

THE IMPACT OF GREEN REVOLUTION ON POLITICS IN HARYANA.

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
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I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Mr. Imtiaz Ahmad,  
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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The state of Haryana came into existence in 1966. At that time, it ranked fifth in India in terms of per capita income. Within a few years of its existence the per capita within the state rose rapidly, and it came to occupy the second rank. This increase owed itself largely to the increase in agricultural production. In the first place, the production of cash crops increased tremendously from 1966 onwards. Secondly, there was no corresponding expansion of industrial sector from 1966 to roughly 1970. Therefore, we can easily conclude that the rapid rise in per capita income in the state was the result of the tremendous rise in its agricultural production.

This tremendous increase in agricultural production in the state is attributed generally to the Green Revolution. The term Green Revolution refers to the improved methods of cultivation based on the use of new high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers and agricultural machinery. Subsequently, we shall argue that the Green Revolution which Haryana experienced along with the Punjab and a few other areas was not altogether contingent upon the introduction of a new agricultural technology. It represented rather the culmination of a number of a series of changes which had been taking place in Haryana for sometime earlier.

Even so, the success of Green Revolution was the immediate cause of the rapid rise in agricultural

production. The rise in agricultural production and the strong trend toward commercialization, which accompanied agricultural growth, provided an incentive for resumption of land for self cultivation by the farmers. At the same time, it served as an incentive for the breakdown of the joint family and division of landholdings. Therefore, there followed two almost contradictory trends from the rise in agricultural production and the concomitant commercialization of agriculture. On the one hand, bigger landholdings were sub-divided, thereby decreasing the average size of landholdings. On the other hand, big and small landholders purchased land in order to increase the size of landholding and utilize farm machinery to the maximum.

Many people were edged out of agricultural sector in the process. The emergence of this new social category, which is often referred to as the 'lumpenproletariat', should have produced a radical impact upon the political scene in the state. It should have, as the classical argument on the proletarianization of the peasantry would suggest, become increasingly radical in its political orientation and taken to violent expression of its frustration. However, so far as we can gauge from the available evidence, nothing of this sort has taken place in the state. Therefore, the question arises: why has this new social force not acted in the way it was expected to behave?

*Palmer*

The object of this essay is to seek an answer to this question and to other related questions.

A great deal has been written about the economy of the state, but writings of a specifically political nature continue to be scanty. Therefore, we have relied in this discussion upon secondary sources of a non-political nature to attempt an answer to the question. Of course, we have tried to substantiate the arguments with data wherever possible, but where data are not available, we have hazarded inferences suggested by available data.

This discussion is divided into seven sections. Following this Introduction, the second section presents a general demographic over view of the state of Haryana and examines the concept of Green Revolution. The third section deals with the economic consequences of the Green Revolution which are infact the logical outcome of all those changes which had been taking place in the state for a long time.

The fourth section deals with the political consequences. First, it tries to highlight those consequences that are assumed to follow the rise of the lumpenproletariat according to the classical theory and that have been observed to follow the economic changes in similar circumstances elsewhere. Second, it tries to establish, with the

help of available data, that the expected consequences have not followed. The politics of the lumpenproletariat has not assumed a radical character.

The fifth section attempts an answer to this question. It discusses those mechanisms which have borne the immediate burden of the dispossessed peasantry and thus prevented a spontaneous outburst of frustration on the part of the growing lumpenproletariat. Perhaps, these mechanisms are temporary and would not passify the peasantry in the long run. Therefore, we focus equally on those long-term trends as well that appear to supplement the achievements of the temporary mechanisms. There is no conclusive proof that it is only because of these factors that the expected consequences have not occurred in the state. Therefore, the arguments we present in this discussion are intended more as hypothesis rather than established formulations.

Finally, the last section summarizes the argument and concludes by formulating a hypothesis which would be tested against empirical evidences by further research.



## 2. GREEN REVOLUTION AND THE STATE OF HARYANA

Haryana is a small state in the north-western region of India. It has ten districts. The total area of the state is 44,222 sq.kms. and the total population of the state is 1,00,36,808, out of which only 1,772,959 lives in urban areas. Thus the rural population of the state is 8,263,849.

