

TERRORISM IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

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CERTIFICATE

Certify that the dissertation entitled "**TERRORISM IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK**", submitted by **Belu Sinha**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University, or any other University.

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Introduction

Depending on the individual, ideology, paradigm, culture or context, the term 'terrorism' may mean different things. Nonetheless, it can broadly be said that it is the symbolic act by use of or threat of use of violence for attaining political ends. Though the phenomenon is as old as the Zealots opposition of Roman rule in Palestine in the first century A.D. which included the Sicarii (dagger-men), the concept has developed only recently, following its advent in the democratic world. Though the emergence of the two, so close to each other in time, could have been a chance occurrence, but the empirical fact that terrorist groups and violence are more likely to be found operating in liberal democracies (as opposed to non democratic settings) opens up an area which needs to be investigated to discover the concealed links between the two. This dissertation therefore grapples with the two and tries to build an argument, with the running thread through all the chapters, that terrorism has been bolstered by the philosophies and institutions of liberal democracies, wittingly or unwittingly, as much as totalitarian societies, religious orthodoxies and ethnic orientations are led to be responsible, in the literature on terrorism.

The liberal slogan of 'man knows what is best for himself' and the consequent *laissez-faire* which was to be applied to the economic and later the political sphere, was, in a way, adopted in the social life of man too. This detached him from the social solidarities of the feudal times and threw him into an arena where man recognized no bonds-he became a free agent, unencumbered by any loyalty, pursuing his own ends in any manner.

Liberal ontology sees fear as a natural and most basic human emotion. Not only is it all engrossing, it also shuts out reason. When a pall of fear descends over man and his very existence is endangered, the other related emotions, namely rage and violence spring up. Since they are natural, they are incapable of being 'cured'.

When the two feed on each other, the use of terror for furthering one's goals, is not far to seek. The journey from 'terror' to 'terrorism' occurs when the use of terror becomes an ideology to be pursued, cutting across the Left and the Right on a sustained basis by individual/s and / or groups /s.

The Athenian model of direct democracy was a simple one, fit for small city-states. It saw to it that all were involved in the deliberative and political process and that none went unrepresented. Though it was exclusionary in nature, the philosophy of the time did not support claims of the excluded. The present model is far removed from the ancient one. It was developed when liberalism incorporated democratic principles within its folds. Also, the philosophy stands drastically altered. Organizational and institutional complexities have multiplied due to the large (both in terms of population and territory) and multiethnic nature of modern states. The concepts of 'popular sovereignty' and 'the Rights of Man' gaining ground after the French Revolution forming the centerpiece of democracy, proved to be Janus-faced. Since democracy does not make provisions for representations based on ethnicity, religion, language etc., these concepts appeared to be incompatible with democratic principle and majority. Carrying it to the other extreme, they might create a tension within democracy, being used by unscrupulous elements in a bid to forward the demands of a small minority, detrimental to the state as a whole. These inherent contradictions within democracy come together with other, more palpable problems.

Though rational discourse is the best method of political communication in a liberal democracy, it is not always realised in practice. Moreover, deliberation is slow. Politics being a zero-sum game, with much at stake, often makes do with short cuts. Venal and power hungry politicians and parties weave through the loopholes of electoral politics to further their ends. Being aided by the prevalent notion that a democracy cannot satisfy all, they tend to build their own niche or vote bank appealing to narrow, particularistic claims. In the process, they might pander to extremists and even incite them to violence. And though all peoples' claims may be represented by this party or that, if power is distributed on the basis of cleavage based voting, the minority tends to become a 'permanent' (and not a 'floating' – issue based) minority.

This drives the affected communities to seek recourse to violence as a means of political communication to attain their goals. But political violence, especially in the form of terrorism divides people, polarizes them around affiliations of race, ethnicity, religion, language, class or ideology and even burns the bridges for any kind of reconciliation or negotiations. Where it becomes self sustaining and of long duration, people accept it, live with it and survive in a world gone dull, nasty, brutish and short. Does this not create a crisis of democracy? Ideologies came and went. Is liberal democracy yet another God that failed and is headed the same way? This is so because it is questioned not just in new democracies, that are weak and corrupt, struggling with the task of nation and state building, but even the industrialized First World democracies have elicited feelings of disenchantment since the 1990s.

In the context of post modernism where micro narratives have gained much currency, this brings us a century and a half backward in time, when Mill,

being the reluctant democrat that he was, expressed his skepticism for the 'new democratic tide' which appeared likely to destroy the huge multiethnic empires, dividing them into majorities and minorities. Though he did not foresee the scourge of terrorism, which it could give rise to, he was nonetheless apprehensive of democracy for multiethnic societies. In the first chapter, the term terrorism is explained. Also, an attempt is made to develop a relation between terrorism and political community. The various definitions of terrorism are examined since there is no one universal definition that is applicable in all contexts. This is also indicative of the fact that there can be no 'one-size-fits-all' kind of counter-terrorism policy. Apart from this, the emergence, evolution and the various stages of terrorism have been laid out in this chapter. Also the need to explain terrorism from a new framework is stressed as the other have fallen from grace.

The next chapter deals with critique of liberal ontology. Here, the cause of terrorism has been sought within the nature of man itself as posited in liberal & western thinking. Fear propels terror and violence is the underlying theme. An array of liberal philosophers' (Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Satre, Fanon) works are examined which have tended to glorify violence even to the extent of saying that it is 'man re-creating himself' and is his very 'essence'.

In chapter three, liberalism as a philosophy is discussed and how it has been, in part, responsible for the terrorism. A similar analysis is made for democracy. A position is then taken that when the two come together, in the form of 'liberal democracy' they provide conducive philosophical conditions for terrorism.

The institutionalization of the liberal democratic principles has tended to be such that it breeds terrorism. This investigation takes place in the fourth

chapter. The spot light is on the role of political parties. The two analogous cases of Punjab and Northern Ireland have been used. Though numerous cases abound, these are the most typical ones.

Liberal democracies and civil societies are as closely associated as Siamese twins. The latter are known to further the democratization process. The mass media is one 'avatar' of the civil society. But as the fifth chapter points out, this particular form of civil society has only spurred terrorism, though not across the board.

Thus through all the five chapters, an attempt to view terrorism from a different perspective is made. Though the successes of liberal democracies are many, it must be agreed that there is a flip side too. Not debunking it totally and absolutely, we must be open to accept a fair enough critique. Of these positions-of being the panacea, the whipping boy and the Frankenstein, by the introduction itself it is evident that we do not support the first. We subscribe to a view some where midway between the other two.

All along, it must also be remembered that the political organization of liberal democracies does not establish a strong political power. The weakness corresponds to the ideology of liberalism. The desire to weaken the state stems at first from the will to protect the freedoms of the individual against the intervention of the state. To liberate the individual, it is necessary to weaken the power of the state. In such a scenario, attempts made by the state to stamp out terrorism are with one hand tied behind its back.

CHAPTER I

Terrorism And Political Communities: Historical Sketch

In ancient Greek mythology, terror (Phobos) and dread (Deimos) were the names given to the twin horses that drew the chariot of Aries (Mars), the God of war. Terror, however, must be distinguished from dread, or fear. Fear is a physical and psychological reaction to the strange, the unexpected, or the hazardous. Some writers have argued that it is a necessary accompaniment of fear that it gives rise to aggression; others believe that aggression is a conditioned response. Terror, on the other hand, is the systematic use of fear.¹ The term was first used to indicate a general state of fear deliberately created for political purposes during the French Revolution (1789-94). Edmund Burke, a noted British political philosopher of the eighteenth century, used the word to describe the situation in revolutionary Paris. He referred to the violence as the "reign of terror".² Violence has been known since long and its various manifestations have made it a well known phenomenon. It is a social reality. In the British society terror arose when this violence was used by street gangs for nothing but the sheer glorification of violence itself. They came to be known as hooligans, who disrupted social life and spread terror among people for no particular reason at all.³ Terror can always be justified as the expediency of the strong; and such Judaeo Christian notions as mercy, compassion and conscience must go with the weak to the wall of history⁴

¹ John Richard Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London, 1987, p. 253.

² Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: A Introduction*, Pacific Groove California, 1991, p. 57.

³ Eric Moonman, (ed) *The Violent Society*, Frank Cass, London, 1987

⁴ Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1975, p. 9.

The suffix 'ism' that is added to terror is sometimes held to denote its systematic character, either on the theoretical level, where the suffix refers to a political philosophy, lifting the concept out of the realm of psychology and relocating it in the sphere of beliefs and ideas; or on a practical level, where it refers to a manner of acting or an attitude.⁵

The main point about terrorism is this: every political community has understood that random and indiscriminate violence is the ultimate threat to social cohesion and thus every community has some form of prohibition against it. Terrorism, allowed full swing, would reduce civil society to the state of nature where there is Hobbes' fine description 'continual fear of violent death and the life of man poor, nasty, brutish and short'. No political community can sanction terrorism, for that would be a self contradiction as the very reason for entering civil society were to escape precisely those conditions imposed by the terrorists.⁶ Most societies are quite clear that terrorism is an especially violent and unethical wrong, but are deeply unsure about what types of acts and which actor fall within its condemnatory reach. This is because political philosophy which concerns itself with ethical issues, creates divergent assumptions about the nature of political communities and about the limits of political action.

In this introductory chapter, the concept of terrorism in all forms- definitional, typological, its emergence, evolution over the years and the present context will be explained. But before that an attempt shall be made to grasp the meaning of the term 'political community' and its role in understanding the nature of terrorism.

⁵ John Richard Thackrah, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁶ Paul Gilbert, *Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, p. 38.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Paul Gilbert tries to delve into the metaphysical question of what a political community is. He observes that the question of what constitutes a political community is seldom at issue in the politics of established states. Political parties tend to agree on what community it is that they seek to represent and they differ only on what it should be like. But this question is very commonly at issue in nationalist conflicts, where what are to count as the community to be represented takes precedence over the question of what they should eventually be like. Yet underlying the political disagreement is commonly a metaphysical one, concerning the criteria for identifying distinct political communities. This gives rise to the realization that to understand conflicts, it is necessary to have not merely theoretical but also an applicable account to the practical problem of creating and sustaining political communities.⁷

For such an exercise, Gilbert mentions the approach as exemplifying in two respects political philosophy. Firstly, its interest in grasping how political conflict can spring from philosophical disagreements, it is therefore conceived with identifying and assessing the conceptual assumptions involved with a view to deriving a reflective and critical attitude to these conflicts and their resolution. Secondly, it draws the philosophical concepts it investigates from the political behaviour to which they are applied since it would be surprising if this behaviour could be explained in terms of notions that has no place in the thinking of its agents⁸

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Such an approach is helpful in understanding behaviour that is often on the face of it, shockingly irrational by reconstructing a pattern of reasoning behind it with an aim to understand and criticize, to assess the plausibility of the pattern of reasoning exemplified in political behaviour and to suggest alternatives. But the extent to which this is possible depends upon the divergent assumptions about the nature of political communities and about the limits of political action. Here in may lie the grounds for irreconcilable differences in the contrasting roles of political agents contending for power. Political actions, therefore, are Janus-faced in the areas of conflict with the state, giving rise to the popular phrase 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist'- they have no single significance- for what people do is determined not only by what they intend but by what behaviour of that kind is understood by other to be, whatever, its agent's intention.

It is those in position of power, who pre-eminently control the conventions, in terms of which political behaviour is understood. Gilbert then raises the question as to whether terrorism should be treated as war (from the view point of those who undertake it) or as crime (from the state's perspective); is it a legitimate tactic to be employed in the defence of a political community or is it a mode of behaviour that any community must suppress as threatening to destroy, not just a particular community but the social relations essential to any political community. A similar question can be posed concerning the security operations of the state-do they serve to protect the community or do they undermine them in pursuit of sectional interests? Are they legitimate acts of law enforcement or can they themselves constitute state terrorism therefore is the state the foundation of community or an instrument of its oppression. Thus it is clear that there can be no

detached point of view from which we can expect definitive answers to these questions.

Next, picking up two of Gilbert's models- the just war and the political crime model-it shall be seen how the two of them are associated with the communitarian and the statist conceptions of political community respectively. The communitarian conception of the former model sees the community as a group with common life, according to its own rules, but needs a ruler to enforce them when communal pressures are inadequate to the task. Justification of disobedience, rebellion, tyrannicide is possible when ruler breaks faith. In the statist conception of this model, groups are identified by their subordination to a common government which has powers to enforce laws. There are no essential connections in terms of shared values. Disobedience is punished. It treats terrorism as a crime. The liberal democratic government, as representative of the community can condemn such acts for breaching the rules. The terrorist must seek to undermine the link between the community and the state by offering an alternative view of how a state might be a lackey of some particular community. He must deny the entitlement of the established state to be the proper political organization for his community.

Such a claim presupposes a communitarian rather than a statist conception of political community. It fits better the terrorist demand to be treated as a soldier and not a criminal. It supports a possible claim by him to be ridding the political community of a tyrant. The clash of terrorists and state is not over what political organizations for people in a territory, but over what relationship must there be between people and their political organization. Therefore, underlying violent struggle there lurk philosophical arguments.

But of late, it is the political crime model that has stolen the thunder. It is associated with the statist conception of political community. It is the citizens as a whole, rather than their ruler, who constitute the entity which may be party to a conflict, namely the state; it is they who seem to be the natural, and perhaps legitimate targets of terrorists who wage a campaign against it. We may be led to view that the citizen body is collectively responsible for any injustice that terrorists seek to rectify not just through 'punishment' but also through deterrence. Innocent individuals may be harmed too. As per the statist view, the member of the political community too have to bear the responsibility for the actions of the state. They seem to have agreed to this form of organization, agreed to membership, are registered as voters or even cast their votes. The state has a mandate, but even this view fails to support the terrorists' claims since it was proved that there is actually no alternative or choice that can be exercised by the political community as regards its political organization.

Terrorists have gone along this thread of argument saying that the liberal democratic procedures do not serve to determine that will of the political community which they represents, due to the lack of political organization necessary to express formally their will as a community. Organising the community of political organisation around cultural principles, indeed, the provision of such an organization is precisely what the terrorist campaign often aims to achieve.⁹

But the terrorists' claim to represent his political community is still shrouded with philosophical complexities. It is one thing to act on behalf of some one or some community and another to act on their behalf as of right. The interests

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62-73.

served must be political and there must be an honest belief, to the extent of foregoing one's private interest, in the cause and the means followed must be political. If these conditions are met, the derogatory term need not be applicable to them.

If this is the dividing line between the dominant community and the terrorists, the former may be classified into four types of groups depending on their conception of political community they claim to represent and their consequent view of their own role in relation to it.- Conservative, Democratic, Vanguardist and Patriotic. These are concerned with principled political action and not with unscrupulous behaviour.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

After grappling with the philosophical aspect of political communities in relation to terrorism, terrorism, as a concept will be explained. As seen earlier, due to the ambivalent nature of political action, it is difficult, if not altogether impossible to have a universally acceptable vocabulary to describe and explain it. This makes terrorism a subject rife with moral uncertainty but shrouded in terminological confusion. Each definition attempts to explain the phenomenon from its particular perspective. Psychologists suggest that terrorists have deviant personalities. Military scientists consider terrorism a form of surrogate warfare. Sociologists have proposed that terrorism is part of the normal aggressive behaviour in societies that lack alternative models of social change. Scholars from the field of law place emphasis on motivational aspects. Political scientists have proposed two types of explanations for violent means to political ends. One provides a variety of individual rationales for violence based on personal

perspectives of terrorists themselves. Another proposes that terrorists act because they are otherwise excluded from political life: the state of relative deprivation is what motivates terrorists.¹⁰ This lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism is important because it not only has an impact on whether or not the perpetrators of an act of violence are labelled 'criminals' or 'terrorists' but also on the formulation of counter terrorism strategies.

Some attempts to define terrorism have been as follows "the systematic use or that of violence to secure political ends" (Wilkinson, 1974)¹¹ "A symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extranormal means, involving the use or threat of violence. Terrorism may gain political ends in one of two ways- whether by mobilizing forces or by immobilizing forces and reserves that would normally be available to the incumbents (Thornton, 1964)¹² "The use of covert violence by a group for political ends.. usually directed against a government, but it is also used against other ethnic groups, classes or parties. The ends may vary from the redress of specific grievance, to the overthrow of a government and the seizure of power, or to the liberation of a country from foreign rule. Terrorists seek to cause political, social and economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently engage in planned or indiscriminate murder (W. Laqueur, 1987).¹³

To Crenshaw, terrorism means socially and politically unacceptable violence which is premeditated and is aimed at an innocent symbolic target to achieve a psychological effect.¹⁴

¹⁰ Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini, *Women and Terrorism*, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996, pp. 64-65.

¹¹ Paul Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, p.4.

¹² Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon", in Harry Eckenstein (ed.), *Internal War: Towards the Theoretical Study of Internal War*, Free Press, New York, 1964, p.12.

¹³ Walter Laqueur quoted in Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, Pacific Grove, California, 1991, p. 5.

¹⁴ Martha Crenshaw quoted in *ibid.*, p. 6

Alex Schmid offered a conglomerate definition of terrorism. His empirical analysis found twenty two elements common to most definition, and he developed a definition containing thirteen of those elements.¹⁵ But this too did not solve the definitional dilemma since the more variables one adds, the more diffuse it becomes, making exactitude elusive.

To overcome this handicap, typologies are resorted to. It allows not just a proper categorisation but also a better understanding of the phenomenon.

Paul Wilkinson made a three fold classification (1) criminal, (2) political, and (3) state sponsored terrorism. While the first is least controversial and is for seeking either individual psychological gratification or profit, the second has been a much debated one. Wilkinson further subdivides it into repressions, nationalist and revolutionary.

J. Bowyer Bell described six basic types of terrorism: psychotic, criminal, vigilante, endemic, authorized and revolutionary. For him, the last deserved more emphasis. He sub classified it into six forms depending upon the purpose they sought to attain. Crozier focused on the terrorist groups in Western Europe. This made his study ethnocentric and eurocentric causing universal application a problem. His classification consisted of six types of terrorist group – anarchists, Marxist revolutionaries, minority nationalists, ideological mercenaries, pathological groups and Neofacists.¹⁶

Using applied political philosophy, Paul Gilbert sees terrorism as war, as tyrannicide, as revolutionary struggle and as political crime in different situations.

¹⁷ For security purposes, which includes tactical measures and counter terrorism strategies, terrorism has to be compartmentalized into groups on the basis of the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

¹⁷ Paul Gilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-53.

tactics adopted by them. Thus there are five basic tactical forms of terrorism: criminal, ideological, nationalistic, state sponsored and guerilla. While the first three are primarily a police problem, the last is more often than not, an exclusively military concern.¹⁸ All the definitions so far examined are framed on the basis of ends and means and not on ideological grounds i.e. the attainment of political ends by creating fear (through attack on innocents.)

POLITICAL TERRORISM

Here following the political scientist's approach, political terrorism shall form the focus of all further attention. Political terrorism is generally defined as the systematic use or threat of violence to secure political goals. It is a sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals. It is different from political terror, which occurs in isolated acts and also in the form of extreme, indiscriminate and arbitrary mass violence. Such terror is neither systematic nor organized and is often difficult to control.¹⁹

Noel O' Sullivan too differentiates political terrorism from other forms and says that it occurs "when a group, whether holding governmental office or outside government, resolves to pursue a set of ideological objectives by methods which not only subvert or ignore the requirements of domestic and international law, but which rely for their success primarily upon the threat or use of violence. 'Political terror' means the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use, or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups. It is the instrument of

¹⁸ Jonathan R. White, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁹ Paul Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

naked power, best seen as a form of coercion, which in turn is one major means of political control. By political control it is meant the shaping and channeling of political behaviour, either to secure compliance with particular directives or to mould attitudes so as to assure political stability through the voluntary acceptance of a given authority structure, its norms of society, conduct and its directives. It manifests itself through normative power, material power and/ or coercive power. The first is also known as positive or symbolic power or persuasion and includes socialization, education and offer of prestige, recognition or love. The second is also known as technical or utilitarian power and includes incentives like wages, rewards, bonuses, bribes and promotions. The final is also called negative or physical power. Commonly known as coercion, it includes forms like fines, penalties, terror and regulatory and police power. It is best for short term compliance and is effective in deterring and punishing behaviour. Not all coercion therefore is terror though sometimes boundaries are vague. Terror is the ultimate weapon with the state. Though it serves two major objectives of the regime i.e. control and change, it tends to erode the relatively stable pattern of expectation required by social organizations since they have no assurance of security or survival.

Dahl too recognizes the use of political terror and says that the most commonplace way to deal with its opponents is to employ violence.²⁰ But terror is inherently ambiguous. It can be productive of compliance or of alienation- or of both. It is both effective and self defeating – can destroy itself by tearing apart the social organization necessary to maintain it. It may increase the effectiveness of a regime-but it may also produce disabling neurosis or paralysis among the citizens.

