

# ***US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE PLAN: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS***

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**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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



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**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE PLAN: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS**” submitted by **PANKAJ KUMAR** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is his own work and has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
**Prof. R.K. Jain**  
(Chairperson)

  
**Prof. Christopher S. Raj**  
(Supervisor)

To  
my grandma & parents

## PREFACE

President Bush's announcement in May 2001 of the deployment of National Missile Defence placed a new and important issue in the United States and abroad on the agenda of changing paradigm of security. Though the research and development programme on BMD started with the beginning of cold war, the NMD emerged against the new threat in the post cold war era.

For the first time such a huge technological infrastructure is being erected against so called 'rogue states' and non-states actors like terrorist, though star wars was against Soviet Union. The US NMD has potential to change the course of international relations in the world politics. It would lead to formation of new world order in security realm. It is seen as assertion of American hegemony.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, it was thought that multipolarity and multilateralism will prevail and world will become more stable and less dangerous. But US NMD has made the world more susceptible about security dynamics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. That's why NMD has invited vociferous reaction from the world actors.

The focus of the present study would be, origin, evolution and implications of the US NMD plan. While undertaking an in-depth study of the domestic debate on the issue, the response and possible consequences of the NMD plan would be critically evaluated.

The first chapter is an introductory one providing a brief description of the various project of the ballistic missile defence of the United States and how

it evolved. An attempt is also made to trace the debate in the United States since the beginning of the issue in mid 1940s.

The second chapter discusses the deliberations and discussions in the United States over various aspects of the NMD plan. Essentially, the questions that bothered the Americans over the years i.e., threat perception, technological feasibility, cost, importance of ABM Treaty etc. The debate would be examined at two levels: supportive participation in NMD and towards a parallel NMD.

The reaction from the world actors on the NMD plan has been dealt in the third chapter. The reaction of Russia, China and the US' transatlantic allies are broadly described in this chapter based on their apprehension about missile defence plan. However, the US effort to exorcise these countries for its ambitious plan is also discussed briefly in this chapter.

The fourth chapter has been titled "Implications of NMD Plan". Analysing the response of many heads of states towards NMD, an attempt has been made to focus on the fallout of the NMD plan. The apprehension of new arms race is the focus of this chapter. Also the repercussion on bilateral relations and international politics is broadly analysed.

In writing this work, I have mainly relied on secondary sources due to the contemporary nature of the topic. Regarding the treatment of the subject-matter, I have tried my best to be objective, but how far have I succeeded in my efforts, is left to the fair judgement of the readers.

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*Pankaj Kumar.*  
(Pankaj Kumar)

## ABBREVIATIONS

ARGMA	-	Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency
ARPA	-	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASAT	-	Anti Satellite
BMDO	-	Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation
BTL	-	Bell Telephone Laboratory
BuR	-	Bottom-up Review
CD	-	Conference on Disarmament
EKV	-	Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
GAO	-	General Accounting Office
GAPA	-	Ground –to – Air Pilotless Aircraft
HOE	-	Homing Overly Experiment
INF	-	Intermediate Range Nuclear Force
MIRV	-	Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle
NIE	-	National Intelligence Estimate
NWS	-	Nuclear Weapon Stated
SBI	-	Space Based Interceptor
SDS	-	Strategic Defence System
THAAD	-	Theater High Altitude Area Defence
UCS	-	Union of Concern Scientist

## CHAPTER - I

### ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE NMD

**“If you have a shield, it is easier to use the sword”**

*-Richard M. Nixon*

The concept of defence emerged along with the concept of state. To find an effective defence, all states have formulated different strategies since their evolution through the means of technology and good planning. In past years, city-states constructed thick walls and fortresses and considered themselves reasonably safe till better materials provided longer-range arrows and battering rams to make the defenders task difficult.

Every states' primary concern has been its national security and it has been one of the permanent feature of national interest. In the international system the Darwinian theory suits the best. Thus states always want to become powerful and protective so as to deter the enemy.

The American war of independence in 1776 and subsequently the adoption of a federal nature of political system was motivated to maintain the autonomy of these states and primarily to keep a central authority for states' paramount interest i.e. physical security. Thus security has been a permanent feature of the United States' national interest since her existence. The isolationist policy adopted by America in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and between two world war was inherently meant for its security concern. During the coldwar the US became what senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has dubbed “the National Security State”, with a vast standing army, a global intelligence

network, and a military industrial economic complex whose booming factories helped spur the post-war growth, transforming the industrial and political geography of America.

The economic prosperity of America after second world war and technological development symbolised by the success of Manhattan project made America a super power in economic and technological sphere. To maintain this superiority, formulation of a policy of national security became inevitable assisted by economic and technological developments. The pursuance of ballistic missile defence was a part of American National Security Policy in the presence of a new ideological adversary, communism led by the Soviet Union.

The origins of the US missile defence programme may be traced to the Nazi programme of world war II, which included plans for the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The search for defence against air attack began on September 8, 1944. When the first German A-4 (V-2) rocket landed in a Paris suburb.<sup>1</sup> In 1944 the Army contracted with General electric company for research and development on a long-range surface – to – surface missile and a high-altitude anti aircraft missile. The anti aircraft missile programme was project Thumper and the surface-to-surface programme was project Hermes. In 1945 the General Electric company's project Thumper studied possible defence against the V-2. The report concluded, that defence was beyond the scope of contemporary technology, the only adequate defence

was to prevent the launching of the rocket by destroying or capturing the launch site. The Herms project provided a wealth of scientific and technical data, used later for the United States ICBM and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) development programme. As a result of this programme was the initiation of high altitude and upper atmospheric research programme.

The Air force, like the army and Navy, gained a great deal of knowledge from the Hermes project and the V-2 firings. In 1945 the Air force and Boeing Aircraft company initiated the GAPA (Ground-to-Air Pilotless Aircraft) project. GAPA was a supersonic research vehicle using both rocket and ramjet propulsion. Later it was merged with GE's Thumper programme to develop the "collision intercept" method for destroying a ballistic missile.

In 1947 a document entitled "Operation Requirements for Guided Missile" relegated ICBM research to a priority below the development of missiles for air defence, jet fighters and bombers. The same year, on the strength of this reports' recommendations, the limited research and development funds available and the von Karman<sup>2</sup> survey – The ICBM project (MX-774), which was later to be revived as the ATLAS, the first US ICBM, was cancelled. Subsequently research on ICBM development was continued privately by the Convair Aircraft Division of General Dynamics, on whose initiative the effort was carried forward until it was revived in 1951 by the Air

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<sup>1</sup> Benson D. Adams. *Ballistic Missile Defence*, (New York: American Elsevir Publishing Co. Inc. 1971), p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Paul B. Stares, *The Militarization of Space*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.23.

Force as part of the National Security Council paper 68 (NSC 68) recommendations.<sup>3</sup>

The NSC 68 analysis of American security, played a central role in the American rearmament programme commencing in late 1949. This NSC analysis was initiated as a result of the communist takeover of China and the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb. NSC 68 concluded that by 1954 the Soviets would be capable of launching a devastating nuclear attack by bomber on the US. As a result of this assessment of the Soviets threat, the analysis recommended that certain measures be undertaken to strengthen the size and survivability of the US strategic retaliatory forces. One of the recommendations was to build an active air defence, to protect the bombers, provide warning of an attack, and provide means for countering a bomber attacks without resorting initially to nuclear retaliation.<sup>4</sup>

The commitment to strategic defence eventually precipitated a heated debate. The debate over air defence contained most of the same arguments later to be found in the debate over missile defence. The key participants in this debate were Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage, both members of the policy planning staff, of state Department.

In May 1953, in the early months of Eisenhower administration, Nitze and Savage flatly stated in a memorandum that continental defence had become “imperative”: “the survival of our Republic and the entire free world”

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<sup>3</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defence*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 47-53.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

depended upon it. They added, “the funds required now to accelerate the building of a more adequate continental defence are not impossibly great. The aim should be to begin a sustained effort... soon to reach a point at which we can measurably reduce the risk to the civil population of whole sale slaughter and to our mobilization base of virtually complete destruction”<sup>5</sup>.

Speculation as to what configuration a Ballistic missile Defence (BMD) system might assume was altered drastically in 1953 to 1955, as evidence of major Soviet activity in ICBM development accelerated the US ICBM programme and led to the initiation of a BMD programme. In November 1955 serious efforts at developing a missile defence system began, when the Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) undertook a feasibility study for the army on the problems and practicality of missile defence.

In 1956 the Bell Telephone study was completed under the direction of the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency (ARGMA). During the same year ARGMA issued Research and Development (R&D) contracts to Bell Telephone, Western Electric and Douglas for basic search on a BMD system. In 1957 the NIKE-ZEUS guided missile defence system project was established by the Ordinance Technical Committee, Headquarter US Army. The NIKE-ZEUS was a system of radars and interceptor missiles for high-altitude interception of incoming ballistic missiles.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Promise or Peril the Strategic Defence Initiative*, (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1986) p. VIII.

<sup>6</sup> Alexander Flax, *Ballistic Missile Defence: Concepts and History*, In *Weapons in Space* Vol. I: Concepts and Technologies, DAEDALUS, Spring 1985, p. 34.

Before research on ZEUS began, a political conflict arose between the Army and Air Force. To help ease the confusion and controversy associated with the decade-old American missile programme, Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson issued a directive on November 26, 1956 to the members of the Armed Forces policy council, entitled “Clarification of roles and missions to improve the effectiveness of operation of the Department of Defence”.<sup>7</sup> This directive attempted to clarify the responsibilities of and limitations on each service with regard to several matters, including guided missiles. Despite the directive, the conflict over the air and missile defence system of the Army (NIKE-HERCULES and ZEUS) and those of the Air Force (BOMARC and WIZARD) continued. By 1957 the BMD programme was a joint Army-Air Force effort which was monitored by the Anti-Ballistic Missile committee of the Department of Defence (DoD).

The test launch of an ICBM in August 1957 and the launch of sputnik I on October 4, 1957 into orbit by Soviet Union stated intense debate in America on strategic doctrine in the nuclear age and future ‘missile gap’. The launch of Sputnik reiterated Alsops prediction<sup>8</sup>. The Eisenhower Administration’s ‘massive retaliation’ strategy was questioned by many among the community of “defence intellectuals”. Scholars like Henry A. Kissinger and Robert E. Osgood, Rand Corporation analysts Albert Wohlstetter and Bernard Brodie, and some retired military men like former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D.

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<sup>7</sup> Adams, n.1, p.22.

<sup>8</sup> Richard A. Aliano, *American defence policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy*, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1975), pp. 160-61.

Taylor, were among those who participated in the public debate<sup>9</sup>. Many of them argued that American strategic nuclear superiority on which the “massive retaliation” strategy was based, had lost its credibility, with achievement of Soviet Union in missile and nuclear field.

Writing on security strategy Kissinger viewed that “The missile gap will therefore reduce substantially, perhaps completely, the threat of our retaliatory force against any challenge to our survival, except the most direct... it should provide increasing opportunities for the kind of blackmail of which the crisis over Berlin is but an augury”<sup>10</sup>.

In 1960 presidential election the ‘missile gap’ issue became the decisive factor to elect a new president. The mood of the voters across the country indicated that concern with declining prestige abroad and the missile gap at home accounted for the uneasiness over the nation’s future<sup>11</sup>. Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy politically exploited the voters sentiment and dubbed Republicans of downplaying the threat posed by Soviet Union. However, in a television campaign speech President Eisenhower asserted that American military might was unassailable, discounted the significance of any transient missile gap... he charged that the Democrats had cruelly distorted the image of America abroad<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Christopher S. Raj, *American military in Europe: controversy over NATO burden sharing*, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983), p. 80.

<sup>10</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *The necessity for choice: Prospect of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960) pp. 36-37.

<sup>11</sup> Theodore H. White, *The making of the President 1960*, (New York: Adenium Publishers, 1961), pp. 319-20.

<sup>12</sup> Aliano, n. 8, pp. 40-43.

After winning the election the new Kennedy administration moved away from the 'new look strategy' of previous administration and adopted a 'flexible response'. The new strategy was based on the view that the US should be prepared to respond in a variety of ways across the conflict spectrum<sup>13</sup>.

In the introductory note to NSC 5814/1, "US policy on outer space" on June 20, 1958, depicted the superiority of Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States by explaining that "perhaps the starkest facts which confront the United States in the immediate and foreseeable future are (i) the USSR has surpassed the United States and the free world in scientific and technological accomplishments in outer space, which have captured the imagination and admiration of the world; (2) the USSR, if it maintains its present superiority in the exploration of outerspace, will be able to use that superiority as a means of undermining the prestige and leadership of the United States; and (3) the USSR, if it should be the first to achieve a significantly superior military capability in outerspace, could create a imbalance of power in favour of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and pose a direct military threat to US security". The introductory note of NSC 5814/1 further states "The security of the United States requires that we meet these challenges with resourcefulness and vigour".<sup>14</sup>

In the state of Union address of the President in January 1958, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which was a part of Director of Defence

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<sup>13</sup> Sam C. Sarkesian & Robert A Vitas, US national security policy and strategy: Documents and Policy Proposal, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 79.

<sup>14</sup> Stares, n.2, p.38.

Research and Engineering (DDR & E) was created to direct all BMD and satellite development efforts.<sup>15</sup>

Earlier on November 7, 1957 President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that we had created a post of special assistant to the president for science and technology. On the next day the DOD authorised the Army's satellite programme – Now known as Explorer - to be back-up Vanguard project, thus revising the guidelines set out in NSC 5520. After a disastrous and embarrassing Vanguard test failure in December, Explorer I using a modified Redstone missile (Jupiter C) eventually became the first successfully launched US satellite on 31 January 1958.

However, the rivalry between Air Force and Army over the leadership of BMD continued without any unwarranted duplication by both services under ARPA's direction. But in January 1958 the WIZARD (The Air Force's area defence BMD) programme of Air Force was halted and Army was given sole responsibility to develop the BMD.<sup>16</sup>

The skifter committee appointed in 1960 evaluated the technical feasibility of ZEUS in the context of determining the undertaking of its production. However, the administration while questioning the possibility of a workable defence, refused to allow additional money on the ground that the system was not ready for deployment yet.

The policy of funding missile defence research and development, but not approving deployment and production, was a consistent pattern of US missile

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<sup>15</sup> Adams, n.1, p.23.

defence policy until September 1967. This dual policy points up to the policymaker's dilemma.

A major difficulty of ZEUS deployment was its great cost since the services had no additional funds, the administration required to raise the defence budget and so a temporary freeze on Fiscal 1961 spending for ZEUS was announced in February while the administration re-examined the programme's research and development requirements.

The likelihood of deployment of ZEUS received a set back in early 1960 as a result of project defender's GLIPAR programme, which involved the investigation and testing of all novel and extreme ideas for missile defence.

The victory of a Democratic president after Eisenhower gave impetus to a through - going examination of US defence policies. NIKE-ZEUS, a centre of controversy since its inception, was one of the items considered. The nuclear test in September 1961 by Soviet Union given a major blow to the US policy makers. The implication of the soviet test for the perfection of BMD compelled the US to resume its own atmospheric nuclear testing programme in order not to fall behind the Soviets in BMD".

#### **NIKE-X**

After NIKE-ZEUS missile achieved the first successful interception of a dummy ICBM warhead in July 1962, the Army pushed for the deployment of a national missile defence system. Secretary of Defence Robert Mc Namara resisted such a deployment and was responsible for seeing that any decision to

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

deploy missile defences was made in the broader context of strategic nuclear deterrence.<sup>17</sup> Since the effort to development a BMD was not being abandoned, NIKE-X was chosen as an alternative, and meanwhile ZEUS testing and project defender were continued.<sup>18</sup>

The NIKE-X programme incorporated three major advances: a phased-array, electronically guided radar; a new short-range nuclear tipped interceptor called Sprint, and an upgraded NIKE-ZEUS missile renamed Spartan.

From 1963 to 1967 development work proceeded on NIKE-X and studies were made to evaluate the capability of the system:

Before the House Armed services committee on January 29, 1964, McNamara discussed the NIKE-X system.

... the continued testing of NIKE-ZEUS and preliminary studies of NIKE-X system's characteristic and effectiveness provided grounds for believing that the technical problems of at least a partial defence against a ballistic missile attack may be solved within the next several years.<sup>19</sup>

By this time opposition to missile defence began in America. Opposition to BMD stems from a belief that the consequences of its deployment, or even existence, would lead to an escalation of the arms race and that it represents a

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<sup>17</sup> House Document, no. 155, 88<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, US Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, A compilation of Material Relating to United States Defence Policies (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1962), p. 48, as cited in n. 1, p.55.

<sup>18</sup> US House, 88<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, (No.4), (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1963), p. 324, as cited in n.1, pp. 55-56.

<sup>19</sup> US House, 88<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, (No.36), (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1964), p. 7016, as cited in n.1, p.85.

frightful waste of money, which could be spent more appropriately on domestic needs. Further, its presence would provide no more security than is now available with offensive weapons. To BMD opponent this weapons represents a destabilizing and provocative threat.

However, the NIKE-X system was still not deployed. Secretary McNamara said that in the past year United States missile defence system had improved greatly with respect to cost and effectiveness and to alternative forms of deployment. While system development had progressed satisfactorily, many technical problems still remained to be solved. Therefore, he suggested that it was premature to make any commitment to production and deployment.<sup>20</sup>

In 1965 the United States was increasingly concerned with the effect a BMD might have on the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, NIKE-X continued its technical progress. As early as the fall of 1965, evidences were accumulating that the development and deployment of NIKE-X would be competing with the cost of the Vietnam war. The financial burden of war, needed the rejection of production of long lead-time items for NIKE-X. However evidence was accumulating that the Soviets were deploying a BMD and their ICBM force was being increased. BMD proponents felt that, aside from these threats, technical progress was being made at such a rate that operational deployment

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<sup>20</sup> US House Senate, 89<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Department of Defence, DoD appropriations FY 1966, part I (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1965), p. 67, as cited in n.1, p.110.

of NIKE-X could not but help to spur further BMD developments and breakthroughs.<sup>21</sup>

After the Chinese nuclear test the deployment of BMD was expected against a future Chinese missile threat but the tussle within and outside the government continued over the deployment of NIKE-X.