In terms of percentages, the percentage of rural and urban population to total population is 82.34 and 17.66 respectively. The total number of towns in the state is 65 and density of population in the urban areas is as high as 3,928 per sq.km. There are 6,731 inhabited and 333 uninhabited villages in the state and the density of population in the rural areas is 189 per sq. km. Density of population in the urban areas is much higher.

These figures show that the state is pre-dominantly agricultural. High urban density shows that the towns, not being metropolitan, have large labour force which is an indication of the developing industry of Haryana.

The general condition of living in the areas now comprising the state of Haryana was not, at the time of its inception, as good as it was in the other parts of the composite state of Punjab. In 1966, Haryana was fifth in India in respect of

per capita income, Punjab being the first. By the fiscal year 1969-70, however, Haryana attained second position. Its per capita income at 1960-61 prices was Rs. 433 in 1973-74 against Rs. 340 for the whole country. Since then it has maintained second position in the country as a whole.

This remarkable progress has been accompanied by a series of related developments. The state of Haryana achieved total electrification of villages by 1970. The agricultural output has increased ten times due to many reasons, including the use of High-yielding Variety (HYV) of seeds and other modern inputs. Several irrigation schemes have been undertaken by the state government and about 3,768 cusecs were added through conservation and utilization of flood and ground water schemes. The number of tube wells alone rose from 27,589 in 1966 to 1,45,000 in 1976. The number of electricity consumers rose from 349,575 in 1966 to 793,139 in 1976. During this period agriculture got 45 percent of the total connected load - the highest in the country.

Thus, there was a tremendous over-all development - the average per acre yield increased; there was increase in the use of HYV seeds and fertilizers; the area under HYV seeds increased; and, so many other changes took place.

Table 1 summarizes the situation in the field of agriculture as it existed in 1966 and 1976.

TABLE 1

	1966	1976
1. Average yield per acre	887 kg.	1,206 kg.
2. Use of HYV seeds	86,000 quin.	1.13 million qn.
3. Coverage of area under HYV seeds	141,000 hect.	1.15 mil. hect.
4. Per hectare use of fertilizers	44 kg.	129.85 kg.
5. Total use of fertilizers	162,000 ton.	600,000 ton.
6. Number of tube wells and pumping sets	32,989	207,000
7. Gross irrigated area	1.7 mil. hect.	2.5 mil. hect.
8. Length of canals	5,666 miles	6,804 miles
9. Cost of medium irrigation schemes	Rs 1.98 crores	Rs 40 crores
10. Expenditure on lift irrigation scheme for drought prone areas	nil	Rs 52.44 crores
11. Per capita consumption of power	57 units	139 units
12. Grain production	2.5 mil. ton.	5.4 mil. ton.

If the figures presented in Table 1 are any indicator of development, Haryana would seem to have made rapid strides in agriculture since 1966. However, a few important points about this development should be noted. In the first place, the developmental effort in Haryana was not based on capital-intensive mechanization. It was based on "a two-pronged strategy -

intensive cultivation in the Green-belt of Karnal and Kurukshetra and augmentation of irrigation in dry areas...".<sup>6</sup> This is not to suggest that modern implements are not extensively used in Haryana, but merely to underscore the point that the type of implements used in Haryana have not replaced manual-labour in a big way. Most commonly used implements are tractors, threshers and tube wells. The task of reaping and sowing have not been mechanized in a big way. These tasks require a large labour force. Thus the number of those who have been rendered jobless because of mechanization in Haryana must be very small eventhough we do not have sufficient data to substantiate the argument. Moreover, there could be other reasons for increase in the number of landless agricultural labourers.<sup>7</sup>

Secondly, Green Revolution has not enveloped the entire state. It is mainly restricted to the districts of Karnal, Kurukshetra and parts of Ambala. It was in this region that the Green Revolution came first. It was here that the joint families started breaking down, thereby reducing the size of an average landholding. It was here that most cultivators took to progressive methods of cultivation. Farm income rose sharply in this region. The number of agricultural labourers in this region is much more than elsewhere in the state of Haryana. And therefore,

Politics { it was here that the spark of radical politics should have appeared. However, it was in this region, as we shall show in subsequent sections, that industry and other developmental projects were encouraged by the state, thereby counterbalancing the radical potential of the landless peasantry.

