

**RELIGION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PAKISTAN'S
DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS INDIA (1947-1965)**

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Snigdha Kumari

Centre for Diplomacy, International Law & Economics

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi-110067

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PREFACE

The relations between any two countries are determined both by the internal as well as external objective situation in which their politics are supposed to work under the international and national obligations. The national interest of each country is an important factor in determining the relations between the two politics but many times each country has to make some alterations in her national interests in consonance with the global interests at large. Sometimes these relations are disturbed because one particular country perceives the other as a party to some alliances. Further more, the ideology of a country and power gains are some important factors in determining and sustaining the relations between the two countries.

Ever since the birth of Pakistan, the relations between the nations, of the sub-continent-India and Pakistan - had been far from friendly. From the very beginning both the countries felt threatened by each other and have been collecting arms to strengthen their armed forces.

The story of Indo-Pakistan relation has been mainly a story of conflict. This conflict emanates from and finds manifestations in a number of problems. These problems are mainly political. At the base of the conflict are interests

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and objectives of ideology, image of each other and power struggle between India and Pakistan.

The period from 1947-1965 has been chosen to explore and analyse the stages in which Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated. This study brings out vividly the trends of relations between the two countries.

The study has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter throws light on the emergence of Pakistan out of the partition of India in 1947. Pakistan was founded on the basis of a religious aspiration, to provide a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. Its basis, its core, its being, very Islamic.

The second chapter deals with the divergent foreign policies of India and Pakistan. It throws light on Pakistan's attempt to woo the Muslim countries of the world against India. In the middle of the twentieth century, the Islamic world was still a reality. Pakistan's tentative first steps were taken in a world in which the Pan-Islamic idea, though heavily compromised, was not completely dead.

The third chapter of this study deals with Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in India. The existence of religious minority groups in the two countries has added further complexity to Indo-Pakistan relations.

The mental image that each has formed of the other has ~~a~~ greatly been influenced by the attitude that each country is alleged to have taken towards the religious minority.

The fourth chapter deals with the princely states i.e. Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Kashmir has been of use to Pakistan. It gave the new nation a course. Pakistan had no policy, no formed attitude, when it came into being, Kashmir become at once the corner stone and the keystone of its foreign policy.

In the last chapter entitled conclusion, the findings of the study have been summed up.

The study is based on secondary sources such as books, articles and newspaper reports.

CHAPTER - I

RELIGION AND THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN

India was passing through two great revolutions at once : the revolution of national liberation, undoing one hundred and fifty years of British rule, and the revolution of Hindu-Muslim separatism, undoing a millennium of Islamic conquest and Hindu reaction. No great revolution is ever accomplished without force and suffering, force often ill-applied and suffering often of the most innocent victims.

- H.V.Hudson

Communalism in Indian politics was generally described as the Hindu-Muslim question. This mode of designating it is seriously misleading. It suggests that the problem was wholly or mainly religious. It also implies that the Hindus and the Muslims were the only parties concerned. Both these ideas though widely prevalent are wrong. The communal problem was more political than religious; it was chiefly political though masqueraded under a religious garb.

Muslims in the sub-continent are local converts and are of the same race as the non-Muslims. Thus the race being largely the same, why should there be two countries instead of one?¹

1. Muntaz Hasan, The Background of the Partition of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. C.H.Philips, M.D.Main Wright, ed., Partition of India 1935-47 (London, 1970), p. 319.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century the British Government began to think of the devolution of political power to the people of the country and constitutional reforms began by instalments; the Hindu intellectuals of the time were quick to take advantage of the British consolidation of the sub-continent. Having come into contact with European ideas of nationalism and democracy, these politically conscious intellectuals, who were the main force behind the newly formed Indian National Congress, saw a rare opportunity before them and in the name of democratic freedom began to claim India for the Indians which in effect came to mean for the majority community.² The majority of Muslims, who regarded themselves as a distinct and separate community, did not take kindly to this nationalistic but impracticable view of future.

As the British government desired to associate people with the administration in increasing measure, particularly in the shape of Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 and the establishment of provincial autonomy in 1937, the scramble for power and position in the political and administrative set up of the country became more and more bitter and the relations between

2. Ibid., pp. 324-25.

the Hindus and Muslims deteriorated progressively.

For the Muslims, Iqbal was a man of vision and Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a man of action. The man of vision could discern the inner process of history behind the outward events and give voice to the latent aspirations of his people in clear and unambiguous terms. The man of action gave concrete shape to the visionary dream and led the movement which gave the Muslims of the sub-continent an independent state of their own.³

The contest in India lay between the forces of nationalism as represented by the Indian National Congress, the spirit of communalism as embodied in the Muslim League, and the British imperial interests. There was thus a communal triangle in our country.⁴ When Indian nationalism became assertive and self-conscious the British imperialism tried to checkmate it by counterpoising one community against the other and provoking their religious sentiments. It thus produced the monster of communalism which soon became the bane of Indian politics.

3. Ibid., pp. 330-32.

4. Ashok Mehta and Achut Patwardhan, The Communal Triangle in India (Allahabad, 1942), p.50.

The British government accentuated and exploited the differences between Hindus and Muslims which already existed. It cannot be said to have created them out of a void. For our misfortunes were thus partly to blame. The foreigners were bound to maintain their supremacy some how or the other, but why should the Hindus and Muslim fall into the trap, distrusting each other and trusting the foreigners?

In its inception the League was thus communal body which it remained throughout its entire chequered career. The League ultimately succeeded in securing its objective in the shape of Pakistan. According to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the delay in the growth of a strong Muslim middle class enabled the League to work up and utilise the psychology of fear among the emotionally excitable Muslim masses. It raised the cry of 'Islam In danger' and propagated that under a Congress rule which would be nothing but the rule of the Hindus under a disguise the fate of the Muslims would be the fate of underdogs. Such irrational appeals to the religious sentiments of the gullible Muslim masses went home and they rallied under the banner of the League in the Hindu majority provinces.⁵ Thus the two communities under the

5. R. Copland, India : A Restatement (1945), p. 186.

religious garb drifted apart from each other. Religion was like an unbridgeable gap for them. The river of religion separated them more and more and they became the two sides of the religious river, never to meet again.

The encounter between Hindu and Muslim cultures that began over a thousand years ago has profoundly influenced both. They have met at many points, on battle fields and at festivals, around market places and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the low lands of mundane affairs. Yet they have remained distinct. They have mixed but never fused, they have co-existed but have never become one.

The partition of the British Indian Empire into separate Hindu and Muslim nations, in 1947, was a last minute concession to rampant history. Pakistan was created from two sections of the Empire, roughly 1,000 miles apart, to give political autonomy to the Muslim minority. This subdivision was an awkward and tragic effort to end the religious war which had raked the subcontinent intermittently for centuries. The idea⁶ was to provide a homeland for the Indian subcontinent's Muslims or most of them, a place whereafter, the British imperial power had gone, they could freely develop their way of life in an Islamic environment apart from the Hindus.⁶

6. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London, 1966), p. 13.

The faith of Islam was brought to India in the eighth century A.D. by Arab traders, and principally, by Turkish invaders knifing through the vulnerable north-west. For 1,000 years, the Hindus lived under despotic and often cruel Muslim rule. Even today, they cannot forget that their sacred land was violated by Muslim conquerors. Today's Muslims, in large measure, are the descendants of converted Hindus.

Under the British rule, the Muslims fell from proud overlordship to a wretched minority. The Hindu profited economically. In reaction to this situation, in part, ^{to} the activities of Hindu political factions, Muslim communalism grew stronger. One result was a fundamentalist revival which sought to strip modern, innovations and foreign influences from the Islamic faith. The movement, called Wahabism, preached the slogan, 'Back to the Koran!' and sought to restore the holy war.

The politico-economic conflict between the two communities widened quickly at the start of the twentieth century. In 1905, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy, divided the south-eastern province of Bengal into two parts. Eastern Bengal, became a Muslim province. Hindu Bengalis vigorously protested and their grievances became a nation-wide issue. In the process, Congress was fashioned into

a nationwide party, instead of a collection of loose groups. Muslim leaders, fearing the prospective success of Hindu agitation formed the Muslim League in 1906 to obtain greater political influence. In 1909, the Morley-Minto reforms granted Indians limited representation in provincial Legislative councils. This first step towards home-rule also established the system of providing separate electoral lists for minority groups, with a certain number of seats reserved for them. The purpose was to solve communal rivalry, but the result was to extend it. The concept of 'communal representation' meant the recognition of the political separateness of Hindus and Muslims, a precedent of immense consequence. 'Behind the shadow of democracy', says T.C. Percival Spear, 'had come the shadow of Pakistan'.⁷

For the next forty-eight years, until independence, the conflict between the Muslim league and Congress became the dominant undertone to the central Indian struggle for freedom. The Muslim leaders, feared the establishment of a Hindu state, more than ^{that} they abhorred the thought of continuing under British rule.

7. T.C. Percival Spear, India, A Modern History (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 327.

The word 'Pakistan' had first been put forward in 1933 as a religious concept by Indian Muslim undergraduates at Cambridge. The Muslim League first adopted the concept of a separate state in a resolution of 1940, but Pakistan was not mentioned by name. For several years, primary support for the idea came not from the Muslim dominated regions which were to form the new state, but from inland areas where Muslims were in the minority and more fearful of their future. Muslim splinter parties outside the League were different or opposed to the proposal, and at first it had only limited acceptance within the community. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the League also failed to win support from Muslim countries outside India. Practical politics thus nullified the claim that all Muslims were religiously united by the urge to convert the world. Even the prospect of creating a new 'State of Islam' could not bring them together.

Within India, however, the pressures were mounting. By the end of the Second World War, it was clear that Britain intended to grant early independence. Jinnah alone spoke for the majority of the Muslims. Mohammad Ali Jinnah based his demands for a separate Muslim state on the contention that the sub-continent was actually composed of two individual nations. 'Islam', he said,

is not merely a religious doctrine, but a realistic and practical code of conduct - in terms of everything important in life, of our history, our heroes, our art, our architecture, our music, our laws, our jurisprudence. In all these things, our outlook is not only fundamentally different, but often radically antagonistic to the Hindus. Our names, our clothes, our foods - they are all different; our economic life, our educational ideas, our treatment of women, our attitude to animals - we, challenge each other at every point.⁸

The concept of partition was anathema to Hindus. Religiously, it would mean the rape of Mother India, the far corners of which were sacred to a nature-worshipping people. Perhaps the tendency to discount the power of Muslim separatism arose first from the religious belief that nothing could disturb the pre-ordained wholeness of this land. As the late President Rajendra Prasad pointed out, the daily cleansing ritual performed by millions of Hindus obliges them to picture the entire country and renews their belief in the sacredness of its mountains and rivers. The water with which the Hindu washes himself comes from a number of holy rivers, including the Indus which, except for its headwaters, lies within modern Pakistan. It cannot be denied that, irrespective of who rules and what were the administrative or political divisions of

8. Ian Stephens, op.cit., p.27.

the country, the Hindus have never conceived of India as comprising anything less than what we regard as India today.⁹

None of the obstacles deterred Jinnah. He preached his vision with cold determination and ruthless single-mindedness. Mohammad Ali Jinnah began to feel that he had the power ~~to~~ achieve partition, and power can be a great intoxicant. He thought that if he could do it why should he not? The other Muslim politicians, for the most part, hitched their waggon to the rising stars.¹⁰ Finally, Mohammad Ali Jinnah founded a nation on religious fundamentalism that was too archaic for the rest of the Muslim world to accept.

The creation of Pakistan was made possible out of what appeared to be an impossibility in the twentieth century. It was odd, because, it was made possible by a factor which had proved politically imponent in the case of other movements. Islam, which made Pakistan a reality, has so far proved a mirage as an ideological framework for Pakistani society. But rarely in history has any nation applied herself so vehemently to the

9. Ibid., p. 83.

10. V. P. Menon, An Outline of Indian Constitutional History (Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1965), p. 56.

search for a theory by which to live and the quest for an identity of her own. The reason for this is that Pakistan is highly conscious of her weakness as a nation and of the fact that Islam is the only ^{factor} ~~2~~ making for an effective nationalism.¹¹

Pakistan's appearance in the world, in an era which witnessed the birth of many new nations was unique because, paradoxically Pakistanis considered the creation of Pakistan as a protest against nationalism. What this really meant was that Pakistan was based fundamentally neither upon the territorial criterion of nationalism, nor on language race or culture, but upon a sharing of a romantic view of Islam. Pakistani elite as well as general public, were anxious to call this an ideology and insisted on referring to it as such.

Pakistanis are clinging to the myth of Islam, which is their style of thought and system of communication. It expresses a social mood of Pakistan in which life without the drug of Islam might become impossible and unbearable.

11. Arif Hussain, Pakistan : It's Ideology and Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p. XIII.

Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, said in America that it was a matter of great importance that, in this era of so many new nations, one new nation knew what he wanted to do.¹² Today these words sound ironic. For in the restless pursuit after a political framework for a good life, Pakistan has many times had no frame-work at all.

As soon as any threat appears of Pakistan's disintegration whether internal or external, the press and the Government immediately embark on an intensive propaganda campaign for Islam. 'Islam in danger' becomes the slogan. The Pakistan movement based its ideology on Islam. Islam, however, was a slogan only and no one was quite sure what was meant by the Islamic state or the Islamic way of life. Islam did provide a complete system of cognitive assumptions and affective identifications, which manifested themselves in the speech, aims, interests, ideals, in short in the behaviour of Muslim people in India and the conception of history in Islam is bound up with the ideology of Pakistan.

The ideology of the Muslim League, mainly revolved around the 'two nation theory', with Islam as a slogan rather than a programme.

12. Ibid., p. XV.

The ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic state found its first expression in the Objective Resolution in March 1949, wherein Pakistan was conceived as a state to enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam, as set out in the Holy ~~Quran~~ ^{Quran} and the ~~Sunnah~~ ^{Sunnah}. This was reflected, some time later in the adoption of a nomenclature. "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan" for the new state.¹³

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was not religious from the point of view of Islamic dogma. Even in the movement of Pakistan he provided the tactics and not the thought behind it. Mohammed Ali Jinnah asked the people to be Pakistanis first.¹⁴ It is clear that he conceived of Islam only as a religion. His version of the 'two-nation theory' appears to be based upon this dominant difference of religion. He clearly accorded Hinduism the same status as Islam, a point which no other Pakistani conceded. For Hinduism is considered a religion only and Islam primarily a polity. Mohammed Ali Jinnah did not live

13. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates,
vol. XV, 2 November, 1953, p.664.
speak,

14. Quaide-e-Azam, /Speeches by Quaide-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Founder of Pakistan, Karachi; ed.
pp. 5-12 (Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims to be Muslims).

long after the emergence of Pakistan to give any clear indication of his trends.

Liaquat Ali Khan did actively talk about Islamic socialism, although he did not do anything positive. Speaking of Islam, he said; 'It firmly believes in the right of private ownership, although it frowns on large/ accumulations of unearned wealth and is greatly concerned over menacing inequalities.'¹⁵

Liaquat Ali Khan also said in America in May 1950 : "In a world of conflicting ideologies, nations that have recently achieved full sovereignty are likely to be victims of mental confusion and consequent instability. Is it not, therefore a matter of supreme satisfaction that at last one nation amongst such nations should not suffer from such confusion and should as a matter of tradition and belief be pledged to clear-cut and easily intelligible principles of democracy and social and economic justice?"¹⁶

It is ironical that this aspect in which Mr. Khan took such pride in fact proved the very malady of Pakistan. Mohammed Ali Jinnah died in 1948 without having produced any distinctive ideological organisation of the Pakistani

15. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan : The Heart of Asia, p. 16.

16. Ibid., p. 16.

society. Even if he had lived, it is doubtful whether he was capable of producing any thing nearer to the myth of Pakistan. He considered Pakistan as a solution of the minority problem of India. To him democracy in a United India was unworkable for it meant 'Hindu Raj all over India.' Liaquat Ali Khan, who, inherited the mantle of leadership after Mohammed Ali Jinnah, also failed to contribute anything except a great deal of talk about Islamic socialism and Islamic justice. He was assassinated in October, 1951, and Nazimuddin stepped down from the office of Governor-General and became the Prime-Minister, which position he occupied until 1953.

In September, 1954, a draft constitution was approved by the constituent Assembly, but at the same time the Assembly enacted laws sharply curtailing the powers of the governor general. The Governor General retaliated by dissolving the Assembly and on the ruling of the Federal Court a new assembly was formed.

A new constitution was passed and in March, 1956, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan started functioning, though with no significant changes. Nearly all groups agreed that the 1956 constitution did not contravene, in any important respect, the requirements of Islam. Yet

the prototypes of its institutions were in operation in British India. The institutions of 1957 were not so very different from 1927.¹⁷

There were no general elections and the National Assembly, which came into existence after the formation of one unit but consisted mainly of old members of the Constituent Assembly, became a battleground between the executive and the legislature on the one hand and between various personalities on the other. In fact, it remained primarily a device with which the formation of the governments was blessed. Eventually things got so bad that in 1958 Martial law was declared.

In 1962, a new constitution was introduced. Again the President was to be a Muslim and no law repugnant to Islam could be passed. It was to be supervised by the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, to be appointed by the President. In addition there was to be an Islamic Research Institute to undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam, to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.

17. Keith Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, p. 19.

The nature of the Islamic state was debated at great length for nine years. Even though this produced no change the idea of the Islamic state was not given up.

The first and foremost "strain" in the words of President Ayub "was ideological" and Pakistan was "involved in the paradox of almost losing its ideology in the very act of trying to fulfil it."¹⁸ The main point which arose was what Pakistan was about to be? Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani, for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name... So prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then ideologically we were Muslims territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional territorial and

18. Muhammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspective, Foreign Affairs, New York, July 1960, p. 547.

and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan.¹⁹

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, in the words of President Muhammad Ayub Khan, "already a sickman on the eve of his triumph",²⁰ wanted now that Pakistan had been achieved, the communal hatchet and the pernicious two-nation theory should be buried. He stood for Pakistani nationalism on secular lines, to be detriment of Islamic ideology so far advocated by the Muslim league. Mohammed Ali Jinnah asked the people to be Pakistani first, rather than be first Hindus or Muslims. Speaking at the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August, 1947, he observed, "If you will work in co-operation forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour caste or creed, is first, second and last citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make."²¹

19. Ibid., p. 549.

20. Ibid., p. 549.

21. Quaid-e-Azam Speaks, Speeches by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Founder of Pakistan, June 1947 - August 1948, vol. 1, pp. 9-11.

Was this secular attitude, which in fact repudiated all what the Muslim League had stood for in the past, due to the 'sickness' physical or mental of Mohammed Ali Jinnah?

This statement caused furore in West Pakistan. The Muslims prior to 14th August, 1947, had set their heart on Pakistan; Pakistanis now set their heart on Islamic ideology. Mohammed Ali Jinnah too fell in line and started laying emphasis on the role of Islam.

President Muhammad Ayub Khan developed a theme of Islamic nationalism in his speech at Dacca on 26 August 1964, "Islam has its own concept of nationalism contrary to others... Muslims could live at peace with the Hindus, but merely by living together, common nationalism cannot be evolved. Our philosophy is different. It is not possible to assimilate the one into the other."²²

The Pakistani nationalism based on Islamic ideology has been three fold. One, in consonance with the ideology, the sovereignty of the state vests with Allah,

22. Morning News, Dacca, 27 August, 1964.

God, rather than with people. As the minorities are not members of the Millat (Islamic brotherhood) they cannot be entrusted with the power to propound and execute state policy at the highest level.

