

**GEOSTRATEGIC FACTORS IN THE
EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARIES**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**GEOSTRATEGIC FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES**" submitted by **RANU BISWAS** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university and this is her own work.

We recommend that dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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**dedicated to
the able subjects of Solomon**

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in gratitude.



(RANU BISWAS)

PREFACE

The land of Israel has for a long time in history -ancient, medieval and contemporary, been in the vortex of many political turmoils. It is quite evident as in the strategic location of this small strip of land which connects, Europe, Africa and Asia. It is also because of this very fact that political imbroglio always surrounds the existence of this nation, and perhaps as a direct consequence to it, Israel is constantly battling to define and secure its boundaries. Presently, though most international entities in West Asia have come to accept Israel as a nation amidst them, yet grudges are still kept alive in the ongoing territorial strife with Palestinian peoples over the West Bank area. On the other hand, the West Bank area has always held a special attraction for territorial adequacy for Israel viz because of water sufficiency, fertile tracts and quite importantly for Jerusalem which falls in contiguity with the demarcated lands for Palestine. Israel personally faces chronic shortage of water, lacks resource endowments due to which its Tertiary and Quarternary Economic Sectors are so well developed. The West Bank is the Jordan River's catchment area and also a stable aquifer.

Thus in consequence Israel has built an extensive road and water link system which reduced water costs and travel time between East-West and North-South eventually integrating the state via major nodes and increasing Israeli mobility throughout, especially to and from the frontier areas. Israel has also followed a relevant and rigorous settlement policy giving generous land subsidies not only within Israel but also for newer settler colonies in the disputed West Bank and Gaza area. Jewish settlements in these parts have in effect led to severe complexities in the delimitation of Israel and Palestinian settlement quarters. Such segmentation (of Arabs) and integration (with Israel) of the West Bank has resulted in dividing the Arab populated areas by an Israeli grid of highways and settlement nodes; Jerusalem and settlements to its east will cut the northern and southern parts of the West Bank off from one another. By this process of curbing population movement and promoting divisive settlement policies, Israel's nationalist dreams of reducing the Arab population to a non power- yeilding minority has somewhat been realized. Moreso because of military strife and a disquiet civil society, people from the concerned area have moved to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. This has increased these countries hostility towards Israel; though these countries did not vehemently oppose such movements, yet in due time the displaced peoples began posing an economic drain on the host country's resources these

neighboring countries held Israel to be the cause of all ills. Other grudges too surfaced within the respective nations when people from other areas came into their lands and settled there with no definite time frame for vacation. Although belonging to the same faith, historically they were not one integrated people of one land, but divided into various tribes and sects, separated from each other by power mongering tribe leaders and vast tracts of waste lands. But that is no excuse for snubbing out nationalism. If Israel's biblical demands are not taken into consideration, then such allegations too should not hold ground.

Thus it is this status of displaced people that can be said to be the crux of the border problem that Israel faces today. These people referred to as refugees now, have not been assimilated in any society, rather nation, thus forcing them to look for their own means of survival. In answer political activism of the PLO, Hamas and *intifada* uprisings have taken shape as redressal measures. It is also here that petropolitics and U.S interests enter into the ploy. It is however heartening to know the fact that all players in the region have at least tried to solve the problem. It is a different story that none till now have been successful. It can also be accorded that genuine third party intervention has been lacking; though the US is actively involved in straightening out Israel's borders, it is also a fact that US is more than biased on the Israeli side. The recent Fahd Plan, April 2002, is however seen as a concerted effort from all the Arab nations in this direction. The fallout remains to be seen.

OBJECTIVE

Keeping the above discussed factum as a precursor, the research work has striven to elaborate on the territorial aspect of spatial delimitation of sovereign functions across the state boundaries of Israel.

As such, explanatory and derivatory light has been thrown upon the **status** of boundary lines between Israel and its surrounding countries of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, as well as for West Bank's Palestinians. Status will implicitly denote the existence, the permeability, the legitimacy and security along or across such a line. The prime discussion that has been furnished is **whether such a boundary line exists on the ground or is merely a redressal line on paper;**

- What is its legitimacy as the International boundary of Israel;
- The degree of acceptance of this boundary line in the International accords and treaties,

especially a U.S. mandate of the entire affair;

--How is it represented to the factions of people within the disputed area, as well as to the governments involved.

Dealing mainly with the administrative particulars, of such 'lines' (in the plural, as there have been many such lines drawn, redrawn, argued and shifted by aggression and regression) this projection also brings forth how such dissensions were brought about and why, whereupon the causatory effects of such deeds was on the inhabiting residents.

The spatial implications too are highly significant here, specially as it represents the actual line of control and dissent. In this context, the work has also harped on the functions of the area *viz* **the resource base, population concentration, strategic restraints and cooperative feasibilities**. This elaboration in effect will give concrete support to the fact that boundary lines between the two factions of Israel-Palestine as well as with the surrounding countries have actually shifted and continue to shift towards the goal of a **complete territorial subjugation** of the Palestinian entity internally, i.e. confirming them to mere pockets, there by reducing Palestinian peoples mobility, allowing communication in limited manner and advancing externally into strategic areas of surrounding nations by the Israeli forces. As such the study **traces the development and formation of Israel's International boundary with respect to geostrategic factors over time and space**.

HYPOTHESIS

Palestinian Arabs now occupy less than 30% of the area that was actually accorded to them since the end of Second World War, after the promissary notes of the U.N. Israel continues with its aggressive nationalist policies of territorial consolidation, forcing Palestinian Arabs out of their homes by more ways than just using military force: Proposition to draw, redraw or even hypothesize on any particular territorial demarcation in such a hotbed of political activity is not an easy task. Yes, effects, causes and presumptions of future fallouts can be prophesized, accuracy notwithstanding, but the fact that even if such demarcations were to be realized by genuine authority- someone whom all the concerned factions hold in respect, to make sure that adherence is actualized and functions of a true international boundary accorded is a

Herculean task in itself. **Who polices whom, to what degree such observatory forces will just observe and beyond what critical point what measures are to be taken against the violators-** a myriad of such questions render legitimacy and non-recognition, and have posed and will pose further constraints in actually bringing out any workable solution. All the talking heads of the warring groups are democratically inclined, embodying the voice of public opinion, working for the territorial, economic, social and political solution of their passionate people. No harm in that; however if democracy may pull the strings then **few counter points can be drawn up wherein political visionaries become more important than civil rights, and that includes rights of all human beings, not just respective citizenry.** The civil society at large may not be farsighted enough as few men of caliber; the message then has to be delivered across, that some workable solution for the benefaction of all sides, has to be drawn up even if the price is reasonably high. **The civil society has to be convinced on such lines.**

Assuming thus that,

- Palestinian Authority gives up administrative claims over East Jerusalem, agreeing to making it an International mandate and a separate economic capital elsewhere;
- The PNA strictly contains the perpetrators of violence who owe allegiance to them, against Israel;
- Israel agreeing to allow the whole of 'united Jerusalem' come under International monitoring;
- The US plays a genuine third party mediator is bringing up workable solution for Israel particularly for the West Bank frontier and future of disputed Syrian Golan heights;
- The Arab League nations leave their partisan politics behind and consensually accept Israel's nationhood as well as its strategic short comings thereby complying with concessions, as it would do if the same were asked of them for Palestine.

In effect, the scholar **Hypothesizes that:**

- Israel will not give up occupation from its geostrategically significant areas (Map A) as it embodies a wider sense of interest for certain global powers who will continue to aid Israel in its territorial expansion.
- The former point leads to this second formulation that there will continue an unabated, though in future a subdued, military and economic aid from the US, a voyeuristic UN and a passively compliant European Union for the expansion of Israel in West Asia, in the hope of securing a strategic ally in the heart of oil barrels and linkages of occidental and oriental seas. Israel is very much aware of this.
- An independent sovereign of Palestine side by side with Israel can be a reality, free from IDF bases within its contiguous structure provided certain areal concessions are made to Israel specially of areas being dominated by extensive concentration of Jewish settlements, regardless of their temporal origin and giving up East Jerusalem in favour of an International mandate (discussed in ch. IV) there.

The work strives to concretize the same.

METHODOLOGY

The most important methodological tool for research used in the work has been a **detailed study of literature** on the subject. In support data has also been given **with relevant analysis of the data sets** on topics ranging from **demography, economic and military quantification**. Of significant importance are also the **maps** and graphical representations drawn up on the basis of the above mentioned research tools.

Chapterization:


The Research study is **divided into Four chapters** keeping in mind that boundary evolution of Israel has a long history to look back into, a fitting Introduction is supplied. The Prologue is thus aimed at pointing out certain facts and consequences based on mythical/factual claims done by the involved parties.

Chapter One elaborates on the land of Israel *viz* its physical countenance providing maps for the same. It also conscripts historical events and their causatory effects that have led to shape the future today. **Contents vary from physical determinism is historical times** involved in a broader perspective of incorporating the **birth of nationalism in Israel** as a consequence the constant flux of people in and out of the region.





Chapter Two deals mainly with **the period from the end of the Second World War till the turn of the century**, wherein Israel followed a very **aggressive expansionist** policy with an equally **rigorous settlement and immigration policy**, **the treaties Israel was signatory to (specially territorial) with the countries in its neighborhood, their fallouts, interpretations given the status of actual adherence on ground of finalized talks and the results of complications faced in reality.** Lines are probably easy on perceptions, but bring borders into people's lives evidently involves a normative element which perhaps military and strategic advisors fail to grasp in their calculations. This part of the work focuses on the **paper works uniting/ dividing the region, the rise of internal power centres and their consequent effects on treaties formulated, the connotations for the residing populace and the more sublime political interests** which ultimately has given shape to the current state of affairs. It traces the policies followed by Israel as well as its adversaries from the past through to present time. Being a **factual descriptive statement**, with certain opinions of the scholar with regard to treaties and other aspects of global politics, this part of work strives to bring in **the major external key factors and actors** in the problem of areal demarcations. It is an observatory reading alongside an appraisal of the situation.

Map A

GEOSTRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS: ISRAEL.



KEYS

	Strategic Defence Zones, Israel.
	Occupied Territories by Israel.
	Area above 300 metres.
	Present International border, Israel.

Sc. : Gerson, A. 1978

Chapter Three focuses on the resource evaluation of Israel in particular and the region in general. It gives an insight as to why the region is so strife torn; what are the resources that lie under the soil and in thin air which fosters strife in the area. It evaluates the **resource endowments in the region, the industrial growth, the options for a cooperative future, bringing out analytical derivations** of the economy of Israel. An appraisal of the **hydrologistics of the entire area** is provided, as water has emerged **as a potent tool for fostering peace** if applied concertedly. In this study, only an individual assessment of Israel is not enough, a comparison with surrounding nations is also required, and is hence provided with.

Chapter Four, the final chapter of the work, primarily **comprises of conclusory remarks and critical appraisals of observation** noted so far. Notes explaining what are the influences of the key factors, their implications and future course of desired actions are discussed. There is special emphasis on spatial organization; as such the study in this part seeks to **bring to light the boundary constraints in its fullest and a attempts to provide reconciliatory alternatives to the territorial conflicts**. Drawing *per se*, concrete boundary lines in the region is relatively easier a task than getting the people to adhere to such a demarcation and thus deriving legitimacy for such an attempt.

The conclusion given will make a concerted attempt to bring to light an appraisal of the entire work thus far. It also attempts, in the light of the discussed developments, to discuss the scholar's opinion with respect to Israel's boundary imperatives.

As such, the work attempts to highlight the geostrategic factors in the evolution of Israel's International boundary. The scholar hopes that the work will satisfy the critic and justly validate the enterprise.

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PROLOGUE:


Since the concerned topic is that of evolution of the boundaries of Israel, evidently an evolutionary approach in the introduction too is expected. Foremost, introducing one of Earth's oldest lands is a Herculean task in it self, added to it, an evolutionary approach will perhaps intellectually be quite demanding on the scholar. Nevertheless, from the birth of Prophet Samuel, to the last days of King David (973 B.C) about a 100 years in span, Israel was a loose confederation of semi-nomadic tribes scattered across Transjordan and Palestine, held together by their common faith, but politically weak and difficult to arouse to united action. In time, the Israelites acquired more settled habits, chose a king, Saul, and under Saul's successor David, became a united nation of considerable wealth and power.

Before Palestine was so named, Palestine and Phoenicia formed a part of the land of Canaan (Map B). So did Syria. In the 16th C, Egypt was ruled by the Hyksos for a century and a half; they were predominantly Semites from Syria and Lebanon and it was in their court that Joseph rose to power, leading to the settlement of Hebrews in the land. The rule was much hated and by 1545 BC the Egyptian Ahmose, initiator of the 18th Dynasty was successful in driving the Hyksos out. The 19th Dynasty Pharaohs attempted to reclaim the Asiatic provinces. But all they got was Palestine, and the long reign of Ramses II (1301-1234 B.C) was marked by wars against the Hittites as also the decline of Egyptian glory. It was under Ramses' son Merneptah(1234-1215 B.C) that the Hebrew exodus led by Moses took place to Canaan. The Canaanites were the second major Semitic group after the Assyro-Babylonians of Mesopotamia. They came to this land from the Syria-Arabian desert in the 3rd Millenium. In the 13th and 12th C. a third major Semitic grouping, identified as Aramaeans in Syria and Israelites in Palestine found its way into these lands. In the same period the 'sea peoples' related to Indo Europeans and called Philistines occupied the southern coasts. They gave their name to Palestine.

The Canaanites were mainly traders, and wherever trade carried them, they settled. Such settlement colonies were first planted in Egypt, Silesia, Cyprus, then in Sicily, Sardinia and later in France, Spain, N. Africa. All were linked by navigation to the mother cities, particularly Tyre and Sidon. The Hebrews had entered the land as nomads, but established themselves among the more highly civilized Canaanites, till the land and pursue other a ways of settled life. They were

Map B.

CANAAN BEFORE THE HEBREW MONARCHIES





SC: Hitti, P.K. 1966

a branch of the Aramaeans. Before the end of the 13th C. they were joined with a kindred group coming by way of Egypt. Enroute the leader Moses was initiated to the cult of a North Arabian tribal deity who became Jehovah of Israel. The deity abode in a tent, practiced vengeance to the point of cruelty and favoured sacrifices from the herd. But in the hands of the Hebrew prophets, he was radically transformed. Endowed with mercy, righteousness and justice, he was elevated into a position of universality, becoming the one and only God of Jews, Christians and Muslims. The ancestors of Hebrews must have spoken Aramic, which in Palestine was replaced by the local Canaanite dialect, the Hebrew of the Old testament.

Israel was one of the two states into which the Hebrew kingdom split after Solomon's death in 923 BC. The other kingdom was that of Judah with Jerusalem as capital. It was the father of Solomon, David (1004-963 B.C.) who was the real founder of the Hebrew Monarchy. His predecessor Saul was a vassal of the Philistine newcomers into the land who had firmly established themselves along the coast. Hebrew - Philistine rivalry for the possession of land prompted the rise of the Hebrew monarchy. David occupied Jerusalem, shook off the Philistine yoke and extended his domain in all directions. Under his son Solomon (963-923 B.C.), the Hebrew monarchy attained its zenith in might and prosperity. The prosperity stemmed mainly from the control of the caravan route that linked Syria and Phoenicia to Arabia and Egypt. Solomon's friend and ally, king Hiram of Tyre, provided the Hebrew monarch with the means for exploiting the Mines at the head of today's Gulf of Aqaba, constructing a navy and building the great temple and royal palace at Jerusalem. In his 'glory', king Solomon followed the Oriental monarchical pattern in maintaining a harem, living in lavish luxury and ultimately depleting the treasury. On his death the short lived united kingdom of Israel splintered into the kingdom of Israel in the North and the kingdom of Judah in the South. (MAP C). The two tiny fragments became rivals. Both fell into the complex of political and belligerent developments that plagued the area. In its two century existence, Israel had experienced nine dynastic changes. It was finally destroyed in 722 B.C. by Assyrian Sargon II. Judah survived till 586 B.C., when it too fell under the blows of Neo-Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar. During the Roman Era, in 4th C. B.C., Jerusalem was the capital of Roman Palestine, known now as Judea. Under Herod the Great, the kingdom of Judah attained its greatest territorial extent. Herod had succeeded his father, an Edomite kinglet, appointed by Pompeii. The Edomites were Judaized Arabians. Herod refortified Jerusalem and rebuilt the temple on a magnificent scale; the Herodian temple was the only

Map C
CANAAN AFTER KING DAVID



SC. HITT, P.K. 1966

one known to Jesus¹. On the coast Herod rebuilt the port of Roman Palestine and named it Caesarea. Such acts aroused his subjects to rebel against him, that he favored Hellenism, promoting it at the expense of Judaism. Most vehement were the Jews, who were also the least amenable to Roman rule. As the 'chosen people of God' and of the seed of Abraham, Jews resisted all attempts at integration or assimilation and insisted on maintaining this own identity. Theirs was an exclusive society, which prompted repressive measures against them by the rulers. Aram, Phoenicia, Israel and Judea may have vanished as political identities today, but as cultural influences they still continue to form an integral part of the heritage of the region.

Islam rose in the mid 7th C. ending the thousand yr. old Greco - Roman era. It also marked the dawn of the medieval age. It introduced a new religion, a new tongue - Arabic, destined to displace all local ones and a new culture itself a synthesis of earlier cultures. Born in 570 A.D, the prophet Muhammad founded the religion of Islam, the holy book - Qoran and also, importantly called forth a nation, the Arab nation, represented as an empire - The Caliphate, that lasted for centuries and at its prime extended from France and Spain through North Africa into central Asia. Through this empire the Islamic culture, expressed through Arabic, shone with greater brilliancy than any other culture. Embodying itself in the empires of Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Ayyubids, Mamluk and finally the Ottoman empire, Islamic faith was spread in almost the entire world. This was also the time when the holy wars and the Crusades took root, specially since Christianity, by the 2nd C B.C had become a potent religio - political force. The entire Europe had embraced Christianity; since the two regions of Europe and West Asia lie in close proximity, and as both religions are monotheistic, room for any other God was not acceptable. The expansionist visions of both the region's rulers brought them into contact and consequently the Crusades were inevitable. By the end of the 18th C, the caliphal empire was also burning out. In place, Europe was now exceedingly becoming important and transience primarily due to the wealth accrued by *Laissez faire* policies.

European interactions were increasing in the region which also meant a conspicuous westernizing influence. This was the period when European imperialism was at its height and one of the first areas to be colonized were, undoubtedly closer to home, the West Asian Region. As such the UK had a wide presence here in the forms of the Mandates -- Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. Increasing western influences brought in, apart from change in economic

¹ Hitti, P.K. 1966. P.72.

approach, Republicanism and inadvertently nationalism. Belongingness to one faith was there, but, being united in opposition to one foreign oppressor, was something new. In 1914, the 1st World War gave a glimpse of the first hints of nationalism, in people of the same faith fighting each other over nation or homeland. It was this crucial realization that in succeeding times have led to the complex of territorial troubles in the region, specially between Israel and Palestinian peoples, discussed as the topic of the work. Of the four mandated territories, Palestine stubbornly resisted it from the beginning to the end. It was also here and in the post 1st World War times that Zionism began to ingress, much to the disapproval of native arabites. All through the ages, the Jewry had from this land been dispersed to Europe, Russia and America. The British mandatory position allowed considerable Jewish migration to this land, and as a mandatory power the Palestinians could not even stop such influx. Throughout the Arab struggle continued against the British as mandatory power and against immigrating Zionists, whom the mandate was committed to support. By the end of 2nd World War, 1939, the Arab population, though increased by natural growth, but reduced considerably in proportion, from 10 to 1 Zion in 1920 to 2 to 1. In their struggle against such odds however, Palestinian Arabs remained disorganized, impoverished and with no substantial aid from outside. To Islamists every where, to whom Jerusalem was the third holiest city after Mecca and Medina, resented Jewish intrusion, but did nothing about it.

During the 2nd World War, the Zionist movement shifted its centre from England (to which it has shifted from the continent in the 1st World War) to the United States of America. There it gained on strength, financially and numerically. By 1942 its position was announced as unlimited immigration to Palestine converting it into a Jewish commonwealth and in effect organising a Jewish army to implement the program. Hitler's persecution of German Jews aroused new and wide sympathies world wide, especially among politicians who competed to win what they considered the Jewish vote. Arabs everywhere viewed Zionism as a inimical movement encouraged by the imperialist West to plant in the heart of their land an intrusive alien state. Their reaction everywhere was united and anti-Zionist. In 1947, as Jewish immigration to Palestine had given them a considerable population. The Arabs attacked the Jews, *vis a vis* a hastily assembled, ill equipped and inadequately trained 'army of liberation'. The Jews in effect attacked Arabs as well as Britishers, who were deciding to limit Jewish immigration as a result of Arab requests/political pressure. The pressure groups were mainly oil producing nations in

the region on whom the modern Europe had become increasingly dependent. Though an effort was made, yet this Islamic effort was unconcerted, individual and lacked the force it could have had if it were some what united. On 14th May 1948, Israel was declared as a state, in Tel Aviv. The US lost no time in recognizing it; other followed suit. The head of the new government was Russian- Polish David Ben Gurion led his country till 1963 (with a two yr. interruption in between). Though a state was declared, yet 1/10 of its current population was against it.

It was also on that very day Syria and Egypt declared war on Israel. Israel returned victorious then and in future too in two other major such aggressive declarations 1967, 1973. It also made certain territorial acquisitions since then, which to this date act as bones of contention between Israel and its neighbours. Discussions in the work will convey further the strife that began then and is presently still continuing; based primarily on territorial sovereignty and the finalization of each one's border .

Presently Israel covers an area of 22,145sq km, bears a population of 4,037,620 people with an average density of population of the order 270 people per sq. km. It shares its political boundary with Lebanon in the north, Syria in North-East, Jordan in the west and south, Egypt in the south-west. Within its domain also lie the Palestinian areas of the West Bank in the eastern Quarter and the Gaza strip in the west along the coastline.

Presently also, Israel is in the thick of negotiations with the Palestinian National Authority for final status talks of the West Bank's administrative future and boundary allocations.

ISRAEL : THE PHYSICAL FEATURES AND DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS

CHAPTER I


Dealing with the historic facts of Israel is easily speculated than researched on. Many wars, many displacements and many returning have taken place to and from this land. Abraham originally came to this land to deliver his people; Moses parted the Red Sea to cross over from Egypt and thus bring salvation to his people from the oppression of Ramses II. Flow charts may indicate the direction of migration (Map I i) in the region but the concrete steps to realize this dream of the Jewish people of “Jerusalem in Israel” finally took shape only during and after the 2nd World War. The primary reason for this may be attributed to the fact that most Jewish populace were concentrated in the European part of the world, and when Nazi persecution loomed large, after fleeing from one nation to another they finally stepped up migration to this small strip of land on the Mediterranean east coast. Figuratively three distinct waves of migration have been identified with regard to the Jewish peoples coming into erstwhile Palestine, known as the *three Aliyahs*.

The **first Aliyah** has been identified from **1882-1903**. The main determinant of this wave was the Russian pogroms in 1881, whereby a mass exodus of Jews from Eastern Europe resulted in the migration of about 25,000 people into Palestine over two decades. These people settled in as agriculturalists; it is also characterized by proto-Zionist activity. Immigrants also came in from muslim countries specially from Yemen and other countries (10% of Yemenite Jews migrated to Israel) settling mostly in Jerusalem and later in Jaffa. The local Jewish urban population were not keen on accepting them as they seemed to more Arabised than Jewish. None the less, they stayed being incorporated into the moshavs as manual labourers contributing to the important factor of introducing Hebrew labour.


The **second Aliyah, 1904-1914**, was characterized by the influx of more than 40,000 immigrants mainly from Eastern Europe. Jaffa, a tiny walled port city, became one of the leading Palestinian cities in terms of its cosmopolitan, secular and nationalist character, as most immigrants preferred to settle here than in Jerusalem with its more parochial and traditional outlook. By the eve of the Ist World War, Jaffa had developed into the second largest city in Palestine after Jerusalem. Tel Aviv a few kilometers north of Jaffa too grew alongside to become the centre of the main metropolitan area. Haifa and Haifa bay also developed during the 20th century into an

JEWISH IMMIGRATION

Map 1i



SETTLED JEWISH AREAS



SC : SMITH, A.D. 1988.

important centre of the New Yishuv – the immigrant settler Jewish population of Palestine, and labour organizations as well as an economic core.

Table I a, depicts Jewish population in selected cities in Palestine. Map I ii marks the areas of concentrated settlements of immigrants Jews in Palestine till 1945.


Interestingly it is noteworthy that these early settlers were more of skilled professionals than merely agriculturalists. This is a clear indication of the Europeanization the Jews had undergone when they had for long resided in European countries. Their occupational preferences in Europe had ranged from Bankers, Professors, Doctors, Lawyers and varied other elect professions of the times. They were obviously held in quite high a regard on this context. Now in Palestine, of the total Jewish population, secondary sector (industry, handicraft, construction) and tertiary sector (communication, insurance, transportation) together occupied 46.7% of the working population while agriculture denoted only 20% approx. (Table I b). This is explained in direct consequence to the immigrant population's limited options in choosing a career--- they decided to carry on with their own profession as that was what they revelled in.

During the 2nd World War, the migratory process was again stepped up. This is identified as the **Third Aliyah, from 1914-1945** (1948 is more appropriate as Israel got its independence in May 1948). This wave saw a huge number of immigrants, far exceeding the 12,000 limit set by the British Government in mid 1920's and 75,00 in late 1930's pouring into Palestine. On the one hand the Palestinian arabs continuously requested British Prime Minister Macdonald¹ to stop immigration by law as the continuous stream of immigrants now began to threaten the arabs with their rising moshavs, kibbutz and their solemn resolve to make Palestine their national home. On the other hand global sympathy for the Jews increased when the holocaust and Jewish persecution came to light after Germany had been defeated by the Allies. Added to it, the USA, a major player in making the Allied powers win against the Axis, was also pressurizing UK not to stop the immigration, at least not reverse any order. USA of course had its own geopolitical interest in the region. Nevertheless the UK was morally obliged to USA and even if it did want to do something its hands as well as lips were probably tied----

For one, the process of demarcating a territory as Jewish homeland had already begun; the postulates of Theodore Herzl had by this time attained the sanction of the USA, who was fast emerging as a major superpower in the UN Security Council, to forge ahead with the plans of

¹ Drysdale, Blake; Middle East and N.Af. p.277

Map Ilii



Settled area of
Jewish immigrants.
(Also includes
Red dots).
1945

Sc: Drysdale, Blake, 1985

shaping Eretz Israel in effect giving the Jews a much needed boost to their sentiments. World over Jews were mobilized and welcomed to this land which they could finally call as their own. The number of migrants just kept increasing, legally, illegally, irrespective of any order. Since then, till date, the USA has acted as a protector and a tapster to Israel;

And secondly, the region depicted one whose strategic potential was of immense value to European powers as access to this area was civilizationally speaking, limited to the occidental world. Turkey too had allied with the Axis powers during the 2nd World War. A friend in a strategic position as this would be quite the investment, at least for the USA. Thus the 1930 White paper was repealed and inspite of justified arab greivances Jewish agencies which were fast buying land in Palestine. Britain kept mum.

.Interestingly, why German Nazi decided to point its organized wrath towards the Jews can also be a valid topic of research. However, this paper shall not delve into such deep subjective politics and on this ground may be accused of superficial study on this regard. Nevertheless, history stands witness to the fact that Hitler played a very important role in speeding up the formation of the Jewish dreamland. Zions not only in Germany but also in Poland, Austria, Switzerland, Russia and Belgium during the holocaust either decided to stay in their respective countries and test their faith in their Gods or decided to leave behind their memories and take refuge in whichever nation was willing to accept them incognito. Though it was from the 1920's that population migratory flow had begun to Israel, it was not until the end of 2nd World War when the plight of the Jews was revealed to the world did the claimants of Israel get due recognition. Then known as Palestine, still a British mandate, the Jewish people attained the permission for limited migration. It was still not clear as to whether part of Palestine would actually be converted to free Israel. Nevertheless, with USA helping, Jewish people from all over Europe began their journey to Palestine. The world community too did not object to this massive exodus. Perhaps certain countries were happy to be relieved of their *Jewish burden*, but the Arabs of Palestine were certainly not one of them. This was, understandably, bound to happen. Earlier on this small trickle of Jewish refugees into this Arab land were unopposed, if not welcome--- the Jews settled on their own, preferably in areas away from an Arab majority, cultivated the lands, for which they brought in planned irrigations, opened schools and in turn benefited the existing Arabs through agglomeration of economies. Arabs were still in the

majority and dictated their terms, and probably felt somewhat elated when these were accepted without any compromise. After 1945 this changed.

Such areally concentrated settlement, one of the main reasons for the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, can be attributed to the fact that these were

* already settled areas having a considerable percentage of Arabs residing (Map I iii);

* here the lands were plain, soil quality the best and these were the areas where aquifer flow was the maximum (Map I iv).

Climographically too, these were the most suitable as the North received moisture in the form of rain in summer and snow in winter. Map I v presents a picture of the most congenial areas climatically giving the isolines of temperature difference-summer/winter diff., relative humidity in percentage, and marks the area of climatic divisions (after Koeppen) in Israel.



An appraisal of the physical constituents of the land is also important here. The Northern region of Israel forms a kind of square which protrudes north along the Huleh valley. The northern eastern and western edges are demarcated by the boundary and the Mediterranean sea; the southern natural boundary follows an irregular line from the mouths of river Tananim to its junction with the Jordan. Its length along the coast is 65 km and along the Jordan 85km, its width north of Haifa is 50km and south of Haifa 65km. The three main longitudinal areas of the country, the Coastal plains, the mountains and the Rift valley are not continuous here; the coastal plain is interrupted by the cape of Mount Carmel, the mountain backbone by the valley chain of Yizre'el, Harod and bet She'an, and the rift valley by the lava flow between Huleh and Kinneret. Map I vi (A) displays the regionalization of the north, which can descriptively be divided into—

1. The Upper Galilee: a. the coast, b. the west, c. the east.
2. The Lower Galilee; a. Haifa, b. the centre, c. the east, d. valley of Yizre'el.
3. The Carmel region; a. the coast, b. Mount Carmel, c. the Hills of Menashe, d. Amir Dome, e. Mount Gilboa
4. The Rift valley: a. Huleh, b. Kinorot, c. Beet She'an.

The Upper Galilee has the most complex topography of Israel. Based on a series of light folds with a synclinal trough in the East, it is crisscrossed by fault scraps which have elevated a number of horsts, but without the corresponding graben basins. These scarps dominate the


JEWISH POPULATION, 1945.

Map Iiii



Map liv

PHYSICAL COMPONENTS - ISRAEL




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- Aquifer boundaries
- Aquifer flow direction
- Main water divide
- > 500m
- 250-500m
- < 250m
- Agriculturally productive region


Map IV

CLIMATIC COMPONENTS - ISRAEL.




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MAP IV, SC: ATLAS OF ISRAEL.

Map Ivi



REGIONS OF ISRAEL.

