COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BRITISH AND INDIAN

EXPERIENCES

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **"COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BRITISH AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES"** submitted by **AMAR JYOTI ACHARYA** is his own work and has not been submitted to any other University or institution or for any other diploma or degree.

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COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

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

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Transnational terrorism, like transnational crime, presents the problem of verification since it does not operate openly like the registered corporate houses with a public audit of its activities and finances. In the face of the difficulties of verification, it is useful to look at the various processes of change that are at play to identify the particular challenge of transnational terrorism, and its relative success. The challenge is to identify permissive causes within states and locate the proximate causes that transnational terrorism exploits.

The transnational nature of contemporary terrorism also presents another kind of analytical problem not captured by traditional security frameworks, although transnational terrorism has been securitized after 11 September 2001. Traditional security frameworks, even the expanded version by Buzan et al, are concerned with states, with security threats seen from a state or a group of states to another state or group of states. The transnational nature of the kind of terrorism that the Al-Qaeda represents is unique in its organization and functioning and may rightly be called post-modern terrorism, even as it is rabidly anti-modern. It is a security threat from a non-state entity dispersed far and wide geographically. The threat that it presents to states is direct and particularly insidious owing to its leaderless organization that consists of phantom cells, networked globally in a digitally integrated world. Its second danger arises from its riding on the wave of religious fanaticism currently sweeping the world, and inviting disparate elements in its rabid war against the liberal democratic world.

The difference between international, multinational, and transnational lies in the location of the main body or bodies. Transnational indicates an absence of any particular location whose destruction may also destroy the entity. Transnational

terrorism indicates a widely dispersed cellular organization that is amorphous and where disruption does not mean destruction. To get at transnational terrorism analytically necessarily involves studying the processes that make its existence possible and including culture via religion as an important variable. In other words, studying transnational terrorism is the study of a global movement. The factors at work are many, and the approach needs to be transdisciplinary, i.e. eclectic.

As Galtung has pointed out, any analysis or understanding of conflicts necessitates an understanding of the deep culture or cosmology (subconsciously held collective beliefs and assumptions of a society). Understanding the deep culture in turn requires a transdisciplinary approach since it deals with as varied topics as history, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, and even philosophy. An approach is not equal to the actual tools used, but indicates the background work that informs the use of the tools at hand. It is in this sense that the methodology used in this work is descriptive-analytical. The tools of analysis are descriptive-analytical, while the approach is eclectic. The simple reason is that the relationship between transnational terrorism on one side and Britain and India on the other, are conflictual. Both Britain and India have internal conflicts that have international dimensions, with India having the added challenge of its internal conflicts also having acquired transnational characteristics amidst growing religious fundamentalism in Indian society. Since contemporary transnational terrorism is anti-modern, a meaningful understanding of the phenomenon necessitates understanding that what constitutes anti-modern. An eclectic approach thus becomes imperative for the topic at hand.

It is with such an understanding that the first chapter looks at the implications for analysis of transnational terrorism. The second chapter is organized around the definitional problem of terrorism and attempts to delineate the nature of contemporary

transnational terrorism, which is qualitatively different than, say ethno-national terrorism.

The third chapter looks at the problem of transnational terrorism in Britain and is arranged in three sections. The first section looks at the problem in Northern Ireland and tries to identify the permissive and proximate causes of the conflict that has engendered Irish terrorism. The second section looks at transnational terrorism in Britain and its permissive causes, and the third section looks at the responses by the British state. The fourth chapter is again organized in three sections. The first section looks at the problem in Jammu & Kashmir and the permissive and proximate causes of the conflict. The second section looks at the nature of terrorism in Punjab and its permissive and proximate causes. The third section looks at the responses of the Indian state. The fifth and concluding chapter is organized around a comparison of the experiences of the two states, drawing largely from the insights drawn from the previous chapters. The concluding chapter closes the argument about the nature of transnational terrorism and looks at the scope and challenges of Indo-British co-operation in combating terrorism.

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Chapter I

IN PERSPECTIVE

September 11, 2001 or 9/11 will remain the first incident of international terrorism that aptly summarises post-modern or new terrorism.[1] In scale and ingenuity as well as the psychological impact that was felt across the globe, 9/11 was the first major terrorist strike (transmitted live worldwide) in the new century. According to Richard Falk, the future of humankind may very well belong to the *Terrorists*.[2] The terrorist may be connected to the technocrat (victim of technological determinism leading to a belief that technology alone is the answer to all human problems) as well as the traditionalist (the belief that going back to the traditional pre-modern way of life is the answer to contemporary problems of radical/alienated individualism and consumerism). 9/11 has made any such assessment psychologically more potent and academically more challenging than ever before. So much so, that September 11, 2001 has become a specific date that has defined a historical crisis shared by the world.[3] It is a historical crisis that is changing world politics in more ways than one.[4]

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[1] The term international terrorism and transnational terrorism will be used interchangeably. It can be argued that a semantic difference is evident between 'inter'- national and 'trans'- national, where 'international' evokes images of relations between two or more 'nations', 'transnational' means across nations evoking an image of more overarching umbrella-networked relations that spans the globe. Here the use of international terrorism is made in the sense of transnational terrorism since in common parlance the term international terrorism is used more frequently, with the term transnational terrorism coming under academic focus more recently.

[2] Richard Falk, *The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations* (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), pp. 1-33.

[3] Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, "Worlds in Collision", in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds *Worlds in Collision* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-23.

[4] A very recent indicator of such a change was the war in Iraq led by the United States that bypassed the United Nations Security Council. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his presentation to the UN Security Council for making a case for war on Iraq on 05 February 2003 categorically stated that post 9/11 (or September 11, 2001) the world was a different place with reference to how the United States viewed the world. Source: CNN live coverage of the Security Council Meeting on 05 February 2003.

What is central to Falk's concern in envisaging the startling scenarios for our future is the very nature of the contemporary world system, and assumptions that undergird it. His concerns mirror the concerns of other scholars who look at terrorism in a critical vein – as emotional or/and rational reactions to the nature of the present world order and the ideas that propel it through.[5] While Falk mentions *terrorists*, along with *technocrats*, *traditionalists*, and *ecological fanatics* that may feed off one another to claim our future, the interlinkages between the nature of the present world order and Falk's probable inheritors of our world involve deep issues in politics, political theory, and the ubiquity of the problem of violence in human life. It is an interesting phenomenon that contemporary international terrorism, rise of religious fanaticisms, and criticisms of modernity *qua* the 'West' appear as synchronous activities in historical time.

However, terrorists actually span a large category of what Falk mentions. Terrorists can and do come from the traditionalists as well, or what Barber calls disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism.[6] They can and do come from religious groups that are engaged in identity conflicts arising from political concerns with historical roots, in what Juergensmeyer and Appleby identify as religious terrorism.[7] Contemporary International Terrorisms[8] that confound Britain[9] and India have their roots in these kinds of terrorisms arising from ethnicity, culture and/or religion.

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[5] See Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001 Edition). Also see Peter C. Sederberg, *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989); R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris, eds *Violence, Terrorism and Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lawerence Freedman, ed., *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002); Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).

[6] Ibid, Barber, pp. x-xxxii.

[7] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); Also see Juergensmeyer, *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular* State (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of The Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).

[8] The use of plural here is deliberate because of the plural nature of international terrorism. It can be state-sponsored and/or it can acquire transnational dimensions with a global agenda, if not reach. State

Combating terrorism meaningfully would need to address the issues that are raised. Going by the level of dissent – terrorism can be seen as occupying the extreme and unacceptable level – and criticisms that abound, a sifting of core issues at hand becomes imperative. The nature and scope of terrorism has undergone many changes from its earlier incarnations, making classifications all the more difficult, and the motives and objectives even more bewildering, if not only global. As Walter Lacquer puts it:

> Scanning the contemporary scene, one encounters a bewildering multiplicity of terrorist and potentially terrorist groups and sects. The practitioners of terrorism as we have known it to this point were nationalists and anarchists, extremists of the left and the right. But the new age has brought new inspiration for the users of violence alongwith the old.[10]

However, it is not only contemporary terrorism that is challenging the idea of the (secular) state and modernity, but also criticisms within academia, alongwith religious fundamentalism. The common rhetorical ends that they reach need to be understood if terrorism has to be combated meaningfully.

PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS & UNDERSTANDING

Contemporary International Terrorism presents an analytical challenge that goes beyond the definitional problem of terrorism. Conventional thinking about security and world politics conjures up images of states whose interactions form a system that is composed

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sponsored terrorism (as proxy & cheap warfare) would be limited to a security complex that usually needs to be regional as well, usually involving two states. International terrorism as transnational terrorism (like the Al-Qaeda network) is a different kind of international terrorism than the typically state-sponsored ones.

[9] By Britain here is meant the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Great Britain comprises England, Scotland and Wales.

[10] Walter Lacquer, "Postmodern Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), volume 75, number 5, September/October (1996), pp. 24-36.

of a structure. [11] The states form the interacting units of this structure. Between the units, that is the state, and the World System are the subsystems or groups of units within the system that may additionally also be regional. Subunits denote organized groups of individuals within units "that are able (or try) to affect the behaviour of the unit (for example bureaucracies, lobbies)." Individuals form the bottom level of analysis and together form the collective 'community of power' of which the state is an expression and whom the state ostensibly secures.[12] These form the classical levels of analysis in world politics.

In the compendium of levels of analysis, systemic level (meaning at the world system level) theories like Neo-Realism of Kenneth Waltz rely on certain abstractions when defining the world structure. Abstractions here mean leaving aside the characteristics of units, their behaviour, and their interactions. It also means abstracting from the attributes of units or leaving aside questions about the kinds of political leaders, socio-economic institutions and ideological commitments of states. It also leaves aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states. It is about ignoring how units relate to one another, and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, that is, how they are arranged or positioned in the structure.[13] The assumption here is of "like units", which means that no functional differentiation

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[11] Here the term *World Politics* is used instead of the more common *International Relations* that has come to denote inter-state (that may or may not also be nations) relations. The origin of the term 'international relations is attributed to Jeremy Bentham, the English Utilitarian, who used the term as a translation of the term *ius gentium* used by the Romans to refer to their corpus of rules in their relations with tribes of Italy and other parts of their empire. See F.S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), pp. 15-16.

[12] Barry Buzan, et al, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp.1-20. Also, see Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (New Delhi: Transasia Publishers, 1987), pp. 18-34. Buzan puts the problematic of individual security being a cognate concept of national security, where the state by itself can become a source of individual insecurity.

[13] Kenneth Waltz, "Political Structures", in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 70-97. Also, see by Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

exists among the major units at least. According to Waltz, "The states that are the units of international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness."[14] Moreover, "States are alike in the tasks that they face though not in their ability to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function."[15] What it means is that, "So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them."[16]

With the major states being the definitive force in terms of the structure at the systemic level, the outcome is seen directly in Afghanistan and Iraq. Post-September 11, 2001 international terrorism is recognised as a systemic level security issue.[17] The important factor here is that transnational terrorism is a non-state actor, with sufficient impact on the system to be considered a systemic security threat. The interactions of units in themselves (except the behaviour of major units) do not change the structure of the system. However, when the present world structure has a single most powerful unit like the United States as a hyper-power, its securitizing of transnational terrorism has system-wide ramifications. The shift in perceptions, that securitizing the issue reflects, has an impact on how other secondary units interact on the issue area. The location of transnational terrorism in states where it finds sympathy means that motives and ideological preferences of the particular units are important indicators, but are ignored in a systemic analysis. This is a limitation of the systemic model of analysis.

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[14] Ibid, p. 87.

[15] Ibid, p. 91.

[16] Ibid, p. 89.

[17] While the nature of the system has not changed, that is, there is no further change in the structure of the new world order (post-Soviet collapse, post-Gulf war-I, and post-Kosovo), the securitizing of international terrorism by the hyper-power has meant that it is recognised as a threat to systemic security threat.

New legislations were passed both in Britain (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 or ATCSA) and in India (The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 or POTA). Both were, in part, reactions to the kind of international terrorism that ravaged the United States on September 11, 2001 (both the acts give the states greater power and represent a curtailment of freedom of their citizens). While terrorism has been one of the many security concerns of world politics even as early as the League of the Nations, International Terrorism has been *securitized* in world politics after September11, 2001 (Security Council Resolution 1373, amongst other related resolutions). The *securitizing* of terrorism by Britain and India (along with other states) throws up some key issues of analysis.[18] "'Security' is the move that takes politics *beyond the established rules of the game* and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitizing can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization."[19] The process of *securitization* is said to be a speech act, that is, it becomes an act when uttered. It has a referent object, that is, things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival; Securitizing actor, that is those who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened; and functional actors, that is, actors who affect the dynamics of a sector (or multiple sectors – in this case terrorist organizations). It also needs an audience that it depends upon for being successful, that is, those on whose behalf the state purports to act.[20]

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[18] Terrorism as a security issue is however older in India where in terms of civilian targeted nature of terrorism, India is easily the most terrorist-battered state in the world. See Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.15.

[19] Buzan, et al, n. 12, pp. 21-47. Emphasis added.

[20] Ibid, pp.1-20.

All states are interdependent from a security point of view. However, security interdependence is more intense among states that form a part of a security complex than among states outside them. Security complex is defined as *a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.*[21] Conventional security analysis usually concerns itself with the security of the state and is criticized for encouraging a state-centric perspective that plays into the inside-outside dichotomy marked by the modern imagination of the world system.[22]

In the security parlance of Buzan, *et al*, sub-units or organized groups of individuals within the units or states form a level of analysis also as far as they affect or attempt to affect the behaviour of the unit. In conventional politics, such sub-units usually arise from the civil societies that flourish in the *free space* of democracies. This *free space* denotes immediately the rights of citizens to participate along with the responsibilities of citizenship and form the "settings between private lives and large-scale institutions where ordinary citizens can act with dignity, independence, and vision."[23] Conventionally, transnational relation consists of interactions between these sub-units located within states but usually acting without, in a web of network. Studying security in the context of international terrorism means that international terrorism is the functional actor here, in its incarnation as a transnational force.

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[21] Ibid. Emphasis added.

[22] R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 125-140.

[23] Sara M. Evans & Harry C. Boyte, *Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1986), pp. 17-25.
The free space in democracies engenders the civil society. Civil society connotes "those areas of social life, viz. the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities, and political interaction which are organized by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state." See David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State* (New Delhi: Maya Polity, 1998), Indian reprint, p. 6.

Transnational relation is defined as the "*regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.*"[24] Transnational or international terrorism is thus a network or networks of sub-units across the globe, working in contra-distinction to what conventional transnational networks or groups stand for. It is important to note that the basis for transnational relations (such as the Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, Amnesty International, etc.) is the *civil society* that occupies the *free space* within democratic units, and as such imply a certain normative underpinning to their functions, objectives as well as the manner and nature of their interactions.[25] Transnational terrorism represents a network of morbid ties between subunits within states and belongs to the realm of international '*un*civil society' that sees itself at war with modernity. While transnational terrorism may be 'normative' principle-based, i.e., it apparently has a set of beliefs about how human interactions should be conducted, the norms that it apparently subscribes to are antithetical of democracy, politics, and humanity as conventionally understood. Yet because it is observed that transnational ties that unite individuals across state borders are stronger than common citizenship,[26] the manipulation of religion/culture by contemporary terrorism to find its recruits makes the threat of contemporary transnational terrorism more acute.

Securitizing terrorism then means moving away from the conventionally state-centric perspective of looking at security (as inter-state security problematic), and expanding

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[24] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction" in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3. Emphasis in original.

[25] Transnational relations that are knowledge-based or normative principle-based can have a major impact on the global diffusion of values, norms, and ideas. Ibid, p.4.

[26] See Johan Galtung, "The Nonterritorial System: Nonterritorial Actors", in Richard Falk, et al, eds *Towards A Just World Order* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), Volume 1, pp. 98-112.

the conceptual net to include transnational networks *qua* international terrorism as a functional actor. Secondly, the nature of transnational terrorism as a network of radical sub-units means a breach of the state from both within and without. As a security issue, studying transnational terrorism means taking into account state attributes as well. It also involves elucidation of issues that makes terrorism a functional actor, with the state as the referent point. Since the rise of religious fundamentalism is seen as synchronous activities alongwith contemporary international terrorism, understanding the fault lines help to locate the rhetoric of terrorism and its various sites.

Criticisms of modernity and the politics of imaginations

Modernity as a project (with the state-system as its product) has been attracting widespread criticisms, in what is known largely as the critical and post-modern viewpoints within academia.[27] These viewpoints generally problematise the universalistic assumptions of modernity as a project that began in what is called the *enlightenment* period in European history. Modernity, with all its historicity and thus attendant complexities, has come to denote a certain knowledge system that revolves around three crucial pegs: It has come to denote an idea of an 'objective self' or the idea of the self that is abstracted from the particularities and contingencies of history and circumstance. This objective self is assumed to work with reason (seen as critical rationality or what is also called instrumental rationality) to reach some objective truth in the world (largely interpreted as physicality of modern science).[28]

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[27] There is a large corpus of literature within world politics that criticise modernity from various perspectives. For a useful work that problematises modernity and the state system, see David Campbell & Michael Dillon, eds *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). For an useful overview of modernity and postmdernity, see Lawerence E. Cahoone, ed., *From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997), reprint.

[28] Ibid. Also, see Michael Luntley, *Reason, Truth and Self: the Postmodern Reconditioned* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 150-196; Ashish Nandy, ed., *Science, Hegemony and Violence* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

By locating modernity in the particularity of European experience, these criticisms have helped bring alternative imaginations within academic focus. Emanating largely within established disciplines, as exercises of self-criticism, such voices have become the articulation of dissent against not only disciplinary orthodoxies, but also are largely directed against ideational and material hegemony of *modernity*. For example, a serious criticism of the valorisation of abstractions, seen as necessary in neorealism, understands such abstractions as "premised on a desire to escape history, to efface the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era."[29] This finds an echo in Diamond according to whom, "the original crimes of civilizations, conquest and political repression, were committed in silence and that is still their intention, if not always their result."[30] According to Jim George, contemporary world politics and its problems are linked to a particular reading of reality:

> [International Relations] resonates with the problems, tensions, paradoxes, and potentials intrinsic to a dominant modernist agenda. These problems include a dichotomized frame of reference at all analytical levels (e.g., subject/object, fact/value, is/ought, self/other, domestic/international, Realist/Idealist); an objectivist, linear sense of (Western) history; essentialist reading/writing practices; universalist strategies of categorization, definition, and exclusion; and a dangerously restrictive understanding of knowledge and reality that, in effectively detaching the observer/analyst from the vicissitudes of the world "out there," abrogates social and individual responsibility to one (perceived) irreducible foundational source or another (e.g., structural anarchy, human nature, historical recurrence and repetition).[31]

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[29] Sankaran Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", *Alternatives,* (Boulder, Colorado), volume 26, number 4, Oct-Dec (2001), pp. 401-424.

[30] Stanley Diamond, "Civilization And Progress" in Richard Falk, et al, eds *Toward A Just World Order* Volume 1 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp.84-97.

[31] Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), preface, x.

What George points out is a near-summary of the kind of criticisms that modernity as a project is attracting within academia. It also points to a growing criticism of the world structure (political & economic) as culturally determined in a deeper sense, and thus open to criticisms from other civilizational matrices that purport to have an alternative viewpoint.[32] The implications are deeply political as well since modernity and liberal democracy are said to be intrinsically linked together. According to Ian Thompson:

> In the liberal doctrine of mankind, 'ratio' or dominative critical reason which is concerned with calculating the means to satisfy human need (and greed) comes to take precedence over (or even replace) 'intellectus', the reflective and contemplative intellect which is concerned with the common good and the ultimate ends of human life. The links between the liberal doctrine of reason and utilitarianism are not accidental. The rejection of super-natural or metaphysical source of reasoning and value in human life, in both rationalism and empiricism, and the attempt to find this either in the inherent structures of reason itself or the social contracts fabricated by the conventions of autonomous rational beings, leads inevitably from Descartes and Locke to the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.[33]

Moreover, the conceptions of the modern objective self that uses reason to arrive at the objective truth, by its very logic is said to engender democracy, even if the working practices do not often add up to the principle of objective knowledge that engenders the

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[32] An important work in this regard, though not overtly a cultural exposition, is by J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993). Blaut posits the present reading of the world as a tunnelled vision informed by ideological determinism that has come about in history because of the colonial experience of the world. He calls it as "a Eurocentric vision" of the world. Said has forwarded a similar concept in what he calls "Orientalism", though it focuses on West Asia and neglects other important regions like India. See, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). Also by Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Also see Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Stephanie Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Richard Falk, et al, eds *Toward A Just World Order*, Volume 1(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

[33] Ian Thompson, "Liberal Values and Power Politics", in Howard Davis, ed., *Ethics and Defence: Power and Responsibility in the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), pp. 82-102.

spirit of scientific endeavour in scientific and academic communities.[34] The argument that liberal democracy as a product of modernity is culturally specific to the 'West' is however not new.[35] The upshot of the criticisms of modernity and its universalist aspirations is that as cultural products (within the historicity of 'Western' civilization), liberal democracy may not legitimately aspire to become a global standard. The implications then seem to leave ground open for other cultures to seek different political expressions (if not organization, since the state-system is a global reality) that may be truer to their particular values. As largely critiques of modernity and the practices it has engendered, and the search for alternatives to it, this forms a broad process within world politics, summed up in what Cornel West calls the new cultural politics of difference.[36]

Culture as a variable

Conventional understandings of world politics hide the underlying processes that cause transnational terrorism to find its supportive audience. Religion, for example, is one aspect neglected in the studies of world politics *qua* International Relations. Analysis has to take into account culture (via religion as an important site of culture as well as its expression), especially in states that fall into the ambit of Islamic civilizational block.[37]

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[34] Michael Luntley, *Reason, Truth and Self: The Postmodern Reconditioned* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 148-149.

[35] Lee Kuan Yew, the patriarch of Singapore, emphasised upon cultural differences between Confucianism and western values as justification for authoritarianism. See Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew", in James F. Hoge, Jr., and Fareed Zakaria, eds *The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 604-618.

[36] Cornel West, "The New Cultural Politics of Difference", in Simon During, ed., *The Cultural Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 1999 reprint), pp.203-217.

[37] It is not to equate Islam with terrorism, but rather those sects that use Islam to recruit terrorists and carry out terrorist activities. While terrorism comes in many guises, Islamist terrorism occupies attention and a large part of what goes by international terrorism today. See Peter Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Hants, U.K.), volume 53, number 2 (1999), pp. 151-167; Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, eds *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld:*

By culture is meant "those habits in individuals that have become customary, conventionalized, and accepted in the community". These are 'transmitted' from one generation to another as set of beliefs, and also 'diffused' from one culture to another, i.e., accepted and 'incorporated into the traditional culture complex of the community' in which it has been 'diffused'.[38] In other words, we can refer to culture as socially shared knowledge[39] that also interacts with other cultures via diffusion. By civilization is meant an *ongoing process* in the 'crystallization of a world of concepts and ideas' to form a 'cosmos' or a world picture that informs what is considered to be universally valid.[40] Huntington provides a civilizational framework that while being systemic in scope, moves outside the material framework to include culture/civilization as the defining variable. His analysis attracted widespread scrutiny as it posited that future conflicts would move around cultural and civilizational referent points, and not states as traditionally assumed.[41] According to Huntington, "culture is both a divisive and a unifying force. People separated by ideology but united by culture come together",[42] leading to what he calls a possible tribal conflict on a global scale since, "Civilizations

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Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001 Edition); R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000); David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London: Pearson Education Ltd., 2002); Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[38] Robert E. Park, "The Problem of Cultural Differences"(1931), in John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, eds *Classical Readings In Culture And Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 216-24.

[39] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 141 & pp. 157-165.

[40] See Alfred Weber, "Fundamentals of Culture-Sociology: Social Process, Civilizational Process and Culture Movement" (1921), in John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, eds, n. 38, pp. 191-215. Although Weber refers to civilization as a universal aspiration within which culture forms the differentiations that lends to culturally distinct communities by their particular modes of habits, civilization is used in a narrower sense here to refer to particular world views or civilizational cosmos, which lends to beliefs of universality of the particular world view within the civilization.

[41] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India (P) Ltd., 1997).

[42] Ibid, p.28.

are the ultimate human tribes".[43] According to Galtung, "...the major causal direction for violence is from culture via politics and economics to the military than vice versa."[44] Galtung lays an emphasis on the deep culture or what he calls the cosmology as an important area of analysis to understand conflicts and violence:

> The deep culture or cosmology [the collectively shared, but usually only at the subconscious level, assumptions in a culture about what is natural and normal; how things simply are] of a civilization obviously conditions not only the perception of conflict life-cycles, but also the actual behaviour in conflict, with a major bearing on conflict transformation. The level of knowledge of this factor, by participants or outsiders, will also affect the outcome. That level is not necessarily higher among insiders than outsiders to the civilization, since cosmology by definition is rooted in the collective subconscious, not in the individual consciousness. For any student of human conflict, this type of knowledge is essential. [45]

Cultural violence is referred to as those *aspects* of culture, 'the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science' – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.[46] Contemporary international terrorism can be seen either as an outcome of these differences or successfully exploiting the differences that clearly exist between different religions, and between religion and secularism as contending forces of order.

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[43] Ibid, pp. 207-245.

[44] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and* Civilization (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 1-23.

[45] Ibid, pp. 81-88.

[46] Ibid, pp. 196-210. This then brings under scrutiny structural norms and practices that then have an inbuilt cultural bias and that which the cultural politics of difference problematises.

Religious Nationalism vs. Secular nationalism

Religion, in particular societies can and do also become the ordering principle where the state (as an idea of secular modernity) needs to come to grips with religion that may differ with the fundamental principles underlying the Weberian state.[47] Religion is important because it forms the psychological premium or the filter through which one views the world. Religion is a belief system that constitutes the sense of self-identity in most people, and hence beyond 'pragmatism'.[48] There is a need to know the relationship between cultural/religious factors and international conflicts since the "exclusivity of religious-based differences derives from the fact that they reflect divergent views on fundamental issues of human existence, such as the nature of life and the fundamental ordering principles of self, family, and society, as well as issues of eschatology and salvation."[49]

A useful work by Reza Nasr studies the role of Islam in Pakistani and Malaysian societies, where the state has used Islam to strengthen itself. According to Reza Nasr, the state in Pakistan used religion to strengthen itself in an attempt to take away the edge of Islamic fundamentalists in their opposition to modernity seen as "westernization". There is little doubt that ruling regimes and disparate social and political actors alike are pushed in the direction of Islamic politics by Islamist forces. Using Islam to strengthen state control is said to have helped the state to take its project

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[47] Religion is said to have an important role in state formation within Europe where the process of state formation using religion resulted in the state assuming the 'requisite religious and cultural guise'. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 18-19. However, the 'modern' state in being secular by definition separated politics from religion. This is something the Islamic states have not been able to do so.

[48] See Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations", *International Studies Review* (Malden, Massachusetts), volume 3, issue 3, Fall (2001), pp. 53-73. Fox salvages religion as an important variable within 'International Relations' studies.

[49] See Errol A. Henderson & Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict", *International Studies Quarterly* (Malden, Massachusetts), volume 45, (2001), pp. 317-338.

of development further without surrendering state control to the Islamic fundamentalist forces.[50] As Reza Nasr puts it, "The exercise of authority is ineluctably entwined with the trappings of culture. Culture provides politics with its repertoire of symbols that connote authority."[51] This is particularly true of postcolonial states where elite manipulation of cultural symbols form politically induced cultural change. This change takes place in a process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select convenient aspects of the group's culture, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group into their constituencies. According to Brass:

> The cultural forms, values, and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in competition for political power and economic advantage. They become symbols and referents for the identification of members of the group, which are called up in order to create a political identity more easily.[52]

The case of Islamic states using religion has meant a 'problematic of the secularization process' whereby 'it did not seek to separate religion from politics so much as it sought to dominate religion, making its thinking and institutions subservient to the state.'[53] This led, according to Reza Nasr, to the strengthening of the role of Islam in politics in a contradiction of the outward secular image of the state.[54] Secularization, as a concept and process owes its origins to liberalism. The principal factor was the emphasis on

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[50] See Nasr, n. 47.

[51] Ibid, p.7. A realisation that has forced Reza Nasr to expand the theoretical framework of New Institutionalism to include culture as a variable in understanding the Islamic phenomenon in Pakistan and Malaysia.

[52] Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 1991), p. 15.

[53] Nasr, n. 47, pp. 18-28.

