

UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF LEONID KRAVCHUK

*Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

FAKIR MOHAN MUDULI



**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI – 110067
2003**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NEW DELHI - 110067

Tel: 26704365 (Direct)
26107676, 26167557
Extn. 4365, 4399
Fax: (+91)-11-26165886
(+91)-11-26198234

Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies


Dated: 15th July 2003

DECLARATION

This dissertation entitled, "UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF LEONID KRAVCHUK" submitted for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University has not been submitted previously for any other degree of this or any other University and is my original work.



Fakir Mohan Muduli

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.



Prof. Shashikant Jha

(Supervisor)



Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy

(Chairperson)

Dedicated to.....

My Parents

Acknowledgement

First of all I would like to place on record my everlasting gratitude to my revered supervisor, Prof. Shashikant Jha, who extended invaluable guidance in planning the scheme of this work and gave me full opportunity to discuss my problems with him. I am short of appropriate words to express my gratitude to him. I greatly value the help rendered by Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy (Chairperson of the Center) Prof. Ajay Patnaik, Prof. Nirjala Joshi, and Prof. Tulsi Ram, Dr. Sanjay Pandey and Dr. Bhaswati Sarkar for their cooperation and suggestions at various intervals of my research work.

I am extremely grateful to my parents and other family members for helping me in every possible way and for bearing my long absence from home.

I am also grateful for the facilities I received from the library of J.N.U., Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Teen Murti (Nehru Memorial Library), Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). I am thankful to the librarian and staff of the above libraries who greatly helped me during the course of my visit.

A special word of appreciation is to my friends-Narayan, Ramesh, Madhusmita Arabinda, Passang, Manoj and Anshul for their full cooperation they extended to me to complete this work. I am also indebted to many people for the completion of this dissertation paper. Lastly, I owe my special thanks to Mr. Sanjay who undertook the task of typing the bulk of manuscript.

New Delhi

15 July, 2003

Fakir Mohan Muduli

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Contents</i>	<i>Page No.</i>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	
PREFACE	
CHAPTER-1	
INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PARAMETERS OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY	(1-21)
I. FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	
II. DETERMINANTS OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY.	
a) Geographical Location	
b) Cultural and Historical Experience	
c) Economic Conditions	
d) Political Parties and Elites	
e) Social Structure	
f) Policy Makers	
g) Public Opinion	
h) Impact of International Environment	
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY	
IV. OBJECTIVES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY	
V. MEANS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES	
a) Non-Alignment	
b) Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendship with All Countries	
c) Economic Co-operation	
d) Temper for Peace	

CHAPTER-2

DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE

(22-42)

I. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

(a) Social Instability

(i) Ukrainisation

(ii) Dual Loyalty

(b) Political instability.

(c) Economic instability

II. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS.

(a) The Western Factor.

(b) The Russian Factor.

(c) The Nuclear Issue.

III. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE: THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY.

CHAPTER-3

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(43-67)

I. FORMATION OF THE CIS.

II. UKRAINE AND THE CIS.

a) Political Integration in the CIS and Ukraine.

b) Economic Integration in the CIS and Ukraine

c) Military Integration in the CIS and Ukraine.

III. UKRAINE'S POSITIVE POLICY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES.

CHAPTER-4

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATIONS. (68-86)

I. UKRAINE AND THE NEW EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION

II. UKRAINE'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

III. COOPERATION AND FORMATION OF LEGAL TIES OF UKRAINE WITH THE PROMINENT EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

(a) Ukraine and the Central European Initiative

(b) Ukraine and the Visegrad Group.

(c) Ukraine and the Council of Europe.

(d) Ukraine and the WEU.

(e) Ukraine and NATO.

(f) Ukraine and the European Community.

CHAPTER-5

CONCLUSION (87-92)

BIBLIOGRAPHY (93-101)

PREFACE

Losing their statehood in the middle of the 14-century, the Ukrainian people struggled throughout the centuries for political independence. Again and again though they lost their historic act of declared independence of 22 January and 1 November 1918, 15 March 1939 and 30 June 1941, they continued their struggle for independence. At the basis of this struggle, however, the Ukrainian people lay a deep awareness of their past, their national and ethnic individuality, and their national rights, which ultimately lead to Ukraine's independence on 24 August 1991.

As the world is interdependent with regular interactions based on a thorough and carefully formulated foreign policy which seeks to promote and protect the national interests, Ukraine after independence attempted to articulate its national interests to provide a conceptual basis for independent foreign and security policies. But the task of defining and articulating the national interests were proved difficult for Ukraine. Lacking a single, unified national 'outlook' and system of values and interests, along with a deeply divided society in terms of political, economic, ethnic, social and religious basis, Ukraine was thus caught in a difficult situation. It is in this backdrop, the present dissertation has made analysis of Ukraine's foreign and security policies in relation to the

tenure of its first president Leonid Kravchuk. The main trends of Ukraine's foreign policy have been explained in five chapters.

Chapter -1 address the theoretical and conceptual parameters of independent Ukraine's foreign policy, in relation to its basic foreign policy principles, objectives and means for achievement of these objectives.


Chapter-II widens the focus as it explains the domestic and external constraints, and the foreign policy choice of Ukraine.

Chapter-III analyses Ukraine's foreign policy in the context of development of political- economic and security structures in the CIS.

Chapter-IV explains Ukraine's foreign and security policy in the context of the new European transformations.

The final chapter provides some conclusion referring to the changing nature of Ukraine's East -West policy and of the contributing factors of its lack of determinacy in foreign policy.

Map of Ukraine



© Andrew Wilson, 1996. Adapted from Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PARAMETERS OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

II. DETERMINANTS OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

- a) Geographical Location
- b) Cultural and Historical Experience
- c) Economic Conditions
- d) Political Parties and Elites
- e) Social Structure
- f) Policy Makers
- g) Public Opinion
- h) Impact of International Environment

III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

IV. OBJECTIVES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

V. MEANS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

OBJECTIVES

- a) Non-Alignment
- b) Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendship with All Countries
- c) Economic Co-operation
- d) Temper for Peace

CHAPTER – 1

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PARAMETERS OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY

At the turn of the 20th Century, when the world was undergoing great changes, geopolitical unions were disintegrating, new states and new socio-political structures were forming, an independent Ukraine came into existence in 1991, and determined to occupy its due place in the world community. Being a part of the international community, Ukraine tried to define its place and role in the new geopolitical environment, and proclaimed its intention in its 1990 Declaration of 'National Sovereignty' to become a non-nuclear, non-bloc regional power.¹ Perceiving Russia as a threat from the east, Ukraine avoided its participation in the institutionalization of multilateral co-operation within the framework of the CIS. Developing appropriate relations with its nearest neighbours Ukraine also pursued the goal of integration into the European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. To establish itself as an actor in international politics and to make a useful contribution to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, Ukraine is trying to translate its broadly conceived goals and national interests into concrete course of action through its foreign policy.

An attempt is made in this chapter to give an introduction of independent Ukraine's foreign policy by outlining its fundamental basis. This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part deals with the conceptual framework of foreign policy; the second and third parts analyse the determinants and basic principles of Ukrainian foreign policy; the fourth and fifth parts outline the

¹ "Ukrainians Adopt Declaration of Sovereignty", in Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), July 16, 1990, SU/0818, B/4.

objectives of Ukrainian foreign policy and means for achievement of foreign policy objectives, and finally, the sixth part ends with a conclusion.

I. FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK

In modern times, since the world is undergoing great changes no state can avoid involvement in the international sphere. Especially after the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of new sovereign states this involvement has become more systematic, based on some well-defined principles. The states of the world have also developed a variety of relations among themselves and gradually the inter-relationships among states has assumed greater significance, so much so that every government has to behave in a particular manner in relation to governments of other states. The study of this behaviour is broadly speaking, the content of foreign policy.² As the behaviour of every state affects the behaviour of other states in some form or the other, either favourably or adversely, every state tries to minimize the adverse effects and maximize the favourable effects. It is the adjustment of the actions of states in favour of one's own state which George Modelski calls "the purpose of foreign policy".³ To him "foreign policy involves all activities of a nation by which that nation is trying to change the behaviour of other nations and adjust its own behaviour in the international environment."⁴ This definition of foreign policy, if analyzed, would mean that foreign policy aims at bringing about such a future state of affairs in which other states behave in a desirable manner. But sometimes change in the behaviour of other state may be necessary and, at other times, even the continuation of a particular type of behaviour of the other state or states may be in the best interest of a nation. Thus, foreign policy is concerned with both change and status quo in so far as they serve

² See Mahendra Kumar, Theoretical Aspects of International Politics (Agra, 1984), p.321

³ George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (London, 1962), p.3

⁴ *ibid.*, Pp. 6-7.

the national interest. Therefore, Modelski's definition of foreign policy needs to be modified to include within its range all activities of a state to regulate the behaviour of other states either through change or status quo in order to ensure the maximum service of its interest.⁵

In fact Feliks Gross goes a step forward and holds that even a decision to have no relation with a state is also a foreign policy or in other words not to have a definite foreign policy is also a foreign policy.⁶ It is for each individual state to decide as to what degree of its involvement in its relations with another state would guarantee and safeguard its interests. Thus, foreign policy has both positive and negative aspects. It is positive when it aims at adjusting the behaviour of other states by changing it and negative when it seeks such an adjustment by not changing that behaviour, so that the policy makers are an essential component of the process of foreign policy. In shaping the foreign policy on behalf of the political community, they have to operate at two levels-with the community which gives them instructions and supplies the resources with which to carry out their functions, and with other states whose behaviour the policy makers try to change or regulate. No doubt it is a complex affair because, whenever a foreign policy decision is made and enforced it releases a number of social processes. Chief among them are co-operation, conflict and neutrality or co-existence. Therefore, foreign policy can be understood only in the context of other governmental activities, objectives, ideology, economic situation, political conditions, psychological attitudes, general culture of a nation, emotional tensions and geographical situations.⁷

⁵ See n.2, p.322

⁶ Filiks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), Pp.47-48.

⁷ See n.2, p.323.

However, foreign policy cannot exist in a vacuum. It can function only in the context of interests and objectives. Therefore, Padelford and Lincoln said that “foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve its interests.”⁸ Here, the two authors have given emphasis on the national interests and objectives as the key elements of foreign policy. To them, these interests are the goals of sovereign states and to give them a concrete shape is the aim of foreign policy. In simple terms they have explained in this definition two functions of foreign policy. Its first function is to attain its broadly conceived goals, and second function is to preserve the national interests. Thus, both interests and objectives constitute the subject matter of foreign policy to which George Modelski keeps under the category of foreign policy “aims”.⁹

Further, every state acts on certain norms or principles, which represent more or less clearly formulated patterns of behaviour, which guides national actions and also interests, objectives and policies. So also every action involves the application of means. In international relations it is often considered customary to use the term ‘power’ for the totality of means which a state employs in pursuit of its interests and objectives

Thus, the study of foreign policy includes policy makers, interests and objectives, principles of foreign policy and the means of foreign policy. A foreign policy can, therefore, be defined at this stage as a thought out course of action for achieving national interests and objectives in foreign relations. In this context Huge Gibson’s definition of foreign policy seems meaningful. To him foreign

⁸ Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics, (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p.195.

⁹ See n. 3, p.9.

policy is “a well rounded comprehensive plan on knowledge and experience for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nations. This calls for a clear understanding of what those interests are and how far we can hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less than this falls short of being a foreign policy.”¹⁰ So also, the Brookings Institution used the term foreign policy to refer to the complex and dynamic political course that a nation follows in relation to other states. According to it “the foreign policy of a nation is more than the sum total of its foreign policy (thought out courses of action for achieving objectives), for it also includes its commitment, the current forms of its interests and objectives and the principles of right conduct that it professes”.¹¹

The above definitions make it clear that foreign policy is the group of principles determined by the states. These principles involve those interests, which influence the behaviour of the states, intending to establish their relations to further and promote them. This includes not only the general principles but also the means necessary to implement them. Thus, these principles are those broader interests, which states strive to achieve in international relations.

II. DETERMINANTS OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of Ukraine is determined by its own specific national interests, its internal and external environment, and national values which compel it to adopt different types of foreign policies. These specific interests are termed as factors which help in shaping and moulding of foreign policy. Hence, J.N.

¹⁰ Huge Gibson, cited in Prem Arora and Prakash Chandra, International Relations (New Delhi: Cosmos Bookhive, 1999), p.71.

¹¹ Major Problems of the United States Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1953), p.375.

Rosenau refers to these as “foreign policy inputs”.¹² But Padelford and Lincoln have divided these factors into two categories: subjective and situational. Under subjective factors, the states think of their own national interests while under situational factors, the states have to take notice of national environment, the activities of other states and their own capacities to meet international situations.¹³ Some scholars have also classified these factors of foreign policy into two categories, viz. internal and external. However, this classification of the factors is not quite scientific because in the present times, it is not easy to draw a clear line of demarcation between the internal and external factors as they often tend to merge with each other. Therefore, there is no unanimity among the scholars regarding the factors influencing a country’s foreign policy . However, for our purposes, the factors influencing Ukrainian foreign policy can be analyzed under the following heads:

(a) Geographical Location

The geographical location of Ukraine has greatly influenced its foreign Policy. As Ukraine is situated in East-Central Europe, bordered by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova to the West, by Belarus to the North and by the Russian Federation to the North-East and East, it is not possible for her to remain aloof from the events taking place in these areas. With a land mass equal to France, a population of 52 million, a location at the cross-road of Europe and Asia, a large agricultural and hi-tech industries, and extensive natural resources, Ukraine is crucial for the stability of the continent. Any uncertainty in that country would reverberate throughout Europe.¹⁴ Further, as Ukraine is

¹² James N Rosenau, The Study of Foreign Policy (London: Unwin, Hyman, 1987), Pp. 2-3.

¹³ See n. 8, Pp. 196-97.

¹⁴John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine Europe’s Linchpin”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.3, May/June 1996, p.52

separated from the West by the states of Central Europe, it serves as Moscow's 'bridge' to the West as well as 'buffer' against invasion from the West. As it controls key positions in Eurasia, it becomes 'Europe's linchpin' and a 'strategic pivot' in Europe.¹⁵ This is what Xavier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, had to say "Ukraine has an absolutely unique role to play in securing stability in the Continent."¹⁶ This predominantly defensive stance of Ukraine's geo-politics in the intricate environment of the Central-East European region, influenced considerably its foreign policy. As a result, Ukraine in its 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty stated that its objective was to make itself a 'non-nuclear', 'non-block' regional power. It also cleared the path for Ukraine to play a significant role in the European security structure and to take initiative on the establishment and maintenance of equilibrium in the continent.

(b) Cultural and Historical Experience

The cultural and historical experience of Ukraine have also greatly influenced its present day foreign policy formulations. Though, historically Ukraine and Russia have a common culture, the terrible experience of Ukrainians' in the 20th Century in relation to collectivization of agriculture, repressive rule of Stalin, consequence of 2nd World War, the explosion at Chornobyl nuclear power plant and secrecy surrounding about this accident, its terrible impact upon Ukraine, and finally, Russian's insufficient respect for Ukrainian independence influenced a lot the priorities of the Ukrainian policy makers to remain tilted towards the West. As a result, a break away from Moscow was defined as a long term top priority task by most Ukrainian politicians. Its first president Leonid Kravchuk laid a great stress on the task to build an independent, sovereign and

¹⁵ ibid, p.52.

¹⁶ Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and Europe on Security (Chatham House Papers, 1997), p.1.

European Ukraine and hence, to be free first and foremost from Russian and CIS influences.¹⁷

Diab. Simultaneously, due to the impact of historical common culture, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which is dominated by Russians and Russian speaking ethnic Ukrainians, tried to remain pro-Russian in their socio-political and cultural activities. Therefore, Ukrainian foreign policy in the beginning remained half hearted both towards the West and the East.

(c) Economic Conditions

The economic conditions prevailing in the country at the time of independence also exercised profound influence on the foreign policy of Ukraine. Though Ukraine's technological advancements and military capabilities give it the potential to be a medium sized power, its room for manoeuvre in its foreign and security orientations became limited because of its weak economic conditions. In the initial years, Ukraine failed to design, let alone implement, a serious reform agenda and, due to the lack of necessary legal, financial, and organizational infrastructures, Ukraine failed to attract foreign investors. As a result, production continued to fall, prices continued to rise and the people's standard of living dropped dramatically. In order to tackle the grim situation, Ukraine felt compelled to become more dependent on Russia economically, but its relation with Russia deteriorated for the reason that it was trying to keep independent stance in international relations. Simultaneously, external pressure on the country to conform to Western expectations for economic support, made Ukrainian policy

¹⁷ Alexander Pirogov, "Troubled Economic Relations", in Lena Jonson ed. Ukraine and Integration in the East (Stockholm, 1995), p.37.

makers vulnerable, and this often limited its capacity to make independent foreign policy decisions.¹⁸

(d) Political Parties and Elities

The policies and programmes of various political parties exercised profound influence on the foreign policy of Ukraine. Political parties like the Centrists, Centre-Right, Civic groups and Parliamentary Factions, those who supported the four aspects of Ukraine's transformation process (economic and political reform, state and nation building) known as reformists, backed a foreign policy orientation that was in favour of Ukraine's coming closer to Europe. Reformists those who followed Kravchuk, (known as romantics) they tended to support Ukraine's immediate membership in NATO, and their policies concentrate exclusively on to establish close ties with European political, economic and security structures. But reformist Ukrainian leaders, those who supported Kuchma (known as pragmatists) believe neutrality and non-bloc status are the best short-term solutions to Ukraine's security problem. They back future NATO membership but tend to be more cautious and pragmatic, supporting the value of neutrality in the short term. These reformist groups see joining NATO as part of Ukraine's general 'return to Europe from which communism and Russian imperialism tore it artificially from'.¹⁹ Europe to these groups, signifies democracy, civilization and a modern nation state.²⁰

Meanwhile political parties like the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine held an uncompromising Cold War view of NATO and its enlargement. They opposed Ukraine's domestic transformation process and

¹⁸ Jennifer D P Moroney, "The Chameleon Nature of Ukraine's East West Relations", in The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p.24.

