POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

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Fax : (+91)-11-26165886
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY" submitted by SUDHIR KUMAR SUTHAR in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY is his original work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or of any other university.

We, therefore recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy
(Chairperson)

Prof. Nirmala Joshi
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Dedicated to my parents

CONTENTS

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Sudhir Kumar Suthar

PREFACE

The emergence of U.S. as a single world power in the decade of 1990's is related to the collapse of another super-power, the USSR. A question which still strikes in one's mind is about the re-emergence of Russia as a super-power, who emerged as a successor of USSR after its collapse. The answer of this question very much lies in the development which are taking place inside the Russian state; they are: Russia, transformation from a socialist-state controlled economy to a market oriented economy and transition from a authoritarian totalitarian state system towards a western type liberal democracy. The biggest change within the political transformation is its changing party system-from a single communist party rule to a multi-party system. This system of multi-parties was formally strengthened with the adoption of a new constitution in 1993.

So far three elections for the lower house of the representative body have successfully taken place which helps in making the picture of emerging political scenario more clear. This study is an attempt to understand this new institution in the Russian Federation. As this study was nearing completion anther election for the lower house of Parliament (Dec. 2003) was successfully held. However, the present study will not examine the latest election.

The Introduction, chapter I deal with the history of Russia's experiment with democracy, which goes back to the first elections during Tsarist period in 1906, followed by the October 1917 revolution and emergence of Soviet Union and thereafter its collapse. This chapter also deals with the emergence of the new Russian state under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin and adoption of a new liberal-democratic Constitution in 1993.

Chapter second deals with the theoretical aspect of political parties and party system. A short history of development of Political Parties and theories of Party System has been discussed.

Chapter third deals with the development of Political Parties in Russia in since 1991, giving a brief historical development of groups during the introduction of political reforms in the last days of Soviet Union. Chapter fourth studies the emerging party system in Russian democracy and explains the role of parties in Russian system in institutions and in decision-making process also.

The Concluding chapter is an assessment of the above.

ABBREVIATIONS

CPRF	-	Communist Party of Russian Federation
CPSU	-	Communist Party of Soviet Union
LDPR	-	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
PR	-	Proportional Representation
RSFSR	-	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SMP	-	Single Member Plurality System
U.S.A.	-	United States of America
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialists Republics

LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

"Every attempt to introduce west European parliamentary forms of government into Russia is doomed to failure. If the transit regime is overthrown, its place will be taken by pure undisguised communism, the communism of Mr. Karl Marx who has just died in London and whose theories I have studied with attention and interest."[1]

"The fundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slow tempo of her development, with the economic backwardness, primitiveness of social forms and low level of culture resulting from it."[2]

Both statements are about the peculiarities of Russian society and its slow tendency of development, first statement is written even before the 1917 revolution. Russians first abolished tsarist rule thereafter Communist regime emerged and then abolished, and now another experiment, a new system called 'liberal democracy' is accepted and continues. Although it is difficult to know what is going on in the minds of Russian people and how will they accept and make themselves suitable for the new emerging democratic culture. But the best scale to measure interest and role of the Russian masses in the new system is through the study of development of democratic institutions. Although many democratic institutions are considered as important ones but few are considered as most important or essential part of any democratic polity, such as Constitutionalism, individual rights and political Parties. Constitutionalism is necessary to establish rule of law and also to establish principles for creation of those democratic institutions that are required for functioning of the system. Individual rights ensure the real development of individual self and their active participation in the democratic polity. Finally, Political Parties are essential to tell the people how to participate in the democratic system. Political Parties are recognized as the 'tutors of democracy', because they help citizens (individuals) in defining their self-interest, and then create a collection of

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[1] Tolstoi, D. A., quotted in Emmons, Terence, "The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia", (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1983), p. 1.

[2] Leon Trotsky, "The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tsarism and the Triumph of the Soviets", ed. F.W. Dupee (Garden city, New York, 1959), p. 1

these self-social interests. They try to fulfill these defined interests through winning the game of power known as elections.

It is wrong to think that Russia is experiencing for the first time an electoral system with multi-Party system. However, Russian experience with democracy was short lived. In spring of 1906 the first Duma elections were held under the Tsarist regime. Democratic representation was not introduced with a wish to make the system democratic but it was ongoing deteriorating situation in the country and increasing people's unrest, which compelled the Tsar to establish a people's elected institution. Two reasons could be attributed as most significant which forced the Tsar to opt for reforms; first is Russia's defeat in Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and second is the 1905 revolution. Here we need not to go into history of these early century reforms what is important for us here to see the Parties, which took part in it. In these elections three Parties one Party, which was dedicated to the values of Constitutional democracy known as *Kadets* or KDS, another Party with the conservative ideas of change the *Octobrist* and Party with the radical ideas was Russian Socialist Democratic Party (RSDLP) known as *left*, were the three main organizations who took part. *Kadets* were the leading winner with 153 elected deputies. Although people got the right to choose their representatives but the then Tsar Nichols-II was not ready to leave his powers in the hands of Duma. First Duma worked only for two months and then faced dismissal. Duma demanded more powers in decisions making and reduction in the power of the Tsar but Nicholas was always keen to make Duma a weak institution. For this purpose the electoral law was changed in 1907 and a high property qualification was introduced so as to keep away the peasants and the workers. With this he restricted right to vote to the upper class or nobility who were in favour of monarchy. But increasing dissatisfaction among peasantry and increasing influence of the socialists made the system adverse towards monarchy. These conditions were worsened when Nicholas announced Russia's participation in First World War. Russia was neither ready nor capable of fighting of big war. The wrong

decision resulted in Russia's defeat in the war. By the beginning of 1917 all sections of society such as the military, intelligentsia, entrepreneurs, civil service, peasantry and working class keenly felt that the system needed a change. The Tsar had alienated even his traditional supporters. In February and October 1917 two sudden changes took place: in the first, the autocracy collapsed and the provisional government was formed; in the second, the Bolsheviks came to power.[3] Bolsheviks were a wing which was in favour of a new state in Russia based on the Marxist philosophy.

According to Marxist Philosophy after the socialist revolution the principle which is followed to crush the remnants of the capitalist system is the 'dictatorship of proletariat". But this principle was not followed in the new Russia and was replaced by the 'dictatorship of the Party'. In the course of the civil war and in the process of consolidation other socialist Parties such as the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks were wiped out. This left the Bolsheviks as the only Socialist Party in Russia at that time. Hence one of the first tasks of the Party, of the ruling group, was to find the technicians and white-collar workers of all grades to put "industry back into production..."[4] in due course the Party came to occupy the centre stage of the Soviet Union. In the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, the role of the Party was defined as follows:

> "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nuclear of its political system, of all state and public organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people".

The organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was based on the principle of 'democratic centralism' that was sized by Lenin in his book *What Is To Be Done* (1902). This principle means:

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[3] Lane, David, "Politics and Society in the USSR", (UK; Basic Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1985), p.23

[4] Carr, E.H., "1917-Before and After",(London; Macmillan Press, 1969), p. 91

(i) the election of the all leading parts or bodies, from the lowest to the highest;

(ii) periodical reports of Party bodies to their Party organizations and to higher bodies;

(iii) strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority of the majority;

(iv) the decisions of higher bodies are binding on lower bodies.[5]

Though the real intention behind this concept of 'Party-State' system was not so in 1919 and it was expected that Party will play a limited role in the administrative blocs and Party was to implement its decisions through soviets. But as the time passed the Party leadership which later took over as the 'statesman', to make the system or state apparatus more loyal to them started giving important positions in the state-system to those who were loyal to them in the Party. This is how the role of the Party also became important in the administration. Another reason for the increasing role of Party was its use as an instrument to stabilize soviet rule in the whole of Russian territory also. In short the Party was functioning in the four spheres of the system: decision-making, verification, implementation and staffing.[6]

As the chart shows the Central Committee of the CPSU was the designated supreme authority. This body was expected to crystallize and formalize the demands coming through the lower organs of the Party. Although its role and functions many times faced fluctuations but despite that it continued to remain a centre for political legitimation and thus of political authority, even in decline[7]. It was also known as the centre of "expertise" which could help politburos while deciding any matter of policy.

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[5] Lane, David, n.3

[6] Gill, Graeme, "The Collapse of a single-party system" –The Disintegration of the Communist Party of Soviet Union", (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, , 1994), p. 4

[7] Srivastava, Vinayak N., "The Separation of the Party and the State", (Britain; Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999), p. 30

It also forged thus monolithic unity of the Party and the central committee....[8] During the Stalinist period open opposition in the Party was ended. During Nikita Khrushchev's period reform programmes to increase the role of Party was launched. Khrushchev's reforms succeeded, as long they did not challenge the integrity and position of Central Party and state apparatuses[9]. During Lenoid Brezhnev's period Party became more prominent especially when the 1977 Constitution was adopted and CPSU was recognized as a leading and guiding force of Soviet Party (Article 6). But things were not smooth for Soviet Union in the emerging national and international challenges. The new General Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure was started with new challenges as he took over on 11 March 1985, which forced him to go for the reform programmes in the Party and the system as well. Many scholars have examined the causes behind the weakening condition of USSR in the nineteen eighties, which finally led to the introduction of Gorbachev's reform agenda. The first is the '*Public Discontent theory*' which focuses on the economic failures of the system. In the second half of 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet Union was facing big set-back with the quality of life of its citizens being poor.

Second is '*The Democratization Theory*' which emphasize on the demoralization of the people because of the corrupt activities and practices of the bureaucrats both within the state and the Party and the ensuring degradation of the entire political system. Though minimal in Stalin's times, corruption in the bureaucracy reached a high point in the last year of Brezhnev's regime. Another explanation of this theory in related to the increasing will of the corrupt to live the western style of life.[10]

Internal weaknesses especially in the economic sphere and a hostile external environment forced Mikhail Gorbachev to adopt reform

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[8] *ibid.*

[9] *ibid.*, p. 31

[10] Shlapentokh, Vladlmir, "A Normal Totalitarian Society-How the Soviet Union Functioned and How it Collapsed", (New York; M.E. Sharpe,2001), p. 179

programmes of political and economic reforms. There are many criticisms of the above mentioned theories as they look at the one aspect of the problem. Rather it would be better to say that a collective impact of increasing problems inside the society and the system's inability (or rigidity?) to respond to these problems in a constructive manner created the thinking of restructuring the system in Gorbachev's mind. Gorbachev had become convinced of the need for institutional reform in the Party that involved not simply the changing of individual psychology, but structural changes in the Party's organizational machinery[11]. The issue of separation of Party from the state was practically addressed in 27th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1986 and concluded in 19th Party conference in June 1988. But the conservative faction of CPSU was not happy with the way Gorbachev was following, certainly because it was a threat to their privileged positions. Gorbachev's address to the 19th Party conference envisaged the development of "Socialist Democracy" which essentially meant one-Party democratization. Gorbachev also favoured Party's separation from the State-System. Despite talk of separation of powers between the State and Party, no such attempt could succeed. It was believed that Gorbachev's announcement of reforms was an attempt to strengthen his hold over the Party.[12]

Gorbachev's efforts could not succeed also because of increasing factions inside the Party. Gorbachev wanted to shift power away from the Party into a new set of democratized state structure and a new state Presidency. On the other hand other republic leaders including Boris Yeltsin wanted to increase the autonomy of their republics at the expense of the Center; democrats wanted to do away the old system of central planning and Party dictatorship in favour of a liberal, democratic system and

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[11] Srivastava, n.7, p. 80

[12] J. Steale, "Why Gorbachev Failed" in *New Left Review*, 216, March-April 1993, p. 141-52

conservatives wanted to return to the certainties of the pre-perestroika system, with its seaming ability.[13]

The March 1990, elections were held for USSR Congress of People's Deputies under a new system of multi-candidate choice for voters. This change was accepted in the 19th Party Conference. Earlier there was only one candidate chosen by the Communist Party and elections were a formal activity to get a formal 'yes' from the citizens. The 1990 elections proved to be the first "quite" popular revolution against the Party-State apparatus. They gave a powerful signal about the declining popularity of the regime. Many high-ranking people of CPSU lost the elections. The elections revealed an important pattern: every time the authorities tried to prevent an independent candidate from taking part in the elections; either by means of administrative pressure or by seeking to discredit him, the voters were even more determined to support the 'antiestablishment" candidate. Boris Yeltsin's case was a prime example of this tendency, who won the election from Moscow, with a record 90% of votes. Along with this the election campaign gave opportunity to people to express their anger in mass rallies. During elections campaign people demanded more democratic reforms. Introduction of freedom of the Press and open criticism of existing institutions raised many questions about the totalitarian character of the system. The newly elected parliament also saw the formation of parliamentary opposition for the first time in Soviet history, the Inter Regional Group of Deputies. By 1990 democrats gained a very strong position among the public and it was further strengthened with the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the end of 1989. From now Gorbachev was ceased to be the single leader of the reform process. He now

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[13] Remington, Thomas F., "The Russian Parliament- Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime-1989-1999, (New Haven & London; Yale University Press, 2000), p. 2

had to contend with rivals who offered alternative reform strategies and whose support in society was growing.[14]

In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR. Gorbachev received less than 6% of the deputies' votes. The chief "architect of Perestroika" did not have the courage to run for the Presidency in popular elections. The resultant lack of popular mandate compromised the legitimacy of Gorbachev's new post and was one of the main reasons for his growing political weakness. Yielding to the demands of the radical democratic opposition, the Congress also changed the wording of the notorious Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution and removed the definition of the CPSU as "the leading and guiding force of society and a core of the political system". This was perhaps the beginning of the system with multi-Parties with different programmes but not with separate ideologies.

In 1990 the other forces, often described as nationalist patriotic democrats of Russia decided to go for a separate reform agenda than that launched by Gorbachev. For such purpose they organized a group called "Democratic Russia"– consisting largely the Russian deputies. In 1990 elections were held for the Supreme Soviets of Union republics and to local Soviets. The members of Democratic Russia contested the elections. The tremendous victory of Democratic Russia was a clear public mandate in favour of their demands.

Everything was happening under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. In 1990 Government of Russia prepared a plan for adoption of market economy with the proposals of freeing prices and the private ownership of enterprise, land and services. Gorbachev accepted it but the all-Union bodies send it back. Radicalists saw it as Gorbachev's tactic to create obstacles in the way of their reform programmes. They now started demanding more strongly for Russia's independence from the Union authorities. Gorbachev was now without the support of the largest among the Union republics. This

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[14]   Chubarov, Alexander, "Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity- A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras", (Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., New York, 2001), p. 184

was the biggest shock for CPSU's legitimacy in the USSR. Its national breakup began when its branches in the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced to their decision to leave the CPSU and become independent Communist Parties. Yeltsin left CPSU in the 28th Congress of the CPSU in July 1990 followed by many other pre-democracy members. The outgoing Communist Party members started forming their own new political Parties. On 12 June 1991 Yeltsin scored a resounding victory in Russia's first Presidential elections. He got 57% of the votes. He also issued many decrees to remove the control of Communist Party from Russian state structures. In August 1991, a coup was attempted by conservative CPSU members to replace Gorbachev[15]. But it was declared unconstitutional and then finally crushed. On August 22, Yeltsin as President of Russia, published decrees and instructions suspending the activities of the Party members. As a consequence, Party members started leaving the Party like an avalanche. Under such uncertain circumstances on 8 December 1991, in Minsk, the Republics of USSR along with Belarus and Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. On 21 December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States with twelve republics joining it emerged on the debris of the Soviet Union. Incidentally the three Baltic States opted for complete independence.

Making of the New Constitution

After the dissolution of Soviet Union Russia emerged as the successor to the Soviet Union. It was not possible then to immediately change the political system hence the Soviet system continued until a new Constitution was adopted. Meanwhile changes in economic structure from the Soviet type system into liberal market capitalism were initiated. These changes were made by President Yeltsin by issuing decrees. For a new political set-up a new Constitution was needed. For this purpose

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[15]   Chenoy, Anuradha, M., "The Making of New Russia", (New Delhi; Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p. 44

Constitution Commission was set up by the Congress of People's Deputies in 1990. This Commission produced a draft in March 1992. But it was opposed and no consensus could be reached. The most disputed issue was the separation of powers between the units and center on formation of a new federation.

