

**ECONOMIC SANCTIONS UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER —
RHODESIA : A CASE STUDY**

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Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfilment
of the requirement of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

by

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NEW DELHI

1978

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr. K.P. Saksena, Associate Professor in the International Organisation Division of the School of International Studies, whose valuable suggestions, advice and encouragement have been indispensable in the completion of this work.

I am indebted to my teacher, Dr. M.S. Rajan, Professor and Head of the Centre for International Politics and Organisation, whose classes deepened my interest in the study of the International Organisation.

I would like to extend my thanks to the staff of the Indian Council of World Affairs Library at Gagan House and the Jawaharlal Nehru University Central Library, for their help.

The ready assistance, promptness of service and courtesy of the Library staff of the United Nations Information Centre, Jorbagh, was really appreciated.

For the encouragement and for help rendered in innumerable ways, I specially thank my friends Ms Tabella Khathing and Ms Ranjana Patnank.

To Mrs. B.L. Pahuja, who efficiently typed out the final draft of the dissertation, I am indeed grateful.


Pooja Juyal

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The situation in South Rhodesia presents a serious defiance to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. It poses a challenge to the entire framework of international peace and security that the United Nations stands for. The systematic violation of basic human rights of the African population and the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white minority regime, has led the Security Council to determine the Rhodesian situation as a grave situation, constituting a threat to international peace and security. Consequently, mandatory punitive measures of an economic nature, described under Article 41 of the Charter, have been in application against South Rhodesia since 1966.

This being the first instance of the application of universal, comprehensive, mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, its significance is obvious. What is also obvious is the hard reality, that despite almost a decade of such economic pressurisation, Rhodesia continues to survive. Why?

The present study attempts to identify the weaknesses of the experiment, gauge the extent of the success it has attained and evaluate the effectiveness of the sanctions weapon as a viable alternative to the use of armed force against an erring territorial unit.

Chapter one examines the theoretical framework upon which the sanctions rest and discusses the relevant Charter provisions. A brief comparison is also made of the Charter and the League Covenant provisions on the subject.

Chapter two briefly traces the political development in the territory which led to the crisis situation, and provides the background to the study of the practical application of the United Nations mandatory sanctions

Chapter three discusses the gradual steps taken by the international community to tighten the sanctions. It also focuses upon the attitudes of those states, whose co-operation or lack of it, could contribute largely to the success or failure of the sanctions programme.

The final Chapter (four) makes an overall assessment of the impact of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and attempts to discover the lacunae which have prevented the total success of the international enforcement programme.

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Chapter One

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter One

how it can be concluded as the beginning of self?

Law is an indispensable requirement for a well-ordered existence and sanctions serve to uphold law. Underlined by the idea of force, they are measures for securing obedience to law. They have been defined as actions taken in response to a breach of legal obligation.¹

Sanctions operate both negatively and positively. The realisation that an act is punishable by the application of sanctions may deter a prospective wrong-doer. Penalties can also be applied for a breach of law already committed.²

Sanctions in the form of customs, conventions, norms of behaviour exist to regulate our lives. Others, more positive, exist in the national sphere. These are backed by the strength of the state.³ But our prime concern here is with sanctions at the international level.

The absence of a World Government and a well established International Law is compensated for by the

¹ Peter Calvocoressi, "The Politics of Sanctions : The League and the United Nations", Ronald Segal, ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 52.

² Sanctions : The Character of International Sanctions and Their Application, Information Department Papers, No. 17 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1935), p. 5.

³ Ibid.

presence of an International Organization - the United Nations - with its almost universal membership accepting the principles of its Charter.⁴

The idea of law enforcement by an international agency is relatively new. 'Sanctions at this level were first provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations'. Prior to this, the procedure followed was that of 'auto-determination' of sanctions.⁵ By this the extent of the injury or violation and the punitive steps taken against the offender were decided by the state who felt that its rights had been transgressed upon. The bigger and the more powerful states had a definite advantage over the weaker ones.⁶

In this system it was very difficult to draw a dividing line between reprisals and sanctions. Though both are steps in response to the action of another state, yet there is much difference between the two. The former is action taken in retaliation against a move or policy adopted by another state, while sanctions are steps taken when there is a breach of universally accepted legal obligations and practice. They are applied with a purpose of making the

⁴ Margaret Doxey, "Sanctions Revisited", International Journal (Canadian Institute of International Affairs), vol. xxxi, no. 1 (Winter), 1975-76, p. 54.

⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁶ Josef L. Kunz, "Sanctions in International Law", American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 50, 1960, p. 325.

recalcitrant state comply with the accepted norms of behaviour.⁷ While the objective of reprisals is punitive in nature, sanctions aim at rectifying a situation threatening peace. Doxey appropriately calls them 'conformity defending instruments'.⁸

Sanctions are an essential element of what is known as the concept of collective security, built upon the premise that the security of one nation is the concern of all nations, and that anyone breaking the peace and resorting to aggression must be resisted by the collective might of the international community. Thus what distinguishes sanctions as understood and employed in the context of this study is that it is an expression of collective concern and collective action in an open system, directed against any power, designed to preserve the integrity of an anonymous victim of violation of accepted norms, by an anonymous violator of these norms.⁹

An attempt was made to institutionalise the concept of collective international sanctions in the Covenant of the League. Member States undertook to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League (Article 10). The Covenant

⁷ Margret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 92.

⁸ Ibid., p. 56.

⁹ For a detailed discussion upon collective security see Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1955), and K.P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis (New Delhi: D.K. Publishing House, 1974).

authorised multilateral coercion or collective sanctions which replaced the individually applied coercive measures.

But though the drawbacks of "auto-determination" of sanctions had been counteracted, the means and methods of application of coercive measures did not change. ⁶ Economic pressure could be applied upon the state guilty of aggression, or armed strength could be used against it. Though economic sanctions are by themselves powerful weapons for peaceful change, yet when combined with armed strength they become a more potent means of warfare.)

⁶ Economic sanctions may aim to fulfil a limited purpose, such as bringing about the end of an aggressive military operation of a state by preventing the supply of essential material to it. The purpose may be a less specific one, such as bringing about a change of policy or even the Government, by subjecting the state to economic hardships and making its existence difficult and uncomfortable. They work by creating a deprivation, a want, which is greater than any benefits the state may obtain from following an offensive policy. Margaret Doxey recognises economic warfare as a 'traditional weapon of International Relations'. ¹⁰ Even in early times it was considered expedient for a state to stop

¹⁰ Doxey, Economic and Sanctions and International Enforcement, p. 1.

trade with an enemy nation, disrupt its commerce by blockading its ports or by controlling the searoutes important for it. The purpose was to cut off its supply of indispensable goods, such as food and ammunition, so that it would easily capitulate when made a target of armed might.¹¹

Greater interdependence among nations arising from more developed means of communication, increased trade and advanced technology has contributed to the enhanced effectiveness of means of economic coercion.⁹

According to the theoretical framework set up by the League system, any state who transgressed Articles 12, 13 and 15¹² of the Covenant (these provided for pacific settlement of disputes) was regarded as having committed an act of war against all the Members of the League, and sanctions

¹¹ "Indeed to seal off an aggressor's or would be aggressor's sources of supply is one of the most powerful weapons". Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 94.

¹² According to Article 12 of the League Covenant, any dispute likely to lead to a rupture between states would be submitted for arbitration or judicial settlement or to the Council. They agreed not to resort to war until three months after the report regarding the issue had been received.

According to Article 13, Members promised not to go to war against the state which complies with the report, decision or award regarding any dispute.

According to Article 15, the members agreed not to go to war against a party who accepts the unanimously passed report of the Council.

under Article 16,¹³ were applied against it. Legal obligation to apply sanctions against an aggressor state arose automatically for all the Member States. The practical application of these commercial and financial sanctions depended upon the volition of the states.¹⁴ They were free to decide the extent they wished to apply them. Though the Council recommended military measures, it was not required of the Member States to carry them out. Sanctions under the Covenant were thus 'automatic and individual',¹⁵ and the system set up by the League was far from the system of collective security.

A more 'organic' system of enforcement has been set up under the Charter with the Security Council vested with the entire responsibility of initiating enforcement measures.¹⁶ In course of this, the Security Council has to be satisfied that there exists a threat to the peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression before coercive measures can be recommended. In keeping with the idea of Great Power

¹³ Article 16(2) of the League Covenant reads: "It shall be the duty of the Council in such cases to recommend to the several Governments what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenant of the League.

¹⁴ This has been described as an "individualist operational concept of collective security", Saksena, p. 353.

¹⁵ Bentwich and Martin, p. 93.

¹⁶ At this point the Charter has drawn fairly near to the conception of a 'World Government', Ibid., p. 89.

unanimity on substantive issues, recommendation of sanctions too require the assent of the Big Five. This is in accord with the underlying assumption of the Charter that the primary responsibility for taking action to maintain international peace and security must be assumed by the Great Powers.¹⁷ The victorious powers were given this privileged position of 'guarantors of peace' at the realisation that any enforcement scheme which they opposed could not hope to succeed.¹⁸ Naturally, therefore, they cannot be made a target of sanctions.¹⁹

Upon the nature and kind of sanctions to be recommended, the Security Council has the final voice. Though Article 41 mentions numerous punitive measures of an economic nature, yet the Council is in no way limited by the enumerated list.²⁰

¹⁷ The Covenant had upheld a principle of unanimity. In the Council as well as the Assembly one hostile vote could prevent a decision (Article 5).

¹⁸ Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 344.

¹⁹ Inis Claude calls 'the decision blocking competence' of the Great Powers, incompatible with the doctrine of collective security, p. 274. Josef L. Kuns has also criticised the 'centralisation of sanction functioning in a strictly political organ', p. 330.

²⁰ Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston; World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 27.

⁶ The 'permissive formulation'²¹ of Article 41 (The Security Council may²² decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be applied....) indicates that the body has complete freedom to decide what measures are to be adopted. The choice, the priority, the combination of the enforcement measures in any situation is left with the Security Council.⁷

Under the League system, it fell upon the Member States to decide what financial and commercial sanctions were to be applied against a state guilty of a breach of peace. Under the Charter, the sanctions recommended by the Security Council are mandatory.²³ According to legal interpretation, in spite of the use of the term 'call upon' in Article 41, the Member States have been permitted no discretion in deciding whether they wish to apply these measures or not.²⁴

Even non-members are brought within the orbit of the Security Council's decisions under Article 39, though

²¹ Bentwich and Martin, pp. 91-92.

²² Emphasis added.

²³ The Security Council does not have armed forces at its disposal owing to the failure of the powers to conclude agreements under Article 43. According to Goodrich and Simons, it therefore, has to depend upon its power to recommend and exhort rather than on its power to order. p. 346.

²⁴ Goodrich and Hambro, p. 277.

legally these apply to Member States alone. This is imperative because sanctions imposed by the Organization can be easily frustrated if non-member States remain neutral in the exercise and continue to support the state who is endangering peace and security.²⁵ Non-compliance with the Security Council's measures by non-members, may cause them to be drawn into the orbit of the Organization's enforcement measures.

States who apply sanctions have the right to consult the Council (Article 50) if they are confronted with problems in course of implementation of the Security Council's decisions.

Though the Charter guarantees non-intervention in what is within the domestic jurisdiction of a state (Article 2, clause VII) yet enforcement measures are not limited by this clause.

In keeping with its position of pre-eminence under the Charter, the Security Council has been vested with the authority to determine which state or states shall be asked to participate in the enforcement of its decisions.²⁶

The sanctions imposed by the Security Council are binding upon all Member States. But the Council itself will decide which states will actually participate in the application.

²⁵ Bentwich and Martin, p. 95.

