

# **ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN ALGERIA: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**

**Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
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**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN ALGERIA: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**”, submitted by **SUDHAKAR M. BADIGER**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is his work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

We therefore, recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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*Dedicated to  
My Late Brother Jalindra...*

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**SUDHAKAR M. BADIGER**

## PREFACE

Politicization of religion is a new global phenomenon. All the major religions of the world are showing fundamentalist devices. But it is Islamic fundamentalism which is most dominant at the global level. Fundamentalist project a vision of worldwide order based on Islam. The theme of Islam as a new global enemy has suddenly gained much prominence. Here we will be dealing with Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria.

The first chapter deals with the sociological theories of fundamentalism like Crisis Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory and Marxist Theory. Our concern will be to study Islamic fundamentalism from various perspectives. It analyses how modernization has promoted the growth of fundamentalism.

The second chapter deals with Islamic dimensions of state building in post independent Algeria. Religion has been one of the most important factor in state building. The policy of cultural monopolization followed by the state is of much importance for adequately understanding the emergence of fundamentalism. It deals with how the authoritarian state, resting on single party (FLN) rule and supported by the military and security apparatus, built and operated comprehensive network of control over all aspects of nations life. The state has kept a tight rein on Islamic spaces and thereby nationalized Islam.

The third chapter deals with socio-economic crisis in Algeria. Various factors which have led to socio-economic and cultural crisis will be taken into consideration. Important questions will be raised regarding the model of development which the third world country like Algeria should adopt. It deals with how the legitimacy formula anchored to oil, state welfare and revolutionary mythology remained operative and during the Boumediene's years. But the legitimacy formula broke down in mid-1980s due to decreasing oil revenue which gave rise to economic crisis. Another important area of interest is cultural aspect of contemporary crisis. Our argument maintain's

that it was modernization and policy of cultural monopolization which led to the emergence of cultural crisis.

The fourth chapter deals with the emergence of fundamentalist movement. Our main concern will be to understand the dynamic of fundamentalist movement by taking various theories like Crisis Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory into consideration. It deals with various strategies used by fundamentalist organizations to get legitimacy. Further it deals with different tendencies prevailing in fundamentalist movement. It also deals with how different regimes have dealt with fundamentalism. Our arguments maintains that due to extremely fragmentary nature of fundamentalist organizations as well as due to Berber factor peace making has become an extremely difficult task.

The fifth chapter is conclusion. It deals with various important issues which have been raised in the preceding chapters.

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## CHAPTER – 1

### THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF FUNDAMENTALISM

The worldwide resurgence of religious fundamentalism has forced sociologists to reformulate sociological theories. Marx, Weber and Durkhiem believed that religion will play lesser and lesser role in modern society. The emergence of religious fundamentalism shows that classical sociologists have underestimated the role of religion. The politicization of religion is now a global phenomenon. The scholars have named the new phenomenon as religious fundamentalism.<sup>1</sup> The politicization of religion is not limited to Islam only. Nearly all the major religions like Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism are getting politicized. American Academy of Arts and Sciences has set up the Fundamentalism Project, covering the fundamentalist movement across the globe. According to Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, who were the directors of the Fundamentalism project; argue that their research has demonstrated that “those people and groups now known as fundamentalists emerge from different regions of the world, cite different holy books, or have different interpretations of the same holy book, or follows no holy book at all but a vulnerable tradition instead”.<sup>2</sup> The common denominator of all fundamentalist movements is that they do not address religious beliefs, but rather a socio-political worldview, that is, a broad concern about the nature of state, society, and world politics. However, that concern might be articulated in religious symbolism. In case of fundamentalism religious texts are reinterpreted. For example, in case

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds.): *Fundamentalism Observed*, (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p.815, The findings of project were Published in five volumes. The other four volumes are: *Fundamentalism and Society*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1993; *Fundamentalism and the State*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1993; *Accounting for Fundamentalism*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1994 and *Fundamentalism Comprehended*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1995, All volume are edited by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby.



Hindu fundamentalism, the system of *Varna* was reinterpreted and it was argued that it conform the western standard of justice.<sup>3</sup> In case of fundamentalism Abrahmic faith religious texts like Bible, *Quran* and *Hadith* play important role while in case of fundamentalism based on Eastern tradition, the religious text does not plays constitute role. For example, in case of Buddhist fundamentalism in Sri Lanka, the religious text are not of much important. It is the Buddhist tradition which plays an important role. Hindu fundamentalism is concerned with political terrorization of Hinduism within the boundaries of India.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand Islamic fundamentalism is an absolutist universalism, a vision of worldwide order based on Islam. Thus we can find much difference between various fundamentalist movements.

The term Islamic fundamentalism, is a problematic term since it is laden with Christian pre-supposition and western stereotype. The term implies a literal reading of Islamic scripture which belies the innovation and flexibility shown by the different theorists. Moreover, it overlooks the wide diversity of belief and values appearing in Islamic culture. Many different and varied phenomena are lumped together under the heading of Islamic fundamentalism. For example, traditionalism, which is quite distinct from fundamentalism is lumped to with it. Traditionalism suggest a returns to the practices of earlier Islamic society characterized by an application of *sharia* and *sunna*.

For Islamic fundamentalist religion is the primary basis for nation-building. The try to re-Islamize modern society. For them Islam is not merely religion but an ideology. They do not reject modernity. They are in fact concerned with reformulating modernity using discursive terms of Islamic heritage. Many solutions that offer have no specific historical

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<sup>3</sup> Suriva Jaswal, "Semitising Hinduism: Changing Paradigm of Brahminical Integration", *Social Scientist*, (New Delhi), vol. 14, no. 223, 1991, pp.20-32.

<sup>4</sup> T.K. Oommen, "Religious Nationalism and Democratic Polity : The Indian Case", *Sociology of Religion*, vol. 55, no. 4, 1994, pp.455-72.

precedent in Islamic traditions. For, example the concept of “Islamic Economy” is not fundamentalist in the sense of harking back to an earlier era, but addresses modern economic problems.<sup>5</sup>

In the present era of globalizations neo-fundamentalist have emerged. The neo-fundamentalist are supra-national. They do not root themselves to specific countries. For them national interest is of secondary importance. To take a recent example, Mullah Omar did not expel Osama Bin Laden to get full diplomatic recognition.

In the twentieth century, various fundamentalist groups have emerged. The common denominator of these groups have been that they have experienced cultural, social and economic dislocation. In Table-1 various socio-economic indicators of Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are given. Table indicates the drastic rise in population and urbanization. Moreover, there is low labour participation in these countries. The problem is further complicated due to vulnerable economic status. The net result of all these has been socio-economic crisis. The negative effect of modernization has promoted the growth of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism appears in urban environments, where social structure has been disrupted by modernization.

**Table 1: Socio-economic indicators of Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia**

Country	(A) Population growth (in million approximately)		(B) Urbanization as percentage of total population		(C) Average annual growth of labour force (%)		(D) Per capita GNP US\$	
	1970	1980	1960	1980	1960	1980	1980	1990
Algeria	13.75	19.33	30	61	0.2	3.5	19.35	29.79
Egypt	33.30	42.13	38	45	2.2	2.2	20.91	40.04
Libya	1.94	3.04	23	52	5.2	3.5	--	--
Tunisia	4.85	5.39	36	52	7.0	2.9	3.52	7.71

**Source:** Column A= The Political Economy of West Asia: Demography, Democracy and Economic Reforms, (ed.) by Grijesh Pant, p.51.  
 Column B= World Development Report, 1980.  
 Column C= World Development Report, 1980.  
 Column D= The Political Economy of West Asia: Demography, Democracy and Economic Reforms, (ed.) by Grijesh Pant, pp.58-59.

<sup>5</sup> Tim Niblock and Rodney Wilson (eds.): *The Political Economy of the Middle East: Islamic Economics*, Edward Elgar Press, Massachusetts, 1980.

## **Historical Context of Fundamentalism**

The contemporary fundamentalism has emerged in specific historical context. The distinct characteristic of the broad historical context in which these fundamentalism movement have emerged should be taken into consideration. The processes that have promoted the growth of fundamentalism are as follows:

Firstly, drastic changes have taken place in the power relation at the international level. The demise of Soviet Union played an important role since it led to the silence of the ideological confrontation between west and communism. The end of cold war led to withdrawal of ideological and strategically motivated security and economic assistance from the superpowers. There is also emergence of postmodern society characterized by strong tendencies towards multiculturalism. The emergence of multiculturalism has broken the cultural hegemony of West. Moreover, multiculturalism has given legitimacy to different cultural perspectives and has thus broken the hegemony of western cultural paradigm. In today's globalize world there is growing movement of capital and labour force, intense migrations, mass media based on the latest development in information technology. Consequently today, there exists, a world system, but not a corresponding world culture or world civilization.

Secondly, fundamentalism is also promoter due to negative effect of modernization. In case of Third World countries the multiple process of modernization had negative consequences. Consequently the paradigm of Western development model and western cultural values have lost their vitality. This discrediting of Western paradigm is one of the most important characteristic. Islamic fundamentalists are indeed attacking West and believing fervently that the new world order based on Islamic principles will supplant the discredited western order. Fundamentalism is a powerful challenge to the existing order of the international system. Since the

institutions is of western origin the revolt is also revolt against West.<sup>6</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer says that in fact we are witnessing new coldwar. According to him “the new world order that is replacing the bipolar powers of the cold war is characterized not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling of old empires, and discrediting of communism but also by the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances”.<sup>7</sup>

### **Theories of Fundamentalism**

There are various theories of fundamentalism. No single theory or concept can fully account for the recent politicization of religion. Here we will be concerns with the Marxist as well as the non-Marxist theories. Basically there are two approaches for understanding the Third World development. They are underdevelopment/dependency and modernization/political development school. Both the schools of thought have neglected the religious dimensions of Third World politics. Both the schools believed that with modernization and development religion will play lesser and lesser role.

### **Marxist/Dependency School**

The dependency school emerged as the reaction to modernization school. Andre Franck is one of the major contributor to this school. His key term is “development of underdevelopment”. Frank argues that the development of the industrialized countries from the fifteenth century was a direct outcome of their economic and political dominance of today Third

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<sup>6</sup> Hedley Bull: “The Revolt Against the West”, in Headley Bull and Adam Watsan (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, (Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.217-28.

<sup>7</sup> Maru Juergensmeyer: *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Contrast the Secular State*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993), pp.1-2.

World country.<sup>8</sup> Due to imperialism the colonies were having long-term disadvantageous relationship with the imperial powers. Due to the incorporation of the Third World countries in global capitalist system their economic and political development was undermined even before the take off stage. His core argument is that development of the industrialized states was made possible (and continues to be) by the underdevelopment of the Third World. One of the main assumption of dependency school is that the Third World would have automatically been transferred from pre-capitalist to capitalist system in the absence of colonialism and forced incorporation. Similarly Samir Amin also believed that the Third world underdevelopment is due to exploitation by capitalist countries.<sup>9</sup> For theorist of this school metropolis and satellite pursue different structural role. It is only by disengagement from capitalist system can the third world countries hope for economic development. For the Marxists the socio-economic crisis of the third World country is because of capitalist exploitations. The implications of this is that fundamentalism is a reflection of impasses of capitalism. According to Marx man makes religion, religion does not makes man.<sup>10</sup> Religious thought which arise at a certain period of human development despite all the peculiar formation and characteristic, ultimately arise out of changes which take in the productive relations and are themselves reflections of this changes. Every religious organization represents certain class interest. The tenacious survival of religion is only possible insofar it maintains its own social base in the support of one class or social grouping. From the Marxist perspective fundamentalism is the reflection of exploitative relationship which the Third world countries have with capitalist countries.

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<sup>8</sup> Andre Frank: *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*, (Oxford University Press, Bombay 1975); see also *Dependent Accumulation Under Development* (MacMillan Press, London, 1978).

<sup>9</sup> Amin Samir: *Accumulation and World Scale*, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974).

<sup>10</sup> Marx and Engles, *On Religion*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1956).

## Non-Marxists Theories

The modernization paradigm is second paradigmatic alternative to the dependency school. According to Talcott Parson modernization is due “structural differentiations” of the social systems.<sup>11</sup> This process can be triggered by many different ways. The chief consequences of this process is that institutions multiples, and the simple structure of the traditional society are transformed into complex one of modern societies. The theories of modernization in fifties and sixties were based on the assumption on convergence. It was believed that modernization would wipe out cultural differences. The implication of this was that uniform modern world would emergence. But soon it was realized that multiple modernities are emerging. To take into account the emergence of multiple modernities new perspective had emerged. This perspective recognizes the uniqueness of the civilization of modernity. It also recognizes the great variability of the symbolic, ideological and institutional responses to it. It is concerned with how different societies interpret symbolic promise of modernity. The emergence of multiple modernity has challenged the classical modernization school.

The modernization school classifies the societies according to their degree of social and economic development. The major indicators used for classification are for capita income, degree of industrialization, urbanization, education, the spread of communication systems, and the level of health care and general welfare.

From this perspective the problem of underdevelopment is due to lack of capital accumulation. Capital accumulations is seen as the major asset for industrialization. It is argued that industrialization will promote urbanization. The logical outcome of this process will be increase in standard of living and other major indicators which we have noted above.

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<sup>11</sup> Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, (Free Press, New York, 1960).

There are many criticisms that can be leveled against the modernization school. From the perspective of modernization school development and modernization are linear processes. It presupposes that Third world countries will follow the rigid patterns of stages of growth similar to the historical development process in the west. It neglects the historical specificity of non European societies. It is an ethnocentric theory since it proposes that development and westernization are one and the same thing. The concept of westernization denies the possibility of Non-European model of modernization, which can be considered as equally developed and advanced. Many factors which are important are neglected by the modernization school. For example it fails to take into account the dialectical interactions between the development of the forces of production and social relations. The main implications of this is that complex problem of underdevelopment are reduced to insufficiency of capital and lack of modern technology.

From the above discussion we can note that the modernization school and the dependency school both have neglected the religion. For both the schools with the passing of traditional society, religion would become an impotent force.

Keeping the above discussions in mind we can understand the emergence of fundamentalism with the help of following three theories. (1) The Theory of incompatibility of Religion and Modernity, 2) The Crisis Theory 3) Resource Mobilization Theory.

### **The Theory of Incompatibility of Religion and Modernity**

Modernity has brought about differentiation and dedifferentiation.<sup>12</sup> In other word we can say the modernization is amalgam of differentiation and de-differentiation. It should be noted that differentiation and

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<sup>12</sup> Paul Heelas: "Introduction: On Differentiation and Dedifferentiation" in Paul Heelas, David Martin and Paul Morris (eds.), *Religion Modernity and Post Modernity*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988), pp.1-8.

dedifferentiation are never total and comprehensive. The reason for this is that life would be difficult if the boundaries would have been very strong. Differentiation has led to the separation of religion, law, politics, education, etc. In sociological terminology we can say that secularization has taken place. According to Berger "secularization is the process, by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols".<sup>13</sup> There are two sources of secularization. They are subjective and pluralism. By subjective source Berger implies replacement of religious explanation in the minds of people. The modern period world is understood to act according to the scientific laws. Pluralism refers to the multiple defining agencies.

The emergence of the fundamentalism has challenged the secularization theory. In contemporary period fundamentalist movements are playing major role. For example moral majority played an important role in American politics in 1980s. Many fundamentalist organizations have set up various institutions like political parties, trade unions, schools, hospitals etc.

Thus in recent times there has been increasing politicization of religion. It seems that categorical separation of religion and politics is difficult to maintain. Moreover, the state in the modern period is getting drawn more and more into issues relating with sex, morality, privacy, ethics, etc. For example, due to progress in medical sciences, controversies have emerged regarding the politico-legal definition of human life. Similarly, in countries like USA marriage based on homosexuality has been legalised. Thus in modern period the state is getting more and more involved into issues of ethics and morality. Fundamentalism in USA was reaction to this intrusion of state in religious matters. The fundamentalist movement in American can be traced to the supreme court decision to legalize the abortion.

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<sup>13</sup> Peter Berger: *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of Sociological Theory of Religion*: (Doubleday, Garden city, 1967), p.107.



Paradoxically, secularization itself can promote the growth of fundamentalism. In modern society the religious elites are marginalized. By promoting fundamentalism these elite try to come back to the centre stage. Hunter's analysis shows that in advanced industrialized societies, religious elites are playing an important role.<sup>14</sup> This signifies the attempt to come back to centre from where they have been displaced. Though significance of religious elites has declined considerably but it is still believed that they have the capacity to legitimize social order. The religious elites in industrialized countries have adopted an adversarial politico-moral stance. Hunter calls them the "religious arms of the knowledge sector". Hunter's argument sensitizes us to politics of religion in advanced industrial societies.

The emergence of fundamentalism shows that it is wrong to proclaim that nothing is sacred in the period of modernity. The main reason for wide spread use of religion for political ends is that religion is both a source of administration as well as object of administration. Since religious symbols are very potent they are used as political instrument. Religion offers a vast institutional network with origins that are deeply rooted. Religious symbols, ideologies and moral authorities are very coercive. They can be used to legitimate or de-legitimate political outcome. They can also be used to keep some issues public and political, while others out of public eye. Sometime state may seek legitimacy through religion if other so non-coercive sources are absent. Once religion is introduced into politics it is difficult to pull it back. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, its absolute criteria clash with the politics of compromises. Secondly, it is emotionally hot. Thirdly, it is accompanied by its own experts who are difficult to control.

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<sup>14</sup> J.D. Hunter: "Religious Elites in Advanced Industrial Society", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980), vol. 29, no.2, pp.360-74.

## **Crisis Theory**

To a large extent the religion fundamentalism is due to the outcome of crisis that we face in the twentieth century. The outcome of modernization project has been very disappointing. The nation-state was initially a European institutions formulated in the early nineteenth century. In this context Giddens argues that "From the state system that was once the peculiarity of Europe there has developed a system of nation-states covering the globe in a network of national communities..... tribal societies have been either destroyed or absorbed in larger social entities."<sup>15</sup> The most important changes in the world order in modern times had been global consolidation of industrial capitalism and the global ascendancy of the nation-state.<sup>16</sup> The modern institutions have failed to take deep root in the Third world countries. Also the benefits of modernization has been unevenly distributed over social spectrum. It is the elites who have benefited most from modernization.

