

**SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS SELECT
TERRITORIAL AND BORDER DISPUTES
IN ASIA AND AFRICA /**

PREM CHANDRA GUPTA

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

**CENTRE FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI
1982**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface		
CHAPTER ONE	Territorial Claims and Border Disputes and International Politics	1
CHAPTER TWO	Soviet View of Territorial Claims and Border Disputes	17
CHAPTER THREE	Soviet Policy : Some Case Studies	30
	(a) Indo-Pakistan Territorial Disputes	
	(b) Sino-Indian Border Dispute	
	(c) Ethiopia-Somalia Territorial Dispute	
	(d) Sino-Soviet Border Dispute	
	(e) Iran-Iraq Territorial Dispute	
CHAPTER FOUR	Soviet Policy : An Assessment	70
CHAPTER FIVE	Conclusion	90
Select Bibliography		96

P R E F A C E

Soviet policy to the Third World has now a long history. Beginning in 1917 with the declaration of the new Soviet State in support and encouragement to the cause of freedom of colonies and semi-colonies, Soviet policy to the Third World was gradually activated since the mid-fifties. Over the last three decades in pursuing its Third World policy, the Soviet Union had to deal with a number of vital issues and problems of the Third World. As a matter of fact, it is time that Soviet policy to the Third World needs to be seen in terms of issues and problems involved rather than to be confined to Soviet-Third World bilateral or multilateral relationship. One of such issues and problems has emerged as territorial claims and border disputes.

This is a study of Soviet attitude to deal with this problem. The study is divided in a number of parts. First, it underlines the general significance of the problem for international politics set against its historical origin and development. It is followed by focussing attention on specific Soviet framework for dealing this problem. Further, it tries to investigate select case studies concerning the problem in Asia and Africa, from the point of view of relevance to the Soviet involvement in the Third World. Finally, the study seeks to assess the Soviet policy to territorial

claims and border dispute. The study relies on published source materials primarily in English and some made available in translation from the Russian language.

I am extremely thankful to Dr Zafar Imam and Mrs Imam but for whose encouragement the dissertation would not have seen the light of the day.

My sincere thanks to Basant, whom I owe more than I can express here. His patience to go through the entire manuscript and valuable suggestions are duly acknowledged. My thanks are also due to all my friends who encouraged me and helped me in various ways.

Prem Chandra Gupta.

PREM CHANDRA GUPTA

New Delhi
December, 1982

CHAPTER ONE

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND BORDER DISPUTES AND INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS

Introduction

Over the last fifty years or so, the Soviet Union has emerged as a world power of major significance almost matching the USA. It has gone through its own characteristic trials and travails in its nation-building programme including two major catastrophes, i.e. the First World War, intervention and Civil War, and above all the Second World War. The very process of its emergence as a major world power has brought it face to face with world-wide problems. Among these problems, territorial claims and border disputes may be identified as a major one.

Not that the problem of territorial claims and border disputes has originated with the establishment of the Soviet State in 1917; indeed it has historical roots in the very development of human society through the ages. But the very importance that this problem has attained in Soviet eyes is relevant to our study. However, to understand this process in Soviet policy, it is worthwhile for us to have a glance at the historical origins of the problem. Hence, we must begin our enquiry by examining the problem of territorial claims and border disputes in the historical perspective and its impact on international politics, particularly in our times.

Historical Background

The problem of rival territorial claims and border disputes is not a new phenomenon in history. It runs through practically the entire range of development of human society and has often led to sharp conflicts and generated much tension between nation-states. It has caused many bloody wars and humanity was made to suffer because of it, through the ages.¹ The seizure of foreign territory was the inevitable concomitant of wars of conquest. These wars were waged by many rulers in ancient times, in the middle ages and even in modern times.²

In modern times, we have seen many conflicts and wars on the rival territorial claims and border disputes. In Europe, since the beginning of the industrial revolution on national aspirations³ as well as animosities have been one of the main factors leading to the instability in the continent. For instance, the French Revolution was also a source of satisfaction to French nationalism which eventually contributed to the Napoleonic wars of adventure and conquest of Europe.⁴ The

1. See, G. Wright, A Study of War (UCP, 1965), 2nd Edn.
2. S. Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, (HUP, 1972), p. 14
3. R.B. Howat, Contemporary Europe and Overseas, (London, Rivington, 1950), p. 6
4. H.A.L. Fisher, A History of Europe (London, Fontana, 1968) vol.II, p. 830

Congress of Vienna (1815) sought to grapple with the rival claims of various nationalities by redefining and delimiting boundaries of European States. The urgency of the situation can be understood in the emergence of the concert of Europe which was an outcome of the Vienna Congress. However, the system could not last long. The French people were resolved to break the settlement of 1815 at all cost. Because it was associated in their minds with contracted frontiers and loss of national prestige. The other powers were equally resolved to preserve this settlement in all its totality, and they were conscious that its violation would open the door to endless confusion and the peril of a European conflagration.¹ However, the system met further blow and collapsed against the rising onslaught of German nationalism and its irrendentist claims, culminating in Bismarck's successful drive for the unification of Germany (1870). Likewise, the struggle for Italian unification under Mazzini was also an effort to adjust boundaries and disputed territorial claims.²

Thus, national movements impelled the Germans, the Italians, the Poles and the Czechs to demand political union and boundaries corresponding to the distribution of their races. The Italian and the German national movements were successful in the 19th Century and brought about dramatic changes

1. E. Lipsan, Europe in the 19th Century (London, A & C Black Ltd, 1928), p. 3
2. V. Luigi, The Expansion of Italy (London, Faber & Faber, 1930), pp. 29-37

of frontiers. The political boundaries were redrawn. These changes were effected by wars in 1859, 1866 and 1870. It was not only caused international tensions but also led to domestic instability in some cases.¹

Yet, territorial claims and border disputes remain a very living problem in international politics and are far from resolved. "The Eastern Question" was one such problem which arose in Europe. Thus, territorial claims and border disputes articulated through rival nationalities of various regions, set the canvass for the First World War (1914). After the First World War, Versailles Agreement (1919) created more problems than it solved; so much so that it finally led to the rise of Nazi Germany and Hitler's Ostpolitik with disastrous consequences for the mankind.

The end of the Second World War transformed the world scenario. Like all other aspects of international politics the problems of territorial claims and border disputes has acquired new dimensions. Now it began to affect the newly independent countries and contemporary world politics.²

By this time, the problem acquired new dimensions because the correlation of world forces was significantly changed

1. A. Hassall, Periods of European History (London: Rivingtons, 1950), pp. 13-14
2. S. Sanakayev, "Most Preserving Problem of Our Day", International Affairs (Moscow), August 1978, pp. 8-18

These changes were brought about by the process of decolonisation and the success achieved by a large number of liberation movements in Asia and Africa.

In this changed scenario, when a number of independent countries emerged, the character of boundaries and its dimension in international politics also underwent changes. Now, on each side of them were territories ruled by sovereign states and not by different colonial powers or the same colonial power. National policies were under formulation and the process of nation building had begun which affected the borders existing before independence. But this problem did not arise as a result of independence of countries in Asia and Africa. Indeed it was rooted in the history of colonialism.

The history of colonialism shows that Asia and Africa were divided and subdivided by the colonial powers for their own interests.¹ Historical, ethnic and geographical factors were ignored. Whole regions were lopped off from their natural environment, and incorporated in others. Economic and Cultural ties which had evolved over centuries were disrupted and destroyed.²

1. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. I, Part 2 (Moscow, 1966), p. 412

2. S. Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (HUP, 1972), p. 4

Hence, many frontiers in Asia and Africa were just drawn on the map along the parallels and meridians. The imperialist plunderers were in so much of hurry to acquire land and capture new areas that they could not draw the boundaries in a scientific manner.¹ At the same time, boundaries were also changed or modified much more frequently in these region.² Cumulatively, all these were bound to present a grim heritage of colonialism. This heritage is known to have given rise to tensions and conflicts among the independent states of Asia and Africa.

As we have stated earlier, the countries in Asia and Africa became independent from the colonial powers inheriting boundaries drawn up arbitrarily by them. These boundaries formed by the colonial powers, not corresponding to localism, sharpened the national feelings and animosity against the neighbours. Thus it became a major source of conflict among neighbours in Asia and Africa.

Effects on International Politics

Hence, the territorial claims and border disputes were much more manifest when the process of decolonisation gained

-
1. R.L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa", World Politics, 18 July 1966 pp. 656-673
 2. S. Touval, Ibid, p. 7

momentum in the post-Second World War period. It has caused serious tensions in the world and has involved many countries in the conflicts and wars particularly in Asia and Africa. It not only has threatened the stability and peace in one region but has also become a major source of threat to international peace and security. The gravity of the problem is so high that it has acquired an important place in international politics. Maximum attention was paid to this problem at international conferences and summit talks. The intensity and complexity of the problem is so marked that it has become a major concern for the international community. For instance, at the Helsinki Conference (1975), the desire to avoid conflict on this issue was expressed. The report on the Conference says, "the participating states regard as inviolable one another's frontiers as well as frontiers of all states and therefore, they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers".

As it is a major problem of international politics, it has also attracted the attention of statesmen, diplomats and social scientists. They have tried to give various interpretations to the issue and put forward some ideas for its resolution. Statesmen and diplomats have devoted much of their time to find out a just and permanent solution to the problem. These have been very much reflected in the Wilsonian concept of national self-determination and Lenin's theory on the Right to

Self-determination.¹ Although the efforts were not very successful, they have attempted to give a conceptual framework to the problem through which it could be resolved.

In recent times, Julius Nyerere also gave his own view on the problem. He considered that our boundaries were so absurd that they must be regarded as sacrosanct.² Hence, all of them have attempted to reach a meeting point where the issue could be peacefully resolved. In spite of all these efforts, the problem has remained a source of conflict and tension in international politics.

As we have stated earlier, the problem of territorial claims and border disputes has attained the most important place in international politics. It also has attracted the attention of social scientists. Social Scientists have attempted to give some conceptual framework to it.

Social scientists consider that a boundary dispute exists when the territorial ambitions of at least two parties are irreconcilable.³ They have provided various models to categorise the territorial claims and border disputes into various types. For our convenience, we take two models put forward by Prescott and Luard.

-
1. K.M. Panikar, Asian and Western Dominance, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959), p. 263
 2. R. Emerson, "African States and the Burdens They Bear", African Studies Bulletin, X, No.1, (April 1967), p. 2
 3. See, C.C. Midstrand (Ed.), African Boundary Problems, (Uppsala: SIAS, 1969)

Prescott¹ divides the territorial claims and border disputes in the following main types:

- (A) Territorial disputes, that result from some quality of the borderland which makes it attractive to the State initiating the dispute.
- (B) Positional disputes which concern the actual location of the boundary and usually involves a controversy over interpreting the delimitation or description of the boundary.
- (C) Functional disputes, which concern state functions applied to the boundary.
- (D) Dispute over resource development.

The above mentioned categories can be safely divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the locational change of boundary. The other is basically concerned with functional change instead of locational change. Hence the groups (A) and (B) belong to the first one and groups (C) and (D) belong to the second one. We are basically concerned with the first one. The model of Prescott only indicates the types of disputes that arise out of territorial claims and border disputes.

The other model, formulated by Luard,² seems more practicable and concerned with the actual situation in which dis-

1. See, J.I.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, (London, 1965)

2. E. Luard (Ed.), The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (London : Thames and Hudson), 1970

pute arise. The essence of the model can be summarised in the following way:

- (A) Disputes arise where no recognised boundary, either delimited, or demarcated, existed. This was at one time the most common of all kinds of territorial claims and border disputes. The Conflicts between European powers in Asia, Africa and elsewhere arose through two or more powers competing for land that was regarded as belonging legally to nobody or over which sovereignty was so tenuous and so disputed that it was regarded as open to appropriation by any nation. These types of disputes prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries but now such cases are comparatively rare because virtually the whole area of the globe is held and is administered or at least claimed by some power. There are some disputes, for example, in the Antarctica of which the same statement is largely true.
- (B) The second type of dispute occurs where a defacto boundary exists, which may be firmly established and defended, but the whole basis of which is challenged by another. Disputes of this kind have been particularly common since the end of colonialism. In some cases of this type both parties may dispute the existing defacto frontiers as in India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This is perhaps the most difficult of all types of frontier disputes to resolve except through some political decision or bilateral agreement.
- (C) The third kind of dispute arise where there exist two rival claims concerning the correct delimitation of the frontier. The dispute between China and India concerning their mutual boundaries in the north-east and north-west of India was of this kind.
- (D) Sometimes dispute arise not over the validity of agreement or the general provisions of such agreement, but over the exact interpretation of the ground of an agreement that is mutually accepted. There can be a very long time-lag between the signature of a frontier agreement and the final settlement of all demarcation disputes. Of this kind, since 1945, have been disputes between Kampuchea and Thailand over Preach Vihear Temple, the boundary disputes between Belgium and the Netherlands.

It is obvious that social scientists are basically concerned with the kinds of situation in which disputes arise, indeed they were unable to help in finding solution to a problem, which remains as complicated and complex as it was.

As we have discussed earlier the problem has touched all aspects of international politics, so much so that it is found that international organizations have devoted more of their time to this particular issue than to any other problem of contemporary world politics.

League of Nations

With the end of the First World War, territorial boundaries were significantly changed. New lines were drawn throughout Europe and the Middle East. The massive reorganization of territorial structure was to be presided over by the League of Nations. During the 15 or more years when the League of Nations survived, it experienced the tremor of territorial claims and border disputes. Hence, from the very beginning, it became necessary for it to formulate principles to resolve the problem.

In reality, the guiding principles of law which governed the League was incorporated in the Covenant, for the resolution of territorial claims and boundary disputes.¹ Under

1. D.A. Wainhouse, International Peace Observations, (Baltimore, 1966), p. 173

Article 10, members undertook 'to respect and preserve against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.'¹

Beyond this, there was one very important principle which influenced the League of Nations in many of its initiatives even though it was not formally incorporated into the Covenant. It was the principle of self-determination.² Increasingly towards the end of the war, respect for the principles of self-determination in some form became important. Its Wilsonian concept and the tentative commitment by the allies to the principle of self-determination was pushed further by the post-revolution Soviet statement of 1917. The Soviet statement on the issue had cut all roots with the imperial past and proclaimed identity to any national group which freely expressed such desire.³ Hence, the principle of self-determination was the one thoroughly respectable principle on the basis of which all states could advance their claim in international forums.

The concern of the League of Nations in this regard was reflected in the Covenant. The Articles 12-16 of the Covenant laid down procedure for the resolution of international disputes.

1. See the Covenant of the League

2. F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, OUP, 1952), pp 102-104

3. Ibid

Further, a procedure was also provided for identifying the international criminals and under Article 16, the provision was made for punishment and coercion.¹

Unfortunately, the League was never cut out to be the stern guardian of world peace, preserving the boundaries of all members.² The League did not succeed in this field and whenever confronted with determined aggression, it was unable to function.³

The United Nations (UN)

The UN Organisation was established with the prime aim of resolving international conflicts and to help continue the international system smoothly. The world community had the bitter experience of two world wars and conflicts during inter-war period. Hence they did not want to face the situation of instability and conflicts. Therefore, the prime objective was to reduce the chances of conflict and maintain peace and security. Article 1, Para 1 of the UN Charter states this fact clearly.⁴

Thus, the Charter makes it one of the expressed objectives of the UN to bring about the adjustment or settlement of disputes

1. G. Scott, The Rise and Fall of League of Nations, (New York, Macmillan, 1974), pp. 72-103
2. G. Scott, Ibid
3. S. Windoss, "The League and Territorial Dispute", in E. Luard (Ed.), The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (London and Thames), p. 191
4. For details, See, Article 1 (1), the UN Charter.

which may lead to a breach of peace. At the same time, the UN Charter also denies its member states as well as other states the violation of territorial integrity or political independence of any country with force.¹ Hence, it advocates the idea of renunciation of force in settling disputes over territory.

