or religious authority, for Kazak Muslims. However, Nazarbayev's choice of Ratbek hadji Nysanbayev to be the first Kazak Mufti proved an unpopular one. Accusing him of financial irregularities, religious mispractice, and collaboration with the Soviet and Kazakstani state security apparatus, a group of believers from the nationalist Alash political party attempted unsuccessfully to replace the Mufti in December 1991.

With an eye toward the Islamic governments of nearby Iran and Afghanistan, the writers of the 1993 constitution specifically forbade religious political parties. The 1995 constitution forbids organizations that seek to stimulate racial, political, or religious discord, and imposes strict governmental control on foreign religious organizations. As did its predecessor, the 1995 constitution stipulates that Kazakstan is a secular state; thus, Kazakstan is the only Central Asian state whose constitution does not assign a special status to Islam. This position was based on the Nazarbayev government's foreign policy as much as on domestic considerations. Aware of the potential for investment from the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Nazarbayev visited Iran, Turkey, and Saudia Arabia; at the same time, however, he preferred to cast Kazakstan as a bridge between the Muslim East and the Christian West. For example, he initially accepted only observer status in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), all of whose member nations are predominantly Muslim.

Conclusion

By the time the U.S.S.R. broke up, that is, by the starting point of the construction of its own statehood, Kazakhstan was one of the most heterogeneous state entities in the former Soviet Union as regards its ethnic composition. Apart from Kazakhs, the population of Kazakhstan included as many Slavs and numerous other ethnic groups. This ethnic mixture was brought about by the Soviet government's policy of reclaiming virgin lands in Kazakhstan in the 1960s, which caused migration to the Republic from the rest of the Soviet Union. Another factor behind Kazakhstan's multi-ethnicity was that ethnic groups subjected to repression were traditionally deported to the Kazakh steppes. In particular, many ethnic Germans lived in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan also had a heterogeneous economic infrastructure. The republic was a blend of well-developed industrial centers and traditionally agrarian territories. Fast-growing cities, populated largely by ethnic Russians, produced urban sections of the population, including the intelligentsia with its way of life and political views, whereas rural areas, with a predominantly Kazakh population, were dominated by archaic patriarchal culture. Geography has been a major factor in the formation of the national political culture and political processes in Kazakhstan. The intensive development of northern areas adjacent to Russia and the reclamation of virgin soil in the 1960s increased the cultural gap between those areas, on the one hand, and South and West Kazakhstan, on the other, where those processes developed on a much smaller scale: the industrial culture of the North was confronted by the traditional culture of zhuz (tribes) and clans of the South and the West. Another geographical factor that has influenced the economic and political development of Kazakhstan is the vast undeveloped, desert and traditionally unpopulated territory in the center of the country, which is unfavorable for livestock and farming. This factor predetermined the peculiarity and autonomy of the republic's outlying areas. Interestingly, this factor had its effect in the Soviet period, in pre-revolutionary Russia (before 1917) which included today's Kazakhstan, and also in the "pre- Russian period" of building statehood in this territory.

The zhuz system is traditional for the Kazakh society; it served as the foundation for Kazakhs' statehood before their inclusion in the Russian Empire. Actually, Kazakhs were rather a community of different zhuz than a single nation. The Kazakh social structure was marked by a clearly defined hierarchy, in which the Higher Zhuz dominated the Middle and the Junior Zhuz. Characteristically, the zhuz factor continues to play an important role in the Kazakh society. Suffice it to say that the overwhelming majority of ethnic Kazakhs in parliament (over 85 percent, according to some sources), as well as the President and the prime minister of the country, belong to the Higher Zhuz. The zhuz system is competitive in nature. Actually, each zhuz seeks dominating positions and shows displeasure if another zhuz dominates. So, the historical domination of the Higher Zhuz is not at all viewed by members of the other two zhuz as the right and natural state of things. Moreover, it provokes serious discontent because, on the one hand, Kazakhstan has officially proclaimed the goal of building a poly-ethnic state representing the multinational Kazakh society, and on the other hand, the political system is openly dominated not even by some one ethnos but by only a lesser part of it.

This research work has demonstrated directionality in a reconstituted awareness of the indicators of lineage-based identities in Kazakhstan. Mobilization of any kind, whether within the context of established political institution or apart from them, requires resonant symbols. The reconstituted knowledge of genealogies and local heroes represent such symbols. The argument made here is that state-led efforts at ethnicity based redress provided a re-establishment of potentially booming indicators of those identities. The irony is clear: concerted attempts to consolidate a united ethnic Kazakh front had the opposite effect of reinforcing salient subdivision among ethnic Kazakhs. Thus, this was not the 'natural' consequence of the lifting of Soviet domination but the result of a multi-tiered ethnic redress practiced by the state elite.

Managing these reconstitute identities has become one of the central political challenges for independent Kazakhstan. Patterns of cadre development, distribution of key resources and the line of political corruption are all subject to the influence of these lineage identities. The critical variables are how economic, linguistic and

regional differences crosscut or overlay these division- a subject which itself requires in-depth analysis.

