

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

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PREFACE

This study seeks to analyse India's role in the Bandung Conference, an important landmark in the history of post-war resurgence of Afro-Asia.

The present essay is divided into three parts. The first chapter reviews the developments which prepared the ground for the Bandung Conference - the interaction among the Afro-Asian countries at the United Nations, Colombo Conference and the Bogor Conference.

The second chapter examines the Indian performance at the Bandung Conference. Pandit Nehru undoubtedly was the most renowned and experienced statesman present at the Bandung Conference. Krishna Menon again was a veteran diplomat. A critical examination of their performance in the various committees and 'behind the scene' is attempted in this chapter. Not all the countries participating in the Conference were non-aligned. Clashes between India's advocates of peaceful co-existence and the members of pacts and alliances became inevitable. This necessitated the Indian diplomacy of accommodation.

The third chapter deals with the reaction of different countries to the Indian role in the Afro-Asian Conference. The survey of various other perceptions of Indian performance would help considerably in giving a balanced view of Indian role.

The last section summarises the conclusion of this study.

I have been helped by various people in the course of this work. I am thankful to Dr. Pushpesh Pant who supervised

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INTRODUCTION

The Bandung Conference was an important landmark in the history of international affairs for the third world. It came as a climax of the successful struggle against colonialism waged by the Asian-African people. It emphasized the sense of solidarity among the nations who had so far suffered exploitation at the hands of imperialist European powers. 'It aroused great hopes of cooperation in political, economic and cultural fields among the diverse people of Asia and Africa. At the time of the convening of Bandung Conference, the cold war between the two rival power blocs - capitalist and socialist - had become quite aggravated. It was not unrealistic to hope then that if the 'Bandung spirit' could be sustained the countries of Afro-Asia would succeed in keeping themselves free from the entanglements of cold war rivalries.

India could not remain indifferent to the possibilities offered by the Bandung Conference. India occupied a special position in the family of Afro-Asian nations by virtue of its large size, population, rich historical past, international stature of her leaders and their vision. The main tenets of Indian foreign policy were anti-colonialism, international peace and non-alignment.

Success in diplomacy means victory in winning other nations over to one's own point of view.¹ Thus India could use

1 Henry A. Kissinger, "Limitation of Diplomacy", New Republic (Washington), Vol. 132, No. 2118, 9 May 1955, p. 7.

the Bandung Conference to win over others to her own point of view. Bandung has for quite some time been a controversial issue in the study of Indian foreign policy. Was it the high water mark of Indian foreign policy with Pandit Nehru at the peak of his charismatic leadership and enjoying great gifts of statesmanship? Or, was it the beginning of our decline with China stealing the limelight from us?

Several important and interesting questions merit consideration. What was India's contribution towards the organization of the Conference? What were the interests India intended to pursue at Bandung? How far was India successful in this respect? How did the other participating countries react to the Indian role at Bandung? A careful examination of these issues will not only help us in attaining a better understanding of what happened at Bandung and its impact on Indian foreign policy, but would also provide the background against which India's performance at subsequent international conferences - Afro-Asian and non-aligned - can be meaningfully studied.

CHAPTER I

Chapter I

ROAD TO BANDUNG

To begin with, the United Nations was the only forum where Afro-Asian countries could cooperate with each other in international affairs. The consciousness among the Afro-Asian countries to raise their problems in an organized way arose in their minds when they realized how the Western countries completely dominated all the workings of the United Nations and that there was no chance for their own interests to be fairly and effectively represented. These Asian countries felt that they must continuously strive to preserve their independence against any political or economic encroachment from the West.

India generally played a significant role in the United Nations. The Indian delegates in the U.N. usually acted as chairmen of the internal meetings and India was recognized by many as the leader of the so-called Asian-Arab bloc. The Secretary General of the Arab League was the first to praise India as the leader of this Asian-Arab group.¹

In 1948 when Nehru visited the U.N., Indian delegates organized a meeting of the Arab and Asian delegates in Paris. From that time onwards an Arab-Asian group could be discerned functioning in the U.N. With the growth of the members in the United Nations the group became known as Afro-Asian.²

The Afro-Asian cooperation firstly developed at social or semi-social functions. The Afro-Asian group held its first

1 Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis, 1952), p. 64.

2 Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (New York, 1964), p. 50.

meeting in B.N. Rau's residence in New York on the 5th December 1950. But this Afro-Asian group was not at all cohesive and it was at best a loose lobby during the period 1950-53. But even then this concept and this group clearly emerged as a significant factor in the field of international relations.³

The first comprehensive consultation took place among twelve Asian-Arab states on the issue of Korean war⁴ and Indian independence of action was effectively displayed during Korean war diplomacy. Secondly, in 1952 the Asian-Arab nations participated in a joint action in Franco-Tunisian war.⁵

India always supported the cause of Afro-Asian nations which is one of the major goals of the Indian foreign policy but it does not mean that India wanted to form any Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. It was not the intention of India to form a mini-U.N. but to form an Afro-Asian force within the U.N. India from the very beginning adopted a policy of non-alignment when everywhere there was any question of forming an Afro-Asian bloc. In May 1950 some of the South and Southeast Asian countries including Australia met at Baguio in the Philippines where the Philippines made a suggestion that these countries might consider forming a non-communist bloc. But India firmly rejected that proposal.⁶

3 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment (London, 1966), p. 103.

4 Levi, n. 1, p. 63.

5 Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansing, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (New Delhi, 1971), p. 84.

6 Levi, n. 1, pp. 57-58.

✓ India did not encourage such bloc system because of the lack of an identity of views between India and other Asian countries in foreign policy matters.

However, India and other Afro-Asian countries shared several things in common - they were all weak internally, shared a recent colonial past and existed in a bipolar world. Other important factors were poverty and backwardness. ✓ Therefore, these Asian African countries tried to find out some suitable means to solve their problems outside the U.N. The Asian relations conference in 1947 was a major attempt of the Asian countries to settle their own problems outside the U.N. Delhi conference in 1949, Bogor (December 28, 1954), Colombo (April 28, 1954) and Bandung (April 18, 1955) followed it.

The Asian leaders did not have much faith on the U.N. as it had failed to solve particularly Asian problems.⁷ But Afro-Asian group in the United Nations was not wholly united. They primarily used this organization only to exert more pressure on colonial issues. Otherwise this group was more fragmentary in character. The main reason being that various new nations were guided by their own national interest and not some common Asian interest. The truth is that Asian solidarity does not have any deep rooted foundation in the Asian masses.

Colombo Conference

The second step towards Bandung was taken at Colombo

7 M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs (New Delhi, 1964), p. 189.

where all the five Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan met on April 28, 1954 to discuss the problem of Indo-China, the recognition of people's Republic of China in the U.N. and the ending of colonialism in Tunisia and Morocco. It was actually the Colombo powers as they were called at that time with Indonesia that took the initiative for convening the Bandung Conference.

The proposal for a bigger Afro-Asian conference came from the prime minister of Indonesia Ali Sastramidjojo.⁸ But Sastramidjojo was apprehensive about Nehru's attitude to this type of a bigger Afro-Asian conference. India was interested in a bigger Afro-Asian conference yet at first she was sceptical about the success of such a conference because of the differences among the Colombo powers. She was specially concerned about Pakistan and Ceylon's stand on international communism. The situation became more complicated when Pakistan entered into a military pact just a few days before the Colombo Conference. Nehru realized the difficulties in organizing such a big conference and, therefore, he laid great stress on the prior consultation amongst the five prime ministers. He stated in the Indian parliament; "one thing else we mentioned in the statement, (Colombo powers statement) about the possibility of having an Asian-African conference. This was a proposal made by the prime minister of Indonesia. We all of us welcomed that proposal.

8 Heimsath, n. 5, p. 84.

There are some obvious difficulties in organizing such a conference. And the prime minister of Indonesia undertook to explore this matter and to consult with the other governments concerned about it later."⁹

Both at Colombo and Bandung the Indian view on international communism was quite different from Ceylon and Pakistan and at Colombo India wanted to convince other Colombo powers to follow a neutral line. The Indian attitude was that communism cannot be met by building armed forces of a country but by ensuring a period of international peace during which the various countries can build up their economies and raise the standard of life of their peoples.¹⁰ One significant factor in the Colombo conference was that there some of the Asian countries decided whether their countries should be aligned or non-aligned. Indian policy was neutral and India's decision to remain neutral in the politics of power blocs arose not from her ignorance of the changes inherent in the expansive policies of the either group but from her desire to keep herself outside their cold war of accusations and counter accusations so as to provide a link between the two groups,¹¹ and therefore at Colombo India's policy was to neutralize Indo-China and by doing so it at least wanted to prevent the American expansionism and extend the "area of peace".

9 India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 10, 15 May 1954, col. 7500-14.

10 Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), vol. III, no. 7, July 1954, p. 83.

11 Ibid.

Though there were conflicts among the Colombo powers yet they showed that Asian powers were capable of taking some initiative in diplomatic questions. Therefore, when Ali Sastramidjojo proposed an Afro-Asian conference on a wider basis the five prime ministers with no controversy and little debate included that suggestion in the final communique.¹²

At Colombo all the five Colombo powers raised the problem of membership for that bigger Afro-Asian conference. Dr. Ali Sastramidjojo's suggestion was that only the members of the Afro-Asian group should be invited to the conference and not the colonial territories but it was decided that all these issues should be discussed later on.

