

**POLITICAL ELITE AND MODERNIZATION
WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO
RAJASTHAN** 2


Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
**CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA
1982**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

This dissertation entitled 'Political Elite and Modernisation with specific reference to Rajasthan' submitted by Robin Arora for the Doctor of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. It is recommended that this dissertation should be placed before the examiners for their consideration for the award of D. Phil degree.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I, owe my heartiest gratitude to Dr. J.S. Ganda without whose supervision and continued encouragement this work could not have materialized. I also ~~wish~~ express my thanks to Prof. Vijayanand Singh of Gorakhpur University when I took my first lessons in Sociology from, Dr. Harish Chandra Srivastava of Doharun Hindu University, my brother, Dr. A.Z. Rizvi of Aligarh Muslim University, and finally my friends, Vijayanand Richea of Patna University and Nand K. Richea of J.S.U. for their very acts of kindness. I am sincerely grateful to thalyya (Mr. Mohd. Kamiluddin) and hajjo (Mrs. Suraiyya Rizvi) for their affectionate concern and cooperation. The responsibility, however, of the shortcomings in the work, if any, is mine and mine alone.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

Betterment of conditions of human living has undoubtedly been the dominant theme underlying 'the incessant changeability of human society.' (1) History bears testimony to the fact that societies that have changed much provide exalted conditions of living than societies that have remained relatively stagnant. The prosperity of the changing societies of the West; and, the poverty of the comparatively stubborn and stable societies of the east are glaring examples to this effect. The economic well-being of a society is, thus, related to its propensity to change. Be it simple transformative process like evolution, progress or slightly complex: development, or most complex: modernization, the theme of invariably all of them is 'change' hence the inference: 'the economic well-being of a society is related to its modernization!'

As a concept pertaining to no more than a process of change, modernization has come to be besieged by a host of seemingly unresolvable controversies emerging out of the 'two dominant ideologies of our times - Marxism and Capitalism' (2) One tries to define it as a structural change while the other seeks to interpret it in terms of cultural change.

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- (1) Davis, Kingsley, 'Human Society' Delhi: Surjeet Publications, 1981, p-321.
(2) Singh, Yogendra, 'Essays on Modernization in India', New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1978, p-1.

Our study is on 'Political elites and Modernization with specific reference to Rajasthan' whose objective is to link the political elite with modernization, and focus on the debacle of the former to gear-up the progress, at least economic, of the society.

Keeping in view the purpose of our study, instead of getting unduly trapped in the definitional quagmire of modernization it seems more advisable to strike a balance between the two concepts. Structure and culture being the two aspects of society, every change to occur in a social-setting has to be essentially initiated at the level of the former i.e., structure (3). Once initiated it (change) encompasses the society in totality.

Now, initiation of change at the level of structure inevitably calls for mobilisation of certain resources which remain under control of only a choicest few (4) - the political elite - amongst the entire population.

We, thus, see how indispensably the political elites of a society are related to its (society) change. It is precisely this relationship between the political elite and 'change' that is sought to be explored in this study. The 'structure' only renders the change eventual but it is finally the cultural aspect that turns this eventuality into practice.

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(3) Abuje, Ram, 'Political Elites and Modernization', Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1975, P-V

(4) ~~Maciver~~ Maciver, R.M. & Page, C.E., "Society: An Introductory Analysis" Madras: Macmillan Co. of India Ltd., 1979, p-130

In other words, while the former prepares the body the latter gives life to it.

The acute socio-economic, regional and cultural diversity of our society calls for our elite-dominated democracy to give equal and just attention to the far-varying regional interests. Given the magnitude of this diversity this becomes an almost impossible task. But the necessity of handling this task keeps frustrating the political equation of the country.

In addition to the above adversity the country is faced with a most problematic situation where its structural progress is concerned. Owing to lack of requisite level of capital, know-how and skilled man-power, our society has much of its resources either unutilized or under-utilized. We are thus only in the transitional phase of development. What we need is not merely economic progress but positive and meaningful alterations in all spheres of our life. But this is possible only when we have acquired necessary level of economic prosperity. How vitally our political elite being undeniably the 'wielders of power' are related to the problem of our infrastructural development is well comprehended by Sachidanand and Lal who notes: "at any rate, the political elite in the under developed countries have had a deciding voice in determining the path of development".

(5) But to our utter disappointment the role of these crucially significant lot - the political elite - in the progress of our society has been rather condemnably negative. It is no less conspicuous how, instead of acting as a 'collectivity' and sincerely channelizing their energies to the cause of development, they are after nurturing their personal interests indulging in corruption, secessionist and separatist activities, factionalism, casteism and parochialism etc. The wrong, however, does not solely rest with the political elites alone but it basically lies in the various systems - social, economic, political, cultural etc. - of our society. The purpose of our present study is thus to treat the political elites in relation to the political system, its attributes and its processes, and, farmer's failure in delivering the goods.

Keeping in view the sensitiveness and vastness of the above purpose what is feasible is to make the study only at a micro - level.

As this study has solely to draw on secondary sources, Rajasthan has been chosen to be studied precisely because compared to other states there is an abundance of authentic studies on the state's politics in relation to its development.

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(5) Sachidanand & Lal, A.K. Eds. 'Elite and development'
New Delhi; Concept Publishing Co., 1979 P-1.

Besides, Rajasthan is a society where aristocratic interests have reigned supreme for centuries together. This interesting fact provided further temptations to prompt the study.

The study has been divided into as many as ^{seven} ~~six~~ chapters. The ~~first~~ ^{second} chapter: 'Perspective on Elite - Deals at length with the Classical, pluralist and Marxian notions of Elite, All these theories have been aptly contrasted and compared to the extent to contrive a general and meaningful definition of elite. The classical theories seek to define 'elite' as the choicest people endowed with superior psychological attributes compared to the inferior populace. The Marxian approach as it is inflexibly committed to its tradition of 'economic determinism' adjudges the elite as mere agents of the bourgeoisie who owing to their dominant position in the 'system' of production' came to domineer over the entire super-structural system of the society.

The ~~second~~ ^{third} chapter: Understanding Modernization - a Perspective - is devoted to the accessible gamut of theories of modernization. The 'Tradition versus Modernity' question in relation to modernization has been pin-pointed. And, it has been ^{been} ~~been~~ ^{enerously} ~~enerously~~ tried upon to define modernization in a relevant and precise way. Keeping in view the demands of the present study modernization has been sought to be interpreted in terms of 'structural variables' i.e. Economy, Culture, polity etc. of the society.

Contd... .6.....

An effective attempt has been made in the ^{fourth} ~~third~~ chapter to explore through secondary sources the social, economic, cultural, educational, and political etc. background of the old and the new legislators of Rajasthan since the background of the political elite has a definite say in his functioning.(6)

The ^{fifth} ~~fourth~~ chapter: 'Party Politics and Elite' seeks to discern the nature, form and background of almost all political parties which have proved of some consequence in state-politics, and, to study the various, elites that dominate these political organizations. Besides, it has been endeavoured to highlight the competition between different political organizations as a result of the conflicting interests that they represent.

The ^{sixth} ~~fifth~~ chapter: 'Caste, class, factionalism and politics' conceives to analyze the role of caste, class and factionalism in the state - politics. The question: "Caste Manipulates Politics or it is politics which manipulate caste" has been discussed at length. Further, the reality of 'caste and class overlapping' in relation to politics has also received our due attention. This chapter could have been avoided but keeping in view the effective influence that caste, class and factionalism exercise upon contemporaneous

politics, it would have been rather a failure on our part not to incorporate it into our study.

In the ^{Seventh} ~~sixth~~ and the last chapter, 'Modernization, Politics and Elite', an onerous attempt is made to assess the economic progress of the province over the last few decades, in the first place, and, secondly, to relate this progress to the state politics and political elites.

The conclusive part of the study seeks to pin-point the debacle of the state political elite in ushering the needed progress of the province.

- (6) See Mitra, S.K. & Singh, Y.B. 'Social Class and Belief Systems in the Indian Political Elite: An exploratory study of the Interactions of attitudes, Ideology and Party Identification' in Sechidanand & Lal, A.K. Eds. 'Elite and Development', New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 1979, pp. 97-123.

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CHAPTER - I

PERSPECTIVE ON ELITE

Elite has been unquestionably preordained in society as a gigantic socio-political reality from time immemorial. Society has travelled a long and tortuous way from primitivity to modernity; simplicity to complexity frequently varying in form, and, so has travelled along the reality of elite as an inevitability. Though not too directly but this reality finds a mention even in the earliest literatures of history.(1) Whether discovered or undiscovered, the objective reality persists. Elite as a literal term might be contemporaneous in its origin but the 'reality' it tends to designate or refer to has an untraceable antiquity behind it.

It's only since the turn of the last century that the phenomenon of elite came to attract the attention of the contemporary social and behavioural scientists of the west (2) hence a prodigious patronage to its study by them both at empirical and exegitational levels.

- (1) The Vedas especially the Yajur Veda, and Mahabharata believed to be literatures depicting the society existing roughly three thousand years from now contain frequent references to kings and warriors having superior socio-psychological attributes compared to the masses.

As a consequence, the study of elites today has gained a world-wide popularity.(3) Where these intemperate studies have undeniably vitally contributed towards broadening the arena of social sciences, there they have also somewhat blurred their (social sciences) vision by creating unprecedented definitional queigire proliferating numerous synonyms of 'elite' exhaling antagonistic theories - a source of severe intellectual rift and promiscuity.(4)

The very first occurrence of the word 'elite' is traced back to as early as 16th century A.D. in a French Dictionary(5) to refer to no more than a mere 'choice'

- (2) Sharma, L.V., 'The Theories of Elites' in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K., Eds. "Elite and Development", New Delhi: 'Concept Publishing Co., 1979, pp. 9-28.
- (3) Marvick, Duaine, ed. 'Political Decision Makers' New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p - 21.
- (4) Swarnker, R.C. "Legislative Elite in Rajasthan" Centre for the Study of Social Systems, JNU, New Delhi, 1980, p - 1.
- (5) "In the sixteenth century, according to Edmund Hagnet, 'Dictionnaire de la Langue francaise du seizieme siecle' the word elite simply meant "a choice" (choix) quoted by Bottomore, T.B. 'The Elite: Concept and Ideology' in Lenczowski, G. 'Some Reflections on the study of Elites; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, June 1975, p - 253.

(choix in French). A century later, the word in the same language was employed to mean commodities of particular excellence.(6) Still later the word turned to be an expression for 'superior social group'.(7) For quite a considerable long time the word with all of its connotations and denotations remained a pacific attraction for the glossographers only. It did hardly succeed still 18th century in enticing the genius of the scholars to explore the blatant reality it referred to. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that the talents of two Italian intellectual celebrities Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (8) could discern it. Coincidentally, the development of the elite theories fostered by Pareto and Mosca follows the emergence of Marxist ideology. Haralambos (9) opines that emergence of elitist theory was a reaction to the evolution of Marxism as an ideology.

CLASSICAL ELITE - THEORIES:

This section consists of enunciations of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. To evince that Pareto has

(6) Bottomore, T.B., Op. cit., p-256.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Haralambos, M. & Herald, R.M., 'Sociology: Themes and Perspectives', Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980, p-107.

(9) Ibid. p - 107.

employed the term 'elite' barely etymologically is substantiated by the fact that he uses the term as a Consummate Counterpart of the Italian word 'Aristocrazia' meaning "the strongest", 'the most energetic', and 'most capable' - for good as well as evil"(10). The sole criterion to become elite, according to Pareto, is to score highest on scales measuring any social value or commodity such as power, riches and knowledge. (11) Excellence in any field i.e., art, religion, politics, economy etc., provides 'one' the access to the position of elite. In other words, possession of an outstanding attribute such as charisma, riches, knowledge etc. by an individual or a group is all that is required for the individual or group to score highest on the social scale hence to form an elite. "The outstanding idea in the term elite, according to Pareto, is superiority"(12) implying that all those who constitute the higher stratum in

(10) Sharma, L.N. 'The Theories of Elites: Import and Relevance' in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K. eds. 'Elite and Development' New Delhi: 'Concept Publishing Co., 1979, pp - 9-28.

(11) See Sharma, L.N.'s footnote (1) Op. cit. p-25

(12) Pareto, Vilfredo, quoted by Ram Ahuja, "Political Elites and Modernization - the Bihar Politics, Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1975, p - 10.

society are essentially elite. To reduce the generality of this concept he classifies 'elite' into 'governing' and 'non-governing' (13) ones. The former refers to individuals directly or otherwise responsible for political governance while the latter pertains to people who excel themselves in the fields of economy, culture, education etc. but are not responsible for political governance. Pareto further divides the 'governing - elites' into 'lions and foxes' - one replacing the other as a historical inevitability in a continued process termed as 'circulation of elites' in his phraseology. It is this 'circulation (of elites)' according to Pareto, which fosters a myriad change in the broader social - setting.(14) The categorization of governing elite into two types i.e., Lions and foxes is indeed on the basis of personal attributes. The lions by virtue of their characteristics that of taking firm and direct action tend to rule by force. Military dictatorship is an instance to this effect. Unlike with the lions, it is cunningness and tactics to manipulate that establish the foxes as rulers. European democracies are expedient examples of this type. (15)

(13) Pareto, Vilfredo, 'The Mind and Society', New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935, Vol. III, p. - 1422-24.

(14) Ibid, P-1427.

This makes conspicuous the fact that Pareto supports the psychological basis of elite - rule.

Gaetano Mosca unlike Pareto conceived to bring the term 'elite' into a concise and restricted ^{use} use to refer only to the ruling class. (16) Invariably all societies, notes Mosca, have two distinctively important classes - 'the ruling and the ruled' - the former numerically insignificant compared to the (numerical) preponderance of the latter but surprisingly enough it is the statistically fragile otherwise agile ruling minority which subjugates the majority to its superordination capitalizing on the privileges of power. Mosca too like Pareto speaks of the qualitative cleavage between the masses and the elite holding that it's the latter's intellectual, material and moral superiority that empowers them to govern the former which remains naturally devoid of this singular possession. He, however, talks of an appropriate interaction between the elite and the non-elite.

But unlike Pareto Mosca displays great concern for the source where this 'superiority' emanates from.

(15) Haralambos, M. & Herald, R.M. Op. cit., P - 108.

(16) Mosca, Gaetano, 'The Ruling Class', New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, P-50.

This 'superiority', according to him, is "a product of social background". (17) For both Pareto and Mosca elite is a group that has an unquestionable say in governance.

In retrospect, Pareto's 'circulation of elites' does, by no means, encompass 'the middle-class' whose significance in being recruited to the elite is quite genuinely pointed out by Mosca.

Gaetano Mosca's assertive view that 'organizational ability grants power' convinced his disciple Robert Michels most resulting in latter's eloquent reassertion that "the very structure of any organized society gives rise to an elite". (18) To Michels organization meant nothing more than oligarchy. This assumption led him to propound a law namely 'the iron law of oligarchy' that pertains to consummate social organizations. Studying modern socialist organizations of Europe whose organizing - principle is itself to antagonize oligarchic trends, he hypothesizes that of whatever kind and form a social organization is it is certain to have the technically indispensable

(17) Harelantos, M. & Harold, R.M., Op. cit, P-109.

(18) Michels, Robert. 'Political parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical tendencies of Modern democracy' Illinois: The Free Press, 1915, P-418.

leadership which evolves within the organization quite spontaneously and remains out of control of the masses. The reality, therefore, he argues, is that of 'Minority Rule'.

Though too indirectly Max Weber points to the reality of elite in his eulogy 'class, status and power'. Power, according to Weber, finds its ultimate expression in domination, and all political dominations imply a fundamental relationship of command and obedience. Since the Weberian concept of power is that of 'Constant-Sum'(19) meaning that amount of power to be constant, power is held by an individual or group to the extent that it's not held by others. It is the majority then which is commanded by the minority by being forced to adhere to the views of the latter. State as a political structure is the most suitable instance to this effect which with a view to maintain its order monopolizes the legitimate use of physical force. (20)

Understandingly enough, if only the 'Constant-Sum' concept of power holds true then only, logically, the existence of an elite in the domination - obedience

(19) Harlembos, M. & Herald, R.M., Op. cit. P-99.

(20) Weber, Max. 'The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations' New York: Free Press, 1936, P-154.

relationship with the non-elite in the total social-setting, is eventual. Once the concept is questioned the fate of the logically derived proposition pertaining to the existence of an elite is unpredictably endangered. None but Talcott Parsons rejects the 'Constant-Sum' concept of power and develops a 'Variable-Sum' (21) concept that regards power as something possessed by society as a whole. Haralambos quotes Parsons as noting: "As such, power is a generalized facility or resource in the society. In particular, it is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general public commitment has been made. In this sense, the amount of power in society is measured by the degree to which collective goals are realized. Thus, the greater the efficiency of a social system for achieving the goals defined by its members the more power exists in society".(22) Power, viewed from this functionalist perspective bears but little hope for the analysis of elite in terms of power in modern democracies.

Andre Beteille's criticism of Weber is most fitting in this context. He notes: "Weber believes that class,

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid. P-99.

power and status are closely interdependent, but none of these could be fully explained by the others.(23) Let us now turn to some of the contemporaneous studies on elite based on empiricism. Referring to elites, Cole informs of "groups which emerge to positions of leadership and influence at every social level"(24). The term 'elite', according to him, was brought into use to evince the superiority and exclusiveness of personal relationships. Floyd Hunter's proposition that the elites tended to be social, political and economic leaders was based on an interview, that he had carried in a city of the U.S. on its elites. This ultimately led him to conclude that access to power in one area makes possible one's entry into another area too.(25) George Catlin's is a rare opinion about the elite. He believes, in a state all the Cabinet Members, Civil Servants, party heads, industrial houses, executives and influential people who can impress upon the decision - makers essentially form an elite. (26)

(23) Betelle, Andre. 'Inequality and Social Change', Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972, P-6.

(24) Cole, G.D.H., "Studies in Class-Structure", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955, PP - 102-105.

(25) Hunter, F. 'Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision-Makers', Chappel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.

(26) Catlin, G.E.G., 'Systematic Politics', University of Toronto Press, 1932, P-229.

CONTEMPORANEOUS ELITE-THEORIES:

Compared to Pareto's and Mosca's theories, C. Wright Mills' version of elite theory is relatively less encompassing in magnitude since it is limited to American Society of 1950's. Rejecting Pareto's elite-rule inevitability and domination doctrine, Mills ventures to analyze elite rule in purely institutional terms rather than psychological. Ruling out the hitherto popular view of qualitative superiority of elite vis-a-vis the masses, he signifies that the structure of institutions is such that those at the top of the institutional hierarchy largely monopolize power. "Certain institutions, according to him, occupy key positions in society, and the elite comprise those who hold 'command posts' in those institutions"(27). He identifies three pivotal institutions hence three kinds of elite in the American society of 1950's viz major corporations, the military and the federal govt. as institutions as proliferating three categories of elite - economic, military and political. These elites together in practice form a single ruling minority - the power elite - because the activities and interests of these elites are similar and interconnected. Discerning

(27) Haralambos, M & Herald, R.M., Op.cit., P-110.

the militaristic nature of American capitalism of 1950's ^{he} be-
evinces how the interests of the political, economic and
military elites were together served by using military power
against the enemy (Japan, in 1945) in the first place, and,
secondly, by selling out arms in the international market.
To be precise, Mills defines power-elite "as those who
occupy the command posts".(28)

Unlike all of his predecessors Lasswell comes up
with an altogether new and convincing interpretation of
elite. His is a perfectly utilitarian theory (of elite)
for he sees the elite as primarily interested in appro-
priating what there is to appropriate. "Influentials"
is a term he employs to denote the 'appropriators' and
all that is worth appropriation he calls them as values.
In his own words, "The influentials are those who get the
most of what there is to get"(29). 'All that is worth
appropriation' or basic 'values', to put in strict
Lasswellian phraseology, are three: deference, income
and safety. "Those who get the most of these values are
the elite, the rest are the masses" (30).

(28) Mills, C.W., "The Power Elites", London: Oxford
University Press, Galaxy edition, 1959, P-4.

(29) Lasswell, H.D., "Politics Who gets what, when, how",
"The political writings of Harold D. Lasswell",
Illinois: The Free Press, 1951, P-295.

(30) Sharma, L.N. in Sachidanand & Lal, A.K. Eds.
Op. cit., P-19.

The appropriation of these values naturally provides the one an access to power but there are large variations in appropriating these values. Among the influentials themselves there would be a struggle to appropriate these values. As a consequence, some would appropriate more, others less. Lasswell, thus, talks of a trichotomized power structure - maximum power with the top elite, less power with the mid-elite, and finally, least power with the masses.(31)

Bottomore's analysis of elite is plain and simple. Political class and political leadership are the two terms he has made frequent and meaningful use of to refer to two different realities. Borrowing the term from Mosca Bottomore means by political class all those groups which exercise political power or influence, and are engaged in the struggle for political leadership. Within a political class, pro- pounds Bottomore, exists a sub-group - the political elite - consisting of individuals who are in real possession of political power to exercise it in a society at a given time. The sphere of political elite circumscribes members of the govt., administrative personnel, military leaders, and in some cases, politically influential families of royalty,

(31) Lasswell, H. & Kaplan, A. 'Power and Society'
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950, pp. 201-202.

aristocracy, industrial houses and other economic enterprises. "The political class, therefore", writes Bottomore", is composed of members of groups which may be engaged in varying degrees of cooperation, competition or conflict with each other"(32).

Elites from the attributive viewpoint of Meisel,(33) have certain qualities - the three 'C's - group consciousness, coherence and conspiracy (meaning common will to action).

