

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA, 1989-1991

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for
the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

S.B. ARTI



CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067
INDIA
2002



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

Tel. : 6107676, 6167557
Extn. 2365
Fax : (+91)-11-6165886
(+91)-11-6198234
Cable : JAYENU


Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies


19 July, 2002

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "**STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA, 1989-1991**", submitted by **Miss. S.B. ARTI** is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and is her own work.

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation of the said degree.


Prof. S.K. JHA
(Chairperson)


Dr. TULSI RAM
(Supervisor)

19.7.2002

Dedicated to
my dear parents

CONTENTS

	Page No.
<i>Preface</i>	<i>i-ii</i>
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	
Chapter-I	1-13
Introduction	
Chapter-II	14-42
Historical Background of Nationalism in Lithuania	
Chapter-III	43-63
Gorbachev's Policies and the Struggle for Independent Lithuania	
Chapter-IV	64-97
Towards Total Independence of Lithuania 1989-1991	
Chapter-V	98-102
Conclusion	
Bibliography	103-116

PREFACE

The present study is intended to analyze one of the most important historical problems of the contemporary world. The problems of Baltic States is related to many centuries, however, it became an international issue after the October Revolution in 1917. The problem of Nationalism in Lithuania and their independence became so volatile that Lenin had to bow before the existing reality and he allowed all the Baltic republics to become free in 1919. But, after two decades of Lithuanian freedom, the wheel of the history once again took a reverse circle at the outset of world war II and during this time Lithuania was re-annexed by Soviet Union following a secret pact (known as Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) signed with Germany.

The dissertation consists of five chapter. The first chapter begins with a short introduction about struggle for independent of Lithuania.

In the second chapter an attempt has been made to present the historical background of Nationalism in Lithuania which used to emerge from time to time during its long period of political slavery.

The third chapter deals with impact of Gorbachev's policies and the struggle for independent Lithuania during the period, 1989 to 1991.

In the forth chapter, a detailed analysis of the problems and issues that were responsible towards total Independence of Lithuania has been made. This period is related to the epoch making events in the Soviet Union which changed the face of the entire world. During this period Lithuanians had to face many twists and turns in the struggle for independent Lithuania.

In the last chapter, an overall assessment of struggle for independent Lithuania during the period from 1989 to 1991 has been made.

Acknowledgement


First of all I express my profound gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Tulsi Ram who was a constant inspiration for me to take my dissertation to logical conclusion and submit to the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University. His deep insight on the subject and sustained guidance throughout the course of my research with his constructive and priceless remarks enabled me to complete this work successfully. I am also thankful to all the professors and faculty members of Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European studies for their valuable suggestions encouragement and advice.

I express my profound gratitude to my parents, Dr. A.K. Rajuoria, my Didi-Jijaji and my Dear Baba who are my source of encouragement an inspiration.

I am specially thankful to my friends: Viresh Raj, Nebedita, Kirti, Narayan, Shobha, Kiran, Manjri, Meenakshi, Shatarupa and Sima and who provided me much needed help and cooperation throughout the period of my research work.

I would also like to thank to the staff members of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, I.D.S.A. Library, Tin Murti and Jawarlal Nehru Memorial Museum, Sapru House and Parliament Library for their generous help in providing study materials.

July 19, 2002
New Delhi


S.B. ARTI

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

Lithuania is the biggest state in the Baltic region however during many past centuries, it has been devastated by the clash of interests of different powers like the Swedes, French and Germans on the one side and the Russians on the other side. Lithuania was set free by the Bolshevik's in 1918 after as long spell of Tsarist rule but in 1940 it was occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union which resulted further devastation in this country. This ordeal ended in 1991 when Lithuania achieved recognition as an independent state. The circumstances of the Soviet takeover and the refusal of the United States and other nations to recognize Lithuania's forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union have distinguished Lithuania as well as the neighboring states of Estonia and Latvia, from the other former Soviet republics in International Law and politics throughout the postwar era. Lithuania has always played strategic role in Russian-Soviet history. Geopolitics of this area had created fierce rivalry among regional powers due to which the Lithuanian state had become victim of foreign aggression not for the economic gains but for the strategic considerations which had been most important factor in Russian policy towards this state. The same consideration had forced the earlier colonial powers to occupy this country in the past.

Lithuania belongs to the Baltic group of nations. Their ancestors had moved to the Baltic region about 3000 B.C from beyond the Volga region of Central Russia. In Roman times, they traded amber with Rome and around A.D. 900-1000 split into different language groups, namely, Lithuanians, Prussians, Latvians, Semigallians and others. The Prussians were conquered by the Teutonic Knights and ironically "Prussia" was taken over by the conquerors who destroyed or assimilated Prussia's original inhabitants. Other groups were also assimilated by their neighbours. Only the Lithuanians and the Latvians survived the ravages of history. Historically, the words Lithuania and

Lithuanians appeared for the first time in West-European historic records in 1009 A.D. This period is notable for the formation of the Lithuanian nation.¹ The first small state emerged on the territory of Lithuania between the 10th and 12th centuries. Traditions of Lithuanian statehood date from the early Middle Ages. As a nation, Lithuania emerged about 1230s A.D. under the leadership of Duke Mindaugas. He United Lithuanian tribes to defend themselves against attacks by Teutonic Knights who had conquered the Kinderd tribes of Prussia and also parts of present day Latvia.²

So far as the problem of independence and nationality question in Lithuania in modern era is concerned, its roots go back to Tsarist rule and Stalinist policies during Soviet period under which these problems had been continuously undermined. The long awaited unresolved ethnic and nationality problem was the product of prolonged Polish rule and later on caused by anti-Russian feeling during Tsarist and Soviet rule. The process of cultural colonization of Lithuania emerged following a dramatic marriage between Polish Queen Jadwiga and Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila on February 18, 1386. And as a condition, Jogaila agreed to become Roman Catholic.³ Thus Catholicism was introduced in Lithuania via the polish connection. Very quickly the personal union became a confederation. However, the socio and cultural variations had a deep impact on the Baltic states.

So far as, the problem of nationalism in Lithuania is concerned, its roots go back in 13th century, when Germans had settled in this region, after their conquest other Baltic region. This is how the German culture and protestantism became an essential part of Estonian and Latvians lives. On the other hand, the social development in Lithuania was quite different from these two states

¹ Akstinas Bronius, *Glimpses of Lithuania* (Gintaras Vilnius 1972) p. 83.

² Ibid. P. 84.

³ Burant. R. Stephen, "Polish Lithuanian Relations: Past, Present and Future" *Problem of Communism*, Vol.40, No.3, May-June- 1991, p. 68.

as it had been dominated for centuries by Polish rulers, who had introduced catholicism in Lithuania. These socio-cultural variations put for reaching impact on Lithuanian state.

The Lithuanian state had become Russian subject long back in 18th century. For example, Estonia and Latvia had been annexed by Peter, the-Great in 1710 and Lithuania was grabbed by Tsarist Russia in 1795. Although Estonia and Latvia had become developed part of Tsarist Russia, the Lithuania remained a backward area. The educational development in Lithuania was particularly neglected by Tsarist Russia. Trarist Government banned its language, schools and even its publication in Latin print in 1863. Latinied Lithuanian publications were smuggled by Lithuanian nationalists into areas dominated by Russians from East Prussia.⁴ Thus, its social development was completely disrupted despite underground efforts made by a section of clergy and other nationalist elements of society to promote Lithuanian education especially to eradicate illiteracy from the masses. In this regard, according to Soviet-sources, it is remarkable to note that by 1897 the literacy rate in Lithuania had gone up to 54 percent as compared to 49 percent in Moscow.⁵

However, after October Revolution following Lenin's new approach towards national Liberation, the Lithuania was allowed to become independent from the old Tsarist colonial rule. Thus, for more than two decads Lithuania had been formally considered to be an independent state. The nationalist party leader Antanas Smetona was installed as first President of independent Lithuania. But this small country was both economically and politically dependent on the Western powers specially on Germany. During this period, Americans also provided economic assistance, arms

⁴ Great Soviet Encyclopidia, Vol.4, (London: Macmillan Education Company, 1975), p. 265

⁵ Krickus Richard. "Lithuania Nationalism in the Modern era" Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge University Press, 1993), P. 162.

and manpower when Lithuania fought Polish, Soviet-Russian and Lithuania-Bolshevik enemies. In spite of the short period, remarkable achievements of Lithuania always survived in the memory of Lithuanians throughout their forced existence with Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, once again Lithuania was grabbed by Soviet Union during the Second World War. On August 23, 1939, in Moscow, German Foreign Minister J.V. Ribbentrop and Soviet Chairman of the council of Commissars V. Molotov sealed an alliance between Stalin and Hitler by signing a non-aggression pact (known as the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact) between Germany and the Soviet-Union. The agreement had a secret protocol that divided Poland much of Central Europe, and the Baltic States between Germany and the Soviet Union. Lithuania was at first assigned to the German sphere of influence and in September it was transferred to the Soviet Union. This is the reason why most of the Western historians have argued that the Baltic issue had played a major role in shaping the alliances for World War II.⁶

After reannexation of Baltic states, Stalin initiated a deliberate plan for Sovietisation of this region. In this regard, Lithuania had to pass through rapid industrialization and cultural transformation. Interestingly, Stalin's plans included shifting of Russian population to different Baltic states and thus, Russian language was imposed on the people.⁷ This process also brought hardcore Soviet administration in Lithuania, which later on became the main source of discontent among the people. Meanwhile, German occupation of Lithuania during World War II brought acute crisis for Soviet Union in that region due to which the

⁶ Walter. R. Iwaskiw, *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Country Studies* (Area hand book 'Series, 1995), p. 180.

⁷ Krickus Richard, "Lithuania Nationalism in the Mordern era", in Bremmer. I and Taras R. (ed.), *Nations and Politics the Soviet Successor State* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1993), P. 165.

developmental process was completely ignored. In this regard, a western scholar has described that the Baltic states had come into this world as more or less unwanted children.⁸ Due to prolonged colonial rule for centuries the people had never aspired for full freedom and only a few Baltic poets and academicians had dreamed about full independence of their countries. Most of the politicians in this region anticipated from time to time only for greater autonomy.

The Baltic States had to live with the Soviet System for a half of the century till 1990. Though, after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev did try to initiate liberalisation and democratisation in Soviet Society by launching a plan to de-Stalinize the Soviet system, but the Lithuanian state remained almost untouched by these reforms. Even during the long spell of Brezhnev, the command system in Baltic states remained the same which facilitated the growth of struggle for independence of Lithuania.

However, after the end of World War II Soviet Union tried its best to justify the annexation of Baltic states by giving much emphasis on the so called "voluntarily merger". And Soviet Union claimed that they were the saviour of Baltic people whom they protected from the clutches of Germany. They were also claimed that their main tasks were to restore the national economy and to lay the foundation for socialism in Baltic Republics, particularly in Lithuania. According to Soviet sources, during the post World War II period five year plan for restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR, during the period 1946-50, Lithuania saw the beginning the socialist industrialisation, the transformation of the cultural revolution. As a whole Soviet claim for Baltic Republics it was period of restoration of economy,

⁸ Stephen. R. Burant, op cit., p. 69.

socialist, construction, industrialisation and collectivization of agriculture.⁹

Thus, during 1950s and 1960s Soviet rule led to collectivization of agriculture and industrialization. The most significant development regarding nationalist upsurge came to light in early 1970s in Lithuania. It was reported in 1971 that Lithuanian democratic movement in an appeal to the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanded the restoration of independence and basic rights to the Lithuanian people. It was further reported in 1972 that a young Lithuanian, Romas Kalante, who was a member of the Communist League, burnt himself alive in town square of Kaunas protesting against Soviet suppression of national religious freedom movement in Lithuania.¹⁰ It was followed by many such self-immolation incidents in Lithuania and open demonstrations in different towns were also organized by the people demanding freedom of Lithuania.

The first and the most impressive sign of organized mass resistance to Soviet rule materialized with the Catholic human rights movements, when Stalin had attempted to destroy the Catholic Church in Lithuania because of its association with Lithuanian nationalism. He outlawed all religious orders and closed and demolished churches. Those clergy who escaped execution were exiled or denied opportunities to perform their pastoral duties. Stalin's draconian policies forced priests and nuns to conduct religious activities in private homes and other places undetected by his agents.

Though, the sporadic voices of freedom continued to rise for years, it could not pose any significant danger to the Soviet rule in Lithuania. However, the nationalist upsurge began to take a dramatic turn in Lithuania after Gorbachev tried to introduce real

⁹ Great Soviet Encyclopedia, op.cit, vol. 30, p.267.

¹⁰ Ibid.

democracy and freedom in entire Soviet society through by introducing Perestroika and Glasnost, but as the pace of such reforms got momentum the demand for independence was intensified in Lithuania and also in some other Soviet Republics. Gorbachev tried to provide meaningful autonomy to different republics but completely failed in his mission before the overwhelming mass up surge against Soviet system. Infact, in the beginning of 1980s, the political process was slowly picking upsurge speed. In this process Lithuanian authorities had permitted the establishment of political grouping called Sajudis, which combined support for Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms with proposals of autonomy and political pluralism.

During this period, the Sajudis spread its activities on the mass scale throughout a Lithuania. It became a powerful force for the future Liberation movement of Lithuania. On the other hand, "Lithuanian League of Liberty", a political organisation which was formed in late 1970s and simultaneously which forced to work underground, also became powerful voice of the people and somehow, it became a legal organisation and entered a new phase of developments in Lithuania. The analysis of political developments of 1988 in Lithuania shows that there was quite uncertain behaviour of the Communist Party of Lithuania towards Moscow, while the people's anger was increasing very fast against the communist rule from Moscow. However, after large scale demonstrations in August 1988 against Molotov-Ribbentrop pact it had become quite clear that the Lithuania would not remain for a long time with the Soviet Union. After August 1988, demonstrations became a regular feature in Lithuania. But, when Sajudis organized a protest march against the 49th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, official permission for the demonstration was sought but it was denied on grounds that the league was an anti-

Soviet organisation. When the demonstration was held, the police cracked down hard and many were injured and arrested.

Thus, this open show of Gorbachev's policy of brutality came as a shock to the Lithuanian public. In October 1988 in a significant development, the leadership of Lithuanian Communist Party was changed. At this time, Algirdas Brazauskas who was the first General Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania, promised major reforms including multi-candidates elections and better church-state relations. However, Religious policy and church-state relations were hardly the main priorities of Perestroika. Therefore, Gorbachev saw changes in the economic and political process as primary. However, these issues could no more be isolated from the process of liberalization. By 1988, Gorbachev had widened the agenda of Perestroika to include an opening up to the Russian Orthodox Church and the prospect of revision of the repressive legislation on religion.¹¹

In fact, Brazauskas's basic policies at this point might be divided into three broad categories: cultural, economical and political. First, culturally, he endorsed Sajudi's programme of making Lithuanian the official language of the republic and he also endorsed the plan to make traditional Lithuanian symbols, such as the tricolour flag the official symbols of the republic. This legislation was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on November, 18, 1988. Second, economically he was prepared to fight with the authorities in Moscow over the issue. Lastly, politically, Brazauskas supported a rather limited notion of Lithuanian 'sovereignty' with the Soviet federation, while postponing a decision on republic independence.¹² At the same time, under Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost, Russian intellectuals had begun to question openly whether the Russian

¹¹ G.F. Robert, "The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia" *The Baltic Charaches and Democracy* (New York, 1995), p. 207.

¹² V.S. Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics" *Problem of Communism* (Washington. DC, 1989), p. 64.

people were ready to meet the challenges of Perestroika. Some explicitly held that they in particular, were ill prepared.

Following many twists and turns in general election of 1989 the Communists were defeated and nationalist government of opposition group was formed in Lithuania. Following the victory of Sajudis Lithuania became the first Soviet Republic to adopt a multi-party system. The Lithuanian legislature abolished the clause from its constitution which had given the Communist Party a monopoly on the power. On April, 1989, the new President Vytautas Landsbergis declared that Lithuania was evolving towards a multi-party system. Main parties included Lithuanian Freedom League, the emerging Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, the Worker's Party and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.

In the most significant development, in May 1989, the first joint assembly of representatives from the independence movement in the three Baltic republics was held in Tallinn. At the same time, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared for self-determination and restoration of a state sovereignty.¹³ However, the defiant mood of the people reached at the culmination when on August 23, 1989 thousands of citizens of the Baltic Republics joined hands in the massive protests against Soviet annexation of the Baltic areas. The protesters formed a human chain across 400 miles of territory from the capitals of Tallinn to Riga, to Vilnius. Bowing to public pressure, Soviet authorities reserved the course and acknowledged the existence of the secret protocols. But the authorities emphasized that the protocols were irrelevant to questions of the contemporary legal status of the Baltic countries. On August 22, 1989, a commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet became the first official body to openly challenge not just the morality but the

¹³ "Chronology of Seminal events Proceeding the declaration of Lithuania's Independence" *Lithuanus* Vol. 36, (USA, Chicago, Morkunas Printing Company, 1990), p. 37.

legal legitimacy of Soviet rule by declaring that the annexation of the territory of Lithuania was illegal.¹⁴

At this point of time, Lithuania has changed radically within a short period. At a time when the party had rejected the methods of administrative leadership and taking a tolerant attitude towards criticism and self-criticism political pluralism and Glasnost had developed a pace and the first shots of democracy had started emerging.¹⁵ It further mentioned that they had done a great deal to restore and provide new interpretations for the historical truth. However, the truth should not be used to whip up political passions and encourage attempts to map out Lithuania's future while ignoring to the 50 years path at Soviet development. Yes, the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the actions that followed them should be seen as an act of political violence. However, we should realize that the republic's legal status will not change because of this, we should soberly realize that the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic is politically and economically integrated into the USSR. It is natural that the assessment of us in the aforementioned is based on that standpoint.¹⁶

In the meantime, in a dramatic development the Communist Party of Lithuania declared itself independent from the Communist Party of Soviet Union. This declaration came from the 20th congress of the Lithuanian Communist party which was held in December 1989. The congress adopted a "Declaration on the independence of the Lithuanian communist party" and a resolution "on the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party". A Lithuanian Communist Party programme and status were also adopted, the congress proclaimed that the Communist Party of Soviet Union of Lithuanian republic organisation had now become an independent Lithuanian

¹⁴ Gregory Gleason, *Federalism and nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (USA, Westview Press, 1990), p. 117.

¹⁵ *Summary of World Broadcast* (UK, Reading) September 1989.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Communist party, and it saw as its main goal the creation of an independent democratic Lithuanian state.¹⁷

But, even the separation of Communist Party of Lithuania from Moscow did not save it in the electoral contest for the Supreme Soviet of the republic in March 1990. In the election the Communist Party of Lithuania won only twenty three of the 141 seats. On March 11, 1990 the newly elected parliament voted unanimously for independence. Brazauskas lost the election for Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet to Landsbergis. While, Moscow did not accept the legality of the independence vote, however, in April 1990, Lithuania had not before the pressure, as a result of which Soviet Union decided to impose economic blockade against Lithuania. The economic blockade came into force on April 19, 1990 and as a first step the crude oil supply to Lithuania was cut off. Quoting from different sources Linas Kucinskas says that the Soviet Union cut off not only oil and gas but also broke off shipments of sugar, fish, metal, wood, rubber, tires and industrial parts.¹⁸ It imposed economic blockade that lasted for three months, until the Lithuanian legislature, now known as the Supreme Council, agreed to a six month moratorium on its independence declaration.

In an additional measure, a military attack on the printing plants was also arranged. Soviet army armed with A.K.- 47, stormed a Communist Party owned printing plant beating civilian guards. A member of the Lithuania parliament, Zigmas Vaisvila, who tried to stop the military action, also was beaten by armed soldiers. The Kremlin was seeking to stop the plants, put the workers on the streets and encourage social unrest, "Lithuanian President Vyautas Landsbergis charged at a news conference." Thus

¹⁷ Linas Kucinskas, "Lithuania's Independence: The litmus Test for democracy in the USSR" *Lithuanus*, Vol. 37, (USA, Chicago, 1991), p.9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 26-27.

the honest dialogue between USSR and Lithuania reached its highest point.¹⁹

Later, Moscow obstructed Lithuanian efforts to gain Western recognition, and on January 13, 1991, attempted to use force to remove the Lithuanian government in Vilnius and to re-establish Soviet rule. Although this attempted coup ended in a massacre of civilians: thirteen died, and hundreds were wounded by the Soviet army, Lithuania's determination did not change.²⁰ The civilians tried to control Radio/T.V Transmission tower and Lithuanian parliament from Soviet force. This incident was dubbed as "Bloody Sunday" which caused enormous discontent and anti-Soviet feelings in Lithuania. Soviet leadership tried to pacify the people with all the means at its disposal, it ultimately failed to check the disintegration of entire Soviet Union following the failed 'coup d'etat' of August 19, 1991. After the failed coup of the August 1991 Moscow permitted Lithuania to regain self-determination and promoted the international community to recognize it as an independent state. The United States extended recognition on September 2, 1991 and the Soviet Union did so on September 6, Lithuania was admitted to the United Nations on September 16, 1991.

