# INDIA'S CRISIS DECISION MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY MOBILISATION IN 2002

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## MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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## CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, **"INDIA'S CRISIS DECISION MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY MOBILISATION IN 2002"** submitted by **SHIVSHANKAR MURMU**, in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, of this university is his original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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*Dedicated*
*To*
*My Family*

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# PREFACE

The present study attempts at analyzing India's crisis decision-making on military mobilization in 2002. The nature of the policy process and institutions and agencies involved mainly in security decision-making are the main focus of the study. Besides the military mobilization in 2002 three other crises have been dealt. This would help in drawing important conclusion regarding how our security decision-making has evolved with time and also whether they are well equipped to deal with changing strategic environment and security challenges.

The available literature on security decision-making has exclusively focused on issues like, the need for creation of specialized institution to assess the security threat and policy formulation; and on higher direction of defence. However, very few studies are found which had made critical analysis of various crises, relating it with nature of policy processes and institution involved for the purpose. At best few paragraphs and a few chapters have been devoted to it. All these no doubt were a big constraint for undertaking this study in a short period of available time, but it also was a challenge. Furthermore, this study on military mobilization in 2002 was started during the course of the present crisis, as such the analysis was made on the basis of content

analysis of periodicals, journals and newspaper clippings. The nature and objectives of India's decision on mobilization as well demobilization has been variedly analysed by the strategic analysts and scholars. Moreover, classified nature of governmental security decision-making results in lack of information at the present moment. For this reason care was taken to objectively study the crisis and not to succumb to the point of view of either section. Finally, no doubt with time better perspectives on the crisis would emerge with more publication of literature and declassification of governmental documents. However, the present study is an honest attempt at analyzing the event as was comprehended objectively at this moment.

The main objectives of the study are:
1. To analyse the various crisis decisions in India in a historical perspective

2. To analyse the role of various institutions and agencies in crisis decision- making in India.

3. To examine how India arrived at the decision to military mobilization in 2002 and to assess how far the decision- making process is decentralized.

4. To analyse the outcome of the crisis and lesson learned by India.

The present study is divided into five chapters.

The first chapter is theoretical in nature, beginning with the conceptual definition of crisis and nature of foreign policy processes in a crisis situation. This chapter has also included various concepts such as crisis bargaining, crisis management etc.

The second chapter deals with a historical account of the various crisis decision- making in India, looking at both the policy processes and the institutions and agencies involved. The crises dealt in this chapter include the Siachen conflict of 1984, the Brasstacks operation of 1986-87 and the Kargil conflict of 1999. The role of intelligence, parliament, political parties, public opinion and civil-military relations etc., in the Process of crisis decision-making have also been dealt with.

The third chapter focuses on the nature and objectives of India's military mobilization in 2002 from the perspective of crisis decision-making. It has also dealt with post September 11 strategic environment, and India's military strategy like counter insurgency doctrine, Limited war, hot pursuit, surgical strike etc. Besides, response of Pakistan has also been included.

The fourth chapter analyses the internal and external factors that led to the decision of demobilization. Internal factors include economic and military factors. The external factors include the role of the United States and international community's role on de-escalating the crisis.

The final chapter is in the form of conclusion. It presents the outcome of the crisis and the implication it will have on the

government's future political and military strategy as well as the policy towards Pakistan.

The study has adopted analytical case study method. The sources for the study are both primary and secondary. The primary sources include government documents and the speeches of different political leaders. The secondary sources include books and articles published in different journals. A content analysis of newspaper clipping and periodical has also been used.

# CHAPTER – 1

# CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Security of a state is designed by the policy makers. Security decisions are arrived at through intense deliberations within various institutions set up for the purpose. Not only the gains to be accrued but also any negative effect that may follow from a decisions are weighed. However, in a crisis situation, decision-making process becomes very difficult due to various constraints the decision-makers face.

Crisis decisions, which are taken in response to a "high threat to values of a nation-state, either immediate or long range and there exist likelihood of conflict breaking out with a finite time to respond to the situations".[1] They are arrived at in a way not normally observed in the policy processes of the state. Crisis alters not only the process-oriented variables such as structure of the decision-making unit, the number of actors involved but alsothe output-oriented variables like crisis management techniques and levels and use of violence.

When an attempt is made to understand crisis decisionmaking, we need to bear in mind the complexities involved in the whole scheme of things. The fate of a nation involved in a crisis is decided by the top leadership. As such,

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[1] M. Brecher, "State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol.23, No.3, September1979, pp.447.

issues which are debated and deliberated upon pertain not only to the problems faced by the decision-makers and the nature of policy process in a crisis situation but also the consequences it will have on the international system in general. The deadly nature of modern warfare with nuclear dimension to it has led us to focus on crisis bargaining and crisis management also. They are considered to be pivotal to prevent crisis escalation and crisis management.

The theoretical perspective on crisis decision-making seeks to bring out all these aspects so that not only the nature of policy processes can be understood in a crisis situation but also views on required variables for sound decision-making can be identified. Various dimensions of crisis are being dealt with in the beginning as a logical starting point to understand various dimensions of crisis decision-making.

**CRISIS:**

Crisis is a universal term for disruption and disorder in the global arena- a disruptive interaction between two or more states in severe conflict marked by violence[2]. The term crisis comes from a Greek word 'Krinein', meaning 'separate'.[3] It denotes "a medical analogy of a 'turning point', a decisive moment in the patient's illness when he or she would irredeemably take a turn

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[2] Michael Brecher, *Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993) pp.2-6.

[3] Charles F Hermann, *Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Research* (Ohio: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc, 1969), p.21.

for the better or for the worse within a relatively short period of time"[4]. For

understanding international politics, the term has been defined in varied ways

and there has not been any agreed definition.

This problem arises from the fact that crisis is a multifaceted

phenomenon and the available literature reveals a remarkable diversity of

interpretations, which have led to some ambiguity. Further, as McClelland,

stated, the difficulty of defining crisis lies in the fact that:

> Not only there has been heavy popular usage of the word
> in ordinary discourse but also there are indications that
> historical change has brought about an expansion of
> variety of situations that are readily called by the crisis
> name.[5]

According to the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, "crises

are either extraordinarily precise and specific and hence not widely applicable to

a variety of situations, organizations, and subjects, or they are so restricted in

meaning that in this it is difficult to distinguish crisis from non crisis"[6]. Therefore,

it is apparent that, "crisis as a phenomenon is too complex to lend itself to easy,

simple, and neat taxonomical categorization and also similar crisis assumes

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[4] Jonathan M. Roberts, *Decision-Making during International Crisis* (New York:  St. Martins Press, 1988), p.9.

[5] McClelland, "Crisis and Threat in International Setting: Some Relational Concepts", quoted in Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior- A Preliminary Report", *International Studies Quarterly*, March 1997, p.40.

[6] James A Robinson, "Crisis", *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, (New York: Mc Millan and Free Press, 1968), p.510.

different forms at different levels of abstraction and analysis"[7]. What has been observed therefore is that it has been defined in a way suitable to ones professed methodological orientation.

Crisis has generally been studied from the perspective of systemic and decision-making approaches. In the systemic approach, the focus is on interaction between the states. According to Roberts, the systemic approach of crisis is macro analysis as it gives a global view of the state interaction and describe how a crisis, taking place between two or more states within a given international system, fits into that system and is affected by it[8] The essential elements of systemic approach are also found in the definition of Young who said that:

> An international crisis is a set of rapidly unfolding of events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general international system or any of its subsystems substantially above 'normal' (i.e. average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system[9]

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[7] Imtiaz H. Bokhari, *Management of Third World Crises in Adverse Partnership- Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.7.

[8] Roberts, n.4, p.14.

[9] Cited in James N. Rosenau (ed) *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New Jersey: Free Press, 1969) p.412.

Similarly, Hermann has also asserted that "crisis is a situation creating an abrupt or sudden change in one or more of the basic systemic variables"[10]. The notion of deliberate challenge and a considered response is also seen in the systemic approach to crisis. Alastair Buchan has defined crisis from this perspective when he stated that "the crisis is a period in a conflict between two or more states when one side has challenged the other on a defined or definable issue and a decision must be reached on the reaction to the challenge"[11].

From various definitions of crisis given from the perspective of systemic approach,[12] it can be seen that assumption of structure and processes maintaining an international system are subject to sudden stress as a result of crisis. Also associated with this is the assumption that crisis is related to such thing as conflict and change. It has been taken to be a boundary or a turning point as the Cuban Missile Crisis led to détente[13] However, the above

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[10] Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable", in Rosenau (ed.), Ibid., p.411.

[11] Cited in Bokhari, n.7, p.6.

[12] Other useful definition from systemic perspective are given by Snyder and Diesing who have stated that: 'an international crisis is a sequence of interaction between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war'. They have asserted that 'since war is always possible, the implicit or explicit threat of war is the ultimate form of political pressure and the ultimate means to security and other values'. Glenn H Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nation-Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp.4-6.

[13] Hermann, n.3, p.21.

assumption has been questioned on the ground that every crisis does not necessarily lead to change or any turning point.

Moreover, it is argued that the system level definition of crisis "are not linked effectively to the main body of the systems and subsystems literature; i.e., they do not integrate all the key concepts - change in interaction, type of structure, degree of disequilibrium and instability; also system-level definition of crisis better serve descriptive than analytical purpose"[14]. Furthermore, the other problem with the systemic approach lays in the fact that crisis being a phenomenon, which is subjective and depends on the perception of the decision-maker, perception of crisis is more important. It is possible for a systemic crisis to be occurring without the decision-makers perceiving it as such and vice versa.[15]

The decision-making approach to crisis is from a single state perspective. A crisis occurs only when the decision-makers perceive it to be so. In this approach the concentration is on the intra-state units i.e. perceptions, actions and reaction by the participants.[16] The important features have been that the authoritative decision-makers have to maneuver not only with respect to the country in conflict but also with the various constituents within the state. Snyder

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[14] Michael Brecher and Patrick James, *Crisis and Change in World Politics,* (London: Westview Press, 1986) p.22.

[15] Roberts, n.4, p.19.

[16] Bokhari, n.7, p.4.

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and Diesing have also concurred with this proposition as a useful supplement to their systemic definition of crisis when they stated that "internal value conflict may give rise to an internal struggle between individuals, factions and agencies, each favoring different ways of resolving a conflict along a 'hard-soft' continuum". [17]

From the perspective of decision-making approach, Hermann's definition is widely accepted and provide a logical starting point. He states that:

> a situation is crisis that 1) threatens high priority goals of the decision-making unit, 2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and 3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.... Underlying the proposed definition is the hypothesis that if all three traits are present then the decision process will be substantially different than if only one or two of the characteristics appear. [18]

Also, Holsti has defined crisis on similar line when he considers "crisis as an unanticipated situation of high threat to important values and short decision time"[19]. Along with the above two definitions, perception of a high probability of involvement in military hostilities as an important element of crisis has also been included. [20]

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[17] Snyder and Diesing, n.12, p.9.

[18] Cited in Brecher, n.5, p.42.

[19] Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis Escalation War* (London: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972), p.143.
[20] Brecher, n.2, p.3. and Snyder and Diesing, n.12, p.6.

The element of surprise is " the absence of awareness on the part of policy makers that the situation is likely to occur[21]. This may happen when a government confronted with a crisis is constrained by many complications arising out of bureaucratic procedure or because of neglect of responsibility or else poorly delegated responsibility .It also includes gap in intelligence, which can bring about the unanticipated dimension in a crisis.

The 'surprise' dimension has been questioned on the ground that "surprise cannot be operationalized, as surprise is not measurable from content analysis"[22]. Brecher contend that not much correlation can be established between time and awareness (surprise) dimension. Hermann himself concurred in his later writing that 'surprise' is not a universally present condition of cris.[23]

Threat is always perceived. It is the decision-maker who decides what constitute a crisis. Usually the threat to core values such as "survival of the society and its population, political sovereignty, and territorial independence"[24] are taken to warrant immediate response.

The time factor for responding to a situation has also been given importance in the definition of crisis. It is because of the fact that time constraint

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[21]Hermann, n. 3., p.30.

[22] Cited in Brecher, n.5, p.42.

[23] Cited in Brecher, n.1,p.448.

[24] Brecher, n.1, p.449.

have bearing on the outcome of a crisis, which could be disadvantageous to a state. The notion of time pressure is clearly related to the uncertainty about the adversary or the information gathered. This is because of the fact that no one is sure about adversary's values and intentions and also there is lack of credible information during the crisis situation. Furthermore, "uncertainty also arises from the participant's lack of full control over events, the possibility of things getting out of hand"[25].

The element of short time in crisis has been questioned on the ground that many decision have been delayed tactically as such finite time for response is much more important.

From the analysis of various aspects of crisis, both from the perspectives of systemic and decision-making approach, we can state that it is not easy to define the term international crisis. Therefore, one needs to delineate some of the essential characteristics of crisis that are suitable for the study undertaken.

Beginning with one must say that the definition of crisis should be a combination of both systemic and decision-making approach. In this regard, crisis can be taken as "a situational change characterized by distortion in type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions with high probability of

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[25] Snyder and Diesing, n.12, p.8.

military hostilities and also it is a challenge to the existing structure of the system"[26].

Furthermore, a crisis can be of short duration or of long duration, though necessarily not unending. However, crisis from potracted conflict perspective must also be undertaken. Azar, Jureidini and Mc Laurien have defined protracted conflicts as "hostile interactions, which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity".[27] According to Brecher and James, "protracted conflicts are processes, not discrete events. Within a protracted conflict, there are phases of higher-than-normal tension, often accompanied by violence. The period of high tension generates crises between adversaries in a protracted conflict"[28]. Important characteristics of crisis from the protracted conflict perspective include such thing as occurrence of violence, perceived threat to basic values and greater reliance on violence for crisis management.

Many view that a crisis escalating into war is not to be characterized as crisis. For instance, Snyder and Diesing have defined an international crisis "as a sequence of interaction between the government of two or more sovereign states in severe conflicts, short of actual war, but involving a perception of high

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[26] Brecher and James, n.14, p22.

[27] Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "Patterns of Crisis Management" *journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol.32, No.3, September 1988, p.429.

[28] Brecher, n.2, p.6.

probability of war"[29]. However, the difference between crisis and war is not watertight. Crisis can be conceived within a war and a war within a crisis. This stem from the fact that "perceptions of harm and stress do not require war; nor do they vanish with war. Rather they are exacerbated by war. This in other words implies that crises can erupt, persist and terminate without violence. The occurrence of war, at any point in the evolution of a crisis, intensifies disruptive interaction and perceived harm and stress[30].

Situational variables bringing about a crisis can originate both from internal and external source. As pointed out by Brecher:

> For many Third World states the situational change which triggers an international crisis has often occurred within domestic environment, usually through physical challenges to the regime by strikes, demonstrations, riots, assassination, sabotage, and/or attempted *coup d etat.* Most new states are deeply penetrated political system; and domestic situational changes, some of which derive from foreign sources, may give rise to an image of external threat.[31]

Finally, a crisis can threaten the nature of the relationship within a system or sub system. However, much of the effect also is determined by thy nature of the system or its subsystem namely its susceptibility to any crisis.

So far, we have explained the systemic and the decision-making definitions of crisis and identified some of the important characteristics suitable

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[29] Snyder and Diesing, n.12,p.4.
[30] Brecher, n.2, p.6.
[31] Brecher, n.1, p449.

for the study. It is evident that the main focus of the authors is on military security crises. The key indicators are: threat to basic values and action demonstrating resolve and overt hostility. Crisis is also characterized by threatening statements and mobilization of armed forces. It leads to increase in disruptive interactions between two or more states and also challenges the structure of an international system. It also increases heightened anxieties on the part of decision-makers and induced them to take important and far reaching decisions. The latter aspect is analysed in the section that follows. The main focus will be on the nature of policy processes in a crisis situation and the effect of crisis on institutions.

## CRISIS DECISION- MAKING:

The decision-making can best be understood if the phenomenon is studied from the perspective of normal decision-making processes and the altered procedure and structure are highlighted. The same is sought to be done in this section by taking "perception as the key variable"[32] and identifying the properties of decisional unit. The nature of policy process in different political

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[32] Stanford School, whose *Studies in Conflict and Integration* in the 1960s and 1970s are credited to have pioneered the work on models of crisis decision-making. They employed a mediated stimulus-response model, wit perception as the key variable explaining state behaviour. The Stanford studies emphasized the perception of threat, time pressure, communication, information overload, and the consideration of alternatives. See Brecher, n.2, p .11.

systems in crisis and measures for improving quality of policy process in crisis are also being analysed.

In all types of political systems, the nature of foreign policy process is dependent upon factors such as "the level of political intensity of the foreign policy situation at any point in time; the type of issue area being discussed at that point in policy process; the structure of the political process or type of political regime".[33] Along with this domestic and international constraints also affect decision-making.

"The concept of issue intensity centers primarily on the perceptions of the decision-makers regarding the distribution and magnitude of the costs and benefits accompanying a particular policy problem."[34]

Perception and definition of the situation constitute a very important element of decision-making. As stated by Rosenau:

> It is difficult to account for specific actions and for continuities of policies without trying to discover how their operating environment is perceived by those responsible for choices, how particular situation are structured, what values and norms are applied to certain kinds of problems, what matters are selected for attention, and how their past experience conditions present responses. [35]

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[33] Peter F.Trumbore and Mark A. Boyer, International Crisis Decision-making as a Two-Level Process", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.37, No6, p.682.

[34] Ibid.

[35] James N Rosenau in Charles F Hermann, Charles F Kegley jr and James N Rosenau (ed.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin Inc, 1987) p.4.

Regardless of how additional information may influence the perception, the leader's initial subjective perceptions or definition of the situation shape the discussion, objectives and choice of alternatives.

Definition of international situation is crucial for ariving at a decision. Pruitt defines international situation as "a set of images possessed by an individual, representing his view of what other nations are like, what relevance they have to the goals of his own nation, and what behavior toward them would be appropriate"[36]. The perception of international situation is very important because of the fact that the success of a policy depends upon how one maneuvers with allies for support. Related to the international situation is the societal reference. The importance of internal or societal reference stems from the fact that decision-maker image of the people in and around him and how they relate to his goals and behavior, determines his action. For politicians, this refers to his political standing and public opinion as an addition to national outlook.[37]

Overall, it can be inferred that "a foreign policy crisis arises from the highest-level of political decision-maker's image of the pressure(s) to cope with

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[36] Dean G Pruitt quoted in Robert, n.4, p.125.

[37] Ibid.

externally focused stress. It also marks the beginning of an international crisis".[38]Brecher has formulated a model to illustrate crisis behavior.