²⁰ Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1970, pp. 1-9.

It may suppress and split under autonomous groups in society, yet in turn it may provoke deviant behaviour but also stimulate more evasion, concealment and dissent. It may atomise society. Also, it is least effective against those who have least to lose. It is wasteful and inefficient the collateral damage is high. Strain on and disruption of, production, services, research and communication are the casualties, apart from life and property, of course. Its impact on the political process too is deep.

Such methods cannot be practiced in liberal democracies where there are effective checks on the power of the government. State terrorism is a completely different cup of tea altogether. It is a more sustained and continual usage of terror as a matter of policy for the furtherance of some goals by the states.²¹ This is outside the sphere of enquiry here.

EMERGENCE

Previously, though various utopian visions of ideal societies were put forward, but till 1789, no one had thought it was actually possible to do very much about them. The possibility of bringing about radical change sparked the ambitions aspirations of modern terrorism.²²

The second assumption that man is naturally good first saw the light of the day in Rousseauian thought. According to it since evil was external to man and sprung from the structure of society, it could be eliminated by making the appropriate social changes. Politics therefore assumed the duty to 'awaken the people' and inspire them to throw off their oppressions. This style of politics required the identification of an 'out group' which could be held responsible for everything

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-130.

²² Noel O'Sullivan, "Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy", in Noel O'Sullivan (ed.), *Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution*, Wheat Sheaf Books Ltd., Sussex, 1986, p. 5.

amiss with the existing social order and then demand its suppression. Robespierre identified kings, aristocrats and priests as the 'out group'; Nazis identified the Jews; Frantz Fanon identified the imperialist powers²³

Every ideology stereotypes its chosen enemies and scapegoats, and mobilizes hatred and violence against them. Such campaigns of dehumanisation have invariably preceded the great wave of persecution, massacre, enslavements and genocide that have characterized the ideological terror of the 20th century.²⁴

Lastly, it was the advent of a novel doctrine of political legitimacy according to which power is legitimate only if it conferred from below, by 'the people'. This doctrine not only liberated the masses and produced harmony but also created discontent.

This definition allows not just opposition groups, but also regimes to be dubbed as terrorists. Sullivan is also quick to add two qualifications here: legal and ideological. The former means that if a group / organization engages in a lot of noisy rhetorical threats, but being basically law abiding, it should not be treated as 'terrorist'. Terrorism is a creation of ideological politics. The intellectual and political assumptions which inspire modern terrorism completely cut across the left-right spectrum.²⁵

EVOLUTION

Dating back to the ancient times terrorists (the Sicarii, Boxers, Thugs) have proved to be the malaise of many societies. Terrorism has an ancient lineage and there is nothing new about the use of terror in support of political, military or

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁴ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1977., p. 77.

²⁵ Noel O'Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p.6.

religious aims. Though the phenomenon is old, the concept is a recent development arising from the ideological style of politics of Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. This can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly being seen as a struggle on behalf of people deflects modern doctrines of popular sovereignty and self determination at play. Secondly it is seen as utilitarian substituting for more traditional ethical prohibitions and the modern view of ends as justifying the means. It was originally generated and has subsequently been sustained, by these crucial assumptions about the nature of man and society.

Firstly, the vast programme of destruction undertaken by the French Revolution led men to believe that it lay within the power of man's will to remake society from top to bottom, and even to refashion human natures since the concept 'the people' could be defined in any way –to justify any government, no matter how appalling its policies, or to defy the government provided that he claimed to be a *truer* representative of the popular will than the established authorities.²⁶

Thus the new ideological style of politics gradually destroyed all the old conventions which commanded the use of violence in Western political life and created a world in which any political act at all, can now be done with an easy conscience, since there is no conceivable act which our modern, extremely tolerant and permissive ideologies cannot present as morally defensible.

Since the 1880s, four major waves of terror have washed over the international world, each with its own special character, dominating purposes, and peculiar tactics. The first three lasted from 35 to 40 years each, and the fourth, which began in 1979, is still in process. The waves overlapped, each surge was closely connected to major unexpected political turning points, exposing

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.7-10.

government vulnerabilities, and making it possible to define new issues or give older ones greater salience.

The First Wave began in Russia during the 1880s and was precipitated by the massive reform efforts the Tsars introduced to bring Russia up to Western standards. The hopes aroused could not be fulfilled quickly enough; and in the wake of inevitable disappointment, systematic assassination campaigns against prominent officials began. The best known groups aimed to reconstruct society radically; but others, such as the Poles and Armenians, sought more modest goals of national independence. Within a decade, the Russian pattern of systematic assassination of high officials for revolution and/or separatism spread.

Meanwhile, in the West revolutionary Anarchists mounted assassination campaigns to frustrate drives towards universal suffrage, a provision they thought could make existing political systems invulnerable. The Second Wave began after World War I and continued for 2 decades after World War II. The principal stimulus was national self-determination, the war aim of the Allies. Articulated to undermine enemy empires, the principle ultimately destroyed the legitimacy of retaining colonial possessions also by the victors themselves, at least in the West. By the 1960s, as Western colonial empires gave way to many new states (i.e., Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, etc.), the Second Wave receded. Though the terrorists had "improved" the tactics of their predecessors, but only limited successes were achieved in the Second Wave.

The Third Wave began in the late 1960s and embraced a revolutionary ethos again, making the West, especially the U.S., its principal target. The political turning point was the Vietnam War. The effectiveness of Vietcong terror

against the American forces armed with modern technology kindled hopes that the heartland of the Western world was vulnerable.


Sometimes the new revolutionary ethos was linked to separatist purpose. Observers of the Third Wave coined the term "international terrorism" to describe the "new" terrorists. A widespread revolutionary ethos created bonds between separate groups which transcended national lines, and a terrorist organization (the PLO in Lebanon) provided facilities to train other terrorists in different groups from many countries. The targets of the actual assaults also reflected in international dimension.

States (i.e. Libya, Iraq and Syria) used foreign terrorists as instruments of their international policies, a practice called "state-sponsored terror". Airline hijacking was the period's novel tactic, numbering over 100 every year in the 1970s. Many right-wing terrorist groups, frustrated with what they understood as unjustifiably slow, compromising government responses, also emerged.

The Third Wave began ebbing in the 1980s. The dramatic unexpected political turning points, the necessary condition for a new wave, were two related events, the revolution in Iran and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. Both "demonstrated" that religion provided more hope than did the prevailing revolutionary ethos. When the Soviet bloc disintegrated (1991), partly because of the Afghanistan disaster, new separatist rebel movements, often with a religious base, appeared.

The Fourth Wave produced a new sacred terrorism form, one in which religious justifications and precedents shaped both the aims and the tactics. No wave, moreover, produced more brutal and deadly attacks. A striking new tactic

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was suicide bombing (self martyrdom) which proved effective against Western targets.

Modern terrorism has come to bear upon political theory, political science and history apart from the other branches of social sciences. With regard to the first, it is the assumptions about man and society which inspires terrorist activity. Also, political theory tries to delve into the relations of these assumptions to our moral and political values. While the discipline of political science searches for those empirical conditions which determine the success or failure of terrorism, together with its likely implications for maintenance of international order, the study of history maintains the continuity of violence in human affairs.

Democratic statism arises naturally from doctrines of popular sovereignty and self determination. Popular sovereignty accords citizens an equal share in the political power of the state. It is not actually implied by the view that the state gains its authority through popular consent-since this is consistent with sovereignty resting in the hands of a ruler rather than the people, but it does naturally go along with it. What is more, if the people are to control the power they exercise, then democracy is a natural corollary of popular sovereignty. The principle of self determination follows from basing the state's authority on consent, for this permits the people, by giving or withholding consent to determine what their state will be and how it will be organized. Putting these ideas together yields a general conception of the people as the source of legitimate political power, and the people's will as the determinant of how political power should be organized and exercised.²⁷ This corroborates Sullivan's view.

²⁷ Paul Gilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

NEED FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK

In psychological approaches to conflict, the theory states that most humans have a natural build-up of blocked energy that searches for release. Aggression stems from a genetically based innate drive that has to be satisfied. Aggressive behaviour is triggered by the excessive frustration of goals. Frustration is further accumulated by the outside interference with the achievement of certain objects. The perception of threats and uncontrolled emotion strengthen aggressive postures. The failure of adaptation to frustration thus leads to violence.²⁸

The frustration-aggression hypothesis, built on these premises seeks to explain the cause of individual violence arising due to his disadvantaged status and with the aim to improve it.

On the other hand, the view that claims that terrorism is undertaken as a means to redress certain grievances and fulfil certain legitimate political demands of some political communities, hinges on the belief that they have been deprived of their due, of what should rightfully have been theirs.

Mass violence can be caused by feelings of relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with basic human needs. A prolonged period of economic and social development generates heightened expectations. However, these expectations are not always met even though people have the ability to achieve them. Relative deprivation exists when people feel that their expectations of conditions for life have not been satisfied.

The perception of deprivation is subjective. If people's hoped and desires far exceed what they can realize, they may have more dissatisfaction with their

²⁸ Theories of Conflict, in Lester Kurtz (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, Vol. 3, Academic Press, London, California, 1999, p. 512.

current situation. The expectation to improve unsatisfied material and social conditions tends to go up with time. However, the economic does not increase simultaneously. Thus expectations are likely to rise disproportionately to what society can actually provide. An intolerable gap between expected social conditions and actual achievement of these conditions can be a precondition for widespread unrest and political violence.

Thus Ted Robert Gurr tried to substitute the frustration-aggression formulation with the conceptually close notion of relative deprivation to denote the tension that develops from the discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, that disposes men to violence.²⁹ This straightforward adaptation of frustration-aggression hypothesis from individual to group level was criticised.

Schmid discusses six varieties of deprivation.³⁰ But when this study of deprivations is tried to be applied to the various political communities, to explain the phenomenon of terrorism, it proves to be inadequate. This opens the door for a new and more comprehensive perspective to be developed and adopted. In the ensuing chapters, an alternative framework to conceptualise the phenomenon, has been discussed.

²⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1970, p. 23.

³⁰ Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al. *Political Terrorism : A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, Amsterdam, Oxford, New York North Holland Publishing Co., 1988, p. 7.

CHAPTER II

Critique of Liberal Ontology

As per the current state of knowledge and information, life is peculiar to our planet Earth. Over the years, since it first appeared, it has reached a highly evolved stage and can broadly be differentiated into animal and plant kingdoms. In the beginning, the conditions were definitely not conducive for life, yet today the earth is teeming with hundreds and thousands of life forms. This competition of life against nature and other predatory forces can broadly be attributed to the instinct of survival. This emerged as the direct spin-off of the fear of death. Therefore, all means, fair as well as foul, though there was no such distinction earlier on, were employed for the preservation of life. Violence was but a part of it. Knowledge, cleverness and trickery came into play later when reasoning developed. Aggression has formed the very basis of the nature of all the successful species that lived and passed through the era of 'might is right' and the Darwinian 'survival of the fittest'. Thus the instinct of survival, made instrumental through the use of violence has enabled the continuation of life in general and the various species and races in particular. There are others who reject this thesis on grounds of the first principle of dialectics to show that there is a qualitative group. They also critique social Darwinism as a defence of anarchic competition. Violent behaviour is a display of man's aggressive instinct. Without that instinct, which he shares with the rest of the animal kingdom, the human species would not survive.¹

¹ Lord Scarman, Foreword in Eric Moonman (ed.), *The Violent Society*, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., England, 1987.

Using violence, and cleverness and trickery, where violence alone did not suffice, man became the master race on the planet. The latter two were more a product of reasoning while the former constituted a part of his nature. Violence interpolated between two views of human nature-rational (Hegel) and species being (Marx).

Violence rests on the same theoretical foundation and structure of the social world itself. It is an important component of our individual and collective effort and memory; indeed, many archetypes are cultivated on a substratum of violence. The cultural premises of our society are deeply rooted in the primordial magma that flows deep in the unconscious. Violence is virtuous and is glorified by many. In other words, violence is not a metaphysical category. It is an ancient message, engraved in our genetic code since time immemorial, ever current and stimulating. Violence is fascinating. It is an inexhaustible reserve of energy. It excites us, it makes us feel alive, it breaks the monotony of daily routine, it dispels loneliness, it cures feelings of impotence and helplessness. Violence is cathartic. Some maintain that it is educational: in the past, torture and capital punishment took place to serve as an example and an admonishment. Violence has a thousand faces.²

Thus violence is the essence of man, which despite being tried to be reigned in by various forms of covenants, pledges and government, fails to be tempered, especially under, life-threatening situations. It is not therefore an ailment of the mind, a psychological aberration, but indeed a purposeful and directed action of man, determined neither by nature or nurture. It is determined by conjuncture.

² Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini, *Women and Terrorism*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1996, p.22.

The state and its institutions constituted a very important part of the political philosophy since the dawn of human reflection. But since man lies at the basis and center of the universe of social sciences, a discussion about his nature could not be ignored. Man as a social / political animal necessitated association with fellow men and the state is the moral perfection of man towards which his whole nature moves. Thus man and state were inseparably linked. This can also be read to mean the perfectibility of man who is morally, nonetheless, good. Though during this age, this was the dominant theme, there were opposing trends too. Ontology of sociability led to teleology of good life (Plato and Aristotle).

The middle ages saw the Popes struggling against the emperors, asserting a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character. The view that human nature was radically corrupt, and that there was no redemption for any one until human nature was killed with him and that man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of God, was upheld. This caused men's capacities to be withered; they became incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, devoid of any opinions or feelings, being utterly subjugated by the church. From St. Gregory to St. Thomas Aquinas this was one refrain. At the center of Thomism. i.e. hierarchy of knowledge was Aristotleanism (primacy of the Unmoved Mover). Thomism had replaced and incorporated Cicero's Natural law traditions to bind men.

Machiavelli too did not hold a good opinion of human nature. Being guided by materialistic considerations, men were fickle, ungrateful, deceitful, cowardly, avaricious, besides being selfish, quarrelsome and power-hungry. It was

the fear of punishment under a monarchy that holds them together in peace.³ In Machiavelli, man becomes masterless without feudal ties and religious solidarities that feudalism implied. Europe was on the horizon of the liberal dawn. Or the other way round.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, views of human nature were related to attitudes towards power and authority “based on the theory of Calvin and the philosophy of Hobbes” puritanical conceptions of sin and guilt plus Hobbesian ideas of human egotism combined to produce what can only be described as a rather unattractive view of human nature... (but) this image of man as essentially sinful, evil and grasping, a being whose dangerous instincts and propensities had to be controlled by skillfully moulded political and social institutions, based on his reason.

With this background, a in-depth look is taken at the nature and essence of man-how he is lured towards what is pleasurable and shrinks from the painful (Hobbes); what constitutes the two categories, with greater emphasis on the sublime (Burke); violence as not just being cathartic but as man re-creating himself (Satre) it is discovered that fear, and subsequently violence, is as much a part of his constitution as is flesh and blood. It is this which helps him preserve his being, or expresses its fulfillment.

Liberalism celebrated the values of free expression, laissez faire, secularism and limited state, among others. The laissez faire principle was conducive for the setting up of a free market economy which meets the demands of the capitalist mode of production. Under this, the view of human nature was that of an economic man all economic activity must be motivated by purely selfish

³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 23, (ed.) Robert Maynard Hutchins, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, London, 1952, p. 24.

considerations, for production of wealth (Adam Smith) without regard to social consideration. This thus gave prominence to baser motives, at the expense of the higher values of life as was proved by the operation of the new system. Though it explicitly deplored the violation of laws of justice, the excessive stress on competition (in the economic sphere which, in turn, determined his social prestige and political status) became too cut throat. The process of alienation, increasing in degrees, brought him on the edge of survival itself. This causes men to mark a return to their condition of immiseration and on the other hand to unquenched thirst of Hobbes commodious living since Locke pleaded for unlimited right to property. Based on it was constitutional oligarchy.

When capitalism failed to deliver the promised goods, the gap between the rich and the poor widened, class exploitation reached its peak and conditions of the working class deteriorated. Industrialization added to it and democracy was nowhere in sight. When it came, it failed to take note of the development that the violent side of human nature was unleashed in economic matters while it controlled political power. It let loose sporadic violence, and class struggle. The seeds of this violence have earlier on been attributed to the instinct of survival, have also found a place in the liberal philosophy, particularly in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). It is claimed regarding Hobbes' birth, that his mother delivered him prematurely, the fear of the Spanish Armada being so acute in England during April 1588. Hobbes later commented that he was thus born 'a twin with fear' and ever after 'abominated his country's enemies and loved peace'. This statement aptly suggests the imprint that 'fear' had on the literary and philosophical works of Hobbes. He painted his man in dark colors and

attributed to him a nature that was definitely negative. Hobbes began his political theory with an analysis of human nature. He portrayed man as a creature of incessant activity who can find no rest in any final end, since commodious (read commodity) living was the golden apple to pursue.

Animals exhibit two sorts of motions –vital, which are voluntary, and endeavour. This endeavour, when it is towards something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire... and when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion. Men are born with some, and learn other by experience. Within this stream of activity, man pursues specific ends. The objects which cause desire are called good and those that create aversion are dubbed as evil.⁴

Hobbes said that there was “similitude of passions, which are the same in all men desire, fear hope etc; not the similitude of objects of the passions”.⁵ Thus good and evil possess diverse meanings according to men’s purposes. In so describing how men form their notions of good and evil, Hobbes was not endorsing a relativistic conception of moral judgments; indeed it was the cornerstone of his political theory that men must concur in certain common definitions if they are to achieve what they all evidently want, namely, self preservation the condition of any activity whatsoever. Self preservation as a basic need, can be categorized as biological, arises from an external threat perception, and is inherent in man, his very nature- being the root of terror.

Therefore, for him, right to happiness was sacrosanct – any means could be employed to preserve it- even aggression. In pursuit of happiness, man could kill, as a natural right.

⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 23. (ed.) Nelle Fuller, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., London, 1952, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

Neither did Hobbes blame man for, not accuse him of being the self-centred creature he is. He held that political philosophy must take human nature as its datum, if it is to show how peace and community can become possible to creatures who necessarily refer all things to their own single selves. Hobbes' politics is therefore linked to his psychology. We notice that human nature creates its other.

Man is endowed with reason. 'The use and end of reason is... to begin at these truths, and proceed from one consequence to another'.⁶ From this springs reason, prudence and sapience. The task that he assigns reason is not to conquer or extinguish passion- an impossibility anyway-but to instruct it. Reason will teach passion what it must refrain from and what rules it must accept in order to attain its ends of self preservation, and beyond that, of well being and the commodities of civilized life. This was supposed to give rise to a well ordered society.

This bears a close resemblance to Plato's thought wherein he uses the criteria of not merely reason, but also valor and appetite to place men into three classes, and each performing its duty, without interference in other's roles would create harmony in an unequal society. Any deviation from this would create chaos and anarchy. But there is a difference too. Plato's men are not all endowed with the same level of reason; while Hobbesian men are all more or less alike. Hobbes goes on to talk about anarchy.

Next he talks of power and defines it as man's 'present means to obtain some future apparent good'.⁷ But this power is to be used for *finis ultimus* (utmost aim) or *summum bonum* (greatest good) as spoken of by old moral philosophers. Since felicity is a continual progress of desire from one object to another, the

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. Also, the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only or for one instant of time, his is a restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.⁸

Nature has made men so equal in their faculties of body and mind that there is no considerable difference between them. Hence arises competition, diffidence and glory- the three principal causes of quarrel,⁹ and a condition of war of every man against every man. Like Prometheus, man '... hath his heart, all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety...' ¹⁰ for the pursuit of industry and other higher ends. This perpetual and continual fear, and danger of violent death made 'the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'¹¹

Under such conditions, the passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.¹²

Covenants were entered into and a Commonwealth with coercive power came into being, to remedy the situation and ensure their preservation- fear forming the basis of the covenants and also the State.

Ironically, it must also be noted that it is the same fear of violent death, instinct for survival and the consequent violence that makes man challenge the power and laws of the common wealth and disobey it only when the individual acts in order save himself from imminent death, wounds and imprisonment. It was therefore Thomas Hobbes, who provided the material basis of the modern state in context of the right of preservation, especially from accidental death. The latter

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp 84-85.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 115, 141.

led to the deprivation of 'happiness, defined as enjoyment of commodious living'. This deprivation or threat of it led to fear. Conversely, man feels himself more of a man when he is imposing himself and making others the instruments of his will, here violence becomes the most flagrant manifestation of power against fellow man which can be justifiable but never legitimate.¹³

Locke, the father of liberalism, says that equality of man by nature, creates a state of liberty but not a state of license.¹⁴ The Commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted for the procuring, preserving and advancing of their own civil interests. Civil interest I call life, liberty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the like.¹⁵ He further says that this liberty is only in as much as to dispose of his person or possession, but not to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use that its bare preservation calls for it. But Locke was not so naïve as to think that men in or out of civil society are always motivated to right, guided by reason towards mutual assistance. He recognized the "corruption and viciousness of degenerate men", the "pravity of mankind" that leads men to prey injuriously upon the fruits of other men's labor" even "the rapine and fraud" of members of the same group. Some writers have even taken this recognition by Locke, of the non rational or vicious traits of men as Locke's agreement with Hobbes on state of nature.¹⁶ Thus man is intrinsically no better than the man portrayed by Hobbes, apart from the sprinkling of reason which prevents him from going over the board in his pursuit of self preservation and protection of his property. His is just a gloss over Hobbes' man. But says Locke,

¹³ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1969, pp. 36-38.