At the same time Lithuania faced bitter economic crisis as well as ethnic problems. Since Soviet troops were still in Lithuania which had initially been deployed many decades ago during the World War Second and never went back the Lithuanian leaders were psychologically very disturbed. In the meantime, the power struggle in Soviet Union between Gorbachev and Yeltsin aggravated to such an extent that the disintegration of USSR soon became a reality. In December 1991, Boris Yeltsin hold historic meeting of the

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Walter R. Iwaskiw, op cit., p. 186.

leader's of all remaining Soviet Republics at Minsk. As a result of this Gorbachev had to resign as the last president of Soviet Union and ultimately, Lithuania achieved complete independence after centuries of foreign rule and Soviet Rule.

CHAPTER-II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONALISM IN LITHUANIA

Lithuanian nationalism has its roots in a deep commitment to the Lithuanian language, culture and in the history of oppression. These communal bonds have produced a Lithuanian identity which has been variable over the centuries, depending upon time and circumstance. But the disparate economic and political factors that have shaped it are secondary, not primary, in understanding the Lithuanian national revival as it has developed since the early nineteenth century.

Those who claim that Lithuanian nationalism is the product of policies and institutions unique to the Soviet Union have presented a number of disparate explanations. One; Mikhail Gorbachev asserted that economic stagnation was the basis for nationalism in Lithuania and would expire as the Soviet Union resolved the problems for which Brezhnev's calamitous economic policies were responsible. Two; Russian chauvinism after the Bolshevik Revolution, was a second explanation which is commonly cited. Ethnic equality was the solution to it. Three; widespread discontent associated with authoritarian rule was a third explanation and democracy the appropriate prescription.¹ Developments leading up to the Lithuanian restoration of sovereignty and events since then suggest that powerful and enduring ascriptive phenomena, language, culture, history and religious life are the primary bases of Lithuanian nationalism. Thus Lithuanian nationalism has its roots in historical background of Lithuania. Basically the words Lithuania and

¹ Krickus Richard, "Lithuania: Nationalism in the Modern era" in Bremmer I. and Taras R. (ed.), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (U.K, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.159.

Lithuanians appeared for the first time in west-European historic records in 1009. This period is notable for the formation of the Lithuanian nationhood.²

The first small state emerged on the territory of Lithuania between the 10th and 12th centuries. Traditions of Lithuanian statehood date from the early Middle ages. As a nation, Lithuania emerged about 1230s under the leadership of Duke Mindaugas. He united Lithuanian tribes to defend themselves against attacks by Teutonic Knights, who had conquered the kindred tribes of Prussia and also parts of present-day Latvia. In 1250s Mindaugas accepted Latin Christianity, and in 1253 he became king. But his nobles disagreed with his policy of coexistence with the Teutonic Knights and with his search for access to Western Europe. Mindaugas was killed, the monarchy was discontinued, and the country reverted to paganism. His successors looked for expansion toward the Slavic East. At that early stage of development, Lithuania had to face the historically recurring question dictated by its geo-political position—whether to join Western or Eastern Europe.³

At this juncture, the Lithuanian state had become Russian subject long back in 13th century. Until the 13th century fighting the German Knights, Lithuania had to repulse the invading Tatars. In the 13th and 14th centuries it fought not less than eight major battles against the Tatars Golden Horde. Algirdas and Kestuties, Gedimina's sons (Gedimina 1316-1341) was the First Grand Duke to ascend the throne by direct inheritance. Since then the succession to the throne became hereditary. In 1323 Gediminas transferred the Capital of Lithuania from Trakai to Vilnius who ascended the throne after his death, finally defeated the Tatars Golden Horde in Southern Russian Land in 1363.

² Astinas Bronius, *Glimpses of Lithuania* (Gintaras Vilnius 1972) p. 83.

³ *Ibid*, p. 84.

After Algirda's death in 1377 his son Jogaila became Grand Duke of Lithuania. At the end of the 14th century, Lithuania was already a large empire extending from the Baltic Sea to the shores of the Black Sea. Grand Duke Jogaila of the Gediminas Dynasty faced a problem similar to that faced by Mindaugas 150 year earlier, whether to look to the East or the West for political and cultural influences. Under pressure from the Teutonic Knights Lithuania, a Kingdom of Lithuanians and Slavs, Pagans and Orthodox Christians, could no longer stand alone. Jogaila chose to open links to western Europe and to defeat the Teutonic Knights, who claimed that their mission was not to conquer the Lithuanians but to Christianize them.⁴

On the other side, Lithuanian's relations with Poland took a new turn with the time. In the second half of the 14th Century it grew more and more difficult for Lithuania to put up effective resistance to the Teutonic order. Poland was also menaced by the same enemy. Besides, the Russian lands conquered by the Lithuanian Grand Dukes were very alluring to the Polish Lords. The Poland found it to their interest to relate with Lithuania. At that time Poland had no king, therefore, the Polish Lords proposed that Jogaila should marry a Polish Princess Jadwiga. Thus, the connection between Poland and Lithuania began with the marriage of Lithuania's Grand Duke Jogaila to Polish queen Jadwiga on February 18, 1386. As a condition of the marriage, Jogaila agreed to become Roman Catholic. Thus, Catholicism was introduced in Lithuania through the Polish connection. Very quickly the personal union became a confederation.⁵ Because in return for his state, Jogaila promised to Christianize Lithuania. He and his Cousin Vytauts' who became Lithuanian Grand Duke, converted Lithuania

⁴ Walter. R. Iwaskiw, *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Country Studies, Area Handbook Series* (June – 1995), p. 178.

⁵ Stephen R. Burant, "Polish-Lithuanian Relation: Past, Present and Future" *Problem of Communism*, vol. 40, No. 3, May-June-1991, p. 68.

to Christianity beginning in 1387. Lithuania was the last pagan country in Europe to become Christian. A combined Lithuanian-polish army defeated the Teutonic Knight at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410 and this victory that further strengthened the bonds between the two nations. The Teutonic order was completely routed. The Grunwald battle meant the sunset of the power of the Teutonic order. Vytautas's diplomatic struggle with the order did not cease. It ended up with a new war against the order and an invasion into its land.⁶ Thus the Vytautas then defeated the Teutonic Knights in the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410, stopping Germanic expansion to the east.

After this, the treaty of Melno signed in 1422 defined finally the Lithuanian- German borders. Thereafter, the German Knights were unable to recover. Therefore, the extermination of the Lithuanian people and the devastation of the country which lasted for two centuries came to an end. The Teutonic order became Poland's vassal, though some parts of Western Lithuania while Klaipeda remained in German hands.⁷ Then the Kreva treaty of Lithuania with Poland helped Lithuania to stand up against the German menace but at the same time, it increased in influence of the Polish nobility which wanted to turn Lithuania into a part of Poland. The majority of Lithuanian feudal lords with Vytautas at their head desperately struggled for the preservation of Lithuania's statehood. Vytautas even tried to crown himself as the King of Lithuania, but suddenly died in 1430. He left no heirs. Jogaila's son Kazimieras who ruled between 1440 and 1492 was both king of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. Thus, Lithuania lost her own independent ruler.⁸

⁶ Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 14 (USA, Macmillan Educational Company, 1988), p.692.

⁷ Walter R. Iwaskiw, op cit., p. 177.

⁸ Constantine Jurgela, *History of the Lithuania Nation* (New York, Lithuania Institute, 1948) pp. 401-406.

The power of Grand Dukes and their influence in the country gradually diminished. They seldom visited Lithuania and as King of Poland they spent most of their time in Poland. On the contrary the influence of rich feudal lords was constantly growing. They won new social and political Privileges and intensified serfdom which became a heavy burden to the peasantry. Until the 15th Century the majority of Lithuanian peasants were free. But later on their dependence on feudal Lords and barons gradually increased. The grand Dukes since Vytautas's rule used to grant land to the gentry who had participated in their campaigns.

In the second half of the 16th century the Grand Duke of Lithuania was too weak to fight alone. It was forced into a reluctant alliance with Poland. Besides, the Lithuanian nobility wanted to enjoy the same rights as their counterparts in the Poland. In 1569 the Polish and Lithuanian nobility met in Lublin (Poland) and concluded there a pact which united the two states into the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita). The new commonwealth had a king, a senate, a common currency and conducted the same foreign policy. The Lublin Union was ruinous for Lithuania's independence and provided legal prerequisites for the further decline of Lithuanian statehood.⁹

Thus, in 1596 Lithuania and Poland united into a single state, the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, whose capital was Krakow, and for the next 226 years Lithuania shared the fate of Poland. During this period, Lithuania's political elite was dominated by the Polish nobility and church, resulting in neglect of the Lithuanian language and introduction of Polish social and political institutions. It also opened the doors to Western models in education and culture.

⁹ Ibid.

However, even after Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth union pact the independent state organisation of Lithuania was not totally destroyed. Lithuania preserved the indivisibility of her territory and kept her own administrative institution, economic structure, army and law. It took two hundred years more to have Lithuania's independence completely liquidated.¹⁰ At the end of the 16th century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth plunged into war with Sweden. At the beginning of the 17th century it was at war with Russia. Later on in 1655-1667, it fought for the Ukrainian lands. In the 17th century political power in the country belonged to the Saimas (Parliament). The landlords often used to perform legislative function. Local landlords turned into an arena of fierce squabbles even swords were used. High-ranking state functionaries were also involved in constant quarrels. At the close of the 17th century real war broke out among the gentry.¹¹

In the 16th and 17th centuries Poland and Russia were national states while Lithuania remained multinational. To make matters worse the Lithuanian landlords adopted not only Polish privileges and customs but also the Polish language while the Lithuanian peasantry adhered to the Lithuanian culture and language. This national reach between the ruling class and the majority of the population was fatal to the Lithuanian state. Actually, the Lithuanian national revival began early in the 18th century at a time when the celebration of language and folk-culture was spreading throughout Europe. By this point of time the Lithuanian gentry, intelligentsia, and clergy had become Polonized, reflecting a close association with the larger Polish state since the 14th century. The intimate relationship between Polish and Lithuanian culture was not, however, altogether one-sided.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 90.

¹¹ Akstinas Bronius, op cit., PP. 90-91.

¹² Stephen R. Burant, op cit., p. 67.

In the 18th century, Lithuania had been annexed by Peter, the Great in 1795. When Lithuania became part of the Russian Empire, its economic and political life became dependent on the social and economic system in Russia.¹³ The Tsarist regime made on fundamental changes in the basic relationship between the peasantry and the gentry. The peasants remained the serfs. Tsars protected the interests of rich landowners. On the other hand, the extensive Russian market enhanced Lithuanian trade. With the growing grain demand most landlords began to seek means to achieve increased yields. As agricultural productivity under feudalism was low the landlords had to switch over from pay rent to their landlords. But these new sprouts of capitalist economy were hampered by feudal laws.¹⁴

At the same time, in 1795, the Polish Lithuanian political association ended with the third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, although living mainly under Russian rule. But, the Lithuanian did not break free of Polish cultural influences, and there was a danger that the Lithuanian language would eventually disappear together. But early in the 19th century, Lithuanian gentry, influenced by German linguists, began to study their mother tongue and Lithuanian history and culture. Until then, in Lithuania extensive political troubles continued because of the Polish nobility. The liberal reforms in the Lithuanian society were more political than religious. These reforms led to the rise of national consciousness among the Lithuanian people. Vilnius University became a centre of Lithuanian culture. In 1821 the national patriotic association was formed in Warsaw. The Liberalisation was of short duration and ended definitely after Lithuania joined the Polish rising of 1830 the Tsar ordered the closure of the Vilnius University in 1832. The Catholic Church was

¹³ Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 14.

¹⁴ Krickus Richard, op. cit., p. 161.

also closed. The teaching of Russian language had become compulsory in schools. However, from 1830 to 1835, 3.5 million Catholics had converted to orthodoxy, the church had come under Tsar of Russia. Polish nobility was also suppressed. In this context, around 50,000 families were deported to the other parts of Russia.¹⁵

TH-10413

As compared to other two Baltic states, Lithuanian society was more agrarian. Kaunas and Vilnius were the main cities of Lithuania. But these cities were dominated by the Russians, Poles, Jews and few Lithuanians. Therefore, the landless Lithuanian peasant could not get employment in these cities. On the other side, in 1863 a revolt brokeout in Polish-Lithuania. However, after the January insurrection of 1863, Russian authorities sought to reduce Polish cultural influence over the Lithuanians. Because Lithuania remained a backward area during that time, so much so the educational development in Lithuania was particularly neglected by Tsarist Russia. Tsarist Government banned its language, schools and even its publciation in Latin print. But Latinied Lithuanian publications were smuggled by Lithuanian nationalists into areas dominated by Russians (Lithuania Major) from East Prussia (Lithuania Minor). Among this number was the grandfather of Lithuania's future president, Vytautas Landsbergis. Gradually, the leaders of the Lithuanian cultural revival realized that the cause was doomed without a political agenda. Here again, a common language played an important part in the political mobilization of the Lithuanian people.¹⁶ Thus underground efforts were made by a section of clergy and other nationalist elements of the society to promote Lithuanian educations especially to eradicate illiteracy from the masses. In this regard, according to Soviet sources, it is

¹⁵ John Fitzmaurice. No.2, p. 87.
¹⁶ Krickus Richard, op.cit, p. 162.

DISS
320.54094793
Ar783 St

TH10413



remarkable to note that by 1897 the literacy rate in Lithuania had gone up to 54 percent as compared to 49 percent in Moscow,

Throughout the Lithuanian's history, their language has been both a curse and a blessing to them. By denying them easy access to intellectual achievements, such as the promulgation of political and economic liberalism, occurring elsewhere in Europe, it was a curse. Yet, it was also a blessing because it sustained a profound sense of national identity and solidarity even in the face of German, Polish and Russian political and cultural hegemony.¹⁷ By the second half of the 19th century, Lithuanian had fallen into disuse among the educated elements of society who used Russian or Polish as their preferred tongue. In the last quarter of the 19th century, it was from the commonfolk that a new wave of intellectuals, often the first in the families to attend a university, began to appear. They would provide the leadership needed to mobilize the peasants who had been the repositories of Lithuanian national life for centuries.¹⁸

The beginning of the 20th century witnessed an economic crisis in Lithuania and in 1905 an anti-Tsarist revolution broke out in Russia. The working people of Lithuania actively supported it. In Vilnius, Kaunas and other towns workers went on strike, there were dashes between the strikers and the Tsarist forces. But the revolution failed. It was very significant for the working class of various nationalities of Russia who came to believe in their mass strength and thought that victory over Tsarist was possible.

Thus, at the same time, Lithuania was the first Russian province to demand autonomy. Independence was not granted because the Tsar firmly reestablished his rule after the revolution of 1905. But the demand, articulated by the elected Grand Duke of Vilnius was not abandoned. But the American-Lithuanians had

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 166.

played a significant role in the Lithuanian revival.¹⁹ American representatives attended the Grand Vilnius Congress (Seimas) which attracted 2,000 Lithuanians from all corners of the globe. It passed resolutions supporting the Lithuanian language and culture and called for an independent Lithuanian state. That revolution had a great impact on the national liberation movement in Lithuania. After the revolution better conditions made it possible for the national culture to revive.²⁰In 1908, devout Catholics established the Ateitis (Futurist) movement. Its members embraced an ideology that merged Catholicism with nationalism. Comprised of students clergy and former priests, the movement secured a devoted following in the Lithuania after independence.

In 1914 World War first brokeout and Lithuania became a battle -field. By the autumn of 1915 the Germans occupied all of Lithuania and set up a strict military administration here. Lithuania was ruthlessly plundered. On the one side the majority of Lithuania's population offered an active resistance to the German invaders, sabotaged their orders and damaged their communication lines. Neither shooting nor imprisonment were able to break this resistance of people of Lithuania.²¹ On the other side Lithuanian-Americans established an information center in Geneva and lobbies the allies for Lithuanian national self-determination.

However, after October revolution, following Lenin's new approach toward national liberation, the Lithuania was allowed to become independent from the old Tsarist colonial rule. Though, the 1917 October revolution in Russia had a great influence on social and political developments in Lithuania. Ten thousands of Lithuanian soldiers drifted into the Tsarist army and civilians who

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 168.

²⁰ Akstinas Bronius, op. cit., p. 97.

²¹ Ibid. p. 98.

had escaped the German occupation by retreating into Russia as early as 1915, witnessed the great revolutionary event in Russia.²²

Thus, Baltic nationalist grew faster after the failed revolution of 1905 which definitely helped Bolsheviks in gaining strength in the Lithuanian region. Its reflection could be seen in the victory of October Revolution. There had been two different understandings behind this co-operation, while main aim of the Lithuanian nationalists was to liberate themselves from the clutches of Tsarist colonialism and become independent nations. Bolsheviks, at the same time had a different approach keeping in mind a broad revolutionary area without Tsar. This approach had no place for the total independence of Lithuanian state.

As for as the Lithuania was concerned, since 1915, it was under Germany. Although, it provided same liberty to the Lithuanian nationalists. These nationalist leaders wanted complete independence of Lithuania. The Lithuanian parliament refused to call for the independence at once, without the approval of Germany on September 17, 1917. But Anastas Smetona a famous Lithuanian nationalist established the National Council and declared independence on February 23, 1918. However, this action of National leader Anastas Smetona was not appreciated by Germany.

After declaration of independence there was the radical change in the Lithuanian state. Lithuanian state wanted to be free from Soviet Russia and Germany. But they had to fight against them to achieve their freedom. A new period, for example war of liberation had begun in the Lithuanian state. When Germany suspended the provisional government of Lithuania, it went underground and continued their struggle for freedom. The German

²² V. Stanley Verdys, "The Collapse of the Lithuanian State" *The Catholic Church dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (New York, East European Quarterly, Boulder Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 19.

troops captured to national institutions and made German language the official language. Thus, in the beginning of the 20th century, the Lithuanians had concluded that the best they could hope politically was autonomy within a Russian federation. With the Russian revolution and Germany's defeat, they believed that an independent Lithuania was within their grasp. Although, the Germans had established a Lithuanian state council (Taryba) hoping one day to absorb Lithuania, but the Lithuanian state council provided the Lithuanians with a semi-independent political institution. It declared Lithuanians independence on February 18, 1918.²³

For more than two decades (1919 to 1939) Lithuania had been formally considered to be an independent state. The Nationalist Party leader Antanas Smetona was installed as first President of independent Lithuania. But this small country was both economically and politically dependent on the Western Powers and first of all on Germany. But during that time Americans provided economic assistance, arms and manpower as Lithuania fought Polish, Soviet-Russian and Lithuania-Bolshevik enemies. It is notable point that until 1938 an average worker in each of the Baltic states received higher wages than their counterpart in the Soviet Union. That is why, the remarkable achievements of its state during their short lived independence period always survived in the memory of these people throughout their forced existence with Soviet Union.

In this period, Land reform amounted to a social revolution in Lithuania. It dispossessed an ethnically different landed aristocracy, and turned almost overnight a feudal peasantry into 'classless' nations of propertied small farmers. There was indeed a touch of the miraculous in this change, if the failure of

²³ Krickus Richard, op.cit, P. 164.

emancipation and land reform before 1918 and the outcome of the peace is borne in mind. Though bitterly contested by former Baltic barons in Estonia and Latvia, and by the former Russian, Polish and German service nobility of Lithuania, land reform was also a remarkably peaceful transition. The creation of smallholder farms was of great political significance, because it sanctioned parliamentary republicanism; even during the so-called authoritarian period in Lithuania after 1926, in the minds of the rural majority. Smallholding also strengthened widespread aversion to communism as a regime whose terror many peasant families unfortunately experienced in the turbulent and uncertain two to three years between 1918 and the establishment of a settled national framework.²⁴ In Lithuania, its Roman catholic peasantry became smallholders in laws of August 1920, March 1922 and August 1925. Forty percent of the land in the shape of entailed estates (majorats) acquired by 450 mainly polish and Russian noble families, but also by a few German, French and Italians as a result of service to the Tsar, were turned into farms with a maximum of 25 hectares for mainly landless peasants and demobilized soldiers. But a problem remained in the shape of some 3000 private owners who were allowed to retain the 'center'; meaning house, outbuildings, and some land. This became politically divisive as part of Lithuania's minority problems.²⁵

Further that, the extremely egalitarian constitutions of Lithuania reflected the radical break with the past dictated by land reform. The memory of Lithuania in 1905 as the first nation to demand autonomy from Russia was an agent, as was Lithuania socialism and populism, in radical constitutional coloring similar to the Weimar Republic. This was problematic in a state which was

²⁴ Nicholas Hope, "Interwar statehood : Symbol and Reality" in Graham Smith (ed.), *The Baltic States*, P.47.