In the resplendent enologies of many a scholar we find references to various approaches to the identification of elites which, though by implication only, facilitate us in our quest for a general definition of elite. The approaches are; the 'Positional', the 'issue-participation', and the 'Reputational' ones. The first that is, the positional approach identifies elites as those 'holding positions of authority actually making key-decisions while those who don't occupy such positions don't make key decisions' (34). The 'issue - participation

32) Bottomore, T.B., 'Elites and Society', Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, PP. 14-15.

33) Meisel, J.H., 'The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite' Ann. Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958, P-4.

34) Bonjean, C.M. & Olson, D.M., "Community Leadership: Direction of Research". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.9, No. 3, Dec. 1964, P-282.



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approach' unlike the first seek to directly locate those as elites who 'actually shape the decisions'(35) without obviously caring much for the positions. The third and the last i.e., the 'reputational approach' recognises "Influential persons in the Community" as elites "who play a significant role and can get things done for the community"(36).

THE MARXIAN PERSPECTIVE:

All the elite-theories that have hitherto received treatment are concentric in one way atleast that invariably all oppose the Marxian approach to the interpretation of elite. This interesting fact combines in part with the necessity of reviewing relevant marxian literature as it has come to acquire considerable purport in social sciences. The economic infrastructure of a society is the basic structure determining all other societal components - religion, culture, politics etc. - termed in strict Marxian phraseology as super - structure. "The forces of production in all stratified societies are owned and controlled by a few i.e., minority"(37). The existence of such a privileged minority

(35) (A) Hunter, F., Op. cit.
(B) Angel, R.C., "The Moral integration of American cities", American Journal of Sociology, LXI, July 1951, part 2.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Heralembos, M. & Herald, R.M., Op. cit., P-101.

in a society implies presence of a parallel majority deprived of ownership and control rights which is vindictive of social inequality. Tawney asserts that "disparity in the ownership of wealth is one of the chief reasons of inequality in politics"(38). Politics is about power(39). And, "the source of power in society lies in the economic infrastructure"(40). And, since this economic infrastructure "~~is~~ is dominated by a minority, this propertied minority has access to power, thus, becoming the 'ruling class'(41) to use power as a coercive means to further its own interests by 'forcing the subject-class to submit to a situation which is against its (subject class) interests. The form in which the individuals of a ruling class, 'Marx argues, 'assert their common interests ^{is} to the state' (42).

(38) Tawney, R.H. 'Equality', London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, pp. 53-62.

(39) Dowse, R.E. & Hughes, J.A. 'Political-Sociology', London: John Wiley & Sons, 1972.

(40) Haralambos, M. & Herald, R.H., Op. cit., p-101.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid.

Leski extends the argument that "the main index to the nature of any actual state is the system of economic class relations which characterize it and the role of the state is to put coercive power at the disposal of the class which, in any given society, owns the instruments of production"(43). Poulantzas (44) quintessence of the relationship between 'state and bourgeoisie', is the capitalist state, which, he feels best serves the capitalists' interests. When the members of this ruling class are not the real politically governing elite, to use his terminology. The state is 'relatively autonomous' from the ruling class. To some degree it is free from its direct influence, independent ^{of} its direct control. He asserts that, however, since the state is shaped by the infrastructure, it is constrained to represent the interests of capital.

This perspective vehemently undermines the articulation of elitists' doctrine by challenging their basic contention that oligarchic elites enjoy uninterfered independence of action, unquestionable superiority and high autonomy of status. No matter the ruling-elites in a

(43) Leski, H.J. 'Marx and Today', London: Fabian Society, Allen and Unwin, 1943, pp. 16-17.

(44) Poulantzas, Nicos, 'The Problem of the Capitalist State in Urry and Wakeford', 1973.

capitalist society come from the non-capitalist class they are but to spontaneously submit to a situation that solely nurtures bourgeois interests since the bourgeoisie tend to subdue the infrastructure which alone determines, besides other superstructural components, the form, composition and role of the state. It is indubitably the 'role' of the capitalist state which is of fundamental significance to the class interests as compared to its 'form' and 'composition'. It's, therefore, insignificant whether the state is democratic, dictatorial or monarchical in form and is composed of ruling elites from among the masses. What is important then is that under all circumstances, its role is to basically protect the capital interests. The political elites under the described state are thus an important lot reduced to the status of a rubber stamp serving only as indirect agents of the domineering bourgeoisie.

The hypothesization conceived by Poulantzas may seem bearing overtones since it basically seeks to underline high degree of independence and spontaneity of infrastructure, but, in fact, it candidly unveils the political realities rampant in capitalist societies disguised as 'democratic set-ups'.

All the socio-political opportunities in a capitalist system - adult franchise, ^{db}openness_A of recruitment to elite,

equality - oriented legal system etc. - serve as apparatus to shadow the exploitative character of the state. Contrivance of such ⁷beign opportunities, quiescent in spirit and nonentity in practice, is ~~an unambiguous~~ highly characteristic of the avid capitalist class to turn numb and blandish the exploited rungs in order to throttle the eventualities of a noxious commotion that may accrue from their overstrung class consciousness.

Marxian sociology, thus, sees elites as a contingent phenomenon related to the nature of infrastructure of a society as opposed to elitism which seeks to define elite as a socio - psychologically superior but tiny segment of population responsible for taking major decisions in society.

This radical perspective has obviously come to be vehemently repudiated by elitists as a ^ucontentious theorem on the grounds that, first, "Economics rather than politics is the determining force in history and the bond that holds societies together"(45), and, secondly, the Marxian postulation of "single and uniform destiny for all societies, irrespective of their divergent histories - classlessness,

(45) Bottomore, T.B. 'Elites and Society' Middlesex: Penguin, 1934, pp 24-31, and Parry G., 'Political Elites', London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, P-27.

rational anarchy, and equality and freedom in all spheres of life"(46) - is unjustifiable.

The essence of Marxian thought is indisputably 'economic - determinism' which is made use of as a yardstick in all analyses but the results are never devoid of logic. What ails Marxian frame of reference in relation to political elite is probably lack of systematic presentation and clarity of articulation.

PLURALISM AND ELITE:

The unbridgeable fissure between elitism and Marxism is only on the issue of nature, character, and recruitment of political elite while both seem placating on the question of political elite being a minority pocketing power. The pluralist perspective, instead of seeing power solely invested in a defined and composite group of elites, maintain that it is divided among various groups in society. The pluralists seek to vindicate their stand by explaining the mounting specialization of the division of labour resulting in growth of innumerable and diversified occupation groups each with its particular interest. "Organizations representing

(46) Singh, Yogendra, 'Essays on Modernization in India'; New Delhi: Manohar, 1978, P - 41.

particular interests in society are known as interest - groups"(47). Since most of the population can not afford to participate directly in politics, their interests are represented by a relatively small number of people. "Political elites are leaders representing these interests and participating in the political struggle. Power is seen to be dispersed amongst a plurality of elites which actively compete with one another to further particular interests".(48) Robert Dahl's pioneer epilogue deriving from his empirical *Study* of ruling elite of New Haven (U.S.A.) that "power is dispersed among various interest-groups and that this plurality of elites does not form a unified group with common interests"(49), lend support to the pluralists' view. Dahl's conclusion accruing from a study done at micro-structure level is permeated in Arnold Rose's assertion prompted by his study carried on at the Macrostructure level that the U.S.A. is not ruled by a unified power elite but among the elite there are several who owe their power to economy, several others to politics, and still others

(47) Herolambos, M. & Herald, R.M., Op. cit., P-114.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Dahl, Robert. 'Who Governs?' New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951, P-61.

who owe their power to military etc. (50).

In a nutshell, pluralists contend that political elite is not a unified phenomenon but a body of intercontesting segregated groups.

The specificity of the theory as evidenced by the very fact that it pertains to highly advanced stratified societies restricts it from encompassing all societies including ours.

In a nutshell, the classical - theories seek to define elite as a group of people explicitly distinguishable from the masses owing to its Sociopsychological Superiority over them. Weber and Parsons endeavour to explain the phenomenon of elite as indispensably related to 'Power'. Weber sees 'Power' as 'Constant-Sum' hence it can only be held by a few. While Parsons sees 'Power' as 'Variable Sum' and propounds that it is held by society as a whole. Pluralists view 'Power' as being shared by multitudinous organizations existing within a society hence the heterogeneous and open character of elite. The Marxists conceive to interpret elite as mere agents of the bourgeoisie, who by dint of owning the means of Social - Production, are the real monopolizers of power

CHAPTER - III

MODERNIZATION - CONCEPT AND THEORIES

THE CONCEPT :

The most fundamental dynamism of society to judge by the testimony of history is that it basically represents an ever-existing and on going collectivity of efforts creating adaptations and innovations day in and day out. Broadly speaking, the ultimate purpose of all this is to make 'living' happier and more meaningful. How 'change' thus becomes indispensable to society. All societies strive to change for good. But they differ in their propensity to change. And, it is precisely owing to this difference that there are some societies which are rich and some which are poor. The former are societies which have advanced techno-economic system so have high percentage of literacy, modern science and education. While the latter lack these attributes. The developed societies have provided 'models' of change to the under-developed and developing ones. As a consequence, the latter societies are trying their level best to sophisticate their techno-economic system. This change desired in the economic-base has to essentially engender a change in other

spheres - socio - political & cultural of a society. Every society desirous to change has different economic and socio-political system but the 'changes' desired in the economic base are uniform in nature irrespective of the differences in each's historicity.

Now the question that has accrued controversies is whether the above changes in the economic base will turn every society identical or irrespective of the universalistic nature of techno - economic changes, every society could be able to maintain its traditional structure as an important ingredient of its identity.

Modernization is, thus, no less or more than a mere process of change that evolves on the techno - economic plane and gradually encompasses the society as a whole. But this seemingly straight concept of change is not that easy to be comfortably discerned, defined and understood. "Modernization is also an ideological concept. The models of modernization co-vary with the choice of ideologies. Marxism and Capitalism are the two dominant ideologies of our time which outline two ends of a continuum on which a multitude of variations on ideological themes of modernization have been formulated".(1)

1. Singh, Y. "Essays on Modernization in India", New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1978, P-1.

These two antagonistic ideologies obviously seek to define modernization at contradictory levels. If one sees it as a purely structural notion, the other treats it as a solely cultural one. Wedded to its tradition of economic determinism, the Marxist sociology explains modernization in terms of the structural variables of a society while the capitalists explain it in terms of the cultural and normative factors.

It is basically this irresolvable dichotomous controversy which has rendered the understanding of modernization very complex.

Modernization, in the most general sense refers to but a process of change. "The composite nature of this concept renders it pervasive in the vocabulary of social sciences and evokes its kinship with concepts like 'development', 'growth', 'evolution' and progress"(2) all of which essentially mean 'change'.

Seemingly vexed by this, Horowitz radically declares that "Modernization lacks the merit of being a concept, and, every attempt to define 'modernization' in terms of an operational set of variables results in the introduction of

2. Ibid.

new ideas which have relatively little to do with the original concept".(3)

Combing the literature on modernization which, according to Y. Singh, is but a legion, we confront dozens of formulations of the concept, namely: the 'Tradition Vs. Modernity' formulation; 'the socio - cultural'; the Marxian; the psychological; the technological; and the normative formulations etc. Invariably all the theories of modernization present either a 'unilinear universalistic evolutionary' or a 'relativistic viewpoint'(4). To be comprehensive, the former seeks to describe modernization as a process that would turn all the societies of the globe into a single homogeneous entity patching - up their social, cultural, economic, political and historical differences; while in the latter case different societies will have different modernization patterns in consonance with their respective historical situations.

The general understanding that goes about modernization is that it is a process opposed to tradition as argues S.C.Dube: Modernization "is essentially a process - a movement from traditional or quasi - traditional order to certain desired types of technology and associated form of social - structure,

3. Quoted by Y. Singh, Op. cit., P-20

4. Ibid., P - 40.

value - orientations and motivations, and norms..... modernization thus is not just superficial acquisition of some isolated traits and elements characteristic of the more advanced countries. Their selection in a logical order and sequence, and integration into the cultural pattern in a widely ramifying manner is essential"(5). Though of course indirectly this definition seeks to equate 'tradition' with techno - economic and cultural backwardness; and justify 'modernization' as highly opposed to 'tradition'. Getting highly critical of Dube's contention, Y. Singh notes: "The formulation of modernity is often also biased by attempts to see it as opposed to tradition. There is an implicit attraction in defining modernization through such a dichotomy. It follows from a simplistic view of social processes and completely neglects 'historicity' in modernization. Once science was similiary counterposed with religion, which has failed to draw conviction, and is far from the reality. Tradition is the very substance through which processes of modernization articulate themselves"(6). "Modernization", contends

5. Dube, S.C., 'Modernization and It's Adaptive Demands on Indian Society' in Eds. Gore, M.S., Desai, I.P., & Chitnis, S., "Papers in the Sociology of Education in India", New Delhi: N.C.S.R.T., 1967, pp - 33-51.
6. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-22.

Horowitz, "may even mean a further reinforcement of traditional structures"(7). Therefore, those who seek to project modernization as a process wiping out tradition surely predict a single fate for all societies undergoing this process. The quintessences of Japan and China as societies undergoing rapid modernization, however, baffle this assumption. They are the societies that have aptly incorporated the elements of modernization into their typically traditional or quasi - traditional systems striking a balance between the two. Despite being modern they have still retained their traditional identity.

Regarding the misunderstanding that modernity is opposed to tradition, Y. Singh further remarks: "The neat contrariety between modern and traditional not only in terms of social structure but also values and norms is lost and is replaced by a picture of evolutionary - multiple transformations. In such a process of development it is not impossible, nor should it surprise us, if glaring role inconsistencies and cognitive dissociations are evident in the behaviour of modernized persons, for instance, if a person is an eminent scientist and yet believes in omens and astrology. To my mind such a 'modern' society is impossible to emerge and does not so far

7. Quoted by Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-22.

exist where there is no inconsistency in thinking and behaviour"(8). Srinivas (9) also supports this contention and opines that modern societies have more inconsistencies where roles and levels of thinking are concerned than the traditional societies.

Julien Steward sees modernization as "sociocultural transformations that result from factors and process that are distinctive of the contemporary industrial world"(10). This renders modernization equivalent to social change based on the rationality that cultural alterations follow structural changes necessitated by certain contemporary compulsions.

The psychological formulations of the concept perceive modernization as a process basically associated with "a set of motivational attributes or orientations of individuals which are said to be mobile activist, and innovative in nature"(11). The concept lacks logical consistency since it unduly ignores the indispensable role of material instruments of modernization, and, treats 'individual psychology' as

8. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-64.

9. Srinivas, M.N. 'Caste in Modern India and other Essays' Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1934.

10. Steward, J. H., 'Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies' Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1937, Vol. I, P-4.

11. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-20.

something independent of the influences of a social system. Somewhat identical are the formulations that conceive to define modernization in terms of social norms and values "whose set", according to Almond and Verba, "form a pattern and enjoy relative autonomy over individual motivations or consciousness"(12). This viewpoint fails to discern the fundamental source where these norms and values emanate from.

Then there is the structural view - point which endeavours to explain the process as related to "structural variables such a bureaurecy, money, market, attachment to universalistic norms in social roles".(13) Parsons is among those who contribute to this view - point on modernization, which, according to Y. Singh, is but a synchronysis of psychological and normative formulations hence its hollowness.

THE FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT :

Parsons conceptualizes modernization as an evolutionary universalistic process. He talks of 'functional universals' that are indispensable to a society. With the movement of

12. Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. "The Civic Culture", Boston and Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1955, P-13.

13. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-22.

societies from simple to complex new 'universals' evolve. In the earliest phase of their growth the societies had religion, communication, social - organization, basic technology and kinship as five indispensabilities. Growing population - pressure, social - segmentations and territorial-spread transformed the kinship - based society into a stratified one. In the beginning societies were stratified into two classes: upper and lower; but they came to be gradually differentiated into rural and urban communities with four classes: the urban upper and lower, and the rural upper and lower classes. Stratification thus comes to be the sixth 'evolutionary universal' since it later proliferates acute differentiation free from 'ascriptive base', and it is this differentiation which is indispensable to modernization. Parsons reminds that if stratification fails to be adequately and acutely differentiated it may retard modernization instead of accelerating it. What follows along with stratification is 'cultural legitimation' that besides reinforcing the latter prepares congenial scope for innovations.

The society having evolved these six evolutionary universals as its indispensabilities now become only eligible

for sustaining the process of modernization which has yet to follow through the sequential growth of bureaucracy, money and market complex, generalized universal norms and democratic associations as the last four universals "as together constituting the main outline of structural foundations of modern society"¹⁴ Y. Singh comments that "the western historicity of modernization is implicit in Parsons' frame of reference but it does not foreclose other possibilities of modernizing structural adaptations. The logical implication is that in achieving modernization societies would differ more in terms of scale rather than in quality and also that there is no basic contradiction between tradition and modernity"⁽¹⁵⁾.

Parsons' analysis is not, however, fully ignorant of historicity. It draws on 'universalism of historicity' of societies rather than considering historicity of each society, and is, above all, "Preferable for its theoretical power and analytical qualities to explain historicity as well as evolution of modernization"⁽¹⁶⁾. The study of Jacobson and Buck (17) conducted on the Parsonian model of modernization also

14. Parsons, Talcott, "Evolutionary Universals in Society", American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 1964, pp. 339-57.
15. Singh, Y. Op. cit., pp. 25-26.
16. Ibid. P = 26.

supports Y. Singh's contention.

Parsons, however, fails first to present an encompassing sketch of modernization since he ignores highlighting its exact nature and form, and, secondly, to outline the requisite level of the last four universals, and above all, the level of functional reciprocity needed among the universals to facilitate modernization.

In addition to this, Parsons' treatment of historicity of societies lacks depth of analysis in that it deliberately avoids discerning the 'objective forces' behind the evolution of various systems (universals) in a society at a given time in history.

To Parsons, societies kept changing and evolving new institutions as if it were in their destiny. And, there were no existential reasons behind to deserve a mention in his scheme of historicity. What he prefers to call 'structures' are, in fact, no more than a consequence and extension of the

18. Deutsch, K.W., 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, Sept. 1961, PP-493-514.

Wisenstedt, S.W., 'Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution', American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, June, 1964, PP - 375-83.

techno - economic base of a society.

Deutsch and Eisenstadt(18) are some of the other social scientists who support the Parsonsian frame of reference for modernization.

Toynbee's conception of modernization is an over-simplification of the 'Evolutionary Universalistic View'. "Modernization", he contends, "is a unilinear evolutionary process whose growth would bring all societies to a level of cultural homogeneity washing away their original cultural identities"(19). Reacting to this contention Y. Singh remarks: "The quintessence of Toynbee's treatment of modernization is based on the assumption that westernization is equivalent to modernization"(20) Westernization is but a narrow concept connoting only a less - pervasive "Process of confrontation between western and non - western societies"(21). Dube, therefore, opines that " as a concession to the sensitiveness of developing societies and as an aid to conceptual clarity, modernization is to be

19. Toynbee, A.J., 'A Study of History' Vol. 8, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936, pp. 135-136.

20. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P - 24.

21. Ibid.

preferred to westernization"(22).

Westernization, as its history would suggest, is only loosely a process of spontaneous change but a conspiracy of the west to impose its ideology on the oriental societies through techno - economic mobilization. What the west achieved "with the help of religion (christianity) in the past"(23), It is now endeavouring to achieve with the help of "technological and scientific symbolization"(24).

Apart from Toynbee's perception, there have been other attempts to see 'modernization' and 'industrialization' as coextensive in sense and usage atleast. One such attempt is by Levy who tries to explain modernization in terms of economic resources.(25) With a view to doing away with this confusion, Dube clarifies: "though industrialization is an important part of modernization it does not encompass the entire process. The connotations of industrialization are overtly technological, social and cultural processes are considered under it only by implication".(23) Then there is the Marxian standpoint on modernization which is solely drawn from its ideological system.

22. Dube, S.C., Op. cit.

23. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-24

24. Ibid.

THE MARXIST CONCEPT :

'Human Labour' runs through Marxism as the most fundamental concept. Everything that constitutes society be it social institutions, culture and structure, invariably all are but products of human labour which is the basic human activity indispensable to human life that seeks sustenance first and other things only afterwards. Therefore, the more the freedom of labour is, the more would be the progress and prosperity of Mankind. This labour is manifested in production.

The products confront Mankind as "objective manifestations that may be endowed with seeds of self - integration or self - disintegration depending upon the degrees of freedom and spontaneity of labour"(27).

'Mode of production is the prime source of manifestation of human labour'. Contradictions emerge in society when human labour begins to be encapsulated through class interests.

25. Levy, J.M.J.R., 'Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan', in Kuznets, S., Moore, W.E., and Spengler, J.J. Eds. 'Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan' Durham: W.C. Duke University Press, 1956, PP. 493-533.
26. Dube, S.C., Op. cit.
27. Singh, Y., Op., cit., P-4.

This encapsulation creates alienation of man as well as of human labour. Contradictions thus go on piling - up, and a point in history comes when the system ceases to bear with them hence it collapses under its own weight and a new system evolves out of it to give fresh meaning and freedom to human labour. This revolutionary transformation keeps repeating till there is true freedom when human labour could be no more encapsulated by narrow class - interests. The society with true freedom is the classless, stateless communist society. The processes that would render the evolution of such a society possible are the processes of modernization.

Obviously enough, the basic flaw with the Marxist sociology is that it ignores the historicity of different societies and predicts a uniform future for all societies irrespective of their structural and cultural variations. Y. Singh argues that "the exact forms of encapsulations of their concrete structures would differ from society to society; it may be class - structure in one society, caste in another and race and ethnicity in yet another, or it may well be a combination of several of these structural

categories into adaptive new series of encapsulations"(28). Marxism thus fails to provide a systematic theory of modernization. "It (modernization) could well be equated with the notion of a Communist society"(29). The 'evolutionary' and the 'structural' notions of modernization claiming it(mod.) to be a universalizing process do not apply even to the modernized societies that owe their allegiance either to the capitalist ideology or the communist one. This fact is demonstrated by the variations in the modernization - patterns of the north - American, the West European and the Japanese societies (30) all of whom representing capitalistic model of modernization should have had uniform modernization - pattern. This is true of communist societies as well; Russia's modernization - pattern is explicitly different from that of the - European communist societies.

28. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-3

29. Ibid., P-5.

30. Dube, S.C., Op. cit.,

About Japan Dube remarks: "It shows how, through some significant structural rearrangement an essentially Asian ethos can successfully take the road to modernization"(31). Marion(32) ~~Levy~~ points to the differences in the modernization - patterns of China and that of Japan which (differences), he argues, are owing to the unidentical structural conditions in the two countries despite many similarities.

Thus, both the 'structural' and the 'evolutionary' formulations of the concept of modernization as they tend to ignore the historicity of different societies are irrelevant in the Third World Context. "The Third World must have its own ideology of modernization"(33).

THE INTEGRAL VIEW OF MODERNIZATION:

"Modernization in the Third World nations is not only a means of economic and social development but also a process for the projection of their cultural self - consciousness and national identity."(34) Most of the Third World countries

31. Dube, S.C., Op. cit.,
32. Levy, J.H. Jr., Op. cit.
33. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-9
34. Ibid., P-10.

including ours were colonies only a few decades ago, having set free from the fetters of colonialism they naturally started desperately searching for their identity on the one hand; and, the pitifully backward state of their economy bequeathed to them by the curse of colonialism compelled them to hasten their efforts at modernization on the other. Thus, their "urge for modernity comingled with their urge for identity"(35). The material pre - requisites of modernization, universal in nature, for being incorporated into a particular society, then had to essentially harmonize with its history and cultural tradition. Optimum inter-play of these material pre-requisites with the ethos of a particular society prepares the ground for modernization to grow and consolidate. It is in this sense that modernization - pattern of one society differs from the other. Undermining the validity of universal evolutionary stages of growth on the ground that they have a conservative ideological bias, Gunnar - Myrdal remarks that the "Crucial factor in development is an upward movement of the social - system as a whole with all its component conditions"(36).

35. Ibid. P-11

36. Myrdal, Gunnar, 'Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations', London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1968, Vol. III, PP. 1847-1955.

which for the South Asian nations are: "(i) output and income; (ii) conditions of production; (iii) levels of living; (iv) attitudes towards life and work; (v) institutions; and (vi) policies"(37). These conditions are so interlinked with one another that a movement (upward or downward) in one, according to Myrdal, causes cumulative movement of similar nature in other conditions too. 'Attitudes towards life and work; and, Institutions' as conditions are most significant and decisive of all since it is they, according to Myrdal, on which depends mobilization of all other conditions.

The aforementioned conditions and the institutions existing in a society, Myrdal opines, have certain values associated with them which have functional significance for the members of the society. These values are of two kinds: independent and instrumental. Since the former descend down from the past cultural ethos and history of a society, they are fundamental to the society, and, therefore, circumscribe the entire gamut of social life, while the latter proliferate owing to the advancement of science and technology. Backward

37. Ibid., PP 1855-1860.

38. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit., P-65.

societies have pre - dominance of independent values over the instrumental ones in that the latter are governed by the former. Reverse is the case with a modern society. "As science and technology advance, more and more categorical (independent) values are formulated in operational (instrumental) terms"(38). Such "increased operationalization leads to the growth of specialized structures"(39) which "is characteristic of a modern society"(40).

According to Yogendra Singh, "Modernization is understood as growth of a uniform set of cultural and role - structural attributes, but attention is not paid as to how these attributes develop typical adaptations within the traditional conditions of each society. This limitation, in our view, can be avoided if we conceptualize both tradition and modernization as sets of values and role - structures which interact as they come into contact, and between them a selective process

39. Ibid.

40. Wottle, J.P. and Robertson, R., 'International System and the Modernization of Societies', London: Faber & Faber, 1968, pp. 42-45.
They propound that alongwith the progressive specialization in a modern society there also occurs de-differentiation of roles.

of assimilation and syncretism starts"(41). This implies that since the independent values descend down from the typical cultural ethos and history of a society, they(ind. values) differ from society to society, while the instrumental values are of universal nature since proliferated by science and technology; the selective process of assimilation and syncretism, thus, may involve "unique combination of traditional values with modern ones"(42).

Modernization, then, starts with the continuity of introduction and enhancement of material pre - requisites of change in a society and grows with the gradual protrusion of the effects of such continuity encompassing the society in entirety, and consolidates with the perpetuation of a congenial mass - mentality. To be more comprehensive, progressive advancement of science and technology in a given society accounts for major alterations in the economy, economic relations, values governing role - performance,

41. Singh, Yogendra, "Modernization of Indian Tradition"
Varidabad: Thomson Press (India) Ltd., Publication
Division, 1973, P-214.

42. Ibid.

institutions such as family, religion, caste etc. and other sub - structures; and creates new adaptations and accelerates specialization. The ingredients of society instead of getting replaced or changing to full are only remodelled to the extent they can prove adaptive in the altered situation, and in return they exert influence over the changing circumstances. This is precisely why tradition persists,(43) though in a mended and merged form, in modernization.

Modernization then is a process involving continued introduction and enhancement of material pre - requisites towards the overall prosperity of a society; and turning the existing obsolete and the less adaptive traditional structures and sub - structures of the society into upto-date and more adaptive structures. Y. Singh remarks: "This, a realistic formulation of modernization should describe this process in terms of (a) role - structures emerging from the continual impingement of science and technology and continual differentiation of social structure on the social system, (b) a system of values representing a scientific world - view, and (c) a

43. Ulyanovsky, Rostislav., 'Present - day Problems in Asia and Africa', Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978, P-113.

parallel system of value categorical in nature and representing both a self - transcendence of pre - existing tradition and of modern science"(44).

To summarize, the functionalists view modernization as a process of socio - psychological, cultural, economic and technological change occurring as an inevitability out of the introduction and enhancement of science and technology in a society. As a consequence, all societies become culturally homogeneous doing away with their respective 'tradition'.

The Marxist approach to modernization seeks to explain the process in terms of its fundamental concept of 'encapsulation of human labour' 'increasing consciousness of the exploited labourers; and the inevitable 'class - struggle' that ensues between the oppressors (owners of the means of production) and the oppressed (workers) resulting - in 'proletarian dictatorship'. The Marxist notion of the processes of modernization thus is no less or no more than the notion of the processes that lead to establishment of communism in a society. The functionalists emphasize the role of cultural variables of a society in modernization while the Marxist approach underlines

44. Singh, Y., 'Essays on Modernization in India'
op. cit., P-23.

the indispensable role of economic variables. The Third - World or the integral view of modernization seeks to define it as a process or processes involving requisite synchrony between tradition and modernity. Historicity (meaning each society differs in the nature of its Socio - Historical setting from the other, so modernization - pattern of one society will essentially differ from that of the other society) is the fundamental concept that runs through the third world ideology of modernization.

CHAPTER - III IV

SOCIAL-BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL ELITES OF RAJASTHAN

Any attempt to pursue a scholastic perusal of 'Political elite in relation to modernization of society' must include age, family, caste, class educational, political and territorial background of the elite. Mitra and Singh's(1) assertion that 'family is an important unit of political socialization' lends support to the relevance of the study of elite background. About age - background they note "the particular stage of the life cycle ~~of~~ a person is at has a lot of influence on his overall political orientation"(2). With regard to the significance of overall study of elite - background in relation to the modernization problems of a given society, Ram Ahuja asserts: "the correlation between background and political behaviour is based on the assumption that age, class, education etc. of elites will determine whether they will be sympathetic to or ignorant of the people whom they are representing or will represent in future"(3).

1. Mitra, S.K. and Singh V.B. 'Social class and Belief Systems in the Indian Political Elite' in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K. 'Elite and Development', New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 1980, pp. 97 - 122.
2. Ibid.

The diagnosis, thus, of elite background would, in no precarious terms, help one discern as to which class gives away copious number of elites; which may precisely unfold the general nature and character of a particular society.

AGE - STRUCTURE :

The Indian Constitution has laid down 25 years as the minimum age for the membership of the assembly (Vidhan Sabha) of any state in India but is silent on the question of maximum age - limit. A study conducted by Mitra and Singh on a few Indian political elites in 1971 revealed that 'age was related in a significant manner with the elite's own general political orientation'(4).

*The table as under gives age - structure of members of three successive assemblies of Rajasthan.

3. Ahuja, Ram. 'Political Elites and Modernization', The Bihar Politics - Meerut; Manakshi Prakashan, 1976, P-25.

4. Mitra, G.K. and Singh, V.B., Op. cit.

* The table is given on next page (i.e. 53)

TABLE NO. I

AGE - STRUCTURE OF THE MEMBERS

Age Group	1952		1957		1962	
	No. of Persons	Percentage to the total	No. of Persons	Percentage to the total	No. of Persons	Percentage to the total
22 - 35	61	38	44	25	39	22
36 - 45	53	33	69	39	83	47
46 - 55	38	24	41	23	45	26
56 - 65	-	-	7	4	4	2
NOT KNOWN	8	5	15	9	5	3
TOTAL :	160	100	176	100	176	100

SOURCE : 1) Jain, C.M., : "State Legislatures in India", New Delhi, 1972, P-32.
 11) 'Congress Ke Teen Varsh', Pub. by Cong. Vidhan Sabha Party Office.

A mere glance through the table reveals that the number of members in the youngest age - group i.e., 25 - 35, is on successive decline which can be hardly taken as a happy development while the statistics depicting the age - group 36 - 45 are seen as continuously swelling. Shrador(5) intimates that large proportion of MLAs in the first and second assemblies were in the age - group of 25-45 years. In the fourth assembly, informs Puri,(6) the maximum number of MLAs (38%) are in the age - group of 45-55, and 35% in the age - group of 36-45. One immediate inference from Puri's statistics can be drawn that the percentage of MLAs in the fourth assembly in the age - group of 25-35 must have been quite less. These statistics are obvious enough to indicate dominance and consolidation of middle - aged elites in the overall structure of Rajasthan oligarchic elite. This trend in Rajasthan politics frustrate atleast Ahuja's conclusion that "the 'present' elites are younger than the 'former'... This shows that the emerging elites are young in age"(7).

5. Shrador, Lawrence.L., "Rajasthan", in Weiner, M. Ed., 'State Politics in India', New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968, P-342.
6. Puri, S.Lato, 'Legislative Elite in an Indian State: A Case Study of Rajasthan'; New Delhi: Abhinav Prakashan. 1978, pp. 51-52.
7. Ahuja, Rem. Op. cit., pp. 26-27.

Interestingly enough, the Chief Minister, the Speaker and many a minister belonged to the numerically expanding age-group (33-45) while they assumed their offices. In the sixth assembly too the age-group (33-45) accounted for the largest share that of approximately 57% while the percentage of the age - group of 25-35 dropped down to a disappointing figure of 22.

Comparing the age - group of Assembly and Lok Sabha members of Rajasthan of the first three terms, C.M. Jain points to a similar trend. Having attempted an identical comparison Puri notes that the fourth Rajasthan Assembly saw younger members vis - a - vis the Lok Sabha Members.

"Recruitment of younger generation into politics, "observed Puri, "reflects the synthesis of new and old generations, and assists in the peaceful transformation of society"(8).

The eventuality of such a synthesis is but a convivial conjecture hastened to surface only by our overoptimism about future. But the contemporaneous political realities are cruel enough to shatter this optimism. Neither the quantitative

8. Puri, S.L. Op. cit., P-54.

autopsy of the Rajasthan political elite nor the logically derived qualitative details evince such a synthesis and transformation of society. To recapitulate, the facts and figures discussed together have evidenced the over - rising dominance of experienced elites over the inexperienced in the arena of state politics of Rajasthan.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND :

Highlighting the importance of education to politics, Key Junior pin points "that opposition to authoritarian political elites, political tolerance and support for freedom in expression and civil liberties tend to increase with education"(9).

The universally accepted vitality of education lies in its modifying the 'self', roughly by inducing in him capabilities to have better understanding and appreciation of things, and, above all, to develop tolerance and realize the vitality of collective interests as against the particularistic ones. In a developing set - up like India levels of values and institutions requisite to sustenance of democracy, and

9. Ahuja, Rem. Op.cit., P-33.

political involvement depend upon 'education' for exaltation.

Rajasthan has been a predominantly illiterate state. Only a meagre section (20%) of its population is literate. C.M. Jain informs that the percentage of members attained education upto post - graduation (low graduation included), has remained almost constant i.e., 27 to 28% in the three legislatures, while the percentage of undergraduates has varied from 13 to 17. The percentage of matriculate members having passed low - secondary has also remained undeflected i.e., 27 to 28% in all three legislatures. Those who can be roughly called as 'literate' (since at best they can read and write only) accounted for 24% in the first three assemblies. In the fourth assembly, Puri writes, members having education upto matric and above accounted for 74% and the rest i.e., 25% only were with a college background. She further inform that the majority of non - matriculates were scheduled castes and tribes returning from reserved constituencies. Puri's elaborate empirical work on Rajasthan elites reveals that legislators are better qualified than their fathers. Regarding the fifth assembly Nagla (B.K.) mentions

that about 24% assembly members had education upto middle, 12% upto graduation, about 7% post - graduation and approximately 35% graduation in law(10).

The statistics contained in the preceding discussion illuminate that although the overall educational level of the elites is low and unsatisfactory by all standards yet it is not that disappointing keeping in view the fact that Rajasthan is with 80% of illiterate population. Recruitment of highly educated elites shows a downward trend and they are seen being perpetually quelled by either merely literate or only nominally educated elites from the first legislature to the fifth. That the legislators surpassed their fathers in education is a point indicating social change.

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS:

Occupation of an individual is no less significant a factor influencing the very nature of his political involvement and behaviour. As is obvious, Rajasthan's economy is

10. Nagla, B.K., "Factionalism, Social Structure and Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Udaipur District in Rajasthan", Ph.D. thesis, J.N.U., N. Delhi-1978.

agricultural and over eighty percent of its population depends upon agriculture for its livelihood though soil - type and climatic - conditions there are hardly congenial for expedient pursuit of agriculture. The first assembly had 18% of its total strength as agriculturalists. This percentage went upto 28 in the third assembly, and, as a consequence, agriculturalists came to be the largest occupational group as informs Jain.

Swatantra, the major opposition in the third assembly, was represented by Jagirdars (about 8%) owning considerable stretches of land with employed labour, for agricultural pursuit. In this assembly lawyers and businessmen constituted 15 and 13% respectively of the total strength. The rest were journalists, teachers and ex - servicemen. This assembly had 18% social workers numerically ranking next to the agriculturalists.

The report on the third general election in the state bears testimony to these facts and figures. Discussing occupations of the members of the third assembly, Verma (S.P.)

notes that 29 out of 173 MLAs had legal and medical professions, 25 social - service and 14 were jagirdars. Social service means no specified occupation hence absence of a regular for livelihood on politics. Jagirdars realized income from property and compensation(11).

About the fourth assembly Puri points to the absence of representation of trade unionists, industrial workers while agriculturists, businessmen, social - workers, teachers, lawyers etc. had considerable strength. Agriculturists, notes Puri, are not exactly farmers but people who own land which is either tilled by the members of his joint - family or by sharecroppers. She found that 55% of the legislators in the fourth assembly were in the low - income group of 750/- p.m., and the rest between low and high i.e. 750/- to 2,000/- per mensem.

With regard to the fifth assembly, Negla (B.K.) discerned that 59.5% constituted the cultivation category, about 24% were legal - practitioners, roughly 7% were in

11. Verma, S.P. and Bhambhri, C.P. Eds. 'Elections and Political Consciousness in India: A Study', Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967.

business, approximately 6% in social service and the rest reported politics as the means of their livelihood. In the sixth assembly too atleast roughly 48% were agriculturalists, 25% lawyers, 6% businessmen, 4% were in medical practice, two had journalism as their profession.

Datta (Tatna) observes: "in the fourth Lok Sabha the social - workers were numerically the strongest group, while in the third Rajasthan assembly this position was held by the agriculturalists' group. Moreover, one may be tempted to observe that the intellectuals' representation has successively declined in both, but has been in larger proportion in the Lok Sabha(12).

All this evinces but growing dominance of agriculturalists and social workers in Rajasthan politics.

About the possibilities of a correlation between individual elite's occupation and that of his father's, Mitra and Singh observe that "parents try to inculcate their norms

12. Datta, R. 'The Party Representative in Fourth Lok Sabha' Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, Vol. 4, 1939, PP- 179-189.

in the children, though, the effect of this on the final overall political orientation is not too strong"(13). In the same context Puri notes that "there is a strong correlation between caste and traditionally prescribed occupation among the fathers, but it gets weaker as we move to the MLAs of fourth assembly. As a matter of fact, 35% of Brahmins, 17% of jats, 17% of Rajputs, 73% of Vaishyas, 3% Scheduled Castes and 20% legislators from other castes have adopted the modern occupation of law, while among the occupation of fathers, none had this as their profession. Although Scheduled Caste, tribe and Muslim MLAs have continued, more or less, to follow the occupation of their fathers and have not shown any major shift to new occupation. However, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe MLAs are in petty Govt. Scheduled jobs like that of school teachers, patwari etc.(14).

Puri's above comparison of elites' and their father's occupations is simple enough to prove that the process of

13. Mitra, S.K. and Singh, V.B., Op. cit., P-107.

14. Puri, Shashi Lata, Op. cit., P-43.

occupational mobility among the new and emerging political elites has gathered considerable momentum.

CASTE COMPOSITION :

Having studied the political elites of Bihar, Ahuja specifies 'Caste' as a typical basis of 'clique' formation within the elites and establishes it as a potent factor that disintegrates elites(15). In relation to individual elite's political orientation, Mitra and Singh provide the orotical reasons to evince caste's strong influence.(16)

All this provides considerable temptation for attempting an analysis of Caste Composition of Rajasthan elites.

Rajput, Brahmin, Mahajan and Jat are some of the major castes forming 30% of Rajasthan's population, the rest comprises other politically less impressive castes inclusive of scheduled castes. Rajputs presence fell to 19 and 20% in the second and third assemblies respectively while the Brahmins almost maintained their position as is evident from the figures

15. Ahuja, R. Op. cit., P-130.

16. Mitra, S.K. and Singh, V.B., Op. cit., P-106.

of 15 and 17% in the second and third assemblies respectively. Mahajans rose from 9% in the first assembly to 11% in the second, and jats from 11 to 15%. A lion's share of assembly seats in the aforementioned three terms that of 64% in average came to these four castes constituting only 30% of Rajasthan's population. As for scheduled caste and tribe MLAs, the percentage of their strength were 11 and 4 respectively in the first term which increased to 16 and 13% respectively in the second term and remained unchanged in the third assembly.

The statistics analysed indicate the gradually swelling strength of the "middle - castes" and lower castes and punctuated curtailment in the dominance of high castes. In other words, an improvement was observed in the general nature of recruitment of elites. The caste-wise strength of the fifth assembly, according to Nagle (B.K.), was as under:

42.2% of the Seats was divided among the high castes i.e., Rajputs, Brahmins, Mahajans and Kayasthas. 32.4% was the strength of Scheduled Castes and Tribes while jats' presence was 16.1%.(17) Other castes constituted only a

17. Nagle, B.K., Op., cit., P-89.

meagre percentage of 9.3. Nagla further notes: "in the fifth assembly of Rajasthan, Brahmins, Rajputs and Mahajans have more members than their respective numerical positions in the state. Besides, due to reserved constituencies Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes also have more members in the legislature than their numerical strength"(18).

A fairly considerable curtailment in Rajput dominance in Rajasthan politics as is apparent from the successive decrease in their strength from first legislature to the fifth surely is an indicator of social change. The socio-historical reality that the Rajputs ever enjoyed a position of dominance and exaltation in the social structure of Rajasthan is evident from the note-worthy passages by Verma and Mathur: "the present name of the state Rajasthan is modified derivative from its popularly known designation "Rajputana or 'Rajware', both denoting a hode of Rajputs. This mass of land has been associated with the activities and achievements of Rajputs. The Rajputs were a warrior group who has played an important role in the Indian history from 8th century onwards especially

18. Ibid.

in the north - western regions"(19). Weiner (14) notes:
"It is important to mention that 17 of the Rajputana states had been ruled by the Rajput castes"(20).

Keeping this history in mind, and their notable performance in the first assembly, their successive derailment thereafter from the power track of the state signifies growth of consciousness and democratic forces amongst the people.

Political Backgrounds:

Nitra and Singh's analysis pertaining to Indian elites in general deserves a special mention here: "the Indian political elites at the time of independence were drawn from various classes (in terms of the classical or marxist use of the concept). What held them together was the legacy of the struggle for independence and a collective stake in successfully transforming the struggle into national reconstruction, or national building at the time of independence there was an implicit consensus among the Indian Political elite on the

19. Verma, S.P. and Bhabhari, C.P., Op. cit.

20. Weiner, M. 'State Politics in India', Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1938.

goals of national - integration, economic development, socialism, secularism etc."(21) Pin - pointing the changing character of the Indian elite Ahuja brings out a successful distinction between 'early' elites (1947-1962) and 'later' elites (1962 onwards) saying that the former had no struggle with the people since the interests of the elites and the people were one - nation - building, while the latter came into indirect conflict with the people owing to various vested interests.(22) This meaningful classificatory analysis provides us a handy scheme to analyse Rajasthan's elites who on this basis, seem falling into two broad categories: the first comprising legislators who had participated in the national struggle and were associated with "preja - mandal movement". Their sincere sacrifices and sufferings were duly rewarded by the deference and popularity they commanded on the masses. Whereas, the second category includes legislators

21. Nitre, S.K. and Singh, V.B. Op. cit., pp. 100-101.

22. Ahuja, Ram 'Political Elite - Recruitment and Role in Modernization' in Sechidanand and Lal, A.K. Eds. Elite and Development, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 1980 pp. 123-133.

who entered the political scene in the late post - independent phase. About them Iqbal (Narain) observes; they could bring material benefits to the people or atleast could promise to do so. However, they became popular with the voters and came in the forefront. Moreover, Panchayati Raj institutions, cooperative societies, banks, charitable trusts, educational societies can be cited as examples which serve as a spring board for power for the second group of legislators"(23).