Though India played a major role both in the Colombo and Bandung yet Ceylon and Indonesia formally convened these two conferences. This was in a way good for India because if India had taken greater initiative other Afro-Asian countries might have resented this, misinterpreting it as an attempt to 'guide' the others.¹³

In a radio broadcast in New Delhi on September 5, 1954 the Indonesian premier explained the necessity of the conference: "Asians will have to make decisions on their own future, without interference by the western world. There has been a slogan which

12 Jansen, n. 3, p. 163.

13 Rajan, n. 6, p. 189.

ran 'Let Asian fight Asians'. That is precisely what we do not want. What we want is to cooperate with our Asian African neighbours, to live together in friendship and in peaceful coexistence, to strive hard, united in aim for the cause of our common will."¹⁴

Bogor Conference

On December 29, 1954, the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan participated in a conference at Bogor, 40 miles south of Djakarta. The Bogor conference was no doubt very short but its importance lay in the fact that here all the five prime ministers broadly decided the framework of the Bandung Conference. The purposes, number of invitees, level of representation, timing and agenda were the main subject of discussion at Bogor and in each subject India's suggestion or influence was very significant.¹⁵

Firstly it was decided to invite only the countries of the Afro-Asian group at the U.N. with the addition of Ceylon and Jordan. But India suggested that there should be a broader membership. As Menon said, "We were from the very beginning against the idea of building up continental compartmentalism if it meant detracting from world unity."¹⁶ The Indian view

14 Mohammed Abdel Khalek Hassouna, The First Asian African Conference held at Bandung, (1955), p. 29.

15 Jansen, n. 3, p. 178.

16 Michael Brecher, Krishna Menon's View of the World: India and World Politics (London, 1968), p. 52.

was that if it confined into the group at the United Nations, Africa would be excluded and Arabs were not interested in only Asian problems. Nehru's attempt was that local disputes specially the Indo-China and Israel should be excluded from the agenda. About membership India's suggestion was that all independent countries of Asia and Africa should be invited to the conference and other Colombo powers agreed on this point.

Nehru's proposal for inviting communist China whose government all five Colombo states recognized was accepted and from then onwards India and Burma's interest in the conference increased considerably.

India also insisted on the invitation of Israel but Pakistan opposed it firmly on the ground that Arab countries would stay away if Israel came to this conference. Pakistani delegates were aware of India's neutral policy and realized that it might influence other Afro-Asian countries in the conference. Therefore from the very beginning they wanted to secure the support of the Middle East countries by opposing the proposal to invite Israel. Pakistan also suggested that Japan and Turkey should be invited to this conference and all the four prime ministers supported it.

The Soviet Asiatic republic were not invited because as Nehru said they were not in Asia in true sense of the term.

Formosa was omitted because its presence would have antagonized China and on the other hand not a single Colombo power till then recognized Formosa government. The one significant

difference was that the Colombo powers invited two Vietnams but not North Korea and South Korea. Ali Sastramidjojo, prime minister of Indonesia, in an interview with Far Eastern editor Mr. I.H. Gordon gave the following reason why they decided to invite two Vietnams.

...the five prime ministers of the sponsoring countries are more or less committed with regard to the issue of Indo-China, since in April 1954 when meeting for the first time in Colombo, they have taken a common stand on Indo-China problem. The world also knows that the Colombo decision had a considerable influence on the Geneva Conference resulting in the state of affairs prevailing now in Indo-China. Now that our suggestions have been accepted by the Geneva conference, we felt a special responsibility by inviting all the Indo-Chinese countries including South Vietnam and North Vietnam.¹⁷

Nehru also said the same thing in a press conference in Djakarta on the afternoon of December 30, 1954.¹⁸

India was also insistant for an invitation to Australia. It seems that thereby it wanted to show that there was no such intention of lining up of coloured people against the western countries. But the other prime ministers did not agree

17 Asian-African Conference Bulletin issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Republic of Indonesia, 1955), p. 7.

18 The Bogor Conference, Ministry of Information, (Republic of Indonesia, 1954), p. 46.

to this. Their view was that "Australia is a separate continent" and this conference was exclusively for Afro-Asian peoples. At the end the conference decided to invite the following countries:

1. Afghanistan
2. Cambodia
3. Central African Federation
4. China
5. Egypt
6. Ethiopia
7. Gold Coast
8. Iran
9. Iraq
10. Japan
11. Jordan
12. Laos
13. Lebanon
14. Liberia
15. Libya
16. Nepal
17. Philippines
18. Saudi Arabia
19. Sudan
20. Syria
21. Thailand
22. Turkey
23. Vietnam (North)
24. Vietnam (South)
25. Yemen

India made two major suggestions in the Bogor Conference - the establishment of a joint secretariat and the drawing up of an agenda by the conference itself, which were later on accepted by all the Colombo powers.

At Bogor, Pandit Nehru again made it clear that India did not have any intention to form any bloc and her main interest was to create an "area of peace" in this region. "It is not our purpose in meeting here today or at a later date in that conference to form blocs and the like. We meet for mutual

cooperation amongst ourselves as well with others."¹⁹

At Bogor conference India also indicated that at Bandung the most important issues would be economic not political. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave a press conference in Djakarta on the afternoon of December 1954, where he said that the main issue in the forthcoming conference would be the economic problem because the problems of Asia and Africa were bound up with the problems in the economic field.²⁰

Pakistan Horizon commented that one of the most significant factor in the conference was that Pakistan and India were not involved in any clash.²¹

It was also decided at Bogor that the conference would be at ministerial level and prime ministers declared that acceptance by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change its view of the status of any country. The prime ministers also agreed that the Asian-African conference would be held under their joint sponsorship.

The five prime ministers in their joint communique outlined the purposes of the Asian-African conference.

- a) To promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish further friendliness and neighbourly relations.

19 Statement by Jawaharlal Nehru given on the first day of the Bogor Conference. Bogor - Road to Asian-African Solidarity, Information Service (Indonesia, 1954), p. 16.

20 The Bogor Conference, n. 18, p. 46.

21 Mohammed Ahsan Chaudhary, "The Afro-Asian Conference", Pakistan Horizon, ^(Karachi) Pakistan Institution of International Affairs, vol. III, no. 7, March 1955, p. 309.

- b) To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented.
- c) To consider problems of special interest to Asian-African peoples e.g. problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism.
- d) To view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. 22

Organization and Functions of the Joint Secretariat

Immediately after the conference of the five Colombo powers at Bogor a joint secretariat was set up with the secretary general of Indonesian ministry of external affairs El-Sayed Roselan Abdulgani - as its Secretary General. The other members of the joint secretariat were the heads of the diplomatic missions of the other four sponsoring countries - Mr. B.F.H.B. Tyabji, the ambassador of the Republic of India, Mr. Choudhuri Khalikhzzaman, the Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. M. Taravanamuth, the minister of Ceylon and Mya Sein, the Charge d'Affaires of the Union of Burma.

To serve the day-to-day running of the joint secretariat a daily secretariat was also set up. The joint secretariat was assisted by two Indonesian committees:

- a) The Independent Committee in Djakarta: The Committee consisted of representatives of the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of communication, the minister of public education, the minister of interior, the minister of defence and police. Chairman of the inter-departmental committee was Ronelan Abdulgani.

b) The Local Committee in Bandung: chairman of this committee was the governor of West Java Mr. Sourj Hardjandinoja.

Liaison officers of the five sponsoring countries maintained close relations with both the inter-departmental and the local committees.

The main secretariat of the Conference was located at Duia Warna building at Bandung with Mr Roselan Abdulgani at its head. It consisted of following sections:

<u>Name of Section</u>	<u>Name of officer in charge</u>
1. Protocol	Kusomo Utojo
2. Transport and travel facilities	Syed Mutahir Rahman
3. Accommodation	M.M. Khurona
4. Conference Section	A. Appadorai and K. Sarwar Hussain
5. Press and Public Relations	Max Maramis
6. Administration	Nugroho

The functions of these different sections were as follows:

1) Protocol: The main function of the protocol section was to arrange reception of delegations both at Djakarta and Bandung. Each delegation had a liaison officer attached to it. All suggestions etc. were communicated to him for action by him. The protocol also issued passes for admission to meeting for delegations.

2) Transport: This section gave all information about the timing of arrival and departure of trains and it arranged vehicles for delegates.

3) Accommodation: It arranged all worship facilities and established four medical centres for the delegates. The officer-in-charge of accommodation was an Indian, Mr. M.M. Khorana.

4) Conference: The most important section of the joint secretariat was the conference section. Dr. A. Appadorai from India and K. Sarwar Hassan from Pakistan were the officers incharge of this section. But K. Sarwar Hassan came very late and A. Appadorai managed almost all the functions of that section. In true sense of the term there were no division of labour between A. Appadorai and K. Sarwar Hassan.²³ Their main function was to inform the delegates the timing of the conference meeting, to prepare the agenda of the conference and circulate it among the delegates. Background papers on various items proposed for the agenda of the conference were being prepared by the conference secretariat and working papers by several participating countries. It also arranged library facilities and published the official report of the proceedings of the conference. Both Indonesian and Indian governments took initiative in this respect.²⁴

23 In an interview with Dr. A. Appadorai, 21st September, 1972.

24 Though there was a clash between Pakistan and India in the political and the economic committee yet there were no such conflict between the Indian and Pakistani delegates in the conference secretariat. Dr. A. Appadorai records that both he and K. Sarwar Hassan worked in the conference section in a friendly manner and there was no clash between them on political ground.