[54] Ibid. Reza Nasr posits three typologies of Islamic states. The rejectionist secularists (Turkey & Algeria); the opportunist Islamizers (Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia); and the thoroughgoing Islamizers (Pakistan & Malaysia). Here, according to Reza Nasr, Islamization is not merely about Islam but also about the state.

reason and the liberal doctrine of individual freedom.[55] The ultimate claim of liberalism was 'religion and medieval religious orthodoxy'. [56] Closely tied to the notion of individual liberty was the natural corollary of religious freedom and the right to be irreligious. Or, in more general terms, liberalism championed the right to dissent from prevailing opinion. The birth of modern liberal democracy is said to be tied to this inalienable individual right, since this necessitated the 'creation of institutions, privileges, customs of the state and society' that would not and could not impinge upon the right of the individual to dissent.[57] In other words, the liberal state had to be a secular state. Secularization, understood as freedom from religious tyranny, arose as the right of individuals and their equality before the law. According to Chadwick, the secularization of Europe meant the conception and creation of a state and society where no pressure was exerted "in favour of one religion rather than another religion; a state in which no social or educational pressure is exerted in favour of one religion rather than another religion or no religion; a state wholly detached from religious (or irreligious) teaching or practice."[58]

In contrast, the appropriation of religion by the state leading finally to the appropriation of the state by religion, as Reza Nasr indicates in the case of Pakistan, however needs a distinction to be recognised between religious traditions and particular interpretations of it to avoid the stereotyping of any particular religion. According to Appleby, a

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[55] The difference between rational and intelligent is that by rational, within modernity, is meant the instrumental use of reason to satisfy human need, whereas intelligence is the contemplative aspect that concerns itself with the larger welfare and ultimate ends of human life. See Ian Thompson, "Liberal Values and Power Politics", in Howard Davis, ed., *Ethics and Defence: Power and Responsibility in the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), pp. 82-102.

[56] Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 24-35.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

"religious tradition is a vast and complex body of wisdom built up over many generations." Its foundational sources "express and interpret the experiences of the sacred that led to the formation of the religious community" and a religious tradition is not less but 'is always more' than these sources. To be traditional means to "take seriously those developments that achieved authoritative status because they probed, clarified, and developed the insights and teachings contained in the foundational sources." Religious extremists on the other hand tend to be 'highly selective in choosing the subtraditions' they champion. The large case of young and the religious illiterate in any society, i.e., those not so well tutored about their own religious traditions, fall easy victim to the arguments forwarded by the extremists 'based on scriptures and doctrines carefully chosen for their seeming endorsement of violence or ambivalence of its use.'[59] The identification of religious nationalism as a contending ideology of order, and the concomitant emergence of religious fundamentalist terrorism, need to be understood in the light of the above qualification.[60]

Having entered the caveat about religious traditions, it is important to note that religion and its retreat to the private sphere is intrinsic to liberal democracy with its emphasis on the right of opinion of the individual as the right to dissent, in terms of not only religious expression, but also the irreligious. Secularization has been the direct product

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[59] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 13-19.

[60] "Fundamentalism is understood as both a religious response to the marginalization of religion and an accompanying pattern of religious activism with certain specifiable characteristics. A fundamentalist movement comes into being in response to, and remains primarily concerned with the restoration of religious hegemony." Ibid, p.101. However, Scott makes a distinction between religious fundamentalism and extremism to the effect that if religious extremism is not overtly concerned with the achievement of hegemony of religion, it may not be called fundamentalism. However, militant fundamentalism and religious terrorism are synonymous in contemporary parlance since they both achieve the denial of modernity and democracy. Here, by fundamentalism is meant militant fundamentalism seen as synonymous to religious terrorism.

of liberalism and the idea of liberal democracy within modernity.[61] The emphasis on religion, in terms of any particular religion, as the defining characteristic of the state then is a rejection of the liberal idea of individual freedom that informs liberal democracy. The flow-out of this rejection spills over to the issue of human rights as well since human rights as understood within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (that prefers democracy as essential to the ensuring of human rights), is the liberal notion of individual freedom.[62]

Systemic Socialization

Moreover, for religion (here Islam) to become the defining state attribute has yet another implication for analysis. According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, power is exercised by a hegemonic power in the world system "through a process of socialization in which norms and value orientations of leaders in secondary states change and more closely reflect those of the dominant state."[63] This comes about in the use of various mechanisms by the dominant power such as normative persuasion, external inducement, and internal reconstruction. However, elite receptivity to norms articulated by the hegemonic power is considered essential to the socialization process in world politics. Apart from the obvious material rewards/punishment scheme, a hegemon exercises power, according to Ikenberry and Kupchan, by:

> ...altering the *substantive beliefs* of leaders in other nations. Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as their own –

[61] Chadwick, n 56, pp. 24-35.

[62] The issue of human rights have been increasingly gaining prominence as the marker of a state's performance and is a strong normative principle within world politics. The 1993 World Human Rights Conference gave birth to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights or UNHCR. As the right of the individual, human rights remain a liberal value.

[63] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power", *International Organization*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts), volume 44, number 3 (1990), pp. 283-315.

> that is, when they internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system. These norms and value orientations occupy the analytic dimension that lies between deep philosophical beliefs about human nature and more narrow beliefs about what set of policies will maximize short-term interests, and they therefore serve to guide state behaviour and shape the agenda from which elites choose specific policies.[64]

Whether or not we count the United States of America as a hegemon in the contemporary era, it certainly is the single most powerful state the earth has ever known. Post-September 11, 2001 reactions of the world leaders only emphasize its pre-eminent role that the recent war in Iraq (2003) has only underlined thickly. It certainly occupies the role of the dominant state in the world system where every other state is a secondary or tertiary power.

According to Kissinger, an international order is legitimate if all the major powers accept it, and revolutionary, if one or more of the major powers reject it. In contrast to a legitimate order, a revolutionary order would be where one or more of the major states refuse to interact with other states according to the conventional rules of the game.[65] If so, where would we place the continuum of states who have embraced Islam as the dominant ideological framework? *Both religion and secular nationalism are ideologies of order and thus rivals.*[66] While it is true that none of the Islamic states count as a major power in the present structure, the growth of Islam as the ideological framework for such states puts forth questions that need to be taken into account. Islam continues to attract both the populace and the elites of many countries as an alternate ideological

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Books, 1957), pp. 316-20.

[66] See Mark Juergensmeyer, *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 26-41. Juergensmeyer posits the possibility of a global confrontation between the two competing ideologies.

framework within which they would prefer to function. Since the crucial element to systemic viability and stability is socialization,[67] this discontinuity, marked by the rise of religious nationalism means that more than one force of socialization is at play in the system. While systemic imperatives, measured in terms of material capabilities of the major powers and the dominant power, may be the constraining force that keeps the system from turning overtly into a "revolutionary" one, it does not do away with the fact that a strong alternative force is at play here, perhaps elucidated by Huntington's thesis of a clash of civilizations.

By the logic of hegemonic socialization and systemic imperatives of it,[68] Islam as an ideologically dominant force in Islamic countries then presents a different set of socialization that is in contra-distinction to the ideas of liberal-democracy that is espoused by the system hegemon. However, for systemic socialization to take place, interactions among units are equally important since the systemic structure that Waltz refers to depend upon reiterative interactions of the units to come into existence. This aspect also then needs to be taken into consideration. One useful way to incorporate this would be to look at structures as both macro (or systemic in the sense of neorealism) and micro, where interactions form a distinct level of analysis and outcomes are explained by reference to the relationships between a system's parts.[69] This then looks at socialization in two ways: One, where socialization is a process of learning by states to conform one's behaviour to societal expectations (here world society). Two, where socialization is also a process of identity- and interest-formation.[70] Since states are

[67] See Waltz, n. 13; Ikenberry & Kupchan, n. 63.

[68] Waltz, n. 13, pp. 47-69.

[69] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 148.

[70] Ibid, p.170.

'intentional' entities, that is, they act in purposive fashion based on desires and beliefs about the world, the cultural and civilizational undertones are inescapable. Culture needs to reproduce itself, via transmission and/or diffusion, to be called culture. This means that states and societies within them will tend to follow a set of practices that do not fundamentally challenge their dominant culture, or attempt a balance between cultural imperatives that inform identity issues, and policy practices that may be culturally alien and imposed as part of systemic constraints. The rise of religion as an alternative ideology of order means a necessary impact on the systemic structure as well. If a sufficient number of states change (i.e., their attributes change), then the changed nature of micro-structures will mean a change in the systemic attributes also. It is in this aspect that religious nationalism as a contending 'ideology' of order presents a challenge to the present world system, with its attendant implications.

Yet an ideology in modern usage means a particular concern with 'political beliefs, values, ideals, and moral justifications pertaining to the form and role of government and the nature of a state's economic system'. Ideologies thus mean political belief systems that provide 'a framework within which individuals can organize political reality, by motivating people to join political parties and mass movements, and by providing justifications that assist leaders in mobilizing their followers'.[71]

However, ideologies so understood also imply a very different kind of tradition in which reason, i.e., rational and objective methods of ethical reasoning find a preference alongwith a differentiation between social, economic, political, and private reality with the first three falling in the public sphere.[72] Liberal societies have shown a preference of

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[71] Charles Funderburk & Robert G. Thobaben, *Political Ideologies: Left, Center, Right* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 1-14.

[72] The separation between public and private spheres is an important distinction within the liberal tradition and is the basis of civil society and human rights seen as the right of individuals, and is thus cosmopolitan in orientation and not communitarian. For an overview of traditions of cosmopolitan and

rational policy-making that is based on the 'criticism of ideology' and geared towards the 'development of objective social theory'. Thus, 'natural law appeals to reason, *not authority*'. It has been a 'tradition' of liberalism to reject authority of tradition in the name of rational principles. Thus the idea of the state and politics that have come about to be accepted have at the core this preference of rational thought over scriptural authority. This preference of rational thought over scriptural authority is true of liberalism as well as utilitarianism as well as of Marxism as well as of political realism.[73]

Religious nationalism as a contending and rival ideology of order marks the anti-thesis of liberal traditions: It emphasises upon scriptural authority as the source of both authority and legitimacy in governance and the imagination of a community life. Thus, religious nationalism represents an alternative socialization, and an alternative imagination of the political than what conventional understandings of politics engendered by modern thought implies. It is an important distinction.

States like Pakistan represent this preference for an alternative socialization that has surrendered the separation of the state from religion that is common to all modern and post-modern states. Islam is used as a set of political decisions by the state to establish hegemony over society, consolidate and expand its powers and control. Traditional understandings of the impacts of transnational forces or relations on states have generally assumed a distinction between the state and society with the society seen as the site for many of these transnational relations.[74] However, in cases of states that are

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communitarian thoughts in world politics, see Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

[73] Terry Nardin, "Ethical Traditions in International Affairs", in Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel, eds *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-22. The Irish Republican Army, the major terrorist organization in Britain was Marxist in orientation, before its split into two, with the dominant Provisional IRA being Catholic in expression, in Northern Ireland.

[74] Risse-Kappen, n. 24, pp.3-33.

essentially Islamic, this distinction is blurred. The alternative ideology of order that religion represents makes the state culturally isomorphic with its society defined by religion. This blurring of distinction between the clergy, polity, and society puts the state on a different footing than those states that espouse secular nationalism as their ordering principle. It also opens up a plethora of problems of interpretations of religious traditions, and the preference of any particular interpretations over the others. In terms of Huntington's delineation of civilizational fault lines, it matters little whether religion appropriates the state (as in the case of Iran), or the state appropriates religion (as in the case of Pakistan and Malaysia), the expression remains predominantly religious/cultural. The expressions of such cultural/religious forces form the stock-of-the-trade arguments by the anti-modern disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism that Barber calls the forces of *Jihad*. *Jihad,* according to Barber, is "a rabid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity; it is diversity run amok, multiculturalism turned cancerous so that the cells keep dividing long after their division has ceased to serve the healthy corpus."[75] It also means that oppositions to modernity become expressed as oppositions to the "west" seen as a different civilizational entity via religion in the political imagination of the protagonists.[76] To understand better the problem at hand then means taking into account those voices that purport to disagree on a basic level about why the world is as it is, including the so-called *Jihad* voices that cite these disagreements as their justification for terrorism.

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[75] Barber, n. 5, pp. 3-32.

[76] Huntington, n. 41, pp. 207-245.

Internal Conflicts

Both Britain and India have problem areas in Northern Ireland and for our present purpose, Jammu & Kashmir respectively. Apart from the two regions in the two states that are facing internal conflicts and terrorism, both the states also continue to be victims of transnational terrorism elsewhere. In terms of contemporary transnational terrorism, the underlying threat remain the same to both the states as far as the broader challenge that transnational terrorism presents to the present world order. Since both the states have internal conflicts within that is also the site for terrorism, an understanding of the dynamics of the internal conflicts become important. According to Michael Brown, literature on internal conflict has largely looked at the underlying causes. These causes are usually cited as structural factors – weak states, intra-state security, and ethnic geography; Political factors – discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics; Economic/social factors – economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development and modernization; Cultural/Perceptual factors – patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories. The permissive factors within which internal conflict may fester also are indications of the proximate factors, i.e. factors that are catalytic. [77]

Brown suggests looking at the proximate causes of four types of conflicts to help in analysis.

1. Internal, mass-level phenomena such as rapid economic development and modernization or patterns of political and economic discrimination.

[77] Michael E. Brown, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An Overview", in Michael E. Brown, et al, eds *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), revised edition, pp. 3-25.

2. External, mass-level phenomena such as large numbers of refugees, fighters crashing across borders, or radicalized politics sweeping throughout regions. It is a case of a 'bad neighbourhood'.
3. External, elite-driven conflicts that are the results of discrete, deliberate policies by governments to trigger conflicts in neighbouring states for political, economic, or ideological purposes.
4. Internal, elite-driven conflicts that include power struggles involving civilians or military leaders; ideological contests over the state's political, economic, social, and religious affairs and criminal assaults on the state. It is the case of 'bad leaders'.[78]

However, conflicts can overlap with external and internal factors converging. The identification of the proximate factors in the conflict in Northern Ireland and Jammu & Kashmir can then yield insights into the nature of the challenge that these two regions pose to their respective states.

Conclusion

The challenge presented by transnational terrorism is unique because of the relatively new globally-networked nature of it, aided by technology and the process of globalization. Like criminal activities, its networking activities are carried out in secret and only its end-product as dramatic violence becomes public knowledge. Ascertaining the real motives accurately becomes difficult since moral justifications are put forth for every terrorist activity. These justifications are usually directed at a receptive audience to claim more recruits and to claim legitimacy elsewhere. In the face of the difficulties of verification, it is useful to look at the various processes of change that are at play to

[78] Ibid.

identify the particular challenge of transnational terrorism, and its relative success. The challenge is to identify permissive causes within states (a part of state attributes) and locate the proximate causes that engender transnational terrorism.

The rise of religious nationalism indicates the rising anti-modern reaction in many countries of the world and forms the constitutive force from where justifications are sought for terrorist activities. It is difficult to separate religious nationalism from religious fundamentalism, since it is the logic of religious fundamentalism that gives rise to religious nationalism. Arising from the environment of religious fundamentalism is the emergence of radical disparate individuals that is a more alarming phenomenon within democratic societies. These radical individuals may either become part of the network of radical groups or seek to undertake radical terrorist activities on their own initiative, making preventive detection very difficult. It is in the networking of various radical sub-units and disparate radical individuals that expresses itself as contemporary transnational terrorism. This networking of disparate elements means the emergence of an amorphous body of globally-networked actors that may equally participate in both global crime and transnational terrorism. that works through a networking of phantom cells, unlike conventional understandings of terrorists who operate in A-line organizational structures. Developments in communications technology has enabled individuals located in diverse geographical locations to interact and group with like minded individuals.

The transnational nature of contemporary international terrorism means that security threats to states here comes from a non-state actor. The use by terrorism of subunits within states across the globe, to network into a transnational force makes the security impact more serious from the state's point of view. This transnational force of international terrorism arises from cultural sites and is criminal in its methods (this co-

relation is itself a disturbing one and is the other violence that contemporary international terrorism subjects on the culture from which it seeks to draw its legitimacy). The problem of contemporary international terrorism as a transnational criminal force that purports to have culture and/or religion as its site for violence, but is situated more accurately in a different ideological zone, than the rest.

Terrorism that flows out of internal conflicts usually attracts a host of reasons, and usually finds permissive causes within. Many analysis of terrorism tend to focus on these permissive factors whereby any direct condemnation of terrorists becomes a little tenuous without addressing the permissive causes – largely seen as discrimination that may be structural, political, cultural, economic, and/or social. There are a host of factors behind the relative failure or success of ethnic/national terrorism, including their ability to garner sufficient international support in their claim to the democratic right of self-representation and governance. It also becomes difficult to separate legitimate dissent from dissent fostered by external powers as part of *realpolitik*. This is one reason why ethnic and national terrorism evoke the kind of emotions that they do on every side, and the reactions on part of state authorities.

Chapter II

TERRORISM: INTERPRETATIONS AND FACETS

Modern terrorism was born during the French Revolution (1789-1795) when Edmund Burke used the term in 1795 to refer to the ensuing violence of the French Revolution, where the new French government of Maximilien Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety in France was killing French nobility and their sympathizers. Terror was used as an instrument of state power and was organized, deliberate and systematic. Over the years, it included radical left-wing movements and beliefs against centralized authority and violent struggles against such authorities. The success of some of these violent struggles in France and Russia gave terrorism its twin notion of fights for freedom, where such struggles were carried out to restructure the economic order. [1]

Similar violent struggles with political and economic objectives were carried out elsewhere in the world, evolving over time and history and changing the meaning of the term. The left-wing bias of terrorism ended after the First World War to become extreme right in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe. After the Second World War, terrorism largely moved to other theatres outside Europe – more notably in Latin America and West Asia. In Europe right-wing terrorism continued in Northern Ireland where it developed in 1968-69 following Catholic and Protestant demonstrations. However, its origins are said to lie in the 1870s with the 'Dynamiters' and the Phoenix Park murders of Lord Cavendish, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and his under-secretary by the Irish

[1] John Gearson, "The Nature of Modern Terrorism" in Lawerence Freedman, ed., *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002), pp. 7-24. Also, see Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). A useful study on the history of terror in Russia and Eastern Europe is by Feliks Gross, *Violence in Politics* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., NV., 1972).

National Invincibles.[2] In Spain, Basque nationalism continues to be the source of violence and goes back perhaps further than nineteenth century. [3] The history of terrorism goes back. In fact, violent protest and terrorism have been familiar bedfellows in most of the history of humankind. The 1960s and the 1970s saw a broad swath of terrorist activities carried out by groups that were ideologically motivated. These included groups such as Germany's Baader-Meinhoff and the Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades, France's Direct Action and the Weatherman in the United States. While most of these ideologically motivated groups were defeated around the world in the 1970s and 1980s, international terrorism came to be identified largely through groups associated with the struggle against Israel.[4] In India, international terrorism made its presence felt in the Khalistan movement in the border state of Punjab, later exported to the state of Jammu & Kashmir where it is still an active problem.[5]

Contemporary international terrorism is largely right-wing and religious/quasi-religious in nature. It differs from early terrorism in the context of a globalized world – the impacts are felt in a much wider area than previously possible – and the means and methods at its disposal that makes it more dangerous. Contemporary terrorism is also international in nature even as it is equally global. The globalization of terror had never been as poignant to the common people as the September 11, 2002 (or 9/11) carnage. Even as the world scrambled to come to terms with the aftermath of September 11 (or 9/11), what became quickly apparent is that there is no easy way to academically capture 'terrorism' in a meaningful way that enjoys a consensus. *What is terrorism?* The

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[2] Ibid, Gearson, pp. 7-24.

[3] Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 8-48.

[4] Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction* (Singapore: Thomson Asia Pte Ltd., 2002), pp. 7-24.

[5] Turkkaya Ataov, *Kashmir and Neighbours: Tale, Terror, Truce* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), pp. 68-70.

debates remain where they were almost a decade ago.[6] The only consensus is that post-September 11, terrorism as a violent act with political objectives is a negative activity that is undesirable.

THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

Concepts are heuristic devices with which we attempt to make sense of the world, amidst infinity of data. Normative concepts refer to moral principles or ideals. Descriptive or positive concepts refer to 'facts' that are assumed to 'have an objective and demonstrable existence' or the reference 'to what *is*'. The distinction between facts and values are however not so easy in political concepts – facts and values are often inextricably linked together giving rise to contested concepts in politics and social sciences. Terrorism is a contested concept in politics. Depending on where one stands, terrorism carries different meanings. This has more to do with the problem of morality in violence, as well as how one looks at the causal factors that give birth to terrorism. For someone looking at terrorism because of distributive injustice inherent in the present world system, as well as the role of modernity in a globalized world that causes cultural disjunctions, terrorism carries a different meaning. For someone looking at terrorism from the point of view of state security, terrorism takes on a different definition. What aspects one may choose to include or exclude from one's analysis when defining terrorism is of course where one places oneself or is placed by life. This continues to plague the definition of terrorism, as it does other concepts in politics.

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[6] See Peter C. Sederberg, *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989); R.G Frey & Christopher W. Morris, eds *Violence, Terrorism and Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001); David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London: Pearson Education Ltd., 2002).

Academic debates continue to befuddle a meaningful understanding of terrorism. The topic of terrorism is both complex and emotive. It is complex because it combines many different aspects of human experience and problematises certain readings of history and politics. Terrorism is also emotive. Not only do experiences of terrorist acts arouse tremendous feelings, but also because those who see terrorists as justified (and there are many) often have strong feelings concerning the rightness of the use of violence. A definition that also enjoys a consensus in academia is elusive. According to Walter Laqueur, the only characteristic found in common is that terrorism always involves violence or the threat of violence.[7] Clearly it is too wide and too general a singular characteristic to become meaningful in studying terrorism.

Definitions by Great Britain, India, and the United Nations Organization

For those in 'responsible authority, nationally or locally', terrorism is the "premeditated threat or use of violence by sub-national groups or clandestine individuals intended to intimidate and coerce governments, to promote political, religious or ideological outcomes, and to inculcate fear among the public at large."[8]

The United Kingdom (Great Britain) has defined terrorism in its Terrorism Act, 2000, as:

> 1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where- the use or threat of action where-
>
> (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
>
> (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

[7] Laqueur, n. 3 p. 6.

[8] David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London: Pearson Education Ltd., 2002), p.10.

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

(4) In this section-

(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,

(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,

(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and

(d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.

(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.[9]

Further in Chapter 24 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 4, a terrorist is defined as a person who:

(a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism,

(b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or

(c) has links with an international terrorist group.

(3) A group is an international terrorist group for the purposes of subsection (2)(b) and (c) if-

(a) it is subject to the control or influence of persons outside the United Kingdom, and

[9] U.K. Terrorism Act, 2000, Introductory Part. http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00011, Accessed on 08-03-03.

(b) the Secretary of State suspects that it is concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has links with an international terrorist group only if he supports or assists it.[10]

The debates in the United Nations regarding terrorism started as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s when the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked the General Assembly to put the issue of terrorism on its agenda. There have been a substantial number of resolutions ever since.[11] The 1994 UN Declaration characterized acts, methods and practices of terrorism as a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of society. Moreover, it determined:

> [T]hat criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, *whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.*[12]

Further, Resolution 1377 (2001) adopted by the Security Council at its 4413th meeting, on 12 November 2001, affirmed the international resolve to combat international terrorism:

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[10] U.K. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Source: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/10024-d.htm#end. Accessed on 08-03-03.

[11] Robert F. Gorman, *Great Debates at the United Nations: An Encyclopedia of Fifty Key Issues 1945-2000* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp.217-222.

[12] United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 49/60 in 1994. http://www.unorg/documents/ga/res/49/a49/a49r060.htm Accessed on 17/02/2003, emphasis added.

Recalling its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999, 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, *Declares* that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century, *Further declares that acts of international terrorism constitute a challenge to all States and to all of humanity, Reaffirms its unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, Stresses* that acts of international terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the financing, planning and preparation of as well as any other form of support for acts of international terrorism are similarly contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, *Underlines* that acts of terrorism endanger innocent lives and the dignity and security of human beings everywhere, threaten the social and economic development of all States and undermine global stability and prosperity, *Affirms* that a sustained, comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all Member States of the United Nations, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, is essential to combat the scourge of international terrorism.[13]

ıe Indian government in The Prevention Of Terrorism Act, 2002, Act No. 15 of 2002, ıacted on March 28, 2002, looks at terrorism as acts by:

Whoever, —

with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner as to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of,

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ıttp://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/No163301.pdf,
:essed on 17/02/2003, emphasis added.

property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defense of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act;

It defines a terrorist as a person who:

(b) is or continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), or voluntarily does an act aiding or promoting in any manner the objects of such association and in either case is in possession of any unlicensed firearms, ammunition, explosive or other instrument or substance capable of causing mass destruction and commits any act resulting in loss of human life or grievous injury to any person or causes significant damage to any property, commits a terrorist act.[14]

Further the Indian state in its extensive *Working Document* submitted to the *Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism*, defines acts of terrorism in Article 2 of the draft working paper as:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, does an act intended to cause:

Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

Serious damages to a State or government facility, a public transporting system, communication system or infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, or where such destruction results or is likely to result in major economic loss;

Any person also commits an offensive if that person attempts to commit an offence or participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1.

Any person also commits an offence if that person:

[14] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm, Accessed on 18/02/ 2003.

Organizes, directs or instigates others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1or 2; or

Aids, abets, facilitates or counsels the commission of such an offence; or

In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences referred to in paragraphs 1,2 or 3(a) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity of purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.[15]

Article 3 removes any ambiguity by declaring that:

> This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under article 6, paragraph 1, or article 6, paragraph 2, to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 10-22 shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases.[16]

The Indian draft resolution has found support from Britain. What we see from the above definitions are the categorical rejections by the Great Britain and India as well as the United Nations of terrorism in whatever form. The key to the UN Security Council resolution 1377, adopted by the Security Council on 12 November 2001 is emphatic in its (a) Securitization of terrorism as 'one of the most serious threats to global peace and security', and (b) The summary rejection of terrorism *in toto*. This then does away with the argument of root-causes as any justification whatsoever for terrorism, in any form. Simply put, terrorism is undesirable in the present world.

Academic Debates on Definitions of Terrorism

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

The uses of violence for political ends generally raise a complexity of issues that turns terrorism into a conundrum as far as its definition goes. Depending on what stance one adopts the meaning changes. Juergensmeyer looks at the etymological roots of the word where terrorism is meant to terrify, coming from the Latin word *terrere*, meaning 'to cause to tremble'. He makes a case for the definition of terrorism to come from the common people – the witnesses – the ones terrified. The common person via its public agent – the media – defines acts of violence that is called terrorism. Terrorism thus becomes "public acts of destruction, committed without a clear military objective, that arouse a widespread sense of fear."[17] Further, Juergensmeyer identifies terrorism to be frequently "associated with violence committed by *disenfranchised groups* desperately attempting to gain a shred of power or influence" (emphasis added).[18] The disenfranchisement of such groups makes a terrorist group "an outlaw group, since refused inlaw status, and for outlaws all fields are battlefields."[19] This explains precisely why terrorism evokes the terror that it does.

This brings us to Lomasky's conception of terrorism whereby one understands terrorism by what it *represents*. According to Lomasky, "Terrorism overtly expresses rejection of a politics that would limit the domain of authorized violence."[20] Terrorism is also "(A)n adherence to a policy of affirmative action for potential victims. It renounces conventional distinctions of person and place."[21] It is the logic of inversion where "The point seems to be that just those individuals (or venues) who, according to conventional

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[17] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 5.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Annette C. Baier, "Violent Demonstrations", in Frey & Morris, eds, n. 6, p. 44.

[20] Loren E. Lomasky, "The Political Significance of Terrorism", in Frey & Morris, eds, ibid, n. 6, p. 100.

[21] Ibid, p. 101.

categories, are most properly removed from the play of deadly force must be subjected to it.[22] Thus, according to Lomasky, one can better understand terrorism "as activity that is primarily expressive in character rather than outcome-oriented. What it expresses is virulent and unregulated opposition to the preconditions of successful civility."[23] It is this representative aspect of terrorism that makes terrorism insidious and condemnable. War as a violent activity is largely bounded by two limits: The target of attack should be '*combatants*' (non-combatant immunity), and 'incidental damage to non-combatants should be minimized'. With this distinction in mind, "terrorism may be seen as a coercive tactic used by the contending sides of a political struggle that deliberately violates these two rules of war."[24]

Terrorism is thus contra-discrimination – a significant feature of terrorism that also makes it contra-political in its rejection of conventional categories that come from modern and contemporary politics that are acceptable.[25] Terrorism then is, in its significance, political nihilism that invokes political and juristic terms (in the self-designations of terrorists as soldiers or guerrillas or freedom fighters or holy warriors) that underlie civil society's quest for order in order to maximize disorder.[26] If terrorism is contra-political, the idea that terrorism uses or threatens violence to achieve political ends becomes questionable acts. Michael Walzer puts terrorism as acts for the purpose to "destroy the morale of a nation or class, or under cut its solidarity; its method is the

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[22] Ibid, pp. 102-104.