The UN has played multi-dimensional roles in this regard. Besides being active in the pre-settlement period, the UN may also have a role to play in the implementation of agreements regarding border problems by controlling a disputed area for some time. It has also played the role of international police by stationing the UN force to supervise the withdrawal of troops or to check the provocation by either side.

The UN has succeeded in resolving or suspending many territorial claims and border disputes. But its success in this field is partial. We still have grim picture of many rival territorial claims and border disputes especially in Asia and Africa.

At present, some of territorial claims and border disputes like PLO problem, Iran-Iraq war and Indo-Pak disputes, remain still unresolved. Although these disputes are tip of the iceberg, they have attracted the world attention and are a reckoning factor in the international politics. Above all, recent war on Falkland Island has shown the intensity of the problem. Hence, eruption of war over any territorial claim and border dispute has

1 Sec, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.

very much affected the third world countries in general, and Asia and Africa, in particular.

Conclusion

Most of the countries of Asia and Africa are newly independent and economically very weak. The persistence of territorial claims and border disputes has proved a great obstacle to economic development and regional peace. In a situation where their economic condition is very weak, the persistence of any kind of conflict including territorial claims and border disputes is bound to prove fatal. Hence, all the countries of Asia and Africa are eagerly in search for a solution to the problem. At least, they are most reluctant to use force to resolve it. Unfortunately, they are sometimes compelled to use force in settling the problem, thereby causing a threat to world peace.

The problem has seemed to be local and regional in nature. But due to the integrated international society, disputes have acquired an international significance. Now, interaction on the world level is more frequent and regular. All countries are interconnected and interrelated to each other in economic, political and defence matters. Hence, the outbreak of a war in one corner of the world certainly has affected other parts of the world and has attracted the attention of most of the countries in general and the Super powers in particular. It has been

found that most of the disputes, the Super powers or their allies, get involved directly or indirectly. Thereby, these disputes acquire international dimensions.

Therefore, it is not surprising to note that, as the Soviet Union is affected by various global and regional problems, it also gets involved in territorial and border disputes in Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union being a Super power and having global and regional strategy, has given much importance to the problem. In many ways, it has affected Soviet Foreign policy in the third world and elsewhere.

The importance of the problem in modern times and its changing dimensions in international politics have attracted the attention of the world community and the international and regional organisations. It has also attracted the attention of statesmen, diplomats, social scientists and individual countries, especially super powers. Thus, we can see the territorial claims and border disputes continue to be a major source of instability in international politics of today.

When the problem has acquired this much importance in international politics in general and in the Soviet foreign policy formulation in particular, it is worthwhile to study the Soviet attitude towards the territorial claims and border disputes in Asia and Africa. We propose to focus attention on Soviet View of the problem in our next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

SOVIET VIEW OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND BORDER DISPUTES

Broadly speaking, the Soviet attitude towards the territorial claims and border disputes in international politics is deeply influenced by two inter-related factors. The one, the very framework of Soviet foreign policy is relevant to an understanding of the Soviet attitude to the problem. The other, the historical experiences of the Soviet State since its very inception in 1917, has to be brought into focus in dealing with this problem. In essence, it is an intermixture of these two factors that may be considered as a guideline to an understanding of the Soviet attitude to the problem of territorial claims and border disputes.

It is widely accepted that the ideological perceptions, mainly derived from Marxism-Leninism, are a significant factor in Soviet foreign policy. International politics and foreign policy postures are thus not simply viewed in terms of the promotion of national interest and security but also against the background of international class conflict and global balance of the social forces, formerly represented by the nation-states, at a given period of time on one issue or the other.¹ In this framework countries of Asia and Africa occupy an important place in between the socialist and capitalist systems. Hence, the problems faced by the countries of Asia and Africa are seen in the perspective of the historical backlash of colonialism and semi-colonialism. Such a Soviet view is, indeed, integrated

1. See, for details, Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Non-Alignment", in K.P. Misra (Ed.), Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (Delhi: Vikas; 1982).

with overall policy of the Soviet Union towards the third world.

In the post-Second World War phase, when decolonisation process had begun, newly independent countries became the subject of international politics instead of the object of it. These countries were granted independence within the boundaries drawn by the colonial powers. These countries were soon engulfed in rival territorial claims and border disputes.

The Soviet Union views the problem as a legacy of the colonial past and not as a result of independence of these countries. As we have discussed earlier, the territories of Asia and Africa were arbitrarily divided and subsequently subdivided by the colonial powers in the 18th and 19th Centuries. This division took place in the course of a bitter struggle for power¹ among Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Italy. Commenting on the events in the final quarter of the 19th Century, Lenin had rightly said that it was in this period that the tremendous boom in colonial conquest began and that the struggle for the territorial division of the world became extraordinarily keen.²

Hence, when the division and redivision of Asia and Africa were going on, the convenience of the colonial powers was given prime importance. This led to the utter disregard

-
1. R.L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa", World Politics, 18 July 1966, pp.656-73
 2. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol.I, Part 2 (Moscow, 1966), p. 512

of the established social, cultural and economic identities. The outcome of these policies was the division of ethnic and cultural groups and the destruction of economies which had been shaped in centuries. A situation of complexities and contradictions had to emerge, it is argued.

The Soviet Union thus views the whole problem in a historical perspective. As we stated earlier, Asia and Africa, were easily and mindlessly divided for their own sake to exploit the colonies. Therefore, the issue is one of the most acute and complex nature produced by the domination of the exploiting class.

As decolonisation process had begun in late forties and is almost complete now, the imperialist and reactionary forces in the west keenly desired to fill the vacuum created by their predecessors. Therefore, they were in search for some out-let in the countries of Asia and Africa. Territories and borders in Asia and Africa, not duly demarcated and recognised, became the source of conflict and tension among these countries. These conflicts and tension have provided a greater opportunity for imperialist and reactionary forces to involve in the third world. They have done their best to foment the issue and to use them for their own ends.¹

1. S. Sanakayev, "Most Preserving Problem of Our Day", International Affairs (M), August 1978, pp. 8-18

The Soviets assert that these conflicts have certainly suited these powers as they have distracted developing countries from constructive effort, interfered with their building up a national economy and weakened the process of nation-building. This situation obviously has helped the imperialists keep these countries dependent on them in terms of economy and defence.

The Soviet Union also considers that by indulging in war and conflicts the Asian and African countries play into the hands of external forces. These external forces seek to disunite the countries emerging from the yoke of colonialism and to capitalise on the rivalries among them. The conflicts have provided a fertile ground for all kinds of manoeuvre and intrigues. This has helped them to check all the progressive forces countering neo-colonialism. The very existence of the situation has provided an opportunity to dig out the root of the third world unity and weaken the nonaligned movement.¹

Most of these newly independent countries are economically weak and dependent on the outside powers. In Soviet eyes, some of them have chosen to follow a non-capitalist path of development.² The non-capitalist path of development followed by some of the developing countries go against the grand design of neo-colonialism as it is contradictory to imperialism and its

-
1. P.N. Haksar, "Non-alignment: Retrospect & Prospect", China Vietnam and Nonalignment (Delhi: New Literature, 1980), pp.98-122
 2. K. Ivanov, Leninism and Foreign Policy of the USSR (Moscow, Novosti, 1972), p. 73

patterns of dependence. Hence, the imperialist powers have sought to exploit the territorial claims and border disputes in Asia and Africa in order to prevent them to follow the non-capitalist path of development. They are prepared to support the claims to the territory of those states who toe their line. In such cases, disputes serve as inflammable material for kindling deeper conflict. What it actually amounts to is thinly veiled imperialist intervention. Brezhnev said that the imperialists were seeking to sow discord among the states which have won national independence¹ on one issue or the other.

The Soviet Union also thinks that in some countries, the ruling elite which are not capable of meeting the needs of the people have utilized the problem to their own ends. They always try to check the forces of class conflict by diverting the attention of working class and other progressive forces. They have exploited their sentiments for meeting their own needs. Hence, they follow the course of conflict to resolve the territorial claims and border disputes and ultimately meet their own ends.

Dynamics of nationalism is also recognised by the Soviet Union. They seem to think that many times pure national chauvinistic elite of the third world try to aggravate the problem of border dispute for their own purpose. In other words, pure national chauvinistic factor is not entirely kept out of consideration.

1. International Meeting of Communist a
(Moscow, 1969), p. 173.

DISS

341.42

G9596 So



TH1052



TH-1052

As said earlier the Soviet attitude to territorial claims and border disputes was very much shaped by its historical experiences.¹ Since the very establishment of the Soviet State, conflicting claims over inational territories and border disputes arising out of the disintegration of the Tsarist empire had engaged its attentions. Therefore, one of the first acts of the new Soviet government was its search for the solution of the problem.

This Soviet desire for solution of the problem was symbolised in Lenin's idea of the Right of Nations to Self Determination² and their practical relevance in implementing them in Central Asia as well as in granting independence to the former Tsarist dominated countries - Finland and Poland. Likewise, the new Soviet state had to cope with problems during inter-war years in its relations with neighbouring states like Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and China.³ However, the Soviet Union had to wait for the resolution of the problem in Europe until the end of the Second World War, when it could redefine its borders vis-a-vis Romania, Poland and Hungary.

Moreover, most of the post Second World War years were devoted for resolution of German question and for a global recognition of territorial status quo in Europe. Finally, it was

1. History of Soviet Foreign Policy (1917-45), (Moscow, Progress, 1969), pp. 42-45

2. See, V.I. Lenin, On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, (Moscow, 1968).

3. Ibid

at the Helsinki Conference in 1975 that the Soviet Union succeeded in achieving its goal of recognition of territorial status quo in Europe through an international agreement involving all European countries and United States and Canada.

Yet the problem remained alive issue for the Soviet Union itself. As it is well known one of the main points between China and the Soviet Union territory and border; so much so the problem remained unsolved. Hence, the historical experience has helped and shaped the Soviet Union to formulate certain patterns of attitude towards the territorial border disputes.

We see that the Soviet view on the territorial claims and border dispute is moulded in the Marxist-Leninist framework of international politics and the Soviet experience in dealing with the problem. At the same time, the Soviet view is very much conditioned by the changing dynamism of international politics. The Soviet Union was very much aware of the colonialist intrigue and basic problem of the emerging new States in Asia and Africa.¹

Looking at the world scenario, the Soviet Union feels that the demand for the revision of territory and demarcation

1. S. Sanakayev, "Most Preserving Problem of Ourday", International Affairs (M), August, 1978, pp. 8-18

of boundaries by all the countries with their neighbours would mean an inevitable aggravation of world tension. Although all these conflicts are of local nature, they have potential to turn into international conflict.¹

Therefore, the desire for complete and immediate solution to the problem with military means would entail serious consequences for all concerned. Even a provocative call or action for a reexamination of borders would inevitably engender a multitude of demands, claims and unsolvable conflicts between countries.²

Hence, the Soviet Union feels that the vital interest of socialism, non-alignment and peace demand that the territorial status quo and inviolability of existing borders be observed as well as the principle of peaceful settlement of dispute.³ Any other position only serves to whip up chauvinism and hatred among peoples. Finally it will threaten to involve several countries in endless and insoluble border conflicts.

We have seen the Soviet concern for the resolution of the problem through peaceful means. Peaceful settlement of dispute should be sought through negotiation, mediation, good offices and arbitration. These methods should be based on non-inter

1. See, "Khrushchev's Message to All Heads of States", International Affairs (U), No.2, February 1964, pp.1-8

2. G. Apalin and U.Mityayev, Militarism in Peking Policies, (Moscow, 1976), pp. 78-89

3. P. Mezentsev, "Horn of Africa", New Times, March 1970, p- 12

ference from outside power and a voluntary choice and agreement between two sides. This very view was reflected in the Soviet role in Indo-Pak dispute and its help to conclude the ^{Tashkent} ~~Tashkent~~ Agreement. In this dispute, the Soviet view is that the USSR has played a role of honest broker. But, in due course it began to influence the negotiations and ultimately the Soviet Union has come out in support of India. This has led to Soviet involvement in the dispute, thereby posing a problem for Soviet foreign policy. This problematic part of the Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis various disputes will be discussed in latter chapter.

The Soviet Union's desire to solve the problems in a peaceful manner is reflected at various levels. It has made such a declaration at 1957 world meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties which states ¹clearly.

Further, the Soviet Union has shown its concern to the problem in the messages of Khrushchev to the Heads of the States.² It has proposed the conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force in the settlement of territorial claims and border disputes. "In the current situation" the message says, "it is possible to raise and solve the problem of excluding the use of force in territorial claims and border disputes between states

1 The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism
(Moscow, 1961), p. 12

2 Ibid

from international relation".¹ Khrushchev noted this in his proposal to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force in resolving territorial claims and border disputes. He also put forward future prospect if force would be used as an instrument to resolve the problem. "If we were to take force as a basis for solution of boundary problems, then evidently every one will agree that in many cases we could come to no solution at all."²

The Soviet Union has also initiated international agreements with the view to strengthening peace and security. In 1965, the 20th UN General Assembly endorsed the Soviet sponsored Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their independence and Sovereignty.³ At the 25th UN General Assembly in 1970, the Soviet along with other socialist countries submitted a draft Declaration on the strengthening of International Security. It states: "It was necessary to settle all disputes by peaceful means and to that end, make further use of the procedures and methods provided in the Chapter". In the same way, at Helsinki Conference the Soviet Union emphasised the above mentioned proposals. That war cannot and must not serve as a means of settling territorial disputes became the essence of the Soviet policy.⁴ ✓

1. Ibid

2. I.I. Potekhin, "Legacy of Colonialism in Africa", International Affairs (II), March 1964, p. 19

3. E.A. Tarabrin, USSR and Countries of Africa (Moscow, 1975) p. 75

4. Programme of the CPSU (Moscow, 1974), p. 48

We have seen that the Soviet Union has tried to resolve the disputes between the disputant countries in a peaceful way. But sometimes, imperialist forces and reactionary elements in the third world have attempted to utilize the opportunities and tried to start offensive war against other disputant country. At this time, when such situations arise it is found necessary to help the aggrieved country from the aggressor and the Soviet Union has extended its help. It has rendered material and political assistance in repelling aggression.¹ This help, the Soviet Union considers, is wholly defensive in nature. Whatever it may be its desire, the Soviet Union, however, slowly gets involved in the dispute and begins to take the side of either of the disputant countries. Hence, its support for either side has resulted in the increasing involvement of other countries of the west, especially, the US. ✓

But, it hardly means that the Soviet Union does not give prime importance to non-use of force in resolving the dispute, even at this stage. However, it cannot ignore the fact that one country is being attacked by other and the war is offensive in nature. At the same time imperialist forces also have given their support to the aggressive country. Hence, the Soviet Union finds necessary to help and support the aggrieved country. But it does not give up its hope of resolving the problem by peaceful means. It seeks to confine and contain the conflict situation and pleads for a negotiated settlement without outside interference. ✓

1. E.A. Tarabrin, USSR and Countries of Africa (Moscow, Progress, 1977), pp. 52-63

Thus, it is obvious that the Soviet attitude to the territorial claims and border disputes stems from the very framework of the Soviet foreign policy. Hence, the goals and objectives of the Soviet foreign policy also became relevant in the understanding of the Soviet attitude to the problem. Broadly speaking, the Soviet foreign policy goals and objectives are to ensure the security for the Soviet Union and its allies as well as to tilt the balance of world social forces in its favour vis-a-vis imperialist-capitalist forces. Hence, the Soviet attitude to the problem may be summarised as exerting all influences in the resolution of the problem rather than making it more complicated. In its search for a solution, a flexible policy has been adopted keeping in pace with the complexities of international politics. It has not been pursued in a straight line, neither has it been a success story always. It has as a rule got involved in the problem overtly or covertly, not always bringing about desired results to its aims and objectives or to its third world supporters.

