

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND ARMS RACE :
A study of us Role in the Arms Race between
Pakistan and India

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND ARMS RACE :
A study of us· Role in the Arms Race between
Pakistan and India

JOHN MUTTAM

A Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Philosophy
of the Jawaharlal Nehru University,
School of International Studies

NEW DELHI

1 9 7 3

PREFACE

There seems to be at least two levels of arms race: one, at the Super Power level with a global dimension and the other, at a national level with a local dimension, disturbing regional peace and generating local conflicts. While the former is the main cause of the present international instability and is capable of creating a nuclear holocaust, the latter has the dangerous possibility of escalating a local conflict into a general nuclear war. What is common about the two kinds of arms race is the role of the actors, both at the international and at the regional level. The Super Powers, as international actors, are primarily interested in maintaining the central balance of power. To achieve this goal, they enter into arms control agreements, hopefully believing in some possible curb on the arms race. But, in a regional conflict, the role of the Super Powers is no less important. In fact, the concern of the Super Powers about the central balance assumes that local conflicts and regional violence may be permitted up to a certain threshold. In general, the Super Powers are still interested in perpetuating regional conflicts within the limiting parameter of the escalation threshold. Even the detente implies this attitude.

This study is based on the assumption that the Super Powers have a definite role in practically all local conflicts. There have been over a hundred conflicts ~~ever~~ since World War II. In many instances, the very origin of local conflicts may be ascribed to Super Power machinations. Local

conflicts are not merely the handiwork of great Powers. They have also been abetted and perpetuated by their connivance and credible interventionist policies. Barring direct confrontation, the Super Powers would be doing everything to prolong a regional conflict so that they could benefit from such crises, further their political goals and consolidate their hold as well as influence over the local actors.

Most of the local conflicts are unfortunately allowed to occur at the periphery of the Super Powers - in the Third World. The local actors, in their mutually irreconcilable antagonism, fail to see how they have been used as pawns in the game of power politics, how their economic resources have been wasted in sustaining a senseless arms race which they cannot really afford, how they have been increasingly reduced to the status of dependent client States of the Super Powers, and how the structure of their internal stability has been slowly but surely undermined for the interests of the Super Powers. The result is the strange spectacle of Asians fighting Asians or Africans fighting Africans.

South Asia as a region has been one of the trouble spots in Asia. Ever since India and Pakistan became independent, the sub-continent has witnessed at least three major conflicts between the two. In the first conflict (1947-48) there was hardly any element of Super Power involvement, but in the conflicts of 1965 and 1971, it was quite pronounced. The Super Power interventionism in the sub-continent has been

harmful to the economic and political development of both the nations. But the greatest danger of interventionism is the threat it poses to the independence and security of nations. These nations may enjoy nominal independence, but the essence of sovereignty, namely, the freedom to adopt an independent foreign or domestic policy has to be sacrificed for obtaining the support of the Super Power. This has been the miserable fate of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan conflicts.

'Conflict' has been used as a generic term in this study. The India-Pakistan conflicts have been described as local conflicts rather than regional conflicts. However, the theoretical framework of this study as well as the conclusions may be applicable to regional conflicts also.

No attempt has been made to describe each individual conflict between India and Pakistan (1947-48, 1965, 1971) because it is not the purpose of the study. However, the period of study is limited to 1965 to provide a comparative view of the two local conflicts, one without the Super Power interventionism and the other with it. The purpose of this study is four-fold:

(i) to deal with the concept of local conflict and to relate it to the first and second Indo-Pakistan conflicts;

(ii) to have a look at the Security Syndrome of Pakistan;

(iii) to examine the role of the United States in stimulating a local arms race by supplying arms to and

linking up Pakistan with the military alliance system; and

(iv) to analyse the dangerous implications of such a local arms race and interventionist policies of the Super Powers to the peace and security of local and regional Powers.

Even while dealing with the two conflicts between India and Pakistan (1947-48 and 1965), it is intended to be only a very limited study, the main focus of which is on the US involvement in creating a continuous climate for local wars in the Indian sub-continent. It will also provide an illuminating contrast to the first Indo-Pakistan conflict (1947-48) in which there was hardly any US involvement.

While studying the question of local arms race between the two countries, care has been taken to identify the steep rise in India's defence spending since 1962 as a direct consequence of the Chinese aggression. The spiraling arms race between India and China has not however, been confused with the arms race between India and Pakistan. A very pertinent question may be asked in this connection: Has there been an arms race between India and Pakistan? A sort of parallel arms race may not be so visible if one looks at India's or even Pakistan's budgetary allocations for defence and the percentage of GNP spent annually on defence, in the 1950s. However, this question has been carefully investigated and it has been established with the support of statistics and other evidences that there has been an arms race between India and Pakistan also.

In the concluding section, it is intended to discuss the futility of a local arms race which is entirely dependent on the Super Powers. If the small and big nations in Asia and Africa have any lessons to be learnt from the history of their protracted local wars fought on their soils in the past quarter of a century, it is this: the best solution to local issues and problems is through bilateral initiatives rather than through a proxy arms race and periodic conventional wars.

The methodology followed in this study is one of critical analysis and interpretation of the major inputs for the generation of an overt arms race between Pakistan and India, the most important input being the American military alliance with Pakistan. This is not a chronological narration of developments in U.S.-Pakistan or Pakistani-India relation during the fifties and early sixties. The focus is almost entirely on the role of the United States in generating a climate of tension in the sub-continent, a climate that works for an arms race. Some quantification has been attempted to show how the spiralling of Pakistan's defence expenditure together with the large supply of U.S. arms and military assistance created conditions for an arms race within the sub-continent.

This study has been completed under the guidance and supervision of Dr T.T. Poulouse, Associate Professor, Division of Disarmament Studies, School of International Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University. I have also worked in close consultation with Dr Bhabani Sen Gupta, Head of the Division of Disarmament Studies, who has been kind enough to read and comment on each of the chapters. My thanks are also due to Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, who gave much of his time to critically read the third chapter and give his valuable comments. I have made use of research materials available at the Sapru House Library.

Although there is a formidable literature on conflict, global as well as regional, most of it is by American and Western scholars and is, therefore, done from the American (or Super Power) point of view. ~~Although,~~ Many of the conflicts in the post-war period have occurred in the Third World, ^{but} there is very little scholarly work done so far on the nature of these conflicts from the Third World point of view. This modest study is an Indian perspective of local conflicts and local arms race.

June 8 , 1973

New Delhi-1



John Muttam

CONTENTS

		Pages
	Preface	i-vi
Chapter I	<u>Introduction</u> Pakistan's Security Syndrome Pakistan and the Commonwealth Pakistan and the Moslem World	1-13
Chapter II	<u>Local Conflict: A Conceptual Study</u> Definition - Inter-State Conflict - Dispute and Tension - Levels of Inter-State Conflict - Global and Local Conflicts - Local Wars: Limiting Factors: (a) Geographic Factor, (b) Weapons in Local War, (c) Targets in Local War, (d) Par- ticipation of International Actors - Factors Inducing Local Conflicts - Third World and Local Conflicts: (i) Economic Factor, (ii) Great Power Nationalism (iii) Local Factors: (a) The Political System, (b) Attitude of Dependency - Conflict Control	14-39
Chapter III	<u>Local Arms Race and the U.S. Role in the India-Pakistan Conflicts</u> Local Arms Race Pakistan Joins SEATO and CENTO US Involvement in the Sub-Continent: US Alliance Policy a) Motivations and Intentions b) Military Aid c) Economic Aid to Pakistan c) Defence Expenditure of Pakistan India's Response to MDA; U.S. Alliance Policy Inducing a Local Arms Race Weapon Purchases from 1954-1965: India Super Power Involvement and Regional Conflicts	40-86
Chapter IV	<u>Conclusions</u>	87-96
	<u>Bibliography</u>	97-104

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's Security Syndrome

No nation can survive for long by relying entirely on a negative policy approach to its problems. Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies were essentially anti-Indian in form and substance.¹ It was based on a feeling of insecurity from India which had haunted Pakistan from its very inception as an independent State in 1947. Presumably, there could be several reasons for the state of insecurity in which Pakistan found itself immediately after Partition. Pakistan was a geographical absurdity with about half of its territory separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory in the east (now Bangladesh). The proximity of a big country like India from which it was separated on the basis of an obscurantist two nation theory was another nightmare haunting Pakistan from the beginning. Pakistan was established as a theocratic State, in order to divert the attention of the people from political realities and to view India as Pakistan's foremost enemy. The events following the Partition in Hyderabad,

1 Robert Jackson, "The Great Powers and the Indian Sub-Continent", International Affairs (London), vol. 49, no. 1, January 1973, p. 47. Jackson says that it should never be forgotten that the bond of Pakistani solidarity is provided essentially by the two related themes of Islamic Nationhood and hostility to India.

Junagadh and Kashmir reinforced their distrust of India. The fear and distrust of India was indeed, coeval with the birth of Pakistan. The leaders of both the nations could not come to trust one another because of the historical legacy of the Hindu-Moslem rivalry bequeathed to them through the centuries.²

Pakistan perceived a pronounced imbalance in terms of military strength, size, population and resources between the two nations. Hence the major task of her foreign policy and military strategy was to correct this imbalance particularly in military strength and if possible to impose a balance of power in the Indian subcontinent.

After the first round of the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir (1947-48), Pakistan succeeded in convincing world public opinion, especially, in the West that India was bent upon destroying Pakistan. When the Kashmir question was debated in the United Nations, she accused India of being an aggressor determined to annex Kashmir, a predominantly Moslem State by the use of force. This was regardless of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, according to which a Ruler of a princely State had the power to decide to accede

2 Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia (New York: Western Publishing Co. Inc., Pegasus, 1970), p. 22; See also, Pakistan: The Struggle of a Nation (The Director of Foreign Publicity, Government of Pakistan, 1949), pp. 9-38.

to India. In fact, only after the accession to India, India intervened in Kashmir at the request of the Maharaja for military assistance to repulse the Pakistani attack.

Pakistan's so-called problem of insecurity on account of India was magnified through relentless propaganda in the press, in the official statements and in the publications of well known Pakistani writers. Was this insecurity real or imaginary? To a great extent, the perception of the threat depend on the political motivations of the ruling elite and the political actors in Pakistan. A threat to national security may be perceived by the political actors and yet, for the sake of the nation's security, such perceptions may not be divulged. Whereas a real threat to the security of a nation may be absent, yet a threat may be fabricated for political ends. What is crucial is whether or not the ruling elite perceive their power position as being threatened. Subjective information of this sort is extremely difficult to obtain. Indeed, a content analysis of the pronouncements of the ruling elite may do little to enlighten us on this score, for it is quite probable that at the very time when the elite feels most insecure, it will publicly state that it has considerable support and that there is little danger of internal decay.

3 Richard Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policies and the Developing Nations (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 194.

In the case of Pakistan it is difficult to say whether Pakistan felt really threatened by India or it was merely an anti-Indian posture of a security syndrome. One thing is unmistakably clear. Pakistani leaders were constantly repeating the allegation that India always had an aggressive attitude and that given an opportunity she would not fail to take advantage of her internal weakness and exterminate Pakistan. "The security which Pakistan was searching for since she came into existence in 1947 was security against Indian aggression"⁴. In support of this fear they argued that the majority community in India had never reconciled to the fact of the existence of Pakistan which evolved as a result of the search for a homeland for the Moslems to safeguard their way of life and culture.⁵

The Indian leaders were accused of predicting the downfall of Pakistan. "It was their hope that it would collapse by itself and it was their plan to assist it to collapse"⁶. Moreover, there were others in Pakistan who

4 G.W. Choudhury, "Pakistan-India Relations", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 11, no. 2, June 1958, p. 13.

5 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 3. See, A Group Study: "The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 9, no. 1, March 1956, pp. 37-50. See, M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Ire of Pakistan", Asian Review, vol. 1, no. 1, November 1967, p. 13. See also, Rais Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan in International Sphere", Pakistan Review, January 1956, p. 18.

6 See, Pakistan: The Struggle of a Nation, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

believed that India would certainly have annexed Pakistan during the months of 1947-48.⁷ This belief and apprehension presumably have arisen from the premises of utterances made⁸ by Indian political stalwarts before and after Partition.

However, there could be reason for fear, not because India posed a great threat to the security of Pakistan, but due to the inherent weakness of the structure of its domestic system. To Pakistan, the real threat from India was its political system, continuous internal stability, enlightened leadership and positive policies. But Pakistan's response to all kinds^{of} real or imaginary threat from India

7 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Pakistan Branch University Press, 1967), p. 115. "The earlier years proved conclusively that the threat from India to our security and existence was both real and constant. Indian efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed towards one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration, ibid., p. 117.

See also, G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., pp. 57-64.

8 The concept of Partition of India was vehemently opposed by the Congress. It provoked huge waves of emotional feelings in the hearts of Indians in general. Gandhi, for example, said that India's Partition could occur only over his dead body. (See, Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 4)

Patel was convinced that Pakistan was not viable and would collapse in a short time. See, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, Pvt. Ltd., 1959). Nehru too held the same view but was less categorical that sooner or later the areas which had seceded would be compelled by force of circumstances to return to the fold. See, Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 376-77.

was to stick to an anti-Indian posture in practically all her foreign relations and even in domestic politics.

During the first phase of Pakistan's political life, stretching from 1947-54, India's size and military might was also worrying her. Other factors which contributed to the security syndrome were the Pakhtoonistan movement, allegedly sponsored by Afghanistan, the membership of the Commonwealth, the need for assistance in making economic progress and finally, the Moslem ideology.⁹ But the most pressing problem for Pakistan was how to establish military parity with India¹⁰ which alone would strengthen her militarily to deal with India from a position of strength and settle such outstanding issues like the Kashmir question.

Of her own, Pakistan could not think of building up her military sinews that would match the Indian counterpart, with the very limited resources at home and with the immense domestic problems, looming large on the social and economic horizons of the country. The only alternative, left for Pakistan was to look outward to achieve this avowed aim.

9 A Group Study, op. cit., pp. 37-50.
See also, Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy", Orbis, vol. 9, no. 3, 1965, pp. 613.

10 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 47.
"India's military strength would always be greater than ours. Our aim should be to build up a military deterrent force with adequate offensive and defensive power; enough at least, to neutralise the Indian army". Ibid., p. 47.

