

**POST 9/11 COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION
BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND U.S.**

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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that this Dissertation titled "POST 9/11 COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND U.S." submitted by S. ANJALAH in partial fulfilment of six-credits out of total requirement of twenty four credits for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of an M.Phil degree in this university or any other university. This is his own work.

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**To my parents,
my brother S. Gopal**

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Introduction

INTRODUCTION:

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks must have been the most unforgettable incident, in terms of loss of lives, destruction of property, and psychological impact on people's mind in the twenty-first century for the confident Americans. The impact was something akin to the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December, 1941 by Japan. Ironically both these attacks were waged against US for being the predominant power in world affairs. No country, except US, in the history of mankind enjoyed such unquestionable influence across the globe consecutively in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The bipolarity of the world did not give required political camouflage but instead had inherent constraints imposed on the US to do whatever it wanted in world politics. However, the end of the Cold War, and emergence of the US as the sole super power had given it abundant space and initiative to shape the world without much opposition. The US drive to shape the world according to its own chosen design had tended to pressurise and even offend cultural and political sensitivities, as well as economic interests of many countries and people.

In particular, the US policies in West Asia and on the Arab-Israeli question roughed-up the feelings of Muslims in general. They feel threatened by the US dominance and the spreading impact of globalisation and Western cultural dominance. This is one of the explanations extended in defence of Al the Qaeda attacks on the US on September 11, 2001.

The events of September 11 and their aftermath poignantly emphasised that terrorism is a long-term global problem, with global membership and reach, and that a global response is required.¹ Therefore, central to success in combating international terrorism is international cooperation. Without this a global war on terrorism is

¹ Jusuf Wanadi, "Global Coalition Against International Terrorism," *International Security*, vol. 26, no.4, Spring 2002, p.184.

doomed to fail.² Hence, given the 'transnational' nature of terrorism, the US wanted to form a 'global' coalition to link up a whole range of national capabilities.³ The US expected coalition partner's diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and technological capability assistance.⁴ This does not mean that each nation is expected to offer the same to the same degree. But each nation, it is hoped, will bring to the table what it can to the degree that it is able. Many countries, including major powers like Russia and China, expressed their sympathy and cooperation to the US in combating this new threat to the civilized world. The US President also went further, after recognizing the indispensable cooperation of the harbouring countries, such as United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, declaring that the 'US will not distinguish between the perpetrators and sponsors of September 11'.⁵ He also warned, 'If you are not with us you are with the terrorists', clearly aiming at countries which have a history of sponsoring terrorism as an instrument of state policy.⁶

Consequently Pakistan, one of the three above countries, which had officially sponsored and recognized the *Taliban* and *Al Qaeda*, was feeling the gravity of the US craving for retributive justice. The *Taliban* was created by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to make Afghanistan a safe haven for terrorists 'waging a thousand cuts war',⁷ and using it, in case, as a 'strategic depth' to fight a war against India.⁸ Because of these reasons the US fight against the root cause of terrorism is centered on Afghanistan. It is reported that Al Qaeda has shifted to South Asia's Pakistan, whose North West Frontier Province

² **Backgrounder: Record Number of Nations Responded to Counter-Terrorism Efforts (June 28, 2002).**

³ **Backgrounder: Experts See More Proactive U.S. Policy Against Terrorism (July, 2002), p.1.**

⁴ **ibid, p.7**

⁵ **Address delivered by the U.S. President George W. Bush to the Nation (Washington D.C.: September 11, 2001).**

⁶ **Address delivered by the U.S. President George W. Bush to the U.S. Congress and to the U.S. People (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).**

⁷ **See Dennis Kux's, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001).**

⁸ **ibid.**

and Baluchistan border Afghanistan. It therefore seems to have become the epicenter of the US war on terrorism. Pakistan's geostrategic location as a tri-junction of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, make it indispensable for any coalition in combating terrorism and a useful tool in the fight against terrorism.⁹ The US considers Pakistan useful in many other areas, such as: it is (i) not allowing Al Qaeda operatives to cross the border and stopping arms shipments from going through Pakistan, (ii) giving US overflight and landing rights, (iii) allowing access to naval bases, airbases and borders, (iv) offering intelligence support, (v) condemning the September 11 attacks and curbing domestic support for terrorism, (vi) stopping fuel supply and Pakistani supporters of the Taliban from going to Afghanistan and (vii) breaking diplomatic ties with the Taliban if it was proved that the Al Qaeda network was involved and if the Taliban continued to harbour Osama bin Laden.¹⁰ Hence, the role of Pakistan, the special ally of US, has become very crucial.

The long US-Pakistan relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asian regional politics of the 1950s. The US concern about Soviet expansion and Pakistan's desire for security assistance against a threat from India promoted the two countries to have a defence supply relationship and military alliance. Accordingly, Pakistan joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).¹¹ As a result of these alliances and a 1959 US-Pakistan cooperation agreement, Pakistan received more than \$700 million in military aid in 1955-65.¹² The US economic aid to Pakistan between 1951 and 1982 reached more than \$5 billion.¹³ However, differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled ties. This was evident during the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971,

⁹ M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Transnational Terrorism and Old Friends: Pakistan and U.S.," *Strategic Review*, Winter 2001, p.16.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ Dennix Kux, *op cit.*, p.71,

¹² Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 49, vol. 1, Spring 1976, p.50.

¹³ *ibid.*

when the US suspended military assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the US-Pakistan relationship.¹⁴

By the latter half of the seventies the US-Pakistan relationship had also come under pressure on account of non-proliferation. The Carter Administration in April 1979, under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), suspended military aid to Pakistan because of its secret construction of a uranium enrichment facility. But the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 made Pakistan a frontline state against Soviet expansionism.¹⁵ This resulted in the relaxation of non-proliferation restraints on Pakistan. But again, towards the end of the 1980s, Pakistan's poor economic performance, continuing deterioration of democratic institutions leading to ethnic conflicts, the human rights violations, continuing nuclearisation efforts, and more importantly, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in May 1988 made the US bolder to make Pakistan ineligible for new US assistance. President Bush, under Section 620 E(e), was unable to certify on January 10, 1990 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device.¹⁶ The United States also warned Pakistan that it was the subject of an active continuing review for a possible inclusion on the State Department's list of terrorist states for its alleged support to terrorist activities in Kashmir on July 14, 1993. The US-Pakistan relation reached a nadir on May 30, 1998 when President Clinton imposed economic and military sanctions on Pakistan as mandated by Section 102 of the Arms Control Act, for the nuclear tests.¹⁷

But September 11, 2001 has brought a thaw and radical shift in US-Pakistan relations. On September 13, 2001 President Musharraf, under strong diplomatic pressure, offered President Bush 'unstinted

¹⁴ See for more details Stephen P. Cohen's book, *Emerging India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁵ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p. 221.

¹⁶ See Congressional Research Service, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, June 21, 2001, p.2.

¹⁷ See for more details Ashlis J. Telli's, *India Emerging Nuclear Posture Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

cooperation' in the fight against terrorism.¹⁸ Because of its proximity to Afghanistan and formerly close ties with the *Taliban*, and being a Muslim country possessing a nuclear capability, Pakistan has been considered very crucial to the US efforts to root out terrorism in the region.¹⁹ The *Taliban* and *Osama bin Laden* enjoy considerable support among the Pakistan population, who share not only conservative Islamic values but also ethnic and cultural ties with Afghanistan.²⁰ Therefore, a major issue facing the US in the Afghanistan war and the war on terrorism is how to make use of Pakistan's support-including military operations-without seriously destabilising an already fragile state that has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

The overall objective of the study is to understand the different dynamics of the U.S.-Pakistan relations during the Cold War, post Cold War, and post September 11, 2001, period.

Chapter one reviews the history of U.S. interventions in Asia during the Cold War period. It initially traces the U.S. containment policies against communism. Its objective is to analyse the U.S. searching for allies in Asia. In the middle part, it mainly narrates the dilemma of U.S. to gain India and Pakistan as Cold War allies to check the spread of communism in South Asia. The final part illustrates the Pakistan-India tensions on Kashmir and the U.S. playing a balancing act. In the end it argues how the U.S. and Pakistan objectives differed and its subsequent leading to disenchantment with each other.

Chapter two analyses initially the historical evolution of terrorism from the French Revolution onwards. Its second part vividly delineates the difference between communism inspired ethno-nationalist and separatist movements from the present Islamic Fundamentalism. Its basic crux is to depict the changing contours and the purpose of terrorism historically. The chapter also highlights the acts of terrorist's violence, as an instrument, for achieving a change, as an end. Its

¹⁸ Sumita Kumar, "Politics in Pakistan Post-September 11, 2001", *Strategic Analysis*, April-June, 2002.

¹⁹ Vijay K. Nair, "The Nuclear Dimensions of the War on Terrorism", *Aakrosh*, January 2002, vol. 5, no. 14, p.27.

²⁰ *ibid.*

middle part explains the role of U.S. in the Middle Eastern countries as one of the factors for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of Taliban-Al Qaeda organisations to create a pure Islamic state. Finally it focuses on the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its subsequent formation of a global coalition with Pakistan as a frontline state to combat terrorism.

Chapter three emphasises on the post September 11, 2001 indispensable role of Pakistan to U.S. fighting against the Taliban-Al Qaeda terrorists. It elaborates the critical Pakistan's political and military support to the U.S. in its war in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter in its final phase accounts the political, economical and military benefits for Pakistan from its counter terrorism cooperation with the U.S.

Chapter four is about the possible hindrances in the way of Pakistan's unstinted cooperation with the U.S. Its basic crux is to understand the internal and external factors which may come in the way of U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation. It argues that in Pakistan the religion is more binding on people than the state. In the view of the common Pakistani, the September 11, 2001 attacks were waged by Osama Bin Laden to save the Islamic religion. Hence Bin Laden is a religious here. But in contrast their government accepted to cooperate with the U.S. to nab Osama Bin Laden. Therefore, the article explains the anti-government and pro Osama Bin Laden protests, apart from other factors like Indo-Pak rivalry, as the most critical obstacle between the U.S. and Pakistan. The basic theme of this chapter is to explain that the Pakistan government has come under pressure from its own people to withdraw its political and military support to the United States.

Chapter five deals with the implications of the post September 11, 2001, U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation on the south Asian region. It is divided into two phases like the positive and negative impacts on the south Asian countries. In its positive dimensions it is argued that the post September 11, 2001 U.S. role in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan has positive implications since they were emboldened by the U.S. support to deal with their intrastate

groups sternly. In its later phase it also argues that this may lead to the resolving of all intrastate and interstate tensions creating a political stability which is a prerequisite for any economic development. Finally, in the negative aspects it objects to the excessive role of U.S. in the internal matters of South Asian countries which will undermine the predominance of the Indian position in its bilateral dealings with the neighbours.

Chapter six being the final chapter on conclusion summarises the trends and prospects of the ongoing U.S. engagement with Pakistan and its inevitable role as a balancer between Pakistan and India on the longstanding Kashmir dispute.

The study has followed historical, analytical and descriptive methods for analysing the multi dynamic aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan post September 11, 2001 counter terrorism cooperation.

The study is based on published literature, government publications, speeches of the leaders, news papers and internet which are collected from both the primary and secondary sources. Besides, articles published in various research journals and books are the source of the study.

Chapter - I

CHAPTER – I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FROM 1947-2001

BEGINNING OF U.S. ROLE IN ASIA:

The end of the Second World War raised the curtain for the emergence of the two countries i.e. the United States of America (U.S.A.) and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) as two global powers.¹ The U.S. was seen as a representative of liberal democracy with free political and economic institutions as basic values while the USSR as the representative of Socialistic way of life.²

The Soviet way of life was seen as posing a threat to the capitalistic way of life, resulting in the Cold War rivalry. Each of these ideologies, in an effort to spread their own ideology, had become antagonistic to each other in nature.³ Here in this context the U.S. engagement in different parts of the world had started opposing the spread of communism in Europe and Asia.⁴

The U.S. engagement in Asia started well before World War II when it started supporting the established Chiang Kai-shek government against its Maoist communist enemies to preserve the status quo in China.⁵ The U.S. sought to bring about a settlement with the cessation of fighting in China fearing a threat to the existing world order. As a result General George C. Marshal said;

Events in this country, [China] however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interests of the U.S.

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S. – Soviet Contest* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), p.28

² Philip Zelikow, "American Engagement in Asia", in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, ed., *Americans Asian Alliances* (London: The MIT Press, 2000), p.19.

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, op cit., p.29.

⁴ Allan R. Millett, "The Parameters of Peacekeeping: U.S. Interventions Abroad, 1798-1999", *Strategic Review*, Spring, 2000, p.34.

⁵ D.A. Graber, *Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p.271.

and all people of the United Nations....to adjust their [Chinese] internal differences.⁶

It had been this anti-communist and pro-status quoistic policies which brought the U.S. engagement into Asia in general and South Asia in particular.⁷

The fear of the Soviet Union's spreading its communism into the Middle East had forced the U.S. to involve itself in South-Asia region. Its importance was recognized because of its proximity to the Middle East and the Soviet borders. Containment of communism in the Persian Gulf and West-Asia was the main task of the U.S. during the height of the Cold War.⁸ Hence George F. Kennon, the then ambassador to the Soviet Union said;

in these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.⁹

In this background Pakistan, for its geo-strategic location as a tri-junction of Middle-East, Central Asia and South Asia, was seen as a desirable partner in the upcoming security alliances.¹⁰ However, American policy-makers, in post war years did not see Pakistan as a factor of significance for the promotion of major U.S. interests. Their attention was principally concentrated on Europe and to a lesser extent on Japan. They regarded the Middle East with its vast oil resources as a region of critical importance.¹¹

In the Asian mainland they had their anxieties over the continuing adverse fortunes of their protégé, Chiang Kai-Shek, in his civil war against the Chinese communists. However, any sporadic

⁶ *ibid.*, p.273.

⁷ Ray S. Cline, "U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia", in Ramon H. Myers, ed., *A U.S. Foreign Policy For Asia: The 1980 and Beyond* (London: Hoover Press Publications, 1982), p.1.

⁸ George F. Kennon, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p.117.

⁹ *ibid.*, p.117.

¹⁰ Baldev Raj Nayar, *American Geopolitics and India* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1976), p.38.

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp.44-45.

attention was directed more at the larger and better known India than the new entity whose very name was little known to the American public.¹² In fact, it appears that American-policy makers were of the view that a 'balkanisation' of India would be more adverse to the U.S. security interests. Therefore, it was believed that instability in the region would facilitate penetration by the Soviet Union acting through indigenous communist and other dissident elements.¹³ Apart from worrying about further balkanisation of British India, there was concern that Kashmir's political weakness as well as strategic location, would invite communist interference and fuel further instability. But this trend could not continue for a long time. The succeeding events in Asia had forced the United State's approach towards Indian subcontinent and Pakistan to make it as a partner of the upcoming security alliances.¹⁴

The global geopolitical thinking which persuaded the United States to recognize Pakistan was a strange compound of the British Tory worldview, in the aftermath of partition and the emerging Cold War collective security concepts of Truman and early Eisenhower years. If the idea of the United States military aid to Pakistan had any one author, it was Sir Olaf Caroe, a foreign secretary in New Delhi under two Viceroy and an authority on Soviet Central Asia.¹⁵

Pakistan, which was formed on the premise that the minority Muslim population would not feel secure in a Hindu dominated India,¹⁶ was established on August 14, 1947 with the territorial jurisdiction over a large section of northwestern India and a smaller section of northeastern India. Initially the U.S. reaction to the creation of Pakistan

¹² M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), p.4.

¹³ *ibid.*, p.6

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.73-87.

¹⁵ Selig S. Harrison, "The Untied States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past?" *Current History*, vol. 6, No. 614, December 1997, p.402.

¹⁶ Robert J. Mc Mohan, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.2.

was mild. But the U.S. expressed apprehension about the rights given to the princely states to join either of the dominions.¹⁷

It was because of this right of the princely states which led to the Kashmir problem, known as the unfurnished task of the partition.¹⁸ The U.S. views on the Kashmir have been consistent in their inconsistency. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to get involved on the contention over the legal question of Kashmir and avoided supporting either India or Pakistan. The initial United States policy was to end the threat the Kashmir dispute posed to peace, not to take sides between India and Pakistan or to pass judgment about whom to blame.¹⁹

But the evolving Cold War with the Soviet Union in Greece, Turkey, Iran, West Asia, East Europe, Berlin crises forced the U.S. to review the significance of South Asia in the process of establishing a cordon sanitaire around the periphery of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Eastern Europe. With India identified as neutral in the Cold War and increasingly friendly towards the Soviet Union, Pakistan became the focus of the American partnership in the strategically vital South West Asia abutting the Gulf, Soviet Central Asia, China and India.²⁰ This had been the case until 1949 in which two important events took place. The United States' sole possession of atomic bombs as a factor enabled it to force a retreat on the Soviet Union in disputes relating to Iran and Turkey. Confident of its power, based on air and atomic supremacy, the United States did not experience any special fears concerning a possible extension of Soviet influence in India. It was the security of Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, of West Asia that virtually monopolized American attention. In any event, American policy in East and South Asia in the

¹⁷ M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), p.8

¹⁸ Alaistar Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991), p.110.

¹⁹ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2001: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.28.

²⁰ Parama Sihna Palit, "The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 25, No. 6, September 2001, p.2.

period immediately after the end of the Second World war was built round the concept of collaboration with China, then under the leadership of their ally, Chiang Kai-shek.²¹

The American atomic monopoly was broken by the Soviet Union in September 1949.²² To meet the eventualities that might arise, the United States had already embarked on a gigantic plan to promote European recovery (the Marshal Plan) and had entered into a military alliance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to contain what it characterized as Soviet expansionism. Under what later came to be known as the Truman doctrine, the United States proclaimed that it would be its policy 'to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.'²³ In practice the application of the Doctrine was limited to Greece and Turkey and the warning implied in it appeared restricted only to the countries of Europe outside the Soviet orbit.

With regard to South and South-East Asia, the United States showed no disposition to attempt any intervention against insurrectionary activities launched by communist parties following the enunciation of a new hard line by the cominform. It contended itself with drawing the attention of nationalists in these countries to the nature of the threat to their positions posed by the local communists and international communism. The nationalist leaders were 'awakened to the fact that... the nationalism to which they aspire is regarded as a high crime and provides grounds for ruthless interference'²⁴ in their internal affairs by the international communist organization. The United States thus identified itself with the nationalists of the countries of the region and laid stress on the interventionist propensities of the Soviet

²¹ Robert S. Mc Namara, *Out of the Cold: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defence Policy in the 21st Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp.53-56.

²² *Ibid.*, p.58.

²³ These development are discussed at greater length in M.S. Venkataramani, *Under Currents In American Foreign Relations* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

²⁴ Department of State, Press Release, 16 September 1948.

Union under Joseph Stalin.²⁵ It did not attempt or even envisage any measures to induce the countries of the region to enter into an American sponsored, anti-Soviet, military alliance. It took some years before the United States formulated a policy for the region involving military alliances, military aid, and economic assistance.

The watershed in American policy towards the Indian subcontinent was clearly the latter half of 1949. The collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 were a shattering blow to the diplomatic and military policies of the United States in East Asia. American leaders must have viewed the debacle in China with dismay and to the American people the news came as a traumatic shock. The loss of China forcefully had brought to the consciousness of the U.S. policy-makers the importance of strengthening relations with the two countries of the Indian subcontinent. The two states whose combined population and resources could nearly match that of China.²⁶ The implications of the establishment of a strong, centralized, and totalitarian regime in China were not appreciated by Pakistan and India as they were preoccupied with their own disputes, like Kashmir, and domestic problems.

CONVERGENCE OF PAKISTAN-U.S. INTERESTS:

Pakistan since its creation on the basis of the two nation theory, had formulated its foreign policy with the sole objective of achieving Kashmir.²⁷ It had been in constant fear that India might undo the partition, whose majority of the population, including the congress leadership, had opposed to the idea of creation of a separate nation for Muslims. Pakistani leadership's paranoid idea of India's unreconciled attitude towards Pakistan had forced it to look for a strong ally. The Pakistanis were in a constant search for a strong ally. Therefore, here it

²⁵ Mohammad Ayub, "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry", *The World Today*, vol. 38, no. 5, May 1982, p.198.

²⁶ Robert S. Mc Namara, op cit., pp.33-34.

²⁷ Smriti S. Patnaik, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy : Objectives and Approaches", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 26, no. 2, April-June 2002, p. 201.

was in this context of the United States looking for an ally for the containment of communism and Pakistan's search for an ally as a security guarantor had paved the way for the convergence of both countries interests. It was with this intention, Pakistani's first Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah's fervently made references to the Americans that the Pakistani peoples stand shoulder to shoulder in support of democracy, was much appreciated in Washington.

However, during this period the United States was clearly more eager to cultivate India than Pakistan. The United States did not have any significant interest in Pakistani life and politics.²⁸ As a result the first American Ambassador to Karachi presented his credentials only in February 1948. Barely five months later he was forced by ill health to return to the United States. It was only in the beginning of 1950 that a new Ambassador took charge of the American Embassy in Karachi. The tardiness of the United States in appointing a diplomatic representative to Karachi indicated the relatively low level of interest of the United States government in Pakistan during the period 1947-1949. No such lethargy characterized the American government's attitude towards India.

This situation was naturally viewed with unhappiness by Pakistan. Nursing a sense of insecurity, profoundly fearful of its bigger neighbour, Pakistan felt greatly distressed that the great Republic of new world, which it had begun to look upon as the only possible guarantor of its security, should have shown such a callous disregard to it and court in the very country which it apprehended the greatest danger to its security.

Apart from delaying the appointment of an ambassador, the United States government first sent an official invitation to the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru causing resentment to the Pakistani leadership. But to the much dismay of the United States, Jawaharlal Nehru continued his adherence to the concept of non-alignment as the foundation of India's foreign policy. The Indian prime minister's

²⁸ See for more details M.S Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan 1947-58* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982).

insistence on his country's neutrality had been much comfort for the Pakistanis.²⁹ They saw that if they played their cards right and gave right answers, they might succeed in convincing American leaders of the value of forging a special relationship with Pakistan.

Therefore, the initiative was taken by Pakistan even before Nehru's visit to America. As early as during September 7, 1947, in a cabinet meeting Jinnah plainly spelled out his views;

Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interest [lie] with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K. and the U.S., rather than with Russia.³⁰

Similarly in 1947, the Pakistani Minister for Commerce, Fazlur Rahman, had declared that the United States and Pakistan shared a similar ideological outlook and Pakistan would never tolerate communism. Finance Minister Gulam Mohammad spoke the need of American technicians to help in the task of industrial development of Pakistan expressing their devotion to the sanctity of private enterprise.

In June-July 1949, Major General Iskander Mirza, Secretary to the Pakistani Defence Ministry, paid a visit to the United States reportedly to establish liaison with American military leaders and to explore avenues for cooperation. The General made it clear that he viewed American military power as the guarantor of peace in the world. In spite these unambiguous indications of their solicitude for American good will, Nehru was the first to be invited to the United States causing much displeasure to the Pakistanis. To equal this diplomatic score the Pakistani leadership started finding ways to move closer to the Soviet Union.

The quality of opportunism that had been a consistent factor in their diplomacy was then clearly revealed. During the same time the Pakistani Prime Minister had announced that he had accepted an

²⁹ Leo E. Rose, "U.S. Policy in Asia: The India Factor", in Ramon H. Myers, ed., *A U.S. Foreign Policy For Asia: The 1980s and Beyond* (London: Hoover Press Publications, 1982), p.40.

³⁰ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.20

invitation to visit Moscow. The visit had not materialized because in the meantime a firm invitation came from the United States and was promptly accepted. Liaquat met the United States Secretary of State, Marshall in Paris in October 1948. This was the highest level of contact between the U.S. government and Pakistan since the latter's attainment of Independence. In the same meeting Liaquat outlined the problem his country was facing. He also stressed that it 'was unthinkable that Pakistan could fall prey to communism since [communism was] against Islam'³¹ and urged the United States to facilitate economic assistance for Pakistan and the nations of Middle East as it had for Europe.

Unlike the Indian prime minister, the Pakistani leaders made public their anti-communist and basic pro-western orientation. That approach was dictated by Pakistan's overwhelming economic problems, its military weakness, and its fear of India. As a result of the above conditions that made Pakistan search for an external patron, a central feature of Pakistani diplomacy from its inception, the U.S. moved towards Pakistan.³² As a result, at the end of his trip the Prime Minister was delighted with the reception he received in the United States and called the trip as 'an impressive success'. The views that he eloquently propounded of Pakistan's determination to oppose aggression, of his devotion to the encouragement of private enterprise were well appreciated. But his one conviction that communism was incompatible with Pakistan's Islamic way of life had evoked much favourable response from the American congress than Nehru's exposition of non-alignment.³³

U.S. NEUTRALITY ON KASHMIR:

Before Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States Pakistan backed 2000 tribal infiltrators had crossed over to Kashmir on

³¹ *ibid.*, p.28

³² Robert J. Mc Mohan, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.72.

³³ M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, "American's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of An Uneasy Partnership", *International Studies*, vol. 8, no.-1-2, July-October 1966, p.79.

the morning of October 22, 1947.³⁴ On the same day the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army received a message in New Delhi that the raiders had seized the border town of Mujaffarabad. Within the next three days the Maharaja of Kashmir acceded to India on October 26, 1947. Once Kashmir was acceded to India, troops were airlifted into Srinagar, on the morning of the October 27, 1947.³⁵ The introduction of Indian troops into the state quickly expanded the scope of the conflict as the Pakistani government explicitly committed itself to the cause of 'liberating' Kashmir.³⁶ The Pakistani decision to invade Kashmir on October 22 1947, was in some measure precipitated by the Indian attempts to incorporate the princely state of Hyderabad into India. Both sides were also keenly aware of the security issues at stake because of Kashmir's geographical location.³⁷ In early November, Jawaharlal Nehru publicly called for a free plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Kashmir. As a precondition for the plebiscite, however, he demanded the removal of all invading forces and the restoration of peaceful conditions.³⁸ Pakistan, for its part, agreed to the plebiscite but spelled out several conditions of its own, such as the withdrawal of all Indian troops, which New Delhi found unacceptable. As a result, when these bilateral negotiations reached an impasse and military operations stalled, Nehru turned to the United Nations. On November 22, 1947, he requested international mediation. Kashmir became an international issue from a local one. Nehru's decision to call for Security Council intervention placed the matter in an entirely different light.³⁹ On April 21, 1948, the Security Council achieved its first breakthrough with a resolution that provided an overall framework for a settlement of the

³⁴ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study of India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p.111.

³⁵ Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflict Since 1947* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p.17.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.17.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.21.

³⁸ W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

³⁹ Robert J. Mc Mahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.22.

Kashmir dispute. Over Indian and Pakistani objections, it established a five member commission, later named as the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The commission was instructed to proceed to the subcontinent. The resolution called upon Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from the disputed territory. Once that process had begun and the fighting had ceased, India was supposed to begin reducing its troops in Kashmir in consultation with the commission. Finally, the commission was directed to arrange for an impartial plebiscite to be held in the disputed territory. Despite its deliberate effort to avoid an overt role the United States was chosen as a member of the UNCIP, along with Czechoslovakia , Belgium, Colombia and Argentina.

But Pakistan wanted active U.S. participation in its favour. When Pakistan found it difficult to achieve Kashmir through diplomacy, it then turned to force, to achieve that same purpose. Faced with this threat of future imminent armed conflict with India, Pakistan started building its army by equipping it with modern weaponry. Therefore when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States, his main concern was the procurement of ammunition for Pakistani army. He requested the U.S. government, through the submission of a memorandum to the State Department, for the assistance of \$510 million for building and equipping its defence services. The total amount of approximate \$2 billion was sought as a loan to be utilized over a period of five years. Of the \$510 million sought for defence \$205 million was specified as being needed to meet anticipated deficits in Pakistan's military budget.⁴⁰ But the United States government had rejected the memorandum. Although some sales were approved, in March 1948 President Truman embargoed arms exports to both India and Pakistan because of fighting in Kashmir. In spite of the fact that the embargo was lifted in 1949 after the cease-fire took effect, the Pentagon was slow to meet Pakistan arms request. In spite of no objection from any quarter, the problem

⁴⁰ M.S. Venkararamani , *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947- 1958* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), p. 20.

was a shortage of equipment and Pakistan's low strategic priority.⁴¹ But the unstated intention of the U.S. in rejecting Pakistan's offer was that any military assistance would make Pakistan intransigent over the Kashmir issue with India.

U.S. TILT IN FAVOUR OF PAKISTAN:

The Americans also did not want to be seen as anti-Indian which could force India to move closer to the Soviet Union. But the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency inaugurated an era of closer U.S.-Pakistan ties. The U.S. policy toward Pakistan became even more positive in its tone as the establishment of a 'Northern Tier' of defence became an early goal of the Eisenhower administration.⁴² Similarly the outbreak of the Korean war in July 1950 and the developments that followed sharply intensified the interest of American leaders to the reaction of Pakistan. The involvement of the United States in the Korean crisis and the profound emotional impact of the conflict on American public opinion provided an opportunity that was skillfully used by Pakistan to build an image for itself as a trustworthy friend of the U.S. in South Asia. At the beginning of the war, however, American public opinion did not pay much attention to the fact that the Pakistani government had unequivocally condemned North Korean aggression and extended support to the United States. Much to the chagrin, it was on the India's response that American attention was centered. But American's enthusiasm diminished for India when it abstained from the voting on the uniting for peace resolution and Nehru's wiring letters to Stalin, Atlee, Truman urging them a cease-fire and negotiations on Korea as well as the PRC's admission into UN. Contrary to this the Pakistanis supported the U.S. foreign policy objectives on Korean war and the Japanese Peace Treaty, especially when viewed in comparison to India's attitude, also brought home to Americans the cooperative and favourable attitude of Pakistan. In the United States the image of India

⁴¹ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington. D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.44

⁴² Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p.2

left behind by the Korean episode was of an appeaser of China and that of Pakistan as a staunch supporter of the U.S.

Meanwhile, disillusionment with Nehru, the intervention of Chinese volunteers in Korea as well as developments in Southeast Asia and the Middle East led to reappraisal of the U.S. policy towards South Asia. Hence receptivity to Pakistani overtures on the part of the United States was further enhanced during the Korean war. For Pakistanis the military support was an urgent requirement in the aftermath of their own 1948 war with India over Kashmir⁴³.