¹⁴ John Locke, *Concerning Civil Government*, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 35, (ed.) William Benton, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., London, 1952, p. 26.

¹⁵ *The Locke Reader*, Cambridge University Press London, 1977, p. 245.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

degeneracy, pravity, rapine and fraud are not the norms or even typical. They are the selfish action of some individuals. Men must be restrained from invading others' rights and from doing hurt to one another. Deducing from this, it can be said that man needs to be governed, either through natural law or the positive laws in the Commonwealth. This necessitates a civil society whose main purpose and function is the preservation of life, liberty and property. This marked the transition from individuality to communality.¹⁷ The difference in interpretations of state of nature in Hobbes and Locke can be ascribed to the growth of the new class of producers of wealth, who are not made part to the political compact though they are made part of the social compact in Locke.

In fact in Locke, the word property gets deployed to mean 'right to life and commodity'. In the concept of property, he was reading two of the basic assumptions of society that were prevalent in Locke's time. First, property leads to commodity production. Second, for this was needed a class that helps in this production, but is not in possession of property. The political divide between the two was overcome by him when he used the word property to have a double meaning. In his argument, both sections of society found a rationale to live in society through the social contract and not engage in anarchy. He was not much of a democrat. The government that he created had nothing to do with democracy. It was a constitutional oligarchy that he created. By his time the working class had come into existence. It is the element of the deprived that became the cause of anarchy outside the realm of what came to be later described as political sects, trade union and labor movements.¹⁸

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

¹⁸ Rakesh Gupta, "Changing Conceptions of Terrorism", in *Strategic Analysis*, Dec 2001, Vol XXV, No. 9, p. 1006.

In Rousseau's man too, there are strands of violence and he is also incited to break free from the structures that bog him down. 'Robespierre is nought but the hand, the bloody hand of Rousseau' and 'Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau' suggest that his philosophy instigated violence. Rousseau himself in *Emile* says "our wisdom is slavish prejudice, our customs consist in control, constraint and compulsion. Civilized man is born and dies a slave. The infant is bound up in swaddling clothes, the corpse is nailed down in his coffin. All his life, man is imprisoned by his institutions."¹⁹

In Bentham's Utilitarianism, limits to power are suggested so that felicific calculus is not violated since power corrupts. This leads him to a theory of representation.²⁰ It is in Mill that one finds the argument of liberty as necessarily an ontological predisposition of man. Mill suggests that there are universal physiological predispositions which partially determine human character. In *On Liberty*, Mill addressed the problem of uncontrolled desires and impulses which are as much a part of perfect human beings as beliefs and restraints, and concluded that strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced, since one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strengths, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is not because their consciences are weak. In Utilitarianism, he analyses the sentiment of justice and says that it has two major elements- the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual/s to whom harm has been done. Both these elements emanate from two sentiments which are natural and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self defence and the feeling of sympathy.

¹⁹ Benjamin Barber, *Superman and Common Man: Freedom, Anarchy and the Revolution*, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York, 1971, p. 49.

²⁰ C. B. Macpherson, *Life And Times Of Liberal Democracy*

Intelligence prevents the instinct for retribution from becoming indiscriminate. Thus, for Mill, instincts or innate sympathies have considerable degree of influence in formation of character.²¹

Thus preservation of life and the recourse to any available means, even violence, underlies the nature of man and consequently the form of state best suited to such a type.

Edmund Burke's (1729-1797) work 'The Sublime and the Beautiful', on the aesthetic theory is used a reference here since Burke, in an attempt to explain the 'beautiful' has also ventured into talking about the 'sublime' to make the idea clear through contrast.

In the Introductory Discourse: On Taste, he claims that the standard of both reason and taste is the same in all human creatures.²² Also, the manner of perceiving i.e. through the senses on which the external objects impinges, is the same for all.²³ This leaves no room for confusion in taste,²⁴ though the preferences may differ, depending upon sensibility, judgment and superior knowledge.²⁵

Notwithstanding taste, any object arousing man's passion is usually capable of exciting pain or pleasure, each of which is of a positive nature and not dependent or even relative to, on the other for its existence,²⁶ though pain is a stronger emotion of the mind than pleasure. It so wholly engrosses the mind as to shut out by degrees almost every other idea.²⁷

²¹ Paul Smart, "Mill and Human Nature", in Ian Forbes and Steve Smith (eds.), *Politics and Human Nature*, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London, 1983, pp. 46-49.

²² Edmund Burke, *Sublime and Beautiful*, p. 11.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior, because we never submit to pain willingly. And indeed the ideas of pain and above all death are so very affecting, that whilst we remain in the presence of whatever is supposed to have the power of inflicting either, it is impossible to be perfectly free from terror.²⁸ The only difference between pain and terror is that things which cause pain operate on the mind by the intervention of the body: whereas things that cause terror generally affect the bodily organs by the operation of the mind, suggesting danger.²⁹

The things mentioned above can be categorized as sublime-whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects or operates in a manner analogous to terror.³⁰

The passions belonging to the preservation of individual turn wholly on pain and danger³¹ making self preservation the strongest of all passions.³² This happens because fear (an apprehension of pain or death, which resembles actual pain) robs the mind of all its power of acting and reasoning.³³ Also, as the performance of our duties of every kind depends upon life, we are strongly affected with whatever threatens the destruction of either.³⁴

He considered any attack on property as terrorist and declared that only a tyrant could think of seizing the property of men.

In Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, like other conservatives, he cherishes the differences between states, peoples and nations,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

and the negative aspect to this is the critique of abstract individualism which discounts such differences. His chief target therefore was the natural rights doctrine which saw human nature as being same at all times and in all places and was attributed to reason and independent of culture. Realizing the depravity of human nature, he favored historically determined /traditional rights which cause the incorporation of the individual into the body politic. Any kind of change is motivated by awareness of tradition, awareness of the warp and woof of the fabric of social life. It must also be gradual if it is not to threaten identity. Thus when the French Revolution caused tumultuous changes in the structure of both social and political organization, he was repulsed. The French slaughtered people in the name of the Rights of Man, property was confiscated, and royalty was displaced. All this created great turmoil. Attack on property was seen as striking fear and so being terroristic – democracy had been reduced to crass majoritarianism. All departures from the normal practice were looked down upon since any radical break will have to de-nature individuals, that is, will have to strip ‘them’ of the sources of their identity. Therefore continuity must be ensured. The regicide, the abrogation of aristocratic privileges was thus viewed as terroristic³⁵; for him it was not tyrannicide (as the apologists of the French Revolution would like to call it.). He, instead, savaged rationalists, revolutionaries and utopians for their insolence about human nature. They were ignorant that the nature of man is intricate: the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity, and hence were unaware of the limitations of normal people and of their satisfaction with existing arrangements. Burke himself assumed certain more or less fixed human needs and desires, which made some imagined forms of social life literally unrealizable. The

³⁵ Christopher Berry, “Conservatism and Human Nature”, in Ian Forbes and Steve Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 53-59.

corollary was that efforts to establish such new worlds would lead through the destruction of the traditional signposts which guide and define us, to the widespread loss of personal identity and security.³⁶

The Critical theorists were concerned with the rupture between ontology and teleology in the western Enlightenment guided societies. From Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* to Jean Francois Lyotard there is the critique of instrumental reason. Marcuse indicated the explosive power of the instincts and developed a theory of instinctual liberation. In psychological terms, he seems to think that it is possible to activate aggressive energy that is free from exploitation and domination. He agrees that although violence is inhuman, it can be, and may have to be used by revolutionaries, after certain humanist values were dropped.³⁷

The Critical Theory of society as propounded by the Frankfurt School was concerned with the mounting irrationality of social and cultural values and was also interested in the individual in the form of psychoanalysis. It rejects the procedure of determining objective facts with the aid of conceptual system, from a purely external stand point... critical thinking.. is motivated today by the effort really to transcend the tensions and to abolish the opposition between individuals purposefulness, spontaneity and rationality and those work processes on which society is built.³⁸

Marcuse's two contradictory hypothesis are- that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future and

³⁶ Vincent Geoghegan, "Critical Theory and Human Nature", in Ian Forbes and Steve Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 86-100.

³⁷ Norman Wintrop (ed.) *Liberal Democratic Theory and its critics*, Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1983, p. 451.

³⁸ Tom Bottomore, *The Frankfurt School*, Tavistock Publications, London and New York, 1984, pp. 209-210.

secondly, that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society.

Stating his cause, he explains at length as to why society in his view is irrational and how individuals are so repressed by 'mimesis' that their reasoning power is whittled down, and even the concept of alienation is rendered questionable. They develop uncritical quietism since any refusal to 'go along' appears neurotic.³⁹

Such an exposition amounted to the negation of the prevailing modes, demanding economic, political and intellectual freedom. It was this theory that formed the precursor of the New Left.

The starting point for Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* is the existential encounter between Native and Settler in a colonial backdrop. The result of this encounter is an orgy of violence which might seem to sane men to be purely destructive, but which Fanon and his admirers endeavour to present as 'redemptive apocalypse'. Decolonization which sets out to change the order of the world is obviously a programme of complete disorder. It is the meeting of two forces opposed to each other by their very nature, giving rise to the veritable creation of new man.⁴⁰ Those who have been oppressed, find self fulfillment in violence, which helps them treat their bondage. Structural violence was to be met by individual violence.

But this phenomenon is not new says Fanon. Tribal warfare, feuds and other forms of "collective auto destruction in a very concrete form is one of the ways in which the native's muscular tension is set free. All these patterns of

³⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Studies In The Ideology Of Advanced Industrial Society*, Beacon Press, Boston, USA, 1964, pp.9-15.

⁴⁰ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmonds Worth, Middlesex, England, 1961, pp 27-28.

conduct are those of the death reflex, when faced with danger, a suicidal behaviour...⁴¹ Therefore, in those prevailing circumstances, the native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self.⁴² In other words, violence is his self fulfillment.

Fanon goes on to say that at the level of the individual violence is a cleansing force as it frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction. It makes him fearless and restores his self respect.⁴³

Moving a step further, he says that it is the practise of violence that binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning.⁴⁴

The summary of Fanon's position is given by Satre, in the preface to Fanon's above mentioned book. He says that Fanon 'shows clearly [that the outbreak] of irrepressible violence is neither sound nor fury, not the resurrection of savage instincts, not even the effect of resentment: it is man re-creating himself. I think we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it- that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them'.⁴⁵

Jean-Paul Satre has also made the most elaborate and systematic attempt to create an ideology of terror and violence. He takes an extreme position concerning violence and makes a determined attempt to work through the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

implications of this for both the individual and society. He seeks to give philosophical respectability to the notion that terror, far from being a cancer of the body politic, is indeed its very life blood.

His social doctrine is diametrically opposed to the humane optimism of liberalism. For him, the true motive force of history is scarcity: each man is the enemy to every other because each is a dangerous rival in the struggle against scarcity. Thus, in his state of nature (as portrayed in *Critique* (1960.)) is bleaker than that of Hobbes'. In this struggle every other individual is viewed as the Other, a cruel and rapacious antagonist, at once predator and prey. No element of altruism or love exists.

But this negative reciprocity is 'dialectically' negated by the social collaboration between neighbours, which man finds, is essential to overcome scarcity.

Le Serment (the pledge) is the commitment that actually gives birth to the group and is binding on the members, with violent sanctions against defaulters. Thus it is apparent that this pledged group is created not from a rational and freely given contract or covenant but from fear, and it is the rule of 'Terror' over every member of the group by all their fellow – member that keeps the pledge enforced and sustains the group. It is only the constant presence of violence and terror, that prevents the group from dissolving.⁴⁶ 'Terror in fact is fraternity. For terror is the guarantee that my neighbour will stay my brother; it binds my neighbour to me by the threat of the violence it will use against him if he dares to be "unbrotherly."⁴⁷ Terror is then the very cement of the state. Unselfish love, trust, innocence, harmony, friendship and co-operation are missing from his view of human life and

⁴⁶ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1977, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁷ Maurice Cranston in *ibid.*, p. 73.

feelings. Instead there is exhaltation of action and violence for its own sake and a callous disregard for the victims and for the social consequences of violence. Satrian man liberates himself through acts of violence and as long as scarcity rules the human condition, evil is irremediable i.e. there is the necessity of evil. Any killing or cruelty committed in the name of the revolution is its own justification: the end justifies the means, the means justify the end; terrorism becomes an addiction, an obsession a way of life, and the act of murder a sacramental duty.⁴⁸

This philosophy of terror is in fundamental contradiction to the values of a liberal community, but has the genetic relationship to liberal ontology and its operation.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

CHAPTER III

Liberalism and Democracy

Liberal democracy is a fairly recent (latter half of the nineteenth century) development, which in theory provides ample scope for political opportunity and participation within the law. This chapter shall seek to critically unpack the term 'liberal democracy' into its basic components i.e. liberalism and democracy trace their evolution in a political context, over the centuries and the consequent amalgamation of not just the terms but also the values associated with them, despite being some what mutually opposed.

Not being a mere juxtapositioning of the two concepts, putting them together, at a philosophical level was expected to give rise to a dialectic process whereby the strengths of the two would reinforce each other. But, as this dissertation points out, unfortunately this did not happen. Infact, the shortcomings of the two played upon each other to give rise to the phenomenon of modern political terrorism. Thus the latter part of the chapter shall try to draw out the intimate connection of terrorism with the liberal democratic tradition.

There have been attempts, though few and far in between, to establish this link by various scholars and researchers on terrorism (Paul Wilkinson, Noel O' Sullivan) . Others too appear to have found this connection. But they have been ambiguous and have shied away from pointing a finger towards it. Perhaps the firmly entrenched, near sacred values associated with this tradition, in a rights obsessed society, which was likely to consider it as heresy, prevented them.

Before condemning it as sacrilegious or a Leftist outlook, an unbiased and critical indepth analysis of the liberal philosophy and the democratic values, keeping in mind the views on human nature (as in the 1st chapter) needs to be made.

The flaw lies, not in the tradition *per se*, but in the way it has been institutionalised, the way the nature of man has caused the circumventing and bending of the rules of the game. Lyotard goes to the extent that once the rules of the game are changed you can not play the game and hence is critical of Habermas's communicative action, since consensus cannot be built.¹ It is ironic, but their very strengths have made them weak against scheming/aggrieved individuals who resort to 'other means' to achieve their objectives.

No alternatives will be explored. The aim is only a clearer exposition of the problem. Most studies have been prophylactic. But unless the question itself is not clear, no answer can be absolutely relevant in all circumstances or universally. A broader perspective is required.

LIBERALISM

Liberalism has been the political philosophy of modernity. Liberal philosophy asserted the general human rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (Jefferson) or life ,liberty and property (Locke) and to the numerous civil and legal rights and freedoms that are codified in many modern constitutions. Starting with Hobbes, whose work marks a point of transition between a commitment to the absolutist state and the struggle of liberalism against tyranny. It is a highly controversial concept and

¹ Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Post Modern Condition*, (ed.) Robert Harvey and Mark S. Roberts, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1995.

its meaning has shifted historically. Early liberalism was optimistic, energetic and philosophic. It appeared likely to bring great benefits to mankind. It was opposed to everything medieval, both in philosophy and politics and the distinctive character was individualism. For centuries, there was a need to stake out a circumscribed private ground in an otherwise statist, mercantilist, all too public world. Thus in the classical sense, liberalism is used to define a private sphere, independent of the state itself in the freeing of civil society-personal, family and business and economic life from political interference and the simultaneous delimitation of the state's authority which followed the expansion of market economies and the struggle for a range of freedoms and rights.

There was no 'liberalism' no constitutionalism, limited government 'individual rights' and 'civil liberties'- in classical antiquity. Ancient states, where the 'state' had no separate existence as a corporate entity apart from the community of citizens, produced no clear conception of a separation between 'state' and 'civil society' and no set of ideas or institutions to check the power of the state or to protect 'civil society' and the individual citizen from its intrusions. Liberalism had as its fundamental pre-condition the development of a centralized state separate from and superior to other, more particularistic jurisdictions.

But although 'liberalism' is a modern coinage which presupposes the 'modern' state (at least early modern absolutism), its central conceptions of liberty and constitutional limits have an earlier provenance. Liberal conceptions of limited or constitutional government, and of inviolable liberties asserted against the state have their origin, in the late medieval and early modern periods, in the assertion of

independent powers of lordship by European aristocracies against encroachment by centralizing monarchies. These conceptions at the outset represented an attempt to safeguard feudal liberties, powers and privileges. They were not democratic in their intent or in their consequences, representing backward-looking claims to a piece of the old parcellized sovereignty of feudalism, not a looking forward to a more modern democratic political order. And the association of these ideas with lordship persisted for a long time, well beyond the demise of feudalism.

The social as well as the political community was organised within the framework of feudalism in the pre liberal era. The society was held together by the traditional bonds of solidarity. The belief that each individual's station in life was divinely ordained created a satisfaction of sorts with his circumstances and caused peace to prevail. The patron-client kind of relationship served its purpose well to keep the community mutually dependent and close knit.²

The advent of liberalism brought in a new mode of production and a new class-the capitalists-who displaced the landed aristocracy and hence the institution of feudalism too. This was supposed to 'emancipate' the people. The liberal philosophy believed in giving individuals more and more leverage and control over their own lives. Thus this loosening of feudal bonds and individuating from a hierarchical and oppressive order was seen as a positive development.³

But this was just one side of the coin. It had its repercussions too-bonds of traditional society had been pulled asunder, leaving relations among men hostage to cold calculations and the cash nexus. The loyalties and solidarities that had held

² Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p.41.

³ John R. Gibbins and Bo Reimer, *The Politics of Post modernity*, Sage Publications, London, 1999.

society together dissolved. "All that is solid melts into air" this very aptly describes the condition. The liberal philosophy tried to rationalize as freedom what was in truth man's loss of connectedness, of dignity and of virtue.⁴

From the intense solidarity of primitive times where groups absorbed the individual, liberalism saw the solidarity of communities being lost to (for the better) universal form of organizations which were not only stable but also provided rights and liberties and a powerful bulwark against statist tyranny.

With regard to rights and liberties, it can be said that the pre-liberal communities viewed some forms of human life as inherently superior to other forms- and this was usually determined by their ascriptive values. And hence the system of rights and liberties was graded. But modern liberalism does not simply value liberty, but an equality of liberty.⁵

Thus in the liberal state, the liberal rights and liberties of individuals are the basis of the constitutional structure. They form the categorical framework of the political union. Political and social goals may be pursued within that framework, but only to the extent that their pursuit is consistent with it. This view endorsed by Mills and Rawls, gives priority to the liberal rights and liberties over other political considerations in all normal circumstances. Rawls believes that in a system of unequal liberty, those with the lesser liberty are apt to lose self respect and have to be satisfied with a subordinate ranking in political/economic life.

Mill justifies his position saying that unequal liberty normally interferes with the unfolding of communitarian sentiments. It also tends to corrupt the apparently

⁴ Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, p.50.

⁵ Gerald F. Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, Croom Helm Ltd, Kent, 1983, p.165.

privileged. Only if citizens are devoted to the common good, that the violation of individual claims to justice can be consistent with social solidarity. Thus, essential to the modern liberal position are claims that those denied equal liberty will be alienated and hostile, or that those with greater liberty will be arrogant self glorifying.⁶

Freedom is grounded on the quest for self satisfaction, the necessity of choice, the requirements of self expression and the dangers of coercion.⁷ On the face of it, this appears fair enough and totally just and unbiased, providing individuals the same kind of conditions for full realization. But liberal reasons do not alone provide a reason for making the liberal rights and liberties categorical. Certain qualifications have to be made under certain circumstances i.e. in wartime, revolution, severe political instability or when it is hopelessly idealistic to demand their recognition.⁸ Though sometimes the suggestion to compromise them, on the grounds that they weaken the structure of the liberal state are condemned as corrupt, sometimes such a step becomes inevitable-liberal societies come with a risk attached that some individuals may begin to use their liberties to plot to radically change or destroy the state by means of violence including terrorism.⁹

Another problematic is associated with liberalism. There is a liberal pre-occupation with the development of the higher faculties of individuals through conscious efforts. There is also the conviction of the similitude of men. There are no radical differences as Plato's classes, but this does not deny individuality either. Such a notion of similitude does not imply equality. This leads to the recognition of

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-194.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.165.