¹⁹ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership", in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.21, No.2, June -1998, p.8.

²⁰ ibid., p.8.

held similar views to the anti-reformist Belarusian leadership with an agenda for restoration of Soviet power, both domestically and externally.²¹ However, due to the considerable divergences in the ideologies and foreign policy goals of the major political parties in the Rada, the Ukrainian government is at present constrained in its ability to shape its own foreign and security policy

(e) Social Structure

The social structure of Ukraine also exercises great influence on its foreign policy. On the basis of ethnic and language there is a regional division in Ukrainian society. On ethnic grounds Ukraine is essentially a state divided in two parts. Out of 52 million population 72.7% are Ukrainians and 22.1% are Russians. Linguistically, Ukraine comprises two overlapping parts in which 43.3% are speaking Ukrainian language and 56.6% are speaking Russian language.²² Ethnogeographically Ukraine is mixed with sizeable Russian minorities in the eastern and southern regions along with Kiev and an outright Russian majority in Crimea.²³ Therefore, as the eastern and the southern region are dominated by Russians, they are, along with the sympathy of Russian speaking ethnic Ukrainians, trying to develop a Russian language Ukrainian culture. But, on the other hand, nationalist politicians with the support of majority Ukrainophones of the West trying to build an indigenous Ukrainian language culture, denying to accept specific culture of Russian speaking Ukrainians.²⁴ As a result, at the societal level, Ukrainian politics since independence has been typically represented as a regional clash between east Ukraine and west Ukraine. While the

²¹ *ibid.* p.8.

²² Roman Wolczuk, "Ukraine in the Context of NATO Enlargement", in *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p.13

²³ *ibid.*, p.13.

²⁴ Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, "Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine", in Taras Kuzio ed., *Contemporary Ukraine*, 1998, p. 77.

former aims for closer ties with Russia and CIS , the latter clamors for a stronger relationship with Europe.

(f) Policy Makers

The foreign policy of Ukraine is also considerably influenced by the attitude and perceptions of its policy makers. Ukraine, headed by its first President Leonid Kravchuk interpreted its national interests in terms of its association with the West. The policy makers headed by him sought to build an independent, sovereign and European Ukraine. To them, the strategic goal of their country was integration with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, they regarded co-operation with EU, the WEU and NATO as a priority component of Ukraine's national security. According to this logic the principal course of Ukrainian foreign policy was the deepening of its relations with European Union. Kravchuk's constant worry about the Russian politician's insufficient respect for Ukrainian independence compelled him to describe Russia as a security threat for Ukraine. Therefore, a breakaway from Moscow was defined as a long term top priority task. During his presidency Kravchuk also tried to be free first and foremost from Russia and CIS influence. In the domestic sphere, the policies of Kravchuk also alienated the majority of Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine, as they were looked upon as pro-Russian. During his period in office, the state controlled mass media demonstrated an increasingly negative tendency towards the public use of Russian language in Ukraine.²⁵

(g) Public Opinion

Public opinion like any other democratic country, is another important determinant of Ukrainian foreign policy. Though Ukrainian public opinion follows

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.76

rather than guides to its policy-making process, it can also exercise lot of influence on the determination of the goals and priorities of its foreign policy. For instance, on 1 December 1991, the people of Ukraine by a free expression of their will endorsed the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 24 August 1991. More than 90% of the voters in the referendum manifested their support for an independent Ukraine which was testified to by observers from parliaments of many countries around the world.²⁶ It is pertinent to note here that in the first three years period of an independent Ukraine, the issue of how to prioritize the national interests of Ukraine, a research conducted by the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the president (Leonid Kravchuk) of Ukraine made undoubtedly a special impact upon the policy makers. This research was based on sociological opinion polls of various social groups within the population and the ruling elite. As became evident from the data the issues of foreign policy and international aspects of national security were at the peripheral areas of public awareness in Ukraine. Considering the fact that in the public's perception, the term "foreign policy" is commonly understood to mean the "far alien states", but not the republics of the former USSR, it was a significant revelation.²⁷

(h) Impact of International Environment

The international environment has considerably exercised profound influence on Ukraine's foreign policy. The independence of Ukraine coincided with the dissolution of USSR and the emergence of new geo-political environment

²⁶ "Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Statement, Documents and Reports", in The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XXXIX, No.4, Winter 1991, p.79.

²⁷ Nikolai A. Kulinich, "Ukraine in the New Geo-Political Environment: Issues of Regional and Sub-Regional Security", in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and The New States of Eurasia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe 1995), Vo.4,p.116.

in Central and Eastern Europe, which created new divisions of spheres of influence between the Euro-Atlantic alliance, on the one hand, and the Russian led Euro-Asian collective security, on the other. Therefore, in the days, immediately following independence in 1991, Ukraine's foreign and security policy was characterized by three key features: a commitment to neutrality, non-bloc status and a preparedness to rid itself of nuclear weapons.²⁸ But pursuing this' policy, -Ukraine has found itself caught between two conflicting pressures: it's desire to join all-European institutions, on the one hand, and it's close economic dependence on Russia, on the other.

From the point of view of all-European geo-political trends Ukraine lies in the sphere of influence of Russian foreign policy and also in the sphere of constantly increasing interests of the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic structures.²⁹ Therefore, the situational demand made on Ukraine since its independence has been far-reaching and extensive. The West has wanted Ukraine to consolidate it's democracy, relinquish it's nuclear capabilities, integrate more closely in Central and Eastern Europe's regional organizations such as CEFTA, and pursue policies characteristic of what may be called a 'Western State'.³⁰ Russia, on the other hand would like to see Ukraine integrate more closely into the CIS structure-specifically the military structures begin to repay it's massive energy debt, and in general, remain within the Russian sphere of influence. Apart from this, NATO enlargement throws up more questions than it answers in terms of its implications for Ukraine's relations with both the East and the West. Therefore, Ukraine is constrained by the growing tension between the West and

²⁸ See n. 1.

²⁹ Serhiy Tolstov, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Course Correction or Change of Priorities?" in The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 1995, p.4.

³⁰ See Moroney, n.18, p.24.

Russia, and is finding itself in an ever-more uncomfortable geo-political position, while it is simultaneously struggling to come out its economic crisis at home. Hence, Ukraine is facing choices for which it is ill prepared, primarily in terms of a society divided on a regional, ethnic, linguistic, political and even religious basis.³¹ Therefore, as Ukrainian government is facing considerable political and economic challenges, both internally and externally, its foreign and security policy decisions are constantly changing, responding and adapting to the external environment in a manner that makes the highest level political decisions appear to lack determinancy.³²

III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The basic principles of Ukrainian foreign policy were outlined by the foreign ministry of Ukraine following the 24 August 1991 Declaration of Independence. According to the foreign ministry statement, Ukraine will steadfastly uphold all norms of international law in conformity with the Universal Declaration on human rights, treaties rectified by it regarding Human Rights and other relevant international documents. Ukraine is prepared to join European Structures in the field of human rights, among them the European Convention on Human Rights.³³ Ukraine as one of the founding members of the United Nations, in full compliance with the goals and principles of the UN charter, has declared its intention to direct its foreign policies to strengthen peace and security in the world, establishing international co-operation in resolving ecological, energy, food and other general human problems. The external policies of Ukraine it is

³¹ See Wolczuk, n.22, p.3.

³² Jennifer D.P. Moroney, "The Lack of Determinancy in Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy", in *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol.45, No. 4, Winter, 1998, p.3

³³ "Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Statement, Documents and Reports", in *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. XXXIX, No.4, Winter, 1991,p.79.

said, will be based on generally accepted principles of international laws.³⁴

Ukraine is also prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with other states and to build relations with them on the basis of equality, sovereignty, non-intrusion in the internal affairs of each other, recognizing the territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders. Ukraine considers its territory indivisible and inviolable, recognizes as inviolate its existing borders and does not harbour any territorial claims against any country.³⁵ //

In accordance with the declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 16 July 1990, and the statements of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the non-bloc, non-nuclear status of Ukraine of 24 October 1991, Ukraine will be a non-nuclear state. It will not store and produce chemical weapons, and it will support for their universal and total outlawing and elimination. However, in short, the basic principles on which Ukraine conducts its foreign policy can be summed up in the following heads:

- Faith in international law and United Nations Organization.
- Peaceful use of nuclear energy and support for disarmament.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of any state.
- Peaceful co-existence and co-operation.
- Support for the creation of a viable environment and a nuclear free world.
- Non-alignment.

IV. OBJECTIVES OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The main objectives which the foreign policy of Ukraine seeks to achieve, are outlined in the 'Main Directions of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', adopted by the parliament in July 1993, are as follows:

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.80.

³⁵ *ibid.*

- Consolidation and development of Ukraine as an independent democratic state;
- Ensuring the stability of the international situation of Ukraine;
- Preserving the territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of its borders;
- The integration of its national economy into the world economic system;
- The defence of the rights and interests of the citizens of Ukraine abroad;
- Spreading in the world of the image of Ukraine as a predictable, reliable partner;

Apart from the above, the following four priorities are also established in the fundamental directions of Ukrainian foreign policy:

- To cultivate favourable bilateral relations which can facilitate Ukraine's integration into the wider global and European order;
- To intensify regional co-operation with such organizations as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union;
- Participation in the CIS, while rejecting CIS supra-national competencies;
- Full co-operation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

V. MEANS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

For the attainment of the above objectives of foreign policy, the means which Ukraine adopted, though not quite specific, can be analyzed under the following heads:

(a) Non-alignment

Ukraine adopted policy of non-alignment in its 1990 Declaration of National Sovereignty to ensure an independent approach to foreign policy and to play a

decisive role as a stability element in the European system of international relations. Upholding this, Ukraine declared its intention to become a neutral nation in the future, which was indispensable as a method to defend Ukraine's strategic national interests; the creation and the strengthening of national independence; the preservation of its territorial integrity; and the maintenance of political stability as a pre-condition to the economic reform.³⁶ It is generally understood in Ukraine that this position does not in any way contradict the general direction of processes taking place in Europe. In the capacity of a non-bloc regional power, and standing for the unity and indivisibility of Europe, in the first instance, the Kravchuk administration refused to accede to the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly in March 1992, the CIS Collective Security Act (the Tashkent Treaty) in May 1992, and the CIS Charter in February 1993. Ukraine pointed out that the creation of a new military political alliance on the basis of the principle of Collective Security of the CIS, will create a new scenario in Eastern Europe as a return to the policy of confrontation between opposite blocs and the renewal of bi-polarity in Europe.³⁷ So, also keeping in mind the fact that bringing NATO to the boundary of Russia would result in active opposition from Russia, (inescapably be followed by even harsher political and economic pressure on Ukraine than exists today, especially inciting the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), Ukraine continues its non-aligned status while developing bilateral co-operation with the countries of both NATO and the CIS.³⁸

However, as Kravchuk remained pro-west during his presidency, some critics interpreted Ukrainian non-alignment as a double standard tactic, as a door, firmly

³⁶ Serhiy Holovaty, "Foreign Policy of Ukraine and The Question of Economic and Military Integration in The East", in Lena Jonson ed., Ukraine and Integration in The East, (Stockholm, 1995), p.18.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.17.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p.18.

closed to the East but open to the West.³⁹ After all, Ukraine's non-alignment, is quite unique, it is a policy, which has always aimed to keep the Tashkent CIS Collective Security Treaty at a distance while gradually increasing co-operation with western security structures and leaving the door open for possible eventual accession.⁴⁰

(b) Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendship with all Countries

// Ukraine has served to attain the objectives of its foreign policy by cultivating good neighbourly relations with nearby states and friendship with all other countries by promoting co-operation in political, economic and cultural fields. // For this purpose Ukraine since independence has been trying for the establishment and legal confirmation of good neighbourly relations with surrounding countries. The resolution of problems related to national minorities between Ukraine and Hungary in 1991 is a noteworthy example of this engagement, and of Ukraine's commitment to human and national minority rights.⁴¹ Apart from this, Ukraine also achieved a number of breakthroughs in consolidating good neighbourly relations. It also concluded basic political treaties with Russia and Romania and developed good relations with Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan and Moldova by signing treaties of friendship and co-operation. However, Ukraine avoided military alliances. //

(c) Economic Co-operation

Instrument of economic co-operation has also been used by Ukraine for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. Ukraine has tried to promote greater economic co-operation amongst the Central-Eastern European countries through

³⁹ See n.29, p.9.

⁴⁰ Kuzio, n. 19, p.12.

⁴¹ Volodymyr Horbulin, "Ukraine's Contribution to Security and Stability in Europe", in NATO Review, Autumn, 1998, p.10.

mutual co-operation. As Ukraine has been facing economic crisis, it demonstrated the most interest in taking part in the CIS, though it has only an associate-membership in the CIS economic union. Particularly through economic co-operation with Russia, Ukraine tried to get rid of its financial crisis. Simultaneously, keeping in mind Russia's opportunities to use gas deliveries as a political tool against Ukraine, it developed economic co-operation with Turkey, Iran and Turkmenistan. So also by developing bilateral co-operation with the West, Ukraine got admission to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction.

(d) Temper for Peace

✓ Finally, for the attainment of its foreign policy objectives, Ukraine has laid emphasis on peace and civilized behaviour in international affairs. It has tried to cultivate intimate relations with the neighbouring countries and concluded non-aggression and mutual respect agreements. Again, Ukraine has tried to promote temper of peace by encouraging disarmament and observing principles of non-interference on the domestic affairs of each other and promoting conditions of peaceful co existence. The first president Kravchuk underscored the government's position that Ukraine will adhere to agreements on nuclear weapons, and stated that his country would gladly welcome any foreign assistance with regard to dismantling the nuclear weapons that were deployed on Ukrainian soil.⁴² Further he said "Ukraine has no territorial claims against foreign territory and doesn't recognize any claims to its territory".⁴³ Further, a declaration of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, made public on 25 November 1991, stated that Ukraine would participate in the implementation of all treaties and accords on the

⁴² "Ukrainian President Inaugurated, Documents and Reports", in The Ukrainian Review, , Vol.39, No.4, Winter, 1991, p.77.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 77.

non-use of nuclear weapons, reducing conventional weapons and armed forces and would support the ratification of treaties and accords between the USA and USSR and other states on these matters. Later on, in 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified START-1 Treaty and in December 1994, its parliament also ratified the NPT Treaty in the capacity of a non-nuclear country.

Despite facing many problems, Ukraine became an active participant in the international community's efforts to settle regional conflicts in Europe. Notably Ukraine's contribution to the international community's efforts to implement the peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its co-operation to a certain extent, in peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, under the mandate of the United Nations,⁴⁴ is also an instance of its temper for peace. On 19 November 1993, the supreme RADA of Ukraine, in response to the request by the then UN Secretary General Butros Ghali, decided to increase the already existing number of Ukrainian armed forces in Yugoslavia from 400 to 1220, with 3 infantry battalions to protect the safe defence zone in Bosnia. However, Ukraine has consistently conducted and determined to continue a policy directed at strengthening security and stability in the whole world.

It is evident from the preceding account that Ukrainian foreign policy is a reflection of the domestic and the new geopolitical factors in Europe. Though none of these factors can be regarded as exclusive determinant of Ukrainian foreign policy, all of them cumulatively influenced its formulation. Further, the foreign policy principles, objectives and means of achieving foreign policy goals of Ukraine is a clear indication of Ukraine's position in the international sphere as

⁴⁴ See n. 41, p. 11.

a sovereign state. These are also reflecting the dynamic nature of Ukraine's liberal, peace-loving policies in international relations. Moreover, Ukrainian foreign policy has also been under-going changes on account of new international actions and reactions. But the prime factor that motivated the Ukrainian leaders in the formulation of foreign policy was the preservation of its newly achieved independence as the prime national interest.

//

TH-10374



DISS
327.477083
M884 UK

TH10374

CHAPTER-2

DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE

I. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

- (a) Social Instability
 - (i) Ukrainisation
 - (ii) Dual Loyalty
- (b) Political instability.
- (c) Economic instability

II. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS.

- (a) The Western Factor.
- (b) The Russian Factor.
- (c) The Nuclear Issue.

III. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE: THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY.

CHAPTER-2

DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE

✓ Since 1991 Ukraine has sought to find its place in the new post-Cold War international order. During the term of its first president Leonid Kravchuk this process got intensified. The debate on Ukrainian security policy and the best means to reinforce national identity underlined the geopolitical reality that its heritage is at once Eastern and Western European.¹ But the current momentum is exclusively towards the integration of Ukraine into the European structures. However, as with many aspects of domestic policy Ukraine has given out confusing signals as to how it sees its role in the world politics not so much because of a lack of coherent geo-strategic vision in Ukraine but because of a stand off between the irreconcilable views of nationalists and their opponents.² As a result, it become complicated by uncertainty over how far the country in terms of Foreign and Security policy could/should facilitate cooperation with the West in the changing security environment of Europe and form a bridge between Russia and the West or project a form of positive neutrality.³ Simultaneously, it also became difficult for Ukraine as to how to avoid a new line of division emerging in Europe on Ukraine's eastern borders, which could give rise to new insecurities. This chapter explores all the complications that come out from the domestic and external constraints and confront in the way of Ukrainian foreign policy choices.