Since this fact viz. concentration of Green Revolution in certain areas is of crucial importance to us, we shall show with the help of available data that this region has benefitted more from Green Revolution than the other regions of the state.

G.S. Bhalla has divided the whole state of Haryana into three agro-economic regions: "Northern, which comprises districts of Ambala, Jind and Karnal; central, which comprises districts of Hissar excluding Bhiwani and Loharu tehsils, and districts of Rohtak excluding Jhajjar tehsil; and, Southern, which comprises districts of Gurgaon and Mohindergarh and Bhiwani, Loharu and Jhajjar tehsils". The Northern, Central and Southern regions are subsequently referred to as Region A, Region B and Region C respectively.

Table II shows Region-wise net-operational holding, total farm output, income

and percentage of agricultural labourers as a percentage of agricultural labourers (workers). It is clear from this table that despite small landholdings in the Northern Region (although it is almost equal to the average size of landholding in the Southern Region), the total farm output in the two Regions is in the proportion of 2:1. Because of the high farm output in Region A, not much need has been felt to raise income from other sources. It is the lowest in Region A and the highest in Region C where total farm output is the lowest. Thus total household income in Region A, B and C is in the proportion of 8:5:4 respectively. Material costs are highest in Region A. In Region B, it is almost half the cost in Region A and in Region C it is half the cost in Region B. This is an indication of the progressive farming in Region A.

TABLE II

	Northern	Central	Southern
1. Average net-operational holding (acres)	11.65	14.28	11.66
2. Total farm output, Rs.	11,699.29	7,226.35	5,404.58
3. Total costs, Rs.	4,426.68	2,260.21	1,700.79
4. Income from other sources, Rs.	538.13	737.31	819.69
5. Total household income, Rs.	7,810.74	5,238.72	4,238.10
6. Savings, Rs.	2,829.94	- 121.93	- 124.90

Table III also confirms this view. It is evident from this table that in Region A, the number of progressive cultivating households in all the categories of operational landholding is greater than the number of non-progressive cultivating households in the corresponding categories. The tendency to take to progressive cultivation increases with the increase in the size of operational landholding. Region B and Region C are dominated by the non-progressive cultivators in all categories of operational landholding.

TABLE III<sup>10</sup>

Sample size 1000 households

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS (PROGRESSIVE AND NON-PROGRESSIVE)

Region and class	Category of operational holding (acres)				
	5 or less	5-10	10-20	20-30	Above 30
Northern ( P )	39	52	48	24	11
Region A (NP)	30	21	18	4	5
Central ( P )	12	13	10	14	8
Region B (NP)	47	47	50	13	11
Southern ( P )	8	9	10	3	4
Region C (NP)	58	52	61	24	17

All these facts suggest that Green Revolution is localized to certain areas of the state and does not cover the whole state. In Region A, where Green Revolution has been most successful, the percentage

of agricultural labourers as a percentage of agricultural workers is the highest. In Region A, it is 29.8 percent, in Region B and C, it is 24.1 and 19.4 percent respectively. The average percentage for the whole state is 24.7. Therefore, we would expect the peasantry in Region A to get radicalized before this process spreads to Region B and C.

A third point suggested by Table I remains to be mentioned. It has already been noticed in Table I that grain production in Haryana rose from 2.5 million tonnes in 1966 to 5.4 million tonnes in 1976. However, Table I does not show that this phenomenal rise has been mainly due to the increase in the production of wheat, and, to a lesser extent, rice. These are the two crops for which HYV seeds are available. Thus the boost in production is not incidental. It is precisely because of certain factors which had been operating in the state and also elsewhere for a long time.

We do not have any data for the crop wise production for the year 1976, but the comparison of production of important food grains in 1966-67 and 1971-72, presented in Table IV, is sufficient to make the point clear that the production of Rice and wheat doubled within a span of five years. On the whole, there was a remarkable increase in the production of cash crops in the state. This also shows a shift in the emphasis from



\* subsistence farming to commercial farming.

