

**THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESSES :
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-MAO DEVELOPMENT**

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PRESENTED TO MY

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PREFACE

The role of the Communist Party is pivotal in the functioning of all socialist countries. The present study makes an attempt to study one of the important aspects of the party system, the National Congress, with particular reference to the Communist Party of China (CPC). In the Party Congress either old policies get legitimised or new policies are declared. To explain its significance, one can say clearly that in the Congress a blueprint for the socio-politico-economic development is formulated.

Further, the Party Congresses have significant place in the process of two-line struggles in the Party. At the Congress the winning group would consolidate the position. It also plays a vital role in vindicating the victorious line. Thus the Party Congress acquires a crucial role from the perspective of political consolidation.

In this paper an attempt has been made to understand the Communist Party of China's line in its development through the Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses. In other words, it deals with the character of the socio-politico-economic policies that were evolved at the Congresses. In other words, the scope of the study is limited and specific. It does not deal with all aspects of the Party nor is it a general history of the Party in the post-revolutionary period. Yet no other aspect is more important for comprehending the dynamics of the Chinese political system. Generally all major policy decisions and

important changes in the policies of the Party acquire legitimacy with the ratification of the National Congress of the CPC. Precisely speaking, all major policy decisions take shape at the Congress. Thus, this study helps in understanding shifts and turns in the Party's line during Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses.

In the first chapter, I have discussed the historical developments of the Communist Party of China through its Eighth, Ninth and Tenth National Congresses, which builds up the setting for a detailed study of Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses.

The second chapter makes an elaborate analysis of the texts of the Eleventh Party Congress and brings out its implications in the context of the two-line struggle. There is no dispute about the fact that Moderates emerged successfully out of the Eleventh Struggle in the Party and subsequently consolidated their position in the Twelfth Party Congress. This marked the end of the period of instability and the beginning of the new phase of a stable order.

The third chapter tries to show how the changes that started in the seventies have crystalized at the Twelfth Party Congress. This period is marked by a fundamental shift from 'politics in command' to 'technique in command'. More interestingly, this Congress witnessed the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as the unchallenged leader of the CPC.

In the concluding chapter, I have tried to make an overview of the developments which took place at the Eleventh and Twelfth National Congresses of the CPC and to indicate the major trends of party politics in the post-Mao era.

Here, I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor (Mrs) Gargi Dutt without whose assistance this work would not have been completed in time. I am indebted to Professor Dutt for extending her invaluable suggestions, constructive criticisms and co-operation throughout this work.

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CHAPTER I

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND : AN ANALYSIS OF EIGHTH,
NINTH AND TENTH PARTY CONGRESSES**

The role of the Communist Party is pivotal in the functioning of all socialist societies. In conformity with the tradition of a Leninist Party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) vests its supreme authority, at least nominally, in National Party Congress. During the Session of the Congress, either old policies get legitimised or new policies are declared. To explain its significance, one can firmly say that in the Congress a blueprint for the socio-politico-economic development is formulated. Hence for an understanding of the international development of the Chinese mainland, one has to analyse critically various Party Congresses of the CCP. Since the liberation, starting with the Eighth National Congress of the CCP, five National Congresses have been held so far. Though I am concerned only with Eleventh and Twelfth National Party Congresses, it would be difficult to understand them properly without some knowledge of the three Congresses, prior to the Eleventh Congress, which I shall be dealing in this introductory chapter.

Twelve Congresses have been held by the CCP from the founding Congress of 1921 but the Eighth Congress is the first Party Congress after the birth of People's Republic of China. The 1969, 1973, 1977 and 1982 Party Constitutions have all stipulated that it must meet every five years. The longest intervals between the Congresses were eleven years and thirteen years between the Seventh Congress in 1945 and

Eighth Congress in 1956 and between Eighth Congress and Ninth Congress in 1969 respectively. The party constitution of 1956, 1969, 1973, 1977 and 1982 contains a provision, an escape clause, which states that "under special circumstances, it (the National Party Congress) may be convened before its due date or postponed" by the Central Committee. It was supposed to meet on annual session according to the 1956 constitution, but no frequency of meetings is specified in the current versions.

We do not know how the delegates are chosen to the Party Congress. The procedures for selection are generally determined by the Central Committee. The 1977 constitution is even vaguer, saying only that 'delegates to party congresses and members of party committees at all levels should be elected by secret ballot after democratic consultation with no specific role assigned to the Central Committee. Presumably delegates are selected at the provincial and district level to reflect the 'constellation of power' at the central level. The process of packing the Congress at various levels of the party organization to represent functionalised leaders may also be in operation.

The sheer size of the Party Congress - 1,510 delegates for the Eleventh Congress (1977) and 1,545 delegates for the Twelfth Congress (1982) - makes an unwieldy body to be truly deliberative. However, the party congress does have

certain basic functions to perform; these can be seen from the agenda for each session. Generally speaking, each session of the Party Congress has three standard items which constitute the entire agenda: a political report by the Chairman or his appointee, a report on the revision of the party constitution, and the election of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee.

A major task of the National Party Congress is to select the new Central Committee. Selection is perhaps not the proper term to describe the actual process involved. A preliminary list of those to become members of the Central Committee is usually drawn up by the key leaders in the hierarchy, and then the list is presented to the Party Congress for formal ratification. For instance, the draft list for members of the Eighth Central Committee (1956) was prepared by Liu Shaoqi's supporters - Peng Zhen and An Ziwen.¹ The membership of the Central Committee, elected in 1977, clearly reflects the power line up within the Party. Omissions from the powerful Central Committee membership are indicative of power shifts or simply of a reduction of influence within the Party's hierarchy.

In the preparation of the party constitution to be ratified by the party congress, inputs have been made by all

¹ Hoderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Contradictions Among the Peoples, 1957-67, vol.1 (New York, 1974), p.144.

party organisations. We know that, beginning in 1967, party organisations at all levels below the Central Committee participated in the revision of the constitution, at Mao's insistence.² Both the 1969 and 1973 party constitutions involved participation and discussion by party cadres at all levels before the final version was enacted by the delegates to these congresses. Wang Hungwen gave a detailed account of the revision process of the party constitution adopted in 1973 by the Tenth Party Congress.³

In addition to the important tasks of ratification of the Party Constitution and election of the Central Committee, the Party Congress accepts and reviews political reports from party leaders. Reports presented at the National Party Congress are published, and one can infer policy shifts and programme emphasising them. Since the Central Committee debates are never published, except for occasional communiques summarising policy formulations and personal charges, reports of the National Party Congress provide a unique source of information with some inkling about the issues and programmes of concern to the Party. For example, the Political Report delivered by Hua Guofeng

2 Lin Biao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the CCP", Peking Review (Beijing Review), no.18, 30 April, 1969, pp.16-35.

3 Wang Hungwen, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", Peking Review, 35-36, September 1973, pp.29-33.

to the Eleventh Party Congress in August 1977 presented the official version of the wrong doings committed against the Party by the purged radical leaders led by Jiang Qing, Mao's widow. The four-hour report contained an eight-point programme of "musts" for establishing party stability and unity to enable the party to lead the nation to modernisation in agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence by 1980. The report also called for a concerted effort in stepping up scientific research in an atmosphere of "freedom and discipline" and of "less empty talk and more hard work."

Finally, there has been always a great deal of fanfare and publicity focussed on the Party Congress. This is more than public relations work by the Party; the convention of the Congress serves as a rallying point for the party members and for the populace in general. It creates a feeling of participation in important decisions of the party among the delegates themselves, many of whom come from humble backgrounds and remote regions of China. It instils in them the "sense of commitment" to and unity with their leaders and the party.

In view of the limited duration and agenda of the Party Congress, the question arises as to how preparations for it are made. Technically, the outgoing Central Committee is responsible for preparing the agenda of forthcoming Congress. In practice, however, the Politbureau or the

Standing Committee of the Politbureau, prepares the agenda and designates members to draft the political reports and to work on the new party constitution under its supervision. For instance, Lin Biao's original draft of his political report to the Ninth Party Congress was rejected by the Central Committee or Chairman Mao.⁴ Evidently, the final report, as read by Lin Biao to the delegates of the 1969 Party Congress was drafted "under Chairman Mao Zedong's guidance." It is assumed that political reports from the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, to the Tenth Party Congress in 1973, received personal approval from Mao Zedong. There have been admissions of hasty preparations for the proceedings of Mrs Liu Shaoqi (Wang Guangmei) who admitted, under Red Guard interrogation during the Cultural Revolution that "everything was done in a hurry" in preparation for the Eighth Party Congress in 1956.⁵

Eighth Party Congress

From September 15 to 27, 1956, the Chinese Communist Party held its Eighth Congress in an atmosphere of some triumph. The Congress heard the political report of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP, a report on the revision of the Party Constitution, and the report on the

4 For text of Zhou Enlai's Political Report to the Tenth Party Congress, see Peking Review, 35-36, 3 September, 1973, pp.17-21.

5 MacFarquhar, *o.c.*, p.101.

proposals for the second Five Year Plan. It adopted the revised Constitution of the CCP, adopted a resolution on the political report, and approved the proposals for the second Five Year Plan for development of national economy. It also elected the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP.

The Eighth Party Congress was to endorse some of the measures already taken to replace the Soviet model of administration. It adopted, however, a model of socialism which was remarkably similar to the first put forward by Stalin in 1936. According to the Congress resolution, since the exploiters had already been liquidated as classes, the basic contradiction in the Chinese society was no longer a matter of class struggle but resided in the relationship between the 'advanced socialist system' and the 'backward productive forces.'⁶ This implied that, since an 'advanced socialist system' was already in existence in part of the society, any class struggle in the future would occur outside that system. Therefore, there was no basis for the systematic generation of antagonism except in relation to residues of the past. Consequently, policies ought to be directed primarily towards developing productive forces and expanding the 'socialist system' rather than fostering class struggle. This official endorsement was later to be vigorously condemned as violation of Mao Zedong Thought. If, however, Mao had any reservations

6 CCP, 27 September 1956; Peking Foreign Language Press (PFLP), 1956, vol.1, p.116.

about this formulation in September 1956, he left no record of them.⁷

Mao did not leave any record of his views of the official Party position on the role of the guiding ideology. The Seventh Party Congress in 1945 had established Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the foundation of Party policy. The 1956 constitution, however, omitted the reference to Mao Zedong Thought.⁸ In the Cultural Revolution, this was held to be one of the 'crimes' of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Commenting on this, MacFarquhar regards such a view as somewhat simplistic and in his analysis of the events of the Congress suggests that there was a very clear difference of emphasis in the speeches of Liu and Deng.⁹ In his view, Liu in line with the criticism of the 'cult of personality' in the Soviet Union following the Twentieth Party Congress, wished to play down the role of Mao in the Chinese revolution. Thus in accepting the recommendation of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai that no reference be made to Mao's thought in the Party constitution, Liu might have demonstrated his personal agreement. Deng, on the other hand, Mac Farquhar argues, was the man most attuned to Mao's ideas. In 1954, he had been appointed as Party Secretary-General, but in 1956, he was elevated to the new eminence

7 MacFarquhar, n.1, pp.160-4.

8 For side by side comparison of these two constitutions, see Current Background 417, 10 October 1956, pp.32-76.

9 MacFarquhar, n.1, pp.160-4.

of General Secretary at the head of a strengthened Secretariat. Deng continued to stress Mao's symbolic importance. Certainly, Deng later admitted that he had withdrawn reference to Mao Zedong Thought in the Party constitution, but "this was probably only true in the sense that he had been a member of the drafting committee."¹⁰ However, as some Sinologists view it, Liu was, if anything, closer to Mao than Deng. In any case it did not matter much because the moves taken by Mao to prepare for his retirement suggest that Mao had full confidence in the Party leadership and that he did not object to the reformulation of the Party's theoretical line.

It is difficult to know, what exactly Mao felt about the omissions of Mao Zedong Thought in 1956 constitution. But one thing seems to be certain that the existing cleavages did not reflect the different sides taken by various leaders in what the Cultural Revolution of 1966 was to refer to as 'the struggle between two lines.' At that time Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai and Peng Zhen were considered to be 'revisionists. Lin Biao and Gang Shen, on the other hand, were considered to be adherents to Mao's correct line. At the Eighth Congress, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao were promoted while Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen and Gang Sheng were demoted. This evidence shows that whatever policy differences there might have been, those had not crystallised into 'two lines' in September 1956.

10 Ibid., p.49.

Mao's Plan to Retire

Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's faults caused Mao to think deeply about modifying the proletarian dictatorship, and within a few months of the Soviet Twentieth Congress he had begun to chart new directions for China. Mao was also impelled to ponder the role of the supreme leader and the succession problem. His own testimony indicates that "he decided to step back out of the limelight in order to allow his senior colleagues to establish themselves as major political figures independent of himself."¹¹

The key to Mao's plan was the division of the Politbureau Standing Committee into first and second 'fronts.' Mao would retire to the second front, shedding duties and functions, and thus allow the other members of the Standing Committee to increase their prestige and influence. It was to ensure that after Mao's death, he would be succeeded by a self-confident group of men, accustomed to take decisions and assume responsibility.

In April 1959, when Liu Shaoqi succeeded him as Head of State, Mao almost certainly retired to the second front within the Standing Committee of Politbureau. "But the evidence suggests that he made the decision gradually to hand over power to Liu and his other colleagues before the Eighth Congress in 1956."¹²

11 Ibid., p.105.

12 Ibid., p.106.

One major indication of Mao retiring to the second front was the provision in the 1956 new party constitution for an honorary Chairman of the Central Committee, a position that would have seemed tailor-made for Mao in the event of his handing over substantive power and the party chairmanship. In 1956 Mao may have envisaged a five-year transition period during which he would divest himself of his powers and posts. In the event the Congress was not held until 1969, and long before then Mao had bitterly regretted his retreat to the second front.

Another indicative innovation in the 1956 Party Constitution was the formation of a different type of secretariat. The old secretariat had been chaired by Mao, and its secretaries had been Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun. Its composition indicated that the secretariat had hitherto been concerned as much, perhaps more, with policy-making as with administrative and organizational questions. This conclusion is explicit from the statement in the Party Congress that the former role of the secretariat would now be assumed by the newly created Politbureau Standing Committee, which consisted of the members of the old secretariat plus Deng Xiaoping, who assumed the new post of party General Secretary at the Eighth Congress. This indicates that Mao saw the new secretariat as part of his plan to make himself less essential to the leadership of China, which would serve to strengthen the party organization and give it a corporate

existence independent, to some extent of its Chairman. A third indication of Mao's intentions at the time of the Eighth Congress was the fact that Liu delivered the Central Committee's political report, an indication that Mao was bringing forward his heir-apparent. Even if all these aspects of Eighth Congress signify the beginning of a planned and gradual retirement from his supreme role, one cannot be sure that he was enthusiastic about the dropping of his thought from the political report and the new constitution.

The longest and most important speech delivered before the Congress was Liu Shaoqi's political report on behalf of the outgoing Central Committee.¹³ It attempted something of a reconciliation of divergent Chinese Communist and Soviet concepts by asserting that "the people's democratic dictatorship has in essence become one form of dictatorship of the proletariat." According to Liu, however, this particular form of dictatorship constitutes a united front under CCP leadership, in which other "democratic" parties and classes exercise dictatorship over the "reactionaries." Liu dealt at some length with the socialisation of agriculture, commerce and industry, with plans for increase in output in all fields of construction and production; with social affairs and with foreign relations.

13 New China News Agency, Peking (Beijing), 16 September, 1956.

With respect to party affairs, Liu echoed a large number of pronouncements which had stressed the necessity for tolerance of divergent views for lenient treatment of erring party members who admitted their mistakes. Since the triumph of Mao in 1935, he said, the Central Committee of the CCP has "not made any mistakes in its line." The happy situation he attributed not only to Mao's leadership but to a sound grasp of Marxism-Leninism on the part of the party membership during the pre-liberation period. He warned, however, that about sixty per cent of the Party's present membership have joined since 1949, and that most of them require more training in Marxism-Leninism.