¹ Roy Allison, "Ukraine's Foreign and Defence Policies", in Taras Kuzio ed., Contemporary Ukraine (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.219.

² Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.173.

³ Alison, n.1, p. 219.

I. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS:

Like any other country the foreign and security policies of Ukraine are the reflections of its domestic developments. As Ukraine is inhabited by citizens of more than 100 nationalities along with Ukrainians, and though the Ukrainian state guarantees all peoples, national groups, citizens who live on its territory, all political, economic, social and cultural rights,⁴ there are still great divisions in the society on the grounds of language, culture, regions and ideologies. In the initial years of independence, most particularly due to the conflict between the nationalists and their opponents, instability in the domestic circle of Ukraine become more visible in its social, political and economic sphere. As a result, both directly and indirectly it affected the foreign policy decisions of Ukraine.

(a) Social Instability:

The social instability of Ukrainian society really exercised a profound influence on its foreign policy. As it is sharply divided on the basis of language and ethnicity it fails to pursue effective foreign policy. Though there are many causes, the two major causes of social instability are analysed under the following heads.

(i) Ukrainisation

Leonid Kravchuk, who gained a reputation for spearheading nationalism, was the pioneer of Ukrainisation in independent Ukraine. During his presidency a fierce argument had begun over the key question whether Ukraine should be the state of the 'Ukrainian people', that is of ethnic Ukrainians alone or of the 'people of Ukraine', in other words, of all Ukraine's inhabitants regard-less of their ethnic

⁴ "Declaration on the Rights of National Minorities in Ukraine. by the Supreme Council of Ukraine, November 1, 1991, Documents and Reports", in The Ukrainian Review, Vol.39, No.4, Winter 1991, p.81.

origin.⁵ As Ukrainian is the only true indigenous language in Ukraine, for nationalists, Ukrainisation is more accurately described as 'de-Russification', that is the reversion to the more natural status –quo ante.⁶ On the other hand, the anti-nationalists insisted for the existence of both the Ukrainian language culture, along with the Russian-language culture in Ukraine. Although, both the Ukrainian language law of 1989 and the 1991 declaration on the rights of nationalities guaranteed individuals 'the rights to use their native language freely in all spheres of social life,⁷ nationalists consistently argue that the Ukrainian tongue should enjoy special privileges on its ancient land.⁸ 'Only the language of this ethnics', it is claimed, 'has the legal right to play the role of a state language.'⁹ Moreover, Ukrainian nationalists tend to assume that Ukrainisation will be relatively a simple and even a natural process.

However, as Leonid Kravchuk while in power accelerated the process of Ukrainisation, he alienated the majority of Russian speaking people of Ukraine.¹⁰ During his period in office the state controlled mass-media demonstrated an increasingly negative attitude toward the public use of Russian language in the country.¹¹ Newspaper space and airtime were given to nationalist politicians who denied the very existence of a Russian-language-Ukrainian culture. The Ukrainian nationalist politicians also argued against granting legal status to the continued de-facto right of Russian speaking. The nationalists tried to deny Ukrainian citizens in the south and east, the right to communicate in Russian with local authorities,

⁵ Wilson, n. 2, p. 147.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 153.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 154.

⁸ *ibid.* (Deputy education minister Anatolia Pohribnyi, interviewed in *literaturna Ukraina*, 29 July 1993).

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 154.

¹⁰ Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, 'Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine', in Taras Kuzio ed. Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of post-Soviet Transformations (Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 76.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 77.

and to send their children to Russian language secondary schools and institutions of higher education on the territory of Ukraine, by arguing that only Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians deserve official status for their language.¹²

Therefore, as a result of this Ukrainisation a great conflict arose in Ukrainian society. A war of words between the nationalists of the West Ukraine and anti-nationalists of Eastern and Southern Ukraine took place. Even if politicians bother less about the economic problems and state building programme of Ukraine and indulge in conflict regarding the question of Ukrainisation and the existence of Russian language –Ukrainian culture.

This social conflict also becomes reflected in the foreign policy of Ukraine. On the one hand, nationalists including president Kravchuk formulated a west-ward orientation of foreign policy, the anti-nationalists of Eastern Ukraine uphold a policy of integration with Russia and the CIS, on the other hand.

(ii) Dual Loyalty

Dual loyalty as another cause of social instability also created hindrance in the way of making independent foreign policy decisions. Many people in the Ukraine have, as it were, dual loyalty and feel that they belong both to the Ukrainian and the Russian nations in terms of language, culture and awareness.¹³ Though this dual loyalty is positive in so far as it acts as a retarder against nationalist exclusiveness, it can have a negative impact in so far as many people see no sense in emphatically investing effort in the sustainment of an independent Ukrainian state.¹⁴ Likewise, as there is a large Russian minority in the Ukraine which tends to view itself as a majority in many regions of the east and south,

¹² *ibid.*, p. 78.

¹³ Gerhard Simon, "Problems Facing the Formation of Ukrainian State", in *Aussen Politik*, Vol.45, No.1, 1994. P.66.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, P.66.

there is risk that the ties between the regions in the south and east of Ukraine to an independent state may turn out to be too weak and that a new division of the Ukraine might result.

As already pointed out, this dual loyalty also created problems in determination of foreign policy choices. The nationalistic foreign policy agenda of president Kravchuk was opposed by the left-wing and anti-nationalist more moderate politicians, by a strong counter-lobby which argued that it was more natural for Ukraine to make its way in the world in alliance with Russia than in opposition to its influence.¹⁵ Simultaneously, the left-wing politicians supported the regional lobbies for the proposals for economic and even political reunion, usually between the Slavic triad of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, although sometimes with the addition of Kazakhstan, in essence echoing Alexander Solzhenitsyn's vision of the post-Soviet future.¹⁶ Many left-wingers have also argued for Ukraine and Russia to coordinate or simply to merge their military efforts as the only way to restore the old Soviet military industrial complex to its former glory. The more moderate anti-nationalist position may be more properly labelled 'Little Russianism'.¹⁷ Its adherents also remain firmly in favour of an independent Ukraine, but either have no desire to leave the Russian cultural and historical space or argue that East European political realities are such that Russia must remain Ukraine's main diplomatic, military and trading partner for the foreseeable future.¹⁸ Therefore, it would be said that this dual loyalty in many ways obstructed the independent foreign policy decisions of Leonid Kravchuk.

¹⁵ Wilson, n.2, p.19.

¹⁶ Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century (London: Harvill Press, 1995), Pp.90-96.

¹⁷ Wilson, n.2, p.192.

¹⁸ *ibid.*,p. 193.

(b) Political Instability

Political instability is another domestic constraint in the way of foreign policy formulations of Ukraine. In the initial years of independence, as Ukraine shifted from a totalitarian political system to a democracy with a civil society including providing guarantees for human rights and liberties, free election, peaceful transfer of power and civilian control of the security forces,¹⁹ Ukraine faced a constitutional crisis, as it has no valid constitution. So also, due to the lack of consensus around political choices and policies in post-communist countries,²⁰ the adoption of a valid constitution become one of the most difficult task for Kravchuk administration. The population was by and large become unfamiliar with the Ukrainian Constitution of June 1991, which was only a slightly altered version of the Soviet era constitution. Even after following the adoption of the draft version in October 1993, there had been a delay in the work on the final constitution, probably, due to the unclear distribution of power between the central and regional authorities.²¹ As a result, society's value system and orientations became distorted. The political apathy of the population also increased and the manifestation of crisis are discernible in the political system.²² In the parliament also a struggle between leftist conservatives and nationalist fractions for leadership took place leading to a certain crisis. In the government crisis, an intermediate position of the prime minister and of the cabinet, between parliament and the president as well as an extensive incapability to act on the part of the government also become visible.

¹⁹ Kuzio, n.10, p. 165.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p.166.

²¹ Rainer Linder, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Conditions Behind Structural Changes in the Ukraine and Belarus", in Aussen Politik, Vol-46, No. 4, 1995, p. 370.

²² *ibid.*, p. 366.

In the structural crisis, a conflict between the central institutions of power as a cause of the waning power of parliament and government also happened, and lastly, the crisis of discourse took place due to the absence of ideas on the overall setting for democracy, especially in the field of the freedom of the media and expression.²³

Moreover, due to all these crises, there are considerable divergences in the ideologies and foreign policy goals of the major political parties in the Rada. So also the executive and legislative branches have not on the whole worked very well together. Side by side, as there is Soviet style bureaucratic structures these tend to increase the time involved in reaching decisions. As a result, the Kravchuk administration became constrained in its ability to shape its own foreign and security policies.

V. G. 2/3

(c) Economic instability

After independence in 1991, Ukraine had accepted and had begun to implement the process of transition from a planned economic system to a market based economy where the forces of demand and supply would largely determine the allocation of resources.²⁴ But due to the lack of support of a clearly articulated post-independence constitution, Ukraine faced the political instability which ultimately led the country towards economic instability. Because of the lack of clear-cut distribution of power and the boundaries of authority between central and local government and between parliament, government, and the presidency, the constant conflict between the different branches of the political system began around the question of economic reforms. This was most evident in clashes between parliament and the president, and the resulting confusion enabled

²³ *ibid.*, p. 366.

²⁴ Kuzio, n.10, p. 165.

parliament to obstruct the process of privatization.²⁵ The political clash between the legislature and the executive branch prevented Ukraine from developing a clear and consistent economic program to transform the economy into a free market system.

As a result, in the initial years of independence Ukraine experienced numerous economic problems, such as: persistently high rates of inflation, rapidly falling out-put, a rapidly growing shadow economy, and a sharply rising debt burden with Russia and Turkmenistan in particular related to energy imports.²⁶ Side by side, this economic instability also gave birth to monetary indiscipline, huge and erratic fiscal deficits, unemployment, corruption, and the dramatic downfall of people's standard of living.

However, this economic instability gave a direct blow to President Leonid Kravchuk's pro-west foreign policy. His failure to bring reform in Ukraine both in the political and economic sphere, slowed down the western economic assistance. The inflow of foreign investments into Ukraine also became restricted as Ukrainian economy was still closely attached to the countries of the former USSR.²⁷

Simultaneously, Kravchuk's foreign policy towards Russia also faced a setback. Russia's intentions to use oil and gas deliveries as a political tool to bring back Ukraine to the CIS orbit compelled President Kravchuk to remain away from Russia. As a result Ukraine sought the economic support of international organisations or of individual state actors, and to get the support Ukrainian foreign

²⁵ Poul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq, and Saul Estrin, "Ukraine: The Legacies of Central Planning and the Transition to a Market Economy", in Kuzio n. 10, p. 184.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 182.

²⁷ Nikolai A. Kulinich, "Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Environment", Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawish eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), Vol.4, p. 119.

policy decisions remained swinging in its priorities, sometimes towards the West and sometimes towards the East.

II. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

➤ In addition to the domestic constraints, a number of external constraints also put obstacles in the way of Ukraine's independent foreign policy formulations. As Ukraine constitute one of the defining features of the European security architecture, its strategic position is cast into particularly sharp focus by the current process of NATO expansion, on the one hand, and the Russia led CIS, on the other.²⁸ At such a juncture, any foreign policy move of Ukraine was obstructed by some international factors. Therefore, how these external factors limited the scope of Ukraine's foreign policy choices are analyzed under the following heads.

(a) The Western Factor.

Since the dissolution of the USSR Ukraine made efforts to obtain a place in the Western European political, legal and economic spheres as an equal partner. Its foreign policy, announced in 1990, sought to establish direct political, economic, trade and other kinds of relations with other states.²⁹ The ultimate goal of Ukraine's national forces, headed by its first president, Leonid Kravchuk, was to build an independent sovereign and European Ukraine and hence to be free first and foremost from Russian and CIS influence.³⁰ Most Ukrainian politicians defined a break away from Moscow as a long-term top priority task and total integration into European political and economic institutions was viewed by the Ukrainian government as a strategic goal. Accordingly, diplomatic efforts were

²⁸ Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, Chatham House Papers (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 1

²⁹ Alexander Pirogov, "Troubled Economic Relations", in Lena. Jonson ed., Ukraine and Integration in the East (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 1995), p. 37.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 37.

undertaken immediately to accomplish this without delay. The first steps were rather encouraging, as Ukraine was admitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction.³¹ But, in its fourth year of independence, Ukraine found itself in a relatively political vacuum. The country's attempts to cooperate as a sovereign actor with a changing Europe have not succeeded. The west, however, did not live up to the expectations of many Ukrainian politicians.

On the contrary, the Western attention was very much directed towards the promising prospects of a new relationship with Russia declaring it as the only successor of the USSR ignoring the political and economic interests of the newly independent states.³² In this concern, Udovenko, who was Ukrainian ambassador to the U.N. in 1991, said in an interview in July 1994 that he remembered how "in the beginning I, and later together with Zlenko, ran around knocking at doors in the U.S. state department, and no body wanted to talk to us".³³

At the same time, the western "political alternations-in-exchange-for-large-scale- economic help" model of the European Union was also decreased with the reason that there are unpredictable political and economic reforms in Ukraine. Similarly, the Western-European states expressed their reluctance to admit Ukraine to their circuit, as Ukrainian leaders were not initially agreed to give up the nuclear weapons deployed in their country. Finally, the intention to keep Ukraine in a period of transition by inviting it only to the European Union's Consultative Forum was expressed in June 1994 by the WEU General Secretary Villem Van Ejkelen.³⁴

³¹ *ibid.*, p. 38.

³² Bukkvoll, n. 28, p. 71.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 72.

³⁴ Pirogov, n. 29, p. 38.

Simultaneously, the countries of the Visegrad “quadrangle” (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) were only able to invite Ukraine to short-range economic bilateral cooperation and over border trade within the so called Euro-region created in 1993. The reasons behind this were their concern with the establishment of cooperation with NATO and the E.U, and Russia’s hard-line policy towards their attempts to become NATO members.³⁵ Apart from this, the Central European countries, the Baltic states, and Belarus also expressed their reluctance to accept President Kravchuk’s 1993 initiative on the creation of the Zone of Stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Under these circumstances, Ukrainian leaders were forced to reconsider their policy in medium-range terms. Dissatisfaction with western policies towards Ukraine and the increasing economic crisis brought them to the realisation that in choosing a western oriented political security policy it was vital to recall that Ukraine’s foreign economic priorities needed to remain within the Euro-Asian geopolitical sphere.³⁶

(b) The Russian Factor.

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the rules of Russian Ukrainian relations in several ways. As Russian –Ukrainian relations suddenly moved into the unfamiliar setting of ‘foreign policy’, conflict started over a wide range of issues and Russia turned to be a key problem in the way of Ukraine’s security and stability.

Keeping in mind the century old imperial nature of Russia, the Kravchuk administration perceived Russia as a serious security threat to Ukrainian independence. To remain away from an imperialist revisionist policy of Russia,

³⁵ *ibid.*,p. 39.

³⁶ *ibid.*,p. 39.

Ukraine formulated a pro-west foreign policy. But most Russians, particularly the political and cultural elites have found it difficult to accept the notion that Ukraine is actually an independent state and no longer a part of Russia.³⁷ So also for many other Russians, Yeltsin's recognition of the independence of Ukraine and other republics has been a betrayal, and the loss of Crimea, Sevastopol, Odessa and the other areas of Southern Ukraine became unacceptable to the Russians.³⁸ In order to revive its past glory, nationalist Russian politicians and even the Russian legislature tried to keep Ukraine within their sphere of influence by using political, economic and security means.

By using the political means Russia continued to regard the CIS as the way to integrate former soviet territory, be it in the form of a confederation, federation or a union and decided to become the key element of the CIS. For Russia, the creation of the CIS meant not liquidating the old centre, but the transfer of that centre from Moscow as the Soviet capital to Moscow as the Russian capital.³⁹ However, keeping in mind the Russian position and intention to dominate in the CIS, Ukraine by insisting on its own independent position within the CIS, has not become a full member of the CIS. Ukraine also did not accede to the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in March 1992, or to the CIS Collective Security Act (The Tashkent Treaty) in May 1992, or to the CIS Charter in February 1993. Finally, distrust of the CIS was formalized as the official Ukrainian strategy in the document 'Fundamental Guidelines in Ukrainian foreign policy' adopted by the parliament on 2nd July 1993. This document includes the statement: 'Ukraine will avoid participation in the institutionalisation of forms of multilateral cooperation

³⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "The Post Soviet Transition in Ukraine Prospects for Stability", Kuzio, n.10, p. 34.

³⁸ John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and After", International Affairs, Vol, 69, No.4, 1993, p. 682.

³⁹ Holovaty, n. 29, p. 14.

within the framework of the CIS which might transform the CIS into a supranational structure of a federal or a confederate charter'.⁴⁰

Because of Ukraine's close links with and economic dependence on the former Soviet republics, especially Russia, and as it wanted to bring crucial socio-economic reforms, which must be carried out in close cooperation with these states, Russia used the economic means to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. As eighty percent of Ukraine's industrial production did not constitute a complete technological cycle inside the country's boarder⁴¹ and the majority of the items needed for industrial production came from Russia, and as Ukraine has depended upon Russia for deliveries of oil and gas, Russia has more convenient and flexible foreign policy tool in temporarily stopping or limiting the supplies. Therefore, Ukraine has found itself under the threat of Russia's suspension of deliveries. In addition to this, the Ukrainian debt to Russia for oil and gas supplied, which has risen steadily since independence has further weakened the Ukrainian position.⁴² For instance, in summer 1993, Russia tried to get Kravchuk to give up Ukraine's share of the Black Sea Fleet in turn for a reduction in the debt, and in 1994, the Russian oil and gas company Gazprom also wanted to take over parts of the Ukrainian pipe-line system in exchange for debt reduction.⁴³ As a result, it created resentment in Ukraine, and to extricate itself from this awkward situation, Kravchuk tried to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas and signed agreements with Turkey, Iran and Turkmenistan.