THE NORTHERN REGION (A)

1. Upper Galilee - a. The Coast
b. The West c. The East
2. Lower Galilee - a. Haifa.
b. The Centre c. The East
d. The Valley of Yizere'al
3. The Carmel Region - a. The Coast
b. Mt. Carmel c. Hills of Menashe
d. Amiv Dome e. Mt. Gilboa.
4. The Rift Valley - a. Huleh Valley
b. The Kinrot c. Bet She'an

THE CENTRAL REGION (B)

1. The Sharon Plain.
2. The Conurbation of Tel Aviv
3. The Yarkon - Ayyalon Region
4. The Judean Plain.
5. The Shefala.
6. The Jerusalem Corridor

THE SOUTHERN REGION (C)

1. The Northern Negev - a. The Coastal Section.
b. The plateau & the basin secⁿ
c. The fold mountains.
2. The Central Negev -
a. The High Negev
b. The Central basins
3. The Rift Valley -
a. The Dead Sea Region
b. The Arava.
4. The Mountains of Eliat.

landscape and erosion has followed these lines only in a few places being more influenced by bases in the Mediterranean to the west and to the Jordan rift in the east. The consequence of this non-conformity of determining factors in the landscape is the lack of clearly defined ridges or watersheds.

The Lower Galilee is distinctly a plain with an average rainfall of almost 600mm which has made it a most favourable agricultural area. A string of villages situated on the slopes of Mount Carmel, of which only three had existed before 1948, now cultivate the land. The village of 'Atlit was founded in 1904 on the swampy lands between the coast and the ridges and has salt production as the main occupation. The Jewish settlements in the region have spread over the plain in order to be nearer to the fields and suffer from the disadvantages of house construction on the more heavy soils. The most favourable area is the foot of Mt. Carmel which enjoys then best drainage and is protected from frost and storm. Bananas and subtropical fruits dominate, the rest of being utilized for vineyards, deciduous fruits, vegetables and fishponds.

The Carmel region is an area of complex structure. It is bounded by a fault scarp of about 400m elevation in the north – east and east, and by lesser scarp which rises steeply about 170m in the west. The latter shows signs of marine abrasion (when the level of sea was much higher) including caves of marine cliffs, in which remains of ancient man have been found. The southern part consists of a hilly area, mainly of hard limestones and dolomite of the upper Cenomanian age, interspersed with soft volcanic tufa which has been eroded into small basins. Its height remains below 200m and is separated from the higher parts of Mt. Carmel by a lowland trough which runs NW to SE. The higher parts of Mt. Carmel consists of two anticlinal ridges; the uppermost layers consisting of hard limestones of lower Cenomanian forming the rim of the mountains at a height of 500m. The Menashe heights are also a salient feature in the region. Agriculturally, it is based mainly on Tobacco, in addition to grains. The western spurs and valleys are occupied mainly by vineyards. The lack of perennial water resources made large scale land reclamation impracticable, and only small areas have been terraced and stoned for the purpose of plantations. The more level areas are utilized for grains and the remainder for sheep grazing which also plays an important role on the higher slopes.

The Mt. Gilboa region lies to the east of Mt. Carmel range, beyond the gap of Jenin protruding into the Bet She'an valley Geologically it forms the continuation of the synclinal trough of Samaria built on soft Eocene chalks and marls. The elevation mainly affected the

northern and eastern rim which forms a narrow ridge arched like those of eastern lower Galilee. The crest of the ridge lies 425m above sea level which rounded peaks which reach 500m. The highest point is Har Malkishua (538m). Inside the frame of this ridge lies a saucer shaped low plateau; its core is a round basin which rises gradually from 120m at the centre to about 200m at the periphery and collects radial drainage from the rim into a few tributaries of Nahl Qishon. The basin rises in fairly steep slopes on all sides to a platform 250-300m in height, which lies at the foot of the elevated ridge or the mountains of Samaria. But the aspect of the mountain is completely different when seen from the valleys of Harod and Bet She'an; from these valleys which lie below sea level, it towers like a giant wall 600-700m high and its impression is intensified by the fact that owing to the risk of the block, dolomites and hard limestones have been brought to the surface on the lower slopes as out crops producing cliffs. As these rocks form the main aquifer of the mountains of Israel, large springs emanate from the foot of the mountain, which drain a large underground drainage area, conditioned by the synclinal structure of Samaria. The largest springs are Harod, which feed the river of the same name, and all-important springs of the Bet She'an valley. In contrast to the abundance of water at the foot of Gilboa, the inner plateau lacks springs and the Eocene slopes are almost barren. But the rendzina soils of the inner basins and the platform are suitable for grain cultivation and the slopes around the villages have been covered with olive groves. The steep outer slopes above the limestone cliffs in the north have been afforested and the limestone is quarried.

Haifa is by far the most important center here. It was constructed as a port city and along with it went the construction of a pipeline from the oilfields of Kirkuk in Iraq, accompanied by a metalled road; the pipeline reached Haifa in 1936² and turned it into a major oil harbor. The oil refineries started production in 1939. The development of these transport facilities was inevitably accompanied by a rapid rise in population.

The central Region takes up one-third of the area of Israel, but contains more than 65% of its population. It consists of the western coastal plain and a narrow salient to the east – the Jerusalem corridor. The central region can be thus divided – 1. the Sharon plain; 2. the Conurbation of Tel Aviv; 3. the Yarqon – Ayyalon region; 4. the Judean plain; 5. the Shefala; 6. the Jerusalem corridor Map I vi (B).

² Kamon, Yehuda, Israel, *A Regional Geography*. P.208

The Sharon plain has a conspicuous swamp belt running N-S through it. Throughout history this belt of hills and swamps constituted a formidable barrier between the eastern and the western sections of the Sharon. The area to the west of it 5km wide, is dominated by kurkar ridges which are absent from the central belt. These ridges which characterize all the coastal belt are best developed here and are almost continuous except for narrow gaps where a river has prevented the accumulation of Pleistocene sands and the formation of a sandy ridge which could later turn into a kurkar. These gaps also serve as the only breakthrough for the four rivers of the Sharon (Poleg, Alexandra, Hadera, Taninim) but they are too narrow to let all flood waters pass and therefore caused the formation of swamps which spread north and south behind the ridges. The western ridge is most conspicuous and forms the straight coast of the Sharon; it is constantly being attacked and only in summer it is protected by a sandy beach which is destroyed by the first winter storms. Waves and rain cause frequent collapse of parts of the ridge and the coastline retreats at an overall rate of 5m per 100 years. Thus for most of its length the coast is formed by a cliff of medium height 20-30m with maximum elevations of 50-60 m, near Netanya.

Between the and the Judean plains lies a stretch of the coastal plain which is truly transitional and shows intermingling features of both the regions. This is the Yarqon-Ayyalon Region. Geographers have always had difficulty in defining its place and it seems appropriate to regard it as a separate region, specially now as it has a unifying human factor – the coast to 35 km at its inland margin.

The slight physical difference from the rest of the coastal plain has probably been caused by a fault running south-east from Yafo to beyond Ramla. This fault which is parallel to the fault of Mt. Carmel, also caused the subsidence of the area north of it. Thus a triangular shaped basin has been formed, the basin of Lod, which resembles the valley of Yizra'el, although of smaller dimension. This basin drained by nahal Ayyalon and its tributaries, apparently allowed deep marine ingressions at certain times during the Pleistocene. Thus the kurkar hills, which demarcate Pleistocene coastlines and usually run parallel to the coast here appear further inland as an irregular grouping of hills and cliffs reaching heights of over 80m. These hills covering an area 3-8 km distant from the sea, pass to the east to the hills of red sand which are typical of the Sharon. They separate Lod basin from the much smaller basin and break through the kurkar hills in a narrow corridor. The Yarqon basin lies at a lower level than the Lod basin, 5-15m above sea level as against 15-40m.

The Southern region of Israel comprises of 60% of the total national area containing however only 10% or less of the population. At the time of the British Mandate the sedentary population of the area outside the Gaza strip amounted to only 5000 (0.3% of total popn.). The reason for the sparsity of population in the regions but obvious, as it is the dry hot desert, whose aridity increases from north to south. Whereas the northern fringe of the southern region still receives rainfall that can be regarded as a big help for dryland farming, the south however has no such good fortune, receiving less than 75 mm of rainfall annually. The Meso regions of the South however has no such good fortune, receiving less than 50 mm of rainfall annually. The meso regions of the south can be described as –1. The Northern Negev: a. the coastal section; b. the plateau and basin section; c. the fold mountains;

2. The Central Negev: a. the high Negev; b. the central basins 3. The Rift Valley: a. the Dead sea region; b. the Arava 4. The Mountains of Eilat. Map I vi (C)

Since the region is characterized by low population density, any demographic phenomena here is of great significance. Thus the status of Be'er Sheva is all the more important. Though a route did exist on this region, yet it remained covered by sand for most of the time. Thus a metalled road was build in the 20th century from the east to the south. By the construction of this road Be'er Sheva became a gateway not only to the areas of the south and east of it, but also to Sinai and Egypt.

Physiographically, the loess basins of the northern sections of the plateau and basin sections are aligned west to along fault lines which separate the Negev from the Judean mountains. To the east of Be'er Sheva lie two large basins of Be'er Sheva and Arad, separated by the elongated spur of Ira. The elevation of the basin rises from the west to east; Eshel Ha Nassi-200m, Hazewrim-240m. Be'er Sheva 330m, Arad-450m. These basins are covered with loess and receive only 200mm of rainfall. They are nevertheless cultivated by the *beduin*. Modern agriculture gained only a small foothold in the region as local water resources are limited and are used mainly for Urban water supply and the general resources of the National Water Carrier provides no surplus for this arid region. Most of the area is still utilized as pasture by the *beduin* who complement it with dry farming of barley on 2 year rotation or with a longer fallow. The only urban centre in the region is Be'er Sheva and represents a regional capital in the true sense of the word.

The idea of drawing borders for Israel can be said to have developed as early as 1913³, whereby a year later, in 1917, Balfour Declaration was proclaimed promising the Jewish people their demand for their ancestral homeland. Since then many plan has been brought up by many involved parties, specially the British Delegates, the Jewish Planners, the Arab countries, and finally the UN⁴. On the eve of independence the UN Partition Plan stood, but this was just the beginning of a long tortuous journey for territorial acquisitions and losses to be witnessed in the region. It is of importance to note here that though the USA was increasingly becoming involved in the dynamics any lines on the ground. Israel was increasingly growing dependent on the US interpretations of the schemes that were being drawn up and perhaps if a judgemental view would be brought up by the US, whereby no commitments or obligations would be involved, even then Israeli leaders would probably give it deep thoughts, if not take actions on the proposed lines. Israel was till in the infancy stage of nationhood and the hand of a rising world power in the politics of the region was bound to have a working influence on Israel. Things perhaps would have different then.

Right after gaining independence, began Israel' s struggle for securing its international borders which it succeeded in fairly well with a constant supply of arms from the US, international pressure in favour of Jewish migration to Israel and absolute non-interference in West Asian Agreement 1916, The Balfuor Declaration 1917 and the British retreat through the 1930 White paper⁵ left the Arab of Palestine in no doubt as to where the loyalty of British lay, even though PM Churchill gave assurances of genuine help from his side. Even International forums like the UN, with a seemingly impartial and unbiased outlook, was dominated by powers adverse to them. Anger rose within and this was perhaps the precise moment when Palestinian nationalism took birth. Accordingly, the 1967 Wars Israel fought with Egypt and Syria were probably manifestation of this anger that was smoldering within the Palestinians, now driven to the status of refugees. They were majorly outnumbered in their places of stay and as political power changed hands in Israel, the Right wing Zionistrs treated them at best as second class citizens, if not prisoners of war in their own hands. They had to pay poll taxes where as their Jewish counterparts did not, had different colored license plates for vehicles to differentiate them from Jewish owned one and were categorically denied high offices in Government institutions.

³ Gerson, Allan, *Israel, The WEST BANK and International Law*, (Maps)

⁴ Ibid, (Maps).



⁵ Wolf, Aaron., *T. Hydropolitics along The Jordan River*, p. 190.

Such measures of differentiation of a principally Zionist state where even education of children was biased on religious line obviously did not harbour any hope for the Islamic Arabs of being patronized. Perhaps the Zionists had just the thing in mind; the takeover of land and property on the pretext of all property within the boundaries belonging to the state, during the 1967 War which were closed or abandoned, and refusing to hand it over to the Arab owners invoked more than just vengeance – massive outflux of people now stratified as refugees from Israel to its surrounding areas (Map I vii). Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt had to bear the brunt of such displacements and for them it was a condition where they could not outrightly refuse the refugees who were people of Islamic faith and the brotherhood concept of the Islamic world had to be upheld to validate their claims in the face of a Western aggression, more so because these nations had not yet come out of their allegiance to religious figureheads to yield to rationalistic politico-democratic understandings. It was thus the will of the civil society which forced the governing of the respective nations to welcome these displaced peoples into their borders. Nor could they sustain themselves with the increasing burden of social overhead costs which kept arising on account of migrants from Israel.

From the results of the 1967 War it was militarily clear that Israeli might had increased manifold during the two decades of freedom it had gained and its neighbours realized that peace with Israel was the only way to solve their problems. Cold diplomatic decisions had to be taken behind closed doors no matter in front it however high the passions were allowed to soar. Probably the actual Palestinian problem began here, after peace was restored in 1967 and border demarcations returned to normality, each country decided to first set its own house in order; in effect left the Palestinian people out alone to fend for themselves in whichever possible way they sought as right.

REFUGEE MOVEMENT FROM ISRAEL

Map I vii



Map I vii

Sc. Drysdale; Blake
1985.

ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

CHAPTER-II

The work for building Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel) had only been waiting for being launched on an international platform. It was as if the Zionists were waiting for an international pronouncement of their plans and irrespective of what who thought about it would go ahead. Obviously some backing was needed politically, which was amply supplied by the United States and UK. The High Commissioner to be appointed in Palestine in 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel was a staunch supporter of the Zionist cause. Purchasing of land and at times entire Arab villages⁶, to establish Jewish settlements and stable cultivation of land had begun soon after the Balfour Declaration as early as 1920. Sir Samuel authorized⁷ a number of policies to aid this even further:

The Land Transfer Policy through which Jewish immigrants could purchase lands;

The Jewish National Fund and Palestinian Land Development, via which finance was acquitted, transferred and distributed among interested Jewish parties. He also allowed massive immigrations of Jews unofficially.

The fact that the Balfour Draft agreed to Jewish settlement in the region did not however mean that the whole of Palestine would be converted to a Jewish national home, but more strictly speaking, that such a home should be founded in Palestine, confirmed in the affirmative by Sir Winston Churchill⁸. The areal extent was as of yet not fixed by treaty for the newly desired state. This points to the important lapse of farsightedness that though apparently the Declaration seemed to be a restricting one, where only some parts of the state of Palestine be used for Jewish settlements it also does not make clear as to which parts may be settled and which left alone. The state covered barren hills in the north; fertile lands in the centre, aquifers in the east, pleasant coasts in the west and rocky hot deserts in the south. Thus on paper the Zionist were not free to settle everywhere, but on the ground they could settle in concentration, anywhere they chose to. Consequently, the first target area for all Jews who made it to Israel between 1929 and 1940 was Jerusalem – the religious heartland or Jaffa and Haifa where a considerable Jewish population

⁶ Pictorial History of Israel, Jablonsky Edward., 1985, p.87.

⁷ Husain, Asaf; *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East*. P 114.

⁸ Ibid, p.114.

existed⁹. However this was not easy as it was still in Arab majority and immigration was heavily discouraged by open hostility, specially in the 1920's from the native arab inhabitants. Thus other marginal areas more to the north and south were occupied.

The ground realities forced the members of the halls of power to at least bring into constitution a body that would mark some equality in redistribution of land. Sir Herbertson proposed a Legislative Council which would compose of 22 members; 10 officials appointees, 2 Jewish, 2 Christians and 8 Arabs. The Arabs refused to endorse it, it was declared null and void and all power from then onwards was to be concentrated in the hands of the British Commission. The Arabs felt that if such a Council came into existence then they would be marginalized; 10 officials appointees obviously meant 10 votes in favour of Jewish programmes, 2 Jewish would make it 12 and in the 2 Christians they did not have much faith. That in effect made it 14 to 8, a clear minority. While such petty haggling continued in the name of diplomacy, the Jewish settlers increased their concentration as well as immigration; it resulted in inevitable conflict. Both sides now began to use apart from pressure tactics in political lobbies, violence as a means to assert themselves. The Arabs wanted all Jewish immigrants to stop before any real distribution was finalized, the Jews could not but stop pouring in as this was the time the 2nd World War was in full swing and that implied Hitler's policies being implemented *in toto*. The Jewish immigrants settled at first bordering the Arab villages and in due time with increasing population and their aggressive settlement policy and financial clout, gradually marginalizing the Arab villagers. This was done not only through physical manifestation of their collective housing and cultivated lands, but also to quite some extent psychologically too. The Kibbutz that began with a few tent houses, gradually expanded into proper settlements with extensive town planning, even if the structures were of tin and wood. Yes, the Jews are a laborious lot, working long hot hours in the fields, at home raising children and as soldiers who vengefully guarded their newly conceived place of stay. Added to this they are also extremely communal believing in he infallibility and oneness of faith. These two qualities which grossly lacked in their Arab counterparts made the Jews successful, and though in the land of hardship all who stay face vagaries on equal footage, the Jewish immigrants soon turned out to be first among equals. This was not to be tolerated among the fissiparous Arabs who were, figuratively, dethorned.

⁹ Refer to Map I i.


Thus began the fight for territories which till date persists. In this light, since 1947 onwards, many a leader many a time have been constantly trying if not committed to solve this problem. From the Peel Commission, 1937, which tried to divide the two factions (Map II i) to the present Saudi Prince's Plan at least 24 commendable peace initiatives have been given a try in the region, to finally stabilize the international boundary of Israel.

Taking a stand of not more than four decades backwards, the UN adopted Resolution 242 on 22nd Nov. 1967, whereby the Security Council unanimously declared the concerned Resolution to be the basis for all peace initiatives for the next 5 years. Resolution 242 still holds true. The Resolution satisfied the demand of the Arabs and their supporter the USSR, for an Israeli withdrawal as Israel had by this time encroached into Egypt and the WEST BANK territories. The Resolution was also accepted by the US and Israel. The movement of Israel into Sinai, though strategically showed the might of Israel, yet did not prove worthy to Israel – it ran short of manpower and climatically as well as economically it was not conducive for Israel to maintain such a vast tract of barren desert, more so as all its neighbours here were absolutely hostile to it. Guarding the Negev meant a cut on other frontiers which were more important. Israel maintained the Eilat – the opening to the Red Sea, more securely entrenched now, which was what was intended as the entire operation began as a reaction to the blockade imposed by Egypt at the Sharm el Sheik and the mouths of Tiran.

Sporadic incidents and the arms escalation in the region led to the formulation of the Rogers Plan, Dec 1969 (William Rogers, US Secy. Of State.) which drafted that Resolution 242 be implemented *in toto*, not requiring any negotiations. This also came at a time when Lebanon was being drawn into conflict as Israel was being increasingly stubborn to actually move out of the occupied areas *de facto*. Israeli PM probably intended to stay close to the Suez for future ramifications, but finally withdrew after future assurances on the future supply of arms from the US as well as a prospective de-escalation from its neighbours. In Feb.1971 the new President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat willingly took up the pursuit of a settlement with Israel. Egypt decided to withdraw its forces from the Suez, asking Israel to do the same to the position of pre-June 1967 lines. Israel was not willing to do inspite of US assurances, at least that is what it portrayed though it knew that maintaining the Siani at this juncture would only qualify for a misadventure. Still it continued to take these territories to be the spoils of war and did not want to give them up.

Map II


PARTITION PLAN FOR PAESTINE PEEL COMMISSION, 1937



SC: WOLF, A.T.
1995

ISRAEL - 1967 BOUNDARIES

Map 11ii



Sci Cossali, P. 1999

W. Rogers categorically stated that in the US view the 1967 boundary should be the boundary between Israel and Egypt.¹⁰ In 1973, Oct 6th, a surprise attack was launched on two fronts of Israel by Egypt and Syria again. Israel was taken completely by surprise, specially on the Egyptian front as it did not anticipate the clarity in crossing the east bank of Suez, what was known as the Bar Lev Line (Map II iii). The day was that of Yom Kippur – The Day of Atonement. It was symbolic for the Arab offensive; they felt it was the right action on the right day as they found Israel to be perpetrating atrocities on their fellow brethren. The day was also one of complete rest for Israel, with all public services being suspended. However during the next three weeks Israel succeeded in not only pushing back the Egyptian tanks west of the Bar Lev, but occupying Syrian Territory almost to the point of threatening Damascus. Retreat from here took almost two years, was slow and pessimistic; mostly due to internal situation in Israel whereby PM Golda Meir was held primarily responsible for the fiasco. She yielded power to Yitzhak Rabin, 1974. The incident also points out the increasing influence of Arab politicking in the region; and to a successful diplomatic initiative by Dr. Kissinger whereby disengagement in Egypt from both sides took place.


In reaction to this and the slow disengagement in Egypt where Israel was increasingly was taking the offensive and thus leading to a deteriorating environment for peace talks, President Carter invited both Egypt and Israel to the Table at Camp David, Sep. 1978. Two outcomes followed -- an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and establishment of normal relations between the two countries;

-- the wider question of the future of West Bank and Gaza was brought up for discussion.

This dealt with the provision for the election of a self governing authority of Palestine to replace the existing military government. Once this authority was brought into being there would be a transitional period of not more than five years during which the inhabitants of Gaza and WEST BANK could exercise autonomy; and finally not later than the five year after the beginning of the transitional period, there should be negotiations to determine the final status of the WEST BANK and the Gaza and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Camp David formula as per the Arab indications were imprecise if not useless. Psd Sadat's Foreign Minister resigned and President Sadat was accused of having sold out on Arab solidarity. In any case

¹⁰ Cossali, P. *Mid East and N. Africa*, 1999.

Map IIiii



Sc: Gerson, A. 1978.

Israel would hold power over creation/abolition/recognition of any authoritative body of Palestine. President Carter insisted that if Palestinian Representatives agreed to the terms, then they would proceed towards the process that would finally lead to their independence. President Sadat's case was that of indirectly representing a group of people whom firstly were not consulted, secondly were not of his concern and thirdly who themselves failed to arrive at a consensus as to their own boundaries. In spite of these the Arab League imposed an economic and political boycott on Egypt. Though President Sadat maintained that his was the first step towards a comprehensive restructuring of Palestine, The Arabs felt it was a separate treaty between Israel and Egypt which leased out Sinai in lieu of Palestinian territory in Israeli hands. In 1980 a feeble attempt by the European Commission was made wherein they declared that the Palestinian people should be allowed to exercise fully their right to self determination. They were thumbed down quite conspicuously by the US.

In the North, Lebanon was backed by Syria as well as the Arab league in the form of the Arab Deterrent Force which continuously launched offensives against the Israeli occupied Golan. To increase PM. Begin's woes, Israeli General Elections were close by, the economy was in no stronghold and it was these issues that forced him to destroy a nuclear plant in Iraq, Baghdad, which he claimed were for Israel's national security reasons. Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear NPT, with inspected and declared non-capability to produce nuclear weapons. President Reagan gave his support to Israel making it clear where future negotiations would lead. Perhaps for PM. Begin it was the right move. In 1981, he gained power and this time his cabinet was even more uncompromising; he appointed Ariel Sharon to the Defence Ministry.

A major initiative during this period (1981) came from Saudi Arabia in the form of the "Fahd Plan" whereby in its Point Seven it requested "the right of all States in the region to live in peace"; Saudi Arab was ready to recognize Israel's Sovereignty in return for an independent Palestinian state. The European Commission, EC, welcomed it as "extremely positive", the US held a vague response and Israel outrightly rejected it saying it was destructive to Israeli sovereignty. PM Begin's Foreign Policy was a very aggressive one not amounting to any tolerance of assertion on the Palestinian behalf. He stuck to his aggressiveness more for the reason that Israel's domestic condition was definitely not in his favour and thus he needed to divert attention elsewhere to mask his inability to consolidate the home front. He launched an offensive in the Golan, bringing in Syria again into foreplay, though part of this was due to the

genuine reason of water shortage and ambitions to harness the Litani river. Active fighting thus continued on the northern front with Lebanon and Syria and in the eastern front where Arab nationalism was smoldering in the form of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and religio-extremist organizations. The Iraq offensive too had a major role to play in disturbing the northern boundary of Israel as Palestinian guerilla warfare was active along the North and North-east boundary fronts and if not for a Syrian presence and a Saudi influence Iraq too would have launched an offensive against Israel.

During this turmoil, President Reagan announced a new plan to settle claims of the ongoing territorial imbroglio. Designed by George Shultz (US Secy of state) Sept. 1982, it envisaged the restoration of territory taken in 1967 on the east and northern Israeli fronts to the Arabites. At the same time US also opined its opposition to the creation of a Palestinian independency and proposed a governance in association with Jordan. Israel again rejected the plan. However, due to continuing economic hardship internally Israel withdrew from Lebanon supposedly completed by June 1985, but maintaining a 10kms wide "security zone" along the border inside Lebanon policed by Israeli sponsored troops. Friction however continued here inspite of intervening peace talks and border negotiations. In Feb 1988, the Shultz plan was revisited – the proposition included, apart from a permanent negotiated settlement of border issue between Israel and Jordan-Palestine, military withdrawal from occupied territories in WEST BANK and Gaza and Municipal elections in the occupied territories. With the Shultz plan, no matter what amount of dissent it may have generated, the entire region was brought into contact, involving interests of all the sovereignties surrounding Israel. It is a different story that the plan was not a complete success.

The PLO and the Occupied Territories

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Inside the Israeli occupied territories, The PLO was increasingly becoming active with Yasser Arafat shifting his operation from Tripoli to Gaza and thus symbolically being more close to ground zero. In a major breakthrough in peace initiatives, **the US recognized the PLO with Y. Arafat as its head in 1989.** The PLO embodied the will of the Palestinian people along with the notions of the Arab league. In present times Saudi Arabia is the most important benefactor of

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the PLO giving over 45m. US\$ as aid every month (current prices 1995). This recognition of course, came after the fact that the PLO under Y. Arafat had decided to abide by UN Resolution 242 as a basis for any future negotiation.

The continuing Jewish immigrants from Russia and the controversy over the Israeli settlement policy was continuing to raise tensions in the occupied territories. In March 1990 violent protests against the settlement of Soviet Jews in east Jerusalem led to the killing of 2 young Palestinians. A month later attempts by a nationalist religious group in the Christian quarter of Jerusalem's old city provoked confrontations with Israel's security forces. Palestinian anger was deepened by revelations that the Israeli govt. had funded the settler's fraudulent purchase of a building belonging to the Greek Orthodox church. Predictably the situation just grew extremely volatile. It is reported that in May an uniformed Israeli approached a group of Palestinians congregating at a roadside labour market in Rishon le Zion and after checking their identity cards opened fire with an automatic rifle, killing 8 of them and wounding 10 more. Demonstrations erupted and attempts at suppression by the army were ignored. This prompted the *intifada*, for the second time since 1987, to spill over into Arab populated regions inside Israeli. Following an international criticism of Israeli's response to the demonstrations, the US government stated that it would consider an Arab sponsored move to send UN observers to the occupied territories. At a specially convened session of the UNSC, Geneva, Y. Arafat, the leader of PLO, to which all Palestinians unequivocally owed allegiance to, accused Israel of attempting genocide in the occupied territories. The Fatah Party *alias* PLO had vowed to liberate Palestine from Israeli clutches and give it back the freedom and a free state. While no agreement was reached to send Observers to the Territories, Israel was now arguably even more isolated. Further pressure came from the Arab summit meeting held in Baghdad to discuss Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel and western hostility to Iraq's reported attempts to develop a nuclear capability. The Jordanian delegation suggested that Israel was trying to engineer a war with Jordan as a means of expelling the Palestinian population from the West Bank. The USA was also criticized for its support of Israel. Within Israel the new government an alliance of the Likud and small right wing religious groups, June 1990, was regarded as the least conciliatory and most unlikely to further the border negotiations and peace process. Rather its very survival was dependent on its ability to appease those within the Knesset who sought to prevent any future dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This aggression was not regarded with the same sense of outrage in the Arab quarters as it was seen in the west. At a time of considerable disillusionment with western attitudes towards the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and with the US government's decision to terminate its dialogue with the PLO, the Iraqi leaders military rhetoric to confront Israeli expansionism had been favorably received by the Arab masses. Kuwait on the other hand was resented both for its prosperity and for its pro-western outlook. Furthermore, two developments attracted popular support for Iraq

- ❖ Saddam Hussain's attempt to link Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to that of Israel's from the occupied territories;
- ❖ The decision of the US to dispatch a large military force to the Gulf region in order, initially to defend S. Arabia.

What had begun as an act of aggression by one Arab state against another was now perceived by many Arabs as a confrontation between the forces of Arab nationalism and Western imperialism, particularly for the Palestinians. That the USA should act so swiftly to deter territorial conquest in Kuwait when it had effectively sustained such conquest in areas occupied by Israel since 1967 was taken by Palestinians as proof of the western hypocrisy and hostility to their cause. Saddam Hussain was swiftly championed as a savior. The PLO at this juncture seemed to be quite confused. It condemned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait but abstained in the vote on whether to deploy a Pan-Arab military force in S. Arabia. It also joined Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia and Algeria in denouncing the proposed deployment of US armed forces in the Gulf region. Perhaps it sought to validate the reasoning of keeping the internal dynamics of one's home to oneself, and not letting in any outsider (US). Two weeks later (19th Aug 1990) the PLO confirmed its opposition to the invasion of Kuwait. Together with Libya and Jordan it continued to act as a mediator but with the US success in building an anti-Iraq coalition rapidly polarizing the Arab states, there was no sign of the consensus that was needed to make their proposals feasible. Instead the concept of linkage of the Gulf conflict with the Palestinian issue, popular support for Iraq and its distrust for the USA all dictated that the PLO should align itself with Iraq. Consequently, Y. Arafat issued a joint statement with the Iraqi leader in Baghdad proclaiming that the Palestinians and the Iraqi, were united in a common struggle against Israeli occupation and US military intervention in the Gulf; in spite of the fact that just a few days ago it had condemned the Iraqi offensive in Kuwait, causing quite a blow to its own credibility. The political risks with such a

firm alliance with Iraq were immense, but PLO officials argued that given the mood of their constituency they had no other option. The PLO's partnership, earned it the opprobrium of the west and alienated its principal financial supporters, S. Arabia and the Gulf states. Jordan, Yemen, Sudan whose governments were most hostile to the western military involvement in west Asia, similarly had to endure the full weight of US and conservative Arab displeasure. Jordan, traditionally pro-western and in the process of democratization was subjected to particular criticism for having allowed a meeting of Arab nationalists and left wing political parties to take place in Amman, Nov '90.