Till the end of 1966 the government's stand on deploying NIKE-X remained unchanged, however debate continued in the new circumstances of arms race as Soviet Union embarked on BMD and the US started enhancing its offensive capability. The decision was rationalized by authenticity of offensive security and the rising cost of Vietnam war.<sup>22</sup>

In his state of the Union message in January 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a decision to seek an accord with the Soviets to halt BMD deployment. The message implied that the United States would defer any missile defence deployment decisions, hoping the Soviets would slow down or halt their deployment and engage in BMD limitation talks. At the Glassboro summit of June 1967, President Lyndon Johnson and McNamara could not convince the Soviets to stop their deployment. Hence, the deployment of BMD became the need of the hour.

Recognising that the US could not stop an all out attack by Soviet ICBM, the Johnson administration elected to proceed with a their anti - ballistic umbrella designed to protect major cities. When secretary of Defence

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<sup>21</sup> Adams, n.1, pp. 117-18.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 123-40.

McNamara announced the plan<sup>23</sup> on September 18, 1967, he made two points that have become part of the current debate of 21<sup>st</sup> century U.S. National Missile Defence: (i) attempts to deploy a comprehensive Anti Ballistic Missile System will only fuel the offensive missile race; and (2) what is needed is enough of an umbrella to counter very limited threat such as that posed by the small communist Chinese ICBM fleet.

### **SENTINEL and SAFEGUARD**

NIKE-X was superseded by Sentinel in 1967. As Sentinel programme proceeded towards deployments, public realization that the proposed sites, including some in urban areas, would have numerous missile with nuclear war heads, stirred strong opposition.

The sentinel system was an area defence weapon that could function over a wide area against a light or unsophisticated attack of the kind the Chinese could be capable of handling by 1975. For the president, political, economic, strategic and psychological benefits of deploying BMD made Sentinel a logical political choice.

Richard Nixon's victory in the 1968 presidential election, initiated a review of US strategic requirements. Based on this review, Nixon refocused the US missile defence deployment so that the system would primarily protect US deterrent forces and renamed the system 'safeguard'.<sup>24</sup> The Safeguard system was comprised of the same missile and radar components as Sentinel, but was

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 165-75.

<sup>24</sup> Tara Kartha, "Ballistic Missile Defence: The Debate in the United States", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIV, no.1, April 2000, p.70.

to be deployed in different numbers and locations. The first priority for the deployment was the protection of US nuclear forces against a Soviet attack; the second priority was the provision of a nationwide defence against a “hypothetical”<sup>25</sup> Chinese attack. A subsidiary role was defence against accidental attack from any source.

In August 1969 the Senate approved initial deployment on a tie vote broken by the vice president. Critics of the programme attributed the vote to two still familiar reasons:

- 1) US approval to move ahead might be useful card to have in the upcoming talks on limiting offensive systems [at the time the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)] and
- 2) With the Soviets already well along with their own ABM system, no one wanted to be soft on defence. Furthermore, the new administration, like its predecessor, justified the light ABM deployment as a means of preventing the Chinese from ever using their emergent ICBM force to blackmail the US.

In November 1969 about five months after president Nixon had invited the Soviet Union to discuss reductions in strategic arms, the first round of SALT began. A little over two years later these talks produced the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) of 1972, which radically changed safeguard deployment plans. The treaty limited the US and Soviet Union to two missile defence sites, each one having no more than one hundred interceptors. This

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<sup>25</sup> Alexander Flax, n. 6, p. 63.

treaty was modified by a 1974 protocol that reduced to one the number of sites either treaty signatory could deploy.<sup>26</sup> The Soviets elected to defend Moscow with their nuclear tipped Galosh system while the US opted to defend the Minuteman missile site around Grand Forks, North Dakota. On October 1, 1975 the Grand Forks site became operational. The next day, the House of representatives voted to close the system down because the Soviet programme to put Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) on their missiles meant that Safeguard would be easily overwhelmed. Further more it was finally recognized that the radars that were part of the system would be blinded by the electromagnetic pulse from explosion of nuclear warheads on the Safeguard interceptors. The Senate concurred with the House action in November, and the February 1976 the system went into caretaker status after only four months of operation. Except for its supporting radar, safeguard was closed completely in 1978. From 1976 until the early 1980s, the principle objective of the Army's missile defence programme was to develop interceptors that did not require nuclear warheads. By the early 1980s, the Army had succeeded in developing the sensor and guidance technologies that would allow a defensive missile to destroy an attacking warhead by physically colliding with it. In June 1984, the Army demonstrated this capability in the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE).

While the Army was developing its hit to kill interceptor technology, the Soviets were improving their offensive missile capabilities inspite of the fact that the US was defenceless against already existing Soviet missiles. By the

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<sup>26</sup> Kalpana Chittaranjan, "The ABM Treaty and US NMD", *Strategic Analysis*,

early eighties, a number of strategic analysts had begun to worry that the Soviet had achieved a first strike capability that would allow them to cripple US strategic forces and still retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy America's cities.<sup>27</sup> This situation led the joint chiefs of staff in February 1983 to recommend to President Ronald Reagan that the US must begin to place great emphasis on its strategic plans on developing missile defence.

Having come to office favourably disposed toward strategic defences, president Reagan was highly receptive to this recommendation from the joint chiefs. In a nationally televised speech on 23 March 1983, the president Regan delivered his so called "star wars" speech, calling for a national effort to move from a strategic deterrence policy based on defensive system.<sup>28</sup> The 'star wars' speech caught almost everybody by surprise, including those most closely associated with the existing BMD research effort. Infact the president speech was originally started out to be a speech the defence budget designed to support his FY 84 defence request.<sup>29</sup> Behind his 'star wars' speech on many scholars say, one notable influence was his movie career, especially "Murder in the Air" with its remarkable foreshadowing of star wars weaponry.<sup>30</sup> In April 1984, following a year of strategic studies to determine how best to pursue the

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Vol. XXII, no.2, May 1998, pp.209-11.

<sup>27</sup> Robert W. Helm, *The Strategic Defence Initiative: its Genesis and Transformation* In the *Strategic Defence Initiative: an International Perspective* by C. James Hang, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 1-15.

<sup>28</sup> Ronald Reagan, *Launching the SDI* In Brezezinski ed. *Promise or Peril* (Washington, Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), pp. 47-50.

<sup>29</sup> Robert, n.22, p.1

<sup>30</sup> Phillip M. Boffey, William J. Broad & Others, *Claiming the Heavens*, (New York, The New York Times, 1988), p.4.

president's goal, the Defence Department established the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) organisation. This organisation was to carry out the SDI programme of research and development (R&D) to resolve the feasibility issue. In 1985 the Pentagon's SDI organisation proposed a multilayered, space based system to defend 3500 targets against Soviet missiles. The SDI was not just about protecting the American homeland, but also about such diverse issues like alliance politics and maintaining American position as number one in the technological sphere. The SDI reassured the Europeans that they would not be left out of this strategy while on the domestic front the president succeeded in eroding both the platform of the right and the Democratic left. In the next elections Reagan was re-elected in a landslide victory and Gorbachev emerged as the leader of the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup>

The Reagan administration had threatened to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty by executive fiat, a move that was opposed by the Senate energetically. Subsequently the Sam Nunn (D-GA) review was an important milestone in legislative procedures, since the Senate's victory with the Biden resolution made clear that any arms control treaty would have to be considered by the Senate. This was to limit the effort of later administrations to do the reverse, that is to centralise ABM treaty rather than sideline it.<sup>32</sup>

After two and half years of R&D, at the end of 1986 the president and Secretary of Defence decided to enter a missile defence system into the defence acquisition process. This led to the approval in September 1987 of the

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<sup>31</sup> Tara, n.19, p.73.

Strategic Defence System (SDS) phase I Architecture, which comprised six major subsystems; a space – based interceptor (SBI), a ground – based interceptor, a ground – based sensor, two space-based sensors and a battle management system. This architecture provided a structure, to guide further refinement of missile defence components, that would in-turn be integrated into and improve the architecture through a repetitive process.

In late eighties it was realised that Soviet threat was diminishing due to the launch of Perestroika and Glasnost by the more liberal Soviet president Gorbachev, the INF treaty and the reduction of forces in Europe. By this time the strategic relationship between the US and Soviet Union had begun to change radically. In November 1989, the East Germans, with support from Soviet President opened the Berlin wall. This was a sign that the Soviet empire was crumbling and the cold war was ending. It was also in late 1989 that the administration of president George Bush initiated a review of the SDI programme as part of a broader examination of US strategic requirements for a new world order that was thought to be emerging. The review was completed in March 1990 by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, who since 1987 had served as America's chief negotiator at the Defence and space talks in Geneva. Cooper noted that as the cold war waned, the most important threat to the US would be from unauthorised or terrorist attack by limited numbers of missiles. Additionally, the ambassador noted, deployed US forces would face increasing threats from shorter-ranged theater missile as the technology of ballistic

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<sup>32</sup> *ibid.* pp. 73-74.

missiles and weapons of mass destructions proliferated. To prepare for these new realities, Cooper recommended that the SDI programme be transformed to concentrate on developing defences against limited attacks rather than preparing for an attack by thousands of Soviet warheads. When Cooper became the third director of the SDIO in July 1990, he worked to implement his own recommendations.

Cooper's report proved prophetic. In August 1990, Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait, and in January 1991, the US and its allies initiated operation Desert Storm against Iraq. Iraq responded with attack by scud missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. This missile attacks led to a major milestone in military history; the first operational engagement between a ballistic missile (scud) and missile defence system (patriot). The dire nature of the threat now posed by theatre missiles was graphically illustrated on 25<sup>th</sup> February 1991 when a scud missile struck a billeting facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 American and injuring another 100.<sup>33</sup>

Responding to this change in the ballistic missile threat, on 29 January 1991, president Bush announced that he was ordering the Defence Department to refocus the SDI programme from its emphasis on defending against a massive Soviet missile attack (SDS phase I) to a system known as GPALS for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. There were three main components to the new system: a ground-based National Missile Defence (NMD), a ground

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<sup>33</sup> Michael O' Hanlon, "Star wars strikes back," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, no.6, November – December 1999, p.69.

– and sea – based Theater Missile Defence (TMD) and a space based Global Defence.


The shift toward, TMD and limited national defences started under GPALS continued under Clinton administration. Given this new direction, the name Strategic Defence Initiative was too narrow. As a result, Les Aspin, president Clinton's first Secretary of Defence changed the agency's name from SDIO to Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO).

The months before announcing the name change, Aspin had initiated a major review of America's post cold war defence requirements, known as the Bottom-up Review (BUR). This study laid out a three fold missile defence programme – (i) theatre missile defence programme (ii) national missile defence programme (iii) a five year technology programme that was to produce advances, applicable to both national and theater defences.

President Clinton was not supportive of the deployment of the NMD system, rather he confined this programme only to research and development. Moreover NMD was viewed as primarily a party political issue, pitching the White House against the Republican – dominated Congress. In 1995 Congress passed legislation mandating the deployment of a NMD system by 2003. But Clinton promptly vetoed the resolution, arguing sensibly that there was no immediate threat to justify such a move. But the Republications continued to pressure the White House. The Clinton administration responded to Republican pressure during the election year of 1996 by announcing a 3+3 programme for NMD. This envisioned three years of research followed by

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decision to deploy within another three years if justified by the threat. A significant aspect of the Republican strategy was to criticize official assessments for underplaying the threat. A notable target was National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19 of November 1995, entitled 'Emerging Missile Threat to North America.' This concluded that 'no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada.'<sup>34</sup> However an independent Commission was established under former Secretary of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld to evaluate the threat missile posed to America. In its 15 July 1998 report the Rumsfeld commission concluded that "concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missile with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the united states, its deployed forces and its friend and allies."<sup>35</sup> Almost as if cued by the Rumsfeld report, the Iranian flight tested their medium ranged Shahab – 3 missile on 21 July. This was followed by a North Korean test of its Taepo Dong – I missile on 31<sup>st</sup> August. This second test was especially troubling, for the North Koreans demonstrated important capabilities associated with ICBMs, including staging and the use of a third stage on the missile.

The stakes rose again in 1999, when the Clinton administration added \$ 6.6 billion for deployment to its missile – defence plan. Clinton submitted his

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<sup>34</sup> NIE November 1995, report available at [http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdoes/nie\\_9519.htm](http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdoes/nie_9519.htm)

<sup>35</sup> See executive summary of the Report of Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the US, 15 July 1998,

missile defence budget to congress in February 1999. Overwhelming majorities of both houses responded with a bill declaring it US policy to deploy a national missile defence as soon as it is “technologically feasible.”<sup>36</sup> The target date for deployment was shifted from 2003 to 2005 to reduce programme risk partially in response to the ‘rush to failure’ warning of the Welch report in 1998.<sup>37</sup>

Under president Bill Clinton, the NMD system would be a fixed, land based non-nuclear defence system with a space-based, defence system, consisting of five elements:<sup>38</sup>

- Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs)
- Battle Management, Command, Control and Communication (BMC3), which includes, (a) Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) and (b) In-flight Interceptor Communication System (IFICS)
- X-Band Radars (XBRs)
- Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs)
- Defence Support Programme Satellites / Space – Based Infra Red System (SBIRs)

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<sup>36</sup> [www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.htm).  
See National Missile Defence Act of 1999 –  
[http://thomas.loc.gov/gibin/gpo/http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cagibin/getgo.c.cgi?dbname=106\\_cong\\_public\\_lane\\_k docid=f:pub 1038.106. pdf](http://thomas.loc.gov/gibin/gpo/http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cagibin/getgo.c.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_lane_k docid=f:pub 1038.106. pdf).

<sup>37</sup> Craig Cerniello, “Cohen announces NMD restricting, funding, boost” *Arms Control Today*, January – February 1999, p.20.

<sup>38</sup> Dean. A. Wilkening, “Amending the ABM Treaty” *Survival*, Vol. 42, no.1, spring 2000, pp.30-31

The Central feature of the proposed system would be an “exoatmospheric kill vehicle” (EKV) that is designed to be carried atop a rocket which then guides itself to a collision with an incoming warhead. Clinton’s NMD architecture was set to grow in four steps: from an initial 20 missile interceptors in 2005 to much larger system by 2011. On completion, the shield would require at least two launching sites, three command centres, five communication relay stations, 15 radars, 29 satellite, 250 underground silos and 250 missile interceptors. It would be based in Hawaii, Alaska, California, Colorado, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Greenland, Britain and possibly Maine Japan and South Korea were the possible Asian sites for two radars. It would have cost a minimum of \$60 billion.<sup>39</sup>

At a speech at Georgetown university on September 1, 2000, president Clinton stated that he did not believe that the technology was yet ready for an effective national defence system and passed the decision to deploy an NMD to his successor. He stated, “we have made progress, but we shouldn’t move forward until we have absolute confidence the system will work.”<sup>40</sup>

In 2000 presidential election, Republican candidate George W. Bush made clear during his campaign that he intended to build a missile defence system, and that his administration would not be bound by an obsolete ABM Treaty. Bush clearly outlined some of his preferences regarding NMD option for the US. “First, America must build effective missile defences, based on the

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<sup>39</sup> Kalpana Chittaranjan, “A Russian Perspective of the START process and NMD” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, no.5, August 2001, pp 679-80.

<sup>40</sup> *The New York Times*, September 2, 2000.

best available options, at the earliest possible date. Our missile defence must be designed to protect all 50 states – and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas – from missile attack by rogue nations or accidental launches ... The Clinton administration first denied the need for a national missile defence system. Then it delayed. Now the approach it proposes is flawed - a system initially based on a single site, when experts say that more is needed”.<sup>41</sup>

The deployment of a missile defence system is, however, top priority for Bush administration, thus fulfilling his election campaign promise.

In a speech at National Defence University (NDU) May 1, 2001, president Bush announced his intention to develop a new strategic frame work, that would involve deploying missile defence and reducing the US nuclear arsenal.

The president maintained that the world now is ‘vastly different’ from 1972 when the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty entered into force holding that more countries either have or are seeking nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, leaving the US vulnerable to attack or blackmail. Bush contended that in this new world, “deterrence is no longer enough” and that the United States would have to “move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM Treaty” and build missile defences to protect itself.<sup>42</sup>

President Bush served formal six month advance notification to Russia in December 2001 as required under Article XV of the treaty that Washington

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<sup>41</sup> *The Washington Times*, May 25, 2000.

<sup>42</sup> President Bush’s Speech on nuclear strategy: A response from senior Democrats, *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 31, no. 5, June 2000, pp. 29-30.

was withdrawing from the ABM treaty in order to deploy a National Missile Defence. Mr. Bush said, “I have concluded that the ABM treaty hinders our Government’s ability to develop way to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.”

He adds that “Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander – in – chief and I can’t and will not allow the US to remain in a treaty that prevent us from developing effective defences. The old doctrine is no longer valid in light of the new friendly relations with Russia, when the threat comes not from each other but from rogue states which may attack with missile”.<sup>43</sup>

The president also said that September 11 terrorist attack made his cause more urgent. By dropping the ABM Treaty, the administration has opened the way not only for testing missile defences but also for acting on them unilaterally.

Analysts attribute a variety of reasons for the US withdrawal from ABM treaty. Ranging from its search for absolute security to the possible inception of a new strategic order in the post – cold war era. Washington might also have been prompted to trash the ABM treaty more for economic reasons<sup>44</sup> rather than political ones. America’s military industrial complex has been bored with inactivity for almost a decade now. The NMD with its initial stage costing \$ 60 billion and deployment touching \$ 320 billion, provides these hi-tech industries

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<sup>43</sup> *The Hindu*, December 14, 2001.