[23] Ibid, pp. 104-105.

[24] Peter C. Sederberg, *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 37-40.

[25] Lomasky, n. 20, pp. 86-115.

[26] Ibid.

random murder of innocent people."[27] While this definition by Walzer assumes the objective of terrorist attacks to look at the nature of terrorism, a deeper political understanding of the problem throws up the question of whom do we consider 'innocent people'.[28]

What Frey and Morris point out is the difficulty of condemning terrorism in a broad out of hand brush-stroke. It involves more subtle distinctions regarding the very ethics of violent force that is a common feature of political life. Yet the three basic elements of terrorism: the creation of terror, the seemingly random use of violence, and the targeting of the innocents or of non-combatants, does not justify terrorism, notwithstanding the problematic nature of defining it accurately.[29]

The 'randomness' of terrorist attacks is a characteristic feature of terrorism. While the randomness of attacks may make the legitimacy of terrorism a suspect,[30] the assertion of innocence of the victims itself, according to some, becomes problematic when viewed in light of the violent history of humankind where the issue is more of the issue of the morality of violence and the paradox that it presents. The evil of terrorism, according to Annette C. Baier, is 'the more general evil of violence'.[31] Terrorism then marks a problem of violence where the nature and degree of it certainly puts it outside normal acts of violence in politics.

According to Chalk, terrorism is a political activity that manifests itself as a criminal activity in an ends-means *problematique*. Further, it is a form of psychological warfare

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[27] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p.197.

[28] R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, "Violence, Terrorism, and Justice", in Frey & Morris eds, n. 6, pp. 6-11.

[29] Ibid, pp. 2-3.

[30] Ibid, pp. 1-17.

[31] Baier, n. 19, pp. 33-58.

where the "immediate objective is not to destroy but, through the use or threat of violence, to create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety and collapse, exploiting this emotional reaction to influence political behaviour."[32] Because of this psychological objective, terrorism according to Chalk is necessarily indiscriminate to generate anxiety responses. As opposed to conventional warfare, terrorism "is a form of psychological warfare that is used to create extreme fear through the use or threat of force against non-combatant civilian/military targets."[33] Chalk considers terrorism systematic where it is an organized policy to achieve certain political objectives through a sustained campaign of terror.[34] It is also a means of political communication to achieve attention and/or hearing through violent acts.[35] Thus, according to Chalk:

> Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means to achieve specific political objectives – these objectives differing according to the group concerned. *It is a psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear-inducing effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate targeting of non-combatant victims and property. In so doing, it can be regarded as a means of political communication that aims to influence behaviour through the precipitation of a general state of fear and collapse that is exploited to alter political attitudes in such a way as will be beneficial to the group concerned. In order to effectively fulfil its communicative function, terrorism must aim to maximize publicity and the perpetrators must claim responsibility for their actions.*[36]

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[32] Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 13.

[33] Ibid, p.16.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid, p.17.

[36] Ibid, p.22. Emphasis added

Emphasizing on the psychological dimension of terrorism is the view of Schmid and Jongman who define terrorism as:

> ...an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorists' victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target, turning it into a targeting of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.[37]

Terrorism is primarily an attention seeking tactic where usually the claim to authorship is a crucial aspect and tactic of terrorist actions. Yet what recent September 11 attacks in the United States revealed was a changed *modus operandi* where no claims were made owning authorship of the carnage. The event was dramatic – as dramatic as any terrorist could hope for – and there was no group or individual claiming authorship. Authorship here was by *inference* – not what conventional understanding of terrorism suggests. Secondly, the global nature of change sought to be achieved makes international terrorism much more wider in its objective, and if one looks at contemporary international terrorism and the rhetorics of those who support such groups, then international terrorism today is a revisionist force.[38]

According to Booth and Dunne, "Terrorism is a method of political action that uses violence (or deliberately produces fear) against civilians and civilian infrastructure in

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[37] Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 28.

[38] Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), 2001 edn. pp. 3-20.

order to influence behaviour, to inflict punishment or to exact revenge."[39] Freedman looks at terrorism as activity that is "normally considered to be coercive mechanism, part of a guerilla strategy, in that actions create threats of worse to come if political demands are not met, and these demands (until recently at least) tended to be geared to ending foreign occupation or a secessionist movement."[40]

Both the definitions have come after the September 11, 2001 and as can be seen, in responses to it. The use of terrorism to, amidst other things, 'inflict punishment' or to 'exact revenge' in Booth and Dunne's definition is the recognition of at least the possibility that some perceived offence may have been committed against those who seek to inflict punishment or exact revenge. Freedman's definition comes with the qualifier in brackets that points to the changing nature of contemporary terrorism. A contrast to Freedman's definition is the one offered by Keohane where:

> (A) key distinctive attribute of *terrorism* as a form of violence – as contrasted with criminal action, guerilla warfare or assassination – is that terrorism seeks to intimidate an audience rather than to eliminate an enemy.[41]

Terrorism, according to Keohane, *is a distinct activity from guerilla warfare, assasination or other criminal activity.* Yet according to a classification by Feliks Gross, assasinations also form part of what he calls individual terrorism that may or may not be part of dynastic assasinations.[42] Wardlaw's definition of terrorism looks at *political terrorism* as "the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group,

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[39] Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, "Worlds in Collision", in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 8.

[40] Lawrence Freedman, "A New Type of War", in Booth & Dunne, eds, ibid, p. 37.

[41] Robert O. Keohane, "The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalitional Politics", in Booth & Dunne, eds, ibid, pp. 141-150.

[42] Feliks Gross, *Violence in Politics* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., NV., 1972).

whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such an act is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators."[43] The problem with the above definition is that demands can extend beyond the political to include social/religious (in keeping with conventional distinctions between the political, the social and the cultural/religious spheres of human activity), or can mean a rejection of the political *in toto.*

What becomes obvious is the difficulty of capturing terrorism in a conceptual net that is acceptable to all. From the perspective of analysis and understanding, notwithstanding terrorism's value in political polemics, terrorism is devoid of any useful meaning. The approaches to the definition of terrorism often contain incompatible elements. Based on another study by Alex Schmid, Sederberg makes a list of some of the common incompatible elements. These include:

1. Definitions that focus on the distinctive nature of the victims but stress different characterstics such as being "innocent," "civilian," "non-combatant," "symbolic," or "arbitrarily chosen." Whatever the superficial similarities, these traits are not equivalent to one another. A civilian victim may not be innocent (whatever that means). Noncombatants need not be civilians (they might be prisoners of war). Symbolic victims might be combatants, and if they are symbolic, they cannot be chosen arbitrarily but rather for their symbolic value.
2. Definitions that stress the difference between the victims, however defined, and the "real" target, for example, the media, the political leadership, or the general populace. This distinction between the direct victims and the actual target presumably distinguishes terrorism from other forms of coercion/violence. Unfortunately for these approaches, many forms of coercion not commonly considered terrorism have targets other than the immediate casualties. Capital punishment, for example, is commonly justified not as an act of pure retribution (the victim as the target). Rather, the death penalty is supposedly a deterrent (the target consists of others who might contemplate capital crimes in the future). U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was not

[43] Cited in Paul Rogers, "Political Violence and Global Order", in Booth and Dunne, eds, n. 39, p. 215.

intended simply to kill communists; rather, the primary rationale was to demonstrate to potential revolutionaries around the world that "wars of national liberation" could not succeed. The strategic target, then, was someone other than those directly attacked.

3. Definitions that stress some particular purpose of terrorism (beyond simply terrorizing). Schmid lists 20 somewhat distinct purposes that different authors have associated with terrorism. Such variety hardly supports clarity, and it suggests that if so many purposes can be pursued through terrorism, then purpose should not be used as a distinguishing trait.
4. Definitions that stress particular acts, like kidnapping or hijacking for political ends, as inherently terrorist. We can, however, easily suggest counterexamples to cases of "terrorist" kidnappings and hijackings, which would seem to imply that such acts are not inherently terrorist. Although the kidnapping, "trial," and execution of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978 might be an act of terrorism, what about the kidnapping, trial, and execution of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann by Israel in 1960? The hijacking of TWA flight 847 in the summer of 1985 may be terrorist, but what about the interception by U.S. fighters of the civilian aircraft on which those suspected in the hijacking of the Italian pasenger liner *Achille Lauro* were passengers?
5. Definitions that stress the motive for the act in defining terrorism. In short, if motives are "pure," the act cannot be terrorist regardless of the nature of the victim. Not surprisingly, different political camps hold conflicting ideas as to what motives excuse violent acts. Yasser Arafat asserts that no one who fights oppression can be a terrorist. Those who identify with a particular established order, in contrast, might excuse severe coercion used by the state against those suspected of political disloyalty.
6. Definitions that stress the "extranormal" character of terrorism. Again, various authors identify different extranormal characterstics. Some point to the weapons chosen; others to the time and place of the threat; still others to the covert nature of the act.
7. Definitions that stress the character of those who resort to terrorism. Again, the various approaches lack consensus in that some associate terrorism with revolutionaries, others with the state. Some argue that dissident groups of either the Left or the Right could use terrorism.

Finally, and most inclusively, some see terrorism as a tactic that could be used by anyone regardless of ideological persuasion or political position. [44]

While one can readily disagree with Sederberg in one of his listings (number 4), the list serves the purpose of illustrating the attendant conceptual problems with defining terrorism. The question "*What is terrorism?*" is unresolved, to everyone's satisfaction, within academia. The problem of definition of terrorism comes about because of the related problem of violence in social and political life. However, while terrorism is violence, not all violence is terrorism.[45] It is this distinction that is the key to terrorism and why it is undesirable. It is a distinction that points to the extra-political nature of terrorism, that is, it takes recourse to means that are clearly not acceptable ways to seek resolution of conflicts.

THE BASIC FEATURES OF TERRORISM

According to White, there are some salient points of terrorism that needs to be appreciated:

1. Terrorism is defined within social and political contexts. This is the primary reason that no single definition of terrorism will ever be successful.
2. In terms of contextual definitions, the meaning of terrorism is influenced by history, conflict, political power, political repression, mass media, crime, and the specific form that terrorism takes.
3. Since the meaning of terrorism fluctuates, a simple definition is probably the best course of action.

[44]Sederberg, n. 24, pp. 24-26.

[45] Laqueur, n. 3, pp.8-48.

4. It is best to look at terrorism from a tactical standpoint, if you are focussing on security. Terrorism is simply a method of fighting. It terrorizes the public because violence is centered on places where people feel safe.
5. Tactically, terrorism has basic forms. These include: bombing, arson, hijacking, assault, kidnapping, taking hostages, and disruption of services.
6. Terrorists use force multipliers to increase their attacking power. Force multipliers include technology, transnational support, media coverage, and religious fanaticism.[46]

Clearly, any definition or useful understanding of terrorism demands *inter alia* a clear statement of assumptions that one has when looking at the world of politics. Politics evolved as a (preferably) non-violent means towards resolution of conflicts that emanate from collective life of free individuals. The idea of the state that dominates, in contemporary times, is one of the liberal-democratic model where citizens have at a minimum (a) a guarantee of certain basic rights involving individual freedom, (b) recourse to judicial protection of rights and (c) democratic (via elections) means of ascertaining their quality of life and governance. This model of state remains, *ceteribus paribus,* the dominant model. It is useful to look at terrorism as an activity in distinction (and in direct opposition) to the various normative assumptions that under-grid the liberal-democratic model of state and governance. Both Britain and India, to varying degrees, are liberal-democratic states, i.e., the state is responsible for ensuring the best conditions that enable individuals to find their self-expressions. The emphasis on the motives underlying a violent act is one ready distinguishable feature of terrorism. The other useful features then are:

1. The objective of terrorism is to attain political and/or religious and/or cultural and/or ideological ends.

[46] White, n. 4, pp. 16-17.

2. The *tactical* use of violence by non-state actors such as individuals or group(s) against other individuals or groups as well as the state is a distinctive feature of terrorism.
3. It works outside the framework of rights and duties of citizens that membership of the state assures, and violates the very basis of the democratic state-system.
4. The key element to terrorism, as its etymology suggests, is psychological. It seeks to achieve a violation of the sense of security in dramatic fashion by creating a fear psychosis amongst the common mass.
5. To achieve this fear psychosis, it is fairly random and non-discriminatory in nature in selecting its victims.
6. The targets of terrorist attacks are usually non-combatant civilians and military victims.
7. Terrorism is systematic in that it pursues a sustained policy of violent force to create and prolong terror and anxiety amongst the society or group it targets.
8. It is premeditated – planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage.
9. It is a criminal act that is political, ideological, or religious – not purely criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money – but designed to change the existing political order.
10. It is aimed at civilians – not at military targets or combat-ready troops.
11. It is carried out by sub-national groups/individual – not by the recognised army of a state.
12. Terrorism can be both domestic and international, with classifications overlapping in many cases.

KINDS OF TERRORISM

Terrorism, by the nature of its demands and stated objectives, methodology used and targetted victims, can be of different kinds. Conventional categorization follows acts of terrorism committed by subnational groups against authority that in contemporary times refers to the state. Apart from sub-state groups indulging in terrorism, even states can be seen as indulging in terrorism – to either eliminate opposition or to counter domestic/international terrorism in its territory.[47] A more recent understanding of terrorism (as a growing phenomena especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States) gives cultural motives to terrorism by looking at religious/quasi-religious sources of legitimation that terrorists claim.[48] It is this kind of terrorism that occupies centre stage in Britain as well as India. While both British (especially Irish terrorism via the Provisional Irish Republican Army and other splinter groups) and Indian experiences (Khalistan terrorism and partly early terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura) have invited largely ethnic explanations for them as their basis, the religion/quasi-religion cited as a basis for acts of international terrorism is what occupies attention in today's world.

This is as much as for the widespread nature (global in many senses) of religious terrorism as it is for their interlinkages. International terrorism today is a widespread phenomena with close interlinkages between groups otherwise geographically situated far apart. Islamist terrorism has turned *jehad* into a war cry of Islamist fanaticism. It is the network of international terrorism and the commonality of religious beliefs that they purport to share that makes contemporary international terrorism acquire its deadly impact. As we will see later, Indian experiences with international terrorism of the

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[47] Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, eds *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000).

[48] Juergensmeyer, n 17. Also by Mark Juergensmeyer, *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular* State (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence Of The Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).

religious kind is much older than British experiences that are only now beginning to emerge in a pattern.

Peter C. Sederberg makes a typology that divides terrorism into two broad categories with sub-classes within each category. The first category is called *Dissident Terrorism*. *Dissident terrorism* is described as those dissident movements or organizations that challenge the dominant system of power and value in a community, with usually a certain degree of comprehensive and coherent political objectives.[49] Within this category of dissident terrorism, Sederberg lists four kinds of activities that are terrorist.

- *Criminal terrorism*: While Sederberg concedes that criminal groups lack coherent ideological programs, the activities of certain criminal groups may tend to be terrorist by virtue of the scale and degree of violent intimidation and coercive measures used to protect their activities. Narcoterrorism is a case in point.
- *Nihilist terrorism*: Nihilist groups often have a coherent political agenda that is essentially negative. Nihilist terrorism is concerned with the destruction of the existing order and is usually a doctrine of pure destruction. The political weakness of such groups (advocating the absence of order) is what make these groups more likely to use tactics of mass destruction.
- *Nationalist terrorism*: is described as the activities of those dissident groups that have a certain degree of success in appealing to the significant segments of discontents within a particular state or community. *Particularistic* ideologies appeal to communities by advocating the claims of some ethno-cultural groups whom and whose interests they purport to protect violently. These are generally less inclusive than established nation-states.

[49] Sederberg, n. 24, p. 49.

- *Revolutionary terrorism*: When dissident groups advocate a program of social transformation that transcends the particularistic concerns of a substate group. The objective moves away from secession to control of the state or system they claim to be fighting against. This can include radical left groups to religious groups who advocate a particular brand of life and order, based on authoritative scriptures.[50]

The second broad category of terrorism Sederberg lists is called *Establishment terrorism. Establishment terrorism* is described as a rather ambiguous condition where it may be a tactic of repression used both by a regime and private citizens 'acting to eliminate some perceived threat to the established order'.[51] According to Sederberg, this results in the institutionalization of terrorism where violence is transformed into force. Within Establishment terrorism, Sederberg includes four forms of violent activity that he terms as terrorist.

- *Vigilante terrorism*: is defined as a form of establishment violence perpetrated by private citizens. Vigilante terrorism intends to defend and preserve the established order, rather than destroy it. Vigilantism deteriorates into terrorism when violence against racial, cultural, or political groups turns indiscriminate. A covert support of vigilantism by the esatblishment turns it into establishment terrorism.
- *Covert Official Terrorism*: While vigilante terrorism is largely conceived to be by private citizens, the line between 'private' and 'public' is not clear. The involvement of (often) off-duty officials of a state in violent activities like death

[50] Ibid, pp. 49-58.

[51] Ibid, pp. 59-60.

squads are examples of *covert official terrorism* with distinction made difficult between vigilantism and such kinds of covert official terrorism.

- *Overt Regime Terrorism*: is described as an openly embraced policy of terrorism by a state or regime against non-combatants. It usually finds its most visible expression in pogroms conducted by the regime against dissident groups as well as communities. Overt Regime terrorism represents attempts to induce magical transformation by legalizing terrorism. Hitler's pogroms against the Jews, Stalin's pogrom against dissidents, Pol Pot's pogrom against dissidents are examples of such terrorism.
- *Genocide*: is described as the ultimate extension of establishment terrorism. It represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, and use this to enforce conformity and participation by the citizenry.[52]

A typology of the different kinds of terrorism is useful, but not foolproof. Typologies of terrorism serve to illustrate how classifications may overlap. A list of types only helps in illustrating the difficulty of generalizations across cases:

1. *Individual Terrorism:* It is conceived as a means toward weakening the government. It is conceived as work of usually small determined group who claim to represent some great human cause to appeal to the sentiments of sections of society. Individual terror tries to spare innocent victims. It is combined with a dramatic and often tragic tactic to leave behind a long term

[52] Ibid, pp. 59-67.

influence. [53] In contemporary times, it is surfacing as the more potent form of terrorism.

2. *Mass Terrorism:* Mass terrorism as a tactical move first gained prominence in Russia during the Bolshevik movement of the early twentieth century. Mass terrorism is a instrument of consolidation of power by terrorizing large populations into capitulation. Infact, Lenin believed in intimidation as a weapon of policy, both internally and internationally to be achieved through mass terror. It is applied as a violent means of coercion and imposition of a new social order and consolidation of political power.[54]

3. *Random Terrorism:* Random terrorism, in its strategic and tactical objectives is related more to individual terrorism than to mass terrorism. However, random terrorism is free of the moral considerations that individual terrorism has. Death, suffering and mutiliation are directed indiscriminately, and targetted at any one who happens to be at the site of attack. It has as its goal the weakening of the government and erosion of institutions. The favourite technique of random terrorism is by placing explosives at those venues that normally has a large concentration of civilians, like banks, railway stations, airports, post-offices, and other similar sites of public use. It is more common a tactic employed especially against democratic governments.[55]

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[53] Gross, n. 42, pp. 23-38. Although Gross looks at individual terrorism as acts of assassinations of people in authority, that understanding is far too common and comes under the rubric of penal crime. However, individual terrorism comes into focus as acts of deadly violence against random targets, usually civilians. See Ingrid Detter De Lupis, *The Law of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 21. Individual terrorism is also a more potent form of contemporary terrorism, comprising of 'networked' individuals in a 'digitally integrated world'. See Peter Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Hants, UK), volume 53, number 2 (1999), pp. 151-167.

[54] Gross, ibid, pp.5-16.

[55] Ibid, pp. 18-19.

4. *Focussed Random Terrorism:* Focussed random terrorism is similar to random terrorism in terms of technique of placing explosives at public places. The difference is that *focussed random terrorism* directs its attack at groups or individuals that it opposes or sees as representatives of the authority at place. Its objectives are (a) punishment, (b) intimidation, and (c) an act of "de presence" or the message that the target authority is not welcome.[56] It seeks to intimidate people in distancing themselves from the authority, thus weakening the government by depriving it of human resources.
5. *Ethnic Terrorism:* Ethnic terrorism attempts to forge a national identity and is usually more vicious than other forms of terrorism. Violence plays a special role in ethnic terrorism in distinction to say religious terrorism that uses violence to make a theological statement. Or political terrorism that uses violence in a symbolic manner. Ethnic terrorism on the other hand uses violence to keep itself alive and the conditions for its survival is dependent on this indiscriminate use of violence. It uses fear to polarise groups. Violence is its *raison d'etre.*[57]
6. *Nationalistic Terrorism:* Nationalistic terrorism is similar to ethnic terrorism except that it may or may not be based in any particular ethnie. Its objectives are similar to *focussed random terrorism* but cites its 'nation' as its motivating force. Attack on non-combatants usually have three motives: (a) To increase the aura of power around itself; (b) To beget attention by the sophistication of attacks; and (c) To exact revenge on those it considers as betrayers of the 'national' cause, as well as persons representing authority.[58]

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[56] Ibid.

[57]Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (Arlington: RAND), volume 21, number 2 (1998), pp. 149-170.

[58] White, n. 4, pp. 193-202.

7. *Ideological Terrorism:* Ideological terrorism usually has as its protagonists hard-line political activists who for ideological reasons (social and economic) turn to desperate methods of incitement, sabotage and injury. More often, ideological terrorism usually represents radical left groups where terrorism is seen as a way to exact revenge on a 'corrupt' order or a capitalist order, both of which sound similar to them.[59]

8. *Religious Terrorism:* Religious terrorism is fanatical terrorism directed at any one with a different faith as well as co-religionists who are not seen as sufficiently faithful in observances of rituals as well as the interpretation presented by the terrorists. Religious terrorism is pathologically intolerant of any dissent and that is what makes it more morbid than other forms of terrorism. Another distinction is that religious terrorism not only seeks to achieve power, but seeks to transform society and polity in its own image. Infact, it would be humourous, had it not been tragic that there exist religious/quasi-religious groups that are believers in the end-of-the world theories and see it as their 'holy' task to expedite the matters.[60]

9. *State-sponsored Terrorism:* State-sponsored terrorism is a common tactic of low-grade warfare that one state conducts on another state. It is usually within a security complex that is also regional. In one manifestation, it is about pure power politics in a zero-sum game. In another manifestation, it can be part of a larger conflict that is ideological, also waged elsewhere in the world against

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[59] Laqueur, n. 3, pp. 21-30.

[60] Ibid, pp. 81-82.

other states but only becomes visible as a regional problem because of direct co-relations engendered by location within a *security complex.* [61]

10. *International Terrorism:* International terrorism refers to acts of terrorism committed by nationals of one country, or by members of nationalist groups or organizations, against governments, institutions, or people in another country.[62]
11. *Transnational Terrorism:* Transnational terrorism is international terrorism with an added attribute. It has a network that penetrates many states and has the capacity to conduct its operations at disparate places scattered across a vast geographical area. Another feature of transnational terrorism is its membership that can and does span across citizens of many states who have come together for a common objective. Contemporary transnational terrorism is a recent phenomena. It usually targets symbols of the states that it opposes and can be called revisionist in orientation. Since its operations span many different states, it becomes visible only when its network is unearthed to reveal its transnational nature, making it difficult to pin down and eliminate easily by any single state.
12. *Narco-Terrorism:* Narco-terrorism is an example of confluence of more common criminals like the mafias and terrorists. Narco-terrorism usually refers to terrorism that is sustained by drug warlords to maintain their operations which are illegal under most states. This confluence of criminals and terrorists makes for a potent combination as the money from illegal sale of drugs is used to finance terrorist operations which may be ideological, religious or ehnic or

[61] Ibid, pp. 156-183.

[62] Thomas C. Schelling, "What Purposes can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" in Frey & Morris, eds, n. 6, pp. 18-32.

nationalist in its original motivations. The widespread underground networks of drug mafias are used for carrying out terrorist attacks against targets.[63]

13. *New Age or Super Terrorism:* New Age or Superterrorism refers to the contemporary terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction and growing technological capacity for widespread destruction. New Age terrorism is exemplified by the Al-Qaeda network with its transnational reach and organization. The capacity of such non-state networks to inflict massive damage to a nation's morale alongwith material damage, and the willingness to go for a mass killing is unprecedented in modern terrorism's history.[64]
14. *Cyber Terrorism:* Cyber-terrorism is the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures such as energy, transportation, government operations or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population. The premise of cyber terrorism is that as nations and critical infrastructure became more dependent on computer networks for their operation, new vulnerabilities are created. A hostile nation or group could exploit these vulnerabilities to penetrate a poorly secured computer network and disrupt or even shut down critical functions. [65]
15. *Exotic Terrorism:* Exotic terrorism is used to refer to terrorist activities of a group that espouses an ideological position that is non-native to its environment, usually with ethnic and social protest combined in cases with ideological

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[63] Laqueur, n. 3, pp. 210-216.

[64] Lawerence Freedman, ed., *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002), pp. 1-6; Laqueur, n. 3, pp. 3-7.

[65] James A. Lewis, "Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, http://www.csis.org/tech/0211_lewis.pdf, p.1, accessed on 18-01-03.

confusion owing to the curious adaptations of imported ideologies to suit local environment.[66]

16. *Eco Terrorism:* Eco Terrorism is largely radical ecology that crosses the borderline between environmental concern and terrorism. It manifests itself as fanatic belief that civilization needs to be destroyed to save the planet. It is largely elitist in origin, and targetted victims usually are organizational assets of commercial as well as governmental bodies that are perceived to threaten the environment. However, the violence is low compared to other more common forms of terrorism.[67]
17. *Single Issue Terrorism:* is what Chalk calls the terrorist activities of those organizations that are not interested in establishing a new society *per se*, but rather see their objectives in terms of a single issue. These single issue groups 'reflect' the problems that concern society and may also include identity issues.[68]

TERRORIST METHODS

The methods used by terrorists have varied along with the technological capability of human civilization. To a determined terrorist virtually anything is useful, as a tool of terror, including in the finality of his/her own body. The only limitation is their ingenuous capacity to use everyday utility items as force multipliers. However, certain patterns have emerged, with certain methods used more commonly than others are. These are:

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[66] Laqueur, n. 3, pp. 184-199.

[67] Ibid, pp. 199-209.

[68] Chalk, n. 32, p. 24.

Arson, bombs and the threat of them, car bombs, chemical substances, hijacking, kidnapping and hostage taking, grenades, guns (small and automatic), knives and machetes, letter bombs, mortar and rocket launchers, stoning, sabotage, suicide, vandalism, and civilian airplanes.[69]

Some more successful terrorist organizations (the LTTE of Sri Lanka) have a highly trained armed force that includes naval units and aircrafts as well. Different kinds of terrorists prefer different kinds of weapons, depending on the nature of their target, the location selected and the kind of weapons they may be able to access. Their constraints are not moral, but material. It is a point that needs to be kept in mind. Advances in technology that help the average person also help the average terrorist. Since technology does not differentiate between humans, though causing differentiations based on the accessibility or denial of technology, a globalized networked world brings equal opportunities to terrorists as well as the average humans.[70] However, the most potent tool that terrorists use as force multipliers is psychological. Terror is the most potent force multiplier terrorists have in their arsenal. Destruction of the sense of security that is accepted as a normal and necessary condition for social and political life is so far the most dangerous tool accessible to terrorism. According to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, the "ultimate objective of terrorism, in all its forms and from whatever source it may come, is to diminish the humanity of its victims and to reduce them to its own level of barbarity."[71] This brings us to the more dangerous methodology that is not so often pointed out – the abuse of the free space within democracies. Transnational terrorism, in

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[69] Whittaker, n. 8, pp. 127-146.

[70] One interesting illustration of the point is a case reported in The Economist about a suspected Al-Qaeda terrorist found ensconced inside a cargo container (used widely for shipping) at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro. *The Economist*, (London), April 6-12 (2002), pp. 59-61.

