

**PASHTUNISTAN AS AN ELEMENT IN
AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY
1947-1973**

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A Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Philosophy
of the School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University.

NEW DELHI

1973

PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE

AS AN ELEMENT IN

AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY

1947 — 1973

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P R E F A C E

The significance of a political movement in the context of today's international power politics is determined by the extent of its internal and external influence and dimension and also by the amount of power politics involved in it. This very fact makes a political phenomenon into a controversial and complicated dispute between the parties concerned, inspite of its obvious reality.

Pashtunistan issue, as deeply rooted in history, is one such major problem. In spite of being an established reality, it has been either neglected or looked upon by the countries concerned and the opposing power blocs only in terms of their specific military and political interests and programs without any regard to its legal or humanitarian aspects.

Pashtunistan, a legacy of European colonialism, is the cause of Pashtuns and Baluchis for their freedom which Afghanistan in view of its racial, cultural and traditional ties with the people continues to support on the basis of their right to self-determination.

This study is an attempt to analyse the Pashtunistan issue as an element in Afghan foreign policy. It tends to examine the factors responsible for the Afghan advocacy and its impact on the Pashtun issue. It also examines the significance of the

Pashtun problem in relation to the vital interests of Afghanistan and the people of Pashtunistan as well.

The study comprises of an introduction with five chapters, nine appendices and a selected bibliography. The introduction identifies the subject matter of this study. Chapter I discusses, in common, the ecological environments and the socio-economic structure of both Afghanistan and Pashtunistan which have a direct relation and a vital bearing on the affairs of both people together. Chapter II traces the historical background and the origin of the problem and examines the Afghan position in its relation. Chapter III examines the Pashtun problem and the attitude of Afghanistan at the time of Pakistan's emergence. Chapter IV is a reflection of Afghanistan's continuous efforts for a settlement of the issue with Pakistan. It discusses the Afghan foreign policy objectives and examines the interplay of power politics and the impact of the power blocs' rivalries regarding Afghanistan and the Pashtun issue during the cold war era. It also examines the extent to which the Pashtun issue had influenced Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and vis-a-vis other powers. Chapter V is an attempt to reveal the factors responsible for the change and the tides in Afghan foreign policy on the Pashtun problem and includes an examination of the attitudes and involvements of foreign powers. It also examines the new orientation in the Pashtun movement and tends to explain the implications of the new developments specially the emergence of

Iran as a major threatening and expansionist power in the region. The last part presents analyses and conclusions.


This study is largely the product of the guidance and generosity of others. My gratitude and thanks are due to Professor K.P. Misra, Chairman of the Center of International Politics and Organization, Dr. R.C. Sharma and other staff members of the Centre and the School. I am much indebted to them for their valuable guidance and advice. I am especially grateful to my Supervisor, Professor M.L. Sondhi for his valuable guidance in preparing this study. I would always remember his generosity, affection and encouragement with which I have always been received most willingly.

I am also very grateful to the staff of the libraries of the Indian Council of World Affairs, School of International Studies, and the Central Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for their help and assistance in getting access to much source materials.

New Delhi
6th June, 1973.


Mohammad Omer Hewadyar

Afghanistan & Pakistan



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Pashtunistan Issue As An Element In Afghan Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is one of the largest landlocked countries occupying a highly significant strategic position in the heartland of the Asian continent. It is the largest part of the Hindu Kush region which historically and geographically forms the highland of a separate ethnic and cultural people to the South of Central Asia between the subcontinent of India and the West Asia. The eastern and southern part of this geographic region is the Pashtun-Baluch territory west of the Indus river, now under Pakistani control, and this has become a burning problem as the Pashtunistan Issue.

The long course of the history of the Hindu Kush region is a reflection of its cultural and political significance as a "crossroad of civilizations" and a "highway of conquest" between east and west. It has, therefore, played a vital role in shaping the history and traditions of entire Asia. It has served as buffer as well as a transmitting zone throughout the ages for eastern and western influences.

The present name Afghanistan is not the original name of the region. In ancient times it was known as Aryana and later at the beginning of the Islamic period it assumed the name of Khorasan — the land of the rising Sun. The name Afghanistan

was given to the region during the first half of the eighteenth century, when it emerged as a nation-state identifying the land of the Afghans as situated between the two great rivers of Oxus in the north and the Indus on the east.

(However, as a consequence of Anglo-Russian rivalries during the nineteenth century, Afghanistan fell a victim of power politics between its two big neighbours — British India and Tsarist Russia, as a result of which in a period of less than eighty years Afghanistan was involved in three major wars with Britain and a serious skirmish with Tsarist Russia. In this period Afghanistan received heavy damage especially the loss of territory east of the Indus river — the present Pashtun-Baluch territory under Pakistan — and the retention of control over the country's foreign policy by Britain as a result of the Second Anglo-Afghan war and the imposition of the Durand line on the Amir of Afghanistan in 1893. These conquests by European powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to threaten the political and cultural existence of Afghanistan until (1907) they were stopped by the present delimited area of Afghanistan as reduced to a small landlocked area, the present position, losing sovereignty over all its eastern and southern parts.)

(Afghanistan achieved its total independence in 1919 as a result of the Third Anglo-Afghan war. Casting off the British control over its external affairs, Afghanistan under King

Amanulla Khan established extensive contacts with European powers and various Asian countries and was internationally recognized.) Comprehensive social and economic programs were initiated to transform the entire socio-economic structure of Afghanistan. Attempts were made to regain its territories under the British and the small part occupied by the Russians in 1895. But the European control of Asian politics and their threats and jealousies on the one hand and the limited resources at the disposal of Afghans on the other, offered little or no scope for the realization of Afghan foreign policy objectives. As a result the hopes and the attempts made by Amanullah, the Afghan ruler, to recover Afghan territories and to increase and strengthen Afghan power, were ultimately foiled by the evergrowing Communist control of Central Asia in the north and the underground British interference in Afghan domestic conditions to oust the anti-British Afghan ruler. Because the British could see a free and strong pro-Soviet Afghanistan, supporting the cause of Indian nationalists, as a threat to their security in the subcontinent. Thus they continued to help subversion in Afghanistan until they succeeded in instigating a successful revolution by bandits to overthrow the ambitious energetic Afghan ruler in 1929.

The fact that Afghanistan since then till early 1950's remained in a virtual state of isolationism, passive neutralism, little or no concern about the problem of eastern Pashtuns, and in a state of retardation regarding social change and economic

development, was the result of these unhappy past memories of Western powers and also the change in nature of the new rulership in Afghanistan. This state of affairs continued until the British withdrawal from the subcontinent of India in 1947, which offered Afghans a new opportunity and freedom of action to raise their voice for the cause of the Pashtuns according to their own wishes. While the growing Pashtun nationalism on both the Afghan side and the Pakistan side championed the Pashtunistan cause, the cold war between the super powers on the one hand and the arming of Pakistan and its use of force on the Pashtuns on the other, suppressed the Pashtunistan movement and the resultant frustration brought a new orientation in the movement.

Today, as a consequence of Afghanistan's failure to offer substantial support to the cause of Pashtuns and also as a result of the emerging new forces and the changing conditions in the relationship of both the super powers and the neighbouring countries and also as a result of expansionist ambitions of Iran, the problem of the Pashtuns has assumed a new dimension leading it to a new orientation. And since it is a problem more cultural and ethnic in nature rather than merely political, it concerns the Afghan people and the government deeply and hence it is bound to bear a vital influence on Afghan foreign policy and its relation with Pakistan and also with other powers.

Therefore, this study attempts to examine the cause of Pashtunistan as an element in Afghan foreign policy. It also

examines the background and the nature of the problem and attempts to show its relation with the Afghans. Geographical and economic factors and various cultural ethnic and linguistic ties existing between the Afghans and Pashtun-Baluch people, which tend to have a direct bearing on Afghan foreign policy, are examined. The study also traces the historical developments which have culminated in the present political problem in the region. A brief examination of the Pashtun struggles for their cause of liberation is inevitably added to find out the magnitude of the problem. After having examined the Pashtun problem the study attempts to assess the Afghan foreign policy with regard to the issue at different stages of its execution, and an effort is made to answer a number of questions which arise regarding the failure of Afghan policy of Pashtunistan issue. (Furthermore the study attempts to examine the new orientation in the nature of the new developments and tends to find out the factors responsible for the new changes in Afghan foreign policy towards the Pashtun problem. The attitude of the super powers and the neighbouring countries towards the Pashtunistan issue and the Pakistani government's reaction is also studied in the light of Afghan foreign policy.) And finally the likely character of various political, cultural and economic factors which tend to be responsible for possible future Afghan foreign policy options and the likely resultant consequences, are examined critically.

These and related questions arising regarding the Pashtun problem as an element in Afghan foreign policy, are subject of study in the following chapters of this dissertation.

Chapter I

Political Ecology of the Hindu-Kush region

The foreign policy of a country which determines its position on a certain international issue is largely the reflection of its physical and human ecology — its physiography, economy, people and the culture. Hence to understand the Pashtunistan issue as an element in Afghan foreign policy, it is inevitably necessary to discuss some of the relevant ecological factors which reflect Afghanistan's relation vis-a-vis the problem of Pashtunistan.

For the purpose of a better understanding of the Pashtun problem a different approach has been adopted for the discussion of the common political ecology of the region related to the problem. Hence an effort is made to recount these common ecological factors in the larger context — the Hindu-Kush region consisting of Afghanistan and the Pashtun-Baluch territory under Pakistan which comes under the name of Pashtunistan and which formerly belonged to Afghanistan.

Pashtunistan

The partition of India in 1947, however, created certain difficulties, and Pashtunistan stands as one of the most serious and complicated issues which has ever since affected gravely the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is a claim

for independence by Pashtuns based upon the principles of human rights, the right to self-determination.

Afghanistan in accordance with its general policy and in view of its common racial and cultural relations with the Pashtun people supports their claim and has insisted that a plebiscite be held among the Pashtuns whether they want their self-determination or prefer to remain with Pakistan.

(Pashtunistan or the land of Pashtuns, is the name adopted by the Pashtuns themselves for the entire Pashtun and Baluch territory under Pakistan.¹ The area is an Afghan territory inhabited by Afghan people which was occupied by the British during the nineteenth century in the name of the security of British Indian Empire.) (During the partition of the subcontinent of India, the Pashtuns raised their voice for a separate state called "Pathanistan" which was changed later on, and called as "Pashtunistan".) (The demand of the Pashtuns inspite of the Afghan request was not entertained and their territory was handed over to Pakistan by means of an unrealistic referendum which was bycotted by the majority of Pashtuns on the ground that it did not provide a third alternative of voting for a separate state for the Pashtuns.) (The Pashtuns since then have

1. On August 12, 1949, a number of Afridi tribes met at Bagh, Tirah, the centre of their land, and after deliberation announced the establishment of a new nation called Pashtunistan. This declaration was followed by a similar declaration of Jirga in Waziristan which appointed Fakir of Ipi as its President (of Southern Independent Pashtunistan). See for detail, chapter III of this dissertation.

continued their struggle for independence till this day inspite of their severe sufferings caused by Pakistani oppressions and imprisonments.) Afghanistan has also made continuous efforts to persuade Pakistan to agree to some peaceful solution of the problem through negotiations. The government of Pakistan has never responded either to the demands of Pashtuns or to the Afghan line of argument and therefore the problem still remains unresolved and tends to be serious and complicated.

Pashtunistan according to the Pashtun proclamation of 1949 and its recognition by Afghanistan consists of three main parts: the "Tribal Territory"; the Northwest Frontier Province; and Baluchistan.² The "Tribal Territory" is called the Independent Pashtunistan" and is inhabited by a number of independent tribes, under nominal control of Pakistan which lies between Afghanistan and the so-called North-West Frontier Province. The N.W.F.P. is called the "Occupied Central Pashtunistan" which falls under the actual control of Pakistan. It is situated between the Tribal Territory and the Indus river on the east. The city of Peshawar is the capital of Central "Occupied Pashtunistan" or the so-called North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.). The third part is Baluchistan which is called the "Southern Occupied Pashtunistan". The city Quetta is the capital of Baluchistan or the "Southern Occupied Pashtunistan".

2. The Pashtun proclamation of August 12, 1947, received immediate Afghan recognition. Loya Jirga was convened which approved the recognition and declared all treaties between Afghanistan and Britain null and void. See, Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, New York, 1965, pp.254-55.

Pashtunistan, both independent, and under Pakistan's occupation, is an area of more than 190,000 square miles with a Pashtun and Baluch population of over thirteen millions. It extends from the Pamir massif on the north to the shores of the Arabian Sea in the South and the Iranian frontier to the West, and includes all the territory lying between Afghan border and the Indus river which is a natural, geographical and cultural boundary between the area and the sub-continent of India.

The term "Pathanistan" used by some writers earlier, is the Indian variant for Pashtunistan. Pashtuns or Afghans are known as Pathans throughout the subcontinent of India.

Common Physiography

Afghanistan and Pashtunistan, categorically, represent a separate identical physiographic region, referred to sometimes as the land of the Hindu-Kush, which is physiographically different from the neighbouring surrounding regions by virtue of its rugged and mountainous nature and its varied and mixed physiographic features.

The area of the Hindu-Kush dominated by the great Hindu-Kush mountains and located between the two great rivers of Oxus on the north and the Indus on the east, is defined by a series of natural boundaries. While Oxus 1700 miles long with its 700 miles length and beyond that the Depression of Central Asia makes a natural boundary on the north between the Hindu-

Kush region (Afghanistan) and the Soviet people's republic of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen, the Indus 1800 miles long forms a natural, cultural and ethnic boundary to the east which separates Pashtunistan — the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, from the subcontinent of India. This is a boundary where in the past as a barrier "for thousand years the influence of Hinduism has stopped at its banks; geographically, culturally and ethnographically India is the country. southeast of the Indus and south of the Himalayas.³ To the South the region stretches through Baluchistan upto the Arabian Sea shores, making a coastal boundary with sea. On the west with the exception of adjacent Seistan and Baluch territory under Iran, the extensive and empty deserts of the great Iranian plateau separates the region from Iran and the west.⁴ Thus the rugged physiography with its natural frontiers identify the region as a separate geographic entity eventually different from the regions beyond the Depression of Central Asia, the plains of subcontinent to the east and the Iranian plateau to the West.

3. Arthur Swinson, North-West Frontier Province, (Corgi Edition), London, 1969, p. 18.

4. The Baluch territory under Iran formed part of Baluchistan before the British annexation of Baluchistan to the British Indian Empire during the 19th century. Prior to that both Baluchistan and the Seistan province as of now divided between Afghanistan and Iran formed parts of Afghanistan. However, the Pashtunistan issue and the recent developments in Pashtun-Baluch regions, has encouraged a feeling of secessionism among the Baluchis living in Iran.

The region is generally a highland of more than 460,000 square miles with an estimated population of over thirty millions of culturally and racially linked ethnic groups of a religion-oriented tribal culture. Afghanistan forms the northwestern larger part of the region with an area of 270,000 square miles and a predominantly Pashtun population of over seventeen millions. The remaining part of the region — Pashtunistan, is inhabited by the same people and lies south and east to the west of the Indus river under the political control of Pakistan. Formerly, before the British annexation of this latter part during the nineteenth century, Afghanistan consisted of the whole region and at present the so-called Durand line separates this area from Afghanistan resulting in the cultural ethnic and economic disintegration of the region and the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue.

Situated at the "crossroad of ancient world" on the "highway of conquest" Afghanistan — which included also the present Afghan territory under Pakistan, was large enough to sustain a vigorous society, and rugged enough to offer major terrain obstacles to invaders. "As natural barricade wedged between Iran, Siberia, Sinkiang and the subcontinent of India", Afghanistan has always been a "pivot", in the words of Iqbal, "a throbbing heart of Asia". As "keepers of the crossroads" the Afghans or Pashtuns or the Pathans as are synonymously named, have battled an endless stream of invaders who have funnelled into

their land through the high mountain passes.⁵

Afghanistan's highly significant strategic position made it vulnerable to invasions from both Central Asia and the West. It has also influenced the delimitation of the country's frontiers, which are political and strategic than ethnic, cultural or economic in origin. The existence of some small ethnic, racial and linguistic groups throughout the country reflects its particular historical geographical position. Similarly the economy of the region has been constantly affected by the political developments in the surrounding regions, which frequently resulted in the destruction of the region's economy and integrity and the obstruction of trade crossing the Afghan territories. Most of the thriving urban centres of Afghanistan -- Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, Peshawar and Mazari-Sharif, as situated in proximity to its borders, in the fertile valleys at the junctions of trade-routes, were frequently captured by various invaders, paralysing Afghan economy, its social and cultural integrity. Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Peshawar as strategic "Gates of India", were coveted many times by the contending empires, who used them "for the defence of India or as spring-boards for the invasion of that subcontinent." The eastern and southern Afghan territory now under Pakistan were annexed by the British Indian Empire for the same reason.⁶

5. Mohammed Ali, The Afghans, Kabul, 1969, pp. 2-3.

6. Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan -- Politics of Reform and Modernization: 1880-1946, California, 1969, p.11.

Afghanistan was not only the "highway of conquest" for the migratory people and expanding empires but it was also both a "crossroad of civilizations and religions and a centre of international trade and commerce. The various east-west trade routes passed through its northern, southern and south-eastern plains and over its mountain passes; linking Europe with the Far East, China and the Indian subcontinent.⁷

As Egypt is called the "gift of the Nile" Afghanistan and Pashtun-Baluch territory under Pakistan may also be called "the gift of the Hindu-Kush" for its lofty snow-capped summits feeding the rivers which have sprung many civilizations, cultures and ways of life. The region with an average height of 4000 feet above sea level displays four principal geographic features: (a) the massive Hindu-Kush mountain ranges, a high plateau, that runs through the whole of central Afghanistan and also through the "Tribal Territory" and northern part of Baluchistan; (b) the foothills of these mountain ranges with green fertile valleys located throughout the Central and northern parts of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan; (c) the sloping plains and steppes watered by the rivers flowing from the ranges which run on three parallel lines over the region between the mountains — the Bactrian

7. Ibid., The famous "Silk-route" passed through Afghanistan and Chinese silk and silken goods, Indian goods and spices were to be exchanged there for goods coming from Iraq and Europe. As a result of which Afghan cities along the routes had emerged as great urban centres in Asia.

plains in the north, Kandahar, Hilmand and Herat plains in south of Afghanistan, and the plains between the Indus and the tribal territory covering Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts on the Pashtunistan side; and (d) the endless undulating plains and wasteland in the north, southeast of Afghanistan and a major part of northern and southwestern Baluchistan.

Thus Afghanistan and the Pashtun-Baluch territory represent a land of violent contrasts and varieties of climate, with a general slope from the northeast to the south and southwest. More than half of its land is a high plateau traversed by lofty mountains, snow-capped for the greater part of the year. The valleys surrounded by hills and mountains, are extremely fertile and beautiful which "appear like green gems set in the lap of mountains".⁸ The other half of the region covering largely the adjacent southwestern part of Afghanistan and a major part of Baluchistan, is flat and sandy, desolate and dusty, where the very wind is often suffocating. Although snow and rain, originating in the high precipitous ranges of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan, provide adequate water and power resources for the region, most of the water is wasted rather than retained and used for cultivation. The rivers receive precipitation during the winter and early spring and discharge a maximum amount of water during the months of April and May, causing frequent floods. The rivers

8. No. 5, p. 3.

are unsuitable for navigation. The region has a continental climate. The prevailing conditions are dryness combined with extremes of temperatures. Because of its climatical variations, the region is ideal for the cultivation of varieties of vegetables, fruits and crops.

The most prominent topographic feature of the region is the massive mountain range variously known on its 700-mile course as Hindu-Kush, Kohi Baba, Siya Koh and so on, that runs from northeast to west dominating the whole of central Afghanistan with normal elevations of 13,000 to 20,000 feet and peaks up to 25,000 feet. The range cuts off the Afghan northern regions from the major provinces of Kabul, Nangrahar, Kandahar and Herat in the south and west of the country. The eastern ranges of the Hindu-Kush radiating from the Pamir on the northeast, run southwest and south to dominate eastern Afghanistan the Tribal Territory and northeastern Baluchistan.⁹ They include Safid Koh, with peaks to 15,000 feet; the Sulaiman Mountains, reaching 11,500 feet; and the Kirthar which swing across Baluchistan.

While the Hindu-Kush has served as a barrier to the political, cultural, and economic integration of Afghanistan, the

9. The "Tribal Territory" is situated between Afghanistan and the administrative boundary of the settled Pashtun districts — the N.W.F.P., which extends from the Sulaiman mountains and the Gomal Pass in the South, to Chitral and the Pamirs in the north, covering an area of 24,986 Sq. miles.

Abdul Qaiyum, "Golds and Guns on the Pathan Frontier", Bombay, 1945, p. 5.

eastern ranges have consistently provided direct and easier approaches to the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan resulting in close and constant cultural contacts between the two parts of Afghan or Pashtun territory separated by these ranges. The accesses across the Hindu-Kush to the northern regions of Afghanistan are formidable obstacles. For example until 1953, there was no adequate direct road linking the Kabul and Kandahar with the northern provinces. The existing roads traversed such hazardous passes as Khawak at 11,640 feet, Ak-Robat at 12,560 feet, and Qipchak at 13,900 feet, which were impassable for at least six months of the year during snowy season. These passes and the narrow rocky gorges which are even higher than some mountains forced both commercial and military expeditions to take a long and circuitous route from Kabul to Kandahar and Herat.¹⁰ On the other hand the passes on the eastern ranges — the famous Khyber, the Kurram, the Bolan and the Gomal, names which reoccur again and again in the history of Afghans, are not as high as that of the Hindu-Kush ranges. They are passable throughout the year and provide easy and direct approaches between Afghanistan and Pashtun territory under Pakistan.

All these approaches to the Indus valley have played an important role in Afghan history and in shaping the characters

10. No. 6, p. 11.

of the people. It was through these passes that from time immemorial migratory hordes, peaceful traders and pilgrims and conquering armies poured over the fertile plains. The fertile plains beyond the Hindu-Kush were invaded by a series of invaders who pushed the native inhabitants down across the Hindu-Kush to the southern and eastern plains of the region leading them to nomadism and wandering which still prevail in the region. Three hundred years before the Christian era, Alexander the Great who invaded Afghanistan and the subcontinent, used the Khawak and the Khyber passes. A thousand years later the invaders Changiz Khan and Tamurlane also swept down across these passes. From these mountains themselves have sprang warriors and kings who ruled regions beyond towards the north, east and west. These invaders and conquerers had to cross these passes over Afghan territories.

Thus all these strategic passes which lie almost on two parallel strategic defensive and offensive lines between the Oxus and Indus, give the region a significant strategic position as situated between contending larger political units. In fact "anyone forming a defensive line on the Hindu-Kush has the Khyber behind him; anyone falling back to the Indus plain is dominated by the Sulaiman range."¹¹ This has been the dilemma for generations of statesmen and soldiers, policy after policy has been

11. No. 3, p. 20.

tried and discarded. No policy has been successful, and most of them have led to disasters, and the present dispute over Pashtunistan is the result of one such policy pursued by the British in the interest of their security in the subcontinent of India.

In fact it is the functioning of this rugged physiography, topography and its sensitive strategic location which has been responsible for the social, cultural and psychological environments in the region. In fact the history and the character of its people and its other institutions is to a large extent the production of these physical environmental factors. These geographic factors and the awareness of common ethnic and cultural ties among its people, have always turned the region into one of the most politically and socially unstable regions on the earth's surface throughout the long course of its history which is nothing but a reflection of a continuous struggle for political freedom and cultural integrity.

Ethnic Groups and Social System

Ethnic Groups: From its history and its rugged and strategic physiography, the Hindu-Kush region derives another determinant factor characterizing its people, its economy and its social structure, namely, the heterogeneous character of its population. The Hindu-Kush region as a crossroad of Asia has seen a series of invasions throughout the long course of its checkered history,

of which each has left some marks on its inhabitants. The Achaemeneans were followed by Greeks, Parthians, Scythians, Yueh-Chis, Ephthalites and then the Turks, Arabs, Mangols and others who held possessions of parts of the region from time to time leaving their impressions on it. But inspite of their merging into the general population losing their originality, the Afghans or Pashtuns living in mountains-walled valleys, apart from cultural impact seems to have retained largely their remote Aryan originality and characteristics.¹² And inspite of somehow diversity of mixed origin, ethnic and linguistic differences, the fundamental principles of religion and religion-oriented tribal culture hold a bearing sway over the population as a whole.


The principal ethnic groups that make up the thirty million composite population of Afghanistan and the Pashtun-Baluch territory under Pakistan — Pashtunistan, are: the Afghans proper or Pashtuns, Tajiks, Baluchis, Brahuis, Uzbeks, Jats, Lassis, Makranis, Hazarais, Turkmans, Nooristanis, Chatralis, Qezelbashes, Hindus, Jews and a mixture of other central Asian and Indian races. All these are mixed and found more or less all over the

12. The terms "Afghan", "Pashtun" and "Pathan" are synonymous terms denoting the martial race that predominantly inhabit both Afghanistan and Pashtunistan — N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The Pashtuns call themselves Pashtuns or Pakhtuns, the pronunciation of one letter of the name varies in the two accents of the "Pashtu" or "Pakhtu" language. While Afghan is the Persian version of the term, "Pathan" is an Anglocization of the term "Pashtun" or "Pakhtun". See Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, U.S., 1964, p. 57.

region, but each group retains certain characteristics of its own, confined to certain territories, the bulk of which are divided between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan.

The inhabitants of Afghanistan are estimated at seventeen million out of which the true Afghans or Pashtuns constitute a majority of sixty five per cent or a population of eleven millions, who primarily live in the eastern, and southern provinces of the country and a great number of them are sparsely settled in some parts of northern Afghanistan and an equal number of the Pashtuns live in Pashtunistan. Next in number are the Tajiks who number over four million accounting for twenty five per cent of the total population. The remaining are: the Uzbeks, five per cent — 850,000; the Hazarachs, three per cent — 510,000; the Baluchis — 160,000; and other small ethnic groups.¹³ The Tajiks are scattered all over the country specially in the urbanized centers of Afghanistan particularly in the provinces of Kabul, Ghazni and Herat. And while the Hazarachs inhabit the mountainous central part of Afghanistan, the Uzbeks and the Turkmans are predominant

13. A comprehensive census has not yet been made, and thus the figures given are estimates, agreeable with small variations to most of the authorities on Afghanistan. The contention is only with regard to the percentage of Pashtuns whose considerable number (nearly two millions) are still leading nomadic life and hence difficult to reach at a definite estimate. While, according to the UNESCO statistics the Pashtuns are 65%, an Iranian estimate is 70%, and a further new American statistics claims that 75% of the Afghan population account for the Pashtuns. See for details, Abdul Azim Walyan, "Kulyati az Auwazayi Seyasi wa Eqtesadi wa Eitemayi Afghanistan", Tehran (1340 Hijra) - 1961, p. 41.

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in the northern provinces of the country. The Baluchis, the bulk of which live in Baluchistan and whose number is small vis-a-vis other Afghan ethnic groups, inhabit a large part of the southwestern Afghanistan adjacent to Baluchistan. The fair-skinned Nooristanis related somehow to Chitralis are comparatively evenly distributed between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan on the extreme end of northeastern boundary.

In Pashtunistan the traditional inhabitants are predominantly the Pashtuns, the Baluchis and the Brahuis. The total population of Pashtunistan is estimated at thirteen million of which Pashtuns account for nearly eleven millions. The Baluchis and the Brahuis who live primarily in the southern and central and the western parts of Baluchistan account for more than one million. The rest are some indigenous ethnic groups and some other emigrants from Punjab.

In the Tribal "Territory" of two and a half million and in the North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) of eight and a half million Pashtuns, account for ninety three per cent of the total 10,900,000 population, the bulk of them belong to the big tribes which are divided between Afghanistan and the area, by the so-called Durand line. The remaining are the Syeds, the labourer and agriculturist Awans and Gujars and some small percentage of Qizelboshis, Hazaras and Tajiks. In the remote northern mountain valleys of the Malakand Agency and particularly in Chitral, there are a number of small Communities the majority of which

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the Chitralis and Nooristanis and others number about 125,000 and their languages is a mixture of Pashtu, Persian and Sanskrit languages.¹⁴

In Baluchistan, the indigenous or permanent resident population account for ninety one per cent of the province's total population and can be divided into several ethnic groups of which the most important are the Baluchis, Brahuīs, and the Pashtuns. According to 1972 census there were 2,400,000 people in the province of which the Baluchis, after whom the province is named according to 1961 census, accounted for twenty six per cent, the Brahuīs twenty three per cent, and the Pashtuns twenty one per cent of the total population.¹⁵ Other sizable indigenous groups include the Jatts (8%), Lassīs (4%), the distinctive tribes of Makran and others. The Jatts are cultivators in north-central Baluchistan and have their own dialect, Jatti, they are unrelated to the Jatts of Punjab. The Lassīs live in former Las Bella State, their tongue is Lassi. Like Pashtun Ghilzais, most of the Baluchi and Brahui tribes are pastoral nomad tribes.

The Pashtuns, Tajiks and Baluchis are racially and culturally akin as they belong to three related branches of Aryans

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14. The Chitralis resembles the Pashtuns in many respects, and they take pride in calling themselves as Pashtuns. The Pashtun code of honour "Pashtunwali" is common among the Chitralis also. Meya Khan Afridi, "Pashtanah", I vol., (ed.), Kabul (1349, Hijra)-1970, p. 12.
15. The figures given above are calculated from the 1972 census's figures released by the government of Pakistan. See, for detail, Times of India, no. 203, vol. cxxxv, April 15, p.13.

who have settled in the region after the early Aryan migrations from its ancestral homeland Arianum Vijo in the north of Afghanistan on the bank of river Oxus. The only difference between these three communities is their language as the Pashtuns speak Pashtu, the Tajiks speak Dari (commonly known as Persian) and the Baluchis speak Baluchi. These languages belong to the same group of the Indo-European family of languages and although intermingled resembling one another, the degree of mutual intelligibility between them is not great.¹⁶ Out of these languages Pashtu is dominantly spoken both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan. Persian is spoken by the Tajiks and Hazarachs, but since it has been for centuries a prevailing court language in the whole of the Middle East and South Asia, still it remains dominant in Afghanistan as a medium of instruction and ^{as} the official language. Since 1921, governments in Afghanistan seem to have tried to bring the Pashtu language to the level of the National and official language but not much success has been achieved so far. The dilemma has already led to frustrations among the Pashtun community and tends to result in serious consequences if liberal

16. Pashtu like Sanskrit is one of the ancient Aryan languages and as confined to the region's mountainous valleys its purity and originality is so preserved that Pashtu can be regarded as a link with the Ancient Indo-Aryan languages, an opinion confined by Dr. Trumpp's and Dr. Darmesteter's research, Pashtu has a very close relationship with the two famous languages of Sanskrit and Latin. Baluchi is more closer to Pashtu than Persian. See for detail, A. Rahman Pazhwak, Afghanistan or Ancient Aryana, Key press, London, n.d., p. 61.

and materialistic steps are not taken for the officialization of the Pashtu language so as to serve as a unifying factor in the integrity of Afghan Society and the region as well.

In Pashtunistan where the Pashtuns constitute ninety percent majority, the position of the Pashtu language is even worse than in Afghanistan.¹⁷ In fact Pakistan's neglect for the Pashtun culture, and the domination of English and Urdu has offered no scope for the development of Pashtu and Baluchi languages.

The other languages spoken are Uzbeki — a special dialect of Turkish origin, Brahui, Nooristani, Chitrali and some small local languages which are not written.

Ethnic character and cultural traditions: The common history and the typical geographic nature of the Hindu-Kush region have

17. The problem of the development of Pashtu language both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan is a determinant factor in shaping the future Afghan-Pashtun relationship, as its backward position has resulted in frustration among the Pashtun community on both sides. Its most serious consequences are seen in the education system of both Afghanistan and Pashtunistan, where with the present hierarchy of languages a Pashtun youth is subject to learning three languages — Pashto, Persian, English in Afghanistan, and Urdu, English Pashto in Pakistan. His exposure to three languages results in some ability to use all of them but no real proficiency in any of them and that "instead of becoming literate in one language he becomes illiterate in three." And as his mother tongue being not in use either in college life or in service career, he fails to equal himself with those belonging to Persian (in Afghanistan) and Urdu (in Pakistan). This has resulted in a domination and exploitation of situations and opportunities by others both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. See, for, The language problem in Afghanistan, Afghan Private Press Publications between July 10-20, 1972, and also, Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, U.S., 1964, pp. 80-81.

had a significant role in shaping the characters of its people, their social system and cultural traditions.

The rich cultural heritage of the people of the region — the Pashtuns, the Tajiks and the Baluchis, covers a period of more than five thousand years and the evidences of its past civilizations have been found in most parts of the region. During the long course of history the main source of the region's artistic, intellectual and cultural expression have been the Aryan civilization of its northern plains (north of Afghanistan), the Islamic civilization and for relatively shorter periods, the Greek, Roman and the Western influences. In other words the culture of the region is characterized by the Aryan traditions, vitally affected by the significant and far-reaching influences coming from outside. The Islamic traditions have been the most significant and it permeates the very art, thought and character of its people.

The noble Aryan cultural heritage coming into contact with the local culture and its martial, tribal and nomadic traditions has, in fact, produced a new culture,¹⁸ which may rightly be called the culture of the people of Hindu-Kush, as it is common among its major ethnic groups, the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, the Baluchis and other small groups.

Islam is the religion of the 99.7 percent of the people and hence it is a strong unifying factor in the heterogeneous

18. Mohammad Ali, A Cultural History of Afghanistan, (Kabul, 1959), pp. 95-96.

community, which has largely contributed to solidarity and integrity among the people. It has also created a sense of identity with the Muslims in the neighbouring and other countries. Ninety percent of the people belong to the Sunni Sect of Islam and eight per cent are the followers of Shoya sect of Islam. The Shoyas include the Afghan Hazaraha, the Pashtun tribes of Turi and Orakzai and a few others both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan.

Islamic influence specially affected by Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the subcontinent and fanned by Pakistani rulers, seems to have increased religious orthodoxy among the Pashtun and Baluchi tribes. It has resulted in a type of religious revivalism. An ideal Muslim society is one in which religious and temporal authority are united so that the state is the instrument of the religious law as revealed in the holy Quran. This religion has now a pervasive influence in most aspects of life both in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan. Pakistan's advocacy of religious orthodoxy and its stress on Hindu-Muslim animosity, has largely weakened the Afghan government's position over the Pashtunistan issue. It has also weakened the movement leading it to a new orientation. Islam, therefore, has brought good dividends for the Punjabis and has been an important consideration in Pakistan's foreign relations and internal politics.¹⁹

The Social structure of the region is primarily based on tribal, pastoral and nomadic ancient Aryan traditions and these

19. No. 12, p. 1.

remain the mainspring of life in the region. Important are the tribal system and martial traditions specially among the Pashtuns and Baluchis. The Tribal system is primarily based on the principle of "unilinear" descent from common ancestor who lived long ago in Afghanistan. Though, all the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Baluchis are kin to one another through their respective common ancestors, still loyalty to the tribe persists which frequently results in tribal rivalries and jealousies leading to tribal feuds and conflicts, some times of a serious nature in which hundreds of lives are lost. These rivalries and groupisms among the Pashtuns and Baluchis, throughout the long course of their history, have reduced them to a culturally and politically minimum. Under a strong ruler who could unite the tribes, the Pashtuns have "achieved marvels, and were able to establish powerful empires with great centres of art, trade" and learning, while in the absence of a strong central authority, they have destroyed "with their own doings the towering edifices which they had previously erected." In fact, wherever they went, they carried with them their intense jealousy, guarded individualism which in the long run proved their undoing."²⁰

There are numerous Pathan tribes belonging to two main tribes of comparatively equal strength — the Ghelzai and the Durrani. While the majority of the Ghelzais inhabit Afghanistan,

20. In fact, the Afghan history is full of such instances when a brother or a tribe has risen in power, the other brother or the tribe has destroyed it.

the bulk of Durrani are settled in Pashtunistan. Earlier to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Afghan emperor, the Ghelzais were ruling the Afghans. But since 1747 the Durrani have supplied the ruling families in Afghanistan. The numerous Ghelzai and Durrani tribes and lineages, each of which has a more or less clearly defined home territory and which vary in strength from thousands to hundreds of thousands are subdivided into Khels, which are roughly comparable with clans. The Ghelzai are mostly nomads while the Durrani are settled in most of the fertile valleys of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan. Until recently thousands of the Ghelzais specially the Sulaiman Khels annually migrated from the highlands of Afghanistan to the plains of Pashtunistan specially the Indus Valley for grazing their sheep and goats on familiar pastures. But as a result of Afghan support to the Pashtunistan movement, the government of Pakistan stopped the movement of these tribes to Pashtunistan.²¹

The Durand line running between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan divides most of the sub-tribes and even related families inhabiting the two sides of the frontier which has never been based on ethnic, geographic or humanitarian basis and therefore it remains undefined and unrecognized by the tribes. The divided subtribes include the Nooristanis, Mohmands, Safis, Afridis, Shinwaris, Massuds, Waziris, Achekzais, Kakars, Baluchis and

21. No. 19, pp. 60-61.

the Brahuīs, who continuously fought the British for their intervention and imposition of the so-called Durrand line on them which was not a practical line as drawn on a sheet of paper, it severed tribesmen from one another.²²

The numerous Baluchi tribes are divided into two groups — eastern and western, largely on the basis of dialect. The eastern Baluchis, which are greater in number, include seven main tribes, the largest being the Rind, Mari, and Bugti. The western Baluchis include nine main tribes, of which the Rind and Rakhshani are by far the largest. Living in arid and inhospitable terrain they are basically nomads, though many have turned to farming, service and business. The important Pashtun tribes of northern Baluchistan include six tribes of which the Kakar is by far the largest to be followed by the Tarian, Pani and Achekzais who are divided between Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

There are twenty-nine Brahui tribes grouped into four branches: The small nucleus of eight tribes, the true Brahuīs tribes who have supplied the ruling house of Kalat; The Saravan branch who lives in northern Kalat; the Jalawan branch, which includes more than half of the Brahuīs, who lives in southern Kalat; and the fourth branch which contains miscellaneous small tribes. The language of the Brahuīs is a Dravidian tongue akin to those spoken in south India, but in other respects the

22. A.R. Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan — The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, London, n.d., pp. 73-83.

