

**FACTIONAL POLITICS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR;
A CASE STUDY OF FACTIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE RULING PARTIES
OF THE STATE.**

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
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DECLARATION


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The Supervisor,
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PREFACE

This is not an exhaustive (nor, I hope, an exhausting) study of Jammu and Kashmir politics in the 1947 to 1970 period. My main concern has been with factional politics in the ruling parties of the state. The necessity for it arose out of curiosity and deep intellectual concern. Long years of stay in the state (for my graduate and post-graduate study) naturally interested me in this complex process of politicking in the state.

It has been the tendency to view the politics of Jammu and Kashmir from a communal angle, or, pro or anti-Indian polarization. But, politics, however, is too sophisticated to be determined by these forces only. Our analysis of factional politics, for example, reveals that the faction formation process in the ruling parties of the state has been guided by the rules of highly pragmatic politics. The anti-Indian posture of Karra has, therefore, to be studied by taking into consideration his elimination from the government and the party (The National Conference). Similarly, Beg's anti-Indian stance can be understood by taking into consideration Sheikh's choice of Bakshi as the 2nd man in the party and governmental hierarchy. Beg, having failed in defeating Bakshi politically within the party, was, therefore, looking for an opportunity that would throw the latter into a direct conflict with Sheikh. In the meantime when Sheikh also started disliking Bakshi's hold on the rank and file of the party and relation with Patel group at

the Centre, Bog prevailed upon Sheikh to evolve a new relationship with India that would destroy the ambition of Bakshi. But, instead, both Sheikh and Bog were sent to nearly 20 years of political wilderness.

Further, the politics in the state cannot be reduced to either religion or regions only. For, we often find that a Hindu has been the major political opponent of a Hindu, and a Muslim of a Muslim. Thus, there occurred conflict between Sheikh-Karra, Bakshi-Bog, Sadiq-Sheikh, Sheikh-Bakshi, Bakshi-Sadiq, Sadiq-Qasim, and so on. All these leaders belonged the same region and religion. On the other hand, Trilochan Dutta, G.L. Dogra, Karan Singh (from Jammu region) do not see eye to eye. So is the case with Sonam Karboo and Kushak Bakula in Ladakh. Thus, factionalism in the state has been found embedded on power, ideology, and personalities. More about the statement of the problem, the scope of study, and methodology etc. is explained in the Introductory Chapter.

Finally, this work owes much to many institutions and persons:

Sopru House Documentation Centre, where the newspaper clippings on the subject since 1949 are preserved.

SIS (J.M.U.) Documentation Section, where I went through many newspaper files relating to Jammu and Kashmir.

Jammu University, Central Library, where the newspaper clippings on the Jammu and Kashmir problem are preserved.

The Centre For Political Studies (J.N.U.), which awarded me scholarship and made it possible to go for a field trip.

As to individual help, this study is the result of wide-ranging help from different persons:

I am deeply indebted to Richard Tremblay, who provided every type of help in pursuing my study from the date of admission itself to the completion of present work.

I gratefully acknowledge my debt to Pramode, Anil, Capt. Surender, Prabhat Singh, An Arvind, Pinki, Satnam and Biranchi. Thanks are due in particular to Kamel M. Chenoey, Annu Chenoey, and Sanjoy for patient scrutiny of my manuscript and most valuable comments and suggestions.

I am also grateful to Girja Kumar, J.C. Tandon, Krishan Gopal, S. Majumdar, V.K. Aggrawal, B.S. Rawat, B.S. Negi (J.N.U. Central Library), Miss Raj Bharti, Wani (Sopru House Documentation Centre), Diwan Chand, O.P. Gupta and Deshbandhu (Jammu University Library).

I also acknowledge my debt to many politicians from the state. Here special thanks go to: Mir Qasim, G.L. Dogra, Mir Lasjan, Dev Dutt Sharma, Mangat Ram, Trilochan Dutta, Kanwar Diwaker Singh, N.L. Potedar, G.M. Rajpuri, S.L. Saraf, Ayub Khan, and M.L. Kaul. I am also thankful to U.P. Saraf, and N.R. Saraf (two renowned journalists from the state).

It would not have been possible for me to continue this study without an inspiration from my mother, father, elder brother, and Bhaviji, and love from Luxmi, Kamla, and Harish.

I am deeply indebted to Prof. Satybhushan, Prof. N.R. Parihar, Prof. Rasheeduddin Khan, Prof. Imtiaz Ahmed and Prof. R.R. Sharma. Finally, this work is the product of continued guidance from time to time by Prof. C.P. Bhambhri, who as my Supervisor immensely helped me in pursuing my work.

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C O N T E N T S

	Pages
Preface	1-iv
Chapter I Introduction	1-16
Chapter II The Background An Inquiry into the nature of the Socio-Economic Conditions of the People, their Social System and Environment	17-113
Chapter III Factionalism An Inquiry into the Nature of Factional Politics in the Ruling Parties of the State	114-182
Chapter IV Factionalism Factional Politics in Bakshi Era	183-216
Chapter V Factionalism Factional Politics Between 1965-70	217-318
Chapter VI Summary and Conclusion	319-327
Appendix I	328-333
Bibliography	339-365

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The process of implementation of the Indian Constitution, and the simultaneous shifting of the centre of gravity from New Delhi to the states has attracted many scholars towards the state-based studies. Well-known studies in this respect are: Paul Brass'¹ work on Uttar Pradesh, Baldev Raj Nayar's² on Punjab, F.G. Bailey's³ on Orissa, Solig Harrison's⁴ on Andhra, Richard Sisson's⁵ on Rajasthan, Mary C. Carras'⁶ on Maharashtra, and the works of Myron Weiner,⁷ and of Iqbal Marain,⁸ etc. Almost all of these studies state that: "the implementation of the Indian

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- 1 Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics In An Indian State, the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966).
 - 2 Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in Punjab (Princeton, Princeton University Press, . . . 1966).
 - 3 F.G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change, Orissa in 1952 (University of California Press, 1963).
 - 4 Solig H. Harrison, "Caste and Andhra Communists", American Political Science Review, vol. 50, no. 2, July 1956.
 - 5 Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in Rajasthan (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1972).
 - 6 Mary C. Carras, The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra (Cambridge University Press, 1972).
 - 7 Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India (Princeton University Press, 1966).
 - 8 Iqbal Marain, ed., State Politics in India (Meerut, 1967).

Constitution and the creation of a universal franchise made the recruitment of formal political elites less controllable than it had been during the short period since independence"⁹ (i.o. 1947-1952). In the words of Baldev Raj Nayar:

when power was eventually transferred to the nationalist leaders by the departing foreign powers, the political consensus at the time was; with some exceptions basically a negative one: to get rid of foreign rule.... After first flush of freedom, new strains developed in the political system as a result of political claims made now in the name, not of the nation, but of race, religion, language, caste or tribe". (10)

Thus, the strains, conflicts or factionalism are defined in these studies by focussing on the following aspects:

- (i) in terms of kinship relations,
- (ii) in terms of caste and communal relations,
- (iii) in terms of social status,
- (iv) in terms of personal loyalties,
- (v) in terms of patron-client relationships, and
- (vi) in terms of party organization v/s ministerial wing.

Perhaps, the only exception to such type of analysis is Mary C. Carras who in her study of Maharashtra says: "Analysis of my data indicates that antagonistic political behaviour has, to begin with strong economic roots".¹¹

9 Richard Sisson, n. 5, p. 204.

10 Baldev Raj Nayar, n. 2, pp. 1-2.

11 Mary C. Carras, "Congress Factionalism at the State and District Level in Maharashtra: Some Theories", Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number), January 1971, p. 326.

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, however, to begin with the implementation of the Indian Constitution or the universal franchise played no significant part. Both the Indian Election Commission and the Indian Constitution were not applicable to this state as was the case with other states. Only in the late fifties and mid-sixties steps towards this direction were taken, but still the Indian Constitution is not fully applicable to this part of the country (as Article 370 is still applicable). Though elections in the state has come under the control of Indian Election Commission, in the elections held so far, there had never been participation by all major political parties of the state.* Further, the ruling party in the state was not the Congress Party (that would mean complete political integration with India) as late as up to 1965. The Union jurisdiction on state political and legal matters, therefore, was least as compared to other states. Similar to other states of India, there existed factions within the ruling parties (the National Conference and the Indian National Congress) of Jammu and Kashmir. But the factional behaviour in the state differed from other states of

* For example, when the elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in 1951 during the Sheikh Abdullah regime, the Praja Parishad (a major political force from Jammu) was made to boycott the elections. And in the consecutive general elections that held in the state thereafter, the Sheikh-Beg led Plebiscite front (though Sheikh never had been the formal member of the organization formally) and other anti-system forces were forced to follow the same course that was adopted by Praja Parishad in 1951.

India, because the National Conference party being independent of Congress (up to 1965) and its leadership having the virtual control of the party and governmental machinery tended to act arbitrarily.* For example, Sheikh Abdullah's treatment of Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra in 1947-50 period was an arbitrary one, and neither the Congress High Command nor the central government could interfere to set it right. But, since 1965, a similar pattern of factional politics seems to operate in Jammu and Kashmir and other states of India.

The historical setting of the state of Jammu and Kashmir differs with other states of India. Whereas on the eve of independence there existed a consensus among the major political forces of India to get rid of foreign rule, in Jammu and Kashmir, there occurred ideological and communal differences over the form of government and the right to rule. The National Conference (a party that led the movement for freedom) was popular only in Kashmir, because the Dogras by virtue of being the ruling class opposed this movement, and the people's attitude towards it in the Jammu province was very hostile.

* But it is not suggested here that: the leadership of any party other than the Congress conducts undemocratically, or that the Congress is a democratic party.

12 For example, one of our informants told this researcher that "in the pre-independence period, the attitude of the people of Jammu province (especially those belonging to the Hindu religion) towards the National Conference was hostile. Only few progressives from this area lent their support to the National Conference during this period". Trilochan Dutta (ex-General Secretary PCC, and at present a dissident leader), An Interview, 31 August 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).

Though, the National Conference Party from the very beginning followed the Congress ideology (of secularism, socialism, and democracy) as an article of faith, the accession of the state to India especially at the instance of its leadership helped the party to organize itself in other parts of the state (like Jammu and Ladakh provinces) also. What helped the party in doing so successfully were the sweeping land reforms and other radical measures. Though the power and patronage at its disposal helped the party to make its presence felt at every nook and corner of the state, at the same time power led to the introduction of divisive factional power-politics within the organization. For example, immediately after coming to power, we find Karra's exclusion from the government, and the Bakshi-Bog conflict, as we will see in the Chapter III of this work.

We find the National Conference as a well-knit team on the eve of independence, but very soon we witness the existence of factions and factionalism within this organization. This study is an analysis of the process of the cohesive and divisive tendencies in the ruling parties of Jammu and Kashmir. Here, it is attempted to explain the changing characteristics of factions and faction-formation processes as was evident from time to time. The period covered in this study spreads over nearly 23 years, i.e. between 1947-70. But for the proper understanding of factional composition as existed in 1947, a hurried survey of the factional behaviour from 1931 onwards has also been done. As far as the

nature of the study is concerned it is a purely exploratory study. Furthermore, while the studies of factional politics have proliferated, neither any general theory of factionalism has emerged nor is one offered here. What I set out to do in this study is to describe and explain the factional behaviour in the ruling parties of the state. But this study is important in the sense that Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state of India.

The history of the internal disputes in the ruling parties of Jammu and Kashmir is an interesting one. Here the conflict revolved round the ideology, power politics and various personalities. The factional politics in the state does not lead to disruptions only, for the factions play both integrative and disintegrative role. Though factionalism weakens the overall capacity of its leadership, it nowhere reduces the overall popularity (or the popular base) of the party. Whereas factional conflict leads to party splits and defections, at the same time, it invites the people from like-minded party or parties into its fold. At other times the availability of so many leaders pitched against one another, attracts a section of people to remain in it, for if they do not like one leader they have others to follow. On many occasions when the conflict reaches its peak, a new leadership role is required for maintaining the cohesion. For the authoritative and top leadership, then it becomes an important task to keep the activities of the factions within the

strict limits. But this is applicable, when the top leadership is above factional conflict, and both the factions agree with his position. When the leader himself is enmeshed deeply into the conflict, then central intervention becomes essential in the resolution of conflict and maintenance of cohesion within the party. It has been the policy of union leadership in the case of Jammu and Kashmir that until and unless the official leadership of the state becomes essentially undesirable, it should support the governmental faction.

Within the state, there is an interaction between the politics of three different regions of the state, and politics in the districts. Though Congress is not regionally based [for it is not a regional party], the regional politics regionalizes its voice too. Formally, the state Congress is the coalition of semi-independent district party organizations, but regions also give their colouring to the Congress organization in the state. Thus we find the representation of the various groups representing Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh respectively, in the Congress Party of Jammu and Kashmir. But such representations are only qualifications of the representative government, and they, in no way regionalize the whole politics of the state. In fact factional politics is too modern and sophisticated to be limited either to region or religion, or both. The fact is that all major factions have been cross-religious in composition, and all but one have been cross-regional in their

following. One faction, that of Dr. Karan Singh is limited to the Jammu region in the sense that it does not include influential leaders or followers from Kashmir province, who consider him as their only leader. Otherwise Karan Singh has a large following both among the Hindus and Muslims in the valley, though not as much as any key leader from that area enjoys. Factional politics thus appears to perform a positive and integrative role. For in the game of factional politics, two Hindu political opponents like to join hands with similar minded persons from the Muslim camp and vice versa. Further, two opponents from one region would like to mobilize their support from the other regions to defeat their adversaries, and some time the major support in doing so comes from the other regions. Though factional disputes may also prove to be disintegrative in practice (as it leads to defections and splits in the party), the recourse to defections and splits have been rare and only in extreme cases because power and patronage were the monopoly of the National Conference, and the Congress Party. All this will be studied in IIIrd, IVth and Vth chapters of this work.

Thus, factionalism is a phenomena that is bound to occur in any political organization. Although every party's ideal is that factions should not exist within the organization, they still exist. They are "not legitimate",¹³ but typically

13 B.D. Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress Party, 1937-66", in M. Schwartz, ed., Local Level Politics (Chicago, Aldine, 1963), p. 323.

14

impermanent and informal groups. Factions are not legitimate, but by being over-present in almost every political organization carry a great amount of de facto authority and influence in the decision-making process.

II. METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

(a) Methodology

This study is a combination of historical, documentary and empirical research on the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. Except one chapter that covers the socio-economic background and the nature of political history of the state, the other are based on field work and supported by the primary source material. Through bibliographical research and the screening of various newspapers and journals, relevant documents and reports, the writings on the subject has been identified, studied, compared and interpreted.

For his subject, the interviews had been most revealing, successful and interesting because they provided the researcher with the capacity to generalize certain views in a systematic way. An attempt has been made at all levels that facts should speak for the views that are given.

14 Because, "the values of corporate group in which they exist do not sanction their activity and they invite severe penalties if they transgresses any of these values; they have to organize themselves and compete for power according to informal or pragmatic values". See, B.D. Graham, n. 13, p. 323.

(b) Procedure

As to the procedure, the first step is the gathering of source materials for the study. From bibliographical research, the materials are identified and classified.

The second step is the compilation of a chronological card index of major events on factional politics and conflict resolution. This index has been very useful, as a cross reference guide to research on particular events, for it helps the researcher to have definite information about the time and sequence of the numerous events.

The third step is the general reading of primary and secondary source materials. The investigator devoted months in screening newspaper clippings in Sapru House Library, in Jammu University, and SIS (School of International Studies) Documentation Section, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Mulk Raj Saraf (a noted Journalist from Jammu) also made available for him a huge compilation of newspaper cuttings of important events in the state. All the noted newspapers from 1947 onwards have been consulted for his subject on Kashmir, and other journals have been consulted for relevant articles. At the same time, books on the topic were read and notes were taken.

The fourth step is conducting of interviews, that helped the investigator to conceptualize in general statements the facts that were noted.

The fifth step is the framing of rough outlines for the

chapters, sections and the writing of dissertation.

(c) Organization of the Study

The present study is organized into six chapters.

Chapter I is the introduction that includes the statement of the problem, methodology and procedures, field work, scope of study and limitations and deficiencies of the study.

Chapter II covers the socio-economic background of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Chapter III deals with the nature of factional politics in the state up to 1953.

Chapter IV concentrates on Bakshi-Sadiq conflict.

In Chapter V a detailed study of the Sadiq-Qasim conflict has been done.

Chapter VI is a summary of findings of the study, a conclusion and suggestions for further study.

III. FIELD WORK

The very selection of the topic on Jammu and Kashmir is greatly influenced by the fact of my living in the state for five long years of my formative age as a student of Political Science in Jammu University. I made two trips of Jammu and Kashmir. The first was in February 1976, when I visited the state for a short period. During this period, I made myself aware of many important political developments in the state. During this period I made up my schedule to carry out the field

work in next trip. During this short visit I met few persons like Dev Dutt Sharma (MLA), Kanwar Divakar Singh (MLA), Mangot Ram Sharma (MLA), etc. and discussed with them the topic of my interest. I was assured of all types of help by them for my next visit and I got great incentive from them.

I made the second trip in September-October 1976. I stayed for nearly 40 days in the state, and met noted persons of political significance. Jammu was not unknown to me, and so I faced no problems in interviewing the people there. In Srinagar I met various people in the PCC office, MLA Hostel, Old Secretariat and New Secretariat, and most of the time in the houses of individual ministers and politicians. Further I made many trips to the far-flung areas of Kashmir valley like Lolab, Sopore, Ganderbal, Lasjan and Avantipur to meet the persons of my concern, that made the trip fruitful and revealing. But, as it is always the case, success is never complete. I was unable to interview the key figures like Mirza Afzal Beg, Maulana Masoodi, Karra, Noor Mohammed, Shamsuddin and Sheikh Abdullah. I met all these people, but because of one reason or another they refused to give any appointment for interviewing them. For example, I visited nearly seven or eight times the Beg's office to get an appointment from his Private Secretary but was always unsuccessful. Ultimately, I visited his house on a holiday to interview him and after long hours of waiting when I met him he politely declined to speak on a topic that he condemned as

'party bazi' (factional politics) story. Similarly, I visited Noor Mohammed's house nearly same number of times as Beg's but he was never true to his time, and when I met, he postponed the issue for the next day: a day that never came during my month's stay in Srinagar. When I met Sheikh Sahab (as Sheikh Abdullah is popularly called in the valley) he explained to me, that because of the intensive campaigning programme in the near future for his proposed municipal elections in the state, it was impossible for him to spare any time for conducting an interview. Karra gave me an appointment, but because of the death of some of his relative, it was not possible to interview him. The case with Maulana Masoodi was also a sad one. He is an old and saintly person, who meets everyone politely. But because of the Roze (fast), as those were the Ramazan days, he asked me to come after Id-ul-Fitr. But because of money shortage I had to leave the valley earlier than this. Again in New Delhi, I tried for nearly one week to interview Karan Singh, but when I was able to get time, he too refused to speak on a topic like-factional politics.

On the other hand, persons like G.L. Dogra, G.M. Rajpuri, M.N. Kaul, Mufti Jayood, Trilochan Dutt, M.L. Potedar, Ayub Khan, A.G. Lone, Srikant Kaul, Begum Zainub, Shamlal Saraf, Bakshi Abdul Rashid, Mir Lasjan, Ali Mohammed Naik, Mangat Ram Sharma, Bhagat Chejju Ram, Miss Mehooda Ali Shah, Sonam Parboo, Motilal Misri, Master Beli Ram, Motiram Baigra, A.G. Goni, Dev

Dutt Sharma, Kanwar Diwaker Singh, Pir Muzamuddin, Kumari Shanti Bharti, Baldev Sharma, Chunni Lal Sharma, Begum Renzoo, Ghulam Nabi Gogami, Pir Giasuddin, L.S. Charak, Mir Poonchi, Balraj Puri, U.P. Saraf, M.R. Saraf and many others contributed greatly to this work by giving long interviews. After coming back I met Syed Mir Qasim and Mohammed Safi Qureshi in Delhi. In all, I conducted nearly sixty interviews.

IV. THE SCOPE OF STUDY

The title of the study is: "Factional Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: A Case Study of Factional Behaviour in the Ruling Parties of the State". It has been found after the study of existing literature on factionalism that it is defined in terms of caste, communal, kinship, social status, patron-client and simply personal relationships. The only exception here is that of Mary C. Carras who in her excellent study of Maharashtra says that factional behaviour is strongly rooted in the economic relations and generated in part by the "party ideology itself".¹⁵ In Jammu and Kashmir, however, it is found that factions and factionalism have originated because of the power-politics, ideological differences, and often due to the clash of personalities. Thus, factionalism, here is explained in terms of power, ideology and personal relations.

15 Mary C. Carras, n. 6, p. 9.

V. LIMITATIONS

As stated in section I of this chapter, this study is a combination of historical documentary and empirical research on politics of Jammu and Kashmir. It relies on the primary and secondary materials available in libraries, and on the field work. Some limitations naturally follow. One difficulty is that no systematic study has been done so far on politics of Jammu and Kashmir. It is because Kashmir has attracted the eyes of many scholars only as a subject of international importance. Second, difficulty about writing on such a topic is that records of events inevitably lag behind the events themselves. Third, no systematic record of even the past events is available. Fourth, lack of reading Urdu language deprived the researcher in going through many other sources published in Urdu. Fifth, the lack of funds shortened the duration of the field trip to Jammu and Kashmir, which, if longer, would have been more informative. Sixth, and perhaps the greatest limitation is the time shortage, which is responsible for many deficiencies of this study. And, it has been realized that to write a dissertation by doing field work and by studying all materials available in six months is almost an impossible task. Finally, to paint a real picture of state politics is almost impossible. First, because perfection has no end. Second, to draw it from whatever source materials that are available to the researcher are difficult because many a time even the authenticity of reports (both official or

otherwise) is also questionable. Therefore, we have to admit that there is a real difficulty of getting true information, and this study has thus many deficiencies.

Chapter II

THE BACKGROUND

Chapter II

THE BACKGROUND

An Inquiry into the Nature of the Socio-Economic Conditions of the People, their Social System and Environment

The Founding of the State

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, as it existed on the eve of independence in 1947, was integrated into one unit by Maharaja Gulab Singh. Though variously defined as 'The Jammu Fox'¹ and 'an opportunist',² the credit for founding the state goes to his great statesmanship,³ when in 1846 after the Sikh War the Treaty of Amritsar was signed and Gulab Singh was allowed to buy Kashmir

1 See for this, Satinder Singh, The Jammu Fox: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir, 1792-1857 (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1974).

2 For example, K.M. Panikkar writes: "He was undoubtedly an opportunist, ready to stand out coldly or to withdraw as the occasion demanded, not committing himself irretrievably without making sure of his ground". K.M. Panikkar, The Founding of the Kashmir State: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh, 1792-1858 (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953), p. 152.

3 As Panikkar says: "His achievement as a statesman was by no means insignificant. ...The strength of will, the deep insight into human affairs, and the persistence with which he held to his objects are such as to deserve admiration ... a man beginning as a petty official in a court conquered kingdoms and territories and established himself as a sovereign. ...He is the only ruler in India's long history who could be said to have extended the geographical boundaries of India. His conquest and annexation of Ladakh, ... is an achievement which writes his name for ever in the history of India. No previous Indian ruler, and not even Samudra Gupta or Akbar, had even dreamed of invading Tibet...." (Ibid., pp. 158, 151).

for a fixed sum of rupees one crore (Rs10,000,000), out of which Rs25,00,000 was exempted because British retained possession of trans-Beas portion of Kulu and Mandi.

The Environment, Area and Population

Area: The territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir extends to an area of 86,023 sq. miles (222,798 sq. km.)⁴ which is slightly more than that of Korea and one-half of Iraq. It exceeds the aggregate area of Himachal Pradesh and Mysore states put together.⁵ It is divided by a line of control as agreed on in 1972, that leaves an area of 32,358 sq. miles to Pakistan and the remainder amounting to 53,665 sq. miles (i.e. 138,992 km.) under Indian control, out of which a small portion of Kashmir's northern district of Ladakh measuring 5180 km. was annexed by China in 1962. During the period of nearly 100 years of Dogra rule (i.e. 1846 to 1947), there had been no change in the boundaries of the state, and state for long stood almost unaffected

4 See, The Law Encyclopaedia - Britannica (William Benton, 1974), vol. 10, pp. 29-30.

5 Census of India, 1961, vol. VI, Jammu and Kashmir, Part I - A(i) General Report (by M.H. Kamili, Superintendent of Census Operations Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, 1968), p. 140. Further this report says that prior to the partition of India, Jammu and Kashmir was one of the most populous, and biggest of the 562 princely states, which dotted the map of India, being 'equal to Mysore, Gwalior, Baroda and Bikaner put together'. Ibid., p. 1.

According to the Census of India, 1921, this state 'very nearly approaches the aggregate area of England, Wales, and Scotland'. See, Census of India, 1921 - Kashmir, Part I, vol. XXII, Report (by Khan Bahadur Chaudhry Khushi Mohamed, Lahore, 1923), p. 4.

by the international developments. But after partition of India, no state in India has been affected as much by international events as Jammu and Kashmir.

Population: The population according to 1961 census was close to 35,60,976 i.e. twice the Jewish population of Palestine.⁶ But by 1971 this number increased to 46,16,632 persons, having registered an increase of 29.65 per cent during 1961-71, which is 4.85 per cent more than the national growth rate of population for the same period. It should be noted that, Jammu and Kashmir is the only state of Indian Union having a Muslim majority. According to 1971 census report, the Muslims are the largest community claiming 65.85 per cent of the total population, followed by 30.42 per cent Hindus, 2.29 per cent Sikhs and 1.26 Buddhists.⁷ If compared with other states of Indian Union, the state of Jammu and Kashmir ranks 10th and 15th in respect of area and population.⁸ Here it is important to note that the area

6 Census of India, 1961, p. 141.

7 See, Census of India, 1971, Series I, Paper I of 1972 entitled "India Final Population" and Series I, Paper II of 1972.

8 Census of India, 1961, p. 154. According to 1941 Census Kashmir was the fourth most populous of the Princely states, viz.

Hyderabad	-	16,339,000
Mysore	-	7,329,000
Travencore	-	6,070,000
Kashmir	-	4,022,000

See, R. Coupland, India: A Restatement (Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 301.

covered by mountains in the state accounts for about 61 per cent of the total mountainous area of India, 92 per cent of the total land area of the state. Of this no less than 95 per cent has to be written off as unsuitable for cultivation.⁹ Therefore, the density of population in the state is very low, and higher than only that of the density of Sikkim state and few union territories.¹⁰

The increase in density of population is mainly reflected in those districts where agriculture is the mainstay of the people.¹¹

Urbanization: The state of Jammu and Kashmir is still overwhelmingly rural. According to the figures related to 1944-45, 96 per cent of the people lived in far-flung and isolated villages subsisting on primitive agriculture which yielded an average annual income of about Rs.11.00 per head.¹² Agriculture has been the only occupation of the overwhelming majority of the people. For example, the 1921 census report noted:

It would be observed that out of every 10,000 persons 8,173, i.e. about 82 per cent are dependent on the exploitation of animal and vegetation. Or more properly speaking on pasture and agriculture.... Of the agricultural

9 Census of India, 1961, p. 154.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 155.

12 P.N. Dhar, "The Kashmir Problem: Political and Economic Background", India Quarterly, vol. VII, no. 2, April-June 1951, p. 143.

population more than 98 per cent are ordinary cultivators, 1.4 per cent are supported by the raising of farm stock, while the aggregate share of growers of special products and forestry does not exceed 4 per cent. (13)

The 1941 census reported:

Jammu and Kashmir state cannot compare with Great Britain, Bengal and Bihar; it has few industries but the more important of these - forest exploitation, sericulture, and fruit growing - are closely allied with agriculture and the state must be described as almost entirely agricultural. (14)

After Independence, however, there has been an appreciable increase in the rate of urbanization. The 1961 census defined the criterion for an urban area as the following:

- (a) population should not be less than 5,000;
- (b) no less than 3/4th of the population should consist of non-agriculturists; and
- (c) the minimum density should be 1,000 persons per square mile.

According to this criterion 17 per cent of the total population of Jammu and Kashmir may be considered urban. Though this high proportion of urban population in 1961 is due to the migration from border areas and from across the ceasefire line, still the increase stands out to be less than the proportion of

13 Census of India, 1921, p. 161.

14 Census of India, 1941, vol. XXII, "Jammu and Kashmir", (Jammu Ranvir Government Press), p. 7.

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urban to the total population in the neighbouring areas, e.g., Punjab where it is 20 per cent.¹⁵ Finally, on this side of the ceasefire line, we find that there are two cities, 31 towns, 2 cantonments and 8 notified areas (i.e. 43 towns in all), as compared to 6,569 inhabited and 167 uninhabited villages.¹⁶ In 1961-71 period, however, urbanization increased from 16.7 per cent to 18.58 per cent, marking an increase of 1.88 per cent during the decade.

Administrative Divisions

Administratively, Jammu and Kashmir is divided into 9 districts, ranging an area from under 1,023.6 sq. miles to 37,753.8 sq. miles, and in population from 88,651 to 656,338.¹⁷ These districts have further been subdivided into 32 tehsils. A village is the smallest unit of administration. The administrative capital of the state is Srinagar in summer and Jammu in winter.

Literacy

The marked feature of the 600 years of feudal exploitation of Jammu and Kashmir is the illiteracy of its people. According to 1961 census, over 58 per cent of the male urban population of the state was illiterate as against 79 per cent

15 Census of India, 1961, pp. 143-4.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 143.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 142-3.

the corresponding percentage in the case of females.¹⁸ The province-wise data indicates that illiteracy is by far more pronounced in the various districts of Kashmir than of Jammu; for whereas in Kashmir 636 out of 1,000 males are illiterate, in Jammu it is 451 out of 1,000. In case of females too the disparity is 852 and 643 per 1,000 persons respectively.¹⁹

Languages

There are at least 13 languages or dialects spoken within the Jammu and Kashmir territories.²⁰ These languages, however, do not include Urdu which is the state language, but the mother tongue of only 4 persons per 1,000 of the population.

Kashmiri, on the other hand is the mother tongue of 53 per cent of people of the state as a whole, and 69 per cent of its urban population and 50 per cent of those inhabiting the rural areas.²¹ It is spoken in the three districts of the valley (viz. Anantnag, Srinagar, and Baramulla) and in the rural areas of Doda district. Both in vocabulary and grammar, Kashmiri

18 Ibid., p. 324.

19 Ibid., pp. 324-5.

20 Frederic Drew, The Jammu and Kashmir Territories (Delhi, Oriental Publishers, 1971) (first Indian Reprint), p. 462.

21 Census of India, 1961, p. 357. It is further reported here that "Kashmiri ranks next after Urdu as the additional language spoken and understood by people with different mother tongues. The number of those who can speak Kashmiri in addition stands at 25,045". Ibid., p. 358.


language is inherited from Sanskrit. Dogri is the next important language of the state. It is spoken by over 24 per cent of the people of the state who reside in the rural and urban areas of Udhampur, Jammu and Kathua.²² Dogri differs with Kashmiri in many ways, and on the other hand its relationship with Punjabi and Hindustani is very close. Both Punjabi and Dogri appear to be equidistant with Hindustani, and according to Frederic Drew's inference "Rambani is about equidistant from Kashmiri and Dogri; not to be understood by any Dogra or by native of Kashmir who has no experience of any other Pahari dialect".²³ The relationship of different languages of the state is shown through a diagram, that we give on the next page. The Pahari language is the mother tongue of about 7 per cent of the people followed by Gojri which ranks next to it by 6 per cent of the people claiming it as their mother tongue.²⁴ In addition to these, the important languages to be mentioned are Ladakhi and Punjabi, the former being the mother tongue of only 1.4 per cent people and latter 3.1 per cent. But whereas Ladakhi is predominant language of Ladakh spoken by 56 per cent of the people inhabiting the district (Balti being the other language spoken by 37 per cent of the population of the district), Punjabi is not a

22 Ibid., p. 357. "Dogri is the additional language spoken by 22,766 persons belonging to different districts of the state with various mother tongues". Ibid., p. 358.

23 Drew, n. 20, p. 468.

24 Census of India, 1961, p. 357.

Diagram illustrating the Relationship
of certain Languages



Source: Frederic Drew, The Jammu and Kashmir Territories
(Delhi, Oriental Publishers, 1971), p. 465.

predominant language of any district of the state, but most of the speakers of this language are from the urban areas of district Jammu.²⁵

Race, Faith and Region

From the point of view of race, faith and region, Jammu and Kashmir is a plural society not only politically, but also culturally, linguistically, religiously, regionally, geographically and racially. It is therefore one of the most sensitive parts of the Indian Union where we find repeated exploitation of the people's sentiments (either by the advocates of the two nation theory, or religious fanatics, and chauvinists etc.). In fact, if there is any unity, it is perhaps only political²⁶ or economic, and more so the political ideology of the ruling class (i.e. secularism, socialism and democracy).

There are many religious communities in the state, but only three of them are of importance, because Sikhs, Jains, etc. do not represent any part of the state as distinctly as the Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists do. Although the Sikhs are 14,709

25 Ibid.

26 Balraj Madhok, for example says:

"The Jammu and Kashmir state as at present constituted ... is simply a political entity. It is conglomeration of at least six distinct peoples inhabiting well defined parts or zones of the state and each having a distinct language, culture, customs, manners, and history". See his Kashmir Divided (Lucknow, Rashtra Dharma Prakashan, 1949), pp. 16-17.

more in number than the Buddhists, they do not dominate any district of the state as Buddhists do.²⁷ There are three predominant religions of three distinct regions, viz., Jammu dominated by Hindus, Kashmir by Muslims and Ladakh by Buddhists.²⁸ The very name of 'Jammu and Kashmir' therefore is inadequate, because it is not an expression of all the regions of the state. What would be more appreciable is 'Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh' which the Ladakhis are likely to demand in future. A few Ladakhis with whom this researcher came into contact already expressed such views.

Regions and religions are not the only cleavages that divide the state, for the state is further divided linguistically, culturally and racially also. Linguistically, Kashmiri is the predominant language of the Kashmir province, Dogri of Jammu and Dard and Tibetan of Ladakh. Both Hindus and Muslims speak Kashmiri and Dogri alike, and so do the Muslims and Buddhists of Ladakh who speak Tibetan and Dard as well. Though religion has been used and abused as an instrument of playing with the most delicate thing like people's sentiments by the propounders of partition of India; this has been neither functional nor it

27 Sikhs and other Punjabi speaking people are scattered throughout the province of Jammu and more sparsely in Kashmir and do not constitute majority in any district of the state.

28 However, it should be noted that on the eve of the partition of India, "in Jammu Muslims comprised a majority of 53 per cent". Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 3.

is a fact of Indian sub-continent so far that the religion is the only determinant of a nation. The fact on the other hand is that neither at the time of the partition of India all Muslim majority areas were articulated in newly carved out Islamic nation (of Indian sub-continent) known as Pakistan, nor all Muslims agreed with this notion of doing welfare to Muslim community. Pakistan in fact could not survive on the basis of religious bonds only, even in the areas and population it claimed as part and parcel of Pakistan at the time of partition of India. The myth was completely exploded in 1971 during the civil war in East Pakistan, when Pakistan itself was divided, and a third nation known as Bangladesh emerged in the Indian sub-continent, while openly protesting against the thesis of 'two-nation'. What we want to say on this basis, therefore, is that religion has proved to be a least functional criterion of any nation.

Language on the other hand, is one of the most functional element of any social system. As far as language is concerned, we do not find anything common between Kashmiris and Dogras. A Jammu Muslim communicates more freely with a Dogra Hindu than his correligious from Kashmir. Thus, he understands more easily the nature and likings of Jammu people (Hindu or Muslim) than of Kashmiris. In fact the tragedy of Jammu Muslims is that so far they had been misunderstood, and ignored by their correligious from Kashmir. One of our informants who devoted his whole life \angle as one of the most prominent journalists from this

state⁷ in understanding the problems of the people of the state, thus rightly argued that:

Jammu Musalmans are the worst sufferers of all. They form nearly 10 per cent of the total population of the state, but they have not only been ignored by Hindus and Muslims of the state alike, but even the Kashmiri Muslims hated them. (29)

What harmed them more than this is that, under the influence of two-nation theory and communal riots that followed the implementation of two-nation thesis by force, both Hindus and Muslims of the area misunderstand each other even after understanding one another so well. The worst that happened to them is that despite having the "thousand and one grievances against the government they could not make a common cause with Hindus",³⁰ because they were still carried away by the opium of religion.

Further, we find that a Jammu Mussalman shares his values in many ways with a Dogra Hindu than a Muslim brethren from Kashmir. In fact what makes this sharing of values necessary is the functional necessity and similarity of the language, culture, dress, habits, etc. in a particular social system. Similar is the case for a person who belongs to Kashmir. A Kashmiri Muslim, for instance, is soon at ease with his native Hindu than a Muslim brethren from other parts of the state, with whom he always looks like a foreigner in every respect, for they share

29 Mulk Raj Saraf, An Interview, Jammu, 30 August 1976.

30 Balraj Puri, Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle (Delhi, 1966), p. 62.

neither same habits nor same language, culture, customs, costumes, etc., and all the time looking like a stranger and trying to understand one another; they depart without even knowing as who is what in actuality. Whereas we find this marked dissimilarity of attitudes between the people of two regions, we find many similarities in customs and traditions of the people living in their respective provinces. They share many common values, and it is not surprising if we find them sharing even the religious values together. ³¹ Though the phobia of religion is still there that creates on many occasions the

31 This fact has been beautifully described by Lawrence, when he says: "... the Kashmiri Sunnis are only Musalmans in name. In their hearts they are Hindus, and the religion of Islam is too abstract to satisfy their superstitious cravings, and they turn from the mean priest and the mean mosque to the pretty shrines of carved wood and roof bright with the iris flowers where the scints of past time lie buried. They like to gaze on saint's old clothes and turban, and to examine the cave in which he spent his ascetic life. In connexion with the suggestion that the Kashmiris are at heart Hindus, it may be mentioned that certain places are held in reverence by Hindus and Musalmans alike. As an instance, at Fatehpura in the Verinag Ilaka, and at Waripura in the Nagam Ilaka, I have seen the imprint of a foot in a stone worshipped by the Musalmans as Kodam-i-Rasal (the prophet's footprint) and by the Hindus as Vishna Pad (Vishnu's foot)".

See Walter R. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (Srinagar, Kesar Publishers, 1967), p. 286.

Similar is the observation of Abdul Ahad, who writes that: "Kashmir has always been the beacon of national solidarity, the impact of which can be clearly seen in all facets of the life of her people. It is found in their culture, language, history, dress, food and tastes, in their attitude, games and amusements.... It should

(Contd. on next page)

crisis of confidence, legitimacy, and identity, when one peeps into the reality, beneath the apparent reality; it becomes clear that religion is perhaps a least functional criterion for determining any nation or nationality.³²

In foregoing lines we have seen that Jammu and Kashmir is a multi-religious, multi-regional³³ and multi-lingual³⁴ state, where, though apparently religion appears to be a most important element of national solidarity, functionally it is of least significance. Now we will see here: how even being so much divided by region, religion and language the people of Jammu and

indeed be a matter of pleasant surprise to a visitor to witness in Kashmir the members of the two communities (Hindu and Muslim) equally holding in reverence the Hindu shrines and Muslim Khan-in-Qah's situated closely or almost in the same premises. To illustrate this, the great Khan-i-Qah of Shah Hamdan, Temple of Kali, Shah Sahib's mosque, Ziyarat-i-Makh-doom Sahab, Hari Parbat, and Maidan Sahib are equally hold in esteem by Kashmiris. The people of Tulamula, both Hindus and Muslims, are often found swearing by the Hindu goddess Khir Bhawani". Abdul Ahad, "Kashmir: Beacon of National Solidarity", Patriot, 13 August 1972.

- 32 Sisir Gupta, also, notes that "the religious division it should be noted is only one and not the most important of the divisions in Kashmir". Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study of India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1967), p. 23.
- 33 For example, the Preamble of the 'New Kashmir' programme says: "We the people of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Frontier Regions, including Poonch and Chinani Illequas". See New Kashmir: With an Introduction by Sheikh Md. Abdullah (Kashmir Bureau of Information, New Delhi, n.d.).
- 34 Article 48 of the New Kashmir programme adopted by the National Conference states that: "The national language of the state will be Kashmiri, Dogri, Balti, Dardi, Punjabi, Hindi and Urdu". Ibid.

Kashmir (not Ladakh) belong to the same racial stock. The fact that Hindus and Muslims belong to the same race, can be proved better by the following classification:

Races of Jammu and Kashmir

		Races			
		Aryan Race			Turanian Race
Subdivisions of Aryan Race					Subdivisions of Turanian Race
		Dogra		Balti	
		Chivhali		Ladakhi	
		Pahari			
		Kashmiri		Champa	
		Dard			

This classification shows that except Balti, Ladakhi, and Champa, all others (that constitute more than 95 per cent of the state population) are Aryan in origin. The division among the Aryans thus occurred only in a later period of history. For example, Frederic Drew notes: "The Dogras and Chibhali were originally one, but they have now become separated in many characteristics, from the latter having become Muhammedans, while the Dogras remained Hindus".³⁵ Similarly, large portion of Kashmiris converted to Islam. Like Dogra, Chibhali, Kashmiri and Pahari - majority of them are Hindus; Dards are also a race of Aryans, who with very few exceptions, are Muhammedans in general.³⁶

³⁵ Drew, n. 20, p. 7.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Regionally, religiously, culturally and linguistically, therefore, Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most diversified and cleavage-ridden parts of the Indian Union. Whereas there appears a clear-cut cultural, linguistic and regional affinities on the one hand, on the other, we find them pitched against the other religiously. If they are divided in all other respects, they are one racially. Thus there always exists a remarkable feature of unity and diversity and unity in diversity in Jammu and Kashmir.

There appears both inter-regional and intra-regional conflict and harmony. Both conflict and cohesion are in fact the predominant features of the Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, there is both inter-regional and inter-religious, and intra-regional and intra-religious conflict and co-operation contemporaneously. A Muslim and Hindu appear to be one culturally, but at the same time we find them looking at each other as their enemies religiously. Racially too, we have seen that there is an element of oneness, but at the same time intra-racial jealousies are evident. Both the Muslims and Hindus of the state thus find themselves closer and away from each other simultaneously.

The People and Their Social System

Jammu and Kashmir, as we have seen consists of three distinct regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

JAMMU

Political Importance

Despite being an indispensable link ³⁷ between India and Kashmir, Jammu becomes at time and again the victim of its disloyalty to Indian secularism and the line of Kashmir sub-nationalism. Variouslly described as 'headache', ³⁸ "step-motherly treatment of it" ³⁹ and perpetually discriminated part; ⁴⁰ before independence the political soil of Jammu was a fertile ground for sentiments of loyalty to royalty and for communalism. ⁴¹ The roots of communalism in Jammu are so strong and poisonous that even men like Sheikh Abdullah became victim of this highly contagious disease. ⁴² And it was because of this reason again

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- 37 Balraj Puri, for instance notes: "Jammu's importance does not lie merely in the fact that it has almost half of population of the state; it is an indispensable geopolitical link between the Kashmir valley and the rest of India". Balraj Puri, "The Importance of Being Jammu", Indian Express, 2 August 1972.
- 38 Sheikh is reported to have said that Jammu in his 'headache'. See, Balraj Puri, n. 30, p. 21.
- 39 For example, the President of the State Jan Sangh Sheikh Abdul Rehman warned that Andhra-like results may follow if, as alleged by him "the step-motherly treatment of Jammu was not discontinued". See "Jammu's Pivotal Position", The Hindu, 1 April 1973.
- 40 Chaman Lal Gupta, a prominent member of Jan Sangh from Jammu alleged that the attempts were being made to "perpetuate discrimination against Jammu and Ladakh". Ibid.
- 41 Balraj Puri, n. 30, p. 13.
- 42 The impact of Praja Parishad (1962-63) agitation in changing the attitude of Sheikh Abdullah is obvious. All of his speeches after this period speak in its favour.

that Maulana Saad Masoodi said in early fifties that, but for ⁴³ Jammu, the Kashmir problem would have been solved easily.

What is, therefore, required is that the people of this part of the state need to be educated politically (those principles that unite India and Kashmir). Taken for granted as the home of Hindu nationalism and therefore Indian nationalism as well Jammu, however, should not be allowed to remain uneducated (though the people there have started looking at issues more pragmatically and less communally), otherwise it can become the cause of losing Kashmir itself, as it became once the reason for losing Sheikh Abdullah's loyalty. ⁴⁴ Politically, Jammu is thus as important, strategic and sensitive as Kashmir.

The Land and People

Jammu is the land of Dogras; a great Aryan race, famous for its martial spirit and heroic military feats and adventures. The hills and stones are the marked feature of this land. According to Sisir Gupta, "From Jammu stretching east along the plains of Punjab the country is Dogra; and all who live in that tract, whether they be Hindus, or Muslims, or Sikhs, whether

43 Cited in Balraj Puri's "Schizophrenia in Jammu?" Economic and Political Weekly, vol. IX, nos. 6, 7 and 8, Annual Number 1974, p. 185.

44 B.L. Mullik, for example, reports of Mehru having told to him that "the Jana Sangh agitation had given him a shock and that for the first time he had started feeling doubtful about the future of Kashmir". See B.L. Mullik, My Years with Mehru: Kashmir (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 30.

high-born Rajputs or low-born menials, are known as Dogras, and have certain national characteristics and a common tongue which differentiates them from any of the other peoples of India".⁴⁵

The people of Dugar Desh are tough, well-built, and clear-hearted, but they lack the art of conciliation.

Caste and Communities

Dogras are divided into numerous castes in the same way as the Hindus of India generally are, but to tell the exact number of castes is very difficult, because no study on this aspect has been conducted so far.⁴⁶ Generally we know them as Brahman, Rajput, Khatri, Thakur, Jat, Karar, Wahajan (shopkeepers caste) and Dhiyar etc. All these castes are further divided into the number of sub-castes, by which one is generally identified.

Inequality is the predominant theme of the general division of Hindu caste system, but there also appears inequality

45 Sisir Gupta, n. 32, p. 25.

Frederic Drew, on the other hand notes that "... the settlers in hills that edge the Punjab, at all events those of them who have retained their Hindu faith, bear ... the name of Dogra, while the country they inhabit is called Dugar". Drew, n. 20, p. 43.

46 Therefore it is difficult to say as how many castes are there in India. But, the so-called empiricists have still ventured to say that: "there are in India more than 3,000 castes, each culturally distinct endogenous community sharing traditionally a common occupation and particular position in the localized hierarchy of caste ranking". See Robert Hardgrave, The Dogras of Jalandhar (Berkeley, 1969), p. 2.

within the same sub-division of same caste. Another marked feature of the caste system is social status,⁴⁷ that naturally implies highly restricted feature of inequality, and that hinders the growth of egalitarian order. Therefore, we find that Americans have led the field in justifying the functional character of inequality.⁴⁸

With urbanization, however, the concept of social status (in strict traditional sense) is gradually changing. Social status in the past, for example, was determined by the ritual standards in those functions which maintain its distinct cultural identity, and by the sensitivity of the people to caste-wise prestige. Today it is steadily undergoing change because a caste which is economically well-off can raise itself in the social hierarchy.⁴⁹ So, as industrialization and urbanization takes place in India, caste consciousness is bound to be blurred, and when the people become class conscious the language of social

47 The term social status is usually attributed to Max Weber who distinguished 'stand' - translated as 'status' from class (see his "Class, status, party" in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber (London, Kegan Paul, 1947)).

48 See especially, K. Davis and W. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification", American Sociological Review, April 1945; and T. Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification" in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967).

49 M.N. Srinivas, for example, writes that: "... higher castes are generally better off than the lower ... (and) castes which acquired economic and political power were able to raise themselves up in the ritual hierarchy". See his, "India's Road to Equality", in Betty B. Burch and Allen B. Cole, eds., Asian Political Systems (London, Methuen Co., 1963), p. 220.

status is likely to be replaced by that of social class.

With the emergence of modern ideas and institutions, caste in India has acquired political significance. The politics of the Jammu and Kashmir also cannot remain untouched by caste-politics, because the political elites everywhere are looking for any type of avenues that begets them in the legislatures or parliament (or in other words the power and influence). Though we do not find the caste polarization in the politics of the state like that of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, but the caste and communal feelings certainly exist there. There exists therefore caste and communal organizations like Brahmin Sabha, Rajput Sabha, Harijan Mandal (or Megh Mandal), Sanatan Dharma Sabha, Sikh Sabha, Shia Muslim Association and Kashmiri Pandit Association etc. No study has been done so far on their effect on politics of the state. Thus this author can say only in brief, as how caste-feelings exist there. For example, he observed during his five years stay in the state and his field work in particular that Hindus are likely to vote for a Hindu, Muslims for a Muslim, and Buddhists for Buddhist.^e A Sikh in general votes for a Hindu candidate, if contest is between a

^e But this is in no way peculiar to India, Pakistan, or Jammu and Kashmir only. Such communal feeling in voting behaviour is evident throughout the world. For example, even in the most literate, advanced, modern societies, that are based on science and technology, a Roman Catholic tends to vote for a Roman Catholic and a Protestant for a Protestant.

Hindu and Muslim but in case there is a Sikh candidate on the field he is likely to vote for him. The communal feelings thus determine the outcome of voting to a great extent.⁵⁰ Thus, we find that Rajputs tend to vote for a Rajput and Harijans to a Harijan, as far as caste loyalties are concerned. For example, we find that leader like Karan Singh is highly popular among the Rajputs, less among the Hindus of other castes, but Kashmiri Muslims rarely like him. One of our informants from Kashmir for instance told me that "Dr. Karan Singh still has a class character, however, intellectually developed he may be".⁵¹ When Karan Singh was elected as Sadar-i-Riyasat, it is reported that progressive minded Hindus in Jammu also thought him as a symbol of feudal exploitation. "R.P. Saraf and K.D. Sethi", for example, "favoured Mahsa Lahar Singh against Dr. Karan Singh as the Sadar-in-Riyasat".⁵²

Similarly, Bhogat Chajju Ram is much respected among the scheduled caste and other low-caste workers than among the members of other communities of Hindus and Muslims. Because of this caste-consciousness again Harijans who form nearly one third of state population disliked and ignored the Praja Parishad

50 For a brief information about voting pattern in the state, see, J.J. Ranadive, "Jammu, Kashmir: Poll or Plebiscite? A Study in Voter Behavior Trends", The National Herald, 24 February 1972.

51 The informant wishes to be anonymous.

52 Ghulam Mohammed Mir (District Congress Committee President Jrinagar (Rural)): An Interview, 9 September 1976. Srinagar (Lasjan).

because they considered it an organization of upper class and upper caste Hindus.

Further, it is also a fact that these caste associations are increasingly working for making their communities politically conscious. For instance, Bhagat Chajju Ram told this investigator during an interview that:

Through the associations like the Kogh Mandal, and the Harijan Mandal formed by Mahsa Kohar Singh, Mahsa Shankar Das, Shri Rangil Singh and myself, I started social service and tried to awaken my community to fight against untouchability and hatred of them by upper caste Hindus. To fight against this discriminatory social system I joined politics. Though I joined the National Conference and the Congress later, my object remains same. (53)

Rajputs had been the dominant caste of the state for more than over 100 years, by virtue of being a ruling class and having thereby political and economic power. ⁵⁴ It was in fact to monopolize this power for ever that Maharaja Amar Singh, father of Maharaja Hari Singh formed Shri Amar Kshatriya Prantik Sabha nearly 75 years ago. Known popularly as the Rajput Sabha to this day this caste association continues to be a common platform of the divergent elements of this community.

Though, ^{the} caste associations work for the politicization of

53 Bhagat Chajju Ram (Minister of State for Industries): An interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar (New Secretariat).

54 M.E. Srinivas, says: "A caste is dominant when it wield economic or political power, and occupies fairly high position in the hierarchy", M.E. Srinivas, n. 49, p. 218.

their respective communities, the caste cohesion and caste loyalties are strong only as long as the caste associations maintain the distinct identity of their own within a Hindu social organization by means of its basic social concerns: endogamy, ritual, and pollution.⁵⁵ But when it strives for non-traditional functions like economic and political power, the cohesion is not to the same extent, and in fact there appears an inner competition and conflict.⁵⁶ In fact, the pursuit for economic and political gain serves as a potential divider. For example, Thakur Lakshman Singh Charak (who was closely related to Maharaja) the youthful President of the Rajput Sabha when took the decision on behalf of this community to support the National Conference, that enabled him to become the member of

55 As Sonjee writes: "A caste enjoys explicit tacit concurrence and support of all its members when it is engaged in those functions which maintain its distinct cultural identity. It maintains this by its firm grip both on endogamy and, to a lesser extent, on matters relating to ritual and to pollution. It treats those three functions as its *raison d'être* and demands the support of the entire group towards their realization".

See A.H. Sonjee, "Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity", American Political Science Review, vol. LXVII, no. 3, September 1973, p. 804.

56 "... when a caste moves from these concerns (i.e. traditional social concerns) towards a search for higher social recognition, economic opportunities, and a share in political power, its internal cohesion becomes progressively weaker ... caste economic and political drives necessarily lead to internal competition.... It is therefore pointless to talk about the presence of the same extent of cohesion in castes for its economic and political pursuits as it exists for its social pursuits". Ibid., p. 803.