In this entire operation Israel seemed to stand out as the sole beneficiary. The international isolation that Israel forced for its procrastination over border negotiation with PLO and repression in the occupied territories, the Gulf crisis offered it the prospect of rehabilitation. Israel grabbed the opportunity for stating that it was the lack of democracy in the Arab world and not Israeli occupation of Arab territories which was the principal cause of instability in the region. The US had begun to coax pro-western leaders to form multinational force against the aggressive forces. And just as it had to pay for Israel's passivity over peace talks, so it had to offer inducements to Arab governments to participate in the multinational force. The Gulf states, potentially prone to further Iraqi aggression, needed little persuasion to do so. Egypt, Syria and Morocco were also in favour of deploying armed forces in S. Arabia. However it was the prospect of economic aid and the influence of post crisis settlement which ultimately persuaded them to despatch troops to fight alongside Americans against fellow Arabs. President Assad of Syria, a longstanding radical, hence the most unlikely of the coalition partners, certainly expected the crisis to be followed by moves to end the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, including Syrian territory. President Mubarak of Egypt, who was anxious to see his country reinstated as the *primus inter pares* of the Arab world aired the same concerns in discussions with his US and European counterparts. The burden of conflicting expectations from Israel and the Arab states placed the US in a delicate position. President G. Bush and the US secretary of state, James Baker, had to avoid any linkage of the crisis in the Gulf of the Arab- Israeli conflict since this would effectively reward Saddam Hussain and displease Israel. Thus President Bush, while maintaining that the issue of Israeli occupation will have to end, also dismissed the possibility of an international conference on the issue in the near future. At a meeting EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris, Sept. '90, The President of the EC, Jacques Delors, warned

Israel that once the Gulf crisis was over it would have to accept 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinians'. In addition, the Italian Minister of Foreign Policy, informed his Israeli counterpart, David Levy, that the Palestinians had a right to their own state.

Meanwhile the Palestinian *intifada* continued though with less intensity. Exhaustion, and the adoption of new tactics by Israel's Ministry of Defense contributed to the decrease in activity. Israel's Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, believed that intensive policing of population centers was largely counter productive. Instead, he instructed the IDF to reduce its presence in the towns and villages of the WEST BANK and Gaza and to redeploy troops on highways and on a major road intersections. Fewer clashes and fewer Palestinian casualties resulted, but arrests and collective punishments continued. The economic repercussions of the Gulf crisis too were evident here. Many families depended on remittances from relatives working in Kuwait, and the loss of income at a time when population was already suffering economically caused severe hardship. Factionalism was another source of concern for the Palestinian leadership. Fierce disputes broke out both in Gaza and West Bank between the nationalists of Fatah and the fundamentalists of Hamas. Division within the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestinian (DFLP) resulted in a *de facto* split, prompting a struggle for the control of various front organizations such as trade unions women's committees and press offices.

In October' 90 at least 17 Palestinians were shot dead in the old city of Jerusalem when a large crowd protesting at an attempt by an extremist Israeli group to lay the symbolic cornerstone of the third temple on the Temple Mount was indiscriminately fired at by Israel's security forces. It prompted a wave of protests and anti Israeli demonstrations. Anxious to avoid charges of hypocrisy at such a sensitive time in Arab-US relations, the USA submitted a draft Resolution to the UNSC condemning the **Temple Mount killings**. It also supported the decision of the UN Secretary General to despatch an investigative mission to Jerusalem. Although this fell short of the PLO's demand for UN protection for the population of the occupied territories, the USA's censure of Israel at the UNSC was significant for being the first vote of its kind for eight years. Israel denounced the UN vote and its decision to send a fact finding mission to the occupied Territories as interference in internal affairs. It declared that the UN representatives would be admitted only as 'tourists'. Prime Minister Shamir castigated both President Bush and Secretary of State, James Baker for initiating such a motion, and issued a statement, which almost amounted to political blackmail, that Israel was the only reliable ally of Washington in

the region The Temple Mount killings were followed by a spate of attacks by Palestinians on Israel's civilians and soldiers, and the violence precipitated by the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, the leader of the neo-fascist Kach movement in New York. Following this the Israeli Minister of Defense ordered all Palestinians from the occupied territories working in Israel to return to their homes. The borders were sealed for 4 days, after which Moshe Arens, declared an intention to reduce the number of Palestinians working inside the 'Green Line'¹¹ - marking the tentative boundary between Israel Palestine and to bar altogether those with a record of activism. The announcement was welcomed by some Palestinians as a further step towards redefining the Green Line.

The Oslo Accords and Thereafter

In mid 1991, Syrian and Lebanese Presidents signed a treaty of 'fraternity, co-operation and friendship' conforming Syria's dominant role in the affairs of its neighbor Israel condemned the treaty as tantamount to a Syrian takeover of Lebanon and a threat to its security. Also during this time, the US secretary of state James Baker's 5th Peace Mission to West Asia, it was announced that President Assad (Syria) had acceded to US and Israeli conditions for the convening of a West Asian Peace Process. Abandoning his longheld insistence that conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute should have the coercive weight of the UN behind it, he gave his assent. Although based on the UN Resolution 242 and 338, this would only feature the UN to a role of an observer and would pave the way for direct negotiation between Israel and its Arab adversaries President Assad agreed to a joint Soviet-US chairing of the proposed conference with EC observers also present. The Syrian *volte face* was followed by Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. Baker also received the backing of the G7 nations and more significantly, of S. Arabia. S. Arabia also gave its support to an Egyptian proposal that the Arab states should end their trade boycott of Israel in return for a freeze on new settlements in the occupied territories, a gambit that Israel declined. The Israeli cabinet endorsed the acceptance of the proposals for the Baker Conference but with the proviso that Israel hold a veto over the composition of any Palestinian negotiating team. This conduct led to the acceptance among participants that the PLO would not participate officially and the Palestinians might have to be represented as part of the Jordanian delegation.

¹¹ Cossali, P. Op. cit. p.50.

The Hamas were forthright in their opposition, condemning the Baker proposals as a conference for 'selling land' threatening any would be participants. However, the two leading Palestinian participants Faisal Huseini and Hannan Ashrawi – made it clear that it would be the PLO which ultimately decided whether the Palestinians were represented at the Conference. The idea to not participate might have proven for the PLO as squandering away an opportunity to actually negotiate on autonomy status; but it also meant that by giving approval it might be abdicating its role as the Palestinian's sole representative. There was also the realization that the PLO could no longer rely on the support of Arab States for its own negotiating positions and there was real danger that a normalization of Arab Israeli relation could be achieved without addressing the fundamentals of the Palestinian problem. In the outcome of the conference there was no mention of the USA's commitment to Palestinian self determination nor any proposals for a resolution of the Jerusalem issue. Nor was there any suggestion that Baker would demand a freeze on settlements in the occupied territories or allow the PLO to formally nominate the Palestinian delegation to any authority. This was followed by the Madrid Conference, Oct, 91, The Washington Conference Dec '91 and the Moscow Talks Jan '92. All of them primarily focused on the one issue of the future of the occupied territories and the feasibility of the PLO as a future sovereign governmental organization. The talks were multilateral, were not completely futile as in they generated increasing communication between the parties, even if most of them, most of the time, were antagonistic to each other. **In mid 1992**, it emerged that Israel and the PLO had been engaged in secret negotiations in the Norwegian Capital – OSLO, and reached an agreement on mutual recognition and a plan for staged Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The key components of the **Oslo Accords** were said to include

- .an early withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho, the redeployment of Israeli troops in other areas of the West Bank;
- the gradual transfer of power from the civil administration to a Palestinian authority;
- The creation of a Palestinian Police Force;
- The election of a Palestinian Council.

Permanent status negotiations were to begin within 2 years of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, be concluded within 5 years and would address issues of Jerusalem, border, settlement, co-operation, security and refugees. Though reaction to success secret talks were mixed in the Arab World, Y. Arafat managed to secure majority support for the accords from the

Fatah central committee with some significant displeasure from the founders. Hamas and Damascus based Palestinian groups denounced the accords as a betrayal, an interpretation that was shared by the majority of Palestinians refugees in Lebanon. Edward Said, a prominent Palestinian writer, described the PLO transforming itself from a national liberator to a municipal council by signing on the Oslo accords. However, much sarcasm it drew, yet the Oslo accords were the first direct contact between Israel and Palestine and gave concrete form to the near future, a scheme which intervening powers could not achieve. It also meant the recognition of the PLO from Israel. As a representative body the PLO thus was gaining more and more ground for future leadership with endorsements from the most important player in the region. It is obvious that actual work could only be done without interviewing partisanship. It is also a pointer that whatever concrete action has to be taken, has to be taken as initiatives from both the sides and not via an outsider. The Oslo Accords truly marked a significant break in Israel-Palestine territorial conflicts. Residents of the occupied territories approved the plan cautiously. President Mubarak. (Egypt) gave full support to the agreement. King Hussain (Jordan) after expressing initial resentment of not being consulted, however approved given the USA's endorsement of the Oslo accords. The member nations of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) too qualified its support. However, Y. Arafat had trouble convincing President Assad (Syria) and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (Lebanon). Syria was always demanding a withdrawal of Israeli forces from its Golan heights, and when the PLO settled its liabilities with Israel, President Assad felt that it made Israeli movement from Golan and Southern Lebanon even more difficult. Prime Minister Hariri too voiced concerns, in an even outspoken manner than his Syrian counterpart that under no circumstances would Lebanon consider the settlement of Palestinians in its territory which, from Oslo accords, was seemingly going to be permanent. Lebanon and Syria refused to endorse the Oslo accords.

In Sept, 1993 in a supposedly diplomatic initiative taken by the White House, PLO spokesman on Foreign affairs, Mahmud Abbas signed the **Declaration of Principles** with Israel with an embarrassed consent from Y. Arafat, Y.Arafat was not fully aware of the end ceremony which included a symbolic handshake between him and Prime Minister Y. Rabin, which added more to his discomfiture. On the same day in Washington, Israeli and Jordanian representatives also signed an agreement. A number of issues too were detailed especially concerning the return of Jordanian territory occupied by Israel since late 60's, the fate of Palestinian refugees in

Jordan, water rights and an number of security issues. Jordan too reiterated that it shall not threaten Israel by force. By July 1994, Israel and Jordan had ended their differences with Israel returning the small area of Jordan seized by it in late 60's.

The Autonomy of Gaza

On 25th Feb. '94, Baruch Goldstein, An American born adherent of the extremist Kach movement and resident of Kiryat Arba carried out an armed attack on Palestinian worshippers in the Ibrahimi mosque in the centre of Hebron. The Rabin government responded to the events in Hebron, by announcing its intention to set up a commission of inquiry and ordering the detention of a handful of known settler extremists. A ban was also declared on the Kach organization and its off shoots, Kahane Lives. These measures failed to mollify the Palestinians who insisted that only the disarming of settlers and the dismantling of the settlements could guarantee Palestinian security in the occupied territories, and for dispatch of an International Protection force in the Territories, a suggestion that was endorsed by the Arab states and the UN Secretary. General, but dismissed as 'neither particularly helpful nor useful'¹² by the USA. US ambassador Albright effectively delayed a vote on Resolution 904, which urged protection for Palestinians in the occupied territories; USA objected to the inclusion of paragraphs describing Jerusalem and territory seized in 1967 as 'occupied Palestinian territory'. Resolution 904 was finally adopted by the UNSC on 10th March with USA abstaining on 2 of its preambular paragraphs referring to occupied Palestinian territory. Both the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad vowed to take revenge and this only added to Y. Arafat's worries. By **April '94** the PLO had agreed to resume negotiations with Israel despite the failure of the securing reassurances that were initially demanded. Palestinians viewed this negatively, specially in the face of dwindling goodwill for the Oslo proceeds and IDF security operations to flush out Hamas activists. It also led to the killing of 6 pro-Arafat Fatah security team in an ambush. This also led many Israeli political establishments to seek urgent steps to reinforce Arafat's position and guarantee the viability of the peace process. In response, the IDF began to redeploy its forces, after a news from Egypt that an agreement had been reached on the final issues dividing Israel and the PLO over the

¹² Cossaali, P. op. cit. P.62.

implementation of autonomy in the Gaza strip and Jericho. On 6th April, the Hamas struck a blow to the fragile negotiation by a car bomb attack in the Israeli town of Afula, killing 7 and maiming several, mostly school children, claiming a response to the Hebron massacre. Around 300 Islamic militants were rounded up and the occupied territories were sealed off. Israel was also highly critical of an agreement reached in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah that had been precipitated by an outbreak of armed clashes between the two factions. Against this backdrop, **Israeli and Palestinian officials met in Cairo, May '94** for signing the successful implementation of an autonomy agreement for Gaza and Jericho. However, from the Oslo agreement onwards displeasure at the working of Y. Arafat was visible in the ranks of the PLO, who termed his ways as dictatorial. Many PLO executive members stayed away from Cairo in protest at Arafat's autocracy. Also within the occupied territories deepening reservations over the style of Yasser Arafat leadership increased adding to his difficulties in trying to persuade political figures to take seats on the 24 member Palestinian Autonomy Council which would oversee the implementation of the autonomy agreement. The signing of the agreement, nevertheless, led to rapid changes – the IDF withdrew from centers of Palestinian population and on 10th May the first contingent of the Palestinian police force arrived in Gaza. A further 400 arrived in Jericho a few days later. Israel also announced the imminent release of 5,000 Palestinian detainees. On 13th and 17th May in Jericho and Gaza respectively the IDF handed over its position to the commanders of the Palestinian forces in simple ceremonies. By the 2nd week of May '94, Israel evacuated its last position in Gaza city.

Israeli Expansion in The West Bank Area

In mid July '94, the announcement by Shimon Peres acknowledging the Golan heights to be Syrian territory was seen as Israel's contribution to the wider US plans of meeting Syria's criticism of Jordan's effective *coup de grace* to the dying beast of Arab unity. That Jordan refrained from signing a full peace treaty with Israel did not disguise the fact that the normalization of Israel – Jordanian relations was close, and on 25th July king Hussain and PM Rabin formally ended their differences, an ceremony which also revealed the underlying warmth that existed between them. The Palestinian reaction in contrast was sharply critical - there were

strong suspicions that Israel, the USA and Jordan were engaged in a concerted effort to isolate the PLO and prepare for a reassertion of Hashemite control over West Bank, leaving the PLO chairman as the 'mayor of Gaza'. A sense of foreboding also surrounded the West Bank residents as a decision of the settlement council of Efrat to expand its settlement on land adjoining the Palestinian village of Al-Khader was announced, in the beginning of 1995. Palestinian leaders protested that the expansion violated the Declaration of Principles. A compromise was reached by Israel in that it froze construction on the initial site but allowed for the construction on new housing on lands next to Efrat. The US made it clear that it would not intervene in a dispute which it regarded as a local matter, to be dealt within the framework of the programme. About 40,000 acres of Palestinian land had been confiscated since the signing of the Declaration of Principles. Their effect was to turn a vast expanse of the WEST BANK into a region in which it would be impossible to implement any final agreement except by annexation to Israel. Mahmud Abbas reflected that if the confiscation is not stopped, there will be nothing to negotiate over its future. In **Jan '95**, two Islamic Jihad suicide bombers killed 22 Israelis, most of them soldiers in a carefully planned attack at Beit Lid. Israel immediately sealed its borders with Gaza strip and West Bank and arrested hundreds of Islamic activists. Prime Minister Rabin also gave his consent to build a 22-mile long security force in the West bank that would physically segregate Palestinian and Israelis. Yasser Arafat condemned the Beit Lid bombing and instructed his security forces to undertake a further and unpopular detention of Islamic Jihad cadres. Yasser Arafat also met Prime Minister Rabin later for opening up of the Gaza and West bank security zone and redeployment of IDF personnel from the concerned areas, as was being pressurized from his constituency who interpreted the move as Israel's unilateral decision to seize Palestinian territories around Israel's border settlements and thus pre-empt negotiations on the 'final status' agreement. He was successful in none of his aims. By April '95, Prime Minister Rabin expressed his support for a plan of the Ministry of Housing to construct 7000 new houses in East Jerusalem and announced plans to confiscate 130 acres of Arab land and facilitate the project. The scale of the proposed project and its impact on final status negotiations on the future of Jerusalem caused an international furore. An irate chairman Y. Arafat authorized the tabling of a UN SC resolution demanding that the decision be annulled. The US presentation was similarly anodyne. US ambassador to the UN, Albright admitted that the new housing units *posed problems for the peace process*, and also added that the Security Council was an inappropriate forum for the

discussion of the issue. It once again used its veto to prevent the censure of Israel. The PNA (Palestinian National Authority) now considered as the sole governing body of all Palestinian areas was seemingly reluctant to mobilize opposition to the construction proposals, and intervention by 6 deputies of the Arab Democratic Party and the Communist led Hadash coalition finally obstructed the Israeli plans. The two parties submitted a motion of non-confidence in the Rabin Govt. inspired by warnings from Y. Arafat not to do anything that would cause the Israel coalition to fall. When it emerged that the Likud, despite their strong support for the confiscations intended to seize the chance to defeat the labour coalition and that vigorous attempts to get other parties to abstain on the vote had failed, the Prime Minister was left with no option other than to suspend the plans to confiscate the Arab lands. The no-confidence motion was withdrawn immediately. The reluctance on part of the PNA in the confiscation of land can be thus understood in this context, that PM Rabin was a man of integrity and Chairman Arafat did not want this particular Govt. to collapse. Negotiations with the Rabin Govt. were far more easier, and Israel would be more lenient towards the PNA if this Govt. remained.

On 4th Nov, 1995, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was shot dead by a Jewish religious nationalist, Yigal Amir, as he was leaving a peace rally in Tel-Aviv. The assassination shocked the Israeli society, it was unthinkable that a Jew could be responsible for the killing of the leader of the Jewish State. The Israeli internal security service Shin Bet, came under fire for its perceived complacency in not anticipating the threat of violence from the far right wing. The Likud leader Netanyahu was criticized for failing to distance himself from the increasingly rancorous verbal attacks on Rabin by the settler lobby, and for thus contributing to the climate that made the assassination possible. Rabin's widow singled out the Likud leader as morally responsible for her husband's death. An opinion poll conducted in the immediate aftermath revealed a 20% support for Netanyahu as with a 54% for Shimon Peres. In obvious inheritance Shimon Peres was declared the next Prime Minister. His agenda was less strongly defined by security than Rabin's had been, and he was more amenable to international views as well as regional pointers on concerning issues.

The Northern Frontier – The Guerrilla Advantage

On 13th March, '96, the US administrations to bolster the peace process between Israel and Palestine, organized what was described as an anti-terrorism conference and a 'summit of the peacemakers' in the Egyptian resort of **Sharm-el-shaikh**. 27 nations were represented including 12 Arab states, Israel and the nascent Palestinian entity. Iraq, Libya and Sudan were not invited, Syria and Lebanon declined their invitation. The Conference concluded with a pledge from the participants in support for the peace processes in the region and their commitment to combat terrorism. Indeed President Assad had already signaled his dissatisfaction by refusing publicly to condemn the Hamas bombing in Israel. With the Israel Syrian talks deadlocked, and the two states' proxy war in south Lebanon intensified, Hezbollah fighters (Lebanese), killed 6 and injured 27 Israel soldiers around Israeli's self declared security zone. In consequence to this and further escalation of armed clashes, Prime Minister Peres ordered the launching of combined air and artillery strikes against targets in S. Lebanon, Beirut and the Beka'a valley – the Operation Grapes of Wrath. The Hezbollah's highly mobile guerillas were largely unscathed by the Israeli onslaught and were able to continue firing *Katyusha* rockets into Israel. These caused panic in the northern settlements but little damages and no loss of life. It had become evident that Israeli forces had been unable to achieve their military objective of silencing the Hezbollah and that they would not be able to do so without the commitment of the ground troops, an option that Prime Minister Peres could not sanction in view of the casualties this would inevitably bring about. Politically the PM was also beginning to regret his decision to intensify the conflict in the northern borders. The indiscriminate nature of the attack had, at least temporarily healed the sectarian divisions in Lebanon and united the country behind the Hezbollah. Moreover with the exception of the US, who had once again blocked the attempt by the UN to formally condemn the Israeli action, the international community was vocal in its opposition to what was widely interpreted as cynical electioneering by the Israeli PM. PM Peres discomfort was magnified when Israeli shells landed on a UN base at the village of **Qana**, killing 105 civilian refugees and wounding several others who had been sheltering there; including Fijian soldiers serving with the UN; **18th April 96**. Israel pleaded technical and procedural errors, but this was rejected in a report commissioned by the UN Secretary General. Following this

President Clinton dispatched the US Secretary of State on a 7 day assignment between Jerusalem and Damascus. He initiated a 6 point plan for securing a ceasefire, including the disarming of Hezbollah and Lebanese-Syrian guarantee for security of Israeli's northern border. It was regarded as too hopefully pro-Israel to survive exploration. However the diplomatic efforts of the French Minister of Foreign Minister Affairs, Herve' de Charette, devised an essential return to the status *quo ante*. Written but unsigned, it stipulated that

-- both parties would refrain from attacking civilians;

The Hezbollah would not launch attacks from areas of civilian habitations;

And, . Israel would not target civilian infrastructure.

In addition both parties agreed to retain the right to 'legitimate defense' within the understanding. The ceasefire was to be monitored by a group consisting of Lebanon, Israel, France, the USA and Syria. Most observers saw the cease fire terms as a victory for the Arab side, as in that the Hezbollah's standing had been enhanced through its ability to emerge from the conflict undefeated. In fact Lebanese PM Hariri insisted that the resistance would continue.

In **May '96** the return to power of Israeli right wing to the Knesset was viewed as little less than a disaster for Palestinian peace mongers. Netanyahu had long been associated with the nationalist hardliners in the Likud and his pre-election pronouncements had included a commitment to treble the settler population of WEST BANK and the expression of his total opposition to Palestinian self determination and to any change to the status of Jerusalem. Though this first speech, in view of international pressure was moderate and conciliatory yet his actions belied his superficial moderation – he appointed Ariel Sharon 'The Hawk', to head the Ministry for infrastructure development on The West Bank. The only consolation for the PLO lay in the Likud's ideological opposition to a 'separation' hence the prospect that there could be a gradual relaxation of the closure of the occupied territories, which was economically and psychologically hampering the WEST BANK residents. In **late Sep'96** PM Netanyahu announced that an ancient tunnel running beneath the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem's old city alongside the Al-Aqsa mosque was to be reopened. Given the sensitive nature of the perceived threat to Jerusalem and its Islamic holy sites, the invokation was interpreted as unnecessarily provocative. Y. Arafat denounced the rehabilitation of the tunnel, effectively enduring a return to the politics of *inti - fadah*, the crucial difference being the existence of a legitimate armed Palestinian security force at this stage. Predictably armed conflict ensued. It was increasingly being discussed on the

international scenario that it was the Netanyahu Govt.'s intransigence, rather than Arafat's manipulation that was responsible for the latest debacle. In response, the EU for the first time was to assign a special envoy to West Asia. The eventual appointment of the Spanish diplomat, Miguel Moratinos, with a limited brief, however represented a defeat for the French led attempt to have the post filled by a high profile political personality with a wider ranging mandate.

Economic relations between the Arab Israel at this point, too had nothing memorable to offer. Israel - Egypt relation remained less than cordial. **In mid Oct '96**, Psd. Mubarak announced that he would not meet PM Netanyahu until redeployment in Hebron was agreed, although his earlier threat to cancel the Middle East and N. Africa Economic Conference was quietly abandoned in the face of domestic economic interests and US opposition to such a move. A plan to build a natural gas pipeline from Egypt, through Gaza to Israel, first proposed in 1993, was postponed indefinitely by its Italian contractor and a joint Egyptian – Jordanian – Israeli project for a tourist development along the shared coastline of the Gulf of Aqaba became another victim of the soured atmosphere.

Har Homa and US Intervention

At the end of **Feb. 1997**, the Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem approved the construction of a settlement, **Har Homa**, on the hill top of Jabal Abu Ghunaim, just inside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. On completion Har Homa would house 32,000 settlers on 6,500 housing unit and complete the ring of settlements around Arab East Jerusalem and would make it impossible to reach E. Jerusalem from the WEST BANK without crossing Israel's territory thereby posing border irreconciliations regarding Jerusalem. In a palliative move, PM Netanyahu simultaneously announced that his government was granting 3,015 building permits to Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The EU described the proceeding as a major obstacle to peace while President Clinton remarked "The important thing is for those people on both sides to be building confidence and working together and so I would have preferred the decision not to have been made because I don't think it builds confidence, I think it builds distrust and I wish it had

not been made".¹³ The PNA in effect pronounced that this marked the end of the peace process and would bring in newer confrontations. The rhetoric softened however after US warning against any repeat of armed clashes. The Israel defence sectors also warned that contingency plans exist for the invasion of autonomous areas if violence proceeded from the Har Homa decision. Though protest marches and strikes followed, the PLO chairman however demanded the diplomatic isolation of the Israeli Govt. Critics of Oslo repeated earlier assertions that what was happening at Har Homa was an inevitable fallout of the Accord's failure to curtail settlement activity during the interim period. Construction work on the Har Homa settlement began during the 2nd week of March. Arab diplomatic protests were stepped up in response to the Har Homa decision. The GCC Foreign Minister's meeting in Riyadh, the Islamic Summit in Islamabad, and the ICO Jerusalem Committee meeting in Rabat, all produced statements denouncing Israel's settlement policies. More opposition was expressed at an Arab Foreign Minister's Meet in Cairo at the end of Mar' 97, whereby the Arab League states endorsed to suspend involvement in multilateral negotiations with Israel, reassert the primary economic boycott and end moves towards normalization of relation by closing down the representative offices through which they were conducted. Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Qatar and Mauritania all had trade and / or representatives in Tel Aviv and the non-binding nature of the recommendations did not do so much as to perturb the Netanyahu Govt. Although the labour administration desired a profitable binding with the Arab state, Israel's nationalist bloc had never been ideologically inclined to forge links with the Arab world that had long been held in cultural and political contempt. By the summer of 1997, and after month of stalled Israeli – Palestinian negotiations, it was increasingly being seen as the nemises of the Oslo Peace Accords. Reports also fortified PM Netanyahu's refusal to give in to the US pressure to agree to the level of compromise on Har Homa that would facilitate Y. Arafat's return to the negotiating table. Perhaps the Israeli PM had realized that just as he could not do without the US support, so also President Clinton needed him to remain a key player in the region and at the helm of affairs affecting the International Community. However that did not mask US frustrations with Israeli policies, with the leaking of a US intelligence report that claimed that many of the homes in Gaza's settlements and in WEST BANK were lying empty. The report seemed to seriously undermine PM Netanyahu's principal public justification for continued settlement in the occupied territories, that land was need to relieve

¹³ Ibid p.76.

Israel's chronic housing shortage. The PM and settler leaders claimed the rumours to be baseless; but few doubted the accuracy of intelligence based on many years of field monitoring and satellite remittance. Following this the Israel Govt. agreed to two confidence Building Measures suggested by the Clinton Administration –

allowing the construction of more Arab housing in Jerusalem;
and, suspending the policy of demolishing dwellings built without a license.

On the issue of halting working at the Har Homa settlement, however, there seemed to be little compromise. Moreover amidst further chaos specifically after the discovery by Palestinian police of a 'terror cell' and a Hamas 'bomb factory' in the WEST BANK town of Beit sahur, another announcement permitting the building of another Jewish settlement in the densely populated Palestinian district of Ras al amud was made, arousing considerable international concern. The key areas of concern for the Palestinian negotiators, therefore remained as the question of settlements, primarily and in addition the opening of the Gaza harbour and seaport and the timing and extent of the long overdue Israel redeployment in the WEST BANK. The US proposition of Israel actions were conveniently interpreted by PM Netanyahu as temporarily not inaugurating new settlement, but proceeding with planned constructions in existing settlements, including Har Homa. This remained unacceptable to the PLO, and their only consolation was the increasing dissatisfaction of US towards Israel. This fact was becoming increasingly clear to the Knesset, and by Nov' 97 it issued that the **Israeli Govt. desired to radically rework the Oslo process**. While agreeing in principle to a further redeployment on the WEST BANK, the Knesset however insisted that this be done only in phases and after the fulfillment of two conditions -

the PNA's meeting certain Israel demands, the revision of the Palestinian National Charter and an end to terrorism and political activity in East Jerusalem;

and secondly, an assessment by Govt. agencies of those areas of the occupied territories to be retained indefinitely by Israel and not made subject to negotiation in the 'final status' talks.

Apart from being rejected in its own houses, this plan also faced opposition from the US. According to the Oslo proceeds, 3 redeployments were due within mid 1998. After this date the only areas in the territories to remain under Israel control would be borders, East Jerusalem, settlements and specified military locations. It was estimated by Palestinian officials that these

areas comprised not more than 11% of WEST BANK territory, as against Israeli claims of 55% and more.¹⁴

PM Netanyahu, The Clinton Administration and The EU

In Jan. 1998 Israel announced a further expansion of two more settlements in the Occupied Territories immediately followed by the resignation of Israel's Dy. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Levy. Though Levy's resignation was forced primarily by disagreements over budget proposals, he was regarded as one of the Liberalists in the Knesset. This was also the time that US protégé Dennis Ross attempted his failed mission to West Asia. The Ross failure and Levy's departure made it clear to the Palestinians that there would be minimal relaxations in Israel's uncompromising approach on expansion and/or IDF withdraw. PM Netanyahu, two weeks later met with two very prominent pro-Israel and anti Clinton personalities in Washington. This served both PM Netanyahu's reinstatement of being backed as well as a warning to the Clinton administration of not pressurizing his govt. too much for concession. President Clinton's Presidency currently reeling under the rapidly escalating sex-scandal, was keen to avoid a diplomatic tussle with the Israel leader especially after his successful high profile engagements. The Clinton initiative of a phased Israel's redeployment from 12-15% of WEST BANK was turned down by the Israel PM agreeing to only 9.5% withdrawal. The US proposals in itself were far less than what the PNA was expecting, but despite this, Y. Arafat accepted the Israel PM's package with evident reluctance. For much of the wider Arab world, the absence of real progress at meetings in Washington signaled dying hopes that USA would be prepared to exert significant pressure on the Netanyahu govt. Of the other issues concerning withdrawals, the Israeli Minister of Def. **Itzhak Mordechai, in the beginning of 1998 announced his preparation for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in line with UNSC Res. 425.** However it would only be undertaken if Lebanon guaranteed its army deployment to the southern border and the incorporation of the Syrian Liberation Army, SLA into the regular Lebanese army. Lebanon rejected the offer, a decision prompted more by Syria's long held opposition to previous 'Lebanon first' proposals mooted by the Israelis. The plan

¹⁴ Arian, A. "Security Threatened". 199

though received backing by the US, was categorically rejected at Beirut and Damascus. The Lebanese PM Hariri accused Israel of rewriting Res. 425 and of attempting to drive a wedge between Syria and Lebanon. He added that he was not in favour of a 'security before peace' proposal. The Lebanese proposal received support from France as with the UNSC which endorsed that Res. 425 demanded a 'unilateral and unconditional' withdrawal.

The year also experienced an attempt by the usually observant EU, at diplomacies in the region. The EC President Jacques Santer visited West-Asia and held talks with PM Netanyahu. The British Secy. of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Robin Cook, implanted with the 6-point British plan also visited the region. The plan called for the Palestinians and the Israel's, apart from adherence to previously signed agreements, a specific appeal to Israelis, for implementation of substantial and credible redeployments in the Occupied Territories, as well as to freeze all settlement activity. It was dismissed by Israel as being essentially Palestinian ideas; this only reinforced antipathy of Israel towards greater European involvement in the regional affairs. Jacques Santer, after, holding talks with both PM Netanyahu and PLC President Arafat, accused the Israeli side of contradictory standards on one hand the Israeli PM wanted economic development in the Occupied Territories, on the other he was not in favour of Palestinians exploiting their economic potential.