Brahuis have nothing in common with the Dravidians of South India. They seem to have absorbed much of Baluchi blood and resemble them in cultural and tribal traditions. The Brahuis are nomadic farmers and hordsmen moving north and south seasonally. The Brahuis are brave, bold, and dependable people.

Though there are some tribes related to other ethnic groups like the courageous, good natured hard-working Afghan Hozarabs and the shrewd business-like Tajeks, they have lost their tribal character, and are mostly settled in the urbanized regions of Afghanistan.

The clan leader is called "malik", the Arabic title for the king; but the malik has no regal power and only maintains his position through constant exertions. He is little more than the first among the equals. These maliks and chiefs have generally been made corrupt and used first by the British and now by the Pakistani rulers to obtain through them the support of the illiterate tribesmen.

Generally speaking, though the people of the Hindu-Kush region has a heterogeneous character, on the whole, they are bound by common ties of cultural, religious, marital and tribal traditions and common manners and usages. Generally speaking they are most virile, unruly, independent, arrogant, energetic and proud people. Amongst them the Pashtuns and Baluchis are known for their fighting powers, their endless feuds, and their pride in their independent way of life. They have a fierce

spirit of individualism and a vindictive obstinate nature.²³

These stereotypes apply more to the Pashtuns in the "Tribal Territory" the nomadic tribes and tribes inhabiting the two sides of the Durand line, where tribal organization hold good sway over the tribesmen than to the settled Pashtuns of Afghanistan and N.W.F.P., who are generally more politically conscious, less distinctive and more prosperous.

The way of life of the Pashtuns (and also of the Baluchis who have a similar practice) is governed to a large extent not by civil or legal laws, but by their unwritten traditional laws, "Pashtunwali" which may be called the Pashtun code of conduct. A Pashtun is bound by honour to respect Pashtunwali and abide by it otherwise he will bring disgrace to himself and his family and is likely to be banished or excommunicated. The first and the important practice of the Pashtunwali is holding of Jirgas, tribal assemblies, for settlement of issues. The Pashtuns are democratic people and the Jirgas are their oldest useful institutions which have three-fold duties of police, magistracy and justice. The decisions of the Jirgas are binding and cannot be broken.²⁴ In cases of local or national emergencies, the Jirgas mobilize force for the defence of the village or the country and elect leaders and even a king in times of anarchy and chaos.

23. See, for details, Mohammad Ali, The Afghans, Kabul, 1960, pp. 23-33 and also no. 1, pp. 22-24.

24. No. 3, p. 24.

The king or Amir's authority was subject to the pleasure of these Jirgas. But since late nineteenth century monarchy has become a hereditary institution and more independent of the choice of ^{the} tribal Jirgas. The Government also convenes these Jargas at the time of emergencies the last of which approved the new Afghan constitution in 1964. The evergrowing centralizing role of government power and administration seems to have eliminated the overall practice of the Jirgas, but still it is a common practice where the population is based on tribal lines specially among the border tribes on both sides of the so-called Durand line.

The second commandment of Pashtunwali is "Badal", which calls for a revenge for any wrong done to a Pashtun or his family, his clan or to his country, as a whole. He does not believe in forgetting and forgiving, he is rather in favour of a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye. The third law of Pashtunwali is "Ninawati", grant of asylum at any cost to refugees, fugitives and help to those seeking protection whether the party is an individual, a group or the government. The fourth principle of the Pashtunwali is "Melmastia" or hospitality, and it is so strong that it takes precedence over 'badal' or revenge. Even an enemy who seeks refuge or help must be received and if necessary protected against his pursuer. Other laws of the Pashtunwali include: Turah, Chivalry and bravery in the battle field; "Merasta", helping those in need; Tiga,

temporary suspension of the differences and conflicts at the times of aggression or intervention by third party or another nation; and others like respecting elders, sacrifice in friendship and preserving one's individualism, dignity and prestige.

The people of the region have always preserved their unity and independence through this common code of behaviour. The British while invading Afghanistan grossly misunderstood a number of these vital factors which resulted in their defeat in all the three Anglo-Afghan wars. When they believed that the people of the region were ripe for a revolt against their ruler and would welcome a deliverer with open arms, they invaded the country and found quite to the contrary that all the tribes in spite of the differences fought against them behind their ruler.²⁵

Though Pashtunwali is a useful institution for the preservation of Pashtun patriotism, individualistic and socialistic characteristics, still some of its practices goes against them. Tribal feuds, jealousies and rivalries seldom cease. Above all, most of these practices make the Pashtuns vulnerable even to their own enemy. First the British and later Pakistan have sought and obtained through this system advantages, support and protection from the tribes even against their own Pashtuns or political leaders.

25. Mohammad Ali, The Afghans, Kabul, 1969, pp. 23-33.

Socio-economic structure: The socio-economic structure of the region is primarily based on pastoral ^{and} agricultural traditions. Being rural, mountainous and arid land the pattern of population density and distribution reflects the location and productivity of arable land. While the plains of Oxus, Herat, Kandahar, and the Indus valley represent a highly productive land and a dense settled population, the south-west vast region of Afghanistan and most of Baluchistan form the most extensive and "empty" land where seasonal migrations take place. There are different and uneven stages of economic living in the region. Except in the case of Tajeks and the few Hindus, Jews, Oezilbash and the Punjabi minorities who dominate the business and economic life of the region, the rest of population is based on some sort of tribal and rural organization established in grouped villages, comprising families bound to one another by ties of blood. With the gradual settling down of the tribes the village community has become increasingly important. The family system inspite of its weakening under modern economic stresses in the cities and its break up into individual families, is still dominantly prevailing. Though many have turned to business, trade, profession and government service, still tribal traditions and cohesion are a dominant problem specially among the Pashtuns and Baluchis. Loyalty to the tribe is gradually replaced by loyalty to one nation which is promoted by the rising Pashtun nationalism.

The economy of the region is primarily a subsistence economy, its population is composed of a large number of self-contained small groups and semi-independent communities. In Afghanistan government is the one powerful centralizing and organizing force in its loosely built society through its administrative laws and other services. It tries to replace 'tribal' organization, administration and defence by its centralized systems and tries to convert nomads to a settled life and tribal communities to regional, local and village loyalties and activities.²⁶ In Pashtunistan also, tribalism is giving way to town living, business and professions. For example the Khattaks, a once powerful tribe, are now nearly all settled in the districts of the Indus valley, and have won a reputation as the best cultivators and craftsmen. Similarly, the strongest Yusufzais have chosen to farm some of the best land in the province. Other tribes also have taken to business, trade and commerce. The Afridis, Shinwaris, Mohmands and others operate a profitable transport business in the region and are skilled mechanics and drivers.

So the socio-economic structure of the region is changing in a new dimension leading it towards a more politically, economically and socially compact region, highly cohesive within itself. There is a new class of intellectuals emerging, eager

26. Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society Its Culture, New Haven, U.S.A., 1962, p. 2.

to apply Western concepts of economic development and social progress. The rising nationalism of the people all over the region aiming at the reunification of the region is another characteristic of the new changes.²⁷

Economy: The economy of the region is basically agricultural but only thirty seven per cent of its cultivable land is brought under cultivation. The cultivation is limited because of the lack of capital to exploit water resources, and because of primitive methods of farming. Wheat cultivation and cattle raising are the primacy source of livelihood in the region. The region possesses large water resources and together with the potentially fertile land there is considerable scope for development. As regards mineral resources the region has plenty of minerals like oil, natural gas, coal, zinc, lead, iron, chrome, magnesium, manganese, etc. which are not yet exploited with the exception of limited exploitation of coal and natural gas.²⁸

Industry in Afghanistan has just started, while in Pashtunistan it is in the process of development, specially in sugar production. In Afghanistan lack of technical skill and capital resources stand in the way of economic development, while in Pashtunistan the government of Pakistan has been reluctant to

27. There is a growing demand among the Pashtuns and other groups on both side of the Afghan-Pashtun border for the reunification of the region — Greater Afghanistan or United Afghanistan.

28. Economic Survey for Asia on Far East, 1954, Bangkok, chapter six: Afghanistan.

undertake any development of the area because of the fear of its economic self-reliance which may encourage the already existing demand of the Pashtuns to breakaway. As such the region's natural resources remain unexploited.

As regards transport and communications, Afghanistan has no railways or navigational waterways. But a network of highways, though inadequate, link almost all the major provinces with the capital, Kabul, as well as the principal trade routes of which the most economic ones pass through Pashtunistan, via Kabul-Peshawar and Kandahar-Quetta, to the subcontinent of India and outside via Karachi respectively. In Pashtunistan, as a result of British strategy and military policy during their rule in the subcontinent, a well stretched network of roads and railways link the area with the principal points of the Afghan frontier.

Although the region is self-sufficient in food production, shortages occur largely because of draughts and poor storage and marketing facilities. Export items to provide substitutes for imports of consumer and capital goods is limited due to undeveloped industry and hence the region stands in great need of technical assistance and inflow of capital goods from other countries for its economic development.

Afghan Foreign Policy

For a better understanding of the Afghanistan's foreign

policy towards Pashtun issue and its relation with the outside world, it is necessary to recall some of relevant events of the past. The year 1793 marks the beginning of European involvement in shaping the course of action in Afghanistan. At this time the European rival powers — France and Tsarist Russia, were pushing forward through intrigues in the Middle East and Central Asia with the view of conquering India. The British who had already established themselves in the eastern part of India, speeded up their efforts to push forward their frontiers towards Afghanistan in search of a security system for the subcontinent. But after the Congress of Viena (1815) Russia, replacing the French and advancing through Central Asia towards Afghanistan, was regarded by the British as the only rival, threatening their power in the subcontinent of India. Hence the British determined to consolidate their position in India advanced further westward occupying large portions of Afghan territory in the name of the defence of India. Similarly Russia gradually continued to swallow the Central Asian Khanates one after another until it reached the northern frontiers of Afghanistan with the occupation of the Afghan territory of Punjāh in the north-west of the country.

Thus as a result of the Anglo-Russian rivalry Afghanistan was involved in three major wars with Britain and a serious skirmish with Tsarist Russia which resulted in loss of a large slice of Afghan territory to the British as a result of ^{the} Second

Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-80. Afghanistan also lost a complete control over its foreign policy.²⁹ This left a deep impressions on the rulers of Afghanistan and caused great psychological damage which has never been healed even till this day.

Hence, the Afghans, being placed between two expanding empires, each with designs over the remaining territory of the country, chose to remain secluded from the outside world as much as possible. The seclusion meant parting with the European multiplying inventions and techniques of the Industrial age. It also meant avoiding any move to introduce convenient means of transport like railways and roads because as the Afghan Amir says, "By making the country easily accessible, foreign powers will not find much difficulty in entering and spreading themselves over our country. The greatest safety of Afghanistan lies in its natural impregnable position."³⁰

With these experiences of the past Afghans were persuaded to follow a neutral course of foreign policy. Hence during the first world war Afghanistan remained neutral inspite of some pro-Turkish pressure on the government of the time. The policy of "jealous seclusion" continued till 1919 when Amanullah Khan ascended the throne declaring Afghanistan's complete independence, which he achieved as a result of ^{the} third Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

29. K.P. Gosh, "Afghanistan in World Affairs", Eastern World, London, February, 1954, pp. 114-15.

30. Mir Munshi, Sultan Mohammad Khan, ed., The Life of Abdur Rahman Khan Amir of Afghanistan, II, (London, 1900), pp. 21-25.

He launched upon a series of vast social and economic reforms and established extensive contacts with outside world. Afghanistan emerged on the world scene to play its vital role, but Amanullah's efforts to increase and strengthen Afghan power were foiled by the jealousies of the two dominant European powers — Communist Russia and British India. While the ever-growing control of Communist Russia in Central Asia checked Amanullah's interest in the fate of Central Asia and persuaded him to follow a friendly course of relations with the Communist Russia.³¹ The British on the other hand continued their underground subversive activities to overthrow the Amir. Because the Britishers saw an independent strong pro-Soviet Afghanistan, supporting the cause of Indian nationalists, as a threat to their security in India; because of the potential power existing in the subcontinent which Amanullah could mobilize against the British, hence they struggled hard to assist the anti-Amir subversion until they succeeded in instigating a successful revolt by bandits which resulted in the overthrow of the energetic Amir of Afghanistan in 1929.³²

So, this another round of bitter experiences and unhappy memories left a deep impression on the successive rulers of the country who followed a cautious neutral foreign policy of isola-

31. H.A. Byroad, "The Changing Position of Afghanistan", Department of State Bulletin, (Washington), vol. CLIV, No. 1126, Jan., 23, 1961, p. 126.

32. No. 29, pp. 14-15.

tionism and conservatism for another two decades in the period between the two world wars. During this period though Nazi Germany and to a lesser extent Japan, had penetrated Afghanistan for strategic purposes in the name of assisting the country. But the outbreak of the Second World War, however, brought pressure from the Allied powers and persuaded Afghan government to expel all the Axis nationals. Afghanistan, however, remained neutral while her other neighbours were involved in the war.

After the war the emergence of U.S. and Soviet Union as the only two dominant global powers specially after the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, the old pattern of power relationship over Afghanistan was replaced by a new one. Now there were U.S., the Soviet Union and the smaller powers — Iran, Pakistan and India which resulted in the emergence of new forces and political trends much more complicated than the old ones, specially the emergence of Pakistan with a strong religious posture, with whom the Afghans happened to have the dispute over the Pashtun problem. On the other hand, guided by their global strategies to fill up the power vacuum which had resulted from the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, the super powers entered into a struggle for the maintainance of their interests in ^{the} strategic Afghanistan. This and specially the arming of Afghanistan's two hostile neighbours — Iran and Pakistan, by the United States increased the fears of the Afghan ruling elite to view this state of affairs as a projection of

the Western alliance to threaten the very political existence of Afghanistan and bring it into the Pak-Iran sphere of influence so that a strong defense belt may be created to encircle Soviet Russia.³³

So with these fears in the mind of Afghan ruling circle it was inevitable for them to find a solution to the threatening problem, and since through the same old policy of isolationism nothing could be done, they embarked upon a neutral policy of active participation in international affairs. The confident and capable Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud knew how to use the strategic significance of his country in its best interests by virtue of such a policy. Afghanistan, unchanged and backward, stood in great need of economic development for its

33. American arming of Pakistan and Iran and its refusal to arm Afghanistan³³ placed in a much significant strategic position vis-avis Soviet Union; the British Satisfaction at the emergence of a strong Muslim Pakistan to dominate the Muslim world of the West Asia, as reflected in the speeches of British officers in Pakistan in 1947; the Pakistan's emphasis on self-determination for the Pashtuns in Afghanistan which according to them wanted to join the Pashtuns in Muslim Pakistan; the giving of higher and more than due share to Pashtuns in Pakistan affairs and their special treatment; the fears of Afghan rulers of possible threat from Pakistan; and the Afghan strong advocacy of Pashtunistan cause in those days; all go to support the above view. See for detail:

- (1) "Arming of Pakistan", Eastern World, Feb. 1954, p. 7.
- (2) "Neutral Afghanistan", Eastern World, Nov. 1959, p. 14.
- (3) Louis Dupree, "An informal Talk with Prime Minister Daoud", American Universities Field Staff, Service Report (South Asia Series), Vol. III, No. 3, Afghanistan L.D. 1959.
- (4) and related materials on Afghan-Pak dispute over Pashtunistan between 1947-1959.

survival and such a development could not be financed from internal resources and therefore she had to depend on foreign assistance and foreign assistance could not be secured without parting with the country's sovereignty which the Afghans were not prepared to do at any cost. Hence, economic development of the landlocked Afghanistan as wedged in between the two hostile neighbours — Iran and Pakistan, both of which linked by military alliance with U.S., created a dilemma for Daoud, the Prime Minister, and it was a difficult affair to get unconditional assistance from the power blocs, while remaining neutral and independent.³⁴

Afghanistan, however, first approached the U.S. for economic and military aid, but the U.S. put forward its own terms to join the western alliance and give up the Pashtunistan issue. In fact, this in view of Afghanistan's traditional neutral policy and her ethnic, linguistic, racial and cultural relationship with the Pashtuns under Pakistani rule, and also in view of the internal factors and the country's common border with Russia could not be acceptable terms. So the only alternative left was to ask for assistance from Russia who was just awaiting for such an opportunity. The Soviets for the first time extended a magnitude of military and economic aid on very suitable terms. But this aid from such a powerful neighbour with its hostile ideology and

34. Louis Dupree, "An Informal Talk with Prime Minister Daoud", American Universities Field Staff, Service Report, (South-Asia Series) Vol. III, No. 3, L.D. 1959.

sharing some ethnic groups could have meant some absorption of the aid-giving country's influence, yet the Afghans did not find it difficult to receive the Russian aid on its own terms in accordance with its positive policy of neutrality and freedom of action, and free will.³⁵

The U.S. having failed to force Afghanistan into the Western alliance, realized the necessity of aid to the country to match the Russian aid and to counter possible Russian influence. The Western powers feared that if Afghanistan went over to the Russian side, their defence system on the southern flank of Soviet Union, would get weakened and their position in south and southeast Asia would be threatened. Hence they began to attach significance to a friendly Afghanistan and inevitably tried to appreciate the neutrality of Afghans.³⁶ On the other hand, to the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan was significant because of its proximity to the Soviet bases at Tashkent and because of only Afghanistan's strategic position as the only neutral barrier between the Western alliance's link in south Asia and also because of its location as a crossroad to the Indian ocean and the subcontinent of India which the Russians have long dreamed to reach. Hence Russia took keen interest in helping Afghanistan to modernize itself inspite of its being a bourgeois monarchy committed to its own course of peaceful neutrality.

35. Ibid.

36. No. 31, p. 134.

Thus, Afghanistan from the midst of "cold war" era till this day has continued to receive the attention of both the power blocs and late of China and "instead of isolating it both East and West have turned Afghanistan into one of the few spots on earth where their constructive energies meet to develop and to befriend this central Asian Kingdom, hoping to sway its sympathies in their respective favour".³⁷ But the traditional neutral policy of Afghanistan "is not a mere opportunist attitude towards "balancing out one outside interest against another", and the very fact that Afghanistan "has unlike China did in the case of India, refrained from exploiting Pakistan's military pre-occupation by putting forward any claims" over Pashtunistan, proves "Afghanistan's genuine concern for world peace" and its real belief in strict, and consistent neutrality.³⁸ In fact, the traditional policy of Afghanistan has been preserved, although it has "changed from an involuntary inactive position to a well founded positive political conception".³⁹

As on other international issues, Afghanistan's position on Pashtunistan is well defined and based on the principles of human rights, and she insists on a plebiscite to be held among the Pashtuns under Pakistan to determine whether they demand self-determination or prefer to remain with Pakistan.

37. H.C. Taussig, "Afghan Neutralism", Eastern World, Vol. 15, December 1961, p. 11.

38. H.C. Taussig, "Afghanistan Foreign Policy", Eastern World, Vol. 19, No. 10, October 1965, p. 8.

39. No. 37.

Chapter II

Origin of the Problem of Pashtunistan

The early history of the Hindu-Kush region traces Afghans or Pashtuns, as the original Aryans inhabiting the Ancient Aryana or modern Afghanistan. Ancient documents clearly testify that the Pashtuns of today belong to "Bactria" (Bakhtar) or the modern Balkh in northern Afghanistan and that their domain after the general migrations of their Aryan ancestors to subcontinent of India and the west, included all the lands "from Bactria in the north, to the banks of the River Indus, or "Sind", the very name of which is derived from the Afghan (Pashtu) word for river".⁴⁰

These Aryans, which latter became known as Afghans, or Pashtuns or Pathans, have played a significant role in shaping the history of the region not as in the general name of their race, but in the names of the different Aryan and alien dynasties which ruled or formed from time to time expanding empires in the region. And similarly in the absence of native strong central authority, due to the strategic significance and fertile valleys of this region, the Pashtuns have found themselves disintegrated under the different contending and shifting autho-

40. In early documents the name Pashtun appears as 'pact' or Pakht related to the name of Bactria or present Balkh, a city in north of Afghanistan. Herodotus mentions the Pakti as the inhabitants of Paktica or Paktya, a territory west of the Indus, see for detail, R. Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: A New State in Central Asia, New York, March 1960, p. 7.

rities of either of the adjacent emerging powers. At other times they have emerged in power and have established vast empires not so much on their own homeland but in the neighbouring world.⁴¹

This has been the characteristic nature of the history of the Pashtuns, but with all their exclusively undefined specific history and their inconsistent past chronicles, the fact remains undisputed that the Pashtuns were recognized as a separate dominant cultural people in the region long before the emergence of their country in 1947, as a modern nation-state called Afghanistan, or more properly Pashtunkhwa in their own language which means the land of Pashtuns as situated between the two great rivers of Oxus in the north and the Indus to the east.⁴²

Thus the early history of Pashtunistan and Afghanistan is part and parcel of one history. The history of the Afghans or Pashtuns and in fact the Pashtun problem — the struggle for freedom from foreign domination, begins only after they have been severed from the Afghan state, to which they have been united by sentiment, loyalty as well as by race and common traditions.

41. As other countries, which in the past were not exactly defined political units, consisting of a number of territorial units under Khans, Nawabs, Amirs and so on, Afghanistan too never had fixed political boundaries as were subject to constant change as a result of emerging different Khanates or dynasties in power in the region.

42. Arthur Swinson, no. 3, pp. 25-26.

Afghanistan as a nation state was founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747 when he succeeded in uniting the various independent tribes into one nation. Though he succeeded in establishing the Durrani Empire extending from Persia to Delhi in India and from the Oxus to the Arabian sea. He never gave cognizance to other parts except covering the Pashtun territory and concentrated only on his own country. This was one of the factors responsible for the coming into power of the Sikhs and later that of the British. Ahmad Shah (1747-73), was succeeded by his son Timur Shah who ruled for twenty years, changing the capital from Kandahar to Kabul on the ground of its proximity to the eastern parts of the country — the present Afghan territory under Pakistan. Timur Shah was able to maintain the realm of the Durrani Empire, but he left as large a number of sons as twenty four, each of whom quarrelled and carried on intrigues for the throne. This not only resulted in destruction and unrest at home, but also gravely weakened the country and encouraged further the rise of the Sikhs in Punjab and the British expansion in Eastern India.

This was a period when European rivalry began to expand influence in Asia around Afghanistan, Russia was advancing through central Asia, the French carried on their intrigues in Persia, and the British pushed forward their frontiers towards Delhi. Soon after, this game became complicated for the Britishers due to the Napoleonic manoeuvres at Tehran and Russian

expansions in central Asia. Moreover the threats of Zaman Shah, Afghan Empror, to invade India further embarassed the British, who found their security in danger in India.

Zaman Shah (1793-1880), the ambitious ruler after having succeeded to the throne, turned his attention towards India which was warmly welcomed by the Muslim masses of India. As soon as he reached Lahore events at home forced him to rush back to Kabul. However the news of his last invasion of India alarmed the British who sought some arrangements to persuade the Fateh Ali Shah of Persia to keep Zaman Shah in perpetual check so as to preclude him from returning to India.⁴³ In 1800 the British succeeded in bribing the Persians and concluded a treaty with Persia to the effect that if the Afghans invaded India, the Persians "would lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions" and try to ruin them. Shah Zaman had reached Labore and when he was preparing to attack Amritsar to pave his way towards Delhi, he was informed that Fateh Ali Shah of Persia had attacked Khorasan and was threatening Herat with a view to supporting Shah Zaman's brother for the throne of Afghanistan. These events compelled Shah Zaman to entrust the Punjab administration to the Sikh leader, Ranjit Singh who took advantage of the unfavourable situation in Afghanistan and strengthened his position so that he declared his independence within three years. This provided the

43. Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India, 1793-1907), New Delhi, 1972, p. 18.

British with time and opportunity to consolidate their dominions and in view of their struggle with the Marathas they entered into an alliance with the Sikhs which greatly increased the Sikh power and enabled them to extend their control over the Punjab. Shah Zaman after defeating the Persians, was blinded and put to death by his brothers.

With the death of Shah Zaman in 1800 the threats of invasion of India by the Afghans were eliminated. For, the rivalries and quarrels between the power hungry Sadozai brothers, the frequent Persian incursions from the west and the British-Sikh encouragement of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul seriously weakened Afghanistan and led to bloodshed and unrest amounting to a civil war in the country. While more than a score of Ahmad Shah's grandsons struggled for the throne, another clan of Durrani, the Mohammadzais, seized control of the empire. One brother Dost Mohammad succeeded to the throne of Kabul and four others became viceroys in Peshawar.

These developments in Afghanistan encouraged the Sikhs who allied with the British, got a free hand to rapidly expand into the Durrani empire, pushing north and west to the Pashtun territories of the Indus valley. The Sikhs first marched into Peshawar in 1818 and subsequently occupied the city in 1823. The Sikhs having failed to exercise direct control of the city, left the Mohammadzai Sardars (noblemen), as their viceroys until 1834, and later on they tried to assume direct rule of the city. This

thing brought Dost Mohammad from Kabul to Peshawar to overcome the 40,000 Sikh army. But the battle was never fought and "as a result of a clever piece of bribery and intrigue carried out by one Josiah Harlan, a gentleman adventurer from Pennsylvania in the service of the Sikhs, Dost Mohammad found himself outwitted betrayed and surrounded",⁴⁴ and he retreated quickly back to Kabul. Thus Peshawar came under the control of the Sikhs who succeeded further in taking Dera Ismail Khan and Teri. Further, the Sikhs allied with the British encouraged the dethroned Shah Shuja's bid to attain the throne of Kabul with their assistance. Shah Shuja in his turn promised the allies to forgo any rights on Peshawar and the adjacent districts in return for their help.⁴⁵ Thus Peshawar became a bone of contention between the Sikhs and the Afghans and as a result of internal crisis and the Persian inroads into the Afghan territory Dost Mohammad inspite of his efforts could not meet the Sikhs effectively to gain Peshawar.

Not only this, the rapid advance of the Russians in Central Asia began to create considerable alarm with regard to the British position in India. Due to vital strategic significance of Afghanistan, the British wanted to have direct control over the country, so they sent a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan to accept a British envoy. However in view of the British

44. James W. Spain, "The Pathan Border Lands", Middle East Journal, vol. 15, no. 2, Spring 1961, pp. 166-67.

45. Asghar H. Bilgrami, no. 43, pp. 60-62.

refusal to assist the Afghans against the Sikhs in regaining Peshawar, the Amir refused to accede to the British demand. This led the British to take the unwise decision to oust the Afghan Amir and restore the throne of Kabul to their friendly (dethroned) Shah Shuja which resulted in the first disastrous Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42). The British and Sikh forces headed by Shah Shuja entered Afghanistan in 1839 and the cities of Kabul and Kandahar were occupied within a year in 1840, and Shah Shuja became the king.

One year later, Shah Shuja decided to keep garrisons in Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar, with Mac Naughton as the British Envoy. The Afghans revolted against the Shah and decimated the entire British garrison at Kabul. Sir Alexander Burnes lost his life and the British and Sikh forces left Afghanistan. This was "an ill-fated expedition that vainly cost the British an army and Shah Shuja his life." "The news of the catastrophe was reviewed in England with consternation. Lord Auckland was recalled from India and Lord Ellenborough succeeded him as Governor-General."⁴⁶

In the meantime the Sikhs had firmly entrenched themselves, Kashmir and some other parts were further detached from Afghan Kingdom during the war as a result of the unfortunate situation in Afghanistan. The situation inside Afghanistan was in a state of civil war and the state of the Sikh-occupied Afghan territory

46. R.B.D.C. Obral (quoted by), R. Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan, (London), n.d., p. 71.

of the Indus valley remained a constant source of alarm to the Sikhs, who never managed to exercise any effective control over the inhabitants.

After the tragic failure of the British to hold sway over Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad again resumed his interrupted region and was forced by the "war party" led by his son Akbar Khan who had emerged as a hero of the Afghan resistance against the British occupation, to regain Peshawar and fulfil the wish of a United Afghanistan. At this time the British defeating the disintegrating Sikhs had gradually advanced to Punjab and had appointed their agents in Peshawar and other strategic points on the Afghan frontier along the Indus river. Hence in 1849 the Amir sent some forces to Peshawar which met with success and resulted in popular rejoicing of its inhabitants but the anticipated British intervention forced him to retire precipitately and the British promptly moved up and occupied Peshawar to be followed by a subsequent annexation of other Afghan or Pashtun districts west of the Indus river in 1849.⁴⁷

At first, as a result of their experience of the first Anglo-Afghan war, the British followed the "Close-Border" policy which meant not to advance further into the hills of the Afghan tribes who remained free or owed allegiance to Kabul. The British seemed to be content with the strategic significance of the

47. Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, New York, 1965, pp. 119-21.

Peshawar plains as Sir Harry Lumsden says:

"Providence has blessed us with a strong line of frontier, covered by rugged and barren hills, through which there are but a limited number of passes by which an army could approach India; and the military art teaches us that the best position for the defence of such ground is on our own side of the passes, just where an army must debauch on the plain....

With Peshawar, Kohat and Sind in our possession, and the communications with our Indian provinces open I consider that we should really have the keys of India in our pockets".⁴⁸

Advocates of the "Close-Border" system held that the Government of India should not assume responsibility for areas it was unwilling or unable to administer as an integral part of its domains. Viceroy Lord Lawrence (1863-68) was even prepared to pull back all the way to the Indus as a natural geographic and ethnic border.

But it did not take the new British leaders long, to realize that their domains would never be secured as long as the Pashtun tribes, frequently supported by Kabul, continued their raids and attacks on the lines of communications, and also as long as Kabul remained unfriendly. Supporters of the "forward" school of frontier policy favoured pushing their frontier northward and westward as far as was physically possible. Their main contention was that the frontier running along the foothills inhabited by the uncontrollable virile tribes, was not strategically safe, as "it served not as a barrier but as a screen behind which one

48. Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, London, (n.d.), p. 70.

could hardly know what precisely was going on.⁴⁹ The advocates of this policy, therefore, "wanted to move forward and fix the 'scientific frontier' on the Hindu-Kush". In addition they thought that the Russian had advanced to a point which made it impossible for the British to remain passive and not interfere with the independent country of Afghans, lying in between the valleys of Oxus and the Indus.⁴⁹

Hence some years later, the British in pursuit of their forward policy invited Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan, to Ambala to negotiate such terms as would satisfy their interests. The Amir found it impossible to agree to any of the British proposals and on his return to Kabul entered into negotiations with Russia. This legitimate step taken by the Amir was viewed by the British as an act of war and hence they marched into Quetta in Baluchistan, and attacked Kabul from three different fronts. The war resulted in a victory for the British forces as the Amir was not prepared to resist. He retreated to Mazar in the north so as to secure some aid from the Amir of Bukhara or the Russians. The Amir died there shortly after. Yaqub Khan, his son, was installed on the throne of Kabul by the British and they imposed upon him the "Treaty of Gandumak" as a result of which the districts of Loralai, Zhob, Peshin, Quetta and Nushki were ceded to the British. The British also occupied the passes

49. Asghar H. Bilgrami, no. 43, pp. 137-38.

and Baluchistan province, and a British envoy was once more received in Kabul.

But this state of affairs did not last long. The people soon rose up in opposition to the treaty and against the British in 1879. The revolt was followed by the military expedition of the British. Amir Yaqub abdicated, leaving his brother Ayub Khan to carry on the war which is known as the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). Severe losses were again inflicted on the British forces in July 1880 and the British envoy was murdered. The British had every intention of staying there to establish their "scientific" frontier with Russia, along the ranges of the Hindu-Kush. Their occupation of Southern Afghanistan led them to think in terms of a "scientific" frontier, along a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar". None of the advocates of the "Forward policy" was content with merely including the plains of the Indus and the hills of the independent tribes.⁵⁰ But the first Anglo-Afghan war made it clear to the Britishers that although it was relatively easy for the Britain to occupy certain key towns in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it was much difficult to hold these areas. Therefore, Lord Lytton, in a reversal of his forward policy, reluctantly decided to withdraw his troops from their precarious occupation of southern Afghanistan and offered to Abdur Rahman Khan, a nephew of Sher Ali, the country

50. James W. Spain, no. 44, p. 168.

with the exception of Herat, Kandahar and the eastern parts. They kept the eastern parts of the country under their own control and wanted Herat to be ceded to Iran and Kandahar to become an independent Amirate under the protection of Britain so as to have achieved partially the objective of their "Forward Policy".⁵¹ Finally the British unwillingly withdrew and Abdur Rahman became Amir of Afghanistan with his foreign policy under the control of the British. But the Amir was able to extend his control over Herat and Kandahar, but the eastern parts of the country remained under the British occupation.

But inspite of partial failure, the British stuck to their forward policy and sought to extend their control into the Afghan tribal areas, while the tribes claiming to be independent or the subjects of the Amir of Kabul resented it. The British interference resulted in a perpetual state of warfare between the tribes and the British and scarcely a year went by without a punitive military expedition against the tribes. The result of this Forward Policy was that Afghanistan became a land-locked country, loosing more than one third of its territory to the British. The Afghan maritime province of Baluchistan was annexed in 1878 when the Khan of Kalat, a feudatory of the Afghan king was forced to transfer his allegiance to the British. Before that Afghanistan was deprived of the whole territory which became

51. Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900-1923: (A Diplomatic History of Afghanistan), Berkeley, 1967, p. 14.

the N.W.F.P. and latter during and after the second Anglo-Afghan war the British succeeded in occupying a large slice of the Afghan tribal areas. Kurram and Khyber were annexed. The Zhob valley in Baluchistan inhabited by Pashtuns, was occupied in 1889.⁵² Not only this, Afghanistan was subsequently forced by the British to lose its sovereignty over the whole of the Tribal belt as a result of the imposition of the Durand boundary on Afghanistan which will be discussed later.

However, the gradual advance towards the heartland of Afghanistan and the forced annexation of its eastern and southern territories which resulted in perpetual tribal warfare against the British, created a very threatening situation for them. Therefore, it did not take the British long to realize the need for a demarcated line of frontier to check the tribal uprisings and raidings frequently supported by Kabul.

There were vastly diverging opinions as to just where the boundary should be. Extremists still held that India's frontier lay on the Oxus; others could be satisfied with the Herat and the Hindu-Kush; while others still believed in the "Scientific Frontier" along a line "from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar."⁵³ However, as a result of the failure of the "Forward Policy" to advance further into Afghanistan, the British finally settled

52. Abdul Qaiyum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier, Bombay, 1945, pp. 48-55.

53. James W. Spain, no. 44, p. 168.

on a line running through the Afghan eastern and southern tribal areas which became known later as the Durand Line or the frontier between Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire. Since the crux of the problem and the right of inheritance claimed by Pakistan stem from the imposition of this frontier line, hence it is essential to study how and in what circumstances the Durand Line came into being and what was its binding force and the degree of its validity.