²⁶ Article 49.

of the programme.²⁷ There may be some states who wish to seek exemption from implementation of coercive measures for specific reasons, and here too it is the Security Council who is empowered to decide on the matter. It naturally derives from this, that the burden of imposing sanctions is not always equitably shared among Member States.²⁸

The right of individual and collective self-defence given to Member States under Article 51 of the Charter seems to put a limitation upon the complete responsibility of the Security Council to initiate coercive measures, economic and military. It can be termed as a decentralised security arrangement, for instead of the Security Council's centralised decision regarding the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of peace and act of aggression, the states concerned have the right to decide on this question. But this right

²⁷ Upon the issue of actual participation in a sanctions programme, the Security Council's decision will be governed by the geographical proximity of a sanctioning state and the target state, by the size of the former's armed forces, or even the strength of the navy - in case the sanctions involve a blockade.

²⁸ According to Security Council Resolution 221 of 9 April 1966, Britain alone was given the authority to blockade Mozambique's port 'Beira'. She was authorised to prevent (if need be, by use of force) oil from reaching Beira. The covert destination of oil was Rhodesia.

given to the Member States is a limited one - capable of being exercised only till such time that the Security Council takes the necessary steps for maintaining peace and security.²⁹

Moreover, all measures taken in self-defence by the Member States have to be reported to the Security Council. Therefore the guaranteeing of this right to the states does not lessen the primary responsibility of the Security Council for taking appropriate action for maintaining peace and security.

The sum total of discretionary authority in the hands of the Security Council is greatly increased by the provision of the Charter calling for sanctions in case a 'threat to the peace' exists. This is an improvement upon the League system where enforcement action could only take place when a breach of peace had occurred. The Security Council is able to anticipate a breach of peace or an act of aggression. It lies within the Security Council's discretion to decide what a 'threat to the peace' may imply. It is not necessary that an act of aggression have taken place, or that a threat of external aggression be present before a

²⁹ Article 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence....Measures taken by the Members in the exercise of this right...shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council...to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

'threat to the peace' may be determined. Repression of a minority, disrespect for human rights, racial discrimination, may independently pose as threats to the peace. It is not necessary that it imply a conflict or a strained relationship between states. It may even spring from a situation or relationship involving a state and a group of people having no characteristics of a state.³⁰ We see that a liberal interpretation has been given to the provisions of the Charter.

The decision that a threat to the peace under Article 39 exists in a particular case does not call for the application of sanctions straightaway. Efforts at peaceful settlement of the dispute, based upon the recommendations of the Security Council may continue in spite of the decision.

It is possible that prior to recommending the application of coercive action against a state, the Security Council may, under Article 40, place provisional measures before the parties to the dispute. This is a means to prevent the aggravation of a difficult situation. In calling upon both the parties to comply with these injunctions the Security Council treats both parties at par and does not make decisions regarding the guilt of either party.³¹ But if this move fails,

³⁰Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens and Son Ltd., 1950), p. 731.

³¹Bentwich and Martin, pp. 91-92.

the Security Council can take recourse to economic or military sanctions.³²

It is not necessary that in course of the Security Council's action, economic sanctions should precede military ones, or that armed strength be applied only when the former show no positive results.³³ Article 41 of the Charter says, "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate...." The language clearly implies that measures under Article 42 can be ordered by the Council, anticipating the ineffectiveness of Article 41 in particular case.

The Charter has been shaped keeping in mind the lessons derived from the League. Chapter VII of the Charter, therefore, seems to be a marked improvement over the Covenant enforcement provisions. The League's single major involvement with sanctions concluded unsuccessfully and ingloriously but it has offered valuable clues to the "imperatives" of a successful sanctioning programme. It highlighted the gap that lay between the theoretical enunciation of sanctions and their

³² According to Goodrich and Simons, though Article 40 can be interpreted to mean that action under it can only follow a determination of a threat^o or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39, but in practice the Council has adopted measures under Article 40 without previously invoking Article 39. United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, p. 346.

³³ Bentwich and Martin, p. 94.

practical application. It was illustrative of the fact that sanctions in practice lacked the potency and effectiveness that seems evident in a theoretical enunciation.

The inaction of the League after the Italian skirmish with Ethiopian forces at Walwal in 1934 encouraged the Duce, and the Italian offensive was launched against Ethiopia in October 1935. Sanctions became effective against Italy and fifty states were ready to apply them.³⁴ But the delay in their imposition favoured Italy for she had got ample time to prepare herself psychologically and materially against them.

Moreover, the universality of application required for the success of coercive measures, was also lacking. Austria, Hungary and Albania had expressed their inability to apply sanctions. Switzerland had mentioned prior reservations.³⁵ Germany was not participating in the exercise. United States had decided to apply sanction against both Ethiopia and Italy in spite of League's identification of Italy as the aggressor state. Britain and France supported the League's measures only half-heartedly. Though committed to support the experiment they felt their interest lay in placating and not antagonising Italy, lest Mussolini be driven to Hitler's

³⁴Sanctions, p. 70.

³⁵Ibid.

camp. So steps which could have made sanctions effective, like application of oil sanctions, closure of the Suez Canal for Italian traffic, were not imposed.³⁶

Ethiopia was ultimately swallowed by Italy. Later events revealed that the British and French self-interest would have been better served by supporting and strengthening the League's sanctions. The target of the half-heartedly applied collective coercive measures began to make overtures towards Germany, thus frustrating the Anglo-French plans of preventing an alliance between Germany and Italy.


Economic sanctions have been frequently discussed since the inception of the United Nations, though the consensus in the Security Council necessary for their application has not been apparent equally frequently.

Economic pressure was authorised against China and North Korea by the General Assembly in 1957 as 'additional economic measures'. But they did not spring from a Security Council decision and therefore were not mandatory. The Soviet Union and the East European countries did not accept them. The Western Powers had already placed Communist China under a strategic embargo, so the General Assembly resolution did not make any difference in the existing situation.

³⁶The League of Nations, Ruth B. Henig, ed., (Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1973), p. 129.

The General Assembly had frequently called for economic sanctions to be applied against Portugal to pressurise it into amending its colonial policy in Africa. Similarly, South Africa is a frequent target for resolutions recommending economic sanctions as a protest against its unlawful occupation of Namibia and its policy of apartheid. But these have lacked the strength and force of action initiated in the Security Council and have been applied indifferently by some states and ignored by the others.

The passage of Security Council Resolution 232 of 16 December 1966, concerning South Rhodesia, initiated sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. This marks a significant development in the evolution of the United Nations for it is the first test of mandatory sanctions.



Chapter Two

CONFLICT AND TENSION IN RHODESIA : THE BACKGROUND

Chapter Two

The imposition of mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia¹ was the sequel of myriad political and economic developments going back several years. A survey of these events would help in analysing the situation and understanding the complexities involved.

British involvement in the area which was later to be Rhodesia, began in the nineteenth century when the policy of colonisation and imperialistic expansion had gained popularity among the Western nations.

The unprecedented rush to colonise Africa, or the "Scramble for Africa"² as it had come to be called, had been inspired by reports of the Continent's fabulous mineral wealth.

¹ 'Rhodesia', till 1923, referred to both Northern and Southern Rhodesia combinedly. After this the Northern part was brought under the British Colonial Office and the latter was made "self-governing". Since 1964, when North Rhodesia became independent as Zambia, the South Rhodesian authorities have dropped the use of the prefix 'Southern'. According to the British Government and the United Nations the territory is still 'Southern Rhodesia', while the Africans call it 'Zimbabwe'.

² Interest in Africa was created by the explorers for whom the 'Dark Continent' held a fascination. They were followed by missionaries and traders. Industrialisation in Europe gave impetus to colonisation, as each nation sought in Africa, areas to obtain minerals, cheap raw material like cotton, rubber, timber, and prospective markets. The prestige associated with vast colonial empires infused a sense of urgency in this process of colonisation - hence the term 'Scramble for Africa'.

In fact Cecil Rhodes, the founder of British Rhodesia, who had already made a fortune mining in South Africa, believed that Mashonaland³ contained vast gold reserves.⁴ Moreover, he harboured the chauvinistic zeal of extending the British dominions in Africa from the Cape to Cairo.⁵ But the process by which the British established control over the tribal chiefs to carve out Rhodesia, is a record replete with subterfuge, double dealing and under-hand, dubiously-legal transactions.

It began with a treaty signed between Moffat (a missionary in Rhodes's pay) and Lobengula (Chief of the Amandebele tribe), by which the latter had to "refrain from entering into correspondence or treaty with any other foreign state or power, to sell, alienate or cede any part of his territory without British approval".⁶ But the complete British entry was effected by the Rudd Concession signed in 1888, by which Lobengula granted Rhodes exclusive mining

³ One of the tribal territories included in what later came to be known as Rhodesia.

⁴ Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 31.

⁵ Quoted in Ralph Zacklin, United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 4.

⁶ Quoted in Loney, p. 33.

rights in his territory.⁷ With this as basis, Rhodes obtained permission to form a Company to explore the resources of the territory. This was also given sweeping quasi-governmental powers. The British Colonial Office thus had no direct control over the governance of Rhodesia. This device of vesting a company with political authority was a policy popular among the coloniser nations, as it helped to avoid financial risks as well as the odium of direct colonisation.⁸

In 1891, Rhodesia was made a British Protectorate. The High Commissioner for South Africa was given jurisdiction over the territory controlled by the Company and a Legislative Council was set up to govern the territory. Authority was to be exercised in the name of the British Queen.

A referendum held in 1922 revealed that white Rhodesians favoured the acquiring of a separate identity as against the possibility of becoming a part of South Africa. Rhodesia was then formally annexed to the British Crown and granted autonomy on 1 October 1923.

⁷The legality of concessions obtained from tribals has always been doubtful. Mlambo calls the Rudd Concession a forgery. Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: Struggle for a Birth Right (London: Hurst and Co., 1972), p. 263.

⁸Zacklin, p. 6.

The Constitution of 1923 gave South Rhodesia an elected Legislature.⁹ A Governor represented the British Sovereign in the territory. The British retained control over foreign policy and policy relating to African interests.


Under the Constitution, Britain retained the right to initiate legislation as well as the right to veto laws made by the Rhodesian Legislature. But this power was not utilised. No efforts were made either to ameliorate the lot of the Africans or to veto the opiate of discriminatory legislation that was being enacted.¹¹ This revealed the remarkable

⁹ Until 1923 North Rhodesia, like South Rhodesia, had been administered by the British South Africa Company (BSAC). But unlike South Rhodesia, her much smaller settler population had been unable to take over the government after the Company's withdrawal and this had passed into the hands of the British Colonial Office.

¹⁰ The franchise qualification involved both English language literacy and means tests, therefore few Africans were included in the electorate.

¹¹ The Land Apportionment Act of 1931 made for allocation of land for Africans and Europeans. The land reserved for the latter was more fertile, suitable for fruit growing, afforestation and intensive beef production. It was also closest to the market. No African was allowed to purchase more than one thousand acres. This was to prevent any African competition with white agriculture.

The White Rhodesians liked to maintain that it protected the Africans from the consequences of superior economic skills of the European. Cited in The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record 1923-1973, E. Windrich, ed., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 119.



indifference of the British to the welfare of native Africans.¹²

II

The white settler regime had successfully kept the native African out of political life by imposing the English language literacy and means tests which limited their right of franchise.¹³ White supremacy was maintained by the passage of several discriminatory legislative measures which worked to limit the development of the African populace.¹⁴ But the passivity into which the South Rhodesian Africans had been lulled, was broken by the rising tide of nationalism which arose from an awareness of their right of self-determination. This consciousness was generated even by the rudimentary education that was made available to them.


¹² Patrick O'Hearn attributes this laxity of British control over South Rhodesia to the fact that it was finding it increasingly difficult to administer its vast colonial Empire. Rhodesia: Racial Conflict and Coexistence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 55.

