


**PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING
DURING THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME OF
BENAZIR BHUTTO AND NAWAZ SHARIF**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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*Dedicated
To
My
Mother*

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Preface xi – xiii

Chapter I –

Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Theoretical Perspective 2 – 25

Chapter II –

Pakistan's Foreign Policy Making: A Brief History from
Independence Till 1988 26 – 65

Chapter III –

The Era of Turbulence: Benazir Bhutto as a Decision Maker 66 – 90

Chapter IV –

Nuclear Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif and Foreign Policy Making 91– 120

Chapter V –

Theory and Practise: An Evaluation 121 – 130

Bibliography 131 – 140

FIGURES

1. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry Decision Making Structure 1
2. Kegley's Model of Foreign Policy Decision Making 13
3. Kegley's Model Reinterpreted on the Basis of the Foreign Policy Decision Making Mechanism present in some Developing Nations 14

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*Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee
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PREFACE

It is extremely paradoxical that though there have been numerous writings on Pakistan and the foreign policy that it had taken, but writings on the elements that are responsible for the formulation of foreign policy decisions are rare. It can be deduced that due to the complexity, ambiguity and changing structure of the decision making mechanism in Pakistan, there has been less study in this area.

Pakistan is a nation that from its very genesis is suffering from an extreme fear psychosis from India, her Eastern neighbour, and has made policies that can check and balance the power equation of the region. But due to the political instability that has been inherent in the political structure of Pakistan, it has not been possible to retain a stable decision making regime in the nation.

The concept of foreign policy decision making, as a theory, is a Western concept, adapted by theorists after the world witnessed the Cuban crisis. From then on, the study of international relations and diplomacy has been gifted with numerous theorists who have moulded and remoulded the decision making system. But with the end of the Second World War, multiple nations took birth out of the end of the colonial regimes giving birth to nations having immature political leaders and unstable governmental structures. They remained in the periphery as world politics till the end of the eighties was ruled by bi-polar politics during the era of the Cold War. But with the disintegration of Soviet Russia, and the initiation of the post-Cold War decade of the nineties, developing nations started experiencing a process of democratisation, which brought in a significant change in the decision making structure of these nations.

Pakistan had a tumultuous political history. In the region of South Asia, it was the only nation having long periods of military rule. The armed forces gained political status as they got numerous opportunities to govern the nation overtly or covertly. They were

also able to create an all encompassing intelligence structure that slowly became an independent decision making element.

The era of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif gains special significance as with the changing world order, Pakistan too after a decade long military rule, from 1979 till 1988, got back on the path of democracy having representative democrats leading the nation.

They wanted to place themselves in the highest hierarchical position in the Pakistani governmental structure, turning themselves as the only legitimate decision maker. But they soon realized with their untimely dismissals, about the real players in Pakistani governmental politics, where they themselves turned into mere pawns in the political game of Pakistan.

The study has taken four theories, three associated from the decision making theoretical framework and the other that has based their theory on the relationship of man and environment while formulating decisions.

In the first chapter there has been an attempt to discuss the theories of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Charles W. Kegley Jr., Mintz and Geva and Margaret and Harold Sprout. An attempt has been made to check the applicability of these theories to understand foreign policy formulations and the actors behind such formulations in these developing societies. Attempts have been made to look at these theories from a new perspective to understand the rickety governmental framework of these developing nations. In the context of Pakistan, the main structural elements of foreign policy decision making has also been briefly studied.

In the second chapter, Pakistan's forty years of foreign policy making has been discussed keeping close observation on the structure of the intelligence, and the elements that were responsible for such decisions to be formulated. The foreign policy making of Pakistan has been divided into two phases; the first phase that started from independence till the separation of East Pakistan, and; the second phase that started from the emergence of Bangladesh till the death of Zia-ul-Haq.

The third and fourth chapters have dealt with two decision makers during the democratic regime after Zia. Their relationship with the other decision makers that worked along with the elected leadership as independent decision makers, their charisma, farsightedness, statesmanship, and many more qualities that are normally required for a good decision maker have been tested.

The last chapter has tried to bring theory and practice together, and as the title suggests, has made an attempt to find a model which might suit the foreign policy decision making structure of Pakistan.

There are numerous mistakes in the study that has possibly missed the human eye. I personally apologise for such avoidable or unavoidable mistakes. The opinion expressed in the study is entirely mine and if any one way it helps to understand the intricate and complex foreign policy decision making structure of Pakistan, the endeavour for going ahead with such study will be achieved.

THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTRY DECISION MAKING STRUCTURE

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVISED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (PSP & Ex-cadre)




Table 1: This Organisation Chart is available on the Pakistan Foreign Ministry Web Page, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 2002 – 2004, see www.pakistan.gov.pk/foreignaffairs-ministry/aboutdivision/org-chart.jsp

I – FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING:

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy making reflects multiple facets of the human brain as well as of the society, the nation and the world. It involves the process of taking decisions and their implementation, after numerous deliberations, balance of judgements, and assessment of the then situation inside as well as outside the nation. As Northedge says, “the framing of foreign policy is a necessary part of the modern state. It arises from the circumstances, firstly, that the state is ... not an immured island but a member of a society of states, participation in which is inescapable, and, secondly, that in this society political power is not centralised but distributed among the states in unequal measure. While foreign policy resembles any other state activity, like maintaining educational or medical services or upholding law and order, it differs from these examples in that the state has, if any, only every imperfect control over the world society in which it lives.”¹

Domestic policy is the state’s own exercise of power in the territory controlled by it; foreign policy is the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law making power in a manner desired by the state concerned.

Decision making has been one of the most important as well as difficult task for the government. Especially, in a world that is grouped into various power arrangements, maintaining balance in accordance with that power ratio needs proper farsightedness, statesmanship and a practical mindset of the decision makers. For that reason deciding what course will the foreign policy structure of a nation will

¹ F.S. Northedge “The Nature of Foreign Policy”, in F.S. Northedge, ed., *The Foreign Policies of Power*, (New York: Frederick A Praeger Inc, 1968), p. 9.

take, weighing what decision will be beneficial for the nation, is not only a difficult task, but requires mature, analytical and intelligent decision makers. It has been argued that “foreign policy... remains effective and useful if it mirrors the national interest correctly within the range of its own power and capacity with an eye on external environment and the international politic. Foreign policy conducted on whims, fancies and emotions based on ultra-national sentiments would not succeed: rather, it would backfire.”² For that reason, the principal task of a decision maker is to remain impartial and unemotional to a given situation so that he is able to formulate and implement proper decisions. Marcel Proust observed that “The life of nations merely repeats, on a larger scale, the lives of their component cells; and he who is incapable of understanding the mystery, the reactions, the laws that determine the movements of the individual, can never hope to say anything worth listening to about the struggles of nations”.³

From times immemorial the necessity of stressing on proper decision making while creating as well as implementing foreign policy has been felt. It started from the writings of the Greek historian Thucydides, in his *The Peloponnesian War*, where he examined the factors that led the leaders of the city-states to decide the issues of war and peace, as well as alliance and empire with as great precision as they did under the circumstances confronting them. He also analysed the causes of the decisions taken by leaders which was some times based on the deeper psychological forces of fear, honour and interest that in varying combinations motivated them as individuals and set the prevailing tone of their particular societies.⁴

But as a concept foreign policy decision making has found shape only during the sixties of the twentieth century. The theories on foreign policy decision making have been formulated and reformulated from then on, but invariably the procreators

² Bishwa Pradhan, *Behaviour of Nepalese Foreign Policy*, (Kathmandu: Malla Press Private Ltd, 1996), p. 3.

³ Charles W. Kegley Jr., “Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”, in Charles F Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin Publications, 1987), p. 248.

⁴ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraft Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, Second Edition, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1989), p. 469.

or regenerators have been under the sole tutelage of the Western theorists. Thus, the machinery of foreign policy making that was explained could not assess rightly the decision making body that existed in the newly made developing nations, who rather than promoting prestige and influence were more interested in the protection and sanctity of their sovereignty and their geographical existence. These nations influenced by their immediate neighbourhood as well as by global politics. Even those policies that were taken that had international significance were taken keeping an eye on their regional surroundings. Even the amount of influence that their domestic environment made was more vibrant and dynamic than that of the developed western nations. For that reason, the analyses will study four theorists who have made significant contributions to the process of theorising foreign policy decision making, their own interpretations, and their shortfalls if any that fails to explain the foreign policy decision making structure of developing or the so called third world nations.

THEORIES OF SNYDER, BRUCK AND SAPIN:

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin can be termed to be the ones who introduced the concept of decision making in foreign policy formulation of nations. Though the world that acted as the stage for the formulation of their theory has widely changed but the pattern with which decisions are being made by the developed nations has not changed to that degree. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin have dealt with the *organizational system in action* or the concept of organizational decision making. They have defined “decision making” as a “process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision maker”.⁵ According to them, decision making is a sequence of activities and this particular sequence is an event which is an action performed by many actors and corresponds to the definition of the situation. They argued that, “this event, which is the outcome of this decision, can be considered as a

⁵ Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*, (Boston: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) p. 90.

unified whole, or that can be separated into its constituent elements, which they have suggested as (a) predecisional activities; (b) choice; and (c) implementation".⁶ They have recognised that choices are made during the entire process of decision making till the final stage of decision making is not reached, which then gets the stamp of being the official decision. They have also clubbed the limited space in which the decision makers work during the selection and chalking out of proper decisions. The factors they have cited are: the individual decision makers' past experience and values; the amount of available and utilized information; situational elements; the characteristics of the organizational system and the known available resources.⁷ They have made a clear methodological assumption that only those who are government officials are to be viewed as decision makers or actors. They have pointed out that state actors themselves purged up in governmental positions have the power and authority to come about with and implement decisions which private citizens lack the authority of doing so. But as they took into notice about strong and stable democratic governmental structures, they fell short to study the decision making systems of those nations having irresponsible, undemocratic, unstable and rash governmental decision makers who are unable to come up with feasible, viable and durable foreign policy decisions. The trio has divided the limitations that the decision makers face into external and internal limitations.

While explaining the external limitation they have mentioned about two major restrictions that the decision makers face while formulating a decision. First, when actions are taken, there is little room for manoeuvrability for decision makers, as the external environment has been preset to take decisions following some agreeable standards and needs less qualitative appraisal; and, the second situation is such a condition, where decisions are being formulated on the basis of the judgemental ability and ability on the part of the individual decision maker, and depends on the quality of the judgement taken.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. p. 92.

While explaining the internal restrictions that the decision makers normally face, they have mentioned about five limitations. The first one is of information that the decision maker collects to analyse the situation in which the decision will be formulated and taken. The information on which the decision makers' banks on are almost never fully received and is rarely testable. On top of that decisions might have to be taken on the basis of the decision makers perceptions due to the lack of information. Secondly, they have talked about the failures that decision makers face in communication. It might be possible that information is already at hand but due to misinterpretation of the problem, the decision maker fails to get the information at the right and correct time. Thirdly, they have spoken about preset precedents that decision makers normally tend to follow, as reversal of policies, though, might have been a wise decision at some point but that is an extremely difficult and expensive proposition if taken recourse to by a governmental body. Fourthly, decisions are normally taken by decision makers on the course of how they see and perceive the situation to be. For that reason the entire process of decision making zeroes down to the perceptions of the decision makers. Lastly, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, have pointed out how scarce resources can restrain the making of decisions into specific and narrowed specifications. These resources can be varied in nature. They can be time, energy, skills, or some times, money.

Action taken by the decision makers takes many forms – “a declaration, a formal agreement, regulation of relationships, discussion, a gift or loan, armed conflict and so on. Reactions take the same forms only they are viewed as responses. Since all these actions taken are more planned than random in nature, the interaction that is made gives birth to a pattern that can be called as repetitive actions that can be easily recognised as reactions. Aims become persistent. The kind of action taken becomes typical, and the reaction with it becomes uniform and the relationship regularised”.⁸ It is on the competence of the decision maker that will make him able enough to formulate positive and farsighted decisions within all these limitations. Competence according to the trio is ‘the totality of those of the activities of the

⁸ Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, “The Decision Making Approach to the Study of International Politics”, in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1969) p. 200.

decision-maker relevant and necessary to the achievement of the organised objective'.⁹ The competence of the actor depends on two features. One is the *description of the job itself*, and the other is the *relationships of the actor to the other actors in the system*. The power of taking and implementing decisions are bound by these two features. According to them, the bureaucracy also plays a significant role in the formulation and implementation of decisions, whichever aspect that might be in the governmental process. They feel "the unquestioned acceptance of the organisation's rules may be very desirable from the point of view of maintenance of the organisation's stability or its defence against external attack. On the other hand, bureaucratisation may be totally dysfunctional if it impairs the organisation's ability to adapt to new or changing circumstances".¹⁰ Here they have mentioned about a very important aspect of the relationship between the superior and the subordinates in the decision making hierarchy. The trio have surmised that the authoritative machinery in a governmental structure is monolithic in nature and did not analyse the feature when the authoritative structure is dispersed amongst the governmental structure with various heads. In the developing nations especially, it becomes very difficult to have a single monolithic authoritative structure and true leadership seldom emanates from a single source.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin analysed the role of motivation amongst decision makers. "It is impossible to probe the *why* of state behaviour without also doing something about the motivation of decision makers".¹¹ In developing nations, the mechanism that is involved with the decision making process, maintains its own unique characteristics unlike that of the developed nations. If the analysis that the trio have given is checked, then the basic point of their theory that can be contended is the power sharing system that is present in the developing nations. The trio's basic presumption that decisions emanate from superior governmental bodies can be refuted, if the pattern with which some of the developing nations function is analysed. When Snyder, Bruck and Sapin mentioned about superior governmental bodies, they were more interested about the principal decision makers that they

⁹ Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, n. 4, p. 106

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 112.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 137.

perceived and during the sixties when the theory was perceived, it was a single individual, or a group of individuals, who had the authority to decide on a certain decision, and they all resided in a single platform of governmental decision making and viewed the world through the same prism. The governmental structure in those nations, are sometimes totally made subordinate to some other decision making elements that is present in the nation concerned. If the case of Pakistan is taken, then it will be seen that the elected government had seldom acquired ultimate powers in their hands to judge and analyse the situation and take decisions at their own liberty and freedom. Z.A. Bhutto though got hold of the power that was necessary to take over the reigns of the governmental structure in his own hands, but the time the other decision making elements felt threatened by the manner in which power was being curbed from their hands they found means and ways, to remove Bhutto from that position. Their decisions were rather judged and legitimised by the other elements like the defence forces of the nation and even the religious heads that sanctified the decision with their approval. It was rather necessary for the elected leaders to inform before hand the possible decisions that will be taken. It also rested in the hands of those elements rather than the governmental machinery for the decisions proper implementation. For numerous times, the government had to buckle due to the pressure created by the various elements present in the nation and had to fall with the same pace that the other elements wanted the government to walk on.

The principal role that one element plays in the decision making process in these types of nations is that of the defence forces. They sometimes play their part from behind the curtain or they some times become the principal actors in the governmental process. In Israel, the defence forces play their part at tandem with the elected leaders. But mostly what is seen that after serving the nation actively, retired military leaders switch over to the political arena and become active political leaders. So in the initial stages they play their role as a subordinate decision making mechanism and then they slowly play an active role in the political machinery.

The trio's analysis was made when the world was entirely bi-polar in nature. This bi-polarity created a dogma on the decision makers which made their decisions

competitive and more of a tit for tat nature. The decision makers tended to rely more on the reaction and perception of another state (or bloc). Thus, the entire process of analysing the process of foreign policy making was more outward than introspective. This made decisions more extrapolative than analytical. The trio gave stress more on such mechanisms than analyse the true nature of the decision makers or their decision that was taken. For that reason, while the analysis of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, still retains its importance, but while explaining the foreign policy decision making of developing nations, it failed to explain the role of the internal political frictions amongst the decision makers themselves that makes a significant impact on the decisions formulated. Even the importance of the immediate neighbourhood for developing nations, which creates significant pressure points on the decision makers, has not been taken into consideration clearly. As for the case of the nation of Israel, their entire foreign policy process is over-shadowed by the Middle East crisis and especially the issue of Palestine. For Pakistan, Afghanistan and India remain as core elements that threaten its very existence, which naturally gets reflected in their foreign policy decision making.

The developing nations, to maintain their identity as a nation and a nationality has forged alliances, switched to different blocs or remained non-aligned. Pakistan joining the SEATO and CENTO as well as going for being a nuclear weapon state without having indigenous resources proves the above mentioned point. The trio has not ventured into these avenues of analysis.

CHARLES W. KEGLEY'S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING MODEL:

Charles W Kegley has written extensively on foreign policy decision making. According to him, national and international circumstances do not make decisions and forge foreign policy; decision makers alone do this. How decision makers perceive the positive and negative incentives of foreign policy options determines the ultimate course of action. In theorising about the sources of foreign policy behaviour, the analyses must begin with individuals, because only persons think,

prefer and act.¹² Charles F Hermann and Margaret G Hermann while presenting a paper at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in the year 1984 said that “all factors that influence what foreign policy organisations actually do must somehow be filtered or translated into the psychological environment through ... the attitudinal prisms of decision makers”.¹³

To explain the elements that formulate major decisions of a nation Marvin Harris had said that “people have a rule for everything they do”.¹⁴ Taking aid of “decision regimes”, Kegley justified the necessity of decision regimes by saying that “collectivities, like individuals, almost invariably establish rules and procedures in order to plan, coordinate and reach decisions for at least some issues”¹⁵. Decision regimes, thus, are like operational codes that are composed of cognitive beliefs emerging from a relentlessly political process. Decision regime takes its birth when knowingly or unknowingly, decision makers tend to follow a set pattern or path through a time period. Kegley also argued that “when struggles are resolved and consensus among a state’s leadership about the norms that should govern the formation of policy is achieved, then the existence of a decision regime in that specified area may be discerned. In general, it may be hypothesised that the more intense the level of debate about the principles advocated to shape a policy sector, and the greater the number of actors and channels of access available for the exercise of influence over the direction of policy within it, the less likely will be the prospects for a decision regime to form, although these same factors, may increase the intensity of the policy maker’s desires to establish a regime particularly if the issue is recurrent. When they do emerge, decision regimes in foreign policy making may be assumed to be arrived at and continually modified through a gradual accommodation of divergent opinions and to be under constant pressure to adapt themselves to evolving new circumstances”.¹⁶ The foreign policy decision regimes bifurcate their work load into two groups, “the substantive decision making regimes” and “the

¹² Charles W Kegley Jr, n. 3, p. 249.

¹³ Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann, “Combining external and domestic factors in theories of foreign policy: the synthetic role decision making models”, Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (Washington DC, 1984), p. 2.

¹⁴ Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism*, (New York: Random House Publication, 1979) p. 275.

¹⁵ Charles W. Kegley Jr., n. 3, p. 251.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 257.

procedural decision making regimes". The substantive decision making regime normally are the chief decision makers that includes the behaviour and attitude of the governing leaders, which moulds and remoulds previous and present foreign policy decisions according to their perception and understanding. Their nature can be understood by the "distributionary pattern of its overall diplomatic activity. When the positions taken on global issues are governed by repetition and regularity, a decision regime may be said to have formed".¹⁷ The procedural decision making regime analyses the decisions taken by the substantive decision making regime through the established rules and patterns that has been laid out and they influence the substantive decision making regime 'because rules for making decisions often shape the kinds of policy decisions that are reached'.¹⁸ Kegley explains the relationship these two decision making regimes share staying within a single political setup.

The main impediment of Kegley's explanation of foreign policy decision making is noticeable when it comes to explain the foreign policy decision making of developing nations, where the democracy is still lying in a nascent stage. Normally, those elements that have a principal role in the decision making machinery plays a docile role in these nations. Multiple factors take the place of the common decision making mechanism putting the real decision makers in a veil. The foreign policy decision making mechanism in these nations is made from elements that normally play subordinate roles in developed nations.

Kegley while explaining his model of decision making had mentioned about two structures that act as the main decision making mechanisms, the 'inputs' for the decision makers. They are the 'national attributes' as well as the 'global attributes'. That might be the case scenario for a developed nation, but for a developing nation, who is going through the process of nation building, the national as well as the global attributes are perceived after looking through the prismatic effect of a region. Even the national attributes are perceived on the basis of the


¹⁷ Ibid. p. 258.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 261.


regional attributes. For example, if the cases of Nepal or Bhutan are taken, their foreign policy decision making are more dependent on the policies of India, Pakistan, China or the immediate neighbours or the region and less dependent on global politics. Nepal and Bhutan are more or less fully dependent on India on the economic front. On the strategic front, the region has three nations armed with nuclear weapons. The conflict that brews between India and Pakistan makes the entire South Asian region extremely unstable. Even if they make some moves that have international significance that too can be viewed to be as balancing acts to secure their position to have a better bargaining position in the region. Even in the domestic politics of Nepal, India is taken to be one of the basic hinges on which the entire nation's politics revolves on. Kegley has also not mentioned about the key elements that constitute the national attributes and has basically depended more on the decision regimes. In the developing nations there is the presence of decision regimes which might not be essentially the democratically elected heads of the state.

In the re-interpreted model, what has been introduced is the regional prism that Kegley did not take into his analysis. The regional attributes that play a considerable role as an attribute of creating the 'inputs' of foreign policy decision making. It sometimes plays a more significant role than the role played by the global attributes in a nation's foreign policy decision making. The re-interpreted model has also seen the national attributes from a new view point, where an attempt has been made to have a cursory glance into the elements of the national attributes that makes a significant impact on the decision makers. The rest of Kegley's model has been kept intact, the manner in which he has seen the foreign policy decision making mechanism. Kegley's analysis of the decision making regime if moulded into the decision making framework of developing nations has to be understood in accordance with the existing decision making structure that is present in the given state. Even the manner in which he explained the decision making machinery through the procedural and substantive decision making regimes has to be matched with the decision making elements that is present in the nation concerned.

Kegley's Model of Foreign Policy Decision Making¹⁹



¹⁹ Ibid, p. 265.



Kegley's Model Reinterpreted on the Basis of the Foreign Policy Decision Making Mechanism present in some Developing Nations (The Reinterpreted portions as introduced by this study has been marked in red and underlined)

THE POLIHEURISTIC THEORY:

The poliheuristic decision making theory highlights the cognitive mechanisms that mediate foreign policy choices and behaviour. The theory incorporates the conditions surrounding foreign policy decisions as well as the

cognitive processes themselves (i.e. the why and how of decision making), thus addressing both the contents and the processes of decisions.

The 'poli' part of the name that has been given by the theorists implies to two key grounds of their formulation. At the core of their theory stands the assumption those political leaders, as "cognitive managers" employ "poly" (many) heuristics or a process of trial and error in a two stage decision process consisting of an initial stage of screening the available alternatives, and an analytic or lexicographic rule of choice to select the best alternatives in an attempt to minimise risks and maximise rewards. Second, political leaders measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using political units.²⁰

The poliheuristic theory holds that main processing characteristics of decision making are: (1) nonholistic, (2) dimension-based, (3) non compensatory, (4) satisficing, and (5) order-sensitive.²¹

The poliheuristic model of foreign policy making assumes that actual decision making behaviour is not rational in nature. It employs simple heuristics. Heuristics compensate for incomplete information as they provide cognitive shortcuts to intricate foreign policy matters by organising the information so as to facilitate the decision process. The first processing character of this theory employs a simplified process whereby the decision maker sequentially eliminates or adopts alternatives "by comparing them to each other, or against a standard, either across dimensions or across alternatives".²² The theory suggests that foreign policy decisions are often grounded in the rejection or adoption of alternatives on the basis of one or at most a few dimensions. Rather than relying on "holistic decision rules ... that require the evaluation and comparison of all alternatives across different dimensions, the decision maker adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require

²⁰ Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking", in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, eds., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive – Rational Debate*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 82.

²¹ Ibid. p. 84.

²² A. P. Sage, "Human Judgment and Decision Rules", in A. P. Sage, ed., *Concise Encyclopedia of Information Processing in Systems and Organizations*, (New York: Pergamon Publishers, 1990), p. 233.

detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria".²³ A decision is being made prior to the completion of all alternatives along all dimensions. The poliheuristic model employs less cognitively demanding decision procedures than expected utility theory, subjective expected utility theory, or other multi attribute utility models.²⁴

The next processing characteristic that Mintz and Geva have pointed out is the nature of the decisions that are dimension based. In this model, if an alternative does not meet a certain threshold of the most important dimension, then it will be discarded. In this model the expected gain in a critical dimension should be higher than a certain threshold level. If the expected gain along a critical dimension is below the threshold value, then the alternative is eliminated. A dimension can be conceived as an organising theme for related information and variables.²⁵ If the decision maker is concerned with the political implications of a decision, then public opinion polls, the leader's popularity, the state of the economy, domestic opposition, and other variables related to this general organising theme may be used to evaluate the consequence of a chosen alternative.

The next factor that acts as a principal characteristic of the decision making process suggests that foreign policy decisions are typically based on a non compensatory strategy: If a certain alternative is unacceptable in a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptable politically), then a high score in another dimension (e.g. the military balance of forces) cannot compensate for or counteract it, and hence the alternative is eliminated. Alternatives are eliminated if a score on a critical dimension is below a cut off. The model enables the decision maker to reject or accept an alternative on the basis of one or a few dimensions rather than to evaluate an alternative along all other dimensions.

²³ Alex Mintz, "The Decision to attack Iraq: A Non compensatory Theory of Decision Making", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 37, 1993, p. 599.

²⁴ Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, n. 19, p. 85.

²⁵ T. Ostrom, J.H. Lingle, J.B. Pryor and N. Geva, "Cognitive Organisation of Person Impressions", in T.M. Ostrom, ed., *Person Memory*, (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1980), pp. 55-80.

The following factor is the “satisficing” decision making principle that the duo formulated. Since the theory employs some form of elimination by dimensions, it can be classified as “satisficing” and not optimising. The model is concerned with finding “acceptable” rather than maximising alternatives because it allows the possibility that not all dimensions will be considered before a decision is made. The alternative chosen must satisfy the decision maker and that is where the theorists have coined the word “satisficing”. The strategy consists of comparing alternatives to predetermined values along a selected set of dimensions instead of evaluating each alternative on each dimension and comparing the sum expected utilities of all alternatives. In the actual world, “values, alternatives, probabilities, and outcomes are not as clear as it is required for ideal decision making. The need to make many choices in a short period of time, the complexity of interactions that determines outcomes, and the uncertainty surrounding probabilities, all compel human beings to make their choices by bounded rationality: a simplified model of the decision environment”.²⁶

According to Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, the application of the poliheuristic theory has a large compatibility and has the adaptability to change according to the environmental demands and to their own personal cognitive make ups. The basic strategy that the theorists applied while formulating the poliheuristic theory is not to identify the actors that are involved in the decision making procedure but the method that the decision makers apply while formulating decisions. For that reason the applicability of the theory can be deduced at a very basic level as experimental evidence can provide some indication as to whether a theory “makes sense” and points to where additional theoretical and empirical work will be most fruitful. For that reason the poliheuristic theory can be used to understand the mindset of the decision makers in developing nations if the decision maker can be recognised.

