

**NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NORTHEAST ASIAN  
SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

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**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**North Korean Nuclear Programme: Implications for the Northeast Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era**” submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

**R. SUBRAMANIYAN**

**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

**ALKA ACHARYA**  
Chairperson, CEAS.



**JITENDRA UTTAM**  
Supervisor

*Dedicated to*

Appa, Amma, Appu and Kuttis' Love.

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## **Preface and Acknowledgement**

Northeast Asia is the region that encompasses China, Mongolia, the two Koreas, Japan and the Russian Far East, and a de facto neighbour the United States. Geography and region-specific fault lines, especially potential North Korea's nuclear and missile threat and implosion or explosion in North Korea, have given rise to a highly complex interdependence in this region.

Managing North Korean threat in its multiple forms has become an integral part of the problem and the solution for both the future of the Korean Peninsula and the future of Northeast Asian geopolitics. Non-proliferation has now become a central focus of U.S. foreign and defense policy. This study is divided into five parts. The first part, chapter 1, considers, in broad strokes, North Korea's nuclear, missile programs as such and its origin. The second chapter examines the nuclear proliferation debates, i.e. the debate over what causes nuclear proliferation. Its aim is to provide a survey of existing conceptual approaches to the nuclear puzzle and identifying areas that explain the causes of North Korea's nuclear programme adequately.

The third chapter tracks and explains as to show the present world order and the Northeast Asian security environment and assesses the paradoxes of theoretical and real world significance. The fourth chapter explains the complex interplay of global, regional, and national forces that have influenced and shaped the changing patterns of conflict and cooperation between North Korea and its neighbouring powers. The fifth and last chapter, conclusion, assesses and explains the findings from other four chapters. Thus, this work seeks to explain North Korea's nuclear programme in broad sense that how it affects other actors of the region and the stability of the region and also explain the rationale behind its nuclear programme and its survival strategies in both the security and economic domains in the context of Northeast Asian geopolitics.

I am alone responsible for any remaining errors that might have inadvertently crept in fact or interpretation.

*“There is nothing which we receive with so much reluctance as advice”*

- Joseph Addison.

People exercise an unconscious selection in being influenced. And so I am here to offer my earnest gratitude to all my well wishers who stood by me to accomplish my work. First and foremost, I would like to offer my due thanks to my supervisor Dr. Jitendra Uttam, whose persistent and undaunted support and advice enabled me to carry through my work unhindered.

Though he is miles away from me I fondly remember Prof. R.R. Krishnan at this moment. He is the person who taught me the basics about Korea. And he is the one who made me read a lot on Korea. Without this base, it would not have been possible for me to reach such level in Korean Studies. Thank you sir.

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
*“When trouble comes your soul to try, you love the friend who just ‘stands by’...”*

My utmost thanks to my friends Peter, SriRam, Muruganandham, Kumarasamy, Prabu, Kai, Louis, Amul, Thiru, Arvind, Senthil, Aradhana, Srini, Karthik, John Anna, Murthy Anna, Bala, Sunil, Naresh, Chakori, Chun, Gangadhar, Arun, Supriya, Aarthi, Ranjini, Ramya, Varthani, and Dharma for their encouragement during my task.

*“There is no friendship, no love, like that of the parent for the child”.*

Hence, I would like to dedicate my work to my ‘Appa and Amma’. It is their love and support that made me dream big in life and reach where I am today. My special thanks to my Thatha, Aaya, nephews Appu, Kuttis, brother Babu, sisters Bhavani and Vanitha, brothers-in-law Vijay and Durai.

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R.Subramanian.



## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>ABM</b>	Anti-Ballistic Missile
<b>AF</b>	Agreed Framework
<b>ARF</b>	Association for South East Asian Nations Regional Forum
<b>BTWC</b>	Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention
<b>BW</b>	Biological Weapon
<b>CMM</b>	Conflict Management Mechanism
<b>CSCAP</b>	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
<b>CVID</b>	Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement
<b>CW</b>	Chemical Weapons
<b>DMZ</b>	Demilitarized Zone
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b>EASR</b>	U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>HEU</b>	Highly Enriched Uranium
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>IRBM</b>	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
<b>JNCC</b>	Joint Nuclear Control Commission
<b>KEDO</b>	Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization

<b>KNCA</b>	Korean Central News Agency
<b>KPA</b>	Korean Peoples' Army
<b>KWP</b>	Korean Workers' Party
<b>KWPCC</b>	The Korean Worker's Party's Central Committee
<b>LDP</b>	Liberal Democratic Party
<b>LWR</b>	Light Water Reactor
<b>MD</b>	Missile Defense
<b>NMD</b>	National Missile Defense
<b>NPT</b>	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
<b>NWS</b>	Nuclear Weapons State
<b>PRC</b>	Peoples' Republic of China
<b>PSI</b>	Proliferation Security Initiatives
<b>ROK</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>TCOG</b>	Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
<b>TEMM</b>	Tripartite Environment Ministers' Meeting
<b>TMD</b>	Theater Missile Defense
<b>TRADP</b>	Tumen River Area Development Programme
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Program
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## 2. Map of Korean Peninsula

Korean Peninsula





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### 3. Map of North Korea



#### 4. Location of Nuclear Facilities in North Korea





## INTRODUCTION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (hereafter interchangeably used as DPRK or North Korea) nuclear issue and security issue in the Northeast Asian region is drawing great attention of the international community. North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile development programmes are different from other third World countries that are going nuclear. Because unlike other third World countries like India and Pakistan North Korea's intention behind developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is specifically to have the ability to launch retaliatory strikes against the super power United States. Since Pyongyang pushing itself ahead beginning conducting nuclear tests, in an effort to acquire additional bombs, in all probability at the end of this decade the rate of increase of its nuclear arsenal could jump. This will worsen the present situation that Korean peninsula will likely be plunged into a state of serious political instability that will result in heightened tension throughout Northeast Asia and thus to the International community. The nuclear proliferation by North Korea indicates a change in its military strategy. This represents the growing friction between weak and strong countries that may cause a serious problem in international relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In the past, it was often thought that for a small country it is impossible to employ a policy that would challenge the military strength of a world power. Because a weak country's military capability is typically inferior to that of a powerful country in terms of both quality and quantity. In case of North Korea this conventional thought in the theory of international relations seems to be changing. North Korea's military challenge has been possible by its asymmetric approach. Given the current circumstances North Korea believes, the only effective means for ensuring its survival is to possess the most awesome arsenal, which includes nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass



destruction (WMD). Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of the WMD is given priority at the top of the national security agenda.

After the September 11 attacks, despite the calls by America to reorient its strategy towards threats posed by the non-state actors and a full fledged war on terrorism the focus on state-sponsored WMD proliferation has been maintained rigidly and fervently<sup>1</sup>. As the Iraq crisis neared a climax, and perhaps buoyed by favourable developments in South Korean politics, North Korea created a new crisis with a series of provocative gestures. Tensions increased after North Korean officials appeared to have admitted to a clandestine nuclear weapons programme when alleged with evidence by Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific affairs James Kelly in October 2002. North Korea has continuously stirred up the pressure by expelling the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors from the nuclear sites, dismantling the monitoring cameras at key installations and declaring its intention to restart fuel reprocessing operations at its facility in Yongbyon.

Here, the dilemma reduced to the question of whether a small proliferator can deter the United States with a nascent WMD arsenal. Because unlike Iraq case North Korea is assessed to already have one or two nuclear weapons in its arsenal and perhaps the ability to produce many more within a short time. The North Korean arsenal is sufficiently threatening to justify extreme caution on Washington's part. This is the reason why Washington simply put action against Iraq first, but left North Korea in a queue.<sup>2</sup> At the core of each conflict is whether reliance on WMD will allow the weak to successfully confront the strong. The chance that a missile with a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead will be used against U.S. forces or interests is greater today than during most of the Cold War period.

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1. Given the tenuous connections linking the "axis of evil" states to the September 11 attacks, this rigidity has struck many Americans as bizarre. But the essential doctrine to emerge from President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech was that "the war on terrorism has now also become a war on the spread of weapons of mass destruction". (Goldstein 2006)

2. The 2003 Iraq War and the ongoing crises with both Iran and North Korea are not exceptional. They do not simply represent the triumph of neoconservative ideology in U.S. foreign policy. Rather, they are the hallmark of the present age.

It is too tempting to ascribe the current commotion about WMD proliferation to post-September 11 sensitivities. In fact, the disturbing outlines of the unstable effects of asymmetric WMD rivalry manifested themselves throughout U.S. defence and foreign policy during the 1990s. Given the U.S. current status of superpower along with the increasing availability of technologies and the knowledge to exploit them, asymmetric WMD rivalry stands as the dominant conflict paradigm of present era. In other words, we can say that the WMD proliferation and the accompanying instability of this process are likely natural byproducts of unipolarity.

### **1.1 North Korea's WMD and Missile Programmes**

North Korea's WMD programmes are more threatening for the US national security. The post-September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States has become more challenging for the US in terms of WMD that may reach the non-state actors like al-Qaeda. The US believes that North Korea could undertake a brazen act of proliferation that would place WMDs in the hands of al-Qaeda. Though North Korea does not have direct link with al-Qaeda, however, the country has military links with governments and elements within governments that have links to al-Qaeda. North Korea's nuclear and missile deals with Pakistan and Iran and its implications for India are assessed in chapter 5 in detail.

The U.S., South Korean, and Russian intelligence estimates have cited for years the growing development and stockpiles of chemical and biological agents by North Korea. With the end of the Cold War, biological weapons have come to head the list of threats to international security. Biological weapons are widely regarded as morally repugnant. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons are primarily useful as a strategic deterrent. But, due to the number of biological states is likely to be greater than the number of nuclear states, the effect of biological weapons serve as an effective strategic deterrent, they may limit the ability of the United States and other countries to take advantage of much of the high-tech weaponry heralded by the revolution in military affairs.

North Korea believed to have a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a Biological Weapon (BW) capability and has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to which North Korea has acceded in 1987.<sup>3</sup> North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes and has a variety of means for delivering these deadly weapons. North Korea is also known to have the biological agents cholera, bubonic plague, anthrax, smallpox, typhoid, and typhus.

A U.S. and South Korea [officially Republic of Korea (ROK)] estimates place the size of those stockpiles of chemical agents at between 2,500 and 5,000 tons. An assessment ranks North Korea among the largest possessors of chemical weaponry in the world. It is believed that at the time of establishment of DPRK, the KPA manual addressed at least the theory of Chemical Weapons (CW) operational doctrine. By 1954, the KPA established nuclear, biological, and chemical defence units along the lines of the Soviet model. It is also believed that Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development was given to the DPRK. North Korea, according to an estimation, produces about twenty chemical agents, including sarin gas, V-agents, mustard gas, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide.<sup>4</sup>

### **1.2 North Korea's Ballistic Missiles And Potentials**

North Korea is considered to be the most advanced of the late missile developers. North Korea has been exporting complete ballistic missile systems, components, and technology to countries like Pakistan and Iran. It has also been reported that Pakistan has

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3. Heightened concerns regarding North Korea's efforts in nuclear weaponry, however, as well as its ongoing missile development and export programs have overshadowed much of the ongoing discussions concerning the BTWC (Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention) and North Korea.

4. North Korea is also known to have the biological agents cholera, bubonic plague. Bubonic plague, anthrax, smallpox, typhoid, and typhus. (Nicsch 2005)

provided the United States with information regarding its nuclear and missile deal with North Korea. North Korea received foreign assistance over the years, especially from the former Soviet Union and China. North Korea is assumed of possessing 24 FROG-3, -5 and -7 missiles and another 30 Scud-C (Hwasong-6) ballistic missiles. In addition, the North maintains an indeterminate number of Rodong intermediate-range missiles.

The range of the North's FROG and Scud-C missiles is limited, not extending beyond the Korean peninsula. Its FROG missiles have a range of 40-70 kilometers and thus threaten only the capital area of Seoul, while its Scud-C missiles are capable of striking anywhere in South Korea. Both the FROG and Scud-C missiles are short-range ballistic missiles with a reach of less than, 1000 kilometers. As these missiles are targeted to strike South Korea, they are not a primary issue for United States and Japan. It was only when North Korea started developing Rodong missiles, which has a range of more than 1000 kilometers. Japan began to express its concern over this missile development. Because Rodong missiles have the capability of striking the United States forces stationed in Japan. If Rodong's range is extended then it can attack any part in Japan. However, Rodong still cannot reach the continental United States.

The United States began to react to the missile threat from North Korea when the North began the development of its Taepodong missiles. Details of Taepodong were not sketchy until North Korea attempted to launch satellite into the orbit, which is considered to be the prototype of this missile in 1998. Details of the North Korean missile arsenal are not complete due to lack of information on North's missile programme. Especially the ranges of Taepodong-1, NKSL-1 and Taepodong-2 are not very clear. Particularly the description of the NKSL-1 used for launching the "Kwangmyongsongho" satellite in 1998. The Federation of American Scientists estimated the range of the Kwangmyongsongho at 2,200 to 2,896 kilometers. It is even estimated that the rocket had the range of an intercontinental ballistic missile. A 1999 U.S. report on North Korea estimated that if the North were to launch a lightweight warhead to strike the United States, it could likely reach any target within a range of 10,000 kilometers (Lee 2001: 73). North Korea imposed a flight-test moratorium after holding bilateral talks with the

U.S. in the late 1990s. It is widely believed that North Korea's next flight test would probably be the untested Taepodong-2 in a space-launch configuration, which if test fired successfully would have grave implications for the United States security.

### **1.3 The Evolution of North Korea's Military Doctrine and Security Policy**

North Korea is a closed society and it still remains "the blackest of black boxes." So not much is known about North Korea. As of now North Korea had no open forum for propounding official views on military doctrine and security policy and strategy. Interpretation and discussion of North Korean military doctrine and security policy rely upon analysis of speeches by high-ranking military officers or detectable changes in military organization, structure and equipment. Western analysts have guessed the motive and logic behind North Korean actions and pronouncements. The study of North Korea's security policy is complicated due to lack of reliable information, as well as an abundance of misinformation about North Korea.<sup>5</sup> Without credible data, it becomes just a guess what the real strategy and goals of North Korean government are, and any unit-level analysis of North Korea's security policy serves as a kind of 'Rorschach Test' of the analyst's own policy preference. Hence there is a more serious problem for the scholarship on North Korea that the lack of data has fostered many speculative but little cumulative theoretical works. Theoretical explanations for North Korea's behavior and security policy are discussed in chapter 2 in detail.

North Korean military doctrine has evolved through as many as four stages since the founding of the Korea People's Army (KPA) in February 1948. North Korean military writings derive from Marxism-Leninism through the conduit of "Kim Il-Sung Thought." Kim Il-Sung is credited with virtually everything in North Korean military thought; from Lenin's reformulation of Clausewitz's classic definition of war to basic squad tactics. North Korean military thinking began as a mixture of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences. At the Third Plenum of the Second Korean Workers' Party's (KWP) Central Committee in December 1950, Kim Il-Sung's report, "The Present Condition and

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5. Arriving at a conclusion about the North Korea security policy are necessary response to two related problems: first North Korea remains "the blackest of black boxes" and the debate about North Korean security policy is ideologically charged.

the Confronting Task,” for the first time interjected North Korean combat experience into military doctrine and thought. From 1951 to December 1962, North Korean military orthodoxy was a conventional warfare doctrine based on Soviet military doctrine and operational art modified on the basis of the Korean War experience. Stalin’s five “permanently operating factors,” those determine the course and outcome of war were directly incorporated into North Korean military doctrine.<sup>6</sup>

North Korean military doctrine shifted dramatically in December 1962 away from the doctrine of regular warfare to a doctrine that embraced people’s war. In December 1962, Kim Il-Sung espoused the Four Military Guidelines: to arm the entire population; to fortify the entire country’ to train the entire army as a “cadre army,” and to modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the principles of ‘*Juche*’,<sup>7</sup> self-reliance in national defence. *Juche* continues to provide the fundamental backdrop for national doctrines, strategies and policies- including those related to missile development and deployment. *Juche* continues to provide official guidelines for independence in politics, economics, national defence, and foreign policy. *Juche* was designed to inspire national pride; sense of collective identity and a strong focus for internal solidarity centred on the KWP, and more importantly, Kim Il-sung. *Juche* meant the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others especially the capitalist countries and using one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance (Sachdev 2000: 1696).

Through the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, Kim Il-sung continued to favour the political-ideological dimension of warfare over technology or military science. A transformation began in the 1970s, when renewed emphasis was placed on conventional warfare and the modernization of the KPA. The importance of economic development and the impact of new weapons on military strategy became prime concern and the quality of arms and the level of military technology were thought to be the defining characteristics of war. The Korean People’s Army was structured and deployed on the

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6. The factors are stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army and the organizing ability of the command personnel. (Savada 1994)

7. *Juche* ideology, which is claimed to be formulated by, Kim Il sung and promoted by his son Kim Jong-il, is the basic cornerstone of party construction, party works, and government operations in North Korea.

primacy of the offence. This offensive doctrine stressed that decisive results can be obtained only through offensive operations. Strategy and tactics were built on the key concepts of combined arms offensive operations, battlefield mobility, flexibility, and the integration of conventional and unconventional warfare.

North Korea's desire to build nuclear weapons has basically emerged from this offensive doctrine. It was Kim Il-sung's dream to reunite the fatherland with the help of military force. The World War-II showed the power of the United States. For North Korea it was difficult to challenge the US forces only with conventional warfare. North Korea's nuclear programme represented a long-standing commitment by Kim Il-sung to a nuclear weapon for a forceful reunification of South and North Korea. But the rationale for the programme appears to have shifted from its original doctrine. Kim Il-sung viewed the development of nuclear weapons as strengthening North Korea's military position in relation to South Korea and the United States and giving North Korea more aggressive military options on the Korean Peninsula.

The sudden change in North Korea's economy, due to natural calamities in the 1990s that costed more than one million people's lives, and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, which triggered a sharp deterioration of North Korean conventional forces and a virtual collapse of its economy, resulted in a shift in North Korea's nuclear policy. WMD, especially nuclear weapons and missiles, now were viewed as an alternative to conventional forces and Soviet support and as necessary to limit the adverse shift in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>8</sup> It has also become a component for the stability of the North Korean regime after Kim Il-sung died in 1994 and his son Kim Jong-il, took power. North Korea's changes in its nuclear policy and security policies are examined in Chapter 2 with the support of theories of international relations.

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8. WMDs satisfied the politically powerful North Korean military, which Kim Jong-il has emphasized as the chief pillar of his rule. Earnings from overseas sales of missiles, as much as US\$500 million in individual years, has provided crucial foreign exchange for Kim Jong-il to finance his nuclear programs and satisfy the economic needs of the military and the political elite in the midst of mass malnutrition, acute energy shortages, and industrial decline.

#### 1.4 North Korea's Nuclear Programme: The Origin

North Korea first became embroiled with nuclear politics during the Korean War. During Korean War, American political leaders and military commanders threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War (Khanna 1996: 291). In 1958, the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea for the first time in the peninsula. These weapons remained there until president George Bush ordered their withdrawal in 1991. So it remained in Kim Il-Sung's mind, throughout his existence, that only a nuclear deterrence would give the assurance to North Korea's security. And to materializing the dream of forceful unification of the fatherland is possible only through nuclear weapons. During the initial years of its origin, North Korea got the support from China and USSR for its nation building. Kim Il-sung thought that his nuclear dream could be realized only with the help of USSR. In early 1950s, North Korea started establishing institutional base for the training of North Korean citizens for its nuclear development programme. The Atomic Energy Research Institute was established along with the Academy of Sciences in December 1952. But the nuclear programme did not begin in its real terms until North Korea established cooperative agreements with the then USSR. North Korea signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and thereafter started sending its scientists and technicians for training in nuclear technology.

In 1959, North Korea and the USSR signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for USSR's help for the establishment of a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon-Kun. In early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive assistance while North Korea constructed its large-scale energy research complex in Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel elements enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor. The small research reactor had been used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. The cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities, but ultimate control of the programme and decisions over weapons development belonged to Kim Il-Sung.



The programme appeared to begin as a peaceful one, but it can be said that the Cuban Missile Crisis had prompted initiation of a dedicated nuclear weapons programme. Kim Il-sung appreciated both USSR and China for their support during the Korean War, but Kim Il-sung's expectation was more with regard to the increased support from Soviet and he was dissatisfied that the war did not end in favour of his lifetime goal i.e. to reunite the Korean Peninsula. Kim had to question the credibility of Soviet's alliance commitment after Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The Korean Worker's Party's Central Committee (KWPPC) adopted policies to strengthen the military and implement import substitution programmes to reduce dependency on arms imports. Kim Il-Sung also asked china to share its nuclear weapon technology following China's first nuclear test in October 1964, but the then Chairman Mao refused to give China's nuclear technology. Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate and they worsened during China's Cultural Revolution.

In the 1970s North Korea started focusing study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974, North Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way as other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. During the same period North Korea began to build a second 5 Mwe capability research reactor. Due to the pressure from the international community in 1977 North Korea concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing it to inspect the research reactor that was built with the assistance of the USSR. In 1980s, North Korea's nuclear weapons programme started focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system. North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. In 1989, it started the construction of a 200 Mwe grade power plant in Taechon as well as a large-scale reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and conducted high-explosive detonation tests.