¹³ In 1923 there were 30 African voters compared to 19,000 European voters. In 1956 out of 62,184 registered voters, only 560 were Africans. In 1962 Africans registered in A roll (which required higher income and property qualification) were 1,020; and 9,535 were registered in B Roll. See Loney, pp. 120-25.

¹⁴ Some of these were: (a) the Land Apportionment Act (see note 11 above), (b) the Industrial Conciliation Act, which barred Africans from certain jobs and excluded them from wage and industrial agreements negotiated under it, (c) the Probationary Act designed to reduce and restrict both land available to, and animal stock owned by, Africans.

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18



Meanwhile the British Conservative Government which was voted to power in 1951, conceded the long-standing demand of the South Rhodesian Government of a closer relationship with North Rhodesia by setting up a Federation of North Rhodesia, South Rhodesia and Nyasaland.¹⁵ This was a political contrivance of the South Rhodesian whites to extend their domination to those two states which had a smaller number of white inhabitants. The copper mines of North Rhodesia also offered promise of great economic benefit to South Rhodesia.

Though the idea of a federation was opposed by the natives of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland,¹⁶ it was largely acceptable to the Africans of South Rhodesia who felt that closer association with African states would increase their strength and bring them closer to independence and majority rule. They believed that joining two states which were under British control¹⁷ would serve to break down the pattern of

¹⁵ North Rhodesia and Nyasaland were British Protectorates ruled by the British Colonial Office.

¹⁶ The natives of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland feared that alignment with South Rhodesia would lead to increased white domination, heightened importance of the status of South Rhodesia in the political scheme of a Federation, extension of South Rhodesia's pattern of race relations into the north and the exploitation of copper revenues of North Rhodesia to benefit South Rhodesia.

¹⁷ North Rhodesia had a smaller white settler population and the natives had a larger share in policy formulation as compared to South Rhodesia.

segregation, discrimination and indignity under which they lived.

But the Federation which was supposed to be a means of securing cooperation and partnership among races and territories did not succeed.¹⁸

The white regime in South Rhodesia adopted a policy of conciliating and integrating the vocal elite African group into the political system. The apparent purpose was the establishment of a multi-racial coalition, the real to form a class alliance with the moderate elite among the African ranks.¹⁹ But gestures of appeasement by way of giving concessions and making reforms, found no favour with the natives. Reforms of the Whitehead²⁰ regime were also recognised as steps to make the Africans compromise on their goal of achieving majority rule.

Concessions made to the Africans in the Constitution of 1961 also did not introduce any fundamental change in

¹⁸ The Monckton Commission (1960) recorded that no association between the three territories was likely to survive without drastic change in South Rhodesia's racial policies.

¹⁹ Lonny, p. 122.

²⁰ Sir Edgar Whitehead was the South Rhodesian Prime Minister from 1958 to 1962.

the existing constitutional framework and were spurned by the Africans.²¹

But the South Rhodesian Government continued to press for independence from Britain upon the basis of the 1961 constitution, a demand rejected by the British as one not acceptable to the South Rhodesians as a whole.²²

Native Africans continued to express their discontent with the regime and to agitate for majority rule. Their opposition was repeatedly suppressed by banning Nationalist organisations.²³

In October 1964 the South Rhodesian Prime Minister organised an indaba (conference) of African Chiefs and Headmen to prove to the world that the idea of independence

²¹ Franchise remained very restricted. The natives' demand of 'one man - one vote' was not achieved. The 1961 Constitution made majority rule for Africans a distant dream. Property and educational qualifications remained. Majority of African voters who qualified for franchise were in Roll B which could elect only 15 members of a 65 seat Legislature. The A Roll voters, almost entirely white, would elect 50.

²² As a concession to the South Rhodesian demands of independence, the British Government under the 1961 Constitution, surrendered its reserve power of initiating and vetoing legislation emanating from the South Rhodesian Legislature - a power that it had possessed under the Constitution of 1923.

²³ The South Rhodesian African National Congress was banned in 1960. Its successor National Democratic Party, formed in 1960, was banned in 1962, and was replaced by the Zimbabwe African People's Union. From a split in its ranks arose the Zimbabwe African National Union in 1963. Both parties were banned in 1964.

on the basis of the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to the South Rhodesian populace. But since they were Smith's hand-picked supporters and hardly representative of the African people, their support of Smith's contention did not carry any weight in convincing the British Government or the International Organisation.

In November the same year, a referendum was organised by the Salisbury Government on the question of independence under the 1961 Constitution. The results indicated that ninety per cent of the voters favoured independence. Smith contended that this offered "incontrovertible proof"²⁴ of support, ignoring the fact that only sixty per cent of the voters took part in the referendum, and even more significant, that more than two-thirds of the adult population was not granted franchise.

In the United Nations, emphasis was being laid upon the necessity of acceptance of the 'one man one vote' principle in the South Rhodesian context. The issue of franchise became the basic and central theme of the question.²⁵ The Conservative Party which was in power when the Rhodesian crisis was brewing up, had enunciated five principles for negotiating with the South Rhodesian Government. These were later endorsed by the Labour Party which came into power

²⁴ Windrich, p. 305.

²⁵ Mlambo, p. 175.

in 1964, under the leadership of Harold Wilson. These were:

- (1) The principles and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
- (2) There would also have to be guarantees against a retrogressive amendment of the constitution.
- (3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

The Labour Party was known for its sympathetic regard for the nationalist aspirations of the natives, and its coming to power aroused ⁵concern among the white South Rhodesians. There were rumours of a "unilateral Declaration of Independence" by the Smith Government. This caused Britain to issue a warning that any such "unreasonable act" would be considered "an open act of defiance" and would lay South Rhodesia open to consequences which would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the country. Such a "unilateral act" would bring all financial aid and all official dealings of Britain with South Rhodesia to a close. Rhodesia would be denied access to the London Market and

the membership and privileges of the Commonwealth Preference Area and the Sterling Area.

But when negotiations on the basis of the five principles between the Labour Government and the Smith regime remained inconclusive, and a crisis seemed imminent, Wilson in a bid to solve a deadlock, compromised the first principle by emphasizing that achievement and not a specific time period should be the criterion for attainment of majority rule in South Rhodesia.²⁶

In a letter to Smith, Wilson said that he had "an open mind on the timing of independence in relation to progress towards majority rule".²⁷

The Labour Government in Britain was in a dilemma. It had to find a solution to the South Rhodesian problem which would be acceptable to the Smith Government, to the anti-racialist public opinion in the United Nations, the Commonwealth and Britain. At the same time, no strong move could be initiated against Rhodesia by Britain for the British electorate recognised the Rhodesian whites as their "kith and kin",²⁸ and would not support a party who would

²⁶ Loney, p. 134.

²⁷ Windrich, p. 205.

²⁸ Mumbo, p. 254. It is interesting to note that the whites in Rhodesia were first generation settlers and several of them had familial ties with Britishers.

apply force against them.

III

In the early sixties, a wave of nationalism swept the African Continent. Among several other African states, North Rhodesia and Nyasaland also found themselves their own masters. These dynamic changes in close proximity were bound to influence South Rhodesia.

The White Government in South Rhodesia was straining against the control exercised by the British. Their demand of independence in place of mere self governance was countered by an objection that franchise in South Rhodesia was restricted. Growing militant nationalism was contributing to the problems of the White Government.

Several abortive attempts had been made in the sixties to get the United Nations involved in the conflict situation. The Rhodesian question was first considered by the United Nations in the Fourth (Trusteeship and non-self-governing territories) Committee during the Sixteenth Session in 1961. The General Assembly passed resolution 1745 (XV D)²⁹ asking the Special Committee³⁰ to consider whether South Rhodesia was

²⁹The eleven sponsoring states were: Burma, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, the Philippines, the UAR and Yugoslavia.

³⁰This was the off-spring of Resolution 1514 (XV) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial People. The strength of the Committee was later increased to twenty-four.

non-self-governing. The Resolution stated that "the indigenous inhabitants (of Rhodesia) have not been adequately represented in the legislature and not at all in the government". The Sub-committee³¹ of this Special Committee concluded from its findings that Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory. It maintained that the Constitution of 1923, upon the basis of which Britain proclaimed Rhodesia's self-governing status, had been given without the knowledge and consent of the indigenous people. The 1961 Constitution had been rejected by the vast majority of the population. Political rights and liberty had been denied to a large majority in Southern Rhodesia. Thus the claim that the territory was independent and self-governing was exposed as a fiction.³²

Nonetheless the General Assembly had determined that the problem of deciding whether or not certain territories are self-governing, was not a domestic prerogative. General Assembly Resolution 742 (VII) had laid down certain features which were imperative for a self-governing state to possess. Since South Rhodesia did not have the power to negotiate, sign or ratify its own international agreements, according to the General Assembly Resolution 742 (VII), it could not aspire to a self-governing status. The South Rhodesians did not have the right to choose their own form of Government either.

³¹The Sub-Committee membership was composed of India, Mali, Tanganyika and Venezuela.

³²Idembo, p. 175.

Neither was South Rhodesia free from external control or interference, for under the Constitution of 1923 Britain had the right to interfere in the South Rhodesian affairs. Thus this resolution served to clarify the fact that despite the British contention, South Rhodesia was not self-governing. The United Nations therefore called upon Britain to transmit information on South Rhodesia as per Article 73(e) of the Charter.³³ But Britain neither felt nor carried out the obligation, maintaining within the United Nations that the constitution of 1923 had made South Rhodesia self-governing; Britain therefore had no legal power to demand such information from South Rhodesia and no authority to transmit any information to the Organisation.

Britain seemed reluctant to cooperate with United Nations on this issue. It tried to prevent the Special Committee from taking up the question of Rhodesia on the ground that it was not a colonial one.³⁴ Earlier there had been some support for the British stand because of the vagueness and confusion regarding the status of South Rhodesia.³⁵

³³ This article calls upon the Administrative Powers of the territories, not governed by Chapter XII (This contains provisions relating to the International Trusteeship System) to transmit to the Secretary-General, information of a technical nature relating to the economic, social and educational conditions of the area.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

but the reports of the Special Sub-Committee highlighted its non-self-governing nature.

Britain's persistent opposition to the United Nations' attempts at defining the political status of Rhodesia, made its bonafides suspect. It challenged the legality of the United Nations' deliberation of the Rhodesian issue and declared that neither United Kingdom nor United Nations had the right to discuss the matter. It was the British contention that the United Nations lacked the competence, and the United Kingdom the legal ability to interfere in South Rhodesia.

Britain disregarded a string of General Assembly resolutions on the subject of Rhodesia,³⁶ maintaining that the self-governing nature of this British colonial possession prevented it from exercising authority there.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Resolution 1745 (XVI) requested the Special Committee to consider whether the territory of Southern Rhodesia had attained self-government and report to the General Assembly upon this issue;

Resolution 1747 (XVI) urged the convening of the Constitutional Conference and urged the restoration of political rights to the non-European population of South Rhodesia;

Resolution 2012 (XX) called upon the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to prevent a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Resolution 2022 (XX) called upon the United Kingdom to effect the release of all political detainees and the repeal of all discriminatory legislation.

IV

Thus five distinct parallel facets can be identified in the Rhodesian issue, each developing inevitably towards the escalation of the crisis.

(a) The advent of the sixties ushered in a period of transition in Rhodesia. The Central African Federation which was showing cracks finally broke up at the close of 1963.³⁷ South Rhodesia got a new Constitution in 1961 which generated a mixed reaction from the populace. The Whites felt that it had conceded too much to the natives. The latter on the other hand felt that they had received a raw deal. In 1962, the United Federal Party, also known as the Establishment Party, which had consistently maintained itself in power since the thirties³⁸ was displaced by the Rhodesian Front led by Winston Field. This party shed even the pretence of working towards multiracialism which the United Federal Party had maintained, and was pledged to the policy of 'separate development' of the two races in Rhodesia.³⁹ A further change came in the form of the replacement of Winston Field as the leader of the Rhodesian

³⁷The independent Republic of Zambia came into being on 24 October 1964 after ten months of internal self-government. Nyasaland became self-governing on 1 February 1963, and independent as Malawi on 6 July 1964.