²⁵ Ibid. 48.

Roman catholic. The seimas (Parliament), like Estonia's parliament became both legislature and executive authority. The State President was no more than a figurehead. Proportional representation, the case also in Estonia and Latvia, ensured in principle multi-party democracy. But here political resemblance with Estania and ended. Postwar anti Bolshevik and anti-secular Roman catholic party-politics played an influential role in postwar Lithuanian constitutional development. This has not been properly written up so far, and a cursory treatment can only be given here. At the level of high politics, relations between Vilnius and the Vatican were bad from the start. The new state was recognized on 10 November 1922, but on Lithuanian church province was created, since the Curia preferred to regard Vilnius as a polish see. Diplomatic relations were even broken off after the Polish concordat of 1925, when Vilnius was assigned as a bishopric to Poland. It created a Lithuanian church province with Kaunas as its archbishopric. Also, after hard bargaining, Lithuania recognized in a concordat of 10th December 1927 the Vatican's designation of the Klaipeda areas, annexed in 1923, as Praelatura nullius Klaipeda.²⁶

In party politics, democratic republicanism was put in question by a young clergy, who as supporters of lay politics regarded the choice of any political party as valid so long as it was behind the Roman Catholic church. Catholic Action it seems, was also very influential in Lithuanian party-political life. The outcome was an inevitable polarization of party -politics around religious and ideological issues, given the presence of active Liberal Populist and Socialist parties. Untill 1926, the Roman Catholic political bloc composed of Lithuania's Christian Democratic party, Peasant Alliance, and federation of Lab our

²⁶ Von Rauch, *Baltic States*, p. 163.

dominated Lithuanian politics and gave the semblance of stability. But it came to an end in May 1926, largely as a result of its failure to do anything about Vilnius, evidence of a corrupt government spoils system, and its poor economic record. The coming to power of a coalition of Socialist and Populists was little short of a catastrophe for the Vatican and Lithuania's church leadership. Allegiance to Lithuania's new democracy was put in question. But Lithuanian nationalist and authoritarian Tautininkai minority government which came to power a week after the concordat on 17th December 1926, because it excluded the Christian Democrats, and began to introduce secular policies. Relations worsened under President Smetona. The papal nuncio was expelled on 5 May 1931, and state control of religion was tightened. The fifth draft constitution, of February 1936, proposed to establish state registry offices planned by Prime Minister Slezevicius in 1926. This would have separated the Lithuanian state from the Roman Catholic Church. In this sense, the Roman Catholic Church, which questioned Lithuanian democracy, and which criticized presidential national government after 1926, strengthened the secularism of Lithuanian nationalists.²⁷

Further, that independence period as a whole witnessed a remarkable expansion of primary, secondary, higher, and adult education, especially in Lithuania. This built on the advance of literacy, primary and secondary educational provision, and adult self-education in the late nineteenth century. There were already, in 1919, 1036 primary schools, and the number increased to 2292 in 1931 to 1932. But illiteracy was a much greater problem than in other Baltic states. In 1923, 32.6 percent of the population were unable to read or write. This posed problems for the

²⁷ Nicholas Hope, *op.cit.*, p.50.

recruitment of an ethnic officialdom to run the new state. And the other side, considerable advance was made in education, to such an extent that by the time of the introduction of compulsory education in November 1931, 116 per 1000 were attending school compared with 111 per 1000 in Latvia, and 105 per 1000 in Estonia. Higher and further education were also comparatively successful. The fact that the old Lithuanian university of Vilnius was run by Poles after October 1921, meant that a new Lithuanian university had to be opened at Kaunas in February 1922. By 1927, it was providing an education for some 68.5 percent nationals. Adult education spread by co-operatives, and the Agricultural Academy at Kaunas established in 1924, were also popular. And then Lithuania, given the lack of an urban infrastructure, developed also a relatively successful agricultural economy run by small farms. Manufacture and industry remained undeveloped before 1940. In 1939, both employed less than eight percent of the labour force. After land reform in 1922, an indigenous co-operative movement which had appeared during the first world war became also very successful in dairy and meat production in the decade 1920-1930. It was one of the factors which led authoritarian government after 1926 to support dairy and meat production rather than wheat for an export market directed chiefly at Germany. The state became an active supporter of the Lithuanian co-operative movement, and this ensured that Lithuanian dairy and meat production became the main source of national income in the 1930's. This success was curtailed only by Hitler's decision after 1933 to limit Lithuanian imports as punishment for Lithuania's claim to the Klaipeda area.²⁸

In 1920 Red Army drove the Polish troops out of Vilnius, and Soviet Russia and Lithuania signed a peace treaty recognizing the

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 53-55.

Lithuania's independence and its claims to its original capital. Vilnius and its region were turned over to Lithuania. In spite of the fact that Poland had also signed Vilnius and the Vilnius region. The Soviet Union was the only state that recognized Vilnius as the capital of Lithuania. The non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania more than once guarded the Lithuania against Poland's claims. The Lithuanian government of the period was claiming for its rights to Vilnius, but in reality it acted in obedience to the demands of the imperialist powers.

In 1922, the US extended diplomatic recognition, and Lithuania was admitted to the League of Nations in the same year. However, from the outset, the new state was confronted with serious minority problems. About 20 percent of the population was not ethnic Lithuanians. The two largest minority groups were the Jews, with a population of 2,00,000 to 3,00,000 and the poles, who numbered about 1,50,000. But after Polish forces seized Vilnius in 1920, the Lithuanians lost about one third of what they assumed would be their Jewish population. By 1921, the government began to restrict Jewish rights, and Jews suffered economically, as the government subsidized their Lithuanian competitors.²⁹ Because relations with the Poles were severely strained from the outset. In 1918 Poles in Lithuania, preferring association with Poland, refused to join the Lithuanian State Council (Taryba) and after one year, fearful of Polish fifth-columnists, the Lithuanians denied the poles a place in the Government. After the units of the Polish army seized Vilnius, forcing the Lithuanians to establish a "provisional" capital in Kaunas, and engaged in a Polarization campaign enmity towards the Poles never subsided.³⁰

²⁹ Krickus Richard, *op.cit*, pp,164-165.

³⁰ *ibid*.

The Lithuanians lost their democracy on December 17, 1926, in a military coup which had been conducted on behalf of the small nationalist party. Many of the founding fathers of Lithuania belonged to the Party, such as Jonas Basanavicius, Antanas Smetona and Augustinas Voldemaras, but it faded after independence. The Christian Democrats became the nation's largest party and it drew its support from the country's predominately catholic and rural population. Smetona was elected president by a rump parliament in 1927, and afterwards he ruled by decree. In face of mounting economic problems, religious and ethnic divisions powerful enemies on its border, and a society barren of pluralist political culture, Lithuanian democracy was doomed.³¹

In 1938 Poland presented Lithuania with an ultimatum demanding the establishment of diplomatic relations. And other side in 1939 the port and territory of Klaipeda were seized by Nazi troops. Thus, during the World War Second Nazi-Germany launched an attack against Poland, menacing the very borders of the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Union Army moved into the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia and the Vilnius territory, all formally occupied by Poland and now threatened by Nazi-Germany. The same danger arose for Lithuania too. Therefore, the Soviet-Union proposed to Lithuania to sign a mutual assistance treaty. According to this pact the Lithuanian government agreed to permit a stipulated number of units of the Soviet Army to be stationed in Lithuania as a protection against an eventual Nazi-aggression. But Smetona's government took up secret negotiations with Nazi-Germany. The ruling circles even asked the Nazis to Proclaim Lithuania a protectorate of Germany.³² On the very first days of the war the local anti-soviet elements formed the so-called "Provisional government at

³¹ V. Stanley Yardys. *op.cit*, pp. 68-72.

³² Augustinas Bronius, *op.cit*, pp. 106-107.

Lithuania" that expected to rule the country under fascist Germany's wing. It rushed to welcome the invaders and tried hard to be obedient. But even such a "Government" was of no use for Nazis. A month later it was dissolved. Lithuania became part of the Ostland and got under the control of a Nazi Commissioner General. Lithuanian's name disappeared from German maps and the Nazis were making plans to exterminate the nation itself. So, from the first day of the war Lithuanian people took up arms against the invaders. The organized resistance movement led by the Lithuanian Communist Party gained more and more strength. Underground organizations were active in all large towns.

The Partisan movement was the most active form of armed resistance. Thousands of people joined their formations. About 90 partisan formations fought against the Nazis in Lithuania. They derailed 364 enemy trains, destroyed 300 locomotives and 18 German garrisons, blasted or burned many supply dumps. In some densely wooded regions, particularly in the south and east the partisans had actual control of the country. The enemy's attempt to suppress their resistance was well vain.³³ The joint actions of Partisan groups were organized by the two Southern and Northern underground committees of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Those who were not engaged in the armed fight against the German invaders sabotaged their orders in town and country, disrupted production and committed other subversive acts.

Hitler's success in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union was short-lived. The German decisions were utterly routed near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk. The Soviet army made the invaders retreat. In the ranks of the Soviet Army there were

³³ Walter R. Iwaskiw. op.cit., p.175.

quite a number of Lithuanians who had effected their retreat to Russia in the summer of 1941. In 1942 they formed the 16th Lithuanian Division. It fought the Nazi invaders on the plains of Russia in Belorussia and finally in Lithuania itself.³⁴

On August 23rd 1939 in Moscow, German foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop and Soviet Chairman of the Council of Commissars Viacheslov Molotov sealed an alliance between Stalin and Hitler by signing a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet-Union. A secret appendix to this agreement provided for the fourth partition of the Poland between the Russians and Germans, for a vague divisions of the Balkans and as the Lithuanian government was informed by both parties on October 4th and 5th a "delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence" in the Baltic region.³⁵ Lithuania's Northern neighbour, Latvia and Estonia were assigned to the Soviet while Lithuania itself was left to Hitler.³⁶ But in June 15, 1940, according to Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by diplomatic exchanges Lithuania again was annexed and absorbed by the rulers of Russia.

This Molotov-Ribbintrop pact signed on August 23, 1939 paved the way for Hitler's advance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet advance in baltic states. Although the Soviet has constantly claimed that all the Baltic states voluntarily joined Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the realty, however, is quite deferent. It was in this background the Molotov Ribbentrop pact was signed by the Soviet Union and Germany on August 23, 1939, which came as the biggest surprise for the allied nations. Hardly a week after Molotov-ribbentrop pact, Hitler attack Poland on September 1, 1939 which marked the beginning of the World War second. Poland was immediately taken over by the German forces and thousands of

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ V.Stanley Vardys, *op.cit.*, pp. 37.

³⁶ Ibid.

Polish refugees poured North across the Lithuanian border. Meanwhile, the Baltic states declared their neutrality in the War, however, their neutrality seemed to be theoretical only. Because after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Baltic states had to face a situation between the devil and the deep sea.

According to this pact, 'In the areas belonging to the Baltic states the Northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in Vilna area is recognized by each party. Poland was split into spheres of influences. Russian's interest in Bessarabia was also recognized, further negotiations led to a protocol, signed on September 28, 1939, that shifted Lithuania to Moscow's sphere in exchange for the Kremlin's conceding to Germany the province of Lublin and other parts of Poland earlier allotted to the USSR.³⁷ Regarding this affair Alex Shtromas says that the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. met on August 1, 1940. On 2nd August it had decided to adopt Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia on 5th and 6th August respectively as Union Republics on the U.S.S.R. Thus by August 1940 the Soviet takeover of the three Baltic states was completed in all actual and formal terms.³⁸

Thus, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and Soviet invasion of Poland followed on 17 September, a Soviet-German Friendship Treaty was signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow to formalise the partition of Poland. In this treaty an amendment was introduced to the "secret additional Protocol" of 23 August 1939 to the effect that 'the territory of the Lithuanian state

³⁷ Clemens Walter, *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire* (New York, St. Martin Press – 1991) p. 6

³⁸ Alex Shtromas, "Soviet Occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the USSR: Political and Legal Aspects," *East European Quarterly*, Vol-XIX, No.3, September-1985, p. 300.

falls to the sphere of interest of the USSR, because, on the other hand, the 'vovodship' of Lublin and parts of 'voivodship' of Warsaw fall to the sphere of interest of Germany".³⁹

Meanwhile, on September 26, 1939, Soviet Union invited a Lithuanian delegation to Moscow. Lithuanian foreign minister J. Urbysys was the head of this delegation. During the meeting Stalin stated that for the security of the Soviet Union and Lithuania, the Lithuanian Government should sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union and to allow soviet troop in Lithuanian territory. Soviet Union wanted to install military garrisons on Lithuanian soil. In exchange, Stalin offered again-Lithuania would receive the official return of her old capital city, Vilnius plus, its surrounding territory which Russia had wrested from Poles.⁴⁰

But Lithuanian foreign minister refused to accept it. During the long discussion the Lithuanian foreign minister repeatedly said that it would not be possible for Lithuania to carry 50,000 Soviet soldiers in the country. the Soviet leader Stalin and foreign minister Molotov assured him that the Soviet government would respect the sovereignty of Lithuania and would follow the principle of non-intervention in Lithuania's internal affairs and also would never introduce any changes in the structures of Lithuanian social and political institution.⁴¹ After this, Molotov also reduced the number of Soviet troop from 50,000 to 35,000. When the Lithuanian Foreign Minister returned to his country to discuss the matter with the then president Smetona the Soviet troop had already entered into Lithuanian borders. Now Lithuania had two alternatives, first could accept the Russian demand and allow soviet troops into her territory and lose part of her hard won. Sovereignty while a waiting

³⁹ John Biggart, "The Collectivisation of Agriculture in Soviet-Lithuania' *East-European Quarterly*, vol. XI, No. 2, p. 54.

⁴⁰ Kaslas. J. Bronis, *The Baltic Nations: The Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty* (Pennsylvania Euramerica Press Pittstan, 1976), p. 226.

changes in the course of history. Secondly its could-refuse and die fighting fearing death and annihilation to accepting a treaty which would strangle her independence. Lithuanians had no choice to save their country's dearest possession, its independence. So, on October 10, 1939, Lithuania signed the Mutual assistance pact and soviet leaders reduced the number of Soviet troop from 35,000 to 20,000 and also assured the Lithuanian government that Soviet Union would respect Lithuanian territorial integrity.

On the one side after reannexation of Baltic states Stalin initiated a deliberate plan to Sovietisation. These states witnessed rapid industrialisation and radical cultural transformation. After the war within a short period the most significant changes were brought in socio-cultured lives of the Baltic peoples. Under Stalin's plan large number of Russian population was shifted from Russian region to Baltic region and Russian language was imposed forcefully on them. In this new Russian population in the society, the Russians held all the powerful positions in political system. All these developments sowed seeds of utter discontent among the people of Baltic states particularly in the Lithuanian. On the other side, the Jews took comfort in the Soviet occupation of Lithuania less because of their love of the Russians or attachment to Marxism, but, rather, out of fear of the Nazis. In the process, they earned the enmity of the Lithuanians who deemed them traitors.⁴²

Thus, Stalin started action in Lithuania, the state adjacent to the German border. Its further after unsuccessful negotiations in Moscow that had lasted for two weeks, on June 14th, the day Paris surrendered to Hilter. The Lithuanians were handed an ultimatum that occurred the Lithuanian government of

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Krikus Richard, op.cit., 1993, p. 165.

kidnapping Soviet soldiers and conspiring against the Soviet Union in a military alliance with Latvia and Estania. Moscow demanded immediate admission of an unlimited number of Soviet troops, "sufficient to guarantee the possibility of realizing the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual-assistance treaty and to prevent provocation actions against the Soviet garrison".⁴³ A divided Lithuanian cabinet agreed, with President Smetona, his Defense and Education ministers and the state comptroller dissenting, and on June 15th, 1941, as specified, soviet divisions began crossing the border. In the meantime, armored troops from bases in Lithuanian rushed to the capital city and other strategic locations to prevent organized Lithuanian resistance.

At that time, Europeans had not yet learned Soviet occupation involved changes of larger proportions than just the formation of a pro-Soviet government and the drafting of policies friendlier to the Kremlin. It is clear from the discussions in the last meeting of the independent Lithuanian's Council of Ministers that many political leaders still had hopes of preserving a semblance of Lithuanian statehood, not to speak of the essential of the social system. For at least two or three weeks this view was shared by segments of Lithuanian society. This illusion made it easier for the Soviet to destroy independent statehood without provoking open resistance. After five months, the Lithuanian Communist Party's secretary, Antanas Snieckus suggested that open opposition was prevented not only by this political disorientation but also by the suddenness of events and the disbelief that is only seven weeks Lithuania could find itself completely absorbed by the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

⁴³ Soviet Documents. 454.

⁴⁴ V. Stanley Verdys, op.cit, p.41.

Further, that in the World War Second Period, relations between Poland and Lithuania were strictly controlled by Moscow. Poland's foreign Policy was dictated by the Soviet. Lithuania as a Soviet Republic had no foreign policy of its own. What relations were allowed to take place between the two countries involved cultural exchanges, lower-level party and government contacts and limited economic cooperation.⁴⁵ The Baltic states had to live with the Soviet system for a half of the century till 1990. Though after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev did try to initiate Liberalisation and democratisation in Soviet Society by condemning the cult of personality and by launching a plan to de-Stalinize the Soviet system, the Lithuania state remained almost untouched by these reforms. Even during the long spell of Brezhnev, the command system in Baltic states remained the same which facilitated the growth of struggle for independence of Lithuania.

However, after the end of World War Second Soviet Union tried its best to justify the annexation of Baltic states by giving much emphasis on the so called "Voluntarily Merger". In this regard Soviet Union claimed that they were the saviour of Baltic people whom they protected from the Clutches of Germany. They also claimed that their main tasks were to restore the national economy and to lay the foundation for socialism in the Baltic Republics. According to Soviet sources, in according with the Post World War-II five year plan for restoration and development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. during the period 1946-50, Lithuania saw the beginning the socialist industrialization, the transformation of agriculture and the implementation of the cultural revolution.⁴⁶ As a whole, Soviet claim for Baltic republics it was a period of

⁴⁵ Stephen R. Burant, op.cit., P.69.

⁴⁶ Great-Soviet Encyclopedia, vol-30, p.267.

restoration of economy, socialist, construction, industrialization and collectivization of agriculture.⁴⁷

However, post war industrialization, Lithuania's labour requirements were primarily met with indigenous manpower. As Lithuanians left the country side for the city and more of them attended university, they acquired skills to fill positions that Russians had occupied in other republics where rate of urbanisation and university were low.⁴⁸ None the less, the number of Russians who found employment in the Republic grew. In mixed Russian-Lithuanian marriages, however, children generally indentified with the Lithuanian parent. This phenomenon reflected ethnic homogeneity and the strength of Lithuanian national feeling.⁴⁹

Longevity in office allowed the Lithuanian party chief, Antanas Snicekus (1940-1974), to build his own personal machine and to manipulate strong nationalist sentiments to his advantage. Although, the Lithuanian Party would grow at a faster pace than the Communist Party of Soviet Union as a whole, by '1984 the percentage of party members in the population of Lithuania (5.25%) was still below the corresponding USSR average (6.75%).⁵⁰ Many Lithuanians were opportunists and joined the party to acquire privileges associated with membership in it. But they retained a strong sense of being Lithuanian and rejected the designation 'Soviet'.

However, after World War Second the emphasis shifted and the intervention of the Red Army had to take second place to domestic revolutionary processes. At first historians spoke of the

⁴⁷ Ibid. Vol-14, p. 312.

⁴⁸ Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Nationalities and the Soviet Economy", In Hajda and Bessinger, (eds.) *Nationalities Factor*, pp. 43-71.

⁴⁹ Romuald J. Misiunas, "the Baltic Republics", in Hajda and Beissinger, (eds.), *Nationalities factor*, p. 206.

“people’s seimas” (parliament) as having released the forces of “socialist revolution”, and in the 1960s, they spoke of “Socialist Revolution” as a process arising from a “revolutionary situation” within Lithuanian society even before the advent of the Red Army. In the 1970s Under the guidance of Moscow historians, this became dogma. The Lithuanians had presumably carried out simultaneous socialist revolutions culminating in their incorporation into the Soviet Union of their own request.⁵¹

The first and most impressive sign of organized mass resistance to Soviet rule materialized with the Catholic human rights movements. When Stalin had attempted to destroy the Catholic Church in Lithuania because of its association with Lithuanian nationalism. He outlawed all religious orders and closed and demolished churches. Those clergy who escaped execution were exiled or denied opportunities to perform their pastoral duties. Stalin’s draconian policies forced priests and nuns to conduct religious activities in private home and other places undetected by his agents.