TABLE IV<sup>11</sup>

COMPARATIVE DATA ON PRODUCTION OF FOODGRAIN IN 1966-67 & 1971-72  
(thousand metric tonnes)

	Rice	Wheat	Total cereals	Total pulses	Total foodgrain	Sugar-cane	Pota-toes	Cotton
1966-67	221	1076	2040	566	2606	510	49	289
1971-72	636	2402	3861	685	4546	514	82	439

But why did all this happen? Certainly not because of the formation of the state of Haryana in 1966. At least, not only or primarily because of this. There were other reasons as well. Certain other factors had been operating in the state and outside for a long time. What actually happened in the years subsequent to the formation of the state was the logical culmination of all those factors and forces that had been at play. It is this culmination of the interaction of various forces and factors which is commonly referred to as the Green Revolution. Let us, therefore, identify the factors which contributed to the success of the Green Revolution in the state so as to facilitate the understanding and analysis of the subsequent changes in the politico-economic structure of the state and the impact it has had upon the politics of the state.

The story of Green Revolution starts from the year 1942 when the Rockefeller Foundation sent a team of experts to Mexico to explore the possibilities of improving upon the local variety of wheat. Within two years of the inception of this research programme, a new High yielding Variety of wheat was produced. Extensive use of this High yielding variety of seed in Mexico dramatically changed the situation, so much so that by 1964, Mexico was in a position to export much of her crop, whereas hardly a decade back she had to rely upon grain import to meet the domestic demand. With the increasing success of the programme, the Ford Foundation also joined hands with the former and diverted attention to other developing countries of the Third World.

In 1960, Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme was initiated in India with the help of the Ford Foundation. The following year, another research programme was initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation to study millet in India. The coordinated efforts of both these Foundations resulted in the creation of International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. Within a short period the Institute came out with a High-yielding Variety of seed. However, the inputs required by these new varieties of seeds of wheat and rice were scarce. The new variety of rice did not suit the climatic conditions of India. Even today this remains a big baffling problem for the scientists in India.

When the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme <sup>was</sup> initiated in the country, the Government was not in a position either to establish the infrastructure required for the expansion of the programme or to provide the technological advice to the adopters. As a result, most of the programmes designed to increase food production either flopped or got stuck up at some stage of their implementation.

The famines of 1965-66 worsened the situation. By 1967, the government had no alternative but to look elsewhere for the solution of its food problem, \* and "U.S. Capital" was knocking at the door with plans for new fertilizer plants and demands for control over prices and distribution. Faced with the upheaval at home and Johnson's intransigence, the Indian Government opened its doors, through which flowed the U.S. Capital and most of the Green Revolution". 13

Thus the forces of Green Revolution which had been at play in other countries for a long time were ready to invade the untrodden soil of India. It is as if they were waiting for favourable conditions in the country. The famines of 1965-66 did serve as catalysts, but that was not the main cause of the import of Green Revolution. The conditions created by the famines were not the only conditions

that the forces of Green Revolution had been waiting for. It was not the pressure of food shortage alone, but something more than that. In the words of H.P. Sharma, "... the Green Revolution in India has occurred not because of adoption of new technology, but because <sup>14</sup> of the acceptance of new technology by the farmers". Why were the farmers not receptive to the onslaught of Green Revolution earlier? Why did they take to modern ways of farming at this stage? Again, according to Sharma, it is because of the institutional and structural shifts which the Indian rural society had been undergoing in the preceeding two decades and which had created the pre-requisites for the Indian peasantry, or atleast for a section of it, <sup>15</sup> to stage the breakthrough. Thus the favourable conditions for the Green Revolution had been created by these 'structural and institutional' shifts.

All the 'institutional and structural' shifts changed the basic agrarian structure of the country after the independence. The two distinguishing characteristics of the agrarian structure of British India were gross economic inequalities and strong feudal elements in the social relations. Landlords indulged in conspicuous consumption. The surplus was not used in any productive enterprise. Feudal and semi-feudal relations of production existed.

After independence a whole series of measures were taken by the Congress Party, dominated by the bourgeois-landlord interests, to bring about land reforms. It was this shift in the relations of production that created conditions conducive to the expansion of Green Revolution in India.<sup>16</sup>  
India.

