

**THE DIPLOMACY OF THE TIBETANS-IN-
EXILE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SANDE ROSE ZIMIK



**CENTRE FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2003**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

Telegram : JAYENU
Telex : 031-73167 JNU IN
Telephones : 667676 / 418
667557 / 418
New Delhi-110067.


Declaration

This is to certify that the Dissertation entitled "The Diplomacy of the Tibetans - in-Exile and its implication for the Indian Foreign Policy' submitted by Ms. Sande Rose Zimik in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) of the University is an original work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degrees of this University or any other to the best of my Knowledge.


Sande Rose Zimik

Sande Rose Zimik

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Pushpesh Pant
(Supervisor)

PROFESSOR
CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067


Prof. Alokesh Baruah
(Chairperson)

~~Chairperson~~
Centre for Studies in Diplomacy
International Law and Economics
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Page No.

Chapter One: Background: Emergence of the Problem.....	1-18
Chapter Two: Diplomacy in Quest of Legitimacy.....	19-33
Chapter Three: The Dalai Lama as a Diplomat.....	34-50
Chapter four: 'Pre-Negotiation' Diplomacy.....	51-69
Chapter Five: India's Position vis-à-vis the 'Tibetan Issue': The Diplomatic Context.....	70-83
Conclusion.....	84-88
Bibliography.....	89-97

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

When I started writing my Dissertation, I never thought I would finish it in time. But it has. And I would like to thank some of the people who had generously helped me in accomplishing the work. first of all I would like to thank my supervisor prof. Pushpesh Pant for enduring all the inconsistency in my work and guiding me. 'Thank you, Sir.'

I would like to thank Mr. Tashi Wangdi, Mr. Jigme, Mr. Karma, Dorji Dhondhup for providing me materials related to my research.

I would like to thank the Teen Murti Library, JNU library and TPPRC Library for their enormous help.

I am also grateful to Mr. Prakash for formatting and printing all my works.

My special gratitude goes to my Ama and Avi for their continuous encouragement and support. 'thank you Ama for yor love and faith; to my brothers and sisters for keeping me in good humour in difficult times. Special thanks to Aunty Pao and Uncle Siddhart for looking after me and treating me as one of their children. 'Thank you so much.'

I would also like to thank all my friends in the hostel, especially my neighbours Tashi Katoch, Thian Guite. Paotinglen, Dominic, my sister Chongamla, Sussanah and Elizabeth for typing and proof reading me entire work.

Lastly, I am specially grateful to my friend Yuingam Jajo for patiently typing and proof reading all the chapters. 'Thank you so much.'

Chapter 1

BACKGROUND- EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM

Tibet, known for its unique culture and rich philosophical tradition and often portrayed as a land of mystic and magic, has been and still is regarded as an area of great strategic importance by the major powers in Asia. The geographical location in the heart of Asia between the three giants-China, Russia, and the Indian sub-continent- has frequently made Tibet to be the object of international political rivalry.

At the time of its invasion by the troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state. The military invasion constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and a violation of international law and of the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people to independence. However, the Chinese Communist Government claims it has a right to "ownership" of Tibet.¹ It does not claim this on the basis of its military conquest in 1949 or the alleged effective control since 1959 or after the so-called "Seventeen-Point Agreement" in 1959. Instead, China's claims are based on historical relationships with Tibet.

Michael Van Praag argues that throughout its history Tibet possessed the essential attributes of statehood, never ceased to be a separate entity; was never an integral part of any other state and though subjected to invasion by outsiders and to claims of tribute and over lordships it had always maintained its integrity. However, the Chinese White Paper entitled *Tibet – Its Ownership and the Human Rights*

¹ Anand Kumar, *Tibet: A Source Book*, Radiant Publishers: New Delhi, 1995. [p.40]

Situation’, published in September 1992, argued the opposite. They stress the kinship alliances between the royal families in the two countries since the Tang dynasty.

Historical background

Tibet entered the historical records during the Tibetan Empire (ca.630-842) during which the small Tibetan states united into a confederacy encompassing the entire Tibetan plateau.² The Tibetan empire fought the Chinese empire of the Tang Dynasty to a standstill and, in 822 A.D gained a treaty ending the Sino-Tibetan conflict in which China recognized Tibet as an independent country encompassing the entire Tibetan plateau.

The primary factors characterizing Tibet as a nation are shared ethnicity, territory, culture, language and religion which were all consolidated by the shared historical experiences of the empire period.

Upon the fall of the Tibetan empire, the clans, tribes and regions of the plateau reverted to their former position, that is, fractious independence. It should be noted that Tibet had no central authority at the beginning of the 13th century.³ Around the same time, however, Buddhist schools had become the dominant economic, political and spiritual authority in Tibet (Buddhism reached Tibet from India during the 11th century).

² ICJ, “Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law”, 1996.[p.31].

³ *ibid.*

By 1234, the Mongol had conquered all of the northern China, including the Tibetan territory. Nevertheless Tibet was allowed a great degree of autonomy. Kublai Khan, the overlord of Tibet, had Chon-Yon (priest-patron) relationships with the Tibetan Lamas who acted as representatives of the Mongol authority in Tibet.⁴ It was integrated into the administration of the Mongol Empire, and treated not as part of China, but a separate subjugated country.

During the Ming Dynasty Tibet maintained its relations with the Mongol. In 1577 Alta Khan invited a Tibetan Lama, Sonam Gyatso and awarded the name “Dalai” meaning “oceanic” in Mongol.⁵ Sonam Gyatso, thereafter came to be known as the Dalai Lama. In 1642 Gushri Khan of the Kokonar Mongol recognized the Dalai Lama, and was entrusted both temporal and spiritual rule.

In 1652, the fifth Dalai Lama visited the new Manchu Emperor in Peking to re-establish the Chon-Yon (priest-patron) relationship that existed with the Mongol Yuan. In 1682, the fifth Dalai Lama died. In 1689, the Manchu reached an agreement with the Russians (the Treaty of Nerchinsk), which marked the beginning of the end of the great steppe empires. With the end of the Manchu Empire Tibet became a bone of contention between the expanding empires of Russian and China.

In 1720 the Qing army entered Tibet to expel a group of independent Mongols from Dzungaria who had gained control over Lhasa. In 1725, the Qing reorganized the administration of Tibet under the Tibetan secular nobility and administratively separates the eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo from

⁴ Warren Smith, Jr, *Tibetan Nation—A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*, Westview Press, US, 1996. [p.36].

⁵ n,2.[p.32].

that of Central Tibet. Native chiefs under the governorships of Sichuan administered Kham, which is between Yangtze and the Mekong. On the other hand, a resident Qing official, known as the Amban supervised the Tibetans and Mongol of Amdo (Kokonor), on the line of the administration of Lhasa.⁶ When the Qing dynasty was overthrown in the Nationalist Revolution, the imperial framework under which China had claimed the right to rule Mongolia and Tibet was destroyed. Thereafter, Mongolia and Tibet considered their relation with China as terminated.

The transformation of Tibet into an object of international interest began with the competition to control inner Tibet between the British Empire and the Russians in Inner Asia, known as the 'Great Game'.⁷

The British Government of India suspicious of the Russian influence in Tibet sought to take trade privileges. However, the Tibetan decline to discuss such matters with them. In 1904, the British sent an expedition (Younghusband Expedition) to Tibet to force negotiations. Before the British expedition reached Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama fled to north Tibet. After defeating the Tibetan forces and entering Lhasa, the British concluded a treaty with Tibet that granted Britain trade privileges in Tibet. The treaty also allowed the stationing of a British resident at Gyantse requiring Tibet, under the same treaty, to pay for the expenses of the British invasion.

Subsequently, London entered into negotiations with China to obtain the acceptance of the 1904 treaty. Subsequently in 1906 the Adhesion Treaty was signed

⁶ n,4.[p.130].

⁷ ibid.[p.36].

between Britain and China.⁸ Under the treaty China agreed to accept the Lhasa Convention of 1904 to pay the indemnity and allowed Britain commercial rights.

The Qing dynasty was completely overthrown in 1911. In 1912, the Chinese were expelled from Tibet and the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. He refused the titles offered by the Chinese Republic and repudiates China's claim to authority over Tibet; acts that Tibetan considered equivalent to a declaration of Tibet's independence.⁹ The International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) found that, "Tibet's position on the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912 can fairly be described as one of *de facto* independence and there are strong legal grounds for thinking that any form of legal subservience to China had vanished. It is therefore submitted that the events of 1911-12 marked the re-emergence of Tibet as a fully sovereign state, independent in fact and law of Chinese control".¹⁰

In 1913-1914 Britain, in order to maintain a buffer zone in Tibet attempted to secure Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy in tripartite negotiations at Shimla in India. Shimla Convention declared that 'outer Tibet' would be autonomous from China, while recognizing that it was under the Chinese suzerainty. Tibetans would administer Tibet without Chinese interference, and China would not station its troops in Tibet but would maintain an Amban and his escort of 300 men there.¹¹ Simultaneously, after a prolonged British mediation agreement was finally reached over the border. The outcome of the agreement led to the control of 'Inner Tibet' by the Chinese and the division of the autonomous 'Outer Tibet' at the

⁸ *ibid.*[p.37]

⁹ W.D.Shakabpa, *Political History of Tibet*, New York: Potola Publication, 1984. [p.222].

¹⁰ ICJ, "The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law", 1996, [p.85].

¹¹ ICJ, "Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic", Geneva, 1960 for the period 1911-1950. [p.139-142].

Mekong–Yangtze. Thus, Tibet was restrained from claiming full independence by China. On the other hand, the British were still committed to secure China's ratification of the Shimla Convention. Taking advantage of the situation the British influence in Tibet increased, including military assistance to Tibet that enabled the Tibetans to push the Chinese out of eastern Tibet (Kham).¹²

The 13th Dalai Lama centralized the Tibetan administration. Under British tutelage and assistance he attempted to strengthen Tibetan military strength by raising taxes to support the army. New taxes were levied and officers were sent to India for training on the modern lines. However not everyone was pleased with such moves. Especially Tibetan monks, who saw modernization as a threat to the dominance of Buddhism and resisted the policy adopted by the Dalai Lama. This forced the Dalai Lama to abandon the pro-modernization initiatives.¹³

China, however, continued to maintain its claim over Tibet. Ironically, this claim was accepted by the outside world although Chinese administration in central Tibet and Kham was virtually non-existent. The acceptance only furthers the interest of the Chinese which the Tibetans have to pay dearly. Emboldened by such international recognition the Chinese Government in 1939 declared Xikang a Chinese province. At the same time Britain continued to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

¹² n.2.[p.40].

¹³ Melvyn C. Goldstein, "Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question", The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 1995.

The Tibetan affairs, between the time interval of the demise of the 13th Dalai Lama and the installation of his successor, the 14th Dalai Lama (In 1937 the re-incarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama was discovered in Amdo and in 1939 he was brought to Lhasa and installed as the 14th Dalai Lama.¹⁴) was taken over by two Tibetan governmental institutions, the Kashag, or Council of Ministers and Tsongdu or National Assembly. In particular, these two institutions handled negotiations with a Chinese representative sent to offer condolences on the demise of the 13th Dalai Lama. During the negotiation the Chinese representative proposed that Tibet should accept Chinese sovereignty in exchange for autonomy in everything except foreign affairs and defense; however, the Kashag and Tsongdu maintained that Tibet was an independent country and instead demanded the return of Tibetan administration of Chinese controlled areas of eastern Tibet.

Tibet maintained the stance for independence throughout the 1930's and 1940's. Tibet also maintained its neutrality during the Second World War even though China was a combatant. This position occasioned the first Tibetan diplomatic contacts with the United States when Tibet refused permission to transport war supplies across Tibet from India to China.¹⁵ An American mission to Tibet in 1943 was informed of the Tibetan claim to independence. In response they suggested that Tibet might attempt to achieve recognition of its independence in a post-war peace conference. After the end of the war in 1943 Tibet attempted to do so by sending a "Victory Congratulations Mission" to India, China, the United States and the United Kingdom. But China protested the travel of the Tibetan mission to other countries,

¹⁴ Melvyn C. Goldstein, *History of Modern Tibet 1913-1951*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989 [pp.310-311].

¹⁵ n,1[p.44].

after which the UK and US agreed to receive the mission only at their New Delhi Embassies.¹⁶

In sum, prior to the 1950 Chinese invasion, Tibet had achieved *de facto* independence and all the requirements of *de jure* independence except formal international recognition. In its 1960 report the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) found that “Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of Statehood as generally accepted under International Law. In 1950, there was as a people and a territory, and a government, which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913 to 1950, foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent state.”¹⁷

The Diplomatic activity and Military threats

Communist Chinese armies entered Tibet on 3rd February 1949 following a series of victories against the Nationalist Kuomintang (or KMT) forces in civil war. On 1st October 1949 Radio Peking began to announce “The People’s Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan”.¹⁸ The attack began in earnest on 7th October 1950. Eighty-four thousand troops from the First to Second field armies of the People’s Liberation Army penetrated into Tibet’s eastern province of Kham, a zone lying in the foothills of the Himalayas east of Lhasa. The Chinese forces crossed the Yangtse River, and after few days advanced deeply into

¹⁶ n,4.[p.254].

¹⁷ ICJ, “Tibet and the Chinese People’s Republic”, [p.5].

¹⁸ Van Walt Praag Michael C, *The Status of Tibet*, US, 1987

the Tibetan territory. They met with an unexpected resistance when Tibetan units such as the Khampas riders fought back with swords like heroes against the advancing Chinese artillery. However, taken by surprise and lacking a unified command, the Tibetans were soon outnumbered and overrun by the assailants. Phase one of the Chinese campaign in Tibet was completed after eleven days.

The foreign Office of the Tibetan government on 2nd November 1950 wrote to Mao Zedong proposing negotiations to settle all territorial disputes. The office sent two senior officials, Tsepon Shakabpa, as the chief negotiator and Tsechaig Thubten Gyalpo, to negotiate with representatives of the People Republic of China (PRC). Meetings were held in New Delhi soon after the Chinese Ambassador Yuan Zhongxian arrived there. The Chinese demanded that the Tibetan government accept a two-point proposal; namely, (i) Tibetan national defense will be handled by China, and (ii) Tibet should be recognized as a part of China. On being informed of the Chinese demands the Tibetan government instructed its delegates to reject the proposal. So negotiations were suspended.

The Chinese aggression drew sharp criticisms from the international community. India expressed its rude shock to the Chinese aggression. In a sharp note to Beijing on October 26, 1950 the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote: "Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there naturally will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace."¹⁹

¹⁹ n,3,[p.36].

Similarly, a number of countries, including the United States and Britain expressed their support for the Indian position.

The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session in November 1950 at which it requested the Dalai Lama (only sixteen years at that time) to assume full authority of the state. The Dalai Lama was then requested to leave for Dromo, near the Indian border so that he would be out of personal danger.

The Tibetan government wrote to the UN Secretary General on 7th November 1950 appealing for the intervention of the world body. It said: "Tibet recognizes that it is no longer in position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus, agreed that it would negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese government. Though there is little hope for the nation it decided that peace would be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to wage war. We understand that the UN has decided to stop aggression whenever it takes place"²⁰

On 17th November 1950, El Salvador formally asked that the aggression against Tibet be put on the General Assembly at the suggestion of the Indian representatives who asserted that a peaceful solution could be reached between the parties concerned. However, the issue was not discussed in the UN General Assembly due to want of strong commitment from the party that seconded the issue. A content analysis of the diplomatic communication between the Government of India and China hints that India's unwillingness to take a strong stand on the issue was camouflaged with the high idea of peaceful solution, which could be reached between the parties concerned.

²⁰ *ibid.*

Faced with the military occupation of the eastern and northern Tibet, the defeat and destruction of its small army, advance of tens of thousands of more Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops into central Tibet, and the lack of active support from the international community, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government decided to send a delegation to Beijing for negotiations with the new Chinese leaderships which resulted in the outcome of the Seventeen Point Agreement.

