

**SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES AT THE
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL : /**
A STUDY OF VOTING PATTERN 1956-1971

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PREFACE

This is a study of Soviet policy to the Third World in the specific setting of the United Nations. Although it is generally known that the Soviet Union claims to have a special relationship of friendship and affinity with the Third World, an attempt here is made to specify the very nature of such a Soviet policy. Hence, we have chosen to investigate the Soviet voting behaviour in the United Nations, during the period 1956-71. The period 1956-71 coincides with the increasing activity of Soviet policy to the Third World as well as that of the Third World countries themselves; likewise the UN General Assembly, and the Security Council are the most important organs of the United Nations. Therefore we have accordingly confined our study.

The Soviet voting behaviour are investigated on three counts; namely, global issues where community of interests between the Soviet Union and the Third World was marked, regional issues where the interests of one or the other Afro-Asian country were directly involved, and, finally, bilateral issues where direct Soviet interests were involved. All these are dealt in separate chapters, while Chapter I attempts to identify the very

framework of Soviet policy to the Third World. Finally, we have summarised our findings.

Although the study takes into account the voting behaviour of all the Afro-Asian countries, it focuses attention on the representative and active ones among them as well as on leading Western countries. Central theme remains, however, the Soviet voting pattern. We have mainly relied upon the primary sources emanating from the United Nations like the official records of the General Assembly and the Security Council and various other such publications.

This study has been mostly carried out in the JNU library, Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Central Secretariat Library and UN Information Service Library.

I owe my thanks to the staff of these libraries. Particularly I am grateful to UN Information Library for its hospitality, where I was privileged to use its library facilities and received much kindness from the staff.

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CHAPTER I
THE FRAMEWORK

The United Nations was conceived during the World War II and, thus it was naturally based on certain wartime assumptions. One of these was maintaining international peace and security. It was accepted from the outset that the organization would be primarily an international instrument for political adjustment. Therefore, the Charter provided a system for the "peaceful settlement or adjustment of disputes and situations, the use of collective measures in threats to or breaches of the peace, and the regulations of national armaments".¹

Besides, the United Nations has now become an instrument for facilitating cooperation among national states for purposes on which they have commonly agreed. Moreover, it has also the objective to develop friendly relations among nations, and to co-operate in solving international economic, social, cultural, human rights and humanitarian problems.

It appears that the above objectives of the United Nations are accepted by the Soviet Union as well.² Hence this is the starting point of our present study. In this

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1. Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Greenwood Press, Publisher's West Port Connecticut, 1975) p. 9
 2. See for example, N.S. Khrushchev's CC Report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1956.

chapter it is proposed firstly to investigate and identify a framework of Soviet policy towards the United Nations. This has to be followed by looking at the Soviet view of the role of the third world countries in the United Nations. Finally, these two elements will be co-related so as to identify a framework of the Soviet policy towards the United Nations in general, and, to the role of Afro-Asian Nations in the UN, in particular.

POLICY TOWARDS THE UN

The Soviet Union is one of the founder members of the United Nations. It took part in its creation and became actively involved in its work, except for a very brief period in the immediate Post World War II period. Since the fifties, it actively participated in UN activities and played a crucial role in enlarging and consolidating manyfold activities of the UN. Indeed the UN, as it is known today, is much the handiwork of the Soviet Union's policy towards it. As a matter of fact, one can legitimately argue that the framework of Soviet policy towards the United Nations stems from Soviet foreign policy and it has its roots in the historical experiences of Soviet states. Hence we must begin with examining them.

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia, one of the great European powers, was on the brink of military disaster due to her involvement in war and her alignment with

the Entente in conflict with the Central powers. When the Bolshevik came to power they were aware that it was necessary for Russia to be extricated from the war.

According to Lenin, the war was an imperialist war, fought not for ideals of liberation, but for control of markets and world supply of raw materials. The real aim of the warring parties was to increase their dominions by the enslavement of the weaker nations.

The 'Decree on Peace' was the first foreign policy act of the Soviet Union. In order to stop the war, the Bolshevik proposed an immediate conclusion of war. The Soviet government thereby expressed itself in favour of peaceful co-existence with states belonging to a different socio-political system. "In the first years of the Soviet State's existence, Lenin elaborated and substantiated his concept of an international organisation capable of making a real contribution to the assurance of a joint and democratic peace".³

The most comprehensive presentation of the Soviet Russia's foreign policy was made by the Russian delegation to the Geneva Conference (Apr.-May 1922), which sought to re-establish the economic and political unity of Europe. Again in

3. Alexander Baryshin, The USSR and the United Nations. (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1977), p. 9

the late twenties the Soviet Union agreed to join the General Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact Treaty of Paris) of August 27, 1928. This was a first demonstration of Soviet active interest in some forms of collective security. The 1928 Treaty was followed by three regional agreements based on its provisions. On July 3, 1933, the Soviet Union (concluded a convention on the definition of aggression) along with Afghanistan, Estonia, Finland, Latin, Persia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, and the following day (a similar convention) with Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia agreed on the definition of aggression.

In the late twenties and early thirties, can be seen the growing changes in Soviet foreign policy. "And the year of 1933 marked a turning point in the Soviet Union's relationship with the capitalist states prompted chiefly by Soviet economic achievement and its enhanced international stature.⁴ In addition the emergence of fascist bloc threatened the peace and security of the world. "Therefore, it became more and more urgent for the USSR and all peace loving, progressive forces to take a stand against the war menace posed by the belligerent fascist powers."⁵ In November 16, 1933 the Soviet Union and the United States concluded an

4. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev, Soviet Foreign Policy, ed.; Vol. I, 1917-1945 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981), p. 281

5. Ibid., p. 281

agreement to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 1934 the Soviet joined the League of Nations and its International Labour Organization (ILO).

The creation of the League of Nations was the first test of Soviet attitude towards an international legal order (hatched outside) although the Soviet attitude towards the League was negative till she joined it in 1934.

Lenin once remarked that the negative Soviet attitude towards the League of Nations resulted from the fact that it failed to provide "anything resembling a real establishment of equality of Nations or a real chance of peaceful co-existence among them".⁶ When Lenin spoke of equality in the League; he was alluding to the fact, a very important one in his outlook, that the "70 per cent of the world population" living in colonies or semi-colonial countries were either not represented at all or were represented by their exploiters. What he meant by 'equality of nations; therefore, was the "liberation of all colonies and of all peoples who are oppressed and denied their full rights".⁷

However, the Soviet Union maintained contact with the League in technical agencies. At the League of Nations Economic conference in Geneva in 1927, which the Soviet Union attended, the Soviet Union declared that "a peaceful

6. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 45 (Moscow, 1960-65), p. 241

7. Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 42

co-existence in the League of Nations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world was possible".⁸ The step implied growing Soviet interest in the search for peace not only on a bilateral basis as in the past, but also on a multilateral level.

Soviet foreign policy from 1927 to 1934 may be characterized as a determined search for security. "Peace for the Soviet Union was necessary to build and modernize rapidly at home, peace was needed more than justice in the prevailing world order".⁹ Peace, for the Soviet Union, seemed best possible through nonintervention, nonaggression, neutrality and disarmament.

In the thirties the USSR demonstrated a strategy of total disarmament, by the principle of collective security. Finally on September 18, 1934, the Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar explained the Soviet reasoning to the Assembly: "The idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoretically unacceptable for the Soviet State and its ideology. The Soviet Union is itself a League of Nations in the best sense of the world. The Soviet State has never excluded the possibility of some form or other of association with states having different political and

8. David D. Finley, Jan F. Triska, "Soviet Foreign Policy" (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1967). Chapt. 10, p. 355

9. Ibid., p. 356

social systems so long as there is no mutual hostility and if it is for the attainment of common aims. The Soviet Union is entering into the League today as representative of a new social-economic system, not renouncing any of its special features and like the other states represented here preserving intact its personality".¹⁰

Peace and security were the primary Soviet objectives in the League. As Litvinov declared in 1935, the Soviet Union had joined "with the sole promise to collaborate in every possible way with other nations in the maintenance of indivisible peace".¹¹ Between 1934 and 1938 Soviet spokesmen in the League were among the strongest supporters of the League as a collective security organization. But they were steadily disillusioned by its failure of resolution. The League did not make use of its resources. In the League the Soviet Union always tried to promote international amity and cooperation.

The Soviet Union joined the League in order to utilize it as at least a certain hurdle on the aggressors road to war and as an international forum for exposing the aggressors and their abettors. But it failed because the principle capitalist countries turned the League of Nations into a screen behind which the world war II was prepared.

10. Jane Degres (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-41 (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 92-93

11. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1962), p. 19

In other words the basic cause of the failure of the League of Nations was the imperialist policy of the states dominant in it.

"To the extent that the League aimed at stemming aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Soviet Union loyally co-operated. Litvinev even pressed for greater authority for the League to enable it to enforce its decisions; and the Soviet Union applied the arms embargo against Paraguay and economic sanctions against Italy".¹² But the League of Nations did not and could not provide a harmonious and homogeneous system of international security. USSR attempted to build up in the League a collective system that would guarantee security in the world but Stalin's hopes were dashed. The League did not prohibit aggression and it never made sanctions against aggression effective. Great Britain and France were following the appeasement policy towards Germany and Italy. Thus, in 1939, the Soviet left the League of Nations.

The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union as well as on Great Britain and France in World War II, put the USSR into the same camp with the West, and soon it led to the promotion of the wartime alliance. And thus the foundation of the UN were being laid.

12. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1952), p. 19

POLICY FRAMEWORK

A new era dawned on the Soviet attitude towards universal international organization with the creation of the United Nation in 1945. This time, the Soviet Union not only joined the UN but became one of the organizations most active members. "Its participation was predicted on the assumption that the United Nations would function primarily, as an instrument to handle specific political and security responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security would develop upon the Security Council."¹³

Soviet behaviour in the United Nations was evolved in response to changes in the perceptions and policies of the Soviet foreign policy and to changes in the international system and in the United Nations itself. Soviet interest has focussed on a number of areas: (a) Political and Security questions; (b) Disarmements; (c) Decolonisations; (d) Economic development; and (e) organizational equations.

Soviet policy towards the United Nations after San Francisco was a mixture of hope and 'peaceful co-existence'. Its policy was for strengthening that body, extending and

13. A.Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (University of Pennsylvania Random House, New York, 1972), p. 311

reinforcing international co-operation and implementation of the principles of the charter. In March 1946, Stalin had said that the United Nations was a serious instrument for the establishment of peace. He gave emphasis for careful observance of 'Great Power Unanimity' and respect for sovereign rights of all member states as conditions of effective UN co-operations.

The initial Soviet policy in the UN was active participation and efforts to support the progressive causes. For example, the condemnation of Franco Spain, attacking racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa, etc. It criticized the South African Govt. and Franco's Govt. for their unhuman behaviour towards the people of those countries.

The Soviet Union made many efforts to criticise the imperialist policies in various regions of the world. The Ukrainian D.D.R. brought the Indonesian case before the Security Council, lodging a complaint about the British use of Japanese troops and requesting restoration of peace under the UN auspices. Likewise, the Soviet Union sided with Egypt and the Sudan against Britain and with Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco against France in various cases involving these regions. The Soviet Union later described that

13. A.Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (University of Pennsylvania Random House, New York, 1972), p. 311

it supported these cases in defence of national sovereignty of those countries.

For a brief period during the fifties, the Soviet participation was often more token than real. In January 1950, the Soviet Union walked out from the United Nations over the question of Chinese representation but after Korean crisis it again came back and participated in the negotiations on the prisoner-of-war questions and cessation of hostilities in Korea.

By the beginning of the fifties a change came into Soviet foreign policy behaviour as well as the Soviet attitude towards United Nations. In 1952 Stalin himself dictated a change in the international situation which gave promise of permitting a peaceful stabilization of Soviet relations with other powers especially with the less developed parts of the world. In 1952 Stalin outlined a new line of Soviet policy, one which has been pursued by his successors. He abandoned the two camp ("Socialism" and "Imperialism") concept and proclaimed that world politics was now to be shaped by three camps through adding the grouping of the newly independent nations and uncommitted nations to the two traditional "camps".

Although Stalin had laid the groundwork for a more active policy, it was left to his successor to take its implementation in hand. The Korean war and the stalemate

that arose from it gave a new orientation, to Soviet policy toward the United Nations. In 1950, the Soviet Union had walked out from the United Nations over the question of Chinese representation but after some time it came in again.

After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the change came in Soviet policy towards United Nations. His successor Nikita Khrushchev adopted a new strategy of 'peaceful co-existence', avoiding war, if at all possible; and giving help to under developing areas. He adopted a policy which was supported by the majority of members of the UN. Its policy of anti-colonial and anti-imperialism got maximum support from Asian-African and Latin American members of the United Nations. The Soviet delegation now emphasized that "the center of gravity in the United Nations was and ought to be the General Assembly; that all members of the United Nations, large and small, are not legally but also politically equal; that the charter of the United Nations must be loosely rather than strictly construed; and that the veto in the Security Council should be reserved for emergency purposes".¹⁴

The Soviet delegation argued that there should be a greater alliance on majority vote in the General Assembly. They emphasized that the United Nations should not only

14. David D. Finley, Jan. F. Triska, Soviet Foreign Policy. (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1972), p. 361

perform a passive security function, but should become an active, Universal Organization for peace, proclaiming freedom from colonial oppression, neutralism and equality for all. According to them the Afro-Asian members should not only be represented in the secretariat, but there should be in fact three legally represented blocs in the secretariat: one to represent the Western powers, one from the communist party states, and the third the 'non-aligned' members.

Thereafter the Soviet participation in various United Nations activities underwent a subtle change. Soviet foreign policy became more active and inclined to compromise, e.g., Australia and Laos. The Soviet Union joined UNESCO; and ILO. And now it has become the member of almost all the UN organs.

Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to put the West and particularly the United States on the defensive in the UN. And it can be said that the balance which used to work to the advantage of the US and the Western powers in the United Nations has proved increasingly difficult to maintain. The effectiveness of Soviet methods in the United Nations is hard to deny.

Some critics of the Soviet Union say that the Soviet Union has failed to live up to the purposes and pledges asserted in San Francisco in 1945, but the fact is that the other Great Powers; the USA, France, Great Britain, and China have also always tried to use the United Nations for

the defence and promotion of their national interests.

Thus, it can be seen that during the first decade of the United Nations, the Soviet Union's policy towards the United Nations was essentially directed in challenging the overwhelming domination of the Western powers over the UN. Such a policy was indeed an integral part of the general Soviet policy goals and objectives of the period. By the very nature of such framework the Soviet policy towards the United Nations did not have full scope. In achieving its goals of transforming the United Nations as a viable and effective international organization as one Soviet writer has put it "the early 60s, with the beginning of the imperialist colonial system collapse and the emergence on the international scene of dozens of new independent states, the situation in the United Nations drastically changed".¹⁵

During the 60s, the change of balance of the United Nations considerably enhanced the Soviet role in the United Nations. By siding with the new third world members of the United Nations on crucial political and economic issues, the Soviet Union certainly helped in making the organization more representative of the entire humanity. Besides, the Soviet Union always tried to engage the United Nations in resolving local conflicts, as for example, the Middle Eastern

15. Alexander Baryshev, The USSR and the United Nations. (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1977), p. 20

war, Indo-Pak war, etc.

Broadly speaking, by the end of the Seventies the Soviet policy framework towards the United Nations was crystallised. The basic goals appear to be the strengthening and consolidating the United Nations and its activities and not to allow the Western domination over it. The primary objectives appear to be to support and encourage the role of the third world, thereby making the organization more representative and universal.

VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE THIRD WORLD IN THE UN

Although the Soviet policy framework for the United Nations is integrated with the Soviet foreign policy, the very changes in the composition and nature of the United Nations have exercised a deep influence on them. More so when this framework is applied in practice at the United Nations.

One of the important elements in the evaluation and operation of the Soviet policy framework in United Nations has been the role of the third world countries in the United Nations as well as the Soviet view of it. It is proposed to focus attention on this very important element in Soviet attitude to United Nations in the following pages.

It is well known that the considerably increasing strength of the Asia and African states at the United Nations

forged a temporary consensus between the super powers during the early stages of the Sixties. This was the time when the United States and its allies were generally in a weaker position than during earlier years. This is the period of the triangular relationship among the Soviet Union, the United Nations and the emerging 'Third World'.

By the mid-fifties important new steps were being taken by the Soviet Union for Third World, including the establishment of a new foreign Aid programme. Khrushchev gave special attention to the Third World "where a new wave of national liberation movement gave promise of successes beyond anything possible in the past".¹⁶ He personally launched the new foreign aid programme with a tour of developing countries in 1955.

In September 1959, when Khrushchev first appeared at the United Nations he told the assembled delegates that the time was ripe for "a radical change for the better international relations, for the complete abolition of the 'cold war' in the interests of the whole of humanity... new independent states are arising in the place of former colonies and semi-colonies",¹⁷ he declared that the United

16. Brinkley, George A. "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Changing Role of the Developing Countries", The Review of Politics, vol. 32(1), (Jan., 1970), p. 97

17. Khrushchev's Speeches, Let us live in peace and friendship (Moscow, 1959), pp. 1210-1250. And the ORGA 12th Session 799th Plenary Meeting (September 18, 1959). (We are using ORGA for official records of General Assembly in the following pages)

Nations was the place where "their inalienable right to be masters of their own destiny"¹⁸ would be assured. "It is the duty of the United Nations to contribute utmost to the economic advancement of the new states rising from the ruins of the colonial system".¹⁹

On his subsequent grand tour of Asia, in 1960, he hailed the establishment of a 'United Front' with the developing countries. He said that the ground should be prepared for improving the work of the main international body in which the peoples of almost all countries of the world are represented at the United Nations Organization.

When he reached the U.N. a second time in September 1960, he called upon the United Nations to demand the complete and final elimination of the colonial regime in all its forms and manifestations. He declared that, it was the time for all nations and peoples to take their destinies into their own hands. He spoke to the General Assembly no less than 11 times during an unprecedented attendance of three weeks' during the course of which he personally made major proposals on disarmament, the structure of the UN, and colonialism. Near the end of his stay at the 15th session, which admitted a record of 17 new

18. Ibid., p. 1210-1250

19. Ibid., p. 1210-1250

members, he said, "It is pleasant to live in times like these, when great events are taking place, when the colonial system is collapsing".²⁰

The Soviet policy of Aid and Trade to the third world countries and of supporting its efforts for their political independence and gaining of economic independence since the mid-fifties had played a significant role in transforming the third world into a force to be reckoned within world politics. Soviet Union gave blanket support to the colonies and semi-colonies of the third world for their fight for freedom. In 1960 a famous resolution was passed on Soviet initiative; 'declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.' And because of the wide effect of the resolution most of the Afro-Asian countries became free during this period.

Khrushchev's prediction were, indeed, correct insofar as they anticipated a major impact from the active entry of the third world into the United Nations; as can be seen in the growth of membership. Fortyfour new members from Asia and Africa had been admitted in the 1960s. At present out of a total of 158 member states the Afro-Asian countries compose nearly two-third; the African states alone now make up one-third.

20. Speeches of Khrushchev, Khrushchev in New York, p. 212 (October, 1960).

It is necessary to add that since 1950s the UN has been changed in many ways and turned in new directions largely at the behest of the developing countries. During this period the Soviet Union was determined to launch a vigorous and imaginative campaign, extending moral and material aid to the new nations, pointing to its own experience of rapid economic development as a model. At the United Nations it welcomed the growing membership of the UN. It gave blanket support to the colonies and semi-colonies for the fight for freedom in UN General Assembly and Security Council.

Thus from 1960 to 1962 the Soviet Union conducted an intensive campaign to change both the personnel and the structure of the UN leadership. In particular, the Soviet Union demanded that the secretariat and the Security Council be recognized on the basis of a three way division of power "so that all three groups of states - the socialist countries, the countries members of the western powers bloc, and the neutralist countries - now to be presented in these organs on a basis of equality".²¹ To achieve this he proposed the "troika" proposals to the financial crisis.

There was the drastic impact of Soviet efforts on third world at the United Nations, as can be seen in terms

21. Speeches of Khrushchev in Khrushchev in New York, (October 3, 1960), pp. 125

of the voting. Vote cast on the winning side in roll calls during plenary session; the Soviet success ratio had shown a modest improvement from 42% in 1959 to nearly 46% in the 18th session of General Assembly in 1961. In 1960s the result was a jump in Soviet voting success to an all time high of 63% at the 20th session of the General Assembly in 1965.

In 1964-65 Khrushchev's successors also showed a positive approach towards Afro-Asian countries in UN General Assembly and Security Council. In his report to the 23rd party congress in 1966, Leonid Brezhnev remarked that "the admittance of many newly-free countries to UN membership has substantially changed the situation in that organization".²² On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Brezhnev again said that, in "the task of developing co-operation with states that have already cast of the colonial yoke, the Soviet Union had achieved somewhat uneven results".²³

In recent years, as a result of joint initiatives by the Soviet Union and the developing states, several new elements have clearly appeared in the consideration by the United Nations of problems relating to the struggle against colonialism, racialism and neo-colonialism. Increasing emphasis is now being placed on questions of racialist and

22. "Report of the Central Committee", on March 29, 1966, 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1966), p. 54

23. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Editorial, vol. XIX (44), (November 22, 1967), pp. 3-20

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colonial regimes in Southern Africa. In concentrated form, the UN demands relating to the domination of colonialism, were set out in the programme of action for the full implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people which was adopted by the 25th, the jubilee session, of the UN General Assembly in 1970.

As we have noted earlier, the collapse of the colonial system in Asia and Africa led to the emergence of many independent nations. The USSR⁴¹ hailed the attainment of State sovereignty by peoples that had been reduced to colonial dependence. In the period from 1955 to 1964 it established diplomatic relations with most of the Asian and African countries. The USSR helped many developing nations to build their economy. Soviet economic co-operation with independent African, Asian nations has been an important factor consolidating their political independence and it helped in their awareness of unjust economic order.

The struggle started by the developing countries against unequal condition of trade, is given active support by the USSR at the United Nations. The Soviet Union firmly safeguards the economic interests of the Afro-Asian states at the United Nations. Economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and the Afro-Asian states, chiefly realized through the construction, with the Soviet assistance of factories, plants and other industrial projects

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in the key sectors of the developing countries national economy.

Behind such efforts of economic help to Afro-Asian countries, we can see the practical measures adopted by the Soviet Union. And the most important measure was the programme of aid and trade. The Soviet trade with the Afro-Asian countries is of both bilateral and multilateral forms. The Soviet Union exports to these countries consist chiefly of producers goods that are essential for the development of their national economies. The Afro-Asian countries ship their traditional export items to the Soviet Union, like natural textile fibres, nonferrous metal, natural rubber, varnishes, raw leather, and seeds and vegetable oils. Finished and semi-finished goods are the leading items of export to the USSR.

One of the most important aspects of Soviet attitude towards Afro-Asian countries at the United Nations forum is Soviet efforts for decolonisation, which has been one of the most important development in international relation during the sixties. And we can see in the table I that the Soviet Union was on the winning side in terms of voting, on decolonization, when compared with the United States.