³⁸Windschich, p. 42.

³⁹Ibid., p. 47.

Front Party, by Ian Smith.

(b) Colonialism and imperialism were issues on which public opinion was sensitive. It seemed difficult to imagine that British would grant independence to the minority white Government in face of international public opinion which would look upon it as a breach of cherished democratic ideals.

Besides the United Nations, two other bodies have been concerned with the Rhodesian issue. These were the Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth. The former because it had pledged to remove all vestiges of colonial rule and racial discrimination from Africa; the latter because Rhodesia had earlier figured as a prospective member of the Commonwealth.⁴⁰ Both served as pressure groups for the cause of the Rhodesian natives - their proposals, resolutions and communiques serving to build up public opinion in favour of African rights.

(c) Moral pressure was being brought to bear against the British Government in the United Nations, in the Commonwealth meetings and by anti-racialists at home. The ruling Labour Party was, at that period, functioning within certain limitations. It had come to power in 1964 with a "knife-edge majority" and therefore had to weave its way carefully in dealing with the Rhodesian issue.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 253.

The Conservatives in Opposition favoured a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem. They were opposed to the sanctions the Labour Party had threatened to apply against the Smith Government in case of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.⁴¹ The possibility of taking any strong action in Rhodesia was virtually eliminated, for any Government using force against their "kith and kin"⁴² would run the risk of completely antagonising the electorate at home. The Wilson Government, under such circumstances, was rendered quite incapable of positive action.

(d) Nationalism gained impetus in South Rhodesia, and the natives were becoming more vocal in their demands and more active towards the attainment of the goal of national self-determination.

Those Africans who had maintained faith in the 'politics of partnership' were disillusioned by the removal, in 1963, of the South Rhodesian Premier, Foss, who professed liberal racial views, and the defeat of his United Rhodesia Party in the elections soon after.⁴³

The natives had believed that South Rhodesia's uniting in a Federation with two African majority states -

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 209.

⁴² Mlambo, p. 254.

⁴³ Lenny, pp. 101-2.

North Rhodesia and Nyasaland - may lead to a reform of the pattern of racial segregation under which they had lived. But the actual gains fell far short of expectations. And when North Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent as Zambia and Malawi respectively, self-determination for Rhodesia seemed yet far.

The Nationalists had organised themselves under the banner of the African National Congress, which when banned, gave place to the National Democratic Party in 1960. This party laid great stress upon making constitutional and political gains instead of merely agitating against racial discrimination.⁴⁴

The Party successfully organised African public opinion to protest against the new 1961 Constitution and boycott the elections held under its provisions. It held an unofficial referendum to demonstrate the unwillingness of Africans to accept the 1961 Constitution.

But the organisation and strength which the National Democratic Party was able to give the National movement soon disappeared in 1962 when it was banned. Its successor, the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) was unsuccessful in recreating it. In fact, on the eve of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the Nationalist movement had become weak and divided and enervated. This was

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

because the split in the ZAPU ranks in 1963, which created the ZANU (Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union), was followed by dissension and violence among the two, on which pretext the Government banned both in August 1964

(e) Within the United Nations, the African group was becoming increasingly restive at the inability of the world body to exercise a positive role in the Rhodesian issue. This lobby had widespread support from Asian, African and several Western Powers as well. In 1965 the issue was taken up as a matter of priority by the Fourth Committee. The large majority by which the General Assembly approved two of its resolutions on the question, was indicative of world concern about the explosive situation in South Rhodesia.⁴⁵

Debates in the General Assembly and Fourth Committee revealed a mistrust of the role Britain was enacting. The fear of being presented with a fait accompli⁴⁶ was also in evidence.

The involvement of United Nations with South Rhodesia was deepened when thirty-five African States requested that the issue be placed on the agenda of the Security Council.

⁴⁵ Resolution 2012 (XX) of 12 October 1965 was sponsored by 40 states. Voting was 107 in its favour, 2 against and 1 abstaining.

Resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965 was sponsored by 56 members. Voting was 82 in favour, 9 against and 11 abstaining.

⁴⁶ General Assembly Official Records, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1540 meeting, 27 October 1965, p. 138.

It was in this background of national and international affairs that the UDI was proclaimed on 11 November 1965.

Chapter Three

SANCTIONS IN APPLICATION : THE GRADUATED SCALES

Chapter Three

The day South Rhodesia declared independence, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning this action of the "racialist minority" and called the attention of the Security Council to the situation threatening international peace and security.¹

The Security Council, in its Resolution 216 of 12 November 1965, urged states neither to recognise, nor to aid the "illegal" regime of South Rhodesia.²

There was a widespread demand of the use of force against the Smith regime, and the African States were the leaders of this pressure group within the United Nations. Under the banner of the Organisation of African Unity, these states had pledged to support the cause of the Rhodesian Africans in their fight for majority rule. In the session held at Accra in October 1965, the OAU had urged the use of force, if required, to uphold majority rule against an illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

The General Assembly too, in a resolution had recommended that Britain use force to restore the political

¹ General Assembly Resolution 2024, Twentieth Session.

² Security Council Resolution 216, proposed by Jordan, adopted on 12 November 1965 by 10 votes to nil; France abstaining.

rights of the Africans in South Rhodesia. This resolution had received support from the Asian and Socialist countries as well.³

Britain on the other hand had been underplaying the need of strong action against Rhodesia. Speaking in the Commonwealth Conference in June 1965, Wilson had warned that the use of force against South Rhodesia would plunge Africa into a conflict.⁴ Actually it was in the interest of the United Kingdom to prevent a state of war in Southern Africa where she had high economic stakes, and therefore it did not evince any inclination to dwell on the subject of using armed force in the area.

Moreover, Wilson was aware that the idea of using force against their white "kinsfolk" in South Rhodesia would be unacceptable to the British people. Exigencies of domestic politics too demanded that the ruling party refrain from committing Britain to the use of armed strength in Rhodesia. Wilson's Labour Party had merely a "paper thin majority" in the Parliament. It had therefore to be cautious about preserving the consensus it had achieved with the Conservative Party on the issue of Rhodesia.

³ General Assembly Resolution 2022, Twentieth Session.

⁴ Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 135.

It was these circumstances that defined Britain's course of action and led her to present before the Security Council a draft Resolution which completely skirted the issue of use of force against Rhodesia. It merely asked for the Council's support of those financial and economic measures which Britain had already put into application against Rhodesia.⁵ The African states were vehement in their criticism of the inadequacy of the British draft resolution and countered it with one of their own which demanded action to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.⁶

These two extreme views were compromised in Resolution 217 which called for an embargo upon the supply of arms and ammunition, oil and petroleum products to South Rhodesia.⁷

⁵ Immediately upon South Rhodesia's declaration of independence, Britain undertook to punish it by applying punitive sanctions. These included banning of import of sugar, tobacco from Rhodesia; forbidding credit guarantees, and access to the British Capital market to it; stopping export of oil and removing it from the Sterling Area and Commonwealth Preference Area.

Subsequently these measures were strengthened by placing an embargo on all import of Rhodesian minerals. Later export of petroleum and petroleum products was also prohibited.

⁶ This chapter deals with action to be taken by the Security Council in case of threats to the peace, breach of peace and acts of aggression. Action under Chapter VII is only taken after the Security Council has determined that the situation poses a threat to international peace and security. This point has been discussed in some detail in Chapter I of this study.

⁷ Resolution 217(1965) proposed by Bolivia and Uruguay, adopted on 20 November 1965, by 10 votes to nil; France abstaining.

This Resolution conceded a degree of victory to both points of view being advocated in the United Nations. Britain had been able to prevent the situation in South Rhodesia from being classified as a "threat to international peace and security", thereby avoiding the initiation of action under Chapter VII of the Charter. But in as much as the Resolution had accepted that the "continuance in time (of the situation in South Rhodesia) would be a threat to international peace and security", Chapter VII had been obliquely mentioned. This was a small concession which the African group and its supporters were able to snatch.⁸

The passage of Resolution 221⁹ was a landmark, for it initiated the use of force in the United Nations' sanctions experiment and marked the advent of stronger resolutions on the subject. It gave Britain the authority to use force if necessary, to prevent the supply of crude oil to Beira, a port in Mozambique, which was the mainpoint of entry of crude into Rhodesia.

⁸ This resolution has been called a compromise between Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 70-71.

⁹ Resolution 221 (1966) was moved by Britain and passed by ten votes to nil, with five abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, Russia and Uruguay).

The passage of this wider resolution too did not satisfy the Africans who were vociferously demanding a total embargo on exports to Rhodesia. They felt that Britain should have been granted the use of force not merely as a last resort, but should be permitted its wider use towards the larger purpose of toppling the Smith regime. They were impatient at the failure of Great Britain to fully utilise the 'arsenal' which the invocation of Chapter VII had laid before the United Nations.

Attempts made outside the United Nations served to pressurise Britain into strengthening its stand against Rhodesia. The Lagos Conference of the Commonwealth (January 1966) had been called at the initiative of the African states solely to discuss the issue of Rhodesia. At the London Conference of the Commonwealth (September 1966) Britain was given a three-month time period to illustrate the effectiveness of sanctions, failing which sanctions would have had to be strengthened.

Since by December 1966 Rhodesia showed no signs of succumbing to economic pressure, and the Rhodesian Government saw fit to reject the outcome of the Tiger Talks¹⁰ held between Smith and Wilson, Resolution 232 was passed. By

¹⁰Talks between Prime Minister Wilson and Prime Minister Smith were held on board RIS Tiger. They began on 2 December 1966 and lasted 72 hours.

this the United Nations embarked upon its first experiment with mandatory sanctions.

Specific items were named in the resolution in which trade with South Rhodesia was prohibited. These included arms and ammunition, military vehicles, aircraft, oil and oil products. South Rhodesian exports, such as asbestos, iron ore, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat skins and leather were to be prohibited as imports.

Mali, Uganda and Nigeria had made several amendments to strengthen the resolution and the important addition of oil and oil products to the list of prohibited exports can be traced to their initiative.

Despite this heavy economic pressurisation, South Rhodesia showed no signs of succumbing to the boycott. Britain continued to make efforts at conciliating the regime and negotiating a settlement with it. Several official and unofficial visits of British politicians to South Rhodesia remained unfruitful. The issue was again brought before the Security Council for an increase in punitive measures, when in a blatant gesture of defiance, the Rhodesian regime ordered the execution of three African prisoners who had been granted a reprieve by the British Crown.

A draft resolution of five Asian African powers (Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Senegal) which called upon the United Kingdom to use the force of arms against South Rhodesia, was not considered. Resolution 253 was unanimously

passed on 28 May 1968 which further increased the scope of sanctions. Hitherto applied on select and specific goods of trade with South Rhodesia, they now covered the import of all goods from, and supply of all goods to, that state. This was a bid to totally blockade and isolate South Rhodesia.¹¹

This resolution also contained a mandatory injunction calling upon the states to submit information regarding the extent to which the sanctions have been applied by them. (Resolution 232 had mentioned this requirement, but it had not been made compulsory.) A Committee was set up to examine the reports of implementation of the comprehensive mandatory sanctions submitted by the Member States and gauge the effectiveness of the sanctions experiment.

The scope of the Sanctions Committee has since been widened by two resolutions. Security Council Resolution 277 of 18 March 1970 expanded its jurisdiction to study ways and means to increase the effectiveness of sanctions. Security Council Resolution 314 of 28 February 1972 wanted a report from the Sanctions Committee recommending ways and means to ensure the implementation of sanctions.