Two, conversely, the Muslims inside Pakistan and across the border in India, in view of Pakistani leaders form one nation though citizens of two states - Pakistan and India.

Three, because of its ideology, the fibre of Pakistani nationalism, is very weak and Pakistan still feels psychologically insecure. The existence of a strong, powerful India in the neighbourhood further accentuates this sense of insecurity.


The Islamic state as an ideal and Islam as a myth are the two constituents of the Pakistani ideology. These two factors have not been translated into social programmes but they do have some influence in conditioning the state of mind and the attitude of the Pakistani nation.

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CHAPTER - II

RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY :

PAN-ISLAMISM A STRATEGY AGAINST INDIA



The first & foremost strain between India and Pakistan in the words of President Muhammed Ayub Khan "was ideological" and Pakistan was "involved in the paradox of almost losing its ideology in the very act of trying to fulfil it."¹

The ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic state found its first expression in the Objective Resolution in March 1949, wherein, Pakistan was conceived as a state to enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. This was reflected some time later in the adoption of the nomenclature - "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan" for the new state.²

According to Arif Hussain, "The Islamic state as an ideal & Islam as a myth are the two constituents of the Pakistani ideology."³

The Muslim League in spite of having one leader and a centralised organisation, never published or openly discussed any social programme. The two nation theory was the only aspect which was spelled out in clear



1. Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective, Foreign Affairs, New York, July, 1960, p.547.
2. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol.XV, 2 November, 1953, p. 664.
3. Arif Hussain, Pakistan, Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London 1966), p.25.

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terms. The diversity within the idea of an Islamic state came to the surface and there were proposals by various personalities and socio-political groups advocating on the one hand a theocratic state and on the other hand a secular state. In the end it was a secular view that prevailed. But secularism in Pakistan is not exactly the same as that which is indicated by the term in common usage. A specific social mood, or a kind of nationalism, blended strongly with the myth of Islam is the result of the thinking in Pakistan.

The primary feature about Pakistan is the fact that it is a Muslim state. But so are other states. The difference is that Pakistanis are highly conscious of the fact that they are Muslims. In fact, the sense of community in Pakistan is only real where Islam is concerned. Thus Islam as an idea and as a myth appears to be the only positive factor which lends some kind of cohesion to the Pakistani nation.

The first outcome of this ideological conflict was that the Congress always stressed and followed a policy of Asian solidarity. In March 1949, significantly before India became independent the congress convened the Asian Relations Conference. The Muslim League refused to participate on the ground that it was a thinly disguised attempt on the part of the

Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the prospective leader of Asiatic people.

It began to be suggested that the Pakistani government had adopted the deliberate policy of setting itself up as the leader of a Muslim bloc as a counter to Nehru's assumed ambition to make India the leading Asian power of the Far East.

There is a radical disagreement within Pakistan on the social and political implications of Islam. Two propositions would however secure general acceptance. They are, first, that Muslims are not Hindus, and second, that in some sense all Muslims are (or at least ought to be) brothers.⁴

The feeling of mistrust between India and Pakistan is perhaps no where more prominent than in the conduct of their foreign affairs; mutual fear and distrust have conditioned the whole international outlook of the two nations.

Pakistan's attempt to foster brotherly relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East was vigorously challenged by India. From the beginning, Pakistan's foreign policy reflected a strong desire for closer friendly

4. K. Callard : A Political Study of Pakistan, (London, 1957), p. 198.

relations with Muslim countries. She constantly championed the causes of Arabs and Muslim countries both inside and outside the United Nations. India did not view this move with equanimity. The word 'partition' became poison to the Arabs after the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel in 1948.⁵

India took full advantage of the prevailing feelings over 'partition' in the Arab world. The notion was vigorously propogated that the British out of vicious parting spite and in accordance with the old policy of 'divide and rule' sought to lacerate the Arab World, in a manner similar to what they had done in India.⁶ This propoganda was quite successful in creating in some Arab countries resentment against the division of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and consequently against Pakistan. India made constant efforts to brand Pakistan as a stooge of imperialism. Nevertheless, Pakistan was successful in making firm and friendly relations with such Muslim countries as Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

5. G.W.Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (Meerut, 1971), p.194.

6. Z.A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, p. 182.

During the first phase of her foreign relations, in the years 1947-52 when she tried to maintain non-involvement in the East-west cold war, Pakistan felt isolated. This increased her sense of insecurity, and she felt the need of the support of some bigger power. The link with the Commonwealth and friendly relations with the Muslim countries could not solve the problem of security and they failed to give Pakistan the freedom from fear which is needed for a country's progress and stability. This led to the abandonment of the policy of non-alignment and in 1953 there opened the second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy. India and Pakistan as factors in each others foreign policy and relations became more prominent and the shadow of the East-west cold war was cast over the disputes of the two countries. The quest for security, the search for friends and allies, and the anxiety to maintain territorial integrity led Pakistan to pursue a policy of alliance with the west, particularly the US. In the early part of 1953, Pakistan accepted new international commitments which dramatically redefined her position in world affairs. First of all, there was the military economic and cultural alliances with Turkey. The Turco-Pakistan pact was followed in May 1954 by the US Pakistan Mutual Security Programme

Agreement. The next steps in the alliance with the West were her joining SEATO on Sept. 7, 1954 and the Bagdad Pact (now CENTO) on Sept. 23'55. Pakistan's Western sponsored Bagdad Pact was not liked by some of the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, which considered the pact as a threat to her hegemony in the Middle East.

The Suez crisis of 1956 provided India with the best opportunity to vilify Pakistan in cooperation with Egypt in the Middle East. President Naseer declared - "Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India".⁷ This was a rude shock to Pakistan. It also illustrated again that the best way to be on good terms with India is to support her case against Pakistan. The Russian leaders supported India on Kashmir issue. Naseer did so by comparing Suez to Kashmir. Naseer's stand in this matter brought Pakistan to a sensible appreciation of her aspiration for Pan-Islamic unity and solidarity. After six years of endeavour to this end, Pakistan's foreign minister found it necessary to tell the Parliament -- "Basically the forces of nationalism clashed with the spirit of resurgent Islamic sentiment that flowed from the new state of Pakistan."⁸

7. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London, 1966), p.172.

8. Bhutto, op.cit., p.20.

As far as Kashmir issue is concerned Pakistan has tried very hard to win the sympathies of the millions of Muslims in different parts of the world and to exploit Islam. Of course it must not be easy for these Muslims to understand the real basis of our conflict with Pakistan. Because to the world outside India is a Hindu country and Pakistan a muslim country.

Only the enlightened among them who have studied the situation as it really exists between the two countries can appreciate our stand for secularism. To the unenlightened the position is simple, since the overwhelming majority of the population in Kashmir is Muslim, it must go to Pakistan and further, India resists the holding of a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir because its Muslim population would vote for Pakistan.

From wrong premises right deductions are not possible. In the first place India has never been a Hindu state, it cannot be a theocratic state since it is against the basic concept of our heritage. Even Hinduism, which is not a religion in the dogmatic sense, but a philosophy of life, does not encourage such an approach; infact conversion has no place in classical Hinduism. An atheist is a Hindu, a montheist is a Hindu, a person believing in all religions is a Hindu. That is why India has welcomed to

its doors all through its history, all faiths and religions. Again though the 85% of the population in India may be Hindu, this country will not be a Hindu state because this is something alien to the preachings of her 'rishis', the message of Lord Buddha, the mission of Ashoka, the teachings of her saints and sages like Shankara, Ramanuja, Nanak and Kabir, the gospel of Gandhi and recently the leadership that Jawaharlal Nehru represented.

~~INDIAN NATION~~ - In the struggle against the British the Indian National Congress never failed to emphasize the cosmopolitan character of India. It fought with the league on the ground that Hindus and ~~Muslims~~ Muslims could not constitute two different nations. Even in the frenzy of communal hatred India adhered to her secular outlook and in the process sacrificed her greatest treasure Mahatma Gandhi. Further despite the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslims in India are all equal and honoured citizens of the republic, holding the highest position of trust and responsibility.

The present conflict in India and Pakistan is therefore basically of theocracy on one side and secularism on the other. It involves one of the great moral issues of our times. As President Dr. Saradha Krishnan emphasised in one of his broadcasts that though India agreed to

partition, neither the leadership nor the people of India accepted at any time the 'two nation theory' that the Hindus and the Muslims constitute separate nations. Under the force of circumstances and the frenzy that was then unleashed by communal forces, Pakistan was created and though it became, as it was bound to become a theocracy, this could not make India a theocracy. That would have been the negation of all that India has always stood for since time immemorial and of the very basis of the freedom movement launched by Gandhiji. That is why Kashmir has become a test of India's secularism. Any compromise on this would destroy the foundation of our democracy; it would be a mockery of all that we have stood for.

These facts must need be told to the Muslim world; some of its leaders and intellectuals are nodoubt aware of them but not the common people.

Indonesia, which is a Muslim country, in the sense that its population is Muslim by religion exhibited a kind of anti-Indian feeling in the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan which was not only painful but smacked of rank ingratitude. For Indonesia cannot forget the role India played in her freedom movement. Indonesia's reaction was due to two reasons - one that it was annoyed with India for having supported Malaysia another predominantly

Muslim country which Sukarno wanted to destroy. How Islam allows this kind of mutual destruction one fails to understand - two that Indonesia had become a puppet of China.

Then there are Turkey and Iran who promised support to Pakistan but what help they gave her is yet to be known. However, neither Turkey nor Iran has ever been accepted by the Arab world which is the heart of Islam, as Muslim countries. Turkey dominated the Arab world for many years and committed the worst atrocities against the Arabs, and when she was defeated in the 1944-48 war, the leader Kemal Ataturk abolished the institution of the Khilafat as an anachronism and as the cause of the downfall of Turkey. He even prohibited Muslims from reading the Quran in Arabic and discouraged the Turks from going to Mosques for prayers.

As for Iran, the Shah of Iran has never been taken as representative of Islam. To the Arabs rightly or wrongly he and his father Reza Shah represented the feudal elements in Iran, and then leadership has been more Persian than Islamic.

Moreover both Turkey and Iran are looked down upon by the Arabs; no bond of friendship has ever existed between them in recent times. Turkey and Iran have recognized Israel which the Arabs regard it as a dagger in their heart.

In the Arab world despite the tremendous propoganda that Pakistan has been doing for years, it has not succeeded in making any impact. The Arabs cannot forget the part Pakistan has played since its very inception in international affairs.

She has been an enemy of the Arab resurgence. Her membership of the Baghdad pact was a clear indication of it. Nehru was one of the earliest and most effective opponents of that pact. India stood by the Arabs during the Lebanese crisis in 1953. Further during the British, French - Israel aggression on Suez, India took the lead in fighting for the Arabs. It is not therefore easy for Pakistan to exploit Islam and represent India as an anti-Islamic country. The communique issued by President Naseer and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the communique issued by the casablanca conference make it clear that Pakistan could not succeed in getting the support it wanted from the Arab world.

As the prophet of Islam has said : 'O Lord! Lord of my life and of every thing in the universe! I affirm that all human beings are brothers unto one another.'

It is to uphold this affirmation that India has fought Pakistan and shall fight her again and again, until she accepts it and gives up her primitive stand that one group of human beings is different from another group and cannot constitute one brotherhood.

There had to be a realistic reappraisal of relations of relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Religious and cultural affinity, as it was soon discovered after independence could not create a mutually shared community of interests, to be the basis of a long term alliance. Pakistan's ardent overtures to the Middle Eastern countries did not find sympathetic response. Muslim solidarity could not simply be established either through increasing official contacts or unofficial conferences. The urge fortunity was not strong enough even in the narrow circle of the Arab states to make the Arab league a powerful instrument of Arab policy. Much less could it be visible on the wider horizon of the Muslim world. The UAR was obsessed with a sense of its own importance as a pivot of Arab nationalism, which was anti-western in content, particularly in Egypt and Iraq, and yet these countries could not forge a common front. In Pandit Nehru, President Naseer found a ~~rea~~ more convenient ally even though India had recognised Israel and Pakistan which was opposed to the recognition of Israel was considered a doubtful friend. So great an importance the UAR attached to the

bond of neutrality between India and itself that for fear of alienating New Delhi, it adopted a neutral attitude in the Kashmir dispute and abstained from exercising its vote in the security council. Pakistan's altruism in her policy towards the Middle East had obviously failed to evoke any response and therefore called for a reorientation to suit the country's national interests, which could be served on a basis of mutuality with the individual countries of the region rather than on a sentimental pursuit of a non-existent and unattainable unity of the Muslim world. The fate of the Arab league, the break up of the union first of Syria and Iraq and later of Egypt & Syria and the general pattern of relationship between the Arab states themselves shows that even Arabism with its linguistic and racial affinities cannot be a unifying force in a world divided into territorial nationalisms.⁹

Pakistan's experience with Muslim Afghanistan is a proof of the same thesis. Religion can be one only one among many factors and by no means the determining factor in international relations. When Pakistan applied for membership, of the United Nations, Afghanistan, a Muslim country, voted against her admission to that organisation.

9. Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore, 1967), pp.240-241.

The reason prompting this action was the issue of 'Pakhtunistan', a territory in Pakistan where 'Pakhtuns' are in the majority. Afghanistan desired that Pakhtuns should be given a chance of self-determination.

Afghanistan is a Muslim state and, as in the case of Pakistan Islam is the only cohesive ^{force} ~~factor~~ in Afghan nationalism. The issue, therefore, is not only interesting from the point of view of Pakistan's behaviour towards a fellow Muslim country when there is a clash of interests, but also because of the arguments advanced by both the parties.¹⁰

Pakistan's

From the very beginning ~~Pakks~~ foreign policy has reflected a desire for close and friendly relations with other Moslem countries. This desire has found expression in several treaties of friendship and in the encouragement of various non-governmental international Islamic organizations devoted to cultural, intellectual or economic matters. It has supported the stand of the Arab states against Israel, encouraged independence movements in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia and condemned "imperialism" in international disputes affecting the interests of Moslem nations.

10. Arif Hussain, op.cit., p.113.

Pakistan's consistent efforts to promote strong diplomatic and cultural ties with all Islamic countries have been hampered by the rising tide of Arab nationalism. There are more Moslems in ^{Pakistan} ~~Arab~~ than in all of the Arab countries combined, but ^{Pakistan} ~~Arab~~ is a new comer to international society and few of its inhabitants can read or speak Arabic the language of the Quran. Egypt had emerged as an international leader of the Arab bloc and would reject any suggestion that it share the leadership with either Pakistan and India. Egypt has indicated that it would choose the latter and has refused to support Pakistan on Kashmir dispute. Pakistan supported Egypt vigorously during Anglo French invasion of the Suez in 1956, but President Naseer spurned Pakistan's offer of arms and even rejected the suggestion that Pakistan ~~and~~ participate in the UN force that was stationed in Egypt after the ceasefire. This incident drew the following comment from a Karachi Newspaper :

"Naseer will never be our friend, he will never think in terms of Islam except when it suits his own interest."¹¹

Foreign policy is invariably the instrument through which the conflicts, problems and the ideology of a country

11. Donald W. Wilber, Pakistan (America, 1964), pp. 313-314.

are intentionally and unintentionally exported abroad. Pakistan is an ideological state like the USSR. Its foreign policy thus cannot be downright realistic. It has to be connected with its basic ideology.

Pakistan came into existence as a result of two currents of thought, one basically western and the other decidedly Islamic. It was the culminating result of the conflict between these two forces. From the ideological point of view the Islamic current was much stronger than any other force in the creation of Pakistan.

In an Islamic society there are always two currents which are influencing the body politic. On one hand there are extraneous forces which are continually influencing it. Such currents have their roots in liberalism, nationalism and the western concept of political democracy. There are the non-Islamic forces which exist in an Islamic society which is instrumental in the creation of Pakistan i.e., Islam. Any attempt to divorce Pakistan from Islam and the Islamic world and to pursue a different course would be suicidal not only for the basic ideology but for Pakistan itself.¹²

The 'ultimate National objective' of Pakistan's foreign policy as well as of its ideology is the unity of

12. Samia Khan, Pakistan, Ideology, Constitution, Laws and Foreign Policy, p. 96.

the Islamic world. Pakistan's sympathy with other Muslim nations has been ably expressed at the General Assembly of the United Nations by her Foreign Minister Sir M. Zafrullah Khan. Both on the question of Palestine and the disposal of the Italian colonies in Africa, Zafrullah contributed the clearest and most persuasive statement of the Arab case. On the latter question he led the smaller nations in a remarkable success in defeating the proposal of the Western powers to hand back Libya to Italy. Sir M. Zafrullah Khan also frequently expressed sympathy for the people of Indo-China and of Malaya in their desire for self-government.

The earliest permanent diplomatic missions which Pakistan set up after independence apart from those in Britain and the USA were embassies in Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. All these countries as well as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Trans Jordan have representatives in Karachi. The Education Ministry has sponsored Pak-Iran, Pak-Afghanistan, Pak-Arab and Pak-Turkish Association in the capital. In announcing this step, the Education Minister said 'with these countries we claim a community of outlook based on spiritual and moral affinities. We have the same faith and the same cultural traditions as

they have, and like us, they too are emerging from the sloth of centuries and are becoming increasingly conscious of the important historical role which Islam has to play as a world unifying force. It is natural that our first cultural links should be with them.¹³

It was with this commitment of support to the Moslem causes that Pakistan was born. In conducting her foreign policy however it became the one single factor of overriding consequence in her relations with India. What has made India the only major factor in Pakistan is not merely the disputes which bedevil their mutual relations, but also the more basic factors involved in the making of attitudes.

In large measure Pakistani feeling towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition... The idea that a country has a foreign enemy is easy for the mass of the people to understand and it also provides a powerful stimulus to unity. For Pakistan, India has filled this role.¹⁴

As Gallard noted : "In the first appraisal of her

13. Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London) p.168.
14. M. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 207.

position among the community of self governing nations, Pakistan could find no single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need."¹⁵

In this bleak situation Islam appeared to Pakistan to offer the only bond of belonging in whose name she could appeal for other nations support.

Apart from this inevitable search for friends was the continued need to cultivate a distinctive sense of belonging in a country which was cut out of a natural, historical geographical and cultural unit. Also important was the urgency of stressing the continued difference with India maintaining that Pakistan had no other security against the natural tendency of one ~~state~~^{Government} absorbing another in a topography^{ical} basis. Aslam Siddiqui says that, "To escape the consequences of this axiomatic development, Pakistan had to put up some shield. That shield obviously is religion on the basis of which partition of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent took place."¹⁶

15. Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study (London 1957), p.17.

16. Aslam Siddiqui, Pakistan seeks security (Lahore, Longman, 1960), p.17.

There was a large measure of confidence in Pakistan, immediately after partition that the Moslem countries of the world will draw closer to Pakistan and indeed might move toward a pan- Islamic grouping of nations. Moslem unity according to this view was the natural corollary of a renewed Islamic sense of belonging, that the creation of Pakistan was a symbol of this post war phenomenon.