The British after having established themselves in the Afghan districts of the Indus valley and after their occupation of eastern and southern Afghanistan, they, in accordance with the Forward Policy requirement, demanded from Afghanistan in early 1890's a demarcation of the frontier, proposing to alienate from Afghanistan the Afghan tribal areas running from Pamir in the north, to the south and the west upto the borders of Iran. A mission under Mortimer Durand was assigned and after having a long negotiation, an agreement was signed by Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan in 1893, as a result of which an Indo-Afghan boundary known as the "Durand Line" was defined and subsequently more or less demarcated between 1894-95. Consequently the detached Afghan territories, lying between Afghanistan and the Afghan territory being actually administered by the British, became something of a "no man's land" or a recognized buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India, until 1901, when Viceroy Lord Curzon designated it as "Tribal Territory" to be

dealt with directly by the Central Government of India. Neither Afghanistan was allowed by virtue of the Durand agreement to exercise its sovereignty over this area, nor could the British control it as it was inhabited by those strong and independent Afghan tribes who could owe their allegiance only to the Afghan rulers at Kabul.

But all of this was not accomplished as the validity of the Durand Line was questioned both by the Afghans and the Afghan tribes affected. The Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, claiming he was forced to act against his will, pleaded with the British repeatedly not to include the hill tribes within their boundaries. He wrote to the British that:

"If you cut them off from my dominions, they will never be of any use to you nor to me... You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them..., and if any time a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these tribes will be your worst enemy..."⁵⁴

The Amir in his autobiography writes that he strongly resisted this "unjust" demand of the British, inspite of his illness, internal crisis and a threat from Russia. In an effort to avoid any demarcation of a frontier the Amir says that he tried to delay the matter to a later date. But, he writes:

"The Viceroy was so insistent on this matter that he addressed a letter to me which was practically an ultimatum, to the effect that the Indian Government cannot wait for your indefinite promises of uncertain date, and therefore at such-and-such a time will draw its own conclusions."

54. Mir Munshi Sultan Mohammad Khan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, (ed.) 2 vols. (London, 1960) 11, p.158.

Further, the Amir complained that his officials were expelled from most parts of the Tribal areas "by force and threats of arms".

The Amir's bitter resentment towards the agreement is even admitted by Durrand himself when he states that the Amir told me squarely:

"I would fight you if you drove me to it. I am not a coward and I would fight though I know what the result would be, ... but I would not give up my independence without a fight for my honour".⁵⁵

Further, in addition to its forced nature, the Durand agreement was not even accepted by the people themselves on both side of the line. In fact it was kept secret and not known to the public for a long time because of the fear of a revolt by the people against the Amir as well as the British. The Durand mission itself entered Afghanistan without any escort, ostensibly not as negotiators of the agreement but as a guest mission of the Amir.⁵⁶ The British themselves admit that "the negotiations between the Amir and Mortimer Durand were conducted in private and no detailed account of them has ever been made public. Noyce emphasizes that the agreement was signed in such a way as to impose it upon the Amir of Afghanistan while keeping its signature a secret from the public which would have otherwise amounted

55. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, pp. 75-56.

56. Ludwig W. Adamec, no. 51, p. 23.

to another war with British.⁵⁷ The Amir, in view of the unfavourable circumstances at home and a threat of an attack from Russia, was obviously forced to avoid a war with the British.⁵⁸ It is therefore, obvious that the agreement was signed under duress and that it was an equal agreement and did not enjoy the verdict of the people and hence continues to remain unrecognized by the Afghans and their rulers as well.

Subsequently when the Afghans came to realize that over a third of them have been excluded from "their national kingdom", they revolted against the "so-called Durand Line". The British boundary Commission was attacked and destroyed by the Mahsud tribesmen at Wana in 1845, which provoked another invasion from Waziristan to be followed by the great uprising of 1897-98 in which almost all of the major tribes participated.⁵⁹ It was a general revolt all along the frontier from Chitral, in the north, to the Takht-e-Sulaiman Mountain in the south. The entire territory was ablaze, the fort of Chakdara was besieged and Khyber was seized by Afridis. The Mohmands descending from the hills, surrounded some parts of the Peshawar plains. It was at a tremendous cost in men and money that this wide-spread uprising was brought under some sort of temporary control and that also

57. Rahman Pazhwak (quoted), no. 48, 77.

58. Ibid., p. 78.

59. James W. Spain, no. 44, p. 169.

after the British committed more than 60,000 highly equipped troops in the Tribal territory.⁶⁰

Thus, the regularising objective which the Durand Line sought to achieve was never realized. It fell far short of either serving the British purpose or solving the problem of Afghan tribes who continued their resistance of the British influence till their withdrawal from sub-continent. The Durand boundary existed in imagination as it was neither based on any sound geographical or topographical basis nor on any ethnic, cultural or humanitarian grounds. In the words of Fraser-Tytler the Durand Line is "illogical from the point of view of ethnography, of geography and of strategy. It splits a nation in two, and even divides tribes." Tytler admits that "the British did not solve the problem of the tribes" and therefore, he says, the British were "involved in a dispute with Afghanistan" over the status of the tribes whom "by nationality were Afghans", which resulted in "strained relations between Britain and that country".⁶¹ In fact the British failed to realize that "the Afghan borderland had no affinities with India," and that "from every point of view, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, as well as in traditions and history, it differs widely." Thus in view of the common identity and the strong national spirit among the

60. Ibid.

61. Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: A New State in Central Asia, (New York), March, 1960, pp. 9-11.

Afghans, Barton argued that "the expectations that the British official hierarchy would wean him (the Pathan) from his attachment to a ruler who embodied Afghan or Pathan nationalism was based upon the flimsiest grounds."⁶²

It was in view of these reasons that the Afghan Amir opposed the Durand Line "most furiously, and submitted solely to evade a greater catastrophe. He considered himself free to abrogate it at the first opportunity."⁶³ The Amir, therefore, believing to have acted against his will continued to encourage tribal agitation inspite of the British vigorous protests, and one could hardly expect him not to express resentment and bitter feelings over the Durand Line and the loss of Afghan territory from the foothills to the Indus. In fact, "a review of the frontier history since 1893, (the imposition of this frontier line on Afghanistan), shows that the agreement increased not only the responsibilities of the Government of India, but also the chances of collision with the tribes and of war with the Amir", which reflect the legal nature of the agreement.⁶⁴

Thus the study of the historical facts and the analysis of arguments advocated by the various authoritative historians against the validity of Durand Line, make clear the following points:

62. Ibid., (quoted from William Barton), pp. 11 and 13.

63. Ibid., p. 10.

64. Ibid., (Quoted from Cambridge History of India).

- (a) The Durand agreement was signed under duress and imposed on the unwilling Amir of Afghanistan through use of threats of military force, and that it was an equal agreement.
- (b) The Afghan territory thus falling under the British control continued to remain a source of dispute between the two countries which questions the validity and the binding nature of the agreement.
- (c) The Durand agreement was never accepted or recognized by the people themselves who opposed it severely through their struggle for freedom from British domination, and therefore it was against the wishes of the people on both sides as it splited a nation in two, and divided tribes and even families.
- (d) Therefore, the validity of the Durand agreement stands questioned and any claim of inheritance of the rights and duties if arises at all, fall short of legal provisions and conventional precedents.

However, the fate of the transborder Afghans, therefore, continued to be the main concern of the Afghan rulers, which eversince their severance from Afghan state has affected Afghanistan's relations with the British and later on with the new state of Pakistan. The tribes, in view of their sentimental, racial and cultural attachment to Afghan state, have provided a strong source of strength for Afghan rulers and have been valuable allies in the events of Anglo-Afghan conflicts, for, Amir's call for war could rally them against the enemy. "Afghanistan", therefore, has always "resisted British demands to severe relations with these Afghan tribes, and overtly or covertly they countered British measures of penetration of this area by their own measures of cultural and political penetration."⁶⁵

The Tribal area, was in theory a British protectorate but in reality it was an independent territory recognized by the British until 1901, when the Curzon administration launched upon a policy of peaceful penetration of the area. He named it as "Tribal Territory" to be dealt with directly by the Central Government of India. Curzon also separated the occupied Pashtun districts west of the Indus river from Punjab and set them up as the North-West Frontier Province of India. In his well-known lecture of 1907 at Oxford, Curzon made it clear that he saw the "Tribal Territory primarily a 'Marchland' in which the north-west frontier of empire could be protected against any hostile interests which might seep through the 'buffer state' of Afghanistan beyond the Oxus."⁶⁶ Yet, inspite of the new policy formulations, the position of the Tribal areas remained as it was and continued to be an inseparable part of the Frontier Province, attached to Afghanistan by sentiments, loyalty and common racial and cultural ties.

In 1919, Amanullah, the new energetic Amir of Afghanistan, launched the short-lived Third Anglo-Afghan War for the purpose of obtaining full external sovereignty and recovering of some of the lost territories or at least making it untenable for the British. Almost all of the major tribes joined the war but continued it for long after the peace Treaty of Rawalpindi of

66. James W. Spain, no. 44, 169.

8 August 1919, which ended the formal war between the two countries. In this treaty, Amanullah was also forced like his father, Amir Habibullah, to accept the Durand Line, but he won from the British the recognition of Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs. Two years later, in the Treaty of Kabul of 22 November 1921, Amanullah managed to extract further concessions. Article XI of the Treaty provides for reciprocal interests in the frontier affairs as it reads:

"Having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding their benevolent intentions toward the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in the future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective sphere before the commencement of such operations".⁶⁷

A note from the British Minister in Kabul addened to the Treaty also admitted Afghanistan's interests in, and concern over the conditions of the frontier tribes.

But inspite of the somehow binding character of the new treaty engagements with the British, Amannullah believing to have been forced to act against his will, continued to support the tribal agitations for freedom from British domination, which as a result of the last Anglo-Afghan War, were growing worst. This severely strained the relations between the two countries and the British blamed their "difficulties in India on unwarranted pampering of Afghans". In fact the ambitious Afghan ruler

67. Aitcheson, Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, (ed. C.U.), 14 vols., 5th ed. (Calcutta, 1929-33), nos. 12, 23 and 24.

had launched upon a series of modernist reforms and political activities to increase and strengthen Afghan power so as to enable him to meet the British effectively in regaining the lost Afghan territories. But the British, who saw a free and a strong Afghanistan under the pro-Soviet Amanullah supporting the Indian nationalist movements, as a threat to their security in India, succeeded in overthrowing Amanullah by instigating a tribal revolt against him in 1929.⁶⁸ After more than a year of virtual chaos, Amanullah was succeeded by the pro-British Nadir Shah, who was carried in victory to Kabul mainly by the Waziris and the Masuds, most of whom were from the British side of the Durand line.

From the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929, onwards until the British withdrawal from subcontinent, the Durand line remained to be reluctantly recognized by the new leadership, but the tribal agitations on the British side continued for long which owed nothing to any support from the new Afghan rulers.

In spite of a change in the traditional Afghan policy towards the Pashtun tribes on the British side, there were major tribal explosions in the 1930's, specially in the early 1930's were the most turbulent ones. In the spring and summer of 1930, a new political organization called "Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) or "Red Shirts" as the British called them, was founded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a rising politician from the village of

68. K.P. Ghosh, "Afghanistan in World Affairs," Eastern World, (London), February, 1954, pp. 14-15.

Utmanzai near Peshawar. The Red Shirts, led by A. Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, gained an increasing number of adherents, especially among the Mohmands and the Afridis. Pashtun agitations became more frequent and harder to control. In 1931 a tribal lashkar actually captured the city of Peshawar, and had placed the British cantonment under siege before reinforcements arrived. The severe British punitive actions caused the tribes to appeal to Kabul for assistance, but "this time they were coldly advised to make their peace with the British."⁶⁹

This reversal of Afghan policy was viewed by many Afghans as a betrayal of the cause of Pashtuns and was therefore resented strongly by the young nationalists which resulted in the assassination of the king's elder brother, Afghan ambassador to Germany, and in a number of other sabotaging activities including an attack on British legation in Kabul in which a British official and two other persons were killed.⁷⁰ Still the tribes continued their fightings specially in 1936-38, when the Waziris and the Musuds rose against the British under the leadership of Haji Mirza Ali Khan (the Faqir of Ipi), who remained the chief spokesman of the tribes for the cause of freedom until his death in May of 1960. In fact the British attempts to break the indomitable spirit of the Pashtuns and to wean them from their unswerving devotion to

69. Arnold Fletcher, no. 47, p. 232.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

freedom were far from successful. In seventy years of British occupation preceding 1937, more than twenty six full scale military expeditions were launched against the Pashtun tribes. Waziristan alone accounted for seventeen such expeditions with incalculable damage and loss of life. In the 1930's in one of such expeditions an army of forty thousand men fully equipped with the latest machines of warfare including tanks, aeroplanes, armoured cars and etc., was engaged in Waziristan. "After about two years of hostilities, the Government of India were back again at the starting point".⁷¹ Therefore "it has been said and repeated that to have had this problem with us (the British) for 70 years and more, to have spent large sums on Frontier expeditions, and still to have the problem before us, is a great slur on our acumen and capacity."⁷²

However, the continuation of the Pashtun struggles in the thirties and early forties without any support from the Afghan side, proves their honesty of purpose and their unswerving determination to fight for freedom from foreign domination. In 1929 Lord Irwin, the Viceroy of India, called the Round Table Conference. The Pashtuns, in order to demonstrate their difference of opinion and peculiarity of their case, boycotted the conference. The recommendations of the Round Table Conference of 1931 were

71. Abdul Qaiyum, no. 52, p. 53.

72. Ibid., p. 54.

applied in 1932, and Griffith was appointed as Governor in Peshawar. The Viceroy in his inaugural message, admitted the special importance of the Pashtun territory, which had led "Curwon's Government in 1901 to propose that the Frontier affairs had to be put in their own hands." ⁷³ The white paper, embodying proposals for considerations by the Joint Select Commission of both the Houses of British Parliament, also had proposed that the province inhabited by Pashtuns be an autonomous unit, which was to be administered by a Governor representing directly the Crown. ⁷⁴ Thus as a result of the emerging strong Pashtun nationalism replacing the traditional ethnic or tribal loyalties, the British gradually began to understand the Pashtun problem. Hence since 1937 they allowed the Frontier province a certain degree of self-government based on the model of the Government of India Act of 1935. They also began to deal with the frontier tribes as quasi-independent entities. This encouraged the Afghans to believe that in the event of their withdrawal from India, the British would certainly allow the Pashtuns to return to their old Afghan allegiance. These hopes received some confirmations in private conversations with some of the British officials of the time. ⁷⁵

Thus in early 1940's when it was confirmed that the British would withdraw from the Indian sub-continent, the hopeful Afghans

73. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 51, p. 18.

74. Ibid.

75. Arnold Fletcher, no. 47, pp. 248-49.

were gratefully encouraged to hope for the eventual return of their lost territory. Afghan neutrality in World War II and the expulsion of Axis nationals from Afghanistan in October 1941 at the request of the British, were acts motivated by the belief that the Independence of India would result in the Union of the Pashtuns or Pathans with Afghanistan. Furthermore, when the Cripps Mission came to India, it informed the Afghans that their claims to the Pathan territory were being seriously considered.⁷⁶

But unfortunately the genesis of the problem was shaped the other way round. In the beginning there was the Congress party and later the Muslim League and the concept of Pakistan came into existence, which along with the callousness of British bureaucracy, seriously affected the Pashtun issue which had gained a new momentum as a result of Khudai Khidmatgars' unswerving devotion to their cause of liberation.

The Khudai Khidmatgars, the only political organization of the Pashtuns, continued their struggles under the dynamic leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, working not with the Muslim League unprogressive party, but within the framework of Indian national movement in close association with the Indian National Congress and its greatest leader, Mahatma Gandhi. "For this independence of the Pathans" Ghaffar Khan said "we sided the Congress and

76. Arnold Fletcher, "Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest", Current History, (Philadelphia), vol. 18, no. 106, June 1950, p. 338.

fought our common enemy".⁷⁷ Since 1937, the Khudai Khidmatgars working with the Congress party had succeeded in forming a ministry in their Frontier Province. In 1946, before the coming into being of Pakistan, a Congress ministry under the Premiership of Dr. Khan Saheb, Ghaffar Khan's brother, was still in majority in the Frontier Province, when the creation of Pakistan on the basis of Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory begun to be acceptable to both the British and the Congress leaders. It was only Gandhi and the Frontier leaders who from the very beginning resented the partition of India on the basis of Jinnah's thesis, as an unpractical and unjust solution of the problem, motivated by the personal ends of the parties concerned. They thought that the thesis was based on violence, untruth and self-interest and that the overall infusion of Muslim community into the Hindu population made the partition an unfavourable solution. However, the Pashtun issue in view of its separate ethnic and cultural and social characteristics, was viewed a different question to be considered for autonomy. But the demand of Muslim League for a separate state of Pakistan backed by the clandestine support of the British Bureaucracy and the total surrender of the Congress leaders to Jinnah's theory of two nations — the Muslim and the Hindu states, made the partition of subcontinent inevitable, which gravely

77. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan is also known as Badsha Khan, the king of the Pathans. Reverentially he is known in India as Frontier Gandhi and among the Pashtuns as Fakhri-Afghan, the pride of Afghans or Pashtuns.

affected the Pashtun demand for independence.⁷⁸

From the very beginning the Khudai Khidmatgars were pressing for their demand of a separate state, which had received some attention from the British and Mahatma Gandhi also, but the attitudes of the parties concerned were something of prejudice, guided against the wishes of the loyal Pashtuns who contributed much more than others in the struggle for the Independence. And when the question of fighting for the sake Pashtun's liberation came to the hour of test, the Pashtuns "thrown to the volves" were left alone in a desparate position. Hence when it was understood that their fate depended on "the two High Commands to agree", the Frontier leaders objected that "nobody in the world can force them to join anyone", and that "it is the Frontier people to decide and if they decide by majority vote that they will not join any group, no body can force them."⁷⁹ Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in a statement on December 6, 1946 urged that the question of whether or not the province should join any group should be left to the free will of the Province itself.⁸⁰ Dr. Khan Saheb, the Frontier Premier, declared on December 21, that "the frontier people do not bother themselves about sections or groups, they want independence and nobody can force them to join anyone else."⁸¹

78. See for detail, J.C. Jafri, "The Struggle for Pakhtunistan," Indian Journal of Politics, (Aligarh), vol. XII, no. 2, p.115.

79. Rahman Pashwak, no. 48, p. 110.

80. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8352A,

81. Ibid.

Another Frontier leader, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan, the Speaker of the Frontier Legislative Assembly declared on December 16, 1946, that:

"The Pathans and Punjabis are two different major nations by any definition or test of nationality, and the very thought of grouping the N.W.F.P. with the Punjab is revolting to the Pathan's mind. We Frontier Pathans are a nation... of our own distinctive culture, civilization, language, literature, names and nomenclature, legal codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions. By all canons of international law a Pathan is quite a separate entity from a Punjabi."⁸²

Throughout the post-1945 years, the Frontier leaders struggled to urge a solution of their problem through heart-to-heart negotiations between the Congress and Muslim League leaders on the one hand and with the British on the other, but nothing fruitful could come out as the parties concerned had already reached an understanding of ignoring the Pathan cause. Here the British diplomacy was the most effective and successful to their ends, in getting out of the responsibilities and leaving the Pashtun problem to be decided by the selfish and shrewed politicians of the Congress and the Muslim League who could not afford to see the Pashtuns as a third party for the cause of separation and independence. Hence the Viceroy, Louis Mountbatten said that: "If the Frontiers were to vote for independence, and if they can get the two High Commands (Congress and the Muslim League) to agree, I will, of course, agree." The Viceroy further stated

82. Ibid.

that he would agree to anything which the leaders of the two political parties would agree to, but he said, "the Congress leaders have decided not to permit independence."⁸³

The Afghan Government and press, supporting the cause of their Pashtuns protested that the statements give the impression that the fate of the Pashtuns depended on the decision of any other non-Pashtun political party and that their destiny is transferred from one foreign power to another in violation of their legitimate rights to decide their own future.⁸⁴ But things moved as it were planned by the British long before the British refer the Pashtun problem to the decision of the Congress and the Muslim League leaders. However, the Pashtun still pressed their demand for a separate state and urged the Congress and Muslim League leaders to reach an agreement. Though the call of the frontier leaders for support had received the attention of Mahatma Gandhi who continued to support "the cause of Ghaffar Khan's Pashtunistan", yet due to his loss of leadership over his trusted colleagues Mahatma Gandhi failed to bring together the Congress and Muslim League leaders to meet the demand of the Frontier leaders. Rajaji the Congress leader was the first to advocate the cession of the Pashtun province to the proposed state of Pakistan.⁸⁵

83. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 112.

84. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 61, p. 22.

85. J.C. Jafri, no. 78, p. 115.

However, "Scintillating Cryptic remarks over the changing attitude of the Frontier Pathans affected by Muslim League's communal propagandas and coupled with the collousness of British bureaucracy" paved the way for the parties concerned to settle on a plebiscite to be held among the Frontiers whether they opt for union with India or prefer to join the proposed state of Pakistan. The Pashtun leaders warned against all such decisions and Ghaffar Khan stated at Bannu that the Pashtuns were prepared to contest the referendum on the issue of Pashtunistan and Pakistan, and not on an issue of Pakistan and India.⁸⁶

Mahatma Gandhi also questioned the logic of the projected referendum, while the Congress leaders specially Nehru and Sardar Patel refused to entertain any demand of the Pashtuns, Gandhi continued to extend his moral support.⁸⁷ In first place he disagreed with the forceful contention of Patel that the influence of the Frontier leaders over their people had waned; he likewise rejected the thesis of Nehru that "the proposed referendum was the best course to ascertain the real wishes of the people of the Frontier Province".⁸⁸ In fact it seems to suggest that the parties concerned were motivated by self-interests and engaged

86. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 61, p. 23.

87. Mahatma Gandhi contended that, "unless the simple Pathans of the Frontier had a clear picture of the proposed state of Pakistan in their mind, any talk of the plebiscite was like a leap into the dark". J.C. Jafri, no. 78, p. 118.

88. Ibid., p. 117.

in a politics of self-aggrandizement. The Congress leaders believed that in view of the close association of the Frontier leaders with the Congress party, and their animosity with the unprogressive Muslim League, in an event of such referendum, the Frontiers would possibly vote for union with India and if went to Pakistan, they will still be a part of subcontinent which may in a long run fall back under their influence through an integrity and unity of cultural and ethnographical ties with the proposed state of Pakistan. The Muslim League on the other hand, believed that an emphasis on the traditional animosity between the Hindu-Muslim communities and the clandestine British support already at work in their favour, would be sufficient means to exploit the situation and wean the frontier people from their leaders who stood for their nationalism and independence, provided a third alternative to vote for a separate state of Pathans was not envisaged in the referendum. Similarly, for the British the game was to bring good dividends. They thought creating two somewhat equivalent hostile political units with Pashtuns incorporated in Pakistan would be best means for them to exercise an effective control over them.⁸⁹ In addition the British thought that the proposed Muslim state of Pakistan would serve as a check on the untamed Afghanistan and would influence the Islamic world of Middle East as a bulwork against possible Russian infiltration into the southern belt of Asia.

89. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 106-8.

Thus the ill-wishes and misdeeds of the parties concerned continued to shape the events, the discredit of which goes not so much to the activities of the Muslim fanatics, but to the role of ^{the} Muslim League and the British bureaucracy which in line with each other tried to inflict a heavy revenge upon those (Pathans or Afghans) who had in the past intensified their struggles against their entrenched authority. This is confirmed by the activities of Frontier Governor, Olaf Caroe, in early 1947, who encouraged and supported the pro-Pakistani demonstrations sponsored by Muslim League, "with a purpose obviously against the wishes of his own ministers (the Frontier leaders), a thing strange for a constitutional head of state."⁹⁰ In addition the mischievous Governor Olaf Caroe being not satisfied with the popular Ministry of Dr. Khan Sahab, desired to confer powers on the Nawab and other pro-British cliques against the Khudai Khidmatgars. Being failed to curtail the popularity of the Frontier leaders, he encouraged and supported the Muslim League's religious propagandas and sabotaging activities against the Frontier popular ministry. This illwill and misdeeds of the British bureaucracy coupled with the Muslim League's call for hatred against the Hindu, pushed the Frontier leaders towards a very awkward situation in which not only their pursuits for a separate state of their own choice could be ignored but also enabled the British

90. J.C. Jafri, no. 78, pp. 116-17.

to dismiss Dr. Khan Saheb's ministry on the ground that it had lost the verdict of the majority.

However the Frontier leaders continued to protest against these intrigues and conspiracies carried out by the British and the Muslim League leaders. Dr. Khan Saheb continued to criticize the British officials for allowing the Muslims to bring disorder and lawlessness in the province. He also protested against the British refusal to consider the question of Pathanistan which the British dismissed potently on the ground that the Indian leaders did not allow independence and that it would create further hatred and factionalism, breaking the province's communal and political solidarity with Pakistan. Though Gandhi entreated the Viceroy once again to impress upon Jinnah the need of negotiation with the Frontier leaders so that "the simple Pathan mind was not used in a wrong way". Yet certainly the Viceroy taking the advantage of the awkward situation, thwarted the requests of Gandhi and Frontier leaders "on the plea of this and that limitation." At the same time it was easier for Jinnah to repudiate on many occasions the demand of the Frontier leaders as "spurious" and "insidious", when "clandestine support of the British bureaucracy was at work... with the blessings of Frontier Governor Caroe and the Viceroy's political Advisor Ismay".⁹¹

However, things were finally decided, though the frontier leaders continued to say that the Pashtuns wanted Pathanistan

91. Ibid.

as an independent state free from foreign domination. Consequently the Viceroy Mountbatten after discussions with the Congress and Muslim League leaders in May left for London and while on his return he handed over on June 2, 1947 to the Indian leaders the British plan of procedure for the transfer of power which envisaged partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. The United Kingdom Prime Minister's statement made on June 3, 1947 in the House of Commons had the following provisions with regard to the Pathan or Pashtun territories:

"The position of the N.W.F.P. is exceptional...in view of its geographical situation and other considerations ...it will be necessary to give the N.W.F.P. an opportunity to reconsider its position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned (India or Pakistan) they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Viceroy and in consultation with the Provincial Government (as of now the Muslim League Government). In view of the geographical situation, Baluchistan will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to choose which of the alternatives to adopt...agreements with the tribes of the North West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated with the appropriate successor authority."⁹²

The announcement of the statement resulted in acute crises in the province. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared that the Pashtuns were prepared to contest the referendum on the issue of Pashtunistan and Pakistan and not on an issue of Pakistan and India. He declared on June 3rd that: "in these circumstances I am convinced that we cannot associate ourselves with this referen-

92. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8686A.

dum". On 28th June at Chorsada he said that:

"the main object is to make the Pathan free from domination. For this independence of the Pathans we sided with Congress and fought our common enemy jointly. We were then called Hindu agents... Now, when we have refused to join Hindustan, we are forced to fight the referendum issue of Pakistan versus Hindustan."⁹³

Mahatma Gandhi also in his letter of 28/29 June to Viceroy questioned the sanctity of the proposed referendum, "When thousands of Punjabis were freely entering into the land of the Pakhtun people". In this letter he firmly rejected the assertion of Jinnah that "any boycott staged by the Khudai Khidmatgars would imply a breach of terms of the projected referendum". He stressed that "the Khudai Khidmatgars under the dynamic leadership of Badshah Khan wanted nothing save autonomous unit based on their local constitution before they were forced to opt for India or to the proposed state of Pakistan". And hence his note further said that "if their demands were ignored so mercilessly, they would be justified in staging boycott at the time of stipulated referendum."⁹⁴ It was Gandhi's earnest desire to save the Frontier Province for the Pathans and to see that a Province of a distinctly Pashtun culture was given the shape of an autonomous unit based on the ideals of nonviolence and Islamic culture.

However, on 1st July Lockhart, the Frontier Governor, declared that the referendum would be held inspite of the boycott by the

93. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 51, p. 23.

94. J.C. Jafri, no. 78, p. 121.

Khudai Khidmatgars. This decision was an unexpected shock to the Pashtuns both in Pashtunistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan notes presented both to the British and Indian Governments urged that the Pashtuns and the inhabitants of Baluchistan should have the right to decide whether their future should lie with Afghanistan or Pakistan or on the basis of their complete independence, but received no satisfaction.⁹⁵ Afghanistan considered the question one that should be decided between the British and the Afghan Government,⁹⁶ but found herself in a delicate situation over the developments in the subcontinent. It was on the one hand pre-occupied with the desirability of preserving friendly relations with Great Britain as a result of Change of Afghan foreign policy since the overthrow of Amannullah in 1929, and on the other, it was the desirability of avoiding any measure which might hinder the development of transfer of power to the Indian people, whose independence was desired by all the people of Asia and specially her neighbour, Afghanistan.⁹⁷

The referendum took place in the Frontier province from 6-17 July 1947, on straight issue of India versus Pakistan. The Khudai Khidmatgars staged a complete boycott and out of the

95. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8704, A.

96. Under the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, the Great Britain has acknowledged Afghanistan's right to take an interest in the well-being of the Pashtuns in the tribal areas, see previous pages 66-68.

97. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 117.

total electorate only 50.119 per cent voters exercised their franchise. The majority voted for Pakistan. The 50.119 per cent voted consisted a large number of non-Pashtun communities who were either the emigrant inhabitants of the urban regions of the province or the large number of Punjabi businessmen dealing with the province who participated in the referendum.⁹⁸ Hence more than 50 per cent of the Pashtun population of the province refused to vote. In addition the referendum was held in five districts of the Province and in the "British Baluchistan" representing roughly one-third of the area and less than half of the total population. No referendum was held in the Baluch states and the District of Dera Ghazi Khan was arbitrarily considered part of Punjab. Any referendum in the Tribal areas which constituted more than half of the total area and population was out of question because they maintained their independence.⁹⁹

Thus in the light of the foregoing discussions the validity of the so-called forced referendum representing "a fraction only, perhaps 10 per cent of the total population of Pashtunistan who voted vaguely for inclusion in an Islamic country" remains challenged.

In addition the referendum was held in such a way that the religious susceptibility of the Pashtuns could be exploited.

98. A.R. Benawa, Pashtunistan (in Pashtu), Kabul, 1330 Hijra, p. 366, see also p. 82.

99. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 61, p. 24.

On one side of the ballot boxes the holy Koran was placed and on the other the Granth, the Sikh sacred book. Therefore it was natural for the participating devout Pashtuns to vote for Pakistan. In addition to the British intrigues, "hurried secrecy" and "public coercion", most of the non-Khudai Khidmatgar Pashtuns who voted were affected by the statements of Jinnah that "the Pakistan Constituent Assembly can only frame a constitution wherein the Frontier people will be an autonomous unit in which the Frontier people will be their own masters... The Government of Pakistan would not interfere with the freedom of North-West Frontier".¹⁰⁰

However, in this way, while the apparent result of the so-called referendum was the forceful incorporation of the Pashtun territories into Pakistan, it showed how the tactics of self-interested politicians frustrated the honest verdict of the people already given at the polls in favour of the popular ministry of Dr. Khan Sahab. No great Congress leader whom the frontiers supported, raised any voice against "the fraudulent registration and impersonation of voters in addition to many mischievous tricks played by the Muslim League with the blessings and support of the British bureaucracy";¹⁰¹ none bothered to see that the Khans and their trusted followers were not deserted and "thrown to the wolves" at the time of crisis; none argued that a referendum

100. Rahman Pashwak, no. 48, p. 116.

101. J.C. Jafri, no. 78, p. 121.

on the straight issue of India versus Pakistan without a third alternative, an independent state of their own, and confined only to a small section of the population, either negatived their verdict already given at the polls or restricted their real choice. It offered no more than a 'Hobson's Choice' putting them in a position of either being fried or grilled.

The first official communique issued in Kabul stated that "...In spite of the boycott of a great majority of the Afghans, the forced referendum was enforced and carried out in Afghan Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. Both were given to Pakistan" hence "our claim stands as it was, and Afghanistan ...will not acknowledge the results of the above-mentioned ...unjust referendum,"¹⁰² and therefore shall not recognize the Pashtun territories of the Independent Tribal areas, the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan as part of Pakistan.

Thus the Pashtun territories were finally incorporated in the new state of Pakistan against the will of the majority and their leaders including Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Saheb, Abdul Samad Khan, the Baluch leader, Amir Mohammad Khan the former Speaker of the Frontier Assembly, Qazi Ataullah, the former Revenue Minister, Pir Saheb of Zakori, Shareef Khan and other Frontier leaders were arrested on the false charges of anti-Pakistan activities.¹⁰³ In fact arrest, tortures, suppression of the Pashtuns became daily affair in the new Islamic state of Pakistan.

102. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 117.

103. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1948, p. 9383, D.

Chapter III

Dealing With British Colonial Legacy 1947-1953

The years post World War II were full of expectations for the Afghans, specially the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent of India. Before the war as a result of the past experience of the Frontier problem, the British had gradually began to understand the Afghan problem of the Frontier Pashtuns. Many British officials came to know the problem and sympathized with the Afghans' position. For instance, William Barton, a frontier officer of long experience wrote:

"For more than a century the Pathan lands east of the Durand Line had formed part of the Afghan Kingdom to which they were united by sentiment and loyalty as well as by race. Where the national spirit is as strong as with the Pathan the expectation that the British officials hierarchy would wean them from a ruler who embodied Afghan or Pathan nationalism was based upon the flimsiest grounds."¹⁰⁴

The Afghans long before hoped that one day the British may withdraw as a result of which the Afghans' dream of their united nation — the re-unification of Afghanistan with its Afghans or Pashtuns east of the Durand Line, may be realized. These hopes among the Afghans both of Afghanistan and the Frontier, had received some confirmations also in private conversations with some of the British officials of the time.¹⁰⁵ In fact Afghan

104. William Barton, India's North-West Frontier, London, 1939, p. 57.

105. Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Berkeley, 1965, pp. 248-49.

neutrality in World War II, the expulsion of the Axis nationals at the British request, and the Afghan friendly policy towards the British since 1929 were acts motivated by the belief that one day the British withdrawal from India would result in the union of Pashtuns with Afghanistan. But surprising as it was, the British withdrawal from India instead of rendering a solution of the Afghan or Pashtun problem, created a new host of problems.

Events after the war led the British to change its attitude and search for a new formula of manifesting their interests in a new form of political control. Encouraged by the meteoric rise of the Muslim League with its two-nation theory, the British reasoned that their "long-range interests" would be better served if a strong Muslim Pakistan was set up to balance and to counter a possible domination of India on the one hand, and to influence the Muslim world from Kashmir to Turkey on the other.¹⁰⁶ Therefore the scheme of creating the 'Hindu' India and the Muslim Pakistan on equal basis gained momentum and required the British to incorporate into the proposed state of Pakistan as much territory as possible regardless of any geographical, ethnographical and cultural factors. Though the scheme envisaged the unrealistic formation of Pakistan into two separate East and West Wings with a forced incorporation of Pashtun territories into the Western Wing, still it lacked the requisites of statehood, therefore, in

106. Ibid., p. 250.

an effort to weld together the different ethnic and cultural entities in the new state of Pakistan and to develop among them a common sense of identity, an emphasis was put on religious rivalism and on the exploitation of the traditional Hindu-Muslim animosity and a dispute over Kashmir with India. Similarly, the British thought that Pakistan counting on their support, had an effective weapon, Islam, with the use of which she would be able to woo the devout Pashtuns of the untenable Afghanistan and to dominate the rest of the Muslim world of the Middle East. This in their view would have well protected the British interests in the Middle East against possible Russian domination. The great zeal of the British to assist Pakistan formation at a cost and the hostile attitude of the Pakistani rulers against Afghanistan and the Pashtun problem is a good indication in support of this argument.¹⁰⁷ The words of the responsible British ex-Governor of the Frontier Province, George Cunningham also give enough strength to this argument, he states:

"These particular anxieties were removed by the creation of Pakistan. There were other reasons of wider importance for anticipating friendship between the two Muslim states (Afghanistan and Pakistan). A chain of Muslim countries from Hindu-Kush to Lahore, from Kashmir to Turkey, would become a solid barrier to the advance of Russian arms and Russian ideas from Central Asia, a barrier not so much of armed force as of the mobilized moral strength of the Islamic religion and Islamic way of life.¹⁰⁸

107. See for detail, Ibid., p. 253 and also footnote no. 33.

108. Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Frontier Discord Between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Kabul, 1950), p. 2.

These reasons and "other considerations" reflect the change in British attitude to ignore the Afghan position on the Pashtun problem and it also explains the reasons for the forced incorporation of Pashtun territories into the new state of Islamic Pakistan. The British failed to realize that the Pashtun struggle was not a religious one and the very association of Khudai Khidmatgars for their liberation with the Congress party and their renunciation to join the fanatic Muslim League tend to prove this fact. It was British false hope to cherish that the establishment of Pakistan on the basis of Islam would stop the Pashtuns fighting for the restoration of their fundamental rights. In fact throughout the long course of their history, the Pashtuns have proved to have fought for the preservation of their independence against any alien power whether Muslim or non-Muslim. The Moghul Empire of India was a Muslim rule which was severely opposed by the Pashtuns. At that time while the Khataks and Afridis under Khushal Khatak fought against the Muslim Moghuls on the east, the Hottaks who subsequently established the Afghan Empire of Persia, were fighting against the Muslim Persians. Therefore, the Pashtun struggle and their resistance of the British rule were not religious in character but directed towards freedom from foreign domination. There is no doubt that in order to achieve their aims, the leaders have allowed the religious zeal of the people to work as an effective factor against the enemy and even sometimes, they have given it the name

of Holy War against the British domination, but this in any way does not mean that the Pashtuns fought the British because they belonged to a different religion.¹⁰⁹

Thus at the time of partition the political minds of the British were so influenced by such false hopes that they could not think in logical, legal, practical or legitimate terms. Their hopes which were mere mistakes never materialized and were responsible for all of the unfortunate events that came and those to come.