Yeltsin saw this period of differences as an opportunity to make the Constitution of his own choice. To reassert people's support he called a referendum in April 1, 1993. This referendum posed four questions before the people: support for President Yeltsin, support for his economic policies; and whether early Presidential and parliamentary elections should be held. 53% of those who voted supported Yeltsin. He proclaimed that this is also a referendum over his draft Constitution. But Supreme Soviet opposed Yeltsin's arbitrary intentions. Now Yeltsin found it difficult to prepare a Constitution that suits his position unless the Congress of People's Deputies is there. On 21 September 1993 he dissolved the Congress, and suspended the activities of the Constitutional Commission. When deputies opposed Yeltsin's action and refused to leave the house Yeltsin called the army. After the bombardment on White House army forcefully evacuated the building. The existing Constitution of 1977 was suspended. Yeltsin ordered a committee under Sergei Filatov (President's Chief of the Staff) to finalize the draft for a new Constitution. No discussions or debates were organized to elicit the views of other groups and organizations before finalizing the principles of the new Constitution. It was only Yeltsin who took final decision on all the disputed issues like question of separation of power, status of the republics etc. As a consequence leaders of several regions and republics remained dissatisfied with the newly draft Constitution. This period of conflict between President and the Congress was perhaps unhealthy for democracy and the development of democratic institutions.

The draft of the Constitution was published on 10 November and placed before the people for approval on 12 December. Fifty five million voters among the 105 million eligible voters had used their ballot. Thus only

53% of the total eligible voters voted. In eight of Russia's republics fewer than 50% of referendum participants voted for the new Constitution (Adyegea, Bashkortastan, Dagestan, Kalmykia, Karachay-Charkessia, Mordovia, Tyva and Chuvashia). The Constitution was supported by 60% of those who voted. The vote showed that just about 25 to 30% of Russian citizens supported the new Constitution. The lower turnout and support for the Constitution can be seen as, in the words of Prof. Anuradha Chenoy that "the large sections of the Russian society had opposed the principles of the Constitution".[16]

The Russian Constitution is divided in two sections.[17] Section one contains nine chapters and 137 Articles. Section two is about concluding and transitional provisions. The Russian Constitution is a mixture of Presidential and Parliamentary System of democracies. But President is given extraordinary powers including right to dismiss the representative house, government and also can declare martial law or state or emergency throughout the Russian territory.[18]

The 1993 Constitution upholds the Western liberal democratic values such as accepting the dignity of human rights and liberties. The new Constitution establishes a Russian state based on federal system instead of unitary one and units do not have right to secede as they had in the Soviet Constitution. Units are divided in the Republics, territory, province, federal city, autonomous region. The units are allowed to have their own language although Russian is the state language of Russian Federation. Article 71 deals with the matters which come under the jurisdiction of Russian federation, whereas Article 72 explains those matters which come under joint jurisdiction and the members of the Russian federations. Those matters which lies out of these matters kept in article 71 and 72, comes under the jurisdiction of members of Russian federation. Units (or members) are

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[16] Chenoy, A.M., n.15, pp., 60-61

[17] "Text of the Draft Constitution, as adopted in December 1993", in *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press (CDPSR), 8th Dec. 1993*

[18] Article 87

allowed to have their own type of creative and legislative bodies in accordance with federal law.[19]

Chapter two of new Constitution not only recognized different civil rights and liberties but also gives guaranty of their implementation.[20] Every individual is given equal status before law, in a sense rule of law is accepted, similarly right to life, right to freedom: includes freedom of movement and the right to choose a place of residence, freedom of movement and the right to choose a place of residence freedom of consciences and freedom of religion, freedom of thought and of speech are also recognized. Freedom of press is guaranteed and censorship is prohibited.[21] Political participation is allowed and for expression of people's authority referendums and free elections are chosen as methods.

Provisions about the President of the Russian Federation are given in Chapter four. The status of the President is explained in Article 80(2), which states, 'The President of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation'. Similarly article 80(30) says '... the President of the Russian Federation determines the basic guidelines for the state's domestic and foreign policy'. President is elected for a four years term, through direct elections. He is given chief appointment powers with the consent of the State Duma (the people's representative body). President appoints the Federal Executive which includes Prime Minister and his council of ministers. He can dismiss the Government. Indeed the powers of the President are enormous.

Unlike the Soviet period the new Constitution accepts people's right to own private property and private ownership of land. Article 36, 37 ensures economic rights of individuals but not as strongly as in a socialist

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[19]   Article 77
[20]   Article 17
[21]   Article 29(5)

country. But mothers and children get special attention of state, and social security is guaranteed. Free healthy facilities are assured. [22]

The State Duma consists of 450 deputies. The One half is elected through the first past-the-post ballot system or the single member plurality voting system and other half is through Proportional Representation system.

The Federal Assembly is the supreme legislative body consisting of two chambers: the council of the Federation and the State Duma. The council of Federation consists of two representatives from the each unit. The electoral procedure for the federal assembly is not detailed in the Russian Constitution. This is because of the disputes on the method of elections that could not be resolved during the drafting of the Constitution. The electoral procedure is outlined in separate documents after an agreement between the state bodies or federal units was reached. The method of election to the federal council was resolved after a long dispute between the canter and the regions and finally an agreement was signed in December 1995.

Under such provisions Russia started its journey on a democratic path. It has already experienced thirteen years of it. The world is watching Russia's experiment with western type liberal democracy with queries sights. Nowhere are the examples or models of Socialist countries opting for democratic polity. The present leadership in Russia also has no experience of how a democratic polity functions. It is important that in a democratic set up tolerance of the opposition is an essential condition of its success. Both these factor are must for the development of a competitive environment of ideas. Political Parties are the cause and effect of such environment. In other words the development of Political Parties also shows the openness of ideas in a functioning democracy. The following study is an attempt to understand this crucial institution in the context of Russian democracy.

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[22] Article 41

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CHAPTER – II

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

"The advent of democracy shattered the old framework of political society. The hierarchy of classes and their internal cohesion were destroyed, and the time honored social ties which bound the individual to community were severed. As the old Fabric had to be replaced by a new one, the problem was to find out how the individual could be reunited to society, in what new organization both could be incorporated, so as to assure form and permanency to their existence. The supremacy accorded to numbers in the state complicated matters by raising the question how the promiscuous crowd of old and young, of learned and unlearned, of rich and poor, who were all declared collectively arbiters of their political destinies, would be able to discharge their new function of "sovereign". The representative form of government adopted by modern democracies simplified the problem in appearance only without touching its essence, for after all national representation proceeds from the great mass of the people.... This solution consists in a methodological organization of the electoral masses by extra-constitutional means and in the form of disciplined and permanent parties".[1]

The renowned political scientist Ostrogorsky's these words reflect the history of Parties which goes back to the question of relationship between individual and state. It also explains how as a solution of this relationship the system of representative democracy emerged and ultimately Parties came to play a role of intermediary between individual and state. Parties on the one hand compete to take-over the position of 'legal-sovereign' in the political system, and in this way becomes a part of state system. Whereas on the other hand, they also take care that state should not abolish individual rights while using its legislative and executive powers and this is how represents individuals. But the time when both camp of political parties-the ruling side and opposition come on the similar stage is called election. During this process Parties communicates with voters- ruling Party demands tenure in

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[1] M. Ostrogorski, "Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties", vol. I, (Macmillan and Company Limited, London 1902), p. 3

the government on their previous performance whereas the opposition camp criticize the previously ruling Parties on the basis of their failures while sitting in government side. This process is the real crux of liberal democracy which provides citizens to decide finally, whom to choose for governance and who should sit in the opposition wing. But elections alone do not make an order democratic. Dictatorial regimes have their plebiscites, which reflect a fraudulent deference to the potency of the ideology of democracy. Characteristically the electoral practices of democracies are associated with Party system which propose to the electorate a choice, as well as with a general disposition to accept the verdict of the count of heads.[2]

Nature and Role of Political Parties

Parties are by for the most important part of the representative structure in complex democratic societies. They constitute a basic element of democratic institutional apparatus. They perform an essential function in the management of succession to powers as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to be the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments or, on the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government.[3] "A Political Party is a group of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power, by electoral or other means."

Here by other means we also include those Parties which also believe in the radical means such as overthrown of the government with the use of physical power (for instance the Communist Party of Soviet Union did not become a Political Party through the use of electoral means). Four characteristics of Political Parties are identified by La Palombara and M. Weiner:

(1)   continuity in organization that is, an organization, whose expected life span is not dependent on the life span of current leaders;

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[2]   Key, V. O., Jr., "Political Parties And Pressure Groups", (Thomas, Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1969), p. 11

[3]   ibid., p. 9

(2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level with regularized communications and other relationships between local and national units;

(3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power and

(4) a concern on the part of the organization for seeking followers at the polls, or in some manner striving for popular support.[4]

These are the characteristics which also separate Parties from Factions, Cliques and Clubs.

Functions of Parties

Wherever the political Party has emerged it appears to perform some common functions in a wide variety of political systems at various stages of social, political and economic development. Whether in a free society or under a totalitarian regime, the organization called the Party is expected to organize public opinion and to communicate demands to the center of governmental power and decision-makers. The Party must articulate to its followers the concept and meaning of the broader community even if the aim of the Party leadership is to modify profoundly or even to destroy the broader community and replace it with some other order such as role of the Russian Communist Party in the Tsarist Russia. Party is also likely to be involved in political recruitment – the selection of the political leadership in whose hands power and decision will in large measure reside.[5] These functions are primarily five:

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[4] Lapolombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, "Origin and Development of Political Parties", in Lapolombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, (edt.)., "Political Parties and Political Development", (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966) , p.6

[5] ibid, p.3

a. Representation

Representation is often seen as the primary function of parties. It refers to the capacity of Parties to respond to and articulate the views of both members and the voters. They are major 'inputting devices' through which the needs and wishes of the society reaches to government. This is a sort of function that could be carried out in a better manner, in an open and competitive system that forces Parties to respond to popular preferences. Rational choice theorists, such as Anthony Downs (1957), explain this process by suggesting that the political market parallels the economic market, in that politicians act essentially as entrepreneurs, seeking votes, meaning that Parties behave very much like businesses[6].

b. Elite Formation and Recruitment

Elite formation and the recruitment functions are more exclusive prerogatives of the Parties. In Parties future elites are exposed to be a long and wearisome process of testing in Party offices and on the backbenches before they are admitted to the highest executive offices. Parties provide a training ground for politicians, equipping them with skills, knowledge and experience, and offering them some form of career structure.

c. Goal Formation

Political Parties have traditionally been one of the means through which societies set collective goals and ensure that they are carried out. Parties play this role because in the process of seeking power, they formulate programmes of government (through conferences, conventions, election manifesto etc.) with a view to attracting popular support. In defining goals perception of interest may vary from one Party to the other.

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[6] Downs, A., "An Economic Theory Of Democracy", (New York: Harper & Row Publications, 1957)

d. Interest Articulation and Aggregation

In the process of developing their respective goals, Parties also help to the people in articulation and aggregation of their various interests. Parties, indeed, often develop as vehicles through which business; labour, religious, ethnic or other groups advance or defend their various interests. The UK Labour Party for example, was crated by the trade union movement with the aim of achieving working class political representation.

e. Socialization and Mobilization

The most important indicator of the legitimacy of a Party system is the share of vote polled by to the Parties under considering while Party espouse a radical change in the socio-economic or political system (known as anti-system parties) or does it support a moderate change in the existing system (called system parties). Parties are important agents of political education and socialization. Internal debates and discussions as well as campaigning and electoral competition are the means of the political education. The issues that Parties choose to focus on help to set the political agenda, and the values and attitudes, that they articulate become part of the larger political culture.

Types of Parties
a. Cadre Parties

Cadre Party originality meant a 'Party of notables', dominated by an informal group of leaders who saw little point in building up a mass organization. Such Parties invariably developed out of parliamentary factions or cliques at a time when the franchise was limited. However, the term cadres is how more commonly used (as in Communist Parties) to devote trained and professional Party members who are expected to exhibit a high level of political commitment and doctrinal discipline. In this sense, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Nazi Party in Germany, and the

Fascist Party in Italy were cadre parties, as are the Chinese Communist Party etc.

The distinguishing features of cadre Parties is their reliance on a politically active elite (usually subject to quassi-military discipline) that is capable of offering ideological leadership to the masses. Simultaneously, strict political criterias are laid down for Party membership.

b. Catch-All Parties

Most modern Parties fall into the category of what Otto Kirchheimer (1966) termed as 'catch-all parities'[7]. These Parties even reduce their ideological commitments in order to appeal to the largest possible number of voters. The best example of 'catch-all Parties' is in the USA in the form of the Republicans and the Democrats. Modern de-ideologized socialist Parties such as the German Social Democrats and the Labour Party in the UK also fit this description. These Parties differ from the classic model of a mass Party in that they emphasize leadership and unity, and downgrade the role of individual Party members in trying to build up broad coalition of support rather than relying on a particular social class or sectional group.

c. Mass Bureaucratic Parties and Electoral Professional Parties

Another distinction in the type of Political Parties is masses– based Party which was described by Duverger and Max Weber emphasizing the role of Party bureaucracy in the Party. But the distinction between mass-bureaucratic and Electoral Professional Parities is better explained by Penebianco[8](see table 2.1).

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[7]   Kirchheimer, O. " The Transformation Of The Western European Party Systems" in J. Lapalombara and M. Weiner, n. 4

[8]   Panebianco, Angles, "Political Parties, Organization   And Power ", (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), p. 264

Table 2.1

Mass Bureaucratic	Electoral Professional
a. Central role of Bureaucracy (Political administrative tasks)	Central role of the professionals (specialized tasks)
b. Membership Party, strong vertical organizational ties, appeal to the "electorate of belonging"	Electoral parties, week vertical ties, appeal to the "Opinion electorate".
c. Pre-eminence of internal leaders, collegial leadership	Pre-eminence of the public representatives, personalized leadership.
d. Financing through membership and collateral activities (Party co-operatives, trade union etc.)	Financing through interest groups and public funds.
e. Stress on ideology, central role of the believers within the organization.	Stress on issues and leadership, central role of the careerists and representatives of interest groups within the organization.

d. Ideology based Parties

Another way of defining Parties types is on the basis of their ideological orientation. On this basis two kinds of Parties can be described, left wing Parties and right wing parties.

Parties seen as part of 'the left' are characterized by a commitment to change in the form of either social reform or wholesale economic transformation. These have traditionally drawn their support from the poor and downtrodden.

Parties thought to constitute 'the right' (Conservative and Fascist Parties in particular) generally uphold the existing social order and are in that sense, a force for continuity. Their supporters usually include business interests and the materially contented middle classes. Although few see this notion of a neat left-right Party divide is at best simplistic and at worst deeply misleading. But it is almost impossible to divide Parties on the clear-cut basis of left or right.

In the last few decades the question of intra-Party democracy has become quite important especially in the liberal democracies. Intra-Party democracy is interlinked with intra-Party organization, which simply means where the power lays in a Party-in the hands of few or with the large number of activists. What are the relations of authority, responsibility and leadership

among the persons concerned? The scales or variables to measure in the Party organization are: how the candidates are nominated, how the heads of the Party-president or vice president are elected and how the decision are taken at local level of the Party?[9] If leaders are properly elected and not imposed, candidates are nominated with the consent and local bodies takes decisions freely and their role is not overtaken by higher level of Party, then we can call it intra-Party democracy. It is believed that if any Party is internally democratic it will also promote the democratic polity and also respect the individual's different rights, especially the right of Expression and Speech. The organization and structure of Parties also reflects the distribution of power within society as a whole. If Parties are structured democratically, they will reflect wishes of different sections of the society in a democratic manner with the use of democratic means but if it is not so and Party is structured on the basis of a leader's personality then it can't promote democratic polity and will try to maintain the dominance of the leader rather then reflecting the wishes of Party members or its supporters.

But above mentioned scales to measure Party's democratic structure do not guaranty the intra Party democracy. Ostrogorski was the first person who argued that the development of Political Parties reduces role of citizens in the state's affairs and the representation of individuals interests had lost out to the growing influence of the Party machine and control exerted by a causes of senior Party figures.[10]

Another work on the internal Party democracy was done by Robert Michel in his book 'Political Parties (1911)' in the form of the 'iron law of oligarchy', or as Michael puts it 'he who says organization says oligarchy'. For Michel the 'law explained the inevitable failure of democratic socialism, and indeed, exploded the myth of political democracy'[11]. Critics, however, point out that Michel's observations made on the basis of a single political

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9   Key, V.O., n. 2 , p. 315

10   M. Ostrogorski, n.1, vol. II, p. 549

11   Michels, R., "Political Parties: A Sociological Study Of The Oligarchical Tendencies Of Modern Democracy", (New York, Collier Publications, 1911)

Party (German SPD) at a particular moment in time, and also rest on questionable psychological theories.

Attempts have been made to strengthen the democratic and participatory features of Parties through reform. In the United States the involvement of middle-class activities in the Democratic Party started in early 1950s, and for a decade or so these new participants competed with older, patronage-oriented activists in the Party. By the mid 1960s -however a number of issues, including the Vietnam War, brought into the Party politics a new generation of issue-oriented worker who was far less committed to working through Party structure. Issue-oriented activists became more important in electoral politics, but the weakening of Party structures meant that elected political leaders could more easily appeal directly, above the heads of activists, to the Party's voters in primary elections.