TABLE I

Voting with the winning side			
	1946-55	1956-59	1960-67
Soviet Union	58%	63%	83%
United States	56%	51%	36%

Source: Albin Rubinsten, Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations, New York University Press, 1971, p. 88

Thus, the Soviet Union was almost on the winning side on the issues concerning Afro-Asian countries, which were discussed and voted at the United Nations. If one looks at the total of roll call votes in committees as well as in plenary sessions, the Soviet record is higher. As Table II shows, Soviet votes have been on the winning side most often in committees where declaratory judgements on imperialism, apartheid, independence for colonial areas, etc., are the most frequent topics of voting.

The Soviet voting success can be seen in this table, which shows the 90% successful record of Soviet voting on roll calls in the third and fourth committees.

The extent to which the nations, other than the 'new nations' have supported the latter, in the United Nations is an indication of its effectiveness. Table III below clearly shows the extent to which the new nations have gained the support of the other nations on colonial issues. It

TABLE II
COMMITTEES

Country	Plenary Session	1st	Spec. Sess.	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	% total	% in plenum
USSR	31	1	5	0	23	9	5	3	65	58
USA	21	8	4	0	5	3	2	2	39	40
UK	20	8	4	0	5	2	2	2	36	38
France	19	8	4	0	6	0	5	2	37	36
India	40	4	5	2	22	8	6	3	76	76
UAR	41	3	5	2	23	8	6	2	76	77
Ghana	38	4	5	2	23	7	1	1	69	72
Tanzania	39	4	4	2	1	22	9	3	72	74




Source: Georg A. Brinkley "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Changing Role of the Developing Countries", The Review of Politics, vol. 32(1) 1970, p. 112.

shows that the original members of the Afro-Asian group and the socialist countries have been most consistent in their support while the western European nations have failed to support the new nations.

TABLE III

Comparison of voting on colonial issues of the majority of other assembly groups in relation to the new nations, at the sixteenth & eighteenth session of the General Assembly

Percentage	0	20	40	60	80	100
Groups						
Afro-Asia						100%
Communist						100%
Latin America						76%
Western European						26.3% 44% 33.7%

	Favour (with the new nations)
	Abstained or non-participating
	Against

Source: International Organization. (New York, November 1967), Vol. 4(4), p. 807.

Further, the Soviet Union wants effective agreements on arms control and limitation of armaments either qualitatively or geographically. It clearly expressed these objectives that through the United Nations, all the nations of the world can get the "assurance of survival and the hope

of shifting substantial resources from armaments to economical development".²⁴

The general features of the Soviet view of the role of the third world countries in the United Nations, as discussed above, cannot certainly be divorced from Soviet foreign policy towards the third world. It is generally accepted that one of the primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy is to support and encourage the third world. Nowhere it can be easily seen than in an international organization like the United Nations. The very policy framework to the United Nations, further underscores it.

However, we have to look at the specifics of Soviet attitude towards Afro-Asian countries in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. This we propose to do by examining the Soviet voting pattern at the United Nations on issues concerning the third world.

In the subsequent chapters it is proposed to undertake this exercise.

24. Philip E. Mosely, The Soviet Union and United Nations, in N. Paddleford and L. Goodrich, eds., The United Nations in the balance (New York, 1965), pp. 302-313.

CHAPTER II

GLOBAL ISSUES

In the previous chapter we have pointed out that the Soviet Union claims a special relationship of harmony and afimity with the third world; indeed it is asserted that one of the primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy is to promote friendly and cordial relations with the third world. It does appear that over the years, particularly since the mid-50's the Soviet Union has by and large created a favourable image in the third world when compared to western powers. What remains however is that the bases of such a relationship need to be investigated.

Our study in primarily concerned with the Soviet Union in the United Nations. And as such it is logical for us to look at the record of Soviet voting pattern in the United Nations. Moreover, it needs to be looked not only in isolation but in relation to the specific issues which have been of direct concern for the third world countries. With this objective, we have taken up three type of issues that came up in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council; these are global issues; regional issues and bilateral issues.

In this chapter we propose to deal with the global issues. The importance of global issues is obvious by the very nature. Both the Soviet Union and the third world

countries have direct interest in them. As a matter of fact it can be argued that the community of interests between the Soviet Union and the third world has been traditionally marked in these very issues.

As far as this chapter is concerned we have divided it into three parts, each dealing with an important global issue. The first part of the chapter deals with 'Decolonisation', the second part with 'Racial discrimination in South Africa', and the third and the final part of the chapter covers 'Disarmament'.

Before we proceed further an important point needs clarification. The total numbers of Afro-Asian members of the United Nations is fairly large today around 158. Hence it is not possible for us to take into account the voting pattern of all the Afro-Asian members. For our purpose we have confined ourselves to a representative selection of 22 countries, most of them are from Afro-Asia. The criteria for selecting these 22 countries adopted are: those who have participated actively in the debate on the concerned issues and those who have been traditionally active in the work of the United Nations. Our sample thus is fairly representative, particularly when the total numbers of votes cast by the Afro-Asian members will always be taken into account.

Further we have included in our investigation the voting pattern of five permanent members of the Security Council as well as some other leading and concerned western countries like Portugal, Australia, South Africa, etc.

Thus is conceived our table and various other sources on which entire study proposes to rely upon.

PART I DECOLONIZATION

Decolonization was one of the most important issues for the United Nations during the sixties. The end of the world war II saw the beginning of a new era in the struggle for liberation in the two continents of Asia and Africa. For many years the two continents had been the victims of foreign domination and exploitation in one form or the other. The Afro-Asian states, represented at San Francisco, were keenly interested in the fate of all colonial territories. They looked upon the United Nations as the "main guardian of the interests of the indigenous inhabitants in all dependent territories".¹ The Afro-Asian group at the United Nations became strong as the time passed. After the Bandung Conference, in April 1955,

1. Yassin El-Aunaty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-Asia (Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971), p. XVII.

the group was universally referred to as the Afro-Asian 'group' or 'Block', and it took upon itself the main responsibility for the independence of colonies at the United Nations during the mid-fifties.

Since the world was divided in several groups, this group had become an effective pressure group in the UN - "To Nehru its members were united in Bandung and remained united even after that but their unity was not against anyone".² "They did not form any bloc or forge any pact or seek isolation of their continents from the rest of the world on its problems, but this group belongs to the world, to history or to future generation".³ Immediate liquidation of colonialism was the first essential duty of the Afro-Asian members in the UN.

The Soviet Union has consistently supported the cause of decolonialism. Indeed one of the primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy since the very beginning was to promote movements and trends for decolonization. At the UN forum such a policy was clearly expressed. And then there emerged a community of interest between the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian model on this very specific and important global issues.

In the first part of this chapter we will deal with three specific issues of decolonization that came

2. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the UN, (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1969), p. 40

3. Farra, Mohammad, H., The Asian-African Group in a world, ed., by Cayezal, Pagez A.; The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World (Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1964), p. 232

up before the UN. The first one is "Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples", the second the question of 'Angola' and the third is the question of 'Rhodesia'. We will analyse the Soviet voting patterns on these issues at UN General Assembly and Security Council, and correlate them with Afro-Asian voting patterns.

DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES: 1960:

Although the United Nations had taken up the issues related to colonialism a number of times during the late forties and fifties, it was at the beginning of sixties that colonialism as a global issue came up before it. It is interesting to note that it was at the initiative of the Soviet Union that such a vital issue was included in the UN Agenda in December 1960. However, the very process of inclusion of the issue in the UN agenda throws interesting light on the attitude of various powers towards it in the United Nations.

The matter of Decolonization was initially proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly's fifteenth session by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita S. Khrushchev, during his address to the General Assembly on 23 September 1960.

In an explanatory Memorandum accompanying his proposal, he declared that the time was at hand for 'the complete and final liberation of peoples languishing in colonial bondage'. The United Nations, he said, could not remain indifferent to the fact that more than 100 million human-beings were still living in condition of colonial oppression and exploitation; in keeping with the principles of its charter, the United Nations must declare itself in favour of the "immediate and complete elimination of the system in all its form and manifestations".⁴

In the draft declaration on the proposal which the USSR submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly, the United Nations members were called upon solemnly to proclaim three demands.

First, all colonial countries and Trust and Non-self-governing territories must be granted forthwith complete independence and freedom to build their own national States in accordance with the freely expressed will and desire of their peoples. The colonial system and colonial administration in all its forms must be completely abolished in order to afford the peoples of the territories concerned an opportunity to determine their own destiny and form of Government.

4. GAOR, (Dec., 1960), 15th Session

Second, all strongholds of colonialism in the form of possessions and leased areas in the territory of other countries must be eliminated.

Finally, the Government of all countries were urged to observe strictly and steadfastly the provisions of the Charter and the declaration concerning equality and respect for the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all States without exceptions, allowing no manifestations of colonialism or any special rights or advantages for some States to the detriment of other States.

On 28 September, the Assembly's General Committee recommended that the items proposed by the USSR be put on the Assembly's agenda. After deciding, on 10th October, to place the item on its agenda, the General Assembly on 13th October unanimously adopted the USSR proposal to discuss the item in plenary meetings. Accordingly it was done between 28 November and 14 December and seven delegations took part in the debate.

Initiating the debate on the proposal on 28 November, the Soviet delegate said that, although the process of liberation of peoples under colonial rule had already achieved striking results in Asia and Africa, colonialism was not yet dead. As recent events in the Gongo had shown

that some countries had not been completely freed from colonial dominations in spite of their nominal independence. Then, too, there were still many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania, "languishing under the yoke of foreign domination".⁵

In a later statement, the USSR representative contended that the colonial powers had always objected to the discussion of questions relating to the political development of the non-self-governing territories. In the case of 'Great Colonies', where there was a developed national liberation movement, the colonialists were trying in every way to postpone the granting of political independence and to guarantee for the future of the position of European minorities in these countries. In the case of smaller territories, he said, they were maintaining them as bases for colonialism by merging them with the metropolitan countries, a policy which was adopted by all colonialists. They were trying to use such territories as strategic bases and points of support for suppressing liberation movements and for exerting pressure on neighbouring countries.

The declaration proposed by the USSR for the immediate and complete liberation of the colonial people

5. Speech of USSR rep., GAOR (Nov., 1960), 15th Session.

from foreign domination would, he said, provide a solution of great historical and immediate practical significance.

Representatives of several Afro-Asian States welcomed the initiative taken by the USSR in bringing the question of colonialism before the General Assembly. The Asian-African States, they said, had long been concerned with the problem. They further stated that the economic freedom was as essential as political freedom. Racial discrimination was condemned by them as a manifestation of colonialism - especially as practised by the Union of South Africa.

Australia and New Zealand agreed with the United Kingdom's contention that colonialism was a necessary transitional phase and that Non-self-governing and Trust territories had made remarkable progress towards independence, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nation's Charter. Each case was governed by its own circumstances, and the test was always that of determining what would best suit the interests of the people whose destiny was at stake. In some cases, progress had been slow because of the special circumstances of a particular territory.

The United States representative observed that, as a result of the application of Article 73 of the Charter, 32 countries - containing over 775 million people had

attained independence since 1946. The ending of the colonial era was already far advanced, and its complete end was certain. After the initial declaration, a draft resolution, 'Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples', was sponsored by the 43 out of 46 members of the Afro-Asian countries. It may not be out of place to reproduce these below the draft resolutions in full:

"The General Assembly, mindful of the determinations proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

"Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion:

"Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

"Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat of world peace,

"Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-self-governing territories,

"Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of the colonialism in all its manifestation,

"Convinced that the continual existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

"Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principles of mutual benefit and international law,

"Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

"Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

"Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

"Solemnly proclaim the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

"And to this end

"Declares that:

1. "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, contrary to the charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. "All armed actions or repressive measures directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to internal affair of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity".⁶

As the issue had divided the General Assembly in one form or the other, a formal debate did not follow the tabling of the resolution. However, even at this stage it was quite clear that the Afro-Asian nations, the USSR and the Socialist countries were strongly in favour of it. While the Western powers were either lukewarm or had reservations.

The Soviet Union was however, not fully satisfied with the draft resolution. As a scholarly study on the UN notes:

6. GAOR, (Dec., 1960), 15th Session Supplement No. 19, pp. 66-67.

"In spite of being a historic draft resolution which secured the support of 89 members out of 98 members of the UN, it was felt by the Soviet Union that it lacked the provision of a time-limit or machinery for supervision being done by the administrative powers and also there was no provision for the assembly to examine at its next session how the terms of the proposed declaration were being respected".⁷ The Soviet Union accordingly introduced the amendments to 43-powers draft resolution but they were not adopted by the General Assembly.

Though the Afro-Asian members unanimously supported the 43-power Afro-Asian draft resolution, they were divided on the Soviet amendments. But this division did not mean deviation from their basic anti-colonial attitude. It appears that the first amendment concerning the time-limit, proposed by the Soviet amendments, had confused a majority of members of the Afro-Asian group, particularly those who voted for the amendment. Those members who voted against this provision or maintained abstention believed that the time-limit was somewhat out of tune with the conception of the Afro-Asian draft resolution and was itself a limitation on the 43-power draft resolution which had demanded 'immediate steps to be taken' towards that end." It

7. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the UN (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1969), p. 204.

TABLE I

Voting in the General Assembly on December 14, 1960,
Resolution 1514(XV)

Countries	For	Against	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia			A
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France			A
Ghana	F		
Indonesia	F		
India	F		
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal			A
UAR	F		
USA			A
USSR	F		
UK			A
South Africa			A
Total Roll Call Vote	89	9	9

Source: Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1960. (UN: New York, 1960), p. 49.

was not acceptable also because it had called for negotiations between the colonial powers and the colonial people who might introduce some conditions or reservations.

The second Soviet amendment on the question of its implementation to come before the XVI Session of the General Assembly drew support from large number of Afro-Asian States. Those Afro-Asian members who voted with the Western powers against the Soviet amendments were mostly Western allies or members of the former French colonies in Africa. All that can be said is that they adopted a mild attitude towards the colonial powers.

On 14 December 1960, the General Assembly adopted the resolution with 89 votes in favour and 9 absentions. The details of the voting pattern on the issue can be seen in Table I on the facing page.

Table I shows that the 9 countries who had abstained were; UK, USA, France, Australia, South Africa, Portugal, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Spain.

It was significant that even South Africa could not vote against the resolution and abstained, while the Western powers in fact sided with South Africa by likewise abstaining. The 89 votes cast in favour of the resolution, included all the Afro-Asian countries, Latin American members, the USSR and all the member Socialist Countries.

Thus out of 98 total members, except 9, an overwhelming majority, had voted for the resolution.

The adoption of the draft resolution on 14 Dec. 1960, without a dissenting vote was regarded as one of the "noblest resolution coming out of the UN"⁸, and as the most constructive achievement⁹ of that session of the General Assembly.

By taking initiative in the United Nations on this issue the Soviet Union certainly demonstrated its support for the vital global issue of decolonization and caused an awareness and appreciation of the policies of the Afro-Asian Nations at the United Nations.

THE QUESTION OF ANGOLA:

Angola was one of the most brutally ruled colonies. It was based on forced labour where natives were not given even freedom of movement by Portugal. Though Portugal's relations with Angola began in 1482 when the mouth of the Congo river was discovered by Diego Cao, it was renamed Portugal's 'overseas province' by a constitutional amendment in 1951.

8. GAOR, Plenary Meeting, 947 (XV), (14 December, 1960), p. 1273, para 32

9. Ibid., p. 1273

The brutal policy of Portugal in Angola became a source of international friction and conflict and it posed a threat to international peace and security. Portugal violated the UN Charter and disrespected many resolutions of the General Assembly. As the national liberation movement in Angola developed, the Angolan question was brought & discussed both in General Assembly as well as in the Security Council.

The Afro-Asian members stated that the issue of Angola is a question of African nationalism and of human liberty. It is a fight for liberation in other African countries. They said that the Portugal violated the UN Charter and the condition of Angola is beyond normal pale of human tolerance and political tolerance. It is not surprising that the Angolans have revolted against oppression for such a long time. They said that the Portugal's policies in Angola posed a moral challenge to the UN by the outrage against the conscience of mankind.

The Soviet Union gave full support to the Angolans who fought against imperialism and interference in Angola's internal affairs. This interference took the form of aggression by South Africa and Portugal. The Soviet Union criticised the South African policy of supplying arms to local counter-revolutionaries in order to start a civil

war in Angola. The Soviet Union supported all the resolutions sponsored by the Afro-Asian members in the General Assembly and the Security Council on Angola.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL:

On 26 May 1961, a request was made by 42 United Nations Members - later joined by two other members - "for a Security Council meeting to be called, as a matter of urgency, to consider the situation in Angola".¹⁰ They charged that the "massacres in Angola were continuing and human rights were being continually suppressed, and this together with the armed repression of the Angolan people and the denial of the right of self-determination in contravention of the United Nations' Charter and of the General Assembly's resolution on Angola constituted a serious threat to international peace and security".¹¹

In a statement issued on 27 May and transmitted to the Security Council, the USSR drew attention to the situation in Angola and stated that it was the duty of all States and peoples to compel Portugal to end the predatory colonial war in Angola. The USSR also declared

10. Yearbook of United Nations (New York, 1961), p. 89

11. Ibid., p. 90

that an authoritative inquiry into the situation in Angola must be held immediately with the participation of the African countries.

The question was taken up by the Security Council on 6 June when it was included in the agenda. The representative of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and Portugal were invited to participate in the discussion, at their request.

On 6 June, Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR submitted a draft resolution. According to this resolution,

"The Security Council,

"Having considered', the situation in Angola,

"Deeply deploring the large scale killings and the severely repressive measures in Angola,

"Taking note of the grave concern and strong reaction, to such occurrences throughout the continent of Africa and in other parts of the world,

"Convinced that the continuance of the situation in Angola is an actual and potential cause of international friction and is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1942 (XV) of 15 Dec., 1960 declaring Angola among others a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of

the Charter as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 by which the General Assembly declared without dissent that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation and asked for immediate steps to be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of these territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

"(1) Reaffirms General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and calls upon Portugal to act in accordance with the term of that resolution;

"(2) Requests the sub-Committee appointed in terms of the aforesaid General Assembly resolution to implement its mandate without delay;

"(3) Calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures and further to extend every facility to the sub-Committee to enable it to perform its task expeditiously;

TABLE II
Voting in the Security Council on the
Question of Angola
Resolution S/4835 9th June 1961

Ceylon	Chile	China	Ecuador	France	Liberia	Turkey	USA	UK	USSR	UAR
P	P	P	P	A	P	P	P	A	P	P

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations,
1961 (UN: New York, 1961), p.89

4. "Expresses the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. "Requests the sub-Committee to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as possible."¹²

A discussion, followed after tabling the resolution. The Minister of External Affairs, Sierra Leone stated that the Security Council should set a time-limit for Portugal to carry out past resolutions of the UN. The Madagascar representative said that the Council should take necessary decision, no matter how harsh they might be. The representative of Ghana stated that maximum action which could be taken against Portugal "would be to 'ostracise' it from the family of nations until it acted in good faith to respect the decisions of the UN."¹³ The USSR representative said that the Council should condemn the colonial war against the Angolan people.

On 9 June 1961, the three-power resolution was put to voting and it was adopted by 9-0-2 votes, as resolution S/4835. The voting pattern can be seen in Table II on the facing page.

12. ORSC (1961), S/4835

13. United Nations Review, 10 (8-9); (Aug-Sept 1963), p.17

The voting shows that the 9 countries who voted for the resolution were Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, USSR, UAR and USA. The two countries who abstained were UK and France. But it was significant that not a single country vetoed the resolution. And some of the Western countries like Turkey and USA voted for the resolution. The USSR along with the Afro-Asian countries voted for the resolution, and thus once more demonstrated its support for the cause of decolonization in the Security Council.

CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

Instead of accepting the Security Council resolution, Portugal stepped up its military repression of the Angolan people. In spite of strict censorship, news of mass killing, arrests and bombardment of villages reached the outside world. The situation was becoming dangerous for world peace. The Afro-Asian group brought the question in the General Assembly.

The General Assembly discussed the item at its resumed session in 15 plenary meeting held from 15 to 30 January, 1962. In introducing the report, the Chairman of the sub-committee regretted that Portugal had refused to allow the sub-committee to visit Angola.

Most of the representatives, of the African-Asian countries, who spoke in the debate regarding the situation

in Angola as a threat to international peace disagreed with Portugal's view that Angola was an integral part of metropolitan Portugal and regretted that Portugal had refused to allow the sub-committee to enter Angola.

On 23 January 1962, a 45-power draft resolution was submitted and subsequently revised. The sponsors of the 45 power proposal maintained that their text was realistic, moderate and went to the heart of the problem. In their view, it emphasized the need for General Amnesty and liberation of all political prisoners after an immediate cease-fire and the necessity that Portugal recognize the right of self-determination and set up transitional political institutions. It also embodied a solemn appeal to all United Nations members to refrain from any aid and support to Portugal.

There was considerable discussions on the 45-power draft resolution. Most spokesmen expressed satisfaction with its moderation. The United Kingdom and United States, however, had reservations about some of its provisions. The United Kingdom representative doubted whether the situation in Angola was a "threat to international peace as stated in the preamble to the draft resolution; such assertion represented an unwarranted

TABLE III

Resolution 1742 (XVI) 30 th January, 1962
 Voting in the General Assembly
 on Question of Angola

Countries:	For:	Against	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia	F		
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France			
Ghana	F		
Indonesia	F		
India	F		
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
UAR	F		
USA	F		
UK	F		
USSR	F		
South Africa		X	
Total roll call votes	90	1	1

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1962
 (UN: New York, 1962), p. 93

extension of the meaning of these words contained in the Charter".¹⁴

Afghanistan, Guinea, Iraq, Nigeria, the USSR and others however, objected to the proposal by the United States on the grounds that while self-determination was no doubt mentioned in the United Nations Charter, the ultimate aim envisioned in the Charter was complete independence.

On 30 January 1962, the 45-power text was put to vote and it was passed by a roll call vote of 99 to 2, with 1 abstention as resolution 1742 (XVI). The voting pattern can be seen in Table III on the facing page.

The table shows that the only country which had absented itself was France and countries who voted against the resolution were South Africa and Spain. The Portugal did not take part in the discussion as well as in the voting.

The most important factor of this voting was that all the Western powers voted for the resolution except a few. UK and USA voted in favour of the resolution alongwith all the Afro-Asian members and Socialist countries.

The voting in the General Assembly and in the Security Council shows that the USSR not only supported the resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian countries but fully participated in the debate and discussions on Angola.

14. Yearbook of United Nations (New York, 1962), p. 94

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

"Since the process of decolonization began, Britain granted political freedom to no fewer than 600 millions of its former colonial subjects on the basis of the Constitution of all the people of a particular country based on the principle of one man one vote, except to the people of Southern Rhodesia."¹⁵ Racial discrimination had also been practised in many ways in Southern Rhodesia. The people of Southern Rhodesia wanted nothing more or less than what had been given, to the peoples of other British colonies. To set the stage for political independence they wanted to have a constitution which must represent the views and aspirations of all the people of the country and which could give every adult man and woman, of whatever race or colour, the right to vote and thus to choose their proper government. They demanded that the constitution of 1961, which had classified the electorate of Southern Rhodesia in class 'A' and 'B' on a racial basis must go. Their ultimate aim was to convene a fresh constitutional conference to draft a new constitution transferring power to the majority on the basis of "one man one vote".

The constitution of 1961 increased unrest in Southern Rhodesia. Violence and arrests became the rule

15. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the UN, (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1969), p. 255

of the day. This fast deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia made the UN take up the issue.