In 1985, US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a clandestine nuclear reactor was being built near Yongbyon. In 1985, due to pressure from the international community, Pyongyang acceded to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, North Korea refused to agree for a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

### 1.5 The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis

In July 1990, the United States alleged that new satellite photographs showed the presence, in Yongbyon, of a structure that could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel. Due to a great initiative by Roh Tae Woo, then President of The Republic of Korea (south Korea), driven by the '*nordpolitik*'<sup>9</sup> principles, offered for the first time to discuss security matters with North Korea. In September 1990, the first of eight prime minister-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials took place in Seoul. These prime ministerial talks resulted in two major agreements, namely the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, which is called as the "basic agreement" and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is called as the "joint declaration"<sup>10</sup>

In late 1991, North and South signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As per the declaration that came into force on 19 February 1992, it was stated that the two sides "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." A procedure for inter-Korean inspection was to be organized and a North South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was

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9. In July 1988, Roh Tae Woo initiated an open policy toward the North, and increased efforts to cultivate contacts and improve relations with Communist states by engaging in a form of diplomacy known in South Korea as *nordpolitik*.

10. On the basis of preliminary talks held between North and South Korea to seek a common ground in their positions for the preparation for a unified Korea, on 13 December 1991, an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation was signed and was ratified in February 1992, which was named as Basic agreement.

mandated with the verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula. In January 1992, North Korea also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had agreed to do in 1985, when acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguard agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the joint declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a bilateral inspection regime. There was a little progress towards the establishment of an inspection regime despite the continued pressure from President Roh Tae Woo for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and dialogue between South Korea and North Korea stalled in the fall of 1992.

The IAEA started its inspection process in the North Korean nuclear facilities, as per the agreement signed by North Korea with IAEA. In the following events IAEA insisted North Korea to open its unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste for special inspections. This culminated in the halting of the IAEA inspections due to North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors. Ignoring the South-North Joint Declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea continued to operate its nuclear reprocessing facilities, making the world suspicious of its nuclear intentions. The continued pressure from IAEA further only irritated North Korea. The lack of progress on the implementation of the denuclearization agreement resulted in North Korea's announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 12, 1993. North Korea's threat to withdrawal from the NPT brought North-South trajectory of relationship to an abrupt halt. Tension erupted on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation between North Korea and the United States deepened.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in May 11, 1993 passed a resolution urging North Korea to cooperate with IAEA and asked North Korea to implement the 1991 accord. But the nuclear issue became a bargaining tool for North Korea on which it could bring the US to the negotiation table and for the same reason North Korea was more interested in engaging Washington on the issue than its southern counterpart (Kapur 1995: 110). The rhetoric by North Korea to reduce Seoul to 'a sea of fire' further deepened the crisis.

A secret visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang in June 1994 averted any negative outcome of the issue and that culminated in the US response by holding political level talks with North Korea in early June 1993 that led to a joint statement outlining the basic principles for continued US-North Korea dialogue and North Korea's "suspending" its withdrawal from the NPT.<sup>11</sup> A second level of talks was held in July 14-19, 1993 in Geneva. During the talks the guidelines were set for resolving the nuclear issue, improving U.S.-North Korea relations and restarting inter-Korean talks, but further negotiations deadlocked.

### **1.6 The Agreed Framework of 1994 and After**

The unloading of fuel from five-megawatt nuclear reactor by Pyongyang and the following events of the resultant US push for UN sanctions and former President Carter's visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 helped to defuse tensions and resulted in renewed South and North Korea talks. On 8 July 1994 a third round of talks between the US and North Korea opened in Geneva. But the sudden demise of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung on July 8, 1994 halted the plans for a first ever South-North presidential summit and led to another period of Inter-animosity. In August of the same year the talks resumed and concluded with the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994 in Geneva.

According to the Agreed Framework North Korea agreed to freeze its existing nuclear programme including the 50 MWe and 200 MW graphite-moderated reactors that were under construction as well as its existing 5 MW reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility and for an enhanced IAEA safeguards. Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with 2 Light-Water Reactors (LWR) of 2000MW capacity by 2003. The two reactors would be safer and would produce much less plutonium at the same time would help boost the supply of electricity in North Korea, which was in a critical shortage of power. In the interim period, the US pledged to supply 50,000 tones of heavy oil to North Korea annually.

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11. The effort of the US to send Jimmy Carter to North Korea to negotiate about the peaceful negotiation on the nuclear issue could be seen in the light of American initiative to have direct talks with Pyongyang according to its policy of engagement.

The agreement also included move towards full normalization of political and economic relations between the US and North Korea and Section III of the Framework also commits North Korea and the US to “work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”<sup>12</sup> And both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The smooth implementation of the 1994 agreed framework was obstructed for a time by North Korea’s refusal to accept South Korean-designed LWR model reactors. The DPRK also sought additional benefits relating to the reactors. The US and the North Korean negotiators met for three weeks in Malaysia and reached an accord resolving this issue.<sup>13</sup> North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of the newly established Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) with respect to the model for the LWRs and agreed to the condition that KEDO would select a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project.

The executive board of KEDO announced that it had selected the South Korean-designed Ulchin3-4 LWR as the reference model for the project and that a South Korean firm would be the prime contractor. The South Korean contractor would be responsible for all aspects of the LWR project including design, manufacture, construction and management. Finally North Korea agreed to negotiate directly with KEDO on all outstanding issues related to the LWR project. On December 15, 1995, North Korea and KEDO signed the Light Water Reactor Supply Agreement. Thus the implementation of the Accord was institutionalized with the establishment of KEDO in 1995, and wider participation was invited in this organization. South Korea and Japan became involved in a very significant manner and South Korea’s grievance of not being involved in initial negotiation process of the Nuclear Accord was very well rectified (Whan 1997: 103). As per the terms of the 1994 framework, the US Government also in January 1995, responded to North Korea’s decision to freeze its nuclear facilities and cooperate with US

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12. According to this section of the AF, Washington would provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. The accord explicitly committed both sides to reduce barriers to trade, which to Pyongyang meant ending the trade embargo.

13. Pyongyang balked at the prospect of South Korea playing the leading role and supplying Ulchin-3 power reactors, a Korean-modified version of Westinghouse nuclear reactors.

and IAEA verification processes by easing economic sanctions against North Korea in four areas as follow:

- By authorizing transactions related to telecommunications connections, credit card use for personal or travel-related transactions, and opening of journalists' offices
- By authorizing North Korea's use of the US banking system to clear transactions not originating in the United States and unblocking frozen assets where there is no North Korean government interest.
- By authorizing imports of Magnesite, a refractory material that is used in the US steel industry and
- By authorizing transactions related to future establishment of liaison offices, participation of the US companies in the light water reactor project, supply of alternative energy and disposition of spent nuclear fuel as provided by the agreed framework, in a manner consistent with applicable laws.

North Korea was cooperating with KEDO and in turn it froze its nuclear programme. South Korea, which had promised to bear the major share of the reactor project cost tentatively estimated at US\$ 4.5 billion, asked the United States to put up at least a symbolic amount for the construction cost. But the US administration, however, stretched its arms widely saying that it could not make any contribution to the construction cost, as Congress had not appropriated the necessary budget. South Korea couldn't drop its demand simply because of domestic problems in the United States. South Korea said the US refusal to share the reactor cost would make it difficult for them to obtain approval from the National Assembly for the South Korean share. The United States started supplying heavy fuel oil to North Korea, but showed least interest in building the LWRs.

The calculation of the US was something else. The US anticipated a collapse of the North Korean regime due to its economic conditions; this was the reason for which it delayed the construction of the reactors. The US intentions and policies towards North Korea are discussed in Chapter 4 in detail. Neither North Korea nor

the US was satisfied with either compromise reached or its implementation. While the US was not satisfied with North Korea due to issues like Kamchang-ri<sup>14</sup> and North Korea's postponement of safeguards inspections to verify Pyongyang's past activities, North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the LWRs. When Pyongyang demanded for compensation from Washington, it replied that 2003 was only a target date and it was not a strict contractual commitment.

### **1.7 The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Crisis**

Ever since George W Bush sworn in as the US president, he has been pursuing hard line policies to deal with the countries that pose a threat to US national security and its allies' security. After coming to office in 2001, the new Bush administration initiated a North Korea policy review that was completed in early June. As per the policy review the United States was advised to improve implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programme, a ban on missile exports and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture. The word improved implementation of the Agreed Framework meant an acceleration of safeguards inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant portion of the reactor construction was completed but before the delivery of critical reactor components.

The crisis between the US and North Korea began as a consequence of a deliberate action by Pyongyang: a decision to circumvent the 1994 Geneva, U.S.-North Korea Agreed framework by pursuing a uranium enrichment programme. The fact that Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations predate the Bush administration indicated that more recent events, while perhaps causing an acceleration of North Korea's clandestine nuclear activities, were not the primary stimulants. The root cause was North Korea's nuclear weapons aspirations.

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14. The US alleged that North Korea had been involved in clandestine nuclear program and it had seen satellite pictures that showed unusual activities near the site Kamchang-ri. Initially, North Korea was adamant but finally the issue had been resolved and a team of inspectors reached to the site in May 1999 but could not get any evidence of program

The event that triggered the crisis was U.S. Assistant secretary of State James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in early October 2002. According to Kelly, Pyongyang responded to his allegations of cheating on its nuclear promises by defiantly acknowledging that it had a uranium enrichment programme. But later it claimed to merely have said it was "entitled" to have a nuclear weapons programme, which was part of its self-defence. The United States responded in December 2002, by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North Korea struck back hard by lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring that freeze and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003. Initially, North Korea claimed that it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generate needed electricity. The US could not take any forceful action against North Korea due to various reasons including the China factor and war on Iraq etc. this will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4.

Negotiations on the nuclear issues started in the form of Six-Party Talks, which started in August 27-29, 2003. The members of the six-party talks include the US, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and North Korea. But these six-party talks did not end in any substantiate actions. Six-party talk and its importance and relevance are discussed in chapter 3 in detail. In a surprising statement on 10 February 2005, the DPRK foreign ministry announced that North Korea had manufactured nuclear weapons.

On 26 July 2005, fourth round of six-party talks resumed in Beijing after a thirteen-month interval. On 19 September 2005, the North Korean delegation to the six-party talk in Beijing signed a "Statement of Principles" whereby Pyongyang agreed to abandon all nuclear programmes and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. However, on the following day a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry declared that the United States would have to provide a LWR to North Korea in order to resolve the lack of trust between the two countries. The distrust between the US and DPRK has postponed the substantial out come of the six-party talks, which is expected to create a win-win situation to all the six-parties involved.



At present, it is estimated that, in total through mid-2006, North Korea has produced an estimated 43 to 61 kilograms of plutonium of which about 20 to 53 kilograms are in separated form and usable in nuclear weapons. About 80 to almost 100 percent of the separated plutonium were generated since the freeze ended in late 2002. The figure below shows North Korea's Plutonium production and separation.

**Table 1: North Korea Plutonium Production and Separation, as of mid-2006**

Plutonium Discharged From 5MWe Reactor		Plutonium Separation		Weapon Equivalents*
Date	Amount (Kg)	Date	Amount (Kg)	Numbers
Before 1990	1-10**	1989-1992	0-10	0-2
1994	21-29	2003-2004	20-28	4-7
Spring 2005	0-15	2005-2006	0-15	0-3
In core of 5MWe Reactor	5-7	--	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>43-61</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>20-53</b>	<b>4-13***</b>

Source: Albright, David and Paul Brannan (2006), "The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006", [Online: web] Accessed 28 June 2006 URL: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf>


\* It is assumed that each nuclear weapon would require 4-5 kilograms of separated plutonium.

\*\* This quantity includes up to 1-2 kilograms of Plutonium produced in the IRT reactors prior to 1994.

\*\*\* The upper bound of the number of weapons is higher than the sum of the individual upper bounds, because particular periods list more Plutonium than needed to give the upper bound for that period.

It is assessed that North Korea's stock of separated Plutonium is enough for about 4-13 nuclear weapons. Though there are doubts about its ability to make a nuclear weapon, it is assessed as likely able to build a crude nuclear warhead for its Nodong missile. At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that North Korea is capable of making a nuclear warhead light enough for the Taepodong-2 missile.

**THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS**



North Korea's nuclear and missile development programmes have been the main policy concerns of the United States for more than a decade and a half. The agreed framework came under critical scrutiny shortly after the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001. The Agreed Framework's two most important projects, construction of LWRs (Light Water Reactors) in North Korea by the KEDO and the supply of heavy oil from the United States, have already been suspended. The post 9/11 hard-line policy also failed to elicit cooperative responses from North Korea, and only initiated a second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the stalemated Six Party talks leave open the question whether or not an agreement that satisfies all the parties, especially the U.S. and North Korea, can be reached.

The resolution of the North Korea needs an understanding of its rationale behind the nuclear programme and its foreign policy behaviour. There have been many nuclear proliferation theories that have explained the causes of nuclear proliferation of countries. Many analysts have viewed nuclear proliferation in different perspective. For years, Western Security analysts have guessed the motive and logic behind North Korea's action and pronouncements. This chapter will attempt to explain the North Korean nuclear programme and security motivation by analyzing various theories that have attempted to explain the causes of nuclear proliferation.

The theoretical debate over how nuclear proliferation should be explained and whether future nuclear proliferation can be predicted or not, has been given fresh insights since the end of the Cold War. The debates on nuclear proliferation have been particularly lively, as the new international environment has brought new challenges to the existing conventional weapons. Although some very important contributions have been made, the dynamics of nuclear proliferation remain largely a mystery.

The theoretical debates on nuclear proliferation have also been hampered by the difficulty of trying to acquire evidence about such a sensitive subject, causing doubts over the adequacy of the knowledge and questions about whether nuclear proliferation can be separated from other phenomena, such as arms racing and domestic coalition-building.

Official documents on the nuclear proliferation are scarce, and it is difficult to establish what kinds of evidence can be relied upon. It is mainly due to lack of the empirical evidence that have caused the debate over nuclear proliferation dynamics to be abstract. Moreover, the problem occurs when conclusions reached about the dynamics of nuclear proliferation in the nuclear weapon states are used to explain proliferation dynamics in states where proliferation is opaque and empirical evidence are more difficult to obtain. This is the case with North Korea since the lack of empirical evidences due to its unique closed society characteristic, hampers the study of its motives behind its nuclear programmes. Thus such inadequate evidences to support any theoretical explanation on the cause of North Korea's nuclear proliferation causes the limitation of the study. However, this chapter will specifically analyse theories and debates on nuclear proliferation and compare them with the case of North Korea's nuclear programme and bring out the a comprehensive explanation for the motives behind North Korea's nuclear programme with support of available literatures.


This chapter attempts to analyse specifically four theories concerning the causes of nuclear proliferation. The logic behind these theories are explained and by doing so each theory is compared as to which theory explains causes of North Korea's nuclear programme with less flaws or more evidences. Four theories concerning the causes of nuclear proliferation include: Realist and Neo-realist theories that proposes the security concerns of a state causes the nuclear proliferation; the second one being the domestic determinants theory which assumes that nuclear weapons are used as political tools to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests; the third one is the theory of

prestige or state identity, which says that states acquire nuclear weapons for grandeur and stature; the fourth theory is technological pull theory, which assumes that there is technological imperative that causes states to develop nuclear weapons. The first section of this chapter will briefly analyse the logic of the first two theories and describe the principle flaws of these theories, while the second and third section of this chapter conclude that the principle cause of North Korea's nuclear proliferation is both security concern and domestic determinants. The reason for attributing the contradicting theories for the explanation of the cause of North Korea's nuclear programme is due to North Korea's principle change in its motivation to build nuclear weapon. The second and third section will provide ample evidences for such a change in North Korea's logic behind its nuclear programme.

## **2.1 Prestige and Technological Pull as Theories of Nuclear Proliferation**

The technological pull theory is based on technological deterministic arguments. This theory assumes that technology can compel decision makers to undertake an action that they would not have in the absence of that technology. Ralph Lapp (1970: 177-178), one of the advocates of technological deterministic theory claims that technology nudges decision makers into making a decision. Other advocates of this theory also strongly claim that technology causes proliferation and decision makers are powerless to halt the inexorable lure of nuclear weapons (Lavoy 1993: 194-95). This theory also assumes that if something is technically possible, then it will be done. This theory is flawed in the North Korean nuclear proliferation case.

The weaker claim of the theory is that the technology affects the decision maker and decision making, which is sustainable, but as the theory strongly claims that proliferation is caused by technology is flawed. North Korea's decision to build weapon was not due to the technology pull it got from the erstwhile Soviet Union. North Korea is not an economically sound country since its inception to manage the pecuniary and opportunity costs at each stage of the acquisition of the arsenal through borrowed technology, which are too great.



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If a country like North Korea producing nuclear weapons at the expense of its economy then there should be a greater cause for the high-risk phenomenon of nuclear production. This theory does not first of all, explain how technology compels decision makers to do what is technically possible. The technological pull theory does not explain why decision makers are helpless to resist developing nuclear weapons. The mechanism that allows technology to overcome all resistance to proliferation on economic and moral grounds is not explained by the theory and most importantly as a principle defect of the theory, this theory does not explain why technological pull is a better explanation of proliferation than the alternatives, such as prestige, domestic determinants and security.

The theory of State identity or prestige focuses on political incentives like prestige attached to the weapons acquisition and seeing nuclear decision as serving important symbolic function that shapes and reflects states identity. Many political leaders, who have conceptualized the weapon acquisition as a prerequisite for achieving national objectives, including all influence in international life, have vocalized this perception. But prestige is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of proliferation as a whole, so with regard to North Korea's case in particular also this theory does give a comprehensive explanation for the cause of North Korea's nuclear proliferation programme. According to the theory's basic principle, nuclear capability confers upon a state great power status.

This assumption is based on the belief that nuclear acquisition will enhance the international prestige of the state, such prestige has been viewed simply as a reasonable means used to enhance the state's international influence and security.<sup>1</sup> Thus nuclear power and nuclear weapons were deeply linked to a state's position in the international system. But, this theory suits the nuclear proliferation case of those states that want to show their position in the international system. But this is not the case in North Korea's nuclear proliferation. North Korea is an isolated country, which does not have any aspiration of attaining any great power status in the international system.

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1. An understanding of why and how actions are granted symbolic meaning, such as why are some nuclear weapons acts considered prestigious, while others produce opprobrium and how do such beliefs change over time, is missing from these analysis. (Sagan 1996)

Even a pre 1945 unified Korea also never had any aspirations to become a great power. Paradoxically, it had a secluded existence throughout its history, which is why Korea was called as 'hermit kingdom'. Moreover North Korea's nuclear proliferation for the reasons of prestige is extremely impossible, because it is difficult for North Korea to undertake the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons merely for the reason that these nuclear weapons would increase its status in the international arena, if only because the pecuniary and opportunity costs at each stage of the acquisition of the nuclear weapon are too great to warrant acquiring nuclear weapons for prestige alone.

Throughout its history, North Korea has run recurring balance-of-payments deficits, posing chronic financing issue. After defaulting on international creditors in the 1970s, North Korea was frozen out of international capital markets and came to rely increasingly on aid from fraternally allied socialist states, remittance from ethnic Koreans in Japan, and illicit activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting to generate foreign exchange. Tremendous trade shocks hit the economy starting in 1990, as the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Eastern bloc collapsed. The Soviets had supplied North Korea with most of its coal and refined oil and one-third of steel. Trade with the Soviet Union accounted for more than half of North Korea's two-way trade. The fall in imports from Russia in 1991 was equivalent to 40 percent of their 1987-90 average (Eberstadt 1995: 94-98). North Korea proved incapable of reorienting its commercial relations in the face of the massive trade shock. The North Korean industrial economy imploded and, deprived of industrial inputs, agricultural output plummeted.

Under such circumstances spending money for the development of a nuclear programme for prestige purpose would mean North Korea's insanity. Moreover, if North Korea had been pursuing its nuclear programme for prestige cause then it would have carried out such, programme openly. But on the contrary North Korea has been concealing its nuclear weapons programme with great care. All these reasons prove the weakness of this theory in explaining the cause of nuclear proliferation in the case of North Korea. Thus the motivation to attain great power status was not the cause for North Korea's nuclear programme.

There are other approaches in explaining the causes of nuclear proliferation. Cognitive and Psychological approaches help to explain behaviour that can provide more pieces to the proliferation puzzle, while other theories fail to do. Through psychology of human behaviour, these approaches give explanation for irrational decision made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders and national elites.<sup>2</sup>

The psychologists argue that irrational behaviour often occur during crisis situations, which increase the tendency of decision makers to apply simplified images of reality that are highly resistant to change. However, this simplification often ignores valid information contradicting their beliefs. Michelsen (1994) points this out in relation to U.S. and Russian nuclear policies, arguing that the belief of the presidents of both states have an important impact on policy. Moreover decision makers' understanding of the behaviour of others is shaped by their own beliefs; they sometimes misinterpret the signals they receive from others, leading to unexpected behaviour. This approach is most suitable to explain the actions of individuals, but it is difficult to explain why groups adopt similar or identical beliefs about certain issues even in the absence of objective information. Thus only a psychological approach alone cannot explain the rationale behind North Korea's nuclear programme.