[71] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Upholding International Legality against Islamic and American Jihad", in Booth & Dunne, eds, n. 39, pp. 162-171.

its present incarnation, uses the civil liberties available in democracies to penetrate states, and hide and even defend their activities. Asylum and immigration laws in most democratic societies are meant to help provide refuge to those who face persecution under oppressive and authoritarian regimes in their states of origin. Since a potential terrorist rarely carries any identification tag, it is easier to infiltrate democratic societies and seek recruits within the dissatisfied groups or plain criminal groups and establish networks that then become difficult to identify and prosecute in the court of law. This is potentially the most disruptive and invisible method that contemporary transnational terrorism uses. Their claim to represent a particular religious group and incidences of recruits from within such immigrant as well as native groups, only help in stigmatising the community that terrorism purports to act on behalf of. The abuse of the free spaces of democracies to disrupt from within is the more dangerous method that contemporary terrorism uses.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Schelling defines *international terrorism* as "(Acts of) terrorism committed by nationals of one country, or by members of nationalist groups or organizations, against governments, institutions, or people in another country."[72] This definition can be amended to include other groups or organizations that (also) are religious or quasi-religious and/or ideological, since a characteristic feature of terrorism in recent times is the religious/ideological component to it.[73] The basic components of a state are its physical component (territory and people subject to the state's authority); institutional component (institutions of law and government); and the metaphysical component (the

[72] Schelling, n. 62.

[73] Juergensmeyer, n. 17.

concept or idea of the state acknowledged or accepted by the populace).[74] International terrorism is a violent dissent against these basic components of a state. According to Peter Chalk, "Terrorism becomes international in dimensions when it is carried out beyond the borders that define the perpetrating group's country of origin; when it is aimed at foreign nationals within a perpetrating group's country of origin; or when it seeks to influence a foreign government."[75]

International terrorism may and does include variations mentioned above. Cyber terrorism is usually international in nature and definitely global in reach. New Age or Superterrorism is transnational, may be religious (like the Al-Qaeda network) and use force to achieve maximum casualty. Religious terrorism can be and is international, while being transnational in nature and enjoy state sponsorship as well. The overlapping of categories only points to the complexities that contemporary international terrorism engenders, and the multifarious challenges that it presents to analysis as well as prescriptions. The emergence of globalization and the end of the Cold war has seen international terrorism emerge in new patterns. Globalization as a process of dilution of rights of nation states and neutral technological processes (communications and media, transportation, and internet) has also meant linkages between international terrorist and criminal organizations.[76] There are two common features to contemporary international terrorism, according to Radu:

1. Reliance on illegal and criminal sources of funding, usually drugs.

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[74] See Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (New Delhi: Transasia Publishers, 1983), pp. 36-72.

[75] Chalk, n. 32, p. 22.

[76] Michel Radu, "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* (Philadelphia), volume 46, number 2, Spring (2002), pp. 275-287. Radu mentions the operation of the Al-Qaeda group in about sixty countries, spanning from Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, Uzbekistan, to Canada, China, Russia (Chechnya), Great Britain and France. India has Al-Qaeda's presence directly via the Lashkar-e-Taeyba, a terrorist group operating largely in Jammu & Kashmir.

2. A hatred for Western democracy and capitalism.[77]

Another feature of contemporary international terrorism is the background of the present day terrorist. They are not the poor, underprivileged of the world who take to terrorism in desperation, as romantic root-cause theories would suggest. Rather, these present recruits of international terrorism come from educated middle-class backgrounds, often emanating from the developed countries of West Europe and the Americas. These suggest, according to Radu, that it may not be structural injustice that breeds contemporary international terrorism, but rather it is fanatic religious ideology. [78] Moreover, the nature of contemporary transnational terrorism can be glimpsed with the Al-Qaeda network that is the supreme body of different militant groups active in the Arab states as well as globally. After Osama bin-Laden became the head of the organization he formed the International Islamic Front that has the support of most radical Muslim groups all over the world. The groups include the Egyptian Jammat-ul Jehad, the Algerian outfit Islamic Salvation Front, the Ittehad-e Islami of Somalia, the Abu Sayyaf organization of Philippines and of course the groups active in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.[79] Their avowed targets consistently have been secular democracies.

Conclusion

The transnational nature of contemporary terrorism poses analytical challenges to conventional understandings of security that move around states as the objects of analysis. The cultural underpinnings to international terrorism, that cites religion as its

[77] Ibid. Surprisingly the hatred for Western democracy is not only from those located outside what is implied by the 'west', but also those within this 'west'.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ataov, n. 5, pp. 125-154.

site of legitimations, makes the issue a sensitive one even as it forces one to take into account the role of religion in today's imaginations. While traditional terrorist organizations were easier to locate and their causal dynamics easier to find within a particular state or a regional security complex, contemporary terrorism, as a networked entity in a digitally integrated world, is highly nebulous and amorphous. It not only uses phantom cells that are geographically dispersed, but because of its 'leaderless' character also constitutes a remarkable example of the network format that make its organizational structure difficult to isolate as a whole.

The use of religion as its site of legitimations not only threatens to obscure the issue, but presents a challenge to the liberal democratic order. In terms of contemporary transnational terrorism, the underlying threat remain the same to all democratic states as far as the broader challenge that transnational terrorism presents to the present world order. The rise of religious nationalism in many states makes the issue more contentious and threatens to pit the imaginations of entire communities against one another. Indeed its attractions to the radical religious elements within particular communities have obscured the argument that terrorism finds its recruits only in regions that suffer from gross distributive injustices. Again, unlike traditional terrorist organizations, contemporary transnational terrorism makes effective use of amateur terrorists or freelancing radical individuals who buy into the rhetoric of the terrorists and often act on their own making detection more difficult and understanding the dynamics more confounding. The dynamics of contemporary international terrorism makes it a peculiarly dangerous threat even as its rhetoric threatens a global war against modernity and the very idea of civility and politics. In other words, contemporary transnational terrorism represents a movement that feeds on the discontent of many to wage a war against all.

Chapter III

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN BRITAIN

International terrorism in Britain apart from the Northern Irish terrorism had two important characteristics (like the rest of west Europe). According to Peter Chalk, international terrorist incidents either were a spill over from the violence in West Asia (largely the Palestine issue) or were violence directed against American targets with non-British actors.[1] Recent years, however, have seen British subjects involved in acts of international terrorism in far off areas as Afghanistan, India and Israel. What makes these incidents more significant is that all the British subjects involved in these incidents are radical Muslims fighting for an Islamist cause of jihad. Great Britain also continues to attract international terrorist activities as the more recent case of persons arrested in North London Ricin poison case, on 05 January 2003, indicates. These cases put Great Britain in a peculiar position. The British state has proscribed twenty-five international groups and their activities within Britain, while there are about fourteen proscribed Irish groups. Out of the twenty-five international terrorist organizations, sixteen are Islamist in orientation, seeking the creation of Islamic states in their various target countries (and abroad) and two are Sikh terrorist groups, seeking the creation of a separate Sikh state in India. Two groups (the Hizbollah's External Security Organisation and the Abu-Nidal Group) have orientations that overlap between ethnic nationalism and religion. Thus out of the twenty-five proscribed terrorist groups, twenty claim religion as their basis for legitimations, while three (PKK, ETA, and LTTE) cite ethnic

[1] Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp.45-63.

nationalism as their basis for terrorist activities. Only two groups (17 November Revolution Organisation and the Revolutionary Peoples' Liberation Party) cite political ideology as their grounds for dissent. All the fourteen proscribed Irish groups cite sectarian religion and nationalism as their grounds for departure from conventional politics.[2] Transnational terrorism and radical religious movements have close relationship in the contemporary period. The participation of increasing number of British subjects in radical militant Islamist *jihad*, wherefore the ties are not of citizenship but of religion, raise issues that present a complex challenge to Britain.

NORTHERN IRELAND

According to Donald Horowitz, Northern Ireland is a deviant case in western terms. Horowitz cites four characteristics that separate Northern Ireland from what he calls the western world (meaning North America and West Europe).[3] The first characteristic is the issue of national identity. While in the 'western' world, there is a supraethnic national identity, Northern Ireland according to Horowitz, like the other severely divided societies of Africa and Asia, is yet to find any such identity.[4]

The second characteristic is that ethnicity in the west does not "displace all other forms of group difference". In Northern Ireland, like some African and Asian states, ethnic

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[2] Sourced from *http://*www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/threat/groups/index#top Accessed on 15-02-03.

[3] Donald L. Horowitz, "Conflict and the Incentives to Political Accommodation", in Dermot Keogh & Michael H. Haltzei, eds *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 173-188.

[4] There are said to be three kinds of Irish nationalism: Secessionist nationalism, irredentism, and state patriotism. Northern secessionism is closely linked to southern irredentism. Although irredentism and secessionism are closely related by definition, in the Irish case it is virtually guaranteed to fail to translate into national unity because of state patriotism as Ulster unionism and loyalism. See Gerard Delanty, "Negotiating the Peace in Ireland", *Journal of Peace Research* (London), volume 32, number 3 (1995), pp. 257-264, p. 258.

and religious identities are coterminous and class has reinforced these ascriptive differences. The third characteristic of Northern Ireland, according to Horowitz is the intensity of ethnic conflict. This is said to be lower in the 'west' than in Asia or Africa. Northern Ireland is again similar to Asian and African states, with a qualification that Northern Ireland does not show the incidence of face-to-face ethnic riots and mass killing as is seen in the deeply divided societies of Asia and Africa. The fourth characteristic mentioned is the location of the deeply divided societies on fault lines between two worlds. Northern Ireland, according to Horowitz, may be said to lie between the Celtic world and the Anglo-Saxon world forming the issue of double minority.[5]

Permissive & Proximate Factors

At first sight, Northern Ireland appears to a combination of at least two of the four kinds of internal conflicts mentioned by Brown.[6] Internal, mass-level phenomena of patterns of political and economic discrimination, and an internal, elite-driven conflict involving ideological contests make Ireland a combination of two kinds of conflict, joined by history. Secondly, there are deep cultural/perceptual factors with patterns of cultural discrimination cited by the minority Catholic group.

The causal flow of violence is said to flow from culture via structural (political & social) before it ends in direct violence, making the cultural/perceptual factors important

[5] Although Horowitz cites Northern Ireland caught between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon worlds, Fionnuala Ni Aolain cites the political violence in both the parts of Ireland as historically deriving from the 'coexistence of four conflicting cultures', viz. Gaelic, English, Anglo-Irish, and Ulster Protestant. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "Where Hope and History Rhyme: Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland?", *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), volume 50, number. 1 (1996), pp. 63-89.

[6] See Michael E. Brown, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An Overview", in Michael E. Brown, et al, eds *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), revised edition, pp. 3-25.

indicators.[7] In fact, the roots of the separatist movement are bound to culture and religion in Northern Ireland.[8] Northern Ireland is a society whose culture has been shaped by rival versions of Christianity. As far as enduring perceptions go, for the Catholics, religion has been a powerful source of unity between North and south Ireland and consequently used to develop their own separate social infrastructure. Consequently, for the Ulster Protestants the Catholic Republicans have remained as second-class citizens with loyalty to the theocratic Church of Rome.[9]

The creation of the Northern Irish state was viewed by the Catholic Church as a threat to basic rights like education which it considered a religious right. Amidst fears of discrimination against Catholics by the Unionist (Protestant) controlled local government, the Catholic Church and the Catholic laity moved to an 'advanced' nationalist position, whereby the creation of Northern Ireland state was considered a violation of Ireland's right to self-government.[10] The early role of the Catholic Church in Northern Ireland was to prevent the establishment of a North Irish state since it was convinced that the right of Catholics would suffer under a Northern regime.[11] The call to nationalist sentiments was thus an invention by the Catholic Church to contain what

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[7] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp.1-23.

[8] The roots of the religious dimension of the Irish conflicts are said to lie in the Protestant Reformation of the 1500s, when Henry VIII created an independent Church of England. The protests by the Irish Catholics against the Anglican Church in Ireland began as early as 1579 when James Fitz Maurice Fitzgerald arrived with a small continental Catholic force in Dingle, Munster. On 7 December 1688, the city of Derry was closed by the protestant skilled workers (also called the Apprentice Boys) against the troops of James II in what is known as the *Siege of Derry*. James II was a catholic challenger to the throne of England. In 1690, William of Orange, whose interests the Protestant 'Apprentice Boys' were defending at Derry, arrived at Carrickfergus and James II was subsequently defeated at the Battle of Boyne. The image of the Derry conflict has remained predominantly that of an enduring Catholic-Protestant conflict. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events.index.html. Accessed on 23-03-03.

[9] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 172.

[10] Mary Harris, "The Catholic Church, Minority Rights, and the Founding of the Northern Irish State", in Keogh & Haltzei, eds, n. 3, pp. 62-83.

[11] Ibid.

it viewed as a threat to itself under Protestant rule. Religious sectarian loyalty was thus expressed in nationalist terms.

The importance laid on cultural autonomy, as sought by the Irish Catholic Church did not find a similar preoccupation within the unionist and largely Protestant community that was content to have, for example, a British educational curriculum. According to Terence Brown:

> [The] central tenet of the cultural nationalism that had served as an adjunct to the political nationalism of the independence movement that Ireland possessed a distinctive Irish-Language-based culture and that separatism was intimately bound with cultural aspirations. [12]

The issue of religious difference cited as a reason for discrimination over such along period in history points to the intractability of cultural and perceptual factors in Northern Ireland. As John Darby points out,

> From its inception until the return of Direct Rule in 1972, political tension was constant in Northern Ireland, only varying in intensity. Sectarian strains were never far from the surface. A chronically insecure Protestant majority, an alienated Catholic minority, electoral malpractice, ethnic bias in the distribution of housing and welfare services, and a declining economy meant that the state could never command full political legitimacy. Nevertheless few observers could see the meltdown around the corner.[13]

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[12] Terence Brown, "The Cultural Issue in Northern Ireland, 1965-1991", in Keogh & Haltzei, eds, n. 3, pp. 160- 170, pp.160. However, for all practical purposes, English language continues to be the vernacular language of the majority of Irish people, with the minority of people, who do use the Irish language in everyday interactions, being reluctant to refer to themselves as a 'linguistic minority' – a tendency that allows for succumbing to the traditional ideology of relationships based on power and domination. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, "Ascertaining a Minority Linguistic Group: Ireland as a Case-Study", in Deidre Fotkell & Bill Bowring, eds *Minority & Group Rights in the New Millennium* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft Publishers, 1999), pp. 87-110.

[13] John Darby, "Northern Ireland: The background to the Peace Process", Monograph, 2003. Published in CAIN Project website www.cain.ulst.ac.uk. Accessed on 23-03-03.

The immediate cause of the beginning of the present Irish violence in 1969 is within this context of a divided society when the 'Apprentice Boys' of Derry decided to hold their march along the same route as the 'Civil Rights' march in 1968. The banning of the Civil Rights march by the authorities and subsequent violence linked to its defiance and action by authorities led to a series of events in which a party called the 'People's Democracy', comprising largely of Catholics and Republicans, organised a march on January 1, 1969. The march continued, despite incidences of violence, until January 4, 1969, when the march was disrupted by an ambush by the Loyalists or Protestant Unionists. The violence triggered of by this incident led to the entry of the Royal Ulster Constabulary into the Bogside area of Derry city that resulted into a serious rioting and a beginning of the present cycle of violence in Northern Ireland.

a. Social & Political Factors

Northern Irish politics is characterised by two distinct and polarised traditions, marked by the two nationalist and unionist ethno-national blocs, having clear religious origin or affiliation. Both the communities over history have shown little desire for integration or assimilation with the other.[14] Both the communities continue to be divided on the issue of loyalty to Britain and loyalty to the Republic of Ireland, with the Catholic minority wanting to maintain some kind of linkages to the Republic of Ireland.[15]

The reasons for such a pessimistic view go back in the history of Northern Ireland when the 1920 Government of Ireland Act of the British Parliament divided the island of

[14] Geoffrey Evans & Brendan O'Leary, "Northern Irish Voters and the British-Irish Agreement: Foundations of a Stable Consociational Settlement?", *The Political Quarterly* (Malden, Massachusetts), volume 71, number 1, Jan-March (2000), pp. 78-101.

[15] Ibid. However, according to Gerard Delanty there is hope that the regional identity of Ulster may lead to an overcoming of the Unionist/Republican divide. This corresponds to real identities with 60% Catholics referring to themselves as Irish, but only 40% as nationalist. Protestants exhibit similar 'hyphenated identities' where their Irish identity is viewed as compatible with their British identity. See Delanty, n. 4, p. 132.

Ireland into two separate nations.[16] The creation of the Irish Free State was seen as an institutionalization of the Irish partition, leading to widespread violence between those who supported the Treaty and those who opposed it.[17] The Irish Free State got full independence in 1949, proclaiming itself the Republic of Ireland and withdrawing from the British Commonwealth. Within Ulster or Northern Ireland, the Protestant dominated the Stormont (Parliament) and local councils marginalized the Roman Catholic minority.[18] The issue of Union with or separation from Britain has ever since dominated Ulster politics. Protestants have tended to be supporters of the Union and Catholics have supported reunion with Southern Ireland, thus forming the two conflicting traditions in Northern Ireland.

Socially the division is clear in Northern Ireland. The Protestant majority and the Catholic minority have evolved their own different social infrastructures. The development of the two different communities in Northern Ireland is however also closely linked to "the economic and political contexts in which different ethnic groups or, more precisely, their dominant classes, operate." According to Kerby A. Miller, in the late eighteenth century East Ulster Presbyterian merchants and manufacturers tried to define their community as inclusively Irish and anti-British when they perceived their interests to be threatened by British policies. That they were unable to do so was a result of the localized and relatively underdeveloped Ulster society of that era. By the

[16] The southern part consisted of 26 counties. The six northern counties formed Northern Ireland (also known as Ulster). The first Northern Irish Parliament opened in 1921. However, Southern Ireland, demanding complete independence, rejected the Act, in an act of boycott of the Southern Irish parliament by the Sinn Fein which had won 124 out of the 128 seats. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events.index.html. Accessed on 23-03-03.
Control of the Southern Ireland was resumed by the British government until 6 December 1921 when the *Anglo-Irish Treaty* signed with the British government created the Irish Free State. See Alan J. Ward, "A Constitutional Background to the Northern Ireland Crisis" in Keogh & Haltzei, eds, n. 3, pp. 33-51.

[17] Aolain, n. 5.

[18] Stormont is the geographical location of the Northern Ireland House of Parliament. However, the hegemonic and discriminatory nature of the regime from 1922-1973 has given it strong negative connotations for the Catholics. Ibid.

next century, according to Miller they were so thoroughly integrated into British capitalism that the protection of their economic links by the new relationship changed their definition of ethnic identity to become inclusivist towards Britain, and exclusivist towards Ireland's Catholics.[19] In fact, the uneven development between the industrialised Ulster and the 'peasant' southern Ireland is said to form the ideological basis of Unionism:

> The clear divergence between the economic and social structures of north and south is sufficient to account for the emergence of two states and the fact that Protestants, especially in the working class, have always been militantly antinationalist.[20]

While this underlines the importance of economic and political contexts, the problem in Northern Ireland has been discriminatory politics informed by religious sectarianism.[21] According to Fionnuala Ni Aolain:

> The polarization of the two communities was built from the inception of the state along religious and political lines. Religious affiliation thus came to define political identity. Ultimately, it was also the means by which the state characterized citizenship and loyalty.[22]

Moreover,

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[19] Kerby A. Miller, "Revising Revisionism", in Keogh & Haltzei, eds, n.3, pp. 52-61.

[20] Paul Bew & Henry Patterson, *The British State & the Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher* (London: Verso Books, 1985), pp. 3-4.

[21] During the 1960s, the issue of civil rights for the Catholic community began to dominate the political agenda with the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) formed in 1964. Housing, employment, education and franchise reform were the main areas of contention. In 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was established to work for civil rights for all Northern Irish citizens. In November 1967, the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC), an association of the Catholic Republicans was formed to look into the housing problems. A march was organised in Londonderry on 5th October 1968 by the Association that ended in bloody riots between the Catholic population of the city and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) that had disrupted the march. Source: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events.index.html. Accessed on 23-03-03.

[22] Aolain, n. 5, p. 66.

> Northern Ireland has long been assumed to contain two peoples with mutually exclusive, non-bargainable political objectives. Broadly speaking, these incompatible objectives were the desire of the Catholic community for the political integration of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic, and the wish of their Protestant counterparts for the territory and governance of the jurisdiction to remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom. Their respective mandates for Irishness and Britishness as political and cultural identities have been exclusive and entirely unsupportive of political accommodation. [23]

To enable political accommodation would necessitate the reaching of some common ground beyond the zero-sum game they are involved in. In a history of bitter memories, each side has held on to a tradition that locks the other out. To this extent, Northern Ireland and its conflicts suggest the failure of religion to reconcile. According to Appleby:

> As bearers of tradition, history, and myth, the religious communities in Northern Ireland have been primary cultural agents of the conflict. Sadly, the churches contributed mightily to the formulation of theologies and myths that sustained a climate of mutual distrust. Once the Troubles began, a constant struggle to gain and hold an advantage over the opponent amid changing circumstances required the mythmakers continually to update and adjust their stories.[24]

Costs of Conflict

The casualties caused by the conflict in Northern Ireland, in proportion to its population of 1698,000 (2000 census), is staggering. Ever since the start of the present conflict in 1969, the *Sutton Index* puts the total casualties from 1969 to 2001 at about 3,602. This includes 1574 Catholic and 1,327 Protestant lives within Northern Ireland. The total

[23] Ibid, p. 70.

[24] Appleby, n. 9, p. 177.

number of civilian deaths is estimated for the entire period at 1,855. The death caused by Northern Irish terrorist activities in Great Britain, between the year 1969 and 2001 is put at 120.[25]

The conflict has cost Britain highest in the decade starting from the year 1970 to 1979, with civilian casualties put at 1,176 lives, while the British Army suffered a total loss of 349 lives. The decade starting from the year 1980 to 1989 saw a marked decrease with the conflict costing Britain 321 civilian lives and 127 lives of British soldiers. The decade beginning from 1990 to 1999 has seen 329 civilian deaths, with about twenty-eight British soldiers losing their life to the conflict. The new decade beginning from the year 2000 to the year 2001 has seen a sharp reduction with about sixteen civilian casualties and no loss of British soldiers.[26]

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The Provisional IRA has its roots in the earlier Irish Republican Brotherhood formed in 1858 C.E. by James Stephens. The IRA in late 1969 split into the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA (henceforth IRA) became the clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The organization had a Marxist orientation prior to its split, with the Provisional IRA becoming thoroughly catholic,[27] and is organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council. The IRA receives

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[25] Compiled from the *Sutton Index*, CAIN Project. Civilian casualties do not include political activists/ workers, and politicians, nor do the deaths include those cases, like death by heart-attacks, etc. that result from the stress of the conflict. Source: http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron, (1969-2001). Accessed on 23-03-03.

[26] During 2000, 7 persons were detained in connection with Irish terrorism, down from 12 in 1999, and the lowest number recorded since 1974. See *Statistics on the Operation of Prevention of Terrorism Legislation 16/01, Great Britain 2000(1)*, submitted on 13 September 2001, p. 1. Source: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/sept11/index.asp. Accessed on 24-03-03.

[27] Bew & Patterson, n. 20, pp. 28-29.

financial support and aid from sympathizers in the United States of America[28] and has received arms and training in Libya and from the Palestine Liberation Organization.[29] Northern Irish terrorism via largely the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its splinter organizations exploit the existing fault lines within the society of Northern Ireland. Ethno-national terrorism needs and breeds on group hatreds, creating conditions that would make rapprochement between the conflicting groups impossible lies at the heart of the interests of the terrorist.[30] Since the nature of the IRA is ethno-national in ideology, exploiting hostility towards the 'out-group', i.e. Protestant unionists, makes its existence relevant. One way it keeps doing that is by exploiting the proximate causes of the Irish conflict, in an environment made permissive because of the history of Northern Ireland and the history of IRA's own activities. Its strategy of destroying the Stormont (parliament) in Northern Ireland and its replacement by direct rule as well as its being the primary cause for increased British military presence in Northern Ireland[31] can be seen as a strategy of drawing the ethno-national lines clear to support its hypothesis of British colonial presence in Northern Ireland.[32]

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[28] The Provisional IRA began life 'as a fledgling and poorly equipped group', organized to fight the perceived threat posed by the Protestant majority. See, Michael Cox, "The IRA ceasefire and the end of the Cold War", *International Affairs*, volume 75, number 4, October (1997), pp. 671-693, p. 669. However, funds from the US have helped the IRA tremendously in terms of greater economic capacity.

[29] The Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI) website http://www.emergency.com/cntrter3.htm.
Accessed on 12-0-03. While ERRI cites the IRA as Marxist in orientation, some analysts believe that the Provisional IRA is not Marxist, though the Official IRA continues to be Marxist in orientation. See Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes, "The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1972: From Policing to Counter-Terror", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), volume 20, number 2, June (1997), pp. 1-24, p. 12.

[30]Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (Arlington: RAND), volume 21, number 2 (1998), pp. 149-170.

[31] Charles Townshend, *Political Violence in Ireland: Government & Resistance Since 1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 396-398.

[32] The IRA has always attempted to portray itself as fighting against British colonialism. In 1970s, the IRA used snipers to shoot British soldiers, picking them up from behind using the cover of the crowd in emulation of terrorist activities in Cyprus, hoping to kill an equal number of troops. See Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, n. 29, pp. 1-24.

Ever since the beginning of the present problems in 1969, the IRA has made some spectacular attacks in Britain. The tendency has largely been to step up strikes whenever the possibilities of negotiations occur. The objective is not only to attempt to achieve a psychological edge in the negotiations, but rather more acutely to stimulate anger and hatred in the Protestant population that has its obvious spill over in retaliatory strikes by Protestant groups. The result often is what suits terrorism best – inflamed passions and acute mistrust and fear. In fact, the IRA and Sinn Fein seek the unity of Ireland irrespective of the wishes of the majority, in a peculiar case where national sovereignty overrides popular sovereignty.[33]Another aspect that is typical of Northern Irish terrorism is the element of 'sacrificial martyrdom', whereby the emotive appeal of its cause is sought to be magnified by being seen as part of their 'sacrificial suffering' with allusions to the 'martyrdom' of Christ.[34]

a. International linkages

The American linkages of the present IRA began with the Troubles in 1968 that prompted a number of organizations to come up with interest in Irish nationalism.[35] Central amongst them were the Irish Northern Aid or NORAID, the Irish National Caucus or NIC, and the Friends of Ireland. NORAID was founded in 1970 by Michael Flannery, an erstwhile member of the North Tipperary Brigade of the IRA during the 1920s. NORAID has been one of the key fundraisers for the Provisional IRA and sent

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[33] The other major party with republican interest within Northern Ireland is the Social Democratic Labour Party or SDLP, but with a major difference in that, it seeks to do so through constitutional and democratic means. This disregard for popular opinion is endemic for most terrorist organizations. See Delanty, n. 4.

[34] David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London: Pearson Education, 2002), pp. 122-124.

[35] The first linkage with the United States began as early as 1859 C.E. when the 'Fenian Brotherhood' organization was founded in the United States to help in the Irish war fro independence. http://www.cain.ulst.edu.uk/events.index.htm. Accessed on 23-03-03.

approximately 3 million US dollars to Ireland between its foundation and the end of 1986. It further sent about another 600,000 US dollars from 1986 to 1991. The money from NORAID goes to *An Cumann Cabrach*, a charity organization working around the IRA. There are said to be several evidences of NORAID fund-raising and subsequent arms purchasing by the IRA. The United States alone is not the source of arms for the IRA. Arms cargo (150 tons) on the ship *Eksund* destined for the IRA was intercepted by the French navy in 1987. The source of this huge shipment of arms was Libya. [36]

The linkages with the Republic of Ireland took an international dimension with the creation of the Republic of Ireland, though the IRA has consistently received support from radical groups from both the parts of the Irish island. Amidst the so-called Irish revolution, the 1920 Government of Ireland Act led to the creation of the Irish Free State or *Saorstát Éireann* on 6 December 1922, leading to the Irish Constitution or *Bunreacht na hÉireann*, approved in the referendum of 1937. The 'Irish Volunteers' or descendants of the Irish Brotherhood, in the early days of the Irish Declaration of Independence simply assumed that with the declaration, their armed struggle had acquired a certain legitimacy, coming to call themselves as the Irish Republican Army.[37] It was only in 1949, with the formation of the Republic of Ireland, through the Ireland Act of 1949, that Irish terrorism, in the technical sense became international as the IRA involved members across the two states in its activities. The linkages with the Irish Republic stems from a common struggle for independence that has left a Catholic

[36] There have been several instances of IRA weapon-purchases in the United States with one case of attempts to purchase Stinger surface-to-air missile. In September 1984, seven tons of guns and ammunition bound for the IRA was seized by Irish authorities from an Irish fishing trawler *Marita Ann*, after their transfer from an American trawler *Valhalala* that had originated from Boston. See Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process", *International Affairs* (Cambridge), volume 72, number 3 (1996), pp. 521-536.