If, security could not be assured from within, it had to be managed from without.

Pakistan's search for security resembled the parallel situation of the French demand for security after the First World War. Since 1919, France was exhausted though not very weak. Germany was completely disarmed. However she soon emerged as a powerful nation with tremendous capacity and resources for the production of war materials, military organization, industrial development and general efficiency. France felt threatened again by the growing might of a determined and resilient Germany.

France's immediate pre-occupation was to contrive tactics to check Germany from overpowering her in the event of another war. For this purpose, she followed two separate and parallel methods: a system of treaty guarantees and a system of alliances.¹¹ The Locarno Treaties illustrated the former and the Little Entente implied the latter.¹²

Just as France adopted two parallel methods in securing support of other nations against Germany, Pakistan also adopted two parallel methods to counterpose India: a system of treaty guarantees and a system of military alliances.

11 E.H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1963), pp. 25-26.

12 Ibid., p. 26.

Pakistan and the Commonwealth

In her bid to embarrass India everywhere Pakistan also decided to join the Commonwealth following India's decision to stay within the Commonwealth. It was Jinnah's firm hope that India would opt out of the Commonwealth as did Burma, thereby giving Pakistan a solid bloc support in her dispute with India, but the calculations were frustrated¹³ by India's decision to remain within the Commonwealth.

But, paradoxically enough, at the Commonwealth Conference held from 7 to 17 September 1949, at which India, Pakistan and Ceylon - three Asian countries - were represented¹⁴ for the first time, Pakistan questioned the very utility of the Commonwealth by alluding to its inability¹⁵ to intervene in matters connected with her relation to India.

Besides the Commonwealth would not have liked to enter into the internal political disputes of member States for the simple reason that the Commonwealth had no machinery¹⁶ whereby to enforce its decisions or recommendations. On his

13 J.B. Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 120. Also see, The Hindu (Madras), 2 May 1950. See Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 329-37.

14 Nicholas Mansergh, op. cit., p. 332.

15 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14 April 1950.

16 Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 17.

return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan said that Pakistan was not a camp follower of the Commonwealth.¹⁷ Obviously, for Pakistan, this was an expression of a failure of expectations from the Commonwealth. What Pakistan sought from the Commonwealth was security and protection from aggression, but that was just the thing the Commonwealth could not guarantee her.

Though Pakistan received a set-back at the Commonwealth Conference, she did not altogether lose faith in the Commonwealth. As if to amend the adverse comments at the first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Liaquat Ali Khan almost appeared to have gone out of his way in praising the Commonwealth, when he visited Canada in the month of May 1950.¹⁸ This could, at least, be construed not as a change of policy, but a change of tactics to win over by adulation, if it could be possible, the friendly Commonwealth nations, particularly Britain and Canada, to support her claims against India.

It was almost a great tribute to British statesmanship when Liaquat Ali Khan said that by the Partition of British-India into two independent States, Britain had made "a great though silent contribution to the stability of Asia", a¹⁹

17 Round Table (London), vol. 39, p. 365.

18 The Hindu, 1 June 1950.

19 Ibid., 3 June 1950.

judgement that was to be contradicted by the subsequent events in the Indian sub-continent. Partition was not a British invention. If Partition were to be attributed to the silent contribution of the British, it would not be beside the point to say that Hindu-Moslem rivalry too was a British invention. Though the British took advantage of the Hindu-Moslem rivalry or even aggravated it for their own benefits, they could hardly think of inventing it. "It is not possible to divide and rule unless the ruled are ready to be divided"²⁰. Anyhow, the Commonwealth forum, to say the least, did not tilt the balance of world opinion in favour of Pakistan, thus eluding the big bloc support for which Pakistan was hankering after ever since she joined the Commonwealth.

Pakistan and the Moslem World

Another strategy used by Pakistan to isolate India was to ensure her solidarity with the Moslem world. Pakistan's disheartening experience with the Commonwealth and the perceived threat from one of its own members, gave enough reason for her to exercise the common ideology which she shared with the Moslem countries of West Asia and elsewhere. The future prospects of assuming the leadership of the Moslem world were not less enchanting for the political incumbents in Pakistan.

20 H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), p. 16.

It is no exaggeration to state that Pakistan planned a grand Pan-Islamic front with the spirit of a crusader, holding aloft the interests of the Moslem countries. Pakistan set to seek an opportunity to consolidate the forces of the Moslem countries in her favour and compel India to negotiate.

But Arab nationalism was stringently exclusive and would admit of no Pan-Islamism as it was conceived by Pakistan. Also, it appeared to the Arab countries of the West that the advocacy of Pan-Islamism by Pakistan smacked of surreptitious undermining of Arab unity and solidarity.

Moreover, India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru had projected an image on the world scene, sufficiently large to consider her a strong non-aligned power in Asia. India had a definite policy towards West Asia which gave wholehearted political support to the Arabs in their struggle against Israel and recognized Arab nationalism as the emerging force in the Arab world. India's policy of non-alignment, secularism and socialism endeared India to some of the important Arab countries like Egypt. These countries were not particularly happy about Pakistan's enthusiasm for Western military alliance building. Later on, these nations disapproved the Baghdad Pact which in their view was against the interests of the emerging independent nations.

The Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria could

look upon India - a stronger nation than Pakistan - as a guide to their own non-aligned policies. In short, the Arab countries neither were prepared to make a jumble of a foreign policy with religious ideologies, big-power politics, domestic compulsions, all in one, nor were they interested in staking the friendship of India by taking sides with Pakistan on any issue. Hence, Pakistan could hope for only marginal diplomatic gains against India in the Arab world.

There was once again an attempt made by Pakistan in February 1952, to hold the Moslem countries on her side, when the Prime Minister of Pakistan extended invitation to Prime Ministers of twelve Moslem countries to meet at a conference in Karachi or in any other suitable place as it deemed convenient to all, to evolve a procedure for consultation between them on questions of common interest. This initiative too was foiled by some Moslem countries due to the fact that they had to confront their own domestic problems before anything else.

Besides, some of the Moslem countries doubted the bona fides of Pakistan in her efforts towards strengthening political bonds by appealing to religious and ideological sentiments almost to the exclusion of other contributory factors. If that could be feasible enough, they questioned as to why strained relations existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a neighbouring Moslem country.

Later, there were a number of Islamic conferences

held in Pakistan but almost all of them were non-political in character, mainly focused on economic and cultural affairs. But the fervour for Islamistan had certainly diminished with the discouraging response from the Moslem world. Besides, the appeal of religious unity became less attractive with the changing political complexities of West Asia. There was a general feeling against Western imperialism among the Moslem countries which acquired new dimensions. This was the period when the Moslem countries in West Asia were moving further away from the European powers while Pakistan was drawing nearer to them. Thus the Pakistani bid to get the Moslem countries together against India did not succeed and her foreign relations on this front failed to achieve tangible results.

Thus, India was Pakistan's intolerable obsession and Pakistan strained every nerve at the diplomatic level to whip up anti-Indian feelings and to mobilize public opinion in the Arab world, the Moslem world and the Commonwealth against India. Being disillusioned by the feeble response, Pakistan began to look in other directions and was soon convinced that the U.S. alliance system together with its military and economic assistance programme would guarantee her security and resolve her dilemma. Pakistan ultimately decided to join the Western bloc.

Chapter II

LOCAL CONFLICT: A CONCEPTUAL STUDY

Chapter II

LOCAL CONFLICT: A CONCEPTUAL STUDY

Conflict is an analogous concept which could have an application in biology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, or political science. It may be defined "as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other"¹.

An elucidation of this definition may be attempted to identify and characterize the nature of conflict phenomena. Conflict requires at least two analytically distinct parties or groups or organizations or States. These parties or groups interact in such a way that their actions and counteractions always remain mutually opposed. The basic motive of these interactions is aimed at an attempt to gain certain vantage positions or incompatible objectives. To put differently "a conflict relationship always involves the attempt to acquire or exercise power or the actual acquisition of or exercise of power"².

1 Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defence: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1962), p. 5.

2 Mack and Snyder, in Rolf M. Goldman, "A Theory of Conflict Process and Organizational Offices", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. X, no. 3, 1966, p. 335.

"Conflict behaviours are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or

The causes of conflict whether latent or open may not be identifiable specifically, but they may be broadly categorised as psychological, economic and cultural, social, ³ political or religious. The categorization does not indicate compartmentalisation but all these causes converge more or less in a totum which would generate a conflict. It may be that one or the other is an activating, predominant cause, precipitating a conflict.

Conflict is an important part of the specialized study of international relations. In this study, therefore, the usage of the term "conflict" is strictly confined to inter State conflicts. It should be understood that the terms ^{Regional Conflicts,} local wars and actual, local conflicts are taken to signify the same concept. "The word conflict is used, with the implication that war is a definite and mutually understood pattern of behaviour distinguishable not only from other patterns of behaviour in general but from other forms of conflict".⁴ Such an attempt to restrict the scope of

other parties and a conflict relationship is one in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense". Ibid., p. 335.

- 3 For details of the causes of conflict, see Werner Levi, "On the Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. IV, no. 4, 1960, pp. 411-20.
- 4 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 9.
"War is considered the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force". Ibid., p. 9.

the term 'conflict' to inter-State conflictful behaviour is to exclude all sorts of intra-State conflicts such as civil strife, political turmoil, rioting, large and small scale terrorism, mutiny, coups d'etats, or equivocal plots.

Inter-State Conflict

An inter-State conflict may be a potential conflict situation or an actual conflict. In the former case, it lies dormant and the situation may be described as an adversary, hostile or antagonistic relationship. When relations deteriorate into tension between the political entities, it may result in an armed conflict in which case it may be described as an actual conflict.

Political conflicts between States may meet with military response. The forebodings of such a response become evident when either one or both the States project overt signs of their antagonism.⁵ An open challenge by the head of a State, provocative diplomatic moves meant to thwart the interest or prestige of another, amassing of troops on the frontiers with no ostensible reasons, an unauthorized army infiltration or attempts to indirectly influence the course of events within the frontiers of another are all overt signs from one side or the other,

5 Wilhelm Aubert, "Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 1, 1963, p. 26.

signalling a conflict situation that will make proximate a direct and open conflict.

Dispute and Tension

However, the term 'conflict' should be clearly distinguished from such terms as 'dispute' and 'tension'. Disputes among nations indicate diverse and competitive interests. The element of violent use of force is absent in disputes; they mainly centre round incompatible political issues of past, present or future positions the disputants want to assume on the negotiating front. They grow out of border incidents, diplomatic embarrassments or unauthorized provocations made by military forces in a neighbour's territory. Presumably, they are easy to settle because the causes are easily identifiable and because they involve specific
6
grievances.

The extremely complex situation where 'tensions' arise is a consequence of the juxtaposition of historical, economic, religious or ethnic factors.⁷ This situation of tension between nations is actively built up by widespread and deep-seated public attitudes of hostility or by

6 K. J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures in Procedures", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 3, 1966, p. 272.

7 K. J. Holsti, International Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1967), p. 443.

deliberate propaganda.⁸ Tension situation among States may assume many forms such as "feelings of hatred and aggressiveness, attacks in the press and on the radio, diplomatic strife, persecution of the citizens of other countries, economic conflict and sanctions, and, ultimately, war. War,⁹ it should be emphasized, is only the last step in tensions". To put it briefly, inter-State conflicts are end-products of enduring antagonistic attitudes and relations between two or a group of States.

The genesis of a conflict may thus be constructed: an¹⁰ antagonistic attitude is nurtured either deliberately or otherwise which gets itself concretized at an opportune situation in the form of a dispute. An inter-State dispute becomes a national issue in support of which the national opinion is mobilized. Accumulation of tension mounts as the issue in question gets enmeshed in the labyrinth of political negotiations. Tensions, thus created by needs, by restriction of space, of free movement or by other barriers, seek

8 Ibid., p. 443.

9 Ibid., p. 575.
Also, "What are the conditions favourable to extreme tension levels and hence favorable to violence? It appears that extremes, either of general security or of general insecurity, may generate high tension levels". Quincy Wright, op. cit., p. 1107.

10 See, Feliks Gross, "Antagonism is Related to Latent Conflict", World Politics and Tension Areas (New York: New York University Press, 1966), p. 25.

to reduce itself by ushering in an open conflict.

Two Levels of Inter-State Conflict

Conflict, in any case, is to be accepted as a possible reality and at no time, it could be eliminated as not being an integral part of the international political system. But care should be taken to differentiate two levels of conflicts that can arise in inter-State relations: one, conflict or war that has a global dimension; the other, conflict or war that has a regional or local dimension.

Defining Global and Local Wars or Conflicts

"A general war", Halperin defines, "as a war involving attacks by the United States and the Soviet Union on each other's homelands. A local war is defined as "a war in which the United States and the Soviet Union (or China) see themselves on opposite sides but in which no attacks are made on the homelands of the two Super Powers".¹¹

11 Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 15. The author indicates that "the first attempt to divide wars into categories came with the distinction made between 'limited wars' and 'total' wars. A 'limited war was viewed as a conflict that would not involve the homelands of the United States or the Soviet Union and that would remain limited both in objectives and the means used. A 'total' war, on the other hand, was a war involving attacks on the homelands of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was assumed that in such a war there would be no limit on either the objectives or the means employed". Ibid., pp. 14-15.

Here, Halperin, no doubt, is defining a general war and a local war in the context of the thermo-nuclear dimension of wars that may be conceivable between the United States and the Soviet Union. But can one say categorically, whether or not all the local wars imply a nuclear dimension or are implicit in them the involvement of the Super Powers in any form or degree. One thing is certain: that not all local wars have anything of a nuclear content. But it is also difficult to insulate local wars from Super Power involvement. The fact that a clear distinction is not perceived, does not justify the argument that there does not exist any distinction at all. For, it does happen that a war could be initiated between two States or two groups of them in a particular region or sub-region, due to regional causes, conditions and compulsions without there being the least scope of escalation through a direct or indirect involvement of any Super Power interest or intervention. It is also possible that there may arise wars in which only one Super Power - either the United States or the Soviet Union - becomes an intervening power.