The Palestinian National Authority

The internal affairs of the PLO, known as the PNA – Palestinian National Authority since the autonomy of Gaza, too needs a closer look at this juncture; validity of Israel's claims will depend substantially on how efficient the PNA proves its working to be. The PNA currently is in possession of the Gaza strip in the West and in WEST BANK territories Jericho area, the Towns of Nablues, Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Bethlehem and Hebron. Election to the Palestinian Legislative Councils took place in Jan' 96, 75% of the estimated 1 m. eligible Palestinian voters participated, electing 86 deputies to the 89 seat council; one was reserved for the President of the PLC's Executive body – the Palestinian President; the remaining two remained vacant till late 2000. The election of a Palestinian Executive President was held at the same time as the election of the PLC. Y. Arafat, opposed by one other candidate, was voted as

the President by 88.1%. He took office on 12th Feb.'96. **In Ap'96 the PLC held its 1st session in Gaza city.** At the meeting it voted to amend the Palestinian National Charter by annulling all the clauses that sought the destruction of the state of Israel. It also voted to amend all clauses contained that were not in harmony with an agreement of mutual recognition concluded by Israel and PLO in Sep'93.

A year later, **April'97**, President Arafat's audit office reported the misappropriation of public funds by PNA ministers to the order of US \$ 320 m. Khalid al-Qidram, the General Prosecutor of the PNA promptly resigned in response, but was placed under house arrest. President Arafat appointed a parliamentary committee to conduct an inquiry; the cabinet was decided to be dissolved and some of its members prosecuted. This however did not occur till Aug. The new Cabinet that was announced, much to the chargin of sedate observers, whereby only one prominent Minister had been removed, many others assuming alternative responsibility or were appointed Ministers of State without portfolios. Although the cabinet was criticized by the Principal donors to the PNA, in Nov. a further grant, of US \$ 3000 m was issued, to be disbursed over the next 5 years (averaging 50 m US \$ per month). President Arafat himself has, over the years been a target of personal criticism from within the organization ranks specially for ~~his handling of the Israel- Palestinian negotiations. Discrepancy in political idealization~~ eventually initiated manouvres that the President was in **poor health and potential successors** to him were also identified – Djibril Rajoub, head of Palestinian Preventive security service in WEST BANK, and Muhammad Dahlan his counterpart in Gaza. Allegation of maltreatment, even torture of Palestinian detainees by the Palestinian Security force were a part of the US based Human Rights Watch Report in mid'98. In the same year the results of the 1st census by the Palestinian authorities were released.

Meanwhile, Iraq had geared up for nuclear capability and in the exposure from a UN conducted weapons inspection had resulted in the US declaring threat by military action against Iraq. Iraq already had moral supporters within Palestinian ranks, and this manifested itself as popular demonstration within the occupied and autonomous areas. President Arafat took firm action to suppress these, even members of his own political movement Fatah, for disregarding a ban on such demonstrations. In March, US officials reportedly confirmed that US CIA was assisting the Palestinian security forces in spheres of espionage, information-gathering and interrogation is an attempt to reassure Israeli govt. of the ability to take effective action against

groups involved in attacks on Israeli targets. Following this the PLC threatened to organize a vote of no confidence in President Arafat's leadership. It also endorsed the issues of delay in approval of the '98 budget and failure to hold local govt. elections. Speculations were vibrant that these issues if addressed might reveal the widespread disenchantment over PNA's working as well as the limited progress of finalizing talks between Palestine and Israel. In the following month Hamas Political leaders in Jordan retracted their statement which they had issued in the face of the US reports of allegations of the PNA working in collaboration with CIA. This came in view of the perceived hand of certain Hamas officials in the supposed murder of Muliaddin Sharif, the 2nd highest ranking member of the military wing of Hamas.

The UN Endorsement and The PNA Purport

In July 1998 the UN General Assembly agreed by 124 votes to 4, to upgrade the observer status of Palestinian representatives to a full member status in all but voting and election rights. Israel and US were joined by the Marshall Isl. and Federal States of Micronesia in opposing the move. The EU expressed its preparedness to back the Resolution underlining renewed European activism in that it felt that Israel's obstinacy was largely responsible for the distingretating state of affairs, specially the peace proceedings. President Arafat took this opportunity for his intention to **unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood when the 5 year interim period established in the Oslo Accords expired on 4th May 1999**. This also came as a measure to stem the tide of growing domestic resentment with him. PM Netanyahu warned that such a declaration would proroke stern responses from his government. In Aug. the Palestinian Ministry of interior dissolved the Palestinian Ahd Party, the Palestinian labour party, the Ahrar Party and the Popular forces party; being small entities, the claim against them was that they were not financially viable and it was planned to merge specially those with similar ideologies in order to increase activity. In Oct. the PLC reconvened after a summer recess – discussions included health services, increased illegal water tapping owing to continuing drought and further accusations of mismanagement of funds by PNA (about 70 m US \$ in customs revenue was alleged to have been collected at border crossings but never deposited in the PNA treasury). It was also in Oct. (15th Oct'98) that the US announced itself to be the host of the **Wye River Conference**,

Maryland, at the UN Gen. Assembly Debate, N. York. The Wye Summit culminated in the signing of the Wye River Memorandum between Israel and Palestinian. The conditions included–

- A 13.1% Israeli withdrawal, that was already due earlier; to be reinstated;
- Israel's redeployment to be undertaken in 3 phases each being contingent on the PNA's fulfilling concrete and veritable security measures to be overseen by the US CIA, and subject to Israel's satisfaction, without which the Israel PM was empowered to suspend withdrawal.

Negotiations on the final status, issues *interalia* the refugees, settlements and Jerusalem were to commence, in Nov. and continue until Oslo's expiry, May'99. PM Netanyahu also won President Arafat's commitments to convene a special session of the PNC for speedy annulment of objectionable clauses in its charter. In turn Israel agreed to schedule release dates for jailed Palestinians, facilitate the opening of Gaza airport and renew negotiations on the safe passage between Gaza and WEST BANK. The announcement on territorial concessions given to the Palestinians was greeted with accusations of treason in Israel, especially from the far right. However, opinion polls indicated 75% support for the Wye Agreement. The Palestinian acceptance of the Memorandum came with the understanding that too much has been conceded on the part of the Palestinians; the Wye Memorandum strayed too far from the terms and the spirit of Oslo 92. It also came with the realization that Israel would be entering into 'final status' talks with 22% control of security in the WEST BANK and absolute control of a further 60%. In addition, the US CIA was also commissioned for further security compliance and monitoring role which would probably use the Palestinian security apparatus as a means for enhancing its own objectives in the region at the expense of Palestinian endorsements. President Arafat made sure that the Wye Agreement did not create much furore back home and categorically issued decrees curbing press freedom and arresting Wye critics. It was anticipated that erosion of civil liberties was a price President Arafat was willing to pay for the peace process to continue unimpeded. Throughout the Wye Summit Palestinians reluctantly had accepted US assurances that Israeli settlement expansion would not continue beyond immediately contiguous areas. The Israeli interpretation of this amounted to the understanding that once the construction of concerned areas were completed, thence the contiguous areas could be allocated for construction. This doctored view along with the ruling party's ideological imperatives, witnessed frenzied

settlement activity on the WEST BANK in a bid to capture as much land as possible before the final status talks commenced. A steady cascade of trust between the PNA and Israel govt. continued in the final weeks of 1998. The case of releasing Palestinian detainees Israel too was reason for concern with the PNA; Israel released mostly non political prisoners and when PNA registered protest, PM Netanyahu endorsed that Israel possibly could not let loose Islamists, specially ones prosecuted on the charge of attacking Israeli nationals. In view of these proceedings, and increased disillusionment of the PNA with Israel with regard to adherence to the signed initiatives over time, **President Arafat reaffirmed his decision to declare Palestinian statehood in May' 99** accepting nothing short of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. In retaliation the Israeli Foreign Minister informed the US Secy. of State ,Madeleine Albright that the second IDF withdrawal scheduled in Dec. is being suspended due to violation of the Memorandum by Palestinian representatives.

Amidst deteriorating relations between Israel and the PNA, on the northern front Israel suffered several casualties in the hands of the Hezbollah in Nov. Retaliatory measures from PM Netanyahu included striking of power lines and water pipelines, an action that led to rumours that Israel was campaigning to destroy the Lebanese communication infrastructure in the south. Significantly by the end of '98 Ariel Sharon introduced the possibility of a phased withdrawal from Lebanese territory, returning and Druze villages in the Golan to Syria. **In Feb.'99**, Israel took possession of the semi abandoned village of Arnoun into the Israeli declared 'security zone' claiming it was being used by the Hezbollah as a staging post to launch attacks. Beirut and Damascus condemned the Arnoun takeover accusing Netanyahu of electioneering at the expense of the Lebanese people, as Israeli general elections were due to be held in May' 99.

No matter how integrated an image the PNA tried to project to the International community, its internal politics and factionalism within the gamut of Palestine's Liberators posed a very serious threat to the *raison d etre* of such an organization. In Feb.'99, Ghazi al Jabali, a Gaza based chief of Police and a staunch opposer of the Hamas reported a US \$ 35 m receipt of Hamas from Iran to carry out 'suicide bomb' attack against Israeli moderates and assist in PM Netanyahu his May' 99 election campaign. Iran and Hamas both denied the allegations; the relation between Hamas and PNA further deteriorated. In March, as a consequent retaliation a security agent and a former member of Hamas military wing was sentenced to death for an attack, while his two accomplices received lengthy sentences. It led to violent, clashes between

protestors and the Palestinian police in Gaza. Civil society too was becoming increasingly alienated from the PNA's objectives. Throughout May lawyers and jurists in WEST BANK and Gaza organized strikes and protests for the curb on civil liberties imposed by the PNA. It was being perceived that the PNA stood more for Israeli impositions on Palestinian people than the will of the same being reflected through the PNA; this price for peace agreements was bearing down not only on the civilian Palestinians but for the PNA as well. In **June '99** a group of Palestinian dissidents 'the Free Officers and the Honest People of Palestinian' accused leading PNA officials of collaboration with Israel and issued an indirect threat to President Arafat's life. Security surrounding the President was accordingly stepped up. In Aug. the PNA and the DFLP decided to set aside their differences and coordinate their positions for the final status issues; it was their first meeting since 1993. At President Arafat's request, Israel allowed the PLFP Dy. Sec. General Abu Ali Mustafa to return to PNA controlled areas after more than 30 years in exile in order to participate in the reconciliation talks. For reasons not completely validated, the Palestinian leadership continued to delay the PLO central council meeting that had been originally scheduled by June '99, after Ehud Barak's election victory in Israel. Statements issued for the delay included that the PLO central council's constitution committee was still working on a preliminary draft containing alternatives addressing points still open to debate.

In **Oct' 99** the PNA High Court ordered the Palestinian authorities to release 34 Palestinian political detainees in Nablus prison. By mid Nov. the PNA had not complied leading to severe outbursts of popular resentments. Administrative protests continued in the areas of PNA jurisdiction; in Nov. taxi drivers held a strike against increased taxes, sit-ins at the PLC were staged to reduce fuel prices, people refused to pay telephone bills after tariffs were lowered in Israel but not in Palestinian territories. Strikes also continued for the price hikes in basic goods like flour which are controlled by PNA monopoly ultimately forcing President Arafat for certain price reductions and issuing investigation into the telephone charges. Criticization of fiscal policies was not far behind the Nov. strikes wherein a US \$ 126 m. was unaccounted for by the Minister of Finance. It was also reported that a number of companies run by the PNA officials that received several million dollars in public funding did not report their profits to the PLC's budget committee, claiming to be private companies, yet at the same time did not pay taxes claiming to be government enterprises.¹⁵ It was obvious that all the accusations were meant

¹⁵ Masalha, Nur. "Mid East and North Africa." p.704

to be directed at the PNA head – Y. Arafat. The authorities responded by launching an immediate crackdown on the Presidents critics and the Document Signatories.¹⁶ Though the other members of the PLC condemned their 9 colleges of attempting to divide the Palestinian people, yet their immunization from trial, as per President Arafat's demand, was not suspended. The PNA's draconian reaction to the anti-corruption petition prompted international condemnation; Palestinians world wide endorsed the anti-corruption petition by solidarity statements with the anti corruption campaigners. The DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PFLP held meetings in Gaza to condemn the PNA response, and urged the Govt. to uphold civil liberties.

For President Arafat, it seemed that eventually this misappropriation of funds had to be corrected. Imminently so when, apart from general disquiet which was suppressed, the Director of the privately run Palestine International Bank, Issam Abu Isa was charged with embezzlement of US \$ 15 m., dissolving the Bank's board and installing his own officers. The matter was let off by the dismissal of Abu Issa and appointment of an International Audit Firm to investigate the case. **On 10th Jan 2000, the PNA established a higher council for Development**, to be chaired by President Arafat. The Council's role would be to ensure the transparency of the Public Finance System; it would handle the general revenue administration, reporting all revenue collected to a single treasury account; oversee management of all commercial and investment operations of the PNA; develop a privatization strategy; oversee handing of internal and external debt policy and repayment of loans. The step was approved by major donors as well as international agencies, and the domestic population saw it as a reestablishment of their lost faith in the PNA. On 26th Jan 2000, the PLC approved the 2000 Budget, supposedly the PNA's first balanced budget. President Arafat also ratified the NGO law, delineating the relationship between the PNA and the Palestinian NGOs. In the first week of Feb' 00 the legislative council sent to President Arafat for signature a draft law on the independence of the Judiciary. In early April it was announced that a new Palestinian National Council was to be established, including the PLO Executive Committee and other leading public figures. The tasks of the new council would include the issue of the Palestinian diasporas, refugee camps in other Arab countries and the possible participation of the concerned Palestinians in elections in those countries. At the end

¹⁶ Ibid. p.750.

"Document' refers to a petition signed by 20 leading Palestinian academics, professionals and 9 members of the PLC accusing the PNA of corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power along with inefficiency in talks with Israel.

of June it was reported that the first draft of the constitution for a Palestinian state was complete and had been submitted to the President for his approval. However repression of anti-Arafat sides continued. By the end of May, the Chief News Editor of the voice of Palestine radio station was arrested after he publicly criticized President Arafat's talks with Israel in Stockholm. During the next month a crack down on media dissenters was carried out with 4 Television and 2 Radio station being closed down. At the end of July leading representatives of Hamas was arrested by security forces in Gaza on charges of defamation and sedition and as being a threat to the internal security who claimed that PNA negotiators attending Camp David Summit 2000 with Israel were guilty of reason.

A Consternate Israel - Changes in Leadership

By mid 1998 it was being evidently clear that US was getting exasperated with Israeli procrastination and intransigence. Effectively, on 19th July Israeli negotiators met with their Palestinian counterparts directly for substantive talks after many months. After 3 days however, President Arafat withdrew his teams accusing Israel of creating obscure formulations on the US initiative. They were angered by an Israeli proposition that 3% of the 13.1% of the WEST BANK territory subject to discussion under the US proposal should be transformed is to a 'nature reserve' on which both Palestinian and Israeli construction would be prohibited. Furthermore a prominent Likud Knesset member stated on Israeli television that PM Netanyahu wanted the final-status negotiation to continue for a minimum of 15 years in order to test Palestinian goodwill. On 23rd Oct., PM Netanyahu and President Arafat signed the Wye River memorandum (discussed above). On his return to Israel, PM Netanyahu had to face protest demonstration from the Jewish settler groups against the Memorandum. In an attempt to reassure them, he announced further plans to proceed with settlement expansion declaring that Wye did not preclude the construction of new settlements or the configuration of Palestinian land. By the end of Oct. he approved the construction of 1, 025 new housing units at the Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem. He was severely criticized by the PNA for violation of the just signed Memorandum, especially when even President Arafat was accused of having given too much

concession at the Wye from his own people. **By mid Nov.** the Knesset had ratified the Wye memorandum and the Govt. implemented the 1st stage of renewed redeployment from the WEST BANK as also releasing 250 Palestinian prisoners and signing a protocol allowing for the inauguration of an international airport at Gaza. During Dec' 98 it was becoming clear that division within Netanyahu's coalition over the implementation of the Wye memorandum was making effective government untenable. On 21st Dec PM Netanyahu was forced to thus support an opposition motion demanding the dissolution of the Knesset and an early election; 17th May.1999.

With his domestic confidence in tatters, PM Netanyahu threw accusations at President Arafat that the Palestinians had not adequately addressed their security commitments and announced that he would not release the Palestinian prisoners with Jewish blood on their hands. He also demanded that President Arafat renounce his intention to declare Palestinian statehood in May 1999. President Arafat for his own part conveyed his own security concerns, reasserting demands for a freeze on the construction of Jewish settlements in disputed territory. Following a meeting between President Clinton, President Arafat and the Israel PM on 14th Dec, PM Netanyahu announced that the 2nd phase of Israel troop deployment scheduled for 18th Dec (Wye Memorandum) would not be undertaken. Following this the Knesset voted to suspend implementation of the Wye Memorandum. Settlement Programmes, albeit this continued. **By mid' 99** Israel had established 17 new hilltop settlements on the WEST BANK, all located close to areas specified for transfer to the PNA, under the terms of the accord.

Meanwhile, US-Israeli relations continued to deteriorate. **In early Jan' 99** US Secy. of State, M. Albright conveyed her disinclination to meet Ariel Sharon during a visit to the USA owing to US frustration with Israel's suspension of the peace process, especially the Wye. The Clinton administration also threatened to withdraw the US \$ 1,200 promised to Israel to cover the cost of its redeployment in the WEST BANK also speculating a US \$ 400 m. award in aid to the PNA. Moreover President Clinton was refusing the meet, for several months, PM Netanyahu while agreeing to meet President Arafat in mid March to discuss his unilateral declaration of a Palestinian statehood on 4th May' 99. The EU-Israeli relations too deteriorated. The EU was annoyed over the Likud settlement expansion programme which it deemed to be illegal, also to continuing disagreement over the status of Jerusalem. **In mid March' 99** the EU strongly condemned Israel's instruction to foreign delegations not to visit Jerusalem, making official

representation to Ariel Sharon, emphasizing the fact that the EU regarded Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* in accordance with the terms of UN Res. 181 (1947) and was therefore outside Israeli sovereignty. This communication provoked a condemnatory response from Israel and subsequently a Cabinet Resolution reaffirmed Israel's sovereignty over a 'United Jerusalem' while A. Sharon declared the UN resolution to be null and void. **On 17th May 99 Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister** with 56% votes against 44% for Netanyahu. Barak's One Israel grouping secured 26 seats to the Knesset while Likud's strength declined from 32 to 19 seats., 78.8% of the 4.3 m. electorate participated in the elections. The election campaign had been bitter and decisive. Most observers believed that the election was lost by the Likud than won by One Israel Netanyahu had become increasingly unpopular and had disappointed many of Israel's business communities who held him responsible for the economic recession due to his freezing of the peace process and his fiscal policies. Despite having gained no clear majority in the Knesset, Ehud Barak had gained a clear mandate to form a broad coalition government. He thus included the Centre Party, Shas, Meretz, Israel B' Aliyah and the NRP in the ministerial positions. The most influential posts were however reserved for himself (Minister of Defence) and for loyalists such as David Levy (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Itzhak Mordechai (Minister of Transport). The former two along with Benyamin Ben-Eliezer were also awarded as the three Deputy Prime Minister.

Shortly after assuming office, PM Barak held a series of summit meetings with Arab and European leaders starting with President Mubarak, Egypt, 9th July, culminating with direct discussion with President Clinton in mid July. A resumption of peace talks between Israel and Syria was encouraged and **on 20th July Syria ordered a cease fire with Israel**. However serious difficulties regarding a suitable starting point for renewed negotiations still remained. **On 4th Sep' 99, the Sharm-el Sheik Memorandum was signed by President Y. Arafat and PM Ehud Barak**, Egypt, in the presence of US Sect. of State, M. Albright, President Mubarak of Egypt and king Abdullah of Jordan. It was a revised version of the Wye Memorandum and was also referred to as the **Wye II**. Most requirements of Wye II were the reproduced ones of the original Wye memorandum. Provisions for interim issues as further redeployments, security, safe passages, the seaport at Gaza and joint committees remained essentially the same except for new target dates. However Wye II decreased to 350 the number of Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons. Important changes were also made regarding the final status negotiations. Following the

signing of the agreement, Israel and the PNA generally fulfilled their outstanding obligations though frequently behind schedule. The major difficulty was posed by the implementation of the 2nd stage of redeployment, scheduled for 15th Nov.' 99 which Israel postponed after President Arafat disputed the areas that were to be turned over to the PNA. The amount of land nominated for transfer to full and partial PNA control was the same under Wye II as in the Wye original; however the transfer was to take place in 3 stages instead to 2. Neither document included a map detailing the transfers by Israel (Area C) to complete Palestinian control (Area A) and / or partial Palestinian Israeli control (Area B). Assurances of Israel's withdrawal were nevertheless given, whereby the transfer of land would in the 1st redeployment take place mainly in the northern part of WEST BANK, the 2nd in Ramallah area and the 3rd around Hebron. Israel also turned over maps to the PNA on the 1st week of Sep.' 99, carrying out the transfer of 7% of the WEST BANK from Area C to Area B on 10 Sep. The numerous pockets of land to come under PNA control were sparsely populated and no IDF forces or check-points were moved. By the 3rd week of September Israel approved some 14 odd military orders to seal off large areas of WEST BANK agricultural lands belonging to 79 Palestinian villages. The area affected was greater than the 7% of land recently transferred to PNA Partial control, Area B. **On 25 Oct' 99, a southern 'safe passage' for Palestinians** traveling between Gaza and Hebron was finally opened, under the terms of the Wye Memo. The 3rd phase of redeployment was scheduled for 20 January 2000 --transfer of an additional 1% of territory from Area C to Area A, while 5.1% was expected to be shifted from Area B to Area C. **On 11 Nov.** Israel presented the PNA with the maps for the 2nd stage of redeployment. President Arafat rejected them stating that the areas proposed were to sparsely populated and did not link existing areas of PNA control. The maps placed the 3% of land to be transferred to Area B is the Judean Desert and classified it as a 'nature reserve'. The other 2% to be transferred to Area A lay near Jenin. After 3 days of unsuccessful talks, 12-14 Nov. to produce a compromise, Israel postponed the 2nd phase of redeployment. It was evident that PM Barak, at this stage, was opposed to placing any territorial constraints on Jewish settlements in the WEST BANK, moreso as a total of 12 new by pass road were at various stages of planning and construction although work on the US \$ 70 m. programme was a impeded by USA's refusal to supply \$ 1,200 m. aid.

The Final Status of West Bank - The Israel - PNA Impasse

By mid September Israel also shifted focus to final status discussion with PNA. A formal meeting between the two parties ensued on **13 September, Erez check point**, marking the 6th Anniversary of the Oslo Agreement. It was later reported that PM Barak and President Arafat had held a secret meeting to discuss the agenda for such talks, prior to the meeting. Meanwhile around the same time, Israel signed an agreement with the US to purchase 50 F-16 fighter aircrafts. The Barak Govt.'s apparent intention to continue expansion of Jewish settlements in WEST BANK came under severe domestic criticisms from left wing groups as well as Palestinians. This followed the approval in Oct. by PM Barak the construction of 2, 600 new Jewish housing units in the WEST BANK near Jerusalem – the average number each year Netanyahu had approved. In Nov. a meeting held between US, Israel and President Arafat, in Oslo, commemorating the 4th Anniversary of Itzhak Rabin's assassination, PM Barak offered the option of dividing the Israel-Palestinian issues into two groups – 'possible' and 'difficult'. Israel and Palestinian could then work on reaching an agreement on the 'possible' issues, by 13 Sep. 2000, with the understanding that any 'difficult' issues that could not be resolved by September would be deferred indefinitely by natural agreement. The Israeli PM explained that he saw the final status issues in 3 categories --

non-negotiable, such as Jerusalem;

vital but negotiable;

and, ones which could be flexible.

He also suggested that the US convene a Camp David style summit in Jan. 2000 President Clinton agreed in principle. **On 8 Nov. 99**, Israel and Palestinians held negotiations on final status in the WEST BANK city of Ramallah. This was 2nd Round of Talks on Final Status negotiations. The two negotiating team, led by Oded Eran (Israeli Ambassador to Jordan) on the Israeli side and Yasser Abd – ar Rabbuh for the PNA agreed to meet 2-3 times a week, alternating between Jerusalem and Ramallah and deal the final status issues as package, rather than to form separate committees. The teams met again in mid Nov. but with no progress. In Late Nov. and early Dec' 99 Israel approved two plans to expand Jewish settlements in the WEST

BANK, which convinced the PNA that Israel was not negotiating in good faith. By this time interim talks had reached an impasse, with the PNA demanding accommodation on the issues of further redeployment and settlements and Israel refusing to reconsider the redeployment maps and claiming that it was obliged to continue with settlement construction begun by the previous Govt. **On 6 Dec. the PNA suspended final status meetings** maintaining that it would no longer discuss anything with Israel except settlement. Two days later USA's Albright presented President Arafat and PM Barak with a suggested timeline: by 10 Jan 2000 Israel and the PNA would complete a draft of the **Framework Agreement on Permanent Status, FAPS**¹⁷, that would facilitate a Camp David Summit before the 13th Feb. deadline of unilateral declaration by PNA of statehood. In early Dec' 99, the resumption of talks between Israel and Syria was announced. It also was followed by assurances to the PNA that this shift would not affect progress on the Palestinian issue. M. Albright's visit was sufficient for the PNA to resume final status meetings on 19 Dec., but since the US Secy. of State refused to interfere on other issues of redeployment and settlement expansion, no substantive progress was made. On 21 Dec. PM Barak and President Arafat held private discussions in Ramallah to revitalize talks – their first ever meeting on Palestinian territory.

The 2nd stage of WEST BANK redeployment was implemented on 6-7th Jan. 2000. Israel transferred 2% of jointly controlled Area B to PNA controlled Area A and 3% of Israeli controlled Area C to Area B, evacuating 6 IDF posts. The transfer of territory was low key, mainly because of the disconnected assortment of villages, enclaves and a desert area categorized as 'nature reserves'. By mid Feb. 2000, Area A represented 12.1% of the WEST BANK, Area B 26.9% and Area C 61%. By the 2nd week of Jan. Israel postponed the implementation of the third stage of redeployment planned for 20 Jan. on the pretext that the PM would not have a chance to review the redeployment maps until he returned from his negotiation round with Syria. Mean while, on 17 Jan. as many as 20 people were wounded in a bomb explosion at Hadera, Northern Israel which appeared to have been perpetrated by Palestinian militants. A week later Israel and PNA announced plans to hold intensive final status negotiations, working simultaneously on issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, borders and settlements. **On 3 Feb, 2000** in a meeting at Erez between PM Barak and President Arafat, the latter angrily walked out claiming that the Israeli PM had asked him to delay the FAPS deadline by 6 months and

¹⁷ Masalha, N. Op. Cit. p.700

postpone the deadline for permanent agreement until mid June 2001. Two days later Dennis Ross and the newly appointed US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk met with Israeli and Palestinian representatives to resolve the redeployment issue. Talks were unsuccessful. On the seventh day of the FAPS talks, 6 Feb., the PNA suspended discussions, saying that they would not resume negotiations until they have received acceptable answers to three issues –

- given that the 13 Feb deadline for FAPS was impossible, did Israel want to eliminate the FAPS and proceed to talks on a full ‘final status’ agreement, or did it seek to extend the FAPS deadline;
- would Israel allow the PNA to take part in drawing up the map of the 3rd stage of the 2nd redeployment and 3rd redeployment;
- when did Israel plan to carry out the 3rd redeployment

To these there was no official response from Israel.

On 8 March a landmark ruling by Israel’s Supreme Court made it illegal for the Govt. to allocate state owned land for the exclusive purpose of constructing Jewish settlements, stating that it must not discriminate on the basis of religion, nationality and ethnicity. The ruling paved the way for Israeli Arabs to buy land for the first time. On 19 March 2000, the Knesset however approved the transfer of further 6% of the WEST BANK. On 30 April, the 3rd Round of negotiations opened at the Red Sea Port of Eilat between Israel and PNA. It was interspersed with the disturbance of Israel’s approval of 174 new housing units in Ma’aleh Edomin. In early May the talks were joined by Dennis Ross to prevent the ‘final status’ negotiation from unraveling. On 7 May, PM Barak and President Arafat held a crisis meeting in Ramallah, wherein the Israel PM laid before President Arafat the proposal of transferring three Arab villages bordering Jerusalem – Abu-Dis, Al-Azariyya, As-Sawahra, under Area A, on condition that the 3rd WEST BANK redeployment (Scheduled for June 2000) be suspended until after a ‘permanent status’ agreement had been reached. Earlier, on 5 May, Israeli Chief Negotiator Eran had presented Israel’s envisaged map of the future Palestinian entity; it showed a canton in Gaza and three smaller ones in the north, south and centre of the WEST BANK. Together they comprised 66% of WEST BANK, with a further 14% to be added after a ‘trial period’ of a few years. The three areas marked were disjointed, but would be connected by a nexus of ‘safe passages’ including a single access road from Ramallah to the Jordan’s an border via Jericho. In

return Israel would annex 20% of the WEST BANK, including the main settlement blocks and two lateral land corridors connecting these to the Jordan valley. The percentage to be annexed did not include Jerusalem which was to remain 'united' under Israel's 'sovereignty'. PM Barak's vision of a truncated Palestinian state saw neither East Jerusalem as its capital or the return of refugees to their homes. Predictably enough, the Palestinian side rejected the offer as utterly unacceptable. By this stage the Israelis and the Palestinians had conceded that the 13 May deadline for reaching a FAPS was unachievable.