The Policies of Kremlin towards the church varied after Stalin’s death. At times the authorities adopted greater tolerance towards it, while on other occasions they resorted to oppressive policies. The catholic human rights activists argued that the Soviet and Lithuanian constitutions provided for freedom of conscience but that the country’s Catholics were being denied religious liberty. By the mid-1960s, devout Catholics feared that the Soviet’s anti-

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 209.

⁵¹ Alfred Erich Senn, “Perestroika in Lithuanian Historiography: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” *The Russian Review*, 1990, vol. 49, pp. 44.

religious campaign was slowly destroying organized religious in Lithuania and intimidating the faithful.⁵²

The most significant development regarding nationalist upsurge came to light in early 1970's in all the three Baltic state. In 1971 the Lithuanian popular movement known as Sajudis and Lithuanian Democratic movement in an appeal to the then Secretary General of the United Nations demanded the restoration in independence and the basic rights to the Lithuanian people. they also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and freedom in Lithuania. It was further reported in 1972 that a young Lithuanian Romas Kalanta who was a member of the Communist League burnt himself alive in Town Square of Kaunas protesting against Soviet suppression of freedom movement in Lithuania. It was followed by many such self immolation incidents in Lithuania and open demonstrations in different towns were also organized by the people demanding freedom of Lithuania. Though, sporadic voices of freedom continued to rise for years, it could not pose any significant danger to the soviet rule.

For most of the soviet era, the only overt displays of protests against Soviet Russian rule emanated from outside the party and the established intellectual community. The dissidents included people like Antanas Terleckas and Viktoras Petkas who were imprisoned for "anti-Soviet" activities. In 1978, they formed the Lithuanian Freedom League, although, it did not surface until a decade later the league's goal was full and complete independence for Lithuania.⁵³

⁵² V. Stanley Vardys, op.cit., pp. 157-159.

⁵³ Krickus Richard, op.cit., P. 167.

The nationalist upsurge began to take a dramatic turn in Lithuania after Gorbachev tried to introduce real democracy and freedom in entire Soviet Society by introducing Perestroika and

Glasnost. As the pace of such reforms got momentum the demands of independence intensified in Lithuania and other Soviet Republics. Gorbachev tried to provide meaningful autonomy to different republics but completely failed in his mission before the overwhelming mass upsurge against Soviet System.

CHAPTER-III

GORBACHEV'S POLICIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA

Gorbachev's first year in power was marked by unprecedented changes in the nature of Politburo and government. It also marked the rapid formulation of economic goal and methods of economic development for the next 15 years. In all other respects, the changes in domestic policy were merely cosmetic, policies were better presented, the style was more modern, but there was few new things in the contents. The reason was not just lack of time or preoccupation with the economy. There were particularly good opportunities to formulate new domestic policies in 1985. The new Party programmes and statutes were being drafted, the long-term economic programmes provided opportunities and there were many international meetings where statements were issued which were related to domestic policy.

When Gorbachev came to power, he saw his most urgent task not in actions, but in formulating documents and particularly the Party Programme, which would contain recommendations about future domestic policy and about the position of the Soviet Union in the World. The final products made it clear that the leadership was not yet ready to launch any active ideological and political initiatives.¹ The situation of Lithuania did not change until Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Even then, Lithuanian's Communist Party leadership hesitated to embrace Gorbachev's programme of limited economic reforms under his policy of Perestroika. The death of pro-reformer leader Petras-Griskevicius, first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania, in 1987 had

¹ Medvedev Zhores, *Gorbachev* (U.K., Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 208- 9.

adversely affected the atmosphere for reform. The new secretary, Ringaudas, Sangaila, was a conservative functionary.²

Initially, the political situation in Lithuania was different from that in Estonia and Latvia. With ethnic Lithuanians being an overwhelming majority in the republic the nationality issue was considerably more relaxed. As has been noted earlier the political process in that republic was initially slow. Ethnic situation was relaxed, but there was the Ignalina problem that took some time to be solved. Because, the problem was a establishment of nuclear power plant at Ignalina in Lithuania. Actually, the original design of the station was to have four 1,500 megawatt graphite moderated reactor. Had it been completed, the Ignalina nuclear power plant would have been the most powerful in the world. The first reactor went on line at the end of 1983, and the second was scheduled for 1986, with the accident at chornobyle, in Arpil 1986, the project was understandably delayed.³

By this time, the political situation in Lithuania had undergone such profound change that Ignalina, finally became an open political issue. At the Moscow party conference, the Lithuanian party secretary Ringaudas Sangalia spoke of growing concern over Ignalina's third reactor and during the rest of summer protests continued to mount. On 25 August, Lithuanian authorities announced that construction of the third reactor would be suspended until all matters of security had been settled. Then open protest against the power plant, sometimes attracting thousands of people holding hands, had now become part of the process of political mobilization.⁴

² Walter R. Iwarkiw, *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Country Studies* (Area handbook series, 1995), p. 184.

³ G. Kristian and H. Stefan, "Transforming the Soviet Union" *The Baltic states and the end of the Soviet Empire* (London, Routledge, 1993) p. 86.

⁴ Ibid.

Even where opposition politics seized upon other issues, such as those linked to human rights or religious freedoms, their reference points were national in content. However, despite their national frame of reference, overall the politics and political actions in which civil society engaged were issue-specific with only limited inter-group co-ordination and organisational capability. This in effect was a product of a society experimenting with the politics of the possible in which particular issues, actions and agendas were judged as less likely to result in retribution by either Moscow or the local party-state machine.⁵ But another cause for this slow political situation was connected with the leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania. In 1976 first secretary Antanas Snieckus died, leaving the helm for Petras Griskevicius, who proceeded to exercise a conservative and mediocre leadership. When Glasnost and Perestroika came around, Griskevicius paid lip-service to the new signals from Moscow, but his heart was clearly not in favour of it. To his mind, historical events still had to be viewed from 'class position'.⁶

When Griskevicius died, on 14 November 1987, his successor Ringaudas Songalia was fetched from the same stock of conservative men of the apparat. In January 1988 report to central committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Songalia spoke of 'alien-philosophies' of 'class conscious' education and of the need to rebuff 'nationalist and clerical extremists. The plenum accordingly expressed a need to 'unmask demagogues and opportunists who seek to speculate with democracy and public opinion of discrediting reconstruction'.⁷ In this background, the Sangalia regime relied heavily on various repressive measures.

⁵ Smith Graham *The Baltic States* (Cambridge) p. 129.

⁶ G. Kristian and H. Stefan, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 90-91.

By this time, political conditions became very difficult, because of foundation of Sajudis (The Lithuanian Reconstruction Movement). The courage and determination of the Catholic activists and others who risked careers, freedom and even their lives to protest Soviet rule did not go unnoticed by intellectuals and Communist leaders who feared that Lithuania and its language and culture were at risk. It also was apparent that the party hardliners were not moving against displayed only one year earlier. Clearly, some had grave doubts about the ability of the regime to survive in the face of mounting economic problems and popular dissatisfaction.

It was against this background that public displays of protest on the part Freedom League (in 1978 formed the Lithuanian Freedom League although it did not surface until a decade later, the league's goal was full and complete independence for Lithuania) contributed to the birth of Sajudis. On August 27, 1987, for example, Terleckas and a former nun, Nijole Sadunaite, organized a gathering in Vilnius to protest the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.⁸ The first open confrontation did not come until 16th February 1988, with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Lithuanian independence. By then however, the stakes in the game were considerable. American President Ronald Reagan had issued a declaration of support for a demonstration due to be held, and a large group of US senators had written Mikhail Gorbachev warning against interference.

At the same time, when in 1988 against the wishes of Songaila regime, Lithuanian engaged in widespread celebration of February 16 independence day. Then Lithuanian intellectuals were pushed into lacking more forceful action as well. Although, the authorities reacted by intimidating sympathetic by standers. But

⁸ Ibid. p. 93.

the demonstrators were not cowed, and they regrouped and took to the streets after each effort to stop them.⁹ Thus, Lithuanian leaders resisted Gorbachev's reforms, and were deeply troubled by Gorbachev's action. They were particularly bothered by his release of dissidents from prison who were then given access to the media and other forums to throttle the system, boldly publicizing the flaws of the command economy and the communist party of Soviet Union of Shortcoming.

Until then, the cornerstone of what was to become Sajudis was not laid until 23 May 1988. On that date, a group of people met at the Lithuanian Academy of Science, there to establish a commission the function of which was to propose such change in the constitution of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic that would be needed in order to further the causes of Perestroika, Democratization and Glasnost.¹⁰ Further, in that meeting at the Academy of Science on June 3, 1988, Communist and non-Communist intellectuals formed 'an initiative group' to organize a movement to support Gorbachev's programme of Glasnost, Democratization and Perestroika. A council composed equally of Communist Party members and non-party members were chosen to organize the Lithuanian reconstruction movement. The leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania did not like 'this independent action but, knowing Gorbachev's limited acceptance of 'informal' societies, did not interfere with the effort.¹¹

Thus, the movement supported Gorbachev's Policies, but at the same time it promoted Lithuanian national issues such as restoration of the Lithuanian language as the 'official' language. Its demands included revelations of the truth about the Stalinist years. Protection of the environment, cessation at the Ignalina nuclear

⁹ Walter. R. Iwaskiw, op.cit., p. 184.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Walter. R. Iwaskiw, op. cit., p. 184.

power plant and disclosure of secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression pact. At first, Party leaders shunned these meeting, but by mid 1988 their participation became a political necessity. Thus, a Sajudis rally on June 24, 1988 was attended by Algirdas Brazauskas, then Party secretary for industrial affairs.¹²

However, the reformers in the party and among the intellectual community proceeded cautiously but were provoked by Songaila when he ignored Gorbachev's recommendation that delegates to the 19th Communist Party of Soviet Union conference seek popular approval for their candidature. The apparat further fueled open displays of opposition when it announced that in "Central Ministry authorities had unilaterally decided to speed up the expansion of giant chemical industries in" several areas that were 'already choking from pollution'.¹³

It was against this background of grievances that intellectuals and scholars at the University of Vilnius formed an 'Initiative Group' in June 1988. Among the original founders of Sajudis were many leading communists, such as Bronius Genzelis, Antanas Buracas, Romualdas Ozolas, and Kazimiera Pruskiene. But they were joined by others who had spurned party membership, like the music professor, Vytautas Landsbergis, whose family had played a vital role in the Lithuanian revival and whose wife, Grazina had been a Siberian deportee.¹⁴

During this period, the political process was slowly picking up the speed, but it was still way behind the pace of Estonia. Lithuanian authorities had permitted, the establishment in may of political grouping called Sajudis for Perestroika, which combined support for Mikhail Gorbachevs' reforms with proposals of

¹² Ibid, p. 185.

¹³ Richard Krickus, "Lithuania: Nationalism in the modern era." *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 170.

autonomy and political pluralism.¹⁵ However, Moscow opted to accommodate such developments, no doubt viewing the popular fronts as loyal grass-roots based. Facilitators of local structural change, the visit of Gorbachev's emissary Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev to the Baltic republics in August 1988 provided an opportunity for Gorbachev to be briefed on developments and for both the fledging popular fronts and the republic leaderships to get a response from Moscow of the permitted parameters of maneuverability.

During the following summer a series of demonstrations were held which served to strengthen the process of political mobilization. It was here that the election of candidates for the Moscow Party conference served as the driving force. On 14 June, Sajudis and the freedom league, although in separate group, gathered in old town Vilnius's Gediminas square to commemorate the 1941 mass deportations. The groups were separated by a broad ideological chasm. Many of the long-time dissidents viewed Sajudis as a communist dominated organisation whose leaders could be trusted.¹⁶ On June 24, Sajudis again held a reply with delegates to the 19th Party conference at the square, which fronted Vilnius cathedral. It had been closed to worshippers for years. Twenty thousand people gathered there, among them was Algirdas Brazauskas, a central committee secretary. This gathering would promote the political futures of both Sajudis and Brazauskas.¹⁷ At the same time, on 24 June a 'send-off' meeting was held, attracting around 50,000 people, and on 9 July a 'reception' was organized, with the participation of some 1,00,000. Then on 23 August there followed the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, attracting 2,50,000 people. The Lithuanian perestroika movement (Sajudis)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Smith Graham, "the Resurgence of Nationalism" *The Baltic States* (Cambridge), p. 13.

¹⁶ A.E. Senn, *Lithuanian Awakening*, p. 225.

¹⁷ Richard Krickus, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

was rapidly picking up steam, and was ready to hold its founding congress.¹⁸

In July 1988 the proposals were handed over to the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The Commission had stated that a number of clauses in the Lithuanian and USSR constitutions deemed sovereignty, economic, social and cultural independence of a Union Republic. The Commission noted that over long years beginning with 1940-41 when the central management increased its influence and turned more bureaucratic, Lithuanian competence was reduced. In many cases the republic had under its control only the secondary matters. The present commission suggested for making principal amendments that was on Lithuanian territory exclusively Lithuanian laws were enforced while the Soviet Union would have on the Lithuanian territory competence granted by Lithuanian laws and not the other way round. Above all, it concerned the activity of the Union ministries to which Lithuanian industrial enterprises were subordinated.¹⁹

In a parallel process, however, more radical forces were gathering under different banners. One of these was the Lithuanian Freedom league. Originally founded in 1978, the group had been driven under ground and did not resurface until in 1987. On 23 August it arranged a public commemoration of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Although the event attracted merely 2,000 people, it seems to have come as a shock to the conservative Griskevicius leadership.²⁰In the next year on 22 May, 1988, the Freedom League arranged another illegal demonstration, this time to commemorate the May 1948 deportations from Lithuania the meeting was dispersed by the police.

¹⁸ Keesing Record of World Events, 1988, July.

¹⁹ Survey of World Broadcast (London) August 6, 1988.

²⁰ G. Kristian and H. Stephan, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

At this time the Communist Party had now irretrievably lost its monopoly of the agenda for public discussion. The newly organized initiative group of the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika, usually referred to by its Lithuanian name Sajudis, was questioning the willingness and even the ability party leaders in Vilnius to meet the challenges of Gorbachev's Programme of reform, and a small group of dissidents, including the organizers of demonstration of August 23, 1987, announced their emergence from the underground under the name the Lithuanian Freedom League. Both organizations could rally considerable popular support in challenging the party leadership.

On July 27, the Freedom League announced plans for a public meeting on August 23. The group's programme, dated July 3, 1988, specified that denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences lay at the heart of its activity, stating in its first sentence, "On August 23, 1939, the dictators of Russia and Germany divided up Eastern Europe..." The group called for the restoration of "Lithuania's sovereignty and independence." Freedom League leaders anticipated confrontation with the authorities. As Antanas Terleckas put it, to request permission to hold a rally "would betray all our principles. They kick us, hit us and keep us under house arrest. That is why we do not ask for permission".²¹ On August 12 the Initiative Group of Sajudis requested permission of the Vilnius city authorities to hold a meeting on the 23rd and the League declared it would go where Sajudis did. After Alexander Yakovlev had visited Vilnius on August 11-14, registering Moscow's nihil obstat in regard to Sajudis's activities, the authorities granted Sajudis permission for a meeting in Vingis Park commemorating the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

²¹ S.E. Alfred. "Perestroika in Lithuanian Historiography: The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact" *The Russian Review*, Vol. 49, 1990, p. 48.

During this period the Sajudis spread its activities on the mass scale throughout Lithuania. It became a powerful force for the future liberation of Lithuania. On the other hand, Lithuanian League of Liberty, a political organisation which was formed in late 70s and simultaneously force to work underground, also became powerful voice of the people. Somehow, it became a legal organization and entered a new phase of developments in Lithuania. The analysis of political development in 1988 in Lithuania shows that there was quite uncertain behaviour of the Communist Party of Lithuania towards Moscow, while the people's anger was increasing very fast against the communist rule from Moscow. However, after large scale demonstrations in August 1988 against Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it had become quite clear that the Lithuania could not remain for long time with the Soviet Union. After August 1988 demonstrations became a regular feature in Lithuania.

At the end of September, the debate over the Nazi-Soviet relation evoked violence in Lithuania. On September 8th the Freedom League announced its intention to hold a meeting on September 28 to mark the anniversary of the second Nazi-Soviet agreement, signed on September 28, 1939, by which the Germans had traded Lithuania to the Soviet Union. The League's announcement declared. "Having established that Lithuania became a part of the USSR as a result of aggressive stalinist policy, it is important to go one step further to pose demands of the present government of the Soviet Union. Those demands included the publication and condemnation of the Nazi-Soviet agreement and a declaration that the Soviet Union had incorporated Lithuania by force. In spite of official permission for the demonstration was sought, but denied, on grounds that the freedom league was an anti-Soviet organization, when the demonstration was held, the police cracked down hard. Many were injured and arrested.

This open show of Gorbachev's policy of brutality came as something of a shock to the Lithuanian public. The summer had seen a large number of peaceful demonstrations and the massive demonstration on 23 August had probably caused many to believe that the struggle was about to be won. Now it was obvious that there might still be a long way to go and this led to political unrest.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that for the first time Sajudis movement and the Lithuanian league of Liberation shared the same platform in September 1988 at a rally which was held to protest the militia violence against the peaceful demonstrators and hunger strikers. It was followed by another development on 7th October, 1988 when in the presence of 1 Lakh people in Vilnius the capital of Lithuania a new national flag was hoisted over a historic fort on Gediminas hill. In another significant development the leadership of Lithuanian Communist Party was changed on 20th October, 1988.²²

Thus, Brazauskas succeeded Ringaudas Songaila on October 20, 1988 as first General Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania constituted nothing less than a revolution. To be sure, Moscow seemed to be exercising control: as Songaila's position crumbled, Moscow sent observers to participate in the discussions concerning succession and even before being designated as the new leader, Brazauskas had to make a ritual journey to Moscow to obtain Mikhail Gorbachev's nihil obstat. The traditional forms, however, did not represent the new forces active in the land. The Communist Party of Lithuania in fact took a giant step along the road that led eventually to its declaration of independence.²³

²² "Chronology of Seminal events Proceeding of Declaration of Lithuania's Independence", *Lithuanus* (USA, Chicago) 1990, vol. 36, p. 33.

²³ V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC) July-August 1989, pp. 53-76.

The Lithuania's popular front (known as Sajudis Movement) that emerged was umbrella organizations whose membership frontiers were defined by their nationality/republic with each movement subsuming most of the issue-oriented interest groups which had dominated earlier oppositional politics. At the founding congress of all three movements in October 1988, a variety of diverse organizations were represented, including environmental movements, heritage societies, religious organisations, those active in human rights, groups committed to re-establishing political independence, and members of the Communist Party. That between a fifth and one-third of their respective congress delegates were drawn from the Communist Party must have offered some reassurance for Moscow that the activities of the popular fronts would reflect the nature and scope of Gorbachev's reforms. However, the overwhelming majority of the fronts members were from the eponymous nationalities. This was particularly marked in the case of Lithuania's popular front, where at its founding congress 96 percent of its delegates were Lithuania.²⁴ This was particularly marked in the case of Lithuania's popular front (sajudis), where at its founding Congress, 96 percent of its delegates were Lithuania. Within only a few months of their establishment, all three organisation could legitimately claim to be truly mass- based movement.

The establishment of popular fronts occurred more or less simultaneously with the removal, in the three republics, of conservative first party secretaries although it was only in Estonia and Lithuania that the two events were directly linked. Consequently, with the appointment of reform-minded leader in the Autumn of 1988 Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania. The republic was able to move towards greater co-operation with the popular front; albeit not unmarked by occasional confrontation. By late

²⁴ V.S. Vardys, *op.cit*, p. 57.

1988, the authorities in the republic was implementing measures linked to calls to relocate their eponymous peoples at the centre stage of local political, culture and economic life.²⁵

Thus, the history of 1939 and 1940 had a role to play in Sajudis's founding congress, held on October 22 and 23. Delegates from the city Kaunas distributed their own programme, which included the statement: "Sajudis asserts that the incorporation of the Lithuanian Republic into the USSR in 1940 was a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939, violating treaties between Lithuania and Soviet Union. The act of incorporation annulled the independence of the state of Lithuania". The Kaunas delegates agreed among themselves to use the word "Occupation" in their speeches.²⁶

At this time, Algirdas Brazauskas promised major reforms including multi-candidates elections and better Church-State relation. However, Religious policy and church-state relations were hardly the main priority of Perestroika, therefore, Gorbachev saw changes in the economy and political process as primary. However, these issues could no more be isolated from the process of liberalization than any other. By 1988, Gorbachev had widened the agenda of perestroika to include an opening up to the Russian Orthodox Church and the prospect of revision of the repressive legislation on religion.²⁷ But different responses of the Churches to Communist rule helps one understand their different roles under conditions of liberalization. The Lithuanian opposition in the catholic church nurtured the active opposition of the Sajudis movement, although Sajudis was largely a movement of the laity.