5) Press and Public Relations: The formation of this section was to assist the journalists from different countries. There was one press officer in charge of press rooms and one Assistant Public Relations Officer, P. Samadikun, at the conference secretariat room. There was one information centre. Its main business was to give general information, technical queries and information material. An Asian-African bulletin was issued by this section.

6) Administration: Since the conference section of the conference secretariat was to deal with all matters directly connected with the session of the conference, namely, to receive or prepare, print and circulate documents, reports and records of the sessions and committees of the conference etc., the function of the administrative section was to deal with all other matters which were not dealt with by other sections. The administrative section was divided into five sub-sections: i) Staff, ii) General Correspondence, iii) Records of the Conference, iv) Liaison with Delegations and Local Committees, and v) Delegates.

After the setting up of the joint secretariat the ground work for the Bandung Conference was completed. The stage was now set for the Afro-Asian countries to make their entry and enact before the world their self-perceived roles. The interaction of several new nations at Bandung promised to make it an important landmark in the history of post-world war international relations.²⁵

CHAPTER II

Chapter II

INDIA AT BANDUNG

The seven weeks between Nehru's speech in the Indian Parliament and the inauguration of the Bandung Conference can be termed as the "prelude to Bandung". In his parliamentary speech Nehru made clear India's position and its basic approach towards Afro-Asian countries. India's main emphasis was on Panchasheel or peaceful co-existence and it was not her intention to form any bloc or to condemn any western country.

Nehru visualized the historic meeting of Asia and Africa as a striking example of co-existence, "Bandung Conference is essentially an experiment in co-existence in countries of Asia and Africa - some of which inclined this way, and some of them the other way in regard to the power blocs - meeting together in a friendly way and trying to find what common ground there is to co-operate in the economic, cultural or even the political field."¹

Some of the western countries feared that Bandung Conference would be nothing more than an anti-western gathering specially America was quite apprehensive about the true nature of this conference. India wanted to remove these doubts and suspicions from the very beginning. Nehru even deprecated the

1 Foreign Affairs Reports, "Nehru's speech in the Parliament on 25th February 1955", Vol. I, No. 2, 1955, p. 31.

idea "Asia for Asians". The main objective of India was to create an "area of peace" where Afro-Asian countries could maintain their own independence. In 1954 Nehru said in the Parliament, "We cannot consider, much less resolve, the important problems of the world today by regarding them as Asian or European, Eastern or Western, problems exclusively. Their solution, however, requires the recognition of the place of Asia in the modern world."²

Nehru's remark in Parliament that every nation should be called upon to state exactly where it stood in regard to those five principles had somehow created an impression that Prime Minister Nehru was trying to force a vote on this issue. The aligned countries notably Pakistan were prepared for a fight on this issue specially on peaceful coexistence at Bandung.³ The Pakistani view was that best protection against India's attempt to reduce the conference into an instrument for the enhancement of its policies could be provided by broadening the sphere of its participation. Pakistan proposed Turkey and Japan's name only for this purpose.

India played a significant role in political, economic and cultural committees where India faced opposition from the many aligned countries and Bandung became the testing ground of India's non-alignment policy. Here an effort is made to find out

2 India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 6, 25th August 1954, col. 227.

3 Asian-African Conference Bulletin, Information Service, Republic of Indonesia, 1955, p. 15.

how far India was successful in creating an "area of peace".

India wanted to avoid any conflict among the participants from the very beginning and to expedite the working of the conference. Two particular events clearly showed the India's harmonizing attitude; one was the attempt on Indian side to eliminate opening speeches and second was the appointment of a Rapporteur for the Political Committee.

Pandit Nehru was greatly concerned about the disharmonies and disruptive drift of the debate. Prime Minister Nehru had originally decided with other conference hosts that there should be no opening policy statements by chief of the delegations. He argued that the opening speeches by the leaders be circulated so that the conference could sit down to business without expending time on formalities. Nehru's opposition to it was justified in the sense that these speeches might introduce specific problems and open up areas of serious dissention. But Pakistani delegation was furious that such matters had been taken up in their absence, particularly since Pakistan was one of the conference sponsors. They refused to accept this decision insisting that such matters could be undertaken only by all 29 delegations meeting together. Turkey and Iraq supported Pakistan in this respect and ultimately it was decided that each delegation had the right to deliver one speech. This was the first test of India's strength in the Bandung conference by Pakistan side. The undercurrent of this rivalry between India and Pakistan changed many of the discussions later on.

In case of the appointment of a Rapporteur India maintained her harmonizing principle. First Ali Sastramidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia proposed Appadorai's name as the Rapporteur of the Political Committee but Pakistan proposed the name of Prince Wan of Thailand. China proposed the name of Jawaharlal Nehru but Nehru refused immediately in favour of Prince Wan. When Chou-en-Lai displayed some confusion about the role of a Rapporteur and its necessity and wanted to take more time to give its opinion about the appointment then Nehru in order to expedite the conference explained to him clearly what the functions of a Rapporteur ~~were~~. He said "A Rapporteur notes down what is stated generally, summarises it in concise form and then presents it to the committee for consideration and adoption. He cannot finally decide anything, he is merely a Rapporteur",⁴ and thereby he convinced Chou-en-Lai to accept Prince Wan as a Rapporteur in the Political Committee and avoid unnecessary delay or ill-feeling between India and Pakistan.

I

Colonialism was the most controversial and sensational issue in the political committee of the Bandung Conference

4 Verbatim Report, Proceedings of the meetings of heads of delegation, Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 20th April issued by the Conference Secretariat. (Republic of Indonesia, 1955), pp. 3-4.

and it created divisions among the Afro-Asian countries which India wished to avoid. However, India could not prevent an ideological struggle between communist and anti-communist blocs.

When the question of colonialism was brought up for discussion, Sir John Kotelwala of Ceylon, head of the Ceylonese delegation condemned communist colonialism. He said:

"There is another form of colonialism which many of us represented here may not be aware of, imagine for example, the conditions of these states under communist domination such as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. These states are in worse conditions than the western colonies in Africa. And, if we, generally, are opposed to colonialism, why should we not declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to western imperialism? The Conference should, therefore, declare before the whole world that it is unanimously opposed to colonialism in all its forms, and that it is determined to take urgent and effective measures to wipe it out altogether."⁵

Mr. Nehru strongly criticized this statement made by the Ceylonese delegate on colonialism. India did not share this view for, in her opinion, the countries of central and eastern Europe were being treated as sovereign in law and practice. The Indian view was that if they were under Soviet influence there were many non-communist nations under a similar influence and domination of other non-communist great powers. Nehru pointedly asked "How many countries here have fully democratic government of freedom? How far do they fulfil human right etc.? These facts are not known to us. Neither can we find out what exactly is happening in central Asia. A paper from dissident group does not turn the country into a colonial territory."⁶


5 Hassouna, n. 14, p. 99.

6 Asian-African Conference, Document, Bandung, p. 6.

Prime Minister Nehru also pointed it out that Ceylonese delegate did not mention the Portugese colonies in Goa and thereby he had ignored the true facts of the world. On the other hand Pakistan's Premier Mohammad Ali also aired his view about it. His view was that it was unrealistic to condemn French colonialism while ignoring that of Soviet Russia, an imperialistic nation with satellites which had brought many people under its heel. But he also did not forget to add that China was different from Russia in that respect.

Iraq and Turkey supported Pakistan's position and Turkey then introduced a resolution supported by Iraq, Iran, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sudan which provided for all types of colonialism including international doctrines resorting to the methods of force-infiltration and subversion.

The sub-committee on colonialism held two meetings on April 22 but could not reconcile the differences of opinion concerning infiltration and subversion activities and whether they were to be considered as forms of colonialism or not. It examined four different draft resolutions: one sponsored by nine nations, the second submitted by Egypt and India and third sponsored by China and fourth by Indonesia. China and India opposed the first draft resolution which insisted that condemnation of colonialism should point out political infiltration and subversion activities which constitute a first step towards colonialism.



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India opposed the Ceylonese condemnation of colonialism on the ground that the purpose of this conference was to throw its whole weight in favour of peace. Therefore, it was not worthwhile to criticize any other country's policy. Because the international atmosphere was charged with fear and suspicions, it was better not to discuss any subject which would ultimately lead to condemnation of this side or that side to recrimination etc. India requested Turkey and Ceylon in this respect not to create any conflict or confusion among the Afro-Asia countries. As Nehru said:

*I would very earnestly appeal to all the distinguished delegates present here, and more specially to those like the distinguished Prime Ministers of Ceylon and Pakistan, the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, the distinguished delegates of Iran and Iraq who may feel this way to look at this question from the broad point of view - that I have tried to set out and help in creating an atmosphere that will be conducive to peace, which we so much desire.*⁷

However, India averted an open conflict thanks to Krishna Menon's mastery over the English language which made possible a convenient replacement of words. A face saving word "manifestation" in place of "form" was found. The conference as a whole declared that "colonialism in all its manifestation is an evil which should be speedily brought to an end". Krishna Menon really played an important role at this point when the conference had entered into a deadlock. As the pioneer commented "clever draftsmanship by Krishna Menon who reputedly coined again a few seintillating phrases, thereby enriching the literature of

7 Verbatim Reports: n. 4, p. 27.

evasive diplomacy had averted an open conflict."⁸

Nehru gave a statement in the Parliament on Bandung clarifying India's stand on that particular issue. "It appeared to us irrespective of whatever views may be held in regard to the conditions prevailing in these countries (East European) or of relationship that may exist between the Soviet Union and them, they could in no way be called colonies nor could their alleged problems come under classification of colonialism."⁹

India's stand on colonialism further distinguished her non-aligned policy. India was not denying the fact that colonialism existed but believed that colonialism as a force in world politics was dead and India was not willing to condemn blindly any bloc and thereby support the other one. It's basic motive was to draw away from all ideological conflict and to try to create a neutral area in this part of the world.¹⁰ For Nehru colonialism which was a dead horse and therefore it was no use of kicking it any longer. He did not expect that conference should outline a definite programme of action against colonialism.