The next major report to the Congress was a lengthy one by Deng Xiaoping on the proposed new party constitution.¹⁴ In addition to the comment on the constitution, he dealt with ideological and disciplinary problems within the party. Among the past or existing tendencies which incurred his disapproval were contempt of the "masses", bureaucratic empire-building by "leading comrades", the formation of cliques, excessive centralisation, insufficient democracy within the party, and occasional manifestations of "cult of the individual." He impaled himself firmly on the paradox, that while the party is "an organization of unanimous opinion", it does not follow that individual opinions even if these happen to differ from the party line.

14 NCNA, Peking (Beijing), 17 September 1956.

Shou Enlai next delivered his report of the First Five Year Plan and the proposed nature of the Second.¹⁵ It should be noted that this topic, though important, gave him little scope for originality. He foreshadowed a continuing emphasis upon the development of heavy industry rather than upon consumer goods. By the end of 1957, he predicted, China would have completed the "co-operativisation" of agriculture and handicrafts and would be producing about 5.5 million tons of steel per year. He admitted that in 1954 his government had compulsorily purchased too much grain from the peasants but asserted that this situation had remedied in 1955 by the introduction of the more moderate "Three Fix" system of grain purchases. In all these there were nothing essentially new.

Minister of Defence Peng Dehuai gave a report which also contained little that was new. Apart from a summary of the Army's progress towards modernization and a statement that its total size was then 2.7 million men, less than its pre-"Liberation" peak, the main point of interest in his report was his heavy emphasis on the "collective leadership" by the CCP's party committees within the armed forces over the respective unit commanders.¹⁶

Probably the most significant aspect of Vice-Premier Chen Yi's report on foreign affairs¹⁷ is that it was he, and

15 RENA, Peking (Beijing), 18 September 1956.

16 Ibid., 19 September 1956.

17 Ibid., 25 September 1956.

not Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai who made it. In the past, Zhou had been accustomed to deliver reports of this kind. Unlike Mao and Liu, Chen made no reference to the "Socialist camp" headed by the Soviet Union. The main themes of his report were those characteristic of Chinese Communists' pronouncements on international affairs: peaceful co-existence, praise for neutralism, and the like.

The Eighth Congress elected a new Central Committee of 97 members and 73 alternative members.¹⁸ The list of regular and alternate members elected to the Eighth Central Committee included all but seven of the regular members elected to the Seventh in 1945. All but four of the alternate members elected in 1945 were also elected to regular or alternate membership on the Eighth Central Committee. In the Eighth Central Committee some rose substantially and others had fallen. The membership of the new Standing Committee of the Politbureau was the same as that of the former Central Secretariat and was made up of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and General-Secretary of the Central Committee.

To all outward appearances the Eighth Congress was a demonstration of party unity, self-confidence, strength and a determination to turn the country from a backward agricultural country into an advanced industrial one as

¹⁸ NCNA, Peking (Beijing), 27 September, 1956.

quickly as possible. Thus the Eighth Congress undermined the basis for a liberalisation programme by stating that the principal contradiction in China was no longer between proletariat and the bourgeoisie but between an advanced socialist system and backward productive forces. This ideological formulation indicated that the main task of the CCP was economic development rather than political reform and it was in conflict with the Maoist analysis of contradiction and so are the policy and programmes of Deng Xiaoping in the Twelfth Party Congress.

Ninth Party Congress

After repeated delays, the Ninth Party Congress was finally held from April 1 to 24, 1969. The Congress departed from previously established procedures for electing delegates to a national party event of a great magnitude, probably because of intensive bargaining among groups competing for political power and a desire on the part of the Maoists to ensure prior approval of the issues under consideration before it met in official session. In 1956 the 1026 regular and alternate delegates to the Eighth Party Congress had been elected by Party Congress of "every province, autonomous region, (and) centrally administered city and (of) party organisations under the Central Committee in the government and in the PLA", which was convened five months before the Eighth Congress. However, the 1512 delegates to the Ninth Party Congress, Beijing claimed, were

"unanimously chosen" in accordance with the decisions made at the Twelfth Plenum, which were never made public and through full democratic consultation by Party organizations at various levels and after seeking the opinions of the broad masses.¹⁹

A period of reconstruction followed the destruction that had marked the Cultural Revolution. Leadership structures and institutions were re-established - drawing on the principles and new ideas that had emerged from the Cultural Revolution - and political life was debureaucratized through increased participation of the masses. The struggle between the two lines became daily phenomenon.

Because of this chaotic situation in the PRC, only eight provinces out of the twenty-nine administrative units were reported to have held party congresses. Of the eight provinces, only Hunan "discussed the list of those who represent the provinces at the Ninth National Party Congress.

Highly unusual was the degree of secrecy maintained throughout the proceedings of the Ninth Congress. None of the three "most important speeches" made by Mao at the opening session of the Ninth Congress, the Plenary Session on April 14, and the Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee was ever made known. Foreign guests were not

¹⁹ Peking Review, n.2, pp.30-35.

invited to the Ninth Congress, in contrast to more open atmosphere prevailing at the Eighth Party Congress.

The agenda of the Congress was announced in April 1 communique: the "Political Report" by Lin Biao, the revision of the Party Constitution and the election of the new Ninth Central Committee.

Although Mao addressed the Congress, Lin Biao was the focus of everyone's attention because the occasion appeared to formalise his position as the inheritor of the Chairman's revolutionary mantle. On April 1, it was Lin who delivered the official Report.

Apparently, the Political Report was thoroughly discussed by the Central Committee prior to submitting it to the Congress. It was said that the draft of the Report prepared by Lin with the aid of Chen Boda was rejected by the Central Committee and it was again drafted under Mao's guidance. It is difficult to explain why Lin was made successor to Mao, even though the draft Report was rejected on the ground that it was based on productivist theory.

While declaring that a "great victory has been won", Lin candidly admitted in his account of the Cultural Revolution that there had been "twists and reversals."²⁰ He cited Luist counter attacks from "the winter of 1966 to the spring of 1967"²¹ and "fierce struggles" until September

20 Ibid., p.23.

21 Ibid., p.22.

1968, when Rural Communes had been created in every province, autonomous region, and centrally directed city. Nevertheless, Lin asserted that victory had been made possible by "relying on the wise leadership of Chairman Mao."²² Echoing Mao, Lin continued, "the revolution is not yet over" and it could still be necessary to continue the "Socialist revolution to carry out the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation conscientiously!"²³ He urged "the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung Thought ... (to) truly turn the whole country into a great school of Mao Tse-tung Thought",²⁴ and attempted to intimidate any remaining Liuist sympathizers with the threat of punishment "by the whole party and the whole nation."²⁵

The 1969 Party Constitution, "unanimously" adopted on April 14, was not only brief (12 short articles as opposed to 60 lengthy ones in the 1956 constitution), but also exceedingly vague when compared with the minutely detailed and carefully worded previous constitution. Most likely, "this change seems to have been the need to formulate controversial issues in such a fashion as to arouse no opposition, or if that proved impossible, to ignore them altogether."²⁶

22 Ibid., p.23.

23 Ibid., p.24.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p.29.

26 Y.C. Cheng, Factional and Coalition Politics in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (USA: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p.61.

The new constitution included the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) among those organizations which "must all accept the leadership of the Party." "It could be described as the epitome of the struggle against bureaucratism within the Party during the Cultural Revolution."²⁷ Second, the Party attempted to tighten its control over the political activities of the PLA by making decisions regarding the convening of party congresses and the selection of Party Committee members subject to the approval of higher party organs. Finally, the statement that Primary Party Organs must "preserve in the four firsts and foster the three eight working style in a big way", a slogan coined by Lin for the military, was dropped, as was a section that called upon the party to learn from the political work style of the PLA. Over all it appears that the Party intended to re-assert the authority and persist in implementing the doctrine of "Politics in Command." Most likely, Lin Biao was pressurised into compromising on these issues.

Ninth Central Committee included 170 members and 108 alternate members. In the Central Committee 50 per cent of the members were militarymen as compared to the Party cadres share of 31 per cent. Another 17.5 per cent was claimed by mass organization.²⁸ The election of a Central Committee

27 G.P. Deshpande, China's Cultural Revolution : A View From India (Bombay, 1971), p.71.

28 Jurgen Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution (London, 1976), p.35.



dominated by militarymen was a vital reason to suppose that the elevation of Lin (who retained his post of Minister of Defence) was not just a paper victory. At Politbureau level, at least ten of the twentyone full members and two of the four alternates could be regarded as having a "primary identification with the PLA."²⁹

Lin Biao as Mao's Official Successor

The 1969 Party Constitution officially designated Lin Biao as Mao's successor. Described as Mao's "closest comrade in arms", Lin was praised for having "consistently held high the great red banner of 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' and... most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian revolutionary line."³⁰ As Lin was elevated to number two position in the Party, many of his supporters became the Central Committee members for the first time.

Thus the dominant role played by the PLA in the Cultural Revolution coupled with the rise of Lin Biao, resulted in a sharp increase in military representation in all bodies of the Ninth Party Congress and especially in the Central Committee.

29 E. Joffe, "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention", China Quarterly, July-September 1973, p.457.

30 For the text of 1969 Party Constitution, see Survey of China Mainland Press (4407), 2 May 1969, pp.10-15.

This dramatic increase in military representation at the highest levels of the Party gave the PLA formidable power, for it had already come to dominate the State apparatus through the control of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees, in which the army had played a major part. Furthermore, the army's presence did not stop at provincial level. Army representation was found throughout the society: in local administration, in industrial enterprises and in educational institutions. "It appeared then that the army controlled China, that Lin Biao controlled the army and that Mao had given blessing to a new successor."³¹ Indeed the Ninth Congress marked the summit of his career, but at the same time, developments were taking place which were speedily to reduce his power.

Emergence of Mass Representatives

Mao succeeded in reorganising the party hierarchy to reflect the changed balance of power. He acknowledged the existence of a new political force, the mass representatives. Approximately twenty per cent or "one quarter"³² of the Ninth Central Committee membership came from this category, now admitted for the first time as a group to the inner

31 John Gardner, Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p.41.

32 A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1974), p.233.

sanctions of party power. Unlike members of the old party elite who rose to prominence through the established paths, the majority of mass representatives gained recognition and acquired party favour by virtue of their energetic efforts on the radical cause during the Cultural Revolution. To facilitate their admission to the party, the new Party Constitution even eliminated the one year probationary period for new members.

Attempts at Centralisation

The 1956 constitution attempted to correct improper and excessive centralism. The party constitution clearly mentioned that all questions of national character or questions that require uniform decision for the whole country shall be handled by party organization and the questions that had to be decided locally shall be handled by the local party organization so as to find solutions appropriate to the local conditions. The 1969 Party Constitution blurred these distinctions by not defining the functions and powers of party organization at different levels and recommending only a "simple and efficient structure" under "unified leadership." Provisions for Party Secretariat, the previous stronghold of Deng, was abolished. Instead, Article 7 of the 1969 Constitution provided for the establishment of "a number of necessary organs... to attend to the day-to-day work of the party, the government

and the army in a centralised way."³³ Furthermore, party members were no longer obligated to "carry out unconditionally" decisions with which they disagreed and, in direct contradiction to Deng's earlier recommendations of decentralisation, the party members were allowed "to bypass the immediate leadership and report directly to higher levels"³⁴ -- which implied Central Committee and even its Chairman.

Zhou Enlai Overshadowed (Standing Committee)

Probably because of Lin's moderate and pragmatic positions, Zhou suffered a temporary setback, illustrated by changing position in the Standing Committee of both Eighth and Ninth Central Committees.

In 1956, the Standing Committee was composed of Chairman Mao and four Vice-Chairmen, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun, with two additional members added in 1958; Lin Biao, the new fifth Vice-Chairman and Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the Party Secretariat. The Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee reportedly enlarged the Standing Committee to eleven members. In the Ninth Central Committee the Standing Committee was wittled down to five; Mao, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai and Gang Sheng. In the official list Mao and Lin appeared

33 For details, see the text of 1969 Party Constitution, n.30.

34 Ibid.

first and second, but the other three were listed according to the number of strokes in their surnames instead of their relative standing in the party hierarchy. Thus Zhou who had always occupied the third position, had now come down to the fourth place below Chen Boda.

The "Tenth Major Struggle" : The Plot

The reconstruction of the party according to the guidelines of the Ninth Party Congress met with resistance, that was overcome in a gradual process. At the end of 1969, the group in charge of the Cultural Revolution, the principal base of leftism, was dissolved - a sign that Chen Boda had fallen from political favour. At the same time investigation was made into the activities of extremism and violence during the Cultural Revolution. "The first open confrontation between Lin Biao and his group and Mao took place at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee at Lushan at the end of August and beginning of September 1970."³⁵

Since the Lushan session Mao had to act cautiously in order to undermine Lin's position; Lin had powerful support notably among the provincial and central military authorities. Mao took certain measures to undermine Lin Biao's group. More and more isolated, according to the official version, Lin Biao devised a plan for a coup d'etat

35 Jean Chesneaux, China : The People's Republic, 1949-76 (USA: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1977), p.176.

which was named the 'project of 571 works', with the help of his wife Yu Jun and his son Lin Liguo, but fortunately the plot failed. It was then that Lin is claimed to have flown for the Soviet Union in a plane that crashed in the People's Republic of Mongolia on the night of September 12-13, 1971.

Thus the Ninth Party Congress represented a coalition between the Maoists and the Lin Biao factions at the national level. They succeeded in eliminating their opposition and were able to strike a balance through mutual accommodation at the expense of Zhou, who apparently lost some of his former stature. Yet the overall situation in China remained volatile. The military gradually lost ground in the ensuing years as the party re-asserted its authority and control, by a strong devotion to the criticism of Lin, and to the readjustment of the army's role and to rebuilding state and mass organizations which was formally discussed in the Tenth Party Congress.

The Tenth Party Congress

The Tenth Party Congress was held in Beijing from August 24 to 28, 1973. Its main accomplishment was to endorse and legitimise the changes that had occurred during the previous two years and the general direction of Zhou's policies. The Congress represented an important step in the long process of repairing the damage to China's

leadership and institutions that had resulted from the Cultural Revolution and Lin Biao affair. Like the Ninth, it received no advance publicity; it was convened in strict secrecy, and announcements that it had actually taken place were made only after its adjournment. The Tenth Congress was undramatic in many respects, yet it was a major milestone. The task was to define the party's course for the difficult transition into the post-Mao period. The Congress was Zhou's show. Mao appeared briefly to "wave to the delegates", and the Congress reaffirmed his symbolic and titular position as China's supreme leader, but Mao's actual role at the Congress appeared to be minimal.

The session of the Tenth Congress was extremely brief in comparison with those of the Eighth and Ninth Congress, which had lasted thirteen and twentyfour days respectively. "It seems doubtful that a thorough discussion of any of the items on agenda could have been possible in a period of only five days. The Congress probably performed no other function than that of simply rubber-stamping the proposals already thrashed out in advance."³⁶

The revised constitution of the Eighth Party Congress had specified that a party congress should meet every five years. But the Tenth Party Congress meeting was only four

36 Chang, n.26, p.90.

years and five months after the Ninth Congress. In comparison to the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses, it was convened earlier than prescribed.

The Ninth Party Constitution did mention that a Party Congress could be convened earlier than the prescribed period only under "special circumstances". For instance, the Tenth Congress was convened before its normal time because of Lin Biao incident. China remained officially silent on the purge of Lin for two long years. Beijing obviously felt that a new Party Congress would provide the ideal occasion to present its formal explanation of what had happened, eradicate any remaining traces of Lin's influence, and restructure the power apparatus of China.