The existence of factions and tensions is as important as formal organization in determining the location of power within a Party. While all parties, even those within apparently monolithic character, embrace some measure of political and ideological rivalry, the degree to which this rivalry is reflected in conflict between organized and coherent groups is crucial in determining the degree of authority of Party leaders. In some cases, faction can break away from Parties in the manner that in Europe Communist Parties often emerged out of socialist Parties in the years following the 1917 Russian revolution. Factionalism is often linked to the weight that Parties place on political ideas and ideological direction. Factionalism is, in the sense, a luxury that only long time Parties of government can afford. This is why monopolistic Communist Parties were able to keep factionalism under control only by exercising ruthless discipline and coercion enforced through the structures of 'democratic centralism'.

Development of Political Parties

The emergence of Political Parties in the modern world is closely linked to the mergence of constitutionalism and representative government.

Parties today are found under almost all forms of government, and in socialist and third world states as well as advanced liberal democracies, but their origins are essentially western.

Moreover, the institutional expression of liberalism, representative government and the subsequent extension of the franchise, created powerful incentives to the formulation of alliances in the legislature, and hence to potential Party groupings. Briefly, there are three types of theories concerning Party origins: a. institutional; b. historical situation theories; c. development theories.[12]

In the first Institution theories as Duverger also insisted that it is important to know whether Parties are created in the parliament or externally. An internally created Party is one that emerges gradually from the activities of the legislators themselves. Externally created Parties are those that emerge outside the legislature and invariably involve some challenges to the ruling group and a demand for representation. Such Parties are more recent phenomena; they are invariably associated with an expanded suffrage, strongly articulated secular of religious ideologies, and, in most of the developing areas, nationalists and anti-colonial movements.

Secondly, there are often historical turning points in political systems, such as: wars, inflations, depression, mass population movements, a demographic explosion, or less dramatic changes in the educational system, occupational patterns, agricultural or industrial development, or the development of mass media. There are sometimes internal political crisis which have their impact on Party formation: legitimacy, integration, and participation. Such historical crises not only often provide the contest in which Political Parties first emerge but also tend to be a critical factor is determining the patterns of evolution of Parties.

The historical crisis and institutional basis do not give always a satisfactory answer to the question of development of Political Parties in a political system. The third answer is modernization means a change in the

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[12] This classification is taken from Palombara and Weiner, n 9, p.7

attitudes of subjects or citizens toward authority; individuals in the society may believe that they have the right to influence the exercise of the power, or sometimes modernization also includes the changing aspirations of political elites in a society, when they seek to win public support so as to win or maintain power even though the public does not actively participate in the public life. A non-participant population may thus be aroused into politics. The reason behind this kind of change in political behaviour are the appearance of new social groups as a consequence of larger socio-economic changes, and in particular the appearance or expansion of entrepreneurial class and the proliferation of specialized professional classes and also the increasing way of communication which makes easier to exchange of views among people on different national, local or international level.

Conceptual Basis of Party System

Political Parties are important not only because of the range of functions they carry out but also because the complex interrelationships between and among Parties are crucial in structuring the way political systems work in practice. This network of relationship is called a Party system. Although many thinks that the number of Political Parties means the kind of Party system the particular country has, one Party, two Party, or multi-Party-system. But Sartori found it quite inadequate to analyze Party system on the basis of number and he further developed a new theory which was based on the relevance of Parties in the political system in terms of formation of governments and as particular whether their size gives them the prospect of winning or at least sharing, government power. Sartori calls these bases as "rules for counting" and broadened the criteria of counting of parties.[13] But number of Parties remains important because it indicates the extent to which political power is fragmented or non-fragmented, dispersed

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[13] Sartori, Giovanni, "Parties And Party System: A Framework For Analysis" (Vol.I), (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.120

or concentrated.[14]On the basis of numbers Parties can be divided into four categories broadly, they are:

a. One Party System

According to Sartori, "..thus for Party has meant Parties– Party indicate a plural... According to the rationale of Party pluralism, if a Party is not a Party, it is a pseudo-Party and if the whole is identified with just one Party, it is a pseudo-whole".[15]

The one Party system materialized only after the World War II. The term helpful in distinguishing between political systems in which a single-Party enjoys monopoly of power through the exclusion of all other Parties (by political or constitutional means). Because monopolistic Parties effectively function as permanent governments, with no mechanism (sort of a coup or revolution) through which they can be removed from power, they in variably develop an entrenched relationship with the State machine. The Soviet, Nazi and Fascist types of Party system are known as One-Party System. Because in such case it is difficult to make a distinction between state and Party-Sartori calls it 'The Party-State Systems'.

The Soviet, Nazi and Fascist models are known as first wave of one Party system. The second wave of one Party system is associated with anti-colonial nationalism and state consolidation in the developing world. For example in Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the ruling Party developed out of an independence movement that proclaimed overriding need for nation-building and economic development.

b. Bi-Party System

In Bi-Party system, the number of the player is two, with equal winning prospect and winning government power. Although a number of minor Parties may exist, only two Parties enjoy sufficient electoral and legislative strength to have a realistic prospect of winning government

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[14] *ibid.*

[15] *ibid.*, p39

power. The larger Party is able to rule alone and enjoys a legislative majority, the other Parties provides the opposition and serving as 'government in the wings'. The U.K. and the USA are the most frequently cited examples of States with two-Party systems, though Canada, Australia and New Zealand are also included.. Its advantage is that it gives a stable system with choice and accountability. The two major Parties are able to offer to electorate a straightforward choice between rival programmes and alternative governments. Voters have faith in the equal winning capacity of both Parties which enables Parties to implement there manifest without making any compromise with coalition partners. Two-Party system is also appreciated for providing accountable government based on relentless competition between the governing and opposition parties. To check the government an opposition, almost equally strong, ready to criticize government and provide alternative policies.

Another problem with the two-Party system is that two evenly matched Parties are encouraged to compete for votes by outdoing each other's electoral promises, perhaps causing spiraling public spending and fuelling inflation. This amounts to responsible Party government, in that Parties come to power on the basis of election manifests to that they have no capacity to fulfill.

c. Multi Party System

Multi-Party system exists in those political systems in which the competition for power is between more than two political parties. It reduce the draw backs of a single-Party system on the one hand and provides more choice for voters compare to bi-Party system on the other. It is difficult to say anything about the number of Parties in this sort of system because coalition politics is also a major part of it. Coalition politics is characterized as a government of many parties, coming together as some common agenda either before the election or after it. A coalition has no limitation of partners, therefore the multi-Party system have no certainty of number of parties.

Sartori have tried to analyze the number of Parties in a different method which is explained later. Germany for example, appeared until the 1990s to have a 'two-and-a-half Party' system. Italian multiParty system traditionally involves a larger number of relatively small parties.

The positive side of this kind of system is that they create internal checks and balances within government and exhibit a bias in favour of debate, conciliation and comprise. The process of coalition formation and the dynamics of coalition maintenance ensure a broad responsiveness that cannot but take account of competing views and contending interests. For instance, in Germany, the liberal Free Democrats act as moderating influence upon both the conservative CDU and the socialist SPD whereas SPD-Green coalitions has helped to push environmental issues up in the political agenda. Similarly in India, the ruling BJP has kept his issue of construction of a temple at a holy place of Hindu community called Ayodhya on a side just because of internal pressure of by its coalition partners like C. Naidu's *Telughudesam and Akali Dal.*

MultiParty system's criticisms are the drawbacks of coalition politics. The biggest problem with the coalition politics is formation of coalition. Those coalitions which cone up before the election have some common agenda with each other but those which emerge after the elections have a separate story. They fight election with different agenda and join the coalition with different priorities. These tendencies of changing priorities weaken faith of the voter in the system itself. Similarly, if one Party is more important than others it can blackmail the biggest Party in the coalition, means it can ask for reward for its strength which encourage corruption. Italy is usually cited as the classic example of multiPartyism, its post-1945 governments having lasted on average only ten months. In the Indian case prime minister N. Rao was accused of paying huge amount to the independent winning candidates to win the vote of confidence in the lower house.

A final problem is that the tendency towards moderation and compromise may means that multiParty systems are so dominated by the political centre that they are unable to offer clear ideological alternatives. Coalition politics tends, naturally, to be characterized by negotiations and conciliation, a search for common ground, rather than by conviction and the politics of principle.

Theories of Party System

First attempt in the field of explaining Party system was made by Maurice Duverger, whose book; Political Parties was published in 1951. Duverger asserted that the two Party system correspondent to the two-fold nature of opinion in society. Further, he maintained that the simple-majority, single-ballot voting method favoured the two Party systems by under-representing minor Parties and inducing electros to support those candidates whose Parties had well founded hopes of taking power rather than those whose Parties had no such prospects.

In accounting for the existence of the multi-Party system in many western European and Scanclavarian countries, he suggested that these Parties were partly the result of the processes of Party fission, partly an effect of division on major issues in the parliament which intersected them from each other to produce several rather than two segments of opinion and partly a consequence of electoral methods such as the two ballot system or proportional representation system, which be considered could reduce the natural pressures towards dualism and provide scope for the creation of new parties.[16]

The historical development of Party systems was reconsidered in an essay by S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967. Their basic approach was to identify the major changes in western societies which had created enduring

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[16]   Duverger, Maurice, "Party Politics And Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction", (Paris, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1972)

political divisions and then provided a framework within which Parties could form and develop.

They identified several such divisions, one of which covered the conflict over the supremacy of state over church.

A second division was that which arisen during the process of nation-building, in countries where the extension of central control and nation-wide bureaucratic structures had caused reactions from outlying regions concerned to preserve their own cultural tradition.

A third division was that which had occurred because the industrial revolution and the growth in international trade had caused an initial clash between rural primary produces and a new urban class of merchants and industrialists and at a later stage a struggle between property holders and employees in one camp and tenants, laborers and workers in another.

A fourth derived from the Russian revolution of 1917, which had created a division within the Communist Party in the country between those who willing to give their first loyalties to their own nation state and those who were appeared to identify themselves with an international revolutionary movement.

The task of establishing a comprehensive typology of Party systems was undertaken by Giovanni Sartori, in the first volume of his Parties and Party System, published in 1976. In the competitive Party systems Sartori placed more emphasis on the configurations formed by Parties in action rather than on their actual members. The rules for counting of Parties given by him are based on the relevance of political parties. A Party's position can be measured by its electoral strength, its governing and coalition potential. Sartori gives priority to a Party's coalition potential over its numerical success. Sartori's scheme of classification of Party system is as follows (See table 2.1):

Table 2.2

(I) Indicator: Number of Parties(fragmentation)	(II) Variables a. Ideology b. Segmentation	(III) Classification	(V) Typology
1. Party (no fragmentation)	High Ideological Intensity	One Party Hegemonic	One Party Totalitarian Hegemonic ideological one Party authoritarian one Party pragmatic hegemonic pragmatic.
2. Parties	Low	Two Party format	Two partism (mechanism)
3-5 Parties	Ideological distance or segmentation	Limited pluralism	Moderate Pluralism
More than 5 Parties(High fragmentation)	High	Extreme pluralism	Polarized pluralism
One predominant (high uneven concentration)		Whatever format	Predominant Party Systems

a. Two-Party System in which two Parties exist and each of them tries to gain an absolute majority of seats in parliament, in which one of them wins sufficient seats to enable it to govern alone, and in which the prospect of spending alternate periods in power remains a realistic one for both partism.

b. System exhibiting extreme and polarized pluralism in which, briefly, a centre Party or a group of centre Parties is placed between two mutually antagonistic oppositions, including anti-system parties. In this kind of system the ideological differences between the units at either extreme or relatively wide. The nature of competition between Parties is tends to be centrifugal rather than centripetal (that is, it proceeds at the expense of, rather than around the centre).

The first distinctive feature of polarized pluralism resides in the presence of relevant anti-system parities. Anti-system Parties can be defined as which undermine the legitimacy of the regime it opposes "but an "opposition of principle".

The second distinctive feature of polarized pluralism resides in the existence of bilateral opposition. When the opposition is unilateral i.e., all

located on one side vis-à-vis the government, no matter how many Parties oppose it, they can join forces and propose themselves as an alternative government. In the polarized politics we find two oppositions that are mutually exclusive: they cannot join forces. In fact, the two opposing groups are close, if anything, to the government Parties than to one another. The system has two oppositions, in the sense that they are counter-opposition;

The third one is "*Center placement of one Party or a group of Parties*";

The fourth feature is Polarization means the spectrum of political opinion is highly polarized: its lateral poles are literally two poles apart, and the distance between them covers a maximum spread of opinion;

The fifth features of polarized pluralism is 'Centrifugal drives";

The sixth feature is congenital ideological patterning meaning that the polity contains Parties that disagree not only on policies but also, and more importantly, on principles and fundamentals;

The seventh feature is the presence of irresponsible opposition;

The final feature is the extent to which polity displays *politics of outbidding, or over promising.*

c. **Systems characterized by moderate pluralism,** in which there are more than three, four five parties. Coalition politics is a major characteristic of these systems. By contrast to the polarized pluralism, here ideological differences between the Parties are relatively small. No significant anti-system Parties exist and competition is centripetal.

This is also called 'limited pluralism'. It is characterized by three features:

1. A relatively small ideological distance among its relevant Parties;
2. A bipolar coalitional configuration and
3. Centripetal competition.

d. **Predominant Party systems** in which one Party obtains an absolute majority of the seats in parliament and stays in power for at least three

consecutive elections. He also included categories for one Party system, as: hegemonic Party systems (in which minor Parties are given some limited scope or activity) and, at the other extreme, atomized systems. [17]

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[17] Sartori, G., n.12 , pp. 119-128

CHAPTER – III

POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA

Introduction

After living seventy-three years under one Party rule, it is really difficult to establish a smoothly functioning multi-Party system. Now when Russia has experienced thirteen years of democracy we are on a stage where the study of evolution of Political Parties is possible with empirical methods. The best way of doing this is to look at the performance of Parties in the elections. As Sartori says (see Chapter 2) that electoral strength of a Party determines relevance or importance of any Party in the given political system. Study of Parties doesn't mean to study every Party, group, club, union or pressure groups in the political society of a particular country. It includes only those Parties, which have or had some influence over the political system through participation in decision-making and most importantly in government formation of a country.

In Russian case fortunately we have three Duma elections in 1993, 1995 and 1999 and also two Presidential elections which make easier the task of selection of important Parties who have gained some electoral strength during these elections.

As we have already talked, during the Soviet period elections were fake because they didn't provide any choice to voters for selection of candidates. Under the slogan of *perestroika* and *glasnost* Gorbachev attempted to democratize the elections. The first step towards this was the introduction of a multi-candidate election, and thereafter amendment of Article six of the Soviet Constitution. This article has enshrined the dominant position of Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in all walks of soviet life. This article was replaced by a new provision that declared that now other Political Parties and groups can function in the Soviet political system. But interestingly this existence of other groups was allowed only inside the circle of the socialist ideology. In other words it didn't establish the multi Party system in a true sense as it was in the other western liberal democratic countries.

The second and more significant measure was the law on public associations adopted in October. This law established the mechanism through which Political Parties and other organizations would be allowed to function with their own organizational structure and functioning systems. For registration an organization, at the all-union level, needed 5,000 members. Though a formal procedure required for the development of new groupings were established but in practice the registration preceded slowly; by August 1991 only the CPSU and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia(LDPR) had gained status of Political Party. The number of Parties which applied for participation was high but there memberships was quite low.

Democratization of the system was initiated to re-achieve the popularity of the Party. But the real challenge for the above mentioned democratic changes appeared from inside the CPSU itself. The one faction of the Party was still not in the favour of the way reforms were drawn-out, at the same time another faction was demanding more democratic system with the introduction of western type multi Party system. As a consequence the Party started loosing its faith; the leadership was blamed for weakening the Party and diverting the Party from its ideological directions. According to the Belarusian Politburo "In our view, those who captain the flagship and plot its course also bear a considerable share of the blame for the fact that our ship is rudderless"[1]. The weakness of leadership to control these emerging dissatisfactions resulted out as the split in the Party and many new groups emerged out of it.

As we talked in the introductory chapter that weakness of the leadership in providing any concrete answers to the issues raised by different organizations or different groups of the CPSU itself, along with other reasons resulted in the collapse of the Soviet system and a new Russian state emerged on its ruins. Yeltsin was the leader of the people who were in

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[1] Gill, Graeme, "The Collapse of a single-party system –The Disintegration of the Communist Party of Soviet Union", (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p.167

favour of democratic Russia. After the collapse he continued with the reform process and gave more westernized shape to the newly emerged state with the introduction of a new Constitution (1993) and allowing a multi Party system[2]. The new Constitution clearly mentions that no ideology can be declared as the state ideology[3]. This is how Parties were allowed to function on their individual ideological basis also.