Even then the basic character of the local war remains unaffected because of the locale of the conflict, its origin and the principal participants. It is not always essential, as Halperin insists, that the two Super Powers or China should be ranged against each other, in a local war. The first Indo-Pakistan conflict (1947-48) was purely between

the two countries without a Super Power involvement. A local conflict may also be distinguished from a regional conflict. In the latter case, the large majority of States in the region including the dominant power in addition to the Super Power or Super Powers will be involved in the conflict. The peace, stability and security of the region as a whole will also be in jeopardy. This need not be the case in a local conflict. In the Indo-Pakistan conflict, which may be more accurately described as a local conflict, the peace, stability and security of the South Asian region have not been completely affected. But what is common about the local and regional conflict is the direct or indirect involvement of one or more Super Powers.

DISS
355.033054
M984 Re



Local War: Limiting Factors

A local war by definition is limited. The limiting factors¹² may be considered in terms of geography, targets, weapons and the degree of participation by various States.

(a) Geographic Factor

A local war, by nature, is circumscribed by geographical conditions. It will not extend itself beyond the boundaries of contending local actors. The Super Powers have a common interest in maintaining the stability of the centre. When their vital national interests are deeply involved or

¹² Morton H. Halperin, op. cit., p. 20.

V, 445 1944x 5 (35): 9 (V, 73) 27G-9061

L3



their hegemony has been challenged the stakes are very high in any local war. However, it is quite unlikely that they would allow any local war to take place there. At the same time, they are prepared to permit a certain amount of violence and strife in the Third World consisting of under-¹³ developed nations. These are the soft areas which are prone to great power interventionism. The vulnerability of these regions may be easily accountable because of the power vacuum created as a result of decolonisation and the national liberation struggle for independence.¹⁴ In order to maintain a balance of power in particular regions the Super Powers may assume that local conflicts and regional violence should be permitted up to a certain threshold. The Super Powers may well be interested in perpetuating regional conflicts within the limiting parameter of the escalation threshold.

(b) Weapons on Local War

A distinction should be made between two types of weapons: strategic nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. So far in all local wars, conventional weapons have been used. It is true that in the Korean war and the Vietnam war,

13 Harry G. Shaffer and Jan S. Prybyla (eds.), From Underdevelopment to Affluence: Western, Soviet and Chinese Views (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1968), p. 49.

14 George C. Abbott, "Seize, Viability, Nationalism and Politico-Economic Development", International Journal, vol. 25 (1969-70), p. 54.

the question of using nuclear weapons was considered by the United States. But the fear of a full scale thermo-nuclear war prevented the American Government from doing so. Except China and to a certain extent India, practically all the developing countries have to rely on the imported arms to sustain a local conflict, because they do not manufacture much of the military weapons. This would mean that even to wage a local war, the Third World countries have to depend on the arms-exporting industrialized nations, especially the great Powers. Therefore, a local war may be of a low intensity or high intensity depending on the arms supply from the Big Powers or on the ability to obtain arms from outside. The local actors engaged in mortal combat would exhaust themselves within the shortest possible time if the arms suppliers are not in a mood to prolong a long conflict. Even regional security arrangements inspired by Big Powers can have constraints which can influence the course of a local war. It is, therefore, clear that the attitude of the Big Powers which would ultimately be the deciding factor in most of the local conflicts if these Powers are really concerned about the outcome of the war.

(c) Targets in Local War

The targets in a global war and the targets in a local war may not be the same. In a global war, the retaliatory strike will be in the nature of a massive blow to wipe out force concentrations and population centres, using

both the counter-force and counter-city strategy. What is at stake in a general war is the survival of the world and more particularly the nations involved directly.

But in a local war, targets are limited and restricted to military concentrations, industrial complexes and other installations of war machinery. Both in the First and Second World Wars, the nations survived the application of force. Despite brutal American bombing (which included carpet bombing, saturation bombing and napalm bombing etc.), North Vietnam still survives as a nation. Unless dictated by military necessities, civilians are never the targets in a conventional war. This still is true of a local war.

(d) Participation of International Actors

Direct or indirect participation in a local war by the Super Powers in a local conflict can alter the very character of a local war. A direct presence may be total or partial; substantial or negligible. A direct, total and substantial presence would mean an active engagement in a war with all available weapons including nuclear weapons to inflict an unacceptable damage to the enemy of the client State. On the other hand, a direct, partial presence would be an active engagement in battle in collusion with the client State but without introducing nuclear weapons. Indirect presence would amount to support given to local actors by way of delivering adequate weapons, technical advice and

economic assistance during the conflict. Negligible presence would amount to moral support or indifferent attitude shown during a particular local conflict.

Factors Inducing Local Conflicts

There are multiple factors generating a local conflict. The factors involved in an outbreak of war may include the immediate occasion of dispute, other sources of conflict between the two parties, long-term rivalries and resentment, the believed chance of success in the conflict (as determined by the existing balance of power, the strength of alliances, the possibility of outside intervention, the believed cost of war (military, economic and psychological), the possible gains, whether consciously or unconsciously conceived, including political, military and economic gains or purely psychological benefits such as the release of anger, frustration or uncertainty and the satisfaction of aspirations to dominance or of unconscious aggressive urges. Each of these factors may be present in entirely different proportions in different disputes, in different types of disputes, among different countries, in different regions and in different stages of history. Attempts to attribute the cause of 'war' and 'aggressiveness' to any one factor or class of factors may not indicate the overall perception of the conflict phenomenon.

15 Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1970), p. 52.

Willard Waller, in his War in the Twentieth Century examines various purported causes of war. The moralistic theory that had it that men cause wars. A more sophisticated moderate version is that wars correct wrongs and remedy evils. The psychological theory is that men fight because of an instinct of pugnacity. The demographic theory is that population necessitates expansion; the economic interpretation is that war springs from economic causes; and according to "primitivized economic interpretation", wars are instigated by the "merchants of death"¹⁶.

Third World and Local Conflicts

Why is it that the Third World or the developing nations are more prone to local conflicts? It is essential to examine briefly the factors responsible for such conflicts. The problems facing the underdeveloped regions are really tangled and complicated. Indeed, there are several factors which generate local conflicts.

(i) Economic Factor

One factor that is common to all these regions which one way or another leads to inter-State conflicts is the economic factor. This is the legacy of colonial conquests and imperialism. As Rupert Emerson has put it: "Empires

16 Quoted in Frederick H. Hartmann, World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations (New York: The Macmillan Co.,) p. 82.

have fallen on evil days and nations have risen to take
 their place"¹⁷.

With the transformation of empires and colonies into nations, neo-colonialism in the "form of economic dependenc-
 ies and satellite States"¹⁸ is taking their place. Economic dependencies are nominally independent States whose major economic activities are largely under the control or influence of a Great Power. Satellite States, on the other hand, are nominally independent States whose political life and foreign policies are in varying degrees under the control or direct influence of a more powerful State. Conflicts growing from these relationships are prone to be both
 intense and prolonged.¹⁹

Robert McNamara gives certain statistics and relevant data concerning the underdeveloped regions, their economic developmental process and the frictions ensuing due to economic disruption from within. According to him, there are roughly hundred countries that are "caught up in the difficult transition from traditional to modern societies". There is no uniform rate of progress among them, and they range

17 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 3.

18 Charles O. Lerche, Jr, and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics (New Jersey: Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 147.

19 Ibid., pp. 147-48.

from primitive societies, fractured by tribalism and held feebly together by the slenderest of political sinews, to relatively sophisticated countries well on the road to agricultural sufficiency and industrial competence.²⁰

McNamara notes that in the eight years through late 1966, there were 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence. 15 out of these 164 outbreaks of violence were armed conflicts between two States and not a single one of the 164 conflicts was a formally declared war. McNamara wants to drive home the point that a necessary relationship could be established between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted. He further gives another series of statistics of the World Bank to prove his contention. He says that the World Bank divides nations on the basis of per capita income into four categories: rich, middle-income, poor and very poor. The rich nations are those with a per capita income of \$750 or more per year. The current U.S. level is more than \$2,900 and there are 27 of these rich nations. They possess 75 per cent of the world's wealth, though roughly only 25 per cent of the world's population. Since 1958 only one of these 27 nations has suffered a major internal upheaval on its own territory.²¹

20 Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 144.

21 Ibid., p. 146.

"But observe what happens at the other end of the economic scale. Among the 38 very poor nations, those with a per capita income of under \$100 a year, no less than 32²² have suffered significant conflicts". He adds further that the trend holds predictably constant in the case of two other categories, the poor and middle income nations. Since 1958, 87 per cent of the very poor nations, 69 per cent of the poor nations and 48 per cent of the middle-income nations suffered serious violence. There can be no question, he says, that there is a relationship between violence and economic backwardness, and the trend of such violence is up,²³ not down.

In the context of the economic problems confronting the developing nations, to McNamara security means development. He says that "security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security"²⁴.

McNamara is correct in as much as he co-relates internal economic development with internal security on which

22 Ibid., p. 146.

23 Ibid., ~~p. 146.~~

24 Ibid., p. 149.

depends internal order and stability. Because with retarded economic growth there is no order and stability; and instability leads to the outbreak of internal violence in the underdeveloped nation resorting to an armed conflict against its neighbour just because there is no economic growth! Is it not suicidal for a poor backward nation to go to war when it is economically so weak and its structure of internal stability is in very bad shape?

1) If the internal political stability and security of nations act as a sure guarantee against war between nations, why has so many wars occurred in Europe? And how could the two world wars be explained? These wars were not waged because of lack of internal political stability or security of the nations which played the most aggressive role in the two brutal wars.

2) In the years after McNamara published his book, internal conflicts and violence broke out in many parts of the world and the United States itself was not spared of the ravages of violence. And none can say that the U.S. is a backward country. These observations definitely do not support the view of McNamara that once the internal security and stability become a permanent factor, violence and conflicts may be predictably ruled out among nations.

3) There is no guarantee that developed nations will not go to war with other countries over what they consider to be to their best of interests. It is quite possible that

insecure nations may resort to war or warlike postures to divert the people's attention away from internal problem. It has been argued that Pakistan followed an adventurist's policy of confrontation with India due to the fact that Pakistan found it difficult to have internal coherence and stability. But it has not been argued that the Sino-Indian border conflict arose from an internal insecurity or instability of any one of these countries.

What emerges from the statistical analysis presented by McNamara is that the U.S. economic aid programme has worked in ways which are not quite conducive to the economic development of the underdeveloped regions. All aids were not without strings attached.²⁵ "If the U.S. in fact, embark on a programme of economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas it will be because we believe that substantial U.S. interests will be furthered thereby".²⁶ What is substantial U.S. interest in the undeveloped areas, but to make the nations of those areas, 'economic dependencies' and 'satellite States'? Hence, McNamara's contention that internal instability and violence spring from backwardness of underdeveloped regions does not carry much conviction.

25 K. Subrahmanyam, "Strategic Considerations Behind Foreign Aid", Motherland (New Delhi), 15 November 1972.

26 Edward S. Mason, Promoting Economic Developments: The United States and Southern Asia (California: Claremont Press, 1955), p. 13.

On the contrary, the U.S. aid programme unlike the Soviet economic assistance, was never aimed at building a strong industrial base, but only to maintain a subsistence level economy which would assure the economic dependence of these nations on the Western bloc. Then how could one explain the frequency of the local conflicts? To a large extent the U.S. economic aid programme should be blamed as a major contributory factor for the anomalous situation within these under-developed regions.

(11) Great Power Nationalism

A second factor that contributes significantly to the cause of many a local conflict is the 'great power nationalism' that is emerging. The Super Powers have an outlook that is global. With their great power resources, a powerful dynamic element is injected into international politics. It has its crisis points along what has been called "the international shatter zone" where the main opposing forces are in direct contact. In its military aspect, it takes the form of a tireless race for allies, raw materials, bases, and armaments. In political terms, it requires a constant search for victory. In psychic terms, it calls for the pursuit of absolute hegemony over the adversary. This was the case of French and British nationalism in the Napoleonic era. Today, the rival nationalisms, each with its global overtones

are the Russian and the American.²⁷

But the United States and the Soviet Union possibly will not confront each other in a nuclear war to achieve their aims though they have been often involved against each other by proxy in various parts of the world.²⁸ The contemporary practice provides many methods far less dangerous and politically expensive than direct attack. "Aid may be given to a revolutionary movement, support provided for one side or the other in a civil war, agitation instigated or sedition preached or a coup d'etat attempted".²⁹ A large number of wars in contemporary period, is the outcome of externally supported efforts to overthrow existing governments rather than full-scale attempts to subjugation from without.

The objective of Super Power nationalism is not to paint new colours across the atlas, but to win friends and influence people.³⁰ What they seek above all is allegiance.³¹ And "since allegiance is unlikely to be won by sprinkling

27 Charles O. Lerche, Jr, and Abdul A. Said, op. cit., p. 149.

28 Evan Luard, op. cit., p. 186.

29 Ibid., p. 187.

30 John W. Burton, Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), p. 16.

31 Kamalleshwar Sinha, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ISSD Publication, Delhi, 1972), p. 105.

hydrogen bombs on foreign populations or even by hurling massed divisions of tanks and guns against them, the use of such crude weapons is not normally an attractive instrument of policy"³². But this does not mean that the Super Powers will not intervene in such situations when their vital interests are deemed to be at stake. Even in this, their sophisticated policy is worked out through proxy rather than direct engagement.

(iii) Local Factors

Many are the local factors which cumulatively exert pressures on the local actors in conflict with each other.

(a) The Political System

Most of the underdeveloped regions have been under the sway of foreign domination until recently. Many of these newly liberated nations do not have stable governmental machinery to cope up with the internal problems that crop up with the transfer of regimes. Internal conflict behaviour within nations of the underdeveloped regions consists of such developments as demonstrations, riots, coups d'etats, guerilla warfare, and others denoting the relative instability of political systems.³³ Lack of dynamic leadership coupled

32 Evan Luard, op. cit., p. 187.

33 Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviours Within Politics 1948-1962: A Cross-national Study", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 2, 1966, p. 249.

with a dilemma to choose between the two great power blocs is mainly responsible for the instability and disorder to which many a new nation has fallen a prey. Disruptive internal situation readily lends itself to civil anarchy and watchful foreign powers are only too ready to fish in such troubled waters.