**Figure 1 Brecher's Model of Crisis Behavior**

| IMAGE | | BEHAVIOR | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT** | **PERCEPTION OF CRISIS** | **FORMULATION** | **OUTPUT** |
| ● GLOBAL SYSTEM<br>● SUBORDINATE SYSTEM<br>● SUBSYSTEM (OTHER)<br>● BILATERAL RELATIONS | THREAT | | |
| ● MILITARY CAPABILITY<br>● ECONOMIC CAPABILITY<br>● POLITICAL CAPABILITY<br>● INTEREST GROUP<br>● COMPETING ELITES | TIME<br><br>PROBABILITY OF WAR | DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND FLOW | DECISION/CHOICE |

FEEDBACK

SOURCE: Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior: A Preliminary Report", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.21 no.3 March 1977, p.52

Within this framework, the model of crisis behaviour has been specified thus:

> *the independent variable* is perception of crisis, is derived from decision-maker's images of stimuli from the external

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[38] Brecher,n.2, pp.3-4.

and/or internal environment; in operational terms, there are three independent variables-perception of threat, perception of time and perception of probability of war; *the dependent variable* is crisis behaviour; in operational terms, there are two foci of attention- the decision-making process and flow, and choice, that is decision.[39]

There is an interrelation between the three components of crisis.[40] The prior presence of these perceptual attributes- more acute value threat, awareness of time pressure and heightened war likelihood, and at the system level, more intense disruptive interaction between the crisis adversaries leads to escalation of crisis.[41]

In a crisis situation, each action taken will require a separate definition of situation. That is, many situations are simultaneously defined. As such, some crisis should not be taken as a single situation but continuing through time, which requires the policy makers to redefine their image of the situation on the basis of additional information and past experience. This would lessen the unanticipated dimension of a crisis.

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[39] Brecher, n.5, p. 52.

[40] According to Brecher, the interrelations can be established thus, "the more active and stronger the threat and the more central the value(s) threatened, the higher will be the perceived probability that military hostilities will ensue. That in turn, would lead to more intense perception of crisis. Similarly, the more active, the stronger, and the more central (basic) the threatened value(s), the more limited will be the perceived time for response. Moreover, the greater the time pressure, the higher will be the perceived probability of war and the more intense the perception of threat. See Brecher, n.1, p.454.

[41] Brecher, n.2,pp.140-141.

Decision-makers respond to threatening development by adopting one or more coping strategies. They are: information search, consultation process, activation of decisional forum and, finally, formulation of choice or alternatives.[42] Gathering of information and past experience are very important not only for defining a situation but also selecting appropriate course of action. Similarly, in a crisis situation national governments depend heavily on the intelligence network. However, in a crisis "the decision-makers conduct fewer searches for alternative solutions and gather less information necessary to establish the nature of the occasion for decision"[43]. In the absence of these and doubt about the success of an action makes decision-makers to look for support. The support is sought not only from the internal constituency but also from international forces. It can be seen in the increasing rate of communication by the decision-makers with the international actors.[44]

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[42] According to Brecher, first coping step by decision-maker is to seek information about the threatening event(s) or act(s). The probe may be through ordinary or special channels. The information may be received with open mind or through a lens biased by ideology, memories of the past experience or other such factors; and it will be processed by n persons in small, medium, or large groups. The initial acquisition of information leads to a process of consultation. This involves peer members of the high-policy elite, bureaucratic and military subordinates and possibly other such as persons from competing elites and interest groups. Consultation may be frequent or infrequent, ad hoc or institutional in form, within a large or small circle, comprising one or more groups and n persons. Coping also involves activation of a decisional forum which varies in size and structure. See Brecher, n.1, pp.452-457.

[43] Hermann, n.3, p.152.

[44] Hermann cited in Brecher, n.1, p. 476.

The crisis also affects the "properties of the decisional unit"[45]. This is reflected in the fact that crisis decisions are tend to be reached by ad hoc decisional units.[46] The time limitations together with the ability of the high decision-makers to commit the government allow them to ignore usual bureaucratic procedures.[47] Crisis decision-making situations tend to focus on the chief of the government and those of his or her close advisors. Elected officials, interest groups, and the public tend to look to the chief of the government for leadership and will typically back whatever pdicy is chosen at least in the short run.[48] Typically, therefore, it can be observed that "decision-making in a crisis situation is by face-to-face groups. The middle management group in the organization tends to get shunted out of the primary crisis decision-making process, except for a role in the implementing decision made at the higher level".[49]

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[45] Hermann describes it as "class of variables includes structural qualities of the decision unit and the processes it employs in reaching decision. A decision can either be large organization or a single individual. Even when a foreign policy decision involves only a small set of individuals, the almost always are member of the complex bureaucracies". See Hermann, n.3, p.95.

[46] Glenn D Paige, "The Korean Decision", in Rosenau, n.9, p.465.

[47] [12]Charkes F Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable", in ibid p.416.

[48] Trumbore and Boyer, n.33, p.683.

[49] Thomas W Milburn, "The Management of Crisis", in Charles F Hermann(ed) International Crises: Insight from Behavioral Research, (New York: Free Press) p.266.

## Regime Type and Crisis Decision-Making:

Anlysing the regime type and crisis decision-making will help conceptualise the impact of domestic political constraints on policy-making process.[50] It will also facilitate the comparison of policy-making process in different political system.

Unlike authoritarian states, the decision-makers in democratic states are influenced by public opinion. They seek to maintain political legitimacy and avoid political fallout of any bad decision or failed policy. This makes the decision-makers in democratic states to take into account various domestic factors.

Salmore has identified three groups of regime constraints: the ability of the regime to extract resources from society, political constraints and leadership disposition to use resources.[51]Furthermore, "the public must be mobilized not only to accept decision, but to sacrifice enthusiastically in order to give the highest chances of success".[52]

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[50] Robert D. Putnam has analysed how domestic political structure and processes impact external behaviour, which is referred to as 'two-level' game argues, "at the national level, domestic groups pressure the government to adopt policies they favour, while politicians seek power by building coalitions among these constituents. At the international level, governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures while limiting harmful impact of foreign developments. See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organisation, 42*(3) 1988, pp.427.

[51] Quoted by Joe D Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", in Hermann, Kegly Jr and Rosenau (ed.), n.35, p.340.

[52] John A Vasquez, "Foreign Policy, Learning and War", Ibid.,p.367.

However, the centralizing tendency of crisis decision making with less participation from different organizational hierarchy makes it apparent that the nature of policy processes in democratic and totalitarian regimes will be similar but not identical.[53] During a crisis domestic constraints are not absent but are suppressed. As regards the use of violence, democratic regimes in crisis are more constrained by domestic factors than totalitarian regimes.[54]

## Policy Processes and Outcomes:

From various aspects of crisis decision-making discussed so far, some important characteristics can be delineated. They include the following: Institutional inputs are minimal, and centralizing tendency with inadequate search of information are its general characteristics. As such question that arises is: how rightful decisions are taken? The policy makers necessarily engage in careful search for relevant information, critical appraisal of viable alternatives and contingency planning so as to avoid mistakes in making important policy decisions. As such, what has been termed by Jerek, Huth and Janis as "vigilant

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[53] Trumbore and Boyer, n.33, p.684.

[54] Ibid., p.685.

problem solving"[55] is needed. This requires various steps for information search, appraisal and planning.

What follows from this observation and related to it is that for sound decision-making in a crisis situation, institutional inputs cannot be ignored altogether. It is important to ensure institutionalization of decision-making process, better coordination and communication between and within various decision-making centers, bridging the communication gap between the civilian leadership and the military at the crucial times, gathering of reliable intelligence and avoiding misjudgment. These aspects are further elaborated below.

The institutionalization of decisionmaking process would negate the ill-effect of centralizing tendency of decision-making. Though decisions related to military and security issues involve a few actors, one should not overlook the implicit danger. "Enormous power in the hand of narrow circle of decision-makers, a close hold over the intelligence and the weakening of parliamentary or legislative oversights etc. may lead to arbitrary decisions comprising national security and interest, though it may fulfill the political objectives of decision-makers or their adhered values and preferences".[56]

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[55] Gregory M Herek, Irving L Janis and Paul Huth, "Decision Making during International Crisis", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.31, No.2, June 1987, p.204.

[56] Stephen P Cohen, Kanti P Bajpai, P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstack and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, (Delhi: Manohar publisher, 1995) p.96-97.

Incoherence resulting from problems of communication and coordination between and within various decision-making centers affect the policy processes in two ways. One, selection of strategy and implementation of policies and, second, diplomatic maneuver as there should not be discrepancies between the action to be taken and position stated.

Finally, as has been stated earlier perception of the decisionmaker is very crucial for decision-making. The political intensity of a situation is a perceived situation. As such a crisis exists only when a decision-maker perceives it to be so. What follows is that the misperceptions should be minimized. The role of misperceptions in generating tensions, precipitating crisis and causing war has been well established. Therefore, what is needed is that a decision should be arrived at only when the situation is objectively ascertained. Reliable intelligence should be gathered and reliance only on single source of intelligence should be avoided. The leaders should be open to various viewpoints. The decision should not be guided by their ideological inclination or their whims and fancies.

**CRISIS BARGAINING**

Bargaining in international crisis involves "interactions between states and content of these interactions consists largely of the interplay of influences in the prosecution and resolution of conflict and the establishment of mutually

beneficial collaborative arrangement".[57] Crisis bargaining is necessarily marked by interactions between the adversaries in situations of high conflict and adoption of appropriate strategies that would lead to successful resolution of the crisis.

Leng and Wheeler further contend that effective influence strategy is the one that avoids diplomatic defeat at war; any dispute escalating into war represents diplomatic failure for both sides.[58]

In the light of the above observation, processes of crisis bargaining and identification of effective bargaining strategy are the concern of this section. According to Lockhart, bargaining in international crisis is a three-pronged processes: information interpretation, analyzing the constraints and search for a satisfactory strategy. It implies that bargaining should be in a wider context in which the decision-makers have not only to ascertain the nature of a crisis but also assess it in terms of interest threatened or opportunities afforded so that effective strategy can be formulated to safeguard national interest.[59]

The important features of crisis bargaining is that it is always redistributive in nature in that the issues are already in hand of a party and the other party tries to change the status quo. Much of bargaining activity is coercive

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[57] Snyder and Diesing, n.12, p.22.

[58] Russell J. Leng and Hugh G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success, and War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.23, No.4, December 1979, p.656.

[59] Charles Lockhart, *Bargaining in International Conflicts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) pp.86-87.

in nature and the stakes involved in the conflict are valued very high by the parties. As such there is a likelihood of war breaking out. Apart from this the involved actors feel that they have limited control over the event.[60]

Adopting an appropriate strategy to safeguard and further one's national interest in a crisis situation is easier said than done. The various moves the state makes during the course of crisis for a better bargaining strength can jeopardize its interest. Therefore, the issue that needs to be pondered over is the nature of political choice and settlement and a dilemma decision makers face, namely the kind of strategies a state can adopt and the condition in which they are productive and counter productive. This aspect is to be brought out by analyzing various dimensions of crisis bargaining namely accommodative, persuasive and coercive.[61] The emphasis has been given on the coercive aspects of bargaining, as it remains the primary form of state interactions in a crisis situation.

The accommodative dimension involves convergence of the bargaining positions of the parties towards a settlement. Any settlement neessarily involves

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[60] Snyder and Diesing, n.12, pp.22-24.

[61] Leng and wheeler have given four-influence strategies.1) Bullying: is based on negative inducements. Any response short of outright compliance is met with severe threat or punishment on each successive attempt2) Reciprocating or Firm-but-Fair approach: actor employing this strategy begins with cooperative move and thereafter simply responds in kind to the types of inducements responses employed by other.3) Appeasing: it is much discredited at present. It may be successful only with an significantly weaker opponents who would not be likely to interpret concession as a sign of weakness. and 4)Trial and Error: in which the actor simply adjusts his choice of inducements based on the target response to the previous influence attempt. See Leng and Wheeler, n.58, pp.657-663.

some form of accommodation because using coercion for the purpose of resolving a conflict is meaningless unless it elicits accommodation.

However, adaptive actions take place when actors feel that while the environment may be predictable, in the short run, it is inalterable or the cost of altering is too high. So they withdraw gracefully from the extended position. Adaptive activity is also employed for the purpose of buying time; it involves a change in aspiration. It is also considered important because of the fact that no nation can challenge all other in all fronts. They invariably are constrained by the resources at their disposal.[62]

Persuasion is akin to coercion. However, it does not involve threats to harm the other party if he does not concede. Instead, attempt is made to change the adversary's estimate of the consequences of possible outcomes, or the values he places on the consequences.

Coercive bargaining is a bilateral process, asserting firmness, making threats and warning and exerting pressure in various ways to influence the other party to accepts one's will. In crisis situation, issuance of threat includes war.[63]

The basic tools of coercion (commitments and threats) are used by most nations at one time or another. Commitments involve an irrevocable choice

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[62] Lockhart, n.59, p.109-110.

[63] Snyder and Diesing, n.12, p.195.

to act in a particular fashion. This choice to act is clear to the committed actor, and his problem lies in communicating his choice credibly to the adversary. Threats are efforts to induce some changes in the adversaries' attitude and/or actions through the application or contingent application of punishment. Conceptually, these actions are distinct, but distinctions between them are blurred in actual practice.[64]

The strategy of coercive diplomacy is an aspect of coercive bargaining and negotiations. It has elicited lots of attention in international politics.

The use of force is concerned with the exploitation of the potential use of force, not the efficient use of force.[65] The strategy of coercive diplomacy, in essence, persuades an opponent to call off or undo an encroachment rather than to bludgeon him into stopping. It calls for use of just enough force to demonstrate resolution of the crisis to protect one's interests and to emphasize the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary.[66]

From the above analysis it can be seen that threat *per se* does not result in the achievement of the stated objectives. The bluff has the potential of causing more

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[64]Lockhart, n.59, p-115.

[65] Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influences* (London: Yale University Press, 1966) pp.2-3.

[66] Alexander George and Gordon A. Craig, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1983), p.189.

harm to a country's national interest. Coercive acts, which are perceived by the target to be "capricious, whimsical, vicarious, or vindictive" are particularly dangerous.[67]

The credibility of a threat supplemented with resolves and the availability of resources to carry out one's desired course of action will determine the bargaining strength of a party. This will ensure the successful resolution of conflict in favour of one party.

## CRISIS MANAGEMENT:

Crisis management is an activity that decision-makers are engaged in since the emergence of organized state conflicts. In recent years, however, it has become a top priority among scholars and researchers mainly because of two reasons. The first one is the devastating nature of war contributed primarily by nuclear weapons. The second factor is the increasing recognition that normal organizational and operational processes come under severe stress during international crises.[68]

This implies that each crisis has potential for dangerous consequence if it is not handled carefully. However, it is also a fact that the decision-makers

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[67] Lockhart, n.59, p.119.

[68] C.Raja Mohan, Crisis Management and Confidence Building, in Sumit Ganguly and Ted Greenwood(ed), *Mending Fences: Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in South Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.183.

always strive for achieving their national interest or objectives in a conflict. Therefore, the desire to win a conflict and simultaneously to avoid war, create dilemma for the state. This dilemma manifest in the fact that, for achieving important objectives, statesmen are invariably willing to take considerable risk of war and, at the same time, striving to keep the risk of war within tolerable limits.[69] The reconciliation of these two aspects is the essence of crisis management.

There exist two schools of thought on crisis management. The first school of thought comprises those who equate crisis management simply with the peaceful resolution of confrontation. Success is wholly dependent upon the avoidance of war. The second school of thought perceives crisis management in terms of winning in a confrontation. The crisis is taken as a means of furthering national interests at the cost of the adversary.[70] Crisis management technique, in fact, is the combination of two schools of thought. The purpose of crisis management is to reconcile both the conflicting issues and the common interests of both parties. There is, thus, a mixture of coercion in order to advance one's interests, and accommodation in order to avoid disaster. This results in a trade-off between the two interests.[71]

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[69] Roberts, n.4, pp.96-97.
[70] Bokhari, n.7'pp.25-27.

[71] Roberts, n.4, p.98.

Decision-makers face a number of tasks and challenges during crisis management. These challenges arise from a number of factors which include the problems of information processing and decision-making in a crisis, coordinating diplomatic and military moves, communicating with an opponent during crisis and addressing special requirement of command and control. These aspects have increasingly been studied for facilitating effective crisis management. Nevertheless, skepticism is raised regarding the efficacies of any technique for success in crisis management. It has been argued that any rigid formula is doomed to fail. The factors that shape the management process are dynamic in nature. Any attempt to develop general technique of crisis management may not be applicable in practice as nature of the crisis differs from one another. Therefore, it is important that one should act according to the kind of crisis faced. As such element of flexibility should always be there. Nevertheless, scholars have identified many requirements of crisis management. For instance Alexander George has enumerated following conditions for crisis management:

1) Maintaining top-level civilian control of military options;
2) creating pauses in tempo of military actions;
3) coordination of diplomatic and military moves;
4) confining military moves to those that constitute clear demonstrations of one's resolve and are appropriate to one's limited crisis objectives;
5) avoiding military moves that one is about to resort to large scale ware fare and therefore force him to consider preemption;
6) adoption of diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek military solution;

7) selecting diplomatic military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with fundamental interests. [72]

Similarly, Milburn has provided certain vital requirements for crisis management. They are: one should first ascertain the nature of crisis within its own particular historical, social, political, and economic or military setting; necessary information should be gathered; able and experienced advisor or decision-making team should be created; greater communication between the adversary should be made; and finally detail contingency plan should also be made to deal with the situation.[73]

The techniques of crisis management, which are frequently used, include the following:[74]

- Limitation of objectives: If a crisis is to be successfully managed, each party involved must realize that in most cases it will not be able to achieve its maximum political goals. The definition of the objectives which will on the other hand not be abandoned even at the risk of an armed showdown should not be left to decision-makers after the outbreak of the crisis. It is one of the main tasks of the above-mentioned strategic spadework to be undertaken in advance.
- Gradual application and localization of armed force:If in order to defend interests defined as non-negotiable, a party involved in a crisis deems the resort to arms inevitable, it

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[72] George, n.66, pp.206-207.

[73] Thomas W Milburn, The Management of Crisis, in Charles F Hermann(ed), *International Crises: Insight from Behavioral Research*, p.261.

[74] Hans Peter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: Lessons from the Past, in Daniel Frei (ed) *International Crises and Crisis Management* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1976) pp.7-10.

should climb up the ladder of as slowly as possible. No rung of this ladder must be overlooked. Every opportunity of buying time is to be seized. The crossing of the nuclear threshold ought to be postponed as a means of last resort, even if only the use of tactical nuclear weapons is envisaged. In addition armed hostilities should be limited geographically. One of the main points driven home by bitter experience is the ease with which a can be escalated. The temptation of turning otherwise certain defeat into victory by using one's most powerful weapons regardless of their legality and by carrying the war to the enemy's weak spot is great. De-escalation is a much more difficult task. All the maxims require firm control over the military instrument by the political leadership should be ensured.

- Face saving on both sides: Crisis managers ought to keep open as many options of escalating and de-escalating the conflict as possible. This rule is closely related to the limitations of objectives. It also directly results from the new basic perspective of modern crisis management: the enemy suddenly becomes one's partner in the difficult task of solving the problem of mutual survival.
- The maintenance of communication with adversary: It is imperative that the key decision-makers keep in close contact during the crisis.
- Search for broad platform of support: Especially if a party involved in a crisis resort to armed force, it ought to obtain the endorsement of its planned or already implemented measures by as many other states as possible. These exigencies also apply to merely moral support and not only to the search for allied participation in military action.
- Consideration of the precedent effect of crisis behavior: Crisis managers should bear in mind that their handling of the crisis can set a negative or at least to certain extent, a positive precedent for similar situation in future.

