

**RUSSIAN APPROACH TO INDIA'S  
NUCLEAR POLICY**

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "RUSSIAN APPROACH TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY" submitted by SUNIL KUMAR SINGH VIDYARTHI in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, is his own work and has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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(Chairperson)

**Prof. Nirmala Joshi**  
(Supervisor)

*Dedicated*  
*to*  
*My Parents*

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## INTRODUCTION

Among the several issues of importance for Russian foreign policy is the question of nuclear proliferation and its policy towards the issue. After the end of the Cold War local and regional conflicts are being perceived as the main sources of tension. These conflicts are arising out of non-military factors such as regional extremism, aggressive nationalism and the forces of separatism. What makes conflicts highly dangerous of peace and stability and further complicates the situation is that several developing countries are perceived as threshold nuclear states. Any outbreak of hostilities could escalate into nuclear one, resulting in disaster is the Russian apprehension. The significance it accords to the question is, therefore, understandable.

An attempt has been made to examine and understand Soviet / Russian approach and policy towards this crucial issue. The first chapter "Soviet Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy and India" discusses the approach of the Soviet Union towards the non-proliferation issue. Ever since the use of atomic bomb in 1945, the nations of the world have been making effort to control nuclear arms and its proliferation. The nuclear non-proliferation issue became important when these states faced the problems of other states acquiring them. The major success in this regard was signing of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Despite the Cold War politics the Soviet Union was committed to it.

The second chapter "Russian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, Continuity and Change", has analyzed the Russia policy towards NPT,

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia's policy towards the issue of non-proliferation is more of continuity than change. In 1995 NPT and in 1996 CTBT were signed. Russia supported both these treaties.

The third chapter "Russia's Response to the Indian Nuclear Policy" shows the dilemma of decision makers in Russia, because of its close relationship with India on the one hand and its commitment towards the non-proliferation issues on the other hand. India's nuclear explosions of May 11 and 13, 1998 shocked the world. While equivocal in criticizing the tests, Russia refused to join the US in penalizing India by imposing sanctions, which could in its view would be counter productive. Although President Boris Yeltsin of Russia expressed his displeasure and he firmly stood by the terms of the NPT and CTBT, he never went beyond this. The overall policy of Russia in South Asia is how to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, so that this danger could be checked and remains under control.

In conclusion, I have critically analyzed the Russian approach towards nuclear non-proliferation with special reference to India.

## CHAPTER – 1

### SOVIET NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND INDIA

The birth of nuclear weapons has heavily influenced the international system and foreign policy of the countries including the Soviet Union. The foreign policy of Soviet Union has been a matter of debate among scholars whether it was guided by real politic or ideologies. However, the western scholars, more or less, share a common perception that there is no meaningful connection between the Marxist theory and Soviet foreign policy. According to this view the real basis of Soviet foreign policy in the post Second World War period was *real politic*, while others are of the view that soviet foreign policy had a political purpose to establish communism all over the world. Ideology was the basis of Soviet foreign policy and it played a major role to shape the foreign policy.

The advent of the nuclear weapons played an important role in the formulation of its foreign policy. Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev had near similarity of views on the nuclear question. It was remarkable that there were little differences on this score.

Ever since the birth of atomic bombs in 1945, the Soviet Union made continuous effort to control nuclear arms and its proliferation. One of the important goals of Soviet foreign policy in relation to the West was the search for agreement on the question of nuclear weapons. Soviet Union dilemma was how to



maintain a balance between the nuclear proliferation and peaceful uses of atomic energy.

### **Soviet Union and the Nuclear Question**

The end of the second World War did not bring the expected era of world peace. As Cold War began as a struggle between two major powers, i.e., the Soviet Union and the US; each at the head of an ideologically defined grouping of states. The Soviet Union assumed the leadership of the socialist countries and the United States of America was leading the capitalist world. While Stalin expected a respite from armed conflict that would enable him to rebuild the Soviet Union's economy, he nevertheless sought to deter the US from using its military strength against it. He did this by increasing the Soviet Union lead in conventional forces. While an active programme of atomic research was under way in the Soviet Union, its Military Doctrine stressed more on conventional forces and superior morale than on nuclear weapons. Andrei Zhdanov described the conflict between two camp – the “imperialists” camp led by US and the camp of peace under Soviet leadership, which sought to “resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion to, strengthen democracy and to extirpate the vestiges of fascism”.<sup>1</sup> Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. claimed that they were struggling for world peace and justice. They saw the world in terms of “tight bipolarity” where all states are forced to choose one side to other and there was no room for compromise or non alignment.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems Enduring Interests* (New Delhi: M.E. Sharpe Publications, 1998), p.64.

On 16 July 1945, the first nuclear explosion in history known as 'trinity test' was conducted at Alamagardo, New Mexico (US) while watching this fateful event, Robert Openheimer explained, quoting from Gita: 'I am become death, destroyer of world'.<sup>2</sup>

At the Potsdam conference in 1945, President Truman of the US, who informed about the nuclear tests – told Stalin that a 'powerful new weapon' was in the possession of the US. There was no question of sharing the nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. According to one report soon after this, Stalin alerted his top nuclear scientists and ordered them to produce a nuclear weapon as expeditiously as possible. In the mid August of 1945, Stalin reportedly told the nuclear scientist I. V. Kurchator that "Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed."<sup>3</sup> From that moment he tried to break the US monopoly. President Truman and his advisors came to see US nuclear superiority as the best guarantee against soviet expansionism. While the leadership in the Soviet Union and military leaders were keen to bridge this gap.

This first US nuclear test at Alamagardo was very significant event in the history of international affairs. It tilted the balance of power in favour of the US and posed the nuclear threat to the security of Soviet Union, which was a non-nuclear state then.

Despite the nuclear challenge, the Marxist-Leninist theory of the inevitability of war remained in force until the end of the Stalin era. In order to

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<sup>2</sup> T.T. Poulouse, *The CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India: Linkage between Nuclear Arms race, Arms Control and Disarmament* (New Delhi: Lancer's Book Publications, 1996), p.3.

<sup>3</sup> Jorn Gjelsted and Olav Njolstad, eds., *Nuclear Rivalry and international order* (London: Sage Publications Limited, 1996), p.3.

reduce the risk of security, Stalin adopted a two fold strategy: to develop a Soviet nuclear strike capability on the one hand and to pursue a policy of nuclear disarmament on the other hand. Hence, the Soviet policy laid stress on banning the destruction of nuclear weapons.

The problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons and utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes was first discussed at the Moscow Conference of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the US and Britain in December 1945. At that conference it was decided to constitute an international control agency for atomic energy within the framework of the United Nations (UN).<sup>4</sup> A tense struggle developed in this conference between the Soviet Union and the US over the question of banning nuclear weapons.

On 24 January 1946 the United Nations General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),<sup>5</sup> consisting of all the permanent members of the Security Council to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of nuclear energy.

It was the US intention to prevent a ban on nuclear weapons and consolidate its nuclear monopoly. In order to achieve this aim the US in mid 1946, proposed the 'Baruch Plan' insisting international ownership and control over nuclear resources. It also insisted on tight international control of all aspects of the use of atomic energy and a certain punishment. The "International Control

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<sup>4</sup> A.A. Gromyko and B.N.Ponomarev, eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980* (Moscow: Progress Publications, 1981), p.91.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

Authority,” the Baruch Plan stated, “should be given the sole exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives”.<sup>6</sup>

Opposing the American plan, the Soviet Union said it would consolidate the American monopoly of atomic weapons. As Boris Isakov observed, ‘the Baruch Plan’ a product of “atomic diplomacy” reflects the aspirations towards world domination.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet reply to the Baruch Plan was the “Gromyko proposal” of 19 June 1946, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN AEC a draft of an international convention on the prohibition for all times of the production and use of atomic weapons for the purpose of mass destruction.<sup>8</sup> The basic proposition of this draft envisaged commitment by all signatories to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, ban the production and stockpiling of such weapons. Breach of convention was declared ‘a most heinous international crime against mankind’. But at the same time Soviet Union was intent on having atomic energy to serve solely peaceful purposes” the use of this discovery only for purpose of promoting the welfare of the peoples and widening their scientific and cultural horizons,<sup>9</sup> said Andrei A Gromyko, then the soviet representative to the UNAEC.

While US insisted on effective international control and inspection before the abolition of atomic weapons, Soviet Union insisted on first outlawing the atomic weapons and their destruction. The main plea taken by the Soviet Union

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p.92.

<sup>7</sup> Boris Isakov, “The two atoms plans: Baruch and Gromyko,” *Soviet Weekly* (Moscow), no. 232, 27 June 1946, p.3.

<sup>8</sup> Ponomarev, n. 4, p.93.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

against international inspection was that it violated the sovereign rights of the states. These differences were irresolvable.

In brief, the Soviet policy during the US monopoly period under the leadership of Stalin mainly focused on banning the bomb, international control of atomic energy and for the reduction in armaments and armed forces. The thrust of soviet argument was to lessen the danger to its security that arose from the US monopoly.

The international situation had changed by the beginning of 1950s, as the US had lost its atomic monopoly. By the end of 1940s, Stalin witnessed the birth of the Soviet bomb. On 25 September 1949 TASS reported that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of atomic weapons and was now in possession of such weapons.<sup>10</sup> This was the genesis of the nuclear and conventional arms race between the Soviet Union and the US.

The Soviet Union's achievements in science and technology, especially in nuclear and thermo nuclear energy, put an end to an extremely complicated and dangerous period in history. When the US pursued an aggressive policy based on its monopoly of nuclear weapons.

By 8 August 1953, after the thermonuclear test the 'Balance of Terror' was set in, by which not only the US but also the Soviet Union possessed a nuclear capability to wreck wholesale destruction on the other in one shift, deadly strike.

The American president Dwight Eisenhower observed on 8 December 1953, that human civilization would probably be destroyed if a nuclear war broke

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p.97.

out.<sup>11</sup> The Russian too had a similar view. G. Malenkov, who succeeded Stalin, initially believed that in a nuclear war capitalism would be destroyed but soon changed his views and said on 12 March 1954 that a nuclear war would mean, the destruction of world civilization.<sup>12</sup> He was convinced that a future war was not inevitable and therefore ruled out any military conflict with Western powers, that would annihilate the whole world. However, the US President Eisenhower recognized the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy as well as the dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation and proposed 'Atom for Peace Plan'. He appealed to all those powers who possessed atomic energy material to become members of AEC under the UN. This plan was also turned down by Soviet Union who insisted on prior agreement on prohibition of atomic weapons.

A change in the Soviet foreign policy took place after the death of Stalin in 1953. The prospect of nuclear war forced the Soviet leadership to revise its approach to the question of the war and peace. There can be little doubt that the modified approach to war had been promoted by advent of nuclear weapons and the prospect of mutual annihilation in a nuclear war.