On April 1951, the Tibetan Government sent a five-member delegation to Beijing led by Kalon Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. They were given the authority to put forward the Tibetan stand and to listen to the Chinese position. On 29th April 1951 negotiations opened with the presentation of a draft agreement by the leader of the Chinese delegation. However, the Tibetan delegations rejected the Chinese proposal in ditto. After which the Chinese tabled a modified draft, which was equally unacceptable to the Tibetan delegations. At this point the Chinese delegates, Li Wei-han and Zhang Jin-Wu, made it plain that the terms were final and amounted to an ultimatum. In other words, choice was to be made to accept it or face immediate military advance in Lhasa.

“As soon as the first meeting began, the Chief Chinese representative produced a draft agreement containing ten ready-made articles. This was discussed for several days. Our delegation argued that Tibet was an independent state, and produced all evidence to support their agreement but the Chinese would not accept it. Ultimately, the Chinese drafted a revised agreement with seventeen articles. This was presented as an ultimatum. Our delegates were not allowed to make any alterations or suggestions. They were insulted and abused and threatened with personal violence, and with further military action against the people of Tibet, and they were not allowed to refer to me or my

government for further its instructions”.²¹ Under immense Chinese pressure the Tibetan delegation signed the Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the local Government of Tibet on measures for the ‘peaceful liberation of Tibet’ on 23rd May 1951, without prior information to the Tibetan Government. Even the seals affixed to the document were forged by the Chinese Government to give it the necessary semblance of authenticity.

The document explicitly stated that the “The Tibetan People shall return to the big family of the motherland, the People’s Republic of China”.²² The Seventeenth clause of the “agreement” authorized the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet and the empowerment of the Chinese officials to handle Tibet’s external affairs. It guaranteed that China would not alter the existing political system nor interfere with the established status, function, and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. The Tibetan People were to have regional autonomy, and their religious beliefs and customs were to be respected. Internal reforms in Tibet would be affected after consulting the leading Tibetans and without compulsion. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan government adopted a cautious approach and withheld public repudiation of the ‘agreement’. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa on 17th August 1951, with the hope of re-negotiating for a more favourable treaty with the Chinese. However, the Chinese refused to reopen negotiation. On 9th September, around three thousand Chinese troops marched into Lhasa, soon followed by some twenty thousand more from Eastern Turkestan (Xianjing) in the North.²³ The People Liberation Army occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok

²¹ Dalai Lama, *My Land and My People*, Potola Press, New York, 1983.[p.87].

²² Peire-Antoine Donnet, *Tibet: Survival in Question*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994.[p.18]

²³ n,1[p.54].

and then Gyangtse and Shigatse. The Dalai Lama, therefore loses the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China 'agreement'.

The National Uprising (1959)

Following the entry of Chinese troops in Lhasa, political and regional divisions were created with certain social and economic reforms to change the fabric of Tibetan society. Various organs of the Chinese government were set up alongside the existing Tibetan institutions. The chronology of the events is as follows:

- Between November 24, 1950 and October 19, 1953 China incorporated a large portion of Kham province into two, namely, Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and one Tibetan Autonomous District. On September 13, 1957 another southern portion of southern Kham was named the Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and put under Yunnan province.
- The bulk of Amdo, and the small areas of Kham, was reduced to the status of the Chinese province, named Qinghai. One portion of Amdo was named Ngapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and merged with Sichuan Province. The remaining areas of Amdo were sub-divided into Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (on October 1, 1953), and incorporated into the Chinese province of Gansu.

- On September 9, 1965 China formally established the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government placing under its administration the whole of U-Tsang and area of Kham.²⁴

Lhasa was swamped with the refugees from Kham. The Chinese authority tried to deport them back. All the Chinese refugees, approximately, 1500 were deported to China. Khampas who had sought refuge were taken back followed by an announcement that “no Khampa without a Chinese identity card would be permitted to live in Lhasa.”²⁵ This measure resulted in the Khampas organizing themselves as Nationalist Resistance Movements. It consisted of about 23 separate groups called Chushi Gangdruk meaning, “four rivers and six ranges” under the command of Gomdo Tashi Andrugstang.²⁶ A genuinely popular rebellion called Mimang Tsongdu (People’s Party), which began as early as 1954 was also formed. It came into public prominence with demonstration, placarding of walls denouncing the Chinese interference with the Dalai Lama’s power and the custom and religion of Tibet. From this account, the atmosphere in Lhasa and central Tibet was charged with anger, fear, suspense and suspicion.

The Khampa Rebels

Having presented themselves as ‘liberators’ the Chinese government cadres embarked upon a long-term campaign to gradually erode the immense political power and pervasive spiritual influence of the Dalai Lama over Tibetan society. In order to consolidate their position and also pave way for Tibet’s complete integration within the ‘great Chinese family’, they had to neutralize the ‘Ocean of Wisdom’ before attempting

²⁴ *ibid*,[p.41].

²⁵ Andrugtsang, *Flight as the Cuckoo’s Behest*, Paljor Publicatios, New Delhi, 1997.[pp54-62].

²⁶ *Ibid*.

to destabilize his position. An entirely new order reigned in the valley thereafter- there would be no more prostrations, no bowing, no kowtowing to Buddhas and the gods; no more 'pujas'- the prayers and litanies endlessly recited by the Tibetan faithful as they spun their prayer-wheels.

The next stage was taken on 22nd April 1956, with the creation of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet to assimilate Tibet into the Chinese administrative mould. All over Tibet, the Chinese cadres were in a hurry to complete their ideological work. The result was the Tibetans revolting against the Chinese in 1955-56 by forming a guerrilla under the Khampa, which attacked the Chinese positions with extreme savagery.

US Interventions In The Tibetan Issue

The Tibetans once again turned to the United States for help. The Americans reciprocated by showing their willingness to provide both diplomatic and military aid. This action was justified by the need to counter Communist aggression. However, India and Britain refused to cooperate with them from taking any positive action. The American gesture propelled the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to destabilize China by opening a code named 'Garden' where hundreds of Tibetan loyalists were transported in utmost secrecy from India to America for intensive training.²⁷ Under the aegis of the CIA and it's the then director, Allen Dulles, Tibetan insurgents were trained in a valley lying at 9,300 feet, Camp Hale, 15 miles north of Leadville, Colorado. The CIA's objective was to train them in guerrilla tactics, provide them with modern arms and infiltrate them into Tibet. "Some of them were parachuted into Tibet; others went

²⁷ *ibid.*

overland. A small number came out and contacted the CIA”, writes David Wise. “But”, he adds, “While this enabled them to harass the Chinese forces, it did not provide them with the means to liberate their country”.²⁸

In January 1956, the Chinese government decided to stamp out the rebellion by any means, whatsoever. Thus, Peking rushed fourteen divisions of army to Kham – with 150,000 men, equipped with Illyushin I 1-28, from the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Chinese bombarded the resistance with devastating result which caused approximately 4000 deaths.

After crushing the revolt militarily, the Chinese army terrorized the monasteries and villages. There is a great deal of testimony concerning the barbarous deeds committed between 1956 and 1958. The Chinese tortured the Tibetan Clergy; Monks were burned alive. Tibetan refugees recall scenes of monks and nuns being forced to copulate in public in front of the Chinese soldiers. Many monks were deported to the labour camps in Qinghai, known to be the harshest in China. Children were forced to shoot their parents. The Chinese army employed an entire arsenal of methods to intimidate the local populations. Tibetans were crucified, burned alive, decapitated and dismembered. Entire villages were razed and wiped off the map. But the guerrillas did not lay down their arms (till the early 1970's) against the Chinese. The Tibetan guerrillas continued to raid Chinese positions relentlessly.

Incessant Tibetans' revolt and the subsequent dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama drew international attention to Tibet. In 1959, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing “grave concern at the violation of fundamental Human Rights of

²⁸ David Wise, *The Politics of Lying*, Random House, New York, 1963. [p.174].

the Tibetan people”.²⁹ In 1960, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) found that “acts of genocide had been committed in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group, and that such acts are acts of genocide independently of any conventional obligation”.³⁰ While battles raged and blood flowed freely, there was absolutely no positive response from abroad. The Indian government recommended to the Dalai Lama when he visited India on the eve of 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s birth, that effort should be made to arrive at the peaceful arrangement with China. The then Indian Prime Minister explained that India did not have the means to help Tibet shake off the Chinese yoke.

The manner of invitation extended to the Dalai Lama by General Tan Guansan on 1st March 1959 to attend the performance of a play inside the People’s Liberation Army encampment in Silingpu triggered the 1959 uprising. But a day before, a Chinese messenger bluntly informed that the Dalai Lama should come alone and unescorted. Now, this was a peculiar case because twenty-five armed bodyguards always used to escort the Dalai Lama. The condition was if he insists he might have two or three bodyguards unarmed. And the important thing that needs to be mentioned is that the arrangement was to be kept secret. The rumour spread and people rushed to Norbulingka (His summer residence) to prevent and protect him from attending the show. Large crowd surrounded the Palace demanding that Chinese quit Tibet and restore the country’s full independence. The Dalai Lama came to learn that the Chinese were planning to ‘liberate’ him. The attack of Norbulingka soon followed this event.³¹ Curiously Chinese batteries of

²⁹ International Commission of Jurists, “The Question Of Tibet and the Rule of Law, Geneva, 1959, [p.59].

³⁰ International Commission of Jurists, “Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, and the Chinese People’s Republic, Geneva”, 1960. [p.3].

³¹ Avedon F. John, *In Exile from the Land of Snows* Harper Collins, New York, 1994, [pp.50-61, 221-222].

heavy cannons and machine guns were already in place on the park. On 16th March, the first two bombs fell on the compound.

This was followed by the flight of the Dalai Lama. The flight took place in strictest secrecy on the night of 16-17 March, disguised as a soldier. On 20th March, bombs started raining down on the fragile building of Norbulingka, Potala, Romoche temple and many parts on Lhasa.³² The Dalai Lama thereafter arrived in India and established the Tibetan Government in Exile which up till now remains the governing body of the Tibetans.

³² Dalai Lama, *Freedom in Exile*, Harper Collins, New York, 1990,[p.141].

Chapter 2

DIPLOMACY IN QUEST OF LEGITIMACY

The Dalai Lama arrived in India on March 31, 1959, which eliminated the last obstacles to Chinese control of Tibet. The 'Tibetan Local Government' was dissolved by order of the State Council announced by Chou En-Lai on 28th March 1959 and the Preparatory Committee (PCTAR) took over the functions of the former Tibetan local government.¹ The Dalai Lama's position as Chairman of the PCTAR was preserved under duress. The State Council furthermore decided on 2nd December 1964 to dismiss the Dalai Lama from the post as head of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The National Preparatory Committee (NPC) also passed a resolution to discharge him from his post as Vice Chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee. In the absence of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama was nominated to function as acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. It needs to be noted that before the signing of the 17-point Agreement, Tibet was divided into three different administrations. General Wang Chi Mei, a Chinese General, headed one. The second was under the Panchen Lama's Bureau and the third, which was described as the Local government, was nominally under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama and his government.

¹ Warren W. Smith, Jr, *Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*, Westview Press, US, 1996, [p.452].

On June 20, 1959 in a press statement at Tezpur, the Dalai Lama said: “Although they had solemnly undertaken to maintain my status and power as the Dalai Lama, they did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and sow dissensions among my people. Infact, they compelled me, situated as I was, to dismiss my Prime Ministers under threat of their execution without trial because they had in all honesty and sincerity resisted the unjustified usurpations of power by representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet”. He further goes on to say that, “Far from carrying out the agreement they began deliberately to pursue a course of policy, which was diametrically laid down. Thus commenced a reign of terror, which finds new parallels in the history of Tibet. Forced labour and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries and execution of certain leading men in Tibet, these are the glorious achievements of the Chinese rule in Tibet”.²

The concept of statehood is central to determining the international legal status of political entities. For a state to exist in International Law, there must be a defined territory and a population inhabiting that territory, and a government possessing authority over the territory and population, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.³ No state is independent in an absolute sense: general international law imposes restrictions on a state’s ability to act independently of other states and states themselves restrict their independence by joining international organizations, alliances, or

² The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law- A Preliminary Report, 1959, [p.11].

³ L.F. Oppenheim, *International law*, in H. Lauterpacht (ed) 8th edition, London, 1955, Vol.1, [pp.118-119].


economic communities by accepting the jurisdiction of international tribunals. It also does so by concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Thus, there arises the question of legality of the Tibetan Government in Exile. The Chinese Government considered that the Dalai Lama's "Government -in-exile" is illegal in nature.⁴ However, Van Praag strongly holds that the Tibetan government-in-exile is not an organization set up outside its territory, but a continuity of the legal, accepted Tibetan government in Lhasa. He is of the opinion that as an independent political entity, "the state of Tibet still exists and the legal government-in-exile in Dharamsala represents it. In exile, that government has functioned, and still functions, effectively to the extent that this is possible on foreign soil and without official political recognition. At the very least, the Dalai Lama's presence in exile and the functioning of his government there act as a continuous challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese administration in Lhasa. The successful reconstruction and advancement of the exile community as a whole present a tangible and viable alternative to the highly unsuccessful and tragic attempt at transformation of the Tibetan plateau. Both these elements constitute the dynamic aspect of the continuity of the Tibetan state".⁵


To cite examples of similar arrangement elsewhere it can be pointed out that during the Second World War, a large numbers of government states incorporated into Germany and Italian empires, including those of Netherlands, Norway, Yugoslavia

⁴ Wang Jaiwei and Nyima Gyaicain, *The Historical Status of China's Tibet*, Intercontinental Press September, China, 1997, [p.293].

⁵ n, 3, [pp.582-583].



TH-10933



and Greece continued their activities in London. In such a case no formal act of recognition was called for and none was given because there had been no legal continuity. According to legal experts, such government continued to be State-organs, possess capacity to conduct the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of government.

Arguing on the similar line, many scholars have repeatedly emphasized the irrelevance of the removal of a seat of government to foreign soil; that government in exile “can only be conceived as organs of their state, acting on the basis of their own legal order whose continuity is unbroken by belligerent occupation”.⁶ Similarly, L.F. Oppenheim pointed out “the term ‘exiled’ or ‘refugee government’, is not very appropriate since it does not express clearly that such government is the only *de jure* sovereign power of the country”.⁷

The continuation of the state is further supported by the continued existence and activity of the Tibetan Government-in-exile. At the present time, the exile government of Kampuchea is still widely regarded as the legitimate government of that country despite Vietnam’s invasion and the installation of a new regime in Phnom Penh. It is the exiled government, for example that occupies the seat of Kampuchea at the United Nations.⁸

⁶ The Legal Status of Tibet- Three Studies by the leading Jurists, DIIR: Dharamsala, 1989, [pp.49-50].

⁷ L.F.Oppenheim, *Governments and Authorities in Exile*, AJIL, 1942, [p.568].

⁸ Micheal C. Van Walt Van Praag, *The Status of Tibet- History, Rights and Prospects in International Law*, Westview Press, USA, 1987. [p.187].

When the Dalai Lama took asylum in India, some 60,000 Tibetan people were coerced to leave the country. Ninety-percent of them now reside in India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and several thousands live in some 30 countries in North America, Europe, Oceania and other parts of Asia. Most of the Tibetans living scattered in different places have acquired foreign nationality. But even then the Dalai Lama's, "Government-in-exile" is commonly regarded as a force for "Tibetan independence" activities.⁹ This implicitly makes itself evident that it continues to elicit support and the mandate of the Tibetans which all the way enforces the legality of its existence.

Tibet In Exile

Soon after their arrival in India the immediate concern of the Tibetan authorities in exile and of their host governments was the relief and rehabilitation of some 80,000 refugees who had arrived to India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. By 1970, thirty-eight settlements harboring almost 60,000 refugees, and a decade later forty-five settlements, mostly agricultural were established. Now some 100,000 refugees live in these settlements; the remaining few are concentrated in towns and villages in the Himalayan foothills or have immigrated to countries around the world.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the exiled Tibetans still maintain their links through strong commercial, political, and religious ties. They continually look to the Dalai Lama and his administration as their

⁹ n,4, [p.292].