There was little detailed discussion of major policy issues. Zhou devoted much of his report to bitter criticism of the Soviet Union abroad and the late Lin Biao and his "anti-Party clique" at home.³⁷ As expected, he gave lip service to the "great victories" of the Cultural Revolution and emphasized the unchallengeable validity of "the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." He asserted that "Chairman Mao has laid down for our Party the basic line and policies for the entire historical period of socialism", and declared that "the struggle between two lines" must still

37 For details, see n.4, pp.17-21.

be continued. He called for steps to prevent a "restoration of capitalism", vigilance against the dangers of revisionism, and continued revolution in the fields of literature, art, education and public health. Zhou also formally confirmed the existence of "project 571" without revealing additional information and reiterated the earlier accusations against Lin, who was now expelled from the Party "once for all." The tone of the report on a new Party Constitution delivered by Wang Hung Wen - a young newcomer at the top of China's hierarchy - was more ideological than that of Zhou's report, and the new Party Constitution presented by Wang stated that new Cultural Revolutions would "have to be carried out many times in the future."

The Tenth National Congress elected 195 regular members and 124 alternate members to the Tenth Central Committee, a forty-member increase over the Ninth Central Committee. Like its predecessor, the Tenth Central Committee continued the implementation of "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh." "Thus 35 of the 170 regular Ninth Central Committee members were not re-elected and 3 were demoted to alternate status, while 10 had died. Fiftyfive or 28.2 per cent became regular Central Committee members for the first time. The turn over was even more striking among the alternate members of the Tenth Central Committee, where those newly elected totalled 59 or 46.7 per cent. While 18 of the 109 Ninth Central Committee alternates were promoted to regular status, 28 were dropped."³⁸

In view of the composition of the Central Committee, army influence was weakened to some degree and consequently veteran cadres and the Cultural Revolution faction gained ascendancy. If the veteran cadres and military cadres, who were closely associated with the Cultural Revolution, can be considered as leaning towards the Cultural Revolution faction, then the Cultural Revolution faction undoubtedly gained an overwhelming majority on the new Central Committee - a great victory for Mao and Jiang Qing. Thus the persecution of Lin Biao's clique was evident in the Tenth Central Committee.

Mao was again elected Chairman of the Central Committee. The Congress reverted to tradition on the number of Vice-Chairmen by naming five Party "Vice-Chairmen." Despite the fact that Zhou was listed as the first Vice-Chairman on the name list, his position was obviously weakened by the enlarged Vice-Chairmanship, including two young leaders, Wang Hung-wen and Li Desheng - a typical example of embodying the combination of the old, the middle aged and the young.

The number of members in the Tenth Politbureau remained the same as that of the Ninth Central Committee - twentyone. "In contrast to the Ninth Politbureau of the Central Committee, the military men elected to the new Politbureau decreased by six members, while the Cultural Revolution faction increased by five members."³⁹ Thus the Tenth Politbureau

39 "The CCP Hold Their Tenth National Congress", Issues and Studies, vol.10, no.1, October 1973, p.6.

mirrored the decline of military representation and rise of the cadre group.

The Standing Committee was expanded from five to seven members and Mao, as was to be expected, retained the Chairmanship. Six members were newcomers, including one military man, two veteran cadres and three leaders of the Cultural Revolution faction. Three were former members (the other two former members were disgraced Lin Biao and Chen Doda). Keeping these factors in view, it is evident that the leadership of China was dominated by the Cultural Revolution faction.

Wang Hungwen delivered the report on the revision of the Party Constitution at Tenth Party Congress. The new Party constitution adopted by the Congress was not a very revealing document. The clause in 1969 constitution designating Lin Biao as Mao's successor was deleted as expected. The charges were relatively minor and the new constitution was just as short, vague and uninformative about the structures of the party as the 1969 document had been. It provided few details about the Central Party apparatus. The vagueness of the 1973 constitution reinforced the evidence that "the situation in Beijing was still an evolving one and that the leadership was not yet in a position to delineate in any constitutional document, organizational structures that might undergo further change."⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the convention of the Party Congress marked a new stage in the regime's effort to consolidate its institutional structures as well as its leadership.

Coalition Changes And Factional Realignments

With Lin Biao gone and decrease of military representatives in the Tenth Central Committee, the military suffered a substantial setback and their influence appeared to wane. Nevertheless, as a group, they were still very much entrenched in the Party, evidenced by the fact that every leading figure in the PLA headquarters was elected to the Tenth Central Committee.⁴¹ In short, the military still wielded considerable power, which they could bring to bear in future controversies.

Party cadres, the main beneficiaries of the decline of the military, regained their lost strength. Many cadres who were criticized and purged previously were brought back to the party since the purge of Lin. The most dramatic example was Deng Xiaoping, whose resurrection was not convincingly explained by the Central authorities. Increased cadre representation in the Tenth Central Committee, coupled later with the return of those liberated, seemed to substantiate the observation that Zhou appeared to be on rise, whose support had come mainly from the bureaucracy and whose

⁴¹ Studies on Chinese Communism (Taipei), 7, no.9, September 1973, p.29.

moderate and pragmatic policies had been most responsible for the liberation of many previously purged.

The Question of Succession

Needless to say, the designation of a successor was in focus of power struggle in the CCP, and hence, the primary function of the Tenth Party Congress. The struggle to succeed Mao, which had originated in the Cultural Revolution and intensified after the purge of Lin, was not resolved by the Tenth Party Congress. No successor was officially named. Mao, as previously betrayed twice by chosen heirs, was now probably too wary to select a third. Wang voiced Mao's preference when he recommended in his report that "no just one or two persons" but "millions" of successors should be trained.⁴² In fact this approach was based on the emphasis on youthful successors, which was reflected in the new Party constitution while no new successor to Mao was appointed or designated at the Tenth Congress, the Maoist replaced the successor with a "collective leadership."

The Anti-Confucius And Anti-Lin Campaign

During the later part of 1973, the anti-Confucius campaign was launched as an attack on the rightists, Confucius' philosophy which has underpinned the Chinese political and social systems for more than two thousand years,

42 Peking Review, n.3, p.32.

was now condemned for "frantically calling for the restoration and preservation of the slave system and for the consolidation of the slave owning, aristocratic class."⁴³ In early 1974 Mao initiated and led the movement to link the anti-Confucius campaign with a new nation-wide assault on Lin Biao, who was called "an out and out disciple of Confucius", whose "innerworld" was "foul and ugly." Lin's misdeeds were brought forward during the campaign as a proof of his guilt. Despite the determined efforts on the part of the leftists, the anti-Confucius and anti-Lin campaigns began to wind down in late 1974. In the meantime, Zhou's public appearances also declined dramatically, for he claimed to be "getting old" and "in poor health." Zhou might have hoped to groom a successor as quickly and efficiently as possible because of the failing health. For this reason, Deng was not only returned to public life, but also was given, whenever possible, the responsibilities and exposure usually accorded to a premier. In 1971, Deng was officially rehabilitated and began to play a highly prominent role in the government.

Thus the Tenth Congress revealed that the Party was in a state of serious crisis. Despite the call for unity issued by the Congress, the Party's central and local organisations were still split into rival factions. The political

43 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.60, no.18, 6 May 1974, p.28.

situation in the country remained unstable, and the domestic economic situation was at a low ebb. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976, opened the way for a convention of new congress and hence to counter-attack the institutional, political and economic instability, the Eleventh Party Congress was convened in 1977.

CHAPTER II

**A STUDY OF THE PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES OF THE
ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS : THE BEGINNING OF THE
POST-MAO ERA**

The Eleventh Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the first since Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, was held in August 12 to 19, 1977 in Beijing, and was followed by the first Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC). The Congress ratified in collective leadership by Hua Guofeng, Yeh Jienying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiennian and Wang Dongxing, revised the 1973 constitution and proclaimed the conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution marked by the smashing of the 'gang of four'. As usual, the agenda of the Congress included: (1) adoption of the Political Report of the Central Committee, (2) adoption of the revision of the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and (3) election of the new Central Committee. As the occasion on which the CCP proclaimed its entrance into a new period of development in the socialist revolution and socialist construction of the country, and on which the Congress consolidated the post-Mao leadership by a reshuffle of the CCPCC and its Politbureau, the Eleventh CCP National Congress deserves a close attention.

According to Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution, "The National Party Congress shall be convened every five years. Under special circumstances, it may be convened before its due date". Therefore, to deal with the special circumstances caused by Mao's death on 9 September 1976, the CCP might have hurriedly held the third Plenary Session of the Tenth CCPCC and

then the Eleventh CCP Congress to formally place Hua Guofeng at the head of the CCPC. Nevertheless, the struggle for the highest leadership of the CCP did not go smoothly. The opposition of the local leaders made it clear to Hua that if his post as Chairman was not legally confirmed, another power struggle might take place and strip him of his leadership position. On the other hand, Deng's supporters became more and more active day by day in pressing for Deng's rehabilitation. Under these circumstances, the third Plenary Session of the Tenth CCPC was hastily convened to confirm Hua and Deng in the CCP's leading hierarchy and the Eleventh CCP Congress was convened before it was due for the purpose of confirming the redistribution of power in the post-Mao era.

The Eleventh Central Committee

Prior to the convention of the Congress, however, a major problem had to be solved. Since the overthrow of the Cultural Revolutionary Left, there had been rising pressure upon the Beijing leaders to restore Deng to his former position. Although Hua opposed such a move, in March 1977 he succumbed to the pressures from other leaders for restoration of Deng. In an enlarged meeting of the Politbureau, he agreed to Deng's come back, which was finally confirmed by the third Plenary Session of the Tenth CCPC held from July 16 to 21, 1977. Deng's return assumed triumphant proportions. Together with Hua and the old Marshal Ye Jianying, he dominated the Party Congress, for which 1510 delegates met in the capital from August 12 to 18, 1977.

After Hua's endorsement of all major policies in a lengthy report and the Party statute had been amended eliminating most vestiges of the Cultural Revolution, the Congress appointed the Eleventh CCPCC, which in turn established the Politbureau as the new leadership core. From now onward, China entered into the phase of the post-Mao era. Hua was confirmed as Mao's successor, representing these cadres who had supported the former Party leader during the Cultural Revolution like Marshal Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, representing the major forces of the Military Bureaucratic Complex and General Wang Dongxing representing the security establishment.¹

The triumph of the Military Bureaucratic Complex of seasoned veterans was evident from the composition of the Eleventh CCPCC's 201 full members and 132 alternate members. Among these 201, 110 (54.7 per cent) were re-elected from the full members of the Tenth CCPCC, 20 (10 per cent) were promoted from alternate to full members status, and 71 (35.3 per cent) were new members. Of the 171 full members of the tenth CCPCC, who were still alive at the time of the Eleventh Party Congress, 110 (61.8 per cent) were re-elected, 5 (2.8 per cent) were demoted to alternate members, and

1 Jurgan Domes, "China in 1977 : Reversal of Verdicts", Asian Survey, vol.8, no.1, January 1978, p.6.

63 (35.4 per cent) did not reappear. This figure included 17.8 per cent of the civilian cadres on the Tenth CCPC, 29.6 per cent of its military men; but 76.5 per cent of the mass organization representatives on the outgoing Central Committee. In terms of Party seniority, 19.1 per cent of those members of the Tenth CCPC who joined the Party by 1935 and 39.3 per cent of those who joined the Party between 1936 and 1949 ^{re-} did not appear as opposed to 71.8 per cent of those who joined the Party after 1949.² Hence the purge of the Cultural Revolutionary Left had hit mainly the Central Committee members with low party sincerity and representatives of mass organizations.

The Eleventh CCPC presented itself as a more civilian, more cadre oriented, and more veteran leadership group with a tendency towards a slightly stronger representation of the Central Committee than the Ninth and the Tenth CCPC.

The rise of the moderates in the Party was well witnessed by the appointment of large number of veterans and people with scientific and organisational skills to CCP's Central Committee. Among the 201 full members appointed to the Eleventh CCPC, there were 76 (37.8 per cent), who had been purged as "capitalist roaders" and "anti-party elements" during the Cultural Revolution.

2 Ibid., p.7.

On the day following the close of the Eleventh CCP Congress, the first Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCPC was immediately convened and elected the Eleventh Politbureau, which was composed of 23 full members and 3 alternate members. The membership of the Politbureau covered a broad range of interests. "All the thirteen living members of the Tenth Politbureau were re-elected to the Eleventh Politbureau, and two alternate members became full members. The other eleven members or alternate members of the Eleventh Politbureau were newly elected."³

"Among the 26 members and alternate members of the Eleventh Politbureau, military cadres number 11, cadres of the Party and State organs number 13, and the representatives of workers - peasants masses and intellectual youth number only 2."⁴

It is noteworthy that 5 members constituting the Standing Committee of the Eleventh Central Committee represented more concentrated power base than the elected by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Central Committee. The Standing Committee of the Tenth Politbureau was composed of the Chairman and all Vice-Chairmen of the Tenth CCPC and three other members whereas the Standing Committee of the Eleventh

3 Chao Hsien-yun, "Implications of the Eleventh CCP Congress", Issue and Studies (Taipei), vol.13, no.11, November 1977, p.31.

4 Ibid., p.31.

Politbureau was exclusively composed of the Chairman and all Vice-Chairmen of the Eleventh CCPC. The members were Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiennian and Wang Dongxing. This signified the victory of the moderates, a characteristic development in the post-Mao era.

Revised Party Constitution

With regard to the character and guiding ideology of the Party, the basic essence of the Constitution adopted by the Eighth CCP Congress on 26 September 1956 had been reintroduced. It defined the CCP as "the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the highest form of its class organization". At the Tenth Congress in August 1973, the statement was amended to read, "The Communist Party of China is the Political Party of the Proletariat, the vanguard of the Proletariat". The constitution adopted by the Eleventh Congress stipulated that "The CCP is the political party of the Proletariat, the highest form of its class organisation. It is vigorous vanguard organisation composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat..."

The statement that the CCP is "the highest form of its class organisation" implies that the CCP is the highest form of organisation that exercises dictatorship of the proletariat. The new leaders meant that they would no longer tolerate any resurgence of the chaos and confusion of the Cultural Revolution and they were determined to consolidate the party leadership over

the mass organisation. In fact, it was Mao who personally pushed the policy of relying on the "broad revolutionary masses" to carry out the rectification of the Party which included the masses to be present at the meeting of the CCPC⁵ and to participate in drafting the Party constitution⁶ of enlisting the "advanced elements" as Party members and of kicking out Party Committees so as to have workers stationed in school and cultural organisations and assigned to carry out the principle that "the working class must exercise leadership in everything". Now the leadership team puts all the blame on the 'gang of four'!

The basic programme and tasks of the CCP, the Constitution adopted by the Tenth CCP Congress reads: "The basic programme of the CCP is the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in place of dictatorship of bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism. The ultimate aim of the party is the realization of Communism". Congruous in meaning with the preceding one, the Constitution of the Eleventh CCP Congress stipulates: "The basic programme of the CCP for the entire period of socialism is to persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of

5 Refer to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth CCPC in August 1966.

6 Lin Biao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the CCP", Peking (Beijing) Review, no.18, 28, April 1969, p.30.

proletariat, eliminate the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes step by step, and bring about the triumph of socialism over capitalism. The ultimate aim of the Party is the realization of Communism". The change of the phrase "the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes" into "eliminate... step by step" again reflected the new leadership's intention to put an end to the Cultural Revolution line as represented by the Party Constitution of the Ninth and the Tenth CCP Congresses.

In the report on the revision of Party Constitution, Yeh Jianying advocated "gradual transition to communist society".⁷ In Yeh's views "society will remain socialist for a period of time after imperialism and social imperialism are totally overthrown."⁸ Mao expected a quick realization of communism, when he established the system of people's communes. But the experience gained in past years has taught the new leadership that communist society is a remote ideal. As it was not in the interest of the new ruling clique specifically to negate Mao's line, they used Mao's word to undo his policies.

The Party Constitution contained the revised version of the domestic tasks such as: "the Communist Party of China adheres to its basic line for the entire historical period of socialism. It must correctly distinguish and handle the

7 Ye Jianying, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution" Peking (Beijing) Review, no.36, 2 September 1977, p.28.

8 Ibid.

contradiction among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy, and consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of proletariat" and "the Party must lead the people of all nationalities in making China a powerful socialist country with a modernised agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century."⁹ The former is a background slogan, the latter unseen in the constitution by the Ninth and the Tenth Congresses, spells out the strong desire of the new leadership for economic development.