Prelude to Camp David 2000

Domestically within Israel on 1st May 2000, 600-1000 inmates of the estimated 1,650 Palestinian political detainees in Israeli prisons declared a hunger strike against unofficial detention. The Prisoners cause drew widespread support and sympathy in the Occupied territories, cutting across political and ideological affiliations. Palestinian frustration at Israel's refusal to release more prisoners under the terms of the peace process and at the current impasse in the talks precipitated widespread unrest in the West Bank and Gaza. Protests, initially peaceful, escalated dramatically around 15 May. On what was declared by the Palestinians to be a 'day of rage' violent clashes erupted in the West Bank with Israeli troops and Palestinian police fighting fierce gun battles in the worst manifestation of Palestinian frustration since the violence that had followed the reopening of the Hasmonean tunnel four years ago. This 'day of rage' came shortly after the expiry of another peace process deadline, 13 May 2000, when Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were to have unveiled a framework for a final settlement. The clashes consequently led Israel to approve the transfer of the three Palestinian villages promised in Eilat negotiations in 1st week of May. Though the decision was made initially to mollify the Palestinians, but now it just incurred the wrath of the Israeli political right. It also put PM Barak's coalition at risk. Following the Knesset's approval of the transfer, the NRP (one of the two parties in coalition that had voted against the motion) announced the withdrawal of its support. Religious, right wing and Russian immigrant parties interpreted the move only as evidence to PM Barak's intention to give up part of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians. The settler groups responded with a large demonstration in Jerusalem; their greatest show of strength

since the assassination of Itzhak Rabin five years ago. In the same week, as a result of such animosity the Knesset approved a bill to limit changes in Jerusalem's municipal boundaries and to ban the transfer of power within them to a foreign element, which many of the coalition members fully supported. At the same time the Israeli Govt. accused the PNA leadership of stoking protests to force concession on territory before the September 2000 deadline for final peace agreement. The Israeli PM demanded that the PNA take effective measures to end Palestinian unrest, especially militancy. He also took the unusual step of banning Israeli and foreign tourists from Palestinian controlled areas, and informed that the transfer of the three village near Jerusalem was on hold until President Arafat acted to curb the unrest. In response the PNA rejected the Israeli claims and reported that the Israeli army had provoked the protestors. **In early June 2000**, pressure from the US helped to persuade PM Barak to resume the peace talks, specially after the PNA carried out a number of arbitrary arrests against those who had led the confrontation with the Israeli army. In spite of President Arafat's urging Palestinians to temperate demonstrations in solidarity with the prisoners on hamper-strike, deep divisions with Israel remained.

The CAMP DAVID 2000

On 5th July 2000 US President Clinton invited both parties to the Presidential retreat of Camp David, the site of the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. On 10 July PM Barak's coalition shattered as three right wing parties withdrew support, fearing that the PM would concede too much to the Palestinians on the negotiating table. He, however, narrowly survived a 'non-confidence' motion on the eve of his departure for Camp David. On 11 July the summit was launched and the following day PM Barak and President Arafat held bilateral talks without US mediation. There was imposed an official news black out imposed, though information gathered could prescribe that major issues of difference were Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders and Jewish settlements. **On 13 July President Arafat threatened to walk out** of the talks in anger at the US bridging proposals that the Palestinian officials regarded as too close to the Israeli position. Effectively, US withdrew the proposals and a crisis was averted. **By 19 July PM Barak reportedly threatened to walk out** in protest at PNA demands for sovereignty over

part of Jerusalem. The negotiations broke down with the USA announcing that the summit had ended without agreement. However PM Barak and President Arafat agreed to remain at Camp David with their negotiating teams while President Clinton was due to return from a G-8 Summit in Japan. Although returning early, his attempts to persuade Israel and the PNA sign an agreement collapsed on **25th July when negotiator failed to reach a compromise regarding the future status of Jerusalem**. However progress was reported in several other areas; a broad agreement on the borders of a future Palestinian state, incorporating the Gaza strip and at least 90% of WEST BANK had been reached. The most densely populated Jewish settlements with about 80% of the Jewish settlers of the WEST BANK, would be annexed to Israel, perhaps for return of territory within Israel itself. Less progress had been made on the issue of refugees, Israel had accepted the right of return of 5,000 Palestinians annually over a 20-year period, while stressing that it was not responsible for the creation of this problem. Towards the end of the Summit, Israel had offered the PNA municipal autonomy over some parts of East Jerusalem and access to Islamic holy sites in the Old City but sovereignty would remain exclusively in Israeli hands. Over this intractable issue President Arafat insisted that Palestine must retain sovereignty over Islamic holy sites, particularly the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque and maintained that East Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state. **The collapse of Camp David seriously damaged President Clinton's hopes of reaching an historic accord** before the expiry of his presidential term in Nov. 2000. He however convinced both parties to approve a final statement committing both sides to continue their efforts to conclude an agreement on all final status issues as soon as possible. They would also avoid 'unilateral decisions', implying President Arafat's intention to declare statehood. Although the delegations vowed not to abandon the peace process altogether, there was a sense of genuine disappointment and both parties blamed each other for the failure of the talks. The failure of Camp David also led to renewed fears of violence in WEST BANK and Gaza. On 26th July both the premiers returned home the Palestinian leader to hero's welcome for refusing to yield under pressure; while the Israeli PM faced criticisms both from left and right wing parties.

At the end of July the Clinton Administration announced the consideration of relocating the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It was a strategy that worked for both sides and negotiators resumed discussions with a hint at a second Camp David in the coming autumn. Mean while the PNA came under increasing international pressure to postpone the unilateral

declaration of statehood on 13 September. It was reported in mid-Aug. that PM Barak had for the first time spoken of offering the Palestinians statehood in order to prevent a dangerous conflict in the region. During that period the Israeli security services had detained some 23 suspected Palestinian militants after uncovering a number of 'terrorist squads' one of which was suspected to be linked to the Saudi born fundamentalist Islamist, Osama bin Laden. **The 13 September deadline passed without much furor.** Leaving a more understanding Yasser Arafat. On 28 Sep. a controversial visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem by the Likud Leader Ariel Sharon, sparked off violent protests by stone throwing Palestinians which quickly spread to other towns in the Palestinian territories. Moreover, Israeli Arabs for the first time took part in demonstrations and clashed with security forces within Israel Mr. Sharon had apparently entered the mosque with his shoes on. The Israeli Govt. received considerable criticisms from the International Community and Human Rights Organizations for the severity of its response to the Palestinian uprising. On 7 Oct. the UNSC passed a resolution condemning the 'excessive use of force' employed by IDF against the demonstrators. Despite diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring calm, particularly by Egypt, USA and France, the violence continued into late Oct.

Israel and Syria

On the northern front, following the resumption of Israeli – Syrian negotiations in late 1999 and early 2000, armed resistance by the Hezbollah against Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon escalated, with Israeli retaliation being targeted at Lebanese civilian infrastructure against Israeli forces and their proxy militiamen of SLA on the Occupation Zone, while Israel continued to launch retaliatory air raids. In mid Dec' 99, Israel apologized for an attack in which some 18 Lebanese school children were injured. **By late Dec.1999 Israel and Syria had reached on 'understanding in principle'** to limit the fighting in southern Lebanon; the cease fire did not last and by 30 Jan 2000 the death of 4 soldiers led Israel to declare that peace talks with Syria would not resume until Syria took action to restrain the Hezbollah. On the first week of Feb. 2000 after Hezbollah attacks escalated, Israel launched a massive series of air strikes on Lebanese infrastructure; the bombing of three major power station resulted in a complete

blackout over Lebanon. Israel subsequently declared a 'military state of emergency' along its northern border. Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and Egyptian President Mubarak met in Beirut and issued a condemnation of the Israeli raids, supporting Hezbollah's resistance against the occupation of the border zone. President Mubarak was also clearly disappointed at the lack of progress on the Palestinian track, to which he had played the role of mediator. On the other hand, Israel was incensed by President Mubarak's endorsement of the Hezbollah, renewing fears of another major Israel-Lebanese conflict. **On 5 March 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously endorsed the proposed withdrawal from southern Lebanon by the first week of July.** Lebanese PM Selim al Hoss welcomed the proposal, stressing his preference for it to be a part of a wider deal involving Lebanon as well as Syria. He also maintained that Israeli forces withdraw from the foot of Mt. Hermon, known as the Shebaa farms, without which it would be difficult for Israel to claim honour of UN Res. 425 on ending Israel's illegal occupation of southern Lebanon. However, Damascus' main concern was that a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was aimed at strengthening Israel's ability to retain the Golan, or at least force concessions out of Syria in exchange for returning the territory. The UN, after being formally notified of the intended withdrawal, requested Israel to disarm the SLA as a condition for strengthening the UN forces there. Israel was skeptical for a quick backtrack as neither Lebanon nor Syria had guaranteed that Hezbollah would cease its activities in Southern Lebanon in the event of an Israeli withdrawal. On 21 May Hezbollah fighters used mortars and machine guns against Israeli posts near Golan Heights and by 23 May the Hezbollah had moved into villages abandoned by the SLA, taking control of one-third of territory previously occupied by Israel and its allies and slicing the security zone into two. The central sector of the zone disintegrated as the SLA fighters sought refuge in Israel or handed themselves over to the Hezbollah or the Lebanese army. On the same day the notorious al-khiam jail in the 'security zone' was stormed by Lebanese villagers and the prison's 144 inmates, some being detained since 1980s, were freed. Thus the Hezbollah secured complete access to the northern Israeli frontier. **Israel's occupation of south Lebanon formally ended on 24 May 2000**, when an Israeli army major walked back across the frontier. A few hours later the last Israeli posts were evacuated. PM Barak made a public statement officially ordering his army home and appealing to all powers in Lebanon to behave with restraint and responsibility. The refugee influx into northern Israel reached to several thousand as SLA members, fearing arrest and long prison terms for collaborating with a foreign occupier,

streamed with their families towards the border of Israel, even while the regular Lebanese army had not advanced from the edge of the zone, nor had the troops of UNIFIL moved into the vacuum. The refugee influx had taken the Israeli Govt. by surprise, as had the rapid arrival of the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, well before Israel had the time to complete its electrified border fence and other defences.

The withdrawal marked a change of strategy on the part of Israel; considering that the cost of occupation outweighed the benefits most Israelis were relieved to see their army leave southern Lebanon. About 900 Israeli soldiers had died in southern Lebanon since 1978; Hezbollah had lost 1,276 fighters since it began its resistance in 1982. Nevertheless, the success of Hezbollah somewhat strengthened the conviction of Palestinians once again, that resistance was the only option that produced results. In mid May 2000 the UN had some 4,515 troops in south Lebanon. The security council at this time endorsed a report by Secy. Gen.'s Kofi Annan on arrangements for the monitoring of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Meanwhile Israel and Lebanon as also Syria were required to provide assurances that their full co-operation would be given in the implementation of the Sec. Gen. 's recommendations. Among the technical requirements was the need to identify a line conforming to Lebanon's internationally recognized boundaries for the purpose of confirming compliance with Res. 425. On 7 Oct. three Israeli soldiers were kidnapped on the border with Lebanon by members of the Hezbollah which demanded the release of dozens of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. One week later an Israeli army reservist was also captured by Hezbollah.

The US announced **on 8 December 99 that Israeli-Syria negotiations were to be resumed** from the point at which they had stalled in March 96, and on 15 Dec talks were formally inaugurated by President Clinton in Washington DC. The two parties agreed to hold their first round of intensive negotiations between 3-9 Jan 2000 outside Washington at Shepherds town and conceded to a US request that the State Deptt. handle all briefings so as to avoid leaks and unproductive statements. Mean while both Israel and Syria had agreed to an informal cease fire along southern Lebanon to curb escalating hostilities. On the first day of the **Shepherd'stown Negotiations**, separate meetings between President Clinton, M. Albright and Farouk ash-Shara (Syrian Foreign Minister) and the former two and PM Barak took place (during which PM Barak handed President Clinton a request for US \$ 17,000 m. in military aid). Talks focused on Israel's demand that security issues be addressed first, and on Syria's demand

that the extent of an Israeli withdrawal be the principal item on the agenda. Syria complained that Israel was refusing to convene the border and waters committees and withdrew from the normalization and security talks until the other committees were convened. The talks failed on account of this impasse. **On 16 Jan.** Ash-Shara informed Albright that Syria could not participate in further negotiations unless withdrawal was the principle issue for discussion, and that Israel gave a written commitment to withdraw to the 1967 borders. PM Barak responded that he would allow no such undertaking. The Israel-Syria negotiations had stalled specifically over a piece of land at the foot of the Golan Heights, on the shores of Lake Tiberias. Various proposals were offered by US including a 'draft Working Document' which was presented to both sides as a basis for framework agreement, but Israel was reluctant to consider them without a signal from Damascus that such a deal would bring peace between them. Israel also demanded the personal involvement of Syrian President Assad, who also abided by the course of Syrian negotiator. President Assad offered Israel full peace for full withdrawal¹⁸, emphasizing that a normalization of relations could take place only once Israel had committed itself to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. There was however a growing public opposition within Israel to a possible return of the Golan to Syria. In early January a demonstration was held in opposition to any withdrawal from the Golan, consisted of 10,000 citizens while both B' Aliyah and NRP threatened to leave the coalition.

On 26 March 2000, Geneva, Switzerland President Clinton met President Assad delivering the Israeli view of control of all the waters, of Tiberias - not only of the lake itself but of the upper Jordan R. and other tributaries flowing into the lake from the Golan Heights. This was in stark opposition to what President Assad had expected; assurances from PM Barak however came that he was at last ready to recognize the pre June 1967 borders between the two countries. In response President Assad stated that he was asking for nothing more than what Syria had held before 1967, and refused to modify his demands for a full unconditional Israeli withdrawal to those borders. This failure appeared to damage President Assad's hitherto cordial relationship with President Clinton, plunging regional peace making initiatives into confusion. **On 10 June, the Syrian President Hafiz-al-Assad expired** further throwing peace process in to confusion. After Psd. Assad's death PM Barak assumed a conciliatory note, expressing sympathy for the Syrian people and issuing a veiled invitation to resume the peace talks.

¹⁸ Ibid. p.665.

However the Israeli government avoided any specific expression of regret about the passing away of Israel's long time opponent. On 10th July, being Unanimously approved by the ruling Ba'ath Party, **President Assad's second son Bashar was appointed as the new Syria President.** By mid 2000 it was still unclear as to how exactly the change of this Syrian leadership would affect the Israeli-Syrian position. Shortly after assuming office, Bashar al-Assad, in a brief telephone conversation with President Clinton, pledged to pursue his father's aims of achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the region.

It is now perhaps evident that the main thrust of border settlement of Israel deals primarily with Palestinian areas viz West Bank. In the consequent year of 2001, events have changed many perceptions in the region. The coming of the Bush Administration in US, the Ariel Sharon Govt. in Israel, increasing militancy in the region and its fallout have all geared the region to inevitable collapse. Chapter 4 of the work details these views with respect to border and peace negotiations between Israel and PNA, as also the likely repercussions that may occur in due course of time.

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

CHAPTER - III



Why is it that Israel is so strife torn, not just today, but since the biblical times? Answers can be derived from other civilizational histories where fertile lands have always attracted populace and ambitious administrators. The Ganges Valley, The Manchurian plains, The Amazon Basin, The Mesopotamian Crescent, The Nile Basin, all have experienced not only changing rulers but many reigns of bloodshed. Instead of it, this strip of land known as Israel always evokes a sense of veneration for the religious minded and a sense of power for the able ruler. Thus apart from the fact that this land be seen as the home for the homeless & persecuted, it is also one of the pivoted points in global politics is the areal distribution of nation. Literally being placed at the centre of the global map geographically, Theodore Herzl probably had decided that the future home for his people would also be the apple of the eye of global politics. Indeed so, Israel has always been the centre point of not only West Asian politics but global politics as well. The crux of the matter is who shall rule this ancient city of three most dominant religions in the world. Symbolism is very much the moot point as is physical presences of a set of people on the land.

The land of Israel does not yield much for its people. But the inhabitants are a hard working lot making the most of whatever nature has endowed on them. As a state, though seen in relative terms, Israel has a vigorous economy, the balance sheets showing a steady growth trend. Before a dive for the statistics of the economy is taken, an account of the principal constituents of the economy is necessary.

Map III i, marks out the soil categories of the state giving an idea to the productivity of the district area within its boundary. The main problem regarding agriculture is that of soil moisture availability and salinity affecting the soil. Map III ii, points out to the salinity levels of soils. Mostly the northern part of the country is free from saline influences. This region also marks the abundant presence of aquifers (refer to map 1 iv). It also comes under the influence of the summer isotherms of 30°C – 26°C and the winter isotherm of 10°C and above (Map III, iii). The isohyets of also overrun the area (Map III iv). This region thus seems to be the most fertile tract. Indeed most of the crops of the land are grown in this region, both on the plains and on the slopes towards the North and East. As one progresses towards the South, the salinity of

SALINITY OF SOIL

MAP. IIIi





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SOURCE: ATLAS OF ISRAEL.

SUMMER/WINTER ISOTHERMS.

Map. III ii





SC: ATLAS OF ISRAEL.

the soil increases. The eastern margins of the WEST BANK have soils ranging from 20 – 40% salinity.¹⁹ The flanks of the Dead Sea have a higher than 40% saline constituent.²⁰ The Shefala region in the Central part of the country and portion of the Judean plain have an impression of salinity of 20%.²¹

The central Negev accounts for a 20-40% saline soil while further south wards and east wards the soil is desertified of over 40% salinity. Though crops include most of the ones cultivated in the shefala and judean plains, yields are relatively lower, during dry years agriculture in the region suffers enormously.

Chief among foodcrops produced in Israel are Wheat, Potatoes, Tomato and Tangevives. Out of the food total agricultural produce (1998) of 2965 th. met. tonnes produced in 1998, together they accounted for 30% of the product.

Among fruits chiefly produced are Cucumbers, Water melons, apple, oranges, grape fruit lemons and limes and banana. These accounted for 44% of the total product. (Table. III a).

Food products also include livestock products (Table III b) Cows milk contributes to more than 65% of the total livestock products.. Indeed Israel's cows are world famous for their productivity. No other product matches such a large percentage share in the gross sector wise output. It is important to note that from 1996 to 1998 agricultural product has seen a down trend from 3282. Th. Met. tonnes to 2965th Met. tonnes. Well as livestock output from 1664 met. Tonnes to 1657 th. Met. Tonnes. Taking a closer look on the output of selected industries (Table III c) polythene product is by far the highest contributing component, covering more than 25% of the total output.

The Net Domestic Product by Economic Activity (Table III d) shows that the Quarter - nary sector (Govt. Service + Social/Personal Service.) and the Tertiary Sector (Finance + Insurance + Real Estate + Business Service + Trade) act for more than 70% of the income generated. Next stands the secondary sector (Manufacturing + Electricity + Const) gives 30% while the primary sector (Agriculture) stands for less than 5% contribute to Net Dom. product.

¹⁹ Citrus fruits, grapes, bananas, olives, wheat, barley, sorghum, onions, tomatoes, melon, sugarbeet, cotton, groundnut and cereal (legumes) are significant cultivations.

²⁰ Grapes, olives, legumes, tomatoes and fodder crops and cultivated on significant basis here.

²¹ Sugarbeet, legumes, alfalfa, fodder crops, onions, potatoes and cotton hold high yields in this region.

Clearly Israel's economy is dominated by Tertiary activities. This brings forth the derivation that though nature has not endowed much but the Jewish community in Israel has turned its manpower into a resource and is a successful utilizer of human resources in modern times. Indeed Israel exports 24% of its expertise,²² while the rest account for goods. Among good that are exported, non-metallic-mineral. manufactures holds the highest value, 27.6% of total revenue generated²³. Other important articles of expenditure include Telecommunication / sound equipment, electrical machinery, office/data processing equipment, transport equipment, organic chemicals, precision instrument. (Table III e)

The principle import commodities include non-metallic mineral manufactures (17.0%) of import expenditure, electrical apparatuses (7.7%), Petroleum imports and road vehicles.

The total important expenditure is 592644 m. sheqels. (Table III e) Israel's principal trading partners regarding import are (in descending order) USA holding 20% trade stakes, Belgium – 10%, Germany – 8.8%, UK – 7.5%, Italy – 6.6% (Table III f). Also is indicated, highest exporter from Israel is USA – 35%, remittance UK – 5%, Germany – 4%, Netherlands – 3.5%.

It is evident that the USA is by far the most important trading ally of Israel. In effect Israel does not hold a position in the 1st 15 of the US list of principal trading partners. A kind of dole-me-out relationship between the two countries seem to be taking shape, whereby US imports from as well as exports to Israel forming a major trade chunk, in effect is not really dependent on Israel as much as Israel is dependent on USA.

Out of the total GDP (1999) – 296, 826 million sheqels, Exports account for 50%²⁴. Agriculture wise, Israel export 6.5% of its produce, mainly to European markets. In these are included citrus fruits, dates, fish, meat and vegetables. Since agriculture is mostly in the northern region, these commodities have easy access to the European and East European market. Israel also produces cotton, flax and silk but these are mainly for domestic consumption or rather the

²² Europe World Book 1999. p. 676.

²³ Fig. of 1998. Ibid. p.676

²⁴ IMF, International Financial statistics, 2000

volume produced is just enough to satisfy domestic needs. Food grains are in most years a strategic commodity. Of the total imports though food grain and animal products hold 5.6%, yet it is essential to the nation to even have a constant assurance of this. It can be explained that the high percentage of non-food product import is mostly to feed its vigorous economy which is more based on tertiary activity. However due to conducive climate and abundant moisture in the north, vegetables grow in excess. Summer as well as winter vegetables both flood the domestic as well as clientele markets of Israel.

Tourism too is an important source of income. In 1998 it contributed to almost 4% of GDP²⁵ Another important factor in Israeli economy is the diamond industry. Israel produces diamonds which are acclaimed world over for their cut, finish and polish. Thus Israel gives the most avid example of a tertiary - quaternary sector based economy. It also provides the examples of how its economy is diversified in relying for trade from as far as Australia, Japan and Hong-Kong. Though the volume of trade is not much in relative terms but still the fact that such a huge network is established points out to a lesson to be learned. In a land where resources are scarce, it probably has to afford such a scale of global trading. From the tables studied thus far, there is a conspicuous absence of Israel's immediate neighbours as its trading partners. This is mostly due to the economic boycott that the surrounding states have imposed on Israel in the light of the on-going territorial clash between the state of Israel and the Palestinian peoples.

In spite of Israel's flourishing economy, it still faces acute shortages of water. Water still remains a scarce commodity, its availability limited, use even more restricted. Water tax²⁶ forms an important constituent of the tax structure of the country. More tax paid on water does not mean that citizens are allowed to use more water. Water is supplied in quotas and its consumption is regulated under strict conditions. The alternative resource bases *viz.* mining, petroleum, falls short of expectations, though at places there is abundance of natural gas. Places in the Negev and Eilat have shown positive responses to the geological quest for oil and the northern hills of Galilee near Lake Huleh to natural gas. Most of the electricity is produced near the coasts on the west, dependent on the oil that is imported. Indeed most of Israel's oil consumption is more in production of electricity. This still falls short for what Israel needs in today's competitive world, and thus again it turns back to water for generation of electricity. Even

²⁵ Cossali, P. Op. cit. p. 678.

²⁶ Jablonsky, E. Op. cit. p. 62.

though Israel has an abundant store of diamonds and other strategic minerals of uranium, thorium, lead and silicon²⁷, yet things eventually come back to the fluid of life – water.

Northern Israel is endowed with numerous small perennial streams which run a distance of 20-80 km radiating from the hills of Golan, of which only a part is harnessable in down stream Israel. Electricity, filling of tanks and use in fields are all expected to be done from there. Volumewise they run far short of what is required for the nation, though regionally speaking they suffice. The Jordan River is thus of immense significance. Not only does it act as an efficient border demarcation, the Jordan system is the sole recharger of the Jerusalem aquifer and its surrounds. The Jerusalem aquifer is the backbone of urban life in Israel²⁸. The south is dry, population through has no choice but survive. The feeling of belongingness of the Jews to this strong soil is so strong that any amount of hardship can be withstood by these men, women and children for remaining in that land; just for name-sake that they are a part of Israel of which the capital is Jerusalem. Southern Israel is one of the harshest regions on earth- high diurnal range, almost non-existent moisture regime, barren rocky topography, no vegetation cover and acidic soil. In spite of it, settlements as well as populations continue to rise. This trait is not delivered among the riotous Arabs of the region. The desert is the home turf for the *beduins* who have the territories ranging from the Sahara, the Sinai, the Negev to the Rub al Khali of Saudi Arabia to their claim. They are pirates par excellence and the claim of successful assault is considered fittingly theirs, if they win.


Such conditions led to the designers of modern Israel – Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan and more recently Ariel Sharon to go ahead with the most ambitious plan for water sufficiency across the nation.

The National Water Carrier (Map IIIiv) This carrier was mainly devised to bring in water to the dry south. The need for such a channel would not be so highlighted if the population specially in the urban regions, would have been kept stable. However, more than natural increase, out of immigration of the Jewish diaspora to Israel, more land has to be occupied. The eastern part was already blocked by the priorly residing Palestinians and armed conflict was in progress there for claiming of territory. This part was blocked for peaceful and purposeful Israeli residency.

²⁷ Atlas of Israel.

²⁸ Wolf, A. T. Op. cit. p. 160.

Map III iv WATER MANAGEMENT



SC: ALLAN, J. A.

The north too had been satiated with settlements beyond which, firstly the land could not supplement and secondly, Lebanon and Syria had already adjusted their borders through a number of treaties and presently showed no signs of aggressiveness on whose pretext any offensive / defensive could be launched. The only escape route seemed to be the coastline and the south-centre. The Negev was thus toiled as the carrier brought in just enough water for the north of the desert to be cultivated.

The West Asian countries face an environmental crisis, mostly due to the imminent water scarcity and the existing potential pollution of their resources. It is estimated that the investment needed to deal with and solve the problem could reach US \$ 70-80,000 million in the period 1995-2000. The hydrogeological conditions are in constant deterioration. As extraction from ground and surface water resources increase, so do the problems associated with low water tables and decreased quality. Almost 20% of the total population in the region lack an adequate potable supply.²⁹ The present population of Israel is 5.5 million approximately and increasing naturally at a rate of 2.5%. Best estimates for the 2020 is a 6-7 million. Present average urban water consumption is 110m³/capita/year. Which amounts to 1000-1300 million cubic metres (mcm) of fresh water pervious year. Inelastic consumption of fresh water resources will amount therefore to approximately 1200-1650 mcm/year in 2020. In order to sustain the country's economic demand for water, policy must be based on major investments, aggressive public education, govt. incentives and penalties, implementation of a water market as well as changes in water rates as well as additional institutional arrangements. It also calls for an elaborate social and political campaign. However it is easily said than done. costs/m³ to treat and transfer and the investments to facilitate exchange of fresh water sources for secondary or tertiary treated effluent could rise to close to desalinization costs. In the Southern Negev, desalinization of brackish water has already been integrated into the system as it is cheaper than piping water from the north; irrigation system there use only brackish water and effluent treated water. Israel sustainable fresh water potential in approximately 1660-1700 mcm/year (excluding the proposed Palestinian Authority (PPA)). Thus Israel will devote all of it fresh water resources to meet inelastic demand, while all or most of the treated effluents will be used in agriculture and industry. **Israel's main water sources are the Sea of Galilee and the coastal and mountain aquifers,** therefore Israel cannot hope to satisfy the needs of the PPA. Although the Palestinians are

²⁹ Ibid. p.22.

presently consuming water at relatively low rates, with 4-6 million people projected within the PPA by the year 2020, and inflexible consumption at 60-80 m³ percapita/year, additional resources will have to be developed and distributed. Apart from comprehensive demand management programmes, regional water transfers and sea-water desalinization are the only feasible solution and must be integrated into the water system of the region in the decades. The Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal Project (Med-Dead Canal) too is an important aspect in this regard along it as a substantive number of desalinization plants are projected to be installed.

Water scarcity is a factor which intensifies the difficulty of the tasks confronting the Israel govt. especially in the face of the Palestinian people's revolts. In the Gaza strip the newly established Palestinian authority is facing an emergency situation in the water sector inherited after 27 year of occupation. Over pumping of the aquifer over the past two decades has led to massive degradation of the only source of fresh water available the coastal aquifer. It is a major constraint on economic development. Furthermore, past and continuing over-abstraction of water from the aquifer has resulted in the degradation of quality of water available. The economic impact is primarily evident in the cropping patterns and in the general health of the population. In the WEST BANK there is an estimated 500,000 dunams of land and in the Gaza another 100,000 dunams (1ha = 10 dunams) which could be brought under irrigation. However the quantity of water available is not sufficient to provide water for this potentially irrigable area. With the rapid growth of population, combined with the inadequacy of the disposal and / or treatment systems of waste water, and the absence of effective regulative and enforcement capacity as well as of appropriate pricing and costing policy for water, scarcity and well as deterioration of water is on the rise. Added to it also are the barriers placed by the occupying Israel Govt. in extension of Palestinian access to and management of the water shortage. The present Palestinian consumption from the WEST BANK aquifers comes to less than 20% of the estimated annual discharge of around 550 mcm. Most of the Palestinian water comes from sources which existed prior to Israeli occupation, the majority from the Eastern aquifer which has no impact on Israel water abstractions from the other WEST BANK aquifers. It has been estimated by the Palestinian water experts the current level of water supply to them falls short by over 50% of the total demand. AT present the annual per capita annual domestic consumption in the WEST BANK averages 27 m³ and around 33 m³ in Gaza. Whereas in Israel, the equivalent figure is around 100 m³ Palestinian WEST BANK consumers also pay almost double the price

per m³ to that of Israeli consumers. However, even if these artificial constraints were removed any augmentation of supply would require the effective and efficient investment of capital and allocation of human resources.

Along with the issues of Jerusalem and Jewish settlements, negotiations over water rights between Palestinians and Israelis were postponed in 1995, and still now no major breakthrough has been achieved, indicating the adamant diametrical positions held by each side. The Palestinians claim that the flow of the mountain aquifer that is derived from rain fall over the WEST BANK, 80-90% of which is currently extracted from deep wells mainly within Israel, should be allocated for their use and that Israel's much criticized, long term, over pumping of the aquifer is a serious threat to the essential future water reserves of the Palestinians. The Palestinians are also concerned that Israel, due to development requirements resulting from the mass immigration of Jews from Russia and other countries, will use more and more of the water from the mountain aquifer depriving the Palestinians of their fair share. Leaders have requested that the authorities of the concerned countries henceforth stop the emigration of Jews to Israel. Since the Israel Civil Administration has effectively frozen Palestinian utilization of water sources in the occupied territories and has allocated insufficient amounts for urban and industrial use and practically no water for increased agricultural development to meet the needs of the growing population, the Palestinian Authorities demand that this embargo be undone. They claim that this discrimination on one hand and on the other, Israel during the period of occupation, has developed many new water supplies in the occupied territories and has allocated significant amounts for agricultural and urban use to the new Jewish settlements in the WEST BANK area. By doing so, Israel has grossly violated the dictates of the Geneva Convention and misused its authority. Particularly aggravating to the water deficient Palestinian villagers is the perception of wasteful/luxurious Israeli water use and landscape practices which often include irrigation of lawns and construction of swimming pools. They are also aggrieved by the fact that, in the process of drilling new Israeli deep wells within the occupied territories there have been cases in which the water level is falling and the drying out of traditional springs and shallow wells used for domestic and agricultural purposes by the Palestinian communities. Israel's pumping of ground water near the Gaza strip has also resulted in severe salinization of the wells in Gaza. Even when the Israel authorities supply water to the communities that lost their original source the cost to the villages is increased and is also viewed as a method of control. It is therefore their point of

concern of the fact that, in all new water projects developed by Israel in the territories serving Palestinian communities, key controlling elements such as reservoirs, valves and control points are located within the Jewish settlement areas and are viewed as a method of domination.