In Third world countries modernity emerged due to colonial rule. The main concern of colonial rule was to exploit the colonies to get raw materials for the industries in their countries. This led to deformed socio-economic development. The world countries inherited this legacy when they became independent. Due to this Third world countries found it very difficult to achieve higher level of developments.

The Third world's countries tried to modernize through the emulation of either Western capitalisms or Soviet and Chinese socialism. But instead of achieving economic prosperity, autonomy and self sufficiency this blind emulation had to more economic dependency upon the capitalist world.

Socio-Economic Crisis is also the result of demographic changes. Population and development are related through a complex network of

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<sup>15</sup> Antony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, (University of California Press, Berkeley), p.255.

<sup>16</sup> Anthony Giddens, *Consequence of Modernity*, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1980), pp.

linkages. In most of developing countries urban population growth outpaces social and economic development. Due to this heavy financial burden is imposed on government for providing education, health facilities, houses, transport and public utilities. Consequently it may promote unemployment problems and other social disturbances. It is the unemployed youths who are easily carried away by fundamentalist ideology. Thus drastic rise in population and socio-economic crisis is the main cause for the rise of fundamentalism. In the Third world countries there has been drastic increase in the population. For example since 1950 there has been a three-fold increase in the population of West Asia and North Africa. About 53 percent of the total population in west Asian and North African countries or in urban areas.<sup>17</sup>

Also, there are many economy, related problem that Third world countries suffer from like underdeveloped infrastructure, population growth, budget deficiency, poverty, badly maintained food supply, environmental degradation, structural problems related with inadequate material supplies etc. Due to their weak economic system and weak state structure developing countries are very vulnerable to the development at the international level. This dependency is magnified in case of those countries which export limited number of export goods. Consequently the fluctuation at the international level can have major impact on this countries. The position of the Third world countries is further complicated due to trade barriers which cut their access to world market.

In case of Middle East and North African countries the picture become more complicated. Paradoxically oil boom during 1980s has

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<sup>17</sup> Prakash C. Jain, "The Changing Demographic Profile of West Asian and North African Countries," in Grijesh Pant (ed.), *The Political Economy of West Asia: Demographic, Democracy and Economic Reforms*, (Manak Publication, 1994), pp.12-26.

induced structural imbalances in old producing countries.<sup>18</sup> Moreover the oil producing countries have rentier economy, which creates problems since the capital growth is not based on productive industrialization. Oil boom of 1970s, led to burgeoning public sector and increasing disparities in wealth. Basically it was the service sector the witnessed the growth. Due to this industrial growth and agricultural lagged for behind. In 1985 due to fall in oil producing countries revenue was drastically reduced.

Moreover, due to privatization the economic disparities have widen. Simultaneous the government commitment to basic service had decreased. Huntington argues that economic growth itself is an double edged sword.<sup>19</sup> He points out that when poor countries pass through economic take off stage and rapid economic growth the political discord may increase. This basically is due to lack of institutions designed to structure the social and economic development. Consequently turbulent development takes place within society related to new demands, urbanization etc. Thus in contrast to industrialized countries, the economic development in the Third world countries, a period of rapid economic growth may destabilized the political situation in the poor countries.

The harsh socio-economic realities has been one of the factor for emergence of fundamentalism. It is particularly disillusioned young men caught between an uncertain future and the lure of past, who constitute a chief recruitment pool for the Islamic fundamentalism. Not only the impoverished masses but also educated men of middle and lower middle class have joined fundamentalist movement.

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<sup>18</sup> Mahmud A. Faksh: *The Future of Islam in the Middle East*, (Praeger, London, 1997), p.28.

<sup>19</sup> Luc van de Gook, Kumar Rupesingme and Paul Scarone: Introduction to the themes, in Luc van de Gook, Kumar Rupesingme and Paul Scarone (eds.), *Between Development and Destruction: An Inquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post Colonial States*, (Marten Press, New York 1996), pp. 1-34.

## **Legitimacy and Identity Crisis**

The emergence of fundamentalism is also, partly due to legitimacy and identity crisis. In case of Third world countries although the independence was the outcome of collective good but, it soon proved to be the case where elites and section of privileged groups succeeded to the power position after the colonial rule. After independence there was intense power struggle among various political factions, interest groups and within groups. The demands put by the various ethnic groups and interest groups were perceived as threat to the unity of the country.

Most of the Third World countries are characterized by authoritarianism and a facing crisis of legitimacy. It should be noted that crisis of legitimacy has not been brought on by religious fundamentalism. It is rather the other way around. The crisis of legitimacy is due to the inclusive effects of modernization. The institution of nations which Third World Countries inherited as legacy from colonial rule, rather than promoting socio-economic development has given rise to socio-economic and cultural crisis.

In the late modern period there is identity crisis. In the traditional society the identity formation took place in a stable background. The highly differentiated and complex modern society is unable to provide forms of membership and identification to meet individuals need for communicated interaction and recognition.

In case of Arab countries where fundamentalist movements are strong identity formation is much more complicated due to historical reasons. Till the nineteenth century Islam remained the basis of new identity formation. In the Arab world strong ethnicity. The new identity was formed on the basis of nationality. Identity crisis is basically due to disagreement regarding the nature of national entity itself. Arabs themselves ask – who are we? Muslims? Ottomans? Arabs? Thus we find Arabs are having multiple identities.

Strengthening of ethnic identity is a sort of defence reaction when the ethnic group is threatened. The crisis of legitimacy and identity had become very acute with the importation of Western and socialist ideologies by the Third world regimes to their traditional societies. The failure of modernization policies underscored the bankruptcy of the alien ideologies. Consequently the local population were forced to look for indigenous and authentic point of reference and allegiance. In the context of Islamic countries this could only mean Islamization. In the Islamic countries people felt the Islam would be the best instrument for the success. According to Abdul Sallam Yassin a Moroccan fundamentalist, "West and East have failed, the future is to Islam."<sup>20</sup> For fundamentalist Islam holds out the prospect of salvation and diminished despair. Thus it was basically the economic crisis faced by Islamic countries that provided impetus to Islamic fundamentalism. The people found refuge in Islam as a faith. They felt that secular nationalism devoid of Islam had failed to provide basic necessities of life.

### **The Resources Mobilization Theory:**

The socio-economic and political grievances linked with the process of Modernization are unable to provide comprehensive understanding of religious fundamentalism. The resource mobilization theory supplements our understanding of religious fundamentalism. The topology of resource mobilization theory was suggested by Amita Ezoini.<sup>21</sup> The theory takes into account various factors like type of resources available, organization structure etc.

The resource mobilization model has got three dimensions. Firstly, the politicization of religion is not possible without presence of opportunities that allow the group to form independent organizations. Secondly, the

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<sup>20</sup> Mohmud Faksh, n.9.

<sup>21</sup> Amita Ezoini, *The Active Society*, (Free Press, London, 1968).

emergence of fundamentalism is linked with number of other factors like variety of resources including communication network, political leadership, organization structure, man power for recruitment proposes, funds and ideology. Thirdly the fundamentalist groups can not be expected to activate without the presence of incentives, resources and motivates that motivates them to be active. The main factor affecting the fundamentalist movement is the element of opportunity that depends upon presence or level of governmental tolerance towards the activity of religious groups. It should be noted that in many Islamic countries the struggle against colonial rule was based to a certain extent on religious ideology. For example, Salafiyya played an active role in Algeria. In many Islamic countries the government tried to achieve legitimacy by using religious symbols. Thus is many part of Third world both the support of the government and secular elite aided the political revitalization of religion. This provided an impetus to the opposition to use religion in order to defend itself against the incumbent regimes. By 1970s and 1980s religion has become the only vehicles for the articulation of the popular grievances.

Also, in the Muslim world the international effect of the Iranian revolution partially transcended the Shitte-Sunni division. Iranian revolution motivated many Muslim people all over the world. It showed the possibility of emergence of Islamic state. The success of any social movement depends to a large extent upon on the possession of certain assets and resources by the cadres. The exposure of religious group to advanced education, sophisticated communication network, and improved quality of life have increased their capacity to the politically active.

Mosques are the most common sites for mass demonstration, strikes and other form of political activity. Mosques are important sites for mobilization since they provide a vehicles for face-to-face communication and interaction in mass assembly. To gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people Islamic organization provide social service and communicate works.

According to Louis Cantori, in the area of Cairo and Alexandria, there are about 9000 Charitable Islamic organization providing welfare service jobs, and education.<sup>22</sup> In the context of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Kepel observes that, “for their monopolistic claim on the transcendental orders, the Islamists implicitly criticized the established the order and device action that aim to transfer and overturn it.”<sup>23</sup> By playing active role in social service sector Islamists try to outdo the government. The main point worth noting is that Islamists movement in Egypt and Algeria are better organized, more efficient, and less corrupt than the government administration.

There are major linkages among the Muslim activist in the contemporary world which had influence the fundamentalist movement in various other countries. The linkages patterns involves large number of militant groups and governments for example Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, the Iranians Mujahidin, the Mujahideen organization in Kashmir etc. These organization are supported by state as well as individuals.

Islamic Banks and financial institutions have emerged in many Islamic countries. The fundamentalist organization have secured for themselves regular and reliable sources of finance from these institutions. For example the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) has financed many terrorist organization. Similarly Al-Shamul Islamic Bank in Khartoum and Islamic Bank in Tirance, Albania have financially promoted fundamentalism movement.<sup>24</sup>

From the above discussions we find that Islamic fundamentalism is more a response to socio-economic crisis then a desire to build a theocracy. The fact that it has flourished since 1980s is an indication of parallel socio-economic crisis in many countries of Middle East. The hold of Islam on the

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<sup>22</sup> Muhmud Faksh, n.9.

<sup>23</sup> Najib Ghabbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World*, (Westview Press, Oxford), p.102.

<sup>24</sup> Ibrahim Warke, *Islamic Finance in the Global Economy* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000).



masses gives the Islamic movement a natural advantage over all other ideologies. Consequently the fundamentalist has been able to capture the peoples imagination and motivate them for political action. Due to the independent networks of Islamic educational, social, welfare and medical services it has succeeded in getting legitimacy in people's eyes.

## CHAPTER -2

### STATE BUILDING IN POST-INDEPENDENT ALGERIA: ISLAMIC DIMENSIONS

According to Marx, “men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”<sup>1</sup> State building in Algeria took place under circumstances transmitted from the colonial past. To understand the genesis of fundamentalist movement one must refer to the colonial time. Without studying society and culture during colonial period our understanding of Islamic fundamentalism will be inadequate. It is important to analyze highly complex and multilayered socio-economic and political reality since colonial time to present era.

Algeria is the tenth largest country in the world. The majority of the Algerian people live in the Northern part of the country, which constitute about 12% of the total land surface. The distinctive geographical features of Algeria are lengthy coastline, rugged mountain chains, vast desert area. These distinctive geographical features have created isolated pockets of self enclosed topographical and economic unit. Nearly all Algerians, all *Sunni* Muslims of the *Malikite* sect. One important component of the Algerian population is Berber, that predates Islamic conquest of North Africa. They are of different ethnic stock and have culture and social organization quite distinct to most of the Arabs. Berber culture is not uniform. One can find about several distinct sub-cultures that have little in common. The *shaiyas*, as *Kabyles* of Eastern Algeria, the *Mozabites* and the *Tuareg* nomads of the south are major groups. Out of these the *Kabyles* are the most dominant groups.

In Algeria the basis of social organization was the family and the basis of the tribal unity was family relationship. In case of Berber number of

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart*, (International Publications, New York, 1972), p.120.

families formed groups. These groups were integrated into *Jemaa*.<sup>2</sup> Number of *Jemaa* formed political unit. In case of Arabs number of families formed *douar*. Two other social organization were *tariqa* and *coffs*. *Tariqa* was basically religious organization devoted to a particular saint. *Coffs* were alliances which existed in some part of territories.

Traditional Algeria political institution were endowed with an elaborate culture apparatus. The various political tradition were characterized by well-defined myth of origin. The religious leaders, political authority, figures, chief gave meaning to mythical traditions and were thus conveyors of the values of the society. One important characteristic of pre-colonial North Africa is that it consisted of many little traditions that failed to generate a great tradition similar to those that flourished in Asia.

The structure of political organization was segmentary. The state organization was formed on the basis of multiplicity of rural tribe or lineage regional subsystems. At the national level, power structure was articulated in accordance with the principle of hierarchy. It was at the provincial level that the *loci* of power lay and central administrative system was replicated. Thus pre-colonial Algerian society was characterized by tribal segments which was socially and economically linked to other neighbouring tribes, towns and cities to a series of market network. Politically and economically they were all loosely tied.

Political organization were related to land tenure and system and mode of production. Three type of land tenure existed in Algeria. They were *milk*, *habious* and *arsh*. Though *milk* was a designated private property, it could not be brought or sold. It was bound by customary rights. The *habous* category was made up of educational and religious building, artisanal workshops and land. The *arsh* referred to collective assents of the tribemen.

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<sup>2</sup> *Jemaa* was the lowest level of Islamic State organization. It was in charge of local affairs. *Jemaa's* decision was subject to consensus.

Some scholars here called mode of production in Algeria as “feudal” or “command feudalism”. For example Rene Gallissot argues that mode of production in pre-colonial Algeria was ‘command feudalism.’<sup>3</sup> In pre-colonial Algeria there was institutionalized relationship through which some tribemen received for their allegiance land from the estate. But just on this basis it is wrong to call the mode of production as “feudal”. Amin has rightly pointed out that most of revenue of political class came from trade and piracy and not from the institutionalized relationship.<sup>4</sup>

### Colonialism

The France colonization in Algeria took place in four phases 1830-39, 1840-72, 1873-1919 and 1920-54. Each colonial phase corresponded to definite stage in the ongoing colonial state formation. The first stage was characterized by the colonization of urban and hinterland. The second stage was characterized by the colonial expansion to the fertile agriculture plains of the northern Algeria. Due to the introduction of cash crops in Algeria, the rural community was completely marginalized. Two-third of the arable land was owned by the Europeans and the entire vine production, the basis of Algerian economy was controlled by them.<sup>5</sup>

French not only employed violent methods but passed various laws which changed the socio-economic structure of Algeria. In 1843, a law was passed dividing the communally held land (*arsh*) and personalized holding. By 1871 the French had opted for a civil regime and the policy of “assimilation”. The French ideology could not conceive of no other civilization than a European one. They wanted that native of Algeria became true Frenchmen in the cultural sense. In 1871 decree was passed which

<sup>3</sup> R. Gallissot: “Pre-Colonial Algeria”, *Economic and Society*, (London), vol. 14, 1975, pp.

<sup>4</sup> Samir Amin: *The Arab Nation*, (Zed Press, London, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> S.M. Imamuddin, *A Modern History of Middle East and North Africa*, (Najamasons, Dacca, 1968) p.306.

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accorded French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria with the view of increasing the proportion of the French colonist.<sup>6</sup> In 1873 Warnier law was passed which nullified the traditional land tenure system. French laws were applied for land transactions. In some cases French used the Islamic doctrine to pass new laws. For example in 1919 Code Morand was implemented, which enabled the Muslim woman to marry non-Muslim man. Moreover, it also nullified disinheritance on the basis of different religious affiliation of spouse as well as apostasy.<sup>7</sup> The code was formulated by using doctrine of *takhyyur*, which is an interpretive tool in Islamic law. French language was imposed as the official language and the language of instruction in schools. Arabic was reduced to a foreign status. The most extreme form of “mission to civilize” occurred when the French shut down most of the Mosques and *Madrasas*. Many Mosques were converted to church.<sup>8</sup> Moreover French passed a law, which made it possible for Algerian to accept French citizenship if they were able to relinquish the Islamic status.<sup>9</sup> French policy of assimilation was bound to fail because social and cultural change cannot be forced. Hierarchical administrative network which French grouped were not always successful to displace pre-existing institutions.

The played crucial role in restructuring social relations. To maintain administrative efficiency and social control, local communities were designated as primary units of social life. Thus balkanizing traditional network. Also, in Algeria there emerged a new horizontal strata of elites, usually formed through the introduction of western education. To the large

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<sup>6</sup> Alal al-Fasi, *The Independence Movement in the Arab North Africa*, (Octogan, New York, 1970), pp.1-4.

<sup>7</sup> Ellen McLarney, “The Algerian Personal Statue: A French Legacy”, *Islamic Quarterly* (London, 1987), pp. 12-18.

<sup>8</sup> John L. Esposito: *Islam and Politics*, (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1984), p.74 .

<sup>9</sup> Vincent Confer, *France and Algeria: The Problems of Civil and Political Reform, 1870-1920*, (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1966).

extent this strata was able to assimilate European cultural values and occupied privileged position.

One of the main consequence of Colonial rule was the fracturing of the union of secular and religious. The urban religion was based more on legal processes in which '*ulema*' and *qadi* played key roles. While in rural area populist practices. Where prominent in which various *marabouts* or *saints* played a central role. The colonization dismantled the structure of organized Islam in urban area and created the space for populist rural based Islam. In terms of administrative practices the main consequence was shifting of the basic structure of society from forms of solidarity to more differentiated social structure. In short colonialism caused increasing differentiation, tribal erosion and rural exudes. In Durkhiemian language we can way that society was moving towards organic solidarity.

### **Emergence of Salaffiya movement and Nationalism**

The emergence of *Salaffiya* movement was the reflection of broader awakening of Arab Muslim consciousness that was emerging in the Middle East and North Africa. The main advocate of *Salaffiya* in Algeria was Ben Badis, who was founder of the Association of the Algerian Muslim Ulemma. Ideological he was influenced by *Abduh*, who was Egyptian salafiest.<sup>10</sup> The social base of the movement was urban and bourgeois. The main concern of salaffiyya movement was to deliver Islam from the polluted and corrupt innovation of the Suffis through cultural and educational revivals. Salaffiya movement introduced many cultural elements which were alien to Islam. For example the reformist in Algeria were willing to accept a defecto separation of religion and politics.<sup>11</sup> The movement tried to bring about cultural

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<sup>10</sup> Jami M. Abun-Nask, *History of the Maghrib*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), p.320.