⁸ D.A. Lloyd Thomas, *In Defence of Liberalism*, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988, pp.14-16.

⁹ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and The Liberal State*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, London and Basingstoke, 1977, p.7.

distinctive capacities and potentialities of individuals. If this is the case, there can be no 'plans' or 'schemes' or 'blue prints' of life, since plans will vary from person to person because endowments and opportunities differ and liable to undergo change or revision throughout life. Each individual therefore requires freedom to find or create the life that best suits his nature so that there is no thwarting of his personality through pre-existing models of life.¹⁰ Popper demands 'that every man should be given, if he wishes, the right to model his life himself'.¹¹ Paternalism, which is the coercing of people primarily for what is believed to be their own good has been decried by Mill. For him, coercion is antithetical to the modern liberal understanding of development since each knows what is best for himself.¹²

Thus liberal attempt to justify a framework of legal and social requirements within which many styles of life and conceptions of what is worthwhile may be pressured. Liberals wish to present this as a 'neutral' framework, not biased towards any particular conception of what is worth while. But they also want to say that it is, in some clear sense, the best framework to have: frameworks that are non-liberal are also worse ones. This dilemma is answered by saying that a neutral framework is deontological and the concept of right is prior to that of good assuring that person's rational nature is something valuable and people are to be treated as ends.

Only in a universe empty of telos, is it possible to conceive a subject apart from/ prior to its purpose and ends. This would mean that it falls to human subjects to constitute meanings of their own. This would explain the prominence of contract theory from Hobbes onwards. The deontological universe and the independent self

¹⁰ Gerald F. Gaus, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹¹ Gerald F. Gaus, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

¹² J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, Oxford University Press, London, 1912, p. 94.

that moves within it taken together hold out a liberating vision. Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the deontological subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As inhabitants of a world without telos, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given. We are self originating sources of valid claims.¹³

The problem arises due to liberalism's refusal to develop public norms in the face of metaphysical uncertainty has left man as a social being without standards, vulnerable alike to meaninglessness and authoritarianism, defenceless in the face of heteronomy, contingency and mere accident without a concept of mutuality, without common goals, how can it produce anything but misanthropy, envy, greed and war?¹⁴ Barber too believes that such a political philosophy rooted in individual hedonism and private interest has the natural tendency to produce anarchy and despotism.¹⁵

Another problem arose, classical liberalism, as articulated by Locke and James Mill, saw men as essentially independent private and competitive beings who see civil associations mainly as a framework for the pursuit of their own interests. The extreme individualism created a demeaning portrait of the human being as basically *homo-economicus*. The market model of society which can develop only in a liberal environment is seen as essentially flawed as it ignores the intrinsic interest

¹³ Michael J. Sandel, "Justice and the Good", in Michael J. Sandel (ed.), *Liberalism and its Critics*, Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1984, pp. 169-70.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.50.

¹⁵ Benjamin Barber, *op. cit.*, p.40.

we have in each other's life. This unconcern and detachedness not only fed upon but also reinforced the other two problems.¹⁶

Thus the dissolution of solidarity bonds and the view of man as a free agent provided some of the gray areas within the liberal political philosophy which provided ideal breeding grounds for terrorism.

The period whose character was defined by the French Revolution was drawing to a close by the mid 19th century. Roughly speaking, the main feature of that period was its search for the conditions of individual liberty. It finally threw off the yoke of aristocratic privilege and replaced it by a faith in the right of the ordinary man to attain, by his own effort, whatever position in society he found open to him. That position was a function of the property he could amass; and to maximise individual opportunity, therefore, the function of the state was restricted within the smallest limits. The demand for individual liberty, moreover synchronized with the Industrial Revolution. Its achievements were so large, its miracles so obvious, that its gospel of *laissez faire* triumphed easily over all competing faiths.¹⁷

In conclusion, it can be said that the attempt to fit the liberal philosophy to the cut of politics rather than the other way round, had disastrous results. Moreover, so fraught with dilemmas was its philosophical foundations that it did not take long to quickly deteriorate into the rule of unreason or majoritarian tyranny.¹⁸ The costs can be listed as follows- the demeaning portrait of human being as an abstract monad and a *homo economicus*: man as beast, as interest monger, as disinterested agent or grasping consumer, as hostile competitor and predatory aggressor; an antipathy to democracy

¹⁶ Gerald F. Gaus, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-57.

¹⁷ Harold J. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1933, pp. 30-31.

¹⁸ Benjamin Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 17.

and its sustaining institutional structure and a preference for 'thin', rather than strong, versions of political life in which citizens are operators and clients, while politicians are professionals who do actual governing; an absolutist approach to rights that ignores their socially embedded character, amongst others.

The liberal political programme's dilemma has succinctly been presented by Rousseau-to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.¹⁹

For all its humanist rhetoric, and despite the considerable success of the institutions whose experience it reflects, liberalism has left modern man with a legacy of discontent. Its predisposition towards anarchy has manifested itself in practise as anomic. Its preoccupation with asocial liberty has precipitated an estrangement that has alienated men and women from their fellows and from their public identity as citizens.²⁰ Thus we find that the liberal tradition is a rich amalgam of political ideas and beliefs constitutionalism, individualism, egalitarianism among other. To these strands, the 18th century added Lockean and Enlightenment ideas of natural rights liberty, the social contract, the limited role of government and the dependence of government upon society.

But the unsystematic and unideological character of this creed is reflected in the fact that no theory exists for ordering these values in relation to one another and for resolving, on a theoretical level, the conflicts that inherently exist among them. Conflicts easily materialize when any one value is taken to an extreme-majority rule

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

v/s minority rights; higher law v/s popular sovereignty; liberty v/s equality; individualism v/s democracy.²¹

In this backdrop, a new outlook was being born, of which the principles were incompatible with the laissez faire state. Political democracy developed in response to the demand for the abrogation of privilege. In modern European history its cause was the liberation of a commercial middle class from domination by a land holding aristocracy.²²

Thus it can be said that the liberal philosophy helped to propel the West into democratic times.

DEMOCRACY

The ideals of democracy and freedom have their origins at the very beginning of civilization. Both Plato and Aristotle have reported it being functional in some of the ancient Greek city states. Nevertheless, Plato was highly critical of democracy for its lack of expertise in government, indiscipline and selfishness, while Aristotle considered it politically unsuitable. In Athens, being a spectacular success, it was crucial to the freedom of both individual and collective life. But the exclusion of women, resident aliens and slaves from the democratic process restricted it to the participation of adult male freemen/ citizens. Thus the clinical notion of 'government by the people, of the people and for the people' was attached with qualifications in ancient times. Its salient features were-equal participation by all freemen in the

²¹ John J. Kushma, "Participation and the Democratic Agenda: Theory and Praxis", in Max V. Levine, Kushma et al (eds.), *The State and Democracy: Revitalising America's Government*, Routledge Chapman and Hall. Inc., New York, 1988, pp. 15-16.

²² Harold Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

common affairs of the polis (city–state) which was regarded as an instrument of good life; arriving at public decisions in an atmosphere of free discussion; and general respect for law and for the established procedures of the community.

The negative connotation attached to the concept was unloaded only towards the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. It has come to mean a government by consent. It also has come to mean only a technique. It can also be understood as being diametrically opposed to totalitarianism –where power is scattered, limited, controlled and exercised in rotation. Free elections in which various parties contend for power is the means to it.

Sartori observed that ancient and modern democracy differed in terms of both the ends and values. Making a modest beginning with about nine democracies among forty eight independent nations in 1902, modern democracy has emerged as the political system of choice around the globe. People in increasing numbers are turning to democracy as the ‘best’ system of government.

There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereign or supreme controlling power in the last resort is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of the ultimate sovereign, but being, at least occasionally called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.²³

²³ J.S. Mill, *op. cit.*, 207-9.

More praise follows 'Democracy is incontestably the best form of governance. Once introduced, its logic of political equality is historically irreversible that is the form of government can be demolished, but not its sociological effects.'²⁴

But while some have fairly realistic expectations about what democracy may be able to accomplish in their countries, others seem to be turning to it unthinkingly, as a panacea for all their social and political ills, or alternatively, as simply the governmental system of last resort.²⁵ James Bryce belongs to the former category. Kaviraj, too, warns us against thinking romantically about democracy. Its short term consequences are not always picturesque or pleasing. It is also apparent that the social consequences of democracy in the Third World have gone beyond the relatively well charted fields of western political thought.²⁶

The collapse of communism and surges towards democracy, in places as disparate as the republics of the former Soviet Union, Africa and East Asia have elevated the ideas of democracy to something akin to an ethical standard. Although there may be some excess in the triumphalism of the 'end of history' scenario, the term democracy has taken on a newly urgent normative connotation. The democratic ideal has become virtually the only recognized political currency of the 1990s.²⁷

Any definition of democracy is structured on the idea of these twin functions- to be responsive to electoral majorities and to protect the basic rights of each and every citizen, regardless of their place in a majority or minority. Apart from this basic

²⁴ Sudipta Kaviraj, "Democracy and Development in India", in Amiya Kumar Bagchi (ed.), *Democracy and Development*, St. Martin's Press Inc., New York, 1995, p. 125.

²⁵ Robert Paul Churchill, Introduction, in Robert Paul Churchill (ed.), *The Ethics of Liberal Democracy*, Berg Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1994, p. 1.

²⁶ Sudipta Kaviraj, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁷ Robert J. Myers, "Ethics, Democracy and Foreign Policy Manipulation or Participation" in Robert Paul Churchill (ed.) *ibid.*, p. 167.

idea, there has been no dearth of theorists who have put forward their own interpretations of the 'essence' of democracy—the opportunity of every citizen to contribute to government decisions; institutional arrangements according to which the only persons permitted to make political decisions are those who have acquired this power by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote; a process of making collective and binding decisions in which citizens have equal opportunities to express their preferences and equal weight in determining the outcome etc.

The essential condition of democracy have been thought to be certain personal capacities or attitudes and dispositions –the voluntarism and disposition to form 'voluntary associations' identified by Tocqueville, or the 'participant' attitudes that constitute a 'frame of mind' or a 'civil culture'; the capacity and will of citizens to engage in deliberative processes determining public good; or a way of life, encompassing 'a faith in the capacities of human nature, faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience'.²⁸

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Making a small beginning with the participation of merely 'citizens' in the political process, democracy reached its culmination in 'liberal democracy'. Though classical liberalism was contrary to democratic principles, the path which capitalism and free market economies took, necessitated the combination of the two antithetical principles to such an extent that they have come to be inseparable as 'liberal democracy'

²⁸ Robert Paul Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

Tocqueville saw it as an attempt to reconcile liberty and equality. But Sartori is skeptical of this new equation. He says that the relationship between liberalism and democracy must be considered on a more concrete level, [since] liberalism is the technique of limiting the state's power, where as democracy is the insertion of popular power into the state and hence a division of roles is created between the liberal and the democrat.²⁹

The problem of defining a liberal democracy was compounded by contending view- though liberalism is a later concept, it incorporated democratic principles or whether democracy, in practise since ancient times, assumed a liberal character to give rise to liberal democracy.³⁰

Sartori emphasizes that what democracy adds to liberalism is at the same time a consequence of liberalism, therefore democracy is the completion, not the replacement of liberalism. He also says that more democracy does not mean less liberalism and that while liberalism is an instrument of democracy, democracy is not in itself a vehicle of liberalism. The formula of liberal democracy is equality through liberty, by means of liberty, not liberty by means of equality.³¹

These definitional issues aside, liberal democracies must meet the following conditions-meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leader and policies, at least through regular and fair

²⁹ Giovanni Sartori *Democratic Theory*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1962, p. 369.

³⁰ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 229.

³¹ Giovanni Sartori, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-3.

elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to form and join organization sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.³² Some other important features include: explicit limitations on majoritarian power and increased protection of individual rights; a strong association with a capitalistic economy, either through explicit government policies and institutions that abet and support market mechanisms or alternatively, through regulations that redistribute projects in support of some aspects of a welfare state or (most likely) some mixed combination; and neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life, that is, equal respect for citizens efforts to freely pursue individual interests up to the point at which the pursuit of private preference may conflict with the rights or protected liberties of other members of the polity.

It is a fundamental liberal assumption that in a representative democracy, governing on the basis of popular consent, government must be dedicated to the good of society and the well being of its individual members. It must seek to protect the whole community, their lives, property, resources, social institutions and their legitimate demands. In a genuine liberal democracy, neither external nor internal security should remain privileges reserved for a small elite or for the richest or most powerful on the land. 'Law and order' means the equal rights and treatment under the law and equal rights of protection.³³

The liberal doctrine does not accord state or government unlimited, inalienable and immutable rights over the whole population and territories. The

³² L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds.) *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Vol. 2 (Africa), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988, p. xvi.

³³ Paul Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-119.

liberal belief in individual free will and the supreme value of liberalism surely implies the large scale changes in constitutions, political frontiers and allegiances may become morally justified because it is popularly desired and politically necessary. Thus, inherent in the political dynamic of liberal democracy, is the constant critical reprisal of the political context, boundaries and relationship of the liberal state and the government holding a fiduciary responsibility for meeting ever changing legitimate popular needs and demands must adjust by continual reform and adaptation.

At the level of policy debate, the constant clash and testing of ideas and the day to day scrutiny of the conduct of administration, the existence of multiplicity of parties and groups can be seen to serve an invaluable function for liberal democracies. It is, therefore, known for peaceful internal change i.e. capacity to tolerate, respond to and harness the forces of popular protest and discontent. Moreover in a liberal democratic society, where the rule of law and the full range of civil rights and liberties pertain, we are accustomed to assume that there will be no popular basis of support for violent rebellion or revolution. The major objective of liberal democratic states, therefore, is to identify and defuse such situations long before they threaten to enter a violent phase. Thus the demands of the minorities are responded to and the use of violence is rendered unnecessary.

But the critics of liberal democracy maintain that the success of all these parliamentary and electoral methods depends upon the willingness of all members of the society to accept the ultimate decisions of the government and legislature as authoritative and binding for all, and there have been instances where a vocal

majority or minority group in the community refuses to accept or abide by the values. Individuals too may follow suit.³⁴

This was made possible by the new ideological style that deprived the words democracy and liberty of any clear connection with the rule of law. To add to it the idea of liberty had become intimately connected with ideals of personal autonomy and self realization, detaching it further from the rule of law. As a result ideological politics open the door to terrorism still further, since anyone at all may now perform any act he wishes, no matter how horrific, in the name of liberty.³⁵

Wilkinson too fears that the individuals begin to use their liberties to plot to radically change or destroy the state by means of violence, including terrorism since the purely subjective meaning of liberty provided no barrier against its transformation into a formula for mere self-assertive egoism.

Thus the stress is almost exclusively placed upon the extension of rights, democracy, and participation at the cost of any attention to obligation, duties, law, authority and order. In such a scenario, the vulnerability of Western liberal states to terrorist attacks is enhanced.

One obvious but extremely important factor is the inherent civil rights and freedoms of the liberal states which terrorist organizations can exploit. The freedoms can be all too easily taken advantage of by terrorists. Such conditions provide a promising ground for recruitment, support and operation of revolutionary movements.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-29.

³⁵ Noel O' Sullivan, "Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy", in Noel O' Sullivan, *Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Sussex, 1986, p. 9.

The government is bound by these very liberties and is unable to act decisively. This is a largely discussed topic.³⁶

Conclusion:

Though the political organization and structure of liberal democracy form a well patterned whole, it does not establish a strong political power. Compared with the strong states of the absolute monarchies, liberal states are weak. This weakness corresponds to the ideology of liberalism. The weakness here refers to the political weakness only. Since economic power, under the liberal thinking has continued to grow.³⁷ The drawbacks may well be explained by the liberal ontology and the liberal philosophy, which has certain loopholes that are circumvented easily in liberal democratic states. This makes the fact that the liberal democratic process and the institutionalization are at fault, quite evident.

³⁶ Paul Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-105; also Jaswant Singh at Tej Bahadur Sapru Lecture delivered by him on 17 October 2001 at Sapru House Auditorium of the Indian Council of World Affairs.

³⁷ Maurice Duverger, *Modern Democracies- Economic Power versus Political Power*, The Dryden Press Ltd., Illinois, 1974, pp. 50-51.

CHAPTER IV

Liberal Democratic Institutionalization

Liberal democracy needs a re-appraisal-not just of its theoretical foundation, as has been seen in the previous chapters, but also the quality of its key institutions, and processes need to be put under close scrutiny. This has been necessitated due to the fact that whatever set of institutions, processes, capacities and attitudes, liberties and rights make up a liberal democracy, it is not the same thing as the end results of these in action. The flawed nature of the way in which the principles and values of a liberal democracy are institutionalised (through political parties, regime types, deliberative machinery etc.) as well as the inherent limitations of the political process has not only created space for the discussion of its shortcomings but also provided a gap between theory and practice. This caused the aspiration of one political community to be strangled by the other more numerous ones. This is just a single example of the way liberal democratic institutionalization and political process produce discontent among a certain section, to such an extent that they may take recourse to terrorism or 'politics by other means' to fulfil their political aims.

This chapter is devoted to the exploration of the processes and institutions involved in the making of a terrorist / terrorist group. It should also get theorists on their toes in a bid to be more concerned with the design of government structures and institutions in ways that best protect rights, result in just outcomes for citizens, or maximise preference satisfaction.

It is a widely acknowledged fact that a democracy cannot satisfy all. Even the most open and responsive political systems have not been able to create a

content population. The problem of discontent becomes deeper if the society is a multiethnic one, causing cleavages between the majority and the minorities, and among minorities themselves in their bid to achieve more favours from the political system. Violence may be used to voice the political discontent by the citizens whose views and interests are ignored by politicians. On the other hand, politicians may pander to extremists and incite them to violence with a view to further their electoral goals. Such conditions forebode a move towards random violence rather than political violence making terrorism common in free and democratic societies.¹

POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Robert Dahl in his study of political opposition in western democracies discovered that political opposition occurs when any of the following eight standards are not optimally realised

- 1) Liberty of thought and expression including opportunity for dissenting minorities to make their views known to other citizens and policy makers.
- 2) Opportunity for citizens to participate in political life.
- 3) When political conflict occurs, control over the decisions of government by majority rather than minority of citizens, voters and elected officials.
- 4) Rationality in political discussions and decision making in the sense of increasing understanding by citizens and leaders of the goals involved and the appropriate means.
- 5) Consensus in political discussions and decision-making, in the sense that solutions are sought that will minimize the size, resentment and coercion

¹ Christopher Hewitt, "Political Context of Terrorism in America", in David C. Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), *The Democratic Experience and Political Violence*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2001, p.325.

of defeated minorities, and will maximise the number citizens who conclude that their goals have been adequately met by the solution adopted.

- 6) The peaceful management of conflict and the minimization of political violence.
- 7) Resolution of urgent policy questions in the sense that the government directs its attention to any question regarded as urgent and important by a substantial proportion of citizens or leaders and adapts solutions satisfactory to the largest number of citizens.
- 8) Widespread confidence in and loyalty to a constitutional and democratic polity.²

The institutions that ensure that these necessary conditions are met must be characterised by certain legitimating features too. The principle of popular sovereignty must be carried through consistently in electoral terms, in that not only the legislature but the head of the executive also is chosen directly or indirectly by ballot, on the basis of universal suffrage. Elections provide not only the method of appointment to political office but also the avenue through which consent to government is expressed. The role of political parties in such a system is to prepare candidates and policies for approval, to focus on electoral choice, and to provide the discipline needed to secure effective government in the event of being elected.

But not only do the eight criteria mentioned above, conflict with one another i.e. one cannot be maximised beyond some range without sacrificing another goal, they also imply an inbuilt opportunity for dissent redressal through

² Robert A. Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, Yale University Press, Yale, 1965, pp. 387-91.

the freedom of political communication. Yet, the very existence of dissent and political opportunity is a sure sign that someone is constrained by government to do or to forbear from doing something that he would like to do and very likely feels he has a moral right, or even an obligation to do.³

In such circumstances, a legitimacy crisis could be said to occur since there arise a serious threat or challenge to the rules of power, or a substantial erosion in the beliefs which provide their justification. In the case of a liberal democratic order that means a threat to the electoral rules and their associated freedoms, or an erosion of commitment to the idea of popular sovereignty underpinning them.⁴

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: VOICING THE OPPOSITION

Of the numerous ways of political communication, such as rational discourse electoral politics, violence and non violence, the intertwined nature of electoral politics and violence shall be the focus. Broadly classifying them into two, it can be said that political communication can either be in the form of discourse or action. Many methods of symbolic action lie close to the action-discourse boundary, conventional and non conventional action forms the second boundary, and violence and non violence forms the third boundary.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, The Macmillan Press Ltd. , London, 1991, p. 168.

	NON- CONVENTIONAL	CONVENTIONAL
NON VIOLENT		
Action	Rallies, Strikes, etc.	Elections, lobbying, etc.
Discourse	Strong emotional appeals.	Everyday conversation
VIOLENT		
Action	Non State Terrorism	Police action, warfare
Discourse	Personal verbal abuse	Verbal abuse in sporting competition.