Development of Political Parties (1993-1999)

Before study of development of Political Parties in the newly emerged democratic Russia we have to keep in mind those factors which played substantial role in the development of a new political culture and helped in the creation of a competitive political system. Here we are concerned with those groups or organizations which emerged during the period of *perestroika* – and created an environment of diverse agendas and ideas. Therefore to understand the existing political culture of organizations first we will have a look at those small groups which emerged during the period of 1988-1991.

a. The Democratic Union

The Democratic Union was founded in May 1988. Initially this group was established to unite all the democratic forces under the umbrella of a Political Party. It supported traditional liberal position in Russia as in the West, including multi-Party system, a mixed economy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. It rejected any cooperation with or continuing role for the CPSU and also challenged the legitimacy of Soviet rule itself.[4]

b. The Union of Constitutional Democrats

It announced its creation in October 1989 and held its first Congress in May 1990. It claimed to be the continuation of the pre-revolutionary

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[2]   Article 13(3)
[3]   Article 13(2)
[4]   White, Stephen, Gill, Graeme, Darell, Slider, "The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future", (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.153.

kadets and emphasized the rule of law and human rights, an active and educated citizenry, a democratic political system and a mixed economy.

c. The Social Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR)

From all over Russia on the 4-6 May 1990 around 237 delegates representing over hundred social democratic clubs gathered in Moscow to found the Social Democratic Party of Russia. The organizational sources that took part on the formation of SDPR were many and varied: the Social-Democratic union that emerged from the January 1988 after the collapse of the All-Union Social-Political Club; the social-democratic faction of the Democratic Union; Moscow's democratic Perestroika and Perestroika of Leningrad, as well as similar groups in dozens of Russia's larger cities.

An attempt was made by these factions to create a Party which would be a center of all democratic forces and which could be regarded as a realistic claimant; if not to power, then at least to substantial influence in the country. It supported a market economy based on the right to own private property and the convocation of a constituent Assembly which would make a clear break with the Soviet past and would establish a 'Sovereign Democratic Republic of Russia." The Party saw its task to consolidate all democratic forces in Russia with a view to assisting in the transition from a single Party to a multi-Party democratic system. In late April and early May 1990 the organizing committee of the future Party was formed, headed by Nikolai Travkin. On 27-28 May the founding Congress of the Democratic Party of Russia was held, but on the second day of its existence, because of disagreement over questions of leadership caused a split among the participants.[5]

d. Movement for Democratic Reforms

Among the unstable circumstances in July 1991, few well known leaders like A. Volsky, Gavril Popov, A. Rutskoi, Anatoly Sobchak, S.

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[5] Urben, Michael, "The Rebirth of Politics in Russia", (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), p. 206.

Shatalin, E. Shevaranadze, and A. Yakovlev, etc. announced the creation of a new Party named "Movement for Democratic Reform." Party could not define its relationship with CPSU and as a consequence, it was seen as a reformer's wing of CPSU.[6]

e. Block of Russian Social and Patriotic Movement

This bloc was formed by the representatives of ten social organizations to support candidates with 'patriotic' inclination. In its programme were: the revival of Russia's culture and its status of global influence which it was loosing, the formation of a new system for the administration of the economy capable of putting a stop to the squandering of the Russian state's wealth and the 'sale of its mineral resources; sovereignty over ancient Russian lands (interpreted very loosely to include, for instance, the Baltic States); the revival of the Leninist-Russian communist Party; the leasing of land, but not its transfer to peasant ownership; monetary reform; and proportional representation of nationalities in legislative and executive bodies.

f. Inter- Regional Group of Deputies (IRDG)

This was the group established within the parliament. This was also established on the principles of democratic reforms. This group was chaired by Gavril Popov and lacked any effective structure.

There were also a number of other small bodies claiming the parentage of the CPSU in one form or another. These bodies did not play a prominent role in the emergence of a new system and their activities were limited to the street demonstrations, often organized in conjunction with extreme nationalist forces like the National Salvation Front.

However, it is wrong to say that these newly emerged organizations (from CPSU or outside it) didn't play any significant role in the emerging Russian political society. Indeed, they were unable to provide any strong

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[6] Chenoy, Anuradha, M., "The Making of New Russia", (Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2001), p.162

alternative to CPSU but nevertheless they prepared the ground on which a new political culture with new Political Parties could be developed. Two reasons can be cited as obstacles in the way of these new groups; one was the lack of democratic experience of their leaders and members. Deputies were not able to come out with unanimous decisions over the Party goals and policies and didn't know how to keep the members together. Leadership quality was absent in all the new emerging blocs or Parties. For instance as we talked that Democratic Party of Russia was formed in June and only after one month of its formation it faced a split. Another reason was the historical dominance of CPSU over the political system of Soviet Union.

The task of the development of Political Parties is not an easy going process. As we discussed in the theoretical part of the study that there are different reasons behind the development of the Parties in any society. If the newly emerging system has a history of mass struggle for the establishment of the democratic system then that system has more possibilities of the better development of Parties through a democratic process as for example in India or on South Africa. But in Russian case we do not have any such mass struggle for the establishment of a western type democratic system or as this transformation from the Soviet type system towards a Westminster liberal democratic system is characterized as 'revolution from above'[7].

· But in spite of absence of a democratic history or movement Russia is experiencing the functioning of a large number of Political Parties. So far three Duma elections are been held successfully. Every election has more than ten Parties participating in this democratic festival. As table 3.1 shows a comparative analysis of all three Duma elections, those Parties which have successfully participated in all elections are very few. Although Russian democracy has experienced a multiparty fight during these three elections but very few among the Parties have successfully survived in the whole decade and proved them more or less, significant for the new system. Their

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[7]   Hahn, Gordon M., "Russia's Revolution From Above",(New Brunswick, U.S.A; Transaction Publishers , 2002)

presence certainty expresses people's faith in them, and Party's willingness to establish itself as a stable Political Party. Rest of the groups or Parties has worked less like an organization called Party and more like "factions".

Parties in Russia still lack better organization skill, leadership operationalities, and willingness to establish themselves as key players of democratic set up. CPRF is the only Party which could be place in the category of a "Political Party" as we understand by this in theory because this is the only Party which has a nationwide existence, ideological affiliations and clear programmes for the future Russia to place before the Russian voter as Party manifesto.

a. Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF)

Regime transition from communism to liberal democracy was accompanied by the transformation of Political Parties, particularly the evolution of Communist organization into parliamentary Parties. In contrast to central and East European Parties, the CPRF was reluctant to take the path of social democratization[8]. But this path of democratization was not a soft one for two reasons, one was the internal fractions of Party itself which caused a big split in the Party and another reason was Boris Yeltsin, the new President who was willing to crush that Party from its root base. Yeltsin implemented his intentions with issuing a decree on November 1991 that banned the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party (RCP) on Russian territory. Throughout the country authorities at all levels took similar action. The Party was suspended, banned or declared illegal, and leading Party figures resigned from its ranks.[9] Disoriented by the failed coup of August, the Party offered no resistance. The legality of the anti-Party decrees, however, was challenged in the Constitutional court by a group of Russian deputies.

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[8]   Sakwa, Richard, "Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia" in John Lowenhardt (1998), ed., *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia,* (London, Frank Cass Publishers, pp.128-129)

[9]   Gill, Gramme, n.1, p. 175

What happened after the ban was not unexpected for anybody was rise of around half of dozen new Parties after a split in the CPSU. Republican Parties declared their independence of the CPSU, while some sections of the Party, like Rutskoi's Democratic Party of Russian Communists formally quit the Party.[10]

Orthodox Communists joined bodies like the Russian Communist Worker's Party (RCWP), headed by Viktor Tyul'kin. This Party was established in November 1991 and advocating a dictatorship of the proletariat based on worker's self-management, Marxist-Leninist ideology and the restoration of the planned economy. Party claimed that its membership had risen from 6,000 on formation to 110,000 in late 1993. Its activities of the Moscow faction were headed by the Viktor Anpilov, officially secretary of the RCWP's central committee till late 1996.

Others significant Parties included two bodies committed to the Marxist Platform: Alekari Prigarin's Orthodox Union of Communists (SK) established in November 1991 and Anatoli Kryuchkov's Russian Party of Communists (RPK). Nine Andreeva headed the Stalinist All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKPB). The Union of Communist Parties of the Soviet Union (SKP-KPSS) founded at the self-proclaimed twenty-ninth CPSU congress in March 1993.

In the middle of 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court began to hold hearings on the status of the CPSU. The result, handed down by the court's chairman on 30 November 1992, was masterpiece of equivocation: the ban on Party's higher organs (the apparatus) had been legal but not the dissolution of Party's lower bodies. Thus the Party had the right to rebuild itself from below to recreate its network of primary Party organization and to reconstitute itself as a legal entity. As a consequence Yeltsin lifted the ban in February 1993. The splinter Parties of the former CPSU came together on 14 February 1993. This declared the way to the convocation of the second congress in February 1993 in which Zyuganov was elected leader. The

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[10] *ibid.* p.175

reconstituted Party soon became by far the largest in Russia, its membership of over half million at least double that of all other Parties combined.[11]

Organizational Structure

The CPRF is the only seriously functioning Political Party in Russia. The CPRF can be analyzed in terms of political science as a Party trying to maximize its appeal in the electoral process – in the way that it selects its candidates, discuss its programmes with them, appeal to the voters in favour of these programmes, target its potential supporters and tries to implement these promises and programmes in the legislature. In these terms the Party has been characterized as an 'urban based programmes Party'[12]. The CPRF claims a membership of 500,000. Its organizational basis was provided by independent Party organizations. The CPRF has its own newspaper and a widespread network of Party offices. They have a stable cadres organized in 20,000 primary organizations. This makes the CPRF the most well structured and organized political force.[13]

Ideological inclinations

The ideological evolution of the CPRF after 1994 marked a shift from orthodox Marxism towards Social Democracy and elements of nationalism.[14] (See table 3.2) It is not easy to conclude about the ideological principles of the Party because of the presence of many groups inside it. But three main tendencies are identified by Joan Barth Urban: The Marxist-Leninist, Revivalists, the Marxists Reforms and the Left wing nationalists.[15]

The Marxist-Leninists revivalists were conservatives in the Soviet-sense, deeply alienated from the Post-Soviet political order and ideologically

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[11] Kaplan, Vera and Morozov, Boris, 'Towards a Multi-Party System 1985-93', in

[12] Sakwa, Richard, n 8, p. 147

[13] Chenoy, A.M., n.6, p.170

[14] Chenoy, A.M., n. 4., p.170

[15] Quoted in Sakwa, Richard, n.8, p. 138 from John Barth Urban (1996), 'The Communist Movement in Post-Soviet Russia', Demokratizatisiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. IV, No.2, pp. 173-84.

orthodox. The main supporter of this view is Luk'yanov with showing loyalty to traditional notions of class struggle, communist goals and Marxist ideology.

Marxist reforms sought to recover a purer Socialist tradition out of the past, condemning the centralized Party state of the Soviet Years. Kuptsov- the first deputy chairman of the Central Committee (CC) and responsible for organizational matter, was a typical representative of this tendency. The approach of this wing is class based, in opposition to Gorbachev's cosmopolitan universalism, but was anti-bureaucratic and supported intra-Party democracy.

Zyuganov is the central figure of the Left-wing nationalists. He is a Marxist reformer in internal Party politics, a patriot in national politics, and an upholder of Russia's great power status abroad. He was elected as a leader of Communist Party in the third congress. Zyuganov's thinking is characterized by such terms as: *sobornost* (organic unity of the nation), *derzhavnost* (great unity of the nation), *norodnost* supports populism, *gosudarstvennost* – quite apart from commitment to the state. The state is no longer defined as the instrument of class rule but as the agent of national development in the right hands. His thinking is a daddy mix of Statism, Slavophilism and populism[16].

Who votes for CPRF?

A poll published in November 1995 found that the CPRF was the most popular Party for those over age 55, but did not come into the top five for those aged 18-24 (about a quarter of the Russian population are pensioners, an estimated 37 million people.[17] This trend still continues in the latest surveys (see Table 3.2). This poses a future problem for Communist Party because young generation doesn't seem to favour them. Similarly, when Russia is forward on the path of globalization and privatization, on

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[16] Sakwa, Richard, n 8., p. 139

[17] Sakwa, Richard, n.8 , p.133

economic issues CPRF lacks sufficient support because of its image of supporter of a state driven economy (See table 3.5). Although new leaderships has tried to come out of it seriously and as Zyuganov insisted that the CPRF has overcome its sectarian approach, determined by the attempt to reflect 'narrow class interest' and now hopes to express the aspirations of the over whelming majority of the Russian people.[18]

TABLE 3.1: MAJOR RUSSIAN PARTIES IN DUMA ELECTIONS[19]

Parties	1993	1995	1999
Three elections	(47.9)	(45.0)	(38.2)
Community Party (CPRF)	11.6	22.3	24.3
Liberal Democrat Zhirinovsky	21.4	11.2	6.0
Yobloko	7.3	6.9	5.9
Women of Russia	7.6	4.6	2.0
Two elections	(28.9)	(28.4)	(4.0)
Russia's choice	14.5	3.0	n.a.
Agrarian Party	7.4	3.8	n.a.
Russian Unity and concord	6.3	0.4	n.a.
Cedar	0.7	1.4	n.a.
Our Home is Russia	n.a.	4.5	1.2
Communist Working for USSR	n.a.	4.3	2.2
Congress of Russian Communities	n.a.	(21.9)	0.6
One election	(12.5)	n.a.	(52.6)
Democratic Party of Russia	5.1	n.a.	n.a.
Unity (Medived)	n.a.	n.a.	23.3
Fatherland / All Russia	n.a.	n.a	13.3
Union of Right forces	n.a.	n.a	8.5
Other of Right forces	n.a.	n.a.	7.5
Other Parties	7.4	21.9	(5.2)
Against, all include	10.7)	(4.71)	

[18] ibid.

[19] Source of the Table is Rose, Richard, Munro, Neil and White, Stephen (2001), 'Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 53, No.3, pp.41-433.

Reformist	Centrist	National Patriotic	Communist Agrarian left
Russia's Democratic Choice (Gaidar)	Our Home is Russia (Chernomyrdin)	Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky)	Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Zyuganov)
Yabloko (Yavlinsky)	Women of Russia (Lakhova)	Congress of Russia's Communities	Power to the people (Ryztikov) Balarin
Forward Russia (B. Federov)	Trade Union And Industrialists (Stmakov, Scherbakov, Volsky)		Communists - Working Russia - For the soviet Union (Ampilov)

TABLE 3.3: AGE, EDUCATION AND PARTY CHOICE[21]

Total	Age	% of those voting for					
		Yabloko	Unity	Zhirinovsky	Fatherland	CPRF	Rights Forces
26	18-29	9	23	33	11	6	31
43	30-54	54	46	43	45	36	45
31	55 plus	37	31	24	44	58	24
	Education						
27	Elementary, incomplete secondary	12	25	38	24	42	19
28	Secondary, basic vocational	22	26	32	24	21	29
30	Secondary, specialized vocational	41	35	25	37	28	28
15	Higher	24	14	5	15	9	24

b. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

LDPR is known as leading nationalist's Party. It was formed in 1991 and Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the founding personality. The goal of this Party is popular mobilization through the articulation of the ideology of ultra-nationalism. Vladimir Zhirinovsky contested the June 1991 Russian Republics Presidential elections, winning 6.2 million votes, which was 7% of the total votes polled. Zhirinovsky propagated an undiluted ethnic Russian appeal, emphasizing on the greatness and uniqueness of the Russians. LDPR's draft of the new Constitution presented in 1993 was the

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[20] This table is taken from White, Stephen (2000), "Russia's New Politics,, The Management of a Post Communist Society", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge p.42.

[21] Source of the Table is Rose, Richard, Munro, Neil and White, Stephen, n.17

one of the cause of conflict between parliament and President. LDPR also supported suspension of all aid to any other countries; stepping up of arms industry, produce favourable taxations etc. They are also not in favor of Russian support to Central Asia and CIS.

In the first Duma election in 1993, LDPR received 22.8% of the national vote from Party list system. Party believes in the promotion of idea of cultural superiority, reclamation of the Russian empire up to the borders, virulent anti-communism and anti-trade unionism. In the 1995 Duma elections, the strength of the LDPR declined considerably. The number of votes they received on Party lists declined to 11.18%. Their number of deputies came down to 51 (Table 3.5).