²⁵ Graham Smith, op.cit, pp.131-132.

²⁶ S.E. Alfred, op.cit, pp. 52-53.

²⁷ G.F. Robert, "The Baltic Churches and Democracy", *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York) 1999, p. 207.

Meanwhile, the founding congress of Sajudis, proceedings were lively broadcasted on the T.V. including an Lithuanian league of liberty calling for immediate restoration of Lithuania's independence. Following this, the Government announced the immediate return to the faithful of historic Vilnius cathedral which had been turned into an art museum 48 year ago and for, the first time, the Soviet regime according to recognition of a religious feast day. All Saints days on 1st November 1988.²⁸ And on 9th November 1988 the Sajudis Launched a massive drive to petition the Supreme Soviet against proposed changes in the Soviet constitution which would centralize the power in Moscow to an even greater extent than so before considering the deteriorating situation, Gorbachev sent Nikolai Slyunkov, a politburo member to prevent the further deterioration.²⁹

Although, the Lithuanians had already began their journey on this road and two weeks before Songaila's resignation, the party's central committee initiated conducting its meetings in Lithuanian for the first time in the past years.³⁰ In addition, in conjunction with Brazauskas's appointment, the Lithuanian party deprived Moscow of its fulcrum in Lithuania when the Communist Party of Lithuanian Central committee compelled the replacement of Nikolay Mitkin the Russia sent by Gorbachev two years earlier to serve as second secretary in Lithuania who was a Russian, the Lithuanians replaced him with a Russian, from Lithuania, Vladimir Berezov.³¹

In fact, Brazauskas's basic policies at this point might be divided into three broad categories: cultural, economic and political. First culturally, he endorsed Sajudis's programme of making

²⁸ Ibid. p. 34. d

²⁹ Ibid. p. 36.

³⁰ A. E. Senn, "Toward Lithuanian Independence: Algirdas Brazauskas and the CPL" *Problem of Communism*; Vol-39, March-April- 1990, P.21.

³¹ V.S. Vardys, op.cit, . P. 64.

Lithuanian the official language of the republic and he also endorsed the plan to make traditional Lithuanian symbols, such as the tricolor flag as the official symbols of the republic. This legislation was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on November 18, 1988. Second economically, he was prepared to do battle with the authorities in Moscow over the issue. And last Politically, Brazauskas supported a rather limited notion of Lithuanian “Sovereignty” with the Soviet federation, while postponing a decision on republic independence. This stand angered Sajudis.³²

Thus, Lithuanian leaders moved to bolster the republic’s own identity by designating a flag and declaring Lithuanian the official language. However, the Lithuanian law makers for the time being dropped plans to duplicate Estonia’s challenge to Soviet authority. They picked up an old national song as the national hymn. Legislators also approved a protest of proposed amendments to the Soviet constitution that the residents of the three Baltic republics claim would limit their autonomy. Several considerations may have prompted Brazauskas’s stand on “nullification”. First, he apparently did not consider this the right issue to confront Moscow at this time. Second, Brazauskas presumably felt a need to distinguish his stance from Sajudis’s programme and finally, he probably objected to putting himself his own identity and his own pace. Brazauskas, in fact, called for the postponement of an action on the proposal instituting “nullification” rather than for its out-right rejection.³³

When the founding congress of Sajudis was held, on 22 October, its ambitions had gone through an important process of radicalization. Demands for autonomy had been replaced by demands for independence. Before the above developments, throughout the Baltic region, cultural organisations particularly the

³² Ibid. p. 67.

³³ A.E. Senn, op.cit, P. 22.

writers associations had been in the forefront of all activities related to the struggle for the liberation of Lithuania. In the meantime, a commission of the Lithuanian Academy Of Sciences whose aim was to come up with the proposals and amendments of Lithuanian constitution had ended its work.³⁴

Meanwhile, Brazauskas's fortunes soared with Moscow's help and Sajudis's support, he was selected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania in October 1988. A year later, he was at the helm when the party broke with the Communist Party of Soviet Union, excepting a rump-group, and joined Sajudis in demanding independence for Lithuania. Some Lithuanians believed that he was under instructions of to take such actions in the hope of coopting the militants in Sajudis who proposed immediate independence. It was not unlikely that Gorbachev concluded that the outer empire in Eastern Europe would have remained intact had men like Brazauskas ruled there. Lithuania, however, was in the "inner", not in the "outer" Soviet-Russian empire, and it was not clear how much maneuvering room Gorbachev would grant Brazauskas.³⁵

After the delay of a month, a rebuttal was published in Pravda. Although unsigned, it had a clear imprint on Gorbachev and Yakovlev. This delay, together with the fact that Gorbachev chose not to face Andreeva personally, made Reddaway draw the conclusion that the General secretary had begun to hesitate, that he was moving towards a centrist position. He also noted that the delegates to the Party conference were of June overwhelmingly conservative and that Gorbachev had evident difficulties in promoting a radical line. In this way, it implies that at the time when the popular fronts were emerging as serious political forces in

³⁴ Survey of World Broadcast (London) August 6, 1988.

³⁵ Richard Krickus, op.cit, p. 172.

the Lithuanian republics, in Moscow the struggle with the conservative forces around Ligachev was pulling Gorbachev towards the centre. Thus we may conclude that during the crucial spring of 1988, forces on both sides cause the political and ideological distance between Gorbachev and the Lithuanian leaders to be widened. Politically, the following summer saw numerous demonstrations taking place across all of the Baltic republics. In Moscow apprehension was growing that was the time for another intervention. In August, Politburo member and Glasnost Chief Aleksandr Yakovlev were dispatched to Lithuania, within instruction to find out what was going on and what could be done further.³⁶

Commenting on the highly sensitive issue of national relations, Yakovlev said that Perestroika could only succeed with the united efforts of all Soviet peoples and nationalities. The national dimension must, thus, be allowed to gain the upper hand and the problems of our society could only be together, through revolutionary innovations in it, Yakovlev recognized that due attention had not been paid to local history and language, thus implying that Russification had been artificially accelerated. Nevertheless, he maintained that a strengthening of the union, and of the friendship between all nations, was the only proper way out of the current troubles.³⁷ Proceeding to Vilnius, on 12 August, the Nationality question was again brought up. Here Yakovlev admitted that in the past the Central Soviet authorities had erroneously tried to erase all national characteristics. National consciousness was now on the rise, and that process harboured dangers for the future: it could well take on 'unhealthy' forms. Since the ability self-criticism was a quality which was still lacking among the

³⁶ G. Kristian and H. Stefan. op.cit, p. 97.

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

nationalists, that risk was particularly pronounced.³⁸ Thus, in Vilnius it could be seen how Yakovlev's comments on the nationality question were marked by a certain ambivalence. On the one side, they reflected his own previously documented aversion to Russian nationalism, but on the other side, he also took pains emphasizing that nationalist sentiments in the Lithuanian republics must not be allowed to endanger Gorbachev's Perestroika. Predictably, the very fact of placing the issue on the agenda would serve to render all warnings rather pointless. The impact was particularly pronounced in Vilnius.

Gorbachev had placed his wager on the popular fronts, hoping that they would provide such leadership and energy that by now was desperately needed for an ill-conceived Perestroika to get off the ground. By October, however, it was becoming obvious that they had mistired. On the one side, Yakovlev had given a kiss of death to the local communist parties, thus severing an important link of loyal information feedback to Moscow. On the other side, the fronts were stretching the limits of both Glasnost and Perestroika way beyond the worst fears even of Moscow conservatives.³⁹

At the core of this process of political mobilization lay the results of the September meeting in Riga, where economists from the three republics had worked out the details of the 'Baltic model: Its basic concept were lightly provocative. The economy should be based on the market principles, natural resources should be under the republican control, taxes should be levied by republican government sand all direct economic control by Moscow should be discontinued. In order to implement the programme, Sajudis had quickly set about drafting necessary amendments to the Lithuanian constitution. In tune with its new 'Yakovlev' policy the local

³⁹ Ibid, p.98

Communist Party seemed to be going along. A second draft was approved on 13 November with the full package including republican. Sovereignty was to be taken by the republican Supreme Soviet on 18 November. It was evidently the time for yet another intervention from Moscow.⁴⁰

On 17 November the Estonian Supreme Soviet outpaced the Lithuanians, by issuing a declaration of sovereignty where republican Legislation was placed above all union legislation. Being the first major challenge to Moscow rule, this step brought the political crisis to a head. Gorbachev opposed it furiously. In order, moreover, to forestall a similar development in Lithuania the new party secretary Algirdas Brazauskas was immediately called to Moscow for consultations, apparently with same significant results. On 18 November, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet refused to issue its planned declaration of sovereignty. Secretary Brazauskas had used all his prestige and influence, together with some rather devious technical procedures, in order to block the issue. His behaviour provoked massive protests from Sajudis, signifying an abrupt end to the brief 'honeymoon' it had enjoyed with the Party after the ouster of secretary Songalia.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Lithuanian Communist Party prevented the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet from voting on a resolution intended to declare its sovereignty like Estonia Supreme Soviet which had already declared independence from Moscow. However, on 20th November 1988, Sajudis declared the 'Moral Independence of Lithuania' and that hence forth only those laws will be honoured which do not limit Lithuania's independence. On 26 November 1988, the two major Lithuanian national democratic movements staged rallies in Gediminas square in Vilnius. The first, organized

⁴⁰ Ibid
⁴¹ Ibid. p. 99

by Sajudis urged Lithuanians deputies departing for the all Union Supreme Soviet Session in Moscow to defend Lithuania's right to sovereignty. The second organized by the Lithuanian League to the liberty denounced the proposed changes in the Soviet constitution, opposed sovereignty as a half-measure and demanded the immediate withdrawal of soviet forces from Lithuanian.⁴²

By this time the damage was terminal. A crushing blow had been dealt to any belief in Perestroika as a way of realizing the ambitions that were being voiced by the popular fronts from now on the rules of the game would be different. In the place of cooperation conflict would emerge and the first victims would be the local Communist Parties. Thus, under the cover of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, Russian intellectuals had begun to question openly whether the Russian people were ready to meet the challenges of perestroika. Some, explicitly held that they, in particular, were ill prepared. It is of great relevance in this context both explicit and implicit became significant that the Lithuanian peoples were Lutheran and Roman catholic not Russian orthodox.

In Lithuania, following the founding of the popular front Sajudis, there emerged an ethnically well defined counter-mobilization which made rather strange bed-fellows: Russians and Poles. Their organisation, known as 'Unity', published its programme on 11 November 1988. In general, it expressed support for the line of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and supported the leading role of the communist party of Lithuania, but it also demanded that autonomous regions should be established for the different ethnic monitories.⁴³ The reason for the Poles to side with the Russian was a legacy of the conflict over the Vilnius area during

⁴² "Chronology of Seminal Events proceeding of Declaration of Lithuania's Independence" *Lithuanus*, vol. 46, (USA, Chicago Morkunas Printing Company, 1990), p.36

⁴³ G.Kristian H. Stefan, *Dissolving the Soviet Union the Baltic States and the end of Soviet Empire*, 1993.P.108.

inter-war period. During the soviet period, Poles and Lithuanians never learned to trust each other. While the Poles tended to see Russian rule as a check against Lithuanian nationalist excesses, Lithuanian leaders column', not for Poland but for the Soviet government in Moscow.⁴⁴

In the meantime, on 29 December 1988, Bishop Julijanas Steponavicius exiled from him Vilnius diocese in 1961 for refusing to condemn Government interference in church matters notified that his 50 years banishment was over, and that he would resume his postural duties in Vilnius.

Thus, the most powerful of these nationalist resources centered on the myth of voluntary incorporation into the Soviet federation, from the late 1980s. This myth received its first public rising, with reform-minded historicis educators, emerging to play a key role.⁴⁵ In the republic, for the first time during Soviet rule, Baltic historians began to challenge publicly the twin myths of soviet official historiography, that stalin's motives for signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler in 1939 were purely intended to secure peace, and that the peoples of the Baltic states welcomed incorporation into the Soviet Union as an alternative to the continuation of authoritarian rule in their own republics. At the founding congress of the Lithuanian popular front (sajudis movement), demands were voiced for endorsing the illegality of forced incorporation and thus the call for reinstatement of independent statehood.

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ A.E.Seen, *Lithuania Awakening* (Berkeley,1990),P.38.

CHAPTER-IV

TOWARD TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF LITHUANIA 1989-1991

As shown in previous chapters political developments and Gorbachev's reforms in the form of Perestroika and Glasnost instigated the suppressed feelings of Lithuanians. This period was also marked by the upsurge of Lithuanian people moving around the sinister pact between Stalin and Hitler, originally known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The year 1991 became the epitome of freedom for the Lithuanian people as it was the 50th anniversary of the above pact. By this pact Lithuania had been grabbed by the Soviet Union. The Lithuanians launched their struggle for the liberation from the Soviet clutches, however Soviet leadership considered this struggle as the outbreak of the ethnic problem.

In January 1989, a party meeting of the Union of Lithuanian Writers, to which historians had been invited condemned "the annexationist USSR-Germany agreements and secret protocols of 1939-1940, which violated elementary norms of international law. In pursuing its programme of "economic self-sufficiency" and "sovereignty" for Lithuania, the new leadership of the Lithuanian communist party itself eventually called for condemnation of the Nazi-Soviet pact.¹

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact put a magnetic effect on Lithuanian people in their struggle for the independence from Moscow. It is remarkable to note that when the deputies of the peoples congress of USSR from Lithuania were leaving for Moscow at the end of May 1989, they were told by the crowd at the farewell meeting in Vilnius. "In 1940 Stalin's sun was brought to Lithuania,

¹ S.E. Affred, "Perestroika in Lithuanian Historiography: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" *The Russian Review*, Vol. 49, 1990, p. 53.

now you must bring it back to Moscow”. This expressed the nation’s mood quite well.² True to the spirit of the above suggestion, when the Lithuanian deputies arrived in Moscow at the first session of the people’s congress of the USSR, they considered themselves not as a part of the congress rather as the Lithuanian delegation to the congress. They started to work cautiously but the methodically for the restoration of Lithuanian’s independence.³

On May 18, 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration characterizing the Nazi-Soviet pact and its secret protocol as a continuation of the Munich policy of appeasement and criticizing Stalinist policy in the Baltic in 1940. The group called on the new USSR Congress of People’s Deputies to denounce Stalin’s agreements with the Germans. In a show of solidarity between government, party, and people, Justas Paleckis, head of the Central committee’s ideological department, introduced the declaration, noting that respected historians and lawyers had reviewed the text.⁴

In this regard Linas Kucinskas has pointed out: “By the opening of the congress they had the declaration from May 18, 1989 of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, condemning the occupation of Lithuania in 1940 and Proclaiming the priority of the Lithuanian Constitution and Lithuanian Laws above the Constitution and laws of the USSR. This was the first attempt of the Lithuanian legislative body to reject Soviet authority. The Lithuanian deputies to the peoples congress had three main goals: to seek the condemnation by the congress of the Molotov-Rippentrop pact of 1939, to make possible the creation of a self-ruling economy for Lithuania and to fight attempts to establish the USSR Constitutional Review Committee which would be an instrument to overrule the

² Linas Kucinskas, “Lithuania’s Independence” The Litmas Test for democracy in the USSR.” *Lithuanus*, vol. 37, (USA, Chicago, 1991), p. 7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ S.E. Alfred op.cit., p. 54.

Lithuanian Legislature. The first conflict developed when the Lithuanian delegation denied to attend the voting for Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev called such behaviour "An ultimatum" but showed no inclination to lead the conflict to ahead. The second and final conflict at this session occurred during the voting for the USSR Constitutional review committee. Lithuanian again refused to attend the voting and when Mr. Gorbachev tried to disdain this protest almost the entire Lithuanian delegation left the Kremlin congress palace. Lithuania's protest expressed in such an unusual way, became an international sensation.⁵

He further says that a negotiation framework was fixed between Lithuanian delegation and Gorbachev next morning. During the negotiations Mr. Gorbachev left his demand to create the USSR Constitution Review Committee and promised to support an idea of a self ruled economy for Lithuania. At this meeting for the first time the word "independence was spoken". Mr. Gorbachev was asked by Lithuanian deputy Nikolai Medvedev to give his view on the question of the independence of Lithuania. Mr. Gorbachev answered that he supported the idea of sovereignty, but not of independence. When he was told that there was no difference between independence and sovereignty, he said, that he accepted sovereignty within the framework of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev was informed clearly that, the idea of the Lithuanian's independence was alive; nine month remained until that independence was proclaimed.....⁶

Simultaneously Lithuanian people also launched Social Democratic Parties to intensify the struggle for freedom. In Lithuania

⁵ Linas Kucinskas, op.cit, pp.7-8.

⁶ Ibid. p. 8

conditions had become complex with informal creation of organisations of two groups Sajudis in which mainly Lithuanians were represented and Edinstvo comprising people speaking mainly Russian language in Lithuania. Sajudis had demanded radical amendments to the constitution of the republic which was not conceded by the supreme soviet of the republic. It had succeeded so far only in making the Lithuanian language as the official language in the republic.⁷

In the significant event in January 1989 a meeting of Union of writer was held in which the historians condemned the annexationist Soviet-German Secret protocols of 1939 which violated the elementary norms of international law.⁸ On the other hand in pursuing its programme of “economic self-sufficiency” and “Sovereignty” for Lithuania. The new leadership of the Lithuanian communist Party itself eventually called for condemnation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. At the same time on February 23-24, 1989 Lithuanian historians met in Tallinn with a large delegation from Moscow, who discussed the various problem related to the freedom of Lithuania. Later on, Valerionas Baltrunas head of the Ideological commission of the Lithuanian’s interpretation of the events 1939-40. In the meantime, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration characterizing of Munich policy.⁹ At this crucial point the elections for the congress of people’s deputies of the USSR were held in March 1989 in which Communist Party of Lithuania was badly defeated and the nationalist under the banner of Sajudis (Perestroika Movement) won the elections. The leaders of the Sajudis had already declared that they would pronounce independence as soon as they assumed power. In this regard, it is interesting to note

⁷ Times (London), January, 21, 1989.

⁸ E.A. Senn. “Perestroika in Lithuanian Histography: The Molotiov – Ribbentrop Pact.” *The Russian Review* (The Ohio state University Press, USA) vol. 40, No. 1, January- 1990, p. 53.

⁹ Ibid.

that during the general elections the Sajudis candidate challenging the Lithuanian Communist Party first and second secretaries Brazauskas and Vladimir Berezov withdrew at the behest of Sajudis executive council who hypothetically expected that the possible victory over two communist leaders might enable Moscow to replace with officials hostile to the Lithuanian National Democratic Movement.¹⁰

Following the victory of Sajudis, Lithuania became the first Soviet Republic to adopt a multi-party system. The Lithuania legislature abolished the clause in its constitution which has given the Communist Party a monopoly on the power. Mr. Gorbachev called the idea of a multi-party system in the Soviet Union “rabbish”, and supported the communists constitutionally guaranteed leading role in public life.¹¹ Adolfus Uza leader of Sajudis movement said: There are no doubt a lot of party functionaries in Moscow who are going to be unhappy but we in Lithuania are delighted.¹²

At this time, Lithuanian legislators became much more active in 1989. In May they approved changes in the Lithuanian constitution making Soviet Laws valid in Lithuania only after approval by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Sajudis, like the other two Baltic popular fronts, was pushed towards more radical positions by other movement calling for independence. In 1989 these included the Lithuanian freedom league , the Lithuanian. Social Democratic Party, and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party. But, many non-Lithuanian felt threatened by the resurgence of Lithuanian nationalism. Their major organization was popular among poles as well as Russian in the republic, and

¹⁰ Chronology of seminal events proceeding the declaration of Lithuania’s independence” *Lithuanus* vol. 36 (USA, Chicago Morkunar Printing Company, 1990), p. 37

¹¹ Bangkok Post (Bangkok) Feb. 22, 1989.

¹² Times of India (New Delhi) Feb 27, 1989.

got support from Moscow.¹³ On April 1, 1989 the new President Vytautas Landsbergis declared that Lithuania was evolving towards a multi-party system. Many parties, including Lithuanian Freedom League, the Greens, the Emergency Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, the Lithuanian Democratic party, the Worker's Party and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.¹⁴ Thus In one of the most significant development, on May 13-14, 1989, the first joint assembly of representatives from the independence movement in the three Baltic republics was held in Tallinn. Approximately 500 leaders participated from the Lithuanian Sajudis and the popular fronts of Latvia and Estonia respectively. It called for independence in a neutral and demilitarized zone comprised of the three republics. On May 18, 1989 Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared for self-determination and restoration of state Sovereignty.¹⁵

On May 31, 1989 the Head of the Communist Party of Lithuania demanded that the Kremlin should reveal the historic truth about Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and set up a commission for this purpose. Later on, in response to these development the then Soviet President Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev told on T.V. that the Baltic National drive for independence would not be tolerated.¹⁶ In retaliation to the Gorbachev's statement, the Lithuanian President landsbergis who was in New York stated on July 7, 1989: "Our right to self-determination is ours and we do not have to beg anyone for it... Some great leaders believe that they can bestow these rights and take them away. This is an antiquated mentality of the times of serfdom."¹⁷ By this Lithuanian people had become quite defiant. On July 13, 1989 a huge demonstration was organized at Lenin's

¹³ Jancinevicius L, "Baltic Nationalism and communism: Kto Kovo?" *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire*, P.196.