The Afghan governments in view of its inalienable, ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural relationship with the Pashtuns, ever since their severance from their motherland Afghanistan, have been deeply concerned over their position under the British political control. In fact Afghan foreign policy throughout the British era, is a reflection of Afghan responses to, and concerns about the status and position of their Pashtuns and their aspirations.

Before the Second World War as already referred to, Afghanistan since 1929, followed a friendly policy towards the British with the view that such a policy would contribute to the understanding of the Pashtun problem. This had received some confirmation also through a series of letters and political discussions that "the British Government would lend a friendly ear to Afghan

109. See for details, Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, or any book on Afghan history.

opinions and at a propitious moment, study them attentively."¹¹⁰
 Thus the Afghans believed that the British may withdraw one day from the subcontinent and would allow their frontier Afghans to decide their future.

But the events after the war moved with such rapidity that they caught the Afghans by surprise. The British determined on partition of the subcontinent of India on the basis of Jinnah's two nation theory, regardless of previous assurances given to Afghans, began to ignore Afghan concern over the fate of Pashtuns who under the Khudai Khidmatgar political movement struggled ^{hard} for their independence. When proposals for a plebiscite in India, giving the population the choice of joining Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan were under discussion, Afghan government quickly protested and asked the British for two additional choices to be offered in the North-West Frontiers Province -- union with Afghanistan or the establishment of a separate state of Pashtuns. The Afghan requests were met with a curt refusal and a subsequent Afghan request was received with silence. The Afghan Prime Minister, Hashim Khan in a public statement in Bombay declared that Afghanistan "was entitled to have a representative at the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province" and expressed his "country's support for a 'Pathanistan' (Pashtunistan) as advocated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan" the leader of the Khudai

110. Ahmad Ali Kohzad, no. 108, p. 10.

Khidmatgars.¹¹¹

However, in view of their "Long-range interests" the British felt committed to include the Pashtun territories in the new state of Pakistan and ignored the Afghan insistence on a third choice to be given to the Pashtuns to decide their future. In order to defend the inclusion of Pashtuns in Pakistan, a number of "British officials rushed to their typewriters" to advocate Olaf Caroe's thesis that "Pashtuns are somehow different from Pakhtuns and that Persian rather than Pashtu is the Afghan court language and the Durrani do not speak Pashtu and that "this difference can be detected in their accent, their hard or soft pronunciation of certain letters in the Pashtu alphabet, and even their style of hair-cut." They also argued that they have inherited the Pashtun territories from the Sikhs and that before Ahmad Shah Durrani it never formed part of Afghan territory as it came under the Moghul Empire of India almost on the same line of demarcation as that of the present Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹¹²

These arguments are nothing more than lies and according to Arnold Fletcher they smack of reationalization more than of reasons. He says:

For more than a century, the British officials — beginning with the brilliant monstotuart — had maintained that Pashtuns, Pakhtuns, and Afghans

111. James W. Spain, no. 44, p. 172.

112. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 250.

were identical; and the point has never been questioned by any Indian or by the people themselves ... the Durrannis do of course speak Pashtu (and often Persian as well. Persian has indeed been the court language of Afghanistan... as a result of the prestige of the language, its extensive literature and its large vocabulary.113

In fact there is no difference between Afghans and Pashtuns, they are the same people and the domination of Persian language in Afghanistan, is due to the influence of the language which once dominated most of Asia, as a result of which it remained as a court language in Afghanistan. In fact it was the Pashtuns who developed the language and even introduced it to the rest of the world specially ^{to} the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Similarly the Durrannis who have supplied the ruling dynasty in Afghanistan, belong to that Pashtun tribe the bulk of which inhabit almost the whole of the Pashtun territory which the British incorporated in Pakistan including northern Baluchistan. As far as the history is concerned the British arguments are equally baseless. The Pashtuns due to the strategic position of their country and in absence of their strong central authority have certainly fallen disintegrated, politically under the influence of ^{the} neighbouring powers, but have never been separated as a people from one another or under actual occupation of any alien power as the British try to advocate. They have always struggled to preserve their independence and have even established

113. Ibid.

vast empires of their own.¹¹⁴ Thus the Frontiers have neither been under actual or direct rule of the Sikhs or inherited by the British as Lepel Griffin in his report to the British Government, reports: "We succeeded to an inheritance of anarchy. They (the Sikhs) had ever been in a state of war with the border tribes and even with the people in the interior districts" -- that is the Frontier province.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the very name of Pakistan according to Arnold Fletcher, is a refutation of the British argument, "since the first 'a' was designated to represent Afghanistan or the "Afghan Province" that is the North-West Frontier Province.¹¹⁶

Anyhow, as already discussed, the referendum was held on the straight issue of Hindu India-versus-Muslim Pakistan which was boycotted by nearly 50 per cent of the Pashtuns on the ground that it did not provide for a third choice of voting for a separate state of Pashtuns. The British ignored both Afghan insistence and the demands of Khudai Khidmatgars for a third choice. The Afghans therefore remained unimpressed by the one sidedness of the referendum which denied the Pashtuns participation to express their real choice. The Afghans pointed out that even the 50 per cent who participated in the referendum consisted

114. See for details, Abdul H. Waleh, "Pakhtun's Inevitable Destiny: Self-determination", Eastern World, January, 1962, p. 16; or see any book on Afghan history.

115. See for detail Second Chapter of this dissertation.

116. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 251.

not only the devout Pashtuns but a large number of the non-Pashtun minorities, emigrants from Punjab and a considerable number of Punjabi businessmen and disqualified voters illegally registered.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the Afghans maintained, that even then "any other result would have been impossible in a land that was 89 per cent Muslims, and in view of the communal hatred that was sweeping India" specially when in the referendum "the Koran was used to designate the ballot boxes of Pakistan and the Sikh Granth those of India."¹¹⁸

The Afghans noted further, that the referendum was held only in five districts of N.W.F.P. and the British Baluchistan" representing roughly one-third of the total area and less than half of the total population. No referendum was held in the Tribal areas, the Baluchi States and some of the districts, which represented more than half of the total area and population. Instead, a British official, George Cunningham, went on a tour in which he interviewed some of the tribal Jirgas requesting them pledges of loyalty to the Islamic state of Pakistan and in return for favours and allowances which ought to be extended. Some of the tribal gatherings rejected it,¹¹⁹ while others "wished to preserve the same relations with Pakistan as they had with the

117. See for detail, previous pages 83-86.

118. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 251.

119. Ahmad Ali Kohzad, no. 108, p. 12.

British". This statement is true, but it contains a number of fallacies obvious to Afghans. First, it would have been impossible and unthinkable for the tribes, more conservative in religion and less informed than their Pashtuns in N.W.F.P., not to choose Pakistan over India, specially when in view of the prevailing communal hatred and Muslim League fanatic activities, their religious zeal and excitement had reached a climax. Secondly "there is an even great irony in the clause" that "they... wished to preserve the same relations with Pakistan as they had with British", which apparently "meant one thing to George Cunningham and quite another to the Afghans." After all the tribes were independent and received a 'lucrative yearly subsidy of 7,5000,000 pounds from the British only for the maintainance of passes and the strategic lines of communication allowed to the British.¹²⁰ The British themselves had recognized the independence of the tribes considering them as the British protectorate.¹²¹

The Afghans have also contended that the meetings with the tribal Jirgas were no less meaningless than the plebiscite itself in view of the conditions at that time. Since August 16, 1946 India had been swept by communal riots, murders and lootings from Calcutta to the Punjab. For a time, despite of Pashtun's

120. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 251.

121. William Barton a former British officer admits that the tribes were independent. He says that the tribal areas or "Yaghistan... between the British protectorate border and the Durand Line, is a British protectorate. It has not been annexed, the tribes have not accepted our rule." See Rahman Pazhwak, no. 61, p. 18.

religiousness and their devotion to Islam, the Frontier Province remained quite until the refugees began to arrive with tales of terror, which resulted in a rising communal processions stimulated by the exhortations of the fanatic mullahs and the Muslim League mischivious activities. On September 7, 1947, there were mass attacks on Sikhs and Hindus who had gathered for assylum at Peshawar and Nowshera. The Afghan government and the Khudai Khidmatgars took the courageous step of openly condemning the atrocities as stimulated by the unknown mullahs and the Muslim League fanatic workers. The Sikhs and the Hindus were given shelter and protection in Afghan territory and were safely sent to India.¹²² Following the flareup of communal violence, tension remained high in the Frontier Provinces and tribal areas until October 25, 1947, when it found release in the planned tribal invasion of Kashmir. Once again the Afghan government did its best to prevent the tribesmen from joining the fighting in direct opposition to the mullahs who were calling for holy war.

There is no doubt that the communal hatreds and the Kashmir invasion were acts planned which both greatly "contributed to the establishment of Pakistan and at the same time it prevented the consideration of Afghanistan's claims" regarding the problem of eastern Pashtuns who still struggled for their independence.¹²³

122. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8634; and Arnold Fletcher, no. 103, p. 252.

123. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 253.

The meetings of George Cunningham with the leaders of Jirgas took place in November 1947, immediately following the outbreak of communal violence and during the Kashmir fighting. Therefore, it would have been almost impossible during this period for any tribesman to suggest any action appearing as anti-Pakistan. In fact these were the designed plans of the British and the new Pakistani rulers, intended "to arouse Muslim enthusiasm, block Pashtun separatism, bring discredit to Khudai Khidmatgars, and hinder action by Afghanistan."¹²⁴

Although these developments seriously affected Afghanistan's initiatives, still the Afghans pressed their view points and in view of these fabricated situations, refused to recognize either the result of the projected onesided referendum or the procedure and arrangements of the agreements with the tribes. When the question of Pakistan's admission to the United Nation came before that world body in September 1947, Afghanistan opposed it on the grounds that it would not recognize the North-West Frontier areas including Baluchistan, as part of Pakistan as long as the Pathans of the area had not been given an opportunity "free from any kind of influence, to determine whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan". Aziz Hussain the head of the Afghan delegation added further that "Afghanistan cannot remain unaffected by, and therefore, cannot be indifferent to, any

124. Ibid.

measure; which would affect the hearts and homes of these people."¹²⁵ Many foreigners expressed a surprise at the dismay with which the Afghans greeted the appearance of Pakistan. But such a surprise was merely a result of the ignorance and a wrong impression of the outsiders concerning Afghanistan and the Pashtun problem which the British had created and misrepresented it to the world. The British had reasons to misrepresent the real nature of the political opposition against them. By calling the Pashtun wars as religious wars and the tribal risings as plunderings they had the intention to divert the public opinion and attract sympathy and justification for their unjust actions and misdeeds they committed in the remote lands of the Pashtun tribes.¹²⁶

Afghanistan pre-occupied with the problems of its economic developments believed in a peaceful solution of the Pashtun problem, hence, towards the end of November 1947, Najibullah Khan a young diplomat, was sent to Karachi for a series of conversations with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Pakistan foreign minister, Zafarullah Khan. Najibullah Khan stressed the Afghan concern over the fate of the Pashtuns east of the Durand Line, and requested a declaration of Pakistan's intentions in the Pashtun areas. Nothing was put on official paper, with the exception

125. Rahman Pashwak, no. 48, p. 118.

126. Ibid., p. 107.

that the Pakistani leaders promised that Jinnah's promise of non-interference in the independent Pashtun territory would be fulfilled and that the Pashtun autonomy would be recognized. This was at least, the message the envoy brought to the Afghan government. This was confirmed by a letter dated 1st January, 1948, from Zafarullah Khan, foreign minister of Pakistan, and by a subsequent statement made by Fazlur Rahman, education minister of Pakistan during his tour of the North-West Frontier.¹²⁷ As a result of this declaration, Pakistan government withdrew all the regular troops which the British maintained in Waziristan and other tribal areas and at the same time the people were told that their independence would be recognized as soon as the war was over in Kashmir. This statement was welcomed by the Pashtuns and brought about a temporary improvement in Pak-Afghan relations.¹²⁸

But at the end of the fighting in Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan changed its policy and refused to fulfil its promise. At the same time the Governor General of Pakistan made a statement declaring that the Pashtun territory was an integral part of Pakistan and that the frontier of Pakistan was the Durand Line and that she was the inheritor of all rights and interests maintained by the British upto 1947.

This statement aroused the resentment of both the Afghans and the Pashtuns which culminated in a general rising of the

127. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 253, and Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 118.

128. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 119.

tribes that was followed by a general arrests of Pashtun leaders and a Pakistani military action against the tribes. On June 16, 1948 Pakistan government invoked its powers and arrested most of the Khudai Khidmatgars including Gaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Saheb, Qazi Ataullah, Amir Mohammad Khan and other leaders who were rapidly given trials and sentenced to prison or house arrest for the fabricated charge of "conspiring with subversive forces active on the frontier". Ordinances giving extraordinary powers to the government were promulgated to suppress the liberation movement of the Pashtuns which was branded by the Pakistan government as "subversion" or anti-Pakistan activities directed by "foreign influence or control, or associated with foreign agents or hostile tribesmen".¹²⁹ The organization of the Khudai Khidmatgars was also banned as illegal. Similarly about the same time the Pakistani military authorities, who had previously reduced the number of battalions stationed in the Tribal areas began to reinforce their garrisons with a view to use their airforce against the remote tribes.¹³⁰ In fact, from 17th March, 1950, to 22nd October 1950, as large as thirteen air attacks were made by the Pakistan airforce bombing the Pashtun villages on the frontier which resulted ⁱⁿ destruction and killings of a large number of innocent men, women and children.¹³¹ One

129. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1948, p. 9383, D.

130. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 254.

131. See for detail, Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, pp. 120-21.

of the primary targets of these raids was the headquarters of the Fakir of Ipi who had now shifted against Pakistan his lifelong fighting for independence.

From this time onwards the Afghan government relinquished all hopes of a compromise by Pakistan, and began openly to support the creation of a "Pashtunistan" nation as advocated by the Pashtuns to be made up of the "North-West Frontier Province, Tribal areas, and Baluchistan. Kabul Radio and Afghan press started broadcasts advocating the cause of Pashtunistan. Pakistan aided by the British, retaliated by increasing tribal subsidies, stepping up police and military activities and releasing a barrage of attacks on Afghanistan from its own press and radio.¹³²

Tension between the two countries increased, which resulted in bombing of the tribal territory by Pakistan. Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan addressing a demonstration in Kabul, promised the Afghan nation that the Government would rescue the "brother Afghans" by peaceful means, but if not "by other means". The reaction of the Pakistan government came through a statement made by foreign minister Zafrullah Khan that neither the Durand line nor any subsequent agreement relating to the frontiers, was open to question, but that Pakistan would welcome discussion with Afghanistan on matters of economic cooperation such as the

132. Arnold Flecher, no. 105, p. 254.

development of the hydroelectric and other resources of the frontier areas.¹³³

The tension between the two countries further aggravated. The Pakistan government increased its bombing of the tribal territory till in June 1949, a number of Pakistani Planes committed aggression on Afghanistan by bombing the village of Moghulgai, almost two miles west of the Durand Line, which resulted in a number of casualties.¹³⁴ At first the Pakistan government denied the incident and claimed that the bombs were dropped on the Pakistan side of the frontier but afterwards admitted that it was a result of a "bonafide" mistake on the part of the pilot. The Afghans refused to accept an offer of compensation by Pakistan and pointed out with truth that "the explanation was an interesting commentary on Pakistan's relations with the Pashtuns".¹³⁵

The Afghan Ambassador in London, Faiz Mohammad Zekeria was instructed to approach the British Government to assist in bringing a solution to the problem, but the British response was a statement made by the Secretary for Commonwealth Relation, that Pakistan was in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the former Government of India in the territories

133. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1948, p. 10172.

134. The Casualties were 23 persons killed and 24 injured, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1950, p. 10172.

135. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 256.

on the North West Frontier, and that the Durand Line was the international frontier. The Afghan Ambassador stated that Afghanistan could not accept this view and added that, if negotiations with Pakistan failed, Afghanistan would appeal to the United Nations.¹³⁶

The tension between the two countries continued and on August 12, 1949, a numerous Jirgas (Tribal Assembly) of the Afridi tribesmen met at Bagh in Tirah, the center of their homeland, and after deliberations declared the establishment of a new nation, Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan, for which they "adopted a flag with a red mountain fronting a rising sun". The proclamation addressed itself to "all the rank and file of the Pakhtunistan, the entire Muslim world, particularly Afghanistan, ... and the United Nation's Organization. It read in part as follows:

"We (the Tirah branch) of the National Assembly of Pakhtunistan having formed the first nuclear of a free and independent Moslem government amidst the lofty mountains of Tirah express the hope that with the help of Almighty God and the support of brave and freedom-loving Pakhtuns this young plant may in a short time grow into a sturdy tree which will not only benefit Pakhtunistan (from Chitral to Baluchistan and from Khyber and Belan to the banks of the Indus) but will also fulfil its obligations to the cause of progress and world peace."¹³⁷

In Afghanistan this proclamation was welcomed with great enthusiasm, and the government announced that it would extend

136. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1950, p. 10172.

137. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 255.

immediate recognition and support. At the same time another Jirga met at Razmak and elected the Fakir of Ipi as the President of the Central Independent Pashtunistan. Soon thereafter the Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) met in Kabul and declared that all treaties between Afghanistan and Great Britain, and especially the Durand Agreement, were null and void.¹³⁸

Pakistan was greatly affected by these developments which continued to suppress them, but officially dismissed these developments as figments of the Afghan imagination or the work of a few dissidents on Afghan pay. But in reality the Pakistani leaders were gravely alarmed. Having failed to crush the movement, they began in December 1949, to exert pressure on the landlocked Afghanistan by halting shipments of petroleum products on the pretext that the Afghan tankers "did not meet safety requirements". At the same time restrictions were imposed on the traffic of Afghan imports and exports through Karachi, then Afghanistan's major link with outside world, which resulted later in a virtual halt of Afghan trade via Pakistan in 1950.¹³⁹ This creation of hinderances and obstacles affecting Afghanistan's political and commercial affairs, was an economic as well as political pressure aimed at precluding Afghanistan from supporting the Pashtun demand. This severely affected Afghanistan's economic developments which had just been started.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

Still Afghanistan continued to press its position on the issue and in view of the "freedom-loving aspirations and the repeated protests of the trans-Durand Afghans," H.M. the king of Afghanistan said that "Afghanistan is responsible for the attainment of their oft-desired independence."¹⁴⁰ The Afghan Parliament also approved the Government's policy in a resolution calling for co-operation with the Government "in overcoming the commercial and political difficulties and the achieving the independence of all Afghan brothers."¹⁴¹

Pakistan too, had a counter-acting policy towards the Pashtuns which consisted of a mixture of threats and favours clothed in religious terms. Where subsidies, allowances, social and economic benefits could work, they offered them in abundance to maliks (elders), mullahs (priests) and other pro-Pakistani elements. Special attention was paid to the Pashtun susceptibilities. While on the other hand, to the great majority who fought for their independence, the Muslim rulers of Pakistan offered them nothing short of oppressive tortures and sufferings.¹⁴²

140. Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 123.

141. The Parliament Resolution while reiterating the Afghan support for Pashtunistan, stated that "The Afghan nation is deeply alive to the dangers of Pakistan's creation of hindrances and obstacles affecting Afghanistan's political and commercial affairs, as well as Pakistan's efforts to oppress the independence of Frontier Pakhtun provinces from Chitral up to Baluchistan. It further stated that Afghanistan can neither recognizes the "imaginary Durand or any similar line", Rahman Pazhwak, no. 48, p. 123.

142. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 255.

In fact bombings of Pashtun villages, imprisonments, trials, house-arrests and confiscation of properties of the Pashtun liberals, and intelligential known to be in favour of Pashtunistan, became a daily routine in the great Islamic state of Pakistan.

The world reaction to this crisis and humaniterian problem, has been varied. India, because of its difference with Pakistan, from the beginning supported the Afghan position and on January 1, 1950, signed a treaty of "eternal friendship" with Afghanistan. A number of the "Pashtunistan days" were held in some of the Indian cities despite of vigorous Pakistani protests.¹⁴³ Beyond this, no official stand over the issue has been assumed by the Government of India. It seems that in view of the Kashmir issue, the Afghan advocacy of a plebiscite among the Pashtuns on the basis of self-determination, has been discouraging for India to assume an official position on the Pashtun position.

The United States active to build its position in the region, "took the part of an anxious bystander, hoping for peace but uncertain how to bring it about." Since both Afghanistan and Pakistan were friendly with the United States and hostile towards the Soviet Union, the United States, desired to bring the two parties together, and, therefore, proposed on three occasions to help mediate the dispute, once it offered to act as mediator, and subsequently suggested the good offices of Egypt and Turkey.

143. Ibid.

Each time the proposal was accepted by Afghanistan and rejected by Pakistan on the ground that it was her internal matter not subject to mediation.¹⁴⁴

But in reality the Americans were against the Afghan position on the Pashtun issue. The Afghans were dismayed at the United States' repeated refusals to provide Afghanistan with arms, which the United States thought that such assistance might be used against Pakistan than against the Soviet Union. On the other hand the Afghans pointed out that such fears did not prevent the British from arming Pakistan which was threatening Afghanistan specially when her planes bombed the Afghan village of Moghulgai in June 1949.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Afghanistan with its twelve rickety pre-World War II biplanes as in marked contrast to the spitfires of Pakistani air force, found itself in a weaker position. Afghanistan's relation with Soviet Union has been cordial for nearly two decades and the Soviets seemed to have a great interest in supporting the Pashtunistan issue. Soviet press since the very beginning carried large publicity on the developments concerning the Pashtun problem. But due to ideological differences, close and intimate relations never existed between the two countries. The Soviets though inflamed at the American presence in Afghanistan, in order to win Afghan friend-

144. Ibid.

145. Arnold Fletcher, no. 105, p. 256.

ship they obviously wanted to support Afghanistan and provide her with arms and economic aid. But the Afghans still hoping for the friendship of the West, avoided any such offers. But the Afghans never succeeded to obtain anything from the West and remained isolated and threatened. This situation was viewed by Afghans as the projection of western diplomacy to bring Afghanistan under the influence of their friendly Pakistan regardless of the country's legitimate interests. Therefore, Afghanistan needed a man stronger in the person of ^aPrime Minister to deal with the state of affairs in the legitimate interest of the Afghan nation and the Pashtun cause.

Chapter IV

Afghanistan Towards Pashtunistan Issue In The Cold War Era
1953-1963

(The year 1953 is a turning point in Afghan history, which marks the beginning of a period in which Afghanistan in the high interests of the country began to move along new paths of diplomacy and economic development. During 1953, three major events took place which left a profound influence on Afghanistan and its foreign policy objectives specially the Pashtun issue.

The first was the coming into power of Eisenhower as the President of the United States and Dulles as Foreign Secretary with a hostile foreign policy which aimed at blocking Soviet expansion into the Middle East by a system of alliances supported by massive economic and military assistance. This change in U.S. leadership appeared to be threatening to the traditional neutral Afghans who had already been dismayed at the American refusal to provide them with arms or at least to persuade Pakistan for a peaceful negotiation of the Pashtun problem.) The Afghans viewed the new American policy motivation as one guided on the British line of thinking to create against Russian possible expansion, a Muslim defence system from Kashmir to Turkey, in which forced inclusion or assimilation of Afghanistan was envisaged.¹⁴⁶

146. "Arming of Pakistan", Eastern World, February, 1954, p. 7, and, Sir George Gunningham, "Frontier Discord: Pakistan and Afghanistan", Manchester Guardian, February 2, 1949 (quoted by Ahmad Ali Kohzad, no. 106).

(The second important event was the death of Stalin in 1953, shortly after the change of administration in Washington which resulted in a substantial change in the Soviet policy towards its Asian neighbours. Stalin, no doubt, was very much in favour of friendship with the strategic Afghanistan, but generally in view of his firm communist convictions he was indifferent and hostile towards the neighbouring South Asian countries with their Bourgeois nationalist governments. This was not a policy to make popularity as it tended to irritate and alienate the people in these countries and was damaging to the Soviet interests, specially when the Americans were active in these countries to build their position.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, the new Soviet leaders found it necessary to formulate a new and an attractive policy calling for genuine friendship and mutual co-operation with the neighbouring Asian countries.)

These two changes on the world scene which aggravated the world affairs and involved the entire international community

147. Stalin firmly believed in the traditional Leninist-Stalinist view that the success of the revolution could only be achieved by "armed struggle" waged by local communist parties against the nationalist bourgeois governments. Therefore, he did not bother much about the Asian attitudes and in fact, he had so little concern for the Asians that he refused to take any part in the economic programmes of the United Nations. Stalin policy specially his attitude towards the Bourgeois nationalist governments in South Asia, appeared to be damaging to the Soviet interests as it tended to irritate and alienate the people of these countries. Because, the Bourgeois nationalist governments in these countries were still popular because most of these governments had achieved independence for their people while others had preserved it against European imperialism.

in a cold war rivalries between the two power blocs. The situation placed Afghanistan in a very complicated and dangerous position. (Afghanistan's relations with both of the super powers were friendly.) But due to the religious and ideological hostility and indifference of the Afghan people towards the communist Russians, Afghan rulers favoured close relation with the West specially the United States. This in view of Afghanistan's difference with Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue did not materialize. (The Afghans made repeated attempts to secure the U.S. assistance in solving the dispute with Pakistan,) but the Americans guided by their global strategy to dominate and fill up the power vacuum which the British withdrawal from India had resulted, refused to attend the Afghan requests, (and rather they stressed on arming Pakistan as well as Iran, both of which were hostile towards Afghanistan.)¹⁴⁸ The American policy makers argued that Afghanistan, being poor, weak, and hostile towards Russia and placed under the threats of her heavily armed hostile neighbours of Pakistan and Iran, will ultimately force the Afghans to turn to the Americans for help which would mean Afghanistan's inclusion in the American Middle East alliance system abandoning the Pashtunistan issue.¹⁴⁹ Afghanistan in view

148. Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, (New York, 1965), p. 256, and pp. 264-5.

149. "Arming of Pakistan", Eastern World, vol. 12, no. 2, November 1958, p. 14 and Louis Dupree, "An Informal Talk with Prime Minister Daoud", American Universities Field Staff Service Report, (South Asia Series), vol. 111, no. 3, 1959.

of her traditional neutral policy and the existence of 1,250 miles long common border with Soviet Union and sharing some ethnic groups with that country could not join such an alliance against Russia nor she could give up the Pashtun issue in view of an internal pressure and Afghanistan's racial, ethnic and cultural ties with the eastern Afghans or Pashtuns. As a result of these developments Afghanistan remained isolated and Pakistan in view of the Afghan support for Pashtunistan continued to threaten her by encouraging subversion, tribal rising and provoking religious elements in the country.¹⁵⁰⁾

(The third event of 1953 was a change in Afghan leadership from old conservatives to young nationalists which was a direct consequence of the critical situation and foreign pressure as referred to, which constantly threatened peace and stability of the country.) The old pro-American conservative government could not handle the situation inspite of its substantial reliance on the west, hence it had to give way to the young and energetic nationalists headed by the confident Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud and his diplomat brother Mohammad Naim, the minister for Afghan foreign affairs.

Afghanistan was already weak enough facing a variety of problems as a result of earlier European rivalries, therefore

150. See for detail, "The Pakhtunistan Issue", Eastern World, Sept-Oct., 1967, p.21, and Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan: Between East and West, National Planning Association (U.S.A.), 1960, pp.11-13, and Arnold Fletcher, no. 148, pp.264-5.

she could not afford any further involvement in the power struggle of the big powers. Afghanistan required urgent modernization and economic development to solve some of its pressing problems which originated largely from lack of such modernization and administrative centralization. Social handicaps in the form of tribal agitations, religious dissatisfaction among the people often encouraged by Pakistani authorities and lack of equipped army, rough physiography of the country and the meager means of communication and transport, insufficient finances and lack of centralizing administrative facilities and other problems, all stood in the way of the country's integrity and political stability.¹⁵¹

The Pashtunistan issue, a legacy of the British colonialism was another major problem which dominated all other issues facing the country. Afghanistan in view of common ties with the Pashtuns who were also Afghans, and in view of the internal pressure in this respect, was bound to support the demand of the Pashtuns for their right to self-determination. The fear that a verbal Afghan support would further encourage the Pakistani authorities to attempt assimilation of the Afghan minority into the majority community, further persuaded the new Afghan rulers to assume a hard and uncompromising position on this issue inspite of an inevitable pre-occupation with the economic development and

151. Ibid., and K.P. Ghosh, "Afghanistan in World Affairs", Eastern World, October, 1954, pp. 14-15.

modernization of the country.¹⁵²

Thus the problem of modernization of the country and the settlement of the Pashtunistan issue became two primary concerns of the new government. But how to carry the two objectives simultaneously which obstructed one another, was a great dilemma for the new rulers. (Afghanistan as a landlocked country had to depend on Pakistan for transit of its foreign trade and developmental goods since the country's only economic link with outside world run through Pakistan. And in view of the Pashtun issue, Pakistan, "holding her economically by the throat" exerted constant pressure on Afghanistan by detaining "on frivolous excuses" her foreign trade and the entry of her developmental goods through that country.)

To overcome this obstacle, Afghanistan forced as it was, still approached the west to persuade Pakistan to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Pashtunistan issue, or at least to provide her with arms to enable her to ward off the danger of a possible threat from Pakistan or arising out of internal troubles instigated by foreign elements. However, the U.S. reluctance and repeated refusal to accede to the Afghan requests to help Afghanistan, did not preclude the new confident rulers from carrying with their objectives. They were so confident that they neither bothered about the U.S. intentions nor they

152. See for detail, Arnold Fletcher, no. 148, pp. 255-76.

feared any threat from Russia in getting closer to her as often advocated by westerners.¹⁵³

Thus for a time during 1954, Afghanistan managed to persuade Pakistan not to take such steps with regard to the Pashtuns which may force Afghanistan to interfere violently, but as soon as Pakistan was enable to enlist the support of the west and also of the Muslim world, she began to assimilate the Pashtun minority into the majority by integrating the Pashtun territories into one unit under West Pakistan.

(The Pakistani leaders were trying from the very beginning to seek such a military arrangement that would strengthen her position vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India. In 1951 they had concluded a friendship agreement with Turkey which resulted in the treaty of February 1954 between the two countries forming the basis for the Baghdad Pact, and the arming of Pakistan by Americans.) However, the supply of arms to Pakistan, described by Mohammad Ali the Pakistan Prime Minister as "glorious chapter in her history," casting Pakistan "for a significant role in world affairs", not only aggravated the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it also aroused the anxieties of the Indian leaders. (Nehru the Indian Prime Minister believing in non-violence strongly objected to it.) He said that Pakistan now "becomes part of a group of nations lined up against another

153. "Neutral Afghanistan", Eastern World, November, 1959, p.14, and "Hand-shakes in Kabul", Eastern World, November 1958, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 14.

group", which he added, is likely to bring war to India's frontier. (But to Afghans who had repeatedly been refused arms supplies by Americans, the arming of Pakistan meant something more than what the Indian leaders feared.) The Afghans describing the arm supply to Pakistan as "a grave danger to the security and peace of Afghanistan", argued that if the American aid to Pakistan was not meant to be used against India as was assured by President Eisenhower to Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, then whom the Pakistanis were going to fight. The Afghans maintained that if the arms were meant against possible threat from Communist Russia, in that case the Afghans should have been provided with arms, since they alone could fall victim of such a threat at first as they occupied the most significant strategic location to the south of the USSR.¹⁵⁴

(Anyhow, as soon as the American aid to Pakistan was confirmed the Government of Pakistan began to harden its attitude towards Pashtuns and Afghanistan as well.) (Towards the end of 1954, the Government of Pakistan decided to merge the Pashtun and Baluch territories into a proposed single unit of West Pakistan.) Frontier ministry of Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan was immediately dismissed on the ground of his opposition to the formation of one unit, and a new ministry under General Ayub Khan's brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan, was formed. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other

154. Louis Dupree, no. 149.

Pashtun leaders who had been just released were rearrested for their opposition to the reunification of West Pakistan and also on the charge of advocating the formation of ^a Pashtun State. The decision of reunification of West Pakistan was motivated by two things — to assimilate the Pashtuns into the majority community and to "add weight of numbers" to the new unit of West Pakistan vis-a-vis East Pakistan.¹⁵⁵

(This decision of the Pakistan Government, however, increased the tension between the two countries leading the Afghan government to lodge strong protests with the Government of Pakistan. On October 13, 1955, the Afghan Minister in Karachi Rafiq Atiq handed over to the Government of Pakistan a strongly worded note that Afghanistan could not remain a silent spectator of the merger of the Pashtun territory without ascertaining the wishes of Pashtun people.¹⁵⁶ The Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan was immediately sent to Karachi to discuss the issue with Pakistani authorities. In a press statement in Karachi on November 7, 1955, he declared that the basic difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan, did not involve any territorial adjustment but the question of giving the people of "Pashtunistan" opportunities to express themselves on "their status and way of living.") Though the Afghan Envoy Sardar Attiq reported in Peshawar on November

155. J.W.T. Cooper, "Pakhtunistan or Not?", Eastern World, vol. 9, June, 1955, p. 12.

156. Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 14 October, 1955.

11, that the two countries had made "a notable advance towards coming closer to each other", which was also confirmed by a statement of Pakistan's Prime Minister that Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan's visit had led to "quite an improvement" in the relations between the two countries,¹⁵⁷ still at the end nothing fruitful came out. It became apparent that either the Afghan envoy was misled by the Pakistanis or he had drawn unduly optimistic conclusions.)

(Thus the relation between the two countries continued to remain strained.) In December 1954, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan declared that the government and the people of Afghanistan continue to have the same attitude in supporting the legitimate claim of the people of Pashtunistan for their freedom, and as stated on many occasions, they do not consider the Pashtun-Baluch territories as part of Pakistan. The Prime Minister stated:

"We cannot agree to any decision taken about these areas without the consent of the people of Pashtunistan. We are not concerned about the recent decision of the Pakistan Government to merge the provinces of West Pakistan, as much as it relates to Pakistan itself, but we consider the imposition of that decision on Pashtunistan contrary to the legitimate rights of Pashtun nation."¹⁵⁸

The Afghan Prime Minister, suggesting urgent negotiations for restoring most close and friendly relations between the two countries, further stated:

157. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14039.

158. "Statement by Sardar Mohammad Daoud, Prime Minister of Afghanistan", Eastern World, vol. 9, no. 1, January 1955, p. 26.

"The Afghan Foreign Minister made it clear to Pakistani authorities, that the denial of the right of self determination to the people of Pashtunistan by Pakistan is the real obstacle to establish close relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan..."

The Prime Minister further expressed his regrets that "while Afghanistan was expecting that "such negotiations will take place between the two countries to reach an understanding", but "the recent decision of the Government of Pakistan has removed every hope for amelioration of existing relationship" between the two countries.¹⁵⁹

However, the Afghans pressed their views which are officially based on the following contentions:

The Pashtun and Baluchi territories are neither historically nor geographically part of the Indian subcontinent. The Pashtun and Baluchis are, ethnically, culturally and psychologically different people from that of the Indian sub-continent. Just because they are Muslim, does not provide justification for their incorporation into Pakistan.

Since the Indian Muslims and the Indian Hindus were granted the right to decide their future, hence the third distinct cultural ethnic and political community, the Pashtuns and the Baluchis should have the same right to choose for their real wishes, whether they wanted to remain with Pakistan or opted for a separate state of their own.