The members of the Afro-Asian group, pioneered the cause of Southern Rhodesia in the UN. The first initiative was taken by 10 Afro-Asian members along with Yugoslavia. Their first draft resolution which was adopted by the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly on 23 February, 1962, asked the special committee of 17 to consider whether Southern Rhodesia has attained a full measure of self-government¹⁶ and to report on its findings to the General Assembly's XVII Session.

As for the USSR was concerned, it gave its full support to the Afro-Asian countries in bringing the Rhodesian issue at the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union strongly favoured the right of self-determination of the people of Southern Rhodesia. It stated that it should be given full independence.

CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In a letter dated 21 June 1962, 41-member States requested the inclusion of an item entitled "The question of Southern Rhodesia" in the agenda of the resumed 7th Session of the General Assembly. An explanatory Memorandum accompanying the letter stated that this had become

16. ORGA (Feb., 1962), 16th Session Pln. Mtg., 1108 (XVI), pp. 1576-77.

imperative since no favourable developments had occurred and on the contrary there was a continuing deterioration in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia.

A draft resolution sponsored by 38 powers, was placed before the General Assembly's plenary meeting, held between 18 and 28 June, 1962. The draft was as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December, 1960, containing the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,

"Having considered the report on the question of Southern Rhodesia submitted by the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples,

"Considering that the vast majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia have rejected the constitution of 6 December 1961,

"Deploring the denial of equal political rights and liberties to the vast majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia;

"Noting with regret that the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has not yet taken steps to transfer all powers to the people of Southern Rhodesia as required under paragraph 5 of Resolution 1514 (XV);

"Having further considered the evidence submitted by the petitioners before the special committee;

"1. Approves the conclusions of the special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the "Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples of Southern Rhodesia, and affirms that the territory of Southern Rhodesia is a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of the chapter (XI) of the charter of the United Nations.

"2. Requests the Administering Authority, (a) to undertake urgently the convening of a constitutional conference in which there shall be full participation of representatives of all political parties, for the purpose of formulating a constitution for Southern Rhodesia, in place of the constitution of 8 December 1961, which would ensure the rights of the majority of the people on the basis of "one man, one vote", in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples embodied in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV);

"(b) to take immediate steps to restore all rights of the non-European population and remove all restraints and restrictions in law and in practice on the exercise of freedom of political activity including all laws, ordinances and regulations which directly or indirectly sanction any policy or practice based on racial discrimination;

"(c) to grant amnesty to, and ensure the immediate release of all political prisoners;

TABLE IV

Resolution 1747 (XVI) 28th June 1962

Voting in the General Assembly on
the question of Southern Rhodesia.

...

Countries	For	Against	Abstn.
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Burma	F		
Combdia	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France			A
Ghana	F		
Indonesia	F		
India	F		
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal			A
UAR	F		
UK			A
USA			A
USSR	F		
South Africa		X	
	73	1	27

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1962
(UN: New York, 1962), p. 68.

"3. Requests the Special Committee to continue its constructive efforts the earliest implementation of resolution 1814 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia in order to ensure its emergence as an independent State."¹⁷

In the general debate in which 50 members took part, the co-sponsors of the draft said, among other things, that they could not accept the constitutional arguments advanced by the United Kingdom. The USSR representative, while supporting the recommendations contained in the draft resolution, said that Southern Rhodesia should become independent as soon as possible and in any event, not later than the end of 1962.

The Assembly then adopted the resolution by a roll call vote of 73 in favour and 1 against and 27 abstention, as resolution 1747 (XVI). The details of voting are given in Table IV on the facing page.

Table IV shows that the 27 countries who had abstained were from the Western block. South Africa cast its vote against the resolution, and Western powers like USA, UK and France in fact sided with it while abstaining. The 73 votes cast in favour of the resolution includes all the Afro-Asian countries, Latin American countries. The UK, however, did not pay any

17. GAOR (June 1962), 16th Session Resolution 1747(XVI).

attention to this resolution.

It is true that despite the tireless efforts of Afro-Asian countries no concrete solution of the question of Southern Rhodesia, like the problem of South-West Africa and Angola, could be found till the seventies. But there is no doubt that it was only a result of united efforts of the USSR and Afro-Asian countries that it was discussed at the United Nations forum and could turn the world public opinion in favour of Rhodesian people. Like the Afro-Asian countries, the USSR always criticised the British policies in Southern Rhodesia and stressed on the need of complete independence of her.

P A R T - II

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

"The struggle of the coloured people of South Africa is neither a religious struggle, nor a political struggle, nor even a social struggle, but it is a struggle of races".¹⁸ The white minority which dominates the black majority refuses to accept the demand of the majority for evolving a democratic process under which the majority should have a share in political power and a

18. D.N. Sharma, "Afro-Asian Group in UN", (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1969), p. 257

say in the social and economic spheres. In the Union of South Africa the coloured people have practically no right; they are economically exploited, politically ignored and socially boycotted. The adherence to the people of racial discrimination by the government of South Africa is totally intolerable to the coloured people of Asia and Africa who consider it a stigma on human civilization and a gross violation of the UN charter on Human Rights.

The question of racial discrimination came up before the UN for the first time in the first Assembly session on 22 June 1946. It was India which brought the question of treatment of Indians in South Africa in the General Assembly. Since then the question comes up before the General Assembly every year. In 1952 a separate question, that of racial discrimination, came up before the UN. Till 1961 both the questions were considered by the UN separately but since 1962 the two questions have been combined as both are the same in substance.

The problem of racial discrimination in South Africa, though a chronic problem before the UN like that of South Africa, is more acute in form even after being on the UN agenda for many years. The world has changed

a lot since 1945, particularly after the emergence of new nations of Asia and Africa. Their emergence on the international horizon posed a challenge to the colonial powers to grant them their minimum human rights of liberty and equality. They have also forced a majority of colonial powers to realize the gravity of the changed situation, to recognize the challenge of the age and to respect the rights of the exploited dark skinned people of Asia and Africa.

The Afro-Asian efforts to end the apartheid policy in South Africa received enthusiastic support from the USSR. During the whole period of UN existence not even a single draft resolution on this question was opposed by the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union had been actively opposed to all form of social and national inequality and discrimination in South Africa. To this day, it condemns the colonial racial regime of South Africa and those imperialist powers that openly or covertly support that regime in violation of UN resolution."¹⁹ It asked the Western powers to stop their trade and other relations with South African Government.

The dominant role played by the Afro-Asian members in the UN on the question of race conflict in South Africa

/ed.:

19. A.A. Gromyko, B.H. Ponomarev/Soviet Foreign Policy Vol. II, 1945-80 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980). p. 404

was clear since 1952, when it was, for the first time brought before the UN. However, an analysis of the concrete role played by the Soviet Union along with the third world on the issue during the period 1956-71 deserves consideration.

QUESTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 1956-1971

In the XI Session of the General Assembly, Ceylon, Iran and Iraq along with Greece and Haiti submitted a draft resolution on racial discrimination. It deplored the fact that the "South African Government had not observed its obligations under the Charter and had pressed forward with discriminatory measures, called upon it to reconsider its position and revise its policy and invited it to co-operate in a constructive approach to this question, more particularly by its presence' in the UN".²⁰

During the general debate, the representatives of Afro-Asian countries criticised the apartheid policy of South African regime and asked all the UN members to put the pressure on that Government to stop its discriminatory policies in that country.

20. ORGA. (1) SPC Mtg. 16 (7) (January, 1956), p. 75

TABLE V

Resolution 1016 (XI) 30th January 1956. Voting
in the General Assembly on Racial Discrimination
in South Africa

Countries:	For	Against	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia		X	
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France		X	
Ghana	F		
India	F		
Indonesia	F		
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal		X	
UAR	F		
USA			A
U K		X	
USSR	F		
South Africa		X	
Total roll call vote	56	5	18

Compiled on the basis of Yearbook of United Nations
1956, (UN: New York, 1956), p. 144

The representative of the USSR thought that United Nations should deal with the question of race conflict in South Africa because the apartheid policy pursued by that government compromised its relations with other countries and thus endanger peace in that part of the world.

Thus the draft resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by 56 to 5 with 12 abstentions on 30 Jan. 1956. The voting pattern can be seen in Table V on the facing page.

The Table shows that the Afro-Asian countries voted in favour of the resolution. The USSR and all the Socialist countries also gave their votes in favour of the resolution. UK, Australia, France, all the big European powers voted against the resolution and USA abstained. Thus we can say that all the Western powers supported the South African Government, casting their votes against the resolution. The other countries who abstained were all from Western block.

After the voting explanation vote^{/of} took place. The Afro-Asian countries and the USSR stated that the time had come for the United Nations to take collective and resolute action to obtain compliance with its resolution and resolute action to obtain compliance with its resolution and its principle. They pointed out that the Government of South Africa always ignored the appeals of

UN members previously and continued its apartheid policies. Thus it was pointless to repeat the mild appeals made in the past. They stated that Assembly should take punitive steps.

Although the question of race conflict in South Africa was discussed every year by General Assembly from 1956 onwards, the year 1963 is very significant when the Security Council, for the first time discussed the apartheid policy of South African Government, as a part of its agenda, and as a matter of urgency.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL, 1963

On 11 July 1963, 32 African States requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the "explosive situation existing in the Republic of South Africa, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security".²¹ The Security Council discussed the question between 31 July and 7 August 1963.

On 6 August Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines submitted a joint draft resolution by which,

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of

21. Yearbook of United Nations, (New York, 1963), p. 15

the government of the Republic of South Africa, as submitted by the thirty two African member States.

"Recalling Security Council resolution S/4500 of 1st April, 1960.

"Taking into account that world public opinion has been reflected in General Assembly resolution 1961 (XVII) and particularly in its paragraph 4 and 8,

"Noting with appreciation the two interim reports of the special committee on the policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa contained in documents S/5310 of 9th May and S/5353 of 17th July, 1963.

"Noting with concern the recent arms build up by the government of South Africa, some of which are being used in furtherance of that governments racial policies,

"Regretting that some States are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of apartheid,

"Regretting the failure of the government of South Africa to accept the invitation of the Security Council to delegate a representative to appear before it.

"Being convinced that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security.

"1. Strongly deprecates the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the charter of the United Nations and contrary to its obligations as a member State of the United Nations;

"2. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of apartheid and discrimination as called for in the previous Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960, and to liberate all persons imprisoned, internal or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid;

"3. Solemnly calls upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa;

"4. Requests the Secretary General to keep the situation in South Africa under observation and to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963."²²

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liberia, Tunisia and Sierra Leone and the Minister of Finance of Madagascar participated in the debate on behalf of Afro-Asian countries. The representative of the USSR stated that the United Nations had an obligation to continue to denounce and condemn the apartheid policy as long as the South Africa refused to abandon it.

22. ORSC (August, 1963), Mtg. 1056, p. 5

TABLE VI

Resolution S/5386 7th August 1963
 Voting in the Security Council on
 Racial Discrimination in South Africa

Brazil	China	France	Ghana	Morocco	Norway	Philippines	UK	USA	USSR	Venezuela	(Passed by 9-0-2 votes)
F	F	X	F	F	F	F	A	F	F	F	

F = For

X = Against

A = Abstention.

 Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1963 (UN: New York, 1963), p.20

The Security Council voted on the draft resolution on 7th August 1963 and it was adopted by 9 votes in favour, none against, and with 2 abstentions. The voting pattern can be seen in Table VI on the facing page.

The table shows that all the non-permanent members voted in favour of the resolution. Three permanent members, China, USA and USSR also voted in favour of the resolution but two permanent members UK and France abstained. So out of total 11 members not a single member casted its vote against the resolution. The resolution was passed by a vote of 9-0 and 2 abstention.

But a paragraph in the draft resolution, calling for a "boycott of all South African goods and for a ban on the export to that country of strategic materials of direct military value",²³ was deleted in a separate vote on the request of the US representative, when it failed to gain the seven affirmative votes. Ghana, Morocco, Philippines, Soviet Union and Venezuela voted in favour and Brazil, China, France, Norway, UK and USA abstained.

The New York Times remarked that "it was the strongest move yet made in the drive to end such policies in Africa"²⁴ but "the Western powers, viz., France, the

23. ORSC. Mtg. 1056 (7 Aug. 1963), p. 4

24. New York Times (8 August, 1963)

UK and the USA again came to the rescue of the South African government in voerward's hour of need²⁵ by abstaining on the voting of the important paragraph of the Afro-Asian draft resolution which called for an embargo on trade with South Africa. Though the USA voted in favour of the truncated resolution, it had no intention of honouring it.

CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The new repressive measures taken by the South African Government on the imprisoned opponents and unhuman torture of the people, compelled Afro-Asian members to again condemn the South African Government.

On 10 October 1963, 55 Afro-Asian members tabled a draft resolution. It stated that South Africa was arranging trial of a large number of prisoners under arbitrary laws prescribing death sentence which would further deteriorate the already explosive situation in South Africa and would further disturb international peace and security, condemned South Africa for the defiance of various Assembly's and Council's draft resolutions.

By this resolution the Assembly called upon the South African Government to abandon the arbitrary trial

25. Times of India (Bombay, 10 August, 1963)

TABLE VII

Voting in the General Assembly on racial
discrimination in South Africa, 1968

Countries:	Resolution 1881(XVIII)			Resolution 1978A(XVIII)			Resolution 1978 B(XVIII)		
	For	Ag.	Ab.	For	Ag.	Ab.	For	Ag.	Ab.
Afghanistan	F			F			F		
Albania	F			F			F		
Australia	F			F			F		
Burma	F			F			F		
Ceylon	F			F			F		
China	F			F			F		
Congo	F			F			F		
Ethiopia	F			F			F		
France	F			F			F		
Ghana	F			F			F		
India	F			F			F		
Indonesia	F			F			F		
Iran	F			F			F		
Yugoslavia	F			F			F		
Libya	F			F			F		
Pakistan	F			F			F		
Portugal	NP				X				X
UK	F						A	F	
USA	F			F			F		
USSR	F			F			F		
South Africa		X			X				X
Total roll- call votes	(106	1	0)	(200	2	1)	(99	2	0)

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1963
(UN: New York, 1963), p. 21.

then in progress and to release unconditionally all political prisoners and all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid.

While taking part in the discussion the representative of Soviet Union said that the South African Government could not continue its apartheid policy without the economic and military support of Western powers. He said that immediate economic sanctions should be imposed on the racist regime of South Africa.

The Afro-Asian members said that the situation in South Africa was becoming very serious. They were very much disturbed by the extreme measures taken against the African political leaders.

The draft resolution was adopted at a plenary meeting of the Assembly by a roll-call vote of 106 to 1, as resolution 1881 (XVIII). The details of voting can be seen in the table VII on the facing page.

Two more draft resolutions were adopted in the General Assembly on 16 December 1963 as 1978 A(XVIII), and 1978 B (XVIII) by a roll-call vote of 100-2-1 and 99-2-0. These draft resolutions were sponsored by 49 powers and 47 powers respectively. All the countries were from Afro-Asia. The voting patterns on these resolutions are also shown on table VII on the facing page.

The table shows that resolution 1881 (XVIII) was opposed by only one country, namely, South Africa. 106 member States voted in favour of the resolution. All the Afro-Asian countries as well as the USSR and the Socialist countries voted in favour of the resolution. The most significant feature of the voting was that UK and France who used to be abstain in the past, casted their votes along with the other Western powers voting in favour of the resolution, while Portugal, Spain, Honduras and Paraguay were not present.

While explaining their votes the representatives of France, Australia, UK and USA stated that they were overwhelmed by the humanitarian spirit of the nations as a whole.

The second draft resolution 1978 A (XVIII) was opposed by 2 members, South Africa and Portugal and UK abstained. 100 countries included all the Afro-Asian States, Latin American members, USSR, Socialist countries and some Western powers, voted in favour of the resolution.

The third draft resolution 1978 B (XVIII) was again opposed by Portugal and South Africa but other members including UK, USA and France voted in favour of the resolution along with Afro-Asia and Socialist block.

Thus we can say that the voting pattern of the USSR and the third world was in favour of the resolutions to condemn the apartheid policy of South Africa. Even Western powers were willing to support the Afro-Asian members to curb the racial discrimination in South Africa. The adoption of the three Afro-Asian draft resolutions by such an overwhelming majority was a hopeful sign for exerting greater pressure on the South African Government to change its policy.

Although the best efforts of the Afro-Asian countries and the USSR to compell the South African Government to end its apartheid policy, the South African Government continued it because it had the indirect support of the Western powers.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL, 1970

In July 1970, the question of 'racial discrimination in South Africa' was once again discussed in the Security Council. The matter was considered at five meetings, held between 17 and 23 July 1970. Ghana, India, Mauritius, Pakistan and Somalia were invited, at their request, to participate without vote.

On 22 July a draft resolution was sponsored jointly by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia. By this resolution;

"The Council called on States to strengthen the arms embargo by: (a) implementing fully the arms embargo against South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever; (b) withholding the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use by the armed forces and paramilitary organization of South Africa; (c) ceasing the supply of spare parts for all vehicles and military equipments used by armed forces and paramilitary organization of South Africa; (d) reversing all licenses and military patents granted to the South Africa Government or to South African Companies for manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or other military vehicles and by refraining from further granting such licenses and patents; (e) prohibiting investment in or technical assistance for, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft or other military vehicles; (f) ceasing provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military cooperation with South Africa; (g) undertaking the appropriate action to give effect to the above measures".²⁶

26. Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, 1970).
p. 123

While taking part in the discussion, Radha Krishna Ramphal (Mauritius), speaking as Chairman of the African Group, expressed hope for positive and resolute council to curb the situation. He said that, although the question of apartheid had been before the Council since 1960, the only concrete measure it had taken was the arms embargo. The African States were anxious to see that this one meaningful measure was not defeated.

Samer Sen of India said that the numerous United Nations resolutions had produced no positive results. Not only had South Africa intensified its racial practices, but it had also built up a formidable military machine to oppose the freedom movement and spread and support by force of arms its racial doctrine and practices in Namibia, the Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia. South Africa posed a grave challenge and threat to the peace of Southern Africa, he concluded.

The representative of the USSR Aleksei Zakharov, stated that the Security Council, while condemning the racial regime in South Africa, should draw attention to the economic and military policies of the Western powers, which promoted the survival of that regime and enabled it to maintain its racial policies by force. As was clear from the data cited in the Council, he stated that the Western powers had never fully complied with the embargo.

TABLE VIII

Resolution 282 (1970) 23rd July, 1970.
 Voting in the Security Council on racial
 Discrimination in South Africa.

Burundi	Colombia	China	France	Finland	Nepal	Nicaragua	Poland	Spain	UK	USA	USSR	Syria	Sierra Leone	Zambia
F	F	F	A	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	F	F	F	F

Adopted by 12-0-3 votes.

F = For

X = Against

A = Abstention.

He said that, the USSR supported the African States' call for the strengthening of the arms embargo and its full implementations.

Similar views were expressed by representatives of other Asian and African States. Ghana, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zambia maintained that the arms embargo against South Africa had been weakened by the reservations of some States and had been made virtually ineffective by the non-compliance of others.

On 23 July the resolution was put to vote by a show of hands and it was adopted by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions, as resolution 282 (1970). Table VIII on the facing page, gives a full picture of voting.

The table shows that out of 15 members, 12 members voted for the resolution. All the Afro-Asian members, USSR and Socialist members voted in favour of the resolution. Even European power like Spain voted for the resolution. But Western powers like USA, UK and France (once again) abstained and thus they were directly or indirectly supporting the South African Government.

While explaining his vote, the representative of the USSR said that his delegation had supported and voted for draft resolution because it reflected the proposals mentioned in the statements made by the majority of the

members of the Council and contained proposals aimed at strengthening the embargo and closing the loopholes used by the Western powers to dodge the Council's decisions prohibiting the supplying of arms to South Africa.

The Afro-Asian representatives said that they voted in favour of the resolution because there are some countries who were selling arms and military hardware to South Africa. So they said that Council could request the Secretary General to keep the matter under continuing review and take necessary action through U.N.

Although the draft resolution was passed by 12-0-3 votes and the remarkable achievement was that not a single country vetoed the resolution, it was clear that the Western powers like USA, UK and France did not like to displease the Government of South Africa. So they abstained. The USSR was once again proved the 'friend in need' of Afro-Asian countries.

CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 1971

The question of race conflict in South Africa was once again discussed in the General Assembly on 9th and 29th November 1971. The matter was taken up on the recommendation of special political committee. The Afro-Asian members expressed grave concern at the persistent

refusal of South Africa to abandon its racial policy and to abide by the Security Council and General Assembly's resolutions relating to the Southern Africa. The General Assembly adopted 10 resolutions in 1971 on racial discrimination. The resolutions were recommended by special political committee.

The first resolution 2764 (XXVI), concerned the maltreatment and torture of opponents of apartheid. By this resolution, the Assembly expressed its grave indignation and concern over every act of maltreatment and torture of opponents of apartheid in South Africa and the increased persecution of religious leaders opposed to that policy. It again called upon all States to do everything in their power to promote the course of justice for all people in South Africa, and to exert their influence to secure "the repeal of all legislation designed to give effect to the oppressive policies and the persecution and suppression of the rights of those who were opposed to these policies; the liberation of all persons imprisoned or detained for their opposition to apartheid; and the removal of orders against those banned or banished,²⁷ for their opposition to apartheid.

The resolution was passed on 9th November by a vote of 109 to 2 with 0 abstention, as resolution 2764(XXVI).

27. UN Monthly Chronicle. (December 1971), vol. 8(2) p. 71

TABLE IX

Resolution 2764 (XXVI) 9th November 1971.

Voting in the General Assembly on Racial
Discrimination in South Africa, 1971.

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia	F		
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France	F		
Ghana	F		
India	F		
Indonesia	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal		X	
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
UK	F		
USA	F		
USSR	F		
South Africa		X	
UAR	F		
Total roll call vote	109	2	0

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1971,
(UN: New York, 1971), p. 78

The voting pattern can be seen in Table IX on the facing page. It shows that all the members of the General Assembly except 2 (Portugal and South Africa) voted in favour of the resolution. Portugal and South Africa gave negative votes. All the big Western powers including USA, UK and France also voted in favour of the resolution. All the Afro-Asian members and Socialist block of members casted affirmative votes. Statements in explanation of vote were made by the representatives of Somalia, Norway, Zambia, India, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, Uganda, and Ghana.

The representative of Somalia said that by voting for the resolutions, the Assembly would fulfil what had been affirmed; that United Nations could not be indifferent to what was going on in South Africa, and that the acts perpetuated under the banner of apartheid were acts against humanity and offensive to all who believed in human equality and dignity.

The representative of Zambia hoped that the adoption of the resolution would lead to South Africa's trading partners searching their hearts so that at the next assembly they would say that they had stopped giving arms to South Africa.

The representative of India stated that the resolution was a warning to the Pretoria regime that after 23 years of authoritarian rule and public terror, it had failed to suppress the churches, the universities and the press - the sources of intellectual dissent in South Africa.

On 29 November, 9 resolutions were passed on the same day in the General Assembly on South Africa. All the resolutions discussed together and put to vote one by one.

The first resolution 2774 (XXVI) was on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. According to this resolution, the Assembly expressed appreciation to governments, organizations and individuals that had contributed to the Fund, and again appealed to all States, organizations, governments and non-government and to individuals for contributing to enable the fund to meet the increasing needs.