Parliament for first Lok Sabha, was not only disliked by the Rajput community, but he was replaced also as the President of Sabha by Thakur Dhanantar Singh, who happened to be the Vice-President of it. Again, when Thakur Dhanantar Singh tried to support the Praja Parishad, a youthful group led by Col. Sansar Singh emerged as a dissident group, that criticized Dhanantar Singh for making the Sabha a handmaid of the Praja Parishad. It is therefore self-evident that the quality of cohesion changes from one goal to another.⁵⁷

In addition to Hindus, the province of Jammu is habitat of Muslims, Jains, and Sikhs etc. Hindus are the dominant community of the province, but no caste or sub-caste dominates the state in any terms since 1948.

Like Hindus, there exists a caste system among the Muslims also, but with little deviation as it is among the Hindus. "These Muhammadanized Hindus" says one writer, "keep some of the old caste rules; not indeed as to eating, for all Muhammadans will eat together; but in the matter of inter-marriage. They either marry in their own separate caste, or take a wife from one below and give their daughters to the caste above them".⁵⁸ Though they converted from Hinduism to Islam, but as traditions

57 For the changing quality of cohesion and simultaneous replacement of cohesion by conflict see, "Caste and Three Levels of Cohesion." (a Table) in *ibid.*, pp. 804-5.

58 *Drew*, n. 20, p. 58.

die hard they could not convert Hindu social system into a completely Islamic one. Chibhalis for example constitute the majority of Muhammedans in the hill region of Jammu, lying between the Chorab and Jhelum rivers. The very word "Chibhal comes from 'Chib' which is the name of one of the Rajput tribes".⁵⁹

Further, some of the sub-divisions of Hindu Rajputs as Chib, Jaral, Pal, etc. exists among the Muslims also. The designation like Muslim Rajput is commonly used. "Besides Rajputs" writes Drow, "there are many Muhammedanized jats in Chibhal ... (and) in eastern part of Chibhal are Muhammedan Thakurs".⁶⁰ There is also a caste called Sudan residing in parts between Poonch and Jhelum, whose position among Muslims is like that of the Mian among the Dogras (and) a general name for this and other high castes of Chibhals is Sahu. Another caste that resides here is that of the Malik of Dharhal; a title given to them by Akbar. They are distinctive in appearance, for their beards are long and waving; they give their daughters to the Jarals. These are Muhammedan Rajputs, of whom, for the seven or eight generation had been the Rajas of Rajouri. Other castes to be mentioned here are that of 'Kokka and Bomba', who "people of the bank of Jhelum between Gingal and Hazafferabad, and up the lower part of the Kishangana Valley; ... and Jekkar who reside in the west of Kotli

59 Ibid., p. 57.

60 Ibid., p. 58.

and Mirpur".⁶¹ Finally, the "Muhammedans on the border" writes Drew, "were not and are not very strong in faith; they retain many Hindu fashions and some even have an idol in their house. Till quite lately it was their custom to marry Hindu women of the same caste, and these remained Hindu and did not adopt Muhammedanism. This is no longer done, but when I was in the country some women of that sort were still alive".⁶²

Thus it is evident that, through the politicization and communalisation of the masses under the influence of two nation theory, Hindu nationalism, partition of India, and communal riots put together the two communities are driven to the two different poles politically; but socially we still find them sharing many values in common.

Now, let us take the Pahari race, dominating some parts of Jammu region distinctly. The caste system among them appears to be the same as it is among Dogras of Jammu. Only now castes to be mentioned among Paharis are that of Gaddis⁶³ and Gujars. Gaddis are Hindus, and have same divisions of castes as the others; they possess large flocks of sheep and herds of goats, and migrate seasonally to higher altitudes.

Similarly, the community of Gujars spends half of their

61 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

62 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

63 Gaddis are reported to have come from Chamba Hills at one time or the other, and few Gaddis now live in upper valley of the Ravi.

lives at high altitudes and half at lower hills. Those who go beyond these barriers are found in Kashmir. Thus we find Gujars at different places of the state, speaking Kashmiri, Dogri, Punjabi, Pahari and sharing some of their values with the communities with whom they live.

On the whole, the Pahari race is mainly concentrated in the areas known as Ramban, Doda, Kishtwar, Poonch, and Bhadarwah having their own speech.⁶⁴ Though the areas of Bhadarwah and Kishtwar are included in the Jammu province, more than half of their inhabitants are Kashmiri, and the overwhelming majority of its total population are Muslims by religion. The rest are Hindus of the Thakar, Krar, and other castes. Initially, however, both areas were predominantly Hindu and ruled by Hindu Maharajas.

The Rajas of Bhadarwah were Kien Rajputs, allied by caste with the families that ruled over Basoli and Kulu. In about the year 1810, this old family was dispossessed by the Chamba family who thus combined Bhadarwah and Chamba. This new family however held it only for twenty or thirty years when through stages it fell into the hands of Gulab Singh.

Kishtwar too was a region inhabited and ruled by Hindu Rajas, the last of whom was Raja Girat Singh, who embraced Islam, under the miraculous influence of Ayed Shah Farid-ud-din, followed by many of his servants and people at large. Disciple of

64 "Though not incomprehensible to the people of neighbouring areas" writes Drew "Pahari still is very distinct from theirs". Drew, n. 20, p. 109.

Murangzeb as he was, latter named him as the Raja Saadat Yar 65 Khan, a tradition that was followed by all of his successors, until when there occurred a conflict between last convertee King Muhammad Teg Singh and Wazir Lakhpat; who in league with Gulab Singh (who was ^{then} at the Court of Raja Ranjit Singh) forced him to give up the kingdom.

KASHMIR

Political Importance

Linked with four international borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Soviet Union; politically Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most important states of the Indian Union, and of which the Kashmir province is the most sensitive region. Variousy known as the test tube baby of Indian secularism, 66 or secular India's prize baby, 67 a beacon light to this benighted

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- 65 "After this first Muhammeden Raja (whose change of religion was determined the faith of all successive Rajas?" writes Drew "came Raja Anluk Singh, who received from the King of Delhi the style of Raja Saadatmand Khan. Then came Raja Mihr Singh, who received from the same source the title of Raja Saadatmand Khan. Next came Raja Sujhan Singh, the Raja Inayat Ullah Singh; lastly Raja Muhammed Teg Singh, also called Saif Ullah Khan". Ibid., p. 120.
- 66 See, Filibbertigibbet, "A Kashmir Diary: Secularism's Test-Tube Baby", Economic Weekly, vol. XV, no. 44, 2 November 1963, pp. 1819-21.
- 67 Taya Zirkir, for example says: "Because Kashmir is a Moslem majority state, it is secular India's prize baby; the proof to Indians that they really are successfully secular". See Taya Zirkir, "The Kashmir question in Kashmir: Prosperity Preferred to Plobiscito", Ceylon Daily News, 2 October 1956.

sub-continent⁶⁸ and the only spot where Nehru would hit blindly; the importance of Kashmir to India is immense. It provides the philosophical basis of Indian national movement as well as the Congress policy.

Strategically, Kashmir acquired the importance throughout. For example, a French traveller writing his experiences in Mughal Empire as *early* as in the mid seventeenth century writes:

It (Kashmir) is probably unequalled by any country of the same extent, and should be as in former ages the site of sovereign authority extending its dominion over all the circumjacent mountains, even as far as Tartary and over the whole of Hindustan to the island of Ceylon. It is not indeed without reason ... Akbar was so unremitting in his efforts to wrest the sceptre from the hand of its native princes. (69)

Finally, Jawaharlal Nehru described the geographical, political, and cultural importance of Kashmir in the following words:

Geographically, from the Southern tip of India to Kashmir it is 2,000 miles. Roughly speaking Kashmir is about 1,000 miles from sea. While it is a part of India, it is in fact 'heart of Asia' and for countless ages great caravans have passed from India to Central Asia through this state. For 2,000 years or more Kashmir has been closely connected with India

68 Gandhiji in one of his speeches during the days of communal riots and partition of India said: "My sole hope and prayer is that Kashmir should become a beacon light to this benighted sub-continent". Joe Pyarolal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, vol. II (Ahmedabad, Lavjiven Publishing House, 1953), p. 500.

69 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mughal Empire, 1666-1668 (Oxford University Press, 1916), pp. 400-1.

culturally and politically often enough. It is also connected in various ways with Central Asia. Even now I wonder how many people realize that Kashmir is further north than Tibet. So one has to think of Kashmir in that particular geographical position apart from the other facts in the case. (70)

The Land and People

The Land: If Jammu is the city of temples and land of large boulder pebble-beds and large ravines ranging from few hundred yards to a mile-wide; Kashmir is reputed for enjoying an exceptional beauty with virgin snow gifted to its lofty and exalted mountains, energizing climate, refreshing rivers and canals, cheering lakes, springs and water-falls, charming flowers and delicious fruits. ⁷¹ Having no parallel in the whole of Himalayas and known as the 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Switzerland of Asia' for its exquisite natural beauty, Kashmir proper is a basin 85 miles long and 25 broad, located approximately 30° - 35° North and 74° - 76° East, with an area of 6.131 square miles. According to De Terra,

the first evidence of a Himalayan Ice Age has become available from Kashmir. Even Switzerland which is reputed for its combination of lake and mountain scenery is not

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- 70 Lehru's statement on Kashmir in Lok Sabha. See for this, The Statesman, 25 July 1952.
- 71 P.N. Bazaz, therefore says: "Perhaps nowhere else in the world has nature been so kind and benevolent to people as in Kashmir". P.N. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi, Pamposh Publications, 1967), p. 1.

comparable with Kashmir. There are many peaks in Kashmir which claim much greater heights than Mont Blanc. The main valleys of Switzerland are not even as large as some of the side valleys of Kashmir. (72)

Similarly, a British resident in his illustrated work 'Kashmir' regards Kashmir more beautiful than Greece.⁷³ Finally, to describe in one's own words the beauty of Kashmir one requires that eye of mind which is the bliss of solitude, a fantasy of a poet and that supersensitivity which is an essential trait of an artist, all of which are beyond the capacity of this writer. But for its scenic beauty, valley has been the concern of lyrics and poets from India and Europe alike. Bernier described it as the 'paradise of the East'; Jahangir wrote that 'if one were to praise Kashmir, whole books would have to be written'; and Lehru liked it as a beautiful woman. One of our informants also told me that "the beauty of Kashmir has attracted many invaders and feudal lords for centuries because just as you ravish a woman,⁷⁴ you ravish Kashmir - a beautiful land".

The People: Physically finest of all races of India, Kashmiris form a separate nationality as the Tamils, Telugus, Maharashtrians,

72 Census of India, 1961, p. 1.

73 "The beautiful Greece with its purple hills and varied contour, its dancing seas and clear blue sky, produced the graceful Greeks". But, writes Younghusband, "Kashmir is more beautiful than Greece". Francis Younghusband, Kashmir (London, Adam and Charles Black, 1909), p. 133.

74 Trilochan Dutta, An interview, 31 August 1976, Jammu (Gandhinagar).

Punjabis or Bengalis etc. do. They share a common cultural heritage of the sub-continent of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Peace-loving people by nature⁷⁵ as they are, outsiders have described them as 'zulum parast' (worshippers of tyranny),⁷⁶ perfect in art of weeping,⁷⁷ false tongued ready with a lie,⁷⁸ most degraded race and cowardly in character.⁷⁹ They are described as

- 75 "Crime" for example says Lawrence, "is almost non-existent in Kashmir. Crimes of dishonesty may be said to be absolutely non-existent among peasants. Property is entirely safe, and during the six years I have spent in the villages, I have never heard of crimes of theft, or burglary being committed by agriculturists.... Offence against the person are extremely rare, and when Kashmiris quarrel they call one another by bad names, will occasionally go so far as to knock off a turban or seize an adversary by his effeminate gown. The sight of blood is abhorrent to them.... This sullen temper is one of the worst points in the Kashmiri character, and joined to deep rooted apathy, makes it very difficult to improve the conditions of the people". See Walter R. Lawrence, n. 31, pp. 6 and 278.
- 76 Ibid., p. 2.
- 77 "Rarely laugh or smile, but", writes Lawrence, Kashmiris "are easily moved to tears.... I was struck with the sight of grown-up men weeping like children, but I soon found that the tears were often feigned, and further discovered that one or two men were told off in each village to excite sympathy. 'they are perfect actors'. Ibid., p. 230.
- 78 Drew observes that, "they are false, tongued, ready with a lie, and given various form of deceit.... They are noisy and quarrelsome, ready to wrangle, but not to fight; on the least exercise of threat of force they cry like children". Drew, n. 20, p. 175.
- 79 Moorcroft, for instance observed that, "at present a more degraded race does not exist". William Moorcroft, Travels in Himalayan Provinces, vol. II (London, John Murray, 1841), p. 128; and Knight, says, "whenever they saw a Kashmiri they would run up to him barking, whereupon in almost every instance that fine-looking, athletic,

(Contd. on next page)

men 'made of the bundles of contradictions';⁸⁰ who hate rain but cannot stand great heat;⁸¹ who possess "great muscular strength ... (but) fond of using only one hand while working".⁸² Finally, these people are described as dirty in their habits and person,

bearded disgrace to the human race would behave as a five-year old English child would be ashamed to do, howling, weeping and throwing himself down in the snow in deadly fear". E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet (London, Longsman, 1895), p. 111.

80 G.M.D. Sufi, for example describes Kashmiri as a "timid yet persistent, degraded yet intellectual, mystical yet adventurous, shrewd and businesslike". See, G.M.D. Sufi, Islamic Culture in Kashmir (Srinagar, 1926), p. 13.

Lawrence also says, "the Kashmiri is made up of contradictions", n. 31, pp. 2 and 3.

Youngusband notes "a Kashmiri soldier is almost a contradiction in terms", n. 73, p. 131.

Similar are the views of Lord Birdwood, who says: "There is one contradiction in his make-up. It is his excellent physique.... He is devoid of physical courage. He will suffer and endure but he will not fight. I have watched a couple of Kashmiris hurling insults at each other, the perspiration standing out on their brows, their raised fists clenched for the first blow. But it never falls". See Lord Birdwood, The Two Nations and Kashmir (London, Robert Hale, 1956), p. 21.

81 Lawrence, n. 31, p. 280.

Lawrence further writes: "I have known men grumble at having accompany me in rain, and have seen others quite overcome with the sun when riding with me on village inspections.... The Kashmiri is a very melancholy person. In the middle of a conversation he will sigh in the most irrelevant manner, and say that he sighs for his sins for the course that is on Kashmir", he adds. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

82 *Ibid.* Lawrence further observed that a Kashmiri "will not work to try to improve his condition for experience tells him that this is superfluous. It is in his opinion the duty of the state to feed him and to provide him fuel cheap, but he himself is unfettered by any duties". *Ibid.*, p. 281.

and highly individualistic. ⁸³ All such views, however, are one-sided in tone, as the Kashmiris are reputed for many noble traits also. Their intellectual superiority, ⁸⁴ honesty, ⁸⁵ past military heroism, ⁸⁶ and peace-loving nature are widely acknowledged

83 "They are extremely dirty in their habits and person, and wash about once in ten days, and this coupled with the fact that their clothes are equally dirty, makes them unpleasant companions in the warm weather. Soap is made in the valley, but is never used for personal ablutions. In the villages barber shaves his client with water. Soap is too valuable to be wasted on so trifling matter as personal cleanliness, as is reserved for the purpose of softening the woollen cloth of Kashmir". Ibid., p. 230.

Similarly writes Lord Birdwood that "centuries of impoverishment have not encouraged the Kashmiri to an awareness of his status. He is dirty and untidy. He wears shapeless, colourless clothes". Birdwood, n. 30, p. 21.

About their individualistic nature, writes Lawrence that "unless they are working for their own benefit, they never exert themselves". Lawrence, n. 31, p. 230.

And William Moorcroft says that Kashmiris are "selfish, superstitious, ignorant, supple, intriguing, dishonest and false". Moorcroft, n. 79, p. 299.

84 Drew, n. 20, p. 175.

85 Lawrence says: "Kashmiris are not the dishonest people (as) they are represented to be". Lawrence, n. 31, p. 5.

86 Jisir Gupta notes that "the Kashmiri once had been a feared warrior; centuries of oppression sapped his vitality". Jisir Gupta, n. 32, p. 27.

Among the women, the name of Kota Devi is still remembered with pride. She not only defeated Urvan a Turk by her courage and organizational skill, but even stabbed herself to death, when attempt was made to violate her chastity, religion, prestige. See for this Lawrence, n. 31, p. 190.

even today. They progressed even after shameless exploitation of their community and cruel violation of their religion.

Not only they possess the key political and administrative positions in the contemporary India, but they have provided some of the well-known political personalities of India also, notably the two Nehrus, Tej Bahadur Sapru and D.P. Dhar; and also a number of brilliant Urdu classicist like Rattan Nath Dhar Sarshar and Anand Lalain Mulla. The very designation of theirs as Pandit, as generally known in India and 'Bhatta' as they call themselves in their homeland bears the truth of their being a race of learned people. Bhatta is the Prakrit from Sanskrit 'bhartri' which means scholar or the same as 'Pandit'.⁸⁷ Thus it is necessary to inquire into the nature of historical facts as how their conditions became so pitiable, and because of which such indolent, sullen, coward and selfish attitudes germinated into them, and the legacy of that behaviour to find even today among the Kashmiris. Therefore, we will give here a brief historical narrative of Islamization, exploitation and repression of Kashmiris.

In Kashmir, a relatively pliant social organisation is reported to have existed under the sway of Buddhism, that was brought into Kashmir during Emperor Ashoka's reign in the first quarter of the third century B.C., and for almost a millennium commended Kashmiris. Hinduism started reaffirming itself in the beginning of eighth century. The first mention of Muslims dates

87 See, A.A. Macdonnell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London, 1924).

to the reign of King Harsa (A.D. 1039-1101) who is reported to have enlisted them in his army. Kalhana also has noted the appearance of Muslims (Turkish) during the eleventh century. But until 1320 A.D. it seems that they did not influence the socio-economic life-pattern of Kashmir culture.⁸⁸ However, it was only couple of decades after it that Islamization took place in the valley. There are at least four factors responsible for the success of Islamization in the valley. These are:

- (a) Iconoclasm of Hindu rulers.
- (b) Anarchy that was prevalent in Hindu Kingdom of Kashmir.
- (c) The persuasion by missionaries.
- (d) Islam by compulsion that was widely practised by Muslim rulers.

(a) "The breaking of images and violation of temple property in Kashmir" writes D.D. Kosambi "actually was the expropriation of accumulated wealth by the central power to pay for its expenses in the struggle against the local chiefs".⁸⁹ Jayapida (eighth century) on the advice of his Kayasthas that greater profits could be extracted from his own kingdom, without the risk and hardships of foreign expedition took such measures

88 Based on the analysis of R.C. Kak, Ancient Monuments of Kashmir (London, 1936); G.M.D. Jufi, Kashmir, vol. I (New Delhi, Light and Life Publishers, 1974); and J.L. Milm, A History of Kashmiri Pandits (Jrinagar, 1955).

89 D.D. Kosambi, "Origins of Feudalism in Kashmir", Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, 150th Anniversary volume (Bombay, 1965), p. 117.

which would be called as 'iconoclasm without theology'.⁹⁰ King
 Samkaravaram (883-902 A.D.) took from the temples the profit
 arising from the sale of incense, sandalwood, and other articles
 of worship ... he plundered 64 temples....⁹¹ "The logical culmi-
 nation of this confiscatory scheme" writes Kosambi, "came under
 Harsa (1089-1101 A.D.). He began by a fortuitous confiscation
 of treasures belonging to the deserted Bhimakesava temple founded
 (near Martanda) by Bhima Sahi, while the priests were querrell-
 ing among themselves, the idol's silver armour had been stolen
 from the locked temple.... He appointed Udayraja; perfect for
 the overthrow of divine images. In order to defile statues of
 gods, he had excrement and urine poured over their faces by
 naked mendicants whose noses, feet, and hands had rotted away
 (lepers). There was not one temple in a village, town or in
 city which was not despoiled of its images by that of 'Turuska'
 King Harsa ... the term Turuska being applied to him in
 hatred".⁹² The iconoclasm without theology thus made many
 Hindus doubt the very sanctity of Hindu religion that was already
 challenged once by the spell of Buddhism in third century B.C.

(b) The rampant anarchic and civil war plight in Hindu
 Kingdom of Kashmir dates back to the reign of King Vchchala

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., p. 118.

92 Ibid., pp. 118-9.

(1101-1111 A.D.) and continued thereafter. ⁹³ Taking advantage of this Dulucha (known as Zulkadar Khan, Zulu or Dalucha), a Tartar warlord, invaded Kashmir. ⁹⁴ For more than eight months Kashmir remained under his occupation, ⁹⁵ but the Hindu King and especially his chieftains did not lose heart and instead made it difficult for him to maintain his rule for long, who therefore after plunder and pillage withdrew from the valley. At this juncture there were three persons of significance with power, position, and influence. They were Ramchandra (the Commander-in-Chief of King Suhadeva) a native from Kashmir and two foreigners Shah Mirza (at whose birth it was prophesied that he would become the King of Kashmir) and Rinchana (who having quarrelled with his father: the King of Tibet, came as an adventurer to the valley). Meanwhile this adventurous Buddhist chieftain's son Rinchana ventured to invade the prostrate Hindu Kingdom. He was given a stiff fight by Ramchandra but Rinchana succeeded in killing him by treachery, and proclaimed himself the

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- 93 Lawrence notes that in Vachchala's reign it is said that "his masters and party chieftains acted like high waymen; his brother wished a civil war in the Kingdom and his treasury was empty". Lawrence, n. 31, p. 189.
- 94 "Zulkadar Khan, commonly known as the Tartar Zulu", writes Lawrence, "slaughtered the people, took slaves, and set fire to the city of Srinagar". Ibid.
- 95 "After an occupation of eight months, Zulu who had depopulated the valley, found provisions scarce, and tried to get out of Kashmir by passes leading from the South through the Kull Laravoo valley, but snow overtook him, and he and his army and his Kashmiri captures perished". Ibid.

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King of Kashmir. After his death, he was succeeded by Suha-
deva's younger brother Udayanadeva. Udayanadeva married Kota
Rani (the widow of Rinchana, and daughter of Ram Chandra)
because she not only enjoyed the confidence of Court officials
(for when Urwan, a Turki invaded Kashmir and Udayanadeva fled
away, she collected an army and sent Shah Mirza to fight the
enemy) but also declared herself as a Hindu lady in deeds, the
proof of which she gave by stabbing herself to death. It hap-
pened at the end of nearly 50 days rule by her after the death
of her husband Udayanadeva. During this short period, she
struggled with Shah Mirza for the maintenance of her power, but
in vain. Shah Mirza on defeating her proclaimed himself a King
and proposed to marry Kota Rani. Kota Rani flatly refused. But
on getting refusal when Shah Mirza advanced to her bridal
chamber, she stabbed herself to death. And, with her therefore
we find the last representative of the Hindu royalty and nearly
500 years (1339-1819 A.D.) of Muslim domination of the valley
thereafter.

(c) The proselytizing aspect of Islam was miraculously
carried out by the Sufi scholar Sayyid Ali Hamdan, who paid
several visits to the valley since 1327, and carried peaceful

96 After proclaiming himself as a King, Rinchana, "married
Ramchandra's daughter Kota and sought to become a Hindu,
but the Brahmans refused to proselytize him. Subse-
quently he embraced Islam". T.N. Madan, Family and
Kinship: A Study of the Pandits of Rural Kashmir (New
Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 19.

Islamization into the nooks and corners of Kashmir. The early missionaries working towards the same goal, were that of the Sayyid Bilal Shah of Turkistan, who was associated with the Suhrawardi school of Sufis.

(d) Among those who freely used the coercive measures to Islamize Kashmir is well known notorious King Sultan Sikandar (1389-1413 A.D.), who soon earned the nickname of 'Butshikan' or iconoclast for his idol smashing. He showed a great zeal in ruining the grand old temples which Hindu Rajas had bestowed there. Not only did he wrecked practically all the Hindu temples of Kashmir, "he compelled Hindu subjects to choose between, Islam exile and death".⁹⁷ By the end of his reign all Hindu

97 T.N. Madan, "Religious Ideology in a Plural Society: The Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir", in T.N. Madan, ed., Muslim Communities of South Asia: Culture and Society (New Delhi, Vikas, 1976), p. 119.

"It is said that in certain stones (of temples destroyed by Sikandar) were found prophesying that these buildings would be destroyed by Sikandar, and he grimly remarked that if he had known of these inscriptions he would have spared the noble piles, for he had no wish to fulfil the predictions of an idolatrous people ... he used the plinths and friezes of the old temples for the embankments of the city and for the foundation of the Jama Masjid. Having glutted his vengeance of Hindu temples Sikandar turned his attention to the people who worshipped in them, and he offered them three choices: death, conversion or exile. Many fled, many were converted and many were killed, and it is said that this thorough monarch burnt seven mounds of sacred threads of murdered Brahmins. All books of Hindu learning which he could lay in his hands were sunk in Dal Lake, and Sikandar flattered himself that he had extirpated Hinduism from the valley". Lawrence, n. 31, pp. 190-1.

inhabitants of the valley, except the Brahmans had probably adopted Islam.⁹⁸ Finally, it was therefore in fourteenth century that Hindus and Buddhists were altogether wiped out and Islam fully established itself in Kashmir.⁹⁹

The process of Islamization, however, did not come to an end with this much only. Perhaps with the exception of Zain-ul-Abidin¹⁰⁰ all others continued the process. In fact, with Sikandar it was only a beginning towards an end. And, all the

- 98 Dr. Stein, therefore writes: "It is most probable that by the time of Zain-ul-Abdul-din all Hindu inhabitants except Brahmans, had adopted Islam. It would seem more exact henceforth to term Brahman instead of too general 'Hindu'". Cited in Lawrence, *ibid.*, p. 191.
- 99 Madan writes that by the time of Sikandar's death in 1413-1414 A.D. "only handful of Brahmans still survived in Kashmir ... the tradition puts the number at eleven". See Madan, n. 97, p. 119.
- 100 Zain-ul-Abdin though did not discourage Islamization process in any way, but he really let the Hindus to live in their own way, and thus he is known as the true precursor of Akbar in Kashmir. Zain-ul-Abdin, is, therefore, remembered to this day as budshaw (great king), for his rule of nearly 50 years reversed the process of past 100 years because he adopted the policy of - let all the flowers bloom, all philosophies prosper, and all religions progress as his motto. This made it possible for Hindus and Buddhists to live a life of security and honour. Restored to health by a Brahman physician, who asked for no fees or fiefs except "mercy for his co-religionists", Zain-ul-Abdin then revoked, if not all, most of anti-Hindu laws that rendered a hope of new life among Hindus. "The destruction of Hindu scriptures was henceforth stopped. The Brahmans who had fled were repatriated, their lands and property which had been usurped by Muslims were restored to them. The annual, capitation tax ... was reduced to a normal fee ... and later was entirely abolished. Sacrifices and pilgrimages were again permitted. Prohibition against cremation was removed. The schools were reopened, and Hindu boys were

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successive Muslim rulers carried their mission of total Islamization of the valley dutifully. Both Mughals and Afghans did their best to start from where their predecessors had left. To mention only one of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb for example, Morrison writes: "In his long reign of fifty years (he) paid but one visit to Kashmir, but that is remembered for the fierce zeal he showed in persecuting Hindus".¹⁰¹ As far as Afghan rule is concerned, it is termed by Lawrence as "a time of brutal tyranny".¹⁰² The Imperial Gazetteer of India also notes about Afghan rules in the following words: "Governors from Kabul plundered and tortured people indiscriminately ... in their agony Kashmir turned with hope to the rising power of Ranjit Singh of Lahore".¹⁰³

"Pathan rule" writes Lawrence was the "cruellest and worst of all ... now only remembered for their brutality and cruelty, and it is said of them that they thought no more of cutting off heads than of plucking a flower. The victim of these

allowed to study their own scriptures. The king ... himself attended Hindu shrines, performed sacrifices, built monasteries and not only acquired a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit, but employed his available time in the study of its sacred books". See Kak, n. 88, p. 34.

101 M.C. Morrison, The Lovely Summer in Kashmir (London, Duckworth & Co., 1904), pp. 50-51.

102 Lawrence, n. 31, p. 197.

103 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. XV (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 93.

fiends were the Pandits, the Shias and the Bombas of Jhelum Valley. First in the rank of oppressors comes Asad Khan, who boasted that the savage Nadir Shah was his prototype. It was his practice to tie up the Pandits two and two, in grass sacks and sink them in the Dal Lake. As an amusement a pitcher filled with ordure would be placed on a Pandit's head and Musalmans would pelt the pitcher with stones till it broke, the unfortunate Hindu being blinded with filth. The Pandits ... were forced to grow beards, turbans and shoes were forbidden, and 'tika' forehead mark was interdicted.... Mir Hazar ... used leather bags instead of grass sacks for drowning of Brahmans. He drowned Shias and Brahmans indiscriminately. Atta Muhammed Khan was a ferocious libertine and his agent, an old woman named Koshib, was the terror of Brahman parents, who rather than allow the degradation^{of} their daughters destroyed their beauty by shaving their heads or cutting their noses. In those days any Musalman who would meet a Pandit would jump on his back, and take a ride and the saying 'Buta chuk ta Khosa dita' which means in Kashmiri 'you are a Brahman and I will mount you' is still quoted'.¹⁰⁴

It is, therefore, not surprising to find Kashmiris - sullen, slavish, deceitful, cowards and babylike in their behaviour. Lawrence, thus rightly says: "Many races, had they lived through generations of oppression like the Kashmiris, might have

104 Lawrence, n. 31, pp. 196-8.

been more cunning and more dishonest".¹⁰⁵ Moorcroft too, thinks that these traits of Kashmiris are not innate but the product of the centuries of cruel government,¹⁰⁶ and that "the native of Kashmir have always been considered among the most lively and ingenuous people of Asia, and deservedly so. With a liberal and wise government they might assume on equally high scale as a moral and intellectual people".¹⁰⁷ Similar is the account of Victor Jacquemont who observes that conquered by one race after the other (i.e. Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs and Dogras respectively) Kashmiris had been the victim of the shameless exploitation of most brutal nature by the feudal institutions for long,¹⁰⁸ which

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- 105 Ibid., p. 274. However, Lawrence says at the same time that "some who have made a special study of the Raja Tarangini informed me that, long before the days of foreign conquest and oppression the Kashmiris were noted for their cunning and dishonesty".
- 106 Moorcroft, e.g. says, "the vices of Kashmiri I cannot help considering, however, as the effect of the political conditions rather than his nature, and it would not be difficult to transform him into a different being". Moorcroft, n. 79, p. 299.
- 107 Ibid., p. 128.
- 108 Victor Jacquemont, for example, wrote in 1833 that: "The Afghans having during the last century despoiled the Mughals of their conquest and Sikhs having expelled the Afghans in this century (that is nineteenth century), a general pillage has ensued upon each conquest; and in the intervals of peace, anarchy and oppression have done their utmost against labour and industry, so that the country is now completely ruined, and poor Kashmiris appear to have thrown the handle after the hatchet, and to have become the most indolent of mankind. If one must fast, better to do so with folded arms than bending beneath the weight of toil. In Kashmir there is hardly any better chance of a meal for the man who works, or

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in exchange deeply degraded their race and culture. And, it was only when the exploitation reached at its peak, new ideas and institution started influencing these people that they became politically conscious; firstly community-wise and then class-wise. A complete polarization of rulers and ruled took place. Their prestige hurt, and their culture degraded, but when conscious of it, they fought for their long deprived freedom. Henceforth a remarkable change in their behaviour took place day by day.

Today a Kashmiri and especially belonging to Muhammadan community is equally self-assertive as any other Indian is. Kashmiri Pandits living in Kashmir, however, still are meak, selfish and deceitful. One of our informants who belongs to this Pandit community confirmed this fact, when he said: "We are a negligible minority on whom no one can depend. We are an undependable race, deceitful highly individualistic and selfish by nature".¹⁰⁹ And, when this investogator asked the reason for it, he replied that "I do not know any reason for our being so, but this is a fact. You might have already seen such Kashmiri Pandits in cities, but those who live in rural areas are in fact more and more so. As far as Muslims are concerned they are good 'individually' but not collectively.

piles the oar, than for him who is despair slumbers all the day beneath the shade of the plane tree".

Victor Jacquemont, Letters from India, vol. II (London, Edward Churton, 1834), p. 230.

109 M.N. Kaul, An Interview, 13 September 1976, Srinagar

Pandits on the other hand never unite and by nature they are anti-collective and highly individualistic".¹¹⁰

Caste and Communities

Kashmir is an overwhelmingly Muslim dominated province with 94 per cent of its total population in three districts. The rest of the population consists of Hindus (and Sikhs also) but they only form a negligible minority, and in about 56 per cent of the villages of Anantnag and Srinagar districts there are no Hindus at all.¹¹¹ But the Kashmiri Hindus are certainly not unimportant. Numerically, very few and negligible but almost every literate person of India knows about them. Further, it is a fact that before fourteenth century A.D. Kashmir was an overwhelmingly Hindu country. This is further proved when we do find the castes among the Muslims of Kashmir also. Now we will briefly describe the caste among Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir respectively.

Caste Among Kashmiri Hindus

Brahmans are at the apex of the social hierarchy of the ubiquitous caste system of Hindus. They consist of many regional castes some of them being of remote antiquity. "Thus there is the puranic division between the northern Gauda Brahmans and

110 Ibid.

111 Source: Census of India, 1941, Jammu and Kashmir State vol. XXII, Part 3, Village Tables and Housing Statistics.

southern Dravida Brahmins, the Vindyas being the dividing line. Each division has five sub-divisions, and one of the Gaudian sub-divisions is that of the Sarasvat named after the river Sarasvati and mainly resident in areas to its West.... Today the Sarasvat are found in Kashmir, the Punjab, the Western Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and along the Western Coast mainly in Maharashtra, Goa and Mysore. The Sarasvat Brahmins of Kashmir who constitute the great majority of native Hindus ... are known as Kashmiri Pandits all over India".¹¹²

The uniqueness of Kashmiri Hindus lies in complete absence of non-Brahman castes among them. But it is widely acknowledged by Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir and outsiders alike that once there were as many castes among Kashmiris as we find among the Hindus of other parts of India. The noted historical document Rajtarangini (a Sanskrit chronicle by Kalhana) for example, mentions about many castes among Hindus of Kashmir. Besides all the four varna: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra, we find the specification of castes, sects and classes such as Damara (feudal lords) Kayastha (clerical castes), Chandala, Demba, Kirata, Nishada, Tantrin and many others.¹¹³ However, it is

112 Madan, n. 96, pp. 15-16.

113 Based on the description of U.N. Ghoshal, Studies in Indian History and Culture (Calcutta, 1957), pp. 207-15; and Gwasha Lal Kaul, Kashmir Through the Ages, 5000 B.C. to 1967 A.D. (Srinagar, 1967).

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difficult to say as who is what.

When all the lower castes were either converted or eliminated, the remnants were only Brahmans,¹¹⁵ who in due course of time devised their own division of labour "based upon occupation

114 "Thus" writes, Madan, "The Damara and Kayastha, it seems, were classes of landlords and civil servants respectively, rather than castes. Tribal groups of various kinds are also mentioned. Of these, the Ekanga and Lavanga seem to have been professional soldiers". Madan, n. 97, p. 118.

115 "Besides Pandits", notes Madan, "there are two other Hindu minority groups in Kashmir, viz., the Buher (or Bohra) and Purib (or Purbi). They have been almost assimilated into Pandit culture, although inter-marriage and inter-dinning are yet the exception than the rule". Madan, n. 97, p. 16.

Lawrence writes Bohras as Khattris of Srinagar, "who inter-marry among themselves and are engaged in trade and shop-keeping. It is said that in former days some of them were admitted to caste among the Pandits, but at present, though they have adopted the customs and rites of the Brahmans, they enjoy no caste fellowship with them. With the two exceptions that Bohra woman wears nose ring and discards griddle round her waist, a Bohra of either sex cannot be distinguished from city Brahman".

Lawrence, mentions two more castes, which he calls as Sikh Brahmans and Mian Rajputs. "Sikh of the valley, he says were, "originally Brahmans of Punjab distinguished at once from Brahmans of Kashmir by their method of wearing hear, by the absence of effeminate gown among the men and by their accent ... and chiefly found in Trahal pargana Krihun and Hemal". "The Mian Rajputs to which tribe rulers of Kashmir belong", writes the same author, "are found chiefly in Deosar Tehsil ... where they have been granted jagirs, or land free of revenue.... Though, they still look smart and clean in comparison with the Kashmiri Musalman, there is a great difference between the Mian Rajput of Deosar and his brethren in the Dogra country". Lawrence, n. 31, p. 305.

The Purbi found in urban areas, according to Madan are "probably form an immigrant Brahman caste" and according

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and fortified by endogamy".¹¹⁶ We find hereafter, three sub-
 divisions of Kashmiri Pandits known as Jyotishi (astrologers),
 'Gor' (derived from the Sanskrit Guru) and 'Karkun' (workers).
 'Jyotishi' are the persons who do not perform priestly function
 but continued the study of scriptures.¹¹⁷ 'Gor' (or priests)
 on the other hand continued to pay attention to the study of
 scriptures and priestcraft, and performance of rites and cere-
 monies of Hindu religion thus became their key domain. 'Karkuns',
 however, became the followers of secular tradition, who consi-
 dered pen as their natural destiny and usually made state employ-
 ment as the source of their livelihood.¹¹⁸ Whereas the Gors
 have become the endogamas caste, and they do not marry either
 of the other castes among Kashmiri Hindus, Jyotishis and Karkuns

to several of his informants, "they came to Kashmir from
 the Chamba valley in east Punjab several hundred years
 ago. The appellation of Pandit is commonly used by the
 Purbi as it is by Pandits themselves". Madan, n. 96,
 p. 16.

- 116 Ibid., p. 22; J.L. Kilam writes about this division,
 that "it was decided that a daughter's son of a person
 should be made bhasha (language, i.e. the language of the
 scriptures) Batta to administer to the religious needs
 of his maternal grandfather's family". Kilam, n. 88,
 p. 53.
- 117 "The Jyotish Pandits" writes Lawrence "are learned in the
 Shastras and expounded them to the Hindus, and they draw
 up the calenders in which prophesies are made as to the
 events of the coming years". Lawrence, n. 31, p. 303.
- 118 "But as state employment became harder to obtain and the
 members of Pandits increased, the Brahmans of Kashmir
 sought other occupations, and many of them are in business,
 while others work as cooks, bakers, confectioners, and
 tailors. Briefly, it may be said that a Pandit may follow
 a trade or occupation except those of the cobbler, potter,
 mason, or fruitseller". Ibid., p. 303.

intermarry.

With only few castes and a limited circle of interaction with each other, it should have been difficult for a Kashmiri to rise in social hierarchy of Kashmiri Hindu social system, but like any other castes of India, Kashmiri sub-castes have also been able to uplift themselves in the social hierarchy, by the logic of their being economically well off. As Madan has found out that "numerically preponderant and economically better off, the Karkuns have arrogated to themselves the higher position in the Pandit social hierarchy"¹¹⁹. "The Gors" on the other hand he observes "are regarded as inauspicious, mean and greedy", the reason of which he says seems to be the fact that "they receive food and other gifts from Yajman (client or patrons) in the name of the dead"¹²⁰. Finally, what produced an internal sub-divisions in two sub-castes of Pandit community (i.e. Karkun and Jyotishi on the one hand and the Gor on the other) according to Madan is "hereditary occupational specification, endogamy and an explicit differentiation in social status"¹²¹.

Finally, D.D. Kasambi, observes about the changeability of Kashmir's social system that "the caste system was never strong enough in Kashmir to prevent such direct change of class whenever economic advantage permitted"¹²². "The class behaviour of the

119 Madan, n. 96, p. 23.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Kosambi, n. 89, p. 108.

Brahmans" he writes "forfeited their sanctity to a considerable extent. Most of them were landholders or government officials. Many fought on the battle-field, arms in hand, solely for personal advancement unconnected with any religious or theological question. The Brahmin Rakka rose from a mere foot soldier to the position of Prime Minister participating in the usual court intrigues".¹²³ "Thus caste system in Kashmir" he says, "was, in contrast to the rest of India too thin a disguise for that of classes".¹²⁴

Caste Among Kashmiri Muslims

For quite a long time, caste has been regarded as a synonym for Hinduism, a fundamental institution, of Hindus, and what Dumont calls a 'Pan Indian civilization'.¹²⁵ But when the language of social class was deliberately rejected in favour of social status, a voluminous literature on caste politics started flowing in the bookstalls, and in this process it was but natural that, ^{the} attention should have been given to the caste among Muslims also. However, the studies on caste among Muslims are only at its take-off stage,¹²⁶ for we do not find much studies on it. For

123 Ibid., p. 111.

124 Ibid., p. 112.

125 See L. Dumont, "For Sociology in India", Contributions to Indian Sociology, no. 1, 1957.

126 For example, Professor Imtiaz Ahmad writes: "Caste as it exists and functions among Muslims and non-Hindu groups

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example, Jammu and Kashmir which is the only Muslim majority state of India, remains unexamined so far. "The presence of caste-like system of social stratification among Muslims of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh", however, "has been recognised for long"¹²⁷. The census reports throughout has noted the fact that caste exists among the Muslims also, but it does not state into which division the Muslims of valley fall.

Caste among the Muslims of Valley however, has been noted by Lawrence and Drew etc. nearly 100 years ago, but their descriptions are by no means satisfactory because they never thought of concentrating on this aspect. But, as no systematic study is done on this aspect so far we will rely on their writings for a brief description of caste among Muslims of Kashmir.

According to Drew, "Muhammadans (of valley) have caste sub-divisions ... (but) it must be understood that castes among Muhammadans though often traceable to the same origin as those of Hindus are not such strict divisions. In the first place there is not any restriction connected with them as to eating in company. There is a general custom of marrying in the same caste, but this is often broken through, and outside marriages are made

of Indian society, has not been studied in equal detail by sociologists and social anthropologists although it has been recognized that their social structures are also organized according to caste principles". Imtiaz Ahmed, ed., Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims (Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1973), p. xviii.

which cause the divisions to grow less and less distinct".¹²⁸
 Lawrence thinks that "the great mass of the village people came
 under the head Sheikh, and are descendants of original Hindus".¹²⁹
 Saiyeds, Mughals, Pathans etc. form a numerous community,
 but when compared to Sheikh they are in great minority.

"The Sheikh Musalman of the valley" writes Lawrence,
 "may have retained some of the Hindu customs of endogamy within
 the caste and of exogamy outside the gotra, but there is no
 trace now of these customs, and the different tribal names (or
 Krams) are names and nothing more".¹³⁰ Though now outside
 marriages are made, but it is still a custom that "one must not
 marry Saiyed families on the one hand and families of market
 gardners on the other".¹³¹ The origin of Kram names is not
 clear, but Lawrence writes:

It is proposed by many that Musalmans of
 the Pandit, Kol, But, Aitu, Rishi, Mantu
 and Ganai Krams are decendants of Brahmans
 who were forcibly converted to Islam in the
 fourteenth century.... Other Krams are be-
 lieved to have sprung from Khatri origin,
 as ancient history mentions that bearers of
 these in Hindu times were a military and
 warlike people. Among these Krams may be
 mentioned the Magres, Tantres, Dars, Dan-
 gars, Rainas, Rathors, Thakurs and Naiks.

128 Drew, n. 20, p. 179.

129 Lawrence, n. 31, p. 306.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

Only one Kram, the Lon is generally assigned to a Vashya origin, and the Damaras are said to be descendants of Sudras, the lowest of the four Hindu castes. (132)

We find that there also appears caste jealousies and caste-consciousness in Muslims also. For example, when in the late years Dums (or Dombs) of Kashmir steadily assumed the Kram of Ganai, the original Ganai's resented to it. Similarly, when boatmen assumed the name of Dar, the other Muslims annoyed Dars and Ganais by asserting that they were originally Dombs and boatmen.¹³³ Today, however, the Krams have become highly complicated and controversial. The name Sufi, which is supposed to be of Brahman origin is chiefly found among market gardeners, bakers and servants.

Saiyads may further be divided into those who follow the profession of religion and those who have taken agriculture and other pursuits. Mir is the Kram name of Saiyads.

Mughals are not numerous in the valley, and have so much assimilated with ordinary Kashmiris that all trace of decent is lost. They came to valley in the days of early Muslim kings and assume the Krams of Mir, Beg, Bandi, Bach, and Ashaye. The other castes are: Pathans, Bombas, Band or Bhaggat, Hanjis, Watahs, Nengars, and Gujars etc.

Like Hindu the Muslim also arrogate themselves up in the

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid., pp. 306 and 307.

social hierarchy by commanding economic power. "Wealth" writes Lawrence, "alone commands position and poverty at once degrades a family. To obliterate all trace of lowly origin, men have assumed surnames borrowed from familiar animals, insects, trades, occupation and places".¹³⁴

Interrelationship of Hindus and Muslims

As the Brahmans or Pandits are the only remnants of Hindus of Kashmir, as a result of almost total Islamization of the valley, it is but natural for them to accept the services rendered by their Muslim correligionists that were previously performed by non-Brahmans and especially by low-caste Hindus. To accept the Muslims as an essential part of their social system is their wiseness, and not to do so would mean the degrading of the Pandits to the various low-castes which no one of them likes to be. Muslims in fact, consciously or otherwise help the Pandit community to maintain the remnants of Hinduism in Kashmir and their Brahmanism as well.

By the fact of being Pandit (by birth) one is traditionally precluded from sizeable number of functions, like shoe-making, barbering, removing and skinning dead animals, slaughtering of goats and sheep and so on.

134 Ibid., p. 310. "One of the leading merchants of Srinagar", for example, writes Lawrence, "is known by name of Jackal. Another man, of considerable influence, has adopted the unpleasant word 'latrine' as his family appellation".

Though Pandits regard Muslims as 'tamas' (ignorance, darkness), 'melechha' (lowly birth), anti-thesis of Hindu values and ritually impure; do not eat food cooked or even touched by a Muslim (though accept clarified butter from milkman, Gujar and Bakarwal); and do not share 'hooka' with him (though a Muslim is allowed to smoke the 'chillum' of Pandits hooka by holding it between his palms but never allowed to use pipe), in practice they regard Muslim as an unavoidable component of their social system. They accept, uncooked food from all (but lowliest Muslims namely Dombs and vatal); unboiled milk from Gujar and Bakarwal; and uncooked meat from butchers (though it may be refused fearing of its being beef). Similarly Pandits avoid the physical contact with cobbler, and winnowing-pan makers, but buy the articles made by these craftsmen. "Among all Muslims" says Madan, "it is the Barber (navid) and the mid-wife with whom Pandit men and women respectively come in most intimate physical contact".¹³⁵

The excessive dependence of Pandits on their Muslim correligionists writes Madan is in case of following:¹³⁶

135 Madan, n. 97, p. 125.

Madan further writes after the study of Utrassu Umanagri village (in Anantnag) that: "in relation Muslims (i.e. general Muslims, except Domb, Vatal, etc.) in village, Pandits are less anxious to avoid physical contact. The fastidious among them will wash their hands after touching a Muslim. I once saw a Muslim servant press the feet and legs of his Pandit masters but the latter did not wash afterwards". Ibid., p. 125.

136 Based on Madan, *ibid.*, pp. 125-7.

(i) Dependence on Navid (Barber)

The Navid bestows both occasional and routine services to his Pandit patrons. In addition to daily routine he is called on four highly important events such as:

- (a) to have a boy's zaraksai (zara-baby hair, ksai - shaving cutting) done;
- (b) to have a neophyte's head shaved during 'mekhala' ('waist string'; the investiture ceremony also called 'yagnopavit' or 'upanayana');
- (c) to shave the beard and hear of a mourner at the end of the period of pollution; and
- (d) during the 'lagan' (marriage rituals).

(ii) Dependence on Kral (Potter)

Potter is another important functionary that serves his Pandit patrons in many ways. He provides them with pots and pans of various kinds which he makes both for everyday use and for special occasions. On the occasion of 'Herath' (a feast in honour of Shiva) for example, he supplies to his Pandit customers the most unusual of all pieces of pottery. Shortage on such occasion is regarded as bad omen and potter is condemned for such lapses. Among many objects he makes is 'sanipotul' (sani - worship, potul - idol), which is the 'lingam' to be installed as Shiva during rites and is obviously phallic in shape. The Muslims abhor the idol worship, but they make it for the Pandits.

(111) Dependence on Washerman and Butcher

Washerman's functions are known to everyone, but the functions of butcher for their Pandit correlative religionists are unique like that of potter and barber. The butcher not only supplies the meat which Pandit enjoys so gracefully, but he also supplies the meat which Pandit offers to some of his goddesses. And "it is the Muslim butcher" writes Madan "who standing shoulder to shoulder with the Brahman Gor slaughters the sacrificial goat after the latter has ritually rendered it sacred". Further as Pandits are the major consumers of meat in Utarassu-Umanagri (the village on which Madan conducted his study), Muslim butchers keep track of the capricious Hindu lunar calendar and avoid slaughtering too many animals on days on which Pandit abstain from eating meat, such as birth days of vegetarian gods and goddesses", adds Madan.

It is obvious from this discussion that Muslim render some of the essential services to Brahmans in Kashmir, without which, they would no more remain so traditionally, and indeed would lose their caste. And, this researcher was also told by number of his informants that, when 'social boycott' was launched against Congress workers on mass scale, following a call from Sheikh Abdullah in 1965, the barbers, shopkeepers, and washermen etc. did not react against the Hindus belonging to Kashmir, whereas it was effectively used for long against the Congress

workers belonging to Muslim community to embrace them. ¹³⁷

Further, we find in Kashmiri Pandits a remarkable awareness of the reality. Whereas Pandits are dependent on services of their Muslim correlative for so many things, Pandits "do not normally render any services to Muslims nor provide them with any goods". ¹³⁸ This "dependence" says Madan "is absolute ¹³⁹ (for) ... he does not feel threatened on either plane".

On the basis of the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that the social system of Kashmir is highly complex, flexible and prone to accept the reality without any stress or strain. Therefore Lawrence observed that, "the social system in Kashmir is delightfully plastic". ¹⁴⁰ We have also seen here how the co-operation of Muslim correlative helps to keep the Hindu system intact.

On this basis, however, it is generalized that the social system of Kashmir is unique one if compared with rest of India, for there exists an equal reverence to temples and mosques and in

137 Based on interviews with Zainub Begum, Mehmooda Ali Shah, Taj Begum, M.N. Kaul, Ayub Khan, M.L. Fotedar and many others.

138 Madan, n. 97, p. 128. "The only exceptions to this in Utrassu-Umanagri", writes Madan "are Pandit 'Hakim', and some moneylenders, and (if we include them) shopkeepers. I encountered several instances of a Pandit astrologer being consulted by Muslims" adds Madan. Ibid.

139 Ibid., p. 136.

140 Lawrence, n. 31, p. 307.

fact Muslims are said to be Hindus at heart. But, the condition is nowhere unique one in Kashmir, as far as the sharing of values in common is concerned. There also exists (in Kashmir) Hindu-Muslim conflict and co-operation as in any other parts of India. The phenomena of mass reverence to both temples and mosques is found everywhere in India as in Kashmir, and sometimes even in a more unique way than it is in Kashmir. If generalizations are to be based on the exceptions than exceptions we find in other parts of India also as in Kashmir. For example, an interesting, news bulletin that appeared in The Statesman of March 11, 1959 says: "A Hindu temple near Suratgarh in Rajasthan has Muslim priests who perform worship of the idol. This has been going on for generations".¹⁴¹

Similarly, the Qasais of Thana, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur had strong Hindu leaning. They abhorred beef-eating to such an extent that they would not even touch a beef butcher, and they avoided mixing with Muslims.¹⁴² "In Karnal" writes Professor Mujib, "... a large number of Muslim agriculturists were, till 1865, worshipping their old village deities...."¹⁴³ "In North of Ganges, in the district of Purnea ... the religious beliefs and practices of lower class Hindus and Muslims was very faint

141 Cited in M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 19.

142 Ibid., p. 18.

143 Ibid., p. 10.

indeed. In every village could be found Kali-asthan, a shrine dedicated to the worship of the goddess Kali, and attached to almost every Muslim House is a little shrine Khudai Ghar, or God's house, where prayers were offered in which names of both Allah and Kali were used¹⁴⁴, and so on.

The fact therefore remains that everywhere in India like Kashmir, an overwhelming majority of the people are Muslims as a result of conversion, and as the cultural habits die hard such practices by Hindus and Muslims are not something surprising. Further, the truth is that whether a Hindu or Muslim, a Kashmiri is a Kashmiri first (like a Punjabi, Bengali, etc. are), and an outsider is often confused in identifying who belongs to which community. This view gets more strength from the fact that Kashmir is almost foreign to a non-Kashmiri, where we find it difficult to understand their language, culture and habits. But when one goes a little deeper, many differences are seen between Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir. And, in practice, in only one way the people of Kashmir differ with that of India (and especially of North India). It is their peace-loving, blood-abhorring and meek character. Hindus and Muslims of the other parts of North India, on the other hand are either secular or fanatics (whatever they are) both in deeds and spirit. Thus, though Hindu-Muslim jealousies exist in Kashmir, but bloodshed

144 Ibid., p. 13.

in the name of religion or anything else does not take place, as it is the case with other parts of North India.