Moreover the psychological factors are difficult to quantify, and can only provide limited explanations of nuclear dynamics. Psychological approaches can lead to greater understanding of belief systems and learning processes and their impact on nuclear decision-making, but they are too narrow and specific to explain the relationship between beliefs and other factors in the proliferation process. The debate on nuclear proliferation comes back to the basics as the psychological approach fails to answer the question as to what causes actors to believe that something is true. Thus, by standing alone, this approach cannot explain the causes of nuclear proliferation, but this approach can be a complementary in explaining the causes of nuclear proliferation.

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2. The concept of belief systems was first introduced into international relations theory by Ole Holsti. A good introduction to belief systems in general, and to Ole Holsti's work in particular, is provided by Steve Smith. (Little 1988)

### 2.2 Classical Realism and Neo-Realism as theories of Nuclear Proliferation

Realist explanations of nuclear proliferation have dominated the thinking about nuclear weapons since 1950s. Due to realist theory's convincing justification for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, it dominated the thinking about the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. Classical realism is perceived to be an elegant theory of motivations applied to the "proliferation puzzle".<sup>3</sup> Realism makes two important assumptions of international politics. The first being that, the international system is anarchic, that there is no final arbiter of disputes in international politics (Waltz 1979), which makes the use of force always possible. The second assumption is that states desire self-help that they want to survive and maintain their sovereignty and independence.

Mearsheimer (1994) provides three central ideas of realism. The first central idea is that all states possess offensive military capability by virtue of possessing any military capability. All military capability is inherently offensive in nature, because any military capability might be used to hurt other states. The second central idea is the uncertainty about intentions, which assumes that a state can never know whether its present allies will remain allies or become hostile. An ally remaining abstained during military crisis is as bad as becoming hostile. So, it is very difficult to be certain of the intentions. The third central idea of realism being that the relative capabilities of states are more important than the absolute capabilities for ensuring the security of the state. Relative capabilities are important because the security of states is provided by the strength of the state vis-à-vis competing states.

In the light of these realists assumptions the principal cause of North Korea's nuclear proliferation is explained in this section. The first central idea of realism says that all states possess offensive military capability. It was the offensive character of the North Korean military that invaded the south, during the Korean War in 1950 for the fulfillment of its goal of reunification of the 'fatherland'.

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3. This phrase was coined by Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (1993), *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results*, London: Frank Cass.



In the same way North Korea also mirrored its assumption that the United States and South Korea are potential threats to its security and their military along the demarcated line also to be offensive. In addition the armistice agreement signed in 1953 was not a treaty to end the Korea War, but a ceasefire to halt the Korean War. So the offensive gesture of the U.S. and the South Korea was still threatening to North Korea. To worsen the situation the United States moved its nuclear weapons to South Korea, stationed them along the line of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in 1958.<sup>4</sup>

As the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still green, North Korea's perception of the U.S. troops along the DMZ was absolutely to be offensive. A security dilemma occurs when an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others. This is often accompanied by spiral effects, because when a country's security increases it decreases its hostile country's security. As a result, the hostile country tends to increase its security. It was this fear, which prompted North Korea to go Nuclear. As the rational deterrence theory assumes that if more than one state has acquired a second-strike nuclear-armed States is unlikely to occur, due to the fact that mutual destruction is virtually assured (Waltz 1981). It was this rational deterrence that forced North Korea to acquire nuclear capabilities in the backdrop of mounting security threat from the U.S. across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.

The second central idea of realism explains the uncertainty about intensions, which says the changing nature of alliance in the anarchic international system. Thus this idea assumes that reliance on allies may betray the State, buck passing its alliance commitment (Christensen 1990). Recognizing in a self-help system the States pursue their selfish short-term interests rather than their long-term interests because the short-term is of greater concern for survival.

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4. Even though the armistice that ended the war had banned the introduction of new weapons, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the monitoring agency for this agreement disbanded at the beginning of 1958. The United States wasted no time: at the end of January 1958, the U.S. led United Nations Command announced that as a response to numerous Communist violations of the armistice, it was introducing nuclear-capable weapons systems into South Korea. It confirmed the presence of nuclear 280-mm artillery shells and nuclear-tipped rockets in the South. Mazzar (1995)

If states do not act to guarantee their survival in the short-term, then there is no certainty that they will survive until the long-term (Thayer 1995: 485). North Korea enjoyed a fearless alliance with China and USSR bonded with ideological commitments. But the fear of the nature of future alliance erupted when the relation between China and Russia deteriorated during 1970s in addition China's incremental opening and reform of its economy which is based on leadership-market socialism came as an indication to North Korea that the future alliance may weaken which would ultimately affect the security of North Korea'. Having felt the anarchic international system, North Korea started to perform in a self-help manner, which is the core idea of the '*Juche*' ideology.

The fear of break-up in alliance became very real when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The disintegration of Soviet Union not only marked the end of Cold War but also the end of economic and military aid of Russia to North Korea and took away the Russian nuclear umbrella to North Korea. It is important to note, in September 1990, as Moscow prepared to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea for the first time, official North Korean Statements warned that, if Moscow took such step, a triangular alliance would be in place against it provide for itself "some weapons for which they had so far relied on the alliance".<sup>5</sup>

It was until this crucial period, I am saying that North Korea's principle cause of nuclear proliferation was based solely on security concerns. One should understand that the period of Soviet disintegration marked the end of Cold War and the allied States of Russia were in a dilemma as to what would be the effect of this phenomenon on their natural security, regional stability and the pattern of international politics. After the fall of the Soviet Union, its inheritor Russia opened up diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1991 and tried to enhance its relations and cooperation with the United States, China also followed suit.

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5. North Korean officials made these same threats directly to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, but Moscow ignored them and established relations with Seoul. (Mazarr 1995)

Facing such a dilemma, North Korea as it was deeply enrooted in its self-reliance or *Juche* ideology did not want to follow suit either Russia or China. It felt need for a self-protection of its Security. This feeling of insecurity is what resulted in hastening the completion of its nuclear programme. The clear intention of North Korea was to bring about chaos in the South Korean politics with the help of 'Spy ring'<sup>6</sup> in which prominent South Korea Labor leaders were also preparing for unification in 1995 by establishing political agitation groups and other organizations with the goal of disrupting South Korean politics and thus fulfill its longtime goal of unification of the fatherland. In addition, interesting enough, in the 1992 Socialist constitution of the DPRK did not have the "non-aggression" clause.

Since North Korea invaded the South in 1950 and the absence of peace treaty instead of armistice agreement, it can be inferred from the absence of the non-aggression clause that North Korea did not rule out the option to reunify the country by military means. Now the question arises if North Korean was adamant in attaining the nuclear weapons, then why it had to sign the Agreed Framework to halt its nuclear programmes. It was the economic hardship that deteriorated the security conditions of North Korea and led to the phenomenon of North Korea signing the Agreed Framework. The economic problems, long source of concern for Pyongyang, appeared to be reaching crisis propositions in 1993.

During 1993, North Korea's GNP was collapsing, having declined to \$ 21.1 billion in 1992, a nearly \$ 2 billion drop from the year before a drastic 7.6 percent contraction, the worst economic performance on record in North Korea's history (Mazzar 1995: 129). The rice production in the North reached a three year low of 4.26 million tons in 1992, down from 4.81 million tons in 1990 against a demand of nearly 7 million tons. Forced by weak economy Russia began insisting on hard currency for its oil delivery in 1990.

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6. The first hints about the existence of North Korean Spy ring surfaced in September 1992. The South Korean Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) announced on October 1, that it would release information about the largest group of North Korean agents uncovered since 1948.

This resulted in shipments to the North dropping from a million tons a year to 45,000 tons. During the same period, delivery from China dropped by a third, from 1.6 million tons a year to one million tons. Thus, suffering by severe economic hardship it became merely a dream for North Korea to unify the Korean peninsula. North Korea, in such a crisis faced with scarcity of energy to run its factories, North Korea could not think about reprocessing of weapon plutonium for a new term. Moreover, when the first nuclear crisis mounted, the U.S. troops started preparing for a full-fledged war.

Having seen the U.S. military supremacy in Iraq War in 1991, North Korea at least tried to preserve its Stalinist regime, which only resulted in signing the Agreed Framework. At the same time, the growing U.S. and South Korea's anxiety about the North's weapon programme during the first nuclear crisis made North Korea think that more the hostile forces were afraid of nuclear weapons the more they should arm themselves with them (Mazzar 1995: 62). This perception is what considered to be the main factor behind the brinkman ship strategy of North Korea in later period from 1998 till today. This will be analysed in the following section.

The theory of neo-realism is also based on the same assumption as classical realism; but adds an extra dimension to it. The neo-realist theory assumes that the structure of the international system be it unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, influences international politics. Kenneth Waltz made predictions about the spread of nuclear weapons using a combination of neo-realism and rational deterrence theory. He also argues that since the end of the cold war, the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar international system may cause the proliferation process. Waltz suggested that the disintegration of the Soviet Union is likely to weaken alliance established during the cold war and this in turn is likely to mean the removal of a nuclear umbrella for some states. As mentioned above the disintegration of Soviet Union left its ally North Korea in a confused state (Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth Waltz 1995 1995). It should be reckoned that for an isolated country like North Korea any such a change in the alliance would mean the deterioration of its security. It was this insecurity feeling that pushed North Korea for an intensified nuclear programme during the first nuclear crisis.

### 2.3 Theory of Domestic Determinants and Cause of Nuclear Proliferation

The domestic determinants theory focuses on the domestic actors who encourage in the case of nuclear proliferation or discourage in the case of nuclear restraints. The main assumption or principle of this theory is that whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests at least some individual actors within the state. (Sagan 1996: 63) Sagan presents three kinds of domestic actors in historical case studies of proliferation: the State's nuclear energy established or organization, important units within the professional military and politicians in States. According to this model when these domestic actors form coalition that is strong enough to control the government's decision-making process, nuclear weapons programme are likely to thrive. Domestic determinants theory moves away from the notion of 'state' as a unitary actor and thus denies the unitary characters of State in policymaking and assumes that state actions are the consequences of rational but self-interested bargaining between intrastate actors.

As has already been stated that there has been shift in purpose for North Korea's nuclear programme, from deterrence to survival, this section will explain what caused the motivation change while the decision to go nuclear remained the same. This section starts from the point when the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. First I would like to explain two situations as to show how the change in motivation occurred.

In the first situation when North Korea started its nuclear Programme, as mentioned before, it was marked by the end of the Korean War, in which three million people died from both sides. And the American troops armed with the nuclear weapons along side the DMZ was a great security threat to North Korea, which caused the start of North Korea's nuclear programme. When the Soviet Union collapsed North Korea faced with the same security dilemma. As mentioned in the previous sections faced with lack of power supply and economic crisis forced North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework.

The second situation is that when there was a new leadership after the demise of Kim Il-sung and after signing the Agreed Framework there was economic crisis due to the floods of 1995, 1996 and the drought of 1997 that severely aggravated food shortages. At least hundreds and thousands of people were killed by famine during these years.<sup>7</sup>

In 1995 North Korea approached the UN for food and humanitarian aid and UN responded positively with millions of tons of rice and food aid through world Food programme (WFP) for which USA, ROK, Japan and China were major contributors. But these economic aids did not reach fully the common people who were affected by famine. Instead the totalitarian regime spent these aids by giving enormously to the Military officials and military personnel. This was a calculative action by Kim Jong I in order to preserve the support of military officials to ensure Kim Jong-il's leadership to the country.


### **2.3.1 The Military Economy and the Military First Strategy**

Due to international economic and humanitarian aid, North Korean economy improved somewhat as compared to the period of 1995-97. The figure 2.1 shows growth in real GDP in North Korea.

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7. North Korea reported to the United Nations that the number of death resulting from famine was fewer than 300,000, but some workers in governmental organizations estimated the figure to be greater than 2 million. FIDH (2003)

Figure 1: Growth in Real GDP in the DPRK, 1990-2003




Source: Bank of Korea (BOK). National Statistics Office. Various years estimated GDP of North Korea. Seoul: BOK.

The period 1998 marked a recovery and the year 1999 showed a sharp increase in its GDP growth. It was during this period North Korea introduced its military first strategy in 1998. The military first strategy has dominated Kim Jong il’s thought even before he became the chairman of the National Defence Commission. When he wrote about *Juche* ideology he iterated,

“...only when is strong, will foreign aid prove effective. In national Defence, therefore, one should rely on the efforts of one’s own people and one’s own defence capabilities before anything else...”<sup>8</sup>

8. Kim Jong Il was of the opinion that when all the people are under arms and the whole country becomes a fortress. All the people could be mobilized to crush the enemy as soon as they come into attack from any quarter and defend the country from imperialist aggression with credit.

Figure 2: Military Expenditure in North Korea, 1990-2002



Source: Bank of Korea (BOK), National Statistics Office. Various years estimated GDP of North Korea. Seoul: BOK  
 (Year 1995-97: There are no economic estimates from North Korea from 1994-97.)

This military first strategy was a reaction to the economic crisis due to famine. The weak economic power of the government threatened to destabilize the State itself. Here it should be noted that the threat to the regime did not come from outside. There was not any sign of U.S. or South Korea attacking North Korea. Paradoxically security guarantee was assured by the United States in the form of Agreed Framework.

It was this situation that made North Korea to preserve its ‘personality cult’ centered regime through increase in its military capability. The introduction of military first strategy was one such move to strengthen the regime internally not only in the sense that it would strengthen the military in real terms but also a move by which it will satisfy the military officials and military personnel to keep the regime from external aggression. And pursuit of brinkmanship strategy was the move to get economic aid from the United States. The first nuclear crisis showed that mere rhetoric and brinkmanship earned many things for North Korea.



The outcome of this perception was the restart of brinkmanship strategy from 1998 onwards when North Korea Test fired Taepodong-1 over the Japanese territory. For North Korea, the image of an unpredictable, irrational provoker and rogue state serves its interests. The image in a way contributed to Pyongyang's pursuit of its short-term goal: the survival of its regime through economic aid from South Korea, Japan and the United States. This also strengthens its negotiating power. This image influences leaders of surrounding countries to see a high level of resolve and risk-taking in North Korea's behaviour despite its military inability to confront the United States.

The vacillating policies of North Korea between brinkmanship and seeking humanitarian assistance from the international community can be explained through Stephen M. Meyer's (1984) explanation on domestic determinant as a cause of nuclear proliferation. According to Meyer a state, which is having an opaque nuclear proliferation fluctuates between internal and external conditions. In North Korea's case the uneven economic improvement left it between its policy of brinkmanship and seeking humanitarian aid.

The situation of the second nuclear crisis should be seen in a different context. As North Korea frustrated with delay in crude oil shipments from the U.S. and Light Water Reactors from KEDO, it intimidated the U.S. by accepting its Highly Enriched Uranium programme. Whether it was true or out of frustration that North Korea admitted its HEU programme, the clear message was that Kim Jong-il wanted economic assistance through its nuclear programme in order to survive his regime. If Kim Jong-il thought about welfare of the people as well as the preservation of a socialist, totalitarian Regime he could have well followed the Chinese model of economic reform in which people are prosperous and the one party system also holds a strong position. But under the excuse of *Juche* ideology Kim Jong-il wanted to survive his regime by ruling the country as an undisputed leader.


But it should be noted that the very essence of North Korea's *Juche* ideology, which is an indispensable element in its domestic and foreign policies, has been questioned by North Korea accepting humanitarian assistance and economic aid. Table 2.1 shows the value of aid North Korea got from other countries.

**Table 2: Value of Aid to North Korea, 1995-2002: Major Aid Donors (US\$)**

By Rank	Official Aid	Private Aid	Total
1. United States	620,000,000	N/A	N/A
2. South Korea	568,800,000	208,000,000	746,880,000
3. European Union	284,700,000	N/A	N/A
4. China	270,000,000	N/A	N/A
5. Japan	256,500,000	N/A	N/A
Total Aid	1,970,000,000	208,000,000	2,178,000,000

Source: Young Whan Khil and Hong Nack Kim 2006, p.89.

The above-mentioned economic aids by foreign countries including the United States were not extended to North Korea in return for any agreement from North Korea. North Korea, whose principle ideology *Juche* does not justify such aids from foreign countries. If Kim Jong-il had strictly followed *Juche* principles in his policy making, then the acceptance of aid from foreign countries does not validate *Juche* principles. It is an infringement to *Juche*, which emphasizes on self-reliance. Thus North Korea's intentions are very clear that present short term goal of regime survival is the motive behind Kim Jong il's nuclear programme supported by influential members of the army. Thus we can conclude that the role-played by powerful group of conservatives that consists of influential members of the army and nuclear establishments and the party and leadership structure all these contribute to the North Korea's nuclear proliferation.



## NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The world's heaviest concentration of military and economic capabilities is in Northeast Asia, with the world's three largest nuclear weapons states (considering the United States as an extraterritorial power) and the world's three largest economies. Till date, half a century after the Korean War ended with an armistice agreement, the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ) remains the most heavily fortified conflict zone in the Post-Cold War world, where more than 1.8 million military personnel confront each other, armed to the teeth with the latest weapons systems.<sup>1</sup> The last fifteen years following the collapse of the Cold War involve some revolutionary changes over the period of time. The most distinctive characteristics of the Northeast Asian security environment in the post Cold War period can be identified as the co-existence of ambivalence i.e. "Continuity and Stability" Vs "Changes and Instability"(Zoellick 1997).

The drastic cut down of security threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union and remarkable economic developments as well, have greatly contributed to the regional cooperation and peace fostering. Concurrently, The demise of the Cold War introduced a new era of uncertainty and instability. There are at least three sets of momentous forces reshaping the international relations of Northeast Asia. 1. The normalization of Moscow-Seoul relations in 1990 and Beijing-Seoul relations in 1992 has erased one of the Cold War alliance systems in the region. 2. In the last two decades, with a rising China and a declining post- Soviet Russia, along with a rising South Korea and declining North Korea, the greatest shift in power had taken place in this region. 3. The forces of globalization in the 1990s have transformed both the context and conditions in which Northeast Asian regional geopolitics was played out (Kim 2002: 6).

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<sup>1</sup>. In the later half of the 1990s, the volcano of potential crisis in North Korea seemed to have become more active than ever before. The possibility of an unstable or collapsing North Korea with inordinate asymmetrical military capabilities had extraordinary refractory ramifications for great-power politics in Northeast Asia and beyond.

As a result of this juxtaposition of continuities and changes in place of apparent stability of the former structure of East- West conflict, a different set of Northeast Asian regional order is emerging, with multiple complexities and uncertainties and of indeterminate shape and content. The end of global bipolarity and the U.S. – China – U.S.S.R. strategic triangle has not brought any new global and regional order. Although great-power conflict and rivalries in traditional form have thinned, uncertainties about the shape of the Northeast Asian regional order abound (Kim 2002: 6).

Northeast Asia region is relatively stable at present, but there are concerns that this stability could be shattered by a number of prominent security issues. In general, traditional issues, strategic miscalculation by North Korea arms proliferation, changing bilateral relations and military alliances and escalating territorial disputes, continue to dominate the concerns of the region. The territorial and maritime disputes of the Tokdo/Takeshima Islands (Seoul Vs Tokyo), the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Beijing Vs Tokyo), the Northern Territories (Tokyo Vs Moscow), the Northern Limit Line on the Yellow/West Sea (Seoul Vs Pyongyang and the Sparty Islands (China Vs six other East Asian states) are seemingly intractable (Kim 2002: 5). North Korea's nuclear programme and its threat to Japan, South Korea and the U.S. troops in these countries, the issue of Taiwan and increasing competition for resources in the South China sea are additional sources of conflict. Especially North Korea the 'haunted house' of the Cold War ghost is considered to be the proving grounds for the great power rivalry in this region.

A unique characteristic of the post- Cold War era can be identified in this region. Although there is a political divergence among the regional actors of the Northeast Asia region, however, there is a considerable economic convergence among these countries. In other words despite the conflictual nature of the political developments among the Northeast Asian countries in matters such as North Korean nuclear issue, territorial issues etc. involving South Korea, Japan, Russia and China, the economic relations among these countries are encouraging towards stability of the region. The economic relation of Russia and China with South Korea in the post cold war era has a mention here.

Many analysts argue that in the twenty-first century international instability is more likely in East Asia and Northeast Asia in particular than in Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> To a significant degree, the shaping of post-Cold War Northeast Asian politics has become path-dependent, since unexpected events such as the attacks on America of September 11, 2001, war on Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. can easily force movement along quite different trajectories (Kim 2002: 6). Thus the discussion of post-Cold War Northeast Asia has focused on the prospects for regional tension and heightened great power conflict. Another set of arguments say that tension will increase because of the relative absence of the liberal or Kantian source of peace: liberal democracies, economic interdependence and multilateral institutions.<sup>3</sup>

### **3.1 The New World Order and the 'Great Power' Structure of Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War Era**

With the demise of the Soviet Union and Russia's preoccupation with domestic political and economic turmoil and the impoverishment of its military forces, the United States reigns as the world's lone superpower. And thus the post-Cold War global structure is characterized by American unipolarity. But the terrorist attack and the destruction of the New York World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 demonstrated a major crisis in the domestic security of the U.S. It has also aroused strong and rigorous reactions of American leaders, who have then expressed an even clearer posture that the U.S. should lead the world. As it was always clear that even before 9/11 incident the foreign policy of the new Bush administration had already been very clear. Based on realism as the foundation, Washington seeks to strengthen even further its national defence forces.