¹¹Under this Resolution, Member States were to forbid public or private investment in South Rhodesia, forbid entry into their territory of any man with a Rhodesian passport, forbid carriage of any goods to Rhodesia on aircrafts or vessels of their registration. The only exceptions to the trade embargo were to be educational materials, medical supplies, news materials, money for certain pensions and other materials, if considered necessary, for humanitarian purposes.

The Sanctions Committee reports are the best means at our disposal to secure a well-informed picture regarding the effectiveness of this international economic pressure.¹²

The well-monitored records of the Sanctions Committee and the very survival of the South Rhodesian regime in spite of almost a decade of complete economic boycott, raises valid doubts about the sincerity with which the sanctions have been applied.

Sanctions demand sacrifices from the applying states who may have to suffer certain inconveniences such as shortages of raw material, loss of well-established markets and the necessity to use longer alternative trade routes. Several states are not willing to make any sacrifice or to subjugate concrete national gains for nebulous interests of the international community. But universality is imperative for the success of any sanction experiment. Without this, vital trade routes, markets and sources of raw material are left open, and even a tiny loophole in the sanctions net may be enough to keep the otherwise besieged state afloat. Sanctions evasion by individuals also create similar difficulties. States who profess to be neutral in the sanctions programme can only be co-operative partners of the target state, for in

¹² Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 47.

sanctioning there is nothing called impartiality or neutrality.¹³

A study of the attitudes of a few states towards post-WDI Rhodesia will give us a clear picture of the extent of co-operation the United Nations' Sanctions experiment has received from them.¹⁴

South Africa has more in common with Southern Rhodesia than a mere border. They are both the last bastions of white civilization in the African Continent, South Africa

¹³ Margaret Doxey sums up the results of non-universality of a sanction policy. "The existence of non-participants in enforcement brings possibilities of important trade relationships being left untouched by sanctions, of alternative markets and sources of supply becoming available, of evasive action being channelled through third states, of loans credits and even gifts from friendly powers; and the development of new communications and lines of transport to replace those cut by sanctions. The psychological effect of sanctions will also be weakened." *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 101. Margaret Doxey

¹⁴ States whose co-operation made all the difference between success and failure, were the following: (a) South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique, the neighbours who withheld co-operation from the United Nations' experiment. (b) Zambia, the neighbour who supported the experiment at the risk of her own development programmes. (c) Eastern Powers who cooperated with the Ian Smith regime. These are the United States of America, Australia, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and (d) Britain who initiated the sanctions experiment.

follows a policy of apartheid which Rhodesia attempts to emulate.¹⁵ But the former's interest in, and subsequent assistance to South Rhodesia has a more important purpose than just aiding its kith and kin across the River Limpopo.¹⁶

South Africa has a keen interest in making the United Nations' sanctions fail, for the success of this weapon could mean the possibility of South Africa being made their target in the future. The general view prevalent in South Africa was that helping Rhodesia to survive sanctions meant, ultimately protecting South Africa from the same fate.¹⁷ But at the same time the South African Government was careful not to rouse the ire of the world community by making direct and obvious efforts to defeat the sanctions,

¹⁵ Larry Bowman talks of the South Africa's contempt of Rhodesia's 'ideological wavering on the issue of apartheid'. "Rhodesia since the UDI", Africa Report, Vol. XII, No. 2, February 1967, p. 8.

¹⁶ South African President Verwoerd said: "Fowsoever others may feel or act toward their kith and kin when their national interests are at stake, South Africa on the whole cannot cold shoulder theirs". Quoted in Good, p. 129.

¹⁷ Johannesburg's Sunday Times, 21 November 1965 said: "we need to save Rhodesia, because in doing so we go a long way in saving ourselves."

for the possibility of punitive sanctions against South Africa herself could not be totally eliminated.¹⁸ At this juncture, South Africa practised subtle diplomacy. It had to be careful not to commit itself either to the pro-Rhodesian lobby to which it was sympathetic,¹⁹ or to the pro-sanctions lobby which commanded the majority and strength in the World Body.

South Africa decided that they would ignore the sanctions and continue 'normal trade' with Rhodesia. This was interpreted to mean the usual competitive progressive trade with an eye to an increase in profit.²⁰ Thus South Rhodesia's trade with South Africa continued to flourish and expand.

The ports of the cooperative neighbour were made open for Rhodesian trade which aided in earning the all-important foreign exchange. Goods were passed off as South African produce. This subterfuge was made simple by the fact that Rhodesia was an exporter of minerals which were

¹⁸ Good, p. 129. — Goodrich, Deland M and Simona Anne P. *The United Nations and the maintenance of peace and security* London (1973)

¹⁹ They had not reconciled themselves to the idea of African rule in the neighbouring state and identified native rule with disharmony, and as a challenge to the continued existence of a white regime in South Africa.

²⁰ Good, p. 132.

produced in South Africa as well.²¹ An analysis of trade figures of the post-1965 period highlights an interesting fact that while export figures of South Rhodesia fell, those of South Africa touched an all-time high.²²

Though there was a general awareness that Rhodesia continued her posture of defiance because of South Africa's co-operation, yet no positive move was made to extend the scope of sanctions to include South Africa. Proposals to this effect, made by some of the Afro-Asian nations had been resisted by the Western Powers who have vested interests in that region.²³

Even the United Kingdom which was politically committed to the success of the sanctions experiment, was not eager to make South Africa a target. The reason is that

²¹ Francis Nehwati, "Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia", UN-OAU Conference on South Africa, Oslo 1973, Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, eds. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1973), p. 151.

²² Ibid. Nehwati reports that exports from Rhodesia fell from 115,000 tons in 1965 to 7,000 tons in 1968. But exports via South Africa soared from 20,000 tons in 1965 to 92,000 tons in 1968.

²³ Numerous recommendations have been made by the General Assembly for the application of sanctions against South Africa, but they have been only fitfully applied by the Member-States. A move to expel her from the United Nations in 1974, and a proposal for a comprehensive arms embargo against her, were vetoed by the United States, France and Britain in the Security Council.

British economic stakes in the region are tremendous and her business group stands to lose a great deal if South Africa is included in the sanctions programme.²⁴

The fact that the importance of the Cape Route had increased upon the closure of the Suez in 1967, also influenced the British policy towards South Africa. It is ironical that the Britain should, by force of circumstances, be forced to cooperate with a State who is the primary reason for the failure of the international sanctions experiment. It is eloquent testimony to the fact that dedication to sanctions is best tested when it clashes with national interest.

Till 1975, Rhodesia was fortunate in having yet another cooperative state on its eastern flank - Portuguese

²⁴ The British representative at the United Nations is reported to have told the Afro-Asian countries that "to refuse to commit suicide is not immoral". Quoted in Esmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: A Struggle for a Birthright (London: Hurst and Co., 1972), p. 260.

In the Commonwealth Conference held in London in 1966, opposing the application of sanctions against South Africa, Prime Minister Wilson said: "In international politics and for Britain's economic future, this is a crucial rider" (p. 131).

Another point of view feels that Britain stood to lose very little on breaking trade relations with South Africa. Mlambo testifies that while South Africa accounted for 9% of the British trade, the former depended more on Britain than any other country. The Observer of 11 December 1966, and The Financial Times of 22 November 1966 substantiate this statement (pp. 260-61).

Mozambique.²⁵ This regime itself involved in the problem of race relations and guerrilla uprisings, could not afford to see sanctions against Rhodesia succeed. Moreover, its ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques catered to the trade of land-locked Rhodesia, involving Mozambique in a profitable activity which it did not wish to forego.

At the proclamation of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Portugal declared the issue to be a domestic matter of the British. It declared its neutrality upon the issue of sanctions, maintaining that it was "willing to look to the just equilibrium of the collective needs of all".²⁶

Efforts were made to counteract the effects of Portuguese neutrality by passing Resolution 221 calling for a blockade of Beira. But this was an uneffective, inadequate measure. It made no mention of blockading the other Portuguese port of Lourenco Marques which could, as it later did, continue to be a part of trade for

²⁵ The Caetano regime was overthrown in April 1976 and replaced by the Government of Samora Machel, a genuine supporter of the African people's right to rule South Rhodesia. Since the liberation of Mozambique, guerrilla movement directed against South Rhodesia has increased in that area. Following skirmishes between guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces, the Mozambican Government has closed its borders with Rhodesia at a great financial loss to itself.

²⁶ Good, p. 133.

Rhodesia,²⁷ Resolution 221 could only be considered logical if it was accompanied by a total blockade of Southern Africa. In the light of the British policy towards South Africa, such a proposition was an impossible expectation.

While Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa decided to ignore sanctions for it was in their economic interest to do so, Zambia, yet another adjoining country has lent its cooperation to the sanctions experiment at a great cost to itself. Zambia's relation with Rhodesia is a peculiar one. The nature of their governments, their principles and policies differ, but force of historical circumstance has bound the two into a close partnership. As units of the British Empire and later part of the Central African Federation,²⁸ the economies of the two countries became very closely interlinked. Their rail and air services were jointly owned and run, with headquarters at Bulawayo.²⁹ Zambia's copper

²⁷ The Sonarep oil refinery at Lourenco Marques increased its storage capacity and supplied Rhodesia.

Guy Arnold and Alan Baldwin testify that since 1966, a number of trading companies have sprung up in Beira and Lourenco Marques, whose raison de etre is to falsify papers covering Rhodesian goods or to re-route imports into Rhodesia. "Rhodesia: Total Sanctions or Total Economic Warfare", quoted in The Rhodesian Problem, Elaine Windrich, ed., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 273.

²⁸ Nyasaland (later Malawi) was the third unit of the Federation.

²⁹ The break-up took place in June 1967.

mines, which were the mainstay of its economy, were dependent upon the Kariba hydro-electricity project situated in Rhodesia. Being landlocked as well, Zambia routed her trade through Rhodesian rail and road routes.

With economies of the nature of 'Siamese twins',³⁰ the sanctions applied against Rhodesia would adversely affect Zambia in the same measure.

The proclamation of independence by Rhodesia put Zambia in a dilemma. Though its sympathies lay with the native African point of view, its relationship with Rhodesia precluded a complete break with it. Such a step would only lead to the strangulation of its economy. It had to choose the path carefully and find an adroit compromise³¹ between the two extreme lines of action.

There was tremendous pressure from the Organisation of African Unity and from Britain to completely break away from the Rhodesian system. But in the interests of Zambia, President Kaunda decided that only mild sanctions be applied against Rhodesia. These comprised of lessening the volume of trade that passed through Rhodesia, making an increase on the tariff of the non-essential consumer goods

³⁰ Good, p. 20.

³¹ John de St. Jorre, "Zambia's Economy, Progress and Perils", African Report, vol. XII, No. 9, December 1967, p. 37.

from its southern neighbour, refusal to pay joint railway dues to the headquarters at Bulawayo, encouraging inflammatory radio broadcasts and harbouring guerrillas in the Zambian territory.³² The sanctions were more a means to register disapproval of Rhodesia's gesture, rather than to pressurise the target state.

Efforts were made to give up dependence on Rhodesian routes, and alternative lines of communication are now being used. From 1967 when 80% of Zambia's imports passed through Rhodesia, in 1972 this figure dropped to 45%.³³ The United Nations has commended the Zambian effort of rerouting her trade.³⁴

³² Ibid.

³³ Zacklin, p. 67.

³⁴ The seventh Report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968), 22 May, reports on Zambia's trade with South Rhodesia from 1965 to 1973. See UN Doc. S/11594/Add.3, pp. 33 and 37. These

contd....

But the decision regarding the intensity, and scope of sanctions to be applied against Rhodesia was taken out of Zambia's orbit when in January 1973, Rhodesia took the initiative of closing the borders between the two countries. Now a state of war exists between the two.

figures reveal a gradual decline in trade.