What were these conditions? In the first place, it created a class of kulaks or rich peasants who were prepared to follow capitalist pattern of growth in agriculture. This class was composed of former zamindars and other landlords, top stratum of peasant proprietors and some former tenants who enjoyed permanent rights. This class was much more secure in terms of its legal rights to land than it had ever been. Formation of the Swatantra Party in 1959 further consolidated its position. This stratum of rural society was much less committed to the feudal norms of interdependency than their predecessors. Thus, there appeared a trend toward capitalist mode of agriculture and, to quote sharma, "If the Ford Foundation had not exported the new technology to India, the new class of Indian kulaks would have sooner or later imported it from wherever it was available".<sup>17</sup>

The early sixties were marked by the presence of this emerging stratum of kulaks, more so in Harvana because of the expansion of ~~industry~~ industry - both small and medium sized. Most of the ~~former money-lenders~~ former money-lenders established small factories in the towns. No doubt industrialization without a corresponding increase in agricultural production kept the economy in imbalance, but the initial accumulation of capital in agriculture was facilitated only because of the expansion of medium and small scale industries.

V. M. Bakhtin

Secondly, accumulation of capital took place in yet another manner. The land reform measures were taken by the Government, which facilitated the growth of the class of kulaks, opened ~~up~~ unexpected avenues through which capital flowed into the pockets of the landlords. It was the result of ~~intentional~~ unintentional loopholes in the laws, but the accumulation of capital did take place anyhow.

The laws that aimed at abolishing zamin-dari system with all its manifestations, also allowed two concessions. In the first place, the erstwhile landlords were allowed to retain a part of their land for 'self-cultivation'. Secondly, apart from 'rehabilitation grants', heavy compensations were guaranteed for the loss in land revenue.

By 1968-69, approximately 3,200 million rupees had already been paid on this account.<sup>18</sup> Half of this amount was paid out in cash and half in government bonds. Even then, the amount that reached the new \*emerging class of kulaks in cash was substantial enough to form a significant part of the necessary capital for later commercialization in agriculture. It is not known how much money was thus paid to the landlords in Haryana but considering the fact that agriculture had always been the dominant occupation of the inhabitants of the state, we can assume that medium landlords, if not big ones, did exist in the state who must have received a significant share of the impressive figure of Rs3,200 million.

Moreover, capital flowed into agriculture in Haryana through most unorthodox quarters. For example, in the Jagadhri tehsil of the Ambala district, \*much of the private capital has flowed into agriculture from the merchant class of the neighbouring urban centres who are mostly of the ggawal community, which has not been traditionally associated with agriculture, at least not since 1194, when the invading Shahabuddin Gauri, made this community disperse and take to various occupations.<sup>19</sup>

\*The other community which invested in agriculture has been the refugees who have settled down all

over the state. A substantial number of refugees had fixed money which they had got by way of compensation for the property they had lost or left behind in Pakistan. Being very hardworking and enterprising, these people had also accumulated ~~some capital~~ 20 some capital. Because of the favourable political climate in the state and the profitability of investments, both these communities invested in either agriculture or industry. In both cases it contributed to the economic development of the state. The point to be noted is that this situation was peculiar to the states of Harviana and the Punjab alone.


Apart from these private sources of investment, government also entered the field in a big way. Rastvarnikov holds, "It was not the institutional capital existing in other spheres, but rather the government that undertook the financing and supplying of credit for agricultural production through long-term investments, advancing credits to co-operative institutions and more recently, after the nationalization of the major banks, by advancing credits to individual producers".<sup>21</sup>





Thus the second important characteristic of the new agrarian structure of the country was the flow of capital into agriculture, especially its concentration in the hands of the kulaks who were psychologically more emancipated from feudal hang ups than their predecessors.

The third important result of the change in the agrarian structure has been consolidation of landholdings - a situation which is quite favourable to the forces of Green Revolution. It is uneconomical to adopt modern technology if land is fragmented and scattered over a vast area. In this regard also, some states of India were better off than others when the development programmes were started throughout the country. The composite state of Punjab had the largest experience in the work of consolidation of holdings. The programme was started in 1920 on a voluntary basis. That was the only state in British India which had started a programme for consolidation of landholdings. Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act 1936 invested the programme with an element of formality and slight compulsion. Between 1920 and 1951 only 2.83 lakh hectares of land was consolidated. "It was felt subsequently that the co-operative approach and the slight element of compulsion would have to be given up in favour of full compulsion".