¹⁰ The Information Office of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, "Tibetans in Exile 1959-1980", Dharamsala, 1981[pp.101-206]; F. Michael, "Survival of a culture: Tibetan refugees in India", Asian Survey 25, No.7, July 1985.

government and to Dharamsala, a hill station in Northwest India that serves as the seat of the exile Government, as their capital.¹¹

Soon after substantially meeting the immediate need of his subjects, the Dalai Lama lost no time in establishing an effective Government-in-exile. At first, it consisted of his cabinet, the Kashag, with six portfolios: Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Religion and Culture, Education, Finance, and Security. Gradually, a Bureau was opened in New Delhi to serve as a link with the Indian government, and to oversee the foreign diplomatic missions and the various international relief agencies. Offices were subsequently opened in New York, Geneva, Kathmandu, Gangtok, and later in Tokyo and London, to act as unofficial embassies for the Government-in-exile.¹²

In 1960, the Dalai Lama called the first democratic elections for a newly created representative body, the Commission of People's Deputies.¹³ A year later he announced the outline for a new democratic constitution. On 10th March 1963, the Dalai Lama promulgated the 'Constitution of Tibet', an instrument combining the principles of Buddhism with those of popular democracy. The constitution, in its preliminary articles specifically recognizes the supremacy of international law, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; it also renounces the use of force as an instrument of national policy. The main body of the document provides for a system of government not unlike a constitutional monarchy, with the executive power vested in the

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid.[pp.3-16].

¹³ J. Avedon, *In Exile from the land of the Snow's*, New York, 1984, [p.104].

Head of State, the Dalai Lama, and the Kashag; the legislative authority vested in an independent Supreme Court. In its present existence in exile, there is no separate Tibetan Judicial system. A smaller elected body, the Commission of People's Deputies, essentially fulfills the function of a parliament-in-exile.¹⁴ Below the Kashag, the governmental functions are now organized under the following departments: the Council for Home Affairs, the Religious and Cultural Affairs and for Education; the Finance Office, the Security Office and the Information Office; and the Department of Health, Services Management, and of Audit. One of the Kashag, assisted by small staff is responsible for International Affairs and Security. He also supervises the activities of the government's representatives abroad. The government is financed by means of voluntary taxes from the Tibetans refugees around the world and from Tibetan business organizations, as well as through small enterprises run by the finance office.¹⁵

Furthermore, the Government has established and encouraged the establishment of a number of institutions as well to preserve and promote the Tibetan heritage and to enhance the exile community's cultural life. Some of the most important ones are the National Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, the Tibetan Medical Center and Hospital, Tibet House in New Delhi, and the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts. Religious institutions, including all the major monasteries of Tibet, have also been re-established in India and Nepal. The reconstruction of the community in exile also focused significantly on establishment of modern educational system. This system

¹⁴ n, 10, Tibetans in exile, [pp.3-14].

¹⁵ Ibid, [pp3-14].

comprises over fifty residential and day schools, numerous vocational training centers, and a graduate academic institution, the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies.¹⁶

Besides these, the Tibetan Youth Congress was founded in 1970 to enlist the active participation of younger Tibetans in issues of national interest and to further the cause of Tibetan independence. The Congress has since then become the largest and the most democratic Tibetan political party with over ten thousand members. Significantly, seventy-five percent of all Tibetan government officials are members of this congress.¹⁷

On the International arena, the Dalai Lama's efforts have not yet been wholly successful though there have positive advancements. International reaction to the events of 1959 was extremely sympathetic to the Tibetans, but no government went so far to formally recognize the Tibetan government in exile.¹⁸ The overall attitude of the international community towards the Tibetans has been more or less ambivalent. Prime Minister Nehru informed the Dalai Lama on his arrival in India of the inability to extend such recognition. Although Nehru sympathized with the Tibetans and considered the subjection of Tibet to China as "an unhealthy relationships" that had brought about much suffering, he also felt that in welcoming the Dalai Lama and the refugees to settle in India and allowing the establishment, at least *defacto*, of a Government in exile, India was doing as much as possible without risking open conflict with an already irritable

¹⁶ Ibid, [pp.209-235]

¹⁷ n,13, [p.101].

¹⁸ Raja Huthersing , (ed), *Tibet fights for Freedom*, Bombay , 1960 , [pp.125-161].

China.¹⁹ In 1954, India concluded with China the 'Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India' whereby India had at least implicitly recognizes the status quo in Tibet.²⁰ Under these circumstances, New Delhi felt that recognition of the exile Government would seriously endanger Sino-Indian relations. Thus far India's approach to the Tibet issue has been cautious pursued. Similarly, Nepal had established diplomatic relations with the People Republic of China (PRC) in 1955 and a year later had also concluded a 'trade and intercourse' agreement whereby all previous Sino-Nepalese and Tibeto-Nepalese treaties were abrogated.²¹ But in India, the Congress deplored the events in Tibet and called the restoration of Tibet's full autonomy and self-determination.²²

In London, the Foreign Office reiterated that the United Kingdom recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet only on the understanding that the latter was autonomous.²³ The United States strongly condemned China's intervention, its ruthless repression in Tibet, and the dissolution of the 'legitimate Tibetan government' in place of which it had established 'direct military rule'.²⁴ However, none of them have openly come out in support of the Tibetan issue in the recent years for diplomatic interests.

In 1959, the International Commission Of Jurists, a non-governmental organization associated with the United Nations, found *prima facie* evidence of genocide

¹⁹ The Statesman, 8th July 1959.

²⁰ R.K. Jain, China-South Asian Relations, 1947-1980, New Delhi 1981, Vol.I, [pp.61-67].

²¹ Ibid. [pp 285, 287].

²² The Statesman, 5th May 1959

²³ Indian Express, 25th March 1959.

²⁴ M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol.V, Washington, 1965.[p.202].

in Tibet. Bolstered by the finding of these distinguished Jurists, the Dalai Lama appealed directly to the Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold for the immediate intervention of the United Nations to stop the crimes against humanity being perpetrated against his people.²⁵

The Federation of Malaya and the Republic of Ireland co-sponsored Tibet's cause at the 14th Session of the General Assembly. A year later, Malaya and Thailand brought the question to the attention of the Assembly. Then at the sixteenth session El Salvador and Ireland joined them in proposing a resolution. The question was again discussed in 1965 when Nicaragua and Philippines joined the sponsors. The result was the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1959, 1961 and 1965, which called for an end to the violation of their distinctive identity, and the deprivation of their right to self-determination.

In the late 1960's the Dalai Lama himself traveled to Thailand and Japan and in 1973 he visited eleven European countries. These visits were followed by many more to Europe and Asia. The Dalai Lama paid his first visit to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia in 1979. During these visits, the Dalai Lama was often received by Government officials (sometimes the Head of States) and municipal authorities, and by religious leaders as well though he is not accorded the status of a visit by a state dignitary. Whenever, Dalai Lama is received officially the Chinese sent protest notes and releases statements against such gestures. For instance, on his visits to Paris,

²⁵ Tibet in the United Nations, 1950-1961, (New Delhi, 1961) 9th September 1959, in Bureau Of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, [p.17].

the Mayor of Rome had received him. The Chinese reacted strongly against it complaining that the Dalai Lama is not only a religious personality, but an exile engaged in political activities abroad, thereby, calling upon the host country to desist from according official recognition.²⁶

Despite the fact that the Tibetan government in exile remains politically unrecognized except by its own people, it effectively administers all affairs pertaining to refugees in India and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere where the Tibetan population are scattered. Here in India the Dalai Lama enjoys a special status. New Delhi for example, refers all matters relating to Tibetan refugees to Dharamsala, or at least handles them in consultation with the exile Government. International government or non-governmental agencies also work with the Dharamsala administration.²⁷ The Government of India and other governments have encouraged, supported, and even organized Tibetan armed forces in exile.

Thus, the Dalai Lama's objective to reconstruct a viable and even successful community in exile has succeeded remarkably well. Indeed, the Tibetans have been called 'the world's most well settled refugees'.²⁸

²⁶ Beijing Review 14th December 1982

²⁷ Tibetan Review, 7 and 8th July /August 1975, [p.8].

²⁸ Sweeny, "Keeping the Gentle Faith", Sheffield Morning Telegraph, 23rd June 1983.

The Present Status Of Tibet

The Tibetan Government in Lhasa until 1959 and in exile since then, nor the people of Tibet have accepted the imposition of Chinese rule over Tibet. To this day, the Dalai Lama and his Government-in-exile challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese presence in Tibet and continue to claim to be the sole legitimate Government of that country. Their desire for the restoration of Tibet's independence is not diminished. This stand is supported not only by the exile community, but more important, by the overwhelming majority of Tibetans in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama gets universal devotion among Tibetans and the overwhelming support for the political ideal of 'rangzen', the popular Tibetan term for freedom and independence that he represents.²⁹ On the other hand, the opposition to Chinese Communist rule in Tibet is also widespread. The Tibetans dislike for the Chinese has historical roots- the dislike was aggravated by Zhao Erfeng's invasion in 1910 and the communist invasion in 1949. The Tibetans regard the Chinese Communists as an alien and atheist people with whom they have hardly anything in common.

The Tibetan people and their government do not accept and continue to reject the Chinese presence in Tibet. Though the guerrilla operations, which declined after 1974, and the underground resistance movements, do not pose a serious threat to China's physical hold in Tibet it continually draw much support from the Tibetan masses

²⁹ The Times, 27th July 1983.

that nurture hopes for self-determination. Moreover, This continuing opposition represents a constant challenge to Chinese authority in Tibet; it is a source of grave embarrassment to Beijing; and it conveys to the outside world that the struggle for genuine freedom is not yet over.

The Chinese government does not itself recognize conquest, annexation, or prescription as modes of valid territorial acquisition, and furthermore, that it has never claimed to acquire a title to Tibet through any of these modes. Instead, Beijing has maintained that Tibet is an integral part of China only by virtue of its prior possession of a legal title to sovereignty over Tibet. Yet the historical analysis contained in the first chapter also conclusively demonstrated that prior to the invasion of Tibet in 1950, no such title existed and Tibet was an independent state. In spite of this the attitudes of other states to China's claims are inconclusive. The initial reaction of the non-communist states was merely sympathetic. Even today, the position taken by many states is non-committal.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the international community towards the Tibet issue is gradually taking a new turn. In the course of debates at the UN General Assembly between 1960 and 1965, non-communist governments made statements that referred to the "military aggression" and "invasion" of Tibet by foreign forces, and denounced the 1951 Seventeen -Point Agreement as having been imposed on Tibet by force.³⁰

³⁰ n, 25.

The Philippines government referred to Tibet “as an independent nation” and voiced support for the Tibetan people’s “fight against foreign dominations”. The delegate also declared, “that on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country.”³¹ The Nicaraguan representative spoke of other governments of the Americas also when he characterized the Chinese action as “act of aggression...perpetrated by a large state against a small and weak one”.³² The representative from Thailand similarly reminded the Assembly that the majority of states, “refute the contention that Tibet is part of China.”³³

During the debates in the General Assembly, the United States, which had earlier denounced the 1951 agreement and Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet, also condemned Chinese “aggression” and their “invasion” of Tibet.³⁴ The German government in Bonn stated that it was not indifferent to the fate of Tibet and the Tibetans despite the fact that “Tibet is not recognized as a sovereign nation by a large majority of all countries.” During the General Assembly debates on the subject, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries supported the Chinese position regarding the status of Tibet.³⁵ They have subsequently abandoned this position and have expressed support for the Tibetans.

³¹ n, 8.[p.185].

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.[p.186].

³⁵ “The Soviet Union’s attitude has changed to the point where it has offered its support to the exiled Tibetan government”. Indian Express, 1st May 1980.

We can conclude by arguing that Tibet was an independent state prior to 1950 until the Chinese annexed their territory by force. We can also add that no sufficient legal grounds can be found to support the Chinese contention that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese mainland since time immemorial. The state of Tibet still exists as an independent legal entity, with legitimate Government in exile in Dharamsala to represent it.

Chapter 3

THE DALAI LAMA AS A DIPLOMAT

The office of the Dalai Lama of Tibet is a unique institution, which is not found anywhere in the world. It holds a powerful mindset for the Tibetans giving them a feeling that there never was a Tibet without its Dalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama is referred to and addressed as 'His Holiness'. It may be argued that the same applies to the Pope and other religious leaders around the World, but for the Dalai Lama's followers, he is the manifestation of Chenrezig, the Buddha of compassion appearing in the guise of a human being. His official title is 'the Venerable Holder of the Three Worlds, the Unequaled'. Some look upon him as the 'guardian of the Pure Lotus' and the 'Jewel of Fulfillment'.¹

Every Tibetans have a deep and inexpressible connection with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. To the Tibetans His Holiness symbolizes Tibet in its entirety: the beauty of the lands, the purity of its rivers and lakes, the sanctity of its skies, the solidity of its mountains and the strength of its people. As he affords a continuity of the Tibetan history for the last few centuries, he is the one living symbol of the Tibetans everywhere. The present Dalai Lama is the fourteenth re-incarnation of the same person and hence represents the accumulation of all spiritual attainments during his previous thirteen manifestations.

¹ Piere-Antoine Donnet, *Tibet Survival in Question*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, [r.52].

His Holiness, the Dalai Lama never loses an opportunity to declare that he is an ordinary Bhiku (Monk) possessing no extra metaphysical or mystic powers.² The Dalai Lama wants to relieve himself from the political affairs and concentrate more fully on spiritual matters. The Dalai Lama has expressed a strong preference for this option but for the Tibetan population this would be unacceptable, as it would undermine the status of their God-King. Like the Pope, the Dalai Lama preaches compassion and non-violence, the two fundamental precepts of the Dharma-the teaching of the Buddha for the Buddhists everywhere. But owing to his added political responsibilities the Dalai Lama is obliged to perform both, most of the time simultaneously. Thus, when he makes religious lecture-tours, the political overtones could be heard. In 1997, when the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan, the first four days were confined to religious affairs; his political agenda began to reveal on the fifth day, when he met Hsu Hsin-Liang who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, the main opposition party in Taiwan Legislative Yuan. This was followed by his dinner meeting with the influential Vice-President and Premeir Lein Chan. It is here that the Dalai Lama was clearly talking politics where he praised Taiwan's "complete democratization" which he saw in Taipei's streets. He even went a step further and described Taiwan's presidential elections as "quite revolutionary".³

Even though no Government in the World today recognizes the 'Tibetan Government-in-Exile' the Dalai Lama regularly meets a great many officials, governmental as well as non-governmental, during his travels abroad and has been

² Inder Malik, *Dalai Lama of Tibet*, Uppal Publishing House: New Delhi, 1984, [p.87].

³ Swaran Singh, "Dalai Lama's Religious Diplomacy", *South Asia Journal*, June 1997, Vol. XX. [p.505].

making headways in drawing international sympathy for the Tibetan cause. These discreet yet enduring supports he has received from a number of international communities are a source of considerable irritation to China. For instance, the award of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama served as a tremendous source of encouragement to the Tibetan people, particularly for those who were on the verge of losing hope in the possibility of achieving freedom for Tibet through non-violence.

The Dalai Lama is surrounded with Tibetan and western political and legal advisors who are attuned to the subtleties of international diplomacy. Among them is Michael Van Walt Van Praag, an international lawyer who is the General Secretary of the Unrepresentative Nation's and People's Organization (UNPO) based in Hague.⁴ He is also the legal advisor to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in International affairs. A skillful tactician with optimism to spare, the Dalai Lama has managed to avoid traps laid down by the Chinese to neutralize him since 1959. He has succeeded in devising meaningful, credible and resilient policies for a future of free Tibet.