²⁶ P. Suedfeld and P.E. Tetlock, “Psychological Advice about Political Decision Making: Heuristics, Biases and Cognitive Defects”, in P. Suedfeld and P.E. Tetlock, eds., *Psychology and Social Policy*, (New York: Hemisphere Publication, 1992), p. 67.

THE SPROUT'S MAN – MILIEU HYPOTHESIS:

One of the central themes in the works of Harold and Margaret Sprout who formulated the man – milieu hypothesis is the relationship between the environment, the perceptions of the decision making heads of state, and the resulting actions taken by those individuals.²⁷ Sprouts were more dependent on the environment and the effects on the decision makers while the formulation of decisions took place.

They mentioned about three elements that played the principle influence on the decision makers. They are: the environment in which the decisions are taken, the perception of the decision makers to that environment and the rationality and the behaviour of the decision makers to face that environment. This three will bring about the outcome as a decision from the decision maker. While explaining the concept of “environment”, they said, “Because of the tendency ... to restrict the term environment to nonhuman factors ... we have deliberately introduced the French term *milieu*. Henceforth we shall use milieu instead of environment when the reference is general: that is, to denote the whole spectrum of enviroing factors; human as well as nonhuman, intangible as well as tangible”.²⁸

So the milieu, according to the Sprouts, is the entirety of factors that surrounds a given unit. They have mentioned about the “total milieu” or “the milieu as it actually is (or as it would be known to an omniscient observer, if one existed, as of course, is not the case).”²⁹ As part of the total milieu makes an influence on the decision makers, they have narrowed down the total milieu to the “operational milieu”. They defined it by saying that “any outside observer (that is, an observer other than the individual whose achievements are being investigated)”.³⁰ The last

²⁷ Dina A. Zinnes, “Some Evidence Relevant to the Man – Milieu Hypothesis”, in James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice A. East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics*, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 209.

²⁸ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*, (New York: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 27.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 28.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 30.

facet that they have spoken about is the “psycho milieu” as they defined it as “the milieu as it is perceived and reacted to by a particular individual”.³¹

So for the Sprouts, the environment depends on the situation that is being perceived. It might have to take into consideration the “total milieu” or by taking the “operational milieu” assessing the situation might be possible. The perception of the decision maker is at par with the “psycho milieu” as the Sprouts have analysed. The third element of the Sprouts is the behaviour that has been mentioned before. This denotes a broad class of human activity, one part of which they designate as “actions”. The Sprouts have argued that “action” is a sub category of behaviour, “it is behaviour which is consciously purposeful”.³² “Decisions” are then identified as a further subclass of actions and are specifically “defined as purposeful *choice* of ends or means or both”. It is this last category, “decisions” which are of principal concern to the Sprouts.³³

The Sprouts have pointed out three contentions while explaining their hypothesis. First, they have argued that the “operational milieu” that has been mentioned above is not enough to find the cause of a decision being formulated. They have said that it is not possible to analyse decisions by having some preconceived notions about a nation’s operational milieu. As for example, always taking into account that the general character of England’s foreign policy is determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation” or “the great wars of history are the outcomes of the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of the globe”.³⁴ The Sprouts have shown their apprehension that past events can be analysed, explained or forthcoming events can be predicted “by the reference to some set of environmental factors”.³⁵

³¹ Ibid, p. 28.

³² Dina Zinnes, n. 26, p. 211.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Harold and Margaret Sprout, n. 27, p. 2 – 4.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 5, The Sprouts have mentioned about the environmental factors that influences the decision makers. They wanted to point out those influences on the decision makers that is bound by fate. By environmental factors they meant, the amount of natural as well as the amount and quality of human resource that makes a nation self-dependent. Those nations that have to rely more on the neighborhood or have to come into alliances with other nations for providing its masses with basic

Their second contention is that only through the aid of the psycho milieu of the decision makers that the proper analysis of decisions can be done. It has rightly been argued that “decision-makers act with reference to and in terms of their perceptions of the environment”.³⁶ The last contention of the Sprouts is that for doing a proper analysis of a decision or a group of decisions, the aid of the decision, the operational as well as the total environment in a balanced manner must be taken. They together might determine “the payoffs or outcomes of any given decision”.³⁷ If the above contentions are taken into consideration then it might be deduced that decisions being made are a function of the psycho milieu that decision-makers with the same perceptions react similarly. For that reason, all decision-makers who perceive that their nation is surrounded by enemies from all sides must react with similar decisions.³⁸

Unfortunately, the model that has been presented by the Sprouts can be applied to any form of decision that emanates from the decision makers. At certain points of time, they imply that domestic policy decisions are part of the operational milieu for the foreign policy decisions. The Sprouts have said that a foreign policy can be loosely defined as “an act taken by the state which is a reaction to, or involves, other states”.³⁹

The frequent crisis situations that arise in the political arena of the developing nations create a totally chaotic “total milieu” that makes the “operational milieu” similarly confused. For that reason, the psycho milieu of the leaders in such a chaotic situation tend to take rash decisions and in such situations there is normally the handing up of power from the civilian to the military leaders that normally takes place through a coup d'état or through a violent change with the aid of force. Major government crises represent “any rapidly developing situation which threatens to

necessities have to mould their foreign policy accordingly, that would be appendages on the minds of the decision makers while formulating foreign policy.

³⁶ Dina Zinnes, n. 26, p. 212.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 213.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 214.

bring the immediate downfall of the present government ...evidenced by the declaration of military law, a state of siege or the suspension or abrogation of the constitution".⁴⁰

Decision makers are susceptible to the internal as well as the external environment that influences their decision making strategies as well as their prowess of making decisions. The Sprouts were more involved in the analysis of the decision making process rather than the decision makers. For that reason there is the birth of unlimited scope to use Sprouts man-milieu hypothesis in different political as well as social arenas.

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN PAKISTAN


In every nation's foreign policy decision making, there is the presence of various structural elements in the foreign policy making mechanism. In Pakistan, similarly, there is the presence of some structural elements that play an integral role in foreign policy decision making.

Leadership: Leadership has played the most prominent role in foreign policy decision making in Pakistan. The personality, the farsightedness of the leader, his or her perception of a crisis situation, nationally, regionally or internationally, all takes its effect on the entire foreign policy decisions. The role of the leaders has been described in detail in the following sections. The role of the leaders till 1988 has been discussed in the second chapter, and the role of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif has been discussed in chapter three and four.

Political Parties: Political parties have played a very subdued role in influencing foreign policy decisions in Pakistan. In the decade of the 40s and till the death of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League, as a political party had a considerable hold on the governing structure of the nation, though it was more leader oriented and never infiltrated to the grass-root level. With the death of Liaquat, a sort

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 224.

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of anarchy came in the governing structure that ended with the military rule of Ayub Khan. The political party that has made a significant impact on the nation's domestic as well as external policies is the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967. As it came to power in 1971, after the creation of Bangladesh, it brought forth a democratised constitution. As Safdar Mahmood in his book *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development – 1947-1999*, has mentioned that PPP's foreign policy agenda was more what Bhutto's policies were and that was "bilateralism" and "personal diplomacy".⁴¹ But all through Bhutto's leadership, his charisma overshadowed the role of the political party. That will be similarly seen in the third and the fourth section where the role of the PPP under Benazir and Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) under Nawaz Sharif, where it has been discussed in detail.

Foreign Ministry: The foreign ministry in Pakistan had been similarly subdued by the leadership as has been the case of the political parties of the nation. The foreign ministry has been directly handled by the leadership assisted by the foreign secretary or headed by a foreign minister working under the direct supervision of the leadership. Though there is a proper structure of the foreign ministry that has been in place as shown in Table 1 but it has no independent role of its own and acts more on the directives issued by the changing leaderships. The ministry has been divided into regions headed by directors, who try to maintain some sort of continuity amongst the decisions taken by the leadership. But they remain dependent actors on the principle decision makers.

Constitution: Constitution acts as a guiding mechanism on which governmental structures functions and for that reason in multiple nations there are provisions in the Constitution that acts as a principle structure in the formulation of foreign policies. The Constitution has never played a significant role in the governing structure of Pakistan. The first constitution itself came into form numerous years after the nation achieved its independence. And soon after its initiation, the nation plunged into military rule till the 1970s. The constitution that was formulated by Bhutto also

⁴¹ Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947 – 1999*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 229.

remained entirely docile. As the authority of foreign policy decision making rested in the hands of Bhutto, sometimes as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), sometimes as the President and sometimes as the Prime Minister of the nation. It was also due to the fragmented structure of the decision makers that it was not possible even after the death of Bhutto for the Constitution to play any significant role to have any influence in external policy formulation.

Intelligence and the Army: The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Army has acted hands in gloves as decision makers and foreign policy formulztors. The Army is headed by the Army General and the Corps Commanders that includes the Directors of the Intelligence outfits.⁴² As they had a significant role as independent decision makers they have been studied in detail in the following sections of the study. The overbearing role has subdued the role of the domestic intelligence like the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and is dominated by the Military Intelligence (MI) and the ISI. From 1958 the Army mechanism too has played and still playing one of the main forces behind foreign policy formulation and they have mostly influenced the political leadership wherever it was required, and it was them who had the final say in matters regarding foreign policy formulation. Their role has been analysed in detail in the forthcoming section and their significant position during the time of Benazir and Nawaz has been studied in the third and fourth chapters.

Internal and External Environments: All the above mentioned theorists, starting from Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, till the Sprouts, have mentioned about the significant role of the internal and external environment in foreign as well as domestic policy formulation. In some phases internal environment moulds the external policies and in some other phases the external environment shapes the internal or domestic policies. From the very beginning of Pakistan, the state of her economy was in shambles. Due to frequent change of leaderships and reigning political instability filled in by immense corruption and nepotism, no such development oriented economic policies have been able to sink its roots deep in the Pakistani society. That

⁴² Pakistan Army Command and Structure, *PakistaniDefence.Com*, 2000, see www.pakistanidefence.com/PakArmy/CommandStructure.htm

has forced the nation to bank more on economic aid and assistance from the developed world, especially the US. The US, while providing assistance, has been able to dictate and mould Pakistani policies according to its wishes and Pakistani decision makers had to minimise their sphere of independent decision making from time to time. The volatile regional environment, too has forced Pakistan to take actions, which has made Pakistan move away from the path of self development, economically as well as socially. The nation, even today, is burdened with massive economic debt provided by various financial institutions as well as from loan providing nations. The impact of the internal and external environment during the period of study has also been discussed further in the next three chapters.

The second chapter will try to find out the principal decision makers that play an integral role in the foreign policy decision making of Pakistan. It will also have a brief study of the relations it maintained and the principal issues that vexed the nation till the period of study. The forthcoming two chapters will analyse the role of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan's foreign policy decision making, their personality traits that made considerable influence on the decisions as well as in their own political careers, the other elements of decision making that worked in tandem with the democratic leaders or played a very important role in their downfall. As both of them became Prime Ministers twice each during the ten year period, these two periods will be studied distinctly to find out the changes, if any, in their mindset or attitude to deal with the complex situations they had at hand. The major foreign policy decisions that were taken by the two leaders will also be analysed to estimate the role of the *troika* as well as the intelligence in the entire decision making process. While this will be done there will be a constant attempt to test the above mentioned theories of foreign policy decision making, their applicability as well as their failures to estimate the decision making structure of Pakistan.

In conclusion, there will be an attempt to evaluate the nature of decision making that took place during the entire democratic regime of Benazir and Nawaz and will make a comparative study between the two. It will also analyse the reasons that were responsible for the abrupt end of democratic leadership through the coup

made by General Musharraf. After studying them distinctly, all through, in the end a pattern will be searched, that might suit the foreign policy decision making structure of Pakistan and the study will analyse how relevant are the existing theoretical construct in the four theories discussed in this chapter are to the foreign policy decision making in Pakistan.

II – PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY MAKING : A BRIEF HISTORY FROM INDEPENDENCE TILL 1988

THE BASIC ELEMENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Pakistan has one of the most complex foreign policy structures in the region. Especially, the nation had one of the most tumultuous political atmospheres that impact upon the decision making structures of the nation. The country, therefore, has stated to be in search “of a viable foreign policy ever since it came into existence as a nation – state in 1947”.¹

The founding father of the nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, said that “there is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace, and develop our country according to our own lights. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations charter”.² Thus it can be surmised that the founding father, while creating a nation, certainly thought about the nature and path of foreign policy that the nation will follow.

The nation itself can be termed to have the most confused political order in the region. The power within the nation was divided into multiple power centers that made the entire decision making structure cracked from within. The death of Jinnah turned out to be fatal for the democratisation process that had started from him. After his death, the worst kind of political bickering ensued to grab the highest echelon of power in the nation. The formulation of the constitution, itself became difficult as no power structure was stable and capable enough to lay the path for the formulation of a balanced

¹ Arvind R. Deo, “Pakistan’s Unending Search For a Viable Foreign Policy”, in K.K. Nayyar, ed., *Pakistan At The Crossroads*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Company, 2003) p. 1.

² Abdul Sattar, “Foreign Policy”, in Rafi Raza, ed., *Pakistan In Perspective 1947 – 1997*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 62.

Constituent Assembly. It took more than eight years for Pakistan to come about with a draft constitution, a period within which numerous governments rose and fell.

With the initiation of the militarization of the entire region due to the Kashmir problem, it saw the beginning of tensions in the South Asian subcontinent itself amongst the nations of India and Pakistan.

The elements that can be weighed to be of principle importance for Pakistan's foreign policy making even till date can be narrowed down to five basic determinants as according to the present President General Pervez Musharraf.³

- The first basic determinant can be considered to be the security interest of the nation. This security insight gives the nation's foreign policy a regional picture due to the decision makers' threat perception of the domination of Pakistan by India. Within this threat perception can be added the dimension of Kashmir, as well as the security interests of the state, that adds to the defense capabilities of the nation. This threat has been the base of foreign policy decision making of the nation from the very genesis of the idea that is the creation of the nation of Pakistan on the "two nation theory". Kashmir has not only been an element that moulded the choices of the decision makers but has been the nerve of the basic foreign policy formulation. In the beginning, the interest of the decision makers were to amalgamate the territory of Kashmir into mainland Pakistan, but with times it has changed its form, and the stress has been more of turning the state of Kashmir into an autonomous zone under the guidance of the Pakistani government and less on its direct governance.
- The second determinant is the economic interest of the nation. Pakistan's economy was in a shambles when the nation was formed. Even after that due to the incessant political instability, there was a lack of major economic planning and development. For that reason, there was the need to come close to nations

³ General Pervez Musharraf, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan", from an address delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 23rd June 2000, see *Pakistan Horizon*, (Islamabad), vol. 53, nos. 2&3, April – July 2000, p. 49.

from whom economic assistance would be forthcoming. Especially, “the economic relations with the Gulf and the Middle East were and still remains important due to the factors of oil and gas which dictate the concerns and close relationship with that area”.⁴ Even till date, Pakistan’s basic imports are in the area of petroleum and crude petroleum. From 1999 – 2000 till 2000 – 2001, there has been an increase of 36.2% in the petroleum import sector.⁵

- The third determinant of the nation is the international concerns that have moulded the nation’s foreign policy decision making. Especially, from the times of the Cold War, the West sought to make Pakistan a base for their activities against the Soviets. After the degeneration of the Communist world, Afghanistan and terrorism kept Pakistan the apple of the eye of the international community. To appease as well as keep tab with the regional aspirations, Pakistan too had catered to the demands of the West by joining various regional as well as international organizations like the SEATO and CENTO.
- The fourth determinant is the basic ideology of the nation that acts as the base of the nation’s polity. As the nation was built to preserve its Islamic identity, for that reason, the nation has strived to develop as well as nurture policies and friendships that will promote as well as secure its basic ideology. Even when it was the case of Afghanistan, or Malaysia or Bangladesh, the tradition of Islam, headed such relations backed by economic necessities of the nations. Even in the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has been more emphatic about its stand due to the large Muslim majority in the valley. All the Pakistani decision makers have come out with their views whenever and wherever there has been any atrocities on Muslim masses in any part of the world. Pakistan believes in the concept of Pan-Islamism and has been working along with the other Muslim nations in achieving that objective amongst the world Muslim community of nations.
- The last determinant is the nation’s principles that is either laid down in the Constitution or the principles on which the nation was founded on. The Muslim world enjoys a special place in the world political arena. It might be due to the

⁴ Ibid. p. 52.

⁵ I. N. Mukherjee, “The Pakistan Economy: Challenges and Opportunities”, in K.K. Nayyar. ed., *Pakistan at the Crossroads*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Company, 2003), p. 167.

natural resources that increase its economic might or it might be due to the strategic position of these nations, which puts them in the forefront of the decision making machinery of the global powers. Whatever may be, the Muslim world has been able to play its significant role in the global political arena. Pakistan, too, for that reason has utilized this fact and has maintained extreme cordial relations with the Muslim world. Nations like Iran, Turkey and especially becoming a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference has helped to bolster the interests of the nation as well as achieve a prestige as a responsible nation. It has been able to convince the entire Muslim world that the existence of the Pakistani nation is extremely important for the interest of the *Ummah*.⁶

As General Musharraf has noted, on that same line it can be suggested that Pakistan's foreign policy making has been basically in the creation and protection of an identity that of a separate independent state from that of the nation it was created from, which is able to take independent decisions, protect its own interests and keep its own sovereign and geographical territory intact. And the issue of Jammu and Kashmir has dominated most of the period of foreign policy making. As per the stand taken by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, "Pakistan's security environment derives its origins from the circumstances in which Pakistan was created. The violence accompanying the partition leading to the emergence of the two independent states of Pakistan and India generated hostility, which continues to afflict relations between the two countries mainly because of the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The issue is the source of continuing tensions and conflict, and shaped the unstable and tense security environment in the region".⁷ Ayub Khan had himself written in his book *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (1967), that Pakistan foreign policy from the very beginning had a principle objective that it followed whole heartedly. The policy makers knew that they had to secure themselves strategically by arming the nation as well as having strong

⁶ Col. Ghulam Sarwar, "Pakistan and the Muslim World", in Mehrunnisa Ali ed. *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971 – 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.137.

⁷ Foreign Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 2002, see www.pakistan.gov.pk/foreignaffairs-division

friends to back them up during conflict situations, as they were by fate placed in a very hostile region, and they have to as well as strengthen themselves economically.⁸

THE DECISION MAKERS IN PAKISTAN

Saeed Shafqat in his book *Civil- Military Relations in Pakistan* has said that “in Pakistan, political leadership is singularly non-cohesive, non-consensual, and non-institutionalised, despite similarities of social origins, beliefs, values and, to a certain degree, style”.⁹ For that reason finding the multitude of decision makers that are normally distinctly present in stable institutionalised democratic political structures, either play no role or play a very surreptitious role in Pakistan. There has been a constant shuffling, subduing and resurfacing of political as well as non political elements in the ambit of decision makers.

On top of that the functioning of the Foreign Ministry from the very initial stages has been kept under the strict observance of the Armed Forces as well as the political leadership. They did not get the ample space to function with some sort of independence, but that can be explained as the governmental structure went through constant shuffling of leadership between different guises of democratic governance and military dictatorship, which created a very unstable political atmosphere within the nation. It also gave birth to multiple decision making units, where the President, the General of the Armed forces, the Prime Minister as well as the Inter Services Intelligence became powerful decision makers independently. The main task was to keep a proper coordination between these decision makers so that there was no internal clash in decision making. This sort of balancing act was maintained and whenever there was a clash either one party had to forsake their priorities or there was a severe change in the decision making machinery itself. It depended at that point of time the low amount of influence and power that the decision maker exercised to keep his position secure. The

⁸ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 114.

⁹ Saeed Shafqat, *Civil- Military Relations in Pakistan*, (Lahore: West View Press and Pak Book Corporation, 1997), p. 4.

stability of his decision as well as his position depended on how many of the other decision makers favoured the decision he took.

Though, all the years through, there has been an internal power schism between these decision makers which has led to relentless changes in leadership but on some important issues there has been some sort of unanimity of decisions that has led to a major continuity of foreign policy making the years through. Even till date the stand taken by Ayub or Yahya is maintained by Benazir, Nawaz or even Jamali. These issues have been that of Kashmir, the issue of strengthening relationship with Muslim nations, defense procurements to strengthen the nation which included the issue of nuclearisation, protecting the ideology of Islam, issues on economic development and the like. According to Mushahid Hussain, for any foreign policy to be successful, it has to be rooted in its domestic base which includes political stability, national consensus, sound economy, effective deterrence and, above all, quality of leadership.¹⁰

Issues on which there had been some severe clashes between the decision makers were on making cordial relations with India and United States, the manner in which the issue of East Pakistan was handled which led to its independence and the defeat of the Pakistani forces in the hands of the *Mukti Bahini* and the Indian defense forces, the manner in which the ISI played an integral role in the internal politics of Afghanistan before the Soviet occupation, during the occupation and after the occupation. The other issues that led to the downfall of power centers were more for internal political dynamics than on external policy making.

It would become easier to analyze the foreign policy decisions if that can be done in phases. During the forty years of Pakistan's foreign policy making history, till 1987, the period became dissected in two halves. One, where the decisions were made for United Pakistan, i.e. for West Pakistan and East Pakistan together, that is till the end of 1960s, and the second phase where East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan and

¹⁰ Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy Should Reflect New Realities", *Gulf News*, August 6, 2003.

became an independent nation, which resulted in a major policy shift of the Pakistani decision makers and their decades long feeling of insecurity and threat became very real where they got defeated, internally as well as externally. The attitude of the foreign policy makers became more prismatic and Indo – centric in nature.

“The three main intelligence agencies in Pakistan are ISI, Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Each agency has its own specific responsibilities, but all share the common goal of preserving Pakistan’s national security”.¹¹

“The ISI is tasked with the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive operations”.¹²

“The ISI is a very powerful agency that reportedly answers to nobody; not to the government and not to the military. According to various sources no-one seems to be in total control over the ISI. Their actions are often dubious; rumor has it that the war in Kashmir is financed with drugs money generated by the ISI.

The tasks of the ISI include:

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) activities.
- Collection of intelligence, both domestic and international.
- Surveillance of foreigners, embassy and consulate personnel in Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats in other countries.

The ISI has a number of divisions, including:

- Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB). JCIB is responsible for surveillance of Pakistani diplomats abroad, as well as for conducting intelligence operations in

¹¹ Military Intelligence, *Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program*, see <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/mi/index.html>

¹² “Inter-Services Intelligence”, *PakistaniDefence.com* see <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Info/Intelligence.html>

the Middle East, Afghanistan, South Asia, China and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.

Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) conducts espionage and covert activities in foreign countries. According to B. Raman "Maj Gen (ret'd) Sultan Habib, an operative of this Division, who had distinguished himself in the clandestine procurement and theft of nuclear material while posted as the Defence Attaché in the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow from 1991 to 93, with concurrent accreditation to the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Poland and Czechoslovakia, was posted as Ambassador to North Korea to oversee the clandestine nuclear and missile co-operation between North Korea and Pakistan. After completing his tenure in Moscow, he had coordinated the clandestine shipping of missiles from North Korea, the training of Pakistani experts in the missile production and testing facilities of North Korea and the training of North Korean scientists in the nuclear establishments of Pakistan through Capt. (ret'd) Shafquat Cheema, Third Secretary and the then acting head of mission, in the Pakistani Embassy in North Korea, from 1992 to 1996. Before Major Gen. Sultan Habib's transfer to ISI headquarters from Moscow, the North Korean missile and nuclear co-operation project was handled by Maj. Gen. Shujjat from the Baloch Regiment, who worked in the clandestine procurement division of the ISI for five years. On Capt. Cheema's return to headquarters in 1996, the ISI discovered that in addition to acting as the liaison officer of the ISI with the nuclear and missile establishments in North Korea, he was also earning money from the Iranian and the Iraqi intelligence by helping them in their clandestine nuclear and missile technology and material procurement not only from North Korea, but also from Russia and the Central Asian Republics. On coming to know of the ISI enquiry into his clandestine assistance to Iran and Iraq, he fled to Xinjiang and sought political asylum there, but the Chinese arrested him and handed him over to the ISI. What happened to him subsequently is not known. Capt. Cheema initially got into the

ISI and got himself posted to the Pakistani Embassy in North Korea with the help of Col.(ret'd) Ghulam Sarwar Cheema of the Pakistan People's Party".¹³

- Joint Intelligence X (JIX) is the administrative division of the ISI.
- Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This division is responsible for political intelligence.
- Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB) operates a chain of SIGINT collection stations along the border with India, and provides communication support to militants operating in Kashmir.
- Joint Intelligence North (JIN) is responsible for operations in Jammu, Kashmir and Afghanistan. According to B. Raman the JIN "controls the Army of Islam, consisting of organisations such as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Al Badr and Maulana Masood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM)".¹⁴
- Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT) is tasked with the collection of technical intelligence.¹⁵

Like the ISPR, the ISI is also affiliated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. This committee deals with the military aspects of state security".¹⁶

In addition to these main elements, ISI also includes a separate explosives section and a chemical warfare section. Published reports provide contradictory indications as to the relative size of these organizational elements, suggesting that either JIX is the largest, or that the Joint Intelligence Bureau is the largest with some sixty percent of the total staff.¹⁷

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's importance derives from the fact that the agency is

³ B. Raman, "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence", *Journal of the United Services Institution of India*, New Delhi, vol. CXXXI, no. 545, July – September 2001, pp. 364 – 365.

⁴ Ibid. p. 364.

⁵ "Fifty-first edition of the N&O column / Spooks newsletter", Friday 02 August 2002 see <http://www.cvni.net/radio/nsnl/nsnl51pk.html>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)", *Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program*, see <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi>

charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan. The ISI supplies weapons, training, advice and planning assistance to terrorists in Kashmir and the the Northeast frontier areas of India.¹⁸

The ISI despite being essentially a military organisation came to acquire a different ethos from that of the Pakistani army. The organization's founder, Maj Gen. R Cawthorne, was an Australian born British Army officer who had chosen to remain behind with the Pakistani army after independence. He formed the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence as a pure military organisation in 1948 during the time of first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir. Not only was Cawthorne looking for more operational intelligence but he and other British officers of the newly formed Pakistani Army also wanted to keep an eye at what the Pakistani officers and men were up to. General Ayub Khan, after grabbing power in 1958, added a political function to the ISI's tasks. The ISI was to track politicians and at times to make sure they co-operated. In 1970 and 1971, the ISI was used to crush the Bengali resistance movement in the country's eastern wing. Prominent Bengali leaders were assassinated and others killed in bomb blasts. West Pakistan politicians too were fearful of the ISI, which by now had become a super intelligence agency controlled by the army.¹⁹ The path of the ISI was ruffled during the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but the ISI got back to its feet with the coming in of Zia-ul-Haq as the Army General.

