SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CHANGING PROFILE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY SINCE 1990

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**Security Environment in Northeast Asia: Changing Profile of Japanese Security Policy since 1990**", submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgement *i-ii*

Glossary *iii*

Abbreviations *iv-vi*

Tables

Table 1: Trends in Defense Expenditure 26
Table 2: What do you think about the Japan-US Security Treaty? 112
Table 3: How to protect the security of Japan? 113

Introduction 1-9

Chapter 1: **Japan's Security Policy from 1945-1990** 10-31
Evolution of Japanese Security Policy
Basic Trends in Japan's Security Policy: From No War to Self-Defense Forces
National Defense Program Outline
1978 Defense Guidelines
Concern Regarding the Increased Military Expenditure
Limitations to Japan's Exercise of Military Power

Chapter 2: **Changing Profile of Japanese Security Policy Since 1990** 32-61
Impact of the Gulf War
Implications of Domestic Shake-ups: Collapse of the 1955 System
First Nuclear Crisis and the Japanese Response
Guidelines Revised
The Second North Korean Missile Attack and Japanese Security
September 11 Attacks and Beyond
National Emergency Legislations
Constitutional Review
Nuclear Debate

Chapter 3: **Threat Perceptions and Issues with China and North Korea** 62-86
Problems and Issues with China
Burden of History

Yasukuni Shrine Visits
Dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands
Japan's Threat Perception of China
Japan and North Korea
Abduction Issue
Nuclear Issue
Japan's New Nationalism

Chapter 4: **The U.S.-Japan Alliance since 9/11** 87-113
Milestones Crossed
9/11 Terrorist Attacks and Subsequent Japan-U.S. Relations
Japan-U.S. Defense Summit
Ballistic Missile Defense
Challenges to the U.S.-Japan Alliance
An Assessment

Summary and Conclusion 114-120

Appendices 121-129

Bibliography 130-139

Preface and Acknowledgement

In the emerging complex security situation in the East Asian region, Japan's security policy appears to be undergoing dramatic changes. Over the past decade or so the Japanese attitude toward security issues has become increasingly realistic, and the security debate in Japan has been infused with fresh vitality. The nation has taken certain significant steps and implemented a number of policies that would have been unthinkable before the Gulf War.

In the post-Cold War period, Japan has shown signs of enhanced security activity, including its dispatch of military forces to provide logistic support for the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in the non-combat areas. As security dynamics in East Asia evolve, Japanese defense planners and policymakers continue to re-examine Japan's defense strategy. Japan's reaction to these security dynamics and how these reactions are perceived by Japan's neighbors could have an enduring effect on East Asian security situation. Nonetheless, debate continues within and outside Japan: What type of security actor does it seek to be? What is the dimension of security it should pursue? Will Japan prefer to stick to its pacifist standing so as to avoid regional responsibilities or will the emerging security challenges force Japan to become a normal nation are some of the interesting questions which are being attempted for an answer in this dissertation.

The unfolding dissertation is an attempt to present in broad outline an analysis of security environment in Northeast Asia where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist. The focus is on the changing security posture of Japan- highlighting the epochal junctures in the transition to the world of the twenty-first century. The work attempts to discern the past, contemporary and future trajectory of Japan's security policy and to reach a more reasoned judgment on the direction that Japan may be heading. The two objectives of the research have been - first, to understand how the regional security challenges are forcing a change in Japan's

approach; second, to take a stock of its alliance with the United States and whether it would be able to sustain these challenges. The methodology used for the study is primarily descriptive and analytical methods have been applied.

A number of Japanese and non-Japanese researchers/scholars have greatly contributed to the understanding of the issues dealt with in this study. However, with the rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia, new issues and challenges are surfacing which can alter the security scenario in the years to come. It is in such an unpredictable environment that the study of the change in the Japanese security policy becomes all the more relevant.

This is a humble effort on my part in this area of study and I hope this work triggers further research on the subject. However, if certain issues have been overlooked to maintain the relevance of the topic, I am solely to be held responsible.

During this course of research, I have been fortunate enough to have many people helped me. First of all, I express my deep sense of gratitude and sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr. H.S. Prabhakar for his able guidance, valuable suggestions, remarkable patience and constant encouragement throughout the course of the work. I am grateful to him, for providing me the opportunity to work on this interesting topic and the trust he placed in my abilities. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the staff in Japan Cultural and Information Centre and the Institute for Defence Strategy and Analysis. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my parents for their blessings and my siblings for giving me solidarity from afar. Their constant support and encouragement have been very instrumental in the accomplishment of this work. Last, but not the least, I would like to thank all my friends and my batch mate in JNU for their valuable suggestions and bearing with my mood swings especially during the completion of this work.

Glossary of Japanese Terms

Though the Japanese terms used in the text are all defined when introduced, for ease of reference or summary of the terms with brief explanations are offered below: (Note: The Romanization of the Japanese words used is without distinction between short and long vowels.)

Bunmin tosei:	Civilian control
Futsu nu kuni:	Normal nation
Fushinsen:	The intruding 'mystery ships'
Gojugo-nen-taisei:	"1955 system"
Hoppo Ryodo:	The Northern Territories
Keisatsu Yobitai:	Police Reserve Force
Koksai Kokka Nippon:	Japan as an international state
Seikei bunri:	Policy of separation of politics from economics
Senshu boie:	Defense oriented policy
Shuhen:	Areas surrounding Japan
Taiko:	New Defense Program Outline
Yujih Hosei:	Emergency crisis legislation

Abbreviations

ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ASDF	Air Self-Defense Forces
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BPND	Basic Policy for National Defense
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIISS	Chinese Institute for International and Strategic Studies
CPJ	Conservative Party of Japan
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FTA	Free Trade Agreements
GNP	Gross National Product
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Forces
HNS	Host Nation Support
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IPSA	International Political Science Association
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JSP	Japan Socialist Party

KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KMT	Kuomintang
KWP	Korean Workers Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LWR	Light water Reactor
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPO	National Defence Program Outline
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai
NPL	Non Performing Loans
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTWD	New Theatre Wide Defense
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation of Security Initiative
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
SCAP	Supreme Command for the Allied Powers
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Self-Defense Forces

SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SDJP	Socialist Democratic Party of Japan
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SMD	Sea-based Mid Course Defense
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TMD	Theatre Missile Defense
U.S.	United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations
UNPKO	United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

International relations in Northeast Asia, have assumed complexity with the end of the Cold War and more so in the new post Cold War or 'post post Cold War' period.[1] After North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and its subsequent withdrawal from the Six Party talks in February this year, the security situation in the region has deteriorated. For the second time in ten years, the Korean peninsula is engulfed by a serious crisis coming from North Korea's nuclear development, the outcome of which will heavily affect not only the peninsula but the entire Northeast Asian region.

Northeast Asia is not easy to define because it is a region still in the process of formation.[2] At its core are China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea which is yet to emerge from its almost total isolation. But it also recognizes the significance of Russia and United States in the meeting ground for four powers insistent on their entitlement in shaping the region's evolution. Even after the end of the Cold War, a number of potential conflict triggers remain, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. However, they have not resulted in a single military conflict or burst of causalities in the past fifteen years. China and North Korea have tested missiles in ways that were regarded as provocative, eliciting sharp rhetoric about security. Leaders have made statements that irritated public opinion in other nations. Yet until 2003, apart from a brief U.S. military buildup against North Korea in 1994, there was little fear of war.

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[1] The period after 9/11 has been labeled the new post Cold War or 'post post Cold War', which is described as an era of increased asymmetrical threats and terrorism, deeper global cooperation concerning counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and growing US unilateralism. For details please refer Ralph Cossa, 'Toward a post post Cold War World', *PacNet Newsletter*, 41, (2001), pp 1-6, online at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0141.htm.

[2] Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 04

There are major shifts beginning to take place in Northeast Asia and fundamental change is at hand. Unlike last 60 years, the future cannot be predicted on the basis of the past. The first half of the year 2005, is witness to some changes which can alter the security scenario in the years to come. Consider the following:

On February 10, 2005, North Korea declared its status as a nuclear weapon power and simultaneously announced its withdrawal from the stalled six-party talks.[3] This came shortly after US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice described North Korea as an "outpost of tyranny". Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) maintains that it was provoked in doing so because the United States was pursuing an "ever-more undisguised policy" to isolate and stifle it.[4]

A week later in the same month, China took a hard line and warned Japan to stay out of its internal affairs after Washington and Tokyo jointly issued a statement in February which described Taiwan issue as "not extraneous" to the US-Japan equations. In other words, Tokyo and Washington considers Taiwan issue is central to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing tends to see this as something, which flies in the face of the repeated commitments by both the United States and Japan to adhere to a One-China policy.[5]

In addition, Japan became the only major country in the world that has joined the United States in opposing the European Union's plan to end arms embargoes against China that were imposed 16 years ago after the Tiananmen massacre of unarmed pro-democracy protesters. Japan's quick, critical comments on China's Anti-Secession Law immediately after its adoption on March 14 also have irked leaders in Beijing.

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[3] Three rounds of talks bringing together the two Koreas, China, Japan and Russia and the United States have been held, with the first round in August 2003 and the last taking place in June last year in Beijing. North Korea failed to show up for a fourth round, scheduled for September 2004. These meetings have been taking place to solve the nuclear crisis in the region.

[4] 'Pyongyang Talks Tough', Editorial, *The Hindu*, February 17, 2005, p. 12

[5] The international community recognizes the non-sovereign territory of Taiwan an integral part of the people's republics of China (PRC) under the universally endorsed One-China policy.

The month of April saw one of the biggest anti-Japanese militant protest demonstrations in many Chinese towns. It was the controversial text book issue that sparked the protests. China has been asking Japan to withdraw the school text books that gloss over the atrocities committed by Japanese fascism six decades ago. This has placed Sino-Japanese relations at their lowest ebb in 30 years. And the new row over the past is a pointer to their future tussle for primacy in reshaping the East Asian order.

The above incident led to the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, issuing Japan's most public apology in a decade for its wartime aggression.[6] Japan has apologized numerous times in the past (18 including the present one), but this time the remarks carry added importance with Tokyo seeking to resolve a spat with Beijing sparked by its approval of a nationalist textbook that downplays Japan's wartime atrocities. In facing these facts of history Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi echoed sentiments expressed in the past by his country's leaders.

The last week of April was also witness to another momentous event. Marking a historic reconciliation, General Secretary of the governing Communist Party of China (CPC), Hu Jintao, and leader of Taiwan's opposition Kuomintang (KMT), Lien Chan, met in Beijing for talks aimed at revitalizing the Chinese nation. "Calling for an avoidance of confrontation and conflict, Mr. Lien said, both sides should "seek reconciliation and dialogue."[7] The significance of the comments lay in the fact that the meeting was the first between the highest leaders of these two political parties since the unsuccessful bid by Mao Zedong of the CPC and Chiang Kai-Shek of the KMT, nearly 60 years ago, to negotiate an end to the Chinese civil war. With the CPC finally triumphing in the civil war and

[6] 'China asks Japan to take concrete measures to back up remorse", *The Hindu*, April 22, 2005.
[7] "Hu, Lien hold 'historic meeting'", *The Hindu*, April 30, 2005.

establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the KMT leaders and their followers fled to Taiwan.

International efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its suspected nuclear programme were in danger of unraveling on May 1, 2005. There were reports that it has launched a short-range conventional missile into the Sea of Japan. According to the Japanese public broadcaster NHK, a missile was fired on May 1, 2005 from the east coast of North Korea and flew about 100km until it fell into the Sea of Japan.[8]

The United States warned its allies that North Korea may be ready to carry out an underground nuclear test as early as June.[9] This reflected growing fears in Washington that the North is going ahead with efforts to develop nuclear weapons. South Korean officials said Pyongyang had recently shut down a nuclear reactor, possibly to harvest plutonium that could be used in an underground test. The launch of a missile would almost certainly damage the prospects for the multi-party nuclear talks involving the two Korea, China, the US, Russia and Japan, which have been stalled for almost a year now.[10]

Another event that has raised some concern in the neighboring countries is Japan's decision to put the birthday of late wartime Emperor Hirohito back on the calendar, breaking another post-World War II taboo. According to it, the holiday would commemorate the country's post-war rebirth into a modern nation.[11] Many doubt it as a sign that Japan is going back to boosting nationalism.

In the later half of the month of May, Japan and China tried to iron out their relation when Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi arrived in Tokyo on May 17,

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[8] "Korea fired short-range missile", *The Hindu*, May 2, 2005.
[9] "North Korea set to test nuclear bomb, warns US"., *The Hindu*, May 1, 2005.
[10] On 10th July, 2005 North Korea agreed to return to Six Party Talks. The negotiations might begin from July 25th of the same month.
[11] "Hirohito's b'day back as Japan holiday", *The Times of India*, May 14, 2005.

2005. The visit was billed as part of a new move toward reconciliation after recent feuding between Asia's two biggest economies. Needless to say, it didn't work out as the optimists had hoped. Shortly before a scheduled meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Wu suddenly announced that she was heading back to Beijing-an unprecedented affront. The Chinese blamed the mess on Koizumi, who, the day before Wu arrived, suggested that he might yet again visit Yasukuni Shrine. Wu described relations between the two countries as more "difficult" than they've been since the establishment of diplomatic ties 30 years ago. Koizumi's annual visit to Yasukuni shrine even after repeated warnings that it would harm their relations, has added to their bitter past.

Another major issue of concern between the two countries is Japan's recent move to grant rights to some of its forms to carry out test-drilling for oil and natural gas in the disputed waters of the East China Sea. On July 15, 2005 Chinese Foreign Ministry express "strong protest" against the Japanese Government's approval of a Japanese oil and gas company's drill request in the East China Sea. China has termed this activity as a "severe provocation and violation" against China's sovereignty.[12]

On the same day, a senior Chinese military official, Maj Gen Zhu Chenghu said China should use nuclear weapons against the US if the American military intervenes in any conflict over Taiwan.[13] Beijing has long insisted that it will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict. But according to Gen Zhu China was under internal pressure to change its 'no first use' policy and to make clear that it would employ the most powerful weapons at its disposal to defend its claim over Taiwan. Whether or not the comments signal a shift in Chinese policy, they come at a sensitive time in relations between China and the US.

[12] "China protests Japanese move", *The Hindu*, July 16, 2005.
[13] "We'll nuke US if it meddles in Taiwan: China", *The Times of India*, July 16, 2005

Apart from this, the increasing expansion of China's military power and its growing economy is alarming to the countries in the region. Some analysts of the Asian region have argued that should the high growth rate of China's economy be sustained in the coming decades, ascending China will change the power configuration in Northeast Asia.[14]

As already pointed out above, the North Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most prominent security issues in Northeast Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea could drastically affect the military balance on the Korean peninsula, seriously destabilize Northeast Asia, and substantially weaken the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It could trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia. The grim prospect of Pyongyang passing on fissile materials to terrorist groups or rogue states is a real source of concern for everyone.

All this reveal that Northeast Asia is a region where countries are competing to reshape the global geometry of power even as they strive to resolve bilateral and regional issues. As Rozman points out,

> "We still do not know what kind of a region will take shape in Northeast Asia. It is difficult to say what will be its geographical range, its pattern of economic integration, its great-power balance, and even its degree of intercivilizational harmony or conflict. No other region in the world may be as confused or as significant for the coming decade of global security and integration."[15]

Surprisingly, economic equation between the countries of the region is the best example for emulation by elsewhere in the sense that it has the best success rate to separate economics and politics. Territorial disputes and political differences have not come in their way of economic activity with each other. In fact, intraregional trade and investment skyrocketed in the 1990s and show no letup

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[14] Changhee Nam and Seiichiro Takagi, 'Rising China and Shifting Alliances in Northeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges facing America and its Allies', *The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 2004, p. 154.
[15] Gilbert Rozman, *op.cit.*, p. 03

even in the aftermath of Asian financial crisis and the global slowdown of 2001-02.[16]

Considering this, what is necessary amongst the nations of the region is the trust and cooperation when dealing with political issues. Even now, certain political decisions, a comment from a national leader of any country raise suspicions in other countries which create distrust for each other. Kim Dalchoong, the president of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), made some very noteworthy comments in his keynote speech at IPSA World Congress, held from June 29 through July 4 in Durban in 2003. He observed that

> "The political trust among the nations of East Asia is fairly dismal in comparison to their swelling economic potential and that the largest threat to the future of this region is its lack of an effective, comprehensive security framework. The true challenge for Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors will be to create a security vision in which countries go beyond narrow concerns of their own national interest and strategies. If the countries of East Asia fail to create a cooperative security system of some kind and strike out on their own in developing their economies, militaries, political systems, and technologies, the security of the region will always be susceptible to disruption."[17]

As the region presents a complex, multidimensional, multilevel security agenda, Japan attaches great importance to the region's security because of the likely impact on Japanese domestic security. The security environment encompassing Japan has become much more complicated since the end of the Cold War, especially since 9/11 which has forced changes and has tested Japan's security policy.[18] Japan has initiated certain significant steps in the last few years. It has sent troops to a combat zone, participated in the US counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, decided to deploy the ballistic missile (BMD) system, and is in the process of revising its Constitution to enable a larger security role. Japan's security policy is intricately linked with peace in Northeast Asia. Or rather, it could be said that it is a part of it.

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[16] Gilbert Rozman, *op.cit.*, p. 01

[17] "A Nuclear Japan" *Japan Echo*, Vol 30, No. 4, August 2003, p. 38.

[18] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder and London, 2004), p. 3

While it is being accepted that Japan is unshackling herself, the main query any observer has is when and how fast will Japan 'normalize'.[19] The debate is whether Japan is voluntarily taking interest in bringing certain changes or is it only attempting to save alliance with United States, which Japan sees as of utmost important. The question also is will Japan perform its international role while holding on to Article 9 and interpreting it accordingly to the current situation, as she has been doing it or, whether it will do away with the war renouncing article. Whatever the ultimate outcomes, the recent changes appear to display far more severe implications in the long run unless relations are seriously managed.

Following chapters unfold through a modest research attempt the way the Japanese Security Profile has evolved and is changing.

Chapter One traces the evolution of Japanese security policy and how it came to rely on United States for its security. The chapter deals with the Japanese dilemma throughout this period of how to stick to its Constitutional provision and also support its alliance with US, which contradicted its constitution. In spite of the pressure from the United States to take more active interest in its own defense, Japan managed to keep its pacifist tradition with only minor changes done to keep the alliance.

Chapter Two looks at how with the end of Cold War, the security environment in the region changed which forced Japan to come out of its pacifist attitude and take more active interest in its own security. Japan has been scaling new heights in terms of its security which have been in the purview of this chapter.

[19] The term 'normal nation' or *futsu nu kuni* was originally popularized by Ichiro Ozawa. By normal nation he means a country that can take a more active part in UN-sanctioned collective security operations.

The Cold War scenario has not changed with the end of Cold War in this part of the world and situation has worsened for the countries of the region. There is a kind of distrust which persists which is hindering in smooth functioning of their relations with each other. Chapter Three deals with these threat perceptions of Japan vis-à-vis China and North Korea. It also looks into how Japanese reactions to these have been termed as the rise of nationalism in Japan.

Chapter Four, covers the most important pillar of the Japanese Security Policy – its alliance with the United States. The alliance has grown from a parent-child relationship to the one of being partners in the region. In spite of facing serious challenges in the new post Cold War period, it seems to be strengthening with each passing year. Looking at the current security situation in the region, it seems the alliance is going to sustain itself and grow stronger in the coming years.

Chapter One

Japan's Security Policy From 1945-1990

In the long run, however, rifles and swords can no longer prevail . . . What grasps people's minds and functions as a gyrocompass for domestic and international politics will be . . . the power of moral justice and the spirit of rationalism.[1] [2]

Since World War II, relations with the United States have occupied the central place in Japan's foreign policy. The period of Occupation (read American Occupation), from 1945 to 1952, accompanied by the adoption of a new Constitution in 1947 made way for sweeping American sponsored constitutional and political reforms and changed Japan's whole appearance. The U.S. imposed Peace Constitution was intended to demilitarize Japan and erected a barrier to the revival of militarism, but during the ensuing Cold War years, ended in the formation of a Japanese-American military and political alliance. Since then security has become a pivotal issue in postwar Japanese foreign policy and United States, the centerpiece of Japanese security policy. Before we go into the finer nuances of Japanese security policy, let us first look at what is security?

Conception of security like its definition, actors, issues and approaches are capable of varying across historical and geographical contexts. The word "security" entered the Japanese vocabulary after World War II to replace the term "national defense," which was generally in use before the war.[3] Security had a strong economic connotation before it acquired a wider meaning. The definition of the term security has varied from paradigm to paradigm.

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[1] This was the first reference to a national security concept made by a Japanese premier after the surrender in August 1945. Addressing the Eighty-Ninth Imperial Parliament on January 28, 1946, Shidehara Kijuro reminded the public of a stern fact that the government was too occupied with the administrative affairs related to postwar reconstruction to think about national security per se. His reference to the "power of moral justice" echoed Morito Tatsuo's thesis that the truly peaceful nation not only wants no war but possesses no war potential and that "a defeated Japan could not grasp the chance to live as a truly peaceful nation" and in this role "become a leader of the world."

[2] Quoted from Makato Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies" in R.A. Scalpino Ed. *The Foreign policy of Japan* (Berkeley, 1977) p. 341

[3] Seizaburo Sato, "Why 'National Defence' Became 'Security'", *Gaiko Forum*, Summer, 2000. p. 5

During the Cold War, Realist or Western school of thought was dominant. Realist or Western school focused on the definitions, actors, issues, and approaches in the military dimension and the key role of the nation-state and interstate warfare.[4] In simple words, security refers to the defence of the nation/sovereign state from external military threats. The predominance of this approach is evident in the way security studies in the United States have been taken to mean "the study of the threat, use and control of military force."[5] In contrast, a report compiled in 1980 by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's Policy Study Group states: "Security means protecting the people's life from various types of threats." It includes a comprehensive combination of military and non-military means. The reason for this broad approach, according to Akihiko Tanaka is realists focusing on military affairs are not part of the academic mainstream in Japan as they are in United States and hence the difference between the two approaches.

It is from 1990s that alternative security concerns were able to reemerge in the mainstream security agenda. Security is now a multidimensional framework which emphasizes on the economic, societal, environmental and military aspects of security. For reasons of convenience and importance, this work deals with military aspects of Japan' security policy.