<sup>11</sup> John Ruedy, Continuities and Discontinuities in the Algerian Confrontation with Europe, John Ruedy (eds.), *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa* (Washington, 1994).

homogenization. The main concern of Ben Badis was to create a single movement, which would unite under the banner of doctrine all theological schools and even incorporate schismatic tendencies. Salafiya movement - defined the field of religious legitimacy. It became the arbiter of "true Islam". It fixed the boundaries of religion that had not previously been possible in Algerian history. The version of *Salafiya* became established version. To a large extent reformist ideology was similar to Calvinism. Like protestant ethic it denounced the wastage of time and any conspicuous consumptions. Moreover, it stressed the importance of money and efficiency. The Salaffist established unified and organized religious sphere. They were successful in setting up the network of private schools, cultural circles, religious associations etc. Ben Badis message laid the foundation of Algerian national Muslim consciousness and identity.

During the Post-World War I period, Islamic reformism was transformed into a nationalist movement as religion and nationalism were joined together. Islamist reformists groups that were relatively small organization were linked to nationalist movement. The emergence of broad based national movement was in fact the struggle to preserve the national culture which the French were trying to destroy. Fanon had rightly pointed out that, "to fight for national culture means ... to fight for the liberation of the nation, the material Keystone which makes the building of culture possible. There is no other fight for culture which can develop apart from the popular struggle."<sup>12</sup>

Though cultural concern was the common denomination of various political organizations, they were marked by differences in their tendencies one can identify two broad tendencies. (1) Liberal assimilationist tendency and (2) Radical national tendencies. Ferhat Abbas was the chief spokesperson of

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<sup>12</sup> Robert Blackey, "Fanon and Cabral: A Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa," the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1974, p.207, pp.191-209.

assimilationist tendency. He founded Federation of Algerian Muslim. He doubted the existence of Algerian identity. He declared “Had I discovered the Algerian Nation, I would be nationalist... I would not die for the Algerian nation because it does not exist”.<sup>13</sup> In 1936, the Popular Front Government introduced Blum-Violette plan to extend French Citizenship to over 20,000 Algerian Muslim, without loss of personal status as Muslim. It aroused considerable controversy and ultimately it was circumvented. Abassi abandoned his stand after this, since he realized that assimilation was not possible.

The increasing development of semi-proletariat was the source of radical anti-colonial nationalism. Missali Ahmed Ben Hadj, who is also called father of Algerian nationalism, formed the North African Star (ENNA).. Missali's ideology was a hybrid combining nostalgic and sentimental attachment to Algeria with Muslim loyalties under a Marxist façade.”<sup>14</sup> In 1937 Missali formed Algeria (PPA). It was a mass based nationalist party that fused socialist and Islamic values. PPA was reconstituted as the movement for Triumphs of Democratic Liberation (MTLD). However, MTLD lacked coherent ideology.

In 1954 members of various organizations formed Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA). The Committee decided to take a violent course of action. Ultimately a revolt was launched by Front de Libération National (FLN) formed from (CRUA). After a lengthy war and a staggering number of casualties Algeria got independence on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1962.

### **Ben Bella Regime**

After the proclamation of independence, the Algerian National Assembly was held on September 20, 1962. The National Assembly elected

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<sup>13</sup> Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace in Algeria*, (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1977), p.40.

<sup>14</sup> John P. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, (Westview Press, Colorado, 1986), p.47.



Ben Bella as premier and empowered him to form government. He immediately formed his government with Boumedine as defense minister. In April 1963, after becoming general secretary of FLN, he engineered the passage of constitution creating a presidential regime with FLN as the sole party.

In Algeria in contrast to the situation in Europe where nationalist grew organically within the womb of feudalism, nation emerged in course of revolutionary struggle against colonial system. In case of Europe the integration and cohesion necessary for development of an nationality was supported by the growth of trade and industry. In Algeria the growth, integration and cohesion of the various social groups was achieved by anti-colonial violence. Moreover, the national solidarity created in course of the anti-colonial struggle was mainly of a political nature not based on social and economic integration and cohesion. Fanon rightly points out that decolonization achieved in this way makes possible the emergence of nation without national-worship.<sup>15</sup> In case of Algeria nation-state came prior to the development of institutional facilities encompassing both rural and urban population. This is linked to the way colonial rule eroded the foundations of the traditional society without bringing sufficient structural and occupational differentiation. On the other hand in Europe, nation-state was accompanied by a commercial, industrial and political revolution. In case of Algeria institutional infrastructure that might channel the different sectors aspirations and activities, failed to emerge.

In Algeria at the time of independence the society was far from being an undifferentiated homogenous country. The majority of the Algerians lived in the countryside as peasants. The Beber-speaking Kablyes has a strong sense of regionalism. They were particularly concerned with their distinctive minority identity. In larger towns there were small groups of

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<sup>15</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (Macmillan Press, London, 1981), p.27.

French educated elites. Also, there were other social distinctions. Thus, Algerian society was deeply divided and pluralistic.

Cultural politics is basically concerned with meaning of social practice as and moreover which group and individual have power to define these meanings. Cultural politics is also concerned with subjectivity and identity. It is the cultural politics “which decides whose culture shall be official and whose shall be subordinated? What culture shall be regarded as worthy of display and what shall be hidden? What history shall be remembered? What voices shall be heard and which shall be silenced? Who is representing whom and on what basis?”<sup>16</sup> At the time of independence the Algerian society was deeply divided. For the purpose of nation-building it was very important to forge a sense of shared purposes. The post independence elites monopolized various cultural institutions in order to promote its own version of Islamic ideology.

In Algeria Islamic ideology was linked with nearly all the policies of state. In Algeria the state had utilized all its resources to promote its Islamic ideology. At the ideological level Algerian ruling elites in immediate post-independent period, were aware of the historical role played by Islam in national movement. To claim historical legitimacy and to give support for its socialist model of development, the ruling elite appropriated Islam. To spread the message of modernization and to impose socialism, in order to promote economic development, Islam was chosen as the most appropriate medium. It was argued that Islam was compatible with modernization. Jean-Claude Vatin says that “it was on this basis technocratic orthodoxy has made itself legitimate by claiming that it alone could lead both in upholding religion and modernizing the country. The intercessor between god and religion was no longer saint, a prophet or a mufti but rather, the state

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<sup>16</sup> Glenn Jordon and Chris Weedon, *Cultural Politics: Class, Gender, Race and Post-modern World*, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1950), p.4.

apparatus.”<sup>17</sup> Commenting on how the Algerian elites utilized Islam, John Enteli’s argued that “from the perspective of revolutionary leadership Islam was not only to serve as an identity forming an instrument, but a legal code by which to order state and society. Ideologically it was one of the dominant themes in the Algerian nationalist consciousness but had no influence on political structure.”<sup>18</sup> In Algeria during post independent era religion was nationalized. The reformist religion was institutionalized. The cultural aspects of folk Islamic religion was suppressed. In fact state tried to legitimate the official Islam. The legitimization of the Islam shows the breakdown of Gellner’s theory of Pendulam. Gellner has built his theory on the basis of David Hume’s theory of religion. According to Gellner the succession of religious movement in Islam can be compared to pendulum swinging from right to left. Right ward swing indicates the emergence of ecastic and charismatic religion characterized by strong hierarchy. On the other hand left ward swing indicates the emergence of religion, characterized by scripturalism, puritanism and egalitarianism.<sup>19</sup> In Algeria pendulum comes to halt on the left. It is reformist Islam which acquires religious legitimacy.

In the post-independent era, Ben Bella took symbolic and practical measures to promote official Islam. In 1962 he banned the use of alcohol, reconverted Christian churches into mosques and replaced Christian symbol with Islamic ones.<sup>20</sup> Islam was brought under regime control by institutionalization and organization of religious activities. Religious affairs were brought under government bureaucracy. In 1964 Ben Bella nationalized private *habous*. In 1966 Supreme Islamic Council was formed

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<sup>17</sup> Jean-Claude Vatin, Revival in the Maghrib: Islam as an Alternative Political Ideology, in Alie Hillal Dessouui (ed.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, (Praeger, New York, 1982), pp.221-250.

<sup>18</sup> John P. Entelis, n.9, p.81.

<sup>19</sup> Gellner, *Muslim Society*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981).

<sup>20</sup> Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movement in North Africa*, (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997).

and its members were appointed by the state. The members were given the right to select their head.<sup>21</sup>

Following independence a Ministry of Religious Affairs was established. This Ministry was concerned with administering mosques, religious schools and *habous* property. Appointing and training religious leaders also came under its domain. According to John Entelis, “the principle objective in these multiple efforts has not been only to raise the level of national religious consciousness as a moral prerequisite for revolutionary advancement, though this remains important. The objective has always been to ensure that Islamic symbols and appeals are not confiscated by autonomous forces hostile to the current regime and its secular politics”.<sup>22</sup> Since independence the state had appointed only sub servant bureaucrats to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. A former member of Ben Badis association Tawfiq Madani was the first person to be appointed as Minister of Religious affairs. Mouland Kassim and Abdul Rehman Chibani also who played an active role for the endorsement of official Islam. The main motive of Mouland Kassim in 1970s, when he was Minister of Religious Affairs, was to enhance religious education. During his tenure he brought out two journals *Al-Asala* and *Al-Risd*. In 1976 all the Quranic schools and institutional were nationalized.<sup>23</sup>

In Algeria the state claimed high moral ground era where censorship was concerned. It introduced strict and effective forms of policing which ensured that official Islamic doctrine was strengthened. Thus folk culture and private associations based on Islamic principle were suppressed. For example in 1964, Ben Bella, dissolved the Association of Algerian Ulema, claiming that doctrine of association has been incorporated as the official religious ideology.

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<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, p.45.

<sup>22</sup> John P. Entelis, n.14, p.84.

<sup>23</sup> Jean-Claude Vatin, n.17.

In Algeria socialist policies were also linked to Islam. We have noted above that FLN leaderships were drawn from various sources. Within the FLN there were a variety of tendencies. What FLN was lacking was coherent ideology. In May 1962 Tripoli programme was formulated. The programme clearly opted for socialist path of development. From the beginning socialism was linked with Islam. Socialism was used to promote cultural values. In other words we can say that economic policy was linked to cultural policy. In fact the Tripoli programme of 1962 stressed the importance of building national culture. It was argued that there will not be any real independence without socialism and no socialism without Islam. In his Revolution Day speech on 1 November 1962, president Ben Bella said that "Algeria wanted to institute form of socialism based on Arab Islamic tradition".<sup>24</sup> In Algeria socialism was based on Islamic Ideology. In fact what was happening in Algeria was just a part of emerging trend of "Arab Socialism." Basically the term "Arab Socialism" indicates a certain feeling of equality, of solidarity and of social justice, which is common to the teaching of the Prophet and socialist convention. In Algeria at a more subtle level it was argued that "Arab socialism" is nothing more than the modern way of realizing the aims of religion. The elites of Algeria stressed the unique character of "Arab socialism". For example let us take the policy of Autogestation. During immediate post-independent period the major problems which Ben Bella had to address was pathetic economic condition of the country. To solve the economic problem he instituted the system of worker management or Autogestation. In March 1963 he passed several decrees that legalized the take over of extensive agricultural land and industrial property left by the colons. Due to strong Marxist orientation when Ben Bella was accused of turning Algeria into Communist state he argued that:

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<sup>24</sup> K.R. Singh, North Africa, in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, (Croom Helm, London, 1981), pp.55-81.

Some evil minded persons say we are propagandist for communism but we tell them that we have come with an Arab and Islamic Mission and that our motto is Arabism and Islam... we did not import our socialism from a foreign country. Socialism is the reflection of the realities of our own country and the ideal for which one and half million martyrs gave their live.<sup>25</sup>

On other occasion he said that “I will take economic analysis of Marx, but I reject his analysis of scientific materialism”.<sup>26</sup> In fact there has been no shortage of statement like this by Algerian leaders.

Ben Bella’s regime tried to consolidate its Islamic characteristic by following the policy of Arabization. We know that language is one the most important aspect of culture. It is a fundamental human mass medium. No other medium is so deeply rooted, so emotionally fraught, so insistently the basis for political aspiration or so much an impediment to the efforts of the state to use modern media for hegemonic control. A language is not a neutral medium but highly charged cultural object. In contemporary time the nation-state has increasingly played central role in turning language to use for societal integration. In the modern age nation-state began using culture to promote national integration by providing formal education. According to Gellner, “the monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence”<sup>27</sup> The state is more concerned with promoting national culture, national symbols and a national language through education. In fact education has become an institutional agency for creating national uniformity among the heterogeneous groupings in society.

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<sup>25</sup> David and Marina Ottaway, *Algeria: The Politics of the Socialist Revolution*, (University of California Press, California, 1970), p.182.

<sup>26</sup> Jean Leca, *Algerian Socialism, Nationalism, Industrialization and State Building*, in Helen Destosses and Jacques Levesque (ed.), *Socialism in the Third World*, (Praeger, New York, 1975), pp.120-160.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Schudson, *Culture and the Integration of National Societies*, in Daina Crane (ed.), *The Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspective*, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p.30, pp.21-45.

In Algeria the state had tried to promote national integration through the policy of Arabization. It should be noted that Berber or Tamzight was the language spoken throughout North Africa prior to the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century. Berber is essentially an oral language. Most of the Berbers eventually adopted Arabic as their language but still in the mountains areas of Algeria large number of people continue to speak Berber as one of the several dialects. In Algeria presently 20% of people speak Berber. The Kalyes, in the area of East of Alger are the most significant Berber speaking population.

After independence the administrative system which French has left was in French and corresponded to French method of administration. Converting the administrative system in Arabic was a monumental task. In spite of this Arabization policy was promoted. On one occasion Ben Bella said, "the place of Arabic language in the city that we are constructing must be eminent. We must reconcile our country, which has been depersonalized with its history and its past, that is to say, with itself... it is basis of Arabo-Islamic culture. Having said that I do not at all fail to recognize the importance of French language which is a factor of enrichment for us..."<sup>28</sup> The Algerian charter which was adopted in 1964 specifically emphasized the importance of Arabic by insisting (a) acceleration in the teaching of Arabic (b) reinforcement of cultural ties, in particular with the Arab world (c) increase in the sphere of studies in Arabic at the university level. On the one hand Arabic language was promoted on the other hand Berber was not even mentioned in the official language of the country.

From the above discussion, we can observe that during Ben Bella's regime the state tried to promote Arabic culture. On the other hand Berber culture was given secondary importance. The regime also tried to promote

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<sup>28</sup> Firoozeh Kashani-Sabot, "The Swinging Pendulum: Linguistic Controversy in Post-colonial Algeria," in *Middle Eastern Studies*, (London), vol. 32, no.4, 1996, pp.264-280.

the myth of unity. By promoting myth of unity the regime tried to set a over anchoring symbols, beliefs and modes of thought with a recognizable patterns to call forth integration at the level of societal action. The regime frequently made claims regarding national symbol sharing, ancient heritage and ethnic unity. By doing so the regime provide substantial psychological base for a sense of membership. The regime made revolution itself the icon to be worshipped. Nearly one million martyrs, who have been killed were accorded glory. It was important for regime to provide myth of unity because regime itself was a extremely fragile coalition. To a large extent Ben Bella succeeded in dividing his rivals, wooing some to this side and capturing others. For example Boudiaf, Khidr and Belkacen Krim were sent to the exile. Ait Ahmed was formally expelled from FLN. In spite of this Boumediene succeeded in ousting Ben Bella in a bloodless coup. The army coup hardly produce any ripple in Algerian society.

### **Boumediene Regime**

After coming to power Boumediene perfected the authoritarian rule. First of all Boumediene consolidated his power. He downgraded FLN importance. He strengthened the Military Security Organization, which became the centerpiece of the system control. The Ministry of Defense and Presidency were kept by himself. He further consolidated his power by shuttering aside many of Ben Bella's cronies and bringing about his own clan at Oujda town to which he had closed affiliation.

On the tenth anniversary of seizing power, Boumediene announced that a new National Charter would be formulated to be followed by new constitution. The most important point to be noted was that the national charter as formulated after a healthy public debate regarding its nature. The charter was finally adopted after referendum.

Boumediene's socialism was strongly technocratic. The main intention of regime was to built a strong industrial base, promote rapid



development and to maintain a viable safety net to keep ordinary people satisfied.

The cultural revolution that Boumediene implemented had three fold objectives. They were (a) to assert and consolidate Algerian national identity and promote all forms of cultural development; (b) to continuously raise the level of education and technical skills (c) to adopt a way of the life which is in harmony with the principles of socialist revolution. Boumediene's cultural revolution was linked his to economic policies. On 4<sup>th</sup> July 1971 he said that, "the Cultural Revolution is the continuation of our all embracing revolution built upon the three pillar of the industrial, agrarian and culture revolution."<sup>29</sup> He feel that Algerian socialism is not based upon any materialist metaphysics and is not linked to any dogmatic conception which is foreign to the spirit of nation. For him building of socialism was inseparable from the Islamic values. On one occasion he said that "we need a socialist party with definite program and a unified line.... we are socialist and Muslims and we are not Marxist".<sup>30</sup> During Boumediene's regime no doubt Islam remained the religion of the state but it was not the source of all legislation. In practice it was much more like socialist country. One important point to be noted is that Algerian socialism was much different from socialism in the communist world. In Algeria regime still represented the people as a whole and not the revolutionary working class.

During Boumediene's regime the policy of control of religion was further enforced. The state kept a tight run on Islamic spaces – places of worship, religious education and religious foundations. The state, supported by the military and security apparatus, built and operated comprehensive network. Though Boumediene was much more oriented towards socialist-Marxist ideology, he promoted cultural revolutions. On the occasion of

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<sup>29</sup> Sid Ahimeed Baghi, *Aspects of Algerian Cultural Policy*, (UNESCO Pub., 1998), p.18.