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2. The region characterized by high capability, abiding animus, entanglement of the four big powers in Korean affairs major shifts in the balance of power, skewed distributions of economic and political power within and between countries, absence of multilateral security institutions, and widespread territorial disputes that combine natural resource issue with post colonial nationalism. (Friedberg 1993)

3. Realists argue that the rise of China and the resulting power transition will create great power conflict over the restructuring of the regional order. Neorealists point to the emergence of multipolarity and resulting challenges to the peaceful management of balance of power. (Ross 2000).

These powerful forces are the groundwork to foster American political and strategic interests. The Bush administration firmly insisted that the U.S. should lead the world, but at the same time American “foreign interventions must be limited interventions with a very clear objective...once military forces are used, victory must be assured.”<sup>4</sup>The immediate repercussion of the 9/11 crisis was that the U.S. made a benchmark to rapidly establish an international anti-terrorist “united front” with countries to take stance whether “for or against” terrorism. The U.S. provided aids and abolished sanctions as an incentive so that American military forces could deeply enter the Central Asian states.

But in the past the U.S. was not able to extend its influence in this large piece of Islam-populated region. The anti-terrorist movement and the following war on Afghanistan and Iraq provided an opportunity for the U.S. to extend its influence in this region. And the U.S. had succeeded of establishing 13 military based in the Central Asian states. During the Cold-War period and after that also this region had long relied on Russia’s shelter in order to maintain stability, but after the 9/11 crisis the countries in this region reacted very receptively to the American requests to borrow their military based and to provide rescue supportive actions.

Despite the fact that these countries are not democratic states, and having their principles of “multilateral, balanced” their security and foreign policies are now tilting towards the Occidental powers (Wai 2003: 102). In south Asia, the relationship between India and Pakistan, which are in perpetual rivalry, has been undergoing subtle changes ever since both countries support American actions in anti-terrorist movement. However after the downfall of Taliban regime, Pakistan has lost the geopolitical effect of strategic depth provided by Afghanistan. On the contrary the relation between India and the U.S. has been improving, as the nuclear deal between these two countries is evident to speak for the tightening relations of India and the U.S.

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4. This rhetoric of the Bush administration emphasizes that the foreign military actions of the U.S. have to be determined and effective, and they serve primarily the American interests. This reflects a strong tendency towards “unilaterism”. (Wai 2003)

The U.S. relation with India has a strong geopolitical strategy of countering any Chinese dominance in this region. The high-profile attitude of the U.S. in her ambition to determine the world order can be reflected by the largely increased defence expenditure, and its tightened research efforts in developing the “Theater Missile Defence (TMD)” and “National Missile Defence (NMD).” In order to pave way for its missile defence programmes, in December 2001 Washington unilaterally abolished the “Anti-ballistic Missile Defence (ABM)” Treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1972 (Sethi 2001: 742).

The October 2001 “Quadrennial Defence Review” proposed by the U.S. Department of Defence stressed on the crucial importance of territorial defence, but also advocates the idea of transferring more naval vessels, especially aircraft carriers and submarines, to the West Pacific region. Thus, the Pentagon seeks to strengthen the military deployment in the vast area from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. As all these illustrate that the military participation of the U.S. in the pacific region has reached an all-pervasive manner.

As the most loyal ally to the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan also makes use of anti-terrorism to launch concrete actions so as to pave her way towards a great political power. Following the 1997 review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation, in 1999 Japan enacted the law on “Situation of Surrounding Areas” (Hook 2001: 141). In autumn 2001, in order to facilitate her actions to send naval vessels and transport airplanes to the Indian Ocean so as to support American military maneuvers against terrorists, Japan quickly moved to enact the “Law on Special Anti-terrorist Measures”, “Amendments to the Law of Self-Defence Forces”, and “Amendment to the Law of Maritime Self-Defence Force”. The Japanese Diet passed all these three amendments on 29 October 2001 (Wai 2003: 105). Japan sending her troops to the outside world has exceeded the territorial limits, but at the same time also removes the constraint on the weapons used. Some ‘hard line’ Japanese politicians even advocate for the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. All these Japanese maneuvers have obtained the approval of Washington, as the latter believes that Japan is a democratic and responsible state.

The U.S. consents to the Japanese research on its proper indigenous satellite reconnaissance system, and has established a ‘coordinating mechanism’ with Japan to facilitate further joint actions in the future. In parallel with the increase in Japanese military expenditure, the future development trend of Japan’s external actions will seriously affect the balance of power in East Asia, despite the understanding that Japan’s aspiration to become a major political power in line with the others should not be considered as equivalent to ‘restoration of militarism’. The new world order after the 9/11 crisis is thus characterized by expansion of the domain of the American dominance.

But this supremacy in world politics does not make the United States hegemony in regional politics. A superpower is a traditional great power in regions outside its home region, while regional powers enjoy the great-power status, but its interests and influence are great in only a single theater of power conflict (Ross 2000: 169). So in the Northeast Asian region the United States is not a regional hegemonic power, but shares the great power status with China in the balance of power. From the early 1970s to the end of the Cold War there were elements of a “strategic triangle” in East Asia composed of the United States, Russia, and China (Dittmer 1981). The collapse of the Soviet Union did not just usher in U.S. hegemony, but bipolarity composed of the remaining two powers—China and the United States. China was the major strategic beneficiary in East Asia of the collapse of the Soviet Union. China filled the vacuum wherever there had been Soviet influence in a third country after its collapse. This was the case in the Korean Peninsula, where Sino-Soviet competition in North Korea was succeeded by Chinese dominance. China has been the sole benefactor to North Korea ever since the USSR stopped its economic aid due to its collapse.

The post-Cold War bipolar regional structure is characterized by Chinese dominance of mainland East Asia and the U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia. In Northeast Asia North Korea’s location on the Chinese border and its strategic and economic isolation yield China hegemony over North Korea’s economy and security. On the Sino-Russian border China enjoys conventional military superiority. (Ross 2000: 170).



China dominates mainland Southeast Asia. Burma has been a de facto Chinese protectorate since World War II. Chinese regional influence expanded following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from mainland Southeast Asia in 1975, when Thailand shifted from alignment with the United States to alignment with China. Only China had the credibility to offset Soviet and Vietnamese threats to Thai security. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam, Hanoi accepted China's terms for peace in Cambodia. Cambodia then developed close relations with China, so that Beijing was content to work with the erstwhile Vietnamese "puppet regime". Thus by 1991 China had achieved dominance over mainland East Asia. The only exception is South Korea's alliance with the United States. But even here the situation is ambiguous. By the mid-1990s China and South Korea had developed close strategic ties. The two countries share considerable concern for Japanese military potential. Seoul is also pursuing strategic hedging by developing strategic ties with Beijing in preparation for possible U.S. reconsideration of its commitment to South Korea (Ross 2000: 171). In addition, China is South Korea's second largest trading partner and the largest target of South Korean FDI (Foreign Direct Investment).

While China dominates the mainland East Asia, the United States dominates maritime East Asia. Washington has access agreements for naval facilities in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. But other powers do not have access to facilities in any of these countries.<sup>5</sup> The security structure in Northeast Asia is vastly more complicated, because Northeast Asian land-based aircraft are within range of important maritime theaters. The combination of U.S. bases in Japan and superior U.S. air capabilities ensures U.S. dominance of the Northeast Asian naval theater. Despite deployment on the perimeters of Northeast Asia's maritime zones, Chinese aircraft cannot challenge U.S. aircraft in any theater, including over Mainland China. China's vulnerability to air combat with U.S. aircraft in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, and the resulting U.S. air superiority provides for American naval superiority in Northeast Asia. These variables make the United States and China two great powers of East Asia.

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5. Apart from the United States, other powers do not have aircraft carriers, and do not have land based aircraft that can project power into the region, the U.S. navy dominates maritime Southeast Asia, including the critical shipping lanes connecting East Asia with the Middle East. (Ross 2000)

They are strategic competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and influence. Though the similarities of bipolar great power capabilities between China and the U.S. resembles the dynamics of the Cold War U.S.-Soviet relationship, various bipolar structures do not necessarily exhibit the same great power dynamics. Present U.S.-China bipolarity in East Asia should be relatively stable and peaceful, in part because geography reinforces bipolar tendencies toward stable balancing and great power management of regional order. Out of the ashes of the Cold War emerged East Asia. It is stable because geopolitical conditions determine that no power can challenge it. The only candidates to become poles are Russia and Japan. But given geographic constraints, neither can challenge bipolarity. They are powerful countries that affect the regional balance of power, but they cannot become poles (Ross 2000: 172). In addition, the geography of East Asia, by affecting great power interests and by moderation the impact of the security dilemma, offsets the tendency of bipolarity toward crisis, arms races, and local wars (Waltz 1973).

### 3.2 The Rise of China and the Security Dilemma

China's emergence as a major power is a central concern in the region. The emergence of China poses an issue of fundamental importance for the world as a whole. Asian countries are more likely to join China than to balance against it, is the view supported by Samuel Huntington. He argues that Asia's Sino-centric past, not Europe's multi-polar past, will be Asia's future.<sup>6</sup>As aforesaid the signs of a power transition process in the post-Cold War Northeast Asia –the rise of China, a declining Russia, a stagnant Japan, and a retreating hegemon the United States- indicate that these dynamics make the political environment ripe for Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rivalry. As China becomes the regional power there is also an increasing security dilemma in this region. The spirals of tension in the region seem great, particularly due to the U.S. military presence and the strong U.S.-Japan military alliance in the region.

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6. Common culture is facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and overseas Chinese communities in other Asian Countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and Mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. (Huntington 1996)

The dilemma theory states that in an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats (Lynn-Jones 1995). Not only the dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities in East Asia increase mistrust, but the importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional actors encourage a destabilizing competition to develop power-projection capabilities on the seas and in the skies (Evera 1998). Because they are perceived as offensive threats: power projection forces are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation's homeland.<sup>7</sup>

Another more important variable that contributes to the security dilemma is the psychological factors such as the historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors such as the issues between North-South Korea and Japan and between China and Japan that are related to their historical animosity due to Japan's colonialism and political geography issues relating to the Taiwan question, which make even defensive weapons in the region appear threatening to Chinese security (Christensen 2000: 136). The protection of Taiwan offered by the U.S.-Japan military alliance is further strengthened by the largely increased arms sale provided by the Bush administration in 2001, which amounts to US\$4 billion.

The past years of relationship between U.S. and Taiwan is the most tightened one since 1979, and Taiwan is most satisfactory with the U.S. assistance. Apart from selling a large amount of military equipment, including four "Kidd" class destroyers and eight submarines so as to prepare the Taiwan Navy to receive the more sophisticated "Aegis" destroyers in the future, the US assists Taiwan in reforming its military forces. The assistance provided to improve the "software" of Taiwan armed forces included training, improving the command and control mechanism in order to strengthen the combat effectiveness, and ameliorating the commander's coordination ability to master various

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7. Perhaps more important in East Asia than these more commonly considered variables are psychological factors such as the historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors and political geography issues relating to the Taiwan question, which make even defensive weapons in the region appear threatening to Chinese security. (Christensen 2000)

types of armed forces in an integrated army (Pomfret 2002: 3). To add injury to insult, China fears that if the U.S. extends its TMD shield to Taiwan it will be detrimental to its security. But, however, a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia is the continuing U.S. military presence in the region particularly in Japan and South Korea. The historically based mistrust among the actors in Northeast Asia is so intensified that not only is the maintenance of a U.S. presence in Japan critical, but the form the U.S.-Japan alliance takes also has potentially important implications for regional stability. In particular, the sensitivity in China to almost all changes in the Cold War version of the U.S.-Japan alliance posed major challenges for leaders in Washington who want to shore up the alliance for the long haul by encouraging greater Japanese burden sharing, but still want the U.S. presence in Japan to be a force for reassurance in the region. To meet these somewhat contradictory goals, for the most part of the United States wisely has encouraged Japan to adopt non offensive roles that should be relatively unthreatening to Japan's neighbors. However certain policies of U.S. policies, including joint research of theater missile defence (TMD) Japan, were still potentially problematic.<sup>8</sup>

### 3.3 Historical Animosity and China's Fear of Japan's Militarization

Chinese security analysts fear that Japan could again become a great military great power in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Such a strong Japan, China believes, would likely be more independent of U.S. control and generally more assertive in international affairs. However, given China's historically rooted distrust of Japan, China fears either a breakdown of the U.S.-Japan alliance or a significant upgrading of Japan's role within that alliance. This sentiment is shared in South Korea as well. They view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States.

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8. According to security dilemma theory, defensive systems and missions, such as TMD, should not provoke arms races and spirals of tension. In contemporary East Asia, however, this logic is less applicable. Many in the region particularly China, fear that new defensive roles for Japan could break important norms of self-restraint, leading to more comprehensive Japanese military buildups later. (Christensen 2000)

The natural aversion to Japan that sprang from its brutal occupation of China has been preserved in part by Tokyo's refusal to respond satisfactorily to Chinese requests that Tokyo recognize and apologize for its imperial past—for example, by revising history textbooks in the public schools. Chinese sensibilities were annoyed by specific incidents such as Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's 1996 visit and Koizumi's five time visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since he took office in 2001, which commemorates Japan's war, dead, including war criminals. To add insult to injury on 23 June 2006, the Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit seeking to bar Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine (Fackler 2006: 1).

During their November 1998 summit in Tokyo, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi refused to offer an apology to China's President Jiang Zemin that used the same contrite wording as the rather forthright apology Japan offered to South Korea earlier in the year. This divergence in apologies further complicated the history issue between Tokyo and Beijing.

However these anti-Japanese feeling in China have not yet affected the practical, day-to-day management of Sino-Japanese relations. On the contrary, since the 1980s the Chinese government has acted to contain anti-Japanese sentiments in the society at large to avoid damaging bilateral relations and to prevent protestors from using anti-Japanese sentiment as a pretext for criticizing the Chinese government (Arai 1996: 21). But the anti-Japanese sentiment in the pretext of an increased Japanese military power, colors China's long-term threat assessments, even if it does not always alter their immediate policy prescriptions (Christensen 2000: 141).

In assessing Japan's current military strength, China emphasizes the advanced equipment that Japan has acquired, particularly since the late 1970s, when it began developing a navy and air force designed to help the United States contain the Soviet Union's growing Pacific Fleet. China also emphasizes on Japanese antisubmarine capabilities such as the P-3c aircraft, advanced fighters such as the F-15, the E-2 advanced warning aircraft, Patriot air defence batteries, and Aegis technology on surface

ships. China points out that, excluding U.S. deployment in the region, these weapons systems constitute the most technologically advanced arsenal of any East Asian power.

Japan's defence budget is a big worry for China as it says, although Japanese defence budget is small as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), it is second only to U.S. military spending in absolute size. Despite China's highlighting of Japan's defence budget and high levels of military sophistication, China contends that Japan can easily do much more militarily than it does. China believes that Japan's economic interest will continue to rely on U.S. military protection in the near future, but at the same time Japan's increased military spending would not strongly damage the Japanese economy.<sup>9</sup>

China has been suspicious about the massive stockpiles of high-grade nuclear fuel that was reprocessed in France and shipped back to Japan in the early 1990s. Chinese security analysts have stated that Japan can become a great military power even if it forgoes the domestically sensitive nuclear option. Chinese analysts contend that nuclear weapons may not be as useful in the future as high-tech conventional weapons, and that Japan is already a leader in dual-use high technology (Samuels 1994). In particular, Chinese experts recognize that Japan has practiced a great deal of self-restraint in eschewing weapons designed to project power far from the home islands. For example, despite the long list of current Japanese capabilities mentioned above, Japan certainly is not yet a normal great power because it lacks the required trappings of such power such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems. And it is not clear that if and when Japan will decide to adopt these systems.

For this reason, Chinese analysts often view Japan's adoption of even new defensive military roles as dangerous because it may begin to erode the constitutional (Article 9) and non-constitutional norms of self-restraint such as 1000-nautical –mile limit on power-projection capability, prohibitions on the military use of space, and tight arms export controls that have prevented Japan from realizing its military potential

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9. In 1992 an internally circulated analysis of Japan's military affairs points out that Japan could easily spend 4 percent of GNP on its military without doing fundamental harm to its long-term economic growth. The examples of much higher levels of spending in healthy economies in the United States and Europe during the Cold War are evidences on the aforesaid possibility. (Christensen 2000)

(Christensen 2000: 142). China did not consider economic hard times of Japan to be particularly reassuring. On the contrary, in terms of intentions, some fear that economic recession and financial crises could improve the fortunes of relatively hawkish Japanese elites by creating a general sense of uncertainty and threat in Japanese society, by fueling Japanese nationalism more generally, and by harming relations with the United States. In terms of capability, Chinese analysts think that Japan's technological infrastructure, which would be critical to a modern military buildup, did not seem affected by Japan's recent economic woes. While all the Chinese analysts fear the result, they have differed in their assessment of the likelihood that Japan will attempt to realize its military potential in the next few decades.

The more pessimistic analysts have argued that this outcome is extremely likely or even inevitable. Their views are consistent with the predictions of balance-of-power theories, but they do not agree with the analysis of some Western experts on Japan who believe that cultural pacifism after World War II, domestic political constraints, and economic interests will steer Japan away from pursuing such a strategy (Berger 1993). The majority of these optimists and pessimists believe that, along with the domestic political and economic stability of Japan, the most important factor might delay or prevent Japanese military buildups is the status of the U.S.-Japan relationship, particularly the security alliance.

The Chinese security analysts believe that by reassuring Japan and providing for Japanese security on the cheap, the United States fosters a political climate in which the Japanese public remains opposed to military buildups and the more hawkish elements of the Japanese elite are kept at bay. They also believe that if the U.S.-Japan security alliance either becomes strained or undergoes a transformation that gives Japan a much more prominent military role, those ever-present hawks might take Japan towards militarisation. China has been following the trends in U.S.-Japan relations with great interest and concern. Before 1995 most pessimistic Chinese analysts predicted and feared Japanese military build-ups largely because they sensed the potential for trouble in post Cold War U.S.- Japan economic security alliance.

The analysts postulated that, given the lack of a common enemy and the natural clash of economic interests between Japan and the United States, political conflict between the two allies was very likely. This conflict could destroy the U.S.-Japan security relationship, which in turn could lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces and eventually Japanese military build-ups. During this period Chinese analysts also discussed about domestic factors such as U.S. neo-isolationism, rising Japanese nationalism, the inexperience and lack of security focus in the newly elected Clinton administration and domestic instability in Japan and their effect in the worsening U.S.-Japan trade conflicts to speed the alliance demise.

But China's cautious optimism about trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance turned to pessimism, as concerns about future Japanese military assertiveness grew rapidly. Then the fear was no longer potential discord in the U.S.-Japan relationship, but concern that the United States would encourage Japan to adopt new military roles and develop new military capabilities as part of a revitalized alliance in which Japan carried a greater share of the burden and risk (Garrett 1997). On April 17, 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued a joint communiqué that called for revitalization of the alliance to better guarantee the "Asia Pacific Region". Japan guaranteed in the days preceding the communiqué base access for U.S. forces and committed itself to an increased logistic and rear-area support roles. The two sides also agreed to cooperate in the ballistic missile defence.

The joint communiqué was issued one month after the most intense phase of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups, including one based in Japan. The crisis and the Joint communiqué triggered fears among Chinese experts U.S. use of Japanese bases in the future Taiwan scenarios. It also gave the picture that Japan might soon begin scrapping various norms of self-restraint and begin expanding its military operations into Taiwan area and the South China Sea.



China also believed that the joint communiqué expanded the geographic scope of the alliance from the area immediately around Japan to a vaguely defined but clearly much larger, “Asia Pacific” (Bojiang 1996: 1-12). This fear was further confirmed by Japan’s “amendments and enactments of its laws of Maritime Self – Defence Forces” that were passed on 29<sup>th</sup> October 2001 (Wai 2003). China views U.S. presence in Japan more as an “egg shell”, which fasters the growth of Japanese military power under U.S. protection until it hatches one day onto the regional scene than as a “bottle cap”, which keeps the Japanese military genie inside the bottle (Yong 1998: 1-13).

The revised defence guidelines for the U.S. – Japan alliance in September 1997, attracted the China concern. Those guidelines put in writing many of the changes suggested in the joint communiqué. New and clarified roles of Japan in the alliance included those logistics and rear area support roles mentioned in the joint communiqué and also added “operational cooperation” missions for Japan’s Self-Defence Forces in time of regional conflict, including intelligence gathering, surveillance and mine sweeping missions. Although Washington and Tokyo quickly abandoned the provocative term “Asia Pacific” following the issuance of the Joint Communiqué, the 1997 guidelines were not entirely reassuring on this core either. They stated that the scope of the alliance covers “situations in the areas surrounding Japan”, but that the definition of those areas could be determined by “situational” rather than “geographic” imperatives. This alarmed the conspiring Theorists of China regarding the potential inclusion of Taiwan and the South China Sea, in the alliance scope, and eventually led to the Jiang Zemin’s announcement that China is on “high alert” about changes in the alliance.