The evolution of Japan's Security Policy

After the defeat in the World War II, Japan was placed under the administration of The Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and was stripped of its colonial possessions. The SCAP under General Douglas MacArthur implemented the initial phase of U.S. postwar strategy for Japan, which sought to ensure that Japan could never emerge again as a regional power through a three-

[4] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Security* (Colorado, 2004), p. 7.
[5] Akihiko Tanaka, "A Model for Japanese Security in the Twenty-first Century", *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Fall 1996, p. 281.

pronged reform package of demilitarization, democratization, and economic deconcentration.[6] The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were disbanded in 1945. On May 3rd, 1947, a new Constitution was passed into law for the nation of Japan. This so called "Peace Constitution" can be said to be the starting point for understanding the fundamental nature of Japan's security policy.

The Japanese Constitution, drafted under the American occupation government, placed strict limits on Japanese military capabilities. The Preamble states its ideals with regard to security:

> We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.[7]

The ninth article of the Japanese Constitution renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. It also promises never to maintain land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.[8] In short, the Constitution does not give Japan the right to use armed forces.

The scourge of the war and the nations crushing defeat after the World War II made Japanese people distrust the armed forces. The wartime elite in Japan had come to power through campaigns of assassination, maneuver, and artificial emergencies designed to rally support behind militarist expansion in Asia,

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[6] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 128.
[7] See Appendix 1.
[8] Article 9 states that, 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.'

reinforcing a sense of victimization on the part of many Japanese, who viewed themselves as helpless in the face of "political forces beyond their control."[9] The result was a deep antipathy for the Japanese military. And this profound Japanese distrust of its own military has consistently been reflected in the Japanese debate over defense and national security throughout the postwar era.

The widespread popular pacifism is a reality of postwar Japanese political sentiment. Constructivist scholars like Peter J. Katzenstein and Thomas Berger have described what they term as a pervasive "culture of anti-militarism", born out of the trauma of World War II, the destruction of Japanese cities under grinding American bombardment, and the shocking power of nuclear war.[10]

The idea of antimilitarism became so ingrained that it was politically incorrect — some might say politically suicidal — for anyone to even think of having any kind of military force. And yet, ironically, shortly after Japan adopted the Constitution in 1947, Washington began to pressure Tokyo to reinterpret Article 9 in ways that would expand Japan's ability to help defend itself against the Soviet Union and communist expansion in the region. The then Prime Minster, Yoshida resisted the pressure, arguing that Japan could not afford increased defense expenditure. The pro-military faction disagreed with this and they viewed U.S pressure as an opportunity to establish an autonomous and more independent Japanese defense capability. Ultimately a pragmatic policy known as the "Yoshida Doctrine" prevailed, which called for Japan to focus on economic development and rely primarily on the United States for defense. He stated, 'the day will come when

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[9] Thomas Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security,* Vol 17, No. 4, 1993, p. 133.

[10] For a detailed theoretical framework on the culture of anti-militarism, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle (our security) until then.'[11]

According to David Arase, in Yoshida's mind, this post-war strategy was provisional and the implication of his statement was that Japan would aim for independent strategic status only after it had acquired the economic basis for it. Thus by distancing itself from the expenditure on defense and security matters, Japan went ahead on to achieve high rates of economic growth. It was, in Susan Pharr's phrasing, a "low-cost, low-risk, benefit-maximizing strategy", defensive in nature and skillful for the degree to which it exploited American needs for Japan's gain.[12]

Meanwhile the situation in the East was getting volatile. The onset of Cold War and the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, heightened U.S. perceptions of the threat from communist expansion and persuaded U.S. policymakers to convert Japan into a friendly client state that would serve as a bulwark against communism. Seventeen days after the outbreak of the Korea War, General MacArthur "authorized" (meaning "instructed") the Japanese government to set up a 75,000-man Police Reserve Force (*Keisatsu Yobitai*) to deal with internal orders.[13] In talks with Prime Minister Yoshida in January and February 1951, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles requested that Japan rearm (including building an army of up to 350,000).[14] This triggered the first postwar debates over Japan's rearmament. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru advanced three reasons why there would be no rearmament. First, rearmament was too expensive for the economy of a defeated Japan; second, psychologically, the public did not support it; and third, the scars of the defeat were still unhealed. The existing restrictions on Japanese rearmament

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[11] David Arase, "A militarized Japan?", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 18, No. 3, September 1995, p. 84.
[12] Susan Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing." in *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change*, Gerald L. Curtis, ed. (New York, 1993), p. 237.
[13] Makato Momoi, *op.cit.*, p. 342.
[14] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 128.

offered the ideal means by which to avoid being crushed under the weight of the superpower. Article 9's ban on the use of military force was actually Japan's "Heaven-bestowed good fortune" in the opinion of Yoshida, who advised a young deputy at the time that "If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools."[15]

However, by 1951, Yoshida's views on national security underwent a subtle change when he accepted the idea of a Japan-U.S. mutual security treaty system. The Occupation of Japan came to an end with the signing of the San Francisco Treaty with the Allied Powers in 1951. Japan also signed a bilateral U.S. - Japan Security Treaty in September 1951[16] which determined the future path of Japanese security policy. By that time the world was divided into two blocs – the western or the capitalist bloc led by U.S. and the eastern or the communist and socialist bloc headed by the U.S.S.R. Japan's acceptance of both the treaties led to its integration into the U.S. camp and Japan was incorporated into the sphere of interdependency centered on the United States.

By signing the Treaty, the U.S. got the crucial basing rights in Japan to defend Japan as well as to keep a check on communism. Interpreting Yoshida's doctrine, Michael Green says,

> "It was piece of a calculated national security strategy. Alliance with the United States provided technology transfers, economic assistance, and markets for those conservatives who were concerned primarily with economic recovery. For the hawks, the alliance provided a source of military technology, defense assistance, and external political support for some level of rearmament. For the doves, the alliance provided a cap on that rearmament.[17]

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[15] Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Changes in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York, 2003), p. 12

[16] See Appendix

[17] Michael J. Green, *op.cit.*, pp. 11-12

Basic Trends in Japan's Security Policy: from 'No War' to Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

With the threatening prospect of Soviet expansionism shaping a new Cold War security order, the United States was desperate to rebuild its former enemy as a bulwark of anti-Communism in East Asia. The Security Treaty ensured that Japan was incorporated into the U.S. side in the bipolar divide and it slowly opened the way for rearmament. Japan agreed to accept U.S. military aid in the form of mutual military assistance in 1953.[18] In June 1954 the Defense Agency Establishment Law was enacted to create the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the Self-Defense Forces Law to create the SDF and then was enacted the Law Concerning the Structure of the National Defense Council (July 1956) to create the National Defense Council (later National Security Council of Japan) responsible for planning Japanese defense policy.[19]

As their name implies, the SDF are officially intended solely for the purpose of "exclusive self-defense." The SDF is heavily confined in its activities, subject to numerous restrictions imposed by the civilian control (*bunmin tosei*). Article 66 of the constitution stipulates that all ministers of state must be civilians. In addition, the 1954 Defense Agency and SDF establishment laws decree that the civilian prime minister is the commander in chief of the SDF (article 7 of the SDF law), and that the prime minister directs the civilian director general of the JDA (articles 8 and 9 of the SDF law), who then gives orders to uniformed chiefs of staff of the three services of the SDF.[20] Any deployment outside Japan's territorial borders has until only recently been forbidden, and collective security arrangements remain unconstitutional under current interpretations. The creation of the SDF encouraged military proponents to lobby for a stronger defense industry capable of

[18] Christopher W. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 129
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

supporting expanding military needs. However, re-establishment of military forces stoked fears of remilitarization and met with significant popular resistance. Many politicians argued that the Japanese government's moves were in disharmony with article 9. But the government went ahead with it.

In the early Cold War period, Japan's principal involvement in regional security was an indirect one via the framework of the US-Japan security treaty. On May 20, 1957, the Defense Council announced the Basic Policy for National Defense (BPND). This was Japan's first statement of its individual military policy. The brief but precise paper (1) stressed the deterrent function of a defence capability; (2) pledged support for UN activities; (3) emphasized the need for a comprehensive national security policy; (4) called for a "gradual build-up of an efficient defense capability" exclusively for the purpose of self-defense, and finally, (5) argued that "the security system with the U.S. will be sufficient to deal with any external aggression."[21] It is noteworthy that BPND has remained unchanged as the foundation of Japan's security policy since 1957.

The BPND opened the door to the quantitative and qualitative buildup of SDF military capabilities.[22] Between 1957 and 1972 the Japanese cabinets announced four defense build-up plans, each of which represented an increasingly autonomous position. The First Defense Build-up Program (1958-60) produced a quantitative increase in Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) strength to fill a possible vacuum that might be created by the withdrawal of US ground troops from its territory.

Meanwhile, by this time the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was revised in 1960.[23] With this Japan granted the U.S. the right to dispose its land, air and sea forces and to use service facilities in Japan (Art 6) for contributing to the security

[21] Makato Momoi, *op cit.*, p. 346.
[22] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 143.
[23] See Appendix 3.

of Japan and maintenance of international peace and security of the Far East. The two countries were obliged to assist one another in the case of an armed attack on Japan, even though it was understood that Japan would not come to the aid of U.S. if it were attacked because the Constitution does not give Japan the right to use armed forces. Alexei Senatorov compares this situation of Japan to an aircraft carrier on which foreign airplanes are based to be used at the discretion of their owner, while above the aircraft flutters the white truce flag.[24]

Even then Japan never fully shared the U.S. threat perceptions in East Asia. While aligning with the U.S., Japan followed the policy of separation of politics from economics (*seikei bunri*), and tried to maintain good trading relations with the countries of the region. Jennifer Lind has termed this as "buck-passing strategy", which recognizes the need to balance against a threat, but it does as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others.[25] Thus Japan with its limited contribution to the alliance was fairly secure and effectively transfer costs for its defense to the United States.

With American assurances that the nuclear umbrella was still valid and effective, and with its encouragement that Japan should "firmly establish a defense posture capable of dealing effectively with aggression smaller in scale than a local war involving conventional arms," Japan formally adopted its Second Defense Build-up Plan in July 1961.[26] The Second Plan (1962-66) confronted a number of issues not dealt with in the first plan or other government defense papers. It augmented the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) through increased weapons procurements and stated that SDF must be able to "deal effectively with aggression lower in the scale than a local conventional war," and recognized the need to deal with a fairly large-scale aggression without

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[24] Alexei Senatorov, "Japan: From "Single-Country Pacifism" to a "Normal" Country?", *Far Eastern Affairs*, Vol 32, No. 1, January-March 2004, p. 55

[25] Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy", *International Security*, Vol 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 103

[26] Makato Momoi, *op cit.*, p. 352

US help during the initial period.[27] The Third Defense Build-up Program (1967-71) emphasized an autonomous naval and air build-up. It concentrated on qualitative improvements in Japan's naval defense in its periphery waters, reflecting Japan's concern over the expanding Soviet naval presence in the Far East. It also placed priority on air defence of vital territorial areas. Kishi government also put 1 % limit on defense expenditure.

With the "miracle" of Japan's post-war growth boom greatly evident by the 1970s, Japanese protestations that economic weakness necessitated minimal defense expenditure were no longer seen as a reasonable excuse. At the same time, major shifts in the dynamics of the Cold War forced the Tokyo leadership to reassess the stability of the American promise to defend Japan with only a minimal Japanese contribution in return, the crucial foundation of the Yoshida Doctrine. The American withdrawal from Vietnam and U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger's clandestine visit to China raised the possibility that its commitments in Asia were being scaled back. The 'Nixon Shocks'[28] of 1972, further engraved Japan's concerns. It was during this time when the Fourth Build-up Plan came up.

Japanese government initial proposals for a Fourth Defense Build-up Program (1972-76) encountered domestic opposition. Worried by the Nixon Doctrine of 1969,[29] Nakasone Yasuhiro, director general of the JDA, argued that Japan should pursue a more autonomous defense posture and that the BPND should be replaced with a principle that stated, among other things, that the US-Japan security arrangement should merely supplement Japan's own defense capabilities.[30] Nakasone, considered hawkish, subsequently proposed a near doubling of defense

[27] Makato Momoi, *op.cit.*,p. 347
[28] The decision by the Nixon Government to impose ten per cent import surcharge and the floating of the dollar. Tokyo was the major target of this 'new economic policy'. This was the time when Japan's trade surplus and the United States' trade deficit in their respective accounts and the US-Japan bilateral trade imbalance all reached unprecedented highs.
[29] It sought to reduce costs by scaling down U.S. conventional forces and having local allies step up to fill their roles.
[30] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 144

expenditure in the new program. His plan set off a number of controversies. The opposition argued that Japan was heading toward full-scale rearmament, and that this would arouse criticism and fear among its Asian neighbors. Finally, his plans were defeated by the opponents.

The fourth plan was labeled "new" instead of the number "fourth" to indicate the new need for Japan to deal with conventional contingencies in response to the Nixon Doctrine. The plan defined a basic defense concept in fairly logical sequence. First, Japan's defence capabilities should be able to deal with limited, direct aggression (by implication, without immediate U.S. involvement) by maintaining sea and air control in Japan's peripheries for the limitation of damage and an early elimination of the aggressor. Second, in case Japan fails in the mission, it should be able to deny and resist any attempts by the aggressor to achieve a military fait accompli or to occupy a local area. Third, together with the necessary denial and resistance, Japan should be able to terminate the contingencies either with U.S. support under the security treaty or with peace effort through the U.N. Finally, Japan must continue to depend on the U.S. for deterrence against nuclear threat.[31]

Following the end of first Cold War there was a period of detente and it produced further developments in Japan's buildup of its individual capabilities in relation to its security ties with the United States. By that time there was growing criticism of Japan in U.S and she was accused of shirking her security responsibilities and getting a "free ride" at U.S. expense. This attitude made Japanese leaders nervous, angry and also uncertain about how to react to American criticism.[32] Already there was domestic opposition on the increasing defence capabilities of Japan. To maintain a fine balance between the two was important and most desired. The government had to reassure the public that government

[31] Makato Momoi, *op cit.*, pp. 358-359
[32] H.M. Holland, *Managing Defence* (London, 1988), p. x

would adhere to an approximately 1 percent ceiling on defence, at the same time it also had to convince the United States that it is doing all that it can do to meet its defense obligations. The policymakers in Japan realized that U.S.-Japan security arrangements had and would continue to be an integral part of maintaining this international structure and that their alliance with the US still formed the ultimate safeguard for Japan's security. Thus despite domestic opposition, the policymakers resolved to increase Japan's defense capabilities and to support the U.S. security position in the region.

The Japanese government – forced as it was to juggle the varying demands of the continued strengthening of individual defense capabilities, the maintenance of U.S. - Japan security arrangements, and to simultaneously restrain any excessive build up of the SDF – produced the *Taikó* or National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976 as the next step in military security policy planning.[33]

National Defence Program Outline (NDPO)

As one of the key pillars of Japanese defense policy, NDPO was established as an official government policy in October 1976. It marked a significant departure from previous defense programs as it was for the first time, since 1945, Japan organized its defense around an explicit strategic doctrine. NDPO sought to galvanize the public in support of military modernization. It assumed that détente between the United States and the Soviet Union would continue, that the credibility of the U.S-Japan relationship would not be jeopardized, that Soviet expansionism would be curbed by NATO's military buildup, unrest in Eastern Europe and a poor Soviet economic performance, that there would be no Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and that a status quo on the Korean peninsula would be maintained.[34]

[33] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 144
[34] H.M Holland, *op cit.*, pp. 21-22

The NDPO began by stating that the broad objective for Japan's military forces was to safeguard Japan's security by forestalling aggression against Japan in cooperation with the United States.[35] It set a ceiling to defense spending at one percent of GNP and this assured the public and opposition parties that the military would be kept under control. It also conceptualized a standard defense force capable of coping with limited or small-scale aggression. And if that aggression proved too powerful, it would employ a force structure capable of effective resistance until U.S. cooperation could be obtained. It emphasized the modernization of weapons systems and equipment and the strengthening of the logistic support system but stabilized SDF expansion in the short term.

According to Holland, the NDPO was a watershed in Japanese defense policy and it gave Japanese defense planners a relatively free hand to interpret what it meant because of is vagueness as a guide to an effective defense buildup.[36]

Despite the existence of all these measures, Japan still heavily relied on the U.S. shield, and shied away from close integration at the operational level. In Washington, officials consistently complained that Japan was not playing an active enough role in assuring its own defense. In Tokyo leaders feared that the incentive value of merely providing basing rights to American forces in the Japanese islands now seemed a fragile thing on which to hang Japan's defense. Now, it was the feeling of abandonment rather than the possibility of entanglement that became the chief fear of the Japanese leaders. At the same time, the threat of the Soviet Union could no longer be ignored. Japan's policymakers though still restrained about close military cooperation in the mid-1970s recognized the pressing need to increase military support for the United States. And thus was formulated the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the "Defense Guidelines") that were approved by the NSC of Japan in November 1978.

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[35] H.M. Holland, *op.cit.*, p. 22
[36] *Ibid.*

1978 Defense Guidelines

The 1978 Defense Guidelines were designed to give definite shape for the first time to U.S. - Japan military cooperation, including combined tactical planning, information exchanges, and logistical support.[37] It maintained the SDF's role in self-defense. The Guidelines for Japan – U.S. Defense Cooperation dealt with three scenarios: deterrence of aggression against Japan, joint action in case of an armed attack on Japan, and Japan's assistance to the United States in unspecified situations that might affect Japanese security.[38] Thus the Guidelines gave operational meaning to the U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan's defence.

Concern Regarding the Increased Military Expenditures

With the onset of the second Cold War, these Guidelines enhanced strategic military cooperation between the two countries. There was quantitative and qualitative buildup of the SDF's military capabilities to complement U.S. military deployments and support the overall regional security strategy.[39] This was evident from the acquisitions made by the MSDF and ASDF of modern, highly sophisticated military equipment. The Japanese government's response to the increased Soviet naval presence in the region led the then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko in May 1981 announce that MSDF would take responsibility for the defense of Japan's own SLOCs up to a range of 1,000 nautical miles. At that time, the government justified this major change in SDF's force structure in terms of protecting merchant shipping bringing oil from the Middle East.

The GSDF acquired large number of tanks and shifted the weight of its deployments to the main island of Hokkaido to counter the Soviet threat. Likewise,

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[37] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 146.
[38] Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post War Japan (Ithaca, 1996), p.132.
[39] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 147.

the ASDF also purchased the E-2C early warning aircraft and F-15 fighters in the 1980s. These were justified to defend Japanese airspace against Soviet T-26 Backfire bombers in the event of war.[40] But actually in the event of a conflict they would clearly be used to defend U.S. bases in Japan from Soviet air strikes and release U.S. military units from defensive responsibilities to concentrate on combat outside Japanese territory.[41] In order to provide the MSDF with submarine detection capability, large numbers of P-3C planes were acquired. These were to be used in SLOC defence and built a close working relationship with the U.S. navy.

By mid-1980s Japan was on the way to becoming a conventional military power in terms of weaponry. This led to the then head of the U.S. Defense Information Center, former Rear-Admiral Gene LaRocque in 1984 pointing out that "Japan's total military force capability compared favorably with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies."[42]

During this period combined exercises took place between the military forces of U.S. and Japan. In 1980, naval cooperation took a major leap forward. For the first time, the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercises together with the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, ASDF and GSDF also conducted combined exercises in 1980s. Japan's expansion of its individual military capabilities in conjunction with United States allowed Prime Minister Suzuki to describe the U.S.-Japan security arrangements as an "alliance relationship" for the first time in 1981.[43]

In the early 1980s, there was growth in the political power of those supportive of a militarily strong Japan. This was symbolized by the election of

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[40] Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London, 1996), p. 50

[41] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 147

[42] Glenn D. Hook, *op.cit.*, p. 50

[43] Arpita Mathur, "Japan's Changing Role in the US-Japan Security Alliance", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2004, p. 506.

Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1982, the first LDP prime minister to have served a term as the director-general of the Defense Agency. The imprint of his nationalism is visible in the policies he pursued. Nakasone sought to take a number of initiatives aimed at breaking out of the normative constraints imposed on its military as a legitimate instrument of state policy. He wanted to increase Japan's military might and integrate with the U.S. forces in the region. There was tremendous pressure from the U.S. administration to increase armament to play a vital role in maintaining military balance to fight the challenges of Cold War. Prior to the advent of Nakasone, successive Japanese administrations had been able to use domestic political factors, such as popular opposition to increased expenditure and Constitution as a means to resist U.S. pressure. Nakasone's political will to create a new national identity and normalization of Japan helped the U.S. to push Nakasone for greater role in military affairs.

Following his visit to the U.S. and meeting President Ronald Regan, he announced that "Japan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the West." He accepted a greater defense burden as demanded by the U.S. and took endeavor to boost Japan's military might. With greater defense cooperation, Nakasone aimed to achieve his own nationalist goal of making Japan an international state (*Koksai Kokka Nippon*).[44] As a result, Japan from near zero military establishments after the defeat was emerging as a normal military big power in the 1980s.

Nakasone lifted the 1 per cent ceiling on military spending in 1987. The 1 per cent ceiling had been established in November 1976 by the Miki Cabinet in the wake of his administration's earlier decision to adopt the NDPO. For the Japanese public, '1 per cent' was the figure as close to the 'zero-point perspective' as practicable.[45] It was a symbol of the ideal demilitarized state as Japan's identity. And Japan's neighbors in East Asia perceived the ceiling as a symbol of Japan's

[44] Glenn D. Hook, *op.cit.*, p.70.
[45] *Ibid.*,p. 55.

commitment to eschew becoming a normal military big power. Japanese defense expenditures exceeded the 1 per cent limit of GNP for the first time between 1987 and 1989 (See Table 1).

Table 1

Trends in Defense Expenditures (1980-92) Initial Budget (¥ billion)

Year	GNP (A)	General Account Expenditures (B)	Increase Over Previous Year (C)	Defense Expenditure (D)	Increase Over Previous Year (E)	Defense Spending as % GNP (D/A)	Defense Spending as % of Govt. Spending (D/B)
1980	247,800	42,600	10.3%	2,200	6.5%	0.900%	5.3%
1981	264,800	46,800	9.9%	2,400	7.6%	0.910%	5.1%
1982	277,200	49,700	6.2%	2,600	7.8%	0.930%	5.2%
1983	281,700	50,400	1.4%	2,800	6.5%	0.980%	5.5%
1984	296,000	50,600	0.5%	2,900	6.6%	0.990%	5.8%
1985	314,600	52,500	3.7%	3,100	6.9%	0.997%	6.0%
1986	336,700	54,100	3.0%	3,300	6.6%	0.993%	6.2%
1987	**350,400**	**54,100**	**0.0%**	**3,500**	**5.2%**	**1.004%**	**6.5%**
1988	**365,200**	**56,700**	**4.8%**	**3,700**	**5.2%**	**1.013%**	**6.5%**
1989	**389,700**	**60,400**	**6.6%**	**3,900**	**5.9%**	**1.006%**	**6.55**
1990	417,200	66,200	9.6%	4,200	6.1%	0.997%	6.3%
1991	459,600	70,300	6.2%	4,400	5.5%	0.950%	6.2%
1992	483,700	72,200	2.7%	4,600	3.8%	0.940%	6.3%

Source: 1992 Defense White Paper, p. 306

Another step, he took was visiting Yasukuni shrine (symbolic fountainhead of prewar militarism) in the official capacity of Prime Minister. This stirred the debate in East Asian countries and was seen as the revival of Japanese prewar militarism.