The intensity and protraction of civil wars and other internal disturbances invariably depend on the active involvement of foreign powers. Where one outside power or alliance becomes involved in an internal dispute another invariably being dragged in. Hence, a civil war within an underdeveloped nation becomes a gambling opportunity for the foreign powers and this may be conveniently utilized to implicate neighbouring States (with a similar political system or not), leading to local wars. Outside powers have openly or marginally supported about 14 out of 21 civil wars that have occurred between 1945 and 1965.³⁴ The provision of substantial assistance by outside powers in civil wars has become the typical form of foreign aid in the present age.

Luard records about 51 coups in the underdeveloped regions. This indicates the extreme incompetency of political actors in those regions and the inadequacy of the political system that has been bequeathed to them by their colonial powers.³⁵ The coups have been always perpetrated by

34 Evan Luard, op. cit., p. 142.

35 See R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within Nations, 1946-59", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 1, 1966, p. 65.

the military junta and almost every time they have acted as the henchmen of foreign powers.

The military men who come to the helm of State affairs are prone to adopt a foreign policy that is rather aggressive than accommodative. They possess a feeling of insecurity and therefore, are likely to exhibit aggressive traits. Not trained in civilian diplomacy, or the fine nuances of democratic involvement in human affairs, they fail to get their answers to many internal and external problems except through the barrel of the gun.

The countries, ruled by the military junta are constantly plagued with internal struggles and instability and as a last resort, the junta may follow an adventurist policy of attacking a neighbour in order to consolidate the internal forces and forge a kind of national unity. More accustomed to the concepts of exploits and excitement, self-aggrandisement and heroic deeds, they invent reasons to provoke a war with the neighbour.

(b) Attitude of Dependency

Though the underdeveloped regions have successfully dislodged colonial powers the new ruling classes are still in the habit of dependence on foreign powers to remain in power. Covertly or overtly, they seek foreign assistance, both military and economic, to solve their problems of

36

security and development. The foreign powers are only too eager to prop up these rulers who are more loyal to their foreign masters than to their own people in case it suits their global policy. They do pressurise local governments to toe their lines. Competitive power struggle between foreign powers in these areas become acute which ultimately may lead to local conflicts.

The developing nations should take note of the subtle policies of the foreign powers to gain advantageous positions all over the world at their expense. Some powers have deployed forces on a global basis in several countries. They have major military bases all over the world. They are ready to engage themselves in advising, supervising and training armed forces in underdeveloped regions. They induce local actors to send their officers and other personnel to foreign military schools. It is an observable fact that many nations have fallen a prey to such inducements risking their own independent policies.

With commitments to give military bases to foreign powers, the host country may secure weapons in return for its own defence purposes. Here again is the anomaly of the

36 Rhodes Murphey, "Economic Conflicts in South Asia", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 1, 1960, p. 83.

There are interactions between the economically developed nations and economically underdeveloped regions. These sorts of interactions generate a variety of conflicts. Ibid., p. 24.

situation in which various local actors vie with one another to bargain with the foreign powers to secure more arms. This inevitably leads to a steady 'arms race' between the local powers. This arms race is a stimulant for the local actors to transform their own antagonisms and age-old disputes into local wars.

Conflict Control

In the contemporary situation, how could one devise methods to prevent the occurrence of local conflicts? It is indeed difficult to suggest clear-cut methods. But just as diagnosis of the disease is a pre-requisite for its effective treatment, an attempt is made to inquire into the causes of local conflicts. Implicit in them are the remedies which probably could be applied to local conflict situations. If local conflicts have to be averted, the local actors, must disengage themselves from the 'Merchants of death'. Self-reliance in arms production can, to a certain extent, keep the local conflicts under control as it will curb the tendency to resort to adventurist policies with borrowed weapons. Self-reliance is yet to be achieved by the underdeveloped nations. The sooner it is realized the better is for the Asians and Africans who are now fighting among themselves. The attainment of economic independence is one of the means of controlling local conflicts. Moreover, it is essential for the developing countries to build up their own viable

political system, taking into consideration local conditions, demands and vital domestic resources while observing a position of non-alignment in international affairs.

Chapter III

LOCAL ARMS RACE AND THE U.S. ROLE IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT

Chapter III

LOCAL ARMS RACE AND THE U.S. ROLE IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICTS

I

Local Arms Race

The manufacture or procurement of armaments for the twin purpose of defence and offence has always been there in the history of nation States. It is a familiar feature of international relationship. But it does not seem altogether correct to say that all wars preceded an arms race between opposing nations. An arms race is not the cause of war; but it is a very powerful and constant contributory factor wherever there is a massive arms build-up. In many ways, direct and indirect, it stimulates and fosters militarist tendencies and makes their appeal more effective. It influences Governments both in their general policy and at moments of crisis. Above all it keeps the anachronistic idea that wars are inevitable.¹

"Arms races are intensive competitions between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments or armed forces".²

1 Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London: Atlantic Book Publishing Co. Ltd., 1958), p. 74.

2 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p. 5.

The basic conditions of an arms race are four: one, there must be two parties or two groups, conscious of their antagonism; two, they must structure their armed forces with due attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with or as a deterrent to the other arms race participants; three, they must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and quality (men, weapons, organizations, doctrines, deployment); and four, there must be rapid increases in quantity and improvements in quality.³

The typical arms race all are familiar with today is the global arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Fully aware of each other's motives and intentions to dominate the world political scene, the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, mutually antagonistic to each other ideologically, started the arms race soon after the Second World War. The Military, political, economic and technological environment would allow them to race along, endangering world peace and international security. But not so known is the competition in arms build-up that takes place between small powers. The magnitude of such competitions or races is, in fact, overshadowed by the global arms race. All the same, a race between two giants and a race between two Lilliputs are races each in its own right. They are not qualitatively different, though in

3 Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World Politics, vol. 24, October 1971, pp. 39-79.

quantity and levels of intensity they differ.

The difference between these two types of arms race is this: the structure, strength and duration of the former depend on the immense economic resources, capabilities and global ambitions; whereas, in the case of the latter, it depends on the limited economic resources, potentialities, population and regional ambitions or interests. However, while the U.S.-Soviet arms race goes unabated, arms race among smaller nations occurs sporadically and remains circumscribed by national or regional boundaries.

In general arms races arise as the result of political conflicts, are kept alive by them, and subside with them. ⁴ Arms race need not necessarily lead to war. A race could be given up for some reason or other as it happened to the Anglo-French naval arms race of the last century and the Anglo-American naval race in this present century. There are two types of nations: one the aligned nations and the other, the non-aligned nations. The nations which are aligned with either the Western bloc or Soviet bloc are beneficiaries of economic aid and military assistance. Relying heavily on the might and power of the dominant power in the alliance, the small nations develop confidence to fight their old antagonisms. The old rivalry which could not be fought out because of lack of men, money and courage,

4 Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Security (Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960), p. 13.

is surfaced, probably also with the connivance of the dominant power in the alliance. At times, if it suits their interests, the dominant powers (in the present cases, the United States and the Soviet Union) take a keen interest in supplying arms to their client States. While one nation builds up armaments or procure arms with an apparent motive of raking up the past to take to the verdict of arms, the other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by pleading defenseless. To safeguard national security, it would be only proper to take measures to stifle the attempts of a potential aggressor.

A local arms race is possible through a military alliance with either of the blocs or through the arms build up by any of the Great Powers. The intensity, duration and capability of such an arms race are always conditioned more by the motives and intentions of the donor country than of the will and vigour of the recipient country. Perhaps the most important aspect of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is the fear of a technological breakthrough, i.e. "that one's adversary will gain a decisive military superiority through a technological innovation developed in secret research. This would leave the other side vulnerable to attack and intimidation"⁵. But at the

5 Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Medlowitz (ed.), "Disarmament and Economic Development" in The Strategy of World Order, vol. IV (New York: World Law Fund, 1967), p. 8.

local context, the important aspect of a local arms race is the fear of one party entering into secret military pacts with one or the other Super Power. This would leave the adversary in a disadvantageous position. It would leave the opponent vulnerable to gunboat diplomacy and political or military blackmailing. An arms race initiated and abetted by the active connivance of the Super Powers may be called an arms race by proxy. It would not be incorrect to call a local conflict, ensuing from an arms race of such a kind, also a conflict by proxy.

II

Pakistan Joins Seato and Cento

Pakistan's readiness to join the Western bloc transformed the initial disinterest⁶ of the United States in South Asia into an active policy of acquiring military bases and forging military alliances with Pakistan to encircle the Communist world by a defence system. The US formulated the containment policy, the essential characteristic of which was to protect what it came to be known as the 'defense perimeter' of the United States. Through the 'ring theory', the US, therefore, was trying to attract political allies in South and South-East Asia, in a bid to strengthen her forces against Russia and China. The strategic position of the Indian sub-continent was supremely conducive to the

6 Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 124.

projected plan of containment of Communist aggression.

The United States could not think of seducing India to her way of thinking in international politics. India's policy of non-alignment, by then, had crystallized.⁷ The Americans were so much annoyed with India's opposition to the bloc politics and the military pacts that her non-alignment policy was dubbed as immoral by Dulles.⁸ It offered Pakistan an opportunity to befriend the United States and accept her alliance policy so that she could contain India. The US perceived the Indo-Pakistani hostile relationship as one which could be exploited for the sake of her global policy of containment of Communist Russia and China, although the US was disdainful of Pakistan in the early stages of her independence.⁹

It became obvious to the United States that Communist aggression could not be prevented effectively in South and South East Asia unless the Asian countries could be brought under an alliance system based on the model of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The United States succeeded

7 A. Appadorai, Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), p. 146.

8 F.S. Northhedge, The Foreign Policies of the Super Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 47.

9 Mohammad Ahsen Choudhury, "Pakistan, South-East Asia and the United States", The Pakistan Review, March 1954, p. 15.

in persuading various countries in South and South East Asia
 to sign the SEATO¹⁰ (South East Asia Treaty Organization) on
¹¹
 8 September 1954.

In 1955 the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) was signed, with
¹²
 Pakistan as one of its signatories. Pakistan was strategi-
 cally located to provide a link between SEATO and CENTO,
 just as Turkey links the NATO and CENTO. The purpose of
 the SEATO was specifically to "apply only to Communist
 aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression
 or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of
¹³
 Article IV, paragraph 2".

Pakistan's view of the alliance system was a
 different one. Fear of Communist aggression on Pakistan
 was only a myth. The raison d'être of Pakistan's entry
 into military pacts, was explained by Mohammad Ayub Khan
 who himself had vouched his close association with the
¹⁴
 Baghdad Pact (CENTO). According to him "the crux of the

10 Parties to the SEATO: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, Britain, Ireland and United States. See, Documents on American Foreign Relations (1954), p. 320.

11 Ibid., pp. 319-323.

12 Text of the treaty: Document on American Foreign Relations (1956), pp. 342-44.
 UK adhered to the Pact on 5 April 1955; Pakistan on 23 September 1955 and Iran, on 19 October 1955.

13 Documents on American Foreign Relations (1954), p. 322.

14 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 116.

problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us: we had to look for allies to secure our position"¹⁵. Hence, "my interest was exclusively in terms of the defence of the country. I was anxious to take advantage of this arrangement (Pacts) to build up the defence forces of Pakistan"¹⁶. Ayub Khan, at the same time, recognized that India was too big to compete with. "After all, India is five times her size and Indian armed forces are four times the size of Pakistani forces. In actual fact, the military aid to Pakistan was designed to provide merely a deterrent force"¹⁷. Hence, the primary motive of Pakistan's participation in the SEATO and CENTO was the result of an extreme pathological Indo-phobia.

The United States and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Agreement Pact (MDAP) on 19 May 1954.¹⁸

Article 1 provided (1) that the US Government would make available to Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the US Government may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed; that the furnishing and use of such assistance shall

15 Ibid., p. 154.

16 Ibid., p. 116.

17 Ibid., p. 130.

18 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York), pp. 379-383.

be consistent with the U.N. Charter; and that any such assistance would be furnished under the provisions and terms of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and complementary legislation. The two governments would "from time to time negotiate the detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of the paragraph".

(2) The same article laid down that Pakistan "will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, for its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area or in the U.N. collective security arrangements and measures"; that Pakistan "will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation"; and that the Pakistani Government "will not, without the prior agreement of the US Government, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished". Under this article, any equipment and materials no longer required or used for their original purposes would be offered by Pakistan for return to the U.S. Government; that the Pakistani Government would not, without prior US consent, transfer to any third countries any equipment, materials, property, information or services received from the U.S.A.; that Pakistan would take such security measures as might be agreed between the two governments "to prevent the disclosure or compromise of

* Italics added.

classified military articles, services, or information under the agreement"; that both governments would take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of the operations under this agreement"; and that procedures would be established for the safeguarding by the Pakistani Government of all funds allocated to or derived from, any assistance undertaken by the US Government.

Article 2 laid down that the two governments would "upon the request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards".

There were two essential factors arising out of the Pact which caused anxiety to India because they could be detrimental to its security. First, the MDAP did not guarantee that Pakistan would not use the weapons secured through the U.S. military assistance against India. Second, neither the quantum of military assistance nor the duration of the aid was specified.

India did not respond to the MDAP by a precipitate arms race. However, like any other country placed in a similar situation India had to keep the armed forces in a minimum state of preparedness and to increase the military spending to meet any possible threat from Pakistan. This

very modest effort on the part of India to compete with Pakistan to maintain its military superiority over Pakistan implied a local arms race.

The MDAP qualitatively changed the political situation and power equation in the Indian sub-continent. The alignment of Pakistan with the United States tilted the balance apparently in favour of Pakistan. A third power¹⁹ intervention in the politics of the Indian sub-continent complicated the relations between India and Pakistan which²⁰ were already hostile and activated a dormant local conflict. The extraneous intervention also generated a tendency in both the countries to acquire more armaments for their national security which implied great strain on their²¹ domestic economy.

19 "A meaningful and effective aid programme far from avoiding intervention in the affairs of a recipient, in fact, constitutes intervention of a most profound character". J. William Fulbright, Prospects of the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 67.

"All aid means some degree of intervention...". See, Frank M. Coffin, Witness for Aid (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 18.

See, M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 273.

20 The MDAP, "instead of adding to the stability of the sub-continent" "will create new tensions and suspicions and thus further contribute to its insecurity". Chester Bowles, New Leader, 22 February 1954.