Table 1 – Violent action in conceptual space created by the contrasts discourse-action, conventional-non conventional and violent-non violent (typical example given in each category).

Source: Journal of Peace Research, March 2003.

Of the 4 modes of political communication mentioned above, for many, rational discourse is an ideal mode, even if in reality it is approximated only occasionally. It is considered to be the best way for members of a political community to reach agreements on sensible ways to live together.

Electoral politics is a rather different mode of political communication. It is the competition between parties (and candidates) for political office, in which elections are the primary means of selection. Electoral politics has several communicative dimensions. Candidates and political parties seek to win the allegiance of voters, both through direct communication such as advertising and election speeches, and by implementing policies that are perceived as desirable. While some elements of electoral politics proceed on the basis of rational assessment of options, others are more manipulative, such as provision of special

funding in crucial electorates and symbolic crusades against crime or foreigners, not to mention routine.

Third method of political communication is violence. An example is terrorist attack a typical purpose of which is to communicate the existence of urgency of a particular group's grievance via the mass media. Indeed, terrorism can be conceived as communication activated and amplified by violence. Governments can also use violence as a form of communication, such as massive police presence, arrests, and brutality against protestors (whether protestors are violent or non-violent). Violence can also serve other functions, such as destruction of life and property or either disrupting or preserving order, but usually there are significant communicative dimensions. Indeed, in most cases, certain meanings of violence are well understood, as in warfare, though needless to say, the meanings are not always the same as meanings are not always the same as those perceived by others. The occasion when meanings are not clear, such as a random shooting, often are the most disturbing.

These being the modes of political communication, we now look at how effective each of them is in addressing the six kinds of changes in the power and social set up of a society that may be require to redress grievances of various political communities.

Mode of Political Communication	Rational Discourse	Electoral Politics	Non Violence	Violence
Elements of power and social change				
1. Dialogue	A characteristic feature	A partial component	An essential element	Limited or non-existent
2. Means-end compatibility	High	Partial	High	Low
3. Opportunity for participation	High	Limited	High	Low
4. Scope for oppression	Low	Medium	Low	High
5. Capacity for power redistribution	Low	Medium	High	High
6. Capacity for system transformation	Low	Low	High	High

Table 2 Showing the 4 modes of political communication, together with 6 features that deal with elements of power and social change, and their cost/benefit analysis.

Source: Journal of Peace Research, March 2003.

The features are listed with an associated question.

1. Dialogue – does the mode of communication foster a mutual exchange of information and perspectives?
2. Means- end compatibility: is the mode of communication (the means) compatible with the goal of the communication process (the end)?
3. Opportunity for participation: is the mode of communication open to anyone who wants to use it?
4. Scope for oppression: does the mode of communication have the capacity to harm or subjugate others?

5. Power Equalization: does the mode of communication have the capacity to reduce inequalities of power between participants?
6. System transformation: does the mode of communication have the capacity to change social structures?

From the table it is apparent that after non-violence, rational discourse is the best mode of political communication. Though they are the most cost effective and efficient means, yet they are not widely pursued since they are slow and time consuming processes. This paves the way for the adoption of electoral politics. It is based only in part on rational discourse, hence only partially satisfies dialogism and means-end compatibility. Most adults can participate as voters, but only a small minority participates as elected officials. Electoral politics has some scope for oppression especially of outsider groups. However, the electoral process provides opportunity for challenging oppression affecting or opposed by the majority. There is some scope for power redistribution, but the actual experience of electoral politics shows that radical power distribution may be in favor of the rich and powerful. Finally, electoral politics is seldom self transformative. It can be argued that it operates as a brake on further democratization.⁵

Though the game of electoral politics is played according to the rules framed for it, but when the means are not institutionalised well, the institutions become a pawn in unscrupulous hands. They merely look for electoral gains and leave no stone unturned to attain it. For them, recourse to violence / terrorist means to further populist demands is a well received option. The combination of electoral politics and violence absolves them of the responsibility for the violence and also gives the appearance of hastening the processes. This forms the

⁵ "Non Violence as Political Communication" in *Journal of Peace Research*, Sage Publication, London, California, Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 40, No. 2, March 2003, pp.216-19.

background to one of the reasons that Hewitt puts forward. The example of Punjab (in India) during the decade of the eighties forms a representative case.

The other reason mentioned by Hewitt is of when citizens resort to violence as a mode of political communication. This occurs when the means of electoral politics is either not available to them, or is skewed against them, making the political system unresponsive to their demands. A typical example is the case of Northern Ireland.

People who see the political system as responsive to their concern will not resort to violence. The existence of terrorism is therefore an indicator of political alienation. Pluralists emphasize that a wide variety of opinions and interests are allowed to organise and compete in the political arena, but in practise, certain groups are excluded from the process. This is due to several reasons. Political cleavages, on basis of inscriptive identities can produce permanent minorities (i.e. Northern. Ireland, and the under representation of Blacks in the US). Besides, electoral competition in two party system tends to ignore the extremes of the ideological spectrum, since there is a drive for the centre.⁶

In most democracies today, the majority speaks for the status quo, while frustrated, oppressed minorities urge futile reform. This dilemma has not only reduced democracy to a crass majoritarianism, no longer answering the demands of minorities, precipitating a bitter crisis of man's faith in democratic institutions, but also a perilous cleavage between popular sovereignty and justice. This is taken up for discussion later.

⁶ Christopher Hewitt, *op.cit.*, pp. 326-7.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS:

Those who think that democracy is a utopian cure-all, argue that since *real* democracies have rules for peaceful resolution of problems /conflicts, the political systems that face these crisis situations, then, are not really democracies. Weinberg and Rapoport counter this argument by saying that they do not engage in this word game, rather, they believe that democratic institutions do not always inhibit and sometimes, even encourage out break of political violence and terrorism.⁷ It is this strain that will be developed in this section.

It has not been easy to define the term 'institution'. A discursive understanding of political institutions would include a sum total of formal as well as informal procedures in use, on the one hand, and norms and values as well as behavioral compliance and deviations on the other. It is not very easy to operationalize all these complex and often contradictory dimensions in the study of any concrete political institution. At what threshold of interaction and value compliance, political institutions can be said to have come into existence and under what conditions it ceases to be one? The tensions between norms and behaviour is not very easy to consensually resolve. Institutions can be defined as organizations and procedures that have come to be accepted by society and thus have acquired a measure of value and stability.⁸

Institutions are crucial to key attributes of democracies i.e. rule of law, freedom, order, representation and administrative capacity. They are also required to guarantee the effective exercise of citizenship. institutionalization thus refers to

⁷ Leonard Weinberg and David C Rapoport, Conculsion, in Weinberg and Rapoport (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 365-6

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, p. 12.

the process where by organizations and procedures become institutions and political structures and practices take root.

Duverger lists the various institutions like the executive, the legislature and political parties, and differentiates between the European and the American counterparts claiming that the context of evolution, the ways of life, modes of thinking and the cultural patterns are responsible for the differences.⁹ He also points out that parliaments are double edged swords, since they are both the expression of popular sovereignty and a means of containing it. He then cites an example, saying that they can become the means by which the bourgeoisie comes to power; they help maintain it in power, by creating a political system that protects it from the people's importunities. They can also dislodge the bourgeoisie from power, if suffrage is made truly universal, if inequalities of representation are eliminated, if bicameralism is abolished, and so on.¹⁰

Self Determination

Daniel Philpott believes self determination to be a form of institution, a new arrangement for governance. Its justification lies in what it promotes – democracy – which is in turn justified by what it promotes – the autonomy of individuals who better steer their fate by governing themselves collectively. Self determination has been demanded to remedy some injustices that the claimant group has suffered. It is a general right derived from democracy, obtainable by any group, the majority of whose members desire to exercise it but also adequately protect minorities within its midst. Self determination has commonly come to be associated with violence, but it need not always be bloody. To obtain

⁹ Maurice Duverger, *Economic Power Versus Political Power*, The Dryden Press, Illinois, 1974, p. 51.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

self determination, a group must uphold basic liberal rights, as well as features of democracies such as elections and representation, also, the procedure for choosing self determination, too must be democratic. But it cuts both ways since it challenges the absoluteness of sovereignty.¹¹ Thus it is evident that by not legalizing self determination, a very important feature of democracy is sidelined, as is the minority, who never gets the opportunity to choose the principles that govern them.

An essential feature of democracy is that it dispenses power through the citizenry as a whole, equally. Also, the value of self determination is respected only where the means available to the individual provide the power to effect choices, or at least affect decisions. If they do not, then-though it may still be true that the individual has a means of expressing a preferred choice it will not be true that he is *empowered* to make that choice effectively. Now it is fairly evident that the dispersal of power through universal suffrage, does not in this sense empower the individual.¹² Thus the 'goodness' of living in accordance with one's own particular conception of the good, which derives from the more basic good of its being freely chosen and pursued and the capacity for rational self determination comes to be at odds with democracy.¹³

Elections and Voting Rights

It is true that universal suffrage denies individuals the power to effect outcomes. Hirschbein believes that the political myth of the 'power of a vote' is

¹¹ Daniel Philpott, "Should Self Determination be Legalised?", in Rapoport and Weinberg (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 107-12.

¹² Gordon Graham, "The Moral Basis of Democracy" in Robert Paul Churchill (ed.), *The Ethics of Liberal Democracy*, Berg Publishers Ltd., Oxford, Providence, 1994, p. 28.

¹³ Maurice L. Wade, "A (Somewhat) Communitarian (Partial) Reformulation of Liberalism," in *ibid.*, p. 87.

embedded deeply in the psyche of citizens of democracies. Voting has been reified by portraying it as a hard-won, sacred obligation. But this narrative fails to recognize that the significance of voting depends upon circumstances : a vote cast in an Athenian assembly or Jeffersonian town meeting has a meaning radically different from pulling a lever in a booth once every 4-5 year in a mass society. In the former case, a vote was merely a means: a protocol for bringing closure to meaningful debate among full-time, empowered citizens deliberating about candidates and issues close at hand. But today, citizens are reduced to passive spectators, and their vote is stripped of its classic meaning and fetishised-it has become an ends-in-itself. Voters neither govern nor are they conversant with candidates or issues. Voting has been reduced into a civic rite and a means of bestowing legitimacy upon elites while distracting attention from the enduring problems of politics and personal life. Legitimation is not simply a matter of being duly elected. The electoral process itself legitimizes the status quo in more subtle ways. In order to exact obedience and devotion, distracting voters from their powerlessness and vulnerability, the spectacle focuses attention on differently packaged candidates by various political parties. Voting is therefore a gloss on politics that makes events intelligible by infusing them with meaning, direction and hope: leaders and their programmes supposedly express the will of those who must prevail in such matters, the majority. Such is the predicament of individual, let alone majorities and minorities, in a mass society. What is worse is that no reform can mitigate the mathematics of mass society.¹⁴

Here, the voice of the individual is lost, so even if a minority as large as 40-45% is gathered, it still has the potential of being sidelined, leaving the people

¹⁴ Ron Hirschbein, "Voting Rites: A Study in Ceremonial Democracy", in Robert Paul Churchill (ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 129-35.

with no other option but the use of violence and /or terrorism to make their voice heard.

The relationship between violence and elections has largely been ignored. Hewitt explains the role of elections in generating violence thus – the electoral process involves appeal to political partisanship with consequent polarization. The resort to violence is most likely to take place when member of groups have their hopes and aspirations raised, but then become disillusioned with the political process. And since politics is in some respects a zero sum game (and not just a winner-takes-all) in which one group's gain is another's loss, the groups that lose the political game, particularly if they lose consistently are likely to resort to terrorist violence as a tempting option.¹⁵

Similar views are echoed by Fareed Zakaria (quoted by Weinberg and Rapoport) "Elections require that politicians compete for people's votes. In societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilations, it is easiest to organize along racial, ethnic or religious lines. Once in power, an ethnic group tends to exclude other ethnic groups. Compromise seems impossible-one can bargain on material issues like housing, hospitals and handouts, but how does one split the difference on a national religion? Such political competition rapidly degenerates into violence..."¹⁶

Moreover, terrorist attacks to cull down leaders, party workers, street demonstrators, and rally people etc. is used to serve the purpose of defeat of other and the victory of self. This occurs when parties decide that they cannot win the struggle or that winning, going by the rule book, costs too much. In such a

¹⁵ Christopher Hewitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-3.

¹⁶ Farid Zakaria quoted in Weinberg and Rapoport (eds.) *op. cit.*, pp. 362-3.

scenario, the axiom that ballots are substitutes for bullets does not hold good. Though ballots may avert bullets, they at times, seem to provoke bullets too.¹⁷

This debasement of the fundamental aspects of democratic process brings us to the analysis of the role of political parties in this process.

Political Parties

Well organized parties are crucial to liberal democratic polities. They constitute one set of political institutions that can help narrow the gap between the growth of politicized demands and governmental effectiveness. In the absence of effective mediating institutions like parties, rapid politicization typically exacerbates problems of governability.¹⁸

But the view taken here builds upon Leonard Weinberg's analysis of political parties and terrorist violence.¹⁹ But before this the role, nature and characteristics of political parties shall be discussed to understand his argument clearly.

To become a party, there has to be identification with one group and differentiation from another. Every party, in its essence, signifies partnership in a particular organization and separation from others by a specific programme.

Evolution

Not only are political parties hard to define, their genesis too is difficult to disentangle from the evolution of the modern state and society. The role of the political party changes substantially as political conditions in a country change. In accordance with the individualism of liberal democracy, political parties usually had weak structures that left a great deal of liberty to their members. Until 1914, it

¹⁷ Leonard Weinberg and David Rapoport, "Election and Violence", in *ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

¹⁸ Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 30.

¹⁹ Leonard Weinberg (ed.), *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*, Frank Cass, London, 1992.

was forbidden in some countries to allude to parties in the parliament. There were only deputies, who were separated from one another and, in theory, independent. It was only towards that end of the nineteenth century that socialist parties began to organise. Being cadre based, they were characterized by strict discipline. Later on, mass organization also emerged.

In Europe, the word 'party' antedated liberal democracy. But true parties, in the modern sense of the word, came into being with parliaments and elections, the functioning of which they made possible. They appeared, at first, in the form of parliamentary groups which were not particularly cohesive. Next came the electoral committees which played an important part in the political process. The conflict was fierce and implacable till the coming of the liberal parties. They not only marked the decline of the old order and the accession of liberal democracy but also helped to narrow the gap between parties and diminish the class conflict.

In the U.S., political parties performed the same function of linking the official democratic structures with the oligarchy that in fact ran the state. They did not represent social classes and had no definite social base. Hence they did not appeal to the masses. They had little structure, little stability and little differentiation one from another. The rivalry between them was to a large degree not ideological but issue based. Major electoral reforms were carried out in the early twentieth century which, among other things, saw to it that candidates who were independent of the organizations had little hope of being nominated by the voters.²⁰

²⁰ Maurice Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-69.

Representation

A democracy has a set of people, called representatives who act as delegates or mouthpieces of the people. A political representative is a person who by custom or law, has the status or role of a representative within a political system. Political representatives have a variety of roles-symbolic, microcosmic, delegated. Representation can be on the basis of personal interests, class interests, the representation of opinions or the representation of political parties. The concept of representation has been different in the hands of various philosophers.

Hobbes believed that the Leviathan-one man or assembly-which preserved security, was acting in the best interest of the people and hence must be obeyed. Locke defended representative government, and was in favor of a government by consent. But Rousseau did not believe in representation. For him, direct democracy in the form of the General Will was the aim. For Burke, parliament was the deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest that of the whole, where not local purposes, not local prejudices are to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole. The view of the American Federalists was that the representatives are dependent on the people, paving way for frequent elections. The French Revolution, too, upheld the view that the people are sovereign and the public functionaries are its clerks.

Despite talking about political representation, it is remarkable that most theoretical writings have either ignored or remained silent about the existence of organised parties . This could be attributed to the fact that it is not, at first sight, easy to justify a system in which the elected representative may be forced by his party managers to vote for a policy which is contrary to the apparent interests of his constituents, contrary to the prevailing opinion in his constituency, and

contrary to his own personal judgement about what is best for the country. In this context, the theory of the electoral mandate, can be reduced to the following propositions:

1. that mass democracy will give a meaningful influence to the electors only if they are presented with two or more alternative programmes of action between which they can choose, knowing that the party which wins will do its best to put its programme into effect during the next Parliament;
2. that a party winning a parliamentary majority at a general election is not only entitled but obliged to pursue its stated aims, having a mandate from the people to this effect;
3. that this will not put too much power into the hands of party managers and leaders if each party is internally democratic, so that members will have the opportunity to take part in the process by which party policies are formulated;
4. that individual M.P.s are therefore obliged to support their party in Parliament, since they were elected on a party platform and their individual opinions (unless they involve matters of conscience) are largely irrelevant.²¹

But the electoral research has revealed the limitations of the theory. Instead conditions of an effective party system are, 'first, that the parties able to bring forth programmes to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programmes'.

²¹ A.H. Birch, *Key Concepts: Representation*, Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1971, p. 98.

Michels and Duverger on Political Parties

This brings us to Michels' analysis of political parties. According to Michel's theory of the oligarchical development of parties, every party is destined to pass from a genetic phase, in which the organization is entirely dedicated to the realization of its 'cause', to a later phase in which (a) the growth of the party's size; (b) its bureaucratization; (c) the apathy of its supporters after their initial participatory enthusiasm and (d) the leaders' interest in preserving party into an organization in which the real end is organizational survival.

He believes in the oligarchic nature of leaders within the community of party members i.e. the parliamentary group tends to hold a dominating position, thus there was no internal party democracy. Moreover since he saw willingness on the part of the masses to make themselves subservient to party leaders, he came to the conclusion that they could not be expected to control their parliamentary representatives. Moreover the representatives in parliament largely escaped the supervision of the rank and file of the party, and even the control of its executive committee, since he was accountable not to the party's members but to the electoral masses, being instruments of the voters.²² They were therefore more concerned with pleasing voters than with pursuing the interests and strategies of the party members. He arrived at the conclusion that all party leaders and members would eventually be dominated by electors and their deputies.

Duverger was more concerned with external democracy i.e. the extent to which the party's voters were adequately represented by its members and/or militants. For him the members were the party; the electors merely voted for its candidates. Not just the premises, his conclusions too differ from Michels'. He

²² Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Free, New York, 1962, p. 153.

divided the history of a party's development in three distinct phases.²³ In the first phase, parties born in parliaments put the parliamentary group in charge over the extra parliamentary organs. In the second phase, beginning roughly at the end of the 19th century, mass based parties would develop large, hierarchical organizations with potential for challenging the dominance of parliamentary representative. The degree to which the extra parliamentary wing could actually control the deputies would depend on several factors that he listed. In the end, he says, it would not be correct to speak either of domination of the party over parliamentary representatives, or of the parliamentary representatives over the party; rather there is a separation of powers between the internal leadership and the parliamentary leadership and a permanent rivalry between them.²⁴

In the third phase, communist and fascist parties would succeed in placing their representatives in government, under the clear domination of the party outside government. Duverger's conclusion was that parliamentary group would become at least coequal (and hence largely independent) in all bourgeois and mass parties and ended up by saying that simple majority systems with second ballot and proportional representation favors multi-partyism (Duverger's Hypothesis) while the simple majority single ballot electoral system favors a two-party system.²⁵

Huntington predicted that in the long-term, two party and dominant party systems were more likely than single or multiparty systems to produce political

²³ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties : Their organization and Activity in the Modern State*, Methuen, London, 1964, pp. 182-202.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190

²⁵ *Ibid.*

stability due to more effective party competition.²⁶ In his treatise *The Modern State*, Maclver had emphasized the importance of political parties and party system. Defining a political party 'as an association organized in support of some principle or policy which by constitutional means it endeavours to make the determinant', he asserted that 'a party seeks to do more than influence or support the government, it seeks to make it. It implies therefore some kind of parliamentary system on the one hand, and on the other a recognized electorate by whose vote, at stated intervals or on special occasions, the legislature is created. The primary business of a party is to influence an electorate, which in turn has the right of determining government.' Speaking of the party system he said, 'the party-system implies an elective, and therefore representative government, and could not develop until this was finally secured... But Parliament must be maintained and sanctioned by public opinion. That opinion must express itself in organized form, and so parties grow up within the state.'²⁷

Therefore, for the stability of any democratic system of government, it is essential to have stable parties, i.e. parties with well-knit multi layered organization and a string of leaders at different levels to sustain the party. It is equally important to have a strong party system so that not only citizens have a democratic alternative, but the political system also has constructive criticism and good governance. The strength of the party system becomes even more vital in a parliamentary democracy because stability and strength of the government is entirely dependent on the strength of the party system. Indeed, the two-party system has been considered ideal for parliamentary democracy. But, the bi-party system is limited to only a few democracies. In any case, political systems in

²⁶ S. P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

²⁷ R.M. Maclver, *The Modern State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1926, pp. 396-7.

developing societies, particularly in multi-ethnic and plural societies, neither have, nor are likely to have a bi-party system. However, it is possible, rather essential, for them to have a strong multi-party system due to a variety of sociological and political reasons. For, coalitions, which are not uncommon in developing societies or in multi-party systems, look vulnerable if the parties and the party system are weak. The question then arises is: 'What are the prerequisites of a strong party system?'