But during the conference it became clear that the anti-communist members directed their attack not against communist policy as against Nehru's policy of non-alignment.

India could not check an intra-regional split either in Asia or in the Middle East. The debate on colonialism led

8 Pioneer, 26th April, See Margaret W. Fisher and John V. Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, Indian Press Digests, Monograph Series (California, 1956), p. 141.

9 India, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 4, No. 13, 30th April 1955, col. 6968.

10 Sunday Times, 20th April 1955, Manila.

to the formation of several groups. Firstly it split the Arab world, some supporting the neutralist and other lining up with the anti-communist group and secondly the Colombo powers as a political bloc lost importance due to the clear opposition of Pakistan and Ceylon and their irreconcilable differences with India, Burma and Indonesia.¹¹

II

India's Policy of Peaceful Co-existence Vs. Pacts or Alliances:

Another controversial issue in the political committee was that of peaceful co-existence. It was an attempt on the Indian side to remove the existing fears and suspicions and the creation of an atmosphere of international understanding. The Colombo powers, however, had succeeded in establishing amongst themselves an area of understanding. India attempted to extend this area of understanding through five principles of peaceful co-existence at Bandung. These five principles were (1) respect for each other territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's territory, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.

Peaceful co-existence postulates the possibility of communist states and non-communist states living together in

11 A. Doak Bennett, "Chou-en-Lai at Bandung", South East Asia Series Journal (Djakarta, May 4, 1955), p. 3.

pursuance of a policy 'live and let live'. It presupposes an abandoning of the belief that one cannot survive except by crusading the other. It implies a policy of non-intervention by the one in the affairs of the other. It is basically a democratic concept in that it recognises the right of others to their own political views and doctrines assumes that they will not attempt to spread their views by force or by any other means.¹²

"Panchashila is the challenge of Asia to the rest of the world and each country will have to give a direct answer to it", as Nehru said, "I hope that this question will be posed by Asian-African conference in all its straightness and holdness".¹³ The answers were no doubt given by the Asian-African countries at Bandung and it showed that some countries supported Indian action and some others did not.

Major General Sovag Jung Thapa head of the delegation from Nepal described Nehru's five principles for peaceful co-existence as being factual and implying goodwill and a sincere desire for co-operation.

Col. Nasser who at first denied that he knew what Panchshila was. He said, "We have our own principles of our

12 Asian-African Conference, Bandung, April 1955, Document 4, p. 2.

13 Margaret W. Fisher and John S. Bandurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, Indian Press Digests, Monograph Series (California, 1956), p. 121.

revolution".¹⁴ He also submitted a seven point resolution for the achievement of world peace and cooperation. These were:

(1) Ensuring the success of the efforts exerted by the United Nations with a view to organizing, limiting and reducing all armed forces and armaments and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Application in letter and spirit by all nuclear states of the provisions of the United Nations charter, whose principles should be respected.

(3) Full respect of nations for their international obligations.

(4) Elimination of the policy of the great powers using small nations as tools for serving their own ends.

(5) Liquidation of colonialism as it has invariably been the source of conflict and instability.

(6) Respect by every country for the political independence and the territorial integrity of every other country abstaining from interfering in other country's internal affairs.

(7) Recognition of every country's right to the free choice of the political and economic system.

But this does not mean that he was opposing the five principles. Later on he fully agreed with these five principles of peaceful co-existence.

During the second day of the conference (19th April) Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia came out outspokenly in

14 Ibid., p. 125.

favour of Panchashila and applauded India's contribution to world peace. Thailand wanted more elaboration of the last principle of peaceful co-existence. Pibul Sangram opposed Panchashila on the ground that "such an agreement outside the United Nations would tend to weaken that body".

But the main opposition came from Pakistan, the Philippines, Iraq and Turkey. All these nations somehow or other were aligned with some military pacts or bloc.

The Pakistani view was that Panchashila would not give any guarantee to the security of small nations against the communist subversive activities. Pakistan while opposing Panchashila produced its own seven pillars of peace. These were: (1) Respect for sovereignty; (2) Non-interference; (3) Non-aggression; (4) Right of self-defence singly or collectively; (5) Equality of all nations; (6) Right of self-determination; and (7) Peaceful settlement of international disputes.

India pointed out that the fifth point in the Pakistani proposal seemed to have been inserted to cover the military pacts of South-East Asia and the Middle East. Nehru singled out SEATO as narrowly achieved power politics. But Pakistan remained adamant in her position and Mohammad Ali said, "Pakistan is independent and sovereign and confident in God only". He added that it was not responsible to India nor to the Prime Minister of India.¹⁵

15 News Bulletin, Special Conference Edition, Antara, No. 113, (Indonesia, April 23, 1955), p. 14.

Nehru also pointed out that the right of defence is the natural and undisputed right of every nation. There was no point therefore in including this provision in the draft resolution except to defend military pacts which in fact did not ensure real security for any country.

India repeatedly emphasized that pacts brought insecurity and not security to the countries which entered into them. He repeated that India did not want to join any bloc. Her main policy was non-alignment. India wanted to defend herself, she did not want any help from outside. Pandit Nehru said, "We will defend ourselves with whatever arms and strength we have, and if we have no arms we will defend ourselves without arms. I am dead certain that no country can conquer India. Even the two great power blocs together cannot conquer India not even the Atom or Hydrogen bomb."¹⁶ He believed that the countries which wanted to reduce the importance of non-alignment were following a dangerous path which would ultimately lead to war.

The Philippines delegate opposed the stand of India. According to them it was not possible for small state like Philippines to defend themselves like India. Philippines delegate Carlos P. Romulo sarcastically commented on this 'We do not have the size and the power of India. We cannot say here

16 Asian-African Conference, Virbatim Report, 22nd April 1955, p. 75.

that even if the world exploded in war we will not be scathed by it. We do not say that - I then speak for the small countries - the small nations, the weak nations."¹⁷ Philippines delegate also asked why India and Pakistan increasing their budget for military preparation? His answer was that because for the purpose of protecting themselves if some incident quite outside the calculations of the parties involved should touch off a general explosive leading to a calamity. Therefore the small state like Philippines had every right to join in military alliance to defend herself from any outside aggression.

Romulo's justification for the alliance with the West on the ground of smallness was refuted by Nehru. He said that it was quality not quantity that judge the independence of one country. In his closing speech on 23rd April, Nehru sagain clarified India's stand, "India will not do this thing or that thing because of its population of 370 millions but because of quality of the Indian people not because of their numbers."¹⁸ Nehru's argument was that small nations had greater chance of survival if they kept away from military alliance. To promote world peace it was necessary to avoid war at any cost.

More opposition came from Turkey. The Turkish delegation defended NATO and Turkey announced that she did not believe in the principles of peaceful co-existence, but rather doubted their value.

17 Ibid., p. 14.

18 Ibid., p. 36.

India attacked NATO as one of the most "powerful protector of colonialism".¹⁹ Iraqi delegate found contradiction in Nehru's speech. Without forming any bloc how could it be possible for the small nations to defend themselves? Neither did India allow them to join in any bloc nor wanted to take any lead in defending these small nations. As Iraqi delegate Fadhil Jamali asked the Indian Premier, "Are you ready to bring us together - the weak and small nations - and form another bloc, so that we carry our work uninterruptedly and also have protection, but by not doing so you leave us alone in small entities, cut to pieces and our existence threatened every moment."²⁰

India would not take such initiative as India's aim was not to form any bloc. She attached greater importance to the morale of the people. Therefore, in her view, although these small states had to develop industrially and economically but their basic source of power had to be moral one.

The Lebanese delegate Charles Malik said that peaceful co-existence was a communist phrase and every country which used the phrase peaceful co-existence was really doing a service only to the communists. The Lebanese delegate in the end of his speech declared that they did not want the grand proclamation of such highly questionable doctrine as co-existence.

This shows that there was a clear cleavage between two groups among the Afro-Asian countries. The first group consisted of

19 Ibid, p. 80.

20 Ibid., p. 4.

countries like Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Thailand and Lebanon who were pro-West and their view was that their security was only guaranteed by military alliances. On the other hand the other group by and large followed India and recognized the principle of peaceful co-existence and adhered to non-alignment. These countries were Indonesia, Burma, Nepal and Egypt.

However, for the sake of unanimity India at last supported the Pakistani proposal on collective defence agreements but with the condition that it must not serve the particular interest of any of the big powers and were not used as means of pressure on other countries.

It is true that Nehru pleaded as he did with other nations but he could not get adequate support in spite of Burma, Indonesia and later Egypt being with him. Those who were linked with military pacts did not recognize the virtue of non-alignment.

Some argued that by supporting the Pakistani proposal India had somewhat stepped back from her principles. But Nehru maintained that this was not at all a compromise and ^{that} particular clause was not against the principles of Indian policy. Nehru gave a report on Bandung Conference in the Parliament where he said:

"The Declaration includes a clause which has reference to collective defence. The House knows that we are opposed to military pacts and I have repeatedly stated that these pacts based upon the idea of balance of power and 'negotiation from strength' and the grouping of nations into rival camps are not, in our view, a contribution to peace. The Bandung declaration, however, relates to self-defence in terms of the charter of the United Nations."