Finally, after analyzing various aspects of crisis management, one thing that can be said with certainty is that, there cannot be any ready-made guide for the decision-makers engaged in crisis management. This is because no

theory of international relations is able to provide such a thing. However, experience and existing literature on the subject of crises and their management can provide some useful first steps for studying the dangers of crisis escalation to war that nations generally avoid.[75]

## Conclusion:

The twentieth century has rightly been said to be a century of turmoil. It has witnessed the emergence of a large number of problems, which are still persisting. Prominent among them include environmental degradation and pandemics arising out of desease such as AIDS. Along with these problems are the military security crises, which threaten peace. The century has not only witnessed two World Wars and a prolonged period of Cold War, but also a great number of local conflicts which are still persisting in many regions including Middle East and South Asia. All these have naturally brought sufferings and misery to the people.

The threat of war and destruction has prompted many scholars and strategic thinkers to devote attention to various aspects of military security crisis. There has been greater diversification of the subject, which now include in its ambit studies such as crisis decision-making, crisis bargaining and crisis management. The underlying objective of all these things has always been to

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[75] Raja Mohan, n.68., p.185.

further the understanding of conflict and cooperation among the states. The manner in which the decision-makers formulate their policies with a view to safeguard and further their country's national interests is very important to study. This is because of the fact that, even though crises and conflicts have been seen as natural in the existing nation-state system, the peace and prosperity are still desired by many.

# CHAPTER - 2

## INDIA'S CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A historical account of any event is provided not only to reconstruct the situation of that time but also to learn important lessons from those events. It is generally believed that those who do not learn from history invariably suffer.

Ever since its independence, India had to deal with numerous external security threats initiated by its hostile neigbours. Some of it attained crisis dimensions. These crises brought out many deficiencies in existing institutions and processes related to crisis decision-making, for which strategic analysts and others have suggested various rectifying measures.

A historical account of India's crisis decision-making will focus on these issues by looking at policy processes and by identifying institutions and agencies involved in crisis decision-making. Three crises mainly with reference to Pakistan, namely Siachen (1984), Brasstacks (1986-87) and Kargil (1999) are also analysed from this perspective.

## DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES:

Governmental decisions are necessarily arrived at through intense deliberations and interactions between a numbers of institutions and agencies. These institutions and agencies formulate policies for safeguarding long-term security interest of a country as well as for taking crucial decision to respond to

any exigencies. The factors, which influence the nature and function of these institutions and agencies, are varied. They include the immediate security challenges arising out of strategic environment and reflection of historical circumstances and cultural ethos of the country. Therefore, it can be seen that the political system and security decision-making structure and policies in India have been moulded by centuries of colonial rule. As pointed out by Raju G.C. Thomas, "centuries of colonial rule has resulted in, on the one hand, absorption of British political and military structures, processes and values and on the other hand, this has led to the rejection - especially during the first fifteen years of independence - of the British and western approach to strategic planning and security policy formulation".[1] Similarly, the civil-military relation has been shaped by historical circumstances, namely conscious attempt by Jawaharlal Nehru to keep armed forces under the civilian control effectively so as to forestall any possibility of military taking over power as was seen in many post-colonial Afro-Asian countries during that time. "The Indian military, mainly the army, which since the British 'Raj', has regularly been called out in aid to the civil authorities, has otherwise remained out of political arena. This is attributed to post-independence measures adopted in India to bring its military under strict civilian control. The army has never sought to control nor be arbiter in India's political affairs."[2] Besides the historical circumstances, institutions and agencies have also been fine-tuned with the changing need and circumstances. Many structures

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[1] Raju G.C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.86.
[2] Maroof Raza(ed), *Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 2001), p.14.

such as National Security Council and intelligence agencies involved in decision-making have assumed importance.

Though a number of crisis decision-making structures exist in India, the relative importance of each depends upon the nature of issues at stake. To appreciate these aspects, we need to analyse the crisis decision-making structures and processes at two levels - namely political system and organizational framework.

1. In Political System, the focus is essentially on the parliament and the various ministries and their accompanying bureaucratic procedures. The manner in which the standing and ad hoc parliamentary committees conduct investigations in the process provide input into the policy-making process. The suitability and adaptability of the parliamentary system of government for making security policy in India will also be analysed

2. Organizational framework includes the cabinet and three-tier defence committee system. Intelligence and other specialized agencies are also included.

**Political System:**

The role of parliament in the process of decisionmaking stems from the fact that it, being a sovereign body, represents the will of the people and deliberate and exercise control over decisions of the executive. The executive is accountable to this institution. The Parliamentary form of government is a cornerstone of the Indian political system and every thing, including security

issues, is brought within its ambit. It is constitutionally mandated to "play the role of creating a national commitment to protect national security[3] and parliamentary control over defence and other security issues means that "ultimate authority is not merely the prerogative of the cabinet, the government in power, or the majority of the party; rather it rests with parliament as a whole".[4]

The Indian parliament utilizes a number of instrumentalities such as debate, question hour, discussion, calling attention motion etc to shape and mould policy within the procedural framework. The government initiated security policies are scrutinized and debated upon by the legislative bodies and "any misguided policies may be sharply rebuked causing the government in power to adjust or change its future policies"[5]. Parliament also exercises control through investigative committees such as Public Account Committee, Estimate Committee and Committee on Public Undertaking. These committees periodically conduct investigations into defence expenditure and into working of the defence industries. Besides ad hoc parliamentary committees also assume investigative role. Consultative Committees of Parliament are also attached to the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

An important feature of this system is that Parliament, for most part, gives direction or influences decision-making. The committees are meant to

[3] P.M.Kamath, "National Security Policy and the Indian Parliament", *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies,* 24(1-4), Jan-Dec 1990, p.54.
[4] Raju G.C.Thomas, *The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics* (Delhi: The McMillan Company of India Limited, 1978), p.66
[5] Ibid p.67.

assess whether the execution of policies are within the bounds prescribed by the Government and approved by the Parliament. Then they may suggest possible remedies for existing administrative shortcomings.

The role of Indian Parliament in the process of decision-making on security issues is limited because the elected representatives are generally preoccupied with their constituencies. Also the executive denies information to the legislature.[6] Moreover the nature of distribution of power in India's Parliamentary system makes executive crucial for security decision-making.

The political parties, as a link between the government and the people, provide inputs into decision-making process. It helps formation of public opinion, which will make impact on decision-making process. As pointed out by Sadasivan, "parties bring individuals and groups under their influence in their effort to create, coordinate and mobilize public opinion. They shape the vague, dispersed, amorphous and confused mass into an effective integrated expression and direct it to specific ends[7]. According to G.C.Thomas, the most significant input that the opposition makes into the government's policies and programmes is provided through parliamentary committees. Although many ruling party members sit in these committees, opposition party members are able to influence the government's policies on various issues more directly and substantially than during the general debate in Parliament.[8]

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[6] Kamath, n.3.,p.54.
[7] S, N. Sadasivan, *Party and Democracy in India* (New Delhi: Tata Mc Graw-Hill publishing Company Limited, 1977), p.320.
[8] Thomas, n.4., p.95.

## Governmental Security Decision-Making Process- organizational framework:

The basic defence decision-making structure in India provides the forum for interaction among various participants at three levels, usually in a hierarchical order. The top or political level consists of elected representatives, civil servants and military chiefs. At the middle or bureaucratic level, interaction is between the relevant authorities of the civil service and the armed services. The bottom or military level involves the interaction among heads of the army, navy and air force.[9]

The system introduced in India, after independence, was based on the recommendations of Lord Ismay. Essentially he recommended a threetier committee system:(I) at the apex the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), all meetings of which were to be attended by the Service Chiefs and the Defense Secretary. (II) The Defense Ministers Committee (DMC), in which the Service Chiefs, the Defense Secretary and the Financial Advisor were the members. (III) There was to be the Chief of Staff Committee (CSC) with the longest serving Chief of Staff as its chairman in rotation.[10]

Each of these committees was aided by other specialized and information gathering committees, such as the Joint Intelligence Committee, Defense Service

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[9] Thomas, n.1., p.119.
[10] Lt Gen. Ashok Joshi, *Restructuring National Security* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2000), p.281.

Advisory Committee, the Joint Planning Committee and various interservice organizations to deal with pensions and personnel matters[11].

In the past, many committees have been set up and many institutions were created to deal with security issues. Also, many have been either disbanded or underutilized.

The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs is a case in point. Established in the early 1970s, the CCPA was merged with the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) that was set up after the 1962 Chinese invasion. The ECC had replaced the Defense Committee of the Cabinet.[12] The CCPA is designed to analyze and evaluate the internal and external situations and provide direction and policy guidance to the government to run the country. The Prime Minister chairs the CCPA. Its members are Home Minister, Minister for External Affairs and Minister for Defense. In May 1986, Minister for Human Resource Development and Minister for Finance were also made members of CCPA.[13]

The National Security Council was envisaged for the purpose of integrated multi-disciplinary approach to security planning. It was felt that the country, with its limited resources, needs an NSC that could maximize efficiency and minimize waste through systematic long-term strategic planning. It was set in 1998,

[11]Thomas, n.1.,p.120.

[12] Brahma Chellaney, 'Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millennium", in Brahma Chellaney(ed), *Securing India's Future in the new Millennium* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p.585.

[13] Col Ravi Nanda, *National Security, Perspective Policy and Planning* (New Delhi: Lancers Book, 1999), p.204.

though earlier also effort was made in this regard in 1990, which did not work out.[14]

A number of intelligence agencies exist in India to assist the government in formulating security policy as well as for crisis decisionmaking. India has the Research and Analysis Wing(RAW) responsible for external intelligence; the Intelligence Bureau(IB) responsible for internal intelligence; and Joint Intelligence Committee(JIC) is mandated to coordinate intelligence activities and prepare special assessment reports. The Military Intelligence (MI) collects information by running field agents in the border areas, including the LOC in Kashmir. It monitors radio traffic through its network.[15]

The decision-making structure on security issues is at present something like this. In India's cabinet system of government, based on the Westminster model, the Prime Minister is the chief executive even though the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces. The apex body responsible for all matters impinging on India's security is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by Prime Minister. Parallel to the CCS and with almost the same membership is the National Security Council (NSC). Prime Minister too heads this. The only real difference between the CCS and NSC, as constituted at

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[14] Chellaney, n.12., p.585.

[15] Col. Ravi Nanda, *Kargil: A wake Up Call* (New Delhi: Lancers Book, 1999), p.25.

present, is that the National Security Advisor (NSA)[16] and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission are also in attendance when the National Security Council meets. The Strategic Policy Group (SPG) and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)[17] assist the National Security Council. The Joint Intelligence Command provides secretarial support to the NSC.[18] The SPG, responsible for inter-ministerial coordination, is a bureaucratic body comprising of the Cabinet Secretary, three Service Chiefs and secretaries of the core ministries like External Affairs, Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Atomic Energy and Space Agency, besides the heads of the intelligence agencies and Governor of Reserve Bank.

Theoretically, at present, the process of crisis decision-making would be something like this. The three principal information gathering agencies-

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[16] The NSA has a pivotal role to play in the effectiveness of the NSC. The Prime Minister is free to appoint any one as NSA from any field- political, bureaucracy, military and strategic community. The NSA acts as a channel of information for the Prime Minister who need not rely on single channel for strategic decision-making. NSA also arranges for an independent evaluation of decisional premises and options wherever necessary. See Dr Subhash Kapila, India's National Security Council- A Critical Review, http://www.saag.com, p. 1.

[17] The NSAB comprises basically of retired officials- four foreign secretaries, three service chiefs, one retired major general, former heads of atomic and space agency, besides three heads of central police organization connected with internal security. Four strategic analyst and two economic analysts also find place in the 32 members NSAB, Ibid.

[18] Col Ravi Nanda, *National Security, Perspective Policy and Planning* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 1998), p.205.

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence - are engaged in collecting information not only for the purpose of security decision-making but also for the purpose of devising various alternatives in a particular crisis situation. "Information from these intelligence agencies moves up the chain of command, depending on the significance. Data useful for the military is sent directly to the three services while other significant information is sent to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), concurrently the secretariat of the National Security Council. Its chairman reports directly to the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary who also happens to be the National Security Adviser (NSA)."[19] Ultimately the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) takes the decisions.

**Evaluation of the institutions and processes of India's crisis decision making:**

The nature of decision-making processes and institutions since Independence has stood the test of time when compared to other Afro-Asian post-colonial countries. India has firmly established many of the institutions and agencies involved in the policy processes. It has also, to a considerable extent, effectively dealt with security challenges it faced.

The defense policy making has served India well as can be seen from the fact that India's armed forces have developed into a very efficient and apolitical entity. However, military reverses faced by India, namely against china

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[19] M.K.Akbar, *Kargil-Cross Border Terrorism* (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1999), pp. 39-40.

in 1962, were attributed to ineffective handling of security issues by the decision-makers mainly because of the lack of appropriate institutions and agencies which could have responded to the situation effectively.

Inter-service cooperation and interaction between elected head and professionals of the armed services at the highest level did not work properly. This could be attributed to the fact that the political establishment in the initial years of independence were afraid of armed forces.[20] The basic decision-making institutions such as CSC, DCC, DMC etc. also were not made to work effectively. According to Col. Ravi Nanda, all these agencies designed for the purpose of political higher control of defense failed miserably in 1962. After that the emergency committee of the cabinet was formed. It lasted till 1967. Thereafter these functions were added on to the CCPA. The CCPA did not have adequate staff structure to carry out these tasks. The inadequacies of the system have received only cosmetic changes.[21]

In India, according to a security analysts, "there has long been intellectual recognition of the prevailing disconnectedness among economic, foreign, defence and internal security policies as also about the absence of an environment of well informed, sophisticated and focused security discussions. Over the years India has developed informal methods of coordination in the security field. NSC created to address these issues faces basic problems such as

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[20] Lt. Gen. Joshi, n.10., pp.281-282.

[21] Col. Nanda, n.13., p.207.

it must reconcile with the cabinet system of government, which in effect it has become more like Cabinet Committee on security.[22]

It is seen that "over the years since inceptions the NSC has had no major successes in evolving a national security strategy or doctrine in concrete terms. The Joint Intelligence Committee continues to provide a stopgap secretariat when a dedicated body for this purpose should have been long functional. A full-fledged National Security Advisor has yet to be appointed as the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister continues to perform these immensely challenging functions."[23]

Indian policy-making has further been affected by poor interministry and inter-department coordination. Also, "serious efforts has not been made to establish institutionalized methods so that policy-making is driven less by personalities and more by long-term integrated planning. A host of functional inefficiencies continue to burden Indian policy-making, constricting any government's ability to manage national security in a prudent, cost effective and result oriented manner."[24]

The tendency of centralization of decision-making, whereby only a few at the top taking decision, has been a permanent feature in India. Political authority in India has always exercised close hold over the intelligence apparatus

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[22]Vergese Koithara, *Society, State and Security: The Indian Experience* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p.404.

[23]Kapil Kak, "India's Defense Modernization: Need for Renaissance", in Satish Kumar(ed) *India's National Security: Annual Review2001*, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 2002), p.310.

[24] Brahma Chellaney, "Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millennium" in Chellaney, n.12., p.584.

for furthering their political interests. Besides, it has also been seen that the parliamentary control is gradually decreasing in many countries. This is the case with India. Historically, in India, it has been observed that "Jawaharlal Nehru, despite his strong democratic instincts, recognized the necessity of central authority in India. Indira Gandhi on the other hand accelerated the trend towards centralization and an imperial executive."[25] Another aspect of over centralization in India has been that many portfolios remain with a single individual. He could either be the Prime Minister or any influential member of cabinet like the Deputy Prime Minister.

Intelligence gathering and assessment as an element of security decision-making is very crucial. Therefore, the effectiveness and institutionalization of these agencies have been emphasized. This is because of the fact that "India has suffered time and again due to faulty, incomplete or lack of intelligence assessments. The failure of strategic intelligence and political judgment about Chinese intentions and strategic objectives in 1962 has a bitter experience for the country."[26] However, what has been seen is that "the Indian intelligence community lacks overall guidance on what it is expected to do, establishing priorities for intelligence collection and analysis to meet the ongoing

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[25] Kanti Bajpai, Cohen Stephen P, P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Sumit Ganguly, *Brasstack and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (Delhi: Manohar publisher, 1995), p.97.

[26] L.P.Singh, "Learning the Lessons of History" in Chellaney (ed.), n.12., p.12.

needs of the government and assessing periodically the performance of the intelligence agencies in meeting these needs."[27]

# THREE CASE STUDIES OF CRISIS DECISIONS WITH REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN:

Half a century of animosities and intense rivalry between India and Pakistan that resulted in numerous crises are rooted in their history, geo-political compulsions and socio-economic foundation. The tit for tat interaction between these two adversaries, both diplomatically and militarily, has resulted in many dangerous situations in the region. The international community always expressed concern over the crisis escalating into uncontrollable proportions endangering stability in the region. Though for India much of the hostilities, initiated by Pakistan, were expected and obvious given the fact that it has not reconciled with the dominating influence and power of India in the subcontinent and its failure to capture Kashmir from India. However, responses and initiated measure to deal with these situations by India have been variedly analyzed.

## The Siachen Dispute:

The Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan has persisted for long even though the military skirmish has ebbed the problem is far from over.

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[27] Satbir Singh, "Restructuring the Intelligence Apparatus in India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXII, No. 12, December 1999 p.1601.

Considered as the highest battlefield in the world it has till date resulted in a great number of causalities for both countries in terms personnel and enomous cost.[28]

The Siachen dispute stems from ambiguous legality of that area because the ceasefire line was not adequately drawn in that region in 1949.The very fact that initially Siachen was considered to completely inhospitable and not worth any conflict on the ground was responsible for the absence of more definitive arrangements concerning the line between territories of India and Pakistan.[29] "The principal importance of the glacier appears to be its location. The Siachen Glacier Complex which abouts the Indo-Tibetan border along the disputed territory of Aksai Chin on the one side, the Shaksgam valley to the

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[28] The Siachen glacier in Kashmir is about 76km long and varies in width between 2km to 8km. One of the largest glaciers in the world, it is popularly called the "Third Pole". The Siachen conflict called "Operation Meghdoot" by India and "Operation Abadeel" by Pakistan; has been the longest war of 20th century and is being fought at an average height of 20,000 feet. India spends upwards of 60million rupees every day to sustain the effort. Over 3,000 soldiers have been killed and many more have been incapacitated and traumatized. The defence services medical forces and the Defence Research and Development Organisation are working together to minimize the casualties. See. Pravin Sahwney, *The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that shape India's Image* (Sage Publications: New Delhi, 2002), pp.268-270.