<sup>44</sup> Bernd W. Kubbig, “Regional perspective: Europe”, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, (California), *Occasional Paper – 5*, March 2001, p. 44.

with a unique opportunity to grab lucrative orders. This is paradoxical since the United States DoD has already spent more than \$ 60 billion on NMD research in the last 20 years and there is not much to show for it. Another reason behind withdrawal is that the US BMD research and development programme has reached a stages where further development trial would have violated the ABM treaty.

In February 2002 president Bush presented his \$ 2.13 billion spending plan for 2003 which included a 14% increase in the defence budget, the highest rise since Ronald Reagan, as well as doubling of spending on homeland security.<sup>45</sup> The budget came in the background of September 11 terrorist attacks on America and presidential Bush declaration of war against terrorism. By keeping overall government spending outside defence and homeland security to a 2% rise next year, Mr. Bush has proposed a dramatic shift in America's spending priorities.

So far the United States has conducted six Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs) of NMD technologies in which four have proved successful and over a dozen additional flight tests have been planned for validation. Though a nascent NMD could be positioned by 2004/2005 a fully operational, expanded system is unlikely to be ready before the next decade.

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<sup>45</sup> *The Economist*, Vol. 362, no. 8259, February 9, 2002.

## CHAPTER - II

### DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE NMD

Officials and analysts have spent more than 30 years debating whether and how the United States should defend itself against long-range ballistic missile threat. This debate has neither been simply academic nor inexpensive. Since President Reagan's 1983 vision of a global defense shield, Congress has appropriated more than \$50 billion directly to the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) programme in the hopes of fielding systems capable of countering ballistic missiles armed with mass destruction warheads. Many more billions of defence dollars have contributed indirectly to the BMD effort.

The vote over NMD may well hinge on ideological and partisan groups. The debate itself, with considerable discussion over substantive issues, is likely to be of secondary importance. For the most part, conservatives and some moderates view the deployment of ballistic missile defence to defend the United States as a singular, defining difference between the two major political parties. Such a difference demonstrates the degree to which the parties will commit scarce budget resources to a key national security concern. Many conservatives point out that most Americans believe they are defended against ballistic missile attack, and when told otherwise, the public expresses support for NMD because 'rogue states' may be able to attack the nation with ballistic missiles. In contrast, liberals and other moderates note that NMD is not needed now because the United States faces no long-range ballistic missile threats. The

key difference between the political parties on NMD issue and its importance was demonstrated in the 2000 presidential election.

Another aspect of this debate is the degree to which decision makers and analysts stress NMD in an overall national strategy to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This overall strategy includes a broad range of arms control agreements and negotiations export control laws and military deterrence. More often than not, the strongest NMD advocates place less emphasis or value on these other “counter proliferation” tools. Others seek a balance for an ABM treaty, which should also take care of BMD development coupled with strong advocacy of each of these tools.

Today, even the most stringent opponents of BMD programme accept that some sort of defence effort would continue for the foreseeable future. It appears that the BMD debate has reached a stage of maturity, with both side hardening and clarifying their stances, and poised for the next round of ‘when’ rather than the ‘why’ of defences. The fact that Democrat and Republicans are poised at either end of the defence debate is well known. But there are clearly other actors – pentagon, the analysts, the scientists and other’s whose input has been significant.

President Ronald Reagan called for anti ballistic missile defence system 1983, yet its advocates are fuming that after 19 years and spending over \$50 billion later they still don’t have their beloved “star wars” system. Star war promoters simply can’t reconcile themselves with the fact that the United states

is not currently capable of building an effective NMD system, despite spending \$4 billion a year. In response the Pentagon has repeatedly plead for patience and has argued that the current policy of allowing the technology to progress until a viable threat emerges is inadequate. In the most recent attempt to foist expensive missile defences on the American public, Sen Thad Cochran, a Mississippi Republican, introduced legislation, S 1973, that calls for deploying “as soon as technologically possible” effective NMD system, subject to the authorization and appropriation process.<sup>1</sup>

The fact, that only Russia and China have ballistic missile with sufficient range to strike any where in the United States. Defending against an attack from Moscow or Beijing, however, is not the motivation behind Cochran’s plan. To offset China and Russia, ICBMs, the US continues to rely on its own deterrence capability while working to reduce the number of ICBMs aimed at it through international agreement Legislation S 1873 argue that the long range ballistic missile threat to the US is increasing from potential adversaries in the developing world. It cites several heads of states such as Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussain as a threat because they have stated their intention to acquire ICBM capable of attacking the US.

In contrast to the debate over ballistic missile defence in the 1950s and 1960s, NMD is now a highly partisan issue. It has been so since president Reagan’s star wars speech in 1983, reinforced over the years by its inclusion in

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<sup>1</sup> Tara Kartha, “Ballistic Missile Defences: The Debate in the United States”, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIV, no.1, April 2000, p. 82.

Newt Gingrich's contract for America and in the quadrennial Republican presidential platform. Under current president Bush, the partisanship of NMD has been joined by two new trends. First, arms control in general has been under continuous attack, mostly from conservative Republicans, with the refrain being that the US honour its legal commitments while other cheat. Second, international treaties in general have been denounced by radical conservatives, some of whom now hold key position in the Bush administration, who argue that the US must remain free to act in its own interests, in light of its 'exceptionalist' status. In the aftermath of September 11, these positions are currently muted but still lay beneath the surface. When Senate Democrats withdraw their challenges to Bush initial BMD funding proposals in the weeks following the terror attack, the differences were only deferred not conceded.

These factors and trends make for a volatile mix sometime in the future, not withstanding the support of the coalition against the immediate and continuing need for bipartisanship in support the coalition against international terrorism.

The Bush administration now robustly pursuing the BMD agenda in a world full of uneasiness about US missile-defence plans. There were doubts at home and abroad about Clinton's intention to move some what more slowly towards very limited missile defence, whose components would be ground – based interceptors in a configuration that was largely treaty compliant. The

new terms of the missile defence debate have been set by the administration in accordance with the convenience.

### **Nature of threat**

An assessment of the desirability and feasibility of missile defence must begin with the nature of the threat posed by missile to the United States, its allies and its military forces deployed overseas. There are two classes of threat that concern the United States. The first class of threat inmates from North Korea, Iraq, Iran and other possible 'rogue' states. The ballistic missile fielded by such countries have ranges less than 600 kilometer, and may pose a threat to US allies and military forces.

The second class of threat is the possibility that a small number of Russian missiles might be launched at the United States accidentally or without authorization. The US might also wish to defend against deliberate attacks from China, which would involve a small number of missiles.

A third class of threat, a deliberate attack by Russia which is unlikely.

During the cold war, the United States was threatened by the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal. That arsenal was often regarded as ruthless, expansionist coldly indifferent to the sufferings of their own citizens and subject to the unfathomable machinations of Kremlin politics. The primary concern today, however, is not a heavily armed superpower rival but hypothetical capabilities that small or medium powers might acquire at some unknown point in the future.

The improved strategic relationship between the US and Russia makes a new dialogue over missile defence possible. The rising threat that the ballistic missile programmes of other states pose potential threat to the United States which necessitate US and Russia to engage each other into negotiations.

Through the mid- 1990s, the official view of the US intelligence community as summarized in periodic National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), down-played any new missile threat to the United States. For example, the Nov – 1995 NIE noted that North Korea was developing a missile that might be able to strike portions of Alaska and the far western portion of the Hawaiian island chain, but it regarded North Korea as ‘unlikely to obtain the technological capability to develop a longer range ICBM’. The NIE gave even less credence to fears of a long range missile threat from Iran or Iraq: “Ballistic missile programmes of other countries are focused on regional concerns’. Finally, the NIE argued that the US would be likely to detect any indigenous long-range ballistic missile programme many years before deployment.<sup>2</sup>

The intelligence community’s relatively benign assessment of the long-range ballistic missile threat proved controversial. A General Accounting Office report charged the Nov-1995 NIE with having ‘overstated’ its evidence.<sup>3</sup> NMD proponents used the controversy to push through legislation creating the bipartisan commission to assess the Ballistic missile threat to the United States,

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<sup>2</sup> DCI National Intelligence Estimate, president summary, “Emerging Missile Threat to North America During the Next 15 years” November 1995, PS/NIE 95-19 at [http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie\\_9519.htm](http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie_9519.htm).

<sup>3</sup> US General Accounting Office, “Foreign Missile Threat: Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates”, August 1996, GAO/NSIAD – 96-225, at

known as Rumsfeld commission. It concluded in July 1998 that “the threat to the US posed by these emerging (missile) technologies is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and report by the intelligence community”. As a result, North Korea or Iran ‘would be able to inflict major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability’ and ‘the US might will have little or no warning before operational deployment’.<sup>4</sup>

North Korea’s surprise test of a long-range version of its Taepo-dong – 1 missile in August 1998 proved the Rumsfeld commission’s case. It indicated that North Korea was developing the ability to build multi-stage missile capable of traveling intercontinental distances. Faced with a far greater threat materializing much earlier than anticipated, the Clinton administration moved on the diplomatic front to dissuade Pyongyang from testing a follow – on missile system, the Taepo-dong – 2. After the US agreed in September 1999 to lift some of the economic sanctions it had imposed half a century earlier, North Korea announced it would halt its missile test ‘while the talks are underway’.<sup>5</sup>

Satellite pictures as a North Korea missile site by private institutions<sup>6</sup> revealed capabilities were no where close to what was claimed by the CIA. This resulted in apparent embarrassment, with James Rubin, the Assistant Secretary of State, contending that the threat – while not a sophisticated one,

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<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/gao/nie 96225.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Executive Summary of the report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the US at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nie99msl.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> *Washington Post*, 25 September 1999.

nonetheless existed. He also emphasized the administration's policy of negotiating a North Korea moratorium on test.<sup>7</sup>

The opponents of the missile defence system argue that if a tangible threat really existed, there might be reason to run the programme high speed but it can also lead to high technology risks. But as if with a single voice, the top professionals in the US intelligence community- Robert Walpole, President Clinton's National Intelligence Officer for strategic and nuclear programme; George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; vice admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency and J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research – say that an ICBM is the least likely means by which a rogue state would attack the US homeland.<sup>8</sup> Former defence secretary William J. Perry adds that the United States has enough capabilities to destroy a hostile nation's launch sites, storage site and production facilities with its long-range, precision guided, conventionally armed weapons. Therefore, no hostile nation could rule out the possibility that the US would strike back if attacked.<sup>9</sup>

News commentary at Union of Concern Scientist (UCS) by Tom Z. Collina views the key reason defenses would fail as “real world targets will not cooperate. Effective countermeasures to thwart the proposed defence can be

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<sup>6</sup> The Satellite photograph were put by Federation of American Scientist. See Website at [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org).

<sup>7</sup> Daily Press Briefing, US department of State, January 12, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> “National Missile Defence – Just Say No” CDI, vol. 4, Issue # 7, February 17, 2000 at [www.cdi.org](http://www.cdi.org).

<sup>9</sup> William J. Perry, “Preparing for the next attack”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.6, November/December 2001, p.35.

cheap and use simple technology – much simpler than the technology required to built a long-range missile in the first place”.<sup>10</sup>

However, none of the traditional ‘rogue’ nations currently possesses missile with ranges capable of reaching the US. According to state department officials, “only North Korea could essentially threaten the United States homeland with ballistic missile in this decade, and only if it abandons its current moratorium on the long range missile flight test.”<sup>11</sup> Moreover the National Intelligence Agencies believe that the most likely security challenges facing the US will come from non state actors using conventional weapon and short range systems. They would employ “bullets and bombs” delivered by truck (as at the World Trade Center in New York in 1993), Aeroplanes as missile (in the case of WTC twin tower 2001), boats (as with the USS Cole in 2000), the post office (as with package bombs), or even by hand (as with the Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995). As acting Assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research Thomas Finger has noted, these “unconventional threat probably post a more immediate danger to Americans than do foreign armies, nuclear weapons, long range missiles, or the proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and delivery system.”<sup>12</sup>

For nuclear weapons, which can’t be subdivided, the attacker can use other strategies. For example above the atmosphere, where national missile

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<sup>10</sup> Tom Z. Collina, “National Missile Defence’s Foolish Rebirth. Star wars sequel a Dud,” Minuteman media, July 12, 1999, p.1 at <http://www.ucsusa.org/index.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Jack Medelson, “America, Russia and the Future of Arms Control”, *Current History*, vol. 100, no. 648, October 2001, p.324.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

defence interceptors would attempt to intercept their target, objects of different weights and shapes could be made to travel at the same speed and follow the same path. Thus a missile could carry a large number of lightweight decoy to confuse and overwhelm the defence. Yet this problem is virtually ignored in Washington by congress and the administration, by Republicans and democrats. Infact the House republicans have slipped language into the Defence authorization bill that would allow the Secretary of Defence to begin production of a national missile defence system “without regard”<sup>13</sup> to whether test have been completed to determine if it will even work.

On the other side the NMD supporters say that we need an “insurance policy” that only NMD will give. But as the state Department’s Mr. Roy pointed out, Russia and China might regard a US “insurance policy” as in “fundamental conflict” with their interests and decide to deploy more ICBMs, Thus increasing “significantly... the qualitative threat to the United States.”<sup>14</sup>

Although missile defence sounds like Prudent insurance against potential adversaries, it offers no protection against America’s real security threat such as terrorism, religious fundamentalism, environment degradation, biological weapon. Any of these contingencies would create a catastrophe so it is reasonable for the US to catastrophe insurance”<sup>15</sup> opined by former defence secretary William J. Perry.

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<sup>13</sup> Collina, n.10.

<sup>14</sup> National Missile Defence, n. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Perry, n. 9, p.36.

However the latest public opinion polls show very thin support and significant doubts, concerning NMD among the American public at large. The data suggest that the public debate over NMD deployment is far from over and the outcome of that debate is yet to be determined.

When asked by Gallup on February 1-4, 2001, whether they support or oppose “the possible development of a defence system against nuclear missile”, a plurality (44%) of respondents express “support” while 20% are “opposed” and 36% are “unsure”.<sup>16</sup>

Less candid proponents favour a system with the declared purpose of managing a threat from the rogues of the world but envisage it as the first step toward a system really designed to neutralize China’s modest strategic arsenal or the expanded Chinese arsenal they expect to see. Other, even more strenuous advocates favour a ‘thick’ multilayered system – combining land, sea, and space based components that would neutralize Russia’s forces along with China.

Many opponents regard missile defence as capable of contributing nothing but trouble. They see it as threatening deterrence and the arms control structure, starting with the ABM Treaty; as inevitably creating major difficulties with America’s allies and greatly agitating its former adversaries, Russia and China. Also they say, the assumption that it might even work and actually serve as a shield is badly flawed. Hitting ten or so bullets with ten other bullets under controlled testing conditions can prove nothing, they argue.

Union of Concern Scientist (UCS) who have presented testimony before congressional committee and have been meeting with congressional leaders and administration officials staunchly oppose any kind of missile defence. They argue that instead of focusing on missile defence, the United States can and should do more to combat terrorism, diplomatically, economically and military. US security – and that of the rest of the world – will require increased level of international cooperation.<sup>17</sup> Their position is based on the logic that first, there is little incentive for a terrorist group or a developing country to use long-range missile. Other means of delivery are less expensive, more reliable, and can deliver much larger payloads more accurately than long range missile. Second, unfortunately, some are using September 11 to justify rushing ahead with defence against long range missile. While the goal of defending the United States from every conceivable threat is understandable, NMD can't protect USA effectively anytime soon. Third, a distinction must be made between the means of delivery and the weapon, a missile would have caused for less destruction than the hijacked airplanes aimed with pinpoint accuracy and carrying tons of explosive fuel.

To opponents the terrifying attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre (WTC) prove such a system unnecessary. To supporters, the September 11 terrorism shows it is essential. Missile defence opponents contend that the United States should focus its attention on improving the human intelligence

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<sup>16</sup> Public Opinion Survey: "Support for NMD declines as Americans earn more" available at <http://www.clw.org/coalition/briefv5n11.htm>.

<sup>17</sup> "Ballistic Missile Defence – UCS" at <http://www.ucsusa.org/index.html>.

gathering rather than building a shield to protect against missile attacks. They argue that it is better and cheaper to rely on the time tested techniques of deterrence and possibly on preemptive strikes with increasingly accurate conventional weapons. NMD advocates however, object to placing all defence eggs in one basket. They insist that it makes no sense to throw in the towel simply because missile defences are not a panacea. The coast guard and customs service offer at least some protection against these other means of delivery, whereas America is strategically naked against the missile threat.

The coldwar may be over, but the world is far from having settled into a new era or a less threatening environment. The danger of a nuclear weapon going off somewhere is actually greatly greater now than it was then. And the threat to the United States in particular is less from rogues of the world than from the disrepair of Russian strategic forces<sup>18</sup> as argued by John Newhouse, a senior fellow at the center for Defence Information. He says Russian structure is much weaker than it used to be. The early warning network is deteriorating and, like the rest of Russia's military infrastructure, is falling on increasingly hard times.<sup>19</sup>

However, a 1996 CIA report alleged by states that, although unauthorized Russian attacks are possible, under normal circumstances the prospect of an unauthorized nuclear missile launch or a blackmail attempt using nuclear arms is low, despite continuing turmoil, political uncertainty and

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<sup>18</sup> John Newhouse, "The Missile Defence Debate", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.4, July/August 2001, p. 99.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

disarray in the (Russian) armed forces.<sup>20</sup> Similar view was stated by National Intelligence Council estimate is September 1999 that Russian accidental or unauthorized missile launches are ‘highly unlikely so long as current technical and procedural safeguards are in place.’<sup>21</sup>

However Bush administration key advisers have taken a much darker view of the threat to the United States from long-range missile system than did the previous administration who like the president were being pushed along by domestic politics. The dominant figures around Bush are vice president Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz. These three are much alike capable, knowledgeable, resourceful, experienced, well to the right of center, and hardline on Russia, China and arms control, and of NMD.