The ISI, under Zia, grew into a well oiled international organisation, benefiting enormously from the Afghan war that saw billions of dollars worth arms and aid to flow into the region. The ISI was tasked to divert a major part of the arms and money and use it for Pakistan's clandestine operations in the Indian Punjab and in building the country's nuclear capabilities. Access to clandestine sources of funds and considerable influence over the bureaucracy and political class ensured that the ISI became a power centre on its

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Indranil Banerjee, "Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence in Afghanistan", *SAPRA India: Military Issues*, (New Delhi), September 2001, see <http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/military20010920a.html>

own right, even though in paper it remained nothing but another directorate of the Pakistani army.²⁰

Neither Afghanistan nor Kashmir could deflect the ISI's focus away from internal politics. For, this was one major source of influence. In the late 1980s, when the Pakistani army led by General Mirza Aslam Beg, agreed to the institution of democracy in Pakistan, the idea never was to allow civilian leaders unfettered access to power. The country nuclear power program, its covert ops, its military and foreign affairs were out of bounds for civilians. One of the reasons for Benazir's dismissal during her first stint in power was her ham handed attempts to influence key appointments in the Army. Her second dismissal was the direct result of her attempts to take on the ISI. She mistakenly presumed, like her unfortunate father had earlier, that the ISI could be countered by promoting rival agencies.²¹

As Major General Ashok Krishna has written that “the ISI is headed by a Director General (DG) of the rank of Lt Gen / Maj Gen; he has hitherto been a serving officer seconded from the Army. The ISI coordinates the functioning of the intelligence directorates of the armed forces and is the sole organisation for collection of military and external intelligence. The DG, although under the Ministry of Defence, is also the adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence matters”.²²

He has gone on saying that “the DG being the Army Chief's man, he only disseminated what the Army Chief wanted the politicians to know. The Army Chief draws his power from the Army, which has the final say in Pakistan on matters of national security; any political interference or opposition is not countenanced. The plans of the ISI are really the plans of the Pak Army. The ISI is therefore, an organ of the Army, not an organ of the state”.²³

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, “The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan”, *Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)*, (New Delhi), Article No: 191, 25 May 1999, see <http://pak-terror.freesevers.com/webarticle20.htm>

²³ Ibid.

General Krishna has noted that “prior to 1971 the ISI aided and abetted insurgencies in Eastern India and, in the post 1971 period it enlarged its activities to encompass Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and later Tamilnadu. Kashmir and its annexation or liberation would continue to be the prime objective of the Pak Army and hence the basic aim of the ISI. Pakistan would not be happy with an independent Kashmir as it could be under the sway of other countries. The origin of the wave of terrorism in J & K can thus be traced to the loss of Siachen in 1984 and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in Pakistan directed against Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship. To divert attention from this military setback and domestic problems, the military regime chalked out a strategy to create trouble in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The ISI spends nearly Rs 100 crores every year to run its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. Each militant is paid between Rs 2000 to Rs 3000 per month depending upon his experience and status in the terrorist outfit. In case a militant dies in action, his or her family gets a compensation ranging from Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000. ISI agents active in Kashmir receive between Rs 50,000 to Rs one lakh a month as emoluments. They are accorded five star facilities during their visits to Rawalpindi. Some Islamic organisations are also funding the militants in J & K. About 30 militant training camps are running in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). These camps are controlled from headquarters in Muzaffarabad and Kotli. The ISI is assisted in its activities by the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) –a group declared to be terrorists by the US State Department in 1997. The HUA had close links with Osama bin Laden, the dissident Saudi millionaire blamed for the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1998 and the WTC attacks and many more terrorist attacks throughout the world. The HUA’s two militias – Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the more extreme Harkat-ul-Jehad – provide shelter, food and clothing for the trainees at these camps, while the ISI provides weapons, ammunition and transport, along with specialist instructors for training. The ISI has been training Afghan Mujahideen, Kashmiris and Punjabis from Pakistan at these camps. The fanatic trait of the trainees is evident from the fact that they are now seeking to change the basic ideology in Kashmir- from azadi (freedom) to Jihad (Islamic uprising)”²⁴

²⁴ Ibid.

PAKISTAN AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING (1947 – end of 1960s)

India: From the very genesis of Pakistan, the relation with India had been worse than with any other nation. It is the only nation with which it went to war thrice, once in 1948, in 1965 and in 1971. Within these years, there were periods when the nations came very close to war like situations but due to the sanity maintained by both the leaders of Pakistan as well as India, serious conflicts could be avoided.

The partition itself created a strain in relation as the whole exercise brought about with an exodus which was never ever witnessed before in world history till date. It led to the death of millions who were either escaping/migrating to Pakistan or to India, who got entrapped in the then ensuing religious riots taking place throughout the border areas of India and Pakistan as well as throughout the subcontinent. Both the countries blamed each other due to the apathy shown by the governing machinery to fail to trap the then ensuing genocide.

Then relations worsened further on the issue of the sharing of the assets of undivided India, between India and Pakistan. Pakistan blamed that India illegally held back the cash balances which legally was theirs.²⁵ The Indian government and political leaders later held joint discussions with the Pakistani administrative machinery to resolve this dispute as both the nations faced other larger disagreements at hand. As A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan have noted down that though “the Finance Ministers of the two countries met in August 1959 to consider the claims and counter-claims, no agreement could be reached. Thereafter, both the governments thought it best let bygones be bygones”.²⁶

Kashmir: Then arose the question of Kashmir which was of such a complex nature, and so many intricacies got entangled with the issue that even after around fifty five years of

²⁵ Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976), p. 377.

²⁶ A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 61.

achieving independence, both the nations still find no solution at hand and even in the foreseeable future.

The issue of Kashmir started from the accession treaty of Hari Singh, the then ruler of the principality of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian side. Pakistani historians have criticized and questioned the legality of the accession of the principality to India. Problem started when around five thousand tribesman came down to the valley from the North West Frontier Province having covert as well as overt assistance of the Pakistani Army. Hari Singh to save his principality from that attack signed the accession treaty with India, as India was unable to assist the principality without the ruler signing the accession treaty. On the question of the accession treaty Gopaldaswami Aiyangar and B.N. Rau has stated that “the accession treaty which took place on October 26, 1947, was both legal and lawful... The Instrument of Accession did not contain any conditions and it did not state that the accession was provisional”.²⁷

This accession angered the Pakistani governmental machinery and the Pakistani Army entered the Valley to stop the Indian Army from entering Kashmir valley. Though the Indian Army saved Srinagar from falling into the hands of the ongoing invasion, still the tribals with the assistance of the Pakistani forces were able to occupy a huge chunk of the valley. India formally lodged a complaint to the Security Council on January 1, 1948. India in the complaint mentioned about Pakistan’s assistance “to the invaders” which the Indian government considered as “an act of aggression against India”.²⁸ The United Nations within this time period called for ceasefire through the Resolutions of August 13 and January 5, 1949 and the major fighting stopped in the valley.²⁹

As according to the Pakistani view point, tribes especially from the hill area aligning the borders became frustrated with the King’s decision and openly revolted. They were successful in capturing major installations of power and radio in Srinagar, the

²⁷ Ibid. p. 81.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 82.

²⁹ S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 32.

provinces capital city. The King tried to suppress the tribes through sheer force, but when he failed to do that he took the decision of acceding to India, usurping the wishes of the Kashmiri people of joining Pakistan. Though there are different Pakistani views regarding the above narrated incident, but all of them basically portray the manner in which the wishes of the Kashmiri people was killed by joining India.

Afsir Karim has written that “to begin with a propaganda war was started against the Maharaja, followed by a series of raids on the borders of the J&K state. As the Muslim population of the Northern Areas & Mirpur – Poonch favoured merger with Pakistan these could be annexed by the raiders without much resistance. When the Maharaja still refused to yield, a full-fledged invasion followed. The first major attacks came in the Poonch district, when the road from Kotli to Poonch was cut off. The so-called raiders were mainly *Mashuds* of NWFP, lead by retired Army officers of the newly formed Pakistan Army”.³⁰

Prem Shankar Jha in his book *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History* has lucidly presented the Indian point of view. According to him, there were two factions of the population in the valley who either wanted to join in Pakistan and Kashmir. The National Conference, headed by Sheikh Abdullah, was more inclined towards India whereas the Muslim Conference headed by Agha Shaukat Ali as the general secretary and Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas as the president of the party, who were more, inclined towards Pakistan. But as Jha has noted that when the Northern parts of the sub continent was experiencing harsh communal riots due to the partition, “the valley had remained completely free from tension. The reason, one suspects, was its distinctive culture...”³¹ Jha also mentioned that the Maharaja’s Army had a major portion of Muslim soldiers and using them against the Muslims was certainly not a conceivable idea. On top of that, in relation to the amount of the population the Army had to cater to, they were grossly outnumbered by the incoming refugees from West Punjab and the areas nearby.

³⁰ Afsir Karim with the Indian Defence Review Team, *Kashmir: The Troubled Frontier*, (New Delhi, London, Hartford: Lancer Publishers and Spantech and Lancer, 1994), p. 68.

³¹ Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 17.

On the issue of the identity of the tribes that attacked Kashmir, Jha has quoted Akbar Khan, a former Major General of the Pakistani Army, who has described at great length the Pakistani involvement in Kashmir, before the accession treaty was signed. Akbar Khan has mentioned in his book, *Raiders in Kashmir*, how he met Mian Iftikharuddin, the founder of the *Pakistani Times* who was also a very important member of the Muslim League, who suggested Akbar Khan to prepare a contingency plan on Kashmir. Akbar Khan, being the Director of Weapons and Equipment at the Army Headquarters, sanctioned 4,000 rifles with a large ammunition stock for Kashmir. He later came to know about parallel plans being made under the supervision of the Prime Minister in Lahore for making similar expeditions in Kashmir. Akbar Khan recollected how his role was minimized to just supplying the weapons and how Liaquat Khan and Mian Iftikharuddin's plan was implemented.³²

As both the views are contested by both the parties, it remains clouded in the pages of history about the exact incident that took place that might be accepted by both the nations.

In 1953, Muhammad Ali Bogra, the then Pakistani President made attempts along with the then Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, on the issue of Kashmir and came out with a Joint Communiqué, the first of its sort between India and Pakistan, which agreed that the dispute regarding Kashmir will be resolved catering to the wishes of the people of Kashmir.³³ But the main problem between the disputing parties in relation to Kashmir was that they remained stuck on the wordings of Communiqués and Agreements and showed no eagerness to take bold steps to make significant positive changes in the Kashmir valley.

³² Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1970), pp. 9 – 22, as quoted by Prem Shankar Jha. *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 27 – 30.

³³ Joint Communiqué issued by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Bogra and the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, 20 August 1953.

There were constant attempts to normalize relations between the nations, initiatives taken by leaders from both the nations. But due to internal political pressures, in the very initial stages itself the attempts faltered and got stalled in relation to one of the party not abiding by the spirit of the agreements. The relations of India and Pakistan from then on has been chequered with allegations and counter allegations, statements and counter statements, ousting of diplomatic officials on charge of espionage and counter ousters, and the like.

During 1959, Ayub Khan, the then Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) of Pakistan showed eagerness to come into a common defense pact with India. But India showed lack of interest as Pakistan had already joined the Western alliance like the Central Treaty Organisation (CEATO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and Nehru commented in the Lok Sabha that he could not comprehend that while Pakistan was arming herself up against India, why it wanted to make a common defense policy with India.³⁴

Relations again got a breather after the dispute regarding water sharing of the Indus River between India and Pakistan got resolved in 19 September 1960.

Till the beginning of 1960s, the entire region of South Asia had their perceptions about the strength of India. The manner in which, India played its role in world politics, made India's neighbors wary about her strength. But that fame of her suddenly got shattered by the manner in which she was defeated in the India – Chinese border conflict of 1962. It strengthened avenues that Pakistan were nurturing for long but never expected them to become strengthened that fast.

Now quite a large amount of international border that Pakistan shared with India, that excluded the disputed territory of Kashmir, remained as bone of contention between the two nations. Amongst them the borders that lie in the Rann of Kutch area. From the very days of independence till date, these borders remain disputed. All through, there had

³⁴ *Dawn* 5 May, 1959, as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947 – 1999*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 189.

been minor skirmishes throughout these border areas as the area was extremely inhospitable for human habitat and there had been no major troop deployment in that area. But the frequency, with which these border incidents started from January 1965, caught the attention of both the nations' leaderships. These clashes led to significant loss of lives of the Indian Army, which led the then Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri make the statement that "the army will decide its own strategy and deploy its manpower and equipment in the way it deems fit".³⁵

But due to the pressure exerted by the United Kingdoms High Commission as directed by the British government, both the governments restrained themselves from going into direct conflict with each other. But within a very short span of time, due to the internal pressure that was created on Ayub Khan, he was forced to take a rash decision without giving much thought to the repercussions. Ayub Khan "approved an even riskier course in May 1965, himself suggesting that the plan should "go for the jugular" by including a possible attack on Akhnur, a nodal point on the transport and supply link for the Indian forces in Kashmir".³⁶ Altaf Gauhar in his book *Ayub Khan – Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (1994) has mentioned that Ayub was influenced by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed to take such a step.³⁷ Abdul Sattar while commenting on the situation that persisted during that time period said that Ayub must have realized that any armed engagement in Kashmir would lead to a general war, but, according to those who were close to Ayub at that point of time, he was pushed into the decision by his adventurous advisers.³⁸

But even till date the entire truthfulness of the situation is yet to come to light. None of the decision makers at that point of time has owed responsibility to the errors committed and all the information that is available is from second hand sources. It depends on the analyst of how he analyses the situation while studying the period.

³⁵ *Hindu Weekly*, 3 May 1965, as quoted by S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 324.

³⁶ Abdul Sattar, n.2, p. 92.

³⁷ Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan – Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1994), p. 217.

³⁸ Sattar, n. 2. p.93.

The small incursions turned into full scale war after Pakistani armed volunteers entered Kashmir in August 1965 and the Indian armed forces retaliated immediately by using sheer force. On the dawn of September 6, 1965 Indian armed forces crossed the international boundary, according to Abdul Sattar, but with the ceasefire passed by the United Nations Security Council on the 4th and then on the 20th of September, the conflict abruptly ceased, within which both the forces captured huge chunks of territories, in the Kashmir valley.³⁹ China took a very strong stand during this war in favour of Pakistan, and practically blamed India for the then incursions that led to the war. Gauhar says that “on September 7, the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned India’s “criminal aggression”, charging that it was trying to ‘bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes’.”⁴⁰

Moscow for the first time took the initiative restore peace between India and Pakistan, increasing its stature as a peace broker in the global arena. The Soviet government invited the Pakistan and Indian delegation to Tashkent, to have some sort of dialogue which could bring forth some sort of a stalemate or betterment of relations. While discussions went ahead in Tashkent from the time period of January 4th to January 10th 1966, both the nations were not eager to budge even an inch to compromise their positions. It has been said that “Shastri modestly explained to Ayub Khan that, as a pygmy succeeding a giant in Nehru, his position did not permit him to change India’s stance. When Bhutto pressed harder, Gromyko peremptorily told him that he was trying to ‘win at the conference table what Pakistan had been unable to win at the battlefield’.”⁴¹ Ayub Khan is stated to have “overruled his more ambitious advisers and accepted Kosygin’s compromise draft. The Tashkent Declaration provided for the withdrawal of forces, and envisaged further meetings ‘on matters of direct concern to both countries’,

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Gauhar, n. 33, pp. 347 – 348.

⁴¹ Hafeez Mallik, *Soviet – Pakistan Relations and Post – Soviet Dynamics, 1947 – 1992*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 192 while quoting Thomas Thornton, *Soviet Mediation at Tashkent*, as quoted by Abdul Sattar, “Foreign Policy”, in Rafi Raza ed., *Pakistan in Perspective: 1947 – 1997*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 96.

but made no direct mention of Kashmir”.⁴² The Tashkent Declaration received a plenitude of criticism from the inner political circles in both India and Pakistan.

Within the first phase there was no more major political movement between India and Pakistan, as there was change in governance in India with the death of the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and with the succession of Indira Gandhi. In Pakistan, too there was the initiation of major internal political disturbances with the holding of general elections throughout West and East Pakistan, and for that reason, they too remained busy with the internal political dynamics.

United States of America: The world after the Second World War was sharply divided into two blocs, the Capitalist bloc led by USA and its allies and the Communist bloc led by USSR and its allies. Both the blocs initiated immediately to increase their spheres of influence by either coming into defense alliances with nations or enamouring nations through financial aids and grants for developmental purposes.

During the initial years, the US governmental structure gave little heed to the South Asian region as they were then involved in restructuring Western Europe. In May 1950, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington for the first time and enumerated the commonalities that the countries shared with each other but there were no immediate response from the US governmental machinery for the creation of very close links with Pakistan. In March 1949 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff noted “the strategic importance of the Karachi – Lahore area ‘as a base for air operations’ against the Soviet Union and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas”.⁴³ Assistant Secretary McGhee was “impressed by the willingness of Pakistani leaders to support US – backed efforts to prevent communist encroachments in South Asia”.⁴⁴ Pakistan’s “prompt support for UN action in Korea in 1950”, and for the

⁴² Sattar, n. 2, p. 96.

⁴³ K. Arif, ed., *America – Pakistan Relations – Documents* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Limited, 1984), p. 15, as quoted by Abdul Sattar, “Foreign Policy”, in Rafi Raza ed., *Pakistan in Perspective: 1947 – 1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 69.

⁴⁴ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery – The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 60 – 75.

“conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan in 1951”, further embellished its image in the United States. It came to be perceived as America’s “one sure friend in South Asia”.⁴⁵ Pakistan from that time on was seen as a potential partner who would be an important nation who will be aid US in encircling as well as containing the Soviets.⁴⁶ As Pakistan during the early 1950s experienced one of its worst food crises, the United States sent one million ton of PL480 wheat to Pakistan.

Within this time period though the expectations of Pakistan were never met, it got numerous assistances from the US. That included arms transfers, financial assistances as well as technological assistances and the like. To maintain as well as increase their security they signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on May 19, 1954 under which the US undertook the pledge that it would provide defence equipment to Pakistan “exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self defence, or to permit it to participate in defence of the area”.⁴⁷ Soon after Pakistan also joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) the same year in the month of September and in the following year became a signatory of the Baghdad Pact that was later known as the Central Treaty Organisation (CEATO). SEATO’s objective was the containment of communism in South East Asia, especially in view of Vietnam. As mentioned by Safdar Mahmood that “Pakistan , by entering into this treaty, received no guarantee of collective action against non-communist attack on its soil, while it was committed to take part in any collective action against ‘red’ aggression. Pakistan, apparently, could not reject the treaty without losing the economic and military assistance from the US”.⁴⁸

CENTO or the Baghdad Pact was the brain child of John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, during the presidency of Dwight D Eisenhower. According to Sattar,

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, editorial, 14 September 1951 as quoted by Sattar, n.2, p. 69

⁴⁶ Paul Nitze, Director of State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Paper deploring Western fragility in the Middle East and recommending direct US involvement in the defense of the region because British capabilities were ‘wholly inadequate’ written on May 1952, quoted by Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery – The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 145.

⁴⁷ Sattar, n. 2, p. 73.

⁴⁸ Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development-1947 – 1999* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 196.

“Dulles found that Pakistan alone had “genuine feeling of friendship” for the United States and the “moral courage” to stand up. He suggested an alliance of the “northern – tier” countries – Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran”.⁴⁹

Though the idea of the Pact was laid by Dulles, the initiation of the pact was made by Turkey and Iraq in the Pact of Mutual Cooperation for “security and defence” which was signed in February 1955 in Baghdad. When Pakistan was invited to join the Pact in the month of April, Ayub nurtured a feeling of skepticism, as it supported the Palestinian cause, due to the pressure created by Prime Minister Nuri Said of Iraq and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey joined the pact. But soon after the *coup* in Iraq, when the royal regime in Iraq was usurped, Iraq pulled out of the Pact, renaming the pact as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).⁵⁰ But the Baghdad Pact received the wrath of many leaders like that of Nasser, the President of Egypt who thought that Pakistan by joining the Baghdad Pact was taking actions that would divide the Arab world.⁵¹ India also was able to utilize this situation by coming closer to the Soviets with Nehru and Khrushchev coming together in 1955 in agreements with each other. In this midst, the US started using Peshawar as the base for spying on the Soviets. As this information became known by the U2 reconnaissance aircraft incident, the Soviet leadership openly criticized the US as well as the Pakistanis for such actions and advised Pakistan not to take recourse such actions which would lead to Pakistanis infuriating the Soviets.

When the Sino – Indian border war broke out in 1962, the United States along with few other Western nations, exerted pressure on Pakistan “to show morale – boosting gestures to India during this crisis”.⁵² The West also wanted Pakistan not to take advantage of the then weak position of India, and to keep the Pakistani and Indian borders peaceful, so that India could fully concentrate on the Northern and Eastern Sino Indian borders and fight the Communist forces and it conveyed that they thought that Pakistan must go along with India during that hour because the war would make the

⁴⁹ Sattar, n. 2, p. 72

⁵⁰ Sattar, n. 2, p. 74

⁵¹ Ayub Khan, n. 8, p. 156.

⁵² Mahmood, n. 27, p. 189

Indian decision makers understand how much the entire sub continent was at threat from the entire Communist factions and if Pakistan at this point of time stood with India it would do more in the long run to bring about a sensible resolution of the Pakistan – India differences.⁵³ Later the United States even forced the Indian government to move on to the dialogue table which resulted in the direct talks between Ayub Khan and Nehru, on November 20 1962. A joint communiqué was issued by both the governments, and the desire for renewed efforts to resolve the outstanding differences between the nations were made clear.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): From the very initial stages of relations that Pakistan had with USSR, the feeling of skepticism brewed mostly within their relationships. When Stalin invited Liaquat Ali Khan in July 1949, just after Pakistan got her independence, Liaquat rather accepted the invitation from Washington and declined the invitation sent by Stalin. As Mushtaq Ahmed has stated in his book *Government and Politics in Pakistan* that the decline of the Soviet invitation was proof enough of Pakistan's pro-Western leanings which became pronounced during the later years.⁵⁴ It was the foundation of distrust that was created between the leadership of the two nations.

When in 1954, Pakistan joined the SEATO and CENTO, it practically was final about Pakistan's status of which bloc it belonged to. Pakistani leadership in some way or the other had some negative inhibition about communism. This stand of Pakistan becomes clear when in 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan during his visit to Washington had asked for a guarantee against the menace of communism.⁵⁵ It was believed that the concept of Communism went against the principles of Islam, and for that reason, for the well being of Islam as well as Pakistan, the leaders stayed away from any influence of Communism.

⁵³ Ayub Khan, n.8 p. 141

⁵⁴ Mushtaq Ahmed, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Pak Book Corporation, 1978), p. 50, as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 210

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, 13 April 1950, as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 210.

But as mentioned before, Pakistan's foreign policy was dominated by its need for the strengthening of its own security needs and to stand against the Pakistani perceived Indian expansionist policies, which made the base of Pakistan's foreign policy formulation. They had no special motive to annoy any of the blocs but made policies that, according to the leaders of the nation, would provide proper protection of the interests of Pakistan. The Soviets maintained a very strong stand on the issue of Kashmir. They felt that Kashmir was an integral part of India. On that basis it provided economic and military assistance to India. Especially, the issue of the U2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US that took off from Peshawar considerably strained the relations between Pakistan and USSR.

But from 1961, a process of rapprochement started between Pakistan and USSR. It started under the pretext of oil exploration which went ahead with technical assistance, financial aid, mechanization of agriculture and the like. The misconceptions and misunderstandings that existed between two nations started thawing during the visit of Ayub Khan to Moscow in April 1965. He told Kosygin, the then Russian Premier that, "We had not joined the pacts to encourage aggression in any direction; our sole concern was our security".⁵⁶ In this small phrase of Ayub, the entire theme of Pakistan's foreign policy making was hidden.

The Pakistani leadership though was disappointed as they felt that USSR could have forced the Indian leadership that was visiting Tashkent to bail Pakistan out from the situation, but still the relationship between Pakistan and USSR steadily improved. The two points of contention was Pakistan's close nexus with the West regarding defence pacts and the closeness Pakistan was nurturing with China received similar reciprocity. Especially after the Sino Soviet border clashes in 1969, the Soviets wanted to practically contain China inside its borders. Rafique Akhtar had noted a conversation between the Soviet defence minister Andrei Grechko and SM Yousouf, the then Pakistani foreign secretary that took place in Islamabad in February 1969 in the *Pakistan Year Book*. Grechko commented that "You cannot have simultaneous friendship with the USSR and

⁵⁶ Ayub Khan, n. 8, p. 171

China". Yousouf had replied that for Pakistan had to make friends with the bigger nations to increase her strategic security.⁵⁷ By this Yousouf wanted to keep Pakistan's position clear on the friendship it wanted to maintain with both the USSR as well as China, as both were strategically and politically important to the well being of the Pakistani leadership.

China: In the initial stages, Pakistan and China did not have any close diplomatic relations due to the overt closeness that Pakistan cultivated with the West and the membership of Pakistan in SEATO, bringing the Western bloc at the Chinese door step. But the Pakistani leadership always tried to maintain some sort of amicability with the Peking leadership, whatever situation might have been in the South Asian region or in the world. During the Bandung Conference in 1955, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan cleared out to the Chinese Premier Chou En Lai that Pakistan's participation in the SEATO was not intended to bring any harm to China and Pakistan had no apprehension about Chinese aggressive or expansionist policies.⁵⁸ Due to that reason, though Pakistan remained close to the Western bloc that did not hinder in the growing of a steady positive relationship with China and Pakistan which started blossoming especially after the Sino India border conflict in 1962. Border negotiations between Pakistan and China started from 1961, which was given the final form by the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in March 1963. According to Safdar Mahmood as well as United Nations official documents China received around 2050 square miles and Pakistan received around 750 square miles.⁵⁹ India strongly protested the action as quite a large portion of the land that was given away to China, was part of the disputed territory of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Both the nations removed their respective defence and communication installations after this compromise was brought about. Ayub Khan, who was one of the principal initiators for such a positive movement later, wrote that the sole purpose of solving any sort of misunderstanding regarding the demarcation of borders

⁵⁷ Rafique Akhtar ed., *Pakistan Year Book* (Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 100 as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 215

⁵⁸ Statement of Muhammad Ali Bogra, National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debate*, vol. 1, no. 12, 27 June 1962, pp. 622 – 623, as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 204.