The LDPR had gained support from the workforce in the military industrial complex, from sections of the army, pensioners and the impoverished.[22]

An organizational structure throughout Russia lacks for LDPR. In April 1994, Zhirinovsky was elected sole leader of the Party for a period of ten years. Electoral strength of LDPR is personality based. Unlike communists LDPR also enjoys the support of age group from 30 to 54 (See Table 3.3), as well as average educated people.

c. Yabloko Party

Yabloko Party is led by economist Grigorii Yavlinsky, shared a commitment to economic reforms but on a more gradual basis. It was sharply critical of the policies the Yeltsin administration had been following with Gaidar's support since the start of 1992. Their aim is to demonstrate that there is a 'democratic alternative to the current regime'. They were critical of the bombing of the white house in October 1993 and the increasingly corrupt nature of the ruling elite, and anxious to strengthen the place of parliament within the current Russian Constitution. Yabloko supported the free market but not at the expense of those who were unable to

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[22] *ibid.* pp.173-174.

defend their own interests. Their electoral programme placed considerable emphasis upon public morality, the environment and evolutionary rather than more rapid change. This Party is choice of age group of 30 to 54 (See table 3.3). Yabloko's appeal is to mature as well as educated voters; its supporters are also older them average (see table 3.3). In 1995 it got 7% and in 1999- 5.93% of votes in PR list system and 4 in 99, and 14 in 95 elections from SMD seats (See table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6).

d. Women of Russia

This Party is based on the soviet-era committee of Soviet- women. It got 8% of the Party list vote in the 1993 elections, it had come to reflect the view of the President and of its leader K. Ekaterina Lakhova, a doctor who belongs from the same part of Russia as Yeltsin and who had organized a commission on woman, the family and demography within his administration. It had also supported a move by Communists and Agrarian, to halt the process of privatization.

Women of Russia had lost their unique claim to represent the female constituency with the inclusion of women in prominent positions in other blocs or indeed as leaders of blocs. Their programme emphasized social issues, including protection for the family, a 'socially oriented market economy' and non-involvement in military conflicts including Chechnya; as the programme point out, 'without women there is no democracy.'[23]

e. Russia's Democratic Choice

This is Party was led by Egor Gaidar and committed to the fullest possible transition to a private ownership economy, founded in June 1994. The bloc included Gaidar's own Russia's Democratic Choice Party, together with the Peasant Party of Russia led by Yurii Chernichenko and the Social Democratic Party, formed in 1995 and led by the 'father of *perestorika*',

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[23] White, Stephen, Wyman, Matthew & Oates, Sarah, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.49, No.5, 1997, pp.767-798, p. 773

Alexander Yakovlev. Gaidar's Party has emerged from Russia's Choice, the largest of the parliamentary fractions after the 1993 elections, but Gaidar himself had resigned shortly afterwards and Russia's Choice lost ground as some of its deputies gravitated towards the Chernomyrdin government.

Russia's Democratic Choice adopted 'freedom, property, legality' as its slogan; it favoured a reduction in the role of the state, support for small business, the privatization of agriculture and a cut in military expenditure. The other famous leaders of Party are Sergei Kovalev known for his condemnation of the Chechen war and actress Lidiya Fedoseeva – Shukshina.

This Party got nine seats from the SMD and unable to get any seat from the PR list because it could not cross 5% vote in 1995 election (table 3.5).[24]

f. Agrarian Party

The Agrarian Party was set up to represent Russia's far-flung regions. It is made up of director of agricultural enterprises, regional leaders and collective farmers, and has wide rural support. It has been based on the organizational infrastructure of the collective form system.[25] Its leader was Mikhail Lapshin, director of the 'Behests of Lenin' farm in Moscow region, its other leading figures included Aelxander Zaveryukha, who was the vice-premier in the Chernomyrdin government and Alexander Nazarchuck, who was minister of agriculture, as well as Vasilli Starodubtsev, who had been one of the conspirator in August 1991 and was the successful chairman of a collective farm in the Tulu region. The Agrarian's election slogan was 'Father-Land, People's Power, Justice, and Welfare'. The Agrarians also opposed land privatization, arguing that it would lead to a fall in production

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[24] Rose Richard, Tikhomirov, Evgeny and Mishler, William (1997), 'Understanding Multi-Party Choice: The 1995 Duma Election', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No.5, pp.799-823.

[25] Chenoy, A.M., n.6., p.175.

and that speculator, rather than farmers themselves, would be the most likely beneficiaries.[26]

This Party became an ally of Communist Party in 1993. In the 1995 elections, it became part of the communist electoral bloc.

g. Our Home Is Russia

This Party was recognized as pro-government. It was founded in 1995 as a political movement that could sustain the Chernomyrdin government in the Duma elections. It was also expected to provide basis for a Presidential campaign by Boris Yeltsin in the summer of 1996. It represented two constituencies above all: the energy complex with which premier Chernomyrdin was related and the metallurgical complex, with which first vice premier Olegsoskovets was connected. Our Home stood for a 'broad centre', including a stronger state and support for domestic produces and investors. Its pre election programme, adopted in August 1995, emphasized there priorities: the 'Spiritual renewal of Russia', including the right to and freedoms of the individual: the 'integrity' of the country', including public order, and the development of a market economy together with a greater degree of social protection. Our Home's most obvious advantage was the support it received from big business, together with its access to the machinery of government and to the mass media. Their campaign slogan – 'on a firm foundation of responsibility and experience' – emphasized this bureaucratic image. In 1995 election it got 10.1% of votes but in 1999 a great decline in the voting percentage was a shock for the Party.

h. Forward Russia

Party was known as 'pro-reformist (Table 3.2). It was founded in 1995 – February and chaired by former finance minister Boris Federov. This Party favored fast privatization of the economy so that the bureaucratic

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[26] *ibid.*

group could be loosened. Another leader was Alexander Vladislavlev. On the question of Russian unity it favoured a strict action against the rebels.

i. Russian Unity and Concord (PRESS)

This Party was led by Sargei Shakhrai. It was originally formed at part of Our Home is Russia but withdrew to campaign separately when it failed to secure enough prominent places in Our Home's national lists. In 1993 PRESS had won votes in peripheral and non-Russian areas, but his earlier supporters were dismayed by his firmly pro-government position in the Chechen conflict and the Party was not exposed to secure representation in the new Duma.

j. Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)

Among its leaders were Yurii Skokov, former chairman of the security, who had close ties with the military– industrial complex; economist Sergei Glazev, Alexander Lebed who was once considered as the most popular politicians in the country in 1995. Congress was founded in March 1993 to represent Russian living outside the federation, gradually evolving into moderate national-patriotic groupings. Its programme was an egalitarian society. Its central beliefs were the gradual reconstitution of USSR by peaceful means, defense of Russians abroad, crackdown on crime, support for traditional Russian institutions such as the church and family, the restoration of Russia's great power status and the formation of a 'highly effective and socially oriented market economy.

KRO made clear that it was not a Party that sought to represent the interests of a particular group but an 'above Party movement' whose members could support a variety of views. It was very critical of the government's economic programmes and blamed Yeltsin for the collapse of the USSR, the October events of 1993, and the excess of privatization.

But because of its inconsistent programme and the unresolved ambitions of its leaders it could not achieve satisfactory success. Especially in 1999 election it got only 0.6% votes in PR list.

k. Unity

This Party can be placed under the category of political right. Party was established in August 1999 by former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, former deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemstov. Party shows its belief in a 'free society' which not only committed to individual political and social liberty but also willing to establish an economically free society based on the model of European Capitalism in Russia. A document of guideline of economic programme was handed over to Prime Minister Putin at a well publicized meeting shortly before the election, at which the premier gave it general approval. This approval was also a sign of approval of political support of URF to the Premier. In the elections, Party not only crossed the 5% threshold with winning 8.52% votes but also won five SMD seats.

l. Father Land - All Russia

This was also came on scenario just before the 1999 Duma elections, in September 1999. Party is also known as 'ad-hoc' Party because of an agreement between already existing two Parties: Fatherland and All Russia. Fatherland was established by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov in 1998 and All-Russia was a movement of governors and regional elites. Former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov and Luzhkov were in the list of the candidates. This Party favoured a stronger role for the society so that a development programme for the whole society could be implemented. It also favoured a 'society oriented market economy, in which particular attention would be attached to the 'real sector' and to the development of domestic producers. Like others, Fatherland-All Russia promised the timely payment of social benefits, and determined onslaught on terrorism and organized crime. In their own view, they were 'neither on the right nor on the left', and were opposed equally to 'pseudo-liberal reforms' and to a 'return to the totalitarian past'.[27]

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[27] Stephen, White, "Russia, Elections, Democracy" in *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.3, 2000

Although there are other groups who participated in the elections an even gain some numerical success but each of them cannot be studied because of their limited or ineffectual role in the Russian politics. These groups are more represents the wishes of their leader rather than a large section of Russian society. Most of them emerged in one election and disappeared or merged with any other Party. How far Parties have been able to influence the government- that is a question dealt in a separate chapter but here we should study the three Duma elections to understand the presence of Political Parties and their performance among the Russian voter.

Elections for the Duma and Presidency and Development of Political Parties

In the theoretical part of our study we studied Sartori's explanations about measuring the relevance of Political Parties among which the most important factor is a Party's electoral strength. To measure this factor elections are the best scale. Elections is the process through which people choose those whom they expect to do what they (people) want and can be thrown out if they could not prove themselves true on their promises. For elections two things are must – firstly, a neutral body, which conducts elections and decides rules of the game, and secondly, Political Parties which take part in this power game for the driving seat of political system. Voters are on the seat of judges.

Elections are also considered as the best way to analyze how democracy is developing in one country. If elections are conducted in a fair manner in which voters can use their right to vote independently, then it is believed that democracy is taking roots is that country. As we talked earlier, during the Soviet period elections were conducted to legitimize the communist Party's representatives and no choice was available for the voters. In 1993 with the adoption of new Constitution, multiparty system was finally accepted and elections were declared a method through which people can express their wishes. For the proper management of elections a

body called 'Central Election Commission (CEC)' is established. Though the role of election commission is not far from controversies regarding its decisions in favour of the President, who appoints the chief of the CEC. But so far elections in Russia are recognized as free and fair by different international observers. Under the new Constitution so far three Duma elections have been held (first in 1993, second in 1995 and third in 1999). Two Presidential elections had also been held successfully (in 1995 and 2000).

Duma Elections In 1993

Although it was a matter of great pleasure for Russians that Russia was experiencing a new style of liberal democracy but the environment in which the elections took place was quite different. The suspension and bombardment of the parliament had created an inhospitable environment for the conduct of these first post-communist elections. There was a brief period of censorship; newspapers were banned on the name of law and order in Moscow city. *Pravada* and *Soveskaya Russia two* of the paper that had been suspended were also instructed to change their names and replace their editors (in the end both retained their distinctive titles, but did not appear for an extended period); the parliament's own paper, *Rossikaya gazeta*, was taken over entirely by the Russian government. Sixteen Parties or organizations were suspended on the grounds that they had been involved in the events of 3-4 October; the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), whose leader had urged both sides to 'refrain from provocation's was eventually legalized, but most of the others, including the National Salvation Front and the hard left Communist Worker's Party, remained subjected to a ban that deprived them of any opportunity to take part in elections.

In the end, thirty-five Parties or alliances began a campaign to collect the 100,000 signatures that they required to secure the right to put forward candidates; twenty one claimed to have collected the number that was

needed; and of these, thirteen were included on the ballot paper after their documentation had been verified.

The results were surprising for the political analysts as well for the leaders around the world. Most successful of all were the independents who won 141 of the 225 single-member constituencies; this gave them nearly one third of all the seats in the new parliament. The most successful was Russia's Choice led by former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and fully committed to the policies of the Yeltsin administration, with a total of seventy seats. (See Table 3.4)

But in the Party list contest the right wing nationalist Liberal Democratic Party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky with nearly a quarter of the vote, with the Communist in third place.[28]

The 1995 Duma Elections

In 1995 there were substantial changes in the environment, as market reforms gathered momentum and social differences widened. The economy continued to be fallen, by a rate of 13% in 1994 and by a further 4% in 1995: a fall that took it below half the level of economic activity that had been recorded in the last years of Communist rule. There were fewer Russians in paid employment, with 8% officially out of work and a further 20% who were not receiving their wages on a regular basis. Life expectancies were falling, to just 58 for men; and levels of recorded crime were still increasing- the number of murders had doubled in just three years, with three members of the Duma itself among the victims. "Governments generally seek to generate a 'feel good' factor as they approach a new election; Russians were 'feeling bad', some very bad indeed..."[29]

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[28] White, Stephen, "Russia's New Politics – The Management of a Post Communist Society", (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 37-39

[29] White, Stephen, Wyman, M. and Oates, S. (1997), "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No.5, pp.767-798.

Table 3.4: Elections to the State Duma, December 1993[30]

Party / block	Party lists			Single-member constituencies		Total seats	
	% Votes	Number of seats	% Seats	Number of seats	% Seats	Number	%
Russia's Choice	15.51	40	17.8	30	13.3	70	15.6
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia	22.92	59	26.2	5	2.2	64	14.2
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	12.40	32	14.2	16	7.1	48	10.7
Agrarian Party	7.99	21	9.3	12	5.3	33	7.3
Women of Russia	8.13	21	9.3	2	0.9	23	5.1
Yabloko	7.86	20	8.9	3	1.3	23	5.1
Party of Russian Unity and Concord	6.76	18	8.0	1	0.4	19	4.2
Democratic Party of Russia (5% threshold)	5.52	14	6.2	1	0.4	15	3.3
Democratic Reform Movement	4.08	--		4	1.8	4	0.9
Dignity and Charity	0.70	--		2	0.9	2	0.4
Civic Union	1.93	--		1	0.4	1	0.2
Russia's Future-New Names	1.25	--		1	0.4	1	0.2
Cedar	0.76	--		--		--	
Against all	4.36	--		--		--	
Spoiled ballots	3.10	--		--		--	
Independents	--	--		141	62.7	141	31.3
Postponed	--	--		6		6	
Total		225		225		450	

According to the CEC, 273 Parties or other organization had the right to nominate candidate to the new Duma, and there were indications that Russia might set the world record for the number of electoral association per head of population. Under the election law Parties had to collect the signatures of at least 200,000 electros to secure nomination, not more than

[30] White, Stephen, Wyman, Matthew & Oates, Sarah, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.49, No.5, 1997, pp.767-798, p. 773

7% of whom could be drawn from any one republic or region. In the individual constituencies candidates had to obtain the support of at least 1% of the local electorate (Article 41). The other 225 seats would be distributed among the Party lists on a proportional basis, provided each had secured at least 5% of the vote and (in both cases) that the level of turnout was at least 25% of the electorate (Article 62). In the end 2627 individual candidates were nominated, 1055 of who were independents, and 43 Parties and movements were registered, with a total of 5675 candidate on their lists.

This time it was term for the left, especially the CPRF, which increased its vote share by 10% compared with 1993, winning twice as many votes as any other Party or alliances and over a third of seats in the new Duma. The other Parties of the left failed to pass the 5% barrier and were accordingly denied representation in their own right. The Agrarian and Power to the People won 20 and 9 single member districts, respectively. Against the predictions of most commentators, second place in the Party list section went to Zhirinovsky's LDPR. Their 11% of the vote, however, was half the share they had achieved two years previously. (See Table 3.5)

The elections also proved a moderate success for Yabloko which consolidated its position as the main Party within the 'democratic opposition' to the Yeltsin's administration. The other Party which was successful in surrounding the 5% barriers was Our Home is Russia. Although it was rather less successful than the main pro-government forces, Russia's choice, Women of Russia, Syastoslav Fedrov's Party of Worker's Self-Management and KRO.

Table 3.5: Elections to the State Duma, December 1995[31]

	PR Party List			SMD		Total Seats	
	% of vote	Number of seats	% of seats	Number of seats	% of seats	Number of seats	% of seats
Communist Party	22.3	99	44.0	58	25.8	157	34.9
Liberal Democrats	11.2	50	22.2	1	0.4	51	11.3
Our Home is Russia	10.1	45	20.0	10	4.4	55	12.2
Yabloko [5% threshold]	6.9	31	13.8	14	6.2	45	10.0
Agrarians	3.8	--	--	20	8.9	20	4.4
Power to the People	1.6	--	--	9	4.0	9	2.0
Russia's Democratic Choice	3.9	--	--	9	4.0	9	2.9
Congress of Russian Communities	4.3	--	--	5	2.2	5	1.1
Women of Russia	4.6	--	--	3	1.3	3	0.7
Forward, Russia	1.9	--	--	3	1.3	3	0.7
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	1.1	--	--	3	1.3	3	0.7
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc	1.6	--	--	2	0.9	2	0.4
Communists-Working Russia for the Soviet Union	4.5	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party of Workers' Self Management	4.0	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Trade Union and Industrialsts	1.6	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Stanslav Govorukhin Bloc	1.0	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
My fatherland	0.7	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Common Cause	0.7	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Transformation of the Fatherland	0.7	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party Of Russian Unity and Concord	0.4	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party of Economic Freedom	0.1	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
89 Regions of Russia	0.1	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Bloc of Independents	0.1	--	--	1	0.4	1	0.2
Other Parties	8.9	--	--	0	--	1	0.2
Independents	--	--	--	77	34.2	77	17.1
Against all lists	2.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
Invalid vote	1.2	--	--	--	--	--	--

The 1999 Duma Election

The events which affected the third Duma elections were the 1996 Presidential elections; August 1998 financial crash, rotating Prime Ministers, and the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya.