Apart from this, Russia also tried to keep Ukraine within its axis through economic cooperation within the CIS. As Ukraine requires economic cooperation

⁴⁰ Bukkvoll, n. 28, p. 64.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴² *ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴³ *ibid.*

with the countries of the CIS to be able to maintain its existence as an independent state in current conditions, it has demonstrated its interest in taking part in the CIS and holds an associate membership in the CIS Economic Union. But when it became known to Ukraine that Russia was trying to transform the CIS Economic Union into 'a single Eurasian Economic Space'⁴⁴ having provisions which prohibits members of the CIS Economic Union to become member of other countries economic or custom unions, Ukraine become cautions in its approach to economic cooperation with the countries of the CIS, especially with Russia.

Lastly, Russia's efforts to integrate former Soviet territory by forming a military defence union are also avoided by Ukraine, as it thinks it goes against its national interest. The main aim of Russia is to create a military defence union among the countries of the CIS. But the main aim of Ukraine is to avoid incorporation into a military bloc, which would be subordinate to Russia.⁴⁵ Russia's insistence on such legal categories as, "the territory of the CIS", or, "Joint national boundaries of the CIS", is not acceptable for Ukraine. Ukraine is especially frightened by the military politics within the framework of the CIS and the situation of "Russia's self-appointed role as the military policeman of the CIS states."⁴⁶ Therefore, Ukraine has refused to join any CIS agreement on military integration, starting with the Tashkent Agreement of 1992.

Finally, it can be said that, Russia and Ukraine have been at odds over a wide range of issues, ranging from the future of the Black Sea Fleet to the division of former Soviet property, from international debt repayments to energy deliveries, from the shape of the CIS to the control and ownership of the nuclear

⁴⁴ Holovaty, n.29, p. 15.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 16.

weapons.⁴⁷ Therefore, for Ukraine, Russia continues to be a threat and an obstacle in its way of independent foreign and security policy formulations.

(c) The Nuclear Issue.

The issue of the status, subordinations and decision of the ultimate fate of nuclear arms installed on the Ukrainian territory in the times of the former Soviet Union has acquired an exceptional significance in the shaping of the foreign policy of Ukraine since independence. Nuclear weapons have become beyond any doubt, the most complicated problem of the foreign policy and security of the state.⁴⁸

Initially, Ukraine's position on nuclear disarmament was influenced by the idealistic perception of the non-nuclear world, the moral-psychological factor of the Chernobyl tragedy, strong pressure from the West and Russia, and the expectation of favorable international conditions for achieving Ukraine's independence and international recognition.⁴⁹ These factors were reflected in the Supreme Rada's Proclamation of Non-nuclear Status (24 October 1991), which oriented the legislative and executive bodies of power towards unilateral nuclear disarmament but without actual clauses, conditions and guarantees. However, during the course of 1993, a gradual increase in the role played by the nuclear arms problem in the civic-political life of Ukraine becomes open. Although the idea of the unilateral nuclear disarmament of state had been proclaimed long before the declarations of independence, the political aspects of this strategic intention were not properly grounded and thought through, in particular, as regards the cost of disarmament and conversion. Therefore, the paradox lay in

⁴⁷ Morrison, n. 38, p.677.

⁴⁸ Serhiy Tolstov, "International Factors of Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine", in The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XLII, No 1, Spring 1994, p. 5.

⁴⁹ Kulinich, n. 27, p.124.

that, the parliament and govt. of Ukraine, which had proclaimed their intention of achieving a non-nuclear status, ended up and become unable to realise this goal by their own efforts due to a lack of the funds required to finance the disarmament process.⁵⁰ In addition, failures in foreign policy led to the emergence of opposition within Ukraine to the non-nuclear policy. Influential circles of the political elite, including members of parliament and some representatives of the military, began to envisage the nuclear weapons as perhaps the most effective guarantee of independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.⁵¹

As a result, decision-making on the future of Ukraine's nuclear weapons was slowed down, and led to complications in relations between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the U.S.A. and the countries of Western Europe, on the other, and to the creation of a negative image of Ukraine in the eyes of public opinion abroad. At the same time, talks on political concessions, including Ukraine's possible renunciation of control over these nuclear devices or the handing over of war heads to Russia without the proper resolution of issues related to the value of the nuclear materials and the financial arrangements for the destruction of the missiles, led to the consolidation of pro-nuclear sentiments among the majority of the factions in the Ukrainian parliament and a part of the military leadership.⁵² Side by side, Leonid Kravchuk being influenced by the nationalists also expressed his reluctance to relinquish the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil. But his efforts to use these weapons as a bargaining counter for increased western economic support backfired. Western institutions made it clear to Ukraine that denuclearisation was a pre-requisite for further economic and political

⁵⁰ Tolstov, n. 48, p.6.

⁵¹ *ibid.*,p.6.

⁵² *ibid.*,P.7.

support.⁵³ America also lead the international community in isolating Ukraine as a pariah nation. Aid, assistance, trade and political support with Ukraine ceased. Tension increased between Russian commanders and custodians of the nuclear missiles and weapon storage bunkers on Ukrainian soil, leading eventually to armed conflict.⁵⁴

However, in order to normalise its relations with the West and with Russia, on 18 November 1993, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine voted in favour of the ratification of the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol in spite of internal political strife, between those in favour of and those against the nuclear status of Ukraine. But the ratification of the START-I Treaty by Ukraine with the thirteen stipulations evoked highly negative reactions in the international community though the stipulations are in general fair and justified in character and reflective of the national interests of Ukraine.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the situation after the ratification of the START-I Treaty by the supreme Rada of Ukraine proved to be critical. There emerged the urgent need to search for some compromise. The meeting of the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine on 14 January 1994 in Moscow and the signing of the Tripartite documents regulating the transfer and removal of nuclear arms from the territory of Ukraine were a breakthrough in this direction, marking a genuine success for American, Russian and Ukrainian diplomacy.⁵⁶

1. Aug.

Moreover, it is important to note that the majority of the stipulations made by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine concerning the START-I Treaty were taken into

⁵³ Jennifer D.P. Moroney, "The 'Chameleon' Nature of Ukraine's East-West Relations", In The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, p.26

⁵⁴ Tolstov, n. 48, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Kulinich, n. 27, p.125.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.125.

account in the tripartite documents. Finally, in February 1994, the Supreme Rada ratified the START-I Treaty in its final form.

However, the signing of the Trilateral Declaration though was an undoubted success of Ukrainian Foreign policy, it can be said that it was not the independent expression of the will of the Ukrainians but an imposition and a compulsion for Ukraine to do so in order to bring a change in the attitude of western states towards Ukraine.

III. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE OF UKRAINE: THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY

The appearance of Ukraine as separate structural unit in the geo-political space of Central and Eastern Europe has undoubtedly been of exceptionally great significance in the development of regional multilateral relations. But as a result of its complex internal and external constraints, Ukraine has failed to reflect this reality in its foreign policy, in consonance with its aspiration to play the role of one of the influential states of Europe, corresponding to its potential. As of now the Ukrainian state can only count on achieving a top-level status in European politics in the long term. However, for the foreseeable future, the state's political leadership and representatives of research circles have tried to find a solution to the paradox of Ukraine's national security and define the directions of strategic foreign policy moves in the geopolitical environment. These attempts have been guided by the formula "movement in all directions" which is a far cry from the "neither East nor West" of the Iranian fundamentalist leadership or the Chinese formula of "equidistance" from global power centers.⁵⁷ But this was to be

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.126.

expected, given that the people of Ukraine have had to solve the issue of their security under conditions that have no parallel in the world.

However, from the point of view of all European geopolitical trends Ukraine lies in the sphere of influence of Russian foreign policy and also in the sphere of constantly increasing interests of the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic structures. Therefore, the question of geo-strategic choice was very clear: either enter the civilized area of geo-politically integrated Europe, confirming and installing Ukraine's historic place in it, or be reintegrated into the Eurasian geopolitical environment constituted by the post-Soviet states, with Russia as a natural nucleus of integration.⁵⁸ But to some analysts, Ukraine's foreign policy orientation will be determined, to a considerable extent, by the division of sphere of influence between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic alliance, on the one hand, and Russia and the Russian-led Euro-Asian collective security structures, on the other.⁵⁹

In this context, the possibilities of choice for Ukraine appear to be fairly limited. One has to take into account the urgent need of the Ukrainian economy to normalise trading conditions with the former Soviet republics, the critical dependence of Ukraine on the import of energy carriers from Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, and the natural desire to preserve markets of disposal in the post-Soviet space due to the fact that Ukrainian products are not competitive in European markets.⁶⁰

Further, preservation of the status quo in Ukraine's economic and political crisis would only aggravate current disintegrative tendencies, along the lines of

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 126.

⁵⁹ Serhiy Tolstov, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy : Course Correction or Change of Priorities?", in The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 1995, p.4

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.4.

“civilisation” gaps and along the lines of intra-ethnic confrontation. Perhaps, therefore, the best way for Ukraine to go is with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, on 16 July 1990, which emphasized that Ukraine, “will strive for permanent neutrality.”⁶¹ This obliges Ukraine not to participate in armed conflicts emerging between other states, join any military unions or blocs, or allow its territory to be used by foreign armed forces and for military bases.

However, in the face of growing and deepening international processes on the continent and ever-increasing inter-dependence at global and regional levels, Ukraine under the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk did not choose pure neutrality, that is ‘neutrality for the sake of neutrality’, but on the basis of the internal and external constraints that Ukraine face and experience, Leonid Kravchuk, chose neutrality as a means to achieve its main national interest: absolute sovereignty and independence, consolidation of statehood, inviolability of borders, and political stability and economic prosperity.⁶²

Finally, it can be concluded that in the form of a non-aligned or neutral state, Ukraine can play a definite role as a stabilising element in the European system of international relations. Given a return to the pre-crisis level of production and a constitutional shaping of liberal principles and democratic foundation of the political structure, such a status could prove advantageous to the principal contracting parties both to the West and to the East. Russia would be able to reconcile itself to the existence of Ukraine as an entity economically integrated in various directions, first and foremost on account of its predominating

⁶¹ Kulinich, n. 27, p.127.

⁶² *ibid.*, p.128.

dependence on the markets of the CIS countries.⁶³ This would allow the Ukrainian state leadership maximum flexibility in the conduct of its foreign policy, while avoiding any commitment to any major foreign military-political obligations.

For the West, this would be also acceptable in that it would assign a definite limit to the formulation of the principles of its policy regarding the states of Central Europe. At the same time, it would permit the encouragement of the strategic nuclear arms reduction process and also provide possibilities gradually to coordinate the evolution of relations within NATO taking into account the latest trends in international relations.

⁶³ Tolstov, n. 59, p.5.

CHAPTER-3

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

I. FORMATION OF THE CIS.

II. UKRAINE AND THE CIS.

- a) Political Integration in the CIS and Ukraine.
- b) Economic Integration in the CIS and Ukraine
- c) Military Integration in the CIS and Ukraine.

III. UKRAINE'S POSITIVE POLICY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES.

CHAPTER-3

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signifies the end of an epoch of world history. On 8 December 1991, this historic event took place, when three former Soviet Republics- Russia, Ukraine and Belorus met at Belovezh near Minsk and denounced the Union Treaty of 1922 and proclaimed the establishment of the CIS. It was only subsequently that other republics of the Soviet Union- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and the Central Asian republics joined in, raising the membership of the CIS to eleven. As the name itself reflects its rootlessness, within days of the formation of the CIS, serious differences became visible over the way the CIS must evolve. However, two contradictory ideological positions evolved concerning its development. The first was the consolidation of the CIS as a common entity with certain institutional structures; the second is the opposition to this consolidation and institutionalization. Among those holding the latter position Ukraine is the most important. This may be surprising because Ukraine is a founder member of the CIS. Therefore, an attempt is made in this chapter, to explain the way of CIS formation, the Ukrainian position in it and to analyse why Ukraine had taken a stand as one of its strongest critics.

I. FORMATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

In order to build democratic and law-governed states and to develop their relations on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for each other's sovereignty and of the principles of equal rights and non-interference in internal

affairs and for strengthening of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation to meet the fundamental interests of their peoples and to serve the cause of peace and security,¹ on 8 December 1991, in Minsk three Slav erstwhile Soviet Republics- Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed an agreement to set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the declaration on formation of Commonwealth of Independent States, the leaders of the republics of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine noted that the negotiations to draw up a new union treaty are deadlocked, that the objective process of secession by republics from the USSR and the formation of independent states have become a reality.² By signing the agreement however, the parties took the decision to dissolve the Soviet Union as an entity of international law, by abrogating the December 1922 Union Treaty which had founded the single multinational state of USSR.

From the moment of the conclusion of the agreement, the application of the norms of third countries, including the former USSR, on the territory of the states which have signed it, was made impermissible, and the activity of bodies of the former union ceased. Fulfillment of international commitments stemming from treaties and agreements signed by the USSR is, however, guaranteed. The members of the commonwealth intend to cooperate in guaranteeing international peace and security and implementation of measures to reduce military expenditure and armaments. They have declared their intention to strive for elimination of nuclear weapons and for total disarmament under international control. At the same time, the sides will respect each other's desire to achieve the status of a nuclear-free-zone and neutral state. It has been decided to preserve unified

¹ Agreement Signed on "Commonwealth of Independent States", Summit Meeting in Belorussia, in Summary of World Broadcast, 10 December 1991, SU/ 1251 P.C1/1.

² ibid., p. C1/2.

command of a common military –strategic space and unified control over nuclear weapons.

✓ The parties also confirmed their commitment to the goals and principles of the UN Charter and of the Helsinki Final Act, bound themselves to observe international norms on human rights and rights of peoples, guaranteed their citizens equal rights and freedoms, irrespective of their nationality, and committed themselves to promote the preservation and development of the cultural, linguistic and religious individuality of ethnic minorities.³ With the aim of developing equal and mutually beneficial cooperation of the peoples and states, it has been decided to conclude special agreements in the sphere of politics, the economy, culture, education, public health, science, trade, the environment and other fields. A statement has been made on recognition of and respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders, the open nature of these and the freedom of movement of citizens. The sides also consider their joint activity on the following areas: the coordination of external policy, the formation and development of the common economic areas, the European and Euro-Asian markets, the customs and migration policies, the development of transport and communication systems, the protection of the environment and ecological safety and the fight against organised crime. Finally, the members of the commonwealth make the agreement open for accession to all the members of the former USSR and also other states that share the aims and principles of the document. The city of Minsk has been chosen as the official location of the coordinating bodies of the commonwealth.

V. 2/2

2/2

³ *ibid.*, p. C1/2.

The next stage of formation of CIS was the meeting of the Central Asian republics in Ashkhabad. The Minsk agreement has apparently given rise to fears of a new level of Slav-non-Slav conflict in the perceptions of different sections of the political class. But the leadership of the Central Asian republics did not fall a prey to the propaganda against the Minsk agreement that it was only a Slav union. Taking account of the open nature of the commonwealth the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan met at Ashkhabad on 13 December 1991 and adopted a declaration announcing their decision to join the Commonwealth of Independent States.⁴ To be more appropriate, they took the position that they would not like to be left out of the position of being co-founders. They viewed the Minsk initiative as positive in the wake of the dead end that was reached on the search of a new union. In this the leaders supported the Minsk assessment of the endeavors connected with the union treaty.

However, the declaration rightly criticized the leaders of the three republics who met at Minsk. It said that the documents with regard to the commonwealth of independent states should have taken into consideration the historic and socio-economic realities of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. It underlined the need "to guarantee the equality of rights of all nations and ethnic groups and the protection of their rights and interests" and asserted that the "Commonwealth of Independent States can not take shape on an ethnic, religious or any other basis that infringes the rights of the person and peoples".⁵ Moreover, it agreed with the Minsk agreement on the strategic issue of control of nuclear

⁴ Rakesh Gupta, "Commonwealth of Independent States Initiated", in Link, January 5, 1992, p.7.

⁵ ibid., p.7.

weapons and a unified command for strategic restraint troops and naval forces.⁶

But doubts about the exact position of the Central Asian republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States were expressed. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan admitted that some doubts remained whether the leaders would manage to end for ever the secondary role which for a long time was allocated to the raw-material producing Central Asian region. However, he reflected the solidarity of leaders by saying that they are going to create living conditions, which would allow the citizens of all nationalities to live in peace, prosperity and harmony.⁷

The last phase in the formation of Commonwealth of Independent States was the meeting at Alma Ata in Kazakhstan. On 21 December 1991, in Alma Ata, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, signed a protocol known as the Alma-Ata declaration, which on the whole supports the general principles adopted at the Minsk agreement,⁸ and says that the reservations and observations of the other states will be taken into account during the process of ratifying these documents, after which the documents will come into effect. This declaration also put its approval on the idea of not creating a central authority. Instead it agreed to have coordinating bodies stationed in Minsk. Further, the Alma Ata meeting decided to politically disband the Soviet Union, which led to the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev since the USSR had neither a de-facto nor a

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷ The Ashkhabad Meeting (Special Supplement), in Summary of World Broadcast, 16 December 1991, SU/1256, p. C1/2.