⁵⁹ *United Nations Security Council Official Records*, 1114th Meeting, Nineteenth Year, 11 May, 1964, S/PV, 1114, pp. 11 – 12, also see Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 206.

between Pakistan and China was to eradicate any possible chances of conflict that could have arisen due to it. He said that “the Chinese began to have trust in us and we also felt that if one was frank and straightforward one could do honest business with them”.⁶⁰ Within a very short span of time, China’s stand on Kashmir also became very clear, as the Kashmir issue and the stand point nations had on that were very vital to have a good relationship with Pakistan. In a joint communiqué in February 1964, China clearly supported the issue of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, which will let the people of the valley come out clearly with the choice of what they had in mind.⁶¹

During the 1965 war with Pakistan and India, China fully backed Pakistan and giving massive infra structural support to Pakistan to bear with the expenses it had to incur during the war. In 1969, Pakistan and China also revived the ancient Silk Route to enhance trade and commerce between the nations. As Safdar Mahmood has noted the significance of the Silk Route that it is the only road that connects China with the sub continent.⁶² In this way, in the first phase, Pakistan and China went ahead in the creation of a very positive and strong relationship with each other.

The Muslim World: Islam had been the basic structure on which the foundation of Pakistan was built. Following that line of thought it had supported the cause of Muslims all throughout the world. Jinnah himself commented that the Pakistani foreign policy must make an earnest effort to create a strong bond with the Muslim nations of the world.

Afghanistan was the closest Muslim nation, Pakistan had contact with. There were ethnic groups in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan that had close cultural, traditional and economic linkages with Afghani Pashtuns. Louis Dupree has noted in his article *Afghanistan* that “Afghanistan (and many Pushtuns in Pakistan) argued that if Pakistan could be independent from India, then the Pushtun areas of Pakistan should likewise have the option for independence as an entity to be called

⁶⁰ Ayub Khan, n. 8, p. 164

⁶¹ *Dawn*, 24 February 1964, as quoted by Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 207

⁶² Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 208

"Pushtunistan," or "land of the Pushtun."⁶³ This demand for secessionism shadowed half of the fifties in Pakistan Afghanistan relationship. In March 1955, mobs attacked Pakistan's embassy in Kabul, and ransacked the Pakistani consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistani mobs retaliated by sacking the Afghan consulate in Peshawar. Afghanistan mobilized its reserves for war. Kabul and Islamabad agreed to submit their complaints to an arbitration commission consisting of representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Arbitration failed, but the process provided time for tempers to cool. Twice, in 1960 and in 1961, Daoud, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, sent Afghan troops into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. In September 1961, Kabul and Islamabad severed diplomatic relations and Pakistan attempted to seal its border with Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was more than happy to provide an outlet, though, for Afghanistan's agricultural exports, which the Soviets airlifted out from the Kabul airport.⁶⁴ But during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the issue of Pushtunistan took a severe beating as the other issues became so very pronounced that the issue of secessionism and ethnic nationalism were sidelined.

Pakistan maintained close relation with Iran and Turkey that led to the establishment of the Regional Co operation for Development (RCD) in July 1964. Safdar Mahmood had said that "the RCD was designed to connect the three countries through rail, road and air, along with collaboration in the field of shipping, abolition of visa formalities, and free movement of goods".⁶⁵ The unity amidst the Muslim world became very much visible especially during the 1965 Indo – Pakistan war, when most of the nations of the Muslim world whole heartedly supported Pakistan, either morally or by material support. Even the stand taken by Pakistani decision makers on the rights of the Palestinians got wide appreciation from the Muslim world.

⁶³ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980, pp. 485 – 494, as quoted by Michael Rubin, "Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, March 2002.

⁶⁴ Louis Dupree, n. 43, pp. 538 – 546.

⁶⁵ Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 223

In the last years of the first phase, the initiation of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) was almost complete in Rabat, the capital of Morocco, which took place in September 1969 where Pakistan played an instrumental role in keeping India out of the organisation as well as becoming an active and important member of the organisation.

PAKISTAN AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING (1971 – 1988)

India, Bangladesh and the Simla Agreement: The beginning of this phase was marred with Pakistan's internal politics getting badly entangled with Pakistan's external politics. The general elections that were held in Pakistan in December 1970 made it clear that the Awami League headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman is going to be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, a notion that was not favored by political leaders of West Pakistan. Mujib, as Mujibur Rehman was normally known as, had kept before Yahya Khan, who succeeded Ayub, a six point programme, which asked for more autonomy of East Pakistan. It was turned down which led to severe political disturbances throughout East Pakistan. These political disturbances later paved the path of the civil war, after Mujib was arrested on the charge of treason. Abdul Sattar had written that "it was foolish to hope that 42, 320 West Pakistani troops could suppress 75 million people in East Pakistan, with India determined to obstruct and prevent the effort through instigation, abetment and military intervention".⁶⁶ Within that time period, a hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft and later blowing up that aircraft by militants, led Indian government close its airspace to any Pakistani aircraft. It put the Pakistani establishment extremely in a jeopardizing situation to continue sending troops as well as other basic necessities to East Pakistan by air.

According to Henry Kissinger, Yahya Khan "was oblivious to his perils... and Pakistan's military leaders were caught up in a process beyond their comprehension".⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Siddiq Salik, *Witness to Surrender*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 101, This figure did not include the local para military formations of the Pakistani Army, as quoted by Sattar, n. 2, p. 103.

⁶⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Letters*, (New York: Little Brown, 1979), p. 861.

Yahya Khan though asked for assistance from the US but, according to Kissinger it was not possible for the US administration to take such a step because “the image of a great nation conducting itself like a shyster looking for loopholes was not likely to inspire other allies who had signed treaties with us or relied on our expressions in the belief the words meant approximately what they said”.⁶⁸ Pakistan for that reason did not get any assistance in the then ensuing crisis from the US. As Kissinger has pointed out that “to dissuade the Indian Armed forces to put more pressure on East Pakistan, Yahya took the decision and on December 3, ordered attack across the border from West Pakistan. But this decision too, like the others that Yahya had made before, proved to be disastrous for the fate of West Pakistan, which facilitated the Indian Army to come out victorious on both sides”.⁶⁹

The US still, went ahead and placed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops in the Security Council but it got vetoed by the USSR.⁷⁰

“Under mounting US and Soviet pressure, Indira Gandhi offered an unconditional cease fire on 16 December, the day Indira Gandhi told the Indian Parliament that she had ‘liberated’ East Pakistan”.⁷¹ Around 90,000 Pakistani troops surrendered with General Niazi, who headed the Pakistani forces in the then erstwhile East Pakistan, as it became an independent state of Bangladesh. It was the ultimate humiliation of Pakistan that it had to suffer ever and it took a real long time for the nation to come out of the shock. The resignation of Yahya Khan was the immediate result of the debacle and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President of the nation.

It was a challenging task that lay in front for President Bhutto as he knew that if he buckled under the pressure created under the pressure that India would be putting him into and if in any manner he moved away from the Pakistani stand that was being maintained from independence there won't be any way that he will be able to save

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 905

⁷¹ Sattar, n. 2, p. 108

himself from the wrath of the political leaders, the Army as well as from the people of Pakistan. For that reason, just before the commencement of the Simla Conference, Bhutto undertook a tour of fourteen Muslim and African countries to consolidate his position as well as his stand. According to Mehrunnisa Ali, “the ‘modalities’ of the then forthcoming summit were ‘settled’ and ‘the subjects to be discussed’ were ‘defined’ at the meeting of the India – Pakistan emissaries, held on April 30 1972”.⁷²

The conference started from June 28 1972 and lasted for five days. Though there was some sort of misunderstanding that persisted between the foreign officials of both the nations, both Indira Gandhi and ZA Bhutto met with a fixed stand from which both the parties would not budge. “After much argumentation by both sides and exchange of drafts between the two, an agreement was reached on 2 July, both sides making eleventh hour concessions”.⁷³ With the concessions that were made, it created a historic agreement between the two nations, that became the foundation stone of the path that would lead to the resolve of the disputes that lingered between the nation.

There are seven points on which the Simla Agreement was agreed upon. **First** was the restoration of normalcy of relations between India and Pakistan. India sought for a package deal that would fasten up the resolution on Kashmir. But it was Bhutto’s idea that gained ground and in the Para III of the Agreement it was included “to normalize relations between the two countries step by step”.⁷⁴ The **second** issue was on the issue of further deliberations that had to be taken to resolve their differences in future. In Clause II, Para II, of the agreement it was clearly observed that both the parties are specifically committed to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them”.⁷⁵ It initiated a process where any third party intervention was ruled out, and it was agreed upon that the differences that existed between India and Pakistan will be resolved on the principle of bilateralism. This part created lot of apprehension amongst the political circle in Pakistan

⁷² Mehrunnisa Ali, “The Simla and Tashkent Agreements”, in Mehrunnisa Ali ed., *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971 – 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 71.

⁷³ *The Economist*, London, 8 July 1972, p. 16, as quoted by Mehrunnisa Ali, n. 56, p. 72.

⁷⁴ The Simla Agreement Text, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1972, Government of India.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

then as well as till date. It was a major achievement on the part of the Indian decision makers to have this part included in an agreement which they wanted to have long time back. It also decreased the role of the UN in the Kashmir dispute, which the Pakistani decision makers really were not agreed to. Later onwards this issue was raised by the political decision makers of both the nations, now and then, and both have come up with their respective explanations of their actions that went against the spirit of the agreement. Bhutto in his speech in the National Assembly on 14 July 1972 stated that the Agreement did not prohibit him from re-agitating Kashmir in the UN.⁷⁶ On another occasion he stated that the Clause did not contain the phrase “exclusively” bilateral negotiations, which did not restrain Pakistan from re-exploring the possibilities of the settlement in the UN.⁷⁷ But still this cause became the principal pillar on which future negotiations was based on as the concept of ‘bilateralism’ became the issue on which the Indian leadership steadfastly stuck on as in reality it was the only conceivable and practical policy on which the issue of Kashmir can be resolved in the future. The **third** issue that was catered to in the agreement was the issue of non-interference in the internal matters of each other. Ali has stated, that “the Simla accord by recognizing the existence of the question of Jammu and Kashmir, placed the problem outside the purview of the application of the principle of non-interference”.⁷⁸ The **fourth** issue that was discussed was on the decreasing of the use of force against each other. Both the nations agreed in Clause VI Para II of the accord that “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other”.⁷⁹ The **next problem** that stood fast was on the issue of the fate of around 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. India steadfastly maintained that till the time Pakistani government did not give recognition to Bangladesh as an independent nation, the question of the release of the PoWs did not arise. Later the issue was resolved between Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, when the Pakistani government recognized Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign nation in 1974. The **next issue** of the pull

⁷⁶ Mehrunnisa Ali, n. 56, p. 75.

⁷⁷ President Bhutto’s Speech in the National Assembly on 31 July 1972, as quoted by Mehrunnisa Ali, n. 56, p. 75.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 78.

⁷⁹ Clause VI Para II of the Simla Agreement Text, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1972, Government of India.

out of troops from each others territories was taken up. It was agreed that the Indian and Pakistani forces would start withdrawal from each other's territories that would start from 30 days to commence from the period of the ratification of the Accord.⁸⁰ The issue of recognizing the Line of Actual Control as the border between the two nations was raised on which due discussions had to take place. On **the issue of Jammu and Kashmir**, in the last para of the Accord it has been mentioned that on the question for a final settlement both agreed to "meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future".⁸¹ It was also added in Clause II Para IV of the accord that "In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side".⁸² Simla accord in that way became the principle agreement on which all future talks with Pakistan and India would be based on.

The next issue that stood before Pakistan was when India went ahead with her first nuclear tests in Pokhran in May 1974. Hasan-Askari Rizvi commented that "India was brandishing its nuclear sword to force the non nuclear states of South Asia to abide by India's priorities in regional politics."⁸³ The Prime Minister of Pakistan, ZA Bhutto commented that "a more grave and serious event has not taken place in the history of Pakistan. The explosion has introduced a qualitative change in the situation between the two countries".⁸⁴ Bhutto, while being a defence minister of the state had mentioned in 1965 in a speech that "If India developed an atomic bomb, we will too develop one 'even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry' because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb".⁸⁵ Pakistan under Ayub Khan had started developing its

⁸⁰ The Simla Agreement Text, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1972, Government of India.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Clause II Para IV, The Simla Agreement Text, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1972, Government of India.

⁸³ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defense Policy", in Mehrunnisa Ali ed., *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971 – 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 211.

⁸⁴ The former Prime Minister, ZA Bhutto's statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 7 June 1974, quoted by Dilip Mukherjee, 'India's Nuclear Test and Pakistan', *India Quarterly*, New Delhi, XXX:IV (October – December 1974), p. 262, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Case Study for a Nuclear Security Guarantee", in Mehrunnisa Ali ed., *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971 – 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 267.

⁸⁵ Z. A. Bhutto, *Awakening the People: Speeches of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1966 – 1969*, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, 1970), p. 21, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear: Attitudes and Postures",

nuclear technology, but, the scientists and the leaders were sharply divided on the role of its military deployment. The Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr I.H.U. Usmani, “wanted to entail ‘peaceful use only’ by completely ruling out any possibility of military use, whereas Z.A. Bhutto and his supporters were in favour of developing a nuclear capability that had potential for an eventual nuclear weapons option”.⁸⁶

Pakistan immediately started making preparations for going along with their own nuclear device. The concept of an “Islamic bomb” got initiated from this phase itself, which ultimately got form in 1998. Pakistan also along with its preparation for such tests launched a worldwide campaign against such tests made by India, and made attempts so that the entire South East Asian region can be turned into a nuclear free zone which was successful as a resolution was passed declaring South East Asia a nuclear free zone was passed by the General Assembly. Bhutto also took a strong initiative to acquire the technology for the establishment of the Dera Ghazi Khan nuclear power plant by managing to acquire a uranium hexafluoride plant from West Germany. This plant would enrich the Kahuta Enrichment Plant with necessary nuclear energy. Z.A. Bhutto is regarded as “the political architect of the Kahuta Enrichment plant. The fact is borne out by Dr A. Q. Khan’s observation that had there been no Bhutto there would have been no Kahuta as well”.⁸⁷

From that time on there were no major movements in Indo Pakistan relations keeping out the regular blaming each other for any untoward incident that took place in

in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives*, (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 105.

⁸⁶ Zalmay Khalilzad. “Pakistan”, in Joseph Goldblat, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation: The Why and Wherefore* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 133, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear: Attitudes and Postures”, in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives* (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 104.

⁸⁷ Zaliid Malik, *Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and Islamic Bomb*, (Islamabad: Hurmat Publications, 1989), p. 34, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear: Attitudes and Postures”, in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives*, (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 109.

India or Pakistan. In regards to the signing of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pakistan maintained a steady stand. Pakistan though signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, ratified it much later. It had supported the principles of NPT but had not signed it on grounds of political context of the region in which Pakistan is situated.⁸⁸ The Pakistani leaders made their stand very clear that till the time India will abstained from signing the NPT, the Pakistani leadership would do the same.

After the dismissal of Bhutto and the rise of General Zia to power with the initiation of one more military rule in Pakistan, tense situation between India and Pakistan was inevitable. But still the Zia government as well as the Morarji government in India made some efforts of reconciliation in 1977. The controversial issue of the Salal Dam was resolved amicably and with the mutual visit of foreign secretaries some sort of thaw came in the terse relations between the nations.⁸⁹

But with the coming back of Indira Gandhi to power in India, the relations that started progressing again took a setback. It was due to basically two reasons. First, the Pakistani leadership suffered from a sort of paranoia about the leadership of Indira, under whose tutelage they had to go through the humiliation of the defeat in 1971, the signing of the Simla agreement which was extremely disliked by the defence establishments as well as under her governance India went for the nuclear tests in 1974.

For Indira Gandhi, she did not want to make noteworthy and significant attempts for reconciliation with her neighbour. The Indian government, whenever there were military generals as rulers in Pakistan, shrank away from the proposition of initiating major peace talks. Similarly, with General Zia, as the head of the Pakistani government, she resisted initiating goodwill gestures to the Pakistani governing machinery. On top of that the manner in which, Pakistan went ahead with its plan to overtly Islamize its society with the rise of numerous religious extremist groups was an eye sore for the Indian political top brass. India also took a very strong stand on Afghanistan, where it blamed

⁸⁸ *The Near Nuclear Countries and the NPT*, (SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1972), p. 26.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Pakistan as well as the United States in instigating violence in the guise of Mujahideens in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. The entire period was marred with intense statements made by both the foreign offices, blaming each other regarding preparing each others forces near the borders for untimely clashes, as well as intervention in each other's internal politics, for India it was Punjab and the Khalistani movement and for Pakistan it was Sindh and the Jiye Sindh Movement. The Kashmir problem remained unresolved without any major initiative taken by both the parties for mediation. The issue of both the troops moving on in the Siachen glacier also rose during this period.

After the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the arrival of Rajiv Gandhi in the political scene of India, it was expected that some sort of positive movement might be expected from the governments. In 1985, the India Pakistan Joint Ministerial Commission was held, which came up with the direct dialing telephone system between the nations. Pakistan also agreed to put on trial some Sikh hijackers who were in Pakistani jail. Relations were also improved by the visit of Zia to Delhi in December 1985, when the Zia Rajiv agreement-in-principle was brought about on the issue of not attacking each other's nuclear installations.⁹⁰ That was later ratified in December 1988 by Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto.

Pakistan's relations with India again took a downward trend during the period of the Operation Brasstacks, an Indian army exercise near the borders that led to the point of open clashes between the armed forces of both the nations. But the dialogues that were immediately brought in at the defence and foreign secretary level and later President Zia's visit to Delhi on the pretext of witnessing a cricket match de-escalated the tensions.

The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) also started during this period, though the initiation of the organisation dates back to 1980, when Ziaur Rehman, the then President of Bangladesh, came up with the idea of the SAARC, though in a different form. The SAARC was formally launched in December 1985, in Dhaka. It became a forum in which nations in South Asia were able to approach each

⁹⁰ "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in 1986", *The Muslim*, January 2 1986.

other, for the economic, technological, social and cultural cooperation. In 1987, Pakistan “called for the adoption of a regional approach for dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, and called for a dialogue on this issue under the SAARC umbrella in the foreign affairs’ meeting held in June 1987”.⁹¹ Pakistan also during this time period made attempts of making bilateral relations using the platform of the SAARC. The mutual bilateral visits of President Zia and the President and Prime Minister of Sri Lanka led to the creation of a Pakistan – Sri Lanka Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation. President Zia also increased relations with Maldives, Nepal and Bangladesh leading to significant increase in trade between these nations. Relations with Bangladesh improved considerably, where President Ershad of Bangladesh visited Pakistan once in 1986 and again in 1988. The creation of the Bangladesh – Pakistan Joint Economic Commission was also a considerably positive step in the enhancement of the objective of SAARC. But unfortunately, during this period there was no such significant movement on the Indo – Pakistani front that would have possibly worked as a confidence building measure between the two.

United States of America: The relationship between Pakistan and the United States went through a series of declines in the initial stages and later improved considerably because of the tactical change of policy by Pakistani decision makers. Especially till the moving in of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan was sidelined in the policy making structure of the US administration. Even before India went along with her own nuclear tests, Pakistan on a war footing started preparing for their own nuclearisation. They decided to import a reprocessing plant from France as well as launch an indigenous clandestine nuclear enrichment programme. Pakistan went to France, who till that point of time had developed their own indigenous nuclear technology. After the US pressure over France succeeded eventually (initially they did not fall in line), the Pakistanis concentrated on the clandestine route. The French government and they ceased from transferring nuclear technology to Pakistan. In April 1979, the Carter administration suspended all economic, technical, and military aid to Pakistan on the grounds that it was “building an ‘Islamic bomb’ by secretly creating a uranium enrichment facility. In

⁹¹ Safdar Mahmood, n. 30, p. 263

November 1979, the burning down of the US embassy by a mob in Islamabad brought the Pakistan – US relations to the lowest ebb”.⁹² On top of that Pakistan in the early years of 1970 stepped out of SEATO as well as CENTO, as according to the Pakistani decision makers both these alliances failed to protect the interests of Pakistan, when it needed the most. But two incidents immediately, made the US administration change its mind on Pakistan. First was the Teheran hostage issue, where the American embassy was directly attacked. The second major setback for the US administrators was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was an unexpected blow for America. To mend the relations with Pakistan, they came up with an aid assistance of \$ 400 million, which Zia rejected as it was not up to the expectations of the Pakistani leader. Later after Zia visited Washington, “the US offered a package of \$ 3.2 billion for economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan” for a six year period that started from 1981 till 1987.⁹³ This offer was accepted by the Pakistani administrators. “The US also agreed to sell 40 high – performance F-16 aircraft at the cost of about \$ 1.1 billion outside the assistance package”.⁹⁴ The Inter Services Intelligence started working hand in gloves with the Central Intelligence Agency to assist the Mujahideens in creating disturbances in Afghanistan having the sole intention of ousting the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Till the end of the period, where the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was on, the relationship between Pakistan and the US went on an unhindered basis. On the issue of nuclearisation too, the United States turned a blind eye towards Pakistan, though in 1984, a statement made by Dr. A. Q. Khan in a national daily disclosed that Pakistan had mastered the most difficult process of uranium enrichment technology and Kahuta was processing non-weapons-grade-uranium. He even mentioned that “If in the interest of the country’s solidarity, the President of Pakistan were in extreme need and gave the team of scientists an important mission, it would not disappoint the nation”.⁹⁵ On another occasion, on March 1, 1987, Dr. Khan disclosed more elaborately while giving an interview to the *Observer* by Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons.⁹⁶

⁹² Ibid, p. 244

⁹³ Ibid. p. 245

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ “Pakistan’s Nuclear Chief Says It Could Build the Bomb”, *Washington Post*, (10 February 1984).

⁹⁶ “We Have the Bomb, Says Pakistan’s Dr Strangelove”, *Observer*, (London, 1 March 1987) as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures”, in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The relationship between Pakistan and the USSR was marred by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and till the decision of the withdrawal of Soviet troops were not announced there was no significant betterment of relations either. Though there were some minor technological transfers, especially, in the case of the Karachi Steel Mill, where Russian technology was used, but both the governments maintained a safe distance from each other while consistently making derogatory remarks on each other's positions in the Afghanistan crisis. The crisis was in such a heightened state that as Safdar Mahmood mentioned "the Soviet deputy foreign minister saying that Pakistan is at war with the Soviets" makes the perceptions on both the nations leaders towards each other very clear.⁹⁷ Though there were some high level bilateral exchanges but with the end of the eighties, it became clear to the Soviets that the burden of Afghanistan was tearing apart the nation. They had to come to some sort of reconciliation where they can formulate a process through which they can recede from the Afghani territory. The Geneva Talks that got initiated in 1982 reached it final stages during the final years of Zia and from then on the terse relations between the nations improved considerably.

China: Relations with China went on growing steadily with Zia's visit in December 1977, and later these visits became very frequent from both sides. China unabatedly went on supplying Pakistan with defense equipments, technological support, moral assistance on the issue of Kashmir, and the like. During the Afghanistan imbroglio of the Soviets, China maintained some sort of distance with Pakistan as the United States became a principle ally of Pakistan during this period. But it always maintained its posture of assurance and maintained good relations with Pakistan. It also maintained to receive assistance in nuclear technology from China. According to Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan carried out improvements in the weapon design it had allegedly acquired from

Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives*, (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 114.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 240.

China.”⁹⁸ According to the *Foreign Report*, “the Pakistani scientists perfected the detonation mechanism by developing a bomb casing that could withstand the buffeting of a high-speed flight”.⁹⁹ Progress was also reported towards “developing a fusing mechanism which would keep the bomb safe while in storage and during flight but causes proper detonation after release from the aircraft”.¹⁰⁰ In this manner, the relationship between Pakistan and China strengthened its closeness through the broadening of the nuclear periphery.

The Muslim World: The Middle Eastern States of Asia took active interest in the conflict situation that was ensuing at that point of time between India and Pakistan. Some nations sided with Pakistan on the issue and some nations remained neutral but all of them were unanimous on one stand that the ongoing conflict must stop immediately in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations and they gave accolades on the attempts that were made in the Simla Accord.¹⁰¹

Relations with Iran also went with his usual ups and downs. The time period for the soft loans that was provided by the Iranian government to Pakistan was relaxed during this period. Turkey and Pakistan also had the opportunity of building up a very strong relationship within each other on the issue of Cyprus, and the situation of civil war that existed over there.

On the nuclear front, in 1978, Pakistan reportedly acquired 100 tons of uranium oxide “yellow cake” from Niger through Libya, and an unknown additional consignment

⁹⁸ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures”, in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives*, (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 114.

⁹⁹ “Pakistan’s Atomic Bomb”, *Foreign Report*, (12 January 1989), p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Pakistan – Iraq Joint Communiqué of 31 May 1972, *Pakistan Horizon*, (Karachi, Second Quarter, 1972), p. 137, as quoted by Zubeida Mustafa, “Recent Trends in Pakistan’s Policy towards the Middle East”, in Mehrunnisa Ali, ed., *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy – 1971 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 97.

directly.¹⁰² It shows the manner in which the Muslim world came ahead in assisting Pakistan to go ahead with the creation of the Islamic bomb.

The main relation that molded Pakistan's foreign policy after 1979 was the issue of Afghanistan, an issue that also played a vital role in molding international politics and bringing the Cold War strife directly into the South Asian region. All the elements of decision making became directly or indirectly involved with the Afghan conflict amongst which the intelligence and the Army played a direct role under the sole dictates of Zia. Zia was also came very close to the US administration during this period as mentioned above on the issue of Afghanistan.

To conclude this chapter that Pakistan's foreign policy making had remained chequered till the democratic phase of the 1980s. It had to fight three major wars, the last one bringing in a shocking reality of a part of Pakistan breaking free with external assistance. As Khaled Ahmed has said that "it is a misnomer to call it foreign policy when so much of Pakistan's domestic policy is involved in it. Pakistan has "spilled over", so to speak, till very little real distinction exists between what is internal and what is external. Pakistan may find it more difficult to change its foreign policy than Israel, because the latter is internally intact. In short, to change its foreign policy, Pakistan itself may have to change".¹⁰³ This might be a bit of an exaggeration but certainly there is some truth in the statement made by Ahmed, as Pakistan decision makers are prisoners in the hands of various internal forces like religious extremists and fundamentalists, the friction amidst the decision makers, the declining economic condition of the nation and various other similar factors, that add on to the regional and international spectrum.

¹⁰² *Nuclear News*, February 1980, p. 91, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear: Attitudes and Postures", in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives* (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 108.

¹⁰³ Khaled Ahmed, "A Foreign Policy that can't be changed", *The Friday Times*, New York, January 28 – February 3, 2000, see <http://www.thefridaytimes.com>

III – THE ERA OF TURBULENCE: BENAZIR BHUTTO AS A DECISION MAKER

THE INSTALLATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME

The year 1988 brought in a major change in the political structure of Pakistan. The death of General Zia made the military decision makers realize that in the present age of world political awareness and change re installing another military general as the head of the state might be an expensive proposition. The Chairman of the Senate of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the acting President of the nation. Both Ishaq Khan and General Beg took the decision of calling for general elections in the nation to fill the political vacuum that had been created after the death of General Zia.