<sup>30</sup> Crewford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, (Yale University Press, London, 1982), p.270.

organization of the Islamic conference in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1974 he said, “Human experience in many religions of the world had confirmed that spiritual links, whether Islamic or Christian is not been able to withstand the pained strokes of poverty and ignorance.. A hungry people does not need Quaranic verses... Hungry People need food, the ignorant knowledge and the seek medicine”.<sup>31</sup> Like Ben Badis, Boumediene banned the activities of al-Qiyam Association. Its periodical *Humanist Muslaman* was outlawed in 1970. Since then all the religious publication are brought out by the ministry of Religious Affairs. For example ministry published two journals Al-A Sala and Al-Risd. The religious scholars, who were considered to the critical were deported or put under house arrest. For example, Shaykha Misbati al Huwaiziq was sent to exile.<sup>32</sup>

Boumediene also introduced Muslim week end (Friday) and outlawed gambling. He also reduced the Ministry of Religious Affairs to a subsection of the Presidency. The decision to attach Ministry to Presidency reduced the official Islam to “the cult of the will of government”.<sup>33</sup>

Like Ben Bella, Boumediene, also felt reinforcement of Arabization project of paramount importance. He argued that “Arabization is not only a national and revolutionary necessity . It is also goal that the revolution must reach whatever its cost”.<sup>34</sup> Boumediene felt that not only the state but also mosque have important role to play. He argued that Arabization cannot be realized with the sole support of the state. Other efforts must be put forth... the Mosque have at their disposal elites, who can educate and teach Arabic to adults.”<sup>35</sup>

The process of Arabization encountered many hurdles. The first problem was that there were insufficient Arabic instructors for

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<sup>31</sup> n.20, p.47.

<sup>32</sup> Faksh:, p.67.

<sup>33</sup> Huge Robert, “Radical Islamism and Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled Ariens of Algiers, *Third World Quarterly*, (London), April, 1988.

<sup>34</sup> Kashans – Sabet, n.88, p.209.

<sup>35</sup> ibid.

thoroughgoing Arabization. In fact Algeria was very much dependent on French Nationals especially for technical education. Talib Ibrahimi, who was Minister for Education for 1961-1973 proposed bilingualism as the solution. He argued that

“Bilingualism as we understand is not a doctrine but a stage. We are against a certain static conception of bilingualism that wants Arabic to be masses and French the language of culture and elites. For us Arabic must assume a larger and larger place in our teaching and in our life, it is in vain to made has to, it is equally dangerous to temporarize too much.”<sup>36</sup>

Revival of Arabic language was linked with Algerian culture. Talib Ibrahimi argued that before the colonial rule there was authentically national culture in Algeria. The colonial rule “killed Algerian culture after having made people incapable of searching the image of their past, after having extinguished in Algerian his consciousness of its values, it ‘taught’ him (at French school) a new mode of thinking, feeling and acting”.<sup>37</sup>

But significant number of people felt that Arabic is not competent to cope with the demands of industrial and scientific civilization. The Algerian weekly organization of FLN, *EL Moudawjabid* also commented upon the more functional nature of French. One of the most important factor to be noted is that language and ideology behind Arabism had remained quite foreign to the majority of Algerians. The main issue is that Arabic, which the state is propagating is quite different from the colloquial Algerian Arabic. The state imposed standard Arabic has negates the cultural pluralism of the near East.

To pursue its policy of Arabization the state has affectively used the communication system. According to Gramsci’s theory of ideological hegemony, the ruling elites manipulate to “perpetuate their power, wealth

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<sup>36</sup>        *ibid.*; p.270

<sup>37</sup>        *ibid.*

and status (by popularizing) their own philosophy, culture and morality”.<sup>38</sup> The state had used media industries to produce and reproduce the context, inflections and tones of ideas favourable to it. Through mass media, the key socialization institution, the states point of view are constantly casted in the public arena . According to Nordenstreng, mass media uniquely “introduce elements into individual consciousness that would not otherwise appears there but will not be rejected by consciousness because commonly stand in the cultural community.”<sup>39</sup> In Algeria communication system was essentially an instrument of indoctrination, and not a means by which knowledge and information is freely circulated among various segments of society. The government owned all formal means of communication. The media was considered as an instrument to promote Arabization policy.

Other than Arabization policy Boumediene’s Islamic policy is reflected in the politics of Family Code Bill. In traditional society Algerian society a women had an inferior status. She was firmly under the authority of men. In spite of this women took part in freedom struggle. But after independence state hardly passed any legislation for their emancipation. During Boumediene period there was even a certain step backward in relation to the preceding era. Boumediene felt that the right of the women were accomplished through participating in war, implying that there was no need for the state to actively pursue the establishment of such right. In fact, in National Charter of 1970s, it was argued that “National Union Algerian women (UNFA) must adopt its activity to specific problems posed by integration of women in the modern life. It must realize that the emancipation does not meant the abandonment of the ethical code deeply held by the people.”<sup>40</sup> Thus it was felt that women should be emancipated

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<sup>38</sup> James Lull, *Media, Communication and culture: A Global Approach*, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995), p.32.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Juliette Mince: *Woman in Algeria*, in Lois Beck and Nikki Keddi (ed.), *Woman in Muslim World*, (Harvard University Press, London), 1975, p.169.

without abounding the ethical code, which is overwhelmingly traditionalist with regard to women and deeply help by the people.

Thus Boumediene's a special brand of Islamic socialism promoted conservative forces. Mchorney argues that, "The FLN's war time call for the "deconololization of the code" metamorphosed under Boumediene, becoming a project to purify the structure of the family, of its non-Islamic elements.<sup>41</sup> During Boumediene period deconolization became Islamization. Despite widespread protest Boumediene was instant on Islamic family code.

The State had also tried to maintain its hegemony by strictly controlling artistic and literary talent. Since the official ideology was pervasively Arabic-Islamic, religiously oriented scholars enjoyed importance, not as independents scholars however, but rather as officially approved religious "bureaucrats". Those writers and artistic who were willing to comprise their talent could easily find employment. These scholars were asked to romanticize the heroic past and the ubiquitous independence fighter, folk hero in stories, poems, film-scripts. Thus the state used artistic and literary talents to promotes its ideology. For example even scholars like Mustefa Hacheref who were concern about rediscovering the cultural roots of Algerian identity, debating about the merit and difficulties of bilingual education, assessing the validity of European pedagogical.<sup>42</sup> This had two implications. Firstly, this has lead to ideological clinches and human stereotypes and secondly in place of true analytical descriptions of social and economic progress, this had led to sterile and idealized treatment of revolution. The main intention of regime was to utilize artistic and literary talent to serve the bureaucratic – propagandistic ends rather than allow it as creative force for social change. Thus we find

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<sup>41</sup> Ellen Mc Larney, n.6.

<sup>42</sup> John P. Entelis, "Elite Political Cultural and Socialization in Algeria: Tension and Discontinuities", *The Middle East Journal*, (Washington), vol. 35, no.2, 1981, pp.191-208.

that religious bureaucrat as well as intellectual were co-opted by the regime promote its Islamic ideology.

One of the most striking fact encounter in the above discussion is the lack of autonomy and the a general weakness of civil society in Algeria when compared with the enormous strength, extension and importance of state. In Algeria the state had subordinated and instrumentalized the rest of the civil society to a very larger extent. This is particularly true of the cultural institutions which are highly dependent on the state. This lack of autonomy of cultural institutions and extraordinary importance of the state in their running and organization had led cultural monopolization. Edward Shills has rightly pointed out that a society has dynamic cultural centre capable of influencing rest of the society. The centre is “the centre of order of symbols, of values and beliefs that govern the society”.<sup>43</sup> The centre is characterized by sacredness and is equally a “structure of activities of rules and person” in which believes are embodied. On the other hand according to Gramsci’s the “Centre” is not so much as set of commonly taken values having sacredness but is a home of a dominant class that promotes a worldview to the population a large that serves its own interest.<sup>44</sup>

Though Boumediene and Ben Bella used Islam to legitimate their rule, the prime question is to what extent can we say that Algeria was an Islamic state? It should be noted that Algerian revolution was not an Islamic revolution led by *Ulema*. It was a national revolution, in Algeria Islam as a cultural and religious factor, and the *Ulema*, as an influential group of Algerians, played a major role in revolution. But this is still a far cry from the Islamic revolution carried through in Iran under the leadership of Ayatolla Khomeini. The Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran was carried out in the name of Islam by Islam and for the Islam. While the Algerian revolution was carried out by FLN in the name of Algerian nation and the

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<sup>43</sup> Michael Schudson, n.27.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid*, p.26.

Algerian People. The implication of this is that one can observe two different, albeit concurrent, tendencies in Algerian constitutional declaration. The two tendencies are secular tendency and Islamic tendency.

The secular tendency is solemnly proclaimed in Article-I of the constitution, which declares that “Algeria is a popular and democratic republic.” Similarly National Charter also states that Algeria is a socialist nation. The secular character of the Algerian state is further consolidated due to principle of equality for all citizens before the law and equal justice for all. Although the Article-107 specifies that president must be of Muslim confession, there is no distinction in law among citizens of different religion.

According to the Charter and Constitution (Article 2). “Islam is the religion of the state,” because “the Algerian people are Muslim.” Thus the seat of authority is not occupied by Islam, but by the Algerian people. The implication of this is that Islam is integral to the system but it is not itself integrating force. It should also be noted that the most distinguishing characteristic of an Islamic state is that state should be governed in accordance with the Islamic law, the *Sharia*. This implies that judicial aspect of the state should be preeminent over both the executive and legislative. In other words we can say that in the Islamic state function and authority of the executive and legislature are subordinate to those of the judiciary. Since the genesis of *Sharia* is divine revelation it is impossible to modify it. Its application may involve interpretation in particular cases but certainly not legislations in innovation way. The *Khalifa* (ruler) of the Islamic state is legitimate so far as he ensures the application of the *Sharia*. Thus the way *Khalifa* should perform are laid in advance.

In case of Algeria the states is not governed in accordance to the *Sharia*. In fact the structure of Algerian state is different from that of which we have discussed above. The executive is the dominant branch of the state. Moreover, the judiciary does not posses substantial autonomy in relation to the executive. In Algeria the religious sphere is controlled by the political

sphere. In Algeria the state has converted the *Ulema* as salaried official. Consequently it has monopolized the religious sphere to gain legitimacy. From the above discussion it is very difficult to call Algeria as Islamic state in the true sense of word. What Ben Bella and Boumediene did was that they selectively applied Islamic principles for getting legitimacy. Both of them used Islamic culture for societal integration. They self consciously used language policy, formal education, collective rituals and mass media to integrate citizens and ensure their loyalty. It is one of the most common tenant of sociology that societies can be integrated through common symbols, culture and mass media. The state-building elite have self consciously used culture as an instrument of national integration. The importance of culture for state building especially in the post-colonial state has been pointed out by the Fanon. He argues that in the post colonial Algeria the role of culture was essentially to transform the political system and artifacts left behind by the colonizer.<sup>45</sup> According to Fanon this was partly due to the fact that for the state to exist autonomously it was imperative to build it on a cultural basis. For Fanon there was dialectical relation between material base and culture. In Algeria though the regimes have used various symbols and cultural elements for societal integration they failed to build a strong cohesive centre. This was partly due to the facts that common culture is neither a sole condition for a sufficient condition of integration.

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<sup>45</sup> F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York), 1963.



## CHAPTER – 3

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CRISIS

Many Third World countries like Algeria and former colonies seeking to catch up with industrial capitalist countries follow a development path which entails a crucial role for the state and public ownership, yet which fosters institutions such as pursuit of profit and hierarchical social relations that are typical of other, more obviously capitalist societies. State capitalism is the social formation that promotes the growth of capitalist mode of production.

There is much difference between two bourgeoisie class of colonial country and the bourgeoisie of the advance capitalist countries. Firstly, the formation of the nation state in Third World countries was not due to the rise of an independent bourgeoisie class. Secondly nascent, but weak bourgeoisie class which emerged in Third World lacked the ability to compete effectively. Capitalism in the form of colonialism failed to perform the task which it had performed in Europe. This was obvious since the metropolitan capitalist at the imperialist stage, had no intention of allowing rivals to arise in dependencies. In many Third world countries it was this weak national bourgeoisie which took charge of the state after independence. Since it was weak relative to the bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist country, due to lack of capital and also, since it had to contend with other class forces that oppose it domestically. This bourgeois uses the states monopoly on political power and economic resources to promote a state capitalist development programme.

To develop the forces of production is the historic mission of capitalism. But capitalist development is fraught with the contradictions of inequality, unemployment, and economic and social insecurity. Contrary to the view of Dependence Theory state capitalism abets this process and

objectively moves a society at a more rapid pace than colonial capitalism did toward the conditions in which socialist mode of production becomes viable alternation.

In case of Algeria Socialism did not appear with any precision in the FLN platform until 1962, in the Tripoli programme. There were various factors responsible for the late emergence and socialist doctrines in Algeria. To understand this one will have to examine the Algerian social structure at the end of the colonial period.

In 1954 the urban population consisted 12 percent of the total population out of which only 2 percent was bourgeoisie. Since industrial and commercial capitalism was non-existing this bourgeoisie was landowning bourgeoisie. The middle classes consisted 4.31 percent of the total population. Out of them 0.5 percent were salaried workers and 3.8 percent were middle tradesmen and artisans. The working class was not homogeneous. The working class was made up of 5 percent of farm laborers and skilled industrial workers, 12 percent of unskilled urban workers, and 14.5 percent of the agricultural day laborers. It was farmers who constituted clear majority. In fact farmers constituted 62 percent.<sup>1</sup> From the above data we can note that although social inequality was striking, any class struggle inside the Algerian society was almost impossible. This was due to the fact that wage earners were the exception. Thus a common "class consciousness" actually never emerged in Algeria. In such case socialism could not mean "triumph of a class over another," "the native bourgeoisie were economically weak and hence could not oppose socialism. Moreover, at the time of independence Algeria faced severe socio-economic problems which only the state was capable of coping with.

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<sup>1</sup> Jean Leca; Algerian Socialism; Nationalism, Industrialization and State Building, in Helen Destosses Jacques Levosque (eds.), *Socialism in the Third World*, (Paeger, New York, 1975), pp.120-60.

## **Ben Bella's Regime**

The Algerian strategy of socio-economic and political development was based, on theory advanced by J.Paelyscks, F. Perroux, and Destane de Barnis.<sup>2</sup> This model ultimately aimed that reaching a certain level of economic growth in a relatively short period of time. According to the proponents of this theory a substantial depending of the domestic market is related to an encourage in GNP. The implication is that labour productivity must be greatly increased. This in turn, can only be accomplished with the help of sophiscated technology. But the main hindrance for inform is the agrarian bourgeois since, they take great advantage of the 'existing system of share cropping. Moreover, the small and landless peasants due to their conservative mentalities are reluctant to bring about the "technical revolution". The major implications is that authoritarianism is inevitable to overcome social and cultural constraints. In this model capital accumulation and heavy industries is given top priority as opposed to the development of agriculture industries which is subordinated to the "industrializing industries" . From the political prospective this set of priorities is justified since, oil revenues has to become an effective source of accumulation in order to built a solid industrial base.

The Ben Bella government gave top priority to the agriculture sector. Thus 50 percent of the total expenditure of the budget in the fiscal year 1963 was earmarked for agriculture.<sup>3</sup>

During Ben Bella government the economic situations deteriorated. His regime witnessed an average annual growth rate of 7.5 percent. The marginal rise of 7.5 percent was basically due to inconsistencies in the socialist policy followed by government. The decline in economic production was also accompanied by an unprecedented loss of capital. By

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<sup>2</sup> Rachid Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria*, (Westview Prerss, London, 1986).

<sup>3</sup> Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.99

1965 about A.D. (Algerian Dinar) 4-5 billion was exported out of country. As a result of this total investment in the country declined from A.D. 3-9 billion in 1962 to A.D. 1.79 billion in 1963 AD 1.30 billion in 1964 and A.D. 1.10 billion in 1965.<sup>4</sup>

First, the socialist programme formulated was very vague. Second, the favouring of the primary sector goes against the theory as well as the established pattern that the construction of socialist society requires a vigorous industrial development. Third, the government resorted to measures that were senseless politically, economically and socially. For example, in March 1963 cinemas, hotels, cafes and restaurants were suddenly nationalized while multinational companies and subsidiaries of French 'metropolitan' firms continued to operate freely in country. Due to this small Algerian traders and entrepreneurs were discouraged not only from supporting the regime, but also from investing. Also, the Ministry of Finance promulgated a new *customs and tariffs* code which was implemented from November 1963, brought about existence of a parallel black markets in foreign currency. Due to this prices of imported goods went up very sharply, providing galloping inflation. Fourth, due to serious financial deficits the private industrial units were shutting down. Fifth, the country lacked the capital, skilled and experienced manpower, technology and social stability. Sixth, agriculture sector which was inherited from French was characterized by 'dual' structure: a traditional sector which produced subsistence crops and modern sector which specialized in production of wine. Seventh, the institutional framework set up on paper was extremely contained genesis of potential conflicts between various sectors of economy.

The March Decree of 1963, contained contradictory elements. The role of Workers Councils and the Assembly overlapped very much. Moreover, the Decrees failed to spell out the role of the government agency

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<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

in charge of socialist sectors. The functioning of the self-managed enterprises was largely curtailed since they had no representation in government agencies. The most serious blow to self management came by setting up of the Office National de la Reforme Agraire (ONIRA) which came under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.<sup>5</sup> Ali Mahasas, who was the first director of ONIRA left no stone unturned to deprive autonomy of self-management. Also many time contradictory's Decrees were passed. For example on April 18, Ben Bella passed another Decree, which prohibited the farmers to use private channels for marketing. They were obliged to use state run, Societes Agrikoles de pre voyance (SAP).<sup>6</sup> This was contrary to the March decree which gave the management committee the right to chooses the channel for marketing of the produce. Thus, self management was largely myth.

### **Boumediene Regime**

Boumediene after coming to power restructured political institutions such as National Assembly, the Political Bureau and Central Committee of FLN party. Under the New Regime FLN party was relegated to secondary position and the armed forces came to constitute the backbone of the Boumediene regime. The regime tried to built up highly centralized state of pyramidal type. Under the regime the gradual formation of a comprehensive policy of development for all sectors, but geared primarily to industrialization took place.

Ben Bella had experimented with volunteerism, with workers self management and with the collectivization of agriculture. Boumediene was less convinced about the spontaneity of masses. Instead, he wanted the state to play role by controlling the economy from top to down. He believed that state planning was the most efficient means of running economy. According

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<sup>5</sup> David and Marina Ottoway, *Algeria : The Politics of a Socialist Revolutions*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970), p.62.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

to him one of the most important aspect of state planning was that it could properly utilize scarce funds. During his regime the state tried to implement “import-substitution” model. It was believed that the state would ensure that high level of investment are made and excessive accommodation of private wealth would be prevented, which in turn would promote an egalitarian ethos.