There is no legal basis for the automatic transferral to the newly constituted state of Pakistan of the British-Afghan treaties. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, declaring the previous agreements including the Durand Agreement null and void, is no longer valid because of the self-removal of the contracting parties.¹⁶⁰

159. Ibid.

160. Pakhtunistan Day and the Pakhtun Question, (London, 1950), p. 28.

The right to self-determination based on the principles of the fundamental human rights confirmed by the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, should be respected with regard to the real wishes of the people of Pashtunistan. Pakistan itself requests a plebiscite in the case of Kashmir which excepting religion has no other relation with the people of Pakistan as the Pashtuns do have with the Afghans, which make the basis for Afghan support.¹⁶¹

Hence the Afghans maintained that the new decision of Pakistan Government to merge the Pashtun territories into west Pakistan is not only against the will and wish of the Pashtun people who want their distinct entity and identity and complete freedom based on the principles of the fundamental human rights, but it is also contrary to the two declarations of late Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the assurances given to Afghan government by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan that the independence of the Tribal areas and the autonomy of N.W.F.P. would be respected.¹⁶²

(However, the tension between the two countries over the issue of merger of Pashtun territories in the West Pakistan continued to deteriorate.) This decision could not but disturb the Afghans, to whom "the elimination of N.W.F.P. seemed part of a move to destroy the identity of eastern Afghans." And "undoubtedly this was one of the motives behind the plan", since separatism among the Pashtuns, though denied by Pakistani

161. For detail see, Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, London (n.d.), p. 130.

162. Najibullah Khan (Afghan Ambassador in London), "The Problem of Pakhtunistan", Eastern World, vol.9, no.1, Jan.1955, p.25.

authorities, constituted a major and serious problem for Pakistan.¹⁶³ (It was this fear with the Afghans that they took the matter serious.) (The Afghan Prime Minister Daoud Khan in a broadcast on March 29, 1955, protested against this decision and gave a warning that such a step would lead to "grave consequences".) A formal note protesting against the merger of "occupied and free Pashtunistan" in the new province of West Pakistan, was again presented to Pakistan by the Afghan Minister in Karachi, but was rejected by Pakistan Government on the ground that the unification of West Pakistan was purely Pakistan's internal matter.

(This hard and harsh attitude of Pakistani authorities, soon around the general resentment of the people in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan which led ultimately to the large-scale demonstrations in Kabul and other cities against the Pakistan Government and in favour of the liberation of Pashtunistan. During these demonstrations, a crowd largely students attacked on March 30, the Pakistan Embassy, to be followed by students, attacks on Pakistan's Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad on March 31, and April 1, respectively. In spite of police intervention which resulted in fighting and many casualties, the students were able to pull and tear down the Pakistani flags. In retaliation Pakistani mobs also raided Afghan Consulate at Peshawar, tearing

163. Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest (New York, 1965), p. 269.

down and burning the Afghan flag and the official documents.¹⁶⁴

These incidents resulted acute tension between the two countries. Frequent protests against the incidents were exchanged and rejected by the two governments charging one another responsible for the incidents, demanded proper restitution for the resultant insult and damage. Finally the Afghan government agreed to offer unqualified apology, to make amends

164. Counter charges were made by both the governments. Pakistani official sources alleged that their diplomatic missions have been stoned and their flags torn down with the help of police, resulting injury of staff members loss and damage of property, and that the Afghan police did not prevent the demonstrators from approaching Pakistani diplomatic missions. But according to Kabul Radio report the police did intervene which caused a fighting between the police and students in which 42 policemen and 35 students were injured.

Similarly in connection to attack on Afghan Consulate at Peshawar, the Afghan Embassy in Karachi claimed that the demonstrators were assisted by Pakistani authorities, while the Pakistani sources alleged that police had prevented the demonstrators from approaching the Afghan Consulate, and that the raid had been the work of "12 Afghan nationals" all of whom had been arrested. But the fact that the target of such an attack was Afghan Consulate in Peshawar, a Pashtun territory, not the Afghan Embassy in Karachi seems to suggest that the raid on Afghan consulate was a deliberate one to show that the Pashtuns whom the Afghans supported their right to self-determination, themselves were against the Afghan claims. Branding those claimed to be arrested as "12 Afghan nationals" was to reflect that the Afghan rulers were not popular in Afghanistan. This is confirmed by the statement made on April 1 over radio by the Pakistani Prime Minister, M. Ali that "the ruling junta in Afghanistan talks of the Pashtunistan stunt in order to divert the Afghan people's attention from the autocratic nature of the regime." In fact it is believed that those who raided the Afghan Consulates were non-Pashtun students in Peshawar, and those claimed as Afghan nationals were the Pashtun shopkeepers of the locality who tried to prevent the demonstrators from raiding the Afghan Consulate, see for detail, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14217, A, and Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. VII, no. 14, 1955, p. 31.

and pay compensation provided similar amends were made by Pakistan for the insult offered to the Afghan flag at Peshawar. This offer was rejected by Pakistan as unsatisfactory and therefore the Prime Minister of Pakistan announced on May 1, 1955 the closing of its consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar and demanded also the closing of all Afghan Consulates and Trade agencies in Pakistan.¹⁶⁵ }

(However, in view of a delivery of a Pakistani ultimatum calling on Afghanistan to make unconditional "adequate amends", the Afghan Government proclaimed a state of emergency on May 4, and ordered mobilization of civil forces against a probable threat from Pakistan.)¹⁶⁶ (And the Afghan Minister in Karachi was recalled.)
 (The Afghan Prime Minister in an interview with Sunday Times correspondent in Kabul published on May 8, stated that Pakistan's refusal to negotiate on the subject of "Pashtunistan" lay at the heart of the disagreement between the two countries and declared

165. Mohammad Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister over a radio broadcast on first April, 1965 declared that "we shall not rest content until an amende honourable is made for the insult and damage caused to our honour and prestige". See for detail, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p.14217, A.

166. Afghanistan has in fact never had any well-equipped army, and her strength and victory in wars with the British depended on the people who had always been armed and ready to fight for their country. But recently Afghanistan had begun a program of training its people according to which each Afghan citizen is required to perform military service for two years. Thus when the emergency was proclaimed on March 1955, all men between 25 and 35 who had performed such services were ordered to report within 24 hours and get themselves registered for defence against possible foreign threat.

that his Government would nevertheless "continue to support the lawful claims of the Pathans." Questioned as to the economic results of the closing of Pakistani frontier, he said that "if we are in a room with only one outlet, and that outlet is closed, we will have to make ourselves another outlet by breaking a window", — i.e. Afghanistan would seek alternative outlet across the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁷⁾

The tension between the two countries became very acute and the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Turkey made mediation offers to alleviate the tension between the two countries. These offers were accepted by Afghanistan as well as by Pakistan, but Pakistan in accepting these offers made the reservation that the use of these good offices in finding a settlement should relate only to the incident of attacks on Pakistan's diplomatic missions in Afghanistan which had caused an insult to the Pakistani nation. In spite of vigorous efforts made by these countries to bring about a settlement, nothing was achieved, and the mediators decided to end their efforts.¹⁶⁸

However, as a result of discussion between the Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan and the Pakistani Ambassador in Kabul, Col. A.S.B. Shah, an agreement was reached on September 9, 1955 whereby both the governments promised to make amends for the

167. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14217, A.

168. See for detail, Ibid.

insult made to their flags. Accordingly the Pakistani flag was ceremonially rehoisted on the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul by Afghan Foreign Minister in the presence of an Afghan military unit and the heads of the foreign diplomatic missions. Similarly at Peshawar Afghan flag was ceremonially rehoisted on the Afghan consulate by Dr. Khan Sahib, the Pakistan Minister for Communication on September 1955.¹⁶⁹

¶ Relation between the two countries again deteriorated during October, as a result of ^{the} continued Afghan opposition to the inclusion of the Pashtun areas in the new province of Pakistan, leading to the recall of the Afghan Minister in Karachi and the Pakistani Ambassador in Kabul. However, this time the government of Pakistan suggested heart-to-heart talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries on matters affecting the Pak-Afghan relations. A formal invitation was sent to the Afghan Prime Minister, but the Afghan Government replied that such a visit should be conditional on the postponement of the implementation of the One-Unit Act, setting up West Pakistan. The Pakistan Government reiterating her previous stand, refused to accept the Afghan proposal. This led to ^a final break off of diplomatic relations between the two countries. (Afghan consulate and trade agencies in Peshawar, Quetta, Chaman and Parachinar were close down.) (This was a serious threat to the economy of the land-locked Afghanistan, since the

169. Pakistani flag was also ceremonially rehoisted on Pakistan's Consulate at Jalalabad, Ibid., p. 14481.

country's only economic links with outside world run through Pakistan.)

This state of affairs continued to disturb Afghans. Their economy was in virtual state of blockade by the closure of the border by Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan continued with their plan of merger of Pashtun territories into the new province of West Pakistan, which exerted an internal pressure on the Afghan Government from the excited public. Tribalism and religious orthodoxy frequently instigated by Pakistani mischiefs, was another threatening problem. The Afghan army was completely ill-equipped. The infantry still carried rifles of the 19th century, and ammunition was scarce and unreliable. Afghan air force consisted of only 12 biplanes dated from First World War. Afghan Government for nearly four years repeatedly requested the West specially the United States to provide her with arms which the Americans consistently refused to offer. This was not objectional to Afghans as far as the West did not provide arms to Afghanistan's hostile neighbours of Iran and Pakistan. With Iran Afghanistan happened to have a dispute over the water of the Helmand River.¹⁷⁰ But the U.S. continued to arm the two countries

170. Iran has been a traditionally hostile neighbour of Afghanistan. In spite of certain portions of Afghan territories seized by Iran at the times of Afghanistan's difficulties which internal conditions and Anglo-Russian, rivalries in last two centuries created, still Iran is not content to stop its dreams of expansionism eastward into Afghan or Baluch territories. The dispute over the water of Helmand River is a result of the

(footnote no.170 cont'd to p.129)

on an ever increasing scale which appeared to the Afghans a potential threat aimed at forcing her entry into the Baghdad Pact against her will. The lack of geographic integration of the country due to lack of modern means of transport and communication, was also giving a warning in view of the foreign activities. Economic problems were also pressing urgency of solution. The U.S. had refused to give Afghanistan any sufficient aid as she had done on large scale in the case of Iran and Pakistan.¹⁷¹

So in view of these threatening problems, specially the Afghan concern over the fate of Pashtuns under Pakistan, pressed the Afghan Government to convene a Loya Jirga, a Grand Assembly, to resolve over these problems specially the Pashtun Issue. The Jirga was accordingly held in November 1955, which at first redefined the

(Footnote no. 170 continued from page no. 128)

division of the Afghan province of Sistan between the two countries. The division of the province getting water from the Hilmand river in Afghanistan, also necessitated a division of water which Iranis claim a greater share than what used to go to that part of the province which is now under Iran's occupation. The dispute has been taken many times to mediation, each time Afghanistan has accepted the mediators' decision while Iran has refused. However, this year an agreement slightly in favour of Iran is reached to end the dispute and the agreement is due to be finally approved by the two parties.

171. The Afghans for a number of years approached the United States for economic loans, but the Americans offered so little amount that dismayed the requesting Afghans, specially when they saw such aids were available on massive scale to Iran or Pakistan. By 1956, Afghanistan had received about six million dollars in technical existence, whereas Iran and Pakistan had been given one hundred millions each, only under this program. While under other programs in addition to military aid they received massive aid both in the form of grants and loans.

See for detail, Arnold Fletcher, no. 163, pp. 266-67.

traditional neutrality of Afghanistan as the keynote of Afghan foreign policy. It then resolved that the Pashtunistan issue should be settled by urging Pakistan to grant the right of self-determination to the Afghans, the Pashtuns west of the Indus river. The Jirga averred that the strengthening of national defence had become essential due to the rift with Pakistan. And as the Western powers were unwilling to furnish arms unconditionally, the Jirga approved the Afghan Government proposal to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia.¹⁷²

Accordingly the Afghan Government began to tackle these problems. They once again approached the United States to persuade Pakistan to negotiate the settlement of the Pashtun issue and open the border for Afghan trade. But since it was not in the interest of United States, she turned out the Afghan requests by 'informal suggestions' for compromise with Pakistan. But the U.S. asked Pakistan to permit only the transit of U.S. aid materials and equipments, that also as a result of Afghanistan's threatening to turn over U.S. aid projects to the Soviet engineers.¹⁷³

(Thus the circumstances forced the Afghans to turn to the Soviet Union both for economic as well as military aid. An official invitation was sent to the Soviet leaders to pay a friendly visit to Afghanistan. In December 1955, Marshal Bulganin,

172. "Co-existence in Afghanistan", Eastern World, Vol. II, November, 1957, p. 21.

173. Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan: Between East and West, (National Planning Association), New York, 1960, p.12.

Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders visited Afghanistan. The Soviet leaders longing for friendship with the strategic Afghanistan, not only supported the Pashtunistan issue but also offered a hundred-million-dollar loan to Afghanistan for economic development and an unspecified amount of aid for military modernization of the country.)

(The Soviet support for Pashtunistan was highly welcomed by the people and Government of Afghanistan, but was received with consternation in Western circles. The Afghan Prime Minister while welcoming Soviet support reaffirmed Afghanistan's adherence to neutrality and declared that there would be no change in Afghan foreign policy as a result of the visit of Soviet leaders.) The Afghan Foreign Minister emphasizing that Afghanistan desired peaceful settlement of the Pashtun issue, stated that "Afghanistan has no commitments to the Pashtun leaders, but the ties between the Pashtuns and Afghans are so close that, if there is a trouble on the other side, a situation might arise which the Afghan Government could not control."¹⁷⁴

(N.A. Bulganin in his speech on December 16th, while expressing Soviet sympathy with Afghanistan's policy on Pashtunistan issue, declared that "The Soviet Union stands for a just settlement of the Pashtunistan problem, which cannot be solved correctly without considering the vital interests of the peoples of

174. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14606.

Pashtunistan".¹⁷⁵ On his return Marshal Bulganin, in presenting his report to the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet, again reiterated the Soviet Union's support for Afghanistan's policy on Pashtun issue.) The report read in this connection as follows:

"In our statements in Kabul we set forth our attitude to the Pashtunistan issue, which is deeply agitating the Afghans. Pashtunistan is inhabited by Afghan independent tribes. The region was annexed to the British Empire in 1893, and in 1947, against the interests of the tribes inhabiting Pashtunistan, it was incorporated into Pakistan.

We regard as justified and well-founded the demand of Afghanistan that the inhabitants of the bordering region of Pashtunistan should be given the opportunity for a free expression of their will. The people of this area have as much right to national self-determination as any other people. No justification can be found for those who refuse to reckon, and do not reckon with the lawful national interests of the people of Pashtunistan."¹⁷⁶

(The visit of the Soviet leaders from Afghanistan and their offers of economic and military aid, specially their support for Pashtunistan, was greatly resented by ^{the} West, specially the United States. The Americans who got humiliated, never expected such Kabul-Moscow cordiality. They had taken it for granted that the Afghans being poor, weak and threatened will ultimately turn to them for help at the cost of their inclusion in the Baghdad Pact. Not surprisingly, the American being rebuffed at the situation, began to focus the world attention that Afghan-

175. Current Digest of Soviet Press (U.S.), Vol. VII, No. 50, December, 1955.

176. Visit of Friendship To India, Burma and Afghanistan. (Speeches and official documents, November-December 1955), Moscow, 1957, p. 248.

istan fell under the so-called "menace of Moscow".¹⁷⁷ Not only this the Americans in order to bring discredit to the Afghan rulers specially the energetic Afghan Prime Minister, began to carry mischievous activities and propagandas that the Afghan dictator rulers were faced with popular resistance of the Afghan people, which in their opinion should have been assisted against the Afghan Government in the interest of the so-called "free world".¹⁷⁸ However, later on due to the strategic importance of Afghanistan vis-a-vis the Baghdad Pact, the Americans were compelled to revise their policy and to reluctantly appreciate the Afghan policy of co-existence in receiving unconditional foreign assistance.)

(The Pakistani reaction to the Soviet support of Afghan position on Pashtunistan issue, was mixed with a measure of fear and anxieties which led the Government of Pakistan to request the Council of the SEATO to reaffirm its support once again for Pakistan in rejecting the Afghan demands for a separate state of Pashtuns.) (Accordingly, the council meeting in Karachi in March 1956, declared in an issued communique that "The SEATO Council unanimously recognized the sovereignty of Pakistan as extending upto the Durand Line."¹⁷⁹)

177. "Hand-shakes in Kabul", Eastern World, vol. 12, no. 2, November 1958, p. 14.

178. See for detail, no. 150, and no. 153.

179. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1956, p. 14840.

(Before the Soviet visit, the Pakistanis had tried to persuade the Soviet leaders not to pay a visit to Afghanistan or at least they should not "say or do anything" that might injure Pakistan's interests. However, Soviet pronouncement on Pashtunistan was severely criticized by Pakistani authorities. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haque, described it as "Soviet tactics" aimed at bringing the area "under the spell of the cold war".¹⁸⁰)

The new developments, however, instead of aggravating the situation, it eased somehow the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Firstly, the Soviet support and the offer of economic and military aid to Afghanistan strengthened the country's position bearing an influence on Pakistan. Secondly because of a change in Western attitude that if Afghanistan remained unattended and if Pakistan continued to harden its attitude towards that country on Pashtun issue, it might force the strategically important Afghanistan to rely heavily on Soviet Union, which will be damaging to the Western interests. Lastly because of the fears of Afghans that a strong advocacy of the Afghan stand on the issue might imply violation of Afghan traditional neutrality and cause heavy reliance on Soviet active support which would aggravate the situation under the cold war rivalries to the advantage of none but the super powers. (Hence the Soviet support instead of sharpening the controversy, had the peculiar

180. Ibid., 1955, p. 14614.

effect of relaxing the tension between the two countries and opened a way for negotiations.¹⁸¹)

(Thus for a time between 1955 and 1958 the tension eased somehow and a series of state visits took place.) President Iskander Mirza visited Afghanistan in August 1956 and the joint communique issued stated that both the countries "affirm their intention to promote better relations, and declare their united resolve to remove all differences between the two Muslim countries through friendly negotiations". Similarly in December the same year ^{the} Afghan Premier, Daoud Khan paid a visit to Pakistan and the joint communique issued declared that the talks between the leaders of the two countries had contributed substantially to a "better appreciation of the respective views held in regard to the question of Pashtunistan, which has been a subject of discussion between the Afghan Prime Minister and the leaders of Pakistan". The communique further declared that:

"It is the intention of the two Governments to continue their efforts to remove all differences between the two countries through friendly discussions".¹⁸²

Again in June 1957, Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan visited Kabul as a result of which it was agreed to

181. Ibid., 1956, p. 15071, C.

182. Ibid., 1956, p. 15279. However, a Foreign Office Spokesman in Karachi said that the reference to "Pashtunistan" merely took note of the fact that Afghan Government regarded this concept which is purely their own, as "the only political difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan". The statement added that this concept was entirely unacceptable to Pakistan since there is no such problem in fact existing, Ibid.

restore diplomatic relations and remove the differences. The joint communique issued stated:

"The two Prime Ministers confirmed the contents of the joint communique agreed upon in Karachi in December 1956 and agreed ... to take steps to resolve their differences through friendly negotiations ... To fulfil this objective they have agreed to accredit Ambassadors to each other with immediate effect."¹⁸³

(Thus diplomatic relations between the two countries which were broken off since ^{October} 1955 were resumed in September 1957, resulting in the reopening of the border for Afghan trade.) The Afghan king, Zahir Shah also paid a state visit to Pakistan in February 1958, as a result of which an agreement on the improvement of transit facilities for Afghan goods through Pakistan was signed in May 1958.

(Thus the exchange of state visits substantially improved the relation between the two countries as a result of which Pakistan, though incorporated the N.W.F.P. in the West Pakistan, still did not make any attempt to merge any part of the tribal zones in the West Pakistan unit, and continued to deal with the tribes as independents through political agents responsible to the central government.) Moreover, the Afghan themselves at the time of Pakistan's crisis did not want to do anything that would have threatened "to end Pakistan's experiment in nationhood" at any moment. In fact, internal crisis, the irritation of East Pakistan at the Punjabi domination and hegemony in the army,

183. Ibid., 1957, p. 15635, Diplomatic relations has been broken off between the two countries since October 1955.

civil service and economy, and the widespread corruption in the government seriously troubled Pakistan.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, Afghans wanted to avoid any such attempt that would have injured Pakistan's stability, hence the Afghans rather emphasised a peaceful solution of the Pashtun problem through friendly negotiations.

However, for a time in 1958, when Ayub Khan came into power as a result of a successful coup, the Afghans were further encouraged to hope that their desires would be fulfilled, as Ayub Khan himself was a Pashtun which sympathetic towards Pashtun aspirations, he might force the new Pakistani government into a more conciliatory attitude towards Afghanistan on the Pashtun question. But not surprising as it was, Ayub Khan being British by education and a rude soldier by profession, and brought to power by ^{the} West purposely to check ^{the} Pashtun separatism, he was rather more adamant and aggressive towards Pashtun aspirations than his predecessors.¹⁸⁵

(Therefore, soon after, the takeover of government by Ayub Khan the tension between the two countries reached new heights as a result of oppressive measures of the new government against the Pashtuns advocacy or fighting for Pashtunistan, and also due

184. Arnold Fletcher, no. 163, p. 274.

185. Ayub Khan himself claimed to be a Pashtun from the Spin Tarins tribe of the Hazara district of NWFP, which according to Arnold Fletcher is a tribe belonging originally to Kandahar in Afghanistan and which was the ancestor tribe of Durrani and the Mohammadzais, the present royal dynasty. But according to majority of Pashtuns Ayub Khan was not a Pashtun, and he was claiming to be a Pashtun just for political reasons.

to the open Afghan support.) (The cold war propogandas against Afghanistan and the Soviet support and the modernization of Afghan army further deteriorated the situation.) In spite of a visit to Pakistan by Afghan Foreign Minister in January 1960, the tension remained acute till it was released in an open conflict erupted in the district of Bajawar in the fall of the same year and again in 1961.¹⁸⁶ The origin of the fighting was Pakistan's attempts to dominate the area and check the resistance movement of the Pashtuns by assisting some tribesmen against those in favour of Pashtunistan. This resulted ⁱⁿ a local quarrel, between the Khan of Khar and the Khan of Jandul sided by the Nawab of Dir. When the Afghans sided with the latter two, who were in favour of Pashtunistan, Pakistan backed the Khan of Khar. The location of Bajawar near to the Afghan side of the Durand Line, caused the intervention of some of the Afghan tribesmen

186. The fightings occurred in September 1960 and again in May 1961. The Soviet support of Afghanistan's position on Pashtunistan, was met with strong resentment of the Pakistani rulers who surprisingly demanded a referendum to be held in Afghanistan whether the Pashtuns wanted to join Pakistan or opted to remain in Afghanistan. However, the ~~Afghan~~ Prime Minister visited Moscow in April and in the joint communique the Soviet support for a plebiscite to be held for self-determination among the Pashtuns was reaffirmed. An article published in Pravda, stated that "the situation emerging in the direct proximity of our frontiers is not a matter of indifference for us". See for detail, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961, p. 18172A, and Arnold Fletcher, no. 161, p. 275.

which was described by Pakistani authorities as Afghan intervention.¹⁸⁷

Reports of the fightings were confused and contradictory, and strongly worded protests were lodged with the governments of each other countries. But obviously the Government of Pakistan used several divisions and employed its air force with considerable success which caused Afghan supply of arms to the tribesmen. Tribal casualties were heavy because of aerial bombardment by Pakistan air force. This was at first denied by Pakistan Government, but later on the Government of Pakistan admitted that bombing operations had taken place in Bajawar.¹⁸⁸ This brought the Bajawar under the control of Pakistan, the Nawab of Dir and his son, the Khan of Jandul and a large number of Pashtuns were arrested. But the tribesmen supported by Afghanistan continued their frequent attacks on Pakistani garrisons.¹⁸⁹

However, in August 1961, shortly after the Bajawar incident Pakistan announced that it was closing its Consulates at Jalalbad

187. The Afghan support to the tribesmen was described by the government of Pakistan as Afghan incursions which the Pakistanis alleged to have been repelled by use of armed forces and air bombardments. The Afghans asserted that Pakistani statements were intended to "divert public opinion" from what was going on there and to "cover up" the facts of oppressive use of Pakistani armed and air forces to suppress the Pashtun movement. No doubt the incidents, involved a few number of Afghan army men which according to Afghan Government was a result of an Afghan officer's misunderstanding of the instructions. Ibid.

188. Arnold Fletcher, no. 163, p. 276.

189. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961, p. 18172A.

and Kandahar, and demanded that Afghanistan should also withdraw its Consulates from Peshawar and Quetta. The reason given by the Pakistani authorities for the decision was the hostility of the Afghan people toward Consular officials and Pakistani nationals. Although, in fact, the Pakistani officials and citizens as a result of the Pakistani attitude towards Pashtun problem, had not been popular in Afghanistan ever since the emergence of Pakistan, the actual motive behind Pakistan's breaking off of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was Pakistan's irritation over the continued Afghan support to the tribesmen in fighting for the attainment of Pashtunistan.¹⁹⁰ In order to bring pressure on Afghanistan to stop its active support of the Pashtunistan movement, Pakistan threatened to block the economy of the land-locked Afghanistan by closing its borders for the transit of Afghan foreign trade. The confident and dynamic Afghan Government, committed to support the cause of Pashtuns based on the Pashtun aspirations and the dictates of common history, culture, race and common traditions, accepted the Pakistani demand, the threat to Afghan economy; to close the Afghan Consulate and trade agencies in Pakistan which resulted in closing of the Pak-Afghan border, blocking Afghanistan's major shipping route through

190. Strongly worded protests were exchanged with regard to each other, attitude were exchanged between the two countries. See for detail, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961, p. 18330B.

Pakistan.¹⁹¹

However, this was an immense pressure on Afghanistan which resulted in Afghanistan's heavy reliance on Soviet Union for aid and transit of trade through that country. The blockade seriously affected the country's economic developments since Afghanistan had just completed its first Five-Year Plan (1956-1961) and had launched a second one. (And as a result of the Pakistani blockade of the Afghan economy, the Soviet Union became Afghanistan's sole means of contact with the outside world, which though costly and uneconomical, it offered the second best and safe alternative outlet for Afghan trade.)

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union helped the Afghans greatly in their hours of difficulties. When the border with Pakistan was closed, Soviet Union promptly offered assistance and a fleet of fifteen Soviet transport planes daily carried off Afghan trade. Further, the Soviet Union offered great assistance in hurriedly constructing and improving Afghanistan's highways that connected Afghanistan with outside world through Russia.¹⁹²

191. As the Pakistani Government severed diplomatic relation with Afghanistan resulting in closure of all Afghan consular and Trade Agencies, Afghanistan also in a pit of national pride, dignity and devotion to the cause of Pashtuns refused to avail itself of the Pakistani route for transit of its goods unless Pakistan negotiated a peaceful settlement of the Pashtun question. As a result of the closing of the border 346 railway tracks of Afghan goods were held up at Peshawar and about 6,000 tons of Afghan cargo were lying in the port of Karachi without being asked for by Afghanistan. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961, p. 18330B, and 1963, p. 19490.

192. J.S. Rousek, "Afghanistan in Geopolitics", Eastern World, December 1963, p. 16.

This resulted in Afghanistan's trade dependency on that country which was but a direct result of Pakistan's economic pressures on Afghanistan. Before 1953, the Soviet Union accounted for only 17 per cent of all Afghan trade transactions, and the major partner of Afghan trade was the United States, but by 1960 the figure of trade with Soviet Union reached almost 50 per cent including over 90 per cent of Afghan petroleum imports and the supplies of military and developmental equipments to Afghanistan. The figure of trade with the Soviet Union, however, further increased as a result of the new Pakistani blockade of 1961 which lasted nerarly for two years (1961-63).¹⁹³

Not only this, Pakistan apart from blocking Afghan economy, stoped^P for the first time in centuries, the periodic migrations of thousands of ^{the} Pashtun nomads to the Indus Valley of Pashtunistan in pursuit of Pasturelands. This measure by Pakistan government meant additional pressure on Afghan economy and an economic hardship for many of the nomads, who depended for their income upon grazing their cattle in pasturelands and carrying unofficial trade. The nomads used to take these migrations as a result of disappearance of Pastures in most parts of Afghanistan in the winter seasons.¹⁹⁴ Afghanistan had to provide means of livelihood

193. See for detail on the pattern of Afghan trade, Aloys A. Michel, "Foreign Trade and Foreign Policy in Afghanistan," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1961, pp. 7-15.

194. Arnold Fletcher, no. 163, p. 276.

for the thousands of nomads, missing means of earning income, which was not an easy job for the already suffering Afghan economy.

In addition, closing of the border halted shipments of equipments from the United States for the Afghan developmental projects and the government of the United States refused to avail itself of the Soviet route. This created a very critical situation in the country and whatever the Afghan government pressed the U.S. authorities to persuade Pakistan to negotiate a peaceful solution of the Pashtun problem and open the border for normal Afghan trade transactions, all the attempts failed resulting in a deadlock between the two countries.¹⁹⁵

(In order to break up the deadlock, with Pakistan over the Pashtun issue, introduce a more democratic and representative political set up, and avoid the hinderances caused to the normal functioning of the Afghan modernization plans, the Great Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammad Daoud decided to resign willingly in the great expectation of benefits to his country and the cause of Pashtunistan.¹⁹⁶

195. Although U.S. offered its good offices to mediate between the two countries and even objected the use of American military equipments by Pakistan against the Afghan tribesmen at the time of last conflict, but in fact the U.S. did nothing to persuade Pakistan for a peaceful negotiation of the problem and it was rather to the satisfaction of the Americans to see things that would amount to the down-fall of Daoud Government.

196. The Prime Minister, clearly specified the beneficial reasons for which he resigned, Afghanistan in the Era of Government in Transition, (Persian), Kabul, 1965, p. 1 and, no. 188.

With the resignation of Daoud Khan, the energetic Afghan Prime Minister on March 4, 1963, however, the golden decade of Afghan history in which the cause of Pashtuns and the modernization of Afghanistan were honestly and actively aimed and attempted with a strong determination ended. And surprisingly and unexpectedly as Daoud, the great Afghan, hoped a new period of political and official intrigues, social and political instability, economic retardation, foreign influence and infiltration, and an era of negligence or a verbal support to the cause of Pashtuns, began which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter V

Adventitious and Conflicting Influences on Afghan Policy of the Pashtun Issue

With the resignation of Prime Minister Daoud, the golden decade in Afghan history which he had instituted ended. During this period Afghanistan saw for the first time a rapid social and economic change, assumed an active participation in world affairs and followed a firm and a positive stand on the Pashtun problem which gave it a new momentum, and contributed greatly to the increasing Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan as well. Daoud's foreign policy left such precedents for the successive governments from which any substantial deviation or regression became difficult affair. The Pashtun issue, dominating Afghanistan's foreign relations, is one such precedent of Daoud's decade which inspite of the succeeding governments' reluctance and immobility in foreign policy, Afghan support towards the realization of the Pashtun aspirations became a Primary objective of the Afghan foreign policy. It became a national issue, and the Loya Jirgas (Grand Assemblies) successively declared it as obligatory on Afghan governments.¹⁹⁷

197. A Loya Jirga was convened in 1964 to approve the draft of the new Afghan Constitution. The Jirga on the final day of its session approved a resolution calling for Afghan support of the rights of the Pashtun people. The preceding Loya Jirga was convened in 1955, when Daoud's government sought and obtained support for its commitment to the cause of "Pashtunistan."

Although the governments that followed Daoud's decade were not serious towards the issue which has been described even as the betrayal of the cause of Pashtuns, yet it does not mean any substantial change in the basic Afghan position on the Pashtun issue. The change was due to the ethnic and class character of the Afghan governments, the lack of responsible and popular representation, organized political pressure and the preoccupation with the constitutional reforms in the country which will be discussed subsequently.¹⁹⁸

As already discussed during the last three years of Daoud's rule the relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pashtun issue deteriorated to an explosive point. Diplomatic relations were broken off, trade and traffic across the border, had come to a standstill for a period of almost two years. The closer of border blocked the Afghan economy and created a pressure on the Afghan Government. Still Daoud was pressing his demand for a solution of the Pashtun problem and had refused to agree to any intercourse with Pakistan unless she negotiated the problem. Since Pakistan was not prepared to do so, the issue had resulted in a deadlock between the two countries. President Kennedy of United States had offered good offices to try to restore trade

198. In fact there has always been a stiff pressure and a demand within and outside Parliament for a real support to the Pashtun issue, which due to lack of political parties the governments of the time have always been able to manage ignoring such popular or parliamentary pressures. The vested and individual interests have always superseded such national interests.

and transit rights between the two countries, yet the U.S. mission was unsuccessful, although an agreement was reached whereby the U.S. became responsible for the delivery of the U.S. goods to Afghanistan.¹⁹⁹

The mediation efforts to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries were renewed by the Shah of Iran who paid repeated visits and held talks with the leaders of the two countries, but the Shah's efforts were met with failure because Pakistan, although, prepared to agree to the re-establishment of diplomatic and trade relations, refused to accept the Afghan demand for the reopening of the Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan unless Afghanistan stopped to use them for "disruptive and subversive activities" as the Pakistanis alleged.²⁰⁰

So whatever the Afghan government tried to persuade Pakistan to open a way for a negotiation of the Pashtun problem, Pakistan continued to refuse to attend the Afghan demands, so none willing

199. President Kennedy's offer of good offices were accepted by both the governments. Mr. L.T. Merchant, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada was appointed for the purpose. He visited both the countries from October to November 1961, but failed in his efforts as Pakistan refused to accept Afghan Government's demand for reopening of its Consulates at Peshawar and Quetta on the ground that they had been used to encourage subversive activities. And without these consulates and trade agencies Afghanistan refused to avail itself of its (346 railway tracks and 6000 tons) cargo which was held up in Pakistan. Thus both the governments continued to accuse each other of failing to honour the transit trade agreement of 1958. See for detail, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963, p. 19490.

200. See for detail, Ibid.

to step back, it created a deadlock with the result of a constant political and economic pressure on Afghanistan. In addition, the Americans had refused to avail of the Russian route for the delivery of its goods for Afghan projects under the Second Five Year Plan. This was an American diplomatic initiative to bring a political and economic pressure on Afghanistan in favour of Pakistan.²⁰¹ Moreover, the Afghan business community, the Tajiks, the Jews, and the Hindus, whose property was held up in Pakistan and whose interests were in danger by closing of the border, tried to bring a pressure on the government to change its attitude towards Pakistan and agree to a reopening of the border and diplomatic relation with Pakistan. At the same time pro-Iranean and pro-American elements in the Afghan elite were active to convince and subvert the elite for a change in the form of government, and the Afghan position on the Pashtun issue.²⁰² The ruling circle itself became aware of the necessity

201. See for detail, last pages of the preceding chapter.

202. Although the relation with Iran apparently seemed good, in reality in view of historical jealousies and a water dispute, cordial and real relation between the two countries never existed till the end of Daoud's decade. In addition Afghanistan shares linguistic and religious groups with Iran which have been subject to Iranean infiltration, therefore Daoud's government being very much aware and suspicious of Iran's motives behind its cultural penetration, tried to keep away from Iran, and to that effect his Government endeavoured to check inflow of Iranean publications and avoided extensive cultural contact with that country. The Americans too did not like Daoud's Government for too much cordiality with the Soviet Union, therefore, they wanted the replacement of Daoud's government by a West-oriented government, obviously closer to Iran and Pakistan. The Americans consistently advocated a confederation between the three countries. See for detail, Louis Dupree, "A Suggested Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation", Middle East Journal, vol. 17, no.4, Autumn 1963, pp. 38-99.

of bringing some constitutional change in the political set-up of the country. Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud himself long before his resignation, in an interview with an American professor in September 1959, had expressed the desire for a popular and representative rule. He said:

"The one dream of the Royal family is to someday give the country of Afghanistan to the Afghans, and let the people select the type of government they want. It will take more than the four or five people in power to do this, however. It will take the education of the majority of our people... We would not for a minute hesitate to give up the throne if this would advance true freedom in Afghanistan. This I say very sincerely and frankly."203

Even, at the time of his resignation Daoud unequivocally declared that the bringing of political reforms, was one of the prime objective in his stepping down from the power. So with the realization of necessity of a change in leadership, in order to open a way for negotiation of the Pashtun issue, and avoid hinderances to economic developments of the country caused by the Pakistani blockade of the Afghan economy and to bring about constitutional reforms, Prime Minister Daoud willingly resigned in expectation of benefits to his country and the cause of Pashtunistan. A new government under Dr. Yousuf, a commoner, was formed and a committee for drafting a new constitution for Afghanistan was appointed.

203. Louis Dupree, "An Informal Talk with Prime Minister Daoud," American Universities Field Staff Report (South Asia Series) vol. III, no. 3, September 1959.