[29] The cease-fire line established as a result of bilateral agreement in 1949 which concluded the war in Kashmir, ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and north-eastwards until map grid point NJ9842, located near the Shyhok river at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Since there were no Indian or Pakistani troops present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyondNJ9842, the cease-fire line was not delineated as far as the border with China occupied territory. It was the case after 1965 and 1971 war. No attempt was made to clarify the position of the Loc beyond NJ9842. The Loc was merely described as moving from Chorbat La in the Turtok Sector "northeastwards to Thang, thence eastwards joining the glaciers. See. Varun Sahni, Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir, in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo, *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2001), p.150.

northwest and the northern 9842 triangle, is a wedge that separates a closer Sino-Pakistan nexus".[30]

From an Indian perspective, Siachen geostrategic importance lies in the fact that its control would support the defence of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir against Pakistani and/or Chinese threats.[31] The importance of height conferring tactical military advantage also is a cause for the Siachen dispute.

**Anatomy of the Crisis:**

For Indian decision-makers till 1970s, Siachen was not much of an issue. The inhospitable and in accessible terrain made them think that this piece of territory is safe from encroachment from hostile neighbours. Therefore the ambiguity was not addressed to even during the demarcation of cease-fire line in 1972. No activity like mountaineering was undertaken or encouraged by India. "The sensitivity of the region where interests of India, China and Pakistan are linked up was not regarded as an appropriate area to introduce either Indian or international climbers." [32]

However, the perception of threat occurred seeing the activity of Pakistan in this territory. Pakistan encouraged mountaineering expedition mainly by the foreign nationals primarily from western European countries. "It circulated notices and offers of help to climbers in the West and in Japan, wanting to climb

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[30] Cited in Sumit Ganguly, *The Origin of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1988) p.84.
[31] Cited in Ashutosh Misra, "Beyond Kashmir: The Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/ Water Dispute", in Bajpai et.al (ed.), n.29., p.204.
[32] Lt.Gen. V.R.Raghavan, *Siachen-Conflict Without End* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India (P) Ltd, 2002), p. 35.

hitherto unclimbed peaks. Pakistan even waived fees it normally charged for climbing in western part of Karakorams."[33] The aim was to legitimize the claim over the region by projecting themselves to be the owner and in effective control of the glacier by virtue of the fact that they have been undertaking mountaineering expedition. Consequently, in many western countries, Siachen was shown to be under Pakistan's control in international mountaineering map published in Europe and North America. "Among others, the National Geographical Society's, *Atlas of the World,* the university of Chicago's *A Historical Atlas of South Asia, The Times Atlas of the World,* the *Britannic Atlas* (1979 edition) and *Reader's Digest's Great World Atlas,* all showed the LoC extending from NJ9842 in a clearly north-easterly direction right up to the Karakoram Pass. According to their alignment of the LoC, the Siachen glacier was good 50 miles westwards of the LoC."[34] The Indian generals recognized this cartographic aggression. " The maps were brought to the notice of the Defence and Foreign Ministries. It was then decided that India should also undertake mountaineering activity in the area with its military climbers. The decision to choose Colonel N.Kumar to lead an expedition to the Karakorams, particularly in the Siachen glacier bowl, was the outcome."[35] From then regular patrolling were done over the area.

The Indian military operation code-named "Meghdoot"(Cloud Messenger) resulted from intelligence report that's that Pakistan was planning to

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[33] Ibid., p.34.
[34] Sahwney, n.28., p.274.
[35] Lt.Gen. Raghavan, n.32., p.35.

establish a military operation to claim the area. "In September/October 1983, Indian intelligence identified a Pakistani column of about two companies moving towards Saltoro range passes. India also received information that Pakistan army was purchasing large quantities of mountaineering and ski equipment for a special task group called the Burzil Force, which was being trained to occupy the Siachen glacier." [36]

The government under Mrs. Indira Gandhi was alerted about the situation. The lesson of Aksai Chin of 1950s and the threat posed to India's security arising out of closer "Sino-Pak nexus"[37] as facilitated by Pakistan's possession of the glacier weigh heavily on the decision-makers. Mrs. Indira Gandhi,s government also wanted to send strong message that India is capable of preempting aggression on her territory. All these resulted in the government's go ahead signal for the military operation by the army. " The choice of Saltoro was carefully made. NJ9842 was on the Saltoro range. The famous words, 'thence north to the glaciers' from NJ 9842 meant north along the nearest watershed, which in the present case was the Saltoro. Pakistan had been crossing the Saltoro by the main pass of Bilafond La. The other usable pass was Sia La. It would be enough to deny these passes to Pakistan to stop the mountain poaching."[38]

[36] Varun Sahni, "Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir", in Bajpai, et al. (ed.), n.29., p.152.

[37] The anxiety in India also stem from the belief that Pakistan's control of Karakoram pass would be China managed. See Rakshat Puri, "Strategic Importance of Siachen", *Hindustan Times,* July 7,1999, cited in Lt.Gen. Raghavan, n.32., p.36.

[38] Ibid., p.37.

## Efforts towards the resolution of Crisis:

Bilateral negotiation between the two countries was started in January 1986.[39]"In the many rounds of talks on Siachen between India and Pakistan, the idea of solution was based on a single principle: that of disengagement by both sides. It was expected that the two armies could disengage and move back to mutually agreed positions."[40] India's proposals include such thing as establishment of demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the Siachen Glacier, cessation of cartographic aggression by Pakistan (that is, of the unilateral attempts in recent years to extend the LOC from its agreed terminus at map reference point NJ9842 to the Karakoram pass of the border with China), exchange between India and

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[39]G. Wirising has cited following rationale of India for possession of Siachen:
1) By virtue of the act of accession in 1947, all of Jammu and Kashmir, including the so-called Northern Areas, is an integral part of India, 2) the Siachen glacier and its environs lie outside the formally agreed LOC in Jammu and Kashmir state, hence outside the territory falling legally under Pakistan's administrative control by terms of the 1972 Simla accord. Neither the formally agreed wording of the 1949 and 1972 agreements, nor any informal interpretations of those agreements made subsequent to them, warrants the arbitrary extension of the LOC by any one party to those agreements in any direction,3) Pakistan's claim to permanent administrative control of the Siachen area since independence is without any foundation in fact. Pakistan's sponsorship of foreign expeditions to the area since 1974 is a deliberate tactic, involving promotional advertisement, eased application procedures and waiver of royalties on some peaks, to gain international acceptance of its administrative authority in that area and, hence, of its unilateral and arbitrary extension of the LOC. India has an obvious right to use force to defend itself against Pakistan's effort to annex Indian territory by resort to spurious claims of customary practice.4) Pakistan's reluctance to make open official acknowledgment of its unilateral extension of the LOC is tacit admission of its illegality. Indeed, Pakistan played down the skirmishes over the glacier precisely to avoid calling attention to its illegal extension of the LOC.5) in accord with the Simla agreement of 1972, the question of administrative control of the Siachen area must be settled bilaterally, through negotiation between India and Pakistan. See Robert G Wirsing, "The Siachen Glacier Dispute-1: The Territorial Dimension", *Strategic Studies*, pp.59-60

[40] Lt.Gen. Raghavan, n.32., p.202.

Pakistan of authenticated maps showing present military dispositions on the ground, delimitation by India and Pakistan of a line from map reference point NJ9842 northward to the border with China based on ground realities and formulations of ground rules to govern future military operations in the area and definitely of the last steps to be taken and redeployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Not much headway has been made with regard to these issues and th problems remain as vexed as was for the last two decade or so.The bilateral negotiations between the two countries have been suspended without agreement after six round of talk in 1992. No sign of resolution is in sight mainly because of the linking of the Siachen conflict to the wider conflict regarding the status of Jammu and Kashmir by then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mrs. Benazir Bhutto in 1993. Therefore, it foreclosed any solution to the Siachen dispute. During the height of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir Mrs.Bhutto thought that any negotiation on Siachen would weaken Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue. She did not want to be pressurized by international community to settle the Kashmir issue after the Siachen dispute settlement. Moreover, she dd not want to send wrong signal to the militants groups in the valley. The issue got more complicated in recent years mainly after the Kargil conflict. India fears that Pakistan may occupy the glacier once it withdraws from that region. As pointed out by V.R.Raghavan, "the Kargil initiative of Pakistan effectively stalled the search for a solution on any issue connected with line of control. The

consequence of Kargil, as far as conflict resolution is concerned, would be greater for Pakistan. The LoC may become a flashpoint. Siachen and Saltoro being closely linked to the LoC, the shadows of Kargil and Afghanistan will in future lie heavy on them."[41]

## Assessment- India's crisis decision on Siachen:

India's decision to airlift soldiers to the glacier to preempt any Pakistani effort to establish military post there was a result of reliable and timely intelligence reports. It resulted in India occupying important strategic points in the glacier, which has enabled it to repel Pakistan's persistent effort to dislodge India from the glacier. However, question has been raised regarding the threat assessment of the army on account of Pakistani activities in the region. Strategic analysts like Pravin Sawhney contend that the army's contention that Pakista, through, Siachen would threaten Leh and endanger LehSrinagar highway is misplaced. Pakistan would not contemplate to attack India trekking through treacherous terrain.[42] Furthermore, poor inter-ministerial coordination was also seen during the time of talk on resolution of the crisis. India was closed to agreeing on disengagement and the Ministry of External Affairs had announced to that effect jointly with Pakistan. However, due to a strong opposition from the army it was not carried out. Even Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao had a chance to settle but dithered on the issue at the last minute on account of

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[41] Ibid., p.200.
[42] Sawhney, n.28.,p288.

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domestic consideration as the elections was round the corner.[43] All these aspect

point to the fact that loose end still remains regarding India's policy on the issue

of Siachen.[44]

## **Operation Brasstacks, 1986-87:**

In 1986-87, the Indian military conducted "Exercise Brasstacks" in the

Rajasthan desert near Pakistani border.[45] Because of the unprecedented size of

the exercises, their close proximity to the Pakistani border, and an underlying

tension in Indo-Pakistani relations, almost brought the two adversaries to the

brink of war.

The military exercise had two purposes. At the military level, it was

designed to test the combat readiness of newly inducted mechanized units of the

Indian army. It was also intended to test an indigenously designed command,

control, and communications and intelligence network. Finally, it was geared to

ascertain the viability of a new conventional deterrence strategy that General

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[43] Ibid., pp.289-290.

[44] Ahmad and Varun Sahni have brought out three alternatives on Siachen. They are: 1) maintaining the deployment on Siachen at all costs, 2) negotiating a military disengagement with Pakistan, and 3) withdrawing Indian forces from the glacier, unilaterally if necessary. See. Samina Ahmad and Varun Sahni, Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on Siachen Glacier, Coopertative Monitoring Center Occasional Papers (Sandia National Laboratories, Alberque, March1998) cited by Ashutosh Misra, "Beyond Kashmir: The Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul/ Water Dispute", in Kanti Bajpai et.al (ed), n.29., p.205.

[45]Brasstacks consisted of four parts. Brasstack1, held in May-June 1986, was essentially a map exercise held in the southern, western, and northern army commands. Brasstack2, held in November 1986, was designed as a computerized war-game-cum-sand model exercise; the Indian Navy and Air Force held their exercises separately. Brasstack3, scheduled for November-December 1986, was envisaged as segmented exercise by different arms and services to support divisional-corps-level offensive operations in a mobile battleground environment. Brasstack4, was scheduled for February-March 1987. It was converted to operation Trident when it was felt that Pakistan might go on the offensive. Bajpai, et.al (ed), n.25., p.28.
This multi-corps level exercise involved close to 200,000 men with a reported cost of between Rs200cr to Rs400cr, *The Telegraph (Calcutta)*, February 8, 1987.

Sunderji fashioned. Conducting the Brasstacks exercise in the east of the Indira canal in Rajasthan was based on military thinking in India about the likely future course of India-Pakistan conflicts. This thinking rest on the strategy that in case of war India could adopt a defensive posture in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir but take advantage of its superiority in armor and combat air craft to achieve major operational gain across Rajasthan in Pakistan.[46]

Politically, t was intended to convey a message to Pakistan, that despite India's counter insurgency commitments in Punjab, its military was still in a position to inflict considerable military cost on Pakistan.[47] In 1986, relations between the two countries started deteriorating. Pakistan started accusing India of stirring up ethnic violence in its Sindh province, while India accused Pakistan for Sikh uprising in the Indian state of Punjab.[48] Therefore, a military exercise aimed at Pakistan's own weak point - the province of Sindh - was thought to be would be a fitting response to Pakistan which posed threat to India.[49]

## Anatomy of the crisis:

The enormous size of the exercise and close proximity to Pakistan border caused concern in Pakistan. "These anxietes were heightened because Pakistan had not been informed of Exercise Brasstacks' contours, despite

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[46] Cited in Bajpai et al. (ed.), n.25.,p.25.

[47] Ganguly, n.30.,p.85.

[48] Exercise Brasstacks, http//users.senset.com.au/~wingman/bras.html. pp. 1-2.

[49] Bajpai et al., (ed.), n.25., p.23.

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repeated efforts to obtain them. These suspicions were fed by alarming intelligence reports that India was stocking large quantities of POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants and ammunition) for the exercise, activating forward airfields, alerting air defence systems, dumping extra ammunition in storage facilities, and so on."[50] Between December 1986 and January 1987, India acted in a manner, which increased the suspicions of Pakistan. The most important one was the deployment of 6 Mountain Division from Bareilly (its peace station) to the sensitive Jammu sector.[51]

During the Operation Brasstacks, Pakistan was conducting two military exercises, code named Saf-e-Shikan and Flying Horse. The areas of exercise were presumably precautionary steps to counter any deflection of the Brasstacks exercise into a thrust against Pakistan. Later the Army Reserve North, involved in exercise Flying Horse, was moved to Shakargarh and renamed as Operation Sledgehammer. This was also construed by India as precautionary measure by Pakistani. Infact, till January 15 1987, when the three service chiefs briefed the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) and advised manning of forward defences, no Indian reaction took place. [52] It was only after the movement of army reserve in south was confirmed that Indian reactions got triggered-off. This movement of troops was thought to have been the prelude for an incursion in the Punjab and Jammu sectors by the Pakistani army and, accordingly, armed

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[50] Ibid., p.30.
[51] Dilip Bobb and Inderjit Badhwar, "Back from the Edge", *India Today*, February 28, 1987, p.40.
[52] Dilip Bobb and Inderjit Badhwar, "Game of Brinkmanship", *India Today*, February 15, 1987, pp.26-28.

forces along the international border were deployed.[53] These movements of troops further exacerbated the crisis as Pakistan construed them as preparations for blocking Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South prior to launching an offensive against Pakistan.[54]

The Brasstacks crisis was diffused primarily because both countries kept open their diplomatic channel and willingness to sit and resolve the issue. On January 23, 1987, the day on which news came that Indian forces were kept on high alert, lots of diplomatic activities took place. "Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh met Pakistani Ambassador Humayun Khan; Minister of External Affairs Narayan Dutt Tiwari met Soviet Ambassador Vassily Rykov; and Minister of State in the Defence Ministry Arun Singh met American Ambassador John Gunther Dean".[55] The telephone hot line was also activated, and discussions took place between military officials of the two operations directorates.

**Assessment of India's crisis decision:**

Inspite of the fact that the kind of military exercise that was undertaken was routine and though "it served its essential objectives of providing ground experience in using newly raised RAPIDs and mechanized infantry divisions, operating signals and communication equipment in desert conditions, and

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[53] *Ministry of Defence*, Annual Report, 1986-87.
[54] Bajpai, n.25., p.35.
[55] cited in Bajpai et al. (ed.) n.25., p.34.

implementing real-time computerized command and control arrangements"[56], there were certain flaws in conceptualization and implementation of the exercise on the part of Indian decision-makers.

First, the advisability of holding such exercises in border areas is questionable on account of the fact that such steps have invariably led to crisis situations.[57] Moreover, it has also been argued that the democratic decision-making structure has been undermined. The centralizing tendency of this decision is clearly apparent. The exercise was a brainchild of Gen. Sunderji. S.S.Gill has summed the dubious role attributed to him as follows:

> The Brasstacks exercise exposes the grave risks involved in a domineering General hijacking the democratic decision-making process. The general was able to strike a close personal equation with his minister, Arun Singh, who was himself, a very intelligent person of great integrity. But Arun Singh was new to the government and had insufficient understanding of the fine balance required to be maintained between the military and the civilian authorities. And he was dazzled by the glamour of being surrounded and saluted by the three defence chiefs. It was against this backdrop that General Sunderji proposed a large-scale military exercise to test the enhanced mobility of the army through mechanization of infantry. Rajiv Gandhi fully endorsed the proposal. Most dangerously the General hankered after a war, not because he was convinced of its inevitability, but as it offered him the only path to personal glory and a niche in history.[58]

During the crucial phase of the crisis the communication channel between the military directorate of the two country was also absent. The same was palpable at the level of political leadership between the two countries. "At

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[56] Bajpai et al. (ed.), n.25., p.40
[57] Ibid.
[58] S.S.Gill, *The Dynasty-The Political History of Premier Ruling Family of Modern India* (New Delhi: Harper Collins), pp.474-479.

the domestic level inadequate communications between the Prime Minister, his Defence Ministers and the service were also visible. Nor were there any strong channels of communications between the defence and foreign ministers, since the latter do not seem to have joined the discussions at the planning stage of the exercise or during the evolving crisis. Moreover communications within the defence apparatus were disrupted, with the Ministry of Defence being kept on the periphery and all Brasstacks-related decisions being taken by between the minister of state and the chiefs of staff committee. The defence secretary was only called upon to issue administrative-financial sanctions."[59] "During the critical period, Rajiv Gandhi was holidaying in the Andamans. From there he went to Bangalore before coming to Delhi. He was not kept informed of the developments on the Indo-Pak front.[60]

All the above cited facts point to centralizing tendency of decision-making, inadequate communication channel within decision-making apparatus and also vague and undefined civil-military relations which resulted in a crisis like the Brasstacks Exercise of 1986-87.

## The Kargil conflict, 1999:

The main issue involved in the Kargil war of 1999 was to repeal the Pakistani intruders who were occupying Indian territory in the Kargil sector. Pakistan made it look like a local rebellion led by Mujahideen, morally and diplomatically supported by Pakistan. It was a well thought out plan on the part

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[59] Bajpai et.al.,n.25., pp.42-43.
[60]Gill, n.58., p.476.

of Pakistan not only to acquire strategic height but also, in the process, control the Srinagar-Leh Highways aimed at eventually altering the status of LoC and capturing the Kashmir Valley.[61]

The Kargil intrusion happened mainly because, since 1971, there was not much worthwhile military activity happened in this region. Moreover, both countries usually vacate the summer defence position in winter. This area is unsuitable for infiltration during the months. Also the preoccupation of security forces preoccupation counter insurgency operations in the valley made the intrusion easy.[62] Furthermore, Pakistani also believed that possession of nuclear weapon would be an insurance for its offensive action and expected that international community would intervene and stop the war at an early stage. China's favorable stance towards Pakistan was alsoexpected.[63] The underlying the cause for Pakistani action was also attributed to increasing frustration of military establishment in that country because of India's success in containing militancy in Jammu and Kashmir within a level. Moreover, Kashmiri peple's open desire to return to normal life also belied Pakistan's, hope that they can bleed

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[61] Jasjit Singh, has explained the Pakistani strategy thus: "Pakistan's basic strategy was to position an armed force across the well established, formally accepted Line of Control in Kargil sector in Jammu and Kashmir State in the form of a bridgehead during the winter months, which could be expanded as the seasoned changed. The basic strategy was the domination of the Drass-Kargil road, which provides the only road link between Srinagar in Kashmir and Leh in Ladakh. The logistics of the Indian army could be affected in Ladakh region including the Siachen sector, which could be further exploited". See Jasjit Singh, "Pakistan's Fourth War", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIII, No.8, August 1999,pp-690-696.