After Stalin's death there was a brief period of power struggle. Finally, Nikita Khrushchev as the first secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) assumed power in 1955. He laid stress on the Principle of Peaceful Co-existence, first advocated by Lenin. Khrushchev knew that in any future war there would be no victors. Hence Khrushchev in his famous secret speech at the "Twentieth Party Congress" of CPSU in 1956 announced that war as no longer

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<sup>11</sup> New York Times, 9 December 1953.

<sup>12</sup> Pravda (Moscow), 13 March 1954.

inevitable as any future war could be nuclear war in which both the communists as well as imperialists will perish and that a peaceful transition to socialism was therefore necessary and essential. The class struggle shifted to the economic plane, this was a fundamental shift from the traditional Marxist-Leninist theory of the inevitability of war. Arguing in favour of revising the theory of inevitability of war, Khrushchev observed, "this concept was evolved at a time when; firstly, imperialism was in all embracing phenomena and dominated the world systems and secondly the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, poorly organized and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war. In that period this perception was absolutely correct. At the present time however, the situation has changed radically. This revised theory of inevitability of war was supported by the soviet leaders and military leaders. Hence, Khrushchev vigorously campaigned nuclear disarmament during this time. There was also a significant change in Soviet Military Doctrine and in its view on a potential war. Until Khrushchev appeared on the scene, the Soviet idea about a future nuclear war was that 'Strategic bombing' would not decide the outcome of war but the soldiers on the battlefield. But after important technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union especially sending a sputnik into the orbit in 1957 followed by the testing of first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), the Soviet Union appeared as a confident power; able to deal with the nuclear question.

The core of Peaceful Co-existence was the renunciation of war, political solution of international disputes, mutual understanding and trust consideration of each other's interest.

But despite these changes, Soviet foreign policy continued to promote the principle of class warfare between capitalist world and the Soviet Union. In the West therefore, the policy of Peaceful Co-existence was seen as ambiguous.

During 1950s both the US and the Soviet Union had restored a policy of secrecy and denial with regard to nuclear energy, peaceful use of atom and technological control over the proliferation of nuclear energy. But in 1960's nuclear non-proliferation became important because of two reasons. First, because of a technologically and scientifically a nuclear explosive device meant for peaceful purpose did not essentially differ from nuclear bomb.

Secondly, the Soviet-US acquisition of nuclear weapons was followed by the United Kingdom (UK) becoming a nuclear weapons state in 1954, France in 1960 and China in 1964.<sup>13</sup> The Soviet Union faced the problem of other countries also acquiring nuclear weapons.

It is with the idea of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons that the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1954 endorsed the plan for setting up of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the UN. The establishment of the IAEA on 14<sup>th</sup> November 1957; "provided the institutional foundations for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensured that nuclear assistance was not being used to serve any military purpose."<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union also supported the creation of IAEA. This policy to Prevent further proliferation of nuclear assistance was reflected in its relations

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<sup>13</sup> Poulouse, n.2, p.5.

<sup>14</sup> "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", [http://www.cnsdlmiis.edu/npt/npt\\_3/hitory.htm](http://www.cnsdlmiis.edu/npt/npt_3/hitory.htm), p.2.



with China. Due to Sino-Soviet tensions China which was getting earlier nuclear assistance from Soviet Union was cancelled. In Soviet view nuclear cooperation with China had to terminate in view of the growing tension when China insisted that it be given a sample of atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture which Soviet Union refused<sup>15</sup> When the Sino-Soviet relations reached the breaking point, Soviet Union cancelled all nuclear assistance to China by the end of 1950s. This experience marked a significant watershed not only in the erosion of the Sino-Soviet relationship but also the evolution of Moscow's opposition to nuclear spread.<sup>16</sup> To an extent Soviet adversarial relations with China were also responsible for Soviet stringent approach to Chinese nuclear question. Soviet nuclear policy after the termination of nuclear assistance to China was based on stringent safeguards, control and adherence to nuclear non-proliferation regime.

### **Détente Under Brezhnev**

With the removal of Khrushchev in October 1964 the era of collective leadership set in the Soviet Union resulted in some modification in foreign policy. Leonid Brezhnev who succeeded Khrushchev as the General Secretary of the (CPSU) pursued the policy of Peaceful Co-existence with determination. As Brezhnev said on 7 June 1972:

While pressing for assertion of principle of peaceful co-existence, we realize that success in this important matter is no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideology struggle. On the contrary we should be

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<sup>15</sup> Joseph L. Noguee, "Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Policy: Dilemma and Contradiction", *Orbis*, vol. 24, no. 2, Winter 1981, p.754.

<sup>16</sup> Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy", *Orbis*, vol. 14, no. 2, Winter 1981, p.310.

prepared for an intensification of this struggle and for it to assume an increasingly more acute form of struggle between the two social systems.<sup>17</sup>

However, during his period Peaceful Co-existence was perceived in terms of détente in Soviet-US relations. Whereas Khrushchev had emphasized the non-inevitability of world war, Brezhnev appeared to emphasize the development of power as an investment in peace. Nuclear parity would ensure the avoidance of war. Lenoid Brezhnev paid lip service to the goal of nuclear disarmament, but in fact he believed that Soviet military and political interests could best be served by on going strategic nuclear arms competition with the US. Brezhnev may even have expected that over time the US would not be able to withstand the fiscal and political strains of ongoing strategic arms competition. Brezhnev and the Soviet leaderships believed that the balance of forces had changed in favour of socialism.

But in 1970s – Soviet-American military parity and stagnation of Soviet economy necessitated a rethinking of Soviet foreign policy. The policy adopted by Brezhnev went beyond earlier practices of “Peaceful Co-existence” – avoidance of war and relaxation of tension with the West – to include active collaboration in areas such as arms control, trade and crisis management.<sup>18</sup> But Soviet Union was suspicious about the real partnership with the West, as Georgii Arbatov, a leading foreign policy advisor to Brezhnev, put that “these relations will never became of an alliance between two superpowers who have divided the world”. Rather, “no

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<sup>17</sup> Kurt London, ed., *The Soviet Union in World Politics* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p.8

<sup>18</sup> Noguee, n.l, p.82.

matter how successful the process of normalization and détente is, in the historical sense [they] will remain relations of struggle.”<sup>19</sup>

### **Nuclear Non-Proliferation – Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)**

Once the Soviet Union had acquired the nuclear weapons and missile capability it was extremely keen to check further proliferation. Hence it participated in all efforts towards this direction. In addition to IAEA, whose establishment was the first concrete step in the direction of evolving a nuclear non-proliferation regime to prevent nuclear proliferation, Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) of 1968 are indeed more specific treaties, whose objectives are to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The PTBT which was signed in Moscow on 5 June 1963. The treaty is regarded as a first major step towards controlling nuclear proliferation. According to this treaty, “nuclear weapons tests are banned in the atmosphere, under water and outer space.”<sup>20</sup> Only underground test will be permitted.

The signing of the PTBT marked the climax of the long drawn negotiations on the stopping of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union had been very active in initiating the negotiations on the suspension of the nuclear testing since 1955. Though initially the treaty was concluded by the Soviet Union, US and UK, it was made open to all the states.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Poulouse, n.2, p.121.

## **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the result of the acknowledgement that atomic energy could be used both for peaceful purposes as well as destructive purposes and of the risk of diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military purpose. Due to the risks of spread of nuclear weapons technology, the international community sought ways to prevent any future use or acquisition of such destructive weapons. Nuclear tests are the core of nuclear non-proliferation problems. As they first increased the danger of vertical proliferation i.e., increase in the capabilities of the existing nuclear powers and secondly, it paved the way for horizontal proliferation i.e. the increase in the number of nuclear states.

The idea of creating NPT acquired urgency in February 1960, when the French conducted nuclear test. For the first time in the history, a country had conducted a nuclear bomb without support of and against the will of the superpower. This raised the fear regarding other states would follow suit.

A driving force behind the NPT was the superpower's interests in ensuring that West Germany, as well as other advanced countries would not develop nuclear weapons. In October 1964, China conducted its first nuclear test which added to the urgency in devising a multinational treaty to prevent further nuclear weapon proliferation.

As mentioned above PTBT was designed to retain the monopoly of superpowers. However, countries like India, Ireland and Sweden continued to press for non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. In June

1965, the Disarmament Commission of the UN adopted a resolution which called upon the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference (ENDC) to meet and allow special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In September 1965, Soviet Union submitted a draft of the non-proliferation treaty to the General Assembly, but did not find support from the US. Later the Soviet Union and the US submitted a revised draft of treaty to ENDC. The treaty was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly on 12 June 1968. The treaty was simultaneously signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and actually came into force on 5 March 1970. NPT membership is divided into two categories – nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states are defined as those that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. This definition included only the US, the Soviet-Union, China, France and the United Kingdom – all of which are members of the NPT.

The NPT strikes a bargain between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Where under the treaty, Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) are agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards over all of their nuclear materials to ensure that they are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In exchange, the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) agree to freely share the benefit of Peaceful Nuclear Energy (PNE) and technology, and not to assist other states to acquire nuclear weapons. In Addition, the nuclear weapon states

pleaded to Pursue “good faith” negotiations towards an end to arms race and toward general and complete disarmament.

The NPT produced a mixed reaction among the countries. While some considered it as a great landmark in human history, the other looked the treaty an attempt on the part of the US and the Soviet Union to establish their nuclear hegemony over the world. The Soviet Union expected it to become universal, so much so that it had insisted at every non-signatory state should sign and ratify it. Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin – said that “the treaty marked a major success for a cause of peace and that it was an important step towards the goal. He said that it checked further proliferation of nuclear weapons and there by reduced the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war”.<sup>21</sup> Reflecting on the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, *Izvestia* wrote: “the globe, if saturated with nuclear weapons, would be like a gigantic powder keg ready to explode the slightest spark”.<sup>22</sup> Foreign Minister Gromyko Stated that “the primary goal of the NPT was to prevent the dangerous outspread of nuclear weapons, to put barriers to the emergence of more and more nuclear weapon states over there by lessen the danger of outbreak of a war in which these weapons could be used.”<sup>23</sup> Leonid Brezhnev noted: “We have reached a new and an important stage. The NPT is important, above all, because it is a barrier of spread of nuclear weapons and ensures the needed international control over the fulfilment by the nations of their obligations in this respect. It is a document of peace aimed at reducing the threat

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<sup>21</sup> K.D. Kapur, *Soviet Nuclear Non Proliferation Diplomacy and Third World* (Delhi: Konark Publication Private Limited, 1993), p.45

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

of a nuclear war, at consolidating the security of the nations.”<sup>24</sup> As a matter of fact both Soviet Union and the western have considered NPT as a part of international law.<sup>25</sup>

Thus we find that during the Brezhnev period nuclear question acquired a new urgency. The effort was to control the spread of such weapons. Thus, it had much in common with the US.

### **Gorbachev and New Thinking for the World**

The final breakthrough in the arms control and nuclear non-proliferation came when Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. His new thinking for his country and the world on military, political and strategic issues, particularly the ‘reasonable sufficiency’ military doctrine and his policy on war and peace and international security, arms control and disarmament has immensely influenced the policies of the nuclear weapon states.