He referred to article 51 of the U.N. Charter in this respect. He also said that it had been stated in the Bandung Declaration in express terms that right of collective defence should be in accordance with the charter. We have not only no objection to the formulation but we welcome it. We have subscribed to collective defence for the purposes defined in the charter.²¹

India's Panchasheel to some extent lost its importance due to the presentation of seven principles each from Pakistan and Egypt and China and three principles from Ceylon. But all these principles said more or less same thing. They were fundamentally not different from each other and this gave everyone a chance to claim that only their principles had been included in the final declaration. Anyhow four principles out of five placed in the final Declaration had been initially put forward by India.

Nehru's comment on the Panchshila was that "when the five principles, or the Panchshila as we have called them, emerged, they attracted much attention as well as some opposition from the different parts of the world... Some alternatives had been proposed and some of these even formulated contradictory positions. The final declaration embodies no contradictions. The government of India in its total agreement with the principles set out in the Bandung Declaration and will honour them. They contain nothing that is against the interests of our country or the established principles of our foreign policy."²²

21 India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 4, No. 53, 30th April, 1955, col. 6970.

22 Ibid.

III

India could not impress the Arab countries as much as the Chinese did. Arab countries were very sensitive to the Palestine issue and they naturally expected that India supported them in condemning the Israeli aggression.

Burma and India in particular had pressed for an invitation to Israel but Pakistan successfully opposed this, arguing that if Israel were invited the Arab states would refuse to come. If Arabs did not turn up then the whole purpose of conference would be rendered meaningless and keeping this in mind India ultimately accepted the Pakistani view not to invite Israel. But India was reluctant to discuss this particular issue due to its complicated nature.

However, the Palestine question was discussed in the course of the human rights debate. First Prince Karim Khan, head of the Afghanistan delegation criticized Israel's aggression and its utter disregard of the U.N. resolution. But India suggested instead of relying on the resolution of the United Nations the conference should make an international appeal for the cause of the Palestine Arab refugees. India pointed it out to the Arab world what were the international forces behind Zionism and what could they do about the getting of the U.N. resolution on Palestine implemented. As Nehru said:

"Zionism may sometimes be strong, aggressive as it is often, but surely it is not strong enough to carry on this aggressive attitude for long years. Therefore, we should understand the forces behind the movement. I do not indicate them. But obviously it becomes a matter of power politics, a matter which concerns the big powers whether they be within U.N. or outside."²³

India put great stress on negotiations. India's basic point was that controversy could not be removed without some talks or settlement. Therefore those countries who have diplomatic relations with Israel should find out a diplomatic way for the solution of the problem instead of using physical force.²⁴

Nehru's support for direct talks between Arabs and Israel considerably surprised Col. Nasser during the meeting of the political committee. This Indian stand on Israel irritated the Arab delegates. On the other hand they were impressed by the Chinese delegate when he supported the Afghan resolution.

All that Nehru succeeded in doing was to avoid harsh language; the Conference adopted a mild resolution supporting Arab views on Israel. In that respect India exercised self-restraint and did not bring forth the issue of Portuguese possession in Goa. When Pandit Nehru described "Zionism as an aggressive movement" it at least healed the minor rift between Arabs and Indians. But the pro-West Arab did not like at all India's attitude in this regard, specially Iran and Iraq.

23 Asian-African Conference, Verbatim Report, 23rd April, 1955, p. 68.

24 The Dawn (Karachi), April 23, 1955.

The stand of each Arab state in the controversy between anti-communist and neutrals was conditioned by its alignment for or against the Bagdad treaty, while its relation with other delegates were also affected by the stand taken by them on the Palestine issue. Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Jordan had military links with the west and were anxious to prove their continued loyalty to Arab ideals. Egyptians on their part were anxious to cover up defections from their leadership by an impressive display of Arab unity. Col. Nasser counted on Syria, Saudi Arab and Yemen as supporters.²⁵ Iraq and Jordan took an anti-communist position and opposed Nehru's policy of non-alignment. Egypt's policy was more equivocal. In the dispute with Iraq, Col. Nasser's position closely paralleled Nehru's attitude to SEATO and American military aid to Pakistan. Col. Nasser however was not always prepared to follow in Nehru's tracks and had his own version of the basic principles of world peace to publicize.

India was successful in creating friendly relations between North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and China but she could not get adequate support from South Vietnam. Pandit Nehru had introduced in the Conference's Political Committee a proposal asking that the question of the integral application of the Geneva agreement be examined. South Vietnamese delegate Mr. Nguyen Von Thoi said the Geneva agreement which ended the Indo-China war were concluded by the big powers in violation of the people's right of self-determination. Nehru agreed with Thoi's statement, but added that in his capacity as the Chairman

25 Mary Kutchbell Keynes, "Bandung Conference", International Relations, October 1957, p. 362.

of the International Control Commission he would have preferred that the Conference examine the Geneva agreement. Thaoi said that India should remain impartial in the affair and not mix its role at the conference here with its other role as a member of the International Control Commission.²⁶ Nehru protested vehemently against this accusation of partiality. Thaoi backed by the Iraqi and Turkish delegates said he did not want to accuse Mr. Nehru of partiality.²⁷ Ultimately India withdrew that proposal from the agenda of the Political Committee.

In the Political Committee India fully supported the African people in their struggle against colonial rule. The Indian delegate did not fail in pointing out that it was upto Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability. India supported the Peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia of their right of self-determination and independence. The head of the delegation of Liberia praised India's support for the African people. As he said in his closing speech, "We thank that great statesman of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, for his sympathetic references to the continent of Africa and the African peoples. We appreciate and we realize that there is a deep feeling of humanity in that continent towards the people of Africa."²⁸

26 Asian African Conference, Verbatim Report, (Indonesia, April 1955), p. 62.

27 The Dawn, 24 April 1955.

28 Verbatim Report, Asian-African Conference, 24th April 1955, p. 241.

IV

Apart from the active participation in the political committee, India's role in the Economic Committee was no less important. The Indian team consisted of Shri B.K. Nehru, K.B. Lall, V.L. Vatt and Vaidyanathan. Indian working paper was on "programme of economic development... ways and means of economic cooperation within the Asian-African region."

Though India was a keen advocate of some sort of regional planning among the Asian countries, she did not elaborate them due to apprehensions ^{of} ~~to~~ the small countries like Ceylon. India was in favour of setting up of a permanent economic organisation with a permanent secretariat but Ceylon and Burma were not enthusiastic about it. Their view was that it was not the proper time to set up an organization. They suggested a consultative committee among the Afro-Asian countries instead of a permanent secretariat. These small countries feared that potentially powerful countries like India which were already emergent in the economic scene of this region might try to exercise hegemony in the economic field. Therefore, India did not get adequate support for her suggestions.

In the economic committee India did not oppose any capital and technical assistance from outside but her view was that in this region there were two or three developed countries in industrial field and they could help Asian and African countries in the development of their economy. India also stressed

that Asian African countries should develop trade relations with China and called for an end to the trade barriers erected between China and other countries.²⁹ Speaking before the economic committee Indian delegate also urged the 29 attending nations to keep their foreign exchange at home rather than deposit it in the USA and European banks.³⁰

In the economic committee, India also suggested the establishment of an international atomic energy commission but pointed it out that such an agency would serve a useful purpose only if it was fully representative. To limit it to a few powers would be undesirable and would bring an element of a conflict even in regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

It is true that India could not organize any intra-regional economic co-operation like the present ASEAN. It was only because of the suspicion and sceptical nature of the neighbouring countries like Ceylon and Pakistan.

VI

Another important committee in the Bandung Conference was the Cultural Committee where India contributed some important suggestions on cultural matters which were included in the final communique of the Conference.

29 Economic Committee, Asian-African Conference, Document 8-C, 20th April 1955, p. 57.

30 The Dawn, 21st April 1955.

In the Committee of the Cultural Cooperation, India stressed the importance of understanding each other/rather than political or military alliances as a foundation of friendship.

In the Cultural Committee India suggested that Asian-African countries should promote widest possible exchange of information on all educational, scientific and cultural matters between different regions of Africa and Asia and also Asian-African countries should undertake a comprehensive programme for the translations and publication of their classical and contemporary literature, as well as reproductions of works of art.

From Indian side it was also mentioned clearly that cultural cooperation would not be possible until and unless there was an exchange of students, teachers, musicians, dancers, artists, sportsmen, atheletic teams among the Asian-African countries. All member states were exhorted to explore the possibilities of entering into cultural agreements with one another.

C.S. Jha was the member of the sub-committee of the cultural committee. Another suggestion from India side was that cultural festivals must be held at frequent intervals in the different countries at which cultural delegations from as many countries as possible may be represented and should be attached more importance to research in Asian-African subjects, specially on cultural, scientific and educational, with a view to bringing out the affinities and possibilities on cultural exchanges in the future between the different regions of Asia and Africa.³¹

31 Working paper from the Government of India on cultural cooperation for the Asian-African Conferance, Cultural Committee, Document No. 5, 24 April 1955, p. 1.

India did not face any opposition in the cultural committee though there were other working papers on cultural cooperation.