Thus, we find the stereotypes both among the Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir. Whereas Hindu stereotypes regard Muslim as 'melecha', dirty, polluted, unprincipled, omnivorous, lustful, and therefore destined to go to hell, Muslim stereotypes regard Pandits as 'Kaffirs' (mischievous), faithless, unfaithful, double-dealer, mean, cowardly, corrupt, dirty and thus bound to go to hell. Now, we will describe in the following lines ¹⁴⁵ the way on which a Kashmiri Hindu differs from his Muslim correlative.

(i) Dress Differences

There are several visible signs by which a Kashmiri recognizes his correlative or otherwise. Besides differences of male and female dress - of headwear gown, trousers and sometimes even footwear - many Pandits wear 'Tyok' on their forehead: a mark of saffron or some other prescribed paste, oblong among men and round among women. Muslims wear beards oftener than Pandits, and of a distinctive cut.

(ii) Language Differences

Though both speak the same language, there are striking differences of lexical elements for Pandits speak sanskritized Kashmiri, Muhammadan prefer the use of Persianized Kashmiri.

145 See for this Madan, n. 97, pp. 108, 130 and 131.

(iii) Differences in Style of Greeting or Addressing

When Pandit would use word 'Namaskar' in addressing anyone it means that he is greeting a Hindu or Pandit. A Muslim greets all, whether Hindu or Muslim, with Salam; but Pandit always says 'salam' to a Muslim and 'namaskar' to a Hindu. "Words like 'Bhagwan', 'dharma', and above all 'Namaskar'" says Madan "are signposts which Pandits have set up as a boundary maintenance device ... and that it would be improper to say namaskar, to a Muslim ... for he is 'melecha' an outsider".

"Thus" writes Madan, "though Pandits and Muslims are mutually dependent, there is no reciprocity of perspective" and this he regards as "a compromise (and) a concession to the exigencies of coexistence".¹⁴⁶

Finally, whereas the Hindu social system appears as absolutely closed one that does not permit any front or backdoor entry, the Muslim system is an open one, for they not only accept the conversion of Hindus to Islam, but also encourage such steps. Therefore, birth is quite irrelevant for one to become a Muslim. Muslims agree that a person who embraces Islam out of conviction is better than one who is so by birth. But as far as the social status is concerned, "birth as a principle of status honour was considerably important in the early

146 Ibid., p. 138.

Muslim society in India".¹⁴⁷

The People of Ladakh and
their Social System

Ladakh, a land of mountains is the country of four races of men: Champa, Ladakhi, Balti and Dard. It is one of the most backward, but the largest district in the country. Its backwardness and monasteries are perhaps the only thing that attract the large number of tourists. For example, Travleen Amarjit Singh writes: "Going to Ladakh is going back in time 2000 years ... like recapturing a forgetting moment in time".¹⁴⁸

Similar are the comments of Winfred Lucas, a psychologist from California, who viewed that "Ladakh will attract lots of tourists because it represents the other extreme. To visit this place is to step into middle ages. And there lies its charm. Any attempt to modernize it will only diminish its appeal".¹⁴⁹

Another tourist, as notes Janak Singh regretted by saying: "I am only sorry that the presence of the people like myself will change Ladakhis attitude to life".¹⁵⁰

147 Imtiaz Ahmad, "The Ashraf-Ajlaf Dichotomy in Muslim Social Structure in India", The Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 3, no. 3, 1966, p. 270.

148 Travleen Amarjit Singh, "Hail Ladakhi", The Sunday Statesman, Magazine Section, 19 September 1976.

149 Cited in Janak Singh, "Ladakh in Ferment - II, Lamas Fighting a Lasting Battle", Times of India, 8 November 1975.

150 Ibid.

As far as prevalent backwardness is concerned it is evident from the attitude of people towards life. For example, when an official who visited Darchik (about 70 kms. from Kargil) he distributed bars of soap among its tribals. The people accepted the gift. But as soon as the official left they dumped the soap in the Indus. A village elder justified it by saying that: "We do not use soap because it damages clothes".¹⁵¹ Though polyandry was banned 32 years ago, but it is still in vogue. "Mr. M.L. Shastri, a Sanskrit teacher at Leh School of Buddhist Philosophy" writes Janak Singh, "says that when he was headmaster of the Timogam High School from 1971 to 1973, every family in that area was polyandrous".¹⁵²

One of the few wonderful places on the globe¹⁵³ Ladakh however is no way less important politically than Jammu and Kashmir provinces are. Though the tourists like it to be backward for centuries to come, so that they can witness the primitive society in a modern world, but the inhabitants of this land are not interested in leading the primitive life any more. Now they have started demanding their rights, and we hear them

151 See Janak Singh, "Ladakh in Ferment - IV, Purest Living Survivors of Aryan Race", Times of India, 10 November 1975.

152 See Janak Singh, "Ladakh in Ferment - I, Grim Fight with Elements", Times of India, 7 November 1975.

153 Remark of G. Walter, from Switzerland, cited in Janak Singh, n. 149.

complaining that: 'whereas the other areas of the state have progressed, Ladakh is still backward'. And there appears at present the feeling of neglect among the Ladakhis,¹⁵⁴ notes Janak Singh.

Recently, a different outlook has appeared in the politics of Ladakhis. It is represented by Sonam Narboo, who has come to play a significant part in the development of the area, and thereby in the politics of the province. It challenges the old and traditional Lamaist style of politics. Narboo himself, for example, told this investigator during an interview: "I was never obscurantist. Bakula's style of politics is Lamaist and, therefore, he has hold among the people. Lamas speak lies, and Bakula had been telling the people that those who will not vote for him will go to hell".¹⁵⁵ Narboo now leads an educated group, who has better understanding of the material conditions of the people.

Kushak Bakula is still a most influential person in state politics, and is much respected because of his status. The five heads - Kushak Bakula, Kushak Tugden, and three other priests of major monastries are widely known by the Buddhists of Ladakh. By tradition the head priest of Homis monastery used

154 See Janak Singh, "Ladakh in Ferment - VI, Feeling of Official Neglect Persists", Times of India, 12 November 1975.

155 Sonam Narboo (Minister for Works, Power, Tourism, and Ladakh Affairs): An Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar (New Secretariat).

to be the 'father superior' but when Chinese occupied Tibet he was reported to be at Lhasa for his ritual education and never returned thereafter. Thus, when fate of Homis Kushak became unknown, the mantle fell on Kushak Bakula. Now says Janak Singh that Kushak Bakula spends more time in Delhi than at his monastery at Leh and with that result his contacts with people have become much less than before.¹⁵⁶

As far as castes and communities are concerned, writes Drew that the only division is that of musicians and blacksmiths who are considered as low-castes called Bem, with whom no ordinary Ladakhi will intermarry.¹⁵⁷

THE ECONOMY

The Economic Condition of the People Before Independence

An overwhelmingly rural state, the poverty, disease, sullenness, hunger and miseries have been the basic problems of Kashmiris for many years. For centuries they were taught that 'they were serfs without any rights, but with many duties'. Their entire history is thus history of their shameless exploitation by their rulers. Though agriculture is the only occupation of an overwhelming majority, their system of cultivation has been highly archaic and primitive.¹⁵⁸ While villagers were degraded, the

156 Janak Singh, n. 149.

157 Drew, n. 20, p. 241.

158 H.N. Brailsford, for instance, writes: "His Wooden plough

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people of the city ^{were} pampered and humoured. The following passage from Hazlett's Life of Napoleon Bonaparte gives a glance of the plight of Kashmir:

The peasants were overworked, half starved, treated with hard words and hard blows, subjected to unceasing exactious and every species of petty tyranny ... which in the cities a number of unwholesome and useless professions, and a crowd of lazy menials, pampered the vices or administered to the pride and luxury of the great. (159)

Similarly, Phadke writes that "the Kashmiris had been reduced to the state of mere 'drawers of water and hewers of wood' whose business was to ply 'shikaras' and house-boats for visitors and to give them the most enjoyable time in their lives".¹⁶⁰ Where an average annual income of the people had been only Rs.11 per head, out of Rs.27.7 million meagre revenue in 1939 the Maharaja and his private department only ate away 4 million rupees, with an additional sum of Rs.5 million spent on army, and the total amount spent on welfare programmes amounted only to 3.6 million rupees.¹⁶¹ In such a situation therefore the nationalism had to be rooted "on the bedrock of stark economic realities".¹⁶² The

dates from the dark ages, and his cattle, if he has any, are of such miserable breeds that they are hardly worth the trouble of milking". Cited in P.N. Dhar, n. 12, p. 143.

159 Cited in Lawrence, n. 31, p. 2.

160 N.S. Phadke, Birth-Pangs of New Kashmir (Bombay, Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1948), pp. 2-3.

161 P.N. Dhar, n. 12, p. 143.

162 Ibid., pp. 147-8.

idea of 'New Kashmir' thus, has to be understood in this back-
ground and not through reactionary eyes. ¹⁶³ Finally, as late
as in 1946, the poverty and degradation of Kashmiris was marked
and painful. H.N. Brailsford, for example, writes:

Today, its peasants are sunk in unimaginable poverty. Their mudhuts contain hardly a trace of visible property save a few pots and water jars. When I put my question in a typical village, every household was in debt, and the usual rate of interest was 48 per cent.... Much of land is held under feudal tenure by great landlords known as Jagirdars who draw their tribute from the cultivators, as a reward for some service rendered to the Maharaja or his ancestors.... The peasants, taxed to the limit of their endurance and subject to an administration that is corrupt from top to bottom are voteless, unorganized and helpless in their ignorance. (164)

Another writer says about this pitiable condition of Kashmiris in the following words:

One can tell that this is a sad people, who have borne for centuries with grief; who have learnt to bend their heads to the storm and have grown twisted crooked in the process.... Alas! if the record of Kashmir

163 One such person is, Balraj Puri, who alarms: "The authorship of New Kashmir is invariably ascribed to the then Communist leader BPL Bedi. Apart from its Communist overtones Sheikh Abdullah in an introduction to it, paid tribute to Soviet Russia for demonstrating: 'before our eyes not merely theoretically but in her actual day today life and development that real freedom takes birth only from economic emancipation'". Balraj Puri, "Communism in Kashmir", Kashmir Affairs (entitled, "Communist Potential in Kashmir), vol. 2, nos. 5-6, May-August 1960, p. 11.

164 H.N. Brailsford in Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, ed., Kashmir Today: Through Foreign Eyes (Bombay, 1946), p. 20.

be read aright, it is a moving tale, of human infirmity, of human sins; and there are not many races in the world upon whom the hand of Fate has been laid so heavily as upon those who inhabit this, perhaps the farthest corner of the earth. (165)

Existence of the Feudal Class

"The importance of Kashmir to the historian" writes Kosambi, "lies in that it shows the true motive force of Indian feudalism, the need to increase commodity productions by local concentration of surplus, whose extraction was heightened by force in the hands of the nobles".¹⁶⁶ "The 'agrahara' grants made to Brahmans did not prevent the rise of private (feudal) ownership of land, but rather served, in the trading environment, as a model of later 'jagir', whereas land in India proper continued to belong to the state till a late period".¹⁶⁷ Feudal institutions in Kashmir, therefore, existed long before India entered into the era of feudalism.

Rulers of Kashmir changed many times, but nothing altered the condition of Kashmiris. Whatever change took place in the plight of its people was only one way story of their becoming poorer and habituated to daily suffering that made Kashmir a 'peaceful paradise' for Rajas and Maharajas up to 1930.

165 V.C. Scott O'Connor, The Charm of Kashmir (London, Longsman, Green and Co., 1920), pp. 96 and 179.

166 Kosambi, n. 89, p. 120.

167 Ibid., p. 108.

The character of feudal class changed with a change in the ruling class. One race replaced the other as the dominant exploiting class. Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, and Dogras exploited this land and its people one by one. With them a new class of feudal intermediaries existed, who became an effective instrument of exploitation for Rajas and Maharajas. These agencies of exploitation, we know as Jagirdars, Muafidars, and Mukarraridars. This feudal class existed, when in return for some service rendered to Maharaja or his predecessors, the latter or his successors awarded them many villages which they could exploit for their as well as Maharajas' benefit. With them the rate of feudal exploitation reached at its peak (in India and Kashmir as well). This "new class of feudal intermediaries not only functioned as agents and props for them but also as their collectors".¹⁶⁸ These jagirdars virtually ruled like despots, above reproach and beyond responsibility. Some of the Jagirs were in cash or kind, others tenable for as long as the ruler so desired, and some were in perennality. For example, there were Jagirdars who were granted with lands (Jagirs) for political services rendered to the state. Another category was that of big Jagirdars known as Muafidars who paid no land revenue on their assigned lands, and owned certain land for which they were exempt from any rent to the King, and who in time became

168 P.N. Dhar, "Land Reforms in Kashmir", Indian Affairs Record, vol. III, no. 4, May 1957, p. 74.

the virtual de facto rulers, judges, and magistrates of their specified lands. Another category of feudals was that of Mukarraridars who received cash grants, pensions, and assignment from the state either as a return for political services or as charity.

Except the big Jagirs (in most of the cases) all others were not granted the ruling rights, and were non-judicial. In this regard, worth-mentioning are the Chenani Jagir in Jammu province consisting of 95 square miles and a population of 12,000 with an annual income of Rs.40,000 of which Jagirdar theoretically received 15 per cent but in fact extracted usually one-third, in addition to his annual income of Rs.36,000 from his lands and orchards;^a and Jagir of Poonch (of which except the town of Poonch is now in the territory of the Azad Kashmir Government) consisting of 1,627 square miles, and a population of 250,000 and with its annual income estimated in 1948 at Rs.1 million. According to an official reports, the number of Jagirdars and Muafidars in the state was 396 and between themselves appropriated Rs.556,313 of the land revenue annually. In addition to this there were 2,347 Mukarraridars who received an annual sum of Rs.177,921 from State Treasury.¹⁶⁹ All these

* In Spring of 1948, when Chenani Jagir was integrated into the administrative structure of the state, the Jagirdar was given a monthly allowance of well-deserved Rs.30,000 only.

169 Mirza Mohammed Afzal Beg (the then Revenue Minister and presently the Minister for Agriculture, Revenue and

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combined thus formed a feudal class who exploited the peasants as they liked.

Class Character of Nationalists

Those who spearheaded the nationalist movement in Kashmir, and then became the firm secular nationalists, were to rule the state immediately after independence. Usually known as staunch nationalists and thorough secularists, these people differed with both Muslim League and Congress leadership in two ways:

(i) First, they (the leaders of National Conference) were from either lower middle class or middle class.

(ii) They were always left (in the sense the Congress socialists of 1930 were).

"Nationalism in Kashmir" as writes P.N. Dhar, "sprang from its incredible poverty, squalor, misery and undernourishment which are the lot of the exploited masses. Nationalism in Kashmir is no mere middle class enthusiasm. It has no glamorous vagueness about it. It is firmly based on the bedrock of stark economic realities and urge for political freedom".¹⁷⁰ The nationalists in Kashmir were thus unlike the nationalists in India, who formed an overwhelming majority of upper middle class. "Indeed in Kashmir" writes Taya Zinkin, "there never was a Moslem

Industry), On the Way to Golden Harvest: Agricultural Reforms in Kashmir (Government of Jammu and Kashmir, 1950), p. 17.

170 Taya Zinkin, n. 67.

upper class because there were no great landowners and Maharaja gave his job only to fellow Hindus or to Moslems from outside. The National Conference leaders were, therefore, school teachers like Sheikh Abdullah, small town lawyer Mir Qasim, and junior employees like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed".¹⁷¹ The sweeping land reforms thus speak for their unambiguous character. They were bourgeoisie by their philosophy, but as they belong to the lower middle class overwhelmingly, they were no double-dealers as the upper-middle class and capitalists usually are.

The revolutionary land reforms and other radical measures that were carried immediately after independence have to be understood, therefore, in the background of the socio-economic conditions of the people, the prevalent feudal exploitation and the class character of the nationalist leaders than from a communal-feudal reactionary angle, the agents of whom made many hues and cries at time and again that Hindus have been discriminated and segregated badly and that the efforts at the Muslim upliftment is being done at the cost of Hindu degradation, or that National Conference is nothing but a Communist organization (or the communists controlled conference).

Agrarian Reforms and Other
Welfare Measures

'New Kashmir' was an instrument of upgrading the masses

171 Taya Zinkin, n. 67.

from the "abyss of oppression, and poverty, degradation and superstition ... into plenty, ruled freedom, science and honest soil".¹⁷² It says ^{the} *that*, "freedom from all forms of economic exploitation is the only true guarantee of political democracy and without it, political freedom is a mere shibboleth".¹⁷³ Introducing it Sheikh Abdullah promised that "in our New Kashmir we shall build again the men and women of our state who have been dwarfed by centuries of servitude, and create a people worthy of our glorious motherland".¹⁷⁴ And, since the independence, the 'New Kashmir' has come to be recognized as the basic economic policy of the ruling parties in Jammu and Kashmir. Everything that is economic in nature, is done in the state on the name of New Kashmir. For example, one of the key Congress members, who is also an influential member of the Congress executive committee told this writer that "Naya Kashmir is nothing else but the New Economic Policy or 20-Point Programme of Mrs. Gandhi".¹⁷⁵

As early as 1944, thus, we find the basic principles of land reforms and other radical measures provided in the New Kashmir. It speaks for the abolition of intermediary agencies of exploitation and landlordism, land to tiller, co-operative

172 See New Kashmir, n. 33.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 Miss Mehmooda Ali Shah, An Interview, 13 September 1976, Srinagar.

associations and other radical measures. Soon after Independence, thus the popular government headed by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah concentrated on these basic issues.

The first step was taken in February 1948, when government introduced two ordinances: one for postponing the realization of debts for a year and the other for providing that all proceedings regarding the ejection of tenants which were pending in the revenue courts should also be stayed for one year. Two months later another ordinance was passed assuring the restoration of all cattles and immovable property to those who had been forced to leave the state as a result of invasion.

The other step of significance was that of April 1948 Act that terminated all Jagirs, Muafis and Makararis except those for religious purposes.¹⁷⁶ It saved for the state about Rs.7 lakhs per annum, relieved the much exploited peasants of the crushing burden of payment in kind to the tune of Rs.3½ lakhs and released 4,250 acres of land granted to Jagirdars in favour of cultivators of the soil. A population of about 250,000 was freed from servitude of medieval type of serfdom and feudal autocracy, as a result of the liquidation of jurisdictional jagirs.¹⁷⁷

By the end of 1948 other agrarian reforms were introduced that reduced the rent for tenancies above 12½ acres to 25 per cent

176 Afzal Beg, n. 169.

177 P.N. Dhar, n. 168, p. 75.

of the produce on rice land and 33½ per cent on other land, benefiting 60 per cent of all the cultivators. Moreover, 50,000 kanals (6,250 acres) of state-owned land were distributed free of cost to landless land-labourers, and cultivators were granted permanent occupying rights.¹⁷⁸

Having done all this the government appointed a 'land to the tiller committee' that included the representatives of government, landlords and peasants, while at the same time considering thoughtfully the problem of the indebtedness. According to the official estimates "rural debts amounted to 310 lakhs of rupees and urban debts to 56 lakhs which meant a per capita average of 48 rupees".¹⁷⁹ In February 1950, the government, therefore, issued an ordinance delaying for another six months the realization of all debts; a process that finally culminated in far-reaching measure known as the 'Distressed Debtors Relief Act'. The Act provided for the 'Debt Conciliation Boards' having jurisdiction over debts up to Rs.5,000.00. In pursuance of the Act both debtors and creditors had to appear before these boards with evidences of amount borrowed, amount repaid, and rate of interests etc.

The government decreed that payment of an aggregate of 1½ times the principle would discharge the debt. Thus age-old

178 For a brief summary of these land reforms see, Liquidation of Landlordism in Jammu and Kashmir (Government of Jammu and Kashmir, 1950).

179 See, Times of India, 21 April 1950.

rural indebtedness was reduced to a possible minimum. In all 10 boards were set up in the state. And by January 1953, it was reported that the debts worth Rs.1,45,69,482.00 were reduced to Rs.62,43,243.00 and the total number of the cases filed to the board were 59,502. Michael Brecher, who was in the valley, in connection with his field work observed that

the principal difficulty confronting the boards lay in the fact that the illiterate debtor-peasant almost never received any written acknowledgement of payments of interests to the creditor. Furthermore because of this illiteracy, the creditor was in the habit of inserting in the contract a sum of considerably large than the amount of the loan actually granted, with a high rate of interest. The function of boards ... was largely that of determining the fact ... but even this deadlock could usually be resolved by the simple expedient of requesting the parties to take an oath in the form of placing their hand on the Koran, or one of the Hindu holy books. The evidence thus given was almost certain to be correct; one of the parties would refuse to take such an oath or breakdown and tell the truth. (180)

The government, however, exempted from the jurisdiction of these boards the commercial and financial groups, the commercial liabilities, arrears of wages and rent, land revenue and debts to the government or banking corporations. But the business community was not happy with it, and on 13 July 1950 the

180 Michael Brecher, n. 28, p. 159. Further writes Brecher, "The Relations between creditor and debtor rarely deteriorated as a result of this conciliation". Ibid.

Jammu Chamber of Commerce demanded that Act should be limited to agricultural debts and that the decision making power be vested to judiciary, not the conciliation boards. Few days later this organization called on its members to boycott the Act and to suspend all loans to the governmental concerns, to pressurize the government to withdraw the Act. But, the government of agitators and freedom fighters, who had seen many days of darkness and immense suffering could not be threatened by these powerless bourgeois threats.

ZAMINDARI ABOLITION: ABOLITION OF BIG
LANDED ESTATES ACT

Finally, on 13 July 1950 we witness the most radical measure that was ever taken in the Indian sub-continent when the government of Kashmir decided to transfer the land to the tiller. This Act still remains without any parallel in the whole of Indian sub-continent including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Act is known as 'Big Landed Estates Abolition Act'. "Under it, proprietor retained only 22 $\frac{1}{2}$ acres of land (i.e. 182 kanals) besides orchards, grass farms and fuel services, and the right of ownership in land in excess of this unit was extinguished and transferred to the tillers to the extent of their actual cultivating possession during Kharif 2007 (September-October 1950)".¹⁸¹ This Act "revolutionized the

181 O.N. Dhar, n. 168, p. 75.

whole agrestic organization of the state".¹⁸² It (this Act) says: "it is this peasant who will henceforth be responsible for payment of land revenue and cesses assessed on that land.... The land revenue will be reckoned at village revenue rates ... the law also prohibits the transfer of land to a tiller who is not a state subject".¹⁸³

This Act, when implemented, transferred some 4½ million kanals (563,500 acres) of land to the tiller. Finally, the legislation, to a great extent, was genuine and revolutionary, because:

- (i) it did not provide for any compensation to the expropriated landlords;¹⁸⁴
- (ii) the question of compensation was left to be settled by Constituent Assembly;
- (iii) tillers to whom lands were transferred were not required to pay anything in return; and
- (iv) the transfer of ownership automatically cancelled all rights of the old proprietor.

182 See, Land Reforms (Land Reforms Officer, Srinagar, 1952).

183 Taken from Beg, n. 169, pp. 59-72.

184 "In the interval", however, as notes Dhar, "the landlords were paid an annuity of three-fourths, two-thirds and one-half of the land revenue of land confiscated in the first, second, and third and subsequent years respectively, subject to a maximum of Rs.3,000 per annum".

The Issue of Compensation

What gave the affix of revolutionary to these reforms was the attitude of the ruling party about the issue of compensation. The constituent assembly subsequently appointed the 'Land Compensation Committee' to examine the question of compensation to be paid to expropriated landlords. And it was in the second session of Assembly (27 March 1952) that the report of this Committee was submitted. The Committee expressed itself against the payment of any compensation. The discussion on the zamindari abolition in the state which started practically since 1950, was completed in 1952. Sheikh Abdullah, while speaking on the motion declared that

The land hunger of the people is Asia's greatest problem today. Mahatma Gandhi and Indian National Congress were the first in India to realize the evil and suggest a remedy. But even the Congress has not so far been able to satisfy the land hunger of the Indian masses. Nehru and other Indian leaders are indeed very much concerned about it. It is not our duty to see what others do.... Our duty is to serve the country and the nation as the present time demand.... Telling us that supreme sovereignty rests with Indian Parliament is to challenge the very basis of the principle of our sovereign body with undisputed power to decide even a hundred year old royal dynasty, not to speak of a few big zamindars. We assembled here as the chosen representatives of our people.... We consider landlord as our kith and kin. They should have rather thanked us that we have shown them the path of honest labour instead of exploitation. We have not completely

expropriated them. They are left with 182 kanals of best land of their choice besides orchards. (185)

Quoting Telengana and China, Sheikh said, that he and his party wanted to avert these conditions, that arose in these places and therefore reforms were to be taken seriously and wholeheartedly. Resorting to reform to avoid a revolution, thus, was his aim.

Mirza Afzal Beg, said in this regard that, though the Constitution of India provides for compensation, but "this part of the Constitution of India is not at all applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir".¹⁸⁶ All the members of the Assembly fully supported the recommendations. Whereas K.D. Sethi viewed that compensation would be to 'encourage new kind of exploitation',¹⁸⁷ others viewed that it was a moral duty of the government to relieve those who had sacrificed their life in the struggle for freedom',¹⁸⁸ or that the "public interest" could not be sacrificed for "vested interests".¹⁸⁹ Finally, they viewed that "what was robbed from them immorally and what is due to them morally, for that they are being asked to pay to those

185 "Abolition of Zamindari", The Hindu, 31 March 1952.

186 Comment by Afzal Beg in the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, 27 March 1952. See, Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates 1952, vol. II, no. 3 (Srinagar, 1952), p. 3.

187 Krishan Dev Sethi, *ibid.*, p. 11.

188 Ghulam Qadir, *ibid.*, p. 13.

189 Assad Ullah Mir, *ibid.*, p. 31.

who got it without morality".¹⁹⁰ Ultimately, on 31 March 1952 the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted the report of Committee which said:

The tillers to whom the excess land from which the big proprietors are expropriated is transferred in ownership right, are an indignant, impoverished and much exploited class by themselves. No question of recovering the price of the lands from them. As a state with limited resources we are too poor to pay compensation from out of the state Revenue. The financial liabilities will be of very serious nature and payment itself will prove incalculably mischievous. Apart from these considerations there is no moral, economic or social basis for compensation. We, therefore, recommended that both in principle and policy the payment of compensation to the expropriated proprietors is not desirable. The payment of compensation would perpetuate the present inequitable distribution of wealth. (191)

Land Reforms were, thus, adopted effectively and authoritatively in Jammu and Kashmir under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. The Times of India correspondent, for example, wrote from Srinagar: "Sheikh Abdullah's land reforms have indeed been sweeping and spectacular. Nearly 46,000 acres of land have been distributed among 42,000 tillers. Almost every peasant can now

190 Quoted by Afzal Beg, *ibid.*, p. 60.

Similarly says Tom A. Cullen that Assembly viewed in confident tone that "to support compensation would be like telling the tillers that though they morally owned the land, they must buy the land from those who do not morally own it".

See Tom A. Cullen, "Kashmir's Agrarian Revolution is won without a shot", Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1952.

191 Cited in O.N. Dhar, n. 168, p. 177.

become the owner of plot he works on ... government has paid no compensation to the dispossessed landlords, because exchequer cannot afford it".¹⁹² And Sheikh Abdullah declared in unequivocal terms that his party would not vote for payment of compensation to landlords as neither tiller nor the government was in a position to make payment and as some landlords do not take their fortunes very legitimately.¹⁹³

It was because of these reforms that many voices were accusing Kashmir Government of having gone wild with revolutionary ideas. It was a regime 'fighting on all fronts'. The educational pattern was also changed and syllabi were made in conformity with the political philosophy of 'socialism-secularism and democracy'. Whereas 100 years of Dogra rule had 3 colleges, in first three years of National Conference rule the number of colleges jumped to 12 (and a new Kashmiri script was evolved for the first time). The institution of private enterprise in five key commodities: food, salt, sugar, and kerosene was eliminated. The cooperatives were opened to manage the distributory functions of these essential commodities. The handicrafts, art, culture, started progressing with the availability of welfare-oriented policy of the government. The government immediately after independence involved itself completely with the

192 "Towards a New Kashmir: Sweeping Land Reforms", Times of India, 6 August 1951.

193 "The Future of Kashmir Ruling Family", The Statesman, 8 August 1951.

task of social reconstruction. As one of the political Pandits observed that,

it combined both the roles of emergency administration and planning commission ... facing two tasks at the same time: that is, foreign aggression and social reconstruction ... it is a government of agitators capitulated into power perhaps a little too soon, on top of an effective bureaucracy. The ministers have reduced administration to personal level. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Deputy Premier and most active member of the cabinet keeps few files. He and his colleagues go to the spot, hear the two sides, and give verbal instructions. Action is prompt. And its effect on the popular mind is salutary. (194)

There was no regional or religious discrimination in the policies of the National Conference, and the only favourite to be helped was poor class, and the only to be taught charity was so far exploiting class. Thus writes the same political commentator that, "the present leadership cannot be accused of parochialism".¹⁹⁵

The measures taken by the newly established popular government were so effective that Sheikh Abdullah was dubbed as a Communist by many people outside and inside the state. The Jerusalem Post, wrote: "though not communist Sheikh Abdullah was¹⁹⁶ attracted by the Communist theories of land reforms". One of

194 "Kashmir's Gigantic Task of Social Reconstruction", Times of India, 8 August 1951.

195 Ibid.

196 See Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1954.

the arch reactionary, functioning throughout against the ghost of communism, writes in the following words:

No discussion on the political situation in Kashmir of that period would be complete without the role of BPL Bedi and Dhanwantri - the two powerful Communist personalities who with headquarters at Srinagar and Jammu respectively, dominated the politics of the state for over half a decade. While Bedi - or more precisely Bedis - mainly confined his role to remain in touch with and influence Abdullah, four members of the cabinet of eight - M.A. Beg, G.M. Sadiq, G.L. Dogra, and Budh Singh - were grouped together under the leadership of Dhanwantri. The state premier, too, seemed to be impressed by the 'political integrity' and the 'intellectual superiority' of this group over the other three - Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Sham Lal Saraf, and Col. Pir Mohammed being illiterate. (197)

About reforms, it was said everywhere that in Kashmir where wooden plough still universally in practice, peasants were handed an agrarian revolution on a platter. The business community felt insecure and they were especially scared of the presence of Bedis and Dhanwantri in the state. The bourgeois press immediately gave a wide publicity to the viewpoints of those vested interests who for long exploited the people of the state. For example, Amrit Bazar Patrika, spoke of Lala Girdhari Lal Anand, in high spirit. He was quoted saying: "Financial integration of the Kashmir with India is the only way to bring about definite improvement in the economic conditions of the

people".¹⁹⁸ In the name of people, thus he wanted the Judicial Protection (as provided in the Constitution of India) for his community's and his interests. He complained about the high rate of taxation, and wanted the government of India to enter into an agreement with the Kashmir Government as provided by Article 278 of Indian Constitution, so that instead of relying on money raised by government by taxing the richer classes, the Government of Kashmir could borrow the same from the Government of India. He demanded abolition of the custom duties, which earned to the state exchequer Rs.127,000,000 and as provided under Article 275 of Indian Constitution, the grants be given to the state government. He thought that idea of self-sufficiency was impracticable and foolish. When reforms could not be opposed in any way, the reactionaries represented by Lala Girdhari Lal Anand and Praja Parishad elements exploited the outspoken nature of Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh was now accused not for his reform policy that annoyed them most, but for his statements like: 'one hundred per cent sovereignty of Constituent Assembly', or 'freedom before accession', and so on. Indian press helped them in criticizing Sheikh Abdullah more than he deserved. Frustrated as he was, Lala finally complained for having no constitutional or legal bar against the confiscation of the property of a few rich people. He complained: "Some ministers have gone to

198 "Problems of Kashmir", Amrit Bazar Patrika, 9 April 1952.

the length of asserting that there would be outright confisca-
 tion of even housing property".¹⁹⁹

Another and equally frustrated and scared community of feudal reaction was the so-called 'Jammu Agriculturist Association'. It requested the President of India telegraphically, to permit the Supreme Court to go into the question of expropria-
 tion of landlords in Kashmir.²⁰⁰

Finally the landlord, merchant, and communal elements were best represented by Praja Parishad, who demanded for 'an absolute accession' with India. The reason for their demand was obvious. They could not make any popular image by making the land reforms a political issue. Though they appeared as delighted nationalists, but during 'Quit Kashmir' when Nehru was arrested by the Maharaja's order at 'Kohala', they not only kept quiet but came in protest against Nehru's entry into the state. From this, it is evident that the Praja Parishad was purely an agent of feudalism. When the feudal class was powerless and nationalists were popular throughout the state because of their land reform policy, they tried to exploit the communal sentiments of the masses. Further, it being an agent of feudalism becomes clear from the fact that, when the hereditary rule was abolished in the state on 12 June 1952 by a decision of Constituent Assembly, Prem Nath Dogra (the life-long leader of

199 Ibid.

200 See The Statesman, 7 August 1952.

the Praja Parishad) immediately summoned the executive body meeting of Praja Parishad and appealed to Government of India to interfere so that as he said: "it might not affect our vital interest".²⁰¹

Jan Sangh came out as an inalienable friend of Praja Parishad outside the state, and demanded to observe 29 June 1952 as the 'Kashmir Day', by holding public meetings, demonstrations in protest of abolition of hereditary rule in Jammu and Kashmir. And, from this day onward we find that Jana Sangh entered into the state as an ally of reaction.²⁰²

Impact of Land Reforms on the Organization of National Conference

The National Conference being the ruling party of the state greatly increased its mass-base with the help of its land reform policy. It became highly popular in rural areas, and people living under age-old serfdom and indebtedness realized what actually representative government is. Tom A. Cullen, for instance writes: "I talked to the peasants in the village of Khaitangan (population 1000), ... without exception the peasants expressed their enthusiasm for the land reforms and paid their

201 See The Hindu, 15 June 1952.

202 See The Hindu, 17 June 1952.

gratitudes to the government for making them possible".²⁰³ "One gaunt, grizzled spokesman" notes the same writer, "expressed to me: '... in the old days we had to give half of our produce to the owner. Then his servant came around for gifts ... we had only one-quarter of the produce left for ourselves. Another tiller told how he had been absolved by a government debt conciliation board of debts amounting to 400 rupees (₹ 80) owed to his landlord. In deciding the case, the board had taken into consideration the blankets, cattle, cornfruit, and clarified butter which the landlord had extorted from the peasants in the form of gifts, he said".²⁰⁴ Thus, a unique type of exploitation that gave itself a name of gift was also done away with completely.

An overwhelmingly rural state, the land reform law was, thus, the most remarkable achievement of Kashmir from the point of view of the peasants and landless;²⁰⁵ and "history making"²⁰⁶ in its effective implementation. They were rightly terms as "Magna Carta for peasantry"²⁰⁷ by the Hindustan Standard. And,

203 Tom A. Cullen, "Kashmir's Agrarian Revolution is Won Without a Shot", Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1952.

* These gifts were another unique source of feudal exploitation. Through this hidden exploitation the jagirdars could ask anything from their peasants in kind.

204 Ibid.

205 H.D. Malaviya, Land Reforms in India (New Delhi, AICC, 1964), p. 415.

206 Ibid., p. 422.

207 See "Kashmir Tenancy Reforms: A Magna Carta For Peasantry", The Hindustan Standard, 20 September 1952.

to a great extent they speak for the victory of National Conference in 1951 elections and boycott of elections by Praja Parishad. Though elections were rigged one, for which the ruling party deserves sharp criticism, but there is no doubt that even in case of a genuine contests the National Conference Party would have won by a thumping majority. And it was only since the implementation of land reforms that the National Conference equally established itself in Jammu and Ladakh provinces also.

NAYA KASHMIR AND ACCESSION TO INDIA

It was because of this progressive character of nationalists from Kashmir, and Congress policy under Nehru and Gandhi's leadership that Kashmir's accession to India became a reality.

As Taya Zinkin writes:

Just as the Congress had its policy of socialism and landreforms going back to the Karachi Resolution of 1931, so the National Conference has its programme for a 'New Kashmir' which goes back to the early thirties and which is to the left of Congress.... It is because of this very left-wing policy, that National Conference has a fringe of fellow travellers. Such a party was bound to find India more congenial than Pakistan. It considers Pakistan providing itself on being an Islamic state as medieval, and it feels that its reform programme would be impossible in a society as landlord-dominated as it considers Pakistan to be; ... its members have seen Punjabi Moslem officials under the Maharaja and that was enough for them. (208)

Similar was the narration of Zainub Begum (the sister of late G.M. Sadiq) who told this investigator during an interview that:

It was on 'Naya Kashmir' that the accession had to be decided. Those who accepted 'Naya Kashmir', they were our natural friends, and we would accede to that country. With this view, Sadiq Saheb was sent to Pakistan to meet Liaqat Ali Khan. Sheikh Saheb, M.A. Beg, S.L. Saraf, D.P. Dhar, Budh Singh and Maulana Masoodi went to Delhi for talks. During his discussion with Sadiq Saheb Jinnah invited the whole working committee of National Conference to Lahore. Sadiq Saheb, when he saw, everywhere in Pakistan an atmosphere of panic and war-like preparation, he asked his friend Miyan Iftikar-ud-din about it. The latter took Sadiq Saheb to his house and told him all that was brewing there. He also warned Sadiq Saheb against staying in Lahore. And when Sadiq Saheb asked as what the Qavalis were doing there in Lahore, Iftikar told him that the whole National Conference Working Committee which Jinnah was inviting would be arrested. In the meantime the Qavali attack on Kashmir would occur, so that if they failed through persuasion Kashmir would be integrated with Pakistan by coercion. Sadiq Saheb then told Jinnah 'give me a plane and I will bring the other members of National Conference Working Committee to Lahore from Delhi'. Sadiq on reaching Delhi narrated the story to all of his colleagues. He told them, 'why talk about Naya Kashmir when Pakistan's plan was this'. Sheikh when he heard all this got enraged and said: 'Choro Pakistan Aur Chalo Kashmir (to hell with Pakistan, let us go to Kashmir). (209)

209 Zainub Begum (Minister of State for Labour and Social Welfare): An Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

India, under Nehru, on the other hand, readily agreed to the National Conference manifesto, 'Naya Kashmir' in unconditional terms. With this similarity of philosophy and ideology, therefore we find Kashmir's accession with India.

Inadequacy of Land Reforms

First, it would be improper to say that in Kashmir reforms were revolutionary (except that it did not provide for the payment of compensation for the lands expropriated), because whereas the average holding was barely 2 acres, a ceiling for a holding had been placed at roughly 23 acres of the best land.²¹⁰ In addition to this, orchards which were very important for money-making in Kashmir, were not touched.

Second, the quality of land was not taken into consideration while formulating and implementing the land reform policy. For example, there cannot be a similar ceiling for the land belonging to 'kandi areas' (areas between rocky planes or hills) of Jammu and the fertile valley.

Third 'Sheikh has been described as fully unsuccessful on the economic front', by many of our informants. The people did not like the compulsory levy system for the procurement of

210 According to 1961 census report, the per capita land area on the side of the ceasefire line works out to 9.6 acres of which no less than 9 acres are usable reducing the per capita cultivable area to 0.6 acres only. The net area sown per capita is still less and stands at 0.5 acres. See Census of India,¹⁹⁶¹ vol. VI, Jammu and Kashmir, Part I-A(1), General Report (Delhi, 1963), p. 154.

foodgrains. For example, one of our informants said: "Such policy created many hardships for the people. It made people suffer in many ways. As there was no permission to take rice inside the city, the people had to cook the rice outside the municipal area, pack it, and then take along with them to the city. Both village and city people, therefore, suffered because of this. Even if one had land in a village and house in the city, and could produce the crop for his need, he could not take it with him to the city for his use. And later Bakshi rightly understood the root of the problem. He abolished the most hated system of compulsory levy known as Mujavaza system²¹¹". Though with coming of Bakshi, this inadequacy was removed, the second mentioned difficulty was also taken into consideration when the government was made to realize that the peasantry of Kandi areas were hard-hit by these reforms. The government therefore appointed a committee headed by Justice Janki Nath Wazir in February 1953. The Wazir Committee was of the unanimous view that 22 acres was not an economical one in Kandi area. Its report was published on 1 June 1953. The Committee in its report strongly suggested that the maximum limit of land-ownership be raised to 38 acres in Jammu and 28 in Kashmir province. It further suggested that a maximum limit be fixed on the basis of land revenue, which was the time index of soil

211 Ghulam Mohammed Mir (District Congress Committee President, Srinagar (Rural)): An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (Lasjen).

fertility.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that there are regional, religious, linguistic, and caste and class cleavages in the social system of Jammu and Kashmir. We have also seen that the reaction to the land reform policies came from Jammu province. The land reforms, on the one hand popularized the National Conference Party, and on the other hand a section of people from Jammu opposed it whole-heartedly. And, as we will see in the next chapter that the land reform policy was one of the factors for factional politics in the National Conference Party in 1947-53 period.

Chapter III

FACTIONALISM

Chapter III

FACTIONALISM

An Inquiry into the Nature of Factional Politics in the Ruling Parties of the State

The term 'factional politics' as it is frequently used in the literature of social science connotes a style of politics that is conflicting, complex, unprincipled and highly unpredictable political behaviour. Factions are not legitimate, but relatively permanent, unstable and informal groupings. A faction germinates at the endeavours of a potential leader, who in search of the avenues for influencing the process of the authoritative allocation of values (for a society) mobilizes the support of various like-minded persons of a party, and in the process the gratification of the objectives and interests of these followers, however, becomes the primary aim of it. Factions in Jammu and Kashmir (ruling parties) may also be defined, therefore, as intra-party groupings, seeking to control power or influence, determining the distribution of scarce economic resources, making of the decisions, and implementing the party policies and objectives in a way that serves their interests most. A faction here appears to be highly impermanent and patternless in case it is purely motivated by power. In this part of the country, most of the time, the stability and strength of a faction is determined by its adherence to the ideology of secularism, socialism and democracy. Further, to

get legitimacy its being pro-Indian is an essential prerequisite. A faction appears to be stable as long as it maintains both power and popularity among the masses, and continues to satisfy its followers by different means. Usually there is only one leader in a faction, and if there are more than one leader in it, it is a coalition of factions. On certain occasions coalition of factions may also appear as a faction (e.g., as we will see in the Sadiq and Qasim faction), but, still the whole faction is identified with one leader.

The history of factional rivalry in Jammu and Kashmir is highly interesting and most revealing. It is particularly so, because Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state of India. Thus, it provides an excellent and thought-provoking case study of the highly complex and cleavage-ridden society, about which it is generally viewed that region and religion are the only determinants of all politics in this state. But our findings do not support these sweeping generalizations. In fact, factional politics is too sophisticated to be decided by simple factors like region and religion, though their influence cannot be ignored completely.¹ Factions in this state, therefore,

¹ One of the most prominent leaders of the day (who had been deeply involved in almost all factional struggles) for example says that:

"In upper classes there is no religion. They eat on the same table, live in the same house, wear similar dress, lead similar life and share similar values. It is only in lower classes that we find the differences over sharing of values and observance of religious practices. But they do not fight for religion by their

are not embeded purely in either religions or regional considerations. In fact, factional conflict more often occurs between two potential leaders belonging to the same region and religion, than between the leaders belonging to different regions and religions. And, even if there is a conflict between the two leaders of different region and religion in some cases, the region and religion are the least important factors that influence their conflict. Further, the strategies and politics of a faction is determined not by regional or religious considerations but by the size and strategies of the rival faction.

Here an attempt has, therefore, been made to show the development of conflicts in the ruling parties of Jammu and Kashmir between 1947 to 1970. We, however, have started since 1931 to find out as how the origin and development of factions took place, as we find them on the eve of independence. So, the period between 1931 to 1947 is briefly treated. In the present and the following two chapters an attempt has been made to describe the conflicts in the ruling parties as they occurred from time to time. In these three chapters, we will discuss the changing composition of factions and factional struggle as they

own. It is the most irreligious people who exploit the religion for their own interest. Jinnah, e.g., was the most liberal democrat, leading a western life and sharing modern values, but he was the person who exploited religion on the basis of the two-nation theory. Thus, what is needed, therefore, is the development of lower classes".

Ghulam Mohammed Mir [District Congress Committee President, Srinagar (Rural)]: An Interview, 9 September 1976 (Lasjan).

took place between 1931 and 1970.

FACTIONALISM IN MOVEMENT ERA

Conflict Within the Muslim Conference

The history of the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir, dates back to 1931. The movement period thus spreads over only 17 years, that is, between 1931 and 1947.

To begin with, it was the Muslim press from Punjab that launched a fierce campaign against the Maharaja's rule. In December 1930, the All Kashmir Muslim Conference was founded, and held its first annual session in Lahore. It was attended by few young men from Jammu and the cry of 'Islam in Danger' was raised. But the Muslims of valley being staunch followers of Mir Waiz Ahmad Ullah Hamdani, refrained from participating in it, in response to an appeal by the Muslim Conference of Lahore. In the meantime, a core of few educated young men representing radicalism and modernism, came into existence (in the valley), who had organized the 'Reading Room Party'. They were, therefore, up in the arms against the conservatism of Maulvi Ahmad Ullah.

The conditions of the people [as shown in Chapter II] were absolutely pitiable and virtually a despotic rule was in operation. It needed, therefore, a leadership with an appreciable amount of humanism, idealism, and sacrificing spirit to

awaken the masses. Sheikh Abdullah, an active member of the Reading Room Party organized masses in various mosques and delivered fiery speeches against the shameless and naked exploitation by Maharaja's regime and also against the dying outlook of the dying Ahmad Ullah Mir Waiz as well. And, in early March 1931, the old Mir Waiz died. The new Mir Waiz Maulana Mohd. Yusuf Shab had all sympathies with the aims and outlook of the 'Reading Room Party'. He lent great support to the new movement, which naturally gathered great momentum. All was, therefore, set for an explosion, and the only thing needed was a little spark.

Historically, this spark was provided by an insignificant butler who in the process of history became so important. On 21 June 1931, when at the end of a meeting called for electing the representatives of the Kashmir Muslims* (who were expected to submit the demands of their community to the Maharaja at the suggestion of G.E.C. Wakefield - a Political Minister), Abdul Qadir (the cook of a European visitor) delivered a violent speech advocating massacre of Hindus. He was arrested and his trial report created a sensation throughout the city. The

* The Muslims from Jammu had already elected their four representatives among whom Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas was one. From Srinagar, seven prominent Muslim spokesmen were elected. They were Khawaja Saad-ud-Din Shawl, Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah, Mir Waiz Atiq Ullah Hamdani, Aga Sayyid Hussain Shah Jalali, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmed Ashai, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, and Munshi Shahab-ud-Din.

people demanded withdrawal of the case against him. Finally, the first sign of the D. Day of the Dogra Rule was thus indicated on 13 July 1931, when an open clash occurred between despotic Maharaja and communal forces. The armed police opened fire on unarmed masses. Thus, within a very short period the movement gathered a great amount of mass appeal. And, a small period of nearly 23 days shook completely the roots of 85 years old Dogra Empire. The 13 July 1931 will, therefore, be written in red letters in the history of the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir.

The organized political movement in the state came up from 1931 onwards. The movement was well in progress and it seems that during those hours there was complete harmony between various leaders of the movement. But, within a very short period the difference between them developed. In fact, "the factional struggle in the political arena of Kashmir", says G.M. Rajpuri, "was evident right from 1931. Various factions under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Maulvi Abdullah (grandfather of Shemim Ahmed Shemim), Maulvi Yusuf Shah, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, Raja Mohammed Akbar Khan, and P.N. Bazaz, were struggling to have as much supremacy in the political situation of the state as possible".²

² G.M. Rajpuri (Ex-Minister in Bakshi Administration and the General-Secretary of the National Conference, 1953-55): An Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar.

Similarly, Shamlal Saraf says: "the first faction in the political movement came about in 1931 itself, when Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah ³ withdrew from the movement". ⁴ This happened when Yusuf Shah felt that the Muslim Conference movement within the state was coming more and more under the influence of the Ahmadyas of Punjab. He being 'Hanifi' Muslim was naturally very much averse to that. Further, he being very prominent Muslim preacher on Muslim religion, not only had a commanding following of Muslims, but also most of the rich and influential Muslim families were his followers. Among them, there were people from the 'landlord class', business class, and some of the influential government servants. They, being abhorrent to the progressive social and political changes (that were to come about in this part of the country), prevailed upon the die-hard and conservative Muslims to refrain from supporting the movement led by the Conference. It is instead of the fact that the Muslim Conference had a cent per cent character of a communal organization. "These reactionary forces", says Saraf "galvanized

3 "To begin with" says Saraf, "Maulana Yusuf Shah was a nationalist. He was the product of Deoband Institution and was taught by the famous Muslim theologism and nationalist Maulana Hasan Madani. And even being the top leader of Muslim Conference, he endeavoured to get cooperation from non-Muslim public men also. But due to prevailing conditions this move did not succeed". Shamlal Saraf (one of the first ten tallmen of Kashmir movement and a very close associate of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed): An Interview, 24 September 1976, Srinagar.

4 Ibid.

a forceful support to their view and, therefore, succeeded in prevailing upon Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah to withdraw his support and himself also from the movement which he did. Therefore, a first faction in the movement for freedom struggle came in 1931⁵. Since then that faction had been keeping away from the political and social changes that came in the state.

The other faction that caught the eyes of every one in the state was led by Sheikh Abdullah, an equally popular leader but an anti-thesis of Yusuf Shah. He was chiefly supported by Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, and Maulana Sayed Masoodi. "Abdullah" says Rajpuri, "managed nearness and proximity to the political forces struggling in the sub-continent that enhanced his chances of survival in the political battle inside the state. The rest of the contestants remained confined to the state boundaries and got overpowered by Abdullah, because of his broader base and superior ideology of socio-economic character"⁶. Actually, after becoming the leader of 'Reading Room Party' Sheikh Abdullah launched struggle against both feudal - communal reactionary combination in the state. This Reading Room Party soon turned itself into the 'All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference'.

In its first session held in Srinagar on 15, 16, and 17 October 1932, Sheikh Abdullah was elected as its first President.

5 Ibid.

6 Rajpuri, n. 2.

By 1936 a radical change had appeared in the mind of Sheikh Abdullah and his other nationalist colleagues. Their militant nationalism started, being replaced by a liberal nationalism. The influence of the both Congress and Muslim League ideology tended to polarize the Muslim Conference Organization around two extreme poles. One section agreed with Abdullah's call for the need of an organization that opens its door to all communities, and the other did not reconcile with this position of Abdullah, but under the pressure of public opinion and popularity of nationalists they also joined it.

The major step for secularizing the state politics was taken in the 6th annual session of the Muslim Conference held on 26 March 1938. In his Presidential address Sheikh* declared that:

Like us the large majority of Hindus and Sikhs in the state have immensely suffered at the hands of irresponsible government.... The main problem therefore now before us is to organize joint action and united front against the forces that stand in our way in the achievement of our goal. This will require rechristening of our organization as non-communal body.... (7)

* Popularly Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah is called as Sheikh or Sheikh Sahab in the valley, and we also therefore, will use these popular references to him interchangeably.

7 Cited in Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (Delhi, Kashmir Publishing Company, 1954), p. 168.

Embodying these views, a resolution was placed before the working committee (of Muslim Conference) by Sheikh Saheb on 28 June 1938. The resolution was adopted "after a heated discussion of about fifty-two hours",⁸ because of opposition from some sections of the party to it. Significantly, those who opposed this move included also the persons like Bakshi and Beg.⁹ Finally on 10 June 1939, a special session of Muslim Conference was held at Srinagar, which performed the formal rechristening ceremony. And, on 11 June 1939 after deliberating over it for a whole night, the historic decision of converting All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference was taken. On this day says, Mehmooda Ali Shah, "good sense prevailed on our leaders and the Muslim Conference was named as the National Conference".¹⁰ "This" writes Bazaz "sounded the death knell of the Muslim Conference and heralded the day with the happy news of the birth of the National Conference in its place".¹¹ Almost all significant leaders including Ghulam Abbas and Allah Rakha Sagar supported the move.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 168. Mir Qasim, G.P. Saraf, and many other important persons also approved this vacillating character of Bakshi and Beg during the movement period.

10 Miss Mehmooda Ali Shah (Present PCC Executive Member and a very close friend of late G.M. Sadiq): An Interview, 13 September 1976, Srinagar.

11 Bazaz, n. 7, p. 171.

In the meanwhile, with rechristening of the Muslim Conference as the National Conference, Hindu leaders like Shamlal Saraf, Jiya Lal Kilem and Kashyap Bandhu came out of the Hindu Communal Organization called 'Sanatan Dharam Yuvak Sabha', in 1938, and lent their full support to Sheikh. Later when the National Conference was organized, they joined it along with many of their followers.* P.N. Bazaz was another supporter of Sheikh Abdullah in his struggle against the forces of reaction. The National Conference thereafter continued to grow in strength day by day. But at the same time the cracks within the organization were obvious. There existed a real gap between the 'communalists' and 'secularists' and inbetween we find the double-dealers and 'vacillating' elements also.