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[31] Source of the table is *ibid.*

As table 3.6 demonstrates, three of the four parries won roughly the same percentage in the 1999 election that they won in December 1995, showing that these Parties might be developing loyal following. The CPRF won almost exactly the same percentage with a slight improvement, over its 1995 showing. Yabloko lost a percentage point – a big blow to the Party but small variation when compared with Yabloko total in 1995-96 even 1993. The Union of Rights Forces (Unity) performed surprisingly well in 1999. Zhirinovsky's LDPR suffered a sharp decline and lost nearly half of its electoral support, suggesting that the LDPR may be the weakest of these four "old parliamentary Parties.... no new ideologically based Party has managed to challenge these established Parties. New nationalist, Communist, and liberal Parties were formed; some even have long histories and famous leaders. But none had captured more than 2% of the popular vote.[32]

TABLE 3.6: THE 1999 DUMA ELECTIONS[33]

	Duma Seats won, 1999		
	PR list	Single-member	Total
Independents	0	114	114
Communist Party	67	46	113
Unity	64	9	73
Fatherland / All Russia	37	31	68
Right Forces	24	5	29
Zhirinovsky bloc	17	0	17
Yabloko	16	4	20
Our Home is Russia	0	8	8
Other Parties	0	9	9

Most striking, two new electoral coalitions competing on the Party list ballot succeeded in capturing a significant portion of popular vote – Fatherland – All Russia and Unity. In contrast to the four parliamentary

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[32] Rose, Richard, Munro, Neil and White, Stephen , n.17

[33] Source of the table is McFaul, Michael (December 2001), 'Explaining Party Formation and Non-formation in Russia-Actors, Institutions and Chance', in *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 34, No.10, pp.1159-1187

Parties discussed earlier, these two organizations are better understood as Presidential coalitions.

Presidential Elections and Political Parties

President enjoys the supreme legislative and executive powers in the Russian Federation therefore the role of Political Parties is crucial in the election of Presidency. But unfortunately so far both Presidents have avoided any direct political affiliation. As a consequence Parties have not been able to play any significant role in the Presidential contest. But because for the adoption of any law and the appointments State Duma's consent is expected, President cannot avoid importance of Political Parties. For this purpose both Presidents have chosen those Parties which can come with any sort of consent with the President over the different issues. These kinds of Parties are known as 'Parties of power'. To get support of the Parties former President offered their leaders some important post in the government. Although this created a big amount of confrontation between President and the Duma but because President has the power to appoint or dismissal of the government and the right to dismiss the State Duma, finally Duma had to surrender.

Unfortunately no Party has been able to replace the Presidential post with the Party candidate. In the second Presidential election Zyuganov and President Yeltsin were qualified for the second round of the vote which was won by Yeltsin. Indeed, Yeltsin had also misused the government machinery and his post to maintain his hold on it. While leaving his post Yeltsin appointed Putin as his successor who finally won the Presidential elections in the year 2000. Putin also continued with the same strategy and have support from the 'Unity'. But so far Putin is not seems to be so negative towards Parties and he had tries to take parliament along with him while dealing with crucial issues.

After studying the development of Political Parties what remains as another significant aspect of the study of Party politics of any country is

their role in the political system. How Parties have affected the legislature, the executive or the other institutions? Are they exists just to show or they have some significant role to play in the policy formation and in decision making? To answer these questions and look into more deep analysis of role of Parties we have to study the development of Russian Party system which continues in the next chapter.

CHAPTER – IV
PARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

Introduction

Parties and Party system are closely related but yet a bit distinct analytically. Parties are organizations which contest elections in order to control or influence the exercise of government power whereas Party systems are the content or frameworks in which that contest or competition takes place. Before Sartori, study of Party system was by and large related to the number of existing Parties in the political system and the only basis of studying number of Parties was presence and performance of Parties in the elections. Although numbers are important but nobody was bothered that something is there beyond the numbers and that is 'how to count the Parties'. While giving rules of counting he added four new types of Party system (earlier it was three –one, Bi and Multiparty system) and gave a complicated but better and well explanatory classification of Party system.

As Sartori argues, Parties are sort of larger whole. Use of the term 'System' implies regularity, recurrence and interrelation among the parts – a phenomenon which we increasingly refer to as 'system-ness'. Classifications of Party system are made in order to try to understand this system-ness and to predict the bahaviour of Political Parties by defining how they interact with one another, and using this definition to comment on the pattern of competition between them in terms of centrifugal and centripetal pulls. Centrifugal means the movement of Parties towards political extremes, whereas centripetal tendency is clustering of Parties about centrist position.[1]

While studying Political Parties in Russia more analytically this study not only examines party's interaction with the system and with the other Parties. For this purpose it looks into role of the Parties in the political institutions and also in decision-making process. Following study also deals with patterns of electoral behaviour to see what people think about them and what sort of political culture is developing in Russia. Finally an effort is

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[1]   Robinson, Neil, "Classifying Russian Party system" in Lowenhardt, John, (ed.), "Party Politics in Post-communist Russia", (Frank Cass, London, 1998), p.160

made to classify Russian Party system to understand their behaviour in ideological manner.

Parties in the Institutions

The emergence of Parties depends upon the cultural, historical and socio-economic factors, but individual decisions especially decisions about institutional structure are the more proximate and more salient causes behind it. During Soviet period the state was based on the Marxist concept of 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which later took a form of totalitarian and authoritarian state. In the post-Soviet period the new Constitution was made under the Yeltsin's leadership influenced by the Westminster model of democracy. However, it was more like an instrument to serve his personal interests rather than the national interests. While studying development of Party system and the environment in which it developed, we have to keep in mind the legacies of Soviet system and role of leadership under which the new institutions were developing.

a. Federal Assembly or Federal Legislature

Federal Assembly is the representative legislative body of the Russian Federation [2] and consists two chambers- the Federation Council and the State Duma. The Federation Council which is upper house consisting representatives from the federal units providing equal status of representation – two members from each unit. The lower house is State Duma[3] chosen at the federal level.

The Federation Council

Federation Council is established to represent the regional units giving equal status to each unit.[4] The Council is given considerably more than the purely advisory powers. Because of severe disagreement over the

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[2] Art. 94

[3] Art. 95

[4] Art. 95 (2)

manner of selection of representative for Federation Council the Constitution was left open-ended about whether the two representatives were to be directly or indirectly elected, full time or *ex officio*[5]. As a result the rules of its formation have changed throughout the 1990s; its members do not rely on party support or party identification to obtain their seats in the council. Regional associations, and not party factions organize the internal work within the Council. A number of Federation Council members did adopt party affiliations in the run up to the 1999 election to the State Duma. Nine regional executives joined forces to form the electoral bloc Fatherland–All Russia. Yet this coalition quickly fell apart after the 1999 vote.

The State Duma

State Duma shares the powers of appointment with the President[6] but does not enjoy the dominant position as the President has. The State Duma has a different type of mixed electoral procedure combining the first past the post ballot or single member plurality and proportional representation system. This sort of procedure was expected to encourage participation of Political Parties in the legislative process. But ironically on the one hand, the Russian Constitution is said to place State Duma... *de jure* in a position of weakness. The President's confined legislative powers to veto parliamentary bills and the issue decrees permit the head of state to rule by decree if he or she commands the support of just one-third of either house of the Federal Assembly. For this reason Holmes describes the Russian Constitutional regime as 'super Presidential', the corollary of which is 'fig-leaf parliamentarianism'. On the other hand, analysts point to the *de facto* limitations on parliament's capacity to act. As we discussed in the previous chapter that the presence of large number of Parties and also entry of many independent candidates through SMD seats left State Duma in a position of 'house with factions'. These faction appears with cooperation on one issue

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[5] Remington, Thomas F., 'Political conflict and institutional design' in Lowenhardt, John, n.1, p. 219

[6] Article 103

and disappears when any issue harms there personal interest. As said by Chaisty, Paul and Schleiter, Petra that "the polarized and fragmented character of the lower chamber is said to contribute to parliament's weakness"[7]. Absence of party affiliation has allowed deputies to behave in an unaccountable manner. The fractured nature of State Duma, weakness of Parties in structuring the works of the lower house, and in linking the legislative priorities of the different branches of government, has led to the different problems of governance in Russia.

One factor which has encouraged Political Parties in Russia is the Proportional Representation system for the election of one half of the lower house. As McFaul says that adoption of Proportional Representation(PR) system was not a sign of Yeltsin's interest in development of a stable Party system but when he was told by Viktozsheini, an independent deputy that if he would accept the mixed electoral system with PR system the biggest beneficiary would be Russia's choice, which in Yeltsin's favour at that time. This is how Yeltsin agreed to the proportional representative system. The mixed electoral system also solved a collective action dilemma for would be party leader of all camps, and allowed them to serve their political goals. By early 1993, because of ongoing confrontation between Yeltsin and his parliamentary opposition, deputes were demanding a new electoral system. This was also necessary because the electoral system was based on the Marxist framework of the Brezhnev Constitution of 1977. There was an almost consensus on giving an impetus to the development of Political Parties by reserving a given share of seats in the parliament for candidates elected from party lists. The advantages which were reasserted: it would enable party members to build political followings by offering allies slots on their party lists, allow them to advertise their political personal and programs at state expense, and increase the power of Parties in the next parliament over the legislative agenda. Privileged representation for Parties in the future

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[7] Chaisty, Paul and Schleiter, Petra, "Productive but not valued: The Russian State Duma, 1994-2001" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 54, No.5, 2002, pp.701-724.

parliament was a valuable and low cost organizational resource for ambitious politicians and the automatic translation of a certain share of the vote for a particular leader or party into parliamentary seats would help allow the heads even of embryonic partisan movements to offer their followers sufficient incentives to accept their leadership. But on the other hand President Yeltsin was willing to have such a system in which nobody would be able to challenge his supremacy in terms of legislative powers. To come out of this dilemma Yeltsin cleverly adopted mixed electoral system.[8]

It is clear that to please the Political Parties the PR system was accepted. Russia's current electoral system for the State Duma accords Parties a privileged position regarding the selection of 50% (225) of Duma members. This 50% allocation goes proportionally to Parties that receive at least 5% of the popular vote in a national election (for a single electoral district)

After three parliamentary elections in the 1990s the core of a multi Party system did appear to be consolidating by the end of the decade. This core is composed of four national Parties- the CPRF, Yabloko, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and the Union of Right Forces. When compared with each other, thee four Parties share many attributes that can also be identified in parliamentary Parties in other political systems:-

I. All of thee Parties participated in all Duma votes in the 1990s, (Although the Union of Right forces did not compete in the 1993 or 1995 votes, but the core party within this electoral bloc, Democratic choice of Russia, did compete in the 1995 election, and its predecessor, Russia's choice, competed in 1993. The ability to field national party lists and candidates in three consecutive national elections suggests that these four Parties have financial resources, brand names, and organizational capacity. Three of the four have enjoyed representation in all three of the four have

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[8]   Chaisty ,Paul and Schleiter, Petra, "Productive but not Valued : The Russian State Duma, 1994-2001", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.54, No.5, 2002,pp.701-724

enjoyed representation in all three parliaments that have served since 1993 (See Table 3.4).

II. All four Parties have well defined political orientation, loyal electorates, and notable leaders. The Communist Party of Russia is a left-of-centre party, the Union of Right forces and Yabloko are liberal Parties, and Zhirinovsky's LDPR is a more nationalist party (See Table 3.5). Demographic patterns also correlate in partisan sympathies. For example, the older, poorer, less educate and more rural are more likely to vote for Union of Right Forces or Yabloko (See Table 4.).

III. As table 4.1 demonstrates, three of the four Parties won roughly the same percentage in the 1999 election that they won in December 1995, suggesting that these Parties might be developing loyal feelings.

Although other Parties were not able to get 5% of the vote by continuation of these Parties, specially the three-CPRF, Yabloko, LDPR have kept alive some hope for a stable Party system but still the question that how it (PR System) promotes the Parties system is unanswerable. To answer this question we have to compare it with the system of the election of other half- the single member plurality districts (See Table 4.2)

In the single member plurality districts nonpartisan candidates assumed a much more prominent role in the 1999 vote then in 1993 and 1995 elections. More striking phenomenon is the declining role of the older parliamentary Parties in the single member plurality districts. The CPRF won 58 in 1995 but 47 in 1999- 11 fewer seats. Yabloko's share also decreased from 14 to 4. It happened with LDPR who won at least one seat in 1995 but this time unable to mark even a single victory. Unity won 64 seats in the PR-list system and in the single member plurality districts won only 9 seats.

This comparative analysis shows that because for PR-list system only Parties can participate and people are bound to vote for Parties. But where

they do not have such limitations they prefer independent rather than party affiliated candidates.

b. The Federal Executive

The Head of the government of the Russian Federation and the Federal ministers exercises executive power in the Russian Federation.[9] The President with the consent of the State Duma appoints the Head of the government. The State Duma has no power to reject the President's choice. In fact, if Duma rejects President's candidate as the head of State, President can dissolve State Duma and schedule new elections.[10] The Federal executive works out the federal budget, economic policy, ensures the implementation of laws and performs other administrative functions. State Duma has a right to express its no confidence in the government. This kind of proposal should be send to President. President has a choice to accept it or reject it.

This shows the helpless position of State Duma, which is the representative body in terms of appointment of government and influencing its policies. Despite its Constitutional weakness State Duma has managed to influence the choice of Prime Minster and the composition of the government. Following the December 1993 elections, Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodor resigned from their posts in the government after their party, Russia's Choice, suffered a devastating defeat at the polls. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin subsequently invited representative from the Agrarian and Communist Parties to join him as a way to reflect (albeit only partially) the will of the people within his government as expressed in the parliamentary election.

However, the President and the Prime Minster were not obliged to bring in party members. When party members did join the government, their

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[9]   Article 110
[10]   Article 111 (4)

allegiance usually transferred to the Prime Minster and drifted away from party leaders and organizations.[11]

c. Regional Head of Administration and Regional Legislatures

Russian Political Parties play a very limited role in regional politics. In some major metropolitan areas, such as St. Petersburg and Ekaternburg, multiparty systems are beginning to take root, but in most regions, a state-based informal network dominated by the local ruling elite still dominates regional politics. Only few executive leaders have open party affiliations. During the cascade of election of regional executives in the fall of 1996 and spring of 1997, Political Parties played only a marginal role in selecting and endorsing candidates. The Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), through its affiliation with the National Patriotic Union of Russia (RPSR) was the only party that had any real influence on the election as a political party. The Kremlin backed candidates and funded campaign on regional level but not through party organizations. Other Parties, including regional Parties and coalitions, figured only in individual races. Zhirinovsky's LDPR ran candidates in several races but won only one in Pskov. Governor Mikhailov in Pskov may be the only candidate who won due to party affiliation.[12]

Without the significant presence of Political Parties in Russia's region, the national Party systems appears destined to remain what it is: a rather shape- less collection of organizationally unstable entities, prone to extreme forms of political fragmentation and sectarian quasi-politics.[13]

After studying institutional impact on party development in Russia, more we are able to choose those factors which either in-favour of party politics or those which hinders the development of a stable Party system.

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[11]   Mcfaul, Michael, "Explaining party formation and non-formation in Russia –Actors, Institutions and Chance" in *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.34, No.10, December 2001,pp.1159-1187.

[12]   *Ibid.* , p. 1169

[13]   Gelman, Vladimir and Golosov, Grigori V., "Regional Party formation in Russia" in Lowenhardt, John, n.1, p.48

Parties in the Decision-Making Process

Study of what role Parties play in the politics of any country remains incomplete unless including their role in the decision making process. If Parties are not able to influence the policy formation of government, they won't be able to represent people's interests in an effective manner. Policy making is always a reflection of people's wishes and Parties makes this process of inputting people's wishes in the system possible with articulating and aggregating people's interests.

In Russian case President determines the basic guidelines for the state's domestic and foreign policy.[14] He also has the supreme appointment powers. Although in any kind of appointment Duma's consent is expected but not must, this absence of an effectual part makes Duma a weak institution. In the field of law making, the President, the State Duma, Federation Council and government can propose draft of any law[15]. It has to be approved by the both houses of the parliament and it requires President's approval in the end. President can veto any bill. This demonstrates President's dominating powers in the field of law making and policy formation. Similarly, Parties have less influence on the government formation in compare to the President. Because government is responsible for the implementation of the laws to the President and not to the legislature, their programmes are controlled by the President and not by the people's representative body as in other parliamentary democracies. Duma can work positively if it goes in accordance with President's wishes but any kind of clash of ideas would result in Duma's weakness. The last ten years of Russian democracy is a mixed history of cooperation and confrontation between President and State Duma. This study looks into three different fields in which policy making and decision-making can be seen as most

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[14]   Article 80(2)

[15]   Article 104

68

significant in Russian politics. They are- decisions over the new western type liberal democratic institutions, economic policy, and the foreign policy.