¹⁴ E.A. Senn, op.cit, p. 53.

¹⁵ *Time of India* (New Delhi) February 27, 1989.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 40

monument in Vilnius to mark the Lithuanian Soviet peace Treaty of 1920 under which Lenin's government had renounced all claims to Lithuanian territory.

Sensing the dangerous development the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on July 27, 1989 endorsed a plan to give the Baltic republics on unprecedented degree of economic independence beginning next year. The three Baltic republic would control their own trade, industry and resources and a right to conduct their economic on a free market basis.¹⁸ However, the defiant mood of the people reached at the culmination when on August 23, 1989 hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Baltic Republics joined hands in the massive protests against Soviet annexation of the Baltic areas. The protesters formed a human chain across 400 miles of territory from the capitals of Tallin to Riga, to Vilnius. Bowing to public pressure soviet authorities reversed the course and acknowledged the existence of the secret protocols. But the authorities emphasize that the protocols were irrelevant to questions of the contemporary legal status of the Baltic countries.

On August 22, 1989 a commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet became the first official body to openly challenge not just the morality but the legal legitimacy of Soviet rule by declaring that the annexation of the territory of Lithuania was illegal.¹⁹ Soviet Communist Party issued a statement on August 26, 1989 accusing the independence movements of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of exploiting the atmosphere of Soviet reform to disintegrate the cohesion of the Soviet Union and warned of impending disaster.²⁰ Than the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee warned on August 26 that separative movements in the Baltic

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Gregory Gleason, *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (USA, Westview Press, 1990), P. 117.

²⁰ E.A. Senn op.cit, p. 41.

were driving the USSR to the brink “Civil conflicts”. Vytautas Landsbergis, Sajudis leader and member of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, declared that “We long ago decided that this is something we must do, to fight for our independence. We are not extremist and we are not violent, but we are determined”. Even before the Central Committee’s broadside, Landsbergis had worried that “The Soviet mass media is paving the way for coercive step against our plans. Meanwhile, Lithuanian legislators immediately sent telegrams to Gorbachev and the Central Committee denouncing the August 26 statement as provocative interference in local affairs, insulting and misleading.”²¹

At this point of time the plenum in August 1989 and stated: We understand the unease and concern of Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee prompted in the context of the complex political situation by the ill-considered statements and actions made by certain individuals participating in social movements. This statement obliges us to look yet again at the path traveled by restructuring and responsibly and soberly to outline further step to regenerate society. Lithuania has changed radically within a short period. At a time when the party has rejected the methods of administrative leadership and is taking a tolerant attitude towards criticism and self-criticism political pluralism and Glasnost have developed a pace and the first shots of democracy have started emerging.²² It further mentioned “we have done a great deal to restore and provide new interpretations for the historical truth. However, the truth should not be used to whip up political passions and encourage attempts to map out Lithuania’s future while ignoring the 50 year path of Soviet development. Yes, the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the actions that

²¹ Ra Anan, *The Soviet Empire The challenge of National and democate Movement.* (1990) p. 112

²² Summary of world Broadcast (/Reading UK) September 1, 1989.

followed. Then should be seen as an act of political violence. However we should realise that the republic's legal status will not change because of this, we should soberly realise, that the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist republic is politically and economically integrated into the USSR. It is natural that the assessment of US in the aforementioned Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee statement is based on that standpoint.²³

However, according to Izvestia (August 30, 1989) a majority of Central Committee members had voted against giving a detailed report of the Plenum in the local press, and the assessments by plenum speakers of the statement on the Baltic situation made by the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee did not show the "Unanimous approval" traditionally reserved for the statement of this kind. When the status of the communist party of Lithuania was discussed, "Around 70% of communist taking part in the discussion" supported the "Independence of the republic's party"²⁴.

At this juncture some encouraging development for the Soviet Union took place in Lithuania. The Moscow home service reported on September 4, 1989 that in Kalnu Park in the Capital of Lithuania, there had been a meeting of working people of the city with the participation of representatives of Klaipeda, Snieckus and also several rayons of the republic. It was organized by the newly formed union for the defence of Soviet power in Lithuania. The meeting discussed the statement by the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee of the situation in the republics of the soviet Baltic. The speakers of the meeting stressed that they had shared the concern expressed in the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee statement at the trends of development in

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

the socio-political situation in the republic. The confidence was expressed that the statement of the Communist Party of Soviet Union central committee should become a firm basis for consolidating all social forces, movement and citizens aspiring for the socialist renewal of society and the rebirth of every nation and nationality in the united family of the people's of the socialist fatherland. The participants in the meeting appealed to all citizens the republic to exert all efforts and good will for confirming inter-ethnic accord mutual respect and co-operation. On behalf of working people of various nationalities and social strata of the population in the meeting addressed demands to the Supreme Soviet of the republic not to all the adoption of laws and decrees directed at withdrawing Lithuania from the Soviet Union contradicting the USSR constitution.²⁵

It also pointed out the demand guarantee proportional representation for citizens of non-Lithuanian nationality in the elected bodies of power, and that the draft law on nationalities should be in line with the principles of the Communist Party of Soviet Union platform on nationalities policy. The participants in the meeting also voiced other demands concerning the provision of real equality of all people of nationalities living in Lithuania, the demonstration of society, the status of the Communist Party of Lithuania and other matters. On the day before in the same park, there had been a meeting organized by the interethnic co-ordination associated of Lithuania. These taking part discussed questions of relation between nationalities in the republic and gave their evaluation of the statement of the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee. The meeting called for the strengthening of

²⁵ Ibid. September, 1989.

friendship of people of differing nationalities noting that for all of them Lithuania was their homeland.²⁶

Raymond Pearson mentioned about that situation; "Although efforts were now made to buy off Baltic dissidence, notably by the Supreme Soviet in 9 July 1989 granting economy autonomy to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 1990, it was too late. Compromises and concessions which might have stood a chance of containing Baltic nationalism upto 1987 and possibly 1988 now only whetted the appetite for more. By late August 1989 Pravda was denouncing the 'nationalist hysteria' in the Baltic and ordering the local Communist Parties to squash 'extremism and separatism'. But at the revolution in Hungary-Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and even Romania gathered unstoppable momentum over autumn 1989, the Baltic nation, could not restrain their determination of participate in the recreation of Greater Eastern Europe.²⁷ In early autumn 1989 there was a mutiny with the party ranks in Lithuania's second city, Kaunas. An "open letter" appeared calling for a radical restructuring of the party and dropping sixty-four officials. The Kaunas membership had numbered over 23,000. but in the first nine months of 1989 some 465 persons resigned and only fifty eight joined. A thousand members were late in paying their dues and there were calls to reduce dues. Some Kaunas Communists called for reparation of the Lithuanian Communist Party from the Communist Party of Soviet Union, a view that some Muscovites disparaged as a call for the "good time". Three viewpoints on breaking with Moscow emerged at Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in October 1989. Conservatives wanted to follow the

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Raymond Pearson . 'Nationalities : Decolonising the Last Empire' in D.W Spring (Editor), *The Impact at Gorbachev: The First Phase – 1985-1990* (London, Printer Publisher's, 1991), p. 99.

Kremlin; centrists headed by the current Lithuanian Communist Party leadership wished to improve the relationship between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Soviet Union but avoid a break. Radicals wanted to split. They demanded a 4,000 strong meeting before the next Lithuanian Communist Party Congress to vote on the issue. But, just before the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee met in October, Gorbachev and first Secretary Brazauskas talked on telephone. Gorbachev suggested delaying the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress planned for December 1989 until spring 1990, after publication of the new Communist Party of Soviet Union draft programme and rules. Brazauskas replied that the congress had already been democratically planned.²⁸

At that time August 23, 1989, grand demonstrations throughout Baltic regions, the relation between Baltic republic and Moscow began to deteriorate very fast. Meanwhile Algirdas Brazauskas, secretary of Lithuanian Communist Party had an intensive talk with Gorbachev on telephone. This talk was arranged on the initiative of Gorbachev himself immediately after demonstrations of August 23, 1989. Later on Algirdas Brazauskas revealed: "until now Gorbachev supported the Administrations of the Baltic republic. However, we are adopting anti-constitutional decisions, and he said that he would no longer be a friend and that he had now crossed over to the opposite side. The concept of financial autonomy had been set up however, according to him, the leaders of the republics had failed to ensure the normal process of restructuring, sajudis had crossed all the limits and had deviated from the initial course; we should come to our senses; they could

²⁸ Jancinevieius L., op.cit, Pp. 196-197.

not conceive of the Baltic republics as not being within the federation.²⁹

Meanwhile, the commission of the USSR congress of people's deputies for a political and legal evaluation of the 1939 German-Soviet non-aggression pact came out with some interesting reports. The members of the commission had reached the following conclusions.³⁰ Members of the commission found that the secret protocol constituted in both the manner of its composition and its content a deviation from the juridical point of view the division of German and soviet spheres of interest envisaged in it is in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a whole string of third party states. The members of the commission stated, that the Soviet Union's relations with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia at that time were regulated by an integral system of agreements. These relations were found upon between 1926 and 1933, according to which the participants pledged mutual respect for each others sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability under all circumstances.

The members of the commission also stated that Stalin and Molotov held the talks connected with the secret protocol, with fascist Germany in secret and without the knowledge of the Soviet people, Russian Communist Party or the deputies of the USSR Spreme Soviet. For this reason the concluding of it (secret protocol) did not in any case express the will of the Soviet people. The latter bears no responsibility for the actions of the Stalinist leadership. An abrupt turn about from an irreconcilable struggle against Fascism to co-operation with the nazi Germany disorientated the masses and had a demoralizing effect upon anti-aggression anti-military forces.

²⁹ Summary of World Broadcast (Reading U.K.) September 6, 1969.

³⁰ Ibid

Taking into account the great political importance of the present issue, members of the commission recommend the following to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies:

- (a) To affirm with a special act the annulment-beginning with the German attack upon the Soviet Union – of the August 23, 1939 pact, the Treaty of friendship and borders of September 28 of the same year as well as the other 1939-41 Soviet German agreements and to recognize all secret protocols as being juridically without foundation and invalid from the moment they were signed.
- (b) To condemn and regard as incompatible with the Leninist foreign policy the pre-war soviet leadership infringements of those legal obligations which the Soviet Union had taken upon itself in respect of third-party states and the use of ultimatums and strong arm politics, as being methods alien to socialism in foreign policy.
- (c) Considering the importance of the events of 1939-41, the members of the commission will continue its work.

During this period, responding to another plea from Gorbachev, Brazauskas on December 1, 1989, told the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee why the Lithuanian Party needed to become independent. The party's ranks were dwindling. The number of Communists resigning had increased tenfold. "Only by becoming an independent political party can the Lithuanian Communist Party gain real authority in society and direct its development toward the creation of a sovereign Socialist Democratic State. At that time amid more warnings and pleas from Moscow, the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress voted on December 20 to become an independent political organization with its own programme and statutes. The new

programme arrested that “restoration of Lithuanian’s statehood is a priority mission” of the party. It called for an “independent”, “democratic” and “socialist” Lithuania. It claimed to be guided by “the contemporary concept of the materialist dialectics of social development”. It said that Communist had gone to for against “Private property”, but the document did not mention the crucial test: ownership of the mean of production.³¹

Thus during this period, interesting in a development the Communist Party of Lithuania declared itself independent from the Communist Party of Soviet Union. This declaration came from the 20th congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party which was held on December 20-21, 1989. The congress adopted “declaration on the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party” and a resolution “on the status of the Lithuanian communist party. A Lithuanian communist party programme and status were also adopted, the congress proclaimed that the Communist Party of Soviet Union of Lithuanian republic organisation had now become and independent Lithuanian communist party and it saw as its main goal the creation of an independent democratic Lithuanian state.³²

In a resolution sent to the Communist Party of Soviet Union by Congress Central Committee informing about its decision to be independent and asserted its right to self-determination. Quoting different sources Linas Kucinskas has mentioned that such development to events resulted in near panic in the politburo of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. Only a very few days later, on December 25, 1989, the Plenary session of the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee was held to discuss the Lithuanian Communist Party challenge. However, only one idea called Soviet Union, in fact, this state never has been a union. It was confirmed

³¹ Jancinevicius, L, op.cit, pp.198-199.

³² Linas Kucinskas, op.cit, p. 9

by Mr. Gorbachev, who said in his report at plenary session: "up to now, our state has existed as a centralized unitary state. As yet, none of us has the experience of living in a federation."³³ He further points out that against the secession of Lithuania Mr. Gorbachev brought two arguments. First, Lithuanians were accused of planning to cut economic ties with rest of the USSR immediately after secession, despite the Lithuanians leaders stressing at every occasion that they had no intentions to cut any economic ties with the Soviet Union but only to turn them to equal partnership. Second, the independence of Lithuania could hurt the integrity of the USSR and would be fraught with the world. In relation to this it is necessary in Europe and in the world. In relation to this it is necessary to say that deliberations of East European countries could have provoked much stronger destabilization than the liberalization of the Baltic states, but nothing of the kind happened. On the other hand, the freedom of Lithuania is not a coin to pay for stability anywhere.³⁴ However, The Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee met December 25-26, 1989, to consider the Lithuanian split. Gorbachev said that "no part of the Communist Party of Soviet Union has the right to decide" on an independent existence without taking into account the position of the Communist Party of Soviet Union as a whole. Still, he said, the Lithuanian problem had to be settled "on the basis of civil peace, not civil war", using concessions and compromises. The Kremlin put off any decisive response to the Lithuanian split until a delegation led by Gorbachev could visit Lithuania in January.³⁵

Certain new political development began with President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania on January 11, 1990. His visit was materialized following an advise given to him by the Central

³³ Ibid. p.10.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 11.

³⁵ Ibid.

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The December 1989 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union had declared the decision of the Lithuanian Communist party as illegitimate and invalid and condemned Algirdas Brazauskas for compromising with nationalist and separatist forces. Gorbachev re-affirmed his position that the federal structure of Soviet Union would depend on the unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite prevailing explosive situation Vladimir Medvedev Chief of the ideology department of Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee, ruled out the use of force to bring the Lithuanian communist party to heel.....³⁶

The plenum, which was described as “stormy”, decided that a formal Communist Party of Soviet Union stance on the question of Lithuanian Communist party independence would be adopted at the next Central Committee Plenum (Scheduled for late January but subsequently deferred until February), to be based on assessments made as a result of Gorbachev’s visit to Lithuania. Vadim Medvedev, the central committee, secretary responsible for ideology ruled out the use of force to bring the Lithuanian Communist Party to heel, however, telling a press conference “our party uses political, not military means.”³⁷

Gorbachev met on January 4 and 6, 1990, with the leadership of both the Communist Party of Lithuania and the rival “Lithuanian Communist party of the Communist Party of Soviet Union Platform” (Created in December 1989 by a breakaway faction supporting unity with the CPSU). Significantly according to unofficial reports he also met four members of the leadership of the Nationalist Lithuanian Restructuring Movement (Sajudis). An advance party compromising more than 40 Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee

³⁶ Keesing’s Record of World Events (Torquay UK) January, 1990, p. 37168.

³⁷ *ibid.*

officials and led by Medvedev arrived in Lithuania on January 8, 1989 to sound out public opinion at meeting in factories and on collective forms.³⁸

Addressing a meeting of Lithuanian intellectuals at the Academy of Sciences of Vilnius on January 11, 1990, Gorbachev stated: "Withdrawal into isolation is a dream which seems attractive. We are for self-determination including secession. In this connection instructions were give to draft a law on the mechanism of implementing this right by any republic. Such a draft already exists and it will be put forward for nationwide discussion and a referendum. This will involve all Nations. But some one thinks simplistically that an elections will be held, say in a few days and that you will get together vote and immediately secede from the Soviet Union, this is not serious politics. This is something definitely not serious, for in that case problems will have to be settled with all the republics and the state. And what about those people who will want to leave if you secede? Who for example, will pay for the housing which they will leave behind and who will give them new jobs? This is a very deep painful and serious process. There is a constitutional right but the mechanism has not been worked out Perestroika will fail if we do not solve the problem. But I am for its solution within the framework of the federation, because otherwise we will face such an aggravation in human relation that this will throw the whole Union and each nation back and result in great losses. That is why we should move slowly but steadily, without getting ahead of ourselves. A start has already been made the Supreme Soviet is taking the issues of land and property. Next will come a law on the division of the competence of all Union and republican bodies. Everything must be clear-cut, not as it is now

³⁸ Ibid.

when a republic may undermine the supreme law and the supreme law interferes in the affairs which can be settled by a rural soviet”.³⁹

He also mentioned: “We will actively move forward without destroying without endangering the pillars of our Union turmoil the whole country is in. Perestroika is moving ahead, we are all advancing towards democratization and sovereignty and what do the Lithuania want? Some are beginning to say that the people cannot prefer such a way. The people will have to understand what is what, and of course they will do say that the people cannot be for such a way. The people will have to understand what they will have to go through and what they should expect in that case. They will think, that is why I am for the second way, you should know about this conviction of mine. I must understand, your way of thinking, but you should also know whom you are dealing with A few days ago I was told that Sajudis was holding its Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) and the following words were spoken at it: We should be saying that we support Gorbachev’s line, but implement our own line.”⁴⁰

He also said, I am for the renewal of the federation and against separatism some people see such an attitude as a continuation of the imperial way of thinking to me personally such thinking is absolutely inadmissible. My approach is based on realities...yesterday one of the speaker at the meet in Vilnius said: “We are looking forward to Gorbachev visit as the leader of a friendly country. Some way of putting it. This is nothing but playing political footlog. But, I must say this is not at all that harmless and safe. One can not play political game when the fate of the people is concerned. This must not be done. So, dear friends, let us think and find

³⁹ On the Lithuanian Problem, (Moscow, White Book, 1990) p. 17-18.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 18.

answers.. in the framework of cooperation and collaboration. I am confident that we will find the right answers.”⁴¹

The main aim of Gorbachev’s visit was to discourage the Lithuanian Communist Party to realign with the Communist Party of Soviet Union. However he completely failed in his mission. After Gorbachev’s visit, the ever biggest blow to Moscow was caused by the elections for the Lithuania Supreme Soviet which was hold on February 24, 1990. In the first round of balloting, on February 24, 1990 sajudis affiliated candidates won enough seats (72 out of 90 seats decided) to ensure an outright majority in the 141 seat Supreme Soviet. A second round was held on moral 14 in constituencies where no candidate had secured an absolute majority and 43 more seats were decided, 20 going to sajudis backed candidates.⁴²

After the elections the newly elected Lithuanian Parliament declared independence of Lithuania on March 11, 1990 by a vote of 124 to none. In a resolution called “Act of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania republic on the restoration of the independent of Lithuania state”, it was said “Expressing the will of the people, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania republic hereby resolves and solemnly declares that the exercise of the sovereign rights of the Lithuania state, flouted by an alien force in 1940, shall now be restored and Lithuania shall henceforward once more become an independent state. The Lithuanian councils independence act of Feb 16, 1918 and the constitution of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) resolution of May 15, 1920, on the reconstitution the democratic Lithuania states have never lost their legal force and make up the constitution base of the Lithuanian state. The territory of the Lithuania state is integral and indivisible and no foreign constitution

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 20.

⁴² Keesings Record of World Events (UK, Torquay), March 1990.

is valid on it. The Lithuanian state places an emphasis on its adherence to the generally recognized principles of international law acknowledges the infallibility of frontiers, as formulated in the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki in 1975, and guarantees that rights of men citizen and national communities. The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic as exponent of its sovereign will, is in virtue of the Present Act, starting to exercise the full sovereignty of the state.⁴³

Another act of the Lithuanian Republic on the Restoration of the Constitution of Lithuania of May 12, 1938, declared the suspension of the Lithuanian Constitution of May 1938 in this course of aggression against independence Lithuania state and its annexation by the Soviet Union on June 15, 1940 as illegal. It also declared that the operation of the Constitution (basic law) of the USSR of October 7, 1977 as well as of the fundamental legislation of the USSR and the Union Republic and other laws of the USSR on the territory of the Lithuania Republic would be terminated and operation of the Constitution of Lithuania of May 12, 1938 would be resumed all over the territory of the Lithuania Republic which suspending the validity of the chapters and articles governing the status of the president, the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament), the state council and the state inspection service of the Republic.⁴⁴

The act on the interim basic law of the Lithuania Republic states: "taking into account the necessity of bringing the provision of the restored Constitution of May 12, 1938 into line with the changed political economic and other social relation the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania Republic hereby resolves: One; the Lithuanian constitution of May 12, 1938, shall be suspended. Two; the interim basic law of the Lithuanian Republic shall be endorsed. Three; it

⁴³ On the Lithuanian Problem, (Moscow, White Book, 1990), pp. 21-22.