ZAMBIA'S TRADE WITH SOUTH RHODESIA
(1965-1973)

Year	In Thousands of US Dollars	
	Imports	Exports
1965	99,507	15,317
1966	64,904	7,018
1967	45,129	2,850
1968	31,602	1,332
1969	30,481	613
1970	32,473	1,032
1971	29,540	560
1972	16,240	1,540
1973*	11,000	440

* Figures of 1973 are only for the period January to November.

Application of sanctions, even though they were not comprehensive, rerouting trade to avoid the Rhodesian routes, and fighting the effects of the sanctions which were reflected on its economy, made Zambia run into severe economic difficulties. But despite her appeals to the United Nations,³⁵ neither Member States, nor specialised agencies have come forward with any offer of assistance.³⁶ The Zambian Solidarity Committee of the OAU has served no fruitful purpose either.³⁷

Since Britain was most closely involved in the issue, it set the tone and pattern of further action by putting into practical application the threat of an economic rap on the knuckles which it had long held out before Rhodesia. The VDI marked the failure of its ability to

³⁵ Article 50 of the United Nations Charter gives any state the right to consult with the Security Council on economic problems which may arise from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures taken by the Council.

³⁶ By the end of 1975, the cost to Zambia of the closure of its southern borders was calculated to amount to over US \$ 300 million. A small number of States had contributed US \$ 63.5 million towards meeting this expense. Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation (16 June 1975 to 15 June 1976). GAOR, 21 Session, Supplement No. A/31/1, p. 133, para 1.

³⁷ Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and UAR were the members of this Committee.

solve the Rhodesian problem on a bilateral basis. Its invocation of the Security Council meeting on the 11 November 1965 further substantiated this fact, for hitherto it had been contesting the legitimacy of international concern in the affairs of "self-governing" Rhodesia.

With its high stakes in the issue, Britain was active in the application of sanctions initiated by the United Nations. The Sanctions Committee Reports list Britain as the country most involved in the implementation of sanctions.³⁸ The Security Council Resolution 221 gave Britain alone the right to use force to intercept ships carrying crude oil to Beira. It was Britain who undertook the expensive responsibility of airlifting oil to prop up Zambia's besieged economy.³⁹

³⁸ According to Zacklin, out of 138 cases which came before the Sanctions Committee till 1972, 127 have been brought to it by Britain. p. 80.

³⁹ Zambia was deprived of oil supplies when Rhodesia was blockaded, and Britain undertook to airlift oil to Zambia. Britain was to bear the cost of this project and would receive Canadian and American aid. The experiment was soon given up as impracticable. According to Zambia's rate of consumption of oil, a daily supply of 500 tons was needed. Moreover, Zambia's airfields were unable to stand the unprecedented traffic. The consumption of fuel by each aeroplane (which carried 2,500 gallons), was 4,000 gallons. For a discussion see, Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967), pp. 358-9.

But in spite of this close involvement in the sanctions policy, certain inconsistencies are in evidence which have lessened the efficacy of the sanctions programme and raised valid doubts regarding Britain's total commitment to their success.

Her continued opposition to the inclusion of South Africa in the sanctions net is one such example. It is well-known that South Africa is the outlet for Rhodesian trade. It therefore is difficult to harmonise Britain's soaring trade with South Africa on one hand with the boycott of South Rhodesia on the other.⁴⁰ Britain would have retained her credibility in the eyes of the world if she would have atleast restricted her trade with South Africa to the pre-UDI level.

Loyal, vigorous application on part of the important powers is necessary if the lesser powers are to fall in with the experiment; and Britain, unable to shed pressures of national interest, has remained incapable of supplying strong leadership to the cause.

Further doubts regarding Britain's faithfulness to sanctions arose when it continued to show its willingness

⁴⁰ In 1965, Britain imported £ 180 million worth of goods from South Africa and exported goods to the tune of £ 265 million. In 1970 imports leapt to £ 258 million and exports were valued at £ 332 million. Nehwati, p. 161.

(if not anxiety) to negotiate with Smith's Government. This seems incongruous in light of its earlier step of declaring the Rhodesian regime illegal, and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence "a treasonable act". Britain's negotiations with the outlawed regime made its appeal of a universal comprehensive programme of sanctions, morally weak.

The African states looked askance at the negotiations, fearing that a settlement to compromise the principle of self-determination in Rhodesia may ensue from them. Each set of British proposals for settlement were regarded as a "sell-out".⁴¹

The manner and method of applying sanctions also left much to be desired. The graduated sanctions initiated by the British Government were applied in instalments and lacked momentum and therefore effectiveness. Similarly, within the International Forum, Britain took little initiative in formulating a more dynamic policy of sanctions. Security Council Resolution 232 for initiating selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia can be traced to the pressure of the Afro-Asian Caribbean group of the Commonwealth. Even the application of limited sanctions was made conditional to the failure of the Tiger Talks between Smith and Wilson. Similarly,

⁴¹ Colin Legum, The United Nations and Southern Africa, Institute for Study of International Organisation, Series I, No. 3 (Sussex, 1970), p. 27.

sanctions were made comprehensive only when Rhodesia gave further proof of her recalcitrance, and contempt for the principles of international law and carried out the death penalty of three African freedom fighters who had been granted a reprieve by the British Crown. This absence of initiative on ^{the} part of Britain is eloquent testimony to its lack of political will to solve the crisis.⁴²

The Rhodesian policy of the United States makes an interesting study. Its initial reaction to the UDI was to sever diplomatic relations with South Rhodesia and apply sanctions. Some hold that Prime Minister Wilson received an assurance, in December 1966, of United States' support of the proposed oil embargo. It is alleged that Wilson in return, for this cooperation, had promised to support United States' Vietnam policy.⁴³ To what extent both were sincere in meeting their avowed commitment remained a matter of conjecture. There was, in the United States, a strong pro-Rhodesian lobby which voiced the fear that the downfall of the white regimes in South Rhodesia and South Africa would leave America friendless in Africa. Some even demanded that United States withhold her support of the sanctions experiment, for Britain had not supported the economic sanctions

⁴² Mlambo, p. 258.

⁴³ Kenneth Young, p. 358.

against Cuba and China.⁴⁴

Nevertheless American trade figures for South Rhodesia showed a decline in export and import figures during the post-UDI years.⁴⁵ But what caused a grave set-back to the sanctions programme was the passage of the Byrd Amendment in 1971. This implied that the import of Rhodesian chrome and other strategically necessary material could not be prohibited despite mandatory sanctions of the Security Council for their import was imperative in the national interests of the United States.⁴⁶

Thus deliberately and voluntarily, a Member-State of the United Nations working towards its own self-interest, created a gap in the sanctions net.

The Byrd Amendment brought, besides material and monetary advantage, a psychological boost to the Rhodesian morale. The reports of the Sanctions Committee highlight

⁴⁴ Vernon McKay, "The Domino Theory of the Rhodesian Lobby", Africa Report, Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1967, pp. 55-57.

⁴⁵ Pre-UDI imports from Rhodesia were valued at \$ 14 million, and exports at \$ 23 million. In 1971 the imports from Rhodesia amounted to \$ 807,000 and exports to \$ 652,000. Figures of the VI Report of the Sanctions Committee, quoted in Zacklin, p. 82.

⁴⁶ In November 1971, the Armed Forces Procurement, Appropriations Authorisation Act became Law. An Amendment to this Act, initiated by Senator Byrd, was accepted and made a part of the law of the land. The controversial amendment was repealed by the American Congress in March 1977, after a personal appeal of President Carter.

the brisk business that the mineral industry of South Rhodesia is carrying on with the United States.⁴⁷ Trade is brisk in chrome ore, high carbon ferro-chrome, asbestos fibre, chrysotile asbestos fibre and electrolytic nickel cathodes. The shipments are made through the ports of

⁴⁷The total trade of the United States with South Rhodesia from 1965 to 1973, as reported to the United Nations was:

Year	In thousands of US Dollars	
	Imports	Exports
1965	14,056	22,982
1966	9,359	7,491
1967	6,463	3,757
1968	1,599	2,024
1969	68	455
1970	115	514
1971	807	625
1972	12,400	700
1973	25,670	581

This table shows that United States was successful in lessening its trade with South Rhodesia after the UDI. But after the passage of the Byrd Amendment in 1971, the import figures shot up again.

UNDOC, S/11594/Add 3, pp. 33 and 36.

South Africa and what was earlier Portuguese Mozambique. The busy ones are Durban, Port Elizabeth.⁴⁸ Prior to 1975, Mozambican parts of Beira and Lourenco Marques were also active in this trade.

The French Government held the view that the Rhodesian issue was a colonial one and therefore a domestic affair of the British Government. It felt that United Nations' intervention in the issue was uncalled for. The illicit sanction evasion in progress in France has been ignored by the Government. The surreptitious trade racket remains unexposed also perhaps because of a strong feeling among the French that it is a good way to pay back Britain for her continued trading with Tunisia during the course of the Algerian war.⁴⁹

Netherlands is another of the countries helping Rhodesia to keep her economy afloat. Her ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and her ships are available for trade traffic between Rhodesia and Europe.⁵⁰

Australia has been exporting wheat to Rhodesia under the humanitarian clause. But since Rhodesia produces

⁴⁸ For detailed account of names, registry and ports of departure of ships and tonnage of the minerals trade of United States with South Rhodesia, see UN Doc S/11594/Add 2 (Part I), Annex III, 2 April 1975, pp. 6-9; and UN Doc. S/11927/Add. I/Annexe III, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

surplus foodgrain--maize, the United Nations discourages this⁵¹ for wheat import encourages Rhodesian farmers to diversify into other fields and thus contribute to increasing the self-sufficiency of the country.

For the success of the sanctions experiment, it was necessary that even the non-member states and the specialised agencies cooperate. Even Article 2, clause VI of the United Nations Charter envisages the cooperation of non-members for the maintenance of international peace and security. Though not a member of the United Nations, Switzerland had agreed to abide by the Organisation's resolutions regarding Rhodesia. She accepted the sanctions in principle, but limited her trade merely to the level of three years preceding the UDI. Though the level of trade itself is not very large, yet the Swiss banks have been helpful to the rebel regime in arranging foreign exchange transfers. Rhodesians continue to have accounts in the Swiss banks.⁵² The Swiss Government have continued to sign long-term contracts with Rhodesia even after the imposition of sanctions.⁵³

⁵¹ Windrich, p. 273.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ A Swiss firm Handelsgesellschaft was controlled by a South African firm Universal Exports Limited (UNIVER) and performed the function of coordinating the sale of Rhodesian chrome ore and alloys in Europe. Zaaklin, p. 86.

When sanctions were first imposed upon Rhodesia, West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) was not a member of the United Nations.⁵⁴ She had not committed herself to support the sanctions policy and served as a helpful ally to the Rhodesian Government. Minerals and tobacco, meat and copper were supplied into Europe by agents at Hamburg, Bremer and West Berlin through the South African ports.⁵⁵ Weapons produced by a subsidiary firm of the Italian Fiat Company in South Africa find their way into South Rhodesia.⁵⁶ Italian car kits sent to Mozambique and South Africa become accessible to Rhodesia as well.⁵⁷

Japan has been importing chrome from South Rhodesia since 1965 and has ignored repeated UN requests to investigate suspected violation of sanctions.⁵⁸

This review of states' reactions to sanctions illustrates that the vital imperative of the sanctions policy - universality of application - is missing in the sanctions experiment directed against Rhodesia. A thorough,

⁵⁴ Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the United Nations only in 1973.

⁵⁵ According to The Observer (London), 17 March 1968, a West German firm Norddeutsche Raffinere imported and refined Rhodesian copper and sent it to Britain.

⁵⁶ Mumbo, p. 273.

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid.

honest and vigorous implementation of sanctions would have proved them to be an effective weapon. But we find that States are willing to apply sanctions only to the extent that this application does not adversely affect their vested interest.⁵⁹ Naturally therefore, despite more than a decade of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions, South Rhodesian economy continues to survive.