The second resolution 2775 A (XXVI) was about arms embargo. According to this resolution, the General Assembly once again asked all the Governments to implement fully the arms embargo against South Africa. The Assembly asked all the Governments to stop the military collaboration with South Africa. It requested the special committee on apartheid to undertake a comprehensive study

of the military collaboration and military assistance to South Africa by Governments and private enterprise and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its twenty seventh session.

The third resolution 2775 B(XXVI) was concerned about educational material on apartheid. According to this resolution "the General Assembly among other things considered that the international year for action to combat racism and racial discrimination should be the occasion to add new emphasis to efforts to enlighten the international community about the evils of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. It was convinced of the special role education should play in international efforts to eliminate apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination".²⁸

The fourth resolution 2775 C(XXVI) stated that "the Assembly endorsed the programme of work of the Special Committee in its report, which it made to the Assembly and to the Security Council and authorised the Special Committee, within budgetary provisions, to do the following: send the representatives, as appropriate, to international conferences on the problems of apartheid, hold consultations with experts and representatives of

28. Yearbook of United Nations. (New York, 1971), p. 71

the oppressed people of South Africa, as well as anti-apartheid movements and non-governmental organizations concerned with the campaign against apartheid".²⁹

The fifth resolution 2775 D(XXVI) was about apartheid in sports. In this resolution, the Assembly declared unqualified support for the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation in Olympics. It affirmed that merit should be the sole criterion for participation in sports activities and solemnly called upon all national and international sports organizations to uphold the Olympic principle and deny support to sports, events, organized in violation of that principle. The Assembly called upon individual sportsmen to refuse to participate in any sports activity in a country in which there was an official policy of racial discrimination or apartheid in sports.

The 6th resolution 2775 E(XXVI) was on Bantustans. According to this resolution, the General Assembly again condemned the establishment by the South African Government of Bantu homelands, Bantustan, and the forcible removal of the African people of South Africa and Namibia to these areas as a violation of their

29. UN Monthly Chronicle, (December, 1971), vol. 8(II), p. 71

inalienable rights, contrary to the principles of self-determination and prejudicial to the territorial integrity of the countries and unity of their people.

The Seventh resolution 2775 F (XXVI) was on the situation resulting from the policies of apartheid. In this resolution, the General Assembly reaffirmed its resolution 2671 (XXVI) and commended all States, organizations and individuals struggling against apartheid and racial discrimination, especially in South Africa. It declared that the present tactics of the racist government of South Africa in pursuance of its so-called outward policy were designed primarily to obtain acquiescence in its policies to confuse world public opinion to counter international isolation to hinder assistance to the liberation movement by the international community and to consolidate white minority rule in Southern Africa.

The eight resolution 2775 G (XXVI) was about the information regarding the apartheid policy. In this resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to "intensify information activities to promote national and international action for the elimination of apartheid, in conformity with conclusion stated in his report on United Nations information policies and in

compliance with recommendations in the report of the Special Committee on apartheid".³⁰

The final resolution 2775 H(XXVI) was on trade union activities against apartheid. In this resolution, the Assembly appealed to all national and international trade union organizations to intensify action against apartheid, particularly by discouraging the emigration of skilled workers to South Africa, taking appropriate action in connection with the infringements of trade union rights and the persecution of trade unionists in South Africa, exerting maximum pressure against foreign economic and financial interests which were profiting from racial discrimination against non-white workers in South Africa to persuade them to cease such exploitation.

The discussion on all the nine resolutions had taken place as well as voted simultaneously. While taking part in the discussion, the Afro-Asian members said that despite the various resolutions passed in the UN in the past on apartheid, the South African racial regime continued its cruel racial discriminatory policies and is still suppressing the human rights and fundamental freedom of all inhabitants. The representative of the USSR said that the time had come to take strong actions

30. Ibid., p. 72

TABLE X

Voting in the General Assembly on Racial Discrimination in South Africa, 1971

Countries	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.
	2774	2775A	2775B	2775C	2775D	2775E	2775F	2775G	2775H
	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)	(XXVI)
(1)	F. Ag. Ab. (2)	F. Ag. Ab. (3)	F. Ag. Ab. (4)	F. Ag. Ab. (5)	F. Ag. Ab. (6)	F. Ag. Ab. (7)	F. Ag. Ab. (8)	F. Ag. Ab. (9)	F. Ag. Ab. (10)
Afghanistan	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Albania	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Australia	F		A F	F	F	F		A	A
Burma	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ceylon	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
China	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Congo	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ethiopia	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
France	F		A F		A F		A	X	A
Ghana	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
India	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Indonesia	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Pakistan	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Portugal		A	X		A	A	X		X
Iran	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

Cont.. p. 89

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Yugoslavia	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Libya	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	
UK	F		A	A	A	A	A	X	A	A
USA	F		A	F	A	F	F	X	A	F
UAR	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
USSR	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
South Africa	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	110 -1 -1	107-2-5	112-1-3	108-1-5	106-2-7	110-2-2	86-4-22	108-2-6	104-1-9	

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1971
(UN: New York, 1971), p. 79.

against South African Government. He stated that the United Nations must take collective and resolute action to obtain compliance with its resolutions and its principles.

When the resolutions were put to vote, the first resolution 2774 (XXVI) was passed by 110 in favour to 1 against and 1 abstention. As can be seen in Table X on the facing page. Only South Africa voted against the resolutions while Portugal abstained. All the Afro-Asian members, Socialist members, Latin American members and most of the European members casted their vote in favour of the resolution.

The second resolution 2775 A (XXVI) was adopted by 107-2-5 abstention. South Africa and Portugal voted against the resolution as can be seen in Table X while the prominent Western powers like France, UK, USA and Australia abstained. All the Afro-Asian members and the USSR along with Socialist Block voted for the resolution.

The third resolution 2775 B (XXVI) was passed by 112-1-3 abstentions. The voting can be seen in Table X. On this resolution, only South Africa gave negative vote while Portugal and UK abstained. The USA and France voted in favour of the resolution. The Afro-Asian members, China, USSR, Socialist block and Latin American countries voted for the resolution.

The fourth resolution 2775 C (XXVI) was passed by 108-1-5 votes as can be seen in Table X. South Africa voted against the resolution while Portugal, France, UK and USA once again remained abstained. All the Afro-Asian members and USSR voted for the resolution.

The fifth resolution 2775 D (XXVI) was passed by 106-2-7 abstentions. The voting pattern can be seen in Table X. The table shows that South Africa voted against the resolution while UK and Portugal abstained. France and USA voted for the resolution. All the Afro-Asian countries and Socialist block voted for the resolution.

The sixth resolution 2775 E (XXVI) was passed by 110-2-2 abstentions as can be seen in Table X. Portugal and South Africa voted against the resolution while UK and France abstained. USA voted in favour of the resolution. All the Afro-Asian members and USSR along with Socialist countries and Latin American countries voted in favour of the resolution.

The Seventh resolution 2775 F (XXVI) was passed by 86-6-22 abstentions. The details of voting can be seen in Table X. UK, USA, France, South Africa and Portugal voted against the resolution while Australia and other European powers abstained. But all the Afro-Asian

members, the USSR and Socialist countries voted for the resolution.

The eighth resolution 2775 G (XXVIII) was passed by 109-2-6 abstentions. As our table shows, South Africa and Portugal voted against the resolution, while USA, UK, France and Australia abstained; the Afro-Asian States and the USSR voted alike in favour of the resolution.

The final resolution 2775 H (XXVI) was passed by 104-1-9 abstentions. South Africa voted against the resolution while Portugal, UK, France and Australia abstained. All the Afro-Asian members, USA, USSR and Socialist countries voted for the resolution.

The table shows that the voting pattern of Afro-Asian countries on all the 9 resolutions was in favour of them. Not a single country from Afro-Asian and Latin America voted against any of the resolutions and neither did they thus abstained. The voting pattern of the USSR on all the resolutions was again in favour of them. It always casted a positive vote. The voting pattern of the prominent Western countries was either abstention or against the resolution. On resolution 2775 F (XXVI), except the USA, their voting pattern was negative otherwise they always abstained on all the 8 resolutions.

It is very significant to note that Western powers till seventies were supporting the racial regime of South Africa. And because of their economic interests, they have not bothered about the inhuman conditions of South African inhabitants; so much so that till today in the eighties, the South African Government is still practicing the racist policy in that country in spite of world opinion against apartheid.

By supporting the Afro-Asia in the United Nations on apartheid policy of South Africa, the Soviet Union certainly demonstrated its support for the cause of South African inhabitants in their struggle for their rights. It always stated that the shameful system of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa would be brought to an end. The moral assistance given by the USSR and the Afro-Asian nations at the United Nations, was a great importance to the patriots of South Africa. The Soviet Union always demanded full implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples, adopted on Soviet initiative. It gave its resolute support to Afro-Asian countries at the UN for their efforts to eliminate the racial discrimination in South Africa.

PART III

DISARMAMENT

The consolidation of peace is the most urgent task facing mankind today. Today nuclear factor has assumed exceptional importance in the entire system of international relations. Nuclear weapons are the most powerful means of mass destruction. One cannot help seeing the growing danger of the unauthorised or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, what is needed is to achieve security through curbing the arms race, through disarmament. Disarmament would particularly benefit the solution of the global problems of all mankind whose urgency has greatly increased in the past few decades.

The Soviet Union regards the limitation of the arms drive, and disarmament, as the main direction in which all nations must channel their efforts to create a system of universal, stable and just peace. After the vanguard of the struggle to limit arms and to move towards a transition to disarmament in practical terms. Since 1945, at all important international, political conferences and talks, and particularly at the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union has taken the initiative with proposals to reduce the military threat, limit the arm race and proceed to disarmament.

In this third part of the Chapter, will be examined three issues on disarmament which were discussed at the United Nations, as global issues. The first issue is General and complete disarmament, the second deals with Test Ban Treaty and the third is of Nuclear Non-proliferation 1968.

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:

In 1959, the Soviet Union took a new important initiative in its efforts to ensure disarmament and avert the threat of war. The tense cold war atmosphere was creating a serious threat to the nations of the world. So the situation demanded resolute action by all the peace forces. After weighing the international situation, the Soviet Government stated that efforts had to be made to resolve the increasingly urgent problem of disarmament and that the "surest step in the existing situation would be to prepare an international agreement on the general and complete disarmament, i.e., the destruction of all means of warfare and thereby excluding the possibility of war".³¹

/ed;

31. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Panomarev/Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980, Vol. II (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980), p. 347

On 18 September 1959, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev gave an address to the General Assembly during which he submitted a declaration of the Soviet Government on 'general and complete disarmament'. The matter was included on the agenda of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly and was referred to the Assembly's first 'Political and Security' Committee, which also considered United Kingdom's proposal for comprehensive disarmament. The debate in the first Committee lasted from 9th October to 2nd November 1959.

The USSR proposal provided for a three stage programme. In the first stage, the USSR, the United States and the People's Republic of China would reduce the strength of their armed forces to the level of 1.7 million men, while the United Kingdom and France would reduce their strength to 65,000 men. The level of armed forces of other States would be agreed upon at a special session of the General Assembly or at a world conference. Armament and military equipment would be reduced to correspond to the level fixed for the armed forces.

In the second stage, remaining armed forces would be disbanded and military bases in the territory of foreign States would be eliminated and military personnel stationed there would be disbanded.

The third stage of the USSR plan provided for the following measures: destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles; destruction of air force equipment; the prohibition and elimination of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare; prohibition of military research and development; abolition of military and para military establishment; termination of military training and, military and paramilitary service; and discontinuance of military expenditure.

An international control organ would be established with control and inspection powers corresponding to the stage reached in the phased disarmament programme. Upon completion of general and complete disarmament, the control organ would have free access to all objects of control, furthermore, the control organization could institute a system of aerial observation and photography over the territories of States. Any question of a violation of the agreement would be submitted for consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly in accordance with their respective spheres of competence.

The USSR also declared that, if there was no readiness on the part of the Western powers to embark upon general and complete disarmament, it would agree to appropriate partial measures for disarmament and security, of which the following were considered the

most important: (1) establishment of a European Control and inspection zone with a reduction of foreign troops; (2) establishment of an atomfree zone in Central Europe; (3) elimination of military bases in the territory of foreign States; (4) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and those of Warsaw Treaty; and (5) conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another.

The Afro-Asian countries supported the USSR proposals. They stated that the solving of this problem of disarmament was necessary. It was stated that the emergence of military alliances had produced a situation in which local incidents or technical failure or accidents might unleash a war of destruction. They said that the most effective guarantee of peace was not the balance of armaments but the cessation of the very possibility of war.

The United States representative, commenting on the USSR proposal, declared that his Government unreservedly supported the greatest possible amount of controlled disarmament. It's attitude was that "in any disarmament programme of whatever magnitude, adequate and timely inspection and control must be built into the system so that the programme as a whole might create confidence".³²

32. Yearbook of United Nations (New York, 1959), p. 8

Further he stated that his country was prepared to give the support to the USSR proposals at 10 nations disarmament committee.

The United Kingdom representative said that the disarmament depended upon the acceptance of certain principles; "first there must at all stages be a balance between disarmament in the nuclear and conventional field; and second, control over the test of progress. Progress towards either disarmament or political settlements would cause a correspondingly favourable reaction in other field."³³

A draft resolution was sponsored by all 62 members. As per resolution the General Assembly, considering that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world today, would: (1) call upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problems; (2) transmit to the disarmament commission and request the Secretary General to make available to the 10-nation disarmament Committee the declaration of the United Kingdom of 17 September 1959, and the declaration of the USSR of 18 September 1959, as well as the other proposal or suggestions made; and (3) express the hope that

33. Ibid., p. 9

measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

While taking part in the debate on the resolution, the representative of Brazil, Colombia, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and South Africa were among those who considered the United Kingdom plan more practical. But Ethiopia and India maintained, however, that the first stage of the British plan did not go far enough towards actual disarmament. They supported the USSR proposals.

The representatives of Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Greece and Liberia maintained that the cause of war was much deeper than the disarmament approach to peace assumed.

Belgium, the Federation of Malaya, Guatemala, UK and the USA were among those who pointed out that disarmament could not in itself guarantee security. In this connection, certain countries including Colombia, Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey maintained that complete disarmament would require the establishment of an international police force to maintain law and order. The USSR on the other hand, considered the question far fetched and asked why there should be super-national armed forces if all

countries were to be completely disarmed and not permitted to possess either arm or armies. Ceylon was of the opinion that such matters might at best be dealt with after disarmament had been achieved.

There was a general support for the stage by stage approach to disarmament but different views were expressed on the time-limits. Considerable emphasis was placed on the question of control. The USSR maintained that Controllers should be present on the territory of States from the very start of the disarmament process until its full completion and also after disarmament had been carried out. Bulgaria observed that control over armaments, as distinct from control over disarmament measures, would represent an intelligence operation. The United States' view that inspection and control must be built into a disarmament system was supported by Ghana, Cuba, India and Yugoslavia.

Several representatives also referred to the question of devoting additional resources for the economic development of under-developed countries from funds likely to be available as a result of complete disarmament. Yugoslavia proposed an immediate reduction of military expenditures as a first step measure, while Nepal suggested that a study be made of the feasibility of verifying

reduction in military budgets. Both Saudi Arabia and India drew attention to the value of an arms truce as a first step. India in addition, suggested a ban on exporting equipment for establishing arms industries, and also that the United Nations secretariat undertake research and submit factual papers on problems of peace.

On November 20, 1959, the resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly as resolution 1378 (XIV).

After adopting the resolution unanimously, no formal discussion followed as it was already discussed while tabling the resolution. But it was clear that all the members of the General Assembly were in favour of the reduction. And by taking initiative in the General Assembly on the issue of general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union certainly demonstrated its support for the cause of disarmament. May it be noted that the essentials of Soviet proposals of 1959 drew support and encouragement from the majority of Afro-Asian nations.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN:

Representatives of the USSR, the USA, and Britain held talks in Moscow from July 16 to 25, 1963, at which they drafted and initiated the text of an agreement

proposed by the Soviet Union. On August 5 of the same year, the three countries concluded a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in the outer space and underwater.

Under that treaty, known as the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, the signatories pledged "to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control it is conducted".⁵⁴

The question of nuclear test ban was also brought in the General Assembly and discussed at its eighteenth session in 1963.

On 27 November 1963, the General Assembly decided to request the 16-nations committee on disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. It did so on the recommendation of its first Committee which had approved a draft resolution to this effect on 19 November 1963.

54. Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, 1967), pp. 11-12.

A draft resolution was submitted to the first committee by Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo and the UAR.

By this 19 power draft resolution, the General Assembly would: (1) request the conference of the 18-nation committee of disarmament to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo nuclear weapons and to report to the General Assembly at its 19th session (1964) and (2) ask the Secretary General to transmit the text of the resolution and all other relevant documents to the 18-nation committee.

Introducing the proposal the representative of Ethiopia said that the matter should be considered urgently and a conference should be held for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

The USSR representative who also favoured the convening of the proposed conference - made the point that, although a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons by ending their production and liquidating all existing

stockpiles of such weapons would be the best solution to the problem, it would be useful to have a prior agreement to prohibit the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs. He recalled that the USSR had informed the Secretary General that it believed that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would help to relieve international tension, strengthen confidence among states and solve the problems of general and complete disarmament. The USSR was of the opinion that, after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the three environments, it would be a logical and reasonable step to agree on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Afghanistan and Guine also spoke in favour of the 19-power draft resolution. The US representative said that the USA was prepared to offer assurances that it would never use any weapon with aggressive intent. However, it had to be prepared to exercise effectively the right of self-defence provided for in the United Nations Charter.

The UK representative said that a simple prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would be completely unenforceable under existing conditions and might even impair international security by breeding a false impression that aggressive action could

TABLE XI

Voting in the General Assembly on Nuclear Test Ban
Resolution 1909(XVIII) 27th Nov., 1965

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia		X	
Burma			A
Ceylon	F		
China			A
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France		X	
Ghana	F		
India	F		
Indonesia	F		
Iran			A
Yugoslavia	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal		X	
UAR	F		
UK		X	
USA		X	
USSR	F		
South Africa		X	

Total	64	18	25
roll-call vote			

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
(UN: New York, 1965), p. 88.

be undertaken without risking nuclear war. He pointed out that his Government could not accept the implication contained in the draft resolution that a case for convening a special conference had been made and that the 18-nations committee should therefore be requested to study this question urgently.

Then the resolution was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 64 in favour, 18 against and 25 abstentions, on 27 Nov. 1968, as resolution 1909(XVIII). The details can be seen in Table XI on the facing page.

The voting pattern shows that the countries voted against the resolution were Australia, France, Portugal, South Africa, UK, USA, etc. It means that all the big Western powers were against the Afro-Asian efforts on disarmament. Although the USA and UK spoke in favour of the resolution while taking part in the debate after tabling the resolution, when the time came for the real support of the resolution, they voted against nuclear test ban as all of them were conducting nuclear tests by that time.

The countries who abstained were Burma, China, Iran and some other European countries and South American countries.

All the 64 countries who voted for the resolution were from Afro-Asia and Socialist block. USSR voted for the resolution. The USSR actively participated on the discussion on test-ban and finally voted for the resolution along with Afro-Asian countries. And after the adoption of the resolution, it hoped that it would halt arms race and reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:

After adoption of test ban the USSR tried for a conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the 18th and 19th UN General Assemblies and in the Eighteenth Nation Committee in 1966, the Soviet Union repeatedly offered to sign an agreement preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, stressing that "it would be inadmissible to give non-nuclear countries access to such weapons not only directly but also through military blocks".³⁸

The conference of the 16-nation committee on disarmament reconvened in Geneva, from 18th January to 4th March 1968. In view of the urgency of concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the

38. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev/^{ed.,} Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980. Vol. 2 (Progress Publications, Moscow, 1980), p. 377

conference devoted this period exclusively to the negotiation of the treaty.

At the opening meeting on 18th January, the USSR and the United States submitted identical revised drafts of a treaty on the non-proliferation on 24th August 1967.

Submitting for consideration by the committee, the full text of a draft treaty on non-proliferation, with amendments based upon proposals by other States, the representatives of the USSR and the United States stressed that the draft took account to a large extent, of the position supported by a majority of the members of the Committee.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

On 24th April 1968, the General Assembly discussed the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at its XXII Session. The General Assembly had before it the report of the conference of the 18th nations committee on disarmament, to which were annexed the text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted on 11th March, 1968, by the USSR and the United States. The Assembly referred the agenda item to its first Committee which discussed it at meetings held between 20th April and 10th June, 1968.

A draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Iran, Iraq, Iceland, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the UAR, the UK, the United States and GDR, discussed at the First Committee.

By the terms of this draft proposal, "the General Assembly, convinced of the urgency of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, convinced that the non-proliferation treaty would be an effective measure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and convinced that an agreement to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed by effective steps on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the treaty would contribute to this aim, would

- " (1) endorse the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the text of which was annexed to the draft resolution;
- (2) request the Depository Governments - to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;
- (3) express its hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty;
- (4) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament urgently to pursue negotiations an effective measures relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; and (5) request the conference of the 18-Nations Committee on disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty third session.³⁶ A revision of this draft text was later submitted.

During the debate, the USA, USSR and United Kingdom called for an early conclusion of the treaty, emphasizing its significant, they pointed out that the treaty would increase the security of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon States, would enable all nations to share in the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear energy, particularly the developing nations, and would facilitate the cessation of the nuclear arms race, then helping to achieve not only nuclear disarmament but also general and complete disarmament.

India emphasized the need for a balanced treaty to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by all nuclear powers, including China. It maintained that the only effective way in which that could be done would be to include in the treaty as obligatory provision for a cessation of any further production of nuclear weapons.

36. Yearbook of United Nations (New York, 1968), p. 8

TABLE XII

Voting in the General Assembly on
Nuclear Non-proliferation.
Resolution 2373 (XXIII) 12th June, 1968.

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania		X	
Australia	F		
Burma			A
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo			A
Ethiopia	F		
France			A
Ghana	F		
India			A
Indonesia	F		
Iran	F		
Yugoslavia			A
Lybia	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal	F		
UK	F		
USA	F		
USSR	F		
South Africa	F		

Total roll- call vote	95	4	21

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1968
(UN: New York, 1968), p. 16.

The USSR stated its readiness to conclude an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and to negotiate a number of collateral measures. Among these it mentioned the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles and eventually a complete ban and scrapping of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control.

On 12th June, the text was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a roll call vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions on resolution 2373 (XXIII). The voting pattern can be seen in Table XII on the facing page.

The table shows that all the Western powers and the USSR voted for the resolution. Albania and three more countries voted against the resolution while Afro-Asian votes were divided into two groups. Some Afro-Asian countries voted for the resolution while the others abstained like Burma, Congo, India, etc. France also abstained. It means that there was lack of unanimity among the Afro-Asian countries on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

The representative of Ethiopia stated that the extension of denuclearized zones to other areas, including major areas of military confrontation would substantially

contribute to efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons by containing them in their breeding areas.