For that reason, Hasan-Askari Rizvi has stated that “the decision to invite Benazir Bhutto to form the government was jointly made by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Aslam Beg. Benazir Bhutto had a meeting with General Beg a couple of days before assuming power. It was generally believed that General Beg outlined the interests and concerns of the military, while she made her case for prime ministership and stressed the Pakistan People Party’s goodwill towards the military”.¹

While explaining the situation that prevailed in Pakistan during the phase in which the transfer of power took place, Hasan-Askari Rizvi has said that: “Post-martial law Pakistan represents the typical dilemma of states that have experienced prolonged periods of military rule and where the military transfers power to the civilian elite after securing its future through constitutional and political engineering and cooption of a section of political elite.”² He has gone on explaining the dilemma that the civilian government faces when they come to power after a prolonged period of military rule. There arise severe identity crises whenever a civilian regime succeeds a military rule.

¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p. 205.

² Ibid. p. 189.

Rizvi has pointed out two dilemmas that the civilian government faces. “On the one hand, these governments want to prove that they are not under the tutelage of the military and can act autonomously. On the other, they cannot afford to alienate the top brass of the military whose goodwill and support are crucial to their survival. Their task is complicated by the fact that once the tradition of direct military intervention in politics is established, the top brass are disinclined to surrender all the power and privileges they enjoyed during the years of military rule; they make sure that there are sufficient guarantees for their entrenched position in the post-withdrawal period”.³ Furthermore, extended military rule creates vested interests and beneficiaries who support authoritarian and non-democratic governance. Military rule also accentuates political fragmentation and divisive tendencies in a multi-ethnic and diversified society especially if there are ethnic and regional imbalances in the military. These factors make the task of political management difficult for any post-martial law civilian regime aiming to establish itself as a genuine democratic government while not alienating the top commanders”.⁴

When a democratic government is installed in such a hostile environment, the power of decision making seldom rests in the hands of the democratic leadership. Rather they get engrossed in doing the balancing act of not angering or earning the displeasure of any of the already stable and powerful decision makers for the stability and lasting of the democratic leadership. They in some manner tend to become partial leaders as the leadership of the nation is already shared from before.

The Benazir government and the military started with a cordial relationship. General Beg repeatedly made statements in support of the government and left no doubt about the military’s blessing to the democratic experiment. Benazir Bhutto had to balance her position amongst the other decision making elements and acknowledged the military’s role in the restoration of democracy and appreciated of its “whole-hearted” support to democracy.⁵

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. p. 206.

It must not be though misunderstood that Benazir Bhutto was not able minded enough to understand from good and bad. But as Ian Talbot has written that before criticizing Benazir Bhutto's leadership, one must certainly accommodate the difficulties that she confronted. The principal difficulty was the post-Zia political entrenchment of the Army and the intelligence services. In the new governing structure, their power was largely unobtrusive and informal. They were able to control the entire political machinery with the aid of the ally they had at hand in the name of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the nation, by using the Eight Amendment. Benazir also had to retain Zia's foreign minister Yakub Ali Khan in her cabinet, which admitted the Army to exert continuous influence on the external policy making framework.⁶

The age of the *troika* started from this democratic age of Pakistan. This extra constitutional arrangement that was initiated was followed through the forthcoming decade and if, at any point of time, this arrangement was disturbed there was a major political reshuffle in the democratic political leadership. In this way, the entire decade through, the military never lost hold of the decision making mechanism and saw to it their area of influence remained unperturbed without remaining directly in the limelight of power politics.

This arrangement was to deliberate on key internal as well as external policies and security affairs. Another forum that gained importance during this period was the Corps Commanders' meeting, which was summoned and presided over by the Army Chief. The Corps Commanders, Principal Staff Officers at the Army Headquarters and other senior officers holding strategic appointments participated in the meetings and discussed professional and service affairs, security and foreign policy, as well as domestic politics.⁷

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, or so to say the position of the President, started acting as a bridge as well as a mediator between the two decision makers, the Army Chief and Benazir Bhutto, having a serious tilt towards the Army Chief. That became the principal

⁶ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 293.

⁷ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, p. 190.

cause behind frequent dismissals of the democratic leaderships. Whenever there was any attempt on the part of the democratic leaders to curb the unconstitutional powers being enjoyed by the Army Chief and the defence forces, he or she was either forced to backtrack or get dismissed on causes of corruption, political mishandling or some other unforeseeable causes.

The Praetorian model was established in Pakistan from its very genesis and during the democratic regime this model became extremely forceful and overbearing on the political leadership. "The praetorian model is synonymous with widespread interference by the military in political change, resulting in short-lived governments installed by force".⁸ Samuel P Huntington has described such societies "where social forces confront each other nakedly... Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup".⁹

Benazir after some time started to show her prowess and independent mindset in decision making and for the first time in Pakistani history appointed Shamsur Rehman Kallu, who was a retired Lieutenant General of the Army, an officer close to her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as the Director General (DG) of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in place of a servicing general of the Pakistani Army. He was replaced in the place of General Hamid Gul, who in seniority was waiting to take over the position of the DG, ISI. This created an internal schism between the Army and Benazir Bhutto, which can be cited as one of the principal cause for her untimely dismissal in August 1990. "Writing in the *Nation* of 31 July 1997, Brig AR Siddiqui, who had served as the Press Relations Officer in the Army Headquarters in the 1970s, said that this action of hers marked the beginning of her trouble with General Beg, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS)".¹⁰ She also went ahead with setting up an Enquiry Commission headed by Zulfikar Ali Khan, a

⁸ Claude E Welch, "Changing Civil-Military Relations", in Robert O Slater, Barry M Schutz and Steven R Dorr (eds.), *Global Transformation and the Third World*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers and Adamantine Press, 1993) p. 80.

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 196.

¹⁰ B. Raman, "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence", *Journal of the United Services Institution of India*, vol. CXXXI, no. 545, (New Delhi), July – September 2001, p. 365.

former Air Force Chief, in 1989 to look into the working of various intelligence agencies including ISI, IB, ASF, and Special Branch of Police and also recommend measures to improve their performance and keep them away from the political arena. The enquiry commission found that ISI's extremely good performance in the external sphere was considerably marred by its undue involvement in domestic political affairs. As for the IB, the commission found it in a state of limbo and organizational and functional disarray. The commission recommended the formation of the National Security Council with the Prime Minister as the chairman, and foreign, defense, interior, finance, chairman JCSC, and all services head as members. It also recommended creation of a joint intelligence committee (JIC) with secretaries of all mentioned ministries, IB, ISI chiefs as its members.¹¹

As for the role of IB, the commission proposed that its role be restricted to internal security and political matters and externally for counter-intelligence operations. The commission also advised against the ISI's role in dealing with the internal security matters, which must be under the exclusive control of the IB. It was also emphasized that none of these organisations must intervene in the daily political chores of the government and must work only during periods of exigencies as well as a safety valve. The commission proposed the establishment of a National Intelligence Training Academy. All these recommendations stemmed from the conclusion that some of the agencies, which of course are an essential part of the security in every state, in certain instances had "gone beyond their mandate." Instead of providing information, they assumed the role of policy makers.¹²

Benazir Bhutto described the situation in Pakistan as "so much has happened. After I won the elections, I was of the naïve view that an electoral victory would end the hardship, the trials. But this wasn't true. During the time I was prime minister, I lived under the shadow of a strong military, a holistic president, an entire constituency that Zia had built; extreme right wingers, religious bigots, and politicians bred during that era of

¹¹ Imtiaz Gul, "Benazir and Intelligence", *Punjabilok*, see www.punjabilok.com/pak_newsletters

¹² *Ibid.*

military dictatorship. They had one thing in common: they were dead set against allowing me to rule.”¹³

She has been described as a Peronist of Argentina.¹⁴ She tried to change in a radical manner so that she can create a mark of her own but that was a very difficult proposition for a conservative like that of Pakistan. She even withdrew cases against political exiles. She released various categories of women prisoners, old pensioners, and generally commuted death sentences of convicts into life imprisonment. She even wanted to repeal of 58th amendment to the 1973 Constitution.¹⁵

Especially, the manner in which Benazir from 1988 itself, initiated the procedure of normalizing relations with India, and invited Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for talks in Islamabad in 1988 and later to Rawalpindi in 1989 made the military wary about Benazir’s intentions.¹⁶ Benazir was a democratically elected leader after a long absence in Pakistani politics and she started moving on a path of mediation and confrontation. She started to initiate process of rapprochement with India on the one hand and promoted the Islamic radicals in Afghanistan against the Najibullah government. Though the fear psychosis or the anti India rhetoric continued without any restraint, but she, in her own way wanted some sort of movement on the diplomatic front to create a better understanding within the nations of Pakistan and India.

Benazir and the military intelligence took similar steps on the issue of training the Islamic radicals as well as the radical student groups to rise against the Najibullah and later the Hekmatyar government in Afghanistan and on the nuclear programme that was being developed with the aid of the Chinese, as the US at that point of time had backtracked on the issue of providing nuclear technology to the Pakistani nuclear scientists.

¹³ Mary Anne Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2002), p. 187.

¹⁴ Mohammed Waseem, “Causes of Democratic Downslide”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Article (Mumbai), November 2-9, 2002, see www.epw.org.in

¹⁵ Rakesh Gupta, *State in India, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asia*, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2004), p. 118.

¹⁶ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, p. 207

BENAZIR AND THE DECISION MAKING

Benazir Bhutto in the beginning maintained some sort of cordiality with the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan as well as with the military leader General Aslam Beg. It must be understood that Benazir, before the 1988 elections was not the choice of the military for the leader of the nation. Being the daughter of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and being a vociferous critic of Zia-ul-Haq, she was naturally not the immediate choice of the Army or Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who also was very close to Zia. Nawaz Sharif, being close to the Army coterie, as well as, the intelligence agencies, was thought to be the natural choice to be the next leader to take over the reigns of governance from the military. Even after thirteen days after the elections result was announced where it was found that the Pakistan People's Party, headed by Benazir, "had amassed the largest number of electoral votes , President Ishaq Khan had nervously consulted with his generals and bureaucrats, and with Nawaz Sharif", as Benazir waited for the formal invitation by the President to form the government.¹⁷ "On the fourteenth day, US Ambassador, Robert B. Oakley called on President Ishaq Khan, and made it clear that the United States believed that Benazir should be sworn in".¹⁸ This pressure made it clear to the President as well as the others that the Prime Ministership for Benazir had to be finalized.

The relation between the Benazir and the military was estranged from the very beginning and an inherent friction curbed the decision making ability of Benazir. The manner in which she removed Hamid Gul, the ISI director after the Jalalabad episode, earned her the wrath of the ISI.

Though the Americans had moved out from Afghanistan, the ISI under Hamid Gul was not at all eager to move out from Afghanistan, till the Communist government, under Najibullah was toppled and Pakistan's covert control over Afghanistan was ensured. As Lawrence Ziring has written, "Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, the ISI

¹⁷ Mary Anne Weaver, n. 13, p. 191.

¹⁸ Ibid.

director, had organized a drive on the important town of Jalalabad, near the Pakistan frontier. Arranged in conventional formation, the ISI-led fighters were soundly defeated by Najibullah's army and the reverberations of this failure rippled through Pakistan".¹⁹ According to Ziring, Hamid Gul suspected that Benazir and General Aslam Beg conspired to have him removed, and due to that reason, he "conferred with Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq in an attempt to enlist their services".²⁰ As Benazir came to know about the conspiracy, Hamid Gul was naturally removed from his position. But Benazir as well as Aslam Beg failed to tackle the ISI, as it rather remained more of an independent organisation, "accustomed to functioning outside the authority of the regular army".²¹

Dr. Farooq Leghari has himself agreed to the fact that the ISI did not want Benazir to have complete control both at the Centre as well as in Punjab, the stronghold of the Army structure.²²

The concept of the "Operation Midnight Jackal" at one point of time became extremely famous all throughout Pakistan, as the ISI was caught red handed trying to buy off PPP Members of the National Assembly to vote against the government on the eve of a no – confidence motion against Benazir.

It must be clearly understood that though the ISI Director at that point of time was chosen by Benazir directly, "but the ISI itself has a very strong sub culture that rejects foreign bodies. The solidly entrenched military interests did not let Kallu function and Lieutenant Gen Hameed Gul still pulled the strings from Multan, where he was Corps Commander. Maj Gen Kallu could not save Benazir from the presidential dismissal. According to a story which went round in those days, Benazir had to send an emissary to

¹⁹ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 2004), p. 213.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 214.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Quoted from an interview to Syed Ali Dayan Hassan, *The Herald* (February 2001), p. 29.

the US Ambassador asking him whether President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was actually about to dismiss her government".²³

She wanted to repeal the Eighth Amendment that hung as a dagger on her head but both the times she remained unsuccessful in removing it as she could not muster sufficient political support and ultimately became the victim of it, where the President of the nation arbitrarily removed her from the government taking recourse to the cause of bad governance and corruption.

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY MOVEMENTS DURING 1988 TO 1990

The first movement that took place in the external policy sector was the fourth SAARC Summit that took place in 1988 in Islamabad. As democracy ushered in Pakistan with the Prime Ministership of Benazir Bhutto, the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi visited Pakistan after 28 years and held discussions with Benazir Bhutto on many vital issues. These discussions ended in three agreements. One agreement was related to an understanding reached three years ago between General Zia ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi of not attacking each others nuclear installations and facilities directly or indirectly. The other two agreements principle concerns was the avoidance of double taxation and promote cultural exchanges. The first agreement even referred that both the governments will inform each other about their respective nuclear installations and facilities that included nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.²⁴ The second agreement as well as the third agreement was concrete steps towards conciliation amongst the relations between the nations. But as the relations went down constant ups and downs, both the foreign offices

²³ KN Daruwalla, "Pakistan: State, Polity and the ISI", *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol. CXXX, no. 539 (New Delhi), January – March 2000, p. 77.

²⁴ Agreement on the Prohibition or Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (Islamabad) December 31, 1988.

remained paralyzed and could not implement the spirit as well as the letter of the agreements.

The Islamabad Declaration that was issued after the summit had reference to the Maldives incident that took place on November 9, 1988, where the Indian armed forces arbitrarily intervened in the domestic politics of the nation.²⁵ Though it was not verbally condemned by the nations in the Summit, but with the backing of the Pakistani decision makers, the heads of the states of the other nations keeping out Maldives showed their displeasure on the high handedness of India in the internal political dynamics of the South Asian region. The issue was taken up largely by the military who questioned about the intentions of the Indian government of launching an air-cum-sea operation promptly hundreds of miles away from the nation.

Especially after the July 1989 visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Islamabad, Benazir overtly made overtures on improving relations with India. This was publicly criticized by the Islamic Jamhoori Itehad (IJI) or the Islamic Democratic Alliance leaders headed by Nawaz Sharif and opposed by the military.²⁶ Benazir talked about a nuclear weapon free sub-continent but no clear formula emerged from the talks in this regard. She assured the United States government that the Pakistani government was not pursuing any plans of building the 'Islamic bomb'. As pointed out in a Staff Report that was presented to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States government, that Benazir "reiterated her opposition to the development of a bomb but without a willingness to sign the Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty (NPT)".²⁷ But along with such pledges made by the nation's Prime Minister, it was also reported in the *Foreign Report* (January 1989) that "she did not have control over the allegedly secret Nuclear Weapons Programme Coordinating Committee chaired by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who, being General

²⁵ Joint Press Release issued at the End of Fourth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, December 31, 1988.

²⁶ Saeed Shafqat, *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, (Oxford, Lahore: West View Press and Pak Book Corporation, 1997), p. 235.

²⁷ *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containing the Threat*, A Staff Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington D.C., USGPO, 1988, p. 17, as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures', in P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftakharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non – Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives* (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 115.

Zia-ul-Haq's Minister for Finance and Secretary-General in the Ministry of Defence, had made a great contribution to the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability".²⁸ *Foreign Report* went on reporting that "Pakistan conducted wind-tunnel tests of the casing of a nuclear bomb which was designed for the F-16s that was being provided by the US government as well as acquired the technology to programme the computers on the F-16 aircrafts for nuclear bombing missions in 1989".²⁹

These reports certainly worried the George Bush Administration considerably, and as Zafar Iqbal Cheema has written, the US administration "warned the Pakistani government that American aid would be stopped if it did not cease the production of highly enriched uranium and its fabrication into nuclear components which is considered crucial to the assembly of a nuclear device".³⁰ When the US administration felt that the nuclear weapons programme in Pakistan continued unabated, in 1990 President Bush refused to certify to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device as required under the Pressler Amendment. The result was disastrous for Pakistan, as the US military and economic aid to Pakistan was stopped from the financial year of 1990 – 1991. This led to tremendous hardships for the Pakistani economy but due to the hardliners in the political establishment, the nuclear weapons programme continued. The first official admission about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability came in February 1992 in an interview by the then Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan to the *Washington Post* in which he stated that Pakistan had acquired the capability to assemble at least one nuclear device.³¹

Pakistan again joined the Commonwealth and India supported Pakistan regaining back her membership which it had withdrawn from 1972. This decision was taken "in

²⁸ "Pakistan's Atomic Bomb", *Foreign Report* (12 January, 1989), p. 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 1 – 2.

³⁰ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures", in P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non – Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives* (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 116.

³¹ *The News* (Washington, 10 February 1992) as quoted by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures", in P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., *Nuclear Non – Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives* (Colombo, New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 116.

view of the declared intention of Britain, New Zealand and Australia to recognize 'Bangla Desh'...In Pakistan's view, it amounted to the approval, encouragement, and legitimization of an act of aggression by one member of the Commonwealth against another".³² India too had to agree to Pakistan joining the Commonwealth as the nation was now governed by democratically elected leaders. India detested any Commonwealth nation being ruled by military dictatorship and fully supported democratically governed nations.

The ISI played a major role during these visits made by the Indian Prime Minister and it became one of the primary reasons for which the first regime of Benazir came to an abrupt end. It was reported that "on July 17, 1989 an intelligence agency clandestinely recorded the conversation between then Prime Ministers Benazir and Rajiv Gandhi while the latter was on a state visit to Pakistan. The room was bugged by the intelligence agency and the two leaders in the course of their private meeting at Islamabad discussed, among other issues, the possibility of mutual troop reduction. Apparently, Benazir was supposed to have agreed in principal to the proposal. Soon thereafter the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Mirza Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan met each other on July 24, 1989 and decided to topple the Benazir government. In order to convince the Opposition and obtain their backing for the need to destabilize the government these tapes were reportedly played to them".³³

In Afghanistan, during the last years of the eighties the ISI came up with the innovative "Bear Trap" strategy that certainly did achieve a short term goal of destabilizing the puppet governmental structure that existed on behalf of the Soviet forces. It has been said that "the free supply of drugs to the Soviet soldiers made them sterile to fight a long war. This was called the "mosquito operation" conceived by the French intelligence and passed on to US President Ronald Reagan who lapped it up as a

³² Pakistan Government announcement of 30 January 1972, *Pakistan News Digest* (Karachi), 15 February 1972, p. 3, as quoted by Khalida Qureshi, "Britain and the Indo - Pakistan Conflict over East Pakistan". in Mehrunnisa Ali, ed., *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971 - 1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 48.

³³ Munir Ahmed, *Pakistan Toot Jayega* (Urdu) (Pakistan Will Break Up), (Lahore: Taklikat Publishers, April 1996), p. 24, as cited by Dr. Bidanda M. Chengappa, "The ISI Role in Pakistan's Politics", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi, IDSA), February 2000, vol. XXIII, no. 11, p. 1869.

great strategy. Free distribution of the *Qu'ran* in the Central Asian countries by the Central Intelligence Agencies was another move to alienate the local Muslims from the Soviets. Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman, who remained the ISI Chief for nearly a decade, formulated the Afghan proxy war, or 'bear trap' as Brig. Yousef would like to call it".³⁴ These concepts of proxy war became a very efficient mechanism in the hands of the ISI later in harbouring the militants in Kashmir as well as play its part in the Afghan imbroglio. The fighting in Kashmir was intensified after the death of General Zia.

After the Soviet decision was taken for moving out from Afghanistan, the nation faced great complexities in the economic, political and security arenas. The large scale availability of arms and ammunition, left by the Soviets as well as the US who sponsored the anti Soviet activities by the Mujahideens, created a very violent atmosphere in the entire region. The proliferation of small arms in civil society degenerate the civil code that rules a society. Especially, for Afghanistan, the society was already broken into various factions, amongst war lords and creating a stable political structure in such vitiated atmosphere was a very difficult proposition. "Pakistan's foreign policy after the departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan received a rude shock when the United States and other Western allies backed out of any further involvement in post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan. The disintegration of Soviet Union and the emergence of Central Asian States opened up new avenues for the Western world to explore and win. Afghanistan no longer enjoyed the strategic exclusiveness that it had when access to Central Asian mineral wealth could only be obtained through the Pakistan – Afghanistan route. Pakistan was left on its own to face and solve the post-Afghan jihad problems with its own resources. In less than a decade Pakistan's dream of acquiring a strategic depth in Afghanistan was to end a nightmare. ISI's plan of installing a puppet regime of its protégés the Mujahideen who had been nurtured during the long years of struggle came unraveled when no Afghan leader would accept unquestioningly the authority of any other Afghan leader. Mujahideen leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prof. Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masud and Rashid Dostrum were simply unwilling to be under Islamabad's

³⁴ S K Datta and Rajeev Sharma, *Pakistan: From Jinnah to Jihad*, (New Delhi: UBSPD, 2002), p. 261.

thumb".³⁵ As a result, Benazir was not able to make significant moves to create an amicable as well as strong move on Afghanistan. The ISI maintained close links with the political leadership of Afghanistan that made it easier for them to corroborate with the Islamic student leadership that later went about with the creation of the Taliban leadership.

During the first years of governance she started playing a dual role in the political decision making mechanism. As she perceived the environment to be she portrayed herself into an extremely religious individual not annoying the multitude of religious extremist groups that held considerable power in the Pakistani society. They found tutelage under Zia and they were certainly not in the mood of being controlled by a woman and that too who was tutored in Western education and a liberal. The manner in which Benazir spoke out on the rights of free speech and expression, especially on the issue of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, created a rift in the Pakistani society itself, the Pakistani intellectuals appreciating Benazir's actions, whereas the Islamic traditionalist as well as fundamentalist vehemently opposed Benazir's stand.

The public opinion regarding this issue was broken into two. The educated and the liberal portion of the citizenry welcomed Benazir's posture as they were vastly relieved to find the Pakistani Prime Minister encouraging the freedom of expression and press, though heading an Islamic nation. But the populace having a strong religious bent of mind rather got extremely annoyed with Benazir. Headed by Islamic spiritual leaders they vociferously decried the writings of Salman Rushdie and considered any Muslim supporting such writings making an offence of blasphemy.

She thought of building liaisons with the Muslim world and in 1990 she made extensive trips to Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. For that reason Joint Economic Commissions were set up in Bahrain where two meetings took place during her first as well as her second regime of governance. With

³⁵ Arvind R. Deo, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Perspective", *Agni*, (New Delhi, Studies in International Strategic Issues), May-October 2001, vol. V, no. 4, p. 12.

Egypt, a Joint Ministerial Commission was set up in April 1989 and the first session of the JMC took place in 1995. But she was also not *a priori* informed about the intentions of the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussain, as she met the Iraqi President just before the Kuwait invasion by the Iraqi forces, on the 2 August 1990. As there was a major difference of opinion on Iraq between the Armed forces and Benazir in regard to the Pakistani stand on Iraq, where Benazir thought of joining the coalition against the illegal occupation of Iraq in Kuwait, and the Army generals saw their moral duty to stand by the Islamic nations at crisis. The situation became so worse, as Ziring has written, that “just four days following the invasion of Kuwait, on August 6, the Pakistan Army, in collaboration with President Ishaq, deposed Benazir, by using the Eighth Amendment and Article 58 (clause b) of the constitution”.³⁶

During her first tenure of Prime Ministership, multiple failures led to her downfall. No new legislation was passed during this period. On top of that, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) that made an alliance with the PPP while forming the government broke away in the last days of 1989 in which the ISI played a considerably influential role. The MQM later became a huge obstacle in Sindh as they took recourse to rioting and anti governmental actions that shook Benazir’s government from the very foundations. Corruption and nepotism became the other principal reason where the stand of Benazir became very weak. The role of Asif Ali Zardari, her husband, Nusrat, her mother as well as the role that her father-in-law weakened her position considerably during both the periods of her governance. The main impediment was that she thought she knew about the ill effects that they were bringing in on her position, but she had practically no control over them or their actions.

Finally, on August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Benazir government, dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Sindh and North-West Frontier Province provincial assemblies, and appointed a caretaker government headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the Combined Opposition Parties in the National Assembly.

³⁶ Lawrence Ziring, n. 19, p. 216.

Benazir Bhutto was ousted from power on August 6 1990 in “a coup – like manner. The Army took control of important government buildings in Islamabad, including the Prime Minister’s house and Parliament while Ishaq Khan announced the dismissal of the government and dissolution of the National Assembly”.³⁷ The reason cited by Ishaq Khan for dismissing the Benazir government included “corruption and nepotism; willful undermining the constitutional arrangements and usurpation of the authority of the provinces resulting in deadlock and confrontation; failure to maintain law and order in Sindh; violation of various provisions of the constitution; and a failure of the National Assembly to discharge ‘substantive legislative functions’ mainly because of internal discord, dissension, corrupt practices, and the buying of political loyalties by offering material inducements”.³⁸

A diplomat quipped to Mary Anne Weaver that Benazir was bound to come back to power but said that he was not sure if she could rule. The choices before her remained unutilised. As he said, “She wasn’t able to focus, and move things forward, or to control situations. May be she will pick better people next time. It’s her streak of loyalty that kills her; she always goes back to what people have done in the past – how they served her father, how much time they spent in jail – rather than considering what they could do in the future. She therefore failed to tap an enormous pool of brilliant young intellectuals and technocrats who could have turned this country around. Instead she relied on feudal landlords, who catered to her illusion that it was her birth right to rule. She is one of the most bewildering women I’ve ever met; one moment she is utter charm; the next moment she is so antagonistic that she comes perilously close to impertinence. But she is not a sulker, she is a battler and a survivor, and that’s not all bad”.³⁹

³⁷ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, p. 209.

³⁸ *President Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s Address to the Nation and the Dissolution Order* (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 6 August 1990) as cited by Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n.1, p. 280

³⁹ Mary Anne Weaver, n. 13, p. 193 – 194.