However, the historical experience of the Soviet State in dealing with the problems may not be entirely forgotten. Indeed, it has introduced a balance in an overtly ideological approach to international politics in general, and to the problem under study, in particular. In other words, it has contributed to the very flexibility and resilience of the Soviet Policy to the problem, thereby to its success and failure.

To sum up, the two main factors identified in the beginning of this Chapter are interrelated and they have essentially

shaped the Soviet understanding of the problem. At this stage, it is worthwhile to examine the Soviet policy and record vis-a-vis some selected territorial claims and border disputes in Asia and Africa. This exercise, we propose to take up in the following chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

SOVIET POLICY : SOME CASE STUDIES

In Chapter One we have shown that the issue of the territorial claims and border disputes is a historical phenomenon, so much so that it continues to be one of the main factors generating hostility among nations and causing instability in international system. Although, it is still a problem for almost the whole world, it is in Asia and Africa that we see the problem in its most acute and explosive form. Most of these countries are confronted with the problem of adjusting territorial borders and resolution of conflicting claims over it. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine the problem for our purpose on a selective basis.

As our study is mainly concerned with the Soviet attitude to the problem, it is worthwhile to consider those disputes which are not far from the Soviet borders and whose locations have political and strategic significance for the Soviet Union. Moreover, we have also taken into account varying levels of the Soviet interest in the problem in the Third World. For instance, we have excluded the Latin American continent, where the Soviet interest on the issue is hardly marked. Keeping these consideration in mind, we will focus our attention on selected disputes in Asia and Africa attempting an investigation of the Soviet policies on the problem. Hence, we have selected the following issues:

- (a) Indo-Pakistan Territorial Dispute;
- (b) Sino-Indian Border Dispute;
- (c) Ethiopia-Somalia Territorial Dispute;
- (d) Sino-Soviet Border Dispute;
- (e) Iran-Iraq Territorial Dispute.

(A) INDO - PAKISTAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

Because of its geographical position, Kashmir has become one of the most strategically important places in geopolitics; so much so that it has attracted the attention of all Great Powers through the ages. In the modern times, it has become strategically important for all the ambitious powers of the region as well as outside powers.

The area is encircled by the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, Tibet and Afghanistan. It is situated in the extreme north of the Indian Union. Tibet borders it in the north-east, Sinkiang is located in the north and the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan are situated in its north-west. Kashmir touches Pakistan in the west. The state is connected with Pakistan through the Jhelum valley. However, Kashmir forms a part of the northern most frontiers of the Indian Union and is, therefore, of great importance to India. It is strategically also important to the Soviet Union because it is adjoining Soviet Central Asia.¹

¹ S.P. Sharma, India's Boundary and Territorial Disputes (Delhi, Vikas, 1971), pp. 124-141.

Therefore, the region always finds prime importance in the Soviet foreign policy. Any tension in this region automatically affects the countries of the region and above all the Soviet Union.¹

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is the product of colonialism. When the British had to leave India in 1947, they broke the sub-continent into two parts, i.e. India and Pakistan. Since that time Kashmir issue has become a bone of contention between the two countries and they have fought four wars over it. The first war occurred in 1947-48. But in the following years, India and Pakistan signed a truce and agreed to a demarcation line which left pending a final settlement. Subsequent wars were fought by both the countries to settle the dispute without any success.

As we have pointed out the strategic importance of the region in world politics, any kind of tension would attract the world community in general and super powers in particular. Hence the Kashmir dispute has attracted the attentions of both the US and the USSR. Although, the Chapter is devoted to the Soviet attitude to the problem, it will be worthwhile to have a quick glance at the US attitude to the problem, as the Soviet policy to the problem has also been affected to it.

1 K.P.S. Menon, The Indo-Soviet Treaty (Delhi, Vikas, 1972) pp. 4-14

Since the emergence of India and Pakistan, the USA had ambivalent attitude to the Kashmir dispute. In the beginning, it did not consider it a serious issue in India and Pakistan relations. In due course the USA realized that Kashmir dispute had become a main determinant of Indo-Pak relation.¹ At the same time, the US failure to get support from India in its policy of confrontation and containment of the Soviet Union also added to the ambivalent character in the US attitude. The USA was also conveniently able to get support of Pakistan in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Hence, it became necessary for the US to support Pakistan on Kashmir issue. On the other hand, the US was also not willing to reject India's claim outrightly. The US failure to bring India in the western camp had hastened the process of checking India in becoming a close associate of the Soviet Union. In this scenario, the west, especially the US had never been able to take a clear cut approach to the problem. Instead of resolving it, they in fact made the problem more complex.

The Soviet attitude to the Kashmir dispute is shaped by three factors. As we have discussed in earlier Chapter that the Soviet attitude to territorial and border disputes is conditioned by its ideological understanding of international social forces, as well as the historical experience of the USSR.

1. G.L. Jain, "India's Role in the World", Times of India, New Delhi, 10 December 1982, p. 8

In this case, a new element is the neighbourliness. The dispute is at the door-step of the Soviet Union, and as such any tension in this region affects the Soviet Union tremendously. Hence, the Soviet Union has shown much concern in the dispute.

Although during Stalin period, the Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir issue was dominated by *frigidity*. Stalin's Kashmir policy has reflected his lack of interest in the sub-continent. Therefore, he showed no interest in supporting either India or Pakistan. He also did not take any attitude to the problem. His non-partisanship also does not reflect his positive neutrality towards them. The basic reason which conditioned his policy was that most of the time he was preoccupied with European problem and the Cold War situation.¹

But this cold attitude changed with the succession of the new leadership. The Soviet's support to India on Kashmir issue during Khrushchev and Bulganin tour (1955)² has showed the extent to which Indo-Soviet relations had developed in the preceding three years since Stalin's death.

The Soviet attitude was clearly visible in 1957, when the Kashmir issue figured in the Security Council. Pakistan raised the question that India was incorporating the state

-
1. For details, see, Zafar Iman, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia : Indo-Soviet Relations (Delhi, 1975)
 2. Visit of Friendship to India, Burma And Afghanistan (Moscow, 1956)

(Kashmir) as a constituent part of the Indian Republic from 26 January 1957. The same year, Britain and the USA cosponsored a resolution on Kashmir. The resolution noted that demilitarization preparing to the holding of a ceasefire and impartial plebiscite under the UN auspices has not been achieved in accordance with the resolution of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan. It called for the use of a temporary UN Force in connection with demilitarization and authorised the Council President to visit the sub-continent for the purpose of discussing the resolution with India and Pakistan.¹

The Soviet delegate, Sabolev proposed an amendment to the above resolution and argued that "the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably since 1948 when the Security Council first called for a plebiscite". He urged bilateral negotiations on Kashmir issue by India and Pakistan without outside intervention, of any sort.² When his amendment was rejected, he vetoed the resolution.

Again in 1962, and 1964, Pakistan raised the question in the Security Council. The Soviet delegate said that "he was firmly of the opinion that India-Pakistan dispute should be settled directly by peaceful means. The parties to this dispute are themselves capable of taking steps to relax the tensions which exist between them ... We should like to point out, with

1. SCOR, 12th Session, 768th Meeting, 1957
2. New Times, No.8, 1957

special emphasis that this requires a calm and moral atmosphere¹. The Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir dispute was thus, very much crystallized. It has supported the idea of bilateral negotiation and peaceful means. At all stages, the Soviet Union has urged to avoid the course of conflict and check outside interference. It has also shown its deep concern by opposing all steps to make the problem an international issue.

It is obvious that the Soviet attitude to the Kashmir issue is also contrary to the western attitude. The Soviet Union gave severe blow to the idea that conflict over Kashmir problem arised from the composition of the population of that state. It argued that it was not the composition of the population but it was the policy of British colonialism that led to the conflict over Kashmir.² The Soviet Union also criticized the USA as a senior partner in exploiting the Kashmir issue. It has also condemned China taking one sided view and not interested in resolving the dispute of its neighbours.³

The Soviet Union has also shown concern that armed conflict between the two countries can benefit neither India nor Pakistan. It was perceived that the wars could not be means to resolve the problem, and it leads to nowhere.⁴ While the tension

1. New Times, No.30, 1964

2. V.B., Kulkarni, India and Pakistan (Bombay, Jaico, 1978) pp. 441

3. New Times, 17 September 1965

4. Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Sub-Continent (Bombay, 1973) p. 48

situation is not beneficial to either country it has helped many times the imperialist and reactionary forces. In fact, these developments are the outcome of their desire to disunite the newly independent countries. They have wanted to counterpose one to another. In this perspective, the Soviet Union feels that these imperialist and reactionary forces have tried to use the Kashmir issues in order to prevent the establishment of good neighbourly relation between India and Pakistan. They have also strived to embroil them in conflict to make them more dependent on the west,

The Soviets point out that these countries are economically weak and vulnerable to outside aggression, peace and stability are necessary for the peoples of India and Pakistan. It is also necessary in the interest of regional peace as well as world peace, that it would be resolved by peaceful means.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has favoured the settling of disputed question among India and Pakistan through direct negotiations. The problems must be resolved by peaceful means in the spirit of the UN Charter and the principle of Bandung.¹

Realizing all the complexities of the situation that has enveloped the Indo-Pak dispute, the Soviet Union believes that it is possible to find out a reasonable solution to the problem. A reasonable solution is only possible when both countries display

1. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XVII, September 1965, p. 12

realism, restraint and an understanding of the grave consequences the development of armed conflict might have.

The Soviet Union has accordingly urged these two countries to resolve, the dispute by peaceful means. The conflict not only would weaken these two countries but also weaken non-aligned movement and the third world unity.¹

The Soviet Union views that the outside forces who did not like India's peace loving policy of non-alignment because it is opposed to joining aggressive military bloc. Nor did they like Pakistan's desire to conduct an independent national policy. However, they always pressurised both these countries to come closer to become victorious in the war or to face the consequences. As an evidence to western pressure, the Soviets point out that during 1965 war, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Phillip Talbot threatened a reappraisal of his country aid programme for Pakistan and the world Bank consortium decided in 1965 to postpone in its meeting on providing economic aid to Pakistan as pressure tactics.³

Again in 1965, when a fullfledged war began between India and Pakistan, the Soviet attitude to the problem became more crystallized.⁴ Various speeches, comments, news-articles in the Soviet Press have focussed on its attitude to the problem.

-
1. Pravda, 11 September 1965
 2. New Times, 27 September 1965
 3. Pakistan Times, 24 August 1965
 4. Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Sub-Continent, (Bombay, 1975), p. 48

These sources also have reflected their genuine concern for peace and good neighbourly relations between the people of India and Pakistan when Brezhnev called them "blood brothers" at the Soviet-Rumanian Friendship meeting in Moscow.¹

The moment two countries engulfed in the conflict, the Soviet Union started its persuasive effort to negotiate the problem. It expressed the willingness of the Soviet Government to lend its good offices and made it clear also that its good office would be made available only if both parties so desired.

The Soviet consistent efforts has resulted in the holding of the Tashkent Conference. It urged upon both India and Pakistan to discuss them matter in cool and calm atmosphere. Although, there were no ready solution to the problem, Soviet Union stressed that certain question had to be crystallized and the ways of resolving them had to be found. It also emphasized that such solutions might be reached if two sides had a flexible approach and meet each other half way.²

Although the Soviet Union made its effort to bring them on negotiating table, but it was aware that it was not possible to resolve the problem in the course of one meeting.³ It only

1 Pravda, 11th September, 1965

2 Hemant Ray, Indo-Soviet Relations: 1955-1971 (Bombay, Jaico, 1973), p. 145

3 The Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 37, p. 26

found out the way that led to the ultimate settlement of disputes; so much so that to create an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding. At the same time, the resolution of the dispute would ultimately lead to the normalization of relationship between India and Pakistan.¹

The Soviet Union managed to play the role of an honest broker between India and Pakistan and the Tashkent Agreement was eventually signed on 10 June 1960.²

The Tashkent Agreement was a great diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union in general and Kosygin, the then Soviet Premier, in particular. But Kosygin did not pressurize either party to bow before the big power. He firmly stuck to the letter and spirit of the offer of good offices. He did not make at any stage any proposals or pressurize either of the leaders to accept the proposals of the other. There was no Soviet arm-twisting of India or Pakistan. All that Kosygin tried to do was to bring to bear on the two leaders his tremendous power of persuasion to make them see others point of view in the interest of peace in the subcontinent.³

However, the Soviet efforts to bring these two countries on negotiating table and its attempt to be an honest broker did

-
1. E.N. Komorov, "Historical Roots and Contemporary Development of Soviet-Indian Cooperation", Soviet Review, No.14, March 1975, pp. 46-48
 2. For details, see, "Tashkent Declaration Text", New Times January 1966, p. 1
 3. M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.8, July 1966

not last long. In the course the Soviet Union began to side with India on this issue,¹ and finally the Tashkent Agreement covered under dust. Both India and Pakistan were engulfed in another war in 1971.

The 1971 Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh may not be regarded as a problem of border dispute and rival territorial claims; indeed the national struggle of the people of the erstwhile East Pakistan against the domination and exploitation of the West Pakistan. Although the past history of animosity between India and Pakistan over Kashmir did contribute in the war. The Soviet slightly regarded 1971 war as India's involvement in the national struggle of the people of Bangladesh. Therefore, its logical for us not to detail our investigation by incorporating in our study Indo-Pak War of 1971.

However, by mid sixties the Soviet had openly come out on the side of India and since then it consistently supported India's policy towards Pakistan, in general and towards the Kashmir issue, in particular.

E.N. Komorov, "Historical Roots and Contemporary Soviet-Indian Cooperation", Soviet Review, no.4, March, 1975, pp. 46-48

(B) SINO - INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

The Himalayas has great geo-political significance for this region. As in 1963, Nehru said, "If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the oceans beyond would lie exposed; and threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to other countries of South, and South-East Asia."¹ The Himalayas, has thus a commanding influence over the geo-politics of the region. Its strategic importance is taken into account in the foreign policy making of every country in the region, including the USSR.

The dispute between India and China over the borders has thus attracted the attention of the Soviet Union mainly because of two reasons. One, the Soviet Union is a neighbour of both the countries and has a long border with them. The other, the Soviet Union is a super power with a global strategy and its relations with China were far from cordial. In a wider perspective, the dispute between the two big Asian powers would affect Soviet relation with the US Vis-a-vis India and China. Hence, the Soviet concern with the problem becomes obvious.

The dispute between India and China is along the Himalayan region. The whole of the disputed region can be divided into three sectors, i.e. Eastern Sector, Central Sector and Western Sector.² In the Eastern Sector, the dispute is over Macmohan

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India", Times of India, New Delhi, 31 March 1963

2. S.P. Sharma, India's Boundary and Territorial Disputes, (Delhi, Vikas, 1971), pp. 1-15

line, a border line between India and China. As for the Central sector, the differences are of minor value and could hardly pose any serious problem. In the Western sector, the dispute is over the question of frontier line through Aksaichin.