The strategy adopted by Boumediene government was that of unbalanced sectoral growth. In this strategy prime importance is given to the installation of basic industries like steel machinery, metal construction, chemical, petrochemical, construction, etc. It was felt that multiplier effect of such strategy would stimulate forward as well as backward links promoting the development of various branches and sectors providing iron goods, equipment and services to the iron and steel complex, whose output would in turn furnish the raw materials and semi finished products needed for variety of industries.

Thus trends towards state capitalism was substantially reinforced by Boumediene and the Oujda group.<sup>7</sup> Thus the most active function within the petty bourgeoisie was able consolidate their power. The new regime firstly sought to encourage private investment and promote private sector to participate in the construction of nation building. To promote private investment new code was formulated in 1966, which gave certain concessions and guarantees.

The state also tried to curtail the dominance of foreign enterprises. Number of foreign enterprises were nationalized and their activities were placed under states domains. For example, in 1966 and 1967 and Foreign banks and insurance companies were nationalized. In May-June 1968, 45 subsidiaries of foreign manufacturing companies were nationalized. This

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<sup>7</sup> This is the group of politicians so called because of their wartime role as staff officers at the Morocco Headquarters of the “Army Frontiers at the Oujda, namely, Cherif Belkauss, Ahmed Medeghri, Abdul Lazz Boutaflika, Raid Ahmed and Mohammed Tayebi Larbi.

process of nationalization culminated in the decision by the Boumediene government to declare unilaterally 51 percent participation in two major oil producing companies.<sup>8</sup> Also, the control over oil and gas production and over national distribution systems was sought by promoting, the state oil company, SONATARACH. Thus by 1970s all key sectors of the Algerian economy were bought under state's control. Paradoxically although the ownership was vested in state, these companies had considerable autonomy since they were governed by private commercial law.<sup>9</sup>

For the dynamic growth of economy various plans were formulated: the pre-plan (1967-78) and the First Four Year Plan (1970-73) and the second Four Year Plan (1974-77) and Third Four Year Plan was introduced the period of 1980-84. Due to rise in oil prices in 1974 the long term development strategy was accelerated and there large increase in investment during the 1974-1977. **Table 1** shows the planned and actual investment for the decade 1967-1977. Similarly rate of growth of GDP by sector for the period of 1967-78 is given in **Table 2**.

**Table 1: Rate of Growth of GDP by Sector 1967-78**

Sectors	1967-73	1973-77	1977-78
	%	%	%
Hydrocarbons	6.9	1.5	9.3
Industry (excluding hydrocarbons)	9.7	7.5	20.8
Agriculture	1.2	2.3	9.8
Others	8.2	8.0	3.8
Total	7.5	6.6	8.2

Source: Richard Lawless: Algeria: the contradictions of Rapid Industrialization, p.165.

**Table 2: Planned and Actual Investment 1967-77**

	1967-1969		1970-1973		1974-1977	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Hydrocarbons	41.9	50.9	36.9	47.1	40.6	48.6

<sup>8</sup> Richard Lawless, Algeria The Contradictions of Rapid Industrialization, in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay (eds.), *North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development*, (Croom Helm, London, 1984), p.150-3.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid*, p.161.

Capital and intermediate goods	47.0	40.6	48.9	46.2	47.6	44.5
Consumer goods	11.1	8.5	14.2	6.7	11.8	6.9
Total industry	48.7	55.3	44.7	57	43.6	62.0
Agriculture	16.9	16.4	14.9	13	13.2	4.7
Infrastructure	34.4	28.3	40.4	30	43.2	33.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100.

Source : Richard Lawless: Algeria: the Contradictions of Rapid Industrialization, p.165.

During Boumediene regime the priority given to industrial investment since 1968 promoted disparities between the development of industry and that of other sectors of the economy. There was insufficient investment in agriculture, housing, health and education which resulted in acute shortage of housing and community facilities. From the table 2 one can note the decreasing investment in agriculture. Also, the rapid import of agricultural products deprived other sectors of resources that could have been used for their development. These inter sectorial imbalances emerged as one of the most serious obstacles to economic growth. After 1974 due to drastic increase in oil revenue this problems become more serious. The rapid rise in the level of investment in the industrial sector was unable to guarantees on equally rapid realization of planned industrial capacity. There was usually long delay and escalating costs which proved counter productive. The delay in implementing plans and escalating costs high jacked projects..

The industrial sector as a whole suffered from shortage of managerial technical and skilled workers. Consequently Algeria had to recruit foreign manpower. There was also sharp polarization of skilled manpower since some branches were able to attract trained manpower then the other. For example in 1977 36.5 percent of all managerial staff were employed in hydrocarbons.<sup>10</sup> This gave rise to low productivity. Moreover, low productivity was accompanied by high production cost. One of the factor

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*, p.166.



which contributed to the cost was Algeria's dependence on foreign technical assistance and range of service agreement, maintenance contracts, licenses and patents associated with the use of imported machinery.

Like industrial sector, Agricultural Sector also did not show rapid development. Boumediene. Second wave of agrarian socialism in 1971 was basically were targeted upon the larger private holding (over 110 hectares). This covered approximately 20 percent of the arable land.<sup>11</sup> The main intention of the regime was creation of communal socialist villages, furnished by the state with housing water electricity. By the end of 1981 only 171 socialist villages were constructed.<sup>12</sup> The program of socialist villages increasingly came under criticisms. The major fault was probably the lack of local participation. Coote had pointed out that the fundamental problem was that urban settlement model was adopted, and that also based on 'Western Model'.<sup>13</sup> Also, the programme of socialist villages had promoted urban values in people who were rural. In place of communal tradition people became more individualistic. An important components of the Agrarian Revolution consisted of distribution of the land to small farmers, who were grouped into cooperatives. According to official data 60,000 farmers were grouped into 4000 cooperatives by 1974, and 10,000 by 1979. The government was able to distribute some 80 percent of the land previously held by the state exceeding 110 hectares. As far as remaining 20 percent is concerned, owners succeeded in evading the legislation by

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<sup>11</sup> Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (London: Yale University Press), 1982, p.137.

<sup>12</sup> Keith Suttan, "Algeria's Socialist villages a Reassessment", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 22, no.2, 1984, p.134, pp.223-248.

<sup>13</sup> Michael J. Heffernan and Keith Suttan, The Landscape of Colonization, The Impact of French Colonial Rule on the Algerian Rural Settlement Pattern, 1830-1937, in Chris Dixon and Michael Heffernan (eds.), *Colonialism and Development in the Contemporary World*, (Mansell, New York, 1991), pp.120-152.

themselves redistributing to family members.<sup>14</sup> By 1980, 40 percent of Algerian were employed in agriculture.<sup>15</sup>

The Charter of Agrarian Revolution also emphasized technical modernization, intensification of production, reduction in the imports of food stuffs and the widening of internal market. The agrarian revolution was imposed to integrate rural population into the administrative bureaucratic structure by strengthening the municipal organization of every commune. The agrarian revolution failed due to lack of an adequate industrial base and the archaism of the agrarian structure, the scarcity of qualified and skilled workers. The most important consequence of the failure of agrarian revolution was the widening gap between the supply of food stuff and the demand for them. The immediate consequences of that was that the authorities opted for easy solution: importation of food from abroad. This in turn led to critical food dependence and a concomitant growth in the value of food imports. Table 3 summarizes the import and export of agriculture products.

**Table 3 : Annual average imports and export of foodstuffs, 1966-77 (million AD)**

	1966	1967-69	1970-73	1974-77
Imports: (value)	731	731	925	4,049
Index (base=1967-69)	--	100	127	554
Exports: (value Index)	--	100	103	85

Source: Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development*, p.216.

Thus, we can note that Agrarian socialism in Algeria is a maze of contradictions. Delegates to the Third Congress of the Socialist Sectors of agriculture aired a number of grievances caused due to bureaucratic in

<sup>14</sup> Crawford Young, n.11, p.138.

<sup>15</sup> Tony Smith, "The Political and Economic Ambitions of the Algerian Land Reform, 1962-1974," *The Middle East Journal*, (Washington), vol. 29, no.3, 1975, pp.259-278.

ineptness and singled out price system particularly as route of problems.<sup>16</sup> Though the wealthiest landed proprietors were eliminated from the rural scene, capitalist agriculturalist remained on the scene. The rank of middle farmers were joined by members of the politico-bureaucratic class. For them landholding was one of the source to outlet their income. Thus agriculture revolution had produced rural bourgeoisie. The policy of socialist villages was also far from satisfactory. The net result of this was dependence in food importation.

Above we have noted the overall developmental process of Algeria in post-independent period during Ben Bella and Boumediene period. Below we will examine the specific issues like education, urbanization, population growth, and public health.

**Education:** The Algerian Education system was perceived by the political elite as a state system, whose mission, was to carry out a ‘cultural revolution’. By carrying out “cultural revolution”, through education policy political leadership felt that they would be able to transcend or minimize the negative influence of underdeveloped socio-cultural influences. But instead of integrating Algerian society the education policy was the source of conflict.

To promote the Arabic language, Ben Bella promoted Arabization of schools and administration. In 1962 Higher Commission for the Reform of Education was established. One of mains objective which the commission decided were ‘unification and homogenization of system, and Algerianization and Arabization’. Since the administrative system left by colonial was in French it was decided to follow the policy of bilingualism.

Arabization could have caused a serious breaches between Berbers and Arabs. Ben Bella in order to gain confidence of Berbers included five

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<sup>16</sup> Douglas E. Ashford, “The Politics of Rural Mobilization in North Africa”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1969, pp.187-202.

members of the Beber community. In fact one of the Berber member, Mohammad Syed, was strong supporter of Ben Bella's language policy.<sup>17</sup>

Like Ben Bella, Boumediene was a strong proponent of Arabization projects. But the process of Arabization was slowed down due to the dearths of qualified Arabic teachers. Moreover, wide spread literacy exacerbated the problems. In Algeria during the first year of independence seven out of thirty hours were given in Arabic. This duration was increased to ten hours during the year 1963-64.<sup>18</sup> The state followed the policy of "democratization" of education by guarantying equal opportunities to all students belonging to different social strata.

According to one study the son of a blue-collar workers has fifteen times greater chance then sons of peasants. Thus we can find strong correlation between socio-economic status and chances for education mobility.<sup>19</sup>

Also education was unevenly developed with cities benefiting more then the rural population. The state was unable to reduce regional disparities. For example in Alger's and Oran 85.5 percent were attending school while on the other hand only 42.7 percent were attending school in Djelfa. Every year government is spending about 10% of the GNP on education policies.<sup>20</sup>

In fact the acquisition of "cultural capital", through higher education permitted the well off families to maintain their monopoly over high position in the increasingly growing state apparatus. The bourgeois and intermediary class are using university to claim their legitimacy to privilege.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Firoozin Kashani – Sabet, "The Swinging Pendulum, Linguing, Controversy in Post-Colonial Algeria", *Middle Eastern Studies*, (Washington), vol. 32, no.4, 1996, pp.264-280.

<sup>18</sup> Charles F. Gallagher, Language and Identity in Leon Carl Brown (eds.), *State and Society in Independent North Africa*, Garamond, Baltimore, 1966, pp.73-96.

<sup>19</sup> Rachid Tlemcani, n.3, p.192.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*

Due to high growth of population the democratization and universalization required considerable human and financial resources. Table 4 shows population growth and projection, while Table 5 illustrates the data regarding education.

**Table 4: Population Growth**

Year	Average annual growth of population (%)		Population (millions)		Hypothetical size of stationary population (millions)	Assumed year of reaching net reproduction	Population momentum 1985
	1965-73	1973-83	1983	1990			
Algeria	2.9	3.1	21	27	107	2025	2.0

Source: World Development Report, 1985, p. 211.

**Table 5: Educational Structure**

Year	Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group						Number enrolled in secondary school as percentage of age group		Number enrolled in higher education as percentage of population aged 20-24	
	Total		Male		Female		1965	1982	1965	1982
	1965	1982	1965	1982	1965	1982				
Algeria	68	93	81	105	53	81	7	36	1	5

Source: World Development Report, 1985, p.223.

From the education policy formulated by the state one can observe that it is strongly under the heavy sway of industrialization. In fact people who want to study any field related with science and technology are strongly encouraged by the political elites.<sup>22</sup>

A. Bouzida has done content analysis regarding the ideology propagated through textbooks. He argues that the major themes in textbooks are very far from the reality which majority Algerian face into day to day life. For example majority of books depict Algerian family owning a spacious house, having telephone and dishwasher. This has promoted cultural alienation.<sup>23</sup>

**Job market and unemployment:** The Algerian model of development has created comparatively less number of jobs in relations to the rate of capital investment. Moreover, most of the jobs are intended for

<sup>22</sup> ibid.

<sup>23</sup> ibid, pp.193-94.

professionals such as technicians, managers, lawyers etc.. After independence one of the top priority for the state was to quickly Algerianize the administration and civil services. Consequently this gave rise to administrative and bureaucratic class. Glassman's finding suggest that the Algerian cadres were in-charge of administrative sector whereas the foreign experts and cadres were in charge of technology. According to Glassman in Algeria there was "technocracy without technology."<sup>24</sup> In Algeria in 1976, almost 28 percent of its high level man power (HLM) were foreigners. During 1969 the figure was 43 percent. In some specific branches of industry the average was as high as 50 percent. The main consequence of this was that there was heavy outlay of fund on foreign HLM. The main point worth nothing is that the average remuneration of a foreign HLM was two to three times higher than that of an Algerian. In some cases it was even 10 to 12 times high. Many times the Algerian elites themselves encouraged students to pursue the studies abroad. In case of one state-run company in Algeria during the period 1967-77 for every 100 personal trained locally, 32 were sent abroad. Thus foreign training represented 12.52 percent of all training organized abroad. Economically this was quite costly. For example the average annual cost of training a single HLM abroad is A.D. 70,000 for a Grade 1 employee and reaches A.D. 161, 690 for Grade III, 2.5 and 3.7 time more respectively, than the average annual cost of training at the establishment.<sup>25</sup>

From the above discussion it is wrong to conclude that Algeria had in sufficient trained manpower. To a large extent dependence on foreign HLM is because of brain drain in Algeria. During 1986 about, one-third of native Algerian physicians were living abroad, especially in France. In case of skilled labour about one fifth were employed in Europe.<sup>26</sup> In fact the

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<sup>24</sup>       ibid.

<sup>25</sup>       Fatima-Zohra Outiher, *Aspects of the Brain Drain in Algeria*, in A.B. Zahlan (ed.), *The Arab Brain Drain*, (Ithica Press, London, 1981), pp.103-10.

<sup>26</sup>       ibid.

Algerian administration is overstaffed and consequently the existing trained personnel are underemployed.

In Algeria there is high dependency ratio. The country is characterized by a very high birth rate and an increasingly youthful population. During 1978, 23.2 percent of population was active. In other words three-quarters of the population was supported by the productivity of less than one quarter. Consequently, there was high dependency ratio.<sup>27</sup>

One of the most important development since independence was structural imbalances in various sectors of economy partly due to the massive exodus from rural to urban area. This had led to profound crisis affecting the agricultural sector. According to the census of 1977 there was dramatic decline in the number of workers permanently employed in agriculture. In 1966, 54 percent of the employed population was in agricultural sector. While in 1977, 29 percent of the employed population was in agricultural sector.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, it has been observed that agricultural retains aging workforce. During 1977, 12 percent of the agriculture workforce was over 60 years of age.<sup>29</sup> Martin has pointed out that number of workers in self management sector has declined from 120,000 to 100,000 from 1967 to 1976 respectively.<sup>30</sup> This has got severe consequences since the self management sector's farm occupy the most fertile lands. This problems was most acute in case of coastal area where new industrial complexes are built. This is due to the fact that youths are more easily attracted towards industrial plants due to higher wages. As a result of this coastal area suffer from shortage of labour. Also, very little new employment has been created due to agrarian reforms. Paradoxically, there are numerous examples of land transferred to cooperative, employing fewer

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<sup>27</sup> Richard Lawless, n.8, p.179.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *ibid* p.180.

worker than before. Thus underemployment rather than unemployment affects the vast majority of the agricultural sectors.

On the other hand non-agriculture employment has drastically increased between 1966 and 1973. It is in urban area that majority of active population are employed. According to one estimate the number of workers in non-agricultural sector grew from 730,000 in 1966 to 1,780,000 in 1977.<sup>31</sup> It was in case of Second Four year plans that there was marked increased in employment due to large amount of investment promoted due to increase in oil revenue. During the Second Four year plan, 513,000 non-agricultural jobs were created surpassing the plan target of 43,000.<sup>32</sup>

The tertiary sector outside administration and employment, was characterized by slow rate of growth. During 1966 to 1977 secondary sector showed the increased of nearly half million new job. Though this figure is impressive one should be sensitive to the fact nearly half of the workforce in the secondary sector were employed in building construction and public work where the new job created were highly unstable. In Algeria many more jobs could have been created if the state had employed less capital intensive technologies. On the one hand state has been employing capital intensive technologies, on the other hand there is official encouragement to employ as many workers as possible. This has given rise to "disguised unemployment". But the creation of new employment does not mean that there is increase in productivity. For example between 1967 to 1978 SONATARCH employment tripled, while its output remained constant.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, in case of fast growing industry like construction and public work sector the value added by each worker had decreased by half from 1967 to 1982. The employment data for the duration 1960 to 1980 is given in the table-6.

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<sup>31</sup> Richard Lawless n.8, p.175.

<sup>32</sup> Lica Jean, n.1, p.166.

<sup>33</sup> Richard Lawless, n.8..



**Table 6: The employment data for the duration 1960 to 1980**

Employment	1960	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Labor for in agricultural (%of total)										
Total	24.1	22.0	19.9	20.0	20.1	20.2	20.3	20.3	20.4	20.5
Male	47.1	42.5	37.8	37.4	37.4	37.5	37.5	37.4	37.3	37.5
Female	2.1	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7
Female labor force (% of total)	4.4	5.1	6.6	7.7	8.0	8.2	8.4	8.6	8.9	9.1
Labor force in agriculture (% of total)	67.0	58.8	50.0	36.9	34.4	32.0	29.7	27.5	25.4	--
Labour force in industries (% of total)	12.0	13.6	15.0	20.0	21.0	22.1	23.1	24.0	25.0	--

Source: World Tables, 1981.