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p.23.

shall hereby be established that the laws and other legal acts which have been in force in Lithuania until now and which do not contradict the interim basic law of Lithuania. Four; the present Act shall enter into force upon adoption.⁴⁵

By another decree the operation of the military commissariat of the ministry of defence of the USSR, as institutions of foreign state present on the territory of the Lithuania Republic was terminated.⁴⁶ After this act and decrees passed by the Lithuania parliament, Gorbachev sent a telegram titled "heed the voice of reason" to V. Landsberg is the president of Lithuania, in which he said: "I hereby send you a copy of the resolution the special third congress of people's deputies of the USSR adopted on March 15, 1990, inform us within three days of measures that will be taken to implement this resolution."⁴⁷The resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR contained the following points:

1. Confirming the right of every constituent republic to free secession from the USSR (Article 72 of the constitution of the USSR) the Congress rules that until the procedure and consequences of secession from the Soviet Union are established by law, the unilateral decisions of the Supreme soviet of the Lithuania , in violation of Articles 74 and 75 of the USSR constitution shall be considered invalid.
2. The President of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the council of ministers of the USSR shall be called upon to ensure, the protection of the legitimate rights of subject at issue, the protection of the legitimate rights of every individual residing and interests of the USSR and of the constituent republics on the territory of the Lithuani.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 23.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 25.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 33

3. The bodies of state authority and the government of the Lithuanian SSR shall take all necessary measures to ensure that law and order are not violated on the territory of the Republic.⁴⁸

The Lithuanian parliament and even people did not pay any attention to Gorbachev's telegram, though Lithuanian president Landsbergis assured Gorbachev that the Lithuanian state would take necessary measures to ensure that the law and order on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic could not be violated.⁴⁹

Gorbachev once again appealed to the Lithuanian Parliament and said: "The incumbent Lithuanian leadership does not heed the voice of reason. It continues to ignore the decision of the third extraordinary Congress of the USSR people deputies and its taking unilateral steps that run counter to the USSR Constitution and that are openly challenging and insulting to the entire union. I want to declare yet again that this road is ruinous and will only lead to a dead end..... I propose that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet immediately annul the illegal acts it has adopted, such a step will open a possibility for discussing the entire range of problems on the solely acceptable basis-within the framework of the USSR Constitution.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, new laws pertaining to secession of the Republic were framed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to these laws the decision on secession of a Union Republic from the USSR shall be taken by the exercise of free will of the people of the Union Republic through a referendum. On the initiative of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of a seceding republic the congress of people deputies of the USSR, shall establish

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 34

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 35.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 38

a transitional period of not more than five years. During which the questions arising from republics secession from the USSR should be solved.⁵¹ As a final ultimatum, a resolution regarding the secession of a Union Republic was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which stated:

1. The USSR law “on the procedure of settling problems connected with the secession of a Union Republic from the USSR” shall be put into force immediately upon publication.
2. Any moves, connected with the raising of the issue of a Union Republic secession from the USSR, going against the USSR law “on the procedure of settling problems connected with the secession of a Union Republic from the USSR,” and juridical consequences for the USSR or for the Union Republics.
3. The Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic shall bring the legislation of the Union Republic in accordance with the USSR law on the procedure of settling problems connected with the secession of the Union Republic from the USSR.⁵²

In spite of many ultimatums from Moscow, Lithuania could not bow before the pressure, as a result of which Soviet Union decided to impose economic blockade against Lithuania. The economic blockade came into force on April 19, 1990 and as a first step the crude oil supply to Lithuania was cut off. Quoting from different sources Linas Kucinskis says that the Soviet Union cut off not only oil and gas but also broke off shipments of sugar, fish, metal, wood, rubber, tires and industrial parts. An additional measure a military attack on the printing plants was also arranged. Soviet army armed with AK-47 assault weapons stormed a Communist Party – owned printing plant featuring civilian guards. A member of the Lithuania

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 40

⁵² Ibid. p. 47-48.

parliament, Zigmar vaisvila, who tried to stop the military action so was also beaten by armed soldiers. The Kermlin was seeking to stop the palnts, put the workers on the streets, and encourage social unrest, "Lithuanian president Vyautas Landsbergis charged at a news conference. Thus, the "honest dialogue" between the USSR and Lithuania reached its highest point.⁵³

In 1990, when Sajudis had come to power in Lithuania and was adopting a strong secessionist stance, the Soviet leadership attempted an economic blockade of the upstart republic. The Lithuanian economy suffered and Soviet made some modest concessions, but the result of the blockade and its abandonment after three months, testified to Moscow's own weakness as well. Many Russian enterprise did business with Lithuania despite Moscow's best endeavours. Mutual dependence was widely believed to have been demonstrated, inter, by perceptible worsening of food supplies to Moscow from Lithuanian.⁵⁴ Infact, this economic warfare hurt many countries. In 1990 Lithuania's single oil refinery supplied oil not just to Estonia and Latvia but also to Kalinigrad. Large all-union factories in Lithuania, manned heavily by Russian workers., were among the first to suffer from the Kremlin's fuel embargo. Lithuania was a monopoly supplier to the USSR of same high-tech components and a large supplier of consumers goods, from food, and cement. Probably the Kremlin could purchase these goods elsewhere, but only for hard currency. Lithuania dependent upon oil and gas from Russia, but it exported more than twice as much electrical power to other Soviet republics as it received. Belorussia and the Leningrad region had become dependent upon Lithuanian meat, milk and fish.⁵⁵At

⁵³ Linar Kucinakas, op.cit, pp.26- 27

⁵⁴ Michael Bradshaw, Philip Hansan and Denis Shaw, "Economic Restructuring" *the Baltic states*.

⁵⁵ Ra,Anan, *The Soviet Empires: The Challenge of National and Democrat Movement*, 1990, p. 115.

a public gathering on May 20, seeing off the delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow, Party first Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas declared it was necessary to reevaluate the documents of 1939-1940: "Lithuanian has already done this, now it is Moscow's turn with a dark spot in Lithuania's soul". He called for a new treaty of union trying together the republics of the USSR. Even when Gorbachev approved the formation of a special commission to investigate the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, he still suggested that the secret protocol might be forgery, pointing to the fact that Molotov's signature was in German rather than Russian script.⁵⁶

Meanwhile Lithuania got overwhelming support from the western countries, however, Soviet Union initially took tough stand against the Lithuania independence. Meanwhile, the US congress passed a resolution by a 416 vote urging the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to recognize the independence of Lithuania at the earliest. Later on, almost all the European heads of states came out with open support to independent Lithuania. A hectic diplomatic move was launched by the United States and other European powers to force some kind of negotiated settlement between Lithuania and the Soviet Union.

When Lithuanian's President Vytautas Landsbergis attended for the first time on June 12, 1990 a meeting of the USSR council of the federation, comprising the President of the 15 Union republics (previously he had refused to participate on the grounds that he was the head of a foreign state). The meeting heard outline proposals by president Mikhail Gorbachev for a new union treaty, which would transform the Soviet Union into a "Union of sovereign state in which some republics might continue to give up virtually none, as in a confederation. After his

⁵⁶ Summary of World Broadcast, August 17, 1989.

council Gorbachev apparently told lands bergis that negotiated with Lithuanian could begin if it suspended its independence declaration, if only for the duration of those negotiations. On June 13, 1990 Lithuanian's Prime Minister Kazimiersa Prunskiene met Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkav to discuss the lifting at the Soviet economic blockade in return for suspension of the independence declaration. Ryzhkov told Prunskiene that the Soviet authorities were to allow unconditionally the partial resumption of natural gas and raw material supplies to selected Lithuanian enterprises. But, only the gas supplies resumed by Soviet Union.⁵⁷

After a sustained diplomatic activities from all sides Lithuanian parliament agreed on June 29, 1990 to put a moratorium on declaration of independence for one hundred days if Moscow would end its economic blockade against Lithuania. Supporting this resolution Lithuania preliament landsbergis said: "Two years ago we chose the peaceful route independence. The route to negotiations, now the condition for negotiation is a moratorium."⁵⁸

On June 30, 1990 in a favourable response to the moratorium Soviet Union reopened the oil pipe line to Lithuania. Thus, the economic blockade began to subside. However, millions of roubles had already been lost. For the purpose of coming out miserable economic crisis Lithuania began to prepare for a cautions negotiation with Moscow. Towards the end of 1990 along side the official delegation headed by President Landsbargis a working group headed by Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas was formed. The working group was assisted by nine groups of experts.

⁵⁷ Keesing Record of World Event (UK, Targyay) January 1990, p. 37540.

⁵⁸ Linas Kucinakas, op.cit, p.29.

According to Linas Kucinskas at the very beginning the Soviet side showed some interest in negotiations.

After both official delegation need in October 1990, the started of official negotiation was scheduled for November 30, 1990. However, when that day arrived the USSR refused to attend the negotiating session, explaining that top officials were preoccupied by preparations for the fourth Congress of People's Deputies. A new date for negotiation was not set.⁵⁹At this crucial juncture, Soviet Union was getting prepared for a possible military intervention in the Baltics. That is why, its stand became tougher, since the Western powers did not like to cause any trouble for Gorbachev they moved cautiously towards a very sensitive issue of Lithuania independence. It was the period, when the United States of America and other western powers were preparing an intervention in the Gulf over the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait as it is well known fact that the Iraqi forces had launched massive attack on Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and annexed the entire territory of the country.⁶⁰ In this regard United States and its allies wanted to have full support of the Soviet Union, so that they could liberate Kuwait by teaching a good lesson to Saddam Hussein. This is the reason, why the western powers particularly United State took liberal stand for the time being on Lithuanian issue, as a result of which the Soviet Union felt unhindered in taking tough stand against the Baltic Republic.

Soviet Union adopted a policy of putting aside all attempt for negotiation, this is why Lithuanian delegation led by landsbergis failed to start any political negotiation with the then Soviet Prime minister Nikoli Ryzhkov in October 1990. The prospects for such negotiation had ultimately vanished, when on December 3, 1990, Rating Nishanov the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, warned

⁵⁹ Ibid, pp.37-38.

⁶⁰ Keesing's Record of World Events (Torquay, U.K) January 1991, p. 37944.

that Republic would be unable to negotiate on their individual states unless they first signed the new Union Treaty. On December 13, 1990 Landsbergis had announced that a further round of preliminary consultations had been postponed indefinitely by the Soviet side.⁶¹

This is how, the Soviet forces resorted to military intervention on January 19, 1991 in the Baltic Republics, thereby providing dramatic evidence of a new hard line in Soviet internal politics. In both the Lithuania and Latvia capitals Soviet forces seized key buildings and installations. Nineteen people were killed most of them Lithuanian civilians, who resisted the Soviet tanks. The crackdown provided an international outcry, although this was greatly tempered by western recognition of the need to maintain Soviet support for the campaign against Iraq in the Gulf war.⁶² The crackdown started on January 7, 1991 when the USSR defence Ministry ordered divisions of paratroopers into the three Baltic Republics, as well as into Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and parts of the Ukraine, to enforce conscription and round up deserters. On January 8, 1991 the defence ministry sought to justify its operation against draft-dodgers by declaring that conscription levels were so low as to threaten national security. The commander of the Baltic military district Col. Gen. Fedor Kuzmin, telephoned the prime ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to warn them not to hinder the paratroopers.⁶³

In a message on January 10, 1991 Gorbachev sent a message to the Lithuanian Supreme Council stating that the deteriorating situation in Lithuania was the result of flagrant violations of the USSR constitution and deviations from the constitution of Soviet

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

Lithuania. The bloody events began in the early hours of January 13, 1991 when troops from the local Red Army garrison stormed the Vilnius television centre where at least 13 protesters were killed and 230 were injured. The assault was launched despite Gorbachev's assurance a few hours earlier that the forces would not be used in Lithuania.⁶⁴

Interestingly on the next day after the assault Gorbachev publicly denied any prior knowledge of the attack of television station. Later on, the Soviet Interior Ministry Boris Pugo explained that the Soviet forces intervened at the request of "National Salvation Committee" forces by Pro-Moscow Communist Party on January 11, 1991, after its members were allegedly beaten up outside parliament as they protested against anti-Soviet slander in Lithuanian media. The Vilnius Garrison Commander had ordered troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers to the television station, clearing this action with a member of the Baltic military district command. After the building was taken the "National Salvation Committee" installed itself there as a rival government.⁶⁵

Such bloody events led to the declaration of national mourning in Lithuania for two days on January 14-15, 1991. Meanwhile Boris Yeltsin then President of Russian federation had suddenly rushed to Estonia on January 13, 1991, and issued a joint statement with all the three Baltic Presidents calling for an emergency U.N. conference on the crisis. Yeltsin also appealed to the Russian soldiers in the Baltic states not to obey orders to use force against the civilians.⁶⁶ Thus, Yeltsin created an unprecedented embarrassment to the Soviet leadership particularly Mikhail Gorbachev.

⁶⁴ ibid, pp. 37944-45.

⁶⁵ ibid, p. 37945.

⁶⁶ ibid.

Meanwhile, it was reported that the Lithuanian President Landsbergis tried to talk to president Gorbachev on telephone to Moscow but failed. He was told by the Gorbachev officials that Soviet leader (Gorbachev) was having lunch. However, a message was left for the president stating that the military units under his command were spilling blood in Lithuania and he must issue orders to halt this action immediately. The western powers came out openly against-Soviet intervention in the Baltic Republic. However, they could not take any decisive measure to stop the Soviet intervention as they themselves were busy in Gulf war for which Soviet support was necessary for them. In this way after about a month of intervention the Soviet policy appeared to shift on January 30, 1991 when Pugo announced that all the paratroopers and two-thirds of the common units were being withdrawn. Reportedly this had been promised on Jan 29, 1991 by the new Soviet-foreign Minister Aleksandra Bessmertnykh at the end of talks in Washington with US secretary of states James Baker. It appeared to represent a retreat in the face of international criticism.

At the Washington talk it had been agreed to postpone the summit meeting between Gorbachev and President Bush Scheduled for February 11-13, 1991, both sides said that Bush was too busy with the Gulf war but US unease about event in the Baltic was widely assessed as having also been a factor.⁶⁷ Following this, developed one of the most surprising diplomatic moves came from the smallest member of NATO bloc. The Iceland who extended first diplomatic recognition to Lithuania. The Iceland move symbolized the western powers (particularly the NATO) desire to accept Lithuania and other Baltic states as independent Nations. It also marked the beginning of the crack in the Soviet empire. After the above developed the main target of Gorbachev policy concentrated

⁶⁷ Linas Kucinskas , op.cit, p. 42.

on a new Union Treaty.⁶⁸ His sole aim was some-how to maintain the integrity of the Soviet Union but the president of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia issued a joint statement on July 28, 1991 refusing to take part in talks of a new Union Treaty. Earlier Union had taken place on March 17, 1991, though the referendum favoured the Preservation of the USSR by 76.4% yes votes, in practice the country headed towards the disintegration.

Meanwhile on August 19, 1991 a coup attempt was made by the hardliners of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to oust President Gorbachev from power. The first news of the coup was a statement signed by Yanayev, Pavolv and Baklanov and distributed by the official news agency Tass on the morning of August 19, 1991 saying that in keeping with the Constitution, Presidential power had been transferred to vice-president Gannady Yanayav "due to Minister Gorbachev's inability to perform his duties for health reasons", and that a statement of emergency had been introduced in part of Soviet Union for six months to overcome "the profound crisis, political, ethnic and civil strike, chaos and anarchy that threaten the lives and security of the Soviet Union's citizens". The statement listed the members of the state committee for the state of emergency, formed, "to run the country and effectively exercise the state of emergency."⁶⁹

However, coup attempt could not get proper support from the army and the KGB. At the same time maverick leader Boris Yeltsin succeeded in getting support from all section of Russian Society as a result of which the coup attempt failed with three days on August 21, 1991 and President Gorbachev was reinstated. However, the real power was grabbed by Yeltsin and Gorbachev practically became defunct. The new union treaty which scheduled to be signed on

⁶⁸ Kessings Record of World Event (UK, Torquay) August 1991, p. 38368.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 38370.

August 20, 1991 became the historic victim due to the coup attempts and thus- disintegration of the USSR became imminent.

During the period of coup telecommunication and broadcast had been interrupted in Lithuania. All the Baltic leaders declared the state committee for the state of emergence illegal and appealed for calm bearing the consequence of provoking military action. Government representatives were given authority to establish government in exile, should legitimate government be taken over.⁷⁰ On August 19, 1991 the first day of the coup the Lithuanian government appealed the world community for recognition. The Lithuanian president Landsbergis stated in the appeal: the coup in the Soviet Union which started on August 19, 1991 and the aggression being unleashed against Lithuania threatens the Lithuanian Republic and bloodshed. We are waiting for your urgent decisions full official recognition of the government of the Lithuanian republic and the renewal establishment of diplomatic relations with the Lithuanian Republic.⁷¹ On August, 27, 1991, the Supreme soviet of Lithuania in resolution on complete withdrawal of Soviet force from Lithuania” deemed that all armed forces of the Soviet Union be withdrawal from Lithuanian territory by an agreed date. Finally, the day arrived, when on September 6, 1991. The State Council of the Soviet Union voted Unanimously to recognize the independent of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The three States were admitted to the conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe on September 10, 1991 and United Nations on September 17, 1991. In the meantime, Soviet Union propose to withdraw its troops (80,000 strong) from Lithuania by 1994. the Lithuania president. Landsbergis said: “the Baltic Countries will receive support from the international community in achievement a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops and 1994 named by the Kremlin at present as the term

⁷⁰ Summary of World Broadcast (UK, Reading August 21, 1991.

⁷¹ Ibid. September 27, 1991.

for pulling out secret troops was absolutely unacceptable to Kremlin.⁷² On different platforms the issue of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Lithuania continued to be a point of discussion during that period. At same time Lithuania faced bitter economic crisis as well as ethnic problems. Since Soviet troops were still in Lithuania which had initially been deployed many decades ago during the world war II and never went back the Lithuanian leaders were psycholocially very disturbed. In the meantime, the power struggle in Soviet Union between Gorbachev and Yeltsin aggravated to such an extent that the disintegration of USSR soon became a reality. In December 1991, Boris Yeltisn hold historic meeting of the leaders of all remaining Soviet Republics at Minsk in which the disintegration of the Soviet Union was materialized and finally all the 15 Soviet Republic emerged as new independent states. Thus the collapse of the former USSR brought the down of independence to Lithuania and Lithuania emerged as an independent nation.

⁷² Summary of World Broadcast, (U.K), September 27th, 1991.

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

The history of Lithuania has been the history of misery, colonial domination, suffering and struggle. Since the inception of the Lithuanian state between 10th and 12th centuries, the people of Lithuania has struggled against one power or other for independent Lithuanian statehood. Lithuania along with other Baltic states remained colony of powers like Poland, Germany, Tsarist, Russia and Soviet Union. In fact Lithuania has been the victim of clash of interests among these colonial powers. The strategic and geopolitical importance of Lithuania have attracted these powers to control Lithuanian territory.

Parallel to this colonial subjugation and domination can be traced the movement of Lithuanian people for their independence. The roots of this struggle for independence lie in the commitment of Lithuanian people to Lithuanian language, culture and history. As seen in the previous chapters the feeling of nationalism among Lithuanian people was the product of prolonged Polish rule and latter on Russian rule. As we saw the process of cultural colonization of Lithuania emerged following a dramatic marriage between Polish Queen Jadwiga and Lithuanian grand Duke Jogaila on February 18, 1386. and as a condition Jogaila agreed to become Roman Catholic. Thus Catholicism was introduced in Lithuania through the Polish connection. However, the social and cultural variations had a deep impact in Baltic states.

Lithuanian nationalism began in 13th century when German conquest of the region took place. When tsar grabbed Lithuania in 1795 and neglected Lithuanian socio-economic developments, nationalistic feelings were aroused through underground efforts of a group of clergy. After the Bolshevik revolution when Lenin adopted the new approach towards Lithuania and allowed

Lithuania to become free from Tsarist colonial rule, United States of America also realized the strategic importance of Lithuania. Now, America started to provide economic and military assistance to Lithuania. In fact, America had its own vested interests in region. It was a cold war period and America intended to use Lithuania to contain communism. History once again reported itself, when Lithuania was captured by soviet union during second world war. In fact, Baltic factor was also an important factor in second world war. Though, under stalin Lithuania underwent through a process of rapid industrialization, Sovietization and cultural transformation of the region continued which added to the miseries of the people of Lithuania. Therefore nationalistic ferments of Lithuanian people, though suppressed, continue to grow which culminated in the Lithuanian independence in 1991.