Democratic centralism in the party has been the subject of much controversy since the death of Mao and the ouster of the 'gang of four'. As the Chinese Communist propaganda machine puts it, "To consolidate democratic centralism in the Party, it is necessary to safeguard the united leadership of the Party" and to protect the united leadership of the Party, "everything must be submitted to the command of the CCPC headed by Chairman Hua." Ye Jianying reprimanded the gang for having undermined both democracy and centralism. He asserted, "There really are people in our Party who are addicted to bourgeois factionalism and have a liking for indiscipline and for anarchy and who prefer to remain free from constraint by the Party organization and leadership."¹⁰ The new leadership made their intention clear

9 For the text of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China see Peking (Beijing) Review, no.36, 2 September 1977, pp.16-22.

10 Peking (Beijing) Review, n.7, pp.30-31.

to abandon the Mao like absolutist rule and to enhance their own leadership statute.

Ye Jianying maintained that "the Communist Party must have not only democracy, but also and still more so, "centralism" and that "the proletarian party's iron discipline is one of the basic conditions for defeating the bourgeoisie and achieving victory in the revolution."¹¹ The new Party Constitution also stipulated that "the whole Party must observe democratic centralism discipline... And the Central Committee of the Party, local Party Committees at the country level and upwards and Party Committees in the army units at the regimental level and upwards should set up commissions for inspecting discipline. The Commissions for inspecting discipline at all levels were to be elected by the Party Committees at the respective levels and under their leadership should strengthen Party members education on discipline, be responsible for checking on the observance of discipline by Party members and party cadres and struggle against all branches of Party disciplines. The Commissions for inspecting discipline seemed to aim especially at violation of Party discipline.

Political Report

Both Hua's Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress and the Party Constitution it adopted, made much of

11 Ibid., p.31.

the adage: "hold high the great banner of Chairman Mao and resolutely defend it."¹² Ostensibly the new leadership took a positive view on Mao's thought line and his personal history, but a careful study of the proceedings shows how the Congress had intelligently manipulated his policies.

Mao's policy of "three red banners" was that of an adventurist and his dedication to struggle, rebellion and warfare, especially during the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolution speaks volumes for his proclivity towards violence. These most distinctive characteristics of Mao's policy have been consigned to permanent or at least temporary cold storage by the new leadership. The new power holders' proclamation of the end of the turbulent Cultural Revolution indicated that they had made great efforts to filter out the adventurist and more violent elements of Mao's thought. Also gone are the ideological accorns planted during the Cultural Revolution.

However, the new leadership did not criticise Maoism openly when it fell in line with their goals. Mao's "Three World Theory" and the "Continuous Revolution" became sharp weapons to defend the power that the new leaders had usurped

12 Hua Guofeng, "Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC", Beijing Review, no.35, 26 August 1977, p.24; "Constitution of the Communist Party of China", Peking (Beijing) Review, no.36, 2 September 1977, p.18.

and to deal with their opponents. But new interpretations had been invested to the theory in terms of the aims of revolution.

Things have not always followed the course cherished by Mao. The most remarkable characteristic of the Cultural Revolution was the use of armed forces for seizing power. All violent measures during the Cultural Revolution, believed to have been endorsed by Mao, led to chaos and confusion. When the new leaders proclaimed the termination of the Cultural Revolution, they hinted that they would reject all measures adopted during the Cultural Revolution. To avoid damaging Mao's prestige, they took a positive view on the supposed achievements of the Cultural Revolution and placed the blame for failures and turmoil on the 'gang of four'.¹³

The new power holders moved a step forward by subordinating revolutionary ideology to a production-oriented programme of economic growth. They made it clear that they wanted modernisation in the fields of "agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology". The shift of emphasis in domestic policies had run afoul of the new leadership's pledge to "hold high the great banner of Chairman Mao."

Mao's thought itself is replete with contradictions, intricacies and sophistry. As Mao left no successor to

13 Ibid., no.35, p.26.

interpret his thought, all ranking CCP members are entitled to turn it to their advantage when necessary. "This being the case, Mao's thought in the end became a source of new intra-party political infighting."¹⁴

The new ruling group was well aware of the crisis and thus was compelled to accept the contradictions that arose from their drastic change in ideology from radicalism to pragmatic programmes of economic development. What is more, the destabilisation of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 served as the best example of the possible outcome of de-Maoism. In view of the unhappy consequences of destabilization of the CPSU, the new leadership knew for certain that they must hold tight the sword of Mao to consolidate their grip on the ^etentacles of Beijing power. It is thus easy to understand why Hua calls himself a "good student and successor of Mao.

The Episode of Eleventh Struggle in the Party

Hua's Political Report tried to rationalize the purge of the 'gang of four' and justified the moderate policies which were the outcome of the moderates' victory over Jiang Qing and other radicals.

14 Chiu K'ung-yuan, "Proceedings of the Eleventh CCP Congress : An Analysis", Issues and Studies, vol.13, no.10, October 1977, p.4.

After a profound tribute to the Chairman Mao and to other leaders and members who had died since the Tenth Congress, the first section of the Report dealt with the "Eleventh Struggle between two lines in our Party", that was between the Party, i.e. the moderates, and the 'gang of four' i.e. the Radicals.

The struggle between the 'gang' and the 'Party' was traced back to 1974. "In January 1974, behind Chairman Mao's back and without prior discussion in the Politbureau, the 'gang of four' smuggled the criticism of "entering by the back door into the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius".¹⁵ It was reported that instead of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, the gang launched their attack against Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice-Chairman Ye Jianying and many other leading comrades in the Party, the government and the army at the central and local levels. Hua said that Mao was conscious about the development and did rebuff them; "Don't carry on factional activities. Those who do will take a tumble".¹⁶

The 'gang of four' was not reconciled to their defeat. The Report stated that the "gang" again led astray in the year 1975. Hua pointed out:

Going against Chairman Mao's significant directive concerning the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and against his teaching that revisionism is the main danger at present.

15 Peking (Beijing) Review, no.35, n.12, p.26.

16 Ibid., p.27.

They raised a din about empiricism being the main current danger, in an effort to label veteran cadres as 'empiricists' and strike at Premier Chou and other leading comrades of the Central Committee. 17

This clearly indicated the new power holders' severity of attack on the 'gang of four'.

The report further stated that the "gang" was severely criticised by Chairman Mao on many occasions and they were at a constant look out for a counter-attack. "In August 1975, Chairman Mao commented penetratingly on the novel Water Margin. Thinking this gave them an opportunity the gang of four maliciously distorted his comments and launched a vicious propaganda drive to smear the Chairman and split the Central Committee".¹⁸

To further consolidate his attack on the "Gang", he added that prior to the death of Premier Zhou and in the days following it, the Gang ran amuck again. They made attacks on Zhou and suppressed and persecuted vast numbers of cadres and people who mourned him. Defying Mao's instructions and going on their own way, they attacked Comrade Deng and brought false charges against him and demanded that Zhang Chunqiao be made Premier. But, according to the Report, Mao intervened and on his proposal, the Central Committee appointed Hua as the Premier. And on the proposal of Mao a post of

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p.28.

First Vice-Chairman was created to prevent the "gang" from coming to power.

Thus we find that the Report went on to the extent of exposing how the radicals diverted the course of each movement initiated by late Chairman Mao following the Tenth Party Congress. Hua reconstructed the struggle indicating the counter measures taken by Mao. Mao was quoted extensively to show his adherence towards the 'gang'. The main charge against the "gang" was that they tried their hardest to cause damage and disruption. It was alleged that the Radicals indulged in disruptive activities even though Mao pointed out more than once that "eight years have passed since the GPCR started. It is preferable to have stability now. The whole party and the whole army should get united". Further, the Radicals were accused of "exploiting every political movement launched by Chairman Mao to do something different.... They used all sorts of underhand methods to oppose Chairman Mao, the Central Committee headed by him and his revolutionary line, in their attempt to achieve supreme power in the Party and State..."¹⁹

Reassessment of the Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution and the downfall of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' have been entered into the Party Chronicles as victories of the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh

¹⁹ Ibid., pp.25-6.

two line struggles in the Party, with each victory being solemnized by the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Party Congresses in 1969, 1973 and 1977 respectively.

Hua's report newly defined the duration of the Cultural Revolution. To him, "The smashing of the 'gang of four' marks the triumphant conclusion of our great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which lasted eleven years."²⁰ This implied that the Cultural Revolution lasted as long as Jian Qing lasted, and that it came to an end with the overthrow of the gang, which was sanctioned by this Party Congress. The GPCR was thus a dark period of history. Nevertheless, in accordance with the established ritual, it was still called 'great' and 'the first'.

Announcing the 'triumphant conclusion' of the first GPCR, Chairman Hua said that the present drive for stability and unity did not mean writing off class struggle. He affirmed, "This struggle will be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp political revolutions in the nature of the Cultural Revolution will take place many times in the future."²¹ This perspective too was somewhat modified in 1978 when the Third Plenum reserved its assessment of the GPCR and gave milder understanding of the nature of class struggle during the socialist period.

20 "The 11th Party Congress", China News Analysis (Hong Kong), no.1095, 7 October 1977, p.6.

21 Peking (Beijing) Review, no.35, n.12, p.39.

Mao did not make any specific exposition of his theory "Continuous Revolution" in any particular essay or speech, but his ideas can be brought together from his various writings and speeches. However, Mao has left behind an incomplete theory which naturally lends itself to misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

Paradoxically, the best and most comprehensive preservation of the theory is enshrined in the Political Report to the Eleventh Congress. Hua declared:

In the theory Chairman Mao applies the dialectical materialist law of the unity of opposition to the study and analysis of socialist society and points out that socialist society covers a historical period of considerable length and that in this period class contradiction and class struggle, the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road and the danger of capitalist restoration invariably continue to exist, and there is a threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and social imperialism. Therefore, in the historical period, it is imperative for the proletariat to persist in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and in dictatorship over the latter and it is imperative to persist in continuing the revolution under this dictatorship. 22

This statement implies that the new power holders were in favour of the 'Continuous Revolution'.

But when we go to analyse another statement made by Hua, we tend to be perplexed regarding the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The report said:

It is necessary to carry on the revolution in the realm of relations of production and to consolidate and develop socialist public ownership and other aspects of the socialist relation of production so that they will correspond better with the productive forces. It is necessary to introduce technical innovations, to carry out technical revolution and speedily develop productive forces so as to provide the socialist system with a growing material base and promote change and development in relations of production and the superstructure. 23

These lines clearly indicated that the leadership had started deviating from the theory of Continuous Revolution. Mao in his article on "Correct handling of Contradictions" explained that only by breaking the fetters of relations of production can the productive forces grow. That is, productive forces can grow only if the revolution was conducted in the realm of relations of production. In his review of Stalin's book on Soviet Economy, Mao said, "First production relations have to be changed and only then the productive forces can be broadly developed. This rule is universal."²⁴

On the contrary, the new leadership gave an impression that development of productive forces would cause capitalist forms of division of labour or other bourgeois social relations would disappear. Thus they reversed the relationship between productive forces and productive relations.

23 Ibid.

24 Mao Tse-tung, A Critique of Soviet Economy, Trans. (New York, 1977), p.17.

In the next step, they said that in order to promote change and development in relations of production and the super-structure, it was necessary to carry on technical revolution. It meant that productive forces always go ahead. If the productive forces are developed, spontaneous change and development will occur accordingly in relations of production. In effect they stressed the development of the productive forces or the technical revolution. Thus they smuggled through back door the ideas of Liu Shaoqi.

Relevance of the Veterans

With the return of the pre-cultural revolutionary policies came the return of those who had flourished under them. In February 1978, the Chinese People's Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a long dormant united front organisation was revived, with Deng Xiaoping as its new Chairman, to serve as a back door through which once purged veterans could be discreetly reinserted into political life. In April 1978, in its first effort at a general rehabilitation, the Party Central Committee ordered a case by case review of all those purged in the 1957 anti-rightist campaign. "Those found to have been wrongly convicted should be compensated", the document said, "and where age and health permitted, given new work on assignments by the State Planning Commission, where the original verdicts were upheld, the victims 'bourgeois rightist' labels were simply to be removed and their political rights restored."²⁵

25 Phillip Short, The Dragon and the Bear (London, 1982), p.223.

Many of those brought back were former Governors, Vice-Governors, Commanders of military regions and districts, as well as lower officials and were unknown outside China. A long section of Hua's Political Report at the Eleventh Congress was devoted to explaining why such men should be brought back. "The gang of four", he said, "perverted Mao's teaching on the question of capitalist roaders within the Party, thus creating much confusion... They equated veteran cadres with democrats and democrats with capitalist roaders."²⁶ Using this device, they had tried to overthrow veteran officials who refused to follow them, even the overwhelming majority of these men were loyal to Mao and had become the mainstay of the country's administration.

The return of the veterans to power was portrayed as part of a much broader United Front Policy, whose aim was to mobilise all sections of Chinese society, communist and non-communist, behind the new regime. But the veterans had special importance because they were the only experienced veterans the leaders could rely on to restore discipline and promote its policies. Younger officials in their thirties and forties, even if they had no direct connections with the leftists, had risen to power and had formed their political outlook during the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. "The veterans had been struck down because they

26 Beijing Review, no.35, n.12, p.32.

believed in the pre-cultural revolution policies which Deng was now bringing back. They still believed in those policies. This was the second and last chance to make them work.²⁷

Foreign Policy

When Hua moved to discuss "the situation and our tasks", the first emphasis was once again upon bringing order to the nation; but employing that optimism Hua professed to see "very good" international conditions. "The international united front against aggression, interference, subversion, control and bullying by the Super Powers is broadening", he reported, and "both the hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are beset with difficulties and crises and are having a harder and harder line."²⁸

A critical analysis of the international political scenario of that period was that, the United States, as a declining power, was in an essentially defensive position while the Soviet Union had launched a campaign of expansion. These two nations served as the source of an inevitable new world war, with "Soviet social-imperialism" representing the greater danger. While Soviet-US contention extended to every part of the world, the focus remained Europe. The immediate danger was that strong forces in the West favoured a policy of appeasement, wanting to follow Chamberlain's steps,

27 Phillip Short, n.25, p.226.

28 Peking (Beijing) Review, no.35, n.12, p.40.

and then could only abet Soviet expansionist ambitions and hasten the outbreak of war.²⁹

The world, according to Mao, was divided into three parts: the Super Powers, the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today and the common enemies of the people of the world; the second world countries, those national capitalist states comprising West Europe and Japan which are both exploiters and exploited; and the third world countries who suffer the worst oppression and hence put up the strongest resistance. China as a developing socialist country, belongs to the third world, and stands firmly with other developing nations, Hua asserted in concluding his global survey.

Concerning Sino-American relations, Hua's comments were straight forward and to the point. He said that the two nations differed in social system and ideology and there were fundamental differences between them. The Shanghai Communiqué must serve as the basis for relations at present, and that Communiqué, in addition to providing that neither state shall seek hegemony, provides in its spirit the withdrawal of all armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan straits area, and an abrogation of the "so called 'mutual defence treaty'", if relations between the United States and the PRC were to be normalized. How and when Taiwan is "liberated", moreover, is entirely China's internal affair, "which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever".

29 Ibid., pp.40-41.

Hua's recitation of foreign affairs continued with an analysis of the Soviet problem. Here, sharp words were employed. "The Soviet leading clique has betrayed Marxism-Leninism. Restoring capitalism and enforcing fascist dictatorship at home and pushing hegemonism and perpetrating aggression and expansion abroad, it has brought about degeneration of the Soviet Union, which has become a social-imperialist country".³⁰ Nevertheless, Hua continued to say that the Chinese had always shown their desire to maintain formal state relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Five Principles of Co-existence. The Soviets, however, have not shown one iota of good faith in improving relations. No progress on the boundary issue has been achieved, and within the Soviet Union, "one anti-China wave after another" has been whipped up. Thus Hua had put the entire blame on the Soviet Union and firmly asserted that China will not attack anyone, but if it is attacked, it will wipe out any enemy that dares to invade.