In an autumn 1987 address to members of the United States Congress, the Dalai Lama offered China the option of transforming Tibet into a demilitarized zone of peace. The 'Five-Point Peace Plan' which he unveiled stated the different issues clearly: "China was to cease stockpiling nuclear weapons and waste in Tibet; it was progressively to dismantle its military installations. The population transfer policy would have to be

⁴ n,1, [p.176].

abandoned .The environment would be allowed to return to its natural state. The Chinese and the Tibetans would embark on ‘earnest negotiations’ on the future of Tibet”.⁵

On 15 June 1988, the Dalai Lama was invited to address a group of the European Parliamentarians in Strasbourg. There he implicitly renounced formal independence for Tibet. In exchange he proposed an ‘association’ between Tibet and China to serve as the basis for negotiation. He proposed that the “whole of Tibet known as Cholka –Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people existing in association with the People’s Republic of China”.⁶ Within this framework, China could maintain responsibility of Tibet’s foreign policy.⁷ It could also maintain a “restricted number of military installations pending the successful outcome of an international conference convened to negotiate the neutral status for Tibet. Thereupon, Tibet would become a sanctuary of peace”.⁸

Furthermore, the Dalai Lama was realistic enough to note, given the on-going processes, that Tibet may have no choice but to compromise with China. This is the Middle Path advocated by him.⁹ On 19th June 1991, having waited in vain for a positive sign from Peking, the Dalai Lama announced during his visit to Switzerland that he could no longer stand by his Strasbourg offer.

⁵ Ibid, [p.60].

⁶ Dawa Norbu, *China’s Tibet Policy*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001, [p.317].

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ n,1. [p.178].

⁹ Ibid.[p.179].

Democratic Tibet

Since his departure into exile, the Dalai Lama has consistently spoken out in favour of democracy. But for the vast majority of Tibetans, the concept of democracy is a new one and a vaguely perceived one at that. On 10th March 1963, the Dalai Lama and his entourage promulgated the first Tibetan constitution subjected to approval by the entire Tibetan population in a free Tibet. It sought to guarantee the fundamental rights of all Tibetans, including every citizen's right to vote, equality before the law and freedom of speech, assembly and religion. A review of the 1963 constitution was undertaken in 1992.¹⁰ A Charter of the Tibetans in exile has now been adopted bringing about institutional changes in the office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama no longer appoints The Kasha (Cabinet) ministers. Now the Assembly elects them. Its members have subsequently been expanded to forty-six members, including representatives from exile communities overseas.

It needs to be noted that there are section of Tibetans opposed to the Middle Path proposed by the Dalai Lama. They are the younger generations who hold more radical and often violent means for political liberation from the Chinese domination. The Tibetan Youth Congress is one such group opposed to any agreement short of sovereignty with the occupying force. Even the members of the Dalai Lama's entourage admitted that the vast majority of Tibetans are viscerally opposed to any agreement with China based on renouncing Tibetan sovereignty. Tashi Namgyal, the General Secretary of the Tibetan

¹⁰ Tibet's Parliament in Exile. TPPRC (New Delhi) 1999. [p.13].

Youth Congress (TYC) said ‘Actually, we don’t really believe this is a wise way of settling the Tibetan issue. Conceding defense and foreign affairs to the Chinese is the same as abdicating or relinquishing sovereignty over Tibet. We feel there should be no concessions on that score. In our opinion, we should fight to the bitter end until we regain our independence. This is what the Tibetan Youth Congress thinks and this is what the Tibetans think. To talk to the Chinese is a fruitless exercise. What we have to do is fight for what is rightfully ours. We have to fight, not talk!’¹¹ The situation inside Tibet does not seem to favor moderation among the young. It is difficult to assess the strength of the few resistance movements that periodically come to the surface. Instead of open armed resistance, they resorted to civil disobedience, sabotage and isolated guerrilla attacks. The Tiger-Leopard Youth Association, one of the main resistance movements, declared that they are not ready to give up non-violence if the international community continues to ignore the plight of Tibet.¹²

However, The Dalai Lama had apparently managed to convince these impatient young people to renounce terrorism and the use of weapons in their struggle. At the Seventh General Body Meeting from 11th to 16th September 1989 the TYC resolved to suspend the call for violence and armed struggle against the Chinese presence in Tibet.

¹¹ Ibid, [p.185].

¹² Tibet Information Network, 16th May 1992

Nobel Peace Prize

The award of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama was a tremendous blow to the Chinese Government's pride. Accepting the honor in December 1989 in Oslo, in the presence of the King and Queen of Norway, the Dalai Lama welcomed the prize 'with profound gratitude on behalf of the oppressed everywhere'.¹³

When the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Prize for Peace, his statements included a number of severe comments addressed to the Chinese regime. He said "In 1987, I made specific proposals in a Five-Point Peace Plan for the restoration of peace and human rights in Tibet.... Last year, I elaborated on the plan in Strasbourg, at the European Parliament. I believed the ideas I expressed on those occasions were both reasonable and realistic, although they have been criticized by some of my people as being too conciliatory. This is why I am very disappointed that China has rejected my proposals and has refused to initiate serious negotiations with the representatives I had appointed for that purpose. If the present Chinese leadership is not willing to discuss the suggestions we have made, which included important concessions, then we have the right to consider our position. What is at stake is not the fate of the Dalai Lama, as the Chinese government usually maintains. It is the future of the six million Tibetans; it is the Tibetan's right to self-determinations, free from external domination and interference. Self-determination is the basis for the enjoyment of all other rights. Any relationship

¹³ Schwartz D.Ronald, *Circle of Protest- Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, 1996. [p.p. 172 and 173].

between Tibet and China will have to be based on the principle of equality, respect, trust and mutual benefit. It will also have to be based on the principle which the wise rulers of Tibet and China laid down in a treaty as early as 823 A.D, and carved on the pillars which still stands today in front of the Jokhang, Tibet's holiest shrine in Lhasa, which says that Tibetans will live happily in the great land of Tibet and the Chinese will live happily in the great land of China".¹⁴

The Peace Prize shored up the position of the Tibetans who reject violence and still believe in a peaceful solution. It also came as a warning to those who prefer another path: in a world saddled with myriad potential and declared conflicts, non-violence had finally won some recognition. Lastly, the prize came as a slap in the face for a faltering regime; a humiliation for the entire Chinese nation. It should be noted that no citizens of the PRC have ever been awarded a Nobel Prize in any field whatsoever.

The Nobel Prize enhanced the reputation of the Dalai Lama at the expense of the China's prestige, and it conferred upon the Tibetan issue a respectability that has opened many doors and elicited strong support from many quarters. Yet while informal recognition and sympathy are growing, official diplomatic recognition from western governments is still pending.

The then Prime Minister of India, of course announced that he was happy that the Nobel Peace Prize had gone to the Dalai Lama. But in December 1988, locked into a

¹⁴ n,1[p.195].

delicate process of improving relations with China, India seems less willing than ever to support the Tibetan resistance. On his official business trip to Peking, the first for an Indian head of state to visit China since 1954, Rajiv Gandhi declared officially that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and that India “would not allow the Tibetan separatists in India to indulge in political activities designed to break up China”.¹⁵ Such a comment was promptly reciprocated by his counterpart, Li Peng, who voiced his admiration for the principled position of the Indian government on the question of Tibet.

Universal Recognition: The Ups And Downs

No country in the world has officially recognized the government-in-exile of the Dalai Lama although it has been implicitly given logistical and similar assistance over the years since coming into being. Ironically over two hundred countries have developed diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, implying recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China’s territory. This applies to most of Western Europe and to the United States of America. This creates a fearful handicap for the Dalai Lama and his cabinet in their attempts to arrive at a peaceful solution the time worn Tibetan imbroglio. Since the Dalai Lama fled into exile in 1959, he has visited more than fifty countries. He has been to the USA, UK, and France at least a dozen times since 1979. But owing to the non-recognition by these states the Dalai Lama and his entourage could not be officially entertained. This has come as an obstacle towards finding a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue. Notwithstanding these diplomatic gaps the Dalai Lama and his cabinet members

¹⁵ “Xinhua”, 19 December 1988

have earnestly pressed on. In this fashion, they have gradually come to have a significant impact upon the foreign policy of a number of countries. Alongside these efforts the Dalai Lama with great perseverance has been continually encouraging the activities of the pro-Tibetan lobbies that exerts great influence on western countries.

The Government of Peoples Republic of China, on the other hand, have not taken such moves made by the Dalai Lama silently, given the large international sympathy that the latter has been able to canvassed over a short time. The Chinese government has adopted apparently a defensive posture towards these moves. For instance, the China's embassies have brought the utmost diplomatic pressure to bear on the government of any country visited by the 'Tibetan Pope'.¹⁶ It also exerts pressure on journalist who writes about Tibet. If an article fails to find favour with the Chinese government, the embassies pressed attaché complain or even threatened the editor of the article.

Nevertheless, The Dalai Lama's meetings with ministers, Prime Ministers, and even Presidents has multiplied exponentially illustrating the extent Tibet has become an international issue. Among the landmarks are his meetings with Presidents Salinas de Gortari of Mexico and Oscar Arias of Costa Rica in 1989; with former US President George Bush in April 1991 and former President Bill Clinton and Vice- President Al Gore in April 1993; with British Prime Minister John Major in December 1991; with President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, President Richard Von Weizsalcker of Germany, the

¹⁶ n.1. [p.197].

King and Queen of Norway, Irish President Mary Robinson, Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, Roland Dumas , French Minister Foreign Affairs and Rene Felber, his Swiss counterpart.¹⁷

The Dalai Lama can rely on the support of a growing of public figures and non-governmental organizations all over the World, including celebrities in the realms of politics, literature, arts, sciences and many other fields. These includes fellow Nobel prize winners Elie Wiesel, Adolfo Perez Esqueivel, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Linus Pauling, Czeslaw Milosz, Wole Soyinka, and Octavia Paz; Dannielle Mitterand, the wife of the French President, Heinrich Harrer, actors such as Richard Gere, Harrison Ford, Liv Ullman, John Cleese, Stephane Audran and Isabelle Adjani; musicians such as Yehudi Menuhin, Philip Glass, John Baez, Peter Gabriel, Kate Bush, Paul McCartney and Joan Armatrading and photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson.¹⁸

With these supports that the Dalai Lama could garner for the cause of his citizens the attitudes of the elected governments towards the Tibetan issue have seen dramatic change in the recent years. Several western Parliaments now extend very explicitly their support and recognition. The US Congress adopted a bold Text on 23rd May 1991 that declares Tibet (including the areas inhabited by ethnic Tibetans in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai) as an occupied country under the established principles of international law; and that Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama

¹⁷ n,1[p.198].

¹⁸ Ibid.

and the government-in-exile. The resolution goes on to say that “Tibet has maintained throughout its history a distinctive and sovereign national, cultural and religious identity separate from that of China. Except during periods of illegal Chinese occupation, Tibet has maintained a separate and sovereign political and territorial identity”.¹⁹

The European Parliament’s Tibet Inter-group has over a hundred members now; some were even part of the delegation that visited Lhasa in October 1991. In December 1992, the Parliament adopted a five-page resolution on Tibet that had been more than two years in preparation, along a substantial report to its Political Affairs Committee by Socialist Jannis Sakellariou.²⁰

Several other European Parliaments have set up Committees or study groups on Tibet. In the UK, there is an All-Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet. The Supreme Council of Lithuania, the nation’s Parliament, adopted a declaration in 1992 in which it “holds His Holiness, the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan government as the true representatives of the nation of Tibet”. The declaration further expresses “support for the legitimate aspirations of the Tibetan nation in international organizations and fora”.²¹

A sympathetic public statement can work miracles during a difficult negotiation over a lucrative contract with the Chinese government. However, pitfalls cannot be

¹⁹ US Congress Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Washington DC, in Governments Resolutions and International Documents on Tibet, 2nd ed, Dharamsala: Office of Information and International Relations, Central Tibet Secretariat, December 1989.

²⁰ n,1 [p.198].

²¹ Tibet Press Watch, International Campaign for Tibet, April 1992, [pp. and 5].

totally avoided at the same time. Destabilizing events also marks the wave of popular support that the Tibetans have received. The controversial visit to Tibet in 1987 by the then West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is a case in point. However, unintentionally or not, his visit did contribute to legitimizing the Chinese presence in Tibet. He was the first head serving head of the state or government to set foot in Tibet since 1950.²² Such incidents points to the cautious approach that the parties need to keep in mind while involving themselves into a politically fragile issues of which Tibet issue is just one.

International Institutions

In the 1950's only vague and muffled voices regarding the Tibetan issue were heard at the United Nations. But the 1960 report on Tibet by the International Commission of Jurists, an organization with consultative status at the United Nations, contained much claiming testimony and accused Peking of perpetrating "genocide" in Tibet.²³ The ICJ sounded another warning in 1961, and the UN General Assembly adopted three resolutions in 1959, 1961 and 1965. Thereafter, very little was heard from the international organization. The silence became deafening after the People's Republic of China joined the United Nations in 1971 prompting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to decide suddenly that the nearly one hundred thousand Tibetans exiles in

²² Ibid.

²³ Tibet and Chinese people's Report-A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet, New Delhi.1966.

India were no longer refugees, and all United Nations' support and assistance were pulled off.²⁴

The bloody upheavals in Lhasa since 1987 and the June 1989 massacre on Tiananmen Square in China stirred the international community from its state of total silence making them impossible to remain mute spectators to these brutal happenings. Finally, the international community began to notice of these brutalities. The European Parliament deplored the Chinese police's brutality against protestors in Lhasa in 1989 as a 'brutal repression' of the Tibetans.²⁵ This was followed by unprecedented condemnation which constituted a major defeat for China's diplomacy. China experienced another stinging diplomatic rebuff in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre. For the very first time in the history of the United Nations the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights called permanent members of the Secretary Council to task at its August 1989 session in Geneva for remaining passive observers.

On 23 August 1991, the Sub-Commission adopted another resolution, this time explicitly on human rights in Tibet and expressing 'concern' about continuing violations "which threaten the distinct cultural, religious, and national identity of the Tibetan people."²⁶ Furthermore, on 4th March 1992, the United Nations Commission on Human

²⁴ n,1[p.200].

²⁵ Resolution adopted in Strasbourg on 16th March 1989 by the European Parliament.

²⁶ n,1[p.201].

Rights, a highly politicized forum composed of fifty-three governments voted to take ‘no action’ on a resolution criticizing Chinese policies in Tibet.²⁷

International opinion gradually began coming out in favour of the Tibetans. The Tibet Support Group in Norway was able to collect 200,000 signatures from sixty-eight countries on a petition addressed to the UN Secretary-General and handed over to the Human Rights Center’s New York Office in March 1992.²⁸

Gradually, the Tibetan cause was making headway at other levels of the International Community as well. In early December 1989, the Western European Union (WEU) criticized China’s policies in Tibet. Its Parliamentary Assembly, which includes all the European Countries except Ireland, stated “The Chinese have been occupying Tibet for many years and deprive the Tibetan people of their human rights”.²⁹

It is important to take note of the fact that from its inception, the Dalai Lama’s diplomacy in exile has stressed the interdependence of national interests and universal human goals in accordance with a Buddhist rejection of military conflict. He identified Tibetan ethos with improvements in global and regional security through a demilitarized status for Tibet. His readiness to search for solutions-even with China, which had indulged in horrendous repressive and destructive activities against the Tibetans, signifies

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid[p.202].

²⁹ Ibid.

a rare intellectual awareness of the need to improve the world political climate in the interests of human survival.³⁰

The Dalai Lama's Dilemma

The Dalai Lama has several options. For one, he can continue his current international campaign, keeping China on the defensive in the international arena while trying to persuade Washington and Europe to use their power to pressure China for concessions. Such a policy would generate sympathy and funds for Tibetans exiled in the west and make Tibetans and their supporters feel good.

More recently, there is growing pressure on the Dalai Lama to adopt either of the two following options: The first is a compromise –sending Beijing a clear message that he is willing to accept less than political autonomy and cease attacking China internationally. However, this is likely to split the fragile unity of the exile community and discourage supporters and donors in the west. Moreover, if it fails the Dalai Lama could face political and financial chaos.

