

U. S. DISARMAMENT POLICY (1945-53)

(DIPLOMACY OF NUCLEAR DOMINANCE :
U. S. ROLE IN DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS DURING 1945-53)

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The atomic age began when the United States tested the first nuclear device on July 16, 1945. Apart from the agony, human suffering and horror the A-bomb created since its use in Nagasaki and Hiroshima it had also tremendous political significance. It altered the existing structure of power in international relations. Among the four big powers of the post-Second World War era, America emerged as the most powerful State with an absolute nuclear monopoly.

Although a new world order on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations was established on the assumption of the continued co-operation of the four great powers, the international situation soon degenerated into what came to be known as the Cold War.¹ With the emergence of the United States as the Super power having complete nuclear monopoly and the Soviet Union having conventional arms superiority and aspiring for Superpower position, the world soon began to witness a new form of power struggle. The Soviet Union, fully realizing its inferior position vis-a-vis the United States, soon initiated

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, (Chicago: William Benton, 1968), p. 43; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 75; D.F. Flemming, The Cold War and Its Origin, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), p. 251; Hartman, The Relations of Nations, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 441; Paul Hastings, The Cold War, 1945-1949, (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1969), p. 3.

certain moves in Eastern Europe in order to bring it under its effective sway. According to the Soviet Union, such a step was necessary to ensure its security against any future threat from a remilitarised Germany. The United States and its Allies viewed these developments as the manifestation of the policy of communist expansion and contrary to the spirit of the 4-power understanding during and immediately after the Second World War. Hence they adopted a policy of containing communism. Thus, there was a polarization of world powers into two blocs: the East consisting of the Soviet Union and all other communist countries and the West consisting of the United States and other Western countries. There were, of course, a large number of small and medium powers uncommitted to either bloc and remaining outside the contest. The emerging situation was one of bloc rivalry and an allout confrontation endangering international peace and security. But the most disturbing factor affecting world peace was the immediate possibility of a nuclear arms race.

U.S. Efforts for International Control of Atomic Energy

Although the United States enjoyed the initial advantage of nuclear monopoly, it had a lurking fear that its monopoly would not last long. President Truman expressed this anxiety on August 9, 1945:

"The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world. That is why Great Britain and the United States who have the secret of its production

do not intend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction.... We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force - to prevent its misuse and to turn it into channels of service to mankind."

Again the President stated in his Navy Day address on October 27, 1945:

1. No nation can long maintain a monopoly of atomic weapons.
2. No nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy."

The Washington Declaration on Atomic Energy on November 15, 1945 (after the meeting of President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister Mackenzie King) reflected the same thinking:

"We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war had placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown against which there can be

2 U.S. State Department, The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, Publication 2702 (1946), p. 108.

3 Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Post-War Negotiations for Arms Control, (Washington: Banta Company, Inc., 1961), p. 33.

no adequate military defence and in the employment of which no single nation can, in fact, have a ⁴ monopoly."

These were apparent efforts on the part of the United States to rationalize its nuclear monopoly. But perhaps there was also a genuine intention to nip in the bud the possibility of any proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was a situation in which a nuclear arms race could become inevitable.

The Soviet-Anglo-American communique of December 27, 1945, also known as the Moscow Declaration, had stated that the three governments "agreed to recommend for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from ⁵ the discovery of atomic energy and related matters." Within the global framework of the Cold War, international politics was characterized by a sharp competition between the U.S. which wanted to maintain its nuclear leadership and the USSR which was trying to break the US monopoly. The Americans knew that it was only a matter of time for the USSR to emerge as a nuclear power. The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission came into being in the first session of the United Nations in January 1946 and since then not only the regulation of armaments, but also atomic disarmament

4 Quoted by Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, (London: John Calder Publication Ltd., 1958), p. 181.

5 Growth of a Policy, op. cit., pp. 125-27.

was discussed by the United Nations with the hope of averting another world war and ensuring international peace and security.

But the first phase of the disarmament negotiations had been clearly influenced by the political polemics of the Cold War, ~~dialectic~~. From the end of the Second World War to the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the United States made a determined effort to maintain its nuclear monopoly. This necessarily required a subtle strategy to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming a nuclear power. Hence the Baruch Plan with its emphasis on the establishment of an international atomic energy control machinery as an essential pre-requisite for banning or destroying the existing nuclear weapons and stockpiles. If the Soviet Union accepted it, then the United States would have got what it wanted namely retaining its nuclear monopoly. But, in case the Soviet Union rejected it, even then the United States would have won a great propaganda victory. As Spanier and Nogee put it, "The Baruch Plan, in brief, was a superb tool of psychological warfare: if the Soviets agreed to it, they would place themselves in a position of permanent military - and therefore - inferiority to the United States, and if they turned it down, they would be spurning America's gesture of goodwill and assuming responsibility for the Cold War. For the Russians, the Baruch Plan was a trap from which there was no escape; whatever the Kremlin said, it was a simple proposition of "damned if they did, and damned if they didn't". And for the American policy-makers, the plan's chief functions were to bring the influence

of world public opinion to bear upon a Soviet decision not to go nuclear to secure Cold War advantages; it was also to reinforce the image of Russian aggression...and to mould American and Western opinion to sustain a policy that would contain communist expansion."

The Soviet Union, though weak and exhausted after the Second World War, had envisioned a world order of its own in which it had assigned a key role to itself. If nuclear power was added to the already existing Soviet conventional arms superiority, Stalin visualized that he could effectively meet any challenge or threat from the West. Hence, it was axiomatic that the post-war Soviet strategy should be based on a nuclear programme to destroy the U.S. nuclear monopoly first, and then to level up to the American nuclear lead. Therefore, the Soviet answer to the Baruch Plan was to attack the core of the American strategy. The Soviet Union insisted that the most essential condition for the acceptance of the international control of atomic energy plan was the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and banning their production and use. This mutually irreconcilable position based on fundamental political differences and motivated by power considerations, taken by the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, had predetermined the pattern of the ensuing disarmament negotiations.

⁶ John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Noyes,
 The Politics of Disarmament, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 58.

The purpose of this study is to examine the disarmament negotiations and more particularly the U.S. disarmament and arms control policy during this most frustrating and difficult period of Cold War rivalry. The aim is not only to examine the various proposals and counter-proposals during this period but also to study American and Soviet motivations and objectives behind them. The strategy of either power's disarmament diplomacy was to weaken the political and military postures of the other. A study of strategy would necessarily lead to an examination of military and strategic doctrines, political postures national and foreign policy objectives and domestic constraints.

A detailed study of the Baruch Plan will be attempted along with a critical analysis of the U.S. justification for international control of atomic energy. The Soviet response to the Baruch Plan and the reasons for its rejection will also be carefully examined. It is the purpose of this study to try to establish with supporting evidence that the obfuscation in the disarmament negotiations was deliberate; that the proposals and the counter-proposals were intended to be rejected; that the Soviet determination to break the U.S. nuclear monopoly and to level its nuclear superiority and the equal insistence of the United States that the Soviet Union should accept the Western proposals for international control of atomic energy and the manpower ratio for reduction of conventional power, were responsible for the nuclear arms race.

This study also proposes to examine briefly the effect of political tensions like the Korean War on the disarmament negotiations, as well as the U.N. role in the disarmament efforts. The major documents relating to disarmament debates and negotiations during this period are included in the Appendices.

Chapter II

U.S. NUCLEAR MONOPOLY (1945-1949)

The United States won the war against the Japanese by using atomic weapons in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. But it lost the peace of the succeeding decades not only for itself but also for the rest of the world because of the arms policy it pursued immediately after the Second World War. It was the policy of the United States to play a politically dominant role in world affairs supported by a military power superior to all other nations. The United States was convinced that in order to achieve this objective the Soviet conventional arms superiority had to be neutralized possibly by keeping the U.S. nuclear monopoly as long as possible. This kind of a policy of maintenance of strategic superiority resulted in a similarly motivated arms policy response from the Soviet Union. But the strategy of the United States nuclear diplomacy was to embarrass the Soviet Union by confronting it with unacceptable terms of arms negotiations. Hence the Baruch Plan.

Acheson-Lilienthal Report

On January 7, 1946, the U.S. State Department appointed a committee headed by Dean Acheson to go into the question of international control of atomic energy. The work of this Committee which came to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, was the source of the Baruch Plan. According to this "rough sketch", as Acheson described his Report, there could be no security until atomic weapons were entirely eliminated

from national armaments. It proposed an International Atomic Development Authority with the power to procure atomic raw material anywhere in the world, to carry on atomic research on an exclusive basis, to construct atomic plants, and to license and control atomic research and production for peaceful purposes. After the International Agency was in full operation, the United States would divest itself of its atomic weapons and cease their manufacture.

According to the Report, "No system of inspection, we have concluded, could afford any reasonable security against the diversion of material to the purposes of war." Hence the Report stated that control of the atomic bomb was meant primarily to have control over the nuclear fuel.¹

Referring to the question of inspection, the Report said that a team of inspectors should be appointed in order to check not merely accounts and instruments but also individuals personally. The Report also expressed the view that there was no adequate military defence against atomic weapons.

Obviously, Lilienthal and his consultants were trying to devise an international control system from a scientific and technological point of view. But the political problems of the control system were more important from the point of view of big power relations.

1 Bernard Bechhoefer, Post-War Negotiations for Arms Control, (Washington: ~~George Banta Company, 1961~~), p. 37.

op. cit.;

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report had been described by some² as a "revolutionary document." It was revolutionary for the United States to suggest self-abrogation of military power that was unrivalled in the world at that time. So revolutionary were the proposals that even if it was found acceptable to the Soviet Union there was considerable doubt that a similar acceptance would have been accorded to it by the United States Senate and House of Representatives.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report made it clear that the United States would go on manufacturing atom bombs until it felt safe to discontinue production.

Baruch Plan

Bernard Baruch who was appointed as the U.S. representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in March 1946 acknowledged that the principles laid down by Acheson-Lilienthal Report were indispensable in formulating specific plans for the control of atom.³ On June 14, 1946 he administered a solemn warning at the first meeting of the UNAEC: "...we are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If

2 Joseph L. Noguee, Soviet Policy toward International Control of Atomic Energy, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 26.

3 Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, (^{op. cit.} London: Stevens & Sons United, 1958), pp. 184-89.

we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: we must elect world peace or world⁴ destruction."

The Baruch Plan, according to him, was specifically designed to alleviate such fears and to demonstrate that the United States had no intention of using the atom bomb against any nation that did not threaten its security, and indeed, that American desire for peace paralleled that of the rest of the world. The Plan he presented to the U.N. was outlined as follows:

⁵
The Principles of Baruch Plan

The Baruch Plan proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the mines to the manufacture of weapons. The IADA would have the following powers:

1. General: The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of [the field of] atomic energy through various forms of ownership, dominion, licences, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel. After this was provided, there should be as little interference with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and **S**tate relationships in the several countries involved. ✓

4 Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, (1946), No. 1, 1st meeting, p. 4.

5 Ibid., pp. 4-14.

2. Raw Material: The Authority should have, as one of its earliest purposes, power to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion.

The IADA should conduct continuous surveys so that it would have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium was known, could equitable plans be made for their production, refining and distribution.

3. Primary Production Plants: The IADA should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives: The Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. This was essential in order that the Authority might keep itself in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy, and fulfil the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best informed agency would the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous activities.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials: The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they were intrinsically dangerous to security, should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable material should not be centralized.

6. Non-dangerous Activities: A function of the IADA should be the promotion of the peace-time benefits of atomic energy. Atomic research, the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangement from the Authority.

7. Operation of Dangerous Activities: Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reached the potential of dangerous use must not only be subject to the most vigorous and competent inspection by the Authority but its actual operation should be under the management, supervision and control of the Authority.

8. Inspection: By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the IADA, the difficulties of inspection were reduced. Inspection would also occur in connexion with the licensing functions of the IADA.