CONFLICTS WITHIN THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

We have seen above that three types of attitudes emerged in the early organization of the National Conference. Thus, it is possible to construct a typology of leaders of National Conference during 1939-47 period. This can be given as follows:

- a) communalists,
- b) secularists,
- c) vacillating or double-dealers.

* Shiv Narayan Fatedar, however, continued to run this communal body.

Vacillators

Let us take the vacillators first. In this we count chiefly three significant personalities, whose attitudes certainly had their impact on the course of the factional politics of the state. They were Maulana Sayed Masoodi, Mirza Afzal Beg, and Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi. We have seen earlier in this chapter that both Bakshi and Beg opposed the move of Sheikh (in 1938) to secularize the state politics by rechristening the Muslim Conference as the National Conference. But at the same time we find that they lent their full support to him in his struggle against Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah, and Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas (and his followers from Jammu). About Maulana Sayed Masoodi says Bazaz: "indeed it was revealed only a few months after the formation of the National Conference that Maulvi Mohammed Sayid, General-Secretary of the National Conference, had actively encouraged behind the scenes a few impulsive Muslim young men to start a Muslim Conference and promised them not only his help but that of other Muslim leaders of the National Conference as well but that when the proposal matured he turned a volte-face owing to the fear of being exposed".¹² Further notes Bazaz that the closeness of National Conference to Indian National Congress "disheartened many nationalist leaders notably Afzal Beg and Maulvi Sayid the two communally inclined members of the

¹² Ibid., p. 175.

high command, if not Abdullah and Bakshi as well".¹³ Their vacillating nature also is evident from their activities before the Quit Kashmir Movement. Shamlal Saraf, for example, said to this researcher that: "At the end of World War II, a move was launched in state politics, by many people who held the view that Jammu and Kashmir being predominantly a Muslim majority state its grievances have been listened to by the British Government. They feared that as the nationalist viewpoint was not heard, the Muslims of the state may be thrown overboard. Therefore, they began to canvas support to their viewpoint, so that they could also join the hands with the state Muslim Conference that meant the Muslim League and Jinnah. Those who were behind this move were Bakshi, Beg, and Maulana Masoodi".¹⁴ According to Saraf: "it was natural on the part of Bakshi, Beg, and Maulvi Sayid, because the Britishers recognized only three parties who would be handed over power. They were the Indian National Congress, the All India Muslim League and the Indian rulers (i.e. princes). Thus, Bakshi and company having failed in getting recognition, followed this understanding of alliance

13 Ibid., p. 184. Thus says Bazaz further that "the high command of the National Conference was a house divided against itself", p. 175.

14 Shamlal Saraf, Interview,

Saraf further said: "Though I was close and even closest colleague of Bakshi, but as a historian how can I ignore the dangerous strategy of Bakshi before the Quit Kashmir Movement. He should, therefore, be mentioned in this regard".

with the Muslim Conference which dominated them up to Quit Kashmir Movement of May 1946".¹⁵ This move, he viewed if succeeded would have been dangerous for the party and the country.

Though the vacillating elements were there throughout the factional struggle, as it is in almost all factional politics, we will not go into this detail here. And even this case of double-dealing is mentioned because of its historical significance.

Communalists vs. Secularists

The secularists include the Muslim leaders like Sheikh Abdullah (the father figure of secularism in Kashmir during the movement period), Sadiq, Karra and Raja Mohammed Akbar Khan of Mirpur, who throughout the movement remained firm and adamant on the stand the party had taken.

The polarization of the communalists and secular nationalists in the National Conference was evident right from the very beginning, because there always appeared a lack of trust in one another's viewpoint. The first major crack, thus, appeared on 28 December 1939, when in a meeting of the Working Committee held at Mirpur, a resolution was adopted that spoke for the 'composite nationalism' of the National Conference and which appeared as the replica of the language policy of the Indian National Congress. In a resolution adopted, the Working Committee "strongly resented the exclusion of the recognized court language Hindustani from the list of both compulsory and optional

subjects prescribed for the Kashmir Civil Services examinations" and "strongly urged its inclusion as one of the compulsory subjects, facility to be given to the candidates to use either Persian or Devnagri script as they like"¹⁶. Significantly, both Abbas and Allah Rakha Sagar were not present in the meeting. "Communal minded and educated Muslims", writes Bazaz, "were waiting for this day. They had been demoralized by the overwhelming popularity of the Nationalist forces in the valley and were discreet to lie low"¹⁷. Few days later Ghulam Abbas left the National Conference and he was followed by most of the Jammu Muslim leaders.

This happened, according to Shamlal Saraf, when "after the conversion of Muslim Conference into the National Conference, some of the rigid communalists did not toe the line that the party had adopted. They continued to call themselves on the Muslim Conference side. In the beginning Chaudhri Abbas and his other colleagues whole-heartedly joined the National Conference, but later they could not persuade their coreligionists from Jammu to join them. Most of them fell out and later Maulana Yusuf Shah, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas and some other recalcitrant reactionary Muslims (who had not joined the National Conference)"*

16 Bazaz, n. 7, p. 179.

17 Ibid.

* This group led by Mohammed Yusuf Qureshi, which did not join any one in 1939, now joined hands with Ghulam Abbas and Yusuf Shah.

joined together and set up the 'Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference' afresh in 1941".¹⁸ And, after this, writes Bazaz, "almost every week cases were reported of black eyes and bruized heads in the scuffles between the two factions (now two parties) of the Muslims...."¹⁹

Hindu vs. Muslim Leaders

With the joining of the National Conference by various Hindus, a Hindu group also existed within the party. Though never having a purely factional character as such, this group, however, tended to unite in case the attack on Hinduism was launched by any of the leaders of the National Conference. Whereas, Sheikh on the one hand invited Hindus to join the National Conference for he thought that without few Hindus within this organization it could not be a non-communal party; on the other hand, feeling that the National Conference was losing its hold among the Muslims by going nearer to the Congress "in his most characteristically demagogic manner he attacked Hindu politics, derided Hindu society, contemptuously referred to Hindu religion ... and made an unwise remark that Islam was the sun and other religions were stars ... that displeased and embarrassed his Hindu colleagues ... who on 28 April 1940, in the meeting of Working Committee questioned these remarks ... Abdullah

18 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

19 Bazaz, n. 7, p. 190.

remarked that what he said was correct and he would repeat it because he was Muslim first and Muslim last ... this unhappy episode ended (finally) in the resignation of Jiya Lal Kilam and Kashyap Bandhu, two leading Kashmiri Pandit members of the Party".²⁰ This was, however, the first and last time that on the basis of religion a few Hindu leaders left the Muslim dominated organization, the National Conference. This did not occur again in the factional history of the National Conference, and the Congress.

Factional Conflict Between
1941 and 1946

By 1941 a qualitative change had taken place in the organizational structure of the National Conference. By this time this party had come into the close contacts with the Indian National Congress. Like within the Indian National Congress, we find in the National Conference also, "many miniature representations of the various political formations of the country. Many were associated with the Congress Socialist Party, certain were communists, and some were outright representatives of the Congress ideology, though the difference of nomenclature was there".²¹

If factionalism is taken purely as a struggle for power, there was no factionalism as such, during the movement period

20 Ibid., pp. 180-1.

21 G.M. Rajpuri, An Interview, 18 September 1976, Srinagar.

of 1940's because up to 1947, as M.N. Kaul, remarked: "the National Conference was leading a movement against the auto-²²cratic government". But still there were certain people trying to control the party organization and achieve supremacy over the others. At no time therefore, factionalism can be avoided in one sense or the other. The period of 1940's - before independence, therefore, again provides with the general typology of the factional alignments. Thus, there existed factions based on the ideology of left and right, and on personal loyalties, during this period.

Charismatic Leadership

Let us first take the faction based on a loyalty to a leader and not an ideology. Such a type of leader-follower relationship is a characteristic feature of almost all traditional societies. To become such leader, one has to be an ideal leader, whose creed is renunciation and suffering, and who does not succumb to personal temptations and ambitions, especially at the cost of his followers.²³ In this way on many occasions a leader makes an exhibition of personality cult or a charismatic leadership emerges on a particular political arena. "Sheikh Abdullah", says Rajpuri, "was the personality who made crude

22 M.N. Kaul (Revenue Minister in Shamsuddin's and Sadiq's Cabinet, and PCC General-Secretary, 1973-75): An Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

23 See Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 237.

exhibition of personality-cult and whom certain people tried to worship".²⁴ But, Sheikh Abdullah because of his towering personality needed no faction of his own, nor did he try to be a faction leader since the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference. In fact, Sheikh always appeared as a father-figure of the whole organization as long as he stuck to the ideology of secularism, socialism and democracy. Instead of being a faction leader he served as an arbiter politician and a cohesive figure. He specialized in the function of maintaining cohesion when the factionalism in the party became acute.

PROGRESSIVES VS. NON-PROGRESSIVES

The progressives in the state of Jammu and Kashmir provide an interesting history of radical politics in India. It was an appreciably a large group within the National Conference, that came directly under the influence of Marxism and Communist leadership. It was represented by G.M. Sadiq, who played a key role in rechristening the Muslim Conference into the National Conference and who was destined to play an even more important role in the later period. For example Saraf said: "From 1942 onwards Sadiq, who had come under the direct influence of Communist ideology tried to inject progressive philosophy into the political thinking of the party, which at times countered with the pronounced Gandhian ideology of the Indian National Congress.

24 Rajpuri, An Interview.

The latter ideology had support of majority of the leadership".²⁵

The formation of a group of progressives in Jammu and Kashmir has an interesting history. The influence of Marxist and Communist philosophy here is credited to the names of well known Communist leaders like Abdullah Safdar and Fazal Illahi Quarban. Both were Moscow trained. They visited the Valley in early 1937 and contacted some leaders of the Muslim Conference, who were believed to possess the leftist leanings. For several weeks they actively worked in Srinagar but without any tangible success. In 1940, Sadiq is reported to have come into contact with BPL Bedi and Farida Bedi, who by the end of 1942 proved to be successful in winning over the sympathies of Sheikh Abdullah and G.M. Sadiq. Another noted Communist who became friendly with leaders of the National Conference in Kashmir was K.M. Ashraf. In early 1942, a young Kashmiri Pandit named Niranjan Nath Raina, who came under the influence of the philosophy of Marxism in the Allahabad University and was trained at different centres of Communist Party of India before 1942, returned to his native place and became the staunchest propagandist of progressive thinking. In the meantime, a study circle was opened at the Dal Gate to propagate the philosophy of Marxism and Communism in the valley. And, by 1942, a clear-cut division of progressives and reactionaries had taken place. The progressives

25 Shamlal Saraf, An Interview.

represented by Sadiq was a big group of intellectuals and leaders like:

1) G.M. Sadiq, 2) M.N. Raina, 3) Motilal Misri, 4) G.R. Renzoo, 5) Pir Giasuddin, 6) G.M. Rajpuri (changed at later stage to anti-leftist), 7) Jiya Lal Kilem, 8) Pir Abdul Aziz, 9) Jia Lal Temiri (labour organizer), 10) Mohammed Lone (peasantry), 11) Mohammed Anwar Khan (peasantry), 12) Janaki Nath Zutshi, 13) Pran Nath Jalali (journalist), 14) D.P. Dhar (vacillated between Bakshi and Sadiq, in fact influenced both by Nehruism and Marxism), 15) Mohd. Yusuf Dar, 16) Ghulam Mohd. Malik (joined just after 1947), 17) Pir Abdul Kabir (peasantry), 18) Ali Mohd. Shah, 19) Bahudin Zehid, 20) Noor Mohd. Sheikh, 21) Hriday Nath Durrani, 22) Sardar Darbar Singh, 23) Ram Piara Saraf, 24) Krishan Dev Sothi (later stage), 25) Moti Ram Baigra, 26) Bedri Nath Nishat, 27) Trilochan Dutta, 28) Miss Mehmooda Ali Shah etc.

Those who were not with Sadiq were usually referred to as rightists or vacillating elements. The rightists were represented by many people like Maulana Masoodi, Shamlal Saraf, Bakshi and on many times by Sheikh himself. Maulana Masoodi was a staunch rightist and as Giasuddin says, "consciously anti-Marxist and anti-progressive".²⁶ Sheikh acted as the sole leader of the organization and above factionalism, but he usually

26 Pir Giasuddin, An Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar.

represented the rightist forces in the organization. He allowed free discussion and argumentation on every matter, and accepted many times the positions which even he himself opposed initially. This was, in fact, the secret of his maintaining supremacy. The remarkable example of vacillating behaviour here was that of Mirza Afzal Beg, who carried with him a little bit of leftist, rightist, communalist and secular philosophy. Less than him was Bakshi, who in general agreed with Sheikh, but on many occasions supported Sadiq's moves.

Conflicts Between Progressives
and Non-Progressives

(i) The first major clash between the progressives and anti-progressives occurred in 1942, when Sadiq succeeded in getting adopted the 'People's War' resolution. The main leaders who opposed it were, Maulana group from Valley, and Jammu group of the National Conference led by Ch. Mohd. Shaffee, K.D. Sethi (later turned an ultra-radical) also opposed the resolution.²⁷

(ii) The next conflict occurred in 1943, when on the circulation of newspaper 'People's War' Sheikh and Karra threatened the expulsion of leftists from the National Conference, and the personal scuffle between Sheikh and Sadiq was evidenced.²⁸ But, later on Sheikh retreated.

27 Moti Lal Misri, An Interview, 23 September 1976. And also based on the interview with Pir Giasuddin.

28 Giasuddin, Interview.

(iii) Sheikh and Karra also objected to the conducting of the study circle by the Marxists. On this issue Bakshi, however, supported Sadiq and helped him in the establishment of the study circles. According to Giasuddin, there are two obvious reasons for Bakshi's doing so:

- (a) Bakshi himself was very poor, and
- (b) He did not like Karra to be lieutenant of Sheikh. (29)

(iv) Sopore Conference of 1945: Immediately after the release of the Indian nationalist leaders like Nehru and Gandhi, the annual session of the National Conference was held at Sopore on 3, 4, and 5 August 1945. It was a historic event for the nationalists of Kashmir, because the prominent leaders of India like Nehru, Azad, Abdul Gaffar Khan and Khan Abdul Samed Khan were attending this session. "Their presence here", says Shamlal Saraf, "invoked lot of enthusiasm and people gave them their fullest ovation".³⁰ One of the outstanding results of that session was that not only National Conference rank and file, but people in general also showed their full solidarity with the National Conference.³¹ It removed, to a great extent, the confusion that was created even in this part of the country

29 Ibid.

30 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

31 Even Bazaz notes that, "no less than 20,000 people attended the session". Prem Nath Bazaz, n. 7, p. 247.

by the then Muslim League politics. ³²

From viewpoint of factional conflict also the Sopore Conference is important. It was here that an open clash between leftists and rightists occurred. There were three significant resolutions on which an open clash was witnessed.

First was 'Naya Kashmir' resolution. Second, was sending of greetings to the 'Red Army' for victory against fascism. Third, was welcoming Molotov's speech in the United Nations with reference to India that it will soon find a place in the International organization.

(1) The 'New Kashmir' (or Naya Kashmir) programme was framed in period between 1942 and 1943, that was to become the objective of the National Conference Party. It is a solely socio-economic plan, divided into two parts: (a) The Constitution of the State, and (b) the National Economic Plan. Its authorship is usually ascribed to the progressives and especially to the comrade BPL Bedi by various reactionaries. ³³ The New Kashmir Programme was already passed in 1944 in Jrinager session of the National Conference, and thus passed unanimously. As

32 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

33 See Balraj Puri, "Communism in Kashmir", Kashmir Affairs entitled "The Communist Potential in Kashmir", vol. 2, nos. 5-6, May-August 1960, p. 11, and see also Bazaz, n. 5, p. 419.

But the suspicion of the reactionaries has no ends. For even "the first Kashmir revolt of centuries that occurred in the early 1930's was, ascribed by William Barton in 'The Princes of India' (1934) to the Bolshevik influence" (cited in Puri, *ibid.*, p. 10).

M.N. Kaul says: "Adoption of the economic programme of the National Conference was dominated by the progressive forces. There was no opponent to the programme as such but different factions had different views about the contents of plan. Some factions had no such broad vision as the progressives, intellectually and socially. Maulana Gayed, Chaudhery Mohd. Shafee and Mohd. Akbar were its opponents in the sense that they wanted to change or reformulate the programme. The style of conflict for example, was this that if one group would say that the land reforms should be in this way the other group would suggest the other method. And, there was no opposition to the land reforms as such. Sopore Conference was still a movement and in fact an expression of the final struggle for liberation rather than the factionalism. Although, Maulana would say that Communists were implementing the imported Russian formula which was inapplicable here, he was the General Secretary of the Organization that was spearheading the movement. Sheikh on his side gave chance for open debate. In fact, in Kashmir no one could be anti-progressive because the movement of which they were the part and parcel was progressive. The resolutions like the land to the tiller, workers charter, 'women charter', and the 'shape of society', were therefore adopted unanimously".³⁴

Similarly, G.L. Dogra says that, "no conflict as such was there when Naya Kashmir was adopted. Certain people were not feeling

34 M.N. Kaul, Interview, n. 22.

enthusiastic about it and were not in favour of it. They did not like it, but they could not oppose it. For example, K.D. Sethi who shouted anti-Communist slogans was then only in the 9th class. This cannot be said as the proper opposition".³⁵

On the second and third resolutions (as mentioned earlier), however, an open conflict was witnessed. The opposition to these, according to Moti Lal Misri, "came from the Jammu group of Ch. Mohd. Shafee and Mohd. Akbar. From Srinagar Maulana Sayid, Kashyap Bandhu and Sham Lal Saraf openly attacked the proposals. Main spokesmen who favoured the resolutions were Sadiq, Karra, and Sheikh. There was a discussion on this resolution for nearly one day and one night, in which the open conflict occurred. The people who opposed it shouted anti-Communist slogans like: 'Communists have betrayed during 1942 and they were pro-British, etc.' The main argument of the progressives was that the victory of USSR was in the interest of the whole of humanity and especially to fight against imperialism, colonialism, etc. And, Fascism according to them, was the most fierce enemy of mankind.³⁶ Simultaneously discussion took place on Molotov's speech also.³⁷

35 Giridhari Lal Dogra (one of tall men of the movement): An Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

36 Interview with Moti Lal Misri, n. 27.

37 Ibid.

Another resolution that was passed here following the line of the Communist Party of India, recognized the right of self-determination of the nationalities within the country. ³⁸

About the nature of politics during pre-independence days, M.N. Kaul says that: "as far as the objectives of the programme were concerned there was no difference, but for their implementation different views were expressed. Sheikh Sahab did not prevent healthy debate, and tried to achieve unanimous decisions. Before 1946, he was more and more nearer to progressive views, and there was also a reason for his being so. This reason was based on facts which speak for the progressive ideology of those days, and nobody could afford to be anti-progressives during this time. The progressives also did not object to the use of mosques and religious places for the mobilization of the masses - for the people here were backward and religious minded. Sheikh freely used these places to galvanize the Muslim mind. The movement was thus not anti-religious also. The progressives tolerated all this because they wanted mass mobilization for which they were prepared to go to any extent. Further, they agreed with the religious overtones of Sheikh Abdullah's demagogy because not accepting this style of Sheikh would mean a full concession to Maulvi Yusuf Shah to communalize the politics and society. Sheikh from the very beginning adopted this style because he could not ignore the influence of

religion on the people".³⁹ According to Giasuddin, however, "it was because of the backwardness of the Kashmir movement that Sheikh's appeals and overtones totally became a religious demagogy motivated by religious history".⁴⁰ And, about the ambiguous character of the leftists, he says that, "due to the backwardness of the movement no class character and no peasant movement was there and the ideological conflict, therefore, got blurred into a personality clash".⁴¹

It is obvious that a sharp division of opinion between progressives and conservatives occurred in 1940's before the Quit Kashmir Movement. But this antagonism was not allowed to increase because of the timely launching of the 'Quit Kashmir' agitation in May 1946. For example, Shamlal Saraf says: "With the launching of Quit Kashmir Movement by the National Conference, factionalism of whatever nature was there, was wiped out. The entire leadership was united hereafter to make the movement a success".⁴² With Quit Kashmir Movement many more members of the National Conference came under the influence of progressive philosophy. G.M. Karra was one of them. Karra as an underground leader of the movement (when all others were jailed) was leading

39 M.M. Kaul, Interview.

40 Interview with Giasuddin.

41 Ibid.

42 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

the agitation single-handedly. The leftists helped him immensely and advised him on many strategic issues.⁴³

The only instance of factional struggle for power during the movement period was between Mirza Afzal Beg and Mian Ahmed Yar. It occurred when Beg was nominated as a candidate of the National Conference to serve as a minister under the diarchy rule (that was announced on 2 October 1944 and came into practice on 19 October 1944). The selection of Beg as minister in diarchy administration marred the chance of Mian Ahmed Yar who was the leader of the National Conference Party in the legislature^{*} since September 1934. This really hurt Mian Ahmed Yar. After one year five months Beg resigned on 18 March 1946 (on the opening day of the budget session of the state legislature) - following refusal of more powers to popular ministers (a demand put forth by the National Conference) and facing administrative non-cooperation. Though the National Conference declared that it could not carry out the people's programme by joining hands with the Dogra ruling class, the crafty Pandit Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak embarrassed them by persuading Mian Ahmed Yar to accept the ministership vacated by Beg following the party

43 "It was during this period" says Glasuddin, "that Kerra reconciled with the Communists". Pir Glasuddin, An Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar.

* The first Assembly (or legislature) a single chamber House known as Praja Sabha was created by a Proclamation of Maharaja Hari Singh in 1934, and continued up to 1946.

policy. And, Mian Ahmed Yar who was nursing his grievances (for by-passing him by appointing Beg as Minister earlier against the National Conference leadership agreed to it and on 15 April 1946 was declared officially as a minister in diarchy administration, only to be dubbed by the Nationalists "as a ⁴⁴ traitor".

FACTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

Factionalism up to 1953

"As a result of Quit Kashmir Movement" says Begum Zainub, "Kashmir had four heroes. The most significant of them was G.M. Karra, who was the underground leader of the movement and, therefore, a hero in a real sense of the word. The other two mini-heroes of the movement were - Bakshi and Sadiq (both ran away to Lahore during this period, and helped the agitation to survive from there). The overall hero was Sheikh Abdullah, who was arrested on 20 May 1946 only few days after the launching ⁴⁵ of the Quit Kashmir agitation". The factional struggle immediately after the movement, therefore, revolves round these personalities. Few other persons of significance to be mentioned, however, are Maulana Sayed, Mirza Afzal Beg, D.P. Dhar, G.L. Dogra, R.P. Saraf, K.D. Sethi, Shamlal Saraf, and Jardar Budh

44 Bazaz, n. 7, p. 253.

45 Begum Zainub (the sister of late G.M. Sadiq): An Interview, 12 September 1976, Jrinagar.

Singh, etc.

Whereas factionalism in the movement era, as we have seen, revolved round the struggle between the communalists vs. secularists, and progressives vs. reactionaries; in the post accession era a qualitative change had taken place in its character. A new factor 'power' that is the concern of every politician gave birth to a new type of conflict. But at the same time the dominant Congress ideology continued to dominate the politics of the National Conference.

The factional conflicts in the ruling party of the state, between the period 1947 and 1953 can be studied under the following heads:

- 1) Karra's Elimination From the Conference.
- 2) Bakshi-Beg Conflict.
- 3) Sadiq-Sheikh Conflict.
- 4) Sheikh-Bakshi Conflict.

(1) Karra's Elimination

With the tribal invasion of Kashmir, the Maharaja of Kashmir was forced to come into agreement with the Indian Government and the nationalists (of Jammu and Kashmir). The accession of Kashmir to India was complete with his signature on the Act of Accession on 26 October 1947 (that was accepted by India on 27 October 1947). The lead ^{how} was the popular sanction to it. Therefore, the Indian Government prevailed upon the Maharaja on 31 October 1947 to sanction the creation of

an Emergency Administration with Sheikh as its head. Thus, there existed in Kashmir two parallel regimes in the period between 31 October 1947 to 5 March 1948, namely that of Maharaja's under the Prime Ministership of Mehrchand Mahajan, and the Emergency Administration of the National Conference under Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah.⁴⁶ The confusion was finally eradicated on 1 March 1948 with the proclamation of Maharaja providing for the establishment of a popular Interim Government with Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah as its Prime Minister. Significantly in the government formed under Sheikh's leadership Karra was not taken as a minister.

The obvious reason for it, says Qasim, was that "Karra became very popular, which Sheikh did not like".⁴⁷ "Karra" says

46 This led to the dichotomy between the two authorities. Within only 23 days, for example, Mehrchand Mahajan wrote to Sardar Patel that: "There should not be a further delay in the formation of an Interim Government. Sheikh Sahab, I suppose is in no hurry about it, having got dictatorial powers which are being exercised in a dictatorial manner regardless of all rules and forms of law". See, Mehrchand Mahajan's letter to Sardar Patel dated 22 November 1947, in Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50, vol. I, New Light on Kashmir (Ahmedabad, Navjivan Publishing House, 1971), p. 81.

Similarly, Sheikh also complained within less than one month after his appointment as head of the emergency administration that the friction between two authorities had reduced the efficiency of Emergency Administration considerably, and he declared that the people of Kashmir were determined "to make Maharaja reign, and not rule". See Times of India, 30 November 1947.

47 Syed Mir Qasim (Union Minister for Civil Supplies And Cooperation): An Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

Giasuddin "came out as a hero, only next to Sheikh Abdullah as a result of Quit Kashmir agitation. Sheikh feared Karra as a man ambitious for power, and Sheikh, Bakshi, and Sadiq got united and liquidated him".⁴⁸ According to Rajpuri, "it was Sheikh and Bakshi combination who led Karra's elimination from the political scene, and because of his difficulty to present an alternative progressive ideological formulation he got isolated. And to remove this deficiency he gave a line that was pro-Pakistani and anti-Sheikh in its overtones".⁴⁹ "Karra" remarked Rajpuri "had in fact no reason to do so, because he was a hard-liner pro-Indian nationalist throughout".⁵⁰ Similarly, B.N. Mullik observed: "... at that time ... the National Conference was working as a team with Sheikh Abdullah, the undisputed leader, towering above the rest, and Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra trailing at the No. 2 holding views at some variance with those of the Sheikh.... By the middle of 1949 the first breach in the Kashmir National Conference had taken place. Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra was an efficient organizer and had been the underground Dictator of the Quit Kashmir Movement against the Maharaja before Independence. He was the only person in the National Conference who could measure up to Sheikh Abdullah, and

48 Interview with Giasuddin.

49 Rajpuri, Interview.

50 Ibid.

so was persona non grata with the latter who was both jealous and apprehensive of Karra's influence lest his own position be subverted. So, Karra was not given a place in the first cabinet which the Sheikh formed under the Maharaja. In anger Karra left the National Conference...."⁵¹

Karra's exclusion from the government certainly surprised many of his devoted factional followers like Ghulam Ahmed Mir, Shamlal Yach,⁵² and the large chunk of the rank and file of the party. According to Rajpuri, the Karra faction at that time also included leaders like G.R. Benzoo, Pir Giasuddin, Pir Abdul Ahad,⁵³ Mohiddin Noor, and Badruddin (a trade union leader). Though Karra had no big faction like Sadiq, since the days of quit Kashmir he was very popular among the rank and file of the party and people in general. He was a dynamic man and a great organizer the proof of which he gave in year 1946-47. His exclusion from the government must certainly have shocked him as well as his followers. "In the beginning", according to Shamlal Saraf, "voices about this were heard, but later these dissensions went underground. These voices were especially those of Beg and Sadiq within their own circles".⁵⁴ "After 1948", therefore, says

51 B.F. Mullik, My Years with Nehru: Kashmir (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 2, 18-19.

52 Interview, Motilal Misri.

53 Interview with Rajpuri.

54 Interview, Shamlal Saraf.

Giasuddin, "he allied with Communists in the state, but very soon he developed differences with them".⁵⁵ Actually, Karra comes to the line of the Communists during the years 1946-47 when he was leading Quit Kashmir Movement as its underground leader, and when all other prominent leaders were in the jails. Though, his exclusion from Cabinet was not liked by Beg and Sadiq, Karra naturally starts disliking them also, for they were in the government, and ^{here} supporting Sheikh Abdullah. Both Sadiq and Beg (whom Karra never thought more important than he himself was), were ministers in the government. Even Bakshi who was selected by Sheikh as his No. 2 was less important than Karra, if the organizational capacity, valour and sacrifices that he showed during the Quit Kashmir agitation are taken into account. Karra, finally came to believe that those who were with Sheikh were not with him, and those who were in government were with Sheikh. Thus, he developed a hostile attitude against all prominent leaders of the Party, like Sheikh, Bakshi, Beg and Sadiq. "Maulana" said Qasim, "was a noble man, having no faction of his own and was vacillating".⁵⁶ During the period, when Karra could not reconcile with both Sheikh and Bakshi, and came closer to Beg and Sadiq (for a while), says Qasim, "I was with Karra, and believed him as my leader as long as he remained

55 Interview, Giasuddin.

56 Qasim, Interview

in the National Conference".⁵⁷ Karra finally left the National Conference by the end of 1949 along with his few followers. In 1950, he along with Mir Waiz Ghulam Habi Hamdani (son of Mir Waiz Ahmed Ullah Hamdani) raised the voice in favour of Pakistan, and gave the line that: "Kashmir's accession was not final and it should accede to Pakistan".⁵⁸ "With the coming out of the National Conference by Karra and his followers", says Shemlal Saraf "it was discernible that they did not cut much ice excepting few workers of the National Conference because most of them returned to the National Conference Organization later including Hamdani".⁵⁹

Though Karra came under the influence of the progressives since Quit Kashmir Movement, on many occasions he developed differences with them and voted against them. "Therefore", says M.N. Koul, "progressives in India trusted Sadiq more than Karra (or Beg), and sometimes even almost rejected him. Karra was not as much mature and intellectually developed as Sadiq was, and being more emotional and less rationalist; frustration overtook him soon and he resigned from the post of the National Conference District President in 1949-50. Though, a perfectly secular nationalist - frustration, immaturity, and lack of proper

57 Interview with Qasim.

58 Interview with Motilal Misri.

59 Shemlal Saraf, Interview.

understanding made him to adopt the wrong course".⁶⁰ Finally, in June 1953 in collaboration with Raghunath Vaishnavi and Maulvi Handwari, "a pillar of the National Conference",⁶¹ Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra organized the Kashmir Political Conference.

The factional rivalry and fear of Karra thus led Sheikh to kill a great nationalist in Karra. Finally, "this antagonism increased so much that in June 1953 Sheikh jailed him by dubbing him as a Pakistani".⁶² It was Bakshi who released him at the end of December 1954 and for a time being tried to win over him. "But Karra" says Mullik, "who had even questioned the Sheikh's leadership, would not accept Bakshi as the new leader, as he considered him more important than the latter".⁶³ Finally, this antagonism was of such nature that both leaders still differ with one another. Recently when Sheikh revived the National Conference, the present researcher widely heard that Karra is planning to join the Congress in order to give a defeat to Sheikh. But only the future will tell whether Karra joins the Congress or not, or who defeats whom.

(II) Bakshi-Beg Conflict

In the first Cabinet that was formed by Sheikh Abdullah,

60 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

61 Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi, 1967), p. 68.

62 Interview with Begum Zainub, n. 45.

63 B.N. Mullik, n. 51, p. 51.

Bakshi was selected by him as No. 2 man in the party hierarchy, and as the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister as well. "This", according to Shamlal Saraf, "was internally resented by Beg, who thought that as he had already worked in Diarchy Government (1945-1946) for more than a year he should have been given the 2nd place in the Cabinet. In this thinking of his Sadiq also lend his silent support and the same was the attitude of Karra".⁶⁴

The relationship between Sheikh, Beg, and Bakshi during this period is an interesting one. Whereas, Sheikh would say 'I am the leader' and therefore, would act like a boss; Beg would say 'I am the intellectual' and thus remain isolated and ignored; and Bakshi would say 'I am the organizer' by which it took him little time after coming to power to make his influence upon both the rank and the file of the party and in the central leadership. While, Sheikh represented idealism, Bakshi was essentially a realist. Beg on the other hand always appeared as an obscurantist. What Sheikh lacked, therefore, was completed by Bakshi, and Beg in fact actually increased what both Bakshi and Sheikh were lacking. Over it, what mattered more was the negative attitude of Beg as a result of Bakshi being the 2nd man both in the governmental and the organizational hierarchy. As far as Sadiq was concerned, he was essentially an ideologue

64 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

(at that time). Maulana was firmly Bakshi's man (but always considered Sheikh as an overall leader). D.P. Dhar, another important functionary of the Council of Ministers was also a firm Bakshite.

On the ideological plane also, both Bakshi and Sheikh held similar views during this period. Whereas, both Sadiq and Beg came close to each other following Sheikh-Bakshi emity, Bakshi and Sheikh never clashed, or in fact Bakshi never disagreed with what Sheikh said as long as he was working under Sheikh. Further, Bakshi knew the art of being a loyalist in a remarkable way that deprived Beg from coming close to Sheikh in the beginning years after accession. Bakshi was not only a "highly practical man, but also an intriguer of No. 1 category".⁶⁵ He was a "wonderful organizer who could mix with the masses, and was a mass leader".⁶⁶ Therefore, O.P. Saraf says that, "even if Sheikh would have liked to make Maulana Masoodi or Beg as Deputy to him, he could not ignore Bakshi's organizational capacity".⁶⁷ And, above all what counts most is the Sheikh-Bakshi relationship during this period. As The Statesman correspondent wrote on 14 November 1951:

65 O.P. Saraf (a renowned journalist from the state): An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).

66 Lachman Singh Charak (ex-NP): An Interview, 22 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).

67 O.P. Saraf, Interview, n. 65.

The relation between Shoikh and his next, Bakshi was said to be harmonious and remarkable. It was a marriage of theory and practice, or idealism and realism, for while Sheikh Abdullah was primarily an idealist, who would spurn any deviation from values, Bakshi had deep sense of practical politics. Thus, while Sheikh Abdullah was guide and philosopher of the party, Bakshi was mobilizer and noted for his organizational skill. (68)

The relationship between Bakshi and Beg on the other hand was based on who gets what, when and how. Sheikh became the Prime Minister because he was the leader and the main spirit behind the party since 1931 itself. Bakshi became next to him because of his managerial skill. Beg on the other hand could achieve nothing, and, thus, was jealous of Bakshi. He guided Sheikh Sahob during and after the movement period. On Land Reforms his views coincided with that of Shoikh Sahob. And according to M.N. Kaul, "Beg played a historic role in 1947. He organized the anti-communal campaign and spearheaded it. During Pakistan's attack he organized anti-Pakistan campaign".⁶⁹ He did not like Bakshi as 2nd man to Sheikh and was looking for an opportunity to be closest to Sheikh. But during the period 1947-51 Bakshi did not let his move succeed. By 1951, however, Beg appears to have prevailed upon Sheikh to think over once

68 See The Statesman, 14 November 1951. "National Conference, A well knit Party: Impressive Teamwork Among Senior Leaders".

69 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

again about the future of Kashmir. Bakshi, who could be loyal to the most powerful elements on the field, in the meantime started looking towards the Indian leaders, and established close contacts with the Government of India, and especially with Patel's group. So, between the period - 1951 and early 1953 Sheikh appears to be equi-distant from both Beg and Bakshi. And, during this period (in 1952) when a complaint against Bakshi was brought by few workers of the National Conference for bribery and corruption (that was allegedly encouraged by Bakshi) Sheikh is reported to have saved Bakshi by saying that: "my colleague will be improved by God".⁷⁰ Shamlal Saraf says that, there can be only two reasons for Sheikh's not listening to these complaints:

- (i) Either he feared Bakshi; or
- (ii) He wanted a bad name for Bakshi.⁷¹

Bakshi had the solid support of Maulana Masoodi throughout this period, in his fight against Beg (if not Sheikh also). And during the Bakshi-Beg struggle of 1947-51 period, whereas Sadiq group appears to have either sided with Beg or remained neutral; in period between 1951 and 1953 Sadiq group sided fully with Bakshi on ideological issues (like relations with India)

70 L.S. Charak, Interview, n. 66.

71 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

and remained more or less neutral and non-ideological ones.

Finally, as far as the nature of the Bakshi and Beg struggle is concerned, it was essentially a struggle for who gets what, when, and how. As Ayub Khan said to this investigator: "the conflict between the factions of Bakshi and Beg was essentially a personal bickering for power".⁷²

(III) Sadiq-Sheikh Conflict

Sadiq and Sheikh differed from one another ideologically. Though Sheikh respected Sadiq's clarity of mind and his intellectual capacity he did not agree with his radical views. The progressives directed the movement in a peculiar way in Kashmir, but after coming to power Sheikh attempted to lessen their influence. A conflict was, therefore, inevitable between Sheikh and Sadiq. The conflict occurred between Sheikh and Sadiq on the following issues:

(1) On the scheme of Sheikh and his other rightist colleagues that 'communists be isolated from trade union movement'.

(2) On the issue that 'Communists be expelled from Jammu and Kashmir militia'. The progressives (to whom their opponents called as Communists) were on the other hand in favour that the militia should be utilized for carrying out land reforms in the rural areas. Both Sheikh and Bakshi opposed it, and Maulana did

72 Ayub Khan (ex-PCC Chief): An Interview, 17 September 1976, Srinagar (Jawahar Nagar).

his best to counter the Communists. Maulana said: "anyone who attends Peace Conference^{*} should be expelled from the National Conference"⁷³.

(3) On 'conduct of government' also there was a difference, because Sadiq was always a true champion of the policy of liberalization in Kashmir.

(4) Sadiq also strongly opposed the move to give to Shiv Narain Fotedar a mandate to Parliament.

During this period (especially on the ideological plane) there was an understanding between Beg, Karra and Sadiq. Bakshi, Sheikh and Maulana on the other were close to each other. "For CPI" says Giasuddin, "it was B.T. Ronadive's period which supported the formation of Independent Communist parties in India. The Kashmir Communists, therefore, entered into an alliance with Karra who had a hold on the trade union movement. It was said that the formation of the Communist Party at State level (at that time) ^{would} put Sheikh into difficulties, because Sadiq was a Cabinet Minister in his government. It was Sadiq who gave a slogan of 'formation of the Independent Communist Party' but later Sadiq himself opposed this move, because even the leader of Communist Party of India like P.C. Joshi, and his own kith

* At that time Sadiq was Vice-President of the All India Peace Conference, and Beg was President of Kashmir Peace Conference.

73 Interview with Giasuddin.

and kins like Zainub Begum, Miss Mohmooda etc. wanted Sadiq to continue as a Cabinet Minister. Thus, the ideology of Sadiq came into conflict with the personal interests of Sadiq⁷⁴.
 "This", says Qiasuddin, "was an opportunist deviation".⁷⁵

"Sadiq", says his sister, "was a mini-Jawahar Lal of Kashmir, an open-book and clear-hearted man".⁷⁶ He, according to her resigned as a Development Minister in 1950, because of disagreement between him and Sheikh on the following issues:⁷⁷

- (i) He wanted a silk factory to be nationalized.
- (ii) About forests also there was conflict because Sadiq was against rapid deforestation.
- (iii) He wanted to give priority to developmental programmes.
- (iv) There was conflict over the education policy adopted by Sheikh, because Sadiq was in favour of the free education to the poor.
- (v) Finally, there was disagreement over Sheikh's food policy, because Sadiq wanted the cheap food for poor.

On all these issues, she says, Sheikh went back and, thus, Sadiq Sahib resigned.

According to L.S. Charak, Sadiq resigned over the "forest lessee issue, on which the first name was that of Sheikh's

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Interview with Begum Zainub.

77 Ibid.

nephew. When Sheikh advised Sadiq to ignore the matter he said: 'I do not want a bad name for you, as the first name in the list is that of your nephew'⁷⁸. Thus finally, he resigned on this issue. Sadiq, says Charak was a man of good will and integrity. He used to provide the financial support to Sheikh's family during the movement period, and especially when the latter used to be in the jails.⁷⁹

"The conflict", says Zainub Begum, "was finally resolved to some extent when Sheikh after few days came to our house at Batmallu and requested Sadiq Sahab that he should be the President of the Constituent Assembly after the election".⁸⁰

The conflict between Sheikh and Sadiq, therefore, was an essentially ideological one to start with, but cracks occurred on highly superficial issues - like concession to Sheikh's nephew etc. Ideologically Sadiq never reconciled with Sheikh, and again it was because of his ideological devotion to the dominant ideology of the party that he came out openly in support of Pro-Indian forces led by Bakshi against the Sheikh-Beg deviation from the original position of the party. More about this we will discuss under 'Sheikh-Bakshi conflict'.

(IV) Sheikh-Bakshi Conflict

The conflict that occurred in the year 1953 in the

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- 78 Interview with L.S. Charak.
 79 Ibid.
 80 Interview with Zainub Begum.

National Conference Party was represented by the forces led by Sheikh on the one hand and Bakshi on the other. It is very difficult to say anything about the nature of this conflict in specific words like power-struggle* or personality-clash etc. What led the conflict between these two charming personalities from Kashmir is a ticklish problem.

'Power', could not be taken as the ^{sole} factor responsible for the 1953 incidents as Bakshi could never remove Sheikh by whatever power he had at his own disposal. Bakshi owed all power only due to Sheikh and not his own. Though his organizational skill and popularity among the rank and file of the party might have influenced Sheikh to pick him as his deputy, had he liked to destroy his political career as he did in case of Karra he could do so more easily than he did in case of Karra. ⁸¹ Bakshi enjoyed power, because Sheikh willed to share it with him. As Rajpuri stated: "Bakshi, of course, tried to augment his forces

* Though we do not find any politician who does not love the power, for such a man can be either a beast or a God; and both Sheikh and Bakshi were neither God-like nor beast-like. They loved power, and tried to become the virtual despots in their respective regimes.

81 However, brave Bakshi might have been, but even after Sheikh's arrest and consequently the imprisonment he feared the latter. For example, Major-General Hira Lal Atal says about the Bakshi's first broadcast (after the removal of Sheikh) to the people from Kashmir Radio: "It was evident from the intention of his first speech that he was halting, quivering and diddery. I went and saw him later in the morning. My impression of his nervous state was correct".

See, Major-General Hira Lal Atal, Nehru's Embassy to Kashmir (New Delhi, Army Education Stores, 1972), p. 161.

but by invoking Sheikh's favour and by depicting himself as the dedicated worker of Sheikh".⁸² Only two days before the 9 August 1953, Bakshi is reported to have said that: "Every Musalman has five faiths and I have six, the last being Sheikh Saheb".⁸³

Therefore, it is somewhat illogical to say that Bakshi mustered a majority in the Cabinet and the Working Committee of the party, because of his personality. Sheikh was too big a personality to be compared with the personality of Bakshi. Bakshi in fact was unique type of loyalist and an opportunist, who because of his loyalty to Sheikh became the No. 2 man in the party and government, and became the Prime Minister of the state by unhesitatingly withdrawing his support to Sheikh Abdullah when the opportunity came. As far as the two personalities were concerned, says O.P. Saraf:

Sheikh because of his background could afford to be in India and still aloof from India. For Bakshi it was not so, he could be only loyal and not aloof. Thus he became first loyal to Sheikh and became the Deputy Prime Minister. In the meantime Sheikh became more and more aloof from India. Bakshi at such hours showed equal loyalty to both. Suddenly when chance appeared to become totally loyal to India to be the Prime Minister

82 Interview with Rajpuri.

83 Mulk Raj Saraf (a renowned journalist from the Jammu and Kashmir): An Interview, 30 August 1976, Jammu.

he did so. In fact, Bakshi always liked to be with the most powerful and he knew that it was not Sheikh but India. (84)

As far as Bakshi's loyalty to Sheikh was concerned he created the impression in the mind of Sheikh that it was everlasting. For example, one of our informants says: "Sheikh thought Bakshi as loyal to him even after his arrest. For example, when he was being carried to Udhampur jail, he asked 'in which jail is Bakshi'.⁸⁵ What we want to say on this basis that though power-struggle cannot be taken as an immaterial and irrelevant factor, for all politics is essentially a struggle for power, Sheikh-Bakshi conflict and removal of Sheikh by the forces led by Bakshi is to be studied by taking into consideration ideology also. The ideologies were: the dominant ideology of the National Conference (or the Indian National Congress) represented by Bakshi, and the minority ideology (i.e. a deviation from the original ideology of the party) advocated by Sheikh Abdullah. It is curious that Bakshi, a man who had no ideology of his own came to represent this dominant ideology of the party. However, it is a fact that since the quit Kashmir agitation he was thoroughly a secular nationalist.

Now we will describe the development of the conflict between Sheikh and Bakshi; and the way Bakshi came to represent

84 U.P. Saraf, Interview.

85 Ibid.

a certain ideology.

(1) Background of Sheikh-Bakshi Conflict

It is evident from the study of Sardar Patel's correspondence (Vol. I) that Sheikh had developed differences with the union leaders, and especially with Sardar Patel within less than one year of his coming to power. The first sign of the differences is evident from the Patel's letter to Nehru dated 30 September 1948, in which Patel complains about the way Sheikh Abdullah shoved his grievances against Maharaja at the press platforms. Patel particularly resents Sheikh when the latter according to him said that the Maharaja "has strong friends in India or that he could buy friends". This Patel says to Nehru, "in my opinion is, to say least, most unfortunate".⁸⁶ Further Patel objects at the statement of Sheikh Abdullah that "certain people in India believe in surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan ... and the (existence) of Hindu fanaticism in Punjab".⁸⁷

Patel writes to Sheikh also in his letter of 30 September 1948:

... I had never imagined that you would ventilate your grievances in public ... whenever you have had any difficulty we have not hesitated to put pressure on

86 Durga Das, n. 46, p. 227.

87 Ibid., p. 228.

Maharaja ... Maharaja is powerless to resist your wishes ... I am also rather mystified at your reference to his having strong friends in India, or his being in a position to buy friends ... you have also referred to certain people who believe in surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan. ... you have also referred to the view that we deserted the Frontier". (88)

Nehru says, "Sheikh Abdullah is, I am convinced, a very straight and frank man. He is not a very clear thinker and he goes astray in his speeches as many of our politicians do".⁸⁹ In his long letter to Sardar Patel dated 4 October 1948,⁹⁰ Sheikh clarifies all that he had uttered, but only to increase more and more the lack of trust that existed between him and Patel. Though Sheikh appears very loyal to government of India, and feels sorry if his utterances has created any misunderstanding thereof, but Patel appears to be negative in attitude, who does not forgive or forget.⁹¹ For example, he would write to Sheikh that:

88 Patel's letter to Sheikh Abdullah, *ibid.*, pp. 228-30.

89 Nehru's letter to Sardar Patel, *ibid.*, pp. 232-3.

90 See, Sheikh Abdullah's letter to Sardar Patel, *ibid.*, pp. 233-41.

91 Though B.N. Mullik was closer to Nehru than Patel and appreciated Nehru's style of dealing with Sheikh, when Sheikh really did let down India, he says: "Events as they turned subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. ... Probably things would not have come to this pass at all if the Sardar was living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect and fear for him". B.N. Mullik, n. 51, pp. 16-67.

I put several pointed questions in my letter. You avoided answering them and even where you have answered a few, it is a repetition of the old, old story.... The foil is that, while you see only one side of the picture, we see both the sides, and that, while you are content to regulate your conduct and your views according to that one side appreciation of facts, we have to weigh matters on a balance of both sides. (92)

Finally, over centre-state relations also there occurred a conflict between Sheikh Abdullah and the Centre as early as in 1948 itself. This is evident from the letter of Sardar Patel to Gopalaswami, in which he grumbles at Sheikh in the following words:

I do not at all like any change after one party has approved of the whole arrangement in the presence of Sheikh Sahib himself. Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to backout he always confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course, he owes no duty to India or to the Indian Government, or even on a personal basis, to you and Prime Minister who have gone all out to accommodate him. (93)

It is obvious, therefore, that there existed differences between Patel and Sheikh almost right from the very beginning of Sheikh's coming to power. Bakshi, though a No. 2 man in the party and Government of Jammu and Kashmir never came to support

92 The draft of Patel's letter to Sheikh Abdullah in Durga Das, ed., n. 46, pp. 241-5. The copy of reply sent by Sardar Patel is not available. The draft letter is produced here in this volume by Durga Das after ascertaining from Maniben Patel that the reply based on this draft was sent.

93 Patel's letter to Gopalaswami, *ibid.*, p. 305.

Sheikh in his dealings with the Centre. Intriguingly enough, he left this job to another loyal follower of Sheikh. This other lieutenant of Sheikh was Mirza Afzal Beg. Bakshi on the other hand wanted to take full advantage of the Sheikh-Centre feud. He, therefore, according to one of his lieutenants, "not only created his impression upon the rank and file of the party, but also upon the Central Government headed by J. Nehru. He displayed his knowledge and valour in lending his support and help to the army when they were engaged in the grim fight against Pakistan"⁹⁴. Whereas, Patel and Sheikh were engaged in the unpleasant correspondence, the only letter by Bakshi to Patel amply shows that Patel and Bakshi had good relations. Bakshi, for example, writes to Patel in his letter dated 17 September 1948 that: "As probably you may be aware, we are holding the annual session of the National Conference on the 24th of this month in Srinagar. We all wish you could pay us a visit to Srinagar on this occasion. Kashmir longs for your darshan. Your presence at the annual session would lend us more courage and greater determination to face the numerous difficulties which beset our path"⁹⁵. Further Bakshi, tried to create an influence among the Union leader that, 'he was a

94 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

95 Bakshi's letter to Sardar Patel, in Sardar Patel's Correspondence, n. 46, p. 300.

too important man to be ignored'.⁹⁶

In the mean-time Patel group, as is natural in politics, tried to create Bakshi as an alternative to Sheikh. This choice was obvious, because Sadiq was not liked by Patel because of his radicalism, Karra was already eliminated and Sheikh and Beg were hands in glove as far as Centre-State relationship was concerned. "Bakshi" for example, says M.N. Kaul, "was ideologically anti-communist and established his links in India with the people like Patel and Pant. His intention at that time was to eliminate all other leaders of equal standing and to become the only alternative to Sheikh".⁹⁷ This relationship of Bakshi and Union leaders was bound to have its repercussions on Sheikh-Bakshi relationship. And, since 1951 Sheikh started rethinking about Bakshi's loyalty, but never seriously.

Sheikh-Bakshi conflict, according to Motilal Misri, thus, "originated in 1951 when Sheikh thought that Bakshi was being built up by Patel group for the parallel leadership".⁹⁸ In 1951, Sadiq-Bakshi moved a resolution of land reforms in the state. (By this time Sheikh and Beg started wavering on the question of accession). Actually, the proposal was to limit the land-ceiling up to 1,000 kanals, but when Sheikh and Beg took the initiative they limited it up to 182 kanals. And the

96 Interview with Mulk Raj Saraf, n. 83.

97 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

98 Interview with Moti Lal Misri.

resolution was passed.⁹⁹ According to Moti Ram Baigra also, "the first conflict occurred over the issue of land reforms. There were certain people like Bakshi and Maulana Masoodi who did not approve such drastic reform when decision was taken by Sheikh (behind the lawn of M.L.A. Hostel)¹⁰⁰".

By 1952, Bakshi developed friendship with the noted persons in the Indian Civil Service and especially those involved in Kashmir affairs. One such person with whom Bakshi is reported to be very close was Bishnu Sahay*. There is also a reason for Bakshi and Sahay to be intimate friends. According to one of our informants, "Bishnu Sahay was snubbed by Sheikh Abdullah and was asked not to subordinate administrative and policy matters. Sahay was working in his ICS style which Sheikh disliked and Sheikh is also reported to have told Sahay that he would speak to Nehru directly on this matter. The ICS man as he was, Sahay was certainly hurt by this, thus, he naturally came closer to Bakshi"¹⁰¹. This friendship says, Charak was "finally evident in 1953"¹⁰².

According to M.R. Saraf, Bakshi's intention of removing

99 Ibid.

100 Moti Ram Baigra (Senior Vice-President of the PCC): An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).

* Government of India's Secretary, Kashmir Affairs.

101 Interview, L.S. Charak.

102 Ibid.

Sheikh were evident nearly a year before it actually took place, when he (Bakshi) met Jiya Lal Kilem and told him as how he could remove Sheikh.¹⁰³ But this seems illogical because, had Sheikh himself not deviated to an anti-Indian path (as he did since 1951), it was in fact impossible to see Bakshi ever as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.* About the origin of Sheikh-Bakshi feud says, one of the political Pandits that, "From the time when Sheikh advised Bakshi to mend the ways in which the latter's brothers were conducting themselves in public, the rivalry between Sheikh and Bakshi started. And, it was immediately after coming to power of the National Conference Party that this happened".¹⁰⁴

(a) Ideology as a Factor in Sheikh-Bakshi Conflict

The conflict between pro-Indian and anti-Indian forces represented by Bakshi and Sheikh respectively took a qualitative turn when party was polarized around the two basic principles. "This ideological conflict" according to one of our informants, "started when Sheikh spoke against the basic ideology of the National Conference".¹⁰⁵ Initially, the two

103 M.R. Saraf, Interview.

* Because Bakshi is already dead, and Sheikh has once again come to power as the Chief Minister of the State in 1975.