Whatever the Chinese objectives in the border disputes at various point of time, there was little doubt that they had vital stakes in the Aksaichin area, because it connects two of the Chinese provinces - Tibet and Sinkiang.- On the other hand, the Chinese claimed the areas on India's north-eastern border (NEFA Sector, now Arunachal Pradesh) where India had all along insisted that the McMahon line was the indisputable border.¹

By the summer of 1959, tension began to rise on the Sino-Indian borders. A minor clash took place in 1959, between Indian borderguards and the Chinese troops. Both India and Chinese representatives apprised Khrushchev of the situation on the border.

But the frequency of skirmishes brought the world attention towards the existence of a border dispute between India and China. The clashes were taking place at a time when the world situation was alarming. The Cold War was at its height. At the same time, the process of normalization of relations between the two super powers seemed to have begun. A rapprochement between US and USSR was expected in near future. At this time, the

1. N. Chakravarty, "Chinese Foreign Minister's Visit and After", India and Foreign Review, August 1981, pp. 6-7

the Soviet Union, itself, preoccupied with Cold-War-detente system adopted a low posture on the Sino-Indian border dispute. The first Soviet official comment on this issue appeared in the Tass statement of 9 September 1959. This statement simply reflected on the incident against the background of the then existing world scenario. The statement said:

"The Chinese and Soviet people are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship... friendly cooperation between the USSR and India is successfully developing in keeping with the idea of peaceful co-existence. Its (dispute) inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful coexistence between the states with different social systems. They want to prevent the strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity in the struggle for consolidation of national independence".¹

However, the right from the very beginning the Soviet Union began to impress upon India and China to refrain from use of force and to resolve the problem through negotiations.

In a foreign policy report, Khrushchev expressed his deep concern over the Ladakh incident and held the view that nothing can make up for the bereavement suffered by the relatives of the casualties and appealed for friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.²

The Soviet Prime Minister had shown his anxiety for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute. He willingly under-

1 Pravda, 10 September 1959

2 New Times, 19 September 1959

took the role of an honest broker between India and China. He made various attempts to persuade the Chinese leaders to abandon their rigid line towards India and to accept a peaceful solution of problem.¹

Against this background in October 1959, Khrushchev went to Beijing and was reported to have dissuaded the Chinese leaders from their rigid posture towards India. He admonished the Chinese leaders that "we, on our part, must do everything possible to preclude war as a means of settling outstanding questions and settle these questions by negotiations."² But the Chinese leaders were not impressed by his suggestion and interpreted this as an insinuation that China was being bellicose regarding the border issue.³ They refused to accept the Soviet point of view.

The unyielding posture of the Chinese and Khrushchev's attempt to ease international tension brought the Soviet Union further at loggerheads with China.⁴ The Soviet leaders began to feel that the primary objective of the Chinese in creating tension on the Sino-Indian border was to prevent their effort to relax international tension and the policy of peaceful co-existence.⁴

1. New Times, 18 September 1959

2. New York Times, October 13, 1959

3. John Gittings, The World and China, (London, 1974), p.319

4. Ibid

Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, the Sino-Indian border issue was full of unhappy possibilities and hopeless canundrums. The Soviet Union realized that the kindling of a conflict between two great Asian countries would serve the interests not only of imperialism but also of reactionary forces within the Third World.¹ These reactionary forces were associated with the imperialist powers who wanted to discredit the independent India.

Thus at the initial phase of the Sino-Indian border dispute during 1959, the Soviet Union opted for a neutral attitude without taking sides. However, a quite diplomatic effort were underway to impress upon both Chinese and Indian leaders to settle the dispute peacefully through negotiations. For instance during his visit to India in April 1960, Khrushchev urged the Prime Minister Nehru to accept the Chinese proposal for discussing the border question at the negotiating table.² Likewise, the Soviet leadership continued its efforts to soften the Chinese attitude.

But all efforts of the Soviet Union went in vain. The situation became acute particularly in 1962. Battle involving large armies flared up between India and China. The Chinese attack on India in 1962, marked the end of a neutral stance in the Soviet Policy towards border issue.

1. Pravda, 9 September 1959

2. Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Foreign Policy in Asia : Indo-Soviet Relations (Delhi, 1975), p. 188

In the beginning there was no official Soviet comment on the fighting. On October 25, the Soviet Union finally broke its silence and indicated that if it came to a choice, she would stand behind China in the border conflict. For the first time, in the past four years of Sino-Indian dispute, Pravda, in an editorial openly sided with China. It lashed out against the western countries for aggravating the situation. It praised the Chinese ceasefire proposals as manifestations of sincere concern to solve the border dispute and asked India to accept Peking's term as the basis of negotiations. Pravda wrote:

"The proposals made by the Chinese government are constructive in our opinion without demagging the prestige of either side they are an acceptable basis for the beginning of talks and a peaceful settlement of a disputed question. A peaceful settlement of conflict requires more active efforts on the part of the progressive forces in India".¹

The new Soviet attitude to the conflict could be seen in the prevailing international situation, especially against the background of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At this particular moment, the Soviet Union needed the support of the whole communist bloc to meet the challenge of the US and western countries.

The tilt in the Soviet Policy towards China, however, did not last long. Soon it returned to the earlier position. In an editorial of Pravda, the Soviet Union urged both India and China to stop the war ^{and} without advancing any terms work out a negotiated

1 Pravda, October 28, 1962

settlement. It did not ask India as it had done earlier to accept the Chinese terms as the basis of opening of talks on settlement. It also did not indicate that the Soviet Union prepared to side actively with India or to say anything stronger on the issue.¹

By now the Soviet Union further endeavoured to bring India and China at then negotiation table. At a meeting to celebrate the 45th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Kosygin suggested that sooner the talks should held between India and China, the more cause of peace would benefit. The Soviet Union also considered that there were no basic contradictions between India and China. Hence, there were no disagreements that could not be solved in round table talks.

The Soviet Union emphasised that there was no basic conflict between India and China, as both these countries had suffered at the hands of colonialists. It accused the imperialist powers of trying to force India a way from her non-aligned path and put her into the arms of the aggressive bloc² and of obstructing China from socialist building.³ The imperialist and reactionary forces had tried to do everything to kindle the conflict and to destroy the age old friendship between the great people of India and China.⁴

1 Pravda, November 15, 1962

2 New Times, November 15, 1962

3 Ibid, N October 29, 1962

4 N.S. Khrushchev, 'On the Sino-Indian Border Issue', News and Views from the Soviet Union, No.82, 15 December, p. 11

In this very perspective the Soviet Union persuaded both India and China to resolve their disputes peacefully and not to be swept by national chauvinism. Therefore, the Soviet Union also supported the mediatory efforts of the six-nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa which met in Sri Lanka in December 1962. Finally, the Soviet Union favoured the Colombo proposals to resolve the Sino-Indian border conflict.¹

But by 1963, the unyielding attitude of China and its constant threat on India's security and the increasing involvement of imperialist powers in India's affairs compelled the Soviet Union to take a position favourable to India's foreign policy objectives. The Central Committee of the CPSU reprimanded the Chinese leaders for their narrow nationalist attitude and dismissed their charges that India had committed aggression against China as unbelievable.² In due course, the Soviet Union began to side with India on the border issue. Its closeness and support to India became more visible when the rift between the Soviet Union and China surfaced by 1963.

Thus, we can see that the border dispute between India, a traditional friend of the USSR, and China, an ally as a socialist country, posed a noble challenge to the Soviet foreign policy. With a sense of shock and disbelief the Soviet leadership obviously did not want to get involved other than stating its general poli-

1 Quoted in: H. Kapur, The Soviet Union & The Emerging Nations (Geneva, Michael, 1972), p. 108

2 H. Ray, Indo-Soviet Relations, 1955-1971; (Bombay, Jaico, 1973,) p. 89

cies for resolving the dispute through peaceful means.

However, as the situation became aggravating and more important thing, the Sino-Soviet relation deteriorated, the Soviet leadership began to get involved in the dispute. Although, siding with India, they kept on emphasising a need for a peaceful solution to the dispute as well as the futility of the conflict in the context of the imperialist policies and strengthening of reactionary forces in the Third World. Thus it is obvious that the Soviet policy is directed towards bringing India and China to the negotiating table and resolve the problem peacefully by mutual give and take. Such a view has not yet found favour either in China or in India.

(C) ETHIOPIA - SOMALI TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

The Horn of Africa is strategically located and as such it is very important. At the same time, this is the traditional oil route to the western world. Hence, not only the western powers but also regional powers like Saudi Arabia have wanted to control the route. Since the region has acquired considerable geopolitical significance, any unwarranted incident has influenced not only the region but also the international peace and security.

Since the October Revolution, the Soviet Union began to support all anti-imperialist movements in the region. It has extended its material and political support to the African

countries. Ultimately, these countries won their independence. But they have preserved the borders which had been arbitrarily fixed by the colonial powers.¹ These inherited boundaries have caused considerable tension leading to armed conflicts in some cases.

The objectives of the Soviet foreign policy in the region has been to keep the imperialist powers at bay and to develop close friendly relations with African countries. In the process, the Soviets had to face the problem of territorial claims and border disputes in the region. In this perspective, it will be worthwhile studying the Soviet attitude towards a characteristic manifestation of this problem, the Ethiopia - Somalia dispute.

The clash of interest between Ethiopia and Somalia is a characteristic example of rival nationalism struggling over borders and territories. Historically speaking, it is in the continent of Africa that this former colonial powers exercised their arbitrary choices to the maximum in dividing Africa in territories and nationalities.² Therefore, the disputes and clashes of interests over boundaries and territories are to be seen in their most acute form in Africa than elsewhere in the Third World.³ It is in this perspective that the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute over boundaries acquires a characteristic example of the problem under study.

-
1. For details, see Africa and Neocolonialism in the 1970s, (Moscow, 1978)
 2. E.A. Tarbrin, USSR and Countries of Africa (Moscow, Progress, 1980), p. 72
 3. Ibid., pp. 73-75

Ethiopia has been one of the oldest semi-independent monarchies not only in Africa but in Europe. It has utilized its position in acquiring neighbouring territories and subjugating various nationalities in its neighbourhood with the active connivance of the colonial powers. One of the victims of such a policy was its neighbor, present day Somalia.

When Somalia got independence in 1960, its leadership had first objective ^{of} reclaiming of the lost territories from Ethiopia and extremely chauvinistic Somali leadership embarked upon a policy of confrontation with Ethiopia by all means on its disposal. It promoted a separatist movement, Ethiopian National Front (ENF) and began to seek support first from its Arab patrons and then from the super powers.¹

It was the Soviet Union which began to respond to Somalia overtures. Not that it liked the Somali leadership but there were other reasons for encouraging response from the Soviets. Firstly, Somalia was raging against Ethiopia, a country totally dependent on the USA. Secondly, the friendly Arab countries like Nasser's Egypt and Sudan, who were active supporters of Somalia, had pleaded for Soviet interest in Somalia. Finally, the Soviet Union itself by mid sixties was searching for an opening in getting a foothold among newly independent African countries and the strategic location of Somalia appeared to be an

1 New Times, April 1977

advert attraction. All these factors combined together in making the Soviet develop their relations with Somalia more closely than those with Ethiopia. Such a policy finally resulted in signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Soviet Union and Somalia in 1974.

Thus, Soviet involvement in Somalia's aspiration of regaining the lost territories and forming Greater Somalia could not have been avoided.¹

In 1964, border skirmishes took place between Ethiopia and Somalia while the relation between them were strained since the beginning of 1960. Another round of armed conflict took place towards 1967. While a major conflict occurred during 1974-77 when a full scale war between the two countries was underway. In the early stages, the Somalians scored victory and grapped territories in Ethiopia's Ogaden province. It was at this stage that the Somalian leadership felt dissatisfied with the Soviet policy and unilaterally abrogated the Soviet-Somalian Treaty.

On the other hand, Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in 1976 and the new Ethiopian leadership took immediate steps to cut down the Ethiopia's traditional dependence on the USA. Simultaneously, they sought assistance and help from the USSR to retrieve the situation created by lightning military success

1 USSR Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. XV, (Moscow, 1969)

of Somalia. After initial hesitation the Soviet began to lift arms and ammunitions for Ethiopia.¹ The shift was facilitated by Somalia's volta-face against the Soviet Union. Soviet help to Ethiopia proved crucial and Ethiopia managed to regain much of its lost territory from Somalia by the end of 1977. In 1978, Ethiopia became one of the leading African associate of the Soviet Union when it signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. The problem of border between Ethiopia and Somalia, however, remains to be formally settled until today.

In the above passages, we have tried to unfold the historical origin of the dispute and its process of development. Soviet attitude towards the dispute logically has to be seen in the very sequence. Here below, we attempt looking at this very process of unfolding the Soviet attitude to the dispute under study.

By the early sixties, the Soviet Union began to perceive the explosive nature of territorial claims and border disputes in Africa. Hence, the Soviet Government's message of 31 December, 1963 to the Heads of State and Government of all proposing the conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force in the settlement of territorial and border disputes.¹

When in 1964, Conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia started, the Soviet Union sent Jacob Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign

1 See, "Khrushchev's Message to All Heads of States", International Affairs (M), No.2, February 1964, pp-1-8

Minister to Somalia. He delivered a message from Khrushchev. It urged that: "We should do everything possible to effect ceasefire on the Ethiopian-Somalia border." He stressed, "it is the conviction of the Soviet Government that in our time there are and cannot be any territorial dispute, any unsettled frontier issues, between states, the settlement of which would require recourse to armed forces. This fully applies also to the disagreements on frontier issues between Ethiopia and Somalia."¹

The Soviet Union supported the Cairo resolution of 1964 of the OAU.² The resolution says that member states are bound together to respect their frontiers as existed at the achievement of independence.

The Soviet Union continued its efforts to localise territorial and border disputes and time and again made proposals to the both sides. The persuasive effort of the Soviet Union resulted in the signing of 1968 Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia. But, unfortunately, it could not last long and the two countries were locked in a savage conflict.

The Soviet Union has also supported the idea of self-determination. But it has opposed all kinds of subversive measure to dismember a country on the pretext of right to nation's self-determination. For instance, it extended the

1. Times of India (New Delhi), 12 February 1964

2. E.A. Tarabrin, USSR and Countries of Africa (Moscow, 1980), p. 75

Programme of the Eritrean Liberation Front adopted in 1971
The Programme proposed an equitable Somalia for the national-
ist's issue in Ethiopia.¹

When fresh hostilities broke out in 1977, the Soviet Union tried to persuade both to refrain from the using of force. Brezhnev noted that the most important things was to observe the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in the interests of peace, security and progress of the people.²

At the same time, the Soviet Union criticised the USA and other imperialist powers including Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Egypt for aggravating the situation and their desire to liquidate the revolutionary democratic regime in Ethiopia. They were plotting a military adventure against Ethiopia would like nothing better than to set African states against one another. It would undermine their effort to strengthen their national independence and weaken struggle against the racist regime.³ Hence, the Soviet Union emphatically opposed to all interference in the internal affairs of African countries.