The section concluded with a call for a 'broad united front against the hegemonism of the two Super Powers, and the development of relations with other countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence. Coupled with this was the call for unity with all "genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations" against "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique".

30 Ibid., p.41.

In these passages, there is scant comfort for either the United States or the Soviet Union. One passage in this section reveals more clearly and concisely than any other fundamental position of the PRC leadership towards these two states. Quoting directly from Lenin, Hua asserted:

The more powerful enemy (read the USSR) can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully making use without fail of every, even the smallest, "rift" among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisies within the various countries and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional (read the United States). 31

Relations with the United States, in sum, are to be seen in tactical terms, with the parallel that of Chinese communist policies during the Sino-Japanese war. At that point, it was essential to unite with the Guo Mindang (read the United States) as well as with China's national bourgeoisie (read Japan and West Europe), while seeking to acquire leadership of the peasants and proletariat (read the Third World) in the struggle against the primary enemy, Japan (read the USSR).

For achieving great order Hua in the Eleventh Party Congress enunciated an 'eight point programme'.³² The eight tasks are: (a) expanding and deepening the anti-'gang of four'

31 Ibid.

32 For details, Ibid., pp.44-57.

campaign, (b) launching a rectification campaign within the CCP to purify, consolidate and enlarge it, (c) reshuffling the leading bodies of the CCP at various levels, (d) expanding productivity with an all-out effort to make up for a lost time, (e) building up a new cultural and educational system, (f) strengthening the state apparatus, including defence and internal security, (g) democratising the country's political life, (h) mobilising all positive forces to build up socialism.

The first task says that the attack against the Gang must be carried through "to the end". Enemies remain and must be liquidated, with care taken, however, to distinguish between those who are true enemies and those who have made mistakes but are willing to repent. Uniting with "more than 95 per cent of the cadres and the masses", the supporters of the Gang must be isolated. In such passages we are informed that a thorough investigation of cadres to continue, with the removal of any remaining supporters of the Gang was essential.

Hua admitted that party had been "seriously corroded" as an organism, with unity and discipline undermined and relations with the masses damaged due to the actions of the Gang. He called for a purification of the ranks, and renewed effort to strengthen party organization and discipline on the basis of "democratic centralist principles". Once again, this is testimony to the concern over discipline in cadre

rank, the factionalism induced by the events of the recent past, and the need to win the mass support.

The third task asked for screening of leading bodies and the shaking up of local leadership, particularly, in cases where Gang recruits have borrowed into authority. More cooperation between young, middle aged, and old cadres was essential for the purpose.

Mao himself once asserted, "There are several hundred thousand cadres at the level of the country Party Committee and above who hold the destiny of the country in their hands." Using this quotation, Hua announced to continue the struggle against "the bureaucratic style of work" and the growth of "an aristocratic stratum divorced from the people." Hua thus followed a long line of leaders in condemning bureaucratism in a system that can only operate via bureaucratism.

While the first three tasks are interrelated and centre around rectification, the fourth task stressed for promoting production and moving the national economy forward. Within the perspective of 'grasp', the very link of class struggle and establish great order across the land, "the programme had maintained a great deal of continuity with the main orientation of the GPCR while it severely attacked the Gang and called for a new stress in economic development."³³ Thus the Party aimed at making up for the economic losses caused by the Gang's interference and destructive actions and

33 V.P. Dutt (ed.), China - The Post-Mao View, (Delhi, 1981), p. 51.

remedying the economic superstructure-production relations so as to see the economy on the right track through strengthened centralised leadership of the Party and improved productivity. "In this recital the thorny question of economic incentives was not resolved, but Hua made it clear that modernization will be China's top priority in the years immediately ahead."³⁴ However, things gradually changed in subsequent months and by the end of 1978 the strategies and policies of Four Modernization were put forth as a wholesome counter-thesis to the GPCR.

To implement this goal, a fifth task was to develop socialist culture and education. Here, Hua promptly attacked what he described as the Gang's interference and sabotage of higher education and culture, and called for the development of "a vast army" of technical cadres, and of "professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists and Marxist theorists". Once again, the pledge was to "let a hundred flowers blossom and contend, ... making the past serve the present and things foreign serve China, and ... weeding through the old to bring forth the new."³⁵ The call to China's intellectual community was for the creation of a large, new scientific technological class that will hold the destiny of China in its hands. Thus Hua's reference to China's intelligentsia was with warmth and appreciation in contrast to the hostility to them by the Gang.

34 Robert A. Scalapino, "The Policies of the Post-Mao Era: An Examination of the 11th Party Congress," Asian Survey (California), vol.17, no.11, November 1977, p.1058.

35 Peking (Beijing) Review, no.35, n.12, p.51.

Once again, the Gang and its followers were held responsible for problems both of modernization and of party control over the military. Hua admitted to serious factionalism and a tendency toward "the mountain stronghold mentality" in military ranks. The task is thus a dual one: to employ science and technology so that the Chinese army, navy and airforce can be upto-date of the needs of either a conventional or nuclear war. Second, discipline and unity must be restored within the military, and an integration of militia and military work must be effected. In addition, "we must strengthen our public security work and the socialist legal system",³⁶ directing the dictatorship against the reactionary classes and the counter revolutionaries. Once again, in outlining this task Hua did not signal specific decisions regarding military modernization, and it was possible that no final decisions had been made, given the controversies over the issue in the past. This question still remains as an acute importance in the international arena of nuclear arms race.

The seventh task displayed the fundamental paradox imbedded in Maoism. Citizens should be allowed to speak out and criticize the party and government, asserted Hua, citing Mao, but all acts in violation of party organization and discipline must be severely punished. And party discipline included the principle that the individual was subordinate

36 Ibid., p.54.

to the majority; the lower level was subordinate to the higher level; and the party was subordinate to the Central Committee. Needless to say, Hua did not add that in practice, the Central Committee is subordinate to the Politbureau. Nor did he dwell here upon the fact that criticism against those in power has often provided a quick one way ticket to prison, although the media featured various martyrs who were imprisoned because they dared to criticize the Gang during their era of authority. There can be no doubt, however, that in seeking to handle one of their commitments, that of "democracy", Chinese leaders continue to wrestle with the implications of allowing the people to have some voice - if not governance at least in criticism - while at the same time retaining "the dictatorship of the proletariat", a dictatorship, which in practice raises a few individuals to a pinnacle of great power, and has normally demanded a final authority in the person of one man. It is another paradox that cannot be fully or finally resolved.

As an eighth task, "of overall consideration and all round arrangement",³⁷ the party and government, in sum, must have a strategic vision, and all specific policies - be they sending youth to the countryside, policies towards minorities, finding jobs for cadres, or united front activities - must fit into and be coordinated with that strategic vision.

Taken as a whole, the Eight Point Programme of Hua is one of ending the 'great disorder' caused by the Gang and striving to establish 'great order' through construction, restoration and development.

37 Ibid., p.55.

As one reviews the political document of the Eleventh Party Congress, two central themes stand out: that of "bringing great order across the land", and "building a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry and defence-based upon a solid scientific technological base." These are obviously intertwined objectives since the fulfilment of the first is a prerequisite - if not the only prerequisite - for the second. It is significant but not surprising that after more than thirty years under socialism, the unification of China remains incomplete; the issues of factionalism, provincialism, regionalism still exist. Given the massive size of the country both in area and in population, one would not expect the nation building process to have been consummated quickly or easily despite the rich heritage of a single great cultural legacy. Moreover, the Chinese communists have often exacerbated their problems, the Cultural Revolution being an outstanding example. On the economic front also, the challenge is prodigious one. In his lengthy address, Hua outlined the broad strategy, the most basic goals, and in doing so, he signalled a certain turn-away from the Maoist era, despite the fact that the turn was camouflaged with Maoist rhetoric. But it is via specific policies that goals can be achieved or lost.

The Eleventh Party Congress will go down in history as an important turning point. It ended an era of destabilisation and revolutionary tension, and made the way for a new

era of normalisation, stabilisation, productivity and modernisation. Whether the great order has yet appeared or not, we will review in the next chapter. As regards the Maoist path of socialist revolution, the prevalent situation during the Eleventh Party Congress was highlighted by correcting the deviations from the Maoist norms and work style, etc. rather than deviating from the Maoist line. With a historical perspective, one can never imagine that things in China would not change. As things develop, China would march ahead into the future and leave the Maoist era far behind. It seems Mao would become less and less relevant to China's development.

CHAPTER III

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE TWELFTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA : THE PERIOD OF DE-MAOISATION**

The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC was held from 1 to 11 September 1982 with 1,545 delegates and 145 alternate delegates in attendance. Since the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the CPC has always convened a national congress at the end of a fierce power struggle. For example, the Ninth Congress (in 1969) was held after Mao Zedong defeated Liu S^S Zhaoqi; the Tenth Congress (in 1973) was held after the struggle between Mao and Lin Biao; and the Eleventh Congress (in 1977) was held following the ouster of the 'gang of four' by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying; and the Twelfth Congress, the latest one, was held after Deng Xiaoping had gained an upper hand in the fierce struggle with Hua Guofeng. Obviously, by convening the national congress, the Deng faction intended to consolidate its leadership within the Party and to further promote its guidelines, policies and reforms.

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC was a watershed in the post-Mao period. It marked the inauguration of the struggle between the beneficiaries of Mao's regime, particularly of the Cultural Revolution period and its victims. The Plenum mirrored the ascendancy of Deng and a decline of Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor. It signified the launching of an intense inner-party struggle both politically and organizationally. In this plenum held in December 1978, the "party adopted a series of new and correct policies after studying the new situation and new experience". Deng told the Twelfth Congress in his inaugural

speech that a plenary session of the Central Committee was no doubt important, but it did not have the authority of a party congress. Therefore, the primary objective of the post-Mao leadership was to win legitimacy and secure the endorsement of these new policies at a full-fledged Congress.

In all the eleven congresses of the Communist Party of China, major policy changes have inevitably been accompanied with fierce factional and political struggles. Therefore, the Twelfth Party Congress's objective was to bring about such alterations in the composition and leadership of the party which would facilitate several other changes in policies and power equations with a view to "create a new situation in all fields" (as Deng said).

Internationally, the third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee was followed by two important events: Chinese attack on Vietnam and establishment of diplomatic ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US). Perhaps these two interrelated events should be studied in the context of the factional struggle which raged in the party in the first two years of post-Mao period and which had ended in an uneasy and therefore temporary compromise, both in organizational and policy areas in the third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee. Since then, the Beijing-Washington controversy over the Taiwan issue, has induced the leadership to scale down their expectations from the US economically, politically and militarily. On the other point, Beijing failed in its attempt to teach Hanoi a lesson.

Now coming down to the domestic front during this period, the policy of production incentives gave rise to problems of growing disparity in the countryside and generated some negative effects. So at the Twelfth Congress candid references were made to "economic corruption, shocking obstruction of work, timidity bureaucratism", "appalling wastefulness" and "chaotic management" as some of the distortions which had come to the fore.¹

It was but natural that this should have intensified the factional struggle making Deng's task more difficult, within the party and the country.

Deng's ascendancy of power was accompanied by the removal of Hua from the chairmanship of the CPC and his replacement by Hu Yaobang. However, Deng had to contend with opposition, particularly in the provinces and at the lower and middle levels of the party. Only a party congress can purge the cadres in the provinces and clear the ways for the new leadership to pursue its new policies. By no means this was an easy task. That is why the congress which was scheduled to be held towards the end of 1980 had to be postponed till the end of 1982. Thus the Congress was convened when the principal factions opposed to the Maoist line came to an agreement that they should give priority to revamp the party, carry on further purge of sympathisers and supporters of the 'gang' and provide a legal

1 R.K. Mishra, 12th Congress of Chinese Communist Party : An Overview (Delhi: Patriot Publications, 1982), p.4.

framework for the functioning of the party and the state. This weakened the influence of Hu which reduced his chances of a comeback.

In his opening speech to the Twelfth Congress, Deng announced the following three main items on the agenda: (1) consideration of the report of the Eleventh Central Committee and a decision on the Party's programme for striving to create a new situation in all fields of socialist modernisation; (2) consideration and adoption of the new Party Constitution; and (3) election of a new Central Committee, a Central Advisory Commission, and a new Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.² In fact these three items deal mainly with the questions concerning economic construction, Party rectification, and power distribution.

Hu Yaobang's report to the Twelfth National Congress has six parts: Part I: 'A Historic Change and Our Great New Task'; Part II: 'Bring About an All Round Upsurge of the Socialist Economy'; Part III: 'Strive to Build a High Level of Socialist Spiritual Civilization'; Part IV: 'Strive to Attain a High Level of Socialist Democracy'; Part V: 'Adhere to an Independent Foreign Policy'; Part VI: 'Make the Party a Strong Leading Core for the Cause of Socialist Modernization'.³

2 See Deng Xiaoping's opening speech at the 12th National Party Congress in News From China, no.47, 1 September 1982, pp.2-5; also in Beijing Review, no.36, 6 September 1982, pp.4-5.

3 Text of the Report of Hu Yaobang to the 12th Party Congress, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernisation". See Beijing Review, vol.25, no.37, 13 September 1982, pp.11-40.

The first part is a brief survey of the developments in between Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses. The rest of the report deals with the new leadership's view of future developments, specifying the important tasks in the immediate future with an eye on the long term development till the end of the 20th century.

The political line adopted by the Congress is to firmly adhere to the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Party and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and to concentrate all forces on promoting socialist modernization and an all round leap forward in socialist economy. However, the retrospection part of the report tries to maintain a delicate balance between de-Nazification and wholesale restoration of the Maoist line:

It is generally believed in China that this was the result of compromises between different leadership factions within the party. Perhaps Deng also realised that some remnants of the cult remained necessary for the assertion of his own authority in the country. 4

The report is more self-critical of the party rather than laying the entire blame on Mao Zedong. In his report Hu Yaobang resorts to the Maoist strategy to divide Mao into two parts: the hero and the villain. About Mao's singular contribution to the Communist victory in China there is no disagreement: "Comrade Mao Zedong's contributions to the Chinese revolution were great and indelible; that is why

4 Gargi Datta, "Chinese Fear of Western Culture", Times of India (New Delhi), 13 February 1984.

over long years he enjoyed enormous prestige in the party and among the people and will continue to do so in the years to come."⁵

However, the Twelfth Congress Report has passed quite severe strictures on Mao both explicitly and implicitly. In this Report, Hu refers to 'fettors of dogmatism and personality cult'.⁶ The word 'fettors' has very serious connotations. It was in deference to Mao that Hu did not elaborate. "Hu's delicate balancing reflects the dilemma of the present leadership: Mao's mistakes were too serious to eschew criticism, yet his face must be saved as far as possible".⁷ It seems that Hu has left the task to his lower colleagues to perform the unpleasant task of sharp talking.

The Twelfth Congress Report's references are to re-affirming the 'Marxist ideological, political and organizational lines', to correcting the Maoist deviation in Mao's later years of life and returning to 'the fine traditions developed by the party during long years of struggle, safeguarding the scientific truth of Mao Zedong Thought'.⁸ Hu added, "In the final analysis, our party has been successful in the above efforts because it has adhered to the scientific Marxist principles of combining theory with practice and of

5 Beijing Review, n.3, p.12.

6 Ibid., p.12.

7 Ten Chung, "Post Mao China's New Path : A Study of the Yaobang's Twelfth Party Congress Report", China Report (New Delhi), vol.19, no.2, March-April 1982, p.8.

8 Beijing Review, n.3, pp.12-13.

reorganizing the people as the makers of history."⁹ However, the concept of 'Mao Zedong Thought' now is rather different from that in the past and certainly it is not the same as what Hua stated: whatever was said by Mao is truth, and whatever was decided by Mao should not be altered. Hu's reference to the return to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought has to be read along with his observations that "we have resolutely broken the fetters of dogmatism" and "thoroughly shattered the heavy chains imposed by the protracted "Left" mistakes."¹⁰ Hence the anti-dogmatic approach to Marxism is enunciated in the report.