9. Freedom of Access: Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority should be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the IADA should grow out of and incidental to its other functions.

10. Personnel: The personnel of the IADA should be recruited on a basis of proven competence, but also as far as possible on an international basis.

11. Progress by Stages: The plan of control would, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These

should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transition from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this commission.

12. Disclosures: In the deliberation of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States was prepared to make available information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocated. Further disclosures should depend, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the IADA was actually created, the United States would join the other nations in making available further information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control were reached, the United States would be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, to national control of activities in this field to the IADA.

13. International Control: There would be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the IADA was established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should, to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority, be subordinated to it. This was neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

14. Punishments and Veto: There should be condign

punishment for the violators of these principles. They should be given punishment like the decisions of the Nuremberg tribunal. And there should be no veto to protect the violators of the agreement.

After the establishment of international control over nuclear fissionable material and weapons, and also after the system of punishment had been devised for the violators, the United States should put an end to all its atomic plants, production and material. The IADA then would have full right to investigate violations in the United States.

The most important rider added to the Baruch Plan was that "unless and until an effective control machinery comes into existence, United States shall have nuclear weapons for its security." According to ⁶ ~~Joseph I.~~ ^{Spanier and} Nogee, the plan Baruch outlined was regarded as one of the most dramatic and imaginative examples of American diplomatic shrewdness since the end of World War II. ⁷ It was an imaginative effort to bring politics and international relations abreast of the tremendous revolution which had taken place in the scientific realm. It started with the conviction - never since challenged - that inspection alone, however, inhibited, could not provide complete assurance against secret weapon manufacture. "There is no prospect of security against atomic warfare", it was declared, "in a system of

6 ^{Spanier and} ~~Joseph I.~~ Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament, ^{op. cit.,} (New York: ~~Frederick A. Praeger, 1962~~), p. 57.

7 Ibid.

international agreements...which relies [only] on inspection⁸ and similar police-like methods.

According to Nogee and Spanier, the Baruch Plan was idealistic in that it seemed to provide a guarantee against the possibility of atomic war, if not indeed against all warfare; it was realistic in that the means by which it proposed to achieve this were grounded in social and unimpeachable scientific and technical facts; it was dramatic because it called for the international ownership and control of atomic energy and the surrender of large measures of national sovereignty by the great powers, particularly over their military power, and it was altruistic because it seemed to suggest that the United States would voluntarily give up the world's newest and most powerful weapon - a weapon with which it could potentially dominate or conquer the world - at the very moment that it held a monopoly of atomic bombs. At the same time, the plan was highly pragmatic in that its various features were well designed to protect American security. But since the Russians could accept the plan only at the expense of their own security, it also turned out to be an inducement for Russian rejection.

There were two assumptions behind the American proposals that Baruch submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. The first - already emphasized by President Truman - was that the American monopoly was a passing one. Now that the bomb had been

8 Frye, R. William, Atoms into Plowshares, No. 113, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1955), p. 14.

produced, other countries would carry on their own research on atomic energy. There was no practical way to stop this nor was it desirable, since atomic energy promised to produce immense peaceful benefits. But - this was the real problem - nuclear fuel produced for peaceful purposes could also be employed in the manufacture of atomic bombs. The second assumption was that any disarmament agreement abolishing atomic weapons could not rest on promises alone; if an atomic arms race were to be avoided, compliance would have to be assured.⁹ This, and the veto problem were the main points which led the Soviet Union to reject the¹⁰ Baruch Plan.

Soviet Reaction to Baruch Plan

The Soviet Union opposed the Baruch Plan saying that its inspection and control system was such that it would interfere with the national life and would foster espionage. According to the Soviet Union the Plan was carefully contrived to keep the U.S. nuclear monopoly.

About the veto, the Soviet reaction was that it would enable the Western Powers to manipulate voting in the U.N. to overcome any Soviet objection. The Soviet leadership saw that the control would be largely American. Moreover, the Soviet leaders were well aware that an agreement accepting international

9 ^{Spanier and} ~~Joseph L.~~ Noguee, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

10 Documents and Papers on Disarmament, 1945-1955, (Vienna, 1956), pp. 9-11.

control of atomic energy would leave the United States as the only power in the world with full knowledge and experience in the manufacture of atomic bombs.

Russia's principal objection to the Baruch Plan, as might have been expected, was to the international control of atomic energy. They rejected the possibility of the IADA at all times protect Soviet interests from States hostile to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders expected the Western powers who were members of the Authority to vote as a capitalist bloc completely dominated by the leading capitalist power, the United States, upon whom all the other Western powers were dependent. This was, in Soviet eyes, amply confirmed by the Marshall Plan economically and by NATO militarily and politically. In these circumstances, acceptance of the Baruch Plan would permit the Western powers - above all, the United States - to exert majority control over the Soviet economic and military establishment.¹¹

It was, therefore, inconceivable that the Soviet leaders would place the Soviet Union's atomic industry under international control and allow an international agency to run and operate almost all atomic energy production. In short, the Soviet leadership saw the control system as basically a military and industrial espionage system - not only because the IADA reflected a predominantly Western composition, but also because the personnel that would exercise this control would be largely

American. Although Baruch had stipulated that the personnel of the Authority would be recruited as far as possible on an international basis, there was no escape from the fact that the United States obviously had by far the largest number of scientists and technicians of "proven competence"¹².

Baruch had added that the United States "must have a guarantee of safety, not only against offenders in the atomic area but against the illegal uses of other weapons - bacteriological, biological, gas perhaps - what not - against war itself"¹³? This seemed to put off America's atomic disarmament to an indefinite future. The Soviet Union was also not ready to trust the Americans. For they felt that the Americans would hide their bombs from the world. The Soviets, therefore, called the Baruch Plan as the most "unrealistic" and "illegal" proposal.

The Soviet representative Gromyko stated that "the notorious Baruch Plan" provided for "a sort of international trust....in which American financial and industrial monopolies would exercise command as they think fit." He described it "an elaborate scheme for making the USA or, to be more exact, the United States monopolistic combines, the masters of the atomic industry of the whole world... The United States industrial and financial magnates would lay their hands on the raw materials in other countries."¹⁴

12 Ibid., pp. 67, 69, 70.

13 Ibid., p. 71.

14 Philip Noel-Baker, op. cit., p. 192.



In reply to the Baruch Plan, Gromyko submitted on June 11 and 19, 1946, counter-proposals that clearly reflected the main Russian strategies. ¹⁵ These were (1) to resist U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons and reject any move to institutionalise American superiority; (2) to obtain from the US, as long as it held its monopoly of nuclear weapons, a public pledge, made at the UN, not to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances; (3) to mobilise world opinion against the manufacture and use of atomic bombs; (4) to create an international agency for the control of nuclear energy in which the Soviet Union would enjoy a status equal to that of the United States; and (5) to reserve the right of the USSR to carry on research in the "peaceful" uses of nuclear energy, which actually meant the right to make the atomic bomb and level up with the US in nuclear strength. The core of the Soviet Strategy was contained in Article 1 of the Draft International Convention that Gromyko submitted on June 19: ¹⁶

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations:

- (a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever;

15 Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year (1946), No. 2, Second Meeting, pp. 26-30.

16 Ibid., p. 26.



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- (b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;
- (c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the present Convention, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition." 17

What in fact led the Soviet Union to reject the Baruch proposal was that they were trying to make a bomb like the United States. Similarly they wanted to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes without foreign interference. According to Noel-Baker, "It was not unnatural that in 1946 the Russians should feel nervous about allowing the world atomic energy industry to be controlled by an International Authority in which the Communist nations would be in a small minority. The essence of their objection to international ownership was their desire to develop the use of atomic energy in Russia without outside interference.... They were a power-hungry country, and in 1946 most of their power stations had been destroyed by Hitler; they needed atomic energy far more than the United States with its cheap water power, oil and coal; they were violently repelled by the idea that a body which the United States would effectively dominate, should obtain control over what was potentially a most important sector of Russian industry." 18

After the Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan, President Truman said in a speech to the nation that if there was no

17 Ibid., p. 193.

18 Ibid.

disarmament agreement on nuclear weapons, only the Soviet Union should be blamed. The American intention seemed to be politically motivated by giving the impression to the world that it was the Soviet Union which rejected their generous offer although the U.S. was ready to come to an understanding with them on measures of controlling nuclear energy.

Soviet Counter-Proposals

Gromyko's June 11 proposals set out in detail the kind of international control of atomic energy ¹⁹ that was acceptable to the USSR. The eight-point proposal was for:

- 1) The institution of strict international control simultaneously over all the facilities engaged in the mining of atomic raw materials and the production of atomic materials and atomic energy.
- 2) The creation, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international body for atomic energy control to be called the International Control Commission.
- 3) The International Control Commission to have its own inspectorial apparatus.
- 4) A special convention to be drawn up laying down the composition, rights, and obligations of the International Control Commission, either as a separate treaty or as a preamble to the "master" treaty.

19 See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year (1947), No. 2, 12th meeting, pp. 21-24. (AEC/24).

5) The International Control Commission to carry out periodic inspection over the activities mentioned in (1) including the checking of existing stockpiles of atomic raw materials and finished products; study of production operations to the extent necessary to control the use of atomic materials and atomic energy; collection and analysis of data on the mining of atomic raw materials, their use, and atomic energy production; special investigation in cases when suspicion of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arises; recommendations to Government on questions relating to the production, stockpiling and use of atomic materials and atomic energy; and recommendations to the Security Council on measures for prevention and suppression in respect of violations of the international convention.

7) The International Control Commission to have the right of "free access" to all mining and production facilities, to be allowed to "weigh, measure, and analyse atomic raw materials and finished products"; to ask Governments for any necessary information; to request "various explanations on questions relating to the activities of atomic energy facilities"; to make recommendations and representations to governments on the production and use of atomic energy; and to submit recommendations to the Security Council on measures in regard to violations of the international convention.

8) The signatory States to the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons must have the right to carry out

unrestricted scientific research activities in the field of atomic energy directed towards the discovery of methods of its use for peaceful purposes.²⁰

Gromyko emphasized that he could never agree to any violation of the unanimity rule which, he said, was the basic principle of the United Nations, and insisted that in case of violations of international agreements the Atomic Energy Commission should be empowered only to make recommendations to the Security Council and not to itself, through any control agency, ^{to} take automatic sanctions. The Security Council would, in such cases, ^{was} take the appropriate measures. Any other arrangement ^{being}, in the Soviet viewpoint, contrary to the Charter.²¹

But the West did not agree with the Soviet view especially about "periodic inspection". It was mainly due to this that the Soviet International Control System was rejected. According to the United States, the Commission, as envisaged in the Soviet proposal, would not be able to prevent diversion from peaceful uses, nor discover secret manufacture. Hence the West called it "completely unrealistic"; it was a means of readjusting the military balance of power in the Soviet Union's favour.²²

The UNAEC also did not share the Soviet view. It said

Keasings Contemporary Archives, (1947),
20 Keasings, op. cit. p. 8688.

21 Ibid.

22 Frye R. William, op. cit., No. 113, pp. 34-35.

that it fully understood "the impact of its plan on the traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem, it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals."²³

Thus, the disarmament debates in the UN Security Council, the UNAEC and in its committees reflected the underlying political conflict between the two blocs. From 1947 onwards there was a complete deadlock between the West and the East. No Commission could make any progress in disarmament issues.