⁵⁹ As Colin Legum succinctly puts it, "Power Politics are essentially the politics of the national interests", p. 36.

Chapter Four

**IN RETROSPECT : AN EVALUATION OF THE SANCTIONS
EXPERIMENT**

Chapter Four

The initiation of sanctions against South Rhodesia was accompanied by the optimistic belief that the defiant regime would soon crumble.¹ The economy of Rhodesia with its dependence on international trade for growth, obviously seemed vulnerable. A country whose exports amounted to 38% of its National Income² was not expected to survive an international economic boycott. It was also anticipated that sanctions would stir up domestic problems for the Government, for sanctions bring in their wake economic hardships for the populace. These adverse effects were to be buttressed by a diplomatic boycott of the regime, which would leave it "isolated and friendless, in a largely hostile continent".³ Smith's capitulation to pressure then, did not seem very far.

¹At the Commonwealth Conference held in Lagos in January 1963, the British Prime Minister had predicted the end of the rebellion in a matter of "weeks rather than months" as a result of the sanctions initiated by Britain.

²Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 70.

³Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967), p.167.

But the imposition of sanctions have so far failed to yield the desired results for various reasons. Firstly, Rhodesia appears to have certain positive advantages in this economic battle. Nature has endowed it with vast mineral reserves. Coal, asbestos, chrome ore, iron ore, copper, nickel and gold are all readily marketable and therefore a tremendous economic asset. Her self-sufficiency in food is an added advantage.⁴

Another advantage which the Smith regime had, was that South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique, its immediate neighbours, had their own motives for defeating the sanctions and therefore rendered whole-hearted cooperation to Rhodesia.⁵ It was therefore, at no time denied access to ports.

The fact that Britain was keen to keep South Africa from being subjected to sanctions, worked in Rhodesia's favour.

Much depended on the effectiveness with which oil sanctions were applied, but the breach in that vital sanction was obviously made by South Africa and Portuguese

⁴ Save wheat, no foodgrain was imported by Rhodesia.

⁵ This point has been discussed in some detail in Chapter III.

Mozambique.⁶ No one could have been so naive as to accept that the blockade of Beira, and consequent closure of the Beira Untali pipeline, closed the supply of crude to Rhodesia. Oil continued to flow through Lourenco Marques and South Africa.

Britain's repeated verbal threats of sanctions before the sanctions were actually imposed had prepared the Rhodesian Government for the eventuality. The boycott would have been more effective if it had come unannounced, as a bolt from the blue. Rhodesia, already anticipating some adverse British reactions had cautiously withdrawn the greater part of Rhodesian gold and foreign assets from London prior to the declaration of independence.⁷ So

⁶ Oil had not been an item on South Africa's Rhodesian trade prior to the UDI. In the course of explaining South Africa's policy of neutrality towards the Smith regime, Prime Minister Verwoerd clarified to the South African Parliament on 22 January 1966, that, "If there are traders who have petrol to sell to Rhodesia, then it is their business.... We will not prevent them from selling". Quoted in "Neutral on Smith's side", The Economist, 26 February 1966, p. 790.

South Africa also organised a voluntary charity campaign of "Petrol for Rhodesia". Though the amount collected in this way could not have been much, it had morale-boosting implications for Rhodesia. The Economist points out that this could be a convenient cloak of innocence for a large operation of aid to Rhodesia.

⁷ The white Rhodesian Government's oft-repeated threats of a UDI should have forewarned Britain of the possibility of such a step. The fact that it took no precautionary measures to prevent it, proves that Britain was not seriously interested in applying effective sanctions against Rhodesia.

Britain's seizure of the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, in London, did not hurt Rhodesia. On the contrary Rhodesia took it as an excuse to disclaim the obligation of repaying its foreign debts and loans.⁸ In the same way, blocking of existing investments of the British citizens and preventing international mining corporations from repatriating their profits from the country, helped Rhodesia with its balance of payments.⁹

In anticipation of the sanctions, the Rhodesian Government had already appointed an Economic Council, to aid and advice it in meeting the challenge of the imminent sanctions.¹⁰

Thus sanctions, when finally applied, were met with a certain amount of preparedness on the part of South Rhodesia. Its counter-reactions to the challenge were impressive. This is best proved by the fact that it has been able to keep its economy from suffering any appreciable breakdown, and is still surviving more than a decade of sanctions application.

⁸ These amounted to £ 108 million.

⁹ Young, p. 335.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 315.

The white people and economy of the territory have revealed a remarkable resilience. The onslaught of sanctions has generated, what Galtung has called "the self-maintaining potential of the organism",¹¹ and this has helped in preventing a total collapse.

The Rhodesian Government realised that to meet the unprecedented situation, the economy had to be restructured to adapt to the changed circumstances.¹² They assessed their advantages and made full use of the gaps in the sanctions net and obtained the services of "privateers" who were willing to get involved in "sanctions busting"¹³ for private profit. Thus the Smith regime, anticipating sanctions was able to take preparatory steps by way of identifying the problems that were likely to arise, gauging their possible intensity, and establishing priorities of their solution well in advance.

¹¹Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia", World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 3, April 1967, p. 409.

¹²Robert McKimel, "Sanctions and the Rhodesian Economy", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. VII, No. 4, December 1969, p. 572.

¹³The Observer (London), 2 June 1968.

Shortage of foreign exchange posed a major difficulty for the Rhodesians in their fight against sanctions. With the purpose of conserving it, the Government encouraged import substitution, with an eye to minimising the quantity of imports.¹⁴

The secondary industry which was developed in consequence, has grown at a fantastic rate without the fear of any external competition. The entire domestic market is secured for it.¹⁵

Expansion of secondary industry opened up areas of employment for workers who have been displaced from fields where the effect of sanctions has been more pronounced.

Tobacco, the chief cash crop, and the 'hmb of the Rhodesian economy'¹⁶ was the hardest hit. Prices dropped

¹⁴ By stringent import controls, Rhodesian imports which were valued at £ 120 million were cut down to £ 90 million in 1969. Margaret Doney, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 81.

¹⁵ The textile industry expanded and developed. There was an increased production of footwear, furniture, paints and electrical goods. Manufacture of crop-spraying and irrigation equipment, medicinal, and veterinary preparations, ceramics, breakfast cereal and confectionery has been successfully initiated. Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁶ of Rhodesia's total adult population was involved in tobacco growing or in the auxiliary trades of selling, packaging and processing connected with it. Young, p. 407.

from 33 pence a pound to 25 pence a pound. The Government's treatment of the tobacco farmers has been sympathetic.¹⁷ To prevent panic resulting from imposition of sanctions, the Government set up a state corporation to purchase all the standing crop of tobacco. Public auctions of tobacco were prohibited and surplus crop stockpiled.

Upon the imposition of sanctions the Government decided to fix the target of tobacco production and guarantee a basic price for it. The fact that since 1974 the minimum price guarantee has been eliminated,¹⁸ and that since 1975 the production quota is no more fixed,¹⁹ proves that the tobacco industry has been nursed back to health.

Similarly, financial aid to the tune of £ 250,000 was earmarked for the mining industry to assist it through the difficult period. Efforts were made to augment the production of gold through research and development work in this field.²⁰

¹⁷ Tobacco had been considered a political target because tobacco growers were considered pillars of the Rhodesian Front Party. Good, p. 69.

¹⁸ Keatings, Contemporary Archives, 1974, p. 26808.

¹⁹ Tobacco Situation (Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture), September 1974, p. 31.

²⁰ Young, p. 358.

Owing to the saleability of minerals produced, this industry had never really suffered from the effects of sanctions. The fact that the output and profits of the mines continued to increase, proves that they had a ready market.²¹ The primary reason for the industry's expansion is that minerals could be conveniently passed off as South African product.

The Government attempted to ensure complete self-sufficiency in foodgrains by increasing maize production. This area also served to absorb those tobacco farmers who had felt the pinch of sanctions and were compelled to find new avenues of work.

The white populace has extended their support and cooperation to the Government in its fight against sanctions. Hardships, like shortages of certain goods, have been accepted as inevitable in a seige economy, and sacrifices readily made. A unity has been forged among the people from the awareness of their common status as an international

²¹The number of mineral blocks registered, rose from 679 in 1964 to 1468 in 1969. Francis Nehwati, "Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia", Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, eds., UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo 1973 (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1973), p. 157.

delinquent.²² This psychological impact of sanctions enabled the Government to exhort the citizens to make any sacrifice.

But it is not merely organised governmental effort bolstered by cooperation of the people, which could solely explain the survival of Rhodesia's economy. Ways and means of carrying on clandestine trade were found. Surreptitious trafficking, be it through private individuals or governments cooperating, has made a major contribution in keeping South Rhodesian economic afloat.²³

The South African Customs Union, comprising of states adjoining Rhodesia,²⁴ is an agency cooperating in carrying out trade with it. The Sanctions Committee reports that information supplied by countries showed that their

²² W.P. Kirkman, "Emotion Reigns Among the Rank and File in Rhodesia", The Times (London), 4 July 1966, says: "Rhodesians even those who in domestic politics detest what Smith's party stands for, in many cases range themselves behind him in the international question of Rhodesia's independence."

²³ The Sanctions Committee has valued the extent of South Rhodesia's clandestine trade in one year (1973) at £ 470 million in exports, and imports to the tune of 290 million. See UN Doc. S/11504/Add. 3, of 7 May 1975. Seventh Report of the Security Council Committee, established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968), 29 May 1968, concerning the question of South Rhodesia, p. 8, para 11.

²⁴ Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, South Africa and Swaziland.

trade with Rhodesia had declined after 1967,²⁵ but their trade with the South African Customs Union countries arose after 1967.²⁶

II

The fact that Rhodesia has been able to withstand the impact of the universal mandatory sanctions indicates certain lacunae in the implementation and application of the international enforcement programme. These, combined with the Rhodesian Government's efficient mobilisation of their internal resources, have prevented the sanctions experiment from attaining total success.

The idea of an international enforcement programme is not easily reconciled with the concept of state sovereignty, and several difficulties spring from this basic issue. Whereas the initiation of sanctions is a function of the International Organisation, their actual application is a state activity.

²⁵ In the period 1965 to 1973, the imports of the reporting countries from South Rhodesia fell from (in thousand metric tons) 85.3 to 1.0. UN Doc. S/11594/Add. 3, Annex VII, p. 8, para 11.

²⁶ The Sanctions Committee has derived a method of calculating the extent of South Rhodesian trade through the South African Custom Union. It compares the figures of imports of reporting countries from the Customs Union with the export figures of the Union. The difference or the unaccounted amount is the volume of South Rhodesian usage.

To what range and extent they will be applied by the individual states is an issue which falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state and the United Nations lacks any sanctionative authority in the matter.²⁷ Thus the centralised decision of the Security Council (representing a consensus between the Big Five) is applied in a decentralised manner. Consequently, there is an absence of uniformity of application by the several states and therefore no cohesion and strength in the enforcement programme.

The attitude of the states towards sanctions is determined by its own stakes, involvement and interest in the issue. National interest is the strongest imperative in international affairs and is hardly ever conditioned by moral precepts and idealism.²⁸ If application of sanctions contradicts their national interests, states do not feel bound to apply them. They may also become indifferent to, and inactive in the implementation of sanctions, the initiation of which they might have supported earlier. The

²⁷ Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 90.

²⁸ "National interest is the determining factor in power politics. No major Power... has ever been willing to commit a large part of its resources for purely moral purposes", says Colin Legum. The United Nations and Southern Africa, Institute for the Study of International Organisation, Series I, No. 3 (Sussex: 1970), p. 36.