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE:

It calls for myriad amount of "experience" to discharge the crucial and typically specific function of a legislator. But in the case of the first Assembly of Rajasthan, Jain (C.M.) found that 70% of its members were inexperienced (not incapable, of course) in that they lacked experience of membership to any political body. Only the rest i.e., 30% had either been in some local bodies or in the princely assemblies. About

23. Narain, Iqbal, 'Democratic Decentralization and Rural Leadership in India: The Rajasthan Experiment' Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 8, August 1964, PP. 1313-22.

the second assembly he informs that 53% of its members had previous experience of whom 27% had been in the preceding assembly. Pertaining to the third assembly, Jain gives the figures of 82% and 18% for the experienced and the inexperienced respectively(24). Projecting her observations about the fourth assembly, Puri tells that 50% of its members had entered politics prior to the formation of Rajasthan and the rest thereafter(25).

We, thus, witness that from the first assembly onwards the experienced legislators started consolidating their strength which suggested "experience" becoming one of the crucial means for grabbing votes.

To interpret it sociologically, experience of membership to any political body starting from parliament and assembly down to municipalities and district boards and panchayats etc. placed at one's disposal ample opportunities to tactfully

24. Jain, C.H., 'State Legislatures in India: The Rajasthan Legislative Assembly: A Comparative Study', New Delhi, 1972

25. Puri, S.L. Op. cit., P-60.

interact with the people and expand local influence besides gaining recognition and prominence. These advantages associated with 'experience gives one an easy sway over his inexperienced rival in the elections. Besides, political parties role in training their members in politics has not to be overlooked. The parties reinforce requisite finance and manpower to their members for campaigning. And, above all, it is the contestant's political party's overall image that determines his performance in the elections.

MOTIVATIONS TO ENTER POLITICS:

Emphasizing the role of 'motivations' in tempting one to enter politics, Ahuja remarks: Bearing in mind the specific differences between the families and communities from which the people derive their orientation and values, information on certain attitudes may acquire meaning"(23).

About the motivations that led the Rajasthan elites to enter politics, Puri found that 'seventy five percent members

23. A huja, R. Op. cit., PP. 54-55.

developed their interest in politics during adulthood, while 15% members were politicized in adolescence or in young age. Five percent MLAs preferred family as a factor for entering into politics while 8 percent MLAs considered friends, neighbours or educational institutions as a factor of politicization. The MLAs who had got interested in politics during childhood were mostly influenced by political atmosphere, national movements, and societal compulsions. Family has played a greater role in regard to members who got socialized during adolescence. Political atmosphere also has an edge as a socializing agent over 'young - age' and 'college etc.' as socializing agents. Personal disposition also played a significant role in the case of legislators who had the privilege of receiving college education. Besides national movement, praja - mandal movement has been a crucial socializing factor by which legislators are being socialized in Rajasthan(27).

27. Puri, S.L. Op. cit., pp. 77-79.

We, thus, see family, primary - groups, educational institutions, and, above - all, general political atmosphere as playing an important role in motivating legislators to enter politics. Regarding caste and motivations, Sisson observes: "precisely a caste - wise analysis of legislators shows that Brahmins, Vaishyas and other communities like Jains, muslims, and sikhs, being better educated and more urban could become political activists easily. Jats, who mostly represent the peasant community, organized kisan sabhas and some of them participated in profamendal movements in the eastern part of the state. After integration Jat MLAs became one of the important groups in the ruling party, and a formidable force in state - politics. It's leader finally broke away from the Congress party and formed a separate party known as Kranti Dal"(28).

These facts prompt us to draw a few important sociological inferences: that secondary socializing agents namely

28. Sisson, R., 'Caste and Political Factions in Rajasthan' in Kothari, R. ed. 'Caste in Indian Politics', Delhi: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1970, pp. 175-278.

the educational institutions and political atmosphere etc. have certainly an edge over the primary agents like family, neighbourhood, play - group (friends etc.). Depending upon the study of motivations in relations to Rajasthan legislators we find them (legislators) falling into two categories; the first is inclusive of legislators of the early post - independence phase who were motivated by national and praja - mandal movements; while the second comprises legislators of the later post - independence phase who were and still are being influenced by situational factors.

Our study of the caste, class, educational, political etc. background of Rajasthan legislators vindicates a close congruence between higher ladder of traditional hierarchical system (stratification) and political positions hence our conclusion that political system in the state is a true representative of the inequality characteristic of the overall Rajasthan society.

The pre - independence politics in India, which had only marginal contradictions, was in fact a politics of struggle against colonialism being pursued from the platform of Indian

National Congress. Such a pursuence called for broadest possible mobilization of the masses, which was successfully done by the Congress by exploiting peoples' patriotic sentiments at the broadest (national) level, and by verbally attending to local problems, at the micro-structural levels. This precisely explains why Praja Mandal movements against the villainous jagirdari system in Rajasthan were patronized by the INC to the extent of merger. Having participated in the pre-independence politics and tasted the sweet egalitarianism of the Congress, the masses felt sure that this egalitarian nature of politics and that of the Congress organization as well would continue to exist even after independence is achieved.

Independence having achieved and democracy borrowed from the West and incepted, there came an inevitable reversal in the nature of the Congress - it naturally did away with its egalitarianism and took to elite - politics as was demanded by the 'game of power'. The masses could not obviously realize this drastic shift in the nature of politics and the political organization precisely because the leadership then comprised people who had been markedly active in the pre-

independence egalitarian politics, and as a result, were in direct touch with the masses. This leadership with its tradition of commitment to the nation and the masses helped maintain the residues of the pre-independence patriotic fervour, and thus kept the emerging contradictions on the social and political horizons at bay.

This precisely explains the dominance in the Rajasthan Politics of politicians such as Tikeram Paliwal, Hiralal Shastri, Jai Narayan Vyas, Jekal Bhai Bhatt, Manik Lal Verma, Mohanlal Sukhadia, Kumbh Ram Arya, Netha Ram Wirdha and a host of others who had participated in the national movement. Owing precisely to this socio - historical privilege that the old elites enjoyed, they kept outnumbering the young legislators in Rajasthan till the third assembly. This also explains why in the early phase of Rajasthan's political culture, factionalism, personalism, casteism, communalism and regionalism etc. were not that rampant and deep-rooted as they are in the current phase.

With the passage of time the leadership gradually declined in quality, and so the political culture, peoples,

long cherished hopes of emancipation from the fetters of social - inequality and oppression were shattered. Talks of social - justice, people's participation and diffusion of power proved to be a hollow promise. It is this realization of the hypocritical nature of politics on the part of the masses that is accruing mounting social - tension and sense of insecurity among people in Rajasthan. This is rather true of the country as a whole.

In our study of elite - background, we found that number of educated legislators in Rajasthan is on a gradual decline since the first assembly. This shows gradual dissociation between education and politics on the one hand but vindicates growing political consciousness among the masses on the other. A majority of the early elites were educated because they were drawn from the pre - independence nationalist movement leadership which was basically (and had to be) politico - intellectual in nature owing the role (of inducing patriotic consciousness in the people and mobilizing them) it had to play.

The post - independence politics since basically involve game of vote and power demand no such role to be played by the elites, it rather calls for such manipulations and manoeuvres on the part of the elites that hardly require education and intellect. Thus the intellectuals are gradually developing a tendency to detach themselves from the grass-root politics. Besides, the masses are hardly attracted to their (intellectuals') ambivalent ideologies. Consequently the distance between the masses and the intellectuals is widening day-in and day-out.

We also found that most of the non-matriculate legislators were from the scheduled castes and tribe communities. This shows how education is still a privilege of only a few. Democracy and extra - constitutional protection carry no meaning till education remains in the unprecedented wedlock with the traditional stratification system.

Presence of legislators with professional background such as law, teaching, medicine etc. as we noted points to the fact that independent profession can be pursued alongwith

the functions of a legislator. But the growing dominance of agriculturists and social workers in Rajasthan politics, as we noted in our study, indicates how politics is being taken as a 'means of livelihood'.

Women's representation in the assemblies has been negligible as has been literacy among them which is even less than one - third of the male literacy percentage. This speaks of the backwardness of the Rajasthan society wherein women enjoy no independent social - status.

We found Panchayati Raj institution, Municipal and district boards, various kisan movements etc. (pre-independence National movement in the case of early legislators as avenues of political participation; caste and family as determinant of personality and social - status playing significant role in the political socialization of the individual elite.

CHAPTER - V

PARTY POLITICS AND ELITES :

Independence to India meant more than an event that heralded end of oppressive British colonialism. It of necessity signified typical agglutination of farvorying (only loosely Indian) interests and identities to converge to 'nationalhood'. This historic creation of a nation presented a typical and unaccidental combination of circumstances that brought about a desired alteration of political systems and interests, proliferated process of political consciousness that opened and widened the venues of political participation, hence formation of various political parties representing various class, caste, regional and religious etc. interests that sought their assertion under the new democratic system.

"An important structural change in India's political modernization which took place following independence was the shift of emphasis from the mass politics of Gandhi to the elite politics of Nehru..... The collective euphoria of the Indian elites on independence reinforced by the

1. Singh, Yogendra, 'Essays on Modernization in India', New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1978, P-49.

compliments of the western democratic notions on India being the first new nation in Asia to follow the liberal democratic path to social transformation"(1) Independent India, thus, chose 'parliamentary democracy' as its choicest form of Government. "A democratic political system must have a plurality of parties to give expression to the divergent opinions and interests. The openness of the political system therefore, proved most congenial for the typical historically permeated diversity - social, cultural, political and economic etc. - of the Indian society to seek representation through multitudinous organisations of national and local statuses hence the coming into being of various sub - cultural political parties on the Indian political scene"(2). Unlike the west where political parties emerged as "political interest group (as distinguished from political factions) following the breakdown of estates and acceleration of industrial revolution"(3), the Indian social - structure "here took

2. Neumann, S., Ed. "Modern Political Parties" Towards a comparative study of Political Parties, Chicago, 1956, P-397.

3. Singh, Y. Op. cit., P-50.

one long jump from status direct to party without any intervening class-transformation. Consequently, the growth of political parties was more dictated by historicity than by the dialectic of social forces. As the process of political-modernization began with these parties in the arena, led mainly by the congress, contradictions slowly began to emerge"(4)

This is indicated by the recent trends in party - formation: "Progressive disintegration of the congress, formation of regional political parties, a continued process of internal schism within each party based on primordial loyalties but rationalized in terms of ideology of parties from urban to rural class interests owing to the progressive articulation of the rural sector in political life, and finally, the lack an all - India perspective in the ideology of newly emerging political parties"(5). As a result, contemporaneous India has around "three dozen political parties of national, state and regional characters securing votes in either Lok Sabha or

4. Ibid., XXXXSI.

5. Ibid., P - 51.

Assembly or both"(6). It is this broad Indian political scene whose meaningful analysis can give clues to the understanding of Rajasthan politics whose combing is our major concern here.

A HISTORISTTE OF RAJASTHAN :

The present name of the state is a modified derivative of "Rajputana" or "Rajwara" both denoting "Abode of Rajputs"(7). The terrains that form today's Rajasthan were say, around independence, over twenty small princely states of which atleast "seventeen were ruled by the Rajput castes"(8). The formation of Rajasthan as one the Indian states was completed in successive stages: "on March 30, 1949, Rajasthan was inaugurated as a state of India"(9). And finally, in

6. 'Report on the Third General Elections in India' Vol. II (Statistical), New Delhi, 1952, PP-12-13.
7. Verma, S.P., Bhambhri, C.P. & Mathur, P.C. eds., 'A Report on the Third General Elections in Rajasthan', Jaipur: University of Rajasthan, 1955.
8. Weiner, Myron., 'State Politics in India', Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938.
9. Menon, V.P., 'The Story of the Integration of the Indian State', New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1950, P-270.

1956 promulgation of 'states reorganization Act' led to the annexation of centrally administered Ajmer to Rajasthan"(10). Having come into being in 1949, Rajasthan remained under control of an interim government headed by a number of Chief Ministers and a senior bureaucrat till March, 1952 when it first experienced the constitution of a legislative assembly.

THE CONGRESS PARTY :

Since independence as is the case with most of the Indian states and center the congress has been the mightiest political organization in Rajasthan 'which has represented a historical consensus and a continuous basis of support and trust'(11). The reason behind its popularity lies more in history than anything else. 'Prior to independence, the Congress was not a political party in the technical sense of the term, but a platform for collective mobilization'(12). This historical advantage is enjoyed by the congress which only is the precipitate of the pre - independent 'Indian

10. States' Reorganization Commission Act, 1957, 7th Amendment in the Indian - Constitution, P-8.

11. Kotheri, Rajni., 'Congress System in India', Asian Survey, Vol. 4, 12th December, 1964, PP. 1-18.

12. Singh, Y., Op. cit., P-50.

National Congress - the only source from where have emerged many political parties' in the changing contingence of historical circumstances(13). As for Rajasthan is concerned the Indian National Congress had 'All India State People's Congress' there affiliated to it, and, as whose provincial unit had functioned 'Rajputana Parahatyia Sabha' into which was merged the praja mandals around 1943. The Indian National Congress as it had a broad national perspective, represented a macro-structural resentment hence struggle against the foreign rule. But its (I.N.C.) affiliates in Rajasthan though basically bound to their principal because of the common cause of independence, had other local causes to serve notably the 'abolition of Jagirdari system' etc. The success of the INC, thus, in mobilizing the masses at the national level primarily owed to its strategy of affiliating sub - cultural and sub-structural organizations by according ready recognition to the socio - economic causes they stood for.

Congress party, the recognized precipitate of the I.N.C., presided over the integration of Rajputana states and

later became responsible for the abolition of Jagirdari system. This best explains congress popularity and dominance in Rajasthan. The abolition of Jagirdari system was naturally to turn the deprived rulers into virile opponents of the congress. This unprecedented development could prove noxious to its (congress) prospects in the first general and assembly elections in the offing since this depropertied class had much of influence left on their ex - subjects. As a result, the congress began desperately looking for favourable political adjustments and which it triumphantly accomplished by luring the maharajas particularly of Jaipur, Udaipur, Kota, Jodhpur etc. to prestigious designations and positions in the party. Notwithstanding this, the maharajas remained uncontended hence could hardly prove fidel to the congress, as notes Bhargava: "these princes were strange to the new democratic set - up; and were facing the problems of adjustment. Well before the first forth coming polls, they finally emerged as a united force to "support the newly born 'Ram Rajya Parishad'(15)

15. Govt. of India Election Commission on "Report on the General Election in India, 1951-52, Vol. II, (Statistical), Delhi, 1955.

which was a major threat to the congress aspirations associated with the elections. Out of the total 150⁽¹⁵⁾ seats, Ram Rajya Parishad bagged 24,⁽¹⁷⁾ and the independents 33⁽¹⁸⁾. The Congress, thus, formed the govt. headed by J.N. Vyas in the first ever legislative Assembly of Rajasthan which was inaugurated on March 29, 1952⁽¹⁹⁾. This Govt., remarks Jain, "aptly paid attention to the genuine need of ameliorating the lot of agrarian community which formed the bulk of the population of the state and these land legislations were designed to free the community from feudal fetters"⁽²⁰⁾ The congress now having acquired the ruling status remained simply preoccupied with handling the depropertied Rajwaras until 1954 when an unwanted development shook it down to its roots. Twenty four Rajput legislators were taken into the fold of the congress which obviously moved the jats - the peasant caste that account for a considerable proportion of Rajasthan's population - and met

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. "Report on the Administration of Rajasthan, Govt. Press, 1952, P-5.

20. Jain, C.H. Op. cit., P-213.

only whose support was decisive to the congress victory but who had by now largely diffused into the congress organization and had come to occupy important positions within the party and in the ministry as well. This led to the emergence of two rival groups within the Congress.

The intra - congress tussle finally resulted in a big reshuffle in the ministry. Vyas who supported the Rajputs was replaced by Mohan Lal Sukhadia who was backed by the Jats. This came to the Rajputs as a denial of importance to them. But in the long run Sukhadia largely succeeded in pacifying the Rajputs who were sure to prove a great threat to the congress in the coming assembly election.

"There is, however, one trend that has been widely noted. Castes have been increasingly mobilized for obtaining political support both at the state and national levels of political participation"(21). In fact, caste and politics will have to go together in India since caste is a form of social stratification caste influences politics in India through the functioning and emergence of dominant castes. These dominant castes

21. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit., P-54.

began to be challenged by lower - middle castes through a slow process of political mobilization and increasing political consciousness among them. Jats in Rajasthan, Haryana, etc. slowly emerged as new contenders for power"(22).

Despite much of opposition and its own weaknesses the Congress, nevertheless, remains dominant in the Rajasthan politics precisely because of its strategy of providing the 'means' to the ascendant caste's (Jats) challenge to the entrenched (dominant) castes and simultaneously acting as a source of a considerable proportion of the entrenched castes' politics too. This should not be taken to mean that entire gamut of both the politics (the entrenched's and the ascendants') is encompassed by the Congress but considerably large proportions of both the politics are within the control of the congress. No other political organization in Rajasthan could value the purport of the changing trends in politics so deeply and widely as the congress did.

Sakhadai's wise handling of the resented Rajputs and a few other important political adjustments brought the party

unexpected success at the polls. The second Assembly (1957), "wherein there was a shift in emphasis - from measures of economic emancipation to social and progressive legislation"(23), with a raised strength of 175 had 119 congress members while the Ram Rajya Parishad could bag only 17 seats as against its strength of 24 in the preceding legislature. Ram Rajya Parishad's influence deteriorated because of many of Jagirdar and Zemindar patrons' decision to contest the election as independents who claimed a share of 23 seats this time. This house i.e., the second assembly, informs Jain, "had peasantry, the largest group which had already been benefited by a series of land reforms, and obviously, it did not support the opposition"(24).

Congress politics in Rajasthan as also in all other states and at the Centre as well, has undoubtedly been an 'elite politics'(25) which is basically 'maintenance oriented' devoid

23. Jain, C.M., Op. cit., P-224.

24. Jain, C.M., P-227.

25. A politics that simply seeks to protect the interests of a few who are on the fence of the ruling political party.

of 'Principled - Politics', that is, its (congress) politics is made to function to basically seek and contrive situations that will merely mean its continuation in power. The depropertied maharajas and jagirdars reunited under the leadership of Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur to form Swatantra Party whose major objective seemed less to win seats and more to oppose congress with maximum might. This threat from without proved most unfortunate for the congress since its organizational cohesion was already endangered by a potent threat from within - resentment among jet members growing owing to the inclusion of Rajputs in the party and allotment of important positions to them(23). This internal development symbolized nothing but an intraelite competition whose clear - cut bases were caste, class and region. Though faced with this noxious crisis and exposed to the external threat posed by Swatantra, the Congress somehow managed to have 88 seats out of 173 thus only marginally retaining the right to form the government. Swatantra's performance was no less remarkable. It had bagged

23. Eminent Jet leaders like P.C. Vishnoi and N.R. Mirdha were too unhappy over Maharaja Harish Chand being given a cabinet portfolio.

36 seats. About this Jain notes: "the ruling party was a divided house and at the same time there appeared no substantial signs in the opposition groups as well of mastering sufficient strength to replace the same and provide a workable alternative to ensure the continuance of parliamentary democracy... the third general elections revealed that if the congress failed to grasp the reality it would gradually be eroded from power"(27).

Thus despite continued threat to its survival by a variety of antagonistic political forces the congress remained a triumphant political entity sweeping the polls and forming govts. successively till the dawn of the sixth assembly elections in 1977.

Almost three decades of invincible congress rule with a stigma of 'authoritarianism' that it sustained at the close of the last decade prompted anti - congress forces to tentatively converge to a single point of unity at the national and the state level as well as to provide a massive opposition to the congress in the coming elections by appropriately exploiting

and exposing its (congress) political blunders. Jain remarks that "the opposition realized that if they could form alliances, they would be able to defeat the congress party"(29).

Jana Sangh, Socialist, Swatantra and Bhartiya Krenti Dal etc. united to be known as Janta party which achieved unexpected success in its mission of blowing the congress into bits in the sixth Lok Sabha and assembly elections in 1977 in which Janata by dint of sweeping over the polls in many of the states and Lok Sabha in general, and Rajasthan in particular. The Rajasthan Janata Govt. was led by Bhairon Singh Shekhawat.(29)

But the Janata rule at the Center and in states as also in Rajasthan proved ephemeral and finally collapsed under its own burden in a little over two years. The diversity of the interests that the Janata party sought to nurture was indeed mightier than the feeble bond that united them. What the 'grand alliance' of 1971 between Swatantra and the Jana Sangh sought and desperately failed in its mission was this time achieved by the Janata.(30)

29. In the 1971 assembly elections of Rajasthan the Jana Sangh and Swatantra Parties made an alliance termed as the 'grand alliance' to oppose the congress. This alliance drew massive support from the industrialists and ex-rulers.
30. Chaturvedi, H.R., "Congress sweeps in Rajasthan assembly elections: A trend analysis", Indian Journal of Political Science. Vol. XXXIII, No.3, July-Sept., 1972.

Following the mid - term poll in 1979 - of course a sequel to the gross debacle of the Janata to survive - the congress(31) came triumphant in the parliamentary and assembly elections of most of the states including Rajasthan.