The major thrust of the Soviet proposals was to the effect that (1) nuclear weapon production should be prohibited; (2) nuclear bombs should be banned; (3) all the existing stocks of nuclear weapons should be destroyed; (4) a committee should be set up to supervise the international exchange of scientific information; and (5) another committee should be established to ensure the prevention of the use of atomic energy to the detriment of mankind.²⁴

The United States rejected the Soviet proposal because it thought that in effect it amounted to the United States giving up its principal source of military superiority thereby reducing itself by one stroke to the level or even below the

23 First UNAEC Report to the Security Council, (quoted by Noel-Baker), op. cit., pp. 198-99.

24 Noel-Baker, op. cit., pp. 191-92.

level of the Soviet Union. Apart from being politically disastrous, it was, indeed, too high a price to pay for a tenuous safety from atomic attack. American spokesmen said that the U.S. was ready to make that sacrifice provided it could be certain that it was gaining safety from atomic attack. The most serious technical objection was that in the absence of reasonably strong safeguards against the clandestine production of atomic weapons, the United States found it difficult to accept the Soviet proposal for the destruction of the existing nuclear stockpiles. On the other hand, the U.S. thought the same should be delivered to the International Authority envisaged under the Baruch Plan and it would keep all the nuclear weapons as a deterrent thereby solving the nuclear dilemma as well.

The Soviet proposal was equally politically motivated. It would frustrate the American plan for the creation of an International Authority before destroying the existing nuclear arsenal. It had also the added advantage of reinforcing the world-wide "ban the bomb" propaganda.

Thus, the American and Soviet proposals revealed that there was fundamental difference in their approach to disarmament. Whereas the former insisted on the creation of a control system first and then nuclear disarmament, the latter asserted that first there should be nuclear disarmament agreement and then only a control system to enforce the agreement. Both the powers stuck to such an irreconcilable position on account of their national policy objectives. The United States was

committed to a policy of preserving the nuclear monopoly as long as it was possible so that it could keep the Soviet Union as an inferior power. This would have very well maintained the status quo under which the United States would remain as the only superpower. But the Soviet Union was equally determined to eliminate the U.S. nuclear monopoly in order to become another superpower.

According to the United States, if the Soviet proposals were accepted, the Soviet Union would have gained tremendous military advantage on account of its conventional arms superiority. Once the nuclear monopoly of the U.S.A. was destroyed and further nuclear weapons were denied to it, it would simply be reduced to a secondary power when compared to the Soviet Union. The disarmament negotiations were, therefore, merely a camouflage to conceal the underlying power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The disarmament negotiations were a form of arms race and it continued unabated as long as the national goals of the United States and the Soviet Union remained unfulfilled.

The western plans for atomic energy and for conventional armaments were approved by the General Assembly in 1948 and 1949 respectively against the opposition of Soviet Union and other Communist countries. But the deadlock continued because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

The Question of Inspection

Against this background of political disagreement caused

by the arms policy of the United States and Soviet Union, it was natural that the latter would not respond favourably to the findings of the Scientific and Control Committee of the UNAEC in which the U.S. had an overwhelming majority, regarding the question of inspection. The Scientific and Technical Committee of the UNAEC stated in its report: "We do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control (of atomic energy) is not technologically feasible." ²⁵

The Committee on Control Problems examined the question of clandestine activities and safeguards necessary to prevent diversion at various stages of atomic production and other related problems. The Committee expressed the view that all these could be adequately prevented by "a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the Inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis, and provided that it has the right to require the plant to be shut down for purposes of clean-up and accounting." ²⁶ The report added that "periodic inspection" would be adequate for small research reactors, but "adequate safeguards for chemical extraction plants...and for the preparation of high grade or pure nuclear fuels...and during

25 First UNAEC Report to the Security Council, p. 37 (quoted by Noel-Baker, op. cit., pp. 194-95).

26 Ibid., p. 195.

the storage and shipment of such fuels, are only possible through management by the international control agency.²⁷" The Committee concluded that it was scientifically, technologically and practically possible to control atomic energy if "appropriate mechanism of control...including one or more of the following types of safeguard: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing" were applied to every stage from the mining of uranium and thorium "until they became nuclear fuel and are used."²⁸ Thus the Scientific and Control Committees broadly agreed with the Baruch Plan.

The UN Commission on Conventional Armaments appointed in 1947 also met with a deadlock. It stood for the regulation and reduction of armaments to a level indispensable for maintaining peace and security. The Soviet Union demanded, in the meetings of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, a one-third reduction of arms, men and all other conventional weapons of all the major powers. But so long as the Soviet Union enjoyed superiority in conventional forces, the Western powers would not agree to the Soviet demand. In order to break the deadlock, France made an interesting suggestion to have a census of all the armed forces. But the Soviet Union did not agree with the French census proposal.

The Russians continued to urge that the UNAEC proposals

27 Ibid., p. 196.

28 Ibid.

meant an unwarranted interference in the economic development, national sovereignty and security of States; they refused to commit themselves to the proposition that inspection should be conducted by an exclusively international personnel; they said that Russia could not accept any proposal which would undermine its sovereignty in any degree. Referring to the question of veto, they said that "any violation of this principle would have far-reaching and negative consequences...may be for its ~~(the UNIS)~~ ²⁹ very existence." They ridiculed the whole idea that any inter-³⁰ national body should be given the powers proposed for the IADA.

In principle, the Soviet Union was not opposed to the setting up of an international authority for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. But it was definitely opposed to the setting up of international control machinery prior to the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons.

With the rejection of the Baruch Plan by the Soviet Union, Baruch submitted his resignation on January 4, 1947. He pointed out that his task in formulating an atomic energy control plan had been completed. He advised the U.S. President that the U.S.A. should continue to manufacture atomic bombs until the ratification of the proposed treaty, and that it was essential for it to continue to preserve its atomic secrets.

Discussion of the Atomic Energy Commission's report in

29 Gromyko, First UNAEC Report, p. 118.

30 Noel-Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

the Security Council was delayed by a dispute between the U.S. and Soviet delegations over the U.S. contention that consideration of the AEC's report should have priority over the question of general disarmament, and that the proposed commission to deal with general disarmament question should be excluded from encroaching upon the work of the AEC.

Gromyko made it clear during these discussions that the Soviet Government took the view that the new Commission should draw up conventions on all aspects of disarmament, including those concerning the control of atomic energy. But the American representative, Austin, thought that atomic and general disarmament questions should not be considered together and that atomic control should be given priority because it was the key to
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disarmament and much work had already been done on it.

The Soviet Breakthrough and the End
of U.S. Nuclear Monopoly

The American nuclear monopoly ended with the explosion of the first Soviet A-bomb on August 29, 1949. The first U.S. thermo-nuclear bomb was exploded in the fall of 1952 (November 1, 1952). And the Soviet Union came out with its first H-bomb on August 12, 1953. Thus, while the Soviet Union took more than four years to make a nuclear bomb, it took only a few months to catch up with the U.S. in thermonuclear weapons. This confirmed the Soviet determination and drive to forge ahead with its

nuclear weapon programme. It was true that the United States still maintained the lead, but the whole strategic equation altered, because it broke the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons. Hereafter, the United States had to reckon with the reality that the Soviet Union was also a nuclear power in addition to its superiority in conventional arms. This compelled the United States to make an agonising reappraisal of its arms policy. This was bound to have its effect on future disarmament negotiations as well.

Chapter III

UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS (1945-1953)

After two devastating World Wars, the United Nations symbolized the hope of humanity "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"¹. The major objective of the United Nations was to build and preserve a durable international peace and security.² Disarmament had been visualized as one of the means of attaining this goal.³ Although due weightage had been given to the great power status through the permanent membership of the Security Council of the U.N., the maintenance of international peace and security and the reduction of armaments had been accepted as the collective and individual responsibility of all members of the United Nations. Hence, the very first act of the U.N. was to unanimously adopt on January 24, 1946 a resolution by the General Assembly on disarmament. It provided for the setting up of an Atomic Energy Commission and entrusting it with the urgent task of making specific proposals for elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction.⁴

In spite of the lofty ideals enshrined in the U.N. Charter

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- 1 Preamble of the U.N. Charter.
 - 2 Article 1 of the U.N. Charter.
 - 3 Articles 11 and 26 of the U.N. Charter.
 - 4 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, (New York: United Nations), pp. 11-13.

and the pious hopes expressed in the disarmament resolution, disarmament negotiations which ensued soon after, were used as the instrument of great power diplomacy for the "overall struggle⁵ for power between the two major antagonists". We intend to show in this chapter how the gamesmanship of these negotiations was utilized to achieve certain aims which were not primarily concerned with a reduction or regulation of armaments; and how each nation's object in these negotiations had been "to weaken the political and military posture of the other side.... In short, the negotiations were actually an integral part of the political conflict and the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union."⁶

The U.S.-Soviet cooperation in regard to disarmament was short-lived. There was unanimity in setting up the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and in creating the Commission for Conventional⁷ Armaments. But beyond this, the underlying political conflicts and the deep-seated distrust had influenced the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union at the disarmament talks and that would account for the dismal record of failure to reach agreement on any important disarmament issues.

It was stated in the preceding chapter that the Baruch Plan was a carefully conceived outline for the preservation of

5 Spanier and Noguee, op. cit., p. 6.

6 Ibid.

7 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 26-28.

the U.S. nuclear monopoly to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. But behind this plan, what determined the U.S. disarmament approach was its military policy. The U.S. was quite convinced that "if an effort is made to reduce armaments, armed forces and military expenditures to a level that is too low, to a level that reflects weakness, it would not be conducive to stability in the world and to the best interests of peace... It is our view that if armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are brought down to too low a level, then...instead of the prospects of peace being improved, the danger of war is increased." ⁸

The Soviet perception of the American approach to disarmament was shaped to some extent by Moscow's appraisal of Washington's overall military policy and the political motivation of this policy. Molotov saw in the Baruch Plan and in the U.S. disarmament talks, a "militant philosophy" from which the "relevant political conclusions should be drawn namely to inflate military budgets, to increase the size of the armies and to try to be ahead of others in the arms race, including the atomic bomb...in this philosophy, there is striking evidence of an irresistible yearning for expansion and undivided domination of the world." ⁹ Molotov added: "The United States plan, the so-called 'Baruch Plan', unfortunately suffers from a certain

8 Noel-Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 29 (Quoting Stassen, President Eisenhower's special representative).
⁹ Official Records of the Security Council, Part II, October 29, 1946,
~~ibid., pp. 244-45.~~
 42nd Plenary Meetings, #44-45.

amount of egoism. It proceeds from the desire to secure for the United States of America, the monopolistic possession of the atomic bomb. At the same time it calls for the earliest possible establishment of control over the production of atomic energy giving to this control an international character in outward appearance, but in fact attempting to protect, in a veiled form, the monopolistic position of the United States in this field. It is obvious that projects of this kind are unacceptable, since they are based on a narrow conception of the interests of our country and on the inadmissible negation of the equal rights of the States and of their legitimate interests." ¹⁰

In the debates in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission which were centred round the issue of international control of atomic energy, the Soviet Union had objected to the nature of international control envisaged by the Baruch Plan. Hence, the first report of the Commission had to be adopted on December 30, 1946 without the active support of the Soviet bloc. The voting was 10 for, none against and 2 abstentions (Poland and USSR). The report established that scientifically and technologically it was feasible to control atomic energy; "to accomplish the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons"; and "to provide effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and

~~Official Records of the Security Council,
S.A.C.R. 1st Session, Part II, October 20, 1946, 42nd
Plenary Meetings, p. 842.~~

¹¹ evasions." The Soviet Union did not agree with these findings. On February 18, 1947, the Soviet Union submitted amendments and additions to the Commission's report. It also proposed that "inspection, supervision and management by an international agency should apply to all existing atomic plants immediately after the entry into force of an appropriate convention or conventions and that an effective international system of control of atomic energy should be administered and enforced within the framework of the Security Council." It also proposed the "destruction of stocks of manufactured and unfinished atomic weapons." The proposal also insisted on the need to preserve the right of veto regarding the question of atomic energy control. ¹² These proposals were clearly directed against the U.S. nuclear monopoly. As the United States was in a position to get an overwhelming majority in the U.N. General Assembly, in the Atomic Energy Commission, and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Soviet Union was extremely concerned about the use of veto in the Security Council. A Soviet veto in the Security Council could kill any proposal regarding disarmament originating from the American bloc if it was detrimental to the Soviet interests or endangered Soviet security. The Soviet-American divergencies were mainly on the following issues: "the stage at which atomic weapons should be prohibited and international control established; the principle of international

11 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit.,
~~14~~ p. 14.