⁸ The Alma-Ata Meeting, (Special Supplement), in Summary of World Broadcast, 23, December 1991, SU/1262, p. C1/1.

V. 2
de-jure existence. With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist.⁹

However, this commonwealth was exclusive in nature since it did not involve the 'Centre' and the rest of the republics who had been party to the 1922 treaty. Thus, its legal basis was questioned by Gorbachev and a number of analysts, who considered it hasty, arbitrary and undemocratic. Especially since a decision of this order should be based on a referendum. Therefore, Gorbachev termed the process as one, which was "outside the morality of politics".

Moreover, the CIS agreement covers the barest possible necessities required in interstate relations.¹⁰ Since the contracting parties did not find the concept of a common centre workable they agree on inter-republican councils and separate agreements on specific issues, such as, they agreed to coordinate radical economic reform, stick to the ruble, etc. They also decided on the issue of respect for territorial integrity and guarantee of equal rights and freedoms for citizens. But the idea of a joint defence and nuclear control has already run into problem. Ukraine's opposition on nuclear control by Russia, and determination to maintain its own armed forces is just the first set of problems for the CIS. The agreement on the CIS thus, is full of opportunities for misinterpretation and is ambiguously drafted and can lead to endless strife.¹¹

In spite of that many areas of policy such as education, foreign policy, social policy governmental structures have been left out. Important issues like coordination mechanism, approaches to ethnic problem, settlement of disputes, sharing of resources have been left untouched, which means if these were sorted

⁹ ibid., p C1/7

¹⁰ Anuradha M. Chenoy, "The Commonwealth of Independent States: Easy Come Easy Go", in Link, January 5, 1992, p.8.

¹¹ ibid., p.9.

out, there would be no CIS at all. Therefore, it was commented that the CIS agreement is patchy and hasty in nature and it has come up in an ad hoc way as a result of break up of Soviet Union, and many problems unstated in the agreements may determine its future.¹²

II. UKRAINE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

The replacement of the Soviet Union by the CIS, which has no statehood of its own, was by any standards a historic victory for Ukrainian interests.¹³ But, within days of the formation of the CIS, Ukraine began to have serious differences over the way the CIS must evolve. At every meeting of the heads of state or heads of government held since then, the gap that separates Ukraine from the others has widened and the CIS finds Ukraine standing forth as one of its strongest critics.¹⁴ An examination of the Ukraine's position on the numerous issues that have come up at several summit meetings would show that the differences are on the basic understanding about, or the concept of the CIS.

When Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreement it had expected the CIS to evolve on the pattern of the European Community (EC), with all states enjoying fruitful and cooperative relations. Importantly, it was clear that there was to be no breakdown of the sovereignty and independence of any member state. In line with this President Kravchuk had expected that the CIS would primarily promote two objectives: that it would create the necessary conditions for building cooperative relations among the republics of the former Soviet Union, and that it would

¹² *ibid.*, p.8.

¹³ John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and After: The Russian Ukrainian Relationship", *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, p.688.

¹⁴ Nirmala Joshi, "Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States", in *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 16, No-10, January 1994, p. 1367.

promote such relations on the basis of equality and justice.¹⁵ However, according to his perception, the CIS has not moved in that direction.

On the other hand, the CIS itself has been treated by Ukraine only as a mechanism for negotiating the issues inherited from the disintegration of the USSR. As Ukraine played a decisive role in creating the CIS as an instrument for the breaking down of the Soviet Union to get independence, its parliament would not ratify the agreement's promises to maintain a single economic and military space and a coordinated foreign policy after it got independence. Rather the Ukrainian parliament was amounted to a substantial redrafting of the agreement. Although the changes were officially labeled as 'reservations', the outcome was that the Ukrainian parliament voted on a text, which had been substantially amended to water down Ukraine's commitments to the CIS.¹⁶ In this context when Yeltsin and Kozyrev were questioned in the Russian parliament (about these amendments), they replied (no doubt on the basis of assurances from Kiev) that the changes were purely technical and without substance. However, as soon as the Russian and Belarussian parliaments had ratified the original version of the Brest Accords, Ukraine declared that since neither Moscow nor Minsk had voiced any objection to the Ukrainian amended text, this would be the only valid one as far as Kiev was concerned.¹⁷ Importantly, Kive's such type of unchanged determination that the new organization be no more than a temporary mechanism for 'civilized divorce' has left Russia and integrationist states such as Kazakhstan firmly in control of the agenda.

Nevertheless, in the beginning leaders, analysts, observes and others from the Russian federation, the largest and the most important member of the CIS,

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 1368.

¹⁶ Morrison, n. 13, p.689.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 689.

More analytical
Should be more incisive
on points
Compare the points here
detail is

have only stressed that member states should strive for close and comprehensive cooperation. Russia has also decided to become the key element of the CIS. Claims of a right to dominate in the CIS are found in numerous statements by Russian leaders, as well as in Russia's absorption of all Soviet administrative structures, including Soviet property.¹⁸ For Russia, the creation of the CIS means not liquidating the old centre, but the transfer of that centre from Moscow as the Soviet capital to Moscow as Russian capital. However, all these aggressive statements created suspicions in the minds of Ukrainian politicians regarding the real intention of Russia. Apart from this, though President Yeltsin has repeatedly acknowledged Ukrainian territorial integrity, statements by other Russian politicians and even the Russian legislature have continued to worry Ukrainian politicians. Side by side, Russian politicians, both in and out of office, who have either rejected or at least shown in Ukrainian eyes- insufficient respect for Ukrainian independence,¹⁹ became a constant worry for President Kravchuk. Therefore, as Ukraine was not in a position to loose its independence it denied a policy of restoring the Moscow- centred CIS as urged by Russia.

Simultaneously, Ukrainian opposition politicians are also called for withdrawal from the CIS altogether. Even if, the Rukh leader, V. Chornovil, addressing his followers in December 1992, attacked the CIS as one of the greatest moral and psychological blows against our newly attained independence and described it as a 'neo-imperial phantom' which existed to pump resources out of Ukraine.²⁰ Moreover, caught between conflicting pressures from those

¹⁸ Serhiy Holovaty, "Foreign Policy of Ukraine and the Question of Economic and Military Integration in the East", in Lena Jonson, ed., Ukraine and Integration in the East (Stockholm, 1995), p. 14.

¹⁹ Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 63.

²⁰ Morrison, n. 13, p. 689.

advocating Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS and those wanting to maintain economic ties with Russia, Kravchuk temporized for most of 1992 with a policy of staying in the CIS but blocking all movers to make the organisation effective and frequently opting out of agreements as a non-interested party.

However, as given the widely differing perceptions of Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other, it is obvious that a lot of mistrust of the CIS prevail in Ukraine. In an interview to interfax, a Russian news agency, in January 1993, Kravchuk pointed out that "in its present form the Commonwealth (i.e. the CIS) will not live long. Perhaps we are not mature enough to understand correctly the concept of Commonwealth".²¹ Ukraine fears that the CIS is recreating the old style centralist state. That is to say, Ukraine's apprehensions about the CIS are based on the positions taken by the later on political, military and economic issues.

(a) Political Integration in the CIS and Ukraine.

Ever since the inception of the CIS in December 1991, the development of this organization has been unbalanced, as it did not develop into a homogenous organization with a unified status of its members in regard to their rights, objectives and intentions.²² The reason is that it has two main actors Russia and Ukraine having opposite perceptions.

On the one hand, Russia regarded and continues to regard the CIS as the way to integrate former Soviet territory be it in the form of a confederation, federation, or a union. For this Russia itself is undertaking steps to strengthen the political union. In particular, this is demonstrated by the attempt to form a legislative body for the CIS countries. The formation of the Inter-parliamentary

²¹ Mayak Radio, 19 January, 1993, Reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 21 January 1993, p. 9.

²² Holovaty, n. 18, p.14.

Assembly of the countries of the CIS (March 1992) is one step in this direction.
However, as the documents adopted by the inter-parliamentary Assembly of the
CIS are of little effect and do not conform to the legislation of many of the CIS
member states and has no direct influence on the political process within the CIS,
it does not satisfy Russia. Therefore, Russia goes one step further in the way of
political integration within the CIS. It actively supported the initiative of the
President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for the status of Inter-
parliamentary Assembly of CIS and transforms it into a body, which will adopt
laws that are binding on the territory of all the nations of the CIS.²³ Program
committees and working groups have already been formed and are working to
prepare model codes for the CIS countries: the Civil, the Civil Procedural, the
Criminal and the Criminal Procedural Codes. The creation of a single legal system
for the CIS countries is also being formed through these means, thereby
strengthening the basis of a future political union.

However, on a quick move in the direction of political integration within
the CIS, in January 1993, in Minsk, Russia along with other seven members but
not by Ukraine and Turkmenistan, signed the CIS Charter which commits
participants to 'a coordinated policy in the sphere of international security,
disarmament, arms control and the organisational development of the armed
forces'. Moreover, using a formulation strongly having characteristics of the
Soviet era, the Charter binds signatories to respond jointly to security threats
through 'collective self-defence' and envisages a permanent body of
representatives from each state and a secretariat.²⁴

²³ ibid., p.15.

²⁴ Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12 Feb. 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-028, 12 Feb 1993), Pp-6-12.

On the other hand, Ukraine, by insisting its own independence has been discouraging the idea of the formation of the CIS into a Union, federation or confederation. It maintains that the CIS is not a subject of international law. It emphasised that the coordinating bodies of the CIS can not lay down law as they are supposed to be no more than consultative bodies. However, the practice that has evolved in the CIS is that all documents are being adopted on the basis of a majority vote, instead of consensus. Therefore, Kravchuk has pointed out: " We did not envisage equipping the Commonwealth with any special mechanism. We counted on the documents prepared by the leaders of the states on their own."²⁵ At the Bishekek Summit held in October 1992, Ukraine adopted a tough stand against the integrative tendencies in the CIS. It refused to sign the agreements on creating an inter-state television and radio company, a single monetary system, and the economic court. Such bodies, in Ukraine's view, only strengthen integrative tendencies.

} v.d.h.p

Moreover, the most significant step which Ukraine had taken was its refusal at the Minsk Summit held in January 1993, to give its approval to the CIS Charter. In its view the Charter infringes its independence and hence is unacceptable. Further, Ukraine holds that the Charter is still a "raw abstract document" to be "specified" in the process of finalization. To Kravchuk, this task would require at least ten years. To establish political and economic structures without settling all the details might facilitate the emergence of a strong centralist state, which is not what the CIS is supposed to stand for. In fact, Kravchuk firmly

²⁵ Interview to The News Agency Interfax, 13 April, 1992

believes that "Russia has never given up its intention to be a super power and the leading force in the CIS and outside the CIS."²⁶

Similarly in April 1993, Ukraine expressed its reservations about the draft statute of the CIS Coordination Consultative Committee. It did so again from a feeling that the statute would lead to a unified union state and turn the CIS into a union. In fact, it wants the CIS to focus on economic integration. But Yeltsin has made it clear that "integration can only be a package deal and that Ukraine can not expect the economic benefits of CIS membership without signing up for political agreements as well."²⁷ However, in order to maintain its independent stand on CIS issues and to remain away from the process of political integration of CIS, in spite of economic hardships, Ukraine put forth, some documents of its own vision on CIS development. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Anatoly Zlenko, said in an interview that Ukraine had submitted two documents for the consideration of the member states of the CIS. One was the Charter for defining the relationship between the member states of the CIS and regulating relations among them, and the other was a Declaration of Principles for Economic Cooperation, which would lay the basis for economic cooperation among the member states of the CIS. Side by side in the field for foreign policy Ukraine envisaged no role at all for the CIS. In an expression it said, "We do not intend to form any Commonwealth structures to act on its behalf in the international arena. The Commonwealth will not be making decisions for everyone although joint steps will be agreed".²⁸ So also in order to be more secure in future, Ukraine has set before itself the goal of achieving its integration into Europe.

V. J. Joshi

²⁶ See n. 21

²⁷ Morrison, n. 13, p.690.

²⁸ Joshi, n. 14, p. 1371,

However, finally, it can be said that this deviant behaviour on the part of Ukraine is obvious as its desire for independence having been fulfilled, and it is not under any circumstances, willing to risk its independence again. Therefore, insisting its constitutional provisions that "Ukrainian law forbids the executive branch of power to conclude any international agreements where Ukraine enters a union with international status and super power functions",²⁹ Ukraine has managed to avoid full incorporation into Russia's political orbit within the framework of the CIS.

(b) Economic Integration in the CIS and Ukraine

The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era with the former Soviet republics developing as new independent states, and among the most essential problems they faced was the question of mutual economic interaction. As member states of the CIS they faced contradictory processes and tendencies, at times forcing them into decisions, (which were more chaotic rather than logical or well founded).³⁰ On the one hand, all the CIS member states have demonstrated a great desire to continue to develop their sovereignty while maintaining independence from Russia. On the other hand, the majority of them remain economically tied to Russia, which is a source of their most important resources as well as a market for their goods. They also determined the necessity to search for new ways of developing mainly bilateral economic relations with Russia. However, at this critical juncture, Russia worked to create multilateral integration mechanisms within the framework of the CIS while carrying out bilateral economic cooperation. Russia's intention also appeared to be quite simple: to preserve the economic, political and military unity of the former Soviet

²⁹ Holovaty, n. 18, p.14.

³⁰ Anton Filipenko, "Economic Integration in the CIS", in Jonson, n. 18, p.50.

Union, and to link the newly independent states to Russia and Russian interests.

Through multilateral agreements like, the CIS Economic Union, CIS Customs Union, Interstate Bank, Interstate Economic Committee etc., Russia intended to narrow the opportunities for interaction of CIS countries with external countries, as well as, limit their independent search for partners in pursuit of their own national interest.³¹

Nevertheless, Economic cooperation within the CIS has developed mainly on bilateral basis, in spite of Russia's intention of establishing multilateral cooperation within an institution. But the irony of the fact was that Russia dominated all the bilateral economic relations with its 59 per cent of the total GDP of the CIS countries, 91 per-cent of the oil, 77 percent of the natural gas, 58 percent of the steel, and two thirds of the machine building production of the CIS.³² So also the economic crisis within the CIS member states makes them more willing to cooperate with Russia. Thus, the well-known economist N. Shmelev stressed in the Russian journal "Voprosy Ekonomiki" that "obvious economic bankruptcy of the majority of post-Soviet republics makes acceleration of economic integration quite possible".³³

However, Ukraine's policies on economic integration within the CIS remain quite unique. When the CIS was created, both official state representatives and members of the political elite in the Ukraine considered the CIS nothing but a structure which should secure the interests of the republics when dividing the property, gold and diamond funds, and foreign assets of the former Soviet Union. But using tactics of delays, economic pressure and threats, Russia in fact torpedoed a normal process of separation into independent states. In particular, the

³¹ *ibid.*, p.50.

³² *ibid.*, p51.

³³ *ibid.*, p.52.

so-called "Zero variant" in the distribution of debts and asserts, which was imposed upon Ukraine, led to direct loss on the part of Ukraine of 30-50 billion U.S. dollar.³⁴ The problem of dividing and basing the Black Sea-Fleet also remain an unsettled question in Russian Ukrainian relations.

Therefore, keeping in mind the initial developments in CIS on economic matters Ukraine determined its position on economic integration in the CIS by taking into account the positions of the main political forces of the parliament and the President and his administration. The main features, characterizing the approaches to the formation of the CIS and its mechanisms, which Ukraine adopted, can be described as follows:

1. retention of national sovereignty, opposition to creation of supra-state structures which might renovate the former Union bodies;
2. support of an evolitional, progressive character of economic integration, dictated by the existing conditions; a gradual development from the simplest forms of integration (free trade, customs union) to more complex and higher forms (common market, economic and currency unions);
3. the priority of national economic interests, guarantee of economic security of the country;
4. rejection of any domination of one country in the mutually formed interstate organisations and associations;
5. development and deepening of relations with CIS countries must not be carried out at the expense of Ukraine's relations with other developed countries of the world;

VVD

³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 54.

6. the participation of Ukraine must not contradict the Ukrainian Constitution, the Declaration of State Sovereignty, the Act of Independence and current legislation.

Virtually, these principles are also to some extent reflected in Ukraine's relations to the CIS. For instance Ukraine did not sign the CIS Charter adopted in January 1993 and also did not take part in either the creation of a Customs Union (13 March 1992) nor in the ruble zone of 7 September 1993. However, those who favour accepting the CIS Charter fear that if Ukraine does not sign the Charter, Russia would cut up its supplies of oil, gas and timber. But this fear of a section of the Ukrainian people is unfounded. As Kravchuk pointed out, the economic difficulties of the country would continue even if Ukraine sign the Charter. The problem lies in dealing with the producers directly and in coming to some agreement with them. Russia has merely fixed the export quota.³⁵ But on the other hand the fear of Russian dominance compel to almost all influential political forces in the Ukraine. (with the exception of the socialists, the former Communists and the plant directors who formerly belonged to the old nomenclature), to reject the country's accession to an economic union. To Ukrainians, the economic union seeks to create supranational structures under Russian leadership and to coordinate all economic-policy activities-monetary, credit, fiscal, trade and industrial policies.

Besides all these, however, by the second half of 1993, due to economic pressures Ukrainian leaders choose reintegration with Russia and the CIS in preference to the risks of isolation and 'civilised divorce'. After much hesitation, Kravchuk supported the CIS Economic Union Agreement drafted initially

³⁵ Joshi, n. 14, p. 1370.