A.B. Rajput wrote in his book on the Muslim league :
"Thus with the birth of Pakistan the hope of pan-Islamic unity and brotherhood brightened a-fresh amongst the Islamic states of Asia."¹⁷

It is interesting to note the terms in which this solidarity was sought by Pakistani intellectuals. To quote Ahmad : "A real agreement among these potential allies can alone ward off the menace of Hindu, Russian, American and British imperialism. The Moslem state or states, which may be inhibited from making a common cause in the fatuous hope that these menacing imperialisms will attack others and leave them in peace will be left in isolation and condemned to annihilations."¹⁸

While such ideas were germinating in some minds even in 1948, concerted attempts for Moslem unity were made

17. A.B. Rajput, The Muslim League, (Lahore, 1948), p. 204.

18. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 213.

Prime Minister of Pakistan

only during 1949. The PM made a statement in London in May 1949, he stopped in Cairo, Baghdad and Tehran and in his speeches stressed the Islamic ideas of Pakistan : "In the laboratory of Pakistan we are experimenting with the principles and ideals of Islam and hope to put before the world a progressive code of life." 19

In Tehran he said : "My hope for the future is that Iran and Pakistan will be like one soul in two bodies." 20 Earlier, an organisation the Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami (Moslem world conference), had started functioning in Karachi; in Feb 1949 its first session was attended by delegates from 19 Moslem countries. On his return from London Liaquat Ali made moves for a conference at the governmental level. However, the Arab and the non Arab countries did not show much interest.

The Pakistani leader had earlier propogated his idea of an Islamistan in a pamphlet on the subject, and had in 1949 visited the West Asian countries and London in order to promote the idea. Although ostensibly concerned only with the people to people campaign for an Islamic bloc, the League leader convassed a security pact with British support

19. A.Siddiqui, op.cit., p.88

20. Ibid., p.88.

on the enlarged pattern of the pact agreed upon by the Arab league countries... even if such a security pact were practicable, apart from the question of being desirable in the present world context, it will have to be underwritten militarily as well as politically by certain non-Moslem foreign powers, ...infact, ...he has been attempting, ... to enlist the active support of these foreign powers... (this) naturally prompts some quarters to ask : Security against whom?"²¹

While the overtly political attempts at Pan-Islamic integration failed, an international Islamic Economic Conference was held in Karachi in Nov. 1949, under non-official auspices. At the conference the Prime Minister of Pakistan said in his inaugural address "Pakistan has one and only one ambition, to serve Islam and humanity... we will belong to the great brotherhood of Islam. Islam alone can solve some of the problems facing the world today."²²

Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad envisaged Islamic unity and cooperation leading to a third bloc of nations. He held "Besides being united in a common faith, a common outlook and a common way of life, we form also a geographic unity." He continued "we cannot put implicit faith in the Western democratic system nor can we subscribe to communism although there are some aspects of this vast and comprehensive

21. Dawn, 15, November, 1949.

22. Dawn, 26, November 1949.

experiment which we must appreciate. Islamic society has never been subjected to the stress and strains of class war and morbid hatred of the rich has never been one of its characteristics. Islam is the golden mean between these two extremes; it is a non-violent method of rectifying unsocial and detrimental inequalities.²³

The Conference ended on notes of high hopes of regional, economical cooperation among Moslem nations as a prelude to political integration. The second Motamar Conference in Karachi raised high hopes of Moslem unity in Feb. 1951. Delegates came from all countries containing Moslems. In the general conference the Prime Minister of Pakistan set the political note. The underlying idea of the movement for the achievement for Pakistan was to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practised and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Moslem brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Moslem countries.²⁴ The world is in sore need of light. I have no doubt that light can be provided

23. Dawn, 26, November 1949.

24. Dawn, 10, February 1951.

by Islam²⁴

The Grand Mufti endorsed this call for unity and asked for the creation of a Moslem bloc, cooperating in matters of culture, economics, politics and defence.

Another organisation, the Moslem People's organisation, held a conference in early 1952, again attended by delegates from several Moslem countries.

All the three organisations the International Islamic Economics Conference, the Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami and the Moslem People's Organisation had their headquarters in Karachi and maintained permanent secretariats there. These Pan-Islamic organisations reflected the internal political groupings within Pakistan, 'One member of the Pakistan Cabinet is the founder President of the international Islamic Economic Conference; another member of the same cabinet is, closely associated with the Motamar, and the former head of Pakistan's national political organisation is bestowing his foster care on the embryonic Moslem People's Organisation²⁵

A certain degree of Pan-Islamism had become at this stage in Pakistan the sine-qua-non for furthering political ambitions.

24. Dawn, 10 February, 1951.

25. Dawn, 9 February 1951.

It should be noted that none of the conferences that Pakistan could arrange was official or inter-governmental.

Subsequently Islamic Conferences did take place in Pakistan, but they evoked less and less enthusiasm. The high pitch of Islamic enthusiasm of the 1949-52 period was not reached again. It was during the period of Muslim league rule that this enthusiasm reached its highest point.

In 1959, there were various Muslims Conferences which gave the impression of an Islamic revival. Pakistan's policy at this time was, to become more closely associated with the West. By the end of the year and during the opening months of 1960, there were signs indicating that Pakistan had graduated in its education in international politics.

Muslim conferences were held in 1961 and 1962 and a variety of political views were expressed. Nasser called Mohammed the first socialist; Saudi Arabia cited the injunctions of Islam in support of its political structure. It was this lack of any common creed which was responsible for the failure to produce a common outlook and hence a common policy. The conferences remained little more than the means of propaganda for an undefined Islamic culture. Islam failed to bring brothers Afghanistan & Pakistan

together, Indonesia did not attend the Southeast Asia Muslim Conference, a regional body of the world Muslim Conference, held in and sponsored by Malaysia in Jan. 1964.

It became clear that the realities of the Moslem world were different from those expected by Pakistan and the enthusiasm for pan-Islamism began to decline.

In February 1954, Pakistan accepted military aid from the US, in September 1954, she joined the SEATO and in September 1955 the Baghdad Pact.

The latter Pact projected Pakistan in West Asia in an entirely different role than the one envisaged earlier by the various Islamic Conferences namely as a third force, a golden mean between capitalism and communism. Apart from India, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia vigorously criticised the pact. It was interpreted in these countries as an anti-Arab move, an extension of Western domination and one designed to divide Arabs.

Typical of the criticism in these countries in the following broadcast from Radio Mecca : Is it therefore, possible for any person to believe that an Islamic state such as that of Pakistan, should accede to those who have joined hands with Zionist Jews... Whatever may be the case Pakistan a country so dear to us and to other Arab countries cannot

be expected to put her hand in the hands of those who
had²⁶ have/bad intention towards the Arabs.

Official apologists of Pakistan on the other hand have maintained that it was to help the Moslem countries and to unite them that the Baghdad Pact was created. In 1956 the Dawn had advised other Moslem countries : Let them shake off their illusions, their vanities and their jealousies : And join the Baghdad pact. If they do so that body can immediately be transformed as to become a moslem NATO with plenty of teeth in it. Nehru does not want it because he wants a Hindu hegemony. Moscow does not want it because it wants a Red hegemony and the Arabs foolishly rise to the bait. Our suggestion may sound fantastic in Cairo and Riyadh in their present moods, but if their hearts and minds could be freed from the mesmeric influence of Islam's enemies masquerading as friends they might wake up with a shudder of guilt to discover that theirs today is the fantastic and suicidal policy.²⁷ (Dawn, 6 Oct 1956)

The Baghdad Pact had tarnished the image of Pakistan in the Moslem world. Sarwar Hasan notes the following dis-

26. S.K.Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan And The United Nations (New York, Manhattan, 1960), p. 76.

27. Dawn, 6 October 1956.

disadvantages of the pact 1) 'it led to a setback for Pakistan among the African and Asian nations (ii) instead of helping the pact worsened the position of Pakistan in her disputes with India (iii) "Pakistan has fallen in the estimation of the Arabs."²⁸ Pakistan's ~~Pakis~~ relation with the Arab world in general entered their most critical phase a year after the signing of the Baghdad Pact. Following the US decision to withdraw the aid for Aswan dam, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. Pakistan upheld Egypt's sovereign rights over the Suez canal and her right to nationalise it.

But at the London Conferences on Suez shortly after this Pakistan's role was different from that of Ceylon, Indonesia, India and the USSR, and Pakistan was publicly criticised in Egypt for her failure ^{to} disassociate herself from the Dulles plan which was totally unacceptable to Egypt.

The Foreign Minister of Pak deprecated unthinking enthusiasm for pan-Islamism. The days of pan-Islamism, he said were over and Pakistanis should first guard the interests of their own Moslems and then of other Moslems of the world. He said "Pak-Islamism and not pan-Islamism should now be the new slogan. You have no future if you indiscriminately

28. Sarwar Hasan, op. cit., p. 76.

fighter^{or} die for Moslems outside Pakistan even though they be the dearest friends of your enemy."²⁹

Yet when the Suez was invaded, protests came not only from the left oriented groups in East Pakistan (the British consulate in Pakistan was burnt down) but also from the Islam-oriented groups in the West Pakistan. An editorial comment in the Dawn said : "They (the people of Pakistan) are asking and we are giving voice to their questions : Is this not the rise once again of bigoted and perverted Christendom against the world of Islam in alliance with the Jews. Is this not a threat poised against the Moslems from the Atlantic to the Pacific."³⁰ The Government's role was, however, less spectacular. Along with the other Baghdad Pact members Pakistan did protest against the invasion, but her protest was not among the strongest. ^{Pakistan} ~~She~~-lost many friends among the Arab people. Dawn ended an editorial thus : "However disappointing may be the policies of the governments, in most of the Moslem countriss, the Moslem people are sound at heart and share the broader Islamic outlook. Some day they will assert themselves and the Moslem world will rediscover its soul which selfish rulers and juntas are now foolishly

29. Asian Recorder, 1956, p. 1116.

30. Dawn, 1 November, 1956.

mortgaging to the enemies of Islam.³¹

Notwithstanding these grave problems and the occasional statements deriding Moslem unity, the urge for Moslem solidarity had characterised the policies of the Governments Pakistani ~~governments~~. Even when the Pak-Egyptian relations were at their decline the Muslim league - the major opposition party revived the demand for a united Moslem world Bloc for their security and survival. Feroz Khan Noon, the then PM talked in 1953 of a Pakistani-Iran-Afghanistan federation. In 1960, a Pakistani author made this the main theme of his book on ~~Pakistani~~ Pakistan's security : In this struggle for survival these three nations must come close together and resist attempts by the Soviet Union or the West to impose allegiance on them. The danger is very real. Already Central Asia is lost; Bokhara and Mervare are no longer Moslem; part of the Islamic homeland is lost to the Jews.³²

The Arabs were regarded as lost and the lament continued : At present nationalism is strongest in the Arab world, which is unfortunate in two respects. Modernism has been introduced with little regard for Islam and its intellectual revival is considerably indebted to Christian

31. Dawn, 27 September 1956.

32. Siddiqui, op.cite., p.159.

writers. The recent cordiality with communism may prove a third complicating factor. All this might lead to an unbridgeable gulf between the Arabs and the Non-Arabs in the Islamic civilisation and finally to its disintegration. Pakistanis believe that Islam itself is a nationality.³³ In fact, one obstacle standing in the way of Pakistan's ties with other Moslem countries is the striking similarity between the outlook of most Moslem states and India in regard to many international issues. There is also a deliberate attempt on the part of India to cultivate cultural and political ties with Moslem countries.

Another impediment for Pakistan had been that while she was engaged in building up an Islamic state in many Moslem countries, leaders like Sukarno and Nasseer were engaged in internal struggles against minority groups which shared the Pakistani view of Islam's potentialities in the modern world. The Masjumi in Indonesia and the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAR were banned and their activities were regarded as anti state.

In spite of these obvious difficulties, there is no denying the fact that in the details of her foreign policy Pakistan has attempted to uphold the so called Moslem

33. Ibid. p.160

causes : its refusal to recognise Israel, while other
CENTO countries have done it; its espousal of the Palestine
case in the UN, its support to the freedom of Tunisia,
Morocco and Algeria, its quick recognition of the pro-
visional Algerian ~~govt~~^{Government} are illustration of this attitude.
In the 1966 const^{Pakistan} of Pak it was one of the Directive
Principles of State Policy that the state shall endeavour
to strengthen the bonds of unity among Moslem countries.
There has been no ~~govt~~^{government} in Pak which has not paid atleast
lip service to the cause.

There are other difficulties in the way of Pakistan
in moving towards closer cooperation with other Muslim
countries on the basis of a common faith. In the place
any attempt at regional integration into a Moslem bloc
presupposes a similar urge for Islamic belonging, in other
Moslem peoples. In other words it projects into the Moslem
world an assumed Moslemness which is unique in the case
of ~~Pak~~^{Pakistan} reflecting its continued problems in the ^{South} Asian
context - it assumes that there are non-religious factors
in their commonness, other Muslim countries will see the
threat of "Hindu" imperialism which Pakistan allegedly faces.

It involves problems of defining the region of
Moslem cooperation. The Moslem world extends from Indonesia
to Nigeria and its politics differ from one country to
another. Even in Pakistan itself, one of the major ~~problems~~

political problems, viz. national integration and the role of religion in politics there is no unanimity or even a consensus. In the politics of the Moslem world, Pakistan is somewhat on the periphery. To say the least, it is very doubtful whether a peripheral state can become the corner stone of Islamic unity. As Gallard says: 'The political upsurge elsewhere was based largely on territorial and racial nationalism, anti western, antiwhite. Religion played a part in this, but it was a lesser part than colour, language and political theory of violent opposition to colonialism and exploitation. For many Moslems elsewhere it has been more important to align Asian and Africans against the Colonial Powers than to defend Moslem causes against non-Moslems'.³⁴

John S. Badeau describes the same obstacle to Moslem unity in more abstract terms. 'Pan Islam is difficult to conceive as the basis for a modern empire because it is almost impossible for any group of states, today, to become integrated into the international structure, when they are based upon a political and ideological pattern at variance with the rest of the world. So long as Islamdom contained the centre of its gravity and was self-sustaining

34. Gallard, op.cite., p. 314.

politically and economically, it could afford to maintain its destructive political organisation. But today it is difficult to perpetuate such isolated political monads and to assume that they will move together with the rest of the world in a pre-established harmony... no group of states can set up a bloc built upon radically different political concepts without being in continuous tension with the rest of the world. Islamdom cannot insulate itself against the seepage of the most universally accepted political concept of our times, nationalism.*³⁵

Some Pakistani intellectual, however, regard this as a temporary phenomenon and feel convinced of the inevitability of the ultimate assertion of Islam. Samin Khan blames the Christian Arabs for deliberately infusing secularism in the Arab world and for reviving the pre-Islamic part of the Arabs. But regarding the future he has no doubt: *Arab nationalism does not rest either on ethnographic or territorial chauvinism. It is based first on the Arabic language and secondly, though indirectly on Islam... the history of the Arabs is the history of Islam... Once nationalism has taken its normal course and sabli achieved its objective it then looks for an ideal

35. John S. Badeau, 'Islam In The Modern Middle East' Foreign Affairs, N.Y. October, 1959.

permanent and sublime ideal since Arab nationalism will not serve the purpose, the forces of history which are much stronger than the temporary transient factors of nationalism shall assert themselves.³⁶

In another article on the same issue, the same author has pointed out how the Kemalist reaction in Turkey was defeated.³⁷ After the second world war the country emancipated itself from the split personality which it had to endure for a quarter of a century. In this conflict between religion and nationalism, nationalism suffered its first important defeat in the Moslem world. The defeat of nationalism was possible for its espousal by the leaders of Turkey. ^{It} was the great betrayal of the aspirations and ideals of the Turks.³⁷

It is possible that behind Pakistan's policy to seek Moslem solidarity lie more basic factors of history. Says Dr. Brown : 'Pakistan as a Moslem nation looks westward to the lands where Islam was born and became great and western. Pakistan especially illustrates the same phenomenon of association with western regions which it has exhibited in the past. It feels itself culturally akin to those

36. Samin Khan, 'Arab Nationalism,' Pakistan Horizon, December, 1958.

37. Samin Khan, 'Religion and State in Turkey', Pakistan Horizon, December, 1958.

areas outside the sub-continent, rather than to the area east of it, though they are geographically close to it and economically its national partners.³⁸

A significant aspect of this observation is the difference implied in it between East and West Pakistan. Indeed, this difference cannot be exaggerated. Cultural difference apart, the East Pakistani's may well prefer closer relations with Malaya and Indonesia, to those with Afghanistan and Iran. An Iran-Pakistan federation, for example, would completely alter the power structure in Pakistan and reduce the advantage of the larger population that East Pakistan enjoys to nothing. Moreover, East Pakistani politics still contains many secular issues which were thrown up in 1954. It is unlikely that any sudden Islamic resurgence can push them in the background. Yet, in this age of super powers, Pakistan must belong to a larger group. In a sense, it is correct that the age of nationalism is becoming out-dated. The trend is everywhere towards the evolution of higher loyalties, Arab unity West, European Community, the Free and the Communist worlds, the Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere, the African personality and Malaysia in South East Asia are all indications of the growing tempo of regionalism. Moslems

38. W.N. Brown, 'Pakistan And West Asia, Pakistan Miscellany (Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1958), Vol. 22, p.30.

of the world too, like other peoples have fallen in step and are getting integrated regionally. Nigeria is seeking cooperation of African neighbours; the Arab states are searching for bases of their own unity; Turkey is primarily a NATO country; Malaya has already proposed a Malaysian Union; Indonesia might become the Keystone of another South-East Asian regional group, where then does Pakistan stand in this emerging pattern? It may be said that there is an element in the thought pattern of the Moslems of the sub-continent, called the unity of Indian Islam, it is not easy for the Moslems of Pakistan, in promoting their Islamic sense of belonging to ignore this obvious unity and any scheme which by passes the Indian Moslems could only have half hearted support in Pakistan. One thing therefore is certain whatever be the approach that Pakistan brings to bear on the question of her future association with other nations or her future partnership in a regional organisation, the rest of South Asia will remain a strong contender for her supranational loyalty. Infact, the continued emphasis on Islam in Pakistan even after being constituted as a Moslem majority area may well be regarded as a measure of her inability to run away from the minority status in the complex of South Asian realities.

Long before India actually attained independence, we were pledged under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru to a policy of peace and international understanding. The roots of this policy go deep in our history. They are embedded in our whole culture and draw their inspiration from our philosophy, our ethics and our different religion, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism. During his stewardship of the nation after freedom, Nehru laboured for peace on the international front with a passion and singleness of purpose which compelled the admiration of the world. In spite of the division of India with its bloody aftermath his persistent ambition was to establish friendly relations with Pakistan.

How is it then that we find ourselves drawn into a sanguinary war with our next door neighbour with whom we have so many ties of history and geography, culture and language, religion and philosophy commerce and economics? We are engaged in the constructive endeavour of building upon economy, raising our standards of living, removing ignorance, fighting disease ^{we have} and looked forward to many decades of this arduous but stimulating journey towards a better future, Pakistan we hoped, was similarly engaged.

There were frequent political skirmishes which were regrettable, but many of us never envisaged the remotest possibility that Pakistan would actually initiate a suicidal war, beginning with a blatantly unadmitted infiltration in Kashmir and developing into an expanding conflict which has already disrupted the plans of social and economic development in both countries for many years. On our side the door is open as the President and Prime Minister have said - Knock with honourable intentions and it will be opened unto you.