12 Ibid., p. 15.

ownership or control of all phases of atomic energy activities, including research; and the application of the principle of unanimity in the Security Council when violations of an agreement were before it."¹³

When the second report of the Commission was considered the pattern of voting was the same. It was adopted on September 11, 1947 by 10 votes to 1 (USSR), with one abstention (Poland). The majority of the Commission, agreed on how an effective system of control to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes could be established.¹⁴ By the time the Commission got ready with its third report which was adopted on May 17, 1948 by a vote of 9 to 2 (Ukrainian SSR and USSR) it became evident that the Commission had reached an impasse.¹⁵ The Soviet opposition to the creation of an international agency for atomic energy prior to the outlawing and destruction of atomic weapons brought the discussions to a standstill. When the three reports came up for consideration before the Security Council, the Soviet Union exercised its veto.¹⁶ So, the American strategy to get the international control agency approved by the UN did not work.

13 Ibid., p. 15. Also see, Official Record of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, annex 4, pp. 92-102, 106-111. Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 22, 115th meeting, p. 455. ✓

14 Ibid., p. 19.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. 21.

However, the Security Council decided to transmit the report, to the General Assembly where the United States had an impressive majority and no fear of the Soviet veto. The West won an empty victory over the Soviet Union (40 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions) endorsing the reports of the Commission regarding international control of atomic energy, because the General Assembly is only a recommendatory body. The Atomic Energy Commission realized that the Soviet-American differences were irreconcilable.

According to the United Kingdom the cause for the impasse "was fundamentally simple. It was that although the minority often put forward a point of view which could not be disregarded and which should be intelligently discussed, in those matters it resolutely refused to accommodate itself, even in the slightest degree, to the wishes and desires of the majority."¹⁷

The Commission for Conventional Armaments which was set up by the Security Council on February 13, 1947, could not make any dent on disarmament problems in view of the same hardening of attitudes by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Commission was to submit proposals regarding (a) the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; and (b) practical and effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation and reduction of armaments. The Commission was not

17 Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, 144th Meeting, September 27, 1948, p. 151. (hereinafter referred to as G.A.O.R.)

entitled to examine anything which came under the purview of the
¹⁸
 Atomic Energy Commission. The Soviet Union was opposed to the
 functioning of the Commission because in its view, atomic weapons,
 weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments consti-
 tuted a single indivisible problem.

The Soviet draft proposal recommending (a) one-third
 reduction of armaments and armed forces of the big powers (b)
 prohibition of atomic weapons as weapons intended for offensive
 and not for defensive purposes and (c) the establishment within
 the framework of the Security Council of an international control
 body for the purpose of supervision and of control over imple-
 mentation of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed
 forces and for the prohibition of atomic weapons,
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 was rejected by 39 votes to 6 with 6 abstentions by the General Assembly on
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 November 19, 1948. Instead, an American-backed proposal recom-
 mending to pursue the study of the regulation and reduction of
 conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of
 the Commission on Conventional Armaments, was adopted by 43
²¹
 votes to 6 with 1 abstention. The Soviet Union voted against it.

18 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit.,
 p. 28.

19 G.A.O.R. Third Session, Part I, 143rd Plenary Meeting,
 September 25, 1948, p. 135.

20 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit.,
 p. 31.

21 Ibid.

The Soviet Union reintroduced its proposal for one-third reduction of conventional armaments in 1949 but it was again rejected by the Commission. A French plan for census and verification of information on armed forces and conventional armed forces was approved by the Commission. The Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR opposed it. However, the French proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council and the Soviet proposal was vetoed by the West.²² Then the General Assembly, by a vote of 44 to 5 with 5 abstentions approved the French plan on December 5, 1949. The Soviet Union and its allies voted against it.²³ A Soviet move to obtain information both on armed forces, conventional armaments and atomic weapons was defeated by a vote of 39 to 6 with 9 abstentions.²⁴

In April, 1950, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the work of the Commission under the plea that the Koumintang representative should be excluded from the body. That was the end of the Commission on Conventional Armaments. It was formally dissolved by the Security Council in February, 1952.

The fate of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission was also a foregone conclusion. With such widely different views which were so fundamental, held by the Soviet Union and the United States, regarding the nature, functions and powers of the control

22 Ibid., p. 32.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 33.

machinery, how could one expect the Commission to survive? It was dissolved on January 11, 1952.

According to the Soviet Union, these Commissions could not succeed because the U.S. "had refused and continued to refuse to solve the principal problem", namely, "the necessity for immediately prohibiting atomic weapons and their utilization for aggressive ends... Any objection to the prohibition of atomic weapons was possible only on the part of those circles which were interested in the retention in their own hands of the control over the weapon, groups which were cherishing plans for attacks on other countries... It would be useless to try to prohibit or control atomic energy without banning atomic weapons in the first place." The U.S.S.R. feared that if it agreed to a control organ, as the West demanded, it would be completely controlled by the United States because of the brute majority in the General Assembly and in other organs of the United Nations. The decisions taken by the control organ were bound to be one-sided. The United States, on the other hand, blamed the Soviet Union that its refusal to accept "the nature and extent of the participation in the world community required of all nations in their field", was the cause of the failure of Commissions.

Despite the irreconcilable positions taken by the two blocs, disarmament negotiations were kept going, thanks largely

25 G.A.O.R. Third Session, Part I, 143rd Plenary Meeting, September 25, 1948, p. 124.

26 Ibid., 154th Plenary Meeting, November 3, 1948, p. 396.

to the efforts of the member nations belonging to the Third World. A tripartite draft resolution sponsored by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria, and revised by the U.K., the U.S.A. and France, was adopted by the General Assembly on January 11, 1952 by 42 votes to 5 with 7 abstentions. The Soviet Union and its allies opposed the resolution. It referred to the "general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burdens of increasing armaments and the fear of war". But the main achievement of the resolution was that it established the Disarmament Commission and dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.²⁷ Despite the Soviet negative vote, Moscow offered to co-operate with the working of the newly constituted Commission because the West had demonstrated its willingness to accede to the Soviet demand for integrating the study of atomic weapons together with conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union submitted a comprehensive disarmament proposal at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in 1952. The draft proposal reiterated its demand for "the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over its enforcement, the prohibition and control to be put into effect simultaneously..." The Disarmament Commission was to submit a draft convention "providing measures to ensure the implementation of the prohibition of

27 G.A.O.R. Sixth Session, 358th Plenary Meeting, January 11, 1952, pp. 294-95.

atomic weapons, the cessation of their production and the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the proposed convention." It also referred to the one-third reduction of conventional armaments of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, as demanded earlier. Apart from these issues concerning disarmament, the Soviet proposal (a) condemned participation in the "Atlantic bloc" and the establishment by the United States of bases in foreign territories; (b) demanded the withdrawal of troops from Korea; and also (c) called on the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact. The General Assembly decided to refer the Soviet proposal to the Disarmament Commission. But the Disarmament Commission approved a compromise French plan by 11 votes to 1 (USSR) on February 4, 1952. It referred to: (i) the disclosure and verification of all armaments including atomic armaments and of all armed forces; (ii) the elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy with a view to ensuring their elimination; (iii) the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination; (iv) the limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and of all armed forces, and control of this limitation and

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reduction.

This was the time when the Korean War was waged with full fury. The political climate was so much surcharged with tension and fear that its echoes were heard even in the disarmament debates whether these took place in the General Assembly, Security Council or in the Disarmament Commission. In the acrimonious exchanges in the meetings of the Commission, the Soviet Union accused the United States of using bacteriological weapons in Korea. The Cold War hostility was clearly reflected in the debates which were infructuous, barren and dilatory.

A notable disarmament formula considered by the Disarmament Commission at this stage was the Western proposal³⁰ for numerical force ceilings, based on a working paper submitted by France in May, 1952. According to this plan, ceilings on the armed forces for China, the USSR and the United States should be fixed at between one million and 1.5 million men and for France and the United Kingdom at between 700,000 and 800,000. For other States having substantial armed forces, the ceiling should be fixed at less than one per cent of the population. While criticizing the force ceilings proposal, the Soviet Union reiterated its demand for the prohibition of atomic weapons in order to solve the basic problem of disarmament. With a view to

29 Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Special Supplement No. 1, para 42 (DC/5).

30 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit., p. 46.

overcome Soviet objections, the United States suggested that if the West's proposal was accepted by the Soviet Union, a conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council could be held to reach a viable agreement "on the distribution by principal categories of their forces within the agreed ceilings, the types and quantities of armed forces and armaments for their support, the elimination of all other armed forces and armaments (expressly including all weapons of mass destruction) and the effective international control of atomic energy" with a view to eventually concluding a draft treaty "encompassing all the reductions and eliminations of all armaments and forces and bringing them into balanced relationship by progressive synchronised steps"³¹. The Soviet Union, however, insisted that "the problems before the Commission could be solved only on the basis of the Soviet proposals calling for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the one-third reduction of all armaments and armed forces"³². The General Assembly rejected the Soviet stand and adopted the West's proposal by 52 votes to 5 with 3 abstentions, on April 8, 1953.

The Disarmament Commission lasted only upto the end of 1953. Meanwhile, important events were reshaping the attitudes of the two rival blocs. In the Soviet Union, the death of Stalin in 1953 brought about a change in the leadership. In the United

31 The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, op. cit.,
p. 47.

32 Ibid.

States also there was a change in the government leadership when President Eisenhower took over the U.S. Administration in 1953. Even more important than this, the Korean War came to an end in the same year. Hence, the disarmament Commission, in one of its last meetings adopted a unanimous report expressing hopefully that "recent international events (the end of Korean War and changes in the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union) would create a more propitious atmosphere for the recon-³³sideration of the disarmament question". The shift in the attitude of the two leading powers was quite visible in the disarmament debates in the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted a resolution on November 28, 1953, by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions, reaffirming its faith in the previously³⁴ declared objectives of disarmament. The resolution is significant in one other respect also. It mooted the question of establishing a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission (which actually took over the work of the Commission in the following years). This was the beginning of the end of the impasse. A mood of optimism seized the disarmament negotiators. A thaw began to appear on the surface of the frozen attitudes of big powers.

The Role of the Third World

Only very few nations belonging to the Third World could

33 Ibid., p. 48.

34 Ibid., pp. 48-50.

be regarded as having even potential nuclear capabilities during the period when the United States and the Soviet Union became nuclear powers. In fact the large majority of them could never hope to acquire any nuclear capability. Yet all these nations were greatly concerned about the danger of a nuclear war because it threatened their security as much as the security of the contending nations. These Third World countries were evincing the keenest interest in the disarmament debates in the General Assembly and were always willing to support proposals which would lead to the reduction and limitation of armaments, or the prohibition of the use as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons. From the very inception of the U.N. some of these nations were given representation in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, Commission for Conventional Armaments, the First Committee and the Sub-Committee of the First Committee, the Committee of Twelve, the Disarmament Commission and so on.

Their role in these various committees and in the United Nations in general, was that of 'bridge-building'. The Indian representative, Mrs. Vijaylakshmi Pandit, in her address to the General Assembly in 1948 tried to define the role of the Third World particularly in regard to disarmament question, as one of bringing "the opposing points of view together". Referring particularly to India's role she observed: "India is eager to help in promoting a general settlement which would reduce the fears of the world regarding the misuse of atomic energy, and in order to obtain general support, is prepared even to sacrifice

to some extent what it considers to be its own interests." ³⁵ At the eighth session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1953, the speech of the Indian representative, Krishna Menon, revealed remarkable consistency in India's approach to disarmament issues. In a world deeply divided and afflicted by naked power struggle, he said, the role of the uncommitted nations was to explore "the common factors, because it is always necessary even more so in the context of conflict, to be aware of and to utilise what little common ground there is, in order that from there may we ³⁶ march towards reconciliation."