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By 1967, tremendous progress had been ~~made~~ made in the consolidation of land.

Table V gives the targets and achievements ~~of the area consolidated~~ of the area consolidated. Looking at the table, it becomes clear that land consolidation programme progressed well during the first four Five Year Plans. By 1967, most of the land had already been consolidated and very little remained to be consolidated.

24  
TABLE V

TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AREA CONSOLIDATED  
(Area in Lakh hectares)

Sr. No.	Period	Target	Achievement
1.	First Plan	25.00	25.01
2.	Second Plan	24.59	34.59
3.	Third Plan	25.21	29.77
4.	1961-62	8.17	11.28
5.	1962-63	7.28	8.96
6.	1963-64	4.86	5.02
7.	1964-65	3.28	3.52
8.	1965-66	1.62	0.99
9.	1966-68*		
	Punjab	0.67	0.34
	Haryana	0.81	0.58
TOTAL		86.29	90.29

Note: Figures given against Sr.No. 1 to 8 relate to composite state of the Punjab

\* It so appears that the failure to achieve the target in 1965-66 was due to the Indo-Pak war and in 1966-67 because of the bifurcation of the composite state of the Punjab. These failures notwithstanding, the over-all trend is very clear.

Consolidation of land is in itself a sufficient reason for the cultivator to initiate Green Revolution on land. Production of foodgrains started rising because of the consolidation of landholdings in Haryana even prior to the introduction of the HYV seeds.

Fourthly, the nature of land legislation changed considerably after the independence. The interests of Capitalist agriculturists came to dominate the legislative bodies. Through legislation, the government itself encouraged capitalist farming. The issue of land ceilings was discussed for such a long time that by the time the legislation regarding land-ceiling was passed in the sixties, most of the big landholdings had already been divided by their owners amongst the members of the households. Moreover, certain categories of farms were not to be touched by ceiling laws. They included "mechanized farms", "farms with heavy investments", "efficient farms", "farms in a compact block", "co-operative farms" etc. Thus the ceiling laws themselves encouraged the big landlords to take to capitalist farming in order to avoid alienation of land. The Nagpur session of the ruling Congress Party in 1959 stressed the importance of "co-operative farming societies".

This helped the big land holders. <sup>✓</sup> Ceiling laws were evaded by dividing the land amongst family members. Now, in order to have the benefits of "co-operative farming societies", these sub-divisions were pooled together. Large and long-term loans for capital investment could now be achieved more easily once this was done. This does not mean that the laws were rendered useless in this manner. Wherever ceiling laws were applied they helped the farmers to expand agriculture. In Harvana, ceiling of agricultural land is contingent upon the method of irrigation for that particular piece of land. The limit fixed for land which is irrigated by tubewells is different from the limit fixed for the land which is irrigated by rain waters. The idea is to leave atleast that much piece of land with the cultivator as might not become uneconomical.

Fifthly, with these structural and institutional shifts, the situation in the village itself changed tremendously. The Community Development Programme started in 1952. As a result of this programme, roads, warehouses, hospitals, schools, recreation centers etc. were built in the villages, irrigation and soil conservation projects were started, drainage system was improved, and storage facilities were provided for the producers.

Marketing and distributive co-operative societies proliferated. It has already been noted that all the villages in the state of Haryana have electricity. Apart from this, all the villages have been connected to the neighbouring towns with pucca roads. Storage capacity has increased tremendously. In May 1968, only 18.75 percent of the total villages in Haryana had electricity; in November 1970, electrification was cent percent. There were 29,000 tube wells connections in May 1968 in the whole state; the number rose upto 1,35,000 in March 1975. In May 1968, the number of villages connected by metalled roads was 1,500; in April 1975, this number rose to 4,360. Total storage capacity in 1968 was 23,895 metric tonnes; in 1975 it was 2,15,332 metric tonnes.

\* Except the Punjab and Haryana, no other state has been able to provide such an infrastructure to the agricultural sector. As a matter of fact, creation of this infrastructure itself was a matter of favourable conditions in the states of Haryana and Punjab and reflected the 'rural bias' of the ruling elite.