Gorbachev’s first goal was to revitalize Soviet Society by introducing political and economic reforms for which he launched Perestroika (reconstruction) and Glasnost (openness). To fulfill this goal, Gorbachev realized, he needed a peaceful external environment of which was extremely hostile as the New Cold War had started in 1980. A major reassessment of the Soviet foreign Policy was undertaken. He realized that Soviet world view was not correct. It had actually contributed to the growth of insecurity and brought the world to the brink of a war and a costly arms race had already ensued, draining Soviet resources heavily. In

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<sup>24</sup> Ponomarev, n. 4, p.377.

<sup>25</sup> Noguee, n. 1, p.756.

the Twenty Seventh Congress of the CPSU in 1986, Gorbachev drew attention to the concept of “interdependence of States”. He said that the nation’s security could not be based on the use of or threat to use force including nuclear weapons. Rather, security for the super powers must be mutual, and must be ensured by political means.<sup>26</sup> Gorbachev was at pains to stress that the “new thinking” did not amount to an abandonment of the classic principles of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine, but the ideology had to be adopted to new circumstances”.<sup>27</sup> The new political thinking is more explicit with regard to the issue of war and peace in a nuclear age. Since Khrushchev had clearly recognized that nuclear war is bound to be suicidal and hence the imperative need of peaceful co-existence. However, Gorbachev moved to: ‘reasonable sufficiency’, this implies that continuous increases in the combat capabilities do not enhance greater security. He said that security is essentially collective, and it could no longer be achieved by military means – either by the use of arms or deterrence, Security is a political problem.

Explaining the Soviet Union’s stand to the Problem of non-proliferation, Gorbachev said, “true to its obligations under NPT, the Soviet Union has been doing and will do all in its power in order not only to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to stop arms race and turn it back.”<sup>28</sup>

Soviet Union strongly believed that only way to check further proliferation of nuclear weapons was to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the history of nuclear test ban efforts had not been positive due to non-

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<sup>26</sup> Noguee, n.1, p.94.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Kapur, n.21, p.49.



cooperation of the US and UK whereas the Soviet Union firmly believed that CTBT was the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In reality NPT could not survive without CTBT. It is precisely for this reason that all the NPT review conferences gave priority to the CTBT. But due to opposition from UK and the US it did not progress. The head of states linked to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in 1989, declared that for the credibility of the NPT regime “the depository states should fulfill their obligation by agreeing to negotiate a CTBT. The Soviet Union accepted and responded positively to the six non-aligned state proposal to convert PTBT into a CTBT. But it was the US which opposed any amendment to convert PTBT into CTBT. The Soviet Union, however, reiterated its wish to reach an agreement on CTBT as soon as possible. It had also expressed its commitment to cease nuclear testing if the US did the same. It was also keen, if other two were willing, to work sincerely to convert PTBT into CTBT.<sup>29</sup> But there has been no progress in the area, though the 1985 third NPT review conference has called upon all the nuclear weapon states to participate in the conference on disarmament negotiations on a CTBT.<sup>30</sup>

The Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Karpov speaking on the occasion of conducting of a nuclear explosion by the Soviet Union on 24 October 1990, said that “the Soviet Union favours an end to all nuclear testing and was prepared to amend the treaty of 1963 banning the test in outer space and underground water by next January.<sup>31</sup>

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
<sup>29</sup> SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm, 1990), p.547.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p.549.

<sup>31</sup> *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, vol. 42, no. 42, 5 December 1990, p.20.

Soviet Union was the only nuclear weapon country which had supported complete ban on the nuclear tests right from the fifties. The US and UK have on contrary, although opposed the complete ban on the nuclear testing on the grounds that periodic testing of nuclear arsenals is essential to verify and test the reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union reiterated its commitment for the conclusion of a CTBT at the fourth NPT review conference held in 1990. The main reasons for the failure of the fourth NPT review conference was the insistence by the NNWS parties to ban the testing of the nuclear weapons by the NWS and the opposition to this demand from the US and UK.

The Soviet Union further supplemented its efforts to achieve a nuclear free world by declaring a unilateral moratorium of nuclear testing effective from 6 August 1985. However, it was compelled to call it off in March 1987 in view of US refusal to reciprocate. General Secretary and President Gorbachev emphasized that mere reduction of nuclear stockpiles unaccompanied by a prohibition of nuclear tests, offer no way out of the nuclear threat dilemma, because the remaining weapons could be modernized. The Soviet Union accused the US of frustrating all efforts towards a conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. The US Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, while rejecting the Soviet proposal argued that, "nuclear testing of weapons were essential as long as we have nuclear weapons". Moreover, one could be certain of the "effectiveness of the nuclear weapons only if they were tested frequently."<sup>32</sup>



<sup>32</sup> The Hindu, 12 March 1986.

The Soviet Union during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev further intensified its effort to consolidate the non-proliferation regime. Though the erstwhile Soviet Union had so far refused to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) formally, it has, in practice agreed to support all the measures agreed upon by the members of the MTCR for controlling the spread of dual delivery capability ballistic missiles. The MTCR was formally set upon on April 16, 1987 with only seven members who were Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an executive agreement, but a set of guidelines.<sup>33</sup> The other major achievements were the signing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), between the US and the Soviet Union. Soviet effort has made "it possible to bring about nuclear disarmament and put peace on a defensible basis in a nuclear free world."<sup>34</sup>

Thus we find that Soviet Union was deeply committed to control nuclear proliferation especially given its adversarial relations with China. It supported all measures adopted by the UN towards this goal. India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 must have put the Soviet Union in a dilemma.

### **India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)**

The Soviet Union's response to the 1974 Nuclear explosion by India can be analyzed on the basis of a broader framework of international politics of that time and also its close relationship with India.

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<sup>33</sup> Rajiv Nayan, "Trend in Missile Technology Control Regime", *Strategic Analysis*, September 1988, vol. 22, no. 6, p.868.

<sup>34</sup> Konstantin Borisov, "The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 6, June 1987, p.61.

The Soviet Union did not develop any systematic approach towards the Third World Countries during the regime of Stalin. A change in Soviet attitude took place under Khrushchev. In the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev also talked about strengthening friendship and cooperation with neutralist and peace loving states in Europe and the Third World. So, one of his important foreign Policy legacies was the Soviet rediscovery of the Third World as the “vital strategic reserve of imperialism”. He saw it as an arena in which the Soviet Union could compete with the West with high likelihood of success, but with less risk than would result from a direct challenges in the main arena that is, the industrialized countries. There after the Soviet Union adopted a very helpful attitude towards the countries of the Third World and made consistent effort to win them over by offering the economic and military assistance and thereby help them to consolidate their independence.

In the Cold War era, the decision of Pakistan to joint military alliances sponsored by the US and India’s refusal to endorse the alliance system drew the Soviet Union and India closer. Strategic and Geopolitical considerations have been critical to the evolution of Indo-Soviet ties. Soviet security perception regarding the threat from the West and later the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relation. On the one hand, coincided with India’s need for soviet political and strategic support for its regional concerns which also included China and Pakistan. On other hand, it underpinned Indo-Soviet relations. The convergence of interests was the main stay of the time tested Indo-Soviet friendship over the years.

The emergence of South Asian states from the colonial yoke in 1947 opened up the opportunities for their active interaction with the rest of the world including Soviet Union. However, after the attainment of independence by India, the relations between two countries could not develop along cordial lines and certain tensions appeared. India's membership of Commonwealth, opposition to the communist revolution in Malaya, support to Greece and decision to adopt policy of Non-Alignment was viewed by the Soviet Union as pro-Western policy. However, after 1950s, the relation between two countries began to improve. After the death of Stalin in 1953, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev as the Soviet Premier and First Secretary of the CPSU who succeeded Stalin, tried to improve relations with India. As mentioned earlier this rethinking in Soviet policy came about largely due to the advent of nuclear weapons, which had a deterrent value. They showed greater appreciation for Indian policy of Non-Alignment. The Soviet Union's veto helped India to tide over the spate of unacceptable resolutions on Kashmir in UN. The Soviet Union also offered the much needed economic assistance in the key public sector in the field of oil, coal, power and energy. In 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India. It was a measure of growing Indo-Soviet friendship that Soviet Union took a neutral stand in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Of the many milestones in the history of Indo-Soviet friendship the one that attracted maximum attention was the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on August 9, 1971. The most significant provision was underlined in Article IX of the Treaty which stated:

In the event of either party subject to an attack or a threat there of, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.”<sup>35</sup>

However, on the question of nuclear non-proliferation, India and Soviet Union disagreed. While the Soviet Union supported the NPT, India opposed it on the ground that the Treaty was discriminatory.

The Chinese attack on India in 1962, its nuclear explosion in 1964, the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 and Indo-Pak war probably hardened India’s attitude towards NPT.

India found the NPT discriminatory in so far it avoided equal and mutual obligations of NWS and NNWS. The treaty while denying nuclear weapon to the NNWS, did not prohibit to NWS proliferate their nuclear weapons. India also pointed out the flaws in article I and II of the draft NPT treaty, which remained in the NPT. These two articles of the draft treaty did not “prevent the training in the use of nuclear weapons of the armed personal belonging to non-nuclear states.”<sup>36</sup> The Indian representative criticized the treaty as being discriminatory saying that a “treaty with its far reaching political and economic implications for all nations of the world must not be based on a discriminatory approach.”<sup>37</sup>

India’s argument fell into three broad categories. One, India could not reconcile with a second class status which the treaty sought to impose on NNWS.

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<sup>35</sup> Jatin Desai, *Nuclear Diplomacy the Art of Deal* (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2000), p.190.

<sup>36</sup> Kapur, n. 21, p.350.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p.300.

Second, it was not concerned about the nuclear capabilities of China, its strong adversary, and whose nuclear weapon status posed a direct security threat to it. Third, that NNWS must be guaranteed legal security against the use of threat or threat to use nuclear weapons by the NWS. Hence India refused to sign it and also conducted a nuclear explosion in 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. India's capability to make a nuclear bomb was demonstrated and its policy since then not go to nuclear provided a concrete step to its nuclear policy called 'nuclear option approach' i.e., keeping the option open of going nuclear. This ambivalent approach, or the nuclear option approach, has been considered and defended by the Indian decision makers as the best available option to respond to India's security environment and the nature of military strategic threat.<sup>38</sup>

In the National Atomic Energy Commission bulletin, it was stated: "India does not intend to produce atomic bomb or weapons and decisively stands against the use of atomic energy for military purposes."<sup>39</sup>

This test was not well received in the Soviet Union, although described as peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), it was a signal that India was capable of producing nuclear weapons. It was also concerned about the consequences of India's action for stability in the South Asia. Publicly, however, "the Soviet media repeated India's phrases about the peaceful purpose and also drew attention to the

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<sup>38</sup> Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Options : Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York: Payer Publications, 1976), p.194.

<sup>39</sup> Zafar Iman, ed., *Soviet view of India 1957-75* (Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1977), p.175.

Chinese nuclear capabilities.<sup>40</sup> But Russian diplomats and arms control experts privately indicated their unhappiness.