Since the basic aim, purpose and goal of political parties is to continuously influence the formation of public opinion and pursuit of power in order to influence public policies, it presupposes a permanent organizational structure and a programme to influence public opinion for maximizing mobilization and support for its programmes. Programme is an important ingredient of political opinion formation because it creates a political platform and becomes the party plank containing the concepts and instruments devised by parties to establish their political influence. However, programmes of political mobilization pursued by political parties often bring out demands that are conflicting in nature. The clash between conflicting public opinions and demands may result in political and social conflicts. Such conflicts and clashes in multi-ethnic societies create deep social schisms that prove detrimental to the political system.²⁸

B.C. Smith lists the various roles that political parties play in developing countries. They can endow regimes with legitimacy, can act as a medium for political recruitment, provide opportunities for the formation of coalitions of

²⁸ Ajay K. Mehra, "Political Parties and Party System in India", in D.D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *Principles, Power and Politics*, Macmillan India Ltd., Delhi, 1999, p. 244-5.

powerful interests to sustain a government, act as the conduits of upward pressure, contribute to political socialization, help ensure political stability etc.²⁹

It is clear from the role played by political parties that their significance for the process of democratization is immense. The success of democratization is in part dependent on the existence in institutionalized parties and party systems of government. The consolidation of democracy is widely regarded as conditional upon the institutionalization of regular electoral competition between parties which can adapt to new constructional rules.

'Institutionalization was deemed to be found when:

- The rules governing party competition are commonly observed, widely understood and confidently anticipated;
- There is stability in the number of parties competing for office;
- Parties are strongly rooted in society, affecting political preferences, attracting stable electoral support and demonstrating continuity in ideological terms;
- Political elites recognize the legitimacy of electoral competition as the route to office;
- Party organization exist independently of powerful leaders, with well resourced nationwide organization and well established internal procedure for recruitment to party offices.

The more party system are characterized by these qualities the more institutionalized they are. The fewer the qualities the more 'inchoate' the system is. While 'inchoate' systems pose risks for democracy of unpredictability, complicated government, weak legislatures, personalism and difficulty in establishing legitimacy. Institutionalized party systems mean party organizers

²⁹ B.C. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2003, pp. 136-138.

have a vested interest in party competition and party discipline makes government effective. While an institutionalized party system may not be a sufficient condition for the consolidation of democracy. It would seem to be a necessary one.³⁰

POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORISM

Terrorism is a particular form of the more general phenomenon of political violence. It need not necessarily be carried out by small, clandestine and short-lived groups. The term 'political party' is usually associated with the exact opposite of this, and hence not thought of being linked to such activities either. But, on the contrary, political parties may have all the characteristics mentioned above: small, clandestine, short-lived, and may use terrorism on a continuing or intermittent basis. Similarly terrorist organizations too may make use of party politics by forming 'political wings' to pursue their goals through the electoral process. Factionalism within a party may give rise to dissidents who come to regard the electoral arena as hopeless and form a terrorist organization, and not a new party, to achieve their objectives.

These linkages provide some of the many ways in which party politics and terrorism intersect, says Weinberg. What makes this study have a deep impact is that, Weinberg is not merely hypothesizing about the connections. Infact, each type is substantiated by a number of examples and data.³¹

In a joint effort with Eubank, they concluded that changes in the number of parties in the system, fluctuations in their electoral performances and in their parliamentary representation from one decade to the other, are linked to the number of terrorist groups active in different nations. A principal finding is that

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

³¹ Leonard Weinberg, Introduction, in Leonard Weinberg (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-6.

nations with many leftist parties have also tended to have many terrorist groups, irrespective of the latter's ideology or political outlook.³² In India, the existence of rights wing parties are equally responsible for proliferation of terrorist organization.

But the process of institutionalization of parties alone cannot help solve the problem that Weinberg exposes. He says that we tend to view the Western political parties as highly organised, institutionalised and seeming to epitomise the democratic process. But in the process, we overlook the links between political parties and terrorist violence, forgetting that parties need not be peaceful in practice or democratic in outlook. Exploring this connection, he makes use of Duverger's ideas about the organizational life of political parties i.e. parties vary with respect to the continuity of their activities. Similarly, says Weinberg, party involvement in political violence is sometimes intermittent (usually during election campaigns) or on a routine basis. Depending upon the extensiveness of their organization, they may be divided into spontaneously organised groups of militants or uniformed militia. Another way of understanding the relationship between political parties and political violence is by noting that parties, like people, may have different careers- a party may undergo a career change by moving underground and pursuing a violent path to power. The change can also be in the opposite direction. Different types of parties and party systems seem much more susceptible to political violence than others. Ideologies of various parties-fascist, communist, ethnic, exclusivist, religious fundamentalist –do not celebrate the values of civility we identify with the democratic process. Furthermore, party systems with extreme polarization among the contestants

³² Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, "Terrorism and Changes in Political Party System", in *ibid*, pp. 125-139.

whose demand on government are both intransigent and mutually incompatible will promote a kind of 'struggle to the death' mentality from which the use of violence flows naturally. Such party involvement in, or sponsorship of political violence is an extremely serious matter and is associated with loss of legitimacy, leading to breakdown of democratic regimes.

In such a situation where the link between political parties and terrorism has been exposed, the exclusion of 'anti-constitutionalist' parties in democracies undercuts the binding forces of democracies and the excluded may be alienated, isolate and resort to terrorist means. Chronic losers, in the game of electoral politics might too indulge in it.³³ Similarly, some electoral regimes may cause proscription of anti democratic parties. Elections are central to the theory and practice of constitution democracy (though however ineffective they might be). Excluding particular groups is a sure way of inciting political violence. The ban on some 'anti-democratic' parties or central proscription is a common feature. But this may limit the range and kinds of information available to the people, thereby undermining the capacity for self-governance.³⁴

Now, the role of the Akali Dal in inciting the political violence, which subsequently degenerated into terrorism, shall be looked at. The Congress formed the hub of the Indian party system, being one of the world's oldest and best-institutionalized political parties. Deinstitutionalization in the Indian party system as such, and the Congress in particular set in by 1969 under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership politics being largely responsible for it. Posing a danger both to the polity and society, the collapse of governance is threatened. The party

³³ Leonard Weinberg and David Rapoport, Conclusion, in Weinberg and Rapoport (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 366.

³⁴ John Finn, "Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-Democratic Parties", in *ibid.*, pp.57-60.

organization or other institutional linkages with the people are put aside and personalised appeals charismatic techniques are used, instilling in more and more people a sense of threat to one's community, religion or nation.³⁵

In this context, the use of the Akali Dal in the 1920s as a nationalist force which later degenerated, resorting to use of terrorism, to meet the demands of electoral politics proves a point in case. During the early years of its inception, Akalis came to represent both a political as well as a spiritual force (being in control of the SGPC). This identity enabled them to maintain a considerable power base among the Sikhs. That identity has also made it difficult for Akalis to find additional non-Sikh political support.³⁶

To hold this Sikh 'vote bank' in thrall, they followed the strategy of manipulation of a variety of symbols of what is described as 'Sikh identity'. But the path to the legislatures was not a cake walk- majority was elusive.³⁷ Being the chronic losers, they used the typical centre -state problems like the formation of a Punjabi Suba and later other demands, as put forward by the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 were cloaked in Hindu-Sikh garb leading the Sikh politics to extremism . As long as Akali and Congress leaders were conscious of political realities and played the power game with some skill, there was not much negative fallout on the ground, but when cunning elements took over, it took an ugly turn. Zail Singh cultivated Bhindranwale to put pressure on Akali Dal to compete with him, to take a more extreme communal stand in Sikh politics. While this met with success, Akalis gave the slogan of 'Panth in danger'. Thus picking up the communal card, they decided what they could not achieve by democratic means,

³⁵ Rajni Kothari, *State Against Democracy : In Search of Humane Governance*, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1988, pp. 38-9.

³⁶ Atul Kohli, *op. cit.* p. 357.

³⁷ K.P.S. Gill , *The Knights of Falsehood*, Har-Anand, Delhi, 1997, p.44.

they must achieve through militancy, or violence. In a bid to keep up with the demands of the electoral politics, Akalis had to support Bhindranwale. He gained so much power that he made both parties irrelevant in politics.³⁸ Thus the role of the Akali Dal in the rise of terrorism has near only been realized but also well documented.³⁹

After the example of a rightist political party engaged in terrorism at some point in its career, organizations with Leftist leanings, indulging in violence too have been looked at. The Naxalite movement was launched under the banner of the CPI-M and later marked a shift to establish links with the CPI- ML which is known to provide all kinds of support to the movement upholding both aimed struggle and all other forms of struggle complementary to it.⁴⁰

As is evident from the examples cited above that most troubles of democracies are political in origin and represent crises of legitimacy, but in the absence of institutionalization, there is a lurking danger that problems of political disorder will be redefined as problems of institutionalization, says Kohli.⁴¹

But this would be putting too much onus on the political process, while disregarding the role of institutions themselves. In this context Varshney⁴² takes the following position: The central idea of the institutional theories of ethnic conflict is that there are clearly identifiable connections between ethnic conflict and peace, on the one hand, and political institutions, on the other. It matters whether multiethnic societies have consociational or majoritarian democracy,

³⁸ Ved Marwah, *Uncivil Wars*, Harper Collins, Delhi, 1995, pp. 15-162.

³⁹ (I) *Ibid*, (II) K.P.S. Gill, *op. cit.*, (III) Satyapal Dang (ed.), *Terrorism in Punjab*, Patriot Publisher, New Delhi, 1987.

⁴⁰ John R. Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Routledge and Kegan Pal, London and New York, 1987, pp. 106. (II) Ajay K. Mehra, "Political Parties and Party System in India", in Khanna and Kuert (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 255. (III) Ajay Sahni, "'Naxalism' : The Retreat of Civil Governance", in *Faultlines*, Vol. 5, Bulwark Books, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 79-104.

⁴¹ Atul Kohli, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-29.

⁴² Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 34-39.

federal or unitary governments, single or multi member constituencies, proportional representation or a first-past-the-post electoral system. Each of these institutional alternatives can be shown to be linked to ethnic peace and violence.

Ethnic pluralism, it is argued, requires political institution, forms and rules of power sharing, type of constituencies, varieties of voting systems, party system-different from those that are appropriate for ethnically homogeneous, or at any rate ethnically undivided societies. An uncritical transference of institutional forms, regardless of whether a society is marked by ethnic division, can be a serious cause of ethnic conflict. Contrariwise, an institutional choice suited to the ethnic map of a society resolves, or at any rate mitigates conflict.

He further says that institutions (especially in civil society) do not simply specify procedures, rules and sites for political contestation, they also begin to generate predispositions to outcomes, given the number and size of ethnic groups. If there are only two ethnic communities in a country, if the minority is more or less evenly distributed across constituencies, if voting taken place entirely on grounds of ethnicity, and if a first past the post system exists, then it can be easily demonstrated that even a minority as large as 40-45% of the population, constituting a plurality, can be entirely excluded from political representation. Such a majoritarian system is very likely to produce a permanent and sullen minority community. Much passionate conflict, even violence and terrorism, can be expected. This is what has happened in Northern Ireland. In multi ethnic societies in which ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, greater federalism, for example can indeed be shown to be more appropriate for ethnic peace than a unitary political system.

Though theories proposing a link between institutional forms and ethnic conflict have acquired remarkable sophistication in the past 3 decades, they do run into a problem. They do not account for why different parts of a country tend to have very different patterns of either ethnic violence or peace. The regional variations go unexplained.

This brings us to the conclusion that not only the political process but also the institutionalization is to blame for the rise of terrorism in liberal democratic setups. Following any one approach would be futile. We therefore need to take a holistic look at both the procedures as well as institutions to understand the concept of terrorism.

CHAPTER V

TERRORISM AND THE NEWS MEDIA

There is no more important topic in contemporary social and political life than the character and chances of civil society. This is because a stable and effective democracy is in part a function of the institutions, it is also dependent on the way civil society is organised to influence policy makers, mobilize public opinion, hold government at all levels to account and make governments responsive to the expression of demands and needs. Such responsiveness and accountability requires a civil society consisting of organizations that are autonomous, voluntary and protected by the rule of law.¹

In this chapter, grappling with the concept of 'civil society', an exploration shall be made of its emergence. Apart from laying out the background, the philosophical landscape will be examined, the views of Hegel and Gramsci in particular. Not neglecting the shortcomings, the geographic variations in form will also be attended to. Next, the mass media, being part of the civil society, shall be dealt with. The debate as to whether the mass media (particularly the news media) encourages or retards the incidences of terrorism shall be assessed. All this will be undertaken with the aim to prove that the essentially liberating project of the civil society of the 18th century has a role in inducing terrorism and giving it a boost.

Civil society connotes those areas of social life-the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction-which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state.² The civil society may also be taken to mean an ideal

¹ B.C. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, Palgrave, Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2003, p. 267.

² David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.6.

type, referring to a set of political and social institutions characterised by responsible government subject to the rule of law, free and open markets, plurality of voluntary associations and a sphere of public debate.³ Another view holds the civil society as the spirit of the society, insisting that should we study the civil society as a set of institutions as the erudite social scientists tend to do, then we miss out the wood for the trees. Scholastically, it is useless to dwell upon the definitions of the civil society, for it is not an institution which has survived and will survive through the history of human society, albeit with transformations. As stated earlier, it is therefore a spirit, better studied through a history of citizenship. This is the spirit of a set of individuals, who, having acquired either property or talents are usually upwardly mobile and actively imagine an order that is going to sustain their new found power. Civil society tends to be born out of the elites within a society, who imagine a new order, founded upon new principles in which either they participate in the affairs of the state, or the state is such that it provides them with the opportunities to pursue their ends.⁴

Gathered from the above, it can be said that the civil society is a non-state instrument with humanitarian goals of peace, prosperity, communal and religious harmony, relief and rehabilitation, amnesty and spreading general awareness among common masses, focussed on the betterment of the life conditions of the people. It seeks the common good and works parallel to the common masses, advocates accountability into the realm of socio-political streams of actions vis-a-vis the state, in conjunction with the individual citizen. Civil society is, therefore, an individual as well as collective action. Moreover the importance of civil

³ Victor Perez- Diaz, "The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society", in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *Real Civil Societies. Dilemmas of Institutionalisation*, Sage Publication, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1998, p.

⁴ Sanjay Kumar, "Civil Society", in *Economic and Political Weekly*, July 29, 2000, p. 2776-2779.

society's involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in violent conflicts has during the last decade been increasingly stressed. It is anticipated to provide popular support for peace and to promote dialogue and reconciliation between polarised groups.

Civil society concept deriving from political theory, but recently also brought into development policy and discourse, is used to describe the fact that people meet, communicate and organise in ways that are not established or controlled by the state, not by kinship and family ties, and with purposes that are driven neither by the power logics of the state nor by the market interests.

In civil society arena, people voluntarily organise to defend common interests or work for social and political change. Colloquially, however, civil society has come to narrowly connote formal, non-governmental, voluntary organizations that are generally presumed to 'do good'. The importance given to civil society actors derives from their being representative of, or in touch with 'the people'. As such, active civil society is seen to create social capital i.e. trust, cooperation over ethnic, religious and other divisions, inclusiveness and open debate, which in turn, is conducive to peace and harmony between sections of society.

Based on the above, there can be three broad but distinct political understandings of the term. One position might be called 'liberal' which sees the effective powers of civil society as basically residing in the economy, in property rights and markets, where such rights may be freely exchanged.

Another view, a radical position, locates civil society in a 'society', independent of the economic domain and the state, where ideas are publicly exchanged, associations formed and interests identified.

Lastly, a 'conservative' position sees it as located in a set of cultural acquisitions, in historically inherited codes of behaviour which moderate relations between groups and individuals. Each of these domains, economy, social and cultural is portrayed by its respective advocates as a domain of special efficacy which ought to limit the state and which can accomplish more effectively what the states have tried to do but with little success.

The term's meaning being clarified, can be conceived of in three typical forms. The first version treats civil society as a hold-all, inclusive, umbrella-like concept, pointing to the number of different institutional arrangements outside the state. In the second version, civil society is pejoratively associated with market capitalism, treated as a super structure, a politico-legal arena that camouflaged the domination of commodities and the capitalist class. Thus while the first version is an all inclusive idea, the second is, in contrast, narrowly and negatively reductionist. However, the third version acknowledges the differentiation in the social fabric, as well as the new economically related social issues.⁵

Civil society promotes the consolidation of democracy by monitoring the exercise of state power, stimulating political participation, educating people in democracies, representing interests and providing an alternative to clientelism. It creates cross cutting allegiances, being inherently plural in character. It throws up political leaders and disseminates political information. Associational autonomy entails a move away from clientism, allowing people, especially the poor to articulate their interest and so move from being clients to being citizens. Parts of civil society are undoubtedly supportive of democracy and of the interest groups hitherto excluded from political power, such as women, urban and rural poor,

⁵ Jeffrey C. Alexander, Introduction, in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-19.

ethnic minorities and thus provides opportunity for them to redress injustices. Sustainable democracy requires democratic deepening or infusion of institutions with democratic practices. The increased popular participation makes difficult for elites to manipulate democratic institutions. The effectiveness of democratic government increases with the strength of 'civil community'.⁶

COMPONENTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Several components of civil society are necessary for the persistence of modern democracies. The first, most obvious, and indispensable component is autonomy from the state. The second involves the access of different sectors of society to the agencies of the state and their acceptance of a certain commitment to the political community and the rules of the state. The third aspect rests on the development of multiplicity of autonomous public arenas within which various associations regulate their own activities and govern their own members, thereby preventing society from becoming a shapeless mass. Fourth, these arenas must be accessible to citizens and open to public deliberation-not embedded in exclusive, secretive, or corporate settings.

Thus one necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a viable democracy is the existence of many private arenas of social life that are independent of the arena of public authority or private coercion. At the same time, these self-organized groups must offer access to the major political arena and have relatively high degree of acceptance of the basic rules of the political game.

No social group or institution should effectively monopolise the society's bases of power and resources so as to deny other groups access to power. Such

⁶ B.C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p.269.

monopolization has occurred at various historical periods in many oligarchic societies that have formally adopted democratic constitutions but in which access to power has been limited to very narrow groups.

It is not just the existence of multiple autonomous social sectors, then, that is of crucial importance for the foundation and continuous functioning of democracies. Rather, it is the existence of institutional and ideological links between these sectors and the state. The most important among these links have been the major institutionalized networks of political representation (legislatures and political parties), the major judicial institutions, and the multiple channels of public discourse that collectively determine how politically relevant information is communicated and who has access to these communications. The extent to which these links are not controlled by the public authorities, or monopolized by any dominant class or sector, and the extent to which they foster the accountability of the rulers, are of crucial importance for democracy.⁷

EMERGENCE

When Habermas (1989) introduced the concept of the public sphere nearly 40 years ago, he was interested in explaining why the normative model of politics changed during the 17th and 18th centuries, so that the principle of open public discussion came to replace that of parliamentary secrecy. He explained this change in politics as being caused by the development of bourgeois public sphere, which he defined as the sphere of private people come together as a public, who claimed the space of public discourse from state regulation and demanded that the state engage them in debate about matters of political legitimacy and common

⁷ S.N.Eisenstadt, "Civil Society", in S.M. Lipset (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, Vol.1, Routledge, London, 1995, p.240.

concern Habermas' 'account of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere' is an extremely idealised abstraction from the political cultures that actually took shape at the end of the eighteenth and the start of the nineteenth century. The civil society emerges at special moments of history.⁸ It emerges when the conscious members of the society perceive a gap between the social aspirations of the people and the opportunities given unto them by the state-when such a gap makes either the society or the state, each on its own, unsustainable.⁹ Nearly always found used in the couplet 'state and civil society', its meaning, and its supposed relationship to the state, has been subject to enormous variation over the past three or four hundred years. At one time, till as late as the middle of the 18th century, it was just another term for what is now called the state. In more recent usage, it has been used to define a realm outside of, often contrasting with or indeed counter balancing the jurisdiction of the state.¹⁰

The first full-fledged civil society emerged in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was built on several basic institutional characteristics and cultural premises of European civilization. The most important of these were the presence of several competing centres of society (for example, state, church, and cities) and a pattern of interdependence, as well as competition, between the centres and their respective peripheries. Class, sectoral, ethnic, religious, professional, and ideological groups were largely separated from each other and from the state. Often, they changed their structure while maintaining their autonomy and their ease of access to the centres of society. Various elites (cultural and economic or professional) were so closely related that they often overlapped

⁸ Ronald N. Jacobs, "Race, Media and Civil Society", in *International Sociology*, Vol. 14 (3), Sept., 1999, pp. 356-7.