### Housing and Urbanization Crisis

To a large extent the conditions laid down by the colonial rule that stimulated the rural to urban exodus were not altered immediately in post-independent period. Mass movement away from the rural areas occurred due to centralization and bureaucratic nature of the state. Increasing number of rural inhabitants migrating into cities is directly associated with the inadequacies of agricultural policy. There has been diminishing returns of agriculture, caused due to over cultivation. The fragmentation of landholdings has forced many farmers move to urban area in search of employment. Moreover due to higher salary in industries young people prefer working in industries. Thus because of wage differentials agriculture is unable to compete with industries. Due to lack of development in the sectors such as transport and housing, fishing, water resources and agriculture has fostered the underdevelopment of the productive forces. The higher rate urbanization can be observed from Table 7. One of the main factor responsible for high rate of urbanization has been high fertility rate. One can observe from the Table 8 that though crude death rate per thousand

has drastically decreased while crude birth rate per thousand has marginally decreased.

**Table 7: Urbanization**

	As % of total population		Average annual growth rate (%)		In largest city		In cities of over 500,000 persons		Number of cities of over 500,000 persons	
	1960	1980	1960-70	1970-80	1960	1980	1960	1980	1960	1980
Algeria	30	61	6.1	6.4	27	12	27	12	1	1

Source : World Development Report, 1980.

**Table 8: Demographic and Fertility-related Indicators**

	Crude birth rate per thousand population		Crude death rate per thousand population		Percentage change in			% of women in reproductive age group (aged 15-44)	% of married women using contraceptives	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	Crude birth rate	Crude death rate	Total fertility rate		1970	1980
Algeria	50	48	23	14	1960-78	1960-78	1978	1978	--	--
					-4.0	-39.1	7.3	39		

Source : World Development Report, 1980.

One of the main consequence of rapid urbanization was housing crisis and very low standard of living. State intervention, which is predominant in every sphere of life is still in embryonic form in case of housing. Distribution of housing facilities in 1977 is show in Table 9.

**Table 9: Distribution of Housing Facilities in 1977**

No. rooms	Total	Urban	Rural
1 to 3	83%	81.1%	84.3%
4 to 5	14%	15.9%	12.7%
Over 6	3%	3%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source : Rachid Tlemacani: State and Revolution of Algeria, p.234.

From the table we can note that nearly 83% of population is packed into are one or two-bedroom apartments. It is only 3% of the population which is living in six room apartment. Most probably this 3% of the population was receiving 25% of the national income. The extremely pathetic condition of housing can be inferred from the following data. In 1977 only 45.8% of housing was connected with running water, 40% with sewerage and 49% with electricity. It is basically the rural masses and

labouring classes which experience most acute problem of housing. It is beyond their means to hire a decent house with average facilities. Most part of their income is spent on foodstuff. Ministry of Labour has pointed out that the prices of foodstuff has increased by nearly 50% from 1969 to 1980.<sup>34</sup>

Due to housing crisis hundreds of slums have emerged in towns such as Algeria, Oran, Constantine and Annaba. Instead of solving the housing problem through policy, the state had opted for easy solution: demolition of slums. In September 1982, the state demolished hundred of slums. In coastal cities random identity checks is extremely common.

Due to rapid urbanization through internal migration has led to a kind "cultural ruralization" of the cities. Today due to rapid urbanization cities are experiencing numerous problems such as congestion, the general absence of basic hygiene scarcity of housing, water, recreation facilities and transportation and inadequate social services. Due to concentration of population into urban areas erosion of the existing habitat has taken place.

One of the most important consequence of urbanization is at social - psychological level. The rural inhabitants who come to city for work are encountered with problem of adaptation and alien urban culture. They take considerable time to get used to whole structure. Thus rural individuals are not easily assimilated. Most of the rural people are illiterate and when they come to cities they find it difficult to lead a normal life since in cities writing and reading is essential, where everyone is expected to know law and regulations and where all services must be paid for, but they have no money for it. Consequently there is great confusion. In general the rest of the mass continue to live miserable life.

**Embourgeoisement:** For any country the redistribution of national income is very fundamental. In Algeria, the vigorous push for rapid industrialization has not been bore equitably by social classes and strata. The uneven

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<sup>34</sup> ibid, p.174

distribution of income has severely affected overwhelming majority of people. Paradoxically, uneven distribution of income was perceived by theorist of economic growth, as an good indicator of economic development. Figure given below shows the distribution of national income 1977.

**Table 10: Distribution of National Income, 1977**

Level of Incomes (AD)	Population ('000)	Percentage	Available revenues (million)	Percentage
7,150	400	3	2,860	16
3,330-2,180	2,900	19	7,710	41
1,030	3,600	24	3,730	21
666-430	7,800	54	4,200	22
Average : 1250	14,700	100	18,300	100

Source: Rachid Tlemceni, *State and Revolution in Algeria*, p.167

From the Table 10 we can note that 3% of the population received 16% of the national income giving rise to wage disparity of 1/6. According to Tlemceni this figure is misleading due to political and ideological factors.<sup>35</sup> Taking this factor into consideration Lemode calculates the wage disparity ratio as 1/20s in the 1980s.<sup>36</sup> The growth of nominal income has increased consumer demand which the national productive system has been unable to meet. The most profitable branches of industry such as commerce, light industry and construction have grown stronger. While on the other hand, in sectors where public investment is highest (hydrocarbon and heavy industry) the profitability shown is considerably less. One of the consequence of this is that it has promoted the growth of national sector constituted by mobilizing family savings through informal banks. The most striking aspects is the very high interest rate of such banks. It ranges between 25 percent to 40 percent. Between 1967 and 1980 the purchasing

<sup>35</sup> Rachid Tlemacini, n.3, p.9.

<sup>36</sup> Mahfound Bennoune, op cit., p.208.

power of manual workers showed slight increase, on the other hand purchasing power of private entrepreneurs increased by 56 percent.<sup>37</sup>

Rapid increase in disposable income has given rise to inflationist tendencies and a growing balance of payment deficit. Between 1967 and 1982 domestic consumption increased by 5.7% while gross household incomes increased in real terms of 4.3 percent annually.<sup>38</sup> This led to strong inflationist tendencies and a growing balance of payment deficit. The economy was able to function basically due to oil revenue which it received. But due to the high inflationist tendencies the standard of living of workers and purchasing power has deteriorated considerably.

In rural areas also there is striking difference between highest and lower income group. For example, by 1979 the poorest 10 percent of families earned only around A.D 2000 per year. Due to this per capita income was about A.D 289. On the other hand, the richest 10 percent of families received an annual income exceeding A.D 30,000 per household. It comes to about A.D 4,347 per person per year. Similarly per capita income in poor rural area was about 25 percent lower than that of the average income of the rural well off families.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, Algeria is a stark case of revolution that has failed miserably in full filling people's expectations. Boumediene had succeeded in building highly centralized state with an authoritarian triumvirate structure of military, bureaucratic and party elites. The regime had seen increasing socio-political segmentation and a greater income differential. The economic policy pursued by the regime instead of raising economic improvement had yielded dislocations, a dependency on food import, social alienation and hyperinflationary pressures. The regime was able to maintain legitimacy due

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<sup>37</sup> Pradeep K. Chhiber, "State Policy, Rent Seeking and Electoral Success of a Religious Party in Algeria", *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 58, no.1, 1996, p.126-48.

<sup>38</sup> Leca Jean, Social Structure and Political Stability, Comparative Evidence from Algeria, Syrian and Iraq, in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980), pp.164-202.

<sup>39</sup> Mahfoud Bennoune, n.3, p.208.

to the system of pay offs. The enormous resources from oil state had maintained dispensing forms of patronage. For example in 1971 the regime invested about 30% of its total revenue in social services.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, this helped the regime to maintain its populist and egalitarian image. This prevented the formation of broad social protest movement.

### **Chadli Benejeded Regime**

After the sudden death of Boumediene due to illness in November 1978, Chadli Benejeded took over the presidency. Chadli's perspective regarding state building were pragmatic. His no-nonsense policy represented a new style of governance. He persuaded the policy of "de-Boumedienization", combination of policy shifts, coercive pressures, changes in Key Personnel and modification of rules of the game. But none of the liberalizing efforts were allowed to challenge the regime's central authority. In fact he followed the policy of carrot and stick.

The new regime had the great advantage from the outset of presidency due to the second oil price shock. Due to Iranian revolution in early 1979, the oil price went from \$13 a barrel to over \$ 30 a barrel.<sup>41</sup> This wind fall allowed the regime to spend lavishly. Due to this the regime was able to reinforce its populist and egalitarian image. Due to oil revenue FLN was able to achieve a social compromise among competing interest.

Things started drastically changing after fall in oil prices in 1980s. The volume of exports of crude petroleum fell from 188 in 1978 to 110 in 1982, with 1985 as the base year. The revenue from oil export fell to AD 45,339, from AD 56,041 in 1983. In spite of all this the government expenditure went up. The declining oil prices and lack of fiscal discipline led to a deficit in accounts. The debt service ratio also increased from 26%

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<sup>40</sup> Pradeep K. Chhiber, no. 37.

<sup>41</sup> John Entelis, *The Revolution Institutionalized* (Westview Press, Colorado, 1989), p.117.

in 1981 to 96.5% in 1988.<sup>42</sup> The national debt almost doubled from 1979 to 1987. Not only did the national debt increase but the real growth in per capita GDP in Algeria fell. As the state seemed bankrupt social inequality increased. During this period Algeria had almost a debt of some US\$ 24,000 and found the annual interest of \$600 impossible burden.<sup>43</sup> The government on account of prestige, refused to reschedule the debt and instead reduced imports, 70% which were food stuffs. This precipitated an economic crisis. The foodstuff became extremely scarce and expensive.

The increasingly sense of hardship produced series of strikes. On 4<sup>th</sup> October 1988 more than 5000 youths destroyed luxury goods and the following day widespread looting occurred. Within few days violence spread to Oran, Anaba, other towns. The army was called to suppress the disturbance. Around 500 people were killed and many were injured.

This event marked the beginning of a deep crisis of legitimacy of the authority. As long as the regime was able to make good on the welfare bargain that linked it to most Algerians the voices of protest were muted. Many people had a stake of some sort. Moreover the sources of discontent did not converge. However by the mid 1980s, industrial projects faltered or collapsed altogether.

### **Cultural Crisis:**

The legitimacy crisis of authority and socio-economic crisis are certainly related with cultural crisis. There are various reasons for the emergence of cultural crisis. It will be helpful to recall that western institutions did not emerge overnight. They evolved over generations in close relationship to changes in religion, economy, family structure, social stratification and other segments of life. In Europe social change took place within society itself.<sup>44</sup> One of the most important characteristics of this

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<sup>42</sup> Pradeep K. Chhiber, n.37, p.128.

<sup>43</sup> *The Middle East and North Africa*, 2000.

<sup>44</sup> Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1978).

process is that attitudes and norms system (Psychogenesis) change concomitantly and parallel to changing social structures (Socio genesis).

The type of change that took place in Algeria is of completely different order. Due to forcible integration of Algeria into a global structure dominated by Europe, social change in this region is basically due to exogenous factors. Such type of primarily exogenously induced change is perceived by those affected as a threat from outside. One of the most important characteristic of such type of social change is that norms and values with substrata in social structure that existed before this changes and that are substantially altered by it, persist. In case of social change that is not exogenously induced norms and values change with the change in social structure. Thus in Algeria there is parallel existence of norms and values of no longer existing historical formation along with newly evolved social structures. Here norms and values do not change as fast as structure do. In such a situation identity formation becomes ambiguous. Moreover, in case of Arabs it become difficult since they have multiple identities, which has been discussed in chapter one. According to Niklas Luhmann in such case what happens, is that “the person in transition is that ‘both-and’ or ‘neither-nor’, and indeed simultaneously. His identity become blurred and interminable. This situations renders of some urgency the problem of determining the indeterminable.”<sup>45</sup>

Other contributory factor to cultural crisis is the model of development which Algeria adopted. The ‘model of industrializing industries’ has uprooted the Algerian society from its tradition and culture. The oil crisis, combined with demographic pressure, has show the limit of “transposed development”. The modernization projected has clearly created social vacuum throwing people into a state of total anomie. One of the main drawback of developmental model was that it was imposed from above. The dialectical interaction between state and Algerians, which was must for

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<sup>45</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Islam and Cultural Change: Accommodation of Social Change*, (Westview Press, Oxford, 1995), p.132.



healthy development, did not take place. While formulating policy, culture and tradition was completely neglected. The development activities have upset the social issues. For example the Algerian socialist villages that were constructed promoted further drift between urban and rural values.

Cultural crisis is also related to the existing political culture in Algeria. One of the most important characteristics of the state political system is that they tend to have relatively homogeneous political culture within which there is general agreement about the proper limits and function of politics. In transitional societies there is great confusion because the political culture tends to be fragmented. Consequently people do not share common orientations toward political action. In case of more stable political systems people make greater adjustment of their personal motivation to put it in line with publically acceptable reasons for political action.

In Algeria political culture can be described as containing several contradictory elements.<sup>46</sup> Due to historical reasons the interelite relations are characterized by a high level of mistrust. But this has not prevented them from expecting reciprocity and equality. Moreover, elite perception of good governance is different from that of people. For elite good governance means a strong statist orientation growing out of intense nationalism. Contra to this populist orientation emphasized extensive mass participation and governmental decentralization. Moreover, there is support for Arabization from a large section of the population and for the practice of ascetic, rigid and austere Islamic orthodoxy. This perspective is coexisting with the nationalist ethic which seeks to implement rapid and sweeping economic and social modernization.

In Algeria there are parallel Arabophonic and Francophonic sections in many faculties and disciplines at major universities. This has led to sever

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<sup>46</sup> John Entelis, Elite Political Culture and Socialization in Algeria, Tension and Discontinuities, *The Middle East Journal*, (Washington), vol. 31, no. 2, 1988, pp.192-05.

competition and conflict between the sections regarding academic status, job opportunity, culture authenticity and nationalist credibility.

In post independent period many time clashes have taken place between Arabaphonic and Francophonic. According to the Arabaphonic there is heart, mind and soul in Islamic civilization and therefore policy of Arabization should be followed. On the other hand Francophones advocates that the main tool of communication should be French. For both the group the policy of bilingualism followed by the state was unacceptable. They have identical view of culture. For them culture means mass schooling to the detriment of other cultural activities. Francophone are proponents of neo-culture, which has emerged due to colonial penetration. Arabophones are proponents of the traditional culture.

The most important consequence of the linguistic policy is the emergence of Berber movement. Berber are infact important component of North African Society. Among Berber population Kabyles are the largest groups, numbering, 1,180,000 in 1966.<sup>47</sup> The Kabyles have played an important role in national struggle.<sup>48</sup> But their contribution was not recognized in the post independent period .

Boumedeine was not only idealist about economy but also wanted to rewrite the history by giving Algerians new identity, on the basis of the Algeria which was a French invention. Boumedeine proclaimed that Algerians were Muslim and Arab. The first claims was more or less true. But the second was certainly “invention of tradition”. Many Algerians other than *Kabyles* and *Turegs*, are ethnically Berber. By following policy of Arabization Boumedeine deliberately tried to suppress Berber culture. It was in reaction to this official policy that the Berber movement arose. Other important factors for resurgence of the Berber movement was

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<sup>47</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerias* ( Beacon Press, Boston, 1962), p.27

<sup>48</sup> Hugué Roberts, The unforeseen Development of the Kabyle: Question in Contemporary Algeria, *Government and Opposition*, (London), vol. 17, no.3, 1983, pp. 312-33.

modernization. One of the most important aspects of modernization is that it increases the groups awareness of all kinds of class, tribe, region, class, linguistic group, religion, etc. The early stage of modernization is often marked by the rise of various movements based on tribe, class, regions. After independence different districts of Greater Kabliya were integrated into a socio-economic and cultural whole. Consequently the inhabitants of this region increasingly possess a community of material interest and a common identity. Cultural agitation which arose due to Arabization were permitted a reaction to the establishment of centralized authority as well as due to loss of old value system.

Berber's have been fighting for their rights. Yakouren seminar was organized in 1981, to deal with the Berber culture in Kabylie. The seminar studied various possibilities for promotion of Berber culture. The main demand was recognition of Berber culture and language.<sup>49</sup>

In summer 1981 the central committee of FLN party formulated new cultural policy. This new policy was a source of great disappointment for Berbers. Berber culture was simply considered as "floklorize" by policy makers.

The government remained undecided over Berber question and it offered ambiguous and paradoxical solutions. For example in 1981 Ministry of Higher Education promised creation of Barber studies. But the Universities in Berber provinces were excluded. Moreover, the Berber studies department were considered as part of the Institute of Arabic Language and Culture.<sup>50</sup>

However, due to persistent effort on the part of Berbers, a new and definite step was taken by President Chadli. In December 1983 he

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<sup>49</sup> Mornia Lazreg, *The Reproduction of Colonial Ideology: The Case of the Kabyle Berbers*, *Government and Opposition*, (London), vol. 15, no. 4, 1983, pp.380-95.

<sup>50</sup> Tuomo Melasus, *Future and Minority in the Arabo-Islam Industry of Algeria* in Kladu Fordinand and Muhdi Mazaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society*, Curzon Press, London, 1988.

recognized that the history of contemporary Algeria covers 25 centuries and Barber culture is an important component.<sup>51</sup>

The emergence of culture movement has raised question regarding the relationship between the so called development and social integration. In spite of culture policy adopted by various regimes in post-independent period the impact of cultural hegemony of western society is striking. French plays an important role in dictating modes of thinking, life-styles and even apprehensions of the future among the Algerian elite and middle classes. The government policy of culture is clearly defeated due to Algeria's reliance on foreign productions. Serials like "Dallas" are very popular among the Algerians. Immigration to France and other western countries by large number of students has led to overestimation of western culture. This in turn has led to identity crisis.

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<sup>51</sup> ibid, p.190.

## CHAPTER – 4

### EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

When Benjedid Chadli took over the presidency, the Algeria economy was characterized high unemployment, educational decline, agricultural failure, over population, high rate of urban migration, exorbitant foreign debt, etc. The state welfare system was in shambles and the authoritarian stat was cracking down.