This is however, for people in political power to decide and let us hope fervently that common sense as well as wisdom and compassion will prevail and peace will not be long delayed. At this moment we should think as to what we have to do as civilians in our own country. The war makes demands on us which are as exactly as those made on the army. The Army's duty is clear and straight forward, every member knows it and performing it as well as he can. Are we doing the same?

If there is lack of unity and discipline in the country, if the functionaries in factories and offices do not do their jobs with honesty and efficiency, if the tempo of production does not rise, if petty or even major political or communal or personal differences are allowed to weaken the strength of our national purpose, we shall

neither be able to help the army to pull its full weight nor make our country really sacrifice worthy.

There is not merely a kind of emergency justification for these qualities-unit, discipline honesty, efficiency, peace, harmony, sacrifice, strength of purpose - but they are essential ingredients in the character of a nation. A nation which wishes to build up both internal and external structure and is anxious to have not merely a power based economy but a decent and humane way of life.

The deeper meaning of this tragic conflict is not conquering any part of Pak or inflicting suffering on its people, who are our kith and kin and whom we wish well. It is an emphatic affirmation of the right of people to live and let live, it is a recognition of the fact that the Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others can live in fellowship and peace that the population of a country need not be directed on a religious or communalist basis.

A war is bad enough divested of its patriotic clap trap. It reduces man to the level of thinking that the rights of a case can be settled by the comparative strength of armoured divisions and fighting planes. But a war becomes definitely worse when it is given a needless religious complexion, when the name of Allah and the Prophet is dragged into it when excitable people are exhorted to fight a holy crusade.

Such a strategy is not only playing with fire but showing grievous disrespect to religion itself.

Islam is a religion of peace. Allah is envisaged as universally beneficent and merciful and the Prophet has been described as a source of blessing and peace for all mankind. If you must, fight a political war, for God's sake, keep God out of it! This war will come to an end sooner or later, Pakistan and India will have to learn to live at political peace with each other.

CHAPTER - III

RELIGION AND MINORITIES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT

The term "Minority", as applied in modern political terminology, is restricted to distinct "racial", or "national" groups within a sovereign state. The individuals of such groups are linked with one another by common ties of national or cultural consciousness and usually live in a state dominated by another group with a larger numerical strength. The individuals of this latter group are similarly linked with one another by ties of racial, linguistic or cultural unity. Both these minorities and majorities look upon their peculiar cultural features, social institutions and religion, as clear expression of their separate individuality; and want to preserve them at any cost. In so far as these are in conflict, or in so far as the former are likely to be swamped and overwhelmed by the latter, the political problem of minorities, as understood now a days is created.¹

In India and Pakistan the confrontation of Hinduism by Islam led to the emergence of minority groups whose differences, though expressed primarily in a religious idiom, had important political and economic aspects.

The problem of minorities is among the most serious problems embittering Indo-Pakistan relations. It is next in

1. M.N. Dalal, Whither Minorities, pp 1-2.

importance only to the Kashmir dispute. On a number of occasions serious communal riots have taken place in India and Pakistan which have created enormous bitterness between them.

When the sub-continent was split into two separate states on the basis of religion in 1947, it was not possible to make the division so as to create two homogeneous and compact national states. The Muslims and Hindus were so intermingled in many parts of the subcontinent that any boundary line was bound to leave millions of Muslims in India and millions of Hindus in Pakistan.

These religious minority groups are the worst sufferers of the partition of the sub-continent. Their loyalty is often questioned; their status as citizens of the two countries—whatever the legal and constitutional framework might be or whatever might be the professions of the two governments is never free from strain and stresses. Their economic conditions have gone down in both the countries while their cherished culture and way of life often seems to be in danger. Worst of all they live in perpetual fear and anxiety.²

The existence of religious minority groups in the two

countries has added further complexity to Indo-Pakistan relations. The mental image that each has formed of the other, has greatly been influenced by the attitude that each country is alleged to have taken towards the religious minority. For instance, it is widely believed in India that Pakistan is an intolerant, theocratic state. Similarly it is widely held in Pakistan that Muslim minorities are systematically and continuously suppressed and oppressed in India that they are in perpetual fear of being butchered by the Hindu extremist groups and that they have lost all possibility of security and dignity. The Muslims in Pakistan feel a strong sense of kinship for their co-religionists in India, with many of whom they have close blood relations. The Hindus in India likewise have strong attachment and sentimental affinities for the Hindus in Pakistan. The news of maltreatment of Muslims in India causes deep resentment in Pakistan, and the same is the case with regard to any news about Hindus in Pakistan. The two countries were on the verge of war - 'on the edge of a precipice' - over this issue of religious minorities in 1950.

The religious minorities are often exposed to dangers and threats whenever there is any worsening of Indo-Pakistan relations. Nationalism is entangled with religious conceptions. Majorities and minorities do not fully form a community with one another in either country. The minorities problem in

India as we face it today, is comparatively a very recent growth. Hindus and Muslims, Buddhists and Christians, Sikhs and Jains and Parsees have been in this land for centuries. Racial and religious differences between them have continued ever since these religions took root on this soil. Long before Europe and America, India had realised the wisdom of religious toleration. The emphasis on difference in religion, race or nationality had weakened, if it had ever existed even in the classic days of the Maurya and the Gupta empires.

The idea of a common Indian nationality is a relatively recent growth. The Moguls, the Britishers sought to revise and cultivate the national idea in India, to consolidate their conquest. It was an impulse of imperialism. The imperial idea has never been absent from the Indian soil, the national idea is a new growth.³ Unification of India under one ruler was thus in the past more an outcome of dynastic or personal ambitions of great soldiers and statesmen, irrespective of the community to which they belong.

The forms and rituals of Hinduism, its places of pilgrimage and variety of dieties have seen a certain sense of fundamental unity throughout the country irrespective of political frontiers. It had made the followers of that

3. M.N. Dalal, op.cit., p.54.

faith feel a degree of kinship with their co-religionists all over the land, which was necessarily strengthened by a common feeling of opposition to the Muslims.⁴

This feeling of kinship, particularly in opposition, was very much stronger amongst the Muslims. Because of their memories of domination in the recent past, care fully cultivated and kept afresh by the exigencies of modern politics, they have felt themselves united and striven to make that unity more real to a much greater degree than is the case with the more amorphous mass of the Hindus.

The sentiment of local provincial loyalty, which is fast developing if not as a rival to the religious sentiment, at least as a cross current in modern Indian politics is creating a new problem of provincial patriotism. This though not unknown in India's past, is, nevertheless, making a new complication in the present day highly intricate problem of the minorities.⁵

Efforts of a more abiding character to weld the different races into one single nation were made long before the British conquered India e.g. the common land revenue introduced by the revenue minister of Akbar, common currency, weights and measures common social hierarchy represented by the Mansabdari system of the Moghul court, Din-i-lahi- a common religion propogated by Akbar, the abolition of Jazya.

4. Ibid., p.55.

5. Ibid., p.57.

The consciousness of a distinct unity had never departed from the Muslim community; and more so as their memories of past domination in India, even though a minority were fresh. They clung more to their traditional past and were in the beginning averse to adopt themselves to the new ways of thought and action. Therefore they were more backward than the Hindus.

HINDU MINORITY IN PAKISTAN

With the history of Western Europe in mind, it is easy to maintain that in a modern democratic state, all citizens should be equal without regard to colour, creed or race. But in Pakistan, the history of more than one generation, had emphasized the incompatibility of Muslims and Hindus. Partition with its consequent bloodshed and hardship, had appeared to conform the two nation theory and had sharpened the passion behind it to a new edge of bitterness. What place could Pakistan offer to its Non-Muslim citizens?

One solution, simple in theory but difficult to adopt in practice, was the exchange of population. As early as 1938 Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, who was not a member of the League, had put forward the theory of exchange of population. In April 1947, Mr. Jinnah demanded an exchange of population in the undivided India.

Again, after the partition, on 26th September, 1947, when communal riots were at their height and as many as 4,000 people were killed, with mass migration taking place from both the countries, Mr. Jinnah said: "If the ultimate solution of the minority problem is to be mass exchange of population, let it be taken up at the government plane, it should not be left to be sorted out by a blood thirsty

element." This was naturally unacceptable to India, who blamed the league for creating such hatred. However, one fails to see how a 'moth-eaten and truncated Pakistan' was going to accommodate forty million more people.⁶

The question of the status of minorities in Pakistan arose during debates in the Constituent Assembly, especially after the Objectives Resolution in 1949. Earlier Quaid-i-Azam had tried to solve the problem by adopting the same policy which the congress followed i.e. by applying the secular formula. But throughout this period, because of the prevailing talk about an Islamic state, India was justifiably worried about the treatment of Hindus in Pakistan since in the traditional Islamic state the non-Muslim, even if they enjoyed religious freedom, were not equal citizens.

During a debate in the Constituent Assembly on the Objectives Resolution, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the spokesman of the traditional school and in this respect the voice of all sections of the religious groups in Pakistani politics, said :

'The Islamic state means a state which is run on the exalted and excellent principles of Islam. It is evident that a state which is founded on some principles, be it religious or secular (like the USSR) can be run only by

6. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, p.20, August 11, 1947.

those who believe in these principles⁷

He also stressed the points that it was historically true that the treatment meted out to the minorities was excellent. The argument seems to be logical but how any one but a communist can live in the USSR is inconceivable. Similarly, if Pakistan is an ideological state every person living under its laws automatically comes under the sway of that ideology. If there is some distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims on religious grounds, then it is logical that it is not the ideology but religion which is the guiding principle.

On the question of the position or relationship between the Muslims and Hindus in Pakistan living in the same country and the Indian Muslims who have become foreigners, the best answer was from Dr. Mahmud Hussain, a professor of History and at that time a Deputy Minister :

"We (Muslims & Hindus in Pakistan) possess common nationality which is a legal concept but we are not the same nation, which is a sociological concept. We are not one nation and yet we are citizens of the same state....Pakistan exists

7. Constituents Assembly of Pakistan, Debates,
Vol. V, p. 45, March 9, 1949.

only on that basis - i.e. the Muslims are a separate nation and on another basis.⁸ The idea behind this statement was presumably to prove that the 'two-nation theory' was not given up.

Quaid-e-Azam was quite certain that one of the most urgent and important tasks that lay before him and his people would be the establishment of communal harmony and mutual trust. Pakistan was to be one nation, to which all citizens might be proud. "Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state."⁹

Mr. Jinnah's words have been repeated on numberless occasions during the ensuing ten years. But it must be remembered that they were delivered to the first session of the constituent Assembly, four days before independence at a time when Sind and Punjab depended heavily upon non-Muslims for commercial and technical services. Subsequent events did not cause Mr. Jinnah to retreat in any way from

8. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1954,
Vol. XV. p. 540.

9. Quaid-e-Azam speaks, Speeches by Quaid-e-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Founder of Pakistan, Karachi, n.d.,
pp. 5-12.

his declared intention to make Pakistan a state founded on complete religious tolerance. But hatred of Sikhs and Hindus and fear of the new India, made it hard for the liberal view to gain acceptance. It was explicitly rejected by many of the plans. On the issue of minorities the general insistence of Muslims was that an Islamic state would deny power at the highest level to non-Muslims. An Islamic state according to the Muslims is governed according to Divine laws and a great part of the task of government consists in the interpretation of such law; how, then, can a non-believer be allowed to interpret the law?

The Hindus who remained in East Bengal, showed their willingness to accept the new state of Pakistan. But they did not welcome the events of 1947. Those in West Pakistan witnessed and suffered several months of killing and looting and endured total uncertainty as to their safety.

One of the most distressing features of political life in Pakistan has been the continuing refusal to take the Hindus at their word and to treat them as fifth columnists.

Any Hindu speaker found it very difficult to make a speech in Assembly dealing with Indo-Pakistan relations or the loyalty of the minority community without encountering

hostile and ironic interruptions. The following is a fair example.

'D.N.Dutta (Hindu) : Most of the minority members did not want division of India but they are in Pakistan now. They have accepted Pakistan...'

'Syed Shamain Rehman (Muslim) : With mental reservations.¹⁰

Alternatively Muslim Members would lecture the Hindus on their duties and warn them that they were under suspicion.

In undivided India, the Muslims were the minority community, and they conducted a long campaign for the establishment and protection of a special political status. The Congress, composed predominantly of Hindus, represented the majority and wished to minimize any measure setting special boundaries between one group and another. The Muslim League has insisted upon the maintenance of special political barriers, while the Congress has urged their abolition.

The institutional form of this protection of minorities was the provision of separate electorates by communities. In this respect all elections in Pakistan until 1954 were in accordance with the scheme established by the Government of India Act. This, was of course designed primarily to protect

10. Constituent Assembly (Legislative), Debates, 1954, Vol. I, p. 1408 July 3, 1954.

the Muslim minority in undivided India. But after 1947 the terminology was not changed and the separate electorates were provided for the Muslims while the Hindu seats were described as 'general'.¹¹

Under the separate electorate system a Hindu politician ~~an~~ finds himself forced to address himself to an all Hindu electorate. In this manner communal hostilities are likely to play a prominent and bitter part in every election.

Undoubtedly the orthodox religious tradition that Muslims and non-Muslims may live at peace within a single state but can never be merged into one community has a bearing on the majority attitude. Islam enjoins toleration but frowns on fraternity.¹²

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11. The relevant sections, of the Government of India Act (Sixth Schedule) were changed by the Government of India (Third Amendment) Act, 1952 and the new provisions governed the E. Bengal election of 1954. The principal change in the system of separate electorates was to make the SC of E. Bengal into separate electorates instead of providing them with certain reserved seats to be filled by the vote of the 'general' electors.

The Amending Act was described by Mr. S.K. Dutta, '...the bill turns the leg. into a relation fair with Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and members of two newly created religions. Their names are "general" and "scheduled"
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debate, Vol. XI, p.65, April 15, 1952).

12. Thus Surah, 51 runs : 'O! ye who believe,' Take not the Jews and Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among of all who taketh them for friends is (one) of them.' K. Callard pg. 243.

The Muslim League itself found it difficult to open its ranks to non-Muslims since both its history and its programme mark it as the organ of the Muslim nation.

The Hindus have deeply resented the Muslim efforts to keep them politically apart. But they feel even more strongly about what they regard as the attempt to split their community in two.

The Muslim League, even in pre-partition days, had maintained that the Congress truly represented only the caste Hindus. In tactical moves to weaken and discredit the Congress, the League, while preserving its own exclusively communal basis, made gestures of friendship and protection toward the scheduled castes. Thus, as a counter to Congress insistence on naming a nationalist Muslim to a seat in the 1946 interim government the League included a scheduled caste Hindu as one of its five nominees. This policy was continued even after partition.

All the minority groups in Pakistan had a more general ground for uneasiness arising from the decision to bring into being an Islamic state. The Hindus had listened hopefully to the words of Mr. Jinnah and they found no cause for alarm in the Interim Report of the Basic Principles committee. But later developments of the proposed constitution showed

the addition of more and more Islamic provisions. In November 1953, the Congress Party reached the conclusion that it was accomplishing no useful purpose by continuing to be present in the Constituent Assembly while the constitution was under discussion. Mr. Chattopadhyaya the leader of the Congress, made a statement on behalf of his party. He cited seven causes of Hindu dissatisfaction. First, the two-nation theory divided Pakistan perpetually into superior and inferior communities. Second, the clause in the proposed constitution relating to the invalidation of laws repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah would not spare even the personal laws of non-Muslim. Third, the doctrines of Islam were to be officially taught by agencies of the state. Fourth, the name of the country was to be an Islamic Republic. Fifth, the office of the Head of state was not to be open to a non-Muslim. Sixth the minorities were to be isolated by means of separate electorates, seventh, the method of arriving at decisions in the House was undemocratic and definitely prejudicial to the interests of the minority.¹³

Many of the complaints of the Hindus are concerned with the discriminatory administration of general laws and the extra legal actions of local officials. The following are some of the grievances : seizure of weapons from Hindus, thus leaving them defenceless against robbery

13. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debate Vol. XV,
p. 558, Nov. 2, 1953.

or riot. The exaction of large contributions to the Quaid-
i-Ajam Relief Fund etc.¹⁴

One undoubted hardship borne by the Hindus has been the working of the evacuee property laws. The Hindus minority as a group have lacked political influence, and Pakistan is a country in which such influence is of great importance. The majority insistence on the creation of an Islamic state has forced the non-Muslims to the view that the state is not neutral in matters of religion, and that when an issue arises involving a conflict between Islam and another religion, the state power will be used against the minorities. Pakistan is to be an ideological state and the minorities by definition do not accept that ideology. The Christian and the Parsi are not suspect to the same degree as the Hindu, since their political connection with India is less close.

minority

The ~~AKK~~ problem of the two countries can be solved by general improvement in India and Pakistan a change in the outlook of the people of the two countries, so that merely on the basis of religion one is not considered to be associated with one country or the other, people in general in both the countries should be made to believe that Government of the other country are not squeezing out the minorities.

14. East Bengal legislative Assembly, Official Report, Vol. III, p. 41 ff., March 23, 1949.

If Pakistan is able to find a means of living in friendship with India many of the fears of the Hindus will diminish. But if Indo-Pakistan relation continue to be tense, the Hindu minority will assuredly suffer.

MUSLIM MINORITY IN INDIA

Secularism assumes a special significance in regard to India, as the genius of its constitution makers is nowhere reflected more brilliantly than in the multifarious provisions designed by them to contribute to the well being and prosperity of its multiple minorities.¹⁵ The way in which the architects of our constitution applied it for the uplift and development of the minorities and wore it into the fabric of the constitution will remain a standing tribute to their superior calibre and talent and their landable foresight and broad-mindedness. The strength of the minorities is the strength of the whole nation.

Muslim constitute the largest religious minority in our country and in the states of Jammu and Kashmir the majority community. Spread all over the country from Kashmir to Kerala and from Assam to Gujrat their population in a number of states is considerable. More than half of them live in what is known as the Hindi speaking region comprising, up, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi, Punjab and Haryana.

15. N. Beg, Secular India and Minorities, p.3.

Indian Muslims are an integral part of the national life and have made rich contributions to the glorious cultural heritage of this great and ancient land. The British policy of "divide and rule" had many facets and this was about the worst. Hindus and Muslims fought shoulder to shoulder many a time during nearly two hundred years, from the battle of Plassey to overthrow the British rule.

Unfortunately the national freedom movement also developed certain negative features. Religion and politics were mixed up frequently and religious revivalism was encouraged by many national leaders. The negative features were utilised by the erstwhile British imperialists to create serious divisions on a religious basis and ultimately to partition the country on the eve of their departure.¹⁶

When the partition took place in August 1947, the overwhelming majority of Muslims living in the areas of the present Indian state decided to stay in this homeland. In fact, many of the Muslims who are now in Pakistan would never have gone there but for certain compelling factors beyond their control. Many others who went to Pakistan under extraordinary circumstances following the partition would have liked to come back to India, their homeland when somewhat

16. S.K.Ghosh, Protection of minorities and Scheduled Castes, p.36.

normal conditions returned.