The Jana Sangh: is one of the most paramount political forces in Rajasthan as elsewhere in the country vehemently opposed to the congress. Its close links with the R.S.S. and presence in it of some of the most outspoken fundamentalist Hindus promot one to conclude that it is a communal organization whose main objective is to crush the Indian Muslims.

The Jana Sangh derives its ideology as well as bulk of its rank and file from the R.S.S.(32). Which claims to be a purely apolitical social - welfare organization aiming at 'revivalism of ancient Hindu culture and establishment of Akhanda Bharat.(33)

31. The question of Emergency (that was imposed in 1975 by the ruling congress) came to fragment the congress into two breakaway parts namely the Cong.(I) and the Cong.(S). It was the former that proved mightiest.
32. Weiner, Myron., Op. cit., P-194.
33. Golwalkar, M.S., 'We or our Nationhood Defined' P.N. Indurkar, Bharat Publications, 1939, P-21.

The Jana Sangh thus is nothing but the political platform of the R.S.S. Bulk of its membership is recruited from the urban - based petty - bourgeois (to be more precise, urban based vaishyas in the Indian context). Presence of bulk of urban - based vaishyas in the Jana Sangh of Hindu cultural tradition and Akhanda Bharat carry a deep sociological meaning for a student of Indian society.

In the scriptural varna system vaishyas placed third had been fully endowed with monopolistic rights over trade and business by the Hindu cultural tradition⁽³⁴⁾. They thus carried out business and trade in a most favourable atmosphere in that threats of competition were hardly passed by other castes.

Processes of modernization are engendering, apart from other things, occupational - mobility in the contemporary Indian society. Owing to growing industrialization and financial capitalism capable entrepreneurs from different castes and communities are taking to business, trade and industry

34. See Joshi, P.S., 'Cultural History of Ancient India', New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1978, PP. 47-61 & 85-95

undermining the pervasive position of the vaishyas in the world of commerce and industry. This severely frustrates the vaishyas (Banyas; Mahajans in the context of Rajasthan) who had enjoyed their place in the Hindu hierarchical system to the best of their advantage for a pretty long time.

The R.S.S. and the Jana Sangh are, therefore, a platform for manifestation of the occupation - anxiety of the vaishyas; and for the mobilization and consolidation of their strife to have the past Hindu cultural tradition restored back so that they regain their unquestioned traditional dominance in the realm of Indian trade and commerce.

Hindu communalism arose, as history would suggest, only in reaction to muslim communalism which emerged much earlier as a conspiracy of the colonists. As the general understanding goes, the R.S.S. and the Jana Sangh are the main pursuers of Hindu communalism today. Unfortunately, Hindu communalism is understandable and explainable today in no other terms but only in terms of Hindu - Muslim strife.

Since no religion in India be it Zoroastrianism, Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism or Christianity but only Islam could

culturally struggle with Hinduism to some extent. It (Islam) met with initial success in building - up a superficial cultural - base parallel to that of Hindu culture in India for which Hinduism was more responsible than the so - called militant Islam.(35) Muslim communalism got highly pronounced by the partition of India in 1947. The territorial separation was forcibly brought to vindicate the unnatural but explicit cultural distinction between Hindus and Muslims, and also to vindicate that Muslims by dint of their cultural unity and numerical - preponderance are capable of dismembering the geographical boundaries of the Indian society and culture. Such a trend is naturally highly repulsive and deserves a potential check where restoration of Hindu culture and establishment of Akhanda Bharat are concerned. Muslims and their religion and culture thus obviously were and have to be the chief concern for Hindu communalism and its vanguard - the R.S.S. and the Jana Sangh.

35. See Mujib, M., 'The Indian Muslims', London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967.

Apart from the vaishyas, the Jana Sangh in Rajasthan (as also in the country as a whole) Brahmins, Kshatriyas, refugees from Pakistan, and other non - vaishyas notably the members of Arya Samaj and Sanatam Dharam etc.(36) The Govt. by passing an Act namely the 'Public Trust Act' declared temples and associated properties as 'Public Property' thereby liquidating the rights of ownership of individual Brahmin families over these properties which accrued handsome regular income. The resented Brahmins with a view to launching a struggle against the Govt., therefore, joined the Jana Sangh.

Revivalism of the past Hindu cultural tradition that runs through the Jana Sangh ideology as a fundamental concept bore much of promise for quite a number of the displaced aristocratic Rajputs in that restoration of Hindu culture would mean revitalization of the divine superiority of the kshatriyas over the masses, and earn them their traditional excellence of place in the Hindu stratification - system.

36. Swarnkar, R.C. 'Legislative elite in Rajasthan: A sociological study', M.Phil Dissertation, JNU, New Delhi, 1980, P-74.

In fact, Swatantra party's ideology itself was a miniature of the overall Jana Sangh ideology(37). Both emphasize reglorification of Hindu culture but the Swatantra pin - pointed the concept of the divinity of the kshtriya - rule. So, many of the members of depropertied Rajput aristocratic class in Rajasthan who under - estimated or abhorred due to any reason Gayatri Devi's leadership in the Swatantra joined the Jana Sangh. There are instances when both of these political parties united by contriving tactful alliances to give massive opposition to the congress in Rajasthan.

Conformity of the Sindhi Refugees from Pakistan to the Jana - Sangh ideology does not obviously call for much of explanation. They have been real victims of Muslim - communalism around the time of partition in 1947(38).

With the coming in of the Britishers and gradual perpetuation of their power in India, christianity took desperately to sabotaging the Hindu society by way of aptly exploiting its (Hinduism's) shameful inegalitarian character(39).

37. See Kamal, K.L., 'Spotlight on Rajasthan Politics: Traditional Challenge in an Indian State', Jaipur:Prakash Publishers, 1967.
38. Harman, S. 'Plight of Muslims in India', London: D.L. Publication, 1977.

Arya Samaj, Brahma Samaj, Sanatan Dharam, Ram Krishan Mission etc. socio - religious movements, as history would suggest, arose within Hinduism as defence - mechanism against the challenge of christianity. These movements aimed at hammering out fatal evils such as severe inegalitarianism etc. that had perpetuated in Hinduism so as to save it (Hinduism) from extinction. This explains the members of these organizations to the Jana Sangh. The importance of the Jana Sangh to the Rajasthan politics can be judged by the fact that in the Janata regime during 1977-79 in Rajasthan, Bharion Singh Shekhawat, a Jana Sangh member, was chosen the Chief - Minister of the State.

SWATANTRA :

This political party was organized prior to the third Assembly elections of Rajasthan by Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur

39. To the oppressed and resented lower - rungs of Hindu society, christianity naturally proved to be an unexpected and sudden blow of fresh and soothing breeze daringly breaking into the severely suffocating confines of Hinduism. Hinduism was not confronting such a challenge for the first time. Its long history which is rather full of such combats has fully equipped it to out do whatever comes as a threat to its survival. Hinduism is highly privileged in the sense that it represents a deep congruence and reciprocity between

It had a trans - state influence - base mostly confined to the north of the vindhya. The party symbolized no more than a renewed attempt of the desperate depropertied feudal elements to reorganize to reassert their lost identity and interest.

Kamal rightly observes that Swatantra was nothing more or less than a 'Political expression of feudal frustration'(40).

The Jana - Sangh had accommodated but only a negligibly tiny section of these discarded feudal overlords whose massive majority, however, remained dissatisfied with the Jana Sangh as, in their opinion, it could nurture their interests but only in an indirect way and that too just for name's sake. They,

Contd.....39.

culture and religion. Elements of culture and religion having melted together have perpetuated down to the roots of the Indian society. Between culture and religion, it is the former which is primary to a society. It is often forgotten that religions emerging and flourishing as a reaction to Hinduism(Brahminism in the case of ancient India) such as Jainism and Buddhism, or religions coming in from foreign lands through conquests and immigrations like christianity and Islam did not have separate cultural - bases but only belief - systems. Whatever cultural-bases they could build-up in the course of time were largely drawn from the Indian culture itself which was more or less a Hindu culture. This cultural superiority rendering Hinduism superior and pervasive to other religions enables it to sustain challenges to it from within and without. This explains why religions like Jainism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam growing on the weaknesses of Hinduism developed in the course of time the same weaknesses in themselves.

40. Kamal, K.L., Op. cit.

therefore, reorganized themselves under the banner of 'Swatantra'. And, to widen their mass - base they found it most wise and tactful to seek glorification of the ancient Indian culture. Kamal informs that during the elections Gayatri Devi worshipped in several temples which had power-ful impact on the masses.

Swatantra like many other political organizations had merged into the Janata party during the 1977 elections hence had a taste of rule.

THE B.K.D. and the Lok Dal:

With the growth and diffusion of democratic forces the congress gradually began to disintegrate since it could not keep pace with the growing demands of stratification (see Y. Singh, 1978, P-50), and, also the chapter on 'caste and politics' in the same book. The elites of ascendant(41) castes who generally occupy lower positions in the traditionally strong political parties, tend to breakaway from the older organization and form new political parties as arenas for their own status ascendance in political leadership(42). Breaking-away of jat

41. A term used by Kothari, Rajni for middle and lower middle castes as quoted by Singh, Yogendra in his book, Op. cit.

42. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit., P-55.

elites like Charan Singh etc. from the Congress and forming B.K.D. which later turned into Lok Dal lends support to Singh's proposition.

In Rajasthan, a former minister in Sukhadia's ministry, Khumbh Ram Arya, dominated B.K.D. that later extended its support to the Lok Dal to the extend of merger.

In 1977 following a unity call to all the political parties opposed to the congress to provide an alternative of the congress, the Lok Dal merged into Janata. And, it was only Janata's rule in Rajasthan that the Lok Dal influenced Rajasthan politics to some extent. Barring this, there is hardly anything on the part of the Lok Dal that tempts us to treat it in detail.

RADICAL POLITICS:

The successive assembly elections that we have treated at length earlier have been highly disappointing where achievements and influence of political organizations pursuing left-politics are concerned. Remarkable among them are the C.P.I., the C.P.I.(M) and the Socialist Party. Barring the C.P.I.(M) which somehow manages to survive and break its way into Rajasthan politics by dint of its influence among a section of

industrial workers inhabiting the peripheries of Jaipur, the rest that is, the C.P.I. and the socialist party have not even meagre amount of mass - base to their credit.

If a requisite level of industrialization is taken as an essential condition for the perpetuation of radical politics, one is convinced why left - politics could not make a mark in the politics of Rajasthan which undoubtedly lacks industrialization hence industrial labour. But the hollowness of this assumption then is potently exposed by the realities that eastern part of U.P., and to some extent, Bihar present. These terrains are no less backward too in industrial prospects than Rajasthan nevertheless, left - politics not only prevails but dominates there by mobilizing the peasantry and the landless agricultural labour to an extent that no other political organization matches. To this question, Singh(43) presents a quite convincing answer: Socio - logical studies have shown that actual deprivation, economic or social, does not matter as much in people's evaluation of the betterment of their life chances as does their perception

43. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit., P-56.

or evaluation of deprivation. Education, political - mobilization and communication may be such important variables. In this respect communication holds an important position. If the rate of economic growth in a region is slow but the communication holds an important position. If the rate of economic growth in a region is slow but the communication multiplier is high, there may develop radical political movements, depending upon a suitable combination of other variables. And, there hardly arises the need to note here that Rajasthan has neither an exalted level of communication nor has it hitherto witnessed other variables functional to radical politics.

Left, thus, poses no challenge either to the Congress or its opponent organizations in Rajasthan.

To conclude, we found that except for a period extending a little over two years when the Janata party appeared on the horizons of political dominance, the Congress remains an unchallenged political force in the state. In the first place what probably helped the Congress to make easy sway over other political parties was the general belief of the masses that it (the Congress) has descended down from the Indian National Congress which apart from steering the national movement

had also vitally associated itself with the anti - feudal
praja - mandal movements in Rajasthan. And, secondly, the
Congress proved to possess requisite political farsightedness
by encompassing and aptly exploiting varying regional, caste,
class, communal etc. interests. Compared to other political
organizations it had a mobile and heterogenous composition of
leadership shrewd enough to perceive and materialize tactful
alliances when needed, and capable enough to sustain continual
threats that factionalism posed to its organization cohesion.

The Swatantra, as we have already analysed, was a political
party representing the deep frustration and desperate urge of
the dethroned princely class to reassert their lost interests
and identity. They endeavoured to build - up their mass - base
by seeking glorification of ancient Indian socio - religious
philosophy that once sought to justify the divinity of the
Kshtriya rule. This explains why the Swatantra had close
affinity with the Jana Sangh in Rajasthan. The Swatantra
undeniably succeeded in its socio - political mission but its
success proved ephemeral since with the passage of time and

diffusion of democratic forces the masses were getting more and more conscious. The Congress having tactfully championed the people's cause and taken a solid anti - feudal stand naturally met in Swatantra its mightiest enemy. Needless to say, the anti - feudal policy of the Congress was more of a political judgement than a genuine and spontaneous concern for humanity. There are instances when the Congress had in its fold members from the princely class.

The Jana Sangh hand in glove with the R.S.S. whome it borrowed its ideology from remains an entirely urbanbased political organization counting largely on the support of the urban Vaishyas (Mahajanas in Rajasthan), Sindhi refugees from Pakistan and Brahmins resented against the government because of its policy of snatching temple properties from them. Vaishyas' pre - dominance in the Jana Sangh owes to the fact that their traditional monopolistic right over business and trade could be best protected by the Hindu cultural tradition.

The Lok Dal representing the interests of the peasantry, emerged, as we have analysed, as a socio - historical inevita-

bility. We found social scientists agreeing that democratization, extension of bureaucracy, priority to rural sector in planning and emphasis on regional development led to diversification of the early Indian National Congress into regional political parties based on lingual, caste, communal, tribal, sectarian etc. solidarities. Lok Dal is a glaring example of this diversification.

We found that radical politics could not earn a viable place in Rajasthan mainly because of paucity of requisite preponderance of industrial labour class due to lack of industrialization in the state. It (radical politics) could have built - up its mass - base amongst the peasantry and the landless agricultural labour class as is the case with the communist politics in eastern U.P. and Bihar. But this could not happen in Rajasthan because in the case of peasantry (and aristocracy as well far that matter) there was an almost absolute but coincidental congruence between 'class' and 'caste'. The 'Jats' as a caste constitute at least eighty percent of the Rajasthan peasantry (as Rajputs as a 'caste'

formed at least 90% of Rajasthan aristocracy class). The peasantry, therefore, was already united on caste lines. This unity did hardly provide any avenue of break through to communism which in Rajasthan is unfortunately confined to the world of academics and intellectuals.

Chapter-VI

'caste, class, factionalism and politics';

Caste and politics:-

The distinctive typicality of Indian politics lies in its inseparable and sometimes unexplainable association with castes. And, there are times when Indian politics acquire close to merely a tactful arrangement of representations of castes destined to share power. No less frequently are visible on the horizons of Indian politics grim caste-conflicts and powerful caste-alliances. Rajasthan being only a sub-structure within the macro-structural Indian politics is no exception where this deep-rooted typicality of association of caste and politics is concerned.

Such interpretations, however, are divorced from theoretical considerations in that they only seek to explain the phenomenon of 'caste and politics' at a superficial level.

Romila Thapar, Rajni Kothari, Rudolphs, Ghurye, Srinivas and Y.Singh are some of the most prominent contemporaneous social scientists whose dependable studies not only confirm the penetrating role of cast in Indian politics but also tend to present a diagnosis of the phenomenon.

This essentiality of the association of caste with the Indian politics and vice-versa accrues out of the "long-jump that the social-structure took from status direct to party, without any intervening class-transformation."(1)

(1) Singh, Yogendra, 'Essays on 'Modernization in India'
New Delhi:Manohar Book Service, 1978, p 50.

The typical association of 'caste and politics' representing a unique and unprecedented intercourse between polity and society has to essentially continue as an 'inevitability' as long as India is even in the slightest grip of traditionalism. Societies that are only "in the transitional stage of modernization process",²

The general assumption that 'caste manipulates politics'⁴ has come to be challenged by Kothari⁵ and Rudolph⁶ who argue that it is politics which uses caste for "articulation of support since it provides ready and immediate organization in which the masses are to be found"⁷ and, in this process a caste comes to be even changed.⁸ Caste, however, is not mandatorily the only means available to the pursuers of politics competing for power. They look for "new sources of support and create groups and loyalties on new and varied bases"⁹

2 & 3 Ibid.

4. Srinivas, M.N., 'Caste in Modern India and other Essays' Bombay ; Asia Pub. House, 1962, pp 23-41.

5. Kothari, R, ed. 'Caste in Indian politics', New Delhi orient Longman, 1970.

6. Rudolph, Llyod & Rudolph, S.H., "The Political Role of Indian Caste Association Pacific affairs, Vol.XXII, No.1, March, 1960, pp.5-27.

7. Kothari, R., op.cit.

8. Ibid.

9. Bhatt, Anil, "Caste and Politics in Akola", 'The Economic Weekly, 24 Aug., 1963 ,p.146.

Though free India disowned Gandhism the essence of which meant 'populism' and 'egalitarianism' yet upliftment of the untouchables was accorded top priority by the ruling Congress headed by Nehru, and, this indubitably meant political support of the concerned castes to the Congress. "Politics is a competitive enterprise.... its process is one of identifying and manipulating existing and emerging allegiances in order to mobilize and consolidate positions.... where the caste structure provides one of the principal organisational clusters, politics must strive to organize through such a structure. The alleged casteism of politics is thus no more and no less than politicization on caste. It is something in which both the forms of the caste and the forms of politics are brought nearer each other, in the process changing both. By drawing the caste-system into its web of organisation, politics finds material for its own design. In making politics their sphere of activity, caste and kin-groups on the other hand get a change to assert their identity and to strive for positions".(10) It was not then the 'concern' for 'philanthropy' and 'welfare of the masses' but the compulsions of democratic politics whose operational value was a written constitution that forced the post-independence Indian politics to identify and manipulate resented traditional collectivities that on the one hand were giant stock of already organised allegiances, and on the other were easy to be identified.

10. Kothari, Rajni, op.cit.

and politicized in that 'politicization' to them meant emancipation from social humiliation and suppression that they were subjected to from time immemorial. It is this utilitarianism of the contemporaneous Indian politics that best explains the political, social and economic patronages and priorities being given to the scheduled castes and tribes whose numerical preponderance fortunately enclosed within 'traditional collectivities' is not something to be overlooked by 'politics'. In the process thus, these collectivities become quite responsive and reciprocal to politics.

In the process of politicization, a caste 'does not disappear' (Kothari) by 'changing into class' (Y.Singh 1978) but "undergoes only corporate organizational mechanisms emerge" (Y.Singh, 1978). And, attainment of political power could bring about fundamental status-mobility in caste. (11) This vindicates only intra-caste mobility which can by no means be equated with the significance of the role of inter-caste mobility which is indispensable to modernization. Inter-caste relations, on the contrary are strained since in this politicization process, a caste organization achieves consolidation and consciousness to the extent of creating its separate individual and independent identity as a 'unified social-structure', (a term used by Paul R.Brass) which becomes an essential condition

11. A. Panikkar, K.M.: 'Hindu Society at Cross Roads', Bombay; Asia Publishing House, 1955.
- B. Srinivas. M.N.: 'Social Change in Modern India, Berkeley: California Univ. Press, 1966.

for its (caste) being responsive to politics under the contemporary utilitarian democratic political system.

The creation of such a reciprocity-oriented identity necessarily implies its isolation from other identities to attain utmost independence. This trend of isolation may accrue a situation wherein an unhealthy competition between the aspiring identities may become unavoidable keeping in view the fact that politics, as quoted by Kothari, is but a competitive enterprise and a key to acquisition of power for the realization of certain goals. This competition sometimes manifests itself in direct and violent caste-conflicts.

Astonishingly enough, side-by-side with such pitched caste-conflicts are heard of caste-alliances as both "fusion and fission continually go on as the interaction of principles of status (birth), class (economic position) and power within the caste-system keep changing the balance of inter-caste and intra-caste relationship".(11)

Caste-clusters and groups that share a somewhat common identity accruing solely out of the principle of status, vis-a-vis equally and more competent caste-organisation/s came to contrive alliances among them. Such alliances are only momentary representing only marginal merger of interests and unity of action oriented to a limited goal. A forward versus backward tussle recently witnessed in Bihar is the most suitable example to this effect. Such caste-alliances come as an inevitability of the typical competitive character of the political system.

As a result of consolidation of caste-identity, contrived purely as a 'response-mechanism' amongst the different caste

clusters and groups of the scheduled castes who constitute the lowest rung of traditional social stratification which articulates 'the inequality in the distribution of power and sharing of norms' (see Y. Singh, 1978 P-52), the designs of the traditional social - stratification based on the principle of hierarchy, power and closedness, have come to be frustrated most. "With the growth of democratic forces, the degree of contradictions between the structural forms of power and social - stratification has increased"(12). Since "Political power has now become a major source for compensating the loss on account of the social - stratification"(13). The decaying designs of the traditional social - stratification manifesting, growing dissociation between 'stratification and power' has essentially created a status - anxiety among the traditionally privileged castes. To repeat, the Indian society 'being in the transitional stage of the modernization process' (Y. Singh, 1978) has to function

12. Singh, Yogendra: 'Caste and Class: Some aspects of continuity and change, Sociological bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Sept. 1968, PP. 180-82.

13. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit., P-34.

through the mobilization of 'traditional collectivities' (Y. Singh, 1978) which undergoing the inevitable process of politicization necessarily evolve isolated 'identities' as 'responsive mechanisms'. Logically, then, politics would strive to keep these indispensable traditional identities in an ever-revived state for its (politics) own survival. This precisely explains why caste, communal and other ethnic considerations and not class - considerations are taken as a measure of socio - economic deprivation of people for the purpose of allotment of priorities. This is true in the case of Muslims too.