(September 1993) by Kuchma with the Russian and Belarussian governments as a blue print for a more integrated CIS.³⁶ But the position of Ukraine remains very unique since it has only an associate membership in the CIS Economic Union though it signed all economic documents.

Nevertheless, though it is a fact for Ukraine that the creation of a comprehensive and mutually beneficial economic cooperation with a respective legal mechanism will allow to solve many, if not all, current problems within the CIS, and might possibly create a pattern of cooperation in other spheres, still it stand as a strongest critic of the CIS economic integration mechanisms. The stand point of Ukraine is that, the attempt to transform the CIS Economic Union into "a single Eurasian economic space" in no way accords with the national interests of Ukraine as it contains provisions like the prohibition for members of the CIS Economic Union to become members of other countries' economic or customs union. But at the same time it demonstrates the essence of the geopolitical and geo-strategic interests of Russia.³⁷ So also Ukraine pointed out that the main problem in the union was Russia, unable or unwilling to view itself as an equal partner in the CIS, and continuing to pursue its political, economic and military policies as if it was a new centre.³⁸ But due to the debt argument with Russia, Ukraine became unable to mobilize much support against Moscow from other former Soviet republics on multilateral issues. It has often been left to negotiate alone with Moscow rather than as part of a coalition of 'near abroad' countries,

³⁶ Morrison, n. 13, p.691.

³⁷ Holovaty, n. 18, p. 15.

³⁸ Solchanyk, "R. Kravchuk Defines Ukrainian CIS Relations", RFE/RL Research Report, 13 March 1992, p.8

many of whom share its suspicions of Russian policy and initially looked to it as a counterweight to Moscow.³⁹

However, Ukraine's leaders was persistently opposed to any kind of subordinating and centralizing CIS structures which might tend to recreate the former system with Russia dominating as the centre. Such attitude, in spite of the worsening economic situation of the country, gave Ukrainian leaders the opportunity to take advantage of the logic of integrational development and to try to convince the leaders of other CIS countries to reconsider the place and role of the organization in their foreign economic programmes.

(c) Military Integration in the CIS and Ukraine

The very idea of military integration on the basis of the principle of collective security of the countries of the CIS is the determined effort of Russia to attain integration and gather the former Soviet republics together under its leadership and in a Russian sphere of influence. For this purpose the first concrete step, which Russia has taken, is well known as, the Agreement on Collective Security of the Member States of the CIS dated May 15, 1992 (the Tashkent Agreement). Through this Russia proceeded toward the creation of a collective security system of the CIS and for uniting the systems for anti-air and anti-missile defence, and the defence of outer space.⁴⁰ Russia also insisted on creating a "joint national boundaries of the CIS" or "common CIS border defence" towards the outside world and also permanent structures or forces for peacekeeping within the CIS.⁴¹ Apart from this, as the borders of Russia are pushed back without Ukraine, weakening the Russian's abilities to project their power and influence onto

³⁹ Morrison, n. 13, p. 699.

⁴⁰ Holovaty, n. 18, p.16.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.16.

Europe, Russia, tried to keep Ukraine within its orbit through the military integration of the CIS.

However, most importantly insisting its constitutional position of a neutral non-aligned state, Ukraine did not sign the 1992 Tashkent treaty on collective security. Significantly, as the treaty forbade its members to join military alliances against another member, obliged all to support a signatory state which was attacked from out-side and created a Collective Security Council to coordinate military activities, Ukraine cautiously pointed out that the Tashkent treaty reflects Russian strategic interests above all and it is completely opposed to the national interests of Ukraine.⁴² Ukraine was also alarmed by the fact that the Tashkent treaty members had no veto right concerning the use of united military forces. It feared that the clause on "deployment and functioning of collective security system objects", i.e. Russian military bases could represent a threat. Ukraine also finds that the clause that a state could only withdraw from the treaty, if it fulfilled all obligations connected with this also served as a means of pressure.⁴³ Therefore, instead of multilateral military integration Ukraine preferred economic cooperation and bilateral ties with the CIS countries.

Moreover, the question of how Russia defines the CIS and its role in it is no less problematic for the Ukraine. It was only the formal status of the strategic nuclear armed forces as section of the military answerable to the CIS supreme command, which prevented the complete separation of the Ukraine from the military structures of the CIS.⁴⁴ Therefore, it became a great concern for Ukraine. This vital issue of having common armed forces has also dominated most summit

⁴² *ibid.*, p.16.

⁴³ Olexander Potekhin and Ingmar Oldberg, "Military Industrial Cooperation", in Jonson, n. 18, p.70.

⁴⁴ Olga Alexandrova, "Russia as a Factor in Ukrainian Security Concepts", in *Aussen Politik*, Vol.45. No.1, 1994, p.73.

meetings. President Kravchuk agreed on the advisability of having a single command for nuclear weapons, but emphatically rejected the idea of having a common military machine. In fact, even before the leaders assembled for Alma Ata Summit in December 1991, he had said: "Unified armed forces herald the end of democracy and the end of independence. The logic is that armed forces listen to one man". Elaborating further, he had declared: "We have not merely an independent Ukraine, but an independent and strong Ukraine, which will have its own armed forces, institutions of authority and law".⁴⁵

In this context, the former Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov also announced that a state, which wanted to be independent in its military policy, could not belong to an alliance, which did not take into account the interests of that state. To him, the proposed CIS security system ran contrary to the legally defined interests of the Ukrainian state.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Ukraine expressed its willingness to work together in the military technical fields within the CIS frame, but not in the military-political field.

Moreover, Kiev's fear about the command structures of the CIS, which could all too easily be transformed into an instrument of Russian hegemonic power, makes her careful regarding the CIS developments. In the first three years of the existence of CIS, Ukraine signed 517 documents (including 81 signed with reservations) adopted by the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government. Notably, Ukraine refused to sign 210 documents; 108 of these were of a military political character.⁴⁷ Between December 1991 and July 1992 Ukraine only signed 11 of the 41 military – political agreements signed within the

⁴⁵ Interview to the News Agency Interfax , 23 Dec. 1991.

⁴⁶ Alexandrova, n.44, p. 73.

⁴⁷ Mykhailo Kirsenko, "Military Integration", in Jonson, n. 18, p.64.

CIS.⁴⁸ Several CIS military-political documents regulating practical cooperation were signed, however, but with reservations. Side by side, Ukraine was careful not to sign documents establishing permanent structures or forces for peacekeeping within the CIS. But the basic CIS document on peacekeeping from May 1992, which comes closer to traditional UN peacekeeping than the later CIS documents, was signed by Ukraine with reservations. Documents concerning the formation, structure and financing of groups of military observers and collective CIS peacekeeping forces were also signed with some reservations in 1992.⁴⁹

Apart from this, Ukraine participated in decisions on actions in specific cases of inter-ethnic and other conflicts. Documents on peacekeeping in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia were also agreed to. So also at the CIS summit in Alma-Ata in February 1994, President Kravchuk signed the Memorandum on Preserving Peace and Stability in the CIS and some other documents but avoided participating in discussion or signing documents on CIS collective security, actions of collective peacekeeping forces, as well as the situation at the Tajik-Afghan border. Any direct participation by Ukraine in Moscow-headed armed peacekeeping actions in Tajikistan or elsewhere in the CIS also strongly opposed by the public opinion for both pacifist and national reasons.⁵⁰

However, Ukraine fails to remain out of fear of Russian dominance within the CIS. Russia's claim to the role of the sole guarantor of peace and of security on the territory of the former USSR creates the opened risk that Russia could adopt a policing function, which would inevitably lead to intervention in the internal affairs of the states concerned and would jeopardise their sovereignty

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.64.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.65

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p.66.

and territorial integrity. More than this Kiev is concerned not without reason that the world's major powers would be willing to accept Russia as a policing power on the territory of the former USSR for fear of armed conflicts.⁵¹ According to a number of Ukrainian analysts, Russia's interests in this respect tally with those of the international community. This situation makes Ukrainians view Russia as an even greater possible threat. Some politicians and political scientists, therefore, come to the conclusion that the political, economic and military independence of the Ukraine is above all threatened by its membership of the CIS.⁵²

III. UKRAINE'S POSITIVE POLICY AND THE CIS.

From the above analysis it is clear that in order to save its newly born independence Ukraine considered the CIS to be an opportunity not to sever existing links, but to strengthen bilateral relations to replace Soviet centralism with a flexible system of mutual cooperation.⁵³ Therefore, Ukraine stands as the strongest critic of CIS when it finds any supranational competencies in its way of growth and development. But this does not mean that Ukraine has only played the role of a critic in the CIS. It has always supported the idea of legislation for facilitating intra-CIS relations on the basis of equality. For instance, it has supported the Electricity Generation Agreement signed at the February summit in 1992, the Declaration on the observance of the principles of cooperation within the framework of the CIS, a statement on the need to prevent the threat or use of force in the settlement of disputes, the agreement on space research, the agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, etc.

⁵¹ Alexandrova, n. 44, pp.73-74.

⁵² *ibid.*, p. 74.

⁵³ Agreement on the Creation of the CIS, Article 5, Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), 10 Dec. 1991, SU/251, p. C1/1.

Most importantly, Ukraine is supportive of the CIS. It feels that it provides a good forum for the leaders to meet and discuss their mutual problems and difficulties. Often bilateral agreements are not enough. In the words of Kravchuk, "The leaders of the CIS should continue their common dialogue. They all need it. However, we should work out new principles".⁵⁴ Ukraine also pointed out that the CIS has the potential conditions to become a useful consulting and coordinating system between the former Soviet republics during the current period of transition. To it, CIS is a means to avoid confrontation and to develop fruitful economic, cultural, political and personal ties based on mutual respect. However, the difficulty for Ukraine is that the CIS can hardly develop into an integrated organisation with efficient mechanisms (regulations, bodies, institutions) for solving conflicts.

On the above analysis, in conclusion, it may be said that the concept of Commonwealth is yet to take root in the former Soviet Union. This is so because of two contradictory tendencies. One tendency, which is supported by Russia, is to make the CIS a close-knit organization; the other, which is represented by Ukraine, wants the CIS to be a loose debulous organization. However, Russia and Ukraine, the two important members of the CIS tried to pull it in different directions. As a result, relations between Russia and Ukraine became strained and have cast their shadow over the CIS, and in consequence the CIS failed to develop an effective mechanism in the first half of the 1990s. Moreover, in spite of all this, Ukraine does not dare to leave the CIS as it will strain its relations with Russia, and prefer to remain a member of the CIS and oppose the centralizing tendency in

⁵⁴ Interview to the News Agency Interfax, 23 Dec. 1991.

the CIS at least so long as it is not in a position to deal with Russia on terms of
equality.

CHAPTER-4

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATIONS.

I. UKRAINE AND THE NEW EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION

II. UKRAINE'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

III. COOPRATION AND FORMATION OF LEGAL TIES OF UKRAINE WITH THE PROMINENT EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

- (a) Ukraine and the Central European Initiative
- (b) Ukraine and the Visegrad Group.
- (c) Ukraine and the Council of Europe.
- (d) Ukraine and the WEU.
- (e) Ukraine and NATO.
- (f) Ukraine and the European Community.

CHAPTER-4

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATIONS.

The radical socio-political changes in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s have brought a spectacular transformation in the Europe signified by the termination of the cold war, disintegration of the USSR and led by structural changes in the geo-political environment in this region with far-reaching consequences for the existing world order. In essence, a new system of international relations is being formed at the global, regional, and sub-regional levels. In such a scenario as independent Ukraine is a part of this new order and, most importantly, is one of the most vital components of the post-Soviet system its way of development become a determining factor in the overall evolution of this geopolitical region. Particularly, Ukraine's policies present challenges to both the Russian and Western policy making, as its role to a great extent influenced the evolution of the CIS. But the irony is that Ukraine itself faced the challenge of options comprised of political as well as economic priorities significant to its future in Europe.

Therefore, an attempt in this chapter is made to analyse how Ukraine has struggled to gain a position with its western neighbours, despite its notable economic and social capabilities, and its failures to meet with success. In the first and second part of this chapter a description is made in relation to Ukraine's position in the new European transformation process and its foreign and security policies in the context of its European integration. In the third portion an attempt is made how Ukraine worked with a strong desire to become an integral part of the enlarged European economic, political and legal space through cooperation

and formation of legal ties with the prominent European institutions via closer political integration with Central Europe.

I. UKRAINE AND THE NEW EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATIONS.

The end of the global confrontation, the collapse of the former communist bloc and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of the bipolar system of international relations and brought about new dimensions to the situation in Europe and Eurasia. The new changes like the socio-economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics, the implementation of geo-political pluralism in Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and the preparation and initiation of the eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union / Western European Union (ED/WED), put an end to former links and opened the door to new forms of cooperation and mutual dependence. The emergence of European countries which are not included into the European Union structure also creates the perspective of a developing multi regional Europe. But the development of individual countries of the former Soviet bloc proceeded along different courses.

Most of the countries of Central Europe, where changes are moving faster than in other areas, and where certain Western countries, particularly Germany, have a clear interest in helping the process of change, opted for a fast track transition to the standards of developed European states, aspiring to close as quickly as possible the gap inherited from the past. The states of Central Asia surprisingly also quickly acquired specific features of post-feudal developing countries, and their state order became increasingly more reminiscent of the African and Asian ex-colonies of European states. In the South-Western Europe, changes in the Balkans are much slower and less certain, and the interests of

Western countries are also remain largely contradictory (as demonstrated by their attitude towards the Yugoslav crisis). But Eastern Europe, which covers the European territory of the former Soviet Union includes a number of new independent European countries, such as Lithuania Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Ukraine, is quite a new geopolitical area. // *verit*

However, one of the most visible consequences of the new European transformation is the process of the regionalisation of Europe and the creation of a number of new sub-regions in Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. For example, in an attempt to reconstruct regional relations to replace the Warsaw Treaty organisation, Comecon and the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland constituted themselves as the "Visegrad Four" and, the republics of the former Soviet Union declared the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moreover, the courses of the process of transformation are determined by the integrational prospects of individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe and their role in the system of regional relations.

Ukraine's geo-pol
In this new geopolitical area, however, the appearance of Ukraine as an independent state with a population of 52 million proved to be one of the biggest geopolitical developments since Yalta and Potsdam.¹ As its strategic location is bordering on Belarus, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey (across the Black Sea), Ukraine's importance ranks among the top European nations. So also, as it has a land mass equal to France, a location at the crossroad of Europe and Asia, a large agricultural and hi-tech industries, and extensive natural resources, Ukraine is crucial for the stability of the continent,

¹ Hennadiy Udovenko, "European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine's Perspective", NATO Review, November 1995, Vol. 43, No -6, p.15.

and uncertainty there would reverberate throughout Europe. In this context it is also viewed that an independent, democratic and reform-oriented Ukraine can provide a model for Russia's development, prevent the emergence of the CIS as a political and military alliance under Moscow's control and promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe²

Apart from this, as Ukraine separates itself from the West by the states of Central Europe, serves as Moscow's 'bridge' to the West and a 'buffer against invasion from the West and as it controls key positions in Eurasia, John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk projected it as 'Europe's Linchpin'.³ Moreover, though in the initial years of independence, Britain, USA and Canada are given little attention towards Ukraine, but later on they recognized the strategic importance of Ukraine to European security and also backed its re-integration into Europe. The British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind called Ukraine "a strategic pivot in Europe"⁴ that would determine the future prosperity and security to the continent. Even Russophile France has started to pay more attention to Ukraine. And American officials have also stated that a free and independent Ukraine is a "Vital strategic interest of the United States."⁵

Therefore, keeping in mind the defensive stance of Ukraine's geo-politics in relation to the new European transformation process, it can be said that an independent and democratic Ukraine committed to friendly and peaceful relations with European and Eurasian countries, can be an important force to European

² John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine Europe's Linchpin", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No-3 May June 1996, p. 52.

³ ibid., p. 52.

⁴ Taras Kuzio, "Britain Awakens to Ukraine: Europe's New Strategic Pivot", The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 41 No.1, Spring 1996, p. 18.

⁵ See n. 2, p. 59.

security, and also an important force in securing a more stable order in the Eurasian region.

II. UKRAINE'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Ukraine, being a large European state and a natural component of the Central and Eastern European region, in order to overcome its prolonged artificial alienation from other nations of the continent, in its foreign policy, announced in 1990, sought to establish direct political, economic, trade, and other kinds of relations with other states.⁶ Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and to institutionalize its relations with the European Union and Western European Union (WEU), was therefore defined as a strategic goal.

Ukrainians also perceive their European integration as an illustration of historical justice and a return to their historic, cultural heritage.⁷ Taking into account the economic advantages of integration into Europe experts defined Ukraine's European integration as not only a moment of truth but a well thought out pragmatic decision. At the same time, keeping in mind Ukraine's sensitive geopolitical situation, the policy makers regard cooperation with NATO, E.U. and WEU as a priority component of Ukraine's national security. Importantly, perceiving Russia as a threat from the east, a break away from Moscow was defined by most Ukrainian politicians as a long-term top priority task. It was also stated that the ultimate goal of Ukraine's national forces, headed by its first president Leonid Kravchuk, was to build an independent, sovereign, and European

⁶ A. Zlenko, "The Ukraine, the UN and World Policy", International Affairs, No 12, December 1990, Pp.3-4.

⁷ Vasyl Kremen, "Ukraine Returns to Europe", The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No.4, Winter 1997, P. 28.