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY MOVEMENTS DURING 1993 TO 1997

Khaled Ahmed says that “the nineties have proved to be the worst decade for Pakistan. It was a decade when it was weaned away from its special relations with the United States, and when relations with Afghanistan plummeted in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. The nineties also witnessed declining Pakistani remittance from the Gulf (from three billion dollars in the eighties to one billion), the bogging down of its relations with Central Asia, the disquieting fluctuations in China’s attitude on Kashmir, and the enforcement of stringent anti – dumping laws in European Union – Pakistan relations”.⁴⁰

After Benazir came to power again for the second time as suggested by many political analysts that she would certainly make a come back, she turned out to be a bit more politically mature than the last time. Benazir did not “buckle at the internecine warfare that went on relentlessly in Afghanistan between the Mujahideens and the new Islamic student group, the Taliban, and Benazir feeling the nerve of the moment abandoned the Mujahideen and rewarded the Taliban with her support. She was assisted in her efforts by her little known Director General of Military Operations – Pervez Musharraf”.⁴¹

During her second term, three issues dominated her foreign policy agenda – Kashmir, Afghanistan, and seeking removal of the Pressler Amendment.⁴² During her tenure of Prime Ministership she made 35 visits to various foreign countries and from October 1993 to April 1995 she made 25 out of the 35 visits. Though it was an extremely expensive proposition for an economically challenged nation like that of Pakistan, the basic objective that she tried to achieve through these objectives was to attract as much foreign investment possible and to internationalise the Kashmir issue by drawing the attention of the global community towards the atrocities meted out by the Indian

⁴⁰ Khaled Ahmed, “Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Ideology and Isolation”, *World Affairs* (New Delhi), January – March 1999, vol. 3, no. 1, p.40

⁴¹ Mary Anne Weaver, n. 13, p. 26.

⁴² Saeed Shafqat, n. 26, p. 244.

governmental authorities on the innocent civilians of the Kashmir valley. Her government tried to present the then state of affairs that persisted in the valley in international forums and in bodies under the United Nations. But as this effort lacked a proper insight and commitment, it failed to garner support from the international community for the Pakistani position. Still the effort certainly embarrassed the Indian authorities and raised the general level of awareness about Kashmir amidst the global actors.⁴³

She wanted to acquire a free transit route through Afghanistan to Central Asia, and as Northern Afghanistan was at that time became a war zone, the only viable option in front of her was Southern Afghanistan. The road route from Quetta to Kandahar, to Herat through to Ashkhabad – the capital of Turkmenistan were viable trade routes through Afghanistan that lay as major options in front of Benazir. Pakistan towards this objective wanted to reconstruct the highway from Quetta to Herat. On this route was the border town of Spin Baldak which was considered to be of significance as it was a critical transit point for trucks to re-fuel. But as the town was under the Afghan war lords, it became extremely unsafe for the truckers. To secure a safe transit route, the Pakistani transport lobby, therefore, desired the government to take actions so that the transit from Quetta to Kandahar became more economically viable. Towards this objective, on 12th October 1994, around 200 Taliban men from Kandahar and Pakistani *madrssahs* arrived at Spin Baldak – and wrested control of the Afghan border town after a pitched battle with the war lords.⁴⁴

Pakistan went on sponsoring the Taliban overtly with the aid of the Pakistani Army as well as the ISI for getting hold of as many power centres from the clutches of the Mujahideen. “Colonel Imam of the ISI accompanied a convoy of 30 trucks with 80 ex-Pakistani Army drivers from Quetta to Kandahar on October 29 1994 that was hijacked by “the *mujahideen* war-lords”. Pakistan, to tackle the problem, directed the Taliban on 3rd November 1994, to rescue the convoy and thereby impose their supremacy over the *mujahideen*. The next logical step was for them to capture Kandahar and this led

⁴³ Saeed Shafqat, n. 26, p. 245

⁴⁴ Bidanda M Chengappa, *Pakistan Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p. 77.

to the emergence of the Taliban control over Afghanistan for the next seven years till 2001 October”.⁴⁵

Nasrullah Babbar, the Interior Minister in her Cabinet, was alleged to be the key architect of the Taliban, which started out as a small, armed movement of former madrassa students. Babbar was a mentor of sorts to Mullah Mohammad Omar, who went on to head the Taliban.⁴⁶

As Mary Anne Weaver has written in this context:

“He (General Pervez Musharraf), General Babar, and the ISI – as Ziaul Haq and his generals had done over a decade before – crafted yet another Afghan policy that would insure a Pakistani presence in a compliant Afghan state. Their rationale was known in military parlance as “strategic depth”: to secure a friendly northern and western border as a bulwark against India. The Pakistani Army – working through the ISI and supported by rich Pashtun merchants on both sides of the frontier – believed that the arms and training it freely gave to the Taliban was an investment for the future. And although the Bhutto government – as the governments of Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf would later do – routinely denied that it was shoring up the Taliban, the fact remained that the planes, tanks and armaments that the black-turbaned Talibs frequently showed off were clearly not all captured in battles with their remaining mujahideen opponents”.⁴⁷

According to Naveed Ahmed Tahir, “when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 and very nearly took over Mazar-i-Sharif in April 1997, there were strong indications that the US might recognize the militia as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Washington also turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban’s

⁴⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London, New York: IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), pp. 26 – 28, as cited by Bidanda M Chengappa, *Pakistan Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p. 78.

⁴⁶ John Cherian, “The Benazir Mission”, *Frontline*, (Chennai, *Hindu*), December 08 – 21 2001, volume 18 - issue 25. see www.frontline.org

⁴⁷ Mary Anne Weaver. n. 13, p. 26

unsuccessful attacks on Mazar-i-Sharif in their bid to occupy the North of Afghanistan”.⁴⁸

There was a basic distinctness in Benazir’s attitude while she governed Pakistan. Having a very strong secular base she though at one hand sponsored the Taliban radicals in Afghanistan, she was as well as worried about the overlapping effect that would effect on Pakistan. As Lawrence Ziring has noted, “Benazir’s secular propensities were more in evidence following the alleged coup” in Afghanistan.⁴⁹ He went on writing that “her tirade against the religious community came at a time when the army was torn between too much and too little emphasis on the nation’s spiritual life”.⁵⁰ There was a clear clash between the decisions taken by President Leghari and Prime Minister Bhutto. When the Prime Minister recommended the name of General Karamat for the position of the General of the Pakistani Army, President Leghari hesitated openly in officially designating General Karamat in the coveted and responsible position. President Leghari, as Ziring has noted, had a better understanding of the developments that was taking place in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. “Leghari replaced Bhutto’s appointments in the Supreme Court with judges approved by the Pakistan Bar Association who had reputations for unfettered honesty. Benazir was not happy with the President’s assertiveness, nor was Leghari pleased with Benazir’s decision making”.⁵¹ The clash between the decision makers became a major impediment for smooth and continuous decision making.

But that does not mean that the Pakistani governmental machinery remained stuck with the adversities that was impending the formulation of proper decisions. In 1996 alone there were multiple high level visits from Pakistan to Afghanistan as well as vice versa. The foreign secretary Najmuddin Sheikh visited Afghanistan twice during this period and the interior minister, Nasrullah Khan Babbar visited Afghanistan on the month of October 1996. From Afghanistan the Minister of Transport Abdul Ghaffar Saim on

⁴⁸ Naveed Ahmed Tahir, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy: The Regional and International Dimensions”, *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), January 2000, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 28.

⁴⁹ Lawrence Ziring, n. 19, p. 239.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 240.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 240.

May 1996 and the Taliban interior minister Younus Qanooni on August 1996 to Pakistan. During this period, the Pakistan government gave to the Taliban Rs 70000 million for the improvement of road infrastructure between Chaman – Kandahar and Rs.40,000 million for the improvement of the communication system of the Taliban governmental structure.⁵²

During this period, “some United States officials implicated Pakistan in the sustained *intifada* in Kashmir as well as the Sikh insurrection in India’s Punjab state. Moreover, Afghan freedom fighters had surfaced in some celebrated terrorist incidents in Europe and the United States. In January 1994, therefore, Pakistan was placed on the ‘watch list’ of potential terrorist states, and the Benazir government was hard put to it in making its case that the country should not be so labeled”.⁵³

Benazir also visited the United States in April – May 1996. She had to marshal all her diplomatic resources to convince Washington of her country’s peaceful pursuits. Her principle objective was to create an atmosphere of understanding regarding the issues of the Pressler Amendment and the release of the F-16 fighter bombers that was put on hold by the US government by the Pressler Amendment. Benazir knew that it would be difficult to win the support of the US government authorities on these complex issues in one go and wanted to initiate the process of understanding which would later resolve the dispute on these two issues. “Benazir’s return in power coincided with the change in American government that had brought Bill Clinton into the Presidency in January 1993. The new President’s foreign security advisors had stressed the need to sustain previous defense agreements between the two countries. Thus, joint exercises between Pakistani and American forces continued albeit at lower levels, and the Clinton administration hinted at the possibility of releasing the F-16 fighter aircraft for which Islamabad had paid \$658 million”.⁵⁴ Her basic achievement during this extensive visit was that she was able to muster sympathy, support, goodwill and appreciation from the US administration.

⁵² Pakistan – Afghanistan Relations, *Foreign Affairs Division*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see www.pakistan.gov.pk

⁵³ Lawrence Ziring. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 552.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 553.

Her efforts to normalize the relation between the two nations started to show signs of rapid improvement.

Lawrence Ziring while analyzing Benazir's actions has written that "what Benazir was able to do was accomplished by dint of her positive credentials in Washington circles. Thus, it became clear that it was Benazir who persuaded the Clinton administration to reconsider Pakistan's argument that either the aircraft purchase contract is honoured or the country be refunded its money. She also caused the US Department of State to re-examine its position on Kashmir. As a consequence of her successful lobbying, Benazir also convinced the State Department to refrain from pursuing the terrorist designation".⁵⁵

Ziring went on explaining Benazir's foreign policy options at hand when he commented that though "Benazir had a difficult time in convincing the Americans that the government's purchase of missile systems from China was not a violation of treaty commitments entered into with the United States. Islamabad also justified its acceptance of Chinese assistance in the development of its Chashma nuclear facility. Arguing its right as a sovereign nation, Benazir was constrained to emphasize that Pakistan was an independent country, and that her government was responsible for the nation's defense as well as its modernization. Pakistan, she declared, wanted good relations with the United States, but not at the cost of the country's security or dignity".⁵⁶

As Lawrence Ziring has quoted that "to demonstrate its commitment to international peace, Pakistan had posted 5,000 soldiers in Somalia as part of a UN peacekeeping mission that had been initially prompted by the United States. Contingents of Pakistani forces also served in the UN missions in trouble spots stretching from Asia to Africa to the Caribbean in the western hemisphere, but although these services were generally acknowledged, they did little to move the international community on the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

matter of Kashmir. Nor did Pakistan's display of international cooperation give it the advantage in its contest with India".⁵⁷

On both the conflicting issues regarding the Pressler Amendment and release of F-16, the PPP regime voiced out their opinion that it had won moral victory and subsequently the Brown Amendment was hailed as a major achievement that improved the US Pakistan relations. In this manner she made a conscious effort to sustain and strengthen a relationship of trust and confidence with the United States.⁵⁸

The concept of the Developing Eight Countries or the D-8 took form and shape in a seminar on 'Cooperation in Development' that took place in Istanbul and the idea was mooted by Dr. Necmetin Erbakan, the former Prime Minister of Turkey which was whole heartedly supported by the Benazir Government, as the countries that were supposed to be the members of this group were Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh and Nigeria.⁵⁹ Benazir's return to power brought back some courage and confidence amongst foreign investors and with the age of globalization and liberalization that was setting in the region, Pakistan too was not left far behind. "Benazir's return had attracted external funds, and a sizeable investment in the country's energy sector was made by American, South Korean, and Hong Kong Chinese financiers and business interests. Pakistan also continued to receive loans and grant assistance from the World Bank, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank".⁶⁰

'The dismissal of Benazir on the November 5th 1996 was again carried out in a coup-style. The Army took control of the Prime Minister's house and secretariat, and Benazir Bhutto was not allowed any communication with her colleagues for several hours... Later the President framed several charges against the Benazir government in the dismissal order. Some of these were familiar while others were new and included non-implementation of the judgment of the Supreme Court, attempts to destroy the

⁵⁷ Ibid. pp. 553 – 554.

⁵⁸ Saeed Shafqat, n. 26, pp. 245 – 246.

⁵⁹ Developing Eight Countries, Background Note on D-8, *Foreign Affairs Division*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see www.pakistan.gov.pk

⁶⁰ Lawrence Ziring, n. 53, p. 561.

independence of judiciary through the proposed accountability law, the bugging of telephones of senior officials and judges, and “extra – judicial’ killings”.⁶¹

EVALUATION

It can be said that during the governance of Benazir, Pakistan achieved some sore of face lift in the international arena. The ushering of a democratic regime after the long standing military rule was welcomed by the world community and being the first women prime minister of any Islamic nation, Benazir in no time got world recognition. The aura that she had created during her period in Oxford while she obtained degrees on Philosophy, Politics and Economics made her acceptable by the world political leaders.

But the manner in which she tried to mould herself to secure her position as the Prime Minister of the nation made her more vulnerable to the elements that were not satisfied with her as the Prime Minister. There have been various analyses that have pointed out that she could have managed the situation existing then in a more mature manner if she did not give way to the wrong and corrupt people under her Party and directly under her tutelage that created large fissures in her governmental structure as well as on her credibility as a leader. She also remained unsuccessful as a major decision maker in the foreign policy making machinery as she was not able to control the internal political squabble that led to her dismissal during both her Prime Ministerships. Even the Foreign Office did not play a major role during her Prime Ministership and was practically sidelined from the decision making mechanism. But she certainly tried to bring in a major change in attitude of the world political actors that saw Pakistan from a negative view point.

The areas where she failed were to maintain cordiality between the other decision making mechanisms that was extremely important not only for her survival but also for maintaining a continuum in foreign policy decision making and also create a consensus on the major decisions that she took. A shadow of suspicion always lurched on all her decisions that made the decisions base very weak.

⁶¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, pp. 224 – 225.

The concluding chapter of the study will try to analyze between the two democratic leaders and the manner in which they managed the internal political schism as well as was able to come up with significant foreign policy decisions.

The forthcoming chapter will be studying the periods in which Nawaz Sharif took over the reigns of governance and brought in his own personality cult in the foreign policy making machinery.

IV –NUCLEAR PAKISTAN: NAWAZ SHARIF AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

INTRODUCTION

The second democratic leader that took the reins of decision making in Pakistani politics was the leader of the IJI, Nawaz Sharif. He was a leader who was a bit more politically prepared than Benazir as he got the opportunity of entering the Pakistani governmental machinery during the Zia regime. Hasan-Askari Rizvi has rightly pointed out that “Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister in the first week of November 1990 with the abundant goodwill of the President and the top brass of the military. Groomed during Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law, he won the appreciation and support of the senior commanders because of his defiant posture towards the Benazir government”.¹

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had two distinct advantages over the governing pattern of Benazir. As Hasan-Askari Rizvi has suggested when speaking about Nawaz’s coming to power that, “First, he had been associated with the Punjab government since 1981, as minister of finance and later as chief minister. Consequently, he was not only familiar with how the government worked but also had considerable goodwill among the senior echelons of civil and military bureaucracy”.² He took pride in identifying himself with General Zia-ul-Haq and has continued to defend his political legacy. Second, he was the first Pakistani prime minister whose social base was an urban Punjabi business family. He broke the monopoly of land owning groups (feudals) or former bureaucrats who had on previous occasions held the office of the prime minister. In popular perception, Nawaz Sharif was a protégé of the military regime, who was trained and groomed by them. On becoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was quick to dispel this

¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p. 210.

² Saeed Shafiqat, *Civil – Military Relations in Pakistan*, (Boulder, Lahore: Westview Press and Pak Book Corporation, 1997), p. 238.

perception, projected his electoral credentials, underscored his popular support base and sought legitimacy as an elected leader. Nawaz Sharif made concerted efforts to establish his credentials as an autonomous, independent and assertive leader. While making decisions, he was firm, decisive and showed qualities of a risk-taker leader. One more reason that can be cited to be of advantage for Nawaz was that he was the second leader during the democratic phase in the nineties, and he did not carry with him the limelight that Benazir was ushered with that made him able to carry on the duties of the Prime Ministership without much pomp and show. As he was also associated with the Islamic parties, he also got acceptance from the *Ulemas* and the other religious leaders who play a considerable role in providing the legitimacy of a leader. As a foreign policy decision maker, he showed more ability than his predecessor and during the two phases of his democratic governance, multiple external policies were taken by his government that changed the course of Pakistan's foreign policy making as well as brought in his untimely dismissals.

NAWAZ SHARIF AND THE DECISION MAKERS

Nawaz Sharif from the very beginning maintained a very cordial relationship between the President and the Army Chief. He was considered to be the natural option as the Prime Minister after the end of the military rule of Zia and after the elections that would bring an end to the interim government. But as the elections were more free and fair than expected, for that reason, Benazir got the opportunity to grab the position of Prime Ministership much to the dislike of the Army as well as the President. But after Benazir's dismissal, and the elections of 1990, the coalition headed by IJI brought in Nawaz Sharif as the next Prime Minister.

After securing his position as the Prime Minister of the nation on November 6 1990, Nawaz retained back the glory of the intelligence forces, which was severely undermined during the regime of Benazir.

It will become easier if Nawaz's relationship is analyzed with the other two principal decision making elements in the two phases.

In the beginning of the first phase of his prime ministership, Nawaz Sharif maintained a cordial relation with both the President as well as the Army Chief. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan practically had a very soft corner for Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif's first cabinet was considerably smaller than that of Benazir Bhutto. Tightly drawn, the cabinet reflected the different regions of the country, but drew the heaviest representation from the Prime Minister's own province.

The army, as mentioned before did not like any intervention in the foreign policy decision making process. But as Nawaz Sharif mistook the goodwill and cordiality that the Armed forces ushered on him, he single handedly started on taking major appointments in the army, intelligence and the bureaucracy. He also initiated major domestic as well as foreign policy decisions by himself without consulting the other two heads in the policy making structure, that had been the norm from the very beginning of the democratic regime. This, in no time, started creating major fissures in the relationship between Nawaz Sharif and the chiefs of the Armed as well as the intelligence forces. Though the President in the beginning started acting as the bridge between Nawaz Sharif and the military, but as the Prime Minister gave no heed to the worsening relations, the President also had to break the relations he had with Nawaz Sharif. The latter was extremely adamant in bringing about a change to the Eighth Amendment and introduction of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Ehtesab Act.³

When Nawaz Sharif took over as PM, Assad Durrani was promoted in the same assignment (DG ISI) as Lt General within less than a fortnight (on 19 November 1990), thereby restoring the 'prestige' of the organization which was disturbed by the selection of retired Lieutenant Generals to that post as was done by Benazir. Durrani was a natural selection as he helped the III opposition to Benazir's government. Ayaz Amir says that "during the run-up to the election, while he served under the Interim Government, and

³ "Story of Pakistan", Timeline Events – 1988 – 1998, see www.storyofpakistan.com

even earlier when he was with the MI, Durrani was supposed to have helped the IJI opposition parties to combine against Benazir”.⁴ The ISI played a major role in installing Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. During the 1990 general elections, “the ISI obtained Rs 140 million (US \$ 6.45 million at the 1990 rate of exchange) from a banker and distributed most of this amount to the IJI and other leaders on the instructions of the then President and with the full knowledge and blessing of the Army Chief”⁵. Hamid Gul is reported to have stated: “it was necessary to create a countervailing force to the PPP, otherwise democracy could not have been restored”.⁶

But in no time the amount of changes that came in the ISI created a sense of bewilderment amongst the ranks. The major rifts that were caused between Aslam Beg and Nawaz Sharif on the Gulf War issue that has been described below, led to early retirement for Aslam Beg. As Durrani was considered to be an Aslam Beg man, after Beg retired as the Army Chief on August 6 1991, Durrani’s days were numbered, and in March 1992 he was shifted and replaced by Lt General Javed Nasir from the Corps Engineers.⁷ Javed Nasir was responsible for involving the Pakistan ISI with terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, an action which brought Pakistan close to being branded as a terrorist state. On American pressure he was later prematurely retired and replaced by Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi, who was formerly Director General Military Intelligence.⁸

In the second phase of Nawaz Sharif, the relationship between the *troika* was also very similar. In the initial stages, the Prime Minister maintained an extremely cordial relationship with the other decision making elements. But his over-leadership character brought him to direct loggerheads with the President as well as with the Armed forces during various occasions. Over that, the intervention of his family members in the decision making procedure also created major cause of dissension for the Armed forces,

⁴ Ayaz Amir, “The Unlikely Spymaster”, *The Herald*, March 1992, pp. 43-44.

⁵ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, p. 193

⁶ Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Invisible Government”, *Newsline*, October 1992, p. 28.

⁷ Ayaz Amir, “The Unlikely Spymaster”, *The Herald*, March 1992, pp. 43-44: Assad Durrani was always considered Aslam Beg’s man.

⁸ KN Daruwala, “Pakistan: State, Polity and the ISI”, *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, (New Delhi), vol. CXXX, no. 539, January – March 2000, pp. 77 – 78.

who felt the eerie similarity between Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz's brother, Mian Shahbaz Sharif. By passing the Thirteenth Amendment he curbed the powers of the President in a major way, where the President lost the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the Assembly, which the President enjoyed for more than two decades. President Leghari himself got so disturbed by the manner in which the Prime Minister's office influenced the judges of the high court, making them redundant in their positions. By introducing the Fourteenth Amendment as well as passing numerous Acts and Bills, he took over the power of the *troika* in his hands. He also tried to overtly Islamize the society trying to establish the Shariat law. For that reason, the relationship that he started nurturing between the COAS as well as the President soured to such an extent that when General Musharraf was being planned to be removed by Nawaz, it did not take much of an effort for General Musharraf to overthrow Nawaz Sharif from the position of Prime Ministership in 1999.

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS DURING 1990 TO 1993

Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as the Prime Minister for the first time, on November 6, 1990. Nawaz had "come to his responsibilities surrounded by international trouble spots, and the sudden demise of the Soviet Union did more to confuse the situation than clarify his government's options. It was Nawaz Sharif's judgment that, rather than become too embroiled in foreign policy issues, it would be better for his administration to address domestic questions. Indeed, the country required stabilization in a period of worldwide uncertainty, and Nawaz Sharif believed he had the formula for internal change. Moreover, the success of his programmes would also determine the degree to which Pakistan could position itself in a transitional world. The Prime Minister, therefore, centred his policies on economic stability and growth".⁹ The economic policies that he took became more of populist policies that instead of socio-economic stability it led to the growth of corruption and nepotism amongst the government structure. In July 1992, Nawaz Sharif fixed a monthly salary wage of Rs 1500 for unskilled workers. The best example of Sharif's populist politics was, however, his

⁹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 533.

introduction of the Yellow Cab Employment Scheme.¹⁰ All of these schemes led to more unpopularity of the Nawaz Sharif government and these issues were taken up by the opposition against the government.

After occupying the position of the Prime Minister, similar to that of Benazir Bhutto, who had to attend the Islamabad Summit within days after becoming the Prime Minister, he had to attend the Fifth SAARC Summit in Malé, the capital of Maldives on November 23 1990. The summit brought about declarations on the economic forefront of globalization that was taking place on the pretext of the Uruguay Round.¹¹

During his stay as the Prime Minister in the first regime, Nawaz Sharif got the opportunity to attend the following SAARC Summits that were held in Colombo on December 21 1991 and in Dhaka on April 11 1993. It was decided that Pakistan will hold the Ministerial Conference on Disabled Persons in the year 1993.¹² The idea of South Asian Preferential Trade Area was first conceived by the Sri Lankan President, Ranasinghe Premadasa.

Nawaz Sharif also changed the nuclear posture immediately after coming to power. According to Lawrence Ziring, “Nawaz declared it to be his government’s goal to accelerate development of the country’s nuclear programme. Cautioning that this did not mean the pursuit of an “Islamic bomb”, the Prime Minister said he wanted Pakistan to be a modern state and that the science and technology of the nuclear era were important to the country’s modernization”.¹³

The first major decision that was given out by Nawaz Sharif was in deciding to assist the US in the Gulf War against the Kuwaiti occupation by Iraqi forces. The

¹⁰ Ian Talbot, *India and Pakistan*, (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000) p. 216 – 217.

¹¹ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, *Fifth Summit Declaration*, 23 November 1990.

¹² *The Declaration of the Seventh SAARC Summit of the Heads of State or Government of Member Countries*, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation issued on 11th April 1993.

¹³ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publication, 2004), p.219.

American-led military offensive against Saddam Hussain had unpredictable consequences in Pakistan. The Pakistani government had sent several thousand of Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia ignoring the advice of the armed forces against the decision, as “his government supported the coalition building efforts of the United States against Iraq”¹⁴, and for that reason, the forces that were sent to Saudi Arabia were never deployed. There was a massive uprising in Pakistan and there were massive road agitations as well as rallies against the governmental support given to the US forces. Pakistanis openly criticized the American-directed campaign.

It was in this context that, “on December 2nd, General Aslam Beg, the COAS, propounded his ‘strategic defiance’ thesis, arguing that an act of defiance (i.e. Iraq’s refusal to bow to Western pressure) was a prerequisite for making deterrence effective and credible. He elaborated his views in another address to the officers on 28 January 1991, when he described the air raids on Iraq by the US and its allies as a part of American strategy to destroy the power of the states that could in any way threaten Israel. He maintained that after the destruction of Iraq, the next target could be Iran and that a day might come when Pakistan would face such a wrath”.¹⁵ These statements were viewed as an attempt by the General to cultivate the political elements in Pakistan that were opposed to the government’s pro – America policy, and thus build pressure on the civilian government. Under normal circumstances, the Army Chief would have been reprimanded for publicly diverging from the official policy. However, the civilian government lacked courage to take such a course of action. The government and the Army Chief diverged again when, in July, General Beg issued a statement on the growing threat of war with India. The Nawaz government publicly disagreed with the statement by suggesting that there was imminent threat of war”.¹⁶ Nawaz Sharif later tried to go ahead with some damage control measures towards the US Pakistan

¹⁴ Saeed Shafqat, n.2, p. 237.

¹⁵ Quarterly Survey of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, *Pakistan Horizon* (The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi), January 1991, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 146 – 153.