Drawing on the post - partition forces of history that had induced but a momentary fear - psychology in the Muslim mind it has been continuously endeavoured to keep them psychologically and interactionally enclosed within the suffocated limits of a religious - community to remain only as an easily accessible and identifiable organization of allegiance for political mobilization and manipulation. Issues relating to Urdu, Aligerh University and their personal law unfortunately which they (Muslims) have been conditioned to emotionally identify themselves with, are continually raised and controversialized to

magnify their minority character and to accelerate the minority-feeling that already keep haunting them. This keeps them as an isolated social - structure.

SIKHS :

The problem with the sikhs as an important minority community is altogether different from that of the Muslims. Somehow, the sikhs have developed a strong feeling that their 'identity' as a separate religions community is being devoured by Hinduism. Following the examples of Muslims, scheduled castes and tribes, the sikhs have strated striving too to regin their identity (hitherto merged into Hinduism) and establish it to full with a view to enjoy benefits that the said pressure - group minorities are enjoying. Their quest for identity is sufficiently reflected in trends in Punjab society and politics. Unprecedented sikh-Hindu riots in the state, and growing demand for Khalistan may seem an outcome of 'foreign hand' to a neta but to a student of social sciences these instances spell out gorwing discomfort among the sikhs, and their strife to organize into a cohesive religious community. The extent to which ecclessiastical sikh groups"exert influence upon the Punjab Politics, and the demand

of a section of sikhs for limited autonomy of the state"(14)
strengthen our above contention.

Is not it something that our manipulative and utilitarian nature of national politics has engendered. But since politics and its processes concern but only a relatively limited sphere of activity of the population, it can be well argued whether to what extent it (politics) can succeed in saving traditional identities and institutions from partial or full transformation which seems inevitable under the impact of the process of modernization.

Caste - composition of members of successive Rajasthan assemblies endorse the fact that political participation among the scheduled castes and tribes and minorities of the state has been relatively limited to 'Vote-Casting Only'. As a consequence, the process of elite - formation has not come to gather momentum among these peripheral castes at the pace at which it (elite - formation) exists among the upper and middle - castes.

14. Gandhi, J.S. "System, Process and Popular Ethos: A study in contemporary politics in Punjab. Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol.V, No. 1, Jan-June 1981, Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.
15. Roche, J.P. & Leonard, W.L., 'Parties and Pressure Groups', New York, Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1964, PP. 163-239.

One of the significant after - effects of the traditional collectivities having grown into isolated identities is their typical function, at times as 'Pressure - Groups'(15).

Upper castes are still dominating the state politics in Rajasthan. 'Brahmin, Mahajan and Jat castes form the three dominant castes in the Rajasthan Congress party. Till 3rd assembly elections 84% of all cabinet members have been members of one of these three castes. The Brahmins represented the largest single caste - group in the cabinet, and have held 44% of all cabinet posts. Scheduled Castes in the cabinet were only 7%"(16).

Invariably all the legislatures in Rajasthan vindicate this upper - caste hegemony. The first ever assembly had 7% of its members from Brahmin, Rajput and Mahajan castes. This dominance of the upper castes came to be gradually and potently 'challenged by lower - middle - castes. Jats in Rajasthan and Haryana etc. slowly emerged as new contenders for power"(17). This ascendance aptly described as having restored the "mass-character of Indian politics which was lost in the early years of freedom"(18) accrued owing to extension of bureaucracy deep into the villages, intensive rural - development programmes, growing emphasis on rural - class

16. Jain, C.M. "State Legislatures in India: The Rajasthan Legislative Assembly: A Comparative Study', New Delhi, 1972, P-234.

17. Singh, Yogendra: Op. cit., P-54.

18. Ibid.

class - interests in the sectoral plans (see Y. Singh, 1978) and mounting consideration to regional problems - all this combined to proliferate a gradual process of political mobilization and increasing political consciousness (see Y. Singh, 1978) among the 'ascendant castes', a term contrived by Y. Singh. The general awakening that has come in the wake of Panchyati. Raj is a significant achievement.(19) Besides, 'the establishment of political parties like Praja - mandal, Ram Rajya Parisad and Kisan Sabha in Rajasthan played in vital role in boasting-up political consciousness among the people of Rajasthan'(20). All this speak of the growing influence 'democratic - politics' has started exerting upon the population.

Such a development is deemed to be followed by conflict and tension between the ascendant and the dominant castes. But in the infant stage of the aforementioned ascendance, such a conflict could be avoided owing to the pervasive role of 'the pluralism of the caste - system'(21) - in resisting the eruption of any conflict so long as 'political values and aspirations

19. 'Report on the study of Panchyati Raj', Panchayat and Development Deptt., Rajasthan, 1964, P-239.

20. Jain, P.C.: ed. Aaj Ka Jaipur, Jaipur: 1948, P-121.

21. Panikkar. K.M.: Op. cit.

had not reached all the caste - strata', (see Y. Singh, 1978).

But now contradictions are surfacing - up owing largely to the fact that 'conflict resisting mechanism' inherent in the pluralism of the caste - system is fading in the wake of diffusion of 'political values and aspirations through the length and breadth of the social - structure (see Y. Singh, 1978).

The peculiar historical characteristics of these contradictions are that it 'promotes fission as well as fusion in the segment of social - stratification'(22). Pertaining to Rajasthan politics, we come across a number of politicians like Kumbh Ram Arya, Gayatri Devi, Ram Nivas Mirdha, Bhikhabhai, Bharion Singh Shekhawat etc. who were leaders of their respective 'socially dominant' caste-groups. And, this privilege alone contributed to their survival and flourishing in politics.

Behind the debacle of many a politician to prove of some consequence to the state - politics has been 'caste' as a cogent factor that could not be adequately manoeuvred to extract requisite level of support so essential to boost - up their individual political - aspirations. Caste undoubtedly plays an influential part in politics in India but 'its relationship with politics

22. Singh, Yogendra, Op. cit, P-55.

is not simple or symmetrical'(23). As we proceed from micro-structure to macro - structure the conspicuous and identifiable role of caste changes into rather an intricate one as notes Singh: 'At the village level the segmental tensions of castes and sub - castes may be most articulate; at the regional level, depending upon caste - demography, dominant castes or caste alliances might be effective political units, but at the national level castes might be replaced by a more complex ethnic - cum universalistic principle of alliances"(24). At the local level which presents a tiny and simple social - environment characterized by almost primary relationships and pre - eminence of traditional structures, high and sometimes undisputed political - participation of dominant caste or castes becomes possible as long as "the consistency of their interest for political mobilizations" (see Y. Singh, 1978) is there. But there are, analyses Singh, "many factors which render interests of segments within a dominant caste inconsistent with that of the whole; this happens when class-like rivalries for control over resources and power emerge"(25).

23. Ibid, P-72.

24. Ibid., P-73.

25. Ibid.

At a broader level, say provincial, which surely presents a comparatively big and complex social realm, there may be a number of caste - groups within a horizontal status - line competing for control over power and resources. Or even if there is a single dominant caste - group there may be variations in life - style, language and regional problems. This essentially calls for a corporate principle to evolve so sure to ordain a placating situation for political - mobilization. In such a circumstance, the castes, argues Singh, "are transformed into a new organic structure, a political group, and caste ceases to be a relevant frame of reference"(26)

The size and diversity of India - lingual, ethnic, religious, regional, social and economic variables sundering the populace - require politics to act as an elaborate 'diversity - management system'.

The situation being this complex, it becomes binding on castes to seek various alliances and loyalties for political mobilization at the macro - structural level. And doing this would inevitably involve an explicit transformation in their form

and character.

Various political parties of consequence in Rajasthan, prominent among them, the Congress, Swatantra, Prajamandal & Kisan Sabha in composition and representation cut across the length and breadth of stratification.

Influential politicians namely Hira Lal Shastri, Manik Lal Varma, Jai Narain Vyas, Mohan Lal Sukhadia, Damodar Vyas and several others derived their following from people of different castes, communities and regions.

CLASS AND POLITICS:

Unlike typical and 'unconspicuous forms of interaction' (27) between 'caste and politics', the relationship between 'class' and contemporary Indian politics seems to be in the explicit making (28) as would be evidenced by the succeeding analysis. The inception of political democracy in western societies coincided

27. Since caste organizations in their interaction with politics lose their original form (Kothari & Y.Singh) and evolve a more universalistic outlook (Y.Singh), their role in politics is thus of a very intricate and unconspicuous nature.
28. Owing to its inique historicity, the Indian society presents a political - situation where caste and class overlap each other with such an intricacy that identification of their separate roles is impossible. It is precisely because of the fact that in India neither the castes have completely vanished nor the classes have fully emerged hence there can hardly be

Contd....

with requisite class - transformation which was a sequel to 'superior mode of production' that had been pioneered and ushered in by the western bourgeoisie(29). In India, by contrast, political democracy confronted a relatively backward 'social - structure based on status' (Y. Singh, 1978, P-50) which had hardly witnessed a superior mode of production that only could ensure congenial class - transformation. Thomas Panthom's explanation in this regard is more elaborate: "Because of the partial and incomplete character of the Indian transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production, no single class has been able to achieve a position of hegemony. In India, the bourgeoisie has had to make compromises with feudalism and imperialism/ neocolonialism(30).

This anomaly between politics and social structure forced the Indian bourgeoisie lacking hegemony over society to rule but,

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drawn a clear-cut line between caste and class yet the role that classes have begun playing in contemporary Indian politics is to relatively more 'articulate' nature compared to that of castes.

29. Panthom, Thomas., 'Elite, classes, and the Distortions of Economic, Transition in India, in Sachidanand & Lal, A.K., eds 'Elite and Development', New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1980, PP. 71-96.

30. Ibid.

'only through the support of elite - groups which perform the function of coercion, bureaucratic control and political manipulation and legitimation'(31). And, these auxiliary groups (elite) obviously existed only "within the middle - class since it was only this class that had almost monopolized modern professions, urban trade, military and bureaucracy"(32). As a consequence, it was this pervasive and dextrous middle - class that came to virtually dominate Indian politics in place of an incompetent and incoherent class of the owners of the means of the production, that is, the bourgeoisie. This middle - class owing to the typical historicity of the Indian - society, incidentally, "has a bulk of its members from the upper and intermediate castes" (Y. Singh 1978, P-50)(33). This is a

31. Sen, Ashok: "Bureaucracy and Social hegemony" in Essays in Honour of Prof. S.C. Sarkar, New Delhi: P.P.H., 1976, pp. 667-686.
32. Panthom, Thomas: Op. cit.
33. While talking of caste and class it should be borne well in mind, first, that it is the same mass of populace stratified along caste - lines that has to be distributed among classes of course only at a given period of history, taken as a "process in the scheme of social-moments (Y.Singh,1978)when its forces have engendered circumstances congenial for such an overwhelming transformation. And, secondly, that stratification accrues essentially out of and is governed by social - institutions and other sub-structural indispensabilities of a society. Transformation of a stratification-system from one form to the other would, then necessarily involve a change in all the sub-structural phenomena

quintessence of how intricately caste overlaps class and vice-versa. This intricate overlapping described above has its scope extending from mere intra-caste rivalries (Y. Singh, 1978), caste-conflicts, to massive insurrections ensuing seemingly out of class - contradictions.

Organization of the masses on class - lines and their upsurge are not unknown to the history of Rajasthan. We have before us quintessences of Bijolian (Mewar), Sikar and Shekhawati etc. which witnessed kisans' and tenants' uprisings against bone-breaking land revenue and rent respectively in the years preceding

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within a society and vice-versa. In a society, which is only at a transitional stage of social - transformation, which the Indian Society is at (Y.Singh, 1978), neither its existing traditional structural constituents would completely vanish nor would fully emerge modern sub-structures but there would evolve a typically contradictory situation characterized by intricate 'overlapping' between the two. It is in this context that overlapping between caste and class in the contemporary Indian society can be best understood. Following this the contention that caste in the contemporary Indian society shows class-like characters (Y.Singh, 1978), and class shows caste-like characters can not be completely ruled out.

34. In 1927, kisans of Bijolian rose under Vijai Singh Pathak to oppose an unscrupulous increase in land-revenue. Around 1935-36, kisans of Sikar launched struggle against mounting land-revenue. Tenants of Shekhawati Launched a no-rent campaign in 1940.

independence(34). The said upsurges represent continual outbursts of class-resentment. There are, then, instances of continued struggle against the oppressive class of aristocrats. Kisan Sabha under Natku Ram Mirdha, Hitkari Sabha led by Arjun Lal Sethi, Jamma Lal Bajaj etc. were organizations based on class-lines that primarily represented class - resentment and aspired for freedom. At a later stage we witness leaders like Hira Lal Shastri, Tikeram Paliwal, Maniklal Verma and Mohan Lal Sukhedia engaged in politically mobilizing the masses against the landed aristocracy. It can hardly be denied that many of the political parties 'prominent among them being the Congress'(35), and politicians who could make a place in Rajasthan politics benefited much from their anti-feudal stance. Despite all this, aristocracy collapsed only when the state took drastic antifeudal steps, were not class-contradictions there behind such insurrections? Of course, they were. But behind the failure of these uprisings to achieve adequate class-character caste class overlappings (as we have talked about earlier) make their weight felt.

35. For details see Kothari, R. "Congress-system in India", Asian Survey, Vol. IV, 12th Dec. 1964, PP. 1-18.

Mitra and Singh(36) opine that "the rural poor which could have been a major source of classical class - conflict(37), was not organized on class - lines at all. They further note that "the rural poor were either not politically organized at all or, when they were, had the local traditional (feudal) elite to lead them. On the top of this were the cross pressures of language, religion, caste and kinship and so on. Generally speaking, thus, conflict was muted, localized and expressed in the idiom of national politics for development and distributive justice. Revolution and classwar as feasible alternative were not in the scene at all"(38).

FAC TIONALISM :

is a phenomenon that refers to a breach in the cohesion in the leadership of a political party as a result of conflict between

36. Mitra, S.K. & Singh, V.B., "Social class and Belief Systems in Indian Society", in Sachidanand & Lal, A.K. eds. "Elite and Development", New Delhi: Concept Publishing House, 1980, PP- 97-123.
37. The only class-conflict that the typicality of and the nature, extent and size of contrafictions inherent in the Indian society, could ensue is through rural populace. The Marxian Brand of 'class-conflict' is impossible to materialize owing to the lack of requisite industrialization, urbanization etc. hence lack of an adequate size of the working class. For further details see Mitra and Singh, Op. cit., PP
38. Mitra, A.K. & Singh, V.B., Op. cit.

two or more constituents of the said leadership. This 'conflict' accrues out of considerations such as a 'desire' for assertion of prestige, personal ascendance, parochiolism, casteism, communalism, secessionism, separatism or a feeling that one has been unduly indiscriminated in the race for the acquisition of highest office. Having crept into the leadership the 'conflict' divides the allegiance and loyalties of the rank and file.

The bigger the domain and influence-base of a political organization, the more are the possibilities of 'factionalism' within it. This is because a political party operating over a large domain has to of necessity encompass varying interests and identities, and give representation to them in its leadership. In such a circumstance, discrepancies and follies are always inevitable.

The Congress enjoying a greater mass - base and operating over a large domain could hardly resist its susceptibility to 'factionalism'. As remarks Jain: "In the 12 years since the first general elections the party has been characterised by factionalism - a condition which has acquired frequent intervention from New Delhi"(39). Mitra and Singh (40) also point

39. Jain, C.M., Op. cit., P-213

40. Mitra, S.K. & Singh, V.B., Op. cit.

to this fact. Other political parties, whether local or national, are no exceptions too. They also come to internalize the political culture of factionalism as pointed to by Allen Sandler⁴¹.

However, as the general misunderstanding about factionalism prevails, it is not always dysfunctional. There are studies prominent among them is the one by Ram Ahuja that seeks to justify the role of factions as functional. He notes: "Factions may either be engaged in creating frictions, diversities and new alignments in older unities and oriented towards delineating consensus among social fragments for selfish political interests and identifies or engaged in manipulating pluralistic differentiations and diversities into unities and integrations"(42).

Factions have ever-existed in Rajasthan politics. During the early fifties, the state witnessed a number of massive factional - coalitions. One was headed by prominent state politician Jai Narain Vyas who had been in the forefront of the

41. Sandler, Allen.P., "Bi-factional Rivalry as an alternative to Two-party competitions; American Political Science Review, No. 49, Sept. 1955, PP 641-62.

42. Ahuje, Ram., 'Political Elites and Modernization-The Bihar Politics', Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1975, P-134.

political protest movements and had enjoyed a prestigious position in the Marwar Lok Parishad. His political background, thus, helped him earn allegiance from lok parishad workers of Jodhpur and its peripheral areas. Most of the rank and file of this massive faction were urban - based brahmins and Mahajans.

The other dominant faction with the Congress was the one led by the then Chief Minister, Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Maniklal Verma. This was a less dominant faction compared to the first since it received support from a small number of elites belonging to Udipur only.

The still other faction was that of the Rajputs. As many as 24 Rajput MLAs by joining the Congress in 1954 frustrated the political balance within the Congress. Prior to this deflection only a negligible number of Rajputs were in the Congress.

Jat - Rajput rivalry had ever posed a great threat to the cohesion of the Congress organization. This deep rivalry came to be pacified to some extent by Mohanlal Sukhadia who took over as Chief Minister from J.N. Vyas in 1954. What escorted him to this exelsior was, infact, his tactful handling of Jat-Rajput cleavage which he tried to patch up. And, he was successful in his mission to some extent. But this diplomacy on the other hand

earned him strong opponents in the persons of Lika Ram Paliwal, Heera Lal Shastri, Jai-Narain Vyas etc. within the Congress.

Since independence days Jats had their strong faction which was headed by Kumbh Ram Arya. Even during the emergence of the Janata and its subsequent rule, this stubborn faction could not manage a psycholocial merger into it (Janata) though it was very much a part and parcel of the Janata itself. The faction kept highly critical of Rajput hegemony over Janata which (hegemony) they sensed was because of the Rajput Chief Minister, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat.

Politics of bargaining & factionalism reached its apex during the Janata regime. As is already known, the Janata was but a tentative reconciliation of forces that had hitherto opposed one another. Once the Janata came to power, their solidarity was put to real test. Different ex-political group - the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra and the Lok Dal etc.- that had merged into Janata, came to act as separate and strong factions. It was basically this weakness of the Janata party that the Congress capitalized on to launch a comeback. The Jat leadership within the Congress found it as an opportune time to manoeuvre the jat - faction within the Janata frustrating Shekhawat.

Thus, from micro to macro levels, the Indian politics need to be analyzed and understood in terms of caste, class and factions.

The basis of factionalism in Rajasthan was 'regionalism' during the early years of independence, as vindicated by Jain. Later regionalism combined with 'casteism' and 'personalism' came to act as the bases.

In our study of caste and politics in the context of Rajasthan society we discerned that both are indispensable to each other. The forms of association between 'caste and politics' are conspicuous enough to be identified. We noted a general disagreement among social scientists on the question of manipulation of 'caste by politics' and vice-versa, and tried to do away with the general misunderstanding that 'caste' manipulates politics." In a society like India which has not yet become class-stratified, the democratic politics has to essentially function through traditional organizations like caste, communities, tribes and kin-groups. As a consequence, these traditional groups, castes and communities in particular, evolve into pressure - groups and in return influence politics"(43).

43. Ahmed, Mobin., 'Communalism-A sociological perusal of the Problem; (Abstract of the article) 'Seventh Indian Social Science Congress' (June 12-15, 1982, I. I. T. New Delhi) Abstracts of papers, Allahabad: Indian Academy of Social Sciences, 1982.

It is, thus, basically politics which manipulate caste.

This explains why socio - economic priorities are allocated on 'caste' and 'communal' bases; and in the leadership of the parties and in the ministries as well there is made an implicit endeavour to give appropriate representation to castes and communities.

Factionalism as a universal phenomenon is inevitable to every political system in the world but it varies in nature and degree from one system to another. In the case of Rajasthan politics we discerned factionalism and defectionism gradually perpetuating in the political culture. We noted a change in the nature of factionalism occurring over years. In the beginning its basis was regionalism which, of late, has extended to casteism and personalism. Defectionism, a rarest phenomenon in the yesteryears, is ruling supreme in Rajasthan politics today. We found that such developments owe to the overall change that has occurred in the nature of politics and leadership itself. The mass-politics of the early days have changed to elite --politics of vote and power. Committed activist and educated leaders are being replaced by uncommitted passivists.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL ELITE, POLITICS AND MODERNIZATION

Discussing the relationship between politics, political elites and modernization, Ahuja writes: "The study of politics implies study of power; the study of modernization implies study of change in structure of society or of system - transformation; and the study of elites implies study of men who exercise power to take society in a definite direction."(1)

Our attempt here is, thus, precisely to assess the role of the wielders of power - the political elites - in the economic modernization of Rajasthan.

Keeping in view the significance of the political elites to the economic advancement of the province, let us first analyse the changing nature and form of the political elites over years.

TYPOLGY OF THE ELITES :

Ram Ahuja⁽²⁾ who pursued a pioneering study on the 'Political elites and the problems of modernization in Bihar' prefers to divide the post - independent Indian political elites into four broad categories: (i) Immediate after independence phase, 1947-1952, in which there was no longer any struggle between the

people and the govt., and the interests of the people and the power elite were one and indivisible. (ii) Consolidation phase, 1952 - 57 in which the political elite worked for the five - year plans. (iii) Chaotic phase (1962)-(1972) in which non - Congress and united front govts. came into power in several states affecting the inter - state and Center - State relations. (iv) Phase of authoritarianism (1972-77) in which one person was catapulted to the position of supreme national leadership and the power - holders came to believe in personality cult, and in which all plans for change and development of society were centralized. The last phase that of authoritarianism ended in a fiasco in in March 1977 and was replaced by a peculiar phase in which non - Congress group of power - holders emerged on the political horizon of the country. Interesting enough, this group consisted of different antagonistic caste - groups,

1. Ahuja, Ram, 'Political Elites and Modernization - The Bihar Politics - Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1975, P - 97.
2. Ibid., PP. 124 - 125.

communities, classes, political organizations, and also farvarying regional loyalties. This group of political elites though of a truly democratic character could hardly maintain its cohesion and succumbed to its own weaknesses. We may better call this phase as 'anti-authoritarianism phase' that was overtaken by its predecessor in just the beginning of 1980.