Ukraine, and, hence, to be free, first and foremost, from Russian and CIS influence.⁸

However, all the above became exactly reflected during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk. From the very first days of his tenure, the government of Kravchuk pursued highly visible pro-Western / Central and East European countries (CEEC) and anti CIS/ Russia political and security policies.⁹ These policies also went far beyond establishing bilateral relations with immediate neighbours and were formalized in the pursuit of entry into Central European institutions by forging closer links with such bodies. From the Ukrainian point of view these institutions had a complex role to play, as membership:

- Represented a window to the West through which Ukraine could see the potential benefits that may increase gradually the pro-Western line;
- Provided contacts with countries that had trodden that path earlier, and hence could facilitate the process of Ukrainian membership of more 'Western' organizations;
- Enabled Ukraine to tap into the momentum built up by the Central European states in their attempts at integration;
- Could help to differentiate Ukraine from the old Soviet and Russian economic and political structures;
- Contributed to the creation of a distinct political identity for Ukraine itself,
- By a process of association would allow Ukraine to benefit from the new identity created by the Visegrad group of essentially European states

⁸ Alexander Pirogov, "Troubled Economic Relations", in Lena Jonson ed., Ukraine and Integration in the East (The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 1995), p. 37.

⁹ Roman Wolczuk, "Ukraine and Europe: Relation Since Independence", The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No.1, Spring 1997, p. 40.

simply rejoining Europe after a period of absence; in other words, it represented a good opportunity for a short cut;

- Probably allowed Ukraine to demonstrate a commitment to the economic and political reform seen as a prerequisite by the main international financial institutions to the provision of aid and loans.

However, as Central European institutions were clearly part of the 'master plan', they represented stepping-stones to membership of the more prominent European institutions. Therefore, so far as Ukraine is concerned they pursued an objective with a vitality that belied Ukraine's status as a new and inexperienced country, unendowed with a tried and tested foreign ministry.¹⁰ It is also probably true to say that while in the days leading up to independence there was some confusion for the European leaders as to how to deal with Ukraine, though there is increasing recognition that an independent Ukraine is more than a transitory phenomenon.¹¹ Moreover, the demands made on Ukraine since its independence to pay for its European integration have been far-reaching and extensive. The West wants Ukraine to consolidate its democracy, relinquish its nuclear capabilities, integrate more closely in Central and Eastern Europe's (CEE) regional organizations such as CEFTA, and pursue policies characteristic of a 'Western' state.

However, despite the numerous social blunders and discouragement, Ukraine, under Leonid Kravchuk, had made vigorous and systematic efforts towards its institutional integration with Europe while simultaneously blocking, slowing or non-participating in the renewal of institutional ties amongst the states of the former Soviet Union. Apart from this, importantly, Ukraine also expressed its

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 41.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 41.

intention to play the role of a bridge builder in international relations linking Western Europe with Euro-Asia. And for this, Ukraine has been very active on the international scene and has ties with all of the significant inter-governmental organizations.

9/13
1/1/13

III. COOPERATION AND FORMATION OF LEGAL TIES OF UKRAINE WITH THE PROMINENT EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

In order to stress its 'European' identity and to reduce the inevitable asymmetry, which is inherent in its economic and political relationship with Russia, Ukraine diversified its foreign policy from the very beginning and tried to integrate into various regional and European arrangements.¹² To Ukraine these will assist in establishing its independent stand in the European international system. One of the major directions of such diversification, however, aims towards building cooperation and formation of legal ties with the prominent European institutions. Moreover, through which Ukraine wants to be an integral part of the enlarged European economic, political and legal space are now discussed below.

(a) Ukraine and the Central European Initiative (CEI)

Partial Access
Associate Member
8/1/13

In 1989 Italy, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia and subsequently Czechoslovakia came together to form the Central European Initiative. Later Poland joined it in July 1991. Apparently, the organisation aimed to establish a platform for cooperation on political and economic issues in the region and thereby contribute to the stability of the region. An additional objective was also

¹² Daina Bleiere, "Ukraine's Integration with Central and Eastern Europe: The Potential or Regional Cooperation", in Jonson, n. 8, p.81.

to facilitate the process of preparation undertaken by member-states for eventual entry into the European Union.

So far as this Central European initiative is concerned, having the same aim and objective Ukraine sought to strengthen ties with it. And, in November 1992, Ukraine for the first time took part in a meeting of foreign ministers of the CEI states in Austria with the Kravchuk administration pushing hard for acceptance. Indeed, by June 1993, Ukraine had made an application for membership, which was rejected in November of the same year. The reason is that Ukraine's economy is considerably less advanced than those of the Central European countries. Besides, most Central European officials also do not really regard Ukraine as a 'Central European' country culturally or politically. Thus, while broadly supporting Ukraine's independence, the Central Europeans have been slow to embrace the latter's opening moves, especially those regarding regional cooperation.¹³

However, on the initiative of Italy, in March 1994, the notion of Associate Membership was mooted for Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. The Associate Membership was attained by Ukraine in July 1994 and latter that month representatives participated in the first meeting of the Association Council of the CEI.

(b) Ukraine and the 'Visegrad' Group

Demonstrating the vigour with which Kravchuk set about allying himself with the Central European institutions, he was virtually simultaneously pursuing other western avenues somewhat closer to home, and in 1991 attempted to gain membership of the Visegrad triangle (now Visegrad "quadrangle"). Apparently,

¹³ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act", in *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, P. 156.

that organisation was set up to coordinate the efforts of Poland, Hungary and the then Czechoslovakia in their interactions with European political and economic institutions, to facilitate financial and trade flows amongst themselves, and collaborate on issues of security and ecology. But in practice it was an attempt to escape from the sphere of influence still emanating from the East, and to demonstrate their commitment to 'rejoining Europe'.¹⁴ However, the purpose of this organisation was twofold: on the one hand, it avoided the accusation of interference in what Russia later termed as its 'near abroad', while, on the other, it precluded the possibility of the backward state of the Ukrainian economy affecting the chances of the Visegrad state's application for European Union membership.

UN It was in background that, in February 1992, Ukraine's application for membership was rejected. Many Central European officials feared that Ukrainian membership would destroy the group's cohesion and that it would add unwanted complications with Russia. They have thus reacted coolly to Ukrainian efforts to establish closer institutional ties and were only able to invite Ukraine to short range economic bilateral cooperation and over-order trade within the so called "Karpati" Euro-region created in 1993.¹⁵ However, Ukraine's effort to establish closer institutional ties with the Visegrad group did not receive any success during the office of Leonid Kravchuk, largely because of the slow pace of economic reform in the country.

¹⁴ See n, 9, p. 42.

¹⁵ See n, 8, p. 39.

S
✓

(c) Ukraine and the Council of Europe.

The significance of membership of the Council of Europe to Ukraine can be best understood by examining Article 1 of the statute of that organisation which states that:

The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its member for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles that are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.¹⁶

Quite simply, from an Ukrainian point of view, the reference to 'common heritage' of its members both defines and confirms Ukraine as a European state. Thus, owing to the organisation's role in affirming Ukraine's European identity and inheritance, membership was inspired with a particular significance. And, following initial contacts in 1990, on 14 July 1992 Ukraine applied for membership; special status with the Parliamentary Assembly of the council was granted in the following September.¹⁷ In July 1994, a political dialogue was initiated between the Committee of Ministers of the council and Ukraine, followed by the signing of a number of conventions of the council throughout 1994. However, so far as President Leonid Kravchuk's efforts were concerned Ukraine's membership and cooperation with the council of Europe was no doubt a success story.

(d) Ukraine and the West European Union.

Owing to the increasing prominence of the WEU in terms of its relations with both the EU and NATO, links with the organisation were pursued with a particular

¹⁶ See n, 9, p. 44.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

eagerness. But relations between Ukraine and the WEU remain limited to regular exchange of visits and information. In its Kirschberg declaration of 1 May 1994, the WEU Council of Minister agreed to grant 'associate-partner' status to countries that had concluded or were about to conclude association agreements with the EU. This included the six East European countries, plus the Baltic States under the 6+3 formula (where the six are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania and the three are Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania). But they did not include Ukraine on the ground that the former countries are considered potential future EU members whereas Ukraine is not. However, Ukraine has argued that it should also be granted associated partner status, but its neutrality and membership in the CIS are regarded by the WEU as incompatible with WEU membership.¹⁸

*Nota
considered
equal in*

(e) Ukraine and NATO

The development of relations between Ukraine and NATO began with Ukraine's participation in the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in January 1992, the institutional basis for cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

As Ukraine was searching for new possibilities to become a member of a pan-European Union, President Leonid Kravchuk never opposed the east-ward expansion of NATO, and even Ukraine's future membership of this military alliance. Speaking at Columbia University, Kravchuk, said that 'The Best guarantee of Ukraine's security would be membership in NATO'.¹⁹ Such mentality of Kravchuk however, resisted Russian pressure for joint armed forces

Success

¹⁸ See n, 13, p. 154.

¹⁹ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership", The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1998, p.13.

and, as a result; Ukraine created its own armed forces. Indeed, Kravchuk used Ukraine's original non-bloc neutrality status as a means in response to ongoing Russian pressure to accede to the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement. Importantly, using this strategy Kravchuk always aimed to keep the Tashkent CIS Collective Security Treaty at a distance while gradually increasing cooperation with Western security structures and leaving the door open for possible eventual accession.²⁰ However, upholding this policy Ukraine on 8 February 1994 joined in the Partnership For Peace Programme (PFP) of NATO. And, in May of that year, foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko presented a document to the NATO Secretariat, which determines the aspects of Ukraine's participation in the PFP programme.

Moreover, the document envisages close ties between Ukraine and NATO, first of all with regard to reform in the armed forces, officer training and joint exercises. It stipulates involvement of Ukraine's military subunits in UN and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) operation, open national defence and budget planning, democratic control over the military sphere and exchange of relevant information. "Membership in Partnership for Peace will enable Ukraine to build its armed forces on a new basis, approaching world standards and involve military subunits in various operations run by the UN and the CSCE which will enhance its authority",²¹ said Yuriy Serheiyev, the head to the information directorate at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, commenting on the signing of the document. Moreover, Ukraine considered the programme to be a timely and promising step in the right direction, which would help to adjust

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹ Ukraine Signs Partnership For Peace, UNIAN News Agency, Kiev, Summary of World Broadcast, 10 Feb. 1994, p. SU/ 1918, D/1.

political and military cooperation with NATO on an equal and non-discriminative basis.²²

Show or action

Nevertheless, the intensification of Ukraine's relations with the West in general and with NATO in particular caused serious concern in Russia. In response to Ukrainian relationship of NATO, a senior Russian foreign policy adviser said that: "We would have to consider using their dependence on our oil and gas to do the greatest possible damage to the Ukrainian economy, causing destabilization by stirring up the Russians in Ukraine, especially in the Crimea, and greatly increasing military pressure over Sevastopol. This would lead to an international crisis of the first order".²³

So far as the above statement is concerned, there is no doubt that bringing NATO to the borders of Russia would result in the latter's active opposition. This would inescapably be followed by even harsher political and economic pressure on Ukraine, especially by inciting the conflicts in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, in the short term, in order not to lose its national independence, but to maintain internal political stability and territorial integrity, Ukraine under Kravchuk preferred to continue its non-aligned status while developing bilateral cooperation with the countries of both NATO and the CIS.

(f) Ukraine and the European Community

The history of direct legal relations of Ukraine with the European Community is rather short and fairly uneventful. To start with one should recall that official relation between the European Community (EC) and the former USSR that included Ukraine were established only in June 1988, when the Joint Declaration on Mutual Recognition between the EC and the Council for Mutual Economic

²² *ibid.*

²³ Lieven Anatol, "Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion", *The World Today*, October 1995, pp. 196-197.

Assistance (COMECON) was signed in Luxembourg.²⁴ This paved the way for the conclusion, at the end of 1989, of a trade, commercial and economic cooperation agreement between the USSR and the EC. However, the collapse of the USSR, following the overwhelming pro-independence Ukrainian referendum of 1 December 1991, terminated a projected new broader agreement between the EC and the Soviet Union. But, at the same time, the landslide vote for independence of the Ukrainian people prompted the European Community to issue on December 2, 1991, a Declaration on Ukraine.²⁵ This welcomed the democratic manner in which the referendum had been conducted and called for Ukraine to pursue an open and constructive dialogue with the other republics of the dying Soviet state in order to ensure that all existing international obligations were maintained.

The response of newly independent Ukraine to this document and similar acts of a number of other states was very rapid and constructive. On 5 December 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted an "Appeal to the Parliaments and People's of the World", expressed its willingness to comply with all the main provisions of the EC Declaration.²⁶ But it has taken some time for the EC to accept the new realities, which emerged after the break down of the USSR. Therefore, the process of rapprochement between the EC and Ukraine has not always been totally smooth and, on occasion, has been fraught with misunderstandings. However, in the first half of 1992 the EC institutions adopted several decisions on the distribution of import and export quotas among the newly independent states formerly allocated to the Soviet Union.²⁷ Parallel to this, the EC also began re-allocating its economic and technical assistance to the former USSR through TACIS (Technical

²⁴ Official Journal of the European Community (OJEC), 1988, L157/35.

²⁵ Victor Muravyev, "The Formation of Legal ties between the European Community and Ukraine", The Ukrainian Review, Vol XL, No2, Summer 1993, p. 18.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p.19.

²⁷ *ibid.*

Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme, which aims at helping the recipients to introduce a system of trade regulation compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such a system will facilitate the subsequent integration of the CIS states into the open international system and, in time, further improvements in access to markets. Within the framework of TACIS, new initiative programmes have been signed with each of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine reflecting their particular needs. Special emphasis is also placed on the sphere of privatization in Ukraine.

However, the most dramatic step made by the EC in its relation with Ukraine and other newly born states was the decision to reach an agreement on cooperation with each of them individually. On 6 April 1992, the EC Commission submitted to the EC Council of Ministers a directive on the negotiation of cooperation agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, to replace the 1989 treaty, which was signed with the USSR on trade, commerce and economic cooperation. Nevertheless, some time still had to pass by before the EC and Ukraine began their first contacts aimed at the conclusion of such a cooperation agreement. This delay may be by several causes but both Ukraine and the EC have managed to reach many points of common interest. The rapprochement between them was reinforced by the talks between Jacques Delors (EC Commissioner) and the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Brussels on September 14, 1992. This was the first meeting of the highest official from both sides.

In his address to the meeting Leonid Kravchuk praised the launch of TACIS and promised to base Ukraine's cooperation with the EC on the principle of the CSCE Final Act ("Helsinki Accords"). Kravchuk and Delors signed a Joint

Statement confirming the need to formalize by an exchange of letter the continuing mutual obligations of Ukraine and the EC under the above-mentioned trade agreements of 1989. They also expressed their intention to reach an agreement on partnership and cooperation. It was agreed to set up an Ukrainian permanent mission to the EC and a delegation of the EC Commission to Ukraine.²⁸

The first contacts between experts of both sides with a view to elaborate an agreement on partnership and cooperation took place in early December 1992. During this meeting the delegations reached an understanding on several important and complicated issues, like the problem of Ukraine's accession to the treaties concluded between the EC and the former USSR. This particular issue was resolved by an exchange of letter between officials of both sides. In the course of these talks the EC experts also presented the outlines of the future agreement on partnership and cooperation. However, the main aim of this new agreement was that it will provide for Ukraine a certain preferential regime in trade and will pave the way for the extension of Ukraine at a future date of the four freedoms: free trade in goods, free trade in services, free movement of labour and free movement of capital. But it will not surpass Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on the basis of Art VI of the GATT.²⁹

Moreover, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) agreed on 23 March 1994 and signed by Kravchuk on 14 June 1994 reached its climax. Essentially this agreement was similar to the Association Agreements signed with the Visegrad states with the exception of the commitment to free trade. However,

²⁸ "Kravchuk in Brussels: Ukraine and European Community Agree on Closer Relations", ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, World Service in English 2004 gmt 14 Sept. 1992, Summary of World Broadcast, 16 Sep. 1992, SV/ 1487, A1/1.

²⁹ See n. 25, p.23.

the conclusion of the agreement on Partnership and Cooperation opened up for Ukraine further opportunities in the sphere of her external economic relations and gradual integration with the world economic system.

Nevertheless, In relation of Ukraine's search for a position in Europe, its Westward orientation of foreign policy can be seen on two levels: On the first level, the emphasis was placed by the political elites on Ukraine's European heritage, culture, and history which represent their efforts in trying to create a European, or more precisely, a Central European identity. On a more manifest level, however, it represents a pragmatic way of trying to deal with the very real economic, security and political problems facing the states of the former Soviet Union such as the drastic economic decline that has characterized their fate since independence. The European institutions for the Ukrainian elite represent beacon of hope and crucially, a source of financial aid or at least facilitating access to it. Implicit within this is also the growing realization that Russia is decreasingly able to provide the economic stimulus for recovery. This is also compounded by concerns as to the future Russian domestic political developments and prevailing attitude amongst the Moscow's political elites as to how internal and international issues should be resolved. Passing through all of the above is the fact that Russia, and its parliament in particular, is continuing to have difficulties in coming to terms with Ukraine as an independent entity.³⁰

Moreover, finally it can be said that Ukraine's strong desire under president Kravchuk to become an integral part of the enlarged European economic, political and legal space brought about little success. But it is well

³⁰ See n. 9. p.39.

understood by many Ukrainian politicians that if the country wants to be an integral part of the larger European area, she must live up to common European standards. In other words, this possibility will be enhanced when the Ukrainian government has coped with its economic crisis, built a democratic society, and strengthened its national statehood.