[37] Townshend, n. 31, pp. 331-334.

minority under Britain, and the source of sympathy for the IRA in Northern Ireland and its affinity with the leadership in the Irish Republic.[38]

b. Activities

The IRA has used bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies, and effectively runs the Catholic ghettos as its personal fiefdom, where compliance is ensured through a sustained campaign of executions for informers, amidst other lesser punishments like knee-capping and tarring/feathering for lesser crimes.[39] The report of Lord Carlile, 2002, cites the continued criminal methods used for securing funding:

> It remains clear without any evidence of abatement that the paramilitary organisations still exercise very significant social and economic influence over communities. On both sides of the sectarian divide there is a clear danger of intimidation within living and working neighbourhoods. Armed robberies remain at a high level, and the raising of money for paramilitaries by various intimidatory methods remains part of the picture.[40]

Before its 1994 cease-fire, its targets included senior British Government officials, British military and police in Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitary groups. Since breaking its cease-fire in February 1996, IRA's operations have included bombing campaigns against train and subway stations and shopping areas on mainland Britain, British military and Royal Ulster Constabulary targets in Northern Ireland, and

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[38] In the early 1970, the government in Dublin, Republic of Ireland, or some of its members are said to have channelled about 100,000 British pounds in aid to the Catholic Defence Committees that was used by the IRA to buy arms. See John Cole, "Security Constraints", in David Watt, ed., *The Constitution of Northern Ireland: Problems & Prospects* (London: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 123-124.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Lord Carlile Of Berriew Q.C., *Report On The Operation In 2002 Of Part Vii Of The Terrorism Act 2000*, Sub-section 2.9, p.10. Source: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/ Accessed on 24-04-03.

a British military facility on the European Continent.[41] The IRA has also used children as its bombers with improvised incendiary bombs against security personnel, hoping to reduce its casualties as soldiers were constrained to use only plastic bullets to avert killing any children.[42] More notably, two IRA terrorist attacks in recent times have evoked considerable dismay even amongst those sympathetic to its ostensible cause.

In December 1993, the Downing Street Declaration was made by the British Prime Minister John Major and the Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds that reaffirmed the two government's resolve on the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. The IRA entered into a ceasefire in August 1994 to enable talks to be held.[43] On August 31, 1994, the IRA ceasefire was effected with help from the Clinton administration of the United States, culminating in a Joint Declaration by the Governments of the Republic of Ireland and United Kingdom in February 1995, known as "A New Framework of Agreement". The Joint Declaration proposed for the creation of many new institutional arrangements between the North and the South. On February 9, 1996, the IRA announced the end of its ceasefire and detonated a 1,500 pond fertilizer bomb at the Canary Wharf business complex in east London killing two storekeepers, injuring more 100 civilians, while the damage to property was estimated as 140 million US dollars. The explosion occurred only hours after the announcement of the end to its ceasefire.[44] The other vivid case of

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[41]The Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI) website. http://www.emergency.com/cntrter3.htm.Accessed on 12-0-03.

[42] Cole, n. 38, p. 145.

[43] The ceasefire by the PIRA began on 31 August, 1994 and broke down on 9 February, 1996. The ceasefire was resumed on 20 July 1997. The cease fire has been violated occasionally by the IRA ever since, including a 1998 car-bomb attack in Portadown, Ireland. Source: http://www.mi5.gov.uk. Accessed on 19-4 -2003.

[44] The occurrence of the explosion within hours of the announcement of the cessation of ceasefire by the IRA points to the nature of its deliberations, in what was clearly planned much early. In fact, Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader refused to condemn the IRA or to acknowledge publicly any split in the ranks, leading the Clinton administration to withdraw Gerry Adam's fundraising privileges in the United States as well as his cabinet-level access. See, Jonathan Stevenson, "Northern Ireland: Treating Terrorists as Statesmen", *Foreign Policy* (New York), number 105, Winter (1996-97), pp. 125-142, p. 126.

the IRA's attempt to sabotage the peace process in Northern Ireland came soon after the so called Good Friday Agreement. The political arm of the IRA, the Sinn Fein was invited by the British Government for talks on 29 August 1997, enabling a broad agreement on the transference of power. This new British-Irish Agreement was put to a referendum and in May 1998 was overwhelmingly supported by the electorates of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. In response, the IRA bombed the Omagh market place on August 1998, killing 29 people and injuring about 250 people. The long culture of violent conflict amidst incompatible demands means that for the IRA, the conflict is not over.[45]

c. Major terrorist attacks by the IRA since 1969[46]

1970 – For the first time after its reorganization, the IRA became visible by organizing an attack at the Belfast New Barnsley estate, a Protestant area.[47]

1979 – 27 August 1979. Lord Mountbatten was killed by remote controlled bomb on his boat, detonated when leaving Mullaghmore Harbour, County Sligo, Ireland. Three more lives were lost in this attack.

1979 – 27 August 1979. Two remote controlled bomb attacks at British Army, at Narrow Water, near Warrenpoint, County Down. The first bomb was left in parked lorry and detonated when British Army (BA) lorry passed. The second bomb was left in a nearby Gate Lodge and detonated when British Army (BA) reinforcements arrived at the scene of the first explosion. The twin attacks cost the lives of eighteen soldiers.

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[45] Also see M.L.R. Smith, "The Intellectual Internment of a Conflict: the Forgotten War in Northern Ireland", *International Affairs* (Oxford), volume 75, number 1 (1999), pp. 77-95.

[46] Whittaker, n. 12, pp. 128-133. All chronologies are from Whittaker and the Sutton Index at http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/ unless otherwise specified.

[47] Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, n. 29, p. 12.

1982 – 20 July 1982. Two remote controlled bomb attacks on (a) British Army (BA) regimental cavalry as they rode past parked car, Rotten Row, Hyde Park, London, and (b) British Army (BA) bandsmen playing at bandstand, also in Hyde Park, London. The attack killed ten soldiers.

1983 – 17 December 1983. Car bomb exploded outside Harrod's Department Store, Brompton Road, Knightsbridge, London, resulting in the death of six people.

1984 – 12 October 1984. The IRA attempted to assassinate the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a time-bomb attack at Conservative Party Conference, Grand Hotel, Brighton, Sussex, England, during the annual meet of the Conservative party. Thatcher narrowly escaped the attack. Anthony Berry, Conservative Member of Parliament, died in the attack along with four other people.

1990 – 25 June 1990. Bomb attack on Carlton Club, St James Street, London, injuring Lord Kaberry, former Conservative Member of Parliament. Lord Kaberry later died in 1991 from the injuries.

1990 – 30 July 1990. Ian Gow, Conservative Member of Parliament was killed by booby trap bomb attached to his car outside his home, Hankham, Pevensey, Sussex, England.

1991 – A mortar bomb attack was attempted at 10 Downing Street, during a Cabinet meeting at the British Prime Minister's official residence.

1996 – 9 February 1996. The IRA exploded fertilizer bomb at the Canary Wharf business complex in East London, killing two store-keepers and injured more than 100 civilians, and damaged property worth 140 million US dollars.[48]

[48] Also, see Stevenson, n. 44, p. 126.

1998 – 15 August 1998. Despite the cease-fire, a car bomb explosion by the IRA at the Market Street, Omagh, County Tyrone, in Northern Ireland, killed twenty-nine and injured 250.[49]

1998 – Multiple car-bomb attacks in the centre of Manchester.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Northern Irish terrorism in ideology can be classified as ethno-nationalist; in operations as a type of focused random terrorism;[50] in nature conservative i.e. most acts have involved symbolic targets to draw attention to its nationalist cause,[51] and thus a traditional terrorist organization, i.e. highly organized and visible. Contemporary international terrorism, in contrast, moves largely away from such conventional understandings. Largely Islamist in orientation,[52] contemporary international terrorism is highly diffuse in organization, based in a networked amorphous and cellular existence. The other key difference is that while the IRA can be described as a local phenomena (like most traditional terrorist organizations) with international dimensions (through sponsorship from certain groups in the USA and the Republic of Ireland, as well as tactical interactions with other terrorist organizations), international terrorism

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[49] Smith, n. 45.

[50] See Chapter 1. Feliks Gross, *Violence in Politics* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., NV., 1972), pp.5-16.

[51] See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 197-199; Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 32-36.

[52] In twenty armed conflicts in the world proceeding in the world, Islam is said to be involved in sixteen or 80 percent of the conflicts. Of the thirteen United Nations peace missions, nine concern Muslim countries. Of the fifty-one states in the contemporary world described as undemocratic, forty-five are wholly or in part Muslim. See Laqueur, ibid, pp. 127-147.
The most striking terrorist attack in the twenty-first century, i.e. 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, was Islamist, with the Al-Qaeda network emerging as symptomatic of post-modern transnational terrorism.

may inversely be described as being transnational in nature with local dimensions. While the IRA can be called a modern terrorist organization, transnational terrorism may be called post-modern terrorism, in its departure from conventional understandings of terrorism as the 11 September 2001 carnage in New York and elsewhere in the United States suggest. The 11 September 2001 carnage has evoked almost unequivocal condemnation of the act by the political elites of Britain, even as it has strengthened the resolve of the political elites to combat transnational terrorism in all its forms.[53] British legislations to deal with terrorism were already in place, owing to its experience of enduring Northern Irish terrorism. However, the perception of transnational terrorism as a new threat to global order and stability meant a reformulation of existing perceptions of terrorism, and a growing awareness of the global nature of contemporary terrorism, integrated in a digital world and the necessary means to combat it. The rapid passing of a new and more strident legislation reflected this new understanding, as well as made the awareness of the internal dimensions more acute.[54]

As a radical religious movement, transnational terrorism has given religion a new prominence in Europe and America as a subject of study. As avowedly anti-modern and anti-secular, transnational terrorism threatens the very basis of liberal democracy. According to Chalk, there are three main factors behind Islamist terrorism, since the end of the Cold War: The sponsorship by Iran and Sudan; the legacy left by the Afghan war; and the fall-out from the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The sponsorship by Iran and Sudan has their strong millenarian vision at the backdrop that believes in violence as a

[53] Britain has contributed significantly to the global war on terrorism, largely led by the United States. It has made significant combat troop contribution to both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – both the operations were a fall out of 11 September 2001, and a strong indication of the appreciation by the British political elites of the particular dangers of transnational terrorism as exemplified by the Al-Qaeda network.

[54] The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 or ATCSA, is a more stringent measure to counter the internal dimensions of terrorism.

legitimate means to an Islamic end.[55] All the three factors have strong implications for Britain. Part of the Islamist world view, which allows states like Iran, Sudan, and until recently Afghanistan to finance and support terrorism, is in direct ideological opposition to Western liberalism. Secondly, the West Asian peace process and rabid oppositions to it by Islamist groups again has implications for Britain since the opposition is on religious lines with a pathological hatred for Jews and those that are allies of Israel.[56] For Britain, contemporary transnational terrorism holds a potency and relevance that not only accrues from Britain as a post-industrial, liberal state being the ideological anti-thesis of Islamist transnational terrorism, but also from Britain's own societal conditions of having a large Muslim population in West Europe. Since incidences have occurred of radical British Muslim citizens participating in the cause of Islamist *jihad*,[57] the threat is double edged, from both within and without.[58]

Permissive Causes

The permissive and proximate causes of transnational terrorism are very different than from those that involve internal conflicts. While ethno-nationalist movements are within

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[55] By 1999, both Iran and Sudan are considered strong cliques in the network of Islamist terrorism with Iran alone being estimated at supplying about thirty million US dollars a year in training, cash and arms to Islamist terrorists around the world. Sudan has developed as the beachhead for Islamist terrorists in Africa, being a safe haven for extremist groups opposed to the West Asian peace process. See Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Hants, U.K), volume 53, number 2 (1999), pp. 151-167, pp. 155-157.

[56] Ibid.

[57] By Islamist Jihad is meant the rabid tribalistic and anti-modern response to modernity and capitalism. See Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001 Edition), pp.3-32.

[58] The three young British subjects who died in Afghanistan fighting alongside the Taliban were purportedly part of the many British youth who had joined the Taliban in support of a jihad. Source: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/nov2001/trea-n10.shtml. Accessed on 13-03-2003; A British subject was arrested in early nineties in India in Kashmir fighting alongside terrorists. Source: http://www.satp.org/data/terrorism. Accessed on 23-02-03. The alleged involvement of British subjects in the suicide bombing in Israel makes the question a little more complicated.
Source: http://www.thescotsman.co.uk/international.cfm?id=548072003. Accessed on 14 -05- 2003.

the ambit of the modern, seeking a state and a flag to fly at the United Nations, transnational terrorism is postmodern with explicitly pre-modern concerns and actually seeks to bring down flags and states. The dynamics are very different and complex. The threat to Britain from contemporary transnational terrorism is peculiarly faced by all democracies in the world. Transnational terrorism is not pitted against the state of Britain in the manner that Irish terrorism is. Rather it is pitted against the very idea of liberal-democracy. It is in many ways a threat to the very idea of political and social life that has come to denote the present world. It is important to note that transnational terrorism as postmodern terrorism is explicitly concerned with the global, and beyond the limitations of any particular state. It is postmodern in its transcendence of state boundaries and in its remarkable use of the technologies (especially communication technology) that have come to denote the idea of a postmodern world in distinction to the modern idea of the billiard-ball nation state. Apart from this feature, transnational terrorism as a radical religious and ideological movement is remarkably pre-modern.[59]

a. Societal & Political Factors

The society is Britain is pluralistic, multi-ethnic, and multi-faith and shows trends of change in its composition. The census for 2000-01 brought out by the Office for National Statistics (Labour Force Survey) of the ethnic break-up of the resident population in Great Britain (excludes Northern Ireland) puts the White population at 53,004,000 or at 92.9 percent. The total non-White population is cited at 4,039,000 or 7.1 percent. In the non-White population, the break-up is as follows:

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[59] See Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001 Edition). Also see Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), and R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence Of The Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).

Black Caribbean population: 529, 000. Percentage: 0.9; Black African population: 440,000. Percentage: 0.8; Black Other (Non-mixed) population, 129,000. Percentage: 0.2; Black Mixed population: 176,000. Percentage: 0.3; Indian origin: 984,000. Percentage: 1.7; Pakistani origin: 675,000. Percentage: 1.2; Bangladeshi origin: 257,000. Percentage:0.5; Chinese origin:149,000. Percentage:0.3; Other groups:700,000. Percentage:1.2. The combined population of all groups, including those who did not state their ethnic group, has been cited at 57,057,000.[60]

In terms of religious faith, the British society is predominantly Christian with different sects within Christianity. However, except for the modest growth in the Presbyterian, and the Orthodox within the Trinitarian Christians, and the Non-Trinitarian Christians, other major Christian sects show a steady decline if we look at the census for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively. While the Trinitarian Christians continue to be the dominant Church in Britain, the census shows a sharp decline in the Trinitarian population from 9,272,000 in the year 1970 to 5,917,000 in the year 2000.[61]

Minority religious groups in Britain however continue to show a steady increase in their presence with the most remarkable growth seen in the Muslim population from 130,000 in the year 1970 to about 665,000 in the year 2000. The Jewish group, having shown a steady decline in population in the census, has risen sharply from 100,000 in the census of 1990 to 954,000 in the year 2000. The cumulative figure for the adult population that is religious has however shown a decline from 10,010,000 in the year 1970 to about 7,910,000 in the year 2000.[62] Since all the other major minority religious groups have

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[60] The Office for National Statistics (Labour Force Survey). Source: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/uk2002/Inetpub/root/uk2002. Accessed on 12-01-03.

[61] The Trinitarians include Anglican, Catholic, Free Churches, the Presbyterians, and the Orthodox Church.

[62] The figures show active religious adult members. The findings are based on the figures provided by the Christian Research and Board of Deputies of British Jews. Source: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/uk2002/Inetpub/root/uk2002. Accessed on 12-01-03.

shown a steady increase in population, the overall decrease in the adult religious population of Britain then points to the sharply changing balance of religious groups in Britain.

Ever since the Iranian Revolution put in power a government of the Clerics, public perception throughout Europe has been influenced by the regressive image of Islam. Owing to perceptual factors linked to contemporary transnational terrorism seen as largely an Islamist one, this change in the balance of religious groups makes the Muslim group the focus of analysis. The concern however is overtly that of assimilation of Muslim groups in the liberal-democratic societies of European countries and the phenomenon of Muslim radicalism in Britain. According to Steven Vertovec & Ceri Peach, the perceptual factor has played an important role in how Muslims are viewed in Europe. This has led to a situation where:

> Unfortunately for Muslims, their strides forward in mobilising themselves with a view to addressing publicly their basic collective concerns, exercise of rights, and elements of discrimination were read by many non-Muslim Europeans as evidence of an amassing anti-modernist enemy within.[63]

Moreover, the image of Muslims as " 'being stuck in the Middle Ages', irrational, suppressive of women, anti-western, anti-modern, anti-democratic, controlled by theocracy, and prone to over-emotionalism and mob-like public outpourings" are stereotypes that have emerged over the years. Conversely, some Muslims in Europe 'have constructed a self-image' that allows them to look at 'all Muslims' problems' to

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[63] Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, "Introduction: Islam in Europe and the Politics of Religion and Community", in Steven Vertovec & Ceri Peach, eds *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), pp. 3-47, p. 3-6.

be 'created by Western corruption, racism and anti-Islam-ism'.[64] This stereotyping of Islam is incorrect since according to Vertovec and Peach, "demographic, historical and anthropological examinations of the Muslim population in Europe reveal it to be characterised by social, cultural, intellectual and political diversity".[65] While at the same time "increasingly on local, national and now even European levels, large numbers of Muslims do indeed mobilise, resist and struggle for rights and social benefits *as Muslims* and as an '*Islamic community*'."[66] The contrast is an insightful one and holds the key to understanding the Muslim phenomena in Europe and particularly Britain.

According to Juergensmeyer, the emergence of radical religious movements from cultures of violence has three elements in common. The primary element is the rejection of compromises with liberal values and secular institutions. Second, radical religious movements refuse to observe the boundaries that secular societies have placed around religion by keeping it in the realm of the private, rather than the public sphere. Third is that they attempt to create a new form of religiosity that rejects modernity as a weak substitute.[67] How the Muslim community in Britain measure up to three parameters that

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[64] Ibid, p. 8.

[65] Ibid. p. 10.

[66] Ibid. Emphasis in original. While Muslims are said to 'mobilise, resist and struggle' for rights and social benefits, their doing so "*as Muslims* and as an *Islamic community*" is a key indicator to the issue at hand. When Vertovec and Peach cite demographic, historical, and anthropological differences amongst Muslims as indicators of the diversity of Muslims, they are seriously underestimating the power of religion to bind and create an overarching identity. Secondly, the semantics of 'resistance and struggle' by Muslims evoke images of oppression by the state, which is false in Britain. Citizenship and voting rights in Britain provide for substantial advantage in the democratic system. Thirdly, the 'resistance and struggle' by Muslims to fight for rights and social benefits *as Muslims* and as an *Islamic community* is precisely the challenge that democracies face, and that pits such demands against the very grain of the secular state.

[67] Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror in the Name of God", *Current History* (New York), volume 100, number 649, November (2001), pp. 357-361.

Juergensmeyer has lain down, is the key to the permissive conditions that become conducive for transnational terrorism to find its recruits in.

The articulation of an Islamic identity (the prior condition for mobilisation given the differentiations that do exist within Muslim population in Britain) involves questions of interpretations of religious traditions within Islam. The differentiations in themselves preclude any single overarching interpretation, except in terms of the 'Self' and the 'Other' that 'over two decades' has 'ceaselessly generated' modes of affirmation of Islam. This has translated into a politics of religion and community, where "new social, cultural, political and religious forces have been established with Islam as a point of reference at the very heart of post-industrial modernity."[68]

The Muslim community in Britain is largely from South Asia and have brought with them their cultural aspirations and worldviews. Given the semi-feudal socialization of South Asia, this present problems of adaptation in the post-industrial modern society of Europe, and hence that of assimilation.[69] The Bradford community of Muslims exemplify the condition of Muslim groups in Britain where local authorities have sought to accommodate Islamic concerns of local Muslim groups.[70] However, the emphasis on

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[68] Gilles Kepel, "Islamic Groups in Europe: Between Community Affirmation and Social Crisis", in Vertovec & Peach, eds. n. 63, p. 49-52. The features of a post-industrial society are markedly different from that of industrial societies, and definitely very different from pre-industrial or industrializing societies that South Asia exemplifies. Daniel Bell cites about eleven important dimensions of a post-industrial society with two dimensions particularly pertinent in the present context: The role of women where women have secure economic base and are not excluded from the workplace, and secondly the importance of scientific knowledge as the referent point for social organization. This is something which contrasts directly from principally religious groups and messianic political movements that usually 'routinize' its creeds and enforces official dogmas. See Daniel Bell, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society", in Lawerence E. Cahoone, ed., *From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997), reprint, pp. 423-436.

[69] Vertovec & Peach, n. 63, pp. 16-19.The South Asian Muslims are said to exhibit a socio-educational profile that is semi-industrialized, newly urbanized working class community that is only one generation away from peasantry. Tariq Modood, "British Asians Muslims and the Rushdie Affairs", *The Political Quarterly* (Cambridge, Massachusetts), Volume 61, p. 145. Cited by Gilles Kepel, "Islamic Groups in Europe: Between Community Affirmation and Social Crisis", in Vertovec & Peach, eds, n. 63, p. 105.

[70] Bradford Council for Mosques was established with a Community Programme grant of 13,000 pounds by the city council of Bradford and has worked towards creating an Islamic environment in Bradford. See

religion as a defining attribute of citizenship raises questions about illiberal ideologies within liberal societies.[71] A few incidents are pointers to this problem of religion claiming public space with the Bradford Muslims in Britain as well as the flexibility of British society in adapting to the demands of multi-culturalism, understood as sensitivity to the norms and ethos of different cultural groups co-existing in Britain, and the tensions that it generates within the liberal state. The Bradford Council for Mosques was successful in getting the local authorities to include Islamic elements in the educational curriculum. Second, the Bradford Council for Mosques successfully raised the issue of *halal* meat to be served in school meals, as a religious requirement for Muslim students. Third, the Salman Rushdie affair saw vociferous protests by the Bradford Muslims, many of whom supported the fatwa or religious order issued by the Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini.[72] These three incidents brought the Muslim groups in Britain in the focus of debates about multi-culturalism and the limits of the liberal state.[73]

A fourth incident that has been cited comes forth as a challenge the liberal state faces from competing world views that the liberal state allows to exist. The challenge is peculiar where the very liberal values that allow for the existence of competing claims, in the end, face existential challenge from the competing world-view that does not encourage dissent or the relegation of religion to the private sphere. Nielsen cites the

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Philip Lewis, "The Bradford Council for Mosques and the Search for Muslim Unity", in Vertovec & Peach, eds, ibid, pp. 103-127.

[71] To understand the issues at hand that led to the development of the liberal state as a secular democracy, see Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 24-35.

[72] Lewis, n. 70. Also, see Jorgen S. Nielsen, *Towards a European Islam* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 89-106.

[73] Nielsen, ibid, pp. 11-24.

incidence of a small community of Muslims in Norwich, of varied ethnic backgrounds including several British converts that specifically decided to reject the structures of British society. It educated its own children, organized its own family relations without reference to civil registries or the English Family Law. [74]

The fifth and more damaging incident is the call given for the establishment of an Islamic parliament in Britain by the Muslim Institute, published in *The Muslim Manifesto*. The manifesto made explicit claims for an Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims in Europe and the identification of Muslims as part of a world-wide *ummah* (community). Defending the right of *jihad*, it claims that:

> Jihad is a basic requirement of Islam and living in Britain or having British nationality by birth or naturalization does not absolve the Muslim from his or her duty to participate in jihad: this participation can be active service in armed struggle abroad and/or the provision of material and moral support to those engaged in such struggle anywhere in the world.[75]

While the right to self-expression is intrinsic to British society, the expressions and the attempts at an alternative and radical Islamic socialization are overtly religious in nature and rejectionist of liberal values and secular institutions. While cultural assertions by minority groups by themselves need not threaten the state, the radical elements that such assertions may help spawn do so very directly. The London-based Islamist group *al-Muhajiroun* is one example amongst many of radical Islamists organizations that network in Britain to recruit radical elements to wage *jihad*. The newspaper report about the two hundred British Muslims who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban is an example of such a tendency that in all its implications directly threaten

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid, p. 93.

liberal-democracies.[76] Such groups not only work towards winning more converts to their radical view point, but also actively involve in fundraising activities for supporting their radical Islamist co-believers elsewhere. The reported arrest of the six men by the British Police, in a concerted effort by the Scotland's Anti-Terrorist Branch, and the Durham and Cleveland Police involving more than 150 officers, on charges of fundraising and providing logistical support to transnational terrorist networks, are indications of a malaise that is gripping British society from within.[77] The need to distinguish between ordinary citizens who are Muslims and the radical Islamists within British society has become an important task and a concern for the British government.[78]

The rise of such radical Islamist elements in Britain is said to come from ill-informed views on Islam and its traditions, and the relative lack of access to informed scholarship about Islam and its tenets. The very manner in which British Muslims are acquiring and then applying their Islam is said to represent a radical break with the scholarly traditions of Islam. According to Nielsen, "fourteen centuries of religious scholarship, with the attendant intellectual disciplines and schools of interpretation, between then and now has for many become irrelevant or inaccessible." This process, according to Nielsen, is strengthened among the Muslim communities in Britain, where a growing number of

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[76] *The Telegraph* (London), 20 November 2001 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/11/20/nmus20.xml. Accessed on 14-05-03. There are sufficient number of reports on the involvement of British Muslims in the activities of the Taliban with several reportedly killed in action against the Coalition forces in the war of 2001. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/11/17/wbrit17.xml.
Also see the ricin poison case showing linkages of the Al-Qaeda network. Source: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/ricin.htm. Accessed on 15-05-03.

[77] *The Telegraph*, 30 January 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/01/30/nafg30.xml. Accessed on 14-05-03.

[78] The Home Office website in citing the major sources of international terrorism explicitly mentions that the British Government does not view "the Muslim community as a threat." See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/threat/face/index.html. Accessed on 04-04-03.
Statement made by Oliver Letwin, the Conservative Shadow Home Secretary on 10 October 2001 matches this concern. http://www.conservatives.com/oliverletwin/. Accessed on 04-04-03.

self-taught people are 'at home' with the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* but are 'ignorant of the intellectual disciplines and techniques which lie behind them'. This affects the attitudes to social relations and more particularly in gender and generation roles leading many to spurn British society and the state.[79] The radical aspect of Islamic presence in Britain is most open to manipulation by forces of transnational terrorism, and from where, what Peter Chalk has called amateur or ad hoc terrorism, finds its most members. According to Nielsen, documents like *The Muslim Manifesto* represent a restrained anger that comes from the experience of living in Britain as an ethnic and religious minority, but also from an older experience of colonialism. It is this element of anger and the need to seek some form of restitution, especially amongst the young Muslims that leads them towards radical ideology.[80] The audience is what R. Scott Appleby calls religious, but religiously illiterate, i.e. the "low level or virtual absence of second-order moral reflection and basic theological knowledge among religious actors" and is "a structural condition that increases the likelihood of collective violence in crisis situations", making the likelihood of 'manipulation by cynical outsiders' easy.[81] It is a site where religious fundamentalism and terrorism find a confluence.

Major Incidents of International Terrorism in Britain[82]

1970 – September 6, 1970. Attempted Hijacking of *EI AI* (Israeli airliner) by a Palestinian woman terrorist over South England.

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[79] Nielsen, n. 72, pp. 11-24.

[80] Ibid, p. 95.

[81] Appleby, n. 9. p.69.

[82] All cases, unless otherwise indicated, cited from Yossi Melman, *The Master Terrorist: The True Story Behind Abu Nidal* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), pp. 162-186.

1970 – Three airliners, including one of British Airways hijacked to demand the release of several West Asian terrorists, including the woman hijacker, Leila Khaled. Demand was met by the British government on September 30, 1970.

1977 – April, 1977, London. Former North Yemeni Prime Minister Abdullah al-Hejini assassinated along with his wife and a minister at the Yemeni Embassy at the entrance to their hotel.

1984 – April. Policewoman Yvonne Fletcher was fired upon from inside the Libyan Embassy in London.

1985 – August 1985. Explosives smuggled in from Libya through *Arab Airlines*, the Libyan national airliner to be possibly used at the Israeli airlines *EI AI* counter at Heathrow airport.