Thus despite its declared stand on nuclear non proliferation, the Soviet Union made no comment, while the Western world was very critical of Indian action. The Soviet Union did not condemn India openly on the issue of the PNE though it was reportedly unhappy about it. It was clear that the Indo-Soviet relations had acquired such a multifaceted character that the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize its relations with India by publicly criticizing it.

The first concrete nuclear cooperation between India and Soviet Union began in 1977, when the later supplied 200 tons of heavy water for the Rajasthan atomic power plant. After its PNE in 1974, India had to turn to Soviet Union for the heavy water after Canada had suspended all supplies of heavy water to India. In an agreement signed between two countries in September 1976, the Soviet Union agreed to supply 250 tones of heavy water. Finally agreement to build a nuclear power stations in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) consisting two nuclear power station was signed between the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the then India Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on November 19, 1988. This was the first major agreement to export nuclear reactor signed by the Soviet Union with any third world countries outside the communist bloc.

Since India's PNE is 1974, the US and other NWS including the Soviet Union insisted increasingly on strict control and safeguard as regards export of civilian nuclear technology to the states of the Third World. The Soviet Union had

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<sup>40</sup> Peter J.S. Duncan, *The Soviet Union and India* (New York: Routledge Publications, 1989), p.23.



made a number of recommendations to create a "reliable barrier" to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>41</sup> The Soviet Union had always insisted that exporters of the nuclear material should abide in their export policy, by the most stringent rules. So as to plug all the loopholes and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has also insisted that while delivering nuclear material to a NNWS, the donor should get the recipient to accept IAEA safeguards and also give definite official assurances that material equipment and technology obtained would not be used to manufacture nuclear devices. The Soviet Union had so far been considerably more consistent and effective than the US in promoting policies to prevent the nuclear spread.<sup>42</sup> A Soviet writer Zhleznov also called for the establishment of stringent regime regarding deliveries of equipment bearing on those element of nuclear fuel cycle connected with production of fissionable materials for the nuclear weapons.<sup>43</sup>

By 1990, the Soviet Union's policy towards Third World had changed substantially, including India. Now driving force of the new Soviet Union policy was economic and not ideological ones. Soviet union was no longer interested in playing a global role.

To conclude, on the issue of nuclear weapons the Soviet leaders firmly believed that nuclear weapon can be used only as deterrent and not in actual war, which would be suicidal for both the communists and the capitalists with limited

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<sup>41</sup> Galoria Duffry, "Soviet Nuclear Experts," *International Security Cambridge Mass*, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 1978, p.95.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p.83

<sup>43</sup> R. Zhelezhor, "Atomic Power and non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 31, February 1977, p.51.

success. Soviet Union tried its best to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons through various treaties like NPT and other safeguards. But it did not get full cooperation from the West especially the US.

The Soviet Union and India developed multidimensional relationship, which suited their national interests. Despite its clear stand on nuclear non-proliferation issue, Soviet Union did not criticize India for its PNE, which showed the understanding with India. Soviet Union helped India on political, economic and strategic issues.

## CHAPTER – 2

### RUSSIAN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The disintegration of Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led to the reassessment and readjustment of Russia's foreign Policy priorities. In the security and strategic area, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was most important.

Russia inherited a policy that was very clear cut on the issue of non-proliferation, from Soviet Union. It's policy is more of continuity, than change. There is a remarkable continuity in the policy related to nuclear weapons. Russia still relies heavily on the 'concept of nuclear deterrence which may be used in extra ordinary situation to defend its territory. It is not getting equal support from the other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) especially the US on issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Russian policy towards the peaceful use of atomic energy is also not supported by the United States of America.

In the early 1990s many people believed that with the end of the Cold War, nuclear-weapons could be placed on the road towards ultimate extinction in the conduct of international affairs. Much of the debate on international affairs focused on how security fears of mutual annihilation could be replaced by security in partnership.<sup>1</sup>

As Lawrence Scheinman argued, during the Cold War, with the superpowers pursuing a global competition, both the US and the Soviet Union

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<sup>1</sup> Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Njolstad, *Nuclear rivalry and International Order* (London: Sage Publication, 1996), p.104.

had a capacity for controlling the threat of proliferation by disciplining their allies or clients. It was assumed that the issue of regional or local conflicts could be settled within the respective blocs. Now that east-west issues has been removed from the centre of world politics, regional problems and conflicts have become increasingly important. Long dormant antagonism have been re-awakened, bitter regional rivalries, ethnic and religious tensions, border disputes have reappeared. While the US and the Russian Federation have agreed to unprecedented cuts in their strategic and conventional arsenals, some of the countries in the developing world are intensifying their military build up and making attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The emergence of new suppliers of nuclear related equipment and the globalization of high technology have gradually made more and more countries capable of developing nuclear weapons, along with missile system to deliver them rapidly over great distances.

To the people in the West, the major threat of nuclear war lies no longer in superpower rivalry in a bipolar world, but in the spread of nuclear weapons to countries located in conflict ridden areas or to countries that cannot be regarded as responsible, reliable states that abide by the rule of international law, countries that are potentially or actually hostile to the West would seem to be a third source of concern. So the structural change of the International security environment following the collapse of bipolarity has presented the international community with new challenges as to preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms.

The end of the Cold War has altered the face of world politics in profound and diverse way. It held out the promise of international peace but at the same time, raised the spectre of new kinds of global instability. As the US President George Bush commented in November 1991, "The Collapse of communism has thrown open a Pandora's box of ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment, even revenge."<sup>2</sup> The peaceful end of Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. On the contrary, the realist theories predict pessimistically that prevailing trends in the diffusion of economic power will lead to renewed competition, conflict and perhaps even warfare among the great powers, and that the range of new problems and potential threats will multiply. To the realist, great power rivalry for power and position is likely to resume because of international anarchy. As rivals rise to challenge the US leadership a new structure will emerge in the twenty first century. It's not also easy for the US to go alone. As former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger summarized in 1993, this poses a serious challenges because, "the US has very little experience with a world that consists of many powers and which it can neither dominate nor from which it can simply withdraw in isolation."<sup>3</sup>

However, Neo-realist analysis provides the clearest statement in support of the retention, nuclear weapons capabilities.<sup>4</sup> Nuclear weapons are seen to play an indispensable role in a new balance of power arrangement to compensate for the collapse of the bipolar order. Many analysts would argue

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<sup>2</sup> Charles W Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformations* (New York: Worth Publishers, 1999), p.97.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p.102.

<sup>4</sup> Christobh Bluth, *The Nuclear Challenge: US-Russian Strategic Relations after the Cold War*, (USA: Ashgate Publications, 2000) , p.13.

that nuclear weapons are necessary to continue to exercise a fundamental restraining influence on inter-state conflicts in the uncertain decades to come. They would point out the absence of war in Europe during the last 45 years. The argument is that nuclear weapons will continue to be an indispensable source of security in Europe and on a global basis. In other words, it is not possible to put the nuclear genie in the bottle because it is always conceivable that some states will secretly require nuclear weapons even after complete nuclear disarmament. Thus it could be argued to be prudent for western states to retain some of its nuclear capability for the indefinite future.

However, some others see the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to begin elimination of nuclear weapons. Russia, as a successor state of Soviet Union announced that it would abide by all the treaties and obligations that had been entered into by the Soviet Union. In this regard Russia's policy towards the nuclear non-proliferation is more of continuity than change.

Russia's security environment went through a fundamental change due to disintegration of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Power the earlier order on stability and security too collapsed. Among the various challenges faced by Russia were undermining of its international status and influence, loss of diplomatic and economic leverages and decline of both the military power and military industrial complex.

Russia inherited a vast military establishment from the Soviet Union which was largely designed in the high intensity warfare with the West or

China. This included the bulk of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. At that time the General staff in Russia lost control over substantial military assets that had been forward deployed to other republics, now independent sovereign states. The task for the Russian military leadership was to restructure the country's military force on the basis of this inheritance in a radically different geo-political environment. This required that Russia had to come to terms with being a state that had no *locus standi* in those states on its periphery who were then independent. It has to define its national interests in a changed environment and chalk out its policy. Russia, as the largest and by any measure the most powerful of the Soviet successor states, had to deal with the many issues, arising from the loss of territory – the relations with the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe, policy towards the former adversaries of the Soviet Union and the extent of any remaining global role that Russia might play.

The lack of consensus on Russian security policy and more broadly, on what constitutes Russia's national interests has resulted that Russian voices on strategic arms policy and nuclear arms policy were initially confused and contradictory. One of the few issues, however, on which there is relatively broad consensus in Russia is that Russia should remain a nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The reasons for this are complex and deep rooted. They are based on general political considerations as well as economic and military ones.

Since the mid-1990s, the policy makers and public have come to a single conclusion, that Russian nuclear weapons do play a vital role in defending its

independence and integrity and in pursuing Russia's national interests.<sup>5</sup> In 1992 Russia advocated complete nuclear disarmament.<sup>6</sup> On January 25, 1992, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that his country, "no longer considered the US as potential adversary."<sup>7</sup> He then announced the decision to stop targeting US cities with nuclear missiles, clearing the way for the US response. In the statements President Yeltsin announced his decision to reduce Russian military spending to less than one seventh of the previous year's allocation. To emphasize the Russian-American friendship, President Yeltsin proposed creating a joint US-Russian global defence system and new international agency to oversee the orderly reduction of nuclear weapons.

Russia's first Military Doctrine was approved on November 2, 1993. A radical re-evaluation of the security threats facing Russia had been carried out by the Russian military.<sup>8</sup> The concept of nuclear deterrence as a political instrument continued to form the basis of the nuclear policy. As far as role of nuclear weapons were concerned, the emphasis was placed on nuclear deterrence. The aim of the Russia's policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons according to the Military Doctrine was to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring any aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.<sup>9</sup> This committed Russia to a policy of extended deterrence against threat to the security of its allies, i.e. the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There was a policy of no nuclear use against non-nuclear states that acceded to the

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<sup>5</sup> Nilolai Voloshin, "Nuclear Policy: Structure and Key Aspects", *Yaderny Kontrol Digest*, vol. 5, no. 4, fall 2000, <http://www.pirecente.org/board/article.php3?artid=436>, p.1

<sup>6</sup> Wittkopf, n.2, p.405.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p.490.

<sup>8</sup> Bluth, n 4, p.51.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p.52.



Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but there was no longer such a policy against non-nuclear states which enjoy a nuclear guarantee by nuclear weapon states. This contributed to abandonment of pledge not to use nuclear weapons first which had been a central element of Soviet declaratory policy since 1981.

This Military Doctrine envisaged no threat of attack from the West or a global war. But the emergence of differences and contradictions with the West were not ruled out. “though the threat of world war has not been eliminated yet, though it had considerably reduced. The main source of danger is local wars and regional conflicts. The removal of no ‘first use’ nuclear weapons was justified on the ground that its conventional capability had been reduced. However, the Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev said, “the nuclear weapons were mainly to a deterrence against any aggression and there would not be any pre-emptive nuclear strike”.<sup>10</sup> Russia’s commitment to NPT was reiterated. The need for the creation of permanent action of the treaty as well as adopting measures to further expand the participation of the treaty was also emphasized.<sup>11</sup>

The Military Doctrine was basically a defensive one. It stressed that Russia did not have any enemy like the Soviet Union. The aim of the Military Doctrine was to protect the national interests of the country. The concept of nuclear deterrence showed a continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia though the threat perception has changed.