Despite the determination of these nations to bring about reconciliation and extend the area of understanding between the two hostile power blocs, they were judging every issue on its merits and supporting or opposing disarmament proposals in the light in which they could interpret them. In most of the General Assembly voting on disarmament proposals, they were siding with the West because they thought that any move to bring about international control of atomic energy established on clearly defined terms, deserved to be encouraged. At the same time, they stood by the Soviet Union on the crucial question of banning the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Indian representative Mrs. Pandit, for instance, in her speech in the General Assembly

35 G.A.O.R. Third Session, Part I, 154th Plenary Meeting, November 3, 1948, p. 422.

36 G.A.O.R. Eighth Session, 448th Plenary Meeting, September 28, 1953, p. 196.

in 1948 said: "While India would agree in principle to the international control and distribution of all power-producing materials such as coal, oil, uranium, thorium and so on, in order to put them to the best use of mankind, it could not agree to an international ownership and distribution of only those materials capable of generating atomic energy while other materials, such as oil, remained under private ownership and without any international control... In order to ensure security, it was essential for all nations to agree to the full and free inspection of their territories coupled with control and possibly international ownership of plants separating or producing the actual fissionable material. Strict control of all such plants by an international agency coupled with the free and full inspection of all territories was sufficient to ensure that desired materials were not smuggled away to the detriment of international security. India would agree to that full and free inspection and if it were agreed to by all nations together with the recommendations for the control of the plants producing the actual fissionable materials, then the paramount considerations of security would be fully met without the necessity of the control or international ownership of the raw materials themselves".³⁷

Similarly, Krishna Menon, Indian representative requested the General Assembly in 1953 "to declare itself in favour of the

37 G.A.O.R. Third Session, Part I, 154th Plenary Meeting, 1948, op. cit., p. 423.

non-use" of atomic weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

"These instruments could be banned, or at any rate, a declaration could be made to this effect".³⁸

While speaking on the tripartite draft resolution for the reduction of arms and armed forces in the General Assembly, the Egyptian representative referred to the role played by the Third World countries. "The Egyptian delegation and some of the other delegations of the Arab and Asian countries decline to seek their inspiration either in the Rule de Grenelle or in the Avenue Gabriel. We express our views on questions that concern us by judging each case on its merits and not by taking sides". It was not neutrality "but a refusal to let ourselves join a side and a refusal above all to regard as the last word in human wisdom proposals which might easily have been improved, even in a very realistic spirit". The Egyptian and other Asian-African countries did not fully support the West, because under the Western proposals, "the prohibition of the atom bomb and other weapons of mass destruction was considered a distant objective, an ultimate ideal only attainable at the end of a very long process". Further, the Third World nations believed that the atom bomb was an offensive weapon and hence "means should be found of outlawing it". They did not support the Soviet proposal for one-third reduction of conventional armaments of the big five because it "would not radically alter the present

38 G.A.O.R. Sixth Session, 358th Plenary Meeting, January 11, 1952, pp. 295-96.

situation and because reduction of armaments in equal proportion would not diminish the risk of war". The Egyptian delegate explained the attitude of the Third World as an "attitude, still unchanged, of contributing to any positive work for peace, and of voicing our objections whenever we encounter those who are not sufficiently receptive".³⁹

The Arms Race

There was a constant refrain in all the disarmament debates in the United Nations: all-pervasive fear and distrust among the big powers which led to an escalating arms race. Behind the grandeur and eloquence of lofty ideas and visions of a disarmed world where every destructive weapon including atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons would be beaten into ploughshares, where confidence among nations would be consecrated into an article of faith in order to build a new millennium of peace and goodwill on earth, a vicious and wicked arms build-up was going on. The whole world knew about it and exasperated nations were expressing their concern about its dangerous consequences. The big powers themselves in their polemical disarmament debates hinted at these ominous developments.

The Soviet representative Vyshinsky in his speech in the General Assembly in 1948 referred to the military preparations by the United States: "In 1947, two years after the end of the

war, the United States Army was three and a half-times larger than it had ever been in pre-war years. The United States Air Force had grown even faster, its numbers in 1947 having increased seventeen times as compared with 1937. During that same period the United States Navy had increased by three and a half times in tonnage of operating naval units, and the personnel of the Navy had increased five times.

"The United States budget approved for 1948-49 showed an increase of four billion dollars as compared with the preceding year. According to official data, the following increases in the military budget intended for the purpose of the re-armament of the Army, Air Force and Navy of the United States had been planned for coming years: 1949-1950, Seventeen and a half billion dollars: 1950-1951, twenty billion: 1951-1952, twenty one and a half billion and 1952-1953, twenty two and a half billion.⁴⁰"

The French representative Moch said in 1952 in the disarmament debates of the General Assembly that "the Soviet Union has four classes with colours, 175 combat divisions, some 30 of them in Germany and eastern Europe, 20,000 aircrafts, 250 submarines, 5 million men in the Service, including police and security forces".⁴¹ The Soviet military budget swelled up from 82.9 billion

40 G.A.O.R. Third Session, Part I, 143rd Plenary Meeting, September 25, 1948, pp. 133-34.

41 G.A.O.R. Sixth Session, 358th Plenary Meeting, January 11, 1952, p. 298.

rubles in 1950 to 110.2 billion rubles in 1953. The Soviet Armed Forces increased from 2.8 million in 1950 to 4.6 million in 1953 and Soviet submarines (conventional) increased from 360 in 1950 to 370 in 1953.⁴² The U.S. defence budget shot up from \$11.9 billion in 1950 to \$47.7 billion in 1953.⁴³ It was clear indication of the developing trend in the arms policy of the East and the West. If there were any lingering doubts about it, the speeches of the U.S. and Soviet representatives in the United Nations confirmed that they were engaged in an arms race. The U.S. representative told the General Assembly in 1952: "...building our strength because we must, planning for disarmament because we desire a world free from the danger of war".⁴⁴ Similarly, Vyshinsky in his speech at the General Assembly in 1953 referred to a Tass Communique (September 18, 1953) indicating the Soviet response to the American military build-up: "Obviously, as long as responsible circles in the United States reject the insistent proposals of the Soviet Union for the prohibition of the atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, for reasons of security, must give its attention to the production of atomic weapons."⁴⁵

42 Roman Kolkowicz (ed), The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 203 (Appendix-I).

43 Ibid., p. 205 (Appendix-II).

44 Ibid., p. 299.

45 G.A.O.R. Eighty Session, 438th Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1953, p. 60.

This was the small beginning of the action-reaction phenomenon which has now mushroomed into hydra-headed multiple warheads (MIRVs) anti-ballistic missile system (ABMs) submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and land-based ICBMs and hardened silos. In this action-reaction chain the United States first exploded the A-bomb in 1945 followed by the Soviet Union in 1949. The United States exploded its thermo-nuclear device (H-bomb) in 1952 followed by the Soviet Union in 1953. While these nations were eologising their peaceful intentions at the disarmament conferences, and excelling each other in improving the blue-prints of peace, they were slowly drifting towards a nuclear Armageddon.

Chapter IV

CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. DISARMAMENT POLICY

U.S.-Soviet relations during the period under study can be aptly described as an adversary gamesmanship in which every move and counter-move, every proposal and counter-proposal, every challenge and response, was made to defeat the opponent's strategy. The role of national and foreign policies, military doctrines and strategic considerations was to achieve this primary objective. Hence, what has been referred to in this section as disarmament policy is to be understood not so much as an independent policy or approach - (in fact there was no independent disarmament policy in the years 1945 to 1953) - as an integral part of the bargaining strategy of the underlying political conflicts. If anything, it was more often a negative approach to mislead world public opinion, a camouflage to disguise the real motivations and intentions of the major military powers, rather than a genuine attempt to reach positive agreements to curb the arms race.

In fact, throughout the fifties, little sustained and intensive attention to disarmament was given in the U.S. outside of the State Department. The Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament revealed that as of September 1957, after eleven years of disarmament negotiations, "no agency of the executive branch has made efforts to ascertain the economic consequences of a reduction

in armaments"¹. Over a year later, in October 1958, in its Final Report, the same Senate Subcommittee observed: "there are only some 6 or 7 persons who work full time on disarmament in the State Department. The Subcommittee struck by the disparity in the effort the world is putting in to thought and action for controlling and reducing armaments and the efforts going into the development, fabrication and build-up of armaments"². Even in the early sixties, the only agencies in the U.S. Government that did have a continuing interest in disarmament are those which had a primary responsibility for, and hence a commitment to, military defence. As Richard J. Barnet put it, "Since bureaucracies are notoriously inefficient at seeking their own dissolution, it is too much to ask those to whom our defence effort and atomic energy programme are entrusted to prepare for disarmament as well"³. It was only in September 1961 that the U.S. Congress authorised the establishment of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an independent executive body reporting directly to the President as well as the Secretary of State. However, Congress prohibited ACDA explicitly from engaging in any kind of work designed to promote public support for disarmament.

1 Quoted in Falk, Richard A., and Mendlovitz, Saul H. (ed) The Strategy of World Order, vol. I, (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), p. 59.

2 Ibid.

3 Barnet, Richard J., "Preparations for Congress", in Ibid., p. 59.

In the USSR also, disarmament issues were handled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the defence establishment. Neither in the Kremlin nor in the CPSU central secretariat was disarmament entrusted to an independent, highpowered agency that would devote all its time and energy to this important issue.

Apart from the unwillingness on the part of the big powers to disengage from their respective posture of confrontation, there were several factors directly contributing to an arms race and perpetuating mutual suspicion and fear. In the case of the United States, these were external events like the Cold War and the Korean crisis; strategy and policy considerations such as the Containment Policy and the Massive Retaliation doctrine; and also internal pressure groups like the arms lobby or the military-industrial complex.

A major factor that has inhibited disarmament efforts and, in fact, worked as a continuing spurt for the arms race is the unstable and volatile "weapons system climate" created by the successive "unfinished" technological revolutions of the post-war world. According to Professor Herman Kahn, "we are having a complete technological revolution in the art of war every five years"⁴. Military doctrines in the post-war period,

4 Kahn, Herman, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards" in The Strategy of World Order, vol. I, pp. 37-47. Kahn's use of the adjective "complete" seems to be inappropriate because one technological revolution led to the other, and each was essentially "unfinished".

although evolving with meteoric speed as contrasted with the period before World War II, have been hopelessly behind events rather than successful in anticipating the future. The first of the technological revolutions in the weapons system occurred ~~in 1951~~, when third or fourth generation fission bombs were available, and the most pressing questions in war planning involved the impact of fission bombs. The second technological revolution ~~of 1953~~ was brought about by the startling development and perfection of thermo-nuclear bombs. "Probably this introduced a more radical change into the technology of war than the introduction of the atom bomb did." These successive technological revolutions introduced an unprecedented competition between the U.S. and the USSR (the two nations that had the resources to absorb the revolutions, the Soviets lagging behind the Americans in the initial years but catching on in the sixties with breath-taking celerity). This competition fed on the Cold War. No wonder that disarmament became little more than a ritual to be talked about rather than performed, a propaganda issue to be used against one another.

The Cold War

In the middle of 1945, when Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States emerged successfully from their joint effort to defeat the Axis Powers, the three victorious allies found themselves the world's only remaining great powers. The war-time alliance was soon to divide them into two hostile camps.

The United States introduced the Marshall Plan in Western Europe in order to restore economic and political stability. But these non-military measures did not prove effective means of checking communist expansion. Then the United States decided to oppose the expansion by military means. This had its first test in Greece in 1946.

In 1946, the Greek government was under attack by local Communist forces. Actually the conflict was typical of many international crises to follow, and the American response to it was symbolized in the doctrine of containment.