1986 – October 1986. Plot to kill Israeli Ambassador unearthed involving West Asian terrorists and a Swedish citizen.

1986 – 17 April 1986. British citizen used as decoy, detained with explosives at Heathrow airport, targeted at *EI AI* flight from New York to Tel Aviv, via London.

1988 – An American airliner, *PanAm* 103 flight bombed in-flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers and eleven on the ground.[83]

RESPONSES BY BRITAIN

Responses by Britain to Northern Irish terrorism and transnational terrorism make for an interesting comparison. There seem to be a twin approach towards combating terrorism. One, the permissive causes via structural wrongs are sought to be corrected at the domestic level. Two, acts of violence seem to be met with resolute response at least ever

[83] Whittaker, n. 34 , p. 130.

since Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher co-operated with the United States in the bombing of Libyan targets in 1986.

The British state responded to the permissive and proximate causes of the Irish conflict in a series of legislative acts beginning as early as 1825 when The *Unlawful Societies Act*, proscribing the Catholic Association and the Orange Order was passed after the political union of Ireland and Britain in January 1801. Attempts to address societal issues began as early as 6 December 1921, when after the Treaty of Peace, signed at Downing Street, the Lynn Committee on education was established to look into issues of the Catholic Church's objections to the education system. The Reforms Package announced on Friday 22 November 1968 was to look into the issues of discrimination by a nine member 'Development Commission'. The 28 November 1968 Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) abolished university representation and the business vote in Stormont elections, making for a more democratic representation. Further the 11 March 1969 Parliamentary Commissioner Bill was introduced to allow for the appointment of an Ombudsman to investigate complaints against Stormont government departments. The British response to Irish terrorism has been to address the underlying causes, while dealing firmly with acts of violence. The primary feature of British Army's presence in Northern Ireland has been the continuance of civilian authorities in control with an "emphasis upon a coordinated politico-military campaign" that called for close co-operation between the civilian authorities, the police and the Army.[84]

The addresses by the British government to the permissive and proximate factors of transnational terrorism within the domestic sphere of Britain lie within the range of domestic laws in Britain that encourages a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic equal society. Laws against racial discrimination are already in place, before the present dimensions of

[84] Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, n. 29, pp. 2-5.

transnational terrorism became the focus of attention. Moreover the attempts by the local authorities to incorporate cultural sensitivities of minority groups, like the Muslim group in Bradford, are examples of the attempts by the British state to create a 'tolerant' society and polity.[85]

However, the interesting difference between British responses to Irish terrorism and contemporary transnational terrorism is the securitization that the latter has attracted. While Irish terrorism has clearly cost the British state in terms of lives of civilians and security forces, as well as property, transnational terrorism in terms of direct cost of British lives has been comparatively minimal. Yet the kind of swift attention transnational terrorism has received is a pointer to the difference in dangers between local ethno-national terrorism and transnational terrorism.[86]

Although the threat from international terrorism was perceived in Britain prior to the incidents of September 11, 2001 and legislation like the *Terrorism Act 2000* (TA) existed, the issue was securitized only after the New York carnage, leading to the adoption of a more robust *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001* (ACTSA).[87] Securitization as an act has three basic components to it. The first is the identification of existential threats. Second, the set of emergency actions taken to counter or contain the

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[85] See Vertovec & Peach, n. 63, pp. 3-47. For an overview of ethnic and race relations, see http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/s95race00.

[86] International terrorism in not new in Britain and Britain has for long remained the centre of much of West Asian terrorist activities. Earlier British approach to West Asian and international terrorism has been that of appeasement, highlighted by the 1970 trade-off release of West Asian woman terrorist. The changed policy of not negotiating with terrorists came with Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1986 when she allowed US warplanes to use British bases to launch attack on Libyan targets. Ever since co-operation between the United States and Britain has strengthened, with Britain opting for a twin approach towards combating terrorism. For details, see Melman, n. 82.

[87] The Terrorism Act 2000 was passed by Parliament on 20 July 2000, and came into force on 19 February 2001. The need for new legislation in the shape of Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) highlights the securitization of the issue, amidst changed perceptions.

threat(s). Third, the effect on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.[88] The response of the British government can be seen as the series of steps in securitizing transnational terrorism. The identification of transnational terrorism as a different kind of threat than the traditional Irish terrorism is evident from the report submitted by the Home Secretary. In a statement to the parliament on 9 September 2002, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in a report entitled *The United Kingdom and the Campaign against International Terrorism – A Progress Report*, stated that:

> Regrettably, the United Kingdom has already had much experience of terrorism and dealing with terrorists. As a result, before last September, we already had legislation and the necessary counter-terrorism measures in place that made it hard for terrorists to operate. *But these measures were designed to counter terrorism on a very different scale.*
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> Following September 11 2001, as a matter of urgency, the Government reviewed security across the board to identify vulnerabilities and tighten existing security measures to make the United Kingdom even safer. This document outlines the most recent action taken to maintain the momentum of the Campaign against International Terrorism and summarises the initiatives taken in the year immediately following 11 September 2001.[89]

Further, the statement in its summary mentions that

> *The attacks of 11 September 2001 served as a stark reminder that the world faces a serious security threat from extremists who misuse the teachings of their religions and exploit social, economic and political grievances to recruit and seek support for terror.*[90]

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[88] Barry Buzan, et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), pp. 23-47. Although security is traditionally seen as an inter-state phenomenon, in the case of transnational terrorism, the security network needs to be expanded to include the non-state feature of transnational terrorism.

[89] Statement by the Home Secretary David Blunkett, *Counter-Terrorist Action Since September 2002*, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sept11/coi-0809.doc Emphasis added.

[90] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

Thus, the existential threat is not only seen as physical, but also social, economic, and political. Although prior legislations existed in Britain to deal with Irish terrorism,[91] the counter-measures have taken the form of a new and more strident legislative action to consider this new threat via the ATCSA 2001. The Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) was passed by Parliament on 20 July 2000, and came into force on 19 February 2001, replacing the previous temporary anti-terrorism legislation that dealt primarily with Northern Ireland. While the TA dealt with terrorist groups and their activities, making it difficult for them to operate in Britain, and gave wide ranging powers to the police for detention of suspects and interrogation, the ATCSA provided for added teeth in terms of preventive measures and powers relating to immigration issues, deportation, financing activities of terrorist organizations or their off-shoots.[92] The need for more stringent laws was felt earlier and the new securitization of the issue facilitated the passage of the new bill. Securitization also meant addressing the issue to the audience, i.e. the British public. Comments and observations by the political elites from both the major parties of Britain indicate the shared threat perception from transnational terrorism and its special dynamics as arising from a cultural site following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. As a precursor for the need for stringent legislations like ACTSA 2001, the Conservative Shadow Home Secretary Oliver Letwin, on 10 October 2001, said:

> Protecting our own security is not just a question of enforcing the law. It is also a question of having the right laws. The situation in which we find ourselves is absurd – seriously absurd. There are citizens of other countries, who are either believed by our security services to pose a

[91] Legislations to deal with the Northern Ireland problem existed, viz., 1933 Special Powers Act in Northern Ireland; 1936 Public Order Act; the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996; the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1974 and the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989). The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 became the first legislation to deal explicitly with terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2000 (came in force on 19 February 2001) replaced the temporary legislations that dealt with terrorism and became the prime UK legislation to deal with international terrorism. See http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm Accessed on 23-03-03.

[92] http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm.. Accessed on 23-03-03.

> threat to our safety, or who are wanted by courts in other countries in connection with terrorist offences, who are nevertheless able to enter Britain and to remain in Britain without the Home Secretary being able either to prevent them entering or to remove them.... We are, and we have a duty to show that we are, as strongly pro-Muslim as we are anti-terrorist.[93]

In his first meeting with the Prime Minister Tony Blair, the leader of the opposition, Ian Duncan Smith stated that, "The reality is I think the British public expect the Opposition to be loyal to them. If we are to defeat this threat of terrorism then we must stand with the Government to do that."[94] In an attempt to delegitimize terrorism further, the Ulster Unionist Leader David Trimble and Conservative leader Ian Duncan Smith, in a joint article in the Daily Telegraph on 21 November 2001, wrote that:

> There is not, and never can be, any moral distinction between terrorists and terrorism. What happened in America is the same as that which has been carried out in the United Kingdom and in particular Northern Ireland. Osama bin Laden and his followers are no different from those who planned and carried out Omagh, Warrenpoint, Hyde Park, Enniskillen or countless other atrocities. It follows that there should be no question of recognising, or creating, different categories of terrorist organisation. Yet that is precisely what this Government has done. [95]

Further, in an earlier speech on 26 September 2001, Ian Duncan Smith, highlighting the nexus between crime and terrorism observed that, "The point is that if we are going to defeat terrorism then we have to go to war too on the criminal activities that help to

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[93] http://www.conservatives.com/oliverletwin/. Accessed on 04-04-03. The reference to the Muslim element reflects the duality of the issue in Britain, where radical Islamic groups and the Islamist transnational terrorism has made Muslim groups come under increased scrutiny, even while the need exists to address the concerns of those British citizens who are Muslims.

[94] Statement to the press dated 24 September 2001, http://www.conservatives.com/ianduncansmith/ Accessed on 04-04-03.

[95] Ibid.

finance it and which can cause just as many problems for the stability of our own society."[96]

At another lecture given at John Jay College in New York, United States on 2 April 2003, Home Secretary David Blunkett underlined the threats of terrorism to society and democracy:

> Now, of course, we face different challenges, which seek to undermine our security and impose restrictions on our liberty. Fundamentalism offers the paradox of justifying destabilisation and, in some bizarre distortion of authentic religion, succour to terrorism. At the same time, it offers repression, and a perverse form of order and stability through the denial of tolerance, democratic free speech, and the crucial checks and balances that ensure that freedom can flourish. Likewise, those extremists who see the State itself as inherently bad would leave us open to a collapse in order and, in turn, the end of democracy and freedom. The relationship between security and freedom is an issue pertinent to new international threats and also to our community life. Crime and anti-social behaviour destroy communities. They create fear which holds people back from co-operation and engenders a sense of powerlessness among those who seek to regenerate their neighbourhoods. It is in those neighbourhoods most affected by crime, those most in need of regeneration, where disillusionment is greatest, where politics is most likely to be rejected. In order to make economic regeneration and social enterprise work, in order to stimulate people to have the self-belief to ensure that self-help and self- determination work, we have to get the essentials right, we have to ensure that people are safe and feel safe.[97]

The third element of securitization of an issue involves the effect of inter-unit relations by the breaking away from rules.[98] In the *Progress Report* submitted to the Parliament,

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[96] Speech as Leader of opposition at Carlton political dinner. Ibid.

[97] Excerpts from the lecture "Securing Our Freedom, Balancing Security and Liberty Post 9/11", David Blunkett at John Jay College, New York on 2 April, 2003. http://www.labour.org.uk. Accessed on 04-04-03.

[98] Buzan, n. 88, p. 25. Securitization is said to be fulfilled only when existential threats exist that legitimizes the breaking of rules. However, securitization, even in an expanded notion of security framework put forward by Buzan et al, move within the referential point of states, i.e., states and the relations between them. In the context of transnational terrorism, the functional actor is not a state

on September 9, 2002 entitled *The United Kingdom and The Campaign against International Terrorism*, the effect of the securitization of transnational terrorism on inter-unit behaviour becomes clear:

> On the political and diplomatic front, British Ministers and officials remained in close touch with their American counterparts and, in the weeks following the terrorist attacks, the UK mounted an intensive diplomatic campaign to build and sustain political and practical support for the Coalition. This was a key factor in the success of the action in Afghanistan. Arab and Gulf states were among the first to condemn the 11 September attacks, with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference strongly denouncing them as contrary to Islamic religious teachings. Russia worked closely with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and took forward proposals with the EU for a new role for Russia in Euro-Atlantic security and for further development of EU/ NATO links. China expressed solidarity with the US over the atrocities on 11 September and has been supportive of international action against terrorism.[99]

Further, the impact of securitization of transnational terrorism on the foreign policy aspects is made clear in the report to the Foreign Affairs Committee in June 2002. It highlights the continued need for international co-operation to fight terrorism:

> We warned, however, of the scale and complexity of the terrorist problem. In our view, the military campaign against terrorism "is likely to be long and may spread beyond Afghanistan." Our consideration of why the 11 September attacks were not foreseen and prevented led us to conclude that "priority must be given to the gathering, assessment and use of high-grade intelligence information. Without that information, this country and its allies are appallingly vulnerable." We further concluded that, to succeed, the international coalition would have to

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(though may perhaps find state sponsors) but an amorphous and radical transnational movement pitted against the very idea of modernity and liberalism.

[99] Report submitted to parliament on 9 September 2002, entitled *The United Kingdom and the Campaign Against International Terrorism*. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sept11/coi-0809.doc. Accessed on 02-02-03. Britain has a long history of co-operating with various states, especially the United States, on the issue of combating terrorism. For an overview of British policy towards international terrorism, see Melman, n. 82.

determine "how the conditions that have contributed to the development of terrorism can be removed, or at least reduced. [100]

Further,

> We note that forms of co-operation between the NATO Response Force and the EU Rapid Reaction force have yet fully to be agreed. Nonetheless, we welcome the agreements reached by NATO Allies at the Prague summit. We recommend that the Government set out, in its response to this report, how NATO's new military concept for defence against terrorism will now be implemented, and how its adoption at the Prague summit will affect NATO's future role in the war against terrorism.[101]

The identification of transnational terrorism as a network of radical organizations and individuals looks at the danger of *ad hoc* terrorism or amateur terrorism arising from radical individuals as a new danger not visible earlier:

> The threat from terrorism remains real and serious. It now comes not only from established groups with clearly defined targets, but also from unaffiliated, loose-knit networks of individuals with a much broader agenda. The principal threats come from international terrorism, and in particular, extremist groups, including those who erroneously claim to be acting for Islam; and nationalist, separatist, and other violent terrorist groups. We do not see the Muslim community as a threat.[102]

However, the growing concern between striking a balance between combating terrorism and ensuring protection of human rights of citizens occupy central position in

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[100] *Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism*, Summary of report submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee, paragraph 3, n.d. Source: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/19604.htm

[101] Ibid, paragraph 4.3.

[102] http://www.ukresilience.info/terrorism.htm. Accessed on 24-03-03. The particular qualification of not seeing the Muslim community as a threat is a pointer to the dangers of religious radicalism and the conscious efforts to avoid equating the religion Islam with radicalism. This is a regular qualification in declarations relating to transnational terrorism and only points to the internal dimension of British society.

Britain and point to the challenges liberal democracies face from contemporary transnational terrorism.[103] The centrality of Human Rights issues in Britain comes from the European Convention on Human Rights and its incorporation in British domestic laws through the *Human Rights Act 1998* that came into force on the 2nd October 2000. This has meant the recognition that in any event, "the courts are required to interpret the TA 2000 so as to be compatible with the European Convention as far as possible."[104] The British government had already proscribed terrorist groups in Britain before September 11, 2001.[105] These groups include both international terrorist organizations, as well as Northern Ireland terrorist groups, including ethno-national groups as well as the vigilante groups seeking to maintain the status quo in Northern Ireland. Following September 11, 2001, four additional international terrorist groups have been added to the proscribed list following the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001.

Conclusion

While Britain has a long history of suffering from terrorism *qua* terrorism in Northern Ireland, the emergence of transnational terrorism as a radical religious force has brought forward an entirely new set of dynamics into play. While terrorism in and from Northern Ireland has cited Irish nationalism as its source of legitimations that draws upon a history of myths and tragedies, transnational terrorism threatens to draw the line

[103] For a criticism of the ATCSA 2001 legislation on the issue of a curtailment of Human Rights, see Helen Fenwick, "Responding to 11 September: Detention without Trial under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001", in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002), pp. 80-104.

[104] Lord Carlile Of Berriew Q.C., *Report On The Operation In 2002 Of Part Vii Of The Terrorism Act 2000*, Sub-section 3.4, p.12, http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/ Accessed on 24-04-03. This need for compatibility of anti-terrorist measures with Human Rights is real in Britain and is part of rights that British citizens have.

[105] Source: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/threat/groups/index#top. Accessed on 24-02-03.

at the very idea of Britain itself in its rabid anti-modernism. The internal dimensions of Britain with a large immigrant population, sections within which are sensitive and receptive to the religious rhetoric of transnational terrorism, present a threat from within that Irish terrorism has not. As a post-industrial state, Britain becomes a natural target for a radical movement that seeks to destroy anything that differs from its radical parameters of what constitutes religion and religiosity. The liberal society of Britain hinged on the values of human rights make it difficult for the state to take strong preventive measures even as it ironically ends up protecting those radical elements within that in the end threaten the very fabric of Britain and British society. The recognition by the British state of the peculiar challenge that transnational terrorism presents has resulted in an approach that seeks to address the permissive as well as the proximate factors within and without. British society as a largely affluent society when compared to the developing states means that the fight against transnational terrorism within Britain is less an issue of gross distributive injustice and more the battle for the imagination of those elements that find their allegiance to the rhetoric of transnational terrorism more than to the idea of their citizenship.

The steps taken to tackle the Northern Ireland problem in a democratic way are commendable as is the sensitivity of the British state to isolate transnational terrorism from the religion that it abuses to garner support. Continued terror attacks by the IRA only reveal the bankruptcy of ideas in terrorist groups and indicate the danger from the radical intolerance of such groups. However, the IRA does not threaten the idea of the British state as transnational terrorism does. To that effect, combating international terrorism has meant a fight to defend the very idea of liberal democracy and modernity. The securitization by the British state of the issue reflects this comprehension on part of the British state.

Chapter IV

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN INDIA

The Indian experience of international terrorism is tied to its neighbours. South Asia has been a site of conflicts ever since the British colonial presence ended in the sub-continent in 1947, with the partition of the British Crown's Dominion of India into the states of India and Pakistan. Conflicts between the two neighbouring states erupted soon after their independence. Pakistan became the first state in modern history to have been created based on religion, as a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslims. India opted for a democratic secular state that is multi-ethnic and religiously plural. Having been created expressly as a homeland for Muslims who, the founding elites of Pakistan believed, would be disadvantaged in a 'Hindu' India, the early conflicts resulted from Pakistan's 'moral' claim over the state of Jammu & Kashmir that had a predominant Muslim population. Pakistan's self-image as a secure homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, (its *raison d'être*) was challenged by the large size of Muslim population in democratic India, and more acutely by the ascension of Jammu & Kashmir to India. The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 and India's support for it became a major watershed as far as Pakistan's 'Two-nation' theory was concerned, since 'Muslim' East-Pakistan chose to (successfully) fight for independence from 'Muslim' Pakistan. The key to Pakistan's antagonism towards India stems from its precipitous 'two-nation' theory, and a summary rejection by India of the same.

International terrorism in India is a direct result of Pakistan's constitution of its self-image as a religious state versus India's self-image as a secular state. Pakistan has consistently used terrorism as a state policy of low-cost proxy warfare against India. Punjab and then Jammu & Kashmir have been two theatres where Pakistan's complicity

has emerged most dramatically, with the latter Indian state continuing to battle terrorism.[1] While there have been more incidences of terrorism in the Indian sub-continent with thousands killed, the international focus on the West Asian theatre reflects a lack of awareness as well as interest in the region by the world community.[2] Yet, for the relative success of terrorism, there need to be the fertile grounds of local dissent. In effect, it is here that the complexity of international terrorism in India begins.

PUNJAB AND KHALISTAN TERRORISM

Permissive Causes

According to Mark Juergensmeyer, the economic, political, and social explanations for Sikh terrorism form only part of the picture and that it is the religious rhetoric of Sikh terrorism that explains its emergence in the decade of eighties, amidst politically fuelled perceptions about Sikh insecurity.[3] Perceptual factors seemed to have played a large role in contributing to the rise of Sikh terrorism. According to Paul Wallace, although Sikhs have a Sikh-majority state with Punjab leading India in a variety of economic indicators, the perception of the Sikhs in the 1980s was in minority terms, though they were in numerical majority, politically and economically powerful.[4] The economic dimension is quite obverse to what is usually cited as a reason for dissent – economic deprivation. According to Wallace, ironically, the relative prosperity of the Sikhs in

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[1] Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 152.

[2] Ibid, p. 150.

[3] Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Logic of Religious Violence: The Case of the Punjab", in *Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.)*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications), volume 22, number 1, (1988), pp. 65-88.

[4] Paul Wallace, "The Sikhs as a "Minority" in a Sikh Majority State in India", *Asian Survey* (California), volume 26, number 3, March (1986), pp. 363-377.

comparison to the rest of the country contributed to a sense of minority insecurity. The substantial outflow of wealthy Sikhs from Punjab to other parts of India and overseas, matched by a substantial inflow of poor 'Hindu' agricultural labourers to Punjab added to the sense of minority insecurity amongst the Sikhs. Bhindranwale's terror tactics was widely seen as attempts to reverse the flow, contributing to his appeal amongst the rural Sikh masses.[5] According to P. Sahadevan:

> [T]he Sikh community's age-old politically cultivated fear of absorption into Hinduism provided the necessary impetus to the Khalistan movement in Punjab. It arose mainly from two sources: decline of respect for the Sikh religious and cultural ethos among the modern educated Jat Sikh youth and a perceived threat from the Hindus' view of Sikhism as a sword arm of Hinduism.[6]

Sant Bhindranwale, a Sikh demagogue, skilfully played upon these apprehensions amid the minority complex of the Sikhs to "take over or replace the Akali Dal as the major authority for the Sikhs."[7] Bhindranwale's efforts were to define the Sikh community in a fundamentalist manner, paying particular attention to the secular lifestyles becoming popular with the prosperous Sikhs.[8] According to R. Scott Appleby, fundamentalists are both reactive to and interactive with secular modernity and tend to be "absolutist, inerrantist, dualist, apocalyptic in cognitive orientation" leading the fundamentalists to see "sacred truths as the foundation of all genuine knowledge and religious values as

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[5] While Sikhs are said to dominant in rural Punjab, excepting Hoshiarpur district, the urban sectors show a Hindu majority. Historically, however, Sikhs have been a minority in the Punjab region, and became a majority only after the advent of the *Punjabi Suba* that resulted in the creation of the state of Punjab. Ibid, pp. 365-376.

[6] P. Sahadevan, "Ethnic Conflicts and Militarism in South Asia", *International Studies* (New Delhi), volume 39, number 2, April-June (2002), pp. 103-138, p. 106.

[7] Wallace, n. 4, p. 377.

[8] Ibid.

the base and summit of morality."[9] Thus Bhindranwale, claiming that the Sikh religion was under threat managed to recruit a ferocious minority of his fellow Sikhs to wage a terror on behalf of religion.[10]

Bhindranwale's ambit of hate targets grew from the Nirankari sect of Sikhs whom he held as a threat to Sikhism, to all those that protected them, including the secular state. His rhetoric involved the killing of all those who 'insulted' the Sikh scriptures and offering sanctuary in the Golden Temple to all those who would thus kill.[11] According to Juergensmeyer, violent religious symbols are often seen as the symbolic expression of social oppression, which of course may be real or perceived. The sacralising of such concerns, as part of manipulation by the elites, provides an aura of legitimacy to political activists.[12] In this case, it was Bhindranwale's desire to upstage the Akali Dal. Although Bhindranwale railed against the ills of a secular lifestyle, seeking to reclaim his version of 'pure' Sikhism, his political ambitions were however ambivalent with regard to Khalistan or a separate Sikh nation-state.[13]

The congress politics of 1978-79 is said to have undermined not only the Janata government at the centre, but also the Akali Dal led government at the state, making

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[9] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of The Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 86-89.

[10] It is a testimony to the logic of such fundamentalism that a large part of the Sikh extremist leaders, as part of this avowed 'battle' against the enemies of Sikhism are said to have behaved no more than criminals, indulging in wide spread rapes, killings and extortion rackets. Of a total of 11,694 persons killed by terrorists in Punjab during the period 1981-1993, more than 61 per cent were Sikhs. See K.P.S. Gill, *Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood* (Internet edition), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/nightsoffalsehood/falsehood4-5.htm

[11] Juergensmeyer, n. 3, pp. 68-71.

[12] Ibid, p. 71. According to Wallace, Bhindranwale's objective was to replace the Akali Dal as the major authority for Sikhs, which also happened to be partly the objective of the Congress party in propping Bhindranwale up. See Wallace, n. 4, p. 377.

[13] Ibid, pp. 76-77. Yet interestingly, it is this ambivalence of Bhindranwale that contributed to the anti-secular, anti-state nature of Sikh terrorism.

Bhindranwale's ascension possible.[14] The Akali Dal in its origins was a religious party and overtly appealed to Sikh identity, seeking to portray itself as truly representative of Sikh interests in Punjab. The Congress efforts at playing the Bhindranwale card were to offset the appeal of the Akali Dal amongst the masses. In conclusion, the exploitation of what Turkkaya Ataov has called the "chosen trauma" of the Sikhs came to replace the 'chosen glory' of the Sikh community. In other words, a group does not choose to be victimised, but it does make it a choice to dwell on the event, and elite manipulation begins here to exploit incidents of victimisation, or to create myths of such perceived wrongs.[15]

The Proximate causes

The proximate causes of Sikh terrorism can be found in two of Brown's four kinds of internal conflicts: Internal, elite-driven conflicts that include power struggles involving civilians or military leaders; ideological contests over the state's political, economic, social, and religious affairs and criminal assaults on the state. Secondly, external, elite-driven conflicts that are the results of discrete, deliberate policies by governments to trigger conflicts in neighbouring states for political, economic, or ideological purposes, with Pakistan figuring as the external factor here.[16] Both these causes distinctly mark the development of Khalistan terrorism in its two dimensions. The first dimension was caused by the internal dimensions of elite manipulation. The second dimension, while

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[14] Wallace, n. 4, p. 376.

[15] Turkkaya Ataov, *Kashmir and Neighbours: Tale, Terror, Truce* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), pp. 107-108.

[16] See Michael E. Brown, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An Overview", in Michael E. Brown, et al, eds *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), revised edition, pp. 3-25.

flowing from the first, was involvement by Pakistan, making Khalistan terrorism an international one.

a. Internal Dimensions

The White Paper submitted to the parliament in July 1984, dates the beginning of terrorism in Punjab to April 1978 when fundamentalist Sikhs clashed with the *Nirankaris*, a sect within Sikhism leading to the assassination of Baba Gurbachan Singh, the spiritual head of the *Nirankaris* on April 24, 1980.[17] The White Paper on Punjab mentions four distinct factors at work in Punjab terrorism:

1. Agitations supported by the Shiromani Akali Dal.
2. Communal and extremist movement that degenerated into open advocacy of violence against common citizens and the State.
3. Secessionist & anti-national activities.
4. Involvement of criminals and other anti-social elements who sought to profit from the situation.[18]

Post-independence Sikh identity politics goes back to 1966 when Sant Fateh Singh successfully pressured the Union government to create a Sikh majority state, by carving out the Hindu majority areas into two new states of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana. Elite manipulation of religion by the Akali Dal and Congress contributed to terrorism in the eighties. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution adopted by the Akali Dal in October 1973 demanded the merger of areas with Sikh population of other states into a single unified Punjab of Punjabi speaking Sikhs, including a more autonomous status for the Sikh

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[17] *White Paper on the Punjab Agitation: A Summary*, in Verinder Grover, ed., *Encyclopedia of International Terrorism, Volume 3: Documents & Studies on Terrorism* (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2002), pp. 11-24, p. 17.

[18] Ibid, p.12.

state. Agitations by the Akali Dal however began much earlier before the demands were submitted in October 1981.[19]

In response, the Congress was nurturing the rise of Sant Bhindranwale, a rural preacher and head of the *Damdami Taksal* (a Sikh religious school). As a political party with religious origins, the Akali Dal had substantial control over the *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee* (SGPC), an elected body that regulates the matters of Gurudwaras. As a political party, it was also rife with divisions within its ranks, and deliberations within its competing sections are said to have contributed to the deliberate abuse of religion as a symbol to mobilise masses for its political survival.[20] Bhindranwale spawned his own fundamentalist group called the *Dal Khalsa* that was supported by Sanjay Gandhi as well as the Home Minister of India, Zail Singh.[21] Support for Bhindranwale and his *Dal Khalsa* by the Congress had the objective of replacing the Akali Dal's control of the *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee* (SGPC) with that of Bhindranwale.[22] However, Bhindranwale's courting arrest on September 20, 1981 in connection with the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, a Press baron, led to large scale violence. This particular incident where his papers are said to be destroyed turned Bhindranwale against the Congress government at the centre.[23] Two

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[19] Ibid.