The representative of India said that his Government could not subscribe to the draft treaty and his vote on the draft resolution endorsing it would be determined accordingly. He stated that the way out of the present impasse could only be found in simultaneous prevention of both vertical and horizontal proliferation and the treaty needed an obligatory provision for cessation of any further production of nuclear weapons. What was required was a 'nuclear moratorium' so that if nuclear disarmament was not achieved within a specific time limit, the non-nuclear powers, as an instrument of pressure would reserve the right to resume their freedom of action.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that after conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, his country would be prepared to start, together with all nuclear powers, negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, reduction of their stockpiles and subsequently complete banning of nuclear weapons, under appropriate international control.

Then the resolution on Nuclear Non-proliferation was passed in the General Assembly by 95 to 4 with 21

abstentions. Some of the Afro-Asian countries abstained while most of them voted for the resolution and supported the initiative taken by the Soviet Union.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

In a letter dated 12th June, 1968, addressed to the President of the Security Council, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States requested the early meeting of the Council to consider a draft resolution which they submitted with the letter.

While the tabling of the draft resolution, the representatives of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States also made an identical formal declaration on behalf of their Governments. They stated in these declarations that "they had noted this concern of certain States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate safeguard measures be taken for their security".³⁷

By the preamble of this draft resolution the Security Council would : "(a) note with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and

37. Ibid... p. 20

thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) take into consideration the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security; and (c) bear in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States".³⁸

While taking part in the debate, the USSR pointed out that the draft proceeded from the generally recognized fact that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States. The provision of the draft resolution that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all

38. *Ibid.*, p. 19

its nuclear weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter provided the solution to the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear countries within the framework of the Security Council, upon which the United Nations Charter placed the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The USSR representative also expressed his Government's intention of continuing efforts to solve the problem of the banning of use of nuclear weapons, eliminating nuclear stockpiles and completely banning nuclear weapons, as well as the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The United State's representative said that the three power draft resolution and the declaration made in conjunction with it would lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty. These assurances combined with the Non-proliferation Treaty, would give each State; if not perfect security, more security than it would otherwise enjoy.

The representative of France declared that its position on the draft resolution was in line with the position it had taken on the resolution concerning the

TABLE XIII**Resolution 255 (1968)**

**Voting in the Security Council 19th June 1968 on
Nuclear Non-proliferation.**

Canada	China	Denmark	Ethiopia	Hungary	Paraguay	Senegal	UNR	India	Pakistan	France	Algeria	Brazil	UK	USA
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F

F = For
X = Against
A = Abstention

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1968 (UN: New York, 1968), p. 21.

Non-proliferation Treaty in the General Assembly. He said that the only solution to the nuclear menace lay in the cessation of the production and the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear arms. The nations of the world would not be secured until the nuclear powers agreed upon and achieved nuclear disarmament.

Algeria, Brazil, India and Pakistan argued that the real hope of security for non-nuclear weapon States lay in nuclear disarmament. Further, they maintained that the draft resolution guarantees were offered by only three of the five nuclear powers, were only declarations of intent and were uncertain because of the existence of the Veto.

On 19th June 1968, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 10-0-5 as resolution 255 (1968). The voting pattern can be seen on the facing page in Table XIII.

The table shows that out of 15 members, 5 members abstained. They were India, Pakistan, France, Algeria and Brazil. Four permanent members voted for the resolution while the 6 non-permanent members also voted for the resolution. France abstained because it had been conducting nuclear experiment in the atmosphere in subsequent years.

Among the Afro-Asian countries India, Pakistan and Algeria had abstained on the voting while Ethiopia and Senegal voted for the resolution. Socialist countries like Hungary and USSR also voted for the resolution.

Thus it is clear that on the question of nuclear non-proliferation, the Afro-Asian countries were not united, neither they supported Soviet view on the issue.

While explaining the vote the representative of USSR said that the adoption of the draft was of extreme importance. The United Nations had successfully completed important stage by preparing the road for the signing of the non-proliferation treaty and its ratification. The treaty would be a serious step towards the creation of favourable conditions for the cessation of the nuclear arm-race and a movement towards nuclear disarmament and complete and general disarmament.

The representative of the USA said that the resolution would be a major contribution to international peace and security. It would lay a firm basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear weapon parties to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed his Government's pledge to move as speedily as possible to sign the treaty and seek its ratification.

The representative of India said that the draft the draft resolution did not fully accord with the basic principles which should govern the problem of the security of non-nuclear weapon States. His delegation therefore could not support it. Nevertheless, it was reassured that all the rights and benefits enshrined in the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security continued to be applicable to all States members of the United Nations. It was his Government's national decision to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In this part of the Chapter, it has been seen that on 'general and complete disarmament' and nuclear test ban, the Soviet and Afro-Asian attitude was same but on nuclear non-proliferation they differed. Some Afro-Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Algeria, etc., criticised the draft resolution on nuclear non-proliferation while the others supported it.

However, it is quite obvious that on various essential and fundamental aspects of disarmament including Nuclear-disarmament, the record of the voting behaviour of the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian nations at the United Nations was identical and convergent. Indeed it is not

surprising as the Afro-Asian nations in general have always looked with favour various proposals that have emanated from the Soviet Union on this very important global issue. Besides, the Afro-Asian nations always shown for obvious reasons a vested interest in disarmament. Thus it can be easily concluded that the basis of identical voting behaviour in the United Nations was the community of interest of the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian nations in general.

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Our investigation in the preceding pages clearly underlines the facts that Soviet voting behaviour in the United Nations on important global issues was generally identical with that of the Afro-Asian nations. This very fact is significant against the background of the growing complexities of international politics during the period of our study. Even those Afro-Asian States who had formally aligned with the West were compelled to vote in the company of Soviet Union.

Such a record at the UN appears to have contributed to the stability and growth of Soviet role in the third world in general, and, to Soviet relations with non-aligned Afro-Asian nations, in particular. Thus we may look at such a Soviet voting behaviour at United Nations on important indicator of Soviet foreign policy itself.

CHAPTER III

REGIONAL ISSUES

One of the most notable features of Soviet foreign policy is to promote friendly and cordial relations with third world countries. Soviet solidarity with the Afro-Asian countries also helped them to solve their regional problems at UN General Assembly and Security Council. Indeed it enhanced the effectiveness of Afro-Asian countries in solving their regional problems at various United Nations forums. These developments can well be seen in the Soviet voting pattern on regional issues related to the third world that came up before the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.

In the previous chapter we have discussed the Soviet attitude towards Afro-Asian countries at the UN on global issues, mainly on decolonization, racial discrimination in South Africa and disarmament. We have seen that the Soviet Union always supported the resolutions sponsored by the Afro-Asian countries on these issues. On the other hand, the Afro-Asian group also most of the time voted with the Soviet Union on major world affairs.

In this chapter we will investigate the Soviet voting behaviour on these regional issues at UN General Assembly and the Security Council where direct interests

of Afro-Asian nations were involved. We will deal with five such critical issues during the period 1956-71, where one or the other Afro-Asian nations was directly involved. They are, Suez crisis, Congo crisis, Indo-Pakistan problem, Vietnam crisis and the Bangladesh problem. Soviet attitude towards these issues emerged as one of the most important factors of Soviet policy towards third world countries during the period, 1956-71.

THE SUEZ CRISIS: 1956

Egypt's vital importance is due to the Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and geographically and economically, it occupies an important position in the international arena. The economic condition of the Egyptian people compelled them to aspire for a better material life. One of the most cherished objectives of the Egyptian government for its economic development was the construction of a new high dam above Aswan. But the refusal of the British and American governments to give the promised economic aid for the construction of the dam provoked the Egyptian government into nationalizing the Suez Canal on 26th July 1956. This was done so that the revenues of the canal could be diverted towards the financing of the Aswan Dam Project.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was followed by a series of events which included lengthy negotiations over how to settle the question. The Western powers suspected that President Nasser's policy was to deprive them "of their economic and political interests in West Africa",¹ and that was why they wanted that he should abandon his plan. On the other hand, the Arab-Asian countries extended their total support to President Nasser for his "strong step to safeguard Egypt's interest".²

On 23rd September 1956, France and the United Kingdom requested the President of the Security Council to call its meeting for considering the situation resulting from the nationalization of Suez Canal. On the very next day, Egypt accused the United Kingdom and France for endangering international peace and security and demanded an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the serious violation of the Charter.

The Afro-Asian countries who were invited to attend the meetings of the Security Council, as well as the USSR expressed their views that nationalization of the company was a legitimate step. The canal itself was

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1. Asian Recorder, 1(84) (4-10 August 1956, Broadcast of French Foreign Minister), p. 965
 2. The Hindu, (9th August 1956), (Statement of Libyan Prime Minister).

regarded as an integral part of Egypt and its nationalization was considered the "beginning of the end of imperialistic exploitation".³

It came as a surprise to the world when Israeli Army crossed the international frontier into Egyptian territory and violated the General Armistic Agreement of 24th February 1949, and the Security Council ceasefire order of 11th August 1949. A bigger surprise came a day later with the Anglo-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to stop fighting within 12 hours in order to ensure free passage through the Suez Canal. The rejection of this ultimatum by Egypt was followed by Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

The Egyptian Government rebuffed the pressure of the Anglo-French threat. On September 15th, President Nasser declared that if any ship entered the Suez Canal without the permission of the Egyptian authorities, this would be regarded as a violation of Egyptian Sovereignty. He said that they would defend the canal and they were prepared to fight for it.

On the same day the Soviet Government made a statement that the Suez question had to be settled by peaceful

3. UN Doc., S/3680, 15 October, 1956, (Letter from Jordan).

means and declared that the British' and French' war preparations were evidence of an intention to seize the Suez Canal by force and were, thereby, a threat of aggression against Egypt.

On October 30th, the Soviet representative submitted a draft resolution by which the Council would call upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established Armistice lines. He accepted an amendment, proposed by China, adding a paragraph calling upon Israel and Egypt immediately to ceasefire.

The Afro-Asian group supported the Soviet draft resolution and condemned the Israeli attack on Egypt and called upon other powers to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation. They said that the action of Britain and France was a blow to the UN itself and it was considered all the more grave because it had been delivered by two permanent members of the Council sworn to uphold the UN Charter.

The representative of Yugoslavia called for the immediate withdrawal of armed forces of Britain, France and Israel. He expressed grave concern at the violation of the Armistice Agreement and requested a ceasefire. On the same evening, the USSR resolution as amended, received 7 votes in favour to 2 against with 2 abstentions.

TABLE I

Voting in the Security Council on Suez
Question on 30th October, 1956

Australia	
Belgium	A
China	F
Cuba	F
France	X
Iran	F
Peru	F
USSR	F
UK	X
USA	A
Yugoslavia	F

Compiled from the Yearbook of the United Nations 1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p.34

Details of the voting can be seen in Table I on the facing page. It shows that out of 11 members, 7 voted for the resolution, two members vetoed the resolution and two members abstained. The USSR, Cuba, Australia, China, Iran, Peru and Yugoslavia voted in favour of the resolution but it was rejected because of the negative votes of the two permanent members. The USA abstained. The voting pattern clearly shows that the Western powers were not serious about solving the Suez question. Although the Soviet resolution fell through it was obvious that the USSR extended full support to Egypt.

ACTION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 31 October 1956, the Secretary General informed member States of the Security Council's decision and to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly under the terms of Assembly resolution 377(V) of 1950 (uniting for peace resolution) was called. The Assembly met on 1st November and considered the question at seven plenary meetings held between 1st and 10th November. At the first meeting, the United States introduced a draft resolution.

According to this draft resolution the Assembly urged as a matter of priority that all parties involved

TABLE II

Voting in the General Assembly on Suez Crisis
Resolution 997(ES-LI) 2 Nov. 1956

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia		X	
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France		X	
Ghana	F		
India	F		
Indonesia	F		
Iran	F		
Libya	F		
Nigeria	F		
Portugal			A
UAR	F		
UK		X	
USA	F		
USSR	F		
South Africa			A
Yugoslavia	F		
Total roll- call vote	64	5	6

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p. 35.

in hostilities in that area should agree to an immediate ceasefire and halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. It urged all parties to withdraw all forces behind the Armistice line. It asked all member States that they should refrain from introducing military goods in that area so that the resolution could be implemented fully. It requested the Secretary General to observe and report in compliance with the resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

The resolution was passed by a roll call vote of 64 in favour and 5 against with 6 abstentions, as resolution 997 (ES-I) 1956. The voting behaviour can be seen on the facing page in Table II.

Table II shows that 64 countries voted for the resolution and 5 countries voted against it, while 6 abstained. All the Afro-Asian countries voted for the resolution except Laos which abstained on the roll call voting. All the Socialist countries along with the USSR voted for the resolution. France, England and Australia casted their votes against the resolution while Portugal and South Africa abstained.

During the explanation of voting, various delegation classified their policies. For instance, Iraq, which was also a member of Baghdad Pact, thought that the resolution appeased the aggressors and compared Anglo-French action with action of Nazis and Fascists and demanded a strongly worded resolution to deal with them.

The UICR representative also stated that the resolution was inadequate and the problem was much more serious.

On 3rd November 1956, the Secretary General reported that the Egyptian Government had accepted the resolution conditionally and that it could not be implemented in case the attacking armies continued their aggression. He further stated that the British and French aggression was continuing against Egypt.

This deteriorating situation compelled the Afro-Asian members to take some concrete measures for the solution of Suez problem. Subsequently, India, on behalf of 19 Afro-Asian members submitted a draft resolution on November 3, 1956, which stated that while regretting the non-compliance of the Assembly resolution of 2nd November by all parties concerned, requested them again to comply with the resolution immediately. The resolution authorized

TABLE III

Voting in the General Assembly on Suez Crisis
Resolution 999(ES -I) 3 Nov. 1956

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan	F		
Albania	F		
Australia		X	
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France		X	
Ghana	F		
India	F		
Indonesia	F		
Iran	F		
Libya	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal			A
UAR	F		
UK		X	
USA	F		
USSR	F		
South Africa			A
Yugoslavia	F		
Total roll call vote	59	5	12

Compiled from the Year book of United Nations
1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p. 35.

the Secretary General to arrange immediately with the parties concerned implementation of ceasefire and to report compliance within 12 hours. It also requested the Secretary General to see the question of withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice line.

The formal discussion did not take place and it was put to vote and adopted by a roll call vote of 59 to 5 with 12 abstentions as resolution 999 (ES-I). The voting pattern can be seen on the facing page in Table III.

The table shows that all the Afro-Asian and Socialist block of members voted for the resolution. Some Western powers like USA, etc., voted for the resolution (but France, UK and Australia voted against the resolution while some Western countries abstained like Portugal, South Africa, etc. The USSR supported the Afro-Asian efforts to bring the peace in that area and voted with them.

The Afro-Asian draft resolution was important and it secured almost the total support of the Afro-Asian group and Socialist group. It is significant to note that the USSR backed all the efforts made by the Afro-Asian group in UN General Assembly and the Security Council on Suez crisis.

The Soviet Union took a resolute step at this critical moment. On November 5, 1956, it demanded that Britain, France and Israel halt the hostilities against Egypt immediately, denouncing this as a criminal aggression and warning of its dangerous consequences. In a telegram to the Security Council Chairman on the same day, the Soviet Foreign Minister suggested the adoption of a resolution requiring Britain, France and Israel to cease hostilities within 12 hours and withdraw from Egypt within three days. The Soviet Union offered assistance to the victim of aggression. It also gave a Memorandum that if Britain, France and Israel did not comply with the Security Council's decision within the set time limit then it would send its armed forces and other form of assistance to help the Egyptians.

On 4th November, the Secretary General submitted a first report on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force requested in resolution 998 (ES-I) submitted by Canada. He reported his conclusions, that without waiting for his final report, the Assembly should decide that a United Nations command for "an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms".⁴

⁴ ORGA 1956, A/3276, Resolution 998 (ES-I). Also Year Book of United Nations, 1956, (UN: New York, 1956), p. 30

On 8th November, the representative of Israel informed the Secretary General that his government would withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately after the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the Emergency International Force. Subsequently the British, French and Israeli forces, withdrew from the occupied area and were replaced by the United Nations Emergency Force created by the General Assembly.

It was the result of the continual Afro-Asian pressure, the Soviet warning, very cold reply of the old and trusted ally the USA and the pressure of world public opinions that compelled France and the UK to complete the withdrawal of their forces by 22 December 1956. The General opposition of the Afro-Asian group and that of the Soviet Union to the intervention could be expected but that of the USA was a welcome surprise. The USA not only stood aloof in the Egyptian crisis but disapproved of the action of its allies.

The Soviet Union's firm stand in defence of Egypt and its resolve to take an active part in curbing the aggressors, restoring peace in the Middle East, and preventing the outbreak of another world war had a sobering effect on the rulers of Britain and France and were the factor inducing them to cease hostilities. Soviet

support for the cause of the Egyptian people won warm affection for the Soviet Union throughout the East, notably among the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries. Interviewed by Soviet journalists, President Nasser declared: "permit me to use this opportunity to express the Egyptians people's gratitude to the Soviet people for their support for Egypt during the Anglo-French-Israel aggression that was undertaken to conquer Egypt and deprive it of its freedom and sovereignty. The Egyptian people are highly appreciative of the support rendered to them by the Soviet people. This is one of the factors of Soviet Egyptian friendship and I should like to see this friendship develop and grow steadily stronger".⁵

THE CONGO CRISIS:

On June 30, 1960, the struggle of the Congolese people for liberation from Belgian colonial rule was crowned with the independence of the Republic of Congo. As soon as the independence was proclaimed and a national government was formed under Patrice Lumumba the Belgian government launched a series of provocations and then organized

5. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev ed., Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. II, 1945-1980; (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980), p. 252

an armed intervention against the new republic. Belgium armed intervention in the Congo following the mutiny in the Congolese army and Tshombe's declaration of secession of Katanga from the Congo caused great chaos in the infant Republic of Congo.

In a statement of July 13, 1960, the Soviet government deplored the imperialist aggression in the Congo. It noted in particular, that as soon as the independence of the Republic of the Congo was proclaimed, Belgians and other Western powers had taken actions, in violation of international law and the UN Charter, to undermine the Congo's sovereignty and trample its independence.

The situation required immediate withdrawal of Belgium forces but the Belgian Government which regarded its intervention, 'unavoidable' was not willing to withdraw its forces until "UN forces were in a position to provide for order and security of persons in the Congo".⁶ Though the Western powers agreed to give military assistance to the Congo, some of them like France, Italy, the UK and the USA supported Belgium's stand. But the Soviet Union which regarded the Belgium's action as armed aggression, wanted the Security Council to condemn this

6. SCOR Mtg. 873, (13th July, 1960), p. 33

action and demanded "immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops".⁷

Though most of the important decisions on the Congo problem were taken in the Security Council where there was very little opportunity for the Afro-Asian members to ventilate their reactions on this major problem, their role was nevertheless significant when compared with their numerical inferiority.

The consideration of the Congo case in the UN was initiated in the Security Council on July 1960. Only Ceylon and Tunisia were the two non-permanent members from the Afro-Asian group in the Security Council at that time. Tunisia, as an Afro-Asian member gave a lead in the Security Council by introducing the draft resolution on the Congo on 13th July 1960. The draft resolution called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary General to take necessary steps, in consultation with the Congolese government, to provide the assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese national security force could meet their responsibilities.

The discussion on the Tunisian draft resolution was held after the voting. The draft was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour with 3 abstentions. . No member voted

7. Ibid., p. 18

TABLE IV

Voting in the Security Council on the Congo Crisis
13th July 1960 - Resolution S/4387

Argentina	Ceylon	Italy	Poland	Tunisia	USA	USSR	UK	France	China	Ecuador
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	N	A	A	F

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1960 (UN: New York, 1960), p. 97

against the resolution. The voting pattern can be seen in Table IV on the facing page. The table shows that Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland, Tunisia, USA and the USSR voted in favour of the resolution. China, France and UK abstained while not a single negative vote casted on the draft resolution.

Though there was no opposition to the Tunisian draft resolution and all members agreed on the need for approving the provision of military assistance to Congo, the Western powers and China expressed reservations about the clause in the Tunisian proposal calling for the withdrawal of Belgiam troops.

The Tunisian draft resolution came as a compromise between the two opposite views of the West and the Soviet Union and both the two Super Powers supported it. For the first time in UN history, it authorised the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with such military and technical assistance as might be necessary to fully meet their task. Out of many factors for the successful implementation of UN mandate, the agreement between the two Super Powers was important and it was achieved on the Tunisian draft resolution.

Since the Afro-Asian draft resolution secured the majority support of members of the Security Council, it

had a great impact on Belgian Government for the speedy withdrawal of its forces from the Congo. Following the adoption of the Afro-Asian draft resolution, UN forces began their function in the main cities of the Republic. Evacuation of Leopoldville by Belgian troops was completed on the evening of 25th July 1960 and the Belgian Government announced on 29th July 1960, that 1500 Belgian troops would leave the Congo immediately.

But the Secretary General's announcement about the entry of UN forces in Katanga on 6th August 1960 came the counter-announcement by Tshombe to resist the entry of UN troops by force. So the Secretary General postponed the entry of UN forces into Katanga.

The Secretary General's announcement surprised many States which thought that the entry of the UN forces in Katanga might have compelled Belgian forces to withdraw and the chapter of the tragic scene in the Congo might have been closed there. The Soviet Union and Lumumba criticised the Secretary General's decision.

The constitutional crisis followed by the murder of Lumumba on 12th February 1961, added a new problem to the Congo crisis. It led the Soviet Union to demand unsuccessfully the dismissal of the Secretary General, to condemn the Belgian action, to remove troops and personnel from the Congo.

TABLE V

Voting in the Security Council on Congo Crisis.
Resolution S/4741 21st Feb. 1961

Ceylon	China	Chile	Ecuador	France	Liberia	Turkey	USSR	USA	UK	UAR
F	F	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	F	F

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1961 (UN: New York, 1961), p. 104.

The Afro-Asian members, particularly India, shared the strong feeling that the UN had failed in the Congo and that they were not prepared to see the defeat of the UN in the African continent and to leave it to mercy of cold war. They wanted the UN to act decisively and strongly. It was with this purpose that the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia, and the UAR after consultation among members of the Afro-Asian group and big powers submitted a draft resolution on 17th February 1961. It called for the UN command to "(i) take immediate steps including the use of force", if necessary, to avert the prevailing drift to civil war; (ii) to bring about the withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian military personnel; (iii) to re-organize and neutralize all Congolese armed forces; (iv) to decide that an immediate and impartial investigation be held into the death of Lumumba and his colleagues; and (v) to have Parliament reconvened in order to establish a representative Government".⁸

Immediately after tabling the resolution the voting took place and the Afro-Asian draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0 with 2 abstentions. The voting pattern can be seen in Table V on the facing page.

8. SCOR Mtg., 942 (20-21 February, 1961), p. 18

The table shows that 9 countries; Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, USA, UK and UAR voted for the resolution while France and USSR maintained abstention. It means all the Afro-Asian countries voted for the resolution. But the USSR remained abstained. The Soviet argument was that UN forces should be withdrawn from the Congo because according to the USSR, it was more or less like an interference even in the internal affairs of a country in a civil war situation. The US support of the Afro-Asian draft resolution was perhaps because "it could not expect implementation of this mandate so easily and so soon and the French abstention was because of its fear of application of this mandate in Algeria".⁹

Whatever might be the reason for adoption of the draft, it was a significant contribution and achievement of the Afro-Asian group which gave the Secretary General as much authority as he wanted to draw from the mandate. And the most contributing factor was that the Afro-Asian countries were expecting vote from the USSR but while remaining abstained it indirectly supported the draft.