Like later conflicts, the Greek civil war was an instance of pressure by the communist movement on the border separating the West and East. Moreover, the United States intervention was far more direct and visible than whatever support the Russians gave. In Greece the communists gained nothing while the United States tested a new approach to contain communist expansion. Under pressure of successive crises - smaller ones occurred in those years in Iran, Turkey and Berlin - the United States formulated its first post war strategy. This was the genesis of the Cold War.

The U.S. perception of this period was that the communists were determined to realize their long-declared goal of spreading socialist revolution in as many countries as possible. After a swift succession of crises generated by communist pressures in Iran, Turkey, and Greece between June 1945, and March 1947, the United States concluded that the communist expansion would

cease only if checked by the use of military power. By 1947 the United States was deeply involved in the new power struggle and had assumed the leadership of the West.

During 1946-1947 and the first nine months of 1948, arms control negotiations followed the pattern of political events. As the Cold War mounted in intensity, the Soviet Union and the United States resorted to evasive tactics and refused to face⁵ the real issues of disarmament.

The United States aim was to retain and then enhance its global power and influence. The Soviet aim was to reach a position of parity as soon as possible without resorting to a hot war. To make its position strong, the USSR allied itself with anti-colonial currents and with Afro-Asian nationalism. This gave the USSR sufficient political leverage against the U.S.A. to offset the policy of military encirclement of the Soviet Union. What was obviously a power struggle between the East and the West appeared in the garb of an ideological conflict between communism vs. democracy.

In these circumstances propaganda had dominated all disarmament plans and debates. Both had been an integral part of a continuous American-Soviet psychological warfare designed to place each one in a more favourable position before world⁶ public opinion.

5 Bernard G. Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 102.

6 ~~John W.~~ Spainer and ~~Joseph L.~~ Noguee, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

In the disarmament negotiations American negotiators attempted to scuttle fruitful disarmament agreements by insisting on settling political issues of the Cold War prior to the actual implementation of any arms control measures. This approach clearly recognized the cause and effect relationship between the conflict of vital interests and the armaments race. By suggesting that the political clashes be resolved first, the assumption was that the problem of disarmament would take care of itself.⁷

So throughout the Cold War period and as long as America had nuclear monopoly it relied on its arms-twisting policy of the Soviet Union.

The Containment Policy

The United States policy of containing the Soviet and Chinese expansion was apparently based on ideological grounds. The Dullesian thesis of uncompromising opposition to and resistance of communism on moral grounds made it a dogma. A vigorous pursuit of such a policy was expected to accomplish two ends. First, it would check communist expansion and keep the communist powers from adding more countries to their bloc; second, by continually frustrating their efforts, it would force the Communists to give up their ^{aims} ~~course~~. In the U.S. perception, the Kremlin could not afford to pursue an expansionist course

7 Ibid., p. 46.

for long; it would be faced with internal dissatisfaction and conflict - even, possibly with ^{the} disintegration of the Soviet system. Such total frustration could generate an all-out attack by the Russians, since they would see no gradual way of obtaining their goals; but this possibility was remote. After all, Russia was greatly weakened by World War II and the United States was not. Moreover, the United States had atomic bombs, while Russia, at that time, did not.

A secret memorandum sent by George Kennan to the State Department in 1946 outlined the basic elements of the new policy of containment. President Truman adopted the basic elements of Kennan's containment strategy, adding to it an ideological component and creating what later became known as the Truman Doctrine.

It was really Kennan who made Containment Policy an intellectually acceptable concept. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1947, he said: "...the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. The Soviet pressure against the institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,

8 *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy*, (The Crowell - Collier Press, 1962), p. 20.
Amitai Etzioni, ~~op. cit.~~, p. 20.

9 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence."¹⁰

The core of the new strategy - which would hardly be considered new¹¹ today - was that the Russians were a major global power and America's chief adversary. Russia viewed the West as fundamentally hostile and threatening and as an obstacle to be removed in one way or another in order to assure the spread of communism.

Accordingly the United States gave military and economic aid to Western Europe and intervened in Turkey and Greece where in 1946 civil war was going on. It also had stationed its forces in these places. These included both conventional and nuclear forces. Since the United States had complete authority over the nuclear force, its policy was to contain the expansion of communism through military means.

The Korean War

The Korean War was the high noon of the Cold War. The U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in a statement on January 12, 1950, amplifying America's foreign policy of containing communism, outlined a "defensive perimeter" which defined the limits of the area the United States believed vital to its national security. Korea at that time was excluded from the

10 "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, vol. 25 (1946-47), pp. 575-76.

11 Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

U.S. defence perimeter because he thought that it was by no means vital to America's national interest. Five months' later, on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea.¹²

To prevent the latter being defeated, the United States intervened in the Korean war along with fifteen other members of the U.N. under the U.N. Command. Technically and legally the U.S. intervention in Korean war^{was} justified under the Uniting for Peace resolution although apparently it was to prevent the spread of communism. Korea had no actual strategic importance to the national security of the United States. The United States charged North Korea of blatant aggression. The U.N. Security Council, called upon UN members to go to the assistance of South Korea.¹³

The Soviet Union and China ranged against the United States and supported North Korea militarily.

The only redeeming feature of the Korean war was that the two big powers decided to have a limited war in Korea, and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, in spite of^{the} Chinese intervention. In order to prevent the local conflict escalating into a nuclear war, the U.S. President Truman had to resort to the extreme step of dismissing General MacArthur, his Commander-in-Chief of the Far East. It was a significant development because

12 James A. Donovan, Militarism, USA (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 14.

13 Ibid.

it proved that the power of the superpowers, particularly of nuclear weapons, could not be used in local or limited wars on account of the fear of escalation into an all-out nuclear war. It also showed that nations were not prepared to give up war as an instrument for settling disputes and that there was still some possibility of limited wars in the nuclear age. It was a glaring illustration of how the Super Powers pursued their global interests through coercive means short of a nuclear exchange despite the risks involved in such an adventurous course.

After a long military and political stalemate, an armistice was signed in July 1953, that fixed the North Korean-South Korean border approximately where it had been before the fighting began.

The Korean war profoundly influenced the course of disarmament negotiations and even spoiled the chances of any meaningful disarmament agreement. On the other hand, irrespective of whether the U.S. had become involved or not in the Korean war, the U.S. arms policy-makers would not in any case have had any option to discontinue the arms race because of the inherent political compulsion resulting from the overriding necessity to stay ahead in military power of all possible rivals.

The United States now favoured an intensive arms race, rather than disarmament. The Cold War and the policy of containment were used as smokescreen for a strenuous build-up of military forces and machinery. This was followed by the United States policy of alliance-building. NATO was the first in a

global chain of military alliances. The whole system was reinforced by military bases and ^{the} stationing of troops.

Just as the Greek war of 1946 contributed to the development of the containment strategy, the Korean war was the crisis out of which the subsequent U.S. military policy was born.¹⁴

Massive Retaliation Theory

After the Korean war, American military strategists became obsessed with the power of nuclear weapons and prospects of atomic war. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles placed no faith in the concept of limited war.¹⁵ The basic elements of the new American strategy were worked out by Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford in December 1952, before the new Administration took office. Eisenhower's approval of the new policy was prompt. Containment, Dulles believed, was expensive, ineffective, and immoral. Containment offered no way out of the impasse, but implied simply an endless round of wars. The West could not expect victory over the communists by way of containment, the most it could hope for was that by dint of great effort it could maintain the status quo.¹⁶

Massive Retaliation, according to Dulles, would correct all the shortcomings of containment. It was effective, economical, and morally superior. Its essence, in Dulles' words, was

14 Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

15 James A. Donovan, Militarism, USA, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 18.

16 Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 25.

the decision to "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." It meant that if the communists attacked again, they could expect nuclear bombardment in return.

Dulles said: "The only way to stop prospective aggressors is to convince them in advance that if they commit aggression, they will be subjected to retaliatory blows so costly that their aggression will not be a profitable operation".¹⁷

An additional advantage of the Massive Retaliation strategy was that if conflict ever erupted again, the United States would be able not merely to defend "freedom" where it was being threatened, but also "to return it to those from whom it had been taken". The Communist bloc would thus not only be contained, it would be pushed back, punished, and possibly¹⁸ destroyed.

But the theory of deterrence through massive retaliation was not new to the thermo-nuclear age. Well before the advent of the H-bomb, the threat of massive atomic retaliation through the Strategic Air Command of the United States had been incorporated into Western military strategy to shore up the deterrent value of conventional ground forces, increasingly outnumbered by Soviet and satellite divisions.¹⁹

17 Ibid., p. 26.

18 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

19 Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Post-war Negotiations for Arms Control, op. cit., p. 250.

In December 1950, Dulles stated that as against the possibility of full-scale attack by the Soviet Union itself "there is only one effective defence for us and for others". That is the "capacity to counter-attack. That is the ultimate deterrent.... The arsenal of retaliation should include all forms of counter-attacks with a maximum flexibility²⁰".

The Massive Retaliation theory was used by Dulles to negotiate from a position of strength. The thermo-nuclear device tested in 1952 by the United States gave added strength to the U.S. assertions and convincing proof of the U.S. might. But whether the communists were overawed by the Massive Retaliation doctrine is another question. The Soviet response came shortly in the form of a big bang. The Soviet exploded the H-bomb in 1953 within four months of the U.S. test. Thus, the Soviet Union came out as it were, with its own version of massive retaliation.

This was arms race, pure and simple. As the Soviet nuclear stockpile grew, the American strategic problem had to undergo further changes. In this situation, deterrence could no longer be measured by absolute numbers of bombs or planes. As Professor Henry Kissinger put it, to seek safety in numerical superiority, or even in super-destructiveness, might come close to a Maginot line mentality to seek in numbers a substitute for

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conception. What was called for was a qualitative race for superiority in arms.

President Eisenhower stated in his "atoms for peace" proposal that if an aggressor should launch an atomic attack against the United States, "our reactions would be swift and resolute....the defence capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor... the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste". He went on to say that "all this, while fact is not the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States", but he made it clear that the United States held and, would, if need be, use this strength. The United States response even to local aggres-²²sions would be through massive retaliation against the aggressor.

According to Henry Kissinger, the aggressor would have to believe that the U.S. retaliatory force was so designed that an attack of a certain scale would trigger a counter-blow almost mechanically. In that eventuality, blackmail could not be effective because once a surprise attack was launched the President would no longer control the decisions to react. By launching a surprise attack, the Soviet leaders would guarantee their own destruction. Such a mechanical trigger is, of course,

21 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 60.

22 Bernard G. Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 251.

23
politically intolerable.

Kissinger further said that the threat of all-out war can ensure the security of Europe only if "we are able to meet two conditions:

(1) Our retaliatory force must be strong enough to win an all-out war if we strike first; and

(2) It must be so invulnerable that even if we should be the victim of a surprise attack it can inflict damage considered intolerable by the Soviet Union. In these circumstances the Soviet Union would not dare to attack Europe for fear of triggering a preemptive strike which would destroy its means of retaliation. It could not launch a simultaneous attack on Europe and the United States, for, our retaliation would, by hypothesis, still produce unacceptable losses. If it launched a simultaneous attack on the United States, the result would be mutual devastation."²⁴

The policy of Massive Retaliation placed the burden of credibility and execution upon the U.S. Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, which began to prosper in both budget allocations and prestige. The other services sought desperately for roles in atomic war that would justify not only respectable size but their very existence. The Navy developed new concepts

23 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choices, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 44.

24 Ibid., p. 102.

of atomic weapons delivery culminating in the missile submarine. The Army and Marines conceived new organizations and tactics for the atomic battle-field which eventually reached tactical absurdity as they prepared to employ hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons on the battle-field. They intended to defend the "free" world even by destroying the U.S. allies' countrysides.²⁵

The Massive Retaliation theory implied a high premium for armament and a low premium for disarmament. Massive Retaliation called for a total involvement of the United States in any confrontation with the Soviet Union or any other communist country in Europe. Such total involvement meant that America should increase its totality of power to the extent that the Soviet Union should not come any way near it. Obviously this suggested automatic increase in military build-up.