104 Ibid.

105 Master Beli Ram (Deputy Speaker, Jammu and Kashmir, Legislative Assembly): An Interview, 8 September 1976, Srinagar (Old Secretariat).

ideologies around which the polarization took place were: dominant ideology of the National Conference (and Indian National Congress as well) represented by Bakshi that asked for "a fair amount of integration with India";¹⁰⁶ and the minority ideology headed by Sheikh Abdullah that "wanted to keep Kashmir as autonomous as possible with only a tenuous bond through accession on defence, communication, and foreign affairs".¹⁰⁷ Later, whereas the dominant faction led by Bakshi reminded the rank and file of the party and its major leader to be firm on the accession issue that was agreed by the party in 1947; the minority faction of Sheikh created confusion among the rank and file by advocating continuously the review of the stand and by demanding an independent Kashmir occasionally.

After emerging a very powerful leader and the tallest man out of the Kashmir movement, Sheikh started wavering on the issue of accession to India. The first sign of his deviation (from the stand taken in 1947) is evident in early as 14 April 1949, when he said in an interview to Michael Davidson that:

Accession to either side cannot bring peace. We want to live in friendship with both dominions. Perhaps a middle path between them, with economic cooperation with each, will be the only way

106 B.N. Mullik, n. 51, p. 24.

107 Ibid.

of doing it. But an independent Kashmir must be granted not only by India and Pakistan but also by Britain, the United States and other members of the United Nations.... (108)

This feeling of Sheikh got strength day by day from the events that took place in the state. The battle of nerves reached its peak during nearly six months long agitation against the government led by Praja Parishad ¹⁰⁹ in 1952-53. The Praja Parishad agitation, therefore, played a key role in changing the attitude of Sheikh Abdullah qualitatively.

This happened according to Sham Lal Saraf, when under the influence of the internal competition and factionalism Bog

108 Extract from A Report of an Interview with Sheikh Abdullah by Michael Davidson, Published in The Scotsman, in Sardar Patel's correspondence, n. 46, p. 266.

Similarly B.N. Mullik notes:

"In January 1949, we received a disquieting report from our contacts in Srinagar about an interview which the Sheikh had given to two foreign correspondents, Davidson and Ward Price, in which he had visualized the possibility of an independent Kashmir. Later, Karanjia of Blitz also gave some indication of Sheikh's thinking on these lines". Mullik, n. 51, p. 9.

109 Praja Parishad was very powerful and popular among the Jammu Dogras. And there was a strong reason for their being so. It was a feudal-communal combination against Sheikh. For example, B.D. Graham writes, "Displaced from power and feeling their landed rights to be in danger, the Dogras joined the forces with Praja Parishad formed in 1947 as a respectable substitute for the illegal RSS".

B.D. Graham, "Saymaprasad Hookerjee and the Communalist Alternative" in D.A. Low, ed., Surroundings in Modern South Asian History (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969), pp. 359-60.

along with others began to prevail upon the top leader of the party (Abdullah) to have a fresh thinking on the question of accession to India. They were under the impression that - the Kashmir Question had remained hanging and may keep on looming ¹¹⁰ large. In the meantime Sheikh Abdullah happened to pay, one or two visits abroad (especially to Europe and America). There a number of diplomats and politicians met him and he also had planned to meet a few. On his return he seemed to have been influenced by the idea that was put to him there. "It", says Saraf, "was making of Jammu and Kashmir state as independent. This thinking in his philosophy emerged from 1951 onwards, and was heard loudly within his own quarters. This thinking might have reached through some responsible quarters to the government of India also. It was natural that it had its reac- ¹¹¹ tions there".

During this period Hindu communalism showed its fascist colour in Jammu province, where a move of no-confidence against the Government of Sheikh or his being a leader of the government, and finally the leader being a Muslim and Kashmiri was planned by Praja Parishad. The Congress under Nehru whole-heartedly supported Sheikh's Government, but some of voices were heard which favoured the communal line of the Praja Parishad. This

110 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

111 Ibid.

also proved an incentive for the anti-Indian elements to inject the theory of separation from India, and ultimately the differences came into the open.¹¹² In fact, Sheikh himself started saying all this since 1952, but he never gave a clear and open alternative as he did in 1953. He used to say since 1952 that "Yah Nahin chalega, Haman Kuch Aur Sochhna Chahiya, Jammu Wale Haman Nahin Mante (i.e. this wont do and we should think of some other alternative, because Jammu people do not agree with us)".¹¹³ Finally, the secessionist thinkers led by Sheikh and Beg, says Saraf, "did not hide their views for long and gave vent to their ideology that created a division in the party".¹¹⁴ By May 1953, Sheikh started advocating his views in public, and a conflict between the pro-Indian and pro-Sheikh forces thus was bound to occur.

It appeared forcefully on 18 May 1953, during a working committee meeting, which discussed the implementation of the Delhi Accord, but soon disagreed over the issue of Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The majority favoured the extension of the court's authority to civil and criminal appeals but five members led by Sheikh Abdullah opposed this proposal. The issue was referred to a sub-committee of lawyer members who met the same afternoon at Sheikh's request. Although he was not a lawyer,

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

Sheikh himself unexpectedly attended the meeting and spoke for two hours. "We have not to think of little things like the Supreme Court, we have in fact to evolve a new relationship with India", ¹¹⁵ said Sheikh. Members of the sub-committee were astonished at this behaviour of Sheikh. G.M. Sadiq, Sheikh's the most vocal opponent questioned the latter by asking, "if this is what is in your mind, why you have supported another ¹¹⁶ cause all this time?"

During the next seven days the Working Committee discussed Sheikh's 'New Basis', but it failed to secure a single new adherent to the idea of the independent valley. The division remained unchanged - five in favour and fifteen against. "In the Working Committee", says Shamlal Saraf, "among the main leaders Bakshi, myself, G.L. Dogra, Sardar Budh Singh, Sadiq, ¹¹⁷ and Maulana were on one side and Sheikh and Beg on the other". Having received the report of Sheikh's changed position, Nehru sent several invitations to Sheikh to come to Delhi. "Even an open invitation by the Prime Minister" says B.N. Mullik, "went ¹¹⁸ unheeded". "If Mohamed would not come to the mountain", says Mullik, "the mountain had to go to Mohammed! And so the Prime Minister went to Srinagar in May 1953". ¹¹⁹ When Nehru

115 "Fall of Sheikh Abd'illah-I", The Statesman, 20 August 1953.

116 Ibid.

117 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

118 B.N. Mullik, n. 51, p. 36.

119 Ibid.

arrived in Srinagar, at his reception Indian flags were nowhere, and only the Kashmiri National anthem was sung. Sheikh gave a feeling of cancelling the instrument of accession in favour of Valley's Independence. Throughout the visit of Nehru Sheikh maintained his hostile attitude against India, though he showed love and respect to Nehru at the same time. But Nehru showed no annoyance, and counselled them to rethink on the subject. Addressing the National Conference Working Committee, he advised the members to think dispassionately. In spite of the Prime Minister's attempt to induce Sheikh to take a reasonable attitude, says Mullik, "Sheikh remained recalcitrant".¹²⁰ At the conclusion of the National Conference meeting, Pandit Nehru invited all the assembled leaders and Sheikh Abdullah to his residence and talked to them for a long time about the internal and international situation, India's past history, his own conception of India's future and the position of Kashmir in India in order to bring the Sheikh round to a reasonable frame of mind by indirectly explaining that Kashmir's security and prosperity could be only in its association with India and, bereft of this, Kashmir would head towards its destruction culturally, economically and politically, though some transitory gain might be secured initially. Yet the Sheikh would not relent and Pandit Nehru returned to Delhi in a very

dejected mood".¹²¹ Nothing moved Sheikh Abdullah, and not even the three-weeks of long and acrimonious quarrel in the Working Committee. After a three-week debate the majority view prevailed that independence was the worst form of dependence.¹²² A few of them viewed that independence was a stepping stone to Pakistan, and as The Statesman wrote: "The clash which had developed was inherent in the discussions of the Working Committee whose daily proceedings were the public property in Srinagar".¹²³

From June 4 to 10, there took place the meeting of Inner Eight composed of Sheikh, Bakshi, Beg, Sadiq, Masoodi, Dogra, Saraf and Budh Singh. Sheikh remained adamant on his thinking. Except Afzal Beg and Mohd. Shafi all other important leaders like Bakshi, Sadiq, Masoodi, Saraf, Budh Singh, Dogra, Qasim, D.P. Dhar were ranged against Sheikh. Thus, in government, party and the Assembly the Bakshi-Sadiq combination had a substantial majority. Then "in order to dislodge Bakshi, whom the Sheikh identified as the strongest ally of India, the latter forced an election to the National Conference from Srinagar which was Bakshi's stronghold hoping that he could uproot Bakshi that way. But Bakshi turned the tables on him and his group

121 Ibid.

122 See n. 115.

123 "The Fall of Sheikh Abdullah-II: An Analysis of Changing Thoughts on Kashmir", The Statesman, 21 August 1953.

came out with a thumping majority".¹²⁴

Later on when Maulana Azad was sent to Srinagar, "Sheikh totally ignored him and went to the length of insulting this highly respected leader at the Id meeting".¹²⁵ And, when Rafi Ahmed Kidwai wished to visit him, Sheikh was reported to have said that, "if Government of India has anything to say to me it had better to do so in writing".¹²⁶ Finally, he announced the date 21 August, when he was to proclaim his final views before an audience of one hundred thousand on the occasion of Id prayers. "On that day I will reveal my plan",¹²⁷ he said, in a speech two days before his arrest.

During all these days Sadiq was bitterly against Sheikh. Shamlal Saraf for example, says: "Sadiq was a man of bitter tastes against Sheikh's line of plebiscite."¹²⁸ Whereas we all thought that Sheikh should be advised, pacified and persuaded;

124 B.D. Mullik, n. 51, p. 40.

125 Ibid., p. 37.

126 See n. 123.

127 Ibid.

128 However, "like Bakshi Sadiq was a man of highly balanced mind, with great tolerance power", remarked Saraf. He further said that, "we did not react like Sadiq and all leaders including Sardar Budh Singh and myself wanted to persuade him to change his line. I and Bakshi met him and he even agreed to go to Delhi, for consultation with the union leaders. But in the meantime Beg went to him and begged before him not to do so. He impressed upon him that as they were the authors of the new basis, going back from it will diminish their image in public. And Sheikh again changed his mind and remained with Beg". Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

Sadiq would say that no discussion should take place on the issue of accession to India".¹²⁹ Further, Sadiq openly advocated the pro-Indian line. Sheikh took it strongly and in the Working Committee meetings challenged him for giving a line of his own. But, Sadiq on such occasions would ask Sheikh, "who gave freedom to Beg to advocate anti-Indian line, and why he did not question him".¹³⁰ After this various attempts at Sadiq's defamation were made by Beg, Sheikh and colleagues by saying that Sadiq was not a Musalman, because he did not read Koran and even did not believe in it.¹³¹

Bakshi, however, never came openly against the Sheikh until the last hour. But, he was actively involved in mobilizing the pro-Indian forces behind the scene. He refrained from accusing Sheikh. In fact, he abhorred the public criticism of his political opponents throughout, though he did not hesitate to kill them secretly. Only two months before the Sheikh's removal, for example, he said: "Efforts are being made in certain quarters to cause disruptions, but they are bound to fail.... It has been an article of faith with the National Conference workers to own Sheikh Abdullah as their only leader".¹³²

129 Ibid.

130 Ghulam Mohmed Mir, n. 1.

131 Ibid.

132 "No Disunity in Kashmir Leadership: Bakshi Ghulam Mohd., Warns Rumour-Mongers", The Hindustan Times, 8 June 1953.

By June 1953, however, an absolute polarization had taken place. And it was considered that, "those who were with Bakshi were not with Sheikh, and those who were with Bakshi were pro-India".¹³³

On 6 August, Sheikh Abdullah is reported having said that, "it is not Constituent Assembly that will decide the future of Kashmir, but the people of the state".¹³⁴ The Assembly leaders were reported to be up in the arms because earlier Sheikh himself regarded Constituent Assembly as sovereign Body of Kashmir and voice of the people".¹³⁵ By this time Maulana also changed his loyalty and moved from Bakshi's camp to Sheikh's tent. He justified Sheikh's 'New Basis' and said that the prospect of anyone removing Sheikh Abdullah in the leadership of Kashmir was "unthinkable".¹³⁶

Finally, the inevitable came on 8 August 1953, when Shamlal Saraf refused to resign as asked by Sheikh. Following the refusal by Shamlal Saraf (on the advice of Sadiq and Bakshi) both the groups started campaigning actively for support in the party. In the Working Committee as we have already

133 Chundi Lal Sharma (District President DCC, Jammu): An Interview, 10 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).

134 "Kashmir Must Think Afresh: Hindu Minister Defies Sheikh", Dawn, 9 August 1953.

136 Ibid.

136 "Idea of Independence for Kashmir, Reaction to Pressure for Merger", says Masoodi. Indian Express, 4 August 1953.

mentioned, the division was fifteen to five in favour of Bakshi, and in the Cabinet it was as follows:

<u>Bakshi group</u>	<u>Sheikh group</u>
1. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.	1. Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah
2. G.L. Dogra	2. Mirza Afzal Bog
3. Sham Lal Saraf	

After having realized all this, therefore, on 9 August 1953 Sedar-i-Riyasat Karen Singh dismissed Sheikh,^{*} by virtue of Delhi Accord under which he was granted power equivalent to that of Governors, whose ministers according to Article 164 of the Indian Constitution hold office during his pleasure. His action was further legitimized, because he was elected by the Constituent Assembly of the state.

Sheikh, therefore, was removed only when he "bypassed all the party forums".¹³⁷ Similarly, Dogra says: "Sheikh Sahab created a confusion throughout the state. Bakshi wanted a clear stand. The conflict increased so much that when Kidwai wanted to get the matter settled, Sheikh neither agreed for his coming to Srinagar, nor he went to Delhi. Thus an unhappy episode occurred. By nature, he always boasted too much of his own decisions. Sheikh Sahab actually was confused at that

* See the Appendix.

137 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

138
time". "Had Bakshi not acted the way he did", says one
other informant that, "another Korea would have been created
in Kashmir".¹³⁹ Similarly, Ghulam Nabi Sogami^{*} says that,
"9th August 1953, was a time of test for us. Had we been
siding with Sheikh it would have been dangerous to the whole
country. Thus I went with Bakshi".¹⁴⁰ It is obvious, there-
fore, that Bakshi was supported because of the wrong course
adopted by Sheikh.

About the nature of conflict between both, says Bakshi
Abdul Rashid (the brother of Bakshi) that: "It was not a per-
sonal conflict. The difference was about the programme of the
National Conference, and the future of Kashmir".¹⁴¹ G.M. Raj-
puri says, "In a series of National Conference General Council
meetings, there was a general consensus against Sheikh. It was
because of the past political background of our organization
and its secular tradition that the bulk of rank and file were

138 G.L. Dogra (one of the tall men of the movement in
Kashmir): An interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

139 Taj Begum Rensoo (member of the PCC Executive): An
interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

* Presently, Ghulam Nabi Sogami has left the Congress and
joined once again the revived National Conference of
Sheikh. The reason for Sogami's doing so is influenced
greatly by the factionalism in Congress. He was Sadiq's
man and after the latter's death he saw no future in
Congress.

140 Ghulam Nabi Sogami, An interview, 15 September 1976,
Srinagar.

141 Bakshi Abdul Rashid, An interview, 18 September 1976,
Srinagar.

in favour of the decision which was reached in 1947".¹⁴² And, according to Giasuddin, "the progressives opposed Sheikh because of the fear of imperialist intervention (in case of Independent Kashmir), and by taking into consideration the National Conference ideology".¹⁴³ The ideology, therefore, played a key role in Sheikh-Bakshi conflict of 1953.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that the conflicts up to 1941 revolved round the communalists vs. secularists. In 1940s it was replaced by the progressives and anti-progressives. And, in period after independence, it was both for power and ideology, and personal differences that the conflicts occurred. Karra became the victim of this factional rivalry, because Sheikh feared him on account of his popularity in the rank and file of the party, and the people in general. He was, therefore, not allowed to establish himself either in the party or government. He was a well recognized No. 2 man without any such formal position in the party for nearly more than three years. His conflict with Sheikh was because of his personality also. The Bakshi-Beg conflict was purely a struggle for power. The Sheikh-Sadiq conflict appears to be an ideological one, because Sadiq did not agree with Sheikh's policy of eliminating the

142 Rajpuri, Interview.

143 Interview with Giasuddin.

leftists from positions of power and influence. Thus it becomes in a way a struggle for power between leftists and rightists also. The Sheikh-Bakshi conflict was also a clash between the original ideological foundation of the party, and the 'New Basis' of Sheikh Abdullah.

In a period after 1953, again we find that there occurred conflicts between Bakshi and Sediq. This we will describe in the next chapter.

Chapter IV

FACTIONALISM

Chapter IV

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN BAKSHI ERA

In this Chapter, we will first give the importance of the post-1953 politics, that we call as the 'New Era' in state politics, and the Bakshi-Sadiq conflict. This chapter seeks to explain as how Bakshi established himself as the undisputed leader of the party and then tried to eliminate opposition to him within the government and party. This conflict is represented in persons of Bakshi and Sadiq.

A New Era: From 9 August 1953, we find 'a new era' in the political history of Jammu and Kashmir. The organizational character of the party changed qualitatively with Bakshi's coming to power. By now four of its leading figures like Sheikh, Karra, Beg, and Masoodi were already out of the picture; amongst the old stalwarts in the party were Bakshi, Sadiq, Saraf, and Dogra etc., with D.P. Dhar and Mir Qasim forming the strong groups of the IInd rank leadership.

The disappearance of secessionists, anti-state and anti-system elements from the party, in fact helped the party again to work as a team with Bakshi now being its undisputed leader. The party did not disintegrate as a result of the revolt by its tallest leader (as was expected in various circles). In fact, as Bazaz says what made Sheikh Abdullah an eminent figure was his adherence to Congress ideology and especially the efforts of Nehru. As he writes:

He (Sheikh Abdullah) invited Nehru to be a guest of the National Conference (i.e. in May 1940). Nehru's tour of the state was a tremendous demonstration of public enthusiasm. Pt Jawaharlal's visit proved a turning point in the political career of Abdullah as well as in the history of the Freedom Movement.... For the first time in his life Abdullah and the National Conference came into the limelight and got publicity not only all over the subcontinent of India but even beyond its shores. These (two) events opened the eyes of Abdullah as to what Congressmen could do for him.... Sheikh Abdullah's dormant ambitions for the fame and power were aroused. He decided to go the whole hog with the Congress. (1)

Not only this but Nehru also had a strong hold among the leaders of the National Conference Party throughout.² All prominent leaders including Sheikh thus continuously paid tributes to Nehru for the philosophy he had provided to their organization.

Once Sheikh started backing out of the party ideology, he started losing ground both at the party and the governmental

1 P.N. Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (New Delhi, Kashmir Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 181-2.

2 For example, B.N. Mullik writes about the Nehru's influence in the state politics in 1952-53 that: "In India many people had expressed doubts about Pandit Nehru's hold on the people of Kashmir, but this internal tussle (between Sheikh and Bakshi), during which the Sheikh was doing his best to undermine Pandit Nehru's influence, showed how strong the latter's hold was. Even in Constituent Assembly whose members had been handicapped by the Sheikh, who had not allowed any opposition to grow, he could not carry the majority with him when he took an out-and-out anti-Indian stand". B.N. Mullik, My Years with Nehru: Kashmir (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 40.

level. Bakshi on the other hand stuck to the same position and came to represent the dominant group of the party. In a special session of the National Conference called in September 1953, a vote of confidence was passed in his favour. On 5 October 1953, the General Council of the National Conference passed a resolution, which unanimously asked for the removal of Maulana Sayid Masoodi from the position of the General Secretary of the party. The General Council of the party also gave him the free hand to constitute the Working Committee of the party.

On 5 June 1954 Bakshi announced the new National Conference Working Committee which consisted of, G.M. Sadiq, Sardar Budh Singh, G.L. Dogra, S.L. Saraf, Mir Jasim, Abdul Gani Trali, G.R. Renzoo, Sheikh Md. Akbar, R.P. Saraf, Moti Ram Baigra, Kushak Bakula, Ghulam Ahmed (Dev), Ghulam Ahmed (Poonchi), and D.P. Dhar. G.M. Rajpuri and Bakshi Abdul Rashid were retained as its secretaries. On 16 September 1954 he was unanimously elected as the President of the party. Before the 4 day 20th plenary session of the party began on 31 October 1954 Bakshi was taken in a procession that was - as the news reports said "the biggest rally that Kashmir has ever seen".³

Bakshi knew Sheikh's weakness, who had been widely unsuccessful on the economic front. He abolished the most hated

3 Successful Session of National Conference: Rank and File's Faith in Bakshi's Leadership, Times of India, 10 November 1954.

levy system, and cheapened the food prices. He knew that the age-old problem of Kashmiris was the food problem, and therefore, "he aimed at the root of the problem".⁴ As the Hindustan Standard correspondent wrote:

the new administration has realized - and rightly enough - that even God dare not come before a hungry man save in the garb of food. This dictum of Gandhiji is being practised in Kashmir today with understandable vehemence. The emphasis is on food with a capital F. (5)

Further Bakshi was not a stereotype of the tough party 'boss', but he was a good manipulator, mobilizer and an extraordinary organizational man. "Not political questions but the developmental programmes were his main concerns".⁶ Bakshi openly said that he did not like political uncertainty at the cost of development, i.e., the uncertainty of hanging between India and Pakistan. He declared that: "You cannot have each foot in a different boat without falling into a lake".⁷ And here, writes Taya Zinkin that: "Kashmiris are settling down to row the Indian boat and enjoy tourist boom.... For Indian middle class, Kashmir is the Switzerland of India and for Kashmiris tourists are boom."

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- 4 Ghulam Mohd. Mir [DCC President, Srinagar (Rural)], An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (Lasjan).
- 6 Bakshi Government Firmly in Saddle: Ameliorative Measures by New Regime", Hindustan Standard, 7 November 1953.
- 6 Ghulam Nabi Sogami, An Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.
- 7 See Taya Zinkin, "No Kashmir question in Kashmir: Prosperity Preferred to a Plebiscite", Ceylon Daily News, 2 October 1950.

Tourists equal prosperity and prosperity equals political stability".⁸ About Bakshi's popularity Rosenthal reported:

His enemies say he is hated by the people. This reporter toured the valley with him for two days. Thousands of persons greeted and cheered him along the way. Some of the demonstrations were arranged, many seemed spontaneous. And the fact remains that he travelled openly through villages and bazars without any form of security. (9)

With this, therefore, the myth of the personality cult was almost exploded and politics took more and more a problem solving turn. As, the Hindustan Standard's correspondent wrote from Srinagar that, almost^{in an} overnight as it were, Sheikh Abdullah became an exploded myth".¹⁰ Thus, writes an observer, who had seen and worked among the political elites of the state for a long time, that:

... Bakshi himself was a liberal-minded and large-hearted person with his feet planted strongly among the masses. ... though a man of not much formal education, he had tried to educate himself and fully understood all the intricacies of government business and the rules of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, and it was amazing how he mastered even the most intricate details of budget and of development plans. (11)

8 Ibid.

9 A.M. Rosenthal, "Changed Keynotes: Kashmir of India", New York Times, 29 July 1955.

10 "Bakshi Government Determined to Win Over the People", Hindustan Standard, 8 November 1953.

11 B.N. Mullik, n. 2, p. 54.

The talks of the plebiscite became only a concern of academic debate¹² and the so-called Kashmir question was completely relegated to the background (from the mind of the people). As writes Taya Zinkin that: "In Kashmir there is no Kashmir Question and the only person I met in Srinagar who worried, was an Assamese nurse who had been reading Indian papers"¹³.

Similarly after a tour of Kashmir the ex-labour Prime Minister Earl Attlee said:

Kashmir has definitely opted for India. It (Bakshi's regime) is thoroughly democratic with local self-government all the way up from the village ... Everyone in Kashmir and Jammu ... is convinced that division of the country has come to stay ... the present regime is successful ... (and) thoroughly democratic. (14)

An Italian journalist Riccardo Longone also wrote:

... The Kashmir problem does not exist in the minds of the citizens of the state. They are and they want to remain Indian.... The Kashmir problem, therefore, exists

12 For example, Rosenthal says: "Talk of Plebiscite is academic. In every village he (Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.) visits, the P.M. says it will not happen ... to talk about plebiscite he feels, is to make people uncertain of tomorrow, and so to stop work and progress, to create instability and religious hatred to endanger the Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India". A.M. Rosenthal, "Survey of Kashmir Regions Shows Region Firmly Welded to Indian Rule, Time, Money, Hardwork, and Power are Main Factors in New Delhi's favour - Talk of Plebiscite is considered in Academic," A Special to, Law York Times, 28 July 1956.

13 Taya Zinkin, n. 7.

14 Evening Star, 20 November 1956.

only for foreigners. ... The Kashmir question is, therefore, an invention of the Western Imperialist Powers. (15)

Bakshi thus, is credited with so many achievements in the development of the state, and its integration with India. Whole party, and especially leftists lend their full support to him, as long as they were given an appreciable representation in the party organization and in the government. But within less than three years time, a feeling started prevailing that the Sultan like Sheikh had been replaced by a new boss, Bakshi. The nepotism, corruption and maladministration, and magisterial style of Bakshi thus gave rise to the political divisions in the party. Within a span of only two years, said our informants that, Bakshi created a new class of rich contractors, forest-¹⁶lessees, shopkeepers, and corrupt officials. Further, when Bakshi tried to lessen the influence and representation of progressives in the party and government, the conflict came into open. The struggle for power, thus took place not to overthrow the dominant faction from power, for Bakshi by all means was an unchallenged leader; but to get (if not more) the same representation that the minority faction had enjoyed during 1953 to 1957. When Bakshi remained adamant, the open conflict led to a

15 Riccardo Longone, "An Italian Journalist in Kashmir", Hindustan Standard, 21 February 1957.

16 Based on the Interview with Miss Mehmooda Ali Shah (a close associate of Sadiq and at present PCC executive member): Interview on 13 September 1976; and G.M. Mir, n. 4.

split in the party.

Now, we will study the conflict between Bakshi and Sadiq, in detail by taking into consideration every possible factor that we came across in our study of the factional politics in the state.

Sadiq-Bakshi Conflict

The history of the struggle between Sadiq and Bakshi covers almost a decade of factional politics in the state. This period is generally known as Bakshi Era extending from 1953 to 1963. These two gentlemen known as the 'mini-Jawaharlal of Kashmir'¹⁷ and 'replica of Sardar Patel in the history of Kashmir'¹⁸ respectively always differed diametrically from each other. In 1953, the question of their very survival and political career made them join hands, but it was purely on an ideological plan of the party that they united against anti-state and anti-system elements of the party. As says Qasim: "We joined Bakshi on an all-India plan, and we wanted the constitution to be finalized and accession to be confirmed. As soon as this issue was over,¹⁹ we again came back to our original position".

17 Zainub Begum (Minister of State for Labour and Social Welfare, and the sister of late G.M. Sadiq): An Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

18 Shamlal Saraf (one of the stalwarts of Kashmir movement, and a very close associate of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed): An Interview, 24 September 1976, Srinagar.

19 Syed Mir Qasim (Union Minister for Civil Supplies and Cooperation): An Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

It was in 1957, therefore, that Sadiq and his followers, as Qasim said above, went back to their original position. But, this was the zenith of conflict. They actually differed with each other from the very beginning. For whereas Bakshi knew that "he became Prime Minister not because of his popularity, but solely by making Delhi happy, irrespective of his own ideas. Sadiq on the other hand was not for Delhi at all costs".²⁰ Though Sadiq wanted Delhi, but by taking the people together, and not by alienating the populace. This difference of outlook was mentioned in Pakistan Times as early as in November 1953 itself. According to this paper, though Bakshi and Sadiq spoke the same thing there was a difference in their style of speaking it. While Bakshi would say that there was no question of going back from accession, Sadiq said that only the people of the state can decide their fate, however, he thought it possible only in association with India.²¹ On the basis of data collected, however, a general opinion formed is that the differences seeped into their relationship by the year 1955.²² Their differences can be studied under the following heads:

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- 20 U.P. Saraf, An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).
- 21 "Kashmir Accession to India, Bakshi-Sadiq Conflicting Views", Pakistan Times, 17 November 1953.
- 22 Based on the Interview with M.K. Kaul, M.L. Fotedar, G.M. Mir (Lasjan), Zainub Begum, Begum Manzoo, Shamlal Saraf, Motiram Baigra, G.M. Rajpuri, Ghulam Nabi Sogani, Motilal Misri and Ayub Khan etc.

- (a) Conflict over the demand for democratization and liberalization,
- (b) Conflict over the demand for clean administration,
- (c) Conflict over allocation of tickets and electioneering,
- (d) Conflict over the Cabinet formation,
- (e) Conflict over organizational matters,
- (f) Conflict in 1962-63 period.

(a) Conflict over the Demand for Democratization and Liberalization

The need for democratization and liberalization appears as an article of faith with Sadiq indeed and in spirit. He disliked Sheikh for his Sultan-like behaviour, and again when he felt that Bakshi had become too powerful and boss-like in his behaviour, it naturally antagonized him. By 1955, everything was settled, and Bakshi was fully in the saddle. When political stability was achieved, "there emerged a school of thought in the National Conference that wanted to fight Sheikh politically".²³ It asked for the release of Sheikh, then request him to come on the political scene;²⁴ and if he refused to change his line then fight him politically, because "the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah", according to this school "was

23 M.L. Fotedar (MLA), An Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

24 G.L. Dogra (one of the tall men of Kashmir movement and very close associate of Sheikh): An Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

giving him more popularity".²⁵ Sadiq led this school, but as Dogra said, "he (Sadiq) was not the sole thinker, and all of us were united on this issue. Sadiq was only a symbol".²⁶ But the dominant faction led by Bakshi did not agree with it.²⁷

In their demand for democratization the Sadiq group asked for the following:

- (i) There should be collective leadership,
- (ii) democratic rights be restored,
- (iii) emotional integration with India be done, and not integration through popular alienation,
- (iv) Sheikh be released and fought politically,
- (v) bureaucratization and bossism be eliminated....²⁸

(b) Conflict over the Demand for Clean Administration

"Bakshi", remarks Trilochan Dutta, "was the leader of

25 Interview with Fotedar, n. 23.

26 Dogra, Interview, n. 24.

27 However, the then General Secretary of the National Conference, Bakshi Abdul Rashid said to this researcher that: "Sadiq Saheb never asked for political fight against Sheikh, it was always Bakshi Saheb who wanted to do it. And he released him for the first time (in 1953) when Sadiq was out of the Party". Bakshi Abdul Rashid (brother of late Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.): An Interview, 18 September 1976, Srinagar.

But this statement of Bakshi Rashid appears to be contrary to the facts gathered from different sources including interviews.

28 Based on the interviews with M.N. Kaul, M.L. Fatedar, Shamlal Saraf, Zainub Begum, Ranzoo Begum, Mir Lasjan, Mir Qasim, G.L. Dogra, Baldev Sharma, Chunnilal Sharma and many others. In fact, almost all repeated these issues.

the most opportunist elements".²⁹ The administration of Bakshi, thus is well known for many evils in the history of civil service in India.³⁰ Even one of his closest colleagues and a life-long lieutenant, for example, confessed that, "though Bakshi was a brave and iron man of Kashmir, who contributed to the nation in many ways, but one cannot forget the vices also of this virtuous man".³¹ These vices according to him were:

- (a) He was not very correct in choosing his colleagues, and
- (b) He could never listen to complaints against his relatives. (32)

Similarly, Zainub Begum says that, "Bakshi was a good man and mass leader but his relatives got him a bad name".³³

The conflict between Sadiq and Bakshi, naturally occurred when the former again and again demanded clean administration. And, it was under the Sadiq rule that a Commission was appointed to enquire into the details of the malpractices and maladministration under the Bakshi regime.

29 Pt. Trilochan Dutta, An Interview, 1 September 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).

30 See, for the maladministration, nepotism, and corruption etc. during Bakshi's regime, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry, constituted under S.R.O. - 39 dated 30th January 1965 (issued by the Home Department of Jammu and Kashmir to inquire into certain charges of misconduct against Bakshi Ghulam Mohd., Srinagar, 30 June 1967).

31 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

32 Ibid.

33 Zainub Begum, Interview.

(c) Conflict over Allocation of Tickets
and Electioneering

As the differences were already there on various matters (mentioned above), the election of 1957 provided an arena for the open conflict between Sadiq and Bakshi. Knowing that Bakshi had become too powerful and irreconcilable, Sadiq wanted an appreciable number of his followers as the party candidates for the coming elections. Bakshi on the other hand knowing that Sadiq was drifting away from him aimed at an overwhelming majority of his group in the coming elections, so that he could easily counter the moves of Sadiq. His brother Bakshi Abdul Rashid (the then General Secretary) was from the very beginning working against Sadiq and his group. Though elections were fought as a united party, the "two sides failed to reach an agreement",³⁴ about the allocation of tickets. B.K. Mullik, for example, notes:

Before the General Election, which took place in March 1957, a split had taken place in the Kashmir National Conference between the two top leaders -- Bakshi and Sadiq -- with their respective supporters ranged against each other. The dispute was over the allotment of seats for the forthcoming elections to the supporters of each other. (35)

Not having reached to an agreement, therefore, many dummy candidates were put (especially at the instance of Bakshi Abdul Rashid) by the Bakshi faction against the official candidates

34 B.K. Mullik, n. 2, p. 52.

35 Ibid.

belonging to Sadiq group. For example, Shamlal Saraf says:

Few official candidates put by the party were internally opposed by some of the office bearers of the National Conference, and especially by Bakshi Rashid, and even dummy candidates were set up against them. For instance, one such candidate was set up against Renzoo in which factionalism played a prominent role. Another man was Mir Lasjan, who faced such opposition. Both Renzoo and Lasjan were Sadiq's men, who lost the election and the dummy candidates were elected. (36)

"Even", says Saraf, "I was opposed by Rashid's men internally, but they did not succeed because barring few instances in which I sided with Sadiq, I was always Bakshi's closest colleague".³⁷

Renzoo Begum (wife of G.R. Renzoo) says that, "the ticket of the National Conference was given to Renzoo, but another man Ghazi Abdul Rehman, a famous 'goonda' was put to oppose him. They won the election in the name of religion, Pakistan, by condemning Renzoo as a Communist and by providing every type of help to Ghazi to get him elected".³⁸ For example, she further said, "at the time of counting electricity was cut off, our men were given 'Charas' (i.e. hashish) by mixing it in 'Pans' (betel leaves) and cigarettes".³⁹ Bakshi Rashid, however,

36 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

37 Ibid.

38 Tej Begum Renzoo (wife of G.R. Renzoo, and present PCC executive member, and AICC member): An Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

39 Ibid.

explained to this investigator that, "Ghazi Abdul Rehman was a great freedom fighter. He was popular and his very name as 'Ghazi' implies braveness. He, therefore, defeated Renzoo".⁴⁰ The other cases worth mentioning are those of A.G. Goni, Mohd. Anwar, Nadim and K.D. Sethi. Sadiq group opposed A.G. Goni's nomination because the latter had been actively involved in supporting the Plebiscite Movement immediately after August 1953 period, and it was agreed that Mohd. Anwar would be the party candidate in place of Goni. But later on this decision was changed and Goni was nominated without consulting Mohd. Anwar or Sadiq. Goni was then a follower of Bakshi and worked against Sadiq. Similarly, factional activity was evidenced in case of Nadim also. K.D. Sethi, however, could not be opposed by Bakshi's agents for various reasons. Thakur Bagh Singh, for example, told to this researcher that: "When I was S.H.O. in Poonch area, I had a good influence there among the people. Bakshi Rashid rushed there for the election campaign, and requested me to help him in defeating K.D. Sethi. I gave him a clear picture of the area and told that either the Jana Sangh nominee or K.D. Sethi are the only two possible candidates, who could succeed there in defeating anyone else. Bakshi Rashid then reluctantly agreed with K.D. Sethi's candidature, which according to him would serve their cause better than the Jana

40 Bakshi Abdul Rashid (brother of late Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.): An interview, 18 September 1976, Srinagar.

41

Sangh nominee".

On the whole, the defeat of Ghulam Rasool Renzoo (the Speaker of the Assembly) at the hands of Abdul Rehman Ghazi (an independent) in a triangular contest from Khanjar (Srinagar) created a thrill in political circles. Ghazi, on the other hand assured immediately after his election that he had full faith in Bakshi's leadership. "This", says Ayub Khan, "kindled the fire of long struggle between Sadiq and Bakshi".⁴² Only a few days after the election Rajendra Sareen noted the rampant factionalism and dissensions within the National Conference in the following words:

The thinking section of the National Conference leadership is, however, perturbed over the manifestation of factionalism carried to an irresponsible extent. It is a fact that in a good many constituencies the party's electoral fortunes were seriously endangered because of this. Independent observers feel that if allowed to continue unchecked this may lead to complications. (43)

The factions that were fighting were that of Bakshi and Sadiq. The elections helped Bakshi to entrench himself more firmly. The Sadiq group was the worst sufferer. As it was

41 Thekur Bagh Singh, An Interview, 30 September 1976, Jammu.

42 Ayub Khan (ex-PCC Chief), An Interview, 17 September 1976, Srinagar.

43 Rajendra Sareen, "The Kashmir Elections: Peoples Faith in Ruling Party, Need to Root out Factionalism", The Hindu, 9 April 1957.

noted: "Most of the members of this group have leftist leanings and the theory is put forward that they would be opposed to any leadership not in sympathy with their leadership".⁴⁴

Further the conflict occurred, when leftists demanded the political rehabilitation of Renzoo by his nomination to the legislative council. The rightists objected that Renzoo's backdoor entry would undermine the morale of the party workers.⁴⁵ Renzoo's special qualification for membership was that he was an expert on cooperative movement, and at last, therefore, he was nominated.

The major cause of a sharpening conflict, however, was neither Renzoo nor Bakshi or Sadiq - as all of them, because of their comradeship in the movement could reconcile, but Bakshi Abdul Rashid (the General Secretary of the National Conference) who came openly against the leftists. This we shall discuss under the rubric of 'conflict over organizational matters'.

(d) Conflict Over the Cabinet Formation

Immediately after the elections Bakshi was unanimously elected as the leader of the party by 65 of the 68 National

44 Conditions in Kashmir, The Hindu, 20 July 1957.

45 "Struggle for Power in National Assembly: A Story of Showdown that Did Not Come Off", Times of India, 26 July 1957.

Conference legislators (as three could not reach in time). After his election as a leader, a long debate took place between him and Sadiq about the composition of the Cabinet. But it produced no results. The real issue was the size of the Cabinet and representation of the Sadiq group in it. Sadiq is reported to have favoured a Cabinet as existed between 1953 and 1957. He demanded the inclusion of all his colleagues like Dogra, Qasim, and D.P. Dhar into the Cabinet. But Bakshi was reported to have agreed for only Sadiq's and Dogra's inclusion. 'Bakshi' was not prepared to take D.P. Dhar and Qasim as ministers into his cabinet in any case,⁴⁶ said one of our informants. According to Motiram Baigra, Bakshi wanted to disintegrate the Sadiq faction in the following way:

- (a) He wanted one of his colleagues in the ministry (either Sadiq or Dogra).
- (b) Another he wanted to be sent to the Parliament for 3rd Lok Sabha.
- (c) Third, he wanted to be a Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.
- (d) Fourth, that is, to D.P. Dhar, he was not prepared to give any position of power and influence. (47)

According to him, 'Bakshi in fact feared the mind and manipulating style of D.P. Dhar'.⁴⁸ About D.P. Dhar's style, says M.L.

46 Interview with Shamlal Saraf.

47 Moti Ram Baigra (Senior Vice President of PCC): An Interview, 9 September 1976, Srinagar (M.L.A. Hostel).

48 Ibid.

Misri that, "it was like that of Kairon and Sukhadia. He had a good reputation among the rank and file of the party. He was a dynamic person and his philosophy was power and money and not ideology. He sided with Sadiq and consequently joined the DNC (Democratic National Conference) not because of the Sadiq/Bakshi conflict, but because of conflict between him and Bakshi on the question of supremacy. Surprisingly, Bakshi feared and wanted to remove him, although he was only a Deputy Minister⁴⁹". Nehru's advise was that he be appointed an Ambassador to Chile but by that time D.P. Dhar identified himself with Sadiq. Thus, when the DNC was formed D.P. Dhar was elected as its Vice-President.⁵⁰

The new cabinet was larger in size than the previous one and four of the six cabinet ministers were new entrants to power. Only Sham Lal Saraf and Bakshi served in the past governments. All others; Dinanath Mahajan, Kotwal Chunnilal, Mir Ghulam Mohammed Rajpuri and Shamsuddin were new faces at the apex of power.⁵¹ The other members of Council of Ministers were Kushak Bakula, Harbans Singh Azad, Bhagat Chajju Ram, Abdul Gani Trali, M. Ghulam Nabi Wani Sogami, and Amarnath Sharma.

49 Moti Lal Misri (the General Secretary of the Democratic National Conference, 1957-60): An Interview, 23 September 1976, Srinagar.

50 Ibid.

51 Refer The Hindustan Times, 27 July 1957.

The government formed by Bakshi came as a surprise to all circles interested in Kashmir affairs. It was entirely a new team of Cabinet colleagues. This climaxed an impasse of several months and two weeks of unsuccessful negotiations between Sadiq and Bakshi. Thus, with this we find the consummation of nearly three years of long inarticulated differences between the two leaders. As wrote the Hindu correspondent from Srinagar at that time: "the last three years, it seems were full of breaches and rapprochements but neither side seemed to be prepared to take responsibility for the crisis. These relations were put to severe strain with the defeat of Ghulam Rasool Renzu ... since everyone knew that parting of ways was near".⁵²

The Sadiq group denied that they were hankering after power. But the dominant faction led by Bakshi declared their attitude as nothing but of power mongers. For example, Bakshi Rashid said: "There was a conspiracy against Bakshi Sahab by these power-mongers, who wanted to remove Bakshi Sahab from power. When Bakshi Sahab, offered the Chief Ministership to Sadiq (in 1953) he refused it out of fear and because of his inability to deliver the goods to the masses. He had no guts to face the masses, but his hunger of power was supreme. When Bakshi Sahab did not agree to take all his followers into his Cabinet, they formed the DEC. But they ultimately failed in their efforts, and begged Bakshi Sahab later (i.e. in 1960) to take them

back".⁵³ Similarly, Sogami says that: "On the one hand Sadiq had no courage to face Bakshi, but on the other he wanted to get jobs for all of his men. And, when this was not done, he started drifting away".⁵⁴

(d) Conflict over the Organizational Matters

Actually the conflict between Bakshi and Sadiq started when the latter found that Bakshi and his people had started dominating the organization; and the man resented most in the organization by the minority faction was Bakshi Abdul Rashid. "Since Bakshi Abdul Rashid", says Shem Lal Saraf, "was not only a very junior worker, but also a man of few letters, his selection for the post of the General Secretary of the Party was resented by some of the senior workers of the National Conference led by G.M. Sadiq".⁵⁵ "Bakshi Rashid", says, T. Dutta "was an absolutely illiterate person, but unfortunately he was made General Secretary of the party, that gave rise to dissensions and divisions".⁵⁶ Rashid's behaviour towards the workers and even towards the common man was not of a responsible leader. "Having full confidence of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed he encouraged and recruited workers of doubtful nature in the party. So much

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- 53 Interview with Bakshi Rashid.
 54 Ghulam Nabi Sogami, Interview.
 55 Interview with Shemlal Saraf.
 56 Interview with Trilochan Dutta.

so that, he introduced a type of factional working even in the rank and file of the party, which was always resented by the majority of the top leadership".⁵⁷

For three years everything was tolerated, but when Bakshi Rashid came out with all he had to eliminate the minority faction, an open conflict was obvious. This happened during and after the general elections of March 1957. Even the top leaders of minority faction openly started challenging Rashid at public meetings. As Sadiq while addressing a party meeting on 7 August 1957 in Srinagar, said:

After the changeover in 1953, the National Conference Convention had taken certain decisions regarding the functioning of the organization and its government, but these decisions had not been implemented so far. Instead certain elements had been encouraged within the conference who had resisted any organizational reform and had indulged in activities which had earned the National Conference the hostility (of the people). The General Secretary of the National Conference, for example, had gone to enjoy powers in organization and government, which have no parallel in the history of Kashmir, except perhaps during Pathan and Sikh regimes in the area. (58)

"These tendencies", he further said "led some of us to differ fundamentally with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed. Powerful elements within the National Conference had aggravated these differences

57 Shamlal Saraf, Interview.

58 "Differing with Bakshi: Statement by G.M. Sadiq", The Hindustan Times, 9 August 1957.

during the last general elections by their conduct which had led to further weakening of the organization. These elements had no stake within the organization except to further their self-interest through the concept of authoritarianism within the Conference and its government".⁵⁹

Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed in a cautious note said that, such interference by party workers was extremely undesirable, but he refuted Sadiq's charge by saying that, "... it would be hardly fair to accuse the organization ... and I think that the National Conference is at present in a much better position than it ever was since 1951-52".⁶⁰

Though, Bakshi enjoyed the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the legislators in the Assembly, Sadiq challenged Bakshi's parliamentary strength by declaring that: "it should not be the yardstick for assessing the real popular strength (of any group). The candidates to the present Assembly were chosen by the dominant group of the National Conference".⁶¹

By August, the differences between Sadiq and Bakshi had grown so much that they were reported not even on speaking terms, and talk of the formation of a new party was the topic of political discussion in various circles. The first step

59 Ibid.

60 "Improvement in Administration, Bakshi's Reply to Sadiq", The Hindustan Times, 10 August 1957.

61 "Sadiq Confident of People's Support", Pakistan Times, 20 August 1957.

towards this direction was the resignation by G.M. Sadiq, Mir Wasim, G.L. Dogra, D.P. Dhar, Ram Piara Saraf, and Moti Ram Balgra from the National Conference Working Committee, on account of fundamental differences on vital problems facing the state and party organization. On the same day, i.e. 6 August 1957, Bakshi told the pressmen that he had accepted the resignations of five of the six men on the advice of the Working Committee (the sixth being that of Sadiq). However, all of them continued to be the ordinary members of the organization. The reason for resignations said, Sadiq was a protest against "authoritarianism, and corruption within the organization and government, which had made it impossible for democracy to flourish in the state".⁶²

Bakshi, on the other hand criticised them by saying that: "it is indeed most astonishing and painful that those who had been occupying ministerial chairs for ten long years should now come out with statements only within ten days of leaving those chairs as if the whole shape of things both in the state administration and organization stood completely changed".⁶³

Within two days of their resignation, Bakshi announced the five new members of the 15-member executive committee. They were, Guru Dutt Sharma (President Kathua District, K.C.), Bhagat

62 "Corruption in Bakshi Party, Sadiq Gives Reasons for Resignation", Pakistan Times, 9 August 1957.

63 The Hindustan Times, 9 August 1957.

Chajju Ram (Minister of State), Hemraj Jandal (M.L.A. Udhampur), Mir Ghulam Mohamed Rajpuri (Industries and Commerce Minister) and M.N. Kaul (M.L.A. Anantnag Tehsil Conference President). Sardar Kulbir Singh (M.L.A.) was appointed Secretary of the Jammu Provincial National Conference.

For the reconciliation D.P. Dhar proposed the restructuring and revitalizing of the National Conference, on the basis of three point draft resolutions, which said that:

(i) The Working Committee should appoint two supervisory committees, one for Jammu and the other for Kashmir to conduct the party elections in October 1957.

(ii) Second, the draft suggested that a parliamentary board be set up to control the party affairs concerning the elections and Assembly work. The supervisory committees and the parliamentary board were not to have such members as would give the minority group a dominant vote.

(iii) Thirdly it suggested that Bakshi should resign from the Party Presidentship and Sadiq be made acting President.

This certainly was a technique of D.P. Dhar to achieve a balance between organizational and governmental machinery, for the success of democratization in the state. But, it certainly was also an attempt by the Sadiq group to capture the party organization, in order to capture the governmental machinery. Bakshi on the other hand, defended the status quo provisions for the functioning of the government democratically. The Conference

executive, according to him was functioning as a parliamentary board and he rejected the suggestions in toto by saying that: "I am not in agreement with these suggestions made in the draft resolution".⁶⁴

The view put forth by the Sadiq faction was criticized by the various political pundits also. Darem was one of them, when he says that: "The Sadiq group was obviously asking Bakshi Saheb to commit political suicide, when it demanded of him to step down from the Presidentship of the party at a moment when the two factions were already arrayed against each other in battle order. In fact the demand was in itself a manoeuvre in that factional battle. Besides, in the peculiar state of Kashmiri politics, it was imperative that the parliamentary wing and the organizational wing should be under the control of the same person. The Sadiq group's proposal would have straight away led to deadlock and prepared a bed of thorns for the Prime Minister".⁶⁵

The minority group when defeated at every point by the dominant faction, sent representatives to Delhi (as the dissidents from other states go) to put before the national leaders their grievances. Both Sadiq and Dhar met Nehru, Azad, Pant, and acquainted them about the state politics, and gave reasons

64 The Hindustan Times, 10 August 1957, Reply to Dhar.

65 Darem, "The National Scene, the Schism in Kashmir", Times of India, 21 August 1957.

for their resignation. But, taking into consideration the gravity of Kashmir, and morale of the government, the union leaders were reported to have showed no favour to their demands.⁶⁶ Even in other states also, it had been the policy of the National Leadership of the Congress to favour the dominant faction. Not only this, but it tried to restore a 'dominant faction system' by discouraging the 'bifactional system'.^{*} Thus, when no help to the minority faction came from the union leadership, an emergence of a new party became almost certain at any moment thereafter. Finally, on 18 August 1957, both the loaders declared in a press conference, after consulting the various leaders of Socialist and Communist parties that, a new party will be formed in the State Assembly very soon.⁶⁷ The process of factional fight to split was finally completed on 6 September 1957, when the Sadiq group severed the links with the National Conference and announced the formation of a new party named as the 'Democratic National Conference',⁶⁸ which implied that the party led by Bakshi was an undemocratic national conference. The reasons given for the formation of new party by

66 "Sadiq and Dhar meet Nehru", The Hindustan Times, 18 August 1957.

* Defined in next chapter; See under the heading of the 'emergence of bifactional system'.

67 "New Party to be formed in Kashmir: Announcement by Sadiq", Hindustan Standard, 19 August 1957; and see also, "New Party Move Disfavoured: Sadiq-Dhar Confer with Nehru and Azad", Hindustan Standard, 18 August 1957.

68 See, The Hindustan Times, 7 September 1957.

the Sadiq group were:

(a) the undemocratic group in the ruling national conference despite persuasion had failed to make a realistic appraisal of the situation in the state, and

(b) they had failed to improve the organizational weaknesses and defects, and only exploited emergency conditions created by external threats.⁶⁹

The most prominent members of the organization, barring few like Bakshi and Shamlal Saraf etc. came out of the organization. They included persons like Sadiq, D.P. Dhar, G.L. Dogra, Mir Qasim, Ram Piara Saraf, Krishan Dev Sethi and many others. But, surprisingly the known leftists like Giasuddin and few others did not favour the Democratic National Conference. Giasuddin, who is variously described as "dirty opportunist"⁷⁰ "third grade man"⁷¹ and "a Khana Badosh type [literally defined as Nomad but here the interviewee defined such people as a man knowing all languages], who believes in political opportunism but speaks the language of progressives".⁷² But Giasuddin himself gave the following reason for his not joining the Democratic National Conference. He said that, "the predominant

69 Refer Hindustan Standard, 20 October 1957. Call for Kashmir Defence, Sadiq Inaugurates New Party Convention. For a whole review of the rift, see, "Confusion Follows Rift in Ruling Party", Hindustan Standard, 23 November 1957.

70 Trilochan Dutta, Interview.

71 Ghulam Mohammed Mir (Poonchi) (PCC President): An Interview, 29 September 1976.

72 Ghulam Mohamed Mir (Lasjan), Interview.

factor in this conflict was that the Sadiq clique came closer to the complete control of the administrative machinery in the state. Thus, within the Communists there was a difference over it and we did not join the DNC. Our stand was finally vindicated, when Sadiq surrendered completely in 1960, and it was also said at that time that Sadiq was not a Communist".⁷³ Initially, it was expected that many would follow Sadiq, but many did not leave the power, in favour of Sadiq. Those who came out of the National Conference numbered 13 initially and later increased but on the whole this number (of 13 people) remained more or less constant up to 1960, when again a rapprochement took place between Sadiq and Bakshi, through the efforts of Nehru.