[62] Col. Ravi Nanda, *Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations* (New Delhi: Lancer's books, 2001), p.144.
[63] Singh, n.61.,p.690.

India through a strategy of "a thousand cuts".[64] Besides these factors, Pakistan also wanted to internationalize the Kashmir issue and wanted to secure the intervention of UN or a third party as they had succeeded in doing earlier in the 1947-48 and 1965 operations.[65]

**Anatomy of the crisis and decision-making:**

Initially the intrusion was thought to be made by a few militants. The real gravity of the situation was realized and perception of crisis occurred when the intruders wiped out the reconnaissance team and the troops sent to evict the intruder suffered heavy causalities.

When the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security took place, it was realized that the intrusions posed a challenge not only on military front but also on political and diplomatic fronts. Therefore it was realized that the challenges for the decision-makers were not only to take military measures to vacate the occupied areas from the intruders, but also diplomatic initiative to garner support from international community toward India's stated position and military action.

The Cabinet Committee on Security met on 25 May 1999 and directed the COSC to evict the intruders and to restore the sanctity of the LOC without crossing the LOC and in case the need arises to cross it, they were instructed to

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[64]Gurmeet Kanwal, "Pakistan's Strategic Blunder in Kargil", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXIII, No.8, August 1999, p-837.

[65] Vinod Anand, "India's Military Response to the Kargil Aggression", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIII, No.10, October 1999, p.1056.

take prior approval of the cabinet for that purpose. The National Security Council met on 8 June 1999 for the first time on the day of launching of India's military response to oust the intruders from Kargil.[66] Simultaneously, on the diplomatic front also, India's decision-makers carried out many maneuvers. In the beginning of the crisis, India's Defence Minister George Fernades offered 'safe passage' to the intruders to go back into Pakistan. Along with this offer, India also had a talk with Pakistan to persuade Pakistan to withdraw its soldiers from Indian Territory. However, all these predictably were not successful. India's diplomatic initiative directed towards the western countries mainly the United States, bore fruit. India's case was strengthened because of " release of taped conversation between Chief of Staff Lt.Gen. Mohammad Aziz and Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf, which exposed the Pakistan's involvement in the crisis."[67] India's restraint not to cross LoC was also appreciated by the international powers. The condemnation by the US Congress and that country's unequivocal support to India's position[68] and neutral stance of China led to the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan.

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[66] Col. Ravi Nanda, n.62.,pp.144-147.

[67] Arpit Rajain, "India's Political and Diplomatic Responses to the Kargil Crisis", in Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P.R.Chari (ed), *Kargil- The Table Turned* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001) pp.186-187.

[68] The primary objective of US policy during that time was to ensure that Kargil did not escalate and urging India and Pakistan to settle the issue themselves and revive the Lahore process. See Pramit Pal Chaudhary, "A Question of Restraint: US Policy During the Kargil Conflict", in Bajpai, et al.(ed.), n.29., p.335.

### Assessment – India's crisis decision on Kargil:

It is universally accepted that India's decisionmakers handled the Kargil crisis with maturity and deftness, which brought political, military and diplomatic victory to the country. However, the Kargil war had also brought out certain weaknesses of the India's decisionmaking structures and processes. This is reflected in the fact that "there was only one meeting of the NSC during the Kargil conflict where members were told to confine their observations to less than three minutes and voice only constructive suggestions and not criticize past handling." [69]This belied the purpose for which said mechanism was created. Moreover, the National Security Council, it has been pointed out, "did not play any role either in forecasting the incursion or preparing the political and military leadership for the conflict."[70]

A committee, comprising of K. Subrahmanyam, B.G.Verghese and Lt. Gen (Rtd) K.K.Hazari, with the Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat, Satish Chandra, as its Member Secretary was appointed to probe the circumstances that led to the incursion and to suggest means of preventing the recurrence of the event. The committee blamed the inadequacies of the intelligence system, specifically pin pointing the failing of the country's external intelligence arm, the Research and Analysis Wing(R&AW). The report also

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[69] Arpit Rajain, n.67., p.200.
[70] Kapil Kak, "India's Defense Modernization: Need for Renaissance", in Satish Kumar(ed.), n.23.,p.310.

criticised the tendency of various agencies not to disseminate their intelligence properly.[71]

From the various analysis done so far the important lessons of the kargil conflict can be concretely stated as follows:

1. There is a need for restructuring our intelligence apparatus. The various agencies need to work together as an integrated enterprise towards a common goal i.e. delivery of reliable, accurate and timely intelligence to combatants and policy makers.

2.The kargil war also highlighted the fact that force modernization has to be done continuously and not in a knee jerk reaction to any crisis. The armed forces lack even basic things like the winter clothing, night vision and thermal imaging device. Also, they had to incur persistent problems such as lack of light weapon system.[72]

3.During the kargil war, the inadequacies in the management of national security and higher direction of defense were also felt. As such, agencies like NSC and NSAB need to be strengthened. The services also be increasingly involved in decision-making process.

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[71] Manoj Joshi, "The Kargil War: The Fourth Round", in Kanti Bajpai et al. (ed.) n.29.,p-54.

[72] Vinod Anand, "Military Lessons of Kargil", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIII, No.9, September 1999,p. 1045.

4.The issue of effective border management was highlighted by the kargil war. A holistic approach in this regard should be adopted. The concept of border management should not be restricted to mere policing of the area.[73]

**CONCLUSION:**

From the analysis of India's crisis decisionmaking in historical perspectives, it is clear that inspite of the widespread acknowledgement of persisting lacunae in decision-making process and institutions associated with it, the changes have been very slow to come by. No doubt, many institutions have been increasingly created and existing one is streamlined on paper. But in reality, this exercise is cosmetic in nature. The effort toward improving civil-military relations have also not succeeded much. This proves that political and bureaucratic vested interest still rule the roost. Regarding decision-making process, centralization of decision-making still persists. A few individuals at the top always have their way in deciding things with very little instititutional inputs even in serious matters like national security. On many occasions this has affected India's interest as can be seen from the analysis of Brasstacks exercises. The need of the hour, therefore, is to gradually rectify these situations. Otherwise, India may not be able to redeem itself from precarious situation, from which it has been able to do in many occasions so far. Not learning from the past mistakes may cost India dearly. This should be kept in mind by the political elite.

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[73] M.V.Rappai, "Post Kargil Analysis: Need for Border Management Mechanisms", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXIII, No.9, September 1999, pp.1035-1038.

# CHAPTER – 3

# DECISION MAKING ON MILITARY MOBILISATION IN 2002

India's decision to deploy military on its border with Pakistan in 2002 in the wake of attack on Indian parliament in December 13, 2001 has created an interesting perspective on the government's strategic thinking and crisis decision making. The military deployment, largest since independence in terms of manpower, equipment, deposit of additional ammunition, laying of mines etc., raised serious fear of an imminent war. The overt nuclear status of the two countries along with the public statement of their leaders, which carried the danger of inadvertent war, compounded the concern of public and international community. The incident also prompted a wider debate among the strategic community and scholars regarding various aspects of nature and necessity of military deployment.

Many view that India's military mobilization was a ploy to put pressure on the United States to stop Pakistan's militant supportive role in Jammu and Kashmir. It also was thought to be intended to provide military muscle to the terrorists' anti election campaign in Jammu and Kashmir. Many issues regarding various aspects of government's strategic thinking with regards to military strategy, counter insurgency doctrine, limited war, hot pursuit, surgical strike etc. were also debated upon. The decision-making process for the mobilization, both from the perspectives of India's security decision-making institutions and

agencies as well as from the internal domestic factors, was examined and analyzed by the strategic community and others.

All these aspects are discussed in this chapter and the subsequent chapter on military demobilization. In this chapter, while focusing on decision-making on military mobilization in 2002, we will discuss issues such as the post-September 11 strategic environment, the nature and objectives of military mobilization, the responses of Pakistan, etc.

## THE POST- SEPTEMBER 11 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT:

India's decision to mobilize soldiers has been linked to post September 11 strategic environment. This is primarily because of the changed perception of international community on terrorism and its concerted effort to fight this menace.[1] Moreover, "Western countries' acknowledgement of Pakistan's

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[1] Indian policy makers were greatly helped forming political and legal case against Pakistan's terrorist activities on the basis of the Resolution 1373 adopted by the UN Security Council on September 28,2001. This Resolution requires all states to "prevent and Suppress the financing of terrorist acts...refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists...take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist act, including the provision of early warnings to other states by exchange of information.... deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens....(and) ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist is brought to justice..." Furthermore, the Resolution 1373 mandates that states should "afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts" and "should also prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls" and other acts of vigilance. See Editorial, The *Frontline*, January 18,2002, p.9.

symbiotic relationship with the Taliban and other Jehadi groups operating against countries like India, Israel and the United States meant that the September 11 constituted a window of opportunity for New Delhi to compel Islamabad to roll back its use of cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy."[2]

India's wholehearted support to America's war on terrorism stems out of these considerations. The Cabinet Committee on Security met on September 13 and unanimously decided to offer all cooperation and facilities for any US military operation in Afghanistan to catch the mastermind behind the September 11 attack in America.[3] India's decision-makers believed that now America would appreciate India's point of view better as it had also to suffer at the hand of terrorists.

Moreover, India's decision-makers also believed that India's set of demand were reasonable and justifiable considering what the United State has been espousing in its fight against terrorism. For the Indian decision-makers, the prospect looked promising also because India had been working closely with America to fight terrorism for the last few years[4] and generally also Indo-US

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[2] S.Kalyanaraman, "Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.26 No.4, Oct-Dec 2002, p.483.

[3] *The Times of India* (New Delhi), September 15,2001.

[4] The United States extradited Dayek Singh Lahoria; a terrorist wanted by India and followed it by signing an extradition treaty with India in August 1997. A Pakistan based terrorist outfit, the Harkat –ul –Ansar, funded by the Inter-Service-Intelligence of Pakistan was branded a "terrorist" organization by the US, despite vehement protests by Pakistan. During his visit to India in October 1997 Under Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering stated that the two countries would work together to enhance capacity to fight terrorism, whether they be sponsored by moon or

relations have been on upswing in the decade of 1990s. The relationship, cultivated through the 1990s, between the two countries has given away the perception of the United States being tilted towards Pakistan. The US role in the Kargil crisis and the perception of neutrality over Kashmir have left Washington in a good position in the mind of Indian decision-makers.

The improving relationship between the two countries during the last decades and clearly at the expense of Pakistan had naturally made the American more effective in India's decision-maker scheme of thing. A case in point being that India's own diplomatic strategy since the kargil conflict has been to draw in the United States to pressure Pakistan. The same was the case in its decision to mobilize troops in 2002.

## DECISION ON MILITARY MOBILISATION:

Though the genesis of the crisis can be traced to the continuing dispute over Kashmir and heightened militant activities in the valley through out the 1990s, the immediate events that prompted the decision-makers

from any other corner. US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright reiterated same resolve during her visit to South Asia in November 1997.
See Parama Sinha Palit, "The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemma", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.9, September 2001, p.793.

The Bush administration endorses the four principles of the US counter- terrorism policy that were laid down originally by George Bush Commission on Combating Terrorism. They are: 1) make no concessions to terrorists. Giving in simply encourages future terrorist actions and debases America's power and moral authority2) isolate, pressure and punish the state sponsor of terrorism 3) bring individual terrorists to justice. Past and potential terrorists will know that America will never stop hunting them4) provide assistance to other governments combating terrorism. Fighting international terrorism requires international collaboration.
See, Rajeswari Pillai Raja Gopalan, Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, July 2001, p. 525.

to deploy soldiers were the attacks on Jammu and Kashmir assembly in October 2001 and, most importantly on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

In the aftermath of a terrorist attack on J & K assembly building on October 1,2001, the army reasoned with the political leadership not to let go of such an opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson. " The army suggested that India strike at militant bases in PoK, conduct raids on Pakistani pickets close to the LoC that were supporting infiltration and use the air force on the Indian side of the LoC. The Northern command was of the opinion that no additional troops were needed for these tasks. According to the army, such proactive measures would help raise morale of the Indian troops, put Pakistan on the defensive and force it to make difficult choices and help sever the growing ties between the people of Kashmir and the Talibanised mujahids."[5] Infact, Indian Prime Minister, A.B.Vajpayee also sent letter to the American President that India's patience is running out, signaled a veiled threat that India was contemplating action against Pakistan. However, " the political leadership, divided on the military option, finally chose to reject the army's advice. Ahead of US Secretary of State Gen. Collin Powell's visit to India on October 14,2001, Foreign Minister announced that India would do nothing to put Pakistan under military pressure.[6]

Once again after the attack on Indian Parliament the decision-makers contemplated initiating military action against Pakistan. The government had the

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[5] Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K.Sood and Pravin Sawhney, *Operation Parakram-The War Unfinished* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p.65.
[6] Ibid.

backing of public opinion and the opposition parties for strong action.[7] On December 15, the Cabinet Committee on security chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of other member such as Deputy Prime Minister L.K.Advani, the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, finace minister Yashwant Sinha, defence minister George Fernandes, planning commission chairman K.C.Pant and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra gave go ahead for limited military action.[8] However, no political objective was given to the army.[9] Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002.After much debate, the service chiefs opted for limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in PoK. Defensive corps in the western and southern sectors were mobilized by December 28, 2001. The Indian Air Force deployed 272 jets in the western sector and the navy moved its eastern fleet to the Arabian Sea.[10] To the India's decision-makers limited action in PoK made sense,[11] as it would not only convey the India resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution

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[7] Only the left parties criticized India's decision for military mobilization openly. They urged the government to take opposition into confidence before taking important decisions. The left parties characterized diplomatic and military move as inopportune.

[8] Shishir Gupta, "When India Came Close to War", *India Today*, December 23,2002, p.25.
[9] Lt.Gen. (Retd.) Sood and Sawhney, n.5., p.73 According to them the armed forces did not press the political leadership initially to give the objectives in writing as it was considered as bottom up operation- implying that the tone of what was to be accomplished was set by the Northern Command.
[10]Shishir Gupta, n.8., pp.25-29.
[11] According to Manoj Joshi "the limited war scenario can be contemplated akin to one done in Kargil. Launching a number of Shallow attacks that would compel Pakistan to react and yet not threaten any thing vital. A penetration of 10kms is not militarily significant, but in the Indo-Pak context it is political dynamite." Manoj Joshi, "War Games: How to Play Safe and Sound", *The Times of India*, December 23,2001.

to manageable level. "Besides Musharraf's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on January 13. Satellite imagery revealed that Pakistan had moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results. This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And, in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided bomb."[12]

Therefore, once military plan was discarded the government concentrated on the effort to achieve the initial set of demand which also were kept changing leading to confusion on government's real objective.[13]Till Kaluchak massacre the Indian armed forces deployed on the border without any direction from the decision-makers carried out various military exercise and also trained

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[12] Shishir Gupta, "India Today's Account of the India-Pakistan Mobilization Crisis, January and June 2002", http://www.orbat.com, p.1.

[13] The initial set of demands communicated through the december14, 2001 demarche to the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi were limited to the termination of the activities of the Lashker-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad including detention of their leaders and sealing of their offices, and blocking their access to funds. But these were expanded to other demand such as: Pakistan should hand over 20 key terrorist suspects, 14 of them Indian national red flagged by Interpol; renunciation of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan; and closing down of training camps for terrorists in Pakistan, and stopping the infiltration of men and supply of arms into Jammu and Kashmir. Later on the level of infiltration was also made yardstick.

the three divisions moved from the east facing China. [14] The unsaid part of military exercise, which was termed as phase two of the Operation Parakram was that it was designed to keep the Pakistani troops on their toes and help the Indian forces retain the initiative.[15]

"The readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, 'Hamein pratikar karna hoga (We will have to counter it).' On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations, Lt-General S.S. Chahal, and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the CCS favoured military action against terrorists in Pakistan."[16]

The decision-makers apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January. But after evaluating various factors the strategy was changed. "The initial military aim to occupy territory in PoK to inhibit infiltration no longer looked attractive because Pakistan had taken adequate counter measures to meet India's threat. The army reasoned that the attrition rate would be high and

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[14] Gupta, n.8., pp.25-29.
[15] Shishir Gupta, "Keeping the Heat On", *India Today*, May 20, 2002, p.40.

[16] Gupta, n.12., p.1.

nothing substantive could be gained."[17] Therefore, the effective military option would be "to stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give Indian an opening in PoK. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J.Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war. The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in Shakargarh Bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in the PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK."[18] "The likely targets of such offensives are in high mountains adjoining the Uri sector or in the Poonch-Rajouri sector south of Pir Panjal. It is in these areas that Pakistan has supported the maximum number of terrorists camps and used advantageous hill features to facilitate infiltration. India could justify making such an attack, stating it was only going after Pakistan's terrorist network and had no larger plan to annex territory."[19]

The joint army - air force firepower exercise at the Mahajan firing ranges in Suratgarh could well have been a rehearsal for India's military action. As part of the broader plan, India moved its warship under the Eastern Naval Command in Vishakhapatnam to the Mumbai based Western Naval Command. Defence Secretary, who was in Washington for Defence Policy Group meeting, conveyed the need for the Indian and US navy to identify coded links so that the two navies do not have any misunderstanding in the event of Indian warships

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[17] Lt.Gen. (Retd.) Sood and Sawhney, n.5., p.81.
[18] Gupta, n.8., p.30.
[19] Raj Chengappa and Shishir Gupta, "In Striking Distance", *India Today,* June 3, 2002, p.22.

moving towards Karachi port. Similarly, Cabinet Secretary T.R.Prasad called a secretary-level meeting in last week of May to take stock of the petroleum, diesel and food grain stocks to ensure that people do not suffer if and when India goes for military strike. [20]

Again the war plan was called off because of factors such as Musharraf's May 27 speech assuring nothing was happening on the LoC; also infiltration dipped to a new low in May and June. A big complication was the oncoming monsoons that could bog down the forces. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage assured India on June 6 that Musharraf would end infiltration in Kashmir and dismantle terrorist infrastructure in PoK. Nuclear blackmail by Musharraf raised Indian fears that in case of war, the global community would intervene in Kashmir. After this, only option left for India's decision-maker was demobilization.[21]

## ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION ON MOBILISATION:

From the above discussion, it is apparent that India's decision to mobilize troops was not aimed at waging war with Pakistan. Moreover, it was also aimed at wresting concessions from Pakistan regarding cross border terrorism and pressurizing America in this regard. Therefore, to evaluate the

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[20] Ibid., p.26.

[21] Gupta, n.12.,p.1.

result, one not only need to analyse the response of Pakistan but also critically analyse India's failure at conceptualizing and implementing military strategy which led abortive attempt twice at initiating military action against Pakistan.