Thousands of Muslims from Pakistan are in India on temporary permits and they are genuinely anxious to settle down here. One thing must be appreciated then in spite of partition and notwithstanding the terrible massacre that followed the partition millions of Muslims decided not to migrate but to stay in the land of their birth.¹⁷

A large number of Muslims who stayed on in India after partition were engaged in traditional handicrafts like manufacture of cloth, glass, bangles, brass utensils, leather carpets, zariwork, shawls, scissors, and a number of other crafts. These Muslims by and large were followers of nationalist Muslim Organisations and were therefore opposed to the Muslim League ideology of separatism. Even in the heyday of Muslim League popularity in undivided India, this section of Muslims generally voted for nationalist Muslims, who were allied to the Indian National Congress and against the Muslim League candidates.

The partition was accompanied by communal massacres both in India and Pakistan. In the midst of communal carnage there were many voices of sanity and reason that were raised in defence of the minorities. Many Hindus

17. Ibid., p.37.

defended and protected the Muslims even at the cost of their lives.

Apart from the partition days communal riots between the Hindus and Muslims broke out in a monotonously regular manner in different parts of the country and for different causes. To incite anti-Muslim feelings they spoke of the persecutions of Shahjahan and even more fanatical Aurangzeb but never mentioned the regimes of Akbar, the Bahamani kings of the Deccan, Tipu's rule in Mysore where Hindus and Muslims lived in friendship and happiness.¹³

Taking advantage of the activities of Hindu Communal organisations against the Muslims minority, the Muslim communal organisations have been active with their own dangerous ideas of separatism. Muslim communal organisations like Jamaat-e-Islami, Hindu communal organisations like the RSS cannot succeed in dividing the country. Muslims must understand that it is not separation that will help them. It is not the Muslim communal organisation that can defend the real interests of the Muslim minority or fight the menace of aggressive Hindu communalism. They must have confidence in the everygrowing strength of the forces of secularism and democracy and they must do every thing to support such forces.

13. Ibid., p. 39.

India claims to have built a secular state, and the Indian constitution seeks to erect the structure of such a state. In an Asian country like India or Pakistan secularism cannot be established by mere legal declaration; the communal outlook in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has very deep roots in behaviour patterns and mental attitudes. In a country where age-old customs and prejudices still play a dominant role, where religious feelings are, by far more important than the proclaimed policy of the government, secularism has no secure foundation.¹⁹

India's secularism can be judged best by an analysis of the fate of its largest religious minority group : the Indian Muslims though the Indian Constitution in theory, guarantees the right of equality to all citizens, the Indian Muslims have in reality, gradually been relegated to the status of second class citizens.

The Indian Muslims have made sincere attempts to identify themselves with the hopes and aspirations of the new India. They have nothing to gain by adopting a communal attitude. They are being discriminated against in all spheres of life for no other reason than that they are followers of Islam; in social life they are segregated; in the economic sphere they are greatly losing place. There

¹⁹ G.W. Choudhary, op.cit., p. 172.

are no new large scale business or industrial establishments started by them anywhere in India. Many Indian Muslim graduates seek employment in Pakistan because they have no avenues in their own country.

In the cultural sphere, there have been attempts at changing the cultural and historical heritage of the Muslims in the form of rewriting Indian history. School text books are increasingly projecting the scope of Hindu culture as the mainstream of Indianism. Islamic faith and culture is represented as alien and odd. Such books are replete with highly exaggerated stories of tyranny and torture alleged to have been done by the Muslim rulers of India. The Muslims of India are portrayed as descendants of an intruding alien people and of those of the lower castes in Indian society who were forcibly converted to Islam. Muslim rule in India is depicted as a dark period of oppression and persecution.

In the political sphere, the Indian Muslims have lost completely and they find themselves utterly frustrated and helpless. The Muslim population in India is so scattered that they cannot, on the basis of numerical strength play any significant role in the politics of the country either on a national or state level.

The constitution may be secular in inspiration, but Indian society government and state cannot be described as secular.

Muslim masses can form an important component of the people's democratic front if their problems are properly tackled. Alternatively they will continue to be exploited by the reactionaries and used against all progressive forces.

The partition of the country was the tragic culmination of the communal politics of the pre-independence days. What the Muslim community got out of independence and partition was a sense of insecurity, frustration and uncertainty. It is now generally accepted that, as compared to the Hindus, the Muslims suffered a greater loss, as a result of the partition of India. The Hindu community, on the whole, remained intact while the Muslim community was truncated and splintered into "three groups" in West Pakistan, East Pakistan and the Indian Muslims. The basis of partition was the supposed incompatibility between Hindus and Muslims. The creation of Pakistan gave it a manifest constitutional recognition and form and rendered the communal problem much more difficult of solution.²⁰

The Indian Muslims were required to develop a new outlook and fit satisfactorily into the democratic non-communal set up. They could do so only by strengthening the hands of those who were struggling to make India a truly secular state. Secularism has never been a strong element in the

20. Maulana Azad : India wins Freedom, pp. 226. 227.

political thinking of the Indian Muslims. Although Sir Syed and others advocated the separation of religion from politics but the dominant attitude has been that of unity of religion and politics. There has been a mistaken notion that secularism undermined the role of Islam. After 1947, it was essential to present the concept of secularism and non-communal rationalism in proper perspective. Maulana Azad had comprehended the significance of this task. He held that separatism and communalism spread poison among the Muslims and led them on a wrong and dangerous path.

Maulana Azad and few other nationalist Muslims thought that secular foundations could be provided to Muslim politics simply by exhorting the Muslims to give up separatism. What they forgot was that communalism had been the political ideology of the Muslim elite which had developed a vested interest in it. The democratic system appeared incongruous, competition would have been of little help in matters of jobs and representation in legislatures. It was prone to assume the form of popular ideology because the elite could successfully exploit the religious susceptibilities of the common people. Islam as religion could be employed as an excuse by those who themselves were the victims of the accidents of history. Islam is the dominant theoretical pattern which proliferates into all the basic activities of the Indian Muslims.²¹

21. Moin Shakir, Muslims in Free India, p.5.

After 1947, the Muslims were left with two alternatives - quasi secular approach of Maulana Azad and the isolationist approach of the communal leaders. The misunderstanding between the two communities pushed the Muslims to isolationism and brought quasi--secular borders closer to the communalists.

It is argued that if the social reforms are introduced on the pattern of the Hindu social reform movement the gulf between the two communities can be narrowed down.

There has been a virtual lack of communication between the two communities. What is alarming is that the secular Hindus have their own prejudices against the Muslim community. The sharp increase in communal riots leads the Muslims to adopt a defensive and static attitude. The modernized muslim in this situation, either withdraws into his shell or, in his public postures feels shy of being identified with anything explicitly muslim.²² There begins to operate some sort of defence mechanism which may result either in desperation, frustration or militancy.

What is generally forgotten by both the Hindus and the Muslims, is that the Indian society needs a renaissance. The

22. M.A. (pseud) : Indian Muslims -- need of the hour, September 27, 1968, p.17.

pre-requisite of the Indian renaissance--the liberation of the objective progressive forces from the prejudice of spiritualistic revivalism, mystic extravagance and religious atavism--has been absent.²³

What is to be shunned by both the communities is the community orientation and religion based politics. Unfortunately after 1947, there has been a tendency to justify the consolidation of the communities along religious lines. Some even go to the extent of saying that there is nothing wrong in religious consolidation. In practice it simply means the continuity of the existing parallel societies. It is also thought to be a device to avoid conflict. One wonders whether it is practicable and compatible with the demands of nation building. The Muslims in India are in a quandary. They appear lost and out of grips with the evolving reality of contemporary Indian political life. And this is for many reasons. In terms of the immediate historical antecedents, their major political conditioning is the ever present memory of their participation in the movement for the formation of a Muslim state in the sub continent : Pakistan. In terms of the contemporary political situation, their basic problem is how to reconcile their sense of religious and communal belonging with their political identification with the national process of change in India, and thereby play a legitimate, and numerically proportionate role inconsonance with their collective status as the single biggest religious

23. Moin Shakir, op. cit., p.7.

minority in the evolution of a modern, federal and democratic all India polity. This problem is not an isolated problem and concern only of the Muslim Community, but part of the larger political challenge facing India and its national policy of secularism and democracy.²⁴

It is well established by facts that Pakistan, paradoxically, was created as a political entity, largely by the direct involvement of those Muslims who were living in provinces and states in pre-partition days in which they were in a minority and who, by that token, continue to remain in India even after partition away from their 'dreamland' which they had bequeathed ironically to their co-religionists who had always lived in provinces and states with a Muslim majority like the Bengalis, the Punjabis, the Sindhis and the Pathans. What is probably the worst irony of history is the realisation, that they, the real creators of Pakistan and the proponents of the 'two nation theory' should remain in India by the exigencies of circumstances, despite their political triumph, only to suffer the consequences of their own logic and face the challenge of secularism and corporate multi communal growth.

Their political logic in pre-partition days ran something as follows : Muslims are a separate nation by all

24. Romesh Thapar, ed., Tribe, Caste and Religion in India, No. 145.

canons of recognition, but in a unified India they would be numerically subordinated, politically overruled and culturally over-whelmed by the Hindus, therefore, it is in the interest of the Muslims if India is divided and an exclusive Muslim state for the protection of the Muslims and the propagation of Islam is constituted.²⁵

A bulk of the Muslims who subscribed to this view, then remained in India more by the compulsions of geography and the strong links of the existing socio-economic relationship, rather than by political choice. Nevertheless it might not be overlooked that there is another bulk of Muslims almost equal if not more in number who were either powerless and bewildered spectators of the zealous two nation theory exponents or weak but conscientious and uncompromising opponents, to whom the entire emotive reaction of the muslim league leadership and its popular acclamation by a large bulk of the Muslim masses was one of the worst nightmares of their political experience. In this latter group were the Muslim 'nationalists' including a section of the ulema and the enlightened gentry, on whom consequent upon the formation of Pakistan, had fallen the responsibility of re-educating the Muslim masses to a sense of inter-communal harmony and realistic living in a secular polity. Then, the

25. W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 263-74.

proclamation of the Indian Republic, in the name of the people, whose liberty, equality and fraternity-irrespective of caste, creed and colour-was enshrined in the Fundamental Rights of the constitution and protected by an impartial, independent and supreme judiciary, has resulted in a new structuring of power-relationship in India. This has generated a process of secularisation and democratic diffusion. All sections of the people, including the Muslims, are caught up, as it were, in a vortex of change.

The Muslim response is limited by four particularistic considerations:-

1. Their adherence, as a community to the traditional view of Muslim polity based on the common law of Islam (Shariat) thereby questioning the total legitimacy of the legislative competence of the democratic law-making processes in India;
2. Painful awareness of their minority-Status and communal cohesion, thus giving them a psychological reservation in committing themselves to the idea of total identification of the nation;
3. Fear of 'Hindu' domination being indicative of their lack of confidence in their creative and contributory role in a competitive polity, thereby making them resist the process of adjustment and integration.

4. Lack of interest and issue orientation in their polarisation and in their aggregative function of politics, thus betraying a lag between their level of modernisation and that of other communities in India.²⁶

Numerically the Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindus are a minority. Accepting the basic fact of the immobility between religious groups, this situation involving the respective immutable communal conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims would continue. Therefore, unless modernisation leads fast to the collapse of traditional cohesion based on caste and creed, the Muslims as an entity would have to reconcile themselves to the position of a perpetual minority. In addition to their distinctive cultural contribution, religious minorities are the natural guardians of the secular state. Therefore, the Muslim despair over the minority status need not be overplayed. First a minority so big and culturally so impressive like the Muslims in India, with centuries of composite history and composite traditions behind it can not but be creative and dominant if only its leaders play a positive and uninhibited role. Second in a secular democracy, itself in a process of modernisation, like India, the operational categories would inevitably change, and with it a new communal culture would be relegated to the background the role of communal groups and would be supplanted by interest oriented groups, which, in the nature of things, would have to be multi-communal in their compositions, corporate in

26. Rasheeduddin Khan, The Changing Role of Religious Minorities, Tribe, caste, Religion in India, ed., Romesh Thapar, p. 148.

their demands, composite in their outlook and issue-- oriented in their politics.

The term "community", as used in India, writes Richard Lambert,²⁷ is one of those conveniently vague words so helpful in the designation of heterogenous social units... The adjectival form "Communal" is one of the most negatively weighted terms in the Indian political vocabulary. It is used to describe an organisation that seeks to promote the interests of a section of the population presumably to the detriment of society as a whole, or in the name of religion or tradition opposes a social change... It is thus an epithet implying anti social greed and reactionary social outlook...²⁷

It was possibly in this sense that Panikkar said 'that the organisation of Islam in India was therefore, frankly communal (because) the Muslims at all time every where have been an integrated community separate from others.' But are not the other minority communities equally if not more integrated 'at all times'? Further, will it be correct to maintain that Muslim Communalism is a sort of parallel nationalism or should we hold that it is basically, even if an exaggerated,

27. Richard D. Lambert, 'Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, Leadership and Political Institutions in India, p. 211.

a form, of sub-nationalism, an in-group feeling, a cohesive religious affinity awareness.

Before answering these queries, we have to recapitulate the all-pervading role of religion in India during its long history. Religion, as a socio-cultural pattern and as the basis of ethical norms and metaphysical speculations, has been the most powerful single factor in India. Therefore, in such a religious dominated country, possessing today a plural society, comprising diversified religious linguistic, ethnic and cultural groupings, it is but natural that homogeneous entities consisting of just one religion, language, race or culture would exist based on narrow yet not ultimately, on divisive loyalties.

Since the majority community is bound to be the first beneficiary of nationalism in a democratic society, therefore the minorities, in order to retain their identity, depend not merely on the promotion of nationalism but also on the simultaneous and contemporaneous development of subnationalism.²⁸ This in the conditions of today in India takes a negative

28. Hinduism is an ethnic religion, the faith of one particular people rather than an international religion India is the only home of the Hindus... An Ethnic religion may easily become closely identified with nationalism... The promotion of national ideals by the state thus tends to become the promotion of religion. This poses a more subtle challenge to the secular state! Donald E. Smith, India as a Secular State, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1963, n.3, p.27.

slant and degenerates into communalism.²⁹ The single biggest reason for it is probably that fact that as a form of primordial cohesion between people belonging to the same religious group communalism is often a reaction to the fear of domination of the majority community.³⁰ It was largely this sense of fear that aggravated Muslim consciousness of communalism which now for almost a century has become a basic factor in Hindu-Muslim politics, making it psychologically difficult for both the communities to discard it.³¹

The minority status of the Muslims in India became further complicated and powerfully stressed by the Communal Oriented section of the majority community as a consequence of the formation of Pakistan. The total number and proportion of the Muslims in the population complex of India has dwindled and, as a community, their political allegiance has been questioned, their economic and social status has declined, unemployment has spread and generally during the last twenty years they have lived groping for light. The process of adjustment is made difficult due to many factors. First there is the community's own lack of confidence in its creative and positive role in a competitive polity. Second is the

29. A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Bombay, 1954, p.346.

30. Richard D. Lambert, op.cit., n.17, p.219.

31. Sisir Gupta, Moslems in Indian Politics, India Quarterly, n.15, p.346.

resistance offered by sections of the majority community due not only to their fear of the muslim minority's reassertion for another form of separatism within India, but probably due also to the fact of the severe competition and rivalry generated in all facets of national life by the working of the politics of scarcity.³²

Then there is in the mind of the common Muslim the long established irrational fear that the final goal of Hinduism is assimilation leading up to the annihilation of Islam in India.

Following the formation of a free government in India after the partition of the country the process of modernisation for the Muslims was checked by three limiting factors-

1. A mass exodus of the well-to-do Muslims to Pakistan took place between 1947-50 thus depriving the community of its middle class and entrepreneur elite, resulting in the severe depletion of its commercial, bureaucratic and vocational leadership cadre.
2. The unavoidable effects of the 'democratic' legislations like land reforms, extension of universal franchise and the introduction of the Panchayati Raj resulted, ironically in hitting the Muslims hard.

32. Myron Weiner, The Politics by Scarcity, p.10.

3. With the operation of the panchayati Raj and the spread of the community development and national extension schemes the process of diversification of Indian Politics has entered a new phase. A new elite is coming up at the local and slowly even at the state level with roots in peasantry and in the countryside. This is part of a wider democratic change, long over due in the rural hinterland. As a result an army of rural elite has emerged which has challenged urban ascendancy in Indian politics and has threatened if not partly also dislodged them from their position of privileges and power monopoly with this development, those communities whose traditional political base has been urban like the Muslims have been relegated to a secondary position.³³

The task before the Muslims then is to transcend the limitations of community orientation. For this they will have to evolve a form.

- a) of emotional identification and political integration
- b) of participation and contribution in the process of modernisation and
- c) of playing the leading role as the exponents of secularism and nationalism.³⁴

For the realisation of the first objective it would be necessary to reconcile the needless dichotomy between religion

33. Rasheeduddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.158.

34. *Ibid.*, p.159.

and country 'to be Muslims' is not antagonistic to 'to being Indian'. It is merely a question of the proper ordering and determination of the spheres of loyalties. A sense of the proper ordering and determination of the spheres of loyalties. A sense of belonging to India, without comprising a sense of adherence to Islam is obviously possible, except if the controversies of modern politics are projected into Islam or the differences of faiths are confused as the differences of nationalities. As a matter of fact, an Indian Muslim is precisely in that order an Indian first and a Muslim next in his sociological, cultural, psychological, and economic and political responses and conditions. Only in terms of faith is he Muslim first and Muslim last. The divergence between him and a member of another community in his region within India is that of degree but not of kind, while the difference between him and his co-religionists elsewhere in the world say in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Nigeria or Albania is essentially a basic difference in kind.

Political integration means closer unity for political purposes in a heterogenous country and plural society like India.

Taking advantage of the constitutional possibilities and the establishment of the process of democracy and change, the Muslim leadership at all levels should encourage their co-religionists to discard their separatist tendencies and

enter the realm of competitive polity and its composite problems so as to accelerate the pace of modernisation. Faster industrialisation greater diversification of interest and more democracy will itself break old relationships based on caste and religious communities.

Minorities with a creative background are bound to play a leading role in the promotion of secularism for the obvious and basic reason of shifting the focus from the religious majority's overlordship. The active, constructive and non-sectional participation of the Muslims in the diversified fields of changing civilisation in India, would not only give an interest orientation to their own politics but also a firm stability to the federal polity of new India, in the building of which our generation has a trust with destiny.

Muslims constitute nearly 10% of the population of India. They are spread all over the country forming significant minorities in all states except Kashmir where they are in a majority and Punjab from where they were expelled after the partition of the country. Muslim masses can form an important component of the people's democratic front if their problems are properly tackled. Alternatively they will continue to be exploited by the reactionaries and used against all progressive forces.

The major grievances of the muslim minorities can be

summed up as follows:-

- 1) Muslims are economically backward because the number of Muslim industrialists is negligible. The abolition of the zamindari system in UP and some other states have affected them. A large section of the Muslims like the weavers and metal workers have continuously suffered under the deindustrialization of colonial India and then when craft unemployment has grown enormously.
- 2) Muslims are educationally backward. The literacy rate is lower because of inherited backwardness owing to the failure of Muslims to take the modern education in time. Economic backwardness prevents parents from sending children to school. The low literacy rate is also because of emphasis on Hindi and practical exclusion of Urdu in UP and other Hindi speaking states and also because of the migration of large number of educated Muslims to Pakistan.
- 3) Discrimination in employment in public services. Because of the low literacy rate they are not recruited in adequate numbers through open competitive exams. Very few of them are employed by industrial and commercial firms.
- 4) Insecurity of life and property when a communal riot occurs.
- 5) Suppression of Urdu. Denying it any role as a medium of instruction or as a language of administration in UP, Bihar etc.