The Palestinians fear that even if a Peace settlement is arrived at with Israel and an appropriate Palestinian entity is established, the agreed upon division of the very limited shared water resources will leave them with insufficient amounts of water required for normal population growth and resettlement of Palestinian diaspora, and the accompanying urban, industrial and agricultural development needed to be economically viable. In the event of major regional projects to import water into the area for Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli use, there is concern and fear over the possibility that Israel will obtain practical as well as political control over the water to be supplied to the Palestinians and the Jordanians through for e.g. the use of the Sea of Galilee as a long term inter seasonal and inter annual storage reservoir. There is likewise concern, that other nations in the region who may supply the additional water or the through whose country water pipe lines may pass, will use the water supply lines for purposes of political control, as Turkey did in the case of Iraqi pipelines (oil) during the Gulf war, 1990-91. In general the Palestinians claim the priority rights to complete and total control of Palestinian water – the Mountain Aquifer and suggest that complicated and expensive schemes to import water from other nations on desalinated sea water, to be allocated to Israel which in turn should forego claims to the local, easily accessible, Arab water resources.

Definitely here it is important also to discuss the Israeli counter claims of the situation. Israel claims that it has the historical legitimate riparian rights to the Mountain aquifer, based on the principle of prior use, major portions of which flow, naturally, into its territory and which has been developed at great expense and fully utilized over a period of time stretching over 60 years. Israel is concerned that if the Palestinians achieve independence in all or part of the currently occupied territories of the WEST BANK, they will, once they gain physical control over territory, insist on making good their claim that all of the water of the shared Yaqon-Taninim Aquifer (Mountain aquifer) derived from rainfall within the WEST BANK be allocated exclusively to their own use. This fear is compounded in Israel's eyes by Palestinian stated goals of returning large segments of Palestinian diaspora to any independent entity which is established. Certain Israeli political experts claim that if there is a major unregulated increase in pumping from the aquifer in the WEST BANK area, it may mean a drastic reduction

of Israel's most important, high quality source of drinking water. The reduction could amount in Israel's current utilization of the aquifer by some 300 mcm/yr, cutting off the drinking water supplies for some 3,000,000 people resulting in a serious threat to Israel's viability; this is completely unacceptable. Even if an equitable agreement is achieved on the division of the water of the Mountain aquifer between Israel and a future Palestinian entity, there is a serious concern of a possible degradation of the quality of the water of the shared aquifer, as a result of inadequate control and monitoring of urban pollution and waste water and toxic agricultural and industrial wastes in the WEST BANK. This Karstic limestone aquifer is highly prone to subterranean pollution which could make the waters in the down-stream areas of Israel unfit for the human consumption. In 1990 Gen. Raphael Etan³⁰, Minister of Agriculture, Israel, Published a full page advertisement in the Jerusalem Post (10th Aug, 1990) expressing many of the above concerns and declaring that because of the water issue alone Israel can never give up the Physical control of any of the occupied territories since they are absolutely essential for the preservation of the country's vital water resources. He cited both the threat to diversion and / or over pumping of water vital to Israel and the danger to environmental pollution of the shared aquifer. There is also the concern of the unregulated over pumping of the Mountain aquifer in the WEST BANK could lead to a serious lowering of the water table with the resulting danger of sea-water intrusion and irreversible damage to the shared aquifer, which could be a grave threat to both partners.

Palestinian calls for the ending emigration of Jews into Israel is seen as an unacceptable interference in Israel's internal affairs. Israel views unrestricted immigration of Jewish refugees as the *raison de etre* of the country and any demand to restrict immigration is seen as inadmissible on any ground. Israeli officials maintain that the Palestinians have not been deprived of the use of needed water. They cite the examples of the construction of hundreds of new village piped water supplies, introduced by Israel since the end of the Jordanian rule in 1967, the granting of permits specifically to Palestinians to drill some 40 new deep well and the importation of water from the National water carrier to increase the water supplies to Palestinian cities and villages in the occupied territories. According to Israeli claims, the total water supply and per capita use in the occupied territories has risen significantly during the period of the Israeli administration. Israel's hydrologists say that there is not much connection between the

³⁰ Allan. J. A. "Water Peace and the Middle East." p.150.

ground water in Gaza and Israel and that the salination of wells in Gaza is purely the result of over pumping by the Palestinians themselves, mostly before 1967. Israel also points out that many of the claims of Palestinian wells and springs drying up coincided with the 1988-91 drought period and should have nothing to do with the Israeli water development projects.

In the face of such claims and equally forceful counter claims, the difficulty in negotiations are further compounded by two additional factors

- First is the non-binding and non-enforceable nature of international laws, rules and treaties which may be used as reference for the resolution of dispute;
- Secondly is the unequal balance of power in favour of Israel both in the local scenario in terms of military might and on the international scene in terms of resistance to political pressure from the international community.

Even if international legislation is accepted as a basis, the criteria for determining water rights embodied in these documents can be referred to by both sides as justifying their respective positions. Israeli willingness to return water 'ownership' rights to Palestine will primarily depend on Israel's assessment of the benefits of peace. It will also depend on the Israel perception of Palestinian willingness and capability to develop sound water policy and establish a water management capacity that will allocate scarce water efficiently and effectively and not be harmful to Israel, if not beneficial.

There are a number of major policy options which could significantly change supply and demand pressures in the region, working mostly for the benefit of strife torn Israel. Reduction of Govt. water subsidies affects water prices, demand and public tending for water projects, Changes in water re-allocation policies could lead to a new equilibrium. As urban and industrial growth will consume most incremental water supplies as well as expel most of the effluents, govt. initiatives supporting re-use projects and exchange of fresh water from effluents are essential components in the large-scale implementation of supply and demand policies. Governments may continue some support for agricultural use of water for internal, social and political reasons despite the damaging economic implications. As demand for water by one nation is directly linked to the supply by another similar policies should be followed by all. Table

III g displays the water statistics of the nations in the region; it is imperative that assessment of supply and demand must integrate data from all consumer groups and suppliers and be available to all parties as a part of an effective joint management regime.

Joint Water Management Envisions

One of the most worked upon options during the early years in development of water resources within the region was that of the Johnston Negotiations, 1953-1955. Eric Johnston, special envoy to US Pres. Eisenhower, worked for two years to bring out a water sharing agreement between the riparian of the Jordan River. Although not recognized for political reasons as well as economic non feasibility at current times, the allocations agreed to by Arab and Israeli technical committees still hold today with furthered modifications. Both Israel and Jordan had agreed to send technical representatives to the regular 'Picnic Table talks' to determine day to day hydrologic operations. These talks named for the site at the confluence of the Yarmuk and the Jordan rivers where the meetings reportedly took place, had proven fruitful over the years in reducing minor tensions.

The period of 1964-67 were appropriately termed as **Water Wars**, as the Arab decision to build an all Arab diversion of the Jordan headwaters to prelude the Israel's National water carrier and ended 3 years later when Israeli tank and air strikes halted constructions on the diversion. This period witnessed one of the most direct water related conflict. During the 6 Day war May 1967, the US Department of Interior and state conversed an 'International Conference on Water for Peace' in Washington D.C. It attracted over 6000 participants from 94 countries, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The course and after effects of the 6 Days war had no stable effects on the discourse of water sharing and rights in the region. Riparian positionings were consequently altered. Israel acquired two of the three Jordan River headwaters specifically in southern Syria, riparian access to the entire river and the recharge zone for the mountain aquifer which supplies, currently 40% of Israel's freshwater. Israel also destroyed the All-Arab diversion scheme of the Jordan head waters, which if operational would have reduced Israel's water by 35%. This occupation was followed by Ministerial level meetings between Jordan and Israel and continued till, or rather was also a part of the 1977 conflict. In **1980 renegotiations on the Johnston Allocations**, based on political and demographic changes

were opened. The concept of the 'Unity Dam' also received much support during this phase. A decade later in 1990, agreements over Unity Dam was again proposed by Richard Armitage (US Dept. of State) via indirect mediations. This was the period when the Palestinian question had developed into a full fledged issued of sovereign existence side by side with Israel.

In 1994, Oct, the treaty resolved by Israel and Jordan included a Jordanian storage of 20 mcm/y water of winter floods in the sea of Galilee, to be returned during summer months; flood water in addition to current uses would be split between the two countries. It also included the construction of 2 dams, one each on the Yarmuk and the Jordan with this Israel would use upto 3 mcm/y of increased storage capacity.


As is evident that in this parched land, any effort to manage water resources have to have the sanction of all riparians involved, it is thus required to get a full grasp of the possibilities. Map III v' depicts potential Inter basin water transfers in the West Asia. Some of the projects are already functional, the prospect of certain ones are being extensively explored while the ones discarded are mainly due to economic non viability. It must also be understood that any possibility seen with a partisan view by any party will only accelerate tension, solving nothing, if not heightening already strained inter regional relations. The most viable option for the near future include the Diversion of the Litany into the sea of Galilee, from where it could go to Israel, the West Bank and/or to Jordan. A pipeline along the coast of the Mediterranean sea could also bring water from the mouth of the Litany to as far as Gaza. Integrating the Litany water with the Jordan watershed has added to the advantage of increased hydropower development. If a conventional energy plant were to be built in Lebanon in the context of regional development, the concerned country might be persuaded to allow greater Litany water through the Qir'awn Dam, where most of the Litany is currently diverted to the Awali water shed for hydropower generation.³¹ Costs might be reduced by using existing infrastructure. The TAP line, an abandoned oil pipeline runs from the Litany, over the Golam heights, where a section is currently being used for water delivery, to the Persian Gulf. If the rights of the Lebanese water should change, allowing other participants to the benefit, the Litany is most seemingly poised to be the benefactor of a number of areas throughout the region.

The EL Arish pipeline extended (from the Nile) to Gaza or the Negev would allow the same exchanges throughout the region in addition to the Litany transfers. Increased water in

³¹ Wolf, A. T. Op. Cit. p.150.



Map III v

POTENTIAL INTERBASIN TRANSFERS



Map III vi

AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX



SC: WOLF, A.T.
1995

Southern Israel would free water from the Northern Jordan to be delivered to West Bank or kept for its own use. Although Sudan, Ethiopia may have a legal say for any out of basin transfer, an exchange of water saving technology for water between Israel and Egypt may reconcile those claims and allow the water export to proceed into the future.

Turkey is the only country in the region having a substantial water surplus (refer Table III g) and thus is invariably a possible source of water imports, Along with a 'Peace Pipeline' several smaller projects have been advanced to bring Turkish water to a number of states in the area by pipeline, in barge, or in 'Medusa bags',³² each holding 1 mcm. Another proposal (**Boaz Watehtel**) is to pipe 1,100 mem/y from the Ataturk Baraji Lake from the Turkish GAP project to the Golan, where an open channel would provide new freshwater supplies and hydropower for Israel, .Syria, West Bank and Jordan as well as acting as an antitank barricade on the border between Israel and Syria. Cost estimates of such a project stand at US \$ 5,000 – 7,000 m. (1992). Once the additional water becomes available, the appropriate exchanges could be made from sources to users, so that the most efficient regional distribution is achieved. However these blue prints are extremely tenuous, both in terms of engineering and political viability, and at best they should serve short term measures.

To explore the most viable option for interbasin water transfers an assessment of the aforesaid projects is necessary. Quantity of water (volume) is measured in mcm/y, quality is ppm salinity or pollutants, reliability is the flux is the system and environmental impact can be measured relatively or in dollar equivalents. Efficiency is calculated as price per cubic metre and political viability as per standards of the PRINCE Political Accounting Systems,³³ Table III h, which marks out the political differences for each of the options The evaluation points out that in terms of technical and economic assessments, all the proposals are almost equivalent. Although the Litany to Israel transfer provides less quantity than the others, it also does so at less expense. The Wachtel Plan offers twice as much water to the region than the others, five times as much as the Litany – Israel transfer, it is also the most complex both technically and politically. Though no cost/m³ is available, the construction cost a US \$ 5000 – 7000 million, it proves to probably be the most expensive project proposal as well. The tabulation also points out that the more the political countries involved, the lower the possibility of the success of the plan. The countries

³² Ibid. p.152.

³³ Ibid p.250.

involved in possible cooperation also make a difference. Bilateral Cooperation between Turkey and Israel who enjoy warm diplomatic relations is more likely possible than between Israel and Egypt which is restrained by legal agreements with Sudan. This option again is perhaps more commendable than one between Israel and Lebanon, who is politically influenced by Syria. Any arrangement involving Syria and Israel together is highly unlikely to gain success, at least at this point in history. Certain options thus, may be prioritized regarding water transfer –

1. Turkey to Israel : Medusa bags.
2. Nile to Gaza : Pipeline.
3. Nile to Gaza, Israel and exchange to WEST BANK : Pipeline, carrier, barge
4. Nile to Israel : Pipeline, carrier
5. Turkey to Israel, Syria, Jordan, WEST BANK : Wachtel Plans.

Any change in parameters, both evaluated and projected in original proposals will lead to a change in the ranking of priorities.

Integrated Ancillary Projects.

Apart from just carrying water, **desalination too is of prime importance.** Large scale desalination projects have often been interpreted as the solution to most of the water scarcity in the region. Any large scale desalination project will have to pass the difficult triple test of technical (including environmental), economic and political viability. Case studies of past plants both unilaterally and cooperative, may provide useful information to guide further the successful implementation of similar initiatives in future. Two such projects – the Agro Industrial Complex, a US supported cooperative project for West Asia studied in the 1960s, (Map III vii) and the Med-Dead Hydroelectric canal, studied by Israel's in 1980s provide useful models for consideration (refer to Map III v) . The best aspects of the two projects, none of which were built to project specification, might be combined and expanded for a new hybrid projected for water and power, i.e. if political developments allow. It would include the regional approach and emphasis on international cooperation, both within the concerned region as well as without it, of Agro - industrial complexes to be incorporated within the comparatively safe energy applications of Med Dead Canal as one integrated venture. This venture, in turn could be incorporated in a

badly needed regional water development plan for West Asia. The project would describe within its fold the political realities of the region, the limitations imposed by economics and hydrology and possible steps that could be taken to ameliorate the problems. Even if the riparians of the Jordan watershed were to agree to such a conjointed project, only the water crisis would be addressed; the water conflict -- the political tensions arising due to the lack of water would probably still remain, as a part of the inter basin transfers required. As such cooperation inducing strategies will have to be in comported in the process of implementation as well. It must be understood that opportunities for cooperation may be hidden in the details of each entity's bargaining mix. Though control of one's major water resources is of primary concern to the riparian states, necessary both to address past and present grievances, it is also a pre requisite for a market driven solution. As such, to foster co-operation with least amount of friction, an initial dis-integration of the basin will be helpful which will mark out areas and surface water channels to all the parties involved.

With specific reference to the Israel-Palestine problem, it can be implemented that mutual guarantees be made to each other as regards supplies in effect, taking advantage of the topography which slopes down from Palestinian areas to Israel. Because of the disparate depths to the water table near the Mediterranean coast, and in Judean Hills and the difference in the efficiency between wells and surface delivery systems, it is cheaper to pump water from the mountain aquifer at the Israeli wells and then pipe it to the hills of the WEST BANK, than it is to pump directly in the hills. This suggests a mutually dependent system of water deliverance, where Palestinian water is pumped at Israeli wells then piped to Palestinian users. Since the Palestinians are upslope and can threaten Israeli supplies, both parties apparently would each have an incentive to cooperate. The step to address the issue of control would also focus on the problem of water quality and the threat to its degradation. Israeli concern over upslope Palestinian control include the dangers to water quality. Palestinian industrial development could threaten the quality of water is Israeli wells, even unintentionally. However some sites on the WEST BANK are more susceptible to groundwater contamination than others. A joint Israeli-Palestinian Committee to establish zones of groundwater susceptibility, investigating soil types, rock formations and ground water flow movement might allows Israel more confidence to release control. In turn it might provide Palestinians with a useful basis for a plan for development on the WEST BANK, which would help protect their own water supplies. The

above steps for addressing both Palestinian concerns for control and Israeli needs for security would help break the difficult impasse. Each approach might also have repercussions on other water conflicts.

In the first possibility, Israel gives up claim to the eastern side of the mountain aquifer in favour of Palestinian Control. In exchange Jordan accedes to some Israeli claims on the Yarmuk (which can then be supplied by gravity to Israeli settlements in the Jordan valley), and Syria agrees to allow more Yarmuk water to flow to Jordan and Israel. Turkey could increase the Euphrates release to Syria by a relatively small amount that could be foregone. Alternatively, Israel gives up its claim to the Yarmuk in exchange for Jordan taking the responsibility to supply to the West Bank with ample surface water for its developmental needs, which alleviates Israeli concerns over Palestinian groundwater exploitation. Either of the above solutions would allow the Unity Dams to proceed. During construction Israel allows Jordan to store in Yarmuk winter run off in the Sea Galilee, thereby allowing a stable Jordanian water supply during the dry summer months as also reducing the salinity levels in Israel's main reservoir. Negotiations could then be focused on the western mountain aquifer and on the methods of point inspection and planning between Israel and Palestine.

The Med-Dead, Red-Dead Canal - Hydro static Co-operation Inducements

In an appropriate example of cooperation inducing design the Med-Dead Canal and the Red-Dead canal seem to be the most outstanding viable options (refer to Map III v for Red-Dead Canal). Although at first glance the projects appear to be fairly complex, technically as well as politically if attention is paid to details, it can be operationalized as a series of smaller projects each with the potential to be developed more fully and with increasing cooperation as technical and political developments occur.

Immediately after the Six Day war, 1967, D. Eisenhower, Lewis Strauss and Alvin Weinberg, developed a 'water for peace' proposal, including a series of nuclear desalination plants in West Asia³⁴ that would provide power and for the immense agro industrial complexes designed, to ease the political tensions caused by refugees heightened by water scarcity. Supportive

³⁴ Karnon, Y. Op. Cit

development at three sites likely were Egypt, Israel and Jordan. Furthermore Gaza too was planned in conjunction with a project for refugee resettlement. Cooperative research between American, Arab and Israeli technicians showed that, on technical level at least, cooperation over regional water resources and planning was possible, the plan though was shelved due to economic, political reason as well as strategic grounds of the dangers of introducing nuclear technology to the region.

In the early 80's, Israel began planning a canal designed primarily for hydropower by bringing Mediterranean water across the Negev, under the Judean Hills to drop it 400 m to the Dead Sea. The 800 MW of electricity that would have been generated by this canal, realized on the lines of the Med-Dead canal would by itself have been worth the cost of the project, an estimated US \$ 1,500 – 5,000 m., but the benefits of the several ancillary projects, made possible by the salt water for cooling or artificial lakes, added viability to the scheme. The Med-Dead canal had focused on power generation rather than only water and was politically unilaterally bringing benefits only to Israel. At this Palestinians had objected to the intake proposed for Qatif because of a belief that it would further integrate Gaza with Israel. Jordan protested about the anticipated rise in the level of the shared Dead Sea and a proposal condemning the decision was sent to the UN Gen. Assembly Jordan, however took the opportunity to investigate the possibility of a similar proposal of its own, the Red-Dead Canal.

These two canal proposals along with the agro-industrial complexes together could be expanded for a new hybrid complex for water as well as power. The core of the complex would be either a Med-Dead or a Red-Dead canal with an emphasis on desalination fuelled by hydropower and augmented with solar and conventional energy generation. This approach, as against the earlier unilateral initiative focusing on power, would make available power and water, both fresh and salt, for agriculture, aqua culture, algae ponds, industry and even recreation on artificial lakes in sparsely populated areas to the benefit of populations from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank. The scope of the project could be expanded, depending on cost, financing and on which of the countries and territories of the region would become involved with greater benefits accruing as a result economies of scale. The Med-Dead salt water canal would have been located in a particularly opportune position to foster regional cooperation. The intake point was to be located near Gaza, the site both of some of the most squalid and densely populated refugee camps in the world and of severe groundwater over pumping. The canal could

also be made to parallel to the Israel-Egyptian border and were these two entities to set aside some of their sparsely populated land, power and water from the project could be routed to a trinational agro - industrial site (Egypt-Israel-Palestinian) in the Negev-Sinai deserts. A Red-Dead route would likewise provide the opportunity for a Jordan/Israel/Palestinian complex. Ample agricultural land exists along both routes, limited currently by the lack of freshwater supply. A large plain south and east of Gaza and El-Arish, the plain of Palusium could be allocated to such one site for an agro industrial complex, because of its suitability for a wide variety of agriculture. Similar tracts exist further inland (refer to Map III vii) in both the Sinai and Negev Deserts if the intake were placed at Qatif.

For a Red-Dead Route, agriculture and industry could be developed in the Arava valley and on both sides of the Israel-Jordan border. Any development in the region has been completely due to lack of freshwater; both Israel and Jordan are currently attempting to overcome the natural limits through water transfers as both foresee this region to be the eventual terminus of their respective national water carriers. Joint development and a local water supply could eliminate the need for redundant planning and piping. Either project would be ideally suited for clean power generation. Not only would clean hydropower be generated at the Dead Sea, it would also be augmented by high temperature solar generation of electricity. The region has 300 cloudless days a year. The crucial contribution of the Med-Dead project would, however, be water, with power being a useful by-product. Current research into the solar ponds suggest that waters of the two distinct salinities will trap heat in the lower denser layers. This heat differential can be exploited to power turbines or to fuel distillation desalination. The relatively less saline water of the Mediterranean Sea, or for that matter Red Sea would provide the cover to a lower, more saline level of Dead Sea water. One estimate is that Dead sea itself could support a 450 km² solar lake, operating a 2,500 MW power plant, if the less saline water were made available. If a dual purpose plant for power generation and distillation desalination were to be built at the intake (either at Qatif or Aqaba as the case may be) the resulting brine from the desalination process could be used for smaller self sustaining solar ponds/desalination plants all along the way to the Dead Sea. The project could thereby grow as power or water demand rose. The brine resulting from desalination could find use in the potash and salt works of both Israel and Jordan, already active at the Dead Sea.

The 400 m drop at the Dead Sea could be used for hydropower generation and in conjunction, could also be exploited for reverse-osmosis desalination adding even more freshwater as output. The cost of desalinated water would be significantly reduced if brackish water were used instead of sea water. Brackish fossil aquifers have been recently discovered in the concerned area – in and below the Nubian sandstone formation underlying the Negev-Sinai deserts, which could be tapped for at least 300 mcm/y. In due procedure, if enough fresh water is made available, it could possibly be exported to other areas of chronic shortage such as the WEST BANK or even Jordanian cities. The water itself need not be piped to these regions, rather water provided at Gaza or in the Negev would allow for a water reallocation from the northern sources of the Jordan River, abundant but currently fully exploited, to be substituted. Additional Yarmuk water could go to Amman, or to more storage in the Sea of Galilee could be allocated which could go to Haifa or Ramallah. Cooperative planning would allow for greater alternatives for such re-allocations and enable the most efficient and economical approach to be developed. Such a Med-Dead/Red-Dead agro-industrial project would also take advantage of sparsely populated lands for agricultural and industrial production utilizing the two parts of Gaza and Eilat/Aqaba, add impetus to regional cooperation and refugee resettlement and help to ameliorate the region's water shortage.

Because of the current relatively high cost of water produced through desalination the complex could stand out as an avid example for the cutting edge of desalination techniques and efficient water use. If the techniques were investigated jointly between researchers from the region and abroad, the results would also have applications in arid regions elsewhere in the world. Employment at all level would also be provided for dangerously unemployed populations of the Gaza and WEST BANK and immigrant Israelis from Ethiopia and Soviet Union. The new sources of water and power provide opportunities for a range of ancillary projects, from inland power plant to artificial lake resorts to salt water aquacultures. The projects would also induce population concentration inward, away from the already crowded coasts and be made eventually to support entire towns. It is however quite depressing to note that either route is highly prone to obstacles in terms of political viability. One optimistic note however, is that proponents of both the Med-Dead and Red-Dead canals include prominent nationalists on both sides of the Jordan R. The former Israel Minister of S and T, Yuval Ne'eman of the right-wing has been actively

supporting the Med-Dead Canal since its inception, while Jordanian crown Prince Hassan has been a principal advocate of the Red-Dead Canal.³⁵

The Balance of Assessment

The project as described, would not be cheap. The original agro industrial complexes were estimated at about US \$ 1000 m. (1967) and that also before nuclear decommissioning costs were included in analyses. In 1982 estimates accounted for US \$ 5000 m. even without the ancillary projects. However a cooperative project would provide for several factors which would help tilt the balance in favour of the projects, especially in an atmosphere gearing towards peace.

Foremost such a project would inevitably spark the interest, and thereby induce the financing, of agencies and individuals interested in bringing cooperation to the region. US, European and World Bank Grants or soft loans would add economic viability to the project evaluations (as yet unrecognized, at least by the World Bank) would help even further. The joint research and development components for desalination technology and efficient water use would further qualify the project for Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) programme of the USAID.

Certain 'peace dividends' are bound to accrue to countries no longer locked in a regional arms race, once regional cooperation, whether induced or volunteered, occurs which will inevitably lead to peaceful development. Water resource development is high on the list of priorities for all parties in the region, particularly in the light of both imminent and ongoing fluctuations of immigrants and refugees. Pooled investment resources and planning would allow for greater flexibility in design and consequently for greater economic efficiency in development. If Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States backed the schemes, their support might come in the form of inexpensive oil or natural gas for conventional power generation, with co-generation of desalination capacity. This could further reduce substantially the cost for the aforesaid components of the project.

Although a 30 years project life was assumed in the calculations for the original Med-Dead Canal there is no reason that this cannot be extended, with the support of ancillary projects.

³⁵ Wolf, A. T. Op. Cit. p.166.

The flow rate of the canal will have to be cut back after a 20 years 'filling period' when the Dead Sea reaches its historic level, but even then, a flow of 1,250 mcm/yr which will just match evaporation rates could be maintained which will not affect to sharply a drop in the power generation. Unlike a nuclear power plant or even a dam, a Med Dead or Red Dead Canal, with proper maintenance, could function indefinitely. Once the project is realized, power and water generation would become extra ordinarily inexpensive.

The environmental assessments of the schemes have to be rigorous and honest, as the risks involved will not just come directly, from the movement of salt water through fragile desert ecosystem, but also indirectly from inland population movement and the consequent infrastructure adjustments. Other risks include the unknown consequences of mixing water from two chemically distinct bodies. One researcher's suggested conclusion was floating clumps of plaster of Paris in the Dead Sea. The risks will have to be accounted for throughout the projects implementation keeping in mind the environmental implications from the very beginning. One clear environmental benefit though would be the restoration of the Dead Sea to its historic level. Before the National water projects of Israel and Jordan began diverting fresh water upstream in the 1960s, the input to Dead Sea of Fresh water just matched the rate of evaporation, and the lake level remained fairly constant. Since then onwards the level has dropped 10 m, with an accompanying reduction in surface area. Early diversion schemes, from the turn of the century onwards, included an attendant project to ameliorate the effects of the loss of in flow to the terminal lake. Without such a project, the Dead Sea will continue both to drop as well as the shrink. Although not much marine life is being affected, the Dead Sea is appropriately named. Potash works and health resorts on both shores have had to contend with the costs of an increasingly distant shoreline. The water body could be restored after about 20 years, after which the amount of Mediterranean inflow would be cut back to equal the natural evaporation rate. A dispersion of populations away from the congested and increasingly polluted population centers may also reduce health risks, especially from air pollution. The canal would also usher in emphasis on solar desalination techniques, which are significantly less polluting than the planned alternatives of coal fired plants. As such environmental impact assessments may help to determine the most desirable route for the project. It is important here to note that the Med-Dead route will take a salt water tunnel directly through the heart of the mountain aquifer of the Judean Hills, on which the entire population of WEST BANK is dependent and on which Israel relies

for 40% of its freshwater supply. The possibility of potential environmental degradation effectively blocked an earlier proposal for the canal project through the Jezreel and Jordan valleys.

Once the legal and economic foundations have been laid for ownership and distribution of current sources, and the existing water supply and demand system is functioning at its most efficient level, the scope of the Med-Dead/Red-Dead project can be implemented as well as extended. At this point too it will be important to approach the project in stages, checking constantly for economic, engineering and environmental discrepancies and using each step to induce cooperation towards completion of the whole complex. The first phase can begin immediately, even as peace negotiations are in progress. A conventional (coal powered) energy/desalination plant could be sanctioned at Gaza, the most parched of the areas in consideration. It could be designed both to be expandable as demands rise, and to serve later as the intake site for the Canal. Meanwhile, a pumped storage facility could be built at the Dead Sea for Israeli or joint Israeli-Jordanian use. Such a facility pumps water up to a higher level of storage during off peak hours, then generates hydroelectricity when demand is at its peak. This facility too can be designed to be incorporated in a Canal project, for hydropower generation with Mediterranean or Red Sea water. Both of the projects have already been in the planning stages for sometime but coordination is equally important to be able to proceed to the next phases. Once the intake and power generation facility are in place, even under different sovereignties, the incentive to connect the two and consequently to develop the ancillary projects would, one hopes, be powerful enough to help induce ever increasing cooperation.

The Canal project could not only be ideally suitable for development in a step wise fashion, dependent on increasing confidence building incentives, but it could also be expandable, designed to incorporate additional components as power and water needs grow in the region into the future. In addition the crisis over water in the region can be turned into an advantage in the light of the ongoing strife, by joint managements and cooperative projects of water resource development thereby inducing the Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR effect. That would not merely lead to enhanced resource stocking it would also act as a future deterrent of cross border conflict and violence in the region.

THE GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

CHAPTER -IV


Israel's borders on the northern and southern sides have of late been relatively secure, more or less free from any disturbance. However still the northern frontiers face sporadic attack from the Lebanese Hazbollah's side. The post 1967 boundaries have been adhered to on the Lebanese front on the condition of a strict US forces vigil and the presence of the UN peace keeping force. The Golan is completely occupied in the north by Israel and similarly lower down Israel has also militarily occupied the West Bank. Obviously, opinions seek the cause for such aggressive behavior with Israel clarifying that the northern part is home to 30% of Israel's water sources, and Lebanon, inspite of having a relative abundance of water reserves, refused to grant Israel the liberty to draw water to supplant somewhat Israel's critical short fall of water. Israel being aggressive, inevitably this led to conflict and the subsequent occupied of the Golan heights(Syria). The Litani R. diversion was created, the three main tributaries of the Jordan were hanned and the northern sector of the National Water Carrier was thus being brought under operative completion. The pressure by the US and the pressure of the UN was definitely an effective deterrent for the Lebanese perpetrators of violence across the border and also for whatever government assistance that they received. The same applied for Syria. As explained earlier, the search for water had led Israel to occupy the WEST BANK and consequently this also gave rise to the arab Israeli conflict.

Thus, though its northern and southern borders were relatively free of tension, the **eastern boundary of Israel is what is the most disturbing and most outstanding case of border dynamics in present times.** The conflict with Palestine w.r.t. The WEST BANK is now, for over 3 decades, been the crux of boundary fluctuation in the region; Indeed Israel is a state which is still in the stage of formation of its boundaries when most of the world's nation's have reached the maturity level if not old age, of border demarcation . An insight of the dynamics of the region is thus of utmost importance.