Their ouster from the organization was termed by Bakshi group as the "dispelling of the last vestiges of ideological confusion in its ranks",⁷⁴ and their resignations were regarded as "a calculated policy based on group and factional objectives".⁷⁵

But knowing that the opposition from outside the organization proved to be more ineffective than from within, Sadiq agreed with Nehru to rejoin the parent organization [the National Conference] when the latter [Nehru] requested him to do so in the interest of the nation. The Sadiq group as a

73 Pir Giasuddin, An Interview.

74 Times of India, 21 September 1957.

75 Ibid.

whole (with few exceptions like Motilal Misri, R.P. Saraf, and K.D. Sethi, who continued to run the DNC for some time) thus, returned to the National Conference in 1960. Immediately after 1962 elections, however, once again it was heard that there existed an enmity between Bakshi and Sadiq.⁷⁶

(e) Conflict in 1962-63 Period

In this period also there occurred conflicts between Sadiq and Bakshi. The most important issues on which they differed were following:

(a) About changing of the designations of the Prime Minister and Sadr-i-Riyasat as Chief Minister and Governor,

(b) Sadiq agreed with Nehru that Article 370 could not be kept for all time to come, and it will wither away. But Bakshi hesitated to do so,⁷⁷ and

(c) Thirdly, it was reported that Bakshi opposed the demand of converting the National Conference into a unit of the Indian National Congress.⁷⁸

76 "Bakshi Denies Rift in Cabinet", Times of India, 27 May 1962.

77 "Kashmir Scene: Rumours of Rift in Cabinet - Merger of Parties", The Statesman, 10 August 1962; see also, "Focus on Kashmir, Bakshi-Sadiq Rift: Rumours Confirmed", The Indian Express, 17 August 1962.

78 "Kashmir Still An International Issue, Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed", Pakistan Times, 31 August 1962.

Conclusion

The Sadiq-Bakshi correspondence ⁷⁹ is, perhaps the only available yardstick of determining the conflict between their respective factions, as far as the written documents on this topic are concerned. Though it is a fact that Sadiq from the very beginning had been representing the progressives of the state, and the Democratic National Conference was dominated by an overwhelming majority of prominent leftists of the state (some of them even being the avowed adherents of scientific socialism); the correspondence between the two leaders does not show that the conflict was over ideological and theoretical issues. One of its key leaders also confessed to this investigator that: "there was no difference between the ideologies of ⁸⁰ the National Conference and the Democratic National Conference". The conflict appears more and more on the organizational and administrative level. In fact, it was a struggle for power between the progressives and conservatives. Finally, as it resolves round the personalities of Sadiq and Bakshi, it was a kind of personality clash also.

The conflict occurred, when a dominant faction led by Bakshi attempted to eliminate the nearly 17 years of dominance

79 See Sadiq-Bakshi Correspondence (Published by Motilal Misri, Convenor, Democratic National Conference, Kashmir Province, Printed at Nishat Press, Abi Guzar, Srinagar 1957).

80 Mir Qasim, Interview.

[1940 to 1957] of the progressives, whose intellectual superiority was not even challenged by Sheikh Abdullah's regime. Though the organizational consensus was in favour of Bakshi, for he was the leader of the dominant faction, the Sadiq group refused to agree with Bakshi's dictation.

It appears from this study that the main differences arose out of the approach to various organizational problems. Bakshi Rashid was not only objected to by top leaders as a candidate for the General Secretary but when selected he encouraged factionalism within the party. Bakshi (Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.) being polite to the omissions and commissions of his kith and kin, only resented the resentments of minority faction against his brother, and from here onwards a type of organizational crises continued. Bakshi being a leader of the dominant faction wanted the consensual arrangement, but Sadiq claiming the intellectual skill of his faction wished to take ad-hoc decisions at the top. Thus some of Bakshi's men claim on this basis that, "Bakshi in a way operated more as a democratic leader than Sadiq, because whereas Sadiq wanted a small elite to dominate, Bakshi was in favour of a broad based consensus. Sadiq's technique and approach was not acceptable to the various belts of the party organization, and on the other hand Bakshi's reliance on their approval gave him an image of the 'people's leader'".⁸¹

81 Ghulam Mohd. Rajpuri (a very close associate of Bakshi): An Interview, 18 September 1976, Srinagar.

The correspondence between Bakshi and Sadiq that started immediately after the elections runs into 68 pages consisting of 14 letters from each. It deals mainly with the accusation levelled against Bakshi, e.g., bureaucratization, nepotism, corruption, and maladministration etc. Sadiq expressed his grudge over the nomination^{of} man like A.G. Goni and the defeat of his colleague G.R. Renzoo, and urged the latter's nomination to the Legislative Council. He also drew attention to the sorry state of the National Conference. The correspondence also mentions that the differences were there not because of the clash between these two persons (Sadiq and Bakshi) but because of the whole atmosphere. ⁸² In his introductory remark Moti Lal Misri charges that some of the members of the National Conference openly propagated communalism with the blessing of their official friends. He says that the nomination had shown the irresponsible behaviour against their own nominees, those in power gave an open show of opportunism and selfishness, and regarded goondalism and hooliganism as their creed. Further, he complained about money making techniques, efforts to propagate a personality cult, bossism and indifference to the people, and the dependence on the governmental machinery; all of which combined (according to him) had diminished the popular character of the National Conference. Finally, he says that even the

82 See Motilal Misri, "Sadiq-Bakshi Correspondence", Foreword, n. 79.

President and the General Secretary of the National Conference became later, hurdles in setting right the organizational character of the party. Their unchecked absolute power he charges, had corrupted the whole organization and government absolutely. They chose yesmen encouraged factionalism, and launched propaganda even against the leaders of standing. All these factors, therefore, led to an inevitable split in the party.⁸³

Finally, remaining out of power for three years, when the Sadiq faction realized that they could not achieve their purposes from without they again rejoined the National Conference in 1960. Now, in the next chapter we will describe how Sadiq came to power, the emergence of Congress in the state, and a detailed study of the Sadiq-Qasim conflict.

Chapter V

FACTIONALISM

Chapter V

FACTIONAL POLITICS BETWEEN 1965 AND 1970

This chapter seeks to explain the developments of the factions and factional politics in the ruling party of the state between 1965 and 1970 period. By the year 1965 we find that the Indian National Congress had organized itself in the state of Jammu and Kashmir also. Not only this, but it also became the ruling party of the state, when the top leadership of the National conference decided to make it a part and parcel of the Congress, by converting it into the Congress Party of Jammu and Kashmir. It had remarkable impact on both the factional as well as the overall politics of the state. With this, therefore, we find at least a dawn of intra-party democracy in the ruling party of the state. Here, in this chapter, we will first describe the major political change, and then a detailed study of the Sadiq-Qasim rift.

The Dawn of Intra-Party Democracy in the Ruling Party of the State

Since Sadiq's succession to power in 1964, many significant events took place in the political history of Jammu and Kashmir, that changed the political process of the state remarkably. Towards the end of 1964, the President of India, on the recommendation of the state government issued an order that extended the Articles 356 and 357 to the state. The state leadership also declared its willingness to change the nomenclature of the Sedar-i-Riyasat (the Head of the State) and the

Prime Minister to the Governor and the Chief Minister respectively. But these provisions facilitated the integration of the state with India only legally. Sadiq, on the other hand, from the very beginning had been advocating the emotional integration of the state with India. Two major steps taken towards this direction under his rule (though these are usually ignored) were: the conversion of the National Conference into the Congress, and the policy of liberalization which was a natural corollary of the Congress Party.

Both the emergence of the Congress in the state and its adherence to liberalization policy changed the state political process beyond recognition. A complete intra-party democracy in the ruling party of the state was achieved as a result of the ruling elite being under the direct control of the Congress High Command on the one hand, and subjected to the different pulls and pressures within the party on the other. The power was decentralized from Halqa Congress Committee¹ level to the executive of A.I.C.C. Here we are, however, chiefly concerned with the factional politics in the Congress Party.

By intra-party democracy in the Congress Party, we mean an almost ever present factional character of this party. We find factions in its organization from village level to the top.

1 And, the District Congress Committee can constitute a village level committee, known as Gram Committee whenever it feels necessary. See Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir Pradesh Congress Committee, Article II, note.

Though this study does not intend to study the factionalism at different levels, it was revealed to us through every level of the Congress hierarchy.

The very emergence of the Congress Party in the state was greatly influenced by Sadiq-Bakshi conflict. After 1953 the National Conference had become a type of Bakshi Party. At the time of succession, there were no more than 15 to 20 people in the Legislature of 75 who favoured Sadiq's succession to power. Bakshi was the only king-maker. For achieving this, Lal Bahadur Shastriji was deputed by his political Guru Jawaharlal Nehru to Kashmir, after the former's successful mission there during the Holy Relic Theft. Shastriji, according to a political pandit, had the following tasks before him:

- (i) to replace the Prime Minister Shamusuddin,
- (ii) the new Prime Minister was to be opposite to Bakshi faction,
- (iii) the next Prime Minister was to be either Sadiq or Qasim. (2)

Bakshi being a trusted lieutenant of India from the very beginning, Shastriji was able to prevail upon him to get Sadiq elected as the leader of the party. ³ Finally on 28 February 1964, Sadiq was unanimously elected as a leader of the National

2 Prem Bhatia, "Premier of Kashmir to be Replaced", Guardian, 24 February 1964.

3 "Lal Bahadur Shastri," wrote K. Rangaswami, "with a characteristic patience and persuasive skill, has succeeded in his political mission in Kashmir". K. Rangaswami, "Inside Kashmir Today", The Hindu, 27 February 1964.

Conference legislature party. But, when invited by Sadiq, Shamusuddin, the ousted Prime Minister declined to join the cabinet. It was nearly six months after this that an independent member gave a notice of censure against the Speaker, and Sadar-i-Riyasat prorogued the legislature. It was said that Bakshi was not sitting idle.⁴ Thus Bakshi was arrested on 22⁵ September 1964 on charges of corruption and other offences. Now Sadiq and his colleagues realized that the days ahead were extremely difficult for the democratic functioning of the state. It was difficult to run the government, when the National Conference legislature party was dominated by Bakshi's men, and Bakshi was put behind the bars. The vital problems that Sadiq group was facing were: the opposition from the Bakshi faction, and achieving of emotional integration with India. So, they

4 See The Indian Express, 23 September 1964. "Full circle"

Cyril Dunn notes that, "Bakshi had drawn up a no confidence motion against the Speaker of the House. But the Speaker is one of Sadiq's men". Cyril Dunn, "Kashmir: Drastic Action Saves India's Man", The Observer, 29 September 1964.

5 However, it was viewed that Bakshi in order to avoid the proposed inquiry against him launched the strategy to get rid of Sadiq for ever. See for the details of Bakshi's arrest and its background, Cyril Dunn, "Kashmir: Drastic Action Saves India's Man", The Observer, 29 September 1964; Rawle Knox, "Kashmir's Rivals for Power", Daily Telegraph, 29 September 1964; and K. Rengaswami, "Background to Bakshi's Arrest", The Hindu, 29 September 1964.

hit on the idea, that would kill two birds with a single shot. This idea was, of organizing the Congress Party in the state, by converting the then National Conference into the Congress Party of Jammu and Kashmir. It certainly helped Sadiq and his colleagues to destroy the Bakshi faction and its dominance in the legislature.⁶ He and his three closest colleagues - Syed Mir Qasim, D.P. Dhar and Trilochan Dutta, worked hard in this direction and finally it was achieved when at their request the Durgapur Session of the Indian National Congress amended its constitution on 10 January 1965, to provide the extension of its activities to Jammu and Kashmir. And on the occasion of the

6 Shamlal Saraf, for example, says, "Sadiq found that he could not find the majority either in the Assembly or the National Conference Party. On both these Bakshi continued to have his full influence and it was, therefore, natural that they contrived a plan of controlling both the party and the legislative wing of it. The plan was - converting of the National Conference into the Congress. Thus, they held the meeting of the party in Jammu, in which myself and Bakshi were not invited. Bakshi was the President on leave and I was the treasurer of the Organization".

Shamlal Saraf, An interview, 24 September 1976, Srinagar.

To a question: "How far the Sadiq-Bakshi conflict was responsible for organizing the Congress Party in the state," Qasim admitted that, "Bakshi was a man whom Sadiq always feared. And their claim is partially true that the National Conference was transformed into Congress because Bakshi still controlled the party. It is also true that these people were not deliberately taken into Congress by Sadiq because he thought that if Bakshi joined the Congress he would make his hold here also. I think that Bakshi had enough capability to do so. Thus, Sadiq Sahab acted rightly, when he disagreed with Bakshi's joining of Congress".

Syed Mir Qasim, Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

Republic Day of India in 1965, "the new party unit was formally⁷ launched by Sadiq and the National Conference was dissolved."

But once the party was organized, the opposition was reduced to possible minimum, and the Congress Party emerged as the dominant party in the state, factionalism immediately started plaguing it. Since then the party has been unable to come out of the clutches of factional struggle. The history of factional politics in the Congress Party of Jammu and Kashmir, therefore, provides an exciting case study of the struggle for power in the post-1966 era. We, however, will cover the period only up to 1970, by taking the Sadiq-Qasim conflict.

SADIQ-QASIM CONFLICT

The Sadiq-Qasim rift provides a highly complex phenomenon of factional alignments and realignments. It is an intricate game of power-politics in which various groups are submerged into two major factions led by Qasim and Sadiq respectively. Here, even the conflict between the various other personalities belonging to both groups is identified with their names. Thus, it provides a thought provoking study, in which we will see, as to how the development of factional politics revolves round the two personalities. Here, we will also see, how in the course of time, both Sadiq and Qasim represented the various

7 Balraj Puri, "Jammu and Kashmir" in Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India (Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 236.

conflicting forces in the state politics.

Sadiq-Hasim Relationship

Both Sadiq and Hasim were good friends - politically as well as on personal level. Sadiq was one of the tall men of the Kashmir movement, who played a unique role in the political history of the state since 1930's; for example, in the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference, the state's accession to India, fighting against the anti-Indian forces by joining hands with Bakshi, in opposing single-handedly the degeneration of the Bakshi regime, and in the conversion of the National Conference into the Indian National Congress etc. Therefore, the present PCC President (a bitter opponent of Sadiq during Sadiq-Hasim conflict days) said that, "Sadiq was the greatest patriot and progressive Kashmir had ever produced".⁸ Sadiq as a man was gentle by nature, an intellectual of high order and dedicated to Nehruism and influenced by Marxism. "Perhaps the only well-read person among the whole state leaders", says M.N. Kaul, "he could impress anyone with his understanding and analytic mind".⁹ He was a very good strategist and a tradition setter, rather than the tradition follower. His honesty and integrity was beyond doubt at all time and places, during his

8 Mufti Mohd. Sayeed (President, PCC, Jammu and Kashmir): An Interview, 24 September 1976, Srinagar (PCC Office).

9 M.N. Kaul, An Interview, 13 September 1976, Srinagar.

long inning of public dealings. Even his political enemies had a respect for these qualities of Sadiq. For example, one of his key opponent (during the time of his rift with Qasim) says that, "Sadiq was an incorruptible person surrounded by corrupt persons".¹⁰

Sadiq was more and more a statesman than a politician,¹¹ but Qasim was essentially a politician of high order. Whereas Sadiq was a good strategist and policy maker, Qasim was an intelligent and extraordinary organizer. He was not as well read as Sadiq was, but his public dealings and reputation among the rank and file of the party was immense.¹² Qasim was a very good orator, and "even better than Sadiq. Whereas Sadiq was a versatile genius, having capability to speak on any topic, anywhere and at any time; Qasim was better than him only in public oratory".¹³ Qasim was not as outspoken as Sadiq or Bakshi

- 10 Mohd. Shafi Qureshi (Union Minister of State for Railways), An Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.
- 11 S. Nihal Singh, for example, wrote during the Qasim-Sadiq conflict days that: "... Sadiq can well claim that he has dared to criticize the Sheikh in public meetings, but the C.M. (Chief Minister) is no politician. He has little personal following, although his personal integrity is by and large, still accepted". S. Nihal Singh, "Mood of Uncertainty and Confusion in Kashmir", The Statesman, 7 October 1969.
- 12 "Qasim", says Mohd Shafi Qureshi, "has had a very wide circle of friends and tremendous patience in his dealing and contacts with party workers and he never tires of meeting people, as many as they are". Mohd. Shafi Qureshi, n. 10.
- 13 Nakhai Lal Fotedar, An Interview, 18 September 1976.

were, but what made him a leader was his organizational capacity. In fact, his style of politics was the blending of Bakshi's managerial and Sadiq's intellectual inspiration, both of which made him a fully developed man and an organizer par excellence. One of our informants, for example, said, "Sadiq Sahab helped him in his intellectual growth by introducing him to the world of books"¹⁴. As compared to Qasim, Sadiq was a big figure, but Sadiq's intellectual guidance moulded him (Qasim) for a bigger role.

Qasim was brought into prominence by Bakshi, Sadiq, and D.P. Dhar.* Bakshi brought him into the ministry, Sadiq made him his closest friend, and D.P. Dhar helped him throughout to make a balance in the sharing of power between Sadiq-Qasim, himself and Trilochan Dutta. According to Motilal Misri, however, "Qasim became prominent in the Democratic National Conference, because of his appeal to the peasantry. He himself came from a peasant family and therefore his method of mass contact was unique"¹⁵. According to one of his strong opponent of today (but a close friend during the days of his rift with Sadiq), however, "only luck made Qasim a Cabinet Minister. He is a clever, shallow, hypocritic, and impotent man. He sided

14 Manohar Nath Kaul, Interview, n. 5.

* Here onward we will use DP in place of D.P. Dhar.

15 Moti Lal Misri, An Interview, 23 September 1976, Srinagar.

with Sadiq because, to be with Sadiq for him was to be on the safer side, and DP supported him only out of his common sense¹⁶. "To begin with", says Qasim himself, "I was with Beg, and then I came under the influence of Karra during the years 1948-49-50. And by 1950, I fully aligned with Sadiq"¹⁷. Since this time we find both Sadiq and Qasim as intimate friends who had decided to swim and sink together and, in fact, they did so for a long time. They worked together without any distinction of superior and inferior. Though Qasim always regarded Sadiq as an intellectual and his senior, Sadiq never forgot to consult him in a friendly style and to take his advice on every important matter, and both held similar views publicly or otherwise for more than 15 years in state politics. Their respect and love towards one another is still unparallel.¹⁸ But when power seeped into their relationship, differences developed. With power, therefore, we find even the best friendship cemented through a long period of

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- 16 Trilochan Dutta, An Interview, 1 September 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).
- 17 Syed Mir Qasim (Union Minister for Civil Supplies and Co-operation): An Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.
- 18 Even when their conflict reached at its zenith, says Qasim, "We never forgot to respect and love one another. When I resigned in March 1969, Sadiq was upset and depressed. His feeling was that of a genuine friend. He told me affectionately, 'Yesterday you were with me, why did it suddenly today'. He also told me, 'We are such close friends, but if you leave me, it is up to you'. I really loved him, but when I did not agree with him, I also hated him. So, it was a decision on my part in politics of love and war". Syed Mir Qasim, n. 17.

joint sacrifices and love being cracked suddenly. Power, thus, made the two close friends Qasim and Sadiq bitter political opponents of one another. Now we will see, in the following pages as how the conflict between them developed in a particular period.

The obvious indications of rift between Sadiq and Qasim are evident after the 1967 election, and Qasim also admitted frankly that their difference started only after the 1967 election. But we will describe here the major developments since 1964 itself (when Sadiq came to power), because it will help us understand the background to the rivalry between Qasim and Sadiq more properly.

Conflict at the Developing Stage

Sadiq succeeded Shamusuddin on 28 February 1964 as the Prime Minister of the state. "At that time", says Qasim "Bakshi and Shastriji approached me to be the Chief Minister, but I flatly refused. I said, 'I have a senior leader (Sadiq), who is seasoned and wise'. If I would have become the Chief Minister, Sadiq Sahab would not have opposed me, because our friendship was well established, and even Sadiq asked me to become the Chief Minister".¹⁹ "From Bakshi's side", he added, "it was a move to break our group, and in the long run even Sadiq Sahab would not have supported me. Thus, I wanted him (Sadiq), to take the

19 Ibid.

responsibility".²⁰ Fearing Bakshi's intention when M.N. Kaul approached Qasim (because Bakshi's men liked Qasim more than Sadiq), the latter told him that, "it was too late".²¹ Further Qasim knew Nehru's mind and, at the same time he did not like to betray Sadiq. Thus, Sadiq came to power with the genuine support of his erstwhile colleagues.

In the initial period Sadiq strictly followed the principles of collective leadership. This collective leadership consisted of Sadiq, Qasim, Trilochan Dutta²² and DP. About this regime, according to TD two slogans were popular: "Imandar Hakumat Aur Char Doston Ki Hakumat (i.e. Honest Rule and Rule of Four Friends). Mutual trust and confidence in each other was the secret of good rule and each of us tried to take the maximum possible".²² Inder Malhotra also testifies this, when he wrote, "there is no doubt that after a long time--and that includes the period when Sheikh himself was the Prime Minister--Kashmir has an outstandingly good government and his three colleagues are men of intelligence and integrity".²³

20 Ibid.

21 Manohar Nath Kaul, An Interview, n. 9.

* Henceforth we will use TD in place of Trilochan Dutta.

22 Interview with Trilochan Dutta, n. 16.

23 Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary, Sheikh Aiming At Change in Kashmir Status: Firm Refusal to Accept Accession as Settled", The Statesman, 17 April 1964.

In the year 1965 Qasim voluntarily left the cabinet to take the PCC leadership and to work exclusively for the Congress organization in the state. And, "it was since 1965", says Ayub Khan, "I saw the difference of attitude between Sadiq and Qasim, but I cannot recollect any obvious issue on which they differed. When I asked Qasim Saheb about it, he would reply that only he and Sadiq knew about it".²⁴ Similarly, Fotedar says that, "factionalism in the Congress Party in Jammu and Kashmir basically originated in 1966, but germinated in 1965".²⁵ It germinated in 1966, on a very trivial matter.* However, we are not able to locate the rift between the two before the 1967 elections.

In the meanwhile, Qasim and DP were found differing with each other. Whereas Sadiq poised himself to be an overall leader and thus above factionalism, Qasim and DP were vying for gaining maximum representation of their group in the party and government.

1967 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND DIFFERENCES OVER THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES

The rift between various political leaders cropped up for the first time during the 1967 General Elections. It occurred

24 Ayub Khan (Ex-PCC Chief): An Interview, 17 September 1976, Srinagar (Jawahar Nagar).

25 Makhan Lal Fotedar, An Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

* This researcher is unable to tell about this trivial issue, but it is hoped that he will be able to find it out in due course, as his informant has promised him to tell about it in future.

over the allocation of tickets to the various group members or to be more specific, over the selection of candidates. Though these facts were not mentioned by the news media at that time, through the interviews it was unfolded that such disputes were wide-spread. Few of them to be mentioned for example are: Ghulam Qadir Beddar (Sadiq's man), Makhan Lal Fotodar (DP's man),²⁶ Mir Lasjan (DP's man) etc., on whose case the conflict occurred over the selection of the candidates. And, Srikanth Kaul says that, "there were differences over distribution of tickets between Sadiq and Qasim. I was the choice of Sadiq, but other persons like Qasim, DP, TD, and Kar²⁷ opposed my nomination. Dr Karan Singh, however, remained neutral". But later on Sadiq considering himself the undisputed leader of the party did not interfere much. Whereas TD and DP were made the election incharges of Jammu province, Kashmir and Ladakh were under the charge of Qasim.

Qasim in Majority, but Sadiq Elected Unanimously As the Leader

When the election results were declared and the Congress

26 M.N. Kaul, Interview.

27 Srikanth Kaul, An Interview, 16 September 1976.

* It was the main reason of Sadiq's having a very small faction (as compared to Qasim) when Congress returned to power with an overwhelming majority. Thus he had to rely on the people like - Pir Qasuddin, Ghulam Labi, Sogami and G.M. Rajpuri etc. On the other hand, DP, Qasim and TD unitedly had almost a full control over both legislative and the organizational wing of the party.

returned to power with an appreciable majority, it became a known factor that in case of a contest, Qasim would be elected as the leader of the Congress legislature party. Both Sadiq and DP, therefore, joined hands and outmanoeuvred Qasim. In fact it was the crafty diplomat DP who made Qasim's way to Chief Ministership difficult by his trickery. DP knew that when the legislature would meet someone might propose Qasim's name, therefore, he consulted and persuaded Qasim to forsake the idea, and advised his followers not to propose his (Qasim's) name. ²⁸ One of DP's men appreciate this action of his leader in the following words:

DP sided with Sadiq in outmanoeuvring Qasim and made the unanimous election of Sadiq a possibility. He did it in the national interest. He asked Qasim to head the government, knowing that the latter will refuse to do so; and, thus, he, in a unique statesmanly style got Sadiq elected. (29)

That Qasim, however, did not like this intriguing against him is clear when he said to this interviewer in an indignant tone that: "If there would have been an election I would have won. But DP and TD indicated that they preferred Sadiq to me. According to them Sadiq was a mature leader, and was not functioning as a group leader". ³⁰ He manifestly disliked DP's style,

28 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

29 Makhan Lal Fotedar, Interview, n. 23.

30 Interview, New Delhi, 7 October 1976.

and said, "DP, throughout his activities created differences between various personalities, and between myself and Sadiq Saheb also". But he refused to reveal anything further, by saying, "as he is not in this world now, I do not want to speak anything against him".³¹

Conflict Over the Composition
of Government

When the government was formed by Sadiq, it was disliked by Qasim because his group went almost unrepresented in it. Further, at the time of the formation of the government, Sadiq promised the easing out the black faces from the ministry. The Qasim group was surprised as to whom Sadiq regarded as black faces, because it was his group that was least represented. "Thus a disenchantment was created",³² since then. Similarly, Zainub Begum also recalled of Sadiq declaring in a party meeting before the formation of government, that he would not take those people in the government whose reputation among the people was not good. "They did not like it. Sadiq preferred Giasuddin, Gurumukh Singh, Ch. Mohd. Shafi and Bandey from the upper house. Kar, Mufti, Loor Mohd., DP, TD, Ayub Khan, Goni, Ranjit Singh, G.L. Dogra were from the lower house. Qasim on the other

31 Interview with Qasim.

32 See the "Sadiq-Mir Qasim Rift Episode Still Unresolved", Assam Tribune, 1 May 1969.

hand wanted more men from the lower house".

Therefore, the rift started immediately after the 1967 elections itself on the issue of cabinet composition, when some of the members of the cabinet were not liked by the other three erstwhile colleagues of Sadiq. They were persons like Giasuddin and G.M. Rajpuri etc., whose public image according to Qasim, TD and DP was questionable and, therefore, did not enjoy the confidence of the party. They were charged with many mischievous activities during the Kamraj Plan and after. Further, these people posed as progressives, but secretly asked Bakshi to flout the spirit of the Kamraj Plan. They had no political backing, aligned with Bakshi and adopted many undemocratic method during Bakshi's regime. Thus, the feelings of Qasim and his colleagues were aroused when Sadiq firmly decided to have them in the government. ³⁴ Qasim especially had strong reasons for resentment over the cabinet composition. Because those included in the ministry were: DP's men like Mufti Mohd. Sayeed, Noor Mohd. (in the initial period), Ghulam Rasool Kar and Mir Lasjan on the one hand; and Sadiq's followers, such as

33 Further, Zeinub Begum complained that, whereas in 1967 they wanted all men (in the government) from the Lower House, in 1972 when Qasim formed the ministry both Mufti (a full-fledged minister) and Lasjan were from the Upper House. Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar.

34 Based on the Interviews with Makhan Lal Fotedar, op. cit., and Baldev Sharma, 18 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA Hostel) See also, for this "Sadiq-Qasim Talks Not Fruitful", The Statesman, 13 June 1969.

G.L. Dogra, Giasuddin, Sogami etc., on the other. TD was more or less neutral at that time.³⁵ The leaders who could be called as strong Qasimites were: Mohd. Ashraf Khan, Abdul Gani Lone, Ghulam Mustafa Mir, Abdul Qayoom, Mohd. Anwar Khan, Ghulam Hassan Masoodi, Master Beli Ram, Mangat Ram,^{*} Abdul Rashid, Ch. Mohd. Aslam etc.³⁶

Election for PCC and Qasim Route
Sadiq's Nominees

Subsequently, after the election, when some (five or six) members were to be elected to the PCC from the legislature, Qasim's men routed Sadiq's nominees on the basis of his strength in the legislature. In this Moor Mohamed (by now he had left his loyalty to DP and identified himself with Sadiq), the Deputy Education Minister, Mohd. Shafi, Gurumukh Singh (Deputy Rehabilitation Minister) etc. were defeated. All Qasim's men like Mohd. Ashraf Khan, Abdul Qayoom etc. were elected as PCC members.³⁷ It shows that there was lack of unanimity between Sadiq and Qasim. It also shows that Qasim enjoyed the predominant position both

35 Though TD was initially a DP's man, he did not oppose Qasim because his feeling was that Qasim could succeed Sadiq. (Based on an interview with M.P. Kaul).

* Though Mangat Ram during this period identified himself with TD, who also had a substantial following and a major faction of his own in the Congress Legislature Party.

36 Based on the Interviews.

37 Based on the Interviews.

in the legislature and the organizational wings of the party. Further, in the early 1968 when Sadiq wanted to send his man Ali Mohd. Tarik to the Rajya Sabha, Chunnilal Sharma (the then Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council) and M.N. Kaul proposed the name of Sayed Hussain (the elder brother of Qasim).³⁸ To this proposal all PCC members agreed and later even Sadiq agreed to it, when he saw no other way out.³⁹

Mir Qasim was able to create a large following for himself because of his very close contacts with the rank and file of the party. Almost every worker had free access to him. Because of his tremendous patience, he listened to all the workers and established close-knit linkages with them. Sadiq, on the other hand, was temperamentally unlike him. Though he was a man of superior qualities and ability than Qasim, it is the organizational skill that matters in factional politics. Thus, one of our informants said: "Everyone had a respect for Sadiq, but Qasim's men were supported by all. Thus Qasim showed that his style would prevail upon Sadiq's. Sadiq was needed to educate the masses in general, but Qasim was needed to include the masses into the party and make them committed".⁴⁰

38 Interview with M.N. Kaul, op. cit., and Chunni Lal Sharma, 10 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA Hostel).

39 According to Chunni Lal Sharma, "it was here onwards that Sadiq Sahab started suspecting Qasim's activities". An interview, 10 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA Hostel).

40 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

Lack of Mutual Trust Overtakes
Sadiq and Qasim

From the data collected through several interviews, it is disclosed that the conflict started between Sadiq and Qasim, when there developed a lack of trust and thereby disagreements between them. It was a two way process. On the one hand, when everyone started following Qasim, Sadiq suspected that he (Qasim) was all out to remove him from the Chief Ministership. On the other hand, when Qasim's faction was not well-represented in the ministry he naturally thought that Sadiq was on the advance to destroy his faction. Further, Sadiq's henchmen made him think that according to everyone he was a toy in the hands of Qasim, TD, and DP. Thus, Sadiq made peace with old adversaries (like Giasuddin, G.M. Rajpuri etc.) and changed his style of working. He changed his entire ministerial team, and there was a marked difference in the Sadiq government before the 1967 elections and after them. Thus, when Sadiq started asserting himself as the virtual leader of the party and taking decisions without consulting his colleagues, disagreements and conflicts started occurring frequently. Whereas the Qasim group thought that only collective leadership could provide a good rule; Sadiq on hearing from many peoples that he was acting as a dummy Chief Minister decided to act as the virtual Chief Minister (that he thought was taking decisions by himself, and without consulting anyone). About this change of style, Ayub Khan says that, "for example C.M. would not consult the

⁴¹
PCC Chief".

The Qasim group thought that the collective leadership was essential because Sadiq was physically incapable to deal with any situation single-handed. They did not like the people who were gathering around Sadiq. These people were: Qiasuddin, Noor Mohammed, Ghulam Habi Sogami, G.A. Burza, Srikant Kaul etc. "The rift started when Sadiq patronized those people who were patronized by Bakshi"⁴². According to Shafi Mohd. Qureshi, "the differences arose, when Sadiq was surrounded by psychopaths like Pir Qiasuddin, Ghulam Ahmed Burza, and Noor Mohd. He accepted their advice, with the result that the party workers lost their confidence in him"⁴³. Qasim said: "these differences were minor ones. I felt that the administrative machinery was not running well and Sadiq was under the influence of elements which I thought were unhealthy. He started treating us--myself, DP, and TD, as a group. But I was not thinking so. The style of Sadiq became more and more dictatorial (i.e. Chief ministerial)"⁴⁴. Zainub Begum, on the other hand, thought that, "the real cause of conflict was the hunger for power by Qasim's men. Sadiq Sahab had a very small cabinet,

41 Ayub Khan, An Interview.

42 Interview,^{Tri Lochan Datta,} 1 September 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).

43 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

44 Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

but Qasim wanted all his men in the government. And men like Kar and Mufti* were not satisfied by their position in the government and wanted to be the Cabinet Ministers. The suspicion in the minds of Qasim and his followers was, thus, absolutely unfounded; because Sadiq was not a man who could change his opinion on the advice of men like Giasuddin, Noor Mohd.,⁴⁵ Srikanth Koul etc.". Qasim, however, concluded the emergence of a difference of outlook between him and Sadiq in the following words:

The real lack of mutual trust and co-operation started, when Sadiq alienated all his co-workers and friends like - myself, DP, TD, Mir Lasjan and Kar etc. These were the people who were more experienced, and helped Sadiq throughout his long struggle against Bakshi and after. But Sadiq took less experienced people into his team. They were: Abdul Aziz Tourist, Giasuddin, G.A. Burza, Noor Mohd. and his son and sister. And, actually it was not just a question of who were taken in, but one of who were alienated and ignored. He was not trusting either DP, TD or myself. (46)

Removal of DP's Home Portfolio

A clear-cut change in Sadiq's style (i.e. from collective leadership to Chief Ministerism) was witnessed, when he stripped

* Mufti Mohammed Sayeed (the present PCC Chief) is usually called as Mufti Sahab or Mufti. We will also use these terms for him interchangeably here onwards.

45 Zainub Begum, Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

46 Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

off the Home portfolio from DP in a most unceremonious fashion. The conflict is generally dated to this incident by almost all our respondents and newspaper reports. It is true (as our data reveals) that DP and his men gave the impression that Sadiq was only a figurehead and the government without him (DP) was unimaginable. This was shown by DP's behaviour as a Home Minister. It is also true that such feeling was infixed in Sadiq's mind by anti-DP people like Srikant Kaul, and Giasuddin, Zainub Begum, and Rafiq Sadiq,⁴⁷ Ghulam Ahmed Burza, Abdul Aziz Burza, Karen Singh etc. Later, Shamusuddin, Raja Muzaffar (of Uri) also joined this anti-DP move. They succeeded in their objective. Thus, there were chiefly two factors responsible for the abrupt change in Sadiq's mind that led him to remove DP from the Home portfolio. These were:

- (a) Sadiq's weakness in judging the qualities of his erstwhile colleagues and friends on the advice of newly made companions, and
- (b) DP's behaviour itself.

Sadiq removed DP without consulting anyone of his former colleagues, and he himself became the Home Minister. Further, Sadiq did it in a most unceremonious style, when all of his colleagues were out of station. This made it clear to everyone that Sadiq did it without consulting any of his old friends. At that time, DP, Qasim, and TD were in Rajouri (in connection of

* The son of G.M. Sadiq, who was working as the personal assistant to him (Sadiq) dealing with public relations.

47 Based on various interviews.

their tour of Poonch area). They were accompanied by many other leaders like Ayub Khan, Master Sali Ram, Abdul Aziz Shah, Mirza Mohd. Iqbal, Ghulam Mohd. Mir (Poonchi) and many other workers. "He came to know about DP's removal (here) from the radio broadcast"⁴⁸ recalled TD. It does not mean that either Qasim or TD strongly wanted DP as a Home Minister, but what made them sympathize with DP was that they were not even informed or told by Sadiq about this action. They were shocked that Sadiq did not take them into confidence before taking a decision which they considered as an important one. The whole circle was, thus, rather surprised and all discussed the matter seriously. "I more or less", said Ayub Khan (Sadiq's man), "kept myself away from taking^e against the Chief Minister behind his back. As a colleague of Sadiq I kept myself away, otherwise I would have sided with them. But this was an unpleasant and abrupt change, which I disfavoured"⁴⁹. It was particularly in this tour that there occurred a unity of minds between ID, DP, and Qasim.

In various circles, it was widely reported that DP was stripped off the Home portfolio, following the agitation of the Kashmiri Pandits (in connection of Parmeshwari Handoo's case).⁵⁰

48 Interview with Trilochan Dutta, 1 September 1976, Srinagar (Jawahar Nagar).

49 Ayub Khan, Interview, 17 September 1976, Srinagar (Jawahar Nagar).

50 Parmeshwari Handoo, daughter of a Kashmiri Pandit widow,

There were certain complaints against DP as a Home Minister, and both the Hindus and Muslims were said to have disliked his continued presence as the Home Minister. One of Sadiq's agents justified his (Sadiq's) action on the following grounds:

- (a) Sadiq got some evidences in which it was clear that Muslims and Hindus were not happy with DP as a Home Minister.
- (b) All the CMs kept the Home department with them, and thus the Prime Minister might have asked him also to keep it with him. (51)

The slogan of the anti-Sadiq group was that "it was breach of faith on Sadiq's part",⁵² but Sadiq was unmoved by the sloganeering of his opponents. He tried to balm the injured feelings of DP by stating that he would continue to seek his aid and advice, but it did not bring them closer. Though some calm prevailed when DP was made the Education and Agriculture Minister, it did not, however, improve the matter. Whereas, peace prevailed on the surface, yet the file remained

was employed as a sales girl in a co-operative department store at Srinagar. She fell in love with a Muslim co-worker in the store, Ghulam Rasool Kanth, embraced Islam and married him. Many hues and cries were thus made about it, and on 3 August Dhanwati (the mother of Permehwari) lodged a complaint against it. Later it resulted in the Pandits' agitation. See, for this, Prem Nath Bazez, Kashmiri Pandits Agitation and Its Aftermath (New Delhi, Pamposh Publications, 1967). DP was, however, held responsible for the agitation. For example, Srikant Kaul says, "DP worked in a manner that agitation was organized". Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

51 Interview, Zainub Begum, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

52 Interview with M.N. Kaul.

smouldering beneath the apparent lull. Before this time DP seemed to be equi-distant from Qasim and Sadiq, but after this, he was also identified with Qasim. According to Mohd. Shafi Qureshi, therefore, "the origin of the conflict was the removal of DP's Home portfolio. DP expressed his reluctance, but Sadiq remained firm".⁵³ It was also revealed by one of our respondents that, in one of those days when DP showed his reluctance to what Sadiq wanted, the latter caught hold of his collar and said that he and his son were corrupt. This happened in the private house of Sadiq (in Srinagar). Then DP went to Qasim's house (which is very near to Sadiq's), where all his friends like Qasim, TD, Abdul Gani Lone and Qureshi were sitting. There DP narrated this story and revealed that Sadiq also accused TD and his sons of corruption.⁵⁴ After few days, Sadiq started working for the DP's exit from the state, and finally succeeded in this when the latter was appointed as India's Ambassador to Moscow.⁵⁵

53 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

54 Based on the Interview with Shafi Qureshi.

55 There are many views about DP's exit from state politics. We will, however, give only two most worthy of being mentioned, given by DP's man and Sadiq's sister respectively. According to M.L. Potedar (DP's man): "It was at the instance of DP and Mrs Gandhi - who wanted DP to leave state politics to serve the nation at large. Thus, DP went out of the state politics. Sadiq on the other hand thought that he did it. DP wanted to go out of the state politics in 1967 but neither Qasim nor Sadiq liked it. They made the inclusion of Karan Singh

(Contd. on next page)

Conflict Comes into Open

By the middle of 1968, the rift had become an open affair. It was in July 1968 that this happened, when a Congress MLA Mian Bashir Ahmed (from Kangan) hurled abuses on Ghulam Rasool Kar* at a small public gathering held at Kacha Nambal (28 km from Srinagar). Another instance of the open factional feud was witnessed in August 1968, when, while Qasim first threatened to quit the Congress, the General Secretary of the PCC, TD already tendered the resignation letter for the second time, before New Delhi wanted to offer the ambassadorial assignment to DP. This was followed, according to B.L. Kak, "by the providential intervention by I.K. Gujral (Union Minister) in the State's summer capital to help to resuscitate the moribund atmosphere between the organizational and the ministerial wings of Jammu and Kashmir".⁵⁶ Thirdly, the open conflict was evidenced when Ghulam

in the union ministry a possibility by keeping DP in the state for one more year. Sadiq wanted him in his own interest, for DP was reputed for his administrative acumen and economic wisdom. Qasim also had this respect for Dhar". Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

But Zainub Begum on the other hand thinks that Sadiq made DP's exit from state politics a reality. She said: "DP wanted to go out, but Sadiq wanted him to be in the state. DP thought without him the state could not run. Sadiq initially wanted him, but later told DP to do whatever he liked. Later, Sadiq in consultation with the Centre led the DP's exit from the state politics". Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

- * Kar a member of Legislative Assembly, and the Minister of State for Forests, was considered to be a close associate of the much talked tire of - DP, TD, and Qasim.

⁵⁶ B.L. Kak, "Kashmir Congress I: Qasim Regains Over Cabinet Party Rift", Amrit Bazar Patrika, 18 March 1969.

Rasool Kar (the Minister of State for Forests) tried to recover money from Mian Bashir, Ghulam Nabi Sogami and G.A. Burza⁵⁷ (all of the three in fact made a type of forest lobby in the legislature). The money to be recovered was reported to be amounting somewhere between 4 crores to 10 crores. Sadiq took objection to this, and especially for making it an affair of public debate. Qasimites then charged the government for being lenient to these elements, whom they called as 'social monsters'. The pro-Sadiq members on the other hand charged the Deputy Minister for Agriculture Mufti for misappropriation of the 1000 bags of the imported fertilizers. "These charges" says Srikant Kaul "were actually against DP and TD. TD was the President of J & K Consumers Federation during these days".⁵⁸ The two charges against them were:

- (a) excess purchases than required,
- (b) wrong entries of disbursement.

Thus, the saving was made by selling fertilizer outside the state. Mufti was charged for it because he was the incharge of that matter.⁵⁹ Further, DP as the Industry Minister issued

57 G.A. Burza was a relation of Sadiq. "But because of factionalism and not being a relative of Burza", says M.N. Kaul, "Sadiq supported Mian Bashir, Sogami, and Burza. In the struggle for power, one loses his reason, and so was the case with Sadiq. And, Sadiq thought that Kar's initiative of proceedings against these people was influenced by factional politics in the party". Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

58 Srikant Kaul, An Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

59 Ibid.

licenses for plywood to a party from outside the state [to S.P. Jain] that proved a complete failure and a tremendous loss to the state. He was also charged for giving the Kathua 'Ceramics' to Amin Chand Pyarolal, which ^{too} proved to be a failure. ⁶⁰ During the conflict in the Assembly these issues were raised. In one of such meetings TD was charged by Bhagat Chajju Ram, * for going against the Congress Party programme by working against the peasants and tenants. He charged TD that the latter had purchased a big chunk of the land near R.S. Pura (in Jammu) ⁶¹ by expelling the tenants from there.

Finally, all these conflicts came into open in a stormy meeting of the Congress legislature party that was held on the evening of 21 September 1968 in Srinagar. Both the groups openly accused and charged one another of corruption and dishonesty etc. In this meeting wrote Hindustan Times, "there was an open clash between Kar and Dutta on the one hand, and some others on the other. The PCC Chief (Qasim) is understood to have supported Kar and Dutta, while CH (Sadiq) stayed neutral". ⁶² Sadiq asked

60 Ibid.

* Bhagat Chajju Ram (a Harijan leader) was a Sadiq's man because of two reasons: because TD was with Qasim, and Sadiq was in power. Later when Sadiq died he became Qasim's follower also. He was with Bakshi also, and nowadays he is a Minister of State for Industries in Sheikh's cabinet.

61 Bhagat Chajju Ram (Minister of State for Industries): An Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar (Low Secretariat).

62 "Jammu and Kashmir Minister and PCC Secretary Resign", The Hindustan Times, 23 September 1968.

Kar to withdraw the order issued by him against the forest lessees, which Kar refused to do⁶³ and then both TD (General Secretary PCC)* and Kar resigned from their respective offices on 22 September 1968. With this wrote Times of India that, "the dissensions in the ruling party became a public scandal ... the situation will not improve even if Kar and Dutta withdraw their resignations.... (And the conflict was so vigorous that) the twin challenges mounted by Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed seem to have no impression on the ruling party so far".⁶⁴ The Indian Express reported : the patch work as too patchy, because the ruling party was continuously troubled by factional pulls among three groups led by Sadiq, Qasim and Karan Singh.⁶⁵

Some more meetings of both the factions took place during this period. The one worth mentioning here is that which took place at Sadiq Sahob's house. In this meeting objections were raised by the Qasim faction over a meeting that was held by Sadiq's followers in the Shalamar Garden. The issue discussed in Shalamar Garden, according to Dhagat Chajju Ram was that, "we should unite and work against the disruptionist forces to

63 M.L. Potedar, Interview, 16 September 1976.

* Few weeks later, however, TD on a unanimous appeal by state Congress leaders withdrew his resignation. In all, during Qasim-Sadiq conflict period TD resigned thrice, the last being in March 1969, after Qasim had already done so.

64 "Recding for a Crisis", Times of India, 30 September 1968.

65 "Sadiq to Pick Up Last Thread", The Indian Express, 30 October 1968.

66

strengthen the hands of Sadiq".⁶⁶ Actually, the Shalamar meeting was secretly called to plan out the factional strategy against Qasim by persons like Ghulam Ahmed Burza, Bhagat Chajju Ram, and S.K. Kaul. This researcher came across the following views about this meeting. Srikant Kaul says that, "when Qasim objected about the secret factional meeting we on our part willed to have some informations about factional activities of Qasim himself and his followers like TD and Kar. Qasim then threw away the file in anger, and walked away while saying that 'let Kaul and Burza govern the state, we cannot work with you'.⁶⁷ And with this the last meeting before the Qasim's resignation ended. According to Ayub Khan, "Qasim objected to factional meeting of Sadiq's followers. Qasim questioned as why there had been a factional meeting. Sadiq being a good statesman prevailed by saying that some people could sit and chit-chat, this should not be taken seriously. In the meantime the scuffle took place between Bhagat Chajju Ram and some of the Qasim's followers when Qasim said that he would speak and Chajju Ram insisted that he should speak. Following this Qasim walked out of the meeting in anger and then myself and Thakur Ranjit Singh went to him and prevailed upon him to come back".⁶⁸ According to M.L. Potedar: "when Qasim Sahab asked as why some MLA's met

66 Bhagat Chajju Ram, An Interview, 16 September 1970, Srinagar (New Secretariat).

67 Interview with Srikant Kaul.

68 Interview, 17 September 1976, Srinagar, Jawahar Nagar.

at Shalamar, Bhagatji replied that 'why are you bothered'. Qasim while accusing Bhagat said, 'if the party does not support me, I will go'. Sadiq got up and said, 'you are at liberty to go'. And Qasim Saheb, therefore, went away. Then Mufti and myself went to Qasim and told him: 'why should you go, when the whole party is behind you. Sadiq is no authority to ask you to go. You are not an individual but an institution; you stand by us and we stand by you'⁶⁹. According to Qasim himself, "few people like Sri Kant Kaul and Ghulam Ahmed Burza met in Shalamar Park and advised Sadiq Saheb wrongly. I told Sadiq, either you accept their advice or mine. Sadiq in a huff replied that he would accept their advice. I threw away the file and went out and then Mufti and others brought me back"⁷⁰. And it was in this last stormy meeting that "the Vice President of the Jammu Unit of the Congress and the senior most party legislator Chajju Ram is said to have been beaten"⁷¹. Similarly, B.L. Kak notes that, "apart from waving fists at some ministers and Congress leaders, the Vice-President of the Jammu Unit of Congress Chajju Ram was alleged to have been beaten up"⁷².

Qasim Resigns

Qasim's resignation was a culmination of the series of

69 Interview, 13 September 1976, Srinagar.

70 Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

71 n. 64.

72 B.L. Kak, n. 56.

accidents (as we have mentioned so far in this chapter) that created personal as well as the group antagonism in the ruling party. The reasons which led to this polarization and antagonism among the state leaders were: continuously increasing lack of mutual trust, the existence of suspicion and doubt over the loyalty and designs of respective group leaders, the lack of coherence and mutual interest, and the struggle for supremacy by one group over the other.

The above mentioned series of developments, and the attitudes formed out of these finally climaxed in Qasim's resignation on 9 March 1969. Qasim resigned not only from the PCC Chiefship, but from the membership of Legislative Assembly as well.^o According to one of our informants, Qasim resigned because:

- (a) He felt by that time that he was reduced to no significance and to a non-entity, and had no power and patronage to satisfy the workers and followers,
- (b) As a PCC chief, he faced non-cooperation from the governmental side,
- (c) Non-interference by the Centre, that would give him some say in state policies, and
- (d) Accusation by the Sadiq faction.

73

Qasim said, "when I came to the conclusion that I got into the Cogmers of Sadiq's intense suspicion, I took the decision

^o But, Qasim did not resign from the primary membership of the Congress Party.

73 Interview with M.N. Kaul, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

exclusively myself. My brother (MP, Sayeed Hussain) was coming there but I took the decision before he arrived".⁷⁴ Publicly Qasim showed a warmth friendship for Sadiq and willed to be a freeman. "I have spent 25 years in politics. I should live the life of a plain citizen", he said. Though Qasim declined to give the reasons of his resignations, the people close to him were reported saying that "he (Qasim) wanted to show that he was not hankering after power".⁷⁵ When asked whether he had resigned from the primary membership of the Congress Party also, he said that, "whatever interpretation you give, I am not in politics now".⁷⁶ He was adamant to keep entirely away from politics and requested to pressmen that: "I will not withdraw my resignation. Please discuss cultural aspects and no politics with me". This notes Kak was said by Qasim, "with a bland air of injured innocence".⁷⁷

Qasim regarded his decision as purely personal and said that it was a permanent and irrevocable step. Therefore, withdrawal of it could not arise. When asked whether the Union leaders knew about it earlier, Qasim said that "they are sufficiently intelligent to have understood that I was thinking along

74 Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

75 "Sadiq-Qasim Confer with P.M.", The Indian Express, 15 March 1969.

76 "Mir Qasim Quits Assembly Seat as well as Politics", Tribune, 12 March 1969.

77 B.L. Kak, n. 56.

these lines but I wish my resignation should not become a contro-
 versial matter".⁷⁸ But in a way Qasim resigned come as a sur-
 prise to all circles. He did not apprise anyone including Sadiq
 of his move to step down from the presidency of the PCC till
 the "CM found him after 14 hours to hear and to be heard".⁷⁹
 Sadiq reacted by saying that he was pained and shocked hearing
 of the retirement of his valued colleague and co-worker, and
 was reported to have told Qasim that his decision was not
 correct.⁸⁰ On the evening of 11 March, Sadiq after knowing about
 Qasim's resignation said: "I hope it is going to be a very tempo-
 rary and Qasim will come back to his place after some time".
 He also said that he would make constant efforts to see that
 Qasim returned to his organizational post but "I do not think
 that Qasim's resignation from Assembly could be prevented",
 Sadiq added. Sadiq, however, was satisfied by Qasim's statement
 that his decision was purely personal. After he was informed of
 the resignation on the evening of 11 March, at 5. 30 p.m. said
 Sadiq, "I tried to locate him at every possible place but did
 not succeed till late in the night. This morning I contacted
 him and he was with me for about three hours".⁸¹ He also des-
 cribed the meeting as cordial. In this meeting according to

78 Tribuna, n. 76.

79 B.L. Kak, n. 56.

80 Refer to "PM Contacts", Times of India, 12 March 1969.

81 See "PM Contacts Sadiq As Qasim Quits, and Sadiq-Qasim
 Rift Comes into Open", The Indian Express, 12 March
 1969.

Sadiq's sister Qasim said that he was fed up with politics, but Sadiq while disapproving this idea said to him that he (Qasim) could not ignore the politics. He told Qasim that even if he had left the politics yet politics would not leave him. Qasim also said that he resigned because he was compelled by his friends to do so.⁸² Further she said that, in this meeting Qasim advised Sadiq that both of them should retire from politics, and should not contest the elections in 1972, but Sadiq rejected the idea by saying, "at whose disposal we should leave it, to Maulana or Prem Nath Dogra".⁸³

What led Qasim to resign was not explained by him to the press, and he would say that he did not like "to raise the storm of allegations".⁸⁴ At other time he said that, "the decision was taken with the sincere belief that it would further strengthen the hands of Sadiq".⁸⁵ He is also reported to have assured the Congress High Command after his retirement that he would not create any difficulties for the present government. His purpose was to give Sadiq a completely frechand in managing the affairs of the state. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, therefore, wrote that:⁸⁶ "Qasim was by no means a dissident of usual type". Northern

82 Interview with Zainub Begum, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

83 Ibid.

84 "Kashmir", Amrit Bazar Patrika, 18 March 1969.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

India Patrika wrote that "this is a new type of political non-cooperation and one might even call it a constructive political gesture.... Sadiq needs Qasim's positive co-operation.... But Qasim-Sadiq breach does not appear to be altogether unbridgeable; probably there is still a ray of hope and Mrs Gandhi can yet apply a second dose of her healing touch".⁸⁷ Similarly, Patriot wrote, while comparing the activities of Qasim with Nijalingappa and Morarji Desai that: "last week Nijalingappa twice offered to step down from Congress presidentship and on both occasions allowed himself to be persuaded to withdraw his offer. Morarji Desai too hold out a threat to retire from politics, and the next day he clarified that he only meant he would quit the government; and in the meantime his friends initiated efforts to find face saving formula so that he could continue in the government. Qasim, however, did not make such noise about his decision to retire from politics.... He has given up office on more occasions voluntarily, and not under the Kamraj Plan than many at the Centre; he has also sat in the opposition along with Sadiq. And when out of office he has devoted himself to organizational work; unlike some Kamraj's Ministers or CMs reluctantly pushed into Congress presidentship, he has toured the state covering village and town, organizing the party, so that the Congress is now able to meet the challenge of

87 "Kashmir", Northern India Patrika, 21 March 1969.