Secondly, the term Massive Retaliation was sufficiently provoking. Any local conflict between a small communist power and a non-Communist neighbour would escalate into a total war. This made it necessary for both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to find out ways of managing crisis. The Massive Retaliation doctrine placed the U.S. negotiators in an ambiguous position because the doctrine was a reflection of the "hard line" policy pursued by hawks.

The United States, however, turned out to be either unwilling or unable to retaliate, massively or otherwise.

25 James A. Donovan, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Consequently, it gained the reputation of talking loudly but carrying a small stick, and it lost much of its capacity to deter aggression psychologically.²⁶

In Indo-China the United States seemed unwilling to make good either its threats or its promises. Serious doubt was cast on its resolve to use nuclear bombs, and hence its capacity to deter became permanently weakened. The threat of retaliation no longer seemed very formidable to the communists. According to some American scholars, the lessening of fear not only encouraged further communist "expansionism" but created a danger that World War III might erupt simply from miscalculation. For instance, doubts about the United States' real intentions might some day lead the communists disastrously to underestimate the American will to strike.²⁷

Nor did nuclear bombing continue to look like a good military prospect in the kind of fighting that was going on in Indo-China. Nuclear bombs could wipe out cities and major military targets. But for tracking down guerrilla fighters in the jungle, the bombs are all but useless.²⁸

Thus, instead of deterring, Massive Retaliation itself was deterred. Massive Retaliation as a theory might be "acceptable", but it had little military, political or moral

26 Ibid., p. 27.

27 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

28 Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 29.

validity. Not only did Massive Retaliation fail to liberate, punish, or roll back; it did not even contain. Thus the time was ripe for a new strategy (graduated deterrence).²⁹

Massive Retaliation failed but it really convinced the Russians in the 1950's that the United States had a force and strength with which they could meet any Soviet challenge. Americans were afraid after the end of their nuclear monopoly that Russia might be challenging its nuclear superiority. The Massive Retaliation theory was to maintain the United States lead in the nuclear field.

The Massive Retaliation theory had in fact helped the industrial and military complex and the hawks in the American Senate to clamour for more armaments while the U.S. was paying only lip service to the disarmament negotiations.

The Military-Industrial Complex

The American society is distinguished by numerous groups and associations that abound and the decisive role these groups play in the political life of the nation.³⁰

America being a capitalist society, weapon production is in the hands of private industry. There was always a tendency in the U.S.A. for the military and industrial interests to exert pressure on the government for more and more weapons.

29 Ibid., p. 28.

30 Cecil V. Grabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1965), p. 737.

The military-industrial complex, came into operation effectively in the late 1950's and President Eisenhower warned the nation of its existence during his farewell address, in 1961. But even as early as the Baruch Plan period, the military-industrial complex was operating from behind the scene.

In the orthodox scenario, the military-industrial complex originated with World War II and the sophisticated weaponry needed to win it. The War Department and the War Production Board had to lean on industry to produce planes, canons, tanks etc. American Universities were co-opted to supply the brain power. It was a necessary partnership to win a war and save democracy. "If we didn't have a military-industrial complex," says Admiral J.M. Lyle, President of the National Security Industrial Association, "we would have to invent one, for the design, production and maintenance of today's complicated weapons necessarily entails the closest cooperation and communications between the military that requires them and the industry which provides them".

What Admiral J.M. Lyle was hinting at was about the linkage between the military and industrial groups. The former needed the weapons for the security of the nation and latter provided them. So there remains cooperation between both the parties by which they influence the national policies of the nation.

31 Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex, (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970), p. 15.

This cooperation at different levels between the military, industrial, academic, political and other interests was necessary in the post-war period, because there emerged a new enemy namely communism. According to the U.S. the communist policy was world-wide conquest. Hence, it was necessary that military weapon production should be stepped up for the sake of the country's security.

Among those who prepared the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan there were bankers, industrialists, and military commanders, apart from scientists.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Board of consultants consisted of David E. Lilienthal as Chairman, Chester L. Barnard (President of New Jersey Telephone Company), Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Dr. Charles Allen Thomas (Vice-President of General Electric Company).

Bernard Baruch's group of experts consisted of John Hancock, a New York banker (co-author of the Baruch-Hancock Report on post-war economic problems) Ferdinand Eberstadt, investment banker, lawyer and former Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board; Major General Leslie Groves, head of the atomic bomb development project, and scientists such as J.R. Oppenheimer and others.

Some of these persons if not all of them had their linkages with the powerful arms lobby and hence they could hardly

32 Bernard G. Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

be expected to be genuine supporters of the disarmament negotiations. In fact, they were interested in finding as many obstacles as possible to prevent the adoption of any arms control measures.

The Services and the weapon manufacturers decide what they want in advance. Then, they try to implement their strategy through the politicians. The citizens play no role except to pay the bill. As Professor Alfred Vagts's put it as far back as 1937:

"Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, action and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts".

Long before the Soviets had acquired their first atom bomb or even tested one, Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves warned that in the first five hours of a Soviet atomic attack 40 million Americans would be killed. General Carl A. Spaatz explained that it would be too late for defense after the atomic bombs started falling. By drawing this ominous picture, the military was able to win approval of a \$12 billion budget for the fiscal year 1948.

The Tyranny of Weapons Technology,

33 Quoted in Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, (New York: Cowles Book Company, 1970), pp. 124-5.

34 Sidney Lens, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

In 1953 wrote the well-known weapons expert, Robert Oppenheimer about the U.S.-Soviet arms race: "The very least we can say is that, looking ten years ahead, it is likely to be small comfort that they are only half as big as we are. The very least we can conclude is that our twenty-thousandth bomb, useful as it may be in killing the vast munitions pipe-line of a great war,³⁵ will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two thousandth." Americans prefer superiority, for it connotes the ability to win in war or to prevail in international contests of power. Superiority is translated into out-producing an enemy in weapons - in building more and more powerful arms.³⁶ Thus, part of the American reaction was due to the self-interest of the military-industrial-political complex. Once the defense plants were built they could be abandoned only at great political risk.³⁷

Every major breakthrough in weapon technology was partly due to the clever manipulation of the fear of Soviet threat, by the military-industrial complex. The military put pressure upon the industrialists and Congress to give them money so that industrialists might be able to produce a bomb stronger than the atom bomb which was produced in 1945. That is the story of the H-bomb in 1952. In the name of the security of the nation, the

35 Ralph E. Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York: Norton and Company, 1968), pp. 15, 16, 20.

36 Ibid., p. 20.

37 Ibid.

industrialists and militarists had been able to make enormous profit. But as long as the military-industrial complex controlled the U.S. arms policy, disarmament negotiations had no chances of success.

Conclusion

The period under survey was one of irreconcilable, antagonism and distrust. Obviously, there was no manifestation of willingness to arrive at a meaningful disarmament agreement. Each of the doctrines, viz., "containment", "Massive Retaliation", and "negotiating from a position of strength" was responsible for increased tension and escalation of conflict.

Hence, the policy of the U.S. was not one that could be deemed as a constraint on its armament policy. It was noted above that the hawks in the Senate and the military-industrial complex were eager to maintain and promote a hard and rigid posture toward the U.S.S.R. The policy, later came to be known as 'brinkmanship' hardly enabled any meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union. As such, the policy under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations never imposed any restraints on America's increased armament policy. If at all there was any constraint, it was on the efforts to build up a disarmament policy.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis of the disarmament negotiations between 1945 and 1953 shows that the U.S. nuclear monopoly period was the most futile years in the history of disarmament negotiations. So long as the United States stayed as the only nuclear power, it hoped to deal with the Soviet Union from the commanding heights of its nuclear monopoly. But it was only illusory.

Despite the universal revulsion against the use of atom bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was convinced of the bomb's immense political utility in dealing with the Soviet Union particularly as a satisfied status quo power anxious to maintain the world order created under the U.N. Charter. The U.S. was also determined to remain as the only super power as long as it could.

The initial disarmament strategy adopted by the United States was to woo the Soviet Union to agree to the Baruch Plan by striking an apparently generous posture of accommodation and offering to surrender its nuclear monopoly to an international agency set up under the U.N. and controlled by the United States. However, as already noted, this generous posture was based upon the assumption that the U.S. and its allies would control the world order, maintain their strategic superiority and succeed in imposing on the USSR a junior position in the global power system.

If the Soviet Union has accepted the Baruch Plan and given up its option to become another nuclear power, the course of world politics would have taken a different turn. However, the Soviet decision to reject the Baruch Plan was also anticipated because the United States was only waiting for an opportunity to blame the Soviet Union for the failure of the disarmament talks. How in an adversary relationship can one expect a nation to unilaterally renounce its power and allow its enemy to become the most powerful nation on earth?

Despite the perils of future nuclear proliferation, the United States was committed to an arms policy which would subserve the interests of U.S. weapon manufacturers. In fact, the U.S. economy thrived on war industry both during and after the Second World War. Hence the arms lobby which came to be known as the military-industrial complex exerted tremendous pressure on the United States not to agree to any disarmament proposals except on its own terms which the Soviet Union was sure to oppose.

When the United States found that the Soviet Union could not be trapped, it resorted to the strategy of direct military confrontation and alliance building, underestimating Soviet technological capabilities. As mentioned already, NATO came into being in 1949, the same year when the Soviet Union broke the U.S. nuclear monopoly. This was followed by the Korean war in which the use of nuclear weapons was at least openly talked about. President Truman had to dismiss General MacArthur partly

because the latter was openly advocating the use of nuclear weapon in the Korean war. Towards the end of the period under study (1953) the U.S. arms policy shaped into the massive retaliation doctrine. This was also the beginning of the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the United States was more interested in the arms race than in disarmament negotiations during this period. This was evident from the U.S. progress in weapon technology from the A-bomb in 1945 to H-bomb in 1952. The professed U.S. interest in disarmament negotiations was meant only to appease the world public opinion.

From the strategic point of view the Soviet Union had three choices against the U.S. supremacy in world affairs: (1) to remain a non-nuclear power and accept an inferior position to that of the United States; (2) to become a nuclear power and aspire for nuclear parity; and (3) to hope to surpass the U.S. in nuclear weapons and establish superiority over the United States. At the very outset, the Soviet Union rejected the first alternative and committed to an arms policy to match the U.S. while keeping the third choice as a distant goal. In 1949, the first Soviet A-bomb was exploded and the first H-bomb in 1953. Thus the Soviet Union joined the arms race in response to the U.S. arms policy. Therefore, the Soviet disarmament approach was equally deceptive. It is true that the Soviet Union also submitted disarmament proposals for banning the bomb and destroying

the nuclear arsenal. But behind these rituals, the Soviet intentions were to break the U.S. nuclear monopoly and to become a full-fledged nuclear power in its own right.

The Third World was a negligible factor though it played a creative role in the early years of disarmament negotiations. The ~~Super~~powers were in no mood to compromise on any vital issues of disarmament which they thought would adversely affect their national interests. Hence, the Third World nations could hardly influence the thinking of the United States, or the Soviet Union, although they were very keen about throwing their weight to any and every proposal which had even the semblance of nuclear sanity. The United States, however, managed to get the support of these nations mostly on technical and scientific issues relating to the control of nuclear energy. But they supported the Soviet ~~Union~~ proposal for banning the production and use of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. nuclear monopoly period laid the political and technological foundation for the future arms race. "The nations have professed greater concern with disarmament in the post-war world than ever before, but the negotiators have carried on their deliberations in the shadow of the greatest arms race in¹ history." The superpowers during this period failed to control the atom and to contain the arms race. Mistrust among nations

1 Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 1.

and political conflicts got so mixed up with the arms race that they could not be separated from each other.