21 Louis Fischer, Russia, America and the World (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 154.

The Pakistani arms acquisition portended a local competition and an arms race seemed to have begun on a very modest scale from 1954.

It is, therefore, necessary (i) to examine the role of the United States in the arms build-up of Pakistan;

(ii) to quantify the US military supply to Pakistan after the conclusion of the MDAP in 1954;

(iii) to analyse the military budgets and other relevant data of India and Pakistan since 1947 to 1965 with a view to find out whether there was an arms race between the two countries as a result of the US arms supply to Pakistan; and

(iv) finally to establish a link between the local arms race and the local conflict as a necessary concomitant of the penetration of globalism into the regional conflicts;

The process of inquiry is based on three assumptions:

(A) The substantial military build-up in Pakistan after the MDAP of 1954 could not be possible except through the massive US involvement through its alliance policy.

(B) The Indian military response to the MDAP showed that it was the alliance policy of the United States which induced the local arms race.

(C) Regional conflicts occur as a result of the direct or indirect involvement of the Super Powers in the hostile relationship existing between two or more nations of the region. The local conflict between India and Pakistan

in 1965 was the inevitable outcome ^{of} by the U.S. alliance policy although the alliance partners were pursuing diametrically opposite objectives.

III

A. US INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUB-CONTINENT: US ALLIANCE POLICY

The first assumption may be examined by analysing:

- (a) the motivations and intentions which compelled Pakistan and the United States to sign the MDAP of 1954;
- (b) the quantum of military aid to Pakistan consequent to the MDAP of 1954;
- (c) the quantum of economic aid to Pakistan after the MDAP of 1954;
- (d) and the defence expenditure of Pakistan before and after the MDAP of 1954.

(a) Motivations and Intentions

The compelling motivations that led both the United States and Pakistan to enter into the MDAP of 1954 were not identical; ²² nonetheless, their interests were not mutually

22 "Pakistan's obsessive preoccupation with India and Kashmir has dominated her foreign policy and dictated many of her international relations, including of course, her alliance policy".
See, Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure in Diplomacy", Orbis, vol. 9, no. 3, 1965, p. 613.

incompatible. Pakistan's first problem was how to establish parity with India militarily. It was, therefore, essentially a quest for Pakistan's security. The Pakistani perception was that she would not be able to survive as an independent, sovereign State in the vicinity of a big power like India which was hostile to her. The answer to the problem was a stronger counterforce. Such a force was readily available to Pakistan if she agreed to sign a military pact with the United States.

The problem of the United States was also one of security but of a global nature. According to the American perception, it involved the question of the survival of the "Free World" against the threat of revolutionary international communism, spearheaded by a formidable rival power, the Soviet Union. Since the "soft areas" on the periphery appeared easily susceptible to the subversive and revolutionary tactics of the Communists, the U.S. policy of containing communism was essentially a strategy of influencing the poor, developing nations, suffering from chronic political instability. ²³ Through a series of military pacts, the

"The Mutual Defense Assistance Programme represents the military portion of an important foreign policy of the U.S.; that of aid to free nations". See, Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, "The Mutual Defense Assistance Programme", American Political Science Review, vol. 45, no. 2, June 1951, p. 321.

23 Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the 'Gray Areas'", Foreign Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3, April 1955, pp. 419-420.

United States succeeded in building up an interlocking system of military alliances and a string of military bases, encircling the Soviet Union.

In signing the MDAP with the United States, Pakistan also sought to obtain from the United States as much economic aid as possible for national development but it did not occur to her that she would have to pay a heavy price by way of adopting a subservient domestic and foreign policy, generally in line with the global strategy of the United States.²⁴

Pakistan's sole objective was to rely on the U.S. military aid as a deterrent against India. But the US Administration insisted that such aid was to be used only against Communist aggression and not against India. However, the U.S. very well knew that Pakistan was not faced with any Communist threat from within or from outside. Nevertheless, the U.S. apparently acquiesced in the Pakistani anti-Indian assertions

24 Nelson A. Rockefeller's Letter to President Eisenhower, dated 31 January 1956, Neus Deutschland, Berlin - quoted by Daniel Latifi, India and U.S. Aid (Bombay: Secretary Public Affairs Forum, 1960), Appendix, pp. 123-31.

Rockefeller's letter is quite revealing as to how the American policy of economic aid and military assistance should be purposefully directed to seep into every fibre of the economy of the recipient countries so that the US could thoroughly influence their domestic and foreign policies.
Ibid., p. 127.

See, Sisir Gupta, "The Great Powers and the Sub-Continent: A New Phase?", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, vol. IV, no. 4, April 1972, pp. 447-463.

since it served the larger U.S. interests in terms of military bases which would be used against the Soviet Union or curbing India's dominant position in South Asia. The U.S. attitude towards the problems of the sub-continent in the early 1950s showed that it was intended deliberately to build up Pakistan as a faithful U.S. ally against the Soviet Union and also to a certain extent against India which posed no Communist threat to the U.S. The only 'crime' of India was that it dared to follow an independent foreign policy which ran counter to the U.S. global strategy and political postures.

Another motive of Pakistan in signing the MDAP of 1954 was to pressurize India to come to terms on the Kashmir issue. The United States' support to Pakistan on the Kashmir question was to lend credibility to her alliance policy and also to demonstrate her dissatisfaction with the intransigent non-alignment policy of India.²⁵

(b) Military Aid

The U.S. military assistance programme was not only to remove or reduce a troubled partner's felt threat of

25 Vera Michalles Dean, "India: An Asian Success Story", Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 34, no. 11, February 1955, p. 88.

See, James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan", American Political Science Review, vol. 48, no. 3, September 1954, pp. 748-49.

aggression by a stronger neighbour but also to serve certain long term policy objectives of the United States. The plea that the military aid was to contain communism was only a camouflage. The American motivation behind the military aid given to developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America was to tighten its hold over the ruling elite. The military, political and bureaucratic elite is assured of the stability of their political system against change. And on it depends the survival of the ruling elite. Military assistance is, therefore, a subtle form of interference in the domestic policies of a State.

"Military aid is not economic aid or development loans or agricultural assistance or technical grants, or food for peace or the Peace Corps. It is not money given to foreign governments. It is not a contribution to the United States gold outflow. It is a programme which provides military equipment and weapons and training to those allied and friendly nations which share our view as to the threat of international communism. It is a programme which funds purchases from American industry for shipment overseas to the military forces of those countries which have the will and the manpower but not the means to defend themselves. It is a programme which brings to our country some 10 to 15,000 foreign military students annually, exposing such students not only to American military knowledge but also to the American way of life. It is an arm of United States

foreign policy. It is an extension of United States defence posture and at bargain basement rates. It is predominantly in our own national self-interest"²⁶.

Thus, the American military assistance programme is intended to serve a definite global strategy. Its aim is to exploit the developing nations. With the decline of the old colonial and imperialist powers, America has emerged as the neo-colonialist status quo power clearly exploiting the weak, poor and small nations by meddling in their regional troubles.

There were some feeble attempts in Pakistan to justify US military assistance to it on account of the threat of communism.²⁷ But did Pakistan perceive any actual Communist threat, especially from the Soviet Union?

In Pakistan the army played a political role²⁸ especially since Ayub Khan became Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in 1951. Inferences from various sources showed that after 1954, Pakistan was the recipient of massive military hardware and equipments. There is considerable difficulty regarding the accurate quantum of arms acquisition from the

26 Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick and Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. v-vi.

27 Aslam Siddiqui, "U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 12, no. 1, March 1959, p. 47.

28 Percival Griffiths, "Pakistan Today", International Affairs (London), vol. 35, no. 3, July 1959, p. 319.

United States. The MDAP of 1954 stipulated that Pakistan should take such security measures as might be agreed between the two governments (U.S. and Pakistan) "to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services, or information furnished under the agreement..."²⁹

However, there are two sources which would provide enough details about the type of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. Senator Chavez reported to the Senate Committee on Appropriations: "Pakistan is being furnished equipment and material consisting of, though not limited to, naval ships, and equipment, jet aircraft, trucks, tanks, electric (including radar) equipment, artillery, ammunition, spare parts, technical publications and training aids. The construction programme has improved airfields and provided supply depots, maintenance ships, ammunition depots, hospitals and barracks, all of which add to the capability of the Pakistan military forces. Communication facilities have also been improved".³⁰

29 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York), MDAP, Article 1, para. 5.

30 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Report on United States Military Operations and Mutual Security Programs Overseas by Senator Dennis Chavez 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, p. 130.
See, "Military aid must be defined to include the following: transfer of hardware, imparting of training as well as transfer of technology relating to production of arms and equipment in use in armed forces".
K. Subrahmanyam, "Military Aid and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs Report, vol. 17, no. 11, November 1968, p. 109.

Second, Colonel Amos Jordan estimated that the military assistance to Pakistan through 1960s amounted to \$390³¹ to 440 million. Around 1965 the United States maintained a Military Assistance Advisory group of about 100 personnel in Pakistan. The United States also agreed to furnish, maintenance, support and modernization training and equipment³² for specific units of Pakistani armed forces.

The table I would indicate a steady flow of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan since its military pact with the United States in 1954. A fact that emerges clearly from the analysis of the arms procurement after 1954 is the continuous spiralling of arms build up in Pakistan which could not have been possible but for whatever medium of economic aid and military assistance given by the United States.

Table I

Arms supplies to Pakistan

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
<u>Aircraft</u>				
(1950-55)	62	Bristol Freighter Mk. 21/31	UK	
1951-53	36	Vickers Attacker F. 1	UK	

31 Amos A. Jordan, Jr, Foreign Aid and the Defence of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 214.

32 House Appropriation Committee, CY (Calendar Year) 64, p. 349.

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1956	10	Lockheed T-33A	USA	
1956-58	120	NA F-86 F Sabre	USA	Aid
(1957)	6	Lockheed RT-33A	USA	
(1957)	1	BAC Viscount 734	UK	
1958	26	Martin Canberra B-57B	USA	Aid
(1958)	(6)	Martin Canberra RB-57	USA	
1958-62	(75)	Cessna O-1 Birdog	USA	
(1960-62)	(15)	Sikorsky S-55	USA	
(1962)	4	Grumman HU-16A Albatross	USA	
1962	12	Lockheed F-104A Starfighter	USA	Ex-USAF; (probably refurbished)
1962	(2)	Lockheed F-104B Starfighter	USA	Probably refurbished
1963	4	Lockheed C-130E Hercules	USA	
1963	4	Kaman HH-43B Huskie	USA	
1963	25	Cessna T-37B	USA	
1965	1	Fokker Friendship	Netherlands	
1965	4	MIg-15 UTI	China	
		<u>Missiles</u>		
1964	150	Sidewinder	USA	
1965	(500)	Cobra	W. Germany	u.c. \$756; being built under licence in Pakistan

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
<u>Naval vessels</u>				
1955	1	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335-375 t.
1955	1	Tug	Netherlands	Completed 1955; dimensions: 105 x 30 x 11 ft
1956	1	Light cruiser, "Dido" class	UK	Completed 1944, refitted 1957, adapted for training 1961. Displacement: 5900-7560 t.
1956	1	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335.375 t.
1956-57	2	Destroyer, "Battle" class	UK	Completed 1946. One refitted in UK 1956. One refitted in US under MAP. Displacement: 2325-3361 t.
1957	2	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335-375 t.
1958	2	Destroyer, "CV" class	UK	Completed 1946. Refitted in UK under MAP. Displacement: 1730-2560 t.
1958	2	Destroyer, "Ch" class	US/UK	Completed 1945; purchased by USA under MAP from UK and refitted in UK. 1 scrapped. Displacement: 335-375 t.
1959	2	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335-375 t.
1959	1	Tug	USA	Completed 1943; transferred under MAP. Displacement: 1235-1675 t.
(1959)	1	Water carrier	Italy/USA	Offshore procurement; built for MAP
1960	2	Tug	Italy/USA	Offshore procurement; built for MAP

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1960	1	Oiler	Italy/ USA	Offshore procurement; built for MAP. Dis- placement: 600-1255 t.
1962	1	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335-375 t.
1963	1	Oiler	USA	On loan under MAP. Dis- placement: 5730-22380 t.
1963	1	Oiler	USA	Transferred under MAP. Displacement: 335-337 t.
1964	1	Submarine, "Tench" class	ISA	Ex-US. Completed 1945; on loan. Displacement: 1670 t. standard, 1864 t. surface
1965	4	Patrol boat "Town"	UK	Completed 1965. Dis- placement: 115-143 t.

Armoured fighting vehicles

(1954-55)		M-24 Chaffee	USA
(1954-55)	200	M-4 Sherman	USA
1954-55	50	M-41 Bulldog	USA
1955-60	460	M-47 and M-48 Patton	USA
(1960-62)	(50)	M-113	USA
1965-66	(80)	T-59	China

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third
World, 1971, pp. 836-838.

(c) Economic Aid to Pakistan

"It is not philanthropy that motivates us. But there is a hard-headed self-interest in this programme"³³ The American aid, though exhibited in a humanitarian garb, its hard core was constituted by political motives. Aid is an instrument of foreign policy which always seeks to safeguard U.S. national security and interest, no matter whether it goes against the security and interests of the recipient nations. "We did not decide in advance that it was wise to grant billions annually as foreign economic aid. We adopted that policy in response to the Communist efforts to sabotage the free economies of Western Europe"³⁴.

To assess the national power it is not enough to take into account the defence capabilities of a nation. It is also essential to evaluate the economic power; indeed, the latter is the base of the former. Hence it is also necessary,

-
- (Washington)
- 33 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 658, 4 February 1952, p. 156.
See, "Understanding Foreign Aid", Headline Series no. 160, 1963, p. 54. "If aid is really to serve U.S. interests effectively, most people would contend, it must have certain strings tied to it". Ibid., p. 54.
- See, Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 265.
- See, Edward S. Mason, Promoting Economic Development: The United States and Southern Asia (California: Castle Press, Pasadena, 1955), p. 13.
- 34 Department of State Bulletin (Washington), vol. 30, no. 761, 25 January 1954, p. 107.

when an assessment of the military assistance granted to Pakistan is made, to calculate the total economic aid which has flowed into that country. The military assistance combined with the economic aid and other assistance would give a complete picture of the U.S. investment of military interests in Pakistan.