However the resignation of Daoud opened a way for direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan to a great satisfaction of Americans, Iranians and the Pakistanis. Immediately following the change of government, the Shah of Iran who had been active for the last few years to bring normalization of relations between the two countries, invited the delegations of the two countries to Tehran whereby an agreement was concluded on May 28, 1963 between the two countries resulting in restoration of diplomatic and trade relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The content of the agreement released,²⁰⁴ did not contain anything on the Pashtun issue, but Mr. Bhutto, head of the

204. The terms of the agreement concluded on May 28, 1963 between the two countries are as follows:

- (1) Pakistan and Afghanistan re-establish Embassies in each other's capital as soon as possible.
- (2) The Afghan Consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would be re-established as soon as possible. Pakistan reserved the right to establish Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad if necessary.
- (3) Afghan trade agencies would be temporarily established at Peshawar and Chamman until the projected railway lines from Chamman and Landi-Kotal had been extended into Afghanistan. Should more trade agencies be needed, this would be discussed between the two governments.
- (4) Transit and trade arrangements would be regularized, taking the 1958 transit agreement into account.
- (5) Both parties agreed that the duties and conduct of their representatives would be in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, usage, and practice, and would be confined to the discharge of their official functions.
- (6) The two Governments agreed to endeavour to create an atmosphere of goodwill, friendship, and mutual trust, and expressed their deepest gratitude to the Shah (of Iran), whose good offices had made the re-establishment of relations possible. Kessings Contemporary Archives, 1963, p. 19490.

Pakistani delegation stated in Rawalpindi that Pakhtunistan was "a closed issue" and added that Pakistan would continue to refuse the entry of the Afghan nomads into Pakistan. Syed Qasim Rishtia, the head of the Afghan delegation, on the other hand, stated in Tehran on the 29th May that Afghanistan had never recognized the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that Pakhtunistan continued to be the main issue dividing the two countries.²⁰⁵

Though the agreement on record did not contain anything on the position of Pashtun issue, in reality the agreement marked a substantial change in Afghan foreign policy towards the issue and resulted in a verbal support or paying a lip service to the cause of the Pashtuns for nearly a decade since then. Beyond this nothing substantial had been attempted by the new governments. This has led the young elite of the country to view the agreement as a betrayal of the cause of Pashtuns and a conspiracy of Westerners, and Iraneans who sought to bring the countries of the region closer to one another to check Soviet influence in South Asia. Iran's stake in the close relations between the three countries was to alienate the Pashtuns from Afghanistan and pave way for its own cultural and political domination of

205. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963, p. 19490.

the region extending upto the borders of India.²⁰⁶ Iran from the very beginning carried underground activities to make the Pashtun issue untenable, because they feared that if a Pashtun state is formed that will strengthen Afghan position and block Iranian influence and expansion in the region. This design, they could not carry actively at the time of Daoud who being suspicious of Iranian designs, kept his country in a balance of power with Iran and continued to check Iranian cultural penetration of the country.

(To the Americans Daoud's removal was a great measure of welcome and enormous satisfaction. The U.S. Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Dean Rusk before opening a news conference on disarmament on 22nd May, unrelated to the subject-matter of the conference expressed this pleasure in the following words:

"I should like at the beginning to express our great pleasure at the news from Tehran that Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to resume diplomatic, consular, and trade relations. We hope that this step by two

206. Iran sharing Shoya sect of Islam with Pakistan could easily dominate the area, but the Sunni Afghans (Pashtuns) and the Baluchis were obstacle in between. Although Shoyas are a minority, yet they dominate Pakistan's government, economy and foreign affairs. This has been in fact one reason for Pakistan's close relation with Iran. It should be noted that Iran at the time of Daoud's Government tried to remain neutral towards the Pashtun issue, but as soon as she became stronger in military strength, she openly advocated her claims on Baluchistan. The motive apart from the strategic importance of Baluchistan, is to block Afghanistan's possible expansion of influence which the realization of the Pashtun cause may result. Iran thinks if the land-locked Afghanistan remained weak and dependent on Iran, the dependency and the resultant enormous cultural contacts will help to bring that country under its influence provided the country remains weak and unable to increase its influence eastward through a solution of the Pashtunistan problem.

great neighbours in the Middle East will open the way to the further strengthening of friendly relations between them.

I wish to congratulate President Ayub Khan and H.M. King Zahir Shah for their resolution of this problem and to express our appreciation to H.M. the Shah of Iran for his skillful and statesmanlike efforts which brought this successful result."²⁰⁷

However, the change of government marked a substantial change in Afghan attitude towards Pashtunistan issue. At the time of Daoud's Government, the Pashtun movement had reached a high, gaining a new momentum and had attracted the world attention. During this period the Pashtuns actively supported by Afghan government carried their struggle for freedom with confidence and a strong determination. While the Pashtuns of the Tribal Territory carried their struggle for an independent Pashtunistan free from Pakistan's control, the Pashtuns of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan continued their agitations for a maximum autonomy with the ultimate goal of independence.²⁰⁸

The movement on both the fronts had begun to absorb and integrate the disunited, exploited and the dissident Pashtun elements. The movement led to the emergence of hundreds of Poets and writers upholding the cause of Pashtunistan. Hundreds of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and a variety of publications and

207. Department of State Bulletin (U.S.A.), vol. 48, June, 17, 1963, p. 931.

208. There were regular bases for the liberation movements in the tribal areas and the different tribes had formed themselves into the branches of the Pashtunistan assemblies and had elected chiefs and leaders for their armed Lashkars (troops) and political organizations.

publicity campaigns appeared all over Pashtunistan. Afghanistan, too, through its radio and press carried a large-scale publicity in favour of the movement. Hundreds of foreign writers began to write on the issue, some wrote in favour while others according to their own interests advocated against the issue. As a result of the new momentum, a literature of millions of pages appeared on the issue, during this period.

The movement reached such a magnitude that Pakistan with the use of all its vigorous and oppressive military and political measures failed to control the Pashtun struggle. Pakistan was forced to keep constantly a major part of its armed forces all over the Pashtun region. More than 5,000 of the Pashtun leaders were put in prisons.²⁰⁹ Great "attention was paid to the susceptibilities of the proud and intensely nationalistic Pashtuns" and where offer of benefits and religious propogandas could do something, a great effort was made to exploit their religious sentiments. Extensive social and economic benefits were offered. Many new schools, hospitals and some economic projects were built. In short, in order to placate them from their struggle for freedom a preferential treatment was given by Pakistan to the Pashtuns in every respect, specially in the army and the civil service.²¹⁰ This was in contrast difference to the position of East Bengal

209. See for detail, H.C. Faussing, "Afghanistan's Big Step", Eastern World, October 1961, vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 15-16.

210. Ibid.

which was fully exploited and dominated by Punjabis. Still, whatever Pakistan did to placate the Pashtuns, she failed to pacify the Pashtunistan movement. Pakistan having failed to control the movement, and embarrassed at the Afghan support, began to bring economic pressure on Afghanistan to stop its active support. Pakistan officially denied that there is any serious demand among the Pashtuns, and admitted only incidents caused by local "trouble makers" or Afghan agents.²¹¹

Afghanistan actively supported the movement and financed part of the expenses also. A provisional government of Pashtunistan was likely to emerge depending on the Afghan support. Afghanistan tried to bring the world attention to this problem, and both within and outside the United Nations, she pleaded for the cause of Pashtuns. Although the issue was not taken to the Security Council, yet in the General Assembly and outside, Afghanistan had strongly emphasised the solution of this issue, and because of this issue, had been strongly advocating the Fundamental Principles of human rights in most of the international conferences and in meeting with the heads of states. In fact Afghanistan's relation with other countries had been determined primarily by the Pashtun issue. Relation with Soviet Union grew very close and cordial because of the Soviet Sympathy and support with the Pashtun cause. It was also due to the

211. Ibid.

Soviet support that the National Awami Party in Pakistan under the Pashtun leadership assumed a Russian bias. India and Egypt were the two other major countries to sympathize with Afghanistan on the Pashtun problem. Afghanistan during this period has been enormously active among the group of non-aligned and the Middle East Muslim countries to win their support on the issue or at least make them neutral. Out of the members of the CENTO Pact, relation with Turkey had been enormously good, and Iran although against, apparently seemed to pose itself neutral.²¹²

Thus, Afghanistan during this period had attempted to exploit all possible options in getting the Pashtun issue popularized and qualified for solution. That Afghanistan failed in its realization was partly the direct result of the difficult situation which the cold war and the interlinked defence alliances had created around Afghanistan. It was also due to limited resources at the disposal of the country. Afghanistan in view of its geographical position, backward economy and limited resources could not afford to get involved in an armed conflict with Pakistan and at the same time she also did not want any solution of this problem in a way that would have involved the

212. Iran was from the very beginning against the issue, and she herself thought in terms of dominating the area. Iran was sure that the SEATO Pact countries would not let the Pashtun struggling areas to dismember from Pakistan, therefore she chose to remain neutral at that time. But as soon as the influence of that alliance disappeared, Iran began to openly manifest its interest in that area.

two antagonist power blocs in the cold war era which would have rather complicated the situation. Although, the communist bloc along with some other countries came with support on the Afghan side, Afghanistan still avoided foreign involvement and hence she rather emphasized a peaceful solution of the problem through negotiation with Pakistan.²¹³

However, as far as the Daoud Government was in power, in view of his strong commitment to the cause of Pashtuns, Pakistan avoided any hostile relation with India, but as soon as Daoud stepped down, Pakistan being sure of Afghan unseriousness seized the opportunity of entering into wars with India, in 1965 and again in 1971. This in itself proves the strong commitment of the Daoud Government to the cause of Pashtunistan which checked Pakistan's aggressive designs.

But after the change of Afghan government in 1963 a substantial change in the nature of Afghan support occurred. The active Afghan political, material and financial support gave way to a verbal support and obstructive activities instigated against the issue within the country by foreign powers which gravely affected the role and significance of the issue in Afghan affairs. The budget allocated for the Afghan support was considerably reduced. The mass media imparting and encouraging the Pashtun movement,

213. Afghanistan has always stressed on the application of the principle of self-determination with regards to the rights of the people and nations which struggled for such rights. This stand is what remains constant in the conduct of Afghan foreign policy.

began to deviate. The attention with which the Pashtunistanis were received with material support, welfare services and privileges was abandoned. The change in the foreign policy and the resultant developments affecting the Pashtun movement, led the Pashtuns to pursue a policy of self-reliance in their struggle for freedom. Thus as a result of Afghan unseriousness, the Pashtuns began to organize themselves for their struggle for freedom the National Awami Party, under the dynamic leadership of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan who has been the leading figure for the Pashtun cause for the last half century. The N.A.P. stands for a maximum autonomy, with the ultimate goal of independence, and integration with Afghanistan if possible.²¹⁴

Thus from the Afghan side the Pashtunistan movement during this period received a severe setback, and in fact as a result of this Afghan indifference the liberation front on the Frontier area disappeared and Pakistan taking the advantage of the situation, was able to dominate most parts of the independent tribal areas. Ultimately the zeal and great interest with which the

214. Wali Khan the President of Pakistan's National Awami Party and other Pashtun leaders too have intentionally as a means of strategy avoided the words of independence, and have rather emphasised autonomy to be their ultimate goal. But in reality they have been dedicated to the cause of independence which according to them would ultimately be achieved in a long run through a greater degree of autonomy. In addition the political and the cultural problems of the Pashtuns are as such which neither favour nor make it possible to opt for immediate independence.

Afghans met the Pashtun question disappeared. The foreign-influenced elements among the elite, and the westernized and brain washed sections who dominated the intelligentsia and influenced the course of political action in Afghanistan began to view the Pashtun issue with resentment and insignificance maintaining that it hindered the development of Afghan economy and the country's good relations with the Muslim neighbours.²¹⁵

However, the following factors have been responsible for the new state of affairs, and the immobility of Afghan foreign policy on the Pashtun issue:

Firstly, the economic pressures which Pakistan frequently and consistently exerted on Afghanistan at the times when she remained stuck to a firm and active support for the Pashtuns. This gave an excuse for the anti-Pashtunistan elements supported by Iran and the West to persuade the Westernized and Persianized ruling elite to relax the Afghan advocacy of the Pashtun issue. The West wanted Afghanistan to deviate from the Soviet Union and get closer to the West and specially to Iran and Pakistan, the two pro-Western countries. Iran being the historical and tradi-

215. The West and Iran-oriented sections of the Afghan elite were to such extent hostile towards the Pashtun cause that they went on propagating that large sums of Afghan money were spent unnecessarily on Pashtunistan in a time when "we do not have non, food for which we depend on Pakistan." These propagandas had such a bearing on the mind of the general public that even the educated Pashtuns began to resent the Pashtun problem totally. While on the other hand there were the Mullahs who at the behest of Americans the Pakistanis were pleading for good relations with all the Muslim countries specially Pakistan.

tional hostile neighbour of the country wanted for the purpose of its own cultural and political penetration, to alienate the Pashtuns from Afghanistan by bringing the country closer to Pakistan, because the Pashtuns under Pakistan have always been a source of strength to the Afghans.²¹⁶

Secondly the preoccupation of the people and the government of Afghanistan with bringing the constitutional reforms in the country. A new constitution was in the process of promulgation which for nearly two years converted the country's attention from other issues. Even after the promulgation of the new constitution, the public opinion and the attention of the intelligentsia continued to be diverted to the constitutional developments, political campaigns, the maintenance and consolidation of ideological and party positions in the country.

Thirdly the change of the government and the resultant transfer of power from powerful nationalist royals to the dominating elite of the minority groups, who could not in any way represent the national aspirations of the majority. Although the Pashtuns

216. At the time of Daoud's government Iran apparently observed strict neutrality towards the Pashtun issue, but in reality tried its best to obstruct the movement by a series of underground sabotaging activities to bring Afghanistan and Iran closer to each other which in Iran's view would have alienated the Pashtuns resulting in Pashtunistan becoming a dead issue. Being failed to end the Afghan support, Iran openly began to crush the movement and advance her own claims. See for detail, "Conspiracy to transfer Baluchistan to Iran," Times of India, no. 151, vol. cxxxv, June 2, 1973, p. 11; Indian Express, nov. 17, 1972, p. 6, and "Under Iran's Wing", Indian Express, vol. XLI, no. 164, May 15, 1973, p. 6.

constituted the majority of the Afghan nation, yet the government and the economy as well as the cultural life of the country continued to be dominated by the non-Pashtun minorities and this fact still persists. The reason is that the Pashtun community based on tribal structure has been backward and confined to a rural and nomadic way of life. The non-Pashtun minority groups have been settled for centuries in the urban regions of the country. Hence while modern education, business and professions spread out inevitably confined to the cities only, these minority ethnic groups received first the benefits which led to their domination of the Afghan economy and civil service.²¹⁷ Daoud was conscious of these disparities and therefore he gave due preferential treatment to the deprived Pashtun community and was trying to end the cultural and economic domination of the minority ethnic groups. Since Daoud, although Persianized, was himself a nationalist royal Pashtun with strong power and aware of the

217. In fact during the post-Daoud period there has not been a single recognized Pashtun minister in the Afghan cabinets who would in a real sense represent the Pashtun Community. The smaller percentage of Pashtuns included in the cabinets belonged to the higher class of the Persianized and westernized community who had either lost their originality or Pashtun identity or had no sentimental attachment to the Pashtun aspirations. This has been a persistent character of the Afghan cabinets since Daoud's decade. In fact Afghan cabinet, civil service and the economy of the country have been dominated and controlled by the non-Pashtun minorities specially the Tajiks and the Quezilbashes whose interests favour a mild and peaceful course of foreign policy and good relations with the neighbours, obviously against the national wishes and the interests of the majority, and the Pashtun: proble. See appendix No. IX.

Pashtun depravity he could largely represent the Pashtun aspirations. But after his withdrawal from power, the situation was different. Dr. Yusuf the Prime Minister who was also in charge of the foreign affairs, and many of his colleagues too were non-Pashtuns and much indifferent to the cause of Pashtuns. In fact his entire foreign policy was implemented by a doctor of literature in Persian, in the capacity of the Director-General of Political Affairs, who conducted the foreign affairs of the country largely according to the wishes of the dominating ethnic elite whom he represented, obviously in the absence of any formulating process due to the pre-occupation of the legislature with the constitution making of the country.²¹⁸ Thus the transfer of power to the dominating minority elite resulted in a change in the foreign policy, particularly with regard to the Pashtun issue. The elite in power representing the business interest groups, commercial and the privileged classes could easily ignore the Pashtun issue in the

218. It is widely known that even Dr. Yusuf himself was originally a Kashmiri obviously by nature and personal aspiration against the Pashtun problem which meant disintegration of Pakistan. In fact most of the succeeding Afghan Prime Ministers and their colleagues have been of a doubtful origin and the sense of Afghan national identity and consciousness with the Afghan minorities has also been weak. In fact Dr. Yusuf, apart from being occasionally interviewed on the Pashtun issue he was avoiding any mention or emphasis on this issue in his speeches or the joint communiques issued at the time of his visits from foreign countries.

The Foreign Policy of Dr. Yusuf's government was directed by Dr. Rawan Farhadi, Director-General of Political Affairs. See, H.C. Taussig, "Afghanistan's Foreign Policy," Eastern World, October 1965, vol. 19, no. 10, p. 8. See also, speeches and joint communiques of Dr. Yusuf, the Prime Minister.

absence of an organized political pressure, and the preoccupation of the country with the constitution making.

And lastly because of the lack of existence of an organized political pressure and the absence of political parties to channalize and crystalize ^{the} public opinion and ^{the} nationalist forces. There has always been a strong public demand and a political pressure in favour of the Pashtun issue both inside and outside the parliament, but because of the above factors and the unrepresentative, class and ^{the} ethnic character of the government and the irresponsible, feudal and individualistic nature of the parliament, popular demands have been either ignored or placated by creation of new problems or by offers of social and political benefits to the members of parliament or to the influential elements in the society.²¹⁹

Thus in view of these social, cultural and political factors which have had a strong bearing on the Afghan policy towards the Pashtunistan issue, a substantial change occurred in the Afghan attitude towards Pashtunistan, for which the circumstances of the post-Daoud period and the obstructing influence of foreign countries specially of Iran were mainly responsible. And in fact whenever a strong pressure has been on the government for a realistic and firm Afghan position on the Pashtun issue, that has been either ignored or forgotten by facing the parliament with

219. "Language trouble in Afghanistan," Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, (News Review on South Asia), New Delhi, September 1972, p. 173.

other issues. For instance, recently, when it appeared that the National Awami Party had grown into a powerful political opposition in Pakistan, there was a strong pressure from parliament on the government to take necessary initiatives in supporting the Pashtun leaders in their struggle for the realization of their aspirations, but "unexpectedly during an otherwise dull debate in the National Assembly about civil service rules", the problem of Pashtu, the national language, rose which divided the house and led to a bycott by the non-Pashtun minorities from Parliament. This was obviously inspired by the pro-Iran elements and the vested interests groups to block the Afghan support for the Pashtuns.²²⁰

220. Pashtu is the language of 65% majority and has been recognized by the constitution of the country both as a national as well as an official language of the country. But due to the Persian domination which is the language of only 27% of the country's population and which is also an official language, Pashtu has been neglected to be brought up to the level of official and link national language. The factors responsible are the domination of the civil service, economy and the cultural life of the country by the minority Persian-speaking community, the base for support of which is Iran. This cultural depravity has resulted in a serious frustration among the Pashtuns and the governments also inspite of being constitutionally responsible for its development, have neglected the language even purposely to be used as an issue in blocking the pressure from Parliament. Thus when the Pashtunistan question came up before the Parliament in which the government never took an interest unless forced, all of a sudden the problem of Pashtu language over the discussion of the Civil Rules Act rose which led to a bycott by minorities. The argument that if the proposed rule was enforced some 75 per cent of the young graduates would become ineligible for civil service, in itself proves the domination of government by minorities. So the Parliament session remained unassembled and a new government came in, the Civil Rule were passed without any solution of the language problem, but the government was relieved of the pressure to commit itself to an active support for the Pashtuns at the time when they mostly required Afghan diplomatic initiatives for their security against the threatening Bhutto's regime which was growing in strength. This obviously means the involvement of some foreign hands, specially of Iran to have blocked the Pashtun issue. See for detail, Ibid.

⇒§ However as a consequence of these factors the relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan greatly improved ever since the removal of Daoud's Government as a result of the conclusion of a series of new agreements, exchange of cultural contacts and state visits between the two countries. In fact for nearly a decade Pashtunistan became a dead issue, and was never a source of difference or strained relations between the two countries. Afghanistan beyond paying a lip-service never did anything substantial that would have helped the Pashtuns in fighting for their liberation. This situation gave a free hand to Pakistan to strengthen its control even in the independent tribal areas. These developments as in contrast difference with the traditional Afghan position on the Pashtun issue, were viewed by the nationalist sections of the Afghan society as a betrayal of the Pashtun cause and a projection of Western diplomacy and conspiracies of Iran to bring Afghanistan under their influence. The change in Afghan policy in itself and its improved relations with otherwise hostile Iran and Pakistan and the country's slightly pro-west position since Daoud's decade, all go together to give enough strength to this viewpoint of the Afghan nationalist elements.²²¹

As a result of the improved relations with Pakistan an air

221. The change of government in 1963, was a source of satisfaction to the West as well as Iran and resulted a slight pro-West bias. Afghanistan for the first time sent students to the United States for military training, cultural and commercial contacts with Iran and Pakistan also increased, while that with the Soviet Union slightly decreased.

agreement was signed in January 1964 to be followed by a transit trade agreement signed in March 1965, which replaced the earlier agreement of 1958. This agreement provided greater facilities for Afghan transit and trade through Pakistan. Not only this a series of state visits took place between the two countries. President Ayub Khan twice visited Kabul, once in 1964 while on his way to Tehran and again in 1965 on his way to Tashkent. Zahir Shah, the Afghan King in return paid a visit to Pakistan in February 1967. He was accorded an unprecedented warm welcome. It was hoped that the personal contacts between the leaders of the two countries would result in negotiating the solution of the political problem, the Pashtunistan issue. But the relations between the two countries had improved to such an extent that "no bitterness or fanaticism crept into these considerations" in that pleasant atmosphere.²²²

However, such a silence over the Pashtun issue in meeting with Pakistani leaders was a deviation from the traditional Afghan stand, and would have never happened in Daoud's decade or earlier to that. The relations between the two countries continued to be improved and the slight Afghan uneasiness was prompted in 1967 by ^{the} passages in the published autobiography of President Ayub Khan, "Friends not Masters", in which he had described the Afghan support for Pashtunistan an "expansionist" policy. Ayub Khan writes that it

222. "Afghan King Visit to India and Pakistan," Eastern World, March-April, 1967, p. 22.

has been Pakistan's experience "that the Afghan claims become stronger and more strident when there is a weak government in Pakistan". These views were vehemently rejected by the Kabul authorities. Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal while refuting Ayub Khan's remarks and reiterating Afghanistan's "determination to support the demand of the people of Pashtunistan for their right of self-determination", accused Pakistan of forcing Afghanistan to resort to "a policy of hostility" in settling the Pashtun problem. He recalled the times of Pakistan's economic pressures on Afghanistan and Pakistan's "transit blockade, hostile publicity and numerous sabotage and other actions and activities of subversions in Afghanistan".²²³

The other explosive instance during this period (1963-1971) of normal Afghan-Pakistan relation was brought up by a speech of Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, the Afghan Envoy at the United Nations in which he strongly demanded self-determination for the people of Pashtunistan. His speech met with criticism and counter criticism of the representatives of the two countries and aroused a general feeling in most of the countries.²²⁴ But otherwise the relations between the two countries continued to be normal with the exception of occasional Pakistani uneasiness over the Afghan verbal support for Pashtunistan as expressed in the annual speeches of the Afghan

223. "The Pashtunistan Issue," Eastern World, September-October 1967, p. 21.

224. "Growing Circle of Friends," Eastern World, December 1968, p. 18.

leaders and official statements. In fact, the issue of the two Afghan official statements during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1965, and December 1971, that "the bombing of Pashtun territories in Pakistan by Indian planes has aroused the deep concern of the people and government of Afghanistan" had greatly contributed to the already improved relations between the two countries.²²⁵

In addition, the observance of a complete Afghan neutrality during the two Indo-Pakistan conflicts was another source of satisfaction in the relations between the two countries and proved Afghan sincerity towards Pakistan. This, however, on the other hand was viewed by the Afghan nationalist and progressive elements as an ample proof of the Afghan government's unwillingness to support the Pashtun issue. They argued that the Afghan government in line with the policies of Americans and Iranians, tried to help the unprogressive military regimes of Pakistan against India rather than urging the solution of the Pashtun issue which Pakistan could not ignore in an event of hostility with India.²²⁶ However,

225. The spokesman of Afghan Foreign Office in connection with bombing of Peshawar and Kohat, the Pashtun territories in Pakistan by Indian planes said that: "the bombing of Indian military planes on the territory of Pashtunistan has gravely aroused the concern of the people and government of Afghanistan. The continuation of the military attacks on the territory of Pashtunistan deteriorate the situation in the region." The spokesman added that "Afghanistan hopes that in view of the friendly relations between India and Afghanistan, and in view of the peculiar position of their region and the existing of the issue of Pashtunistan, the Government of India, is expected not to do anything that would bring the war to the region of Pashtunistan". See, Afghanistan dar Dourahi Hokomati Entiquali, (Persian), Kabul, 1965, p. 310.

226. This is a widely known view of the nationalists and some of the progressive elements specially the Afghan-Milat political organization.

the Afghan argument to this accusation is that opportunism and solution of political problems by violent means is against the traditional Afghan policy of neutrality, and the economic interest of the country.

However, after the disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971, the events around Afghanistan were shaped in such a rapidity against the interests of the country that it caught the Afghan policy makers by surprise to realize their mistakes and illusions of their utopian belief in pleading for sincerity and friendship in relations with the neighbouring hostile countries of Iran and Pakistan. The Post-Daud Afghan governments thought that such friendly relations with the neighbours will enormously contribute to peace and friendship, and mutual cooperation among the countries of the region and will offer Afghanistan ample opportunity to develop its economy and strengthen its political position.²²⁷ With this line of argument, they abandoned their support for the Pashtun issue, but the illusion proved otherwise. Afghanistan's economy remained stagnant, and the country for the first time in its history suffered a severe starvation in which hundreds of lives were lost, and politically the country was reduced to a smaller role in world affairs. In fact neither the traditional hostile neighbour, Iran, became a cordial friend nor the Muslim

227. The pro-Iran elements in Afghan society have always been spreading out the propogandas that the Pashtunistan issue is against the interest of the country. They argued that at time when the landlocked and economically backward Afghanistan suffered from lack of sufficient food, Afghanistan's support for Pashtunistan, was unrealistic.

Pakistan realized the Afghan goodwill in respecting its wishes. Iran began internally to penetrate the country through its cultural and commercial contacts and externally to encircle the country by expanding its influence in Pakistan. In view of these developments as well as the growing emergence of ^{the} new progressive and nationalist forces within the country Afghanistan was forced to reactivate its support for Pashtunistan. 228

The new orientation in Afghan foreign policy towards the Pashtunistan issue is, thus, a direct result of the new internal trends and a change in the external conditions. Firstly the emergence of the National Awami Party in Pakistan as a main opposition under the Pashtun and Baluchi leadership greatly encouraged the aspirations of the progressive and nationalists elements in Afghanistan. The Pashtuns in Pakistan have frequently arisen in power but have been crushed by the military regimes in Pakistan as a result of immobility and weakness of Afghan Foreign Policy. This time the circumstances that led to the disintegration of Bangladesh greatly strengthened the position of the minorities specially the Pashtuns and Baluchis to broaden their base of campaign for autonomy. Similarly the progressive pose of the N.A.P.

228. After the disintegration of Pakistan, Afghanistan reactivated its support for Pashtunistan. Afghan leaders began to advocate the Pashtun cause in their speeches both within the country and at the international level. Still this change is in contrast difference to the Afghan support at the time of Daoud's government which envisaged both political as well as material support to the Pashtuns in their struggle for self-determination.

and the presence of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Afghanistan served to unite the different and otherwise hostile Afghan elite to bear a united influence on the shape of events in the country.²²⁹ This greatly strengthened the demand for Afghan support to the cause of Pashtuns which was further supported by the ever increasing general awareness and awakening of the Afghan people. As a result of these developments, Wali Khan, the chief of N.A.P. became a source of national aspirations for the Afghan elite, bearing an influence on the policy of the country.

Outside developments were also greatly responsible for the change of Afghan attitude towards ^{the} Pashtun question. The new developments in South Asia moved in such a way that seemed to end the Afghan freedom of action, isolate the country and frustrate the Pashtun movement.

Afghanistan for nearly a decade had changed its attitude towards Pakistan as well as Iran in the hope of gaining their real friendship and avoided anything that would have annoyed Iran or disturbed the shaky Pakistan in her disputes with India. This was alright for the Afghan government as long as the United States and China did not rearm Pakistan and as long as Iran encouraged by the West did not poke its nose in the Pashtun question. But very

229. Abdul Ghaffar Khan as a result of his seven years stay in Afghanistan, became a guiding source and a link between the nationalist pro-Moscow leftists and other progressive elements in Afghanistan which brought a unity between them and made them aware of the real interest of the country in relation to the Pashtun issue.

soon after the disintegration of Pakistan, the Americans operating through Iran began to develop its stake again in the Pashtun-Baluch territories and the rest of Pakistan. Arguing that "Soviet-backed Syria and Iraq on the west and Soviet-backed Afghanistan and India on the east are threats to both Iran and Pakistan", the Americans began rearming of Pakistan and Iran. They argued that non-U.S. concern will encourage Soviet presence in this strategic area and the Indian Ocean.²³⁰

The renewed interest of Americans along with the Chinese interest discovering areas of agreement in Iran and Pakistan for blocking of Soviet influence and protection of economic interests, has greatly strengthened the hands of the expansionist and ambitious Iran to make its presence in South Asia felt. The United States in view of its economic and political interests, is engaged in building Iran as a major power in the Middle East and South Asia with most sophisticated war machine in Asia. Iran has been receiving, since the beginning of cold war era, large quantities of arms from the West and has recently been able to acquire highly sophisticated arms from the West. She has also placed orders worth of nearly 3000 million dollars for the massive purchase of highly sophisticated military hardware from the U.S. and other western countries. Iran's argument and justification for her massive arms-build-up is to safeguard her territorial integrity, protect

230. "U.S. urged to help solve South Asian Problems," Times of India, no. 145, vol. cxxxv, May 27, 1973, p. 13.

the world's oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and to check subversion or hostile influence of the neighbouring countries in the Middle East and South Asia, which according to Shah of Iran may pose a threat to Iran's security and the oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.

However, in reality the motivation behind the arms-build-up is Iran's search for territorial expansion and increase of its sphere of influence, and this can be evidenced by tracing the history of Iran. Iran's occupation of the three Arab Islands of Shatt-El-Arab, and her interference in the Pashtun-Baluch autonomist movement in Pakistan is a good evidence of Iran's expansionist designs. Since Iran's expansion westward is not much feasible because of large resources at the disposal of the Arab countries, hence she looks to the east towards Afghanistan, and the Pashtun-Baluch territories. This is a fact rooted in the history and the Afghan history is a reflection of Iran's claims, intrigues and repeated invasions of Afghan territories. During the nineteenth century, taking the advantage of Afghanistan's suffering from the Anglo-Russian rivalries and the resultant civil wars, Iran managed to annex some parts of the Khorasan and the Selestan provinces of Afghanistan. Still Iran claims tacitly most of ^{the} Western parts of the country. In 1929 taking the advantage of the civil war instigated by the British, Iran wanted to invade Herat, the north-western Afghan province in the name of the security of her frontiers but she was threatened by the Soviet Union to abandon the plan.²³¹

231. "Russian Memorandum to the Government of Iran", Monasibati Afghanistan wa Etihadi Shorawi, (a collection of the Soviet-Afghan documents in Persian), Kabul, n.d., pp. 42-53.

Iran has always had a subversive hand in Afghanistan and appears to be very hostile and aggressive in its publicities towards the Afghans. Mirza Said Mehdi, an ex-Iranean ambassador at the court of Kabul, in his book, "The Political History of Afghanistan", after describing Afghans in a rough language and denying their historical existence, writes that ^{the} Afghans should always be threatened only.²³²

Thus a review of Iran's history and her recent claim of interest in Baluchistan and her activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan reveal Iran's real motives, that is expansion eastward to establish the ancient Daryush Empire for which she has been dreaming for centuries. What checked Iranean designs was Afghan awareness of Iran's sinister wishes and the freedom loving character of ^{the} Afghan and the Baluchi people. But the new resources from oil, and the current of international events since the disintegration of Pakistan, have offered Iran new hopes of expansion and domination as a major power in the region. The so-called regional and global responsibilities claimed by Iran to safeguard the security of the region and protect the world's oil supplies, are the initiatives to justify its tremendous arms-build-up and to enlist the support of the West and the countries opposed to the Soviet bloc, particularly China. Therefore Iran's real objective is to increase eastward its sphere of influence

232. Pazhwak, Contemporary Afghanistan, (unpublished class text notes), p. 2.

as much as possible. The Shah of Iran in advocating the thesis that Iran stands for the protection of the Persian Gulf and the Makran coast, has openly revealed the intention that if Pakistan happened to disintegrate further, Iran will occupy Baluchistan because she does not want "another Viet Nam situation" on her frontiers as it will constitute a threat to Iran's territorial integrity.²³³ In fact Iran itself has been creating the troubles in the region and provoking the resentment of the neighbouring countries just to justify her arm build-up. The discovery of Iraqi arms in Pakistan in itself was an Iranian conspiracy to pave a way on the one hand for a massive purchase of arms, and on the other to crush the anti-Iran Pashtun and Baluchi governments in Pakistan.²³⁴

233. "Under Iran's Wing", Indian Express, vol.XLI, no.164, May 15, 1973, p.6; and see for detail, "Shah of Iran has no faith in CENTO", Times of India, no.111, vol.CXXXV, April 23, 1973, p.12.

234. The discovery of Iraqi arms in Pakistan was a joint conspiracy of Pak-Iran governments. Both the governments from the very beginning knew that how the arms were coming to Pakistan, but were waiting for an opportunity to use its seizure as a political issue to topple down the NAP governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. Iran wanted Pakistan to bring up this issue in such a time when she was prepared to use it to justify her move for a purchase of US arms. Thus Pakistan was asked by Iran to uncover the arms in Iraqi Embassy when it served the common interests of both parties - to crush the increasing influence of NAP and to pave a way for rearming of the two countries by the United States and China on the ground that Soviet arms were supplied to people in the region for subversion against the two countries. This Pakistani action not only proved her illwill against the Pashtuns and Baluchis but it also proved the fact that Pakistan was under virtual control of Iran, as the observers argued that why should Pakistan against her interests annoy one country (Iraq) for the sake of another country, since the Iraqi arms if meant at all were to be used against Iran. It had nothing to do with Pakistan as Wali Khan has pointed out that "if NAP wanted arms, it could have easily arranged to get them via Chitral and Afghanistan", see for detail, "Iraqi arms were meant for Baluchi rebels in Iran", Times of India, no.42, vol.CXXV, Feb.12, 1973, p.1, and Ibid., no.46, vol.cxxv, February 16, 1973, p.1.

However, the actual intention of Iran is to infiltrate eastward into Afghanistan and Pashtunistan and to fill up in collaboration with the government of Pakistan the power vacuum which exists in this region and which Pakistan ever since its emergence due to cultural differences and weak position has failed to fill up that vacuum. That is the Pashtun-Baluch territories and the Makran Coast to the South of Baluchistan which formerly were but an integrated part of Afghanistan. Iran therefore in line with Pakistani leaders is making serious efforts by cultural penetration and offers of benefits to develop an Iranian identity among the neighbouring Baluchi and the Shoya communities of Sind and Punjab. She does so in the hope of getting in future an opportunity or an excuse to intervene and occupy these areas specially Baluchistan and if not possible at least to keep them under her control. The very age-old close relation, extensive contacts, economic and military co-operations between Iran and Pakistan as in contrast difference to Iran's relation with the neighbouring sincere Afghanistan, explains Iran's intentions and the priorities in her foreign policy objectives. Apart from Iran's cultural penetration into Afghanistan which share cultural traditions with Iran, there has not been a single instance of even a minor co-operation between Afghanistan and Iran, while on the other hand, there have been extensive contracts, economic and military cooperations between Iran and Pakistan, the two

geographically and culturally distant countries.²³⁵

However, the reason for this unnatural course of Iran's foreign policy is that Iran by exploiting the difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pashtun issue, has been trying to keep the two otherwise culturally and geographically close countries alienated from one another and tries to infiltrate herself into the region. The actual intention is to end Afghan influence and crush the possible emergence of a Pashtun state which will ultimately increase and strengthen Afghan position and check Iran's influence. To do so Iran is thinking in terms of an occupation or an actual political control of Baluchistan which would ultimately result in blocking of Afghanistan's hopes for increasing its influence and getting of a sea-outlet through the establishment of Pashtunistan. If Pashtunistan movement is crushed and Baluchistan falls under Iran's occupation or control that would result in Afghanistan's dependency on Iran for sea outlet, since the country's only workable sea outlet run through Baluchistan and the second alternative also run through Iran.²³⁶

²³⁵. Geographically, and culturally Afghanistan and Iran have been the two closest neighbours while on the other hand Iran and Pakistan have been far off, yet inspite of Afghan goodwill towards Iran, the relation with that country has been far from friendly. And with Pakistan that country has kept maximum contacts and has co-operated in different respects. This in itself refelects Iran's motives in that country. See also "Pak bid to assuage Shah's feelings", Times of India, no.127, vol.CXXXV, May 9, 1973, p. 7.