VII

India's Accommodating Approach Towards China

China was invited to Bandung as an adherent of panchshila, as an Asian rather than a communist state.³² At that time India was preoccupied with the problem of communist China's isolation from the rest of Asia. Therefore Chau's visit to New Delhi in June and Nehru's visit to China on 18th October 1954 inspired the idea that an Asian African meeting might serve to break their isolation. So that in the teeth of opposition from Pakistan and Ceylon India insisted on inviting China to the Bandung conference and at Bogor Nehru said clearly that there should be some sort of understanding between China and other Afro-Asian countries.³³ India wanted to suppress as far as possible all anti-communist expression at Bandung in return to play down such controversial issue as Formosa and China's U.N. seat. Burma and Egypt to some extent helped Nehru in this respect. This matter was considered earlier in Rangoon on 15 April ^{MSS,} when Col. Nasser,

32 Charles Neuhauser, "Third World Politics- China and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization 1951-67", Harvard East Asian Monograph, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 3.

33 The Bogor Conference, n. 18, p. 19.

Chou En-lai, Nehru and U.Nu met on their way to Bandung.³⁴

Secondly, India attached importance on Chinese participation in this conference, hoping that it would weaken Peking ties with Moscow while strengthening her ties with Asian neighbours.

Panchashila was the only instrument with which India wanted to encourage intercourse between China and the Vietminh on the one hand and the other Indo-Chinese states, Thailand, the Philippines and several powers of the Middle East. But all these friendly talks and discussions were held outside the conference. India intended mainly to encourage private discussion on the subject with Chou En-lai in the hope that a possible compromise would emerge. On 19th April Krishna Menon and Chou En-lai held private talks on the Formosa problem.³⁵ On 20th April, Nehru gave a dinner where Chou En-lai, Carlos P. Romulo and Prince Wan were present and by doing so India wanted to bring together the communists and the anti-communists in a friendly fashion.³⁶ On the Formosa issue John Kotelwala took great interest and suggested that Formosa should be under the trusteeship of eight nations³⁷ but ultimately his efforts failed and Nehru took up that thread and had frequent meetings with Chou En-lai to discuss this issue

34 Keynes, n. 25, p. 362.

35 The Dawn, 21 April 1955.

36 A. Doak Bernet, "Random Notes on the Asian-African Conference", South-East Asia Review, ^(Singapore) Djakarta, Vol. III, No. 9, 4 May 1955, A.F.U.S.

37 Ceylon Daily News (Colombo), 21 April 1955.

These informal meetings no doubt proved beneficial for the conference, they at least convinced the aligned countries that Chinese were not hostile to anyone. They were further reassured when China announced that it wanted to negotiate with USA over Formosa problem.³⁸

The Panchashila policy which India wanted to popularise in the Bandung conference was to secure the commitment of the Chinese communist government publicly to certain principles of state action in the hope that this would allay the fears of the small states bordering China without at the same time involving Indian government in an expensive policy of opposition to possible Chinese moves.³⁹ But from the very beginning China used Panchashila simply as a delaying and confusing manoeuvre. Nehru's tactical limited deployment of panchasheel in the defence of India's integrity and security produced the result opposite to what he expected.⁴⁰ Thailand, Philippines and others refused to follow Nehru's lead on friendship with communist China.⁴¹ Ironically all these nations somehow or other were influenced by or at least believed in Chinese pronouncements on peaceful co-existence while criticising the same thing when it was repeated by Nehru in the conference. It was because of China's

38 Hassouna, n. 14, p. 137.

39 Philips Talbot and S.L. Poplai, India and America: A Study of their Relations, Council of Foreign Relations, (New York, 1958), p.2.

40 Jansan, n. 3, p. 131

41 Beatrice Pintey, India a World in Transition, (London, 1963), pp. 304-305.

soft tone at Bandung that made its policy appear more acceptable. Nehru's unconcealed bad temper when things failed to according to his plan roused resentment and antagonism among his fellow delegates.⁴²

But Nehru at his best tried to present China as an Asian country so that both China and India became a powerful non-European voice in world affairs. Such was Nehru's purpose at the conference.⁴³ But China planned to use the conference not as a means for ending the cold war but rather as a forum for expounding and expanding the Chinese viewpoint on a series of

42 One instance of this is cited by John Kotelwala in his autobiography. After the stormy discussion in the political committee when the delegates ~~walked~~ walked out, a particularly unpleasant exchange took place between John Kotelwala and Pandit Nehru. The former Ceylonese premier has written like this:

"The atmosphere was electric as we marched out of the room. Chou asked me why I had said what I did, and whether it was my intention to break up the conference. I enquired if it was his intention to do so, because if he had not entered his protest and shown such evident feeling the discussion would have merely ended with the speech I made. His good humour was restored, but Nehru came up to me and asked me in some heat, "why did you do that, Sir John? Why did you not show me your speech before you made it?"

I have no doubt the remark was well meant, but the only oblivious reply I could make was, "Why should I? Do you show me yours before you made them?"

John Kotelwala, An Asian Prime Minister's Story, (Toronto, 1956), p. 187.

43 Heimsath, n. 5, p. 199.

cold war issues. Therefore, Nehru's aim of "bringing China to an arena of predictable dealings" succeeded at Bandung and simultaneously India's own influence on Asian countries suffered very much.⁴⁴ Ton That Thien commented on this "Cambodia was to turn away from India to China for protection. Burma was more convinced ~~more~~ than ever that friendship with China was a "geographical necessity". Laos was to find out that it could not settle its internal problems so long as the uncompromising Pathet Lao was fully backed by Communist China".⁴⁵ India's role was nothing more than a conciliatory one between Chinese and other South-East Asian countries.

If Chou En-lai emerged as an outstanding personality it was only because of the spirit of panchashila which enabled him to come into contact with various Asian nations.

The Eastern Economist commented on India's role in the following words:

•It was a mistake for Indian patriots to be dejected because Nehru's public performance did not attract the same attention as the dramatic gestures of Chou En-lai. India's part which was that of an honest broker reconciling the communists with the anti-communists was a vital link in this conference. In spite of slips here and there, the part was well played. 46

India was partly successful in extending that "area of peace" by removing misunderstanding between the Chinese and other Afro-Asian countries. Another point of credit for India was that she introduced the largest communist country to the Afro-Asian world not as a communist but as an Asian country.

44 Neuhauser, n. 31, p. 4.

45 Ton That Thien, India and South East Asia (Geneva, 1963), p. 321.

46 Eastern Economist, April 29, 1955.

CHAPTER III

Chapter III

REACTION OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES ABOUT INDIA'S ROLE IN THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

All the twenty nine delegations came to Bandung with different motives and they were disappointed whenever their own particular interests were not secured and they were satisfied when Bandung fulfilled their aspirations. Participating countries views were naturally expressed in positive and negative terms in accordance with the 'helpful' and 'obstructionist' behaviour of India as viewed by that particular country in the light of her own interests.

The following review focusses mainly on the reactions of other four Colombo powers. Besides that the impressions of the Arabs, the Philippines and some of the Western countries are briefly discussed.

Pakistan

Pakistani analysis of India's role was quite negative. Their dominant impression was that Bandung turned out to be much less a 'Bharati show' than it was expected before hand. India was unable to sway the conference according to her own will and India's hope for leadership in Afro-Asian world completely got crushed. In two respects India failed miserably. The first was that India could not prevent the delivery of opening speeches in the plenary session by the delegates of the different countries and this was a defeat for Nehru on procedural matters.¹

Another fact was that the panchashila policy was submerged in the eventually adopted 'ten commandments' of Afro-Asian final communique. Two of these principles which were opposed by Nehru from the very beginning were included in the final communique. The first principle was 'respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively within the Charter of the U.N.' and the second principle was that 'settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the United Nations'.² By the first Pakistan justified their membership in SEATO. Pakistan's impression was that India could not resist regional security arrangements. It was an inevitable necessity for every small nation. Other smaller nations of the world also defied that India's policy of non-alignment by supporting the inclusion of this principle in the final communique. About other principle Pakistan indirectly referred to the Kashmir problem and therefore they stressed on the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.³

2 Ibid., 27 April 1955.

3 Jansen, n. 3, p. 216.

Mohammad Ali claimed that Ten Principles of Bandung Conference⁴ contained more of his "seven" than of Mr. Nehru's "five". This was indeed a setback for the Indian diplomacy at Bandung, that

- 4 1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
 (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

it could not prevent the incorporation in that particular principle which was quite contrary to its own non-alignment policy.

One interesting comment in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn was that Premier Mohammad Ali refrained from mentioning the Kashmir problem in the plenary session only to save "Bharat" from embarrassment. But India faced a frontal attack and strong criticism from the Philippines on this Kashmir issue.⁵ But Pakistan was dissatisfied that the conference did not discuss, much less find a solution for the Kashmir dispute. Mushtaq Ahmed, editor of the Morning News commented that "In avoiding the discussion of the disputes, in which the Bandung states were directly involved and with which the West was not even remotely concerned, the conference lost much of its prestige and stature that it would otherwise have acquired."⁶

Premier Mohammad Ali, the Pakistani leader, commented on the achievement of the conference in an interview with the New York Times on April 1955. He said that the conference had been a great success and proved that general agreement is possible. He said that Chou En-lai had made a good impression on the conference - showed reasonableness and moderation and concentration of his efforts on winning the friendship of all.

5 The Dawn, 24 April 1955.

6 Mushtaq Ahmed, "Afro-Asian Conference", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi, June 1955), vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 366.

But he did not mention anything about India. His remark on China was quite understandable because of the fact that in spite of Pakistani criticism against Soviet Union China did not adopt any antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan, rather it showed friendliness towards Pakistan.