Since independence, Pakistan received from the United States \$4 billion for economic development and India \$10 billion.³⁵ Economic aid to Pakistan until the end of the U.S. fiscal year 1965 has been recorded to be between \$2.5 and 3 billion.³⁶ A significant increase in the amount of American economic aid was visible after the MDAP in 1954. Foreign assistance which came only trickling down till 1954 increased in volume to the tune of 5 per cent of the G.N.P. in 1959 to 1960 and to 6.3 per cent in 1964 to 1965.³⁷

Pakistan's meagre share of U.S. aid up to 1954 was 0.2 per cent of the total economic aid disbursed to the various underdeveloped countries. This slender percentage of 0.2 of U.S. aid up to 1954 steadily increased to 2.9 per cent in 1958 and 7.9 per cent in 1964. (See Table II)

35 Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to the Congress, 9 February 1972, p. 48.

36 New York Times, 30 August 1965; see Norman D. Palmer, "India and Pakistan: The Major Recipients", Current History, vol. 44, November 1965, p. 263.

37 Government of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, June 1965, p. 8.

Table II

Major U.S. Government Foreign Assistance to Pakistan
(in millions of dollars)

Year	(a) Aid to Pakistan	(b) Total U.S. aid (a)	(c) as % of (b)
Upto December 1953	99	47,835	.2
Fiscal Year 1954	12	5,181	.2
Fiscal Year 1955	67	4,856	1.3
Fiscal Year 1958	145	4,926	2.9
Fiscal Year 1961	218	4,248	5.1
Fiscal Year 1963	380	5,148	7.3
Fiscal Year 1964	377	4,715	7.9

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, Table 1197, p. 873; 1965, Table 1232, p. 864.

A total increase in American commitments for economic aid too was clearly discernible in the period after 1954. In 1955 following the MDAP, the U.S. commitment for economic aid to Pakistan was in the vicinity of \$63 million. But this seemed to have notably augmented to the periphery of \$214 million in 1964. Pakistan stood to gain a substantial amount of economic aid from the consortium pledges besides getting aid from other countries. (Table III) Stretching through a

period from 1961 to 1965, Pakistan is estimated to have received from the consortium source, a total of \$1818 million.³⁸ The increase of economic aid to Pakistan is not without its military implications for the United States. It seemed to have been a subsidy to maintain the huge war machinery Pakistan was trying to set up after the MDAP. After all, supply of sophisticated weapons, alone would not leave Pakistan in a comfortable position against any threat whatsoever. American personnel were required to train the Pakistanis in the manipulation of these weapons. Besides, spares, services, maintenance, all these would cost a fabulous amount, which Pakistan would not be able to meet. Article 1 of the MDAP makes provision for such economic aid when it stipulates "that the U.S. Government would make available to Pakistan such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as the U.S. Government may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed...."

38 IBRD Press Release 64/27, 16 July 1964 and Planning Advisory Staff, Office of the Assistant Director for Development Planning, USAID, Karachi, Statistical Fact Book: Selected Economic and Social Data on Pakistan, May 1965, Table 10.2.

Table III
 Foreign Economic Aid to Pakistan
 (As of 31 December 1961)
 (in million dollars)

Country or Agency	Allocation	Utilization
United States	1,523.83	1,213.46
Canada	121.56 (a)	104.15 (a)
Australia	25.90	23.41
UK	5.74 (a)	5.75 (a)
New Zealand	5.68	5.68 (a)
Japan, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore and India	0.21 (b)	0.21 (b)
West Germany	2.52	2.52
Sweden	0.63	0.63
UN and Specialised Agencies	20.52	10.31
Ford Foundation	21.26	17.21
	1,728.95	1,383.61

(a) As of June 30, 1961

(b) As of June 30, 1960

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Rawalpindi, Foreign Economic Aid A Review of: Foreign Economic Aid to Pakistan, 1962, pp. 110-11.

(d) Defence Expenditure of Pakistan

There was a staggering amount of expenditure on defence

in Pakistan in the years immediately following independence. The defence expenditure for 1947-48 was 77.44 per cent of the total revenue of Pakistan which then amounted to Rs.1989 lakhs. In 1948-49, the total revenue was Rs. 6676 lakhs but the defence expenditure remained 69.11 per cent. The percentage in military expenditure following the MDAP of 1954 decreased considerably for obvious reasons of military aid. In 1959-60, with a total revenue of Rs.1,5846 lakhs 57.37 per cent only was spent on defence. (Table IV)

Table IV
Budgetary Position of the Central Government
of Pakistan

Year	Total Revenue Receipts	Total Expenditure met from revenue ^(A)	Defence ^(B) Services	(b) as % of (a)
	(Rs. in lakhs)			
1947-48	19,89	23,60 (-3,71)	15,38	77.44
1948-49	66,76	64,70	46,15	69.11
1949-50	88,54	85,60	62,54	73.06
1950-51	1,27,32	1,26,62	64,99	51.32
1951-52	1,44,84	1,44,23	77,91	54.01
1952-53	1,33,43	1,32,01	78,34	59.34
1953-54	1,11,05	1,10,87	65,31	58.90
1954-55	1,15,70	1,15,01	63,93	55.58
1955-56	1,29,92	1,29,71	76,94	53.05
1956-57	1,29,83	1,29,41	73,79	57.02

Year	Total Revenue Receipts	Total Expenditure met from revenue (Rs. in lakhs)	Defence Services	(b) as % of (a)
1957-58	1,46,77	1,47,37 (-60)	79,35	53.84
1958-59	1,53,83	1,43,54	80,85	56.31
1959-60	1,58,46	1,51,46	85,85	57.37

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, The Budget for 1958-59, and 1959-60, Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1958, pp. 364-65.

Of the total capital expenditure for the year 1948-49 which came to be Rs.499.9 million, 23.42 per cent was expended on defence services. Just before the MDAP of 1954, the expenditure on defence services came to be about 19 per cent of the total capital expenditure of Rs.794.8 million. But following the MDAP, there was a sharp fall in expenditure of defence services with 11.41 per cent for the total capital expenditure of Rs.694.4 million. In 1960, the total capital expenditure came to Rs.1,797.4 million. But, the expenditure on defence services in 1960 was only 1.05 per cent (Rs.18.9 million).³⁹ (Table V)

39 Pakistan 1958-59 (Karachi: Pakistani Publications), p. 41.

Table V

Capital Expenditure of the Central Government
of Pakistan from year to year

(Rs. in million)

Year	Total Development Expenditure	Total Non-developmental expenditure	Defence Services (Non-Develop.) (a)	Total Capital Expenditure (b)	(a) as % of (b)
1948-49	201.8	209.1	116.1	499.9	23.48
1949-50	335.1	738.1	126.7	1,072.2	11.81
1950-51	233.7	280.4	53.1	514.1	10.32
1951-52	414.2	536.1	122.8	950.3	13.97
1952-53	435.6	475.1	211.1	910.7	23.17
1953-54	643.4	151.4	149.2	794.8	19.00
1954-55	572.8	76.6	74.1	649.4	11.41
1955-56	765.3	220.9	51.2	986.2	5.19
1956-57	715.3	149.8	982.1	865.1	9.49
1957-58	661.9	941.6	52.5	1,603.5	3.27
1958-59	1,492.4*	- 12.3	76.0	1,480.1	0.51
1959-60	1,596.6	300.8	18.9	1,797.4	1.05

Source: Appendix - B Pakistan 1958-59 (Karachi, Pakistan Publication), pp. 32-33.

Two facts stand out clearly from the analysis of the defence expenditure. First, Pakistan, from its very inception as an independent State spent a massive sum on defence, because of the immediate danger it seemed to have felt from

its big neighbour, India. Second, the fact that defence service expenses tapered down to a considerable level after the MDAP of 1954, makes clear the truth of the assumption that American economic and military assistance substantially helped Pakistan to build its entire military force and maintain it.

B. INDIA'S RESPONSE TO MDAP: U.S. ALLIANCE POLICY INDUCING A LOCAL ARMS RACE

India refused to believe in or accept the division of the world into two mutually antagonistic power blocs. With this India also rejected all the basic assumptions of the cold war as well. Moreover, India wanted to pursue an independent policy of equidistance from both the military blocs and judge every issue on the basis of its merits. This was the essence of India's policy of non-alignment.⁴⁰

When Pakistan decided to join the U.S. alliance system, India viewed it as a grave development because it would endanger the security of the sub-continent and destroy the chances of any settlement of the disputes between India and Pakistan. Nehru warned that the MDAP would change the situation in the Indian sub-continent. And it did change. With a prophetic vision, he declared in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954 that

40 K.R. Narayanan, "New Perspectives in Indian Foreign Policy", The Round Table (London), no. 248, October 1972, p. 453. See also, Som Dutt, "India and the Bomb", Adelphi Papers (The Institute for Strategic Studies, London), no. 30, November 1966, p. 5.

the "step adds to the feeling of insecurity in Asia. It is, therefore, a wrong step from the point of view of peace and removal of tensions".⁴¹

Still more emphatic was Nehru's assessment of the military assistance to Pakistan when he addressed the 59th session of the Indian National Congress on 23 February: "If Pakistan accepts this aid, she becomes a part of the group of nations lined up against another group. She becomes potentially a war area and her policies will be progressively controlled by others... The other fact that - this military aid might possibly be used against India - cannot be ignored".⁴² Nehru did not live up to 1965 to see the fulfilment of his accurate prediction.

Hence India could not remain indifferent to these developments which jeopardised her security. India's military response was not so immediately discernible from a perusal of her defence spending since 1954. This was mainly because the already existing military ratio between India and Pakistan since the Partition was so disproportionate that India initially enjoyed a built-in advantage. However, unlike Pakistan, India attempted to gradually reduce her dependence on arms procurement by introducing self-reliance

41 Parliamentary Debates (India), vol. 1, no. 6, 22 February 1954, col. 432.

42 Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, p. 13461. 1952-54.

in arms production. Even here, the results were not immediately noticeable. But it was regarded as an important step in insulating the big Powers from interfering in the internal affairs of India.

Pakistan's dependence on foreign powers compromising its self-respect, dignity and honour never seemed to have bothered its ruling class. Hence the principle of self-reliance also did not make any difference to Pakistan. But, to India, despite all its dependence on foreign aid, the very idea of dependence was so repugnant to its national sovereignty. The tragedy of Pakistan is its complete reliance on foreign powers. The deep seated fear and hatred of India are responsible for this pernicious policy of Pakistan.

However, with the increase in the foreign arms supply the force level between the two countries began to create disequilibrium in the sub-continent.⁴³ Since then India's military response was becoming more visible, although it did not precipitate a steep arms race, as it happened after the Chinese aggression in 1962. Yet, India's military budget and other collateral measures indicated an upward trend in India's military spending. (Table VI)

43 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The New Balance of Power in South Asia", Pacific Community, vol. 3, no. 4, July 1972, p. 701.

India

Table VI

Defence Expenditure as percentage of
G.N.P.

(In crores of Rs.)

Year	Defence Ex- penditure (net)	Net National Product at current prices	Percentage
1949-50	150.81	9,010	1.7
1950-51	163.31	9,530	1.8
1951-52	181.13	9,970	1.8
1952-53	185.49	9,820	1.9
1953-54	196.45	10,480	1.9
1954-55	195.12	9,610	2.0
1955-56	189.83	9,980	1.9
1956-57	211.84	11,310	1.8
1957-58	279.66	11,390	2.4
1958-59	278.81	12,600	2.2
1959-60	266.98	12,950	2.0

Source: Defence Budget 1972-73, A Seminar Report, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, vol. 4, April 1972, no. 4, Appendix 1, p. 434.

(Contd. on next page)

India

Table VI

Defence Expenditure as percentage of
G.N.P.

(In crores of Rs.)

Year	Defence Ex- penditure (net)	G.N.P. at current prices	Percentage
1960-61	280.94	14029	2.0
1961-62	312.49	14860	2.1
1962-63	473.91	15803	3.0
1963-64	816.12	18088	4.5
1964-65	805.80	21176	3.8
1965-66	884.76	21839	4.1
1966-67	908.59	25285*	3.6
1967-68	968.43	29899*	3.2
1968-69	1033.67	30329*	3.4
1969-70	1100.88	33019*	3.3
1970-71	1199.28	Not available	---
1971-72 (Re)	1410.97	Not available	---
1972-73 (BE)	1408.36	---	---

Growth rate in 1970-71 was 4.7% and for 1971-72 it is estimated to be 4%.

A close study of the Indian budget for defence from 1954 to 1962 would indicate a gradual rise in defence production and procurement of armaments from various countries.

Whereas the percentage of defence expenditure remained on an average below 2 per cent of the GNP upto 1954, it remained over 2 per cent on an average of the GNP after 1954. (Table VI) The percentage of GNP for defence expenditure did not indicate substantial increase, but it was not insignificant.

Judging from the Western standard, the Indian defence expenditure looked to be very low. And India had reasons to keep it low whether or not the reasons proffered were valid. From the time of independence India pursued a policy of non-alignment. It would seem that neither the Communists nor the "Free World" would use their military strength to threaten India's sovereignty. Under the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, "the Indian defence budget was kept at minimal levels and because no large scale assistance was accepted from either the West or the Communist Bloc, Indian training and arms continued at a level which most nations had surpassed in World War II"⁴⁴.

At any rate, the Indian defence expenditure tended to mount high after Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. (Table VII) To counteract the various measures adopted by the U.S. in modernising the Pakistani armed forces, India had to make provisions for a better equipped army. The U.S. assistance programme for Pakistan included the improvement of airfields,

44 Harold A. Hovey, op. cit., p. 100.

supply depots, maintenance shops, hospitals and barracks. Substantial effort and money must have been diverted into developing basic logistic facilities. India's efforts to improve her own defence may be gauged from the various developments between 1947 and 1973. Strength of the armed forces in 1947 was only 300,000. Now it totals, 1,000,000. Back in 1947, there were only 16 ordinance factories in the country manned by less than two dozen Indian officers, producing mostly subsidiary items and serving as feeders to the main arms supplying sources in Britain and elsewhere. There are 30 such factories now, to which have been added eight public sector undertakings as a completely new feature of the arms-producing system. They turn out small arms, anti-aircraft guns, 7.62 rifles, 75mm. mountain guns, anti-tank missiles, Vijayanta tanks and armoured personnel carriers for the army, supersonic interceptors, fighter bombers, medium transport helicopters and radar equipment for the Air Force and frigates and patrol craft for the navy. The Estimates Committee of Parliament recorded that the Ordinance factories supplied materials worth Rs.10 crores in 1952; now the figure is Rs.300 crores.⁴⁵ While Pakistan was trying to depend more on aid, India set off to produce weapons from indigenous resources.