**The Pakistan's response:**

Pakistan's response to India's military mobilization was one of defiance. It made counter mobilization of its forces. It also test fired series of missiles. Though President Musharraf condemned the attack on Indian Parliament, he refused to act on the list of most wanted 20 and also sought evidence of Pakistan's involvement in the December 13, 2001 attack.[22]

Due to the increasing pressure from the international community, namely the United States and Britain, which increasingly came out in support of India's position on cross-border terrorism, Pakistan took certain measures against Lashker-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. They were banned and their assets frozen. Maulana Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammad, was also arrested.[23]

This was followed by President Musharraf's much publicized January 13,2002 address. In this he promised to stop any kind of terrorist activities to take place from its territory. The President of Pakistan also declared measures for regulation of madrassas, which are considered as the breeding ground of terrorists, and reining in Islamic fundamentalist endangering peace and security within Pakistan. However, along with these promises, he reaffirmed his country's

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[22] *The Hindu*, December 26,2001 and May 26-29, 2001.
[23] The reason cited for his arrest was said to be because of the provocative speech he made endangering and disturbing their internal peace. *The Hindu*, December 23,2001.

diplomatic, moral and political support for the Kashmiri cause and asserted that Kashmir run in their blood.[24]

These promises by Pakistan, no doubt, were the result of India's military build up, which prompted the international community to lean on Pakistan against its terrorist supportive activities. Pakistan's actions on the whole was much less than what was desired by India. The reason for this being that Pakistan's military and political establishment get its sustenance from the issue of Kashmir.[25] It cannot compromise or seen to comprise on this issue as it will have adverse impact on them. Furthermore, doubt has also been raised regarding the ability of President Musharraf to rein in the fundamental elements within Pakistan. They have very powerful influence in that society and have their say in almost all aspect of their life. Fear was also raised regarding the resistance President Musharraf might encounter from within the military and or Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).[26]Along with this, President Musharraf was in a delicate situation considering the fact that opposition was not forthcoming in extending its support on this issue, and he himself was in the process of consolidating his power. [27]Pakistan also exploited the American war on terrorism in Afghanistan to its advantage. It threatened to move its forces from the western border with Afghanistan, namely in North Western Frontier Province

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[24] Alexander Evans, "India, Pakistan, and the Prospect of War", *Current History*, Vol.101 No.654, April 2002, pp.162-163.
[25] Kashmir is seen as impinging on Pakistan's core identity and partition's unfinished agenda. While India reject the basis of two-nation theory the very creation of Pakistan was championed on that basis.
[26] Eijaz Haider, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Dramatic Reversal", *The World Today*, Vol. 58, No.2 February 2002 p.6.
[27] Eijaz Haider, "Multiple Crises", *The World Today*, Vol. 58, No. 7, July2002, pp.8-9.

sector, to the international border with India. The United States predictably does not want this to happen as it required these soldiers against the fleeing Al Qaeda forces from Afghanistan.

Indian decision-makers did not grasp all these aspects. They did not comprehend the post-September strategic environment in right perspective. It is said that India was too naïve to expect the United States to discard Pakistan. "There was hope in India that the US would soon declare Pakistan as state sponsoring terrorism. India and the US had identical view onterrorism; Pakistan was already under a cloud for having trampled on democracy, something dearly held by both India and the US; and the world was not unaware that the Taliban were the creation of Pakistan. Leading Indian analysts joined the government in predicting that Pakistan had reached the end of the road. However just the opposite happened." [28]Pakistan was made frontrank ally of the American led coalition fighting in Afghanistan and rewarded economically also.

## Military strategy:

According to a section of the strategic community, the mobilization was necessitated as India's option was limited. Non-military measures like economic sanctions had only symbolic value given the low level of trade between the two countries. Severance of transport links would affect on a small section of the

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[28] Lt.Gen. (Retd.) Sood and Sawhney, n.5., p.22.

population with links on the other side. And Islamabad could no longer even be isolated diplomatically given its central role in the campaign against terrorism.[29]

However serious doubts have been raised regarding the wisdom of contemplating military action against Pakistan. This viewpoint has been put forth after analyzing such factors as India-Pakistan military balance, nuclear factor and limitation of proactive policy. All these factors had impinged greatly on India's failed attempt to initiate military action on Pakistan on both occasions in January and June 2002. These issues are being dealt below.

## Limited war-

It was the defence minister George Fernandes who first used the 'limited war' doctrine after kargil war of 1999.[30] Since then, a section of strategic community and the government believe that limited war with Pakistan can be waged even though both countries posses nuclear weapons.[31] Some important members of the government like Deputy Prime Minister L.K.Advani also had talked about 'proactive policy', 'hot pursuit' etc to deal with terrorism and prepared to fight limited war with Pakistan.[32]

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[29] Kalyanaraman, n.2., p.483.

[30] *The Outlook*, May 27, 2002, p.34.
[31] Jasjit Singh, "Dynamics of Limited War", *Strategic Analysis*, October 2000, pp.1205-20. For skeptical views see for example, V.R. Raghavan, "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia", *The Non-Proliferation Review*, Fall-Winter 2001,pp.82-98.

[32] *The Hindu*, New Delhi, January 6,2000.

The basic thrust of these policies was to shut off terrorist flow into India by destroying the terrorist camp of the terrorist crossing the Loc through surgical strikes or by sending in troops to catch the terrorist operating from out side the country's territory. India also contemplated to mount a series of raids across the line of control to capture small areas of interlinked territory, little by little, to eliminate training camps and capture militants. The rationale for these kind of initiatives were no doubt made on the basis of international law, namely the right of self defense and the right of hot pursuit, apparently inspired by the actions of Israel and the United States in the post September 11 incident.[33]

However, there are many serious flaws in this kind of actions.[34] Prominent among them being that most of the training camps for the terrorists situated in Pakistan occupied Kashmir are make shift camps. They come into being only when adequate recruits are obtained for training. Moreover, there is a possibility that they have already been dismantled. Even if terrorist camps were targeted, it would give only temporary respite as they can be reassembled at short notice.

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[33] Article 51 of the UN charter postulate that the right to self-defence is available against armed attack. It is an exception to the otherwise fundamental principle of non-use of force in international relation embodied in UN charter. See V.S. Mani, "Armed Responses and International Law", *The Hindu*, December 28, 2001.

[34] For arguments on these lines see B.Raman, "Proxy War: Indian Style", *The Hindustan Times*, December 31, 2001. V.R. Raghavan, "Responses to Pakistan's Terrorism", *The Hindu*, December 25, 2001. Gautam Sen, "Military action against Pakistan", *The Hindu*, December 28,2001. Siddharth Varadarajan, "Reckless Rhetoric- Tanks no Answer to Terrorism", *The Times of India*, December 27, 2001.

Hot pursuits are also effective only when armed groups indulge in hit and run raids from rear bases in foreign territory across the border. It cannot be used against suicide squads of foreign mercenaries operating from safe sanctuaries within the country.[35] It has also been said that India does not have the capability to mount these kind of military operation. In difficult mountain terrain this would require meticulous planning with limited objectives, adequate numbers of troops, swift operation based on hard intelligence and with comparatively larger losses, which would have to be prepared for and politically accepted. This is not seen in India.[36] Furthermore, any limited conflict has the potential to escalate into full-fledged war with a nuclear dimension to it.[37] Therefore, the wisdom of initiating military action faced serious constraints.

## Nuclear factor-

The nuclear factor played a crucial role in the entire decision-making process. On both occasions, when the military action was called off against Pakistan, nuclear issue was prominent. In India, a line of thinking existed that Pakistan did not have the wherewithal nor the will to exercise nuclear option

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[35] B.Raman, "Proxy War: Indian Style", *The Hindustan Times*, December 31,2001.

[36] Gen. V.N.Sharma, "India's Future Strategy for Pakistan" in Rajeev Sharma (ed.) *Pakistan Trapp* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributor Ltd, 2001), p.49.

[37] While India has a no first use policy on nuclear weapon, Pakistan does not. Infact Pakistan sought to offset through her nuclear weapon the conventional military superiority of India. Concern has also been raised regarding the nuclear button in the hand of military ruler. Moreover fear also expressed that the nuclear weapon might fall into the hand of Jehadi element.

against India. This was premised on the fact that Pakistan would not risk its total annihilation on account of India's second-strike capability to which most of its population and cities are prone. Moreover, the repot that Pakistan possessed TNW[38] has been rubbished on the ground that it does not have the technology to miniaturise a nuclear weapon. However, the Indian decision-makers desisted from going through with war because of the fear that Pakistan might nuke Indi. No one was sure how Pakistan would behave in the event of Indian aggression. Pakistan's series of ballistic missile test during the height of the standoff when India's military action looked imminent point to the fact that Pakistan was successful in deterring India, howsoever it may be denied by India's decision-makers. Lt. General D.B. Shekatkar, former additional director general, military operation and additional director-general perspective planning, asserted that Pakistan was capable of using tactical nuclear weapon. According to him, a series of missiles supplied to Pakistan by China and North Korea are capable of carrying a tactical nuclear weapon. China also has the technology to miniature. [39] Infact Indian troops had undergone training and exercise to counter this threat. In May 2001 the Indian Army carried out "an integrated exercise in the Rajasthan desert to test India's preparedness in the event of a 'chemical, biological and nuclear

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[38] The term Tactical Nuclear Weapon is used to describe smaller versions of nuclear weapons with relatively low destructive capabilities and an impact radius confined to a limited area as against conventional nuclear war heads that can wipe out a entire city. This lower yield versions or minituarised nuclear weapons can be used to inflict damage on strategic military deployments of the enemy. The TNWs include a broad range of atomic explosive devices like nuclear artillery shells, nuclear landmines and nuclear warheads which can be airdropped from planes, launched on missiles or fired from artillery guns. China, which is suspected to have about 120TNWs, is most likely to have transferred few to Pakistan. India does not have TNWs. This perhaps explains Islamabad's nuclear rhetoric. See "Just What is a TNW?", *The Outlook*, June 10,2002, p.45.
[39] Interview with Lt Gen D.B.Shekatkar, *The Outlook*, June 10,2002, p.44.

assault'. In one such exercise, the army indulged in a mock encounter with an enemy air craft carrying a nuclear war head.[40] Therefore, even if theoretically much of the India's argument regarding Pakistan ability to posses and exercise nuclear arsenal against India may look reasonable, practically it is a different story.

All these things point to the fact that India's going nuclear has not furthered its national interest; rather it has hindered. After India's nuclear test, "Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee proclaimed South Asia's new bombs to be 'weapons of peace', which made war an impossibility in the region. The proposition was soon mercilessly exposed by the Kargil war. While nuclear weapons had indeed made any full-scale conventional engagement between India and Pakistan near impossible, paradoxically it has opened the door for an escalation of sub-conventional conflict by Pakistan. While both India and Pakistan have for long been known to possess nuclear weapons, the demonstration of their capabilities worked to impose new thresholds on the use of India's conventional capabilities. India could no longer respond to heightened sub-conventional warfare by threatening to go to war."[41] This stark truth was seen in India's abortive attempt to strike militarily during Operation Parakram. Further more the enormous pressure from the international community mainly from that of the United States has resulted in stifling the development of India's nuclear weaponisation. In India today even army is not really sure about India's real

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[40] *The Outlook*, June 10,2002, pp.45-46.
[41] Praveen Swami, "Beating the Retreat", *Frontline,* November 8,2002, p.14.

nuclear capability. Along with this, the nuclear doctrine, command and control authority has remained vague and not properly put into place.

Compared to this, Pakistan, whose nuclear pursuit has been India specific is able to acquire credible nuclear weapon and delivery system. It does not matter much whether they were developed indigenously or acquired from external sources. Moreover, in Pakistan the real source of political power has always been with the army and this entire thing has naturally simplified the problem of command and control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

Overall, therefore, only reason for India going nuclear and the dilemma which India's decision-makers as was evident during operation Parakram can well be summarized in the language of Nicholas D. Kristof: "For a variety of reasons, and most of them foolish and having to do with national prestige, India created a nuclear arm race in South Asia. Having pulled both itself and Pakistan into the nuclear club, India has to calm down and engage Pakistan with same terrified delicacy with which the United States, Russia and China treat each other".[42]

## Conventional military strength:

In India there is a general believe that India is far superior to Pakistan in terms of conventional military strength and has also defeated the enemy in

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[42] Nicholas D. Kristof, "India-Pakistan: From War Simulations to the Real Thing", *International Herald Tribune,* January 1,2002.

the last two wars which it fought, namely the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war and the 1999 Kargil war. India therefore can overwhelm Pakistan militarily and end cross-border terrorism once and for all.

However, historically and in present context, Pakistan has able to maintain rough parity in conventional military strength compared to India. Even the Kargil Review committee has pointed out that "on the Indian side, it has been made more abundantly clear that the Indian Army has not for sometimes enjoyed a punitive edge over the Pakistan Army to adopt strategy.[43] This has been because of the fact that Pakistan could qualitatively improve her military strength because of American arms aid. Compared to this India's defence spending has increasingly been neglected first by the P.V.Narasimha Rao government who concentrated increasingly on economic reform measure and later on by the H.D.Dewe Gowda and I.K.Gujral government.[44] The result has been that India's military does not have sophisticated weapon. The result can be seen in less than effective counter insurgency measure in Jammu and Kashmir.

The defence analysts generally accept that India's true conventional military prowess is obtained only in a long war scenario lasting about three to four months. This however is not possible considering the enormous international pressure, which is likely to be exerted in the event of India Pakistan war. The general problem afflicting India's armed forces and nature of India

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[43] *The Kargil Review Committee Report* (New Delhi: Sage Publications), p.77.
[44] Lt.Gen. (Retd.) Sood and Sawhney, n.5., pp.157-158.

Pakistan military balance has been summarized by Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K.Sood and

Pravin Sawhney as follows:

> 1.The Indian and Pakistan armies are nearly matched at the operational level of war.2. The Pakistan Air Force has quantum-jumped its long-range strike tonnage to approach near parity with the Indian Air Force.3. Pakistan is expected to use its ballistic missiles with conventional warheads in both the depth and contact battles to supplement its air force. Unlike India's Prithvi, Pakistan's ballistic missiles use solid propellants and better guidance system acquired from China.4. For the envisaged short and intense fullscale war, true air-land capabilities are a must. In the obtained circumstance, the synergistic effort of closely coordinated joint operations will not be available.5. The army's new thinking necessitates an aggressive and proactive posture. It requires restructuring of security instruments to provide versatile and balanced forces, greater induction of technology, greater flexibility in force levels and organizations, and greater inter-services coordination, which are not available at present.6. The land based and air firepower and mobility of India leave much to be desired.[45]

All these aspects were not completely ignored by the decisionmakers

who had to abort their war plan twice during the operation Parakram.


**CONCLUSION:**

The military mobilization by India in 2002, has generally been

interpreted by many in India as ploy to put pressure on the United States to stop

Pakistan from aiding and abetting militancy in Kashmir. This is partly true. No

doubt, India had for some years now, increasingly tried to convince the

international community mainly America to rein in Pakistan. However, during the

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[45] Ibid., p.170.

Operation Parakram, India contemplated initiating military action twice in January and June. However, on both occasions, it did not materialize mainly because of the India's decision maker. Though they were convinced that Pakistan needed to be taught a lesson militarily they were not sure how to go about. The ill-conceived military adventure, was from the beginning, doomed for failure as the decision-makers were not sure about the political objective and, at best, their action can be termed as Knee-jerk reaction to the December 13 attack on Indian parliament.

Therefore, when the military action seemed unlikely and not feasible, the decision-makers increasingly pleaded with the United States to address their grievances. However, this also did not have the desired result. This was a direct result of their inability to anticipate the unfolding events of post 9/11 strategic environment mainly in India's neighbourhood. They, as such, were left with no option but to order withdrawal of troops. This necessitated that they had to invent some achievements so that they can backout without loosing face. The ensuing Kashmir election gave them an opening. The process of demobilization, the main theme of the next chapter, will deal with these aspects in details.

# CHAPTER – 4

## THE PROCESS OF DE-MOBILISATION

India's decision to pull back the troop after ten months of forward deployment on the border with Pakistan marked the end of India's unprecedented military mobilization since the December 13, 2001 attack on Indian parliament. The Cabinet Committee on Security is understood to have ordered the pullback on the basis of recommendations of the full National Security Council comprising the National Security Advisory Board and Strategic Policy Group. Several members reportedly contended that continued deployment of forces did not pass the muster of cost-benefit analysis.[1] The official word used was "redeployment" and not withdrawal, which means that the strategy will ensure that the guard is not lowered. In principle, it will maintain the defensive stance while withdrawing additional troops.[2] The redeployment would involve India pulling back its two strike corps, massed tanks and heavy artillery from the international border in the Jammu sector (of Jammu & Kashmir), Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat.[3] Before that warships were withdrawn from forward locations in the Arabian Sea in May 2002 and prior to that over flight curbs on

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[1] Editorial, *The Hindustan Times*, October 17, 2002.
[2] Pranab Dhal Samanta, "When an Army Moves", *The Hindu*, October 27, 2002.

[3] Sudha Ramachandran, "India: Withdrawal Symptoms", http://www.atimes.com, p.1.

Pakistan planes were lifted. However, the troops in Jammu andKashmir were to remain stationed as usual.[4]

Whatever might have been the rationale and circumstances for the decision on demobilization, one thing is certain that it brought respite from the fear of military showdown between the two adversaries and the likely nuclear holocaust, which prompted the dignitaries from Western countries to come in droves to the subcontinent and finding ways and means for de-escalating the crisis.

Like the mobilization, demobilization of soldiers had also fair amount of scrutiny by the media and strategic community and also the public in general. The issues raised in this context varied from the one relating to the circumstances in which the said decision were made by the decision-makers to likely consequences of the increasing role of the international community on the India-Pakistan conflict in terms of India's future strategy on the Kashmir issue.

The Indian decision to demobilize was, no doubt, the result of a number of factors which included external pressure, the abortive military strike attempt, the feeling of exhaustion by the forces, government's unwillingness to prolong a state of high alertness, and the absence of a clear link between the military action and political objectives.

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[4] *The Hindu*, October 17, 2002.

All these aspects are being analyzed by looking at the following things:

1) Internal factors: the cost of mobilization in military and economic terms will be analysed. The rationale provided by the government for de-escalation is also scrutinized.

2) External factors: The role of international community in defusing the tension between the two countries. The nature of its initiatives and the India's responses to them.

3) The role of United States[5] in deescalating the tension between the two countries. Its role is analysed against the background of its involvement in India – Pakistan conflict.

## INTERNAL FACTORS:

Any analysis of internal factors resulting in de-escalation must be made and situated in context of the sets of demand India's decision-makers made to Pakistan as part of the decision to deploy soldiers along the international border with Pakistan.