In some ways it is simply the existence of Pakistan that under-mines the Muslims' position in India.³⁵ The Indian

35. W.C. Smith, Islam In Modern History, N.Y., 1963, p.268

Muslims are Indians and their destiny is inextricably bound up with their status as Indians. Even so, Pakistan has been a conspicuous factor in their continuing distress, and insecurity as well as their integration into Indian society.

Pakistan enters the life of the Indian Muslim in a variety of ways, but the one sense in which it could be said to touch them deeply is their perception by others as Pakistani expatriots. Muslims are denied placement in strategic areas and defence services as they are considered a serious security risk. Or again they are suspected of their allegiance to Pakistan and treated suspiciously if not contemptuously in their day to day dealings with the members of the majority population.

The conception of the Indian Muslims as second class citizens is a natural corollary to their perception as Pakistani expatriots or fifth columnists.³⁶

After the partition of the sub-continent the Indian Muslims decided to stay on in India because -

a) the rural muslims were deeply rooted in the local agrarian structure and the question of migration to Pakistan raised the problem of their social and economic security.

36. Imtiaz Ahmed, Pakistan and the Indian Muslims, Quest, Jan-Feb., 1975. (93) p.39.

rehabilitation in an alien sitting.

b) The main source of the upper middle class muslims in the northern Indian region was Zamindari. There was a chance of losing their titles to the land and moreover there was no guarantee that they would be granted lands in the new country.

c) The Urban muslims were mainly in government service and private employment. There was the fear of their loss of seniority, provident funds, pensions etc.³⁷

The psychological repercussions of their decisions was quite shattering. Smith has noted they realized that they were now divided between two separate subsequently mutually hostile nations. Their religious bond linked them with their co-religionists in Pakistan, the sheer logic of their decision had resulted in their becoming citizens of what they had all along perceived to be a hindu nation.³⁸

This decision produced insecurity hatred and distrust towards Hindu. If Pakistan had been carved out so as to include the Indian Muslims they would have enjoyed the sense of security. Their numerical strength was reduced because of partition so they looked to Pakistan for their security as a community. The Indian muslims found out that their status as Muslims opened to them a kind of subtle and invidious discrimination so common to cultural and ethnic minorities

37. Ibid., p.41.

38. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.257.

everywhere. Their image as Pakistani expatriots served as a convenient rationalization for the denial of economic opportunities to them.

There are two distinct attitudes towards Pakistan in the new generation of Indian Muslims which has grown up since independence.

- a) There is one group quite indifferent to Pakistan and reacts towards it just as they react towards any other alien country. They realise that the presence of Pakistan is often a source of embarrassment for them and also find that their status as Muslims is a handicap for them both in matters of employment and in social life.
- b) Second group whose patriotism is weak and self-centered. They are concerned with their social and economic prospects.

It is persistently argued by Indian progressives that if India becomes fully socialist, the problems of the Muslim minority will be automatically solved. This argument is advanced not only by communists or socialist parties but also by Muslims who claim to be secular and nationalists.

An ideology which insists on a highly centralised economic system and one party government will be consist in demanding one language and one language in India would surely not be Urdu.

It is also wrong to suppose that if the government had

the monopoly over the whole economy, the Muslims would be in a better position. The main grievance of the Muslims is against the government in whose service they say there share in decreasing. Under a system where every Muslim would depend upon the government for his livelihood it would be next to impossible for them to preserve their own culture.³⁹

Since independence, the Muslim community has been the victim of a cruel tragedy; has acted like a sleep walker, as if it had lost the sense of direction and purpose, its confidence in itself, in its future and in its motherland. Demoralised by partition, weakened by continuous exodus of talent and skill, charged with lack of patriotism, accused of extra territorial loyalties of being fifth columnists and traitors, lost between the mirage of Pan-Islamic sentiments and the hard realities of existence, facing steady economic deterioration, accelerated by the abolition of Zamindari and the narrowing avenues of the government employees, the Muslim community was exploited by the congress as a vote bank to be overdrawn at the time of elections.⁴⁰

The adoption of secularism as a national goal gave hope to the Muslim community. But the recurrence of communal violence; the step-motherly treatment to urdu in the land of

39. Gopal Mittal, The Muslim Minority's problems and Socialism, Svarajya Nov. 16, 1968, Vol. XIII, No. 20, p. 13.

40. Syed Shahabuddin, Muslim Minority and Hindu Backlash, Secular Democracy, Feb. 3, 1980, p. 8.

its birth, the politically inspired moves for their modernisation the ideological gospel of Indianisation; the lengthening shadows of the government upon the Aligarh Muslim University, discrimination in the field of higher education sapped its energy and its determination to struggle for a better future in India and within the framework of the constitution with every election, promises were made to be broken hope turned into despair. The result was that the muslim community receded more and more within its protective shell.

Then came 1971-the liberation of Bangladesh. Then the muslim community in India suddenly realised that it was the biggest of the three segments and that it was neither Pakistan nor Bangla Desh but India which was the repository of all that was of permanent value in the Islamic heritage of the sub-continent.⁴¹ It made them realise the absurdity of the two nation theory. Pakistan was no longer viewed as a bulwork, as protector, as a hope or as a refuge. The Muslim community made a psychological break with the past and decided that it had no option but to stay and struggle for their democratic rights and for the redressal of their legitimate grievances. So in 1975 when the dark night of emergency descended upon the country he stood up defiant and made sacrifices. In 1977 he exercised his franchise to defeat authoritarianism and to restore democracy.

Secularism with all that it implies is a new experience

41. Ibid., p. 8.

for the Muslims. The Muslim Indian has come to recognise that beyond the classical categories of Islamic geopolitics, Darul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb, there is a third category namely 'Watan' whose love the holy prophet ordained as the essential ingredient of Iman (faith).⁴² So long as the Muslims enjoy freedom, equality and security, i.e. so long as India is democratic and secular, it is watan for the Muslims of India in the Islamic sense and must be the focus of their love and commitment.

The task of the new generation of Indians whose vision is not clouded by the night mare of the past or by the gross inequities of the present is to build a future in which all groups and communities shall find fulfilment.

The partition of India ended direct confrontation between the Congress and the Muslim League but it did not end the communal tangle. Independent India was left with no less than 40 million Muslims who formed the third biggest population of that community. Likewise as many as twenty million non-Muslims were left in Pakistan.⁴³

M.A. Jinnah had given assurances that minorities in Pakistan, would enjoy full security of life, property, honour

42. Ibid., p.8.

43. Shri Aj-it-Prasad Jain, National Integration and Minorities, AICC Economic Review, Vol.XVI, Jan. '65, p.28.

and equality of status. But a country born out of the two nation theory, Hindu and Muslim being different in culture, faith, religion, history and way of life could hardly be in a position to fulfill the promises. Pakistan was designed to be the home land for Muslims and soon there grew up a feeling among Muslims there that non-Muslims in Pakistan were aliens. The unfortunate result was the uprooting of over 10 million of non-Muslims--Hindus, sikhs, christians from their ancestral homes in Pakistan and migration to India and about 5-6 millions of Muslims from India to Pakistan. In terms of money, prosperity, and human suffering the loss incurred would compare with some of the worst devastations of war.⁴⁴

In 1947 India launched the process of democratic nation building. Indeed it was more than that. It was in essence the start in constructing a new civilization around a liberated man -- a man who was to be freed from the shackles of feudal exploitation, religious obscuratism and above all from an obsolete heritage that had transformed tradition into bondage.

The challenges were staggering. There was the encrustation of a social order that had long outlined its utility and purpose but had never the less survived the vicissitudes of history. There was the frustrating problem of chronic poverty

44. Ibid., p.29.

of the masses amidst unchecked population explosion, scarce resources and inadequate technology. There was the baffling problem of reconciling many forms of sub-national demands with the urgent and basic need for creating a national identity. Persuading Minorities-- The quest for a new civilization -- pursued through the methods of persuasion and consent and based on the values of democracy like egalitarianism, adult-franchise, representative institutions, rule of the law, secularization of politics and socialization of economy is an on going process. Its pace and momentum depends primarily on the capacity of the dominant elite to elicit the co-operation of people belonging to the many segments that constitute India. A democratic solution of national problem involves not only the approval and commitment of the majority segment but also the concurrence and involvement of the minority groups.

In a segmentary society like India, the process of nation building passes through what might be called, phases of 'fission' and 'fusion'. Community based segments in India particularly the Hindus and the Muslims cut across regional, caste and language identities and acquire its functional politics almost as a continental dimension.

It should be remembered that while majority communalism can and does pass off as nationalism in any society in the

world, because the majority community is bound to be the first beneficiary, minority communalism cannot remain concealed under that garb. Thus while the majority communalism may be viewed as the primordial level of national integration, minority communalism cannot but give the contrary impression of weakening that very national integration.

It is therefore in the interest of the minority more than of the majority to transcend its communal orientation and play a leading role as the exponent of genuine secularization of the polity.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from the liberation of Bangladesh is the fact that the religious bond alone was not enough cohesive pull to sustain a territorial sovereignty. The history of Pakistan from one angle is the history of a ruling elite which had unscrupulously and for non-religious purposes stretched the role of religion far too widely to cover all aspects -- political, social & cultural. What is amazing is the almost unabashed exploitation of Islam for purposes which are mostly of a profane character.

The creation of Bangla Desh exploded the myth of the 'two nation theory'.

Irrationality of the 'two nation theory can be proved by the following points :-

1. Religion alone to the exclusion of other actors is not

and has never been the basis of nationalism and nationhood.

2. If the demands of the so-called Muslim nationalism could be satisfied only by the formation of an independent state in regions which were Muslim majority areas e.g. East Bengal, Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, then why should it not be considered as essentially a regional and not a religious demand in which religious means were employed for regional ends.

Indian Muslims are an integral part of the national life and have made rich contributions to the glorious cultural heritage of this great and ancient land. It was under the British rule that Indian history was written with communal overtones and those who received their education under this dispensation began to think and talk of a Hindu period and a Muslim period. The British policy of 'Divide and Rule' had many facets and this was about the worst. In spite of this poisonous education Hindus and Muslims fought shoulder to shoulder many a time dividing the nearly two hundred years to overthrow the British rule. Religion and politics were mixed up frequently and religious revivalism was encouraged by many national leaders. The negative features were utilised by the erstwhile British rulers to create serious division on a religious basis and ultimately to partition the country on the eve of their departure.

The break up of Pakistan demonstrates the ineffectiveness of religion as a cement of disruptive political, social and economic forces. Affinities of religion, race, language or culture may serve as added sources for securing unification but it is obvious that to use any of these as means of removing a sense of injustice bred by economic, social or political oppression or frustration is only to misuse them as 'opiates'.⁴⁵

45. Mirza Hamedullah Beg Democracy, Minorities and National Integration, p.57.

CHAPTER - IV

RELIGION AND THE PRINCELY STATES

One of the major problems which confronted Indian leaders on attainment of independence in 1947 was the problem of welding together some six hundred and odd princely states with its main political structure. These states covered nearly forty five percent of the territory of undivided India and about twenty four percent of the Indian people resided in them. Some of these states were so small that there was hardly any justification for their existence as independent political units. The statesmanship with which the Indian leaders successfully integrated these states with the rest of the country within three years of the independence is testimony of their ability.

The British finally decided to quit the country in August 1947 and passed the Indian Independence Act. In terms of this Act the country was divided into two independent Sovereign States. India and Pakistan.

It may be observed that though the Indian Leaders tried to persuade the British Government to prevail upon the princely states to join the Indian Union and make necessary provision to this effect in the Indian Independence Act, the British Government adopted a strictly legalistic attitude and pointed out that with the transfer of power to the Indian hand, the British Paramountcy over the states would automatically lapse and the states would be free to join either

India or Pakistan, or even remain in-dependent.

Soon after the transfer of power to the Indian hands some of the princes asserted their independence and refused to accede to India despite strong historical, political, cultural and economic links with India.

Sometime after assuming office Vallabhbhai Patel issued a communication that the states would have "an autonomous existence" in the Indian Union and the Government of India had no intention to interfere in the domestic affairs of the state. The states were expected to concede only defence, external affairs and communications to the Central Government. This statement of Patel was welcomed by states like Bikaner and Alwar. After thorough discussions with the representatives of the princes, the State Department prepared drafts 'Instruments of the Accession' and 'Stand still Agreement'. The Instruments of Accession were not uniform for all the states. The Standstill Agreement was, however, uniform in all the cases.

On the eve of independence all the states except Junagadh, two small states under the rulers of Kathiawar, Kashmir and Hyderabad, acceded either to India or Pakistan. The state Department under the able leadership of Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon did a remarkable work of integrating 652 princely states with great consummate skill, state craft and diplomacy.

The most alarming thing since independence had been the development of direct conflict between the governments of India and Pakistan, likely to embroil them in war over the

Terrible as had been the accession of certain princely states, /bloodshed inflicted on the peoples of the Punjab by communal hatred, the diplomatic capacity of the two governments was to be even more severely tested by their competition for the adhesion of the princely states. Relations between the two-Dominions approached boiling point over the fate of three princely states: Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

When the ruler of a state and his subjects were of the same religion, no dispute ordinarily arose. It was different where the ruler was Hindu and the population mainly Muslims, or where the ruler was Muslim and the population mainly Hindus. In this context let us examine how religion played a role in these princely states.

JUNAGADH

Junagadh together with Hyderabad and Kashmir had not acceded to either Dominion on August 15, 1947. Junagadh was in some respects a Hyderabad in miniature with a Muslim Prince and oligarchy ruling over a predominantly Hindu state in the middle of the Indian territory. With an area of 3,337 square miles and a population (according to 1941 census) of 670,719 (of whom 80 percent were Hindus), Junagadh was one of the important Kathiawad States, bounded on all sides by the states which had acceded to India and the only possible opening to any other country was a small port on

the Arabian Sea. The distance between Karachi and its port Veraval was about three hundred miles. There were many islands of the Junagadh state in the states of Gondal, Bhavnagar, Navaragar Parts of the states which had acceded to India were interspersed with Junagadh territory and access to them was possible only through Junagadh.¹ It's railways and posts and telegraphs formed an integral part of the Indian system. The railway police, telegraphs and telephones were administered by the Government of India. India was therefore interested in its accession.

Junagadh's only tie with Pakistan was that its ruler was a Muslim.² But initially in their pronouncements in the public, the ruler's advisers never indicated the desire of the Muslim ruler or his court to accede to Pakistan. Infact, in April 1947, a statement by the government emphasized its sense of solidarity with the Kathiawar states.³ During the same month the Dewan repudiated all reports of Junagadh's inclination towards Pakistan. In the meeting of the Princes on 25 July, the clarifications asked for by the Dewan gave no indication of his leanings; on the other hand, he went so far as to advise Mountbatten that he proposed recommending to the ruler to accede to India.⁴ A change over

1. V.D.Mahajan, Fifty Years of Modern India, 1919-1969 (Delhi, 1970), p.325.

2. V.P.Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay, 1961), p.119.

3. V.P.Menon, op.cit., p.125.

4. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London, 1951), p.192.

took place five days before the transfer of power when a miniature coup d'etat put one Shah Nawaz Bhutto as the Dewan. Bhutto was a Muslim League from Karachi, who was brought earlier in the year into the State cabinet.

The Government of India had sent the Instrument of Accession to the Nawab for signature, and contrary to the opinions expressed earlier the ruler after anxious consideration and careful balancing of all factors announced his decision to accede to Pakistan.⁵ This decision was a shock to India for various reasons. In the first place, it would be a violation of the principle of geographical compulsion if any state acceded to the Dominion which had no border with it; secondly, it would set up the very unhealthy precedent of the ruler's wish being the law in the matter of deciding a State's future, thirdly, its potentialities in terms of deepening the communal discord in western India could be enormous, fourthly, the open revolt of this tiny state could well set an example for the two bigger states, Hyderabad and Kashmir to follow.⁶

As it later came to be known, secret negotiations were carried on by Jinnah with Shah Nawaz Bhutto. Promise was

5. Documents and Speeches of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. II, London, 1953, p.702.

6. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India - Pakistan Relations (Delhi, 1966), p.30.

made of helping Junagadh economically through the port of Veraval.⁷ It was the view of Lord Ismay, as noted by Alan Campbell Johnson, that the move was, essentially one of the traps and teasings on Jinnah's part.

Mountbatten the then Governor General, telegraphed to Governor General Jinnah that Pakistan's acceptance of Junagadh's accession was "in utter violation of principles on which partition of India was agreed upon and effected."⁸ V.P. Menon was deputed by the Indian Government to persuade the Nawab to change his decisions. He, however, remained disappointed.⁹

India refused to accept the accession and protested in Pakistan, pointing out that three basic principles had been violated in the case, of Junagadh's accession. Junagadh's geographical contiguity, the composition of the population, and the wishes of her people. No reply was received from Pakistan and even a reminder failed to bring forth any clarification of Pakistan's viewpoint. On 12 Sept. 1947 Lord Ismay carried to Karachi a communication from the Government of India indicating their willingness to abide by the verdict of the people. While the Pakistani Government refused to take any note of this communication on the ground that it

7. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 128.

8. Security Council, Official Records, 250th Meeting, 18, Feb. 1948.

9. V.P. Menon, op.cit., pp. 132-33.

did not bear any number or certificate showing that its issue had been authorized, on 13 Sept. they informed the Government of India that they had accepted the accession and also signed a stand still Agreement.

The position of Junagadh became complicated because of a number of factors. The rulers of other Kathiawad States were very disturbed at the decision of the Nawab and condemned it unitedly. It was their fear that the security of the states was being undermined. Secondly, the people and their leaders were determined to organize an alternative government from outside. Thirdly, there were two states in Junagadh territory, which were supposed to be under the suzerainty of Junagadh, but whose ruler and people claimed that when paramountcy lapsed, independence had come for them also.

The popular emotions in Kathiawad and in Bombay province were greatly disturbed and the State's people warned the Government of India that they could not hold the people in leash for long. Their determination was to form a parallel government for Junagadh in Kathiawad. The Government of India did not favour such a development, but all they could do was to counsel patience and restraint.

By 24 September, the Government of India had decided to send troops to Kathiawad state to prevent any untoward incidents. On 25 September a Provisional Government of

Junagadh was formed.¹⁰ On 25 September, the government of India received a telegram from Pakistan, reasserting that the Nawab had the right to accede to Pakistan and that plebiscite was a matter between Junagadh and its subjects.

By October 4, the Indian attitude hardened and a decision was taken to occupy Mangrol and Bahariawad. It was also decided to tell Pakistan that Junagadh must revert to the status quo, prior to the accession, before any negotiation could start; the alternative to negotiation was a plebiscite. On 5 Oct, Pakistan replied in a telegram, that they were ready to get legal opinion as to the status of Mangrol and Bahariawad and meanwhile withdraw Junagadh troops from these territories. There was no reference to Junagadh and hence the proposal was unacceptable to India.