45 Indian Express (New Delhi), 2 February 1973.

Table VII

Indian Central Government Revenue and Expenditure
(in 1,000 million rupees)

Year	Current Revenue	Current Expenditure	Civil	Defence	Defence current	as a % of expenditure
1950	8.03	6.59	3.71	1.88	29.0	
1951	9.17	6.89	3.88	1.97	28.6	
1952	8.44	7.11	4.06	1.98	27.9	
1953	8.51	7.35	4.35	2.09	28.5	
1954	9.09	7.76	4.62	2.10	25.8	
1955	10.28	8.58	5.12	2.03	23.7	
1956	11.66	9.58	5.61	2.26	23.6	
1957	13.22	11.20	6.27	2.93	26.2	
1958	13.90	12.00	6.99	2.92	24.3	
1959	15.20	12.87	7.60	2.83	22.0	
1960	16.83	14.09	8.39	2.97	21.1	
1961	18.71	15.63	9.27	3.31	21.1	
1962	20.75	19.12	10.49	5.21	27.7	

(The figures represent 1,000 million rupees and were obtained from the United States, Year Book of National Statistics.)

Source: Quoted from Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest For Security, 1947-1965 (Dehradun: EBD Publishing & Distributing Co., 1967), p. 221.

Weapon Purchases from 1954-1965: India

Between 1954 and 1958 a number of major weapons were purchased by India. This was in response to Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. and its understanding that it would join both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO). Orders for Canberras, Gnats and Mysteres were placed in 1954 as part of the planned expansion of the Indian Air Force (IAF) which had been envisaged at the time of independence.⁴⁶ Orders for Hunters and additional Canberras and Ouragans closely followed reports that Pakistan was to receive F-86 Sabre fighters and B-57 Canberra bombers from the United States. AMX-13 light tanks were ordered from France after Pakistan had received M-41 Bulldogs from the United States. The order for MiG-21s was signed with the Soviet Union, in 1962 was invariably referred to in connection with the promise of United States to supply two squadrons of F-140s to Pakistan.⁴⁷ (Table VIII)

46 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1971), p. 475.

47 Ibid., p. 475.

See, Vinod Gupta, Anderson Papers (Delhi: Indian School Supply Depot, 1972), pp. 65-73.

INDIA

Table VIII

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
		<u>Aircraft</u>		
1954	6	Sikorsky S-55	USA	
1954	26	Fairchild C-119G Jet Packet	USA	
1955	2	II-14	USSR	Gift
1955	2	Vickers Vis- count 730 and 723	UK	
1955	10	Auster AOP.9	UK	
1956	20	Auster AOP.9	UK	
1956	30	NA T-6G	USA	
1956-60	50	HAL/DH Vampire T.55	UK/ India	Produced under licence in India
(1957)	33	Dassault Ouragan	France	
1957	6	DHC-3 Otter	Canada	
1957-58	6	Bell 47G-3B	USA	
1957-61	160	Hawker Hunter F.56	UK	
1957-61	22	Hawker Hunter T.66	UK	
1958	5	Fairey Firefly T.T.4	UK	
1958	66	English Elec- tric Canberra B(1)58	UK	

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1958	8	English Electric Canberra PR 57	UK	
1958	6	English Electric Canberra T.4	UK	
1958	20	DHC-3 Otter	Canada	
1958	110	Dassault Mystere IVA	France	Ordered in 1956
1960-62	100	HAL/Folland Gnat	UK/India	Produced under li- cense in India; 25 complete Gnats; 15 sets of components
1960	2	Sikorsky S-62	USA	Supplied for evalua- tion. Cost: \$540000
1960	24	II-14	USSR	
1960	8	Armstrong Whit- worth Seahawk	UK	
1961	10	Mi-4	USSR	u.c. \$150000; sold for cash
1961	8	An-12	USSR	
1961	29	Fairchild C-119G Packet	USA	
1961	15	Breguet 1050 Alize	France	
1961	6	Bell 47-G-3B	USA	
1961-62	13	Armstrong Whit- worth Seahawk	UK	
(1962)	(23)	Fairchild C-119G Packet	USA	
1962	8	DH Vampire T.55	Indonesia	
1962	16	Mi-4	USSR	For cash
1962	8	An-12	USSR	

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1962	2	DHC-4 Caribou	USA	MAP
1962-64	12	Lockheed C-130 Hercules	USA	Free loan basis with air and ground crews provided
1963	5	Auster AOP.9	UK	
1963	3	Armstrong Whitworth Sea Hawk	UK	
1963	6	MiG-21	USSR	
1963	24	Fairchild C-119G Packet	USA	MAP
1963	20	Sud Alouette III	France	
1963	5	DHC-3 Otter	Canada	Emergency aid
1963	8	Douglas C-47	Canada	Emergency aid
1963	36	CCF T-6 Harvard	Canada	Emergency aid
1963	6	Mi-4	USSR	For cash
1963	8	An-12	USSR	
1963-64	16	DHC-4 Caribou	Canada	On loan
1965	6	BAC Canberra B(1)58	UK	
1965	36	Mi-4	USSR	On deferred payments
1965-67	10	HAL/HS-748	UK/India	Produced under licence in India
1965-67	60	MiG-21	USSR	Direct purchase
1965-68	57	MiG-21	USSR/India	Produced under licence in India

Naval vessels

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1954-55	2	Inshore Minesweeper, "Ham" class	U.K	Launched 1954. Displacement: 120-170 t.
1956	4	Coastal Minesweeper, "Ton" class	UK	Completed 1956. Displacement: 360-425 t.
1957	1	Cruiser, "Colony" class	UK	Completed 1940. Refitted in 1954. Displacement: 8700-11040 t.
1957-58	4	Seaward defence craft, "Savitri" class	Italy	Completed 1 in 1957, 3 in 1958. Displacement: 63 t.
1958	1	Anti-aircraft frigate, "Leopard" class	UK	Completed 1958. Displacement: 2251-2515 t.
1958	3	Anti-submarine frigate, "Backwood" class	UK	Completed 1 in 1958, 2 in 1959. Displacement: 1180-1456 t.
1959	2	Seaward defence craft, "Sharada" class	Yugoslavia	Completed 1959. Displacement: 86 t.
1960	2	Anti-aircraft frigate, "Leopard" class	UK	Completed 1960. Displacement: 2251-2515 t.
1960	2	Anti-submarine frigate, "Whitby" class	UK	Completed 1960. Displacement: 2144-2545 t.
1961	1	Aircraft carrier, "Majestic" class	UK	Launched 1945. Sold to India; 1957; Completed 1961. Displacement: 16000-19500 t.

Armoured fighting vehicles

1953	180	Sherman M-4	USA
------	-----	-------------	-----

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1956-57	210	Centurion	UK	
1957-58	40	AMX-13	France	
1964	70	PT-76	USSR	
1965-68	66	Vijayanta	UK/India	Version of Vickers 37 produced under licence in India; indigenous content 43%

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World, 1971, pp. 833-36.

C. SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

From the brief analysis of the budgetary figures of Pakistan and India, the economic aid given to both countries by the United States and the pattern of arms procurement by them, few conclusions may be arrived at:

1) A state of conflict governed the relations of India and Pakistan from the very inception of the latter. The conflict was purely of local origin and remained a local conflict of an indigenous variety till 1954 when it got enmeshed in the bloc politics.

2) The U.S. intervention through economic and military assistance in the politics of the sub-continent further complicated the issue and seemed to have been to the advantage

of the intervening power.

3) Through a programme of economic aid and military assistance, the U.S. was able to influence Pakistan's foreign and defence policies.

4) The U.S.-Pak MDAP induced India to divert huge sums that could have been spared for economic development instead of building up armaments.

5) The MDAP of 1954 initiated a local arms race in the Indian sub-continent through the knowledge and active connivance of the United States.

The institutionalized military presence of the United States in Pakistan emboldened Pakistan to adopt a vigorously hostile attitude to India which ultimately exploded itself into an open conflict in 1965. The stockpile of modern weapons stimulated the military junta to take to a warlike path to settle scores with India. Though an arms race need not necessarily lead two States to war, here is a case in which the very presence of sophisticated weapons instigates a small power to quixotic adventures. In this conflict, the United States was responsible for sustaining the ever-increasing arms build-up, a false sense of parity with India, and bellicosity against India. This warlike mood in Pakistan was reciprocated by India by way of accelerating its defence capabilities to thwart any pre-emptive Pakistani aggression.

The chain reaction leading to massive arms build up on either side, was in the nature of a local arms race. The

MDAP was the first step directly responsible for disturbing the local military equation existing in the Indian sub-continent. It was a futile exercise in semantics when the United States assured India in 1954 that weapons supplied to Pakistan under the MDAP were meant to be used against Communist aggression and not against India.⁴⁸ But, by now, the world has realized that two wars (1965, 1971) were not of India's making but by Pakistan and her ally, the United States. The United States should accept full responsibility for arming Pakistan to the teeth through the policy of military assistance programme.⁴⁹ "It is easy for an Indian to understand that Pakistan could not have posed the threat it did to India over the last two decades, on its own strength, without the active support they received from the United States and lately from China. The threat to India's security arose not merely from Pakistan but from the policies pursued by the two big powers over the years. Pakistan's attitude and behaviour were only a symptom of a more fundamental security challenge posed to India by the two big powers".⁵⁰ This study is, however, concerned with the role of one Super Power, the United States.

48 Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954 (New York), p. 375.

49 Norman D. Palmer, "The Defense of South Asia", Orbis, vol. 9, no. 4, 1966, p. 919.

50 K. Subrahmanyam, Our National Security (New Delhi, Federation House, December 1972), p. 2.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, an attempt has been made to examine two Indo-Pakistan conflicts, one without a Super Power involvement (1947-48) and the other with the Super Power involvement (1965). It is quite evident from the study that the US alliance policy and arms supply to Pakistan transformed a primal conflict into an endless military confrontation and recurring wars. The analysis of the role of the United States in the military build-up of Pakistan has also demonstrated that the local arms race is the offshoot of American involvement in the regional politics of the Indian sub-continent. Apart from its pernicious effect on the regional security, the conclusion to be drawn is that this variety of Super Power intervention is bound to destabilize a whole region for a long period. It is immaterial whether the region is strategically less important to the USA or not. Its immediate consequence has been to induct big power rivalry into the Indian sub-continent, the intention being, to exploit the economic backwardness and political instability by diverting domestic resources and energy to a proxy arms race to serve Super Power interests. Domination of the Third World has been the neo-colonialist strategy of the United States.

Unfortunately the poor and developing nations are the victims of their own making, though one is inclined to blame the interventionist policies of the Super Powers. Perhaps,

these nations would have turned their attention to the serious problems of development, had they not been influenced by the policies of the Super Powers. This is one of the important lessons both India and Pakistan should have learnt from the three futile wars they have fought.

The local arms race between India and Pakistan has certain special characteristics. It is not so simple and so visible as the arms race between the Super Powers. In the case of India and Pakistan, the annual military budgets, the G.N.P. percentage of military spending and other barometers, indicating the arms race do not reflect the parallel arms race. This is a more subtle form of arms race, cleverly concealed behind such statistics. All the same it can be seen and its effect can be felt. The ever increasing physical presence of enormous quantities of highly sophisticated weapons and equipments in Pakistan and India is an evidence of the typical local arms race. These include large quantity of unaccounted weaponry given to Pakistan by the United States under classified items. ~~It~~

In the local arms race, the major effort to run the race was clearly that of Pakistan because she had to match India's superior strength. Purely in a local context, India's lead over Pakistan till 1954 was so preponderant that an arms race with India alone would bring Pakistan anywhere nearer to India's strength. But when once the proxy arms race started, Pakistan became too ambitious, not only to establish parity

with India and safeguard her security against any perceived threat but also to overtake India in this race. Perhaps Pakistan would have succeeded in this game, had it not been for the Chinese aggression in 1962 which was, indeed, a blessing in disguise for India. Since then, Pakistan lost the race against India and it was convincingly proved in the 1971 war.

However, it is a proxy arms race because the United States is the major source of the arms supply to Pakistan. When once these supplies are stopped or withheld, the arms race automatically comes to an end. This reveals the artificial character of the local arms race which is entirely dependent on foreign interventionist Powers. Whereas the Super Powers have complete control over the global arms race which is entirely of their own making and based on their own resources, the local arms race is propped up and controlled from outside. Needless to say that a global arms race has been characterised by its nuclear component and by the enormous cost. But the local arms race is still conventional and less expensive. Other symptoms of the local arms race which resemble the global arms race are tension, distrust, suspicion, fear and destabilisation.

It is clearly evident that the regional or local powers are incapable of sustaining a continuous and costly military build up. However, their mutual hostility drives them into the open arms of the Super Powers to whom they

cling on, in perpetual dependence, so long as they have to obtain arms and other military hardwares from the big Powers. The local wars in the Third World are distinctly different from the kind of local wars described in the strategic studies of Western writers. According to them local wars may escalate into general nuclear war depending on the degree of direct Super Power interests. However, there is only a remote possibility of local wars and conflicts occurring in the Third World developing into a major nuclear war. This is because the Super Powers have defined in advance the escalation threshold of such local wars. A low intensity or high intensity conventional war has been ordained on the periphery by the Super Powers. It is true that in Korea and Vietnam, the use of nuclear weapons was considered by the US military command. But, then the Super Powers again decided to keep both the wars at the level of a protracted and ferocious conventional war. The main thrust of the local arms race is to maintain the conventional character of the local war. Since the objectives of the local arms race are confined to the local issues even with Super Powers intervention, the basic character of the local war in the Third World does not change. One thing is certain, this type of conflict need not escalate into a nuclear war.