Against this background whereby each country needed the other, for its own respective reasons, the development of close relations between the U.S.-Pakistan was seen as natural and inevitable.⁴⁴ Even though the United States was not entirely happy over the manner in which Nehru practiced his policy of non-alignment, it clearly realized the importance of ensuring that India did not go the Chinese way. Any development in that direction was regarded as involving serious consequences to the security interests of the free world.⁴⁵ Therefore, in 1951 when India faced the shortage of food stocks, the U.S. agreed to supply India on far favourable terms than requested by India. Pakistan complained to the U.S. that India does not face food shortage if it stops the trade war against Pakistan. In short the U.S., while following even handedness, was not ready to be influenced by India and Pakistan on its policies towards the subcontinent.⁴⁶ As a result, it is said, carrying its bag of leafs, fishes and knives the United States was walking the tight rope, tossing some to the right and then to the left, as its interests demanded.⁴⁷

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.2.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p.2.

⁴⁵ See for more analysis David W. Clinton's book, *The Two Faces of National Interest* (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1994).

⁴⁶ See Inis L. Claude's book, *American Approach to World Affairs* (New York: University Press of America, 1986).

⁴⁷ M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", *International Studies*, vol. 8, nos. 1-2, July-October 1966, p.82.

But the final disillusionment came in 1952 and in subsequent year when India expressed its skepticism about the U.S. signing the ANZUS Pact (1952) and the bilateral treaties with Japan and the Philippines as provocation to their, friendly country, China. The American's realized India's response as obstructionist to their policy of countering the communist expansionism in Asia.

SIGNING OF U.S. PAKISTAN DEFENCE AGREEMENT:

Added to these Army Chief Mohammad Ayub Khan's professional mission to 'modernize and expand'⁴⁸ the Pakistani military paved the way for the U.S. and Pakistan military collaboration. As result, on May 19, 1954, Pakistan and the U.S. signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Therefore, the Pakistani high powered team, that included Ayub, met the Eisenhower administration. The U.S. officials announced a 'comprehensive aid package'.⁴⁹ The memoir was meant to boost the level of military aid to \$ 50 million for the coming fiscal year and established specific program goals. The aid memoir also committed the United States to equip 4 army infantry and 1.5 armored divisions, to provide modern aircraft for 6 air force squadrons, and to supply 12 vessels for the navy. The estimated cost of the program was \$171 million.⁵⁰ Although Washington's fear of Soviet expansion had spurred military aid for Pakistan, the first regional anti-communist alliance that Pakistan joined in 1954 was the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Interestingly, when the U.S. Secretary of state, Dulles, the originator of SEATO, invited South Asian countries to join the pact, it was only Pakistan which attended. Having attended the Manila Conference, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan insisted the delegates to have the SEATO include 'aggression from all quarters, not just from communist states.'⁵¹ Despite Zafrulla Khan's best efforts,

⁴⁸ See for more details Mohammad Ayub Khan's book, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

⁴⁹ This is elaborated more clearly in Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001).

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p.69.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.71.


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Dulles refused to agree and even added an explicit reservation to the treaty to make clear that SEATO would deal only with communist aggression.⁵² Later, on American requested Pakistan to join the Baghdad pact on 25 September 1955. In the mean time, despite its political instability, after eight and a half of its coming into existence, on March 23, 1956, Pakistan became Islamic Republic with Iskander Mirza as its president.⁵³ India continued expressing its doubts about the U.S.-Pakistan relations. Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his skepticism about Pakistan-American formal security alliances and supply of weaponry to Pakistani army fearing that the alliance would instigate aggression against India. Allaying Nehru's fears the U.S. president assured India that under the principles of the United Nations Charter, the United States would be supporting India if it became the victim of any armed aggression.⁵⁴ Pakistan, after joining the U.S. sponsored anti-communist military alliances, wanted to smoother relations with China. Therefore, Prime Minister Suhrawardy, continued his efforts to minimize tensions with China. Hence in late 1956, he exchanged a well publicised official visit to China's Premier Chou En-lai.

Pakistan's Prime Minister, frustrated by the lack of progress towards a Kashmir settlement, along with Foreign Minister Feroz Khan Noon, wanted to take the Kashmir problem back to the UN Security Council. At a minimum, they asked United States to voice its support for a plebiscite. They also asserted, that anything less than staunch reaffirmation of support for [the] plebiscite would be shattering to the Pakistan-U.S. relations. The Prime Minister, who had accepted flying of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft from Pakistan justifying his country's alliance with U.S., also said; 'Pakistan [can] not do so [remain neutral] and must therefore turn to others for her defence.' The United States, while assuring India on one hand, had signed a Bilateral Agreement on Military Cooperation on 5 March 1959 with Pakistan which stated in its preamble that the government of the United States of American regards

⁵² **ibid., p.71.**

⁵³ **ibid., p.77.**

⁵⁴ **ibid., p.82.**

as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.⁵⁵ The Agreement also further stated that in case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United States of America will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request. As a result in July 1959, the two countries entered into an agreement about the establishment of a communications unit at Peshawar in Pakistan which the U.S. had sought for a long time.⁵⁶ The signing of Treaty of Friendship and Commerce in November 1959, further facilitated the entry of American private capital and investment. Moreover, the political security and economic alliance with the Pakistan provided the United States with a relatively pliant ally which supported the American approach on many international issues, including the Suez crisis, the landing of American marines in Lebanon, the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.⁵⁷

Pakistan, inspite of its internal political instability like the imposition of Martial Law by Ayub Khan on 27 October, 1958, insisted for more U.S. military supplies, like F.104 fighter aircrafts. Unmindful of the first military take-over in Pakistan, the United States President Eisenhower paid his official state visit, the first U.S. President to visit Pakistan. The president arrived in Karachi on 7 December 1959, travelling for the first time in his Air Force One.⁵⁸ President Eisenhower in his talks with Ayub Khan discussed all concerned issues. But the Pakistani leader, while raising the prospective Russian invasion of Afghanistan for warm waters and China's constructing air bases near the region, insisted that his country's security is in danger. The implied message was to force the United States to supply adequate modern weaponry, including F-104s, to Pakistan Air Force. These pretensions

⁵⁵ Hamid H. Kizilbash and Khawar Mumtaz, *Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy and Pakistan's Options* (Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1976, p.4

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.13.

⁵⁷ Rashmi Jain, *U.S.-Pakistan Relations 1947-1983* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), p.14.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p.89.

were correctly understood by the then Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South Asia and Africa, Langley, who wrote;

I wonder if we have not collectively developed certain generalizations about Pakistan and then proceeded to accept them as gospel truth without sufficient periodical scrutiny... the situation of strength which we have accepted as synonymous with Pakistan has too large component of wishful thinking... [It is] not too difficult to make a rather convincing case that the present [Pakistani] military programme is based on a hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat.⁵⁹

Hence the U.S. president was not receptive to Pakistan's demand until 1960. In the same year Washington agreed to supply F-104s.

The U.S. acceptance had many advantages for Pakistan. Politically, it allowed Pakistan to end its diplomatic isolation and secure the support of a super power which made it feel more confident of its position vis-à-vis India. The United States gave Pakistan the political support on the Kashmir question vis-à-vis India and on the Pashtunistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Militarily, the alliance provided immediate defence capabilities that freed Pakistan from its most urgent fears of political and military intimidation by India. The security relationship involved substantial aid. The aid being in the form of the U.S. military hardware, training and security supporting assistance.⁶⁰

However, the United States and Pakistan, had divergent goals and interests in coming together in an alliance. For Pakistan, the main consideration in forging a security alliance with the United States was its obsession with the perceived threat from India. It had also expected through the alliance a substantial economic aid to improve its defence capabilities.⁶¹ Besides, the U.S. was expected to exert pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir question to Islamabad's satisfaction.

Washington, on the other hand was guided by its global strategy of containing its communist adversaries vis-à-vis China and the Soviet

⁵⁹ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.93.

⁶⁰ See Stephen P. Cohen's, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.52.

⁶¹ Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, "Emerging U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 26, no. 3, July-September 2002, p.370.

Union and to that end found Pakistan with its strategic location at the doorstep of the Soviet Union and China to be strategically important for bases. Thus, in various defence treaties and arrangements, the U.S. specifically confined its obligations and commitments to situations of communist aggression. When Pakistan's utility in Washington's perception declined or other interests were considered commanding greater attention, Pakistan's interests were given less weightage. These divergent security goals – the global perspective of the U.S. versus the India centric goals of Pakistan led to tensions and eventual Pakistani disillusionment with the U.S.

It is significant to note that it was only after the United States found it was not possible to wean India away from its policy of non-alignment, the American policy makers entered into an alliance with Pakistan, which was willing to grant bases and communications facilities on its territory. But even if Washington decided to forge an alliance relationship with Pakistan in the 1950s, at no stage did the United States write off India altogether. The economic stability of India was considered to be a helpful factor in keeping it economically oriented towards the West. Thus as early as 1954, Dulles stated that the largest single items of \$85 million out of \$ 307.4 million – was earmarked for India. He also urged the congress to support this request in spite of disagreements on foreign policy issues between New Delhi and Washington.⁶²

Furthermore Pakistan's fears were exacerbated with the coming of Democratic President Kennedy whose government had decided to increase economic aid to India. President Kennedy, being the admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru, in his state of the union address to Congress on 30 January 1961, applauded the 'soaring idealism' of Nehru.⁶³ Karachi started suspecting the new Washington's perspective as biased approach towards India. The ruptures have started becoming obvious

⁶² Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.46.

⁶³ See for more information Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.115.

between the U.S. and Pakistan. It was perhaps with the U-2 incident in May 1960 that the implications of its deep alignment with the United States of America first became apparent to Pakistan. Russia's sharp reaction to American military flights originating from Pakistan brought an awareness to the people of Pakistan that the 'nations independence had been bartered away.'⁶⁴ Anti American feelings were generated coinciding with the winning of the United States presidential elections by the Democrats. Kennedy was India-oriented and his views of the subcontinent were markedly different from the Republicans before him. His foreign policy laid greater emphasis on demonstrating understanding and support of the non-aligned countries, like India. At the same time, the Indian military takeover of Goa was also completed and American reaction fell far short of Pakistan's expectations. The Goa and Kashmir situations were comparable and Pakistan feared that if Indian occupation of Goa could be executed without much protest from its ally [the U.S.] then similar Indian steps in Kashmir may be possible.

BEGINNING OF TENSION IN U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

This appears to be the time in the U.S. and Pakistani relations when tensions began to emerge perhaps for the first time since formally aligning, Pakistan took a step without consulting the United States. It broke diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in August 1961, leading to the sealing of borders by Pakistan as a retaliatory measure and the consequential halt of American aid to that country which was transported through Karachi and Kyber pass. At the same time Pakistan's new orientation towards communist countries also disturbed Americans. Pakistan signed an agreement for oil exploration with the Russians in 1961 and also decided to enter into negotiations over its border with china.

These tensions were smaller in nature and Ayub Khan during his visit to the United States in July 1961 tried to smooth over the differences. He tried his best to sell Pakistan as a most reliable friend. Before a joint session of American Congress on July 12, he said;

⁶⁴ Se for more details Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's *Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan, provided you are also prepared to stand by them... I would like you please remember that whatever may be the dictates of your world wide commitments, you will , I hope, take care that you will not take any steps that might aggravate our problems in any fashion to jeopardize our security.⁶⁵

The strains, identified earlier, which were being felt in the relationship reached their climax after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. This was also the year when the reliability of America as an ally was completely exposed.

The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 triggered the prospects of massive arms aid to India from the United States and from the United Kingdom. Pakistan felt let-down because this aid was provided to India without any prior consultation which Pakistan considered a legitimate expectation as an ally of the United States. The quantity of military assistance also was not commensurate with the nature of the conflict. In Pakistan's view it would disturb the military balance in the subcontinent. Most importantly, instead of using military assistance as a lever to settle the Kashmir problem the United States was pressurizing Pakistan to freeze the issue so that India could move its forces, deployed in Kashmir, to the Chinese border. This caused a greater bitterness and anger in Pakistan.

The period from 1962-65 is that of action and reaction in Pakistan's relations with the United States. Pakistan's policy makers, disgruntled by the U.S. actions, were feeling insecure. Hence they were trying to broaden their policy-options. Therefore, in March 1963, a border agreement between Pakistan and China was concluded followed by other trade agreements and an air agreement.⁶⁶ Exchange of State visits between the Chinese leadership and President Ayub Khan took place. Chau En-lai came to Pakistan in March 1964 and Ayub Khan visited China in 1965 where he was given grand reception. There was some change in Pakistan's policies towards Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka

⁶⁵ Norman D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Policy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Press, 1966), p.39.

⁶⁶ W.M., Dobell, "Ramifications of China-Pakistan Border Treaty", *Pacific Affairs*, Autumn 1964, pp.283-95.

also. With Burma, the border was demarcated, with Nepal more trade links were established.⁶⁷ For the first time since becoming a member of the security pacts, Pakistan did not attend the SEATO meeting held in April, 1964.

It appears that these actions of Pakistan irritated the United States. The United States was particularly critical of Pakistan's relations with China. Consequently, the United States showed its displeasure by first canceling Ayub Khan's visit to the United States which was due in April 1965. This was followed up with the postponement of the aid to Pakistan consortium meeting by two months in July 1965, at the insistence of President Johnson's Government. The meeting was supposedly to decide upon the aid for the first year of Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan. And the postponement has caused great hardship.⁶⁸ By 1965, the sense of betrayal was wide spread in Pakistan. The American alliance was suspected and at the same time friendship with China was widely acclaimed as a step in the right direction.

Pakistan's fear that America would not come to its assistance in the event of a confrontation with India crystallized first in the Rann of Kutch conflict in 1965. America used all its efforts to get a ceasefire and the return of troops to earlier position. In the 1965 September war, Pakistan's apprehensions were confirmed when the United States immediately clamped an embargo and suspended all economic and military aid to India and Pakistan on 8 September 1965, and publicly warned China to keep out of the conflict.⁶⁹ The U.S. arms embargo further embittered the U.S.-Pakistani relations. Although it affected both India as well as Pakistan, it was perceived as being particularly devastating for Pakistan because of Pakistan's total dependence on the United States for supplies in artillery, tanks, aircrafts and logistical support systems.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p.43.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.44.

⁶⁹ Tahir Sherin-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of An Influence Relationship*, (New York: Praeger Press, 1982), p.21.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.22.

Pakistani bitterness against the Americans was intense because during the Sino-Indian conflict, American military aid continued to flow but in the India-Pakistan conflict the United States refused to supply arms to its, once called as, 'most allied ally.'⁷¹ American claims of neutrality and non-interference only aggravated the problem. The Americans aid also remained suspended till 1966 i.e. till after the Tashkent Declaration. Ayab Khan's cancelled visit, materialised in December 1965 paving a thaw in relations, was perceived at the official level. On the one hand Pakistan friendship with china was expanding but at the same time assurances were being given to America that Pakistan will do nothing to endanger relations with United States in its relations with other countries, including China.

However the most substantial U.S. military aid programme was between 1954 and 1965. In that period Pakistan received over \$630 million in grant military assistance for weapons, \$619 million for defence support assistance and some \$55 million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis. In the same period India purchased over \$50 million in military equipment. In 1962-65, after the Sino-Indian border conflict, it received over \$90 million worth of grant in military assistance. Primarily it was meant for communications and transport equipment, including some hardware plus arms production facilities. But in 1965 all grants were terminated.⁷²

The United States action of stopping all military assistance and economic aid prompted Pakistan to establish a better relationship with China and to refuse to renew the agreement on communications base, Badaber near Peshawar in July 1969.

President Yahya's Government ushered in an era of complete confusion in the conduct of foreign policy but the pro-American orientation continued. In 1970, Nixon decided to sell jets and armoured personnel carriers to Pakistan. But in 1971, when Pakistan was in the

⁷¹ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947- 2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.70.

⁷² Stephen Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 49, vol. 1, Spring 1976, p. 50.

midst of a grave 'internal crisis',⁷³ the United States House of Representatives voted to withhold United States aid for Pakistan until political stability had been restored, even though Pakistan had shown its faithfulness by preparing ground work for facilitating Kissinger's secret visit to China.⁷⁴

The U.S.-Pakistan troubled relations seem to have further drifted, during Ford regime, after the establishment of Bangladesh as a nation. The disappointed Pakistan left SEATO in 1972.

The creation of Bangladesh also had diminished the importance of Pakistan for the United States. But indigestible for Pakistan, the U.S. started recognizing India's predominant position after 1971 because of its geographical size and political clout.⁷⁵ India's conducting nuclear test in May 1974, seems to have added further weightage to the side. As a result Henry Kissinger as a Secretary of State, arrived in Islamabad on October 31, 1974, after spending three days in New Delhi, described India as the preeminent power in the region.⁷⁶ India felt happy to have heard such words from non other than Kissinger, but the Pakistanis got worried about its import.⁷⁷ When Kissinger met Prime Minister Bhutto the latter persisted for the supply of arms to Pakistan. He said: 'It was not that Pakistan wanted toys... Pakistan sought sufficient arms to permit it to defend itself.'⁷⁸ For the same purpose Bhutto paid a visit to Washington on 4 February 1975. His main aim was to achieve the final lifting of arms embargo.⁷⁹

⁷³ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagon* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), p.264.

⁷⁴ See for more details Henry Kissinger's *White House Years* (Boston: Little & Brown Press, 1979), p.854.

⁷⁵ See for more details Stephen P. Cohen's book, *Emerging Power India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁷⁶ See Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-91* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1993), pp. 227-28.

⁷⁷ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington. D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), p.216.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 216.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p. 217.

President Ford's reaction was that he would consider the removal of restrictions. At the same time Kissinger said that Pakistan was 'an ally which is in the serious position for being subjected to an embargo'⁸⁰ Therefore on February 24,1975, Washington officially announced that it was removing all limitations on arms transfers except lethal arms, to Pakistan , ending the embargo that Lyndon Johnson had imposed almost ten years before during the country's 1965 war over Kashmir.⁸¹ In line with the administration's friendly approach, Washington also agreed to provide four hundred thousand tons of wheat worth about \$65 million and \$78 million development loans⁸²

ISSUE OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME:

But ever since India conducted the nuclear tests, Pakistan had been in constant endeavour to match India. Therefore in 1975 the Pakistani government started bargaining about the purchase of 'nuclear reprocessing plant' with the French government. The United States government had started doubting the deal because the capacity of the plant was in excess of the fuel requirements of the Karachi nuclear reactor and other projected power projects. The subsequent contract with West Germany on a facility to produce heavy water plants made observers in the United States to express doubts that Pakistan has seriously embarked upon the construction of a nuclear program.⁸³

Therefore President Ford and Kissinger requested in a letter to Bhutto that asked Pakistan to forego plans for acquiring reprocessing and heavy water capabilities until a clear need existed and all alternatives at the U.S. were fully examined. President Ford was eager to prevent Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold to show his commitment to non-proliferation. He also accepted to supply the 110 A-7 attack bombers to wean away Pakistan from the nuclear path. Around the same time the Congress, as part of tightening up nuclear policy had adopted amendments to sections of 669 and 670 of the

⁸⁰ **ibid., p.218**

⁸¹ **ibid., p. 218.**

⁸² **ibid., p. 218.**

⁸³ **ibid., p. 221.**

Foreign Assistance Act proposed by Senators John Glenn and Stuart Symington to bar assistance to non-NPT signatories. This act was meant to the countries which imported uranium-enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. The Secretary of State also warned that Pakistan might face an economic aid cutoff under the new legislation. The Ford and Kissinger's efforts were to make Pakistan to accept to an administration's proposal on the nuclear issue. Their proposed nuclear package consisted of a substantial conventional arms package, including the potent A-7's, if Pakistan agreed to forego the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.⁸⁴

In spite of these U.S. carrot and stick approach the Pakistanis, under Bhutto, accelerated their policy of construction of a nuclear device. Bhutto had appointed a nuclear metallurgist Abdul Khadir Khan, who had gained detailed knowledge of the highly sensitive and complex ultracentrifuge uranium-enrichment process while working in Netherlands, to head the nuclear programme to match India. As a result, in spite of having good relations with Pakistan, deterring it from pursuing the nuclear path would become a major bilateral issue during the remaining decades of the twentieth century.⁸⁵

ISSUE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY:

In the late 1970s Pakistan entered into an era of political instability with a tussle between the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Bhutto and Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Though the PPP won a thumping majority with 155 seats out of 200 National Assembly seats in 1977 general elections the PNA came on to the streets protesting that rigging had ensued the PPP success. As a result Bhutto had called the Army in under General Zia ul-Haq as Army Chief. The army involvement was construed as the denial of democracy and its suppressive nature as the detrimental to the basic human right for whose protection the Carter administration had committed.

⁸⁴ **ibid., p. 223.**

⁸⁵ **ibid., p.226.**

Before Bhutto had announced general elections on 7 January 1977 to be held later in March 1977, Ford administration was succeeded by Jimmy Carter, who advocated, during his election campaign, tougher nuclear non-proliferation stance, a more restrictive approach to arms transfers to nations of the developing world and a greater emphasis on human rights. Therefore, when Pakistan's domestic situation had worsened the Carter administration had announced that it would block the export of \$68 thousand worth of tear gas on 21 April 1977. Later on the State Department explaining reasons for the stoppage said that the supply would signal U.S. support for a repressive regime and be contrary to the administration's human rights policy. Similarly the Carter administration withdrew the offer of 110A-7 attack aircraft the had remained on that table when Gerald Ford departed the White House.⁸⁶ More than the withdrawal of the offer the most scathing thing for the Pakistan was that it was not even informed⁸⁷. They were come to know only from the press. Added to this another important incident took place in the year 1977. The political impasse, a fight between PPP and PNA, was not broken. Hence it forced General Zia ul-Haq to impose Martial Law on 5 July 1977 under the name of 'Operation Fair Play.'⁸⁸ As a result the military took over the administration for the third time since Pakistan gained independence and for the first time, most importantly, ousted an elected government⁸⁹

By this time Pakistan started rigorously bargaining for a French fuel reprocessing plant, hence the U.S. administration's main worry has been to stop Pakistan's nuclearisation. But even after the military take over Zia u1-Haq had not changed Pakistan's nuclear policy. As a result Joseph Nye, the State Department's nuclear specialist warned in his September, 1977 trip to Pakistan that, if Pakistan persisted with the French fuel reprocessing project, the U.S. would have to cut off

⁸⁶ Thomas P. Thorton, "Between Two Stools? : U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan in the Carter Administration", *Asian Survey*, October, 1982, pp. 959-77.

⁸⁷ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p.226.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p.233.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p 235.

economic assistance under the Glen amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment barred U.S. aid to countries that had not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and that imported nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. In spite of all these, Pakistan had not stopped its clandestine nuclearisation. On 6 April 1979, just two days after Bhutto's execution, on the basis of 1973 constitution which imposed death penalty for the charges of murder and 'other high crimes', the State Department announced its suspension of aid.⁹⁰ A month earlier, after the U.S. intelligence community had concluded that Pakistan was covertly pursuing the enriched-uranium path towards a nuclear explosive capability. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher had stopped in Islamabad during a trip to South Asia to alert Zia to the possible renewed suspension of aid. Christopher had advised that the United States would have to take this action in pursuant to the Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act unless President Carter received reliable assurances that Pakistan was not seeking a nuclear weapon. Zia promptly assured Christopher that the programme was entirely peaceful but refused to rule out peaceful nuclear tests and was unwilling to accept international safeguards on Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Hence the Carter administration found Zia's response inadequate and suspended economic aid a second time. Thus the nuclear issue had created a great friction in their bilateral relations.

THAW IN U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DUE TO AFGHANISTAN INVASION:

However, the incidents in the succeeding years of 1979 were a turning point in the U.S.-Pakistan relations. The 1978 revolution in Iran, the coup in Kabul and the Soviet Army's penetration into Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 have altered the security environment in the region⁹¹ forcing the United States dwell less heavily on the Pakistan's nuclear issue. As a result of Soviet invasion Pakistan was once again viewed as a frontline state against the Soviet

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p.238.

⁹¹ Mohamad Ayub, "India, Pakistan And Super Power Rivalry", *The World Today*, vol. 38, no. 15, May 1982, p.201.

expansionism. Subsequently in opposing the Soviet army, Washington required Pakistan's cooperation. Delighted by the rare opportunity the Pakistanis demanded for more economic and security assistance since its cooperation involved these costs. Therefore, on 14 January 1980 the Carter administration announced an assistance package of \$400 million in economic and security aid package rejuvenated General Zia, speaking to the press on 18 January 1980, termed the assistance as 'peanuts'.

Even though Zia ul-Haq had a bitter experience with the Carter administration over his country's nuclear issue, democratic rights and sub-subsequent meager aid package, he had a ray of hope in seeing a new President's arrival in the Capital Hill. The Reagan administration taking oath on 21 January 1981 had promised higher defence expenditures and a more vigorous foreign policy in response to the US Soviet advances in the third world like Afghanistan. The new regime therefore, started regarding the former most allied ally as a potentially key partner in opposing the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The new administration had also believed that Pakistan deserved far more U.S. support than the previous Carter administration had offered. Hence in September 1981, because of the primacy of Afghanistan, Zia's peaceful assurances on nuclear issue, human right and democracy, the Reagan administration negotiated a \$3.2 billion five year 'economic and military package'⁹² to Pakistan. The United States Congress also facilitated the resumption of aid in December by adding section 620E to the Foreign Assistance Act, giving the President authority to waive section 669 for six years in the case of Pakistan, on the grounds of national interests.⁹³ Therefore, in subsequent years, thus with the invasion of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Pakistan became funnel of arms supplies to Afghan resistance.

⁹² John Hoff, "How the United States Sold Its Soul To Win The Cold War", *International Journal*, vol. 3, Summer 2001, p. 376.

⁹³ See Congressional Research Service, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, June 21, 2001, p.2.

CONTINUING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME ISSUE:

Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in the U.S. Congress remained concerned about Pakistan's nuclear program. Their concerns were based on evidence of U.S. export control violations that suggested the Pakistan's crash programme to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Consequently in 1985, Section 620 E(e) was added to the Foreign Assistant Act.⁹⁴ This addition further made the requirement of the President to clarify to congress that Pakistan does not posses a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be provided. Interestingly the Pressler amendment [section 620 E(e)] represented a compromise between those in Congress who thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuing to develop its nuclear option and those who favoured continued support for Pakistan's role in opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.⁹⁵ Yet amidst this controversy a further \$ 4 billion aid package for five years was signed in 1986. In the same spirit, the Congress also doubled the level of U.S. funding for the covert anti-Soviet programme from \$300 million to 600 million annually.

However, from 1986 onwards, with the introduction of Stinger Missiles to the fighting Afghan Mujahideens and subsequent casualties, the Soviet forces were demoralized in Afghanistan. The casualties were unbearable to the extent of forcing the Soviets to withdraw slowly by the end of May 1988. By September 1991 also the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed that they would both stop the supply of military equipment to Afghanistan. The accord reached between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze rang down the curtain on one of the last remaining U.S.-Soviet cold war confrontations. With this action, Washington effectively washed its hands off Afghanistan.⁹⁶ Therefore, the Afghan crisis became third tier foreign policy issue. Afghanistan suddenly became no longer the U.S. primacy. Similarly the Bush administration almost confirmed the

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p.4.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.4.

⁹⁶ George Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade", *Asian Survey*, April, 1980, pp.400-14.

involvement of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) with groups involved in the Kashmir insurgency had further landed Pakistan on the verge of 'terrorist state.'⁹⁷

Therefore, once again the Pakistan's nuclear issue started coming under close U.S. scrutiny. As a result, in October 1990, President Bush suspended aid to Pakistan, as per the previous legislations, because he was unable to make the necessary clarification to Congress. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic and military aid to Pakistan was stopped. It also led to the suspension of major military equipment. The sole exemption was the narcotics assistance of \$ 3-5 billion, administered by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. In 1992, the Congress also partially relaxed the scope of aid cut off to allow for P.L. 480 food assistance and continuing support for non-governmental organizations. The P.L. 480 food aid totalled about \$ 5 million in both Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998.⁹⁸ The foreign operations appropriations act for fiscal year 1996 further included an amendment introduced by Senator Hank Brown that allowed a one-time release to Pakistan of \$ 368 million in military hardware ordered before the 1990 aid cutoff.⁹⁹

By all these sanctions and exemptions the United States wanted to send a serious signal to Pakistan. Hence one of the most serious consequences for Pakistan was the non-delivery of some 71, F-16 fighter aircraft ordered in 1989. These equipment was thought, in the US view, to be the main element of air force of Pakistan.¹⁰⁰

By the time George Bush Senior Sr. left office in 1993. 'The glue of the cold war for a common struggle against the occupation of Afghanistan was also weakening the U.S.-Pakistan ties.'¹⁰¹ For the Pakistanis, having been disappointed, charged that the United States

⁹⁷ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p.316.

⁹⁸ See Congressional Research Service, *op cit.*, p.4.

⁹⁹ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p. 329-330.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p.327.

¹⁰¹ Thomas P. Thorton, "The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistan Relations", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1989, pp. 142-59.

had once more, as in 1965, proved to be a fickle friend.¹⁰² The Pakistani observers also commented acidly, 'with the end of Afghan war the United States no longer need[s] Pakistan. 'You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex.'¹⁰³ Added to this, the election of Bill Clinton as the President had further disappointed the Pakistanis.

PAKISTAN'S UNCOMPROMISING NUCLEAR PROGRAMME:

The incoming president, like Jimmy Carter, had stated that he would be focusing on the nuclear non proliferation, human rights, democratic governance and terrorism.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile the Clinton administration took up where his predecessor had left off the terrorism issue. In the Bush administration waning days, renewed reports of the involvement of Pakistani's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) with groups involved in the Kashmir insurgency had created trouble. Adding to this friction was the newly elected Prime Minister, on 6th October, 1993, Benazir Bhutto's statement which said, '[R]olling back the nuclear programme is not feasible... The nuclear programme is linked with the Jammu and Kashmir issue'.¹⁰⁵

However, in March 1994 determined Clinton administration had launched a fresh nuclear non proliferation initiative. He announced his willingness to seek Congressional approval to deliver the embargoed F-16s, if Pakistan agreed to cap its nuclear programme and accept what they described as 'no intrusive' verification.¹⁰⁶ In spite of its rhetoric about a more vigorous nuclear non-proliferation policy, the Clinton administration was shelving the unrealistic goal of rolling back the Pakistani capability and signaling its willingness to live with a freeze in the programme, something which the Pakistanis had previously offered. On the Pakistan side, the then chief of Army Staff, Gen. Abdul Waheed, who was visiting the United States, made clear his opposition. The army chief declared that the military would not 'bargain away Pakistan's

¹⁰² Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p.361.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p. 365.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas P. Thorton, *op cit.*, p. 959-77.

¹⁰⁵ Dennis kux, *op cit.*, p.325..