An alternative direction is escalating or encouraging (or even organizing) violent opposition in Tibet as a means of exerting new leverage on China. This is also difficult for the Dalai Lama given his commitment to non-violence, and even difficult to

³⁰ Petra K. Kelly, Gert Bastian, and Pat Aiello (ed), *The Anguish of Tibet*, Parallax Press, USA, 1991 [p.267].

personally opposed it.³¹ The Dalai had said that, “I will remain committed to the promotion of human values and religious harmony. I also announced then (in 1969) that the Tibetan administration-in-exile should be dissolved and that the Tibetans in Tibet must shoulder the main responsibility of running the Tibetan government. I have always believed that in the future Tibet should follow a secular and democratic system of governance”.³²

To conclude, we can reiterate what Samdhong Rinpoche had stated explicitly. According to him “The only indispensable condition for the future of Tibet is the unification of the three provinces of Tibet, or the entire Tibet population, as a single political entity. A fostering harmony is needed between the Chinese and the Tibetan to achieve true and lasting stability”.³³ If progress is to be made, therefore, a catalyst or facilitator is needed to play a constructive role, either through direct diplomacy or through a proxy country.

³¹ Melvyn C. Goldstein, “The Dalai Lama’s Dilemma”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No.1, 1998, [pp.91 and 92].

³² Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on 10th March 2003, the 44th National Uprising Anniversary, “Positive overall developments amid continuing worries”, *Tibetan Review*, April, 2003.

³³ Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche, “No compromise on truth, non-violence and genuine democracy”, Kalon Tripa, 10th March, *Tibetan Review*, April, 2003.

Chapter 4

'PRE-NEGOTIATION' DIPLOMACY

As a member of the United Nations, China is under legal obligation to settle the dispute through peaceful means of negotiations. In 1979, China's supreme leader Deng Xiaoping stated that China was prepared to discuss anything except total "independence" of Tibet and since then the Dalai Lama and his government has repeatedly made efforts to find a negotiated solution to the grave situation in Tibet within the overall framework of China's stated policy.¹ Despite that China refused to come to the negotiating table. In his proposal, the Dalai Lama never advocated complete independence from China, but 'mutual benefit and respect'. His five-point plan and the Strasbourg plan contained far-reaching concessions, which respond to China's declared interest in Tibet.

China's primary goal in opening dialogue with the Dalai Lama had been to secure his unconditional 'return to the motherland' and thus legitimize China's rule in Tibet. The dialogue had, however, opened up all the political issues of Tibet, including the fundamental issue of the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and had exposed the issue to international scrutiny. This has put the Chinese in a defensive mode with a certain measure of cynicism in their attitude towards the dialogue. The Chinese interpreted the Strasbourg statement not as a concession, but as perpetuating and elaborating 'the idea of Tibetan independence'. Even the characterization of Tibet as a dependency of China in the past, under Chinese suzerainty as the Tibetans were willing

¹ Warren W. Smith, Jr, *Tibetan Nation-A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*, Westview, U.S, 1996.[p.608].

to admit, revived the issue of Tibet as a country separate from China and the illegitimacy of China's liberation of Tibet in 1950.²

Questions may be asked whether the Tibetan Government in Exile is the right party for entering into negotiations with China. In this regard it is admitted that the Tibetan Government in Exile, headed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama is regarded as the sole and legitimate representative for the millions of Tibetan people.

Moreover, the Tibetan government in exile headed by the His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been recognized, albeit indirectly, by many national parliaments and the international bodies, and its legal credential to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government is also similarly recognized in diplomatic circles. The statement of Action Conference of European Parliamentarians (Palace of West Minister, 3-4 May 1993) went a step further by demanding that the Dalai Lama and the democratically elected Tibetan Government in Exile be given the fullest international support and the opportunity to address the United Nations General Assembly, especially in recognition of the non-violent approach of the Tibetan people in expressing their desire for independence.

The first official international support for the political cause of the Tibetans came in 1987 when members of the US Congress attached a resolution to a State Department Authorization Bill deploring Human Rights violations in Tibet. The House of Representatives adopted the resolution on 18 June 1987.³

² "What is behind the Dalai Lama's 'Plan'", Beijing Review, 19 February 1990, [p.21].

³ United States Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Washington DC, in "Government resolution and International Documents on Tibet", 2nd ed. Dharamsala : Office of Information and International Relational Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat ,December 1989, [p.23].

According to many legal studies the state of Tibet still exists at this time as an independent legal entity, with a legitimate government, which is exiled in Dharmasala. This is concluded on the basis of the continuing support for the Dalai Lama among the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan population and the active resistance to Chinese rule in Tibet, the successful development of the Tibet polity in exile, the functioning of a government in exile and above all the illegality of the continued Chinese presence in Tibet.

Conditions For Negotiation

The Dalai Lama's proposal for autonomy set up some pre-conditions for further negotiations. Some of these pre-conditions are; first, it is only with a withdrawal of Chinese troops that a genuine process of reconciliation could commence.⁴ China, however, could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet solely for defense purposes until a peace conference could be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved. Second, for the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is imperative that the population transfer is stopped and Chinese settlers return to China.⁵ On the other hand, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin, indicated that, before a dialogue could begin, the Dalai Lama must "publicly make a statement and commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China."⁶

⁴ Rinpoche, "Tibet: A Future Vision". TPPRC, New Delhi, 1996, [p. 52].

⁵ Ibid. [p. 53].

⁶ Frank Ching, "Hong Kong Solution for Tibet?" Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 161, No. 31, July 30, 1998, [p. 37].

While rejecting the Dalai Lama's autonomy proposal, the Chinese nationalists have developed the notion of a pan-Chinese nationality, which holds that all people, including Tibetans living in the territories of the PRC, are Chinese. The nationalist Chinese approach to the Tibet issue is concerned with adopting three measures. First, the Chinese state uses force to crush any rebellion in Tibet, and adopts divide-and-rule tactics to control the Tibetan elites. However, this measure could not yield the expected end as it failed to neutralize the secessionist movement. It merely brought about temporal calm by driving the secessionist elements underground from where it re-emerges whenever the political and military control is weakened.

The second measure is to 'buy off' secessionists through wealth and funding. The Chinese government, for example, has funded fifty development projects in Tibet in the recent year. However, economic 'sweeteners' cannot quench the secessionist aspirations of the Tibetans. Nor can economic integration deflect demands for Tibetan political and cultural identities.⁷ Tibetan secessionism is not a matter of economics, but of politics. Thus, even the second measure pursued by the Chinese to win the support of its Tibetan subjects has not met with much success.

The third measure is to accommodate secessionist claims by offering a kind of semi-autonomy. However, this semi-autonomy has its own limitation. This was unacceptable to the Tibetans because they knew that it cannot satisfy their aspirations of charting their own destiny politically, culturally and also socially. Nor can it manage the

⁷ A political and cultural solution is required. See Alan P. Liu, "Mass Politics" in *The People's Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China*, Westview, Colorado, 1966.

internal boundary question effectively. Tibetan, as a traditional and historical national community, felt that they should have a strong right to self- government, including the right to negotiate and veto to protect their interests.

Negotiations With The Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama has entered into negotiations with the Chinese government over the years; some open, some semi-secret and some only rumoured. The issue of Tibet is a classic example of informal diplomacy and its practices are only exercised by the states having an independent existence and an international recognition, by which is meant being a member state of the United Nations. Tibet lacks both. But the Tibetan Diaspora along with the Dalai Lama's Government-in-Exile has been successful, as far as the exercise of informal diplomacy is concerned. Besides this it has also been quite competent in generating opinions around the world in favour of their cause. In sum, the informal diplomacy has kept the Tibetan issue alive. According to Dawa Norbu, "The Sino-Tibetan dialogue still appears to be a continuing process but after more than ten years of contact and dialogue, it has definitely reached the pre-negotiation stage, which is negotiation about negotiations."⁸

The Dalai Lama had come to the conclusion that he does not have any alternative but to negotiate for a greater degree of autonomy from the PRC when the US abandoned their cause in the early 1970's. However, the whole issue took a favourable turn for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in the 1980's. In particular, when the Sino-American

⁸ Dawa Norbu, *China's Tibet Policy*, Curzon, London, 2001, [p.333].

rapprochement began from the mid-1980s, western moral support for the Dalai Lama's peace initiatives increased culminating in the award of the Noble Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama in 1989.⁹ Notwithstanding such positive trends the whole issue of entering into a lasting solution still remains an illusion. The admission of the PRC to the Security Council as a permanent member has deterred the international community from openly voicing the Tibet issue. The previous opportunity of openly raising the Tibetan issue at the United Nations has been greatly checked (though the UN has passed three weak resolutions).

The first bold initiatives from the Chinese government to resolve some of the outstanding "national" problems such as Taiwan and Tibet, was taken by Deng Xiaoping, who contacted the Dalai Lama in 1979.¹⁰ It needs to be kept in mind of other developments which could have prompted such bold initiatives from the Chinese government. In the late 1970's the Dalai Lama had scaled down his claims for independence to concerns about his people's economic welfare. On 10th March 1978 His Holiness had declared that, "The main reason why we are in exile is the welfare of the six million Tibetans".¹¹ In 1980 he was more explicit when he stated that "The core of the Tibetan issue is the welfare and ultimate happiness of the six million Tibetans in Tibet."¹²

⁹ A Tom Grundfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1988, [pp. 79-103 and 147-60].

¹⁰ Dawa Norbu, "The future of Taiwan and the Tibetan Model (1951-58): Political Analogy and Policy Implications", *China Report*, vol. 23, no. 1 (January-March 1987), [p. 9].

¹¹ His Holiness the Dalai Lama Collected Statement, Interviews and Articles, Dharamsala: The Information Officer of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1982, [p.53].

¹² *Ibid*, [p. 59].

On 3rd December 1978, Deng Xiaoping conveyed three points to the Dalai Lama's older brother, Gyalo Thondup. "The basic question is whether Tibet is part of China or not. This should be kept as the criteria for testing the truth so long as it is not accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about."¹³ The Tibetan side interpreted this as the agenda for all negotiations except those aiming for total independence. Deng's second point was that the Dalai Lama might send delegations to Tibet to investigate the actual conditions there. Third, he accepted the Tibetan suggestion that 50 Tibetan teachers from India would be permitted to teach in various parts of Tibet. Subsequently, a series of "fact finding delegations" were sent both to inner and outer Tibet.¹⁴ However, the resultant outcome of such findings abysmally falls short of bringing about substantial basis for further negotiation because the Chinese explicitly make it evident that these findings would not be the basis for negotiation. On the contrary, Beijing would do all the job of deciding what would be the issue for Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Therefore, due to this unyielding posture taken by the Chinese government the 'bold initiative' met with a similar fate as in the past.

Between 22nd May and 1st June 1980, Hu Yaobang led China's own fact-finding delegation to central Tibet, and issued a six-point policy directive. They are as follows: -

- (i) Autonomy means "having the right to decide for oneself" referring mainly to economic decentralization.

¹³ Dawa Norbu, n, 6. [p. 316].

¹⁴ Ibid

- (ii) Tibetans would be exempted from paying taxes and wages will be paid, their products could be purchased at negotiated prices.
- (iii) A flexible economic policy would be carried out with a view to diversify the whole Tibetan economy.
- (iv) Beijing would further increase central funds to the Tibet Autonomous region in order to develop the local economy and improve living standards.
- (v) Within the socialist framework, it would make “vigorous efforts to revive and develop Tibetan culture, education and science.... All ideas that ignore and weaken Tibetan culture are wrong.”
- (vi) Tibetan participation in the local administration should account more than two thirds of all government functionaries within two to three years.¹⁵

After having made the necessary economic concessions to the Dalai Lama’s basic demand made in 1978 and 1979, Hu Yaobang next specified the party line on the Dalai Lama’s personal status upon his return to China. On 28th July 1981 Hu conveyed to Gyalo Thondup China’s “five point proposal to Dalai Lama.” First, China having entered a new era of political stability, and economic prosperity friendly relations among all the nationalities will remain so. Since, the Dalai Lama and his entourage “are intelligent” they should believe in what the new era promises. If they do not believe, they can wait and see.¹⁶ Secondly, the Dalai Lama and his representative must be “sincere”; and must

¹⁵ Dawa Norbu. n, 6, [p. 317].

¹⁶ Ibid

not “bargain like businessmen”. On China’s part, there will be no punishment for those Tibetans who took part in the 1959 Rebellion. Thirdly, “we sincerely welcome back the Dalai Lama and his entourage to permanently settle down in China; once they returned, the Dalai Lama can promote national unity, improve relations among nationalities and accelerate the progress of the four modernizations”. Fourthly, “if and when he returns to China, his political and economic privileges will be those of pre-1959”. Fifthly, “the Dalai Lama when he returns China would organize a grand reception and hold a press conference”.¹⁷

The Dalai Lama’s reaction to the Chinese five-point proposal was, “Instead of addressing the real issues facing the six million Tibetan people, China has attempted to reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status”.¹⁸

Similarly, in 1982 Tibetan delegation made three demands. Juchen Thubten Namgyal one of the Tibetan delegates, demanded for more concessions for Tibet because of its unique historical status; more than the nine-point proposals to Taiwan stated by the PRC. In return, the Chinese merely reiterated that Tibet has already been liberated in 1950 and is now well on it’s way to socialism unlike Taiwan. Secondly, the Tibetan delegates referred to unconditionally recognize the right of national minorities to self-determination. However, the Chinese felt that their party was still immature to take up politically sensitive issue for the moment. Therefore, political discussions should be left to one side. And instead be concerned with the easier issues to build up confidence for further engagements. The discussion also included the issue of Kham and Amdo to be re-

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ The Dalai Lama, “Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet”, (New Delhi – Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1988),[p. 4].

incorporated under the Tibet Autonomous Region as one administrative unit. The Chinese merely left the issue open for further consideration.¹⁹

On 24th October 1984 the same delegation conveyed their views on various subjects to Jiang Ping, Deputy Director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, United Front, North Department in Beijing. They suggested that more fact-finding Tibetan delegations should be allowed to visit Tibet; all arrested Tibetan dissidents must be released to create the proper atmosphere for earnest negotiations. The Chinese declared that they do not accept the Chinese five point proposal and reiterated some of the basic Tibetan demands like-reunification of inner and outer Tibet, high degree of autonomy in association with the PRC, withdrawal of Chinese troops, thereby paving the way to making Tibet a zone of peace, etc.

On 28th October 1984 Jiang Ping conveyed to the Tibetan delegate that they welcome the Dalai Lama's return to either stay permanently or visit China. Although there were differences of opinion on certain issues, the Chinese assured that such differences would not be an obstacle to further visits and exchange of opinions. Jiang reiterated Hu Yaobang's five-point proposal made to Gyalo Thondup in 1981. Mr. Hu also stated that the Dalai Lama, if proved to be a Chinese patriot would enjoy equal or similar status as the Panchen Lama. He put forward, before the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September 1987, his own five-point counter proposal:

- (a) Transformation of the whole of Tibet (Inner and outer) into a zone of peace;

¹⁹ n,6.[p.321].

- (b) Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
- (c) Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
- (d) Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
- (e) Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and relations between Tibetan and Chinese people.²⁰

China rejected the demand for greater degrees of autonomy and the extension of that status to Inner Tibet. The following were the reasons:

(i) The physical areas inhabited by Tibetans are contiguous and not unified. Moreover, the local economy and culture of Inner Tibet were not unified. (ii) Due to vastness of the area there would be no benefits for joint economic and cultural developments if Kham and Amdo were united with the Tibet Autonomous Region. The Chinese added that "Unless this demand for a greater Tibetan Autonomous Region is dropped we cannot have negotiations".²¹

²⁰ Ibid, [pp. 5-9].

²¹ n,6.[p.322].

In June 1988, during an address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama outlined the framework for a Hong Kong style settlement. The key points were:

- ❖ Beijing would be responsible for Tibet's foreign policy;
- ❖ Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic law;
- ❖ The Tibetan government would comprise a popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature and an independent legal system;
- ❖ Tibet would become a demilitarized zone but with China's right to maintain military installations in Tibet for defense purpose only, until neutrality is established.²²

The Tibetan Proposal was based upon the "one country two systems" formula the PRC had offered to Taiwan and Hong Kong.²³

Most outside observers found the agenda constructive noting that for the first time the exiled leader had formally asked for an arrangement short of total independence. The Chinese credited the proposal with "a change in tone". However, China rejected the proposal as tantamounting to a declaration of independence or semi independence for Tibet, neither of which it found acceptable.²⁴

²² Dreyer Teufel June, "Unrest in Tibet". *Current History*, September 1989, [pp. 284 and 288].