¹⁶ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n. 1, p.210-211.

relationship, but Washington did not acknowledge his peace overture and American aid was not resumed.¹⁷

The developments that took place in Afghanistan that led to a failed peace initiative amongst Najibullah and the fighting mujahideen factions, added to Nawaz Sharif's burden. Moreover, while Najibullah was finally forced to yield to the mujahideen forces, the different factions that occupied Kabul displayed considerable difficulty in forming a new Afghan government. Unable to agree on a collective formula, that proceeded to attack one another, and Pakistani mediation efforts were also unsuccessful. Akram Zaki, Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, spoke for all the higher officials when he noted that "Pakistan's foreign policy used to be walking on a tightrope; now it is walking a minefield and it does not have a map".¹⁸

The military was extremely dissatisfied in the manner in which the Nawaz government was handling the foreign policy formulations of Pakistan. "The US had suspended military sales, military training programmes and economic assistance to Pakistan from October 1 1990 (one month before Sharif assumed power) by invoking the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act as retaliation against Pakistan's nuclear programme. While agreeing that Pakistan should not unilaterally surrender its nuclear weapon option, the military expected the government to devise a diplomatic solution for weapons procurement from the US. Such a prospect was marred as the US and Pakistan diverged on the issues of drug trafficking from and through Pakistan and the activities of Pakistan-based transnational Islamic groups linked with the Afghan resistance movement, known as Afghan war veterans. As they threatened American interests or the governments of the Muslim countries perceived to be pro-US, corrupt and un-Islamic in their policies, the US and these governments asked Pakistan to contain such groups. In 1992, the US Department of State placed Pakistan on the 'watch list' of states allegedly sponsoring terrorism. The military, concerned about Pakistan's image

¹⁷ Ian Talbot, n. 9, p. 539.

¹⁸ *The News*, 21 August, 1992.

abroad and keen to obtain weapons, felt that the Nawaz Sharif government was not doing enough to counter these difficulties".¹⁹

Due to the domestic turmoil that existed in the nation, Nawaz Sharif was not able to concentrate on the foreign policy decision making process. Rather he became more embroiled in the ethnic politics that ruled roost during his period of governance. Due to the political instability in the domestic politics, policies that were being framed for the increase of prestige regionally and internationally were sidelined.

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS DURING 1997 TILL THE *COUP D'ÉTAT*

Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister for the second time on February 17, 1997, obtaining 177 votes in a house of 217 members.²⁰ This time also he tried to keep some sort of cohesion between the *troika*, which did not last long. He also tried to bring in some sort of economic development in the nation, when in March 1997 he introduced multiple economic packages like the loan retirement scheme, the 2010 Programme for good governance, and so forth. The government also was able to secure a low-interest loan of \$ 1.6 billion from the IMF under the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), subject to several structural changes in the economy. The first two instalments of this loan were received in October 1997 and March 1998.²¹

There were major external dimensions that were added to Pakistan's foreign policy making during this period of Nawaz Sharif's second government that is from 1997 till he was dismissed by the military coup that led to his fall.

In 1997 Nawaz Sharif and Inder Kumar Gujral agreed on eight working groups to discuss all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.²²

¹⁹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n.1, p. 212 – 213.

²⁰ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n.1, p.226.

²¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n.1, p. 226.

²² Najam Sethi, "Diplomacy as verbal gymnastics", *Indian Express*, Tuesday, November 04, 2003.

During the initial years of his regime, trouble brewed in Afghanistan. The *Taliban* and their opposition had entered into a new phase of civil war and both sides were getting assistance from various nations. There were reports that the forces opposing the *Taliban* regime were getting military assistance from the Russians. It was said that large number of Russian flights had brought in huge number of military and other supplies to the opposing forces. In other reports it was mentioned that the Pakistani Army was overtly as well as covertly supporting the *Talibani* forces in the war.

In an apparent move to dispel some of the mutual mistrust, on June 6-8 1997, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pshvalyuk visited Islamabad and held talks focused on Afghanistan with the Pakistan Foreign Office. The joint Russo-Pakistan statement after this meeting expressed the hope that the two sides could work together to help Afghan factions reach a settlement, although they disagreed over the *Taliban*. The Russian side said that it considered the *Taliban* as only one of several players in Afghanistan and disagreed with Islamabad's recognition of *Taliban* as the legitimate government.²³ In the same period, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan also visited Moscow and briefed Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov on Pakistan's perception of the Afghan conflict. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub defended Pakistan's recognition of the *Taliban* government and said the decision was based on the fact that *Taliban* controlled Kabul and 22 out of 32 *Afghan* provinces which had resulted in comparative peace and law and order in the areas controlled by them. The allegation of the presence of Pakistani soldiers on Afghani soil was also categorically denied.²⁴ During this period, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan opined that a broad-based government in Afghanistan was the best possible solution to the crisis. He expressed satisfaction on the fact that Russia was apparently willing to cooperate in this regard. Nevertheless, the exchange of allegations and counter-allegations between Russia and Pakistan on the export of fundamentalism, terrorism and embroilment in the civil war in

²³ *Dawn* 11 June 1997.

²⁴ *Dawn* 10 June 1997.

Afghanistan continued throughout, and from the time the Russian began their offensive in Chechnya, the allegations and counter-allegations increased.²⁵

Pakistan was also experiencing massive influx of refugees from the western borders. Due to the political instability that was ruling roost in Afghanistan, people in millions were pouring into NWFP and Balochistan that in itself turned into a major concern for not only the Pakistani governmental machinery but also various international organisations like the UNHCR, who worked closely in assessing the situation in those areas. The refugee problem gave birth to multiple ill effects on the Pakistani society as the amount of proliferation of arms, the drug trade and the growth of the black economy in the country shot up. As Naveed Ahmed Tahir has stated that “despite the fact that Pakistan’s fight against drug has been described as a “success story” in a recent UN report, for it has eradicated over 60 per cent of the opium poppy cultivation during the 1998 – 1999 growing season and in 1998 elaborated a comprehensive drug law enforcement programme, the country was still being used as a conduit for drug smuggling from Afghanistan”.²⁶

Pakistan was also accused of “sending in Pakistani nationals trained in *Deeni Madressahs* to fight alongside the *Taliban*. The former Afghan President and leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front Sibgatullah Mujaddedi requested the then Pakistan’s Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf to take effective steps for the withdrawal of Pakistani nationals from Afghanistan and to halt supplying all types of war-making material to the *Taliban* (Mujaddedi also called upon Afghanistan’s other neighbours to stop military backing of the Northern Alliance and other factions. He asked them to take serious and practical steps for the restoration of peace and stability and the formation of a popular representative government in Afghanistan)”.²⁷

²⁵ Naveed Ahmed Tahir, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy: The Regional and International Dimensions”, *Pakistan Horizon* (The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi), January 2000, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 26 – 27.

²⁶ *Dawn* 24 February 2000.

²⁷ *Dawn* 11 November, 1999.

The next major step amongst the major foreign policy decisions that were initiated was on the issue of the nuclear tests that both the major nations of South Asia, India and Pakistan went along with, in 1998. As Samina Ahmed and David Cortright has pointed out “the official nuclear policy has all along enjoyed public support”²⁸ Mohammed Waseem has stated that “while the Kashmir dispute topped the list of issues of public interest, the nuclear issue stood at the sixth position. However, 85 percent of the respondents favored the policy of going nuclear if India opted for a nuclear test. Generally, people were not sensitive about the cost of human life in the case of a nuclear war or the devastating effect of economic sanctions. The role of India in the region remained the highest determining factor in foreign policy in the public eye. The tiny anti-nuclear lobby in Pakistan has ascribed the relative insensitivity of the public to the horrors of a nuclear arms race in South Asia”²⁹ The issue of nuclearisation, Afghanistan as well as Kashmir was domesticated to such an extent that people of Pakistan following the trend of over nationalism fell for the nuclearisation and weaponisation of the entire region.

Initially after the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan tested the international waters before going ahead with their own respective nuclear tests. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan described the Indian nuclear tests as “A dangerous blow to the international efforts to achieve non-proliferation”³⁰

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that “the international community should have taken notice of Indian intentions, at an appropriate time. He said that Pakistan repeatedly drew the world attention towards the BJP’s nuclear ambitions but they did not pay any heed to Pakistan’s concerns”. He said, “While dismissing India’s officially proclaimed nuclear designs they not only ignored our concerns but also spoke of the

²⁸ Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, “Pakistani Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy”, in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, eds., *Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1998), pp. 17 – 22.

²⁹ Mohammad Waseem, “Dialectic between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy”, in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?*, (New Delhi, London: Manohar Publishers, Centre de Sciences Humaine and Zed Books Limited, 2002), p. 280.

³⁰ Quarterly Survey of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, *Pakistan Horizon* (The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi), July 1998, vol. 51, no. 3, p. 7 – 8.

assurances given by India that no changes in its nuclear policy were in the offing”.³¹ Mr. Nawaz Sharif said that Islamabad recently drew the attention of the international community, particularly permanent members of the UN Security Council, regarding India’s plan to exercise the nuclear option and induct nuclear weapons in the region. He further said that by deploying the Prithvi missile, India killed Pakistan’s proposal for a Zero Missile Regime in South Asia. According to him, “It has not only destroyed the internationally endorsed concept of creating a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia but also dealt a serious blow to creating a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the entire southern hemisphere.”³²

There was a flip – flop position on the nuclear position. This can be seen in the statement made by the Prime Minister on 19 May 1998 when he said that “Why we are not testing this capability is because of the fact I want to show the world that Pakistan is a responsible country. ... If India is doing it out of sheer madness, we do not have to blindly follow suit.”³³ Eric Arnett has shown some following reasons which can be stated for Nawaz Sharif to change his mind and that too on such an important and vital decision in such a short span of time.

The first reason that has been cited has been the basic pressure that Nawaz had to face internally in his own political party. Especially, the threat that Nawaz was faced with was his own Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, who was the son of a general. He was not at all pleased the manner in which Nawaz Sharif showed reluctance to go for similar tests similar to that of India.

The second reason was the pressure created by the Army on the political leadership for going nuclear. Nawaz relied more on the Mirage aircrafts acquired from France than on the missiles, giving the Pakistan Air Force an upper hand over the other two defense organs. But going nuclear was not only the issue of the Army getting an upper edge over the other defense force. India, by the assistance of the United States,

³¹ Ibid.

³² Eric Arnett, “Why Did He Do It?”, *SIPRI Home Page*, see <http://projects.sipri.se>

³³ Ibid.

Russia and the United Kingdoms, had acquired smart – bomb technology that could easily neutralize the prowess of the Pakistani Air Force. Even the Mirage that the PAF was so proud of, would fall short, in front of the technology possessed by the Indian defense forces, as it can be easily detected and neutralised. This fact was reiterated by one PAF officer who told the press in April 1997 that the Air Force could not hold up under Indian "plans to neutralize our radars and [surface-to-air missiles] and destroy the Pakistan Air Force on the ground and in the air."³⁴ For that reason, Nawaz had to backtrack on what he said and to go ahead with the decision of going for the tests, not assessing how much that might harm the socio-economic development of Pakistan.

The United States without any delay dispatched emissaries to Pakistan as well as India, and specially advised the Pakistan government to show ultimate restraint at this testing time of the nation. The Pakistani Prime Minister said that, "We will alone decide the future course of action and I will not accept dictation from outside... my government will not hesitate to take any step necessary to protect the national security. Pakistan, being a sovereign and independent state, would not take any dictation as to how to address its legitimate security concerns in the wake of India's nuclear explosions".³⁵

After India went along with their nuclear tests, European Union (EU) urged Pakistan to show utmost restraint in its response to India's nuclear tests. In a draft statement, the 15 European governments condemned the Indian tests as representing a grave threat to international peace and security but made no mention of possible steps that would be taken against India for going ahead with the tests. The Pakistan government expressed its disappointment over the EU's condemnation and warned that the EU's threats of delaying World Bank loans to New Delhi and ending preferential trade tariffs for Indian exports were not good enough to contain India's expansive intentions. Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif also wrote separate letters to the leaders of the G-8 countries. He stated, "I trust that you would recognize and be

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Quarterly Survey of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, *Pakistan Horizon* (The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), Karachi, July 1998, vol. 51, no. 3, p. 7 – 8.

receptive to Pakistan's legitimate needs for self-defense" while asking Islamabad "to exercise restraint at an extremely critical juncture on matters involving national security and survival".³⁶

Nawaz Sharif reiterated that there was a national consensus to respond to the challenges and the threat posed by the Indian nuclear tests. He said that "Pakistan would not tolerate further Indian provocation over the Kashmir territory".³⁷

Explaining what he called Pakistan's impeccable record of restraint despite being in possession of nuclear capability, he regretted that his country had been pressurized and penalized with discriminatory laws after Pakistan went ahead with the nuclear tests. The Prime Minister also regretted that the Indian defiance of world opinion attracted less sanctions and more understanding and some countries even appeared willing to endorse India's nuclear policy.³⁸

Mr. Sharif invited the world attention to the fact that the balance of power in the region had been violently tilted and said that under the circumstances Pakistan's undivided focus should be only on the preservation of its national security interests. United States tried to dissuade Pakistan from exploding its nuclear device and sent a delegation to Pakistan headed by the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott but he failed to win assurances from Pakistan that it would refrain from carrying out nuclear tests. He was told that Pakistan was left with hardly any choice other than to conduct a nuclear test as the international community, especially US and other permanent members of the Security Council had failed to pre-empt the Indian adventure. It was in this backdrop that on May 28 Pakistan carried out five nuclear tests in the Chagai district in Balochistan and another one on May 30.³⁹

After the tests were carried out by Pakistan, initially there were different statements made by the Armed forces, the Foreign office, and the Prime Minister's

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

office regarding the number of tests made, which showed the lack of communication that existed between the decision makers.

Describing the nuclear tests as a defensive step, Prime Minister said that there tests were conducted solely in the interest of national security and integrity. Nawaz Sharif said that every time Pakistan brought to the world attention India's massive arms buildup, New Delhi contributed it to Chinese threat to India's security. But, he said, despite its tremendous superiority in defensive capability China was against expansionism while India had proven on more than one occasion that it harbored strong expansionist ambitions. Under the circumstances it was natural for Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif said, to feel concerned and in order to ward off the threat to national security, the country had even proposed that America, Russia and China should mediate and save Asia from arms race. He said that if Pakistan had wanted it would have conducted nuclear tests 15-20 years ago but the abject poverty of the people of the region dissuaded Pakistan from doing so. But the world, he said, instead of putting pressure on India not to take the destructive road, imposed all kinds of sanctions on Pakistan for no fault of it.⁴⁰

After Pakistan went along the same path of what India, on the policy of tit for tat and at last went along successfully in the building of the 'Islamic Bomb', as according to Ian Talbot, Pakistan went through a development of its own self-identity and its international status. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a televised speech, reflected the former dominant-strand in the nationalist discourse when he jubilantly declared: "We paid them back".⁴¹

In keeping with the established national discourse, those who opposed the tests were dubbed 'unpatriotic' and even '*kafirs*'.⁴² To bolster his popular stand on the nuclear issue, during the first year of its anniversary, the grave reality of the situation and the crisis in which both the nations, India and Pakistan, were standing were

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 10 – 11.

⁴¹ Ian Talbot, n.10, pp 213 – 214.

⁴² Ibid.

forgotten, where the day of the nuclear blasts were celebrated through a series of lavish television advertisements boasting about the feat that was achieved through the nuclear tests and in calling the May 28th 'Youn-e-Takbeer' ('time of celebration').⁴³

If Pakistan's nuclear capability is analyzed in brief during the time it went for the nuclear tests, it will become clear that the nation becoming nuclear capable was enough cause of concern for her neighborhood as well as the international political actors. According to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report published on May 14 1998 that Pakistan had several nuclear-capable aircraft, including the F-16 and Mirage. Its ballistic missile capability was based on three different systems: the Chinese M-11, with a range of 280 km; the Hatf-III, with a range of 600 km; and the intermediate-range missile Ghauri, which, with a range up to 1500 km with a 500 kg payload, which was capable of reaching most cities in India.⁴⁴ But though Nawaz remained as the legitimate leader of the nation, the nuclear trigger remained and still remains in the hands of the Armed forces.

After Pakistan went ahead with the nuclear tests, there was a mixed response from various parts of the world. Nations like US, Japan as well as nations in the European Union came up with harsh statements against both the nations of Pakistan and India. But there were other nations, that keeping in mind the long standing relation they shared with the two nations, were a bit more perceptive about the situation and more understanding. Li Peng, the Chairman of the Chinese People's National Congress, during his visit to Pakistan after the blasts, said that though China was committed to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, in the present situation, "Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests after India had done so".⁴⁵ He also said that though the Chinese had provided Pakistan equipments which have the sole purpose of increasing Pakistan's

⁴³ Ibid. p 214.

⁴⁴ U.S. Tries to Stifle Pakistan Nuclear Test, *Proliferation Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non Proliferation*, Vol. 1, No. 4, May 14, 1998 see www.ceip.org

⁴⁵ Hasan Akhtar, "China does not favour Nuclear weapons, says Li Peng", *The Dawn* (Islamabad, 19 April 1999), see www.dawn.com

defense and security environment, but the Chinese government has not taken any action, which can threaten any neighboring country.⁴⁶

The then Information and Culture Minister Mushahid Hussain commended China for its steady and unflinching support and assistance to Pakistan without attaching any political strings. "China has always supported and given assistance to Pakistan in the hour of need without any pre-conditions or attaching any strings. China's support for Pakistan has always been based on promoting the principle of self-reliance and not forging dependence on aid. Our relations are based on the principle of respect for the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs as well as mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity."⁴⁷

The US also made elaborate plans to put pressure on Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and committing it to a moratorium on fissile material production. As the plans were proposed Nawaz Sharif planned to travel to Washington during December 1998. Pakistan Foreign Secretary visited Washington in November to prepare the ground work for the visit of Nawaz Sharif the following month. With the economic sanctions slapped on Pakistan after tests, its foreign exchange reserve dipped to a meager amount of around 500 million dollars only. The International Monetary Fund had also blocked around 1.56 billion dollars of soft loan package.⁴⁸ Other nations those who also put a plug on the finances that was pouring into the nation, were Germany, Japan and United Kingdoms. Several other nations condemned both India and Pakistan against the nuclear tests.

Nawaz Sharif also played a significant role in creating a sense of solidarity amongst the Muslim nations. Not only through the development of the "Islamic Bomb", but also through increasing the sense of development and interdependence that Nawaz sought to create a sense of bonhomie amongst the Muslim nations. While attending the

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Mushahid praises China for unconditional support to Pakistan, *Associated Press Of India, News Summary*, (Islamabad), February 18, 1999 see www.fas.org

⁴⁸ "US expected to pressurize Pakistan on nuclear pact during Sharif visit", *Press Trust of India, Indian Express*, Sunday, October 25, 1998.

eighth summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference that was held in Teheran during the month of December 1997, he said that the Islamic world must make a sincere effort "translate into reality the noble concept of solidarity and unity among the Ummah".⁴⁹ He said that then only it will provide the Muslim nations an invaluable opportunity to coordinate their positions on salient political issues facing the Ummah. When asked about the means through which solidarity could be achieved asked about his suggestions for the solidarity and unity among the Muslim ummah, Sharif proposed: "in my view the real issue is to translate into reality the noble concept of solidarity and unity among the Muslim ummah. It can best be done by forging greater cooperation in the economic and cultural fields. We also need to promote inter-Islamic cooperation in the fields of information, science and technology, communications and transport. We must move from rhetorical affirmations of solidarity to concrete steps to build and broaden the inter linkages among Islamic states". He also added that "we must endeavor to forge a partnership for development and cooperation among OIC member states," said the Pakistani prime minister, adding, "this would also entail substantive cooperation between the OIC and the regional and sub-regional organizations in the Islamic world".⁵⁰ He appealed to the Islamic countries "to promote and inculcate true Islamic values among our youth to enable them to be the proud bearers of the message of enlightenment." "The coming millennium", he concluded, "beckons us to dismantle barriers in the way of reviving the Islamic Ummah's role as a historic civilizing force and co-managing the globe as an equal partner in harmony with the rest of humankind".⁵¹

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also expressed concern about the Kosovo crisis where ethnic Muslims were being persecuted by the Serbians. At the Emergency Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, at Geneva on April 7 1999, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, commented that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was of the view that "all Muslim countries must take immediate steps to bring to an end this continuing tragedy which not only affects a people but also

⁴⁹ Interview given by Nawaz Sharif during the ongoing 8th Summit of the OIC in Teheran in December 1997 to the Iranian English Language Daily *Iran News* on December 9 – 10, 1997, see www.irna.ir

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

violates fundamental principles of justice and human rights. In a letter to President Khatami, the Prime Minister had called for urgent consultations so that the OIC may address the Kosovo crisis effectively, and thereby facilitate a quick end to the Kosovo tragedy. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has also suggested to President Khatami that a high level mission of the OIC should visit Brussels and Moscow to urge for action to end the Kosovo tragedy".⁵²

The next major move was the tenth SAARC Summit that was held in Colombo from July 29 to 31. It was the first meeting of the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani Prime Minister after the nuclear tests. The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, Lakshman Kadirgamar made it a point that the nuclear and the Kashmir issue will be avoided in the Summit for its smooth functioning of the Summit. Still, after Chandrika Kumaratunga, the President of Sri Lanka while chairing the Summit said that though the nuclear issue is not on the Summit's agenda but it simply could not be over looked. The then Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina and the Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in harsh words condemned the nuclear tests made by India and Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif made proper use of the opportunity he got and used the Summit's platform to make his views clear amongst the leaders of the South Asian nations. He said that "the summit was being held in the somber backdrop of a dangerous security environment in the region and that the shockwaves from the test have heightened fears about peace and stability in South Asia".⁵³ He said that it was an "inescapable reality" that South Asia had become nuclearised". Nawaz Sharif said that SAARC was facing its greatest challenge since its inception and added that the time had come for it to redefine its role and priorities. According to Sharif, the primary reason for the failure of SAARC to live up to expectation was that it failed to discuss political problems. He said that peace was inseparable from progress and development and without peace; beneficial regional cooperation would have only limited success. In this context, he proposed a Peace, Security and Development Initiative for South Asia. According to Sharif, this Initiative

⁵² Statement by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the Emergency Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, at Geneva on 7 April 1999.

⁵³ John Cherian, "A low-key summit", *Frontline* (The Hindu, Chennai), August 15 - 28, 1998. vol. 15, no. 17, see www.flonnet.com

should focus on bilateral issues and problems between member-states and promote economic progress in the regional context.”⁵⁴ In the Tenth SAARC Declaration, all the nations pledged that they will take positive steps towards nuclear disarmament. They mentioned that some of the nations that had pledged under the CTBT as well as the NPT, being a signatory or a non-signatory, to work towards a nuclear weapon free world have rather vitiated the climate of the region with promoting nuclear weapon proliferation.⁵⁵

The next dimension that was added to Pakistan’s external political dimension was the peace initiatives that was taken by Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, by the way of bus diplomacy that later took the form of the Lahore Declaration. Inviting Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore made him the third Prime Minister visiting Pakistan after Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi. The Indian Prime Minister traveled to the Wagah Border check post by bus and he was greeted by his Pakistani counterpart on February 20 1999. The three Service Chiefs of the Pakistani Armed Forces, the Pakistani Air Force and the Pakistani Navy remained absent while the Indian Prime Minister alighted from the bus in the Wagah border in Pakistan and remained visibly annoyed with the dialogue that was taking place.

Three agreements were signed by the leaders during this visit. First one was the Lahore Declaration, where both the nations pledged that there will be sincere efforts to resolve all the disputes that exist between the two nations including the Kashmir dispute. Immediate steps will also be taken to avoid accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and evolve methods and pathways through which confidence building measures can be initiated in the nuclear and conventional weapons field aimed at prevention of conflict. Both the nations also pledged to fight the menace of terrorism that has been prevalent in both the nations and has been affected by terrorism.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Colombo Declaration 31 July 1998, *Tenth Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)*, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 29-31 July 1998.

⁵⁶ The Lahore Declaration, Lahore, 21st February 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, see <http://meaindia.nic.in>

A joint statement was also issued by the Foreign Secretaries of both the nations during this visit. The statement reiterated that the Foreign Ministers of both the nations “will meet at regular intervals to discuss on all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues. The two sides will also clear their stand regarding issues related to the issues that emanate out of the dispute that has given birth out of the impasse in the WTO summits. They will also find out means and methods through which there can be increase in the sharing of technology in the information and technology sector. The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to civilian detainees and missing persons”.⁵⁷

The next step that was taken during this visit was the issuance of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two nations. It reiterated the demands of creating confidence building measures so that both the nations can avoid any conflict between each other, conventional as well as nuclear. They also undertook the decision of notifying each other in respect of ballistic missile flight tests and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard. The two sides were also fully committed to undertake national measures to reduce risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertook to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such accidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify or establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose. The two sides also made a commitment to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. The two sides also took the decision to conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides, as it has been one of the issues that

⁵⁷ Joint Statement issued by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Lahore, 21st February 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, see <http://meaindia.nic.in>

have vexed the relations between the nations. The two sides also took the decision to periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs. The two sides also pledged to undertake a review of the existing communication links that normally is between the respective Directors General, Military Operations and the like, with a view to upgrade and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications. When this MoU was signed, the two countries already had signed agreements to minimize the risk of war, such as establishment of a hotline between the Prime ministers, prevention of violation of airspace and prior notification of military maneuvers. The two sides also would engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.⁵⁸

The basic achievement that was considered to be a significant feat for the Pakistani government was to have Jammu and Kashmir issue amongst the bilateral talks amidst the nations, which India detested till then.

The last dimension that was added by Nawaz Sharif as well as the Army was the formulation of the policy of going ahead with a major armed intervention in the Kargil.

Bruce Riedel in his Report that was presented in the Blair House mentioned that "In the spring of 1999 the Pakistanis sought to gain a strategic advantage in the northern front of the LOC in Kargil. Traditionally the Indian and Pakistani armies had withdrawn each fall from their most advanced positions in the mountains to avoid the difficulties of manning them during the winter and then returned to them in the spring. The two armies respected each other's deployment pattern and did not try to take advantage of this seasonal change. In the winter of 1999, however, Pakistani backed

⁵⁸ Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, K Raghunath and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, Lahore, 21st February, 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, see <http://meaindia.nic.in>

Kashmir militants and regular army units moved early into evacuated positions of the Indians, cheating on the tradition. The Pakistani backed forces thus gained a significant tactical advantage over the only ground supply route Indian forces can use to bring in supplies to the most remote eastern third of Kashmir".⁵⁹

On top of that the inclusion of the Taliban militants complicated the Kargil conflict as they functioned in a more independent manner and depended only on the ISI and not on any other Pakistani governmental decision making structure. "The *Dawn* of Karachi (November 8, 1998) and some Urdu newspapers of Pakistan reported that the Taliban had set up 28 secret training camps for training volunteers for fighting against the Indian army in Kashmir and 1,350 volunteers were under training in these camps. They quoted one Maulana Mohammad Qasim, who described himself as a Taliban commander and as leader of a new organisation in Kashmir called Lashkar Hyder, as saying, "The Taliban troops are in Kashmir to give a steel frame to the insurgency. The Taliban does not have any links with the all-parties Hurriyat Committee. The Kashmiri militants are not considered good enough to take the battle to a new level in Kashmir. That is why the Taliban is in Kashmir. We are here to give a final push to enable the Kashmiris conquer the Kashmir valley."⁶⁰

According to some Indian journalists while assessing the Kargil conflict and Nawaz Sharif has commented that the reality is Nawaz Sharif has many faces. "And at least four can be easily delineated — one, Nawaz the heavyweight power politician; two, Nawaz the industrialist-businessman keen on bolstering his own and Pakistan's economic interests; three, Nawaz the Muslim Leaguer inheriting the Islamic card from

⁵⁹ Paper presented by Bruce Riedel titled "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit" prepared for the *Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania*, in the Blair House, Washington. Its excerpts were published in *The Indian Express* titled "July 4, 1999: Clinton, Nawaz, Vajpayee and a N-war" on 17 May 2002 and hosted on the Ministry of External Affairs Home Page, Government of India, see <http://meaindia.nic.in>

⁶⁰ B Raman, "General Pervez Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif and the Kargil Conflict", *SAPRA India Article*, 2 May 1999, see www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military

Zia-ul-Haq; and four, Nawaz the Army's horse in the political stable. In the shaping of the Kargil misadventure, all the four faces of Nawaz Sharif interact".⁶¹

The Kargil conflict suddenly came to an abrupt end with the withdrawal of the Pakistani Armed forces from Kargil. It was Nawaz Sharif's decision to pull out Pakistani troops under the intense pressure that was created by the US administration. It became one of the principle reasons for the later military coup as it was a major embarrassment on the part of the Pakistani government as well as the Armed forces to acknowledge its role in the attack and later bring back its forces from the Indian side. The Army establishment vehemently criticized Nawaz's action and considered such an action as a major fall out in Pakistan's foreign policy making. It was considered as a 'sell out' of Pakistani interests under Washington's pressure which threatened Pakistan's ability of independent foreign policy making. The Pakistani public opinion was also very critical of Nawaz's decision.