The basic issue during the years 1945-1953 and subsequently also was whether to disarm and not how to disarm which was only a peripheral question. This study has shown that both the United States and the Soviet Union did not come to grips with this problem during the early years of disarmament negotiations. The vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the problem of the Nth country, the self-generating momentum and tyranny of weapon technology were all due to the spiralling arms race caused by the perverted and self-centred policies of the Super Powers. Instead of providing any additional security to nations, the arms race, begun soon after the Second World War, constituted one of the greatest threats to humanity. As Winston Churchill perceptively observed, security had become "the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

APPENDIX I

*

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1(I) adopted on January 24, 1946, setting up the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. The Resolution reads as follows:

Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters:

1. Establishment of the Commission

A Commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with the terms of reference set out under section 5 below.

2. Relations of the Commission with the Organs of the United Nations.

(a) The Commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interest of peace and security, otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these reports to the General Assembly and the Members of the United Nations, as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other organs within the framework of the United Nations.

(b) In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance

* Source: United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965, (New York: United Nations), pp. 11-12.

of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.

3. Composition of the Commission

The Commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those States represented on the Security Council, and Canada when that State is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission may have such assistance as he may desire.

4. Rules of Procedure

The Commission shall have whatever staff it may deem necessary, and shall make recommendations for its rules of procedure to the Security Council, which shall approve them as a procedural matter.

5. Terms of Reference of the Commission

The Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular, the Commission shall make specific proposals:

(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic

weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The Commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

APPENDIX II

The Baruch Plan

Statement by Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946.

MY FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AND MY FELLOW CITIZENS OF THE WORLD:

We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business.

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.

Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing them. For each new weapon a defense has been produced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist.

Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it can be made a giant help to humanity, but science does not show us how to prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our people. Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.

It is to express this will and make it effective that we have been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nurnberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States - a formula certain to benefit the world's future.

In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a larger way, we represent the peoples of the world. We must remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments belong to the peoples. We must answer their demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security.

In that desire the United States shares ardently and hopefully. The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. But she stands ready to pros-
cribe and destroy this instrument - to lift its use from death to life - if the world will join in a pact to that end.

In our success lies the promise of a new life, freed from the heart-stopping fears that now beset the world. The beginning of victory for the great ideals for which millions have bled and died lies in building a workable plan. Now we approach

fulfilment of the aspirations of mankind. At the end of the road lies the fairer, better, surer life we crave and mean to have.

Only by a lasting peace are liberties and democracies strengthened and deepened. War is their enemy. And it will not do to believe that any of us can escape war's devastation. Victor, vanquished, and neutrals alike are affected physically, economically, and morally.

Against the degradation of war we can erect a safeguard. That is the guerdon for which we reach. Within the scope of the formula we outline here there will be found, to those who seek it, the essential elements of our purpose. Others will see only emptiness. Each of us carries his own mirror in which is reflected hope - or determined desperation - courage or cowardice.

There is a famine throughout the world today. It starves men's bodies. But there is a greater famine - the hunger of men's spirit. That starvation can be cured by the conquest of fear, and the substitution of hope, from which springs faith - faith in each other, faith that we want to work together toward salvation, and determination that those who threaten the peace and safety shall be punished.

The peoples of these democracies gathered there have a particular concern with our answer, for their peoples hate war. They will have a heavy exaction to make of those who fail to provide an escape. They are not afraid of an internationalism that protects; they are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings

about sovereignty, which is today's phrase for yesterday's isolation.

The basis of a sound foreign policy, in this new age, for all the nations here gathered, is that anything that happens, no matter where or how, which menaces the peace of the world, or the economic stability, concerns each and all of us.

That, roughly, may be said to be the central theme of the United Nations. It is with that thought we begin consideration of the most important subject that can engage mankind - life itself.

Let there be no quibbling about the study and the responsibility of this group and of the governments we represent. I was moved, in the afternoon of my life, to add my effort to gain the world's quest, by the broad mandate under which we were created. The resolution of the General Assembly, passed January 24, 1946 in London, reads:

"Section V. Terms of Reference of the Commission

"The Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of the problems, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

"(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

"(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

"(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

"(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

"The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken...."

Our mandate rests, in text and in spirit, upon the outcome of the Conference in Moscow of Messrs. Molotov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bevin of the United Kingdom, and Byrnes of the United States of America. The three Foreign Ministers on December 27, 1945 proposed the establishment of this body.

Their action was animated by a preceding conference in Washington on November 15, 1945, when the President of the United States, associated with Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, stated that international control of the whole field of atomic energy was immediately essential. They proposed the formation of this body. In examining that source, the Agreed Declaration, it will be found that the fathers of the concept recognized the final means of world salvation - the abolition of war. Solemnly they wrote:

"We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy."

Through the historical approach I have outlined, we find ourselves here to test if man can produce, through his will and faith, the miracle of peace, just as he has, through science and skill, the miracle of the atom.

The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including--

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective,

the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.

I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.

But I think the peoples we serve would not believe - and without faith nothing counts - that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb, constitutes effective fulfillment of the instructions to this Commission. Previous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported by effective guaranties of security and armament limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.

Now, if ever, is the time to act for the common good, public opinion supports a world movement toward security. If I read the signs aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions - an international law with teeth in it.

We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward effective control of atomic energy.

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign

punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that--

1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and
3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject of course to our constitutional processes and to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.

Now as to violations: In the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible should be fixed for--

1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;
4. Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;
5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend

myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five great powers - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed.

As matters now stand several years may be necessary for another country to produce a bomb, de novo. However, once the basic information is generally known, and the Authority has established producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent nation to produce a bomb in 12 months, and if preceded by secret preparation and necessary facilities perhaps even in a much shorter time. The time required - the advance warning given of the possible use of a bomb - can only be generally estimated

but obviously will depend upon many factors, including the success with which the Authority has been able to introduce elements of safety in the design of its plants and the degree to which illegal and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will have been eliminated. Presumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one bomb.

This shows how imperative speed is in detecting and penalizing violations.

The process of prevention and penalization - a problem of profound statecraft - is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom a few months ago.

But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area but against the illegal users of other weapons - bacteriological, biological, gas - perhaps-- why not? against war itself.

In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread "secret" weapons which are evaluated solely by their capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back not merely to the Dark Ages but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man

learns to say "A" he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet too.

Let this be anchored in our minds:

Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions. We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration.

Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics.

The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the price of war.

I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomized.

1. General. The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and management by competent personnel. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate, and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. Raw Materials. The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and

accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their production, refining, and distribution.

3. Primary Production Plants. The Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives. The Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfil the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best-informed agency will the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous activities.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials. The

activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Non-Dangerous Activities. A function of the Authority should be promotion of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy.

Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and non-dangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provisions should, therefore, be made to assure constant reexamination of the questions and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. Operations of Dangerous Activities. Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of the

Authority.

9. Inspection. By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority.

10. Freedom of Access. Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey, and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the Authority but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw-materials field by nations or their citizens.

11. Personnel. The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.

12. Progress by Stages. A primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibilities, powers, and limitations of the Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has

been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this Commission.

13. Disclosures. In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority.

14. International Control. There will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate

to it. This is neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The Commission should resolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present discussion. Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of the United States proposals and by the plans of the other nations, which, it is to be hoped, will be submitted at their early convenience. I and my associates of the United States Delegation will make available to each member of this body books and pamphlets, including the Acheson-Lilienthal report, recently made by the United States Department of State, and the McMahon Committee Monograph No. 1 entitled "Essential Information on Atomic Energy" relating to the McMahon bill recently passed by the United States Senate, which may prove of value in assessing the situation.

All of us are consecrated to making an end of gloom and hopelessness. It will not be an easy job. The way is long and thorny, but supremely worth traveling. All of us want to stand erect, with our faces to the sun, instead of being forced to burrow into the earth, like rats.

The pattern of salvation must be worked out by all for all.

The light at the end of the tunnel is dim, but our path seems to grow brighter as we actually begin our journey. We cannot yet light the way to the end. However, we hope the suggestions of my Government will be illuminating.

Let us keep in mind the exhortation of Abraham Lincoln, whose words, uttered at a moment of shattering national peril, form a complete text for our deliberation. I quote, paraphrasing slightly:

"We cannot escape history. We of this meeting will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we are passing will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.

"We say we are for Peace. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save Peace. The world knows that we do. We, even we here, hold the power and have the responsibility.

"We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud."

My thanks for your attention.

Source: Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear Years, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 123-33.

APPENDIX III

Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments. (~~22 October - 15 December 1946~~) 8

Resolution 41(1), adopted unanimously on December 14, 1946 reads as follows:

1. In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The General Assembly

Recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or convention approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

3. As an essential step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes.

The General Assembly

Urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946.

4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

5. The General Assembly

Further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are

established.

7. The General Assembly,

Regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

Recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

Recommends the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements;

Further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.

8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

9. The General Assembly

Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with

the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Source: United Nation and Disarmament, 1945-1965,
(New York: United Nations), pp. 26-28.

APPENDIX IV

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 41(1) on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments, adopted on December 14, 1946.

Resolution 41(1), adopted unanimously on December 14, 1946 reads as follows:

1. In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The General Assembly

Recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or convention approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in

accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

3. As an essential step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes.

The General Assembly

Urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946.

4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary

to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

5. The General Assembly

Further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and

status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

7. The General Assembly,

Regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

Recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

Recommends the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements;

Further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.

8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

9. The General Assembly

Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with

the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Source: United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965 (New York: United Nations), pp. 26, 27, 28.

APPENDIX IV

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 502(VI) adopted on January 11, 1952 setting up the Disarmament Commission.

Resolution 502(VI), creating the Disarmament Commission was adopted on January 11, 1952, by 42 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions, the Soviet Union voting against. Resolution 502(VI) reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

Believing that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international

control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

Noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496(V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

1. Establishes under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. Dissolves the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of

atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces - including para-military, security and police forces - and all armaments including atomic;

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. Directs the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments:

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restriction on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits

and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than June 1, 1952.

8. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

APPENDIX ~~IV~~ V

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 715(VIII) adopted on November 28, 1953 on regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

At its eighth session, the General Assembly, on November 28, 1953, by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions, adopted resolution 715(VIII), which reaffirmed previously declared objectives and suggested that the Commission consider the establishment of a sub-committee of the Powers principally involved to seek in private an acceptable solution of the disarmament question. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need of providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Believing that the continued development of weapons of

mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament throughout the world, as the existence of civilization itself may be at stake,

Mindful that progress in the settlement of existing international disputes and the resulting re-establishment of confidence are vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament programme with adequate safeguards should be made concurrently with progress in the settlement of international disputes,

Believing that progress in either field would contribute to progress in the other,

Realizing that competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of Member States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace,

Having received the third report of the Disarmament Commission of August 20, 1953, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 704(VII) of April 8, 1953.

Endorsing the Commission's hope that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament question, the capital importance of which, in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace, is recognized by all,

1. Recognizes the general wish and affirms its earnest desire to reach agreement as early as possible on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and all such other weapons of war and mass destruction, and for the attainment of these ends through effective measures;

2. Recognizes that, whatever the weapons used, aggression is contrary to the conscience and honour of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations and is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world;

3. Takes note of the third report of the Disarmament Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to continue its efforts to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned, taking into consideration proposals made at the eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report again to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than September 1, 1954;

5. Calls on all Member States, and particularly the major Powers, to intensify their efforts to assist the Disarmament Commission in its tasks and to submit to the Commission any proposals which they have to make in the field of disarmament;

6. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible, in order that the Commission may study and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than September 1, 1954;

7. Further suggests to the Disarmament Commission, in order to facilitate the progress of its work, to arrange for the sub-committee when established, to hold its private meetings as appropriate in the different countries most concerned with the problem.

Source: United Nation and Disarmament, 1945-1965
(New York: United Nations), pp. 48, 49, 50.

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