[20] For an insight into the intra-party politics of Akali Dal and a comparative study of the functioning of the Congress (I) and Akali Dal parties in Punjab, see T.R. Sharma, "Defusion and Accommodation: The Contending Strategies of the Congress Party and the Akali Dal in Punjab", *Pacific Affairs* (New York), Volume 59, number 4, Winter (1986-87), pp. 634-654.

[21] For a detailed view on the support extended by the Congress(I) party to Bhindranwale and the prevention of his arrest on two occasions by intervention by the Union Home Minister Zail Singh, see Gill, n. 10.

[22] See Ayesha Kagal, *The Times of India* (New Delhi), 12 September 1982.

[23] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p 94. However, according to Gill, Bhindranwale's break-up with Congress leadership was more to the developments in his personal stature within the extremist groups, and a logical fall-out of his ideological moorings that were rabidly anti-secular. See Gill, n. 10.

extremist groups, the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) and *Dal Khalsa* were particularly involved in the violence that ensued with Sikh extremists on motorcycles killing four persons.[24] Subsequently, an *Indian Airlines* plane was hijacked to Lahore on September 29, 1981 by extremists in what would be repeated over the years of Khalistan terrorism in Punjab.[25]

The immediate proximate cause for terrorism in Punjab was political manipulation by political parties that is unprecedented in contemporary democratic societies anywhere in the world. This manipulation of religion and ethnicity has been said to be a state policy of the Congress government of that period that saw ethnicity as not merely a threat to the nation, but rather that "under certain conditions 'dangerous' ethnicity could constitute an important component of statist policy making itself."[26] The strategy of the Congress party during the time of Indira Gandhi, according to Sankaran Krishna, was to first discredit the state government and dissolve the regime on grounds of instability, and then contest the ensuing elections on the platform of restoring peace and stability. This is what happened directly in Punjab:

> ...in Punjab in the early 1980s, the regime in New Delhi promoted extremist, separatist groups in order to create instability and violent turmoil in the state. Such instability was used in a two-step process by the center: first, discrediting moderate elements of the ruling Akali Party by encouraging extremist provocations as reason for central government intervention – in this instance the army was sent, followed by elections in which the Congress Party hoped to triumph by promising to restore order and stability.[27]

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[24] Interestingly, Bhindranwale, for all his Sikh Puritanism, added the motorcycle and revolver to the traditional Sikh symbols, holding it necessary for each village to keep one motorcycle, three baptized Sikhs and three revolvers. See Appleby, n. 9, p. 89.

[25] Grover, n. 17, p. 18.

[26] Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 24.

[27] Ibid, p.25.

However, according to K.P.S. Gill, the officer credited with having successfully combated terrorism in Punjab, it was more the Akali party than the Congress that shared the larger blame:

> It is a well known and well documented fact that the flames of terrorism were fanned by the Congress (I), that the Akalis, if anything, initially opposed the 'Bhindranwale card' that the Centre and the State Congress leadership was playing ..... It was, however, the Sikh religious leadership – and prominently among them, the Akalis – that picked up the fundamentalist card; moreover, it was this very leadership that had, over the past at least four decades, been preparing the soil in which the seed of bigotry and communal violence would thrive. And eventually, it was this very religious leadership that participated in, encouraged, or failed to oppose or dissociate itself from, the campaign of terror for Khalistan. [28]

Operation Bluestar by the Indian army to dislodge the terrorist groups from the Golden Temple began on June 3, 1984. While the army was successful, this act attracted outrage from many Sikhs who saw in it a visible desecration of their holiest shrine. The subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards led to days of widespread riot in Delhi and elsewhere in which many Sikhs were killed. The perception of desecration of their shrine and the riots contributed to the resurgence of Khalistan terrorism.[29] The release of most terrorists by the then state Akali government only helped in the Golden Temple being once more taken over by the Khalistan terrorist who evicted the SGPC from the temple premises.[30] A second operation to clear the Golden Temple was undertaken between May 11 and May 18, 1988. However, instead of the army, the civilian Punjab police force undertook this task. Operation Black

[28] Gill, n. 10.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

Thunder, as this was codenamed, was conducted under full media coverage. This particular operation, in contrast to the army operated Operation Bluestar, is credited with having eroded the moral grounds of religious terrorism in Punjab, as it exposed the sordid activities of the terrorists in the Golden Temple whose desecration by the religious terrorists themselves shocked and appalled Sikhs in the state.[31]

In brief, Ashutosh Varshney's observation that "Indira Gandhi used religion for political purposes, just as Bhindranwale used politics for religious purposes" aptly captures the internal dynamics of the Punjab problem, as well as the dangerous price of mixing religion with politics.[32]

b. External Dimensions

The external dimensions of the proximate causes to terrorism in Punjab began with Pakistan's direct involvement with Khalistan militants, with the Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq being credited for having "authorised the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency to give training, weapons and logistical facilities to Sikh militants.[33] Pakistani support to Khalistan terrorists was merely a part of its twin policy towards India, adopted by General Zia-ul-Haq. According to J.N. Dixit, "From 1981 onwards, his two-track policy towards India – that of an apparent peace offensive, while encouraging covert moves to erode India's unity, influence and strength – crystallised."[34] The intensification of Pakistani involvement in the terrorism in Punjab from the end of 1981

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[31] K.P.S. Gill, "Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993", http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpstext.htm Accessed on 23 June 2003.

[32] Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 79.

[33] J. N. Dixit, *India-Pakistan in War & Peace* (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002), pp. 253-254.

[34] Ibid, p. 248.

meant the hijacking of a second *Indian Airlines* flight by *Dal Khalsa* terrorists on 4 August 1982. This was earlier preceded by the hijacking of a plane on 29 September 1981.[35]

The second half of 1986 saw a manifest Pakistani support of terrorism when Pakistan began to encourage visits by large number of Sikh pilgrims from the United States of America and Britain. The Pakistani infiltration of the Sikh community in Punjab was done through the Sikh pilgrims who visited Pakistan. Contacts were arranged between the diaspora Sikh groups and Indian Sikhs to widen the networks of Khalistan terrorists. These networks of Sikh diaspora located largely in Britain, the United States, and Canada have been instrumental in providing financial support to the Khalistan terrorists. The support from these radical elements within the Sikh diaspora had even extended to active campaigns to mobilise international support for the idea of Khalistan with one former minister in the Punjab state, Jagjit Singh Chauhan even said to have floated a separate currency for Khalistan in Britain.[36] In fact, many leaders of some of the most extremist Sikh terrorist groups have been located in Pakistan and continue to try and motivate Sikh youths from the UK, Canada as well as from Indian Punjab to take recourse to extremist activities.[37]

This involvement begun in earnest after the Operation Bluestar, when Pakistani-supplied arms and ammunition to the terrorist groups became visible when the weapons used by the terrorists began showing a sudden improvement in quality and potency.[38]

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[35] Ibid, p. 251.

[36] Jagjit Singh Chauhan was Punjab's finance minister for three years from 1967 and went into exile in Britain in 1980 at the peak of the Sikh separatist campaign. In London, Mr Chauhan led the call for a Sikh homeland, Khalistan. The call, however, did not get much international support. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1410278.stm. Accessed on 10-07-03.

[37] Source: http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/pak_terrorism.htm. Accessed on 10-07-03.

[38] Gill, n. 10.

Costs of Terrorism

The Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, provides an index of those killed in Punjab terrorism through the years 1981-2000.[39] A break-up of the data shows that for the year 1981-85, the total number of casualties was 1324, with civilian casualties at 523. The number of terrorists killed in this period has been 113 while the number of security forces shows an inordinate high of 688 deaths.

The years 1986-90 show the total number of casualties at 10,746, with civilian casualties at 7,014. Number of terrorists killed are 2802, while the number of casualties in the security forces are at 930. The figures for the year 1991-95 show the trend of the years 1986-90 in reduced casualties in security forces vis-à-vis terrorist casualties. The total number of civilian casualties was at 4,157 while 774 security forces and 5,175 terrorists were killed. For the years 1996-2000, the casualty figures have come down dramatically. There were seventy-four civilian casualties, with four terrorists and two security force personnel being killed.

The inordinately high figures of casualty in the security forces in the early five-year period from 1981-85, and the reason for terrorism to have gained its stranglehold over the state are put to the ineptitude of the political elites. In a scathing indictment of the role of the political leadership, Gill says that:

> In Punjab, however, the shock of terrorist tactics – unfamiliar in the extreme – produced a paralysis that was compounded enormously by the conduct of politicians at the very highest level. To expect a sagacious, balanced and adequate response from district police officials against extremism that is clearly, directly, sometimes openly, encouraged by leaders at the highest levels of governance, is to ask for the impossible. In any event, in the absence of a clear

[39] The data is maintained by the internet portal of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm Accessed on 30 June 2003.

mandate and a firm leadership, the police, directionless and demoralised, quite simply, refused to engage.[40]

JAMMU & KASHMIR AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Permissive causes

The transition of the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) from a largely composite culture flowing from the tolerant Rishi-Sufi cult to a theatre of radical Islamist terrorism is symptomatic of the power of ideas in a digital world and the reactions that modernity as a project is still evoking. J&K's accession to secular and democratic India was seen by the Islamic state of Pakistan as a violation of its 'Two-nation' theory, notwithstanding a violation nonetheless, even if J&K were to join Pakistan owing to large areas of it having Hindu and Buddhist majorities.[41] Thus at the onset, we have important perceptual differences between India and Pakistan that belong to fundamentally opposing ideologies. The subsequent radical Islamization of Pakistan in the 1980s has pitted India and Pakistan vigorously against one another as representatives of the contending ideologies of order, and illustrates the phenomenal challenge that secular nationalism faces from religious nationalism. In fact, the case for India becomes more complicated because of two major factors: the religious and semi-feudal nature of Indian society that continues to be largely agrarian-peasant based and where modernization as a process is experienced as temporal displacement, causing disjunctions.[42] The second factor is the large presence of Muslim population in India

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[40] Gill, n. 31.

[41] Ataov, n. 15, p. 58. Also see Kalim Bahadur, "Terrorism or "Freedom Struggle" in Kashmir", *World Focus* (New Delhi), volume 23, number 10, Oct (2002), pp. 3-6.

[42] Modernity is said to have led to two results in the realm of religion and politics in India. First, owing to the link between secularism and amoral politics, communal riots have increased with the advent of

that, in large sections, continues to entertain an Islamic worldview within a feudal set-up and is sensitive to developments in neighbouring Pakistan. The rise of religious nationalism in India can be seen as a direct result of this radical socialization of Pakistan and the two factors of complication in India.

Flowing from the above conditions, we have competing themes within India about what it is that defines an Indian. According to Ashutosh Varshney, three competing themes about India have fought for dominance since the rise of the national movement. The competing themes are territorial or the idea of India as a 'sacred geography' situated between the Indus river, the Himalayas and the seas; Cultural or the ideas of tolerance, pluralism and syncretism as dominant ideas that define Indian society; and thirdly the religious theme that India is largely a land of the Hindus, expressed variously as culture and civilization.[43]

With modern politics, (mis)understood as opportunism in a semi-feudal society, there is also the theme of corruption in local administration of J&K. The disruption of the political process 'consequent to' the dismissal of the Sheikh government in 1953 saw largesse being doled out by the Union government, ushering in an era of corruption.[44]

J&K borders Pakistan in its north and west with proximity to Afghanistan, and China to its east. The failure of the Pakistani state and the radical Islamization undertaken by the Pakistani regime under General Zia-ul-Haq, in part to build his constituency of legitimacy, and in part to cater to his own personal beliefs, led to a spurt of radical Islam

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modernity. Second, because secularism puts the believer on the defensive, fundamentalism and secularism have become the two sides of the same coin. See, Varshney, n. 32, pp. 70-81.

[43] Ibid, pp. 60-70.

[44] The largesse doled out as ostensible compensation to pacify the dissenting voices came in the shape of discretionary permit power with the bureaucracy, leading to corruption. See V.K. Nayar, "Low Intensity Conflict: Jammu & Kashmir", *Journal of the United Service Institution of India* (New Delhi), volume 128, July-September (1998), pp. 405-424, p. 409.

in Pakistan that had its impact on the entire region.[45] By redefining the relationship of Pakistan with Islam, he made his radical socialization attractive to the Muslim population in India that is yet to find its bearings vis-à-vis secular modernity other than on an openly confrontational approach.

Finally, the proliferation of drugs in the region, particularly in the area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, sponsored by the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) of Pakistan as well as elements of its defence forces, and the geopolitical implications of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, formed the volatile external environment of J&K that engendered terrorism and disruption.[46]

Proximate Causes

a. Internal Dimensions

The proximate causes for the J&K complication is unique where political ineptitude of the political elites is said to be the very reason behind the internationalization of an issue that has vexed the Indian state from the very beginning. It is common notion to cite the beginning of the J&K imbroglio to Pakistani tribesmen invading J&K in October 1948 and Pakistan's subsequent claim over J&K. However, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is credited with not only making the accession of J&K to India a suspect with his offer for 'plebiscite' when there existed no differences within the political elites of J&K over its accession to India, but also to have needlessly internationalised the issue when it was a domestic affair.[47] A further complicating factor

[45] To understand the dynamics of this radical adoption of Islam by Pakistan, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 130-157.

[46] Ataov, n. 15, pp. 113-123.

[47] B. Vivekanandan, *In Retrospect: Reflections on Select Issues in World Politics 1975-2000* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2001), pp. 133-137.

that resulted in the division of J&K is cited to his stopping the military action against the invading tribesmen at a decisive point when the invading hordes could have been decisively pushed back.[48] According to B. Vivekanandan:

> Thus, it may be seen that each one of successive decisions Nehru took on Kashmir – offer to plebiscite or referendum, taking the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council, stopping the Indian Army in the final stage of its successful operations, and the creation of a cease-fire line inside Kashmir – in 1947 and 1948 proved inimical to India's interests. Nehru did all these by bypassing the advice of his senior colleagues like Vallabhbhai Patel. [49]

The immediate escalation of conflicts after the independence and Nehru's lack of vision or decision resulted in Pakistan occupying about one-third of J&K, or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, signalling the start of a long campaign of sedition in the rest of J&K to wage a struggle of secession from the Indian union. The beginning of alienation of people in J&K is said to have begun with the arrest and incarceration of the prominent Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah.[50] Sheikh Abdullah is said to have no differences about the accession of J&K to India, but had differences about the limits of the accession, where he feared the submersion of Kashmiri identity in a unitary system.[51] The non-violent civil disobedience movement in protest against the Sheikh's detention soon led to deteriorating administrative environment amidst a growing schism between the different religious communities of J&K.

The Sheikh's land reform measures, it is said, threatened the majority of Laddakhis since it limited the wealth of the traditionally dominant Buddhist monasteries, thus

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Bahadur, n. 41.

[51] Ataov, n. 15, pp. 60-69.

fuelling a disinformation campaign about the Sheikh's intentions.[52] The special status of J&K under Article 370 of the Indian constitution was sought to be retained by the Muslim population of J&K and equally resented by the Hindus and Laddakhi Buddhists who wanted it to be abolished. Moreover, the "influence of the Iranian Revolution, the Muslim reactions to Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the beginnings of Khalistan secessionism, and the echo of Hindu antagonism" made Muslims in J&K more susceptible to dissent in Kashmir.[53] For the Muslim population of Kashmir who were conscious of retaining the special status of J&K, the interference from the Union government in the form of dissolution of the Sheikh as well as his son Farooq's government "helped promote the cause of terrorists, facilitated their publicity, and helped them set new formations".[54] Coupled with influences from across the border, these made the cause of Islamization of the valley seem coterminous with 'independence' and began to be expressed as such.

The tenure of Jagmohan Malhotra as Governor of J&K is also said to have contributed to the dissent with his dismissal of the Farooq Abdullah government.[55] Amidst large scale violence and killings during the second tenure of Jagmohan as Governor, the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits began from the valley. However, the infiltration of the

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[52] However, the Sheikh's governance had seen J&K make large strides in economy, education and representative government, making J&K a zone of tranquillity. However, the bureaucracy was steeped in corruption, giving rise to the expectation that religious radicalism would bring justice and freedom. See John Ray, "Kashmir 1962 to 1986: A Footnote to History", *Asian Affairs* (London), volume 33, part 2, June (2002), pp. 194-231.

[53] As early as 1979, pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini could be seen everywhere in tea shops, even as hopes for a dignified place within India and democratic solutions began to fade in the Muslim population of Kashmir. Pakistan began to emerge as a possibility in the minds of Kashmiris. With the death of the Sheikh in 1982 ended whatever hopes Kashmiris had. By 1986, terrorism had begun to seem a possibility. Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

Muslim population of J&K by radical Islamic elements had a direct co-relation with what was happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

b. External Dimensions

The external dimensions of J&K terrorism exhibits more than international terrorism carried out by a bad neighbour as a tactical proxy-war within a regional security complex and hence within the ambit of traditional security analysis. It also involves by its nature of Islamist fundamentalism, participation of *jihadis* from as diverse places as Britain and Sudan, and the changing nature of transnational terrorism that takes terrorism outside the ambit of purely *statist* positions. The external dimension can be linked to two forces at play here. One is the familiar role of Pakistan. Second is the Afghan dimension.

i. Pakistan dimension

The radical socialization of Pakistani society and its military on Islamist lines began with General Zia-ul-Haq, partly to pander to his own personal convictions, largely to find grounds of legitimacy within Pakistan,[56] and his own calculations about the benefit of radical Islam in the geopolitical considerations arising from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.[57] According to Satish Kumar:

> General Zia proceeded to offer an alternative focus to the public in the shape of religion. A peculiar brand of Islam was created and packed specially for the purpose. ...Zia employed Islam

[56] Reza Nasr, n. 45.

[57] Bahadur, n. 41.

> in affecting legislation as well as altering the character of the state institutions such as judiciary and the executive.[58]

This radicalisation of Pakistani polity and society also saw the growth of uncontrolled groups of radical Islamist camps for churning out *jihadis* to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, and India in J&K and elsewhere. Free flow of arms and radical Muslims from around the Muslim world, willing to wage *jihad* began to change the very nature of the region. According to Kalim Bahadur:

> Pakistan's ISI decided to intensify the war in Jammu and Kashmir around 1989. The war in Kashmir would have twin objectives. To wage war of attrition in Kashmir to weaken the will of the Indian leadership to hold on to Kashmir and to weaken the Indian state by gradual spreading the area of terrorist activities through the Indian subcontinent.[59]

It is worthwhile to note that it was not only General Zia who followed the policy of subversion of the Indian state, but rather it has been the *raison d'être* of Pakistan ever since its inception in 1947. Even during its brief dalliances with democratically-elected governments, the ruling elites have always pursued Islamist agendas with Benazir Bhutto and her interior minister Naserullah Babar credited for the creation of the Taliban.[60]

This owes to the differing nature of regimes in both countries with India being secular and democratic, and Pakistan for most parts having military dictatorship and now

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[58] Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan", *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), volume 30, number 8, August (2000), pp. 1075-1087.

[59] Bahadur, n. 41, p. 6.

[60] Sumit Ganguly, "Putting South Asia Back Together Again", *Current History* (New York), volume 100, number 650, December (2001), pp. 410-414, p.411.

radically Islamic. Thus, both have conflicting perceptions of and approaches to conflict and peace.[61]

ii. Afghan Dimension

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan spawned a process, ably assisted by the Western powers, that has culminated as a global threat in the form of Islamist terrorism.[62] While the linkages of Taliban and the Al-Qaeda are well known, the linkages of the Taliban forces with J&K terrorism moved terrorism in J&K away from that of ethno-national and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and elevated it to being a part of the global Islamist *jihad* that was sought to be imposed upon the world. According to Sumit Ganguly:

> As the Taliban consolidated its hold over Afghanistan, they played host not only to bin Laden and Al-Qaeda but also to a variety of other ISI-supported groups that were intent on carrying their jihad into the Indian-controlled portions of Jammu and Kashmir. These groups, comprising of Afghans, Arabs, Pakistanis, and disaffected Kashmiris, contributed to a reign of terror and mayhem throughout the Kashmir Valley during the last decade of the twentieth century.[63]

The Afghan dimension via the Taliban is in conjunction with the Pakistani state's radicalization of its society and encouragement to Islamist forces. According to Afsir Karim:

> The militant camps once established in Pakistan to support the Mujahideen were handed over to the Taliban. These were also used by various fringe groups of the JUI. The Harkat-ul-Ansar led by Fazlul Rehman Khalil, an ally of the JUI and an important militant group, was given a

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[61] P. Sahadevan, "Competing Regional Interests, Conflict Formation, and Conflict Management in South Asia", in P. Sahadevan, ed., *Conflict & Peacemaking in South Asia* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2001), pp. 1-59, pp. 16-17.

[62] Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Hants, U.K), volume 53, number 2 (1999), pp. 151-167, pp. 155-157.

[63] Ganguly, n. 60, p. 412.

militant camp called Badr near Khost. This group regularly sent terrorists to Kashmir, Chechnya and Yugoslavia.[64]

The subversion of and the shift from the fight for independence to a particularly brutal Islamist terrorism has pitted terrorism against Kashmiri culture itself, and the Kashmiri people. As Afsir Karim notes:

> The Taliban influence in Pakistan is reflected in the latest orientation of terrorist operations in Kashmir and Tajikistan. The insurgent warfare in Kashmir is no longer waged to gain independence or to join Pakistan, but to subvert the present socio-religious culture of the Kashmiris. The foreign mercenaries consider themselves as crusaders with a mission against the Sufi and Hindu cultural influences on the Kashmir Muslims. In this campaign, Pakistan-based fanatical groups such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, Markaz-e-Dawa-i-ul-Irshad and Harkat ul Mujahdin are in the lead. Unfortunately, they have adopted the most brutal means of killing by hangings, strangulation, beheadings, skinning alive, blowing the bodies by tying dynamite, slitting of throats, nailing, and gunning down the innocent victims.[65]

Costs of terrorism

Terrorism in J&K is largely the result of anti-modern transnational Islamist *jihadis* carrying on a Punjab style of terrorist tactics by systematic killings of non-Muslims and anyone who dissents from their world view. The total number of killings for the period 1988 to June 1999 is 21,039 with about one-thirds of them being Muslims.[66] The selective killing of Hindu civilians by terrorists by the way of massacres from the year

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[64] Afsir Karim, "The Rise of Terrorist Culture in South Asia", in Verinder Grover, ed., *Encyclopedia of International Terrorism: Volume 2, Terrorism in World Countries* (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2002), pp. 403-416, pp. 404-408.

[65] Ibid, pp. 406-407.

[66] Ataov, n. 15, pp. 60-69.

1996 to March 2003 is put at 548.[67] The figures from the year 1998 to the year 2001 are indicative of the brutal nature of the conflict. In 1998 out of 2,194 casualties, 982 are that of civilians, 228 of Security Forces and 984 of terrorists. The year 1999 figures put the total killings at 2259 with 821 civilian deaths alone. Casualties in the same year for security forces amounted to 356, while there were about 356 deaths amongst the security forces and 1082 deaths amongst the terrorists. The year 2000 figures show 3,288 deaths out of which 842 are civilians, 638 security forces and 1808 terrorists. The figures for 2001 are equally unrelenting with 4,507 deaths with about 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces and about 2,850 terrorists.[68] The total number of international terrorists operating in J&K who were arrested during the period from 1994 to 1999 is cited at 142, with about 1,379 killed in the same period.[69]

Major terrorist Incidents in India

The list of terrorist incidents of India frankly goes beyond the present purview as it goes in hundreds. The difficulty lies in classifying what constitutes a major or minor incident and the parameters that one may use. Incidents that involve large loss of life are too many. Incidents whose implications have been perceived as psychologically more disturbing again begs parameters even while raising questions of ethics and choice. The nature of transnational terrorism exemplified by the IC-814 hijacking incident is the parameter that is used in this listing, except for the Kanishka entry. A small number of incidents are listed that caught public attention more strongly than the others.

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[67] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/data_sheets/major_massacres.htm Accessed on 24-03-03.

[68] Compiled from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm Accessed on 24-03-03.

[69] Compiled from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/data_sheets/foreign_mercernaries.htm Accessed on 24-03-03.

- **June 23, 1985**: Mid-air explosion on board the AI flight 182 *Kanishka* that took off from Toronto. After a brief stopover at Montreal was *en route* to New Delhi when it exploded off the coast of Ireland while it was preparing to land at the Heathrow airport. The explosion killed all the 329 people on board.
- **March 12, 1993: Bombay, India**: A serial (thirteen) bomb attack in Mumbai targeting the Bombay Stock Exchange, the headquarters of India's airline, and three luxury hotels. 317 people died and 1,200 were injured.
- **December 1999**: Indian Airlines flight IC-814 hijacked by terrorists. Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan-based terrorist organisations and Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, indicted in the hijack.
- **December 22, 2000**: Lashkar-e-Taeyba terrorists storm the Red Fort in Delhi and kill three security force personnel.
- **October 1, 2001**: Attack on State Legislative Assembly Complex, Srinagar by the Jaish-e-Mohammad Group, killing thirty-two, and injuring seventy people.
- **December 13, 2001**: Five terrorists attack India's Parliament while it is in session by Jaish-e-Mohammad Group, New Delhi, killing eleven and injuring thirty people.
- **March 30, 2002**: Suicide attack at Raghunath Temple, Jammu by the Laskar-e-Taeyba Group, killing seven and injuring twenty people.
- **July 13, 2002**: Massacre carried out in Kasim Nagar, Jammu by the Laskar-e-Taeyba Group killing twenty-seven and injuring thirty-three civilians.
- **September 24, 2002**: Terrorists attack the Akshardham temple of the Swaminarayan sect, Gandhinagar, Gujarat killing thirty-three and injuring seventy-four people by the Tehreek-e-Qisas and Laskar-e-Taeyba combine.

- **November 24, 2002**: Attack on Raghunath Temple, Jammu by the Lashkar-e-Taeyba Group killing thirteen and injuring forty-five people.
- **March 16, 2003**: A joint operation by at least 50 terrorists belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen group, the Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen group, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen group and the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami group, attack a remote police post in Ind village, Udhampur district of Jammu, killing thirteen and injuring nine people.

RESPONSES BY THE STATE

The Indian response to the threats by terrorism can be put in two broad categories: Legislative and actual policy decisions. Legislations go back to the colonial period with *The Prevention Of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911*, enacted on 22 March 1911 that sought to "consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of public meetings likely to promote sedition or to cause a disturbance of public tranquillity."

In response to the hijacking of civilian airliners by Punjab terrorists to Lahore, *The Anti - Hijacking Act, 1982* (received the assent of the President on 6 November 1982) was passed to give effect to the international "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" of 16 December 1970, that the state signed at The Hague. Further, *The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982* was passed on 6 November 1982, in consonance with the international "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation" of 23 September 1971 that the state signed at Montreal. The siege of the Golden Temple by the terrorists in Punjab prompted the adoption of *The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance, 1988* to prevent the misuse of religious institutions for political and other

purposes. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was exempted from this ordinance, keeping in view its special status.

The growing incidences of terrorism led to the adoption of *The SAARC Convention (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, 1993* enacted on 26 April. This act was held applicable to the entire country including J&K. The most relevant legislation to come into force against terrorism has been *The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002* that replaced the earlier *Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance* or POTO of 2001. This act generated controversy since it gave sweeping detention and preventive powers to the state and has been seen by its critics in violation of civilian rights guaranteed by the constitution and emphasised by *The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993*, enacted in 1994, providing for the constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Right Commissions in States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of Human Rights.[70]

In terms of policy decisions, the approach seems to be of accommodation of interests evidenced by the Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 24 July 1985 that sought to accommodate the demands of the Akali Dal and made major concessions to the Akali Dal demands.[71] The restoration of federal rule in J&K with state elections in 2002 has shown a preference of the state to deal with the problem democratically, with the elections declared fair if not very free. Seen in the context of the years of intimidation by terrorists and the threat to life for those who participated in the recent elections, the turn out was an act of faith and courage by the common J&K people.[72]

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[70] All the documents have been sourced from Grover, n. 17.

[71] Sourced from the Institute for Conflict Management website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/document/papers/memorandum_of_settlement.htm Accessed on 28-06-03.

[72] ISS Team Report, "Fair Elections under the Shadow of Fear", *World Focus* (New Delhi), volume 23, number 12, December (2002), pp. 59-62.