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<sup>10</sup> Spancer D. Bakich, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism?” *Conflict Studies*, no. 301, July-August 1997, p.6.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid*, pp.6-7.

The National Security Concept of December 17, 1997, once again made it clear that the real threat to Russian security was from local wars and regional armed conflicts. This document for the first time, laid down, that, “it does not strive for parity in the armaments and armed forces with the major states of the world. Nuclear deterrence remained an effective means of the self defence, and the main task of nuclear deterrence was to prevent a nuclear and conventional large scale of regional war. The 1997 National Security Concept allowed for the first use of nuclear arms significantly “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russia.”<sup>12</sup>

The National Security Concept of 2000 stated that the “significance of military forces in international relations remained considerable. It is also warned of any attempt to ignore the interests of Russia when tackling major problems of international relations, including conflict situations, can undermine international security and stability. The main task of the Russia is to deter aggression of any scale against it and its allies, including by the use of nuclear weapons.”<sup>13</sup> By 1993 onwards Russia had started stating that the CIS or the ‘near abroad’ was its special sphere of interest. Protecting its allies was Russia’s responsibility. The document further stated, “the Russian Federation must have nuclear force capable of delivering specified damage to any aggressor state or a coalition of states in any situation”.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Baidya Bikash Basu, “Russian National Security”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, n. 7, October 2000, p.1297.

<sup>13</sup> Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 7, October 2000, p.1281.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

The Military Doctrine of 1993 as revised in 2000 in the light of changes in the international environment. The revised Military Doctrine of 2000, stated:

“the Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in reply to use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapon against it or its allies, as well as in reply to a large scale aggression with the use of conventional weapon in situations critical for the security of Russian Federation. The Russian federation shall not use nuclear weapons against states party to the treaty on the non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons that do not have nuclear weapons, unless on attack at the Russian Federation, the Armed forces of the Russian Federation and other troops, its allies or a state to which it has security obligations.”<sup>15</sup>

The National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of 2000 showed that Russia was determined to defend itself by all means, including the use of nuclear weapons. It also reflected the evolution of Russian thought in response to the changing geopolitical and geo-strategic environment and threat perceptions and the assessment of the country's overall capabilities. Russian hopes of building a partnership with the West after the end of the ideological divide proved futile. A subtle rivalry for power control and influence had emerged.

This led Russia to strongly perceive that nuclear weapons are vital to its security. It could be argued that because nuclear weapons provided Russia with security at the same time it believed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons had to stop. However, the peaceful use of nuclear energy had to be promoted with international safeguards. The move by Russia to expand civilian atomic

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<sup>15</sup>      *ibid*, p.1282.

energy cooperation with India reflected a significant new approach in the use of nuclear power.

President Putin of Russia, in the millennium summit of the United Nations (UN) in 2000, highlighted the two broad themes; one the importance of nuclear technology in the context of expanding global energy requirement and the concerns about the ecological degradation arising from the excessive use of coal and some carbon based fuels. Russia was convinced that one of the best ways to deal with global warming and the demand for cleaner environment was through the increased use of nuclear power. Mr. President Putin's second proposition challenged the orthodox view in the Americans arms control community that the greater use of nuclear energy for civilian use would result in the spread of nuclear weapons. This belief has led to a spate of American domestic and international regulations that have inhibited the promotion of nuclear power and transfer of related technologies. The Russian President said "the policy of restrictions on nuclear technology transfer to other countries and enhanced the international control proved to be insufficient to bar nuclear proliferation."<sup>16</sup> It is the recognition as well as the civilian nuclear programme which have encouraged Russia to decide on an expansion of its nuclear exports. Putin's new approach to nuclear non-proliferation has been driven by the dynamic Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Mr. Evgeni Adamov, who urged for international cooperation to develop innovative design of nuclear

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<sup>16</sup> Hindu (Madras), 10 October 2000.

power plants that are safer than the present generation ones and to deal more effectively with the problem of nuclear waste management.

Another aspect of difference between the Russian approach and dominant nuclear thinking in the US, centred around the question on how best to dispose the plutonium?

The American preference has been for, “immobilising” the plutonium from the excess stock and bury it as waste. While the Russian believed the “best way to deal with plutonium to burn it in civilian nuclear reactor. Such an approach, Moscow argues, will put the energy embedded in plutonium to productive use.”<sup>17</sup>

The principal argument against selling nuclear reactors to nations like India has been the plutonium generation could be put to making nuclear weapons. The West has strong reservation about Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation. The Russian government “announced that it planned to increase its cooperation with Iran in the energy field, including a proposal to build five more nuclear reactors in Iran.”<sup>18</sup> Russian officials have said repeatedly that “Bushehr Plant Reactor was meant only for energy production and they are not abetting Iran’s nuclear weapons research”.<sup>19</sup> The Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Al Exande Runyantsev,” had promised US officials that they will not allow the Iranians to have access to the spent fuel”.<sup>20</sup> The Russian legislature

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> *New York Times*, 30 July 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

changed the country's law last year to allow for the return and storage of the spent radioactive material on Russian territory.

However the CIA director, George Tenet, told Senate Armed services committee, in March 2002 that "Russia continued to supply significant assistance on nearly all aspects of Tehran's nuclear programme."<sup>21</sup>

### **Russia and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**

President Yeltsin announced his support to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) policy. The MTCR is an informal arrangement among the world's most advanced suppliers of missile related equipments to control the export of ballistic and cruise missile and missile related technologies. Initially designed to deter the spread of nuclear capable missiles, the MTCR was expanded in 1993 to prevent the diffusion of missile systems from delivering chemical and biological weapons. The regime created by seven countries in 1987, has since expanded to include twenty five additional states. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) met in the Hague in 1991 and decided that it would henceforth meet every year. It also established a permanent point of contact. At its next meeting in Warsaw in 1992 the Group agreed on three important new measures. Henceforth, no member of the Group would permit nuclear exports to any non-nuclear weapon states that did not accept full-scope safeguards. The Warsaw meeting also drew up a list of 65 dual-use items whose sale abroad would require on export license.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statute gave almost equal weight to the promotion of nuclear cooperation that is nuclear trade and to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Following US President Bill Clinton's advocacy in 1993 and the 1994 Stockholm MTCR Plenary meeting sought to transform the export regime into a set of rules commanding universal adherence. However, MTCR currently relies on voluntary compliance and is neither an international treaty nor a legally binding agreement. The weakness was illustrated in 1993, when the US was unable to prevent China, which earlier pledged to abide by the MTCR, to transfer missile components to Pakistan in violation of its provision. Russia formally joined as a member of MTCR at a plenary meeting held at Bonn in 1995. Russia's admission to the MTCR was a condition on the establishment of a new export control system which was accomplished by the 1993 presidential decree "list of equipment materials and technologies used for developing missile weaponry, the export of which is controlled and licensed." And the government edict "procedures for controlling the export from the Russian Federation of equipment, materials and technology used for developing missile weaponry. While complying with its MTCR obligations, Russia continued to export missile technologies under the following new conditions: export related disputes are resolved multilaterally, the opportunities for exporting MTCR controlling high-tech items to MTCR members are growing and Russia has a say in regulating MTCR Provision. In an interview on 20 March 2001, Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov discussed the possibility of Russia's withdrawal

from the NSG. He said that negative pressure from the NSG countries over sales to Iran was seriously damaging Russia's economic interests and a review of regime should be carried out. He further added that nobody ever built a nuclear weapons from a civilian reactor and that the accusation that Russia was contributing to a nuclear-weapons program in Iran was baseless.

### **Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

Among the many vigorous debates gripping both political parties and the press was the question of how the Russian Federation could retain effective control over the country's deadly nuclear arsenals. The fears expressed were that, if the smaller republics had some nuclear weapons in their possession these could potentially fall into wrong hands. President Gorbachev's science adviser", Y. Velikhov has asked the international community to play role in controlling the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal while the country was confronted with the possible of political collapse.<sup>22</sup>

The break up of the Soviet Union initially impeded the progress of arms reduction. Even more problematic at that time was the nuclear arsenals of some of the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, although these states signed the May 1992 Lisbon Protocol a prelude to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement pledging their elimination of all nuclear weapons on territory by 1999 and their willingness to join NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

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<sup>22</sup> The Times of India (New Delhi), 25 September 1991.



In May 1995, NPT Review Conference was held at New York. The conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. It may be noted that the US and its allies were in favor of unlimited extension of the treaty, while non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) opposed its indefinite extension. The decision of the conference to extend it indefinitely was a diplomatic victory for the US and her allies. The permanent extension of the NPT means that only five countries – The US, the UK, Russia, China and France – could legally possess nuclear weapon capabilities. In short, the NPT in its present form has put the ‘nuclear haves’ in a privileged position by permitting them to keep nuclear weapons, while other states shall not be permitted to acquire them. To placate the non-nuclear weapon states, a list of disarmament goals were attached to the extension decision, one of the objective outlined in the goal was completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996. India opposed the extension of the treaty on two counts. First, it did not adequately reflect India’s plea for equitable, global nuclear disarmament and divided the world into two, i.e., nuclear haves and have nots. Secondly, the signing of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state was not warranted on consideration of security. Russia, which assumed the status of a NWS under NPT supported the extension. The US and Russia reaffirmed their commitment under article VI of NPT, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains their ultimate goals.”<sup>23</sup> Russia and the US reiterated their commitment that the two countries will continue to work

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<sup>23</sup> “Non-proliferation and Economic reform in Russia”, *Strategic Digest*, vol. 15, no. 10, October 1995, p.1393.

place only under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The leaders reaffirmed their strong support for IAEA and reiterated their view that its safeguards programme played a fundamental role in global nuclear non-proliferation regime.<sup>24</sup>

In recent years, NPT Regime has gone under considerable changes. Both negative and positive developments have taken place. No nuclear-weapon state is outside the NPT. As regards NNWS, the overwhelming majority saw the NPT as an instrument serving their national interests because it prevented other NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons, it fostered peaceful uses of nuclear energy; promotes nuclear trade under international control which impedes misuse; and facilitating reduction of nuclear armament by the nuclear weapon powers. Hence, record number of adherents to the treaty have increased substantially. However, the NPT not yet attained the degree of universality it needs to be fully effective.

India, Israel, and Pakistan refused to join NPT and to give up the option to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran another party to NPT, is suspected by the Western powers of having secret installations to develop nuclear weapons.

In the last five years, neither Russia nor the US has taken any substantive moves to promote nuclear non-proliferation and fulfillment of the 1995 decisions. The NPT is the most representative of all effective international treaties, but four states (India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba) still remain beyond its scope. The 1995 decision calls universal adherence to the

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.1394.