### **Whether NMD an unworkable concept**

The decision on whether to deploy a NMD focus on whether it is technically and operationally effective. The effectiveness of a given NMD architecture can be estimated by determining the area of the United States that the system can cover, the performance of the surveillance and tracking sensor architecture, and the performance of individual interceptors.

With respect to NMD architecture, the scope of the proposed project will evolve through four stages, beginning with 20 interceptors in 2005 and growing to a larger system by 2011. According to the critics, an investment of

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<sup>20</sup> *Washington Times*, 22 October 1996.

<sup>21</sup> Robert D. Walpole, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015”, National Intelligence Council, September 1999 at [www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm).

US \$60 billion simply can't be justified on the basis of recent test or the prospect for success in future. The technology is not capable of satisfying even the most basic requirement for success and according to critics among scientists and engineers, it is unlikely ever to be robust enough to deal with decoy and simple countermeasures.

Consider the argument put forward by Burton Richter (winner of the 1976 Nobel prize for physics) 'Assume for the sake of argument that an attack is composed of five missiles and suppose that the chance of one interceptor finding and destroying the real warhead from one of the attacking missiles is four or five, or 80%. Then the chance of killing all incoming warheads with five interceptors would be calculated this way: 0.8 for the first interceptor on the first warhead, multiplied by 0.8 for the second on the second and so on for all five. Work is out and the probability of getting all five is about 33% or as two-out-of-three chance that atleast one of the incoming warheads will get through. Since one warhead can kill hundreds of thousands of people that is not good enough'.<sup>22</sup>

According to congressional testimony by General Robert T. Kadish, Director of Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO), if interceptors approach 80% accuracy, two or three attempts would increase the probability of a successful hit to 96% to 99% respectively.<sup>23</sup> Thus he is not sure of 100% success of the NMD system.

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<sup>22</sup> *Washington Post*, 23 July 2000.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*

General accounting office (GAO) is doubtful about the feasibility of technology and is more critical. In a June 1998 report the GAO said the programme faced “significant performance and schedule risk”. This new report stated that despite Department of Defence’s subsequent decision to postpone NMD deployment from 2003 to 2005 and other changes many risk remain. Developing a hit-to kill capability is still a difficult technological challenge”.<sup>24</sup>

The first intercept test, claimed by the BMDO to be successful but criticized by the scientific community for data rigging,<sup>25</sup> took place on October 3, 1999. It was later confirmed by the pentagon stating that the interceptor had initially drifted off course and only located the real target after detecting the decoy balloon floating nearby. The pentagon couldn’t determine whether the intercept would have taken place had the decoy balloon not been there.

The second test on January 19, 2000, failed because of “a clogged cooling pipe in the kill vehicle.”<sup>26</sup> Third test on July 8, 2000, also failed because the “kill vehicle” did not separate from the booster rocket.<sup>27</sup> In all, 19 intercept test have planned by the BMDO. Given the unproven nature of the technology, Clinton put off the decision to deploy the missile defence system.

So, by this decision of September 1, 2000 Clinton, although committed to eventual deployment of a ‘limited’ NMD, deferred the deployment decision as well as the construction of the x-band radar in Alaska.

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<sup>24</sup> GAO report on NMD available at [www.fas.org/spp/starwars/gao/nsiad-98-153.htm](http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/gao/nsiad-98-153.htm).

<sup>25</sup> *The New York Times*, 14 January 2000.

<sup>26</sup> *The Hindu*, 21 January 2000.

<sup>27</sup> R. Ramachandran, ‘Towards a new arms race’, *Frontline*, August 4, 2000, p.4.

Between January and July, the scientific community went into full gear. In April 2000, the UCS and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) security studies programme released a technical study on the effectiveness of missile defence counter measures. The “countermeasures report”<sup>28</sup> written by a panel of 11 scientists and engineers called for a shelving of the current NMD plan as unworkable and counter productive. “We don’t believe that access to classified information would in any significant way alter our study or its conclusion” said the report.

However, on July 6, a group of 50 Nobel laureates organized by the Federation of American Scientists sent a letter to president urging him not to deploy the planned NMD system. This group also raised the countermeasures issue.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, Ted Postol, a physicist in the MIT security study programme, analysed an early NMD test and discovered that pentagon claims that the system successfully distinguished decoy from the mock warhead, appeared to be false.<sup>30</sup> He also found indications that future test plans had been changed to make it easier for the system to distinguish the decoys. These findings received considerable attention in the press and helped undermine the credibility of Pentagon claims about the system.

An internal Defence Department report detailing programme delays and testing failures of the NMD system was made public on June 26, 2001. The

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<sup>28</sup> The report is available at <http://www.ucsus.org>.

<sup>29</sup> Ramachandran, n.27, p.10.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p.12.

report concluded that the programme was falling behind schedule at a rate of 20 months every three years and warned that it was unlikely that a 2005 target date for having an operational system in place could be met without restructuring the programme.<sup>31</sup>

Earlier in January 1999, the Clinton administration had announced that it would take a decision on the deployment of the NMD system in summer of 2000. The decision would depend upon the cost involved, the implications for the strategic and arms control agreement and the readiness of technology.

Consequently, at a speech at George town University on September 1, 2000 Clinton stated that he did not believe that the technology was yet ready for an effective national defence system and passed the decision of whether to deploy an NMD to his successor. He stated, "We have made progress, but we should not move forward until we have absolute confidence the system will work".<sup>32</sup> He went on to add, "A national missile defence, if deployed, should be part of a larger strategy to preserve and enhance the peace, strength and security we now enjoy, and to build an even safer world".<sup>33</sup>

The study of Phillip E. Coyle, the Pentagon's Operational Test and Evaluation Director, who had done a comprehensive study on the NMD test programme in August 2000 was made public on May 31, 2001. In brief the Coyle Report finds that the NMD system's effectiveness is not yet proved, even in the most elementary sense. According to the report, the programme is

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<sup>31</sup> August 2000 Pentagon Report on NMD Technology, *Arms Control Today*, vol. 31, no.6, July/August 2001, p.32.

<sup>32</sup> *The New York Times*, September 2, 2000.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

too immature to assess its effectiveness or to predict potential deployment date. In addition, the report says that the programme fails to test the basic elements of the system.<sup>34</sup>

Prior to the above study, in 1998, a panel of defence experts headed by retired General Larry D. Welch, a former air force chief of staff reported on the risks associated with the test programme. It had cautioned that the strategy of accepting a high level of risk to shorten the deployment schedule was more likely to cause, programme me slips, higher cost and even ultimate failure.<sup>35</sup> In response to this, the Defence Secretary restructured the NMD programme in January 1999 with the objective of fielding 20 interceptors by the end of 2005, two year later than originally planned.

Doubts about the basic feasibility of the system thus became an important part of the NMD debate and rapidly began to erode support for an early deployment decision. Lead stories, editorial and opinion pieces began appearing in major papers pointing to the technical issue as a reason to rein in the programme. Technical feasibility not the potential threat began to be the standard against which NMD system was judged.

### **Republican Vs Democrat**

Domestic politics in the United States has played crucial role in development and deployment of NMD system. For all the agreement among Americans on the need to build missile defence, no agreement exists, on how

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<sup>34</sup> R. Ramachandran, "Going Back to Star Wars", *Frontline*, August 17, 2001, p.50.

<sup>35</sup> Welch Report available at <http://fas.org/spp/startwars/program/welch>.

much weight should be given to other concerns countries. At one extreme lie NMD supporters favouring and forging ahead with missile defence come what may. At the other extreme lie committed arms controllers who are concerned of others and who give Russia and China a veto over the US decision to deploy a missile – defence system that contravene the ABM Treaty. Among Republican and Democrats, each has the potential to shape the political debate over missile defence.

In recent years NMD proponents, mainly Republican Party have succeeded in pushing missile defence to the forefront of the political agenda. They believe that any American president who would leave the United States vulnerable to nuclear attack is immoral. Their policy prescription is straight forward: The US should move as fast as possible to translate Reagan’s vision of a nuclear peace shield into reality. Question of cost and foreign reaction are of decidedly lesser importance than deploying a defence system.

Passionate NMD supporters keep an angry approach against the ABM Treaty. Some believe, the treaty is now dead. Republican senator James In-hope declares that it ‘shouldn’t’ be in effect anyway. It was a 1972 treaty with the Soviet Union that doesn’t exist anymore, so he considers it unfit to pay so much attention to it.<sup>36</sup>

Richard Perle, a former Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Reagan administration and recently appointed advisor to the Bush Defence Department, stated in testimony before the Senate in July 2001, “as long as that treaty is

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<sup>36</sup> Wolf Blitzer, 17 October 1999, available at <http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/9910/17/le.oo.html>.

regarded, as it is in some circles today, as fundamental to the security of Russia and the US, it continues the contest of the cold war.” And finally, the administration often invokes the specter of vulnerability created by the treaty, stressing, as Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz did in July 2001, that “our people and territory are defenceless”<sup>37</sup> because of the ABM Treaty.

Even some moderate proponents of NMD, such as National Security Advisor in the Bush administration Condoleezza Rice refers to the treaty as ‘a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship’ that no longer exists.<sup>38</sup> However democrats are in favour of preserving ABM Treaty. Reacting on the president Bush speech of May 1, 2001 Democrat Senator Thomas Daschle (D-SD) said that “I believe it would be a grave mistake for the United States to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to deploy a robust national missile defence system. Unilateral action will trigger reaction all around the world and those reactions themselves could make our nation less secure.”<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to the Republican thinking a more recent ABC News poll conducted on February 7-11, 2001 indicated that, Americans will not support efforts to build missile defence system if it means the United States breaks its treaty commitments. A majority of respondents (48%) ‘opposed’ missile defence ‘if it broke an existing treaty with Russia’, while only 31.4% still supported missile defence.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Jack, n. 11, p.326.

<sup>38</sup> Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no.1, January/February 2000, p. 59.

<sup>39</sup> “President Bush’s speech on nuclear strategy; A response from senior democrats,” *Arms Control Today*, vol. 31, no.5, June 2001, pp. 29-30.

<sup>40</sup> Public Opinion Surveys: n. 16.

The Republicans criticized the Clinton administration's management of the anti-ballistic missile programme, pointing that it has not given missile defence enough importance. The failure of the third NMD test put more pressure on Clinton. Earlier a bipartisan bill (HR4) was sponsored by Republicans on February 4, 1999. President Clinton previously threatened to veto the Bill but backed off after the Senate passed a compromise amendment saying that the US would continue to negotiate cuts in Russian nuclear forces. The Democrat believed that the amendment language was inextricably linked to the ABM Treaty, which they considered the key to arms control negotiation with Russia. But the Republicans rejected the language that would have explicitly linked the NMD with adherence to the treaty.

In January 1999, the Clinton administration announced that it would take a decision on the deployment of the NMD system in the summer 2000. The Republicans preferred Clinton to delay the decision until after presidential election 2000 and thus stop the Democrats from taking credit for launching start war II, as the NMD is described in the American media. The Republicans wanted an administration headed by Bush to take the decision on the NMD deployment as they felt that Clinton might give several concessions to Moscow while negotiating amendments to the ABM Treaty.

After winning the presidential election Bush announced for the deployment of NMD system in May 2001. But as he began his preparations, Bush was confronted with a quite unforeseen power shift in the US Senate following the defection of a long serving Republican senator who was upset at

the extreme agenda unfurled by the new administration. This deprived the Republican party of control over both the executive and legislative branches. The Democratic Party majority in the US Senate is now expected to pose a few tough questions for the Bush administration's defence proposals.

### **Cost of NMD**

With respect to the financial cost, the proposed United States investment in NMD is approximately US\$60 billion over ten years or about \$6 billion per year between 2001 and 2011. That is about 2% per annum of a defence budget of approximately US\$ 300 billion. The United States has spent about \$ 3.5 billion a year on missile defence programme since president Reagan first announced the SDI, adding upto more than \$50 billion in 18 years. The fiscal year 2001 budget for ballistic missile defence is \$ 4.5 billion (approximately 1.5% of the total US DoD budget). With \$ 1.9 billion allocated to NMD and \$ 1.7 billion allocated to TMD<sup>41</sup>.

The BMDO has sought a funding of \$ 8.3 billion for 2002, a 60% increase over the previous year. Proponents argue that given the stake involved, these numbers are not actually so big – the tab for NMD amounts to less than one percent of defence spending. If Washington can spend ten percent of the defence budget defending Persian Gulf oil or South Korean security, these advocates argue, it can devote one or even two percent to protect America's own territory. However recent polls in the US have indicated that support for NMD programme is severely qualified by considerations of its cost.

In the summer of 2001, the Senate Armed Services and Appropriation Committees initially cast very skeptical eyes on the nearly 60% proposed increase in funding for FY 2002 missile defence programme and the administration professed intent to use some of these funds to violate the ABM Treaty. Carl Levin the new democate chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee won a 13-12 partisan vote in Committee to reduce the requested funds and to provide a case – by – case review mechanism before any violation of the ABM Treaty. Both initiatives were withdrawn after September 11, (detail discussed in subsequent chapter) but these issues will resurface again.

Thus the current congress, narrowly divided, will exercise its power over NMD budget and other issues for two fiscal years. In November 2002, there will be midterm elections for the entire House of Representatives and for one-third of the Senate. The larger political context promises a near-certain recession, a growing budget deficit with conflicting priorities for available funds, and the need - both domestically and internationally – for coalition support of the condition during a period when the US is likely to experience one or more additional terrorist attacks.

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<sup>41</sup> John Deutch, Herald Brown and John P. White, “National Missile Defence: Is there another way?” *Foreign Policy*, no.119, summer 2000, pp. 95-96.

## CHAPTER - III

### INTERNATIONAL REACTION OVER NMD

NMD is one of the element, which has changed the security Paradigm of the nations in the changing concept of deterrence in the Post-Cold war world. These Nations have reacted sharply over US NMD because they fear that US' Plan will render their deterrence capability irrelevant. This chapter will present an elaborated study of the response of various countries especially Russia, China and US' allies whose security is affected by NMD programme.

#### **Russia Response to the NMD**

In the present changed circumstances it is must for Russia to define her position in the world as a strategic player of consequence. Russia is still the biggest country on the world map. She still prides herself over a strategic nuclear arsenal second only to that of the US. Her national resources seem to be almost unlimited and her scientific community remains both highly competent and capable of technological innovations.

Russia has been insistent on preserving the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of the global strategic<sup>1</sup> balance since the current debate on NMD started especially after the passing of the NMD Act of 1999 by the US congress during the Clinton administration. The basic argument presented by Russia

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<sup>1</sup> Steven Fetter, "Overview : Desirability and Feasibility of Ballistic Missile Defences," in Joseph Cirincione and Frank Von Hippel ed. *The Last 15 Minutes Ballistic Missile Defence in Perspective*, (Washington: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, 1996), p. 12.

against the NMD is that its development will disturb the global strategic stability by upsetting the strategic balance.<sup>2</sup>

Russia further views the American NMD as undermining not only the ABM Treaty by also the confidence of the retaliatory capability of its current strategic force. Though Russia has made it clear that the NMD doesn't constitute a threat to its nuclear shield but its implementation would sound the death knell for the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty was an end-product of the first phase of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) which extended from November 1969 to May 1972, and was signed simultaneously, with the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The main features of the treaty are<sup>3</sup>:

- Each party may have two ABM system deployment areas. One is to protect the party's national capital. And the other is to protect an ICBM launch area. On July 1974, by signing a protocol to the ABM Treaty, further limiting each party to a single ABM system deployment area at any one time.
- A party may deploy no more than one hundred interceptor missiles and no more than the same amount of launchers within a radius of

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<sup>2</sup> George Lewis, Lisberth Gronlund, and David Weight, "National Missile Defense: "An Indefensible System", *Foreign Policy*, no.117, Winter 1999-2000, p.130.

<sup>3</sup> Anotonia H. Chayes and Paul Doty, Introduction and Scope of Study" in Anotonia H. Chayes and Paul Doty ed., *Defending Deterrence, Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's international Defence Publishers Inc., 1989), pp. 1-5.

one hundred and fifty kilometers. The ABM system to protect a party's capital may have no more than six radar complexes.

- The parties are not allowed to obtain interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead or rapid reload launchers. Each party undertake not to develop, test, or deploy launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile at a time, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to deploy in the future radar system for early warning of strategic ballistic missiles attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
- The parties are not allowed to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Each party undertakes not to give ordinary air defence system capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements, and not to test them in an ABM mode.
- Each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty.

Moscow views the ABM Treaty as the basis for strategic stability and a necessary condition for maintaining the broad array of agreements on controlling weapons of mass destruction and the means of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov referred to these agreement as the “modern architecture of international security with the

ABM Treaty serving as foundation. If the foundation is destroyed, this interconnected system will collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.”<sup>4</sup>

Russia views the American rationale for developing NMD-that the US is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology by certain “state of concern” - as implausible Russian analysts consider only North Korea a credible threat in technological terms for a time frame of 10 years or less and relegated potential threat from middle East threats (Iran and Iraq) to a 20 to 25 years window. They further argue that the US can rely on existing TMD systems or can develop Theater High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) to deal with any missile launched by the aforesaid countries. The American reluctance to rely upon boost-Phase TMD to cope up with potential missile threats from ‘rogue states’ instead of developing NMD, is seen by Russia as an attempt by the US to undermine and possibly neutralize Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability.<sup>5</sup>

Russians are of the view that though US’ NMD plan has been virtually proclaimed to counter ‘rogue states’ but the hidden agenda could be to extend it to Russia and China. Russia President Vladimir Putin said that Moscow knows fully well that Washington’s missile defence plans are aimed at neutralizing the nuclear missile potentials of Russia and China and not those of North Korea and Iran. And that is why Russian diplomats in consultation with their

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<sup>4</sup> Igor Ivanov, “The Missile Defence Mistake: undermining strategic stability and the ABM Treaty,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no.5, September/October 2000, p.15.