The Soviet Union has also tried to make its policy clear towards the region in general and Ethiopia-Somalia in particular. They emphatically argued that their policy were not for any privileges and benefits for itself in Africa. Its policy in this

1 A Special Statement on Eritrea (Moscow, 1976)

2 New Times, October 1977, p. 1

3 V. Sidenko, Soviet Union - Africa, New Times, 19 March 1977 p. 18

Continent is one of building peaceful and friendly relations with all peoples and helping them advance along the road of independence and progress they have chosen.¹

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the Soviet-Somalia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1974, for the first time with an African country, the Soviet Union has conspicuously avoided any commitment to support Somalia's territorial ambition. However, the treaty stresses the right of nation's to self-determination, in accordance with the UN Charter; in other words it implies that the use of force and settling Somalia's territorial claims will not find favour with the Soviet Union. Likewise ^{the same} /is the case with the Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty, four years latter in 1978.²

From the above discussions, we can easily identify the main elements comprising the Soviet attitude to the Ethiopian Somalia territorial dispute. Firstly, the Soviet Union does stresses that the problem in Africa, in this case Horn of Africa, is inherited by the colonial exploitation and domination. But it finds that the redrawing of maps in Africa after the decolonisation is bound to create instability and tension in the continent. However, it would prefer the maintenance of the status-quo. Secondly, if at all the problem does come to the surface as has been the case with Ethiopia and Somalia, it must be settled by peaceful means and not by the use of force, through ne-

1. Daily Review of Soviet Press, February 28, 1978

2. See, Zafar Iman, Soviet Treaties with the Third World, Soviet Studies (Glasgow), January-March 1983

gotiations. Finally, the Soviet Union seems to opt for exerting its influence in favour of peaceful settlement of the dispute and does not intend to get involved in the problem directly or indirectly.

However, as we have pointed out above, the Soviet Union did get involved in the dispute first on the side of Somalia and latter after 1977 on the side of Ethiopia. Such an involvement appears to be conditioned by Soviet response to western and Chinese policies in the region and in the Ethiopia-Somalia disputes, in particular. But it certainly appears to the Soviet leadership that the settlement of the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia is a long-drawn affair and will take time and efforts of all concerned.

(D) SINO - SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE

The disputed area between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China lies in the Soviet Central Asia and the Pacific region. However, it is basically in the Sinkiang region. The disputed area is strategically important because the region is adjacent to China, Afghanistan and Mongolia. At the same time, Siberia and Soviet railway communication network from Moscow to Pacific lie in close proximity to the disputed region. Siberia is one of the richest mineral zones in the world. Hence, any conflict and tension in the region will affect Central Asia as well as Siberia and will become the fertile ground for all kinds

of intrigues and subversive activities. Therefore, it will pose hazardous problems to the Soviet security system.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has acquired significance because of two reasons. First, the area is located in a sensitive part of the Soviet Union. It being a global power, any conflict on its territory would lessen its capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Second, these two disputent countries are socialist countries. Hence, it is unique a case in our study, because it was for the first time, that two socialist countries confronted each other in a war to settle their dispute. When the dispute broke out, it shocked the world community. Because of these complexities and uniqueness - it will be worthwhile to study the Soviet attitude towards its own border dispute with the other socialist country - China.

The relation between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate in the late 1950's. The friendly and good neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and China were becoming more and more strained. The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed four and half months after the proclamation of the PRC was no more than a piece of paper. Its solemn declaration to base their relations on the principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territory became a matter of past. Ultimately, the State of relationship showed its lowest water mark in the breaking out of a war in 1969.

The Soviet Union has a long border with China¹ which it has inherited from the Tzarist Russia. It has considered the border between the Soviet Union and China intact and unchanged. The Chinese government did not also raise the frontier question until as late as 1957. China's first statement about the existence of a territorial and border dispute between China and the USSR was made in 1957. But the demand for revision of territory did not come on surface even by that time.² It was only in the summer of 1960, that border skirmishes began.

In March 1973, the Chinese Government first ~~publicly~~ publicly explained that the border treaties with the Tzarist empire like the 'Treaties of Aigun (1858), Tienstin (1858) and Peking (1860) among others were unequal treaties and that they raised outstanding issue which when the time was ripe should be settled through peaceful negotiations. It subsequently became clear that China wished to renegotiate the entire length of the frontiers in question.³ China also demanded of the Soviet Union a public admission that the Treaties were in themselves unequal.⁴

On the historicity of the Chinese claim, some of the Soviet academicians like Khrostov have tried to justify the treaty as equal on the historical grounds. They have traced its history

1 7520 Kms

2 O.B. Borisov and B.T Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations: 1945-1973, (Moscow 1975), p. 220

3 See, D.J. Doolin "Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict", Document Analysis (1965)

4 J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (OUP, 1968), pp. 172

from the 17th Century. They talked about the developments and possessional changes of the disputed territories. They have noted down all treaties from Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 to the Petersburg Treaty of 1881. On that basis they have come to the conclusion that in fact the Treaty between the Tzarist Empire and China is not unequal.¹

The Soviet Union rejected the charges of China that the treaties between the Soviet Union and China were unequal. It vehemently argued that the idea of unequal treaty was born in October Revolution. It was Lenin who formulated the concept of unequal treaties signed between weak and strong during the heyday of colonialism. But there were also some clauses which were meant for friendly and good neighbourly relations. Lenin said, "We reject all classes on plunder and violence but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these".² Therefore, the Soviet Union has urged that at no time, any where did Lenin question the validity of the border between the USSR and China.³ Therefore, the validity of the treaties between the Tzarist empire and China remains relevant for the Soviet Union.

Besides, the above arguments, the Soviet Union has also agreed that the Tzarist government followed the policy of expan-

2. V. Yasanev and Y. Stepanov, China's Frontiers (Moscow, 1981) pp. 90-91

3. New Times, March 1969

1. V.H. Khrostov, "The Chinese Account and Historical Truth", Soviet Press Release, No.10, October 1964

sionism and annexation. They signed many unjust and unequal treaties. Subsequently, unjust treaties were also imposed upon China when reactionary forces were active. Every imperialist and expansionist power wanted to conquer the territory of its neighbours. The same thing took place between the Russian Tsars and the Chinese emperors. Both tried their best to expand their territory. This resulted in arbitrariness in laying down the state boundaries with neighbouring countries.¹ Any demand after hundreds of years at this stage for complete change would be liable to create tension and instability. Therefore, the territorial status legalised by Aigun, Teinstin and Peking treaties and by other protocols should be considered valid.

Although, the Soviet Union has considered the old territorial status as final, it has shown its willingness to some minor alterations. According to Suslov's report to the Central Committee Plennun of 8th February 1964, the Soviet Government has taken the initiative in proposing that consultations should be held in order to specify the frontier line between the USSR and China at certain points. He declared "We do so in the belief that no territorial issue exists between the USSR and China and that the Soviet-Chinese frontier took shape historically and that the issue can concern only certain sections of the frontier to mark them more precisely wherever necessary".²

1 New Times, March 1969

2 Ibid., March 1964

When in 1969, the border confrontation took the shape of fulfilled war, the Soviet sent a strong protest to Beijing (Peking) demanding an immediate investigation and severe punishment of those responsible for it. It was emphasised that these actions were harmful to the cause of socialism and peace, the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.¹

The Soviet Union also felt that the time at which China created the tension on the Soviet-Chinese border was meant to divert the attention of the people at home from the disastrous situation in which the country had been plunged. The aggressive policies were nothing but an attempt to divert the people's attention from the utter insolvency of the present Chinese leadership.²

The Soviet Union has further claimed that the Maoist attempt to provide a theoretical base for the territorial claims over the Soviet territories is a reflection of national chauvinism and distortion of the world history.

The border dispute with China has turned out to be a very embarrassing problem for the Soviet Union. As we have seen above, the Soviet Union has taken a stand that as far as it is concerned there is no basis of a border dispute with China. In

1 A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), pp. 74-75

2 New Times, March 1969

such Soviet attitude the historical preoccupation of the Soviet leadership with securing and safeguarding its borders against hostile neighbours has been a determining factor. Likewise, the fact that China's claim over Soviet borderland is an integral part of its overall ideological and power politics stance against the Soviet Union has also played a very significant role here. The solution of the problem, thus, appeared to be a long drawn affair and it is dependent on the overall status quo in Soviet-Chinese relationship.

(E) IRAN - IRAQ TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

Strategically, the Middle East is very important. It connects Asia, Africa and Europe. It has commanding influence on the world politics. At present time, the region has attracted the attention of the world community. First, the region is endowed with rich mineral resources. Second, most of the countries of the region are weak and susceptible to outside influence. These two factors have presented a paradoxical character to the region in the sense that the outside powers just cannot be kept out of it. This very paradoxical nature of the Middle East has caused great tension in the region. Due to its geopolitical significances, it occupies a place of importance in the foreign policy of the super powers. Any instability and conflict causes great concern to the super powers.

As the region is in direct proximity to the Southern borders of the Soviet Union, it has obvious interest in the happenings of the region. The Soviet Union has viewed it on two planes. The first is based on neighbourhood relationship and the second in connection with super power relationship in global strategy. While the USA is very much preoccupied with global strategy in its relation with this region. Hence, any development in the region is considered in the prism of super-power relationship.¹ Although the region has occupied the place of importance in foreign policy objectives of both super powers, the Soviet Union has viewed any tension in the region with much unconcealed concern.²

The significance of the dispute is also enhanced because of its being waged in the very heart of one of the world's largest oil producing areas. These two belligerents account for a large share of the Middle East oil output. Iraq's 35 and 90 per cent of Iran's oil wealth is found in this very region. Oil exports to the west account for upto 90 per cent of their foreign currency. The conflict has affected the development plans in developing countries. It has caused disastrous impact on their economy as well as the economy of the developed countries.³

At this stage, it will be necessary to see the background of the two countries and their attitude towards the USA. The ouster

1 W.B. Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in the US Strategy", Journal of Palestine Studies, 1971, pp.39-42

2 W.E. Griffith, The Great Powers, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf (London, CUP, 1975), pp. 19-23

3 The Financial Times (London), 30 October 1980

of the Shah regime in Iran and its aggressive postures towards the US, reduced the American influence in the gulf region. The USA also found that the solidarity of the countries of the gulf region would decrease the American influence in the area¹ and its support could not be procured through the Camp David agreement.² While Iraq is an active participant in the non-aligned movement, it has always followed independent foreign policy and is not guided by imperialist forces. Iraq has also opposed Camp David agreement and criticised American bias against the Palestine people.

Before we proceed further, it will be worthwhile having a quick glance over the developments between Iran and Iraq which ultimately led to the conflict situation. The conflict arose in 1980 over the Shatt-al Arab waterways. Before this conflict, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement in Algiers in March 1975. Under the Algiers Agreement it was decided to demarcate the boundary line between Iran and Iraq on the basis of the 1913 Constantinople protocol and the protocol 1914 boundary fixing commission. It also advocated restoration of security and mutual trust on the common border in order to put an end to all acts of infiltration of a subversive nature. Moreover, Iran and Iraq, decided at that time to reestablish relations of good neighbourliness, friendship and bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, both the countries put aside the Algiers Agreement and were engulfed in war in September 1980 on border issue.

-
- ✓1. See, M. Primakov, Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict, (Moscow, 1979)
 2. The Current Digest of Soviet Press, November 2, 1980, p.7

With the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, the west and the Soviet Union began to formulate certain policies in pursuance of their foreign policy objectives. The Western powers especially the US felt that the conflict is going at door step of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union may utilize the opportunity to involve and establish itself in the Middle East. While the Soviet Union felt that the conflict must have weakened the warring countries which will increase their independence on outside forces. Finally, it has helped the imperialist powers to seize the opportunity accelerate their activities to meet the needs of neo-colonialism in the region.

The activities of the imperialist powers in the gulf region are accelerated with the support of Saudi Arabia and Egypt¹ They became closer to the US in a military and political alliance.² The Pentagon has established the ARCAS (Airborne Warning and Control System) in Saudi Arabia and has sent several hundred military specialists to service it. The Rapid Development Force based its place in the Persian Gulf zone. Hence, the conflict has provided pretext to the imperialist forces to use the region for their own ends. The fact was proved by the announcement of the Carter Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine says that America's vital interest is involved in the region and any kind of interference in the region will be considered to be interference in the American interest. And to preserve it, the US will do everything.³

1 Now Times, November 1980

2 Soviet Review, September 1982, pp. 16-20

3, The Financial Times (London) 30 October 1980

The Soviet Union also criticised the policy of the western countries to see the issue in terms of religion. The Financial Times has noted, that two Moslem States are parties to this conflict and a very important factor is that it is being waged by the two regimes - one of them headed by Shia Moslems (Tehran) and the other by Sunni Moslems (Baghdad) that represent rival trends in Islam.¹ The Soviet Union has considered that religion might be one of the causes. But will be misleading to say that Islam is the main cause of conflict between Iran and Iraq. Some times, religious factors are brought to the surface to give a cover to the political and economic factors.²

The Soviet has perceived that conflict has created a situation of rift in the non-aligned movement.³ The Seventh Non-aligned Summit was supposed to be held in Baghdad. But the conflict has created a situation of uncertainty. And at last, the venue was shifted to Delhi. Hence, the rift in the non-aligned movement would weaken the Third World Unity. Ultimately, this strengthens the imperialist forces and lessens their ability to fight against racialism and zionism. Its disunity certainly put the struggle for New International Economic Order in lull.⁴

1 The Financial Times (London) 30 October, 1980

2 Pravda, October 10, 1980

3 New Times, March 1981

4 The Current Digest of Soviet Press, November 11, 1980

Thus, the Soviet attitude to the dispute must be seen against the background of Soviet commitments to both the parties involved as well as the international situation.¹ Both Iran and Iraq are Soviet Treaty partners and Iran after the fall of Shah is considered by the Soviet to be the bastion of anti-imperialism, that is to say the USA, despite the Islamic feature of the Iranian regime. On the other hand, the Iraq's involvement in the war has, in the Soviet view, weakened the Arab front against Israel, thereby strengthening the US role in the entire region of the Middle East.²

Thus, the Soviet Union avoided taking sides in the dispute. However, it is obvious that the Soviet Union considered the dispute as a characteristic example of rival chauvinistic nationalism clashing with each other without any regard to the consequences involved. As far the Soviet concern, sooner the dispute is resolved, the better. But, what specific role the Soviet Union will play in the dispute remains to be seen.

1 Soviet Review, September 1982, pp. 16- 20

2 Y. Rummyantsev, "Peace Plan for Asia", Soviet Review October 1982, pp. 27-29

CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET POLICY : AN ASSESSMENT

Soviet involvement in territorial and border disputes in the Third World appears to be related to the overall policy of the Soviet Union with the Third World. As such its involvement is an important foreign policy posture of the Soviet Union. Hence, it is necessary to view Soviet involvement (i) against the background of its policy objectives vis-a-vis the problem; and (ii) against the background of the overall Soviet objectives in the Third World.

As pointed out earlier, the Soviet policy objectives towards territorial and border disputes is to contain and resolve this problem in such a manner that could strengthen the position of the Third World states, which are considered progressive. It is also directed in a way which could counter the imperialist powers. In the pursuit of these objectives, the Soviet policy makers have adopted a flexible approach, although at the same time trying to help the progressive forces in the Third World. A possible way of understanding these policy postures could be a survey of the Soviet record in these disputes, followed by its assessment.

We must now begin to build a panoramic view of the Soviet policies in a chronological manner.

(A) INDO - PAK TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

In the preceding chapter, we have tried to unfold the historical development of the Soviet policy to territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. It is generally known that since the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the rival territorial claims over Kashmir have led to wars. Although over the years India has taken the stand that there is no territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir as the entire Kashmir region belongs to her. There is no denying the fact that there has been dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir affecting the entire gamut of Indo-Pak relations. In other words, there is a kind of ambivalence in India's policy towards Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir.