Economic Construction

It is clear from the Twelfth Congress Report that the Chinese have advanced quite far along China's own socialist path. Mao's famous 'General Line' has now been drastically revised to read,

The general task of the Communist Party of China in this new historical period is to unite the people of all our nationalities, in working hard and self-reliantly to achieve, step by step, the modernisation of our industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology and to make China a culturally advanced and highly democratic socialist country. 11

The essence of the new pragmatic approach is the reiteration of 'step by step'. "This is meant to correct Mao; impatience

9 Ibid., p.14.

10 Ibid., p.12.

11 Ibid.

with waiting for things to take their own course".¹² Mao was unhappy about the fact that even after so many years China was unable to overtake the United States. It was this Maoist impatience or misguided zeal which forced him to commit one of those 'foolish things' in launching the 'Great Leap Forward' in later part of the 50's, causing heavy damage to the countryside.

In his speech to the Twelfth Congress of CPC, Deng said that as early as the Eighth CPC's National Congress in 1956, there was a proposal for developing all-out socialist construction but, for many reasons, the proposal was not carried out. The main reasons were the failure of the "Three Red Banner" policy, i.e., the "General Line, Great Leap Forward and People's Communes" in 1958 and 1959, and the damage done by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's. After the fall of the 'gang' in October 1976, the Chinese Communists again called for modernisation under the slogan of realizing the "Four Modernisations" by the end of the twentieth century. A "ten-year economic plan" was formulated by Hua in 1978, to realize that goal. However, that economic plan which was later proved to be grandiose and impractical was put aside. Beginning in 1979, an economic readjustment was made in line with the eight character principles. However, when it was put into practice in 1979 and 1980, the economic readjustment

12 Tan Chung, n.7, p.10.

policy did not bring about the expected results, rather it resulted in galloping inflation, financial deficits and marked price increases because of the many contradictions between the readjustment measures and restructuring policies. A further readjustment measures of the economy were taken later. In his report to the Twelfth Congress, Hu summed up various economic policies adopted in the past and formulated a new one to be followed in the coming twenty years.

The Cultural Revolution led China's economy to the brink of collapse. However, in the two years following the ouster of the 'gang', the leaders based their intention on using foreign equipment and technology to realize a "leap forward". But just depending on West for foreign equipment and technology can never make the nation fully modernized. China is the most populated country with one billion people and has a developing economic foundation, and the economic construction can only be achieved when the problem of feeding and clothing of one billion people on the mainland has been solved. It is exactly for this reason that the Chinese communists have put aside the slogan of realizing the Four Modernizations by the end of this century and decided for a long range plan for socialist modernization.¹³

13 Chung Chen-pang, "Analytical Study of the 12th CCP National Congress", Issues and Studies (Taipei), vol.18, no.11, November 1982, p.16.

Actually, the objective set out by Hu for mainland China's economic construction in the coming twenty years was ambitious. He presented a perspective of China's economic development till the end of this century, by which time the country will strive to "quadruple the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2,800 billion yuan or so in 2000."¹⁴ This is only reaching the level of development of the US in the 1970's. Yet this would mean that the overall production of the country has to quadruple its 1980 level in the space of 20 years, which may still be impractical. Just after the Twelfth Congress in 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang in a speech was candid enough to express that "China might or might not have the requisite capital, energy resources and materials to quadruple her production in 20 years. But there is no harm in trying for the best."¹⁵

At least one-tenth of China's population is officially conceded to be 'short of grain' which is the code expression for hungry. The census released in October puts the number of citizens to be illiterate at one quarter of the population. This is a very low standard indeed in a country where 21 million 'literate' urban workers surveyed last year were found to be

14 Beijing Review, n.3, p.15.

15 Tan Chung, n.7, p.10.

at only primary school 'cultural level'. The credibility low population growth rate of 1.4 per cent annually is still too fast; unless there is a drop of 300 million within a century, all economic plans, no matter who draws them up, will founder.¹⁶

The strategic priorities "outlined in the developmental path presented at the Congress are agriculture, light industry, energy and transport and education, and science and technology. Investible funds will be concentrated on key development projects and on programmes which have a direct bearing on the improvement of the living standard of the people. The post-Mao leadership has come to the conclusion that since the level of development of the productive forces is on the whole still fairly low, it is necessary to maintain different economic forms for a long time to come.

The most crucial factor to achieve success is to reorganise their institutions, modernize management and mobilize the potential of the people and the Twelfth Congress has laid its finger on this. One strategic move of the government is the withdrawal of interference particularly in rural life. The Report says:

The responsibility system for production setup in various forms in the countryside in recent years has further emancipated the productive forces and it must be adhered to for a long time to come. The thing for us to do is to gradually perfect it on the basis of summing up the practical experience on the masses. In no way must we make rash changes

¹⁶ Johnathan Mirsky, "China's 12th Party Congress", The World Today (London), vol.38, no.12, December 1982, p.471.

against the will of the masses, still less must we back track. 17

Thus from the report it is clearly evident that the new pragmatist leaders are eager to increase the production of agricultural products by not coming in conflict with the interests of the peasants will. "The reformer Deng Xiaoping had gradually, relentlessly chipped away at the Maoist legacy, focussing on rigidly dogmatic aspects that keep China a backward nation three decades after the triumph of the Communist revolution."¹⁸

Hu's report has weighed heavily in favour of the responsibility system rather than of the commune system. From the spirit of the report we find that the overriding considerations of the new leadership are in mobilizing the peasants' initiative and enthusiasm. "In theory it seems to be a setback to the socialisation of the relationship of production. In practice, it could mean the abandoning of an arbitrary and primitive collectivisation, creating conditions for a more rational and benevolent socialisation."¹⁹

By the introduction of the responsibility system, there lies a contrast between the earlier commune system and the present responsibility system. Earlier there were excellent crops in the private plots, while commune lands produced indifferent yields. Under the present system, both private plots and

17 Beijing Review, n.3, p.18.

18 "A Change of the Guard", Asia Week (Hong Kong), 17 September 1982, p.9.

19 Tan Chung, n.7, p.11.

commune lands are the children of the peasants, with equally good yields. Under the new agricultural policies there has been the revival of the free market for the sale of excess production. This has given a spurt to the peasants' income. "I saw brisk coming and going between village and city at various places, peasants owning motor cycles or small trucks taking their produce to private market in the city."²⁰ Whether or not this is 'breeding capitalist elements and tendencies' is still debatable. The Chinese are well aware of this problem and to them, "the interests of production must take precedence. After production had been increased sufficiently, the state could introduce an "accumulative" (progressive?) income tax to limit the extent of inequality."²¹

The Twelfth Congress Report observes, "The fundamental aim of socialist production and construction is to meet continuously the growing material and cultural needs of the people. A basic principle guiding our economic work is 'first feed the people and second, build the country'".²² This is a clear indication of departure from Maoist approach and the government's intention for the improvement of people's living standard. It makes no sense to build a rich and strong socialist country with poor and weak people. The present leadership is very honest in saying that as the whole living

20 Gargi Dutt, "Chinese Youth No Longer Credulous", Times of India (New Delhi), 14 February 1984.

21 Ibid.

22 Beijing Review, n.3, p.18.

standard has remained fairly low, which implies that the Maoist era has left the population in the grip of poverty and backwardness. This new policy of the present leaders is aimed to correct Mao's ultra-'left' economic policies during the fifties. This highlights the correlation between people's living and production and construction. The starting point of production and construction has to meet continuously the growing material and cultural needs of the people, only after proper arrangements have been made about people's living. Thus what the new leaders mean is that there must not be an order of priority of the two basic items of livelihood and construction in the national economy, but the two must be given equal attention and kept in balance. Thus the Maoist pursuit of even faster economic growth at the expense of people's welfare is now being replaced by slower economic growth along with corresponding elevation of living standard.

He stated in his report, "It is our firm strategic principle to carry out the policy of opening to the outside world and expand economic and technological exchanges with the foreign countries in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit."²³ As a part of this strategy, the post-Mao leadership considers it necessary to import advanced technologies suited to China's national conditions.

23 Ibid., p.20.

Another important ingredient of this strategy is to speed up production in various economic fields and to expand the foreign trade in full swing. The third component of the policy advocates in this area is to utilize, as far as possible, more foreign funds available for China's national construction. In sum, import of technology and capital and expansion of export are the crucial elements of the economic strategy which has been confirmed at this Congress.

This policy framework is likely to generate fierce controversy within the Chinese Communist Party. Persuasion of a policy of export based on growth and import of technology and foreign capital, indicates a bourgeois trend. However, to be fair, it must be stated that the CPC leadership has said that these economic and technical exchanges with foreign countries will be governed 'in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit' and in pursuit of a "self-reliant stand". But this is a saying of every government. At this stage it will not be wise to say whether these policies are right or wrong. It only clears the options which the post-Mao leadership considers "necessary" in order to ensure "development of national economy".

The report clearly states the leadership's determination to: (a) improve law and order; (b) change the unworthy social trends of benefiting oneself at other's expenses, pursuing private interests at the expense of public interests, loving ease and despising work, putting money first in everything,

unscrupulous pursuit of personal enjoyment and attempting to isolate and attack advanced elements; (c) eliminate 'all the vile social evils which had been stamped out long ago by New China but have now cropped up again; and (d) arouse revolutionary spirit.²⁴ During past three decades, most Chinese Communist Party members and cadres, having all become members of a privileged class, have degenerated and are riding roughshod over the people. They generally practise bureaucratism, seek privileges, indulge in backdoor deals, embezzle public money, offer or take bribes, smuggle and sell smuggled goods, engage in speculation and profiteering, and misappropriation of public properties, thereby have caused a keen opposition between mainland people and their communist rulers.

In the last two years, the government has taken some serious steps to get rid of these unethical deeds and to keep the socialist zeal in a proper track. The government has executed a number of criminals on charge of rape or murder to warn the criminal elements. Discipline has been tightened. The Chinese Communist Party leadership is very much concerned over the degradation of moral values and is earnestly battling with the problem. "The execution of many criminals, as they have been described, is evidence of the leadership's anxiety and the number of the people being executed is higher than is generally supposed. Many others are dismissed or rebuked for their lapses."²⁵

24 Ibid., p.26.

25 Gargi Dutt, n.s.

Part IV of the report reads as "Strive to attain a high level of socialist democracy". It observes "the steady development of socialist democracy provides the guarantee and support for the building of socialist material and spiritual civilisation. To attain a high level of socialist democracy is therefore one of our fundamental goals and tasks."²⁶ For nearly one hundred years the Chinese have been longing for democracy. In the past almost all the patriots were willing to sacrifice their lives for the achievement of democracy. Undoubtedly, there was an improvement of democratic atmosphere in the early years of the People's Republic than the previous regimes in China. But the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960's created an undemocratic atmosphere which the Chinese will never forget. There was the abnormal situation of anarchical dictatorship and lawlessness which it is said, has claimed one hundred million victims. The post-Mao pragmatist leaders have taken a serious note of it and have done quite a lot to heal the wounds of the Cultural Revolution and have moved a correct step further in trying to ensure certain minimum individual rights, including personal labour.

Foreign Policy Dilemmas

Mao's one time "three world theory" is no more heard from the new leadership. No reference to the "three world theory" has been made neither in the new party constitution nor in Hu's report to the Twelfth Congress. It seems that

26 Beijing Report, n.3, p.26.

the present Chinese leadership has considerable reservations in analyzing the world situation through such a theoretical framework".²⁷ Several factors have contributed to such reservations: firstly, in view of the rapprochement in Sino-American relations, despite the setback regarding American arms sale to Taiwan and in view of the Chinese support for a strong US and strong NATO to counter Soviet expansion, it would not be right to place the US on par with the USSR in the First World Category. Secondly, China is very anxious to increase her relations with the Second World not only in terms of trade and economic cooperation but also in a view that they will play a much more active role in countering Soviet hegemony; as such, the Second World countries have a more important role as depicted in the framework based on the "three world theory". Thirdly, it is very strange to witness that although China still considers itself belonging to the Third World, it is certainly neither a leader nor even a member of the Group of 77. Due to such developments one can better appreciate why Hu's outline of China's foreign policy position in his report to the Congress lacked a common theme and a framework.

However, China's basic approach is rather clear. It has been asserted in the report that China will adhere to an independent foreign policy and it is definitely not

27 J.Y.S. Cheng, "Analysis of the 12th National Congress of the CPC", Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), no.18, Fall 1982, p.102.

swayed by expediency or anybody's instigation or provocation.²⁸ It is interesting that the specific foreign policy section deals with (1) Sino-Japanese relations, (2) Sino-US relations, (3) Sino-Soviet relations, (4) Opposition to hegemonism and safeguarding world peace; and (5) expansion of co-operation with Third World countries. The order in which the foreign policy issues have been presented in the report reveals the priorities of the leadership in their international perceptions.

Appropriate references to "the political line" of the Eighth Party Congress were made by both Deng and Hu Yaobang. However, they have carefully avoided to mention the foreign policy formulations which were put forward on that occasion. There are enough evidences to show that the drift towards disaster in the domestic policies of China, after the 1956 Congress, was accompanied with the shift in the foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party.²⁹

"We Chinese people have our own national self-respect and pride"³⁰ is an important statement made by Deng in his inaugural speech at the Congress. Pride in one's own country is neither chauvinism nor self-righteousness. There is some evidence to show that an effort is being made in China to fight the tendency to sit on judgement over others and to that

28 Beijing Review, n.3, p.29.

29 R.K. Mishra, n.1, p.30.

30 News From China, n.2, p.4.

extent it is a welcome development.³¹ Modernization of economy is the main objective of the CPC. Thus it has come to realise that a climate of peace is necessary for the success of these plans.

The foreign policy formulations at the Twelfth National Congress signify the fact that the post-Mao leadership has to adjust its foreign policy stances towards its new friends and alliances keeping in view the reaction which their actions must evoke among the Chinese people. For instance, Hu said, "Now some forces in Japan are white-washing the past facts of Japanese aggression against China and other East Asian countries, and are carrying out various activities in an attempt to revive Japanese militarism."³² To him these are the dangerous developments which have put the Chinese people on the alert. He further says that the new leadership will work to eliminate all hindrances between the two countries and make the friendship to flourish.

In regard to the relationship with the United States, Hu says that China has always hoped that her relationship with the US will continue to grow and that he considers this development beneficial both to the people and world peace. But the Taiwan Relation Act has created some serious problems. However, both Beijing and Washington have, for the time being,

31 R.K. Mishra, n.1, p.32.

32 Beijing Review, n.3, p.30.

succeeded in putting this source of tension on the shelf. Many sinologists have viewed that Beijing can extract her things from the US as long as she serves the purpose of Washington in 'Asia'. It is becoming clear to the Chinese leaders that the US's real intention is not to make China an industrial state. The real purpose is to use China for anti-Soviet purposes in the near term and to spoil China's Asian policy.

As the present leadership has become convinced about this fact and in order to safeguard their own interests, they must create rapprochement with the Soviet Union to some extent. During the recent past it has been viewed that Beijing has engaged in a series of low level exchanges with the Soviet Union. "These exchanges, however, should not be interpreted as China attempting to play the Soviet card against the US."³³ After the Afghanistan crisis, there has always been a threat to Beijing from the Soviet Union. China has always guarded its independence of its foreign policy; and maintaining channels of communication with the Soviet Union has been an important part of its deterrence against any possible Soviet attack. The Chinese leaders want to reduce the tensions between the two. Significant improvement in the bilateral relationship is not to be expected. Ideological disputes are surely less important today. A solution to the border issue is still far from sight. Hu's report noted that Soviet

33 Cheng, n.27, p.103.

leaders had expressed more than once the desire to improve relations with China, but he indicated that China would wait for the Soviet leaders to "take practical steps to lift their threat"³⁴ to China's security. Hu also stated that "the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are applicable to our relations with all our countries, including socialist countries". This might be a hint that the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and also with Vietnam should be on such a basis.