American counterparts be addressed in ways that would not violate the ABM Treaty. They especially suggested the creation of a global control system to monitor the spread of missiles and missile technologies, combined with cooperation on non-strategic missile defence or TMD, which the ABM Treaty permits.<sup>6</sup> While placing START II Treaty before Duma, Putin said that ratification will affirm and reinforce the indissoluble link between the START II and the 1972 ABM Treaty. Ratifying START II Treaty on the condition that it will take effect only if ABM Treaty is maintained intact and strictly observed will confront the US with a choice: Either that country assumes the blame in the eyes of the whole world for destroying the foundation of strategic stability, in the form of the treaty-based system of strategic arms limitation and control, or it abandons its pursuit of a NMD system.<sup>7</sup> By attaching such strategic conditionalities to the ratifications of START II Russia tried to counter what it believes to be US' hidden agenda.

Russian fears that the US' envisioned missile defence is part of a conscious US strategy to maintain global strategic superiority. They disagree with the US' threat assessment, doubting that developing countries can deploy long range missiles before 2010 and doubting that such missiles would ever be used against the US in any event. Russian leaders believe that the ABM Treaty still serves their strategic interests. Firstly, it limits the threat which US NMD

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<sup>5</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, "Russia's New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defence Debate," *Current History*, vol. 99, no.639, October 2000, p.339.

<sup>6</sup> "Putin, Clinton Can't Agree on Missile Defence," *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 52, no.23, July 5, 2000, pp.1-4.

<sup>7</sup> "Russian Duma Ratifies START II", *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 52, no.16, May 17, 2000, p.5.

would pose to the Russian strategic missile force. Secondly, it limits an area of strategic competition in which Russia is ill-prepared to compete—namely hit to kill interceptors and advanced radar and infra-red detection and tracking system. However, even if the US decides to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty to deploy such a defence, Russia would like to play it to its political advantage as Moscow seeks partnership with other states (such as China) to check US' growing influence worldwide, and also as it seeks to enhance the role of nuclear weapons for its own defence.<sup>8</sup> Thus Russia would like to have a multipolar international order to put an effective check on US' rising hegemonistic tendencies.

Russia is further opposed to the American missile defence plan as it would unleash yet another new arms race, including one in outer space.<sup>9</sup> Russian scientists are of the view that their countermeasures are effective enough to deal with the America's NMD system. But Russian policy makers do not exude such confidence and instead wonder as to why the US would pour billions of dollars into an ineffective system.<sup>10</sup> Russia still maintains a quick-launch posture for its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and keeps missile submarines on so called dockyard alert. Its missiles system, like those

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<sup>8</sup> Dean A. Wilkening, "Amending the ABM Treaty," *Survival*, vol. 42, no.1, Spring 2000, p.36.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National missile Defence and the Future of US Nuclear Weapon Policy," *International Security*, vol. 26, no.1 Summer 2001, p.73.

<sup>10</sup> George, n.2, p.130.

of the US could be launched with a few minutes of receiving the launch command.<sup>11</sup>

### **Russian Efforts**

To counter American NMD programme, Russia has signed a military and defence treaty with North Korea in 2000.<sup>12</sup> Again on August 4, 2001 both countries signed the Moscow Declaration according to which North Korea declared that she would adhere to the “moratorium it has declared on ballistic missile launch until 2003”. The declaration also reference to the 1972 ABM treaty as “the cornerstone of the strategic stability and foundation for the further reductions in strategic offensive arms.” Moscow presumed that this will strengthen its hand in its dispute with US over the need to preserve the ABM Treaty. Russia thought that North Korea’s willingness to maintain its moratorium on ballistic missile launches until 2003 created a two year window opportunity during which Russia can attempt to resolve its disagreements with the US over approaches to “new threats” and the fete of the ABM Treaty. Moscow did not rule out the possibility of a direct US-North Korea dialogue as one possible avenue for resolving their disagreement.<sup>13</sup>

Russia also tried to put a common front with Europe who has serious reservations about NMD in general, particularly with regard to its consequence for strategic stability and parity symbolized primarily by the ABM and SALT

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<sup>11</sup> John Newhouse, “The Missile Defence Debate”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.4, July-August 2000, p.99.

<sup>12</sup> “Russia, China Sign Friendship Treaty,” *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no.29, August 15, 2001, p.1.

<sup>13</sup> “Putin, North Korea’s Kim Join in ‘Moscow Declaration’”, *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no.32, September 5, 2001, p.1-3.

Treaties. Assessing the common interest in opposing US NMD with Europe, Russian President Putin proposed that Russia and NATO membership can jointly examine the prospects for a Pan-European missile defence against non-strategic missile. This was seen in Washington as an effort to divide America from Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Russia has, not without some disappointment realized that she cannot put too much hope on setting up anything like a “common front” with China or Europe. Even if she could, there seems little hope of any possible change in the American policy of unilateralism in enforcing its missile defence plan as evident from the Bush May 1, 2001 speech. There seem to be no hope for any concession or a complete abandonment of NMD plan by United States. Along with this, domestic and financial constraints, has further led Putin to show for some willingness for arriving at some compromise formula with United States.

### **Russia’s Pro-West Policy**

Russia, after the disintegration of the USSR has adopted a pro-west policy in the hope of integrating itself with a broader Euro-Atlantic community which will help Russia in overcoming its severe economic challenges. This factor has somewhere forced Russia to compromise with US and its NMD plan. Putin from the very beginning has been trying to reconcile Russia’s political and economic interest with US’ unilateralism.

After meeting with the American President Bill Clinton in 2000, President Putin during an interview on BBC Television, President Putin

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<sup>14</sup> Newhouse, n.11, p.105.

announced that Russia has no objection in principle to forging a missile shield against non-strategic missile in partnership with US.<sup>15</sup> At the same time while reiterating Russia's firm commitment to the ABM Treaty and opposition US NMD Putin said that "Russian and American point of reference concerning the emergence of new threat is same, but we are against the cure that is worse than the disease".<sup>16</sup>

An early indication of Russia's relevant submission to the US' dictat on the future of ABM Treaty came in July 22, 2001 with American President, Bush and Russian President Putin reaching an agreement, which could be regarded as the beginning of a practical process of modifying the ABM Treaty. Not once in the President's Joint Statement the term "Corner Stone" so often emphasized till recently as signifying the key essence of the ABM Treaty, was mentioned. Bush confirmed that the two sides have agreed to link the discussion on offensive weapon system with defensive systems and he also expressed the US intention of signing a new treaty with Russia replacing the existing one. Putin on the other hand also said that the two sides have agreed to examine the problem in a comprehensive fashion linking the ABM Treaty with the issue of further cut in strategic arms.<sup>17</sup>

So Russia agreed at least in part to link a modification of the anti-ballistic missile regime with cuts in offensive weapon. In opting to modify the

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<sup>15</sup> Putin, n.6, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.4.

<sup>17</sup> "Bush, Putin in Genoa: An Arms Control Breakthrough?" *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no.30, August 22, 2001, p. 1.

treaty, Russia was able to secure a political space in a process of multilevel and multilateral consultations on international issues.

Putin and Bush again met in Shanghai on October 22, 2001 at APEC Summit. Observers unanimously noted the new degree of flexibility that Putin showed in describing the current status of the dialogue on missile defense. They particularly highlighted the comments Putin made at a joint press conference about the need to “think about the future” and “respond appropriately to possible future threats”. Putin’s statement about the possibility of “reaching an agreement that takes into account the national interest of Russia and the US and the need to enhance international stability” was taken by observers as a sign of Moscow’s willingness to agree to an acceptable modification of the ABM Treaty in conjunction with radical cuts in strategic ballistic missiles on both sides.

Another important – looking development was that, besides expressing uncompromising support for the American military action in Afghanistan, Putin reaffirmed that it is a strategic priority for Russia to build relation of long term partnership with America based on common values of world civilization.<sup>18</sup>

The Russia decision to close its electronic intelligence gathering radar in the Cuban town of Lourdes and its pledge to shut down its naval and air base at Cann Rahn in Vietnam was presented to the world as yet another peace

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<sup>18</sup> “Putin’s New Policy Towards US sparks, Controversy”, *The current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no.43, November 21, 2001, p.1.

initiative, demonstrating the US-Russian desire for relations based on greatest possible trust.<sup>19</sup>

On November 3, 2001 American Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Moscow. On the eve of his visit Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said 'The ABM Treaty is an important but not the only component of strategic stability'.<sup>20</sup> This statement from the Russian defence minister were certainly indicative of the softening of Russian stand over the issue of modifying or abrogating the ABM Treaty as desired by the US stand on ABM Treaty. In November 2001, both President met in Texas but failed to strike a deal on US missile defence plan.

Finally, ABM Treaty which was major impediment to American unilateralism was removed, and US' global dominance was complete. Proliferator in Chief (as termed by Guardian newspaper, London) Bush announced on December 13, 2001 that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin mildly responded to the decision by calling it merely a "mistake" and said that it will not hamper the improving US-Russian relations.<sup>21</sup> This statement marks a U-turn in Russia's position on the issue. Earlier Moscow threatened to walk out of all or most arms control pacts the Soviet Union signed with US if the latter unilaterally dump the ABM Treaty.

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<sup>19</sup> *The Hindu*, 10 November 2001.

<sup>20</sup> *The Hindu*, 4 November 2001.

<sup>21</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, "Russia's strategic priorities", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no.1, January/February 2002, p.4.

Though Moscow was capable of posing a symmetrical threat to Washington in course of arms race, it was not out of desire for disarmament, but rather to make the arms race more predictable and less perilous and costly, that the two side had decided to codify rivalry by maintaining strategic stability on the basis of parity.

Amid the extremely acute socioeconomic and political crisis that gripped Russia in 1990s, an enormous asymmetry arose between Washington and Moscow. But the fact that the bilateral arms control regime was preserved intact and that the US, now the sole remaining superpower, nominally maintained military-strategic parity with Russia was perhaps the main factor protecting Russian interests in the world arena.<sup>22</sup>

Russia still possesses a semblance of the not so old Soviet era military capability. It has a level of preparedness of counter the US' NMD plan. Putin has clearly said that Russia's decision on MIRVing of ICBMs will depend upon the "quality of the US-Russia relationship." However, Putin, it seems, has decided to avoid a confrontationist attitude and is instead looking forward to a new arms agreement with US; US support for Russia's WTO membership and a closer NATO-Russia relationship.<sup>23</sup>

Russia ultimately signed a new arms agreement with US in last week of May 2002, "the Treaty of Moscow" and on May 26, 2002 Russia was granted a

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<sup>22</sup> "Does US Ending of ABM pact Bode III for Russia?", *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol.53, no.52, December 2001, p.4.

<sup>23</sup> Wallander, n.22, p.6.

non-voting seat in NATO forming NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which heralds a new era of post-cold war cooperation.

### **Chinese Response**

As America plunges ahead with its plan to deploy a limited NMD system, the US is making a great effort to overcome Russian opposition. But it is actually the reaction of China that is the decisive factor in whether a missile defence system ultimately improved US security or lead to a new arms race. The Chinese reaction to missile defence proposals is negative, strongly felt and expressed mainly in terms of cross-strait relations. Chinese leaders, like many of their Russian counterparts, view US missile defence programme as part of a strategy to maintain America's global strategic superiority. China believes that US leaders are exaggerating the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation and that the US is not particularly vulnerable because it can retaliate against any attack with devastating force. The view is widely held in Beijing that Washington will act unilaterally to pursue its interests without regard for the UN charter or for Chinese sovereignty.

Beijing is also feared that US plans would damage the ABM treaty – a treaty which has ensured the viability of its strategic viability of its strategic deterrent for several decades. The treaty's abrogation could derail other international arms – control effort at a time when China is placing greater emphasis on arms control to help the international environment to its liking.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Dean A. Wilkening, "Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability", *Adelphi Paper* 334, New York, Oxford University Press Inc. 2000, pp.18-21.

China's top arms control official, Sha Zukang, who has said that the NMD programme will effectively restart the arms race, was quoted in the official China Daily as saying that deployment of the system would "upset the world strategic balance and hinder the process of international nuclear disarmament."<sup>25</sup>

Deeply conscious of its vulnerability, China believe a system such as NMD would wholly neutralize China's small strategic force and could therefore threaten China's survival.<sup>26</sup> Unlike Russia, which has more than enough missile to overwhelm a limited NMD system, China has only around 20 ICBMs all DF-5s, capable of hitting North America.<sup>27</sup> Adding to Beijing anxiety is the perception that US enthusiasm for missile defence is inversely proportional to its interest in traditional arms control. The Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT, America's eagerness to scrap the ABM Treaty, Washington cool reaction to Moscow's offer to cut nuclear arsenal to 1500 warheads all gave Chinese leaders the impression that the US is more interested in solidifying its absolute strategic advantage than achieving meaningful disarmament.

China believes American NMD programme will harm its regional interest. In addition to NMD, the US also plans to deploy theatre missile defence (TMD) in East Asia. Japan is already a partner in TMD and Taiwan

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<sup>25</sup> Weekly Defence Monitor, Centre for Defence Information, vol. 4, Issue no. 25, June 22, 2000 at [www.cdi.org](http://www.cdi.org).

<sup>26</sup> Newhouse, n.11, p.107.

<sup>27</sup> Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "The implication for postures and capabilities in South Asia" Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of

wants to join. Beijing worries that a US-led TMD effort will expand America's influence in East Asia and blunt China's short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which China uses to compensate for its poor navy and air force.<sup>28</sup> Most importantly, Beijing fears TMD's extension to Taiwan would create a defacto alliance between Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo that would destroy any chance of China-Taiwan reunification. China fears that the provision of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) technology to Taiwan is specifically designed to provide protection to the island nation so it can declare its independence. China also fears that BMD is designed to neutralize its nuclear deterrence against the US.

Taiwan's response to the ballistic missile threat has been to request technology now being developed by the US for BMD. Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act the United States is obliged to provide "arms of a defensive character" and to maintain its own capability "to resist any resort to force" against Taiwan. Chinese officials have stated the provision of BMD technology to Taiwan will result in a step up of China's modernization efforts.<sup>29</sup>

China feels that the structure of NMD system has been designed East Asia oriented. In the C<sub>1</sub> phase of NMD the only new missile tracking radar will be deployed on Shanya, an outpost well located to watch missile from

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International Studies, (California), *Occasional Paper* – 7, May 2001, pp.60-61.

<sup>28</sup> Stephen A. Cambone, "The United States and Theatre Missile Defence in North-East Asia, *Survival*, vol. 39, no.3, Autumn 1997, p.75.

<sup>29</sup> Carlyle Thayer, "It's Not An Arms race yet", *Asia week*, vol. 29, no.22, 9 June 2000 at <..././asiaweek/magazine/2000>

East Asia, including Russia Siberia, North Korea, and China. The only NMD launch site in the C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub> phases would be in central Alaska, which is much closer to East Asia than the Middle East or European part of Russia. This geographical structure provides more time and less defence range from the interceptors in defending against missile from East Asia than from other places in the world. This may help the USA take a strategy of 'Shoot-look-shoot' in defending against missile from East Asia.

The Chinese defence white paper, China's National Defence in 2000, states that "a certain country is still continuing its efforts to develop and introduce the NMD and TMD systems, which have undermined the international community's efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to promote disarmament." The white paper also argue that the United States is accelerating its development of NMD. It reads "in disregard of the relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty and the opposition of the international community ... China expresses its strong opposition to such moves on the part of the US, for they will undermine the global strategic balance, severely hamper the nuclear disarmament process and international non-proliferation efforts, jeopardize global peace and regional stability and may even touch off a new round of arms race."

Concerning TMD, China's white paper comments are as follows:

"The joint research and development of the TMD system by the US and Japan with a view to development in East Asia will enhance the overall offensive and defensive capability of the US-Japan military alliance to an

unprecedented level, which will also far exceed the defensive needs of Japan. This will touch off a regional arms race and jeopardize security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. China expresses its profound concern over such a development. China is strongly opposed to the provisions of the TMD system, its components and technology, and any such assistance to Taiwan. China is also strongly against any attempt to incorporate Taiwan in any form into the TMD system by any country”.

This language suggest that while China strongly oppose both NMD and TMD, its opposition to NMD is stronger. Some Chinese analysist privately note that the real problem caused by TMD/NMD is its possible relevance to Taiwan.<sup>30</sup>

China plans to counter the development of a BMD system by increasing the number of ballistic missile and warheads.<sup>31</sup> China has sold over 100 CSS-8 intermediate – range missiles to Middle Eastern countries. China’s ten-story high CSS-4, with a range of 8000 miies, is already deployed.<sup>32</sup> China will also develop various technologies to penetrate a BMD defence such as multiple warhead, and decoy. That could trigger a regional arms race.

On July 16, 2001 Russia and China signed “The Good Neighbourly Treaty of Friendships and Cooperation”. After signing the treaty, the Russian

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<sup>30</sup> Toshiro Ozawa, “Regional Perspective: North East Asia”, International perspective on Missile Proliferation and Defence”, Centre for Non proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, *Occasional Paper* no.5, March 2001, pp.71-72.

<sup>31</sup> William J. Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.6, November/December 2001, p.43.

<sup>32</sup> John Train, “Facing the Risk: A realistic look at Missile Defence”, *Strategic Review*, (Boston), vol. XXVIII, no.3, Summer 2000, p.7.

and Chinese sides stressed “the basic importance of the ABM treaty, which is a corner stone of strategic stability and the basis for reducing offensive weapons and speaks out for maintaining the treaty in its current form”.<sup>33</sup>

The US withdrawal from ABM Treaty on 13 December 2001 even though didn't invite sharp reaction from China but it expressed concern on US action. Speaking after the US announced its decision, the Chinese President, Mr. Jiang Zemin, said it was of “great importance” to maintain the international arms control and disarmament regime. China he said was ready to work with other countries in the world to make its due effort to uphold world peace and stability.