Let's start with the decisions over the selection of democratic institutions for the new Russian democracy. Yeltsin emerged on the changing political scenario in Russia with his agenda of democratization and economic reforms. But in the beginning of 1990s, when he introduced his agenda the political arrangements were not so smooth for him. Late Soviet period Constitutional arrangements made the President subordinate to the legislature. While the President nominated the prime minister and other leading government members, these officials were all subject to confirmation by the parliament. Yeltsin successfully countered these institutional arrangements by convincing the parliament to grant him extraordinary powers to promote his radical economic reform programme. His decrees were made equal to law. Implicit, in the parliament's action, however was its prerogative to take such powers away; something the parliament did in the spring of 1993. Parliament chairmen Khasbulatov, who took an anti-reform position, led this. Personal career interests were also lying behind this opposition. The confrontation became wider over the issue of making a new reformed Constitution to make Russia a western type liberal democracy. Yeltsin was in favor of a Constitution, which will ensure a strong President whereas parliament wanted a parliamentary friendly Constitution. To stop parliament Yeltsin dissolved it, bombarded the white house and arrested those who opposed him. A new Constitution was adopted without following any democratic process of debate and discussions. Neither political groups were invited nor any opposition leaders were consulted. The draft was presented before the people but accepted by a minority of Russian population. This is how a democratic culture of consensus over the structure and functioning of the democratic system was murdered and a one-man Constitution was accepted.

In the economic field Yeltsin followed same policy of marginalizing opinion of other groups or Political Parties. While implementing economic

reforms Yeltsin used decrees and never consulted with the Congress. Yeltsin favoured a shock therapy approach whereas most of the parliamentary groups were in favour of gradualism and against immediate transformation towards western type open-market oriented economy.[16] In the new Duma Yeltsin appointed Gaidar as his Prime Minister, who was leader of the party named Russia's Choice. This party was actually an alliance of pro-reform group or Parties. Yeltsin used these Parties to secure his position while passing any legislation in Duma. But this group was in minority while majority of Deputies was with the opposition (CPRF, LDPR. and Agrarian Party). In October 1994 a sudden decline in the value of the rouble prompted the resignation or dismissal of government members. In the same year, Russia commenced military intervention in the Republic of Chechnya: an apparent lack of progress there together with the continued deterioration of the economy was instrumental in the approval by the State Duma, in June 1995, of a motion expressing 'no confidence' in the government. Yeltsin subsequently dismissed a number of ministers; however, Gen. Pavel Grachev, whose resignation had been demanded by the Duma, notably retained his post as Minister of Defence. In early July 1996, a second vote of 'no confidence' (as required by the Constitution) failed to secure the necessary majority.

In the second Duma conflict arose between Duma and President over the issue of appointment of Prime Minister. In August 1997 the State Duma rejected government proposals to reduce budgetary expenditure. Due to allegations of corruption on Minister of Finance and Deputy Premier, Chubais, Duma demanded his dismissal. Although Chubais dismissed from the post of Minister of Finance but he continued as Deputy Premier until March 1998, despite requested by Duma-again and again.

In late March 1998 Yeltsin removed Chernomyrdin from office of Prime Minister, citing the need to revitalize the process of economic

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[16]   See for debates over new Economic model in Russia, Aslund, Anders, ed., "Russia Economic Transformation in the 1990", (London; Pinter, 1997)

70

reforms. On his place he appointed minister of fuel and energy and close ally of Nemtsov, Sergei Kiriyenko. This appointment was finally confirmed at the Duma's third vote in mid-April, following threats by Yeltsin to dissolve the legislature. Tension between the legislature and executive were intensified in mid-1998 and CPRF has initiated impeachment charges against Yeltsin. But this move was declared unconstitutional by a parliamentary commission in late July. In the same year Russia faced heavy economic crisis. As a consequence Yeltsin dismissed Kiriyenko and his government and reappointed Chernomyrdin. But his candidature was twice rejected by Duma. In mid September Yeltsin (aware that if his candidate would be rejected for a third term he would be constitutionally obliged to dissolve the Duma) nominated Primakov as Chairman whose candidacy was endorsed by a large majority despite Primakov's lack of economic experience. In May 1999, Yeltsin dismissed Primakov and his government. Sergei Stephashin, the first Deputy Chairman and Minister of Internal Affairs, was appointed as Chairman. Meanwhile, a further attempt in State Duma to impeach Yeltsin failed in mid-may, as the five charges brought against the President (the distortion of the USSR in 1991; the violent disbandment of the elected legislature in 1993; the dispatch of troops to war in Chechnya; undermining the armed force and thereby national defence; and bringing 'genocide' on the people of Russia through economic reforms that had resulted in a lower birth-rate and reduced average life expectancy) failed to secure the necessary majority of two-thirds of the chamber's membership. In early August Yeltsin again dismissed Stephashin and replaced him by Putin former KGB Chief. This time Duma accepted the President's choice easily. He was also named as his preferred successor as President. [17]

In the field of foreign policy, President Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev looked at west as their best supporters for their

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[17]   Europa Year Book, vol.II, (London; Europe Publications, 2003s), p. 3468-72

economic reforms and their regime as well. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev emphasized the desire for Russia to become a normal great power, not just a military power. The first draft of Russian foreign policy was accepted without any consultation with the parliament or with Political Parties. Similarly, during war with Chechnya, Parties were not taken into confidence. Even Duma reacted more as anti-Presidential institution rather than a national legislative institution. However, very soon Yeltsin realized the importance of public opinion in foreign policy. The pressure was felt when the nationalist party – LDPR, achieved high number of seats in the first Duma election. Shift in Russia foreign policy became clear with the appointment of Evgenii Primakov as a successor of Andrei Kozyrev in 1996. Moreover by this time Russia was disillusioned with the west. Russia's high expectations *vis-a-vis* the west had not been fulfilled. Besides Russia was much eager to respond to the nationalist mood of the Russian public than to the preferences of the West. Yeltsin's foreign policy, in large part after 1991 was a response to the growing strength of conservative and nationalist forces in Russia. It now turned to its earlier traditional partners like India, China etc.

Political liberalization in Russia was based on the leader's perception of their national interest and not influenced by any outside forces. The Political Parties that arose after 1991 have viewed national interests from a different perspective. As a result, today's Russian leadership does not enjoy a *carte blanche* in the sphere of foreign policy in the way that soviet leaders did. The Yeltsin-Kozyrev team began to face serious opposition to their foreign policy plank, both from the public and political opposition.[18]

Role of Political Parties in the Parliamentary committees is also very important to influence the law-making process. But the absence of a stable working majority in the Duma goes to the weakening of Party's role even in this field. As we discussed earlier, in none of the three Dumas elected since

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[18] Kanet, Roger E. and Birgerson, Susane, M, "The Domestic Foreign Policy Linkage in Russian Politics: Nationalist Influences on Russian Foreign Policy", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 30, no.4, pp.335-344, 1997.

1994 has a single Party or coalition of Parties commended the 226 votes that are required to form a majority. This is reflected in the highly unusual non-majoritarian feature of the Duma's internal organization. In the Council of the Duma – the body that is formally responsible for setting the legislative agenda – voting rights are held in parity basis by each party leader, irrespective of the number of seats that their party commands in the lower house. Senior committees' posts are divided up between all parties on a proportional basis, but parties have limited influence over committee agendas, and deputies in plenary sessions reserve the rights to override the legislative preferences of the Duma Council and legislative committees. In practice, no single body or political force exercises undivided control over the law making process. The Duma council lacks the political incentives to force committees to adhere to the official legislative programmes, and deputies are procedurally uninhibited from amending the Duma's agenda on the floor, or from replacing bills prepared by committees with alternative drafts.

But it is wrong to conclude that the Duma sessions were only of confrontation between the President and the parliament. Parties have also shown commitment to work in a democratic manner. Moreover, notwithstanding, their divisions, parliamentary Parties have achieved cross-party agreement on a number of legislative matters, sometimes, with the federation council, sometimes with the President and sometimes with both.

During its meetings Duma passed set of rules related to the judicial system which included a Constitutional law for a reorganization of judicial system and a new version of federal criminal code. Duma also rectified universal law establishing uniform political rights of voters and law related to conduction of elections for State Duma, for President and law on referendums etc. But Duma's efforts to pass the law for restriction or reduction of President's power could not succeed. For instance a law preventing the President from returning any of the cultural treasures seized by the Soviet Army during the Second World War (the 'trophy art' law)

was, passed by both chambers by wide margins, was vetoed by President; the veto was overridden but the President continued to refuse to sign the law. The Constitutional Court subsequently considered the President's refusal, which was within his right.

There were not only confrontation between the legislature and executive but also intra-cameral divisions. A bill providing legal rights for municipal governments to raise their revenues passed by the Duma but was rejected by the Federation council. Similarly, a law related to hardening rules for election at all levels of government was passed by Duma but rejected by Federation council.[19]

However, the real cause of conflict between these two institution is that the "Russian Federation was 'born asymmetrical'.[20]The cause of this asymmetry, according to Solvinick, was that there were strong region to region variations after the collapse of Soviet Union, in the resources that local elites could acquire, and the power that they could generate. The power could be use either to resist them from central authorities or to determine that local political arrangements were favourable to them. As a consequence federal units possessed very different *de facto* powers with regard to the administration of their territories and their relations with the centre. Yeltsin's policies then formalized and encouraged these differences. We have seen that in order to secure the support of regional elites for his re-election as President, Yeltsin assured them some unique rights and privileges. He signed many treaties with federal units, which granted a wide range of powers to some of the regions and republics so that they could structure political and economic system independently of the centre. Out of the 21 Federating unit's two republics; Tatarastan and Bashakharatan signed special treaties while Chechnya has yet to sign it. These policies helped to

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[19]   Remington, Thomas F., n.5

[20]   Quoted in Robinson, Neil, 'Russia's Partial democracy' from Solvnick, S.L. "Is the Center too weak or too strong in the Russian Federation?" in V. Sperling (ed.), *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, Boulder Company, Westview press, pp. 1-23, p. 155

create a wide range of local political regimes across Russia. With no overreaching legal framework to regulate local political development, the chief influence on local politics was elite interests. Where significant power was vested in local legislature, the degree to which elites facilitated political competition and constructed open political regimes were a function of how they thought they could control politics. The result has been a huge diversity of political regimes from local authoritarianism to a wide variety of partial and unconsolidated democratic regimes.[21]

The Russian Party System

While making new institutions under new circumstances, history always matters and Russia is not an exception of it. Seventy years of Communist party rule created a strong negative reaction within Russian society for party politics. Because Soviet society was hyper organized and "overpartyized", post-Soviet Russian leaders and citizens have held an allergic reaction to Parties.

In first wave democracies such as Britain and Sweden, elections with universal suffrage came after the development of parliamentary and civil society institutions of horizontal (that is inter-elite) accountability, including Political Parties. By contrast in Russia free elections have come first and Political Parties have had to be organized 'from scratch'.[22] Even after a decade of democratic experience Parties in Russia are not able to establish themselves as the true representatives of Russian masses.

For a stable Party system Parties should behave in a stable manner. In a floating Party system Parties behaves in an opposite manner. Here the Parties competing for popular support change from one election to the next, thus making accountability difficult, because voters can neither reaffirm nor withdraw their support from the party they voted for at the previous election.

[21]   Remington, Thomas F., n.5

[22]   Rose, Richard, Munro, Neil and White, Stephen, "Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.53, NO.3, 2001,pp.419-443

In the 1993 Duma election 13 Parties were on the list ballot; in 1995 there were 43 Parties and in 1999 were 26. The insubstantial nature of Russian Parties indicated that more than sixty Parties failed to win any list ballot seats because their votes fall below the 5% threshold. In 1995, 49.5% of the list vote went to Parties had failed to clear the 5% barrier or were cast against all or spoiled ballots. In 1999 a total of 18.7% of the vote was cast for Parties that failed to win any list seats or against all.

In successive Duma elections, Parties have been floating on and off the ballot. Of the 13 Parties that contested list seats in 1993, five disappeared in 1995 and three more by 1999 election. Of the 43 Parties contesting list seats in 1995, 35 had disappeared by the subsequent election.

Out of the eight Parties that cleared the threshold in the 1993 election, only three, the Communists, the LDPR and Yabloko, fought and cleared the barrier again in 1995 and in 1999. The one party that cleared the barrier in 1995, Our Home Is Russia, failed to do so in 1999, when it was no longer a party of power, while three Parties that did not exist at the previous election did so. A floating Party system forces many elections to become floating voters, because people cannot be loyal to a party that does not compete at successive elections.[23]

A necessary condition of accountability is that elected representatives belong to the same party in parliament as they claims to represent when seeking election these. In an established Party system the affiliation of members of parliament is the same as at the general election. But this is not the case in Russia. The party affiliation of candidates, whether in either registration as an SMD candidate or on a party list, is often different from the party affiliation that candidates take when they initially enter the Duma or during the election and their party affiliation can change yet again of the election and during the life of a Duma.

Between election day and the first meeting of the Duma on 18 January 2000 a total of 147 Duma seats, one-third of its membership,

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[23]   *ibid*

changed Parties without a single popular vote being cast. Two new Parties-People's Deputies and the Agro-Industrial Bloc-were created, and Russia's Regions, a group consisting mostly of independents in the 1995-99 Duma, was re-created. Figure 4.1 shows that how Duma is reshaped after an election. Interestingly, the movement of Duma representatives showed in Figure 4.1 should be considered the first rather than the last shift in party allegiances occurring in the Duma ending in 2004.[24]

As we talked earlier institutional development in a country depends on those who design them. Because Russia's new Constitution was made under the total influence of Yeltsin, it cannot be unaffected from his attitudes towards different state-institutions. Yeltsin's attitude towards Parties was purely negative.

On resigning his CPSU membership on the last day of the Twenty-Eight, Congress in July 1990 Yeltsin declared that he would join no party and declared himself to be above party politics. Yeltsin clearly felt more at ease working through his own 'team' free of political or social control. His claim to be President of all Russian's only strengthened the tendency towards charismatic above-party leadership in a political in the regime system in post-communist Russia. In the Presidential elections of 1996 he ran as an independent.[25] So far we talked about Yeltsin's personal attitude but this is inadequate clarification regarding implementation of his own ideas while constructing institutions. Luckily for Yeltsin the circumstances were also favourable. When Yeltsin won Presidential election in 1991(of the RSFSR), he was recognized as a symbol of change and the leader of "democratic Russia', whereas the Congress was recognized as symbol of conservative ideology who wanted to continue with the soviet system. This was also proved with their failed attempted *coup d'etat* in August 1991. Because Yeltsin's won with a huge majority vote in 1991 Presidential fight when Parliament opposed his ideas of new Constitution and a strong

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[24]   *ibid.*

[25]   Sakwa, Richard, "Russian Politics and Society", (New York; Routledge Press, 1996),pp. 91-92

Presidency, Yeltsin decided to crush the opposition. He not only dismissed Duma but also ordered military to forcefully evacuate the building from deputies. Meanwhile Yeltsin successfully projected himself as a leader of "democratic Russia". This was the reason that while referendum on the draft of new Constitution and even in 1996 Presidential election, Yeltsin won without any party affiliation. As Sakwa writes 'A communist Dominated Duma was one thing, balanced by a reformist President, but a Communist President as well would have destroyed the *de facto* political separation of powers. While willing to support the CPRF in the national parliamentary elections in December 1995, voters appeared more interested in competent professionalism and 'stability'[26]. President Yeltsin had also used state resources to win the elections and used his position to create a anti-communist coalition. Prime Minister Putin used the same strategy. He endorsed not one but two Parties in the 1999 parliamentary vote – Unity, the Union of Right Forces. On December 31, 1999, Prime Minister Putin got the chair of acting President on the day of Yeltsin's resignation. The office of the acting President endowed Putin with resources that helped him with the Presidential election in March 2000. He did not need a party affiliation to win.

Study of Electoral Behaviour: A Political Approach

From the available sources the following conclusions could be drawn about the Russian voter's behaviour.[27]

Popular demand: Fifty seven percent people said that they do not see much possibilities of change due to Duma elections, as against 34% believes that it will have some impact on the way that the country was governed. Around 70% respondents were happy that now they are more free than the Soviet period in terms of decisions whether or not to participate in politics.

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[26] Sakwa, Richard, "Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia" in John Lowenhardt, n.1 , p. 134

[27] This section is largely based on the analysis given by Richard Rose, Neil Munro and S. White published in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2001.