²³ n,1[p.609].

²⁴ *ibid*,[p.323].

Although the Dalai Lama was accused of trying to internationalize the Tibetan issue he was invited to come to Beijing for negotiations. The Dalai Lama agreed to negotiate but preferred to meet to meet them in a third country outside the Chinese territory. The Chinese then refused to accept a member of the negotiating team-a Dutch lawyer specializing in international affairs who had worked with the exiled government for many years. The Dalai Lama's group stressed that the lawyer would attend as an advisor rather than as a member of the negotiating team.

On 23rd September 1988, the Chinese Embassy at New Delhi issued an invitation to the Dalai Lama for direct dialogue. It read, "We have never recognized the government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama. That is why we will only hold talks with the Dalai Lama himself and will not hold talks with the so-called 'government' delegation sent by the Dalai Lama."²⁵ The implication is that China does not recognize the Dalai Lama as the Head of the Tibetan Government in exile or even as the leader when Deng Xioping's initiative in 1978 assumed. On 12th April 1989 the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (New Delhi) issued public clarifications on the three objections raised by China. According to the public release "the delay in the commencement of the negotiations has been on the following accounts; (a) independence cannot be the basis for the negotiation; (2) the negotiating team must represent His Holiness the Dalai Lama; (3) there could be no foreign participation in the negotiations".²⁶

²⁵ Dawa Norbu, n. 6,[p. 324].

²⁶ n,1.[p.617].

After this, especially, the imposition of marital law in Lhasa on 7 March 1989 the Dalai Lama cut off all contacts with China. As late as May 1990 a Chinese government official was quoted as stating: "The central government has upheld an open attitude towards the talks with the Dalai Lama and we have never changed our eagerness to hold negotiations."²⁷ When Hong Kong was proposed as the venue for preliminary talks Beijing showed no interest to hold talks. In June 1993, Dharmasala sent two-member delegation to China to clear all misunderstanding raised during Thondup's visit. The delegation carried a 13-point memorandum, stating the Dalai Lama's wish for a peaceful negotiation. In the same year China severed all formal channels of communication with Dharmasala.

Preparations about talks got underway in 1993 at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi but were broken off with the Tibetans complaining about the rudeness of Chinese officials. Even then, the two sides continued to maintain co-operation in the search for the 11th Panchen Lama the second most revered Tibetan figure.²⁸ But by 1994 relations deteriorated fast. This was primarily due to the differences between the two sides regarding the reincarnations of the Panchen Lama. In the end, the Chinese seized the Dalai Lama's choice, a seven-year-old body that has not been seen since then.

In July 1994, China held the "Third National Work Forum on Tibet" in Beijing at which hard line policies were drawn up.²⁹ These paralleled the tougher lines adopted on Taiwan, which culminated in the off shore missile exercises. The new party secretary on

²⁷ Dawa Norbu n. 6, [p. 326]

²⁸ Becker Jasper, "A pilgrimage diplomacy in offing." *Tibetan Review*, November 1998, [p. 16].

²⁹ n.1. [p.638].

Tibet, Chen Kuiyuan, enforced tough measures aimed at stamping out the embers of resistance. He introduced tough family planning policies ending the freedom of Tibetans to have unlimited children, abandoned the teaching of Tibetan culture in schools, closed monastic schools and sent some 13,000 Tibetans to be educated in mainland China. He also restricted the number of monks and nuns to 46,000 and forced the remaining clergy to undergo patriotic re-education.³⁰ Furthermore, Chen purged the bureaucracy getting rid of those who are unable to write Chinese, stepped up arrests and toughened the punishments of those who resisted, handing out sentences as long as 18 years.

Yet the rebellion against such brutal administration survived, spreading to the countryside with more and more reports of protests and bombings. The number of known political prisoners rose steadily from 420 in 1992, 610 in 1996 to 1200 in 1998. Outside China, the Tibetan issue has been kept in the international eye through hunger strikes, and at times extreme actions such as self-immolation by one of the Tibetans in New Delhi.³¹

In 1994 the Dalai Lama has changed his style of negotiation with Beijing for a genuine autonomy in Tibet working through back channels such as unarmed Chinese businessmen and western politicians friendly to both sides. The result of this quiet negotiating process was President Clinton's China visit in the summer of 1998 during which he publicly raised the Tibet issue. President Jiang Zemin was compelled to respond in public. He said he would consider resuming formal talks if the Dalai Lama first proclaimed that Tibet is an alienable part of China, that Taiwan is a province of China

³⁰ Ibid [p.16].

³¹ Ibid.

and that he will have to abandon all his pro-independence activities, both is word and deed.

Moreover, Jian Zemin added that “The Chinese will send officials at vice-premier level to negotiate with the Dalai Lama himself, or his family members as his representatives only if the exile Tibetan leader no longer insisted on Tibet independence and refrained from pursuing splittism. But Beijing would never hold talks with the Dalai Lama’s exiled government. This time talks can be held in places like Beijing, and Hong Kong, or any Chinese consulate abroad designated by the Dalai Lama”.³² However, there was no subsequent follow up on this.

It is important to note that the Chinese government invited Gyalo Thondup to take a private visit to China. He met three key officials of the Communist Party’s United Front Department in Beijing. But they only told him that they wanted nothing other than the unconditional return of the Dalai Lama. There was absolutely no interest in discussing the issue of Tibet.

Citing reports of a closed-door conference ~~is~~ Beijing in October 1998, the Information and International Relations Department of the exile Tibetan government said in a statement dated 22 March that a section of liberal Chinese leader wanted to see the Tibetan issue resolved during the lifetime of the Dalai Lama. They argue that China, may not find a leader, who enjoys the loyalty of all the Tibetan people, to negotiate with. However, some hardliners argued that as long as the Dalai Lama is alive, China should

³² “China ready to talk again?” Tibetan Review, August 1999, [p. 7].

merely feign foreign interest in negotiating with him. "This will help us build our international image and buy time. The issue of Tibet hinges solely on the person of the Dalai Lama, who is now nearing 65 years of age. When he dies, the issue of Tibet will also die."³³

The Dalai Lama also expressed confidence that the issue of Tibet could be resolved in his lifetime while admitting that a transition process had to be initiated to prevent any leadership vacuum in the event of his passing away in exile. So, Samdhong Rinpoche Lobsang Tenzin was elected head of the Tibetan government making him the new Kalon Tripa (Chairman of the Cabinet). He is given the charge of constituting his cabinet with the help of seven candidates approved by the Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD, the exile Tibetan Parliament).³⁴

On September 2000, the Dalai Lama proposed to send a delegation with a memorandum asking Beijing for dialogue on the Tibetan issue and outlining his own thoughts on the issue. On 9 September, the office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Dharmasala quite suddenly announced that a team of two envoys of the Tibetan leader, along with two assistants, was to arrive in Beijing that day. They were Mr. Lodi Gyaltzen Gyari, the Dalai Lama's US-based Special Envoy, and Mr. Kelsang Gyaltzen, Brussels-based envoy. This was the first time in nearly 10 years that an official exile Tibetan government delegation visited China and Tibet. It was also first contact since June 1993, and also first time an exile Tibetan government delegation visited occupied Tibet since

³³ "Hardliners thwart call for dialogue with Dalai Lama", Tibetan Review, April 1999, [p. 6].

³⁴ "Exile Tibetans elect head of government". Tibetan Review September 2001.

1985 when the last of four fact finding delegations went there. The Kalon Tripa Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche simply said that the visit was a culminating effort to reach out to the Chinese government. Unfortunately the effort went in vain

During a press conference in Dharmasala, Gyari termed the visit a “positive development in the right direction” and the opening of a new chapter” in Sino-Tibet relations.³⁵ Soon after this the Cabinet has issued a statement urging Tibetans and Tibet supporters not to frustrate Chinese leader’s impending visits to foreign countries by staging any rallies or protests. Also, the Tibetan cabinet gave a June 2003 deadline for Beijing to respond positively to the Tibetan overtures. So far, the Chinese media has remained silent.

The new Chinese leadership apparently has conveyed a positive note to the Tibetans at least from the initial information available about some of them after the 16th party congress held in November 2003. Out of the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, atleast three – Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghang and LU Gan–have either had some connection with Tibet.

Concerning Hu Jintao, he has negative ties with Tibet. He is also known to have told a group of Japanese journalist at Georgetown University in Washington, DC in November 1994 that the issue of Tibet could be resolved along to lines of the 17-point agreement. Additionally, a new book about the China’s new rulers, *The Secret Files*, says “Hu Jintao advocates keeping the war of words with the Dalai Lama at a level that ‘is

³⁵ “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue: A game of hope and suspicions.” Tibetan Review, December 2002 [p. 22].

beneficial', reasonable and restrained". The book also says "Lu Gan believes that Tibet, with a single unified minority mostly committed to non-violent politics, is easier to manage than Xianjiang."³⁶ Of course this is not different in the book that indicates that he may be waiting for his Holiness to pass away.

The Kalon Tripa Prof Samdhong Rinpoche has answered the big question arising from the deadline the exile government set for China to begin negotiation on Tibet's political status by June 2003. He advocated the resumption of non-cooperation and civil non-violent resistance movement inside Tibet. At the same time, he also of the opinion that, the Kashag (Tibet's Exile Cabinet) continuously make efforts to send delegations and start substantial dialogue. According to him "The Kashag has always wanted to send delegations, for dialogue. The delegations that went to China and Tibet in September (2002) were assigned to revive lost contacts with the Chinese authorities. Now, substantial dialogue should begin for resolving the Tibetan issue."³⁷ Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama has spoken of an intention to send another team to meet Chinese officials, after studying the report submitted by the Gyari delegation that visited Beijing.

³⁶ "The Party and Tibet," Tibetan Review, December 2002.

³⁷ "Assistance movement to follow June 2003 deadline" Tibetan Review, January 2003, [p. 9].

Chapter 5

INDIA'S POSITION VIS-À-VIS THE 'TIBETAN ISSUE':

THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT

Since time immemorial Tibet have flourished as a repository of an ancient culture thriving under the silence and solitude of a vast firmament away from the tumult and turmoil of the world. Tibet was known to mankind not for its wealth and weaponry but for the heights of its spiritual glory and depth of its philosophical thoughts. Religion had been the keynote of its culture. Life continued on its spiritual endeavor in the mountain vastnesses, the glens and the plateau of Tibet until recently when the force of circumstances changed the shape of things.

Generally, when one thinks of India's contacts with Tibet it is usually perceived from the advent of Buddhism. However, according to the Tibetan tradition these contacts go farther back in history.¹ Tibetan chronicles and scholars like Bu-ston suggest that the Tibetan race stems from the descendants of a military general named Rupati of the Kaurava army. According to Tibetan legend, Rupati fled to Tibet with a large number of his followers after the defeat of the Kauravas at the hands of the Pandavas in the epic battle of Mahabharata. T.W.D. Shakabpa in his work *Tibet: A Political History* argues that a large number of learned Tibetans claim their race to have descended from Rupati and his followers. The claim is based on a letter by the India's pundit Sankarapati, (Deje-

¹ Tespon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, Yale University Press, London, 1967. [p.5].

dakpo in Tibetan) about a hundred years after the death of the Buddha. The latter described the migration of Rupati's followers to Tibet.²

Buddhism was introduced in Tibet by the memorable efforts of two Tibetan kings, Songtsen Gampo and Trisong Detsen.³ Since then India represents to the Tibetans a land of the Noble Master, the Buddha; the birthplace of all that is noble in thought and deed. Tibet's religion, philosophy, art, and poetry all show a deep Indian influence. The core of the entire Tibetan attitude to life is Karuna or Compassion. Their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama is Karuna's incarnation par excellence. As an incarnation of Avalokitesvara (Chenresi in Tibetan), he is dominated by the power of love through the conquest of the heart. The next important incarnation is the Panchen Lama representing Amitayus (Hodpamey in Tibetan) – Infinite Light-the Dhyani-Buddha of the existing Kalpa. Besides these, there are numerous incarnate of accomplished saints called Tulkus. The system of reincarnation, originally Indian came into popular vogue in their country largely from the time of Gendun Chopel, the first Dalai Lama.

Moreover, Tibet imbibed its monastic tradition from India. Buddhism was the first monastic religion of the world. Monasteries are sprinkled throughout the length and breadth of Tibet as a monument to its Indian connection. Scenes from the life of the Buddha taken from the Jatakas painted in frescoes are reminiscent of Ajanta paintings of

² Ibid

³ Ibid.[p.6].

India. Curiously, the inspiration to the Tibetan painter came not from Ajanta, but from the art of the Pala kings of Bengal.⁴

Literary Affinity

Sanskrit and Pali works have been translated into Tibetan.⁵ The Mahayana literature from India was properly catalogued and preserved for the first time in the Tibetan language. Many works in their original Sanskrit form are available in the Tibetan Language.

There are numerous reverential references to Tibet in Medieval Indian literary documents and Hindu Tantric texts, and many Hindu consider Tibet as part of their religious geography. The Hindus view the Himalayas as sacred (Mansarovar Lake and Mount Kailash). Perhaps, one can say that it is for this age-old ties and cultural proximity the emotional public support for the Tibetan cause is very strong from the Indian masses.

India's View of Tibet's Pre-invasion Political Status

When the People's Liberation Army forced its entry into Tibet in 1949 the Indian Foreign Office sent a note to the Chinese Office stating that: "In the context of the world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable

⁴ L.L.Mehrotra, "India's Tibet Policy". TPPRC, New Delhi. November 2000. [p.3].

⁵ Ibid.

and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace".⁶

If India had treated Tibet as an integral part of China, it would certainly not call the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet as an 'invasion'. Prior to these events, soon after India gained independence in 1947, the Government of India had said to the Tibetan government "The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan government to continue relations on the existing basis until new arrangements are reached that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's government".⁷

The note was addressed to the Tibetan Foreign Office, recognizing Tibet as any other independent country, running its own foreign affairs. In 1947, at Prime Minister Nehru's initiative in his capacity as the Head of the interim government, an Asian Conference was organized in New Delhi. Tibet was invited as a participant along with other countries of Asia and its flag was flown with other participating nations.⁸ In September 1947, the Indian Government assured Lhasa that all Anglo-Tibet treaties and convention would be respected as before, and two years later an Indian army officer was sent as advisor to the Tibetan government.

⁶ n.4.[p.6].

⁷ Ibid.[p.7].

⁸ Ibid.

Tibet has enjoyed similar independent status with several other governments until China forcibly brought it under its rule. For instance, in 1913 Mongolia had concluded a formal bilateral treaty with Tibet. Nepal has also concluded treaties with Tibet and maintained an Ambassador in Lhasa. When Nepal applied for the membership of the UN in 1949, it formally stated that it had independent diplomatic relations with United Kingdom, the USA, India, Burma, and Tibet.⁹ Furthermore, accounts from the last British representative in Lhasa and the last Chinese representative described the status enjoyed by Tibet at that time, i.e. 1947-48, as fully independent. In *Tibet and the Tibetans* Shen Tsung-Lien, the last representative of the Republic of China wrote after leaving Tibet in 1948 “Since 1911, Lhasa has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence.”¹⁰

Similarly Hugh Richardson, the last British Consul General in Lhasa summed up Tibet’s status during his time (1936 – 49) as follows:

“The government of Lhasa with which I dealt was beyond question in complete control of its own affairs dealing directly with the Government of India in such matters as frontier disputes, trade questions, supply of arms and ammunition and so on. There was no Chinese participation whatsoever in such matters and no reference to them, nor were they informed. In all practical matters the Tibetans were independent.”¹¹

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Shen T. and Lin S, *Tibet and Tibetans*, New York, 1973.[p.62].

¹¹ n,4 [p.8].