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p. 327.

nuclear programme for F-16s or anything else.¹⁰⁷ He also declared that if the country's political leadership reaches a compromise, the army would certainly make its views known. This statement, in the context of army's power wielding role, can be construed as a threat declaration. Even in any case, after India reacted sharply, the proposal was doomed to fail in Pakistan, even if the army responded positively. Traditionally, Islamabad had refused to agree to non proliferation measures unless India also accepted them. Benazir Bhutto told Talbot, 'if we are unilaterally pressed for the capping, it will be discriminatory and Pakistan will not agree to it'.¹⁰⁸

IMPROVED U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

While Pakistan was making its nuclear intentions clear, the Clinton administration officials were making pro-Pakistan statements. Most important among them were the Robin Raphel and Secretary of Defence William Perry. The former stated that the U.S. had never accepted the accession of Kashmir to India while the latter was insisting Pentagon to consider Pakistan as a long time friend, who will potentially be a helpful partner in Western Asia and the Middle East and an important source of forces for burgeoning UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁰⁹ As a result when Perry visited Islamabad in January 1995, he was the first U.S. official in several years to suggest any steps to rebuild security cooperation. The Secretary of Defence also proposed reviving the Pakistan-U.S. consultative group, which had been established during the Afghan war as a vehicle for senior military to military discussions. Further the arrest of Ramzi Yusuf in February 1995, an Islamic militant believed to be the mastermind behind the February 26, 1993 terrorist bombing of World Trade Centre. His deportation was well appreciated in Washington.¹¹⁰ Therefore, the Brown Act was amended

¹⁰⁷ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p.329.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p.327.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Van Hollen, "Leaning on Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 38, 1980, pp. 35-50.

¹¹⁰ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p.329.

on September 25, 1995 to give the President discretionary powers in transfer of economic and military aid to any country including F-16s.

Hence by March 1996, inspite of Pakistan's internal ethnic clashes and the ring-magnet transactions from Beijing, Washington felt sufficiently comfortable with Pakistan's situation. Thus subsequently it moved ahead to implement a major element of the Brown amendment.¹¹¹ The implementation of the amendment had facilitated the U.S. to release \$368 million military equipment frozen by the Pressler amendment. It also facilitated the refund of \$ 120 million for items paid for but not produced before the 1990 sanctions took effect.

U.S. TILT TOWARDS INDIA:

Finally, the U.S. Pakistan bilateral relations were cordial during Clinton's first four years. But Clinton in his second term shifted U.S. foreign policy focus from the Pakistan centric to India centric. Hence, it made Islamabad to judge that the Clinton administration had only marginal interests in better relations and mainly was interested in improving U.S.-India ties. Notwithstanding the passage of the Brown amendment, Washington had to pay Pakistan for the undelivered F-16 aircrafts. The Pressler arms embargo remained intact. The U.S. government, having done little to assist Pakistan faltering economy, was becoming increasingly unhappy about Islamabad's support for the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan. It was also critical of Pakistan's involvement with the insurgents in Kashmir. In April 1998, Pakistan on its part imported missiles causing more trouble. This time, North Korea, not China, was the culprit. Early in the year, the U.S. intelligence community also concluded that Pakistan had imported North Korean technology to develop a medium-range missile.

The missiles were successfully fired over a range of nine hundred kilometers on April 6, 1998. Hence rejecting the Pakistani position, the U.S. government proceeded to impose sanctions against North Korea and Khan Research Laboratories, where the missile's were produced. These sanction's have reportedly had symbolic effect, since earlier

¹¹¹ *ibid.*, p.330.

sanctions had already barred dealing with the United States. Adding up to these frictions Pakistan had conducted six nuclear detonations on 28-31 May 1998. Pakistan claimed that these tests were conducted in response to India's which were conducted on 12-13 May 1998.¹¹²

The Inter Service Intelligence's support for the Taliban had also, by this time, become a significant source of friction with the U.S. After the Taliban gained power, they continued to allow Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian, to use their territory as a base for organizing terrorist activities on U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Therefore on 21 August 1998, the United States struck back. The U.S. Navy warships launched cruise missiles against Bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. More than the attacks on Afghanistan, what seems to have insulted the Pakistanis was that it was not even informed for air-space violation by the U.S. missiles.

The Clinton government also imposed economic and military sanctions, on 13 May 1998 on India and Pakistan, on 30 May 1998. These sanctions were mandated by Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act.¹¹³

The year 1999 was the most important as far as U.S. shift is concerned in South Asia. At the start of 1999, President Clinton had sent Talbot to have nuclear discussions with both Pakistan and India. Talks were held in Islamabad. The Talbot team had proposed a nuclear outline under which the U.S. would seek lifting of all sanctions against Pakistan, including the presser amendment, if Islamabad would sign the CTBT. The team also laid down certain conditions. They were that Pakistan should stop its missile cooperation with North Korea, agree to participate in the multilateral negotiations to ban the production of fissile material, and put in place a comprehensive nuclear export control regime.¹¹⁴ But the Pakistan response was that India should take the lead before Pakistan would do so.

¹¹² See for more details Ashlis J. Tellis's, *India Emerging Nuclear Posture Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹¹³ See Congressional Research Services, *op cit.*, p. 7

¹¹⁴ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p. 351.

Their relations were further strained when Pakistan reciprocated India's move, in February 1999, of Lahore Declaration with a military invasion into Kargil in May 1999. The U.S. government worry was that India might broaden the conflict by striking across the line of control in an effort to cut off the intruders. Washington also worried that the conflict might snowball into a nuclear war, since both the countries were having the 'nukes'.¹¹⁵

However, the conflict was resolved when Clinton urged Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 4 July 1999 to order the withdrawal of army backed infiltrators. The taking back of government support to the infiltrators led to the 12 October 2000 military coup by General Pervez Musharraf. This was seen as a tussle over the responsibility of the Kargil.

In the end it appears very appropriate to say that the more the Pakistan defied the U.S. the more it was neglected. Its relevance appears to have been diminishing after 1971. Though inevitable, the peak stage of its being ignored is completed with Clinton's five hours stay in Pakistan in contrast with his five days visit in India on 25 March 2000.

But, thanks to the terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, once again Pakistan occupied the U.S. global strategic screen becoming a frontline state in the subsequent U.S. global war against the terrorism.

CONCLUSION:

Unknown to each other by any common objectives by 1947 both America and Pakistan came closer through security alliances on the premise of containing the spread of communism. But their priorities differed. If countering communism remained the U.S. main objective, the achievement of Kashmir, through applying its security guarantor's political, diplomatic, and military force had been Pakistan's first priority. This had been evident during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, 1965 India-Pakistan war, and 1971 Bangladesh war. The U.S. Pakistan U-turn

¹¹⁵ Dennis Kux, *op cit.*, p. 352.

completed its circle during the May 1998 when the Pakistan was embargoed on nuclear missile non-proliferation.

In fact the Pakistanis have attached great importance for their durable security alliance with America. Where as the American's primary objective has been their national interests rather than anything permanent. In spite of all these ups and downs in their relations it was said that Pakistan's fate has been determined by three As: Allah, Army and America.

But the U.S. continues to prove the Lord Palmerston's famous words that there are no permanent friends and foes in international politics, only the permanent interests. In short the attitude of America can be described in Henry Kissinger's words where he says that America's friends have suffered more than America's enemies in its global politics. This can be construed from the way they have been moving closer towards India and China in Asia. Hence the Pakistanis complain that the United States has used them like a 'Cleenex' after every major international trouble to the U.S.

Chapter - II

CHAPTER – 2

EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM : SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 AND U.S. FORMATION OF A GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM WITH PAKISTAN AS A FRONTLINE STATE

CONCEPT, ORIGIN, NATURE AND PURPOSE OF TERRORISM:

Terrorism is an act of 'violence'.¹ But it is used for a particular 'purpose'². Any one who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation is called a terrorist. The purpose may be creating fear among people or forcing the government to accept terrorist's views. But most of the time the terrorist purpose remains the acquisition of power. They want to use this power to achieve 'change'.³ However, their stated objectives have ranged from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution.⁴

The main characteristics of modern version of terrorism are that it is a well planned, calculated, and a systematic act apart from the use of sophisticated technology.

The definition of the word terrorism and its connotation has changed from time to time. The word 'terrorism' conveyed a positive meaning when it was used by the French government as an instrument of establishing order in the post 1789 anarchical domestic upheaval.⁵ It was designed to consolidate the new government's power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new French regime regarded as 'enemies of the people'.⁶

¹ Michael Walzer, "Five Questions About Terrorism" *Dissent*, Winter, 2002, p.5.

² Kanti P. Bajpai, *Roots of Terrorism* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002), p.6.

³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New Delhi: Columbia University Press, 1998), p.14.

⁴ An address by U.S. Secretary Shulz, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies", before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, U.S. Department of State (Washington D.C., June 24, 1984), p.2

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *op cit.*, p.14.

⁶ *ibid.*, p.15.

Furthermore, the French Revolution's 'terrorism did not share at least two key characteristics' in common with its modern day variant. Firstly, the then French government's use of 'terrorism' was neither random nor indiscriminate, as terrorism is often portrayed today.⁷ It was, when meant for the maintenance of domestic order, organised, deliberate and systematic. Secondly, its goal and its very justification was the creation of a 'new and better society' in place of a fundamentally corrupt and undemocratic political system.⁸ This is the most important characteristic which is clearly in contrast to the modern day narrow ideals of religious terrorism.

However different terrorist organisations and terrorists have come up in time and space but their aims have been always for a change. Therefore, Robespierre's revolution's central goals were similar in tone and content to the manifestos issued by the many contemporary revolutionary terrorist organisations. For example, in 1794 Robespierre declared, in language eerily presaging the communiqués issued by groups such as Germany's Red Army Faction and Italy's Red Brigades nearly two centuries later;

We want an order of things... in which the arts are an adornment to the liberty that enables them, and commerce the source of wealth for the public and not of monstrous opulence for a few families... In our country we desire morality instead of selfishness, honesty and not mere 'honor', principle not mere custom, duty not mere propriety, the sway of reason rather than the tyranny of fashion, a scorn for vice and not a contempt for the unfortunate...⁹

The origin of terrorism can be traced back to the French Revolution. Its more enduring repercussion was the impetus it gave to anti-monarchical sentiments elsewhere in Europe. Popular subservience to rulers, who had derived their authority from God through 'divine right of rule' not from their subjects, was increasingly questioned by a politically awakened continent. The advent of nationalism and with it the notions of statehood and citizenship based on the common identity

⁷ Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1971), pp.8-14.

⁸ *ibid*, p.16

⁹ *ibid.*, p.16.

of people rather than the lineage of a royal family were resulting in the unification and creation of new nation-states such as Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, the massive socio-economic changes engendered by the industrial revolution were creating new universalist ideologies. These common ideologies, such as Communism, were born of the alienation and exploitative conditions of nineteenth century Capitalism. From this milieu a new era of terrorism emerged. The same concept had gained many of the familiar revolutionary, anti-state connotations of today.

But primarily the Italian republican extremist Carlo Pisacane was seen as the chief progenitor of terrorism.¹⁰ Pisacane, apart from his theory of 'propaganda by deed', believed that 'ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former'.¹¹ Therefore, he believed that the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free.¹² He believed in violence. Hence he argued that violence was necessary to draw attention to generate publicity for a cause. He further could see violence as a means to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution. Pisacane seems to have found difficulty in finding an alternative to violence. Therefore he said that the purpose of violence can never be effectively replaced by pamphlets, wall posters or assemblies.¹³

If Italy was the first country through Pisacane to have founded terrorism, Russia was the other country which founded the first terrorist organisation. A small group of Russian constitutionalists, Narodnaya Volya or People's Will, founded in 1878 was the first organisation to put into practice Pisacane's dictum to challenge the tsarist rule.¹⁴

But interestingly the earlier terrorist organisations like Narodnaya and its successor groups were discriminate in their selection of

¹⁰ **ibid., p.17.**

¹¹ **ibid., p.17**

¹² **Quoted in George Woodcock (ed.), *The Anarchist Reader* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), pp. 43-44.**

¹³ **Bruce Hoffman, op cit., p.17.**

¹⁴ **ibid., p.18.**

targets.¹⁵ An intrinsic element in the group's collective belief was that not one drop of superfluous blood should be shed in pursuit of aims, however, noble or utilitarian they may be. Their strong adherence to this principle is best illustrated by the failed attempt on the life of the Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich made by a successor organisation to the Narodnaya Volya in 1905.¹⁶ As the royal carriage came into view, the terrorist tasked with the assassination saw that the duke was unexpectedly by accompanied by his children. Therefore, the terrorist group aborted its mission rather than risk harming the intended victim's family.¹⁷ This is in clear contrast to the mid-air explosion caused by a terrorist bomb on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. This indiscriminately executed act claimed the lives of all 259 persons on board. It included men, women, and children plus eleven inhabitants of the village on which the plane crashed.¹⁸

In the 1880s and 1990s, militant Armanian nationalist movements in eastern Turkey pursued a terrorist strategy against continued Ottoman rule.¹⁹ The same strategy would later be adopted by most of the post Second World War ethno-nationalist and separatist movements.²⁰ Therefore, on the eve of the First World War, terrorism still retained its revolutionary connotations.

The events immediately preceding the First World War in Bosnia became famous because of their subsequent impact on world affairs.²¹ There, the groups of disaffected nationalists including Bosnian Serb intellectuals, university students and even school children, collectively known as Mlada Bosna or Young Bosnians, arose against the continuing Habsburg suzerainily.²² Interestingly, it was a member of Young Bosnia,

¹⁵ **ibid., p.18.**

¹⁶ **ibid., p.18.**

¹⁷ **ibid., p.18.**

¹⁸ **ibid., p.18.**

¹⁹ **See Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1987), pp. 11-13.**

²⁰ **Kanti P. Bajpai, op cit., p.7.**

²¹ **Walter Laquer, op cit., p.19-20.**

²² **Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (London: Weidenfeld Press, 1966), p.180.**

Gavrilo Princip, who is credited with having set in motion the chain of events that began on 28 June 1914, when he assassinated the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.²³ And the same incident culminated in the outbreak of First World War.²⁴

But by 1930s, the meaning of terrorism had changed. During this period it was used less to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed against governments and their leaders as analysed above. But in contrast it was used more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens. Thus the term regained its former connotations of abuse of power by governments. Hence it was applied more specifically by authoritarian regimes that had come to power in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.²⁵ The most sinister dimension of this 'terror' were that it became intrinsic components of Fascist and Nazi governance.²⁶ They have executed their policies at the behest of, and in complete subservience to, the ruling political parties of the land. These countries have also arrogated to themselves the complete, total control of their people.

During the same period the violence as an instrument was used not only against other states but to seize total power within the country by a totalitarian authority. Therefore Stalin's 'political purges' were a conspiracy for acquiring total control resulting in the death, exile, imprisonment, and forcible impressments of millions.²⁷ Certainly, thereafter similar forms of state directed violence and 'terror' against a government's own citizens continued. Therefore, the use of 'death squads'²⁸ to intimidate political opponents, human rights activities, students groups, labour organisation, journalists, and others has been a

²³ *ibid.*, pp.181-82.

²⁴ Imanuel Geiss (ed.), *July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1967), p.52.

²⁵ Alam Bullock, *Hitler: A Study of Tyranny* (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 239-40.

²⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *op cit.*, p.24.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.25.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.25.

prominent feature of the right-wing military dictatorship that took power in Argentina, Chile, and Greece during the 1970.

And also surprisingly violence as an instrument through the 'death squads' was used against elected governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru since the mid 1980s.²⁹ But these state-sanctioned and explicitly ordered acts of internal political violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own citizenry are generally termed 'terror' in order to distinguish that phenomenon from 'terrorism', which is understood to be committed by non-state entities.

Though it may be paradoxical but following the Second World War the meaning of the word 'terrorism' regained the revolutionary connotations with which it is most commonly associated today. At that period, the term was used primarily in reference to the violent revolts, then being prosecuted, by the various indigenous nationalist and anti-colonialist groups that emerged in Asia, Africa and the Middle East during the late 1940s and 1950s, to oppose continued European rule. Countries as diverse as India, Kenya, Algeria, Cyprus and Israel, for example, owe their independence at least in part to nationalist political movements that employed terrorism against colonial powers. It was also during the same period that the 'politically correct' appellation of 'freedom fighters' came into being.³⁰ This was a result of the political legitimacy that the international community accorded to struggles for national liberation and self-determination movements. Therefore many newly independent Third World Countries and Communist bloc states, in particular, have adopted this model. They argued that anyone or any movement that fought against colonial oppression of Western domination should not be described as terrorists. Instead they were properly to be deemed as 'freedom fighters'.³¹ Hence this position was perhaps most famously explained by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yassir Arafat, when he addressed the

²⁹ **ibid.**, p.25.

³⁰ **ibid.**, p.26.

³¹ **ibid.**, p.26.

United Nations General Assembly in November 1974. His statement runs in the following way;

The difference lies in the reason or which each fights. For whoever stands by just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers, and the colonialists, can't possibly be called terrorist...³²

During the late 1960s and 1970s, terrorism continued to be viewed within a revolutionary context. However, this usage also now expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups, outside a colonial or neo-colonial framework, as well as radical, entirely ideologically motivated organisations. Disenfranchised and exiled nationalist minorities like PLO, and the Quebecois Separatist Group FLQ (Front de Liberation due Quebec), have adopted terrorism as a means to draw attention to themselves and their respective causes. But most of the time with the specific aim, like their anti-colonial predecessors, of attracting international sympathy and support. During the same period various left-wing political extremists, drawn from Communist movements in Western Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and Asia came into existence. These organisations began to form terrorist groups opposing American intervention in Vietnam and what they claimed were the irredeemable social and economic inequities of the modern capitalist liberal-democratic state.³³ In the early 1980s, for example, terrorism came to be regarded as a calculated means to destabilize the West as a part of global conspiracy. There were increasing suspicions that these plots were orchestrated by Kremlin and implemented by its Warsaw Pact client states, to destroy the free world.³⁴

By the middle of the 1980s a series of suicide bombings directed mostly against American diplomatic and military targets in the Middle East was focusing attention on the rising threat of state sponsored

³² Yassir Arafat's, "Address to the UN General Assembly (November 13, 1974)" quoted in Walter Laquer (ed.), *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Bantam Press, 1976), p.510.

³³ Seweryn Blair and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Global Rivals* (New York: Vintage Books Press, 1988), pp.130-171. Also see, David Held's *Political Theory and the Modern State* (New Delhi: Worldview Publication, 1998).

³⁴ See Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane Russak Press, 1984).

terrorism. Consequently this phenomenon, whereby various renegade foreign governments such as regimes in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria became actively involved in sponsoring terrorist acts. Interestingly these terrorist actions replaced Communist conspiracy theories as the main context within which terrorism was viewed. Therefore, terrorism became associated with a type of covert warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution.³⁵

Thus terrorism is an act of the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of a political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is also specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victims. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider target audience that might include a mere ritual group. Sometimes it may be an entire country, a national government, political party and public opinion in general.³⁶

Therefore, terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through publicity generated by their violence, terrorist seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.³⁷

US AS THE CREATOR OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM:

The global phenomenon of Islamic terrorism has been rooted not so much in a different civilisational or theological ethos as in the mundane matrix of US-led global geopolitics.³⁸ The U.S. helped the birth and nourishment of Israel on the sacred Arab soil. This creation may be due to its domestic compulsions as well as oil interest but its exercise incurred the enormous wrath of Arab Muslims. The

³⁵ Brian Michael Jenkins, *International Terrorism: The Other World War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1985), pp. 19-20.

³⁶ Bruce Haffman, *op cit.*, p.43.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.44.

³⁸ D.L. Choudhury, "The United States and Terrorism: Post-September 11, 2001 Syndrome", *India Quarterly*, vol. LVII, no. 4, October-December, 2001, pp.3-4.

consequence of the birth of Israel with overt American support was that the Palestinians were dislodged from their homeland and were forced to become refugees in their neighbourhood.³⁹ Obviously, it hurt the religious sentiments of the Arab Muslims apart from other problems it created. Consequently the slogan Islam in danger was raised by the religious zealots and it was resolved to regain the homeland of the Palestinians by means of militancy and terrorism.⁴⁰ Here, it was marked the birth of Islamic terrorism which has been vigorously nurtured since then in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict.⁴¹ However, subsequently religion has often been the primary motivation igniting international terrorism. But the explanation of its rise is to be found in the forces of geopolitics and political economy. Most of the Muslims and Arabs are unhappy with the US extending unequivocal support to Israel and the so called moderate, yet authoritarian Arab and Gulf regimes that are insensitive to democracy and inattentive to civil rights. They have been called the 'stooges of western imperialism'.⁴²

RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF TERRORISM AND IRANIAN REVOLUTION:

It is perhaps not surprising that religion should become a far more popular motivation for terrorism in the post Cold War era. This has been on the rise ever since the old Marxist-Leninist ideologies lie discredited with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist ideology.⁴³ The religious factor started increasing when the promise of munificent benefits from the liberal-democratic and capitalist state, apparently triumphant at what Francis Fukuyama in his famous aphorism has termed the end of history, fails to materialise in many third world countries throughout the world.⁴⁴

³⁹ *The Economist*, September 22, 2001, p.10.

⁴⁰ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 6, November-December, 2002, p.75.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.76.

⁴² *ibid.*, p.76.

⁴³ Bruce Hoffman, *op cit.*, p.92.

⁴⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington's book, *the Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Press, 1997).

The salience of religion as the major driving force behind international terrorism in the 1990s is further evidenced by the fact that the most serious terrorist acts of the post Cold War decade have all had a significant religious dimension. As a result the religion instigated terrorist attacks have been on the rise. Among all the most prominent one's was the 1993 bombing of New York City's World Trade Centre by Islamic radicals. They have deliberately attempted to topple one of the twin towers on to the other. Reportedly they were also simultaneously releasing a deadly cloud of poisonous gas.

And similarly the Iranian revolution was held up as an example to Muslims throughout the world. The revolution was to exhort them to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Quran and to resist the intrusion of Western influence into the Middle East. This stance reflects the beliefs and history of Shia Islam as interpreted by Khomeini and subscribed to by his followers in Iran and other Middle Eastern Countries. It begins with the notion of the Shia as a centuries-old minority within Islam being persecuted because of its special knowledge. The community also entails an unswerving conviction of the inherent illegitimacy of all secular governments. Under this rationale, legitimacy can be conferred only through the adoption of Islamic law in order to facilitate the return of the Prophet Mohammad to earth as the Messiah.

Accordingly, Iran is the only state to have begun the process of redemption by creating a true Islamic state, it must be the advocate for the oppressed and aggrieved everywhere. As a result violence and coercion are not only permissible to achieve the worldwide spread of Islamic law, but a necessary means to this divinely sanctioned end.

The sense of alienation and of the necessity for far-reaching changes in the world order is apparent in the words of a number of Shia theologians. As a result a Shia scholar Ayatollah Baqer-Sadr explained;

The world as it is today is how others shaped it. We have two choice: either to accept it with submission, which means letting

Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires.⁴⁵

Similarly another Shia scholar Mustafa Chamran has also stated;

We are not fighting within the rules of the world as it exists today. We reject all those rules.⁴⁶

Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah who was also the victim of Israeli helicopter-borne assassination in 1992, once remarked;

We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.⁴⁷

These statements also reflect the Shia's perception of encirclement and concomitant predatory defensiveness. As a result a 1985 communiqué from the Lebanese Shia terrorist group of the same name declared;

We, the sons of the community of Hezbollah [the party of God], consider ourselves a part of the world Islamic community, attacked at once by the tyrants and the arrogant of the East and the West... our way is one of radical combat against depravity and America is the original root of depravity.⁴⁸

The Hezbollah perceives itself as fighting an entirely self-defensive struggle, sanctioned by God, is also evident in the pronouncements of the group's spiritual leaders, Sheikh Muhammad Hussain Fadlallah. In this context Fadlallah pointed out, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the embodiment of the West's hostility to revolutionary Islam;

This invasion was confronted by the Islamic factor, which had its roots in the Islamic Revolution in Iran. And throughout these affairs, America was the common denominator. America was generally perceived as the great nemesis behind the problems of the region, due to its support for Israel and many local reactionary regimes, and because it distanced itself from all causes of liberty and freedom in the area.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Steven Simon, "The Terrorism : Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe," *Brookings Review*, Winter 2003, p.19.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Quoted in Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism* (London: Sphere, 1987),pp.7-8.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.97.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.97.

PAKISTAN AS CREATOR OF TALIBAN:

The Taliban had emerged from anonymity in 1993. Though this was possible because of Pakistan's official tacit infrastructural support. In the span of four years they had radically changed the complexion of the Afghan civil war by becoming the notable political elite.⁵⁰ Essentially, Taliban grew out of the turf battle between the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Interior Ministry in Islamabad during Benazir Bhutto's second term.⁵¹ The establishment had resisted their creation and reportedly criticised Benazir Bhutto for the use of the Taliban for their November 1994 operation in rescuing the trade caravan on its way to Central Asia that had been captured by the local warlord of Khandahar. The ISI which had run the Afghan operations with complete autonomy since the late 1970s, was averse to the Taliban because they had continued to pin faith on the Hizb-i-Islami under Hekmatyar to dislodge the Rabbani government.⁵² More importantly, the ISI viewed the Taliban as yet another Benazir Bhutto ploy to reduce its role. But Major General (Retd.) Nasrullah Baber had relentlessly pursued the Taliban options. Despite persistent denials by the Benazir Bhutto governments there was little doubt that the Taliban have been created, trained and equipped by the ISI and Interior Ministry officials.⁵³

Accordingly to some estimates, the Taliban required \$ 70 million on a monthly basis to keep the militia in functional order. And a major part of this money was provided from across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The purchases by the Taliban of tanks, artillery, and armoured personnel carriers had come from illegal tax checkpoints that have been raised along the trade routes linking Pakistan to the central Asian Republics.⁵⁴ The Taliban had become a more cohesive force, stocked

⁵⁰ Shaukat Qadir, "The Concept of International Terrorism", *The Round Table*, 2001, p. 335.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.336.

⁵² Sunita Kumar, "Pakistan's Goals and Strategies in Afghanistan", *Strategic Analysis*, January-February, 1997, pp.1450-62.

⁵³ Sreedhar, "The Taliban Factor in the Ongoing Civil War", *Strategic Analysis*, January-February, 1997, pp.1470-72.

⁵⁴ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) September 26, 1995.

with adequate weapons, including Air Force, as a result of the ISI's vigorous assistance. There had been reports that Pakistani Army Personnel were present in Taliban ranks, taking part in operational missions.⁵⁵

The nucleus for the Taliban had been Afghan *Talibs* who were studying in large numbers of *madrassas* throughout Pakistan.⁵⁶ Studying in *madrassas* offered a way out of the dreary living conditions inside Afghanistan. Between 1989 and 1991, a few thousand Mujahidden, disillusioned with the post-Soviet withdrawal's fighting amongst various mujahideen groups, also joined these *madrassas*. Until the emergence of the phenomenon of the Taliban, the Pakistani establishment either over estimated the various Mujahideen groups in different regions of Afghanistan or preferred to achieve their objectives by placing implicit faith of resolving the Afghan conflict in their favour by pushing Hizbi-i-Islamic under Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.⁵⁷ General Baber, therefore, perceptively recognised the role of *madrassas* in being the fertile ground for indoctrinating the Afghan *Talibs* to find a new way of establishing a new order. Close interaction with numerous *madrassas* all over Pakistan and specially those belonging to the Deobandi denomination saw the first beginning of a new puritanical group that would seek to cleanse the country of its corrupt Mujahideen leaders.

At the same time, there was realisation in Islamabad which questioned the ability of major Mujahideen factions to retain fighters. Surplus weapons or religious ideology were no longer inducing these fighters to remain loyal to faction leaders. Like all protracted civil war conditions the only manner in which the leaders could retain their loyalty was through money. This condition had become evident in Afghanistan from 1993 when reports of the growing role of faction leaders in playing in the volatile money markets of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Peshawar became well known. It was also during Najibullah's post-Soviet rule that frequent desertions by local

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ Jessica Stern, "Preparing for a War on Terrorism", *Current History*, November, 2001, p.356.

⁵⁷ *The News (Islamabad)*, March 18, 1997.

commanders became common practice. Najibullah used it with great success to repulse Pakistan in Jalalabad and Khost in 1992.

As a result, when the Taliban, supported by Islamabad, entered the Afghan arena, there was a clear strategy of targetting local commanders of regional warlords in a piecemeal fashion.⁵⁸ This would explain in large measure their blitz through Southern and Central Afghanistan, capturing 14 provinces without encountering resistance.⁵⁹ Even in 1997, this policy had been pursued with even greater success in ensuring that their non-Pashtun opponents like Ahmad Shah Masood, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Karim, Khalili and Sayyad Naderi have been weakened not through battles but by desertion of men, local commanders and equipment.⁶⁰ The Taliban's entry into Salang was facilitated after a local commander, Bashir Salangi, switched sides. Similarly, in Uzbek territory, the Taliban took advantage of the brewing crisis between General Dostum and Abdul Malik to buy off the later, along with a string of his local commanders. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif and the fleeing of a once powerful Dostum took place only after his entire frontline commanders switched sides for large sums of money.

The Taliban also derive much of their religious inspiration from the Deobandi movement in Pakistan. Virtually all the Taliban leaders had been refugees in Pakistan for several years and studied in *madrassas* there affiliated with one branch or another of the Deobandhi political party Jamiat ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI).⁶¹ The same link remains important and provides new recruit to the Taliban. These *madrassas* and the political parties with which they are affiliated are also a political force in Pakistan. Through them the Taliban are linked to more extreme Sunni groups, such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba and Laskhar-i-Jhangvi. Both of which were thought to have been involved in acts of terrorism

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 1374.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 1374.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 1374.

⁶¹ Ahmad Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 6, p.25.

against Shia community in Pakistan.⁶² Many of their members were reportedly gained military experience with the Taliban.

The Taliban also received support from traders based in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi who were engaged in the transit and drug trade.⁶³ These traders include both Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns. The removal of checkpoints and the establishment of public order in Southern and Western Afghanistan were of great benefit to them.⁶⁴ These contributed to the Taliban's treasury and were regularly assessed as needs arose. Afghan, Pakistani, and Arab traders based in the United Arab Emirates have also contributed to the Taliban. These traders also affirmed their new found social status through contributions to the madrassas where Taliban are trained. They are linked to the local administrations of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, which were remunerated for permitting smuggler's markets to continue.⁶⁵ Officials of these provinces also benefited from the system of permits in force for the exports of food and fuel to the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban thus had a broad set of links to Pakistan's society and polity.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN:

Pakistan, ever since 1971 loss of East Pakistan, started continuing maneuvers in Afghanistan. It foresaw a possible future war with India on the Kashmir issue. In any case if war takes place Pakistan thought that Afghanistan can provide a 'strategic depth' against India.⁶⁶ Since Afghanistan is a sovereign country, in the case of a nuclear clash with India, Pakistan expected that it can store its nuclear arsenals in bordering Afghan provinces. This was to protect its nuclear weaponry

⁶² Vivek Kumar Mishra, "Madrassas, Military and Politics in Pakistan", *Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 10, Issue-1, January-March 2003, p.14.