²³⁶. The second alternative route of Afghanistan's sea-outlet runs through Iran and Iran is now building a highway linking Afghan border with Iran's port of Banderi Abass, obviously with the purpose of making Afghan trade to develop and depend on this outlet with the strategic significance for Iran which will also encourage Iran's further penetration into Afghanistan.

So such an Afghan economic dependency on Iran will bring fruitful dividends to Iran which in a long run through Iran's pressures and cultural penetration assisted by Persianization and Westernization of Afghans, leading to alienation of self-oriented Pashtuns under Pakistan which is already at work, will bring Afghanistan under the control of Iran and that is what Iran has been dreaming and aiming for ages.

The fact that Afghanistan's efforts for nearly a decade met with failure to get closer to the two neighbouring countries give enough support to the above viewpoint. In fact Iran for her intentions has been exploiting the religious and political conditions in Pakistan. Pakistan in reality has been dominated politically as well as economically by the Shoya minority community. Most of the Pakistani leaders including Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, belong to the Shoya sect of Islam which is the state religion of Iran. In fact the domination of Pakistan's political and economic life by the Shoya minority community has been due to this awareness which has continued to be encouraged and supported by Iran. The process has been largely assisted by the sense of doubtful origin among the Pakistani Shoya minority and by the fast-developing Iran's efforts to develop among them an Iranian identity.²³⁷ This very fact explains the very reasons for the

237. Iran is making serious efforts to encourage blood and social relationship between Iranians and Pakistanis. Bhutto's wife and of many others are said to be from Iranian origin. As a result of Iran's encouragement, the Shoya elite of Pakistan have been able to establish, one way or the other, the most intimate social and cultural relationships with Iranians.

Pakistan's bitter attitude towards the Afghans and her attachment to Iran and it also reflects the emerging resentment of the majority Sunnis and the anti-Iran attitude of the opposition parties in Pakistan which belong largely to the deprived majority community of Sunnis.

Thus the exploitation of religious sectionalism and animosity in Pakistan by Iran as assisted by Afghanistan's dispute with Pakistan over Pashtunistan, has greatly served Iran's intentions in that country and has recently aroused the resentment of other communities which although being put under control and suppression, seems to explode one day. Therefore, it may not be surprising to see Wali Khan saying that there is a conspiracy to "hand over western province of Baluchistan to the neighbouring Iran."²³⁸ In fact after the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, in view of these reasons Pakistan has actually fallen under the protection and political control of Iran. The disintegration of Pakistan in itself according to some observers, was the direct result of Iran's diplomacy which persuaded Pakistan to crush the struggling "Hindu-penetrated" and culturally separate and different East Bengal, which led to the disintegration. These observers further argue that Iran itself wanted such a disintegration of Pakistan because Iran could not dominate a united Pakistan under the

238. "Conspiracy to transfer Baluchistan to Iran", Times of India, no. 151, vol. CXXXV, June 2, 1973, p. 11 and "Under Iran's Wing", Indian Express, vol. XLI, no. 164, May 15, 1973, p. 6.

influence of East Bengal which would have brought Pakistan closer to Afghanistan and India and which would have also strengthened the position of Pashtuns and Baluchis vis-a-vis other communities in Pakistan obviously strengthening the Afghan position.²³⁹

Thus in view of these developments and Iran's activities in Pakistan and her interference in the Pashtun and Baluch problem, Afghanistan was forced to react and reactivate its support for Pashtunistan, because the entire developments in this region seemed to encircle Afghanistan's influence and frustrate the Pashtun movement through which according to Americans and the Chinese, Soviet contact and influence could possibly reach Indian Ocean and the strategic Pashtun-Baluch territories to the east and South of Afghanistan as situated between the sub-continent of India and the Indian Ocean. The emergence of NAP under Wali Khan with the pro-Russian bias as a strong opposition political party in Pakistan, has been further responsible for the reactivation of political developments in this region. It became a source of encouragement to Afghans as well as the Soviets who had since long

239. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's six-point formula envisaged a loose federation of Pakistan with maximum autonomy including certain measures of foreign relations. Therefore if adopted would have led to Pashtun solidarity and integration and close relation with Afghanistan which would have checked Iran's influence. Therefore Iran struggled hard to see that Sheikh Mujib with his formula did not succeed. The argument that Iran wanted the disintegration of Pakistan is strengthened by the point that Iran encouraged Pakistan with promise of military aid to crush East Bengal, but when the disintegration became apparent she avoided any such help.

back recognized Afghan interests in the Pashtun issue. At the same time this increased the fear of the America (U.S.A.) and China (P.R.C.) that the success of the NAP will encourage Soviet influence, therefore, the two super powers operating through Iran and president Bhutto's pro-Chinese regime began to crush the NAP governments in Pakistan in collusion with each other.²⁴⁰

However, Afghanistan after the disintegration of Pakistan, hoped for some solution of the Pashtun problem. They thought that the experience of disintegration of East Pakistan will ultimately convince the Pakistani leaders to respond somehow to the aspirations of Pashtuns and Baluchis. Thus congratulating President Bhutto, the Afghan Prime Minister Dr. Abdul Zahir drew the attention of the former to the "only political issue" between the two countries - the question of giving the right of self-determination for the people of Pashtunistan. The Afghan Prime Minister expressed the hope that the people of Pashtunistan would succeed in attaining their legitimate rights, the right to their self-determination whereby the relations between the two countries would be consolidated in accordance with the "immutable law of Islamic brotherhood". Earlier on 6 January 1972, the Prime Minister stated:

"Just as by agreeing to release Sheikh Mujib unconditionally the Pakistan Government had shown respect to the wishes of the people of Bangladesh, it should also respect the wishes of the people of Pashtunistan by showing greater attention to their issues.²⁴¹

240. See for detail, "Pakistan - Disintegration or confederation," Mankind (Delhi), vol.xvii, no.1, Jan-March, 1973, pp.41-45.

241. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (News Review on South Asia) New Delhi, January 1972, pp. 2-3.

However, the reactivation of Afghan support for Pashtunistan persuaded Pakistan at least to respond for the time being to the aspirations of Pashtuns who at that very critical situation following the break up of Pakistan were threatening with secession that if Bhutto does not respect their wills and wishes then "Kabul could become a second Calcutta." The situation all over Pashtunistan has been in fact a warning one to Pakistan.²⁴² Therefore, Bhutto paid a four-hour surprise visit to Kabul in January 1972, to ask the Afghan government "to suppress, at least for the time being, the Afghan support for Pakhtunistan." Although this has been denied by Bhutto, yet the purpose of the visit seems to be an attempt to ask Afghanistan to relax its support for the Pashtunistan movements at that difficult hours of Pakistan's struggle for survival.²⁴³ President Bhutto in a press conference in Lahore on 13 January stated:

"I did not go there (to Kabul) to plead with them not to intercede in our internal politics. There were many pressures on Afghanistan to create problems for Pakistan. I went to Afghanistan to thank them for not increasing our problems when we were facing the gravest crisis."²⁴⁴

However the repeated reiteration of Afghan emphasis on the rights of the people of Pashtunistan and the large demonstrations by the N.A.P. workers in February 1972 in Peshawar for autonomy

242. See for detail, Weiner Adam, "Storm Warning North-Western Pakistan", Swiss Review of World Affairs, vol.xxii, no.1, April, 1972, p. 21.

243. Quarterly Economic Review (E.I.U. London) the issue on Afghanistan Bangladesh and Pakistan, no.1, 1972, p.4.

244. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, no. 39, p.3.

forced Bhutto's regime to respond favourably. While the Afghans speeded up their publicity, the Pashtuns threatened war against Pakistan government. Mohammad Ayub, President of the Peshawar City Committee of the N.A.P. stated that:

"If President Bhutto lifts martial law and restores democracy, if he allows Pathans self-government, if he recognizes Bangladesh and makes friends with India, we are ready to stay within Pakistan. Otherwise we are armed and ready to fight."²⁴⁵

The Afghan king on his state visit to Soviet Union in March once again reiterated the Afghan support for the right of Pashtuns to their self-determination. He concluded that "the problem of Pakhtunistan is the legacy of colonial times unsolved and continues to be a serious political issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Thus Bhutto was forced to surrender to the demands of the N.A.P. to lift Martial law and reinstitute N.A.P. governments in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan and an agreement to that effect was reached in March between President Bhutto and Khan Abdul Wali Khan. Wali Khan after his talks with Bhutto said: "We have averted a confrontation that would have been disastrous for the nation. We got the best agreement we could under the circumstances".²⁴⁶ Hence the N.A.P. governments were restored in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan.

245. In one of the demonstrations on February 24, 1972, more than 10,000 Pashtuns, many of them armed participated demanding immediate lifting of Martial law and restoration of their self-government; see for detail, "Pathans Demand Autonomy", Facts on File, February, 1972, p. 154, C2.

246. See for the agreement, "Martial Law to end", Facts on File, March, 1972, p. 173 E1.

However these measures were welcomed by Afghanistan. A commentary on Kabul Radio on 7th May hailed the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, allowing the Pashtuns to arrange their own affairs and the establishment of their governments in the two provinces of "Central Occupied Pakhtunistan" (N.W.F.P.), and "Southern Occupied Pashtunistan" (Baluchistan). The commentary added that "the people of Afghanistan considered the gesture as a promising one. Another commentary on 10th May welcoming the restoration of "rights and the national identity of Pakhtuns", stated that the "forced occupation of Pakhtunistan by Pakistan were" still "some of the issues which have to be settled". The Afghan Foreign Minister Mussa Shaffique was also reported to have reiterated Afghan stand on Pashtunistan at a reception in his honour in China at the time of his official visit from that country.²⁴⁷

These developments for a while in that inevitable circumstances continued to bear on the parties concerned with the Pashtun issue. Pakistan continued to listen to the reactivation

247. The Afghan Foreign Minister stated in Peking on April 20th, that Afghanistan followed a policy of active neutrality and opposed colonialism and supported peoples and nations fighting for their right to self-determination. Hence he declared that "Having a common history, cultural and racial ties, the people and government of Afghanistan want the Pakhtunistan issue, a remnant of colonial days and which is the only political difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be solved through peaceful means so that the People of Pakhtunistan may be given the right to self-determination", Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi), no. 239, May 1972, p. 3.

of Afghan support for the Pashtuns and responded largely in favour of Pashtun demands. A Pakistani delegation led by Begum Nusrat, Bhutto's wife paid a three-day visit to Kabul in May for talks and on its return to Peshawar was reported to have said that the Afghan King told them that if Pakistan was in trouble Afghanistan was bound to be affected. The special emissary of President Bhutto added that Afghanistan was "prepared to go to any length" to improve relations between the two countries, but Afghanistan's stand on Pashtun issue, he was told, remained unchanged the emissary reported.²⁴⁸ However, the Afghans stuck to their stand and the Afghan Foreign Minister Mussa Shaffique and later the Afghan Representative at the United Nations in their speeches in the General Assembly reiterated the Afghan stand and urged Pakistan to give the right of self-determination to the people of Pashtunistan. The Afghan Envoy, Abdur Rahman Pazhwak after emphasizing the right to self-determination for Pashtuns added:

"We cannot have double standard. We base ourselves on the right of self-determination. I think Pakistan will not be able to tell us that they do not believe in the right of self-determination. I challenge them. In their own interests they should not violate it."²⁴⁹

The relation between the two countries continued in this manner until President Bhutto entrenched his position. Once he was sure of outside support specially of Iran and of his authority and ability to instigate successful conspiracies against opposition

248. Ibid.

249. See for detail, Ibid., October, 1972, p. 121.

parties, he changed his attitude towards NAP as well as Afghan government. In an apparent bit to assert his authority in NWFP and Baluchistan and ^{to} eliminate the increasing influence of the NAP, Bhutto launched upon a policy of "divide and rule", setting one tribe against the other, and alluring one leader by offer of posts against the other. In this game he used all the reactionary elements and power-hungry personalities such as Qaiyum Khan, (Muslim League), Hayat Mohammad Sherpoe, Chaus Bakhsh Raisani, who were offered ministerial posts, and others like Aslam Khattak, Ghulam Qadir, Mir Nabi Bakhsh Zehri, Nawab Akbar Bugti who were either tribal reactionary chiefs or allured from the NAP by offers of undue high posts. This combination of subversive elements were provided with sufficient means of creating troubles for the NAP governments in the two provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan to make cases for Bhutto's intervention.²⁵⁰ Bhutto still having failed

250. President Bhutto himself created troubles in NWFP and Baluchistan to pave way for military intervention by the centre and the final removal of NAP governments. For instance, the Las Bela tribal uprising was the work of Bhutto's agents and the centre sent army there despite of the repeated requests and protests by Bizenjo, the Governor, that the centre should withdraw the army as the situation was normal. But centre did not do so until it removed the Governor as well as the popular NAP ministry. The NAP leaders from the very beginning knew that the Central Government's action was motivated to instal their government in Baluchistan and remove the popular government of opposition. The dismissal of the NAP governments in the two provinces has also been emphasized by Iran to enable her to build military basis in Baluchistan. See for detail, "Iran also to Post army in Baluchistan", Times of India, no. 166, vol. cxxxv, June, 17, 1973, p. 1; "Pakistan Crisis", Times of India, no. 46, vol. cxxxv, February 16, 1973, p. 7; "The Las Bela happenings a mystery", Ibid., no. 44, February 14, 1973, p. 9 and "The Pakistan Scene" - (Charge), Ibid., no. 33, vol. cxxxv, February 3, 1973, p. 6.

to counter his strong opponent NAP party's influence, brought up in collusion with Iran, issues such as the discovery of arms at the Iraqi Embassy to link it with the NAP so that the party is discredited and he has a free hand to dismiss the party's popular governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. Thus Bhutto through his conspiracies was able to remove the popular governments of NAP in the two provinces on the pretext that they were unable to restore law and order and that they were working for foreign powers and wanted to disintegrate the country. These feelings and conceptions were what Bhutto and his colleagues themselves in line with the Iranian activities to eliminate the NAP which was opposed to Bhutto's regime as well as Iran's ambitions in Pakistan.²⁵¹ They

251. The stand of NAP is well known. The party stand for loose federation of Pakistan in which the provinces will have maximum autonomy to preserve and develop their respective cultures and way of life, and advocates close relation of these provinces with the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, India and Iran for cultural contact political stability and mutual economic co-operation. Because the cultural position of NWFP and Baluchistan at the circumstances favours such a policy to enable the provinces to develop their culture and languages which are dominated by Urdu language and very backward almost at the verg of decay. The NAP knows that cultural awareness and advancement will ultimately lead to self-government and link the two provinces with Afghanistan whether under federation or otherwise. In fact the same is the backward position of Afghan language and culture of the majority Pashtuns which is the same as that of NWFP and Baluchistan and which due to domination of Persian language supported by Iran's influence continues to remain backward and neglected resulting in frustration among the deprived Pashtuns. Hence the autonomy advocated by NAP for NWFP and Baluchistan giving impetus and momentum to cultural advancement and integration, would ultimately bring cultural and political unity and integration between the two provinces and Afghanistan ending domination of Urdu and Persian

.....(cont'd...to next page).....

did so to enable Bhutto's regime to hold its control over the two provinces that would enable Iran to build military basis for Pakistan in Baluchistan. In fact neither the NAP wanted immediate secession at that circumstances nor the Afghan government was willing or able to support such a move by the NAP. Because the political, economic and cultural position of Pashtuns and Baluchis favoured at first step a cultural integrity and political unity of their provinces and an awareness and mobilization of their dis-united people. The Afghan attitude, although emphasizing on the right to self-determination for the people of Pashtunistan, is to support what the Pashtun and Baluchi leaders wanted. The Afghan government's statement of March warning Pakistan for the removal of NAP governments declares that "Afghans would not tolerate continuation of the present policy of injustice and repression in occupied Pashtunistan (NWFP and Baluchistan)." The statement further add:

"We still hope that Pakistan government would abandon the dangerous path of naked repression against the

(cont'd...from last page).... languages in Pashtunistan (NWFP and Baluchistan) and Afghanistan respectively which would also mean checking of Iran's cultural penetration, and that is what Iran struggles not to come. For this very reason Iran tries to fight the NAP at two levels. In Pakistan she is operating through Bhutto's regime to crush the NAP for charges that it is working for foreign powers and for the disintegration of Pakistan. In Afghanistan she is active through the persian-speaking dominant elite in power to creat the feeling that the NAP, the spokesman of Pashtuns and Baluchis, is dreaming of disintegrating Pashtuns from Afghanistan, see for the tune and colour of Iran's propagandas, "Pakistan's Political Dreamers", Kayhan International, vol. V, no. 263, May 12, 1973, p. 4. See also, previous footnote.

Pakhtoons, we would warn the Pakistan government not to play with fire. The people of Afghanistan have the fullest sympathy for their tortured bretheren in occupied Pakhtunistan and would retaliate in every possible way if in any way harm was done to their leaders."252

This statement is the strongest Afghan warning, ever since the end of the Daoud decade. Still the statement beyond the fact that it was able to stop Bhutto's regime to take any oppressive measures against NAP as were planned, the warning was not backed by any diplomatic initiative to at least bring the NAP to its former position or provide it with alternative options. A subsequent statement issued by Afghan government in April this year reflects the exact nature of Afghan position on the Pashtunistan issue. The statement in full reads as follows:

"The cabinet held a meeting on 17 April, and issued the following statement:

At a time when the government of Pakistan promulgated a new constitution, the government of Afghanistan considers it a duty to reiterate, once more, the followings:

1. The historical ties, based on Islamic brotherhood, and life in this one cultural region that link Afghanistan with the nation of Pakistan, have special value to the people of this country.
2. Hence the people of Afghanistan welcome every step which will help lead life in Pakistan towards normalization and stability in that brother country.
3. The people of Afghanistan can never accept any action by the government of Pakistan which would entail suppression of the rights of our brothers in Pashtunistan, be they Pashtun or Baluch.
4. The people of Pashtunistan and their land have a history and culture independent of that of the people of the sub-continent of Pakistan and India, and it shall be so. Hence, whatever resolve that does not emanate from

252. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (News Review on South Asia) New Delhi, March 1973, p. 87.

their own will, and is not based on the principle of the right of self-determination of nations, shall have no legal status for Afghanistan.

5. Afghanistan considers it a right and historical duty to support the demands of the people of Pashtunistan for the right of self-determination in every peaceful way.

Afghanistan in accordance with the decisions of the Grand Assemblies, shall continue with this support until such time that our Pashtunistani brothers achieve this inalienable right, and their national wishes are fulfilled."²⁵³

However, inspite of the new orientation in Afghan stand on the issue and its reactivation of publicity campaigns, the fact remains obvious that beyond a verbal warning to Pakistan, the Afghan government has not taken the issue seriously as it has avoided to press its solution through diplomatic initiatives and the options opened to the country. The conditions since the very beginning of the disintegration of Pakistan were promising one and if Afghanistan made serious attempts some sort of compromising solution could have been reached with the troubled Pakistan. It was the weakness of Afghan diplomacy that gave enough opportunity to Pakistan to exploit the Afghan position in strengthening her position at a time when Afghan support in favour of the agitated, restless and armed Pashtuns and Baluchis could alter the shape of things, specially when the interest of some foreign powers could also favour the Afghan initiatives. It has been due to this weakness, immobility and inconsistency in Afghan foreign policy on the Pashtun issue that Iran was also encouraged to try its stake in the Pashtun and Baluchi region. She seems to have been

253. Kabul Times, vol. XII, no. 20, April 18, 1973, p. 1.

preparing for the occupation of Baluchistan in an event of Pakistan's possible disintegration. The Shah of Iran has openly hinted recently in an interview that if Pakistan happens to disintegrate, Iran will take "protective" measures in Baluchistan that is to seize it. The Shah's statement although provoked a bitter opposition and criticism in Pakistan specially from ^{the} National Awami Party leaders as Iran's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, yet the statement did not lead to any official Pakistani reaction, because it served the interest of Bhutto's regime since the Shah's statement calling on India "to help the shaky Pakistan government control the autonomist, movements in North-West Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces", strengthened Bhutto's regime. ²⁵⁴

254. NAP and the opposition Democratic Front rose in opposition to the Shah's statement and demanded a debate in the National Assembly on this interference of Iran. But Bhutto's regime describing the opposition's demands as conspiracy instigated by foreign powers to spoil Pak-Iran cordiality, issued a strongly worded official statement that praised Iran in spite of the Shah's interference, for having goodwill towards Pakistan and criticized the role of opposition parties and the unfriendly attitude of the neighbouring Afghanistan and India. Wali Khan, the NAP chief, in response to this statement accused the Pakistan government of "trying to confuse" the issue of Iran's interference and sinister intentions in Pakistan's affairs. Wali Khan said, "if we accept the official argument, then it would give both China and America a more justified right to 'dictate' to us because of their contribution to our defence and economy". Wali Khan described the comparisons made by Pakistan government's spokesman between India's, Afghanistan's and Iran's relationship "with Pakistan as a very unusual procedure of any country's foreign relations, Times of India, no. 139, vol. cxxxv, May 22, 1973, p. 11, and see for detail "Pak bid to assuage Shah's feelings", Times of India, no. 127, May 9, 1973, p. 7, and Ibid., no. 111, vol. cxxxv, April 23, 1973, p. 12.

In fact, the Shah's statement amounts to an actual interference in one's internal affairs since the "autonomist movements" in Pakistan was a product of Pakistan's own social and cultural requirements and had nothing to do with a foreign country such as Iran, and if Afghanistan is supporting such^a movement among the Pashtuns and Baluchis that is based on the wishes of the people concerned with whom Afghanistan has racial, historical cultural and linguistic ties.

However, since Iran's intention in Pakistan serve the interest of Bhutto's regime and strengthens its position in that country and vis-a-vis other countries, it is therefore not surprising to find Bhutto welcoming Shah's statement as "Iran's anxiety and concern for Pakistan", inspite of the obvious interfering nature of the statement.²⁵⁵ Not only this, at the time of Bhutto's visit to Tehran in May this year, the Shah even more vehemently repeated its resolve that Iran would not tolerate any separatist movement in what remains of Pakistan. The Shah addressing Bhutto said:

"We will stand by you ... we will not remain indifferent and close our eyes to any separatist movement in your country."²⁵⁶

Similarly the Shah in a subsequent interview declared that "Iran will not accept any attempt to liquidate Pakistan" and hence "the big powers and India must be fully aware of our resolu-

255. "Pakistan given backing against separatists", Kayhan International, vol. V, no. 264, May 19, 1973, p. 1.

256. Ibid.

tion" because the Shah added that Iran does "not want a Viet Nam situation on the frontiers of Iran."²⁵⁷

However, the Pindi-Tehran cordiality, defence pact and extensive cultural and political links between the two countries which in collusion with China and America, bring Pakistan under Iran's sphere of influence and tend to check Afghan influence in the region through which Soviet influence could reach to the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent.²⁵⁸ Here what is important to note is to see how Afghanistan is going to react to Iran's attitude, because it is Afghanistan that since the very emergence of Pakistan has been, although sometimes verbally, advocating the cause of Pashtuns for self-determination and claims to continue this based on the wishes and aspirations of ^{the} Pashtun people. The Iranian declaration however amounts to a warning not to India or any other country but mainly to Afghanistan. Since neither India after the emergence of Bangladesh has claimed any interest in the Pashtun issue nor the Soviet Union in spite of N.A.P.'s pro-Russian bias, favour any further disintegration of Pakistan. India's interests lie in normalization of relations and economic cooperation with Pakistan. Unless forced by circumstances as Iran is going to create that would pose a threat to its security, India would

257. "Iran not to accept Pakistan's liquidation", Times of India, no. 130, vol. cxxxv, May 13, 1973, p. 13.

258. See for detail, "Pindi-Tehran defence pact foreseen," Times of India, no. 137, May 20, 1973, p. 7; "Under Iran's wing," Indian Express, vol. XLII, no. 164, May 15, 1973, p. 6 and see also the preceding pages of this chapter.

struggle for close and intimate relations with that country.²⁵⁹

The Soviet Union on the other hand, would also not like the disintegration of Pakistan but its control under some pro-Russian leadership that would enable Soviet Union to link and increase its cultural, economic and commercial contacts, political and strategic influence through an integrated Pakistan in the Indian Ocean, sub-continent of India and East Asia and that is what is meant by Russian proposals for South Asian Security system — comprising Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.²⁶⁰

Similarly Soviet interests does not favour a Pashtun state that will strengthen Afghanistan's influence because it will further render Afghanistan difficult for the Soviet Union to keep her under its influence. Hence disintegration of Pakistan which would further alienate Pakistan from Soviet Union and lead to its fall under the Indian or Chinese sphere of influence, is damaging to the Soviet interests and obviously against her policy of peaceful penetration.

Thus in view of such prospects it seems obvious that if any separatist movement among the Pashtuns and Baluchis is supported at all by a foreign power, that is but Afghanistan, as she openly claims to do so based on the aspirations of the people concerned for their right to self-determination. Therefore it is striking

259. Ibid., and "Pakistan's political dreamers", Kayhan International, vol. V, no. 263, May 12, 1973, p. 4.

260. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (South Asia) March 1972, p. 4.

to note that Afghanistan claims to support the Pashtuns for self-determination, while Iran challenges and warns that she would not tolerate it, and yet Afghanistan remains silent and does not react to Iran's interference in the rights of "their Pakhtun and Baluchi brethrens".

Afghanistan's immobilism on the subject of Iran's avowed goal of "preventing the disintegration of Pakistan" is a reflection of Kabul's reluctance to embark on any sort of military confrontation. Although the land-locked position and the limited resources at the disposal of the country are major obstacles in the way of a military confrontation, yet Kabul cannot ignore the situation in the field of diplomatic initiatives. Iran's interference in the Pashtun issue and her efforts to limit Afghan influence, in the name of this and that security of Pakistan is a significant fact, which the Afghan government has to note. Afghan silence will not only strengthen Pak-Iran position regarding Pashtunistan but will also jeopardise the basic objectives of Afghan foreign policy.

However, inspite of all these one thing seems obvious that the recent developments — Iran's arm-build-up, Pak-Iran defence pact, Chinese and American identity of interests in a united and well-armed Pakistan and Iran and the revival of CENTO Pact, has left Afghanistan to get closer to India, Bangladesh, Soviet Union, Iraq and ^{the} other Arab and ^{the} neutral countries which is obviously an initiative motivated by the change in the balance of power in the region which Iran's arms-build-up and the Peking-Tehran-Pindi tie-

up has resulted. In fact, recently there has been extensive contacts, numerous exchange of repeated state visits and conclusion of numerous cultural and commercial agreements between Afghanistan and Soviet Union, India, Iraq, and other neutral countries. And the Pashtun issue seems to be one of the stimulating factors responsible for the new orientation in the Afghan foreign policy.

C O N C L U S I O N

Situated at the crossroads in the strategic area to the South of Russia, between the subcontinent and West Asia, in proximity to the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan has since early times been the scene of intense human activity and has figured predominantly in shaping the history, art and culture of the entire southern hemisphere of the Asian continent. Before the discovery of sea-routes and the advent of European colonialism to Asia, Afghanistan at the crossroads of Asia, providing the main land-routes between east and west, was flourishing, which enabled her (although known under various names through the long course of history), to rise in power and to provide great centres of art, culture, trade and commerce, through and from which human civilizations, thoughts and religions travelled east, west and northwards to central Asia and China. But the discovery of sea-routes and the advent of European colonialism in Asia assisted by its naval supremacy, and the resultant imperialistic rivalries between the European powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries not only reduced the power of Afghans who had just began to build their power on a new national and cultural basis, but also resulted in a disintegration of their country, leading the eastern Afghans to fall under the British colonialism which created a problem, on the one hand, between the severed Afghans and the British, on the other, between Afghanistan and

the British, and later that of Pashtunistan between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thus the Pashtunistan issue, a problem of social and cultural identity and survival, political and national existence, is a legacy of European colonialism deeply rooted in history. It is the product of interaction of the diplomatic and military activities, political conspiracies and manoeuvrings of the two European rival powers — Czarist Russia and British India, which brought about the fragmentation of the Afghan nation, and subsequently the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue.

At the close of eighteenth century, the rivalries between the European powers around Afghanistan and their expansion through intrigues created unfortunate developments in Afghanistan, and Ranjit Singh who was entrusted with Punjab by the Afghan ruler, taking the advantage of the unfortunate situation in Afghanistan strengthened his position and soon declared his independence. Later encouraged by the British he even extended his control to some of the trans-Indus Afghan territories. But as soon as the British strengthened their position in India, they began first to curtail Afghan power with the help of the Sikhs which resulted in the First Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42), and then to eliminate Sikh power in the Punjab.

An invasion of Afghan territory by Persia at Russian instigation in 1837 and Afghan refusal to accept an alliance with the British and the Sikhs or to accept a British envoy at Kabul,

unless the Sikhs withdrew from Peshawar and other Afghan districts west of Indus, was responsible for the first disastrous Anglo-Afghan war, which was motivated by British fears of Russian expansion. Although the Afghans forced the British to withdraw, yet due to the resultant civil war in the country and Persian repeated invasions, the Afghans, inspite of their repeated attempts, could not recover Peshawar and other trans-Indus districts, which the British subsequently occupied after the elimination of Sikh power in the Punjab. This strengthened the British position and checked the hopes of the Afghan Amir who was forced to submit to the British terms of friendship and was compelled to conclude a treaty of friendship with the British virtue of which the Amir forfeited his claim to Peshawar or other Afghan territories under the British.

As a result of the experience of the first Anglo-Afghan war, the British at first remained content with making Afghanistan friendly, and only retained Peshawar and some other districts, thereby following the "close-Border" policy or the policy of "containment", commonly known as "masterly inactivity", which meant non-interference in Afghan Affairs or in the affairs of the Afghan hill tribes which remained free or owed allegiance to Kabul.

But this state of affairs did not last long, as the succession of Amer Sher Ali Khan to the throne of Kabul, greatly encouraged tribal agitations against the British which the Amir continued to support in the hope of regaining some of the lost territories.

This and Russian consolidation of influence in Central Asia soon aroused the British to transform as a part of a new strategy, the policy of containment into a policy of interference or "forward policy", because the British thought that in view of increasing Russian influence, their domains would never be secure as long as the Afghan tribes, frequently supported by Kabul, continued their struggle, and as long as Kabul remained unfriendly. They argued that the imaginary frontier running along the foothills inhabited by the independent virile Afghan tribes, was not strategically safe as it served not as a barrier but as a screen behind which one could hardly know what precisely was going on. The aim of the Forward policy was to move forward and fix the "scientific frontier" on the Hindu-Kush or on a line extending from Kabul, through Ghazni and Kandahar to Herat. With this objective in view, the British being failed to impose their terms of interests on Amir Sher Ali Khan, resorted to military action.

Afghanistan was once again occupied and further dismembered, and her people suffered mass arrests, collective fines and mass executions, yet the proud and recklessly brave Afghans fought to save their country, although some eastern parts of the country further fell under British control, and in addition unwittingly the people chose an Amir who was brought by the British themselves to the scene. But inspite of the new Amir being friendly with the British, he was forced to press Afghan demands for the return of Afghan territories and with that objective he supported the

aspirations of the eastern Afghans for freedom from British domination. The continued tribal struggle which was the direct result of the severance of Afghan tribes from their parent country, forced the British not only to reject Afghan requests for the return of the lost territories but also to demand a demarcation of a boundary between the Amir possessions of the Afghan territories and those to be under British actual or nominal control included in the Indian Empire.

An agreement known as the "Durand Agreement" defining a boundary between the two countries was thus imposed on a most unwilling Amir which greatly strained Anglo-Afghan relations. The agreement was signed under duress, and in a secrecy which would have otherwise resulted in a revolt against the British and the Amir both. Demarcation dictated by threat of use of force and not by scientific, ethnic and other considerations, naturally culminated in the general uprisings of the Afghan tribes which continued until the British withdrawal from the subcontinent. The Durand Line, neither based on topographical, ethnic nor on anthropological reasons, was not only resented by Afghanistan, but also by the tribes within the British side of the boundary. In spite of the imposition of the boundary, the territory thus denied Afghanistan never formed an integrated part of British India, but remained as its North-Western Frontier, its most turbulent, unruly region. In fact, the objective which the Durand Line sought to achieve was never realized because

neither the Afghans nor the Afghan tribes ever recognized it as a line dividing a nation and tribes into two.

In 1919, Amanullah Khan who became the Amir of Afghanistan, launched a war against the British with the purpose of gaining Afghan external sovereignty and recovering some of the lost territories or at least to make them free from British influence and domination. Almost all of the major tribes joined the war but continued it for long after the termination of war. Amanullah also like his predecessors was forced to accept unwillingly the validity of the Durand Line, but he managed to persuade the British to recognize at least Afghan interest in the affairs of the tribes. Having failed to free the Pashtuns, Amanullah in an effort to prepare for a combat in regaining the Pashtun territories, initiated several modernist reforms and political innovations. But the British aware of his intention, succeeded in overthrowing him by instigating a tribal revolt against him.

Yet whatever the circumstances the Pashtuns remained loyal to their concepts of freedom and whatever attempts were made to draw them closer into the British orbit of influence it met with strong opposition from the tribes who claimed to be owing allegiance to the Afghan Amir at Kabul. Proud, suspicious and recklessly brave, the Afghan tribes preferred to risk their life and property rather than entertain outsiders on their soil. Peace and prosperity without pride, honour and freedom, meant very little to them. "Doubt in the integrity of such sensitive"

freedom-loving people "did not benefit the British at all". Hence British habitual disbelief and miscalculations resulting in their large military expeditions against the tribes brought them disastrous consequences and great losses in men and money. In fact in a period of less than seventy years of British occupation, upto the thirties of this century more than 26 full scale expeditions were launched against the Pashtun people, and after the end of each such hostility the British would find themselves back again at the point from which they had started.

However, what was meant by all these tribal uprisings and agitations against the British was not just the political adventurism of the Pashtuns as is often referred to by the "civilized" Britishers as tribal raidings and plunderings of the "semi-savages". Indeed it was nothing but the ceaseless struggle of the Pashtuns to preserve their freedom and which continues to be so till this day. The British officers of the political and Defence Departments in order to justify their barbaric and uncivilized methods of dealing with the Pashtun resistance, labelled them as savage raidings. They could do any harm to the Pashtuns easily in view of the dual position of British India as a part of the British political structure and as a country with its own powerful government. The broad outline of external policy was naturally determined by the British cabinet, but the responsibility for its execution lay with the Indian government, the influence of which on the determination of British policy was bound to be

strong. The great distance involved between the two British governments necessitating local defence strategies, further gave a good deal of liberty of action to the Indian government. So in view of these factors the Indian government and its adventurist political officers on the frontiers had enough liberty to try all sort of military adventures against the Afghan tribes largely for the sake of military experience and training regardless of any humanitarian consideration for the Pashtun tribes who sought nothing but that their freedom be respected. Hence the British authorities did their best to keep public opinion completely ignorant about what exactly the civilized British were doing in the frontier in the alleged cause of the security of the Indian people.

Indeed all sorts of motives at different times calling it "close-border" policy or "hit-and-run" policy, policy of "masterly inactivity" or policy of "peaceful penetration," had urged the British to advance further into the Pashtun territories, aiming at subjugation and emasculation of the tribes and bringing more and more of their territories under British control. In fact, very often the fear of Russian threat furnished a justification and excuse for British invasions, incursions, and raids into Afghanistan and the Afghan tribal territories which always ended in some further annexation of territory. It is in view of these reasons that the so-called professed desire of the British to have a strong and independent Afghanistan as a buffer between

Russia and India stands negatived by the course of British policy, which ever since their rule in India aimed at curtailing of Afghan power and annexation of its territories as a result of which Afghanistan was reduced to the position of almost a vassal state, completely land-locked. Still not content with availing such a position of Afghanistan, in order to check further Afghan influence in the tribal areas, the British who had all along professed a keen desire to see Afghanistan strong and independent, began the policy of making their control effective over the so-called "no man's-land."

However, the British objective was not to keep Afghanistan strong as is commonly believed, but to keep it weak and reduced to a nominal power under their control so that it could not act against the British by availing of the power it could potentially mobilize among the powerful Pashtun tribes and the Indian Muslims, which could easily be realized in the name of religion. In fact the Russian threat was not real, as the British knew that it was difficult for Russians first to occupy the geographically difficult country of the brave Afghans, and then to invade India where the British were far the most prepared. Thus the British aware of the permanent possibility of the rise of the Afghans, threatened by their possible alliance with Russia, endeavoured utmost to control Afghanistan and curtail its power to the maximum. They consistently refused to give the Afghan Amirs arms or treaty alliance, or any other help that would have

strengthened the Afghan position, and even their keenness for control of Afghan affairs was not backed by a corresponding willingness to undertake a share in the responsibility of Afghan defence. Only in the case of unprovoked foreign aggression of which they were to judge, was a little aid promised. Trust as it is said is not "a one-way street in human behaviour nor is friendship bought by pretence".