Thus, at the time when India became free, Tibet was not under the Chinese suzerainty but existed as an independent state, at least in practical matters regarding its own affairs. As a successor state, after the British, India maintained a Consulate General in Yatung, Gyantse and Gangtok, as a communicating link with them and a military contingent for their safety.¹² There was extremely close interaction between the Tibetans who were largely Buddhist and whose lives centered round their monasteries and the Indians. Every year Tibetan pilgrims used to visit Gaya, Sarnath and Sanchi connected with the lives of Buddha by the thousands. The thirteenth Dalai Lama had undertaken a visit to India in 1956 at the Buddha's 2500th birth anniversary celebrations in India when the Tibetan ruler was hardly twenty.

Indo-Tibetan Relationship in the Post-Chinese Invasion

In 1950, Nehru tried his best through diplomatic efforts to prevent a Chinese military occupation of Tibet, and strongly advocated a peaceful resolution of Sino-Tibetan tension. The Sino-Tibetan standoff posed a threat to India's security interests in the Himalayan region and it was determined to protect this vital interest. As the Chinese Communists neared their revolutionary victory, Nehru, as a precautionary measure was rushing through a series of defense treaties with Bhutan (8th August 1949), Nepal (31st July 1950) and Sikkim (15th December 1950) in case of a Chinese invasion. Then, Nehru assumed that the border question and the demarcation of respective sphere-that is China's Tibet and India's Himalayas would be resolved by 1954. It should be noted that all

¹² Ibid [p.8].

political maps of India prior to 1954 marked the northern border extending from Kashmir to Nepal as “undefined” and the northeastern frontier as “undemarcated”.¹³

However, in the events that followed neither India’s vital security interest in the Himalayas nor its stand on the border problem was recognized in writing or respected in practice by China nor was the autonomy of Tibet respected. Furthermore, when in 1954 through the Panchsheel Agreement Nehru recognized Tibet as part of China, it began to officially claim territory along the Indo-Tibetan border. Chinese territorial claims over the Indo-Tibetan border are primarily based on Tibetan – not Chinese – documents, which would be valid only if India recognized Tibet as part of China. Zhou Enlai himself acknowledged this in a letter dated 5th November 1962, sent to Asian and African leaders concerning the boundary dispute, in which he cited only on Tibetans evidence to support PRC’s territorial claims. In this letter he conceded that the names of rivers, passes, and other places in the eastern sector (NEFA/ Arunachal Pradesh) were written in the Tibetans language. Moreover, it asserted that the inhabitants of the middle sector are nearly all Tibetans. It also claimed that the Tibetan archival documents indicate that the “local government” had consistently exercised its jurisdictions over the Tibet-Sikkim border area.¹⁴ Similarly, Zhou Enlai based China’s claim over the Aksai Chin by declaring that it was once a part of Tibet’s Zinjiang and Ngari District.

It is important to reiterate that the Chinese violated the 1954 Five Peaceful Coexistence or the Panchsheel Agreement by occupying nearly 36,000 square miles of

¹³ Dawa Norbu, *China’s Tibet Policy*, Curzon Press, UK, 2001. [p.285].

¹⁴ Ibid [p.287].

the Indian Territory.¹⁵ The collapse of the agreement had marked the end of India's commitment to treat Tibet a region of China. India had until then ignored the fact that Tibet had functioned as a sovereign independent state. There was virtually nothing Nehru could do but befriend new China by all means and cost. Still then, when the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet in 1950, India did not hesitate to deplore China's invasion.

During the debates in the UN in 1959, 1960, and 1961 many governments had recognized the fact that on the eve of the Chinese invasion, Tibet was independent. The 1961 UN Resolution passed by the General Assembly categorically spoke of Tibet's right to self-determination. It renewed its call for the cessation of practices, which deprived the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedom, including their rights of self-determination. It expressed the hope that Members States would make all possible efforts as appropriate towards achieving the purpose of the resolution. Taking note of India's influence in the region and the ties and connections that Indian and Tibet share since time immemorial the United Nations General Assembly's 1961 Resolution clearly provided India the basis for making all possible efforts towards achieving self-determination for the people of Tibet. That was one option India should have exercised, particularly after the invasion of its territory by the Chinese. In pressing for self-determination for Tibet, India would not have violated any norms of international behavior. Again, India supported the Tibet issue at the 1965 UN Resolution. Another change in Government of India's attitude towards the Tibetan political issue was to allow

¹⁵ Sharan Shanker, "India's Tibet-China Policy". Hindustan Times, New Delhi. 16th May 1996

the Tibetan to form the Tibetan Government-in-exile with its Headquarter at Dharamsala in India. Whatever be its official attitude, India's deep-rooted sympathy with the Tibet is evident from her enormous efforts to rehabilitate Tibetan refugees.

The 1962 invasion of India by China was a final blow of the 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' sentiment. The process of the Chinese invasion had actually started on 1st January 1950 when Mao Zedong proclaimed "the liberation of three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression" as a basic task before the people's liberation Army of China.¹⁶ Sino-Indian relations further deteriorated with the Indian Government radically revising its stance on Tibet. It supported the Tibetan cause in the 1960's both openly and clandestinely. In 1965 the special frontier force 'Code-named 22', was established to train able-bodied young Tibetan refugees. Swamy Subrmanian, in *Critic of India's China Policy* observed that:

"The status of Tibet, and our (Indian) perception of it, has been one of the destabilizing factors in Sino-Indian relations. Publicly, the Indian government regards Tibet as an integral part of China. But in popular parlance, and in many of our actions, we do not behave as if Tibet is a part of China. For example, the Indian government has raised in the 1980s a highly paid special service unit, 8,000-strong commando group of Tibetans, who walk up every morning in the special camps with cries of "Long live Dalai Lama, We shall liberate Tibet". This commando group is still under the active supervision of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Cabinet Secretariat. If we regard Tibet as part of

¹⁶ n,4.[p.13].

China, then why is there need for maintaining such a special group? The Indian government has never answered this query of mine”.¹⁷

The India delegate openly supported the United Nations Resolutions on Tibet for the first time since 1950. In the same year Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was to recognize the Tibetan Government in exile, but he died suddenly and Indian politics took another twist.¹⁸ The essence of India’s dual-track policy is that while the Government of India officially continues to declare that Tibet is a part of China and has been an autonomous region of China, India facilitates the Dalai Lama’s international movements and continues to assist the Tibetan exiled Government. Depending on the perceived state of Sino-Indian relations (and other global factors), the Indian government supports or sacrifices the Tibetan demand for autonomy.

The continued presence of Chinese in Tibet and the establishment of nuclear centers in Tibet have come to pose new security problem to New Delhi. Within less than a decade of the occupation of Tibet, China’s Ninth Bureau established the North West Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy in Amdo, a part of Tibet called Qinghai by China.¹⁹ It was called the Ninth Academy is short. For nearly decades it was responsible for designing all of China’s nuclear bombs. It also served as a research center for detonation development, radiochemistry and many other nuclear weapons related activities. China conducted its first nuclear test at a site close to the Ninth Academy in

¹⁷ Swaran Lata Sharma, *Tibet: Self-Determination among Nations*, Criterion Publication, New Delhi, 1988) [p.109].

¹⁸ Swamy, Subramanium, *India’s China perspective*, Konark Publications, New Delhi 2001[p.26].

¹⁹ Singh Swaran, “Tibet factors in the solution of Sino-Indian strategic Ties”. *Journal of Peace Studies*. Vol. 8, issue, Jan-Dec. 2001, [p. 11].

1964, which posed a direct threat to India's security. With the alleged nuclearization of Tibet by China, the Himalayan frontier vanished altogether and all of India became accessible to Chinese weaponry. New Delhi is within only 2000 kms. of these Chinese missile sites in Tibet. There are reports that at Nagchuka, North of Lhasa (at a height of about 15,000 feet) nuclear missiles are permanently stationed. Today China has 23 airfields most of which are located next to Himalayan frontiers. Most of these are used for carrying military personnel and other essential goods and, for a long time, these air routes were not open for civilian traffic. In this context it is best that India takes a definite stand and abandon its shifting stance on the issue.

Population Transfer

From 1983 there has been a sharp increase in the transfer of Chinese settlers to central Tibet. The Information Office of China's State Council recently issued their second white paper titled *New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibetan Autonomous Region*. According to this, the Tibetans constitute about 95 per cent of the total population of China's Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The total population has nearly doubled (from under 1 million in 1950's to 2.3 million by 1993). In 1996, it reportedly has reached 2.44 million. The Tibetan claim that their population is six million. While the Chinese claim is slightly more than four million, only those residing within the Tibetan Autonomous Region. However, looking at the statistics the Chinese has given it was over six million in 1959. In November 1959 TAR had 1,273, 969, Xikang had 3,381, 064 Tibetans. In Qinghai and other Tibetan areas incorporated into

Gansu, there were 1,675,534 Tibetans.²⁰ If these three figures are put together the Tibetan population then stood at 6,330,567. In February 1988, Huan Xiang, Director of the Centre for International Studies under the State Council in Beijing stated that, "Of the present population of 6 million Tibetan only two million are living in Tibet (read TAR) while the remaining four million are in other provinces of China".²¹ This is due to the large influx of the Hans population which has resulted in making the Tibetans a minority in their own land. If such a trend continues unabated a grim future awaits the Tibetans outside the TAR. The ramifications of such a trend could possibly affect India where there is substantial number of Tibetan refugees. Thus one can add cautiously that this could further complicate the Government of India's stand on the Tibetan issue if the latter turn to violent means using the Indian territory as the base to launch such attacks on the Chinese rule in Tibet. Thus, it becomes pertinent that the Indian government adopts pre-emptive policies towards such possibilities.

Environmental Destruction

Tibet has the world's biggest uranium reserves and there are reports of many local Tibetans having perished after drinking contaminated water in the proximity of uranium mine in Amdo. In 1991, Green Peace exposed plans to ship toxic slugs from the USA to China for used as "fertilizers" in Tibet.²² And there are other reports of certain European firms negotiating with the Chinese authorities for dumping nuclear toxic wastes in Tibet.

²⁰ People's Daily, Beijing, November 10, 1959.

²¹ n, 19, [p.11].

²² "Tibet and Indian Diplomacy". Economic Times, December 1, 1991.

The fall-out is a matter of urgent concern for all those neighboring countries, including India, through which flow the great rivers of Asia originating from Tibet: Oxus, Indus, Brahmaputra, and Mekong. If these rivers are polluted, it will be hazardous for millions of people on the Asian mainland, especially the two most populous countries- India and Bangladesh. Thus, the Government of India needs added interest and efforts through diplomatic means to interfere in these issues in order to avoid hazardous consequences in the future.

Quest For An Answer

The crux of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry is that if India dominates Tibet (as the British had done until 1949), the Chinese interest in the region would be threatened. Conversely, if China occupies Tibet (which it has been doing since 1950) India feels that its whole northern security system, stretching over 3,200 km, is open to external dangers. Such a strategic zero-sum game over Tibet may be resolved through the neutralization and demilitarization of the contested territory.

As of now, India's response to the disturbances in Tibet is at once predictable and justified. It is predictable because since 1950 India shares a strategically important relationship with Tibet. Though New Delhi considers the Tibetan issue as Beijing's internal affair it cannot afford to remain indifferent because of the many affinities that both share since time in immemorial. Moreover, the geopolitical location of Tibet is directly related to India's internal security from foreign invasion. To top it all given India's commitment for peaceful solution to all the global issues it is legitimate that New

Delhi should seek to create a proper atmosphere for the peaceful negotiations to solve the Tibetan imbroglio.

In conclusion one needs to reiterate that when a free nation comes under aggression it is the duty of other sovereign states to interfere under international laws to restore status quo. Moreover, under international law, if an agreement such as Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 is signed, parties should honor the agreements. If either party to the Agreement unilaterally abandons the treaty, the other group has the right to appeal to other nations and expect their support and help. Therefore, from the aforementioned grounds the Dalai Lama's demand for restoring the autonomous status of Tibet in its genuine form is most reasonable and deserves universal support. In lending him support, India would be discharging a responsibility which is both a moral responsibility and a strategic necessity.²³

²³ Jayaprakash, "What needs to be done?" ICWA, New Delhi. December 1981. (Reprint from Vol.XV, No.3 of India Quarterly. July-September, 1959)

CONCLUSION

The History of Tibet took a dramatic turn following its illegal occupation by the Communist China in 1949/1950. The Tibetan people who remain inside Tibet continues to suffer under an alien, communist rule, while those in exile face the challenge of adopting to unfamiliar climate, language barriers, culture shock, and above all, the difficulty of earning a livelihood in their host countries while pursuing their freedom. At the same time the Tibetan government in exile has come a long way in keeping the flame of the Tibetan freedom struggle burning while reconstructing and channeling a confused and overwhelmed Tibetan refugee community into a well established organization under the leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The study presented in the preceding chapters covers the fundamental issue of Tibet, one of its cultural and political survival. The Tibetans continue to hope that the justice of their cause will eventually compel the international community to challenge China's sovereignty over Tibet. The Dalai Lama's peace initiatives have considerably attracted a lot of western moral support. It has thus contributed to setting an example to the promotion of a global political culture of non-violence and dialogue. When the Dalai Lama visited the United States and met the former President Bill Clinton in the late 1990's the latter had called on the Communist leadership in Beijing to open talks with the

Dalai Lama. It came to be viewed as a triumph of the Dalai Lama's Religious Diplomacy.¹

The least Tibetans seek is internal self-determination in the sense of respect for human rights and autonomy or self-government. In fact, under the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1959, certain degree of autonomy was promised to Tibet but China has not honoured this promise. It must be noted that under that agreement China gave a number of undertakings, viz., promises to maintain the existing states and functions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of religion and the monasteries, and to refrain from compulsion in the matter of reforms in Tibet. But instead of fulfilling these and other obligations, China has unleashed the policy of genocide, oppression, terror and demographic aggression against Tibetans resulting in the exodus of a large member of Tibetans as refugees.

Tibetans have been subjected to a consistent pattern of serious violation of universally recognized human rights. Widespread abuses against individual Tibetans and against the Tibetan people, their culture and religions have been disseminated as reported by various human rights organizations and a number of governmental delegations, which visited Tibet. Pressuring the Chinese on this ground, many governments, parliaments, non-governmental organizations, Tibetan support group and individuals, urge the Chinese to resolve the question of Tibet through peaceful negotiations. The death of over 1.2 million Tibetans (one-sixth of the population) between 1951 and 1979 and the cultural

¹ Singh Swaran, "Dalai Lama's Religious Diplomacy", Strategic Analysis, Vol.XX/ June 1997.

genocide have made the international community seriously concerned about the very survival of the Tibetans people and disappearance of their distinct religious, cultural and national identity. Thus, in all the three resolution which the UN General Assembly has passed on Tibet, the Assembly expressed grave concern at the continued violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet and the continued suppression of their distinctive cultural and religious life, and declared its conviction that such violations embitter relations between peoples. These resolutions called for respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Tibetans, including their right for self-determination.

In recent years the human rights situation of the Tibetans have worsened further. Despite an official announcement by the Chinese authorities of the lifting of martial law on May 1, 1990, Tibet remain in a state of *de facto* martial law. The unending cycle of repression, torture, intimidation and summary execution continues.

The Tibetan people are entitled the right to self-determination. But China denies both the entitlement to and claims for self-determination by the people of Tibet by asserting historical claims to the territory, which is being vehemently opposed by the Tibetan people and the Tibetan government (in exile). Thus, there is a dispute about the sovereignty of China over Tibet for the settlement of which China should engaged in true negotiations with the Tibetan Government in Exile. It needs to be noted that India has always held a special position vis-à-vis Tibet. In the heydays of the Hindi-Chini Bhai-

Bhai in the fifties, Jawaharlal Nehru, with the consent of the Chinese government, if not at it's prodding, tried his hand in bringing about reconciliation. Although this did not last, the point to note is that the Chinese Government at that time not only did not object to Nehru's good offices, but also actually appreciated it. India today could extend positive diplomacy by creating an atmosphere for both Beijing and Dharmasala to negotiate. The Dalai Lama had also said that, "I believe India can and should play a constructive and influential role in resolving the Tibetan problem peacefully, 'My Middle-path Approach' is in line with the basic Indian policy vis-à-vis Tibet and China".²

In June 25, 2003 India made a diplomatic stunt by changing its position on Tibet. It recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and also reiterates that it would not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.³ Further the Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha also stated that there would be no change in the freedoms accorded to the Dalai Lama by India. This has created another setback for the Tibetan who have look up on the Indian government to facilitate peaceful negotiations. Nevertheless, India's role in bringing about a solution to the time worn Tibetan issue remains all the more imperative. And with the growing stature of the Indian state internationally, it should evolve strategies and policies towards this vexed issue rather than merely leaving aside as other people's affair.