To the Third World countries, the Chinese leaders offered "South-South co-operation", and to their view, it would help the Third World "to break out of the existing unequal international economic relations and establish the new international economic order."³⁵ Hu's report to the non-communist or even anti-communist Third World countries, particularly, those in Asia stated that "revolution cannot be exported but can occur only by the choice of the people of the country concerned."³⁶ It further promised that in no circumstances could China seek hegemony over others.

The Chinese leadership has to reckon with the fact that as long as the Third World perceives China as a tool of US policy, Beijing role will always remain suspect in the eyes of the Third World and the response to its drive to expand cooperation with Third World countries will not be adequate.

34 Beijing Review, n.3, p.31.

35 Ibid., p.32.

36 Ibid., p.30.

Hu's report stressed on the CPC's renewal of ties with Communist Parties in Western Europe in strict conformity with Marxism and peaceful co-existence. It also indicated that the CPC would be willing to learn from other communist parties' success and failures, thus justifying the CPC's attempt to study the Yugoslavian and Hungarian experiences.

The post-Mao leadership has tried to demarcate itself from the US by criticising "Israel for its heinous aggression and atrocities against the people of Palestine and Lebanon with the support and protection of US hegemonism."³⁷ This is undoubtedly a positive view as far as it goes, but it needs to be mentioned that the American support to Israeli aggression has been criticised even by some of its Western allies and has evoked opposition even within Israel.

From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the Twelfth Congress did not undertake a fundamental review of the principal perceptions of the Chinese world view. Chinese leaders' aim to build a strong China is understandable. But the basic question before us is that whether the United States is expected to play the very role in making China great. The Chinese leaders have to take into consideration the fundamental attitude of international capitalism towards a socialist economy. To the US and its allies a "strong China" could be used against

37 Ibid., p.31.

the Soviet Union and socialist and newly independent countries of Asia. Secondly, the credit and economic cooperation policies of the US and its allies are not free from self-interest. These policies may give rise to social tensions within China.

In this background, Chinese planners and economists have taken a fresh look at the consequences of this foreign policy on its economic future. Since national interests will ultimately prevail, the post-Mao leadership is eager for the Sino-Soviet normalization of relations. However, the present leadership's foreign policy is a clear break from the Maoist approach.

Party Rectification

Since the downfall of the Gang, the Chinese communists by examining the mistakes committed by Mao, have come to realise that Mao's dictatorial rule was the source of all calamities. Deng and Chen Yun, from their own experience have also realized that the Chinese Communist cadres have become a privileged class, which has seriously wrecked Party discipline and style of work. Also, the lack of a retirement system resulted in a phenomenon that most leading cadres of the party are old and enfeebled. The CPC hopes, by its revision of the Constitution, to ensure a collective leadership by a reform of the leadership system; to purify the Party organisations and further consolidate Deng's strength by the policy of promoting "revolutionized, younger, better educated and professionally more competent cadres" to leadership posts; and to rectify the Party discipline, workstyle and organisations.

The party centre, according to the new party constitution, has adopted a tripodal structure, with a central committee, a central advisory commission and a central commission for discipline inspection elected by the national congress.³⁸ Thus, according to that programme, the CPC's National Congress would in future directly elect the Central Committee, the Central Advisory Commission, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. This would have amounted to a major reform of the central leadership, and it would have strengthened inspection and supervision within the party. According to Deng, the Central Committee was to have had a Secretariat headed by a General Secretary consisting of younger cadres, to deal with Party policy making and day-to-day work - the so-called front-line. The Central Advisory Commission was to be composed mainly of senior cadres aged over 65 who had a lot of experience and who enjoyed high prestige. It was to stay in the background and take part only in major policy decisions but not in routine party work. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was to be responsible for enforcing Party discipline and supervising the Party's work. These three leadership organs were to be of equal rank and were to counter-balance one another as a system of 'checks and balances'.

The draft constitution adopted at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, held before the publication of the 1980 reform programme, contained a provision that Central

38 For details see Cheng, n.27, p.94.

Committee members could only hold office for two terms and an upper age limit was set for them. However, in the new Constitution adopted at the Twelfth Party Congress, this provision was deleted and changes were also made in the relationship between the above mentioned three leadership organs. According to the new Constitution, the Central Advisory Commission and the Central Commission for Discipline are put under the direction of the Central Committee and the Central Advisory Commission is to serve as assistant and consultant to the Central Committee. Other provisions in the new Party Constitution include the abolition of the posts of Party Chairman and Vice-Chairman, while the Politbureau and its Standing Committee and the Central Military Commission are retained; the institution of the Secretariat headed by a General Secretary who is responsible for convening meetings of the Politbureau and its Standing Committee; selection of the Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Central Military Commission from among the Politbureau members. The new Party Constitution has prescribed 8 rights for party members³⁹ which is an innovation. Many other provisions have been added with the express aim to prevent anyone from rising above the party. Article 10 says: "The Party forbids all forms of personality cult. It is necessary to ensure that the activities of the party leaders be subject to supervision by the Party and the people...."⁴⁰ Article 16 says: "No Party member, whatever his

39 For details see, Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 6, 1982. Xinhua Agency News Bulletin, No.12290, 8 September 1982, p.10.

40 Ibid., p.15.

position, is allowed to make decisions on major issues on his own". "No leader is allowed to decide matters arbitrarily on his own or to place himself above the Party organization."⁴¹

As a result, although the new Party Constitution stipulates that no individuals are allowed to make decisions on major issues and that personality cults should be prevented, there is still doubt that the system of collective leadership can be fully implemented. Today, although Hu Yaobang is the nominal head of the Party, the actual power lies in the hands of Deng Xiaoping. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau, Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Deng is actually as powerful as Mao was when he was alive. Therefore, it becomes clear to us that the system of collective leadership has been put into practice in name only. Whether the reform of the leadership system can get rid of the adverse effects of Mao's rule is questionable.

From Hu's report it became evident that efforts are being made to vigorously carry through the policy of getting "revolutionized younger, better educated and professionally more competent cadres"⁴² promoted to leadership posts. Here lies a two-fold meaning to Deng's faction. First, it will get rid of old and ignorant cadres and pave the way for veteran cadres to be succeeded by younger ones. Second, it

41 Ibid., p.17.

42 Beijing Review, n.3, p.35.

will help to consolidate Deng's strength by eliminating opposition in the leadership organs at all levels. That is to say, through the election of the new Party leadership organs anti-Deng elements can be replaced by supporters of Deng.

However, "the current policy of promoting younger cadres to leadership posts itself presents a difficult problem because there are not many young cadres qualified for such positions".⁴³ During the Cultural Revolution period the higher education ceased completely and hardly any educated and professionally trained young cadres were turned out. Thus, it has become difficult to find qualified cadres from among those aged under 35. On the other hand, about the middle aged cadres there also lies problem. These cadres who are now backbone of the Communist Party and are most qualified to assume leadership posts are frowned upon by Deng because of their connection with Lin Biao and the 'gang of four', as most of them were promoted during the Cultural Revolution. Deng and Chen Yun have time and again lamented that persons who rose to prominence by 'rebellion', who have serious factionalist ideas, who have indulged in beating, smashing and looting, who have opposed the line followed by the line adopted by the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee since its Third Plenum, or who have seriously violated the law and

43 Pang, n.13, p.19.

discipline politically and economically should not be promoted to the leading posts. Under these circumstances, it is only possible that few middle aged cadres can be given leading posts. As it is difficult to find out qualified young cadres, Deng has maintained that the policy of promoting "revolutionized, younger, better educated and professionally more competent cadres" is among the four tasks to be carried out vigorously in the coming twenty years.

Nevertheless, the most urgent task to be solved by the Chinese Communists today is the rectification of Party organization and the Party's style of work. "The style of a political party in power determines its very survival".⁴⁴ "This observation originally came from Chen Yun, but it is not yet known where and when he said it."⁴⁵ Chen's theory is that while in the opposition the Communist Party has a natural ally in the people, because without the support of the people, the party cannot achieve the seizure of political power. "Once the Communist Party has seized power, this circumstance undergoes a drastic change. It then tends to act as their master. It becomes difficult for a ruling communist party to remain as dedicated to the people and to selflessly serve the people, failing which it would degenerate into an anti-people party. Based on this spirit, the report reiterates:

We must lay stress on getting member to understand clearly the character, position and role of the Party and to realize that all Party members have

44 Peking Review, n.3, p.39.

45 Tang Chung, n.7, p.14.

only the duty to serve the people diligently and conscientiously, and no right whatsoever to take advantage of their power and positions to fatten on the state and on the masses. 46

In an effort to rectify the Party's style of work, the Chinese leaders have taken measures in punishing of economic criminals and the simplification of the government organizations as the two major tasks to be fulfilled. At the time of the Twelfth Congress, there were 39 million party members, among whom 18 million were recruited during the Cultural Revolution. Whether one joined early or late, the universal tendency of the party members, particularly those in positions to dispense power, has been to place themselves above the common people. Quite a number of careerists and even bad characters have got into the party. It was in this respect, the decision of the Congress to launch a large scale of purge of the party, which is termed by the report as "an overall rectification of Party style and consolidation of Party organizations."⁴⁷ Deng said in 1980 that these 18 million Party members were not qualified for membership and cannot be models for the masses of the people but should undergo rectification because they were influenced ideologically by Lin Biao and the Gang. Today, the Chinese Communists are very frank to admit that the unhealthy work style and the lack of

46 Beijing Review, n.3, p.38.

47 Ibid.

ideological consciousness had led the CPC into a state of semi or complete collapse. In his speech Hu pointed out that the Party's work in the country three years will be focused on the rectification of the work style, with the hope that the work style can be improved significantly in five years beginning from the second half next year. In Deng's mind, however, it will take at least twenty years to fulfil the task.

Painstaking, long term purges, with minimal executions are a Deng Xiaoping hallmark. "This spring, Deng ordered a purge of several hundred thousand civil servants, including the 'retirement' of 11 out of 13 Vice-Premiers, and the sacking of 50,000 school teachers in one province alone."⁴⁸ Thus it is clear from this glaring example that, despite the call of Party for collective leadership, Deng is at least first among many. The 79 year old Deng appears as powerful as ever and just as tough.

It becomes clear that the new Party Constitution has placed stricter demands on Party members and cadres in order to set to rights the workstyle of the Party. Although it has been said that the current rectification campaign will be carried out through criticism and self-criticism and not through "cruel struggle and merciless attack", it will nevertheless give the Chinese Communist Party a thorough shake up.

48 Mirsky, n.16, p.472.

Power Distribution

The redistribution of power has been an inevitable outcome of each political struggle or political event in Communist China. That is why the election of new leadership organs at the Twelfth Congress of the CPC warrants our close attention.

The Twelfth Congress elected certain leadership organs and they included the Central Committee, the Central Advisory Commission, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The Central Committee then elected its Secretariat, Politbureau and Standing Committee and the Central Military Commission.

Though membership of the Central Committee and the governing bodies conformed to guidelines set by Hu in his marathon keynote address in the opening day of the Congress, there were number of surprises and several glaring deviations from the much flouted goal of retiring older leaders and thoroughly removing die-hard opponents of Deng's pragmatic policies.

The First Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee elected a six-member Standing Committee of the Politbureau. Hua Guofeng who ranked last in the previous Standing Committee was no more this time. Except him, the names remain same. As Hua was the youngest member of the last Standing Committee, the average age of the current one is higher. Thus the elderly cadres whom many thought would retire, hung on to top positions. Most prominent was

83 years old, Ye Jianying who along with Li Xiannian and Chen Yunⁿ, both 77, was re-elected to the Politbureau as well as its Standing Committee.⁴⁹ However, Deng's struggle was obviously augmented when Hua was driven out of the Politbureau.

There are 25 Politbureau members this time, two more than previously. They are: Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Ulanhu, Feng Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Yingchao, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, Yu Jieli,^u Song Renqiong, Zhang Tingfa, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qiaomu, Hu Yaobang, Nie Rongzhen, Ni Shifu, Xu Xiangqian, Peng Zhen, and Liao Chengzhi. The alternate members elected this time are Yao Yilin, Qin Jiwei and Chen Muhua.⁵⁰ Last time there were only two alternate members. Among the Politbureau members elected by the Eleventh CCP Central Committee 5 were not re-elected this time. Those elected for the first time are Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun and Liao Chengzhi, all of them were Deng supporters. "The triumph of the pragmatists was reflected within the Politbureau where several new members have strong ties with Southern China (especially Guangdong Province), which has been granted a degree of economic autonomy to implement such ground breaking experiments on the special Economic Zones."⁵¹

49 Asia Week, "The Overhaul Continues", 24 September 1982, p.11.

50 For details see Pang, n.13, p.21.

51 Asia Week, n.49, p.12.

Obviously, the Deng faction has been able to exert greater control over the Politbureau. However, as most of the newly elected members are aged over 70, the average age of this Politbureau is even higher than that of the previous one.

During the First Plenary Session of the Twelfth Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Hu Yaobang was elected General Secretary and nine others were elected secretaries and two alternate secretaries. The membership is too fewer than that of the previous secretariat. Among the nine secretaries selected this time, four were selected for the first time; the two alternate secretaries were first time members. As the main body of the future collective leadership, the Secretariat of the Twelfth Central Committee is of course dominated by the Deng faction. Among the new comers to the Secretariat, Hu Qili and Jiao Gbi began to establish close connections with the Hu Yaobang when he was in charge of the Communist Youth League. The average age of members of the newly elected Secretaries is a little lower than that of the previous one.

As far as the leadership question is concerned, the triumvirate of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang certainly succeeded in consolidating its control over the party. The Twelfth Central Committee is composed of 210 full members and 138 alternate members. Among the full members 96 were elected for the first time. *Of all the Central Committee members, 144 (or 68.2 per cent) are Party and Government cadres (53 per cent in the last Central Committee);

50 (23.8 per cent) are military men (previously 30.8 per cent); 16 (7.6 per cent) work in industry, agriculture science, technology or education (the previous percentage was 16.2).⁵² Among the 138 alternate members, 114 were elected for the first time and most of them are leading cadres of Party Committees below district level or work in industry, agriculture, science, technology or education. Thus in the new Central Committee 211 members are new comers and they are believed to be loyal supporters of Deng's reform programme. The average age of full members and alternate members elected to the Central Committee this time is remarkably lower than that of the members of the previous one. About two-thirds of the new members are below 60 years of age. "Such a Central Committee will certainly help to minimize the impact of any succession crisis".⁵³ Further, quite a number of new Central Committee members have professional qualifications too. "The number of Central Committee members working in science, technology and education increased from 9 (2.7 per cent) in the Eleventh CCP Central Committee to 59 (17 per cent) in the Twelfth CCP Central Committee."⁵⁴ Changes in the composition of the Central Committee are, therefore, very considerable and Deng finally completed the task begun in December 1978.

In the Central Advisory Commission, including Deng Xiaoping, there are 172 members. Deng is elected as the

53 Cheng, n.27, p.95.

54 People's Daily (China), 12 September 1982.

Chairperson of the Commission, which means in this sphere he also heads the top authority. As planned, this commission stands in the background and all its members are supposed to have at least 40 years of Party membership. From these 172 members, 59 are militarymen, the other 113 are Party cadres or cadres in other fields of work. Many senior cadres from these 59 are discontented with Deng faction, as they are excluded from the CPC's Central Committee and its Politbureau. On the other hand, Deng does not trust them either. Therefore, Deng serves as the Chairman so that he can control them. As a large number of military men were brought into the Advisory Commission, there has been an indication that a large-scale reshuffle of military personnel is expected.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection consists of 132 members. Though it was anticipated at that time that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection might be headed for an expanded role as part of the continuing campaign to improve Party style, it was the one body where there were few surprises. Chen Yun was re-elected to his position as first secretary while General Huang Kesheng, who served as permanent secretary on the previous commission, was named second secretary. "Few, however, took such relative quietude as a sign that Deng's ambitious reform of the party was slacking off. Indeed, many seasoned China watchers thought the current line up to be more stable and better united than any in recent memory. It now remains for the

leaders to move on China's plethora of problems".⁵⁵ However, as it still does not operate parallel with the CPC's Central Committee, the role it can play to counter-balance the Party administration is doubtful.