⁶³ Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban", *Current History*, February, 1999, pp. 79-80.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 80.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 81.

⁶⁶ See Dennis Kux's, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001).

against India's retaliating attacks.⁶⁷ Apart from this it had also the economic interest of making Afghanistan as a conduit to central Asian oil resources.⁶⁸ In order to fulfill these objectives Pakistan sought to establish a puppet regime in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ With the same intention Pakistan had recognized the oppressive Taliban regime diplomatically.⁷⁰ Apart from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates were the other countries which have recognised the Taliban regime diplomatically. All these three countries have recognised because their interests converged on the aim of creating pure Islamic state.

OBJECTIVES OF THE TALIBAN:

The Taliban's state was supposed to run according to the *shariah*. Therefore, the Taliban regime imposed a very narrow interpretation of *shariah*. All Western technological advances including TVs, VCRs, photography and films were banned. They have gone even to the extent of destroying and publicly displaying those items. Capital punishment was imposed frequently. The position of women and children was reduced to 'pathetic proportions'.⁷¹ They imposed a strict dress code to all women, if violated, to be sprinkled acid on their faces as punishment.⁷² They have also demolished non-Islamic temples and structures. As a result they have demolished the Buddha statue in Bamiyan without heeding to the international community. But for all these actions Pakistan's, the mentor of Taliban, reaction was tacit encouragement and public denials, since itself is a theocratic state.

TALIBAN, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA NEXUS:

Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, was the creation of America's Central Intelligence Agency during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

⁶⁷ Juan Manuel Lopez Nadal, "Pakistan A Fragile Ally", *Strategic Digest*, vol. 32, no. 2, February 2002, p.250.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.253.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p.253.

⁷⁰ Samina Ahmad, "The United States and Terrorism in Southeast Asia," *International Security*, Winter 2000, p.80.

⁷¹ Aabha Dixit, "Soldiers of Islam: Origins, Ideology and Strategy of the Taliban", *Strategic Analysis*, August, 1997, p.670.

⁷² *ibid.*, p.671.

He fought against the Soviet occupation as a Mujahideen. When the Soviet withdrew from Afghanistan he went back to Saudi Arabia.

In Afghanistan, the dependent faction was the Taliban, struggling to extend its authority over the whole country and for cash.⁷³ Here Osama bin Laden provided the support to the Taliban military with reliability. Bin Laden in return got a secure base from which to carry out his war with the West. And most importantly the mutually dependent relationships were underpinned by a shared religious ideology and congruent pragmatic objectives. Al Qaeda can't operate as a hydroponic organisation living on air and water alone.⁷⁴ It needed a territorial base for training camps and safe planning headquarters, two requirements that are essential when thousands of cadre to be trained. Therefore as long as Afghanistan was at their disposal, the group controlled territory, had enforced rules, maintained armed forces, had a treasury and internal organisation, and maintained 'diplomatic relations with some states' while being able to declare war on the West and on America.⁷⁵ The Taliban and Al Qaeda also believed that the only way to bring Islamic Revolution was to attack America which will help in bringing of Islamic Revolution indirectly.

As a result Osama bin Laden issued a *fatwa* in February 1998 against 'infidel', America;

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military-is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the word of Almighty God, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together', 'and fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God'... We - with God's help - call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on

⁷³ Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban," *Current History*, February, 1999, p. 80.

⁷⁴ Michael Radu, "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, vol. 46, Spring, 2002, p.8.

⁷⁵ Steven Dimension and Daniel Benjamin, "The Terror", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 10-11.

Muslim *ulema*, leaders, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.⁷⁶

Bin Laden also spewed venom against America in a subsequent *fatwa*. He declares;

We have declared *jihad* against the US, because in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God's word is the one exalted to the height and so that we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries... the driving-away jihad against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the Arabian peninsula, but rather it must desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims in the whole World.⁷⁷

Hence inspired by these *fatwa's* the Al Qaeda terrorists have targeted the American property and civilians. Ever since the prominent U.S. financial and military symbols have become the terrorist's targets. The first terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in 1993 were a mere dress rehearsal for the calamity of September 11, 2001.⁷⁸ However the U.S. missed its warnings despite its most competent intelligence community. The attack on the World Trade Centre was not financially motivated. It was an attack on the symbols of Western society.⁷⁹

Similarly the two bombings in Saudi Arabia, one in Riyadh in November 1995, and the other on the Khobar Towers near Dhahran on June 25, 1996, killed nineteen U.S. personnel.⁸⁰ These attacks were to serve a clear signal from the terrorists that they wanted U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia. The terrorist attacks on the two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, were most vigorous and challenging.⁸¹ They killed twelve Americans and nearly three hundred Kenyans and

⁷⁶ Quoted in Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin's article, "America and the New Terrorism", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p.68.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p.68.

⁷⁸ D.L. Choudhury, *op cit.*, p.5.

⁷⁹ See Henry Kissinger's article, "America at the Apex: Empire or Leader", *The National Interest*, Summer 2001.

⁸⁰ D.L. Choudhury, *op cit.*, p.6.

⁸¹ Jessica Stern, "Preparing for a War on Terrorism", *Current History*, November 2001, p.355.

Tanzanians, and approximately five thousand were wounded.⁸² The US intelligence community acquired convincing information from reportedly reliable sources that the bombing of the two US embassies was masterminded and financed by Osama bin Laden and his terrorist outfit, the Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the US announced a reward of five million dollars on his arrest. The US Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at all the six training camps of Osama bin Laden in Khost completely destroying all of them but he was neither nabbed nor killed.⁸³ Over two dozen persons were killed, majority of them being either Pakistanis or Kashmiris, while seven Arab nationals also perished. The then US Deputy Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering, informed that the Pakistanis killed in the missile attacks were from Harkat-ul-Ansar, a terrorist organisation engaged in sending terrorists inside Kashmir. The Pakistan-backed Harkat-ul-Ansar had linkage with many foreign terrorist outfits at the global level. It was said that the missile attacks on the targets in Afghanistan served no setbacks to terrorists led by Osama bin Laden. Rather their menace was all the more intensified. It ought to be remembered that it was at Khost in Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden announced the launching of his international *Islamic jihad* against America and Israel in his famous press conference held in May 1998 to issue of *fatwa*.⁸⁴ The conference was reportedly attended by volunteers from most of the Arab countries, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Sudan. The daring attack by two Arab men in a motorised skiff on the *USS Cole* completely crippling it when it docked in Aden to refuel on October 12, 2000 illuminated the US security dilemma in the Persian Gulf.⁸⁵ Its message was clear. The US presence in the Persian Gulf was under attack.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE US:

On this day terrorist have hijacked two passenger airplanes and directed to crash into world Trade Centre and the pentagon five

⁸² D.L. Choudhury, *op cit.*, p.6.

⁸³ *ibid.*, p.6.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p.6.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p.6.

thousands and one hundred eighty nine people died respectively from about eighty countries.

September 11, 2001 will be a date the US and the world can never forget. These were the most devastating attacks in history happened in New York and Washington D.C. National security and defence organs and public in the United States have all been fully mobilized to confront these horrific events. Responses have been extended from the rest of the world, as terrorism has an impact not only on the country in which it occurs but also on other countries.⁸⁶ Therefore, September 11, terrorist attacks have attracted world wide attention.

The geographical location of the United States always saved it from the danger brought about by wars. But these attacks in two of its major cities have caused great losses to the nation, financially, politically and emotionally.

Major American media reportedly agreed that the September 11 tragedy means as much to the current generation as the Pearl Harbour incident in 1941 and John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 meant to previous generations.⁸⁷ That nightmare in this modern age of civilisation will leave a deep impact on the United States in particular, and on the world in general. The US President George W. Bush in his September 11 address to the nation said;

Today, our Fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under deadly terrorist acts.⁸⁸

In a speech at the White House on September 12, Bush described the attacks as more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. The US intelligence agencies have suspected the Osama bin Laden and Al Qaedas as the masterminds of the attacks. In subsequent raids and arrests of people in Europe confirmed that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda

⁸⁶ See Major General Vinod Saigal (Retd.), "11 September 2001: Global Response Patterns," *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol. CXXXI, No. 546, October-December 2001.

⁸⁷ Xiao Ding, "Pondering Over the September 11 Terrorist Attacks", *Beijing Review*, October 4, 2001, p.9.

⁸⁸ *The Hindu* (New Delhi), September 17, 2001.

were behind the attacks. Therefore, George W. Bush, during his visit to the Pentagon, said;

I want justice. There is an old poster out that said wanted dead or alive [Osama bin Laden]...⁸⁹

Many countries and international organisations, cutting across geographical and ideological barriers, have condemned the attacks and offered the needed assistance with the US. On September 12, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1368, which condemned 'in strongest terms' the terrorist attacks on the United States and called on all member states to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Following on this, the UN General Assembly adopted another Resolution on condemnation of terrorist attacks in the US that called for 'international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of the outrages of September 11, 2001', and to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism.

Similarly political and religious leaders and organisations around the world added their words of condolences and resolve to fight the terrorism. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary General, Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) said;

We denounce and condemn those [September 11 terrorist attacks] criminal and brutal acts that run counter to all covenants, humanitarian values and divine religions, foremost among which is Islam, and our tolerant Islamic religion highly prizes the sanctity of human life and considers the willful killing of a single soul as tantamount to killing humanity at large. The Islamic world as a whole shares the pain and sorrow of the American people in this terrible and devastating ordeal.⁹⁰

Similarly other nations including Canada, Britain, France, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Czech Republic have

⁸⁹ US President George W. Bush's Address to the Nation, issued by Executive Office of the President of the United States, November-December, 2001.

⁹⁰ U.S. President George W. Bush's Address to the Nation, op.cit., p.45.

expressed, 'although for their own purposes,⁹¹ their assistance to the US.

But ever since the U.S. intelligence agencies have identified Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the US attention has been shifted to South Asia.

FORMATION OF A GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM:

Since Al Qaeda is a transnational organisation operating in many countries, the US wanted a global response to fight against it. Therefore, even US's erstwhile arch-rivals like Russian and China came forward to cooperate with the US. In the UN Sir Jermy Greenstock, Chairman of the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee, reported that one hundred sixty member states out of one hundred eighty nine have expressed their cooperation with the US.⁹² It was an unprecedented number when compared to responses on other issue. The UN also adopted the Resolutions 1373 on September 28 to help nations deny safe haven to terrorist and their supporters.⁹³ The above resolution also requires nations to freeze funds and other financial assets of terrorists, and their supporters.⁹⁴ It also mandates refrain from providing any active or passive support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts. According to this resolution they must not allow any recruitment on behalf of terrorist groups or efforts to supply weapons.

Similarly for the first time in its fifty two years history, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has invoked Article 5, under which an attack on one alliance member would be considered an attack on all members.⁹⁵ Also for the first time, the Australian government has

⁹¹ See for more details, *Time Magazine*, November 12, 2001. And Dennis Kux's article, "India's Fine Balance", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3, May-June, 2002.

⁹² *Backgrounder: Record Number of Nations Responded to Counter-Terrorism Efforts (June 28, 2002).*

⁹³ *ibid.*, p.1.

⁹⁴ See Barry R. Posen's, "The Struggle and Tactics", *International Security*, Winter, 2001.

⁹⁵ Paul Dibb, "The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002.

invoked Article 4 of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty in order to meet this common danger. Japan, in a major departure from its reluctance to send military overseas has agreed to deeply warships in support of US.⁹⁶

Therefore, in this background the events of September 11 and their aftermath poignantly emphasized that terrorism is a long term global problem, with global membership and reach, and that a global response is required. Therefore it became clear that central to success in combating international terrorism was international cooperation. Without this a global war on terrorism was doomed to fail.⁹⁷ Hence, given the transnational nature of terrorism the US wanted to form a global coalition to coordinate a whole range of national capabilities. The US expected coalition partner's diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and technological capability assistance.⁹⁸ This does not mean that each nation is expected to offer the same to the same degree. But each nation, it is hoped, will bring to the table what it can to the degree that it is able.

The US President also went further, after recognizing the indispensable cooperation of the harbouring countries, such as United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Syria, North Korea and Pakistan, declaring that the 'US will not distinguish between the perpetrators and sponsors of September 11.'⁹⁹ He also warned, 'if you are not with us you are with the terrorist',¹⁰⁰ clearly aiming at the countries which have a history of sponsoring terrorism as an instrument of state policy.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.131.

⁹⁷ **Backgrounder: Expert Sees More Proactive US Policy Against Terrorism (July, 2002), p.1.**

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p.6.

⁹⁹ **Jusuf Wanandi, "Global Coalition Against International Terrorism," *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 4, Spring 2002, p.184. And also see, John Ikenberry's article, "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs*, September-October, 2002.**

¹⁰⁰ **See the address delivered by the U.S. President George W. Bush to the U.S. Congress and to the U.S. People, Washington D.C.; 20 September 2001. This address is given as a document in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 54, no. 4, October 2001, pp.122-129.**

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, p. 132.

PAKISTAN AS A FRONTLINE STATE IN THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM:

Pakistan, one of the three above mentioned countries, which had officially sponsored and recognised the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was feeling the gravity of the US craving for 'retributive justice'. The Taliban was created by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to make Afghanistan a safe haven for terrorist 'waging a thousand cuts war' against India.¹⁰² Because of these reasons the US fight against the root causes of terrorism is centred on Afghanistan. It was reported that Al Qaeda has shifted to South Asia's Pakistan, whose North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan border Afghanistan. It, therefore has become the epicentre of the US war on terrorism.

Pakistan's geostrategic location as a trijunction of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, make it indispensable for any coalition in combating terrorism and a useful tool in the fight against terrorism.¹⁰³ The US considers Pakistan in many other areas, such as: it is (i) not allowing Al Qaeda operatives to cross the borders and stopping arms shipments from going through Pakistan, (ii) giving US overflight and landing rights, (iii) allowing access to naval bases, airbases and borders, (iv) offering intelligence support, (v) condemning the September 11 attacks and curbing domestic support for terrorism, (vi) stopping fuel supply and Pakistan supporters of the Taliban from going to Afghanistan and (vii) breaking diplomatic ties with the Taliban if it was proved that the Al Qaeda network was involved and if the Taliban continued to harbour Osama bin Laden. Hence, the role of Pakistan, the special ally of US has become very crucial.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² See Dennis Kuxis, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001). See specially the Introduction on the importance of Afghanistan for Pakistan's Security.

¹⁰³ M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Transnational Terrorism and Old Friends: Pakistan and US," *Strategic Review*, Winter, 2001, p.16.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.16.

PAKISTAN'S OFFER OF UNSTINTED COOPERATION TO THE US IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM:

On September 13, 2001 Pakistan President Musharraf, under strong diplomatic pressure, offered president Bush 'unstinted cooperation' in the fight against terrorism.¹⁰⁵ Because of its proximity to Afghanistan and formerly close tie with the *Taliban*, and being a Muslim country, possessing a nuclear capability, Pakistan has been considered very crucial to the US efforts to root out terrorism in the region. The Taliban and Osama bin Laden enjoy considerable support among the Pakistani population, who share not only conservative Islamic values but also ethnic and cultural ties with the Afghanistan. Therefore, a major issue facing the US in Afghanistan and Iraq war has been how to make use of Pakistan's support, including military cooperation, without seriously destabilising an already frazil state that had nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.¹⁰⁶

CONCLUSION:

Terrorism's concept, nature and purpose have been in constant change. Terrorism as an instrument has been used both within a country and without it also. It has also been used by Marxist-Leninist inspired groups and countries against their perceived opponents.

In the post-World War II period it was used as an instrument against colonial powers by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups. But it has had the acceptance of the world community as a legitimate option of self-determination.

However, by the end of the Cold War the old well known causes were nearly ended, giving a way to the religion as a motivating cause.

¹⁰⁵ Sumita Kumar, "Politics in Pakistan Post-September 11, 2001", *Strategic Analysis*, April-June, 2002, p.233.

¹⁰⁶ Vijai K. Nair, "The Nuclear Dimension of the War on Terrorism", *Aakrosh*, January 2002, vol. 5, no. 14, p. 27. Also see a paper presentation by Paul Leventhal and Bramha Chellaney, "Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia." This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Nuclear Control Institute's Nuclear Terrorism Prevention project for Presentation to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, October 10, 1988.

Therefore, the religious dimension of terrorism has been a later phenomenon. For this it has been argued that the US policies in the Middle East as the responsible impetus for the emergence of religious terrorism. It is said that the creation of Israel, dislocating many Arabs from their holy homelands, was seen as the root cause for the Middle Eastern Arab People's grievances. Added to this its alliance and strong support to the authoritarian regimes in suppressing Muslims was also seen as one of the reasons for Muslim anti-Americanism.

The US support to the Mujahideens, from which Osama bin Laden emerged, was said to be the culmination of the United State's culpability as a state responsible for the latest emergence of Islamic terrorism.

Osama bin Laden had utilised the anti-American feelings of the Muslims to wage a *jihad* against it to bring an Islamic Revolution. He seems to have expected the realisation of Islamic Revolution only by Muslim's attacking the US. He said if America is attacked then it would retaliate Islamic countries. In the likely case the World wide Muslims will revolt against the US and this would facilitate in establishing a pure Islamic state. For this purpose he aligned with Taliban Al Qaeda. Therefore the September 11, 2001 attacks were the master plan by them for their supposedly noble cause.

The Americans, in the process of Combating Islamic terrorism, found that the Taliban-Al Qaeda is a transnational organisation. For which a transnational cooperation is required. Hence the US formed a global coalition with many countries to fight this menace. In the process they have allied with Pakistan for its former diplomatic recognition, geographical proximity, and Muslim population to fight this new menace to the civilized world. Therefore, Pakistan's role had become very crucial in eliminating the Taliban-Al Qaeda sponsored terrorism.

Chapter - III

CHAPTER – 3

AREAS OF COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION

CRUCIAL ROLE OF PAKISTAN:

Pakistan is seen by the U.S. as the most pivotal coalition partner in the war against terrorism. Some of the most important reasons for this could be identified. Firstly, were that firstly, it has the longest border with and provides the best access to Afghanistan.¹ Secondly, in a broader sense, Pakistan was crucial because of its being one of the world's most populous Islamic state. Its cooperation could help prevent the war on terrorism becoming a conflict between Islam and Christianity.² Thirdly, Pakistan also fell into category II as a sanctuary for global terrorist movements.³ Fourthly, and most importantly, Pakistan has effective military and intelligence services and thus could serve as an important ally for anti-terrorist operations.

Therefore, even though many countries came forward to offer assistant to US, the administration was keen to solicit Pakistan's political and military cooperation to nab the suspected mastermind of September 11, 2001 attacks on WTC in the US, Osama bin Laden and his organization Al-Qaeda. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda were aligned to wage jihad against America and West from Afghanistan.

Pakistan on its part, immediately after September 11 attacks, condemned the terrorist attacks on the US. President Pervez Mushraff also called upon the world community to unite in the fight against terrorism in all its forms to root out what he called 'this modern days

¹ Steven Metz, [Defeating Terrorism Coalition Partner Pakistan.htm](#).

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.* Category -I states support movements as official policy (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq). Category-II states turn a blind eye or allow terrorist movements to exist because of fear, weakness, or sympathy (e.g. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). Category-III states host terrorist activities because their systems of legal and civil rights and their large immigrant communities provide a form of protection (e.g., Germany and the United States).

evil'.⁴ In his condolence message to US President George W. Bush, General Musharraf conveyed deep sense of sorrow and grief over the incident that shook the whole world. He said;

The people and government of Pakistan deeply mourn the enormous and unprecedented loss of innocent lives in the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. We share the grief of American people in this grave national tragedy. I convey to you, to the bereaved families and the American peoples our most profound sympathy and condolences.⁵

US EXERTING PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN:

The US administration's opinion was that unless and until Pakistan cooperates politically and military, the capturing of Osama bin Laden could be an uphill task. President Bush in the process of 'exerting pressure'⁶ in his address to the nation warned all those countries which could shelter or support the terrorists;

We (US) will make no distinction between the terrorists who commit these acts (9/11) and those who harbour them (Taliban).⁷

Accordingly, Pakistan, apart from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, the countries that officially supported the Taliban regime, felt the gravity of the US warnings.

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre's twin towers and the Pentagon, as the United States sought to identify the perpetrators and contemplated its possible responses, attention was turned to the role that Pakistan could play in assisting a US military strike on Afghanistan and in capturing alleged terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf had already

⁴ *News*, Islamabad, September 12, 2001.

⁵ *POT Pakistan*, September 14, 2001, p.3774.

⁶ *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 19, 2001.

⁷ See the website <http://www.state.gov/>, September 11, 2001, for the text of the Statement made by the US President to the US nation after the September 11, terrorist attacks on US. The full text is also available in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 54, no. 4, October 2001, pp. 93-95.

condemned the terrorist attacks and assured the United States of his 'unstinted cooperation' in the fight against terrorism.⁸

On September 13, 2001, President George W. Bush sought Pakistan's cooperation in hunting down those responsible.⁹ Gen. Musharraf readily accepted to cooperate with the US. Hence Bush voiced his appreciation of the willingness of President General Pervez Musharraf to assist the United States. Earlier the same day, the new US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, Presented her credentials in Islamabad and had a 40-minute one-on-one meeting with General Musharraf in which details of Pakistan's political and military cooperation were reportedly discussed at length. Consequently, President General Pervez Musharraf in a statement said; 'I wish to assure President Bush and the US Government of our fullest cooperation in the fight against terrorism'.¹⁰ Later Ms Chamberlain responded; 'The President (Gen. Musharraf) made a very strong statement that he was with us. He repeated several times that he was with us'.¹¹

US REQUESTS:

The US request to Pakistan included both political and military cooperation. Hence apparently, the United States asked Pakistan to fulfill the following requests.

POLITICAL REQUESTS:

The political requests were: 1) closing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to cut off all activities and transits of Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda group members in and around Pakistan 2) Freezing the assets in Pakistan of Afghanistan's Taliban rulers. 3) Halting the supply of fuel to

⁸ "Pakistan Vows to Help US to Punish Attackers", <http://www.cnn.com/>, September 13, 2001.

⁹ Amir Mateen, "US Seeks Pakistan Help in Retaliatory Attacks," *The New International Pakistan*, September 14, 2001.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *ibid.*

the Taliban 4) extending political cooperation to the US in any future actions against terrorists or terrorism.

MILITARY REQUESTS:

The military requests were: 1) providing intelligence information on Osama bin Laden, his organization and the Taliban collected by its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, 2) to permit the stationing of US covert forces in Pakistan, which would go in to capture Osama Bin Laden and 3) responding response positively to further US requests for military and police assistance.

These lists of requests were reportedly communicated by Secretary of State General Colin Powell in a telephone call to General Musharraf on Thursday, September 13, 2001 and by US Ambassador Chamberlain.¹²

PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE:

In recent years, the United States has stepped up its efforts to capture Osama bin Laden for his alleged role in the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1998. But these efforts have so far been unsuccessful, despite the United State's firing more than 50 land-attacks cruise missiles against Bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan in 1998. The United States had also pressed both Pakistan and Afghanistan's Taliban rulers to capture and turn over bin Laden. Pakistan had offered more of moral rather than tangible support until September 11. But the terrorist attacks against the United States have completely changed the picture and placed Pakistan 'between the devil and the sea,' in the words of a local journalists.¹³

DILEMMAS FOR PAKISTAN:

The dilemma for Pakistan was that on the one hand a wounded super power was seeking retribution against the perpetrators of the deadliest attack on US territory. On the other hand, domestic religious

¹² "US Presses Pakistan to Cooperate", BBC News, September 13, 2001.

¹³ Mayed Ali, "Musharraf should opt for lesser loss," *The News International Pakistan*, September 14, 2001.

forces could destabilize the country in protests, if Pakistani bases were to be used to strike against Bin Laden, as they consider him a soldier of Islam. The decision for general Musharaff was further compounded by crippling sanctions imposed against Pakistan by the United States for its nuclear weapons programme and the lack of a democratic government. Therefore, Secretary of State Powell observed, in this context; 'they (Pakistanis) are sanctioned up to the eyeballs and they don't have that much aid now'.¹⁴

Pakistan can also benefit economically by withdrawing its support for the Taliban and helping to capture Osama bin Laden. But it can also lose in a big way domestically, if it acceded to US pressure since powerful Islamist groups consider Bin Laden a hero and could destabilize Pakistan. Gen. Musharaff was actually aware of this dilemma. In his address to the nation in September 19, he said;

Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today, can have far-reaching and wide-ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decision in this crisis, it can lead to worst consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistani's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worst situation for us... it is said in shariah that if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is better to opt for lesser one.¹⁵

Explaining his approach, the General added;

First ensuring the country's security and stability from external threat. The second priority is our economy and we are striving for its revival. The third priority is our strategic assets: nuclear and missiles and the fourth priority, is the Kashmir cause... Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary.¹⁶

Aware of political trouble he would face at home for making this policy shift, he said;

¹⁴ "Bush Administration Puts Pressure On Pakistan," www.CNN.com, September 13, 2001.

¹⁵ Address by General Pervez Musharraf to the Nation, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol. LXVII, No. 24, October 15, 2001, p.754.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

The future of 140 million Pakistanis can't be jeopardized. Even Sharia provides that if we are faced with two difficulties and a selection has to be made, it is always better to choose the lesser one.¹⁷

But the choice was very clear. Given the magnitude of the casualties in New York and Washington, history's deadliest terrorist attacks, if it could be established that Osama bin Laden was implicated in the attacks, Pakistan's only option would have been to join the emerging international coalition against terrorism and against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It was to assist the United States in capturing Osama bin Laden and in delivering him either to the international criminal court or US courts for trial.¹⁸

PAKISTAN'S DEMANDS:

But the Pakistani establishment put two demands before joining any US led action. Its demands were that both India and Israel should be kept outside of any anti-terrorism coalition. They also asked for having \$30 millions grant, lifting of \$30 billion debt and all sanctions against it. And the Pakistani Foreign Minister, after a four-hour joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Cabinet in Islamabad, said; Pakistan does not expect to take part in military operations outside our border.

The American administration was ready to accept all these above conditions.¹⁹ But they were caught in surprise when the Pakistan establishment asked the US to prove the complicity of Osama bin Laden. The US response, however, was that it has the evidence but due to tactical reasons it was unable to made the intelligence reports public. But subsequently in an encouraging development for US diplomacy, the government of Pakistan announced on October 4, 2001 that, in its view, the US had produced evidence strong enough to indict Bin Laden in a court of law, the first endorsement of the evidence against Bin Laden

¹⁷ **ibid.**

¹⁸ **"United States Seeks Pakistan's Assistance", <http://cns.miis.edu/>, September 13, 2001.**

¹⁹ **News, Islamabad, September 17, 2001.**

by a Muslim state.²⁰ Although Pakistan accepted to go along with US in the name of Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later, their decision reflected a tactical change.

PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL COOPERATIONS

AFGHANISTAN:

PAKISTAN TO OBLIGE UN RESOLUTIONS ON TERRORISM:

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly had adopted a resolution on September 12, 2001 strongly condemning the acts of terrorism. The same day the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1386 emphasizing that the terrorist acts represent a threat to international peace and security. Hence, complying with this resolution was obligatory on all member states. Therefore, subsequently the Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, commenting on the UN resolution, said that Pakistan has always supported the decision of the Security Council as a matter of policy.²¹ The Pakistani establishment also said that it is ready to give a positive response to any suggestion from the United Nations or an international alliance seeking blocking of supplies from Pakistan but Islamabad will like to remind the international coalition that a 1400-mile long porous Pak-Afghan border will make it impossible to enforce any sanctions. Highly placed official sources said as a first step the Pakistan government has told the Bush administration that it will positively respond to any of the international plans aimed at addressing Afghanistan-related terrorism.²² As a result, the government's proposal for a joint working group with the US government to tackle the issue of Afghanistan and terrorism was considered in Washington.²³ The Pakistan government, in accordance with the wishes of the UN and the US, was to send a delegation of senior officials to Afghanistan on 17 September, 2001 to

²⁰ Keesing's Archives, October 2001, p.44-393.

²¹ POT, Pakistan, September 18, 2001, p.3851.

²² POT, Pakistan, September 18, 2001, p.3853.

²³ *ibid.*

demand that the ruling Taliban militia hand over Osama Bin Laden to US.²⁴

The Pakistani delegation, which was travelling to the Taliban's headquarters in the southern city of Kandahar, had to issue an ultimatum to the religious militia: either deliver Osama, the leading suspect in the terrorist attacks on the New York and Washington, or risk a massive retaliatory assault.²⁵ The Taliban was also told that international community has been mobilized to attack Afghanistan if the Taliban refuses to hand over Osama bin Laden. The delegations trip came a day after Pakistani military and diplomatic officials said Pakistan had agreed to a list of US demands for a possible attack on Afghanistan, including a multinational force to be based there. Pakistan was to give the Taliban rulers three days to hand over Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden or face military action. The ultimatum came as Pakistan made 11th hour diplomatic efforts to prevent a military strike in the region.

A Pakistani emissary went to Afghanistan within the next 24 hours to push for a peaceful solution to the confrontation. Meanwhile thousands of Afghans poured across the border into Pakistan in the part few days, swelling refugees camps already near bursting point with around two million residents. The Spokesman of Pakistan's military government Major-General Rashid Quereshi said, the despatched delegation was to hold talks with Taliban in the Southern Afghanistan capital Kabul to seek the surrender of Bin Laden in the hope of averting a US led coalition's assault on Pakistani's neighbour.

But after three hours of talks, the Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press quoted Taliban spokesman Abdul Hai Mutamaeen as saying the two sides had so far not resolved the Bin Laden issue. Discussions were due hence to continue.²⁶

However, Pakistan, did not accept the US dictation to snap its diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, as snapping lies with the Taliban

²⁴ *News, Islamabad, September 17, 2001.*

²⁵ *POT, Pakistan, September 19, 2001.*

²⁶ *Deccan Herald, Bangalore, September 18, 2001.*

government would be counter productive.²⁷ The US reportedly requested Pakistan, following September 11 attacks in America, to snap diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. A Senior Pakistan official confirmed:

Yes, we were requested by the US to snap diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, as the United Arab Emirates did recently. ²⁸

He also said Pakistan after considering this request informed Washington that snapping diplomatic ties with Afghanistan would be counter productive in the sense that it would close the last window of talks between Taliban leaders and the world community through Pakistan: He further said the US government accepted the argument forward by Islamabad and agreed to the logic.