Another example of people's wish to participate in politics was the voter turnout in 1999 Duma election (61.7% of registered voters), only 4.0% Lower than at the 1995 Duma election.

Choice: When the post-election survey asked. Russian 'Is there any political party which has policies closer to you than others' 49% replied in the affirmative and 51% were negative. Of those who said they felt close to a party, 42% said they were strongly attached to it, 52% said to some extent and 6% were only a little attached.

Accountability: Because the supply of Parties tends to vary from one election to the next, the link between voters and Parties is a hoc rather than the result of a lengthy process of political socialism. Among those feeling there was a party close to them, 55% have a party that did not exist four years ago, and in the case of unity and the union of Right Forces the 'Parties', named did not come into existence until October 1999. An additional 15% said they identified with a party that had fought at least two Duma elections.

Similarly to the January 2000 NRB survey, it found 55% saying there was a party that expressed their views better than any other party. But when the Duma elections were held 18 months later, nine of the 14 Parties did not nominate candidates and a majority of Russians voted for Parties that did not exist when the survey was conducted.

Influence of Socioeconomic Interests: In established democracies theories about voting behaviour hypothesize that party choice reflects durable social and economic interests of the people and the society as a whole.

The multiplicity of Duma list Parties makes it important to distinguish between two types of linkage between interests and Parties. A particular party can appeal to a single interest and draw most of its support from that interest, but still not represent it. For example, although most people who vote for 'Women of Russia' are female, more than 96% of women voters do not support that party. It received only 2% of the list vote

at the 1999 Duma election. At the 1999 election it was statistically impossible for any of the Duma Parties to be the sole representative of majority interests in society, since even the largest received less than a quarter of the list vote. Therefore, a stable co-relation between a socioeconomic interest and party preferences should not be 'over-interpreted' as a deterministic cause.

Chart 4.1: Change of Deputies in the Duma

While considering economic interests of the party affiliation Communists draw more than two-third of their support from those in the low income group, while the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko draw three-fifths of their support from those in the top half of household incomes (See Table 4.1). The income distribution of Unity supporters, as well as of Fatherland / all Russia and the Zhirinovsky block, enjoys the support from all sections of the society having different economic status. An individual's evaluation of the current economic system is also associated with party preference; people who are more positive about the economic system are more likely to support the union of rights forces and those most negative to

vote communist. Future perceptions of household income also correlate with party preference. Those most optimistic about the future are most likely to support Union of Right Forces or Yabloko, and those who think their household will be worse off financially to support the Communists (see table 4.1). [28]

Table 4.1: Economic Division and Party Choice[29]

Total		% of those voting for					
		Yabloko	Unity	Zhirinovsky	Fatherland	CPRF	Right Forces
Household Income Decide							
8	1 Lower	7	6	10	4	13	4
11	2	6	11	7	14	14	5
11	3	6	13	9	16	16	9
11	4	10	9	15	8	13	7
14	5	12	17	20	14	17	12
12	6	16	15	12	7	9	10
8	7	12	8	9	11	5	9
8	8	8	9	8	9	6	14
7	9	7	7	7	3	4	13
10	10 Highest	16	5	3	14	3	17
Evaluation of Current Economic System							
59	Negative	65	59	59	57	71	47
10	Neutral	4	11	11	10	9	12
31	Positive	31	30	30	33	20	41
Future Household Economic Situation							
17	Worse	14	12	24	15	23	13
49	Same	44	50	33	49	57	44
34	Better	42	38	43	36	20	43

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[28] See Rose, Richard, Munro, Neil and White, Stephen, n. 20, pp. 419-443, also see 'Are Russian Undemocratic' Post Soviet affairs, 18(2) 2002, (Apr- Jan), pp. 91-121.

[29] Source of Table is *ibid*

Classification of Russian Party System On The Basis Of Sartori's Scheme

Party system is the context or frameworks in which that contest or competition takes places. This context is created by factors such as institutions in which decisions are made and implemented, process of decision making, electoral behaviour, leadership etc. But here one factor is missing which can be franked on the top among the determinants of party behaviour or the Party system. So far, the factors we have discussed are-relationship between institutions and Parties, favourable and non-favourable factors for Parties, historical legacies, shaping of electoral behaviour and most importantly role of Parties in the decision-making process. Now we are in a position that while dealing with intra-party relationship we can classify Russian Party system according to the Sartori's scheme.

Neil Robinson has attempted to apply the Satori's scheme on the Russian case. According to him "The Russian Party system is peculiar if not unique in the sense that it has both centripetal and centrifugal drives.[30] It can be recognized as polarized because of the ideological divisions that exists between the large numbers of Parties (as discussed in chapter 3).

Russian political system has been experiencing largely two ideological extremes - left and right. They have been demanding the change in the principle of governance and more power for parliament, which makes them anti-system Parties. Although both camps have quite similar views but despite that different attitudes are not absent which identifies them as different polls.

One pole which is left-poll, consist the largest and well organized and only mass party, based on principle of social-democracy that is CPRF. Others are Communists, working Russia – for the Soviet Union; Russian socialist party, etc. (see Table 3.2) The ideological characteristics of this whole group is there support for USSR's socio-economic system and power blended with Russian nationalism, anti-system sentiment.

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[30]   Robinson, Neil, "Classifying Russian Party System" in Lowenhardt, John, n.1, p.164

The other pole of anti-system opposition is based on nationalist-patriotic Parties including the main party within the bloc, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and the Congress of Russian Communities. The Parties of this second pole share many ideological traits with the communist successor Parties, particularly anti-Westernism, preference for "state-rather than market-economic distribution, and political authoritarianism, although some parts of this general platform are obfuscated in individual party platforms and manifestos.[31]

On many occasions parts of both poles came together; for instance the gathering Parties from both blocs, to support the CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov's Presidential election campaign, and the post election attempts to set up a new political movement, the Popular-Patriotic Union of Russia, from that campaign alliances. But that was not the end of difference over principles. The LDPR is known as, the party of a leader. 'If there is Zhirinovsky there's a party; if no Zhirinovsky there is 'no party'. The CPRF on the other hand, is a mass party with factional activity and policy debate.

To some extent and with variations over time and across Parties, each camp is free to be irresponsible in its opposition and to make extravagant claims about what it would do if electorally successful. The smaller Parties in each of the sub sets of anti-system opposition offer voters an alternative so that the larger Parties have to protest their claims of an ideologically distinct position in order to retain their core support. For the sake of improvement in its image as anti-system opposition CPRF is forced to allied with 'the younger and more aggressive, passionate nationalist' trend. But this also threatens its claim for ideiological purity and provides an opportunity to smaller Parties to claim more ideological devotion compare to CPRF. An example of this is the backlash in the RCWP against Viktor Anpilov, one of Russia's most prominent neo-Stalinist after his support for Zyuganov during the Presidential election campaign, and despite his

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[31]   *ibid*

opposition to the establishment of the CPRF – led Popular Patriotic Union of Russia.

The other side of the ideological spectrum of the Russian Party system is as fragmented as the anti-system opposition. Indeed, it is probably better to think of it as two distinct 'halves' of a pro system position (pro-system in the sense that all more or less democratic in orientation and in favour of the market as a major, if not the only, means of resource distribution).

The difference between the two halves has been a function of the extent to which Parties support, and has their origins in, the government of the day. The composition of the two 'halves' has varied over time. In the 1993 State Duma campaign one 'half' comprised Russia's choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES); the other 'half' was Yabloko and some of the other democratic opposition Parties including the Democratic Party of Russia and the Democratic Reform movement.

In 1995, one half was the Our Home is Russia (NDR) and the Ivan Republic electoral bloc, while the other half comprised Yabloko, the renamed Russia's Democratic Choice and some of the other democratic opposition Parties such as *Vpered Rossiya'* (Forward, Russia). [32]

Usually in the pluralist Party systems Political Parties face the problem of transfer of vote from 'centre' to 'extreme'. This can be understood as a dilemma of the 'centre' Parties. In such cases if Parties do not change themselves as per the 'transformation' of the system then they have a challenge from the 'Parties of power' and if they do then the 'extreme Parties' are ready to claim of ideological purity in compare to the centre party. As a consequence, in both cases their electoral potentiality reduces.

While studying the centripetal and centrifugal drives, it is unfortunate to know that there is no strong ideological pole exists in Russian Party system. This less-ideological tendency also weakens the centripetal tendency. Whatever degree of cooperation with 'centre' is available that is

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[32]   *ibid.* p.166

simply because of the 'forced – cooperation' steaming from the need to occupy the space created by the absence of a real political centre and by the uneven distribution of powers between the legislature and the executive... In 1993-Duma a strong ideological centre did not exist therefore tendency of cooperation emerged. Though this could not remain continues tendency. In 1995 the scenario was changed when CPRF emerged as a party, which can turn a legislature bill having 157 Duma seats. But CPRF cannot challenge the executive on more important questions and therefore still remains far from being a centre party. In the 1999 State Duma, Unity and Fatherland have a bigger Deputy favour and they are known as 'party of power', and this is best used by Putin to get his reform agenda approved from the parliament.[33] The power of CPRF is also restricted by the Federation Council which consists regional leaders without any party affiliation. In Duma 114 deputies are independent which also limits the CPRF's ability to be the centre-party.

There has thus been no translation of the CPRF's electoral success into decisive anti-system legislation. Worse, at least as far as the CPRF's credentials as an anti-systematic party are concerned, the party has been trapped by the need to compromise on the two most important issues of Duma business in 1996; the confirmation of the prime minister after the Presidential elections; and the passage of the 1997 state budget. Similarly, the problem of quick change of Parties by deputies is the cause which weakens the CPRF. After the 1999 election 18 Deputies of CPRF changed party.[34]

On the basis of these reasons Neil Robinson is not more optimistic about development of any stable Party system in Russia. As he says "..nor is it possible to infer from the behaviour of Russian Parties or leaders that Russia is moving towards a particular type of Party system. The peculiarities

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[33] Smyth, Regina, "Building State Capacity from the Inside out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia", *Politics and Society*, Vol.30, No.4, December 2002,pp.555-78.

[34] Rose, Richard, Munro Neil and White, Stephen , n. 20, p. 426

of the ideological space that Russian Parties create and inhabit, contradictory centrifugal and centripetal driven, and the fact that elites are not under any great pressure to organise Parties to ensure that they have access to political decision-making, have worked to prevent the simplification of party competition and have left party development unconstrained."[35]

But on the other side McFaul seems quite positive about the development of party-system in Russia. He accuses PR-list system that has constrained the development of the two-Party system in Russia and promoted multi-Party system. If national coalitions, emerging from below by linking regional Parties together, do not occur quickly, the end result of liquidating proportional representation could still be the emergence of a two Party system – the right of center Unity (with fatherland now in alliance) and the left of centre Communist party. But McFaul seems to be over optimistic about the stability of Party system. As Robinson says that it is not that the Parties are working for a stability of stable system (or Party system) but actually it is forced cooperation because of their weak position in the process of decision-making. Although Parties get enough electoral support but even then they don't have the power to modify the system.[36]

More facts are given by Rose, White and Munro. They asserts that in Russia the capacity of Parties to hold government accountable is problematic, for it is an extreme example of 'democratization backwards'.[37] If we look at the opinion polls organized in the last few years, it shows that how Russian voter is upset because of behave and attitude of Political Parties. This attitude does not allow Parties to be fitted in the ideal classification of Political Parties and therefore the Russian system is also recognized as "Party system without Parties."[38]

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[35] Robinson, Neil, "Classifying Russian Party System" in Lowenhardt, John, n.25,p.164

[36] Robinson, Neil, "The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy" in *Political Studies Review*, 2003, Vol.1, 149-166

[37] Rose, Richard, Munro Neil and White, Stephen , n. 20, p. 426

[38] Stephen White, Mathew Wyman and Olga Kryshtanovskaya; "Parties and Politics in Post Communist Russia," in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (1995), pp. 183-202 (P. 198).

CHAPTER – V

CONCLUSION

We began our study with a perspective comment on Russian peculiarities, which talked about the difficult implementation of western type liberal democracy in Russia. After going through the study of newly under-developing system in Russian Federation with Western type liberal democracy, these peculiarities seem to be continued. The manner in which Political Parties have functioned in Russia so far, it is a difficult task to make any substantial conclusive remark about Russian Party system and Political Parties. What are required for a stable Party system are well organized, transparent political Parties so that people can input their different interests in the system in a democratic manner, and government can take decisions on the outputs which are a reflection of public demands. Presently in Russia we have only one such Party that is Communist Party of Russian Federation. Other Parties exist but having neither any structural base at the national level, nor having any defined ideological affiliation. They usually emerge for a short period of time or their existence depends upon their charismatic leadership. In other words we have a system defined as a 'Party system without Parties'.

But on the basis of present situation it would not be wise to place Russian system in the category of one-Party or dominant Party system because other Parties have some role to play and the biggest Party has fewer roles to play as compared to its electoral success. While studying role of Parties in institutions or in decision-making process we find that so far Parties have not been able to emerge as a decisive factor in decision-making. This is because of the two reasons.

One reason lies in the newly established institutional structure, which gives the President the supreme authority in the field of law making or policy-making. Actually what has happened during last ten years was under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, a person who was not ready to cooperate with the Political Parties at all. In Russia this created a hostile environment for the development of Political Parties. The base of the new Constitution was the beginning of an undemocratic culture. Yeltsin failed to prove himself as a role model for the next generation as a committed leader for liberal democracy as

we had in U.S. or in Indian case. Yeltsin could have utilized his Presidency for initiating a democratic culture based on consensus, consultation and open-debate. The legacies of Communist rule, which were undemocratic, had to be overcome. A collective consequence of all this has led to the development of a culture which is, if not undemocratic, then at least not healthy for the democratic values.

This has been proved by different surveys organized by different organizations. The Political Parties have not been able to articulate people's interests in a suitable manner. For instance the way privatization of Russian economy was undertaken, it was not only undemocratic but also proved unhelpful in improving the economic condition of Russia.

Second reason is the inability of the Parties to prove themselves as the best representatives of the Russian people's interests. They are still unable to provide a more democratic alternative to the Russian voters and this made them equally responsible for the emerging weak democratic culture in the country. In the regions of Russian Federation, Parties have not been able to influence voter's choice to a larger extent. Regional bureaucracy also has important role to play with the Parties. Similarly Party candidates are succeeded only in the Party list part and not in the single member plurality system based electoral districts. People are still attached with individual personalities rather than Party affiliation. Russian voter does not seem to support Party agendas. In fact, a large numbers of voters decide their choice of candidate only before a few hours or just before voting. No cooperation seems to emerge among Parties even on the most important issues of national interest.

Another phenomenon, which has been hindering the possibility of cooperation among Parties, is the phenomenon of 'Party of power'. Both Presidents since 1991 onwards avoided any Party affiliation and they have used Parties to get sufficient support in legislature for approval of his\her (President's) proposed legislation. For this support the President often tends to misuse his position and privileges by offering Parties perks and gains. Those who favor President are recognized as 'Parties of power'. But during Yeltsin's

period the 'Parties of power' were used in an undemocratic manner whereas President Putin is using his-favourable Party 'Unity' and 'Father land-All Russia' more positively to get sufficient support for his reform agenda. But he has not ignored the existence of other Political Parties and making efforts to reach on consensus on important issues. But again all this depends upon the wish of the President and not on the Parties.

Therefore except defining Russian Party system as a multi Party and still an evolving one, it is difficult to place it in any specific category of multi Party system as suggested by Sartori.

But does this slow movement of development of political Parties and Party system lead us towards a negative conclusion of Russian democracy? Actually it is too early to say anything about it because of certain reasons. On certain issues Political Parties have been able to influence the law making or they have at least mobilized public opinion in favour of their agendas. The best example of it was the change in the directions of Yeltsin's foreign policy, when the pro-west tilt was given up in favour of a balanced approach. This pressure was felt when the nationalist Party – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia achieved high success in the first Duma elections in 1993. Duma also has passed many significant bills after ending confrontation with the President Yeltsin. To some extent it is also true that for a stable-democratic Russia a strong executive or a strong President was necessary. In the absence of a democratic culture, freedom granted to Political Parties could have resulted in an instable democracy.

However, Russians have shown their spirit of continuing with the new model of democracy and Russia is moving towards a stable political system. A successful completion of three Duma elections and three Presidential elections is accepted as largely free and fair democratic exercise. Similarly, it is quite unfair to expect a radical development of new culture and values. Especially the liberal democratic values takes long time to take roots in any society. Russian people and leaders are unfamiliar with the new system therefore they have to learn how to establish values which respects not only one's own rights

but also takes care of the other's rights, which is required for the better development of liberal democracy. To make a competitive environment of ideas they need to develop a politically open society in which differing political ideas will be respected by the ruling Party or leader. Only this will lead to a transparent, open and democratic culture for the development of Political Parties and Party system in Russia.

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