In yet another step, Nakasone in 1983, partially breached the ban on export of weapon-related technology by signing an Exchange of Technology Agreement between Japan and the U.S. Now the United States got access to Japanese technology in both the public and private sectors i.e. technology in possession of

the JDA, technology originally provided by the U.S. and then improved by the Japanese government or the private sector, as well as technology developed independently by the private sector. Before the adoption of Guidelines, it was Japan who used to rely on the transfer of high levels of technology and information from the United States. Japan by this time had attained higher level of technology development and was a tough competitor to U.S. in technology front.

The signing of this agreement led to the undermining of the ban on the export of arms and weapon-related technology. According to Hook, this was the most important signal of the formal erosion of a normative principle established as a constraint on militarization process.[46] Japan in 1986 also signed an agreement with the United States for participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars missile shield proposed by President Ronald Reagan.[47]

These new ties and the accompanying buildup of Japanese forces were significant, but remained under an Article 9 framework that prohibited Japan from participating in missions unrelated to its own direct defense. The new joint relationship was described as "shield and spear", where U.S. forces were the "spear" and Japanese forces the "shield."[48]

The need of cooperation with its alliance was recognized by the Japanese leadership but their reluctance in playing a front-line role remained. It was this loose alliance relationship that was challenged with the end of Cold War.

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[46] Glenn D. Hook, *op.cit.*, p. 54
[47] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 148
[48] Michael Green, "The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations after the Cold War" in Gerald L. Curtis ed, *New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations* (Tokyo, 2000), p. 244

Limitations to Japan's Exercise of Military Power

The limitations to Japan's security policy are both external and internal. The external factors include Japan's demilitarization process, the bilateral security treaty with the United States and the imposed peace constitution. Internal and self-imposed constraints also shaped Japan's response to security challenges.

Exclusive Defense-Oriented Defense

The Japanese government has pursued an exclusively defense oriented policy (*senshu boie*) and elaborated other constitutional prohibitions on Japan's exercise of military power. The first is that Japan should limit its military capacity to the minimum necessary for the purpose of self-defense. But the government stresses that the minimum limit depends on the prevailing international situation and standards of military technology. It also stresses that the SDF should not possess "war potential" as prohibited in article 9. The second prohibition relates to the conditions of the right of self-defense. The Japanese government defines these as an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan, the absence of an appropriate means to deal with aggression other than the resort to the right to self defense, and the use of armed force confined to the minimum necessary level. The third constraint defines the geographic scope of self-defense. The government argues that it is not necessarily confined to Japanese territory. Japanese government regarded the overseas dispatch of SDF as unconstitutional as it would exceed the minimum force necessary for self-defense. During Cold War Japan refrained from doing so. The law was amended in 1992.

Collective Self-Defense

The fourth prohibition is on collective self-defense. The Japanese government recognizes that as a sovereign state and under article 7 of the UN Charter it has the inherent right to collective self-defense but since the 1950s, the government has taken the position that its actual exercise would exceed the minimum necessary force for self-defense and is therefore unconstitutional. During the Cold War Japan was never asked to exercise collective self-defense in support of its U.S. ally because of the fact that Japan-U.S. defense cooperation was concentrated around Japan. And in case it has to take an action to defend its own territory and U.S. troops there, both are justified under the right to self-defense. However according to the U.S. this is an insufficient alliance commitment and limits the scope of U.S.-Japan defence cooperation which will move further beyond Japan's own territory. As a result there is a vigorous debate in Japan regarding the need for the government to revise its interpretation to permit the exercise of collective self-defense.

Restrictions on the Use of Force

Apart from the above constitutional prohibitions, Japan's exercise of military force for security ends has been governed by a range of antimilitaristic principles and policies, many derived from the spirit if not the letter of the preamble and article 9.

First, the government repeatedly pledges not to become a military great power. It gives no strict definition of the criteria for that but stresses that it will not acquire military capabilities above the minimum necessary. This is quite debatable as what do we understand from 'minimum necessary.' What is minimum necessary for us may not be the same for them.

Second, since the administration of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in 1967, the Japanese government has maintained the three non-nuclear principles-not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan, and thus has preferred to rely on U.S. nuclear umbrella. The three non-Nuclear principles are widely seen as the symbols of Tokyo's pacifism of so called 'nuclear allergy' or 'nuclear taboo' since the country's defeat in World War II with the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is to be noted that Japanese government does not regard nuclear weapons as unconstitutional if used for the purpose of self-defense. Another thing to be noted is that the third principle has arguably been breached by the introduction into or transit through Japanese ports of nuclear weapons on U.S. naval vessels.

Third, Japan restricts the export of arms and defense technology. Initially it was restricted to communist states and counties under UN sanction and parties to international dispute but later was extended to all states.

Fourth, the Japanese National Diet in May 1969 passed a resolution stating that Japan's activities in outer space should be limited to peaceful purposes, interpreted as non-military activities. However Japan's development of spy satellites and a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system since the 1990s has challenged this principle.

Finally, the defense expenditure is limited to 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) from 1976 onward. Though during Nakasone's premiership, he pushed the defense spending just above 1 percent but the successive governments have maintained defense spending around 1 percent.

Another factor that has restricted Japan's exercise of military power for national security ends is the memory of prewar militarism and the system of civilian control imposed on the SDF. Article 66 of the constitution stipulates that

all ministers of state must be civilians. The Prime Minister is the commander-in-chief of the SDF and even the director general of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is a civilian.

Though Japan has more or less stuck to limitations in its security policy, it is quite clear that from time to time they have interpreted these limitations in the existing situation of that time. Whenever there have been concerns about commitment, Japan has not disappointed its ally. Through whatever changed it could make it has managed to maintain its alliance with U.S.

Thus Japanese security policy can be grouped into three categories in terms of interactions between Japan's security policy and the international security environment. During the first period (1945-51), the basic framework of security policy was shaped. In the second (1957-60) and third periods (1968-89), minor changes occurred in the security environment that were not potent enough to cause significant changes in Japan's security policy. The end of Cold War prompted discussion of Japan's new responsibilities as a global, economic power, but Japan continued to rely on the United States for security. The limitations of this approach came to a head prior to 1991 Gulf War. And this was the turning point in the changing attitude of the Japanese policymakers. It is this changing mindset of the Japanese and the reasons for the changing attitude which is the subject of discussion in the next chapter.

Chapter Two

Changing Profile of Japanese Security Policy Since 1990

Japan's view of its national security appears to be undergoing a sea-change. Any close observer of Japan and its position in the international system will admit that intriguing new trends and developments have emerged as Japan grapples with questions relating to its international role. The key question that Japan confronts today is whether it should become a "normal" country, which is strategically self-reliant country that assumes a balanced range of international roles, including political and military ones that are proportional to its world class economic capabilities. David Arase elucidates that, while Japan has not taken any authoritative, overt decision to abandon the postwar policy line established by Shigeru Yoshida, it has moved beyond it implicitly, and has stepped onto a slippery slope leading toward an independent security posture.[1]

The principal driver of this change is the alteration of Japan's external security environment. From 1945 to the early 1990's, few Japanese believed that their country faced a serious military threat or needed to concern itself with international power politics. Japan was defined as a unique "Peace State" dedicated to realizing the pacifist ideals of its 1947 constitution. Air, sea and land forces were maintained, but these were deemed not to constitute a "military" in the conventional sense, and were limited to what was thought necessary to repel a direct attack on Japanese territory. Declaring itself, in effect, a "conscientious objector," Japan abstained from collective security arrangements and the use of force.

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[1] David Arase, "Japan's Evolving Security Policy After the Cold War", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 1994, p. 396.

With the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. it was believed that the Cold War power structure would automatically collapse. While it did happen in Europe, in East Asia, the continued division of Korean peninsula, the Chinese claim to Taiwan and outstanding territorial dispute between Japan and Russia remained as bleak reminders of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War accelerated fundamental shifts in the international system. And as James E. Auer and Robyn Lim opine, Japan's strategic environment is now much less predictable, and thus potentially more dangerous, than during the Cold war.[2]

In 1990s, important events took place which show that in practice Japan is gradually, although very cautiously, liberating itself from "absolute pacifism," or "single-country pacifism," as it is otherwise called.[3] What brought a definite change in Japan's security stance was the traumatic experience after the second Gulf Crisis. Japan was rebuffed by United States as not capable of taking an international role for herself. Secondly, North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs convinced many Japanese that they did in fact face a serious military threat, particularly after Pyongyang test fired missiles over Japanese territory in 1993 and 1998. Another source of concern is China's rising power and bellicosity. Japanese expectations of a relatively benign China preoccupied with economic growth were shaken by Beijing's use of "missile diplomacy" in the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis; its assertive claims over the Spratly and Senkaku islands; its continued nuclear testing and military modernization; and its unwillingness to set aside the "burden of history" in Sino-Japanese relations.

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[2] James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, "Japan: America's New South Korea?" *Current History*, Vol 103, No. 674, September 2004, p. 280.
[3] Alexei Senatorov, "Japan: From "Single-Country Pacifism" to a "Normal" Country?", *Far Eastern Affairs*, Vol 32, No. 1, January-March 2004, p. 58.

Impact of the Gulf War

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Japan was under pressure from the United States and its allies to participate in the multinational coalition in some other way than providing economic assistance. The government of Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki began to look for ways to make a "human contribution" within the constraints of the constitution. But he was unable to get a revised UN cooperation bill through the Diet. Japan's defense-oriented posture and its prohibition on collective self defense, meant that it was unable to dispatch the SDF on missions overseas that would involve the threat or use of force unless strictly for its own self-defense. Japanese political and intellectual leadership was convulsed by an intense debate over the nations' appropriate role in the crisis. When the George Bush administration planned a coalition to drive back the invasion forces of Saddam Hussein and restore the integrity of the Kuwait in 1991, Japan failed again. In spite of being United State's alliance partner, Japan contributed neither troops nor non-combatant military personnel to the war. Japan's contribution instead took the form of U.S. $ 13 billion to the coalition efforts after the end of major combat operations and sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the cessation of hostilities.

But these measures earned Japan little credit because they risked no Japanese lives, nor were Japan's actions perceived to be spontaneous and voluntary. This came to be perceived as merely another example of "checkbook diplomacy," that is, Japan acting as a "cash dispenser" in lieu of exposing its own military and citizens to physical risk.[4] The international and particularly American evaluation of Japan's role was not favorable. As President George Bush later noted,

[4] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions*, (Colorado, 2004), p. 160.

there was "a Japan-bashing mood around the country."[5] Japan's insistence that it was legally unable to use its forces for anything other than the defense of Japan was virtually incomprehensible to the United States.

According to Eugene Brown, "for better or worse, the Gulf crisis marked a profound turning point in Japan's relations with the outside world. It intensified the debate among Japanese opinion leaders and policy elites over how best to operationalize the common wisdom that 'Japan must do more internationally.'"[6] This was the time when Japan was seeking higher international political status. Japan was aspiring for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and looking for political leadership in Asia to match its economic predominance. The second Gulf crisis raised the question whether status quo policies would be sufficient to support Japan's new international agenda. That same year for the first time, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in its Diplomatic Blue Book (1991) called for going beyond checkbook diplomacy.

The humiliation resulting from the Japanese government's incapacity, other than through monetary means, to contribute to multinational efforts to defeat Iraq, strengthened the determination of some to amend the SDF law and even possibly the constitution to allow the dispatch of the SDF to support United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO) missions. A Special Study Group on Japan's Role in International Society was formed by the government under the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa. This group concluded that it would be possible for Japan to participate in multilateral and UN military operations by adopting the concept of international security.

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[5] Kazufumi Hamai and Peter Mauch, "Defining Japan's Role in the Post-Taliban World Order: Tokyo's Path to Great Power Status", 2002, at http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/hamaiandMauch.html.

[6] Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War World: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 1994, p. 331.

In June 1992, the governing LDP pushed through the Upper House of the Diet the law enabling the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping Operations. The passage of the Law on Cooperation with the UN Peacekeeping Forces (UN PKO law) and the permission to the SDF to be dispatched overseas in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations was a historic measure. It marked the cautious start of an overseas Japanese military role in international security.

It was enabled as long as missions did not involve the use of force and fulfilled the "five PKO principles" that

1) an agreement was reached between the conflicting sides on a permanent cease-fire or temporary halt to the hostilities;
2) the conflicting sides, including the host states, consented to the activity of UN forces and Japan's participation in it;
3) neutrality was observed, which did not permit supporting one of the conflicting sides;
4) Japan retained the right to independently recall its contingent if any of the named conditions was not fully implemented;
5) The use of weapons was kept to the minimum.[7]

In addition to that, this law was adopted on the condition that Japan froze its participation in the main forms of activity of the UN peacekeeping contingent. This meant participation in only those kinds of activities, which are not accompanied by the use of armed force or the threat of its use. Such activities included monitoring elections; assistance, supervision, and inspection in the police service; assistance and supervision in the administrative service; medical services, vaccinations; evacuation of injured citizens and helping them return home; distributing food; setting up refugee camps; restoring and equipping destroyed facilities; helping to protect the environment; other work relating to transportation, storage,

[7] Alexei Senatorov, *op cit.*, p. 59.

communication, construction and repairs.[8] This was to continue until such time as a revision to the law was introduced to unfreeze these missions.[9]

In this way by creating a legal basis for dispatching Japanese armed forces overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping activity, Japan tried to balance the spirit of its peace constitution as well as performing its international role.

The passage of the law enabled the Japanese government to dispatch its Self-Defense Force (SDF) to peace-keeping operations under the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC) between October 1992 and September 1993. The law, in the spirit of "active pacifism," forbade soldiers from engaging in armed combat or from monitoring cease-fires, thereby limiting their civilian role to providing food, rebuilding hospitals and roads and monitoring elections. It was the first deployment of Japanese armed forces for purposes other than training since World War II. This marked an expansion of Japan's military security role and firmly implanted the concept that Japan's contribution to international security should be linked to the dispatch of the SDF.

Although there were periodic warnings from Asia of a revival of Japanese militarism, the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia did not lead to persistent criticism from the region. Once it was apparent that the Cambodian dispatch would not in fact lead to sharp international repercussions, some of Japan's more hawkish officials and opinion leaders began urging Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations in other troubled areas as well. Since then Japan has dispatched token forces to several UN PKOs in Mozambique, the former Zaire, and the Golan Heights. According to Eugene Brown, "passage of the UN peacekeeping bill was indeed a signal event in Japan's evolution from a politically marginal state

[8] Alexei Senatorov, *op cit.*, p. 59.
[9] These activities were unfrozen in December 2001.

to one that accepts its responsibility to help maintain the open and stable international order upon which its own safety and prosperity depend."[10]

Implications of Domestic Shake-ups: Collapse of the 1955 System

For changes in international structure to drive state behavior there must be domestic conditions that permit or stimulate adaptive responses As Japan began to deepen its engagement with international security, critical changes in domestic politics were also in progress. Most notably, the monopoly of power by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was broken in August 1993 and with that collapsed the "1955 system" (*gojugo-nen-taisei*).[11] According to Hughes, the collapse of one-party rule and the '1955 system' was in part engineered by Ozawa Ichiro who wished to see the collapse also of the politically imposed postwar constraints on Japan's security role.[12] Ozawa himself was a LDP member but broke away from it and created two short-lived coalition governments between August 1993 and June 1994. The 1993 coalition governments of Morihiro Hosokawa and Tsutumu Hata consisted of anti-LDP conservative splinter groups and lasted just over a year. In June 1994, the LDP came back to power with the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).

For more than 40 years, the leftist Social Democratic Party of Japan (previously known as the Japan Socialist Party) was fiercely pacifist, opposing outright the very existence of the SDF on the grounds that maintaining armed forces violated both the letter and the spirit of Article 9. The SDPJ even objected to

[10] Eugene Brown, *op cit.*, p. 3-8.
[11] The '1955 system' (*gojugo-nen-taisei*) takes its name from the year that the LDP was formed and the two wings of socialists united as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). In essence, the 1955 system implied a stand-off between the conservatives and the socialists over a wide range of issues. It also implied fundamental disagreement over 'peace-war issues, such as the constitutionality of SDF.
[12] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 162.

the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty for the same reason. Opinion polls in the mid-1990s indicating a change in the electorate's views regarding SDF support for U.N. peacekeeping missions made it obvious, however, that the party's tenets were outdated. A new perception of Japan's role in the post-Cold War order had developed.

Former SDPJ chief Tomiichi Murayama, who was elevated to the premiership in June 1994 as part of a political marriage of convenience among the Socialist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the New Komeito, tried to bring his party's position on security matters into the political mainstream. In his inaugural speech, he not only endorsed the existence of Japan's SDF but also recognized the legitimacy of U.S. – Japan alliance, thus destroying his party's long-standing raison d'etre. Mr. Murayama was viewed as blatantly opportunistic by everyone else. Voters responded by rejecting SDPJ candidates in subsequent upper and lower house elections. In fact, with the exception of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), now there are no major differences within the ruling coalition or among the opposition parties on security issues.

The demise of the leftist-pacifist political forces in domestic politics has changed the context of political discourse on security matters in a somewhat fundamental manner. The return of the LDP, the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as the largest opposition party, the decline of the leftist forces like the SDJP and JCP has ensured the constitutionality of the SDF including its dispatch beyond the Japanese national border and the strengthening of U.S. – Japan alliance. In short, the overall change in the domestic atmosphere has lifted long-standing taboos on security policy. As a result, the Japanese, for the first time in the postwar years, have begun to debate security matters squarely. Although security still remains a controversial issue in Japan and few are ready to challenge the antimilitaristic norms, nevertheless, Japan's politicians and bureaucratic policymakers are increasingly prepared to debate security issues in the open, and

there is a strengthening body of opinion in Japan that argues that it should become a "normal" state.[13]

These debates have penetrated the government itself and have given momentum to the expansion of its military role. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which has the responsibility for devising security policy is aware of the need for taking great security responsibilities and has sought expansion with the United States. But at the same time, in keeping in line with the principle of civilian control, it is cautious about ascribing the military too great a role in security planning.

Another factor that is inducing changes at domestic political level is the rise of a new generation of Japanese politicians, who are gaining prominence in the National Diet. These young politicians are taking an increasingly realist approach to defense policy. The Koizumi government's successful push for changes in the legislation governing the activities of the Japanese military reflects the influence of these realists. More open debates about Japan's security policy have taken place without stimulating major public protests. One of the reasons that can be attributed to this change is that they come from a generation that has no memory of the war years. They have not seen the post World War II period and the time when Japan's economy was in shambles. They are products of a new era when Japan had regained its status in the world as a major economic power. And as a result, probably they want Japan to play an important an independent role in world affairs. This is not to say that most of them think on these lines. But in a country where a premium is placed on consensus decision-making, these debates have sown the seeds for a more proactive defense policy in the years ahead.

[13] Christopher W. Hughes, *op cit.*, p. 163.

First Nuclear Crisis and the Japanese Response

The Korean Peninsula is a key influence upon Japan's security policy makers, as it is a point of geostrategic convergence for regional and global powers.[14] The pre-World War II period witnessed all the regional powers - China, Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan - sought to defend their security interest on the peninsula and bring it into their respective spheres. Japan saw North Korea as an invasion route to and from Japan and continental Asia. Historically and even now, Japan's strategic aim has been to prevent the domination of Korean Peninsula by a hostile power. Japan fought for its control during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and again during the Russo- Japanese War of 1905, which led to Japan's eventual annexation of Korea in 1910. In the postwar era, Japan's concerns were similar. The outbreak of the Korean War demonstrated that the most immediate threat came from Korea and that Japan could be a target for a retaliatory or warning strike on its territory.

Since the early 1990s, deep suspicions and misgivings about North Korea's nuclear program started growing in Japan and worldwide. International concern about North Korea's nuclear ambitions was aroused by its obstruction of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at its Yongbyon nuclear plant. North Korea was suspected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of having produced enough fissile material for two nuclear weapons in the period to 1992.[15] In March 1992, responding to the collapse of the Soviet Union and to tentative overtures from the George Bush administration, Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) signed a 'full scope safeguards agreement' with the

[14] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

[15] The first signs that the North had an indigenous nuclear programme came in March 1984, when U.S. satellite intelligence identified an apparent nuclear-reactor vessel under construction at Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. Further intelligence coverage and study showed some more evidences of a nuclear-weapon programme were underway.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by North Korea's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT signed in 1985).[16] [17]

Under the terms of the safeguard agreement, North Korea was required to declare and accept IAEA inspections of all nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA conducted some six normal inspections of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and no evidence of the North's making a nuclear bomb was found.[18] By late 1992, however the IAEA determined that North Korea had not fully declared its pre-1992 plutonium production, and the IAEA requested inspections of suspect nuclear waste facilities that could contain evidence of North Korea's real plutonium production. North Korea refused subsequent IAEA requests which might throw further light on past reprocessing activities. The IAEA's demand of special inspection led to a total impasse. Attempts by Washington and Seoul to ease tensions were derailed by North Korea which declared its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, claiming that it faced a nuclear threat from the U.S.

The North's policy, combining with its test firing of *No-dong* I ballistic missiles and tough rhetoric against the U.S. and South Korea, heightened military tensions on the Korean peninsula, and created a perceived North Korean nuclear threat to Northeast Asian security.[19] The United States considered seeking sanctions against North Korea in Security Council to which the North warned the international community that sanctions would mean war.

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[16] Before 1992, North Korea had managed to delay signing its safeguards agreement under various pretexts, all the while constructing and beginning to operate an undeclared 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated research reactor and reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, intended to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons programme.

[17] Gary Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis", *Survival*, Vol 45, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 8-9.