Hence, any outside power has to take into account the ambivalence in India's attitude, namely the denial of the very existence of dispute on the one hand and its role in Indo-Pak relation on the other. However, a possible explanation of such an ambivalent attitude adopted by India is simply that it is concerned with formidable nation-building problems. The Soviet Union has been deeply affected by such an ambivalent attitude adopted by India. As we have discussed earlier during 1947-50¹ the Soviet Union avoided taking notice of the Kashmir issue. It is only during the mid 1950s that Bulganin and Khrushchev

1 Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia. (Delhi, Kalyani, 1975) p. 72

visited India and the Soviet Union came out in support of India on the Kashmir issue.¹ However, the existence of dispute over Kashmir was not flatly denied by the Soviet Union.² However, during 1957, during the debate in the Security Council, the Soviet Union openly sided with India by its vetoes.³

The Indo-Pak war of 1965 was extremely disturbing to the Soviet leadership particularly when it came after Nehru's death and during the transition period of political leadership in India. It suddenly chose to play the role of mediator. The Tashkent Agreement symbolized the ~~growing~~ success of the Soviet mediatory role in the dispute.⁴ But the euphoria of success was short lived.

Before the end of the sixties, it was quite obvious that the Soviet has chosen to back India all the way in its dispute with Pakistan. Indeed it totally agreed with India's objective of developing friendly relations with Pakistan without letting the dispute over the Kashmir adversely affecting them. Thus, in fact, the Soviet seems to agree with India that the Kashmir is no longer a dispute between India and Pakistan but the main problem is developing friendly relations between two neighbouring countries of the sub-continent.

1 N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan : Speeches & Official Documents (Moscow, 1966)

2 V.S. Budhraj, Soviet Russia & Hindustan Sub-Continent (Bombay, Samaya, 1973), pp. 171-221

3 SCOR, 12th Session, 768th Meeting, 1957

4 M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, July 1966, p.8

Soviet policy, thus, seems to coincide with that of India over the problem. Such a development need not be seen as a logical corollary of growing friendly ties between India and the USSR since the end of sixties.

Hence, a quick glance at Soviet-Pak relation may help us to understand Soviet policy towards the dispute in better perspective. The situation which led to the estrangement of Pakistan was the contradictory objectives of Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Pakistan wanted to take maximum benefit from the Soviet Union and to push India to the number two status in the Soviet strategy in South Asia. While the Soviet Union wanted to maintain a balance in its relations with India and Pakistan, but the Soviet Union was in no mood to give priority to Pakistan over India.

In this scenario, both Pakistan and the Soviet Union began to operate their foreign policy objectives. By 1965, the Soviet Union had achieved its desired goal of establishing an understanding with Pakistan without prejudicing the cordial relations with India.

In the post-Tashkent period, the Soviet Union, as before, has been striving hard to develop close relations with both India and Pakistan and to utilize every opportunity to bridge their differences. The Soviet Union stepped up economic aid to Pakistan. Towards the end of 1966 it offered \$ 80 million

in aid. It also agreed to grant a credit of Rs.600 million to Pakistan for the construction of 15 Broadcasting stations.¹

But the Soviet Union rejected the plea of Pakistan to stop supply of arms to India. Though, the Soviet Union did not want to promote an arms race between India and Pakistan, as they considered it harmful to the economic development of the countries, it had agreed to supply arms to India because of the increased threat to India's security from military hardware valued at \$2000 million supplied by USA to Pakistan. At the same time, the Soviet supply of fighter-bombers to India met a sharp criticism in Pakistan.² Pakistan's excessive demand for arms and its insistence on only partial supply of defensive arms to India were contrary to the Soviet foreign policy objective in India. The lukewarm Soviet attitude led to Pakistani moving closer to the USA and in late 1960s it began to develop close ties with China.

Under this very circumstances, India's potential power made the Soviet Union concentrate on India. Finally in 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed, supporting India in the region particularly against Pakistan.

During the Bangladesh crisis, the Soviet Union gave constant support to India in the Security Council. The US efforts to charge India as aggressor were prevented by the Soviet Union.

1. New Times, September 1966

2. Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy (London, Michael, 1969)
p. 102

It also pressed for an immediate termination of military conflict and simultaneously for a political settlement in Bangladesh.¹

After the Bangladesh crisis, the Soviet involvement in India continues to grow. In his report on the 50th Anniversary of the UCSR, Brezhnev noted "now that our relations are based on the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, we feel that they will become closer still".² Further the visits of Brezhnev in 1973 and in 1980 to India were indicative of the Soviet desire to maintain its close relations with India.³ India's multi-dimensional economic relationship⁴ with the Soviet Union and Soviet help in the defence establishment have contributed to close relationship between India and the Soviet Union.

Hence the Soviet record in the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir can be summarised as follows. Firstly, in the beginning by relating it with a cold war phase policies, it viewed it as a regional problem of world-wide dimension. Later on it came all out in support of India in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Finally during the 1970s it viewed its involvement in the dispute as an integral part of its global policy vis-a-vis US and

-
1. A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), pp.116-17
 2. L.I. Brezhnev, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow, 1972), p. 48-49
 3. Visit by L.I. Brezhnev to India (Moscow, 1975)
 4. Soviet Review, No.41, September 1982, pp. 12-14

its allies, particularly Pakistan in the concerned region. Needless to add that these essential contours of the Soviet record emerged out of the increasing Soviet involvement in India's pursuits of self-reliance and national security.

Thus, we can see that the Soviet attitude to Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir was initially geared to its resolution. The Tashkent Agreement and the Soviet role in it was symptomatic of the fundamental of the Soviet policy to resolving the dispute by peaceful means. Since then, the very dispute has undergone qualitative changes and it is integrated with the problem of promoting the regional security and stability in the Indian-subcontinent.¹ This is the problem in which the Soviet has high stakes now in the eighties and essentially seen in terms of avoidance of the conflict situation and adoption of a programme of self-reliance economy through peaceful development.²

(B) SINO - INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

As we know, the Soviet Union by the turn of 1950s had begun to take much interest in the Asian Affairs.³ This inte-

1. I.V. Arkhipov, "Inviolable Friendship of Two Great Nations" Soviet Review, September 1982, p. 10
2. See, Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Non-Alignment", in K.P. Misra, (Ed), Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (Delhi, 1982)
3. See, Zafar Imam, "Ideology & Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia, (New Delhi, Kalyani, 1975)

rest was hastened by the emergence of China as a Socialist country.¹ The Soviet Union had considered the establishment of the PRC as the first step in the process of socialist movement. By this time, India's attitude to various international issues had cleared the misunderstanding of the Soviet view of India. This was in India's recognition of China and the Indian role in the Korean crisis. Hence, the Soviet Union wanted to see India as a leader of the anti-imperialist movement in Asia. It wanted to see China and India lead the anti-colonial as well as anti-imperialist movement, as these were ultimately bound to strengthen the Soviet strategy of weakening capitalism at the world level.

Therefore, the Soviet Union did take a close look at the relation with China vis-a-vis India. The Sino-Indian move to sign Panchsheel in 1954 was appreciated by the Soviet Union.³ It viewed approvingly growing amity between India and China. Any kind of dispute between India and China was bound to create a disturbing problem for the Soviet policy-makers. When the border disputes came on the surface, especially in late 1950s, it had caused a serious problem to the Soviet Union. Moreover, it came in the midst of the Cold War era. The Soviet Union did not like any situation which weakened its maneuvering capacity vis-a-vis the US.

1 A.R. Rubinstein, Soviet & Chinese Influence in the Third World, (New York, Jackson, 1975) pp.71-75

2 H. Ray, Indo-Soviet Relations (1955-1971), (Bombay, Jaico), pp. 14-16

3. New Times November 1955

As we have seen, when the first skirmishes had taken place in 1959, the Soviet Union had refrained from taking sides and had tried to bring both the countries on the negotiating table. The Tass bulletin of 1959 says that the Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship ... friendly cooperation between the USSR and India is successfully developing ... Its (the dispute) inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social system and to prevent the strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity in the struggle for consolidation of national independence.¹ The Soviet Union had tried to play a role of honest negotiator through out the late 1950s. Khrushchev even tried to dissuade the Chinese leaders from their rigid posture against India during his 1959 visit to China.² Likewise, he did with India during his visit to New Delhi in 1960.

In 1962, when fulfilled war between India and China it posed a more serious problem to the Soviet Union policy makers. By this time the international scene had undergone many changes. The Cuban Missile crisis was fresh in the memory. The unexpected Chinese attack on India had compelled Indian leaders to ask for help from the western countries including the USA. The Cuban crisis had required the unity of socialist world and the US help to India led the Soviet Union to choose China in the event of need.

1 Current Digest of Soviet Press, 10 September 1959

2 New York Times, October 3, 1959

The Soviet Union had indicated that if it came to a choice, she would stand behind China in the border conflict. It praised the Chinese ceasefire proposals as a manifestation of sincere anxiety to solve the border dispute and asked India to accept Peking's terms as the basis of negotiations.¹ Now, again the Soviet Union had followed the role of negotiator instead of siding with either one. It had supported conciliation between India and China.

The unyielding Chinese posture had compelled the Soviet Union to criticise its policy of national chauvinism. It began to support India on border issue. This support on border and other interests of India and the Soviet Union led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The Soviet record of involvement in Sino-Soviet border dispute does indicate, that USSR has opted for the promotion of regional security while trying to help in the resolution of dispute through peaceful means. However, in the pursuit of these objectives it seeks to gain friendship and cooperation with the potentially powerful nations involved in the dispute. When China was not willing at any point to come closer to the Soviet Union, it has to choose India. Here the conclusions on the part of Soviet policy makers seem to be India's policy of non-alignment² as well as its pursuing the non-capitalist path of development.³

1 Pravda, October 28, 1962

2 See, Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Non-Alignment", in K.P. Misra (Ed), Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics (Delhi Vikas, 1982)

3 I.V Arkhipov, "Inviolable Friendship of Two Great Nations", Soviet Review, September 1982, p. 10

(C) ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

We have already discussed the Soviet attitude towards Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute in an earlier Chapter. We will try to unfold the record of Soviet involvement in the dispute.

Since the independence of Somalia, the desire for greater Somalia led to clashes with Ethiopia. The persistent Somali demand for re-demarcation of the territorial boundaries and strategic importance of the region alarmed the outside powers.

The Soviet Union began to take keen interest in the affairs of Africa in the post-Second World War period and supported the liberation movements there.² Somalia was one of the first African countries ^{with} which Soviet relations developed. But its relations with Somalia are not free from trouble. As we have stated, Somalia wanted to fulfill the aim of Greater Somalia, and the Soviet Union was confronted with this problem. The Soviet Union supported the idea of right to self-determination, while at the same time, it tried to mould the Somali demand to suit the reality of time. But it never came out with open support for Somalia and asked both Ethiopia and Somalia to settle the dispute by peaceful means.

1 A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), pp. 133 - 137

2 Documents and Resolutions, 25th Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 1976), p. 16

However, the Soviet Union was interested in maintaining its relations with Somalia and it extended military, economic, and political support. In 1963, Somalia had accepted a Soviet offer of \$ 30 million in military and economic assistance.

Although, it wanted to maintain its relationship with Somalia, it did not want to ignore Ethiopia. The Soviet Union wanted to come in close contact with other countries of the region. It supported all the conciliatory groups like the OAU to resolve the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia.¹ It is indicative of the indifferent attitude of the Soviet Union to the Somali demand. This attitude was conditioned by its foreign policy objective in the region. The Soviet Union was aware of the fact that Somali government was not willing to modify its idea of Greater Somalia and would not go too far with it.²

As we have pointed out earlier when in 1964, the tension between Ethiopia and Somalia exploded into open hostilities, the Soviet Union followed a conciliatory approach.³ The persuasive role of the Soviet Union resulted in the signing of 1968 Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's close ties with the western world, especially, the USA and the vulnerability of Somalia compelled the Soviet Union to maintain close ties with Somalia. The Soviets also extended economic, military and political help to it in late 1960s.

-
1. E.A. Tarabrin, USSR and Countries of Africa, (Moscow, 1980), p.75
 2. Pravda, 12 February 1964
 3. A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), p.136

Hence, the Soviet foreign policy objective in the region and Somalia's desire for Greater Somalia converged into the signing of Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974.

But the Soviet Union was still in search of a country with which it could have a closer identity. This was materialized when the revolution took place in Ethiopia in 1975.

After the establishment of the revolutionary regime, the power configurations also changed in the Horn of Africa. By this time, Ethiopia was facing external and internal problems.¹ Imperialist and reactionary forces at home wanted to destabilize the new regime. At this moment, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to support the progressive regime of Ethiopia. The close ties with Ethiopia were considered a great blow to its nation building by Somalia.

Although the Soviet Union still continued to carry both countries together. It continued to support the Ethiopian regime. At the same time, it remained in touch with Somalia. In 1977, President Podgorny of the Soviet Union on his way back home from Southern Africa made an unscheduled stop at Mogadishu.²

As discussed earlier, the Soviet efforts to keep these two countries out of conflict did not succeed. In 1977, a full fledged war took place. In the war, the Soviet Union declared

1 Soviet Review, May 1977, p. 32

2 Indian Nation (Patna), December 14, 1975

its open support to Ethiopia. The Soviet support to Ethiopia has resulted in the abrogation of Treaty of Friendship and co-operation signed in 1974 between the Soviet Union and Somalia.¹

The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia also grew after 1977. The Soviet help in the field of defence and economy continued to mature. The close relationship between Ethiopia and Soviet Union resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1978. The problem however, remains a live issue between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia certainly posed a dilemma before the Soviet foreign policy in Africa. As a result of the dispute, the Soviet Union was compelled to change the focus of its policy in the Horn of Africa from Somalia to Ethiopia with a lot of embarrassment and a little gain for the Soviet Union. However, through Ethiopia it continues to have a foothold in the Horn of Africa.

In the Soviet eyes, it is a classical example of colonial heritage and national chauvinism. While because of its colonial origin, the natural Soviet desire was to get involved in the dispute so that it may be resolved peacefully. On the other hand, because of the element of national chauvinism, the natural Soviet desire was to keep away from the conflict. It is the combination of both these factors that finally shaped the Soviet policy to the dispute. That is why we find that the

1 E.A. Tarabrin, USSR & Countries of Africa (Moscow, 1976) p..76

Soviet Union endeavours to restrain Somalia when it had leverage with the Somalian leadership. Later, it had adopted the same posture in the case of Ethiopia. However, the conflict got escalated and the Soviet policy did not prove very effective.

Thus the dispute has regional as well as global significance for the Soviet Union. On both these counts, the Soviet would certainly not like that the issue of redrawing the national map and boundaries in Africa could be opened at this stage. As it is bound to invite interference and activation of the role from the West, the USA, in particular. However, it is quite obvious that the Soviet Union wants the resolution of the dispute through peaceful means and it also prefers to avoid a direct involvement in its further escalation.

(D) SINO - SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE

With the emergence of China as a socialist country, the socialist movement also found practical shape in Asia. The Soviet Union found it easier to launch the anti-imperialist movement in the region through China. At the same time, China looked at the Soviet Union, the first socialist country, as a source of help. These very objective led to the development of fraternal relationship. This relationship was strengthened by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, just after the inception of the PRC.