Both Ram Ahuja (3) and Y. Singh (4) are of the opinion that the elites in the first phase were urban - based with stable economic background, belonged to the upper - castes and middle - class professions and were committed to the societal interests. The elite - background of Rajasthan's earliest political elites that we have discussed earlier confirm the above contention. The elite in the second phase i.e., the consolidation phase were mostly those who were elected in 1952 elections about whom Ahuja remarks: "They had only a part - time interest in politics. They wanted rewards in the form of some political office for participating in the national struggle for independence. These elites caused a certain amount of disequilibrium in the beginning in their party structures but their pressures for active participation in politics were pitched in such a low key that they were soon integrated in their party systems"(5).

3. Ahuja, Ram, Op. cit.

4. Singh, Y., 'Essays on Modernization in India, New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1978.

Pertaining to Rajasthan, drawing on our penetrating discussion on elite - background earlier, we witness that the elite voted to power in the state in 1957 were mostly young and inexperienced politicians with either urban - middle - class professional background, trade or business as their occupation, or were from the rural and or urban land owning class. "They thought that since they shared political values with the masses and since they could trust the integrity of old professional politicians, they did not concern themselves quite so directly with politics"(6). With the succession of elections in the country the recruitment of elite to the national politics gradually opened to the lower middle and lower rungs of the society. And, now people from intermediate and lower castes, industrial working - force, urban middle - class professions, peasantry etc. Started flooding the group of 'power wielders' yet the older elite still retained their influence. There was thus toleration on the part of the new and accommodation on the part of the old elite (7).

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5. Ahuja, Ram, 'Political Elite: Recruitment and Role in Modernization' in Sashidhanand and Lal A.K. Eds. 'Elite and Development' New Delhi! Concept Publ. Co.), 1980, PP. 123 - 139.
 6. Ibid., P-126.
 7. Ibid.

Having a look at the background of the legislators elected in 1967 and 1972 assembly elections we find that a majority of them had no source of livelihood other than politics. This is true not only of the Rajasthan legislators but also of other assemblies and the parliament as well(8). "They believed more in using the ties of kinship, caste and language to smoothen the way through the corridors of power"(9).

This phase witnessed both ideologically traditional and rational elites.

The ushering in of an entirely new elite into the national political scene during 1977 was an ephemeral phenomenon. It was neither their radicalism nor democratic ideals that brought these elites into power but it was precisely a popular rage against the authoritarianism of the Congress that voted them to power. In terms of action they proved no better than their predecessors.

We, thus, witness a qualitative difference between the old and the new political elite. The elites of the earliest phase whom Ahuja aptly calls as "Intellectual committed politicians" were replaced by the new elites in the successive phases described (by Ahuja) as "mediocre uncommitted partisan" what was attributive of the old political elite was uniformity of their structural

background and their ideological commitment while what characterizes the present political elite is heterogeneity in their background.

Besides, bargaining, defectionism, and factionalism which have of late crept into the national political culture and have consolidated as inevitable institutions, clearly speak of the current political elites' particularistic designs. The formation of political affiliations today finds its basis not in ideology as was the case earlier but in the particularistic interests of the elite.

To compare the old elites with the new Abuja (10) has developed typology classifying all political elites into four categories: Progressive, rationalist, indifferent and manipulative. "Though both the progressive and the rationalist", according to him, "work for public interest, the former believe that the cause of progress moves on automatically regardless of the interference of man and is not subject to human control while the latter believe that progress rests upon conscious control." (11) The present elite far beyond being progressive and rationalist are indifferent and manipulative since public interest is not primary to them.

10. Ibid., p.127.

11. Ibid . pp. 127-28.

Circulation of Elite:

This "is a process of movement of individuals from the non-elite to elite and vice-versa". (12) Obviously enough, the momentum of this circulation thus becomes a measure of the extent to which a society is open and politicized. In the Indian context political elite is undeniably a composite term since there are various political culture bases (13), each differing from other in nature, scope and significance, and each having its own cordon and brand of elites. A close persual of the background of Rajasthan political elites (which we have already discussed earlier in a separate chapter) would reveal that most of the political elite at the state political culture base are recruited not from the non-elite but from the political-elite itself of the lower political culture base i.e., district, block and panchayat levels. C.M. Jain confirms this fact. he remarks:

The MLAs and MPs in Rajasthan are associated as members of the Zila Parishads as its ex-officio members". (14) In the case of Bihar elites, Ram Ahuja (15) found out that once these lower level political elites climb up the ladder i.e., from panchayat, block and district levels to the state or national levels, they never retreat to their previous positions.

¹² Pareto, Vilfredo, 'The Mind and Society', Vol.III, London: Janathan Cope, 1935, P.1427.

13. National, Provincial, District, Block and Panchayat levels.

14. Jain, CM., 'State Legislatures in India: The Rajasthan Legislative Assembly

never retreat to their previous positions, "this, however, does not mean", insists Ahuja, "that they cease to take interest in politics of the level from which they have moved up in the hierarchy". (16)

This holds good for the Rajasthan elites as well. Only 'upward trend' is witnessed in the movement of political elites from lower levels to higher levels, and not vice-versa, hence absence of a circulatory process. Pareto's theory, therefore, does not apply in the context of Rajasthan.

Even at the level of panchayats (in Rajasthan), lowest in the political culture-base, there is not openness in recruitment and smoothness in circulation of elites.

Jain (17) remarks: "The panchayati Raj institutions, an empirical study reveals, have given birth to a new leadership and can best be described as 'Neotraditional'..... Yet the leadership which is actually emerging is mostly from the affluent and traditionally higher strata of rural society". (18) The class of traditional leaders. (19) Chaturvedi notes that "the weaker sections (in Rajasthan) have not

A Comparative Study, New Delhi 1972, p.214.

15. Ahuja, Ram, op. cit., p.128

16. Ibid., P.128.

17. Jain, C.M., op.cit., p.213

18. Ibid.

19. Chaturvedi, T.N. "Tensions in Panchayati Raj: Relations between officials and Non-officials", Economic Weekly, Vol.16, No.22, May 1964 pp.921-24.

20. Ibid.

succeeded in capturing high offices of Sarpanchas and Pradhans inspite of their numerical strength." (20)

Bottomore (21) argues that Pareto's theory of the circulation of elite apart from referring to the movement of individuals from non-elite to elite and vice-versa, also points to the replacement of an individual elite by another within the governing elite. If Pareto's theory, as argues Bottomore, conceptualizes the latter phenomenon, it holds good for the Rajasthan politics. Ram Ahuja (22) seeks to explain 'elite mobility' in terms of (i) the rise of new political interest (ii) the decline of moral qualities of the old elites; and (iii) the rise of new elite with moral manipulating qualities. According to Schumpeter, (23) both individual and social factors determine the circulation of elite.

Modernization and elite:

David Apter (24) on the basis of the role of the political elite in the modernization of society, divides them into two groups: (i) Development System elite; and (ii) Maintenance System elite. The former, according to him, are the elites who possess radical outlook and endeavour to introduce

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21. Bottomore, T.B., 'Elites and Society' Middle Sex, Penguin, 1964, p. 48.
 22. Ahuja, Ram, op. cit., p.129
 23. Schumpeter, Joseph, quoted by Bottomore, T.B. in 'Elite and Society', op. cit., p.58.
 24. Apter, David, "System, Process and the Politics of economic Development", in Finkle, J.L. & Gamble, R.W., Eds. 'Political Development and Social Change', New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, pp. 441-457.

deeprooted changes in the attitudes and institutions that only could ensure economic progress of the society. These development oriented elite take the political party and the govt. as the pivotal instrument of change. While the Maintenance elite are a passive lot and believe in status-quo. For them, change carries no temptations. For these latter 'elites' Ahuja uses the term: 'Prisoners of Society'. He notes: "The present political elite in India belong more to 'maintenance system' than to 'development system' with the result that they have failed to reconstruct the nation's social and economic framework or to develop and implement radical economic policies and programmes". (25)

In our discussion on 'modernization' in the earlier chapter we have endeavoured to highlight the process or processes the term 'modernization' refers to. Modernization can be in no way solely explained in terms of economic development since it is a composite concept encompassing the society in its entirety, and not a single aspect of it. Generally speaking, modernization, however, refers to an exalted state of the society which is marked by scientific temper, freedom of occupation, distributive justice, elimination of destitution, decentralization of power democracy, free elections and public-opinion, secularism,

25. Ahuja, Ram, op.cit., p.130

26. See the chapter on Modernization in this dissertation, and also Ram Ahuja in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K.eds.

individualism, mobility, equality, achieved-status rather than ascribed, and volatization of unprecedented elements of social pattern, and advanced technology and abundant economic production. (26)

To understand Modernization, thus, calls for a pervasive treatment of all the dimensions of change. Since it is not at all feasible to be that comprehensive, we would rather confine ourselves to the discussion of 'economic variables' (of modernization) which are after all the structural pre-requisites of the process (of mod.) in that they provide the primary infrastructural basis for modernization to grow and consolidate.(27)

How much Rajasthan is developed:

Even after planning for three decades Rajasthan continues to be one of the most backward states in the country. (28) In terms of development, it ranks only above Sikkim, Meghalaya and Tripura. (29) It is the tenth largest state population-wise. It had a population of 25.8 million in 1971 which has risen to 34 m. in 1981- with a high growth rate of 32.4%. 82.4% out of its total population lived in villages in 1981. The density (of population) has risen

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27. Lerner, Daniel, 'The passing of Traditional Society', The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1958, p.47. See Eisentadt, S.M., "Transformation of Social Political and Cultural orders in modernization". American Sociological Review, Vol.30, Oct., 1965, p.659
28. 'The Competition Master', Sept., 1981 Vol.XXIII, No.2 Chandigarh, p.119.
29. 'Yojna' Prakashan Vibhag, Patiala House, New Delhi, December, 1-15, 1981, "Ank" 20, year 25.
30. 'The Competition Master', op. cit.

from 75 in 1971 to 100 in 1981. The staple occupation of Rajasthan's population is agriculture. (30) The second largest state in area, Rajasthan accounts for 10.4% of the total land area of the country. 60% of its total geographical area lies in arid and semi-arid zone. The net area sown was thus only 36.36% of the total reported area in 1956-57. This area increased by 7.60% in 1976-77. (31) Net irrigated area was 1437 thousand hectares in 1956-57 which increased to 2,600.0 thousand hectares in 1974-75. (32) Even to this day, well remains the chief source of irrigation. Of the 35,795 villages in the state only 5,483 had irrigation facilities till 1980. (33) The 'Rajasthan Canal' with a budget of over Rs.450 crore is not yet complete whereas work on it started as early as 1958. Rajasthan has a share of only 1.35% in the total irrigation capacity of the country.

The area under foodgrains was 78.87% in 1956-57 which came down to 73.07% in 1976-77. The yield rates of jawar, bajra, maize, wheat, barley and gram were 352, 145, 657, 987, 1232, 772 kgs. respectively in 1956-59. (34) which changed to 428, 366, 760, 1280, 1163 and 769 in 1976-77.

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31. Rajput, Munshi, Singh, "Levels of Agricultural productivity in Rajasthan: A district-wise study, 1956-57 to 1976-77." M.Phil dissertation, Center for the Study of Regional Development, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1981.
 32. Shreder, Lawrence, L. "Rajasthan" in Weiner, M. Ed. State Politics in India', Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968, pp.321-398.
 33. "Yojna", op.cit.
 34. Rajput, Munshi Singh, op.cit.
 35. Ibid .

Of a total of 26 districts, 69.5% showed a decline in productivity in 1956-59. In 1976-77 this figure came down to 42.3%. There were only 48 pumpsets per 10,000 in 1974-77 and 15 tractors per 10,000 upto the years. (35)

The total foodgrains production was 6.7 million tonnes in 1973-74 which rose only to 7.8 in 1978-79. In 1979-80 the figure was 5.2 million tonnes. (36)

Mineral Resources:

Rajasthan has rich deposits of many metallic and non-metallic minerals. It monopolises the mining of certain minerals such as lead (concentrates), zinc (conc.), emeralds and garnets. Apart from this, Rajasthan's contribution to the country's total output of asbestos and felspar, gypsum, silver-ore and mica is 75%, 92%, 90% and 20% respectively.

Industry:

Major industries in Rajasthan include textiles, cement, sugar, chemicals, vegetable ghee, urea, mica, brick and zinc slates. The number of registered factories was 2423 in 1972 which has risen to 3812 in 1976. About 49000 small-scale industries were there in 1981. Kheri industrial production has registered a marked improvement. Cotton and woolen textiles worth Rs.137 lakh were produced in 1973-74. This figures mounted to 411 lakh in 1977-78.

In 1973-74 the total electricity generated and purchased was 1825 in KWH. In 1977-78 this figure touched

a mark of 3330 m. KWH with 29 powerhouse scattered allover the state. The industrial consumption during 1973-74 increased from 608 to 1093 m. KWH while domestic consumption was far less.

Miscellaneous:

The number of the unemployed in Rajasthan in 1974 was 229,000 as the employment exchange figures reveal. This number rose to 322,000 in 1978. The placement of job-seekers was 7 to 8%.

The state domestic product (SDP) was Rs.2467 Crore in 1975-76 which rose to 2824 crore in 1977-78, In 1954 the per-capita income of the state was Rs.227 which rose to 249 in 1959. The per-capita income at current prices was Rs.629 in 1970 which rose to 925 in 1980-81.

Plan outlays:

The first plan had an outlay of Rs.54 crore for Rajasthan second 103; third 213; annual plans 137; fourth plan 309; fifth plan 858. Sixth plan has an outlay of Rs.2025 crore which exceeds the total expenditure incurred during the thirty years of planning in the state. Out of the total investment of Rs.11,351.2 crore by the center in public enterprises, only 227.1 crore has been invested in Rajasthan till 1980.

Literacy:

In 1971 literacy in Rajasthan was 19.7% which rose to 24.05% in 1981. Male-literacy today is 35.78% and female is 11.32. District-wise, Ajmer has the highest percentage of literacy (35.01%) while Barmer has the lowest (11.97%).

Transportation etc.

Transportation etc.

In 1976-77, for every 1000 sq. kms. the average length of rails in Rajasthan is 16 kms. For every 100 sq.kms. road length is 16 kms. While the national average for road length is 42 kms.

Rajasthan's per-capita electricity consumption is 83 units as against country's average of 119. (37) These facts and figures clearly speak of the pitiable and shocking state Rajasthan is in where its economy and overall development are concerned. Despite an inflow of 4000 crore rupees for development works in the state over a period of roughly thirty five years since independence nothing considerable has been achieved in the name of progress.

Inspite of the passing of radical legislations namely:

'Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952; Rajasthan Land Reform and Resumption of Jagir (amend.) Bill, 1954'; and , 'Rajasthan Zx Z amindari and Biwedari Abolition Bill, 1958', the per-

capita land-holding in the state is even less than an acre. And, the per-hectare value of agricultural-output is 422. Lest to talk of irrigation network, fertilizer-facilities and per capita income which are far less than the national average. The rate of growth of annual income of the state has kept shuttling between 3 and 4%.

37. These figures have been taken from 'The Competition Master', and 'Yojna', op.cit.

38. Ahuja, Ram, op.cit., pp. 105-7.

Elite and Modernization:-

Regarding the question of modernization of Bihar, Ram Ahuja (38) interviewed a number of Bihar political elites and found the majority among them believing that 'modernization in economic and social fields has been achieved only slightly though political modernization has been achieved to a great extent. The main reasons given by them for lack of modernization were (i) ineffective leadership and its indifference to development efforts, (ii) wide corruption and factionalism among elites (iii) Blind conformity to traditions (iv) defective planning by bureaucrats and technocrats due to lack of commitment (v) Mass illiteracy (vi) change of ministries.

The Rajasthan political elites and bureaucrats are no better than their Bihar counterparts in their attitude towards the question of modernization of their state. 'They', observes Shrader, "are still prone to point to the 'physical psychological' change in the peasantry rather than to evidences to economic and objective change. (39) The relationship between 'caste and politics' which we have discussed at length in the earlier chapter in the context of Rajasthan has gruesome consequences for development efforts. And, to this effect, Shrader notes: "In a state such as Rajasthan

39. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.

40. Ibid.

where little modernization has occurred caste tends to be of even greater significance". (40) This significance is virtually vindicated by atleast the cooperative movement in Rajasthan about which Shrader remarks: "On paper the cooperative movement is one of the most successful programmes in the state. By 1961 it was officially estimated that 5.3% of the state's villages and 24% of all rural families were enrolled in coop. societies. This department has been under the control of successive jat ministers during much of the time that rapid expansion of the coop. movement occurred, and it is widely maintained by informed persons in the state that the coop. movement has been of greater benefit to the jat faction than the general peasantry.(41) But the Act was fully implemented as late as in 1959. as notes Shrader: "Jagir Resumption Act has been slowly implemented." (43) The 'Rajasthan Tenancy ACT? *1955' which provided for only two clauses of tenants namely,

41. Ibid.
42. "VIDHAN SABHA KE B ARES VARSHE"
43. Shrader, Lawrence, & op. cit.
44. Jain, C.M., op.cit., p.207
45. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.
46. Jain, C.M. op.cit., p.218
47. Ibid. p.218.

'khetedar and Gheir-Khetedar' tenants "could not be a considerable success due to lack of adequate finance (20.46%) or ignorance of this privilege (35%) or owing to undue influence exercised by land holders (27%)." (44) Pertaining to this very Act, Shrader also comments that "no Ceiling on land holding had been established by 1961". 45) 'Sagri Abolition Act, 1962' aimed at abolishing completely the system of Sagri (Loans extended to Tribals by non-tribal people). "According to the Survey Report of the Rajasthan Tribal Research Institute and Training Centre, the Act has failed to abolish Sagri". (46) As quoted by C.M. Jain who further remarks: "The failure of Sagri legislation may be attributed to the inherent and usual defects often seen in all social laws being not proceeded by requisite social thinking". (47) The failure of the Act in question is further indicative of the fact that "no social change can be brought about by legislation alone, if masses are not awakened to the prevailing evils and if really effective conditions are not created for the implementation of such legislations." (48)

To overhaul village-administration and to let the fruits of democracy reach the nook and corner of the state, Rajasthan Govt. introduced the Panchayati Raj System about which Jain remarks: "The Rajasthan Assembly has done

48. Ibid. , p.218

49. Ibid. p.215

50. Chaturvedi, T.N.' Tensions in Panchayati Raj:

a pioneering job in this field. This panchayati Raj has without doubt, revolutionized the thinking of the village mind.. There are two stumbling blocks still in the way, general illiteracy of the people and the bureaucratic attitude of the officials". (49) Thus, "the political elites of the state have undoubtedly failed to make panchayati R j a complete success". (50) "The enthusiasm generated by its introduction has not percolated down to the villages. The common man in the village is yet to be enthused into active participation into development programmes. The weaker sections have not succeeded in capturing high offices of Sarpanchas and Pradhans inspite of their numerical strength". (51) Despite the fact that the area of irrigated land in Rajasthan has ~~drastically~~ drastically increased from 24000 acres to 36000 acres between 1951 and 1959, and, to 2600.9 thousand hectares in 1977. as the official figures put it, agricultural production has been almost stagnant and productivity has only sustained a meagre increase (from 22 in 1950's to 422 in 70's) whereas both the production

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50. Chaturvedi, T.N. 'Tensions in Panchayati Raj: Relations between officials and non-officials', Economic Weekly, 16(22), May 30, 1964, pp.921-924
51. Ibid.
53. Shrader, L. op. cit.
54. Ahuja, Ram in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K. op.cit., p.132.

and productivity should have increased at least five-fold to a minimum. Shrader's remarks in this regard seems most appropriate: He says: "Waterlogging has been a serious problem in the state, and irrigation is somewhat less effective than these figures would indicate." (52) The first phase of 'Rajasthan Canal', meant to turn the Thar desert arable,; and the biggest in the world with a proposed expenditure of over Rs.450 crore, had to be completed by 1982. Work on it started as early as in 1958. To one's disappointment, the progress in the work on canal suggests that its completion would call for no less than a decade from the year it was scheduled to start functioning. Shrader rightly points out: "clearly Rajasthan achieved no major economic breakthrough even though its performance did not compare unfavourably with the national performance". (53) Such is the extent of miserabilities that Rajasthan has as its destiny for which non but its uncommitted and insincere political elites and bureaucrats have to blame. Activist elite who are committed to development but they fail to deliver the goods to a considerable extent owing to certain hurdles in the way of their functioning.

These hurdles, according to him are (i) the problem of split ideologies, namely the ideology of passive party officialdom, of party militants of the disinterested and uncommitted rank and file of party members and party identifiers and the party's public ideology. (ii) the problem of

confusion of cross-cutting issues and alternative performances; and (iii) the problem of in-fighting among the elite for power-sharing.

The political elites are related to the politics of the state through the political organization of national and local levels which have in themselves various groups and sub-groups with 'conflicting loyalties, (55) personal rivalries, aspiration of ascendance, political conflicts and ideological warfare within the organization sometimes leading to breaking-away of many a leader to join other political parties as avenues to look for better prospects. Ahuja insists that "this ideological gulf between the office-seeking elite and the ideologically-oriented elite ~~is~~ always forces the former to indulge in activities which are usually motivated by extraneous considerations".(56)..... It is these office-seeking elite who "hinder the development and modernization". (57) of a particular society.