⁹ Sanjay Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 2776-2779.

¹⁰ Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p.67.

and frequently engaged in political activity on a nationwide basis. Finally, the legal system was highly autonomous, as were many cities, which served as centres of social and cultural creativity and as sources of collective identity—for example, with respect to the group's ideas of the meaning of citizenship. A good example is provided by the Italian cities of the Renaissance.

These cultural and institutional features greatly influenced the development of civil society in modern Europe. In particular, they influenced the processes of competition and confrontation between rival national, regional and local centres and between various groups and elites with regard to access to the centres and influence over their policies.

The Structure of Civil Society

Varies greatly between different countries, and within them, at different periods in their history. That structure is affected by social and economic forces, such as the extent of division of labor and the type of political economy in a society. It is also affected by cultural and institutional factors. Among them are the major symbols of collective identity, especially the relative importance of primordial (tribal, ethnic, national), religious, and ideological components among those symbols; the prevailing conceptions of the arena of political action, the scope of the state, the nature of statehood, and the desirable relationship between state and society; the conceptions of public authority and accountability prevailing in the principal sectors of society; the place of law in political discourse and activity; the concept and practice of citizenship; the pattern of interaction between central and peripheral institutions and sectors; the structure of social hierarchies and classes, the level of their collective consciousness, and their modes of political

expression; and, finally, the basic characteristics of protest movements and other challenges to political authority.

The way in which these cultural and institutional factors are promulgated and implemented by a society's elites in interaction with broad sectors of the society greatly influences the way in which various components of civil society come together, the way in which different social groups relate to each other, and whether they share a vision of the common good for the society.

The various formats of civil society-European, American, Latin American, and Asian alike-have changed continuously in response to structural changes and new cultural and ideological ideas. A major example of this kind of change is the institutionalization of welfare-state programs.

In western and central Europe there developed some very important variations in the structure of civil society and in the links between civil society and the state. These differences were influenced by a variety of historical and structural conditions as well as by cultural factors. Among these were the relative emphasis on equality or hierarchy, differing conceptions of the political arena, and the relative importance of ideological and civil components in the construction of collective identities. They also were influenced by prior existence of a common political community or, conversely, the extent to which the struggle for access to the political center as interwoven with struggle over collective boundaries-especially territorial boundaries—and identities.

In England, for example, a common political community developed early, and the confrontation between state and society was relatively muted. In Germany and Italy, a common political community did not develop until the middle of the eighteenth century. Its very construction was a focus of protest, and the resulting

society was greatly fragmented. Constant confrontations, which occurred between the state and those fragmented societies, contributed to the breakdown of constitutional democratic regimes in the 1920s and 1930s.

The crystallization of a distinct American civilization with its strong emphasis on equality, its weak conception of the state, its collective identity based on ideological (more than historical) components, and its strong moralistic principle of the accountability of rulers gave rise to yet another distinct type of civil society. Society generally was seen as relatively more important than the political and administrative center. Earlier movements of protest had been oriented to the ideological reconstruction of the center, as in Europe, or to the construction of distinctive collective political identity. Protest movements in the United States were much more oriented toward moral purification or the enhancement of the national social community.¹¹

THE EXPANSION OF THE WESTERN MODEL

The expansion of modern European civilization beyond the Western world has transplanted modern political institutions and ideologies, including democratic ones, to civilizations that did not share the basic premises and institutional characteristics that shaped the first modern constitutional regimes and the initial forms of civil society. Non-Western countries have been able to adopt or adapt these institutions and ideologies in many cases.

In developing countries of the South, civil society has come to mean agencies and practices which oppose the power and control by the state and which attempt to wrest areas of life from the state. But these agencies and practices may

¹¹ S.N. Eisenstadt, *op.cit.*, p.241.

not always be dictated by secular concerns-their appropriation by religious fundamentalist forces, also ethnic and tribal. Therefore extreme caution needs to be exercised in supporting activities for an expansion of areas of public participation since these processes may not always lead to greater democratization and freedom of choice. They may have limited political perspective. In India, a non-denominational state with substantially secularised laws, resting on a secular constitution, co-exists with a civil society where religious interference is pervasive.¹²

In Africa, the male dominated and gerontocratic, ethnic and fundamentalist religious associations are unlikely to sponsor democratization. Moreover the 'uncivilized' were excluded from the ranks of equals in civil society, which was laced with racism.¹³ Therefore, the elements of civil society are still underdeveloped and the participation is limited.

In India, the state-civil society debate revolves around two basic positions-one which sees the civil society as an alternative to an unresponsive state.¹⁴ The other view is that it is difficult to detach civil society from the state, and though an independent civil society exists, it is not really effective and fails to play any decisive role.¹⁵ The former is the stance taken by social scientists like Rajni Kothari, D.L. Sheth and Partha Chatterjee. The supporters of the latter include Gurpreet Mahajan, Dipankar Gupta and Pranab Bardhan.

¹² Achin Vanaik, *Communalism Contested*, Vistaar Publications, New Delhi, 1997, p.38.

¹³ B.C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁴ (I) Rajni Kothari, *State Against Democracy: In Search of A Humane Governance*, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1988. (II) Rajni Kothari, *Transformation and Survival: In Search of Humane World Order*, Ajanata Publication Delhi, 1988.

¹⁵ (I) Gurpreet Mahajan, "Civil Society, State and Democracy", in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34 (20), May 15-21, 1999, pp. 1188-1196. (II) Gurpreet Mahajan, "Civil Society and its Avatars: What Happened to Freedom and Democracy", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34 (49), 4-10 Dec., 1999, pp. 3471-72. (III) Dipankar Gupta, "Civil Society in the Indian Context", *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997. (IV) Pranab Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1986.

Rajni Kothari, a representative of the first position claims that there has been a loss of faith in the state. This happened because the path of development chosen by the state in India is deeply flawed. The state has failed to meet the demands of the people, so the civil society has arisen as an arena where the marginalised may protest and struggle for their democratic rights. Thus the civil society empowers the common man. Within the folds of civil society fall a variety of contemporary social movements and a network of voluntary self-governing institutions.

But the believers of the second position, especially Mahajan feels that such a clubbing together of diverse organizations and community structures under the rubric of civil society poses a problem-particularly in a country like India, where the inter group and intra group equality still remains to be achieved- because in such scenario, empowering all types of social and religious institution tends to hinder the realization of democratic equality. In such conditions the involvement of (and not the total detachment of civil society from) the state is necessary to create conditions that are necessary to protect the institutions of civil society from internal disruptions.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND.

There are two distinctive positions, that can be isolated from the complex debate about the state-civil society relationship. On the one hand, there are those who see civil society as the benign sphere of (individual) freedom whose integrity needs to be jealously guarded against the incursions of a domineering state. This has often been tied to an argument for the sanctity of private property and some sort of restraint upon the authority of democratic decision-making. The second

position has tended to see civil society as an anti-social 'war of all against all' economically necessary, but needing to be controlled and patrolled by a powerful state embodying a wider social and public interest.

The civil society, which expressed the spirit of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, was the imagination of a modern state founded essentially upon the liberty of the individual to effect changes in his own life, equality among men so that each had his own opportunities and fraternity among people. These aspirations made the Weberian nascent capitalist community effectively be founded upon the ethics of trust and honesty and stand up as a bloc against the trepidation of the autocracy, ecclesia and the royalty. Liberalism, at its birth was the imagination of the bourgeoisie of its social role as the creator of the order in which he lived-the civil society, in the true sense could not have been but born of such a moment of liberal ideology. The civil society speaks of an order, under which the individual fulfills his ontological quest. But though the civil society raises demands, it requires the state to fulfill them. The civil society cannot design anything to purposefully eliminate sections of the society, or can raise demands that are non universal.

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel divides ethical life (*sittlichkeit*) into three moments – i) Family-ethical life in its natural or immediate phase; 2) Civil society-ethical life in its division and appearance; 3) State-freedom, universal and objective, even in the free self subsistence of the particular will.¹⁶ These three moments can also be seen as three alternative modes of inter human relationship. Hegel's argument would be that men can relate to each other in either one of the

¹⁶ Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, p. 133.

following three models 1) particular altruism (in the family) the mode in which I relate to others with a view of their, rather than my interests in mind.

2) Universal egoism (in the civil society) the mode where I treat everybody as a means to my own ends. Its most acute and typical expression is economic life where I sell and buy, not in order to satisfy the needs of the other, his hunger or his shelter, but where I use the felt need of the other as a means to satisfy my own ends. My aims are mediated through the needs of others: the more other people are dependent on a need which I can supply, the better my own position becomes. This is the sphere where everyone acts according to what he perceives as his enlightened self interest.¹⁷

Hegel believes the civil society to be the child of the modern world, which exists in every society and has fully developed, institutionalised, distinct and differentiated social sphere.¹⁸ Hegel says that in civil society we do more than acquire the skills we need in order to collaborate and complete successfully for the satisfaction of personal needs for the attainment of private ends. Life in civil society is educative-it inclines the mind to appreciate the values embodied in the state. In working together to promote private ends, we acquire public ends; we begin to value the collaboration for its own sake and not just for what it brings to individuals.¹⁹ This brings us to the third mode i.e. universal altruism (the State).

Life in society multiplies our needs. Since these needs are born of reason in us, we become more rational for having these needs and we perfect our reason in the process of satisfying them.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.142.

¹⁹ John Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, Vol. III, Longman Group UK Ltd., Essex, England, 1963, p.126.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

Hegel distinguishes between state and civil society. Positive, laws, the courts of justice, the police and the administrative departments are as much organs of civil society as of the state. To the extent that their function is to reconcile and promote personal and private interests, they are organs of civil society; to the extent that they serve to hold the community, whose members value it for what it is, they are organs of the state. Society, conceived as a means to the realization of personal interests is civil society. Whereas conceived as legal and moral order in which man acquires these interests and others too, and to which they grow attached for its own sake, it is the State.²¹

Hegel's definition of civil society follows the classical economist model of the free market. In civil society, each member is his own end, everything is nothing to him. He integrates the Smithian model of free market into his philosophical system by transforming Smith's 'invisible hand' into dialectical reason working in civil society. Self interest and self assertion are the motives of activity. But these can be realised by the individuals only through interaction with others and recognition by them, emphasising the mutual dependence of all on all. Economics are the handmaid of reason acting in the world.²² Thus the realization of the powers of civil society in the world of man is central to Hegel's discussion of it in the Philosophy of Right.

By the time Marx wrote his volumes, the civil society had transformed from an essentially liberating project of the 18th century Europe to being hegemonistic. This was because the upwardly mobile new elite (bourgeoisie) gave up its mission to expand, and started concentrating upon protection of the gains already made. Its discourses became domineering and exclusive. Thus for

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130-1.

²² Shlomo Avineri, *op. cit.*, pp.142-147.

Marx, civil society's sphere of formal equality and freedom simply defined a social order in which the controller of private capital were free to exploit the labor power of those who lacked these resources. Certainly for Marx (in contra-distinction to Hegel), it was civil society rather than the state that was the dominant and determining element in the relationship. Real freedom could not mean extending autonomy within civil society, but rather the abolition or overcoming of civil society itself.²³

The recovery of Antonio Gramsci's work gave a new focus to civil society. The term has gained a great deal of currency since 70s, since it promised autonomy, democracy and prosperity. In the west, disillusionment with the process of party politics, led to shift of attention to the revitalization of civil society. By civil society, Gramsci indicates a concept much broader than Hegel or Marx. It included the entire complex of social, cultural and political organizations and institutions i.e. everything that is not strictly part of the state.²⁴

Writing from the prison to which he had been confined by the Italian fascists, Gramsci set out a quite distinctive Marxist view of the state-civil society relationship. He insisted that the mode of capitalist rule could not be reduced simply to the actions of a repressive state apparatus acting directly under the control of the capitalist class. Gramsci argued that under the 'advanced' form of capitalism that had developed in the West, the normal form of rule was mediated through both state and civil society. The mundane rule of capitalism was not secured principally through repression and armed control of the population (though these options always remained available for 'emergency use'). Rather, the rule of capital was more normally (and securely) managed through the ideological

²³ Christopher Pierson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁴ Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, (Introduction by Lynne Lawner), Quartet Books Ltd, London, 1979, p. 42.

and cultural domination of the subordinate classes within the institutions of civil society. Churches, newspapers, schooling, the structure of the family, cultural values, reformist trade union: these were the media through which both an ideological and practical domination was maintained. Rule was a mixture of 'manufactured consent backed by coercion'. The elements of cultural and ideological control, the mobilization of consent, Gramsci called hegemony. Under normal circumstances, the bourgeoisie would seek to secure its rule, not simply by imposing its will upon society, but rather by pursuing hegemonic strategies in which it would seek to win the support of secondary classes, even of elements within the working class itself, so as the better to secure its long term domination.

His usage of state and civil society is not entirely clear and consistent. At times, he distinguishes modes of rule through the state and the civil society-but he also wrote of 'the integral state' or 'the state in its inclusive sense' which embraced rule mobilised through 'political society plus civil society. This is a very broad conception.²⁵ Though the contemporary advocates of civil society define the concept very broadly, there are some variations- for most commentators, it is something *more* than the economy. For some, it is actually something *other* than the economy. Also, a strong civil society tends to be invoked as a means of empowering citizens over and against a domineering state. Keane defines civil society as "an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in the complex of non-state activities-economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary association-and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressure on controls upon state institutions". Further, realising the fact that the state may be required to

²⁵ Pierson, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

intervene, he says “ without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous public spheres, goals such a freedom and equality, participatory planning and community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans. But without the protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, struggles to transform civil society will become ghettoised, divided and stagnant, or will spawn their own, new forms of inequality and unfreedom”.

Cohen and Arato define civil society as ‘a sphere a social interaction between economy and state, composed above all the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication’. They make a three fold account of the social order (state, economy and civil society). They are concerned with the threat that the corporate capitalist economy poses to the integrity of civil society and try to guarantee the space in which a civil society, partially sheltered from the logics of both state and economy may flourish.²⁶

Held claims that democracy must be reconceived as a double sided phenomenon, concerned, on the hand with the reform of state power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society.²⁷

John A. Hall says that “civil society properly understood, should include notions of cooperation i.e. groups working both together and with a responsive state”. For him, the notion of civil society does and should retain connotation of civility. It endorses social diversity.²⁸

²⁶ Christopher Pierson, *op. cit.*, p.70.

²⁷ David Held, *op. cit.*, p.182.

²⁸ John A. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

SHORTCOMINGS

Thus civil society come to be viewed as a site which would connect society and the state, and as absolutely indispensable for democracy. But the relationship between the two has been extremely complex as the dynamic civil society has not always helped but also sometimes hindered democratic practices. Most scholars of civil society have more often than not hailed the euphoria about the return of civil society rather than examine the pragmatic problems created by an 'uncivil society' Michael Walzer draws attention to three features of civil society-inequality, fragmentation and fitfulness that stand in its way.

Civil society is an invocation that only successfully camouflages and masks the existing inequalities. Walzer goes a step further and claims that the inequalities are not merely reflected but even magnified in the organizational life of civil societies, so that the weakest groups have the weakest organizational presence.²⁹The civil society discourse chalked out by the elite expects civil society to play a mystifying role by invoking an illusory commonality of interest across different social economic profiles, the market and civil liberties rather than the need for an egalitarian and interventionist state. But the role of civil society should be one of progressive force for strengthening democracy and renewing social struggles for real civility.³⁰

Civil society is a realm of fragmentation and division. The civil society discourse has always encompassed a contradictory theme of the repressive, reactionary and profane. These cultural contradictions have provided the basis for the discrimination and exclusion of various ethnic, racial, gender, religious and other

²⁹ Michael Walzer, "Rescuing Civil Society", in *Dissent*, Winter 1999, p. 63.

³⁰ Elisa Reis Banfield, "Amoral Familism Revisited :Implications of High Inequality Structures for Civil Society", in Jeffrey C. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p.

groups. This is due to the reason that civil society is an intertwined sphere of solidarity where both the universalism and the particularistic versions find a place. The civil society discourse contains the symbolic oppositions that allow for uncivil activities- that is the irony of the discourse of civil society. Thus the real civil society often remains a hollow shell, behind which privatistic and fragmented institutional processes and internal practices continue to play themselves out.³¹

Though cross cutting memberships and the blurred boundaries that result, provide the best social back ground for democratic politics, we need to be wary of 'greedy institutions' which make for intolerance and are the enemies of civil society.³²

Post modernization which has created a new political agenda including gender, sexuality, environment, animals, child care, sport, the body, identity, the self and the media, requires a number of ethical rules and principles to not just overcome these shortcomings but also to maximize their authenticity and expressive potential. They are (1) the equity principle, (2) the principle of revocability, (3) the toleration principle, (4) an impartiality clause, (5) the stake holding principle, (6) the shared space principle and (7) the public goods principle.³³

PART II

In this part, the role of the media (which forms a component of the civil society) in a democracy will be explored. It is the news media, to be more precise, that shall be emphasized. How the freedom of the press and the satellite T.V. boom has affected terrorism forms the centerpiece of the discussion that follows. A free

³¹ Victor Perez Diaz, "The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society", in *ibid.*, p.

³² Michael Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

³³ John R. Gibbins and Bo Reimer, *The Politics of Post Modernity*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 135-58.

people needs a free press; but terrorism needs a propaganda platform. So in all Western countries the news media faces a dilemma: is it possible to keep citizens informed of daily events, including the often graphic tragedy of terrorism, without becoming, to some degree, propagandist for the perpetrator?

The question of whether information is news or propaganda is very important. Even straightforward news stories about terrorism can involve agonizing decisions. Do they contribute to the free market place of ideas helping people to understand the central issue of their day? Or do they give terrorists a megaphone through which to spread their message of fear to their ultimate target – the public at large? Do the news media provide the oxygen of public on which terrorism thrives, and help in the spread of sedition? Does extensive coverage by the media inflate the terrorists' ego to that of folk heroes or does such coverage produce a sense of outrage-public revulsion against terrorist acts and demands for tougher measures by the government? Does journalism put so much pressure on the government that it acts irresponsibly or does it provide important information to officials, since in hostile situation reporters can sometimes go where decision-makers in government dare not venture? Many people and organisation consider the media to be hooked on terrorism. To some people in the media, terrorism is drama; do the media, in an effort to captivate viewers, cover terrorist incidents whenever possible? Or do they, as they believe, report the facts which are verified and with total fairness and straightforwardness? The issue is outlined in questions form because there is so much disagreement on when is the correct approach.³⁴ After a survey of ample literature and with philosophical

³⁴ John Richard Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1987, pp. 150-1.

analysis and evidence to back it, the view taken here is that media indeed encourages terrorism.

Volumes have been written about the role of the mass media in a democracy. But before addressing the subject, it helps to define the terminology. In the broadest sense, the media embraces the television and films entertainment industries, a vast array of regularly published printed material, and even public relations and advertising. The “press” is supposed to be a serious member of that family, focussing on real life instead of fantasy and serving the widest possible audience. A good generic term for the press in the electronic age is “news media”. The emphasis in this definition is on content, not technology or delivery system.³⁵

We live today in a mass media – saturated environment. No one can seriously question that the mass media have drastically changed people’s everyday lives. A simple indicator of this fact is the amount of time that people spend with the mass media everyday. In addition to this, today more than ever before, we can use the media for our own purposes. We can use them in order to express ourselves. This is the positive aspect of the mediatization process. But at the same time, with greater differences in people’s use of the media, there will come a corresponding divergence in the construction of people’s individual world view. The social science version of this perspective is called ‘uses and gratification’ research. Different groups of people turn to different parts of the media output and construct different versions of the world, making it increasingly difficult to communicate in meaningful ways. A common public sphere—a sphere in which everyone participates – may become increasingly difficult to uphold. People’s perception of the media images is therefore, to a great degree responsible for taking varying

³⁵ George A. Krimsky, “Media and Democracy”, in *Span*, March/ April, 2003, p. 32.

position as to whether media is an aide to terrorists or one of the other competing versions. This shall be dealt with at length later.