India's demands and pre-condition for de-escalation, as spelt out by Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister were: Pakistan had to hand over 20 key suspected terrorists, 14 of them Indian nationals red-flagged by Interpol. It had to issue a "categorical and unambiguous renunciation of terrorism" and close down training camps for terrorists, choke their finance lines and weapons

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[5] The role of United States is being done separately by taking into account the critical role that country had played in defusing tension in south Asia between these two adversaries historically and also regarding the present crisis.

supplies and stop the infiltration of men and supply of arms in Jammu and Kashmir.[6] This was followed by an assessment of the ground situation as a follow up to the promise of President Musharaff to stop terrorist activities from that country. These were to be measured on the basis of assessment of factors such as level of the violence, magnitude of communication traffic between terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir and their mentors across the Loc, trends of supplies in terms of food and ammunition, pace of Hawala transactions and the intensity of firing from the Pakistani side which usually picks up during infiltration bids. It was also observed that the armed forces would not be moved before the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir.[7]

Among these precondition for demobilization, none of these demands were fulfilled.[8] The government did not specify any specific reason for de escalation except the assertion that the troops were being redeployed after a successful mission.[9] However, it was also brought to notice that the National Security Advisory Board and Special Planning Group advised that the mobilization

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[6] Praveen Swami, "Beating the Retreat", *Frontline*, November 8,2002 p.12.

[7] It may also be noted that India's initial demand after the December 13 attack on Indian parliament were action against Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashker-e-Tioba, later four pointed agenda were given. Along with these, later on, demand also were made regarding disbanding of 70 terrorist camps reportedly came up in POK after Pervez Musharraf's Speech on January 12; action against 3,000 terrorists who were waiting to infiltrate into India in order to disrupt the ensuing election in Jammu and Kashmir. See Raj Chengappa and Shishir Gupta, "In Striking Distance", *India Today*, June 3,2002 p.28

[8] Pakistan flatly refused handing over of twenty terrorists demanded by India. Even though the Jammu and Kashmir election was considered success by the government, the proposition has also been questioned. This is because of the fact that a large number of civilian as well as political workers were killed during the course of election. See n.6., p.12.

[9] The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) while deciding for demobilisation expressed that, "the armed forces had, with great distinction, achieved the objectives assigned to them.
Sandeep Dikshit, "Government Orders Withdrawal of Troops from IB", *The Hindu* (New Delhi) October 17, 2002.

was not cost effective which was the basis for re-deployment. The successful completion of election in Jammu and Kashmir also was cited as an added reason for the said decision. India, according to an analyst was looking for "an excuse to pull back its troops and cut the costs. That opportunity came in June with Musharraf's promise to the US to put a permanent end to infiltration. In the weeks that followed, there was in fact a fall in infiltration. However, India could not risk lowering its guard along the border then for crucial elections in Jammu & Kashmir were just three months away. The completion of those elections gave India an opening. The international endorsement it received for the conduct of a free and fair poll strengthens India's objectives."[10]

Without any clear policy statement from the decisionmakers on demobilization, the strategic communities have attributed varied reasons regarding the government decision. From the perspectives of costbenefit analysis, following material and human cost can be seen to be prominent in the ten month long mobilization of armed forces.

**Economic factors:**

Though it is certain that no concrete economic cost can be given, the cost was prohibitive if we take into account of the diversion of military assets and men from the eastern theatre to the front with Pakistan. The effort in relocation was minimal for the Air Force and slightly more for the Navy. But transporting

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[10] Ramachandran, n.3., p.1.

troops from the eastern-most fringes of the country to the western and northern peripheries was a huge task for the army. Even the tank replacement regiments were sent to the front. The resultant transpot and fuel cost were enormous. The redeployment was arduous and costly.[11] A army study reveals, " the initial mobilisation for Operation Parakram which includes transportation, supplies and logistics has cost the exchequer Rs 500 crore. Moving an infantry brigade of 3,000 thousand men costs Rs3-5lakh. It cost Rs25 lakh to move regiment of 45 tanks by train, and artillery gun costs Rs20 lakh per regiment in deployment."[12]The daily maintenance cost including giving field allowance for one year and transfer allowance as also the wear and tear cost of equipment and depletion of mines, ammunition and war-like store also added to the cost. These cost has been estimated by the Army Headquarter were as follows:

> The cost of mobilisation of 500,000 troops including pay and allowances, field allowance for one year and transfer grant alone is Rs 700 crore (Rs 7 billion). The wear and tear cost of equipment adds up to Rs 1,300 crore (Rs 13 billion). The depletion of mines, ammunition and warlike stores is around Rs 550 crore (Rs 5.5 billion). Transport and fuel costs together add up to Rs 850 crore (Rs 8.5 billion). And compensation paid to civilians for loss of property, life, crops, etc is around Rs 350 crore (Rs 3.5 billion). The figure adds up to Rs 3,860 crore (Rs 38.6 billion) and doesn't include the cost of withdrawal of troops (estimated at around Rs 500 crore) and the cost of demining one million mines for which new demining equipment had to be bought. Nor does this figure include the cost of deploying (and redeploying) the Navy, the Indian Air Force and the Coast Guard, which

[11] Sandeep Dikshit, "Close Calls", The Hindu, October 27, 2002.
[12] Shishir Gupta, "Keeping the Heat On", India Today, May 20,2002, p.41.

is estimated to be another Rs 1000 crore (Rs 10 billion). [13]

The secondary economic costs involve the loss of vast tract of agricultural land due to the laying of mines. It was reported that in Rajasthan alone, the number of peasant households affected was not less than 1,50,000. Moreover, the loss gets compounded as the vast stretches of agricultural land remained fallow for a period of almost a year. Another estimate has it that in Jammu and Kashmir alone, the army laid mines on around 25,000 acres of land. And clearing these mines is much more hazardous than laying them. Moreover every time mines are laid and removed some areas are never really de-mined. These exercises claim a number of civilian and military personnel.[14]The business loss can also be attributed to the cost as the war hype affected the tourism sector and general investment scenario also.[15]The human cost included large number of military and civilian causalities because of landmine explosion and other mishaps. Along with this livestocks also were lost.[16]

[13]Aditi Phadnis, "Parakram Cost Put at Rs 6,500 Crore", http://www.rediff.com, p.1.

[14]CPIML Websites, "Restore Normal Diplomatic Ties with Pakistan and Resume Dialogue",http://www.cpiml.org , p.1.
Farmers in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat provinces are demanding compensation from the federal government for the extensive mine fields laid by the troops along the 1,800-mile border during the military buildup. See Shaikh Azizur Rahman, "Cost of Border Standoff Rises", http:// www.atimes.com, p.1.

[15] Huge business losses resulted because of downfall in stocks market due to war hype.
Editorial, The Hindustan Times, October 17,2002.

[16] The Outlook, June 17, 2002, p.20.

From the above analysis it can be said that the money could have been better utilized rather than wasted in course of Operation Parakram. It is rightly pointed out that " the proceeds of the 4 per cent tax imposed in Union Budget could have better used to upgrade counter-terrorism and surveillance capabilities. Portable surveillance radar, which was purchased for Rs.350 crores from Israel, for example, could have been paid for with a fraction of the funds spent on Parakram. The El-Op manufactured radar, which can detect human movement at up to 4,000 metres, would have just like a drop in the ocean.[17]

## Military factors:

According to defence analysts the deployment is sustainable at battle ready mode upto six months and renewable thereafter with greater short-and-long term costs. After a certain period of time, therefore, deployment of troops is counter productive.[18] The manifestation of problem can be seen in several forms. The prolong mobilization and separation from home had created stress related indiscipline, namely the deliberate killing of colleague by the soldiers (referred to as "fragging").

Defence Minister George Fernandes reported in Parliament that "combat stress" brought on fighting insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir had led to more than 20 incidents of "fragging" since 1997. It is also generally believed that

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[17] Swami, n.6., p.14.

[18] Ashok K Mehta, "The Costs of Troops Deployment: How it Affects Economic Growth", *Tribune* (Chandigarh), January 29, 2002.

many "fragging instances are covered up for reasons of insurance payments and out of respect for dead families.[19]

Besides this, many soldiers in Kashmir suffer from hypertension, high blood pressure and excessive sweating. Many of them continue to show signs of mental disorder months after being relieved of their duties in Kashmir. Doctors at the army's Research and Referral Hospital in New Delhi say that a combination of high-altitude living and constant stress is sapping the sex drive of many soldiers who report "marriage problems" on return from their tours of duty.[20] Before Operation Parakram the percentage of stress-related cases of indiscipline stood at 0.42-0.45 of the total cases of indiscipline in the army. After Operation Parakram the figure has increased to an 'unprecedented level of 1.21 percent'. In over all terms it was a 200 percent rise during the course of 10 months military build up.[21] Moreover the armed forces were also unhappy with the disutility of mobilization on high alert in harsh condition as no clear sign was given by the decision-makers regarding its objectives and motives.[22] Also training courses, an important feature of Army life, were disrupted due to 10 month long deployment. "Armoured formations have also reported relatively high rate of heatrelated

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[19] Shaikh Azizur Rahman, "Indian Troops Tiered, Stressed on Border", http://www.war-times.com , p.1.

[20] Ibid.
[21] Ramchandran, n.3.,p.1.
[22] Praful Bidwai, "De-escalation, But No Thaw Yet", http://www.chowk.com , p.1.

engine problems in the T-70 main battle tank, the main weapon used by the Army's strike corps."[23]

The army has devised various strategies to keep the troops motivated. "Army Chief General S.Padamanabhan has directed all the mobilized units to go into training mode and use the opportunity to rehearse specific operational strategies. From August 2002, Army Headquarters allowed 15 percent of troops in each formation to go on leave for 35 days. Junior commissioned officers were trained to handle stress among jawans deployed on the borders. Army officers also were directed to pay special attention to the management and welfare of the soldiers on the front."[24]

Infact whatever India gained during the Operation Parakram was related to operational gains for the army arising out of military exercise and practical experience. The Army chief, General Padmanabhan asserted that Operation Parakram was very useful. He said that it had proved boon for the armed forces to upgrade its training and as well as its equipment availability.[25] General Vij who succeeded General Padmanabhan pointed out gain from military mobilization asserting that "the Army in recent months had covered a 'reasonable ground to equip formations of the Northern Command, responsible for Jammu and Kashmir, with ground sensors and other major surveillance system and also assimilation and absorption of the Russian frontline T-90 tanks and upgradation

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[23] Praveen Swami, "Building Confrontation", *Frontline*, June 7,2002,p.9.
[24] Shishir Gupta, "Life on the Edge", *India Today*, September 9, 2002, p.36.
[25] *Decan Herald*, December 31,2002.

of T-72 tanks, T-1 sights for tanks and armoured carrier are in full swing."[26]

According Lt.Gen (Retd.) Sood and Pravin Sawney operational gain for the

armies in concrete terms were:

1) Today the army is confident of employing its dual-tasked forces, which were moved from the Chinese front in the east to J&K in the west against Pakistan. These include up to three divisions and a corps headquarters. Given that the government has decided to call the demobilization of the army a strategic relocation, these additional forces in the J&K sector will not move to their peacetime locations in a hurry.

2) The army achieved a high level of coordination with the railways and civil administration for strategic movement of forces across the country. This would help a future mobilization, if needed, to be much smoother and faster.

3) The army was able to find shortcomings in its mobilization drills and evolve self-operating procedure.

4) The importance of the Special Forces and commando units with infantry battalions on the LoC was highlighted. Army Chief Gen. Vij hinted that the special forces had done a good job, and would hence get special attention, implying better equipment and communication. These indicate that the army plans to raise a few more special forces for J&K. [27]

## INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:

With both sides adopting confrontationist attitude the world community

started applying diplomatic pressure on India and Pakistan to take meaningful

steps to bring about de-escalation along their border. In late May and June

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[26] *The Pioneer,* January 13,2003.

[27]Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K.Sood and Pravin Sawhney, *Operation Parakram- The War Unfinished* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003) pp.179-179.

several countries including the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Australia, Japan, Denmark and New Zealand asked their citizens to leave the subcontinent. The United States, Russia and China coordinated their activities. At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) at Almaty, informal advise was given to India and Pakistan to achieve de-escalation of tensions at the borders.[28]

The international community was sympathetic to India's stated position on cross-border terrorism, aided and abetted by Pakistan. At the same time, it maintained that the course of military action India embarked would be fraught with danger.[29] Their contention was that any military conflict between these two countries could result in enormous human and material cost for these countries. The consequences would not only be limited to the region but also the entire world. The best possible way to deal with the situation, according to international community is through negotiation. They strongly advocated bilateral dialogue between the two countries to resolve all their outstanding issues including the one related to the status of Kashmir. They also put forth various constructive measures to address the concern of India, like the one advocated by Japan for

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[28] *The Pioneer*, June 29, 2002.

[29] Russia solidly backed India's position and attributed border tension to unending anti-national activities of the jehadis based in territory under Pakistan's control. Japan warned Musharraf that economic aid to Pakistan would be up for review if he did not curb cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. The United Kingdom rubbished Pakistan claims of freedom struggle in Kashmir and feels that the 1947-48 UN resolution on Kashmir were not valid in 2002.
See Shishir Gupta and Rajeev Deshpande, "Diplomatic Endgame", *India Today*, June 10, 2002 pp.36-39.

installing sensors along the border to monitor the infiltration of terrorists into India.

The international community's influence on the de-escalation of the crisis can be seen from the fact that India, which could not get the overwhelming support on the issue of combating terrorism, felt the need not to push too far its military posturing. Many countries, by advising their citizen to leave the subcontinent, also affected India economically. This is due to the fact that not only tourist flow was affected but also it gave wrong signal to the prospective international investors. India did not want to lose the goodwill of the international community, which stem generally from India's restraint and responsible behavior traditionally seen in its dealing with Pakistan.

Analyzing the various aspects of the response of international community to the crisis, we can make some generalized observations on India's crisis decision-making. One is that India, before opting for military buildup failed to gauze the likely response of international community. Moreover, it also did not mobilize the support for its cause from the global audience, which is so much essential for undertaking any adventure like the one it did. The only gain, which India's decision-makers can rightfully claim from the international community, is its acknowledgement of Pakistan's complicity in the terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. This, at best, can be said to be only a secondary gain.

The monitoring of border to check and access infiltration mooted by countries like Japan did not fructify. While countries like Japan advocated the

positioning of international monitors along with Indian and Pakistani observers to verify any reduction of infiltration across the Loc, India has favored joint patrolling of the border. This also did not materialize as both countries have different perception on this issue.[30]

**THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES:**

The sub-continental stand off in 2002 once again brought to fore the critical role the United States has played in South Asia. The very fact that India's decision to mobilize armed forces on the international border, as has been seen by the strategic community and other, as intended to put pressure on the United States to stop Pakistan in its terrorist supportive activites on the Indian soil, also underline the importance of America's role. Moreover, America's influence in the region and its effectiveness lies in the fact that it, being the sole superpower, has enormous economic, military and political clout. Consequently, as was clearly visible, the contour of India's policies and objectives were enormously shaped and influenced by America's stance and initiatives.

The concern of the United States stems from the fear that conflict between the two countries might lead to nuclear holocaust in the subcontinent. This aspect has been well brought out by C.Raja Mohan, who asserts that, "it

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[30] Mr. Vajpayee, at the end of his four-day visit to Almaty, floated the idea of "joint patrolling which is premised on various reasons such as: 1) it gives India an opportunity to take progressive and proactive steps to address the infiltration problem, by offering Pakistan the opportunity to follow up on its commitments on the ground 2) it stops the internationalization process in its tracks with the offer of a perfectly implementable bilateral mechanism and finally 3) by committing itself to the idea, Pakistan cannot absolve itself of the responsibility of checking infiltration, putting Gen. Musharraf's promises on the line. For Pakistan, however, the system of international monitor is more attractive because it absolves it of responsibility and most importantly involve third party in the dispute with India which it desire for long.

was the very logic of nuclear weapons that the world would devote attention as never before to the crisis management and eventually conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. The frequency of American diplomatic intervention in the subcontinent increased after the introduction of nuclear weapons. During the Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, the May 1990 crisis, the Kargil in June-July 1999 and the post December 2001 confrontation between India and Pakistan. Each time America devoted high level diplomatic energies to diffuse tensions between the sub continental rivals and preventing them from escalating to nuclear level."[31] Other reason for which the US has stake in South Asia, though not much related to the 2002 military standoff, is its aim to counter China by building a strategic partnership with India,[32] and also because of the fact that, "besides this region being a source of narcotics and terrorists, the South Asian migrants to the US forms a new and unprecedented link between the US and countries in the region."[33]

One of the crucial reasons for which the United States had to spend enormous diplomatic resource during the Operation Parakram was strategic. Strategically, it did not want to get distracted from antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan in which Pakistan was an important ally. Pakistan's threat of pulling its troops out of Afghan border would have affected America's agenda of sealing the influx of people and terrorists from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The US was

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[31] C. Raja Mohan, "The Problem", *Seminar*, September 2002, p.14.

[32] Mahnaz Isaphani, "Alternative South Asian Futures", *Seminar*, September 2002, p.17.

[33] Saleem Kidwai, "How Can the United States Play a Role in Indo-Pak Confidence-Building?", in Moonis Ahmar, *The Challenges of Confidence-Building in South Asia* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.133.

also concerned that in the event of war in South Asia, there would be curbs on its use of air space. Along with this the Bush administration was worried bout the security for US civilian and military personnel and installations inside Pakistan guarded by Pakistani troops.[34]

Sumit Ganguly has given various reasons for the support of Pakistan which the U.S sought in its war on terrorism. They were:

> Minimally, the United States sought to use Pakistani territory and military bases as staging areas for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. More substantively, however, Washington wanted Pakistani's dreaded Inter-Services-intelligence directorate (ISI) not only to sever its connections with the Taliban but also to provide information about the whereabouts of the key member of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Also in an attempt to shape the longer-term political future of Pakistan and Afghanistan, it wanted Musharraf to crackdown on the various militant Islamic organizations that had proliferated in Pakistan over the preceding decade. Specifically, it wanted Pakistan to curb its support for the Islamic militants who had been wreaking havoc in Indian – controlled Kashmir since 1990. This last item however, apparently was not one that the United States was willing to treat as a compelling priority. [35]

The United States because of these factors had to do balancing act. On the one hand, it advised India to exercise restraint and promised that it would prevail over Pakistan. On the other hand, it praised Pakistan for assisting the US campaign in Afghanistan.[36] The modus operandi of the United States in diffusing

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[34] Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Concern in the U.S", *Frontline*, January 18,2002, p.16.

[35] Sumit Ganguly, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 654, April 2002 pp.147-148.

[36] It has been argued by some that prior to the Indian massing of troops, the US was unresponsive to India's concerns regarding Pakistan's support to cross-border terrorism. However, when the Indian mobilization prompted Pakistan to divert a sizeable section of its

tension between India and Pakistan in 2002 has been that on the one hand it cajoled Pakistan to act on certain aspects of India's demand and on the other advised India to show restraint and back up from military misadventure. India also promised that its concern would be looked into once its preoccupation namely the war on terror against Taliban-al-Qaida was over.