When Prelude to the current situation is to be offered, it is better to make it short, as an elaborate historical monologue will only lead to further complications in the understanding of the reader, as settlement processes in this land are one of the most complex ones ever witnessed


by history. Making things stick to simplicity, thus, as things stand today, the people of Palestine claim their right to land not only congenitally, but also on the basis of various historical treaties and peace pacts; though signed by both Israel and Pal. Auth. but categorically refuted by Israel. As of present, Israel is in complete possession of WEST BANK, militarily, but politically and economically it is still struggling as Palestinian people owe their allegiance to own sovereign bodies, What Israel was 1/2 a century ago the Palestinians are now, people without a land. Strange that a community who have faced such vagaries of fate would in time inflict the same pain on another set of human beings. Of course, Israel has the answer -- defending one's territory is not an act of barbarity. Granted so, but it is also evident as to what Israel is defending- occupied territories. It is important to note here as to why the question of 'occupation' arises at all. At the concretization of the Jewish idea of a sovereign state, two specific plans can be pointed out which marked out territory for a Jewish homeland in Palestine the Jewish Agency's Partition Plan (Map IV i) and the UN partition plan (Map IV ii). On the day Israel graduated to full status of nationhood the UN partition plan was put into action. However, one look at the map brings out the fact that it is covered, to quite a large extent, with inherent flaws over the one proposed by the Jewish Agency right from day one. **For One-Territory**; such fragmentation of territory obviously does not hold any ground for reigning together a nation. It was far from following the basics of geopolitical factors of governing a nation. How could one possibly govern such a perforated sovereignty, especially when both the parties involved were hostile, almost ready to strike at each other the slightest of instigation. Again, it was not as if the formulators of the plan were not aware of it. Of course, defenses can be drawn up claiming that such a complex distribution of population required such a complex redistribution of land; argument can be accepted too, but the intersection of boundary lines near Afula south of Nazareth could be avoided, as what the Jewish agency plan had formulated. The settlement pattern reveals that North of Nazareth, leaving aside an enclave the area was surrounded by Jewish settlement. Similarly in the Gaza locales too, a considerable part was under Jewish occupation. Here also the Jewish Agency's plan could have been followed. The UN plan (refer map IV ii) was probably justified on grounds of consideration of the people's allegiance at the time. On what other compulsions the plan finally took shape is also probably hidden in diplomatic diaries, but opinionizing thus, would the transfer of these lands to Israel be such a gross mistake in lieu of providing Israel and in effect Palestine people with contiguity of territory

Map IVi




Sc: Gerson, A. 1978

Map IV ii



See Gerson, A. 1978

Map IViii. POLITICAL CONDITIONS, W. BANK



See: Scott MacLeod.

which they could govern without having to answer the complications of having such a tortuous boundary. Such sinuous lines obviously look neat on paper, but translating them on the ground proved to be immensely difficult on administration lines. It was like granting Israel and Palestine people singular enclaves almost like settlement colonies which they were to administer. That is definitely not what a nation state is made up of. Perhaps the planners thought that the inhabitants would in due time learn to accept the differences and sort them out on their own. In this process they also perhaps did not pay attention to the other powers of the region. Derivatively, population inhabiting the demarcated lands seemed to be The deciding factors for which part goes to whom. While the WEST BANK area had almost no Jewish settler population, the eastern part of Israel did have Jewish concentration (refer map I iii) which was constantly on the rise. Clearly an early demarcation leaving ample room for further demographic expansion of Israel was to be taken stock of and accordingly continuous territory could have been accorded to Israel. It could also include sufficient water and agricultural base for a succeeding Jewish population. That would probably leave less room for further expansion on the Eastern Frontier of Israel, and Israel would then have to answer for its aggression, what it has done today, if at all it would do then.

Secondly the status of Jerusalem- both contenders regard it as their own holy city. Frankly this problem must have perplexed bureaucratic brains then as they do still now. Solution to this will probably be more economic than territorial or for that matter emotional. Jerusalem attracts tourists, pilgrims, theologians, all alike. The UN was probably right when they volunteered to make it an **Internationally administered enclave** as whoever ruled Jerusalem would also have access to the vast revenues that are generated courtesy tourism, commercial activity, educational activity and all other revenues coming from the agglomeration affect. A **residential population ceiling** would probably have to be worked out beyond which population living for the purpose of residence would not be allowed. Alongside it could house educational institutions, religious institution and the revenues generated would go directly to the **International Trust administering it which would divide the dividends equally** to both Israel and prospective Palestine. This Trust would also be responsible for petty administration of the city like water supply, law and order, transport and communication et.al. As for claims that Jerusalem be made the capital of Israel/Palestine, mostly this claim is based on religion grounds by both parties Jerusalem could thus be heralded as the **religious capital** of both the parties, the

economic/administrative capitals lying else where, something similar to Bolivia which also has two capitals. Access to and from Jerusalem would be made toll free for both Israel and Palestine, citizens whereas any other national would be liable to be considered as an alien, thus making Jerusalem accessible to both the parties yet not contentions. It is quite clear from the discussion in chapter-3 as to where Israel's concentration of economic activities lie - in the west, the Mediterranean coast. The Palestinian economy is still in infancy and could probably be directed towards Nablus , if at all it has to develop. Of course, there is imminent in formulation of border/territory demarcation the consent of the neighborhood. Jews were unwelcome, Palestinians are probably unwanted. In 1950, when Jordan decidedly took in to its fold the Palestinian territory of WEST BANK calling it TransJordan it was obviously for the purpose of fulfilling the more ambitious plan of creating a Greater Jordan. Since then, what seemed to be a brotherly act, in reality turned out quite the reverse - Palestinians who were reemployed in Jordan as a remedy to increasing Israel clamping downs of issuing work permits to Palestinians in the Israel occupied territories, were not apparently happy with their status in Jordan too. Two reasons can be decisively cited for this-

** as Israeli occupation increased in the WEST BANK. and more and more Palestinians were forced either into refugee camps or out into Jordanian territories, Jordan merely condemned these activities; concretely there was no evidence of a resistance to such aggression. All the fighting on the field was done either by Palestine alone or by a combination of Jordan/Syria,/Libyan /Iraqi forces at the Northern borders;

** Jordan almost welcomed this permeability with Palestine people. It is a known fact that Palestinians were more skilled as professionals in almost all fields, more on the tertiary and secondary sectors while the Jordanian population kept more to the agricultural side of contributing labour. Jordan utilized this position to better its economic balance sheet at the expense of Palestine while giving them little 'trickle down' benefits. Almost all heavy economic activity was being concentrated on the East bank³⁶ , all promises of WEST BANK prosperity being diverted to the Jordanian East Bank Palestinians had to travel from the WEST BANK to Jordan for their daily bread, were taxed and non of their dreams of housing an economically prosperous WEST BANK materialized. They felt alienated even in a land which claimed to accept them as brothers. The situation was nothing very different from their western counterparts

³⁶ Jablonsky, E, Op. Cit.

- both made them feel second class citizens. Economic condition deteriorated for WEST BANK residents with unemployment rising, Israeli occupation increasing and almost no genuine help coming from their 'brotherly' quarters. S. Arab, Jordan were on the contrary pro US which made them feel ever belittled US was the prime beneficiary to Israel.

Disillusioned thus Palestine felt let down by all and anger took root in the young Palestine blood. The Hamas and the *Intifadah* rose in answer to this. They were fed by S. Arab's money, which amounts to 40 mn US\$ / month and Lebanese and Syrian mercenaries, Iraqi and Iranian ammunition. Like an unwanted orphaned child young minds were trained in suicide bombing squads to disrupt Israel prosperity on the other side of the fence. Obviously economic reasons were at the root of such terror tactics. Perhaps if Israel had the sense of allowing Palestinians to work peacefully on their territory , giving them sufficient to keep their fireplaces burning in winter, such a condition would not have arisen. It seems Israel is hell bent on believing that no matter how well the Arabs of Palestine are treated, they will always revolt against them. This also probably stems from their own experience during and before the WW II when no matter how deep their political loyalties were to their respective countries they were still not spared. History once witnessed is very difficult to forget, especially if it is personal. Jewish insecurity stems from that very facet of life and which is something that will not go away for a long long time to come. As Israel grew on prosperity and Jordan drew on Palestinian skills, Palestine felt drained both economically and morally. In effect with a little coaxing from their neighbors, Palestine blamed Israel for their downfall. What they failed to realize was that an Israel Palestine conflict would divert attention of Israel from the surrounding States of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. **Palestine thus acts as buffer between these nations and Israel.** Sharing a distinct border with Israel is probably not a very appealing idea for them, especially so when US seems to be a major Power in tandem with Israel. After all, the Islamic nations must maintain the status quo as far as civilizational conflict goes with US to keep the religiously inclined vote bank. Saudi Arab's Grand Mufti Abdel Aziz Bin Bar remarked (December,1994) that making peace with Israel was permitted under Islam³⁷. The Islamic groups and theologians reacted sharply stating that ' Applying this to Jews is incorrect, because these usurping Jews have never been headed towards peace.'. Evidently Bar is said to have clarified later that what he meant was peace with Israel was conditional and couldn't be made as

³⁷ Pasha, A. K. World Focus. Vol. 267, p.17.

long as Jews occupied Arab Muslim lands. It is evident from this discussion that there are groups which would prefer peace with Israel but then there are also certain pressure groups working within the politicking machine which to maintain their prominence would not let certain steps be taken. PLO has often argued that Saudi Arab use the oil weapon to pressurize US to stop sponsoring Israel with sophisticated arms and boosting their aggressive temperanent so that some movement be made towards peace. Saudi Arab has categorically declined by stating that any embargo on crude oil supply will destabilize the global price system. S. Arab is not willing to take such an accusation, in other words they could not be much bothered as to who survive and how in far away Palestine as long as Riyadh is able show a steady growth in GDP.

Two decades of violent emotions and constant bickering and bargaining on peace talks tables around the world, Yasser Arafat, the undisputed icon of Palestinian nationalism , now seems visibly tired and broken physically and psychologically. Similarly two decades of constant warring has made not only negotiators weary, but also inhabitants of both sides look back in anguish as to what has been happening. The Palestinians have given up all hope of anybody doing anything for them and like mute puppets play into the hands of crooks who promise them martyrdom as bombers, pay compensation of 10,000-25,000\$ to their families and at the end of the day turn the dead hero into a statistic figure. It is a life of hopelessness which is probably better off dead, even it is in the pretence of defending one's faith and home. Little do they realize that a compensation of 10,000\$ to their living family members damage an entire initiative to actually free them of their drudgery. Small such incidents have always pushed the vigilant and extremely cautious Israel to always turn its back an the table. Perhaps, even this is the moot idea for the perpetrators of such treacherous acts. However International pressure is mounting on both the parties to ignore such acts as mere terrorism meant to derail any effective communication between the two. Interestingly, the civil society within Israel too is pressurizing its government to sit at the peace table - hundreds of International and Jewish peace activities defied Israel soldiers and marched in to the office in Ramalah where Psd. Arafat was besieged, to meet the Palestinian leader as a show of support. 350 Israel reservist soldiers refused to serve in operation against Palestinians as they considered Israel action unjust³⁸ . The Israeli offensive has caused a humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories.

³⁸ Sahukar, B. A. World Focus. Vol. 267. P.21

The day Israel gained independence, it was from that very day war was declared on it. Instinctively thus, Israel learned to fight from its birth. Aggression seems to be one of the qualities that came with the genesis of nationhood for Israelis. On the other hand the Palestinian people have been gradually drawn into such tortuous warfare making them brave to the point of taking their own lives. Both these factors mix to form the heady concoction of an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth - it does not matter who loses most as long as both keep losing. Evidently it's a losing game that has been continuing for decades and which shows, apparently, no signs of winding up. The Clinton administration seemed to make some genuine efforts to clear some of the mess, but it was too little, lacked effective commitment and was biased on the Israel favour. President Arafat found it increasingly difficult to succumb to the Israeli countenance, he could not let 25 years of promises be scattered away just because he did not seem to have the energy to do so. **George Bush's Oath into the White House 2001 and Ariel Sharon's majority in the Knesset** spelled doom for whatever little progress had been made between Israel and Palestine peace process. Any hopes too were shattered - President Bush primarily declared Iraq, Iran, N. Korea as axis of evil and Palestinians as terrorists. PM Sharon fanned Islamic religion extremism by his boisterous behavior on his visit to the Temple Mount, September 2000. Signals were pretty clear. They were here not for peaceful settlement. Indeed President Bush when questioned about the West Asia peace talks preferred to answer in the vaguest of terms which translates into White House's indifference towards the crises; especially so after the Sep attack on the WTC which has tilted the balance of favours to P.M. Sharon's side giving the hawkish mind more support to carry on militarizing the whole region on the pretext of peace. However it has not had any significant impact on the Israeli population. The thin margin by which PM Sharon won is probably the first sign to show that Israeli people have had enough of war time gimmicks and want a normal life with pleasant if not friendly neighbours. It also points to one important fact that PM Sharon is probably as worried as any other politician in the world to maintain his seat of power. With Israeli election nearing the post again, he too must prove his mettle in keeping his right wing supporters happy to regain their confidence. Obviously, like the Arabs, he too has his own political compulsions and making peace with the Arabs is certainly not on his priority lists. Added to this are often made statements like destroying completely the Arabs and driving them away from Jewish lands, or driving the Jews to the sea and regaining Islamic pride from the hands of the cruel Jews - these are more than political

slandering on any dias or media; it must be understood that the situation is not merely one balanced on a tightrope it is a very sensitive issue and needs to be dealt with utmost care and verbal as well as diplomatic tact. Nothing should be said or produced which will breach the trust which has to be brought in between the Israeli is and the battered Palestinian people. Obviously - **The problem is that too many countries have their own interests**; none apparently seem to give a lending hand to this completely deteriorated condition; moreover there are too many problems in the world. It is up to the many nations to ponder that the world could do with one less problem.

The penultimate reasoning must come from the contenders themselves --- the fact that fighting has only depleted them even more; and that the final onus is on them both to try to listen to each other than trying to make a point. This ego game should be given up, too many lives, too much resources are at stake in this fast famishing world. In the final round, they will be left on their own to fend for themselves. The supporters of Palestine have realized their limitations and have probably made it clear that apart from money, arms and significant moral support there is no other means by which they can help, that too money is slowly dwindling out. President Arafat has with due respect to Palestinian nationalism, probably realized this aspect and is thus more willing to get to the table. Presently the support that Israel had from US too does not seem to be on hold for very long. US is haring to face up to its own domestic problems, reeling under pressurs from the economic devastation that the WTC crash has inflicted as well as from the imminent friction of the global economic slowdown. Israel must not be haughty and tempera - mental at this point. It must now see eye to eye the fact that Palestinians at present are a lot of dispersed people who would rather live in peace as a consolidation. It is up to Israel to understand patience does not mean being passive, but quite the contrary-- being an active agent in helping solve its final border problem. Already **International pressure has forced US to accept UNSE Res. 1042 for withdrawal of Israel from Palestinian** cities of Ramallah and that both Israel and Palestine move for an immediate cease fire (Mar 30, 02)³⁹. The Resolution was passed by a vote of 14 in favour, none against, though the Syrian Delegation did not turn up. This was **the 2nd time in a month that US has voted with the UNSCR**, for a West Asian Resolution, the 1st one calling for a Palestinian state (Mar 13,02), after years of abstaining and vetoing the Council measures, Israel's final pillar of Hercules has the potential also to turn into

³⁹ World Focus, Vol. 267. P.23.

its Achilles' heel. It would be a wise decision now to cut the hammering down on already battered people and make the most of it while its apparent opposition is willing to settle the bill.

The Saudi Arab initiative at this juncture should be given more thought as a possible reality. It is, after all a very crucial statement⁴⁰ - offering Israel normal ties and full peace in exchange for complete withdrawal from occupied Arab lands. This also comes in the face of a speculative mood when US probably was contemplating another attack on Iraq. At the summit reinforcing the Saudi Plan, S. Arab's Crown Prince Abdullah publicly embraced Iraq's Presidential envoy Izzat Ibrahim and the Kuwaiti and Iraq's delegation also shook hands. This gesture means a lot to US as both the nations are close allies of the US and this support is crucial for US w.r.t. any action taken in the region. The Plan also is in rogation to the Palestine refugee settlement calling for them to be repatriated or compensated in accordance to a 1948 UN Resolution. In return the Arab countries could consider the Arab- Israel conflict ended and enter into a peace agreement. with Israel establishing normal relation in the context of this comprehensive peace. It is interesting to note here that inspite of the complete agreement to the Saudi Plan, **Lebanon demanded that the Plan categorically mention fact that Lebanese Constitution rejects any settlement of Palestinian refugees on its territory;** the delegation ultimately brought in the point of rejection of any solution which would conflict with the special interests of the Arab host countries. Egypt and Jordan had decided to extend external support and did not attend the delegation. What is evident from the above facts is that the plan, though endorsed by important Arab powers is however subject to negotiation. It must be mentioned here that, granted the Israeli's are rigid on this approach to any solutions for this territory but that by no means makes the Arab League flexible, not to mention Palestinian view points. The Arab league will not tolerate any movement on issues from the Israeli side but they are however quite malleable to their own kin's interest. This position has to be abandoned if at all the Arab's mean serious business. If the region is to be stable one, Arabs / Palestinians must realize that Israel too, just like any of them, has its own interest and by all means shall not make any attempt to hide them -- sidelining them will only end up in pushing the dirty linen under the carpet. One thing which lies the highest on the priority list for bridging trust is being open. It might seem diplomatically impossible, nor does it suggest that every box in Pandora's every room be opened, yet wherever possible an effort should be made honestly to come clean

⁴⁰ Ibid p.23.

with one's interest. Israel's interest in the region has to be regarded as much as the Arab League regards its own prizes in the events that are to come. Rigidity shown by any of the members will only delay if not stall the slow grinding of the process that has seemingly begun. At least the Arab League has come to a somewhat consensual stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict issue. This opportunity is one, which though viewed with much skepticism by Israel, should not be allowed to get away and that message also for the US to contemplate on. As for further details of the plan which would favour Israel, the talking table is always around the corner. US should make it clear to Israel what it expects and pressurize PM Sharon to sit with P. Arafat and negotiate; not squander the entire effort away. It would eventually send the wrong message to a seemingly united Arab proposal. Also the world which has become tired of such mindless massacring will be watching, A positive response is very crucial at this intersection, as global patience with both US and Israel is running thin, as is the pressure from within the nation growing. Perhaps President Bush is subtly aware of the situation corroborating his evidences in his support of UNSCR 1042. Israel should be wise enough to take the hint and play its turn accordingly. It is a chance where Israel has to take the cue in trust. When hostile neighbors extend the hand in truce there is obviously some slackening of motivation for contest some where. This response is at best turned to one's advantage, rather than expecting a complete confession. Israel has already made its presence felt. It is no longer a primitive world, it is a contractual one where there may be confidence building measures but confidence *per se* in one another is sparingly shared, especially when territorial and border settlement are the core issues.

THE FAHD PLAN

The plan in this context, for the first time has offered the **unanimous decision of all 22 Arab states to define peace with Israel as normal relations**. Earlier on, Israel's main worry was that 'peace' would only amount to the end of belligerency but not ties such as trade and tourism. The plan prospects include not only these but also Israeli embassies in the concerned nations implying positive diplomatic relations. The document as such does propose words which Israel finds hard to accept, but as the scholar mentions earlier, they are definitely negotiable, to some extent. It is evident that since all the Arab nations have formulated the consensus, it will also contain all the requirements and grievances of them against Israel. Consequently, what Israel finds objectionable mainly are —

the retreat of borders to the pre-June 1967 lines and withdrawal from Syrian Golan and southern Lebanon. Israel argues that such a retreat is not just back-tracking on its own unanimous policies but would also mean uprooting some 216,000 Israeli settlers⁴¹; it could have serious consequences on its electoral trends;

that fact that East Jerusalem would have to be given up for the capital city of a prospective Palestinian sovereignty, which would come in to existence on the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. For the formulators, who, in effect, demanded the entire Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, this is probably a concession, but Israel now insists on keeping the entire city under its sovereignty, not willing to give up 'United Jerusalem' as well as not transferring settler population from there;

the document insists conformity with the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 w.r.t. the Palestinian refugee problem, which gives them the right to return to their homes in what is now Israel or to receive compensation. Israel rejects the former stating that doing so would effectively dilute the present Jewish majority.

As for the 1st objection, it is perhaps stupefaction on the part of the formulators to even have conceived that Israel would agree to the point. However, on the obverse it also perhaps signals the willingness to invite Israel to the negotiating table on the issue. The point that is made in this first formulation is perhaps the panacea to all the troubles in the region. However, if not fully, then at least partially certain concessions have to be considered by Israel on the issue. A complete withdrawal to pre June '67 lines would not only settle the Golan and Lebanon issue but also lead to the settlement of the consecutively raised point of East Jerusalem. However, **the positioning of Jewish settlements in the WEST BANK is such that conceding to any boundary will not be bereft of tortuousness**, thereby posing administrative difficulties for the Palestinians (Map IV iii).

.For the second objection, the scholar feels, given the present conditions, it is best to declare it as an international enclave governed by an arm of the UN, as mentioned earlier in the work.

⁴¹ Macleod, S. Time, 8 Apr. 2002, p.32.

For the third objection Israel could negotiate on the basis that it would relocate within Israeli territory an additional Arab population, that moved out from the occupied territories more into the WEST BANK, during and as a result of the 1967 advance. The rest would have to be a Palestinian responsibility. The relocated Palestinian population within Israel would be compensated with land, homes, gainful employment and educational facilities for their children and all other measures as any Israeli citizen benefits. This would of course need tempering within Israel where moderate and extremist forces are both at frantic work. It may take time, but it is perhaps apart of the solution of the seemingly unsolvable puzzle.

THE PALESTINIAN STATE

AS of present, the Palestinian autonomous areas consists of the Gaza Strip of 364sq. km. and the West Bank area 5,633sq km, totaling to 5,997sq km in all. Population, including Jewish settlers, amount to 2,895,683 (2.09m. apx.), 1.8m in WEST BANK and 1 mn. in the Gaza (refer Tab. IV a for details). Revenue receipts include 863.1 m US\$, expenditure US\$ 1007.3m. (Table IV b) . The GDP, 1997 has been US\$ 4,173.1m⁴². (Table IV c). Expenditure on imports are 2,164, 037 US\$ apx, while export earnings amount to 380,524 US\$ apx (Tab. IV d). Being governed under the PNA, Defence statistics indicate (Table IV e) that military forces are a 2% of the total population of Palestine. The Defence budget amounts to 500m. US\$. In comparison, The Israeli Defence budget is US\$ 6900m. apx. 2.5% of the GDP; while PNA statistics of the same is 10.6%. Israel has 3% of its population engaged in defending the nation. A closer look shows that PNA forces account for 30% the strength of the Israeli army, that also when unemployment levels are as high as 30%. apx., Which brings the derivation that each Palestinian soldier is out numbered by 3 Israeli soldiers. In arms and ammunitions too the story may not be much different. If Palestine does win independence, no doubt with a very tortuous border with Israel in legacy , area wise it will be 30% Apx⁴³ of what Israel is. It is also important have to note that **PNA GDP at present is 6% of Israel's GDP**. As of now, the Palestinian entity, in whatever from it exists in, is completely dependent on international aid and grants from sympathetic nations. Once it gains independence, it will still be needing the same for a long time to come to strengthen its economy, social infrastructure as well as military enforcements. With nationhood

⁴² Masalha, N. Op. Cit. p.710.

⁴³ Refer Table A for areas of Israel, fig in appx. as area of Israel includes parts of West Bank. .

also comes in a lot of respect in the international community as well as weightage. Obviously if Mr. Y. Arafat is made president, or any one for that matter; the Palestinian head of state will definitely be obliged to nations who have helped and are still helping him after he takes office. That also means he will be politically obliged too, which may translate into pressure some day, forcing him to concede to demands made by his friendly nations to tilt the scales to their sides. Puppetry or not, is what time will tell, but Palestine as a principality of the Arab League-- definitely yes. With the burden of moral of economic obligation on its shoulders, a bleak statistical balanced sheet on all accounts in comparison to the other surrounding nations, Palestine, once realized, **has all the making of becoming a principality of the other Arab nations is West Asia.** It is a facet Israel has Dprobably realized as has the US, and they could do with one less such a state in the region.

Perhaps a time tested. Y. Arafat has also realized that. He had also realized, that at Camp David 2000, Israel had offered him the best deal yet on statehood; not by objective standards, but still. The Israeli PM was one of the moderates, who could be negotiated with. The opportunity was a golden one, not to be lost. However, it seems today that Psd. Arafat is more intent on being a hero to his people and at the same time vying for International sympathy by rejecting such offers than being remembered as a leader. It is not a surprising event that everytime such a deed is accomplished and the Palestinian youth are fighting the Israeli army, at times with literally sticks and stones, Y. Arafat's approvals rise steadily up. It should have occurred to him earlier on that Govt. in Israel may change any day and not always for the better. It has probably already occurred to him that no Israeli leader will accede to a Palestinian state unless the claims to all or most of East Jerusalem is relinquished, parts of the WEST BANKK are given up to Israel and the refugee problem so created is made the sole problem of Palestinians. Being a leader for so long who apparently has the capability to stand up to political pressure, and the icon who in no circumstances will let the people of Palestine down, President Arafat definitely is not going to let his image be tarnished by giving in to these considerations in place of a Palestinian independent state. Added to this is the fact that the PNA administration has become an increasingly corrupt and incompetent one. Violence and sentimental issues also serve as a cover up for that. The PNA chief is also aware that given the strength of his army he cannot conventionally fight out Israel; on the other hand violence coupled with International criticism for Israel will probably demoralize Israel and thus soften their position on the

negotiating table. The success of the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon also stands as an example for him, who had succeeded in forcing the IDF to retract. There were other forces at work too within the Israeli security consideration matrix, which Psd. Arafat perhaps chooses to ignore; it cannot be that he is not aware of them. Violence has thus worked in most of the times in making a point with Israel and thus The PNA continues to support the suicide bombers. It is also understandable now, that why the PNA is being festured with factionalism. The working of Psd. Arafat for a long time now has been the core issue of disagreement and the US President's call for a step down for Psd. Arafat may be secretly what certain PNA officials have wanted to do for a long time now. Indeed there are capable figure heads who could take the place of Psd. Arafat-- Mohammad Dahlan: head of Presentine Security force,Gaza; Jibril Rajoub: head of Preventine Security force, West Bank; Ahmad Korei: Speaker of elected Palestinian Legislative council; Mahmoud Abbas: Sec. General of the PLO Excutive committee; and perhaps lead Palestine to complete statehood, and are also the object of full animosity from Psd. Arafat himself. The recent arrest of Jibril Rajoub⁴⁴ has driven home the point clearly that Psd. Arafat probably does not appreciate his deputies growing too strong. J. Rajoub is one of the chief contenders for his position.

The fact that Psd. Arafat has been repeatedly postponing the declaration of Palestinian statehood is also intriguing. Agreed, that a unilateral decision to do so will bring chaos into the region, but then in not doing so he is also only allowing violence to be perpetrated and leading to loss of precious man power almost daily. Perhaps this is the best option as we shall see. Even if he is not completely in control of such terror tactics, his office is capable of taking more effective steps to curb such inconsistencies, especially considering the fact that Palestinian society is not so large and complicated that the PNA network cannot identify the segments which are prone to organizing terror.

It would also be wise on his part to do so as he is probably the only one voice to whom Palestinians accord that kind of authority as also the fact that such terror tactics against Israeli civilians is not furthering their cause; though initially it was seen as the only option, nonetheless unjustified, against the Israeli army, but as of now such a policy of terror is costing them every bit of International support that they were out to garner on account of the Israeli actions against them. Psd. Arafat's modulations will have partial effect in the least, hoping for a complete one is

⁴⁴ The Hindu, 4.7.02.

a bit too much, on such perpetrating minds. His innuendo is only playing the PNA more into the hands of Israel, not quite what he had started out with.

On the other hand it would not serve **Psd.** Arafat any statesmanship laurel if he did decide to declare statehood unilaterally. No doubt such a feat will make him what he so desires from the Palestinian people — a hero, but as far as diplomatic relations with the rest of Arab nations is concerned, he would be doomed to failure. Such a declaration would definitely bring the IDF and Palestinian forces to clash out in the open, full steam ahead. It will also be a one in **a lifetime opportunity for Israeli too, as winning in a war borne out of an unilateral decision, almost amounting to instigation will give it more justification of keeping the lands legally what is illegal now.** The International condemnation too will be transferred to the PNA's office. And it will also mark the beginning of another half a century of depravity for the Palestinian people, not to mention his own nemesis. As for help militarily from his fraternal Islamic states, even if they personally would prefer to keep away, electoral pressure will force them to enter into the war thus spelling disaster for the entire region. Primarily, **Psd.** Hosni Mubarak, Egypt would have to mobilize part of his vast troops to the southern and western frontier of Israel which would compel Israel to divert concentration from the WEST BANK or perhaps freeze action there. It is expected of him, as propaganda in Egypt maintains anti-Israeli feelings, in actuality used as a cover up for the corrupted mismanaged state of affairs at home. This also acts as a justification to the maintenance of a vast troop base. He is also replete with the propaganda that the well being of Palestine is the foremost ideal of Egypt. If this happens, Syria's young and insecure President Basher Assad would be also forced to send his troops to the northern frontier in Golan; King Abdullah of Jordan, who greatly values the peace with Israel will probably come under immense pressure from his subjects forcing him to send armoury to the Israeli Jordanian border. The Hezbollah in the north is perhaps ever ready to strike at Israel whenever necessary or even as unnecessary, to as far as the densely populated Haifa. Finally it would also give **Psd.** Saddam Hussain, Iraq to answer the calls of fraternity and mobilize his troops to the frontline positions — marching through Jordan and Syria. Both the concerned countries would rather avoid an Iraqi army marching through their territory; as for Egypt, deploying troops against Israel would mean negating Anwar Sadat's peace treaty 1978, Camp David also losing about US\$ 2 billion a year US aid, that pays for the very weapons it would deploy into the Sinai as well as mollifies economic preasse. For pro-US Syria and Jordan it would mean an antagonistic US in future as

also a licentious Israel; moreover Syria's obsolete military equipment will hardly bring any spoils back home. Iraq would probably land few ballistic missiles into Israel, the presence of which he has denied vehemently till date consequently altering trust equations within the region as well as globally (which could lead to directly confront Iraq once again and further the confusion of the Syria-Jordan-Egypt triptych).

If the forces aligned with Palestine are defeated, it would not only indicate Psd. Arafat's recklessness in strategy, it would also see a regime change within the region — the fundamentalists would have their way by stroking up the 'faith mantra', as well as the inefficiency of the non-elected hierarchs, toppling crowns ever so easily; the Arab leaders, low on legitimacy and increasingly being seen as stooges of the West would have to step down disgracefully. Such a spectacle is never on their minds, hence perhaps the indefinite delay in Palestinian statehood. As for Israel winning would be costly and bloody and will leave it in no better a position except perhaps a more battered WEST BANK (the other consequences are mentioned earlier). It would also be **disastrous for US interests in the region**, specially w.r.t. Saudi Arabia as Riyadh will be compelled to take a position against Israel in the scheme of things. Or else it may have to forfeit its claims of Islamic fraternity if it refuses to endorse the Palestinian cause. This is more likely the scenario to be seen, if the PNA takes an unilateral decision or if Is. extremists account for Psd. Arafat's extermination; an Israel victory is more on the cards as it is quite improbable that Israel suffer an utter defeat. Over the three decades since 1967, the military balance has stooped greatly in favour of Israel. Conventional warfare is what Israel is best trained to do and equipped even more with a large inventory of first line strike aircrafts and guided weaponry. Israel must understand that rash decisions now will only lead to further mayhem, the speculation of which only shows increasing discord and a future that at best is not approached. The entire framework of the region's stability is at a precipice, and all the players have to maintain strictly the balancing act. Perhaps Psd. Arafat has realised this, or perhaps it has been made sure by the other keys in the ring that he understand it fully, as unintentionally or otherwise, Psd. Arafat has the entire regions' regimes in his own hands; whether the others endorse it or not, and has in effect induced them to wish him a long life for his beleaguerment might precipitate the most catastrophic of wars. Israel too has probably had the wisdom to steer clear of this course, especially in the light of the recent siege under which

Psd. Arafat was placed. It would be wise now for PM Ariel Sharon not to give in to emotive electoral pressure and deal with the situation in tandem with the other forces in the region. It will strengthen his diplomatic position with them as also will his bargaining power be enhanced on the negotiating table, and the negotiating table is the only way out. Both for Israel as well as for the Palestinian National Authority.