The situation of Junagadh started deteriorating. More than a lac of Hindus ran away from the state of Junagadh. Law and order in the whole of Kathiawar practically collapsed. When the Nawab of Junagadh found that help from Junagadh found that help from Pakistan was not enough to keep him on the throne, he ran away from the state towards the end of Oct. 1947. He took with him to Karachi not only the members of his family but also all his jewellery and all the available

10. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London, 1964), p.194.

cash in the state treasury. Although the Nawab ran away, Shah Nawaz Bhutto continued as Dewan of the state of Junagadh. On 27 Oct., Shah Nawaz wrote to Jinnah, describing the adverse results which had followed in the wake of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan: Our principle sources of revenue railways, and customs have gone to the bottom. Food situation is terribly embarrassing, though Pakistan has come to our rescue with a generous allotment of food grains. There have been a harsh treatment of Muslims, travelling on Kathiawad railway lines, who have been subject to several kinds of hardships and humiliations. Added to this, His Highness and the royal family have had to leave because our secret service gave us information in advance of serious consequences to their presence and safety. Though immediately after his accession, His Highness and myself received hundreds of messages, chiefly from Muslims, congratulating us on the decision, today our brethren are indifferent and cold

Muslims of Kathiawad seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan... I should, therefore, suggest that you immediately arrange for a conference of the representatives of the two Dominions to decide the Junagadh issue.¹¹

On 5 November, the Junagadh State Council held a meeting where it was decided that it was necessary to have a complete readjustment of relations with the few Dominions. Negotiations between the Dewan and the leader of the Provisional

11. V.P. Menon, op.cite., pp. 142-3.

Government started on 7 November, but the ultimate decision was to hand over the government directly to the Government of India through the Regional Commissioner for western India and Gujrat states.

On November 1, the administration of Junagadh was formally taken over by the Government of India through the Regional commissioner for western Indian states. As soon as normalcy was restored in Junagadh, the supervision of a senior Judicial officer. The polling took place on 20 February 1948 and out of 190,870 voters, who had exercised their franchise (of a total electorate of 201,457), only 91 chose Pakistan.¹²

Pakistan refused to accept the validity of the accession to India as negotiated between India and Junagadh on the ground that, having once acceded to Pakistan, Junagadh has no competence to reverse its decision. It was a violation of international law and of Pakistani territory when India took over the state. The Indian Position as explained in a telegram from the Prime Minister to his Pakistani counterpart was that, if they had not intervened, the state would have been in a complete chaos and bloodshed could not have been avoided.

Pakistan, however, was not convinced and to this day claims Junagadh as a part of its territory. The issue of Junagadh has apparent similarities with the Kashmir issue.

12. Ibid., p. 142.

Both the States were governed by rulers who belonged to a different religious group than the majority of their subjects. Both of them had acceded to the Dominion where the majority of the people were of different religious faith than the majority in the state. The analogy, cannot be carried further. Kashmir's geographical location afforded the opportunity of choice between the two Dominions and Junagadh's offered none; Another factor was the will of the majority in Kashmir was admittedly a matter of doubt, not so in Junagadh. Again, force was used to coerce Kashmir before the accession; in Junagadh, the attempt throughout was to persuade the Nawab to accept the logical course. Lastly, Pakistan had no economic or strategic interests in Junagadh as India had in Kashmir.

Pakistan promoted its religious sentiments by interfering in the accession of Junagadh. It's only common link with the state was that it had a Muslim ruler who was that susceptible to accede to Pakistan because of the common religious bond. He did so despite the unwilling Hindu majority in the state, who fled in large numbers because of the disturbances in the state and to ^{be} escape the consequences of its accession to Pakistan.

HYDERABAD

The problem of accession of Hyderabad to Indian union, is unique among all other princely states. Though both Junagadh and Hyderabad were ruled by Muslim rulers with Hindu majority, the problem that Hyderabad posed was more formidable than that of Junagadh. Firstly, Hyderabad was India's premier state geographically it occupied pivotal position in the heart of India. Secondly, it was characterized by strong feudal structure and suppression of all civil liberties. Hyderabad was the most important among all the princely states also from the standpoint of size, revenue and population. The revenues of the Hyderabad state for many years were double than that of any other state and equivalent to about 16-1/2 crores in Government of India currency. The state could boast of a size equal to Italy or France and had a population of sixteen millions.¹³ Despite its position as premier state Hyderabad was treated by the Britishers no different from other Indian states. The right of intervention in internal affairs was repeatedly asserted and exercised.¹⁴ Nizam's state was divided into three distinct regions, with three different languages.

13. K.L. Gauba, Hyderabad or India (Delhi, 1948), p.52.

14. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.316.

Fifty percent Telugu speaking Andhras were living in eight Telengana districts. Maharashtrians were inhabiting its Northern and Western areas. The Kannada speaking people were located in South West of the state. Hyderabad was surrounded by Indian union from all sides.

The accession of Hyderabad to Indian union has added significance because of the peasant struggle which was started around the same time and was strong in Telengana districts of the state. This struggle was basically directed against the feudal relations that were existing in the state. This struggle was combined with the Hyderabad state Congress struggle for the accession of Hyderabad. The Indian Union and establishment of Responsible Government.

The Communists in the Telengana region of the state had started a movement against the suppression and exploitation of rural people by 'zamindars' and 'Marktedars'. These land lords owned majority portions of land in villages which gave rise to landlordism and oppressive system of land tenure.¹⁵

Till 1948, the struggle was directed for achieving two aims - one was to destroy the feudal structure and the other was to force Nizam to accede to the Indian Union. It was the latter objective which attracted most of the people

15. For details see P. Sundarayya, Telengana Peasant Struggle And its lessons, Calcutta, 1972.

who, enthusiastically participated in the struggle because their basic aim was accession of Nizam to Indian union. The State Congress constantly which was founded in 1938 constantly demanded introduction of responsible government and restoration of civil liberties. During the 1942 struggle the historical developments in the rest of India also found their echo in Hyderabad state which witnessed mass demonstrations and protests.

It was in the background of these two movements, one led by State Congress and socialist party and the other led by Communist party that efforts were carried on for final accession of Nizam to Indian Union. The futility of these efforts and growing unrest in the rural areas, generated by Razakars and communists had ultimately compelled the government of India to send troops to force Nizam to accede to the Indian union. This is known as 'Police Action.'

The problem of accession of Hyderabad to Indian union erupted soon after the announcement of His Majesty's governments plan of 3rd June 1947 which laid down the method by which, power, was to be transferred from British to Indian hands. It was declared in that plan that if the areas with a majority of Muslim population desired that they should be allowed to form a separate dominion, a new constituent assembly would be set up for that purpose.

After this announcement the Nizam issued a 'firman' declaring his intention not to send representatives to the constituent assembly of either Pakistan or India and made it clear that on 1st August, 1947, he would be entitled to resume the status of an independent sovereign.

On the eve of departure of British the last Nizam (who been ruling since 1911) had two choices before him one was, to reshape the state so as to give it a form that would accord more with the character of populace, i.e. give it a more democratic form, which would ensure the preservation of its special, religious and linguistic character and give the Hindu majority a certain shape in the state power and its administration. The other choice was that it should establish close relations with independent India. But the self-willed ruler had since 1922 been planning to become the Khalifa.¹⁶

Nizam could not take to the first course because it implies loosing of his rule with establishment of democratic institutions. The second option also would not have worked because India would not have approved of an sovereign, independent state ruled by a despotic in the centre of its dominion. It is because of these reasons and also on the

16. Wilhelm Vonpochama, India's Road To Nation-hood, (1981), p.581.

plea that accession would lead to unrest and bloodshed in the state that the Nizam had chosen to remain independent from both Pakistan and India. Nizam could not have acceded to Pakistan either. There was never any question of Hyderabad acceding to Pakistan as it was inside India and because the proud ruler of Hyderabad would accept only a fully independent status or something as near to it as possible.¹⁷

It is in such circumstances Nizam said, reiterating his intention to remain independent, "it is still my desire and the desire of Hyderabad to remain within the family of nations known as the British Common Wealth. After all these years of friendship, I am confident, that the ties which bind Hyderabad to great Britain will not be severed."¹⁸ With this intention on July 11, 1947, the Nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to meet Lord Mountbatten. The delegation was told that the government would not enter into a standstill agreement without the state of Hyderabad, acceding to India. At this time Nizam asked for two months of time to consider his position and that time was allowed to him, hoping that ultimately Hyderabad would

17. Lars, Blinkenberg, 'India Pakistan - The History of Unresolved Conflicts' (Munksgard, 1972), p.99.

18. K.M. Munshi, The End of an Era, Hyderabad, Memories, Bombay, 1957, p.13.

accede to India.

On 8th August, 1947, the Nizam, wrote to Lord Mountbatten, that he could not think of bringing Hyderabad into an organic union with either Pakistan or India.¹⁹ He was prepared however to enter into a treaty with India which would establish close relationship with India by conducting external relations of the state in general conformity with the foreign policy of India and also by Hyderabad contributing ^{to} an agreed number of troops for the defence of India. These were qualified by 3 conditions. The first was that in the event of a war between India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral. The second that Hyderabad should have the right to appoint Agents, General wherever it thought fit and lastly that there must be a provision in treaty that if India succeeded from British Commonwealth Hyderabad would be free to review the situation denovo.

At this time Nizam's Constitutional adviser Sir Walter Monckton had resigned, owing to the attack on him by the Hyderabad press. He was later on persuaded by Lord Mountbatten at the instance of Nizam to stay on to his service. Nizam

19. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.305.

had also expressed his desire to resume negotiations with Mountbatten. Sir Walter Manckton had suggested that Nizam could be persuaded to enter into a treaty provided the term 'Instrument of Accession' was substituted by the term, 'Articles of Association' for which Sardar Patel was totally opposed and argued that Nizam must refer the question of accession to the people of his state and act according to their decision. Then Lord Mountbatten wrote to Nizam on 27 August making the offer of a referendum under the supervision of a British officer, which was rejected by the Nizam.²⁰

On 8th September, 1947 the Nizam wrote that short of accession Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into a treaty of association with India, as he was afraid that accession would lead to disturbance and bloodshed in Hyderabad. Sir Walter Manckton had presented, a draft of heads of agreement which was very unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the Indian Government. After Sir Walter Manckton went back to Hyderabad he reported to Mountbatten about the stiffened attitude of the Nizam in regard to the question of accession and said that it was quite clear that Pakistan influences were the root of change in the Nizam's attitude

20. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.307.

and that the latter wanted him to go to Karachi on 1st October, to seek an interview with Jinnah.²¹

After protracted negotiations with Government of India in which Sir Walter and Sir Sultan Ahmad and the Nawab of Chattari participated. A draft was prepared which was acceptable to the government of India and the delegation sent by the Nizam. As Nizam rejected them under the pressure of Quasim Razavi all the three members of the delegation had resigned.

Then the Nizam wrote a letter threatening that he would negotiate and conclude an agreement with Pakistan.²²

A new delegation was sent on October 31st. As both the parties continued to differ on the issue, for the first time government of India was prepared to consider Standstill Agreement without accession. In spite of all the difficulties, the Standstill Agreement was signed between Government of India and the Nizam on 29 November, 1947. This Stand Still Agreement was for one year. The Government of India was quite hopeful that this period of one year would enable Hyderabad and India to forge closer relations and pave the way for permanent accession.

In the Stand Still Agreement it was emphasized that the aim and policy of the dominion of India and the Nizam of

21. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.309.

22. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.314.

Hyderabad was to work together in close association and amity for the mutual benefit of both. The Agreement laid down that until new arrangements were made all the agreements and administrative arrangements in matter of common concern including defence, external affairs and communication which had existed between the crown, representative and the Nizam before the transfer of power would be continued as between the Government of India and Nizam. However the dominion was not bound to send troops to assist the Nizam in the maintenance of internal order or to the station of troops in state except in time of war. The two parties agreed to appoint their respective agents in Hyderabad and Delhi. It was also agreed that under the agreement, the government of India would not exercise any paramountly functions in their relations with Hyderabad. The Agreement was to come to force immediately and was to remain in force for one year. Thus Hyderabad got a further period of one year to review its decision. With standstill agreement the Government of India got respite from the necessity of opening a second front with Hyderabad, having in the meantime their hands full with Pakistan in the valley of Kashmir. This strategy of Indian Government was short lived as Nizam constantly violated the standstill agreement. The Nizam signed this agreement with a view to consolidate his position in the state at the same time trying to gain independence by securing the withdrawal of the Indian troops from Hyderabad and by accumulating norms for defence.

As a part of this strategy the Nizam had issued two ordinances one is banning the export of all precious metals from Hyderabad to Indian union and declared the Indian currency to be a non-legal tender in the state without consulting Government of India. He showed his intention to appoint agents in several foreign countries and also advanced a loan of 20 crores to Pakistan.

With these violations of the terms of the standstill agreement situation had further deteriorated with the activities of Razakars. Razakars were organised as a power-military wing of 'majlis Ittehad Ul Musselmeen' by its leader Kasim Razavi. The intention of this organisation was to establish a theocratic state in Hyderabad. Right from the time of Nizam's 'firman' of June 1947, Kasim Razavi had entertained this idea and remained a hurdle in peaceful settlement between Indian union and Hyderabad state. The advice of Kasim Razavi to the Nizam was that as the hands of Indian union were full of other problems, they would not be able to date the intricate establishments with irresponsible duties. This sophistication has resulted in Kasim Razavi's ouster take action against Hyderabad and that the Nizam could afford not to exceed Indian Union. After the signing of Standstill Agreement Kasim Razvi gave inflammatory speech arousing communal feeling. He said that we have no other friends except Allah, who has created

this Islamic state and who will never let us down, with the Quran in one hand and ~~AN~~ sword in the other, let us march forward, cut our enemies into pieces, establish our superiority.²³

The objective of Razakars was to intimidate the non-Muslim population with a view to forcing them to leave the state. They went to the limit of holding uptrains passing through the Hyderabad territory and looting passengers. Razakars took revenge on the Hindu population of the neighbouring villages. No non-muslim women could venture into the street without being molested by them.²⁴

The regular violation of the standstill agreement ignoring the Indian Government's protest and the growing menace of the Razakars on one hand and increasing communist insurgency in telengana areas has compelled the Indian Government, to send its troops into Nizam state to force Nizam to accede to the Indian union. The Indian forces had entered the Nizam's territory on 13 September, 1948, and Nizam surrendered on 17th September paving the way for establishment of military government as a stop gap. In conclusion Hyderabad was forced to accede to Indian Union in a complex situation created by Nizam and Razakars on the

23. K.L.Gauba, op.cit., p.123.

24. K.M.Munishi, op.cit., p. 182.

one hand and the communist in insurgency on the other hand.

Though Nizam had no serious intention of acceding to Pakistan because of the geographical limits he sought total support from Pakistan leadership in his attempts to remain independent from Indian union. Pakistan on its part extended its full support to Nizam because of its own interest in Nizam, a Muslim ruler, remaining independent in the middle of the Indian Union. Jinnah in June 1948, said Hyderabad was an independent sovereign state and that not only the Muslims of Pakistan, but Muslims all over the world fully sympathise with Hyderabad in struggle.²⁵ Jinnah was always opposed to Nizam's accession to India, even with the stipulation that the Nizam's troops would not be employed against Pakistan at any time. Jinnah also required Hyderabad as an active ally not as neutral in case of a war.²⁶

After Police Action critical voices were heard against this conquest of old Nizam state and in Pakistan it was termed 'naked aggression.'²⁷

In fact the position taken up by Nizam was in accord with the view point of Jinnah as to the right of an Indian state to consider itself independent after the lapse of the

25. V.K.Kulkarni, India - Pakistan - A Historical Survey of Hindu Muslim Relations, (Jayco Publishing House, Bombay, 1973), p.435.

26. Ibid., 19 p. 435.

27. Cars Bunkerberg, op.cit., p.101.

paramountcy of the British power.²⁸ Pakistan had also tried to get recognition of Hyderabad as an independent state and to reppen the issue by sending a UN Comaission to Hyderabad to interview the Nizam or to hold a plebiscite in Hyderabad under U.N.²⁹

With the support from Pakistan, Nizam gradually expressed his interest to establish an independent Muslim state by violating the provision of the standstill agreement. For Nizam the Stand Still Agreement was a stop gap to gain time to make his intentions cleaf. In fact, Nizam was against Stand Still Agreement. In this context, Sir Walter M. Nizam's constitutional adviser advised him to execute the standstill agreement because it was necessary to have at least comparitive peace in order to prepare Hyderabad for more genuine display of strength later on.³⁰

In Nizam's attempts to remain independent, Razakars a para-military wing of Majlis played a very devastating role. Quasim Razavi, the leader of the Rajakars, with the connivance of the Government, let loose an anti-Hindu terrorist force and tried to carry on a kind genocide in the state.

The Razakars were patronised by Nizam with two objectives -

28. K.L. Gauba, op.cit., p. 110.

29. Taraknath Das - 'Modern Review, ' July, 1949, Vol.LXVXVL.

30. K.M. Munshi, op.cit., p.68.

One was to terrorise the Hindu population and the other was to counter the growing communist insurgency. The government of Hyderabad policies were also directed to achieve his goal of establishing Independent Muslim state. Despite a Hindu majority, with languages other than Urdu, was declared the language of the state in which official work at all levels was done, majority of the government posts, high and lower manned by the Muslims. According to K.M.Munshi 75% of the general administration and 95% of police and military posts were held by the Muslims.³¹

This policy of Nizam was designed to woo the Muslim elite to support his claim for independent state. Laws were applied against Hindus while Muslims happened to be the favoured ones. Thus in such a situation, with, deteriorating law and order created by Razakars and communist insurgency on the one hand and Nizam's distrustful activities on the other hand, the government of India finally, decided to force Nizam to accede by sending Indian troops to enter Hyderabad.

31. K.M. Munshi, op.cite., p.17.

The real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed all the venomous speech, the recalcitrance and the suspicion that have characterized the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organisation that find themselves locked in deadly conflict in which Kashmir has become both a symbol and battleground.³²

If the struggle for Kashmir were a struggle for territory, if it were a struggle for national resources or for manpower, or for strategic position, or for any of the other prizes for which nations traditionally contest, it might have been solved some years ago; it might no longer constitute for the entire subcontinent the menace that today it remains.³³

KASHMIR

India-Pakistan relations since 1947 have pivoted mainly on the issue of Kashmir. This dispute is the poisoned well from which infection has spread to every other point of contact between the two countries.

32. Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p.25.

33. Ibid., p.25.

The Muslims in Pakistan have shown themselves determined never to accept a state of affairs in which Kashmir with Muslims composing 80% of its population would be governed by Hindus from Delhi. The Kashmir issue dominates national thinking. To a Pakistani, Kashmir is not a remote and unknown country; it is near, dear and vital : near in geography, dear in religion; vital in strategy.³⁴

A single historical event has acquired within the context of the Kashmir dispute, a quasi-religious import.³⁵ Islam entered into the state in the tenth century and since then the Muslim culture has been dominant. It was firmly established by the Moguls-Akbar, Jahangir and Aurangzeb who paid frequent visits to the state.

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as in case of other states the struggle for freedom and democratisation of administration started in 1930-31. In the state of Kashmir the case was just the opposite of Hyderabad. While the majority of the population (78%) consisted of Muslims, the key posts were in the hands of non-Muslims. The Muslim population took first step towards a greater share in the administration of the state in 1924 when they presented a memorandum to the Viceroy, Lord Reading demanding proprietary rights

34. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966 (London, 1968), p.91.

35. R. Coupland, Indian Politics 1936-42 (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1944), p.35.

of the land for the peasants, and employment of Muslims in state service in sufficient number.³⁶ But a more systematic effort to fight for the Muslims was made in 1930 when an organisation named Reading Room Party was formed by some Muslim graduates, including Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. This organisation focussed attention on the hardships and distress of the people of the state. The state government did not pay any attention to this organisation.