China viewed aspects of both the joint communiqué and the revised guidelines as troubling mainly because they could facilitate U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency. China views Japan as having both stronger emotional and practical reasons than the United States for opposing Taiwan’s reintegration with the mainland and a greater stake than the United States in issues like sea-lane protection far from Japan’s home islands. Chinese pessimist analyst state that Japan’s material interests have not changed much from the 1930’s to the present.

They believe that Japan could again choose to develop power projection capabilities designed to protect its economic interests in the distant abroad, because Japan is still heavily dependent on foreign trade and investment. Another great concern of China with regard to the U.S.-Japanese alliance in Japan's agreement to research Theatre Missile defence (TMD) jointly with the United States. Despite Japan's initial reluctance to commit itself to the project, after five years of U.S. coaxing Tokyo finally agreed to joint TMD research after the North Korea's Tae Podong missile launch across Japanese territory in August 1998. Though it is clear that there is a persistent threat to Japan from North Korea, China still believes that development of U.S.-Japan TMD is also designed to counter China's missile capabilities, which China recognized as most effective military asset, especially in relation with Taiwan.

However Chinese analysts presently fear U.S. power much more than Japanese power. In November 1998, the U.S. Department of Defence published the U.S. security strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region (EASR). In that report, enduring U.S. security interests and the continuity of policy was reflected. A special emphasis can be laid on five elements in that document as follow: 1. Securing and invigorating bilateral alliances in the region. 2. Engaging China and having China recognize that the U.S. has a legitimate security in the region. 3. Deterring North Korea, preventing nuclear proliferation. 4. Maintaining multilateral dialogue in Asia, and 5. Another noticeable change was that the U.S. has made the first official mention of continued U.S. presence after a Korean reunification or reconciliation.

The report reflects a continuity of U.S. policy in the region. This policy recognized the criticality of U.S.-Japan alliance; the need for a continued U.S. presence in Korea after reunification or reconciliation; and the continuing role of the U.S. as a balancing force as well as the dominant force in the region. However there was some inconsistency found between the 1998 version of EASR report and the present U.S. reality in the following aspects: 1. The U.S. attempt to engage China on the one hand and hedge on the other. 2. Bilateral arrangements are the foundation of the U.S. strategy in the region in contrast to the emphasis on multilateralism in the region. 3. The U.S.

presence in the region and the Taiwan Relations Act strains the one-China policy (Song 2002: 139-40). On May 1, 2001 the U.S. president announced that the U.S. will unilaterally decrease its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the U.S. and other its allies will build a multi-national missile defence (MD) system and it would pursue a new defence strategy, based on a mix of offensive and defensive forces; the dependence on strategic nuclear power and conventional weapons will be drastically reduced, meanwhile, emphasizing the importance of development of MD system to prevent from the threat of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) by, in U.S. terms, 'rogue states' such as North Korea. There has been increasing concern especially from China that a MD system would foster tension and shift the existing balance of power by eroding China and Russia's strategic deterrent, and thus spark a new round of arms proliferation and military build-up in the region (Song 2002: 141).

### **3.4 North Korean Nuclear Programme and the Northeast Asian Security**

The nature of the Korean Peninsula security problem has been and continues to be dictated by its position as the center of convergence for the geostrategic interest of the major regional and global powers of the day. The Korean Peninsula's position at the center of superpower tensions and military alliance systems means that it continues to be a potential source of instability for Northeast Asian security even after the Cold War world. After the Cold War, owing to relaxed situation of Northeast Asia, adjustment and reconstruction of relations between great powers, as well as transformation of the armistice treaty of Korean Peninsula to a peaceful mechanism, have been desires and requests of all parties involved. The establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, indicated great improvement of Central Asian Security environment, acted as a model in constructing the security environment of Northeast Asia. However the improvement has not been as satisfactory as expected, not only because of coexistence of traditional and nontraditional security issues, but also their severity. The North Korean nuclear and missile issues are the major challenges for the stability of the region in the post-Cold War era.

Strategically located at the vortex of Northeast Asian security, Pyongyang could by instigating hostility or instability, potentially entrap China or all other regional powers in a spiral of conflict escalation that these countries would avoid due to the present economic growth. Without launching an armed invasion, by using its on and off brinkmanship and the threat of its collapse, Pyongyang is exercising its negative power to destabilize the Korean peninsula and beyond.

The lack of mechanism for security cooperation in the region is one contributing factor for the political instability in the region. The bilateral relations of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea, which were once the tools of the United States to contain USSR during the Cold War era, are not effective in dominating the regional security affairs now. The present North Korean nuclear issue created a complex and intricate situation for China. For a rising China the North Korean nuclear issue poses a great security and economic problems. The fear of nuclear proliferation by North Korea increases the likelihood of Japan and Taiwan to follow suit. While the North Korean nuclear programme gives the excuse for Japan to produce nuclear weapons, the same gives the impetus to Taiwan to produce nuclear weapon under the excuse of Chinese nuclear threat as North Korea gives the same excuse that it is facing nuclear threat from the U.S.

However Taiwan's nuclear production is not possible in near future, whereas Japan's capability is truly alarming especially that Japan has been largely accumulating plutonium. In times of absolute necessity Japan is able to produce nuclear arms in a very short time, thus constituting what the strategists call "recessed deterrence". In June 2002, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japanese government, Yasuo Fukuda, has implicitly hinted that Japan might abandon the "Non-nuclear Principles-No Possession, No Fabrication, and No Importation" (Wai 2003: 114). If the North Korean nuclear programme pushes Japan to produce nuclear weapon, it will shake the present stability of the region. Another challenge to Chinese strategic thinking is the "equalizer" effect that can be brought about by the nuclear ammunition. Missiles loaded with nuclear forces can diminish the power gap between the strong and weak powers, and consequently constrain the freedom of maneuver of Beijing in securing a great power status (Wai 2003: 114).

Moreover North Korea's nuclear programme further strengthens the U.S.-Japan alliance, which as mentioned earlier in other way complicates the security interests of China. Another worst-case scenario would be that if there is any preemptive attack from the U.S. or any sudden change of regime due to economic collapse would seriously jeopardize the Chinese security interests. Such a collapse would bring the U.S. troops stationed near Chinese borders, which would have grave implications for China's security. And such collapse might result in refugees flow into China, far eastern Russia and of course South Korea.

### 3.5 TMD and Northeast Asia

The U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen on his trip to Northeast Asia in 1997 expressed Washington's interest in the deployment of theatre missile defence (TMD) system by its two allies Japan and South Korea in the North East Asia region. The need for TMD deployments in North-East Asia grew considerably since the early 1990s. North Korea's ballistic missile programmes, despite the country's failing economy and due changes in the threat environment in Northeast Asia pushed the U.S. to urge Tokyo to decide in 1997 to provide the nation with a TMD capability. During the end of 90s the U.S.-led effort to bring North Korea's nuclear programmes under verifiable restraint did not resolve the underlying concern that Pyongyang had the material to develop, or had already developed, one or more nuclear devices that could arm its ballistic missile fleet. International concern about North Korean intentions was reinforced in 1993 by a U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) announcement that a modern North Korean ballistic missile, the No-dong had become operational (Cambone 1997: 66).

This gave North Korea a credible ballistic missile threat against both Japan and South Korea. North Korea's Tae-podong1 missile test in 1998 and the fear of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test preparation at the Musudan-ri launch facility in North Jamgyong, which was recently spotted by the U.S. satellites (Reuters 2006: 27) poses a threat to U.S. security also.

Thus given Pyongyang's instability, its potential volatile reactions to domestic or international pressures, and the possibility of an attack against South Korea and Japan, TMD deployments by both Japan and South Korea becomes a key issue. But South Korea doubts whether Missile Defence would be an effective defence system for achieving and maintaining peninsula stability, specifically vis-à-vis possible North Korean missile attack. South Korea's rationale behind its negative response to TMD is that although TMD might advance scientific technology and smooth military operations; it would not clearly counter North Korean missile attack. It promises to target short and medium-range 600 to 3500km missiles.

However, the distance between Seoul and North Korea is only 40km, a distance and flying interval too brief for the current TMD programme to be activated (Roh 2003: 78). Also, the U.S. expenditure has been massive, with upfront TMD costs of \$120 billion and later approximately \$273 billion. With this amount South Korea might do better to focus on its field ability to attack and incapacitate North Korea's ballistic missiles than to concentrate on Missile Defence (Roh 2003: 78).

South Korea perceives that TMD would also attenuate Korea's fledgling attempts towards military independence by requiring continuous stationing of U.S. troops and deployment of radar and anti-ballistic missile in South Korea. Moreover, with an TMD system's base on the peninsula, South Korea would be the first target for attack in any effort to destroy the U.S. TMD system. In other words South Korea could become a casualty of conflict that does not directly concern it. A deployed anti-ballistic missile system in its territory aimed at China and North Korea would be a draining source of regional tension and confrontation. Nonetheless, after adopting the sunshine policy South Korea believes that North Korea would not make any nuclear attack on South Korea due to the increased reconciliation between the North and the South.

However in December 1998, the Japanese government formally declared that Japan would commence joint research on a TMD system with the US in fiscal year 1999.<sup>10</sup> According to an agreement signed in August 1999, the joint Research and Development (R&D) effort would focus on the sea-based navy theatre wide missile defence system, which will be deployed in 2007 in East Asia (Hong 2000). In the latest test of the U.S. missile defence programme on 22 June 2006, an interceptor missile, fired from a U.S. navy warship off Hawaii, shot down a medium-range missile warhead above the earth atmosphere. In this test, a Japanese destroyer performed surveillance and tracking exercises. This was the first time an ally has taken part in a U.S. missile interception. The sea-based system tested off Hawaii was designed to counter only short or medium range missiles (Associated Press 2006: 3).

Though the main intention of the U.S. to deploy TMD is to counter any North Korea's missile attack, this gave the excuse for the U.S.-Japan alliance to check the Chinese security calculations vis-à-vis Taiwan, as well. China perceives that the primary rationale for U.S.-Japan TMD programme is China.

Because the DPRK signed a moratorium on missile test in 1999, then it also began to take an unprecedentedly open diplomatic approach, actively pursuing dialogues and better relations with many western countries. The leaders of the two Koreas Summit meeting in Pyongyang was another step that suggested that North Korea might not take any aggressive steps like missile attack on South Korea and Japan, but unfortunately, the U.S. and Japan alliance's determination to put forward their joint programme on TMD, no matter what have been achieved on the Korean Peninsula make China think that China was the primary rationale for TMD. However the recent Taepodong-2 missile test, which was a failure though, has created the necessity for hastening the targeted accomplishment of the TMD research by Japan and the U.S.

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10. The most obvious step for Japan was to improve its command-and-control network and surveillance capabilities- radars and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, so that they can accommodate TMD systems and operations effectively. By upgrading earlier versions of Patriot, with the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability Version 3) Japan gets a modern hit-to-kill capability. Such improvements give Japan a limited are-defence capability against missiles with ranges of less than 1,500 km.


China's evolving security policy has also heightened concern about regional TMD deployments. China's willingness to use its ballistic-missile forces to intimidate Taiwan, reports of veiled threats to employ those forces against the U.S. if its support for Taiwan caused conflict with China, and its insistence that a U.S. national missile defence (NMD) system would destabilize the U.S.-Chinese strategic relationship, shows that China sees the credibility of its ballistic-missile forces as essential to its great-power status (Cambone 1997: 67). China perceives that the deployment of missile defence would undermine the regional security and could spark a new round of arms races, which would be detrimental to the economic and social development of the countries of Northeast Asia. China and North Korea perceive that a decision to pursue TMD by Japan would encourage others in the region to believe that Japan would become not only more active but also positively assertive.

But the U.S.-Japan alliance views that while a decision to deploy a TMD system could elicit a negative reaction from regional powers, failing to deploy, as part of a prudent approach to regional stability ought to cause more concern. Such a failure could be construed as a tacit admission of the legitimacy both of possessing ballistic missiles by a regional power and of threat they can pose to states without a retaliatory capability.

The U.S.-Japan TMD system bears rather negative influence of US policy towards the security situation in Northeast Asia. It is aimed at increasing the latitude of the U.S in its involvement in the region's military conflicts and thereby, maintaining the U.S. as the unchallenged military hegemony. However, as the decision was taken by the world military hegemony, the U.S. and by Japan in response to North Korea's missile and nuclear programme, whose military capability lags far behind that of its adversaries, this threat to Northeast Asian security would arguably be much greater than that of North Korea's missile launch. This is because the TMD would break the current strategic balance and the framework for the great powers' relations in Northeast Asia, and because it would upgrade the military's importance for the security of the countries of the region (Dent 2002: 196), which might result in a new arms race in the region.



**REGIONAL ACTORS AND NORTH KOREAN  
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME**



The post cold war period has witnessed drastic changes taking place in the foreign policy postures of countries all over the world. It did not spare even the non align countries. The end of cold war brought about remarkable change in the international relations. Countries tied with ideological rigidities that bound these countries together in a conflictual situation earlier, gave way to new flexibilities in the conduct of their diplomatic relations. One evident indicator of such changes among these countries can be seen in the growing trend toward political democratization and economic reforms. However, in Northeast Asia, the end of superpower rivalry did not reflect in the total transformation in the equations of the major powers of the region. And the North Korean communist state structure remained intact even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship has been the protracted issue in this region for more than a decade and a half. This chapter looks into the relations between the Northeast Asian regional actors and North Korea and their mixed response towards the North Korean nuclear programme.

Japan has been already maintaining diplomatic relations with all the Northeast Asian countries but North Korea. Japanese policy in the last decade had gradually moved toward a breakthrough in its relations with Pyongyang. The Korean peninsula is the only region in the world that serves Japan's geopolitical interest largely. In 19<sup>th</sup> century, Japan used the excuse of potential Chinese and Russian threats to Korea, to declare war on both countries, defeated them and annexed the peninsula into the Japanese empire in 1910 (Sunoo 1986: 181-204). In 1945, with Japan's defeat and liberation of its colonies, the Soviet Union's spread across Eastern Europe, the imposition of a communist regime in the Northern part of the peninsula which was divided along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel by an agreement between Washington and Moscow and a successful communist revolutions

China posed a potential threat from the Korean peninsula. But a non-communist South Korea proved to be the perfect solution to Japan's potential security problem. The U.S.-Japan alliance had been Japan's first line of defence in Northeast Asia and served as a buffer zone against possible aggression from the Soviet Union or China. Divided against each other, the two Korea's focused much of their foreign policy energies across the thirty-eighth parallel rather than against their traditional enemy Japan. But in the late 80s, South Korea's rapprochement with communist powers, China and Russia, prompted Japan to mend its relations with Pyongyang. The rationale behind this change was that the two major powers, the Russia and China, would gain more influence on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, Japan foresaw the normalization with North Korea would be useful in enhancing its influence on the Korean peninsula. Japan also believed that inducing North Korea to participate in the main arena of international politics as more prudent way of reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. In the same way Kim Il-sung also responded to such a move by South Korea by seeking out new relationships with its long-time enemies South Korea, United States and Japan.

### **4.1 Japan-North Korea Relations**

Initially Japan was passive and ambiguous on this issue. It changed its position on the prerequisites for eliminating North Korea's nuclear doubts. At variance with the South Korean and American positions that encompassed the dismantling of North Korea's plutonium reprocessing plants, Japan viewed the IAEA nuclear inspection as sufficient. Even by accepting that DPRK pursues a rational foreign policy, there were enough reasons to counter North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapon programme. One such reason is that North Korea's acquisition of the nuclear bomb would very likely force South Korea and Japan to follow suit. Japan thought this would not only compound the problems associated with nuclear proliferation, but also seriously complicate international security in the Asia Pacific region given its belligerent posture towards the U.S., South Korea and Japan. According to Japan's calculation, the missile programme of North Korea compliments its nuclear programme as it can reach any part of Japan.

Japan fears, if nuclear card played by North Korea gains favorable economic and diplomatic arrangements, it could add years to the dictatorial regime of Pyongyang and it might export destabilizing nuclear technology to other regional hot-spots especially to those states or / and non state actors who pose a grave threat to U.S. security. The U.S. congressman Stephen Solarz asserted that

“...if it (North Korea) acquired nuclear weapons (or) material, North Korea would see to solve its foreign exchange crisis by offering a variety of options to such potential purchasers of nuclear materials....once [the North Korea] have this nuclear technology, it will be very difficult if not impossible, to stop them from exporting it”(Roy 1994: 144).

It seemed that the war on Afghanistan and Iraq might lead to an intensified war fought in the recent past, but without any risk of intervention from other countries, the United States successfully completed its task of dismantling these two regimes. This example of the U.S. war against Iraq and Afghanistan gave the notion to North Korea the likelihood of U.S. attack on North Korea without any risky intervention from other countries, given the China’s strict recent diplomatic developments with Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.

Against this backdrop, Japan reluctantly wanted to engage North Korea for the reasons aforesaid and the crisis in 1993, 1998 and 1999 over nuclear weapons and intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) tests. The notion of engagement with North Korea appeared almost oxymoronic.<sup>1</sup> Yet there have been basically eleven attempts by Japan to engage North Korea, which culminated in Pyongyang Summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong-il in 2002 and 2004.

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1. The use of engagement historically and theoretically presumes at least three things: 1.some confidence that interests and intentions between the “engager” and target state are somehow mutually compatible.2. Some confidence that the target state’s intensions are indeed engageable.3. If not 1 or 2, then some level of confidence that engagement can create the conditions for 1 or 2. But none of these conditions had been established in the DPRK case, yet engagement continued due to the hope that Sunshine policy gave. (Cha 2001)

## **Regional Actors and North Korean Nuclear Programme**

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The engagement efforts at improving relations took place during the détente years from 1971-74, when a train of Japanese officials went to Pyongyang, most notably Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi in 1971; the Japanese Diet established a league for promotion of friendship with North Korea; and memorandum trade agreements were signed. In the early 1980s, additional high-level initiatives were made through personal emissaries of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Third, at the end of the cold war, a delegation led by then Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) strong man and vice Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru returned from Pyongyang in 1990 with grand aspirations for normalization that led to talks in 1991-92.

The fourth attempt began with the resumption of preliminary normalization dialogue between Tokyo and Pyongyang in December 1999. In early December, Japan partially lifted sanctions on the DPRK, including the ban on charter flights and restrictions on unofficial contacts with DPRK authorities that were imposed after the August 1998 Taepo-dong missile test launch. This was followed by former Prime Minister Murayama Tomichi's visit to Pyongyang. Japan and the DPRK followed through on the December meetings in 2000 with the goal of holding formal normalization talks. In early March, Japan lifted a three-year suspension on food aid to the DPRK and committed to provide 100,000 tons of rice through the World Food Programme (WFP).<sup>2</sup> This met an important pre-condition for the North to start normalization talks. North Korea also responded with a 'smile diplomacy', which reflected a change in tactics largely for the purpose of regime survival. Japanese suspicion was whether there was more behind the smile (Cha 2001: 554). Proponents of Sunshine gave the hope to Japan's pursuit of diplomatic engagement actions with North Korea. It was argued that encouraging tactical opening and spurring some economic growth in the North will in effect start a process of change that will have a moderating effect on DPRK intentions.

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2. The special thing about the rice donated to North Korea is not just the quantity that exceeded the WFP's demand, but the decision to deliver Japanese rice rather than less expensive Thai or Chinese rice. (Kim 2002)

But Japan and in fact also other allies, the U.S. and South Korea faced the problem of inability to distinguish between tactics and preferences in their engagement policies with North Korea. There were, however, several signs of development or concession made by each side. Japan indicated that it would be willing to adopt the same formula it had used during normalizing relations with South Korea in 1965. North Korea for its part, suggested that it would not insist on “reparation” from Japan but would settle for “compensation”.<sup>3</sup>

Until tenth round of talks towards normalization the development seemed heading towards a successful ending. Despite the positive signs of the previous talks and Japanese efforts, the eleventh round turned out to be the opposite. The failure of the eleventh round of normalization talks was attributed to the leadership change in Japan and United States. More than Japan the leadership change in the United States changed the course of the progress of normalization efforts. In the U.S., the Clinton administration, which had become gradually closer to North Korea, was replaced by the Bush administration, which revealed its hawkish stance against the DPRK regime during the presidential campaign.

Another explanation for the statement of the normalization process can be attributed to the issues of “apology”, “compensation”, “abduction” and “missile development”. These issues were so sensitively related to nationalistic mood that the gap between the two couldn’t be narrowed from the outset. Moreover, at the time of the eleventh round, North Korea had more room to breathe, so that an early conclusion of the talks and a following monetary inflow were no longer an urgent need (Kim 2002: 92). During this time, North Korea had become more acceptable to international society after the ninth round of talks. It was admitted into the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), in July 2000, at which time many countries began to recognize North Korea.

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3. Due to these developments, the joint press communiqué after the tenth round of talks was brighter and contained more specific elements. The discussion aimed sincerely toward the early establishment of a friendly relationship.

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There were several signs that in 2000 the North Korean economy had improved. As the figure below shows, North Korea had experienced a positive gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 1999.