Only three countries in the world recognized the Taliban government and established diplomatic ties with it – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Now, only Pakistan has diplomatic ties with the Taliban government for the sake of poor Afghan people, as it has been pleading hard to the international community not to completely isolate the Afghan people, though it would fully support any action against terrorists in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, contrary to its earlier position, in a significant way has agreed in principle to allow US and other partners in the international coalition to use its airspace for over-flights for an operation against terrorism.²⁹ The Pakistani foreign Minister said that country agreed to provide logistic support adding that specifics have to be discussed in the light of the operation plan. He said that these specifics will be discussed during the forthcoming visit of US Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca to Pakistan as the head of high-level delegation.

Asked if ground troops were going to be allowed, he said every proposal that comes from Washington was to be examined in the spirit of cooperation that Pakistan has assured US. He, however, said

²⁷ *News, Islamabad, September 24, 2001.*

²⁸ *POT, Pakistan, September 18, 2001, p.4027.*

²⁹ *POT, Pakistan, September 18, 2001, p.4029.*

Pakistan has not been told that the US ground forces will be involved in a operation. He said he believes that US has not decided to place ground troops in Pakistan or Afghanistan for a long period. He hoped at the meeting with Rocca that Pakistan will be taken into confidence with regard to precise nature of the operation and expectations from Islamabad.³⁰

Pakistan had also announced on September 24, 2001 that it had temporarily withdrawn all its diplomatic and non-diplomatic staff from its mission in Kabul and consulates in different cities of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile a high level delegation from the United States arrived in Islamabad to exchange notes with the military establishment on the nature of cooperation it expected from Islamabad on its fights against Osama bin Laden and Taliban regime. After the end of the meeting with the US. The Pakistan Foreign Office Spokesman was at pains to emphasize that Islamabad's decision did not amount to snapping of diplomatic ties with the Taliban, as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had done.³¹ He pointed out that the Taliban embassy continued to function in the Pakistani capital with limited staff, as mandated by the United Nations Security Council sanctions. The spokesman recalled his observations made on September 22, 2001 that in the perception of Musharraf government the Taliban Embassy in Islamabad served as a window to know the Taliban and vice-versa.³²

The announcement to withdraw the staff from Afghanistan came even as the high level US defence team, led by Air Force Brig-Gen Kevin Chilton, was engaged in parleys with their counterparts in Islamabad on the nature of cooperation the US expected from Pakistan in the coming days and weeks in its fight against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.

However, Pakistan, while insisting on the Taliban to abide by the UN resolutions to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial by appropriate authorities, also told the Bush administration that any decision to use force in Afghanistan should be mandated by the UN Security Council.

³⁰ **ibid., p.4029.**

³¹ ***Asian News Digest*, October 8-14., 2001, p.1482.**

³² **ibid.**

Earlier Pakistan took another important decision on September 17, 2001 to close down the Pakistan-Afghan border halting the flow of everything but food and calling in police to implement a new order to confine refugees to dozens of camps in Pakistan. About two dozen supply trucks were stopped at Torkham, a border town in northern Pakistan.³³ On the Afghan side, thousands of refugees fleeing hunger, drought and the possibility of a US military attack also tried to cross, but were turned away by Pakistan. Afghans, fearing a US strike, have been lining up at a barbed wire fence at Torkham and other crossings trying, mostly unsuccessfully, to get into Pakistan. The closure of the border was one of several requests made by the United States.³⁴

Pakistan proving to be the true US partner also ordered its State Bank on September 26, 2001 to freeze on the bank accounts of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Al-Rasheed Trust which were included on a terrorism blacklist made public by the USA.³⁵ Both groups were named on a list of 27 individuals or groups identified as being linked to terrorism by US President George W. Bush on September 24, 2001. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has been battling Indian forces and has previously been inked to Osama by the US.³⁶ And the Al-Rashid Trust insists that its activities, which include providing financial and legal support to jailed Muslim militants around the world, were purely humanitarian.³⁷

PAKISTAN TO SEND ULEMA TO KABUL:

Pakistan on September 27, 2001 despatched a delegation of the country's top Ulema to Afghanistan as a 'last attempt' to convince the Taliban government to cooperate with the international community against terrorism as a peaceful solution would save the region from a long, bloody war.

³³ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, September 19, 2001.

³⁴ *ibid.*,

³⁵ *Dawn*, Islamabad 27, 2001.

³⁶ *POT, Pakistan*, September 29, 2001, p.4095.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.4095.

The team representing Pakistan's major politico-religious parties was to visit Afghanistan on September 28, 2001 to hold a meeting with Taliban supreme leader Muhammad Omar who defied the world's pressure to hand over Osama bin Laden.³⁸

The timing of the visit was significant in the backdrop of an understanding reached between Pakistan and US on September 26, 2001 in Rawalpindi to jointly combat terrorism. The understanding was reached after a series of three-day meetings between a visiting US defence delegatin and Pakistani officials led by two-star Army General.³⁹

A group of Ulemas also held a meeting with President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi after a broad understanding between Pakistan and US was reached. Though the official spokesman denied any meeting between Gen. Musharraf and the Ulemas, but the media reports confirmed that a meeting had taken place.⁴⁰

Among others the meeting was also attended by Jamaat-e-Islami chief Husain Ahmed, Jamiat Ulema Islam (S) Chief Samiul Haq, JUI (F) chief Fazlur Rehman, and Jamait Ulema Pakistan Chief Shah Ahmed Noorani. These Ulemas were to form the delegation that was to fly to Afghanistan on September 28, 2001.⁴¹

ULEMA TEAM RETURNED EMPTY HANDED FROM KANDAHAR:

The Pakistani delegation of Ulema failed in its bid to convince the Taliban leader Mohammad Omar in Kandahar to hand over Osama bin Laden and release eight foreign aid workers on September 28, 2001.⁴²

A Pakistani senior official said;

They have returned empty-handed, with the only encouragement that the Taliban have not refused to meet the Pakistani Ulema delegation.⁴³

³⁸ *Hindu*, New Delhi, September 20, 2001.

³⁹ POT, Pakistan, October 1, 2001, p.4114.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² POT, Pakistan, October 3, 2001, p.4129.

⁴³ *ibid.*

Ten top Islamic leader who flew to the Taliban headquarters were accompanied by Director-General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Lt. Gen. Mehmood and some other civil officials.

According to reports most of the members of Ulema delegation were less know public figures but highly respected by the Taliban and included the chief of the trust recently declared as a terrorist organization by president Bush. He was Mufti Mizamudin Shamzai who runs the Al-Rashid Trust and whose bank accounts were frozen by Pakistan a day earlier. The Ulema were also said to have abundant influence over the Taliban because of their years old association.

PAKISTAN SUPPORTED UN SECURITY COUNCIL ANTI-TERRORISM RESOLUTION:

The United Nations Security Council adopted a binding resolution, forcing all the member nations to freeze assets of terrorists, prohibit their movement, close their training and recruitment camps and take other measure to combat terrorism.⁴⁴ The Security Council resolution was binding under chapter 7 of the UN charter and violator countries can face UN measures, including use of force against them. However, some observers commented that the resolution still lacked the exact definition of a terrorist.⁴⁵ The resolution also called for compliance with all other UN resolution against terrorism. By inserting one line about compliance of previously adopted such anti-terrorism resolution the US has been able to bring all these resolutions as an obligation of 189 UN member countries under chapter 7 of the UN charter.⁴⁶

'Linking all such relevant resolutions with this resolution under charter 7 has turned them into resolutions with binding obligations under charter 7', an observer commented.⁴⁷ US envoy to UN John Negropnte welcomed the unanimous and speedy adoption of US draft and said;

⁴⁴ *News, Islamabad, October 4, 2002.*

⁴⁵ *POT, Pakistan, October 4, 2001, p.4158.*

⁴⁶ *ibid., p.4158.*

⁴⁷ *ibid., p.4158.*

It obliges all the UN members to deny financing support and safe haven to terrorists. It will also expand information sharing among the UN members to combat terrorism and there will be a Security Council mechanism to monitor on a continuous basis. We are very encouraged by the Security Council's strong support and rapid unanimous action.⁴⁸

The compliance with the UNSC resolution popularly named as 'freezing of assets of terrorists' caused wide-ranging changes in the national laws of UN member countries from police, finance, passports, travel, formation of voluntary organizations, banking, travel and cross-border movement of goods and humans. It had also caused a change in laws relating to refugees and asylum seekers. It also called for freezing of the current assets of terrorist groups. Yet this resolution and previously adopted resolution did not provide any exact definition of terrorist.

Though this enactment of the resolution in UN was binding on all states, Pakistan had to do more than any other state since the whole international community had turned its attention to it. The US and its Western anti-terrorism coalition partners strongly believed that Pakistan's withdrawing its political recognition would help isolating and rooting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since the UN resolution also authorized US plans to punish the September 11 perpetrators by use of force also meant that the US led forces can attack the Afghanistan at any time.

Consequently the US, in response to the refusal of the Taliban regime to surrender Osama bin Laden and his senior Al-Qaeda associated unconditionally to the US authorities, the US and UK armed forces on October 7, 2001 commenced military operations with the name of *Operation Enduring Freedom* against Taliban military targets and suspected Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. At approximately 9.00 p.m. local time about 50 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, each with a 450-kg warhead, were fired from the US ships and submarines, and a UK submarine, at targets near Kabul and Taliban facilities and forces in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, Jalalabad in the north-east of the country, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north. Thirty-one specific targets on

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.4158.

October 7, 2001 included Kabul airport, just outside the city, and Taliban air-defence facilities, such as radar stations and anti-aircraft batteries across the country.

PAKISTAN'S VITAL ROLE IN US WAR ON AFGHANISTAN:

A growing consensus in the Bush administration that Pakistan, through its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) assets in Afghanistan, hold the key for success of the US's political and military objectives and will be the centre piece of the ensuing talks between US Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad on October 15, 2001.⁴⁹

The October 15, 2001 meeting was the first face to face contact between top Pakistani and US officials since September 11, 2001 when Gen. Powell telephoned President Musharraf to directly ask whether his government would stand by the US or terrorist in Afghanistan.⁵⁰

To successfully prosecute the war in Afghanistan, the Americans were confronted with a dilemma similar to what they faced soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The main problems for the US were how to reach Afghanistan. Although the situation in the twenty-first century was markedly different from 1980 in terms of routes to Afghanistan, yet the Americans realized that Pakistan was a key state to secure cooperation for the prosecution of the war.⁵¹ New routes to Afghanistan via central Asia were available, but the strategic significance of Pakistan was too overwhelming to be ignored. Despite the fact that a regional state like India did not waste any time in extending its full cooperation to the Americans and offered all types of facilities; the Americans decided to enlist the support and cooperation of Pakistan, along with attracting as many as members in the coalition as possible Pakistan on the other hand, was confronted with very difficult choices. Not only does it have a large Pashtoon population,

⁴⁹ *News*, Islamabad, October 15, 2001.

⁵⁰ *POT*, Pakistan, October 17, 2001, p.4393.

⁵¹ Pervaiz Iqab Cheema, "Post-11 September Development: A Pakistani Perspective," in Deepanker Banerji and Gert W Kueck (eds.), *South Asia and the War on Terrorism: Analyzing Implications of 11 September* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002), p.40.

which lives next door to Afghanistan in provinces like North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, and Afghanistan was a Muslim neighbour, but its economy was facing extreme difficulties. Being a country heavily sanctioned against, reviving the health of the economy was by itself an uphill task.⁵² In addition, there was a sizeable section of the Pakistani population which was either supportive of the Taliban or was anti-American. Since the Americans have let Pakistan down many times, certain sections of Pakistani society were not keen to be once again associated with the 'unreliable Americans'.⁵³

More importantly Taliban was the Pakistani's own creation. Ever since 1971 loss of East Pakistan, the Pakistan establishment has been in constant research of territorial gain to match their arch-rival India. Therefore the Pakistani governments started efforts to make Afghanistan as its backyard. Pakistan's objectives vis-à-vis the new Taliban regime were: settling the Pashtunistan issue, attaining of strategic depth, building an oil pipeline for central Asian oil through Afghanistan to Pakistan, and providing safe haven in Afghanistan to train and motivate the Kashmir insurgents to fight the Indian forces.⁵⁴ They were more concerned about the previous Afghanistan regimes not accepting the Durand Line as the international border. The bordering ethnic Pashtoon population and their demand for a separate nation with their Afghanistan ethnic Pashtoons has caused a great fear to the Pakistanis. Already having suffered the loss of territory in 1971 the 'Pashtunistan demand' all the more feared the Pakistan.⁵⁵ Hence they wanted to ensure that any regime that sits in Kabul should be friendly to Pakistan.⁵⁶

Given such an important security related issue like withdrawing diplomatic support to Taliban was by no means a small political sacrifice by Pakistan. Did Pakistan rate safety and security of international

⁵² *ibid.*, p.41.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.41.

⁵⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Explicit Pro-Pushtum Policy and Pro-Taliban Support," *Biweekly Briefing*, Central Asian Caucasus Analyst, Cacialanalyst.org.

⁵⁵ Juan Manuel Lopez Nadal, "Pakistan A Frazile Ally," *Strategic Digest*, vol. 32, no. 2; February 2002, p.252.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.252.

community above its national interests? Only time will tell what the Pakistani will do with the post Taliban structure in Afghanistan. Many observers commented that more than Pakistan's conviction of eliminating terrorism, they were disillusioned with the policies of their own protégé, the Taliban.

Accordingly when the incumbent regime of President Rabbani had turned against Pakistan, the Pakistanis not only welcomed the rise of the Taliban to power, they also assisted them in their process of consolidation. During the initial phase, the Taliban turned to Pakistan for all types of assistance. But once they had installed themselves firmly, they began to assert themselves and frequently undertook courses of action that ran contrary to Pakistan's advice. Soon, Pakistan became somewhat disillusioned with them. It was more specifically over their attitude of non-cooperation or lack of cooperation towards both Pakistani authorities as well as UN special representative, their extreme religious views, their perceived involvement in international terrorism.

Afghanistan's refusal to cooperate with the UN and to implement the Security Councils resolutions brought about a tougher attitude from the UN. In fact, mandatory sanctions were passed when the Taliban refused to extradite Osama, putting Pakistan in a very difficult situation, as it had to comply with the UN resolutions. Pakistan's disillusionment intensified when Mullah Omer refused to hand over Pakistani criminals who had taken refuge in Afghanistan.

However, since the attacks on the twin towers had angered the Americans who in their own perception had put the blame entirely on Osama bin Laden and to give vent to their anger decided to launch an attack upon Afghanistan, which had given refugees to Osama and refused to hand him over to the Americans. Just before the actual launching of the attacks, the American President sought Pakistan's political help in terms of giving access to Pakistan's air space, intelligence and logistics. Cognizant of the ground realities, including the determination of the great military power to under take tough action alongwith the extremely non-cooperative attitude of the Afghan rulers, Pakistan opted to agree to provide the requisite support to the US led coalition against the Taliban regime. Thus, Pakistan once again

became a front-line state. A combination of above-mentioned factors influenced Pakistan's rulers to opt for what was deemed best in Pakistan's national interest.

IRAQ:

PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL STAND:

Ever since the United States declared the Muslim countries like Iraq, Iran, apart from North Korea, in the 'axis of evil', speculations began about the role of Pakistan if the United States goes to war against Iraq and Iran in the name of combating terrorism. These countries are either close allies of Pakistan or have been strategic neighbours, like Iran is to Pakistan. So there has been a concern over what Pakistan would do if the US decides to go for military action against Iraq and Iran, especially since Pakistan has given the US logistic support in the form of air bases. Would Pakistan have allowed its territory to be used for attacks against Iraq or even Iran? If not, how would Pakistanis have dealt with its military cooperation with the US? These issues have become central to the dynamics of the new US-Pakistan relationship, and while there was a clear 'no' to the first question, the second question still has not been answered clearly.⁵⁷

Therefore when the US insisted that the Iraq authoritarian regime should be changed, for its alleged killings of civilians, its having weapons of mass destruction and connections with the Taliban-Al-Qaeda networks, the Pakistanis were in a dilemma whether or not it should cooperate with the US. But, given the Pakistani people's anti-US sentiment, when US Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell called on Foreign Minister Kurshid Mehmood Kusuri on February 16, 2003 to solicit Pakistan's support for a possible resolution to authorize military strike against Iraq, the Foreign Minister clearly stated his country's stand against any unilateral action against Iraq.⁵⁸ Earlier President

⁵⁷ Shireen M. Mazari, "Regional Security and Concerns: A View from Pakistan," in Deepanaker Banjerje and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *South Asia and the War on Terrorism: Analyzing Implications of 11 September* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.81.

⁵⁸ *Statesman*, Calcutta, February 17, 2003. Also see <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/ifronthtm>. Vol. XV, No. 3, March 14-20, 2003.

Mushraff had told the American President that his 'hands are full', in a references to the public and institutional pressure that has been built upon him for his pro-American stance.⁵⁹ Furthermore Pakistan had announced on March 11, 2003 that it would abstain in from voting in UN Security Council on a US-backed resolution approving war on Iraq. Coincidentally, Pakistan was also one of the fifteen members of the UN Security Council members whose vote and political support was crucial for the US. For the US in the face of Germany and France's hesitation, the Pakistan's cooperation has become all the more very important. At least nine countries must approve the resolution to get it passed.⁶⁰

Interestingly, when the US did not go for a UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, the Pakistan's prospective political confrontation was averted. But subsequently, inspite of world wide opposition to war, the US finally waged a war against Iraq. As expectedly Pakistan's response was against the war. Hence Foreign Minister Mehmood Kasuri said: 'Pakistan deplores the initiation of military action against Iraq'.⁶¹ However, in a balancing act, Kasuri also blamed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein;

We regret that President Saddam Hussein did not consider all options to save the Iraqi people from death and destruction.⁶²

Finally, Pakistan, on March 28, 2003, reacting to the people's anti war protests, called for a halt to war and announced that it was exploring all avenues to send humanitarian relief as soon as possible.

However, Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamaili reportedly deemed it necessary to issue a statement placing on record that the people and government of Pakistan are 'deeply concerned' about the plight of the Iraqi people and the emerging humanitarian crisis in Iraq.⁶³ Jamali also made it known that the military action initiated by

⁵⁹ Najam Sethi, "Pakistan's Pragmatism," <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/ifronthtm>. Vol. XV, No. 3, March 14-20, 2003.

⁶⁰ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, March 12, 2003.

⁶¹ *Asian Age* New Delhi, March 21, 2003.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ *Hindu*, New Delhi, March 29, 2003.

the US in Iraq has 'compounded' the problems of the already suffering Iraqi people who have lived under sanctions for over a decade'.⁶⁴

People on their part have opposed the US war on Iraq on March 30, 2003 in a largest anti war rally in Peshawar-streets. The rally was organized by the Muttahida Majlis Amal, an alliance of six religious parties, and the protests clearly had the blessings of the provincial government run by the anti American religious grouping.⁶⁵

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY COOPERATION WITH US:

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 11 September 2001 Pakistan emerged as a frontline state to cooperate militarily with the US in war against terrorism targeting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The one of the reasons why US asked Pakistan's military help was that the Pakistani intelligence officials knew not only Afghan terrain, but also the Taliban's storage places of arms and military assets.⁶⁶ Additionally, the US also needed Pakistan's help to provide it with military bases, intelligence sharing, coordinated Pakistan's police and military cooperation to support the international forces to apprehend the Al-Qaeda elements that might flee to tribal areas of Pakistan. This had been perceived as more dangerous by US since the tribals had dedicated sympathizers for the Osama Bin Laden group among them. The US also requested the Pakistan government to provide logistics support such as food, water, transport facilities, fuel, communications and medical services in support of US military operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁷ More importantly, Pakistan itself has the capability to sabotage the operations.

PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN THE OPERATION:

President General Pervez Musharraf delineated the areas in which Pakistan would support the US. Those were intelligence and information

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Hindu, New Delhi, March 31, 2003.*

⁶⁶ **In the US bombing the Taliban arms depots and fuel storages were destroyed in accurate air strike. This became possible only with the Pakistani intelligence input. See "Inside Kabul", *Herald*, November 2001, p.31.**

⁶⁷ *Asian Age, New Delhi, February 10, 2002.*

exchange, support in the use of Pakistani air space, and logistic support. The President agreed to be a part of an unusual joint intelligence team, comprising professionals from Pakistan, Russia, the US and Tajikistan intelligence.⁶⁸ Pakistan had agreed to allow to set up intelligence-gathering bases at various sites on its territory following the agreement between the two countries to share information.⁶⁹

Pakistan also provided air bases, with the Pakistan air force all but vacating bases in Dalbandin, Shams: Jacobabad and Pasni to make room for the US air crafts. At the same time, it beefed up security to protect the US aircrafts.⁷⁰ It was reported that the US pressured Pakistan to lease 20,000 acres to set up military bases, a no fly zone area and related facilities for its ground troops and the other servicemen in Baluchistan. The army already took over the control of Dera Ismail Khan, Panjgur, Pasni and Gwadar airports and Pakistan's regular commercial flights to these airfields were suspended to clear the flight path for the coalition aircraft.⁷¹

Pakistan also, virtually closed down its 2,430 km porous border with Afghanistan on September 17, 2001 to prevent Al Qaeda elements from crossing into Pakistan tribal areas. Pakistan had deployed its police force along with the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to back up the efforts to close down the border. Earlier the high level US defence team, led by the Air Force Brig-Gen. Kevin Chilton, was engaged in parleys with their counter parts in Islamabad on the nature of cooperation the US expected from Pakistan in the coming days and weeks in its fight against Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban.⁷² US and Pakistani defence officials said President Pervez Musharraf had given permission for US force to began operating from a commercial airport in Baluchistan province and a small military airfields in Sindh. Pakistani interior minister Moinudin Haider said that Islamabad was allowing US

⁶⁸ *News, Islamabad, September 27, 2001.*

⁶⁹ *Nation, Islamabad, September 26, 2001.*

⁷⁰ Jason, Sherman, "Pakistan's Price: Anti-terror Ally Seeks US Arms Compensation," *Defence News*, 20-26 May 2003.

⁷¹ Shamin Shamsi "US Plans Land at Jacobabad: Four Airfields Cleared for Operations," *Dawn*, 12, September, 2002.

⁷² *Asian Age, New Delhi, September 19, 2001.*

forces to use two airports but only for rescue and recovery missions. Haider also said;

Pakistan was committed to support and cooperate with the world community and the US in promoting an exchange of information and intelligence, air space, whenever and if ever required, and logistical support whenever it is required.⁷³

At first, Pakistan was engaged in joint operations with the US forces near the Afghan border. The first success of the joint operation was the arrest of a Yemeni microbiology student Jamil Qasin Saeed Mohammed, wanted in a connection with the bombing of the *USS Cole*, on October 28, 2001. He was also suspected of being an active member of the Al Qaeda network run by Osama bin Laden. Mohammed was secretly turned over to the US authorities bypassing normal extradition and operational procedures, including some of the part of a Arab Students, suspected of having ties with al Qaeda.⁷⁴

By late April 2002, the US Royal Marine commandos initiated *Operation Snipe*, interdicting infiltration from the Pakistan border zone and disrupting enemy infrastructure. The special forces operation into the Pakistan tribal areas was similarly intended to intercept attempts at reinfiltration into Afghanistan. In *Operation Anaconda*, initiated by the US against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters in the mountains south of Gardez, many fighters slipped south and crossed the porous border into Pakistan.⁷⁵ Since many of these elements have already infiltrated to Pakistan's urban centres, Pakistan's police assistance had become very crucial for coalition forces to catch the Al Qaeda elements from Pakistan.⁷⁶ It was reported that Abu Zubaydah, a deputy to Osama and some fifty Al-Qaeda members were arrested from their hideouts in Faisalabad and Lahore with the assistance of Pakistan's intelligence and police. ⁷⁷ Even Osama's financial advisor was arrested from Karachi.

⁷³ *Telegraph*, Calcutta, October 12, 2001.

⁷⁴ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, October 29, 2001.

⁷⁵ Anthony Davis, "Afghan Regional Powers Test Kabul in Run up to Loya Jirga", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2002, p.9.

⁷⁶ See Abdul Aziz, "No Ordinary Refugees", *Herald*, December, 2001, p.32.

⁷⁷ According to Mubashir Zaidi quoting an intelligence agency source the number of Al Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistani cities and tribal areas was 200-300 as

Most of them were believed to have travelled through Waziristan. It was reported that in May 2002, Islamabad reluctantly deployed army troops in north and south Waziristan to help the Western forces encircle militants dispersed by the Shahikot fighting between March and May, 2002.⁷⁸ Between 100 and 1,000 hardcore militants in 2002 were reportedly present in the highland of north and south Waziristan and Pakistan has deployed around 8,000 troops to help the US force in combating operation code named 'Mountain Lion'.⁷⁹ The Pakistanis continued police support inspite of casualties to their police force. In the June 26, 2002 raid, conducted in south Wazirsitan Agency, ten Pakistan military personnel died. It happened inspite of US providing intelligence input regarding Al Qaeda elements to the Pakistan Army. Initially, the Pakistan government denied joint operation with the US, since the religious parties were against the deployment of US troops inside Pakistan territory.

Pakistan has declined the US combat forces to be deployed in the tribal areas. Even the Pakistan military officials disallowed the US officials to make direct contact with the tribal leaders. It was also reported that despite of US-Pakistan troops deployment for joint operations in north and south Wazirstan areas in the NWFP, the nature of this operation was not made known for public, succumbing to religious parties pressure. Therefore, the nature of further US-Pakistan joint military operations was not made public.

Subsequently the Pakistani authorities have furthermore extended their cooperation to US in many other military exercises. In December 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has sought tactical assistance from Pakistan for an assault on the Tora Bora mountain operations.⁸⁰ In the same month when CIA Director George Tenet requested President Gen. Pervez Mushraff and Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) to provide intelligence, for more information about

per conservative estimates. See Mubashir Zaidi, "Slipping Through the Net," *Herald*, 2002., p.51.

⁷⁸ M. Ilyas, "Terror Strikes Back," *Herald*, July 2002.

⁷⁹ M. Ilyas Khan, "Sleeping With The Enemy," *Herald*, June 2002, p.28.

⁸⁰ *New York Times*, December 4, 2001.

the bases formerly used by the anti-Soviet Mujahidden in the Tora Bora region and para military cooperation for further operation, the Pakistani establishment has readily agreed.

US-PAKISTAN JOINT INVESTIGATIONS:

In what was believed to be first joint operation by Pakistani and American investigative agencies, two suspected members of al-Qaeda were killed and six persons, including two policemen, injured during a crackdown on terrorist in the Punjab province. It was reported that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel and the Pakistan's local police were engaged in the operation in Faisalabad, Lahore on March 28, 2002 in which four Al-Qaeda members were arrested.

The joint operation assumed significance in the light of reported statement by Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar that if necessary the question of allowing US troops to cross over from Afghanistan in pursuit of al-Qaeda suspected members could be considered. He said, 'there is no problem US forces can cross the border into Pakistan if necessary',⁸¹ with this permission the US-Pakistan special commando teams, each comprising five FBI men and local personnel have raided six spots in Faisalabad in which 46 Al-Qaeda members were arrested, including 19 foreigners.

On March 31, 2002 Pakistan handed over to the US about 20 Arabs arrested in Faisalabad. The US officials have deported these fugitives to the US Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were detained.⁸²

Though the earlier US-Pakistani authorities assisted each other in subsequent anti-terrorist operations, the arrest of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, who investigations say was the high-ranking operative of Al-Qaeda and one of the few people still alive who knows the inside details of September 11 plot, was the peak point in joint operations.⁸³

⁸¹ *Hindu*, New Delhi, March 30, 2002.

⁸² *Asian Age*, New Delhi, April, 2002.

⁸³ *New York Times*, September 13, 2002.

Ramzi Bin Al-Shiah was also believed as one of the killers of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.⁸⁴ Similarly another breakthrough in the war against terror and most importantly in another joint FBI and Pakistan police raids, Al-Qaeda activist and suspected mastermind behind the September 11 attacks in the US, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested on March 1, 2003 along with two foreigners of Arab origins.⁸⁵ Khalid Shaikh, 37, for whose arrests the US had announced \$25 million reward. Pakistan's chief intelligence agency in its first ever briefing to foreign media at its headquarters in Islamabad confirmed, on March 10, 2002, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed met terror network leader Osama in December at an unknown location.⁸⁶ A senior Inter Services Intelligence Official told foreign media persons; 'he [Khalid Shaikh Mohammed] confirmed he met Osama in December'.⁸⁷ However, Khalid said he did not know the location of the meeting. However, he revealed the name of a Moroccan national Yassir al-Jaziri and was subsequently arrested on March 15, 2003 from Lahore along with an Afghan Gulzeb.⁸⁸ Agencies also arrested a Pakistani citizen identified as Shakeel. In the end both Ramzi Bin Al-Shib and Khalid Shak Mohammed, the catches so far in the war against terror launched after the September 11, 2001 attacks on Washington and New York, were handed over the US authorities by the Pakistan government.⁸⁹ In a subsequent briefing to the media in Islamabad, the ISI-Pakistan's premier intelligence agency revealed that it has arrested 440 terrorists in 131 raids from various parts of the country. Out of these 382 have been extradited, most of them were handed over to the US authorities.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, September 18, 2002.

⁸⁵ Hasan Mansoor, "Operation Against Al Qaeda Activists To Be Intensified In Cities," *The Friday Times*, vol. XV, no. 5, March 28-April 03, 2003. And also see <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/inews66.htm>.

⁸⁶ *The Economist*, March 8, 2003, pp. 25-27.

⁸⁷ *Statesman*, Calcutta, March 11, 2003.

⁸⁸ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, March 17, 2003.

⁸⁹ *Statesman*, Calcutta, March 5, 2003.

⁹⁰ Hasan Mansoor, "Operation Against Al-Qaeda Activists To Be Intensified In Cities," *Friday Times*, vol. XV, no. 5, March 28-April 03, 2003. And also see <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/inews66.htm>.

In spite of all these arrests with the help of Pakistan's military cooperation, Pakistani is being suspected by US authorities for protecting Pakistan origin Al-Qaeda members as against foreigners. However it was reported that, except in Danial Pearl case in which Pakistan tried to protect the suspected culprit, a UK national, Ahmad Omar Sayeed Shaikh, US was satisfied with the way the Pakistanis have military cooperated.