The sixth major impact was on the social relations. The Constitution of India shows equal respect to all socio-ethnic and religious groups in India and untouchability has been abolished. In Haryana such social constraints did not exist in a major way. With the coming of the independence, whatever little constraints existed received further blow. Writing about the Ludhiana district of Punjab, Aggarwal observes, "... the traditional institutions such as the caste system and the septi system were much less rigid in the Punjab as compared to other parts of the country. Teachings of the Sikh gurus had much to do with this. Also the influence of the Arva Samaj reinforced the idea of castelessness to a considerable extent. Therefore, when the Green Revolution came, the necessary social adjustments were made with more ease in Ludhiana than would have been possible in a more rigid social environment". Similar situation exists in the state of Haryana as well which has also witnessed the reformist movements, including those by the Sikh Gurus and Arva Samaj leaders, against extreme casteism. The problem of casteism and untouchability has never been very serious in these areas. The Untouchability Act of 1955 did not produce spectacular results but it did reduce the menace considerably. Untouchability is not practiced

publically. In places of worship, educational institutions, eating houses, trains, cinema halls and other places of recreation there is no discrimination against such people. In fact, it is difficult to differentiate between those who may have been considered untouchable in old days and others. "The reason partly is the people's better economic lot as compared to other regions and their preference for good clothes. The usefulness of all communities in agricultural operations, the region being predominantly rural has also a lot to do with ending differentiation leading to untouchability. Of late there has been a change in the cities too where the institution of domestic servants is gradually disappearing and "sweepers" are increasingly employed to clean floors. This was rare earlier".<sup>27</sup> In a way, the circumstances themselves facilitated the growth of 'Protestant ethics' in the state of Harvaha.

The sixth characteristics of the new situation is the co-ordination between two different sectors of economy viz. the industrial sector and the agricultural sector. By the early sixties, savings from agricultural sector were beginning to find their way into the wholesale trade in foodgrains and the expanding road transport system. With the expansion

of electricity, small-scale rice mills and wheat flour mills proliferated in the villages and small towns. Brick kilns sprang up to meet the demand for developmental projects. In all these economic activities, kulaks played an important role. Unlike the French landed aristocracy which continued to rely on surplus expropriated from the peasantry and used the money in conspicuous consumption thereby preparing grounds for the great social and political upheaval of 1789, the kulaks in Haryana learnt to rely less and less on surplus expropriated from the peasantry.

The extent of the interlocking of industrial and agricultural capital cannot be decisively ascertained, but the close relationship had been established by 1960s. An indication of this increasing relationship is the fact that FICCI severely criticised the agrarian policies of the Third Five-Year Plan, particularly the section on the proposed land ceilings. While commenting on the Second Plan, FICCI had completely ignored the agrarian policies of the government.

Aggarwal observes that among other factors, 'indigenization of technology' is an important factor which led to the success of Green Revolution in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.



As a result of heavy stress on industrialization in the first three Five Year Plans, small-scale and medium scale industries expanded in Haryana, particularly in Ambala and Karnal districts. Table VI shows the district wise strength of registered factories in 1966 and 1971. The table shows that even in 1966 enough registered units existed in \*those districts where agricultural production was high. In the two districts of Jind and Mahendragarh the number of registered units was negligible both in 1966 and 1971 which shows that intersectoral flow of capital did not take place in these districts because of the comparative backwardness of either of the two sectors or both.

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Table VI

NUMBER OF REGISTERED FACTORIES IN THE SEVEN DISTRICTS  
OF HARYANA IN 1966 and 1971 \*

District	1966	1971
Hissar	174	193
Rohtak	167	223
Gurgaon	326	454
Karnal	216	268
Ambala	353	397
Jind	25	37
Mahendragarh	9	15

\* Till recently there were only seven districts in the state.

The figures in Table VI do not include small scale industries and service ~~workshops~~ workshops. The data on this is not available, but it is evident that they have proliferated at a much faster speed. The most important thing about these industrial enterprises is that they produce implements and equipments to suit local needs, thereby creating favourable conditions for the expansion of Green Revolution.