**Table 3: DPRK's GDP Growth Rate 1994-1999**

	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
<b>GDP Growth Rate</b>	-2.1	-4.1	-3.6	-6.3	-1.1	6.2
<b>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery</b>	2.7	-10.4	0.5	-3.8	4.1	9.2
<b>Manufacturing</b>	-3.7	-5.2	-8.9	-16.8	-3.1	8.5
<b>Building Trade</b>	-26.9	-3.2	-11.8	-9.9	-11.4	24.3
<b>Service</b>	2.4	1.7	1.1	1.3	-0.5	-1.9
<b>Government</b>	3.3	2.8	1.8	2.2	-0.3	-4.5

Source: Jung, W. J. 2001 "Estimated Results of North Korea's GDP for 1999", 2001.1.4, [www.kotra.co.kr/main/info/nk/eng/main.php3](http://www.kotra.co.kr/main/info/nk/eng/main.php3)

This recovery from the long march of negative growth rates was mainly due to aid from other countries, including Hyundai's Kungang Sight seeing fee (Kim 2001). The rays of hope came from another chance of normalization of relation between Japan and North Korea, when the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il seemed to solve the issues involving the two countries such as North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, abductees issue and colonial past issue in a surprise summit on September 17, 2002.

Koizumi went to Pyongyang expecting a resolution to the abductees' issue and in return assuring serious movement towards normalization of relations and reparations. In fact, relations between Japan and North Korea deteriorated very rapidly and at their lowest for many years. The admission by Kim Jong-il that North Korean agents had after all kidnapped almost all of the missing Japanese that Tokyo had accused them of abducting came to Koizumi's surprise. The failure was also an outcome of Japanese domestic politics combined with U.S policy in East Asia (Beal 2005: 339). The hard-line Japanese leaders urged Koizumi to break off talks with Kim Jong-il after he admitted abductions.

The U.S pressures also mounted on Japan to take hard steps regarding the normalization of relations with North Korea. As far as the Korean peninsula is concerned, Japan has no foreign policy of its own and simply follows Washington's lead. Japan's policy did not overstep the bounds drawn in Washington. The one exception was Kanemaru LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) vice president meeting with chairman Kim Il-sung, on resuming diplomatic talks in 1990. Kanemaru did this without the knowledge of the Bush (senior) administration and he came under heavy fire. The U.S. officials warned the foreign Ministry that resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue would be difficult if Japan ignored the implications for nuclear proliferation and normalized relations with DPRK. The official Japanese line, and the one disseminated in the Japanese and most international media, is the failure to resolve the abductees issue since the Pyongyang Summit and despite a second trip to Pyongyang by Prime Minister in May 2004, was due to Pyongyang's cheating.

As agreed, North Korea allowed the surviving abductees to return to Japan in late 2002. On the understanding that they would return to consult their families in North Korea on where they wanted to live. But the Japanese government barred them from going back to North Korea. The case of Yokata Megumi, who reportedly committed suicide after suffering a nervous break down, reported as having happened in 1993, but subsequently amended to 1994. The cremated remains of Yokata Megumi that was brought back to Japan in 2004 and after DNA tests on 8<sup>th</sup> December, the Japanese government announced that the remains were not those of Yokata Megumi but of two

other unidentified people. Pyongyang's response was angry and laid stress on the role of Yokata's Korean husband, Kim chol Jung. Pyongyang also issued a detailed criticism and raised doubts about the DNA testing process through Korean Central News Agency (KNCA). Pyongyang accused Japan of negating the severe efforts made by the DPRK driving the bilateral relations to the worse phase of confrontation (Beal 2005: 347). As neo-conservatives apparently attempted to utilize for a harder line policy against North Korea, Tokyo also tried to use its own conclusion to suggest punitive measures such as economic sanctions. As accused by the U.S. that North Korea might have a nuclear arms programme based on HEU and as Japan claims that North Korea might have sent false bone ashes either mistakenly or intentionally, but no scientific evidence has so far been provided to prove all allegations.

### **4.2 Japan's response to the Nuclear Crisis**

During the first nuclear crisis, Pyongyang's refusal to admit IAEA's inspection increased tension in the region. In the wake of Pyongyang's refusal Japan reaffirmed its intentions to cooperate firmly with the ROK and the U.S. (Sharma 1996: 71). At the Japanese-South Korea Summit meeting in Kyongju in November 1993, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa expressed his willingness to cooperate fully with the ROK in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Japanese willingness to cooperate fully with South Korea in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue was clearly indicated during president Kim Young Sam's state visit to Japan on March 24-26, 1994. The two leaders discussed at length the nuclear issue and agreed on a common approach to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

In this regard, they fully agreed to cooperate with the U.S., China, and other states. Hosokawa reassured president Kim that Japan would undertake responsible measures and actions within the framework of Japanese constitution in the event of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. They also agreed on the necessity of a closer consultative body among Japan, South Korea and the U.S. Hosokawa's successor Tsutomu Hata also retained same policy towards North Korea. Hata government indicated its willingness to cooperate fully with



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the U.S. and ROK in imposing sanctions on North Korea. In his testimony before the Foreign affairs committee of the House of Representatives, Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa stated that Japan would cooperate as much as possible even if the U.S. would take unilateral action against North Korea. On June 6, 1994, premier Hata decided to take the following course of action in dealing with North Korea. They are as follows:

- 1) To issue a warning prior to imposing sanctions;
- 2) To enlist China's support for exercising influence on North Korea;
- 3) To cooperate with the U.S. and South Korea if North Korea refused to comply with the request for full inspections of its nuclear facilities (Sharma 1996).

Although Hata expressed a preference for participating in the U.N. mandated sanctions he was willing to cooperate with the U.S. and South Korea in imposing sanctions even without U.N. approval. The Hata government received a draft resolution on June 15, 1994, prepared by the U.S. for the U.N. Security Council for sanctions against North Korea. The first phase of sanctions included a ban on scientific cooperation, U.N. economic assistance and curtailment of diplomatic, cultural, educational and commercial exchanges. In addition to a mandatory arms embargo, the ban on all air traffic except for scheduled passengers flights were imposed. This first phase would become effective 30 days after adoption of the resolution giving Pyongyang time to reconsider its actions.

The Hata government approved the U.S. draft resolution on sanctions, as the U.S. proposal was basically in line with its policy. In August 1998 North Korea's Taepo-dong-I missile test came as a nightmare to Japan, which flew over Japanese territory. This increased the concern of the Japanese government. With the increase in its missile launching capability North Korea became a real threat to Japan's security. After the Taepo-dong missile launch, the Japanese public sentiment toward North Korea hardened and the Japanese government took a proactive stance toward North Korea.

The missile launch led to the passage of legislation to support the revised U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines. In December 1998, the Japanese government formally declared its agreement with the U.S. for a joint research on a Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system in fiscal year 1999 (Hong 2000). After North Korean spy ships entered Japanese territorial waters in the spring of 1999, the Japanese government gave authorization for the Japanese Marine Self-Defence Force to fire at intruding North Korean spy ships in the future. It also introduced airborne refueling planes to the Japanese Air Defence Forces, giving the nation directly attack military bases inside North Korea. As the second North Korean nuclear crisis evolved Japan adopted a number of uncharacteristically bold responses. Japan participated in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI), which functions to interdict ships carrying missile export, one of North Korea's key sources of revenue. After decades of tolerating such commerce Japan moved to cut off sources of cash remittances that have been making their way into North Korea from pro-North Korean community in Japan. It also closed down credit union affiliated with North Korea indirectly. The Japanese parliament passed a bill that allowed the Japanese government to impose economic sanctions on North Korea, enabling the government to restrict trade with North Korea.

In June 2003 the Japanese Diet passed a series of war contingency bills that allow the government to assume increased powers in times of national emergency. In June 2003 the Japan enacted a law that could ban North Korean ships from Japanese ports. The legislation gives the carrot-and-stick approach to talks with Pyongyang. North Korea's nuclear programme rekindled the nuclear debate, in Japan. On 17 March 2003, U.S. Vice President Richard B. Cheney apparently stated that North Korea's nuclear and missile programme might trigger an arms race in East Asia, and that Japan might be forced to consider whether or not they, want to readdress the nuclear issues.<sup>4</sup>

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4. In April 2003, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa openly discussed the nuclear option. In May, chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda generally hinted at revising defence doctrine. (<http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?Id=437>)

However, Japan wants the issue to be resolved in a peaceful manner. However, because of North Korea's proximity to Japan and the immediacy of the perceived threat, Koizumi does not intend to follow the U.S. lead on North Korean relations.<sup>5</sup> His independent approach was demonstrated by his bold trip to Pyongyang.<sup>6</sup> The increasing hostility in America's approach to Pyongyang jeopardizes Koizumi's goals (North 2004: 48-49). However unlike South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Koizumi does not seek a fundamental review of his country's security relationship with the United States. Because, Japan feels that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is pivotal in not only resolving the nuclear issue but also for the peace and stability of the Northeast Asian region.

### **4.3 The United States and North Korea**

The relationship between the DPRK and U.S. has had been in a long-term turbulence. U.S. relations with both Koreas, while allied with South Korea and adversarial with North Korea, have reflected the structural difference and asymmetries of a global super power, largely a preeminent maritime power in East Asia and a continental centered middle power and of course with differences of history, culture and geography. In the case of North Korea, relations were frozen in isolation and cold-war enmity. For North Korea, the first and foremost enemy is U.S. For the U.S., North Korea is a residue of cold war, which now has taken new dimension of a post cold-war threat, with implications for U.S. interests in East Asia, security of Japan and South Korea as well as for its non-proliferation policies. This threat is not just a security threat but also a threat to the balance of power structure in the East Asian region as North Korea uses the China card for its support. For the U.S., any unilateral decision over the North Korean nuclear issue would not fetch the regional allies support as well as create great power rivalry which might affect the stability of the region.

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5. Koizumi with continued public support paid careful attention to his North Korea policy and not simply delegate to President Bush. He had a lot riding on successfully establishing diplomatic relations with North Korean and resolving outstanding bilateral issues.

6. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang to discuss the normalization of relations. Japan had been exploring this visit for more than nine months without telling the United States. Washington, in fact, found out about the trip only three weeks before it occurred, when Koizumi presented the upcoming visit as a fait accompli to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. (Harrison 2005)

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The dynamics of U.S.- North Korean relations reflect very different incentive structure driving each side's respective policies. The motives of the U.S. have been a rise of threat reduction, humanitarian considerations and alliance management. Whereas for Pyongyang, it is achieving an opening to the United States with twists and turns of the diplomacy- are best seen as part of a long standing pattern of seeking to manipulate major powers' concerns to its benefit, and so for its regime survival. USSR's collapsed in 191 and Russian disengagement from the Korean peninsula only served to compound North Korea's security anxieties. Like wise, the establishment of China-South Korea relations and reduction in aid discredited China as a reliable ally to North Korea. North Korea had little choice but to maintain ties with its more powerful Northern neighbors, and it has continued to receive some security benefits because of China's reluctance to see North Korea collapse or coerced by other powers in the region.

Under such circumstances North Korea began to search for new supporters to enable it to break out of its diplomatic isolation, to counter South Korean pressure, to establish a new balance of power, and ultimately to ensure its own survival. Thus North Korea adopted a strategy to restore the diplomatic, military, and economic balance of power against the South by establish links with those powers traditionally on the South's side namely the U.S. an Japan. This had involved the North Korean attempts to muster all the diplomatic and military pressure it could in order to detach the U.S. and Japan from South Korea sides and to weaken the U.S. security system in the region, which had for so long contained the North.

The nuclear viewed by Kim-il Sung s an instrument of both deterrence and coercion to serve this strategic goal of reunification of the father land, had turned at the afore said period as political bargain chip to achieve the key goal of regime survival. North Korea's economic decline and fears of absorption raised the profile of its concern about political legitimacy. Pyongyang viewed the U.S as the keeper of the gate without whose approval neither Japan nor South Korea were likely to be very forth coming toward North Korea. Pyongyang saw the U.S. in the forefront on the nuclear issue; leader

of the U.S.-ROK-Japan core of global coalition, North Korea saw this alliance as a largest prospective threat to it. North Korea sought to address the entire nuclear problem through the prism of the U.S.

### **4.4 The Nuclear Issue and the U.S. Response**

Fears about the North Korea's nuclear ambition had surfaced as early as 1984, with a discovery by the U.S. intelligence satellites of the North Korea's construction at its Youngbyon nuclear plant of second reactor believed to be capable of reprocessing plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. After a train of events as described in Chapter 1, it led to the October 21, 1994, DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework. Since the 1990s, North Korea's growing weakness and instability combined with the dangerous asymmetry of power on the Korean peninsula, had paradoxically set in motion a reappraisal of American policy on North Korea.<sup>7</sup> North Korea's covert nuclear weapons programme presented one of the first policy changes for the Clinton administration in 1993. In the spring of 1994, growing tensions over North Korea's nuclear programme pushed Washington and Pyongyang to the brink of war.

As North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect its suspect nuclear facilities, the Clinton Administration began to press the U.N. Security Council for international sanctions against North Korea. North Korea said that it would constitute a declaration of war. Influential commentators openly speculate about the need to launch a preemptive attack and the administration prepared to move major reinforcements to East Asia. But the preemptive officials keeping the memories of the Korean War opined that a preemptive strike against North Korea would lead to a general war on the peninsula that might claim as many as 100,000 American lives stationed in South Korea. The Clinton administration wanted to avert war and stop North Korea's nuclear programme simultaneously, for which the Congress with Democratic majorities was supportive.

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7. It became increasingly clear that America's deterrence policy alone was no longer sufficient for coping with the clear and continuing danger of a North Korean "hard landing" i.e., a reunification-via-collapse leading to absorption of North Korea by the South.

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However some Republican lawmakers accused the administration of being too soft and insisted upon military action against North Korea's nuclear programme. But Clinton administration believed that war would not be necessary because Washington would be able to coerce Pyongyang in to halting its nuclear programme if the United States negotiated from a position of greater military strength (Hathway 2004: 718). This view assumed that North Korea would act rationally when considering a military clash with the United States, even though members of Congress frequently described Kim Il-sung as irrational or bizarre. But the great confidence in the coercive capabilities of the American military power voiced by these republican lawmakers, contrasted sharply with the administration's belief that Washington needed to offer Pyongyang concessions in order to achieve U.S. objectives on the peninsula.<sup>8</sup>

The Clinton administration realized that North Korea's desperate economic situation would make an incentive policy possible. The Clinton administration also thought that North Korea was proliferating not out of strength but out of weakness. By 1993 the country's gross national product (GNP) was estimated to be only 5 percent as large as that of South Korea. And the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and China's decision to suspend economic subsidies tripped Pyongyang of its key foreign supporters.

This left the North with critical shortage at all levels of its economy, for example, electricity became a rarity in many parts of the country; as oil imports from the U.S.S.R fell from about 440,000 tons in 1990 to only 40,000 tons in 1991 (Newnham 2005: 168). The negotiators began to see the hints that this weakness could provide an opening especially the United States and its allies could replace the lost energy suppliers the North so desperately needed. Robert Gallucci, the chief U.S. negotiator with North Korea, noted that there was room for an exchange, which would provide for North Korea to do a great many things that were in the U.S. non-proliferation interests, if the United States could provide a great deal in the way of things it valued.

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8. A typical of congressional action on North Korea during these tense weeks was a nonbonding resolution passed by the Senate on 16 June 1994, by a vote of 93-3, which urged the administration to "take all necessary and prudent actions to deter and, if necessary, repel a potential North Korean attack". (Hathway 2004)

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In late April preparations for June talks began between then Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci and DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju. A joint statement on June 11, 1993, twenty four hours before the NPT withdrawal was to take effect, listed three agreed principles, beginning with “assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons”, while the two other principles insisted upon non interference in each other’s internal affairs and support for peaceful reunification. The statement added that in that context the two government would agree to continue dialogue. Eventually the DPRK unilaterally suspended carrying out its NPT withdrawal (Manning 2002: 73).

Similarly, in a second round of talks in July, a mutually agreed to DPRK press statement stressed that the U.S. reaffirmed its commitments on assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. In July talks a new blandishment emerged. According to the statement both sides recognized the desirability of the DPRK’s intention to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors. In addition, “as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issues,” according to the statement the U.S. was prepared to support the introduction of Light Water Reactors (LWR) (Manning 2002: 74).

Both DPRK and the U.S. appeared to be moving for a quid pro quo, trading the DPRK nuclear programme for a still emerging package of benefits. But for North Korea to continue its negotiations with the U.S. had to meet the conditions set by Washington: consultations with the IAEA and dialogue with South Korea. As North Korea was apparently anxious about the detection capabilities of IAEA, it did not permit IAEA to carry out minimal safeguard activities to verify even a continuity of safeguards on its monitored programme. This heightened tensions to the point that in early 1994, the Clinton administrations began to rush Patriot missiles and other reinforcements to South Korea, preparing for an imminent full-scale conflict. But, at the same time U.S. conducted lower level discussions with DPRK but not willing to go to third round of high level talks until Pyongyang allowed IAEA for inspections. But DPRK refused to allow the IAEA full access to its facilities.

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In April 1994 Pyongyang shut of its 5-megawatt reactor and informed the IAEA that it intended to refuel the reactor at an early date. The U.S. began to push for UN Security Council fir sanctions against North Korea. A nonbonding resolution on North Korea passed by the senate on June 16, 1994, by a vote of 93-3, which urged after several negotiations and former U.S. president Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang in October 1994 the United States signed the Agreed Fragment, which averted a war between the U.s. and DPRK. The Agreed framework froze activity at North Korea's known nuclear facilities and allowed for IAEA inspection of those facilities. In return the U.S. and its allies were to provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and two LWRs.

The accord also provided for the resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea and movement towards the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang. But members of Congress raised various questions with regard to the accord such as how the U.s. could trust North Korea to implement the agreement when Pyongyang had a long round of stealth and deceit. In addition, Congress members opined that North Korea's existing power grid would not be able to use the electricity that the light water reactors would produce, which might lead Pyongyang to demand assistance to upgrade its grid. One of the most common criticisms leveled at the Agreed Framework was its failure to address North Korea's missile and chemical and biological weapons programmes.

The support among Republicans grew for the notion of an "Agreed Framework plus", a new agreement that would expand on the Framework by addressing issues such as North Korea's ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons programme and its overseas missile sales. The interest in a renegotiated agreement reflected increased concern by the late 1990s that Pyongyang could soon possess missiles that could strike the United States with Weapons of Mass Destruction. A serious crisis emerged in August 1998 when the New York Times reported that the U.S. intelligence had discovered a high level of activity at a heavily guarded North Korean bunkers at Kumchang, prompting Americans fears about the existence of a great nuclear facility (Hathway 2004: 724).



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After months of negotiations, North Korea, in March 1999 concluded an agreement with the United States to allow Washington to conduct multiple inspections of the suspected site in exchange for large quantities of food aid. But subsequent American inspections of the site found no evidence of nuclear activity. During the same period, on August 31, 1998, DPRK surprised U.S. intelligence by test-firing a multistage rocket that flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. Although the intelligence community eventually concluded that the test was a failure; immediate comment emphasized the potential threat to Alaska, Hawaii and ultimately the American heartland.

Congress adopted a legislation in October 1998 mandated the appointment of a senior administration official to coordinate North Korean policy and Clinton named former Secretary of Defence, William Perry to that position on November 12, 1998. After a ten month review Perry submitted a report to Clinton on September 15, 1999. What became known as “the Perry Process”, Perry outlined two alternative courses of action. The first path envisioned a comprehensive set of negotiations that would lead to reciprocal actions by Washington and Pyongyang to eliminate the North Korean nuclear and long range missile threats and would result in the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations. The second less desirable path, was a continued policy of containment, most likely leading to an increase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Two days after the report was submitted, Washington and Pyongyang took a potentially important step along the first path. Accordingly North Korea signed a moratorium in Berlin in September 1999 to halt its missile tests as long as negotiations with the United States continued. In return, Washington pledged to ease a range of economic sanctions on the DPRK.

### **4.5 Bush Administration and the Nuclear Crisis**

The elections of George W. Bush in 2000 gave Republican lawmakers the chance to put their approach into practice in North Korean matter that differed from that of the Clinton’s administration. Initial signals from Bush suggested that he shared the skepticism of Congressional Republicans towards the North Korean regime. He was

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reluctant to negotiate with Pyongyang. Bush's labeling of North Korea as part of an international "Axis of evil" mirrored the hard line rhetoric, which used to be the voice of Republican members of Congress (Hathway 2004: 732). Initially, Bush was slow to develop a dramatically different comprehensive policy. He backed the Agreed Framework, and continued to provide food aid, and sought to resume negotiations with Pyongyang. This was criticized by the Congressional Republican. The course of events brought about changes in Bush administration's policies changes.