NPT “on urgent priority”. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 demonstrated the erosion of the non-proliferation process. Neither South Asia nor Israel has made any step towards the NPT. They are free from the NPT commitments and they pursue their own national interests, sometimes very successfully.

In practical terms, the US supports Israel’s policy in the area, while Russia supports India’s. The US failure to press Israel to join NPT makes some Arab States question the admissibility to further compliance with the treaty.

Even throughout the terrible economic difficulties of the 1990s, Russia has never directly or indirectly violated article 1 of the NPT, and has not transferred nuclear weapons or their components to other states. Russia complied with the article IV concerning assistance to NNWS in providing peaceful technologies (e.g., the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran). However, as far as, Article VI (disarmament) is concerned, Russia demonstrates its firm commitment to strengthen export controls and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-proliferation regime, our country takes full account US concerns about export controls,” said Putin.<sup>25</sup>

The final document of the conference, which included an ambitious forward agenda on nuclear disarmament, was hailed by commentators as a

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<sup>25</sup> Vladimir Orlov, “Russia’s policy on non-Proliferation under Putin”, *PONARAS*, Policy mem.131, April 2000, p.4.

'landmark' agreement. In this closing remarks, the President of the conference, Ambassador Baali of Algeria, called it a 'great day for nuclear disarmament.'<sup>26</sup>

There is now a consensus in favour of international norms designed to reduce the nuclear threat and marginalize or reduce nuclear weapons completely. On the other hand, there is little evidence of support by the governments of the nuclear weapon states for eliminating this. Russia also fell in this category. It would be a mistake to expect any substantial move by the Russia and other NWS to reduce their nuclear weapons.

### **Russia and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

The next important step in the direction of nuclear-non proliferation was the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. Ever since 1994, when the US and other nuclear weapon states endeavoured to conclude the CTBT with a view to consolidate their positions gained through the signing of the NPT in 1970s. It is well documented that India had remained at the vanguard of the struggle for a comprehensive test ban ever since India first called for a halt to all forms of testing in 1954.<sup>27</sup> India envisaged a ban on nuclear test as an important definite and irreversible step towards the ultimate resolution of a nuclear weapons free world by putting a halt to the qualitative development, upgradation and improvement of nuclear weapons.<sup>28</sup> All through its presentations before the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament (CD),

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<sup>26</sup> Carl Ungerer and Marianne Hanson, *The Politics Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (Australia, Allen and Unwin Australia Pty Limited, 2001), p.73.

<sup>27</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *Stand Still Agreement, in India and disarmament on Anthology* (New Delhi: Ministry of External affairs, 1988), p.33.

<sup>28</sup> K.K. Pathak, *Nuclear Policy of India* (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publication, 1980), p.86.

the main negotiating body that was formally given the mandate to draft the test ban treaty in 1993, Indian representative pressed for the CTBT to be placed in the context of total nuclear disarmament within a well-defined frame. India upheld that without such a linkage steps such as the CTBT or the proposed fissile material cutoff convention narrow and futile exercise aimed at controlling non-nuclear weapon states, further strengthening the discrimination inherent in the non-proliferation regime.<sup>84</sup>

On the other hand, the US, had also become keen to conclude a CTBT by the early 1990s after having opposed it over the last four decades, saw it primarily as a non-proliferation tool. Its basic intention was to ensure India and Pakistan into the non-proliferation regime. This difference in perception compelled India to disassociate itself from the treaty despite participating in the drafting process at the CD. It was also highlighted that India's national security was adversely affected by the prospect of some countries relying on nuclear weapons for their security while denying the same privilege to others. Consequently, India refused to sign CTBT. Russia not only supported the US initiative for the conclusion of CTBT soon after the extension of the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally, but also welcomed the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution mandating an adhoc committee on nuclear test ban to prepare a draft on treaty on CTBT before the NPT review and extension conference in April-May 1995.

Russia praised the US on extension its moratorium on nuclear testing until CTBT entered into force. In 1995 according to a foreign ministry

statement, "Russia has initiative on indefinite moratorium on nuclear tests. It intends to firmly keep it as long as similar moratorium announced by other states (nuclear powers) are adhered to defacto or de-jure."<sup>29</sup> The foreign ministry also favours signing the CTBT in 1995. In an address to the UN 50<sup>th</sup> General Assembly in September 1995, Russia Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that it was necessary to conclude the CTBT as early as possible but not later than 1996. In the meantime, he called for a universal and permanent moratorium on nuclear tests."<sup>30</sup> Even President Yeltsin during a meeting with the President Clinton in New York endorsed "Zero-yield" CTBT, to be completed in 1996."<sup>31</sup> Russia played a very active in the negotiations by the CD on the CTBT. As demonstration of its solidarity with the US on its stand on CTBT, it has abandoned its earlier demand for a 10 tons TNT yield as threshold CTBT. It is no longer conducting hydro nuclear tests. All doubts about the Russian stand on the US proposal of a zero yield CTBT had been removed when President Yeltsin announced his endorsement of it in April, 1996 at the G-7 meeting. In 1996 President Boris Yeltsin co-chaired a nuclear safety summit in Moscow, which attended by the heads of state of the G-7 countries. Joint communiqués were issued calling for the signing of a comprehensive nuclear test ban by September 1996 and pledging to implement stricter nuclear safety standards. This was the first time that Russia supported a total test ban. Russia proposed that nuclear powers base nuclear weapons only

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<sup>29</sup> Russia: Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) Negotiations History", <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/treaties/ctbt.htm>, p.4.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p.3.

<sup>31</sup> "US, Russian and Chinese Leaders make arm control gains in NY", *Arms Control Today*, November 1995, p.19.

on their own soil. Russia also called for a creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in eastern and central Europe.<sup>32</sup>

The Chief of Russian delegation to the CD, Grigoriv Berdmikov, confirmed Russia's support for CTBT in August 1996. Russia Foreign Minister Primakov said at the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1996 – A programme of disarmament security and stability oriented towards the 21<sup>st</sup> century should become a core of strategy in transformation from the cold war times.

“A huge step in the direction is the treaty on a global ban on nuclear tests. Russia has just signed the treaty. We think that joining of this treaty by all countries capable of creating nuclear arms is essentially important” said the minister. A nuclear test by a country before the treaty enters into force will crucially change the international situation, harm to the treaty and force many to revise attitude to this document”<sup>33</sup> warned Primakov.

He called attention of the treaty opponents to the fact that document will help to consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime and encourage gradual transition to nuclear disarmaments on a multilateral basis. “This is the goal Boris Yeltsin's proposal to sign a treaty on nuclear safety and stability with the participation of all nuclear nations”,<sup>34</sup> said Primakov. But at the same time Russia said, if the supreme national interests are threatened, Russia will use its right to withdraw from the CTBT in order to conduct all necessary tests to conform the safety and reliability of key types of Russian nuclear weapons.”

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<sup>32</sup> Russia: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiations History, n. 29, p.2.

<sup>33</sup> Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), BBC, 26 September, 1996, p. B/10.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

Russia also criticized India's refusal to sign the treaty. India requested that nuclear powers provide a timetable for complete disarmament, but the nuclear powers found such a request impossible to fulfill. In fact, Russian President Yeltsin went on a mission to Beijing to get support for the Zero-yield CTBT and to persuade the Chinese leaders to give up their stand on PNEs. Russia played a very useful role in the P-5 consultation within the CD in order to iron out all outstanding differences to views with regard to the rolling text of CTBT. According to Gregon Berdinkov, the Russian Position is that CTBT should ban all nuclear test explosion without threshold or exemptions, through like the US, it is equally concerned about the safety, reliability and performance to its nuclear stockpile.<sup>35</sup> It also welcomed the US decision concerning a simplified withdrawal from CTBT.

In view of special relationship between the former Soviet Union and India during the Cold War period, the nuclear experts in India hoped that Russia, China and India would take identical position on CTBT. Some of them even suggested that these three countries should oppose the US stand of zero yield CTBT as it permitted loophole possibly allowing the refinement and modernization of nuclear weapons under the CTBT. These are highly contested technical issues and there is no conclusive evident in support of these claims however, India has been disappointed with Yeltsin unequivocal support for the President Clinton on CTBT.

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<sup>35</sup> T.T. Poulouse, *The CTBT and rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India*, (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1996), p.169.



Hence after a nearly 50 years of debate and years of complex negotiations CTBT was opened for a signature at the UN in New York on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1996. India voted against the treaty. The treaty would however come into force only after 44 nuclear capable countries including India sign the treaty.

The Treaty places a ban on all kinds of nuclear explosion. It envisages an international monitoring system to check treaty violation. A network of 20 stations would be set up which shall be able to detect underground, atmospheric or under water explosion more powerful than the equivalent 1,000 tons of conventional explosives. All decisions on behalf of the organization would be made by a 51 members executive council to be constituted on the basis of global representation. The Treaty would enter into force 180 days after it is ratified by 44 countries.

Russia signed the CTBT on 9<sup>th</sup> December 1996 in New York and ratified it in April 2000. The earliest that the CTBT could have entered into force was 24 September 1998, but without ratification by all 44 designed states to the CTBT. The conference ended up with a very weak final declaration calling upon states to sign and ratify the CTBT.<sup>36</sup> A major blow to the CTBT was inflicted when in mid October 1999 the US Senate rejected ratification of the Treaty.

Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 also reaffirmed its commitment to non-proliferation. It stated,

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<sup>36</sup> Hanson, n.26, p.43.

“The transformation of international relations, the end of confrontation, steady elimination of the consequences of the cold war,” and the advancement of Russian reforms have substantially broadened the possibilities for the cooperation in world arena. The threat of a global nuclear conflict has been reduced to a minimum. While the military power still retains significance in relations among states.”<sup>37</sup>

It further stated,

“Russia is prepared to consent for a further reduction of its nuclear potential on the basis of bilateral agreements with the US and in a multilateral form at with the participation of other nuclear powers on condition that strategic stability in the nuclear sphere will not upset.”<sup>38</sup>

About the non-proliferation it says,

“Russia reaffirms its unswerving course towards participating jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, as well as relevant material and technologies. The Russian Federation an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant international regimes, including the creation of a global system of control non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. The Russian Federation to firmly adheres to its commitment under the CTBT on nuclear tests and urges all countries of the world to join it.”<sup>39</sup>

Russia’s policy towards the nuclear issue can not be seen in isolation. Russia has its nuclear weapon capability and the use of these weapons in extremely rare eventuality has been included in its Military Doctrine and National Security Concept. It believes in its deterrence concept.

Russia has shown its commitment and willingness towards the nuclear non-proliferation issue by signing the various treaties like NPT and CTBT. But it is not getting cooperation from the US and other states. Hence, it has its own limitations to solve the international problems like nuclear non-proliferation.

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<sup>37</sup> “The Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation,” *Strategic Digest*, vol. 30, no.9, September 2000, p.1248.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p.1250.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, pp.1250-51.