Pakistani assessment was that the conference participants were divided into two groups. One was led by Pakistan with staunch and persistent backing from Turkey, the Philippines, Iraq, Lebanon, Iraq, and Thailand and for the other group China did the main bargaining not the Indian premier ~~Mr.~~ Nehru.⁷ India, in his view, had ^{lost} its prestige and leadership in South-East Asia in a keen competition with China. As K. Sarwar Hassan pointed it out, "while Bandung marked the beginning of the Sino-Indian "honeymoon", it also marked the beginning of understanding between Pakistan and China. As he said "Chou En-Lai by his gentle diplomacy almost in an unconscious manner, outmanoeuvred the ever aggressive Mr. Nehru".⁸

The Philippines

The Philippines was another aligned country which opposed India at Bandung almost on every issue. The Philippines considered India's role as complicated and puzzling. India was

7 The Dawn, 24 April 1955.

8 K. Sarwar Hassan, Documents on the Foreign Relations of China, India and Pakistan (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. vii.

more anti-U.S. than anti-British though India had remained under the British colonial rule for a long period.

Carlos P. Romulo said "to a student of international diplomacy, Mr. Nehru, at Bandung was a most interesting study in human relations... He also (Nehru) showed an anti-American complex, which is characteristic of Indian representation at international diplomatic meetings. He was not anti-British despite his many years of imprisonment when India was under British rule... He was predisposed by his anti-Americanism to be pro-Russia."⁹

The Philippines analysis was that India played the role of "mother hen" to premier Chou En-lai throughout the conference and by doing so India herself got relegated to the background. The Philippines view was that the Bandung conference was not at all wholly at the beck and call of Mr. Nehru.

Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine delegate disapproved Nehru's neutralist policy as in his opinion neutralism would work for the advantage of communism.¹⁰

Ceylon

In his book "An Asian Prime Minister's Story" John Kotelwala frequently emphasized his own role in the Bandung conference and according to him it was a great achievement that

9 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (North Carolina, 1956), p. 12.

10 B.R. Chatterjee, South East Asia in Transition (Meerut, 1965), p. 158.

a small country like Ceylon's voice could be heard at international gatherings. His view was that India was more agitated than China when he criticized Soviet colonialism.

Ceylonese assessment was that Nehru's role was nothing more than that of a sanctimonious parrot uttering those sermons "peace" "understanding" "goodwill" "accord" etc. not leading to any effective solution of the problem. The Ceylonese journal United National Party commented that Sir John Kotelwala had saved the conference from those pious but empty talks of Nehru. Another Ceylonese observation was that India always tried to be the first to hink of everything and gave advice what others should do. India tried to monopolize everything in the conference but ultimately India could not mastermind all the affairs of the conference. The real hero for Ceylon was not India but China in that conference.¹¹

Indonesia

Indonesia could not conceal their displeasure when Indian delegates took over the management of the conference virtually fixing and arranging all the agenda and proceedings of the conference without the help of the Indonesians. Specially pro-government papers delivered personal attacks on Nehru in which were reflected the hurt pride of Ali Sastromidjojo at the fact that Nehru frequently set right his bungling chairmanship of the political committee. P.I.A. News Bulletin commented that the

11 The United National Party Journal, The Hero of Bandung (Colombo, May 6, 1955), vol. 8, no. 51, p. 4.

delegates to the Asian African conference in Bandung expressed their surprise that the chief delegate of India ~~Mr.~~ Nehru in his closing speech did not express a single word of appreciation to the chairman of the conference nor to the joint secretariat or to the government of Republic of Indonesia whereas all other speakers including Chou En-lai, U.Nu, Mohammed Ali, Carlos P. Romulo, Nasser, Jamali and others have expressed their appreciation and gratefulness to the chairman of the conference.

Newspapers like The Medan (North Sumatra), Daily Patriot and Berita Indonesia praised India's policy of peaceful coexistence and these papers wrote that peaceful co-existence was not just one of the possible outcome of the Bandung conference but in essence the conference itself was the expression of this great principles of living together.

China

China openly applauded India's role at Bandung. In her view, as a conference sponsor Nehru played a brilliant role who enabled the conference to overcome obstacles and achieved success.

Jen min Jih pao editorially commented that prime minister Nehru tried very much to seek common ground while reserving differences and the editorial in this matter referred to Nehru's speech, that, countries of Asia and Africa were participating in an experiment "meeting together, trying to find what common ground there is to cooperation in the economic field, the cultural

field and even in the political field".¹²

According to Chinese India's stand was correct when India saved the conference by not condemning Soviet colonialism. Chou En-lai said in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, "one may like or dislike certain social systems but views and interpretations contrary to the truth could not be accepted by the conference. Prime Minister Nehru rightly said on April 30, 1955, in his report to the House of People in India "such views could not become part of any formulation on behalf of the conference."¹³ China considered India's role was moderate and conciliatory.

Burma

India's and Burma's attitudes were quite similar in the Bandung Conference. Both of them were anxious to apply a moral interdiction to China's possible expansionism by persuading her to accept as publicly and as widely as possible the promises of good behaviour contained in panchasheel. Both of them have had the same aim and specially in this connection Burma was more eager than India because of frequent communist subversion within Burma. Therefore Burma was quite sympathetic and helpful to India in maintaining harmony and a friendly atmosphere in the conference.

12 Survey of China Mainland Press (Hongkong, 1955), 23rd April 1955, No. 1033, p. 22.

13 Chou En-lai's report on the Asian African Conference, China and the Asian African Conference (Documents), (Peking, 1955), p. 38.

The Burmese view was that although prime minister Nehru had taken the lead in the negotiations at Bandung conference, U.Nu shared a great deal of credit with Nehru for whatever the success the conference may have had.¹⁴ Burmese view was that with the help of Burma India boldly stood in her position and gave a good fight against the aligned countries in the subcommittees of the conference specially against Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey. But Burmese were somewhat reluctant admirers of Bandung conference. On the day the conference ended, U.Nu had decided that if another such conference was held, Burma would not attend because this conference had only brought out the differences of opinion, and even the resolution passed reflected them.¹⁵

Arab Countries

Arab thinking towards India was reflected in two different lines. The pro-West countries like Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon openly criticised India's stand on Israel. On the other hand neutral Arab, specially Nasser's antagonism was aroused by Nehru's refusal to join whole-heartedly in the condemnation of Israel.

The main aim of the Arab world in particular and Muslim world in general was to mobilize international opinion in support of their struggle against the menace of Israel and the continuing oppression of North African Arabs by imperialist France. For

14 William C. Johnson, Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism (Cambridge, 1963), p. 95.

15 Jansen, n. 3, p. 220.

reason of her own India did not want that conference should condemn a nation which was not present at that moment and India's sole intention was to give more importance on general principles rather than on regional one. But emotionally involved with Palestine as their local problem the Arabs could not appreciate Nehru's stand on Palestine issue. However, later on Arabs were favourably impressed by Nehru when he described Zionism as an aggressive movement. The Jordanian foreign minister Walid Salah said that it was highly significant that a man like Nehru had described Zionism as an aggressive movement.¹⁶

Charles Malik, the Lebanese delegate's view was that Pandit Nehru had somehow succeeded in swaying the conference to denounce regional pacts serving the interest of the big powers such as the SEATO and the Turko-Iraqi pact.¹⁷

Arab circles were satisfied that premier Nasser had managed to play a key role at the conference because he took up an independent line and stayed away from east-west prejudices and differences. To them it was clear that Premier Nasser had not followed Nehru's policy at the conference. There was in fact many cases in which he took different attitudes in committee meetings. For example the Egyptian premier favoured the clause on colonialism which denounced colonialism of all types, because in the opinion of the Egyptian delegation there was a kind of colonialism on the communist side which should not be overlooked in the resolution in colonialism.¹⁸

(Cairo)

- 16 Middle East Weekly Review, 30 April 1955, No. 189, p.3.
- 17 Ibid., 21 April 1955, No. 172, p. 16.
- 18 Ibid., 30 April 1955, No. 189, p. 3.

Western Countries

The western view was that Nehru was ^{relegated} ~~related~~ to the background and Chou En-lai triumphed over all other delegates.

One French newspaper "Le Figaro" in its issue of April 21st wrote about the behind the scenes struggle between communist China and India and of victory which Chou En-lai scored over Nehru. It also referred to the success of the communist leader in enlisting the support of Arab countries for the policy of his government. Chou En-lai was the only delegate who came forward with practical proposals to the West for the settlement of Formosa and other outstanding problems between China and the West.¹⁹

The western press also never hesitated to blame India for not taking a bold stand against Soviet colonialism. They felt quite surprised that Nehru who was in trouble due to the communist activities in India did not condemn Soviet colonialism but proceeded to attack French and British colonialism.

Britain welcomed the achievements of the conference. Britain's view was that India had tried its best to maintain a cordial and friendly atmosphere and persuaded others to give more importance on general principles of war and peace and India was stressing this only to facilitate economic cooperation among the Afro-Asian countries but it did not get adequate help from two sponsoring countries, Ceylon and Pakistan. The London Times

19 Hassouna, n. 14, p. 29.

analyzed India's role in an article published one day after the final session, "Indian diplomacy displayed all its customary outspokenness but it did not succeed in overcoming the lack of confidence in Delhi's neutrality specially from countries like Turkey, Iraq, Thailand. Moreover, it did not receive any assistance from Pakistan and Ceylon."