The nationalistic upsurge in Lithuania became sharper during Gorbachev's period and Gorbachev was forced to allow Lithuania to hoist its national flag on all public buildings. It was a major achievement for Lithuanian freedom fighters. Earlier the Sajudis, a political organization of Lithuanian opposition had got extraordinary popularity, which led to a confrontation with the communist party of soviet union and the soviet authority. The contradictions between Sajudis and soviet authority became sharp when the general elections for the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies held in March 1989, in which the communists were defeated and nationalist government of opposition group was formed in Lithuania. At the same time, the Lithuanian Communist party declared itself independent from Moscow. However, Soviet government refused to accept the independence of Lithuania and declared it illegal. In order to improve the situation Mikhail Gorbachev visited Lithuania in early January 1990 and had extensive talks with the Sajudis and other leaders, but no change could be brought into the existing situation. A series of negotiations between Lithuanian and Kremlin leadership failed even

Communist Party of Lithuania stopped obeying Communist Party of Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Soviet Union imposed economic blockade against Lithuania which came into force on April 19, 1990. Soviet Union imposed not only economic blockade but also organized military attack on the printing plants, in which many civilians were injured. It also failed to pressurize Lithuania as a result of which, Soviet Union intervened militarily in Lithuania in January 1991. The soviet military action in Lithuania invited extraordinary criticism from the western powers, even Boris yeltsin, the president of Russian federation openly criticized Gorbachev from taking military action against the Lithuania. The soviet intervention in Lithuania took place at a time when United States of America and Its western allies were fiercely busy in the Gulf conflict in January 1991. As it is well known fact that without Soviet support the United States and its allies could have never succeeded in taking military action against Iraq over its annexation of Kuwait. Therefore, they could not do anything against Soviet military action in the Baltic states except issuing some strong statements of criticism against said union.

In fact, the reforms of Gorbachev in the Perestroika and Glasnost gave dramatic term to Lithuanian national movement. With the pace of these reforms the momentum of demand for independence intensified in Lithuania as well as in other states. Gorbachev tried to provide meaningful autonomy to different republics but completely failed in his mission before the overwhelming mass upsurge against Soviet system. Up to this time the Communist Party had also lost its monopoly. The newly organized groups of Lithuanian movement questioned the willingness and even the ability of party leaders in Vilnius to meet the challenges of Gorbachev's programme of reform, and a small group of dissidents, including the organization of demonstration of

August 23, 1987, announced this emergence from the underground under the name the Lithuanian freedom league. These organizations could rally considerable popular support in challenging the party leadership. During this period sajudis became a popular mass movement and emerged as a powerful force in Lithuania. Other organizations which were formed during the decades of 1970's and 1980 also started to cooperate Sajudis in Lithuanian national movement because of this Lithuania national movement became a mass movement when for the first time Sajudis movement and Lithuanian league of liberation shared the same platform in September 1988. At a rally to protest the military violence against the peaceful demonstrators and hunger sticker, the Lithuanian national movement became a power mass movement.

In this way Perestroika and Glasnost proved to be major landmarks in the Lithuanian struggle for independence because these reforms instigated the suppressed feelings of Lithuanian people. In this backdrop, Gorbachev resumed to the negotiations with Lithuanian authority and also supported an idea of a self ruled economic system for Lithuania. Gorbachev was ready to support the idea of sovereignty but denied the idea of independence of Lithuania. As a result of this denial Lithuanian people lunched a Social Democratic Party to intensity the struggle for freedom of Lithuania. In Lithuania conditions had become complex with informal creation of organizations of two groups in which mainly Lithuanians were represented. Meanwhile, Sajudis had demanded redical amendments to the constitution of the republic which was not conceded by the supreme Soviet.

At this juncture Lithuanian legislature abolished the clause in its constitution which has given the Communist Party the monopoly in the power and Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to adopted multi- party system. This was a great victory of Lithuanian people in general and for Sajudis movement in

particular. The Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself independent from the Communist Party of Soviet Union. This declaration came from the 20th congress of Lithuanian Communist Party which was held on December 20-21 1989. This event shocked the Communist Party of Soviet Union. In this way Supreme Soviet of USSR was forced to pass new laws pertaining to the secession of the republic of Lithuania.

Meanwhile, Lithuania also succeeded in getting support from western countries for its independence. Lithuania continued to face severe economic and ethnic problems with its independence. Now, the task of economic reconstruction became imminent. The collapse of former USSR brought the independence for Lithuania but economic reconstruction became a major challenge.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Documents and resolutions: 27th CPSU Congress (Progress Publishers, 1986).

Documents of 19th Party Conference (Moscow, Novosti Publishers, 1988).

Documents and Materials: CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting on 20th September 1989 (Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1989).

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Country Studies, Area Handbook Series (Washington DC, Library of Congress).

Keesings Record of World Events 1988-1991 (UK, Torquay).

On the Lithuanian Problems (Moscow, White Book, 1990).

Summary of World Broadcast 1988-1991 (UK, Reading).

The Soviet Union 1986/1987 (London, Edited by Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, Westview Press).

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Akstinas. B, *Glimpses of Lithuania*. (Lithuania, Kardis Press, Vilnius, 1972).

Allworth. E, *National Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic states: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region* (New York, Praeger Publisher, 1997).

- Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, *Soviet Policy for the 1980s* (Great Britain, Pitman Press, 1982).
- Azrael. J.R, *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (Praeger Publishers, USA, 1978).
- Bremmer. I and Taras, R, *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (UK, Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Bronis. J. Kaslas, *The Baltic Nations: The Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty* (Euro-America Press Pittston, Pennsylvania 1976).
- Dallin J.D, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy* (Newheaven, University Press, 1952).
- Eklot. B, *Soviet Breifing* (London, Westview Press, 1989).
- Ernest Mandel, *Beyond Perestroika* (New York, London).
- George. Von. R, *The Baltic State: the Years of Independence 1917-1940.* (London, 1974).
- Gleason G, *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Right in the USSR* (U.S.A., Westview Press, 1990).
- Graham Smith, *The Baltic States* (Published in the United States of America, 1996).
- Hidden J, *The Baltic Nations and Europe- Estonia, Lativa and Lithuania in 20th Century* (London, Longman, 1991).

- Hidden J, and Lane. T, *The Baltic and The Outbreak of the Second World War* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- Hosking G, *History of Soviet Union* (Fontana Press Collins).
- Jack Stukas, *Awakening Lithuania* (Madison, J: Florham Park Press, 1963).
- Kasulalitis. J.A, *Lithuanian Christian Democracy* (Chicago, Draugas Press, 1976).
- Kool. K.M. and R. Silenas. R.V, Inveis. R, *The Baltic Republics: A Study Russification* (Maryland Joint Baltic American National Committee, 1983).
- Kung. Andres, *A Dream of Freedom: Four Decades of National Survival Versus Russian Imperialism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1940-1980* (Cardiff Boreas, 1981).
- Lavin A, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the path to Independence*, (New Heaven, 1993).
- Maniusis. J, *Soviet Lithuania Economy and Culture* (Mints Publishing House Lithuania, 1973).
- Martin Croach, *Revolution and Evolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Politics* (New Delhi Prentice, Hall of India, 1990).
- Medvedev. Z, *Gorbachev* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986).
- Merridale C and Ward. C, *Perestroika. The Historical Perspective* (London, 1991).

- Rajiv Shah, *New Horizons of Soviet Policies* (New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1987).
- Remikis T, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945-1980* (Chicago Institute of Lithuania Studies Press, 1980).
- Romuald. J.M. and R.T, *The Baltic States Years of Independence 1940-1980* (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1983).
- Senn. Atfred Eric, *The Emergence of Modern Lithuania* (New York: Columbia University Press-1959).
- Siman. G, *Church State and Opposition in the USSR* (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1974).
- Smith. T, *The Baltic States: The National Self Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (USA, St. Martin Press, 1996).
- Sonnen Feld H, *Soviet Politics in the 1980s* (Westview Press, Boulder and London, Pinter Publisher, 1991).
- Stanley W. Page, *The formation of the Baltic State: A study of the effects of Great Power Politics upon the emergence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1959).
- Stephen White, *Gorbachev in power* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Swethnham. J.A, *The Tragedy of the Baltic States* (London, Hollis and Carter, 1952).

Vardys V. Stanley, *The Catholic Church, dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (U.S.A., Columbia University Press, 1978).

_____, *The Baltic states in peace and war* (University Park, Penn state University Press, 1978).

Von Rauch, *Baltic states* (Kaunas University, 1940).

ARTICLES

Agrell. Wihlem, "Baltic and Scandivania: The Implication of Changes in Military Strategy", *Current Research on Peace and Violence* (Finland) Vol. 1, No.2, 1986. PP. 45-53.

Alfed E.S., "Perestroika in Lithuania Histography: The Molotov-Ribbentrop" *Russia Review* (America, The Ohino State University) Vol. 49, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 43-56.

_____, "Toward Lithuanian Independence: Algirdas Brazauskas and the CPL" *Problem of Communism* (Washington) Vol. 39, April 1990, pp. 21-29.

Alumus. V, "Sufferings from self-determination" *Foreign Policy* (Washington) vol. 8, No.4, 1991, pp. 66-71.

Anderson. Edges, "The role of Baltic States between the USSR and Western Europe", *East European Quarterly* (Colorado University of Colorado) Vol. VIII, No.4, 1974, PP.379-397.

- Bolsheviks. D.E, "Class culture and Politics in early Soviet years", *Slavic Review* (America) Vol.47, No.4, Winter-88, PP.599-613.
- Branhm. H, "Disintegration of the Soviet Union and Europe", *Aussen Politik* (Hamburg) Vol.43, No.1, 1992, PP.43-53.
- Brazezinski. Z, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 68; No.5, winter 1989, PP. 1-25.
- Bromley. Y, "Ethnic Problems and Perestroika," *Social Science*, Vol.21, No.1, 1990, PP. 22-37.
- Brown. A, "Gorbachev and Reforms of the Soviet System," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No.2, April-June-1987, PP. 139-151.
- Bungr Dzintra, "Joint Political initiatives by Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians as reflected in Samized at Materials 1969-1987". *Journals of Baltic Studies*. Vol. 19, No.3, Fall 1988, PP. 267-271.
- Burant, Stephen, "Polish Lithuania Relations, Past, Present and Future," *Problem of Communism* (Washington) Vol. 40, No.3, May-June 1991, PP. 67-87.
- Burks. R.V, "Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union," *East European quarterly* (Colorado), Vol. 18, No.1, March-1984, PP. 61-71.

- Conquest. Robert, "Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice," *Soviet Studies Series* (Glasgow) Vol.2, No.4, 1967, P.64.
- Crowe. D, "American Foreign Policy and The Baltic States Question 1940-41." *East European Quarterly* (Colorado), Vol. 17, No.4, January 1984, PP. 401-405.
- Datta P, "Problems of Nationalities in the USSR," *Asian Studies* (Calcutta), Vol. 9, No.1, 1991, PP.43-46.
- Dovlevin, "Jews and the Socio-Economics: Socialization of Lithuania 1940-40," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), Vol. 17, No. 3, 1987, PP. 25-38.
- Dussanovsky, Hand Robert Von, "The Philosophy and fate of Baltic self-determination," *East European Quarterly* (Colorado) Vol. 20, No.1, Jan-1987, PP. 493-504.
- Edger. A, "The role of Baltic States between the USSR and Western Europe," *East European Quarterly* (Colorado) Vol.7, No.4, January 1974, PP. 379-97.
- Esper. T, "Russia and Baltic," *Slavic Review* (America) vol. XXV, No.3, 1986, PP. 458-74.
- Gidadhpublic R.G, "Growing Discontent in the Baltic Republics: Causes and Consequences," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay) Vol. 24. No.1, 1989. PP.24-26.

- Granberg. A.G, "Economic Interaction of Soviet Republic," *Soviet Review*, vol. 25, No.2, Summer 1984, PP. 24-26.
- Grazinlgor, " On the influence of Baltic Policy of Process of Democratization in the USSR- The Ethnical Aspect," *Lithuanus*, Vol.37, No.2, 1991, PP. 78-81.
- Hartman Gary, "They origins and Growth of Baltic Nationalism as a for Independence," *Lithuanus* (USA Chicago,) Vol. 38, 1992, PP. 69-89.
- Hough J.E. "Gorbachev's Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.5, Whiter 1989-90, PP-2641.
- Jenisch. U, "Recent law of the sea development in the Baltic sea," *Aussen Politic* (Humburg) Vol. 38, No.4, PP. 362-377.
- Joane Nagel, "The Ethnic Revolution: The Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism in modern states," *Sociology and social Research*, vol.68, No.4, July 1984, pp.417-734.
- John. B, "The Collativisation in Soviet Lithuania," *East European Quarterly* (Colorado) Vol. 9, No.1, 1975, PP.53-75.
- Joseph. J, "How firm was the Polish Lithuania," *Slavic Review* (America) Vol. XXII, September 1963, PP. 442-449.

- Juozas Lakis, "Ethnic Minorities in the Post-communist Transformation of Lithuania," *International Sociology* Vol.2, No.2, June-1995, PP. 173-184.
- Kaushik, Devendra, "Political Reforms: A Balance Sheet," *World Focus* (New Delhi, 1988).
- Kreep. Ended, "Security and non-aggression Baltic States and USSR treaties of Non-aggression," *Problems of the Baltic*, Vol. 20, (1973), pp.224-232.
- Kucinskas. L, "Lithuania's independence, the Litmus test for Democracy in the USSR", *Lithuania Quarterly* (Chicago USA) vol.37, 991. PP. 226-234.
- Leonid. M, "The Russians in the Baltic Republics Strangers in their own Homes," *New Times* (Moscow) Vol. 24, 1990, PP. 31-34.
- Lenoid, S, "Adoptive Behaviour in Foreign Policy Crisis situations in Lithuania 1938-40", *East European Quarterly* (Colorado) Vol.21, No.2, Summer 1987, P.43.
- Levin, D, "Jews and the Socio-Economic Sovietization of Lithuania 1940-41," *Soviet-Jewish Affairs* (London) Vol. 17, No.3, Winter 1987, PP.25-38.
- Levin. N. "Germanization of Lenin," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, Vol.35, No.1, Jan-88, PP. 137.
- Lewilter. L.R, "Peter the Great and the Modern World," *History Today*, Vol.35, Feb-1985, PP. 16-33.

- Lewin. M, "Perestroika: A New Historical Stage", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.42, No.2, 1989, PP. 283-298.
- Martinavicius. J, "Privatization in Lithuania," *Baltic Review* (Tallinn) 1995, P.43.
- Mchrotro. O.N, "Disintegration of the Soviet Empire," *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi) Vol.14, No.4, July 1991, PP. 369-80.
- Meissner. B. "Transformation of the USSR," *Aussen Politick* (Humburg) Vol. 1, No.9, 1992, PP. 54-61.
- Mlechin. L. "Aliens Lithuania," *New Times* (Moscow) Vol. 25, No.2, 1990, PP. 32-33.
- _____. "Lithuania New People Can Change a invitation to forum," *New Time* (Moscow) Vol. 25, No.17, 1990, P. 25.
- _____. "Meeting on the Road to a Market of Baltic Republics," *New Times* (Pravda, Moscow) Vol. 25, No. 35, 199, p.19.
- _____. "What is Nation Expects Lithuania," *New Times* (Pravda, Moscow) Vol.25, NO. 13, 1990, PP.5-6.
- Modak A.K. "Gorbachevian Policy of openness," *India Quarterly* (New Delhi) Vol. 45, No.1, Jan-March- 1989, PP. 46-70.
- Oswald. P.B, "The Problems of Federalism in Lithuania," *Slavic Review* (America) VOL.1.1, Dec-1962, PP. 639-59.

- Parming. T, "Population Process and the Nationality issue the Soviet Baltic," *Soviet -Studies* (Glasgow) Vol. 32, No.3, 1980, PP. 398-414.
- Phillip G. Roeder, " Soviet federalism and Ethnic Mobilization" *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, January 1991, P.228.
- Pinkus. B, "Emigration of National Minorities from the USSR in the Post-Stalin Era," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London) vol. 13, No.1, Feb- 1983, PP.3-36.
- Powell. D.E, "History and Recent histories of the USSR," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 20, No.3-4, Winter-87, PP. 343-58.
- Pustogarov. V, "Soviet Republics in the World Community," *International Affairs* Vol. 3, No.5, May 1991, PP. 3-12.
- Remington. T, "Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: Glasnost and Policy-Making under Gorbachev," *Russian Review* (America) Vol.48, No.3, Jun-1989, PP. 271-304.
- Romuald. J. Misianas, "The Baltic Republics," *Slavic Review* (America) vol.20, No.8, 198, P.206.
- Sallow. J, "Baltic Unrest in the Wake of Perestroika Threatens Soviet Cohesion," *Geographical*, Vol. 61, No.4, Nov.1989, PP. 16-21.
- Senani. E.A, "The Formation of Lithuanian Forming Office 1918-1921," *Slavic Review* (America) Vol. 22, No.3, September 1960, PP. 500-507.

- Senni. E. A, "Perestroika in Lithuanian Histography: The Molotov-Rebentrop," *Russian Review* (The Ohio State University, America) Vol.49, No.1, Jan-1990, PP.43-56.
- Shaking. M, "The Baltic Way; Dashing From the Union", *New Times* (Pravda Press, Moscow) vol. 24, NO.23, 1990, PP.30-32.
- Shtromas. A, "Soviet Occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into USSR: Political and Legal Aspect", *East European Quarterly* (Calorodo) Vol. 19, No.4, 1985, PP. 459-467.
- Sidorova. G, "The Lithuanian Knot," *New Times* (Pravda Press, Moscow) Vol. 24, No.23, 1990, PP. 30-32.
- Soloman. M, "Soviet Nationality Policy Past and Present" *Problem of Communism* (Washington) Vol.2, No.6, 1953, PP. 41-46.
- Sprudzg. A, "The Baltic Path to independence," *The Problems of Communism* (Washington), Vol. 40, NO.2, 1989, P. 42-50.
- Stephen. C. "Self-determination and recent development in the Baltic States," *Journal of International Law and Policy* (Cambridge) Vol.19, No.3 1991, PP.625-646.
- Suny. R.G. "Towards a Social History of the October Revolution" *American Historical Review* Vol. 88, No. 1, Feb. 1983, PP. 31-52.

Taagepera. R. Inclusions of the Baltic republics in the Nordic Nuclear Free zone," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol.16, No.1, 1985, PP. 33-51.

_____ "The Baltic States," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 19, No.4, 1990, PP. 303-311.

Thuden Edward. "Baltic National Movements During the 19th Century," *Journal of Baltic Studies* vol. 16, No.4, winter 1985, PP. 411-421.

Tonu. P. "Population Process and Nationality issue in the Baltic," *Soviet Studies* (U.K.) Vol. XXXII, No. 3, July 1980, PP. 398-414.

Vardys. V. Stanley. "Human right issues in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 12, No.3, 1987, PP. 275-298.

_____ "Lithanian National Politics", *Problems of Communism*, vol.39, 1990, p.57.

_____. "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," *Problems of Communism* (Washington), Vol. 32, No.4, August, 1983, PP. 21-34.

_____. "The Baltic in Search of their own Political System," *East European Quarterly*, (Colorado) Vol. 7, No.4, PP. 399-412.

_____ "The Partisan Movement in Post-War Lithuania," *Slavic Review* (America) Vol. 3, No.1, Sep-1963, PP.459-522.

_____. "The Role of Churches in the maintenance of regional and National identity in the Baltic republics," *Journal of Baltic Studies* Vol. 18, No.3, 1987, PP. 287-300.

Vendova. T. "Ethnic Identity and the Nationality issue 'in contemporary Soviet Literature," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 21, No. 2-3, 1988, pp.319-329.

Vibopu. H.J. "The USSR, basic Legislation: Legislative authority of the Baltic republics," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 19, No.2, 1988, PP.117-128.

Vladimir Bukovsky. "What to do about the Soviet Collapse," *Commentary* (America), Vol. 2, No.3, Sep-1991, PP. 19-24.

NEWS PAPERS:

The Hindu (Madras)

Indian Express (New Delhi)

International Tribune (Paris)

The Patriot (New Delhi)

The Telegraph (Calcutta)

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

The Times (London)

Times of India (New Delhi)

The Tribune (Chandigarh)