However, the policy of capitulating in to demands of terrorists was started with the infamous Rubbaiya case when the Union Home Minister (and now the Chief Minister of J&K) Mufti Mohammed Syed's daughter was kidnapped on 8 December 1989. The Union government readily gave in to the demands of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) to release five terrorists in return, although the Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah was not in favour of such capitulation.[73] This incident is said to have opened the flood gates of terrorism in J&K.[74]

Subsequent terrorist actions of hostage taking, with the more dramatic hijacking of an Indian airliner to Khandahar and the negotiated release of hardcore terrorist leaders in Pakistan, under arrest in India, betrayed the complicity of the Taliban and Pakistan. A statement to this effect was made on 14 March 2000 by the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in Parliament that there was triangular coordination between Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan-based terrorist organisations and Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, in the hijack of flight IC-814, in December 1999.[75]

In fact, this incident can be seen as the point after which the securitization of terrorism in India began. While Pakistan has always figured as a major security irritant, the terrorism in Punjab was conjoined to the Pakistani threat, as an additional factor. The early terrorism in J&K was perceived a security threat, but was not securitized. Any state at any given point of time faces challenges to its security. This challenge may

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[73] Ataov, n. 15, p. 129. Ataov lists the multi-national nature of the Muslim radicals functioning in J&K.

[74] Navnita Chadha Behera, "Jammu & Kashmir: The New Political Equations", *World Focus* (New Delhi), volume 23, number 12, December (2002), pp. 31-34

[75] The terrorist leaders had to be transported to Afghanistan from India, to be released in Pakistan. One of them, Maulana Masood Azhar subsequently began his terrorist operations soon after. What makes this particular incident particularly noxious is the bill of 10,000 U.S. dollars sent to the Indian government by the Afghan Taliban regime for services rendered during the flight IC-814 hijack. India is said to have refused to entertain this ludicrous demand.
Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/timeline_2000.htm Accessed on 23-03-03.

come as territorial, economic, social, political, or even ecological. Securitization implies the articulation of a threat as an existential threat to the state's security.

The hijacking of flight IC-814 points to the securitization of transnational terrorism in India, as the nature and implications of IC-814 incident indicated the nature of challenge that was much more beyond mere externally-induced internal dissent. This can be seen as the intensification of diplomatic efforts for combating international terrorism, and the legislative equivalent that saw the *Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance* (POTO) of 2000, coming into force in 2001. The 11 September 2001 saw the ordinance converted into the comprehensive *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2001* or POTO. The criticisms that this has attracted point to the challenge a democratic state faces in trying to balance the rights of its citizens on one hand and securing the state on the other.

The indictment of Pakistan and the Taliban in the hijack saw an intensification of diplomatic efforts by India to mobilize the international community. This culminated in joint declarations with Israel (January 10, 2000), Italy (January 13, 2000), Turkey (April 1, 2000), Iran (April 10, 2001), China (January 13, 2001), Mauritius (January 23, 2001), Russia (December 4, 2002), the United States (September 26, 2000) and Britain (January 14, 2000)[76], of the resolve of the international community to fight global terrorism.[77]

The 11 September 2001 carnage in New York not only shocked the Indian state but also suddenly made the transnational dimensions clear to its population. With this sense of shared suffering also emerged a certain hope that perhaps Indian experiences of terrorism were not merely a particular result of state ineptitude and the institutionalization of corruption at all levels of public life. The responses of the

[76] Britain and India have deepened their cooperation in combating transnational terrorism through a joint declaration signed between the two countries on 6 January 2001.

[77] Ibid.

political elites, especially the two major parties of Congress and BJP have largely and predictably focused on Pakistan and its sponsorship of terrorism. In the 16 January 2003 Press release, the General Secretary and official spokesperson for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) indicts Pakistan's complicity with transnational terrorism:

> The report to the effect that Al-Qaida is utilising lakhs of dollors[sic] deposited by Non Resident Pakistanis in various relief funds of Pakistan govt. is an open proof of unholy alliance between Al-Qaida and Pakistan Govt. [sic] While making sensational disclosure of missing lakhs of dollors [sic] gifted to various Govt. Relief Funds by Non Resident Pakistanis the Pakistan's Auditor General has himself indicated that the money could have been misused by various terrorist organizations including Al-Qaida which is a matter of serious concern to the entire world.[sic]
>
> India have always been warning that Pakistan is giving financial support to Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations which are indulging in various nefarious activities not only in India but also in other parts of the world and Pakistan is their fountain head and main operational centre.[sic][78]

The attack on the Indian Parliament House on 13 December 2001 brought unequivocal condemnation of the act amidst attempts to extract political mileage. In its emergency session convened on 13 December 2001, the Congress party called the attack a 'monumental' failure of security:

> The Congress Working Committee met in an emergency session on 13th December, 2001 to express its deep shock at the dastardly attack on Parliament House in broad day light today. The congress Party along with the whole nation condemns this attack and reaffirms the nation's resolve to combat unitedly the terrorist menace. ... The Congress Working Committee cannot refrain from pointing out that the primary task and sole responsibility for safeguarding the security of the nation is that of the Government. This incident brings out a monumental security

[78] Sourced from the website of the Bharatiya Janata Party www.bjp.org/Press/apl_1003. Accessed on 12-02-03

and intelligence failure, particularly highlighted by the fact that Government had previous information about a possible terrorist attack on Parliament.[79]

Subsequently, Sonia Gandhi, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha in her speech in the parliament on 19 December 2001, stated:

> ...at this critical juncture, the need of the hour is for the Government and all political parties to rise above partisan considerations. The need of the hour is for all concerned to desist from using the occasion to raise such contentious issues that divide our plural society. This is a moment when the entire country must stand together in solidarity. The Government shoulders a major responsibility for creating this solidarity.[80]

However, her earlier statement 19 November 2001 entitled "Vajpayee Government Flayed on POTO", was at variance from this unequivocal position. It was reported:

> The Congress president, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, on 21 November came down heavily on the BJP-led Central government on the contentious issue of Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO), combined with a note of caution on the Centre going ahead with the proposed changes in labour laws, sans consensus. Apart from not consulting anybody on POTO, the BJP Government, adopting a similar strategy, is planning to bring in changes in labour laws, which might affect thousands, said the Congress president, adding the party will vehemently oppose such changes.[81]

The contradictions and confusion within the political elites regarding the securitization of transnational terrorism is highlighted by the statement by the Bharatiya Janata Party's

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[79] Sourced from the Congress party website www.congresssandesh.com/dec-2001/comment.html Accessed on 12-02-03.

[80] Source: http://www.congresssandesh.com/dec-2001/speech1.html. Accessed on: 12-02-03

[81] Report on speech given at a gathering of the "All-India Safai Mazdoor Congress", the labour wing of the Congress party. The text of the speech itself in not available at the Congress party website, but the BJP response indicates that despite the rhetoric on solidarity on the issue of transnational terrorism, there are differences in threat perceptions of it within the political elites. Source: www.congresssandesh.com/dec-2001/speech6.html. Accessed on 12-02-03.

General Secretary and spokesperson Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, in a Press release dated 30 December 2002:

> The BJP has no objection on the Congress Party's demand for issuing a "White Paper" on terrorism but this white paper should also reflect the origin of terrorism and the policies that have been responsible for its growth. Moreover, the white paper should also include full details of the terrorist activities that have been taking place in various parts of the country including Punjab, North-East and Jammu & Kashmir over the last 3 decades.
>
> It is painful to note that the Congress Party whose wavering and weak policies towards terrorism have costed [sic] them the lives of their Prime Minister, a former Prime Minister and Chief Minister is now shamelessly raising the demand for the issuance of a white paper on terrorism. ... It is sad that the Congress Party which has failed miserably in punishing the murderers of their leaders during a decade continues to oppose necessary anti-terrorism legal measurers like POTA.[82]

Conclusion

Terrorism in India shows two very clear factors at play. The internal dimension of a pluralist society where the political elites have sought to play upon the faultlines or create new ones for short-term gains that have gone a long way in making India the most terrorist-battered state in the world. It would not be prudent to view the loss of life, and especially civilian lives, in terms of proportionality without confessing to a twisted morality that reduces human life to mere numbers.

The second factor is Pakistan's morbid anti-Indian stance that stems from a poverty of legitimation that the state sees in its avowedly religious character. The conflict between Pakistan and India can easily be said to be representative of the conflict between religious nationalism and secular nationalism and their fundamental incompatibility. The Indian condition is exacerbated by a long list of actions by its political elites that

[82] Source: www.bjp.org/Press/apl. Accessed on 12-02-03

only can be termed suicidal for the state. The creation of both Punjab and J&K problems lie with political ineptitude and shameless fractious policies by the ruling elites that created an environment easily exploited by Pakistan in its low-cost proxy war that it has indulged in against India. If one looks at the causes of terrorism vis-à-vis, the role of political elites then India can unfortunately be termed a state that is its own enemy.

Chapter V

Conclusion

The transnational nature of contemporary terrorism poses analytical challenges to conventional understandings of security that move around states as the subjects and the objects of analysis. The challenge presented by transnational terrorism is unique because of the relatively new globally-networked nature of it, aided by technology and the process of globalization. Like criminal activities, its networking activities are carried out in secret and only its end-product as dramatic violence becomes public knowledge. Contemporary international terrorism has found its expression in the networking of various radical sub-units and disparate radical individuals within the milieu of religious fundamentalism. Given the religious fanaticism as an attribute of contemporary terrorism, it is difficult to separate religious nationalism from religious fundamentalism, since it is the logic of religious fundamentalism that gives rise to religious nationalism. The overtly religious rhetoric of contemporary transnational terrorism finds easy audiences in many societies that are yet to catch up with the rest of the world in terms of development and modernization, particularly in those societies where any particular religion is the dominant ideology around which the state and society are structured.

This networking of disparate elements means the emergence of an amorphous body of globally-networked actors that may equally participate in both global crime and transnational terrorism. The networking of phantom cells, unlike conventional understandings of terrorists who operate in largely A-line organizational structures, makes contemporary transnational terrorism operationally difficult to contain without wide-spread international co-operation between states.

While Britain has a long history of suffering from terrorism *qua* terrorism in Northern Ireland, the emergence of transnational terrorism as a radical religious force has brought forward an entirely new set of dynamics into play. While terrorism in and from Northern Ireland has cited Irish nationalism as its source of legitimations that draws upon a history of myths and tragedies, transnational terrorism threatens to draw the line at the very idea of Britain itself in its rabid anti-modernism. The internal dimensions of Britain with a large immigrant population, sections within which are sensitive and receptive to the religious rhetoric of transnational terrorism, present a threat from within that Irish terrorism does not. As a post-industrial state, Britain becomes a natural target for a radical movement that seeks to destroy anything that differs from its radical parameters of what constitutes religion and religiosity. The liberal society of Britain hinged on the values of human rights make it difficult for the state to take strong preventive measures even as it ironically ends up protecting those radical elements within that in the end threaten the very fabric of Britain and British society. British society as a largely affluent society when compared to the developing states means that the fight against transnational terrorism within Britain is less an issue of gross distributive injustice within and more the battle for the imagination of those elements that find their allegiance to the rhetoric of transnational terrorism more than to the idea of their citizenship.

The steps taken to tackle the Northern Ireland problem demonstrates the British commitment to democracy as does the sensitivity of the British state to isolate transnational terrorism from the religion that it abuses to garner support. Continued terror attacks by the IRA, however only reveal the bankruptcy of ideas in terrorist groups and indicate the danger from the radical intolerance of such groups. However, the IRA does not threaten the idea of the British state as transnational terrorism does. To

that effect, combating international terrorism has meant a fight to defend the very idea of liberal democracy and modernity. The securitization by the British state of the issue reflects this comprehension on part of the British state.

Terrorism in India shows two very clear factors at play. First, the internal dimensions of a pluralist society, where wrong policy decisions or political manipulation by the elites that have sought to play upon the faultlines or create new ones, for short-term gains that have gone a long way in making India the most terrorist-battered state in the world. The second factor is Pakistan's morbid anti-Indian stance that stems from a poverty of legitimation that the state sees in its avowedly religious character. The conflict between Pakistan and India can easily be said to be representative of the conflict between religious nationalism and secular nationalism and their fundamental incompatibility. The Indian condition is exacerbated by a long list of actions by its political elites that only can be termed suicidal for the state. The creation of both Punjab and J&K problems lie with political ineptitude and fractious policies by the ruling elites that created an environment easily exploited by Pakistan in its low-cost proxy war that it has indulged in against India. If one looks at the causes of terrorism vis-à-vis the past role of political elites, then India can unfortunately be termed a state that is its own enemy.

British perceptions about India, despite Britain's long presence in the sub-continent, had remained rooted in factors arising from a *eurocentric* understanding of the Indian society, leaving the British largely ignorant about the dynamics of a civilization that admitted plurality within its nation. Second, the British colonial politics saw the construction of ethnic and national groups (such as the Sikhs) in India through elite manipulation. Moreover, it interpreted the absence of a state in colonial India and its diversity as evidences of an amalgamation of various tribes and nations held together by the British Crown. The partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for

Muslims registered this perception more directly, while it masked the politically constructed nature of such demands.

Subsequently, demands for secession, whether as a result of the ineptitude and fractious policies of the political elites in the initial phases of terrorism in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) or externally induced terrorism were viewed in the context of expressions of national groups for self-determination within a *third world* polity viewed as an artificial construct. The Cold war dynamics and India's reluctance to be party to any of the super-power blocs contributed to the ignorance about the dynamics of terrorism in Punjab and J&K within British political elites, as well as their reluctance to interfere in what they saw as largely internal problems of a *third world* nation. Additionally, the liberal British society made it difficult to arrest the activities of terrorist groups of India in Britain in the absence of proscription of these groups as terrorist groups. To this extent, terrorism in India, as seen in Britain, has reflected a divergence of perceptions in the past between the two states. The liberal European notion of the right of self-expression of national groups, within European experiences meant the willingness, in principle, to grant such status to those groups that could successfully lay a claim to statehood within Europe, and thus support for activities perceived as such in the rest of the world.

While terrorism in India began in the early eighties, British indifference to the Punjab terrorism is indicated by the fact that supporters of terrorists were not only able to actively campaign for political support but also indulge in fund-raising activities on British soil. A qualitative change in British perceptions apparently came after the assassinations of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and subsequently that of her son and the Leader of the Opposition, Rajiv Gandhi. These two incidents seem to have made the British state sensitive to the problem of terrorism in India, when it agreed to sign an

extradition treaty with India in 1992 as largely a measure to help the Indian state in prosecution of those involved in acts of terrorism against the Indian state.

Post 11 September 2001 saw a securitization of transnational terrorism by the international community, leading to a joint declaration between Britain and India on 6 January 2002 that moved transnational terrorism from being a minor security issue between the two countries to a shared major threat perception with the setting up of the *UK/India Joint Working Group on Terrorism.*[1] While British co-operation with India in combating terrorism can be effectively put to the extradition treaty of 1992, the *New Delhi Declaration* by the two states clearly points to the role of 11 September 2001 events in the growing urgency to fight terrorism. The securitization of transnational terrorism in world politics has meant a greater sensitivity to incidents of transnational terrorism in the world, with two military campaigns undertaken to change regimes in states that were seen to connive with terrorism, with the singular exception of Pakistan. Both Britain and India share a long experience with terrorism that was earlier seen as internal problems typical to each state. The recognition of sharing a common threat from transnational terrorism has contributed largely to these increased levels of co-operation that the joint declaration exemplifies.

However, both the states face problems that are typical of the two societies in their fight against terrorism. While human rights clearly is the dominant issue with Britain and tempers its actions, the conditions of Indian society make the Indian capability in this regard very weak. Britain is committed, even in its addressing the external dimensions of transnational terrorism, to human rights, democracy and good governance. To that extent, the failure of the Indian state to measure up to the standards demanded by Britain may create problems of convergence of perceptions. The internal tensions of the

[1] "The New Delhi Declaration: India and United Kingdom: Partnership for a Better and Safer World", *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), volume 32, number 2, February (2002), pp. 239-241.

Indian society put it in an awkward position vis-à-vis the developed democracies oriented towards human security as a primary condition of governance. However, the unique position of India as the only secular democracy in Asia makes co-operation between Britain and India imperative in the global fight against transnational terrorism. Both Britain and India have sought to address the permissive as well as the proximate factors of international terrorism. The internal dimensions of both the states vary, as do the external dimensions. The responses by both the states to their internal dimensions have been to accommodate demands. Yet the responses by the two states to their internal dimensions raise problems of their own, owing to societal factors. In the British case, multiculturalism as a preferred state policy is said to have encouraged the local authorities to accommodate demands by the Bradford Council of Muslims to incorporate Islamic elements in the school curricula even as *halal* meat was made available at the school canteens in deference to Muslim sensibilities.

Multi-culturalism as a societal feature is in consonance with the democratic values in a liberal state that respects and upholds the rights of the individual. Yet as the case of Bradford Muslims represent, multiculturalism as a rent-seeking practice (securing public support for one's own private interests) corrupts politics and encourages the growth of non-liberal ideologies, and by the politicisation of issues, represent a threat to civil society. According to G.B. Madison:

> The consequences of this (politicised) approach to social issues can only be disastrous for the maintenance of a civil society. When one's opportunities are not a function of one's individual abilities but of one's group affiliations, it is inevitable that groups will be led to compete with one another for their government allotments. This results in "rent-seeking" and a consequent corruption of politics. Politics ceases to be concerned, as it ought to be in a genuine civil society, with the *common good*, becoming instead the arena wherein special interest groups vie with one

another to maximize, at the expense of others (opportunities are always scarce), their own private interests as a group.[2]

The emergence of the civil society is said to be tied to the existence of the liberal state as both form necessary conditions for one another. The idea of the civil society as a core concept of democratic political theory is also an all-inclusive one where civil society designates a "thoroughgoing institutionalization of communicative rationality in all spheres of human agency – cultural, political, and economic."[3] The kind of multiculturalism that is evidenced by the treatment of minority rights in the case of the Bradford Muslims represents an isolationist practice that comes with adversarial multiculturalism where the 'cult of *victim*' is encouraged, leading to a condition where it becomes aggressively anti-western.

In the case of India, rent-seeking and rent-giving policies have been a hallmark of the political elites that has contributed to social divisions. For example, the political use by the Bharatiya Janata Party of the issue of building a temple in Ayodhya at the site of a disputed site is said to be a reaction to Congress rent-giving policies. In the case of India, secularism is not defined as a radical separation of the clergy from the polity, but rather as an equidistant policy that could easily be translated as an 'equal proximity', and thus leading the political elites to get trapped in religious anxieties and fears.[4]

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[2] G.B. Madison, *The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human Rights* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 29.

[3] However, civil society is said to be an inescapably cosmopolitan concept where the etymology of the term refers to "an urbane, city mode of existence" where the city is not a community but "a place where all sorts of people from all sorts of disparate backgrounds are thrown together – and must accordingly learn the civic virtues that will permit them to live together in peace and in respect for their mutual rights." Ibid, pp. 33-37.

[4] The case of Shah Bano merits mention as that of rent-giving policies where the constitution was amended by the Rajiv Gandhi government to give Islamic Shariat law precedence over the country's civil law. See Ashustosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 55-86.

Such political practices may yield electoral rewards in the short-term, but erodes the basis of liberal society that is based on a firm separation of religion and the state. The use of religion by the state in the cases of Pakistan and Malaysia has not helped in the rise of a plural, multicultural society, but rather has helped in the rise of religious fundamentalism. Liberal democracy and religious nationalism (as the product of religious fundamentalism) are fundamentally incompatible, and the political elites in both states should have learnt the lesson that the world around them offers.

Only recently have the political elites in India shown a greater appreciation of the problem and have democratically sought to delegitimize terrorism. The successful elections in J&K, despite serious threats to the life of the electorates from terrorists, have begun a restoration of the democratic process in the state even as it has delegitimized Pakistan's rhetoric of the "freedom" movement that it has "morally" sought to support.

The most direct threat to Indian interests continues to come from Pakistan and its transformation into an overtly radical Islamist society. Economic deprivation as a factor is being increasingly replaced with ideological affinities between radical Islamist groups within and without, as the large number of international mercenaries arrested in J&K show. Within the political elites of India, while there is a general refrain against terrorism, reactions by political elites in India show a poor appreciation or understanding of the problem and threats of transnational terrorism. Corruption as a serious internal dimension is ignored while consistent and coherent policies to deal with the issue are remarkable by their absence. The relative lack of interest of the international community in India's problems with terrorism may be fatigue with a region that is fraught with deep divisions in society and has managed to institutionalize corruption to almost every level of public life, so that an agrarian peasant-based society

that is semi-feudal and corrupted may perhaps seem natural grounds for terrorists to breed in.

This is in contrast to Britain where the political elites largely show a greater appreciation of the dangers of transnational terrorism and the threats posed by it to the British state. The internal dynamics of the British state however has meant a different challenge that it faces in effectively combating terrorism, from within. While the immediate external environment presents no security threat, its internal dimensions remain problematic with radical elements surfacing within the protected environment that a liberal democracy like Britain assures. The orientation of the British state towards upholding the human rights of its citizens and its juxtaposition with the politicization of society (seen as rent-seeking practices) ironically means protecting those that may work against the state and become easy recruits for transnational terrorism on radical ideological grounds. For example, legislations like the *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001* (ACTSA) has evoked considerable criticism in Britain as a case of domestic law-making and enforcement that threatens the security of the individual. This has to do with the British state's commitment to guarantee human rights to its citizens and where preventive legislations like the ACTSA are seen to be in tension with British domestic laws like the *Human Rights Act 1998* that came into force on the 2nd October 2000.

The responses by Britain and India to the external dimensions of transnational terrorism vary owing to the differing capacities of the two states. The British state identifies itself at the forefront of internationally combating the root causes of terrorism, i.e. the permissive causes. Britain describes its policies as aimed at spreading the benefits of globalization while it seeks to ensure respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law. The emphasis in the British approach is on promoting democracy and good

governance globally. Further, it is working closely with the European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised states to disrupt finance networks of terrorist groups.

The Indian response has been to bring international attention on the role of Pakistan as a core state for transnational terrorism as perceived by India. In addition, India is working in varying combinations with Britain and other states to address its problem of a bad neighbourhood. Diplomatic efforts from India saw the expulsion of Pakistan from the Commonwealth even as increasing international scrutiny has been brought upon Pakistan's complicity in transnational terrorism. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Act, 26 April 1993 has been an important step within the region to combat terrorism, and reflects India's initiative to address the external dimensions within the South Asian context.

The recognition, post-September 11, 2001 that terrorism in J&K in India is symptomatic and part of the radical transnational movement, resulted in a joint declaration signed by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee to fight terrorism and terrorist financing jointly, as part of the global initiative to combat terrorism. Given the instances of Sikh terrorists in the eighties and early nineties indulging successfully in propaganda and fund-raising activities that was allowed by the British state, the joint declaration signed on 6 January 2002 between Britain and India point to a new approach to terrorism by Britain and Indo-British co-operation in the area.

However, the challenges remain formidable before the two states. British laws, even those relating to terrorism are meant to be interpreted in the light of the European

Convention on Human Rights, and form part of British domestic laws. This makes extradition of terrorists that seek refuge in Britain, to India a difficult task.

In contrast, the Indian polity continues to exhibit fractious divisiveness and the Indian society continues to send remarkable messages of corruption at most levels of public life. While the security of human rights of its citizens form the dominant orientation of the British state and conclusively a factor in its fight against terrorism within the domestic milieu, the Indian state is quite far removed from such a capacity. The differing capacities of Britain and India come from the different nature of their societies. Since society and state in modern times become difficult to differentiate, the liberal structure of the Indian state is seriously compromised by its societal attribute that is semi-feudal and corrupt.

These differences between Britain and India will continue to remain a factor in their fight against transnational terrorism, even though growing co-operation between the two states signal the shared threat perception that transnational terrorism poses to the two states. While the threat to the British state is incidental, the threat to the Indian state is direct and India continues fighting a costly battle.

The common challenge however, to both India and Britain, comes from radical religious ideology and groups that in the digitally integrated world of today, manage to network effectively into a transnational force that is ideologically committed against modernity and freedom. Terrorism is both a war and a crime and transnational terrorism only makes it a global war and a global crime. As a war, it has to be fought resolutely and as a crime, the state needs to address the permissive conditions meaningfully without giving in to the demands of *resentiment* or the new tribalism that is based on politicization of social issues that results in rent-seeking (and -giving) policies and a consequent corruption of politics. It also means a dissolution of civil society, and thus

necessarily a degradation of liberal democracy. Both Britain and India exhibit this weakness within.

Appendix 1.

List of Proscribed Terrorist Groups in Britain[1]

International Terrorist Groups

a. Islamist Groups

1. Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO): Israel and its friends.
2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): Phillipines.
3. Al-Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI): Egypt and "Western World".
4. Al Qaeda: "Western World", Israel, and non-Islamic nations.
5. Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA): Algeria.
6. Asbat Al-Ansar ('League of Parisans' or 'Band of Helpers'): Lebanon.
7. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ): Egypt and "Western World".
8. Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades: Israel.
9. Harakat Mujahideen (HM): India and the "Western World".
10. Hizballah External Security Organisation: Israel.
11. Islamic Army of Aden (IAA): Yemen.
12. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Uzbekistan
13. Jaish e Mohammed (JeM): India and the United States of America.
14. Jeemah Islamiyah (JI): Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines.
15. Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) (PKK): Turkey.
16. Lashkar e Taeyba (LT): India
17. Mujaheddin e Khalq (MeK): Iran.
18. Palestinian Islamic Jihad - Shaqaqi (PIJ): Palestine.
19. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) (GSPC): Algeria.

[1] Sourced from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/threat/groups/index#top Accessed on 15-02-03. The names of countries figuring alongside the name of terrorist organizations refer to their countries of origin in most cases and the countries that are declared by the groups to be their targets.

b. Other Religious Groups

20. Babbar Khalsa (BK): India.

21. International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF): India.

c. Ethno-national

22. Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA): Spain and France.

23. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Sri Lanka.

d. Radical Left

24. 17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17): Greece.

25. Revolutionary Peoples' Liberation Party - Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi - Cephesi) (DHKP-C): Turkey.

Proscribed Irish groups

1. Continuity Army Council
2. Cumann na mBan
3. Fianna na hEireann
4. Irish National Liberation Army
5. Irish People's Liberation Organisation
6. Irish Republican Army
7. Loyalist Volunteer Force
8. Orange Volunteers
9. Red Hand Commando
10. Red Hand Defenders
11. Saor Eire
12. Ulster Defence Association

13. Ulster Freedom Fighters

14. Ulster Volunteer Force

Appendix 2.

Major Punjab Terrorist Groups[1]

- All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)
- Babbar Khalsa
- Bhindrawala Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTFK)
- Dashmesh Regiment
- International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
- Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)
- Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF)
- Khalistan Armed Force (KAF)
- Khalistan Liberation Organisation (KLO)
- Khalistan National Army (KNA)
- Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)
- Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)

[1] Sourced from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/index.html Accessed on 30 June 2003.

Appendix 3.

Major Terrorist Organizations in J&K[1]

1. Al Barq (ABQ) – Foreign sponsorship
2. Al Fateh Force (AFF) – Foreign sponsorship
3. Al Jihad Force/Al Jihad (AJF) – Foreign sponsorship
4. Al Mujahid Force (AMF) – Foreign sponsorship
5. Al Umar Mujahideen (AUM) – Foreign sponsorship
6. Awami Action Committee (AAC)
7. Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DEM) – Foreign sponsorship
8. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) – Foreign sponsorship
9. Hizbul Mujahideen (HUM) – Foreign sponsorship
10. Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen (IUM) – Foreign sponsorship
11. Jammu & Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) – Foreign sponsorship
12. J&K Jamaat-e-Islami (JKJEI) – Foreign sponsorship
13. Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – Foreign sponsorship
14. J&K People's Conference (JKPC) – Foreign sponsorship
15. J&K People's League, Rehmani Faction (JKPL-R) – Foreign sponsorship
16. J&K United People's League (JKUPL) – Foreign sponsorship
17. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) – Foreign sponsorship
18. Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) – Foreign sponsorship
19. Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Almi (JUMA) – Foreign sponsorship
20. Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference (KJHC) – Foreign sponsorship
21. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) – Foreign sponsorship

[1] All groups that are cited as having foreign sponsorship are those cited as having direct foreign sponsorship. Sourced from K. Santhanam et al, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003). The number of terrorist organizations with possible links with transnational terrorism can be extraordinarily large if the rest of India is to be included.

22. Mahaz-e-Azadi (MEA) – Foreign sponsorship

23. Muslim Conference (MC) – Foreign sponsorship

24. Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) – Foreign sponsorship

25. Muslim Mujahideen (MM) – Foreign sponsorship

26. Pasban-e-Islam (PEI)/ Hizbul Momineen (HMM) – Foreign linkages

27. Shora-e-Jihad (SEJ) – Foreign sponsorship

28. Tehrik-e-Jihad (TEJ) – Foreign sponsorship

29. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen (TUM) – Foreign sponsorship

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