The Congo problem became a prestige issue for the members of the Afro-Asian group. It was a direct challenge to them because their tireless efforts seemed

9/. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the UN (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1969), p. 159

to go waste. The fast deteriorating situation in the Congo following the murder of Lumumba and his colleagues; the direct clash between the UN forces and the ANC (Armed National Congolese) on 3 and 4 March, 1961; the refusal to withdraw Belgian forces from Congo; the challenge to the legality of the Council's resolution of 21 February 1961 by the Tananarive conference on 6 March 1961, led the conciliation commission of the Afro-Asian members to suggest "an early return of Constitutionality in the Congo, the insulation of national and other armies from politics; necessity to convene national Parliament; release of political prisoners, and execution of political leaders in Congo".¹⁰

No doubt, the Afro-Asian draft resolution was adopted by 9-0-2; but the delay in implementing this resolution either due to bitter opposition by the Congolese authorities or due to lack of complete agreement among members of the UN on the question of how the mandate would be applied or due to the Secretary General's reluctance to transfer the peace force into a shooting force in the Congo compelled the Afro-Asian members to take other initiatives for the implementation of UN mandates or towards the solution of the Congolese situation.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 159

On 14th November, 1961, Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR submitted a draft resolution by which "the Security Council would; reaffirm earlier resolutions; deprecate secessionist activities carried out in Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries - and armed action against the United Nations forces authorised the Secretary General to take vigorous action; for the apprehension, detention or deportation of all foreign mercenaries and other "hostile elements" as laid down in the resolution of 21 February 1961; request the Secretary General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry of such elements or of war material; demand that all secessionist activities in Katanga should cease forthwith and declare full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo".¹¹

The sponsors argued that the United Nations should declare its support to the constitutional Central Government established in August and should give a clear mandate to the acting Secretary General to deal with the problem of foreign intervention in Katanga.

The United States representative stated that the three power draft resolution had constructive elements but focused predominantly on one aspect of the problem.

11. Yearbook of United Nations 1961 (UN: New York, 1961), p. 68

He felt that the Council should take effective action not only in connection with the secessionist in Katanga, but also with regard to what he described as the defiance of the Central Government by the authorities in the orientale provinces. He suggested that the United Nations should provide assistance to the Congolese government to strengthen and retrain its armed forces and acquire a small, effective air force.

The representative of France said that the problem of re-integration of Katanga in the Congo and the problems of relations between the various parts of the country should be solved through negotiations and persuasion, to which his Government would give full support and not by force.

The USSR representative said that Katanga was the centre of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo and that such interference was the basis of the whole Congolese crisis. He supported the three power draft resolution, despite its weaknesses, it did focus attention on this main problem.

The representative of China suggested that there should be efforts to promote negotiations and conciliation and emphasised that the United Nations should not interfere in conflicts of a domestic nature.



TABLE VI

Voting in the Security Council on Congo Crisis.
Resolution C/5002 14th Nov., 1961

Ceylon	China	Chile	Denmark	France	Liberia	Turkey	USA	USSR	UK	UAR
P	P	P	P	A	P	P	P	P	A	P

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1961 (UN: New York, 1961), p. 80.

The three power draft resolution then put to vote and adopted by 9 vote in favour to 2 abstention as resolution S/5002. The details of USSR voting can be seen in Table VI on the facing page.

The table shows that the 9 countries voted for the resolution and 2 remained abstained. All the Afro-Asian countries, USSR and USA voted for the resolution while UK and France maintained abstention. No one gave negative vote.

The three power draft resolution was slightly different from the previous UN mandates. It ignored the principle of non-intervention in domestic disputes. By recognising the Central Government for military help, it ignored the principle of neutrality as well. If this policy had been adopted in the early stages, the Congo might have been saved from the great tragedy but it could not be done because of the adherence of the policy of strict neutrality by the Secretary General his application of the same norms in the Congo as were followed in different situations of Suez and Lebanon.¹² It was also because Afro-Asian members wanted to give a change to the Belgian and Katangese authorities to solve this problem peacefully. They preferred to pursue

12. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations, (Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1989), p. 163

the policy of negotiation, persuasion and conciliation for the peaceful solution of the Congo.

The Afro-Asian draft resolution immensely helped the UN to take effective measures in December 1961 to counteract heavy attacks on the ONUC (United Nations operation in the Congo), and also to maintain law and order in the Republic of Congo in December 1962 when the U. Thant plan was ignored by Tshombe and there was disorder in Katanga and other provinces. It was the after effect of the strong attitude of Afro-Asian members and the firm action of the UN that Tshombe was compelled to agree in January 1963 to carry out the Secretary General's plan of National Reconciliation and ONUC was able to bring the situation under control in the Republic of the Congo. It was that the two super powers came together in the Security Council and helped the UN in its successful operation in Congo.

UN troops were also withdrawn from the Congo in early 1963 on the insistence of the USSR and many Afro-Asian countries.

The Soviet Union supported the efforts made by the Afro-Asian countries for the freedom and independence of the Congolese peoples. Its voting on the issue of Congo was more or less similar to the voting of Afro-Asian

countries as can be seen in resolution S/5002 and in Table IV. The Soviet Union supported most of the Afro-Asian resolutions sponsored at the UN on the Congo crisis, notwithstanding some minor divergences in their approach to the problem.

INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION - 1965

The India-Pakistan question has frequently been before the Security Council since 1948. During the first half of 1965 the situation in the Rann of Kutch led to increased tension between India and Pakistan, which culminated in armed conflict between the two countries. During this period, the Government of India and Pakistan also addressed a series of communications to the Security Council concerning Kashmir. On 30th June 1965, the parties reached an agreement for a cease fire in the Rann of Kutch. Subsequently, as a result of a new outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir during August, the Security Council, beginning on 4th September, 1965, devoted a total of 12 meetings to this dispute.

By a letter of 11 April 1965 to the President of the Security Council, India charged that Pakistan had committed flagrant acts of aggression against India, prior to the partition of India, the Indian complaint

said, the Province of Sind, which now forms part of Pakistan and the state of Kutch and Gujrat had had well defined boundaries, which had not been altered in any way by the partition of India, some two months previously Pakistan armed personnel had made illegal intrusions into the area south of the boundary between Kutch and Sind, upto a distance of over two miles. India had protested against these intrusions and had proposed that a solution to the problem could be found. Instead of responding to Indian proposals, however, Pakistan had, on 9th April 1965, mounted heavy attacks on two Indian Police Posts.

On 6th July, Pakistan transmitted the President of the Security Council the text of an agreement concluded on 30th June 1965 by India and Pakistan for a ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch. Among other things, the agreement called for an immediate ceasefire to take effect on 1 July 1965 and the restoration of the status quo ante the withdrawal of all troops on both sides to be completed within seven days.

On 14th December 1965, the Secretary General, at the request of the two governments nominated Judge Gunnar Lagergren of Sweden as Chairman of the arbitral tribunal.

In a letter of 5th March 1965, at the Security Council, India protested against Pakistan's alleged attempt to integrate part of the Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, in violation of the Security Council resolution of 17th January 1948.

In further letters of 18th and 28th June 1965, Pakistan charged that for some time past an offensive build up of Indian military forces had been taking place in the Indian occupied part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in violation of the ceasefire agreement and of the resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

On 27th August 1965, India in two letters rejected Pakistan's charge that it had illegally annexed the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union and reiterated its contention that Pakistan had no authority to negotiate an agreement about Kashmir's border with the People's Republic of China.

On 9th August 1965, the Secretary General had appealed to the government of Pakistan for observance of ceasefire line and to the government of India for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from its side. Restoration of the ceasefire line, the Secretary General continued, could be achieved only under the following

conditions: (a) willingness of both parties to respect the agreement they had entered into; (b) reaction on the part of the government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossing of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniforms; (c) evacuation by each party of position of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan position in the Kargil area; (d) halt by both parties to the firing across the ceasefire line that had been occurring in some sector with artillery and smaller guns; and (e) allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations observers to both parties on both sides of the line.

On 4th September 1965, the Security Council met to consider the question, with the representatives of India and Pakistan participating in the debate without the right to vote.

A draft resolution sponsored by the six non-permanent members of the Council - Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay was then introduced. It called upon the governments of India and Pakistan to take forth with all steps for an

TABLE VII

Voting in the Security Council on Indo-Pak Problem
1965
Resolution 209(1965)

Bolivia	
China	
France	
Iraq Coast	
Jordan	
Netherlands	
Malaysia	
UK	
USA	
USSR	
Uruguay	

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1965 (UN: New York, 1965), p. 173.

immediate ceasefire; to respect the ceasefire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line and to co-operate fully with the United Nations military observer group in India and Pakistan in its task of supervising the ceasefire. It requested the Secretary General to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of the resolution.

The representative of China, Jordan, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States spoke in support of this draft resolution, emphasising the urgent need to bring all out an end to this fighting.

The six power proposal was unanimously adopted on September 1965 as resolution 209 (1965). The voting pattern can be seen in Table VII on the facing page.

The table shows that all the members of the Security Council voted for the resolution. No one gave negative vote or abstained. All members requested ~~India-Pakistan~~ to ~~cease~~ hostilities in the area. They requested the concerned parties to withdraw all armed personnel back to the position held by them.

On 17th September at Security Council's meeting, the Council had before it the text of messages sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the

Prime Minister of India, Mr. Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub in which he expressed the concern of the USSR over the conflict and offered its good offices to solve the problem.

On 20th September a draft resolution was sponsored by the Netherland. By this draft.

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the reports of the Secretary General on his consultations with the government of India and Pakistan,

"Commending the Secretary General for his unremitting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the Security Council's resolutions of 4th and 6th September,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Noting the differing replies by the parties and an appeal for a ceasefire on set out in the report of the Secretary General, but nothing further with concern that no ceasefire has yet come to being,

"Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards peace. Full settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

1. "Demands that a ceasefire should take effect on Wednesday, 22nd September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a ceasefire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5th August, 1965;
2. "Requests the Secretary General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;
3. "Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;
4. "Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution 210 of 6th September, has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in article 33 of the chapter, to this end;
5. "Requests the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution and to report to the Security Council thereon."¹³

13. SCOR 1965, S/66921, Resolution 211 (1965).

TABLE VIII

Voting in the Security Council on Indo-Pakistan
Question: 1965

Resolution 211 (1965)

Adopted by 10-0-1 abstention

Netherlands	Jordan	UK	USA	USSR	France	China	Bolivia	Malaysia	Ivory Coast	Uruguay
Y	A	P	P	P	Y	P	P	P	P	P

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1965 (IN: New York, 1965), p. 174.

While taking part in the debate the representative of Netherland said that the troops of both the countries should be withdrawn to the position held by them before beginning of the war. He asked the Secretary General to make efforts to secure immediate implementation of the Security Council's decision.

The Soviet representative's emphasis was first on the implementation of the ceasefire, then on the strict observance of the ceasefire, partly on the initiation of efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The Soviet delegate, Fedorenko stressed in the Security Council that the withdrawal of the armed troops to the position held by them on 5th August 1965, should take place as soon as possible.¹⁴

Then the resolution was put to vote and adopted by 10 votes in favour to 1 abstention (Jordan). The voting pattern can be seen in Table VIII on the facing page.

The table shows that out of 11 members, 10 members voted for the resolution and one member abstained. All the Afro-Asian members except Jordan voted for the resolution. The USSR and the Western countries also voted for the resolution.

14. SCOR Mtg. 1247.(1965) p. 23

While explaining his vote the representative of Jordan, Mr. Laleed M. Sa'eli said that the two earlier resolutions had proved inadequate. Something basically different an analysis and a resolution dealing squarely with the issue involved was needed. A reaffirmation of the Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948 was essential. Moreover, the reference to the need for a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries deserved more emphasis than was accorded to it in the resolution.

Mr. Ramani of Malaysia said that the resolution, in his government's view was subject to certain reservations. His delegation would have preferred to eliminate references to a political settlement. He also expressed reservations about the fourth operative paragraph of the resolution. If a separate vote had been taken he would have voted against it.

The French representative said that the resolution was important because it called for a ceasefire; reaffirmed the Council's interest in the political problems underlying the dispute and suggested ways of dealing with the substance of the problem. He said that these provisions were complementary and equally important. He stated that it was equally important that as soon as the fighting ended a serious effort must be made to achieve a genuine political settlement that would ensure a lasting peace.

In a report of 21st September, the Secretary General gave an account of the action he had taken to give effect to the Security Council resolution of 20th September. Texts of the resolution had been sent to the two Governments, and a reply had been received from Prime Minister Shastri, stating that India was willing to order a simple ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.

On 22nd September, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, speaking to the Security Council, confirmed that orders for a ceasefire had been issued. However, he continued, a cessation of hostilities was not enough. The Security Council must now address itself to the heart of the problem.

On the same day, the Secretary General addressed identical messages to the two Heads of Government, notifying them that the formal acceptance of the ceasefire demanded by the Security had been confirmed by both Governments. In another message, dated 23rd September the Secretary General informed Prime Minister Shastri, and President Ayub Khan that the United Nations Military Observers had been dispatched to the area and that more would be coming. Because of the differences in origin of the two operation the Secretary General was separating the supervision of the ceasefire and withdrawals in areas outside Kashmir from the existing ceasefire line in Kashmir. The

team of observers operating outside Kashmir would be known as the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). The two operations, however, would be closely co-ordinated administratively and operationally.

Between 22nd and 26th September, the permanent representatives of India and Pakistan addressed to the Secretary General several complaints, each of them alleging that there had been violations of the ceasefire by the other side.

A number of communications were also exchanged between the Secretary General and the two parties, regarding arrangements for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution.

The Indo-Pakistan question was not brought before the twentieth session of the General Assembly. Reference was made to the question by many speakers during that session, but no further discussion was done in the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union played a very important role to solve the Indo-Pakistan problem. It offered for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and proposed Tashkent as the venue for a meeting of the leaders of India and Pakistan. Prime Minister of India accepted the invitation immediately and thanked Kosygin for his initiative. The

approval has sent to the Soviet Union on 23rd September through the Indian Embassy. At first Pakistan appeared reluctant to accept the proposal but later on Pakistan felt convinced that the Soviet Union would adopt an impartial attitude in the matter.

The idea of a meeting at Tashkent received support from all countries of the world. The meeting finally came off on 4th January 1965. The Soviet Union took a neutral attitude of the conference giving equal importance to both sides.

The Tashkent talks thus started under Soviet auspices. The Soviet Union seemed quite optimistic about the success of the meeting. For the first time the Soviet Union was mediating not only between the non-Communist countries but also between a aligned and a non-aligned country. The Tashkent Declaration represented not only a triumph of Soviet policy but also decline in US and Britain influence in Asia.

The success of Soviet diplomacy to solve the Indo-Pak conflict was remarkable. It did not spoil Soviet relations with the Western countries. Indeed, the countries of the West supported the Soviet Union's action. The United States offered its cooperation to the Soviet Union in making the meeting successful.

Thus the Soviet Union was able to score a diplomatic victory at Tashkent and emerged as mediator and peace-maker in the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent.

QUESTION RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM: 1966

The question of Vietnam was a frequent issue of discussion at the United Nations from fifties to early seventies. The United Nations had taken a number of steps in pursuit of peace, but nothing serious came out and in 1953, the USA started sending thousands of military advisors and experts to South Vietnam. Although the United States stated its desire to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict in the violation which had been reaffirmed in communication to the number of governments, that the United States was prepared for discussion or negotiation without any prior conditions on the basis of the Geneva accord of 1954 but nothing came out of these statements and in 1956, the USA "obstructed the reunification of Vietnam, blocked the holding of general election as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva Agreement".¹⁵

The Vietnamese people put up a heroic resistance and fought for the reunification of the entire nation.

15. A.A. Gromyko and B.H. Penomarev ed., Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. II, 1945-80 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980), p. 383

It was supported by all the Socialist countries and even denounced by students, intellectuals and other segments of the population of the USA. Some US citizens refused to serve in the army and other military offices.

The Soviet Union adopted a firm and resolute attitude, extending full support for the Vietnamese people in their war. It supplied sophisticated weapons, ammunition, and resources to Vietnam and helped to master them. Meetings were held regularly at the highest level, at which both sides informed each other on domestic and international problems, considered questions related to Soviet assistance to Vietnam. There were repeated meetings with Vietnamese leaders in the CPSU, Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Views were exchanged on the situation in Vietnam and on means of effectively repulsing aggression and agreements were drafted on comprehensive assistance to Vietnam.

In 1966 at the United Nations the Soviet Union tried to make a world public opinion in favour of Vietnamese people. It made the moves to secure the earliest termination of the war and a political settlement in Vietnam.

The Afro-Asian countries supported the Soviet move for a political settlement in Vietnam. They stated that

the negotiations should be made for a peaceful settlement on the basis of Geneva Accord of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostility should be envisaged and a ceasefire might be the first order in any discussions or negotiations. They stated further that the United States should withdraw its forces from South Vietnam and the reunification of the Vietnam should be decided by the free decision of their peoples. They asked the Secretary General to see into the matter.

At a press conference on 20th January, the Secretary General declared that he had been doing his utmost for the last two and a half years to bring about a peaceful solution and was still continuing his effort. In mediation, he said, certain basic principles of a negotiated settlement seemed already agreed upon, namely, that both parts of Vietnam would not enter into military alliances or seek foreign assistance and that both parts of Vietnam would be free to decide between themselves the question of reunification.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On 31st January 1966, the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Vietnam.

Also on 31st January, the United States submitted a draft resolution, whereby, inter alia, the Council would call for immediate discussions, without pre-conditions among the interested governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and to recommend that the first order of business of such a conference should be arranged for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervisions.

On 1st and 2nd February, the Security Council met to consider the United States requests for inclusion of the question in its agenda. The United States representative declared that his Government's recourse to the Security Council signalled not the end but a new dimension to its peace offensive, and that arose from the urgency of finding a way to end the fighting in Vietnam. The failure of every other effort to bring about negotiations, and it is Security Council's responsibility for maintaining peace and security. The United States role in Vietnam was based on violations of the provisions of the Geneva Accords - particularly of Article 19 on the cessation of hostilities by North Vietnam. It had made repeated appeals for whatever help the United Nations collectively or individually, through any of its organs, might provide in bringing about unconditional discussions and negotiations

for an acceptable formula to restore peace to Vietnam. The United States rejected completely the USSR contention that it had violated the Geneva Agreement.

The USSR representative objected to the convening of the Security Council and to the inclusion of the Vietnam question in its agenda. He said since the question should be settled within the framework of the Geneva agreement. Moreover, by bringing the question to the Council simultaneously with the resumption of its barbaric air raids on Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States was not aiming at a genuine settlement of the question, but had resorted to a diversionary tactic with a view to converting the expansion of its aggressive war in Vietnam and was using the Council to stage a propaganda show. In fact, the United States was unwilling to revert to strict compliance with the General Accords of 1954. Since it refused to recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people.

The USSR representative went on to say that, while the United States continued to interfere in the domestic affairs of Vietnam from a position of brute force and to terminate the struggle of the peoples of South Vietnam for independence and freedom. The President of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam had again recently demonstrated his country's readiness to achieve a joint settlement by stating on 24th January that, if the United States was genuinely interested in peaceful settlement it must recognize the four point programme of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the programme of the National Liberation Front, and stop unconditionally and forever the bombing and all the military acts against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The USSR delegate insisted that the problems of Vietnam must be resolved within the framework of the Geneva Accords and with the adoption of the programme for a political settlement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the National Liberation Front, which is the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people.

The representatives of Argentina, China, Japan, the Netherlands and Uruguay favoured consideration of the problems by the Security Council, which had been entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

TABLE VII

Voting on Vietnamese Question in
the Security Council, 1966

Argentina																				
China																				
France																				
Japan																				
Netherlands																				
Nigeria																				
Mali																				
Jordan																				
Bulgaria																				
Newzealand																				
Uganda																				
UK																				
USA																				
USSR																				
Uruguay																				
	P	P	A	P	P	A	A	P	X	P	A	P	X	P	P					

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations, 1966
(UN: New York, 1966), p. 150.

Mali and Nigeria said that while they did not contest the right of any member state to bring such a question as Vietnam to the Council, they did not think that discussion of the question was appropriate in the present context. Mali pointed out that, with the exception of the United States all the other parties concerned not only were not members of the organization but had exploitly expressed their opposition to any discussion in the United Nations and indicated their preference for discussion within the framework of the general agreements. Uganda declared that the issue should here been brought before the Council long before the bombings of North Vietnam had begun.

On 1st February, a vote on the adoption of the agenda was postponed on the proposal of Jordan, a proposal which was supported by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda.

On 2nd February, Jordan declared its support for all efforts aimed at peace in Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva Accord, whether such efforts were initiated within the United Nations or outside it.

The question was included in the adenda by a vote of 9 in favour to 2 against and 4 abstentism but no resolution was sponsored by any country. The voting behaviour can be seen in Table VII on the facing page.

The table shows that Socialist countries like USSR and Bulgaria voted against inclusion of the item in the agenda. Three Afro-Asian countries and one European country abstained while 4 Afro-Asian countries and 5 Western countries voted in favour for the inclusion in the agenda. It means the Afro-Asian countries were divided into two groups for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. Some Afro-Asian countries favoured that the item should be included in the agenda while the others thought that the solution could be found only in accordance of the Geneva accord.

While explaining his vote the representative of USA said that the request for a Council Meeting to consider the problem of Vietnam signalled a new dimension in the peace offensive in which the United States was engaged and which it was determined to continue.

The representative of the USSR said that his delegation objected to convening the council to discuss the question of Vietnam and opposed to inclusion of the item in the agenda. His Government supported the joint position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the question should be settled within the framework of the Geneva Accord.

The representative of UK said that his delegation fully supported the United States move to bring the question of Vietnam to the Council.

French representative stated that his delegation could not support the request inscribe the question of Vietnam on the Council's agenda. The United Nations where only one of the principle parties involved in the conflict, (- USA -) was represented, was not the proper framework for achieving a peaceful solution. He stated further that a situation could be achieved only through negotiations based upon the principles of the Geneva Accords.

The representative of Mali said that only one of the parties concerned had expressed the wish that the United Nations should discuss the question; the others, which were not members of the organization, had explicitly stated their preference for a discussion within the framework of the Geneva Agreements. He agreed with the view that the Geneva agreement was the most appropriate framework for re-opening the question.

The Nigeria representative said that, in view of the unfortunate resumption of the bombing, it was a poor time for the Council to discuss the question. A profitable discussion would require the presence of the

People's Republic of China, the Government of North Vietnam and National Liberation Front as well as the Government of South Vietnam.

The representative of Uganda said that the United States should have brought the matter to the Council long before it became so deeply involved in Vietnam and long before it began the bombings. He said further that it might be better to refer the matter to the Geneva venue.

The representative of China said that a refusal to inscribe the item on the Council's agenda was not only to ignore the appeal of mankind; but to restrict primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

Then no resolution was sponsored or passed in the United Nations on Vietnam problem in 1966. Voting was done only for the inclusion of the item on the agenda.

On 26th February, the President of the Council informed its members by a letter that some members, in conformity with position taken during the debate, had not participated in the envisaged consultation. Serious differences remained unresolved, especially on the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Vietnam under present circumstances. Hence, there was a general and

common feeling among many members of the Council that:

(1) There was a general concern and growing anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Vietnam and a strong desire for their early cessation and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem; and (2) there appeared also to be a feeling that termination of the conflict should be sought through negotiation in an appropriate forum in order to work out implementation of the Geneva Accords. Meanwhile the Council remained seized of the Vietnam problem.