For the concretisation of the state of Palestine, areally a little more than the small state of Leichenstien, the PNA must do a lot more, Arafat or no Arafat.

Firstly, it must put an **effective stop to the ongoing terror tactics**. Most of the suicide bombers are in the age range of 18 to 30 years. Evidently, lack of gainful employment in one of the primary reasons these youth decide on such a precarious end to their lives. Perhaps, if they were employed the energy of their youth would have been diverted to more constructive arenas. It is true that the PNA in most cases does not have a major say in controlling these groups, but on the other hand, it is also true that a severe crack down and arrests will only fan more fire into the cult of violence as violence begets violence, as also increasing the divide that both factions face today. Ruthlessness is thus, no answer. What the PNA has to do is ensure that employment is generated within and without its governed territories. For this the **PNA could initiate a recruitment/ employment cell** within its ranks, keep track of jobs outside the territories, negotiate on this account with the neighbouring states and allow the youth to employment. This will not only generate revenues for the PNA, it will also be a constructive way to vent out frustration that the unemployed youth of Palestine faces today. Israel too can be brought under this umbrella, thus acting as an **Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** measure, as in the case of water management. Interactions will not only increase between Israel and Palestine but it will also gear the region up to a more interdependent whole thus forcing member nations to avoid further conflict, or at least be cautious about it.

For this measure to be realised, once again the onus falls on the internal working of the PNA. It must first **bring its own house to order**. The corruption of administration and the mismanagement of funds have to be checked and this has to be an honest and concerted effort, from the highest ranking official taking a keen initiative downwards. Partisan politics should just be kept out of the scene, Psd. Arafat can at least pay heed to that. Coming clean on this regard will only **increase the intimacy, legitimacy and faith of the people in the PNA**. Once it has established a transparent governance, factionalism within its own ranks will be lowered,

international approval will be bountiful, Arab League nations will be satisfied that their money is not being hoarded and is being put to good use, repugnant nations too will be forced to change their view. Thus secondly, PNA can approach Israel to bring in more work for Palestinian people with the support and backing from the Arab Nations that will probably readily guarantee responsibility for any mishap in lieu of peace, barring a few uncontrollable ones. It will also bring the US to pressurize Israel to sit at the talking table, once the region has achieved considerable quite w.r.t. suicide bombing and civilian attacks. Things will be much smoother then and more easily logicised when there is no impending fear of violence, and that applies to both the parties. It will also be a sure **diplomatic win for the PNA for scoring future points**.

On this pretext again, what are to be future borders between Israel and Palestine, the **PNA could argue a permeability** there. If Israel were to agree to an economic venture as the one mentioned, then Palestinian people would have to be allowed into Israel and back and *vice-versa*, adding more momentum to ADR measures. Borders, both tangible and perceptual would have to be thrown open leading to increased interaction among both sides and eventually existing as peaceful neighbours. What is the most contentious issue now, *viz.* border demarcation, may be then just a formal line on the map, in reality existing only for the Defence Department and not for the civil society at large. Perhaps education too would have its own role in bridging the gap between the two societies; ethical education should also be made an important part in the curriculum, imbibing value judgement in small children to accept and respect the differences among various peoples in the world. Once the economy begins to move in the positive direction, it will also usher in a more cosmopolitan society which will definitely bring in more understanding, at least from the civil society, that in a war there are no victors.

.And finally there is the **Negotiating Table**. From this there is no escape. There is just one option for both Israel and Palestine left to realize their respective goals, and that is negotiating with each other. It is the only way out, whether there is third party mediation or just the two of them, to find any solution to the mayhem that reigns today in West Asia.

Even if, as per the scholar, the onus lies on the PNA, Israel too has its own responsibility in the scheme of things. It must be **party to certain accessions w.r.t. Palestine**. The Oslo 1992 and Camp David 2000 were highly accoladed among circles who genuinely want to see peace in this holy land. It will not be a one man show, both Israel and Palestine have to have equal measure of faith in each other to see anything materialise. Global politicking and electoral

pressures apart, Israel must understand that each day it just keeps losing face in the international community; It just adds to a further loss of Israel on the bargaining power and credibility that it has built up on account of Palestinian terror tactics. The US has already shown its impatience, and if Psd. Arafat gracefully steps down, PM Ariel Sharon or anyone thereafter will have more reason to worry as future leaders may not be what Israel right now expects, being wary of Israeli military might. There are several reasons for this.

For one, pressure has already built up within Israel to finally deal with the problem, once and for all. While the extremists are banking on land sentiments to win them power, the day is not far when each Israeli citizen would rather have peace. What it wants to bargain for now, in future it may have to give it up altogether if domestic pressure as well as international pressure, specially from the US, keeps mounting.

Secondly, the Arab League of Nations have given Israel an invitation, consensually, to activate the negotiating process. It is evident they are not going to do this for a long time to come if this opportunity is rashly put aside. Israel must take note of this, especially so when fundamentalist/ extremist forces are at fervent work within the concerned nations. If the process is allowed to fritter away, it will only strengthen those forces, who if brought to power will thrust the entire region into one long terrible contention, from which Israel might not come out unscathed. It is best to pay heed to the dove's call now, we shall see what the future holds anyway; it will hopefully not be as chaotic as the present.

Thirdly, assuming that Psd. Arafat steps down, then a patient Israel will have a diplomatic score over whosoever takes his place. With the feeling of let bygones be bygones, both leaders of the stalemate can begin anew. At least, internationally Israel will be approved and it is something which it badly needs right now. After all even the US is a member of the UN, it may be a power bloc unto itself, but it also has economic and domestic considerations, especially when the Israeli cause has began to be reflected within its own boundaries. The US cannot risk another WTC attack. If it does Israel will surely have to pay the price.

What had begun as a struggle for existence, today has turned into intense politicking involving almost all the power blocs of the world. The region is definitely on the edge of a very dramatic event which could either result in peace for a long time or devastation for the entire region. Israel must understand that Palestine will not be the sole loser if things turn for the worst. The weeds that will rout out peace in the region have already started spreading. It is upto both

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER V

One of the most prominent points that stand out is the entire study of the evolution of Israel's international boundaries is the fact that in the entire region has the international boundary violations have been a constant feature for the last half a century. From its very inception as a state, the issues of border demarcation for Israel have been primarily the acquisition of its geostrategically significant areas (discussed in preface.) A close inspection of border conflicts reveal that Israel presumably follows the very same strategic location imperatives in whatever defence policies it has adopted. It also reveals these areas are important for Israel as in their topographic characteristics (the high Golan, the aquifer West Bank, the opening to the Red Sea – Eilat). The U.N. Partition Plan that had been implemented for a sovereign Israel had been primarily drawn up keeping the concentration of distinct population groups in view. Perhaps a more geopolitical approach in demarcation of Israel's international boundaries was need, viz. water imperatives and the possibility of future strategic points. Evidently, in due course of time, Israel found it necessary to acquire these territories, moreso in the advent of the 2 consecutive wars that ensued between Israel and its neighbouring Arab States. The most important impediment in maintaining a strict boundary formation for Israel was in the form of Palestinian Arabs, who inhabited the West Bank area adjoining the Dead Sea and around the area south of Lebanon (refer map IV ii). They perceived the land as their own and in effect maintained a high degree of permeability and mobility across the borders of Israel. Also during the 1973 war, the Golan Heights were used as a strategic high point by Syria and Lebanon to launch attacks on Israel. This made it all the more important for Israel to occupy this territory. On the southern front, Egypt too had utilized this Sinai as a strategic point in launching an offensive against Israel. Here too, Israel had to curb irritations on the border by first taking on the entire Sinai (1967) and then redrawing and stabilizing the southern boundary. At present, the northern sector of Golan is still considered significant as Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian guerillas still maintain active offensive whenever possible. The territory of Golan is declared as 'occupied by Israel'; Israel maintains the justification that since this area is being used as a launch pad for offensive against it, the military vigilance over here from Israeli defence forces is necessary. It forms a crucial issue in the definition as well as a base of delimitation of Israel's northern

boundary. In effect guerilla warfare here is an obstacle and threat encountered is the maintenance of Israel's borders, and safeguarding its national security.

The issue of West Bank and Palestinian peoples however, emerges as the most important imperative for Israel in finally stabilizing its borders on all fronts. A complex procedure has definitely to be employed in any demarcation along this region. Any border line, if drawn, will be highly tortuous, based on a number of factors and will probably be equally difficult in managing (refer Map IV iii). The possible bases for a boundary demarcation will probably be settlement complexes as well as areas of religious significance. Hydrologic compulsions too will be included. The settlement configurations keep changing every month; it is obviously evident that such dynamism within the contested areas will have deep repercussions in either stabilizing (including security management) or effectively guarding infiltrations along/across any international border.

Though boundary allocations are treated as a separate area of study, yet it cannot be free from political compulsions and decisions. In this light the diplomatic initiative taken in the Fahd Plan, probably is a fine opportunity in the finalization of border marking for Israel. It is quite evident that Israel's international boundaries are still evolving. The stabilization of the same, though being faced with stiff resentment from the neighbouring sovereign Arab detractors has however begun. Israel has had a peaceful southern border for over two decades, both with Egypt and Jordan; with Jordan specifically, Israel as settled territorial adjustments near the base of lake Tiberias. It is however the northern border with Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah and the border agreements with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the West Bank that pose serious problems for Israel in border stabilization.

When governmental forces seem to be entrapped in diplomatic animosity, the facet of Confidence Building Measures should be emphasized. People of good faith should initiate such measures among the civil society. This will bring in more faith among dissensions as well as clear out the clouds of doubt. In time the civil society as a whole will act as a pressure group to bring about speedy reconciliation. CBMs can include interchange of children across the borders for going to school, opening Arab schools in the vicinity of Jewish colonies where children of

dissenting sections can be taught together, stressing more on moral duties in the curricula, increasing NGO operations in conflict ridden areas which will provide relief in the form of hospitals, food camps, water allocations and support by offering employment as well as monitor nefarious activities.

In addition the work also indicates Alternative Dispute Resolution measures, ADR. The prospect of water has already been discussed. Agriculture too can be used to benefaction. The northern part of Israel is well suited for citrus plantations and vegetables, Whereas the drier West Bank areas are replete with staple crops like potato, tobacco. An economic exchange of the two on specialization level is suggested, whereby Israel's north can concentrate on fruit plantations and vegetable marketing with West Bank authorities and in turn they can supply staple crops of wheat, potato, etc. It will foster economic integration as well as increase social interaction in the region. The idea is perhaps something similar to the Agro-Industrial complex mentioned in the work.

The region could also run along the lines of the EU operations, having convertible/single unit of currency fostering economic integration in effect acting as an ADR measure.

Such Track II diplomatic initiatives also brings to mind the *raison d etre* of these measures. Obviously it is the demarcation of the boundary of a prospective Palestine with Israel that is the crux of the matter- the process of evolution of a boundary. Assuming that Palestine does get sovereignty, what is the degree of it maintaining a peaceful existence. Foremostly the areal extent it is likely to receive is quite small. In addition a disjointed state is also on the cards - Gaza separated by a considerable stretch of Israeli land from the West Bank. It is true that Israel has promised safe passages through its territory linking Gaza and WEST BANK, but given the present inclination of Israel how far is it safe for PNA to rely on such grants. Definitely trust is the trump card; however since both entities are interested in maximum territorial integration, it is quite difficult to hypothesize positive results. Nevertheless attempts should always be appreciated.

Israel must understand that their peaceful existence is deeply tied to the reigning of peace in the region. In this light Israel must grant certain rights to people of the land. Maintaining a stubborn deportment in this regard is not in its best interests. It must allow the freedom of religion and cultural distinction. Israel has acquired significant amounts of territory in the north, south and east. If the west was not a coast, probably there too expansion would have occurred. But it is not just acquisitions that make the land one, an integration with the residing people too have to be deeply considered by Israel. It is only then that its boundaries will stay stable and secure.

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TABLES

Table 1a
Jewish Population
Selected Cities, Mandatory Palestine

Sl.No	Name of The City	Year			
		1880	1914	1931	1945
1.	Jerusalem	18,000	45,000	53,800	97,000
2.	Jaffa	1,000	10,500	7,700	34,000
3.	T.AV				
4.	Haifa	600	1,500	46,300	174,000
5.	Safed	4,300	3,000	16,000	66,000
6.	Tiber	2,400	7,000	2,500	2,400
7.	Hebron	900	6,000	5,400	7,000
	Rural population	3000	1000	—	—
	T of Population	27,000	12,000	38,450	152,800
		85,000	174,500	5,92,00	

Source : Smith, A.D. "Is. Trans from Community to State" E. Korsh; E (ed.) p.84.

Tabl : 1b

1.	(Agri)	-	19.3 %
2.	Industry, <i>Handi.cft.</i>	<i>Building, Constctn.</i>	27.1 %
3.	Comm., Insurance, <i>Sp.</i>	-	14.1 %
4.	Pop. <i>SeRvices</i>	-	14.6 %
5.	Others	-	19.2 %

Agricultural Production
Table III a
(Produce in th, metric tones)

Name of the Product	1996		1998	
	Produce	Percentage	Produce	Percentage
Wheat	185	5.6	116	3.9
Barley	353	10.7	271	9.1
Groundnut	23	0.7	23	0.7
Cotton seed	96	2.9	98	3.3
Olive	41	1.2	19	0.6
Cabbage	61	1.8	52	1.7
Tomato	491	14.9	386	13.0
Pumpkin Squash and Gourds	25	0.7	30	0.1
Cucumber	95	2.9	100	3.4
Poppon (green)	76	2.3	75	2.5
Onion	94	2.8	69	2.3
Carrot	81	2.4	68	2.3
Watermelon	254	7.7	260	8.7
Grapes	90	2.7	90	3.0
Apples	98	3.0	111	3.7
Peaches	47	1.4	48	1.6
Oranges	366	11.1	325	10.9
Tamperine, mandarins, elementines	115	3.5	125	4.2
Lemon and limes	27	0.8	21	0.7
Grapefruit	348	10.6	364	12.2
Amocada	76	2.3	80	2.7
Banana	98	3.0	112	3.7
Strawberry	13	0.4	14	0.5
Cotton (Lint)	51	1.5	54	1.8
Melons	76	2.3	74	2.5
Total	3282	100	2965	100

Table III b
Livestock Products
Production in Th. Met. Tonnes

Name of the Product	1996		1998	
	Produce	Percentage	Produce	Percentage
Beef and Veal	42	2.5	39	2.3
Mutton and Lamb	5	-	36	-
Pork	11	0.6	13	0.8
Poultry meat	260	15.6	253	15.2
Cow's milk	1125	67.6	1120	67.6
Sheep milk	18	1.1	19	1.1
Goat milk	12	0.7	13	0.8
Cheese	94	5.6	93	5.6
Butter	4	--	5	--
Hen egges	90	5.4	93	5.6
Honey	3	-	3	-

Source : FAO Production Year Book

Table – III c
Selected Industrial Products
Production in Met. Tonnes

Name of the Product	1994		1996		1998	
	Produce	Percentage	Produce	Percentage	Produce	Percentage
Refined Veg. Oil	45447	9.2	59,000	-	--	--
Wine (Th. Liters)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Beer (Th. Liters)	50750	10.3	--	--	--	--
Cigarette	5638	1.1	4793	--	--	---
Printing /writing paper	65790	13.3	95,000	--	95,000	--
Other paper	103142	21.0	130,000	--	130,000	--
Card board	103142	21.0	130,000	--	130,000	--
Ammonia	--	--	--	--	--	---
Chlorine	37555	7.6	35000	--	--	--
Caustic soda	32,765	6.6	41,000	--	--	--
Polythene	126979	257	--	--	--	--
Paints	53260	10.8	58,000	--	--	--
	492888					

-- not available

Source : Industrial Commodity Statistics Year Book. 1998, UN Publication.

Table III d
Net Domestic Product
By Economic Activity
Fig. In million new sheqels)
1 newsheqel = US \$ 4.0

	1995	
	Amount	Percentage of production
Agriculture – (Hunting, forestry, fishing)	4419	2.3
Manufacturing (?? And Mining quarrying)	35501	18.5
Electricity (Gas and Water)	3299	1.7
Constue	16401	8.
Trade (Wholesale and Retail and Hotels and restaurant	12,122	6.8
Finance, Insurance, real estate, business, services	51,754	27.1
Govt. Services	48297	25.2
Social/ personal services	8403	4.3
Statistical discrepancy	363	0.19
Total	191,032	

SOURCE : MID EAST & N.Af. 2001

Table III e
External Trade
Principal Commodities (US \$ million)

Imports	1996	1997	1998	% of totale
Food and live animals	1,703.2	1,654.6	1,560.8	5.6
Cereals and cereal preparation	593.7	540.2	447.5	1.6
Crude materials (inedible) except fuels)	669.6	712.7	605.6	2.2
Minerals fuels, lubricants, etc.	1,824.5	1,884.0	1,431.2	5.2
Petroleum, petroleum products, etc.	1,823.7	1,875.4	1,424.5	5.2
Chemicals and related products	2,701.7	2,742.7	2,803.9	10.2
Organic chemicals	636.9	661.8	643.8	2.3
Basic manufactures	9,205.1	9,196.1	8,170.2	29.7
Paper, paperboard, etc.	488.5	486.1	495.6	1.8
Textile, yarn, fabrics, etc.	777.1	793.5	802.0	2.9
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	5,692.2	5,631.3	4,679.0	17.0
Iron and steel	743.2	759.6	685.0	2.5
Machinery and transport equipment	10,452.7	9,499.1	9,445.6	34.3
Power-generating machinery and equipment	420.1	601.0	639.1	2.3
Machinery specialized for particular industries	848.3	647.3	713.7	2.6
General industrial machinery, equipment and parts	1,369.2	1,213.5	1,157.5	4.2
Office machines and automatic data-processing machines	1,129.4	1,167.3	1,179.3	4.3
Telecommunications and sound equipment	1,201.9	1,072.1	1,208.8	4.4
Other electrical machinery apparatus etc.	2,423.6	2,054.7	2,126.7	7.7
Road vehicles and parts	2,324.2	1,982.4	1,766.5	6.4
Other transport equipment and parts	569.3	612.3	474.4	1.7
Miscellaneous manufactures articles	2,656.3	2,614.3	2,679.7	9.7
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments, etc.	607.0	597.3	647.3	2.3
Total (incl. Others)	29,949.0	29,084.4	27,469.8	

Source : Mid-east and N.Africa World Book 2001.

Table III *33e*
Israel : Principal Commodities – import/export

Imports	1996	1997	1998	% of totale	Exports. F.o.b	1996	1997	1998	% tot
Food and live animals	1,703.2	1,654.6	1,560.8	5.6	Food and live animals	995.8	903.2	867.4	3.7
Cereals and cereal preparation	593.7	540.2	447.5	1.6	Vegetables and fruit	642.2	578.3	587.6	2.5
Crude materials (inedible) except fuels	669.6	712.7	605.6	2.2	Crude materials (inedible) except fuels	552.7	588.0	590.8	2.5
Minerals fuels, lubricants, etc.	1,824.5	1,884.0	1,431.2	5.2	Chemicals and related products	2,858.6	3,287.1	3,372.3	14.5
Petroleum, petroleum products, etc.	1,823.7	1,875.4	1,424.5	5.2	Organic chemicals	716.5	806.2	843.1	3.6
Chemicals and related products	2,701.7	2,742.7	2,803.9	10.2	Basic manufactures	7656.6	8,296.5	7,973.2	34.2
Organic chemicals	636.9	661.8	643.8	2.3	Textile yarn, fabrics, etc.	400.3	448.4	475.6	2.0
Basic manufactures	9,205.1	9,196.1	8,170.2	29.7	Non-metallic mineral manufactures	6,352.9	6,875.1	6,440.5	27.5
Paper, paperboard, etc.	488.5	486.1	495.6	1.8	Machinery and transport equipment	6,067.0	6,888.7	7,781.9	33.4
Textile, yarn, fabrics, etc.	777.1	793.5	802.0	2.9	Machinery specialized for particular industries	537.1	506.6	568.2	2.4
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	5,692.2	5,631.3	4,679.0	17.0	General Industrial machinery, equipment and parts	729.6	627.4	695.4	3.0
Iron and steel	743.2	759.6	685.0	2.5	Office machinery and automatic data-processing machines	923.1	1,117.2	1,215.9	5.2
Machinery and transport equipment	10,452.7	9,499.1	9,445.6	34.3	Telecommunications and sound equipment	1,811.6	2,216.5	2,546.6	10.9
Power-generating machinery and equipment	420.1	601.0	639.1	2.3	Other electrical machinery, apparatus, etc	1,314.9	1,528.9	1,643.0	7.0
Machinery specialized for particular industries	848.3	647.3	713.7	2.6	Road vehicles and other transport equipment and parts	511.9	586.6	815.4	3.5
General industrial machinery, equipment and parts	1,369.2	1,213.5	1,157.5	4.2	Miscellaneous manufactures articles	2,301.5	2,454.9	2,530.7	10.8
Office machines and automatic data-processing machines	1,129.4	1,167.3	1,179.3	4.3	Clothing (excl. footwear)	644.0	600.4	651.7	2.8
Telecommunications and sound equipment	1,201.9	1,072.1	1,208.8	4.4	Professional, scientific and controlling instruments, etc.	575.6	755.9	787.9	3.4
Other electrical machinery apparatus etc.	2,423.6	2,054.7	2,126.7	7.7	Total (incl. Others)	20,610.2	22,590.8	23,285.6	
Road vehicles and parts	2,324.2	1,982.4	1,766.5	6.4					
Other transport equipment and parts	569.3	612.3	474.4	1.7					
Miscellaneous manufactures articles	2,656.3	2,614.3	2,679.7	9.7					
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments, etc.	607.0	597.3	647.3	2.3					
Total (incl. Others)	29,949.0	29,084.4	27,469.8						

Table III. g f
Israel – Principal Trading Partners

Country	Import						Export					
	1996			1998			1996			1998		
	Amount	%age	rank	Amount	%age	rank	Amount	%age	rank	Amount	%age	rank
Belgium	3650.0	12.1	2	2871.1	10.4	2	1123.4	4.2	4	1103.0	4.7	14
Canada	189.0	0.6	16	316.1	1.1	13						
France	1179.6	3.9	7	1125.6	4.1	8	671.8	2.5	8	664.3	2.8	9
Germany	2817.0	9.4	3	2417.7	8.8	3	1041.3	3.9	6	1110.8	4.7	3
Hongkong	419.3	1.4	11	532.4	1.9	10	1071.4	4.0	5	796.8	3.4	6
India	250.7	0.8	5	343.8	1.2	12	318.7	1.2	11	334.5	1.4	12
Italy	2272.8	7.6	5	1827.5	6.6	5	555.9	2.1	9	736.7	3.1	8
Japan	1105.0	3.6	8	976.2	3.5	9	1224.6	4.6	3	754.8	3.2	7
Netherlands	956.7	3.2	9	1142.0	4.1	7	893.1	3.3	7	1099.7	4.7	5
Southern Africa	304.0	1.0	13	274.1	1.0	15						
Spain	630.0	2.1	10	623.1	2.2	9	339.7	1.3	10	400.2	1.7	10
Sweden	368.8	1.2	12	296.9	1.0	14						
Turkey	252.1	0.8	14	443.1	1.6	11						
Swiss	1658.8	5.5	6	1499.9	5.4	6	302.2	1.1	12	378.6	1.6	11
U.K.	2649.0	8.8	4	2062.1	7.5	4	1367.9	5.1	2	1323.0	5.7	2
USA	5981.6	19.9	1	5386.0	19.6	1	6303.0	23.7	1	8254.5	35.4	1
Russia							259.0	1.0	13	184.7	0.8	14
Singapore							200.6	0.7	15	174.6	0.7	15
Australia							215.8	0.8	14	237.2	1.0	13
Total	29,949.0			27,469.8			26,610.2	23,285.6				

Amount fig. In US\$ million imports exclude military goods.
Source : Europa World Book 2001, p.677.

Water Statistics
West Asian Countries
Table III g g g

	Israel	Jordan	Palestine	Syria	Lebanon	Turkey	Egypt
Population (Mill) 1995	5	3	2	12	3	55	60
2025	10	10	5	26	4.3	83	120
Water resources, Potential, ????	1,500	880	200	15,000	9,000	250,000	60,000
Tot. water, m ³ /p/y ² 1995	300	250	100	1,250	3,000	4,500	1000
2025	150	90	40	580	2,100	3,00	500
Total MWR. 2025 mcm/y	1,250	1,250	625	3,250	540	10,400	12,800
Tol. Excess/shortage/mem/y	+250	-370	-425	+11,750	+8,460	+239,600	+47,200

M³/person/year
Minimum water requirement
Source : Op.cit. Allan J.A.P. 161.

Table III h
Water use-actual and projected

Water Use – Actual (1989/1991)

	Population (Millions)	Total domestic use (Mm ³ /year)	Per capita domestic use (Mm ³ /year)	Total industrial use (Mm ³ /year)	Irrigation area (ha0)	Total Irrig. Use (Mm ³ /year)	Irrig. Water applic. Rate (Mm ³ /year)	Grand total water Use (Mm ³ /year)
Israel	5.00	495	100	115	200,000	1,100	5,500	1,710
West Bank	1.00	35	35	5	10,000	100	10,000	140
Gaza	0.70	20	25	X	5,000	60	11,000	80
Jordan	3.60	170	50	40	70,000	760	10,850	970
Total	10.30	720		160		2,020		2,900

Water Use – Projected (2040)

	Population (Millions)	Total domestic use (Mm ³ /year)	Per capita domestic use (Mm ³ /year)	Total industrial use (Mm ³ /year)	Irrigation area (ha0)	Total Irrig. Use (Mm ³ /year)	Irrig. Water applic. Rate (Mm ³ /year)	Grand total water Use (Mm ³ /year)
Israel	12.8	1,280	100	260	ND	1,900	ND	3,440
West Bank	3.8	380	100	40	ND	350	ND	770
Gaza	2.6	260	100	X	ND	100	ND	360
Jordan	16.9	1,700	100	180	ND	550	ND	2,430
Total	36.1	3,620		480		2,900		7,000

ND : No data available

Source : Allan J.A. op.cit. p.26

TABLE IV a.
POPULATION STATISTICS: WEST BANK, GAZA

AREA	POPULATION	DENSITY
West Bank	1,873,476	332.5
Jenin	2,03,026	351.3
Tubas	36,609	165.7
Tulkarm	1,34,110	549.6
Qalqiya	72,007	436.4
Salfit	48,538	236.8
Nablus	2,61,340	308.2
Ramallah	2,13,582	251.3
Al Quds *1	3,28,601	972.2
Ariha *2	32,713	60.1
Beit Lahm *3	1,37,286	219.7
Al Khalil *4	4,05,664	399.7
GAZA STRIP	1,022,207	2808.2
North Gaza	1,83,373	
Gaza	3,67,388	
Deival Balah	1,47,877	
Khan Yunis	2,00,704	
Rafah	1,22,865	
Total	2,895,683	482.9

*1 Jerusalem

*2 Jericho

*3 Bethlehem

*4 Hebron

Figures include an estimate of 2,10,209 for East Jerusalem; exclu
Source: Census of Israel, 1997

Table IV b
Revenue / Expenditure Estimates, 1998

Revenue	US\$m.	%of Tot.	Expenditure	US \$ m.	% age tot.
Domestic Revenue	321.1	37.2	Current Export	802.6	79.6
Tax Revenue	224.3	26	Wage & Salaries	466.8	46.3
Income Tax	68.4	7.9	Civil Service	286.0	28.4
Value added Tax	80.6	9.3	Police force	180.9	17.9
Other Receipts	96.8	11.2	Other purpose	335.8	33.6
* Revenua clearances	542.0	62.8	Capital Expend.	204.7	20.3
VATax	202.1	23.4			
Petroleum Excise	106.8	12.3			
Total	863.1		Total	1,007.3	

* Selected Rev. resultant of a customs union between Israel and Palestine authorities, of which, Israel and Palestine collectively agent, periodically making transfers to PNA.

Source : Europe World Book, Mid-east and N.Af. p.709.

Table IVc
GDP by Economic Activity

Sector	Activity	US \$m.	% of GDP	% Sector wise
Primary	Agriculture & Fishing	266.6	6.39	6.39
Secondary	Mining, Quarrying	41.3	1.0	26.4
	Manufacturing	657.9	15.7	
	Electricity/Water Supply	35.0	0.8	
	Construct	371.1	8.9	
Tertiary	* Trade	1245.3	30	35
	Transport/Commerce	202.6	5	
Quaternary	** Other Services	865.5	20.7	20.7
Total	4,173.1			

* Trade includes – Wholesale/ Retail Trade, Hotels, Restaurant, Financial intermediates, Real estate

** Includes – Community, Social, Personal Services, Govt. Services, Non-profit and Domestic Services to households

Fig of 1997

Source : Europa World Book

Table IV d
Principal Commodities – Export/Import 1997

Item	Import	% of Tot.	Export	% of Tot.
Food, Live animals	479,390	22.1	57,240	15.0
Beverages, Tobacco	70,461	3.2	19,639	5.1
* Crude materials	75,667	3.5	17,237	4.5
Mineral fuels	329,041	15.2	6,175	1.6
Animal /Veg. Oil	23,880	1.1	7,907	2.1
Chemicals	169,015	7.8	22,701	6.0
Basic Manuf.	577,746	26.7	165,578	43.5
Manuf. transport Equipmt.	274,138	12.6	21,715	5.7
Miscellaneous manufactures articles	150,374	6.9	56,878	14.9
Other Commodities	13,785	0.6	5,354	1.4
Total	2,164,037		1380,524	

Fig in US \$ 1997.

Table IV C
PNA Defence

Estimated Security Budget : US \$ 500 m

Forces	Numbers	% of Tot Forces
Paramilitary forces	35,000	51.1
Public Security Forces	14,000	20.4
Gaza	6000	
West Bank	8000	
Civil Police Force	10,000	14.5
Gaza	4,000	
West Bank	6,000	
General Intelligence force	3,000	4.4%
Preventive Security Force	3000	4.4%
Gaza	1,200	
West Bank	1,800	
Military Intelligence Force	500	0.7%
Presidential Security Force	3,000	4.4%
Total	68,500	