The process of mediazation, talked about earlier, is a complex of six aspects in today's world. First, the media culture is increasingly changing from a print culture to an electronic culture which is not only more reminiscent of reality but also the one medium whose codes basically everyone can understand. Second, the media are increasingly involved in transnational processes. The import of television output and the satellite broadcasting has aided this immensely. Third, the media are becoming increasingly commercialized and deregulated. Being set up largely for the profit motive, ideological and cultural reasons have been sidelined. Fourth, media ownership is increasingly being concentrated in small number of corporations which are larger and more dominant hence reducing competition. Fifth, new technologies change the mediazation process. People can communicate across borders and gain information on basically anything without having to deal with the kinds of gate-keepers that control traditional media. Finally, a key characteristic of the mediazation process is inter textuality.³⁶

PUBLIC SPHERES AND NEWS MEDIA

While news media and public spheres have always been intricately intertwined, it is important to maintain an analytical distinction between them. The concept of the public sphere refers to a particular type of practice which takes place in civil society: the practice of open discussion about matters of common public concern. These discussions can take place in public spaces such as meeting halls, universities, in the private spaces of someone home, or in the 'virtual' spaces of

³⁶ John R. Gibbins and Bo Reimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-53.

print, television or the internet. What turns a discussion into a public sphere is the fact that it is composed of private citizens who are engaged in free public debate about matters of common concern and free of worries about state censorship or coercion. The news media, on the other hand, consist of any space in which information of some public interest is circulated to some portions of the public.

There are many instances in which news media operate as something other than a public sphere, because while public spheres must contain actual dialogue between specific individuals, news media can include other forms of communication as well, which means that they often produce selective reports about actual dialogues. This is the case with television 'sound bites', in which the public is deprived of the full sequence of events which preceded the reported statement. Journalists frequently write stories in which they contact a number of sources independently and then juxtapose the comments of these sources into 'virtual' dialogues that never actually took place.

The news media form imperfect public spheres, because they tend to provide only partial access which is organized in structurally predictable ways. Empirically all public spheres provide limited access and as such are imperfect. But the news media are in principle open to anyone. Continuous attempts are made to expand the participatory access further. In such a scenario, try as they might, state action are unable to maintain anything approaching total control of media publicity. This is further augmented by the mediatization processes.

News media provide a common stock of information and culture, which private citizens rely on in their everyday conversations with others. Thus, by creating an open-ended space where ideas can be expressed and received by a potentially

limitless and universal audience, the news media not just expands the public sphere,³⁷ but also binds together people's different public and private arenas.³⁸

Given the strong presence of news media in contemporary civil society, association and communities are faced with the problem of distinguishing reality from illusion. The lines between the two are blurred and we live in hyper reality believing more in the images that are shown to us than in reality itself.³⁹ In such a scenario, terrorists try to conquer space in the papers, on the air waves, and ultimately in our hearts and minds (through emotions of fear, revulsion etc.) They are waging a media war, exploiting the media for political ends by staging news worthy acts of violence. Thus media war was already foretold in the 1960s by Marshall Mc Luhan who predicted that "the next war will be fought with images."⁴⁰

MEDIA AND TERRORISM

In a liberal democracy, where the enlightened choices exercised by the citizen are essential for good governance, hard information leavened in the an open exchange of views is indispensable. Abraham Lincoln articulated this concept most succinctly when he said "Let the people know the facts and the country will be safe". Given the complexities and technologies of the 20th century, Lincoln's viewpoint may be regarded as naïve.⁴¹ In this context of the 'four freedoms' expounded by Roosevelt in 1941, the first, namely freedom of speech and expression and the fourth, namely, freedom from fear, are ceasing to remain

³⁷ Ronald . N Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-60.

³⁸ John R. Gibbins and Bo Reimer, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁰ Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom from Intimidation", in Lawrence Howard (ed.) *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Response*, Praeger, New York, West Port, Connecticut, London, 1992, p. 95.

⁴¹ George A. Krimsky, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

compatible. This is because the Western media, by informing us on acts of terrorism, not only intimidates all those who own a radio, or TV set or read a paper and identify with the victim of a particular act of terrorism⁴²

Media and terrorism began to interact sometime in the late 19th century and ever since, the link has only strengthened. The connection becomes evident in Carlos Marighella's statement- "The war of nerves is an aggressive strategy, in which information spread by the mass media and orally, is meant to demoralize the government".⁴³ It was Alex Schmid and Janney de Graaf (1982) who first showed systematically how the media use terrorists and their terrorism as much as terrorists use the media of the uses. Of the uses of the news media by terrorists, they enumerated 22 active ones and 10 passive uses. It is then needless to say that they actively seek publicity.⁴⁴ The ways of reaching the necessary means of publicity can be grouped as follows:

1. Planning actions for their news value
2. Undertaking supporting propaganda and recruitment activities.
3. Choosing the most favorable time and place for publicity for actions and movement.
4. Issuing statements.
5. Keeping in contact with the press and giving interviews.
6. Claiming responsibility for terrorist actions.
7. Issuing messages through the meaning or symbolism of the target or the deed.

⁴² Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media", in Lawrence Howard (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁴³ Robin P.J.M. Gerrits, "Terrorism Perspectives: Memoirs" in David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, London, New Delhi, 1992, p. 30.

⁴⁴ Alex P. Schmid and J.F.A. de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*, Sage, London, 1982, pp. 16-54.

These seven tactics serve the psychological strategies that in turn are supposed to bring about the final goal of the (terrorist) movement. It should be noted that each tactic of publicity may serve each of the psychological strategies. The publicity obtained is therefore only instrumental in serving the final aim of the terrorist movement.

The psychological strategies and the purpose of violence involve

1. Demonstration of the movement's strength and exposure of the vulnerability of authorities.
2. Utilization of repression by the government.
3. Demoralization of the opponent and raising of the morale of the terrorist group and its supporters.
4. Gaining or enlarging sympathy among the people for the movement.
5. Radicalizing the people or polarizing the political situation to create chaos and fear.
6. Stressing heroism or the necessary use of violence.⁴⁵

See figure 1.

Schmid draws up the following lists, which are based on empirical observations and suggestions in the secondary literature, providing some insight into possible misuses of the media by terrorists.⁴⁶

Diffusion And Amplification Of Violent Propaganda

- magnifying impact of fearful events by transporting mass audiences, as it were, to the scene of action of a terrorist episode.

⁴⁵ Robin P.J.M. Gerrits, "Terrorists' Perspectives: Memoirs", in Paletz and Schmid (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 35-44.

⁴⁶ Alex P. Schmid, "Editors' Perspectives", in *ibid.*, pp. 131-33.




Figure 1. The Terrorist's Psychological Strategies and Tactics of Publicity

- forcing national and international opinion to listen to terrorist demands and put these on the public agenda.
- generating disproportionate fear of the opponent by media's exaggeration of their strength, thereby aiding terrorist organization in its mythmaking.
- announcing further actions
- inciting public against government
- winning favorable publicity by means of statements expressed by grateful released hostages.
- winning publicity by granting exclusive interview in the underground.
- manufacturing violent events for the primary purpose of being reported by the mass media in order to create, through imitation of such acts, a contagion effect.
- extending identification offers to like-minded members in the mass audience, thereby instigating replication.

Winning Information And Intelligence On The Outside World For Underground Organization

- obtaining information about the identity, status; or actions of hostages and utilization of this knowledge for coercive bargaining (e.g., prominent person X, who, according to media reports, is among the hostages, will be killed first when ultimatum expired).
- obtaining sensitive information on countermeasures by security forces.
- identifying future targets for terroristic violence on the basis of news clipping archives.
- basing tactics and reactions on intelligence obtained from the media.

- using media as go-between between underground terrorists and their aboveground support groups and potential constituencies.
- learning new terrorist techniques from the media (modeling)
- misleading opponent by spreading false information.
- verifying demand compliance by the opponent (e.g., watch release of comrades from prison on TV).
- obtaining information about the reaction of (sectors to the) public to terrorist act.

(Re-)Directing Attribution Of Responsibility, Leading To Possible Legitimation Of Terrorist Violence

- obtaining status through recognition by the media that terrorist group is important enough to be covered.
- linking (propagandist) message to victim.
- discrediting victim by making parts of his or her “confessions” public
- discrediting victim by making victim’s “confessions” public
- advertising terrorist movement and cause represented
- making converts, attracting new members to terrorist movement
- placing the government, or specific public officials, in a bad light
- providing a basis for the public’s justification or rationalization of the terrorist act
- gaining a Robin Hood image

Coercion And Blackmail Of A Third Party

- intimidating media by maiming or killing journalists
- demanding publication of manifesto under threat of harm to victim or target

- occupying broadcasting station to issue message
- using media as conduits for threats, demands, and bargaining
- arousing public concern for victims to pressure government into making concessions
- staging visual violent events for threat emphasis (e.g. hanging one kidnapped person in front of video camera)

Other

- using media presence at site of siege as insurance against “dirty tricks” by security forces
- using journalists as negotiators in bargaining situation
- deflecting public attention from disliked current or forthcoming issue (e.g. democratic election) by “bombing” it from front pages
- polarizing public opinion
- triggering contagious behavior
- obtaining psychological gratification from media exposure, morale boosting

Having discussed extensively the strategies and the kinds of abuse that the terrorists expose the media to, the dynamic interactive relationship among terrorist groups, media, terrorism, public opinion and public policy decisions in a democratic political system, in which a relatively free and unfettered press normally functions is hypothesized by Russel F. Farnen in figure 2. The key elements are discussed below.

Terrorist Groups-they have various objectives and take different actions, all involving violence or the threat of violence. Most objectives are global, vague, changing and ideologically rooted. Their goal is to upset the orderly processes




Figure 2. Terrorism and the mass media: An interactive system.

and to achieve private, usually unpopular, political and informational ends. Along the way, these violent groups use and abuse the media and the state, and they are reciprocally used and abused. Media become witting and unwitting winners and losers in this process.

Mass Media- include national and international, radio, television, news papers, magazines and other print and non-print news media which set the public agenda. Media coverage may be exhaustive or minimal, first hand or secondary, dramatic and violence prone with no attempt to analyse underlying group motives or social causes. Media magnifies, distorts and over simplifies through use of value laden, establishment based stereotypes, usually obtained from government sources or else is profit based. The liberal slant is therefore illusory. Additionally, since media has unquenchable thirst for unsavory violence and 'man bites dog' stories, militant groups find them easy targets for manipulation. The reverse is also true.

Terrorism – is a larger than life product of media treatment. In other words, it can be said that terrorism could not exist in its present form without a mass audience. Without widespread popular exposure, the very nature of the terrorist phenomena would radically change. Indeed what we know as terrorism is actually a media creation: mass media define, delegitimise and discredit events that we have not actually seen, but that we all instantly recognize as terrorism. The result is a concept, affect, and throughput, which bears little resemblance to the much smaller insignificant group who initiated the threatened violence.

Public opinion – is the national and international set of values, opinions, attitudes, feelings and concepts / cognition on which the public bases its supports and demands for given public policies or preferred state action .

State Action and Public Policies – in part rely on media information, public opinion (usually vague and uninformed), establishment goals and independent information. All terrorist activity is automatically branded unlawful, unjust and non-negotiable. But the response thereto varies with the importance of victims, for the impositions of sanctions. Negotiations, as a first step, and use of violent interdiction as a last step in the process, are more routine today than in the early 70s. The public policy on media coverage law, nationalizing the media, or regulations governing allowable media activity are made under umbrella of “national security” or ensuring “law and order”. There is an underlying supposition that the normally establishment oriented media are difficult to control, predict or manage in such situations.

Political Environment – consists of the political culture and history the normal level of order, violence, press freedom or democracy in the society. Also of influence are other government and international organization as well as the international media network.⁴⁷

EFFECTS

Of the various scholars and authors surveyed each has something different to say about the nature of the media and the effect of terrorism there upon.

Alali and Eke believe that there are two schools of thought. Proponents of the first school contend that media coverage of terrorist events has a contagion effect. Its exponents included Brian Jenkins and Yonah Alexander. The other group is of “non-believers” who hold that there is no clear evidence that publicity (by the

⁴⁷ Russel F. Farnen, “Terrorism and the Mass Media”, in Conor Gearty (ed.), *Terrorism*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., Aldershot, England, 1996, p. 261.

media) is responsible for significantly affecting the occurrence of terrorism, this view is shared by Grant Wardlaw and Robert Picard.⁴⁸

David L. Paletz and John Boiney say that in the literature on terrorism, many works indict the media without offering much more exhortation or nominal solutions to the problems identified. There are two diametrically opposed camps: those that indict the media as proterrorist and those that indict the media as anti terrorist. In the former group, they place Schmid and de Graaf, Wardlaw and Alexander among others. The latter has Herman and O' Sullivan.⁴⁹ On the question of media coverage affecting terrorist objectives they have put forward case studies that support contradictory views i.e. it supports terrorism and it hinders terrorism. A third which claims the "media in control" position has also been listed.

Alex P. Schmid. Commenting on the relationship between terrorism and the media lays out three school of thought.

1. There are those who argue that the media reduce uncertainty about acts of violence. By informing about terrorism they prevent rumours and panic. In this perspective media coverage reduces the impact of terrorism.
2. Then there are those who argue that terrorism existed long before today's media and that the mass media, like jet liners, are just one more modern commodity used by terrorists as well as by other people.

⁴⁸ A. Odasuo Alali and K. Kelvin Eke, Introduction, in A. O. Alali and K.K. Eke (eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism*, Sage Publications, New Bury Park, London, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁹ David L. Paletz and John Boiney, "Researchers' Perspectives", in David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 10-22.

3. Finally, there are those who argue that the media inspire and encourage terrorism. He subscribes to the third group. But it is a qualified subscription depending upon the definition of both 'terrorism' and 'media'.⁵⁰

Kevin G. Barnhurst divides expert opinion on terrorism and the media into two schools. The great majority of authorities consider the media culpable to some degree for terrorism. Their writing has spawned a variety of hypotheses to describe the instrumental role of the media. A scattered few take issue, arguing that the media are vulnerable to, but not responsible for terrorism. In the first i.e. the culpable media, authors like Yonah Alexander, Schmid and de Graaf assert that the media can cause or increase terrorism. The means through which this works includes interference (direct physical involvement in an event), contagion and awareness. The case of vulnerable media is supported by Paul Wilkinson, Brian Jenkins and Bernhard Johnpoll among others, who oppose placing blame on the media. Instead they hold the view that the media are victims of terrorism.⁵¹

Thackrah says that one of the most noticeable development in recent years has been the increasingly skilful use of publicity by terrorist organization. He also acknowledges the vulnerability of the western media to misuse by international terrorists. The fact that terrorism by definition tends to be dramatic and also pictorial through the terrorist acts which take place, makes the media vulnerable. The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives, and the media too have always magnified terrorist exploits quite irrespective of their intrinsic importance.⁵²

⁵⁰ Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media", in Lawrence Howard (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.

⁵¹ Kevin G. Barnhurst, "The Literature of Terrorism", in A.O. Alali and K.K. Eke (eds), *op. cit.*, p. -115-119.

⁵² John Richard Thackrah, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-2.

Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter claim that the media inevitably provide the means for terrorists to advance their purposes with a view to subverting the democratic processes. Also, the media enable them to admit their aims, promise more, frighten the population, and undermine government. They divide their observation in the US, UK and European perspectives, their view is that in the US, the coverage is intensive and, after the TWA 847 hijack in 1985, the media adopted some policies to avoid being sensational. The structure of the US media-decentralized, commercial and competitive-affects the way news is reported and sometimes causing contradictory demands for security and the maintenance of democratic values acute.

In the UK, though government control is exercised through the Official Secrets Act, tension sometimes comes up between media and government during terrorist crises. This calls for not just a revision of the Act but also voluntary restraint in media. The other European countries have evolved ground rules to limit and to introduce a basis for government-media cooperation. But tensions do arise because the media and authorities have different functions in a crisis.⁵³

In India, the discussion regarding terrorism and the media has not been a scholastic one. Most of the authors on terrorism are no acclaimed academicians, hence they have a weak hold on the theoretical aspect. They dwell on the concepts borrowed from the Western literature, little realizing that due to their culture specific nature, they cannot be transplanted in India in their entirety. Nevertheless, most of them being in the frontline services have experienced the scourge of terrorism first hand. This gives them an edge over the works of academicians,

⁵³ Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, "Terrorism and the Media", in Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media. Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public*, Brassey's (U.S), Inc., Maxwell Macmillan Pergamon Publishing Corp., U.S., 1990. pp. 35-72.

being closer to ground realities and practical aspects. Nonetheless, they tend to differ in their views regarding interaction between terrorism and the media.

Anil Maheshwari's work on the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir claims the terrorism had created such conditions that caused a collapse of the state media.⁵⁴

Arjun Ray claims that over the years, the National Media has matured and is increasingly playing a fairly responsible role in fighting militancy, particularly post March 1995 (Tsrar-e-Sharif). But he does not have such kind words for the Vernacular Press. He calls it an "oddity the like of which has never been experienced before in any conflict situation". He also accuses it of being allergic to the uniform. Lack of professionalism and being unclear about its role in militancy are the other drawbacks. He outrightly dismisses it as being "blatantly seditious and anti-India". According to him though some checks are advisable to discipline the media, censorship is both undesirable and unenforceable.⁵⁵

K.P.S Gill too blames the media, particularly the so called "Sikh Journalism" for being paranoid about the Sikh religion against the "Brahmanical conspiracy". Such reports were earlier on (in the fifties, sixties and seventies) dismissed as the rantings of the lunatic fringe in the community. But gradually the local state media collapsed under the weight.⁵⁶

Similarly, D.P. Sharma too believes that in Punjab the local media could not bear the weight of the terrorist propaganda and gave way. Nevertheless, all the while the national media acted honorably and held its anti-terrorism stance.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Anil Maheshwari, *Crescent over Kashmir, Politics of Mullahism*, Rupa and Co, New Delhi, 1993.

⁵⁵ Arjun Ray, *Kashmir Diary*, Manas Publication, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 65-68.

⁵⁶ K.P.S. Gill, *Knights of Falsehood*, Haranand Publication, New Dehi, 1997, p. 36.

⁵⁷ D.P Sharma, *The Punjab Story: Decade of Turmoil*, APH Publication, New Delhi, 1996

CONCLUSION

Thus in the light of the over whelming evidence in favor of the position that the media encourages terrorism, this dissertation too would throw in its weight behind the same. Moreover, firmly believing that the liberal philosophy is responsible for the rise of terrorism in modern times, adds further conviction to this stream of thought. The freedom of speech and expression in a liberal democracy have been abused by elements who indulge in terrorist acts. But such a view should not be taken to mean that the liberal democratic project should be abandoned for some other model. Here we are not suggesting any alternatives or suggestions, only pointing out to the inherent weaknesses of the present model. This comes together with an appeal to give up viewing democracy as a sacred value. Its criticism need not mean taking up the model on the other extreme of the spectrum i.e. totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Democracy has often been referred to as the best workable model and not the best one *per se*. This provides space for a lively dialogue, which in other defects are pointed out. It is only when such an exercise is undertaken that the further step of plugging the gaps can be carried out.

Conclusion

As a concluding remark, an observation is stated. The literature from the West on terrorism focuses mainly on non-liberal societies. They predict that the trans plantation of liberal democratic regimes would help these societies tide over just any and all kinds of problems including terrorism. This current understanding is related to the role of religion (basically Islam), ideology (especially Communism, in the Cold War era) and the national liberation movements. It holds that the socio economic factors too play a role and therefore the theories of relative deprivation assumed importance, particularly in the case of under developed third world countries. They conclude that it is these kinds of societies that provide the ideal breeding grounds for terrorism.

But rarely has an introspection taken place. They overlooked their very own backyards which were the home to terrorists. They neglected to search their own philosophy, institutions and democratic processes to find the causes for terrorism. Though a change has occurred in the outlook-earlier almost all instances of terrorism were attributed to the Red philosophy. But ever since its collapse the search for another scape goat is on. Though we have reached a time when Western literature has started to deny that Marxism is responsible for terrorism, this is still a far cry from the soul searching that is required by the liberal democracies themselves. A few works, here and there, do tend to do this (Paul Wilkinson, Leonard Weinberg) but a massive, academic interrogation is yet to be undertaken.

A very earnest beginning has been attempted in this dissertation, searching for and putting together the various works, literature and references that support

the position that the liberal view of man, liberal democratic politics and political process account for a large measure of the objective factors that can create among others, violence and terrorist violence.

This forms the underlying belief through all the chapters – the first one being critical of the way terrorism has been sought to be defined by liberals, the second, is a critique of the liberal ontology for breaking social solidarities while the third and the fourth claim that liberalism and democracy have both spurred terrorism. The fifth chapter looks into how even the civil society especially media, of the liberal world had provided an impetus to terrorism.

Taken together, the entire work has viewed liberalism from a different perspective which has helped to bring out linkages between terrorism and liberal philosophy and practice. But this neither completely gives a clean chit to the pre-liberal ideology or praxis of a role in boosting terrorism, nor does it debunk liberal democracies entirely. The former would amount to eulogizing those ideologies without actually making a critical analysis. The latter would mean throwing the baby with the bath water. Each ideology and philosophy has its highs and lows. A positive necessarily has a negative side too. It is for us to examine and make not just a simplistic cost-benefit analysis but also search for remedies that could possibly remove the scourge. Nonetheless, a healthy criticism is a must. It helps to bring out the shortcomings and so aids in the proper definition of the problem and hence find viable solutions too.

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