55. A term used by Pam Ahuja.

58. See Dahrendorf, R., "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 65

(58) Dahrendorf suggests that there is hardly any cohesion between the lower and the upper strata of elite. Each keeps charging the other with corruption. "The 'oligarchic elite and the subjacent elite' (59) do not find a common set of goals. The aims of the oligarchic elite are either so personal (capturing office) or so general (maintaining status quo) or even so radical (maximum nationalization) that they fail to motivate the subjacent elite". (60) Among the subjacent elite there is always a good number of politically uncommitted or less committed individuals who nurture high aspirations to rise. They are easily manipulated by the oligarchic elite on false promises. And, thus, is sustained the possible antagonism between the lower and upper strata of elite which if materialized would contribute to the development of society. As Ahuja's hypothesis goes: "The higher the monopoly at the higher political culture base, lesser are the elite to participate in public welfare issues at lower political culture base". (61) If power is held by only a few oligarchic elite at the national level, that is, high

59. Higher and lower elites.

60. Ahuja, Ram, in Sachidanand and Lal, A.K. Eds. op.cit. p.133

61. Ibid.

62. Dahrendorf, R., op.cit.

centralization of power at the center, the elite at the state level will not feel free to express their views freely and frankly. And, there would be a dissatisfaction among the non-ruling and non-activist elite to support the current elite in their programmes of development. This undoubtedly hampers the adequate and appropriate functioning of the political elite at the state level. (62)

The defection of many an important leader from the Congress and the Lok Dal a decade ago signifies the frantic desire they had to seek offices. The case of Kumbh Ram Arya is the most suitable example to this effect.

In 1977, the Congress in Rajasthan lagged behind in the race to form government. The combined opposition defeated it by a meagre one vote. Sukhadia's manipulations, however, could feather the Congress cap by luring a few politically uncommitted members of opposition to his (Congress) side. This adequately vindicates the extent to which bargaining and defectionism have perpetuated in the political culture of Rajasthan. Excepting for a short span of time extending from mid 1977 to the fall of 1980, Rajasthan has been a one-party dominated state - the Congress. About the Congress and Rajasthan, Shrader remarks:

The Congress party was more successful in developing major political leaders. Having control of the State's govt.

Throughout this period and backed by the prestige of the national party, the state Congress leaders have been able to exploit the advantage of office, the control of patronage and the responsibility for implementing programmes of economic development and social and political reforms in the development of political leadership. Despite these advantages, Congress leadership has tended to be local and regional in nature. No mass leader who could appeal directly to all sections of the state has emerged; instead political leaders have tended to be adroit managers of political influence". (63)

Thus, the main aim of the Congress leadership in the state, was and still is to retain power rather than to commit itself to the development of the state. This is precisely why no political leader of outstanding capabilities and popularity could come up there. Mohanlal Shukhadia was the Chief Minister for seventeen long years. Shrader opines that he (Shukhadia) "managed to retain leadership of the

64. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.

65. Ahuja, R.m, op.cit.

66. Mitre, S.K. & Singh, V.B. 'Social Class and Belief Systems in the Indian Political elite- An exploratory Study of the Interactions of Attitudes, Ideology and Party Identification' in Sachidanand & Lal, A.K.Eds. 'Elite and Development' New Delhi: Concept Publishing Col. 1980; pp. 71.97.

Congress party through 12 stormy years, more by his judicious use of political influence, his balancing of competing factions within the party, and his capacity to anticipate the political intrigues of his opponents than through any quality of personal magnetism' (64) or by earning natural popularity through committing himself to the cause of development of the state.

Factionalism and political conflicts are also frequent hurdles in the way of modernization of the state. (65) Though factionalism is a basic feature of the Congress party at the national level 66 but in the case of Rajasthan it acquires much more high proportions and seems to have perpetuated to the grass-root level. "Factionalism within the Congress party", insists Shrader, "is the second major force of conflict in Rajasthan; moreover, this has been a constant feature of the party's history. The survival of the Congress party has depended on its ability to keep factionalism within reasonable bounds, so as to prevent such a weakening of the party as to render it ineffective as a political organisation". (67) The basis of factionalism varied from 'regionalism' in the beginning to ('ersonalism' and 'casteism' at a later point in time by when ascendant caste in Rajasthan had come to be considerably politicized, and, as a consequences

67. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.
68. Ibid
69. Ibid
70. Ibid

started making its presence felt in the state politics. Initially, there were three important factions based on regionalism. One was the Udaipur group headed by Mohanlal Sukhadia and Maniklal Varma. The other was the Vyas group representing the formerly Jaipur-state area. The third was the group of a few jat leaders from Jodhpur and Bikaner areas. "The Coalition", informs Shraeder "which defeated Jai Narain Vyas assumed the form of regional groupings when the jat and Udaipur groups joined forces with the second-generation nationalist leaders in the eastern plains." (68)

Since 1954, there appears a shift in the basis of factionalism. Regionalism continuing to be "one characteristics of Rajasthan's factionalism, personalism and caste have become more prominent features as well".(69) This shift which undoubtedly speaks of the rapid politicization of the masses was a result of, "Shraeder insists, "the progressive breakdown of regional loyalties".(70) He further asserts: "One of the ironies of Rajasthan politics is that the more the old regional loyalties are corroded, the greater the tendency for factionalism to shift to a caste and local-based factionalism". (71) The extent to which factionalism has crept into Rajasthan politics is made further conspicuous by Shraeder who notes: "At the state level, factionalism is so widespread that an aura of intrigue often hangs over the state capital. Endless rumours of internal conflicts within

71. Ibid

72. Ibid

the cabinet or the legislative party are circulated and from time to time, kenor cabinet reshufflings take place in response to the shifting lines of factional strength. No minister dares ignore his own group of followers and his allies for should he become isolated or should his support be undercut, his own position would soon be in jeopardy". (72) In a bid to check factionalism the Congress high command in 1957 denied assembly tickets to many a member of Sukhadia ministry. Mathure Des Mathur, the prominent Jodhpur leader, was given parliamentary ticket in 1957 with a view to overtake him from the state politics. Though only after two years he managed a comeback. At a later state efforts were made by the Congress high command to even eject Mohanlal Sukhadia from state politics and to install him at the Center. Political rivalry between Sukhadia on the one hand, Jai Narayan Vyas and Hiralala Shastri on the other is too well-known. Kumbh Ram Arya who had been denied an assembly ticket in the first three assembly elections consecutively was heading the Jat faction of the eastern plains region. Factionalism instead of coming to a standstill or diminishing became more rampant in the successive years. Disappearance of Barkatullah Khan from the political scene of Rajasthan is attributed to factionalism.

"Factional-conflict within the party", opines Shrader, "is part of competitive politics within a dominant national party system". (73)

The downfall of Janata party was precisely owing to factional-conflict.

"Factionalism", concludes Ahuja from his empirical study of Bihar politics, "many a time thwarts the development policies and programmes of the parties in power. Because of this factionalism, the elites even do not wield considerable influence over the masses. Most of the politicians do not have any influence over their followers and those few who have some, derive it from their ascriptive roles as big zamindars etc. rather than from the political posts they hold". (74) Factionalism in Rajasthan, thus, as we see finds its basis in regionalism, casteism and personalism "hempering modernization". (75)

Factionalism is just one component of the structure of conflicts rampant in Rajasthan politics. It rather signifies only intra-Congress conflict. An equally potent conflict we witness in the tussle between the ruling Congress and the erstwhile landed aristocracy.

73. Ibid.

74. Ahuja, Rem, op.cit. p.112

75. Ibid., p.134

"The change in political leadership (in Rajasthan) took place within the context of two basic political conflicts. One centered round the controversy between the Rajput Jagirdari class and the Congress party; the other was centered within the Congress party and focused on the emergence of new leadership groups in terms of both generation and caste". (76) former was an open and gruesome conflict which cost much of Congress' energies, time and attention.(77)

The decisions of the Congress to resume the jagirs turned the entirety of the landed aristocracy of Rajasthan against it (Congress). "The Rajputs entrance into politics in almost monolithic opposition to the Congress party at the time of the first general elections was triggered by this decision, and they have remained an important, if less monolithic, opposition group in the state's politics ever since". (78)

-Stay-orders were secured against resumption of jagirs Act, 1952 from the high court. And, it was only in 1954 that the Supreme Court finally upheld the Act. Kshtriya Mahesabha was the organizational platform from where the

76. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.

77. Kamal, K.L., 'Party Politics in an Indian State: A Study of Main Political Parties in Rajasthan', Jaipur, Prakash Publishers, 1967, pp. 76-77

78. Shrader, Lawrence, op.cit.

depropertied class forged a unity and jointly fought for its lost material heritage. It was this Sabha which negotiated with the state and central governments.

It represented itself in the first general elections and achieved considerable success. In 1953, a tentative agreement was reached between the Sabha on the one hand and the state and central govts. on the other. This agreement proved ephemeral since most of the conditions laid down in the agreement could not placate the depropertied jagirdars who demanded 50% compensation, liberal-rehabilitation grants and redefinition of 'khudkasht' land for which they launched an intense campaign organized by Bhoomiswami Sangh. A number of protest demonstrations and the like upsurges threatened the tranquility of the state.

The Jana Sangh and the Ram Rajya Parishad stood by the cause of the depropertied Bhoomiswamis and supported their demands in the 1957 elections. As a consequence, both these parties", remarks Shrader, "Lost from 25% to 23% of their previous strength". (79) In 1959 atleast Pandit Nehru mediating between the Rajasthan govt. and the Bhoomiswami

79. 'Report of the State Land Commission for Rajasthan', Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur: Govt. Central Press 1959, p. 21.

80. Ibid.

Sengh proposed liberalized terms for rehabilitation grants for jagirs with an annual income of less than Rs.5000/- . This proposal was "accepted by both sides, thus finally ending this controversy". (80)

This gruesome conflict that lasted for no less than seven years influencing the first two general elections held in the state kept the law and order situation in the province in a pitiable state necessitating the political elites to divert their full attention to it which could have otherwise been devoted to the cause of progress of the state.

"a lot of decisions taken by the political elites are not economic but political ", (81) and, most of their time and energy is spent on political manipulations which are an inevitability particularly when factors such as factionalism, rivalries and vested interests, to cite a few instances, make politics an actually competitive process. It thus becomes binding on the part of the maintenance-system elites, which the current political

81. Ahuja, Ram, op.cit., p.109

82. Ibid., pp. 108-108

83. Ibid., p,109

elites indubitably are, to be highly manipulative, as Ahuja's study of Bihar elites suggests, in order to maintain their continuance in power. Least attention is, thus, paid by the political elites to "mitigating the acute problem of unemployment and promoting employment opportunities, stepping-up industrial production, breaking the monopoly of big business houses in the field of industrial production ridding the state of recurring floods and droughts, providing stable government, maintaining law and order, ceiling of property, augmenting agricultural production, checking corruption and preventing price-rise". (82) which only would assure progress of the state. Besides, among the aforementioned problems "what are going to get priorities depend upon the commitment of the elites". (83)

Centre-state relations also is major factor that determines the propensity of a state to develop. By interviewing the political elites of Bihar Ahuja (84) found many an elite alleging that center's aid to the state depends on the political party (and the political faction) in power. Where Rajasthan is concerned it has always remained a neglected state as is vindicated by the allocation of funds in the successive plans except for the current plan in which which it receive over 2000 crore of Rs.

Keeping in view the extent to which Rajasthan has achieved progress it can be asserted that the state's political elites have only endeavoured to maintain a status-quo and not to develop the province.

Modernization, according to Ahuja is "a planned process of social mobilization. Social mobilization of masses for making them ready to accept changes in social and ideological structures is the primary function of political elites". (85) But since political elites, as we have analysed, remain glued to the politics of power grabbing, one wonders if they can be expected to socially mobilize masses. True that modernization can not be understood solely in terms of political elites rather there is a host of factors detrimental to it; but so far as the role of the political elite in atleast the economic progress, a prerequisite for modernization, of the state is concerned, it is undoubtedly a fact that the acute economic problems Rajasthan is confronting today is precisely due to the "lack of development efforts in the industrial and agricultural sectors by the political elites".(86)

84. Ibid., p.114

85. Ibid., p.134

86. Ibid., p.115

We found that the net sown area in Rajasthan in 1956 was 36.3% which increased by only a margin of 7.6% over a period of twenty long years. Studies suggest wells are still the chief source of irrigation in Rajasthan. Rajasthan Canal', the much publicized giant irrigation project of Asia with a budget of over Rs.450 crore, should have been ready to function by 1982 but it is not. To our utter disappointment, Rajasthan has a mere share of 1.35% in the total irrigation capacity of the country. The area under foodgrains was 73.8% in 1956 which came down to 73% in 1977.

The small scale industries have remarkably multiplied in number during the past ten years but heavy industries are yet a far cry. 322,000 persons were unemployed in the state in 1978. State domestic product has risen from 2467 crore in 1975 to 2824 crore in 1978 increasing only by a small margin. Only 19.7% people were literate in Rajasthan in 1971. This percentage rose but only to 24.5% by 1981. For every thousand square kilometers the average length of rails is only 16 kms. Average road length is 16 kms. per hundred square kilometers. In 1970 per capita income in the state was Rs.629 which rose only to 925 in 1981. Where Rajasthan stands in terms of 'development' can be best assessed by the gruesome fact that it ranks only above three small states of the country Sikkim, Meghalaya and Tripura.

Various social legislations in the name of social reform were passed important being them the various Jagirdari Abolition Acts, land - Tenancy Act, Sagri Abolition Act etc. but there is an abundance of empirical studies about them which we found clearly indicating that these Acts have not been fully implemented. This explains why even after such drastic measures (?) adopted on the socio-economic front by Rajasthan political elite, the average per capita land - holding in the state is less than even an acre.

We found prominent social - scientists such as Schrader, Jain, Ahuja, Chaturvedi etc. whose empirical studies pertain to Rajasthan's Politics and development problems' agreeing that the present leadership in the state is indifferent and uncommitted to development efforts; that the majority among the present leadership is conformist of 'tradition' and believes in maintaining status - quo, and; that there is a lack of competent and committed bureaucrats and technocrats in the state as whose consequence planning is always defective. Drawing on the aforementioned studies we also analysed that there is hardly any rapport between the elites at the center and the state; and between state - level elites; and lower ones.

Absence of such a coordination hampers development. We found that the elites are only interested in continuing in power and appropriating material benefits, and not in working collectivity for people's cause. Oligarchic elites who are slightly committed and wish to do something honestly and concretely for the state are strongly deterred by the party officialdom and are sometimes charged as doing anti-party activities. Factionalism, personal rivalry, conflicting loyalties, aspiration of ascendance, political conflicts, defectionism keep eating into the vitality of the Rajasthan political system hampering the functioning of the political elites. These evils accrue essentially out of the vicious game of power in which the present elites involve themselves to have personal gains. The most hevec political conflict in Rajasthan, we analysed, was the Congress - leadership versus the Rajput Jagirdari class that continued for roughly a decade naturally calling for the elites to channelize fully their time, energies and attention to it which would have been otherwise devoted to developmental works. We discerned how

most of the decisions taken by the political elites are not economic but political, and how manipulations on the part of the individual elite play a vital role in keeping him stuck to the exalted chair of power. Mohanlal Sukhadia's continuation as Chief - Minister of the state for around seventeen long years fully vindicates the significance of manipulations to Rajasthan politics. It is too well - known a fact how tactfully he kept balancing the caste equation by enchanting the jet variable to remain in positive relationship with the Rajputs so that a luringly rich treasure of allegiance could be ungenerously exploited.

Given the magnitude of funds allocated to Rajasthan in various plans; the rich stock of natural resources that the state is endowed with; a menagable state of economy; and above all, a congenial social environment, the political elites should have easily and sincerely ushered the state on to the road to economic prosperity which is primary to modernization.

Our study, thus, leads us to conclude with all objectivity that the political elites of Rajasthan have condemnably failed to modernize the state.

C O N C L U S I O N

The political elites being the elected representatives of the people in a democratic set-up are the legitimate wielders of power, decision-makers, Law-givers and policy makers. The economic progress of a society depends on plans, policies and resources, and above all, on how best these plans and policies are implemented and the resources utilized. The responsibility of formulating the plans and policies and implementing them lies solely with the wielders of power - the political elites. This precisely explains the relationship between the political elites and modernization of a society. So, the quality of political elites a society has would decide the quality and quantity of economic progress achieved or to be achieved by it (society).

But since the political elites do not exist in vacuum but are the qualitative product of the society they are part and parcel of, their nature and character are essentially shaped by the various systems - economic, political, cultural etc. - of the society.

The indifferent attitude of the political elites towards modernization, gruesome revalries within them, their desperate concern for continuation in power, their non-commitment to people, their selfish character, acute factionalism, bargaining and defectionsim - the bases of all this lie in the nature and form of the political system

itself rather than in the nature and character of the political elites. Democracy as the form of 'politics' being a highly competitive process was a successful experiment of the class-stratified west. Incepted in the caste-based society of ours, it started mobilizing and manipulating available organizations - caste, communities, kingroups etc. - for allegiance. Since the masses are tied-up in different traditional solidarities such as caste, community, kingroups etc. as stock of allegiance to be manipulated at the will of the political elites, the elites hardly care about them (the masses) and get busy serving their own ends. And, there obviously ensue competitions among them since each wants to compete with the other in appropriating what is there to appropriate.

There is hardly any study on Rajasthan which seeks to assess and analyse the role of its political elites in its modernization. There are, however, a number of studies on politics and political elite wherein only bits of scattered references are found about their role in the progress of the state. Modernization of the state as a separate issue remains either unstudied or understudied. Studies on social - background of the political elites are devoid of attempts to study their behaviour in relation to developmental problems, their perception of these problems and possible solutions. Forms of concrete relationships could have been explored between elite-behaviour and social - background with the help of such studies.

Much of study is available on party politics in Rajasthan but invariably all of them are found over-emphasizing the congress ; Swantantra tussle overlooking the very fact that the Swantantra was but a momentary phenomenon. The Jana Sangh remains understudied so is its ongoing tussle with the congress. Since the Jana Sangh has majority of orthodox Hindus in its fold, has its ideology of 'Akhand Bharat' and revivalism of ancient Indian culture, it is held as a Hindu Communal organization. No attempt has yet been made to ascertain whether it is really so. All studies on party - politics in Rajasthan seem taking for granted the emergence and growth of 'Lok Dal' - the political platform of the peasantry. Reasons behind its emergence and growth are not analysed in any study.

Radical politics is the worst sufferer. Agreed that radical politics hold no viable place in the state politics but no attempt has been made to explore the reasons objectively. Many of the studies seek to give reasons that since Rajasthan is not an industrialized and literate society it obviously lacks industrial labour and education hence absence of radical politics. If industrialization and education are the pre-requisites for radical politics to extend its influence, how one explains the pre-dominance of radical politics in the most unindustrialized and illiterate terrains of eastern U.P and Bihar.

All the studies on Rajasthan politics seem proceeding with the presumption that the state-politics is caste - oriented (implying that it is caste which manipulates politics) and classes have hardly begun playing their role in politics.

The basic flaw with the available literatures on Rajasthan is that they seek to study the political elites in isolation from the 'politics', 'the political culture' and the 'social system' of the province. None of the studies seems getting to the significance of exploring and analysing objective forms of inter-relationship between the political elites, politics, ~~and society~~ ^{and Society}.

The present study, therefore, conceives to assess and analyse the political elites and their role in the progress of the society in relation to politics, ~~and society~~. The concept of modernization has been studied in the third-world context. The capitalistic and the socialistic concepts of modernization have been analysed in the light of neo-colonialism that ~~is~~ ^{is}, the quest of the first and the second worlds to extend their economic interests over the developing and the under-developed societies through propagating their socio-political ideologies in the disguise of their so - called politics of economic - aid. Modernization in the context of our society then refers to processes of synchronisation of tradition and elements of modernity.

Politics, we analysed as manipulating and consolidating ^{tradition} ~~tradition~~ and influencing other sub-structures of the society as well whose product are the political elites. So, the manipulative nature of politics naturally keeps congruence with the nature and character of the political elites.

Party-politics and the overall political culture of Rajasthan have been studied from the 'caste, class and community' perspective. Forms of association particularly between politics and caste have been explored and it has been concluded that it is basically politics which manipulates caste and not caste that manipulates it.

'Caste and class overlapping' in relation to politics has been identified and thrown light upon. Diversification of macro-structural political organization into regional political parties has been analysed in the light of socio-historical realities. Party politics has been assessed and analysed from the perspective of 'interest' of social-groups each political party seeks to represent. In short, the role of the political elites in the modernization of Rajasthan has been studied as being shaped and dictated by the overall nature of Rajasthan politics and society rather than existing independent of any influence.

It may be emphasized at this juncture that the overall frame of reference developed in this study is more of a theoretical nature than empirical since as per restrictions the study had not to be based on primary sources.

The limitations of secondary sources (which our study depends on) are too well-known where dependence of crucial social research on them is concerned.

The study promises a great deal of useful and objective results provided 'empricism' is taken help of to test and validate the hypotheses. Further research can be carried out with the help of emprical tools and techniques on social attitudes of the political elites, their personal characteristics, their perception of modernization, their motivations to enter politics, their ideological orientations and their self-images so crucial to their role in modernization. Inter-party and intra-party elite-elite relations and tussles that way well speak of the nature of elite-behaviour and party-politics could be studied. Besides, the socio-psychological hangups inherent in the upper-lower level elite-elite relations hampering the requisite coordination between the two could be attended to but with an emprical effort. Further, a comparison can be attempted between Rajasthan and a politically and economically advance state where elite-behaviour is concerned.

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