## CHAPTER – 3

### RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

The Indian government's decision to go for nuclear explosion in May 1998, put Russia in a difficult situation. Different views came from Russia following Pokhran II and Pakistani nuclear explosion in Chagai. It brought to the fore the inherent dilemma of the Russia. Unlike the West, Russia's reaction was calm and muted. On the one hand, Russia was a strong adherent of nuclear non-proliferation regimes, on the other hand it also valued its close friendship with India. Hence it never went public over the issue. This ambivalent position on India's nuclearisation was evident.

Russia was concerned, however, on the kind of impact it would have on the Central Asian region and Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a escalation in terrorist activities were causing immense concern to Russia. The nuclear explosion by India and Pakistan further complicated a complex situation.

#### **Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy**

India started research in nuclear physics as early as 1950s, soon after independence. The intention at that stage was definitely to put nuclear technology to peaceful uses only. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, had committed all future governments to the exclusive use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. India did not perceive any security threat from any of the big powers. Uneasy relations with Pakistan did not dictate the

acquisition of nuclear weapons for national security. China was then not perceived as a threat, and was then not a nuclear power.

In 1962, China fought a border war with India, in which India suffered a humiliating tactical defeat; notwithstanding this military defeat, the policy of using nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes continued till 1964 – when China carried out its first nuclear test. The country was engulfed in a debate whether India should go nuclear. This debate forced a change in the Nehruvian model that nuclear energy was only for peaceful purposes. Then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on 23 November 1964 declared on the floor of the Lok Sabha, that “India had the capability to make nuclear weapons, but the government was not keen to exercise this option. At the same time, it kept its option on conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion”.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized a project for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). The Indian scientists were supposed to have proposed an underground nuclear explosions and the government, it is assumed, had approved it as far back as in January 1965.<sup>2</sup> After the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964, Homi Bhaba gave a statement that India could produce a bomb within eighteen months, if it so wished.<sup>3</sup>

A debate started within India on the question of developing nuclear weapons, but the debate remained inconclusive. India adopted the policy of

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<sup>1</sup> Aabha Dixit, “States Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity”, in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., *India and the bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options* (Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1996), p.59.

<sup>2</sup> Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York: Pager Publications, 1976), p.194.

<sup>3</sup> Shyam Bhatia, *India's Nuclear Bomb* (Sahibabad: Vikas Publications, 1979), pp.113-114.

caution because the perception that in a bipolar world with two superpowers any flexing of nuclear muscle was not desirable by a regional power.

In the mid-1960s, during the first year of Indira Gandhi Prime Ministership, India tried hard at meetings of Eighteen-Nations Disarmament Committee in Geneva to get on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would safeguard its security from the nuclearized China. It wanted effective and credible measures included in the treaty that could ensure non-nuclear powers against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers. Finally, when NPT took shape, India did not sign the treaty because of its discriminatory character. The policy of peaceful use of nuclear energy was followed by Lal Bahadur Shastri as well as Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

India carried out its first underground nuclear experiment for peaceful purposes in Pokhran, Rajasthan desert on 18 May 1974.<sup>4</sup>

Announcing the blast, the government continued to assert that it would use nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. The Atomic Energy Commission described it as PNE.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told a Press Conference that “This is our normal research work, and that we are firmly committed to only peaceful use of atomic energy”.<sup>5</sup> Speaking to the UN special session on disarmament. Later Prime Minister Morarji Desai confirmed this line of thinking by stating that

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<sup>4</sup> George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.178.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p.178.

“we are the only country which has pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world did so.”<sup>6</sup>

On the whole the PNE was largely welcomed by all sections of Indian Society. The Times of India stated “Thrilled Nations Louds Feat”. The Sunday standard declared, “Monopoly of Big Five Broken”. “India Goes Nuclear at last” knifed the motherland.<sup>7</sup> Other headline proclaimed “Indian Genius Triumphs”, “A Great Landmarks”, and nation is Thrilled.<sup>8</sup>

Subsequent statements by the Prime Minister and officials hewed strictly to the nation’s peaceful intention not to build nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup> India’s Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh emphasized that the present experiment was important because it “represented our resolve to develop our indigenous resources of energy for the benefits of our people through our own efforts.”<sup>10</sup> It may be noted that conduct of this test by India did not in any way conflict with the commitment of India as a signatory to Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 because this treaty prohibited nuclear test only in atmosphere, including outer space or under water.

The explosion produced a mixed reactions outside India. Pakistan felt terribly upset, the Western power especially the US were not exactly happy. Canada also reacted sharply and suspended all nuclear aid till the implications

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<sup>6</sup> *India and Disarmament: An Anthology* (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, 1988), p.201.

<sup>7</sup> Perkovich, n.4, p.179.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p.178.

<sup>10</sup> K.K. Pathak, *Nuclear Policy of India: A Third world Perspective* (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publications, 1980), p.133.

of the Pokhran nuclear test were made available. The non-aligned world as a whole applauded the competence of Indian scientists and technologists.<sup>11</sup> This is understandable because here was a developing country which had the capability to demonstrate its powers in an area that was the exclusive preserve of only five countries.

The Soviet Union was privately displeased, given Soviet Union's genuine interest in preventing proliferation. However it only issued a tepid public criticism in deference to Indo-Soviet friendship.<sup>12</sup> Thus despite its declared stand on peaceful nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union made no critical comment. Although, it was reportedly not happy about it. It consistently showed understanding of India's nuclear policy.

During the 1980s, and into 1990s, the Indian approach was to hope that the US would somehow stop the Pakistani nuclear programme. But US did not respond positively to this issue.

However, the Soviet Union was also concerned with the budding Pakistani nuclear capability. The proliferation of nuclear weapons to Pakistan posed risks to Soviet Union. The most immediate concern for Soviet Union involved the likelihood of military conflict between India and Pakistan which could involve China. In addition to raising the military capabilities of potential soviet adversaries geographically close to Soviet territory and increasing risks of nuclear conflict on the sub continent. Thus nuclear proliferation in South Asia posed more global, long term concerns to Soviet Union.

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<sup>11</sup> Perkovich, n.4, p.183.

<sup>12</sup> The Hindustan Times, 19 May 1974.

However, the major non-proliferation activities pursued by the Soviet Union in South Asia have been directed towards India. This is despite the focus of Soviet declaratory policy on Pakistan's nuclear programme and the general absence of Soviet press commentary on the proliferation risk posed by the Indian nuclear energy programme.

As mentioned earlier, there was a great deal of continuity than change in Russia's nuclear policy towards India. However, in the initial years of its existence the Russian Federation pursued a policy that was identical with that of the US perhaps the need for better relationship with the West particularly the US in order to help its systemic transition. Russian nuclear policy towards India was greatly influenced by them. The Prime Minister G. Burbulis visit to India in May 1992 and the cancellation of the cryogenic deal had an impact on Indo-Russian relations. It may be stated that Russia was committed to supply two cryogenic engines along with the transfer of technology, and the deal was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, it seems that under US pressure the deal was cancelled.

### **Russia's Pokhran II Dilemma**

India's nuclear explosions in May 1998 had sent diplomatic shock waves through out the world. The reaction of other states varied from outright condemnation to sense of regret and disapproval. However, Russia's close and friendly relations with India was the main cause of its muted reaction. However, subsequent tests by Pakistan at Chagai added to Russian concerns about the Indo-Pak conflicts escalating into a nuclear one.



This tilt towards India can be analyzed in the present context of Indo-Russian relations.

### **Indo-Russia Relations**

Immediately after the disintegration of Soviet Union, Russia followed a policy of Pro-West and Pro-US. Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev of Russia believed that there was no need to preserve the special relations with India which existed in the Soviet era. A special relationship with India was likely to undermine Russia's interaction with other countries in South Asia, particularly Pakistan. Russian Foreign Ministry publications on the 'Concept of Russian Federation's Foreign Policy' in January 1993 put South Asia in seventh position of their priority.<sup>13</sup> Russia's growing opposition within the country for its pro-West policy also forced it to look for a more balanced policy. However, with the visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to India in 1993 and conclusion of new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation injected the stability in Indo-Russian relations. The new treaty did not include the strategic security clause under which the former Soviet Union and India were committed to each others defence. The two countries also signed an agreement related to the supply of defence equipments to Indian defence sector. However, the highlight of the visit of President Yeltsin was his equivocal support for India's stand on the Kashmir issue.<sup>14</sup> Russian-Indian relations found a new basis for their ties.

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<sup>13</sup> Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic thinking", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. no. 21, no. 10, January 1998, p.1468.

<sup>14</sup> O.N. Mehrotra., "Indo-Russian relations after the disintegration of USSR", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 19, no. 8, November 1996, p.1138.

Geopolitical and strategic interests coincided which paved the way for friendly relationship.

The relations between two countries were further cemented in 1994, when Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao paid a visit to Russia. During this visit the leader of two countries concluded agreement on various subjects ranging from defence, science and technology and environment. On economic front Russia agreed to provide \$830 million to India for buying arms. In March 1996 Russian Foreign Minister Primakov visited India and concluded several agreements. He also supported India for permanent membership of the Security Council. Again in 1997 Prime Minister of India Deve Gowda paid a visit to Russia. On this occasion two countries signed agreement relating to avoidance of double taxation, extradition and defence.

Since then, the cooperation has been growing and has acquired the status of a strategic partnership. In other words, there is a vast area of compatibility of interests between India and Russia.

### **Russia's Reaction after Pokhran II**

On 11 May 1998, India conducted three underground nuclear explosions. The policy announcement was made by the Principal Secretary of the Prime Minister, Mr. Brajesh Mishra said, "These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme."<sup>15</sup> Two more tests were conducted on May 13, since then India has declared itself a

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<sup>15</sup> Col. Ravi Nanda, *Strategic Compulsion of Nuclear India* (New Delhi: Lancers Books Publications, 1998), p.265.

nuclear weapon state and has announced a moratorium on further testing and has also given a no-first use assurance. "Weaponisation is now completed". A.P.J Abdul Kalam Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister told in New Delhi. After the tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee declared, "India is now a nuclear weapon state."<sup>16</sup>

India's underground nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998, caught the world by surprise. The reaction from the international community was loud and clear. Aid was suspended, sanctions were imposed and ambassadors were recalled. In contrast Russia's condemnation was so mild and muted. As Russian daily put it, the "worldwide condemnation of India's nuclear explosions were in contrast to Moscow's quiet, almost serene, response."