The summit meeting between Bush and South Korean president Kim Dae Jung, in March 2001, highlighted the division within the Bush team, and between Seoul and Washington with regard to the continuation of the engagement policy toward North Korea. In an event to smoothen the internal and external divisions the Bush administration issued its policy reviews in June 2001. The strained Washington –Seoul relationship with regard to North Korean improved somewhat. The division and ambiguities within Bush administration returned after the 1 September 2001 attacks on the U.S. When North Korea tried to induce cooperation through the accession to various U.N. anti-terrorism conventions and through a concrete offer to further restrain missile testing. But the U.S. did not accept any kind of partnership with DPRK in the fight against terrorism. On 29 January 2002, Bush, in the State of Union address pushed the fight against the "Axis of evil" to the top of his foreign policy agenda. This was a big turning point in Bush policy towards North Korea.

The Bush administration highlighted the difference of its approach from that of the Clinton administration, while South Korean President Kim Dae Jung insisted for more engagement with Pyongyang to keep the momentum of the June 2000 summit meeting. But Bush gave only rhetorical support to the Sunshine policy and asserted that he distrusted the North and there were some indications that North Korea was violating its agreement with the U.S. Thus the first phase of the Bush administration's North Korea policy was marked by divergent views within the administration and failure of the U.S.-ROK summit meeting.

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During and after summit, the need was stressed by rising national and international pressure for Washington's as to support of the Sunshine Policy and an early conclusion of the policy review. Bush was criticized that he gave the impression that he wanted to pressure the North Korean ballistic missile threat, despite the progress in bilateral U.S.-DPRK relations under the Clinton administration, in order to legitimize the National Missile Defence programme (Keeney2001). The Bush administration presented the results of its policy reviews, which made clear that moderates in the State Department had won the day over more-conservative forces in the Pentagon in formulating the North Korean policy of the administration. Overall, the results of the policy review mirrored the conclusion of the armistice reports of 1999, which criticized the Perry Process as insufficient, (Armitage 1999) but at the same time accepted the baseline of the Clinton engagement policy while criticizing it. The second phase of the Bush administration ended with an adjusted in its 'go-slow' policy.

It also mirrored the conclusions of the Council of Foreign Relations Task Force in March 2005. Thus there was an undramatic policy shift vis-à-vis North Korea occurred between the Clinton administration and Bush administration. At the same time the toughening of the U.S. became clear when the old topics such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programme were combined with newer topics such as conventional arms control. Although the report rejected the idea of scraping or renegotiating the Agreed Framework, it pressed for an acceleration of the implementation process, i.e., an early conclusion to the talks between the IAEA and North Korea on special inspections at undeclared nuclear sites.

While the review supported an initiative to end the North Korean ballistic missile programme, it also stressed the need for intrusive bilateral verification measures in all phases of the programme such as development, testing, deployment, export. In contrast to the Clinton administration, the Bush administration added conventional arms control to the negotiating agenda. The prioritization of IAEA inspections, the call for an intrusive missile verification regime and bilateral talks on conventional arms control seemed to that Washington had raised the stake considerably for further negotiations.

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In addition, Washington imposed symbolic sanction a North Korean firm, the Changguang Sinyong Corporation for proliferating Missile technology items (Harnisch 2002: 869). On the wake of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. policy priority switched to South Asian and the military campaign against Al Qaeda and Taliban. Pyongyang's unprecedented condemnation of the attack on the U.S. and its support. U.S. was turned down by Bush administration. On January 29, 2002, president Bush "Axis of Evil" speech in his state of the Union address clearly shifted gears in the U.S. approached toward North Korea. The toughening of the Bush administration stance continued, which was made clear in Secretary of State Powel's speech that raised bar for negotiations with North Korea.

While Powel reiterated the no pre-condition for negotiations, Bush put forth conditions for negotiations such as Pyongyang to get out of the proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles that threaten others, move towards a less-threatening conventional weapons posture and came into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguard. In sum, since taking office the Bush administration position in relation with North Korea had toughened considerably. When the crisis broke in October 2002, as North Korean officials admitted to having a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme after allegedly confronted with evidence by U.S. officials. The following month, Washington convinced its allies to halt fuel oil shipments, which had been part of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

In December North Korea expelled IAEA inspections and dismantled surveillance cameras at its nuclear facilities. In response to these measures, during the course of the Iraq war, Washington reinforced its forces on the Peninsula in, sending two thousand soldiers and Carl Vinson carries Battle group; as well as a force of thirteen stealth night hawk fighter bombers to the U.S. air base at Kunsan. But North Korean leader Kim Jong-il likely sensed that his regime would be safe during the U.S. war against Iraq became Washington was certain to avoid fighting two wars simultaneously (Goldstein 2006: 178).

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The U.S. intelligence failure in Iraq case has made U.S. to take cautious steps in dealing with North Korea due to mounting pressure from national as well as international community. As a result of which U.S. and its allies felt that the Korean nuclear and missile crisis could be solved only through Six Party talks. This resulted in four rounds of talks. But U.S. persistent demand for CVID, (Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement of Nuclear Reactors) resulted in failure, which demanded Pyongyang to do it without any security guarantee or economic assistance. The underlying assumption of the hardliners in the Bush administration was originally that China would cooperate in bringing about a collapse of the Kim Jong-il's regime by putting economic pressure on Pyongyang. Instead, China began stepping up its economic help to Pyongyang, made clear that it did not want North Korea to collapse. The hardliners then staged a temporary tactical retreat.

The Bush administration permitted assistance Secretary of State Christopher Hill to launch a serious negotiating initiative with Pyongyang in mid-2005. This resulted in the September 19 Six-Party talk Beijing Declaration. But very next day Pyongyang told that it would agree for CVID only if it received light water reactors and security guarantee. This again brought the issue to the beginning. Immediately thereafter the hardliners in Bush administration have orchestrated a campaign to depict North Korea, as a "criminal regime" with who normalized relations are not possible.

In September, the US government ordered suspension of transactions with a Macau based bank that was alleged to have counterfeit money and frozen the assets of eight companies accused of involvement in weapons sales, Publicized defectors allegations of regime engagement in large-scale opium production and accused North Korea of the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit hundred dollar bill; "super notes".<sup>9</sup>

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9. The U.S. denunciation of North Korea on grounds of counterfeiting was dubious for another reason. On Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's instructions, the Pentagon in 2003 drew up something called "Operation Plan 5030", a revision of its earlier plan for war against North Korea that featured stabilization, including "disrupting financial networks and sowing disinformation". (Gavan 2006)

While the U.S. ally South Korea's policy into stabilize and liberalize the existing regime in Pyongyang a "changing regime" policy- leading to a confederation and eventual reunification, the Bush administration policy seems to be by contrast, a 'regime change' in Pyongyang (Harrison 2005).

### **4.6 China and North Korea Relations**

Historically, Chinese influence in Korea manifested itself by general parallel between the rises and falls of Korean dynasties and Chinese dynastic rule and the keen interest of Chinese leaders in Korean Security, especially because of China's rivalries with Japan, and, in the last century, the U.S. (Han1994: 17-28). Chinese-Korean historical relations have left their imprint on the present scenario also. North Korea is the only country with which China maintains its cold war alliance past (Kim 2002: 109). China's Key national Security objective on the Korean Peninsula is to have a friendly, stable Korea; this means having a Korea that is not a setting for a major war, and receptive to the PRC's influence and does not become a spring board for the extension of Japanese military or economic Power.

Since China established relations with the Republic of Korea in 1992, Beijing has had to promote "peace and stability " in Korea while carrying out a difficult balancing act of engaging the South while sustaining the North (Jinbao 2001: 33-44). Chinese leaders have been sensitive to North Korea's stubborn adherence to its own foreign- policy and development paths. China had always regarded North Korea as an essential security buffer, an interest that fits China's new security concept, which emphasis friendly relations with bordering states and a multi polar response to "hegemonism".<sup>10</sup>China's impact both on the political and economic systems in DPRK are substantial. But the ideological partnership between China and North Korea rapidly decreased in importance as the Chinese leadership moved into the fourth generation and distanced itself from the rigid communist system of the past (Swanstrom 2004: 52).

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10. China's policies seem clearly to be driven by a consistent set of purposes: to sustain Chinese influence in a divided but peaceful Korea for as long as the North can survive and to position China to continue to have influence over Korean affairs after unification, presumable when the North passes under Seoul's authority. (Gurtov 2002)

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The North Korea nuclear and related issues along with the question of how to manage it in a cost – effective way, remains one of the most-important challenges confronting China’s foreign relations in the post Cold War world. Since the 1993-94 nuclear crisis, an unstable North Korea with inordinate potentials to destabilize Northeast Asia through its conventional and non-conventional military capabilities and threat had been expanding refractory ramifications for China’s Foreign Policy in general and its two-Korea’s policy in particular. After the Cold War the Chinese aid to North Korea sharply fell, but this did not cut off the relations between China and North Korea completely. The Sino-North Korean relations improved since 1999 onwards by a series of high level political and diplomatic exchange including president Jiang Zemin’s official State visit to Pyongyang in early September, 2001.

China’s current support for North Korea is not just partly born out of the fear of having US troops at the Chinese–Korean border, but also due to the fear that a collapse of DPRK world, apart from a probable war, create huge refugee flow to China’s North eastern provinces. China’s position on the North Korean nuclear issues related negotiations has been affected by its ambivalence towards both North Korea and the United States military position in the Korean Peninsula. China fears that the military intervention by the U.S. would lead to the dissolution of DPRK followed by the creation of a unified Korea controlled by the Americans. There is also a great concern in Beijing over Pyongyang’s interest in developing nuclear weapons. Moreover apart from the dangers Pyongyang possessing nuclear weapon, China fears, it would undoubtedly lead to a popular demand in Japan to acquire nuclear capabilities. According to China, this is something that would further threaten the regional security and stability of the Northeast Asian region.

Faced with asymmetrical interdependence realities between China and North Korea, in all political, military and economic issue areas Beijing seeks to achieve multiple mutually competitive goals on multiple fronts. These goals include: maintaining peace and stability on the Korea Peninsula, promoting economic exchange and cooperation with South Korea, helping North Korea’s regime to survive, reducing the

financial burden of the bilateral relationship by replacing aid with trade and investment, sustaining two-Korea status quo as long as it can maintain influence in both and use the North leverage with the U.S. on the Taiwan issue, halting the flow of North Korean refugees, stopping the rise of ethno nationalism among ethnic Chinese-Koreans, enhancing China's influence in Korean affairs, preventing the formation of any anti-China coalition in East Asia, and expanding and diversifying China's foreign policy options by viewing East Asia as the center of Chinese power and influence. According to China all these goals can be realized by resolving just one issue: North Korean nuclear issue.

### **4.7 China's Response to the Nuclear Crisis**

China's public stance on North Korea has been consistently supportive of Pyongyang and consistently critical of Washington (Tracik 2005). But the official statements about North Korean nuclear crisis place at least part of the blame for heightened tension on Pyongyang. But China gradually disappointed with the North Korean nuclear drama and its withdrawal from NPT in 1993. The Chinese government openly opposed Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT and repeatedly called for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days in March 2003, ostensibly for technical reasons. Reports in September said China sent 150,000 troops to guard its border with North Korea. It was speculated that Beijing intended these acts to be diplomatic signs to pressurize Pyongyang to move toward reaching an agreement to halt its nuclear weapons programme. However, the support for regime change in North Korea did not become part of China's official policy position due to the fear that a collapsed North Korea would pave way for a unified Korea and thus allow the U.S. troops presence very near to its border. Thus china insisted to resolve the Crisis through dialogue rather than military pressure or economic sanctions. During the initial years of the crisis China did not involve into the matter deeply.



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Because, during the 1993-94 crisis the Chinese leadership was in a period of transition. The third generation of leaders was consolidating their positions and powers, while at the same time trying to handle the post-Cold War order as well as the aftermath of the 'Tiananmen Square' incident. During this period of consolidation of power by Jiang Zemin, China continued with its "open door" policy, encouraging foreign investment and development of a market economy and a private sector (Swanstrom 2004: 64-65). It was also during this time that the Sino-U.S. relations focused on engagement and economic cooperation that took priority over the ideological considerations. China viewed the economic growth as an essential factor to secure comprehensive national strength. Hence, the creation of favorable conditions for economic growth, international trade relations especially with the U.S. was of China's priority. China was focusing on another important policy objective: to develop a reputable position in the international community, both to be perceived as a responsible power and to counter the China threat theory that most countries in the region adhered to.

This was the time the North Korean first nuclear crisis erupted when Beijing was occupied handling its own internal problems and political changes. China perceived this crisis as a stumbling block for the fulfillment of Beijing's policy goals since it endangered the improved Sino-U.S. relations. Thus, China preferred to maintain a low profile, wielding its influence through hidden channels and at the same time consolidating the domestic situation. Chinese government said that the North Korean nuclear issue was principally an issue between North Korean and the United States, and it was most appropriate for those two countries to reach a settlement through bilateral negotiations (Roy 2004).

Thus, Beijing followed a policy of informal and non-threatening interaction with regard to North Korea, which limited the possibility for either the U.S. or the international community to convincingly threat North Korea with sanctions (Niklas Swanstrom 2004: 65). Despite Chinas stance against any pressure towards the DPRK, the increased importance of its relations with the U.S. and regional neighbors in comparison with an increasing frustration with DPRK's position and brinkmanship

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pushed China to change its position. With Beijing's increasing frustration a retraction of support to the DPRK followed and China also made an unprecedented move to get openly involved in the DPRK negotiations. In May 1993 Beijing abstained from, rather than blocking, Security Council resolution calling for DPRK to change its position on the nuclear issue.<sup>11</sup> But Beijing's general reluctance to force the North Koreans to participate in formal multilateral negotiations and despite a continued pressure from the U.S., ROK and international community China's refusal to use coercive measures gave Pyongyang the impression that China was still there to back them. But China's reluctance to pressurize North Korea was due to the fear of implosion in the North that might result in refugee flow into China and damage its growing economy. However China's participation though limited as a facilitator ended in the Agreed Framework in 1994.

The period 1994-98 witnessed a period of strained relationship between China and North Korea. However the Kosovo war served as the proximate catalyst for setting in motion the process of repairing the strained relationship. The developments in the region in late 1990s such as the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation and the growing U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of TMD system, and the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, gave China the images of an America bent on global hegemony through the containment of China.<sup>12</sup>

China also perceived that the Kosovo war would establish a dangerous precedent of bypassing the UN Security Council for American Neointerventionism by lowering the threshold for the use of force, and of replacing or trampling state sovereignty as the core principle of international relations (Kim 2002: 113). Kosovo triggered alarm in Pyongyang, with a sense of crisis that North Korea too could become a target of America.

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11. U.N. Security Council Resolution 825 (1993).

12. Chinese policy in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue is basically shaped by its main threat. The threat comes from the Bush administration's so-called "hedge strategy" to cope with the rise of Chinese influence in international affairs by more and more relying on a normalized Japan and the American presence in Guam and Japan to hedge growing Chinese influence in Asia, while playing the card of Taiwan independence. (Wang 2005)

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Thus Beijing's displeasure with North Korea was put aside as the China began to see the United States as the more clear and present threat to its own interests in Northeast Asia. Against this backdrop, Beijing's relations with North Korea began to normalize, starting from the spring of 1999 via exchange of high-profile delegations. Beijing dispatched two delegations in October 2000, one of which was a military delegation to Pyongyang, headed by Defence Minister Chi Haotian, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of its entry into the Korean War (Kim 2002: 115). Jiang Zemin's visit to North Korea in 2001 meant to represent the formal mending of relationship that had been troubled from 1994-98 and to repay two successive visits by Kim Jong-il in May 2000 and January 2001. When the second nuclear crisis arose in 2002, China became a key player as both North Korea and the United States were seeking Chinese backing for their respective position. The United States was disappointed with Beijing for refusing to formally pressure the DPRK. But China continued its focus on informal influence. China in turn was frustrated by the Bush approach to handling the crisis, which China believed would only aggravate the situation.

However China also became increasingly frustrated with Pyongyang, which continued to escalate the crisis by restarting the Yongbyon nuclear plant. China feared as earlier mentioned, that if North Korea acquired nuclear weapon, it would provide an excuse for Japan and Taiwan to either develop their own nuclear programme or to unite under a U.S.-led TMD system. On 1 August 2003, China managed, by informal pressure, to convince the DPRK whose preference was bilateral talks with the U.S., to participate in Six-party talks. The outcome of the meeting was only a consensus on the need to meet again and it was called "the beginning of a process" by the American State Department. Five rounds of the Six-party talks ended without any progress. In the fifth round of talks North Korea announced that it would be unthinkable to return to the table while Washington was taking actions against it for alleged counterfeiting, drug trafficking and money laundering.

China's role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is pivotal for all other five parties involved in six-party talks. China emphasizes that North Korean nuclear issue should be solved in a peaceful environment. Finally to say, China feels the dilemma in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. The security analysts view that, China would lose face if North Korea tested its nuclear weapon and American-led international opinion would blame China for the outcome. Realizing such an outcome, China warned North Korea in private that if it abstains indefinitely from negotiating, China will not oppose the U.S. bid to hand over the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council or that China will abstain from voting when the UN talks about imposing sanctions against North Korea (Wang 2005: 485).

### **4.8 South Korea's Reaction to the Nuclear Issue**

From the very inception of two States in one nation on the Peninsula the relationships of South and North Korea has deeply entrenched in the politics of the Cold War. The politics of the Korean Peninsula got very specific characteristics that involved the U.S. as a key player along with the USSR and China. But the U.S. presence continued even after the withdrawal of Chinese and USSR troops from the peninsula. The end of the Cold War at the global level heralded the beginning of a new era in the international policy. However, in the Northeast Asia, the end of superpower rivalry did not reflect in the total transformation in the equations of the major power players of the region. The most important alliance among South Korean, Japan and the United States continued to be an important variable in the security scenario of the peninsula.

The inter-Korean relation has not been restructured in any significant manner in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the threshold of emerging post-cold War order, South Korean president Roh Tae Woo made a series of policy declaration to ease the persistent tension on the peninsula due to a hostile relationship between the South and North. In July 1988, Roh initiated an open effort to cultivate contacts and improve relations with communist states by engaging a form of diplomacy known in South Korea as nordpolitics.

Other noteworthy endeavors in this regards were Roh's inaugural message, the 'special Presidential Declaration for National Self-determination, the Unification and Prosperity' of 7 July 1988 and the, "Korean National Community Unification Formula of 1989 (Kim, Dong Won 2002: 61). Through these initiatives South Korea postulated a policy of 'integration of a National Society first, Unification later'. But North Korea proposed to establish a 'Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo', which in essence called for 'national unification first, integration of National Society through exchange and cooperation later. On the basis of preliminary talks held between North and South Korea to seek a common ground in the aforesaid positions, high-level talks were resumed in October 1991 after a successful and simultaneous entry of both North –South Korea in the United Nations in September 1991.

On 13 December 1991, an agreement on reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, was signed and the same was ratified in February 1992, which was named as Basic Agreement. Another agreement of 'Joint Declaration' on the Democratization of the Korean Peninsula was concluded on 31<sup>st</sup> December. However, a sharp difference in the position of both sides remained unsolved regarding the course of reunification process. The aforesaid improvements in the inter-Korean relations from 1988 to 1992 and emergence of a mature understanding got thwarted in 1992, as the North Korean nuclear issue assumed prominence.

When North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on the pretext of unwarranted demands by the international Atomic Energy Agency to inspect two sites at Yongbyon, South Korea decided to conduct annual joint-military "team spirit" exercise for 1993, with the U.S. By North's decision in the Spring of 1994 to begin unloading fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor, the U.S. and South Korea were disturbed that North by the removal of rods without safeguards would move one step closer to the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. The U.S. and the South Korea began to lay out specific plans for UN sanctions.

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The sanctions were to be developed in three stages; to involve the stoppage of all technical and remittance to North Korea from its citizens residents in Japan estimated to total between US \$ 40-400 million annually; and for the interdiction on the high seas of all shipping traffic to the North. The diplomatic and military impose was finally broken on 15 June by visit of ex-president Jimmy Carter to North Korea which culminated in Agreed Framework in 21 October, 1994. However, a large section of South Korea was not happy with improvement in the US-North Korea relations. It was perceived to be symbolic of dilution of American commitment to the U.S.- South Korean alliance. The implementation of the accord was institutionalized with establishment of Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 and South Korea and Japan became involved in a very significant manner and South Koreans grievance of not being involved in initial negotiation process of the Nuclear Accord was rectified (Kihl 1997: 103).

In August 1998, when the three stage missile Tae-podong I was test fired over Japanese territory the newly elected president Kim Dae Jung was confident enough of his own democratic credentials and long held Pacific ideals to eventually break ice with North Korea. Kim Dae Jung preferred to treat the North Korea as a partner to reconcile and cooperate with. The gap in the manner of Foreign Policy implementation was clearly visible between South Korea and the U.S. over the issue of missile development of North Korea. Although South Korea was worried about the North Korea's missile programme and export of missile technology and missile to other countries, it did not insist on a policy of confrontation. Rather South Korea preferred a policy of engagement with North Korea to address the objective or subjective threat perceptions of North Korea.

The policy of engagement followed by Kim Dae Jung administration resulted in a Summit Meet between the leaders of North and South Korea in Pyongyang in June 2000. Kim Dae Jung's approach did not get sufficient support and encouragement from the Bush administration. However, Kim Dae Jung felt the need for rapprochement with Pyongyang, because any insanity on its part provoked or otherwise, would be detrimental for it given the physical proximity of both sides. Kim Dae-Jung government proceeded with its sunshine Policy toward the North.