BENEFITS FOR PAKISTAN FROM ITS ANTI-TERRORISM COOPERATION WITH US:

Ever since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Pakistan was considered an important 'frontline state' to fight the Taliban-Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. As a result the US had to compromise on Pakistan's democracy and nuclear proliferation.

US COMPROMISE ON DEMOCRACY AND PAKISTAN'S ESCAPE FROM THE FAILED STATE:

On September 10, 2001, many observers believed Pakistan was on the verge of failure. When the military seized power in 1999, some Pakistanis reportedly acknowledged that their state had 'failed' but noted that it had failed four or five times earlier, most notably when half of the Pakistan's population became the state of Bangladesh.⁹¹ The natural comparison with India reinforced this judgment.

Pakistan's economy, by comparison, was worse. Its core institutions were in shambles. Its economy and politics were characterised with no sign of economic growth and steady political deinstitutionalization.⁹² And it initiated a war with India in 1999 (Kargil), leading to heavy US pressure and thereupon a humiliating withdrawal of Pakistan' forces.⁹³ If anything, Pakistan was a state, seemingly incapable of establishing a normal political system,

⁹¹ Stephen P. Cohen, "The Nation and State of Pakistan", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2002, p.110.

⁹² *ibid.*, p.15.

⁹³ Sumit Ganguly, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", *Current History*, April 2002, p.149.

supporting the radical Islamic Taliban, and mounting jihadi operations into India. Added to this internal religious and ethnic-based violence was rising dramatically.

Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan still resembled a state that lost its way. Therefore, Pakistanis reportedly debated such problems as corruption, bad governance, poor education, weak political parties, domestic disorder. They also started discussing Pakistan's dangerous filtration with Islamic extremists, and Pakistan's continuing and ruinous obsession with India and Kashmir. According to reports, some of the Pakistanis had finally developed a perception that their country was slipping into extremism and violence at a rapid rate. According to them it had become almost a scourge to all its neighbours, and a potential threat to friends and allies such as US and China, consequently leading to the lack of consensus on the purpose of Pakistan.⁹⁴

But suddenly the September 11, 2001 events provided Pakistan with an opportunity to consolidate in every possible sphere. In fact when the US had imposed sanctions on it in the aftermath of 1998 nuclear tests and military coup d'etat in 1999, Pakistan had virtually become a 'pariah' in international community.⁹⁵ What was scary to Pakistan before September 11 was the inclusion of their country in the list of states sponsoring terrorism by the US State Department.⁹⁶

And in the summer of 2001 US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage had branded Pakistan along with other rogue states and had said that the cold war relationship with Pakistan was a false relationship. The symbolism of US President Clinton's five hour visit to Pakistan in March 2000 clearly had a message for the Pakistani military regime.⁹⁷

Given these factors, in the aftermath of September 11 when the US asked Pakistan's cooperation, President Mushraff's unstated

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p.115.

⁹⁵ Ajay Darshan Behra, "Managing Adversity: Pakistan And The War On Terrorism", a paper presented at IDSA Weekly Fellows Seminar on 14th December, 2002, p.1.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.1.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p.1.

calculation was, apart from economic assistance, to bring Pakistan out of this international isolation.

The paradox of the post September 11, 2001 US policy was that the US, which had always believed that its political ideals and principles are in theory universally applicable,⁹⁸ aligning with a military ruler who had come to power by dethroning an elected government. From founding onward as the Americans have been concerned and judgmental about the domestic democratic order in other countries.⁹⁹ Therefore, they have intervened militarily in Haiti to restore an elected president to power.¹⁰⁰ But the US did not apply the same formula by not intervening to restore the Nawaz Sharif government when deposed by Musharraf in coup d'etat. The US though demanded the restoration of democracy by imposing sanctions but that was not enough to the US standards which US selectively apply to other countries.¹⁰¹ As a result, the Pakistani security analyst, Hussein Haqqani argues that the US, being the principal donor of aid to Pakistan leading to have enormous influence¹⁰² could have done more than what it did in 1999. That influence means that at least unequivocal statements from the US government could have real impact on the Pakistani political elite and the military.¹⁰³ Unfortunately this did not happen. He also argued that the US could have added tangible incentives to influence the Pakistanis for the restoration of democracy. For example the Bush administration could link arms transactions, such as the recent sale of Hercules C-130

⁹⁸ Gideon Rose, "Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy", *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 3, Winter 200, 2001, p.186. Also see an address: "Terrorisms: The Challenges to the Democracies", by Secretary Shultz before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, US Department of State, Washington D.C. June 24, 1984.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p.186.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p.189. And also see Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), and Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

¹⁰¹ Hussain Haqqani, "America's New Alliance with Pakistan: Avoiding the Traps of the Past," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.ceip.org/>, p.3.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p.3, Pakistan is the fourth largest recipient of U.S. aid.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p.4.

transport aircrafts to the Pakistani army, to progress on a democratic transition.

Moreover the faulty, Pakistani democracy culture can be attributed to the U.S. historically aligning with the military establishments. The general perception has been that the US prefers military rule to democracy in Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ They saw the Pakistani military rulers, in contrast to their democracy professing, as more convenient than civilian government for their benefits.¹⁰⁵

It was the military which was useful for the Americans in the need of every hour for example during the 1960s, the US maintained military bases and intelligence gathering posts, for instance U-2 incidents, directed against the Soviet Union. Pakistan was the intermediary in initial US contacts with China. Henry Kissinger began his secret trips to Beijing through Islamabad in 1969. During the 1980s, Pakistan was the strategic ground for the covert war against the Soviet occupations of Afghanistan. Incidentally Pakistan's leaders through all these phases were military men brought to power by coups detas. Washington's forthright backing of General Musharraf since September 11 has enforced the traditional popular perceptions that the US prefers military dictators who will do its biddings.¹⁰⁶

The US backing of all these authoritarian regimes in Pakistan has been conceived as one of the main reasons why the Pakistan's democracy failed. These military governments with the backing of US have become more authoritarian giving no space for any political establishment. No civilian government has completed its full term since they were dethroned in army coup deta. Therefore, Samina Ahmad observed;

Democracy, governance and democratic politics have been the victims of the military's interventionist policies.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁰⁷ Samina Ahmad, "Pakistan At Fifty: A Tenuous Democracy," *Current History*, vol. 96, no. 61, December 1994, p. 423.

But the proponents of authoritarian rule claim that the failure of elected representatives to subdue substate extremists proves the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of democratic politics in Pakistan.¹⁰⁸

In the post September 11, 2001 context the US again has seen Musharraf's rule as more promising than democratically elected government. As a result General Musharraf has taken advantage of US backing resulting from his support for the war against terrorism.

Apart from delaying the conduction of general elections, Gen. Musharraf had split the political parties to see to it that in the coming elections the pro-military parties will gain majority. For example, splitting the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif into pro-military Pakistan Muslim League Qaid-e-Izam (PML-QA). He also most importantly debarred with special provisions the Nawaz Shariff and Benazir Bhutto from contesting elections.¹⁰⁹ This act was not only against people's basic political rights to participate in elections but quite clearly undemocratic.

Finally, although he held elections but the hung parliament was the result, thanks to Gen. Musharraf's tactics. There were reported allegations that he had used his authority to manipulate the elections. Some of the media reports even indicated that he had 'rigged' the elections in favour of pro-military parties.¹¹⁰ Even the European Union observers assailed the military government, on October 12, 2002, for trying to distort elections by giving preferential treatment to pro-government candidates, misuring state news broadcasts, and locking out political rivals.¹¹¹ Even in post-elections period the General had ensured that the military's voice will be given due importance through establishing a National Security Council comprising both military and civil authorities.¹¹² Earlier Musharraf himself became the president in a

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 422.

¹⁰⁹ *Telegraph*, Calcutta, July 8, 2002.

¹¹⁰ *Statesman*, Calcutta, May 3, 2002.

¹¹¹ *Times of India*, October 14, 2002.

¹¹² *Hindu*, New Delhi, July 13, 2002.

'dubious'¹¹³ and 'unconstitutional'¹¹⁴ referendum, held on April 30, 2002, with enormous powers to even dismiss an elected government in the name of 'national interest'.¹¹⁵ The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) complained to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights about the violation of constitution and the basic rights of political parties. The PPP's argument was that the bogey of referendum was used in 1960 to confirm field Marshal Ayub Khan as president of Pakistan, it was used to extend the presidency of Zia-ul-Haq in 1984, and now Gen. Musharaff was using it. In all these cases the rule of authoritarianism was perpetuated.¹¹⁶ However, interestingly through all these Musharaff's anti-democratic moves, the US did not raise any objection. And the US, instead of applying more democracy related sanctions imposed in the aftermath of 1999 military coup, had lifted them on September 22, 2001. Therefore it is said that the US had compromised on Pakistan's democracy. In a way this was the result of US post September 11, 2001 war on terrorism. Otherwise the Pakistanis would have been subjected to more democracy related sanctions by the world community. Hence the September 11, 2001 has given a chance for Pakistanis to escape from the brand of a failed state, clearly a benefit from its cooperation to the US after September 11.

U.S. COMPROMISE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATIONS AND PAKISTAN'S ESCAPE FROM AXIS OF EVIL:

The US started war on Afghanistan, after terrorist attacks on New York and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, to eliminate further plans of Al-Qaeda elements to inflict another surprising attack on the U.S. The war was also in a way a warning to countries which have a plan or a desire to attack the US in a surprising manner as happened on September 11. The US knew that these Al-Qaeda elements at large might sneak into countries, which are opposed to US such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Lybia, Sudan and Syria which may assist there anti-US

¹¹³ Hussain Haqqani, *op cit.*, p.3.

¹¹⁴ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, March 25, 2002.

¹¹⁵ *Hindu*, New Delhi, April 6, 2002.

¹¹⁶ *Hindu*, New Delhi, April 19, 2002.

elements to attack the US with weapons of mass destruction such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons. The American suspicions were proved when the anthrax attacks were made on U.S. after the September 11.

Therefore, the US had announced its strategy of 'preemptive strikes' against the suspected states which have either plans or a desire to further attack the US. As a result the US President in his state of the union address identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as 'evil of axis' which may pose a security threat to the US in the future directly or indirectly.¹¹⁷ The US administration's suspicions was that Iraq might be assisting the Al-Qaeda group for further attacks on the US since it had weapons of mass destruction like chemicals, biological and radiological weapons which have been already used in earlier attempts. The US intelligence agencies even disclosed that the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had helped the Al Qaeda elements in the September 11 attacks.

As a result, the US insisted that the weapons of mass destruction be destroyed and the Iraqi president be deposed in order to ensure that the already at large Al Qaeda elements will not get the state support. Therefore, the US pressurised in UN to pass a resolution to send a weapons inspection team under the Hans Blix. Even though after repeated searchings the Blix committee could not find even a small source of weapons of mass derestruction, yet the Iraq was attacked and President Saddam Hussein was dethroned on the mere suspicions.

But if at all any state which may really pose a threat to US in the future is Pakistan. It was already a culprit in September 11 because the attacks were possible because of its diplomatic support to the Taliban regime which was given sanctionary, training, necessary elements to attack any country, to Al-Qaeda which could successfully wage attacks on the US. Therefore, the responsibility of September 11 was to be shared between Pakistan and Taliban-Al Qaeda.

The US intelligence agency - CIA had reported that Pakistan's two nuclear scientists even have been in constant consultations with

¹¹⁷ *Telegraph, Calcutta, February 15, 2002.*

Osama bin Laden on the production of nuclear weapons. The only Taliban-Al Qaeda's closest state, geographically and ideologically, among all US suspected states, is Pakistan with nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction which may fall into the hands of Al Qaeda since the command and control system is weak since it is in the hands of the Army. It is more scaring that the half of the army is dominated by the pro-Taliban-Al Qaeda elements. Either they may allow the weapons to fall into the hands of Al Qaeda or the Al Qaeda elements may steal the weapons. Therefore, the real danger of falling weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons is in Pakistan which may not be so in Iraq, Iran and North Korea which are a bit distant in any sense of the logic from the Al-Qaeda elements.

Apart from this, Pakistan has been the only country which has supplied nuclear related information to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The famous Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, has visited Iran in 1986 offering to build nuclear reactor at Bushehr.¹¹⁸ Dr. Abdul Khadir Khan also was contacted in 1990 by Saddam Hussein to help construct a nuclear bomb for Iraq.¹¹⁹ More importantly according to intelligence and media reports, Pakistan has been continuously supplying clandestinely its gas centrifuges used to create weapons grade uranium to North Korea from 1990 onwards. The quid pro quo was getting Kim Jong II and Nodong missiles from North Korea to match the mighty India's missile programme. What has been so surprising is that the Pakistani government has not even stopped this secret supplying of nuclear weapons related knowledge even after the terrorist attacks on September 11.

Analysts have often wondered how Pakistan, which was economically crippled in the late 1990s could afford to pay the millions of dollars to North Korea, which has made missile export a cornerstone of its survival tactics. But now it appears that it was a simple matter of barter between the two impoverished countries involving missile for

¹¹⁸ *Indian Express*, New Delhi, January 9, 2003.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*

nukes. Hence officials familiar with the intelligence on this matter were quoted as saying;

What you have here is a perfect meeting of interests – the North Korea had what the Pakistanis needed and the Pakistanis had a way for Kim Jong II to restart a nuclear programme we had stopped.¹²⁰

However, the successive US administrations have consistently tried to gloss over or underplay Pakistan's nuclear shenanigans that have roused suspicion in the non-proliferation community. The Bush administration while raging against Iraq's nuclear programme has in fact chosen to understate the fact that it were two Pakistan nuclear scientists who were engaged with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda.

But for the first time, US officials have privately confirmed Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation even as administration mandarins publicly ducked the issue. Some officials, in fact, speak up only after they have left the administration. One such official, Robert Einhorn, who was one of the Clinton administration's non-proliferation gurus, said;

If the US had a list of most wanted country for violating nuclear non-proliferation regimes, it would be the Pakistani government which stands in first place.¹²¹

Mr. Robert Einhorn also said about Pakistan-North Korea nuclear nexus that Pakistan was a possible North Korean collaborator because it too used gas centrifuges, and its own nuclear weapons initially used the enriched uranium. Mr. Einhorn, who is now a senior advisor at the centre for strategic and international studies in Washington, also said;

North Korea and Pakistan have been known to engage in sensitive trade, including Pakistan's purchase of Nodong missiles from North Korea. US officials were concerned at the time about what the quid pro quo might be.¹²²

¹²⁰ *Times of India*, New Delhi, October 19, 2002.

¹²¹ *The New York Times*, March 13, 2003.

¹²² *Times of India*, New Delhi, October 19, 2002.

Inspite of various acts of Pakistan breaching the nuclear non-proliferation regimes it is complained that the US has not been serious about Pakistan's actions. When the US lifted sanctions on 22 September 2001 the Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powell said that he had no concerns about risks to Pakistan's nuclear defence programme.¹²³ Similarly when the Pakistani President Gen. Musharraf visited the US in February 2002, the US was silent on Pakistan's missiles support from North Korea. When the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was asked shortly after Musharraf's meeting with President George W. Bush if there was any discussion about Pakistan's missiles imports from North Korea, Fleischer replied that 'there was no discussions that I heard'.¹²⁴ Was any of the US aid money contingent on Pakistan ceasing its missiles purchases from North Korea? The White House spokesman replied in the negative saying;

Not that I have heard. That did not come up in the meeting that I was attending.¹²⁵

However the US accused Pakistan's Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) of its spreading nuclear know how to other countries and had imposed sanctions in March 2003. The US explanation for the sanctions was that it helped through 'material contribution to the efforts of a foreign country, persons or entity of proliferation concern to use, acquire, design, develop and or secure weapons of mass destruction'.¹²⁶

Finally, the critics have complained that the US itself had compromised on the nuclear non-proliferation regimes and how could it expect its allies to adhere to them? They contend that even in 1960s the US subordinated the non-proliferation objectives to its global strategic interests of containing Soviet expansionism. This was shown by drastic shift from suspending economic and military assistance to Pakistan under the Symington Amendment in the spring of 1979 to offering Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in December

¹²³ *Telegraph*, Calcutta, September 23, 2002.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*,

¹²⁵ *ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Hindu*, New Delhi, April 1, 2003.

of the same year, a US \$ 400 million package of military and economic assistance that Zia regime scornfully rejected as 'peanuts'.¹²⁷ Even the Reagan administration (1981-88) transformed Pakistan into a 'frontline state' in its struggle against the Soviet Union. Despite the Reagan policy of using arms transfers to dissuade Islamabad from pursuing a nuclear arms policy, by 1984 Pakistan had reached the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.¹²⁸

The Sr. Bush administration (1989-93) continued the 'blind eye' policy of the Reagan administration towards Pakistan. Despite overwhelming evidence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, in the late 1989, President Bush certified that Pakistan still 'did not possess a nuclear explosive device'.¹²⁹ This was in sharp contrast with the policy of the Carter administration's embargo on economic and military aid to Islamabad, twice in 1977 and 1979, even though at that time there was much less evidence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons intentions. Only in 1990 Bush declined to make the certification required by the Pressler Amendment, and ended economic aid and military sales to Pakistan.¹³⁰

The Clinton administration (1992-2000) though made the nuclear non-proliferation as one of its foreign policy aims could not stop the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests. He initially imposed the sanctions but later on had to reengage them for 'capping' from the further tests.¹³¹

The Bush II (2000-2004) administration has virtually made the Nuclear Missiles Defence as its foreign policy goal making the US commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation a hypocritical approach leading to, 'do as I say not as I do.' Therefore, it is said that the US policy's double standards in non-proliferation damaged the NPT regimes during the Cold War. When the September 11 took place the US had virtually lifted all nuclear related sanctions to get Pakistan's cooperation

¹²⁷ Mario E. Carranza, *At The Crossroads: US Non-Proliferation Policy Towards South Asia After The Indian and Pakistani Tests*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 23, no. 1, April, 2002, p.98.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p.99.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, p.121.

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p.99.

¹³¹ *ibid.*, p.122.

to fight the global terrorism thus giving a final death blow to the NPT regimes.

And the Pakistanis, who were otherwise to be condemned for exporting nuclear related material to terrorist groups and nations, got an opportunity in the aftermath of September 11 to escape from being branded as the part of 'evil of axis'. This escape from this brand was clearly an advantages for Pakistan.

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN:

Ever since the war on terrorism was declared Pakistan has started pressing for military equipments. It's demand for weapons was that since it has obsolete defence instruments, it can't effectively cooperate with the US unless it gets new instruments from US in nabbing Al-Qaeda elements.

As a result Australia, one of the US anti-war allies, was the first country to have come forward to help restore defence relations with Pakistan which were terminated by Canberra after Islamabad's nuclear tests in May 1988.¹³²

Similarly, the US, Pakistan's biggest source of defence assistance from 1947 onwards, lifted all the nuclear related sanctions on September 22, 2001 and had agreed to revive the Defence Consultative Group (DCG). Pakistan and US have this mechanism of DCG, which remained extremely active during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. However, it was held in abeyance since the Red Army was forced to pull out of Afghanistan. But the group was reactivated in 1995 when US Defence Secretary William Perry visited Pakistan. Since then, the group was held in abeyance until the latest agreement.

The US decision to lift the sanctions on nuclear-related 92 entities, involved in nuclear and missile activities, barred in 1998 from buying the US goods, was done to revive contacts with the US. Significantly, this allows the transfer of dual use of technologies, including the high performance computers (HPCs) to Pakistan.¹³³ The

¹³² *Hindu*, New Delhi, September 22, 2001.

¹³³ *POT*, Pakistan, September 26, 2001, p.4018.

most important development for Pakistan was the removal of military sanctions that included munitions licenses and foreign military sales (FMS) and military spare parts to Pakistan. Earlier the Pakistanis had a list of spare parts stuck in the pipeline because of the imposition of Glen Amendment. Hence subsequently the US Senator Sam Brownback introduced a bill seeking to authorize the waiver on the sale of military goods and services as well as dual use items to Pakistan till September 30, 2003, by changing the Glen Amendment. The bill was co-sponsored by Senator Mitch Micconnell. It authorizes President Bush to provide for Pakistan 'assistance, enter into contracts, sell, lease or authorize the export of defence services.¹³⁴ The waiver also permits the lifting of the denial policy currently in place in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for NP (N-Proliferation) – and MT (Missile Technology) – controlled items to Pakistan.

The US also by October 2001 has indicated to have formal defence ties with Pakistan but cautioned by saying that the decision will depend on Pakistan's need and other factors, such as the extent of Islamabad's continued cooperation with them in Afghanistan, its non-proliferation commitments and its pursuit of domestic reforms.¹³⁵ As a result, the Under Secretary of Defence and Comptroller of US Defence Department Dov. S. Zakheim assured the Pakistani Defence Secretary Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Hamiz Nawaz Khan of US Cooperation.¹³⁶

Therefore, the US has completed the process of giving F-16 spares to Pakistan by April 3, 2002 under the foreign military sales programme, which earlier needed the congressional acquiescence. Subsequently the US Central Command head, Gen. Tommy Franks said;

Are we where we want to be in terms of the maturity and the growth of that relationship today? Of course, we are not. I can tell you (Pakistanis) that my boss, the Secretary of defence, is very much engaged in working, along with other elements of

¹³⁴ *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 30, 2003.

¹³⁵ *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 30, 2002.

¹³⁶ *News*, Islamabad, January 1, 2002.

our own country, to grow and mature the relationship that we (US) have with Pakistan.¹³⁷

However, this shows the change of US approach towards Pakistani defence requirements. This could have been impossible in the past 1998 Pakistan nuclear tests. But clearly the September 11 had changed the situation giving a great advantage for Pakistan to gain defence equipment.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN:

By September 11, 2001 Pakistan's economy was in shambles. The fastest population growth rate compared to economic growth rate, the continuing deterioration of foreign investments, and ever increasing foreign debts, were creating enormous pressure on the state apparatus. The condition of foreign debts was that over a period of time it had accumulated a massive foreign debt of around \$38 billions. Therefore, the status of Pakistan's economy was one of the Musharraf's reasons, sold out to the Pakistan's people, to join the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

As a result after 11 September, 2001 one of the areas where Pakistan made some headway was in its economy. It was possible because of the generous financial assistance of the countries like US, EU and other international organizations like IMF, World Bank, ADB etc. The United States and European Union have basically provided the financial support in return for Pakistan's support.

Musharraf also saw the opportunity to ease out some of Pakistan's economic problems. The Bush administration promised an economic package totaling several billion dollars which would include sweeping debt rescheduling, grants stretching over many years and trade benefits as reward for Pakistan's support in the war on terrorism. The US at first instance lifted all economic related sanctions on 22

¹³⁷ **ibid.**

September, 2001 and wrote off \$ 1 billion in loans and agreed to reschedule a \$379 million government-to-government debt.¹³⁸

In November 2001, it announced \$ 73 million in emergency aid to Islamabad to strengthen security on the country's porous borders with Afghanistan.¹³⁹ Again at New York when Bush met Mushraff, the US pledged \$ 1 billion.¹⁴⁰ The Asian Development Bank (ADB), around the same period decided to increase assistance from the planned \$626 million to \$ 950 million for coping with the Afghan refugee crisis.¹⁴¹

Pakistan's total external debt as of 11 September 2001 amounted to \$36.5 billion. Of this bilateral debt amounted to \$12.5 billion and multilateral debt at \$15.5 billion. Therefore Musharraf has been seeking a debt-swap.¹⁴² But the response has not been very encouraging. General Musharraf also requested Japan to waive the entire \$ 5 billion owed to Japan. Japan has earlier lifted all sanctions against Pakistan.¹⁴³ At the same time the Japanese have also signed a debt rescheduling accord worth about \$500 million with Musharraf government.¹⁴⁴ With this signing of agreement, Pakistan has concluded debt rescheduling pacts with 14 countries worth \$1403.7 million including earlier \$379 million loan, rescheduled by the United States. Through the Finance Minister, Shaukat Aziz, said the rescheduling of the debt by 11 September, 2001 there is little doubt that the US and its allies have been going out of their way in the last few days to help Pakistan in its economic difficulties. This is seen as a 'reward' for the bold decision taken by Gen. Musharraf to side with the international

¹³⁸ *Hindu*, New Delhi, September 25, 2001.

¹³⁹ Ajay Darshan Behera, "Managing Adversity: Pakistan and War on Terrorism," a paper presented at IDSA Weekly Fellows Seminar on 14 December 2002, p.10.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p.10.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.10.

¹⁴² A Debt-Swap is when the debt is converted into a social sector grant and the interest is waived. See "Islamabad Seeks \$15 billion Debt Swap," *Dawn*, 16 March, 2002.

¹⁴³ Ajay Darshan Behera, *op cit.*, p.11.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11.

community in the fight against the Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.¹⁴⁵

Further the US also was planning to reschedule payments on the \$3 billion that Pakistan owes the US and has urged other allies to do the same.¹⁴⁶ Hence Pakistan's Foreign Exchange reserves have reached a healthy \$7 billion.¹⁴⁷ But the main factor for the increase in the reserves was the purchase of over \$3 billion by the State Bank of Pakistan from the Open Market. Another reason for the reserves to have grown was the increase of in remittances sent by overseas Pakistanis. These have exceeded \$2 billion.¹⁴⁸

Apart from all these the Pakistan government has requested the US to free the restrictions and allow textile exports of Pakistan. Pakistan's textiles exports constitute 60% of the country's export productions and give employment opportunities to large sections of people. However, the US administration has responded positively, if agreed this would become the most advantageous substantial economic benefit the Pakistanis ever got after September 11, 2001 cooperation with the US. And given the necessity of Pakistan's cooperation it is all likely that the US will agree.

CONCLUSION:

Ever since the US intelligence agencies have indicated Osama bin Laden as the main mastermind of 11 September, 2001 attacks, the US attention has shifted towards Pakistan. Given Pakistan's geographical and political proximity to Taliban and Al Qaeda of Afghanistan, cooperation of Pakistan was perceived by the U.S. as indispensable in effectively fighting the war against terrorism. Hence, Pakistan had become a frontline state in Afghanistan war due to its ISI's knowledge of both the terrain and the Taliban's operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, given its cultural and ethnic relations with Afghanistan,

¹⁴⁵ *Hindu*, New Delhi, October 6, 2001.

¹⁴⁶ Josephh Kahn, "US is Planning on Aid Package for Pakistan worth Billions," *New York Times*, 27 October 2001.

¹⁴⁷ Ajay Darshan, Behera, op cit., p.11.

¹⁴⁸ Ajay Darshan, Behera, op cit., p.11.

Pakistan's role all the more become vital because in case of Taliban-Al Qaeda sneak into it, its intelligence and police cooperation would become very crucial in nabbing the Taliban-Al Qaeda fugitives. It would be virtually impossible for the US to catch these elements without Pakistan's political and military cooperation. Pakistan also was crucial in extending its political and military cooperation in the Afghanistan war giving US the much needed logistical support.

Since the Afghanistan war was over but the Taliban-Al Qaeda elements were at large entering into different countries like Iran, Iraq and other Central Asian countries. Therefore, in any case if US wage war on any of the muslim country like Iraq, Pakistan's political support becomes vital in not projecting the war as crusade against Islam. Therefore, Pakistan's political support is as much important as its extending military support.

However, joining the international coalition was not a conviction but a convenience for Pakistan. Till September 11, 2001 Pakistan as a state was seen as failed. Although as a state Pakistan was failing in many fields but its economy and political arenas were much affected. Economically it almost became a stagnant country and politically a pariah in international community.

Hence, the Mushraff's decision to join the US led war on terrorism was seen as an opportunity to bail Pakistan out of these above two areas. Consequently, the Pakistani's have got the much needed economic assistance and political acceptance because of its decision to join the war on terrorism. Therefore, in the end it is being said that the Pakistanis have joined the war in the name of its national interest but not in the name of humanity.

Chapter - IV

CHAPTER – 4

OBSTACLES OF COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION

Ever since the Pakistani President General Pervez Mushrraf had accepted to cooperate in counter terrorism with the U.S., various factors, such as madarassas and seminaries influenced jihadists violence, rise of religious right, refugees problem, sectarian violence, the ISI's double role, the ambiguous role of army and the India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir, have started coming in the way of Pakistan-U.S. relationship.

THE MADARASSAS AND SEMINARIES:

The madarassas are perhaps the most important source of tension in the U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation since September 11, 2001. Given the amount of influence and respect they command in Pakistani society, their cooperation with the Pakistani government in assisting the U.S. has become all the more very crucial.

The word 'madarassas' is an Arabic word, which means to 'learn something'. Therefore, the word madarassas implies the place where something is taught (school). The primary aim of madarassas is to acquaint the students with the Islamic worldview and outlook of life through the teachings of 'Quran' and Sunnah¹ (sayings of Prophet Mohammad), which should guide them and find expression in all aspects of their life. These individuals are expected to be the torchbearers of Islamic knowledge, carrying its light to people from all walks of life, at every opportunity and in all circumstances for the sake of Allah.² To impart a sound knowledge of Islam with an understanding of practical implications of its teachings in the contemporary world, the madarassas are also supposed to teach the students how to invite others to Islam in a peaceful and non-aggressive manner.³

¹ Vivek Kumar Mishra, "Madrassas, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan", *Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 10, Issue 1, January-March 2003, p.10.

² Kaship Iqbal Buttar, "Madrassa Schools in Pakistan", <http://www.ipcs.org>

³ Vivek Kumar Mishra, no. 1, p.11.

However, in today's Pakistan, the environment obtained in the madrassas is very different. They differ widely from the government-controlled schools and universities in Pakistan.⁴ Unlike public schools and universities, madrassas have no concept of co-education. The general perception about madrassas as they have evolved in Pakistan today, is that they are fundamentalist in orientation. They are regarded by even educated Pakistanis as the breeding grounds, for Islamic terrorists to wage Jihad in Kashmir and other parts of the world. They provide weapons and training to the Jihadis and are regarded as being largely independent of the control of the Pakistani government.⁵

Therefore, different Pakistani military and political governments have made serious attempts to regulate and check these institutions. But their attempts resulted as the unnecessary involvement in religious rights of people,⁶ even when their involvement in sectarian military has come under severe criticism. However that they play an important role is evident from a number of reports prepared by the state intelligence agencies which delve into the vast network of seminaries and their role in increasing militancy and the sectarian divide, as well as their importance in the lives of the poor.