In an identical letter on 11th July, the permanent Mission of the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, condemned the United States for embarking on a course of expanding its shameful war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people by barbaric bombing attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

On 20th June 1966, at a press conference at United Nations Headquarters, the Secretary General announced three steps which he had been presenting to some of the parties principally concerned and which he thought could alone create conditions conducive to negotiations leading to the return to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, on which everybody seemed now to agree, and to a peaceful settlement

o f the problem of Vietnam. The three steps which became known as the three point proposals, were; first the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam; second, the sealing down of all military activities in South Vietnam which along could lead to the bringing about a ceasefire; and third the willingness of all sides to enter into discussion with those who were actually fighting.

VIEWS EXPRESSED DURING TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF
GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

Although the question of Vietnam was not an item on the agenda of the XXI session of the General Assembly, its gravity was recognized in reference to the problem by 107 of the 110 speakers in the General debate in the opening phase of the session; "the discussion turned" as the representative of Sweden said, "into a veritable poll of international public opinion".¹⁶ The question was generally recognized as a serious threat to international peace and security.

The proposals of the Secretary General for ending the war in Vietnam received support in General Debate. Some representatives, including Cyprus, Denmark, India, Iran and Sweden approved them without any objection.

16. Yearbook of the United Nations 1966. (UN: New York, 1966), p. 152

On 22nd September, the United States representative stated that in violation of the Geneva accords, the charter and the Assembly resolution of 21 December 1965, "on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of South Vietnam was under attack by forces directed and supplied from the north and reinforced by the regular units of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with the purpose of forcing upon the people of South Vietnam, a system not chosen by any peaceful process",¹⁷ He reaffirmed that the United States did not seek any permanent United States presence in South Vietnam, nor did it seek to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam. The United States wanted a political solution. . .

But some representatives denounced the United States aggression in Vietnam as an increasingly serious threat to peace and security and they categorically opposed the United States proposals. Some of these representatives expressed the view that the United States proposals were a hypocritical device to divert public opinion from new criminal steps in the escalation of the war. Cambodia said that what the "United States plan asked for was, in fact surrender on the part of the Vietnam National resistance and the granting to the

17, Ibid., p. 153

United States of the right to maintain in Saigon a Government of its own choice which the Vietnamese people did not want."¹⁸

The representative of the UDCR said that the programmes of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam provided a solution of the problem: "unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, withdrawal of all armed forces of the United States and its allies from South Vietnam, removal of all military bases and of foreign armaments, and granting to the Vietnamese people a chance to settle their internal problem without outside interference".¹⁹

ATTITUDE ON SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION

In their varied comments on the problem of Vietnam made during the general debate in the opening phases of the Assembly in 21st session, the speakers suggested some specific considerations, such as the need to end the war by a political solution, the role of the United Nations, the Geneva Agreements, the cessation of

18. Ibid., p. 154

19. Ibid., p. 154

bombing, a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops.

The majority of speakers stressed their desire for a quick end to the war and the need for negotiation indicating that to bring about peace it would be necessary, "at sometime or given certain conditions for the parties at the conflict to discuss and reach agreement on a settlement".²⁰ The representative of India said that there could be no lasting military solution to the Vietnam problem and that the only alternative was an earnest search for a peaceful political solution. Afghanistan hoped that all those directly concerned would reach for ways and means to bring the problem from the battlefield to the conference table and that the people of Vietnam would be guaranteed the possibility of determining their political dealing of their own free will and without any interference from outside.

STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND PRESIDENT OF
GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

On 2nd December 1966, in accepting his appointment to a new term, the Secretary General stated to the General Assembly that the threat to the peace in Vietnam was a continuing source of anxiety and even anguish. He

20. Ibid., p. 156

added that an atmosphere might be created which was necessary for meaningful talks to be held in the quest for a peaceful solution. The Secretary General concluded by declaring that he would regard it as his duty to make every effort on a personal basis to promote a solution which would bring peace and justice to the people of Vietnam.

The President of the General Assembly, in his speech in closing the 21st session of General Assembly said that it was obvious that the United Nations could not intervene in any way in the war in Vietnam, but it was equally clear that the governments represented in the United Nations could not remain aloof where question of war and peace were at stake. He declared that there was universal agreement that a peaceful solution through negotiations was the only desirable solution.

The Vietnamese people put up a heroic resistance, fighting for the liberation of South Vietnam and the reunification of the entire nation. From the very outset of Vietnam problem the Soviet Union adopted a very firm and resolute posture extending unremitting support for the Vietnamese people. In the United Nations Organization, too the Soviet representatives took steps to have the US aggression in Vietnam condemned. The Soviet Union called

upon the leaders of many countries to act more vigorously against the USA's policy in Vietnam. It always supported the Afro-Asian efforts to solve the Vietnamese problem at United Nations. At home a nation wide movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people unfolded in the Soviet Union.

On March 31, 1968 the US Government gave the order for a partial cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and declare that it was prepared to negotiate with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The talks between the representatives of the DRV and the USA held in Paris. As a result of an understanding reached by the DRV and US representatives in Paris, the USA ceased the bombing of the DRV on November, 1968. Political negotiations were started between representatives of the DRV, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the USA and the Saigon administration with the purpose of working out a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem. The Soviet Union saw the understanding reached in Paris as an important advance towards a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

THE BANGLADESH PROBLEM, 1971

Ever since the creation of Pakistan the relationship between India and Pakistan had remained an uneasy one. Pakistan had two fronts Eastern and Western Pakistan. East

Pakistan was more than a thousand miles away from West. Both were separated by India. The cultural and linguistic differences dividing the Bengalis from their western compatriots, over the years the East Bengalis began to feel resentful and not without justification of the treatment meted out to them by the government of Pakistan. The demand for a greater autonomy from the central government became important issue in the politics of East Bengal. Things took a turn for a worse in 1970.

When the negotiation between the two wings of government failed, the crisis assumed a serious proportion. The activities of Pak army in Bangladesh displayed characteristic of genocide and resulted in a large influx of refugees into India. India could hardly be expected to remain indifferent to this violent upheaval in her neighbourhood specially when these developments threatened to interfere with stability of her own social and economic system.

In January and February 1971, India and Pakistan each addressed two letters to the President of the Security Council, continuing their correspondence of previous years regarding the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The permanent representative of Pakistan complained of repressive actions by the government of India in that state, and emphasized

that the status of Jammu and Kashmir remained to be determined in accordance with resolution of the Security Council.

The permanent representative of India contended that since the state had become an integral part of India by virtue of its accession in 1947, the issues raised by Pakistan concerned matters of domestic jurisdiction. His government would not discuss such matters with any other country or in United Nations. Though it was prepared to discuss bilaterally with Pakistan the question of Pakistan's illegal occupation of part of the state.

Following the outbreak of civil strike in East Pakistan in March 1971, the United Nations humanitarian programmes in the subcontinent were established by the Secretary General and commenced operations during the spring and summer of 1971. In a memorandum dated 20th July 1971, to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary General indicated that in East Pakistan, "international and governmental efforts to cope with the humanitarian problem were increasingly hampered by the lack of substantial progress towards a political reconciliation and the consequent effect on law, order and public administration".²¹

²¹. Yearbook of United Nations 1971 (UN: New York, 1971), p. 144

On 20th October 1971, with the situation continuing to worsen along the borders of East Pakistan and amid reports of growing tension on the border between West Pakistan and India, the Secretary General said that he had addressed an identical message to the heads of the governments of India and Pakistan on 3rd December in the light of reports of a further grave deterioration in the situation along the border of East Pakistan and elsewhere in the subcontinent. The Secretary General reported to the Security Council on the efforts he had made thus far for the regard to the problem. He said his conviction that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On 4th December 1971, the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom and the United States requested an immediate meeting of the council to consider the deteriorating situation which had led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan.

The Council met on the same day. It decided to place the item on its agenda, together with the reports of the Secretary General, and insisted the representatives

of India and Pakistan should participate in the debate without the right to vote. The USSR representatives proposed that the representatives of Bangladesh also be given a hearing.

Opening the debate, the representative of Pakistan said that India had not only launched aggression on the territory of Pakistan but had openly demanded that Pakistan dismember itself.

The Indian delegate said that, "after having failed totally to suppress what Pakistan called the Bengali rebellion, Pakistan had made an effort to internationalize the problem to make it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute in the hope that people forget what the Pakistani army was doing in East Pakistan. But the refugees were still coming, and India could not take any more, their conditions were already intolerable."²²

The representative of the USSR said that the situation in East Pakistan was a result of the Actions of the Pakistani military authorities. Because of the application of force and terror against the people of East Pakistan, millions of people had been compelled to leave their homeland and flee to a neighbouring country - India - and because political refugees. The representative of Pakistan had officially acknowledged that there was a

22. SCOR 1971, S/1041 Mtg. 1606.

serious domestic crisis in his country and that the crisis had acquired an international character. The Security Council should deal with the root cause of the crisis.

The USSR subsequently introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would "(1) call for a political settlement in East Pakistan that would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities; and (11) call upon the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which had led to deterioration of the situation".²³

The representative of the USSR again urged that the Council extend an invitation to a representative of Bangladesh to participate in the debate. He also circulated a statement of the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) which he stated, set out the position of the USSR on the situation. The statement warned against the "dangerous course followed by Pakistan which had given rise to serious events in direct proximity to the USSR border".²⁴

The representative of Somalia said, while introducing the 6 power draft resolution, that the principle of withdrawal of enemy troops from the territory of another country

²³. Yearbook of the United Nations 1971 (UN: New York, 1971), p. 148

²⁴. Ibid.

could not be subject to negotiation. It was not for any other state to impose a political solution on East Pakistan by military means. The time had come to transfer the question to the General Assembly, as provided for in the Assembly's "uniting for peace resolution 377 A(V) of 3rd November 1950".²⁵ By this six-power draft resolution,

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the item on the agenda of its 1606th meeting, as contained in documents agenda S/1606,

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 1606th and 1607th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to refer the question contained in document S/1606 to the General Assembly at its 26th session, as provided for in assembly resolution 377A(V) of 3rd November 1950."²⁶

The USSR representative disputed suggestions and said that the USSR supported India's stand and did not favour the proposal to refer the matter to the General Assembly.

25. See, Yearbook of United Nations 1950 (UN: New York, 1950), pp. 193-95; also see GAOR text of resolution 377(A)(V) 1950.

26. SCOR 1971, S/10424, Mtg. 1608, Resolution 303(1971).

TABLE VIII

Voting in the Security Council on the issue of
Bangladesh

Resolution 303(1971) 6th Dec. 1971

Argentina	Burundi	China	France	Japan	Nicaragua	Poland	Sierra Leone	Somalia	UK	USA	USSR	Belgium	Italy	Syria
F	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	A	F	F	F

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1971 (UN: New York, 1971), p. 159.

The representative of the United States, while taking part in the debate said that a state of open hostilities existed between India and Pakistan and that there was a grave threat to the peace and stability of Asia. He stated further that there should be immediate cessation of hostilities and asked for the withdrawal of armed forces to their respective territories.

The representative of Poland said that the source of the conflict could not be liquidated and peace restored except through a political settlement in East Pakistan that would take into account the will of the people of East Bengal.

On 6th December, the draft resolution was put to vote and passed by a vote of 11 to 0 with 4 abstentions as resolution 305(1971). The details of voting can be seen on the facing page in Table VIII.

The table shows that 11 countries voted for the resolution while 4 countries were abstained. France and UK remained abstained because they were not interested in solving of the problem. The USSR and Poland favoured the Indian view while abstaining. But all the Afro-Asian countries in the Security Council voted for the resolution along with USA and by doing this they did not see the seriousness of the problem.

The representative of the USSR said that efforts should be made for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes from India.

The delegate of Somalia said that the principle of withdrawal of enemy troops from the territory of another country could not be subject to negotiation. It was not for any other State to impose a political solution on East Pakistan by military means. The time had come to transfer the question to the General Assembly.

The France and United Kingdom said that they were unable to support the proposal for referring the question to the General Assembly because they had doubts that this procedure would promote a solution.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

The General Assembly took up the question referred to it by the Security Council at two plenary meetings held on 7th December, 1971.

Before the Assembly, was a draft resolution sponsored eventually by the 34 members. Introducing this draft, Argentina called for continued efforts by the General Assembly or the Security Council to work out a political solution for the problem confronting India and Pakistan. By the preamble of this draft resolution.

"The General Assembly,

"Noting the reports of the Secretary General of 3rd and 4th December 1971 and the letter from the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6th December 1971.

"Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which continue an immediate threat to international peace and security.

"Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities.

"Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

"Mindful of the provisions of the charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraphs 4,

"Recalling the declaration on the strengthening of international security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

"Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of

their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders.

"Mindful of the purposes and principles of the charter and of the General Assembly's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the charter and of Assembly resolution 377A(V) of 3rd November 1950.

"1. Calls upon the government of India and Pakistan to take further all measures for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the Indo-Pakistan borders;

"2. urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

"3. call for the full cooperation of all states with the Secretary General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

"4. urges that every effort be made to safeguard the lives and well being of the civilian population in the area of conflict;

"5. requests the Secretary General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

"6. decides to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand;

"7. calls upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in the light of the present resolution."²⁷

During the debate, the Secretary General said that since March 1971 he had taken a number of humanitarian initiatives on the situation of East Pakistan. He appealed to all the parties to the conflict to take every possible measure to spare the lives of the innocent civilian population.

While taking part in the debate the representative of India said that his country had made repeated attempts over many months to inform international opinion of the developing dangers of the situation. He stated that India could not ignore what was happening "just across the border and the effect on its national integrity, amounting to civil aggression against India".²⁸ He further stated that when Pakistan found it could not impose its military solution in Bangladesh, it had sought to create a confrontation with India and launched armed attack against India.

27. GAOR 1971, A/L. 647/Rev. I, Mtg. 2003, Resolution 2793 (XXVI)

28. Yearbook of United Nations 1971 (UN: New York, 1971), p. 151.

TABLE IX

Voting in the General Assembly on Bangladesh Question
Resolution 2793 (XXVI) 7th December 1971

Countries:	For:	Against:	Abstention
Afghanistan			A
Albania	F		
Australia	F		
Burma	F		
Ceylon	F		
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France			A
Ghana	F		
India		X	
Indonesia	F		
Iran	F		
Iraq	F		
Libya	F		
Nigeria	F		
Pakistan	F		
Portugal	F		
UAR	F		
UK			A
USA	F		
USSR		X	
South Africa	F		
Yugoslavia	F		

Total roll-call vote	104	11	10

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1971
(UN: New York, 1971), p. 160.

The representative of Pakistan said that the Indian aggression ~~was a~~ total interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and India had caused and aggravated Pakistan's internal crisis.

The United States representative said that the Assembly's task was to bring the influence of the United Nations to bear in order to restore conditions of peace essential for a political solution.

The representative of the USSR said that power in East Pakistan must be transferred to the elected representatives of the people of that land.

Then the resolution was put to vote and adopted by a vote of 104 in favour to 11 against with 10 abstentions, as resolution 2793 (XXVI) on 7th December, 1971. The voting pattern can be seen on the facing page in Table IX.

The table shows that 104 countries including most of the Afro-Asian countries, Western countries and Latin American countries voted for the resolution. All the Socialist countries including USSR voted against the resolution along with India. It means that they favoured the Indian stand. Afghanistan remained abstained and while the France and the UK also abstained.

While explaining their votes the representative of the USSR said that the representative of Bangladesh should be invited in the discussion at the United Nations.

The representative of Poland said that the conflict was basically within East Pakistan and therefore, must be resolved in conformity with the wishes of the population of East Pakistan.

The Indian delegate said that the Bangladesh was a reality and could no longer be considered a part of Pakistan. India had recognized the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Any withdrawal of troops had to include the withdrawal of Pakistan occupation troops from Bangladesh. Any cessation of hostilities had to be simultaneous with the release of the leader of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The representative of Pakistan said that his country would spare no efforts in achieving a peaceful settlement of its internal problems consistent with the will of its people and its territorial integrity, provided it was free from foreign pressure.

The voting on Bangladesh question, showed that the Soviet Union voted in favour of Indian stand. Soviet Union along with India casted its vote against the resolution sponsored in the General Assembly by 34 countries

Most of the Afro-Asian countries voted for the General Assembly resolution except few who abstained.

In the Security Council also the Soviet Union favoured the Indian stand and abstained in the voting of 6 power draft resolution adopted by the Security Council. The Soviet Union's argument was that the any settlement of this issue should be in conformity with Bangladesh representation. The USSR was concerned with the problems of refugees which had caused a critical problem for India. The Soviet Union supported the Indian stand at the United Nations as well as it gave the financial help for refugees.

The forgoing discussion indicates the nature of Soviet attitude on regional issues at UN General Assembly and the Security Council. In this chapter we dealt five regional issues and 9 resolutions. Out of 9 resolutions the Soviet Union favoured 7 resolution on Moz, Congo, Indo-Pakistan, 1965, and Vietnam, 1966. Other two resolutions were concerned with Bangladesh' problem in which the Soviet Union supported the Indian and Bangladesh's stand and abstained in the Security Council resolution 303 (1971) and casted its vote against the General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) 1971.

It is quite obvious that the Soviet Union has shown particular concern for and demonstrated its support to major regional issues of direct Afro-Asian interest at various UN forums. It is particularly worth noting that even those Afro-Asian countries who aligned with the West were constrained to vote on the side of the Soviet Union on these issues. This is of course not to suggest that there were no differences whatsoever in the approaches to the issues adopted by the USSR and various Afro-Asian nations. But what was important was that on the essential of these issues the community of interest between the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian nations was fully demonstrated at the UN.

Such a Soviet policy at the UN was obviously an integral part of Soviet policy to the third world.

However, our study will remain incomplete unless we examine corresponding Afro-Asian responses at the UN on these issues, bilateral in nature, that came up before the UN where direct Soviet interests were involved. We propose to undertake this exercise in the subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER IV
BILATERAL ISSUES

Like all nations, big or small, the Soviet Union has also priority interests. Indeed the Soviet view that the ideological orientations of the Soviet State are not in contradiction with his priority interests. It is well known that the Soviet Union has, since the end of the Second World War, the top most priority interest in European Socialist Countries. As it happened during the period of our study the Soviet Union has experienced a number of crisis in East Europe, as for example in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, so much so that these became major issues for a world body likely United Nations.

In the preceding pages we have examined and analysed the voting behaviour of the Soviet Union in the United Nations on these issues where the Soviet Union had common interest with the Afro-Asian countries (e.g., global issues) as well as where direct interest of Afro-Asian nations were involved (e.g., regional issues). It is therefore, logical for us to look at the other side of the story, namely, the voting behaviour of Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations on issues of direct Soviet interest. Such issues have been traditionally well marked in the Soviet foreign policy within a

bilateral framework. It is worthwhile to identify them within a bilateral framework. Hence, we shall focus our attention on two such major issues, namely, Hungarian crisis and Czechoslovakian crisis.

THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS: 1956

At the conclusion of world war II, Hungary was devastated and it suffered in calculable moral, physical, political and economic danger. By 1956 the Communist Party in Hungary was divided and there was general dissatisfaction among the people. The internal and the external repercussions led to a major political change in Hungary. Internally, Andras Hegedu's Government was replaced by Imre Nagy on 24th October, 1956, and an all party government was formed. The following day Erno Gero was replaced by János Kadar as the first party Secretary. A few days later Kadar announced the formation of a new government which had the support of the Soviet Union. Externally, the Western powers reacted sharply to the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

On 27th October 1956, France, UK and the United States requested a meeting of the Security Council to reconsider an item entitled, "The situation in Hungary".

pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter. They stated that foreign military forces in Hungary violently repressed the rights of the Hungarian people, which were secured by the Treaty of Peace of 1947 to which Hungary and the allied and associated powers were parties.

On 28th October, the representative of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic protested against consideration by the Council of the situation in Hungary. He said that the events of 22nd October 1956 and thereafter, and the measures taken in the course of these events, were exclusively, within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary.

The representative of the USSR, while opposing consideration of the item, maintained that its discussion by the Council would amount to gross interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary and violation of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. Council's consideration was designed to encourage the armed rebellion which was being conducted by a reactionary underground movement against the legal government. The Hungarian Government in taking measures to end the criminal activities of counter revolutionary elements, had been acting entirely in accordance with article 4 of the Peace Treaty, which obligated it not to permit the existence and activities

TABLE I

Voting on the Hungarian Question in the Security
Council for the Inclusion of the Item in the Agenda
26th October 1956

Australia	Belgium	China	Cuba	France	India	Peru	USSR	UK	USA	Yugoslavia
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	X	F	F	A

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1956
(UN: New York, 1956), p. 67.

of organization of a fascist type. Article 34 of the Charter, which concerned only disputes or situations of an international character, was not relevant and the Council was not competent to examine such question.

The representative of the United Kingdom categorically denied the motives ascribed to the government of France, the United Kingdom and the United States by the USSR representative and declared that the foreign troops were fighting in Hungary obviously made the matter and of the international concern.

On 28th October, the Council decided by a vote of 9 to 1 with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia) to include the question in its agenda as can be seen in Table I on the facing page. The table shows that out of 11 members 9 members were in favour of the inclusion of the item in the agenda while the USSR and Yugoslavia maintained that it was an internal affair of Hungary. The Council discussed this question at four meetings held between 28th October and 4th November 1956. At the first of these meetings the representative of the Hungary was invited to the Council table.

The Afro-Asian members, under the confused Hungarian situation, maintained restraint while assessing the situation till 7th November 1956. Iran, an Afro-Asian

member and also a member of the Baghdad Pact, was the only representative of this group in the Security Council. Although it expressed the general attitude of Afro-Asian members that they could not remain indifferent to the fate of the countries which became victims of intervention of foreign powers and it voted for all the three draft resolutions moves by the Western powers concerning the inclusion of the Hungarian question on the agenda of the Security Council, Soviet withdrawal from Hungary and convening of the II Emergency special session of the General Assembly.

Some other members of the Afro-Asian group like Pakistan and Turkey, both members of the Baghdad Pact, reacted in the different ways. While the Turkish newspaper "Cumhuriyet" bitterly criticised the Budapest events. The Pakistan Prime Minister's reaction was not so sharp. He appealed to the Soviet Prime Minister to desist from the use of force in Hungary and to allow the Hungarian people to decide for themselves, without coercion the form of government they wished to establish in their country.¹

1. See Kossigin's Contemporary Archives (24th November, 1st December, 1956), p. 226

The third reaction came from the Indian Prime Minister on 5th November 1956, who, while opening the General Conference of UNESCO in New Delhi, stated, "We see today in Egypt, as well as in Hungary, both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern army used to suppress people and to gain political objectives".²

While taking part in the debate in the Security Council on Hungary the representative of the United Kingdom, France and other Council members held that the evidence showed that the foreign troops had intervened on a massive scale in Hungary, creating a situation of which the Security Council, acting under Article 34 of the Charter, must take action. Even if the Soviet troops were in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty provisions.