The close relations between China and the Soviet Union had been reflected in the Soviet support for the PRC recognition in the UN. The Soviet Union had assisted China in its economic development. It had helped China in setting up many big industrial enterprises and also extended a five hundred and twenty million rubles long-term credit.¹

The close and cordial relationship between the Soviet Union and China could not last long. After the death of Stalin relation had begun to deteriorate. The area of economic cooperation had shrunk. In this changing situation, the firsts statement about border problems between China and the Soviet Union was made by China. This was disturbing situation for the Soviet Union. Because, the international scene was fast changing and China's attitude had become indifferent to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet attempts to normalise its relation with the US which ultimately led to the process of detente created bitterness in the mind of the Chinese leaders.² The Chinese leaders had always considered the imperialist powers as an enemy of socialist revolution. Hence any attempt for the normalisation of relations with the US was interpreted as a betrayal of the socialist cause.³ This feeling was triggered off by the cultural revolution.⁴ The relationship between China and the Soviet Union had reached its lowest Watermark when a fulfilled war took place in 1979.

-
1. A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), pp.73-75
 2. O.E. Clubb, China and Russia (London: CUP, 1974), p.376
 3. H.L. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (London:1966) p. 272-74
 4. G. Dutt & V.P Dutt, China's Cultural Revolution (Bombay, 1970) p. 96

By this time, the rift between the Soviet Union and China became an established fact. It was the first time, that an open clash took place between the two socialist countries. The myth of one socialist world was shattered. On the other hand, the rift between the Soviet Union and China had lessened the manoeuvring capacity of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the US. Hence it was disturbing to the Soviet Union.

Now, the Soviet Union had started criticising Chinese omissions and Commissions. The Soviet Union had tried to highlight China's desire to become the leader of the socialist world by all means.¹ In this pursuit, China had followed the policy of collaboration with the imperialist forces.² However its attempts for peaceful negotiations had resulted in holding meetings in 1969 in Beijing between Alexie Kosygin and Chou En-Lai. Further in 1970 the USSR and China exchanged Ambassadors and signed a trade, protocol envisaging an expansion of trade. But, through the 1970s, the relation between the Soviet and China have been markedly by animosities and bitterness.

It was in such a scenario that China began to make the claims over the Soviet borders. As we have discussed in previous Chapter the first Chinese statement on its border claim was made in 1957. Since then as the entire range of controver-

1 New Times, No. 11, March 1969

2 Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists (Moscow, 1970) p. 115

sies between China and the Soviet Union began to widen, the border dispute correspondingly took serious turn, finally resulting in armed conflict in 1969. In other words, we do notice that the border question can not be seen in isolation of other issues in the Sino-Soviet rift.

The border dispute with China was obviously very embarrassing to the Soviet leadership. That is why, as we have pointed out in earlier Chapter that the Soviet leadership made repeated efforts to bring China to negotiating table. Likewise, it gave indication that minor adjustment of the border could not be entirely ruled out. However, in the Chinese leadership did not respond.

It is obvious that the Soviet leadership would not agree to major changes in the borders to satisfy the Chinese aspirations mainly because of the fact that it would disturb the status quo and stability of the Soviet Union. In any case, Soviet Union interest lies in the resolution of the dispute.

Thus we see that the Sino-Soviet border dispute is not a characteristic example of such issue in the Third World or elsewhere. It is, indeed, a byproduct of the Sino-Soviet rift. Hence, until the rift is healed even at the minimum level, the border issue between China and the Soviet union will remain alive. But for our purpose, it is interesting to note Soviet policies and postures on the border conflict where its own direct interest is involved. One element in Soviet policy to the territorial

claims and border disputes appear to be common, namely, it wants the resolution of the dispute through negotiations, not by use of force. Thus, such an element, indeed, a very basis of the Soviet Policy on the problem comes out very clearly in the case of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

(E) IRAN - IRAQ TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

In the preceding chapter, we have discussed the facts about the Iran-Iraq war, likewise, we have tried to investigate the Soviet view of the dispute leading to the crisis.

As seen earlier, the Soviet view of the disputed territories between Iran and Iraq is as much characteristic as the dispute itself. For instance, the Soviet Union has not stressed as it has done in such disputes in Africa, that it is strictly inherited by colonialism. The background of colonial exploitation is not, indeed forgotten, but it is seen more in terms of clash of interests between rival nationalities for their own chauvinistic ends without the least regards of the consequences. In other words, the Iran-Iraq war is a characteristic example in Soviet eyes for rival nationalist ruling elite of the Third World using force against each other for their own ends, thereby helping the imperialist in their efforts to dominate over them. For this very reason, as we have pointed out that the Soviet Union has avoided taking sides in this dispute, indeed very involve-

ment in it. This particular Soviet policy is more glaring when we keep in view the facts that both Iran and Iraq are Soviet Treaty partners and Khomeini's Iran is considered by the Soviet a bastion of anti-US policies in the Middle East.

However, it is evident that the Soviet Union is not concerned with the regional characteristic of the dispute. It considers it as a problem of global dimension, in the context of the US policies in the region. In other words, this is also viewed by the Soviet Union as an opportunity for the USA to stage a comeback in Iran and to draw Iraq from the Soviet Union. Hence, it would like the stability in the region to be promoted through the peaceful negotiated settlement of the dispute without its overt or covert involvement.

The dispute under the review essentially fits in the general Soviet policy towards the problem of territorial claims and border disputes in the Third World. Although it has specific dimensions arising out of the very characteristic of the dispute.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Right from the dawn of history, conflicts and wars have been a dominant feature of civilization. One of the main causes of wars and conflicts among nations has been rival claims on territories and disputes over borders. In modern times, the problem has acquired new dimensions. As the colonial world freed itself from the foreign domination, it found to its dismay that most of their territories and boundaries were arbitrarily created by their former colonial masters. In their search for nationalism, most of the newly independent countries wanted to redraw and readjust their boundaries and lost territories. Such a policy eventually caused tensions, armed conflicts and instability in the Third World.

As the role of the Third World countries grew in international politics, the issue of rival territorial claims and readjustment of boundaries became an explosive one affecting not only the countries involved but also the very stability of international system.

The involvement of the Soviet Union in the issue was, thus, logical and could not have been avoided; so much so that the Soviet Union was itself directly affected by the issue when an emergent China made claims over its territories and resorted to the use of force against the Soviet Union in its efforts to claim its so called lost territories. Such a Soviet involvement, however, grew in stages.

The Soviet Union was very much preoccupied with the European situation till late 1940s and to some extent early 1950s. But the Soviet Union did not ignore its contact with the Afro-Asian countries and it supported the national movement in Asia and Africa. Its relation with the countries of the Third World was simplistic in nature and did not occupy the place of importance in the Soviet foreign policy making.

In the post-Stalin Period, the Soviet interest in Asia and Africa became explicit. By this time, the Cold War theatre also shifted to the region and more and more countries began to be independent. It is a matter of fact that the western block wanted to fill the gap of colonial masters in new garb to contain the increasing influence of communism, in general and the Soviet Union, in particular. The Soviet Union also became aware of the fact that it was necessary to involve itself in the region to create a necessary balance to counter-act imperialist powers at regional as well as global level. This desire was very much reflected in the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to the Asia in 1955 and signing of trade agreements with Asian countries. Hence, an era of complex relationship developed and a place of importance was given to the region in the Soviet foreign policy making.

The Soviet involvement in the region and its close contact with the countries of Asia and Africa brought it to face the problem like territorial claims and border disputes and to formulate certain attitude towards the problem. The Soviet Union having the experience of the past gave its full attention to the issue.

The experience in the Central Asia and Eastern Europe helped it to formulate certain understanding and to suggest some solution to the problem.

As it is, the Soviet Union has considered that the problem is the legacy of colonial past. It has also perceived that the situation which was shaped in centuries cannot be solved at one stroke. At the same time, in these disputes newly independent countries are involved, it has warned them not to use force to settle the problem.

All these disputes have developed in strategically vital region of the world, i.e. Asia and Africa. At this count, the Soviet Union has followed two-fold policies. First it has wanted to increase its influence in these regions which was obvious outcome of overall Soviet foreign policy strategy. The Soviet Union has taken its stand on the dispute and issued statement in pursuance of its resolution. This pattern we find in all disputes. The Soviet Union issued general statement on Indo-Pak, Sino-Indian, Ethiopia-Somalia and Iran-Iraq disputes to resolve peacefully. Second, the Soviet Union's strategy of close contact with the countries of the region was materialized by having ties with them and signing treaties. This strategy has resulted in a situation in which the Soviet Union became an ally of one of the parties. In Sino-Indian border dispute, though did not have treaty relationship with India, at the later stage, the Soviet soft attitude towards India irritated China. In Ethiopia-Somalia

dispute, the Soviet's denial of full support to Somalia and the growing close relationship with Ethiopia resulted in the abrogation of the Soviet-Somalia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. However, we see that the Soviet Union directly, or indirectly has involved itself in these disputes.

As a super power with a global perspective and strategy, the Soviet Union always has tried to persuade the disputant countries to resolve the dispute through negotiations by peaceful means. In this regard, one can say that its efforts to resolve the Indo-Pak dispute and to offer its good office is symbolic and it resulted in the Tashkent Agreement.

The Soviet Union is also aware that the confrontation in any part of the world is bound to attract another super power which aggravates the situation. Secondly, it wants to consolidate its position in the region and thirdly, the confrontation always becomes a burden on the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union wants to maintain its close relations, it has to meet the requirement of its ally. Otherwise, it moves away to another super power. We can see this complexity in Ethiopia-Somalia dispute in which the Soviet denial of full support to Somalia and growing relation with Ethiopia led to break away Somalia from the Soviet Union. Somalia has moved towards the Western bloc especially the USA. Hence, the Soviet Union always has tried to see the whole situation in totality. It has to maintain the regional as well as global balance. The Soviet shift to Ethiopia is reflected in its

desire to maintain its influence in the region. The Soviet Union has tried to present a configuration of regional as well as global interest.

The Soviet Union's desire to persuade both parties to arrive at a negotiated settlement were very much reflected in the Indo-Pak dispute vis-a-vis the Tashkent Agreement. From the very beginning, the Soviet Union has tried to influence both the countries. After signing ^{of} the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, the Soviet Union, tried to make Pakistan friendly and extended to it all kinds of economic and defence help. Through this kind of strategy to impress both the countries did not succeed, but its move in this regard was very cautious. The Soviet Union did not take either to weaken the old ally or to fail to make new friend. In this case - case of India and Pakistan - the Soviet Union also gave prime importance to India. While in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia, the Soviet Union was in search of a strong and progressive ally and ultimately shifted to new one. Hence, its desire to maintain its influence in the regional level did not diminish, indeed, its strategy led the continuation of its locus standi in the Horn of Africa more effectively.

The Soviet efforts to resolve and contain the disputes have resulted in partial success. In all studied disputes, the efforts to mediate did not succeed. Its overemphasis on the resolution of the problem and its involvement, direct or indirect, led to consider it enemy by the other party. The Soviet effort was fully mate-

realized only in Indo-Pak dispute in the sense that it brought both the parties on the negotiating table. But its result - Tashkent Agreement - could not last long. Likewise, the Sino-Soviet dispute remains to be resolved.

However, a general pattern can be seen from the Soviet attitude to the problem. In all disputes under study the Soviet Union has taken a common stand that these disputes are the colonial legacies and these should be resolved by peaceful means which is in the interest of the world peace and security in general and involved countries in particular. Nowhere such a common pattern comes out so sharply as in the case of Sino-Soviet border dispute where direct Soviet interests are involved. Here too, we find that the Soviet policy is essentially directed towards the solution of dispute through negotiation, not by use of force.

Another common feature can also be identified. The Soviet Union has tried to contain the conflicts when they have surfaced; it has not tried to escalate them by encouraging one party or the other. Although the Soviets have been invariably involved in the disputes, they certainly have tried to contain and restrain the side which they have supported by urging on it a defensive posture as well as a need for negotiated settlement.

This brings us to the nature of the Soviet Involvement. We have tried to make distinction between the involvement for the resolution of the dispute through peaceful means and the involvement by seeking to escalate the dispute so as to make its



resolution more problematic. Our contention is that the Soviet involvement is no doubt seen in almost all the disputes under study, but it is geared towards the resolution of the disputes as soon as possible through peaceful means.

The totality of the Soviet attitude to the disputes, thus, underlines the fact that the problem of the territorial claims and border disputes has become an important issue for the Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet attitude to the issue has, thus, become an significant indicator of Soviet foreign policy conduct and behavior in world affairs, and in the Third World, in particular.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Brezhnev, L.I., Following Lenin's Course : Speeches and Articles, (Moscow, Progress, 1972)
- _____, On Problem of Peace and Security, (Moscow, 1973)
- _____, Our Course : Peace and Socialism, A Collection of Speeches, March 1971-December 1972 and January - December, 1974, (Moscow, Navosti Press, 1975)
- _____, Our Course : Peace and Socialism, A Collection of Speeches and Articles delivered in 1980, (Moscow, Navosti, 1980)
- _____, Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress (Moscow, 1971)
- _____, Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 25th Congress (Moscow, 1976)
- Gromyko, A., Safeguarding Peace is the Main Task (Moscow, Navosti, 1981)
- _____, and Others., Foreign Policy Documents (Moscow, 1980)
- Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqué, 1964-1976, (Daily Review of the Soviet Press, Moscow)
- Khrushchev, N.S., Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 20th Party Congress, (Moscow, 1957)
- _____, and Bulganin, N.A., Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan : Speeches and Official Documents, (Moscow, Foreign Language Press, 1956)
- Lenin, V.I., On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State (Moscow, Progress, 1961)
- _____, National Liberation Movement in the East, (Moscow, 1973)

Lenin, V.I., Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow, 1970)

BOOKS

Andemicael, B., Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles Of The United Nations and the OAU (New York, UNFIR, 1972)

Apalin, G., and Mitayayev, V., Militarism in Peking Policy (Moscow, 1976)

Ayoob, M., The Horn of Africa : Regional Conflicts and Super Power Involvement. (Cannberra, ANU, 1978)

Banerjee, J., India in Soviet Global Strategy. (Calcutta : South Asia Books, 1977)

Barnds, W.J., India, Pakistan and othe Great Powers (New York, Praeger, 1972)

Bazmi, P.N.K., Kashmir and Power Politics from Lake Success to to Iashkent (Delhi, Metronolitan, 1966)

Bandarevsky, G., Hegemonists and Imperialists in the Persian Gulf (Moscow, Navost, 1981)

Borisov, O.B. and Koloskov, B.T., Soviet-Chinese relations 1945-1970 (Indian University Press, 1975)

Brezezinski, Z.K. (Ed), Africa and the Communist World (Uppsala; Sweden, 1973)

Choudhury, G.W., India, Pakistan Bangladesh and the Major Powers Politics of a Divided Sub-Continent (New York, Free Press, 1975)

Chubin, J., Soviet Policy Towards Iran and Gulf. (Adholphi Papers, 1980)

- Chufrin, G., Economic Cooperation and Collective Security in Asia (New Delhi, Vikas, 1976)
- Claude, Isis, Jr., Swords into Plowshare, (PHI, 1976)
- Cohn, H.D., Soviet Policy Towards Black Africa, (New York, Praeger, 1972)
- Duncan, R.W. (Ed), Soviet Policy in Developing Countries (Western Press, 1970)
- ✓ Dyakov, A.M., The Crisis of the Colonial System, (Bombay, PPH, 1961)
- Edmonds, R., Soviet Foreign Policy : 1962 - 73 (London, OUP, 1975)
- El-Ayouty, Y., and Brooks, H.C., Africa and International Organizations (The Hague, Martinus, 1974)
- Etinger, V. and Melikian, O., The Policy of Non-Alignment (Moscow, 1966)
- Fisher, H.A.L., A History of Europe (London: Fontana, 1968, vol.II)
- Gal, C., (Ed), Socialist Community and Non-alignment (Bombay, Allied, 1978)
- ✓ Geoffrey, J., The Soviet Union in Asia, (Berkley, 1971)
- Ghosh, M., China's Conflict with India and the Soviet Union (Calcutta, World Press, 1969)
- Gross, F., World Politics and Tension Areas, (London, ULP, 1966)
- Gunther, J., Inside Africa (Bombay, Allied, 1969)
- Gunar Myrdal, Asian Drama (Penguin, 1975)