According to statistics available with the police departments, Pakistan inherited approximately 150 religious schools in 1947. By 1950, the number had gone up to 210 and by 1971 the number of madrassas has climbed to 563. A committee set up by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1979 estimated that there were over 1000 seminaries in Punjab alone.⁷ A similar exercise carried out in 1996 revealed that the Punjab hosted around 2,500 seminaries with a combined strength of over 200,000 students. Of these, 750 institutions were identified as actively involved in military training while 1,700 were receiving funds from foreign sources.⁸ Since the last count, the numbers have increased even further. Currently, government officials estimate that there are

⁴ **ibid., p.11.**

⁵ **ibid., p.12.**

⁶ **POT, Pakistan, November 27, 2001, p.5133.**

⁷ **ibid.**

⁸ **ibid.**

around 2,715 seminaries with 250,000 students in the Punjab alone.⁹
This can be illustrated through the following table.

BREAK UP OF PUNJAB SEMINARIES AND NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Division	Number of Seminaries	Deobandi		Baralvi		Ahle-Hadith		Shia	
		Madrassas	Students	Madrassas	Students	Madrassas	Students	Madrassas	Students
Lahore	356	157	19,781	149	20,169	45	7,074	5	610
Gujranwala	154	40	3,995	95	10,140	14	2,883	5	419
Rawalpindi	186	91	9,203	70	9,137	7	459	18	559
Faisalabad	124	52	3,578	43	7,527	20	3,445	9	770
Sargodha	164	75	6,973	70	9,277	10	2,548	9	475
Multan	363	140	6,076	175	12,878	30	3,880	13	726
D.G. Khan	397	146	10,897	191	13,565	27	4,109	33	940
Bhawalpur	971	368	38,404	540	35,238	39	5,549	21	841
Total	2,715	1,069	99,907	1,333	1,17,931	192	29,9	47,113	5,340

Source: POT, Pakistan, November 27, 2001, p.5133.

Although Punjab shares the maximum number of madrassas and seminaries, they are also in considerable number in other parts of Pakistan.

These madrassas provide accommodation, food and scholarship. When the students finish their studies, quite a few madrassa graduates

⁹ *ibid.*

become professional mosque muezzins, professional pulpit preachers and prayer leaders. Their services are required at wedding and also at funerals. However, all the madrassa trained students do not get such employment. To provide employment to the madrassa graduates, the society would require many mosques every years, but the inadequate growth of mosques in the preceding years, has created severe unemployment problem. In fact, unemployment is the most important factor in Pakistan. Hence even young students who have graduated in private institutions also join Jihad. Crisis in Pakistan is so acute that many of the madarrassa educated students go on to join Jihad.¹⁰ In the name of religious education, these madarrassas generally promote a conservative and regressive version of the religion, divorced from reality, that advocates violence as a means to a desirable end.

Many of these madrassas abound with pro-Jihadi literature - some of the which are produced within the madrassas and many others are made available through a network responsible, for coordination among the madrassas at some level. The walls of many of these madrassas carry large posters glorifying the Afghan jihad, the militants and Osama Bin Laden. It is pertinent to mention here that there are different kinds of madrassas depending upon their sectarian outlook, which divides the jihadis in many ways. However, the common theme they cherish is celebration of violence almost as an end in itself.¹¹

Therefore, a major source of increasing fundamentalism is the madrassas.¹² These madrassas were established in large number by General Zia to recruit troops for war in Afghanistan and also to gain the support of religious parties. These madrassas have been preaching only a narrow and violence version of Islam.¹³ In these institutions only religious education is offered completely ignoring modern sciences, and mathematics. Some of these extremist madrassas preach jihad. To fulfill their 'spiritual obligations' the young graduates go to an extent of

¹⁰ Vivek Kumar Mishra, no.1, p.13.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p.14.

¹² Rizwan Zeb, "War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan", *Journal of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. XXV, no. 3, Spring 2002, p.62.

¹³ *ibid.*

fight against Muslims of other sects in Pakistan. Pakistani officials estimate that 10 to 15 percent of the country's total madrassas espouse such extremist ideologies.¹⁴ In the poor areas of southern Punjab, madrassas funded by Sunni sectarian political party Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), even pay compensation to parents for sending their children to these madrassas.¹⁵

Only about 6,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrassas in Pakistan have registered with the government. Some madrassas send students to camps for military training despite parent's instructions to the contrary.¹⁶ Moreover some madrassa chancellors are unwilling to expand their curricula arguing that madrassas are older than Pakistan, and that teaching of Islamic studies is not compatible with hard sciences.¹⁷ Mujibur Rehman Inqlabi, the aforementioned SSP's second in command, is of the opinion that madrassas are the supply line for jihad.¹⁸

As a result, motivated madrassa returned people have started street protests with the slogans of 'God is great' and 'Down with America' at rallies across the country in response to calls by madrassa influenced Islamic groups for a show of support for Bin Laden and the Taliban.¹⁹ At the main rally in Lahore, about 20,000 people streamed through the city centre brandishing flags from the 35 Islamic groups that called the protests and a one day strike against the Pakistani government decision to support the U.S. to wage a war in Afghanistan. 'If America attacks, we will turn Afghanistan into their grave yard', announced one speaker, amidst cheering crowds.²⁰ It was estimated

¹⁴ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan Jihad Culture", as quoted in Rizwan Zeb, "Pakistan Afghan Policy (unpublished paper).

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.4

¹⁶ Rizwan Zeb, no. 13, p.53.

¹⁷ Jessica Stern, no. 15, p.6

¹⁸ M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Transnational Terrorism and Old Friends: Pakistan and the US," *Strategic Review*, vol. XXIX, no. 1, Winter 2001, (United States Strategic Institute, Boston), pp. 11-12.

¹⁹ *Washington Post*, December 13, 2001.

²⁰ *Telegraph*, Calcutta, September 22, 2001.

that nearly 10,000 to 15,000 madrassas inspired jihadists have entered into Afghanistan to fight the US in October, 2001.²¹

To stop all these anti U.S. demonstrations the Pakistani government has to divert its armed forces and police, which otherwise would have been useful in assisting the U.S. in effectively nabbing Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Therefore, the madrassas influenced anti U.S. jihadist instigated street demonstrations will be one of the tensions between the U.S. and Pakistan in the latter's counter terrorism cooperation. The anti American feeling reached a stage in the subsequent protests where even they wanted to assassinate Pervez Musharraf for his pro-US stand.²² Currently there are 19 jihadi organizations operating in Pakistan. They are: (1) Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, (2) Hizbul Mujahideen, (3) Jaish-e-Mohammad, (4) Lashkar-e-Taiba, (5) Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islamic, (6) Al-Jihad Force, (7) Al-Umer Mujahideen, (8) Ikwan-ul-Mujahideen, (9) Islamic Inqilabi Mahaz, (10) Islamic Student League, (11) Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, (12) Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Army, (13) Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, (14) Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front, (15) Muslim Mujahideen, (16) Tehrik-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir, (17) Tehrik-e-Jihad, (18) Tehrik-e-Jehad-i-Isami and (19) Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen. All of these organizations are openly opposed to decision of Pakistan to support the US in counter-terrorism.²³

RISE OF MUTTAHIDA MAJLIS-I-AMAL (MMA):

The October 10, 2002 Pakistan general elections produced three victorious political entities: the first, the much derided King's Party, the PML(Q), with 77 National Assembly (NA) and 134 Punjab Provincial Assembly seats heads the list, with representation in all three other smaller provincial assemblies. The Pakistani People's Party (PPP) enjoyed the second position in the NA with 64 seats. The third place had gone to the extreme religious rightwing, group the six party alliance called Muttaheda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), with more than 51

²¹ New York Times, December 11, 2001.

²² Telegraph, Calcutta, July 21, 2002.

²³ Rizwan Zeb, no. 13, p.68.

seats. But this was a major new force, though it comprised all the familiar old religious parties, big and small. It was new in terms of its emergence in the post-September 11 political context. These six parties have united into electoral alliances under the leadership of Jamaat-i-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad and had successfully garnered the widespread anti-American sentiment, created by Musharraf's betrayal of Taliban and American bombings in Afghanistan. The MMA's subsequent formation of government in the strategically important North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan was seen as ominous by the US and others in the West since the MMA had promised in the elections about the strict implementation of shariah and the withdrawal of Pakistan's support to the U.S. in the Afghanistan war.

The MMA has already vowed to close down American airbases in Pakistan and ask the US forces deployed in the country to leave. 'American airbases given by the Mushrraf government, for anti-terrorism operations in the country would be closed down', said Qazi Hussain Ahmad, a key MMA leader, addressing a victory meeting on October 11, 2002.²⁴ Qazi Hussain Ahmad also said;

These bases in any form in Pakistan are unacceptable to us. We consider American presence a brazen abridgement of the country's sovereignty and ego and would ask the U.S. forces to leave.²⁵

As a result, the Musharraf government succumbed to the MMA's pressure and has ordered the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), operating in Afghanistan, to close down its base in Karachi with immediate effect.²⁶ The decision of the Musharraf regime to lease out a portion of the Qaid-e-Azam international airport in the port city of Karachi was also criticized by the religious parties in Pakistan.²⁷

The MMA's rise was a backlash of the policy switch Mushrraf made on September 11 when he ditched the Taliban. From the viewpoint of simple Pushtun admirers of Taliban in the Frontier and

²⁴ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, October 13, 2002.

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ *The Hindu*, New Delhi, October 21, 2002.

²⁷ *ibid.*

Baluchistan, it was a traumatic experience.²⁸ They strongly disapproved Pakistan government, its subservience to the US in allowing American agents to gather intelligence and help nab the fugitive Taliban and Al-Qaeda men. This was the case since they were admired widely in Pakistan for wrong reasons.

Mullah Mohammad Umer and Taliban were role models for Jihadi forces in Pakistani, because they were both Pushtuns and right kind of Muslims, denominationally speaking. Since they were the Pushtuns and they upheld their Pushtun traditions of not surrendering their guests or those who have sought their protection-Osama and Al-Qaeda men. As a result Osama and Al-Qaeda have become objects of admiration, support and indeed veneration.²⁹ Hence the subsequent result was that the Pushtuns have given shelter to Taliban-Al Qaeda to escape from the U.S. bombings in Afghanistan. The Pushtun tribes even misguided the FBI searchings by giving wrong information about the Taliban-Al Qaeda.

Therefore, given the geographical proximity of the NWFP and Baluchistan with the Afghanistan, these Pushtun population's support had become very indispensable. But the reality showed that they have fully cooperated with the Taliban-Al Qaeda in escaping from the Afghanistan. Hence the non-cooperation of the Pushtun population and their MMA government have been the most important irritant factor in U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation since the 'Operation Enduring Freedom',

3. SECTARIANISM:

Pakistan has been predominantly a Shia dominated society. The other sect Sunnis constitute a minority. Although both the groups profess Islam, they are opposed to each other vehemently. Both these Shia and Sunni sects sponsor their own madrassas and seminaries, which in turn will preach their own brand of Islam.³⁰

²⁸ MB Naqvi in *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, October 17, 2002.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Juan Manuel Lopez Nadal, "Pakistan A Fragile Ally", *Strategic Digest*, vol. 32, no. 2, February 2002, p.250.

The major sectarian groups in Pakistan are the (1) Sipah-e-Sahaba, an anti-Shia organization, (2) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and (3) Sipah-e-Muhammad (SM), a pro-Shia organization. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are committed to turn Pakistan into a hardline Sunni state. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is headed by a former member of SSP, active in the Seraiki Belt of southern Punjab and also extends its activities to the Lahore-Faisalabad-Wazirabad triangle.³¹

The sectarian problems, which remained at manageable levels until late 1970s, began to escalate both in intensity and scope under the Zia regime. The introduction of Zakat and Usher system enhanced the social status of the Mullahs as they played an important role in the Zakat committees.³² Mullah's free access to the district and provincial administrations gave economic freedom to the Mullahs. Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir created a serious sectarian divide within the Pakistan society. It is not possible for Pakistan to promote Jihad in Kashmir and Taliban in Afghanistan, without inadvertently promoting sectarianism in Pakistan. The JUI, the SSP's founding party, also helped to create both the Taliban and Harkat. Deobandi madrassas issue anti-Shia edicts and boys trained to fight in Kashmir are also trained to call Shia the infidel.

Therefore, the sectarianism has polarized the Pakistan society into distinct groups. All sects profess to follow Islam, but have a distinct view of their own true Islam. Any attempt to impose the majority fiqh (Hanfi) in Pakistan alienates other sects and causes open rebellion. Some minority sects look-up to other countries for support and protection.

Although the sectarian clashes have been common to Pakistan, their intensity and frequency have risen since September 11, 2001 even challenging the writ of the state. Therefore, General Pervez Musharraf spell out what he characterized as 'rules of behaviour' that would henceforth govern all citizens and organizations in Pakistan and

³¹ Rizwan Zeb, no. 13, p.63.

³² *ibid.*

declared that 'the writ of the state shall prevail'.³³ He also further went to express his anguish saying that;

the Pakistani's are sick of sectarian violence and the day of reckoning has come. It is a day of major decisions. Do we want to convert Pakistan into a theocratic state? Can we run the country only through religious education or make Pakistan a progressive, modern and dynamic state?³⁴

However, outraged by Mushrraf's decision to join the international coalition's efforts to fight Taliban-Al Qaeda, the sectarian groups have started creating violence and anti-US demonstration all over Pakistan. Therefore, in order to control sectarian violence, the Pakistan government has to divert its limited state police resources, which will weaken its cooperation with U.S. Therefore, the sectarian violence is one of the tension areas in U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation.

4. REFUGEES:

Ever since Pakistan got involved in the Afghanistan conflict, the influx of refugees into Pakistan increased. Pakistan remained deeply involved in Afghanistan for more than twenty years and has paid a huge price for his involvement. During the Soviet invasion (1979-1989) of Afghanistan three million refugees entered Pakistan and they were allowed by the Zia government to move anywhere in the country. These Afghan refugees have created little Afghanistan's in and around Peshawar and Quetta.³⁵ The refugees were settled in NWFP and Bauchistan. They represented 20% of the local population of these two provinces.³⁶ According to one of the most respected journalist of Pakistan, Ayaz Amir;

the outskirts of the town (Peshawar and Quetta) are pockmarked by Afghan tents. The richer Afghans dominate sections of the main bazaar. The poorer sorts push street-carts or work as day laborer.

³³ Hindu, New Delhi, January 13, 2002.

³⁴ See *Asian Age*, New Delhi, January 14, 2002, for President Mushrraf's address to the nation on January 12, 2002.

³⁵ Sher Khan, "Enough, No More", *Pakistan Observer*, 14 January, 2001.

³⁶ *ibid.*

A vast Afghan influx is changing the colour of the entire north Punjab plain. These Kabuliwallas are not seasonable migrants... they are here to stay, their urge to do so strengthened by the memory of the misery they have fled and the relative plenty they have found here.. General Zia, the source of so many of our sorrows, let them have the freedom of the country. The consequences are now upon us in the form of an Afghan invasion more permanent theory any before it. It is also an ongoing invasion with Afghanistan's ongoing troubles sweeping fresh waves of refugees into Pakistan.³⁷

According to a *U.S.A. Today* report the NWFP is home to 3,000,000 Afghan refugees who have only created a state within a state, but also have made the province a heroin trade centre.³⁸

Added to this all of them are pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda and have become a law unto themselves.³⁹ Therefore, Pakistan government wanted to repatriate the refugees. Repatriation of Afghan refugees would, to a large extent, reduce Pakistan's concern regarding fundamentalists and small arms proliferation. More importantly, some of these groups have pledged to wage jihad against Pakistan if they are forcefully sent back to Afghanistan. The refugees, not bound by the policies of the Pakistan's government, feel betrayed by Pakistan's change of policy. Therefore, they have the potential to create problems both for Pakistan and U.S. in rooting out Taliban and Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.

5. DOUBLE ROLES OF PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT AND ISI:

It was alleged that, even after Pakistan's decision to support US in Afghanistan, arms supplies were being shifted to the Taliban by ISI supported private firms and individuals from Pakistani territories until October 22, 2001.⁴⁰ A US official complained that 'Islamabad knew this, but refused to take action'.⁴¹ This official was only one of the vast

³⁷ Ayaz Amir, "A Glimpse of the Future", *Dawn*, 27 January, 2001.

³⁸ "Pakistan: Can Democracy Survive", *USA Today*, 2002.

³⁹ For instance the Afghan refugees in Karachi have been involved in arms trading and drug smuggling activities. Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Crime and Punishment," *Herald*, December 2001, pp.28-9.

⁴⁰ M. Illyas Khan, "Taliban-ISI-CIA Connection", *Asian News Digest*, December 2-8, 2001, p.15.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

majority of US analysts who are convinced that the real truth about the Taliban's military power lies in the secret files of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's premier intelligence agency which controls the country's policies on Kashmir and Afghanistan.

It may also be noted that Pakistan was the last country to withdraw recognition to the Taliban regime, which was after all, its own protégé. Pakistan also asked the US to provide proof of Osama's involvement in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Therefore, General Musharraf while addressing the nation said;

we are asking them (US) to come up with whatever evidence they have against Osama Bin Laden. What I would like to know is how do we save Afghanistan and Taliban. And how do we ensure that they suffer minimum losses.⁴²

General Musharraf also further publicly supported Osama Bin Laden saying that he did not plan the September 11, 2001 attacks. Hence he observed;

I don't think it possible that Osama sitting up there in the mountains could do it (9/11). He was perhaps the sponsor, the financier, the motivating force. But those who executed it were much more modern. They knew the US, they knew aviation. I don't think he has the intelligence or the minute planning. The planner was some one else.⁴³

Therefore, in order to save Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda subsequently the Pakistan government also held a series of meetings with the Taliban to thrash out a deal for the surrender of Osama. General Musharraf sent Director General of ISI as his personal emissary to talk to Mullah Umar to surrender Osama.

It was also said that the ISI has helped the Taliban-Al Qaeda elements to escape from Afghanistan before the US started bombing the country. It was even suspected that the Pakistan ISI had given a safe passage to Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omer. This suspicion assumed even greater importance because the Taliban and Al Qaeda cadre could have escaped from the very sophisticated US precision guided missiles attacks on Afghanistan.

⁴² *New York Times*, August 6, 2002.

⁴³ *ibid.*

However, it was alleged that this was possible with the double role of the ISI which, apart from supporting Taliban-Al Qaeda, pretended to help the U.S.

The US officials go even further. They say that the ISI has been playing a double game using espionage espionage parlance. It facilitates the FBI's operations in Pakistan, but at the same time, as it has been doing for years, it also keeps in close touch, and perhaps extends occasional cooperation to the sinister Al Qaeda.

Therefore, the distrust of ISI among the US FBI officials is so much that the latter had established its own intelligence infrastructure. Though the ISI attempts to flaunt its cooperation with the Americans, the fact is that the FBI is running its own show.⁴⁴

A diplomat posted in Islamabad claimed that the FBI has its own men – not Pakistan – sitting in the main telephone exchanges of every Pakistani city. When it obtains specific information, it organizes a raiding party, but informs its Pakistani counterparts only hours before the operation is undertaken.⁴⁵

Hence the diplomat observed;

They (FBI Officials) tell the Paksitanis that they need so many men and so many vehicles. They tell them (ISI) nothing of where the action is going to be until the raid begins. Then they tell them, 'follow us.'⁴⁶

This was because of the lack of trust on part of the ISI agency. The most glaring evidence of ISI's, double role was the arrest of Al Qaeda military head, Ramzi Bin Al Shib in an house, only three kilometers away from Army Chief's house, where General Pervez Musharraf stays. Therefore, the ISI's double role was seen as one of the tensions of US-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation.

6. ATTACKS ON CHRISTIANS AND WESTERNS:

⁴⁴ Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 9, 2003, p.14.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.14.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

Ever since Pakistani President General pervez Musharraf had announced his decision to support the war against Taliban in Afghanistan, the terrorists attacks increased on the foreigners. These attacks were mainly on Christian missionaries, schools, hospitals and embassies, since they were seen as the infidels.⁴⁷

Although many terrorist outfits have participated in the attacks on the foreigners, it was Laskar-e-Jhangvi, which was linked to the suicide car-bomb attacks in Karachi outside the Sheraton Hotel in May and the US consulate in June, and the murder of abducted US journalist Daniel Pearl in January, 2002.⁴⁸

Following is the chronology of attacks on Christians and Westerners in Pakistan since September 11, 2001. On October 28, 2001 five gunmen opened fire on Achatholic church in Bawalpur in Punjab province, killing 16 worshippers.⁴⁹ On March 17, 2002 an attacker burst into the protestant church in Islamabad's diplomatic enclave and hurled grenades at the congregation of mainly foreign diplomat's families. Five people, including a US diplomat's daughter, were killed.⁵⁰ On June 14, 2002 a suicide car-bomb attack outside the US consulate in Karachi killed 12 Pakistanis including the attacker. On July 13, 2002 grenades are thrown at a group of European tourists observing archaeological site in Mansehara in Northern Pakistan.⁵¹ Twelve people including seven Germans were highly injured. On August 5, 2002 four masked gunmen stormed the Murree Christian School, north-east of Islamabad, killing six Pakistanis and wounding four.⁵² Similarly on August 9, 2002 three men hurled grenades at worshippers emerging from a morning prayer service in the Christian Hospital Chapel in Taxila, west of Islamabad. Three Pakistani women-two nurses

⁴⁷ Teresita C. Schaffer, "US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03., p.174.

⁴⁸ *Asian Age*, New Delhi, August 13, 2002.

⁴⁹ *Statesman*, Calcutta, August 10, 2002.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² *ibid.*

and a paramedic-and one of the attackers were killed, while 26 hospitals staff and local Christians were wounded.⁵³

Therefore, vexed by all these anti-foreigners violence, the US had announced that all the US citizens should leave Pakistan since they have become insecure from the fundamentalist attacks. The Pakistani government was not happy with the US and expressed its dissatisfaction since the latter's decision had affected the Pakistani tourism and foreign direct investment. Hence analysts have even speculated that this may create a rift between the US and Pakistanis in the latter's counter terrorism cooperation.

THE ROLE OF ARMY:

As the military campaigning in Afghanistan intensified, General Musharraf came under increasing pressure not only from the religious extremists but also from people who believed that he had sold out to the American's. In the face of increasing countrywide protests, and the call for the removal of General Musharraf by Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), there were increasing concerns about the possibility that Musharraf might lose power. Added to this was the fear that the hardliners within the army might rise against Musharraf.⁵⁴

General Musharraf made sure that he strengthened his position by reshuffling the army. His appointment of a new Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the creation of the post of Vice Chief of Army Staff were intended to remove discord from the higher levels of the military. On October 7, 2001, two of his most trusted lieutenants during the coup i.e. Deputy Chief of Army Staff General Muzaffar Usmani and ISI Chief General Mehmood Ahmed were removed while General Mehmood Aziz was sideline as he was reassigned as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, considered to be a mainly ceremonial post. These actions which were meant to clamp down on immediate or future

⁵³ **ibid.**

⁵⁴ **Sumita Kumar, "Politics in Pakistan Post-September 11, 2001", *Strategic Analysis*, April-June 2002, p.232.**

dissent against the president, were combined with a reshuffle in the police and local administrations.⁵⁵

It is obvious that in the new context the army will have to let go its dependence on the Islamic extremists for creating an impediment to the functioning of mainstream political parties or democratic process and for helping it to achieve the country's foreign policy goals. While it would probably be easier for the army to do the former, only time will tell whether it will manage to achieve the latter.⁵⁶

7. INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS ON KASHMIR:

Various Pakistani governments have looked upon Islamic militants as an instrument of regional influence for almost three decades. The policy of backing Islamic militants was encouraged and funded by the United States during the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, the United States changed its policy but Pakistan did not.⁵⁷

Musharraf regime abandoned the Taliban immediately after September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, and subsequently allowed U.S. forces to use Pakistani air bases for operations inside Afghanistan. Pakistani intelligence services provided, though continue to provide, valuable information to the United States in its ongoing hunt for Taliban and Al Qaida members. The Pakistani military is now working with U.S. law enforcement officials in tracking down terrorists in the lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. But Pakistan still harbours militants who target India.⁵⁸

Therefore, with the assistance of ISI, the Pakistani terrorist outfits Lashker-e-Taiba and Hujbul-Mujahideen have attacked the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly on October 1, 2001. Similarly the ISI backed terrorist organizations have attacked Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. India had expressed its diplomatic displeasure

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.232.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.232.

⁵⁷ Hussain Haqqani, "America's New Alliance with Pakistan: Avoiding the Traps of the Past", [http: www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org).

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p.5.

during the above incidents.⁵⁹ But its patience ran out of limit when the Pakistani backed terrorist outfits attacked the Army camp at Kaluchak on May 14, 2002. Outraged by the continuing terrorist attacks India has decided to deploy its military forces along the border. Diplomatic relations were cut off between India and Pakistan. India even threatened to go war unless the Pakistani government stops supporting the militants in Kashmir under the name of the freedom struggle. Analysts described the situation as the gravest since 1971 war. Even they have speculated that both the countries may resort to nuclear exchange.

However, Pakistan on its part has also deployed its military forces along the border. It had to withdraw its forces deployed along with the Durand Line to counter Indian forces.⁶⁰ The American's have worried since the withdrawal of Pakistani forces along with the Afghanistan border might cripple its capacity to counter Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.⁶¹ This could indeed result in the termination of operations in the tribal areas. Without the participation of Pakistani troops, probing and combing of tribal areas is not a feasible proposition for the U.S.⁶²

Therefore, the India-Pakistan stand off on Kashmir was seen or one of the obstacles to the U.S.-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation.⁶³

MISCELLANEOUS:

There were, however, differences between Pakistan and the US in some major areas. As reported, these pertained to (i) US military assistance to the Northern Alliances; (ii) signals from the US targeting Pakistani religious groups; (iii) US refusal to earn fresh UN

⁵⁹ Teresita C., Schaffer, "U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, p.175.

⁶⁰ Pervez Iqbal, Cheema, "Post-11 September Developments: A Pakistani Perspective" in Deepanker Banerji and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *South Asia and the War on Terrorism: Analyzing Implications of 11 September* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.50.

⁶¹ Hussain Haqqani, op cit., p.176.

⁶² *ibid.*, p.50.

⁶³ Marty Kauchal, "U.S.-Pakistan ties in the balance", *Armed Forces Journal*, December 2002, p.8.

endorsement for its military action in Iraq; and (iv) non-inclusion of Muslim states in the military coalition that would undertake military action.⁶⁴ Later the US assured Pakistan that the help extended to the Northern Alliances was limited in nature and the US would support the establishment of multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan. Pakistan was apprehensive that non-inclusion of other Muslim countries in the coalition force would make it difficult for Pakistan to get domestic support for joining the war against terrorism, but the US ruled out that demand.⁶⁵ Therefore, some of the analysts thought that it would create an obstacle between the US and Pakistan.

Finally, it may be said that Pakistan today is a country in disarray, lacking in social cohesion, without an honest and competent political class, under the hegemony of the military and the secret services, weighed down by poverty, social polarization, corruption and feudalism, and may become an easy pray to religious fundamentals, ideal terrain for violence and fanaticism.⁶⁶ It is corroded by all the seeds of instability but, without doubt, possess nuclear weapons with the theoretical possibility of using them. These lethal arms also, which in case of destabilization, can fall into the hands of extremists beyond control.⁶⁷ Hence Pakistan is a reluctant ally in the military operation. Musharraf government has clear difficulties in thrusting his cooperation on its own public opinion, including the hardliners in the army and the ISI.⁶⁸ An internal purge of fundamentalist, pro-terrorist elements or those involved in the big Taliban opium trafficking business would not be easy.⁶⁹ Therefore, all these make Pakistan a source of constant

⁶⁴ Kamran Khan, "Cracks in Pak-US Coalition Against Terrorist", News International, 26 September 2001.

⁶⁵ General Musharraf was reported to have said to the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, that including the moderate Muslim states in the international force would make it easier for him to provide logistical and related support to a multinational army. Kamran Khan, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Juan Manuel Lopez Nadals, "Pakistan a Fragile Ally", *op cit.*, p.251.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p.251.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.255.

⁶⁹ Times of India, New Delhi, May 7, 2003.

worry for the US in the post September 11, 2001, counter terrorism cooperation.

CONCLUSION:

From the day one the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has accepted to support US in its fight against global terrorism, he began facing many obstacles. The most important among all of them has been the madrassas influenced jihadists. They see the US and Western people as infidels hence Pakistan's support to them should be stopped. As a result they started instigating the anti U.S. protests and demonstrations which have been crippling the Pakistani state apparatus. Similarly the madrassas inspired jihadists have been resorting to the killings of westerners and 'US citizens in order to demonstrate that their presence in Pakistan is unwanted. The madrassas divided between Sunni and Shia sect, have been preaching the anti-U.S. sentiment which is rampant in today's Pakistan's society. The Shia and Sunni madrassas have spawned rival terrorist forces that are continuously engaged in violent attacks on sectarian rivals. Therefore, the sectarian violence, apart from jihadists, is seen as another areas of obstacle in US-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation.

And also the rise of MMA in October 2002 elections was seen as the most powerful obstacle. Their election manifesto included the implementation of shariah and withdrawal of Pakistan's support to US in the war against terrorism. Therefore, the MMA governments in both North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, which play crucial role since they are ethnically and geographically closer to Taliban-Al Qaeda, is seen as the important stumbling block in US-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation.

It is also reported that the ISI has been playing a double game with the FBI. The FBI has even alleged that the ISI has been giving prior investigation information to the Pakistan origin Taliban-Al Qaeda cadre. It has been evident from the FBI's experiences in the NWFP and Baluchistan where the ISI had only cooperated in nabbing non-Pakistani Taliban-Al Qaeda members from the refugee camps.

Finally, the India-Pakistan rivalry on Kashmir has been a continuous threat to Pakistan's capacity to support US effort in counter terrorism in Afghanistan. In the post-December 13 period India has openly threatened to go for a war with Pakistan on its alleged support to terrorist outfits which are killing innocent Indian citizens. As a result the Pakistan government has to withdraw some of its forces, already deployed along with the Afghanistan border, to counter the Indian moves in Kashmir. The US finally had to intervene because if at all war takes place its primary goal of eliminating terrorism would suffer.

Therefore, in the end, it is said that the factors such as the jihadists, the sectarianism, the rise of MMA, the refugee problem, the ISI's double game and the India-Pakistan tensions as prospective tensions in Pakistani's counter terrorism cooperation with the US after the September 11, 2001.