Sheikh Abdullah and PF".⁸⁸ Similarly Shafi Qureshi said that "Qasim moved from village to village to convey the message of Congress to the people, whereas Sadiq was sitting in his house when the Congress was organized".⁸⁹

However, Qasim's resignation was in no way a renunciation of politics. Various political pundits gave various reasons that led Qasim to resign. K.S. Khosla, for example, says that "the resignation climaxed the differences between Qasim and Sadiq during the past two years".⁹⁰ These differences according to him were on the following issues:

- First, Sadiq failed to implement an assurance given to Qasim to reshuffle the cabinet before the current session (i.e. March 1969) of the Assembly,
- Second, the issue was Qasim's demand of dropping some Ministers and inclusion of new party members,
- Third, was the issue of choosing a successor to DP Dhar,
- Fourth, the Qasim group regarded the open overtures to Sheikh Abdullah and other secessionists as "not good for the only true nationalist and powerful Congress organization in the state",
- Fifth, the Qasim group did not like the alleged overtures to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, which was,

88 "Mir Qasim: Profile", The Patriot, 14 March 1969.

89 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

90 K.S. Khosla, "Qasim Plan For Firm Policy, Differences with Sadiq", Times of India, 17 March 1969.

however, denied by Sadiq,
 Sixth, Sadiq criticized the efforts of his opponents
 to tarnish his image, and
 Seventh, he asserted that as a leader he could not be
 dictated to by anyone, and asked for free hand
 in the cabinet composition.⁹¹

Northern India Patrika, on the other, gives the following reasons for his resignation:

- (a) he did not like the inclusion of certain persons in Sadiq's cabinet,
- (b) he was uneasy about the bureaucratic influence over the administration of the state, and
- (c) he was reported to have felt that in those circumstances he could not play an effective role in the state.⁹²

According to the Times of India, the main grievances that led Qasim to resign were:

One, the PCC meeting in 1968, when both factions exchanged blows. Since that time onwards both TD and Qasim were dissatisfied in the way the administration was conducting,

Two, the failure of the CM to consult the party chief in filling the governmental and party posts,

Three, nepotism was alleged in the selection of Jammu

91 Ibid.

92 n. 87.

and Kashmir state service for appointment to IAS cadre. ⁹³

The Indian Express noted that, "the resignation of Qasim from the Presidentship of the Pradesh Congress brings out into the open for the first time the ill-concealed groupism and in fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir Congress. The facade of unity has been broken, notwithstanding Sadiq's unconvincing protestations to the contrary". ⁹⁴

Shamim Ahmed Shamim thought that "Qasim was compelled to leave the house as a result of frustrating circumstances". ⁹⁵

Impact of Qasim's Resignation on His Followers

Qasim's followers did not approve this move of Qasim. "I frankly told him that I do not approve of this move", ⁹⁶ said one of Qasimite to this researcher. And Qasim himself admitted that, "my followers were unhappy about my action". ⁹⁷ But it certainly enhanced his popularity. Though he assured the Union ⁹⁸ leaders that his decision would have no impact on his followers,

93 "Bury the Hatchet", Times of India, 15 March 1969.

94 The Indian Express, 9 April 1969.

95 See "Pro-Qasim's MLAs Broad Side Against Sadiq Government", The National Herald, 15 March 1965.

96 M.N. Kaul, Interview. Similarly Ali Mohd. Laik recalled, "that day when I went to Qasim's house, I told him that he had not taken a wise step". Ali Mohd. Laik, Interview at Jammu and Kashmir House, New Delhi, 15 January 1977.

97 Interview with Qasim.

98 As he said immediately after his resignation that, "It is my personal decision and I appeal others not to be influenced by it". Mir Qasim Retires from Politics, Times of India, 12 March 1969.

and that he would not create any difficulties for the government,^{it was} only within 24 hours of his resignation that PCC General Secretary, TD reacted by resigning from his post.* "I can not work effectively. I am going to inform the Legislature Party leader about my position",⁹⁹ said TD. He felt disinclined in the office and said that he was morally bound to resign when his President had done so.¹⁰⁰ He told a reporter of the Press Trust of India that, "Since I was nominated as General Secretary (of PCC) by Qasim, it will not be fit for me to continue in that office after the former (Qasim) has resigned".¹⁰¹ Referring to the decision of Qasim, the former minister of state for forest Ghulam Rasool Kar, said: "I welcome Sayed Mir Qasim's decision. It is a patriotic decision".¹⁰²

Though seven DCC Chiefs and six legislators sent the telegram to the PM, expressing shock at Qasim's resignation, which according to them would produce far-reaching challenges for the party; it was a type of appeal not to criticize the action of Qasim, but to make the Union leaders realize that Sadiq's style of ruling was becoming a danger to the Congress

* But TD like Qasim, did not resign from the Assembly seat also.

99 "Mir Qasim Quits Assembly Seat as well as Politics", Tribune, 12 March 1969.

100 "Qasim Quits", Tribune, 13 March 1969.

101 "Qasim-Sadiq Rift Comes to Surface", Tribune, 13 March 1969.

102 "Mir Qasim Retires from Politics", Times of India, 12 March 1969.

Party in the state.¹⁰³ Finally, what might have made upset both Sadiq and the Union leaders was Qasim's assertion that he could not make any positive contribution to the cause of secularism, and democracy in those circumstances.

Qasim, Sadiq Summoned to Delhi

A temporary calm prevailed following the Sadiq-Qasim visit to Delhi, where they had consultation with Mrs Gandhi and other Union leaders, but no result was achieved. Mrs Gandhi's efforts at cohesion did not succeed. Sadiq immediately after his arrival from Delhi, declared that his relations with Qasim were cordial and there were no differences between them;¹⁰⁴ but Qasim on the other hand declared that his relations with CM could not be solved by piecemeal.¹⁰⁵ The Times of India, thus wrote that: "Sadiq is only deluding himself when he says that there is no crisis in Kashmir Congress.... Everyone knows that

- 103 As the Assam Tribune already indicated that: "it has definitely weakened both the state Congress and the state government". Assam Tribune, 14 March 1969, "Jammu and Kashmir Congress."
- 104 For example (after coming from Delhi) while addressing the public meeting at Kathua on 18 March Sadiq said that: "there are no differences between Qasim and me. Our relations are so close and cordial that they cannot be affected by the rumours of rift in the Party", which according to him were spread by "vested interests to weaken secular and democratic forces in the state. We have taken pledge to work unitedly with devotion till we have solved all our political^{and} economic problems". See "Sadiq Denies Difference with Qasim", The Hindustan Times, 20 March 1969.
- 105 Refer "Sadiq-Qasim Rift Causing Anxiety", The Indian Express, 15 April 1969.

the ruling party is now split into two warring camps".¹⁰⁶ When Chavan, the then Union Home Minister, visited the state for nearly 38 hours, his efforts at bringing both the persons round the table also proved a failure.¹⁰⁷ Interestingly enough, whereas both the leaders in their public meetings strictly observed the party codes of conduct and did not forget sometimes even to shower praises on one another, but the activities of their supporters left no doubt over the existence of acute differences between them.¹⁰⁸

Organization Vs Government

The conflict between the ministerialist and organizational wing of the party was chiefly influenced by two factors:

- (a) one's right over the other, and
- (b) who should be superior.

Both agreed with the first condition, i.e. the overlapping prerogative of both the authorities over the organizational

106 "Task in Kashmir", Times of India, 19 April 1969.

107 Chavan, however, attempted to save his face by saying that to his visit to the state was "a periodic one and connected with his visit to state affairs". But, the Free Press Journal, ridiculed him when it wrote that "perhaps this is the polite way of saying that his mission has failed. Discretion and diplomacy over delicate issues are certainly commendable, but when the whole world knows about the rift, the display of such qualities may well be mistaken as a maladroit exercise either in self-delusion or for deceiving people. In either case, it can be self-defeating", Free Press Journal, 16 April 1969, "Perilous Rift."

108 See "Public Praises Fail to Hide Rift in Kashmir Congress", Tribuna, 17 April 1969.

and governmental wings of the party as fundamental and essential. But the conflict occurred over the latter issue, i.e., who was superior--the organizational or the ministerial wing. Whereas Sadiq desired that the party should work in accordance to the policy of the governmental directives,¹⁰⁹ Qasim thought that the party was the backbone of the government and the government should carry out the party policies following which they got the mandate from the people. When Sadiq announced the separation of politics from the administration, this annoyed his colleagues in the party. Thus, they complained that the Sadiq regime had favoured the bureaucratization and authoritarianism. They felt that the bureaucrats were dearer to Sadiq than the party workers. Not people, but the problems of bureaucrats they complained were listened to by Sadiq. And they also said that Sadiq ignored the people, who went to him.¹¹⁰ Finally, whereas Sadiq gave priority to the governmental and administrative,

109 But it was only few years ago when Sadiq was also in favour of a strong organization when he was fighting against the strong man of Kashmir - Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed. And, in Sadiq-Bakshi correspondence, we find Sadiq again and again saying to Bakshi that, unless the organizational structure was strengthened, the administrative wing which was only incidental to it would continue to reflect the weakness. See Sadiq-Bakshi Correspondence (published by Motilal Misri, Convenor, Democratic National Conference. Printed at Lishat Press, Abi Gajar, Srinagar, 1967).

110 Based on the Interviews of Dev Dutt Sharma / 1 September 1976, Jammu (Mast Garh) /, Baldev Sharma / 10 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA Hostel) /, Mir Lasjan / 9 September 1976, Srinagar (Lasjan) /, Mangat Ram Sharma / 11 September 1976, Srinagar (Dal Gate) / and many others.

machinery, Qasimites demanded that the organization be given sole priority and everything in the state be done on the name of Congress Organization.¹¹¹

Similarly, Arvind Bhandari says that, "the Qasim group which leads the organizational wing of the party feels that the CM, Sadiq has become too assertive and indifferent towards it. Qasim's supporters complain that the Sadiq administration often sides roughshods over the feelings of partymen in matters pertaining to the implementation of policies, particularly at the grassroot level. There is also the crisis of confidence. The organizational wing feels that it is often bypassed by the CM and not taken into confidence".¹¹²

To maintain the superiority of the administrative wing Sadiq constantly invited Qasim to join the cabinet, and also requested the Union leaders to get Qasim's inclusion in the government, but Qasim declined repeatedly to do so, by saying that: "I feel my continuing in the organization will be more helpful in stabilizing the Congress which is the backbone of the government".¹¹³

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- 111 Interviews with Mir Lasjan (PCC President, Srinagar (Rural), 9 September 1976, Srinagar (Lasjan), and Mangat Ram (Minister of State for Transport), 11 September 1976, Srinagar (Dal Gate).
- 112 Arvind Bhandari, "New Developments in State", Indian Express, 10 September 1969.
- 113 "Qasim Still Unwilling to Join the Government", Sunday Standard, 3 November 1968.

And, when after his resignation, the correspondent of the Indian Express A.T. Chandramohan asked Qasim as to why he sent the letter of his resignation to the Congress President Nijalingappa, he (Qasim) replied that, "since he had been elected President by the PCC, the resignation letter had been sent to the next person in hierarchy"¹¹⁴. Thus, wrote Patriot: "the differences which have been cropped up between him (Qasim) and Sadiq are of the same nature as between all strong Congress Presidents (Kripalani, Tandon, Kamraj) and the Prime Ministers.... The basic issue involved is who is supreme--the party or the government leadership"¹¹⁵.

B.L. Kak notes that, "Qasim's resignation followed the difference of opinion between the organizational and ministerial wings"¹¹⁶. The Times of India also wrote that, "a thinly veiled struggle for power between the organizational and the ministerial wings of the Pradesh Congress had been going on for quite sometime. Things came to a head, last September when at a stormy meeting of the state Congress Legislature Party some members are said to have exchanged blows and Qasim's supporters staged walk-out. Though subsequently the factions formally decided to close ranks, neither Qasim nor some of his associates like Trilochan Dutta have since made any secret of their dissatisfaction

114 The Indian Express, 12 March 1969.

115 Tribune, n. 76.

116 B.L. Kak, n. 56.

with the way Sadiq had been conducting the administration. Their main grievance was that the CM had failed to consult the party chief in filling several key posts in both the government and the party organization".¹¹⁷ Finally, Sadiq himself said (when asked to define the nature of the conflict between him and Qasim) that: "it boiled down to the question whether the administrative wing or the organizational wing was supreme. The question was discussed by the Working Committee of the AICC during the time of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel and it was decided that the Prime Minister should be free¹¹⁸ to carry out the party's policies".

Meanwhile a similar struggle i.e. between government Vs. party bosses was going on at the Central level also, but the struggle at the state level was neither a copy nor the ramification of it. It was purely a development within the state political process, and in fact a result of local politics in the state. Here, both factions had come to be identified with the name of Sadiq and Qasim, but both were pro-Indira Gandhi, or pro-government as far as the fight at the Central level was concerned. In fact, both Sadiq and Qasim were vying to show their greater loyalty to Mrs Gandhi. And, as Qasim told this researcher that, "I came back to politics to support Mrs Gandhi. There was a rift going on in the Centre between Kamraj and many party bosses

117 Times of India, n. 93.

118 Times of India, 16 November 1969.

on the one hand, and many liberal democrats on the other. And when the rift reached the crucial stage during the presidential election, I joined politics again to vote for V.V. Giri. As I was the PCC President, my vote became necessary in this matter. National crisis, therefore, tempted me to come back to the politics".¹¹⁹

But Qasim had certain disadvantage in vying for Mrs Gandhi's loyalty because, among his followers few influential were reported as the supporters of syndicate politics of the Old Guard. TD, however, was charged openly for being the main voice of Nijalingappa in Jammu and Kashmir Congress, and thus inducting the syndicate politics in the state. It was reported that at the time of the Presidential poll, TD disliked and refused to agree with the ideological hues and cries and the theory put forth that the socialism and secularism would be endangered in the event of Sanjiva Reddy's election.¹²⁰ TD, therefore, voted for Sanjiva Reddy,¹²¹ but he was not the only

119 Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

120 "Socialist and Reactionaries in Kashmir", National Herald, 23 October 1969.

121 But, there are no indication that TD wanted syndicate politics in the state. He, for example, told this researcher that his action was purely based on the local politics and influenced by factional struggle. "I was opposing Sadiq, and when Sadiq voted for V.V. Giri, I naturally, therefore, had to vote for Sanjiva Reddy. And, if he would vote for Sanjiva Reddy, I would vote for Giri". Interview, 31 August 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).

person from the state to do so.

EMERGENCE OF THE BIFUNCTIONAL SYSTEM

Until his resignation from the PCC chiefship, we find that Qasim was willing to remain within a dominant faction system. But once it became evident for him that Sadiq wished to keep his men at every position, he tendered his resignation. We have already seen that Qasim enjoyed the majority in both the legislature and organizational wings of the party as a result of the 1967 general elections (which were conducted under the exclusive supervision of Qasim, DP, and TD). And, it was also evidenced there that Sadiq's nominees for PCC and Rajya Sabha were routed by Qasim's. Therefore, 'the Bifunctional System' was in operation since the 1967 general elections itself. But, up to March 1969, no complete factional polarization as such had taken place, and Qasim and Sadiq still agreed on some matters. Thus, the bifunctional system as it implies a complete regimentation of followers ¹²³ also can be dated only after 9 March

122 The other people who voted for Raddy were: Mohd. Anwar Khan, A.G. Lone, Abdul Qayoom, Hansraj Dogra and few others. (Based on Interview).

123 See, for this B.D. Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress Party 1937-66" in M. Schwartz, ed., Local Level Politics (Chicago, Aldine, 1963), pp. 323-60. Here, Graham gives four types of factional systems, which he calls as: a dominant-faction system, the bifunctional system, the trifunctional system, and a multi-factional system. The bifunctional system, according to him is one "in which two evenly balanced informal groups are in conflict".

And "if one group becomes much bigger than the other, but still permits its weaker partner to exist, a dominant faction system is produced".

1969, when Qasim resigned.

The resignation by Qasim dramatized the factional politics. It did not remove him from the mainstream of state-politics, as was widely expected. In fact, it enhanced his power and influence. Neither it disrupted the unity of his faction, nor his followers allowed him to retire from politics. A complete polarization of conflicting forces in the Pradesh Congress started hereafter. Both the DP's and TD's followers fully identified themselves with Qasim, whereas the followers of Karan Singh allied with Sadiq. G.L. Dogra also associated himself with Sadiq, and the leaders like Ayub Khan, Bhagat Chajju Ram, Randhir Singh (Karan Singh's man), Ranjit Singh (Karan Singh's man), and Akhtar Nizami (Karan Singh's man), tied themselves up in factional relations (i.e. of leader follower relationship) with Sadiq. Further, Sadiq had power and patronage at his disposal which won him the factional loyalties of many members as against his key opponent Qasim, who was virtually out of power. But, Qasim had maintained a close relationship with the rank and file of the party throughout his tenure as the PCC Chief, and the party workers not only had a great respect for him, but they also loved him. Qasim was essentially a master of organizational art, and had a large following among the members of the party (both in the legislature and party). Qasim, even being out of power, thus, had an almost a balanced position against his political enemy

Sadiq. After his resignation the factional polarization was so rapid that within two months of it a clear-cut division in factional loyalties had taken place. By May 1969, therefore, we find two evenly balanced groups in conflict with one another. This bifactional system can be understood under the following heads:

- (i) Impact of the factionalism in the organizational wing. This will be studied under the subtitle of two parallel PCC's.
- (ii) Impact of factionalism in the Legislature. This we will describe under the heading, "A Drama in the Legislative Assembly".

With the completion of both these processes, a third stage comes, that we call as "Intensified Factionalism". This we will study under the subtitle of "A Factional Drama in New Delhi".

I. IMPACT OF FACTIONALISM IN THE PCC

Two Parallel P.C.Cs

Following Qasim's resignation on 9 March 1969 (from the PCC chiefship), Bhagat Chajju Ram (the then Vice-President of the PCC) was asked by Sadiq to assume the office as the PCC chief. Since this time the two parallel PCCs emerged in the Jammu and Kashmir Pradesh Congress Organization. One faction still regarded Qasim as their only chief (because the PCC never

formally accepted Qasim's resignation from the Presidentship), the followers of Sadiq on the other hand accepted Bhagat Chajju Ram as the legitimate occupant of the PCC chiefship. From this time onward we find that both the groups were actively working to destroy each other. Though the ground-work for this war was set, but they still continued their strategies until the fateful hour came.

This was supplied by the Chief Parliamentary Secretary Abdul Aziz Zargar (a Qasim's man) and Chief Minister Sadiq himself, when the latter asked the former to show the cause as to "why he should not be removed from his post for factional and anti-government activities".¹²⁴ Zargar, a strong Qasimite was reported to have accused the state government in a Congress meeting held in Anantnag, for failing to check corruption in the administration and other fields.¹²⁵ On 19 May 1969, therefore, Sadiq dismissed Zargar from his post for his alleged anti-party and anti-government activities - an action followed when Zargar refused to resign when asked to do so.¹²⁶ Zargar, however,

124 "Qasim to Rejoin Congress", Patriot, 18 May 1969.

125 Meanwhile, when Master Beli Ram (Deputy Speaker of the State Assembly), Jyoti Ram Krishen (MLC) and Kulbir Singh, complemented Qasim for his organizational spirit, he said that before submitting his resignation he found "frustration in the mind of Congress workers, but if they now tell me that their frustration has vanished, I will consider to come to the Congress".
Patriot, 18 May 1969, Qasim to Rejoin Congress.

126 "Sadiq Dismisses Chief Parliamentary Secretary", Times of India, 20 May 1969.

dismissed the Sadiq's charges of promoting factionalism and running down the government. On the other hand, "it is men like Giasuddin and others, who by making false allegations against old and trusted workers and leaders made Sadiq believe all they say, are responsible for disruption",¹²⁷ said Zargar. He also complained that the action against him was taken without even verifying the charges by Sadiq. Zargar also released the correspondence he had with Sadiq.¹²⁸ About the dismissal of Zargar, Ayub Khan said that, "Abdul Aziz Zargar was part and parcel of the government, but he was on the move of non-cooperation against the government. He conducted in the style of a factional follower and we - especially Giasuddin and Srikant Kaul, reacted against his factional behaviour. Consequently he was dismissed".¹²⁹

127 "Kashmir PCC Group Prepares for Showdown: Ex-Parliamentary Secretary Denies Sadiq's Allegations", The Hindustan Times, 22 May 1969.

128 The following is a part of the correspondence between Zargar and Sadiq. Sadiq's letter to Zargar (dated 13 May 1969) for example, said: "It has been brought to my notice that you have been taking active part in certain meetings called with the purpose not only of promoting factionalism in the party but also of running down the government. While you are free to express whatever views you may have, you will appreciate that propriety demands that you should immediately discontinue as chief Parliamentary Secretary and not to be associated with the government after you have given expression to anti-government views". "Before I take necessary action in this connection and have orders issued terminating your appointment I would like to know if you have anything to say by way of explanation". See "Kashmir PCC Groups Prepare for Showdown: Ex-Parliamentary Secretary Denies Sadiq's Allegations", The Hindustan Times, 22 May 1969.

129 Ayub Khan (ex-PCC Chief), An Interview, 19 September 1976.

In the meanwhile, when the Qasim group demanded the convening of the PCC meeting, the Sadiq faction surprised everyone by questioning the very validity of the PCC working on the name of Qasim. On 20 May 1969, while addressing a hurriedly called Press Conference, Ghulam Nabi Sogami (Sadiq's man, and earlier Bakshi's client) disclosed that 26 legislators including two ministers and block Presidents had sent a joint appeal to the acting PCC chief, Chajju Ram, requesting him not to entertain any move to convene the meeting of PCC. Among the important signatories were Pir Giasuddin (Minister for Industries), Ghulam Ahmed Burza (MLA), Kushak Bakula (MP), Srikant Kaul (MLA), and Sonam Wangle (MLA)*. He also disclosed that PCC had spent Rs1 crore during past years and asked for a detailed account of the expenditure. Finally he said that the Qasim group had reached to a point that they could not keep quiet. "We will not allow some members of the so-called PCC to exploit it to further their own interest", ¹³⁰ he declared. And, when asked by this researcher as: why he gave such Press Conference, Sogami said that, "I gave the Press Conference as an independent member. He declared the PCC as an illegal body because, it was

* From Ladakh both Bakula and his lieutenant Wangle allied with Sadiq. Whereas, Sonam Marboo remained neutral during this struggle between Qasim and Sadiq. But, Marboo also refused to accompany the Qasim's followers to Delhi (to complain against Sadiq or rather to replace him) when he was requested to do so.

130 "Kashmir PCC Rift Widens", Times of India, 21 May 1969.

neither elected nor selected, but a nominated body. There were no elections held for constituting it. The nominations were a fraud. They spent nearly Rs.1½ crore of election funds, and we asked for details of the amount spent because not more than rupees 10 to 20 lakhs of it could actually be spent".¹³¹

Pir Giasuddin went to the extent of saying that this PCC was an "illegitimate offspring of Qasim" and an "unconstitutional"¹³² body. When asked by this researcher the reason for giving such statement, he was also of the view (as Sogami's) that, "as there had been no proper elections to the Pradesh Congress, I declared that it was an illegal body".¹³³

These statements by Sadiq's followers embarrassed and emboldened Qasim and his adherents. Though he formally declared his come back to state politics on 15 November 1969 but with 20 May 1969 (i.e. nearly two months after his resignation) we find his active participation in the factional politics of the state. He declared on this day that he would not watch helplessly if he found that the principles for which the Congress stood were being sacrificed. "I will step in to prevent deviation from these principles",¹³⁴ said Qasim while addressing a

131 Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar.

132 "Sadiq Group Demands Fresh Elections to State Congress", Times of India, 24 May 1969.

133 Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar.

134 "No Policy Deviation be Allowed, says Qasim", Times of India, 21 May 1969.

meeting of Congress workers at Anantnag. Shafi Mohd. Qureshi and M.N. Kaul also addressed this meeting and viewed that the organization should be supreme and requested Qasim to withdraw his resignation. During this visit says Shafi Qureshi, "Sadiq phoned Mrs Gandhi that I should not be allowed to visit Qasim, because he was trying to convey to Mrs Gandhi that I was trying to exploit my position (as a Deputy Minister of the Government of India) in favour of Qasim".¹³⁵ Qureshi further said that Sadiq was so much annoyed with him for siding with Qasim that, "when I went to see him and asked about his health, he told me¹³⁶ that he was not well and held me responsible for his illness".

On 21 May 1969, 30 of the 41 members sent a fresh requisition for convening a meeting of PCC on 1 June 1969 to settle the feud between the two wings of the party. The signatories included a deputy minister, a member of Parliament and the dismissed parliamentary secretary Abdul Aziz Zargar, besides 10 PCC presidents. They threatened to convene the meeting in June if the requisitioned meeting was not called by the acting PCC president. Earlier, Qasim was given an ovation by about 5,000 Congress workers, when he addressed them at his residence, which lay within the 10 yards of Sadiq's private house. Here Qasim said that he had resigned from the post of the President of PCC in the hope that the step would help to consolidate the Sadiq's

135 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

136 Ibid.

position in the government. He viewed that on this hope he kept quiet for two months. But, "these gentlemen headed by a Cabinet Minister (obviously referring to Giasuddin) were trying to challenge the existence of Congress. For these disruptionists, the PCC does not exist. If PCC does not exist, nor any other forum of the organization, then which is the forum to settle disputes, in the organization?"¹³⁷ Qasim questioned. Amidst the cries of shame, shame, Qasim charged Giasuddin of trying to scuttle the Congress in Kashmir. "If this is their intention then I will go from village to village and conduct a crusade against such elements",¹³⁸ he said. He also disapproved of the action against Zargar without any proper hearing. He held the PCC as valid. He explained that the PCC elected its executive and the delegates to the AICC, met several times to consider the Gajendragadkar Commission report and action on the Ayyangar Commission. If the PCC was then legally constituted body and all its actions were valid, "how does it become invalid now?" He criticized the acting PCC President for making confusing statements, who initially felt it too dangerous to convene the PCC meeting when some members requisitioned,¹³⁹ but later denied even the knowledge of any such requisition. Qureshi in this meeting said, "it was really unfortunate to see

137 n. 127.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

the organization which we all have built with so much labour and hard work ... disarrayed at this time by the activities of a few disruptionists".¹⁴⁰ Zargar also praised Qasim, and said, "I have been shocked to read Qiasuddin's statement challenging the highest organizational forum".¹⁴¹

About this meeting, says Sadiq's sister that,

Qasim brought nearly 1500 Congress workers to his house, and they were addressed by nearly 30 leaders one by one. They accused Sadiq and all of his relatives. Sadiq Sahab was not in the house, and when I rang him up and told him what was happening behind our house he told me to close the backdoors* and not to listen to what they were saying. He was a man of great heart and courage. They openly accused him without knowing what they were doing. (142)

Sadiq's group then actively started working for their demand for fresh elections to the PCC, to counter Qasim's mobilization activities. First step was taken on 21 May 1969 itself. This was the locking up of Congress offices in Jammu. Goni the Minister of State for Finance justified this action by saying

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

* "Surprisingly", said Qureshi in a full vein of laughter that, "because of this factional fight both the ways the back doors of Sadiq's as well as Qasim's house, were permanently closed since this day onwards".

Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi. Further Qureshi said that, "Myself, Lone and many others spoke there alleging Sadiq of authoritarianism, maladministration, and so on. Rafiq and Zainub etc. were also alleged".

142 Zairub Begum, Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

that, "We feared some disorder and disruptionists in the Congress office and to check it before hand the action was essential".¹⁴³ The Sadiq faction occupied the provincial Congress office of Jammu, its printing press, and the party's Urdu daily Qasmi Awaaz. It was against this locking up of the party offices by ministerialist that Praduman Singh (President DCC Jammu (Urban))[]] resorted to 'dharna' in protest against it. "When I am city Congress Chief the locking up action is illegal",¹⁴⁴ said Praduman Singh. Similarly in various other parts of the state also the followers of Sadiq occupied the party offices. Eventually a preparation for an all out war against this was carried on by the Qasmites on their parts also, for retaining the control of party offices, jeeps etc. Dharam Vir (the then Congress Block President (Kathua))[]], for example, told the present investigator that: "I was the de facto and de jure in-charge of the office. They seized the jeeps and locked offices in Jammu and elsewhere. Thus, we were fully prepared to face any attack on us by Sadiq group and police force, and to keep the office and jeep under our control. I was called on by the D.C. and S.P. I informed them about my programme. We were nearly more than 500 workers in the office and nearby shops etc. Then, A.G. Goni, Gardar Gurumukh Singh, Randhir Singh etc. came there to capture the office and to hold a rally, but knowing our hold and

143 "Dismissal of Unlawful Kashmir PCC Demanded", The Hindustan Times, 24 May 1969.

144 Ibid.

preparation they had to abandon the idea. Therefore, they left the office under our control by saying that they could make many such buildings. They said that we could not keep up the Congress flags or party jeeps with us, but I did not surrender the jeep to them".¹⁴⁵

During this struggle, Shafi Qureshi, while talking to newsmen before the residence of Qasim in Srinagar alleged that the state Industry Minister Pir Giasuddin and the Deputy Minister for Tourism Noor Mohammed accompanied by two officials had locked up the PCC office in Srinagar and removed the party flag from the office's premises. "These people", he declared were "culprits", who did the same thing, when the PCC office was forcibly locked and the party flag was removed seven years ago in May 1962, when the Party had just been formed by him in the state.¹⁴⁶

To counter the demand of the Qasim faction for convening the PCC meeting, the followers of Sadiq called on a meeting of the Block Presidents on 23 May in Jammu, that expressed dauntless faith in the leadership of Sadiq. They asked the state High Command of the Congress under Bhagat Chajju Ram's leadership to appoint an ad-hoc Committee to head the organization for the time being, and held that the attempts to convene the meeting of the PCC by an unconstitutional PCC would be "a grave act of

145 Dharam Vir (the ex-Congress Block President, Kathua), An Interview, 22 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA Hostel).

146 n. 127.

indiscipline and political sabotage".¹⁴⁷ They also demanded an inquiry into the alleged irregularities in accounts relating to Congress funds. Referring to the unconstitutional nature of the PCC, they said, "it functions only as a forum in the hands of some power-hungry frustrated elements who want to use it for personal aggrandisement".¹⁴⁸ They regarded the anti-Sadiq meetings as "disruptive and unpatriotic", and held Sadiq as an "inspiring leader".¹⁴⁹

Whereas, the Sadiq group and especially Giasuddin earlier said that their group would accept unconditionally the AICC President's award: whether the PCC as constituted under Qasim was valid or not;¹⁵⁰ but when the Centre and Congress High Command did not hold their views and advised that all disciplinary actions taken against the Qasim's be withdrawn,¹⁵¹ they did not show any indication of accepting the award. For example, Sadiq Ali (the then Congress General Secretary) said, on 24 May that the AICC had always recognized the existing PCC as a constitutionally valid body. He viewed that, "in the

147 n. 143.

148 "Sadiq Men Demanded Ad-hoc Body", Times of India, 24 May 1969.

149 Ibid.

150 "Nijalingappa Verdict to be Accepted, J & K PCC Rift", The Hindustan Times, 23 May 1969.

151 "Sadiq-Mir Qasim Dialogue Soon", The Hindustan Times, 27 May 1969.

heat of controversy, the constitutional existence of the PCC has been questioned".¹⁵²

The second step taken by the Sadiq group was that of removing Qasim's men from the positions of power and influence in the party, and replacing them by their own men. They declared the PCC Chief Qasim as persona non grata and said that entire rank and the file of the party was in revolt against the illegal PCC which according to them consisted of the "handpicked men of Syed Mir Qasim".¹⁵³ "Bhagat Chajju Ram", says Shafi Qureshi, "became a virtual yes man of Sadiq; and when placed in the chair of the PCC Chief he became too inhumane and would order like an absolute dictator, e.g., vacate houses, vacate jeeps, vacate offices and so on".¹⁵⁴ It was under Bhagat Chajju Ram's order that the following men (having loyalty to Qasim) were removed from their respective positions. They were: M.N. Kaul, Mohd. Anwar Khan, Sardar Praduman Singh, Sardar Kulbir Singh, Ghulam Mustafa Mir, Hans Raj Dogra, P.L. Karhaloo, Mangat Ram Sharma, Mohd. Yusuf and Ghulam Mohd. Mir (Lasjan). In all, the District Congress Committee (DCC) Presidents of Doda, Jammu (rural, urban), Kathua, Poonch, Rajouri, Baramulla, Anantnag and Srinagar (rural) were removed. Only two district Congress heads: Zainub Begum (sister of Sadiq) who was the PCC President

152 "PCC is Valid", The National Herald, 25 May 1969.

153 The Hindustan Times, n. 143.

154 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

Srinagar (urban) and Moti Ram Baigra, the president of DCC Udhampur were retained intact, due to their loyalty to Sadiq.

From the side of Central High Command, Sadiq Ali wrote to the acting PCC Chief Bhagat Chajju Ram in this connection, and held such actions as a matter of concern for the Congress as a whole.¹⁵⁵

Bhagat Chajju Ram justified his action by saying that, "Before Qasim resigned I was neutral. I could not resign with him and, therefore, joined hands with Sadiq. And, on Sadiq Sahab's will when I became the President it was my programme that, every district should run smoothly. Thus, I had to take measures towards this direction".¹⁵⁶ Similarly, another follower of Sadiq says: "when they tried to form a parallel PCC group--a dangerous organization within the organization, we eliminated some of the PCC presidents etc., because we never wanted our leader to be defied by dissidents".¹⁵⁷

Following these developments in the state, both the Central Government and Congress High Command felt uneasy about the affairs of the Pradesh Congress. On 11 June, Mrs Gandhi and the then AICC General Secretary met in New Delhi, for bringing out the solution of the Congress crises in the state. It was also reported that Sadiq Ali did not see with any favour the elimination of the Qasinites from their position in the party or

155 Refer to "Concern Over J & K Affairs", The Hindustan Times, 2 June 1969.

156 Interview, 15 September 1976, Srinagar (New Secretariat).

157 Srikant Kaul, Interview, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

government. And, it was also reported that Mrs Gandhi agreed with Ali's view.¹⁵⁸ Sadiq on the other hand justified his action by saying (while addressing the Congress workers at Beerwa, 40 kms from Srinagar) that he was bringing new blood into the party.¹⁵⁹ Meanwhile at the instance of the Union leaders both Qasim and Sadiq met for three hours on 12 June 1969,¹⁶⁰ and on 14 June for two and a half hours. Sadiq came out with the statements that "good progress has been made for restoration of mutual confidence";¹⁶¹ but The Hindu correspondent from Srinagar, however, wrote : "... in spite of the intervention by the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi and the Union Home Minister the crisis in the state Congress remained unresolved. It appears, as if the efforts made so far to restore peace in the Pradesh Congress have proved to be an exercise in selling sand in the Sahara".¹⁶² This was further proved when there occurred an open clash between the respective groups on 29 July in which eight congressmen including Abdul

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- 158 "PM Sadiq Ali Discuss PCC Rift", The Hindustan Times, June 1969.
- 159 "Need for New Blood in Congress in Kashmir", Times of India, 13 June 1969.
- 160 "Sadiq Confers with Qasim", The National Herald, 13 June 1969.
- 161 "Good Progress in Talks with Qasim says Sadiq", The Statesman, 26 June 1969.
- 162 "Persisting Rift in the State Congress", The Hindu, 8 July 1969.

Gani Lone (MLA) were taken into custody at Handwara.¹⁶³ According to Qasim's spokesman, the scuffle occurred (in which many people were injured) when the ministerialists assisted by police entered the Handwara Congress block office where Lone was addressing a meeting of Congress workers. Another breach occurred between both the factions in October 1969, when CM unilaterally announced the party nominees for the seven Council seats for which the nominations were filed on 30 September 1969.¹⁶⁴ Sadiq met both Qasim and TD in this connection, but having failed to reach an agreement, he sent the list of candidates through the Finance Minister G.L. Dogra for approval. Qasim did not approve this because he wanted to discuss the issue at PCC Working Committee level and then sent it to the Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB) for approval. TD was reported to be even more rigid than Qasim. Thus, instead of seven nomination papers by the Congress they filed 13 (7 belonging to Sadiq group and six to Qasim) and one independent was also in the field. The elections showed only a slight edge of Sadiq over Qasim group.

Qasim Comes Back to Active Politics

Mrs Gandhi faction delighted Qasim by inviting him to

163 See "8 Congressmen Held after Faction Fight", Times of India, 30 June 1969.

164 Refer to "Sadiq-Qasim Rift Widens", The National Herald, 1 October 1969.

attend the AICC meeting in New Delhi to be held on 22 November 1969.¹⁶⁵ Jammu and Kashmir had eight AICC members and they included both Qasim and Sadiq. Qasim who immediately accepted the invitation with joy, made an announcement of unequivocal support to Prime Minister's policies on 15 November in Srinagar (a week before the AICC meeting). With this, thus, dates back the formal coming back of Qasim to active politics.¹⁶⁶ In the meanwhile the formal arrangement of making Qasim as the legal President of PCC were made. A meeting of PCC Working Committee was called in, which was attended by 12 of the then 18 working committee members. The meeting was held at the residence of Sardari Lal Mahajan under the Presidentship of ID. Those who did not attend it were--Sadiq, Zainub Begum, Karan Singh, Om Mehta, Kushak Bakula, and Chajju Ram. All these belonged to Sadiq's regiment. Mohd. Shafi Qureshi (Qasim's supporter) also could not attend the meeting and the seat of DP was vacant. And, those who attended it were: T. Dutta, Master Beli Ram, Chunni Lal Sharma, Mirza Mohd. Iqbal (Rajouri), M.N. Kaul, Syed Hussain, Anwar Khan, G.R. Kar, Sardar Kuldip Singh, Sardari Lal Mahajan and Mir Lasjan. T. Dutta, then issued a statement that Qasim was the PCC President.¹⁶⁷ Finally, on 16 November

165 "Qasim Group Too Back Mrs Gandhi", Times of India, 11 November 1969.

166 Qasim, Interview, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

167 Based on the Interview with M.N. Kaul, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

1969 Qasim himself declared his active entrance to politics to work for the forces of socialism, secularism, and democracy and said, that "he valued the advice of his friends to resume the Presidentship of Kashmir PCC and also attend the requisitioned AICC meeting".¹⁶⁸ TD had already done so by voluntary resumption of duties as Kashmir PCC General Secretary following Congress President Nijalingappa's direction.¹⁶⁹

So far, Sadiq was advocating that he was pained at Qasim's resignation and hoped that the latter will soon resume his duties. But when done so, the factional feud did not end with it. In fact it was now much more intensified. This was obvious from the following factors:

- (i) Sadiq refused to recognize Qasim as the PCC President. (170)
- (ii) The group led by Sadiq did not attend the PCC meeting.
- (iii) the acting president of PCC Bhagat Chajju Ram challenged its validity because, it according to him was not called by him. (171)

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- 168 "Qasim will be in Active Politics Again", The Hindustan Times, 17 November 1969.
- 169 T. Dutt Calls PCC Executive Meet: Nijalingappa worsened Jammu and Kashmir Crisis, The Patriot, 10 October 1969.
- 170 One of the Sadiq's followers justified Sadiq's action by saying that, "When there was an open rebellion against the leader, how Sadiq could recognize Qasim as PCC Chief".
- Ayub Khan, An Interview, 19 September 1976, Srinagar.
- 171 See "Kashmir Congress", The Indian Express, 19 November 1969.

Srikant Kaul, Giasuddin, Noor Mohd., Ghulam Nabi Sogami, etc. disowned PCC as well as Qasim. But this hardly made any impact on Qasim's position, because he had the support of majority in the PCC and was followed by many of the MLAs also. All MPs (belonging to both the groups) also welcomed his decision. Then came the special session of the Congress at Delhi. There the AICC members persuaded Qasim to become the General Secretary and one of the working Committee member (of AICC), provided he leaves the organization in the state at the disposal of Sadiq. Conditionally, therefore, he was nominated as one of the Congress Working Committee member by C. Subramaniam [the then Ad-hoc President of the AICC (N)]. But Qasim was persuaded by his followers in the state not to accept this proposal and remain in the state politics.

The resumption of the office of the President of PCC by Qasim in fact, intensified the factional activities. S.K. Kaul who described himself as the provincial secretary of the PCC said that, they had decided to call a delegates session which had the support of 57 legislators including 40 members of state Assembly besides 72 of the 79 Block Presidents. This session he said would elect the PCC Chief, PCC executive and the new General Secretary of the Party.

On 7 December 1969, a delegation of four Kashmir Ministers

172 Refer "Sadiq Commands Majority: Qasim Group in Jammu and Kashmir Faces Ouster", The Patriot, 13 December 1969.

headed by Pir Giasuddin met newly elected Congress (D) President Jagjivan Ram and apprised him of the necessity of holding elec-
 173
 tions to the PCC in the state. But the idea was reported to have been rejected by Jagjivan Ram and other Union leaders, and it was only a day after that the pro-Sadiq people abandoned
 174
 this idea (to avoid the embarrassment to Mrs Gandhi). It saved the party from being divided formally.

Then came the Bombay Session of the Congress. Both Wasim and Sadiq were happy that they enjoyed the confidence of Mrs Gandhi. Here Wasim was advised to become the third General Secretary of the AICC. Wasim was reported to have said that he was prepared to serve the organization in any capacity and had no hesitation in working as a General Secretary, if called upon to do so, but he always rejected the idea that he should withdraw from active participation in state politics. As he said on the evening of 9 February in New Delhi that: "I am a worker of the party and I would rather confine myself to the arena
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 where I am needed most and where I think I can serve best".

While talking to the newsmen a few days before the Assembly Drama, Wasim said that he continued to be the PCC Chief

173 Refer "Kashmir PCC Poll: Jagjivan Ram Approached", The Hindustan Times, 8 December 1969.

174 See "In Kashmir PCC Poll", The Hindustan Times, 9 December 1969.

175 "Kashmir PCC Dispute Still Unresolved", The Statesman, 10 February 1970.

because his resignation was not accepted by the Congress High Command and "hence there is no need for another President". He also said that he did not like Sadiq becoming the PCC Chief and asserted that he always enjoyed the "Confidence of the Central Leaders".¹⁷⁶ By this time, in fact the antagonism within the Congress had reached to an extent that the hardliner dissidents, even willed to sit in the opposition benches and thought that no confidence move against the CM could be possible by formally doing so. But Qasim was said to have strongly opposed it by saying that at that stage the question be left to him.¹⁷⁷ Now comes the final stage of Sadiq-Qasim conflict, which we call as: A Drama in the Legislative Assembly.

II. IMPACT OF FACTIONALISM IN THE LEGISLATURE: A DRAMA IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

As we have seen above, by the end of February 1970, the antagonism had reached the point that some followers of Qasim were even willing to sit in the opposition. A kind of psychology of defeatism had taken over his followers like A.G. Lone, and ID etc. But Qasim, a man with great amount of tolerance power advised to leave all this to him. In the meantime he started thinking that something should be done to show his strength in the party. The Assembly session was also to be held

176 "Qasim Not For Sadiq As PCC Chief", Times of India, 16 February 1970.

177 Refer "Advice to Qasim: Hardline Against Sadiq", Times of India

at the end of February 1970 itself. A conflict was therefore, bound to occur between the two factions in this session. This happened on 28 February 1970. An open conflict was witnessed in the Legislative Assembly on the second day of the Budget Session when pandemonium prevailed for about 45 minutes and the repeated appeals of the Speaker Shamusuddin for order were drowned in shouts and counter-shouts of rival Congress members who gesticulated and abused each other. The trouble started in the Assembly when TD began a bitter attack on the Deputy Education Minister Noor Mohd. by saying that the latter (Noor Mohd.) used to collect the teachers when attendance was thin at public meetings addressed by him. When Noor Mohd. rose up to defend his government and held the allegations as baseless the supporters of Qasim protested and demanded that TD be allowed to speak. Then Sadiq stood up to say that the Minister was within his right to defend the government. This was followed by shouts and counter-shouts. Sadiq then changed the very topic of discussion by declaring that TD was not even a permanent resident of the state, that in fact produced more huss and cries. TD felt this as a question of life and death to him and, thus, retorted: "The CM has threatened me by saying that I am not a resident of the state. I was not a corrupt Minister like others. Let Sadiq appoint a commission to enquire into the conduct of all of his ministers, and prove even one charge against me. I am not a rich and am a self-made man. I am prepared to

178
suffer".

When the CM rose to say that, he had posed no threat, and was only making the charge in all seriousness, TD counter charged: "No, you have posed a threat. I know which officials had been burning the mid-night oil to fish out something to discriminate against me".¹⁷⁹ And in these allegations and counter-allegations the session time was over. This process went on for the consecutive days also. M.L. Kaul, another Qasimite, o.g. charged the government that, "only lip service is being paid to socialism with the result that the rich were getting richer and the poor - poorer,¹⁸⁰ the corruption was being institutionalized and legalized", and he called for a complete re-appraisal of economic policies. Abdul Gani Lone also contested the government's claim that everything was well.

In the meantime, a signature campaign was initiated by the Qasim faction to ascertain the strength of their group. After ascertaining their strength, they prepared to vote down the government of Sadiq in the Assembly. A.G. Lone, G.R. Kar, TD, Mufti Sayeed, Mir Lasjan etc. were mobilizing maximum possible support to achieve their purpose. Mufti Jayeed and M.L. Kaul

178 "Pandemonium in Jammu and Kashmir Assembly", Times of India, 1 March 1970.

179 Ibid.

180 "Pro-Qasim MLAs Broadside Against Sadiq's Government", National Herald, 15 March 1969.

during this period addressed a Press Conference and demanded the removal of Glasuddin, Ayub Khan, Noor Mohd., and Ranjit Singh from their respective positions in the government. ¹⁸¹

This meeting was held in Mufti's house. The remarkable feature of this meeting was Mir Poonchi's Press Conference, who changed colours like a Chameleon. Giving the decision on behalf of the 35 MLAs, the Chief Whip of the party, Mir Poonchi said that the majority of the Congress members in the Assembly had lost confidence in the leadership of Sadiq, because he failed to deliver the goods to the party inside and outside the Assembly. ¹⁸² The Deputy Chief Whip, Randhir Singh, however, said that "the Congress legislature party is firmly behind G.M. Sadiq, ... no disruptive move from outside can succeed in undermining his position ... whoever, may have circulated the statement about the withdrawal of support, in fact, it has no basis". ¹⁸³ Mir Poonchi became the most prominent figure of 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram' ¹⁸⁴ politics in the state, when he said next day that his previous

181 Interview with M.S. Kaul, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

182 "Qasim Group Decerts, But Sadiq Group Safe", Patriot, 13 March 1970.

183 Ibid.

184 Literally translated the term 'Aya Ram' and 'Gaya Ram' means Ram came, Ram went. It is said that the title of Aya Ram was given to Gaya Lal (a Harijan legislator of Haryana) by Rao Birendra Singh. Gaya Lal had declared in Delhi earlier the same day that he was quitting the United Front (led by Rao) to join the Congress. Rao personally brought him to Chandigarh and declared before newsmen at his house that Gaya Ram was now 'Aya Ram'.

day's statement "was made under pressure".¹⁸⁵ But Qasim's men said to this researcher that no pressure was being exercised on him and they only persuaded and convinced him. "He joined us but later he was kidnapped by his wife from Mufti's house. Whereas Qasim group only exercised pressure of persuasion, Sadiq group, corrupted him. Personally Mir Poonchi's entire family was obliged to Sadiq Sahab, because during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 he was charged of anti-national activities. Only Sadiq Sahab's intervention saved him. His elder brother was a big forest lessee and, thus, Sadiq Sahab contacted him who in turn sent Mir Poonchi's wife to Mufti's house and took him away

Later this expression was popularized by the Union Home Minister who mentioned it in his speech in the Lok Sabha. See for this Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power, Defections and State Politics in India, revised and edited by Savita Kashyap (Delhi, National Publishing House, 1974), p. 169.

In Jammu and Kashmir, Mir Poonchi was widely mentioned in this connection following the days of his Press Conference. For one political observer wrote, "in view of the emergence of Aya Rams and Gaya Rams on the state political scene smooth sailing for Sadiq is difficult". See O.P. Saraf, "Threat to Sadiq Government Recedes, Governor Prorogues Legislature", in The Hindustan Times, 14 March 1970. Similarly, the Tribune editorial wrote of "the extension of Aya Ram Gaya Ram phenomenon in J&K, regardless of the dangers threatening the state". The Tribune, 16 March 1970, Moss in Kashmir.

186 O.P. Saraf, "Threat to Sadiq Government, Governor Prorogues Legislature, The Hindustan Times, 14 March 1970.

from us".¹⁸⁶ Sadiq's men on the other hand said that "He did not attack Mufti's house but wanted to get our Chief Whip Poonchi, who was kept occupied in eating and merry-making. His wife was more intelligent^o and she thought that it was wrong on her husband's part to betray Sadiq. Thakur Randhir Singh and I went to Poonchi's house and told her about his (Mir Poonchi's) whereabouts and of his alliance against us. We did not tell her to recall him, but we told her that one should be a loyal friend and straightforward and this move by him was not good for him".¹⁸⁷ Mir Poonchi himself recalled the following story (as to what happened with him that day:

they (Qasim faction) had already a plan to vote down Sadiq in the previous meetings in which I was not present. In the last meeting of this series I joined them when invited by Qasim. I was called to join it at the

186 Related by one of the Key Supporter of Qasim during this period, who wished to name him for this narration, but we are keeping him anonymous in order to avoid controversy. But, this fact has been supported by many of my respondents when I tried to confirm the view.

^o Mir Poonchi also said when asked about the reason for his wife being pro-Sadiq that "being a politician's wife she is politically aware, and is matriculate as for education is concerned, but that night three reasons were responsible for my recall by her from Mufti's house. (i) Neither she, nor any of my children knew where I was, (ii) they wanted to have their meals, as they usually used to wait for me, and (iii) it was purely because of the pressure by Sadiq's men that she came to take me off from Mufti's house. It was not her personal choice or decision".

Interview with Ghulam Mohammed Mir (Poonchi), 30 September 1976, Jammu (PCC Office).

187 Interview with Srikant Kaul, 16 September 1976, Srinagar.

last hour. Mir Lasjan and Ch. Mohd. Aslam came to me and told that Qasim Saheb had called on me. At 5 p.m. I had to go for a PCC meeting at Sadiq Saheb's house, as a Chief Whip of the Party. But as I was called by Qasin, I followed Lasjan and Ch. Mohd. Aslam. They told me that they were going to withdraw the support to Sadiq in Budget Session. In the tense atmosphere of Mufti's house except Qasim himself all group leaders were present there. Few minutes later there was a Press Conference. I was not aware of the background, but when everyone asked me to give a Press Conference, all of a sudden I had to give the decision of 36 MLAs including myself that Sadiq had lost the confidence of the majority. There was no pressure on me, but circumstances were like this. Mentally I was not prepared to support the issue because it happened suddenly. That day I was in Mufti's house up to 2 o'clock. In the meantime, Zainub Begum, Srikant Kaul, Rafiq Sadiq, Ghulam Ahmed Burzo, Randhir Singh, Akhtar Mizami, Abdul Jani and Ayub Khan went to my house at about 1 or 1.30 p.m. They told my wife that Sadiq wanted to see me. Then my wife came there, when directed by them to Mufti's house. Only my wife and driver were in the car. They (Sadiq's men) were waiting in my house for my arrival. My wife told me to come because the whole family was waiting for me. Immediately after reaching home, I proceeded to Sadiq's house alongwith his agents. We reached there at about 2.30 a.m. They told me that they were waiting for me in the CPP meeting. Same day my brother-in-law (Abdul Hamid Mir) and nephew (Manir Hussain) were arrested. This was done to pressurize me. And, it was one of the factors of my going to Sadiq's house. The next day, I gave another statement to press that I was with Sadiq, and my nephew and brother-in-law were released. (188)

Next day, both the groups alleged the confinement and

188 Interview with Ghulam Mohd. Mir (Poonchi), Vice-President, PCC, 29 and 30 September 1976, Jammu (PCC Office and in the home).

kidnapping of their supporters by rival groups. Sadiq alleged that Mir Poonchi and seven others had been abducted by his adversaries the previous night. While Mir Poonchi was secured by his wife after a midnight search alongwith some others, four of them were still in confinement, and even their relatives were unaware about their whereabouts, added Sadiq. He also said that the disciplinary action would be taken against partymen for such undemocratic tactics. Similarly, TD charged that Sadiq's supporters had confined two MLAs: Mangat Ram and Chajju Ram (not Bhagat Chajju Ram), and were pressurizing them to issue the statements.