[18] Sharif Shuja, "The DPRK's Nuclear Program and Policy: Continuities, Changes and Challenges", *Korea Observer*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 674.

[19] Christopher W. Hughes, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security", *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 80.

During the crisis, the U.S. requested Japan for more active and direct support for any potential war effort, including logistical support. International pressure rose for Japan to act, but like in the Cold War years, domestic debate regarding its regional security role and responsibility towards defense exposed a bitter political power struggle. In response to the unfolding Korean crisis, different government factions revealed the complexities of the reactive/pro-active debate over Japan's security stance. Whilst Prime Minister Tsutumu Hata and his followers appeared ready to react to the sanctions and offer Japanese logistical support, they also assumed that any implementation of the UN economic embargo would provoke probable North Korean military reprisals directly against Japan, resulting in entanglement in regional conflict. It was argued that Japan's exercise of its right to collective security would overstep the boundary of the constitution. In opposition to this stance, however, other policy makers influenced by views of former LDP member Ichiro Ozawa, felt that the Korean crisis presented Japan with an ideal opportunity to assert a new security role in Asia.

For domestic politics, the eventual outcome was a vote of non-confidence for the Hata government. Meanwhile, whilst Japanese policy makers wrestled with the constitutional legalities of whether to reactively or proactively pursue the crisis situation on the peninsula; American intelligence believed that North Korea was close to possession of enough plutonium to make five to six atomic bombs.[20] In June 1994, they considered launching an attack on the North Korean facilities and a second Korean War appeared imminent. Fortunately, this explosive situation was defused, when North Korea agreed to dismantle its (then) existing nuclear programme and resolve the nuclear issue through bilateral talks with the United States. After several round of negotiations between the two, the Agreed Framework was concluded on 21 October 1994.

[20] Masao Okonogi, "Dealing with the Threat of a Korean Crisis", *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2003, p.73.

The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to abandon construction of two gas-graphite moderated nuclear reactors, freeze reprocessing of spent fuel from its research reactor, accept IAEA monitoring of its declared nuclear facilities, and eventually come into full compliance with its safeguard agreement by allowing the IAEA to reconstruct the operational history of its research reactor to verify that no nuclear material was missing.[21] In return, the U.S. agreed to organize an international consortium to provide the two light-water reactor (LWR) within five years. In addition to this, it also called for steps to normalize economic and political relations between Washington and North Korea. To deliver the LWRs, Washington formed an implementing agency – Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) – with Seoul and Tokyo in March 1995.[22] [23]

For many scholars, Japanese reaction to these events is strange. Japan is a neighboring country most affected by potential instability on the Korean peninsula, it has often been the subject of direct threats from North Korea, and it falls within range of North Korea's *No-dong* I missiles. Many observers have critically commented on what they view as Tokyo's strange passivity and lack of reaction in the face of the North Korean threat. They see Japan as having failed to take any real initiatives to resolve the nuclear problem and as having fallen back on its traditional 'reactive' stance and reliance upon the U.S. in international affairs.

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[21] The Agreed Framework was structured to require North Korean disarmament in stages, linked to the progress of the nuclear power project. In the first stage, the Agreed Framework capped further production of plutonium, but North Korean retained a residual nuclear-weapons capability, until a 'significant portion' of the LWR project was completed. At that point, North Korea was required to satisfy the IAEA that all plutonium was accounted for and under inspection before the LWR project could continue. At further stage of the nuclear power project, North Korea was required to accept the removal of some 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 5-MW reactor (estimated to contain about 30 kilogrammes of weapons-grade plutonium) and dismantle its indigenous plutonium production facilities.

[22] David Reese, "The Prospects for North Korea's Survival", *Adelphi Paper* 323, 1998, p. 51.

[23] For detailed step by step information of North Korea's nuclear card see David Reese, *op.cit.*, pp. 39-58.

As for Japanese policymaking, the response to the Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, re-emphasized that they could no longer remain passive observers in their attitude towards regional defense. To do so would be to incur possible abandonment from the US security framework. Indeed, US Secretary of State William Perry remarked that had conflict ensued without Japanese assistance, "it would have been the end of the alliance".[24]

Thus keeping in mind the changing security environment, in August 1994, a report of the prime minister's Advisory Group on Defense was published. This report which is called as Higuchi report called for Japan to readapt security policy to the post-Cold War environment. The report characterized the post-Cold War environment as one of diverse and non specific problems, such as regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and economic dislocation. The report recommended that Japan respond not only by strengthening its military cooperation with the U.S. but also by taking initiatives to increase SDF UN PKO activities and by promoting multilateral security dialogue in East Asia.[25].

This induced the Japanese government to revise *Taiko*. New Defense Program Outline (new *Taiko*), adopted by the Cabinet in November 1995, stressed a new role of the SDF in international peace-keeping efforts and an important role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in these endeavors. It stressed the need to strengthen the close cooperative bilateral relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, increase Japanese efforts for peace and stability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations activities.

The revised NDPO emphasized the U.S. - Japan alliance by inserting a new clause stating that "should a situation arise in areas surrounding Japan (*shuhen*)

[24] Margerison, http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/Margerison.html.
[25] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

which will have an important influence on national peace and security," then Japan will take appropriate steps to deal with this in line with constitutional and other military restrictions and through support for UN activities, and the "smooth and effective implementation of Japan – U.S. security arrangements."[26] According to Hughes, this was a clear indication to demonstrate to the world that Japan would help U.S. military forces for the security of Japan and the surrounding region. Hence, the NDPO was a statement of Japan's individual security policy, increasingly being constructed within the context of the strengthening of the bilateral alliance so as to expand its potential role in supporting U.S. to cope with regional contingencies, a role that it had not been able to fulfill during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis.

The 1994 crisis on the Korean peninsula caused by Pyongyang's refusal to allow outside inspection of its nuclear energy facilities made the Japanese aware that their neighborhood no longer was safe. The behavior of the People's Republic of China (PRC) reinforced that view. China's nuclear tests in 1995 and its test-firing of ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, heightened Japanese concerns about its powerful neighbor's strategic designs for the region.[27]

Along this line of logic, the "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty-First Century," signed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, declared that the Japan-U.S. security relationship remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives. It stressed the importance of bilateral alliance for the security of Japan and, for the first time, the entire Asia-Pacific. Before this the word "alliance," and "alliance relations" was used skeptically by the officials in Japan. The joint declaration welcomed the maintenance of U.S. troops in Japan and the region and noted that Japan and United States would cooperate in studying Ballistic Missile

[26] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 170.
[27] China test-fired ballistic missiles near Taiwan that landed within 60 kilometers of Japanese territorial waters around Okinawa.

Defence (BMD). The two parties also signed Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 1996. The ACSA defines ways and means of U.S.-Japan cooperation in such areas as joint military exercises, U.N. peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian relief activities.[28] The central objective of the declaration was to state both sides' commitment to review the 1978 Guidelines and research into cooperation in areas surrounding Japan that could influence peace and security. A Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was established to review it and after negotiations and political debates, the Japanese government approved the new guidelines in September 1997, and the National Diet approved legislation implementing them in June 1998.

Guidelines Revised

The Defense Guidelines finally established the functional scope of U.S. – Japan cooperation for regional operations under the security treaty. These functional areas include rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces, sea-lane patrol, intelligence sharing, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other missions that would not put Japanese forces into forward combat roles in their countries but would prove critical to facilitating successful resolution of conflicts.[29] It gave a far greater flexibility to both the countries to respond in a crises situation. As mentioned in the Joint Declaration, the alliance would now function for the security of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Critics of the Guidelines in the JCP and the press have attacked the guidelines as an "automated war machine" in the sense that the guidelines will now work like a wending machine, the United States dropping in a coin and receiving

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[28] Yoshida Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives" in Muthiah Aligappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (California, 1998), p. 215.

[29] Michael Green, "The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations After The Cold War", in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations*, (Tokyo, 2000), p. 245.

whatever Japanese base or hospital or destroyer is required to carry out operations.[30] However, Green argues that it is wrong to assume this because joint defense planning is different from treaty as there are no obligations under international law.

The Japanese policymakers maintain that the guidelines have not been designed to counter the threat from any specific country, and the term *shuhen* used in the guidelines as well as the NDPO is situational rather than geographical. Though it does have a geographical element in the sense that the scope of their operation is likely to be close to Japan, but the government argues that it does not involve a revision of Prime Minister Kishi's 1960 definition of the Far East and the range of security treaty. It is to be noted that it was Kishi who first introduced the concept of *shuhen.* It meant to delimit the scope of U.S.-Japan security treaty and was strongly geographical in nature.

According to Hughes, there is a gradual shift in emphasis from geographical to situational definition of *shuhen.* He says that this has two advantages for Japan. First, this situational concept gives Japan the scope of encompassing the entire Asia-Pacific region as envisaged in the Joint Declaration and thus goes beyond traditional geographical limits as defined in the 1960s. Secondly, this concept of situational need is ambiguous with particular advantage of leaving vague the position of Taiwan and China as objects of guidelines.[31]

In order to ensure full implementation of the New Guiding Principles, the Japanese government had to get the parliament adopt a law defining the regulations for joint action with U.S. troops around Japan and to make amendments to the Law on Self-Defense Forces on the use of sea forces beyond Japanese territorial waters.

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[30] Michael Green, *op.cit.*, p. 245.

[31] In line with the Kishi's 1960 definition of the Far East, Taiwan comes within the coverage of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and the events of 1996 (which will be discussed in detail later) demonstrated that China-Taiwan tensions are still a major concern for the U.S-Japan alliance.

This was done in May 1999. In accordance with the new law, joint action with U.S. troops is envisaged in a "situation which, if it continues, engenders the danger of direct attack on Japan and so on", instead of vaguer formulation offered by the government: "situations in the regions around Japan, which have a vital impact on peace and security in Japan"[32]

The Second North Korean Missile Attack and Japanese Security

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 have put great strain on Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). According to James Auer and Robyn Lim, one of the reasons that Japan's security environment has turned for the worse is that North Korea, having been made an "orphan" by the end of the Cold War, has become more dangerous.[33] Throughout the Cold War period and even in the early 1990s, as seen in the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94, any notions of likely threat towards Japan were administered via the US security framework. As seen in the previous chapter, this framework suited the Japanese as it meant they could concentrate on economic, rather than military security matters. At the same time, however, it developed growing criticism that Japan was not 'pulling its weight' in security matters. In particular, following the 1991 Gulf War, Japan was perceived by the international community as possessing neither the will, nor the capacity to carry out independent foreign policy, in spite of its enormous, economic strength.

Since the 1994 nuclear crisis, when the Japanese began to recognize North Korea as a potential threat to their security, North Korean bellicosity has continued, increasing Japan's claims to vulnerability. The test-firing of a *No-dong* -1 in May

[32] Alexei Senatorov, *op.cit.*, p. 61.
[33] James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, *op.cit.*, p. 281 .

1994 and with that the North Korean missile threat had shocked the Japanese. Then came the launching of the *TaepoDong* on August 31, 1998. The shock it gave to Japanese was arguably comparable to the one the Soviet launching of Sputnik in October 1957 gave to the Americans.[34] This underlined an ongoing concern of a direct conventional attack from North Korea. The very fact that North Korea launched a missile that actually flew over the main island of Japan and splashed down into the Pacific Ocean was enough to send shivers up just about every Japanese spine.

Prior to this Tokyo had maintained a conciliatory posture toward the North. The Japanese government hoped that a patient show of goodwill would encourage Pyongyang to negotiate the long list of issues between the two countries. But the *Taepodong* missile attack questioned the validity of such an approach. Following the missile launch, regional tensions increased. Japan under revised Guidelines started taking more interest in its security. In March 1999, the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) engaged for the first time in its history in the unilateral exercise of force on behalf of the Japanese state-against the so called '*fushinsen,*' the intruding 'mystery ships' which sped across Japanese waters and disappeared in the direction of North Korea.[35] These *fushinsen* were believed to be North Korean vessels engaged in routine espionage missions. In outburst of popular support from the Japanese people, the then Chief of the Japan's Defense Agency (JDA), Norota Hosei, announced that in certain circumstances Japan enjoyed the right of 'pre-emptive attack'.[36] This was a significant development in Japan's post-World War II security policy. This statement would have led to uproar and resignation, but in 1999 it passed with little comment. In the same year in October, the JDA's

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[34] Matake Kamiya, "*A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea*", http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/kamiya_may03.asp.
[35] Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis*, (London, 2001), pp. 32-33.
[36] *Ibid.*, p..33.

parliamentary Vice-Minister, Nishimura Shingo, carried this further by putting the case for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons.[37]

September 11 attacks and beyond

North Korean attitude called for some laws to be formulated to deal with such issues in the future. An additional stimulus for accelerating the Japanese government and parliament toward a practical resolution of these problems was the unprecedented acts of international terrorism in September 2001 in New York. The Japanese government saw the fight against terrorism as a factor in ensuring its own security and decided to render full support to the U.S. as an ally country and achieve solidarity in the fight against terrorism with all countries of the world community. Expressing shock and anger over the attack, Japan offered its support and assistance to the US in its war against terror. When the US struck at Afghanistan, Koizumi's government strongly supported the American air strikes.

In October 2001, Japan's government passed a new law that enabled the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to fire upon intruding vessels. The JCG is permitted to open fire on the condition that the intruder vessel represents a danger to peace, order, or security within Japan's territorial waters; that there is probability the ship's activity will be repeated if not dealt with; that the ship is suspected of preparing to commit serious crimes; and when prevention of the crime is impossible without stopping and searching the ship in question.[38] The JCG subsequently used this new law to fire upon and ultimately sink the North Korean *fushinsen* in December of the same year.

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[37] Glenn D. Hook and McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis*, (London, 2001), p. 33.
[38] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 171

The government also prepared a draft law on special measures against terrorism and amendments to two existing laws. They were submitted in the parliament on 5 October 2001. These legislative acts were adopted by the Parliament on 29 October, 2001.

The unprecedented rapidity with which the draft laws passed through parliament can be explained primarily by the fact that Japan recognized the exceptional nature of the threat on international terrorism itself and wanted to make its contribution to combating it. In fact, the anti-terrorism measures law, enacted speedily to dispatch Japanese SDF for logistical support in the Indian Ocean, was legitimized in the name of the United Nations Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and not the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Here, the lesson from the 1991 Gulf War experience was clearly at work. The Japanese government did not want to repeat the mistakes of the Gulf War. Its decision in going against "checkbook diplomacy" was taken with their alliance with US in consideration. Japanese government felt that any further reluctance to measure up to the expectations of its ally would generate a crack in the partnership and expose them to the risk of abandonment. It would also have given a severe blow to Japan's role in the domain of international security, especially when Japan is aspiring to be a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council.

Only the leftist wing of the opposition made any major objections to the governmental draft of the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law. The CPJ believes that even rear support for military operations of American troops in Afghanistan permitted by the law should be viewed as military action, which contradicts the constitution. In addition, according to the party, participation in military reprisal cannot be justified even by international laws. The SDPJ saw Japan's support for the American antiterrorist operations primarily as a way to legalize sending SDF overseas and to put Japan's right to collective defence, which is not recognized in

the constitution, into practice. Another opposition party, the Liberal Party, was not in agreement with this law either, but for an entirely different reason. It believed that only change in the government's interpretation of the constitution was necessary to send the SDF abroad, and current laws were enough for them to guard American facilities on Japanese territory.

The DPJ recognized the possibility of consenting to the government draft law under certain conditions. In the end, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was adopted. After passing these laws, the government enabled the dispatch of SDF overseas in war time. This was a turning point in Japanese security policy. Following this Japan send MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support for refueling American and British ships.

This made it easy for the Koizumi government to take another step, thus extending the participation of Japan's SDF in their limited cooperation in the UN's peacekeeping activity.

On 7 December, 2001 amendments were made to the Law on Cooperation with UN peacekeeping Forces in effect since 1992 on the government's initiative. With this now, in addition to the previous types of cooperation, Japan may participate in the main types of activity of the UN peacekeeping contingent, which it was previously prohibited from since they involved the use of weapons. Now the personnel of the SDF can participate in measures to monitor truce or disarmament; be deployed and carry out patrol in the buffer zone; check the incoming and outgoing shipments of weapons; store and monitor weapons; help to set up a truce line; and help to exchange prisoners-of-war on an equal basis with other participants in the UN peacekeeping operations. Also, the norms for the use of weapons have been mitigated somewhat, which in the past was only possible when protecting their own Japanese servicemen. Now weapons may be used to protect other employees of international organizations.

America's decision to begin the military operation against Iraq again started the debate in Japan of whether to send its SDF to Iraq or not. After urgent consultations with the leaders of the parties in the ruling coalition, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed support for the U.S. combative actions, but stated his intention not to send Japanese troops to participate in them. However he also knew the extreme importance of its alliance and pointed out that a breach of trust at this moment in Japanese-American relations would be counter to state interests.

Most of the Japanese population did not approve of the military campaign against Iraq. But the government felt it was not enough to limit itself to only moral support of its ally. It began to analyze ways for its SDF to participate in the postwar restoration in Iraq. On 26 July 2003, the Law on Special Measures to Support the Restoration of Iraq was adopted. According to this Law, SDF shall be sent to Iraq in compliance with the UN Security Council resolution calling for cooperation in restoring Iraq. The Japanese military contingent was to help provide humanitarian aide and assistance in the restoration, as well as "activity to maintain security" in the form of rear support of American and British troops. However, no immediate plan was taken to implement this law. Japan carefully analyzed the situation that developed in Iraq and in December 2003, after taking a long hard look at the situation, it decided to send Japanese servicemen to Iraq.

The Japanese sending of its SDF to Iraq is the most momentous decision because for the first time after World War II, the Japanese troops were sent abroad. It was significant in the sense that the area (Iraq) was still a combat zone and secondly this time there was no United Nations backing. Even countries like France, Germany had refused to send troops because it was not sanctioned by the UN. For this purpose War Contingency Bills were passed.

Japan's support to the Iraq war and the North Korean throwing in its second nuclear diplomacy[39] paved a way for the Japanese government to enact the long-waited legislations. On 6 June 2003, Japan's parliament passed three war contingency bills that gave the government significant powers in military emergencies.[40] These Laws, in essence, enable a smooth operation of the SDF within the territory of Japan, allowing the SDF to begin certain ground operations before the prime minister issues a mobilization order. It is very first time for Tokyo after the end of the World War II that such war contingency laws are enacted.

The surprising element here was the fact that the war contingency legislation received support not only from the ruling LDP and the New Komeito, but also the main opposition party, the DPJ. As many as 90 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives and more than 80 per cent of the Members of the House of Councilors approved the bills.[41]

National Emergency Legislations

In addition to the efforts aimed at legalizing sending SDF abroad to participate in UN peacekeeping activity and supporting the military operations of alliance troops, the Koizumi government extended great efforts to draw up a legislative base for regulating Japan's activity in an emergency. The North Korean nuclear crisis highlighted Japan's lack of planning and legal frameworks to cope with regional contingencies and the failure to remove obstacles to the deployment

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[39] By announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, North Korea set in motion its "second nuclear diplomacy" (the first in 1993-94) to deal with United States and other countries concerned using the development of nuclear weapons as bargaining chip. It demanded a non-aggression-pact and normalization of relations with United States, an early realization of Japan's economic assistance to North Korea, supply of electricity, and the construction of light water reactors.

[40] Toshiya Nakamura, "Coping with the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Abridged Version", http://www.glocom.org/debates/20030804_nakamura_coping.

[41] "Parties Acted Wisely on Contingency Bills", *The Yomuri Shimbun*, June 15, 2004, from http://www.yoimuri.co.jp/index-e.htm.

of the SDF to defend Japan from any type of external attack. In the event of a military attack on Japan, it was believed, SDF tanks would literally have to obey civilian traffic signals while responding to the crisis.

The first steps in this direction were taken more than two decades back. The JDA since 1978 had conducted research into the possible creation of an emergency crisis legislation (*yuji hosei*) to provide control over civilian property, buildings, electrical power networks, and transportation systems. The same year General Kurisu, Chairman of the Joint Committee of Chiefs of Staff, publicly announced that if Japan fell victim to a sudden attack, troops, without waiting for a government decision, could act on the basis of orders by the military commanders.[42] Kurisu was removed from office but a heated discussion raged in parliament. However, the research failed to progress due to jurisdictional disputes among related ministries and anti-militaristic sentiment. The Conservative Party of Japan (CPJ) and the SPJ, both opponents of the emergency legislation believed that its adoption would contradict the Constitution. They organized mass protest demonstrations with the support of trade unions. Though the results of government's studies on this question were reported to the parliament but since emergency provisions were not accepted by the Japanese public opinion it was kept aside. With the end of Cold War and the decline of visible threats to Japan, it lost its momentum.

In the early 1990s, Ichiro Ozawa, general secretary of the LDP, tried again to draw attention to the problem of "emergency legislations" and "crisis control." However, Japan's interest in the *yuji hosei* was stimulated again by the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in 1995, and the Kobe earthquake of the same year, all of which revealed government deficiencies in crisis management and the lack of an appropriate legal framework. In particular, neither the SDF nor the police had sufficient legal mandates to defend against

[42] Alexei Senatorov, *op.cit.*, pp. 67-68.

North Korean guerilla or terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities. The absence of a legal framework would also make it difficult for the SDF to respond to U.S. requests for assistance in Japan itself and around its periphery in the types of regional contingencies envisaged under the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.

Japan once again returned to the issue of crisis legislation with the momentum created by the events of 9/11, the North Korean *fushinsen* incursion in December 2001, and apprehensions that the SDF was ill-equipped to respond to domestic terrorist and other international contingencies. Junichiro Koizumi's government took specific measures to draw up this kind of draft laws. When setting the task of drawing up new laws, he demanded an "all-encompassing, comprehensive approach."[43] This meant that emergency measures must be considered in their broadest sense, not only in the event of an armed attack on Japan, but also in the event of terrorist attacks, violations of Japanese territorial waters by unidentified vessels, natural disasters, and so on.

The government approved and submitted three draft laws to the Diet in April 2002. These were on the situation of armed attack, on amendments to the Law on SDF, and on amendments to the Law on Instituting Security Council. At first, they were rejected in the Diet. Critics argued that conditions for mobilizing the SDF were too vague, possibly triggering SDF deployment in any scenario. In addition, it was criticized for concentrating more on complementing the revised Defense Guidelines than as serving for Japan's own individual defence. Critics also noted that the proposed legislation contained measures mainly for the SDF to engage in straight conventional war, rather than the types of terrorist and low-intensity conflicts that were anticipated. Finally, the extent of powers provided to the government to mobilize the SDF and to override civilian prerogatives were seen

[43] Alexei Senatorov, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

as too sweeping, including the right to fine or even imprison business owners that failed to cooperate during a military crisis.