² His Holiness Dalai Lama's Statement on 10th March 1998, the 39th Anniversary of Tibet National Uprising, TR, April 1998.[p.21].

³ Hindustan Times, June 25, 2003.

In sum, under the International Law, Tibetans are a people under alien subjugation entitled to the right of self-determination. The Tibetan people have not yet exercised this right which requires a free atmosphere in order to be able to genuinely express their will. And India as one of the dominant power in the sub-continent has a major role towards a peaceful solution of the Tibetan issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources:

Ashutosh Thakur, "Tibetans in Exile 1959-1961, The Information, Office of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1981.

Ashutosh Thakur, "Right Angle of India-Tibet- China Triangle", (ed.) India Tibet Friendship Society Publications, JNU, New Delhi, 1995.

"Charter of the Tibetan's-in-Exile", Documentation Center Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR, Dharamsala) 1999.

Dalai Lama: "My Land and My People", Potala Publication, New York 1962.

Dalai Lama: "Freedom in Exile", (Official Report from 1959-1969), 1969 Publications.

Document on "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question", Foreign Language Press, Peking 1960.

Eva Herzer, "Option for Tibet's future Political Status-Self Governance through an Autonomous Arrangement", by Tibet Justice Center, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center, New Delhi, 2002.

"Height of Darkness: Chinese Colonialism on the World's Roof- Tibet Response to Beijing's White Paper on 8 November 2001"(Dharamsala) 10 December 2001.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama, collected statement, interviews, and articles, The Information Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1982.

"Indian Public on Tibet." Tibetan Youth Congress (November 27-29) Dharamsala, India, 1997.

International Commission Jurists, Tibet and Chinese People's Republic for the period 1911-1950 (Geneva, 1960).

International Commission Jurists, The Question of Tibet and The Rule of law-A Preliminary Report. (Geneva, 1959).

International Commission Jurists, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 1996.

L.L Mehrotra, "India's Tibet Policy", (TPPRC, New Delhi) 2000.

Robert Mc Corquodale and Nicholas Orasz, "Tibet: The Position in International Law-Report of the Conferences of International Lawyers on Issues Relating to Self-determination and Independence for Tibet, (6-10 January) (ed) London: Hansjor Mayer, 1993.

Samdhong Rinpoche, "Tibet: A Future Vision", TPPRC, New Delhi, 1996.

Shiromany A.A, "The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama", Tibetan and Policy research Center, New Delhi, 1998.

Sino-Indian Dispute over Indo-Tibet Border, DIIR, Dharamsala, 1997.

The Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet, Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi, 1988.

The Encyclopedia of Religion, 1999.

Tibet's Parliament in Exile, TPPRC, New Delhi, 1999.

Tibetans in Exile 1959-1980, The Information Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1981.

Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, ICJ, Geneva, 1997.

"Tibet: The Facts-A Report prepared by the Scientific Buddhist Association for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights", Tibetan Young Buddhist Association , Dharamsala, 1990.

"Tibet and Chinese People's Report: A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet", New Delhi 1966.

"Tibetan People's Right of Self-Determination of the Tibetan People: Legitimacy of Tibet's Case", 1994/1996, (TPPRC: New Delhi) 2000.

"Tibetan Autonomy and Self Government: Myth and Reality", Report of the Proceedings of the Workshop held in November 1999, (TPPRC, Delhi) 2000.

"Tibet-Proving Truth from Facts", (DIIR Publication) March 1994.

"The International Position of Tibet", Government of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1959.

Tenzin P. Atisha, "A Survey of Tibetan History", The Information Office Central Tibetan Secretariat, Gangchen Kyishong, Dharamsala 1984.

Tibet in the United Nation's, 1950-1961) 9 September 1959, in Bureau of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Dharamasala, 1961.

"Tibetan life in Exile- An Information Brochure." The Council of Home Affairs for His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1987.

"The Panchen Lama Lineage- How Reincarnation is being reinvented as a political Tool." DIIR, Dharamsala, 1996.

"The Legal Status of Tibet." Three Studies by leading Jurists. Office Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, 1989.

United States Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Washington DC, in *Government Resolutions and International Documents on Tibet*, 2nd Edition. (Dharamsala: Office of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat), December 1989.

Secondary Sources

Alam Jayanthi, *Tibetan Society in Exile*, Raj Publications, New Delhi, 2000.

Alan P. Liu, *A Political and Cultural Solution in Mass Politics in the People's Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1966.

Andrugtsang, *Flight as the Cuckoo's Behest*, Paljor Publications, New Delhi, 1997.

Amar Jasbir Singh in "Tibet Problem and China's Foreign Relations" in Surjit Mansingh (ed.) *Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspectives*, Radiant Publication, New Delhi, 1998.

A. Tom Grundfeld, *China's Tibet*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987.

A. Tom Grundfeld, *The making of Modern Tibet*, Oxford University Press, Bombay 1988.

Benina Berger Gould, Marguerite R. Waller and Jennifer Eyunga, (ed.), *Frontline Feminism – Women, War and Resistance*, Garland Publication, New York, 2000.

Bhim Sandhu, *Unresolved Conflict: China and India*, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1994.

Bhutiya Diki Kalzang, *Tibet issue at the UN: A case study in Informal Diplomacy (1950-1965)*, JNU Ph.D thesis, New Delhi, 2000.

Bina Roy Burman, *Religion and Politics in Tibet*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979.

Cao Changching and James D.Seymour, (ed.) *Tibet through Dissident Chinese Eyes-Essays on Self-Determination*, USA, 1998.

Charles Bell, *Tibet, Past and Present*, Oxford University Press, 1968.

Chopra P.N, *The Ocean of Wisdom-The Life of Dalai Lama XIV*, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1986.

Dawa Norbu, *China's Tibet Policy*, Curzon, Britain, 2001.

Dawa Norbu, "India and Tibet", in Lalit Mansingh (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for the 21st Century*, Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1998.

Dawa Norbu, *Tibet: The Road Ahead*, Harper Collins Publishers, New Delhi, 1997.

Donnet, Peire-Antoine, *Tibet: Survival in Question*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994.

Ekka, Kanti Kumari, *Tibet as a factor in India-China Relations 1976-1993*, JNU (Dissertation) New Delhi, 1984.

Franz Micheal, *Rule by Incarnation-Tibetan Buddhism and its Role in Society and State*, Westview Press, USA, 1982.

Girija Saklani, *The Uprooted Tibetans in India*, Delhi, 1984.

Graver W. John, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Simon and Schuster Co. USA, 1993.

Heyu, *Tibet: A General Survey*, New World Press, Beijing, 1988.

H.E. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, Shambhala Boulder, London, 1984.

Jayaswal, Rajeev, *Tibetan Refugees in India*, JNU (Dissertation) New Delhi, 1997.

Jayaprakash Narayan, *What Needs to be Done for Tibet?* ICWA, New Delhi, December 1981 (Reprint from Vol. XV, No.3 of India Quarterly, July-September, 1959).

Jetley, Nancy, *India-China Relations: 1947-1977; A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, Radiant Press, New Delhi, 1979.

John F. Avedon, *In Exile From the Land of Snows*, Wisdoms Publications, London, 1985.

Kadian Rajesh, *Tibet, India and China – Critical Chaos, Uncertain Future*, New Delhi, 1999.

Kayathwal kumar Mukesh (ed.), "South Asia and Emerging Trends in International Relations" in M.G.Chitakara, *China's Politics Towards Tibet*, Pointer Publishers, Jaipur, 1999.

Kumar, Anand (ed.), *Tibet – A Source Book*, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1995.

Lee Feigon, *Demystifying Tibet-Unlocking the secrets of the Land of Snows*, Profile Books, London, 1999.

L.F.Oppenheim, *Governments and Authorities in Exile*, AJIL, 1942.

L.Oppenheim (ed.), *International Law*, H.Lauter Pacht, London, 1955.

Malik Inder, *Dalai Lama of Tibet- Succession of Births*, Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984.

M.M.Whitman(ed.), *Digest of International Law*" Vol.5, Washington, 1965.

Melvyen C.Goldstein, *History of Modern Tibet 1913-1931*, University of California Press, Berkely, 1989.

Michael C. Van Praag, *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*, Westview Press, USA, 1987.

Petra K. Kelly, Gert Bastian, and Pat Aiello (ed.), *The Anguish of Tibet*, Paralax Press, USA, 1991.

Raja Huthersing, (ed), *Tibet Fights for Freedom*, Bombay, 1960.

Ram Rahul, *Central Asia-A Historical Survey*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1996.

Ram Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, Vikas Publication, New Delhi, 1969.

R.K Jain, *China-South Asia Relations, 1947-1980*, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1981.

Ronald D. Schwertz, *Circle of Protest-Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising*, Motilal Banerasidas Publishers, Delhi, 1996.

Shen T. and Lin S., *Tibet and Tibetans*, New York, 1973.

Sharma Swaran Lata, *Tibet: Self Determination Among Nations*, Criterion Publications, New Delhi, 1988.

Smith, Warren.W, *Tibetan Nation; A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*, Westview Press, USA, 1996.

S.Chandrashekar, *Red China-An Asia View*, Frederick A. Praeger Publication, New York, 1962.

S. Chandrashekar, *Communist China Today*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962.

Shakya Tsering, *The Dragon in the Land of the Snows-A History of Modern Tibet since 1947*, Pimelico, London, 1999.

Sharma Lata Swarn, *Tibet: Self-Determination in Politics Among Nations*, Criterion Publications, New Delhi, 1988.

Subramaniam Swamy, *India's China Perspective*, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 2001.

Tsepon W.D. Shakapbpa, *Tibet-A Political History*, Potola Publications, New York, 1984.

Wang Furen and Suo Wenquing, *Highlights of Tibetan History*, China Studies Series, New World Press, Beijing, 1984.

Wang Jaiwei and Nyuoma Gyaincain, *The Historical Status of China's Tibet*, China Intercontinental Press, Beijing, 1998.

Wolf Gang Von Erffa, *Uncompromising Tibet-Tradition-religion-Politics*, Paljor Publications, New Delhi, 1996.

Zhong Zangwen, *China's Tibet*, China Intercontinental Press, Beijing, 1995.

Journals:

Amar, Jasbir Singh, "How the Tibetan Problem Influences the China's Foreign Relations". *China Report*, Vol. 28 No. 3, New Delhi 1992.

Dawa, Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations". *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII. No. 11 November 1997.

Dawa, Norbu, "Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region". Strategic Analyses Vol.XX, No. 4, July 1998.

Dawa, Norbu, "China's Dialogue with the Dalai Lama 1979-1990; Pre-negotiations Stage Order or Dead End?". Strategic Analysis February 1992.

Dawa, Norbu, "The Future of Taiwan and the Tibetan Model (1951-1958) :Political Analogy and Policy Implications", China report, Vol.23, No.1(January-March) 1987.

F. Michael, "Survival of a culture: Tibetan Refugees in India", Asian Survey 25, No.7, July 1985.

Frank Ching, "Hong Kong Solution for Tibet?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.161, No.31, July 30, 1998.

Karmel M. Solomon, "Ethnic Tensions and the Struggle for Order; China's Policies on Tibet". Pacific Affairs Vol. 68, No. 4. Winter 1995-1996.

Kabir Mansingh, Heimsath, "The Great Game – Roads to Lhasa". Himal 15/9 September 2002.

Melvyn C. Goldstein, "The Dalai Lama's Dilemma", Foreign Affairs, Vol.77. No.1, 1998.

Singh, Swaran, "Tibet Factor in the Evolution of Sino-Indian Strategic ties". Journal of Peace Studies. Vol. 8, Issue 1, Jan.-Feb. 2001.

Singh, Swaran, "Dalai Lama's Religious Diplomacy". Strategic Analysis, Vol.20, June 1997.

Singh, Swaran, "Dalai Lama's Washington Visit; Tibet Factor Today". Mainstream 33 (19) April 1997.

Stokenp P., "Tibet and the Institution of Dalai Lama". Strategic Analysis. August 1999.

Articles:

"A call to reopen the 17-Point Agreement", TR, December 2001[pp.20-21].

"Affluent China may resolve Tibet Issue", TR, August 1999.

"A pilgrimage diplomacy in offing", Tibetan Review (TR), November, 1998, [p.15-16].

"Assistance movements to follow June 2003 deadline", TR, January, 2003.

“China ready to talk again? TR, August 1999.

“China wants to decide next Dalai Lama”, TR, September 2001[p.4].

“Criticism against the Dalai Lama”, TR, December 2002.

“Dalai Lama’s envoy visits Beijing and Lhasa”, TR, October 2002, [pp.16-18].

“Dalai Lama wants elected successor”, TR, March 2001 [p.9].

“Dalai Lama’s Envoy visit Beijing and Lhasa”, TR, October 2002.

“Dalai Lama in US Tibet festival meets President Clinton”, TR, July 2000, [pp.10-11].

“Dalai Lama Kept out of UN Spiritual Summit”, TR, August 2000, [p.8].

“Dalai Lama cautious in new China contact”, TR, January 2001, [pp.7-8].

Dryer Teufel June, “Unrest in Tibet”, Current History, September 1989.

“Exile Tibetans elect head-of government”, TR, September 2001,[pp.12-13].

“Hardliners thwart call for dialogue with Dalai Lama”, TR, April 1999.

“Karmapa permitted to stay in India”, TR, March 2001, [p.8].

“New Exile Tibetan government takes charge”, TR, October 2001, [p.10].

“Resistance Movements to follow June 2003 deadline”, TR, January, 2003.

“Sino-Tibetan dialogue: A game of hope and suspicions”, TR, December 2002.

Sparham Ven Gareth, “Why Beijing does not talk with the Dalai Lama”, TR, (32) December 1997.

“Spectre of dialogue on Tibet on settles China”, TR, June 1998[p.27].

“Tibet’s plight –An Indian Empathy and Appeal”, TR, December 2002.

“The Party and Tibet”, TR, December 2002.

NEWSPAPERS:

“A Tryst with Freedom”, Priya Pathak, The Times of India, New Delhi, November 2002.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s statement on 10th March 1998, the 39th Anniversary of Tibet Uprising, TR, April 1998. [p.21].

“I would like to be the last Dalai Lama”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 7 April, 2003.

“Saving Tibet”, A.G. Noorani, The Statesman, New Delhi, April, 1994.

Sharan Shanker, “India’s Tibet-China Policy”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 16 May, 1996.

Shastri Tsewang Pema, “what Tibet’s expect from Exile leadership?” TR, March 2003. [p.10].

Swami Subramaniam, “Sino-Indian Relation through the Tibet Prism”. Hindu, 15th September 2000.

Sweeny, “Keeping the gentle faith”, Sheffield Morning Telegraph, 23 June 1983.

Tibet Information Network, 16th May 1992.

Tibet Watch Press, International Campaign for Tibet, April 1992.

“Tibet and Indian Diplomacy”, Economic Times, New Delhi, 1 December 1991.

“Tibet holds the key to Beijing”, M.L.Sondhi, Telegraph, Calcutta, 2 January 1991.

“US faces another challenge as the Dalai Lama begins Visit”, Sridhar Krishnaswami, Hindu, 7 May 2002.

“What is behind the Dalai Lama’s plan”, Beijing Review, 19 February, 1990.

WEBSITES:

www.tibetnet.com

www.sino-indianrelations.com

www.phayul.com

www.tibetlink.com

www.tyc.com

www.tinsinfo.com

www.tchrd.org