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From South Korea's view point, this was neither a simple concession to North Korea nor an appeasement policy, but it was instead aimed at lasting peace based on a strong security stance. However, the North-South relations after the September terrorist attack on the U.S. and the second nuclear crisis in 2002 remained in a stalemated state, and the environment of reconciliation and cooperation that was created by the Korean Summit has not been maintained (Lee 2002: 338-39). However, South Korea did not want any imposition of economic sanctions or military action against North Korea by the United States. This was possible due to a relative autonomy of South Korea foreign policy, influenced by gradual deepening of democracy, from the US policy. Due to the growing anti-American sentiments in South Korea, which was caused by a fundamentally altered threat perception held by South Koreans towards North Korea,<sup>13</sup> inter-Korean relations remained static and through out the emergence and deepening of Second North Korean nuclear crisis and South Korea is showing remarkable level of maturity and consistency in pursuance of its policy of engagement vis-à-vis North Korea.

Nonetheless, the U.S.-South Korea alliance was not being dismantled in any significant manner, in the process of incremental autonomy of foreign policy by South Korea. South Korea feels that military alliance, apart from pragmatic needs of the allies, is also a political practice, which is central to the constitution, production and stabilization of state identity. The deteriorating relationship of the U.S. and North Korea has made it difficult for South Korea to sustain the process of rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea. South Korea supports the multilateral redressal of North Korean threat perception without compromising South Korean security. The attitudes of Seoul in the five rounds of Six-Party Talks in Beijing exemplifies the mature and pragmatic foreign policy behavior, which does not lose sight about the long term interests of South Korea and the peninsula as whole.

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13. As a legacy of the Sunshine Policy, South Koreans today did not view North Korea as the palpable threat that Americans, and especially the current Bush administration views the Kim Jong-il regime. Thus, South Koreans expressed their dissatisfaction with a lack of progress in engagement, not towards North Korea, but perversely against America and its policies. (Hwang 2003)

### 4.9 Russia's Role in the Nuclear Issue

Russia has significant economic, political and strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula. Russia was a close ally of neighboring North Korea for 45 years, after the World War II. Now Russia has good relations with both North and South Korea. After the downfall of the Soviet Union, Russia stopped its economic aid to North Korea, which strained the relations between these two countries. The normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul showed the pragmatism of the post cold war world. Moscow skewed two Koreas policy in 1990, but ended with a whimper. Moscow was the chief catalyst for transforming the political and strategic landscape of Northeast Asia, including the initiation of cross-recognition and the entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations (Kim 2000: 36). But since the mid 1990s Moscow had retreated significantly from its skewed policy, moving toward a more balanced policy as a way of reassuring and thus enhancing its leverage in Pyongyang and resuming its great power role in the politics of divided Korea.

During the first North Korean nuclear crisis Russia did not play even a minimal role in resolving the issue. The precipitous and traumatic decline of Russia from great power status to a powerless poor state made Russia restrain from any regional activities apart from economic activities. Against this back-drop, when Vladimir Putin, assumed office as president of Russia in May 2000, reaffirmed his pledge to restore Russia's a great power. His state visit to Pyongyang on July 20-21, 2000, coincided with the completion and ratification of three national security concept and foreign policy blueprint documents that year: a new national Security Concept, a new military doctrine and a new foreign policy concept. The new foreign policy concept also made reference to the Korean Peninsula, expressing Russia's desire to play an important role in the inter Korean peace process and to seek balanced relations with the two Koreas.



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On May 15, 2000, speaking at the presentation of diplomatic credentials ceremony president Vladimir Putin stated: “Historically and geopolitically the Korean Peninsula has always been within the sphere of Russia’s national interest” (Lukin 2003: 75). This manifested the new policy aimed at more active ties with both Seoul and Pyongyang and Russia’s role in stimulating inter-Korean dialogue. On explaining as to why Putin had to visit North Korea for one of his first visits abroad he said that Russia was interested in peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and economic cooperation with both Korean States to stimulate the development of the Russian far east. Therefore it badly needed dialogue with Pyongyang (Lukin 2003: 77).

In February, 2000, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov traveled to Pyongyang to sign a new treaty- the DPRK-Russia treaty on Friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation as a fresh start to replace the 1961 security pact that was scrapped in 1996. The new treaty, which took effect in late October 2000 with an exchange of certificates of ratification, was hailed as providing political and legal guarantees to boost cooperation and exchange in all aspects of the DPRK-Russia relationship. The automatic military intervention clause of the 1961 treaty which is mentioned in Article 1 was replaced by a new “immediate contact” clause in case of a security crisis, in the new treaty in Article 2.<sup>14</sup>

The trade relations between Russia and North Korea also improved. Russia was eager to help reconnect an inter-Korean railroad that links up with the trans-Siberian rail line, which could reduce the cost and time required to transport South Korean exports (Wuchte 2005: 225). Russia thinks that this project would reap a huge economic reward from a successful unification of North and South Korea that could link transport networks from Korea’s Pacific Ports to Russia and Europe while opening the Korean market for new Russian natural gas fields, and would get North Korea’s huge debt to Russia repaid by a unified Korea (Kim 2002: 39).

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14. The new “immediate contact” clause of Article 2 was more ambiguous as compared to the previous one. The new clause read: In the event of the emergence of the danger of an aggression against one of the countries or situation Jeopardizing peace and security, and in the event there is a necessity for consultations and cooperation, the [two] sides enter into contact with each other immediately. (Kim 2000)

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This was perceived to be the specific measures taken to enhance Russia's great-power role in inter-Korean affairs. Putin's personal diplomacy in 2000-2001 was a dramatic step not only toward bringing Moscow back into the rapidly changing Korean Peninsular equation in order to reassert Russia's great-power identity, but also to counter troublesome American policies. (Kim 2002: 38), the recent developments in economic and bilateral relations were overshadowed by the recent turn of events on the Korean Peninsula and what it perceived as the U.S escalation of tensions over North Korea's nuclear and missile programme. Like any other neighbors of Northeast region, Russia also sees the solution to the current crisis in a negotiated settlement, believing that threats, sanctions, and accusations would be counter-productive.

At the same time, president Vladimir Putin was firmly opposed to the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapon State, a circumstance that would greatly complicate Russia's Security interest in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT surprised Moscow and it expressed deep concern. Russia feels that such a move could only exacerbate the already tense situation around the Korean Peninsula and damage international regimes, global and regional security. North Korea's announcement of its withdrawal from NPT, refusal to cooperate with IAEA, reactivation of nuclear programmes and admission to possessing nuclear weapons were roundly condemned by Russia. As Russia is serious in cooperating with other countries on the non-proliferation regime, Moscow declared that North Korea should renounce all nuclear and WMD programmes. At the same time Russia reiterated Washington's role in the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework with Pyongyang.

Sharing the same principle with China, joint Russian-Chinese declaration signed during Chinese leader Hu-Jintao's visit to Moscow in late May 2003, which reiterated that the preservation of peace and stability on Korean Peninsula meets the security interests of both Russia and China and the common aspirations of the international community. It also stated that the scenarios of power play or the use of force to resolve the problems existing were unacceptable.


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The declaration also stated that the security of the DPRK must be guaranteed and favorable conditions must be established for its socio-economic developments. Russia's role in the North Korean nuclear issue was legitimized by its entry into six-party talks in August 2003. Russia's increased role in the nuclear issue had widened its role as a regional power in the Northeast Asian region. Russia has two fundamental interests concerning the Korean Peninsula: first, Russia does not want WMD anywhere in the world, least of all on its border, second, Russia does not want a war in Korean Peninsula, significantly due to the Russia's general understanding of the current international situation, particularly the disturbing wish on the part of Washington to unilaterally establish international rules, ignore international law and defy international organizations especially the UN and its Security Council. And if there is a war near the Russian borders it will result in a flow of thousands of hungry people from North Korea to its territory. Moreover, both North and South Korea are Russia's economic partners. Russia has economic projects in both countries.

Thus Russia wants a friendly and cooperative situation on its borders, which would provide appropriate conditions for the growth of Russia's troubled economy. In general, Russia is willing to cooperate with the international community on the North Korean nuclear issue to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Moscow is ready to use whatever leverage it has on Pyongyang to persuade it to renounce its nuclear programme under the condition that Pyongyang agrees to the deal and peace is assured (Lukin 2003: 96). Russia closely coordinates its policy with South Korea, China and the U.S. to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully through the most appropriate channel: Six Party Talks.

## CONCLUSION



As this study reaches its conclusion part this chapter will briefly analyse the previous chapters and give the findings of the research. As mentioned in the introduction section East Asia in the region where the interests of four powers – China, Japan, Russia and the United States- intersect and where the Korean peninsula is still divided between North and South. Prospects for a security order in this strategically important region in the 21<sup>st</sup> century seem to be bleak with protracted tension in the region due to North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. There are plenty of reasons to look at North Korea as a strategic challenge- a state whose conventional and mass –destruction war capabilities pose potential threats to South Korea, Japan and the United States.

North Korea should be seen as weak state with legitimate security needs. National Security, whether understood as a process or as an objective, refers to the protection of core national interests from external threats. There tends to be little dispute over the nature of core national interests: physical Security, economic prosperity, and preservation of national values, institutions, and political autonomy (Goldman 2001). Dramatic shifts in national security doctrine are often the product of major discontinuities such as regime change, defeat in war, disappearance of a major threat or revolutionary technological break throughs that alter the foundation of national power.

A country like North Korea always anticipates threat from a superior power. In that case, a competitor i.e. the weak country that cannot match a set of superior capabilities however, may opt to inhibit or constrain the super power by developing niche capabilities, or asymmetric responses, designed to offset superior strengths. A niche competitor need not acquire the capabilities to defeat the superior power, but simply to deny it the ability to exploit its superior capability.

Asymmetries always exist among rivals and inferior powers invariably seek ways to avoid the strengths, exploit the vulnerabilities, and degrade the capabilities of their superiors. The relative cheapness and accessibility of new technologies, many of which do not require the infrastructure needed for developing and operating more complicated systems, mean that more technologically advanced societies do not command the advantage they once might have had.

North Korea's ability to achieve negotiation with the United States was possible by this asymmetric approach. Given the current circumstance, North Korea believes, the only effective means of ensuring its survival is to possess the most awesome arsenal, which includes nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As analyzed theoretically in chapter II, the real cause for North Korea's nuclear programme has to be understood in order to resolve the ongoing issue. North Korea's logic behind its nuclear programme has changed over the period of time. During and after the Korean War an imminent threat from the U.S. was perceived by North Korea as the U.S. moved its nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1958.

The structure of the bipolar world politics during cold war always kept this insecurity intact. After the disintegration of Soviet Union such a military threat from the U.S. became very real as the Iraq war in 1991 showed the military superiority of the U.S. North Korea could not only rely upon its million plus conventional army force. It needed something superior, which could create fear for any country that attacks North Korea. It should be seen in this standpoint that the security concerns and self-reliance in the absence of Soviet Union's support caused North Korea to go for an intensified nuclear programme. But later the way things unfolded due to the U.S. threat of war, pushed North Korea to think whether it is the short-term goal of saving the regime, which relies on '*Juche*' principle, or to peril its regime in protection of its nuclear programme. American had an edge over North Korea during the first nuclear crisis because North Korea was still in the process of producing a nuclear weapon.

Thus it was easy for the U.S. to attack North Korea and bring about a Regime change. It was sure that it would not face any nuclear deterrence from the north. Thus, any kind of provoking action from the North Korean side would have been detrimental to North Korea. Having realized such situation North Korea agreed to come to the negotiation table to freeze its nuclear programme. The point here is the offensive character of North Korea had been fading since the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And by becoming a member of United Nations in 1991 North Korea indirectly denoted that the goal of reunifying the Korean peninsula through force had become bleak. Thus the real purpose of having a nuclear arsenal is for deterrence. In order to protect its regime from a U.S. attack North Korea left with only one option: to sign the agreed framework. This was the motivation behind North Korea's nuclear programme during the first nuclear crisis.

Now the second nuclear crisis requires a different perspective to understand the motive behind North Korea's nuclear programme. First of all the situations during the first nuclear crisis needs an understanding here. During the first nuclear crisis North Korea's policies were strongly based on Kim il Sung's principal ideology of *Juche*. Even the acceptance for an agreed Framework was not seen as an infringement of *Juche* ideology. Because North Korea did not get the crude oil supply from the U.S. out of the later's discretion, but in turn it agreed to freeze its nuclear programme. The reason behind this logic is explained in the following pages. The situation during which the second nuclear crisis arose was different from that of the former one. North Korea faced the following years after the Agreed Framework with flood and famine in 1995, 1996 and 1997, which devastated not only its people's lives but also its economy.

During this period the North Korean government initiated a number of retrenchment campaigns, but by the spring of 1995 the situation had become so dire that North Korean government approached first the Japanese government and then the South Korean government for food assistance, reaching agreement in June. In July, it announced to the public that it was receiving external assistance, although failed to mention the South Korean role.

In August 1995, North Korea made a formal request for emergency assistance to the United Nations and immediately began receiving aid from the U.N.<sup>1</sup> The economic aids by foreign countries including the United States were not extended to North Korea in return for any obligations from North Korea. North Korea, whose principle ideology *Juche* does not justify such aids from foreign countries. This situation should be understood in the context that there has been change in North Korea's fundamental principle itself. If North Korea can compromise with its basic ideology in order to get economic assistance then why should there be reluctance to reform its economy? North Korea's claim that it is fighting to protect its socialist, *Juche* ideologist regime is not justified with the acceptance of foreign economic aid.

It can be argued that it was the same reason as it had in 1994 when it signed Agreed Framework, that survival of the regime as a short term goal was behind its acceptance of foreign assistance. But the survival of the same socialist regime could have been achieved by adopting economic reforms by following the China's reforms model, where still communism holds its position and so the one party structure. Thus by following a Chinese model, North Korea could have very well improved its economy and avoided any kind of crisis. But here I would like to emphasize on the role of personality cult politics of North Korea. Kim Jong il had been enjoying an absolutely superior position and often referred to supreme leader, who is also worshiped by his people. The military officials who also enjoy a formidable position also get whatever they want. Any kind of reform would bring change in the positions these people had been enjoying so far.

This is the logic behind the short-term goal of regime survival of North Korea. The only way to remain in their position is to improving the economy but not at the cost of the regime change. Hence the only means to get economic assistance is through the strategy of brinkmanship. Thus the clear-cut change in the motivation behind North Korea's nuclear programme is evident.

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<sup>1</sup>. The food assistance has been running at approximately \$500 million annually since 1998. The provision of this aid had posed a variety of challenges and ethical dilemmas for private and official providers of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) is still barred from areas accounting for approximately 15 percent of the population and is unable to employ Korean speakers, and is forced to submit to prenotification for site visits.

Another point to add is that North Korea has proven adept at adapting to extremely challenging circumstances. Its top leadership and political-economic system survived adversities such as the end of alliance support by Russia and China, and their greatly reduced assistance; nuclear stand off with the U.S.; flood and famine, energy shortages and other hardships.

All these shows the North Korea's system survivability and the durability of military first-party state rule. At the same time North Korea seems to show a willingness to deal on its missiles and nuclear capability. The point here is that North Korea against all those hardships did not give up its nuclear programme. It continued to develop its nuclear weapons. This shows that in order to save its regime from any kind of external threat nuclear weapons is the only shield. Now it is willing to come to negotiation table. North Korea is ready to dismantle its nuclear programme in return of economic aid and security guarantee. But it may give up its further proliferation process. However, it might not take any assistance at the cost of its present nuclear weapon arsenal.

The United States approach to the North Korean nuclear issue is of great concern. The United States approach to North Korea is colored first and foremost by the hegemonic position of the U.S. in East Asia. U.S. policy seeks to maintain primacy, politically and economically as well as militarily. The U.S. security ties with South Korea and Japan reflect the primacy of its goal in East Asia. No country or combinations of countries in East Asia have ever come closer to matching the U.S. network military base, which consists of 100,000 forward deployed forces, nuclear and conventional weapons deployments.

But North Korea looms large in U.S. strategy because of its socialist ideology, closed economy, and conventional and unconventional military capabilities that are outside U.S. control and thus challenges the U.S. kind of system represented in its alliance with South Korea and Japan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent famine in North Korea gave the anticipation to the U.S. that the collapse of North Korea was nearing.



It should be seen in this standpoint that the U.S. delayed the construction of the Light Water Reactor, which was supposed to be completed by 2003. As the time for the dead line was nearing and the expected collapse did not take place, in 2002, the U.S. sparked the second nuclear crisis. In addition, Kim Dae-Jung's 'Sunshine' policy and the subsequent Pyongyang summit in 2000, and Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi's Pyongyang summit in 2002 showed ever more conciliatory approach that Seoul and Tokyo had been taking toward Pyongyang. If the reconciliatory relation becomes realized then the security umbrella of the U.S. to South Korea and Japan would mean a review of security ties among South Korea, Japan and the U.S., which would ultimately result in U.S. troops withdrawal and thus wear off the U.S. dominance in the region. By raising the Uranium issue and blowing it out of proportion the Bush Administration hoped to scare Japan and South Korea into reversing their policy (Selig 2005).

North Korea's "NCND" (neither confirm nor deny) policy also helped U.S. to interpret things according to its own wish with the help of its satellites. The China factor, however, limits the pressure the U.S. can bring on North Korea. Any U.S. decision that might provoke a forceful North Korean response would definitely have to take the Chinese reaction into account. Moreover the rise of China and its influential relations with both Koreas puts China first in bringing about any peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. A U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea's missiles, such as TMD, runs afoul of Chinese Security concerns. Because TMD would neutralize China's small nuclear-missile arsenal. Japan's and possibly Taiwan's involvement in a TMD network is a worrisome development in East Asia for China.

China and even South Korea also fear a Japanese remilitarization under the excuse of North Korean nuclear and missile programmes. The military expenditure in Northeast Asia is rapidly increasing. Thus, despite the fact that the region has relatively few states, which would make it easier to cooperate, there is deep distrust among all parties. Not surprisingly, Northeast Asia is the only region in the world today that lacks a formalized regional cooperation institution.

Discussions about an increased dialogue between the parties has been going on for sometime, but regional parties have never been able to agree about the structure of the dialogue, the agenda or as to who should lead the discussions. However, the post-Cold War era has made changes in the approaches of these countries. All these countries in the region feel the need for an economic stabilization of the region and so they also realize the impediments to such phenomenon in the form of distrust between countries and the protracted North Korean nuclear issue.

The post Cold War era witnessed praiseworthy attempts for conflicts management such as Korean peninsula Energy Development organization (KEDO), Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Northeast Asian Dialogue (NEACD), but they did not shape into regional organizations in the formal sense. Other informal multilateral institutions namely trilateral coordination and oversight Group (TCOG), Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), Tripartite Environment Ministers' Meeting (TEMM) and finally Six –Party Talks. Among these multilateral bodies the only informal institution that gives rays of hope for resolving present nuclear issue is Six-Party Talks. While the KEDO has been stalemated and TCOG serves the triangular relationship of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. in their broad policy level on the North Korean nuclear issue, the Six-party talks though at present is stalemated due to distrust between the U.S. and North Korea on each other, possess the potential not only to solve the nuclear issue but to develop into a multilateral security organization in Northeast Asia.

Thus, though there are security dilemmas among the countries of Northeast region, the present economic growth of the region and the fear of any destabilizing events, keep the countries of this region to resolve any kind of issues in a peaceful manner. To conclude from the findings of above analyzed chapters, there had been swift change in the North Korea's logic behind its nuclear programme as it was started for deterrence purpose but had been changed for the purpose of fulfilling Kim Jong il's short term goal of regime survival. As far as the regional security and cooperation is concerned, the States in the region have a deep economic interdependence and, good

infrastructure and thus it is politically and militarily difficult for one state to dominate the region and there is a relative cultural homogeneity. But there has been lack of regional cooperation and military and political rivalry. The only hope for a regional organization that can deal with Conflict Management Mechanisms (CMMs) is Six-Party Talks. The security situation leads to devastatingly high military cost and Northeast Asia needs to increase openness and trust on each other through opening up economic and security cooperation institutions, so that the transaction costs for security can decline. However, in Northeast Asia such developments are possible only by resolving a few historical and current North Korean nuclear issues.

Figure 1

Appendix 1



5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon.

Figure 2


Appendix 2



**Radiochemical Laboratory at Yongbyon. Note the demolished corner near the bottom of the image in a facility whose purpose is unknown. The “canyon” where reprocessing occurs is a long, multistory building on the right**

Appendix 3

Figure 3



50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon.

Figure 4


Appendix 4




A composite series of images showing the cooling tower at the 5 MWe reactor. A plume is visible in January 2005 and is not visible in the images from April and June 2005. A plume is visible in September 2005 and January 2006. In the most recent image, from May 16, 2006, a plume is not visible above the cooling tower.

Figure 5

Appendix 5



September 11, 2005



May 16, 2006

A comparison of September 2005 and May 2006 images of the 50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. Continuing construction is evident at a support building adjacent to the 50 MWe reactor facility. Within the compound housing the industrial buildings, however, there does not appear to be any substantial construction activity. A mobile crane, first identified in the September 2005 image, remains in the same location in May 2006.



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