Constitutional Review

Perhaps no other issue is as sensitive as the Constitution, in particular Article 9 when it comes under the purview of amendment. Throughout the post War years and during Cold War, Article 9 was subjected to minor flexible interpretations, for example from no armed forces to creation of SDF in the name of right of an independent nation to defend itself.

The launch of *Taepodong* missile, the intruding mystery ships in Japanese waters had stirred people and majority of them supported unilateral exercise of force on behalf of the Japanese state. In the words of Glenn Hook and McCormack, Japanese indicated a sign of new maturity and openness.[44] Looking at the security environment around Japan, Constitutional Research Council was set up in 2000 and provided a broad forum for national debate. For the first time since Japan's constitution took effect in May 1947 during the occupation, special legislative panels were convened to study its revision. This was a significant step in Japanese post-World War II history as no government so far contemplated to make amendments to it.

This special committee was given the task of studying the constitution and the need to review it. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has been the subject of greatest controversy, public debate and legal challenge and around which sharpest debate was to be focused in the Constitution Research Council. The Council was to submit its report in 2005. And as expected, the committees in both the houses of Parliament came out with its report in April 2005. The Lower House submitted a final report stressing the need to amend the Constitution's war renouncing Article

[44] Hook and McCormack, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

9. The report has the support of the members of the ruling LDP, its junior coalition partner, New Komeito, and the DPJ. However, the members of the JCP and the SDPJ opposed the report. This is the first time the Diet has set a course to revise the Constitution. According to the report, majority opinion believed that the nation should hold fast to the pacifism policy and maintain the war-renouncing Clause I of Article 9.[45] However, it is of the opinion that there should be some constitutional changes regarding the right to self-defense and the SDFs.

The Upper House however, failed to declare a consensus on amending the war-renouncing Article 9. Although the two panels differ on Article 9 and other issues, they have set the stage for the Diet to press ahead with debate on revising the Constitution, which has remained unchanged since its introduction in 1947.

Nuclear Debate

The changing international environment resulting from the end of the Cold War is only one of the factors that has rekindled the debate over nuclear policy in Japan. For many years discussion of Japan's arming it with nuclear weapons has been strictly taboo. This is in part because of the restrictions placed on Japan's military activities by its Constitution. The strong antinuclear sentiments implanted in the Japanese by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also play a big part in this. The Japanese have come to believe in nations' three non-nuclear principles – not to possess nuclear weapons, to produce them, or to allow them into the country – and it goes neatly with this popular sentiment over the years. Though Japanese public opinion might be changing on the need to review the Constitution and Article 9, it continues to be vehemently averse to the very idea of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons

[45] *The Japan Times*, April 28, 2005.

However, the presence of a nuclear threat from North Korea has set off the recent talk within Japan about acquiring nuclear arms. The debate has become particularly intense among bureaucratic and academics circles after North Korea's attitude. Meanwhile, similar talk is once again being heard from United States as well. In a March 16, 2003 interview on NBC television, the then Vice President of United States Dick Cheney declared, "The idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea with ballistic missiles to deliver those will, I think, probably set off an arms race in that part of the world. And others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question."[46]

This was the first time a senior US administration official had ever spoken of Japan going nuclear. This came under severe criticism from Japanese commentators, for example, Professor Kamiya Matake, of National Defense Academy of Japan points out that foreign commentators fail to recognize the limitations imposed by Japan's pacifist constitution and the widespread antipathy toward nuclear weapons among the Japanese public, rooted in the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[47]

It is worth examining the views of Japan's political elite on the question of Japanese nuclear armament. A survey of both houses of the National Diet carried out by Yoimuri Shimbun in late 1998 sheds some light on the views. Some 60 percent of all Diet members responded to the survey, which covered their positions on various policy issues. The legislators were in almost total agreement across party lines on the issue of nuclear arms. Just 17 respondents of 431 who gave their view on Japan's possession of nuclear weapons – a mere 4 percent – stated that they were "in favor" or "somewhat in favor" of this idea. While the Liberal Party and the LDP were home to a few Diet members in favor of a nuclear Japan, it is clear that Japan's legislators agreed overwhelmingly that Japan should not seek

[46] Sakurada Jun, "The Folly of Calls for Nuclear Armament", *Japan Echo*, August 2003, p. 39.
[47] *Ibid.*

these weapons, a consensus that remains unchanged to this day.[48] It is thus only natural that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney's reference to the possibility of Japan going nuclear in response to the North Korean nuclear threat was greeted with such surprise by the Japanese.

Japan insists that its nuclear program is solely motivated by economic and energy-security considerations. Despite these disclaimers, however, suspicions of Japanese intentions remain undiminished in neighboring countries. In the eyes of her East Asian neighbors like China, South Korea and North Korea, Japan is systematically perfecting its capacity to make nuclear weapons overnight by developing independent plutonium-reprocessing and uranium-enrichment capabilities as part of its civilian nuclear program.[49] North Korea, describes Japan as an "associate member of the nuclear club," while China finds evidence of Japan's nuclear ambitions not only in plutonium accumulation but also in its development of sophisticated rockets for its space program that could be converted to intermediate and intercontinental-range missiles.[50]

This shows the lack of trust the countries of the region have on each other. Each country has its own threat perceptions about the other and as a result it is becoming increasingly difficult to rely on what one says. It is these threat perceptions which are being discussed in the following chapter.

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[48] "A Nuclear Japan?", *Japan Echo*, Vol. 30, No. 4, August 2003, p. 38.
[49] Selig S. Harrison, *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington, 1996), p. 5 .
[50] Selig S. Harrison, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

Chapter Three

Threat perceptions and Issues with China and North Korea

The end of Cold War deepened Japan's constant sense of foreboding and uncertainty. Its relative stability of the Cold War was taken over by a diffused security environment which in many ways was more dangerous. As Professor Seizaburo Sato puts it, "in East Asia there are three surviving communist countries, while there are none in Europe. Europe can neglect China and North Korea, but Japan cannot."[1] Similarly, Professor Tomohisa Sakanaka asserts that, with the decline of the Cold War, "on the Japanese side, there is growing realism and alarm about regional flashpoints" in East Asia.[2] This meant that though ideological differences during Cold War kept the superpowers busy in the region but it also kept the regional tensions under control. However, Japanese perceptions of security climate in Northeast Asia started changing in the post Cold-War period, with principal potential flashpoints in Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula coming into highlight.

Japan's latest Defense White Paper (2004) cites regional powers such as North Korea, China, and Russia as potential security threats. Though with the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union the military threat that Japan had during Cold War from Russia has been eliminated, the territorial dispute over the southern Kuril Islands (or *Hoppo Ryodo*- the "Northern Territories" as the Japanese call them) continues to generate friction on and off.

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[1] Seizaburo Saro quoted in Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War World: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options", *The Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol 8, No 2, p. 332.
[2] Tomohisa Sakanaka quoted in Eugene Brown, *Ibid.*

The territorial dispute around the four islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group off the northeast coast of Hokkaido began with the Soviet occupation of the Kuril chain including these islands in the waning days of World War II and the San Francisco peace conference of 1951.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin was expected to visit Tokyo early this year but it could not take place and has been postponed indefinitely. Evidently the two sides are not ready to break the ice in their bitter dispute over the Northern Territories.

The year 2005 is a memorable year for both the countries: the 150th anniversary of the 1855 Treaty of Amity - which established diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia - and the centennial of the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty set the border between Russia's South Kuril island of Urup and Japan's northernmost island of Etorofu.

Japan's basic negotiating position is laid out in the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, which refers to all four islands in dispute. The landmark document states that a peace treaty will be concluded after the sovereignty claims to all these islands are settled in light of historical and legal facts, on the basis of the documents agreed to between the two countries, and according to the principle of law and justice.[4] The "Agreed documents" include the 1855 treaty of amity and the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in which the two sides agreed to end their technical state of war and restore diplomatic relations. Given their continuing differences over the islands, however, they agreed to put off the signing of a peace treaty until after the territorial issue was resolved.

The joint declaration was recognized as the starting point for peace treaty talks in a statement issued by Mr. Putin and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in Irkutsk

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[3] Alexei V. Zagorsky, "Soviet-Japanese Relations Under Perestroika: The Territorial Dispute and Its Impact" in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon (eds.), *Japan in the Posthegemonic World* (Boulder and London, 1993), p. 137.

[4] "Russia Japan thaw not in sight", *The Japan Times*, March 18, 2005.

in 2001. On that basis, the statement, known as the Irkutsk Declaration, reaffirmed that the treaty would be signed after the sovereignty issue involving all four islands was resolved in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration.[5] However, last year Mr. Putin, describing the Japanese demand as incomprehensible, made it clear that Russia would return only the smaller islands of Habomai and Shikotan, thus contradicting the Irkutsk Declaration. This has further complicated the issue between the two countries.

The territorial dispute apart, Japanese policymakers, since the end of Cold War have been more concerned by the decay of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's nuclear submarine force, which threatens to wreak environment havoc in Northeast Asia.[6]

However, the friction between Japan and Russia is not enough to provoke a military threat unlike China and North Korea. It is China's military modernization and expanding economy and North Korea's activities which represent a more immediate threat and is influencing Japanese military planning.

JAPAN and CHINA

Problems and Issues with China

Historically, Sino-Japanese relationship has never been good. In the pre-World War II period, both the countries were in conflict with each other. The transformation of mainland China into a communist state after its independence and its alignment with the Soviet Union naturally pitted it against Japan. But at that time Japan was not so concerned about China's threat perceptions. In fact, throughout the postwar period virtually all Japanese political leaders, even during the height of American hegemony in Japan, hoped to pursue an independent China

[5] "Russia Japan thaw not in sight", *op.cit.*
[6] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions* (Colorado, 2004), p.165.

policy At the end of the Occupation, Japan had a different perspective of China than America's postwar leadership. As Yoshida Shigeru famously remarked that he did not care "whether China was red or green. China is a natural market, and it has become necessary for Japan to think about markets.[7]

With Japan signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and China opting out of it, diplomatic relations was not established between the two until 1972. However Japan pursued an informal policy of *sekei bunri* i.e. separation of economics and politics, and built a trading partnership with China. After US rapprochement with China, Japan also established diplomatic relations with China in 1972 and concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. With this Japan developed a healthy economic relation with China but it was then when the disputes between the two started opening up. An even now, their bilateral relationship is defied within the contours of historical animosity and mutual suspicion that appears to be growing with the passage of time, instead of receding.

Burden of History

These disputes came to the fore with the Japanese unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility of wartime damage and atrocities committed in China. The role of the Japanese Ministry of Education in screening Japanese history textbooks and especially their interpretation of Japanese imperialism in Asia further aggravated the issue. China has been asking Japan to withdraw the school text books that gloss over the atrocities committed by Japanese militarism before 1945. The history textbook issue is unresolved till now and is like a thorn in Sino-Japanese relations. Japan has apologized numerous times for its World War II conduct but the issue keeps erupting up once in a while. Even now, as recently as April 2005, the text book issue sparked militant protest demonstrations in many Chinese towns with thousands of people shouting anti-Japanese slogans and

[7] Christopher W. Hughes, *op,cit.*, p.131.

causing damage to Japanese property in China. It led to Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, issuing a public apology for its wartime aggression.

Many Japanese feel that their government has made substantial efforts to apologize to China for the past aggression. And China's raking up the issue again and again infuriates the Japanese. This feeling has seeped into the Japanese and is resulting in anti-Chinese feelings, which many have called as the rise of nationalism in Japan.

Yasukuni Shrine visits

Beyond history text books, the visits of the Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo have become a contentious issue between Japan and China. Yasukuni Shrine is regarded outside Japan as a symbol of its imperial militarism of the past. This shrine honors Japan's 2.5 million war dead, including over a thousand convicted World War II war criminals. Though the Japanese political leaders visited Yasukuni shrine in 1971, 1980, and 1981, such visits did not elicit any major outcry in China. In 1985, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to the shrine. His visit led to anti-Japanese student demonstration in Beijing and other cities.[8] In the face of protests, Nakasone promised not to repeat an official visit to Yasukuni and no subsequent prime minister did so until Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

Since he came to office in 2001, Koizumi has made his regular trips to the shrine (now four in all) a matter of principle, arguing, essentially, that it's up to the Japanese to determine how they honor their war dead. That viewpoint pleases members of the powerful Association of Bereaved Families of the War Dead and religious groups that are a mainstay of Koizumi's embattled Liberal Democratic

[8] See for protests, Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, 'Against Us or with US? The Chinese Perspectives of America's Alliance with Japan and Korea', *Asia/Pacific Research Centre*, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, May 1998 at http://www.taiwansecurity.org.

Party, which has witnessed a steady erosion of it support from other quarters in recent years.

Chinese media and official statements have given undue attention to this annual event, and meetings between Koizumi and his Chinese counterparts have been dominated by arguments over the shrine. But Koizumi regularly visits the shrine annually not withstanding the number of warnings and protests by China and other countries. Chinese President Hu Jintao has made it clear that Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine are the primary impediment to improved bilateral relations at official levels.

Koizumi's stubbornness has had a devastating effect on Japan's regional reputation, and the Chinese have been all too happy to seize the opening. The Yasukuni issue allows China to claim the moral high ground, says Robyn Lim, a professor of international relations at Nanzan University in Nagoya. "It allows the Chinese to keep waving the bloody shirt, and it puts the Japanese on the back foot all the time. The Japanese just aren't helping themselves.[9]" Leading commentator Takashi Tachibana agrees. "As long as Japan can't solve its history issues with other Asian countries, I think it will be difficult for Japan to exercise true leadership in the region."[10]

Dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands

The Senkaku islands dispute could be a military flash point between Japan and China. The uninhabited island chain accounts for only 20 square kilometers of land made up of the five islands. This island chain has been the center of a growing territory dispute among China, Taiwan and Japan since the late 1960s, when a

[9] Christian Caryl, 'Off Balance: Can Japan Lead Asia while at political odds with Beijing?', *Newsweek*, June 6-13, 2005, p. 26.
[10] *Ibid.*

United Nations survey suggested its potential oil gas reserves and rich fisheries and economic zone.

Japan formally claimed the islands in 1895, the same year it gained control over Taiwan and other surrounding islands as the result of war with China. Yet the Senkaku/Diaoyutai (to Chinese) islands were not renounced in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 when Japan renounced its claim over Taiwan and all other islands associated with Taiwan, which Japan cites as a clear indication that it has sovereignty over the Senkakus. The treaty in question, however, lacks any finality on the issue because neither China nor Taiwan was a signing party. In all, Tokyo has maintained control over the islands for the better part of the past hundred years, during and before World War II as an Axis power, and after 1971 as part of the returned Okinawa territories.

The adoption of China's 1992 Territorial Waters Law[11] and its clear listing of the Senkakus/Diaoyutai as a part of China's territorial waters and its assertion of an inherent right to repel "invaders" by military means, has brought the dispute to the fore in the post-Cold War security environment. It was only in 1996 that the issue was reignited when Tokyo reaffirmed its claim over the island chain. Beijing responded with a bout of rhetoric, and redirected military flights closer to Japanese airspace. This in turn inspired the Japan Youth Association, a right-wing nationalistic civilian organization, to set up a makeshift lighthouse on one of the disputed islands, and in true tit-for-tat spirit, boatloads of Taiwanese and Hong Kong civilians made their way to the islands to counter the actions of susceptible Japanese youth. This trend has continued until today.

In late March, a group of seven mainland Chinese activists landed on one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. It was an effort to solidify China's claim to

[11] In February 1992, China promulgated a Territorial Waters Law which codifies its long-standing claim of sovereignty over the Sprately and Parcel islands in the South China Sea and the Senkaku islands northeast of Taiwan.

the small island chain, triggering the latest in a growing trend of brief spats involving Tokyo, Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Taipei. This was the first successful attempt by Chinese citizens to land on the islands, and occurred only a couple months after one attempt failed when Japanese coast guard vessels purportedly opened fire with water cannons on Chinese ships approaching the islands. Japan's coast guard arrested the activists, but sent them back to China, amid warnings coming out of Beijing to refrain from any drastic action.

As this latest event highlights, in the face of an emergent China and a politically and militarily asserting Japan, these islands stand to become a crucial indicator on how far either government will go to demonstrate its regional dominance.

These issues have led Yoichi Funabashi to comment that "it appears that history, which used to play a supporting role, has become the leading player on the East Asian international political scene where the past is more unpredictable than the future.[12]

Japan's threat Perception of China

These issues act as the main irritants in Sino-Japanese relations. What makes China pose a greater threat to Japan's security is its growing economy and quantitative and qualitative buildup of its armed forces since the Gulf War.

The increasing expansion of China's military power is perhaps the most important problem faced by Japan's policymakers. The JDA and the SDF have grown particularly concerned about Chinese military capabilities in recent years. In the revised NDPO that mapped out Japan's defence policies for the period 2005-2015, China has been singled out as one of the two countries that are potential

[12] Yoichi Funabashi, "East Asia's History Creating Mistrust", *Japan Times*, April 1, 2005.

threats to Japanese security and integrity. This is for the first time China has been overtly named as a threat in NDPO.

Japan's perception of China started changing especially with the resumption of nuclear testing by China in 1995 and Chinese intimidation of Taiwan with ballistic missiles.[13] This resulted in changing attitude of the policymakers. Evidence of changes in Japan's policy can be drawn from the following: In 1994, successive Prime Ministers Morihiro Hosokawa and Tsutomu Hata both took a harder line with Beijing on military transparency and nuclear tests than their predecessors ever had. Japan provoked China's wrath by inviting Vice President of Taiwan to the Hiroshima Asian Games in October 1994. In June 1995, Chairman of the Joint Staff, General Tetsuya Nishimoto ended the Japan SDF's long-standing exclusive focus on Russian threat by announcing that he would express Japan's concern to China over the missiles launched in the direction of Taiwan that same summer. In October 1995, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei made front page news in Japan by mentioning in the National Diet that Chinese military modernization and territorial policies could be source of instability in Asia. In early 1996, Japan responded to Chinese activities in East China Sea by deciding to formally extend its Exclusive Economic Zone in the area. And in March 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto summed up Tokyo's new attitude towards China when he expressed his concern that Chinese policies in the region "might be heading in the wrong direction".

Japan is worried about the increasing military expenditure by China and the growing teeth of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). At a plenary session of the PLA delegation held in 2003, Chairman Jiang Zemin of the Central Military Commission (CMC) China said that "in order to promote China's military change it was necessary to pursue "informationization" alongside the "mechanization."[14]

[13] China test-fired ballistic missiles near Taiwan that landed within 60 kilometers of Japanese territorial waters around Okinawa.
[14] *East Asian Strategic Review 2004*, The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, p. 109-110.

Here "mechanization" means mechanizing and increasing the combat power of PLA units, while the term "informationization" refers to improving the combat power of the PLA units by introducing information technology.

In recent times there have been innumerable incidents of Chinese ships violating the maritime boundaries of Japan, for example, Chinese ships have entered 21 times the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200nm without permission.[15] The East China Sea issue emerged in 2004 as the most visible field of rivalry between Japan and China. Last year, Chinese surveillance and reconnaissance vessels conducted over thirty illegal incursions into Japanese territorial waters, culminating in a November infiltration by a Chinese nuclear submarine.[16] These vessels have been surveying submerged gas fields on the floor of the East China Sea, which China began to exploit in the first half of 2004 despite Japanese protests. This dispute has prompted Japan to move to replace its aging F-4 fighters in Okinawa with upgraded F-15s. Also, in November 2004, the Japanese Defense Agency drafted operational plans to deploy 55,000 troops, as well as planes, warships, and submarines in the event of an invasion of the Nansei Islands southwest of Kyushu and Okinawa.[17]

Japan's academicians, are exceptionally united in its alarm over Beijing's military buildup. Seizaburo Sato, finds this as China's "clear wish to be the dominant military power in East Asia," while Professor Shigekatsu Kondo of the National Institute for Defence Studies argues that "China is the big worry" for Japan in Asia. For Professor Takashi Inouguchi, "the trend is alarming", while Professor Yoshida Soeya argues that a "Chinese military that believes in the

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[15] "Chinese ship violates Japan's EEZ", *Jane's Defense Weekly*, June, 30, 1999, p. 16.
[16] "Japanese Perceptions of Growing Chinese Military Power", at http://www.gees.org/pdf/1180/+japanese+perceptions+of+growing+chinese+military+power+pdf&hl=en.
[17] *Ibid.*.

usefulness of military force to establish its dominant place in the region constitutes a threat to the region as a whole. Japan must respond in that context."[18]

Japan's foreign policymakers and opinion leaders are in broad agreement that China's drive to build up its military beyond the ordinary requirements of self defense is evidence of a larger strategic design by Beijing to "convert the South China Sea" into the "all China Sea". As Professor Shigeo Hiramatsu put it, "It is widely assumed in Tokyo that China's perceived drive for regional hegemony through its buildup of air and naval assets will manifest itself concretely in a move by China to resolve territorial disputes in the Pacific by force or by the threat of force.[19] That is why Japanese leaders in academics, politics, and business and even in foreign ministry are increasingly arguing that Japan must be prepared for other scenarios. This confirms Japan's changing attitude and as Green and Self say, "Japanese thinking is shifting from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism."[20]

Japan has asserted itself in the East China Sea and has improved its relationship with Taiwan despite Beijing's protests. Recently, the Japanese government granted one of the Oil and Gas companies, the concessions to conduct experimental drilling in East China Sea. Japan's activity has been termed as provocative that impairs China's sovereign rights and interests.[21]

Another kind of threat to Japanese security is from the increasing economic expansion of China which has threatened to take over Japanese place in the region. Japan's decision to stop its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China is evident in the growing economic rivalry. China has developed close cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was china that

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[18] Eugene Brown, *op.cit.*, p. 339.
[19] Shigeo Hiramatsu quoted in Sanjana Joshi, 'Redefining Japanese Security', Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, *Delhi Papers 5*, 1996, p. 33.
[20] Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism", *Survival*, Vol. 38, No 2, p. 36.
[21] "China protests Japanese move", *The Hindu*, July 16, 2005.

proposed and signed the free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, and was the first to accede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and signed a joint declaration with ASEAN on 'Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity' in October 2003.[22]

In contrast, surprisingly, economic relations between the two countries are positive. Japan understands the need for maintaining friendly ties with China owing to its booming economy. Japanese businesses now recognize that the economic relationship presents a win-win opportunity for both countries. Chinese statistics show that trade volume between the two nations topped $130 billion in 2003, an increase of 30.4 percent from the year 2002.[23] Two-way trade is expected to exceed $150 billion, marking six years of continuous growth. Last year, China was the biggest exporter to Japan, providing 18.3 percent of Japan's imports. Japanese exports to China reached 6.6 trillion yen in 2003, a 33.8 percent increase, making the mainland the second-largest export market for Japan.[24]

China's growth has become the engine of Japan's recovery. The Olympics 2008 which is to be held in Beijing has helped revived Japanese economy to some extent, especially the construction industry. Expanding Japanese investment in China is linking the two economies ever tighter. Yet for each positive sign, there is a disturbing "other side of the coin".