Stephen P. Cohen has commented about the possibility that the incursion that was launched in Kargil, was by elements of the Pakistani establishment, who wished to derail the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's policy of "bus diplomacy" and normalization with India. He also mentioned that the military conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kargil road in Kashmir could yet turn into a major regional crisis. Hard-liners in both countries mistakenly believe that they can exhaust the other side by a slow-motion, low-intensity war.⁶²

As Cohen commented that given the two 'sides' newly developed nuclear capabilities, the conflict in Kashmir is no longer just an ugly sideshow; it is a serious threat to stability in South Asia that will require a long-term, international peace process.⁶³

⁶¹ OP Sabherwal and PN Jalali, "Many faces of Nawaz Sharif", *The Hindustan Times*, Jul 06, 1999.

⁶² Stephen P Cohen, "South Asia Needs a Peace Process", *The Wall Street Journal* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, June 24, 1999), was also published on June 12, 1999 in the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, see www.brook.edu

⁶³ Ibid.

While analyzing the conflict he said that the current crisis is the result of a bold Pakistani incursion to push armed raiders across the Line of Control, the post-1972 name for the old cease-fire line. The Pakistanis caught the Indians by surprise, but like Pearl Harbor real victory could have been an illusion as India responded by unleashing its air power in Kashmir for the first time, representing a significant escalation of the conflict.⁶⁴

He also mentioned about the fruitlessness of the talks that had been initiated by the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott with his Indian and Pakistani counterparts, which was initiated after the nuclear tests were made by the two nations. But it had totally avoided the issue of regional conflict which has kept the Kargil conflict keep on simmering unabated even when eight rounds of such talks are over. He even suggested that it might be irrational to have mediation similar to that of the Israeli-Palestine conflict in "Camp David" and have similar talks for South Asia, but it is not too soon for the concerned states in the international community to bestir themselves. If not, the fighting that was taking place over the Kargil road will either be repeated in one guise or another or lead to a wider war. If ever there was reason to care about the battles taking place in Asia's hinterlands, this must certainly be it.⁶⁵

During the Kargil intrusion or war, whatever it might be named, the spokeswoman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on July 2 1999, Beijing that, "We sincerely hope that both India and Pakistan can earnestly respect the Line of Control in Kashmir." This statement was given a day after Nawaz Sharif concluded his talks with the Chinese leaders in Beijing regarding the conflict situation in Kashmir. It was a bit of an embarrassment for the Pakistani government as the Chinese official also underlined the importance of a bilateral resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan under the Lahore process which the Pakistani government was not in favour of. The response of the Prime Minister of the British Government, Tony Blair,

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

was also quite dampening for the spirit of the Pakistani government. The Tony Blair government according to a spokesman of the Foreign Office here said that India's "measured response" to Pakistani provocations had earned "sympathy and support" from the international community. Mr. Blair said he had told Mr. Sharif that Pakistani infiltration across the LoC had created a serious situation in Kargil.⁶⁶

The erstwhile Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto blamed the Nawaz Sharif government entirely for the situation that prevailed in Kargil. She criticized the Nawaz Sharif government for mishandling the Kashmir situation from the very beginning. She said that that his "dual policy of bus diplomacy and armed struggle is like having your cake and eating it, too. And during the conflict he tried to pass the blame on to the military, causing division in the country."⁶⁷

Karl F Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, the United States Government, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to assess the situation that prevailed in Pakistan after General Musharraf took over the reins of government by throwing out the Nawaz government, in Washington on 14 October, 1999, said that the euphoria that was created after the "bus diplomacy" had dissipated after the initiation of the Kargil conflict. It started as forces from Pakistan made major incursions into territory on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which resulted in serious and deadly fighting between the Pakistani and the Indian armed forces. It ended only when Prime Minister Sharif, in a meeting with President Clinton at Blair House, took the decision of withdrawing the Pakistani Army backed intruders from Kargil. This created a massive misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and the Armed Forces as well as the people of Pakistan. If it was suggested that the Pakistani Prime Minister taking the decision of withdrawing from Kargil was not a wrong decision, rather, "the mistake was to launch the incursion in the first place. Civilian and military leaders alike--at the highest levels of government--share responsibility for that grave error, which set back the prospect of reconciliation with

⁶⁶ C Rajamohan; "Respect LoC, says China", *The Hindu*, July 2 1999.

⁶⁷ "Benazir to Reveal More Secret Info about Kargil Briefing", *South Asia Tribune*, Special SAT Report, Issue No 61, Sept 28-Oct 10, 2003, www.satribune.com

India which had seemed so promising, and also raised the prospect of a larger war between two nuclear capable adversaries".⁶⁸ The nations who played significant role in influencing Nawaz Sharif to take back the forces from Kargil were the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan with the support of the Crown Prince Abdullah's directions, as the British Prime Minister and the government of China, mentioned above.⁶⁹

Later, after his dismissal, Nawaz Sharif tried to denounce his role in the Kargil conflict and put the entire blame on Musharraf. While violating the Official Secrets Act, he divulged to give out state secrets to clear his position that was scarred due to the Kargil conflict. He evaded the role that was played by his brother, who was even accused in amassing huge point of wealth through illicit drug trade and the influence that he made in the planning of the Kargil intrusion.⁷⁰

To conclude, it becomes necessary to analyze the success of Nawaz Sharif as a decision maker, mostly in the external policy sector. He was removed by force mostly due to the rash decisions he took in the external policy sector as well as the amount of bewilderment the nation's populace went through during his regime. The military take-over by Pervez Musharraf was not taken as an unwelcome incident by the nation's people and rather the General found a massive popular support for his actions.

Why did that happen can be a singular question, where people are favoring for the dismissal of a democratically elected government and the revival of the military governance in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif had been elected for three reasons. The first cause could be sighted as bringing back a non-corrupt democratic regime against Benazir's corrupt governmental machinery. The second cause was to bring forth economic

⁶⁸ Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Washington, DC, October 14, 1999).

⁶⁹ Paper presented by Bruce Riedel titled "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit" prepared for the *Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania*, in the Blair House, Washington. Its excerpts were published in *The Indian Express* titled "July 4, 1999: Clinton, Nawaz, Vajpayee and a N-war" on 17 May 2002 and hosted on the Ministry of External Affairs Home Page, Government of India, see <http://meaindia.nic.in>

⁷⁰ Nasim Zehra, "Betrayal on Kargil", *Jang*, Friday, June 16, 2000.

liberalization in the Pakistani economy, which the country was in dire need of. And the third cause was the continuation of Pakistan's democratic experiment in the hope that civilian rule would devote more resources to domestic economic development rather than to military expenditure and military adventurism. But keeping out the second cause, in the rest of the causes, the Nawaz government turned out to be a major failure. The second cause also was vehemently put to test, as the economic liberalization process brought in major malpractices amongst government bureaucrats and politicians. Nawaz himself was accused of embezzling government property amassing a massive property.⁷¹

The amount of power that Nawaz centralized in his hands also became an eyesore for the opposition as well as the armed forces. He became one of the most powerful Prime Ministers in the political history of Pakistan.

Even the amount of failures Nawaz met in the external policy sector reduced the popularity of the democratic regime. The peace initiatives that he took against the decisions of the other elements of the *troika* made it difficult for the peace initiatives to take any formidable shape. The loss of face that Pakistan had to go through as they had to pull back the forces from the Kargil sector was also considered as a predicament that was brought in by the irrational decisions taken by Nawaz.

As Pervez Hoodbhoy, who is one of the leading Pakistani commentators on Pakistani politics, has commented that the military is still seen as the only clean, uncorrupted and efficient institution left in the country. Due to that reason, there was not much adverse public opinion in Pakistan that criticized going back to the military governance to save the nation from unpopular and corrupt democratic rule.⁷²

Nawaz even had little control over the Foreign Office. As has been mentioned before, even the decision of going nuclear was on the insistence of the

⁷¹ Marika Vicziany, "Pakistan - the question of the righteous military?", *Monash Newline: Humanities*, Monash University, 15 April 2004, see www.pso.adm.monash.edu.au

⁷² Pakistan's offer for cooperation, *Campaign for Nuclear Phase-out*, June 1, 1998, see www.cnp.ca

Foreign Minister and the Armed forces. He had little control over the intelligence agencies as well as the armed forces. He neither had any inkling on the source of funds received by the intelligence agencies.

Nawaz as a decision maker was able enough to make rational as well as positive decisions, but he could not maintain similar diplomatic standards to maintain cordial relations amongst the other decision making elements of the nation. He also made efforts of decreasing the role of the ISI by giving birth to new specialized investigative agencies that became extremely provocative for the existing machinery. No one in the decision making machinery supported the actions that were being taken by the Prime Minister and for that reason all the agreements that were brought about by Nawaz, was left to be implemented.

Though after the coup took place the major trend of foreign policy decision making did not go through a thorough change, but certainly the power balance that had highly tilted towards the position of the Prime Minister was brought back to that of the military.

The forth coming chapter will analyze the manner in which both the leaders, Benazir and Nawaz, took foreign policy decisions, their perceptions of the international environment and the manner in which they respected the existing decision making structures by comparatively studying their role in foreign policy decision making. There will also be an attempt to bring forth the theories that has been described in the first chapter in the macro level checking their applicability in Pakistan's foreign policy decision making. Even the manner in which the relation that was maintained and broken amongst the decision makers that created stress and strains amongst relations that ultimately led to untimely dismissals of democratically elected leaders and its impact on foreign policy making will be looked into. The regional paradigm on which the entire foreign policy making of Pakistan depends on will also be studied.

V –THEORY AND PRACTISE: AN EVALUATION

After going through the democratic regimes of foreign policy making in Pakistan, during the successive regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, each leader getting the opportunity to govern the nation twice during this ten year period, there comes the necessity to evaluate the entire foreign policy making according to the four theories that have been described in the first chapter.

Pakistan for the last fifty years and more had one of the most tumultuous political histories in the region. It had all the political frictions, dynamics, upheavals and political degenerations that nations in other parts of the world, where decision making theories have been normally formulated, have sometimes or never faced. For that reason, Pakistan is a proper ground to test the existing theories on foreign policy decision making to understand the decision making structures in the developing world.

The first chapter has discussed the theories that have been chosen, but the need of checking its applicability on Pakistan's foreign policy decision making especially during the democratic regime of the 1990s needs to be analyzed.

The first theory as selected by the study is Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's theory on foreign policy decision making. Their theory was written just after the Cuban missile crisis, which made a significant impact on the theory. The personality of the American President, John F. Kennedy, the influence of the US Air Force in context of the Cuban missile crisis on the President and the role of the other decision makers, like the Congress, the Senate and the like made significant impact on this theory. Due to the then context, the theorists have given stress on the organizational system of action while taking decisions in foreign policy making. They have also spoken about the internal as well as external limitations that the decision makers face which constrains their decision making maneuverability or space to take decisions. The external limitations as well as

internal limitations are still, according to the trio, less significant as it depends on the capability and perception of the decision maker, how he moulds and remolds the situation according to the needs of the time, as he thinks fit. But they have not clearly explained that in developing regions like that of South Asia, if nations already from the very initial stages of decision making becomes a pawn of power politics, gets embroiled in a fear psychosis, that becomes inherent in every decision maker with the insecurity that they suffer from, how unbiased can they be in taking decisions?

In the context of Pakistan, what can be said in relation to the trio's theoretical framework, is that the Pakistani decision makers, and especially, Benazir and Nawaz, has taken decisions after they were considerably influenced by the other decision making units in the nation. The path on which Benazir wanted to unify the decision making structures under a strong leadership, the manner in which, due to internal as well as external pressure Nawaz Sharif decided to walk on the path of nuclearisation, the role of both the decision makers in relation to Taliban and Afghanistan, shows as Snyder, Bruck and Sapin has analyzed, as selecting some options from a number of alternatives at hand, which would have a long lasting and beneficial effect on the future of the state. But in what manner that has been successful in Pakistan, can certainly be questioned. The Hekmatyar faction also faltered to receive assistance from the Pakistani regime which was a major setback to Pakistan's Afghan policy. Pakistani decision makers also had to change their stand in a major way while going against the Taliban government during the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan siding with US providing them with logistical support as well as providing them with air bases, much to the chagrin of the religious fundamentalist elements in Pakistan, who still sympathizes with elements promoting religious extremism. Pakistan's decision making has been done less arbitrarily and more is a defence strategy against India. But still the last two democratic prime ministers had taken significant initiative to come to some sort of a dialogue with India. It started from Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad and later to Rawalpindi in 1988 and 1989, the exchange of various high level ministers at regular intervals, and later the bus travel to Lahore by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, which created some sort of a platform on which good relation can be sustained.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's theory failed to analyze how multiple decision makers can work in parallel to each other by taking decisions that do not suit everyone. When the Indian Prime Minister was visiting Lahore meeting his Pakistani counterpart, having entirely good intentions at heart, the manner in which the ISI and Pakistani Army backed intruders entered into the Kargil division of Indian occupied Kashmir, contradicts the decisions of amity taken by the Pakistani Prime Minister with his Indian counterpart. The manner in which the theorists have entirely relied on individual decision makers did not explain the decision making system in nations like Pakistan, where multiple decision making units work in tandem with the political decision makers and that too independently. They have stressed that those in governmental position and are officers serving the state are designated decision makers. But can elected representatives be clubbed together with military heads, indirectly elected representatives or the intelligence? If they have clubbed them all together then the precision and clarity of analysis becomes blunt. As they have not explained what they have meant by the superior governmental bodies, it rests on the reader to test the validity of the theory on Pakistan and other developing nations, where there is no such concept as a fixed superior governmental body, and the entire decision making structure depends on a fragile power equation between multiple governmental bodies, that keeps on changing. For that reason, it can be said that Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's theory falls short in explaining quite a number of facets in the decision making system in the developing nations (as well as Pakistan), though some parts of it still retains its viability.

The second theory as selected by the study is of Charles W. Kegley Jr. where he has described about decision regimes, the substantive and the procedural decision making regimes, has given a model where the proper decision making inputs and outputs can be recognized, and in keeping tandem with Snyder, Bruck and Sapin as well as with world politics has spoken about the "global attributes" and the "national attributes" in foreign policy decision making. His concept of procedural and substantive decision making regimes certainly expands the sphere of analysis as he has increased his sphere of discussion not only to democratic states but as well as states having different types of governmental machinery. As he has mentioned while explaining these two concepts that

the two decision regimes are complementary to each other. The substantive decision making regimes are associated with the chief decision makers, whose perception and understanding is behind the decisions that is taken. They are the ones who perceive an immediate situation or crisis at hand and on that basis comes up with the decision that will be beneficial for the interest of the nation. The procedural decision making regimes are more associated with laid down procedures, norms and systems.

As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin have mentioned about internal and external limitations, on that line, Kegley has expanded his model of global and national attribute. He has said that the motive of the decision maker is more to stay in line with the international as well as domestic politics and that his entire effort of formulating decisions remains bound on this parameter. There has been an attempt though to narrow down his analysis to suit the politics of developing nations like Pakistan. Kegley did not mention about the prismatic effect that the policy makers of these nations go through. The region has a strong influence on any decisions that are formulated, that might be by the substantive decision makers or the procedural decision makers that moulds its domestic as well as foreign policies. If the case of Nepal or Pakistan is taken, then it will become clear that Sher Bahadur Deuba's dismissal in 1996 from the position of Prime Minister was more due to the Mahakali Treaty that he signed with the Indian government. Similarly, Pakistan's stand on the nuclear issues it has made with the US, Russia as well as China, was principally due to the anti-India stand that they have maintained for the last fifty years and more. In the second chapter, the causes for Pakistan joining the SEATO and CENTO is explained, where it can be seen that the principle motive was to enter into military alliances with the West to cater to the challenges posed by its bigger neighbour. When Pakistan found out that these alliances did not come to its assistance during the 1965 war with India, it shrank away from these alliances as it had lost its relevance for Pakistan. If the decisions in Afghanistan are taken for instead during the democratic regime of Benazir Bhutto, then it can also be seen that she wanted to have a stable and friendlier nation on her Western Front so that the nation's powers are not bifurcated into two halves. Having a friendlier and cooperative Afghanistan and a strong bond with China will certainly put pressure on India significantly. Benazir and Nawaz both made an

attempt to make a closer link with the Muslim world, to have some sort of a backup mechanism during times of exigencies. For that reason the reinterpreted model has put more of a stress on the regional aspect along with the global attributes. It has also added some specific national attributes that add pressure on the procedural as well as substantive decision regimes, like the Inter Services Intelligence or the Military Intelligence in Pakistan. Even the political leadership in opposition plays a significant role for the sustenance of the substantive decision maker, as it has been seen the manner in which Nawaz Sharif came in close connivance with the other decision makers, during the first phase of Benazir's regime, to plan her dismissal.

The third theory as selected by the study is of the poliheuristic theory as formulated by Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva. It has given more stress to find out how decisions are made and the reasons for the formulation of such decisions. Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, on the realist line of thought has in a way correctly pointed out that actual decision making behavior might not be rational in character. The East Pakistan crisis that led to the secession of that portion of Pakistan into Bangladesh, and the manner in which the Pakistani leadership handled the situation, Zia's Operation Topac, that led to a near war situation, the entire Kargil episode that took place, when some sort of positive movement had started between the two leaderships of India and Pakistan, the ample space that was given by decision makers for religious extremists and fundamentalists to have an integral part in the governmental structure, the incessant attempts of breaking the equation that the democratic leadership had with the Armed forces and the Intelligence machinery as well as the President, trying to grab as much power in their own hands leading to their early dismissals and many more such decisions in the first cursory glance certainly beyond doubt does not look rational. But if all the elements, which includes, the personality and the psyche of the leader, his or her background, his or her attempts of consolidating power in one's hands, the personal coterie they maintained and their role in influencing the leader, the environment they were working in, which includes the domestic, regional as well as global environments, the relationship the leader maintains with the other decision makers in the nations and several other elements that affect the perception of the leader as well as on his or her actions, is taken into consideration, then

the rationality of decisions becomes clear. This has not been clearly explained by Kegley or his model.

The fourth theory is the man – milieu hypothesis as formulated by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Though it is not a theory that is normally taken in the aegis of foreign policy decision making, but as environment, the perceptions of the leadership of the nation and the actions they take based on that perception certainly makes a significant impact on decision making, this theory becomes an integral part of the decision making structure of nations. This theory certainly aids in understanding the manner in which Benazir Bhutto as well as Nawaz Sharif maintained their distinctness in policy formulation. Mintz and Geva have taken the regional angle into consideration as they have spoken about the ‘total milieu’ and the ‘operational milieu’. A developing nation operates more on a regional scale rather than on a global basis. The effects of global politics though play a role but the nation’s foreign policy relies more on the regional platform. For Pakistan, the significance of SAARC and OIC found as well as found more place than the alliance of the SEATO or CENTO. The ‘psycho milieu’ that has been mentioned by the Sprouts also finds special relevance to that of the Pakistani leadership during the 90s. Benazir was more involved in domestic politics as during her period of governance, she had to face stiff domestic political resistance from political parties having ethnic origin, as well as from the IJI. She also tried to curb and control the ISI’s administrative structure by taking the Army Chief into confidence that created much annoyance amongst the military ranks. The wrong perception she had about the Iraqi leadership, as she visited Saddam Hussain just weeks before he invaded Kuwait without any knowledge of the Iraqi intentions makes it clear that either the intelligence did not provide her with such information or she did not perceive such imminent threat that Iraqi’s will turn out to be for the Middle Eastern Nations. Nawaz Sharif’s case is also somewhat similar. The Kargil issue can be taken to understand Nawaz Sharif’s perception. If he had prior information of what was taking place in Kargil, then why did he go along with the façade of creating a long lasting relationship with India during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit? And if he did not know about it and was a single handed action

of the Armed forces and the ISI, then it becomes clear on how much the relationship between the decision makers had broken as there was no consistency in decision making.

When the nation already went ahead with the Kargil episode and there was a sense of victory amongst the Armed forces of Pakistan as has been mentioned in the third chapter, Nawaz during his Washington visit took the decision to pull out Pakistani troops from Kargil. That created severe mistrust, suspicion and a feeling of betrayal by Nawaz as the Army perceived. The behaviour of the Armed forces, the Prime Minister, the Intelligence and the President, who was though maintaining more a pro-Sharif stand, were standing on various decision making modes, that led to the military take over. But as has been mentioned before in the analysis of the first chapter, the Sprouts were more involved in analyzing the decision making process rather than on decision makers. now in developing nations, where the political structure itself is unstable and in a growing stage, the role of the political leadership, military generals, intelligence chiefs and the like play a much more prominent role than decision making structures. Still when Kegley's model is put into the man-milieu hypothesis having the concept of operational motive of taking decisions as analyzed by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, while testing the decisions with Mintz and Geva's five processing characteristics, then analyzing the decision making process becomes less complicated.

The manner in which Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan fought for gaining supremacy in governance during the last vestiges of the first period of Nawaz's Prime Ministership, shows how decision makers fight with each other, to gain primacy in hierarchy of position. The Army's overbearing role throughout the democratic regime shows that how the democratic leadership failed either to take the Armed forces into confidence or tried to curb its powers without strengthening the base of the democratic structure that they were standing on. Due to this reason, the public opinion in some provinces of Pakistan often went against the democratic leadership and there was no such massive popular dissention after the military took over power again in 1998 from Nawaz Sharif. It will be a bit of an exaggeration to say that the Pakistani public is still faction-ridden and immature. It will also be not totally true to come to the opinion that they are not been able

to distinguish between good and bad and have been unable to have a proper opinion about the politics of the nation.

The third and the fourth chapter have tried to explain the changing world, region and domestic nature and the manner in which two democratically elected leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, reacted to it and took decisions. These two chapters have been divided into two phases according to the two periods of governance that the leaders governed the nation. It has also tried to put up the leaders relations with the other decision makers that were working in tandem with the political decision makers. The study has selected major issues and kept of issues which have not made significant impact on the position as well as the decisions of the two leaders. Domestic politics too has also been discussed to understand the turmoil that the leaders have to bear that made a significant reflection on their decision making prowess. If the two chapters are taken together then it will be seen that Benazir got more embroiled in internal political friction and dissension which made her incapable in taking major foreign policy making strides. Even having a lesser time period of governing the nation, she remained involved in tacking the uprisings taking place in the domestic political front. Nawaz Sharif found more space, where he could keep his mark in Pakistani foreign policy decision making. Most of the changes that were brought in by Nawaz Sharif in domestic as well as in the external front were soon shelved as he was soon usurped by General Musharraf by a military coup, but some of the steps taken then remains functional even today. For instance, the bus diplomacy that was started off by the Indian Prime Minister and his Pakistani counterpart in 1998 is still playing a significant role as a confidence building measure between the nations. It has also been replicated with India's other neighbour, Bangladesh. The manner in which Nawaz reiterated the Pakistani stand on nuclear weapons and later went ahead with the nuclear tests, shows the ability to stand straight even during times of severe global criticism and sanctions. Though he buckled under Washington's pressure to pull out troops from Kargil, if the two leaders are taken side by side, then it will be seen that Benazir was not fully able to cultivate, as well as, put in practical use her Foreign Ministry to strengthen Pakistan in the international forum which Nawaz Sharif somewhat managed to, in some instances, like in the nuclear issue and in

trying to improving Pakistan's role in the OIC, SAARC etc. Though both the leaders at some stage or another made attempts of building some sort of a positive gesture towards India, but due to the inherent anti-India psyche of the entire political establishment of Pakistan, it was not possible for both the leaders to maintain that positive stand for long. Both the leaders stand on Kashmir, was more or less the same, and kept Kashmir as a core issue between the discussions that took place between India and Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was able to create closer links with China, which not only improved Pakistan on getting better and improved defence equipments and technology but there was a positive and significant economic boost that took place between Pakistan and China, especially during his regimes.

So there is a need of the clear amalgamation of all the theories that have been mentioned before so that the peculiarities that can be seen in Pakistan decision making structure that do not match with the decision making structures of the developed Western nations can be smoothened out and analyzed.

Having such diversities, it is very difficult to explain the decisions and the reasons for such decisions taken by banking on any one theory. Rather there comes the need to take the assistance of multiple theories to explain the ups and downs of decision making that has chequered the history of Pakistan's foreign policy making. If the case of Pakistan is analyzed, then it becomes easier to analyze foreign policy making structures of nations like Nepal, Bangladesh, Israel, North Korea and similar nations having similar political setups which has some sort of similarity with the political structure like that of Pakistan. There might be the mistake of generalization but that can be corrected by taking specific nation's cases into consideration. But the reinterpreted models that have been explained might come to the assistance for proper analysis.

Pakistan retains even today a unique foreign policy making structure and under the present leadership has taken new shapes and forms. It has changed its long lasting friendship with the Taliban, nurtured under Benazir Bhutto and strengthened under Nawaz Sharif. While being an important partner in the war against terrorism led by the

United States, the Pakistani governance came down strongly on the Talibani leadership of Afghanistan, which led to their removal from the Afghanistan political machinery. General Musharraf has also taken several steps as well as made significant remarks, to curb the religious extremists functioning in Pakistan as well as against the religious extremists earning much criticism from the Pakistani religious establishments.

Pakistan is entering into a new phase of economic resurgence, national integration, and trying to make its mark as a major regional as well as a global player. It is now only in need of a good democratic governing structure under the guidance of strong and able leadership, which can make Pakistan cross the threshold of instability and bad governance to an era of stability and good governance.

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