The nature of the United States initiative during the crisis was thus summed up by Alexander Evans as:

> Washington conducted an open and private campaign to encourage India to back down from open conflict, all the time encouraging Pakistan to take steps against its own militants. President Bush also personally announced the banning of the Lashker-e-Taiba on December 21, 2001, calling it a "stateless sponsor of terrorism". His statement signaled America's commitment to take a stand against groups determined to exacerbate Indo-Pakistani hostility. And when Musharraf finally conceded some of India's demands, American leaders were quick to praise him.[37]

Anil Padmanabhan had summed up specifically what America wanted Pakistan to do with respects to India. They were:

> Musharraf should take steps against infiltration that can be detected by India and ensure all commitments made to the world on terrorism are fulfilled. Islamabad should not flaunt its nuclear prowess and threaten India with first use of nukes to balance Delhi's conventional arms superiority. After stopping sponsorship of terrorism, Musharraf should initiate meaningful engagement with India so that tensions on the border are erased. The general should unilaterally reduce troops on the Loc

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troops deployed along its border with Afghanistan to its eastern border with India, things changed, for now US combing operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban were thrown into jeopardy. See Ramchandran, n.3., p.1.

[37] Alexander Evans, "India, Pakistan, and the Prospect of War", *Current History*, Vol.101, No. 654, April 2002, p.164.

and deploy them on the Durand Line to make the US operation against Al-Qaida effective. Pakistan's ISI should prevent Al-Qaida elements from regrouping in Pakistan and making Kashmir the new battleground of radical Islam. [38]

The intensity of the United States role increased considerably when India's military action looked twice imminent during the ten months standoff - first in the month of January and second in the month of June 2002 after the attack at Kaluchak. It successfully halted India initiating any military actions. Shishir Gupta brought out the US factor, which halted the contemplated India's military action. They were:

> On the first occasion the US stance and initiatives were: Called for Indian restraint but conceded Delhi's right to respond to Islamist terrorist attacks.2) In case of a war by Pakistan, India would be hampered by the US forces in Pakistan and in north Arabian Sea.3) Declared LeT and JeM as terrorist outfits and put the heat on Musharraf to publicly renounce terrorism in Kashmir.4) Feared Musharraf would go nuclear after the Indian strike.
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> And after the Kaluchak incident its concern and initiative included: 1) A full-scale India-Pakistan conflict could hamper the US operations against Bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan.2) The US told India it was putting pressure on Musharraf to permanently end cross-border infiltration in Kashmir.3) War could damage the growing Indo-US cooperation in nuclear energy, space, hi-tech equipment and defence. [39]

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[38] Anil Padmanabhan, "Can America Tame the General?", *India Today*, June 10, 2002, p.41.

[39] Shishir Gupta, "India Today's account of the Indo-Pakistan mobilization crisis January and June 2002", http:// www.orbat.com, p.1.

The visible gains to India accruing from the U.S role during the standoff were: the January 13,2002 President Musharaff's speech renouncing terrorism; Pakistani promises on ending infiltration permanently and dismantle the terrorist camps after the Kaluchak massacre on May 14, 2002 and commitment of Colin Powell during his visit to the subcontinent in July 2002 to keep up pressure on Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism and backed India's position on the sequence of steps leading to a dialogue on Kashmir.

However, India's decision-makers were disappointed with the United States whose pressure at Pakistan to stop its terrorist supportive activities against India did not yield the expected result. Serious reservations were raised by India with the nature of America's campaign against terrorism. The U.S was also accused of adopting double standard. However, the bilateral relations did not deteriorate much between the two countries. This was because of India's realization of America's compulsion. According to Sumit Ganguly, "the Bush administration has managed to display a greater degree of deftness in formulating a policy towards India. This time despite its heavy reliance on Pakistan and its lionizing of General Musharraf, the Bush administration's has deftly managed to avoid rift with India". This seeming dexterity in the Bush administration's South Asia policy, according to him, arises because of two reason.1) the coalition regime in New Delhi, led by Prime Minister Atal Behari

Also see Major General (retd) Ashok K Mehta, "India closer to war twice", http://www.........co.. , p.1.

Vajpayee's Bharatiya Janata Party, has proved far more pragmatic in dealing with the United States than almost any previous Indian administration, and 2) the end of visceral anti-Americanism in India, coupled with the Soviet Union's demise, made the America's task of engaging India considerably easier.[40]

## CONCLUSION:

India's decision to demobilize its forces has generally been welcomed because of futility of the exercise, which was a drain on the exchequer and also its potential to escalate into a greater hostility assuming nuclear dimension. The economic and human cost of the deployment has beenfigured out. However, the contention lies in the likely military and diplomatic cost of mobilization, which generally believed to have been a failure. It has been rightly argued that without much concession accrued even with conventional military superiority, Pakistan would be encouraged to continue its proxy war. Further more, the credibility of India's future options is also at stake. India's military threat might not be taken seriously in the future.

Therefore, the future strategy regarding Pakistan should be carefully made. While some argue that only way to resolve contentious issues between India and Pakistan including the Kashmir tangle is through dialogue. The nuclearisation of subcontinent effectively has shut off the military option őr India.[41]

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[40] Ganguly, n.35., pp.149-151.
[41] Praful Bidwai, "Closer to Nuclear Madness", http://www.annwar.com, p.1.

It is also generally advocated that "Pakistan's integrity, stability and prosperity are in our national interest and there is need to improve trade, economic cooperation and 'people to people contacts' between the two countries.[42] The other section argues that India, inspite of trying to engage Pakistan through out the decade of 1990s, had gained nothing. The failed Lahore and Agra peace initiatives have been cited as a case in point. As such a section of them argues for covert action in Pakistan, which would inflict economic and other cost, which would be a lesson for that country. Ajai Shani argued that talking with Pakistan or any of its sponsored terrorist or their front organizations will not help. The entire problem confronting South Asia has been the militarised Islamist-fundamentalist state of Pakistan. Therefore, to rectify this state of affair, enormous cost has to be subjected on that country through economic-military-political competition. In the process, their political and economic system should be debilitated and destroyed. Only then that country would shun terrorism and geo-strategic ambitions.[43]

Similarly the Western countries' role, namely that of the United States, on bilateral issues of the two counties has similarly been debated. While some argue that these countries need to be involved only then Pakistan would be

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[42] Arguments on these line see Jasjit Singh, "Watch the Signals From Across the Border: The Commando Speaks," *The Indian Express*, May 29, 2002.
[43] Ajai Shahni, War within border, "countering terrorism- The core issue is Pakistan" *Defence and Technology*, Vol. II, No. 9, January 2003, pp. 35-38, http://www.satp.org, p.1.

pressurized to end its terrorist supportive activities,[44] others contend that a third party should not be involved.

However, it must be contended that the incrementally activist role adopted by the United States and other major powers in the sub continental inter-state relations amounts to third party intervention.[45] This naturally leads to questions regarding the prospect of third party intervention or facilitation role as some prefer to call it. Furthermore, even if other countries are allowed to facilitate normalization of relations between the two countries, one is not sure that it will lead to conflict management or conflict resolution. All these warrant that India's decision-makers should formulate clear-cut policies in this regard. Also important is that India should not excessively be dependent on countries like the United States. The present crisis clearly shows the limited extent to which other countries would commit themselves and help India.

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[44] C. Raja Mohan, *The Hindu*, February 14, 2002.
[45] J. N. Dixit, "Three is a Crowd Always", *The Hindustan Times*, February 8, 2002.

# CHAPTER – 5

## CONCLUSION

The analysis of three crises from historical perspective in the present study gives an interesting insight on India's security decisionmaking institutions and processes. This is because whereas, the Siachen (1984) and Brasstacks (1986-87) crises happened during the Congress rule, the Kargil (1999) crisis happened during the BJP led NDA government at the center. The nature of the crisis decision-making processes during these crises was remarkably similar. This is evident mainly from the ad hoc nature of decisions, centralizing tendency where only a few individuals at the top take the crucial decision, and lack of inter-departmental coordination. In the Kargil conflict, which is widely recognized as political, military and diplomatic victory for the country, the institutions like the NSC played very insignificant role. It is found that the intelligence apparatus was responsible for the Kargil intrusion. Therefore, only thing that can be concluded is that even after setting up of specialized institutions, the nature of security decision-making has not changed. The reason for this could well be found in the Kargil Review Committee. It states, "the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishmerts appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the

background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war"[1].

The military mobilization in 2002 has also highlighted many of the deficiencies associated with non-institutionalization of decision-making processes. These deficiencies and the lessons that can be drawn from Operation Parakram can concretely be analysed under the following heads.

## Defining clear political objectives:

After the Cabinet Committee on Security meeting on October 16,2002 in which India's decision-makers decided to demobilize its soldiers from the international border, India's Defence Minister, when asked whether the government has achieved the objective set out to achieve, said that 'the armed forces have with great distinction, achieved the objective assigned to them'.[2] This statement compliments the undeclared political objective during the time of mobilisation and reflects the confusion in the minds of the decision-makers from the beginning. The failure of Operation Parakram lies precisely in this.

The indecisiveness of the government on many occasions during the standoff had negative impact on India's credibility. Inspite of twice ordering military action during the standoff, it prematurely aborted the plan, as it neither had guts nor clear objectives. During the course of mobilisation the government was still discussing whether limited war or a full-scale war should be waged.

[1] *Kargil Review Committee Report*, http://www.geocities.com, p.1.
[2] *The Times of India*, October 17,2002.

Regarding its demands made to Pakistan, the government not only kept on changing but also some times appeared ridiculous. A case for instance is the most wanted list of twenty. Regarding this, it has rightly been said that a huge country with a billion population would not risk nuclear war for twenty criminals.

The basic flaws in the government's decision stems from the fact that it wanted Pakistan to give up something militarily, i.e it should stop its activities in Kashmir. Pakistan's military and political establishment cannot compromise on the issue of Kashmir, which is considered as part of their core identity. Expecting the US to address India's concern was not right because it had its own interest in Afghanistan.

All these things necessarily entail that India should not have made a knee jerk reaction to any provocative incidents. The political goal and strategy should be objectively defined.

**De-linking political from the military objectives:**

Domestic political agenda and security issues should not be interpolated, and the nation should be taken into confidence before taking any crucial security decisions. The government should also be open to varied opinion on security issues. These can be achieved only when the issue is dealt with sincerely and not given political color. The exploitation of anti terrorist sentiment for political purpose will not bring any result. It has been argued by a section of people that "there is no dearth of strategists in BJP ranks who think that a war

hysteria would help overcome the five-year record of corruption and criminal misgovernance in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab."[3] Shail Mayaram further argues in the similar line stating, "the political context for war exists. The crucial Uttar Pradesh elections are due in March and once again the ruling party feels the precariousness of its support base".[4]

Security issues should be dealt with professionally and not interpolated with domestic agenda. Security decision-making is a long-term perspective and is best done by the expert and professional. They should be given crucial leeway and autonomy and independence.

**Institutionalization of decision-making processes:**

**Centralization-**

It appears that during Operation Parakram also decision-making was highly centralized. The various security decision-making agencies were not involved properly. A commentator said: " The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) who met on October 16, 2002 to discuss the pullback, had before them no study papers on the subject, nor detail research data on the potential outcomes of the move. It took the NSAB barely two hours to recommend that troops be pulled back; the body was not summoned before Operation Parakram was initiated. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) again dispatched the issue in all of 90 minutes, again without detailed consultations with top military

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[3] Harish Khare, "Mobilising Democratic Opinion for War", *The Hindu*, December 27,2001.
[4] Shail Mayaram, "Do We Want War?", *The Hindu*, December 27,2001.

officials or the internal security bureaucracy.[5] This underlines the fact that, centralized decision-making was the norm during this crisis also.

Inspite of the fact that institutionalized security decision-making are sought to be done by setting up institutions such as NSC, in practice they are ot made to work effectively. The NSC, established in 1999, has not made any significant contribution towards security assessment and policy formulation. The government still assigns the post of National Security Advisor to the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. This arrangement persists despite the need for permanent NSA which has been voiced by the strategic community. The government should seriously address these shortcomings.

**Civil-military relations:**

The problem of civil-military relations in post-independence India is legion. The military have not been involved in policymaking loop for a long time. During the Operation Parakram also incongruence between the armed forces and political authority occurred. First, the army's suggestion that limited military action against Pakistan be made was turned down after the attack on J&K Assembly. Later, in January and June 2002, the same happened on matter of strategies i.e. whether to wage a limited or a full scale war.

Inadequacy of communication between the civilian leadership and military was also clearly seen on many occasions during the stand off. While on the one hand the army chief is briefed the media that the armed forces was

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[5] Praveen Swami, "Beating the Retreat", *Frontline*, November 8,2002 p.15.

ready for a war, the same was later dismissed by the Defence Minister. Lt Gen

Kapil Vij who moved his 2 Corps troops dangerously close to the border, was

latter transferred.

These things are a result of lack of coordination between the

government and the armed forces. These sorts of problems are continuing due

to existing structural arrangements on security decisionmaking. Therefore, what

is needed is that appropriate changes should be made so that "muchcloser and

more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Serices can

be facilitated. The entire gamut of national security management and apex

decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence

and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and

reorganized".[6]

**Intelligence-**

The attack on parliament happened due to intelligence failure.

Parliament and other government institutions were said to be high on terrorist

target. As such, it is the failure of intelligence apparatus that led to December 13

attack on Indian parliament.

Even after the failure of intelligence apparatus, there has not been

much changes observed regarding the functioning of the intelligence apparatus.

It has been rightly observed that the Indian government, which sought

the help of countries like the United States and Britain, to devise methods to

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[6] *Kargil Review Committee Report*, n. 1, p. 1.

monitor the level of infiltration also point to the fact that Indian intelligence agencies failed to curb cross border terrorism.[7] In this regard, the following observation of Kargil Review Committee need to be pondered by the Indian decision-makers:

> Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), are extremely useful and effective in surveillance, especially if they have night vision and thermal imaging capabilities. UAVs have just been inducted and are operating in the plains under the charge of the Army. Similar efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude UAVs. Institutionalized arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible. UAVs could also prove effective in counter-insurgency operations. They may replace WASO patrols in the long run. However, in the interim, the possibility of using more stable WASO platforms than Cheetah helicopters and equipping them with thermal imaging sensors should be explored.[8]

**Counter-insurgency doctrine and Modernization of armed forces:**

'Even if it is claimed that India should fight its own war, solution does not lies in undertaking any hasty military measure which is doomed for failure. Rather the solution should be sought at evolving sound military strategy both for fighting war and countering insurgents. This no doubt also needs modernization of armed forces and raising of Special Forces to fight militants. Amassing a large quantity of armed forces without adequate and sophisticated gadget would not succeed. At present it is seen that "troops engaged in counter-terrorist duties are still not routinely equipped with basic pieces of equipment like night vision

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[7] V.Sudarshan, "Wihat's Wrong With Our Intelligence?", *Outlook*, July1,2002, p.22.
[8] *Kargil Review Committee Report*, n.1., p. 1.

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devices. Even the supposedly elite Special Operation Group of the Jammu and Kashmir Police still depends on recycled Pakistani supplies made to terrorist groups, for night vision equipment, sniper rifles and rocket launchers. There is still no centralized database on terrorists, or a single worthwhile forensic laboratory in Jammu and Kashmir."[9] Moreover, the government should increase spending on armed forces modernization. However, the irony is that the present government at the centre has for last three fiscal years beginning with 2000-2001 has underspent the allocated amount for defence. " In 2000-2001, out of budgetary allocation of Rs.58,587 crores, the Defence Ministry has surrendered over Rs4,000 crores. In 2001-2002, Rs. 5,000 crores had remained unspent."[10].

A serious political dialogue should be undertaken in Kashmir to arrive at solution. Alienation of the people of the valley is a factor in terrorism and not the gullibility of Pakistan alone is the reason. As rightly brought out in an editorial in a leading newspaper that "while India's concerns about cross-border terrorism are not unwarranted, New Delhi must recognize that it needs to address other dimensions of the Kashmir situation besides the military or security related aspects. Militancy in the valley cannot be comprehensively and effectively brought to an end until and unless the people are persuaded to believe they have reason to rally to India's cause. They will do so only when New Delhi uses the opportunity created by successful elections to the state assembly to allow for

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[9]Swami, n.5., p.14.
[10] *The Hindu*, February 20,2002.

the re-establishment of good governance at the local level and thereby reaffirm the moral authority of Indian states."[11]

## Limit of external power interventions:

A worrying factor of Operation Parakram is the perception that India was strongly influenced by American advice and felt constrained by its military presence in Pakistan. In this regard a security analyst has rightly pointed out that "while complete strategic autonomy is not easy to visualize, the space for relative autonomy needs to be maximized through enhancement of military capability and fine tuning concomitant doctrines."[12]

An excessive dependence on the United States will not help India much. The US is known for its ad hoc decision-making. Revamping the security apparatus in terms of modernization can only make India capable of influencing other governments toward its politico-military objectives. Serious and meaningful dialogue within the country with all those having stakes in J&K and Pakistan can only lead toward peace in the valley. Contemplating military action after nuclearising the subcontinent is nothing but suicidal.

It has been rightly pointed out that, "it is time India dispassionately assessed the relevance of President Musharraf for the US, and the region comprising Afghanistan, the Central Asia Republics, and Iran. The coming together of the US, Pakistan, Iran and the Karzai regime for stability in

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[11] Editorial, *The Hindu*, October 18, 2002.
[12] Sandeep Dikshit, "It Was a Fruitless Deployment of Troops", *The Hindu*, March 9, 2002.

Afghanistan would deny India the influence it had hoped for in the region. Once economic incentives like the gas pipeline deal show promise of fruition, the US is likely to press India to go more than halfway to settle matters with Pakistan. Moreover, the US's pre-occupation with Iraq, North Korea and West Asia leaves it little time to focus on India-Pakistan problem."[13]

## Dealing with Pakistan:

The process of mobilization and consequently demobilization, according to analysts, resulted not only in enormous material and human costs but also diplomatic and strategic cost. It is argued that the inability of India to extract substantive gains from Pakistan even with flexing military musle would encourage Pakistan to persist with its sub conventional proxy war with India. It made Pakistan to believe that the conventional superiority is no match for her low cost war. Pakistan was also led to believe that India was prevented from taking strong military action in defence of its vital interests because of Pakistani nuclear threat. It was no coincidence that Pakistan test fired its ballistic missiles during the height of standoff and consequently President Musharraf's proudly claimed that it had defeated " the enemy " without fighting a war.

India's predicament so far is whether to resume bilateral talks with Pakistan or not. However, it must be realized that at present talk is the only option for India. India's continued refusal to talk with Pakistan will not find

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[13] Pravin Sawhney, "Speaking With the Enemy", *The Pioneer*, January 16,2003.

favour with the US or other countries. India should resume bilateral talks in right earnest. It should not hastily conduct any summit level talks without doing any groundwork. The failure of Agra summit points to this fact. As such, talks have to resume at various levels like secretary-level as well as at lower political level. The talks should be in the of economics relations and on nuclear confidence building measures. As pointed out by Sawhney, " after the 1998 nuclar tests, it was evident that India and Pakistan would need to evolve Confidence Building Measures to tide over the destabilising factors; one created by the imminent nuclear weaponisation, and the second pertaining to ballistic missiles. The process was started with the signing of the Lahore declaration on February 21, 1999, between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif and now need to be carried forward".[14]

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[14] Pravin Sawhney, "The Two-Plus-Six Formula", *The Pioneer*, January 17, 2003.

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