- Gupta, S., Kashmir : A Study in India-Pakistan relation (Bombay, Asia; 1967)
- Hinton, H.C., Sino-Soviet Confrontation : Implications for the Future (New York, Crane Russak, 1976)
- Hassall, A., Periods of European History (London, Rivingtons, 1950)
- History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1945 (Moscow, Progress, 1969)
- Israelyan, V., (Ed), Soviet Foreign Policy : A Brief Review 1955-65 (Moscow, 1967)
- ✓ Ivanov, K., Leninism and Foreign Policy of the USSR (Moscow: Navosti, 1972)
- Jenks, C.W., The Prospects of International Adjudication (New York, 1964)
- Kapur, H., The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations : A Case Study of Soviet Policy Towards India (Geneva : Michael Joseph; 1972)
- _____, The Embattled Triangle : Moscow, Peking, New Delhi, (New York, Humanities Press, 1973)
- ✓ Kass, Ilana, Soviet Involvement in the Middle East : Policy Formulation 1966 - 73 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1975)
- ✓ Katin, V., For A Collective and Just Solution of the Middle East Problem (Moscow : Navosti, 1981)
- Kenots, Roger (Ed.), The Soviet and Developing Nations, (London JHP, 1974)
- Kodachnka, A., USSR and Developing Countries (Moscow, Progress, 1976)
- ✓ Koronov, V., Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Action (Moscow, 1975)

- Kortunov, V., International Relations : Dialectics of Development, (Delhi, Sterling, 1981)
- ✓ Kovalenko, I., Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security (Moscow, 1979)
- Kruchinin, A., and Olga, V., Territorial Claims of Mao-Tse Tung: History and Modern Times (Moscow : Nauka, 1971)
- Laqueur, W.Z., Soviet Union and the Middle East (London: Rantledge and Paul, 1969)
- Legum, C and Lee, B., Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London, Dextoltings, 1977)
- Lewis, I.M.A., The Modern History of Somalia : Nation and State In the Horn of Africa (ICP, 1969)
- ✓ Luard, E., Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System (Boston, 1963)
- Luigi, V., The Expansion of Italy, (London, Faber & Faber, 1930)
- Mackintosh, V., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (OUP, 1962)
- McLane, C.B., Soviet Asian Relations (New York, OUP, 1973)
- ✓ Mc Laus, R.D., Middle East in Soviet Policy (Lexington, D.C Heath, 1975)
- Menon, K.P.S. The Flying Troika (London: OUP, 1963)
- Misra, K.P. (Ed), Non Alignment : Frontiers & Dynamics (Delhi, Vikas, 1982)
- Mowat, R.B., Contemporary Europe and Overseas (London: Rivingtons, 1950)

- Naik, J.A., India, Russia, China and Bangladesh (New Delhi, S. Chand, 1972)
- ✓ Nailer^P and Feuchtwangers, ^{EJ(EA)} The Soviet Union and the Third World (London, MacMillan 1981)
- Nasenko Yuri, Jawaharlal Nehru And India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, Sterling, 1977)
- Nielsen, U., The Great Powers and Africa, (London, 1969)
- Podmore, G., (Ed), History of the Pan African Congress (London, HBS, 1963)
- ✓ Page, S., USSR and Arabia : The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula 1953-70 (London, CARL, 1971)
- Paniker, K.M. Asian and Western Dominance (London: George Allen, 1959)
- Pavlovsky, M.N., Chinese - Russian Relations (Moscow, 1979)
- ✓ Ponomarev, B., The War Danger : Its Source and How to Stop It (Moscow, Novosti, 1981)
- ✓ Prescott, J.R.V., The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (London, 1965)
- ✓ Prinakov, Y.M., Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict (Moscow, 1979)
- Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs: 1954-56, (Bombay, APH, 1963)
- Ray, H., Indo-Soviet Relations 1950-71 (Bombay, Jaico, 1973)
- Rubinstein, A.Z. (Ed), Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (New York, Random, 1972)
- Scott, J.B., Law, the State and International Community (New York, 1939, vol. II)
- Budhraj, V., Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent (Bombay: Samaiya Pub, 1973)

- Simoniya, M., Neo-Colonialism : New Trends (Moscow : Novosti, 1981)
- Simson, J.L. and Hazel, F., International Arbitration (London, 1959)
- ✓ Soviet Foreign Policy : A Brief Review : 1955 - 1975 (Moscow, 1976)
- Stein, Arthur, India and the Soviet Union : The Nehru Era (Chicago : UCP, 1969)
- Tarabin, E.A. (Ed), USSR and Countries of Africa, (Moscow, 1975)
- ✓ Tomashovsky, D., Lenin's Ideas and Modern International Relations, (Moscow : Progress, 1974)
- Touval, S., The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Harvard Press, 1972)
- Tuzmukhamedov, Rais, Soviet Union and Non-Aligned Nations (Bombay, Allied, 1976)
- Ulan, A.B., Expansion and Coexistence (New York; Praeger, 1963)
- Uliyanovsky, R., National Liberation (Moscow, Progress, 1978)
- ✓ _____, Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations (Moscow, 1974)
- Vladimir, D (Ed), Soviet-Chinese Relations : 1947-70 (London, Indiana, 1975)
- Vincent, R.J., Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton, PUP, 1974)
- Volsky, D., The Developments in the Indian Sub Continent and the Soviet Union (Moscow : Soviet Land, 1972)
- Vucinich, U.S. (Ed), Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples (Stanford, 1972)

- Wainhouse, D.A., International Peace Observation (Baltimore, 1972)
- Walters, F.P., A History of the League of Nations (London, OUP, 1952)
- Weeks, A.L., Otherside of Coexistence : An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy (New York, Pitman, 1970)
- Widstrand, C.G. (Ed), African Boundary Problems (SIAS: Uppasala, 1969)
- Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia (New Delhi, 1975)
- _____, Soviet View of India, 1957-1975 (New Delhi: Kalyani, 1977)
- Zagchi, C., Russian in Ethiopia, (Naples Guide, 1973)

ARTICLES

- ✓ Agwani, M.S. "Arab-Soviet Triangle", India Quarterly, 36 (2), April-June 1980, pp. 210-17
- Andronov, I., "Kashmir Conflict : Some Antecedents", New Times No.41, Oct 13, 1965, pp. 16-18
- _____, "Hindustan Impressions", New Times, No.1, Jan 1966, pp. 25-27
- _____, "Indo-Chinese Border Conflict - The Imperialist Game", New Times, No.50, Dec 12, 1962, pp 5-6
- Barrows, W.J., "The USSR, China and South Asia", Problem of Communism, Nov-Dec, 1977, vol. xxvi, pp.44-59
- _____, "Moscow and South Asia", Problem of Communism, 21 (May-June 1972), pp 12-31

- Basu, B.K., "India's Frontier Problems in the 19th and 20th Centuries with Tibet and China : Historical Background", Quarterly Review Historical Studies, 5 (1) 1965-66, pp.30-36
- ✓ Biegel, A., "Strategic Implication of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia", Military Review 57 (2), Feb.77 pp. 3-14
- Bien-Henry, 'Perspective on Soviet Intervention in Africa', Political Science Quarterly, 95 (1), Spring 80, 29-42
- Bochkaroyov, Y., "Horn of Africa : Dangerous Compact", New Times, No.34, August 1980, p 12
- Bowles, Chester, "China and India : Problems and Perspectives", Modern Review 115 (2) Feb 1964, pp 107-14
- _____, "India and China : Crucial confrontation", Commerce (Annual No.) 113 (2903), 1966
- _____, "America and Russia in India", Foreign Affairs, 49, July 1971, pp 636-51
- Brayton, A.A., "Soviet Involvement in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 17 (2), June 1979, pp 253-69
- Chandra, R., "China and Indo-Soviet Friendship", New Age 11 (29) 21 July 1963, p. 4
- Davydov, L., "USSR & Ethiopia", Close Friendship and Cooperation, International Affairs (M) (2), Feb. 1979, pp. 90-94
- ✓ Denisov, Y., "Good neighbourly Relations Born of the October Revolution", International Affairs (M) (1), 1978, pp 57-63
- ✓ Dolgoplov, Y., "Colonialism - A Source of Tension and Armed Clashes", International Affairs (M), July 1962, pp. 16-23
- Dorothy, Woodman, Barric and Rockliff, "Himalayan Frontiers : A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries", Quest, (65), Apr-Jun 1970 bh 72-74

- Deshpande, G.P., "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash", EPU, 4(15), 12 April 1969, pp 634-47
- _____, "Is China Losing Friends Wilfully?", EPU, (Annual No.), 3 (1-2) 1968, pp. 37-40
- Fedorenko, N., "The Soviet Union and Africa", New Times, No. 19 May 10, 1964, pp. 5-7
- Gabrielyan, G., "Ethiopia : Ties of Friendship", New Times, No.28, July 1980, p. 28
- _____, "Ethiopia : Building and Battling", New Times No. 37, Sept 1980, p. 12
- Ganguly, S., "China's Strategic Objectives", China Report 5 (6), Nov-Dec 1969, pp. 13-17
- Glazov, V "Pentagon's Indo-Chinese Testing Ground", New Times No.28, July 14, 1965, pp 16-17
- ✓Gelman, H., "The Conflict : A Survey", Problem of Communism March - April 1964, pp. 3-15
- Gorodnov, V & Kosukhin, N., "In the Somali Democratic Republic", International Affairs, (II) May 1972, pp 102-105
- Gupta, S., "India and Pakistan", Link 15 (1), Aug 15, 1972, pp 117-119
- ✓Glukhov, Y., "Solid Foundation for Soviet-Arab Friendship", International Affairs (II), Jan 1980, pp 95-101
- Hinton, H.C., "Moscow & Peking Since Mao", Current History 75 (440); Oct. 1978; pp. 120-22
- Hayland, U.G., "Sino-Soviet Conflict : A Search for New Security Strategies", Strategic Digest 10(4), April 1980, pp.105-
- ✓Ivanov, K., "The National & Colonial Question Today", International Affairs (II), May 1963, pp 3-11

Jain, Girilal, "The Triangular Balance : Problems for the Soviet Union", Times of India, August 1971, pp.3-5

_____, "Sino-Soviet Confrontation : A Case for Indian Neutrality", Times of India, 18 February 1970 pp 3-5

_____, "Sino-Soviet Dispute, Why India Should not take Sides", Times of India, 16 April 1969

James, B., "Sino-Soviet Struggle for Strategic Sinkiang", Organiser, 17 (9) 7 October 1963, p.5

Kapil, R.L., "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa", World Politics, 18 July 1966, pp. 656-673

Khan, M.L., "Soviet Press Condemns Chinese Attitude to India", New Age, 11 (33) 18 August 1968

Kryukov, P., "Results of the Tashkent Talks", International Affairs (II), February 1966, pp 3-4

Kubalkova, V and Cruickshank, A.A., "Soviet Concept of Peace-Coexistence", Some Theoretical and Semantic Problems", Australian Journal of Politics & History, 24(2), Aug 1978, pp. 184-98

Kudin, G., "The Situation on the Indian Subcontinent", New Times No.43, October 1971, p. 15

Levin, D., Ideology of Colonial ^{and}Plunder and Enslavement", International Affairs (II), February 1962, pp. 7-15

Makarov, V., "Sortie that Failed", International Affairs (II) No.10, Oct 1963, pp 83-84

Menon, K.P.S., Eternal Triangle : India, Russia and China", Yesterday and Today, August 1976, pp 19-21

Melcutsev, P., "Horn of Africa : Covering Up the Tracks", New Times, No.11, March 1978, p.12

✓ _____, "Persian Gulf : Blood & Oil", New Times, no.49, December 1980, p. 11

✓ Miller, A., "The Origin of Leninist Eastern Policy", International Affairs (M), April, pp. 68-75

Mustafa, Z., "1971 Crisis in Pakistan: India and the Soviet Union and China", Pacific Community 3 (3) April 1972, pp. 498-515

✓ "Negotiations is the Road to Settling the Conflict" News and Views from the Soviet Union, No.74, vol.XXI 1962

✓ Peterson, V., "Gulf War", World Today, 36 (11), Nov.1980 pp. 415-17

Payton, G.D., "Soviet Military Presence Abroad: The Lessons of Somalia", Military Review, 59(1), Jan. 1979 pp. 67-76

✓ Price, D.L., "Moscow and the Persian Gulf", Problem of Communism, 28(2), March-April 1979, pp.1-13

Rao, C.R.M., "Sino Soviet Border Talks: Relevance to India China Dispute", China Report, 5(6), Nov-Dec 1969, pp. 32-34

✓ Rubinstein, A.Z., "Soviet Policy in the Third World in Perspective", Military Review, 58 (7), July 1978, pp.2-9

Samatar, S.S., "New Imperial Rivalry in Africa: America and Russia in the Recent Crisis of the Horn", Pan Americanist, 18 July 1979, pp. 36-47

✓ Sanakayev, S., "Most Pressing Problem of our Day", International Affairs (M), August 1978, pp 8-18

✓ "The Soviet Union's Struggle for Universal Peace and Security of Nations", International Affairs (M), February 1972, pp. 67-75

Sen, N.C., "The Evolution of China's North-Eastern Frontiers and the Sino-Soviet Clash on the Ussuri", China Report 5(3), May-June 1969, pp.27-32

Shakhnazarov, G., "Soviet-Chinese Conflict: Who is to Blame" Socialism: Theory & Practice, Supplement IV, 1981

Smolansky, O.M., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East and Africa", Current History, 75, (440), October 1978, pp. 113-116

Solodovnikov, V., "The Soviet Union and Africa", New Times, No.21, May 23, 1969, p. 2

Stepanov, L., "The Indo-Pakistan Accord", New Times, No.3, Jan 19, 1966, pp. 3-4

_____, "The Future of Afro-Asia", New Times, No.51, December 22, 1965, pp. 6-8

Ulansky, A., "Indian Sub-Continent : Roots of Crisis", New Times, No.46, November 1971, p. 7

Vosky, D., "The Indian-Pakistan Conflict", New Times, No.38, September 22, 1965, pp. 7-8

Wolfe, T.W., "Soviet Policy in the Sino-Soviet Dispute", United Asia, 23 (1), Jan-Feb 1971, pp. 47-48

Wright, C., "Implication of the Iran-Iraq War", Strategic Digest, 11 (3), 215-36

Yodafat, A., "USSR and the Persian Gulf Area", Australian Outlook 33 (1), April 1979, pp. 60-72

JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS

Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Washington)

Daily Review of the Soviet Press (Moscow)

Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi)

The Hindu (Madras)

India (quarterly) (New Delhi)

International Studies (New Delhi)

International Affairs (London)

International Affairs (Moscow)

New Times (Moscow)

Problem of Communism (Washington)

Socialism : Theory and Practice (Moscow)

Soviet Review (New Delhi)

The Times (London)

The Times of India (New Delhi)