The Central Military Commission is headed by Deng as its Chairman and Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nieh Rongzhen and Yang Shangkun are the Vice-Chairmen. Yang is the permanent Vice-Chairman. Members of this Commission can also become members of the State Military Commission. Thus, the army is still under the complete control of the Party.

In short, the new leadership is still filled with old and enfeebled cadres. This is an indication that there are difficulties in finding qualified cadres to take up leadership posts. Undoubtedly, this problem will remain for quite a long time.

According to the new Party Constitution, Hu Yaobang who is now the General Secretary, is the leader of the Party. But, he is only a nominal leader, the real one being Deng Xiaoping. The General Secretary is only responsible for convening meetings of the Politbureau and its Standing Committee and presiding over the work of the Secretariat. Under the current system, the General Secretary enjoys less power than the previous Party Chairman. On the other hand,


55 Asia Week, n.49, p.12.

Deng faction not only controls the Politbureau and its Standing Committee, but also the Central Advisory Commission and the Central Military Commission. It can be said that Deng is as powerful as Mao used to be. The current power structure⁵⁶ in which the General Secretary is not given the authority according to the new Party Constitution should be regarded as a transitional one which will tend to change with the times. The chart in Appendix-I shows the flow of party power in the Twelfth Party Congress and the process of election of different organs in the Twelfth Congress.


56 See Appendix.

APPENDIX I

FLOW OF PARTY POWER



PROCESS OF ELECTION



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Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), 17 September 1982, p.16.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION : AN OVERVIEW

CONCLUSION

The National Congresses of the CPC have significant place in the process of the two line struggles in the Party. At the Congress the winning group would consolidate its position. It also plays a vital role in vindicating the victorious line. Thus the Congress acquires a crucial role from the perspective of political consolidation. The veracity of the argument is proved by the fact that each of the Party Congresses studied here, was held after fierce struggles in the Party.

Political and economic strategies are vital in a nation building process. Sharp shifts in political and economic strategies have taken place several times in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). But "the new orientation given to the overall policy frame in the post-Mao era is of critical importance because of glaring contrast with the pattern of politics and economic development associated with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".¹ Since 1977 there has been gradual changes at many levels in China starting from ideological perspective down to the level of policies and working style. While during the Cultural Revolution the stress was on the class struggle for socialist construction, the present leadership gives stress on order and stability for achieving the proclaimed developmental targets.

1 V.P. Dutt, ed., China: The Post-Mao View (Delhi, 1991), p.46.

There has been significant rearrangement in the political functioning of the various organizational structures in China. The period of the Cultural Revolution was characterized by a certain demobilisation of the state organs and mass organizations. Political affairs were managed by the Party's ruling groups at various levels through mass campaigns in support of their line. This situation was slowly rectified by the post-Mao leadership. Since the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC, several major steps are taken to re-activate the state organs and the mass organizations and to reorganize the Party's organizational structure while by and large suspending mass campaigns.

A significant aspect of the institutional rearrangement in post-Mao China was to limit the Party's role mainly to high level policy making at the national level and political leadership at the lower levels. No more the Party was assigned the governmental or other management functions as was the trend around the time of the Tenth Party Congress. At the same time the internal organizational process of the Party has been streamlined through several new steps such as stressing collective leadership, asking members to observe Party rules and regulations. Thus the process of Party reorganization and stability is the basic feature of the Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses.

Since the death of Mao Zedong the basic tendency of the Chinese communists has been to achieve stability in the

midst of chaos. Thus the post-Mao era started with the evolution of a new power structure and policy line, which ultimately resulted in the re-emergence of Deng and the revival of his power is the watershed of this change.

The first stage in the evolution of policy line was the actual control by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. During the Eleventh Party Congress Mao's line was partially revised to develop flexibility in policies. But before the new lines had been in effect for long, the second stage arrived. As soon as Deng achieved real power, he again made considerable revisions in Mao's line.

Mao's line was designed on the theory of Continuous Revolution. Mao made the class struggle the guiding principle of the Party and used it to repress the old as well as the newly emerging opposition. Mao gave revolution and politics first priority and placed economy, education and other fields at a lower level. This ultra-leftist policy inflicted heavy damage to country's economy. "This strategy made the Party the nucleus of political control into a tool for dictatorial rule. Aside from a very small leftist minority, there was already no other group that could be trusted or counted on".² After the death of Mao and the collapse of the "gang of four" the new leaders in Beijing had no choice but to change these policies.

² Yao Hong-huan, "The New Policy Line of the Chinese Communist Party," Issues and Studies, vol.15, no.5, May 1979, p.23.

Hua made some revisions in Mao's theory of Continuous Revolution which changed only a few ultra-left judgements of Mao and absolute nature of class struggle. Hua entirely upheld Mao's theory that class struggle is perpetual. Hua also made use of "multilines theory" i.e. it is possible to make use of other theories besides class struggles. The lines adopted at the Eleventh Party Congress were based on this kind of theoretical policy and had the main purpose to re-enforce government control and stabilise the regime.

Although the lines adopted at the Eleventh Party Congress included not a few of Deng's own opinions, they were still not entirely acceptable to him and he intended to revise them. The Party had announced its new interpretation of Mao Zedong's thought and set up Hua's theory as a standard one and Hua as the spokesman for Mao's thought. In March 1978 at the National Science Conference, Hua and Deng publicly clashed on several important questions of theory and policy. Very soon Deng emphasised putting theory into practice and his supporters further pointed out that practice is the only standard for testing truth. However, no one, including Stalin, Lenin and Mao, had ever placed practice on such a high pedestal. The only reason they advocated to use of practice to measure theory was really to employ their value judgement to criticise Mao's thought and policy line, and to criticise Hua's compromising position. This two line

struggle finally opened the way for the Twelfth Party Congress and Deng and his supporters have consolidated their position.

The Eleventh Party Congress ratified in collective leadership by Huo Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing, revised the 1973 constitution and proclaimed the conclusion of the First Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution marked by the smashing of the "gang of four". The Congress consolidated the post-Mao leadership by a reshuffle of the Central Committee and its Politbureau. The death of Mao Zedong opened the way to hold the Congress as soon as possible to formally place Huo at the highest leadership of the CPC. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping's supporters pressurized Huo for Deng's rehabilitation. Thus the third Plenary session of the Tenth CCPCC was hastily convened to confirm Huo and Deng in the CPC's leading hierarchy and the Eleventh Party Congress for the redistribution of power in the post-Mao era. Deng's return assumed triumphant proportions. The main characteristics of the Eleventh Central Committee were the triumph of the Military-Bureaucratic complex of the seasoned veterans. It was a more civilian, more cadre oriented and more veteran leadership group. The rise of moderates in the Party is also well witnessed by the appointment of large number of veterans and people with scientific and organizational skills to the Eleventh Central Committee.

The character and guiding ideology of the Party was in many ways similar to the theme of the constitution adopted by the Eighth Party Congress. The new leaders meant that they would no longer tolerate any resurgence of the chaos and confusion of the Cultural Revolution and they were determined to consolidate the party leadership over the mass organization. The leadership put all the blame on the 'gang of four'. In the interest of the new ruling clique, specifically to negate Mao's line, the new leadership used Mao's word to undo his policies.

Democratic centralism in the Party has been the subject of much controversy since the death of Mao Zedong and the ouster of 'gang of four'. Ye Jianying excoriated the Gang for having undermined both democracy and centralism. Ye maintained that the Communist Party must not only have democracy but also, more so, centralism. The new leadership trumpeted that the promotion of democracy:

demands that among members of Party Committees we should earnestly apply the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility under a division of labour, and that we should rely on the political experience and wisdom of the collective and prevent and overcome the bad tendencies towards one man rule or timidity in shouldering individual responsibilities. 3

3 Ye Jianying, "Report on the Revision of Party Constitution", Peking (Beijing) Review, vol.20, no.35, 2 September 1977, pp.30-31.

Thus their intention was to abandon the Mao like absolutist rule and to enhance their own leadership stature.

Both Hsu's Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC and the Party Constitution it adopted, proclaimed to hold high the great banner of Chairman Mao and resolutely defend it. But very intelligently the Congress has manipulated his policies. Mao's thought itself is replete with contradiction, interclass and sophistry. As Mao left no successor to interpret his thought, all CPC's members are enticed to turn it to their advantage when necessary and this has happened in the post-Mao era. At the time of the Eleventh Party Congress the new leadership knew for certain that they must hold tight the sword of Mao to consolidate their grip on the Beijing power. This is the reason why Hsu called himself a good student and successor of Mao.

Hsu's Report went on to the extent of exposing how the Radicals diverted the course of each movement initiated by Mao Zedong following the Tenth Party Congress. Mao was quoted extensively to show his adherence towards the Gang. It could be suggested that Radicals either acted with tacit support of Mao or enjoyed his full confidence. Perhaps, this explains why Moderates awaited the death of Mao to purge Radicals and reinstate Deng. And Hsu might have been closer to the Moderates than to the Radicals. Of course, he was not willing to give up the "new born child of Cultural Revolution". But then he maintained that such institutions

cannot exist without strong material base. This could be the reason for Hua's alliance with Moderates to purge the Radicals.

However, Moderates emerged successful out of the Eleventh struggle in the Party. So, naturally it enabled them to implement their policies freely. The Eleventh National Congress of the CPC legitimized Moderates' pragmatic modernization policies. The Report said:

It is necessary to introduce technical innovation, carry out technical revolution so as to provide the socialist system with a growing material base and promote change and development in relations of production and superstructure. 4

That is why it declared that "the developing socialist economy is the basic task of the dictatorship of the proletariat".⁵ So, naturally such policies tended to restrict workers participation in the management, increase the power of managers, strengthen material incentives, curb the struggle against revisionism and so on. This position is not fundamentally different from the one taken by Lin Shuqi.

In other words, the fundamental problem for the proletariat to solve, according to the new line adopted during the Eleventh Party Congress, seemed to be that of

4 Hua Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Peking (Beijing) Review, vol.20, no.35, 26 August 1977, p.36.

5 Ibid., p.35.

increasing production as quickly as possible; in building the material foundation of socialism it was believed that the corresponding production relations and appropriate superstructure would develop. The policies adopted by the new leadership were not in consonance with Mao Zedong's thought. Mao said that in transition period "all social relations must be fundamentally transformed" - "All social relations" include in its meaning the production relations and the superstructure, economics, politics, ideology and culture, etc."⁶ He also said that "all revolutionary history shows that the full development of new productive forces is not the pre-requisite for the transformation of backward production relations".⁷

Thus drastic change of shifting emphasis from "politics in command" to "technique in command" occurred at the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC. It will go down in history as an important turning point. It ended an era of destabilization and revolutionary tension and made the way for a new era of normalization, stabilization, productivity and modernisations. In regard to the Maoist path of socialist revolution, the situation highlighted by correcting the deviations from the Maoist norms and workstyle, etc.

6 Mao Tse-tung, Trans., A Critique of Soviet Economics (New York, 1977), p.34.

7 Ibid., p.51.

In spite of the emerging power struggles, the Congress closed with a call for unity, discipline, stability and co-operation - a sharp contrast to the continuous upheaval and factional strife that characterised the Mao era. "In many ways the Congress seemed to signal the beginning of the end of the Maoist era".⁸ It seems Mao would become less and less relevant to China's development.

Since the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the Chinese Communist Party has always convened a national Congress at the end of a fierce power struggle. The Twelfth Congress was held after Deng Xiaoping had gained an upper hand in the fierce struggle with Hua Guofeng. Deng's ascendancy to power was viewed by the removal of Hua from the Chairmanship of the CPC and his replacement by Hu Yaobang. In the new leadership structure we find that the Deng faction has strengthened his position and undoubtedly he is the most powerful man in the PRC. However, in the immediate sense unity has been achieved by the present leadership, the seeds of conflict, tension and instability exist and these have to be handled carefully by the present leadership.

The Twelfth Party Congress provided Deng with an important opportunity to prepare for a smooth transition and to eliminate the danger of succession crisis. He had

⁸ Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China Without Mao (New York, 1982), p.32.

succeeded in shaping the Central Committee according to his design and control over almost every key position in the leadership organs. In the new Central Committee 211 members are new comers and they all are believed to be loyal supporters of Deng's reform programmes. The average age of full members and alternate members elected to the Central Committee this time is remarkably lower than that of the members of the previous one. Further, quite a number of new Central Committee members have professional qualifications too. Changes in the composition of the Central Committee are, therefore, very considerable and Deng finally completed the task begun in December 1978. It can be said that Deng is as powerful as Mao used to be.

Rapid changes in the top leadership are a distinct possibility in near future. The main hurdle before Deng is his age factor. If he manages for another five or more years his hand-picked successors will mature and smooth transition may be guaranteed.

There will still be resistance when vested interests begin to feel the pinch of Deng's reforms, especially among the old cadres and the Maoist Peoples' Liberation Army officers. They certainly have supporters among cadres at the middle and lower levels. But increasingly such resistance is not much a challenge to the leadership group or to a certain policy programme. It will simply become a

hurdle commonly encountered in the development process as Deng's reform programme gradually gains legitimacy.

Deng and his supporters will be hard pressed to demonstrate their pragmatist reforms and they have to cultivate a new order of cadres who are competent, reliable and uncorrupt. For this goal, they will tighten discipline, launch a mild rectification campaign and set up strict criteria and procedures governing recruitment. Such tasks, undoubtedly, are more strenuous than Party struggles at the leadership levels, and their success or failure will be a yardstick for the present leadership.

The political line adopted by the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC is to firmly adhere to the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and to concentrate on promoting socialist modernization and an all round leap forward in socialist economy.

The new party constitution reaffirms that the general task of the CPC at the present stage is the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defence transforming China into a culturally advanced and highly democratic socialist country. Thus, Hu Yaobang, in his report to the Congress, put forth the general objective of China's economic construction between 1981 and the end of the century to quadruple the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production from

710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2,000 billion yuan or so in 2000. Hua's target is obviously not beyond reach, but it is certainly little over optimistic and assumes a favourable domestic and international environment.

The present leadership has taken into account people's living standard. Thus the Maoist pursuit of ever faster economic growth at the expense of people's welfare is now being replaced by slower economic growth along with corresponding elevation of people's living standard.

Deng, like all his comrades at the Congress, failed to give decisive directives on population control. "The Centre still shrinks from enacting the regulations already in force in many provinces, where compliance is so patchy that population still rises."⁹ Parents want children for social security and to help them in their private allotments for which there is now encouragement from above. "We must do our best to reduce the population" was the best Hu could muster. "Intellectuals in their thousands, and even a few million party cadres are relatively easy to cow, but hundreds of million of resentful peasants can overthrow a dynasty".¹⁰

However, Deng's success at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC will help to create an encouraging

9 Johnathan Hirsky, "China's 12th Party Congress", The World Today, vol.38, no.12, December 1982, p.4771.

10 Ibid.

environment to achieve the ambitious economic targets of Deng. The present Chinese foreign policy also aims to secure a stable international environment for domestic economic construction. It is a clear break from the Maoist approach. The economic development programmes, though slightly over-ambitious, correctly analyses the strength and weakness of the Chinese economy and outlines a realistic path towards the attainment of the goal. At present Deng's policies seem to enjoy a considerable support from the people. "But their durability would depend on whether they can more quickly meet the revolution of rising expectations, as much as on the eventual outcome of the sharp power struggle that still rages in Beijing".¹¹ Difficulties and obstacles may delay the progress but if the general direction will not be disturbed by leadership changes, China will certainly be in the front rank of the countries of the world in terms of the output of major industrial and agricultural products, if not at the end of this century, then in the beginning of the twentyfirst century.

11 Gargi Dutt, "Chinese Fear of Western Culture", Times of India (New Delhi), 13 February 1984.

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