To overcome the crisis Chadli followed the policy of economic liberalization and political relaxation. Perhaps, Chadli consciously followed the "Gorbachev Gambit" thinking that he would get new lease of life as a reformer. Chadli in fact wanted to maintain hegemony of ruling elites by following the policy of economic liberalization and political relaxation. Political relaxation was basically political survival strategy through which Chadli wanted to open up the political arena to a degree of participation, sufficient to attract support from the groups, which were interested in political reform, like intellectuals and professionals, without at the same time creating conditions which would undermine, the hegemony of the ruling elites. Moreover, his goal of economic survival was to promote a degree of economic change sufficient to attract foreign investment, reduce debt payment and raise foreign exchange without undermining economic interests of those domestic groups and elites that were tied to public sectors. Thus early phase of democratization was little more than defensive maneuvers by people who want to cling to power.

The economic strategy failed basically because petroleum power has some serous limitation. Algeria being a semirentier state much of its income is derived from non-productive activity.<sup>1</sup> Economic reforms made the

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<sup>1</sup> For this topic see Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World", in Glacome Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*, (Routledge, London, 1990), p.85-98.

situation from bad to worse. Due to reforms many public enterprises had to face competition. Managers of public enterprises instead of introducing sound economic management method, found it easier to increase the prices of their product from 50 to 200% overnight.<sup>2</sup> Inflation grew at 42% annually and population growth remained 3.2%.<sup>3</sup> The drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s, resulted in a loss of nearly 40% of the country's resource, which further exacerbated economic pains. This was due to the fact that oil exports constitute more than 90 percent of Algerian foreign currency. By 1991, 125,000 workers were laid off.<sup>4</sup> Thus the lives of the overwhelming majority of Algerian's continued to deteriorate. The disparities between have and have not grew wider. By 1988, 5% of the population earned 45% of the national income while 50% earned less than 22%.<sup>5</sup>

As far as political reforms are concerned Chadli brought about radical changes. On 3<sup>rd</sup> November 1988 the reforms were approved by 92.3% of the votes cast in referendum. The identification of the state with FLN was ended by allowing non party candidates to participate in elections. Furthermore, Prime Minister was made responsible to the National Peoples Assembly. The creation of association of political nature was allowed. But the formations of parties based on religion, regional or professional interest were forbidden. New parties were obliged to be licensed and were not to be externally financed. The amended constitution gave public sector workers the right to strike.

Due to deinstitutionalization the state seemingly retracted from most areas, even those that were traditionally associated with the very essence of statehood-law and order. In the wake of the state retract, illegal activities

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<sup>2</sup> Assedine Layachi and Abdel-Kader Haireche, "National Development and Political Protest: Islamist in the Maghreb Countries," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (Washington), vol. 14, no. 253, 1992, p.15, p.69-91.

<sup>3</sup> Mahmud A Faksh, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalist in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia* (Praeger, London, 1997), p.29.

<sup>4</sup> Azzedine Layachi and Abdel-Kader Haireche, n.2., p.75.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

flourished. There was drastic increase in crime rate. Moreover, there was growing black-markets - referred so as *trabendo* – which was making up for the empty shelves of the state distribution system. Corruption and private appropriation of state funds multiplied. This was partly due to dissolution of the State Security Court as well political police, known as Delegation Generale Pour La Documentation et La Securite in September 1990.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Emergence of Fundamentalism**

According to Tilly's theory of Resource Mobilization, sudden withdrawal of expected government service motivates people to revolt.<sup>7</sup> In Algeria to overcome economic crisis state drastically reduce the revenue spent on social welfare policies. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism can partly be explained on the basis of Tilly's argument. But what is more important is that socio-economic conditions provided fertile ground for the emergence of fundamentalism. Its growth corresponded with the revelation of a tired and confused state socialism and corrupt authoritarianism. Nationalism, socialism and other western ideologies which provided legitimacy were unable to solve the acute problem of Algeria. Due to the failure of Western ideologies to solve problems people started questioning their validity. The mass appearance of Islamism had its root in secular circumstances but have been given a religious expression. The symbolism and idioms employed are religious, but the real concern is grievances caused due to so called socialist policies. The Islamic resurgence offers Islam as an indigenous ideology and as an alternative to other alien ideologies.

In social-psychological terms, the return to indigenous sources can also be interpreted as a search for cultural identity. In fact the cultural

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<sup>6</sup> Assedine Layachi, "The Domestic and International Constraints of Economic Adjustment in Algeria", in Dire Vandewalle (ed.), *North Africa: Development and Reform in Changing Global Economy* (Macmillan, London, 1996), pp.129-151.

<sup>7</sup> Jeft Goodwin and Theda Suocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1989, pp.489-509.

alienation and identity crisis function as the social-psychological background for the Islamic resurgence. Extrapolating Durkheim's concept of "anomie" we can say that there is emergence of "cultural anomie. "Cultural anomie" denotes "the consequences of asymmetrical process of interaction in the cultured sphere on an international level".<sup>8</sup>

According to Niklas Luhmann religion is able to solve identity crisis. He argued that religion has the function in the social system of transforming the indeterminable world into a determinable one. Religion becomes more prominent in societies which are characterized by drastic changes. In such societies members failed to understand their environment. In such cases religion helps in absorbing disappointments.<sup>9</sup> Islamic cultural symbols offers an indigenous form for the articulation of political content in a situation of crisis. In fact Islam has more chance of reaching and mobilizing a broad sections of populations. The hold of Islam on the masses gives the Islamic ideology a natural advantage compared to secular ideologies. It enables the movement to capture the peoples imagination, inspire them, and to mobilize them for political action. Summing up the above discussions we can say that the return to Islam as an indigenous cultural heritage and political framework is a reaction to the alien ideologies as well as Western culture.

In Algeria there are numerous fundamentalist organizations, like FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), HAMAS (Islamic Society Movement), MNI (Islamic-Rivival Movement), MIN (Islamic Movement of Algeria), Mouvement El-Oumma (al-Umma movement). Out of various organization FIS, HAMAS and al-Nahda are the prominent organization.

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<sup>8</sup> Bassam Tibi, "The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East", *The Middle East Journal*, (Washington), vol. 37, no.1, 1983, pp.3-13.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*



The fundamentalist ideology reveals different trends. But still there are some common assumption which the fundamentalist group across the world share.<sup>10</sup> These common assumptions are as follows.

- (1) The Muslim world is in state of disorder caused due to political and moral decay.
- (2) This moral as well as political decay is caused due to western intrusion, which infected the Muslim world with an alien set of immoral and secularist value. This intrusion took place due to imposition of western inspired governmental and cultural experiments that proliferated in the colonial and post colonial period.
- (3) In order to overcome decay the Muslim world must be re-Islamized, by reassertion of classical Islamic ways. This can be achieved by introduction of *shariah*, or Muslim law, while purging most aspects of western cultural and political influences.
- (4) The only way to Islamize society is to repoliticize Islam. The Islamization of society will lead to the solving of the problems of corruption and spiritual viciousness that pervades the contemporary society.

But this does not mean that Islamic fundamentalist reject modernity altogether. They are in fact very much in favour of modern institutions. But they want to built modern institutions on the basis of Islam. This is the fundamental difference between fundamentalist and traditionalist. Traditionalist reject modernity altogether. Traditionalist wants to freeze society so that it conforms to the memory of what was once. It is a society as described by our forefathers.

In Algeria there are two main dominant Islamic tendencies in the fundamentalist movement. First, there are those who are not exclusively driven by religious conviction. They take into consideration the political

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<sup>10</sup> Lawrence Davidson, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Greenwood, London, 1998), pp.12-13.

considerations defined by a complex national milieu. They are ready to compromise and cooperate. They are termed as “Algerianist” (djaza’ara). This tendency is represented by figures such as Abassi Madeni, president and spokesman of the FIS.”<sup>11</sup>

The second tendency is represented by the Salafis, a global movement driven by a strong desire for religious purification.<sup>12</sup> They are driven by explicitly religious and ideological reasons. Salafis are much concerned with instituting practices that capture the purity of Islam, as interpreted by the Salaf (early companions of the Prophet) and revealed in the Quran and Sunna.

Moreover, the fundamentalist groups also disagree about the rules for engagement. There are number of disagreement regarding the means to re-Islamize the society. For example radical salafis like Armed Islamic Group (GIA) are in support of violent methods.<sup>13</sup> For them *jihad* is not simply a means to an end; it is an end in itself.

Thus we find that fundamentalist movement in Algeria is not a monolithic movement. The fundamentalist ideology is characterized by ideological fissures and contradictory elements. The movement is characterized by a nebulous, loose affiliation of autonomous grouping, each with its own leadership, strategies, tactics, and religious dogma. Although they face a common enemy, there are profound differences over interpretation of Islamic doctrine regarding the purpose of struggle and the religious permissibility of particular actions and tactic in warfare.

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<sup>11</sup> For FIS view see, Joyee M. Davis (ed.), *Between Jihad and Islam*, (Macmillan, London, 1997), pp.47-64.

<sup>12</sup> A number of different terms are used for salafis like Hanbalists, neo-wahhbi.

<sup>13</sup> A good description of methods followed by the radical fundamentalist is given in Quaintan Wiktorowicz, “Centrifugal tendencies in the Algerian civil war”, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (Washington), vol. 23, no.3, 2001, pp.65-82.

## The Cadres of the Islamist Party and the Islamist Masses

According to the Resource Mobilization Theory cadres as well as masses of fundamentalist groups join the organization due to the presence of incentives, reasons and motives.<sup>14</sup> The cadres of the fundamentalist organizations are young intellectuals, educated in government schools following a westernized curriculum. Moreover they belong to recently urbanized families. At the university level, the fundamentalist groups recruit people from technical faculty.<sup>15</sup> The elites of those organization are also highly educated. For example Abbasi Mandani of FIS is a Ph. D in Comparative Education and was professor at the university of Algiers. FIS was also supported by the commercial strata and section of private sector.

Similarly, Hamas also enjoyed the support of educated classes, particularly middle and upper level cadres in the state administration. Similarly it also had significant support among the private sectors entrepreneurs.<sup>16</sup> In fact all the sociological studies about fundamentalism lead to the same conclusion: they recruit from intellectual urban milieus.<sup>17</sup>

There are basically three reasons why intellectuals, and private entrepreneurs supports fundamentalist organizations. First, the western ideologies like Secularism, Nationalism or Marxism, that fulfilled the need for protest are losing momentum. Second, fundamentalist gains can also be explained by crisis in ideology. The failure of "Arab Socialist Model" have left room for new protest ideologies to emerge in destructed society. Intellectual quest is not for the past, but for the re-adaptation of modernity to a newly re-discovered identity. It is basically because of this that fundamentalist favour industrial development, education and urbanization.

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<sup>14</sup> Emile Sahily, "Religious Resurgence and Political Modernization", Emile Sahily (ed.), *Religious Resurgence and Political Modernization in Contemporary World*, (New York University Press, New York, 1990) p.5-16.

<sup>15</sup> For example in the Electro list of FIS running for parliamentary election more than 200 where Ph.D. holders, Jayee M., Davis (ed.), n.10.

<sup>16</sup> Frank Tachan (ed.), *Political Parties of North Africa and Middle East*, (Greenwood, London, 1994, p.46.

<sup>17</sup> Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (IB Tauris, London, 1999), p.50.

Third, FIS ideology has been liberal favouring privatization.<sup>18</sup> The FIS had advocated less state intervention in economy. Moreover, it oppose socialism and favour privatization of all sectors of economy and retract of all nationalized property. It wants to abolish the current monopolies and promote competition. It is because of such liberal polices that private entrepreneurs supported it.

One can't create revolution only with party cadres. Fundamentalist need masses to create revolution. The masses of fundamentalist organization are product of socio-economic crisis in modern Algerian society. The modern masses are new urban arrivals. The millions of peasants have migrated to urban area. By 1970s and 1980s, Algeria's population was increasing at more than 3 percent annually and the age structure was sloping dramatically towards the dependent ages, with the media age in 1990 at 17.51 the urban population in 1985 was 9,251000.<sup>19</sup>

The masses of the migrant poor are kept "out", permanently disenfranchised, economically and politically. Their alienation, traditional conservativeness, despondence, uprootedness make for almost total susceptibility to the fundamentalist ideology.

The drastic rate of urbanization has given rise to housing and transportation shortage. In Algeria in 1990, 80 percent of youth aged sixteen to twenty nine still live with their parents, with an average of eight inhabitants in a room.<sup>20</sup> Such youths are the main resources for fundamentalist organization.

Unemployment among the youths is undoubtly the main resource of the fundamentalist movement. The state policy of education has given rise

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<sup>18</sup> Mansoor Moaddel, and Kamran Talattof (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought*, (Macmillan, London, 2000), pp.273-300.

<sup>19</sup> John Ruedy, "Continuities and Discontinuities in the Algerian Confrontation with Europe" in John Ruedy (ed.), *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa* (Washington , 1994).

<sup>20</sup> Oliver Roy, n. 16.

to “lumpenintelligentsia.” There are various factors responsible for the emergence of “lumpenintelligentsia”. There are student overpopulation, the weakening of the general standard of education , and replacement of colonial language (French) with national language, which in some places are under the disadvantage of not being the normally spoken language. (Like modern Arabic in Algeria). This "lumpenintelligentsia", after having spent time in school are unable to pursue higher education , whatsoever might be the reason, and moreover are unable to find employment are easily carried away by the fundamentalist ideology. Thus unemployed among the educated is the main resource of the fundamentalist organizations in Algeria.

### **The Availability of Organizational Structures and Resources**

The success of any social revolution to large extent depends upon availability of organizational structures and resources. The fundamentalist organization in Algeria have a well built organizational structures . Moreover they have used various resources for social welfare activities in order to get legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Major linkages exists among fundamentalists organizations in the contemporary world . The fundamentalist organizations maintain variety of connection that have important impact on their movement . This network of linkages can take different form and are international in scope . Contemporary electronic media has played major role in integrating fundamentalist across the world. Due to information technology it is possible to issue the call globally for volunteers for *jihad* in Algeria

One of the most effective international network of linkages was the Salafiya movement based on Mohammad Abduh teachings. By utilizing modern media communication, through publications early in the twentieth century it had major impact in shaping the emerging expression of "Public Islam" in Algeria . One of the oldest international organization is the Muslim Brotherhood which was established in the 1928 in Egypt. There are various branches of Muslim Brotherhood. These organizations though linked

together, however, represent a wild diversity of approaches and positions. HAMAS in Algeria is part of Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in the Arab world.

The fundamentalist in Algeria are also linked to the organizations of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC).<sup>21</sup> PAIC was formed under the leadership of Hasan al-Turabi in Khartoum. In early December 1993, PAIC held its second international meeting which was attended by delegates from some sixty countries. The FIS of Algeria also took part in the meeting. In fact the Congress provided the venue for major efforts to mediate between conflicting groups within the Islamic world. Moreover, it showed the potential for international Islamic diplomatic and negotiating coordination.

Thus we find that fundamentalist groups in Algeria are linked to various organizations. This network has provided them supporters which includes state as well as individuals.

Fundamentalist organizations in Algeria are financed by Saudi Arabia.<sup>22</sup> In fact according to one perspective emergence of Islamic fundamentalism is linked to impact of oil revenues. According to Daniel Pipes, "in the 1970's came the oil boom, and suddenly Muslims could stand up to their Christian nemesis... the oil boom marked a turning point in Muslim consciousness, more than anything else, it prepared the way for widespread Islamic political activity."<sup>23</sup> Fundamentalists have become very sophisticated in raising as well as disguising funds: they use a variety of financial vehicles – front companies, charitable organizations, third party bank accounts to disguise the location of their assets. According to US

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<sup>21</sup> John Obert Voll, "Relation Among Islamists Groups," John L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam, Revolution, Radicalism or Reform* (Lynne Rienner, London, 1997), pp.231-247.

<sup>22</sup> Jean-Claude Vatin, "Revival in the Maghreb, Islam as an Alternative Political Language", Ali Hillaoui (ed.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (Praeger, New York, 1989), pp.221-251.

<sup>23</sup> John Obert Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, (Westview Press, Colorado, 1982), p.351.

Customs Service, which looked into the World Islam Studies Enterprise Foundation (WISE), Florida-based organization linked to a Saudi Arabia finance think tank called the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), allegedly raised funds for organized terrorist groups under the guise of collecting money for orphans and the families of martyrs of the Islamic cause.<sup>24</sup>

The fundamentalist use money for sponsoring the social welfare cause. The FIS, through an extensive network of mosque has dispense religious and socialization programme as well as welfare and social services rarely provided by the government. In 1989, when an earthquake hit Algeria. FIS was first to reach the disaster stricken area and distribute food and medical supplies to the countryside. The FIS involved its party cadre in voluntary activities like collecting garbage, offering medical care, tutoring high school students etc.

When FIS won municipal election and assumed the authority of the municipalities it managed to built and impressive legacy of tolerance and honest administration. The incompetent FLN employees were not fired but reshuffled. In fact they were trained by FIS cadres. Upon assuming the authority when FIS officials discovered that 70 plots were sold by the FLN which municipality did not own FIS returned the land to its owner. Moreover, they provided low interest loan to poor and skilled workers. It opened the centre feeding ninety poor families on daily basis.<sup>25</sup>

### **Algeria's Civil Conflict**

Following political reforms many parties emerged in Algeria. By mid 1990 some twenty parties had registered. But the only significant parties were those which were affiliated with Islamic movements.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibrahim Warde, *Islamic Finance in Global Economy* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent Contemporary Islamic Movement in North Africa*, (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997), p.140.

The prominent fundamentalist parties were, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and the Islamic Society Movement (Al-Nahda) Movement (MNI). Some parties were based on ethnic basis like Kablye Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) were also formed. The regime while granting the status of parties to numerous political associations overlooked the constitutional provision which prohibited formation of political association on the basis of religion, regional or ethnic basis.