Despite growing economic exchanges, the two publics have negative impressions of the other. A 2003 yearend survey showed that 28.4 percent of Japanese thought that relations with China were good/very good; 31.5 percent, bad/very bad; and 30.4 percent could not say (the rest didn't answer).[25] One survey

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[22] For text, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dqc/t27737.htm.
[23] Brad Glosserman, "China Mind Games", *The Japan Times*, September 5, 2004.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] "Japanese Perceptions of Growing Chinese Military Power", at http://www.gees.org/pdf/1180/+japanese+perceptions+of+growing+chinese+military+power+pdf&hl=en.

found that 93.1 percent of Chinese internet users do not like Japan. This was exhibited in the kind of anti-Japan demonstrations recently witnessed in Beijing. Yukata Kawshima, a well-known Japanese diplomat of yesteryear, recently expounded the dilemma in Japan-China ties thus: "While the economic interdependence of Japan and China deepens and widens, the sense of nationalism in each country often manifests in the form of negative attitudes towards the other."[26]

China's role in the six party talks on the North Korean nuclear standoff has acquired even greater strategic significance. America has come to rely on Chinese mediation, and as a result Beijing has acquired influence over the pace and direction of events in the region. As China's influence in the area rises, this dispute is likely to show up again and again. Even as growing economic relations are further integrating the economies of Northeast Asia, the mutual suspicion between China and Japan seems to be growing as well.

On the other hand, China is also becoming increasingly critical of Japan's growing military profile. The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration of April 1996 and the negotiation of the 1997 revised Japan-U.S. Defence Guidelines induced China to launch its first attack on the alliance since the 1970s. As Jiang Zemin pointed out, "To be frank, we are on very high alert regarding this Japanese-U.S. military treaty . . . We still hear occasional echoes of Japanese militarism that are inconsistent with history, so we need to be alert against it."[27]

Over the years, Chinese attitudes toward the US-Japan alliance have shifted from outright condemnation and opposition in the 1960s, to tacit acceptance in the 1970s and 1980s, to growing criticism since the end of the Cold War. In the past the alliance in Beijing's eyes served a useful purpose of keeping Tokyo from

[26] "Japan, China and a 'troubled past'", *The Hindu*, April 28, 2005, p. 11.
[27] Paul Midford, "China views the Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 4, 2004, p.114.

seeking re-militarization. As Curtis observes, 'the popularity of the idea that the Security Treaty is the 'cap-in-the-bottle' of Japanese militarism is a legacy of the Nixon-Kissinger era, even if the phrase itself is not'.[28]

Beijing was highly critical of the April 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the September 1997 US-Japanese Defense Cooperation Guidelines. The upgrading of the US-Japan alliance system has caused concern amongst the Chinese. China has regarded these changes in Japan's national security strategy as having negative implications for China's security and voice serious concerns from time to time. The joint statement by Tokyo and Washington in February 2005 which considers Taiwan issue as central to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region has irked Beijing.

For China, US military presence means increasing danger to Taiwanese independence. Beijing views the latest US-Japan security statement as an encroachment on China's sovereignty and meddling in its internal affairs because of its references to the Taiwan Strait and its call for transparency in China's military affairs. What alarmed Beijing is what it views as the unprecedented clarity with which Washington and Tokyo define their security interests and security perimeter in the region, which now clearly includes the Taiwan Strait. This is seen by China as exceeding the jurisdiction of a bilateral US-Japan security pact, whose original objective was the defence of Japan.

Beijing is increasingly worried that a more assertive Japan actively involved in the region's security affairs and seeking to be a "normal" power will emerge as a result of the US-Japan accord. The new Japanese defence guidelines and the recent defence white paper in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original mandate exclusively of self-defense to a broader collective defense function,

[28] Gerald L. Curtis, "US Policy Toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton: An Assessment", in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations* (Tokyo, 2000), p. 10.

therefore providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs. Japan already has one of the largest defence budgets in the world. In addition, Japan's industrial and technological ability will provide it with ready resources should it decide to become a great military power at short notice.

In short, China and Japan have to come to terms over the historical legacies, unresolved territorial disputes, and growing mutual suspicions of and hostility toward each other as the two Asian powers compete for recognition and leadership in East Asia.

Japan and North Korea

With its aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, North Korea has emerged as the most immediate threat to Japanese security. North Korea is one of the two countries (the other being China) to be been named as a major threat to Japan's security in the revised NDPO. According to the Diplomatic Blue Book of Japan 2004, Japan's basic policy concerning North Korea is to comprehensively resolve the abduction issue and the security issues such as the nuclear and missile issues based on the Pyongyang Declaration and thereby normalize relations with the North Korea in a manner that would contribute to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.[29]

The Korean Peninsula is a key influence upon Japan's security policy makers, as it is a point of geostrategic convergence for regional and global powers. All the regional powers-China, Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan-sought to defend their security interest on the peninsula and bring it into their respective spheres. Japan saw Korea as an invasion route to and from Japan and considered it as a "dagger thrown in the heart of Japan". Thus Japan's strategic aim in the past

[29] Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/bluebook/2004/chap1.pdf

and even now is to prevent the domination of Korean peninsula by a hostile power. Japan fought for its control in Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95 and again during Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and finally annexed it in 1910.

Japan and North Korea have not established official relations since the Korean Peninsula was liberated from Japanese rule (annexed in 1910) and divided into two separate states following Japan's defeat in World War II. And as both the countries were from two opposing camps and having different ideology (North Korea following Soviet Union), there was an inbuilt tussle in their relationship. Japan largely ignored North Korea throughout the Cold War. Politically, it accepted South Korea's argument that it was the only legitimate Korean state. But Japanese government acknowledged the practical reality of the existence of the North Korean government throughout the Cold War. However, no official relations were maintained.

The Struggle for Normalization

Normalization talks between North Korea and Japan are now in their fourteenth year, with little progress toward resolution. Japan - North Korea ties were first promoted by unofficial political dialogue between, on the one hand, sections of the LDP and opposition parties, and, on the other, North Korean elites represented by the Korean Workers Party (KWP).[30] The delegation's visit resulted in the Tripartite Declaration by Japan's Socialist Party and the North Korean Worker's Party, calling for early government-level talks on normalization. These opened in 1991 but collapsed a year later after eight rounds because of the North's refusal to discuss kidnapping allegations.

While direct bilateral talks were making little progress, Japan became an active player in the multilateral attempts to engage North Korea in the mid-1990s.

[30] Glenn Hook, *et al.*, *Japan's International Relations* (London, Routeledge, 2000), p. 177.

After the U.S.-brokered Agreed Framework of 1994 froze North Korea's plutonium production, Japan agreed to pay $1 billion toward construction of two light-water reactors in the North. It also began in 1995 to donate food aid in response to the famine conditions there. However, relations deteriorated when North Korea fired a multi-stage rocket over Japanese territory in August 1998, heightening the public's perception of a military threat. The missile launching in the Sea of Japan, spy ship incursions, revelations regarding abductions of Japanese citizens, acceptance of a covert nuclear programme and withdrawal from the NPT- have thrust North Korea into the forefront of Japanese security concerns. In the process, public opinion has come to view the country almost entirely through a negative lens.

Abduction issue

The North's reprehensible kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s remains the most important bilateral issue from the standpoint of Japanese public opinion. Since 1991, the Japanese government has taken every opportunity to raise the abduction issue with North Korea, but the North Korean side rigidly continued to deny its existence. After the *Taepodong* missile attack on Japanese waters, the normalization talks between the two countries had been broken off. It was Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's surprise announcement in August 2002 that hoped to restart negotiations on normalizing diplomatic relations and to press North Korea to refrain from nuclear weapons development in exchange of economic aid.

At the Japan-North Korea Meeting held at Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il admitted for the first time that its operatives had kidnapped numerous Japanese citizens to use as language teachers for North Korean intelligence agents. This was accompanied by a shocking report that of the total 13, only five of them are alive and eight of them died while

entering North Korea. However, the Pyongyang Declaration was signed which called for normalization talks between the two.

Normalization talks between Japan and North Korea started in October of the same year. But Japanese requests for a full settlement of the remaining abduction-related issues, including more details concerning the reported deaths, were met by the North Koreans insistence that this matter had been broadly settled already. The round of talks ended inconclusively, and the negotiations are yet to resume.

Since then the resolution of the abduction issue is one of the most important issue facing Japanese diplomacy, and Japan has been calling forcefully on North Korean side toward its swiftest possible resolution. Japan attaches importance both to "dialogue" and "pressure" in its attempt to resolve the issue.[31]

Another reason that stalled the Japan-North Korea normalization talks and parallel security talks was North Korea's October 2002 admission to U.S. officials that it has a secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment.

Nuclear Issue

While the abduction problem remains the most contentious issue, it is not the only obstacle to normalization. Even if North Korea makes a sufficient accounting to satisfy public opinion, Japan will not be in a position to normalize relations without a solution to the nuclear crisis. The security threat posed by Pyongyang - the nuclear programs, development of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles that can target the entire Japanese territory - is ultimately of far greater importance.

[31] Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/bluebook/2004/chap1.pdf.

North Korea has been suspected of developing nuclear weapons for more than 15 years. In the last chapter we have already seen how the first nuclear crisis owing to North Korea was resolved.[32] Suspicions over North Korea's nuclear programme were rekindled when US Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly visited North Korea in October 2002. The US had strong suspicion that North Korea might be advancing its nuclear development by uranium enrichment and the North Korean side admitted that this was the case. North Korea asserted that it was the US side which had violated the Agreed Framework and announced that it would reactivate its nuclear related facilities by lifting the freeze on nuclear facilities instituted under the Framework.

In his January 2002 State of the Union address, Bush placed North Korea alongside Iraq and Iran in the "axis of evil"[33] and in September of that year, he did not exclude North Korea from the possible targets of preemptive strikes. North Korea's withdrawal from NPT in January 2003 set in motion the second "nuclear diplomacy" to deal with United States and other countries using the development of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip.[34] Three Party Talks were held between US, China and North Korea to solve the issue which bore no fruits. Later Six Party Talks were also held among the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the US to defuse the crisis. The US conceived of the Six Party Talks as a venue in which North Korea would be subjected to multilateral pressure but so far even after three rounds of meetings nothing has been sorted out. In February 2005, North Korea withdrew from the Six Party talks and the situation turned from bad to worse. There was pressure from China and U.S. to return to six party talks and after meetings with Condoleeza Rice, North Korea has agreed to return to the Six Nation talks. The talks might resume on July 25, 2005.

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[32] Please refer Chapter no. 2, pp. 41-44.
[33] Yoshida Soeya, 'Japanese Diplomacy and the North Korean Problem', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Spring 2003, p. 59.
[34] *East Asian Strategic Review 2004*, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, p. 11.

The North Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most prominent security issues in the entire region. Since the blatant admission of uranium enrichment programme by the North Koreans, Japan's foreign policy has taken active interest in solving the problem. Soon after the nuclear crisis materialized, Tokyo officials approached the Bush administration about increasing Japan's role in Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). TMD is geographically limited to protecting Japan from missile attacks in Northeast Asia.[35] It was further strengthened by US-Japan joint technological research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Proliferation of Security Initiative (PSI).[36] There were even claims that it would revise its own antinuclear stance.

The current nuclear crisis is far more serious than the previous one of 1993-94 on several accounts. Compared to ten years ago, for one thing, North Korea stands much closer to substantially expanding its nuclear capabilities. In fact, the North has claimed that it possesses nuclear weapons and that it has almost completed the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel into weapons grade plutonium, which would allow North Korea to produce five or six nuclear weapons. While such claims have not been independently confirmed by the United States, many believe that since its withdrawal from NPT in January 2003, North Korea has reprocessed its fuel rods and may have turned the plutonium into weapons.

Another difference from a decade ago is North Korea's increasingly stubborn and belligerent stance. In an unusually explicit threat to Japan in September 2004, North Korea warned that Japan would be immersed in a "nuclear sea of fire" if the United States were to attack the North. In spite of several negotiations and persuasions to dismantle its nuclear programme, North Korea declared itself a nuclear power in February 2005. Especially after watching Iraq,

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[35] Glenn Hook, et al., *Japan's International Relations* (London: Routeledge, 2000), p. 142.

[36] Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is being vigorously pursued by Bush Administration to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related items. The participating states point that the PSI is targeted at proliferation per se and at any particular state, but it is no secret that a main target of the initiative is Pyongyang.

North Korea may have regarded nuclear weapons as an end in themselves, a military deterrent and the ultimate guarantor of the regime's survival. North Korea continues to test short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan, most recently on May 1, 2005.

These factors taken together suggest that the Korean peninsula is facing a genuine crisis. Even if the abduction issue is solved, normalization cannot be achieved unless the nuclear issue is settled. At the same time, normalization is one of the major incentives for inducing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, but one that it cannot receive as long as the abduction issue remains outstanding. This suggests that unless both problems are addressed, progress on either one is likely.

Apart from this there is a fear of a nuclear arms race in East Asia. The 2004 Defense White Paper focuses on North Korea, naming the country as its top military threat and calling for the development and deployment of a missile defence system to be speeded up to counter the danger.[37] China has regarded these changes in Japan's national security strategy as having negative implications for China's security and voice serious concerns from time to time. North Korea's rogue behavior has contributed to China's escalating sense of insecurity about Japan's security policy. Additional provocative behavior by the North would likely push Japan toward a more assertive policy.

Japan's New Nationalism

The reality of the rising Chinese power and the North Korean threat to Japan has certainly been useful for galvanizing public opinion in favor of changes

[37] "New Challenges Arise from a Changing Global Security Environment", http://globalsecurity.com/global_security/new_challenges/new_challenges.html.

that the government was already pursuing. This has raised concern in neighboring countries of Japan. They look this as a rise of nationalism in Japan.

Japanese nationalism is something which is not only denounced and debated in Asia but even in Japan. It was Japan's nationalism with fascist underpinnings that led to the rise of militarism in Japan. And it was its nationalist military and their idea of making "Greater Co-prosperity Sphere"[38] that was considered responsible for taking Japan to the devastating war which ultimately led to the dropping of the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result people developed great antipathy towards military and any kind of forces. After the defeat in the Second World War and Japan's occupation by Allied powers, the country started a process of demilitarization and democratization. Article 9 of the Constitution, committed the country to pacifism and thus nationalism was relegated to the fringes of Japan's popular debate till recently.

Japan's active role in Northeast Asian security has raised doubts in the minds of its neighbors. The sinking of the North Korean *fushinsen* (mystery ships) which had entered Japanese territorial waters was a marked contrast to past responses. It was for the first time since the end of World War II that Japan's navy had sunk a foreign vessel. Such behavior would have been almost unimaginable only a decade ago. Since then there have been open calls for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. And when in 2002 North Korea admitted that it was actively developing nuclear weapons, the then Japan's defense minister, Shigeru Ishiba, warned North Korea that Japan could launch a preemptive strike to defend itself if necessary. He repeated the warning in September 2003, noting that, "the Japanese constitution permits my position. Attacking North Korea after a missile attack on

[38] Japan's brutal attempt to dominate Asia during the pre-1945 era was undertaken in the name of creating such a co-prosperity sphere.

Japan is too late."[39] In mid-2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda argued publicly that the constitution did not prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. As discussed earlier this was something which would have been unthinkable few years back.

The acceptance of the involvement of Japan's SDF in Afghanistan and Iraq, though in non-combat roles, is also seen as the sign of increasing nationalist feeling in neighboring countries. The Japanese were shocked and appalled at the kidnapping of Japanese civilians in Iraq. When they were released by the members of Mujahedin who had been holding them, everyone breathed a sigh of relief. Many were surprised then to see the treatment the freed hostages received upon their return at the hands of the Japanese media and their own government, who even went so far as to begin leveling fines against the former hostages to reimburse the state for the trouble it went through. This mistreatment can be understood as part of a larger move toward right-wing nationalism in Japan today.[40]

In addition to this Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated official visits to Yasukuni Shrine are considered manifestations of contemporary Japanese nationalism. Another flashpoint for the right in Japan has been the now mandatory raising of the *Hinomaru*, the national flag, and the singing of the *Kimigayo*, the national anthem in praise of the emperor, at school graduation and commencement. Both of these actions have strong imperial connotations in Japan. The flag and the anthem though very simple on the face of it, is not so simple for the reason that, concerning Japan's neighbors, these are seen as the swastika is seen in Europe.[41] And combined with the change in attitude of the Japanese security policy, this causes fear among the neighboring countries.

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[39] Eugene A. Matthews, 'Japan's New Nationalism', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, p. 75.
[40] Ian Werkheiser, "Nationalism and Aggression in Japan: The U.S. Model", May 11, 2004 at www.dissidentvoice.org.
[41] Hook and McCormack, *op.cit.*, p. 10

Perhaps the most eyebrow-raising manifestation of the government's recognition that a new approach to national security is required was the Diet's enactment on the formation of "constitutional review councils" in 2000. In an opinion poll in December 2004, 79 percent of the respondents approved of an amendment. In a similar poll the previous year, 81 percent responded positively. The need to review the Constitution and Article 9 in particular is seen as the increasing changing attitude of the Japanese.

To add on to the economic woes is China's rise as an economic and military power. Many consider China as the main threat to Japan.[42] And over the years as China is slowly assuming leadership of the region, the resentment is increasing. With China's raking up the textbook issue on and off and its criticizing the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni shrine and the incessant demands for apology has irked the Japanese. Many Japanese now feel their country has apologized enough for its actions 60 years ago and think Tokyo should start asserting itself. "Japanese people are getting tired of 'apology diplomacy'. If China puts pressure on Japan, the Japanese just get angry," said Prof Ryosei Kokubun, an expert on China at Tokyo's Keio University.[43]

The revised Guidelines are even seen as encouraging rightist, if not 'militarist' forces in Japan. According to a Research Fellow at the Chinese Institute for International and Strategic Studies (CIISS), there is a direct connection between US-Japan security cooperation under the new Guidelines and the efforts of some Japanese to put their country back on the road to militarism:

> Adjustment in Japan-US military relations will enable Japan to have the opportunity to achieve a new breakthrough in military policies and further encourage the turn to the right in domestic politics in Japan. . . some people in

[42] Assessment from interaction with many young Japanese students revealed that they fear China's economic and military expansion. Though they fear North Korean belligerent attitude, but it is China which they consider as a long term threat to Japan.
[43] Anton La Guardia, "Asia rises against 'whitewashing' of Japan's atrocities", *The Japan Times*, April 9, 2005.

> Japan are attempting to seek a military upswing by strengthening its military relations with the United States.[44]

Similarly, an article in the people's Daily claimed that the new Guidelines promoting Japan-US military cooperation would prove to be 'an important means' for strengthening 'the seed of Japanese militarism'.[45]

As if Pyongyang's missile threat and China's increasing importance in the region were not unsettling enough for the Japanese, the fact that the economy is still far from taking off has intensified the sense of national unease. Unemployment is still around 4.6 per cent and is affecting the younger generation who have not seen the horrors of war and who are not that committed to pacifist tendencies. Pensions and domestic relief programs are in serious peril, and the idea of permanent job security is no longer the assurance it once was, as loyalty to one company is being rewarded more and more by bankruptcy and layoffs. "Non-Performing Loans" (NPL) are hanging like a stone around the necks of Japanese banks.[46]

Yet during all this, money is being used to help shore up the US dollar, due to demands by the neo-conservative government in Washington, demands that Japan does not think it can afford to ignore with the US acting as their shield against North Korea and power balancing against China.[47] Japan's relation with the United States is the most important pillar of their security policy which they cannot afford to ignore and which is the subject of discussion in the next chapter.

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[44] Paul Midford, "China Views the Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 4, 2004, p.129.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] Ian Werkheiser, *op.cit.*
[47] *Ibid.*

Chapter 4

The U.S.-Japan Alliance Since 9/11

> With the world's second largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the US involvement in Asia. The revised guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation should be regarded as the floor, not the ceiling, for an expanded Japanese role in the trans-Pacific alliance.[1]

US-Japan security relationship has formed one of the most significant pillars of Japan's security strategy ever since the end of World War II. Right from the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1951 till this date, US-Japan relations have passed through corresponding stages, with each one bringing about a fundamental change. In this new era, they have reaffirmed their mutual security relationship and defence cooperation in areas ranging from Theater Missile Defence (TMD) to regional contingency planning and intelligence sharing. As Green says,

> "There is no doubt that the alliance continues to serve the fundamental interest of both parties. For the United States, it provides critical forward basing in East Asia and political partnership with the world's second largest economy. For Japan, it provides regional stability, a nuclear umbrella and alignment with world's largest economic and political power.[2]

From the mutual security issues, the emphasis of the alliance has shifted to address the changes in the international security situation, with a focus on East Asia. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has fostered a close and cooperative relationship with President Bush, so much so that many compare it to the "Ron-Yasu" relationship of 1982-1987 between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro

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[1] Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, *The United States and Japan Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership* (Washington D.C, National Defence University, 2000), quoted in Arpita Mathur, "Japan's Changing Role in the US-Japan Security Alliance", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 503.

[2] Michael Green, The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations after the Cold War in Gerald Curtis ed., *New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations* (Tokyo, 2000), p. 241

Nakasone. According to Japanese diplomats, "U.S.-Japan relations have never been better than they are now."[3]

And though it remains healthy in the new millennium but it still faces various challenges in the form of shifting perspectives on security in East Asia, development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rising economic and military power of China and growing teeth of international terrorism. With Japan now taking an active interest in its security policy and assuming an international and regional role for itself, how Japan and United States overcome these issues will be a test for their alliance in the future.

In the first two chapters we have seen how Japan from being a protégé under U.S. patronage has grown to be known as an alliance partner. In other words, there is a shift in the US-Japan Treaty from the defence of Japan to Japanese support for the American military presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region. All throughout the Cold War period and in the post Cold War period it was mainly because of the US pressure that Japan has come out of its pacifism and has started taking an active interest in regional and global security matters.