In Beijing a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said “China is not in favour of missile defence systems. China worries about the negative impact ... we think the relevant sides should seek through a constructive dialogue a solution that safeguard the global strategic balance and doesn't harm international efforts of arms control and disarmament.”<sup>34</sup>

The Chinese response to the US move was muted because the Bush administration had taken a number of measures to allay the Chinese fear. These measures include US President Bush visit to China in October 2001, frequent consultations with Chinese officials, deferring US decision to provide more advanced missile defenses to Taiwan, and most-importantly, President Bush call to President Zemin on December 13, a few hours before US announcement on ABM Treaty.

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<sup>33</sup> John Cherian “A historic accord,” *Frontline*, August 17, 2001, pp.60-61.

Chinese reaction on the US NMD plan depend upon how long US and Russia walk together to reach a compromise deal on ABM Treaty and reduce for strategic weapons.

### **European Response**

The response of Europeans to the US NMD plan range from skepticism to outright opposition. The United States NATO allies have traditionally been wary of American proposals for ballistic missile defence.<sup>35</sup> The Europeans are reluctant to support the NMD and pursue their own national missile defence,<sup>36</sup> which is the result of a strategic calculation. This calculation comprises that most European states are unlikely to wage war against the emerging ballistic missile powers including Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and other Europeans are worried that US decision to protect itself with NMD could lead to divergent security system within NATO. Mr. Schroder and French President Jacques Chirac have characterized the NMD as an “invitation to proliferation”.<sup>37</sup> The German government has said that international treaties like the ABM should continue to remain the foundation for international treaties. French President Chirac has warned:

“If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war you will see that there’s permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. The more improvements are made in the shield the more improvements

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<sup>34</sup> *The Hindu*, 16 December 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Wilkening, n.25, p.17.

<sup>36</sup> Justin Bernier and Daniel Keohane, “Europe’s aversion to NMD”, *Strategic Review*, vol. XXIX, no.1, Winter 2001, pp. 42-43.

are made to the sword. We think that with these system we are just going to spur swordmakers to intensify their efforts.<sup>38</sup>

The French reaction is based on the fact that if Russia builds more ICBMs as a result of American missile defence plans, the French deterrent would become weaker. It also fears that once put in place, a US missile shield could decouple the US from Europe by leading to a mindset that feels secure in “fortress America”, leaving Europe to its plight.

The European apprehension at the Franco-British Summit<sup>39</sup> in November 1999 led to a serious consideration of the establishment of a rapid reaction force of some 50-60,000 personnel. Deployable within 60 days to undertake the full range of crisis management operation in Europe. The EU representative for a common foreign and security policy apprised the NATO foreign ministers one month later on European plans to develop an autonomous capability to conduct crisis response operations.<sup>40</sup> The plan was a clear indication that each of the international players was bracing itself against the proposed American action.

Although there is no consensus amongst nations on BMD there are several factors that have dominated European perceptions and concerns. Many

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<sup>37</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 8 March 2001.

<sup>38</sup> *New York Times*, 17 December 1999.

<sup>39</sup> Manpreet Sethi, ‘US National Missile Defence: A case of misplaced logic’, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XXIII, no.12, p. 2168, also see. Bernd W. Kubbig, ‘Regional perspective: Europe’, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies *Occasional Paper* no.5, March 2001, p.50.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

arms control advocates and BMD-sceptics in the United States have also outlined the same position given below.

### **Threat Perception in Europe**

The first and most fundamental factor is the interpretation of the potential threat. The Europeans question whether ‘rogue states’, characterized by USA, would ever have the intention of using ballistic missile and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against the west. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine argues that it is ‘not very serious’ to claim that states like North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya could threaten a nuclear superpower like the United States and calls their threats microscopic – or theoretical.<sup>41</sup> The British House of Common Foreign Affairs committee has argued that the Americans focus on more capability rather than intention. It states that “we are concerned that the USA over-emphasises the capability component of the threat equation. When it comes to assessing the extent of the threat it faces, and attaches too little importance to intention. It is this which makes the threat which NMD is intended to counter less credible”.<sup>42</sup> On the issue of missile proliferation European government tend to view it in a regional context and not necessarily as a precursor for direct threats to Europe or the United States.

### **Arms Control and Strategic Stability**

Second important factor is the different European and American attitudes towards arms control and towards strategic stability. The greatest

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<sup>41</sup> Phillip H. Gordon, “Bush, Missile Defence the Atlantic Alliance”, *Survival*, vol. 43, no.1, Spring 2001, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Camille Grand, “Missile Defence: The View From the Other Side of the Atlantic” *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no.1, September 2000, p.16.

cause of European concern over America's BMD plans lie in their potential to undermine the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime and to stimulate new arms race. The Europeans want the ABM Treaty preserved as a key component of strategic stability. They view the US deployment without prior Russian agreement to modify the ABM Treaty, as a potential source to a new arms race with Russia and China and further breakdown of global arms control and multilateral cooperation. They point to Washington's refusal to go along with other important international agreements (including the International Criminal Court, the ban on anti-personnel mines, CTBT, and the Kyoto agreements) as signs of negative trend. Russian officials have claimed that even a limited NMD would force Moscow to withdraw from Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II. Moscow has also said that the prospects for reducing the ceiling to 1500 under a START III agreement depend on keeping the ABM Treaty intact.<sup>43</sup> In an EU-Russian summit in October 2000, Russian President Putin and French President Chirac stated 'The EU and Russia have an identical viewpoint. We have condemned any potential revision of the ABM Treaty, believing that such a revision will involve a risk of proliferation that will be very dangerous for the future'.<sup>44</sup> However, the French and German government became wary about being used by Russia over BMD.

### **Alliance Security and Deterrence**

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<sup>43</sup> *Washington Post*, 23 June 1999.

<sup>44</sup> Tomas Valasek, Europe's role in NMD, Centre for Defence Information, Washington DC, <<http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issubrief/ch8>>

A third factor in shaping European perspective on NMD arises from alliance security and the future of deterrence. There were apprehensions that if the United States acquire some protection against missile attacks, but Europe remained vulnerable, this could undermine the concept of shared risk and America's extended deterrence and security commitments to Europe. This is based on the presence of US forces and nuclear weapons on European soil for decades. It was postulated that in a worst-case scenario, NMD could bolster unilateralist tendencies in the United States and create a "Fortress America" mindset where Washington became reluctant to take risk on behalf of its allies.<sup>45</sup> Concerns were raised that, even if the military link remained intact at the very least NMD could undermine the alliance's cohesion in future out-of-area operations.<sup>46</sup>

Concern remain in Europe over the longer-term consequences for deterrence. There are concern that cold war concepts of deterrence, based on mutual vulnerability and the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation, are not suited to a strategic environment characterized by multiple and diverse regional adversaries potentially armed with long-range missile tipped with nuclear or biological payloads. An emerging concept of deterrence combine the threat of retaliation with the means to deny an opponent the ability to execute its strategy. From a European perspective the question of whether BMD will

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<sup>45</sup> Karl A. Lamers, "NMD and implications for the alliance", November 2000, at <http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-265-e.htm>.

<sup>46</sup> Grand, n.43, p.13.

undermine or strengthen deterrence remain a controversial issue as long as Washington remains committed to its present course.

Scepticism has been explicitly expressed in Europe on the issue of technological feasibility of BMD.<sup>47</sup> Major flight test in 2000 failed to hit the target. A further issue involves the likelihood that future adversaries will employ counter-measures to confuse or overwhelm any defences. Indeed the NMD testing programme has been criticized for not involving realistic counter-measures.

### **Cost Factor**

The budget is another issue of concern in Europe associated with resource allocation to BMD. Official cost estimates for deploying the initial phase of NMD appear prohibitive to most Europeans, especially when the technology has yet to be proven. Concern have been raised over how these billions of dollars could be better spent on other defence projects or alternative way to address missile proliferation. In terms of NDM system, there is anxiety that much expenditure would reduce the resources allocated to improving US force projection capabilities and sustaining the American military presence in Europe.<sup>48</sup> In terms of a wider BMD system, there are concern over the financial cost that could be incurred by the European themselves.

Beyond these factors there are differences even within Europeans over NMD. Regarding their position on BMD France and Germany have stood out

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<sup>47</sup> Mark Smith, "European Perspective on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Missile Defence," Centre for Non proliferation studies, 'Monterey Institute of International Studies, *Occasional Paper 7*, May 2001, pp.74-75.

<sup>48</sup> Lamers, n.46.

among their European partners in voicing concerns and criticism. In February 2001, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher warned in relation to NMD that “new arms races must be avoided and further disarmament steps introduced”.<sup>49</sup> However, more than any country in Europe France has seriously questioned the rationale underlying America’s missile defence plans. In January 2001 President Chirac claim that NMD “can’t fail to re-launch the arms race in the world”.<sup>50</sup> Some in France also worry that the deployment of NMD systems by France’s adversaries could undermine the viability of the French deterrent force.<sup>51</sup>

Contrary to French and German views, Britishers have expressed their sympathy with America’s proliferation concerns, emphasizing a desire for any defensive response not to violate the ABM Treaty. This non-committal stance stems largely from Britain’s close defence relationship with the United States. However, Britain and Denmark are in an awkward positions of being asked to offer part of their territory for forward based radar sites (at airbases in Fylingdales, England and Thule, Greenland) for a system that would not protect them yet might make them more appealing targets to a potential adversary.<sup>52</sup> It is highly unlikely for Britain to decline any US request to use Britain facilities because US-UK defence and intelligence relationship is too significant for Britain to jeopardize, by not supporting a project deemed vitally important to its most important ally. The problem for Britain is that on one side it is very

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<sup>49</sup> *Times of India*, 4 February 2001.

<sup>50</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 30 January 2001.

<sup>51</sup> Gordon, n. 42, p.25.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

much interested in maintaining this relationship on the other hand it aspires to sustain a leadership role on European defence issue.

Two of the newest member of NATO alliance, Poland and Czech Republic have expressed unequivocal support to the US NMD programme and even claimed that a defensive alliance like NATO have moral imperative to develop defensive weapon. Italy whose new leader Silvio Berlusconi, is a keen Atlanticist, expressed guarded support for the idea.<sup>53</sup>

### **Public Opinion**

A poll conducted in August 2001 in Britain, France, Germany and Italy by the International Herald Tribune in collaboration with the Pew Research Centre for people and the press, a non-partisan US polling group, and in association with the US council on Foreign Relations. Citizens of the above-mentioned countries of West Europe overwhelmingly disapproved US President position on missile defence. According to the survey President Bush of the US is marginally ahead of President Putin of Russia in winning public confidence. Majorities of the Europeans in the poll describe Mr. Bush as a unilateralist, concerned only with US interests by Margins of 3 to 1 or more, and that he understand Europe less well than earlier American Presidents.

Germans being most sensitive amongst the Europeans on issue of arms control resoundingly disapproved Mr. Bush's plan to develop an anti-missile

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<sup>53</sup> "George Bush European Tour: A bumpy landing", *The Economist*, June 16 2001, p.37.

system even if it meant withdrawing from ABM Treaty.<sup>54</sup> The survey data has been presented below based on few questionnaires.

1. Bush decision that the US should try to develop a missile defence system even if it means withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

Country	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ refused
Britain	20	66	14
Italy	24	65	11
Germany	10	83	7
France	14	75	11
United States	39	42	19

2. As I read a pair of phrases tell me which one better describes George W. Bush.

Country	He understands Europe better than other American President	He understands less about Europe than other American President	Don't know/ refused
Britain	13	75	12
Italy	18	53	29
Germany	13	75	12
France	12	74	14

3. Again, which one better describes George W. Bush.

Country	He makes decisions based entirely on US interest	He takes into account European interests when making decisions	Don't know/ refused
Britain	79	14	7
Italy	74	15	11
Germany	73	18	9
France	85	8	9

4. I'm going to read a list of political leaders. Tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

<sup>54</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 16 August 2001.

a) Russian President Vladimir Putin

Country	Great Deal	Fair Amount	Not too much	None at all	Don't know/refused
Britain	1	25	35	22	17
Italy	2	21	36	13	28
Germany	4	37	31	24	4
France	2	12	39	38	9

b) US President George W. Bush

Country	Great Deal	Fair Amount	Not too much	None at all	Don't know/refused
Britain	4	26	36	28	6
Italy	3	30	43	16	8
Germany	3	48	27	19	3
France	2	18	43	32	5

Source: *International Herald Tribune*, 16<sup>th</sup> August 2001.

## **Reaction over US withdrawal from ABM Treaty**

The US withdrawal from ABM Treaty did not invite much reaction from American Transatlantic allies. France suggested for “binding international rules and instrument”<sup>55</sup> to help guarantee strategic stability, but did not condemn the US act. On the same day of withdrawal, the French Foreign Ministry, describing the treaty as “a crucial element in the strategic stability of recent years”<sup>56</sup>.

Briefing reporters on December 18, 2001 after a meeting of NATO’s 19 defence ministers, a senior Pentagon official said, no concern or opposition was voiced about the announced US withdrawal. But one European diplomatic sources in Washington said the low-key allied reflection is a “resignation in the face of facts created by the (United States) rather than support on substance.”<sup>57</sup>

In recent times the position of Germany and France have toned down. Both countries want to avoid creating tension over a project deemed inevitable under Republican administration. However the reaction of these countries depend upon how President Bush deals with Russia.

## **Indian Response**

India was the second country after Australia to give its qualified endorsement of the US NMD plan. However, India maintained that the ABM Treaty should not be unilaterally abrogated.<sup>58</sup> Indian stand was contrary to the

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<sup>55</sup> “Bush announces US intent to withdraw from ABM Treaty”, *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no.1, January/February 2002, p.29.

<sup>56</sup> US announces withdrawal from ABM Treaty, Outlines a ‘New Triad’ at <..././docs/0112/doc01.htm>

<sup>57</sup> Bush, n.56, p.29.

<sup>58</sup> *The Hindu*, 3 May 2001.

stand taken by her neighbouring countries, especially China, who vehemently opposed the US plan. On the other hand, Pakistan, a longtime ally of the USA also opposed the NMD plan.

New Delhi's posture based on the statements of Indian officials, consist of four elements - deterrence (which is premised on the possession of a "minimum credible deterrent"), disarmament (which seeks the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons), diplomacy (based on genuine multilateralism) and de-alerting (which seeks to keep missile off high-trigger alert and under divided control).<sup>59</sup>

The long tie between Beijing and Islamabad has always been a security threat for New Delhi. India's neighbour, China, may use US' missile defences as an excuse to further modernize its already expanding nuclear and missile arsenal. India's security is adversely affected by the increasing Chinese threat.

India's unprecedented support to the US' NMD programme was based on certain perceived benefits of a reciprocal US support to some of its vital issue of concern. India can access to the USA surveillance data both as global and regional level.<sup>60</sup> This will help India in maintaining an active vigilance on the missile launching sites of Pakistan and China. India could also look ahead to the lifting of US' sanction over the transfer of dual use technology to India. However the most important benefit that India has availed from the US is agreement between the two countries to work together in building a missile

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<sup>59</sup> Sidhu, n.28, p. 64.

<sup>60</sup> *Times of India*, 19 June 2001.

shield for India to counter any missile threat from Pakistan.<sup>61</sup> The NMD system has further reduced the importance of CTBT with which India is uncomfortable.

India keeping in full view its traditional friendly ties with Russia has opposed any unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, while fully endorsing the US NMD plan at the same time. The basic objective here has been to strike a balance between the time-tested Indo-Russian relationship and newly emerging contours of Indo-US cooperation.

Leaving aside the objection from Europe, Russia and China US allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea, and neighbour Canada are not much enthusiastic about the US NMD programme. Canada signed a joint statement with Russia in December 2000, confirming its “commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security”. The joint statement underlined the importance of the ABM Treaty, describing its as “a cornerstone of strategic stability and important foundation for international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”. Canada who will be a major participant in NMD programme wants to know more about the NMD system.

South Korea never formally requested deployment of TMD on its territory. In March 1999, the South Korean Ministry of Defence announced that it did not plan to participate in the US TMD programme.<sup>62</sup> The ministry cited the high cost of programme and its limited effectiveness for South Korea’s defence purposes as the justification for its decision. South Korean

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<sup>61</sup> *The Hindu*, June 2 2002.

President Kim Dae Jung and Russian President Putin issued a joint declaration in February 2001 emphasized the need to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty. However Korean officials explained that endorsing ABM Treaty doesn't mean opposition to the US NMD plans.

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<sup>62</sup> Ozawa, n.31, p. 75.

## CHAPTER - IV

### IMPLICATIONS OF NMD

The US' determination to operationalise a NMD system to protect itself from missile attack by 'rogue state' (state of concern) and TMD system to its friends and allies in Europe and Asia, raises many basic questions of international security and stability. Most of the countries of the world including the allies of the USA are skeptical about the efficacy of BMD and are apprehensive about its repercussions on international security and stability. What will be the effect of US' BMD programme on arms control efforts, international order, concept of nuclear deterrence, regional conflicts, relations among nations and world politics are still to be calculated. Many heads of states scholars, analysts, and officials have expressed their views on NMD programme and have calculated the ramification of constructing a new security paradigm. In the changed concept of deterrence in Post Cold War era attack on enemy country and barring the incoming missiles have been restructured coupled with modernization process of attacking and defensive capability of the nations. Present chapter discusses the consequences of missile defence programme.

#### **NMD and Missile Proliferation**

Small and regional power are attracted towards ballistic missile. Missiles have regional and global utility in conflicts and rivalries. It can also help smaller regional power to get some role in wider international politics.

The potential of delivering Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) in a very short period is the key factor of proliferation of missiles.