Chapter - V

CHAPTER – 5

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA:

From the Cold War perspective, South Asia was perennially on the sidelines. Its principal reasons might be construed as defiance of Cold War alliances forged by the United States of America and its Western allies, and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) that had been able to articulate non-involvement in the polarised power blocks.¹ Conceivably, India-US relations, despite their being two largest democracies, continued to be neither too cordial nor too cold. However, there was the lowest ebb during the Bangladesh liberation movement in 1971 when the US was criticised for its 'gunboat diplomacy' for demonstrating support for Pakistan.² Therefore, it has been said that the US interest in South Asia was rather benign except with Pakistan, its cold war ally, and later as the frontline state for anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.³

Surprisingly, however, the cold war neglect continued in the post-Cold War relations between South Asia and the U.S. It was said that the India-Pakistan rivalry on Kashmir and the unified positions taken by the developing countries and non-aligned group against the industrialized north, as reasons for the US hesitation in South Asia.⁴ Since South Asia had an abysmally slow growth rate and continued to reel under objective poverty, Western interest might have been receded in the region.⁵

But the September 11 terrorists attacks on Washington and New York were a 'paradigm altering' events and their significance will continue

¹ Lok Raj Baral, "Post-11 September Developments and their Implications for South Asia: A view from Kathmandu", in Deepankar Banerjee and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *South Asia and the War on Terrorism : Analyzing the Implications of 11 September* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.101.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Maleeha Lodhi, "Security Challenges in South Asia", *The Non-Proliferation Review*, Summer 2001, p.118.

to resonate in international politics for decades to come.⁶ All other issues, disputes and trends in international politics such as the rising Chinese power, missile defence, drugs, the environment, the global finance and trading systems, apart from various other intra state and interstate conflicts, have been put on the backburner.⁷ And, at any rate, they are now being reexamined through the lens of the 'war on terror.'⁸

From the day of US forming a global counter terrorism coalition with Pakistan as the frontline state, South Asia once again acquired its prominence in the US strategic thinking.⁹ Although India came forward to offer the needed counter terrorism cooperation, the US placed greater priority on Pakistan for its ideological and geographical proximity with the Taliban-Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As a result Pakistan became once again the most needed ally. Therefore the question to be asked is what implications this U.S.-Pakistan close relation would have for the South Asian region?

The U.S. policy toward the region since September 11 has signaled a fundamental change in both the intensity, and the quality of involvement of the United States in South Asia.¹⁰ Looking beyond the immediate objectives of the war on terrorism, the United States has begun to focus on the deeper interstate and intrastate conflicts that have long troubled the region. For its part, the region, itself has been more receptive than ever before the new U.S. engagement.¹¹

The result is a potential reorientation of the subcontinent. If the Bush administration can sustain the level of involvement it has demonstrated since September 11, the prospects of reordering both the subcontinent's interstate relations and its intrastate dynamics is real. And

⁶ Varun Sahni, "Fractured, Frightened and Frustrated: South Asia after 11 September", in Deepankar Banerjee and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *South Asia and the War on Terrorism: Analyzing the Implications of 11 September* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.85.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Raja Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, p.141.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.141.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p.141.

at the same time, South Asia even might prove an immediate, visible success of the Bush administration's expansive war against terrorism.¹²

Unlike elsewhere in the world the South Asian region's political class have seen the U.S. effort as an opportunity. Few areas in the world have experienced the ravage of international terrorism like the subcontinent, where terrorism has really become a part of everyday life. As the United States began to demonstrate greater interest in the region, South Asian leaders eagerly moved to draw Washington into their regional and internal disputes by offering military cooperation in the war on terror. Although unstated, the new welcoming attitude towards the U.S. military presence and enhanced U.S. security role in the region reflect a recognition that South Asian security has become a global issue. Similarly the region's problems now are no longer manageable within the confines of either domestic political or bilateral frameworks.¹³

PAKISTAN, INDIA AND KASHMIR:

Within South Asia, Pakistan was seen as the state which officially intervenes in its neighbours by sponsoring regimes and terrorist groups into Afghanistan and India respectively. Its sponsoring Taliban-Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and its destabilising repercussions in the South Asian region and across the world are well known. Especially the ISI sponsored terrorists and their havoc in Kashmir, leading to the regional tensions have been the principal reasons why the regional organization like South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has almost become dysfunctional.¹⁴

Added to this, within Pakistan, the number of madarassas and seminaries and their negative impact on the Pakistan society has become socially incohesive leading to the fractured politics. The grip of Islamic clerics and Ulemas on the jihadist elements has become more powerful than the state in the recent part. Their known rhetoric of waging a holy

¹² *ibid.*, p.141.

¹³ *ibid.*, p.142.

¹⁴ See M.S. Rajan's, "India and Its Neighbours the Policy and Problems", in S.D. Muni (ed.), "Understanding South Asia : Essays in the Memory of Late Professor (Mrs.) Urmila Phadnis (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1994), p.31.

war and cutting India with thousands cuts have been clearly the result of Islamic clerics and Ulemas in Pakistan. Their writ runs harder than the state in today's Pakistan. This was obvious in the recent past when the Zamali government ordered the Jaishe-e-Mohammad leader, Masood Azar, not to enter into the Azad Kashmir, but he disobeyed the state and participated in an anti-India rally.

Pakistan is also one of the countries, apart from axis of evil group, to have been continuously supplying the nuclear related knowledge to other state for financial and material benefits, and violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regimes. And more importantly Pakistan is the only Islamic country with nuclear bomb and loose command and control system. Therefore, the worry for the US in the post September 11 counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan has been to see to it that the Taliban – and Al Qaeda won't get the nuclear know-how. With the assistance of other state's instruments, the Taliban-Al Qaeda could inflict such a terrible acts of September 11 and one can't imagine if the so called Pakistan's nuclear bomb, which was already projected as 'Islamic Bomb',¹⁵ reaches the hands of Osama Bin Laden. Therefore, the main U.S. concern in the post September 11 is how to stop the Al Qaeda elements from getting the nuclear knowledge. Because of these reasons the United States described South Asia as the most dangerous place on the earth. Because of the above mentioned reasons U.S. made Pakistan as the key ally in the war against terrorism after September 11, 2001.

Therefore, the most important question is in what way the U.S. engagement will have implications for South Asia? Nonetheless, the US for the first time, has increased its involvement in South Asia, prompting the former Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, to describe the U.S. as another South Asian power. Its involvement in increased bilateral contacts with the countries of the region has brought the only super power to the region. What actual impacts would be on the region, however, need to be examined.¹⁶ One should remember that the cold war

¹⁵ Ryukichi Imai, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Major Wars, Regional Conflicts, and Terrorism," *Asia-Pacific Review*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, p.98.

¹⁶ Lok Raj Baral, op cit., p.107.

U.S. involvement is different from the post September 11 U.S. involvement in Pakistan. If there is any country which can influence the Pakistan state than any one else in the world is the United States. The amount of clout it had on Pakistan is incomparable with any country. With this leverage the U.S. President could ask the Nawaz Sharif government to withdraw from the Indian territories in 1999 Kargil war.¹⁷ If the U.S. had not intervened then the subsequent casualties of Indian soldier would have been larger¹⁸ and the conflict would have taken a serious turn. Subsequently the U.S. pressure only could bring Pakistan to the Agra summit in June 2001.

In 2002 January the U.S. pressure on Pakistan had resulted in Musharraf promising to modernize the Pakistani society. He also ordered to regularise the madrassas and their curriculum apart from banning the anti-India terrorist organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Laskar-e-Toiba etc. Banning of the terrorist groups and reforming the Pakistani society under the leadership of the Musharraf regime was clearly under the pressure of the U.S. both these above measures will have a stabilizing effect on Afghanistan and Kashmir leading to a long term stability of the South Asian region. This would have been an unimaginable result if the U.S. had not aligned with Pakistan.

In 2002, the de-escalation of tension along the Line of Control, through U.S. exerting pressure on Pakistan to withdraw the armed forces was a significant positive U.S. impact on the south Asian region. The another positive aspect of U.S. involvement in Pakistan was that India has relied on the United States to wring commitments from Pakistan to end infiltration permanently and then to verify its termination.¹⁹ This had opened up the political space for the United States to move from crisis management to conflict resolution in South Asia.²⁰

¹⁷ V.R. Ragavan, "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia," *Non Proliferation Review*, Fall-Winter 2001, p.89.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Satu P. Limaye, "Mediating Kashmir: A Bridge too Far," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, p.162.

²⁰ C. Raja Mohan, *op cit.*, p.148.

On the nuclear proliferation front the U.S. engagement with the post September 11 Pakistan will have the positive impact in the following three ways. Firstly, the U.S. will prevent Pakistan from using nuclear weapons by accident, miscalculation or design. Secondly, the U.S. will pressurize Pakistan to ensure the lowest possible level of nuclear weapon arsenals and delivery systems. Thirdly, the U.S. will ensure that the capabilities for nuclear weapon and their delivery systems do not spread from Pakistan to other states. Fourthly, the U.S. objective to limit the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on the subcontinent will lead to the no arms race in the sub-continent.²¹ The influence of the post September 11 U.S. involvement on South Asian regional countries is analysed in the following details.

NEPAL:

Nepal has joined the global coalition hoping that it would end up in flushing out the Maoist insurgency from the country. The Maoist cadre on their part have realised that the world equations have changed and there will be no place for violence. This was possible because of U.S. aggressive talking about the Maoists. After September 11 the Maoists violence was internationalized, drawing attention of the major countries of the world, specially the U.S. Therefore, the United States officials made the flurry of bilateral visits and commitments of funds for mitigating the menace of the Maoists. As a result a U.S. team of security experts visited the Maoists-ravaged districts in the western hills, followed by the Secretary of State Colin Powell in March 2002. The Secretary also made his commitment to provide assistance to upgrade the quality of weapons of the Army, besides other help for anti-Maoists operations. Such activities and remarks made by the US officials and its ambassador about the US role in Nepal also led to some controversies. It has prompted the U.S. ambassador to clarify that the U.S. was not at all interested in Making Nepal a base for promoting its (U.S.) objectives. However, the U.S. officials made an

²¹ Maleeha Lodhi, op cit., p.121.

unequivocal commitment to safeguard democracy and the government duly elected by the people.²²

The U.S. has also committed \$20 million, plus weapons and logistics needed for the army. The visit of the Nepali Prime Minister in May 2002 to the U.S. and his meeting with President George W. Bush and later with the British Prime Minister and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan were construed as a diplomatic victory of the prime minister. He could also impress upon the leaders in person about the actual status of the Maoist People's war and its likely future.²³

Mobilization of national and international support for the government seemed to have dampened the initial euphoria of the Maoists, as they are now under strong pressure for laying down arms before starting fresh negotiations. The statements of the top Maoist leader, Prachanda, are characterized by moderation and realism that depart from the previous stubborn positions on some issue like the abolition of the monarchy, holding of a new constituent assembly, and an interim government. Now, indications are that they want to be one with other constitutional parties to safeguard the gains of the 1990 movement lest they be taken away by retrogressive forces. Although the signals are not yet clear, the pressure brought to bear on the Maoists due to international support and the anti-insurgency operations launched within the country by the security forces have shown some impact on weakening the Maoists strike capability.²⁴

Finally, although the Maoist movement had been rampant with killings from the 1996 onwards the Nepali government had not branded it as a terrorist organization. The Maoists were forced to come to talks in November 2001 forced by the hostile global environment. However, the talks were failed and the Deuba government, emboldened by the U.S. and world support, branded the Maoists as terrorist group and imposed emergency. These were clearly the results of the U.S. backing the South

²² Lok Raj Baral, *op cit.*, p.111.

²³ *ibid.*, p.111.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p.112.

Asian countries against the interstate forces in the post September 11 scenario.²⁵

SRI LANKA:

U.S. interest in finding ways to address the two-decades-old civil war in Sri Lanka, where nearly 60,000 lives have been lost in the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, predates September 11, 2001.²⁶ Because of the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and strong financing sources in the United States, the terrorist organization was technically under the ambit of U.S. law.²⁷ Therefore, the LTTE was designated as a foreign terrorist organization in the late 1990s.²⁸ The Clinton administration backed Norway's political initiative to facilitate a dialogue between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE at the turn of the decade, which provided extremely valuable impetus as it helped to broker a cease-fire at the end of 2001. The Norwegian initiative's success, however, also depended on the decisive warnings from the United States to the LTTE in early 2002 not to use the peace talks to regroup, rearm, and provoke another round of confrontation, as it had done in the past. Veiled in the warning was the suggestion that the LTTE could become a target of the U.S. war on terrorism, driving home an understanding among Tamil extremists that they would need to rethink their strategy.²⁹ India's own strong support of the peace process in Sri Lanka and its refusal to allow the LTTE any leeway also contributed to a new set of external circumstances, which helped to provide the opportunity to end civil war and move toward political settlements.

As a result the LTTE had come forward for a settlement with an offer of an interim government. Earlier, the LTTE was adamant and not receptive to anything lesser than Eelam. Therefore, the LTTE's acceptance

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.110.

²⁶ C. Raja Mohan, *op cit.*, p.153.

²⁷ Ashutosh Varshney, "South Asia and the War on Terror", *Seminar*, January 2002, p.59.

²⁸ C. Raja Mohan, *op cit.*, p.153.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p.153.

of a peace process and provincial autonomy were clearly the results of U.S. involvement in South Asia.

BANGLADESH:

Bangladesh has been sheltering many of India's extremist groups from the North-East.³⁰ It was considered a tit for tat to India's support for the Shanti Bahini in the Chittagong Hill Tracks.³¹ Bangladesh has also suspected to have played a conduit to many of the ISI supported jihadi activists against India.³² And not surprisingly Begun Khalida Zia even went to the extent of describing the anti-Indian extremists and terrorist groups as freedom fighters.³³

When India brought the ISI operative's issue to the Bangladesh government's notice, the Foreign Minister said that 'India is the home of thousands of ISI agents. If it was unable to throw them out with their mighty military forces, how can it (India) expect us (Bangladesh) to do in our country.' This kind of attitude has been the hallmark of Bangladesh government prior to the September 11. But September 11 has changed the equations of the countries forcing the ISI sympathetic countries, like Bangladesh, to take some stern measures to curb their funds and activities in the country and region. This could have happened simply because of the U.S. leading as a counter terrorism coalition leading forcing the sponsoring and sympathizing nations like Bangladesh to eliminate the terrorists.

BHUTAN:

Thimpu also came under pressure after the post September 11 U.S. involvement in South Asia. As other regional states it had also started flushing out the militants. For the last four years ultras belonging to organizations like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapur Liberation

³⁰ S.D. Muni, "Challenges of Terrorism in South Asia", *South Asia Politics*, May 2002, p.37.

³¹ *ibid.*, p. 37.

³² *ibid.*, p. 37.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 37.

Organization (KLO), have bases in Bhutan. The militants belonging to these organizations sneak into Bhutan from Assam. The dense forests of Bhutan have long been used as a safe sanctuary by these militants. Their numbers have been growing and they are now in several hundreds, as per political analysts and observers.³⁴

The ULFA and NDFB are fighting for independent homelands in the State of Assam while the KLO is a ragtag outfit from West Bengal propped up by the ULFA. According to the Indian intelligence estimates there could be up to 3,000 ULFA NDFB and KLO cadres in Bhutan. At present, there are nine camps of ULFA and several camps of BODO besides camps of NDFB and KLO in Bhutan.³⁵

Although these camps were there for the last four years, the Royal Government of Bhutan was encouraged by the post September 11 happenings and started flushing them out. As a result the government applied a several-pronged approach on the Assam militants. The national assembly debated on the issue several times. In fact, it had asked the government to initiative a dialogue with Indian forces to persuade them to leave its territory. The rejuvenated Royal Assembly even warned that if the rebels failed to leave peacefully, then the government must evoke National Security Act and evict them forcefully. This was in July last year. Earlier, the Bhutanese Government had given anti-India rebels December 3, 2002, as the deadline to leave the kingdom.³⁶

The Bhutanese king, encouraged by the U.S. support to nations in suppressing terrorists, His Majesty King Jigme Singye Wangchuk had given a national call to socially boycott the Assam militants. He even gave a call to his nation to be prepared to fight these militants and throw them out of their territory. This was clearly a result of the changing regional and global politics after the September 11 incident which will clearly have a positive impact on the South Asian region.³⁷

³⁴ *The Pioneer*, New Delhi, July 9, 2003.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA:

The U.S. involvement in Pakistan after September 11, 2001, have negative implications as well. Firstly, the excessive United States role in Pakistan and other regional countries, in terms of involving financial matters and influencing the security policies, might weaken the sovereignty of these nations. Secondly, the U.S. pre September 11 concern in the South Asian region has been the issue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). But in the post September 11 situation the U.S. had virtually maintained silence on the Pakistan's continuing violation of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Hence encouraged by this U.S. tacit acceptance of Pakistan's nuclearisation might lead to more countries to follow the same path. Thirdly, although India was treated as a 'regional dominant power', with the U.S. involvement its dominance does not manifest in India-Pakistan relations.³⁸ This is notwithstanding the disproportionate power parity between them. The defence expenditure of India and Pakistan is respectively recorded at \$13.6 billion and \$3.3 billion. The army manpower ratio is 11,00,000 to 5,50,000 and weaponry, aircraft, warships, submarines and attack helicopter also provide far more leverage to India.³⁹ There are several added advantages to India because of its physical size, resources, population, and legitimate political institutions.⁴⁰ Therefore, the leverage India has over Pakistan in power parity is being compromised with U.S. playing a balancing role in the region.

CONCLUSION:

The post September 11 U.S. involvement has both positive and negative implications. The United States intervention is a great stabilizing factor. The South Asian region has been ravaged by the interstate and intrastate rivalries. The ISI backed militants in Kashmir have literally created a havoc for India in the past. But the post September 11 U.S. putting pressure on countries like Pakistan has resulted in its promise to

³⁸ Lok Raj Baral, *op cit.*, p.112.

³⁹ See India Today, 4-7 May 2002, p.29.

⁴⁰ Lok Raj Baral, *op cit.*, p.113.

stop infiltration 'permently.' Similarly, the Pakistani President General Musharraf's speech on January 12, 2002 was considered as an historical speech since he had promised to make Pakistan a moderate Islamic country. This effort will have clearly a positive stabilizing effect both on Afghanistan and India. This would have not been possible without the U.S.-Pakistan alliance.

The U.S. has even forced the Maoists in Nepal to come to the peace negotiations with the Nepali government. Their warnings and support to the government had forced the Maoists to redefine their rigid demands such as the abolition of monarchy, holding of a new constituent assembly and interim government.

In Sri Lanka, the long civil war of LTTE was even brought to a moderate situation by U.S. putting pressure through closing its financial sources. The U.S. even threatened the LTTE to brand as terrorist organization if it does not reciprocate to the Norwegian peace process. The LTTE even have agreed to the limited provincial autonomy to the Eelam. This also would have not been possible without U.S. taking interest in Sri Lanka.

Finally, the U.S. warning statements against the terrorist sponsoring countries and sympathizing nations have forced the Bangladesh and Bhutan governments to eliminate terrorists from their nations. If all these nations resolve to fight against terrorists, by solving their intrastate and interstate tensions, definitely it will pave the way for the stabilization of the region. It is found that the political stability is one of the main factors for the economic prosperity of the South Asian region. In the coming future it seems possible.

Chapter - VI

CHAPTER – 6

CONCLUSION:

The active role of the United States in Asia began in early twentieth century. The purpose of the involvement was to see to it that the communism, opposed to the capitalism, will not spread in the Asian continent. As a result the United States started supporting the anti-communist struggles like Chiang Kai-shaik regimes in China. The U.S. even spread the fear that the crux of communism was antagonistic to the Asian countries nationalism. The intended intention was to turn the nations of Asia against the then Soviet Union. Therefore, the ideological rivalry of the U.S. and the then Soviet Union made inroads into Asia making it a ground for potential conflict. In the process Japan was the natural ally of the U.S. since it was opposed to the Soviet Union and China. Although the American interventions were there until 1948 the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek nationalist regime had exasperated the U.S. fear that the Soviet Union's communism was making stronger inroads into Asia. As a result U.S. was making stronger inroads into Asia. As a result the U.S. was in a strong search of the anti-communist alliances during the height of the Cold War. The 1952 Korean war was the high point of the importance of the alliances in opposing the spread of communism. Similarly, the 1965 U.S. burning its fingers in Vietnam all the more forced it to realize to have political support and military backing of the South Asian regional countries.

South Asia as a region acquired importance during the Cold War period. India, being the second largest country after China, and its efforts to move closer to the Soviet Union and its extending support to the China in UN somewhat forced the U.S. to come into the region. Although the U.S. was keen in having alliance with India, the latter's consistent adherence to the Non-Alignment pushed the U.S. towards Pakistan.

Pakistan, a country formed on the two-nation theory, was in constant search for the alliances with powerful countries. Its fear was

that India the giant neighbour was not reconciled to the idea of the creation of Pakistan and may undo the partition one day. Its obsession with Kashmir made its foreign policy India centric. Initially Pakistan was ready to move closer to either U.S.S.R. or U.S. but preferably to be in a camp in which India will not be a member. Jawaharlal Nehru's willingness to be closer to the Soviet Union had opened the clear avenues for the Pakistani leadership. In order to woo the U.S. leadership the Pakistan's establishment started making statements proclaiming that Pakistan's practicing of Islam and Communism are incompatible hence it is a natural ally of the U.S. Its subsequent blind support to the U.S. on issues like Korean and Vietnam wars all the more brought it closer to the U.S. The result was the entry of Pakistan into SEATO and CENTO Cold War military alliances. Finally by 1954 the Pakistan was one of the closer Cold War allies of the U.S.

The U.S.-Pakistan relations have prospered in the subsequent decades with many ups and downs since their objectives were different. If the containment of communism was the U.S. primary objective, achieving Kashmir was Pakistan's sole objective. As a result Pakistan has recognized the importance of a strong standing army, which, in their mind, would be fulfilled only with the technologically-military advanced cooperation of the U.S. The Pakistani have further demanded that the U.S. should guarantee the territorial integrity of Pakistan in case if it goes to war with India over the Kashmir dispute. However, the U.S. was unwilling to be entangled with India over Kashmir. The U.S. imposing arms embargo in 1948 and 1965 were the instance where U.S. was unwilling to be embroiled in the India-Pakistan dispute, however, with the exception of 1971 war over Bangladesh. But the subsequent decade has altered the power equations of U.S.-Pakistan in South Asia since India emerged as a powerful geographical and political entity. Pakistan was disappointed because inspite of having military alliances with U.S. its territorial integrity was not protected. The subsequent period marked the low level of U.S. Pakistan relations because of the latter's less importance to the U.S. in global politics.

But the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union marked a new era in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The subsequent collaboration of the

U.S. and Pakistan in throwing Soviet forces out of Afghanistan has made Pakistan a frontline state in opposing communism. The Soviet Union's withdrawal in 1989 and the subsequent Pakistan's embarking on to nuclear bomb created a lull once again in their relationship. The U.S. administration's stance on nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and democracy have further drifted the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The continuing disenchantment, although began during Clinton's first term, reached a peak stage in his staying five days in India and five hours in Pakistan. The reasons were that the reducing relevance of the Cold War alliance with Pakistan to contain communism and the increasing importance of Indian markets in the new era of the globalization.

But every time the U.S.-Pakistan relations worsened some incident occurred making Pakistan more relevant to the U.S. The détente between U.S. and Soviet Union resulted in the cooling of relations but only to be reinforced with the invasion of Afghanistan. But again subsequently the Pakistan's political instability, their favourite preference to military rule to democracy and political interventions into Afghanistan and Kashmir, through ISI backed activists, have created a rift between U.S. and Pakistan. The country's poor human rights record and continuing violation of Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) irritated the Clinton administration which professed them as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Therefore, the U.S. had imposed sanctions in 1998 when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and in 1999 when a civilian government was dethroned in a military coup. The imposition of sanctions was seen in Pakistan as unfriendly. Similarly, the country's economic growth rate was also lower than the population growth rate making it economically almost a stagnant country.

Because of all these above reasons many observers said that Pakistan was politically a pariah and economically a stagnant state. Pakistan was in dilemma. But the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on New York and Washington by Taliban-Al Qaeda once again gave an opportunity to become politically acceptable to the United States. Due to its political and ideological closeness, apart from

geographical proximity, Pakistan was seen as indispensable in multifarious ways for the U.S. in their war against Taliban-Al Qaeda group.

Since the U.S. war on terrorism was to be fought in Afghanistan, the U.S. sought its Cold War ally Pakistan's political and military support. The U.S. saw Pakistan's help as indispensable in effectively rooting out Taliban-Al Qaeda in Afghanistan because its ISI agency not only has the capability to sabotage the war but knows the ranks and files of the Taliban-Al Qaeda since they were its own creation. Hence Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S. led coalition against terrorism. Once again the Cold War centrality of Pakistan to U.S. strategy resurfaced with the September 11. If the Cold War mission was the containment of communism, today's purpose is to eliminate terrorism. Though the objectives have been different but the critical role of Pakistan is same as indispensable.

Though Pakistan promised to cooperate with the U.S. in the war against terrorism many questions remained puzzling about the feasibility of Pakistan role as a frontline state in the war against terrorism. The U.S. thought that the Pakistan's ISI cooperation is essential in stopping the life-line to the Taliban Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But the subsequent findings show that ISI has not cooperated the FBI in arresting the Pakistani nationals of the Taliban-Al Qaeda. The Pakistan, to some extent as a token of commitment, has only assisted in arresting the foreign nationals of the Taliban-Al Qaeda. There were even confirmed reports that Pakistan has already given a safe passage to Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad Omer in escaping the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan. The initial U.S. raids in Afghanistan operation called 'Enduring Freedom' included the attack of precision guided missiles on the suspected bases of the Taliban-Al Qaeda. But the ISI, with the assistance of Pakistan's Air Force, had literally airlifted them to safer places like Saudi Arabia. The glaring example of Pakistan's non-cooperation to the U.S. was the ISI's efforts to protect the high profiled Al Qaeda leader Mohammad Shaik and Ramzi Bin Al Shib from extraditing to the U.S. At the most the ISI's pretension was to catch an unimportant Taliban-Al Qaeda member before every Pakistani official's visit to the U.S. to show that Pakistan's cooperation is

indispensable in the U.S. led war against global terrorism. They have done all these gimmicks to get more and more benefits, like financial and military assistance, from the U.S. If Pakistan has really cooperated with its genuine knowledge about Taliban-Al Qaeda, it would have been not impossible to catch Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad Omer within few hours. But this did not happen in full two years neither it will happen in coming future. Though the ISI and FBI have been jointly searching for the terrorists, the level of ISI's distrusts so high that the FBI officials have their own intelligence troops to locate the Taliban-Al Qaeda members. The reports have shown that the FBI had totally lost the trust and faith in the ISI. Therefore, it can be said that the ISI had not cooperated with the U.S.

Pakistan is a country where religion is more important than anything else. For them the non-Islam people are infidels and should be contested. As a result when the terrorist attacks took place on New York and Washington, the people were so jubilant that they chanted the anti US and pro-Osama Bin Laden slogans in the streets. For any Muslim the non-Islam religious, like Christianity, are seen as anti-Islamic.

This was more evident in the countries of the Middle East like Saudi Arabia. In the minds of Pakistani's the September 11 attacks were the result of the U.S. support to the authoritarian and repressive regimes in the Islamic world. The US presence in this region was seen as a threat to the Islam. Therefore whoever does the efforts to save Islam from the US and Western infidels is a hero in their view. In their view Osama Bin Laden did plan the attack to save Islam hence he is a savior of Islam. Given this background will the Muslims in any country, that too in Pakistan, allow their state to cooperate against their religious hero. Consequently in the early days of the Afghanistan war, when there were rumors that the Osama was killed, thousands of Pakistani Muslims protested in the streets against their country's cooperation with the US. The state ultimately has to obey their citizens rather than the external masters like the US. This is what exactly happening in the present U.S.-Pakistan's relations. Even now if the US

or the world has any hope for the capturing of Osama Bin Laden it would be a fools paradise to float.

Every country wants to protect its own interests. Similarly the Pakistani and the US diplomacy is not a missionary of charity. Rather it is protection of national interests by peaceful negotiations and persuasions. If the protection of Taliban-A! Qaeda, which will give an edge to the Pakistan in the Afghanistan and Kashmir, is Pakistan's priority, the Central Asian oil resources and markets are the US priority. The U.S. logic of aligning with Pakistan has been that in case of a hostile Central Asia and the Middle East, Afghanistan will provide the required support for the Central Asian and Middle Eastern oil resources and markets for the U.S. companies. This has been more evident in the U.S. policies. Therefore, the Bush Administration has been remarkably criticized in its foreign policy decision-making on one point that it has always based its decisions on a consideration of U.S. national interest. This can be more evident in the words of Condoleezza Rice who said that 'the American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on national interest and the pursuit of key priorities'. Prior to September 11, these key priorities included ensuring US military supremacy, promoting economic growth and political openness, renewing US relations with allies, focusing on establishing comprehensive relationships with major powers, and dealing decisively with rogue regimes and hostile powers. As result of the hallmark of the U.S. foreign policy before September 11 was 'decide, announce explain' style. This can be construed from the U.S. activities of its withdrawing unilaterally from the Kyoto Protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, more recently, objections to the International Criminal Court.

In the end, it can be said that whether a country cooperates with the international community or not depends upon its national interests. If the US could withdraw unilaterally from the above treaties, after all they are in the interests of the larger humanity, why can't Pakistan behave as a follower of its friend the US, famous for protecting its 'national interest' through 'realistic approach' in international affairs.

Hence, Pakistan's attitude towards U.S. in cooperating in the war against terrorism depends upon its weighing the costs and benefits of Pakistan's national interests. Who knows what benefits the Pakistanis are contemplating by keeping Taliban-Al Qaeda alive in the South Asian region.

Finally, prior to the September 11 attacks, the United States was in the middle of enhancing its relations with India. Pursuit of a closer relationship with India has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy towards south Asia since the Clinton administration and has only been reinforced since President Bush came to office.

The Bush administration was forced to adjust its policy in the aftermath of September 11, however. Suddenly, Pakistan, not only sharing a border with, but also having political and intelligence ties with Afghanistan, became the country in South Asia of primary importance for U.S. policy. Close cooperation between the United States and Pakistan since the September 11 attacks suggests that such renewed U.S. attention to Pakistan will potentially change the fundamental tone of US-Pakistan relations and thus will have enduring consequences for U.S. policy in the region. In other words, India must come to realize that while the United States will continue to strengthen ties with India, the crucial role Pakistan will play in the war against terrorism will prevent the United States from favouring Delhi over Islamabad.

With longstanding dispute over Kashmir continuing between India and Pakistan, the United States will have to strike a fine diplomatic balance in the tug-of-war between India and Pakistan. This is more likely since neither of which wants the other to have close relations with Washington. The US will only intensify its efforts to persuade both countries to restrain their behaviour towards each other, as continued tensions between India and Pakistan, combined with their inherent rivalry, could potentially provide a new nest for terrorist groups.

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