Out of all the parties FIS was the most popular party in Algeria. In less than one year after its inception, its membership base was three million from various segment of society.<sup>26</sup> The extent of FIS popularity was reflected at the first multiparty municipal elections held on June 12, 1981. when it won 55 percent of the national popular vote and 856 of the 1,541 Assemblies Populaires Communales (APC). The elections constituted crushing defeat for the FLN. The Election result reflect that FIS had strong in large as well as small cities. Especially in Algeires, Oran, and Constantine where the FIS won by 70 percent of vote. It did poorly only in the Kabylie and the sparsly populated in South.<sup>27</sup>

In order to prevent FIS from winning multiparty parliamentary election, which was scheduled for June 1991, the FLN regime passed new electoral law with the intention of over representing South, in the new Assembly. The regime restored to such tactics because FLN had done well in the south.

The first round of parliamentary election took place on December 20, 1991. FIS emerged as the clear winner in the election. It won 188 out of the 340 seats, nearly majority of the total and 81 percent of the seats won in the

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<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, p.134.

<sup>27</sup> Frank Tacheu (ed.), n. 15, p.23.



first round. While FLN and the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) won 23.28 percent of seats.<sup>28</sup>

FIS stunning victory in the first round of election posed a serious threat to FLN as well as army. The monopoly of State-FLN was shattered. The military was determined to prevent FIS from coming to power. On December 1981, a committee National pour le Sauvegarde de l'Algérie (CNSA) was set up to oppose the FIS. Various forces who joined with the government to form CNSA were RCD, union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA), Ligue Algerienne des Droits de l'Homme (LADH), The Hizbal al Talin al Ishtirakiya or parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (PAGS). On 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1992, an anti FIS demonstration was attended by more than 135,000 in Algiers. The main demand of CNSA was cancellation of 2<sup>nd</sup> round of election. On 11 January 1992 Chadli resigned as president and announced that he had earlier dissolved the National People Assembly. Following day High Security Council cancelled the second round of elections due to simultaneous dissolution of National Assembly and the resignation of president which was an unprecedented. The Constitutional Council, declared that power should be assumed jointly by the army, the prime minister, the constitutional council and the judicial authorities. FIS felt that it was robbed of the electoral victory. FIS was dissolved. Moreover 8,900 supporter of FIS were arrested. The major cause of coup was a fear of emergence of a genuine democratic force. For example, the FFS march of 2 January 1992, which was attended by more than 800,000 Algerians, (this was biggest street crowd in the history of Algeria), aimed at mobilizing the silent majority (particularly the 42% of the population who absented to vote), showed the growing emergence of democratic force.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Mohammad Mohmoud Mohamedou, "The Rise and fall off Democratization in the Marghreb", Paul J. Magnavella (ed.), *Middle East and North Africa: Governance Democratization and Human Rights*, (Astigate Press, London, 1999), pp. 209-240.

<sup>29</sup> Mohand Salan Tahi, "Algerian's Democratization Process: a Frustrated Hope", *Third World Quarterly*, (London), vol. 16, no.2, 1995.

The silent coup and anti-Islamist campaign, including trials, torture and assassination by military led to a civil war in Algeria. From the beginning FIS has followed a strategy of respectability and a desire for institutional integration. Up till the coup they had followed a non violent strategy. In fact the military coup led to the break of Islamic organizations. The moderate Islamic organizations like Hamas and al-Nahada declared a break with FIS leadership.<sup>30</sup> Similarly many radical elements subsequently left the FIS to form the rebellious groups. Important among them were the Islamic Guards, the Apostancy and Flight Organizations, the Algerian Afghans etc. Later were this groups coalesed to form to major militant clusters: Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Islamic Salvation Army. The GIA, strongly apposed the stands of moderates' like Abbas Madani. They vowed to bring down the state by following violent *jihad*.

Shortly after the military takeover, Muhammad Boudiaf, who was in exile, was called head a five-men High State Council. The new regime took drastic measure against fundamentalist organizations. Many of the FIS leaders were arrested and thousands of its supporters were detained in desert camps. The autonomous network of independent mosque was suppressed. Many private mosque were closed down. In fact government replaced 40 percent of the imams of Algeria's 9000 mosques.<sup>31</sup>

This strategy of confrontation and suppression led to vicious violence by extremist groups. A holy war was proclaimed Senior government officials, army and security official were the potential targets. Later came a terrorists drive against the intellectuals, judges, journalist and academicians. During the last two month of summer in 1994, thirty teachers and schools

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<sup>30</sup> Mohmud A Faksh, n.3, p.73.

<sup>31</sup> Robert Wright, "Islam and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, (New York), vol. 71 (Summer 1992), pp.134-45.

directors were killed and 58 schools suffered bomb attacks. By the end of 1994, GIA had assassinated 142 teachers.<sup>32</sup>

Not only in Algeria, GIA had formed network throughout the western Europe and thus embroiled other foreign governments in the conflict. Terrorist activities are carried out in France, Spain, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Luxemburg.<sup>33</sup>

The threatening consequences to the military led to a reorganization of the Army structure. In February 1994, the government freed some 10,000 common law prisoners to form anti-Fundamentalist militia called the Groups de Legitime Defense (GLD). The Army also created 50,000 men special task force to fight the insurgent in urban centres called as 'Ninjas'. Consequently this led militarization of Algerian society.<sup>34</sup>

According to the Ministry of justice, in 1995, there were around 16000 political prisoners in the country. By 1995, 600 hundred schools were burned down by the fundamentalist organizations. Some 2500 people were reported to be missing. About 500 journalists were forced to leave the country. Around 70 intellectuals and 85 Imams were killed.<sup>35</sup> This had led to psychological fear among masses. Fundamentalist activities included mutilations, throat slitting, beheadings disembowelments.

Added to this cauldron is the Berber factor which makes the matter more worse. The Berber area near the Kabyle of Algiers is the strong of secularists as well as socialist parties like FFS and RCD. The demands of these parties are antithesis of the fundamentalist agenda. They are in favour of the secular democratic and plural society. Berbers are against Arabization. Similarly the imposition of *sharia*, aspect of which contrivance their

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<sup>32</sup> Quntan Wiktorowicz, n.12.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>34</sup> Mahmud – Mahmoud Mahamedou, n.27, p.218.

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, p.219.

traditional tribal customs, is strongly resisted by them. Many Berber have taken up arms as part of the anti terrorist local militia.<sup>36</sup>

Due to the standoff in the protracted and vicious conflict among the Algerian's, the growing powers exercised by the army, and moreover due to the diminishing prospect of democracy, increased the chasm between secular political parties and the regime. President Zeroual moved cautiously in search of the settlement. He opened the talks with the major opposition forces. Repeated talks were held between government official and Abbas Madani and Ali Belhaj. As a consilatory gesture government released two prominent FIS figures, Sheikh Ai Jeedi and Sheikh Abdul Kader Boukhamkham. However, there was no apparent outcome.

But by mid-January 1995, the prospect for a negotiated settlement were rekindled. During the Rome meeting of the Algerian opposition parties, which was held under the auspices of the Sant Edigio Catholic community, the leading political parties like FLN, the FIS and FFS, which together won about 85% of the vote in December 1991 parliamentary election agreed on the National Pact. The main agenda of National Pact was restoration of civil and democratic civil society under the rule of law and rejection of all forms of dictatorship, respect for human rights and individuals freedom regardless of linguistic, ethnic, religious differences; release of all political prisoners, an end to military's intervention and lifting the ban on FIS.

The Rome agreement was a sort of victory for the FIS. Its position was considerable boosted and it gained more legitimacy compared with the other opposition parties. But at the same time it did not renounce its goal of an Islamic state or call for an end to *jihad*. The radical Islamic militant like GIA, decried the FIS role for the Rome accord and vowed to continue the armed struggle.

The government also changed its strategy. It showed moderation in dealing with the opposition parties that endorsed it. In fact for the first time,

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<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, p.79.

in almost four years, a public rally was organized by the opposition, which was attended by around 10,000 people in Algiers in June 1995 a meeting that could not have taken place without government acquiescence.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, the government announced the presidential elections. According to President Zeroual, the presidential vote was described as the legitimate means to conduct direct dialogues with people. But the National Pact parties withheld their support. They were against elections held by the military controlled government. The Rome Accord was also not implemented. Due to the absence of major political Parties presidential elections hardly restored political stability. In fact presidential election only reconfirmed the existing power structure sustained by the military-technocratic administrative alliance. The landslide victory of president Zeroual, over the main contenders – Nahnah of Hamas, Boukrouh of Algerian Renewal Party and Sadi of RCD probably strengthened the regimes determination to maintain political structure.

After election president Zeroual backed by landslid victory was determined to exclude the fundamentalist in any future negotiations. Regime seemed more inclined to negotiate with the moderates like Hamas and the Algerian Renewal Party, which together had won 30 percent of the vote. In fact it considered them to be legitimate Islamic movement on the scene.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile the violence continued unabated with militant group and security forces appeared determined to match each other. The GIA had launched series of attack resulting in hundred of deaths. The security killed about 1300 militants in March 1995 in the region of Ain Defla, and Media region. The government imposed strict measures on media to suppress reports on the extent of violence.

In1997 Zeroual amended constitution. Series of changes were introduced. But the most significant of all changes was a ban on political

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<sup>37</sup>        *ibid.*, p.80.

<sup>38</sup>        *ibid.*

parties that were based on religion, language, gender and regional differences.

During June 1998, violent ethnic protest in the Kebyle region took place following the assassination of Lounes Matoub, who was outspoken critic of fundamentalist and the government. The protest further escalated due to implementation of controversial legislation on the compulsory use of Arabic. Berber activists fiercely opposed the Arabization policy of regime.

Due to his ill health president Zeroual announced that presidential election would take place in March 1999, nearly two years ahead of schedule. Abdelazzi Bouteflika, who was one of the candidate for election, commanded the support of the mainstream FLN and the RND. Though there was assurance given by the military not to nominate the members of armed forces for presidency, but the public support to Bouteflika by the retired member of arm forces, a gave rise to widespread cynicism regarding the military's assurance of its neutrality.

The presidential election was held on 15<sup>th</sup> April 1999. Bouteflika won 73.8% of the vote caste. At his inauguration on 27 April, Bouteflika reiterated his comment to end the civil conflicts in Algeria. Bouteflika proposed peace plans, which were incorporated in a Law on Civil Concord, where by amnesty was granted for members of armed Islamist groups who surrendered within a six months deadline and were not implicated in mass killings, rape or bomb on public places. The support for Bouteflika was reflected in nation referendum held on 16<sup>th</sup> September. For the first time in the history of Post-independent Algeria, Bouteflika exhibited unprecedented condour by admitting in August 1999. This civil conflict had caused at least 100,000 people (hitherto the authorities had put the number of deaths 30,000). Moreover, he also admitted widespread abuse of state monopolies. By the end of the October Boutlefka pardon 5000 pensioners and had released about 14500 of the prisoners.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> *Middle East and North Africa*, 2000, p.210.

In January 2000, following the discussion between representatives of AIS, the army and the government, an agreement was reached. AIS promised to disband in return for the restoration of the civil and political rights. Moreover, it was also decided that the rebels who would be pardon would assist the security forces in apprehending members of GIA, and its break up group, the *Groupe Sarlafiste pour la predication et le combat* (GSPC).

In spite of this, violence persisted following the expiry of the deadline for amnesty under the Law of Civil Concord. In fact since the expiring of the general amnesty in January 2000 terrorists and 100 civilians were killed till July 2000. By the end of 2000 there was sharp escalation in violence. It added weight to the arguments of those who believed that civil conflict in Algerian was far from resolution. Bouteflika ` policy towards fundamentalist has given rise to tension between Bouteflika, the military high command and those parties that are apposed to any appeasement with militant fundamentalist. Boutlefka policy towards fundamentalist organization is been regarded by army as too willing to make concessions to the Islamists. Army is more interested in safe guarding its interest by playing the role as supreme arbiter of national politics. The military bureaucratic- secularist power elite seems to prevail against the fundamentalist challenge. Due to inability of fundamentalist to bring down power structure, military bureaucratic regime will continue to keep its hold on power. Due to extremely fragmentary nature of fundamentalist organization peace making seems to be extremely difficult task. The Berber factors makes the situation more complex.

## CHAPTER-5

### Conclusion

The emergence of fundamentalist movement at the global level is one of the most important aspect of our contemporary era. Themes about the Islamic fundamentalism started with the Iranian revolution and which were greatly amplified with the demise of USSR. For fundamentalist religion is the primary basis for nation building. For them Islam is an ideology on the basis of which they want to restructure the society. One of the most important aspect of fundamentalist is that they want to reformulate modernity using the discursive terms of Islamic heritage. Thus they are not against modernity. In fact various fundamentalist groups are now super-national, transcending the boundary of the nation state. This shows the about late universalism – a vision of work with order based Islam is their central concern.

In Algeria the emergence of fundamentalist movement was due socio-economic and cultural crisis. The rentier economy is highly politicized and centralized, decentralization of the economic power to often spills over the political area, diffusing political power. This is what happened in Algeria. Due to glut in the world oil prices market led to drastic reduction of revenue. Consequently the regime could not longer “buy” acquiescence in their rule. The policy of political relaxation was one of the device for buying acquiescence. The void thus created was filled up by the fundamentalist groups. It seems that Chadli had erred in opening the political system when the economic change was shaking the foundation of society. Infact it is extremely difficult for fledging democracy to support change from socialism to capitalism.

The fundamentalist were quick to capitalize on the growing despair and they blamed the misgovernance of the state for it. It was argued that



states misgovernance and adaptation of alien Western ideology was responsible for the crisis. Thus fundamentalist movement was a response to socio-economic crisis. Islamic resurgence had offered people an alternative to other alien ideologies. Islamic culture offer an indigenous way to overcome cultural alienation. Due to its indigenous characteristic Islam has more chance of reaching and mobilizing broad sections of people. The fundamentalist by using Islamic culture try to motivate the people and thus they expand their constituencies. Due to the hold of Islam on the masses, Islamic ideology has a natural advantage in mobilizing masses compared to secular ideologies.

The one element which is fairly consistent in fundamentalist movement is the rejection of west and things associated with the west. In fact for fundamentalist this incompatibility is timeless and the most essential characteristic feature of the relationship between Islam and west. Fundamentalist claim to have an immutable, absolute divine message, that they must deliver it and if circumstances permit, imposes on all humanity. The content of this divine message for all of humanity is the *Sharia*.

For fundamentalist their is only one solution for all social, political and moral problems and that is the notion of Islamic order / *al-nizam al-Islam*. The fundamentalist discourse is more concerned with ethical issues rather rational political discourse, having a through analysis of current state of affairs is lacking in fundamentalist discourse. The scriptural reference are invoked by the fundamentalist are both arbitrary and selective. They quote Islamic scriptures to defence or disprove any specific interpretation regarding the notion of Islamic government.

In Algeria there are numerous fundamentalist groups. In fact the fundamentalist movement in Algeria is extremely fragmentary. The FIS is one of the most prominent organization. To a large extent FIS resembles the FLN. As a front it is composed of different tendencies. In fundamentalist movement one can observe both radical and moderate tendencies. Radical

tendency is represented by organization such as GIA. They are strictly driven by religious dogmas. Any compromise with the regime is interpreted as going away from Quranic principles. The moderate tendency is represented by organization such as al-Nahada and Hamas. They don't support the extremely violent ways as followed by the radical. Moderate as well as radical have different interpretations of *Quaran*. Thus the fundamentalist movement is extremely fragmentary. It is characterized by various organizations which are loosely affiliated, each having it own leadership, strategy, tactics and religious dogmas.

The fundamentalist have succeeded in striking deep root in the society. They have followed various strategies for this. They have been sponsoring social welfare activities. In fact many tasks of the state are taken over by them. They have tried to bring efficiency in administration. For example, when FIS won the local election it tried to remove grievances of the people by bringing efficiency in administration.

The constituencies of fundamentalist movement cut across the class structure. The middle class, poor people, private entrepreneurs are attracted towards it. The masses of fundamentalist movement are migrant poor. The poor people are most susceptible to the fundamentalist ideology due to their alienation, priority, illiteracy, etc. Another section of society which is the main source of resource for fundamentalist movement are unemployed youth. The youths are enables to find employment due to various reasons like overpopulation, declining number of jobs, failure of so called socialist policy etc. These youths are easily carried away by the fundamentalist ideology. The intellectuals support the fundamentalist movement due to crisis in ideology. The failure of "a Arab Socialist Model" as well as failure of ideologies like Secularism, Nationalism, Marxism's has brought about crisis of ideologies.

The fundamentalist organization in Algeria are linked to various organization across the Arab World. Countries like Saudi Arabia are sponsoring the fundamentalist activities.

The popularity of fundamentalist group like FIS can be gauged from the fact that it was able to build membership base of three million, from various section of society, within one year of its inception. It won 55 percent of the national popular vote in 1981 election. But FIS was unable to come to power due to the military coup. Naturally it felt cheated. Till the coup FIS had non violent strategies. But the coup gave rise to radicalized fundamentalist groups like GIA.

The authoritarian regime in Algerian had tried to suppress the fundamentalist groups by arresting the leader, suppressing its cadre and closing down the private mosque. This strategy of confrontation and suppression led to drastic escalation of violence.

The other complicating factor in Algeria is Berber issue. The fundamentalist agenda is antithesis of Berber's demands. Berber are against Arabization policy. In fact various regimes have suppressed Berber. Many Berber have taken arms as part of the antiterrorist local militia.

Inspite of all this, the prospect of negotiated settlement were rekindled. In 1995, where various parties, like FIS, FFS, FLN took part in formulating National Pact. The main agenda of the National Pact was rejections of dictatorship, respect for human rights and individual freedoms, release of all political prisoners and lifting the ban of FIS.

The government did not implement the National Pact. This again escalated tension between fundamentalist groups and regime. The presidential election which was held in June 1995 was boycotted by the major political parties. Parties like Hamas which took part in election were consequently considered as legitimate Islamic movement on the scene by the regime. Meanwhile, the other radical fundamentalist groups like GIA continued unabated violence against the regime. Thousands of people were

killed hundreds of schools were burned and human rights were violently suppressed.

The prospect of negotiated settlement rekindled again during Bouteflika's regime. Bouteflika proposed peace plan, which was incorporated in a Law of Civil Concord. According a general amnesty was to be granted to Islamic groups which would surrender within a six months of deadline. Boutflika realised around 14,000 prisoners. Inspite of this the violence had continued unabated. Bouteflikas policy towards fundamentalist groups has given rise to tension between government, army and Berber's.

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