NMD is a unilateral response to missile proliferation rather than an attempt to engage the problem itself. The effect of NMD on missile programmes in 'states of concern' are difficult to predict, but the key motivations driving missile development in these states remain 1) bolstering long-range deterrence of military superior opponents; 2) increasing regional prestige and leverage in conflicts with regional military competitors and 3) earning export revenue. In the case of long-range deterrence, it is possible that the deployment of NMD will discourage missile development, but it seems equally likely that NMD deployment will generate a new international market for countermeasures, especially given the vulnerability of some missile defence system to this technology<sup>1</sup>.

### **Implication on International Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Regime**

Nuclear disarmament is a necessary condition for mustering the popular support of non-proliferation regime. Progress made in nuclear disarmament has helped to bring about the indefinite extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, the conclusion of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the understanding among the parties to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on the negotiation of the convention on the prohibition of production of Fissile material for weapon use. The US, which

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<sup>1</sup> Mark Smith, "Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence and Arms Control", Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, *Occasional paper – 5*, (California), March 2001, pp. 24-27.

already possesses the largest conventional and nuclear arsenal in the world, is now to embark on the development of TMD and NMD system.

The most common implication of NMD is the demise of the ABM Treaty and NPT. These treaties are the two pillars of nuclear disarmament and arms control that were responsible for slowing the pace of proliferation during the cold war. Because they continue to be essential for controlling proliferation and maintaining a stable nuclear environment, it is imperative that these treaties should not be undermined. When the NPT was signed in 1968 there were five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and now there are seven NWS with India and Pakistan joining the club recently. The expectation when the NPT was negotiated was that there would be far more NWS but that prediction proved wrong. The NPT would, therefore, seem to be an overwhelming success<sup>2</sup>.

However, the United States seems adamant towards arms control treaties and signaling that its arms control commitments from now onwards will be unilateral and not bound by treaty. In October 1999, the US Senate refused to ratify the CTBT, seriously frustrating the efforts of international community for the last thirty years. Similarly in early November 2001 the Committee on Disarmament and Security of the United Nations concluded its deliberations and forwarded a set of resolution for ratification by the General Assembly. The resolution called for progress towards total disarmament in terms of the 13-step listed in the 2000 review conference on the NPT. The resolution was approved

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<sup>2</sup> Frank P. Harvey, "The international politics of missile defence", *International Journal*, vol. LV, no.4, Autumn 2000, p.547.

but the US voted in the opposition of the treaty<sup>3</sup>. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) could not come into effect because of conflicting interpretations about its anchorage within the wider context of arms control treaties. The US believes that it stands alone, while the Russians believe that the entire sequence of negotiated agreements beginning with the ABM Treaty of 1972 constitute a seamless web. No one component can be removed without jeopardizing the entire agreement.

The withdrawal from ABM Treaty by the US would seriously impede the nuclear disarmament process. The realization of nuclear disarmament requires a stabilized strategic environment with mutually assured security. As stated in the ABM Treaty, effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms.<sup>4</sup> The preservation of ABM Treaty also served to ensure the conclusion of such US-Russia treaties in the 1990s as START I and START II as well as preparation for the START III treaty. As the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov writes that if US goes ahead with NMD and abrogating the ABM Treaty, it would inevitably raise the question of the future of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty signed in 1987. Further nuclear arms reductions will not happen without the ABM Treaty and thus the viability of the NPT itself would be threatened<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Sukumar Murlidharan, "Dialogue and recalcitrance" *Frontline*, January 4, 2002, p. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Tara Kartha, "Ballistic Missile Defence: The debate in the United States", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XXIV, no.1, April 2000, pp. 71-72.

<sup>5</sup> Igor Ivanov, "The Missile Defence Mistake", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no.5, September/October 2000, p. 18.

One of the reasons for which the Russia Duma for a long time refused to ratify the START II treaty is that the US insisted on developing an ABM system. Other nuclear countries also made the cessation of the development of ABM systems a pre-requisite for their participation in any future disarmament process. The Russian government has been continuously stating that the US would obtain further strategic superiority by developing its ABM system, thus breaking the balance of offensive nuclear forces. And the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would undermine the entire security system, leading to a complicated situation. In such circumstances, Russians believed that it was no longer necessary for Russia to fulfill the obligations under treaties of offensive strategic arms.

### **The Danger of New Arms Race**

The NMD programme has the potential of a new arms race in both offensive and defensive strategic arms across the world. Russia is the other party to the ABM Treaty. It possesses many thousands of nuclear warheads, and it still sees itself as a nuclear superpower. Russia maintained that the US NMD system will destroy the global strategic stability and thus lead to a new arms race all over the world. Russians view the NMD programme as being targeted against them and to counter it, Russia may increase the number of its missiles with multiple warheads. It could emphasize more survival missile launchers such as those mounted on trucks or cruise missiles to fly underneath the missile defence radar system. To overwhelm the NMD cover Russia may also develop and deploy more countermeasures or sophisticated decoys to travel along with

the real warheads to confuse or blind the system's sensors. To penetrate on NMD shield during crisis Russia may go for quick response to incoming missiles.<sup>6</sup>

Thus in response to NMD, the alert rates of missile submarines at sea and road-mobile rockets on land might be increased. Russia's SS-18 force might increase its readiness to launch on warning even if it means breaching the 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin detargeting pact. In striving to ensure that its missile forces in silos and on dockside alert can be launched before incoming US missile strike them, Russia might heighten the readiness of its remaining functional early warning radars and nuclear command posts. To deal with contingency, Russia would likely to deploy<sup>7</sup> multiple warheads on its new land-based Topol-M strategic missile and might even consider extreme responses including the fielding of space mines designed to disable the NMD's space based sensor system in the event of US-Russian hostilities.<sup>8</sup>

Russia's alert posture due to the deployment of NMD may heightens the risk of a mistaken or unauthorized Russian launch. The decay of Russian nuclear arsenal has already eroded its safety and safeguard, along with its basic offensive capability. This deterioration increases the risks<sup>9</sup> of mistaken, illicit or accidental launch and of the loss of strict control over Russia's vast nuclear complex.

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<sup>6</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 8 September 2000.

<sup>7</sup> *Hindustan Times*, 23 February 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Bruce G. Blair, "Accidental or Unauthorized Launch", in Joseph Cirincione and Frank Von Hipper ed. *The last 15 minutes: Ballistic Missile Defences in Perspective*, Coalition to reduce Nuclear Danger, Washington, 1996 pp. 22-23.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

Russia's nuclear arsenal is much weaker than it used to be. Moscow's overall economic decline has taken a large toll on Russian security during the past decade. Its military cannot adequately perform essential security missions- airspace surveillance and defence territorial defence against invasion, border control and maintenance of internal cohesion. The role exception to this dismal state of military affairs is nuclear deterrence. The nuclear mission is also becoming accident prone as Russia's military crumbles and its nuclear control and early warning deteriorates<sup>10</sup>.

The Russian government has made it clear that, in view of the development of ABM system by the US, Russia will develop its offensive strategic arms and it will be much faster and cheaper as well, than developing defensive strategic arms. Russia has also announced that its strategic Rocket Force has successfully conducted a missile interception test at its missile launching site in Kazakhstan.<sup>11</sup>

Showing its most robust posture, Russia could retaliate against NMD deployment by refusing to reduce its nuclear arsenal further, by retaining its existing multiple-warhead missile (banned under START II). Russia might also retaliate by suspending work on bilateral programmes designed to keep Russian nuclear materials secure, and by selling nuclear and ballistic-missile technologies to 'rogue states'. Russia has already hinted at its intention to

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<sup>10</sup> John Newhouse, "Missile Defence Debate", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.4, July/August 2001, p. 99.

<sup>11</sup> *Times of India*, 21 January 2000.

resume military–technical cooperation with Iran, suspended six years ago under American pressure<sup>12</sup>.

The Russian government has now abandoned<sup>13</sup> the START II pact which barred both US and Russia of having land based strategic missiles with multiple warheads. Russian doctrinal pronouncements suggest that Moscow is placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons to compensate for relatively weak conventional forces<sup>14</sup>.

Moscow had warned Washington that if the latter repudiates the ABM Treaty then Russia and China would even go in for the joint production of weapons capable of effectively evading the US' ABM shield and successfully targeting its air, ground and space based elements.<sup>15</sup> During talks in Moscow in mid-February between Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council of China Zhang Wannian and Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, the two sides reportedly discussed the priority project that the two countries should cooperate in case the Bush administration went ahead with the NMD Programme.

Among the project short list are the joint production of different anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons (laser and interceptor missiles) and improving the quality of Chinese missile by linking them up with Russian military satellite

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<sup>12</sup> Manpreet Sethi, "US National Missile Defence: A case of Misplaced Logic," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XXIII, no.12, p. 2168.

<sup>13</sup> *The Hindu*, 15 June 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Giles Whittell, "Russia Dusts off Nuclear Plan", *The Time*, 14 October 1999, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup> John Cherian "A Dangerous Gambit", *Frontline*, March 30 2001, p. 51.

systems. In addition Russia has promised China the 949 and 971 class nuclear submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles.<sup>16</sup>

Both Russia and China see BMD as militarization of space by United States. They have read the Air Force Space command's web site which talks about American domination of space and about space as the fourth frontier of warfare. And they have read "Joint vision 2020", a document produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that advocates "full spectrum dominance – a capacity of US forces... to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operation ... with access and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land and air and information"<sup>17</sup>.

There has been some talk of a joint Sino-Russian missile defence as one of the several possible countermeasures against the US NMD. Under joint defence Russia will allow China to use its space based navigation system (GLONASS) for military purposes which would enhance China's defence capacity<sup>18</sup>. This would have its implication for India's security, considering that China lays claims to some portions of Indian Territory. India would have to reassess its military capabilities, which expectedly would cause a similar reaction in Pakistan.

According to a report by Gaurav Kampani of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies of Monterey Institute of International Studies, US, China is likely to invest in more robust nuclear triad. "Within the triad," the study

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Newhouse, n. 8, p. 105.

<sup>18</sup> Sethi, n.10, p. 2168.

says, ‘as China’s long range strike programme come to fruition, single warhead liquid-fuel missile will be replaced by larger range, multiple warhead solid fuel system’<sup>19</sup> China will likely to deploy its DF-41 missile – a new solid fueled and road-mobile missile capable of reaching most part of the US sometimes between 2005 and 2010.<sup>20</sup> China plans to counter the development of a BMD system by increasing the number of ballistic missile and warheads. It will also develop various technologies to penetrate a BMD defence such as multiple warheads and decoys. That could trigger regional arms race. On December 13, 2001, Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, assessing the possible chain reaction triggered by US withdrawal from ABM Treaty believed it could lead to China developing a ‘Considerably larger (arsenal) than it would have,’ putting “incredible pressure on India and Pakistan.. [M]ark my words, within five years there’ll be debate in Japan about whether or not they should be a nuclear power”.<sup>21</sup>

### **China Options**

There are four possible approaches to defeating NMD system, China can adopt.<sup>22</sup>

The first aims to overwhelm the defence by building more ICBMs, placing multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on existing

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<sup>19</sup> R. Ramachandran, “Implication for India,” *Frontline*, August 4, 2000, p.21.

<sup>20</sup> Greg may, “2000 Reality: Beijing must factor into missile Defence Equation”, Accessed over internet.

<sup>21</sup> US announced withdrawal from ABM Treaty, outlines a ‘New Triad’, at <../docs/0112/doc01.htm>

<sup>22</sup> Dr. Li Bin, “The Effect of NMD on Chinese Strategy”, accessed over internet.

ICBMs to multiply the number of warheads; releasing decoys from the missiles; or dispersing chaff to fool the sensor on interceptors.

The second aims to lower the observability of warheads by applying radar or infra-red stealth technology.

The Third group creates a rivalry between the warheads and the interceptors during flight by making warheads maneuver or through other means.

The fourth raises the survivability of ICBMs by deploying mobile ICBM or Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) building a missile defence; or putting nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

If China aims to overwhelm NMD by developing more warheads, the size of its retaliatory force should be larger than the sum of the number of warheads that can produce intolerable damage.

Chinese situation differs from Russia's for one reason: even a limited US missile defence potentially threatens its nuclear deterrent of 20 ICBMs, China might decide to put its missile on high alert but, such a strategy only increase its insecurity. For this reason, China is more likely to respond to a US NMD system by deploying more of its own ICBMs and by developing more sophisticated countermeasures. But even a ten or-20 fold increase in the size of Chinese ICBM force would not alter the strategic balance<sup>23</sup>.

Far more likely is that China will retaliate against deployment of missile defence by becoming more belligerent and less cooperative on a range of issues

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<sup>23</sup> *Washington Post*, 11 November 1999.

that matters to the United States. A particular possibility is that Beijing will refuse to cooperate on non-proliferation matters and become more inclined to sell nuclear and ballistic missile technology to other countries. As it has already indicated that it may resume missile sales to Pakistan.

The next decade is also likely to see further improvement in China's command, control, reconnaissance and early-warning capability, including the possible introduction of space-based assets to support these functions. It is also likely that China will devote more resources to developing countermeasures, such as decoy, shrouded warheads and possibly anti-satellite weapons, to defeat missile defences. Importantly these developments are likely to affect China's nuclear doctrine, which will transition from a fundamentally "minimalist" posture to a more variegated deterrent<sup>24</sup>.

These possible modernization steps will result in a second generation of far more robust, ready and survival nuclear weapons for China. In some cases China has assisted those countries whose missile programmes American defences will be designed to thwart, such as Iran<sup>25</sup>. It is also possible that Chinese exporters will transfer counter measures technologies to the rogue states such as North Korea, further-complicating the US missile defence efforts.

A similar cycle could beget a nuclear arms buildup in South Asia. Washington tends to see Pakistan as India's major concern, even though China,

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<sup>24</sup> James A. Sands, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Capability: Implication for US Policy", a paper published by the US Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, April 1995, p.11.

<sup>25</sup> Greg May, n. 18.

which has seen main supplier of Pakistan's nuclear technology, is abiding source of Indian insecurity<sup>26</sup>. Any changes in the Chinese posture is certain to fuel a fresh round of debate given the newfound nuclear machismo in Indian strategic circle. The NMD spurred environment would heighten the threat perception in India and would accelerate the operationalization and the state of readiness of the nuclear force. This could also lead to India giving up its self-imposed moratorium and renewing testing of nuclear weapons as well as delivery system such as Agni II<sup>27</sup>.

India's response could trigger a similar response from Pakistan and lead to a regional arms race. This could also mean a renewed transfer of missile technologies to Pakistan by North Korea and China. China has already indicated that US cooperation with Taiwan on TMD amounts to a violation of commitments under the MTCR. It could, therefore, retaliate by resuming missile sales to Pakistan. This could signal a revival of the occasional noises of a limited Indian anti-missile defence against the Pakistani missile force. Unconfirmed reports have it, that, India is exploring the feasibility of modifying the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile in an anti-ballistic mode<sup>28</sup>.

#### **NMD and START Process**

Russia and the United States are currently implementing START I, which limits each country's deployed strategic nuclear warhead to 6000. START II, which has not yet entered into force, would lower this limit to 3500

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<sup>26</sup> Newhouse, n.8. p.107.

<sup>27</sup> Ramachandran, n.17, p.21.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

warheads. Although the two countries agreed in March 1997 to pursue an additional follow on treaty, START III, that would reduce their arsenal to no more than 2500 strategic warhead each, Russia has since proposed going down to 1500 warhead. Terms for a START III cannot start without START II coming into effect. As regard START II, when Duma ratified it on April 14, 2000 linking it with ABM Treaty, it made “strong and explicit” conditions under Article IX for the Resolution of Ratification which made clear that Russia would exchange the instruments of ratification with the US only when the US had carried out a number of actions the US would also have to update START II that had originally been ratified by the Senate<sup>29</sup>.

Now Russia has abandoned<sup>30</sup> START II in the background of the demise of ABM Treaty and the “Treaty of Moscow”<sup>31</sup> has been signed by Russia and US on 24 May 2002.

### **Treaty of Moscow: A New Arms Reduction Initiative**

‘The Treaty of Moscow’ obliges the US and Russia to slash their nuclear arsenal by two-thirds to between 1700 and 2200 warheads by the year 2012. This is the first important treaty signed between the two nuclear power since 1993. The treaty marks a departure from past arms control part.<sup>32</sup>

According to critics, the treaty is full of loopholes. It lacks timetable for decommissioning of weapons. It is devoid of verification procedure and is conceptually expressionless on how a warhead to be identified and accounted

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<sup>29</sup> Kalpana Chittaranjan, “A Russian perspective of the START process and NMD”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XXV no.5, August 2001, p. 678.

<sup>30</sup> *The Hindu*, 15 June 2002.

<sup>31</sup> *The Hindu*, 25 May 2002.

for. Further it doesn't speak of warheads that are taken out of service. It puts no prohibition on the US plans to build a missile defence system. The pacts' expirations in 10 years allows either side to return to any level to desires, and even before the 10 years expiration it allows the ability to pull out with 90 days' notice.

### **Changing Web of US-Russian Relations in the context of NMD**

When the Cold war came to an end, there was general agreement throughout Europe that Russia must be integrated into Europe affairs. Little has been delivered on that promise. On the contrary, the Russians have had to swallow, some major western initiative that they regard as offensive. First, the extension of NATO's jurisdiction eastward. Second, in the course of enlargement, NATO assured the Russian government that it would never attack unless one of its members are attacked first. Yet NATO launched an air attack on Yugoslavia without seeking the approval of the UN Security Council. The another unilateral action adopted by the USA was the development of NMD and the scrapping of ABM Treaty which Russia considered as a "corner stone of strategic stability".

In recent years the relation between US and Russia in a large extent determined by the US decision on NMD and ABM Treaty, Russia has already threatened US to go along with China to counter the US missile defence system and helping the rogue states" i.e. Iran, Iraq and North Korea in missile development programme, if the US withdraws from ABM Treaty. Infact Russia

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<sup>32</sup> *Washington Post*, 14 May 2002.

wanted to bargain with the US on NMD issue as the European allies of the US were skeptical and didn't come openly to support the US plan. The Europeans security fear in the new changing world is natural. It is very evident that leaving Russia and China hostile towards US will hamper the security interest of Europe and America. On the other hand the US wants legitimacy for the deployment of its missile defence programme. Thus it is in the US interest to engage Russia and Europeans who doubted the US action as 'unilateral multilateralism'<sup>33</sup>.