The USSR representative said that events in Hungary had made it clear, that with the assistance of the United States, a reactionary underground movement has been organised in Hungary which had exploited the difficulties and shortcomings in the work of the State

2. GAOR Pln Mtg, 569 (EC-II), (8th November, 1956). Quoted by the representative of El Salvador while expressing general satisfaction over the voice raised in Asia by a statesman of great moral stature, Jawaharlal Nehru who condemned equally the invasion of Egyptian territory and the intervention of foreign military forces in the internal affairs of Hungary.

and the party organs in Hungary in order to mislead certain section of the people. In response to an appeal by the Hungarian Government, Soviet military units, located in Hungary in conformity with the Warsaw Treaty.

On November 3, the United States representative submitted a draft resolution to hand over the question to the General Assembly. By this draft

"The Security Council,

"Considering that a grave situation has been created by the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights;

"Taking into account that because of a lack of unanimity among its permanent members the Security Council has been unable to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly resolution 377(V) in order to make appropriate recommendations concerning the situation in Hungary".³

3. SCOR (4th November, 1956) Mtg. 754, Resolution S/3733, adopted by 10-1-0 by the Security Council on 4th November, 1956.

TABLE II

Voting at the Security Council on Hungarian
Question: 4th November 1956

Australia	Belgium	China	Cuba	France	Iran	Peru	USSR	UK	USA	Yugoslavia
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	X	P	P	P

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p. 84.

When the resolution put to vote it was rejected by a vote of 10 in favour to 1 against with a abstention. The voting pattern can be seen in Table II on the facing page.

The table shows that out of 11 members 10 members voted for the resolution while one member, USSR, voted against the resolution. All the non-permanent Afro-Asian members voted for the resolution along with Western countries and Yugoslavia but the resolution could not be adopted because of a negative vote of a permanent member (USSR).

The table clearly shows that the Afro-Asian countries did not favour the Soviet view on Hungary and then their voting pattern differed from the Soviet voting pattern.

While explaining her vote the representative of the USSR said that the resolution was the interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary. The Hungarian problem was the internal matter of Hungary. The Soviet representation said that the Western attitude towards the Hungarian question was not only a propaganda strategy but was a provocation designed to influence the situation in Hungary.

The Afro-Asian members supported the draft resolution but maintained restraint while explanation of voting.

Then we can see that though the voting pattern of the Afro-Asian countries differ from the Soviet voting but they avoided any confrontation in the Security Council on Hungarian issue.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

When the second emergency session of the Assembly was convened on 4th November 1956 to consider the item entitled, 'The Situation in Hungary', the USSR representative opposed its inclusion in the agenda on the ground that discussion of it was barred by Article 2(7) of the Charter. The legal Government of Hungary, he said had, protested against discussion of the matter in the United Nations. The Nagy Government, had in fact collapsed, and a revolutionary workers and peasants government had been formed.

On 4th November, the General Assembly decided to include the item in its agenda. The United States representative submitted a draft resolution which was modified during the debate. By this draft the Assembly "would by

the preamble to the revised version; recall the guarantees in the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 concerning human rights and fundamental freedom; condemn the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights; note the USSR declaration of 30th October, 1956 of its avowed policy of non-intervention; note this demand made on 1st November, 1956 by the Government of Hungary that USSR instantly withdraw its forces; note the Hungarian Government's communication of 2nd November, 1956 asking the Security Council to instruct the Government of the USSR and Hungary to start negotiations immediately on withdrawal of Soviet forces; note that Soviet intervention in Hungary had resulted in grave loss of life and widespread bloodshed among the Hungarian people".⁴

By the operative part of the draft resolution the "Assembly would: (1) called upon the USSR to desist forthwith from all armed attack on the people of Hungary and from any form of intervention in Hungary; (2) call upon the USSR to cease the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw there for all of its forces without delay; (3) affirm the Hungarian people's right to a government responsive to its national

4. Yearbook of the United Nations 1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p. 70

aspirations; (4) requests the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary; (5) call upon the government of Hungary and the USSR to permit observers designated by the Secretary General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely there in and to report their findings to the Secretary General; (6) call upon all members to cooperate with the Secretary General, in consultation with the heads of appropriate specialized agencies to enquire on an urgent basis, into the needs of the Hungarian people for food, medicine and other similar supplies, and report to the General Assembly as soon as possible".⁵

While taking part in the debate the representative of the USA said that the General Assembly would see that the Soviet Union should desist from any armed attack on the Hungarian people and withdraw its forces from Hungary. An investigation of the situation caused by the Soviet intervention in Hungary was an essential element for the solution of Hungarian problem.

The representative of the USSR criticized the US draft resolution and stated that it was against the international principle of non-interference in the internal

5. Ibid., p. 70

TABLE IIIVoting in the General Assembly on Hungarian
Question

Resolution 1004 (ES-II), 4th November 1956

<u>Countries:</u>	<u>For:</u>	<u>Against:</u>	<u>Abstention</u>
Afghanistan			A
Albania	F		
Australia	F		
Burma			A
Ceylon			A
China	F		
Congo	F		
Ethiopia	F		
France	F		
Ghana	F		
India			A
Indonesia			A
Iran	F		
Libya			A
Pakistan	F		
Portugal	F		
UAR	F		
UK	F		
USA	F		
USSR		X	
South Africa	F		
Yugoslavia	F		
<u>Total roll call vote</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations
1956 (UN: New York, 1956), p. 84

affair of a country. He said that the Hungarian problem was an internal matter of Hungary and Soviet Union was helping the Hungarian Government on their request.

Then the US draft resolution was put to vote and adopted by a vote of 50 in favour to 0 against with 15 abstention on 4th November, 1956, as resolution 1004(ES-II).

The voting pattern can be seen in Table III on the facing page. The table shows that 50 member States voted for the US resolution and 0 casted their vote against the resolution while 15 remained abstained. The countries who voted for the resolution including some Afro-Asian countries, Latin American countries and all the Western countries. Some Afro-Asian countries like India, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon and 11 more abstained while the USSR and the Socialist Countries voted against the resolution.

The voting structure of the Afro-Asian countries on Hungarian question was different from the regional and global issues. On US draft resolution of 4th November, from the Afro-Asian group who supported it were Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Siberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand. None of the members of the group voted with the Soviet

bloc in opposing the resolution. The other members of the group, viz., Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Saudi-Arabia, Syria abstained on the voting.

Numerically speaking the supporters of the US draft resolution from the Afro-Asian group were only 8 whereas the number of abstainers were 13.

A majority of the members of the group who voted with the Latin America on the US draft resolution were allied to the West. There were few members like Cambodia, Ethiopia and Liberia who were not a party to any military pact with the West but Iran, Pakistan were members of the Baghdad Pact. Again Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand were members of the SEATO.

In a note addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, on 10th November, 1956 the Secretary General requested information about the needs of the Hungarian people for medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothing. Also on 12th November, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary conveyed to the Secretary General a statement by the revolutionary workers' and peasants' government of the Hungarian People's Republic. It stated that "in the past weeks, the serious situation which had arisen, the government could restore law and

order only by requesting the aid of the Soviet troops. After the complete restoration of law and order, it would immediately begin negotiations with government of the USSR for the withdrawal of these troops from Hungary. On that basis the Hungarian government emphatically stated that the settlement of the situation by exclusively within the internal legal competence of the Hungarian state. It further stated that Hungary was grateful for the humane resolutions of the Assembly about assistance and would facilitate the receipt and distribution of food and medicine sent for the Hungarian people".⁶

On November 16, the Secretary General informed the General Assembly that he had appointed judge Oscar Gundersen (Norway), Mr. Arthur Lall (India) and Dr. Atherte Lleras (Colombia) to constitute a group for investigating the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary.

Thus we have seen that the voting pattern of both the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian members, on Hungarian question, was differed from the earlier issues. Some Afro-Asian members did not hesitate to criticize the Soviet action in Hungary. Some Afro-Asian countries were agreed that the Hungarian question was a humanitarian question. They

6. Ibid., p. 73

favoured the right of self-determination for the Hungarian people. They wanted the UN observers to go in Hungary.

the
On the Hungarian question, some Western countries accused the Afro-Asian group as the defender of Soviet interest at UN. They challenged the Afro-Asian sincerity towards the UN by saying that these countries were concerned only with the Afro-Asian problems and were showing indifference towards an East-European question. The Afro-Asian faith in the principles of the UN Charter, in Human rights and in self-determination was doubted on the ground that they follow the same principles only on the matters of Asia and Africa and not for the Europe. Some countries said that the initial silence of Afro-Asia on the Hungarian question was an escape from the discussion on this complicated problem.

Although the Afro-Asian nation while dealing with Hungarian crisis did show some reservation at the UN but we can not say that they have not concerned with the seriousness of the problem. They tried to pursue the principle of moderation, conciliation and negotiation which were essential for the solution of the problem. Most of the Afro-Asian members supported the humanitarian assistance for the Hungarian people and they all were

united on this question. They regarded the Hungarian question primarily as a humanitarian question which required a moderate and impartial approach to its solution.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN QUESTION, 1968

The Czechoslovakian question was another issue which was discussed at the United Nations forum in 1968, and on which interests of the Afro-Asian countries and the Soviet Union were not the same. This was not the first time that the issue was brought before the UN but it was discussed before also in 1948. A clear picture of the attitude of the Afro-Asian group on Czechoslovakian question was reflected by their voting behaviour unit. They were broadly united on the question. They did not support the Soviet action and criticized the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia whenever they thought that the Soviet action was the direct or indirect intervention in Czechoslovakia. But some Afro-Asian countries did not fully criticize the Soviet action and they maintained certain reservations while making any statement on Czechoslovakia.

There are many factors which are responsible for Soviet action in Czechoslovakian crisis. The political

development in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68 represented an additional cause for Soviet alarm. The rise of various political grouping was becoming the problem for Czech Communist Party. They were demanding for various reforms in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union thought that the reform and reorientation being carried out in Czechoslovakia might creat some problems for the Czech Government. Even the NATO members were giving its support to the rival factions in Czechoslovakia by which the problem was becoming more dangerous. So obviously the Soviet leadership weighed the decision to take some measures to check the problem.

On August 21, 1968, the representative of Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States requested the President of the Security Council to convene an immediate meeting of the Council to consider "the present serious situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic".⁷

When the Council met on the same afternoon, the representative of the USSR read out the text of a letter he had addressed to the Council President stating that the USSR government vigorously opposed consideration of

7. SCOR S/8758, Supplement, (1st July - 30th September, 1968), p. 136

the situation in Czechoslovakia since that would serve the interest of certain foreign circles which represented the forces of a aggression. The events in Czechoslovakia, he stated, were a matter that concerned the Czechoslovakia, people . . . , and States of the Socialist Community which were bound by appropriate mutual obligations. Military units of the Socialist Countries had entered Czechoslovakia at the request of its government. This decision to meet that request was in accordance with mutual treaty obligations and on the basis of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning "individual and collective self-defence".⁸

The representatives of Canada, Denmark, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States, supporting the adoption of the agenda, expressed the view that it was imperative for the Council both to discuss the invasion - which they said, was in brazen violation of the United Nations Charter. On 21st August 1968, the Council adopted the item in the agenda consisting of the letter from the six member states.

The representatives of Algeria, Pakistan and India explained that their votes were without prejudice

8. Ibid., S/8759, p. 137

to their governments views on the substance of the question. The representative of India also read a statement by his Prime Minister expressing the hope that the forces which had entered Czechoslovakia would be withdrawn as soon as possible and that the Czech people would be able to determine their future according to their own wishes and interests and that any mutual problems between Czechoslovakia and its allies would be settled peacefully.

The Council considered the question of the situation in Czechoslovakia at five meetings held between 21st and 24th August 1968.

The representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia were invited, at their request to participate in the discussion, without the right of vote.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, after stressing that in addressing the Council he was acting on the explicit instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Jiri Hajek, read out several messages received from that Minister containing declarations attributed to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 members of the government and the Presidium of the National Assembly. The declaration

called upon "the governments of the occupying countries immediately to withdraw their troops from Czechoslovak ~~is~~ and also release certain Czech national leaders so that they could exercise their constitutional functions".⁹

The representative of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR stressed in their statements, that the situation in Czechoslovakia was entirely an internal affair of that country and the socialist group of states and was no concern of the Security Council. In response to an appeal from the lawful authorities in Czechoslovakia - namely, a group of members of the Central Committee, of the government and the National Assembly - allied Socialist States, including the USSR, had come to the assistance of Czechslovakia under existing treaty obligations. The declaration of the Bratislava Conference, it was pointed out, declared that the defence of the Socialist achievements was the common cause of the Socialist countries and an international obligation for all of them. Their action reflected the firm decision of the Community of Socialist States to oppose any threat from outside; it was not directed against the independence of Czechoslovakia, it threatened no state and served only the cause of peace.

9. SCOR S/8768, Supplement (July 1 to September 30, 1968), p. 142

On 22nd August, the representative of Denmark introduced a draft resolution, co-sponsored initially by Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States, and subsequently by England also. By the preamble of this draft

"The Security Council,

"Recall that the United Nations was based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members;

"Express grave concern that, as announced by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, troops of the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact had entered their country without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Czechoslovak Government;

"Consider that the action taken by the Government of the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact invading the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was a violation of the United Nations' Charter, and in particular, of the principle that all members shall refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

"Express its grave concern over risks of violence and reprisals, as well as over threats, to individual

liberation and human rights, which could not fail to result from imposed military occupation; and

"Consider that the people of the sovereign state of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had the right, in accordance with the United Nations' Charter freely to exercise their own self-determination and to arrange their own affairs without external intervention. By the operative part of the text;

"The Security Council would,

"(1) affirm that the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic must be fully respected;

"(2) condemn the armed intervention of the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and call upon them to take no action of violence or reprisal that could result in further suffering or loss of life, forthwith to withdraw their forces, and to cease all other forms of intervention in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs;

"(3) call upon Member States of the United Nations to exercise their diplomatic influence upon the USSR and the other countries concerned with a view to bringing about prompt implementations of this resolution; and

"(4) request the Secretary General to transmit this resolution to the countries concerned, to keep the situation under control and to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution."¹⁰

The representatives of Brazil, Canada, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States spoke in favour of the eight power text and the representatives of Hungary and the USSR spoke against it.

At the opening of the night meeting on 22nd August, the representative of Czechoslovakia said that the situation in Czechoslovakia had been deteriorating as a result of the occupation by foreign armed forces.

The representative of India, citing statements by his Prime Minister, said that India opposed any interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and that of any action of the Security Council must be directed towards alleviating the situation in Czechoslovakia. The Prime necessity was the withdrawal of the foreign forces and the safety of its leader and people. With that in mind, he had suggested changes in the draft resolution, principally to remove the judgement of condemnation. Since they were unacceptable to some of co-sponsors, his delegation would abstain.

TABLE IVVoting at the Security Council on Czechoslovakian
Question

23rd August 1968

Algeria	Brazil	Canada	China	Ethiopia	Denmark	France	Hungary	India	Pakistan	USA	UK	USSR	Paraguay	Senegal
A	F	F	F	F	F	F	X	A	A	F	F	X	F	F

Compiled from the Yearbook of United Nations 1968
(UN: New York, 1968), p. 302.

In the early morning of 23rd August, the Council voted on the eight-power draft resolutions. There were 10 votes in favour, 2 against and three abstentions. The voting pattern can be seen on the facing page in Table IV.

The table shows that out of 15 members 10 voted for the resolution. 3 members abstained while 2 members voted against the resolution. 10 members, who voted for the resolution were from Western countries, Latin American countries and from Afro-Asia. 3 Afro-Asian members who abstained were India, Pakistan and Algeria. The USSR and Hungary casted their votes against the resolution. It means the Afro-Asian voting was divided on Czechoslovakian question. Some members voted with the Western bloc while the others abstained.

While explaining his vote the Pakistan's representative said that he has abstained because shortage of time had made it impossible for him to receive instruction from his governments.

The representative of Canada stated that in the light of the rejection of the eight-power draft resolution and the continuing seriousness of the situation in Czechoslovakia, another draft resolution should be sponsored. By the new resolution, the Security Council

would request the Secretary General to appoint and dispatch a special representative immediately to Prague to seek the release and ensure the personal safety of the Czechoslovakian leaders under detention and report back urgently.

The USSR representative said that the draft resolution was another manoeuvre by the State members of NATO designed to drag not only the Security Council but also the Secretary General into intervention in the affairs of a Socialist State. He maintained that the proposal was not contrary to the jurisdiction of the United Nations' Charter.

The representative of the USA said that this was the 105th time the Soviet Union had used its veto to frustrate a colonial decision. He said that whatever the Soviet Union is doing in Czechoslovakia, is against the wishes of Czech people to pursue their own national development.

Thus the draft resolution could not be adopted because of negative vote of a permanent member.

On 23rd August 1968, the representative of Yugoslavia read a statement of his government, issued on 22nd August, concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia. It said that the "armed intervention of five States, for which there was no justification, constituted

a gross violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country, as well as a denial of the principles of the Charter. Expressing its full solidarity with the people government and constitutionally elected forums of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia supported their demands for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. He added that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states had been infringed; one principle of socialism whatsoever could justify the intervention. It had been once again confirmed that military blocs could not guarantee the security and free development of their members; on the contrary, they created conditions for subjugating the interests and independent policy of one member of an alliance to the interests of another or others".¹¹

On 24th August, the USSR representative read a statement issued by the TASS press agency to the effect that the talks between delegations led by the President of Czechoslovakia and the leaders of the USSR Government and Communist Party had resumed on 24th August 1968 in a frank and friendly atmosphere. He expressed the conviction that any question arising between Socialist States could and must be settled by those countries without foreign interference, especially interference on the part

11. Yearbook of United Nations 1968 (UN: New York, 1968), p. 301

of imperialist powers:

The meeting of the Council adjourned until Monday, 26th August, 1968 but was subsequently cancelled. No further meeting on the question took place.

In a letter dated 27th August 1968, the representative of Czechoslovakia requested the Security Council's President, in view of the agreement reached on the substance of the problem during the USSR-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow from 23rd to 26th August 1968, to arrange for the withdrawal of the item from the agenda of the Council. He pointed out that the Czechoslovakia had not requested its inclusion in the agenda.

Between 23rd August and 17th September, 1968, 10 communications from the representatives of Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Jamaica, Indonesia, Panama and Zambia, respectively were addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting statements and declarations of protest made by their governments, National Assembly's or national leaders, concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia.

So we have seen that the neutrality of the Afro-Asian members was once more questioned in Czechoslovakian question. The Czech question was slightly different from

the Hungary and it was discussed only in the Security Council and no resolution was passed because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council. Even the Afro-Asian group did not criticise the Soviet action at the UN whole-heartedly. They had certain reservations. Pakistan who was the member of SEATO did not support the resolution sponsored by Western powers. And it along with India and Algeria maintained abstention. The Soviet Union and the Hungary opposed the draft resolution.

A number of interesting features emerged out of our discussion above. First of all, it is quite clear that the Afro-Asian nations, including non-aligned one like India, were critique of Soviet policies on the Hungarian and Czech crisis; so much so that they either abstained or voted against Soviet policies. Secondly there was a marked split among the Afro-Asian nations mostly because of the growing linkages of some of them with the West and as a result of Western pressure; however, most of them felt that the sovereign rights of the Hungarian and Czech people must be protected and preserved. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union obviously choose to ignore such a voting behaviour of Afro-Asian nations on these issues and

continued its policy of support and encouragement to the causes vital for Afro-Asia for instance we have seen earlier the voting behaviour of the Soviet Union in the UN in various UN forums did not registered a change either after Hungarian crisis (1956) or after the Czech crisis (1968).

Moreover, it is indeed true to say that majority of Afro-Asian nations did try to meet Soviet resentment over their voting behaviour on these issues. For instance, they expressed reservations on the harsh and bellicose tone of Western sponsored resolution; indeed on many details they did not agree with the Western approach.

Thus in totality we can safely summarize that the Afro-Asian nations asserted their independent judgement without damaging the pattern of voting behaviour of the Soviet Union at the UN.

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CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union, as one of the founder members of the United Nations, took an active part in its working. It has always held that UN should effectively serve the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the strengthening of international security. However, right from the beginning of the UN the Soviet Union was concerned with the total domination over the organization by the Western powers. So much so that it withdrew for a ^{brief} ~~period~~ from it in early fifties.

The emergence of the Third World Countries at the United Nations marked an important turning point in the history of the organization. The United Nations had been created primarily through the efforts of States with a European or European derived political and social culture possessing a common history of political involvement at the international level. During its first ten years the organization was dominated by the problems and conflicts of these same states. However, by 1955 the process of decolonization which has marked the post-1945 political scene began to reflect in the membership of the United Nations. By 1960 the rising

tide of the decolonization had reached flood crest with the entry in that one year of seventeen new members from third world. Indeed by the beginning of fifties the new emergent states began to assert themselves in the United Nations and by the end of the decade it was obvious that the traditional Western domination of the organization has become a thing of past.

The Soviet Union particularly welcomed the emergence of the third world countries at the United Nations. In the specific context of the United Nations the Soviet Union saw in the role of the emergent nations as a vital means to break the monopoly of the Western powers over the United Nations. Very soon it embarked on a well defined policy of support and encouragement to the activitization of their role in the organization. In practical terms such a policy was amply demonstrated, as we have seen in the preceeding pages, in the very voting behaviour of the Soviet Union in the various forums of the United Nations.

However, it is necessary to point out that such a Soviet policy in the United Nations was an integral part of the Soviet policy to the third world in particular, and, Soviet foreign policy, in general. Thus Soviet voting behaviour in the United Nations emerges as an

important indicator of Soviet policy to the third world, indeed the very Soviet foreign policy itself.

We have examined and analysed Soviet voting behaviour in the United Nations namely on three counts; firstly, on the issues where the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian nations had common and shared interest; second, on issues where one or a group of a Afro-Asian States had direct interests, sometimes in conflict with the Western powers and often among themselves; and finally, on the issues where direct Soviet interests were involved. For our convenience, we have termed these issues as global, regional and bilateral.

On the first count it seems that the Soviet Union invariably voted along with the Afro-Asian countries. On the second count we find that where the issues were in conflict with the Western powers the Soviet Union voted along with the majority of the Afro-Asian nations, while on issues where there was the conflict among the Afro-Asian States the Soviet Union choose to vote for the nonaligned countries.

Finally, there was a wide divergence in the voting behaviour of the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian nations on issues where direct Soviet interests were involved.

7 Although our study has the self-imposed limitations of examining the voting behaviour in the two main forums of United Nations, namely, the Security Council and the General Assembly during a specific period; (1956-1971) the above voting pattern of the Soviet Union clearly emerges out of it.

 From the above it can be safely summarized that the Soviet Union voted invariably with the Afro-Asian countries in the United Nations with some notable exceptions; the important ones were the Hungarian crisis and the Czech crisis. But it is also notable that the divergence did not affect adversely Soviet voting pattern viz., Afro-Asian countries either in post Hungarian crisis period or post Czech crisis period.

 However, within the general framework of Soviet support to Afro-Asian countries in the UN, it was obvious that the Soviet voting behaviour had become progressively selective in favour of nonaligned countries. Such an emerging trend during the period under study appears to be influenced by the growing complexities of international politics as they effected the Afro-Asian countries.

In general it can be safely concluded that the Soviet voting behaviour in the United Nations was broadly speaking in harmony with Afro-Asian nations and it certainly helped in the activation of Afro-Asian role in the organization as well as in the very transformation of the United Nations as of now.

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