Legislature Prorogued

But, Mir Poonchi's statement to the Press at Mufti's house carried a great amount of truth. And next day Sadiq told the newsmen that he had advised the Governor to prorogue the Assembly from tomorrow (i.e. 14 March 1969). He said: "Coupled with the attempts of certain sections in the Legislature to induce the members of Congress Party to defect compelled me to advice the Governor to prorogue both the houses of the Legislature. I hope the Legislature will meet very soon, but probably in the current month", ¹⁸⁹ Sadiq added. When asked whether his cabinet would be reshuffled, he said, "I do not think there

will be any need for that. It is premature".¹⁹⁰ The Kashmir Government in a press note issued on 13 March 1970 (that became operational from 8 O'clock on 14 March 1970) announced that the Governor had prorogued both Houses of Jammu and Kashmir Legislature. It said, "this order has been necessitated on account of the agitation launched in Jammu by various groups and parties which have seriously affected the proceedings of the current session of the legislature. It will be recalled that some members had voiced their fears regarding their personal safety on the floor of the House".¹⁹¹ But these were only lies of factional drama. On the contrary, as wrote the Times of India, "the prorogation of the Assembly on a flimsy excuse strengthens¹⁹² the suspicion that he (Sadiq) is no longer sure of his position".

Later a delegation of 14 legislators met the Governor Bhagwan Sahay. They were told by him that he was bound to accept the CM's advice under the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. These legislators led by G.R. Kar, staged a 'dharma' before the Governor's residence and two MLAs A.G. Lone and M.L. Potedar¹⁹³ complained that: "the democracy has been murdered".

The prorogation of the Assembly created furore and many comments were made on it. For instance, the Indian Express

190 Ibid.

191 Government of Jammu and Kashmir - Department of Information, Press Note, 13 March 1970.

192 Times of India, 14 March 1970.

193 The Hindustan Times, 14 March 1970.

viewed that "the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir can hardly be blamed for proroguing both the houses of the state legislature on the CM's advice. It is only state in the Union which has constitution of its own, and Bhagwan Sahay is quite right in saying that under the constitution Governor has no discretion ¹⁹⁴ in the matter. The fault lay in Sadiq's advice".

Sadiq's action was subjected to the severe criticism in the Lok Sabha, where it was commented upon that after what happened in Haryana a pattern seemed to have been set for the CM ¹⁹⁵ reduced to minority to avoid facing the legislature. All members belonging to the opposition, e.g., Madhu Limaye (SSP), Srichand Goyal (JS), and Parkash Vir Shastri (BKD) etc., felt ¹⁹⁶ that the President rule should be imposed in the state. Chandra Sekhar, a Young Turk said that, "the way the Kashmir Assembly has been prorogued, has not added to the prestige of the New Congress and its government". Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. said that "there is a split in the ruling party. We are not concerned ¹⁹⁷ with either Sadiq or Qasim". Vajpayee (the then President of J.S.) was the strongest critique of the Sadiq government, and asked, "for Central intervention to stop open assault on democracy

194 The Indian Express, 16 March 1970, "Whose Fault?"

195 The Indian Express, 14 March 1970, "Kashmir Follows Haryana."

196 "Demand for President Rule in Jammu and Kashmir", The Statesman, 14 March 1970.

197 Ibid.

and Constitution in Kashmir ... the interlude is now being utilized to buy and blackmail the defecting MLAs" ¹⁹⁸ he added. Chavan, however, spoke in the Parliament that "democracy is the concern of everyone of us and I think that the House (the State Assembly) will have to be reconvened ... because the budget has to be passed before March 31". ¹⁹⁹ One foreign political observer Peter Hazelhurst regarded it as the "flagrant breach of democratic principles". ²⁰⁰ Similarly, the Hindustan Times wrote that, "Sadiq has acted hastily in recommending the prorogation of the Assembly, which is presumably intended to give him time to mend his fences. This would seem ^{as} an admission that he had been reduced to a minority in the House. It would have been for better had he decided to face the legislature and resigned" ... the course that he adopted might enable him to win back sufficient support to prop up his government, but it will damage his position, possibly irretrievably". ²⁰¹ Grish Mathur viewed that "In these days of Aya Ram Gaya Ram Politics, it is rare to find

198 "Ram Calls Qasim to Delhi", The Hindustan Times, 15 March 1970.

199 The Statesman, n. 196.

200 Peter Hazelhurst, "Assembly in Kashmir Prorogued", The Times, 14 March 1970.

* According to Sadiq's sister, "Sadiq thought of resigning but the Governor Bhagwan Sahay and Chief Secretary P.K. Dave did not approve his plan". Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

201 "Many Upsets", The Hindustan Times, 14 March 1970.

a CM who goes to the Assembly for a vote of confidence, the moment some MLAs change sides".²⁰² The Brae Prasa Journal also wrote that "the main cause of the prorogation was the menace of defections--actual or potential".²⁰³

In the meantime, on the state political scene, Mufti (the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and Law) dramatized the rift by tendering his resignation.²⁰⁴ In his resignation letter he said, "for quite sometime I have been feeling uncomfortable as a member of your cabinet over the whole manner in which the affairs of the party were being conducted. Distaste has been smearing which had resulted in the majority of the Congress members in the Legislative Assembly having indicated clearly²⁰⁵ that the ministry headed by you has lost the confidence".

Meanwhile, 20 supporters of the Qasim group, including Mufti called on the Governor on 14 March and complained against alleged harrassment by the supporters of Sadiq.²⁰⁶ Coinstantaneously a memorandum signed by 34 MLAs was sent to the President and the Prime Minister that asked for the election of new

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- 202 Girish Mathur, "Intrigue Behind Present Kashmir Crisis", Patriot, 22 March 1970.
- 203 Brae Prasa Journal, 16 March 1970.
- 204 "Minister Resigns", The Hindustan Times, 14 March 1970.
- 205 Times of India, 14 March 1970.
- 206 See "Governor's Rule Suggested", The Hindustan Times, 15 March 1970.

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leader.

Preparation for a Drama
in Delhi

Low started the most hectic activity of the factional drama. The preparation was done in the Kufthi's house where it was decided by the Qasim group to replace Sadiq by any means. About 30 to 35 legislators were gathered there. In the beginning there were only 20 to 21 legislators, but nearly 10 people they got defected from Sadiq's Camp. "Sadiq's policy", said one Qasimite, "was very poor, and ours was a well-knit group". All this happened on the direction of Qasim. As Qasim himself said, "when they wanted no-confidence against Sadiq, I told them to go to the Central leadership. I sent them to Delhi not to change the leadership but to solve the issue". The Qasim group then got nearly 10 to 12 people from Sadiq's camp. They were: Mohd. Yakub Bhat (Kulgam), Abdul Rohman Dar (Kulgam), Abdul Khaliq Mir (Beorwa), Mian Bashir (Kangan), Sardar Surender Singh (Jangmarg), Abdul Rashid (Rajouri), Mahant Ram (Kathua) and few others. Qasim also admitted that "our people did bring some MLAs from the Sadiq group also". After the

207 Refer "Mir Qasim Asked to Come to Delhi", National Herald, 14 March 1970.

208 Interview with M.A. Kaul.

209 Interview with Qasim.

210 Based on Interviews.

211 Qasim, Interview.

prerogation of the Assembly, many of them were in the Mufti's house and few others were in the house of Justice Shirajuddin (a relative of Qasim).²¹² Sadiq group knew that most of the MLAs were in Mufti's house and, therefore, raided it under the command of A.G. Goni, Moor Mohd. and Thakur Randhir Singh. "Those gangsters", said one of the Qasim's men, "stoned Mufti's house, but as we also had many workers at his house, we frustrated their move".²¹³

Interestingly enough, those who defected to Qasim group were kept under a close watch, and all sorts of cares were taken to keep them busy in merry-making and enjoying. As Qureshi said: "^{the} fear was always there that if any of them goes out of their hands, it will be difficult to win him back. Therefore, they were always kept in the company of the leaders who were close to them. These leaders would mix with them, discussed with them one matter of the other, and in this way, did not provide to them any opportunity to slip away".²¹⁴ Low started the preparation of the Qasim faction for despatching the maximum possible followers (of the Assembly) to New Delhi. One of our respondents described this preparation in the following words:

After a raid on Mufti's house, we came to know from our intelligence that some of the members will be forcibly removed by the

212 Based on Interviews.

213 Interview with E.L. Kaul, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

214 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

Sadiq faction. We were prepared to frustrate their move. Thus the same night (the day on which Mufti's house was raided) we arranged the removal of those members who recently joined us from Sadiq group. We dispatched them to Pathankot, and asked them to go to Delhi from there. We arranged for their transport and Railway Tickets also. In Delhi the arrangements were made for their stay at the residence of Qureshi, Syed Hussain, and at Lodhi Hotel. By the time Sadiq came to know about it, they had already crossed the state borders. So they could not prevent it because we leaked out the information that we would leave for Delhi next day. Actually, that day Sadiq group had a plan of taking them back forcibly with the help of the police. The next day all others who were Qasimites at all time and places followed them. (215)

A few people at that time went via Basoli to Delhi fearing the Sadiq's plan to stop them at Lakhapur checkpoint. All anti-Sadiq elements, thus, were united at that time. At those hours DP worked even from Moscow. For example, Qureshi revealed to this researcher that: "DP telephoned me from Moscow to bring the MLAs to Delhi to remove Sadiq".²¹⁶

According to our another respondent (who belonged to the Sadiq group) these people who defected from the Sadiq group and then went to Delhi were purchased for not less than Rs.10,000 each. The names of Mahant Ram and Punjab Singh^o were openly

215 Interview with M.K. Kaul, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

216 Interview, 9 October 1976, New Delhi.

^o Punjaboo Ram alias Punjab Singh, said our another informant (belonging to TD's faction which was allied with Qasim) was pressurized by the DC and Session Judge etc. to sign in favour of Sadiq. Interview with Dharam Vir, 22 September 1976, Srinagar (MLA's Hostel).

mentioned in this connection. The same informant further said that Abdul Rehman Dar was taken in the night suit and there was still food left in his plate.²¹⁷ It means that he was asked to leave hurriedly, while he was having his dinner.

"Sadiq", said Zainub Begum, "could take them back, but he was not such person. Same night one person^{*} rang up and told us that as it was the question of Sadiq Sahob's integrity, he could bring some of them back to Jammu. He obviously wanted some money to purchase their loyalty, but Sadiq Sahob refused to do so".²¹⁸ Those, who could not be purchased by Qasim faction according to her were--Abdul Gani Lamthihali, Raja Muzaffar Khan, Mohd. Yunus Khan, Ayub Khan, G.L. Dogra, Loor Mohammed, Giasuddin, Marboo^{**} (who according to her when asked to follow them to Delhi said that he could not betray Sadiq Sahob), Srikant Kaul, G.A. Burza, Moti Ram Baigra, Akhtar Nizami, A.G. Goni, Randhir Singh, Shafi Mohd., Gurumukh Singh, Bhagat Chajju Ram etc.²¹⁹ In fact these people formed the then Sadiq group.

217 Related by Sadiq's agent, who did not caution to keep it anonymous, but we wish to keep it anonymous following the nature of information.

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218 Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

** Sonam Marboo also told this researcher that "I was appealed but I did not go". Sonam Marboo, An Interview, 21 September 1976, Srinagar (Lev Secretariat).

219 Ibid.

Mahant Ram's case is the most interesting one among those who were taken to Delhi. It was announced by the Sadiq faction that he was their man, and the Qasim group regarded him as their man since the very beginning. Dharam Vir gives the following story about Mahant Ram's dispatch to Delhi. He said:

He was our man since the beginning, but at that time he was in Sadiq camp. It went to Gandhi Nagar where Mahant Ram was staying in Mathu Ram's house. I went in the evening and again next morning to him. Then I took him to Kathua. He was asked by S.P. whether he was going to Kathua willingly or under pressure. Mahant Ram told him that how he could be taken under pressure? The S.P. was informed by officials in Jammu to enquire about the actual happenings. Later Gurumukh Singh, Janak Singh, and late Nazir Hussain Semnani (MLA), went to him and asked him to return to Jammu. From Delhi, Qasim, Beli Ram etc., rang me up repeatedly about Mangat Ram and Mahant Ram's whereabouts. In Kathua, Mahant Ram got the time to think, and then later went to Delhi with Mangat Ram. In Jammu, Dogra announced that Mahant Ram was with them, but in Delhi Mahant Ram himself gave the reverse statement. (220)

By 14-15 March, therefore, we find that almost all MLAs supporting Qasim had reached Delhi. Sadiq too, thus, sent his feelers to Delhi, when the chief whip Randhir Singh, and two Deputy Ministers (Parmanand and G.M. Bandey) left for New Delhi on 16 March. Later Bhagat Chajju Ram also followed them. 221

220 Interview, 21 September 1976.

221 Refer "Sadiq in a Mood For Compromise", Times of India, 17 March 1970.

Publicly, however, Sadiq group claimed that "only a handful of MLAs turned hostile have been whisked away". Sadiq said: "it could hardly be described as democratic procedure".²²² Sadiq²²³ was greatly hurt by it and regarded it as a "great betrayal". He never expected that so many party legislators were against him. His sister, however, said that, the Assembly party was annoyed with Sadiq because Sadiq never liked any MLA bringing his own demands or his relatives case. He would ask them to bring the demands of the people.²²⁴

About the political atmosphere and activities in Sadiq camp following the departure of nearly 32 MLAs to Delhi, says Ayub Khan that:

When 32 MLAs went to Delhi, we went to Sadiq's residence. He was unruffled by it and said that those who have left for Delhi will not succeed in their designs. He said that there was nothing to worry. This was a style of a visionary politician like him, otherwise he would have broken down.* He were calm, quiet

222 The Statesman, 18 March 1970.

223 "Sadiq Calls it Great Betrayal", Times of India, 20 March 1970.

224 Interview with Zainub Begum, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

* But according to most of our respondents, this vote of no-confidence was responsible for Sadiq's serious illness later on. TD, for example, recalled that "On Sadiq's death when we were returning after Sadiq's burial, I told Qasim that we were responsible for his murder (i.e. death)". Interview, 1 September 1976. Similarly, M.I. Kaul, Srikant Kaul, and Qureshi said that the vote of no-confidence shocked Sadiq so much that he was almost permanently embedded to bed thereafter.

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* But according to most of our respondents, this vote of no-confidence was responsible for Sadiq's serious illness later on. TD, for example, recalled that "on Sadiq's death when we were returning after Sadiq's burial, I told Qasim that we were responsible for his murder (i.e. death)". Interview, 1 September 1976. Similarly, M.K. Kaul, Srikant Kaul, and Qureshi said that the vote of no-confidence shocked Sadiq so much that he was almost permanently embedded to bed thereafter.

and little worried. It was an informal and sympathetic meeting. (225)

All this - e.g., the prorogation of the Assembly, and dispatching of as much as nearly 32 of 61 MLAs to Delhi, worsened the situation so much that now the only ray of hope lay with Mrs Gandhi. As Times of India wrote that: "All 32 MLAs from Kashmir are here in no mood to relent. They seem determined to oust Sadiq and elect new leader in his place. They claim that a number of MLAs supporting the demand for a change in leadership had already risen to 39 ... the situation in the state Congress has gone bad to worse"²²⁶. It was on the basis of these deteriorating conditions that the Governor of the state was reported to have communicated to the President V.V. Giri that "the political atmosphere in the state was fluid following desertion from G.M. Sadiq's camp"²²⁷. These MLAs were reported to have contended that: the crisis in the state be resolved before 30 March because the budget had to be passed; and President's rule in the state should not be resorted to, for the Congress had a thumping majority. The Congress High Command also appreciated both the stands. Later it was reported that Central leaders had advised Sadiq against imposition of the

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- 225 Interview with Ayub Khan, 19 September 1976, Srinagar.
- 226 "Patch-up in Kashmir Unlikely", Times of India, 17 March 1976.
- 227 "Governor Reports Kashmir Situation Fluid", The Hindustan Times, 17 March 1976.

228
 President Rule. By now, thus, the stage of factional drama had completely been shifted from the Winter Capital of the state - Jammu to the Capital of India - New Delhi.

INTENSIFIED FACTIONALISM: A FACTIONAL
 DRAMA IN NEW DELHI

When nothing changed either in favour of Sadiq following the prorogation of the Assembly, and the majority of the Congress MLAs already being on Qasim's side, the preparation was made by Qasim's camp to shift the stage of the factional drama from Jammu to New Delhi. A complete regimentation of the conflicting forces around the persons of Sadiq and Qasim had taken place. The bifactional system was now at its final stage, which we call as Intensified Factionalism, and in this type of struggle both the groups tended to violate or forget all norms of intra-party democracy. Qasim's men in the government were staging a complete non-cooperation move against the Sadiq's government; and Sadiq on the other hand, refused to face the legislature which he thought was manipulated for the time being by his political opponents. Within the Pradesh Congress, there existed two parallel PCCs. Thus, all party and governmental forums became inoperative. The drama seemed to be over for the time being (because President's rule was expected), without being performed fully. Finally, an impasse was found out by Qasim when

228 "Sadiq Advised Against Dissolution of Assembly", The Hindustan Times, 19 March 1976.

he shifted the stage from Jammu to New Delhi, by sending no less than 32 of the 61 Congress legislators participating in it. In the meantime Sadiq also sent his men to New Delhi. Thus, the arena of political activity was completely changed by the presence of both the groups in New Delhi. New Delhi, is the last centre of appeal, and highest forum of the Congress Party, where the grievances of the individual members and various groups are heard.

On 13 March itself, Qasim was asked by the Congress President Jagjivan Ram to come to Delhi. In Delhi, these MLAs met various leaders including Mrs Gandhi. They met her twice, and other leaders like Chavan, F.A. Ahmed, G.L. Manda, Dinesh Singh, J. Ram etc. were also called on by them. The initial response of the P.M. to these dissidents was reported to be that of annoyance ²²⁹ but later on she gave a hearing to them. On 18 March, Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi, Y.B. Chavan, G.L. Manda, Karan Singh, and many others gave a patient hearing to these dissidents. The dissidents questioned the authority of the Chief Whip's call for a meeting of the Congress legislature party in Jammu. In a telegram to him, they said that the CM had no locus standi to call any such meeting. Demanding cancellation of the notice, they threatened that they would meet in

229 For example, it was told to this researcher by many of them that, M.L. Kaul (the spokesman of Qasim Group) when rose up and started accusing Sadiq and his regime before Mrs Gandhi, not only she got annoyed but also refused to listen to such complaints and made M.L. Kaul to sit down. (Based on Interviews).

Delhi on 19 March and formally pass a vote of no-confidence against Sadiq. "You will be responsible for the constitutional crisis that will follow. A clear majority of the Assembly members present in Delhi have declared withdrawal of support from Sadiq"²³⁰ they said. Although the Congress High Command, sympathized with their demand, at the same time they questioned their wisdom on the following points:

- (a) whether the conflict was of policies or of personalities,
- (b) whether the change of leadership would^{not} introduce an element of instability in the border state, and
- (c) how the evenly balanced factions would keep the government stable even if the leadership is being replaced. (231)

In answer to this, the MLAs let it be known that "no rapprochement was now possible between Sadiq and those who were opposed to his leadership. The crises would be further aggravated if the central leadership made any attempt to keep Sadiq in power".²³²

Meanwhile, the Congress High Command summoned Sadiq also to Delhi. On his arrival in Delhi on 20 March, Sadiq asserted that he still enjoyed the majority in the party;²³³ and if voted

230 The Hindustan Times, n. 228.

231 "32 Congress MLAs Seek Permission to Elect New Leader", Times of India, 19 March 1970; see also Ibid.

232 Ibid.

233 "Dissidents May Elect Qasim As Leader", The Hindustan Times, 22 March 1970.

down assured the way for the election of a new leader. He also said that the reconvening of the Assembly before the ending of March was necessary to pass the budget, and it was possible only "as soon as those who were here (in Delhi) march back", he added. But he let it be known that "I will go to the Assembly only if I secure a vote of confidence from party".²³⁴ "The issue could not be settled on the roadside in Jammu or elsewhere",²³⁵ he further said. Sadiq also challenged the dissidents for their attempts to call a party meeting in Delhi because only the leader of the party could do so. But the dissidents were reluctant to go to Jammu for a party meeting because, as their spokesman said: "We are not sure of the safety of our legislators. Already three legislators have been confined to a house in Jammu and kept under police guard. They are not allowed to communicate with outside world".²³⁶ And later the then AICC General Secretary Bahuguna was reported to have met all the dissidents individually, and they told him that they had withdrawn their support to Sadiq voluntarily. They also accused Sadiq for playing into the hands of "big forest lessees, bankers, arch reactionaries and some opportunists".²³⁷

234 "Sadiq To Test his Strength in the Party", Times of India, 21 March 1970.

235 The Hindustan Times, 21 March 1970.

236 n. 233.

237 Ibid.

As far as the top Union leadership was concerned, it was reported that they have made it known that they were not in favour of the change of leadership. But in case, it was not possible on account of dissidents majority, it was also made felt that Qasim would be asked to shoulder the responsibility. ²³⁸

On March 22, a meeting was held between Mrs Gandhi and Qasim, but nothing came out of it. Qasim, however, said after it that he at no stage "aspired for the CM ship" and what he wanted was "necessary adjustment in the PCC as suggested by him". ²³⁹ Earlier Sadiq also got mollified when he said that a

rapprochement should be honourable (because) no government can be run on compromise". ²⁴⁰ On 23 March again, after a brief discussion with Qasim and Bahuguna, Mrs Gandhi had a half-hour discussion with the dissidents on following line of thought:

- (a) recognition of Qasim as PCC Chief,
- (b) recognition of Sadiq as CM by declaring a vote of confidence in him.

It was, on this line of thought that her two principal lieutenants H.N. Bahuguna and Uma Shankar Dikshit were busy in finding out an adequate formula. Mrs Gandhi also requested Qasim to use his influence to precipitate the crisis. Qasim

238 Ibid.

239 "Dissidents Determined to Oust Sadiq", Times of India, 23 March 1970.

240 The Hindustan Times, 21 March 1970.

did not commit himself to anything and put everything on the will of his followers. When he unfolded the formula before them (his followers) they strongly reacted to it. He said that he had nothing to say or act but that he could not go against the wishes of Mrs Gandhi. He was reported to have made a highly persuasive speech but still some of his followers were in a defiant mood. The scene then shifted to 15 Windsor Place (the headquarters of the ruling Congress Party), where both Bahuguna and Dikshit addressed the MLAs and appealed to them to withdraw the move against Sadiq. Later the dissidents met Mrs Gandhi, who told them, not the change of leadership but give and take principle was in the best interest of the Congress Party in the state. Thus a new era of cohesion was introduced in the state politics and nearly 10 days of political crisis in the state came to an end on 24 March 1970. As the Times of India wrote that, "a split in the state Congress which could have led to the imposition of Presidential rule has been averted largely by the efforts of Qasim. He responded to the Prime Minister's appeal to retain Sadiq as CM and thus maintain the party unity"²⁴¹. And with this the factional drama of intensified nature came to an end. For example, a musical editorial that appeared in the Indian Express which wrote that: "after a week of high drama during which more than 30 members of the Congress legislature

241 "Kashmir Dissidents Agree to Drop Move to Oust Sadiq", Times of India, 26 March 1970.

party of Jammu and Kashmir performed in New Delhi before the Prime Minister and sundry other leaders of the New Congress, the tamasha^o organized by Syed Mir Qasim has ended on a tame note. Qasim seldom came to the Centre of the stage, but he was furiously busy in the wings as a prompter. As the producer and director of the tamasha he appears rather pleased with the performance. The national audience, however, is unlikely to share his satisfaction. Till the very last act, the Kashmir troupe created the impression that the curtain will fall with Qasim replacing Sadiq as the leader of the Congress Legislature Party and therefore as Chief Minister of the state. However, at the last moment Qasim's chivalrous nature asserted itself. We are told that Mrs Indira Gandhi appealed to him to retain Sadiq as Chief Minister and thus maintain the party's unity. Qasim responded to the appeal and, therefore, presumably the Kashmir Congress has been instantly restored to good health. Qasim will now return to Kashmir and start functioning again as the President of the Pradesh Congress Committee. The winter of discontent has ended abruptly and it is spring again in the Kashmir Valley. The trouble is that the spring in Kashmir is more fickle than it is elsewhere. Last year Srinagar had its heaviest snowfall at the end of April. Whether winter has

* Literally translated the term "tamasha" means 'a show', or 'spectacle' etc. See Mahendra Chaturvedi and B.N. Tiwari, eds., A Practical Hindi-English Dictionary (Delhi, National Publishing House, 1970), p. 241.

really given way to spring in the Kashmir Congress remains to be seen...."²⁴²

However, the drama staged by Qasim was of great significance to him because of mainly two reasons:

- (a) Qasim at no time so far emerged as a more popular leader than today, and
- (b) It made the Union leaders realize that he had a large following among the rank and file of the party as well as in the legislature.

Various political pundits, for example, wrote that "Mir Qasim has got all that he has been asking for as a result of Mrs Gandhi's mediation",²⁴³ and "the compromise is definitely a personal victory of Qasim in particular and his group in general".²⁴⁴ But there were no reasons for Sadiq also to be unhappy. For example, the Tribuna wrote that, "Sadiq has returned to Srinagar apparently a happier man".²⁴⁵ About the overall impact of the rapprochement on state politics wrote The Hindu that, "the none too deep waters of Kashmir parliamentary democracy have began to settle once again over the reefs of rocks revealed by the disturbance of surface caused by recent storm in the state Congress...."²⁴⁶

242 "Change of Season?", Indian Express, 26 March 1970.

243 "A Compromise", Times of India, 26 March 1970.

244 "Compromise At Last", Assam Tribuna, 30 March 1970.

245 "Sadiq and Qasim", The Tribuna, 27 March 1970.

246 "Musical Chairs in Reverse", The Hindu, 20 April 1970.

After the accord, Sadiq dropped all of his cabinet colleagues except G.L. Dogra and Noor Mohd. Among dropped were - Konwar Ranjit Singh, Giasuddin, Ayub Khan, Bandy Gurumukh Singh, Ch. Mohd. Shafi and Parmchand. And, the new inclusion in the government were - M.N. Kaul, A.G. Lone, T. Dutt, Thakur Randhir Singh, Mian Bashir Ahmed and at later stage even Qasim.

Though, the intensified factionalism disappeared as a result of accord, but the deep rooted differences did not come to an end with it. It continued even after the accord and a few new men in the government like M.N. Kaul etc. (who were previously with Qasim) were dubbed as Sadiq's men. The accord was, thus, only a compulsive one when all party and governmental forums went out of order and a constitutional crisis ensued. Even Qasim's induction into the government was possible because of Mrs Gandhi's efforts. As K.S. Khosla, for instance, wrote that, "the differences between the two leaders are too deep rooted to be resolved quickly.... It is no secret here that Qasim has joined the ministry in deference to the wishes of Mrs Gandhi and not because of his relations with Sadiq".²⁴⁷

Similarly, S. Venkatesh wrote that "the rapprochement that was supposed to have ensured proved to be nothing more than an uneasy truce, each side viewing the other with suspicion,

247 K.S. Khosla, "Reconciliation Between Qasim and Sadiq: Task Ahead", Times of India, 14 October 1970.

mistrust, though agreeing not to air its discontent publicly".²⁴⁸

Thus, Qasim's return to government after six years of political wilderness in no way marked the ending of the prolonged drama played on the political stage of Jammu and Kashmir. There was also conflict over the Panchayat elections,^{*} Bakshi's inclusion to Congress²⁴⁹ and the much talked topic--the policy of liberalization; but we have not discussed these issues here because they do not carry as much significance as the other aspects mentioned in this chapter.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, the Qasim-Sadiq feud appears essentially a struggle for power. There are no fundamental differences over the policy or ideology of the party. In fact all the major factional leaders like Sadiq, Qasim, DP,

248 S. Venkatesh, "Ruling Party Trying to Ward off Yet Another Crisis", The Statesman, 24 September 1970.

* When Panchayat elections were held Qasim faction did not participate in it, because Sadiq did not seek their co-operation. Sadiq solely took the decision to contest elections, in order to fight plebiscite front politically.

249 Whereas the Union leadership and Qasim were reported to be in favour of Bakshi's entrance to Congress "to further strengthen the nationalist and democratic forces in the state" (See "Sadiq-Qasim Differ Again", Free Press Journal, 28 August 1970), Sadiq was reported to have told that "Bakshi would be a liability to the party since he is not acceptable to the people of J&K". And as wrote S. Venkatesh that "He has threatened even to force a split in the party on this issue". See S. Venkatesh, n. 248.

TD, and Karan Singh believed in the same ideology. Though, various interested circles tried to give an ideological colour to this struggle, especially Qasim faction's opposition to the Sadiq's policy of liberalization, here it must be noted that both Sadiq and Qasim were the co-authors of this policy. As the differences developed both leaders made it routine to disagree rather than convince each other. We find the Qasim faction opposing the Sadiq style of implementing the liberalization policy. Though, they would not oppose the policy of liberalization as such, under the influence of factional politics they took exception over Sadiq's decision for permitting Sheikh Abdullah to meet Air Marshal Noor Khan of Pakistan; and the degree to which Mirza Afzal Beg (the President of the plebiscite front) was propagating a secessionist view. Thus, Qasim would object to Sadiq in a unique way, by contending that, "if the green flag could fly freely in the state ... it should not be a licence for the destruction of tri-colour".²⁵⁰ But, in essence what Sadiq followed was also followed by Qasim after the former's death. Not only this, but he also entered into an agreement with the Sheikh, vacated the chair of Chief Minister and placed Sheikh Abdullah over it by extending the full support of the Congress Party to his government. Thus, it is obvious that the struggle was purely based on power, and all other issues that occasionally took the ideological colour

250 Northern India Patrika, 24 May 1969.

(like TD's induction of syndicate politics in the Pradesh Congress, or differences over the liberalization policy etc.) were only part and parcel of this factional feud for power.

As far as the clash of personalities is concerned, Sadiq was too big a figure to be compared with Qasim. Sadiq was one of the tall men of the movement who played a key role in all major events since 1938 and he was indeed a builder of modern Kashmir. Qasim regarded him as his leader since 1950. In fact, we find that Qasim was to Sadiq, as Shastriji was to Lohru. We find Qasim as a follower of Sadiq even up to this day. For example, on Sadiq's death Qasim spoke that: "I pray to God to give me strength to follow in his footsteps".²⁵¹ And Qasim during his rule carried the state on the same road and along the same sign posts which Sadiq built. But interestingly enough, we find that the conflict reached at the level of a clash of personalities. For example, Sardar Nihal Singh wrote that, "Qasim-Sadiq quarrel is a symbol of highly personalized politics of Kashmir, in which old friendship and new estrangement are recalled in all their details. Questions are posed in terms of virtue and vice. Kashmiris are a gentle and civilized people possessing endearing qualities of old-world courtesies".²⁵² Thus,

251 See "G.M. Sadiq Dies of Heart Attack", Times of India, 13 December 1971.

252 Sardar Nihal Singh, "Mood of Uncertainty and Confusion in Kashmir", The Statesman, 7 October 1969.

the Congress High Command refused to entertain the wish of dissidents (in Delhi) by questioning them as, "whether the conflict was over policies or personalities".²⁵³ And, Qasim himself admitted that the conflict became a clash of personalities.²⁵⁴ He said, "In a sense it was a clash of personalities".

But Qasim corrected himself, when he further said that "to put in better sense of the term it was a detachment from one another of two personalities, who were so far close friends".²⁵⁵

In this study we see how a factional struggle for power when it reaches the stage of the bifactional system and then to the highest stage of it (that we have called here - intensified factionalism); is reduced purely to the personal politics in which the relationship is knitted by the intimate ties of affection and loyalty between leader and followers. Whereas Sadiq already had a large following because of his role and personality since the late thirties of this century, Qasim with his unique managerial art was able to establish the warmest relations with his followers. Initially, there was no clash of personalities as such, when the conflict was still at its developing stage. There were independent factions of Qasim, DP, ID, and Karan Singh. Sadiq acted almost as a leader above factionalism, and thus he was an overall leader. But, when he realized the strength of

²⁵³ Times of India, n. 231.

²⁵⁴ Interview with Qasim, 7 October 1976, New Delhi.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

Qasim he also started winning the loyalties of those people who were not with anyone, or who were in the government and were not liked by Qasim. In the meantime, following the sharing of portfolios and formation of the government, many people were seen to be unhappy with Sadiq's government, and a tendency developed that those who were anti-government were regarded as anti-Sadiq, and those who became anti-Sadiq identified with the name of Qasim, who came ultimately to spearhead this (anti-Sadiq) move. And, those who were with the government or did not like Qasim allied themselves with Sadiq. These alignments and realignments were also determined by the factional politics itself and various other reasons. For example, Karan Singh and G.L. Dogra associated themselves with Sadiq fearing the large following of TD in the Congress Party of the Jammu province. DP sided with Qasim because Sadiq removed him from the Home portfolio, and TD allied with Qasim because he was not happy with the new faces in Sadiq's government, such as G.L. Dogra etc., as he initially was one of the four friends who ruled the state in the period immediately after Sadiq's succession to power. Thus, all factions in a process of struggle for power submerged into two major factions led by Sadiq and Qasim. Finally, at the level intensified factionalism the personal politics comes to play a predominant role. It can, therefore, be said that all politics, that operates under the bifactional system and then reaches the level of intensified factionalism becomes personal in nature at all times and places.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

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SUMMARY

In the preceding chapters we have analyzed the conditions in which factions germinate and the conditions that determine the factional alignments, defections and splits. Factionalism, is studied here by taking into consideration the historical background and the socio-economic conditions of the people. We have given a detailed historical narration in which the regional, religious, and caste and class cleavages have been explained. In the historical background we have also explained the exploitation of Kashmiris since the period 1339 A.D. by alien rulers. On the whole we have attempted to show that Kashmiris in general, and the poor class of the state as a whole in particular, had been the worst sufferers of feudal rule. The existence of the feudal class and an intermediary class (i.e. the class of Jagirdars, Mukarraridars and Maufidars) as its agency for exploitation had been the prominent features of feudalism in the last stage of feudal rule in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, the very movement for freedom struggle in Kashmir is rooted in the bedrock of economic reality. Therefore, it is not unusual to find even a party like the Muslim conference radical in character. As B.D. Graham says: "the Dogra Maharajas who had ruled the area since 1846 had been byword for oppression, and it is not surprising that the Muslim

conference, founded in 1932 should have been both communal and agrarian-radical in character".¹

The movement for freedom in Kashmir was progressive in character. Thus, we find that the factionalism in the movement period revolves round the forces communalists Vs. secularists, and progressives Vs. non-progressives. On the eve of independence both secular nationalists and progressives were in full command of the situation. The radical land reforms in the state speak both for their ideology and class character. But its repercussions in Jammu province take a negative turn. A movement against the government was spearheaded under the leadership of Praja Parishad (a respectable substitute for the illegal RSS), which finally succeeded in influencing the sentiments of sentimental Sheikh Abdullah. At that time once again we find the factional alignments and realignments around the two basic ideologies. Not personality but ideology, therefore, was the basic determinant of factional loyalties in the 1951-53 period.

During the period 1947-51, we have seen that the introduction of power introduced power-politics within the National Conference. It is explained in Chapter III in terms of the Bakshi-Bag conflict and Karra's elimination from the National Conference organization. The other major conflict that occurred

1 B.D. Graham, "Bhawan Prasad Mookerjee and the Communalist Alternative" in D.A. Low, ed., Surroundings in Modern South Asian History (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963), p. 353.

during this period was between Sadiq and Sheikh. It is purely on ideological grounds that Sadiq differed with Sheikh and finally resigned from the government headed by Sheikh.

Though, the very factional behaviour is highly patternless, unsystematic and unpredictable everywhere, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir it is even more so. The sudden deviation in Sheikh's outlook, (i.e., change from a pro-Indian to an anti-Indian position) and a radical change in Karra's activities (i.e. from strong pro-Indian to staunch pro-Pakistani) speaks for the highly unsystematic political behaviour of the state leaders. It was, because emotions and not reason governed the mind and activities of Sheikh and Karra. "In fact", says one of our informants that, "among the Muslims it was not the emotional attachment to 'Bharat Mata', but because of the leftist ideology that the National Conference came closer to the Indian National Congress".² The Sadiq faction, therefore, remained throughout a major anti-Pakistani and pro-Indian force in the state. The outlook represented by the Bakshi faction, however, was strongly guided by pragmatic reality. As B.L. Mullik writes that, "Bakshi and D.P. Dhar ... were more pragmatic and realized that Kashmir's welfare depended on its unity with India".³

In 1953-63 period, that we have called the 'Bakshi era'

2 Trilochan Dutta, An Interview, 31 August 1976, Jammu (Gandhi Nagar).

3 B.L. Mullik, My Years with Jammu Kashmir (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 14.

a little more systematic factional behaviour (than up to 1953) seems to be in operation. In this period, the Sadiq-Bakshi feud is defined in terms of differences over organizational, and administrative matters etc. Though the Sadiq faction was dominated by an overwhelming majority of the leftists (and communists like Ram Piara Saraf and Kishan Dev Sethi), the conflict does not appear to be an ideological one. Though exclusively not based on power also (for all agreed with Bakshi's undisputed leadership), the conflict apparently occurred because of Bakshi's style of governing that tended to lessen the influence of Sadiq and his followers, and especially because of Bakshi Abdul Rashid's (the brother of Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.) functioning in the National Conference organization as the General Secretary. Factionalism here differed in only one way with the other parts of India, i.e. both the Union Government, and the Congress High Command had no jurisdiction over the organizational matters of the National Conference (who otherwise by interfering could settle the issue). Bakshi was the supreme power. Thus, an inevitable split occurred, in the absence of arbitration either by the Congress High Command or by the Central Government.

Factional behaviour changed remarkably since the period 1965 onwards. It is because both the Union leaders and the Congress High Command came to enjoy the position of arbiters in case of Jammu and Kashmir also, by virtue of Congress being the ruling party in the State. From this time onwards, to a

great extent the trend of splits and disruptions was checked. The dissident group had now another superior body (in the Congress hierarchy) where their grievances could be heard. One of the present dissident leaders, for example says, "Congress is essential for the democratic functioning in the state because if something goes wrong with any member or a group of members of the party, they can approach the Congress High Command for help. In the case of the National Conference (referring to both the Sheikh led National Conference (of today) and the erst-while National Conference organization) if something is done wrong against a few members of it by the government or its top leadership, they cannot approach any other authority for protection".⁴ Though, the emergence of Congress in the State has been able to check the splits and defections, still defections can take place. This happens when the dissidents or a group of it is dissatisfied with both the state level party leadership as well as the Congress High Command. For example, one such dissident leader who has defected with many of his colleagues from the Congress to the Sheikh-led National Conference said that: "We explained our case, and the judge (the Congress High Command) understood it. But, not only did he give a decision against us but he also punished us (by expulsion from the Congress). We waited for nearly two years but without any

4 Zainub Begum, An Interview, 12 September 1976, Srinagar.

fruitful results".⁵

But on the whole, the Congress Party is able to check the disruptions and defections in the state, because of:

- (i) its monopoly of power,
- (ii) deterrence of disciplinary action, and
- (iii) through arbitration.

Therefore, even after a long struggle between Qasim and Sadiq, the party did not split when nearly 32 of the 62 Congress legislators went to New Delhi, to put before the Congress High Command their grievances.

Finally, the Sadiq-Qasim feud is explained here in terms of party vs. government, as a bifactional system and as intensified factionalism.

Conclusion

The conclusion drawn from this study is that factionalism when it reaches the stage of bifactional system and then an intensified stage of it, tends to become a clash of personalities.

Secondly, factionalism is both disintegrative and integrative in nature. The disintegrative aspect of it becomes more obvious than the integrative, but in the long run the integrative aspect seems to be more important.

5 A.G. Lone (Ex-Education Minister), An Interview, 11 September 1976, Srinagar.

As far as the disintegrative aspects of it are concerned, the Karra's, Sheikh's and presently A.G. Lone's defections from their respective parties can be mentioned. The Sadiq faction also formed another party in 1957. Obviously, factionalism is an integrative force also. Usually two factional opponents belong to the same region and religion. For example, Karan Singh, Trilochan Dutta, Mangat Ram Sharma, and G.L. Dogra are the major opponents of each other. Similarly, Sheikh, Bakshi, Sadiq, Qasim, etc. were each other's rivals. In such case, therefore, the various faction leaders join hands with the leaders of like-minded nature belonging to different regions and religions, to defeat their adversaries and to achieve a common goal. The factions in Jammu and Kashmir ruling parties appear, therefore, cross-regional, cross-religions, and vertical in composition. As we have mentioned in the introductory chapter that except one faction (that is of Karan Singh) all others are cross-regional in character. And, all major factions including Karan Singh's faction, are cross-religions in composition.

Factionalism is an integrative force in the sense that the factional opponents enrol the maximum primary members for the local organization to acquire the voting strength in the organizational election.⁶ And, it has been proved in various

6 Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in An Indian State, The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 240-1.

studies that "factionalism plays a dominant role in deciding the voting pattern".⁷ Finally, we have seen in chapter V, that when there existed an almost bifactional system (and thus the two parallel PCCs) both the factions vied for maximum support at the every level of organization. In case of intense factional struggle this close relationship between the factionalism at the top and base, according to Myron Weiner, makes "it possible for the party to sustain popular support in the midst of intense intra-party conflict".⁸

The third conclusion drawn from this study is that factions in the Jammu and Kashmir ruling parties have been based on ideology, power, and persons.

Suggestions for Further Study

This study can be very well done by more efficient techniques of research design. For example, it can be studied more adequately by studying factionalism at the district level and if necessary at block, Tehsil and even Halqa levels. Further, an independent study can be done to show that the politics in Jammu and Kashmir is not only determined by the regional and

7 V.M. Girsikar, Electoral Process in Poona 1967: A Study in Parties, Politics and Voters (Unpublished manuscript, Poona, Department of Political Science, University of Poona, 1971), p. 26.

8 Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 159-60.

religious considerations. And, the land reforms and other radical measures can also be studied independently by taking into consideration the socio-economic conditions of the people, the nature of the movement for freedom struggle in Kashmir, and the class-character of the nationalists.

APPENDIX I

Appendix I

FACTS AND REALITY ABOUT SHEIKH'S DISMISSAL

On the late night of 8 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed by Sadar-in-Riyasat Karan Singh, and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (the Deputy Leader) was reported to have accepted the Office of the Prime Ministership at 4.35 a.m. on the 9 August morning. The timing seems unique for the removal and installation of these two significant men of Kashmir politics. The order issued from the House of Sadar-i-Riyasat said:

"Whereas for some months I have been noticing with growing concern that there have existed acute differences of opinion between the members of the government on basic issues--political, economic and administrative affecting the vital interest of the state; and whereas members of the government have been publicly expressing sharply conflicting points of view regarding these matters; and whereas on these fundamental issues the views of the majority of the members of the cabinet are sharply opposed to the view held by Prime Minister and one of his colleagues; and whereas efforts to work in harmony and pull together as a team having failed, the majority of the cabinet has expressed that lacking as it does in unity of purpose and action, the present cabinet has lost the confidence of the people; and whereas the economic distress of the people has considerably increased which needs prompt and serious attention; and whereas the stage has been reached in which the very process of honest

and efficient administration has become impracticable; and whereas, finally, the functioning of the present cabinet on the basis of joint responsibility has become impossible and resultant conflicts have gravely jeopardized the unity, prosperity and stability of the state, I, Karan Singh, Sedar-i-Riyasat, functioning in the interest of the people of the state, who have reposed responsibility and authority of the headship of the state in me, do hereby dismiss Sheikh Abdullah from Prime Ministership of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and consequently the Council of Ministers headed by him is dissolved forthwith".

Karan Singh's Invitation
to Bakshi

The following is the text of Sedar-i-Riyasat's letter dated August 8 to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed asking him to form the cabinet:

"I have just dissolved the cabinet which functioned till today and have relieved it of the powers and functions of civil administration of the state. I, however, feel that a new cabinet should be constituted immediately so as to avoid a political and administrative vacuum. In the task of forming a new Ministry, I have decided to seek your aid and advice. Will you, therefore, make it convenient to meet me immediately so that we might discuss the formation and composition of the new cabinet. I need hardly add that the continuance in office of the

new cabinet will depend upon its securing a vote of confidence from the Legislative Assembly during its coming session".

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's reply to the Sadar-i-Riyasat is as follows:

"I am highly grateful to you for the trust you have reposed in me by calling me to offer you my aid and advice in the task of constituting a new cabinet. In accepting your kind invitation, I am solely guided by a sense of duty to my country and its people and I shall try to the best of my ability to fulfil the responsibilities which you propose to entrust to me. I shall be available for consultation at your convenience".

The following communique was issued from the residence of Sadar-i-Riyasat at 4.30 a.m. of 9th August 1953:

"The Sadar-i-Riyasat has been pleased to dismiss Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah from the Prime Ministership of Jammu and Kashmir state and has dissolved the Council of Ministers, headed by him. The Sadar-i-Riyasat later called upon Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Deputy Leader of the majority party in the Assembly, to form the Government".

"Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, having accepted, was sworn in by the Sadar-i-Riyasat as Prime Minister this morning (9 August). On the advice of Prime Minister, Girdhari Lal Dogra was sworn in as Minister of the State".

And, as The Hindu Correspondent noted:

"In the early hours of this (9th August) morning, Srinagar

had rains. The city was fast asleep, but the lights were burning in the residence of Sedar-i-Riyasat. There were hardly half-a-dozen persons in the drawing room, including an A.D.C., Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D.P. Dhar, and K. Kidway, Chief Secretary of Jammu and Kashmir Government, apart from a few Pressmen who had been chasing the story all the night."

The swearing in ceremony took hardly five minutes and communique was handed over to the correspondent present.

Sedar-i-Riyasat's Letter
to Abdullah

The text of Sedar-i-Riyasat's letter to Sheikh Abdullah, dated August 8, dismissing his cabinet, is as follows:

"My dear Sheikh Abdullah, You will recall that in the course of our meeting today, I conveyed to you my deep concern at the serious difference which exists in your cabinet. I impressed upon you the immediate necessity for restoring harmony and unity of purpose among the members of the cabinet in the execution of its policies. You were, however, unable to assure me that these acute differences could be remedied.

This conflict in the cabinet^{has} for a considerable time been causing great confusion and apprehension in the minds of the people of the state. The situation has reached an unprecedented crisis with the result that three of your four cabinet colleagues have, in a memorandum to you, a copy of which they have sent to me, expressed their complete dissatisfaction with your actions and policies, which have lost the present Cabinet

the confidence of the people. This document clearly indicates that the divergence within your cabinet has reached proportions in which the unity, prosperity and stability of the state are gravely jeopardised.

When we met today, I further suggested to you that an emergent meeting of the cabinet should be held at my residence this evening so that we could jointly explore the possibilities of securing a stable, united and efficient government for the country. But to my regret you evaded the issue.

Under those conditions, I, as a Head of the State, have been forced to the conclusion that present cabinet cannot continue in office any longer and hence I regret to inform you that I have dissolved the Council of Ministers headed by you. A copy of my order in this connection is attached herewith.

I need hardly add how deeply distressed I was at having to take this action, but the vital interests of the people of the state, which it is my duty to safeguard, leave me no alternative. I trust that this will in no way affect the mutual regard and cordial feelings we have for each other.

Yours sincerely,

Karan Singh
Sadar-i-Riyasat

Source: The Hindu, 10 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah Dismissed, Action By Sadar-i-Riyasat, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. Becomes Premier.

Violation of Joint Responsibility

In a memorandum, the majority group in the cabinet complained to the Sheikh about the violation of the joint responsibility in the following words:

"You will kindly recall that in the course of the meeting of the Cabinet held on August 7, 1953, and on many other occasions previously, we brought to your notice that certain pronounced tendencies indicating a very sharp divergence of opinion had become manifest in our approach to the broad policies which form the basis of the Government and the administration. Contrary to the normal practice of a uniform policy in the conduct of the administration, it has become increasingly clear that Mr. Beg and you, in utter disregard of the opinions of your colleagues and without their consultation, make public pronouncement which flout the principles of joint responsibility.

"Since the formation of the present Government, in spite of the constant endeavour of your colleagues to secure maximum agreement and unity in the formulation and execution of essential policies in accordance with the mandate given by the people, you have frequently adopted certain arbitrary measures in complete denial of the right of expression of opinion of even your own colleagues in the handling both of external and internal affairs of the State.

Inconsistent Policies

"Most of these measures and policies have been self-contradictory and inconsistent leading to serious complications.

After the establishment of the Legislative Assembly, we had expected that our joint responsibility and collective functioning as a Cabinet would be governed by well-established parliamentary practices. But we regret to observe that you have not only disregarded the wishes of your colleagues in the Cabinet, but have acted in the Legislative Assembly also in a manner which denied the right of freely exercising their opinions to the representatives of the people in regard to the basic policies pursued by the Government. In the past, even though occasions have arisen when we seriously opposed certain measures which affected the efficient and smooth functioning of the administration, we refrained from bringing matters to a head by making concessions to your views in the interests of securing harmony and concord in the working of the Government.

"Unfortunately, however, this spirit of accommodation has been misconstrued by you, and you have consequently adopted an attitude which is far from democratic and indicates a tendency towards making arbitrary use of power and position. Your attitude with regard to the political and economic policies of the Government has given rise to a great deal of confusion in the public mind and serious dislocation of the economic life of large sections of the people. For quite sometime now, a factional tendency has been evident in the Cabinet, which has been responsible for a progressive deterioration in the administration. Consequently, various ameliorative measures proposed by

the members of the Cabinet in good faith have not been implemented honestly. Above all there has been a singular failure to exercise vigilance and proper supervision in the day-to-day functioning of the administration, which has produced corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and wanton wastage of public resources in most spheres of Government activities. All these acts of omission and commission have inevitably created large-scale discontent in various parts of the State.

Sense of Direction Lacking

"All along, the Government has lacked a sense of uniformity and direction in its plans and programme. Time and again, we have brought to your notice the imperative need for arresting this process of deterioration in the administration. We attempted to represent the feelings of various sections of the people who were facing acute economic distress. We even indicated the urgent necessity of undertaking immediate measures for the amelioration of these conditions. But we regret to say that you not only disregarded all our opinions in this respect but have even ignored the recommendations of the Wazir Committee which had been set up by the Government to inquire into a number of grievances of the people.

"Consequently, the political uncertainty has been accentuated with the result that our economy has been thrown into stagnation, which has impoverished large masses of people. When

the tourist traffic showed healthy improvement, last year and this year, you destroyed public confidence through your irresponsible utterances. This has created large-scale unemployment and economic unrest throughout the country.

"The events of the last few months have in particular thrown the State in the midst of a severe crisis. The repercussions of this crisis are bound to be serious and far-reaching. We regret to state that you, as the head of the Government, have not only failed to take note of the situation but have by your words and deeds accentuated the tension. You have consistently refused to acknowledge the responsibilities that devolve on you as the Prime Minister of the State by not following the declared policies that form the basis of the Government. You have tended to act in a manner that has generated uncertainty, suspense and doubt in the minds of the people of the State in general and of those in Jammu and Ladakh in particular. All these factors have combined to strengthen the disruptionist forces seeking the disintegration of the State.

Delhi Agreement

"As is well known, the unprovoked aggression from Pakistan had put our very national existence at stake. In that critical hour of crisis, all of us jointly approached India for help and requested her to accept the accession of the State and assist us in repelling the aggression and restoring peaceful conditions in the State. The united will of the people stood

solidly behind this act of Kashmir's accession to India. While accepting our request, the Government of India assured us of the right of self-determination for our people. After the convening of the Constituent Assembly, certain inescapable elaborations of the State's relationship with India were defined in the Delhi Agreement, of which you were the chief architect on our behalf. Your stand was unanimously endorsed by the Government, the National Conference, the Indian Parliament and the Constituent Assembly of the State.

"But you have not only deliberately delayed implementation of the agreements on these matters, which form the sheet-anchor of our policy, but have purposefully and openly denounced these in public. You have thus arbitrarily sought to precipitate a rupture in the relationship of the state with India. Though it is true that the people of the State have the ultimate right to decide their future, the conditions of chaos and confusion which are being engineered to-day by you are bound to be fatal to the exercise of the right of self-determination by our people. Under these circumstances, what seems inevitable is that interested foreign Powers may well take advantage of and exploit the situation for their own selfish purpose.

Charge Against Mr. Beg

"Mr. M.A. Beg has persistently been following policies of narrow sectarianism and communalism, which have seriously undermined the oneness of the State. Unfortunately, you have

been lending your support to his policies in the Cabinet and to his activities in public. This has generated bitter feelings of suspicion and doubt in the minds of the people of the various constituent units of the State. You have connived at all these unfortunate happenings and thus strengthened and encouraged the forces of disruption. The result is that the unity and the secular character, the two fundamental aspects, of our State, stand threatened to-day.

"We have been constantly urging upon you to end these unhealthy tendencies and to undertake unitedly measures for restoring the morale of the people. In spite of our best intentions, we have failed in our efforts.

"It is, therefore, with great pain that we have to inform you of our conclusion that the Cabinet, constituted as it is at present and lacking as it does the unity of purpose and action, has lost the confidence of the people in its ability to give them a clean, efficient and healthy administration".

Source: The Hindu, 10 August 1953. Abdullah Regime: Allegation By Ministers: Disregard of Joint Responsibility.

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