President Bush withdrawal from ABM Treaty is the administration's most blatant and radical departure to date from three decades of US support for multilateral and bilateral arms control and non-proliferation measures. It may set a very dangerous precedent for other countries' adherence to and willingness to participate in multilateral arms control regimes. Washington has already created disbelief among world community by rejecting CTBT, scuttling the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, rejecting negotiations on small arms, refusing to accept-kyoto protocol, didn't agree to establish International Criminal Court and has not signed the land-mines treaty<sup>34</sup>.

The ABM Treaty provided Russia with status, partnership and security. Status came from locking the US into a bilateral relationship that no other country shared. The ABM Treaty prescribed an aspect of superpower status

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<sup>33</sup> Karen Brutentz, "In Pursuit of Pax American (I)", *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 41, no.3, May/June 2000, pp. 37-66.

<sup>34</sup> ABM Treaty withdrawal: Neither necessary nor prudent, An ACA Press Conference, *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no.1, January/February 2002, p. 15.

that Russia could claim even as its nuclear arsenal dropped to nearly half of its cold war high. By the same token, the treaty created a claim for partnership in negotiating strategic stability in the new security environment. Although Bush administration tried to relegate Russia to a lower priority in US foreign policy in the early months of its term. It realised soon that it needs to take Russia seriously to try to find a compromise on the ABM Treaty, if only to reassure European allies that the United States remained a reliable partners<sup>35</sup>.

The signing of a new arms treaty and induction of Russia in NATO as a 'junior partner' has some reason behind it. On economic front Russia is seeking closer relations with European Union<sup>36</sup>. It is paying special attention to its economic agenda and insisting that trade barriers buildup over the decades by the west be dismantled. Both the economic and defence fronts Russia insist on "equal partnership" status, although according to western analyst, there is embarrassing imbalance between economic and military resources on both sides of the fence. For example, Russia's defence spending is 1/40<sup>th</sup> of the US and the size of the former's economy is no bigger than that of Belgium<sup>37</sup>. Coming closer to the US may offer a place of honour for Russia at the top table of world affairs and clearing the ground for its integration into the western economic and political structure. At the same time Russia needs US support for accession to the WTO, which should expand Russia's export market and provide leverage for cleaning up Russia's business practices.

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<sup>35</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, "Russia's Strategic Priorities", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no.1, January/February 2002, p.4.

<sup>36</sup> *The Hindu*, 28 May 2002.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

On the other hand it became necessary for the US to forge close tie with Russia to form an international coalition to fight against terrorism after September 11, 2001. Without Russian cooperation it'll be very difficult for the US to fight against terrorism because Russia's geographic proximity to west and central Asia, in role as a major oil producer in stabilizing the international energy market at a time when uncertainty looms large over the Gulf and its intelligence resources on extremists and terrorist groups operating near its southern borders. Russia also facilitated<sup>38</sup> the US to establish its military bases in Central Asian states. For the US, Russia has finally been transformed from an evil empire to a strategic ally. Washington is also making moves to lift long standing restrictions against economic cooperation with Moscow. US is likely to remove Russia from the ambit of the notorious Jackson-Vainik amendment<sup>39</sup> that limited the trade cooperation between the two. US would futher like to confer on Russia the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on a permanent basis and also facilitate its entry into the WTO.

### **Implications for European Union and United States**

The new friendly tie between US and Russia will help the United States to allay the fear of the European allies on NMD issue. However the US-EU relations for last few years has under- gone change. The issue of confrontation between these two transatlantic allies are expanding. The integration of European countries into a bloc has created a new economic and military

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<sup>38</sup> *The Hindu*, 8, November 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Indira Gurbaxani and Sonja Opper, "How Tension Between Specific Chinese and American interest Affect China's Entry into WTO," *Intereconomics*, vol. 33, no. 5, September/October 1998, pp.218-19.

competitor for the US. The creation of European Rapid Reaction Force, opposing the US policies on Iraq, the tussle between US and EU on the issue of raising tariff on steel by the US and the US unilateral withdrawal from ABM Treaty are some of the thorny issues where confrontation can be clearly demarcated. The US allies will be disappointed that the United States is not turning around and embracing multilateralism as it appeared, it would, after September 11, 2001. Allied support was requested but very little cooperation was accepted to help conduct the war much to the regret of the Germans, French and others. The French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, accused America of pursuing a “simplistic” one point agenda by saying that “It reduces all the problems in the world to the struggle against terror”<sup>40</sup>. The European Union external affairs commissioner Chris Patten described US foreign policy as “profoundly misguided”. He wrote in an article “the stunning success of the US campaign in Afghanistan has reinforced some dangerous instincts: that the projection of military power is the only basis for true security; that the US can rely only on itself and that allies may be useful as an optional extra but that the US is big and strong enough to manage without them it is must”<sup>41</sup>.

This simmering dissatisfaction mean that in the future, US allies will be little more reluctant to offer their unconditioned cooperation to the United States. They will be suspicious of US motives and less trusting of the United States’ vision. The EU countries may even develop their own missile defence

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<sup>40</sup> *The Hindu*, 12 February 2002.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

system<sup>42</sup> which will reduce EU dependency on the US for security. The EU may go ahead to forge strong tie on military front with Russia because hostile Russia may prove danger for Europe.

### **Sino-US Rivalry**

The relations between the US and China is two-dimensional. One at economic level, where cooperation seems inevitable, secondly at political sphere where confrontation prevails. For the last one decade the Chinese economy has shown tremendous development and growth. The open market policy of China has provided opportunity for the US to harness the Chinese market. Chinese entry into WTO would not have been possible without American support.

At political front both countries are on two opposite path. After the disintegration of Soviet Union China remains the only country that can become competitor for the United States. The proposed NMD system is vehemently opposed by China as it poses direct threat to the Chinese deterrence capability. The bilateral relations do not smoothly run between the two country. China believes that the present world order does not fit Chinese interest.

Since early 2001 Beijing has owned down its anti-missile defence rhetoric. This happened only because the new Republican administration had sent clear message to the Chinese government, about the likely direction of US missile defence plans. While relations have not returned to the level of 1997-98, where the two sides exchanged high profile state summit visit, things are

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<sup>42</sup> Justin Bernier and Daniel Keohane, "Europe's Aversion to NMD", *Strategic*

improved now from 1999, when a host of problems plagued the bilateral relationship from the Cox committee report and its allegations of nuclear espionage to the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Even the issuance in early September 2001 of US sanctions against a Chinese company for its proliferation activities made hardly a ripple in relations between Washington and Beijing. Firmer footing for the bilateral relationship was only strengthened in the wake of the September 11 attack: Washington focused its strategic attention on the war on terrorism, and China took a number of constructive steps in support of US effort.

For the time being even though China mutely oppose the NMD but it cannot keep quite for a long time. Thus any change in the present security equation by Washington will be seen by Beijing as a direct threat. Apart from modernizing its offensive capabilities China may forge strong tie with Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan to counter the US NMD system. China will also continue to cooperate with Russia. By this effort there is a possibility of emerging a new bloc to oppose US.

On the issue of Taiwan if China see a full fledged TMD system in the near future, it may leave no stone unturned to unify Taiwan with the mainland China. China may even exercise military option before deployment of TMD on Taiwan, which may jeopardize East Asian security.

## **East Asian Security Scenario**

Deployment of TMD in Japan and South Korea in the near future going to change the security balance in East Asia. This in turn will have its bearing on Sino-US and Sino-Japan relations.

As for North Korea, it remains the single most dangerous real-life military threat for the United States. In an all out war, its eventual defeat is certain, but with thousands of US troops within range of the huge mass of North Korean artillery and with South Korea exposed to heavy rocket barrages, initial losses could be severe. The United States therefore have to support the detente between the two Korean states.

## **Changing dimension in South Asia**

As a vulnerable state living in a dangerous neighbourhood, India has to look at missile defences strictly through the prism of national interest. The Indo-US tie are witnessing a qualitatively new level of engagement with a call for “strategic tie” between the two largest democracies. India has extended unflinching support to the NMD dubbing as a defensive step. India’s stance on the NMD is far different from that of China or Russia. India could benefit doubly from Russian strategic decline. The more Russia accept a second position and the more it cooperate with the US, the less the US needs the Pakistani military dictatorship and the warmer the US would be to India. The US would have to worry seriously about nuclear irresponsibility by Pakistan. Thus any provocative Chinese proliferation to Pakistan must lead to American pressures on the Pakistani army to the benefit of India. On the other hand, were

China to play it cautious and reduce its involvement with Pakistan. India stands to gain from the double isolation of Pakistan from its principal allies of the cold war, the US and China. At the same time, Indo-Russian relations would retain its vigourousity without its anti-US thrust. Russia has long preceded India in all forms of partnership with the US. It would be meaningless for Russia to sidle up to Pakistan. India and China are the biggest arms market for Russia and the Russian armament industry is the only one that competes internationally. India also provides a fertile field for nuclear and space collaboration. Thus, the time-tested Indo-Russian relations shall continue to flourish, even as India and the US try to reorient the contours of their bilateral relations in the face of newly emerging post-cold war realities.

## CHAPTER-V

### CONCLUSION

Defence has always been an issue of concern for mankind. The history of mankind is full of war either for expansion of influence or taking direct control over territory. The inherent motive behind it is defence and United States is not an exception. As enveloped by two great oceans by two sides, the United States is far from other European and Asian countries who faced numerous attacks by contiguous enemy through conventional weapons. But the development of long-range weapon covering large territory was a matter of concern because natural distance became less important for it.

The early years of 1950s were the years of major debate in the US about air defence, in the background of Soviet detonation of nuclear bomb and emergence of People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union matched parity with the United States in nuclear deterrence and her progress over Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threatened US superiority in nuclear field. As a result it became inevitable for Eisenhower administration to go for serious effort for missile defences system. Hence, NIKE-ZEUS emerged as guided missile defence programme for the US.

However, the Soviet remained ahead of the US defensive and offensive missile programme when they launched powerful missiles which put Sputnik in space. This Soviet action created perception in American policy-makers that Soviet were proving superior in missile force.

The Soviet Union's vociferous pursuit of missile defence, created much confusion in the US to adopt the policy of either defence from incoming missile or create overwhelming offensive weapon. Cost and feasibility of the defence system also played important role. Thus the policy of funding defence research and development and not approving deployment and production was a consistent pattern of the US missile defence policy until 1967.

In the early 1960s the 'missile gap' gave America the rationale to increase its nuclear deployment. However, the deployment of Soviet limited missile defence system made the deterrence unworkable. Now it appeared that the Kennedy administration was in awkward position because the Soviet Union had also restored its nuclear test. The US policy makers did not prioritize the relevance of missile defence programme. Consequently major discussion and debate started on whether offensive or defensive policy is good for security.

The public opinion also went against missile defence and played important role in deployment decision in the background of US increasing involvement in Vietnam. The general trend of public perception was that any missile deployment in cities would result in such cities vulnerable to Soviet missile attack. The rising cost of Vietnam War and skepticism about the missile defence technology might have compelled Defence Secretary Robert McNamara to go for deployment of offensive weapon. The increasing intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict could have compelled the Soviet Union in 1967 to reject the halt of its BMD programme, whereby <sup>US</sup> alerting to address missile defence.

However, Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, which weakened the communist bloc, the US' adverse reverses in Vietnam war, détente between two super-powers culminated in the signing of ABM treaty to ensure Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) for both countries. Nevertheless, the research and development work over BMD continued.

In 1983 President Reagan announced Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) to counter all the incoming missiles targeted on USA. However with the disintegration of Soviet Union, the real enemy against whom the SDI was launched, ceased to exist. The US emerged as the sole winner of the cold war. Consequently no formidable ballistic missile threat existed for the United States. Yet the American foreign policy – decision makers formulated a new missile threat to pursue its missile defence programme. The confrontation between US' led allied forces and Iraq during Gulf war made it clear that US and its forces outside the country are no more safe from missile attack.

The emergence of America as the undisputed power in the post Cold War era created much security concern, for it, to maintain its hegemonic status. However, the Clinton administration was not in favour of any missile defence system for the United States. The missile defence programme became a political issue between the Democrats and the Republicans, who were in favour of the programme. Coming under pressure from Republican, Clinton announced the NMD programme in 1996. The initial test failure of NMD and deferring decision by Clinton to his successor gave crucial political mileage to Republican to take the credit for the deployment of NMD, as they wanted.

When George W. Bush became president it looked very clear that he would pursue the NMD programme vigorously even at the cost of ABM treaty. Even since he entered the White House NMD programme subject of serious discussion and debate within the United States. Many issues like threat assessment, cost factor, technological feasibility, deterrence capability, alliance security, and reaction from the rest of the world became part of the discussion.

The opposition view about threat assessment seems quite logical as they argue that the US is more vulnerable to suitcase bomb, bomb delivered by truck or boat, collision by plane, terrorist attack, global warming, environmental degradation etc. rather than missile attack. The September 11, 2001, attack on the US has proved that US is more vulnerable to terrorist attack rather than attack by the states. On the other hand the researcher feels that the US is more worried about the Chinese ICBM attack and unauthorized launch of Russian nuclear arsenal due to disrepairing and deteriorating maintenance.

The technology of the NMD has not yet proved. Since the beginning of missile defence programme the technology is still evolving. The Gulf war has proved that missile defence can't provide full guarantee to intercept the incoming missiles. The researcher feels that less technologically advanced NMD would need more number of interceptor to provide full guarantee as offensive capability of states are also increasing

Since the beginning of the concept of missile defence, the plan has been opposed by many states as it disturbs the balance of power. The reaction over the NMD plan came mainly from Russia, China and US' transatlantic allies.

Being a signatory state of ABM treaty Russia's reaction was natural as the programme had the potential to destroy the ABM Treaty. Russia herself has been very clear that its vast number of ICBM can penetrate any missile shield, but the continuous opposition to the US NMD plan was motivated by Russian apprehension, that, US might adopt unilateralist policy undermining the national interest of Russia. Russia also felt that its crisis-ridden economy wouldn't be able to afford new arms race. The fact behind Russian vociferous reaction over US intention to abrogate ABM Treaty was to bargain from the US on several issues: a) NATO Eastward expansion (b) to get market economy status and integration in the European affluent economy (c) to get the status of first grade actor in international politics etc.

US NMD programme left China at the receiving end. The US limited NMD programme would make the Chinese deterrence capability impotent. China had threatened to proliferate the nuclear and missile technology to 'rogue states' and its modernization process of ICBM would have negative effect on South Asia. The TMD deployment on Taiwan was seen in Beijing as a direct threat to Chinese sovereignty. Thus China never wants to see any intervention by the US on Taiwan issue, which has been one of the irritant factors in Sino-US relations. US-China talk on missile defence would help stabilize East Asia and great power relations: numerical limits, range limits, speed limits and testing restrictions on TMD would be at the heart of the Talks. China could in return slow down/stop MIRVing and cruise missile.

The reaction from the US' transatlantic allies range from skepticism to the outright opposition. The NMD plan has created rift between the US and EU. The emergence of EU as one bloc is seen in the US as losing Europeans dependency on the United States. The US apprehension has also been strengthen by raising European Rapid Reaction Force. France and Germany are very much against US NMD programme because they fear that it will have impact on European security. The Europeans also oppose US policies concerning Iran and Iraq.

India has shown interest in maintaining closer ties with the US in Post Cold War politics for economic and strategic interest. As a result, India, one time champion of non-align movement (NAM) and strong advocate of non-proliferation efforts, supported US NMD plan. Initially it appeared that India has acted in haste, but the Russian and Chinese reaction over US withdrawal from ABM treaty has vindicated the stand taken by India on US NMD.

In East Asia South Korea and Japan have strategic tie with the United States. The proposed defence shield to these countries would strengthen their security against North Korea missile threat and would provide them more active role in the region. The US' North Korea policy may also need to be revisited: economic aid and reassurance much more than coercion is required to deal with Pyongyang.

The proliferation of ballistic missile has undermined the American security at every level. American has been exercising its diplomatic efforts to halt this proliferation. However, the benefit of the ballistic missile have

attracted large number of states to procure it. America realize that, it is better to create defensive system than convincing or providing leverage to these countries. But this effort may prove futile, as supremacy of America can only be maintained in the stable world. The ramification of the National Missile Defence plan shows a dark picture. The immediate implication of NMD has been the abandonment of ABM Treaty. The US withdrawal from ABM Treaty has set a bad precedent. Now the States may take the international treaties for convenience.

For the time being Russia has compromised with the west due to its ailing economy but once its economy revived itself, there is a possibility that it would adopt a tough posture against the US because the status of superpower is still deeply embedded in the Russians psyche. Chinese aspiration to be a global power necessitate China to modernize its deterrence capability which may deter the United States. The new arms reduction treaty between US and Russia have allayed the fear of embarking Russia into new arms race which has cascading effect all over the world, but the flaws in the treaty leaves both parties skeptical of each other.

The September 11 terrorist attack has changed the course of international politics with long terms implications and pushing the NMD issue in back burner. Now fighting against international terrorism is the highest priority for the United States. The US declaration of war against terrorism has given a pretext to the United States to take unilateral action against the so called rogue state i.e. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. International terrorism has

brought even the rival nations together. The growing closeness of US and Russia may weaken the Chinese opposition against US unilateralism.

The researcher feels that by deploying NMD system, the United States is trying not only to maintain its advantageous position of power and high level security, but also to augment and exploit its military and political power. By deploying NMD the US may adopt more interventionist and unilateralist policy in world affairs. It seems quite clear now that the US will go ahead with its national missile defence programme.

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