CHAPTER-5
CONCLUSION

CHAPTER -5

CONCLUSION

This study started by pointing Ukraine's foreign policy during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk. In the beginning as an independent state Ukraine's personality was shaped in the hands of its first President Kravchuk. In order to not to lose its newly acquired independence, to occupy a due place in the international community, to play a decisive role in the security and stability of Europe, and for the establishment of equilibrium on the continent, Ukraine under Kravchuk formulated its foreign and security policies. Historical experiences of Ukraine about Russia's imperialistic tendencies influenced a lot of Kravchuk's romantic mode of looking at problems of foreign policy matters. This fascination lead Kravchuk to be pro-Western as the best way of strengthening Ukrainian national sovereignty and of maintaining distance from Russia.

Ironically, this old fashioned leadership of Kravchuk had paid little or no attention to economic reforms. As a result, on the one hand, Ukraine has been forced by its economic situation into closer economic cooperation with Russia than it had intended on the eve of independence. On the other hand, Ukrainian policy makers' proposition that the entire western world would be ready to accept the newly independent state as well as provide it with all the necessary benefits and support turn to be a myth, as the West did not live up to the expectations of many Ukrainian politicians.

However, despite dissatisfactions of Western policies towards Ukraine, Kravchuk did not give up his pro-West foreign policy. Instead, he vigorously pursued a western oriented political and security policy, and a Euro-Asian economic policy. But in such a foreign policy move, he did not succeed. So far as

his pro-Western policies were concerned, he failed to receive any clear-cut political and security assurances from the West. Kravchuk's policy to uphold nuclear weapons as a bargaining counter for economic support also backfired. The Western institutions made it clear to Ukraine that denuclearisation was a precondition for further economic and political support. Side by side, as both Europe and USA initially pursued a Russo-centric policy, little attention was paid to Ukraine, except for the problem of nuclear weapons.

Simultaneously constrained by a number of domestic factors, Kravchuk had also failed to bring a serious economic reform in Ukraine. As a result, due to the lack of necessary legal, financial and organizational infrastructures, the inflow of foreign investments into Ukraine became slow and it also curtailed Ukraine's ability to obtain adequate assistance from the western financial institutions. Therefore, in precise terms it can be said that Ukraine had experienced its failures of pro-West foreign policy.

Kravchuk's Euro-Asian policy faced some obstacles too. As it is dominated by Russia, Ukraine failed to go along the line that Russia intends to follow. Russia's stand on Crimea and Sevastopol, the belligerent statements of its parliamentarians towards Ukraine, its insufficient respect for Ukrainian independence, and its opportunities to use oil and gas deliveries as a political tool against Ukraine to keep control over the Black Sea Fleet in return for a reduction in the debt, made the Kravchuk administration more cautious. And, importantly, all these factors compelled the policy makers to perceive Russia as a security threat from the East. Therefore, Ukraine opposed Russia's every efforts of making the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a supra-national entity.

V.2p.

— So far as Russia's efforts to bring Ukraine to its sphere of influence through the process of political integration within the CIS was concerned, the Kravchuk administration had avoided it by insisting Ukraine's independence. His administration also pointed out that the CIS is not a subject of international law and, therefore, the coordinating bodies of the CIS would not lay down laws as they were supposed to be no more than consultative bodies. Similarly, Russia's efforts of economic integration within the CIS were opposed by Ukraine. In spite of its economic dependence upon CIS (particularly Russia), and of its poor economic situations, Ukraine under Kravchuk preferred to remain away from the CIS Economic Union, only accepting an associate membership. Apart from these, the Kravchuk administration also opposed the very idea of military integration of Russia, as it was based on the principle of collective security of the countries of the CIS. However, Kravchuk did not dare to leave the CIS as it will harden its relations with Russia. (But cunningly, preferred to remain as a member of the CIS, while opposing the centralized tendencies of Russia within the CIS.)

Moreover, in order to get rid of Ukraine's economic difficulties, to keep her away from Russian's influence and to make her an integral part of the enlarged European economic, political and legal space, Kravchuk had tried to cultivate intimate relations with its neighbouring countries, and via political integration with Central Europe intended to achieve the goal. But his attempts had met with a cool response, as the Central European nations had been slow to embrace Ukraine's opening moves of regional cooperation. Therefore, Kravchuk's efforts of integration into the major European institutions had gained a little success.

However, from the above analysis it is very clear that as the head of the state Kravchuk had made every effort to defend Ukraine's strategic national interests for the creation and strengthening of national independence. But due to the drastic internal dilemmas, such as unsuitable economic conditions, ethnic divisions as well as external challenges, like the fundamental question of its sovereignty, all these were constrained the independent foreign policy move of President Kravchuk. Apart from all these, there were also some other reasons of Ukraine's lack of definitiveness in foreign policy matters. These may be pointed out as follows.

- Kravchuk's approach to foreign and security policy were guided by the formula "movement in all directions", which is a far cry from the "neither East nor West." Upholding the policy of non-alignment and following the above formula Kravchuk wanted to maintain to some extent equidistance from global power centres. As a part of this policy in order to maximise Ukraine's national interests he also tried in three different ways. In the first way he had taken steps to deepen ties with key western institutions and actors. Secondly, he tried to normalize Ukraine's relations with Russia, and thirdly, his efforts were directed to establish Ukraine as a regional power.
- Both Europe and the United States initially pursued a 'Russo-centric' policy, paying little attention to the other members of the CIS including Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine's policy options were initially limited.
- Kravchuk's reluctance to give-up the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil and his attempt to use them for bargaining created tensions with the

West, especially the United States. As a result, Ukraine's relations with the West remained largely frozen until this issue was resolved.

- Ukraine's failure to implement serious economic reform limited its ability to obtain western financial assistance. Therefore, Ukrainian economy declined sharply, exacerbating regional and ethnic tensions within the country.
- Lastly, the external pressure on Ukraine really limited its capacity to make independent foreign policy decisions. On the one hand, the west wanted Ukraine to consolidate its democracy, relinquish its nuclear capabilities, integrate more closely in central and Eastern Europe's regional organisations and pursue policies to conform to western expectations. On the other hand, Russia also liked to see Ukraine integrate more closely into CIS structures and to remain within the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, due to its unique geo-political position, just after independence, Ukraine had found itself caught between two conflicting pressures: its desire to join all European institutions, on the one hand, and its close economic dependence on Russia on the other. Thus, finally it can be said that this conflicting pressure really gave birth to the changing nature of Ukraine's east-west policy.

However, in spite of all these, keeping in mind its strategic and geopolitical location Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk had developed good relations with its neighbouring countries. In order to act independently it had also carried on economic and political reforms. Standing for the unity and indivisibility of Europe, Ukraine had also considered the point that the creation of new military political alliances in Eastern Europe as a return to the policy of military

confrontation between opposing blocs and the renewal of bipolarity in Europe is undesirable. Therefore, in order not to lose its national independence as also to maintain its international political stability and territorial integrity Ukraine had preferred to continue its non-aligned status while developing bilateral cooperation with the countries of both NATO and the CIS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- “**CIS Agreements: Agreement on Status of Strategic Forces**”, Documentation, Link, Vol. 34, No. 32, 22 March 1992, Pp. 27-32.
- “**Constitution of Ukraine**”, The Ukrainian Review, Vol.43, No.4, Winter 1996, Pp. 3-54.
- Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press
- Documents and Reports, The Ukrainian Review (Provided by the Ukrainian Central Information Service).
- Summary of World Broadcast

Secondary Sources:

Books

- Albright, David E. and Appatov, Semyen J., eds., **Ukraine and European Security** (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999).
- Allison, Roy and Bluth, Christoph, eds., **Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia** (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Sullivan, Paige, eds., **Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data and Analysis** (New York, Armonk: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
- Bukkvoll, Tor, **Ukraine and European Security** (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Wellington House, 125 Strand, 1997).
- Chander, Prakash and Arora, Prem, **International Relations** (New Delhi: Cosmos Bookhive, Eighteenth Edition, 1999).

- D' Anieri, Paul, **Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations** (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998).
- Dawisha, Adeed and Daw'isha, Karen, eds., **The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** (New York, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), Vol. 4.
- Goncharenko, Alexander, **Ukrainian Russian Relations: An Unequal Partnership**, RUSI Whitehall Paper 32 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1995).
- Gross, Filiks, **Foreign Policy Analysis** (New York, 1954).
- Ham, Peter Van, **Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy**, Chaillot Papers No. 13 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, West European Union, February 1994).
- Jaworsky, John, **The Military–Strategic significance of Recent Developments in Ukraine**, Operational Research and Analysis, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Project Report No. 645 (Ottawa: Dept of National Defence, August 1993).
- Jonson, Lena, ed., **Ukraine and Integration in the East** (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institute, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
- Kumar, Mahendra, **Theoretical Aspects of International Politics** (Agra: Rajiva Offset Press, 1984).
- Kuzio, Taras, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, Washington paper 167 (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies and Praeger, 1995).

- -----, ed., **Contemporary Ukraine** (Armonk, New York; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
- Modelski, George, **A Theory of Foreign Policy** (London, 1962).
- Padelford, Norman J. and Lincoln, George A., **The Dynamics of International Politics**. (New York: Macmillan, 1960).
- Rosenau, James N., **The Study of Foreign Policy** (London: Unwin, Hyman, 1987).

Articles.

- Alexandrova, Olga, "Russia as a Factor in Ukrainian Security Concepts", Aussen Politik, Vol. 45, No.1, 1994, Pp. 68-78.
- Alexandrova, Olga, "The NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev's Euro-Atlantic Integration", Aussen Politik, Vol. 48, No.4, 1997, Pp.325-334.
- Aslund, Anders, "Ukraine's Turnaround", Foreign Policy, Vol. 25, No. 100, 1995, Pp. 125-143.
- Balmaceda, Margarita M, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No.2, 1998. Pp 257-286.
- Blank, Stephen, "Russia, Ukraine and European Security", European Security, Vol. 3, No.1, Spring 1994, Pp. 182-207.
- Brzezinski, Ian, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations-Europeans Neglected Strategic Axis", Survival, Vol. 35, No.3, Autumn 1993, Pp. 26-37.
- Buant, Stephen R, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus", Europe-Asia-Studies, 47 (7), November 1995.

- Chabariivskiy, O., “Deepening Crisis in the CIS”, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XL, No. 4, Winter 1992, Pp.6-7.
- Chenoy, Anuradha M, “**The Commonwealth of Independent States: Easy Come and Easy Go**”, Link, Vol. 34, No.21, January 5, 1992, Pp. 8-9.
- Bill Clinton, “**United States of America and Ukraine: Sharing a Common vision of Freedom and Prosperity**”, Strategic Digest, Vol. 25, No.10, October, 1995.
- Elish, Jason, “**The Ukraine Dilemma’ and U.S. Foreign Policy**”, European Security, Vol.3, No.2, Summer. 1994, Pp. 251-280.
- Foye, Stephen, “**Civil Military Tension in Ukraine**”, REL/RL Research Report, No. 3, No. 25, 18 June 1993.
- Gupta, Rakesh, “**Commonwealth of Independent States Initiated**”, Vol. 34, No.21, Link, January 5, 1992, Pp. 4-7.
- Hasiuk, Oksana, “**Walking The Razors Edge**”, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Winter 1994, Pp. 23-26.
- Horbulin, Volodymyr, “**Ukraine’s Contribution to Security and Stability in Europe**”, NATO Review, Autumn 1998, Pp. 9-12.
- Joshi, Nirmala, “**Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States**”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 10, January 1994, Pp. 1367-76.
- Kosyk, Wolodymyr, “**The Path to Independence**”, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XL, No.3, Autumn 1992, Pp. 3-5.
- Kremen, Vasyl, “**Ukraine Returns to Europe**”, The Ukrainian Review, Vol.44, No.4, Winter 1997, Pp. 28-32.

- Kuzio, Taras, **“Britain Awakens to Ukraine: Europe’s New Strategic Pivot”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 41, No.1, Spring 1996, Pp 18-20.
- -----, **“Leonid Kravchuk –Old Fashioned ‘Little Russian’ Governor or New Ukrainian Hetman ?”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XXXIX, No.3, Autumn –1991, Pp. 7-13.
- -----, **“The Security Service of Ukraine-A Transformed Ukrainian KGB?”**, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.5, No.3, March 1993.
- -----, **“Ukraine and Its Future Security”**, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No.12, December 1993.
- -----, **“Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership”**, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, NO. 2, June 1998, Pp. 1-30.
- -----, **“Ukraine-A New Military Power?”**, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.4, No.2, February 1992.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen, **“Ukraine’s Balancing Act”**, Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 Summer 1996.
- Lindner, Rainer, **“Domestic and Foreign Policy Conditions Behind structural Changes in Ukraine and Blarus”**, Aussen Politic, Vol. 46, No.4, 1995, Pp 365 –375.
- Marchenko, Victor **“Can Kuchma Pull Ukraine out of the Crisis?”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XLI, No.1, Spring 1993, Pp. 7-9.
- Matiaszek, Petro, **“Closer Look at Ukraine’s Constitution”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 43, No.2, Summer 1996, Pp 3-5.

- Mazut, Lubomyt, **“Fifty Years of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 43, No.3, Autumn 1996.
- Molchanov, Mikhail, **“Ukraine Between Russia and NATO: Politics and Security”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol-45, No. 3, Autumn 1998, Pp. 3-16.
- Moroney, Jennifer D.P., **“Lack of Determinancy in Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 45, No.4 Winter 1998.
- Morrison, John, **“Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship”**, International Affairs, Vol. 69, No.4, October 1993, Pp. 677-704.
- Mroz, John Edwin and Pavliuk, Oleksandr, **“Ukraine Europe’s Linchpin”**, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May-June 1996.
- Muravyev, Victor, **“The Formation of Legal Ties Between the European Community and Ukraine”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XL, No. 2, Summer 1993, Pp. 18-27.
- Nabytorych, Ihor, **“Ukraine-NATO-Russia: The Search for Sides in the Trilateral Relations”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol.43, No.4, Winter 1996).
- Pohrebennyk, Volodymyr F., **“The Present Situation In Ukraine”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, Winter 1991, Pp. 3-10.
- Pukhtayevych, Halyna, **“The Current Sate of the Ukrainian Economy Strategy and Reform”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XLII, No. 2, Summer 1994, Pp. 5-13.
- Pyrozhkov, Serhiy, **“Ukraine and NATO”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn 1995.

- Sherr, James, **“Russian-Ukrainian Rapprochement: The Black Sea Fleet Accords”**, Survival, Vol. 39, No.3, Autumn 1997.
- Shevtsov, A.I., **“Ukraine’s Experience and Nuclear Disarmament”**, Review of International Affairs, Feb. 1999, Pp. 15-20.
- Shulman, Stephen, **“Culture in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the Cultural Threat From Abroad”**, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No.2, March 1998.
- Simon Gerhard, **“Problems Facing the Formation of the Ukrainian State”**, Aussen Politik, Vol. 45, No.1, 1994, Pp. 61-67.
- Singh, Swaran, **“Ukraine: An Acid Test fro US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy”**, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 10, January 1994, Pp. 1307-1320.
- Solchanyk, Roman, **“Russian, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy”**, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4, October , December 1993, Pp. 337-365.
- Stepanenko, Viktor, **“Ukrainian Independence: First Results and Lessons”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. SLI, No. 2, Summer 1993, Pp. 3-7.
- Tarapacky, Tanya, **“A Brief Over-view of Ukraine’s International Position”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XL, No. 4, Winter 1992, Pp. 3-5.
- Tolpygo, A.K., **“Ukrainian Political Ideologies”**, Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 36, No.5, Sep-Oct. 1995.
- Tolstov, Serhiy , **“International System After Cold war: Ukraine in the Context of European Transformation Process”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol.46, No1, Spring 1999.

- Tolstov, Serhiy and Potekhin, Oleksandr, **“Ukrainian Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Political Thought”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No.4, Winter 1997.
- Tolstov, Serhiy, **“International Factors of Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. XLII, No. 1, Spring 1994, Pp. 5-20.
- Tolstov, Serhiy, **“NATO Enlargement: The Ukrainian Position”** The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 43, No.2, Summer 1996.
- Tolstov, Serhiy, **“Ukraine’s Foreign Policy: Course Correction or Change of Priorities”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 42, No.1, Spring 1995.
- Udovenko, Hennadiy, **“European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine’s Perspective”**, NATO Review, Vol. 43, No.6, November 1995, Pp. 15-18.
- Wolczuk, Roman, **“Relations Between Ukraine and Romania in the context of NATO Enlargement”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No.4), Winter, 1997.
- -----, **“Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 1997.
- -----, **“Ukraine in the Context of NATO Enlargement”**, The Ukrainian Review, Vol.44, No.3, Autumn 1997.

Journals, Periodical and News papers

Journals / Periodicals

- *The Journal of Strategic Studies.*
- *The British Journal of Politics and Internal Relations.*

- *Monthly Journal of Strategic Analysis.*
- *Europe- Asia studies.*
- *Survival.*
- *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues.*
- *Post-Soviet Affairs.*
- *NATO-Review.*
- *The Ukrainian Review.*

Newspapers

- *International Herald Tribune*
- *The Hindu, Delhi.*
- *The Economic Times.*
- *The Statesman.*
- *The Times of India*

Websites:

<http://www.cns.miis.edu>.

<http://www.rurasianet.org>.

<http://www.russia.shaps.hawaii.edu>

<http://www.csd.org/96Book/udovenko.htm-16k>.

<http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/studies/volume-2/content.htm-22k>.

<http://www.ForeignAffairs.org/1993/3html-34k>