These conclusions about the linkages between forms and levels of identity in politics have certain implication for studies of cultural pluralism, which theories single and isolatable identities and their political effects. Ease of analysis and the pursuit of frugality aside, forms of cultural and political identity are interconnected in complicated ways. Studies of identity politics should therefore take stock of the dynamic interplay of forms of social cohesion. It is not merely that isolating certain identities and ignoring others leaves something out. The problem is that social divisions that do not routinely enter our analytical purview often have a profound effect on those that do.

So, the Republic was a mixture of contradictions: the absence of a dominating ethnos and the poly ethnicity in the country; the heterogeneity of the economic infrastructure, which presupposes different vectors of economic development; and the coexistence of industrial centers and autonomous agrarian areas. It must be noted that the ethnic dispersion was territorially based: North Kazakhstan bordering on Russia was largely populated by Slavs, whereas ethnic Kazakhs settled predominantly in the south of the country. Furthermore, northern and southern Kazakhs constituted isolated groups not only because northern Kazakhs were more industrialized and lived the urban way of life, compared with agrarian southern Kazakhs, but also due to historical reasons: as discussed before, the Kazakh ethnos descended from several zhuz.

This heterogeneity inevitably suggested that the state of Kazakhstan, within its 1991 borders, was an artificial entity. As a matter of fact, this issue arose with regard to most of the former Soviet Republics. The government of Kazakhstan had to choose between two strategies for the country's further development: achieving internal unity by "melting" heterogeneous territories and communities into a single state organism, or building the state of Kazakhstan as an ethnic homeland for Kazakhs. The latter option could destabilize the situation in the country, so President Nazarbayev consistently pursued the first strategy, which, however, did not prevent the rise of

Kazakh nationalism in the Republic and mass emigration of Slavs, ethnic Germans, Koreans and other non-Kazakhs from the country. Kazakhstan did not avoid social and economic upheavals, a steep economic decline and partial de-industrialization. But, on the whole, the Republic avoided the real threat of the collapse of its industrial potential and major social and ethnic conflicts.

Just as in other plural modernizing countries with a growing mobility in the population, in Kazakhstan objective demands of cultural homogeneity required by the economic base of social life, conflict with ethnically connected social differences, which hinder the flow of personnel across the lines of social stratification. It is just these differences that became a source of explosive polarization and social disunity, while ethnically unmarked differences remain tolerable.

In this respect the situation in Kazakhstan and some other republics of the former Soviet Union resemble the situation in other multi-ethnic countries. The competition for political participation, economic opportunities and culture status virtually ensure that 'ethnicity will remain an important criterion for political organization and that ethnically based claims will maintain a prominent place on the agenda of the state.'

'The working men have no country. We can not take from them what they have not got', claimed the founding father in the communist manifesto in a belief that class membership and rational economic interest will erase ethnic solidarity and, eventually, ethnic differences. Many ethnic communities in the former Soviet Union came to a different conclusion. They consider blood much thicker than the ink that was spilt to convince them of the opposite. Ethnic differences became more salient and more important than class differences; ethnic membership began to be considered as the best leverage for social mobility and economic advancement. In an atmosphere of overall economic and political crisis, ethnicity becomes the only common political language for the Kazakhs and million members of the other ethnic groups. Nationalist demands turned out to be the effective means for political mobilization of the masses in the country, which until recently declared internationalism its official ideology. The ethnic corporatism, implicitly or explicitly, makes equality of opportunities for member of competing ethnic group to a large extent fictitious. This may explain why

nationalism in the newly emerged commonwealth of independent states usually takes not state-as-sociated but ethnic form.

As a result, we have a very confused situation. On the one hand, the poly-ethnicity is becoming a factor of the development of civil society in Kazakhstan, that is, it plays a positive role in this case. On the other hand, this factor often works against the individual as it reduces opportunities for him. Perhaps, this is a peculiarity of the development of civil society in Kazakhstan.

The development of the Kazakh society has also a religious factor. On the one hand, the state in Kazakhstan interferes in the society's religious life and the confessional preference of its citizens much less than the other Central Asian states. On the other hand, the poly-ethnic population of Kazakhstan has centuries-old experience of peaceful co-existence of peoples having different religious beliefs. As a result, Kazakhstan has one of the most tolerant societies in the entire post-Soviet space as regards religion. Ethnic friction that occasionally arises in the country never develops into religious conflicts.

The Kazakh statehood, which is profoundly secular by nature, promotes harmonious co-existence of people professing different religions – not only the "indigenous" ones, such as Islam and the Russian Orthodoxy, but also those that are new to the country, such as Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Characteristically, Kazakhstan does not face threats from Islamic extremists. The historical past and the government's policies have made Kazakh Moslems "inoculated" against Islamic radicalism.

To conclude, one thing is sure: neither the Kazakhs nor the Russians are in favour of destabilizing the current Kazakh government. As the Republic pushes towards a 'market economy', the ordinary people of both nationalities will likely focus on their private achievement in the new 'capitalist' Kazakhstan.

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