After some time Sheikh Abdullah founded the Muslim Conference and became its first President. In July 1931, the Muslim Conference organised a massive demonstration against the State Government and the Maharaja. This is considered to be the beginning of the struggle for independence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The communal politics slowly turned secular and in May 1936 the Muslim Conference Party observed Responsible Government Day throughout the state, in which the non-Muslims participated with great enthusiasm. Another organisation 'Kashmir Youth League' was formed which believed in the equality of all people in the state and held that no distinction should be made on the basis of religious beliefs. Sheikh Abdullah also realised that the battle for self-government should be fought on non-communal basis. He therefore, impressed

36. H.K. Chhabra, W.T. Jones, State Politics In India (Delhi, 1980), p.36.

on the Muslim Conference to make alteration in the name and constitution of the organisation so that people could become members of the Conference irrespective of their caste, creed or religion. Accordingly the name of the Muslim Conference was changed into National Conference. This was not liked by the die-hard Muslims and for the time being membership of the Conference greatly declined.

In the meanwhile, at the national level the Congress and Muslim League had emerged as two major political parties. For some time the National Conference did not join either of the two parties, but after the visit of Nehru to Kashmir along with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in 1940, the National Conference committed itself to the Congress ideology. In 1942 when the Congress launched 'Quit India Movement' the National Conference adopted resolution supporting the same. Efforts of Jinnah, during his visit to Kashmir in June 1944, to wear away the National Conference leaders away from Congress did not prove fruitful. In its Sapore Session of August, 1945 the National Conference declared that "the future and independence of Jammu and Kashmir state were inextricably linked with the future and independence of India."

In 1946, the National Conference started 'Quit Kashmir' agitation to force the Dogra Ruler and his government to quit.

After independence the Government of India, as in case of other states, carried on protracted talks with the representatives of the Kashmir for its accession to India. Even Mountbatten advised Hari Singh, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to accede to either India or Pakistan, but the ruler decided not to accede to either side. It must be admitted that the choice of the Raja was very difficult. If he acceded to Pakistan, his action would have been resented by the Non-Muslims of Jammu and Ladakh. On the other hand, if he acceded to India, it would have provoked strong reactions from the Muslims. Ultimately the Government of Jammu and Kashmir decided to negotiate Standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan. While Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement, the Indian Government preferred to wait because it was pre-occupied with the problems of other states.

Though the ruler of Kashmir executed the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan the relations between the two remained far from cordial. The Pakistan Government tried to coerce the state into acceding to Pakistan by cutting the supply of food, petrol and other essential commodities. It also imposed restrictions on free transit of travellers between Kashmir and Pakistan. Pakistan even resorted to military pressure and there were large number of border raids on Kashmir. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir protested to the Pakistan

authorities against the breaches of the Standstill Agreement and continuous raids, but they paid no heed to these protests. On the contrary on 21 October, 1947 they encouraged the frontier tribesmen to invade Kashmir and provided the raiders not only with passage but also modern weapons.

All these developments greatly upset the ruler of Kashmir and he made a desperate appeal for help to the Government of India. The Government was willing to offer help only if the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, which he did sign on 26 October, 1947. The accession was accepted with the condition that a plebiscite would be held in the state when the law and order situation permitted.

The rescue operations started on 27 October when over a hundred civilian aircraft and R.I.A.F. planes were mobilized to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. One of the first tasks of the Indian forces was to assist the Government of Kashmir in maintaining law and order in Srinagar, and checking the raiders at the battle-neck of Baramulla to prevent their further infiltration into the Srinagar valley.

When Pakistan came to know the fact that India had accepted the accession of Jammu and Kashmir and to the Indian troops were in Srinagar, Jinnah wanted the Pakistani troops to be rushed to Kashmir. Pakistan openly declared that the

accession of Kashmir was "based on fraud and violence" and as such cannot be recognized. Nehru on the other hand pointed out in his broadcast of 2 November, that every step as regard to Kashmir had been taken after proper thought and consideration of the consequences. He asserted, "Not to have taken these steps would have been a betrayal of trust and cowardly submission to the law of the sword with its accompaniment of arson, rape and slaughter."

By 11 November, the Indian army had succeeded in dislodging the raiders and capturing the heights of Uri. Lord Mountbatten tried to find out a solution of the problem through negotiations and arranged a meeting of the two Prime Ministers (Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan) to find out a peaceful solution. In the course of this meeting Nehru insisted that Pakistan should make a declaration they would use all their influence to persuade the raiders, who had entered Kashmir, to withdraw and to take steps to see that no further invaders went to Kashmir from its side. The meeting however proved fruitless. However in the course of this meeting Mountbatten, suggested that United Nations organization may be entrusted organization may be entrusted the role of a mediation between India and Pakistan. This suggestion of mediation by the UN mooted by Lord Mountbatten was not accepted and the two countries continued their efforts to find some solution. However, as no concrete results were visible, the Government of India formally appealed to the UN. The UN brought about a ceasefire on

1 January, 1949. Pakistan continued to occupy a part of Kashmir forcibly.

In the light of these developments no plebiscite could be held in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. While the area under Pakistan's control continued to have an autocratic government, representative government was set up in the areas under Indian control. The popularly elected Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir gave its final approval to the accession of Kashmir to India and thus Kashmir became an inseparable part of the Indian Union.

If one examines, the Kashmir conflict in the light of history, it becomes clear why India cannot accept the argument that merely because the majority people of Kashmir are Muslims the state must be annexed to Pakistan. In the ultimate analysis the well-being of people is not determined by mere religious affinity between the government and the people. This is amply borne out by what is going on in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir where people live a life of frustration without any inspiration of social and economic progress constantly being imposed by non-Kashmiri people and lacking even in the most elementary forms of democracy.

The Muslim citizens in India, as indeed the government and people of India, look upon Kashmir as a symbol of their hopes and aspirations for a way of life which is above religious strife and intolerance.

The Kashmir problem, it may fairly be argued, arose from the incompleteness of partition in 1947, from the failure of the devisers of partition to make adequate provisions for the division of Paramountcy between India and Pakistan.

In all the three regions, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad the government of India during the course of 1947-48 applied policies derived from the 'one nation' theory. The great difference between Kashmir and the other two regions - Junagadh and Hyderabad, lies in the fact that Kashmir alone is in direct territorial contact with both India and Pakistan. Only here has Pakistan been in a position to offer any effective opposition to the Indian 'one nation' outlook. Hence Kashmir became a battlefield where as Junagadh and Hyderabad have not.

India has strong stakes in Kashmir. Firstly, it is not possible for India to accept the two nation theory. Secondly, Kashmir is the test of Indian secularism. To keep the Hindus, of India tolerant towards the Muslims and to give some psychological satisfaction to the Indian Muslims from the fact that there is at least one state in India where they have majority, it is necessary that Kashmir should continue to remain within India. 'In the minds of Mr. Nehru and the Congress, Kashmir is in miniature another Pakistan and if this Muslim Nation can be successfully governed by India, then their philosophy of secularism is vindicated.'³⁷ Thirdly surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan may again set migrations and killing in

motion as was seen during the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Fourthly, to annul Kashmir's accession to India or to grant the right of self-determination to a territory which has, besides other things, continued to be its part for quite sometime and whose people are similar in many respects to other parts of India, may encourage the Nagas, Mizos and other such sections of India to break away from the Indian union and thus lead to disintegration of India. Pakistan's relations with other countries greatly depends on the extent to which those states support Pakistani case, on Kashmir. Pakistan's moves to form an Islamic bloc, to join the Western System of alliances largely depend upon this.

Pakistan claims that the larger section of the population of Kashmir are Muslims and therefore Pakistan has a right to plead the cause of the larger section. If this be the case, every Muslim whether he is in Pakistan or is any part of the world including India has a right to plead the cause of every other Muslim who is a citizen of the nation where no theocratic regimes of Islam exist. This position will raise certain fundamentals. Is it not expected that every citizen of whatever creed or faith he may be, expected to be loyal to his own Government? Will Pakistan permit if the cause of non-Muslims in Pakistan is exploited to attack Pakistan in order to safeguard the interests of non-Muslims in Pakistan? If

Pakistan pretends to champion the cause of the Muslims, their partitioned attitude towards the Muslims in Kashmir and towards the Muslims in Egypt or Syria is not understandable. The only scope of understanding of this partitioned attitude is found in the convenience of their policy. Muslims in China, Muslims in Russia, Muslims in India, Muslims in the Arab States do not consider that Pakistan is the only source of protection for them. They do consider that the Governments of the countries wherein they reside are the adequate protection for them. While presenting Pakistan's case before the United Nation Security Council, Mr. Zafarulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, made a touching reference to the background of the case. Unfortunately the background to which he referred misleads in the context of the cause which he was pleading. The cause he was referring to was Indian complaint of aggression by Pakistan whereas the background related to the communal disturbances resulting out of abetment of communal hatred fostered by those who were responsible for creation of Pakistan.

Let us now examine the background of the communal disturbances which Mr. Zafarulla Khan considered as a cause for the provocation of tribesmen. This background of the communal disturbances arising out of the direct action was initiated to establish the two nation theory. This was initiated by the Muslim League in the pre-partitioned India for the achievement of Pakistan.

Let us therefore start with late Mr. Jinnah's reported intentions of entering into Kashmir in triumph. Mr. Jinnah had a two months stay in Kashmir in the early periods prior to the partitioning of India. During this period, he held several consultative meetings with the leaders of Kashmir. These leaders were Muslims and the larger section of the peoples who were lead by these leaders were Muslims. There were leaders of the Muslim Conference which followed the policy of Muslim league that was instrumental in the creation of Pakistan. With this background of consultations with the Muslim leaders of Kashmir who parted company with him in the approach to the issue of Kashmir, Mr. Jinnah cherished the hope of entering into Kashmir in triumph. Mr. Jinnah's theocratic doctrines were not conceivable to Muslims of Kashmir. This is apparent that even in the pre-partitioning of India, the larger section of the population was opposed to being led into Pakistani trap. If this position is understood, it will hardly need any stress to prove the futility of Pakistan's claim of psychological inclinations of the larger section of the people of Kashmir to Pakistan. When Mr. Jinnah realised that it was impossible to secure Kashmir by methods of convincing and persuasion of the peoples, he, on having founded Pakistan and consolidated his personal, position manoeuvred the conquest of Kashmir with the aid of the tribesmen.

Pakistan's claim that the people of Kashmir are largely

Muslims and that their inclinations should naturally fall with Pakistan. Pakistan and Kashmir are inter-related not for the people of Kashmir, not for the people of Pakistan, but for the people in power in Pakistan that Kashmir is made the battle ground of diplomacy by Pakistan.

When the Kashmir problem is studied closely it will be found that in Kashmir India and Pakistan are fighting a battle of values. The events and developments of the past so many years have proved that primarily this is an ideological warfare in which the parties are consciously and unconsciously fighting for certain principles which the two countries espouse. India has set up secular democracy as its goal under which all people living in the vast country without any distinction of colour, religion, caste or sex will be treated as equal before the law. Pakistan has resolved to build a religious state to be guided by the principles, tenets and traditions of Islam. Thus the fight over Kashmir is not so much for territorial gain; it is in fact a struggle for the supremacy of a principle. If the state stays as a free unit of the federation of secular and democratic Indian people, India will have established the paramountcy of modern values and human ideals over the forces of theocratic reaction and medievalism. In the alternative if Kashmir strays into Pakistan it will drag the subcontinent back into morass of religious fanaticism with unpredictable consequences.

Kashmir is the outward manifestation of Pakistan's conflict with India, which is more basic. It is the consequence and not the cause of the discord. Its importance lies in the fact that it helps Pakistani leaders to rationalise their hostility to India and channelise their hate-India campaign. It also helps them to contain discontent from within and to divert it to unprofitable channels in order to keep their hold over masses.

For Pakistan, Kashmir is not merely a struggle for territory. It is more aptly a struggle for her ideology. The Pakistani leaders contend that Pakistan came into being on the basis of religious majority areas and, Kashmir, being contiguous to West Pakistan should form part of Pakistan. Actually by emphasising the plea of geographical contiguity in case of Kashmir, Pakistan contradicted her ideology that the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and West Pakistan, separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory, constitute a concrete protest against territorial nationalism. Besides India, contends that partition of India was agreed to on the basis of self-determination, not the two nation theory which she never accepted. For the sake of argument, even if the Pakistani contention is taken at its face value, the theory of religious majority areas applied only to British India and not to the Indian states.

Pakistan argues that if self determination was the

governing principle for partition of India, then the people of Kashmir should be allowed to exercise this right, and refers to Mountbatten's note on 'reference to the people' while accepting the accession of Kashmir. India contends that this assurance of 'reference to the people' was a unilateral offer to the people of Kashmir and had nothing to do with Pakistan.

Pakistan further argues that India was honour-bound to hold plebiscite in Kashmir, as pledged by her in the Security Council. India points to Pakistan's now implementation of stipulations mentioned as pre-conditions therein, precisely because Pakistan, being not on sure grounds, wanted to avoid plebiscite. Till April 1954, India was nonetheless willing to hold plebiscite. But for Pakistan's endeavours to introduce cold war in the region, the Kashmir question would have been solved long ago. In March 1956, India flatly refused to hold plebiscite as the offer had lapsed, and could not be kept open for all times. Besides, she feels that raking up the old religious conflict, which Pakistan is bound to do, would be injurious to communal harmony in India. This point is recognised as valid in some Pakistani circles.

The righteousness of Kashmir cause cannot be proved on the battlefield nor by the superior military might. Pakistan leaders who derive inspiration solely from religious wars fought thirteen centuries ago and ignore the subsequent

evolution of political philosophy as a consequence of scientific discoveries may rely on success in arms; not so India which possesses a historic sense in dealing with national and international affairs. The days are passed when people would be conquered by arms, subjugated by force and converted to new faiths. In this era of anti-colonialism and profound social revolutions conversion can take place only through the method of persuasion and by education. It is not suggested that any armed invasion from across the border should not be met by force. An aggressive Pakistan should be firmly and strongly repulsed. India's ultimate victory in this ideological tussle can be achieved only when the Kashmiris willingly consent to be part of secular India and refuse to have any-thing to do with Pakistan.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSIONS

The birth of Pakistan was based on the two nation theory, propounded by Rahmat Ali, Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding fathers of Pakistan. Since her birth as a separate polity, Pakistan's relations with India have been tense. The British adopted the policy of "Divide and Rule" and succeeded in keeping the Hindus and Muslim apart. The politicians of the pre-partition days, also took advantage of the religious differences. The Muslim League was considered as a party of Muslims while the Indian National Congress was labelled as the party of Hindus although it had many prominent Muslim leaders as its members.

Pakistan was a nation born in a hurry. It came to life as it has since subsisted and is now expiring in crisis and carnage. It was an ill-fated nation. In a real sense, it was never a nation at all, and this has been its pathetic fallacy, its downfall.

When the prospects of independence became a reality, India's Muslim led by Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League could find no way of reconciling their fears of Hindu domination within a one-nation frame.

Islam, considered as a religion has not been a powerful

factor influencing either the Government or Muslim opinion in Pakistan. This is equally true of other Muslim countries. Considered as a myth on the other hand, Islam has continued to exert a considerable influence on Pakistani thinking. This myth was never condemned or abandoned, even when it failed to provide an explanation for events. Pan-Islamism has influenced Pakistan's foreign policy and Islam as an ideology in Pakistan's foreign policy has remained a constant factor. Her attitude to Afghanistan, her work for the revival of Islam in international politics and her relations with India demonstrate this fact.

Every country's ideology, tends to become modified as a result of contact with other reality. In this connection, Pan-Islamism became a dominant theme as soon as it transpired that Pakistan had failed to secure Indian recognition of the 'Two-Nation Theory' and when it became evident also, as a result of various conferences of the Muslim countries, that Pan-Islamism had no immediate future.

In the case of the western alliances Islam was interpreted as peace and hence the pacts were seen in the guise of efforts towards that peace. In the case of the friendship with China not only the negative factor of hatred towards India but also the positive emotions of self assertion played their part. In general, however, ideology has often worked as a mere vehicle of rationalisation and has so far been a

hindrance to Pakistan's power of independent action, especially as regards her relations with India.

The US military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership of Western alliances continued to boost Pakistan against India. It created an impression in Pakistan that qualitatively the Pakistani war machine was superior to that of India. This was partly responsible for Pakistan's use of force in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir in 1965. More important than this were the Chinese aggression on India and development of Sino-Pakistan collaboration since then. Although Sino-Pakistan friendship had started developing since 1955, it had not until 1960, become direct factor in embittering Indo-Pakistan relations.

Mohammad Ayub Khan's victory in the Presidential elections of January 1965 was not as outstanding in East Pakistan as it was in West Pakistan. These led Pakistani leaders to repeatedly emphasize upon Islam and hatred of India as the common links between the two wings of Pakistan. This complicated the minority problem and was perhaps responsible for perpetuation of tension along the border between India and East Pakistan. The adoption of Islamic provisions in the 1962 constitution of Pakistan further created a sense of insecurity among the minorities in that country, led to their influx into India, and complicated the minority problem.

The conflict over Kashmir is the result of conflict of interests and objectives, conflict of ideologies, conflict of images, conflict of status and conflict of power, which date back to the pre-partition days.

The religious issue has never had the same value on both sides of the border. This makes the conflict even more complex, than others in which religion is an inherent element. If one compares the Indo-Pakistani conflict to the one in Ireland, for instance, which also mainly follows a dividing line based on religion, one may see the difference in regard to the support of the basic issue by the two sides. In Ireland there are very few Northern Ireland's Catholics supporting the Protestant's cause and they have been deprived of practically all political influence. The tiny minority of Protestants in the Irish Republic has kept some economic influence at the cost of any political importance. Very few among them would dare to pronounce themselves openly in the conflict.

In India, on the other hand, the Muslims, have held a fair amount of influence in politics. In Pakistan, the existence of the Hindu minority, was always a difficult one. Compared to the even more serious Arab-Israel Conflict, where the religious dividing line is certainly very sharp, the conflict between India and Pakistan looks even more complex. Israel remains (as Pakistan) a religious state (even if it's social life has a modern, secular outlook), and the Arab minority

has hardly any political influence. Despite the fact that Egypt as such is not an Islamic state, there is hardly any Jewish minority left there and whatever remains has absolutely no political influence.

The discussions of the Pakistani view on the two nation theory which the Muslim League in United Natl India had formulated to justify its demand for partition exposes, on the one hand, the fear and the calculation which compel the Pakistani ruling and intellectual elites to stick to this theory, and, on the other, the complications it creates for them. The fear is that without this "Ideological" support Pakistan would lose its *raison d'etre*. The calculation is that adherence to the theory would continue to justify Pakistan's claim to Jammu and Kashmir. The fear is irrational. The Pakistanis suffer from an intense feeling of inner security arising out of the fact that Islam has not served as a strong enough adhesive-witness the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation and the continuing dissidence in Baluchistan and that they have not been able to create for themselves a democratic polity of which they could be proud of. They suffer in their own esteem when they contrast their failure with India's success as a democracy.

This dissertation seeks to explain, how a religion of peace and equality has been misused by Pakistan, in pursuit of its diplomatic goals vis-a-vis India.

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