Milestones Crossed

Before we go into the challenges that face the alliance lets briefly look at the history of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The US-Japan alliance has passed through many milestones since its inception in 1951. They are:

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (1951-1957)

The two sides signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951 to form an alliance with the United States. At that time the

[3] Glen S. Fukushima, "Why Japan Prefers Bush", *The Japan Times*, September 9, 2004.

most powerful threat to US and Japan was the Soviet Union and its communist agenda. The main purpose of the alliance was to restrain the Soviet Union. With the signing of the Treaty, the foundations were laid for a 'minimalist' security posture. The United States and Japan developed a highly asymmetrical alliance, with Japan providing the conventional defence of its own territory and U.S. bases, and the United States using its nuclear deterrent and forward deployments to guarantee security.[4] What was significant was the fact that the US also undertook to provide assistance to maintain internal disorders as well.[5] Japan's Basic Policy for National Defense (BPND) which was its first statement of its individual military policy, reiterated dependence on the US for security in its entirety.

Revision of the Treaty (1957-1975)

In June 1957, the then Prime Minister Kishi, based on the discussions about the former treaty, proposed that the United States should revise the Treaty. Following negotiations, their alliance was further strengthened with the two countries signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960. Japan in the revised 1960 treaty was explicitly obliged to defend US forces on its territory. However, Japan avoided any formal commitment to collective self defense, and the treaty contained no provision for the defense of US forces outside Japan or the United States itself. On its part, US apart from the conventional military forces provided nuclear umbrella against neighbors.

Japan's most important obligation was to provide US the use of Japanese facilities and areas in Japan for contributing to the security of Japan and maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. US was also required to consult with Japan regarding implementation of the treaty. According to

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[4] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder and London, 2004), p. 150.

[5] The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulated in its Article 1 that U.S. forces stationed in Japan "may be utilized.....including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."

Hook and others, there is little evidence that the United States has sought prior consultation with Japan, or that Japan has the political will to refuse, dependent as it is on the United States for its own security.[6] One notable shift from the 1951 agreement was that the clause relating to the US contribution to Japanese domestic or internal security was omitted. Despite fierce opposition to the ratification of the current Treaty, it was approved by the Diet in June 1960. The treaty was automatically extended in 1970 and remains in that form till date.

Drawing up the Former Guidelines and Expanding Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1975-1991)

After signing the Treaty, the two countries became closer, particularly concerning political and economic cooperation. However, no specific discussions were held about cooperation for defence operations. It was only after Prime Minster Takeo Miki and the U.S. President Ford in 1975 agreed that the relevant officials of the two countries shall meet and discuss on this issue. As a result, in July 1976, it was agreed to establish the Japan-U.S. Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation which laid the foundation of the defense cooperation.

The third momentous progression of the alliance was the adoption of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978. The formulation of these guidelines was a significant development adding pith and substance to the treaty in that they drew out a mechanism for the implementation of the treaty, which did not have any operational rules till then.[7]

The growing importance of the treaty and the enhanced level of cooperation between US and Japan allowed Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to describe their partnership as an "alliance relationship" for the first time in 1981. The decade of

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[6] Glenn D. Hook, et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security* (London, Routledge, 2001), p. 129.
[7] Arpita Mathur, 'Japan's Changing Role in the US-Japan Security Alliance', *Strategic Analysis*, October-December 2004, p. 505.

1980s saw close cooperation between the two countries in the field of military cooperation. The then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone termed Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for its ally. Even within this bilateral framework, Japan still had limitations on the degree of support it would extend to the US on the event of a regional contingency.

The Collapse of the Cold War and the Current Guidelines Drawn Up (1991-2001)

In December 1991, the collapse of the former Soviet Union ended the Cold War. It decreased the possibilities that large-scale attacks would break out against Japan, although it was made clear that the whole Asia-Pacific region still suffered from instability and uncertainty as seen in North Korea's suspected nuclear development, which resulted in more tense situations on the Korean peninsula.

The security environment in East Asia had changed with the end of Cold War and it engendered major problems for the management and continuation of the US-Japan alliance. The removal of the Soviet threat questioned the political and military rationale of the alliance. With the onset of the second Gulf War in 1990, the U.S.-Japan security relationship was nearing a crisis. Japan did not live up to the expectations of its partner which wanted Tokyo to take a more active role within the partnership.

The alliance was also under strain because of its inability to deal with regional contingencies such as the North Korean crisis. On asking for logistical support by US in case of eruption of a conflict, the Japanese government was unable to commit any forces. Japanese policymakers became concerned that the United States might abandon the security treaty and Japan as an unreliable partner. On the other hand, US also was concerned that the alliance could crumble and it would deprive them of crucial bases in East Asia.

Looking at the changing security environment, the Japanese and American reviews of their defence policies began independently. In early 1994, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa appointed a blue-ribbon advisory group chaired by Hirotaro Higuchi to examine the future of Japanese Defense Policy. The report entitled, '*The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: the Outlook for the 21st Century*' was published in 1994. It favored a re-definition of the alliance oriented towards two objectives – ensuring smooth Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the event of any military contingency in Japan and contributing to the stability of the region around Japan.[8] It also suggested moving from a "cold war defense strategy" to a "multilateral security strategy."[9]

Similarly, the U.S Defence Department conducted its own review of East Asian strategy. The result of the review was delineated in a report which came to be known as Nye Initiative, after the name of its main coordinator, Joseph Nye Jr. The report termed the alliance with Japan as the most important and called for the need to remain engaged in Asia. It also identifies the U.S.-Japan alliance as the linchpin of U.S security policy in Asia.[10] It clearly defined that U.S. forces were committed not only to the defense of Japan but also to the preservation of peace and security in the entire Far East.

The Nye initiative helped shaped the new NDPO which called for stronger military ties with the U.S. and also broadened the geographic scope of national defense to the Asia-Pacific region. A U.S.-Japan summit was planned to reaffirm the security pact. But the rape of the Okinawan schoolgirl by American servicemen in early September posed one of the most difficult political challenges to the alliance in recent memory. In spite of the official US apologies for the incident and

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[8] Akio Watanabe, 'Has Japan Crossed the Rubicon? Defence Policy since the Higuchi Report', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol 17, No. 4, Winter 2003, p. 241.
[9] Mike M. Mochizuki, 'A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance', in Mike M. Mochizuki ed., *Toward A True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations* (Washington, 1997), p. 9.
[10] Ralph A. Cossa, 'Security Goals and Military Strategy of the U.S. and Japan and their Impact on Korean Peninsula Security', *Korea and World Affairs*, Winter 1996, p. 596.

the imprisonment of the three servicemen, there were large scale protests in Okinawa against the presence of US bases. The alliance was badly shaken by this issue. And it still remains one of the major issues to be resolved in the coming years.

Meanwhile, Ryutaro Hashimoto became the prime minister after the resignation of Murayama in January 1996. Known for his hawkish views, Hashimoto was more enthusiastic about strengthening the alliance. The situation in the Taiwan Strait crisis provided a good context for convincing Americans and Japanese about the strategic importance of the bilateral security partnership.[11]

The two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) just before the planned summit. It mandated Japanese logistical support for U.S. forces during peacetime in the context of training, joint exercises, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian missions. They also decided to review the 1978 guidelines to handle "situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan."

The scheduled meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the American President opened with the statement,

> "Japan and the United States approach the twenty-first century as allies and partners with shared values, interests, and hopes. Our relationship is of bilateral, regional, and global importance. We face the challenges of tomorrow strengthened by years of common tests, experiences, and cooperation.[12]

The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security was signed on 17 April, 1996 which called for bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in

[11] Mike M. Mochizuki, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[12] Ralph A. Cossa, *op.cit.*, p. 590.

the areas surrounding Japan. The Declaration commits both sides to the revitalization of the defense relationship.

The Clinton/Hashimoto Declaration was a significant step forward both in informing the general public in both nations about the importance of the alliance and in paving the way for greater defense cooperation. It recognized close bilateral defense cooperation as a central element in the security relationship and went on to say that:

> The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.[13]

Following the reaffirmation by the Joint Declaration of the role played by the Japan-U.S. partnership for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the two countries made the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in September 1997. The revised Guidelines were approved by the government in 1997 and by the National Diet in 1998. The guidelines envisaged an expanded role for Japan's forces not only in the defense of its own territory but also in area surrounding it.[14]

Christopher Hughes opines that the revision of the Defense Guidelines contributed to the process of the reconfirmation, even redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance and has restored the sense that it can respond to the post-Cold War security environment.[15]

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[13] "Raplh A. Cosaa, *op.cit.*, p. 591.
[14] For details please refer Chapter Two, pp. 47-48.
[15] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

9/11 Terrorist Attacks and Subsequent Japan-U.S. Relations (2001-2004)

The 9/11 terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 made people realize that international society was facing serious new threats that were spreading all over the world, including international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration encouraged Japan to strengthen its security role in the Asia-Pacific. As U.S. has strategic interests in the region, it has placed growing demands on Japan to become a 'normal' country. After the dispatch of the Japanese troops to Iraq, much attention has been paid to Japan's recent steps toward becoming a "normal" nation. Mike Mochizuki states three versions of a normalized Japan: a Japan that participates in a collective security system centered on the United Nations, a Japan that exercise its right to collective self-defense as part of an alliance with the United States, and a Japan that is redefined as primarily an Asian power.[16]

Post 9/11, the government of Japan has tried hard to reverse its 1990s image as a slow-moving bureaucracy in time of crisis. The passage of the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law was relatively swift. Japan deployed ships in the Indian Ocean; co-hosted the Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference; supported the US preemptive attack on Iraq and adopted a new law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. It also passed war contingency laws which empower the government to mobilize the SDF to cope with a military attack situation. The amendments to the Self Defense and Maritime Safety Laws and to the International Peace Cooperation Law are also significant. In the new post Cold War, the above measures have strengthened Japan's position in the alliance and thus moved it closer to attain normal nation status.

[16] Mike Mochizuki, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

Japan-U.S. Defense Summit

In November 2003, a Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting was held in Tokyo. Japan's Minster of State for Defense, Shigeru Ishiba, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld agreed that both countries need to further promote cooperation not only in regional but also global security issues, based on a recognition of "the Japan-U.S. alliance in a global context" in the new security environment. They also discussed issues related to Iraq reconstruction and North Korean nuclear problem. Regarding the North Korean issue, Rumsfeld stated that the U.S. approach to the North Korean problem would not in any way undermine the Japan-U.S. security Arrangements.

Apart from this Japan's SDF and the United States forces have been conducting joint exercises. Based on this perspective, in August to September 2003, for example, the GSDF held a combat exercise utilizing special training facilities in the United States as a practical training in urban warfare.[17] Also in February 2003, a Japan-U.S. joint exercise was held as command post exercise regarding cooperation and coordination procedures between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as well as between the SDF and U.S. forces.[18]

Japan and the United States have also amended the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and it was approved by the Japanese Diet in 2004. The amended Agreement expands the scope of application to operations in armed attack situations, and operations to further the efforts of international community to contribute to international peace and security, and to cope with large-scale disasters or for other purposes.[19]

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[17] *Defense of Japan 2004, op.cit.*, 145.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*

Ballistic Missile Defense

The rapid proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern for the international community and many ballistic missiles have been deployed in the region, some of which are capable of striking Japan. It is also possible that these weapons might be acquired by non-state entities such as terrorists who have no state or nation to protect and against whom traditional deterrence does not work well. In the face of such circumstances, the Security Council and the Japanese Cabinet met on December 19, 2003 and the government officially decided to introduce a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system as a purely defensive measure.[20]

If Japan has managed to avoid total integration into U.S. military strategy under the revised Defense Guidelines, then participation in BMD projects alongside the United States may tighten the alliance bonds irreversibly. Proposals for U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense systems date to 1986 and the agreement of the Nakasone administration to participate in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. This agreement became the basis for the U.S. SDI Office and prompted U.S. and Japanese private defense contractors to carry out a joint study on Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture for missile defense from December 1989 until April 1993.[21] Meanwhile, U.S. and Japanese interest in BMD in the post-Cold War period continued to be driven by proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities globally and in East Asia.

Japan got interested in undertaking a joint research into missile defense system with U.S. when North Korea conducted a test launch of a ballistic missile in May 1993. The revised Guidelines also called for cooperation and coordination to respond to a ballistic missile attack. However, the Japanese government remained

[20] For details see, Development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System in *Defense of Japan 2004* (Inter Group Corporation, Japan, 2004), pp. 550-551.
[21] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

reticent about committing to cooperative research into BMD. Japan's commitment was assured by the Taepodong shock. The Japanese government approved joint research with the United States in December 1998. In August 1999, the Japanese government began joint technical research with the United States on a Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD) system.[22] (Today, the NTWD is called the Sea-based Mid-course Defence (SMD) system.) Japan's interest increased following North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and rumors of another planned ballistic missile test over Japan.

Japan's interest in BMD extends to the introduction of Patriot Advanced Capabilty-3 (PAC-3)[23] and since early 2003 the JDA has indicated that it intends to request funds to purchase the upgraded system. The government in its FY2004 budget proposal requested funds for the purchase of interceptor missiles to be installed on Aegis-equipped destroyers as part of the SMD program.

Japan has agreed to undertake joint research into NTWD and four associated technologies: infrared seekers mounted in the nosecones of interceptor missiles to detect and pursue targets; the protection of infrared seekers from heat generated during flight from the atmosphere; kinetic interceptor warheads, or kinetic kill vehicles, for the direct destruction of ballistic missiles; and the second-stage rocket motor of the interceptor missile.[24]

The Japanese government stresses that the BMD project remains at the research stage (currently 2006-2007) and that separate government decisions will be necessary before development and deployment. However, following the renewed nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, Prime Minister Koizumi indicated

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[22] *East Asian Strategic Review 2004*, p. 242.
[23] PAC-3 are surface-to-air missile that intercept incoming ballistic missiles/warheads at the terminal phase from the time they reenter the atmosphere to the time they land.
[24] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, pp. 184-185.

in 2003 that Japan may "accelerate" its participation in BMD development with the United States.

Japan, if it develops and deploys BMD, will in essence be acquiring a weapons system that cannot function without active cooperation of the United States. This would mean a stronger as well as closely knit partnership for the two allies. According to Umemoto Tetsuya, the impact of the system on the alliance might include:

- An increased scope for Japan to protect U.S. forces in regional contingencies in the future;
- Greater coordination on equipment to translate into more solid ties;
- Joint development and production of anti-missile systems could draw U.S. and Japanese defense industries closer.[25]

Japan and the United States are currently engaged in joint technical research on BMD. But moving beyond research to joint development and production based on this research would have meant export of weapons from Japan to the United States. This was against the three-principle ban on arms export adopted by Japan in 1967. There were few reports by the government which stressed on the need for Japan to reconsider and relax such a ban. As a result in December 2004, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda stated that the missile shield would be excluded from the weapons export ban.

Although these measures are of obvious significance, they also mark another important aspect of Japan's changing defense posture: an even closer strategic alignment with the United States. Japan is arguably now a closer ally to the United States than at any time during the Cold War. Under, Prime Minister

[25] Arpita Mathur, *op. cit.*, p. 516. For details, see, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, (eds.), *Reinventing the Alliance: US-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 187-212.

Junichiro Koizumi's leadership, Japan is virtually an unquestioning partner of the United States. Tokyo has shown full support for Washington in the military overthrow of the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Koizumi has also signed on to U.S. President George W. Bush's hard-line approach toward North Korea.

Japan's support to the US is seen as operating under fear of abandonment by the US. Throughout the Cold War years, Japan involved only partially in its own defence. As already discussed in the first chapter, this was mainly because of its Peace Constitution and secondly due to the fear of entrapment in any potential conflict. The threats from North Korea and China and Russia to some extent, made Japan respond by taking greater defense responsibilities within the bilateral alliance framework. These measures which include dispatch of MSDF to Indian Ocean and SDF to Iraq without UN authorization, passage of anti-terrorism law and contingency bills have simultaneously served to move Japan away from its rigid pacifist stance and toward becoming a more "normal" nation in the future. Thus with each step toward a more normal defense posture, Japan has become inextricably linked to U.S. security initiatives.

Challenges to the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is unquestionably critical for the peace and stability of the region not only of Japan but of the entire East-Asia-Pacific region. Even in the post 9/11 environment, this security relationship serves as the linchpin of Japan's security policy as well as America's deterrence strategy in the region. In spite of growing cooperation certain challenges remain. Developments in recent times are bound to have an impact on the form, complexion and future shape of the U.S.-Japan alliance. These developments are rooted in both a shift in focus of U.S. global strategy as well as Japan's incrementally expanding security profile.

The 'Base' Issue

The planned realignment of U.S. forces globally is emerging as an important issue between the United States and Japan. The proposed alterations in force posture are based on the twin principles of 'greater flexibility and agility' to face new security threats and challenges "associated with rogue nations, global terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction."[26] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also argued in favor of the theory that "capability can be maintained, and sometimes upgraded even if the number of troops who pose a burden to hosting communities is cut"

Hinting at such a plan in June 2003, Andy Hoehn, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Strategy and the main architect of realignment, had said that the U.S. would still maintain a ring of permanent military 'hubs' on U.S. territory, such as Guam, and in closely allied countries such as Britain and possibly Japan.[27] Speaking on the realignment of American troops in Japan, Rumsfeld stated that the new arrangements will be "completely satisfactory to Japan as well as the United States," adding that the U.S. "certainly intend(s), as a country, to stay engaged in the region. It's an important part of the world and Japan is an enormously important ally.[28]

The American bases in Japan offer Washington a very economical and effective platform from where not only can they meet any contingency in the region, but also deploy troops flexibly. However, one of the major friction areas is over Okinawa, which holds 75 percent of the American base in Japan.

During World War II, Okinawa was the only part of Japan where land war was fought between Japan and the allies, particularly the U.S. the ferocity of the

[26] Arpita Mathur, *op.cit.*, p. 514.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*

fighting was unparalleled and various authors have described it in graphic terms. When sovereignty was restored in Japan under the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, Okinawa was excluded, with only residual Japanese sovereignty recognized.

With the onset of the Korean War, it was turned into a highly militarized prefecture for the U.S. use. It was the 'Keystone of Pacific': the base for the conduct of wars on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam and for the deployment in general readiness for global or regional, conventional and nuclear wars.[29] According to Hook and McCormack, Okinawa as a 'war state' was obverse of the 'peace state' elsewhere in Japan. As the construction of the base complex went ahead, people were ousted from their homes and villages, often by bayonet and bulldozer, and forced to derive subsistence existence in the periphery of the bases or to emigrate. As a result there was and still is resentment against U.S. presence and there was a long battle for its reversion to Japan.

With the return of the Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, around 60 per cent of the 37,000 U.S. troops in Japan continued to be stationed in Okinawa. Their concentration in Okinawa led to strong calls for their reduction. It was argued that because of the bases development activity of the region gets restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected. The necessity of this was further questioned with the end of Cold War. The long-term frustration in the prefecture reached a crisis point when three U.S. servicemen raped an Okinawan girl in September 1995. Protests erupted everywhere in Japan. In spite of the official U.S. apologies and the punishment meted out to the culprits, the incident prompted large-scale protests in Okinawa against the presence of U.S. bases. These protests were supported by the governor of Okinawa.

[29] Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis* (London, 2001), p. 24.

An unconstitutional crisis erupted in 1996, shortly after the rape crisis. The governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide, refused to override the property rights of the Okinawan landlords by renewing leasing agreements to the U.S. against their will. Had his decision been allowed to stand, the US occupation of their bases would not only have become illegal, but the very ability of Japan to perform its designated role in the alliance system would have been threatened. The largest demonstration, on 21 October 1995, was attended by 85,000, and protests continued until a prefectural referendum was held in 1996. The majority of the residents voted for the realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases. The alliance was badly shaken by this issue and it has obliged the governments to reduce the burden of U.S. bases on Okinawa.

To defuse the crisis, a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established by the governments of Japan and the U.S. to look at reducing the size and number of U.S. bases. Since then, intensive discussions were made for about one year and it recommended the return of the Futenma Marine Air Station at Ginowan and a 20 per cent reduction in the land area of U.S. bases. This was followed by SACO's Final Report in 1996.

The SACO Report stipulated the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and improvement in operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement.[30] It proposed that the Futenma facilities should be transferred to a floating heliport to be constructed off the coast of Okinawa. In the opinion of Hughes, "the huge estimated costs and the large economic stimulus package that the Japanese central government offered Okinawa demonstrated the lengths to which the Japanese government would go to keep a lid on the problem and prevent a larger political crisis centering on security issues."[31]

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[30] *Defense of Japan* 2004, p. 381.
[31] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

Though for the most part, the recommendations in the report were carried out, but certain unresolved problems still remains and act as a political thorn. The unresolved problems include disagreement over a time limitation for the new Futenma base, a reduction in the number of bases, return of base land to local citizens, noise and air pollution issues as well as the number of criminal actions relating to U.S. stationed military. Both ` governments continue to work on these areas.

Japan also faces some difficulty as the amount to maintain U.S. forces continue to increase. Japan's negotiations on a new host nation support (HNS) arrangement with the United States have not been without difficulty. Since the mid-1990s Japan had assumed all the costs for civilian workers, fuel, heat, and lighting at U.S. facilities, and two-thirds of the total costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.[32] The constraints of Japan's defense budget made for a tough round of negotiations in 2001.

A reduction in the burden on Okinawa Prefecture is expected to help create favorable sentiment among local residents toward the United States, thus helping U.S. bases in the region function more smoothly and effectively. This would serve to boost the Japan-U.S. alliance.

North Korea's threat to their alliance

The greatest threat to Japanese security and the U.S.-Japan alliance in Northeast Asia is from North Korea. Ralph Cossa identifies Korea as the Achilles heel of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.[33] We have seen in the second and third chapters how North Korea poses an immediate threat to Japan's security. North Korea has been designated as one of the three countries in Bush's 'axis of evil.' It

[32] Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p.188.
[33] Raplh A. Cossa, "Security Goals and Military Strategy of the U.S. and Japan and Their Impact on Korean Peninsula Security", *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 1996, p. 602.

has violated its KEDO agreement and has continued to produce uranium-enriched materials. It is also an exporter of missiles and missile technology. These factors and others including North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, and the Six Party Talks and tensions between North Korea and United States and between North Korea and Japan have made it more difficult to engage North Korea to meaningful discussions about the normalization of relations and peace on the peninsula. The attack on Iraq, another member of the axis of evil, by the US-led coalition forces has helped to change the dynamics of the standoff between the United States and North Korea.