It was on the basis of their past experience of the wily British that the Afghans appeared most suspicious of Britishers who not only turned down repeated Afghan requests for return of their occupied territories, but also consistently pressured the Afghan rulers not to support the struggles of their brother Afghans for freedom from their colonialism and oppression. The fact that Anglo-Russian advances in the region were stopped with Afghanistan remaining a reduced national landlocked entity, was the result of Afghanistan's geographical position; the rivalry between Russia and Britain which prevented one from advancing at the expense of the other; the skill of the brave Afghans in guerilla warfare; and the skilful policy of her rulers. Based on the premise that Afghanistan's neighbours were essentially hostile and bent on territorial annexation, Afghan rulers followed a policy of balancing the two powers, a policy of checking pressures from one neighbour by obtaining support from the other. And the most important factor to which Afghan owes her national survival, however, was the existence of the Afghan

frontier tribes who always prevented the British from invading Afghanistan. In fact these tribes, although under nominal control of British, attached by race, language and sentiments of loyalty to Afghan rulers, were powerful allies of the Afghans in all of the wars with the British. Having failed to obtain the return of the Pashtuns, the Afghan rulers tried to see them established at least as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India, a barrier to British penetration. Afghanistan, therefore, continued to support tribal struggle against the British and consistently refused British demands to sever relations with these Afghan tribes.

Such was the nature of Afghan policy towards the Pashtun problem during the entire British period. It aimed at the eventual return of the lost territory if possible, and if not then at least to make it untenable for the British to dominate in that area. But the Afghan rulers continued to hope that in the event of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, the Pashtuns would certainly be allowed to return to their old Afghan allegiance. In fact, after the overthrow of Amanullah the friendly Afghan attitude towards the British, Afghan neutrality in World War II and the expulsion of Axis nationals from Afghanistan were acts motivated by these hopes which had received some confirmations also in private negotiations with some British officials. However at the time of partition of the subcontinent, in spite of Afghanistan's friendly and sincere attitude which unfortunately led to a

weak Afghan statement of claim on the Pashtun issue, the Britishers in violation of their promises did not respond to Afghan wishes. Had Afghanistan taken a stiff and uncompromising attitude, the British would have been forced in those circumstances, to have taken the Afghan position into account.

However, encouraged by the meteoric rise of the Muslim League with its two-nation theory, the British ignoring Afghan wishes, in view of their "long-range interests" proceeded with their plan of creating a Muslim Pakistan equal in strength to "Hindu" India which necessitated the incorporation of Pashtuns into it. The British thought that a strong Pakistan with the powerful weapon of Islam would serve better the British interests in the subcontinent, as Pakistan spokesman of Islam, would not only be able to serve as a counter against the increasing influence of potentially powerful India, but would also influence other Muslim countries from Kashmir to Turkey which in the British view would result in checking of Soviet influence in the area and protection of British interests in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. In fact this was the British plan, which followed subsequently by the Americans, continues to operate even till this day. Thus accordingly Pakistan was created and the Pashtuns were forcefully incorporated in it against their wishes.

Thus at the time of partition in 1947, both Afghan hopes, and the wishes of Pashtuns to form their own state, were dashed.

In a referendum organized by British offering only the choice of joining India or Pakistan, the Pashtuns were not given an opportunity to state whether they wished to join Afghanistan or to form their own state. Therefore the Pashtuns under their Khudai Khidmatgar leaders boycotted the referendum, and as a result the majority of the population of the Administered Areas to which the referendum was confined refused to vote. The referendum offered no more than Hobson's choice, and was held in parts of occupied zones only, representing less than fifty per cent of the total population and the areas. Tribal areas being independent and representing more than half of the population could not be brought under the so-called referendum. Not only this, the referendum was based on religious preferences and was held in a state of hurried secrecy and public coercion. Thus the validity of the plebiscite remained challenged by the Pashtuns and their claim for a separate state began to gain a new momentum.

Any claim by Pakistan to have inherited Pashtun territories, as heir or successor to the British Indian Empire, is likewise void and invalid. In fact Pakistan itself was a self-constituted state, not a successor state. Although according to the opinion of the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Secretariat, Pakistan was a successor state, yet Pakistan being a successor state did not validate her claim on Pashtun territories, because the British were never in actual occupation or possession of the country as a whole. She did conquer and

occupy parts of the Pashtun territory, but her rule was confined only to the peripheries of some town in the districts under British occupation. The tribal belt and the states under Nawabs and Khans never came under the British rule. The independence of the frontier tribes in the vast Tribal Areas was recognized by the British themselves and the various independent Pashtun States and Khanates had special pacts of non-aggression with British India. Moreover the established principle is that a successor can only succeed to possessions unchallengedly held by its predecessor. International law does not recognize "the inheritance of a disputed area after a major change in status or reformation of the successor state". In fact the Pashtun territories have been always in a state of dispute between Afghanistan and British India. The question of state succession in itself according to unanimous legal opinion, is no more than "Pure Fiction," and there is no fixed or recognized obligation on the areas in dispute to submit to the will of either the inheritor or the successor state, terms which in themselves have no legality in International Law. In fact issues of state succession have more been political than legal in origin.

Furthermore, the status of Pashtun territories during the British rule was that of a protectorate, the recognition of which by the British has already been discussed in previous chapters. In fact there is no law to warrant a transfer of "protection" from one state to another, and there is no obligation

on the part of a "protected" people to this transfer. The "Durand Line" claimed by Pakistan to be a boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, was not a boundary in a legal sense as it remained consistently in dispute, and which never functioned as a boundary. Moreover the so-called "Durand Line" drawn and imposed on the most unwilling Amir, was rather to define the sphere of influences of Afghan and British governments, it did not change the national and sentimental integrity of Pashtuns with their Afghan motherland, nor did it make Pashtun territory an integral part of the British Indian Empire.

However as already discussed, the Durand agreement in itself was not a valid agreement on the ground that it was imposed and signed under duress; it was an unequal agreement, it was repeatedly challenged, and continued to remain ever since its imposition under dispute and also in view of major changes the agreement stands null and void and contrary to the tenets of international law. Moreover there is not a single provision in the so-called Durand Treaty that can validate inherent rights for the new state of Pakistan. Thus the partition of India certainly under no circumstances gave rights of sovereignty to Pakistan over a "territory which belonged to people who enjoyed more freedom during the British occupation of India than any other part of present Pakistan."

Not only this, the rights of Pashtuns are based on the principles of human fundamental rights and confirmed by the

Atlantic Charter and the Laws of the United Nations which impose an obligation on the member states:

- (1) "to recognize any territorial changes only in accordance with the freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned.
- (2) to respect the right of people to choose the form of government under which they will live and to have the sovereign rights of self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
- (3) to respect as a fundamental right the right of self-determination of peoples and nations".

Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, under paragraph 2, refers to the protection of the right of self-determination as one of the basic purposes of United Nations in the following words:

"to develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, and to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character; for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and to be a centre for harmonising the aims of nations in the achievement of these common ends."

Article 2 of the Charter also states that all the members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. Thus in her dispute with Pakistan over the Pashtun issue, Afghanistan has continued to emphasise and respect the application of these principles which have been guidelines for Afghan foreign policy on the issue. In spite of tide and an

inconsistency in the nature of Afghan foreign policy regarding Pashtunistan, Afghanistan since the very emergence of Pakistan has continued to support the Pashtun issue on the basis of these principles and the principles of Fundamental Human Rights, specially the right to self-determination. This right for the Pashtuns has been regularly, although some times verbally, emphasised by Afghanistan in official declarations, statements, joint communiques and in the speeches of the Afghan leaders both at national and international level. But in fact Afghan insistence exclusively on the application of these principles with regard to the Pashtun problem, though a very laudable ideal, is unrealistic and inapplicable in the context of modern international power politics which recognizes nothing but national interest, regardless of any consideration for basic principles of human rights and human aspirations. The world has not witnessed a single political issue that has been solved on the basis of the wishes and aspirations of the people concerned, and in fact, it is this very national interest that even lead countries to openly stand against the application of these fundamental rights, a good proof of which is Iran, that openly declares that she "will not tolerate any autonomist movement in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan". If Afghanistan still believes that the Pashtunistan issue can be solved peacefully on the basis of the will and wishes of the Pashtuns, and does not resort to diplomatic initiatives and other options open to her,

then its 'bona fides' on the issue will be open to conjecture.

However, it is in view of this unpracticable aspect of Afghan foreign policy that Afghanistan has missed many chances and the political options at its disposal in getting the Pashtun issue settled. Especially after the thaw in the Cold War, Pakistan in view of her animosity with India could never ignore a concrete and consistent Afghan position on the Pashtun issue. In fact the policy of the country towards the Pashtun problem ever since the British occupation of the area, is a reflection of repeated Afghan mistakes and the result of deceptions, first by the British and them by Pakistan. No doubt the neutral, landlocked position and the limited resources of the country has been a discouraging factor, yet with the exception of King Amanullah's (1919-1929) and Prime Minister Daoud's (1953-1963) periods in which the Pashtun issue has been actively supported, Afghanistan at other times has neither been serious nor able to prepare and mobilize itself for the settlement of this issue. Especially from 1963 onwards the Pashtunistan issue which had gained a new momentum and had encouraged a promising Afghan (or Pashtun) nationalism, suffered much at the hands of the successive minorities-dominated and foreign influenced Afghan governments. At the time of Daoud's government, Afghanistan continued to persuade Pakistan to at least admit that such a problem in fact existed which Pakistan refused to admit. At present Pakistan laments over the Pashtuns' search for separation and condemn their National Awami Party's

leadership for trying to disintegrate the country, yet the Afghan attitude remains that of verbal support.

However the factors responsible for Afghanistan's weak postures on the Pashtunistan issue have been the economic and culturally backward position of the Pashtuns, and the domination of the country's economy, civil service and foreign affairs by the minority ethnic elites, Persianized and the westernized elements which have either little sentimental attachment to the Pashtun cause or have been susceptible to foreign influence, specially that of Iran which has been directed against the Pashtunistan movement. Although the Afghan government is responsible to the parliament for the formulation and execution of foreign policy, yet the parliament, due to lack of organized pressure and political parties, has not been able to exert its influence on the governments of the times which have always been able to ignore the general will and popular demands, either by exploiting the individual and class character of parliament or by creating new problems.

However, Iran's influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and her open moves to check the Pashtunistan movement with the ultimate objective of limiting Afghan power and influence and bringing it under her influence, has recently resulted in an increasing awareness and consciousness of Iran's designs among the emerging progressive intelligentsia^s of the country which has begun to influence the Afghan attitude towards the Pashtun issue.

Similarly the massive arms-build-up of Iran, Afghanistan's traditionally hostile neighbour with its avowed goal of checking the Pashtun and Baluchi separatism, and her military tie-up with Pindi and Peking, affecting the Pashtun issue and leading to Afghanistan's isolation, seem to have alarmed Kabul to reactivate its publicity campaign for the cause of Pashtuns. In fact the emergence of Iran as a potential big power in the region linked with CENTO and her tacid military alliance with Pakistan and China, has added a new dimension to the Pashtunistan issue as the interests of other powers, specially of Soviet Union and India, converge on the area. In addition the new policy makers with their slight Pashtun colourings, seem to have realized that the "verbal support" policy, assisted by the ever increasing Persianization and Westernization, widening the gulf between Afghans and the Pashtuns, may alienate further the proud and the brave people of Pashtunistan who have always been allies and life-savers of their Afghan brethren at the time of trouble. Now it is not only the question of the freedom of Pashtunistan alone, the people of which inspite of being under foreign rule for two centuries, still preserve their cultural, and national identity and integrity. But it is also now a question of the survival of Afghanistan as a political and cultural entity which cannot do away with the present Persianization and domination by minority which continues to be supported and encouraged by Iran with the aim of bringing the country under the Iranian sphere of

influence. In fact, it has always been Iran's effort to alienate the Pashtuns from their Afghan brethren by keeping Afghan governments indifferent to their cause and also by persuading Pakistan to "break their power" and assimilate them.

In fact the emergence of the National Awami Party as a main opposition in Pakistan under the Pashtun leadership has greatly alarmed Iranians who fear that if the National Awami Party succeeds in resuming Pakistan's leadership or at least is able to achieve complete autonomy as its aims are at present, will bring Pakistan closer to Afghanistan, and will check Iran's influence even in Afghanistan itself which would result in the cultural, political and economic integration and advancement of both Afghanistan and Pashtunistan. So in order to check such a development, Iran in agreement with American and Chinese interests tries to help Pakistan in crushing the National Awami Party, which stands for maximum autonomy. In fact Iran has been greatly able to reduce National Awami Party's influence through Bhutto's regime which has fallen a great deal under Iran's political influence.

Indeed Pakistan has inherited a "fruit of colonialist sin". She is naturally unwilling to lose a large slice of territory and has done whatever she could do to either placate and exploit the susceptibilities of the proud and intensely nationalistic Pashtuns and Baluchis, or to suppress them. Still the Pashtuns have survived all these ordeals. In fact the situations in

Pakistan arising out of the Pashtun demands for their rights, have always been more grave than the Pakistanis have been prepared to admit. History witnesses that the Pashtun problem being older than Pakistan itself, having started with the Pashtun severance from Afghanistan and their falling under British control, has continued to remain alive awaiting solution. British imperialism as well as that of Pakistan with all its might, has failed to crush the unsevering determination of Pashtuns for the cause of their freedom.

Therefore, if Pakistan cannot transcend its tragic past and cannot give up the outworn conceptions, military strength can never be adequate for controlling the nationalist forces operating among the Pashtuns and Baluchis. In fact the exercise of creative statesmanship by Pakistani leaders could help the Pashtuns to recover their freedom. This is possible only if the present leadership in that country gives up its policy of confrontation and adopt a policy by which the justifiable aspirations of the Pashtuns and Baluchis could be satisfied.

In fact Pashtunistan issue is bound to deteriorate Afghanistan's relation with Pakistan and can never be alleviated unless Pakistan is prepared to negotiate its solution with the Pashtun leaders. As a result of the general awareness both among the Afghans and Pashtuns, and also as a result of the new emergence of Iran with its expansionist designs, the Pashtunistan issue is bound to be an important issue in Afghan foreign policy, as the

survival of the country depends on this issue, a successful solution of which would increase Afghan power and influence.

Therefore apart from a moral and a national obligation on the part of Afghans to support the Pashtun cause, Afghanistan for the sake of its own interests and survival also cannot remain indifferent any more towards the Pashtunistan issue.

In conclusion, may we quote a confession by Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler, an official and emissary of the Imperial Government, whose outlook and policy might have been contrary to that of the people of Pakhtunistan, but who knew one fact when he wrote:

"Their brethern of Afghanistan, on whom fall the task of shaping the destinies of their kingdom, have shown that contact with the world brings out in the Pathan a latent spark of administrative genius. But those who have remained in the great tangle of hills ... demand from the world nothing save to live in freedom."

APPENDICES

Appendix ISir John Malcolm's Treaty with Persia, January 1800

1. This treaty of friendship between the two empires of British and Persia shall remain in force till the sun shines on those empires and illuminates the earth. Henceforward there will be no discord and hostility between these empires.
2. In case the king of Afghanistan intended to invade India, the people of India being the subjects of British emperor, it is hereby agreed that the authorities of Persia shall move a powerful army into Afghanistan to devastate and ruin that territory sparing no effort in creating harassment to the Afghans.
3. In case the king of Afghanistan inclined himself to express a friendly gesture towards Persia and a treaty of friendship were signed with him, the Government of Persia will include the condition that no Afghan army shall ever invade India; and that the King of Afghanistan shall not plan to encroach upon India which is a part of British empire.
4. In case the king of Afghanistan or an authority of French nation attempted to make war on Persia, the British Government shall place at the disposal of the officials of Persia all types of guns and the necessary military equipment stored in the ports of Persia.
5. In case a French army landed at a port of Persia with a certain specific objective or with a treachrous design, the two governments of Britain and Persia will form a joint command and their combined armies will move to turn them out. The British Government will specially undertake in such a stituation to supply the military equipment and other provisions needed to the Government of Persia. It is also agreed that if anyone of the French Nations asked to favour of the Government of Persia to grant permission of using as station a port or an island, such a request shall not be granted.

Appendix II

The Tripartite Treaty: Treaty of Alliance and Friendship
Executed Between Maharaja Ranjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-
ool-Moolk, with the Approbation of, and in Concert with
the British Government, June 26, 1838.

Whereas a treaty was formerly concluded between Maharaja Ranjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, consisting of fourteen articles exclusive of the preamble and the conclusion; and whereas the execution of the provisions of the said treaty was suspended for certain reasons; and whereas at this time Mr. W.H. Macnaughten, having been deputed, by the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland ... Governor General of India, to the presence of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh, and vested with full powers to form a treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagement subsisting between the two states, the treaty aforesaid is revived, and concluded with certain modifications, and four new articles have been added thereto, with the approbation of and in concert with the British Government, the provisions whereof will be duly and faithfully observed:

1. Shah Shooja-ool-Mulk disclaims all titles on the part of himself, his heirs, and successors, and all the Suddozyes to whatever territories lying on either bank of the River Indus, that may be possessed by the Maharaja ... These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate, of the Maharaja; the Shah neither has nor will have any concern with them. They belong to the Maharaja and his posterity from generation to generation...
13. Should the Maharaja require the aid of any of the Shah's troops in furtherance of the object contemplated by this treaty the Shah engages to send a force commanded by one of his principal officers; as far as Cabul, in furtherance of the object contemplated by this treaty.
14. The friends and enemies of each of the three high powers, that is to say, the British and Sikh Governments and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, shall be the friends and enemies of all.
16. Sikh troops may be despatched for the purpose of reinstating His Majesty in Cabul...
18. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk binds himself, his heirs and successors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign state without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh governments, and to oppose any power having the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability...

Done at Lahore, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1838...

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, Simla on the 23rd day of July, A.D. 1838.

Appendix III

Treaty Concluded Between Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab and Sirdar Gholam Hyder Khan at Peshawar, March 30, 1855.

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession; concluded on the part of the British Government by John Lawrence Esquire, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the most noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., & C., Governor General of India; and on the part of the Ameer of Cabool, Dost Mohammad Khan by Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Khan, in virtue of full authority granted to him by His Highness.

1. Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan, Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.
2. The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.
3. His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein; and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

Appendix IV

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major F.L.N. Cavagnar, C.S.I., Political Officer on Special Duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Honourable Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer-Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted

Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the
Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the
Order of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor-General
of India.

The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies:-

ARTICLE 1

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the War, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

ARTICLE 3

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank

and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's dominions.

ARTICLE 6

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British Subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a

line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jalalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed,* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jellalabad Districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1296, A.H.

AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN

N. CAVAGNARI,
Major, Political Officer on Special Duty

LYTTON.

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla, on Friday, this 20th day of May 1879.

A.C. LYALL
(Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.)

Appendix V

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part,
-- 1893.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:--

- (1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement. (This map is not included in this Appendix.)
- (2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
- (3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.
- (4) The Frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
- (5) With reference to the question of Chamman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:--

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Pasha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chamman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chamman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

KABUL;
12th November 1893.

H.M. DURAND
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN.

Appendix VI

Anglo-Afghanistan Threat of 1921

Preamble

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, with a view to the establishment of neighbourly relations between them, have agreed to the Articles written hereunder, whereto the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have set their seals:

Article I

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan mutually certify and respect, each with regard to the other, all rights of internal and external independence.

Article II

The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan Frontier, as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8th August 1919, corresponding to the 11th Ziqada, 1337 Hijra, and also the boundary west of the Khyber laid down by the British Commission in the months of August and September 1919, pursuant to the said Article, and shown on the map attached to this treaty by a black chain line; subject only to the realignment set forth in Schedule I annexed, which has been agreed upon the order to include within the boundaries of Afghanistan the place known as Tor Kham, and the whole bed of the Kabul river between Shilman Khawala Banda and Palosai, and which is shown on the said map by a red chain line. The British Government agree that the Afghan authorities shall be permitted to draw water in reasonable quantities through a pipe, which shall be provided by the British Government, from Landi Khana for the use of Afghan subjects at Tor Kham, and the Government of Afghanistan agrees that British officers and tribesmen living on the British side of the boundary shall be permitted, without let or hindrance, to use the aforesaid portion of the Kabul river for purposes of navigation, and that all existing rights of irrigation from the aforesaid portion of the river shall be continued to British subjects.

Article III

The British Government agrees that a Minister from His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the Royal Court of London, like the Envoys of all other powers, and to permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in London, and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India, and to permit the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul.

Each party shall have the right of appointing a Military Attache to its Legation.

Article IV

The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establishment of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and the British Government agrees to the establishment of an Afghan Consulate at the headquarters of the Government of India, and three Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, Karachi, and Bombay. In the event of the Afghan Government desiring at any time to appoint Consular officers in any British territories other than India, a separate

agreement shall be drawn up to provide for such appointments, if they are approved by the British Government.

Article V

The two High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the personal safety and honourable treatment to each of the representatives of the other, whether Minister, Consulate-General, or Consuls, within their own boundaries, and they agree that the said representatives shall be subject in the discharge of their duties to the provisions set forth in the second Schedule annexed to this treaty. The British Government further agrees that the Minister, Consul-General, and Consuls of Afghanistan shall, within the territorial limits within which they are permitted to reside or to exercise their functions, notwithstanding the provisions of the said Schedule, receive and enjoy any rights or privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister, Consul-General, or Consuls of any other Government in the countries in which the places or residence of the said Minister, Consul-General and Consuls of Afghanistan are fixed; and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees that the Minister and Consuls of Great Britain shall, within the territorial limits within which they are permitted to reside or to exercise their functions, notwithstanding the provisions of the said Schedule, receive and enjoy any rights or privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister or Consuls of any other Government, in the countries in which the places of residence of the said Minister and Consuls of Great Britain are fixed.

Article VI

As it is for the benefit of the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan that the Government of Afghanistan shall be strong and prosperous, the British Government agrees that, whatever quantity of material is required for the strength and welfare of Afghanistan, such as all kinds of factory machinery, engines and materials and instruments for telegraph, telephones, etc., which Afghanistan may be able to buy from Britain or the British dominions or from other countries of the world, shall ordinarily be imported without let or hindrance by Afghanistan into its own territories from the ports of the British Isles and British India. Similarly the Government of Afghanistan agrees that every kind of goods, the export of which is not against the internal law of the Government of Afghanistan, and which may in the judgement of the Government of Afghanistan be in excess of the internal needs and requirements of Afghanistan, and is required by the British Government, can be purchased and exported to India with the permission of the Government of Afghanistan. With regard to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees that, as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government of Afghanistan are friendly, and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation in Afghanistan, permission shall be given without let or hindrance for such importation. If, however, the

Arms Traffic Convention is hereafter ratified by the Great Powers of the world and comes into force, the right of importation of arms and munitions by the Afghan Government shall be subject to the provision that the Afghan Government shall first have signed the Arms Traffic Convention, and that such importation shall only be made in accordance with the provisions of that Convention. Should the arms Traffic Convention not be ratified or lapse, the Government of Afghanistan, subject to the foregoing assurance, can from time to time import into its own territory the arms and munitions mentioned above through the ports of the British Isles and British India.

Article VII

No Customs duties shall be levied at British Indian ports on goods imported under the provisions of Article VI on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, for immediate transport to Afghanistan, provided that a certificate, signed by such Afghan authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments, shall be presented at time of importation to the Chief Custom Officer at the port of import, setting forth always that the goods in question are the property of the Government of Afghanistan and are being sent under its orders to Afghanistan, and showing the description, number and values of the goods in respect to which exemption is claimed, provided, secondly, that the goods are required for the public services of Afghanistan and not for the purposes of any State monopoly or State trade, and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a clearly distinguishable nature, transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government agrees to the grant, irrespective of all trade goods imported into India at British ports for re-export to Afghanistan and exported to Afghanistan, by routes to be agreed upon between the two Governments, of a rebate at the time and place of export of the full amount of Customs duty levied upon such goods, provided that such goods shall be transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or subdivided before their export from India.

And also the British Government declares that it has no present intention of levying Customs duty on goods or livestock of Afghan origin or manufacture, imported by land or by river into India or exported from Afghanistan to other countries of the world through India, and the import of which into India is not prohibited by law. In the event, however, of the British Government, deciding in the future to levy Customs duties on goods and livestock imported into India by land or by river from neighbouring States it will, if necessary, levy such duties on imports from Afghanistan; but in that event it agrees that it will not levy higher duties on imports from Afghanistan than those levied on imports from

such neighbouring States. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the levy on imports from Afghanistan of the present Khyber tolls and of octroi in any town of India in which octroi is or may be hereafter levied, provided that there shall be no enhancement over the present rate of the Khyber tolls.

Article VIII

The British Government agrees to the establishment of trade agents by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, Quetta, and Parachinar, provided that the personnel and the property of the said agencies shall be subject to the operations of all British laws and orders and to the jurisdiction of British Courts; and that they shall not be recognized by the British authorities as having any official or special privileged position.

Article IX

The trade goods coming to (imported to) Afghanistan under the provisions of Article VII from Europe, etc., can be opened at the railway terminuses at Jamrud, in the Kurram, and at Chamman, for packing and arranging to suit the capacity of baggage animals without this being the cause of re-imposition of Customs duties; and the carrying out of this will be arranged by the trade representatives mentioned in Article XII.

Article X

The two High Contracting Parties agree to afford facilities of every description for the exchange of postal matter between their two countries, provided that neither shall be authorised to establish post offices within the territory of the other. In order to give effect to this Article, a separate Postal Convention shall be concluded, for the preparation of which such number of special officers as the Afghan Government may appoint shall meet the officers of the British Government and consult with them.

Article XI

The two High Contracting Parties having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding the good will of the other, and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operations of major importance, which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres, before the commencement of such operations.

Article XII

The two High Contracting Parties agree that representatives of the Government of Afghanistan and of the British Government

shall be appointed to discuss the conclusion of a Trade Convention and the convention shall in the first place be regarding the measures (necessary) for carrying out the proposes mentioned in Article IX of this treaty. Secondly, (they) shall arrange regarding commercial matters not now mentioned in this treaty, which may appear desirable for the benefit of the two Governments. The trade relations between the two Governments shall continue until the Trade Convention mentioned above comes into force.

Article XIII

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the first and second schedules attached to this treaty shall have the same binding force as the Articles contained in this treaty.

Article XIV

The provisions of this treaty shall come into force from the date of its signature, and shall remain in force for three years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified, twelve months before the expiration of the said three years, the intention to terminate it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. This treaty shall come into force after the signatures of the Missions of the two Parties, and the two retified copies of this shall be exchanged in Kabul within two and a half months after the signatures.

(Sd.) MAHMUD TARZI
Chief of the Delegation of
the Afghan Government for
the conclusion of the Treaty

Tuesday, 30th Aqrab 1300
Hijra Shamsi (Corresponding
to 22nd November 1921)

(Sd.) HENRY R.C. DOBBS
Envoy Extraordinary and
Chief of the British
Mission to Kabul

This twenty-second day
of November one thousand
nine hundred and twenty-
one.

Appendix VII

Letter dated January 1, 1948, from Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan to His Excellency Najibullah Khan, Special Envoy of His Majesty, The King of Afghanistan

My dear Excellency,

It appears from the discussions which have taken place between your Excellency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Your Excellency has not fully grasped the Government of Pakistan's

policy toward the tribes living on our side of the Durand Line of the constitutional position of the Provinces included in Pakistan. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the position as follows:

The tribes of the North West Frontier have contributed in a great measure towards the achievement of Pakistan and when this new Islamic state was set up they expressed their firm determination to join it. The Qaid-i-Azam, while accepting the independence of the tribes, assured them that the Government of Pakistan will continue all the treaties, agreements and allowances until such time as the representatives of the tribes and of the Pakistan Government have met and negotiated new agreements. In accord with this policy fresh agreements have since been concluded with the tribe of the North West Frontier.

As regards the constitutional position of the Provinces this has been made clear by the Qaid-i-Azam with special reference to the North West Frontier Province after a referendum was held in that Province. He stated: "So far as the Pathans of the Frontier are concerned I have no doubt that they will enjoy in Pakistan the fullest freedom to develop their social, cultural and political institutions. They will have the same self-Government as any other part or province of Pakistan." The achievement of Pakistan was brought about by the combined effort of all the Province. The Government of Pakistan's policy toward each Province is therefore the same.

As regards the future, as Your Excellency is aware, a constituent Assembly has been set up in Pakistan which consists of representatives from all parts of Pakistan. The Constitution of the Central Government as well as the Provinces will be framed by this sovereign body. It is open to any Province to raise any question in the Constituent Assembly concerning its future Constitution.

In this connection I have much pleasure in forwarding to Your Excellency, for information, copies of two statements made by the Qaid-i-Azam.

I take this opportunity of conveying to Your Excellency an expression of my highest consideration.

Sd/- Zafarullah Khan
Foreign Minister, Pakistan.

Statement made by Qaid-i-Azam to the press and published
in DAWN dated July 31, 1947:

New Delhi, Wednesday. Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Governor-General Designate of Pakistan, in a statement appeals to "all the different

elements in the Frontier Province and in the tribal areas to forget past disputes and differences and to join hands with the Government of Pakistan in setting up a truly democratic Islamic state." He assures the tribesmen that Pakistan would like to continue all treaties, agreements and allowances, until new agreements and allowances are negotiated.

Mr. Jinnah says: "The result of the referendum in the North West Frontier Province has shown that an absolute majority of the Pathans is desirous of joining the Pakistan Dominion. The result, which was never in doubt, has been received with considerable satisfaction by the Muslim nation. Now that all the referendum are over we can start the building of the Pakistan Dominion.

"So far as the Pathans in the Frontier Province are concerned, I have no doubt that they will enjoy in Pakistan the fullest freedom to develop their social, cultural and political institutions. They will have the same self Government as any other part of Province of Pakistan.

"As regards the tribal areas, I am very happy to acknowledge the great support they have freely given to their fellow Muslims in their demand for their own independent state. I wish to assure them on behalf of the Provincial Government of Pakistan that we would like to continue after August 15 all the treaties, agreements and allowances until such time as the representatives of the tribes and of the Government of Pakistan have met and negotiated new agreements. The Government of Pakistan have no desire whatsoever to interfere in any way with the traditional independence of the tribal areas. On the contrary we feel that as a Muslim state we can always count on active support and sympathy of the tribes.

"We have every intention and desire to have most friendly relations with the Government of Afghanistan, over immediate neighbour, and other Muslim countries where before long we hope to have our own diplomatic and commercial representatives.

"In the end I would appeal to all the different elements in the Frontier Province and in the tribal areas to forget past disputes and differences and join hands with the Government of Pakistan in setting up a truly democratic Islamic State." API.

Statement issued by Qaid-i-Azam to the press at Karachi
in August 1947:

Now that we have achieved our cherished goal and have started building the Pakistan Dominion, I desire to send my greetings to the tribesmen of Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan tribal areas. I wish to assure them on behalf of the

Government of Pakistan that, after August 15, 1947 all agreements and allowances will continue until such time as the tribes can be consulted. Till then there will be no change whatever in the laws governing Baluchistan and no interference with Riwal will be allowed. The tribes of Baluchistan have declared their firm resolve to enter the Pakistan Dominion, and in that Muslim state they will receive welcome and help to prosperity and progress.

Ethnic Character of Afghan Cabinets 1963-73

Cabinets	1963-65	1965	1965-67	1967-69	1969-71	1971-72	1972-73
Ministries							
Prime Minister	Dr. M. Yusuf	Dr. M. Yusuf	M. Hashim Maiwandwal	Nur Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Nur Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Dr. Abdul Zahir 5	Mohd. Mussa Shaffique 4
First Deputy Minister	Dr. Abdul Zahir 5	Said Shamsuddin Majrooh 4	Noor Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Dr. Ali Ahmad Popal 1	Abdullah Yaftali	Dr. Abdul Samad Hamid	None appointed
Second Deputy Minister	Dr. Ali Ahmad Popal 1	None appointed	Abdul Satar Shalizai 1	Abdullah Yaftali	None appointed	None appointed	None appointed
Foreign Affairs	Dr. Mohd. Yusuf	Dr. Mohd. Yusuf	Nur Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Nur Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Nur Ahmad Ettimadi 3	Mohd. Mussa Shaffique 4	Mohd. Mussa Shaffique 4
National Defence	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2	Gen. Khan Mohammad 2
Home Affairs	Dr. Abdul Qaiyum 5	Mohd. Hussain Masa	Abdul Satar Shalizai 1	Mohd. Omer Wardak 2	Eng. Basher Loudin 2	Amanullah Mansouri	Dr. Nimattullah Pazhwak 2
Finance	Said Qasim Rishtiya	Abdullah Yaftali	Abdullah Yaftali	Mohd. Anwar Ziayee 3	Dr. Mohd. Aman	Dr. Mohd. Haider Dawar	Mohd. Khan Jalalor
Justice	Said Shamsuddin Majrooh 4	None appointed	Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi	None appointed	Abdul Satar Seerat	Mohd. Anwar Aghandiwal	None appointed
Mines and Industries	Mohd. Hussain Masa	None appointed	Abdul Samad Salim	Abdul Samad Salim	Amanullah Mansouri	Mohd. Yaqub Lali	Eng. Gen. Dastagir Azizi
Agriculture	Dr. M. Nasir Keshawar	Mir Mohd. Akbar Raza	Mir Mohd. Akbar Raza	Mir Mohd. Akbar Raza	Abdul Hakim	Abdul Hakim	Dr. Abdul Wakel 1
Public Works	Brig. Gen. Mohd. Azim 2	Ghulam Dastagir Azizi 5	Eng. Ahmadullah 1	Mohd. Yaqub Lali	Gen. Khwazak Zalmai 1	Gen. Khwazak Zalmai 1	Gen. Khwazak Zalmai 1
Education	Dr. Mohd. Anas 3	Dr. Mohd. Anas 3	Dr. M. Osman Anwari	Dr. Ali Ahmad Popal 1	Dr. Abdul Qaiyum 5	Hamidullah Enayat Saraj	Mohd. Yaseen Azim
Press and Information	Mohd. Hashim Maiwandwal	Mohd. Hashim Maiwandwal	Mohd. Osman Sidqui	Dr. Mohd. Anas 3	Mohd. Ebrahim Abbasi 3	Mohd. Ebrahim Abbasi 3	Sabahuddin Kushkaki 5
Commerce	Mohd. Sarwar Omer 5	Dr. Nur Ali 3	Dr. Nur Ali 3	Dr. Nur Ali 3	Mohd. Apif Ghoussi	Mohd. Apif Ghoussi	None appointed
Public Health	Dr. Abdul Rahim 5	None appointed	Miss Kobra Nurzal 3	Miss Kobra Nurzal 3	Dr. Majid Saraj 3	Dr. Majid Saraj 3	None appointed
Planning	Abdullah Yaftali	Dr. Abdul Samad Hamid 2	Dr. Abdul Hakim Ziayee 3	Dr. Abdul Samad Hamid 2	Dr. Abdul Wehid Sorabi	Dr. Abdul Wehid Sorabi	Dr. Abdul Wehid Sorabi
Communication	Dr. Mohd. Haider	Dr. Mohd. Haider	Dr. Mohd. Haider	Eng. Mohd. Azim Gran	Eng. Mohd. Azim Gran	Eng. Nasaratullah Malikydar	Eng. Nasratullah Malikydar
Tribal Affairs	Gul Pacha Ulfat 4	None appointed	Mohd. Khalid Roshan 5	Mohd. Khalid Roshan 5	Mohd. Khalid Roshan 5	Mohd. Ayub Aziz 3	None appointed
1. R Pashtun	One out of 18	None out of 13	Three out of 18	Two out of 17	One out of 17	One out of 17	Two out of 12
2. A Pashtun who has lost Pashtun identity	Two out of 18	Two out of 13	One out of 18	Three out of 17	Two out of 17	One out of 17	Two out of 12
3. A Complete Persianized and Westernized Pashtun	One out of 18	Two out of 13	Five out of 18	Six out of 17	Four out of 17	Three out of 17	None out of 12
4. A Pashtun Oriented Sayeed	Two out of 18	One out of 13	None out of 18	None out of 17	None out of 17	One out of 17	One out of 12
5. Not known	Four out of 18	One out of 13	One out of 18	One out of 17	Two out of 17	One out of 17	One out of 12

Note:- The remaining unnumbered ministers belong to non-Pashtun minority communities.

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