India's role was assessed from Washington in the following way:

•One of the leaders favouring silence at Bandung was Nehru. Nehru was trying to include Egyptian Premier into the neutralist camp at the conference. But Egyptian premier avoided taking any sides in his first appearance at an international meeting of this gathering. A leading U.S. Newspaper commented, "From Washington's point of view a number of illusions had been blasted at Bandung. The illusions were (1) that there was such a thing as a single Asian voice; (2) that communist China enjoyed almost universal sympathy and support outside the western world, (3) that other Asian and African leaders would follow wherever Nehru, the Indian prime minister would lead."20

U.S. assessment was that India's role was unconvincing and the most significant development at Bandung was the relative eclipse of India. The conference had backfired on the neutral Nehru because the anti-communist countries in Asia had made an effective case against the dangers of communism.

editorial

C O N C L U S I O N

CONCLUSION

The Conference at Bandung brought together diverse people from many nations in Asia and Africa. It is not surprising that national expectations differed widely and often rivalled each other in a contradictory fashion. While India sought to win adherents to her policy of non-alignment and extend 'the area of peace' in a world in the grips of cold war, several Afro-Asian countries believed that their only hope for survival and security lay in military pacts and alliances. This difference in outlook led to repeated clashes between the adversaries at the Conference and should be kept in mind when inquiring about the success or failure of India at Bandung.

The main thrusts of Indian diplomacy at Bandung was to bring China into a peaceful involvement with other participants and thereby to help to break through China's diplomatic isolation and to remove the misunderstanding that existed between China and other Afro-Asian countries. Nehru's sincere efforts were directed to stimulate cooperation among Afro-Asian nations.

India did not want that the Afro-Asian conference should remain confined only to the Afro-Asian problems but thought it should discuss all the major problems of the world which affected these Asian-African countries.

The official Indian view was that her sole intention was to encourage some sort of a get-together among the Afro-Asian leaders for the purpose of discussing common problems and getting better acquainted with each other. India's aim becomes more comprehensible if we consider the then prevailing international

situation.

The international situation and political structure of the world had grown progressively more complex during that period - the two super powers were engaged in a bitter competition with each other, there was the problem of the war in Indo-China, and by the time of Bandung various alliance systems had crystalized and military politics had come up to the very doorstep of India ~~but~~ through Pakistani membership of the Western alliance system SEATO. It was also important for India to maintain good neighbourly relations with China.

Indian expectation at Bandung was to persuade other Afro-Asian nations to help her create an 'area of peace' through negotiations. India's primary aim was the enlargement of the 'area of peace', of the extension of the policy of non-alignment throughout the world, so it could at least prevent the cold war from turning into a hot war. Through this Asian-African Conference India wanted to build up the pressure of world public opinion against the bloc system and tried to keep the participating nations away from the cold war arena.

Considering all these things one can say that India had three major aims:

India aimed in particular at dissuading Cambodia and Laos from developing closer relations either with SEATO or the United States and simultaneously she wanted that these countries should be free from Chinese and Vietminh influence.

Secondly, India wanted to exert a moral pressure on China rather than join or encourage military coalitions against China. But a favourable atmosphere had to be created for that, at least China had to be given a chance to prove whether or not it would honour the five principles of co-existence. Therefore India was pressing the Colombo powers to invite China to this Conference. Nehru's belief was that if China promised to follow these five principles in the Bandung Conference then it would be difficult for her to flout these principles. Such a commitment would constitute a significant moral interdiction against China's deviation from these principles.

[At Bandung the dominant Indian motive was not to play a role of Asian leadership but it was her intention to reassert Asia's rightful place in the world community.]

India's policy was basically not different from that of the other Afro-Asian countries. [The common denominator of the majority of nations in attending this conference was a desire for a larger voice in world affairs and support for self-determination of all peoples, demand for racial equality and a desire to catch up with the rest of the world and a hope for peace.]

[Before any evaluation of India's role at the Bandung is made it should also be kept in mind that the countries represented at the Bandung were divided into aligned and non-aligned groups. India's diplomatic endeavours, therefore, influenced them with varying degrees of success.]

India's influence on non-aligned countries specially Nepal, Indonesia and Burma was greater than on Egypt, Cambodia and Laos. Nasser took an independent line when he found that the conference was not under the control of Nehru. China and North Vietnam more or less supported India's stand but they also maintained their own identity specially China was very successful in this respect. African countries supported India's view but they were more concerned about their own affairs rather than Asian problems. Among the aligned countries, Turkey, the Philippines, Pakistan and South Vietnam completely denied Nehru's non-alignment policy.

It must be admitted that at Bandung India could not erase the differences that existed among the Afro-Asian countries. India could not prevent the ideological struggle between the communist and anti-communist bloc. No doubt India's strong anti-colonial stand gave credence to her non-aligned policy yet it could not check intra-regional split both in Asia and Africa. It split the Arab world, some supporting the neutralist and other lining up with anti-communist group. On the other hand Colombo powers as a political bloc lost their importance due to the divisions among themselves.

(This also must be realized that by introducing China to the Afro-Asian world India did not succeed in accommodating that powerful neighbour. Later events showed that China flagrantly violated all the Bandung principles and ultimately showed that it

considered them nothing more than a farce.) The expansion of Chinese influence was beginning to involve her in a rivalry with India and to a degree this reflected in the Indian government's opposition to the Chinese proposal for a second Afro-Asian Conference.

While India attached greater importance to world peace and non-alignment the smaller countries of Asia and Africa were more concerned about their own security and could hardly bother about larger international problems. (The Indian view was that regional and local problems would be solved if there could be a solution of the major problem of the world, if the rivalry between the two super powers came to an end.

In the economic front India's suggestion for broader economic cooperation was accepted by all. But India's proposal for a permanent organization for regional economic cooperation where Japan, India and China could provide technical knowhow did not materialize due to the opposition from Ceylon and Pakistan.

Participation in the Bandung conference made India realize that its policy of international peace and non-alignment had no particular appeal for the smaller countries of Asia and Africa, however, relevant it might be in her relationship with big powers. The younger nations held Nehru in high esteem but resented the unfortunate impression^{created} by his manner of a big brother. The mediatory role which Nehru had made so particularly his own

in fact led India into isolation. It would be pointless to debate whether India won or lost at Bandung. It adopted a diplomatic stance consistent with its foreign policy formulations at that time and if this enterprise met with little success this was due to the complexities of existing international relations.

It must be said that the Bandung experience was a chastening one for India as after Bandung India was not keen on having another gathering on geographical basis and preferred a non-aligned context where differences between the Asian participants would be less pronounced.)

A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX

FULL TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE

The Asian-African Conference, convened by the Governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to 24th April, 1955.

In addition to the sponsoring countries, the following twenty-four countries participated in the conference:

Afghanistan, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the State of Vietnam and Yemen.

The Asian-African Conference considered the position of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their peoples could achieve the fullest economic, cultural and political cooperation.

A. Economic Cooperation

1. The Asian-African Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.

The proposals with regard to economic cooperation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital.

It was further recognized that assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region through international or under bilateral arrangements had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programs.

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of:

Experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes, exchange of know-how, and establishment of national and, where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the existing international agencies.

3. The Asian-African Conference recommended:

The early establishment of a special United Nations fund for economic development;

The allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries;

The early establishment of an international finance corporation, which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment; and

Encouragement of the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest.

4. The Asian-African Conference recognized the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region.

The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognized that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable and desirable they should adopt a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other international forums.

6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended: Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw materials whenever economically feasible before export; intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement be given to the exchange of trade delegation and groups of businessmen; exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade; and normal facilities should be provided for the transit trade of landlocked countries.

7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, which are often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem and collective action thereafter to induce

the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was further suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade may be made.

8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of a common policy.

10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for Asian-African countries.

The Conference welcomed the initiative of the powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of an international atomic energy agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the agency; and recommended that Asian and African governments take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programs.

11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of liaison officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest.

It recommended that fuller use should be made of the

existing international organizations, and participating countries who were not members of such international organizations, but were eligible, should secure membership.

12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. Cultural Cooperation

1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilizations, which have enriched other cultures and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process.

Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately, cultural contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries.

The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating governments at the Asian-African Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural cooperation.

2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and

Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cultures of the peoples.

Some colonial powers have denied their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture, which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples.

This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed.

Similar discrimination has been practised against Asian and coloured peoples in some parts of the Continent of Africa.

The Conference felt that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression. In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries.

True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of world cooperation.

Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural cooperation, the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa, to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

First, the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country;

Second, mutual cultural exchange; and

Third, exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of the opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural cooperation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own wherever possible and feasible.

C. Human Rights and Self-Determination

1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full

support of the fundamental principles of human rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a prerequisite of all the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights.

2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental value of civilization and the dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination and especially by the people of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustained their cause; reaffirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. Problems of Dependent People

1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems

of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. The Conference agreed:

First, in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

Second, in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;

Third, in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples; and

Fourth, in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. Other Problems

1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine and the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support

of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and called for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Iran, based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations could assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the southern parts of Yemen known as the protectorates, and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation

1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several states have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that, for effective cooperation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all states which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter.

In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference the following among the participating countries which were represented in it - Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal and

a unified Vietnam - were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution was inadequate. It expressed the view that, as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty toward humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion to bring about

such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all powers concerned to reach agreements to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation, and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

3. The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war.

The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection all states should cooperate especially through the United Nations in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs, particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standard of life in larger

freedom.

Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples in freedom, and independence must be granted with the least possible delay to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from distrust and fear and with confidence and goodwill toward each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- 6.a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian-African Conference declares its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural field would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference in consultation with the participating countries.

Bandung, 24 April 1955.

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