After three major encounters between India and Pakistan (1947-48, 1965 and 1971) and their traumatic and ruinous effect, more particularly on Pakistan, have the local actors

learnt any lessons? Have they realized that it is the senseless arms race/arms build-up and their military approach that brought about this calamity? Have the local powers realized that without self-sufficiency in arms they cannot afford to sustain a policy of arms build-up, if not arms race, by almost exclusively relying on arms supply from outside?

Since the root cause of all the major conflicts of this nature has always been the involvement of the Super Powers and their arms supply policy, it is desirable to control local conflict through the introduction of some form of arms control measures. It might be asked what sort of arms control measure can be envisaged in the regional and local rivalries? One measure that could be thought of is self-reliance rather than a dependent policy of procuring arms from outside. This would have real control over their arms policies. According to Hedley Bull, arms control is essentially the restraint on the arms policy of a nation engaged in an arms race with a rival country.¹ A second arms control measure could probably be to bilaterally or otherwise agree upon not to enter into an arms race, either by direct arms supply deal with others or by joining the alliance system.

Security is often a psychological problem. Sometimes, the very proximity of a big nation may be perceived as a security threat to a small nation, although, in reality, it

1 Hedley Bull, op. cit., p. 65.

may not be so. This has been amply shown in the case of India-Pakistan relations, where all the Pakistani fears of neighbouring India as a source of insecurity have been exaggerated. It was only the anti-Indian policies of Pakistan, sometimes in collusion with one or more Super Powers every time, that endangered Pakistani security. It is evident from the India-Pakistan wars of 1948-49 and 1965.

Even if Pakistan had exaggerated her fear complex, if only the Super Powers had influenced the political thinking and outlook of Pakistan to revert to a saner attitude and approach to international relations, Pakistan would have very well, perhaps, avoided the confrontations with India. In all the wars Pakistan fought against India, it was not India but Pakistan which took the initiative to commit aggression, because it was emboldened by the support of the United States. If Pakistan, on the other hand, had opted to live in peace with India on the basis of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence, as India has often been advocating, the history of ^{The} sub-continent would have been so different and wholesome. If Pakistan had a more positive approach to international relations, instead of an entirely negative policy towards India, and had Pakistan not joined the military alliance and attempted to involve a Super Power in her domestic problems, perhaps, Pakistan could have settled all her outstanding issues with India and lived in peace and amity with India.

In spite of all the high expectations of Pakistan, it could not succeed in making the United States fight her battle against India. On the contrary, the United States was always indicating that though it accepted Pakistan as its ally and friend, it did not consider India as an enemy. For the United States, the enemy has always been international communism. However, the U.S. was furious about India taking a defiant stand against the U.S. global policies.

India has been consistently following a non-aligned policy which ran counter to the American cold war policy and bloc rivalries. Hence, India incurred the ire of the United States in whose perverted thinking, India was not an autonomous centre of Power of any consequence in South Asia. With her backing of Pakistan militarily, the United States was always trying to equate India with Pakistan. This proved to be really disastrous to Pakistan. Pakistan's diplomatic moves were always to counter the policy of non-alignment pursued by India and to accomplish it, Pakistan adopted a policy of expediency, compromising her national sovereignty, independence, dignity and even national interests. In international relations, unequal military partnership, especially with a Super Power, creates enormous expectations in the weaker partners. They often tend to be living on false hopes and mere illusions. The mighty alliance must have raised great military expectations in Pakistan. And expectations are, as the saying goes, fulfilment in anticipation.

But here precisely has Pakistan misread the American policy of alliance building and brought upon itself a multiplicity of troubles and problems. On what ground did Pakistan venture on to wage war with India in 1965 or in 1971? Did not Pakistan entertain false hopes that the United States would intervene directly at any time in the course of the war to help out an ally? One should admit that either Pakistan did expect a situation in which the US would intervene to slash the Indian forces and ensure a victory for Pakistan or the rulers of Pakistan committed a Himalayan blunder by initiating a war against India - a mightier power than three Pakistans put together - with the hope of defeating India with the sophisticated weapons and equipments received from the United States. Conflict with India has brought no gain for Pakistan except the sombre realization that India is growing in strength and becoming a mightier power after every such encounter. Yet Pakistan is fighting shy to accept this reality.

Pakistan was plagued with feuds and strifes which kept the nation continuously unstable. In the first ten years of its existence, Pakistan was under civilian rule which brought ruin on itself. Then the 'night of the Generals' began to roost the political rostrum and it ended up with the dismemberment of Pakistan. Since then, politicians are back in the game once again. But the "prospects of a lasting political stability in Pakistan remain

uncertain at least. Further, after 25 years of independence² Pakistan has yet to establish a democratic tradition". Endless instability, wounded pride, bitter suspicion of India are still rocking the country. "Conflict with India - even though its futility is widely recognized - still seems to condition much official thinking in Islamabad"³. It looks as though Pakistan has not come to terms with itself yet.

But India which preferred to live by certain principles⁴ rather than by political expediency and follow a more positive approach to international relations rather than by haphazard and wayward policies pursued by Pakistan, has been able to attain greater domestic stability and democratic credibility; to forge unity and solidarity among diverse creeds, castes and linguistic groups and impart a better sense of national purpose. The basic policy of India's non-alignment is still valid. India has become more self-reliant

2 The Times (London), 22 March 1973, p. 1.

3 Ibid., p. 1.

4 Louis Fischer, Russia, America and the World (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1961).

"Independent India began life equipped with the Gandhian philosophy of the individual - above all and committed to secular rule, social reform and economic planning which Nehru and many other leading Indians had long advocated. But Pakistan came into this world naked except for the word: Islam. This might have sufficed. Yet as President Ayub Khan has himself written, "in our ignorance we began to regard the Islamic ideology as synonymous with begotry and theocracy and sub-consciously began to fight shy of it..." Ibid., p. 165.

and has been regarded as a dominant power in South Asia. The US objective of maintaining a balance of power in the sub-continent by tilting the balance of forces in favour of Pakistan has been completely defeated.⁵ Even the United States is now gradually realizing that India, which has all along been the dominant power in South Asia can no longer be equated with Pakistan.

These fundamentally opposite approaches to nation-building and international relations lie at the root of the local conflicts between India and Pakistan. And the Super Power interventionism has always been aggravating it and jeopardizing the security of the sub-continent. The menace of Super Power interventionism has got to be eliminated from the Third World. That alone will ensure their security and stability.

5 According to Sisir Gupta, one of the "erroneous" assumptions on which the U.S. policy towards the Indian sub-continent was based had been "that an Indo-Pakistani military balance was a viable concept and that it was beyond the capacity of the Indian State to breakout of the framework that had been imposed on the sub-continent since 1947". See, "The Great Powers and the Sub-Continent: A New Phase?", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1972, p. 458.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Department of State Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 658, 2 February 1952, p. 156.

_____, vol. 30, no. 761, 25 January 1954, p. 107.

Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954 (New York), p. 320.

_____, 1954 (New York), p. 375.

_____, 1954 (New York), pp. 379-383.

_____, 1956 (New York), pp. 342-44.

Government of Pakistan, Pakistan 1958-59 (Karachi Publications), p. 41

_____, The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, p. 8

_____, Ministry of Finance, Foreign Economic Aid: A Review of Foreign Economic Aid to Pakistan, 1962, pp. 110-111

_____, The Budget for 1958-59 and 1959-60 (Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1958), pp. 364-65

House Appropriation Committee, CY, 64, p. 349

Parliamentary Debates (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 6, 22 February 1954, col. 432.

Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s. The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to the Congress, p. 48

U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, p. 130

Secondary Sources

(a) Books:

Almond, Gabriel & Coleman, James J., (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

- Andrew, Mellor, India Since Partition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951).
- Appadorai, A., Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971).
- Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Friends Not Masters (London: Pakistan Branch University Press, 1967).
- Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959).
- Behari, Bepin, The Facts of Foreign Aid (Bombay: Vora and Co., Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1963).
- Bhargava, G.S., Pakistan in Crisis (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969).
- Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defence: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1962).
- Brines, Russell, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).
- Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).
- Burton, John W., Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962).
- Butwell, Richard, (ed.), Foreign Policies and the Developing Nations (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969).
- Callard, Keith, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1957).
- Cambell, Johnson A., Mission with Mountbatten (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1951).
- Carr, E.H., International Relations Between the Two World Wars (1919-39) (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1963).
- Chopra, Maharaj K., India: The Search for Power (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1969).
- Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relation (New York: Randon House, 1962).

- Coffin, Frank M., Witness for Aid (Boston: Mass. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964).
- Coward, Roberts H., Military Technology in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass: Centre for International Studies, MIT, 1964).
- Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1960).
- Falk, Richard A., and Medlowitz Saul H., (ed.), Disarmament and Economic Development - The Strategy of World Order, vol. IV (New York: World Law Fund, 1967).
- Feldman, Herbert, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- Fischer, Louis, Russia, America and the World (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1961).
- Fulbright, William J., Prospects of the West (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1963).
- Greene, Fred, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1968).
- Gross, Feliks, World Politics and Tension Areas (New York: University Press, 1966).
- Gupta, Das T.B., Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).
- Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir: A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966).
- Gupta, Vinod, Anderson Papers (Delhi: Indian School Supply Depot, 1972).
- Halperin, Morton H., Contemporary Military Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1968).
- Hartmann, Frederick H., The Relations of Nations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).
- _____, World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962).
- Hodson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969).

- Hotski, K.J., International Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967).
- Hovey, Harold A., United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick and Praeger Publishers, 1965).
- Jordan, Amos A. Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defence of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962).
- Kavic, Lorne J., India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965 (India: EBD Publishing & Distributing Co., Dehradun, 1967).
- Khan, Liaquat Ali, Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).
- Kundra, J.C., The Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954 (Djakarta: J.B. Wolters, Groningen, 1955).
- Latifi, Danial, India and U.S. Aid (Bombay: Art Printing, 1960).
- Lerche, Charles O., Jr., and Said, Abdul S., Concepts of International Politics (New Jersey: Eaglewood Cliffs, 1964).
- Luard, Evan, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1970).
- Lumby, E.W.R., The Transfer of Power in India: 1945-47 (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954).
- Mansergh, Nicholas, The Commonwealth Experience (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
- Mason, Edward S., Promoting Economic Developments - The United States and Southern Asia (California: Claremont Press, 1955).
- McNamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
- Misra, K.P., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969).
- Moon, Penderel, Divide and Quit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961).
- Moraes, Frank, India Today (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960).

- Morgenthau, Hans J., The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
- Noel-Baker, Philip, The Arms Race (London: Atlantic Book Publishing Co. Ltd., 1958).
- Northhedge, F.S., The Foreign Policies of the Super Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968).
- Osgood, Robert E., Alliance and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968).
- _____, Limited War: A Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1957).
- Palmer, Norman D., The Indian Political System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960).
- Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs 1954-56 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964).
- Richardson, Lewis F., Arms and Security (Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960).
- Rollistein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
- Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
- Sen Gupta, Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia (New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., Pegasus, 1970).
- Siddiqui, Aslam, Pakistan seeks Security (Calcutta, Orient Longmans Pvt. Ltd., 1960).
- Sinha, Kamaleshwar, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ISSI Publication, Delhi, 1972).
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971).
- Subrahmanyam, K., Our National Security (New Delhi: Federation House, 1972).
- William, Barnds J., India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).
- Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965).

Articles

- Abbott, George C., "Size, Viability, Nationalism and Politico-Economic Development", International Journal, vol. 25, 1969-70, p. 54.
- Aubert, Vilhelm, "Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 1, 1963, p. 26.
- A Group Study: "The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 9, no. 1, March 1956, pp. 37-50.
- Choudhury, G.W., "Pakistan-India Relations", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 11, no. 2, June 1958, p. 13.
- Dutt, Som D., "India and the Bomb", Adelphi Papers (London), no. 30, November 1966, p. 5
- Feierabend, Ivo K. and Fierabend Rosalind L., "Aggressive Behaviours within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-national Study", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 2, 1966, p. 249.
- Goldman, Rolf M., "A Theory of Conflict Process and Organizational Offices", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 3, 1966, p. 335.
- Gray, Colin S., "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World Politics, vol. 24, October 1971, pp. 39-79.
- Griffiths, Percival, "Pakistan Today", International Affairs (London), vol. 35, no. 3, July 1959, p. 319.
- XGupta, Sisir, "The Great Powers and the Sub-Continent", The X Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1972, p. 458.
- Gupta, Sisir, "The Great Powers and the Sub-Continent: A New Phase?", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1972, p. 458.
- Holsti, K.J., "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures in Procedures", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 3, 1966, p. 272.
- Ispahani, M.A.H., "The Ire of Pakistan", Asian Review, vol. 1, no. 1, November 1967, p. 13.

- Jackson, Robert, "The Great Powers and the Indian Sub-Continent", International Affairs (London), vol. 49, no. 1, January 1973, p. 47.
- Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, p. 13461.
- Khan, Rais Ahmad, "Pakistan in International Sphere", Pakistan Review, vol. IV, no. 1, January 1956, p. 18.
- Levi, Werner, "On the Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 4, 1960, pp. 411-20.
- Michalles, Vera D., "India: An Asian Success Story", Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 34, no. 11, February 1955, p. 88.
- Murphy, Rhodes, "Economic Conflicts in South Asia", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 1, 1960, p. 83.
- Narayanan, K.R., "New Perspectives in Indian Foreign Policy", The Round Table (London), no. 248, October 1972, p. 453.
- Palmer, Norman D., "India and Pakistan: The Major Recipients", Current History, vol. 44, no. 291, November 1965, p. 263.
- _____, "The Defence of South Asia", Orbis, vol. 9, no. 4, 1966, p. 919.
- Rummel, R.J., "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within Nations, 1946-59", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 1, 1966, p. 65.
- Sen Gupta, Bhabani, "The New Balance of Power in South Asia", Pacific Community, vol. 3, no. 4, July 1972, p. 700.
- Siddiqui, Aslam, "U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 12, no. 1, March 1959, p. 47.
- Spain, James W., "Military Assistance for Pakistan", American Political Science Review, vol. 48, no. 3, September 1954, pp. 748-49.
- Subrahmanyam, K., "Military Aid and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs Report, vol. 17, no. 11, November 1968, p. 109.

Trager, Frank N., "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure
in Diplomacy", Orbis, vol. 9, no. 3, 1965,
p. 613.

Newspapers

Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

Indian Express (New Delhi)

Motherland

New York Times

The Hindu

The Times (London)