These tests put Russian policy makers on the horns of a dilemma. In the official response Moscow unequivocally criticized the tests. President Yeltsin said, "India of course has let us down with its blast, but I think we can bring about a shift in its stance through diplomatic efforts."<sup>17</sup>

Foreign Minister Primakov on NTV said, "India's decision to carry out underground nuclear explosions was "shortsighted", was "unacceptable" as far as Russia was concerned and seriously risked an India-Pakistan conflict."<sup>18</sup> However, on May 13, Foreign Minister Primakov said, "I am not in favour of Russia imposing sanctions against India for whatever reasons. We regard such

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.290.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.283

<sup>18</sup> *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), May 14, 1998, p. B/4.

measures with great caution because sometimes they prove to be counter productive”.<sup>19</sup> Earlier Russian experience with sanctions against Libya was unhappy. Russian move was followed by freezing of assets by Libya, which hurt Russia. The official statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry on May 12 expressed “alarm and concern” and “very deep regret” over the Indian action and urged India to reverse its nuclear policy and sign the NPT and CTBT.”<sup>20</sup>

However, the Russian Duma came out with a different reaction than of Kremlin – The Chairman of the state Duma, Gennady Seleznev said, “I believe that India acted correctly. In this respect it acted by consistently and it was a correct decision not to curtail its research programme halfway, inspite of the US pressure. I can only admire their national pride.”<sup>21</sup> The leaders of some opposition parties took a different stand from government. The General Secretary of the Communist party of Russia, Gennady Zyuganov and the leader of the Ultra-Nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, welcomed the Indian nuclear tests. Russian media also showed sympathetic approach, as *Izvestia* (May 14), in its headline said, “Moscow will not quarrel with its Ally-Indian Nuclear Tests do not threaten Russia.”<sup>22</sup>

A conciliatory and reassuring statement came from Russian Ambassador in New Delhi. He said on May 23: “Every nuclear weapon state has some right.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. B/1.

<sup>20</sup> Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s post-Pokhran dilemma”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 22, no. 5, August 1998, p.723.

<sup>21</sup> Zafar Imam, “Response of Russia to Nuclarisation of India”, in Shams-ud-din, ed., *India and Russia towards Strategic Partnership* (New Delhi: Lancer’s Book Publication, 2001), p.90.

<sup>22</sup> Bakshi, n.23, p.725.

But for getting recognition it must have some obligations. Once it is ready to show these obligations ... its recognition as a nuclear weapon power will follow.”<sup>23</sup>

Against the backdrop of world wide condemnation and outrage, it appears that Russian opposition to Indian nuclear explosions was mute and not critical like the US and the West and it also did not impose economic sanctions like the US and others. It was clear that the Russian reaction was in line with the trends in the country’s foreign policy.

The last five years have seen Russia asserting itself and pursuing an independent line increasingly on international issues. Russian officials went out of the their way to reassure India that all was not lost and that Indo-Russia’s relations would not be adversely affected in any way. Even while voicing Russia’s concern about nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent, Russia’s ambassador to India went as far as to state that his country was willing to recognize India as a nuclear weapon state if it signed the CTBT and NPT. Apart from ideological considerations, economic factors could also have motivated Russia.

It is not without significance that a day after the second series of tests, on May 14, the scheduled meeting of Indo-Russian council, that oversees scientific and technical cooperation between two states was held in an atmosphere of friendship. While on May 19, it was made known that Russian Minister for Atomic Energy would soon be visiting India to sign a supplement

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<sup>23</sup> Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “From Russia’s a muted reaction”, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/Ja98/Ja98khripunov.html>, p.15.

to the 1998 agreement for construction of an atomic power plant at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. Russian Atomic Power Minister, Mr. Yevgeny Admov on May 19, said, "Russian cooperation with India including the construction of power plants would continue despite nuclear blasts."<sup>24</sup>

In the post Cold War era the process of formation of a new democratic world order based on the principle of multipolarity has taken an exceptional intensity in South Asia, since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Russia was concerned that the Indian and Pakistani tests could disturb the current "fragile balance" among the nuclear powers. The problem of Kashmir may provoke a new armed conflicts, this time possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons. The three neighbouring states-China, India and Pakistan-now officially or 'unofficially' have nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons of two of them – China and Pakistan – are directed towards India. This calculus did not exist even during the worst days of the Cold War.

These tests carried out by India and Pakistan ran counter to Russia's national interests, as they were clearly in breach of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was clear that the nuclear arms race in South Asia would not stop at that, and the nuclear tests in Pakistan confirmed these apprehensions. The chain reaction might continue and involve other potential nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, Iraq, Israel and Libya, which are dangerously close to the borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states. Another dilemma of Russia is how to keep China and

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<sup>24</sup> Nanda, n.15, p.28.

India as Russia's main weapons recipients if tensions between India and Pakistan escalate.

Russian nuclear cooperation with India is being promoted with an eye on participating in a large share in a growing market for nuclear energy. India has announced its desire to increase its nuclear output to 20,000 MWe by 2020. Hence the possibility of nuclear contracts with India is of particularly important to Russia. Similarly India has been looking to Russia for cooperation in this sphere. It is no surprise therefore that President, Vladimir Putin during his visit to India in October 2000 was taken to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai. The first visiting dignitary was taken there.

Russian cooperation in the nuclear field continues despite the well known position of India even on the question of nuclear non proliferation regime. To reiterate, India opposed the permanent extension of the NPT on two pleas. First, it does not adequately reflect India's plea for equitable, global nuclear disarmament and divides the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. Secondly, the signing of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state is not warranted due to consideration of security of India because of the country is flanked by two nuclear powers China and Pakistan.

In 1996 when the question of approval of CTBT arose, India voted against it on the ground that it would sign the treaty only after the five nuclear powers agreed on a time table for total removal of nuclear weapons. In her statement to the plenary of the conference on disarmament (CD) on June 20, 1996 Ms. Arundhati Ghosh stated, "the CTBT that we see emerging appears to

be shaped more by the technological preferences of the nuclear weapons states rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament.”<sup>25</sup>

As a new member of nuclear club India has adopted a draft nuclear doctrine. This also show the accountability and consistency in its nuclear policy. On August 17, 1999 Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra released a draft report from the office of the National Security Advisory Board, known as the Indian Nuclear Doctrine. On December 15, 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee spelt out the principal elements of India’s nuclear policy in a statement in parliament.<sup>26</sup> In brief it was stated India’s resolve to preserve its nuclear independence, minimum nuclear deterrence, no-first use, non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers and a firm commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

This doctrine outlined only broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India’s nuclear forces. Many details of policy and strategy concerning force structure and nuclear targeting schemes, will flow from these broad principles.

The most distinctive feature of the proposed nuclear doctrine is that it is anchored in India’s continued commitment to total nuclear disarmament. The preamble states that any use of the nuclear weapons world constitute “the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international

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<sup>25</sup> Manpreet Sethi, “CTBT and India’s Options”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 26, no. 6, September 2000, p.1078.

<sup>26</sup> Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 11, February 2001, p.1953.



systems.”<sup>27</sup> A global non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangement for nuclear disarmament continues to be India’s national security objective.

The proposed doctrine commits India to no-first use of nuclear weapons in case of conflict. Nor will India threaten or use nuclear weapon against states which do not poses nuclear weapons or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers. The categorical and unambiguous commitment to no first use determines the contours of India’s nuclear employment.

The consensus documents also provides for a credible minimum deterrence, implies that India’s nuclear policy, strategy and posture would be guided by the minimalist principle. “The emphasis on “minimum” deterrence clearly defines this principles in relation to the capability sought, the size of the arsenal, costs involved, the level of retaliation required and the nuclear posture in peace time and in times of crisis and active threat.” nuclear forces that are effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive to the requirements of credible minimum deterrence.

Leading Western powers expressed fear that this doctrine would lead to nuclear arms race in South Asia. The US government rejected the Indian desire to develop a nuclear arsenal. However, France welcomed the release of India’s draft Nuclear Doctrine as “logical and indeed wanted step.”<sup>28</sup> With regard to India’s Nuclear Doctrine Russia maintained silence. This by itself indicated Russian understanding of India’s position.

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<sup>27</sup> Gurmeet Kanwal, *Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal* (New Delhi: Knowledge World in Association with IDSA, 2001), p.235.

<sup>28</sup> The Hindustan Times, 27 August 1999.

The decision of India to go nuclear was taken after its firm belief that security can't be guaranteed without nuclear weapons. Russia's reaction to India's nuclear tests was a balanced one. The emergence of India as a regional power also fulfilled Russian national interests especially on the strategic defence and economic issues.

## CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union's perceived national interests was far more important than Marxist-Leninist ideology in determining the foreign policy goals of the country. Though it must be stated that often ideology and national interests were complementary.

Due to the logic of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union took the initiative to revise the classical Marxist-Leninist theory of 'the inevitability of war' precisely because it was convinced that any war could escalate into a nuclear one in which there would be no victors and hence there was no alternative to save humanity from nuclear annihilation. The Soviet Union was convinced that the survival of the socialist state and its allies and the whole of mankind would depend on the avoidance of nuclear war. All the Soviet leaders were convinced that nuclear weapons can be useful as a deterrence and it would not be used in war. Hence nuclear weapons were an integral part of their military and security policy. The Soviet Union like other nuclear weapon states tried to maintain its nuclear hegemony while denying the same right to other states. It had very positive view about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Soviet Union also supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime over the years. It consistently supported all the efforts leading to Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards systems. It also took a lead in demanding a ban on atomic weapon and the use of atomic

energy with international safeguards. The Soviet Union tried to cooperate with the US on nuclear issue. Since 1980, particularly after Gorbachev coming to power further strengthened the process of Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime.

On the question of nuclear issue India was never directly criticized by the Soviet Union. It had consistently said that India had a right to develop nuclear research for peaceful purposes. Moreover, India had always declared that it did not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons during Soviet period.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Russian Federation continued to attach the same importance to global Non-Proliferation Regime. Russia still relies on the deterrence concept of nuclear weapons. It has incorporated it in its Military Doctrine and National Security Concept. This idea believes that it can be used only for defensive purposes. Russia has been an effective partner in de-nuclearisation of the other states such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus.

Russia is a supporter of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and played a role in the extension of NPT and in voluntary cession of nuclear weapon testing and strong support for the CTBT. Russia has also supported the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, helping non nuclear weapon states in providing technology.

India has been a consistent opponent of nuclear weapons ever since independence. In 1995, India refused to sign NPT because of its discriminatory nature, again in 1996 when the question of CTBT arose India

voted against it on the ground that it could sign the treaty only after the nuclear five agreed on a time table for total elimination of nuclear weapon. India lastly went nuclear in May 1998, because it is surrounded by nuclear weapon states China and Pakistan with whom India's relations with are uneasy.

Russia's muted reaction to India's nuclear test was very much consistent with its policy. Russia's reaction was not critical and also did not impose economic sanctions. Russia's main concern is how to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia, from escalating into a nuclear one.

Russia's southern flank comprising the Central Asian states is vulnerable and would worsen the strategic scenario for Russia. Another major worry is possible "domino effect" of the Indian test perhaps a North Korean re-evaluation of its nuclear weapon programme. Certain states are still considered as a threshold states such as, Israel, Brazil and South Africa.

In the near future Russia's South Asia policy is likely to remain essentially Indo-centric. On the issue of nuclear weapons there is no threat to Russia from India. Since Russian-Indian interests are compatible to a great extent, which has now acquired the status of a strategic partnership, the nuclear issue will not cast its shadow on the relationship. The two countries could have certain differences on this issue, but they have taken care to see that it does not affect the friendly tenor of Russian-Indian Relations.

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