United States policy towards Rhodesia illustrates the point. It openly continued trade in strategically necessary minerals with South Rhodesia despite the universal mandatory sanctions of the United Nations. The Byrd Amendment passed by the United States Congress in 1971 had declared that a boycott of these mineral imports would make the United States dependent on imports from Soviet Union. Such a state of affairs was considered contrary to its national interest.²⁹

Similarly, Portuguese Mozambique did not participate in the sanctions programme and continued its lucrative trade with South Rhodesia.

This non-compliance by states makes loopholes in the sanctions net, which can be utilised to the maximum advantage by the target state to keep economic strangulation at bay. There is no directive save moral compulsion, to force the states to apply the sanctions. The International Organization can merely use moral pressure to secure the compliance of the states. The only possible action it can take against a non-complying state is to draw it within the orbit of the sanctions as well.³⁰ But such a step would

²⁹The controversial amendment was repeated by the US Congress in March 1977, after a personal request made by President Carter.

³⁰Zacklin, p. 40.

only serve to make the task of the United Nations more comprehensive and complex. The economic burden of this widened sanctioning exercise would fall upon states already involved in a faithful application of these enforcement measures. Besides the increased expenditure, it would also involve a greater dislocation of world trade.

Thus the inability of the United Nations to compel states' cooperation is a basic weakness of the sanctions programme.

But there is a possibility of securing universal compliance with the experiment if the important Powers render the willing support and co-operation to it.³¹ A dynamic, vigorous and determined leadership can carry the lesser states along. But such dedication on the part of states that matter, has been conspicuous of its absence in the Rhodesian issue.

The opposition of the important powers to the extending of the scope of sanctions to apply against South Africa, has made their bonafides suspect.

The United States has flaunted mandatory sanctions with impunity, openly declaring national expediency to be of primary importance and made mockery of obligations under Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter.

³¹ibid., p. 89.

The United Kingdom, itself the initiator of sanctions, exhibited its lack of political will in solving the crisis by vacillating between tepid pressurisation of the renegade regime and feverish negotiations with it.³² Such an attitude of the major Powers led to the demoralising of the smaller powers' attitude towards international sanctions.

In this situation of oscillating attitudes of Member-States, the United Nations could not be assured that the target state would be isolated and sealed off for the purpose of achieving the objectives.

Since evasion of sanctions could be a profitable activity, it was likely to flourish in states whose governments were slack and indifferent to the application of sanctions, for evasion cannot be traced without the co-operation of the state concerned. Augustine Femon's equating international sanctions with the "revival of medieval ex-communication"³³ seems far-fetched and unlikely.

The Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council was authorised to be the sole official body entrusted with the

³² Britain's enunciation of a policy of 'no force' against Rhodesia and her opposition to the application of mandatory sanctions in the early period of the crisis had created grave doubts in the African mind. They feared that the British were working in collusion with the Smith regime, against the interests of the native Africans.

³³ Doxey, p. 78.

responsibility of tracking the large quantum of clandestine trade in progress. In a system where the International Organisation is no more than an association of sovereign states, the Sanctions Committee's authority could be derived solely from the goodwill of the Member-States. Its efficient functioning was dependent upon the complete support and cooperation of the member governments. The information upon which it would function was to be supplied by them. In any definite or suspected breach of sanctions, it could do no more than request the state for the supply of relevant information. It lacked the authority and power to examine suspect cargoes or to determine by expert help, its origin. Nor could it verify the information supplied to it by the states.³⁴ Even if the violation of sanctions was established, it could merely draw the matter to the attention of the Security Council, for the taking of necessary action against the evader of sanctions was a political question,³⁵ and

³⁴ See The Observer (London), 2 June 1968. "The chief defect... is the failure to provide the new UN Committee to supervise sanctions, with an inspectorate to detect and follow up the activities of the sanction breakers."

³⁵ Zacklin, p. 92.

therefore beyond the scope of the Committee's jurisdiction.³⁶

Galtung had felt that sanctions served well, the expressive purpose of registering disfavour,³⁷ but doubted their efficacy as instruments of change. It was his contention that the target society was an organism which possessed 'self-maintaining potential'³⁸ and reacted positively to the pressure applied against it.

But though the sanctions have not so far succeeded in the purpose of bringing about the capitulation of the Rhodesian regime or its replacement by a more amenable one, yet they have not been an exercise in futility either. The

³⁶ The Sanctions Committee has made recommendations aiming at streamlining its functioning. Among others, there are suggestions that the Committee name a body of experts to determine the origin of cargo; that it publish a manual of instructions regarding clearing or confiscating cargo after the determination of its origin; that a Sanctions Fund be established; that an official, with experience of international trade and commerce conducted through third parties, be appointed to the Committee.

Security Council Resolution 388, passed in April 1976 has given shape to a recommendation of the Committee. This instructs Member States to take action to ensure that their nationals did not insure any commodity or product exported from or destined to South Rhodesia. It also forbids the states and their nationals to permit the use of trade-marks and trade names by trading companies in South Rhodesia.

³⁷ Galtung, p. 411.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 409.

importance of the limited success as they have achieved cannot be ignored or under-rated.

The sustained pressure exercised by the sanctions has been successful in thwarting the designs of the white racist regime, of consolidating and perpetuating their hegemony in the territory. Although the white Government has managed to remain afloat, the economy of the territory is no more a growing, developing and dynamic one. Its easy access to foreign markets has been barred. The inevitable shortage of foreign exchange prevents the proper harnessing of its enormous economic potential. Industry suffers from the Government's inability to import machinery.³⁹ The efficiency of the railways has been impaired, for there is difficulty in finding replacements for existing railway stocks. The few loans and credits which are available to Rhodesia are lent out on high rates of interest.⁴⁰ Under such circumstances, Rhodesian economy remains stagnant and growth is only limited and piecemeal.

Though Rhodesian trade has been able to find loopholes in the sanctions net, yet it is evident that contravention of sanctions is an expensive process. "Sanctions

³⁹ Leith McGrandle, "The Eighth Year of an Economic Siege", The Sunday Times, 12 November 1972.
 "Because Rhodesia is a closed economy, the money just goes round and round."

⁴⁰ South Africa is the primary lender.

busters" demand higher prices in lieu of the risk undertaken in a trade of this nature.⁴¹ Moreover, illicit trade may have to be routed through longer, circuitous routes. Imports therefore are expensive and goods for export may fetch less than the fair price.

Owing to the comprehensively applied diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia has been unable to acquire a legal international basis and remains politically isolated.⁴² Not even its closest ally, South Africa has given it de jure recognition.⁴³ This, combined with the feeling of 'pariahdom' which arises from being made a target of a collective enforcement programme, has a stultifying impact on the psychological development of the people of Rhodesia.⁴⁴

Tourism, which brings in valuable foreign exchange and is the barometer of public confidence abroad has suffered

⁴¹ J. D. F. Jones, "A Hard Look at Sanctions", The Financial Times (London), 23 June 1969.

⁴² Legum, p. 30.

⁴³ South Rhodesia has Consular Missions in Johannesburg (South Africa) and Lisbon (Portugal); Information Offices in Washington D.C. and Sydney (Australia), and a Trade Mission in Johannesburg.

⁴⁴ Jones, "A Hard Look at Sanctions".

a set-back in recent years. The notoriety which accompanies sanctions along with the recent political upheavals in Angola and Mozambique have contributed to this. The rate of white immigration, which enforces the number and strength of the supporters of the regime, has also dropped.⁴⁵ But a very vital function which sanctions have successfully performed is that the Rhodesian issue has been kept open for discussion on international public forums. International concern has been a great help to the cause of the Nationalist opposition,⁴⁶ and has greatly assisted in the movement for setting right, what is internationally accepted as wrong. But for the sanctioning experiment, the UDI and the Rhodesian problem would have been a dim recollection in the public mind.

III

Recent socio-economic and political changes are working to hasten the achievement of the objective of the United Nations enforcement programme.

⁴⁵ See UN Doc. S/11594, VII Report of the Security Council Committee on South Rhodesia, pp. 41-44.

⁴⁶ Guy Arnold and Alan Baldwin, "Rhodesia: Token Sanctions or Total Economic Warfare", Elaine Windrich, ed., The Rhodesian Question: A Documentary Record, 1923-1973 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 270.

The liberation of Angola⁴⁷ and Mozambique,⁴⁸ footholds of another racist regime (Portugal) in Southern Africa, have given impetus to the liberation movements in Rhodesia as well.

The increase in African unemployment in the territory, given the rapid rate of African population growth, is posing a menacing problem for the white regime. The stagnant Rhodesian economy is unable to absorb this mass whose explosive potential has been greatly heightened by education which has fostered greater awareness⁴⁹ of their rights, and of the wrongs perpetrated against them.⁴⁹

Guerrilla activity launched by the native Africans has expanded considerably since the closure of Rhodesia's borders with Mozambique⁵⁰ and Zambia.⁵¹ Rhodesian native guerrillas are being trained in Mozambique and Tanzania. The white Government is being compelled to spend larger sums on its armed and police force⁵² and virtually a full mobilisation

⁴⁷ On 1 November 1976.

⁴⁸ In April 1976.

⁴⁹ John Worall, Guardian (Manchester), 19 July 1968.

⁵⁰ In April 1976.

⁵¹ In January 1976.

⁵² The 1975-76 budget increased expenditure on the army from £ 39 million of 1974-75, to £ 48 million. Expenditure on the police force increased from £ 25,200,000, in 1974-75 to £ 27 million. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 29 July 1975 (by arrangement with The Observer (London)).

of the whites has been ordered.

The number and tone of the General Assembly resolutions directed against the South Rhodesian regime, are proof of the support world public opinion is extending to the cause of the African Nationalists.

A widely attended meet - International Conference in support of the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia - held at Maputo in Mozambique in May 1977, adopted two resolutions by a consensus. This agreement too indicates the tremendous support of the world opinion against the Smith regime. This is further testified by the unanimity by which a resolution was passed in the Security Council, on 27 May 1977, which aimed at broadening sanctions against South Rhodesia.⁵³

IV

In a retrospective assessment of the sanctions experiment it is evident that the cause of their failure lay not in the theoretical enunciation of the sanctions programme, nor in the structure of the machinery devised

⁵³ The draft resolution S/12339 was sponsored by all fifteen members of the Security Council. It called upon states to bar the outflow of funds of the illegal Smith regime for any office or agency established by it in the other countries, except those established for pension purposes.

to enforce it, but in the manner and method of its implementation by the "sovereign" states. Certain states whose cooperation would have made the vital difference towards the success or failure of the experiment, revealed no commitment or responsibility towards it. Demands of national expediency relegated claims of international morality to the secondary place. States who had earlier supported the programme of sanctions, and even Britain - the initiator of the experiment, displayed a complete absence of political will in solving the crisis. Sanctions, to be effective, needed to be applied forcefully comprehensively and swiftly. But in the Rhodesian issue they were applied "piecemeal", in a graduated manner and therefore made little impact. It is small wonder then, that sanctions imposed by, and in the name of world community, were unable to achieve the objectives they had aimed at.

Yet they cannot be written off as an exercise in futility either. Their achievement lies in that they have successfully kept the issue of Rhodesia open for public debate and discussion on the International Forum. This has rendered great moral support to the African Nationalists agitating ~~within~~ Rhodesia for national self-determination.

By creating deprivation and shortage of foreign exchange within the territory, and by keeping the white regime almost completely isolated diplomatically, the sanctions have prevented ^{the} racist regime in Rhodesia from

stabilising itself. Moreover, the psychological impact of universal isolation cannot be under-estimated.

Some positive advantages have thus been achieved in the economic fray.

The impress of sanctions from without and the pressure of political, social and economic factors released by them from within, have opened two battle-fronts for Smith. There is increased possibility that the African Nationalists will attempt to wrest by force, what Smith is not willing to concede peacefully at the Conference Table.

All portents indicate the fall of another "bastion of white civilisation" in Africa. When the transformation of South Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is effected, the economic sanctions will have been a major contributory force in the transformation.

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