Similarly for Japan, the abduction issue is the most important part of the Japanese bilateral and multilateral agenda. Japan has stated that relations between the two countries would not normalize till the abduction matter is resolved. North Korea's sending of spy ships to Japan and violation of the promise to extend moratorium on missile testing by firing a missile close to Japan in March 2003. These events have greatly hampered the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Despite these setbacks, Japan is working with the United States and South Korea to engage North Korea. At the same time, the Koizumi administration, while engaging North Korea, is under pressure not to be too soft on its threatening neighbor.

Relations with China

Another challenge faced by the alliance is China. Japan and United States each have a relationship with China that is at times uneasy and tense. Pre-9/11, the Bush administration already had some conflicts with China. The collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane with a PRC F8 fighter over the South China Sea, human rights issues and stronger U.S. statements in support of Taiwan are some of

the examples. After 9/11 China cooperated with the United States on counter-terrorism but was one of the UNSC members to oppose the U.S. attack on Iraq.

For the Bush administration, China was a 'strategic competitor', in contrast to Clinton administration's 'strategic partnership'. Now the Bush administration 'seeks a constructive relationship' with China.[34] However, in terms of potential economic competition and military power, China is still a potential threat.

China's economic power is rising and represents a challenge to both Japan and the United States. The U.S. trade deficit with China not only surpasses its deficit with Japan but is also its largest trade deficit. Moreover, Japanese imports from China are increasingly close to its percentage of imports from the United States. In 2001, U.S. imports and Chinese imports amounted to 15.6 per cent of the total of and 14.4 per cent respectively of Japanese imports and Chinese imports 14.4 per cent. In addition, China is increasingly becoming a competitor in higher value added manufactured goods, including advanced technical products.

Japan's relationship with China has flashed hot and cold post 9/11. There have been various sources of friction between the two countries during the Koizumi administration, including the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni. Apart from this there are other geopolitical concerns like the possible cross-straits confrontation between Taiwan and China and its subsequent impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance. If China is to attack Taiwan, there is a possibility that Japan could become embroiled as an ally of the United States. The pressure would be there for Japan to respond with some kind of backup.

With the rise of China as a regional and global power, advocates of collective defence believe the best way to ensure stability in East Asia-Pacific region is to balance China with a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. According to Hisahiko

[34] Stephanie A. Weston, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

Okazaki, one of Japan's leading geopolitical analysts, Japan should play a role in American power balancing in East Asia analogous to one that Britain plays for the United States in Europe.[35] Even the report on *The United States and Japan Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership* cites 'the U.S.-Great Britain alliance as a model for the U.S-Japan alliance.[36]

China has also questioned Japan and United States' redefinition of the alliance after the Cold War, and has also been 'critical of the joint research and development by the U.S. and Japan of a TMD system with a view to deploying it in East Asia. China also feels that it is a target of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and strongly opposes any outside interference in its ongoing conflicts with Taiwan over national sovereignty.

The Right of Collective Self-Defense

At the root of the problem is the issue of the right of collective self-defense. Whenever an international security problem arises, the first thing the Japanese authorities do is consider whether it touches on the right of collective self-defense. If they decide it does, they declare that this rules out any help from Japan. Through its arbitrary interpretation and across-the-board decision, Japan has built a progressively higher wall between Japan and the U.S.

Many influential U.S. politicians who are well versed with Japan's situation, including former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, have argued for a revision of Article 9 to allow SDF to engage in collective self-defense. Armitage in October 2000 stated:

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[35] Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates" in Mike M. Mochizuki (ed.), *Toward A True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). p. 60.
[36] Stephanie A. Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 46

> "Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. . . Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner."[37]

The Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is also in favor of the need to revise the Constitution so as to enable the SDF to engage in collective self-defense with the U.S. forces. Although the Lower House and the Upper house in the Japanese Diet differ on Article 9 and other issues, they have set the stage for the Diet to press ahead with debate on revising the Constitution – especially keeping in mind any future situation in the region that might arise in Taiwan Straits or Korean peninsula.

Japan's Economic Woes

Japan's economic state also affects the alliance and regional security. Specifically, a faltering Japanese economy could not only affect its support of U.S. bases in Japan but also Japan's capacity to extend logistical support for future contingencies. Under the Bush administration, a new initiative, the U.S.-Japan Partnership for Economic Growth started prior to 9/11 which emphasizes deregulation, competitiveness and investment in the Japanese economy. Although some progress has been made through bilateral initiatives as well as domestic structural reform, Japan still has a long way to go to recover from its economic recession. The U.S. economy has also been battered by 9/11 and affected by its new insecurities and vulnerabilities in the new post Cold War. The Bush administration's two wars in less than three years have also affected the U.S. economy negatively. The importance of the healthy economies as the foundation for the alliance, as well as being imperative for bilateral, regional and global security, cannot be denied.

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[37] Richard Armitage, quoted in Arpita Mathur, *op.cit.*, p. 516.

Oil Demand and Resource Politics

Japan imports over 91 percent of its oil from the Middle East and is looking to diversify those resources.[38] This need for oil might increase US-Japan policy friction as Japan seeks separate accommodation with oil exporters. Japan already faces US opposition because of its oil development talks with Iran. Iran is a part of President Bush's "axis of evil" and is suspected of trying to develop nuclear weapons. Bush administration is strongly opposed to Japan's pursuit of a development project in the Azadegan oil field of southwest Iran. An investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency has found that Iran is building uranium-enrichment facilities behind the scenes as well as an experimental heavy-water reactor.[39]

Securing stable long-term oil supplies, of course, is the central objective of Japan's energy strategy. But it is equally essential to maintain the political and security alliance with the U.S. Japan stands out as a U.S. ally that maintains friendly relations with Iran. The U.S. severed diplomatic ties with Tehran following the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, but to date Japan-Iran ties have remained largely intact.

An Assessment

U.S.-Japan alliance has incrementally transformed in its role, purpose and scope. From its inception to contain communism in the region and to perform the function of cap-in-the-bottle in the rise of Japanese militarism, it has grown both in its purpose and scope. In its own national interest, Japan continues to show strong support for its alliance with the United States. Although its present peace

[38] William E. Rapp, "Past its Prime? The Future of US-Japan Alliance", *Parameters*, Vol. 34. No 2, Summer 2004, p. 111.
[39] "Securing the Oil while Keeping the Alliance", *The Japan Times*, July 11, 2003.

constitution and past laws limit the terms of its engagement, since the end of the Cold War Japan has progressively moved forward to change the parameters of its support for the alliance. It is now not limited to being a mechanism for the defense of Japan but has become a 'global alliance. The sentiments expressed three days prior to 9/11 by Secretary of State Powell in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the alliance are even more applicable now:

> If the story of the last half century was how former enemies worked closely together to construct a flourishing partnership, the challenge of the next half century will be how firm friends can work even harder in that partnership. Our alliance needs to become global alliance, an alliance that can deal with international crime, high seas piracy, HIV/AIDs, illegal narcotics and other transnational threats. And an alliance that continues to extend the values of democracy, open markets and build respect for human rights.[40]

Under the Koizumi administration, Japan has seen great success in foreign policy initiatives involving economic integration and peace-building efforts in Asia as well as the expansion of Japan's logistical support for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Koizumi, in his government's support of the U.S.-led coalition's second war on Iraq, has clearly positioned Japan as a member of the global community and most importantly as an ally of the United States. To co-operate with the United States in Iraq, the Japanese Government hastily enacted the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures law last year. It was this law that was used to "legally" permit SDF to play a role in wartime Iraq without UN authorization or a request from the host country.

On May 20 this year, Japan's House of Representatives passed seven contingency bills to supplement the three existing laws. Before these laws came into effect, Japan's SDF could resort to force only when invaded. But now SDF can initiate attacks as long as they feel threatened and even launch pre-emptive strikes. Meanwhile, the SDF operation area has expanded from Japanese territory to the surrounding areas and even far beyond.

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[40] Stephanie A. Weston, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

One major aspect that has been of great assistance is the favorable domestic support for the alliance. Prominent sections of political and ruling elite favor both maintaining and strengthening the alliance. The LDP, the Liberal Party and the New Komeito Party - members of the ruling coalition – favors revitalizing the alliance to suit the requirements of new international order, as well as the growing Japanese role in the international arena. The main opposition party – the DPJ, recognizes the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as "the most important pillar of Japan's security policy," while mentioning the need for Japan to engage in close dialogue with U.S., keeping in mind its own national interests.[41] Classified according to party affiliation, a recent Asahi Shimbun poll shows, 84 percent of LDP supporters, 80 percent of New Komeito supporters and 73 percent of opposition DPJ supporters were in favor of the security treaty. Even among supporters of the Japanese Communist Party, opinion on the security treaty was nearly evenly divided at 47 percent.[42]

Domestic public opinion also favors the partnership. In a poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in April 2005, on supporting the Japan-US alliance, 76 percent of respondents approved the Japan-US Security Treaty and that it should be maintained in the future.[43] Even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and greater assistance extended to the United States by the SDF, many Japanese apparently still support having the security treaty serve as the main core of Japan's national security (see Table 2 and 3).

To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba notes that Japan's defence forces in the twenty-first century 'need to be strengthened to respond more effectively to new threats toward

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[41] *The Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security* from its official website, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/security.html.
[42] "Poll shows many still favor Japan-US Security Treaty", *The Asahi Shimbun*, May 11, 2004, at http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200405110142.html.
[43] Yu Yoshitake, "Playing the Constitution as a Diplomatic Card", *The Asahi Shimbun*, May 23, 2005.

Japan or to various contingencies Japan may face.'[44] According to the Japanese Defense Agency's plan, the nation will develop the missile defense system in stages.[45] To begin with, Japan will enhance the interception capability of its Aegis destroyers by 2007. Japan will complete an overall missile defense system by 2011, thus becoming the first Asian country capable of intercepting medium-range missiles.

With the unstable security environment in the East Asia, the U.S. is also realizing the need to have a partner in the region, instead of a dependent ally. Thus the relationship presents a picture of mutually beneficial and reciprocal arrangement. Series of new structures are being put in place under Koizumi and Bush administrations to strengthen the alliance. A window to the future of the alliance as well as Japan's role in it can be fathomed from the visions put forth by the Araki Report, which calls for the maintenance and strengthening of the alliance – termed as a "vital buttress in Japan's defense system."[46]

Table 2

What do you think about the Japan-US Security Treaty?

Year (FY)	Useful (%) (Useful +Sort of Useful)	Not Useful (%) (Not Useful +Not Very Useful	Don't Know (%)
1981	65.8	12.7	21.5
1984	71.4	10.4	18.2
1987	68.8	12.5	18.7
1990	63.5	18.2	18.3
1993	68.3	14.6	17.1
1996	69.4	15.2	15.4
1999	71.6	14.8	13.7
2002	73.4	13.2	13.4

[44] Shigeru Ishiba, *Defense of Japan* 2004.
[45] Yao Wenli, "Japan Flexing its Military Muscles", *The Japan Times*, September 30, 2004.
[46] Arpita Mathur, *op.cit.*, p. 521.

Table 3

How to Protect the Security of Japan?

Year	Abrogate Japan-US Security Treaty and Expand the SDF (%)	Present State (Japan-US Security Treaty and the SDF) (%)	Abrogate Japan-US Security Treaty and Reduce the SDF (%)	Other (%)	Don't Know (%)
1981	6.1	64.6	7.6	0.9	20.8
1984	5.0	69.2	6.8	1.1	17.9
1987	5.9	67.4	7.2	1.3	18.3
1990	7.3	62.4	10.5	1.0	18.7
1993	4.3	68.8	7.0	0.7	19.2
1996	7.1	68.1	7.9	0.6	16.3
1999	8.0	71.2	5.8	1.2	13.8
2002	8.3	72.1	4.7	1.1	13.8

Note: Survey conducted between January16, 2003 and January 26, 2003, surveyed population of about 3,000 people of age 20 and older throughout Japan. Valid No. of respondents (%)- 2128 people (70.9%), Individual interview by survey personnel. Figures in % rounded up *Survey conducted by the Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office.*

Source: Defense of Japan, 2003, p. 496.

Conclusion

Japan's security policy is closely related to the 'Peace Constitution'. Article IX's ban on having any kind of armed forces became the mainstay of Japanese security policy. And for the Japanese, peace and military matters became antithetical concepts and remain so even today to a great extent. An idealistic pacifism crept in and echoed public distrust for military. A broad consensus was established emphasizing that anything military means war, rejecting anything military means peace, and the use of military force is absolutely evil. Under the mind-set that gained wide currency, the use of military force in pursuit of peace was seen as wrong, and even discussion of the possibility came to be considered wicked.

With this, an alliance with the United States became the cornerstone of Japan's security policy. Reliance upon the US for security eased the fears of Japan's neighbors and other Asian countries about any sort of revival of Japanese militarism. It also allowed Japan to concentrate on economic development.

As Japan became a major player in economic arena, it was asked to increase its defense spending and assume a larger share of the defence burden. However, Japan did not endorse significant rearmament and undertook the minimum rearmament so that the United States would continue to provide protection if Japan were threatened by an external attack.

The end of Cold War prompted discussion of Japan's new responsibilities as a global, economic power, but Japan continued to rely on the United States for security. The limitations of this approach came to a head prior to 1991 Gulf War. The United States put pressure on Japan to contribute assistance to the UN-backed coalition forces. Conservative Japanese politicians, interested in carving out a more active Japanese foreign policy role with a possible military component, seized upon

potential international criticism as a reason to interpret Article 9 in ways that would permit Japan to send troops as part of the UN coalition. The resulting outcry from the public and opposition parties ultimately forced the Japanese government to dismiss the idea, damaging Japan's standing in the international community. Despite spending $13 billion to assist in the Gulf War, Japan suffered significant international embarrassment for its reluctance to send troops, even in non-combat roles. Japan's action was termed as mere 'checkbook diplomacy.'

The Gulf War of 1991 was, in many ways a turning point in Tokyo's assessment and review of its security construct. The war became a touchstone in Japan's ties with its alliance partner. The foundations were then laid for a review of Japan's security policy. The landmark passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992 marked the first step taken by Japan to let participate its SDF in UN activities over its traditional earmarked duties of protecting Japanese territory and assisting in natural disasters.

Japan's reluctance to send troops in 1991, its failure to assure support to United States in 1993-94 crises disappointed US leaders, and led to increased pressure from Washington for proactive defence policies. Sensitivity to U.S. pressure has historically influenced policymakers in Japan, and in the last decade, Washington has pressed Tokyo to play more active role, both in its own defense and the world stage. With a joint declaration on security and new defense cooperation guidelines, the Japanese forces were to take a more active role which was not just limited to narrow self-defence purposes. Instead, the revised guidelines solicited greater Japanese participation and taking on new responsibilities in 'areas surrounding Japan'. The phrase led to widespread controversy among Tokyo's neighbors like China on what such an 'area' would encompass. The revised guidelines were in part reaction to the increased demands from Washington and the need to maintain an alliance with the US.

Another factor that affected Japan's policies was the emergence of China as a potential competitor in the region. Beijing's military modernization emerged as an increasingly distressing issue for Japanese policymakers. While bilateral relations between Japan and China improved with increased economic interdependence, policymakers in both countries continue to view each other potential challengers. Both nations' militaries rank in the top ten in the world, and many fear that a conflict between these regional rivals in inevitable. Japanese defence reports, including annual Defense White Papers dating from the late 1990s, expressed concern about Beijing's military capabilities.

Although the potential tension between Beijing and Tokyo has been sidelined by increased attention on North Korea, long-term defence planning for Japan will continue to monitor and react to the growth of Chinese power.

In the case of the Korean Peninsula, Japan's strategic security preference has been driven by a need to counteract a perceived threat, whilst simultaneously engendering a favorable regional and international diplomatic status. A significant issue affecting the Japanese public's attitudes towards North Korea is the emotional controversy surrounding North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens. In September 2002, the North Korean government admitted that its operatives had kidnapped numerous Japanese citizens to use as language teachers for North Korean intelligence agents. While this admission and permission for surviving captives to visit Japan were meant as goodwill gestures by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), the abductees issue has instead played a major role in turning Japanese public opinion against the Kim Jong Il regime. Despite recent North Korean attempts to sideline the discussion about abductees, the government of Japan has continued to link the abductees question with the resolution of the nuclear issues.

The resurgence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program took place at a time when the reputation and credibility of North Korea among the Japanese public had already hit rock bottom. At the same time, North Korea's nuclear and missile threats have irritated Tokyo. A nuclear-armed North Korea could drastically affect the military balance on the Korean peninsula, seriously destabilize Northeast Asia, and substantially weaken the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It could trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia. The grim prospect of Pyongyang passing on fissile materials to terrorist groups or rogue states is a real source of concern for everyone.

Tokyo's policies, including participation in six Party Talks, have supported a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. However, Japan, unlike China and South Korea, has also expressed a willingness to use sanctions and pressure against Pyongyang if necessary. Japan's defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has pressed for a tougher security policy regarding the North, and stated in February 2003 that Japan would be justified in carrying out a pre-emptive strike if attack from the DPRK seemed imminent. Heightened anxiety about North Korea's threat has muted both public and political reaction to comments such as Ishiba's, and points to the strengthening of voices within the political and defense establishment that argue for a security-conscious agenda that directly challenges previous passive policies.

Accordingly, what has emerged in recent Japanese foreign policy initiatives is a strategic preference, which values both pro-active and reactive behavior simultaneously, demonstrating change and no-change. This can be seen as a 'hedging' strategy, and one that provides the safest approach in an uncertain security environment.

Japan's reaction to the September 11th terror attacks in the United States and the conflict in Iraq were recent turning points for Japan's security policies, and illustrate the extent to which U.S. pressure influences Japanese policymaking. After

September 2001, Japan made bold efforts to assist the U.S. led war on terror, including the dispatching of the Maritimes Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) into the Indian Ocean to assist with operations in Afghanistan. The split in the international community over Iraq put Japan's usually robust support for multilateral institutions to test. Japan has historically been strong supporter of multilateral organizations, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the IAEA. However when controversy arose in the Security Council about the use of force in Iraq, Tokyo supported the Bush administration. Despite public opposition to the war in Iraq, the Koizumi government chose not to risk alienating the United States at a critical junction in the North Korean crisis.

Tokyo also did not want to repeat the diplomatic disaster that befell Japan after the 1991 Gulf War. This time around, Japan gave the United States concrete assistance, including dispatching an Aegis destroyer to assist U.S.-led forces and the prime minister's personal lobbying of UNSC members to support a second resolution authorizing use of force. It has now passed war contingency laws. The morning these bills passed the House of Representatives with broad support from ruling and opposition parties alike, one national newspaper reported this under a headline trumpeting a new era of "security debate with no taboos."

A new generation of Japanese politicians, taking an increasingly realist approach to defense policy, is gaining prominence in the Diet. The Koizumi government's successful push for changes in the legislation governing the activities of the Japanese military reflects the influence of these realists. More open debates about Japan's security policy have taken place without stimulating major public protests.

Potential proliferation of nuclear weapons has also influenced shifts in Japanese attitude toward defense. Japan's support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is tied to the belief that the NPT has played a vital role in ensuring Japan's

national security. Japan felt sufficiently secure to abide by the Three Non-nuclear Principles. However, with the nuclear nonproliferation regime in danger, some politicians in Japan are thinking the logic of adhering to anti-nuclear pledges in the long term.

The transformation occurring in Japan's defense thinking has also affected discussions on the subjects of offensive capabilities and nuclear weapons development. While the Japanese public (and the majority of politicians) still opposes moves toward offensive capabilities, especially nuclear capabilities, the fact that these conversation are occurring within the Japanese leadership is itself a radical change from the policy discussions of the last few decade.

Japan is poised to make decisions that will have long-term ramifications on its standing in the international arena about possible remilitarization, an important factor in its security policies. However, as concerns over North Korea and China's military development become more pressing, the opinion of other countries are likely to play less of a role. If pro-military factions are able to push their agenda through, Japan's security policy could change significantly in coming years. Many Asian countries still distrust Japan's intentions and suspect that current military constraints are superficial. This reflects a chronic fear in the region that Japan is more disposed to re-arming than it is willing to admit. Tokyo's policies towards offensive capabilities would therefore have an immediate effect on the defense policies of neighboring countries. The result could be a regional arms race or other forms of insecurity and conflict.

However, by asserting itself in military front, it does not mean that Japan is reverting to its pre-1945 militarism. Although many in neighboring countries are shrill in their worry about a remilitarized Japan, it is folly to believe that Japan faces a choice between continued one-country pacifism and the nationalistic militarism of the 1930s. There are choices in-between, and the tone of learned

writings and political statements from Japan indicate a reasoned and determined shift toward assertiveness and political autonomy.

Many observers have proposed that some future crisis in Northeast Asia that forces the government to take actions beyond long-established defense-related practices could allow for the emergence of a new Japan. Whether Tokyo decides to assert itself on the global stage by once again cranking up its military machine will depend on a number of issues — the strength and the adaptability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance the most important among them.

In its own national interest, Japan continues to show strong support for its alliance with the United States. Although its present peace constitution and past laws limit the terms of its engagement, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has progressively moved forward to change the parameters of its support for the alliance. Notwithstanding increased combativeness on trade and other economic issues, there seem to be no indications that it wants to play an independent security role outside the purview of the alliance with the US in the near future. It looks as if Japan will remain committed to the security alliance with the United States because the alternative — an independent defense posture — is untenable domestically and would be far too threatening to Asian neighbors. Put another way, Tokyo has too much to lose by going it alone.

Japan is charting new territory with its war contingency laws, redefinition of the alliance, the dispatch of the SDF overseas under its Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Act, all without changing its constitution and convincing its citizens of the need to do so in the post 9/11 world. How much further can Japan expand its security policies without changing the essence of Article 9 remains to be seen.

APPENDIX 1

Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of the government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefit of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Article 9 : Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

APPENDIX 2

Security Treaty between the United States and Japan September 8, 1951

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defence because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of American and Japan. The Tfeaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defence, that the United States of America should maintained armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the exception, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other then to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article I: Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to security of Japan against attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

Article II: During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third Power.

Article III: The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

Article IV: This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security diposition as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.

Article V: This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

APPENDIX 3

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan Signed at Washington, D.C., January 19, 1960

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore, agree as follows:

Article I: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavour in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

Article III: The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

Article IV: The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance wit the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI: For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the Unites States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed in Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements s my be agreed upon.

Article VII: This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII: This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

Article IX: The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

Article X: This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960

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