Lastly, a certain political climate emerged that proved to be conducive to the Green Revolution. Democratic decentralization made it possible for the kulaks to get into political institutions at the village level and even at higher levels. By the time the state of Haryana came into being, the kulaks had had enough experience of politics at the village level, block level and the higher levels. Because of the absence of a powerful rural elite, as well as the urban elite, the first elected government of the state did not come under the control of the traditional political elite. The new government of Haryana had a strong 'rural bias'. Representatives of the kulak interests got into state legislature. This infused great confidence into those agriculturists who were going to adopt new technology. They knew it pretty well that in case of the failure of the new

programme they could fall back upon the cushion of a sympathetic government.

These were some of the important institutional and structural changes that the entire country witnessed after independence. They created the conditions in which capitalist farming could be successfully adopted. By the sixties all the physical pre-requisites were present in the state of Haryana. Besides, there were natural factors which went in favour of the state. Whereas the alluvial soil of the Indo-Gangetic plains is more conducive to the production of wheat, the black soil found in not less than six states of the country, is not so conducive. This is not to suggest that these regions cannot or should not produce wheat. What exactly it means is that the yield per acre of land in Indo-Gangetic plains would always be more than the yield per acre of land in other areas, inputs being the same in nature and equal in quantity in both the areas. Therefore, even if it is possible to increase the yield per acre of land in other areas of the country, the benefits accruing from that would be less because of the greater inputs required in those areas to increase the yield per acre of land.

We have tried to show in the preceding pages that Green Revolution is contingent upon many factors. If we do not take this fact into account, we are likely to confuse the results with the cause. For example, evolution of a class of kulaks is, as we have already shown, one of the conditions necessary for the success of Green Revolution. <sup>\*</sup>This class has not emerged as a result of Green Revolution, as generally held. Of course, this class got strengthened as a result of the success of Green Revolution. This distinction between the cause and the effect is important from our point of view.

This brings us to a conceptual problem. What is Green Revolution? How do we define it? We are certainly not looking at the phenomenon from the point of view of a layman, so we are not in agreement with those definitions that seek to exhaust Green Revolution by using it for the phenomenon of increased agricultural production as a result of adoption of new technology and HYV seeds. In other words, all such definitions identify Green Revolution with increased agricultural production as the function of two factors viz. use of HYV seeds and modern inputs. All those factors which we have enlisted in the preceding pages as the pre-requisites of Green Revolution, become the effects of Green Revolution if we accept this simplistic definition of the concept.

The sense in which we are using the concept of Green Revolution is a slightly different one. We are using this concept to refer jointly to all those structural and institutional shifts that have created the conditions in which H.V. seeds and modern technology could be adopted by the farmers. Commercial farming was not the only thing that happened under the conditions created by the structural and institutional shifts. Many other things happened in the socio-economic and political spheres. We shall be concerned with all of them, for there is a marked continuity in what had been happening before sixties and what happened subsequently - sixties being the arbitrarily fixed period of Green Revolution because of the phenomenal increase in food production in that decade.

To put it<sup>t</sup> precisely, Green R-volution, in the sense in which we have used it in this discussion, refers to the interplay of the following three types of factors, viz.,

- (i) international factor which relates to the development of High Yielding Variety of seeds and various other technological innovations;
- (ii) national factors which relate to (a) independence of the country, (b) agrarian property relations,

(c) emergence of the class of kulaks and formation of capital in agriculture, (d) consolidation of landholdings, (e) the nature of legislation both at the state and national level, (f) development of proper infrastructure in the villages, (g) eradication of social constraints, (h) interlocking of agricultural and industrial capital, (i) creation of a favourable political atmosphere; and,  
 (iii) natural and incidental factors which relate to (a) nature of the soil in the state, and, (b) formation of the state itself.

We have discussed all these factors in the preceding pages. What remains to be mentioned here is that we do not think that increased agricultural production is the only function of all these factors. There is something more to it. Changes have appeared in both these socio-economic and political set up of the state. No doubt, changes in these fields are inter-related but they are the function of 'Green Revolution' if understood in the sense in which we have used it. Henceforth we shall use it only in our sense of the word.

### 3. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

In order to study the economic consequences of Green Revolution we shall divide Agricultural workers into two categories viz.

Agricultural labourers who do not own any land and depend upon their labour to make a livelihood; and, cultivators who own land, although some of them also work as agricultural labourers in order to make additional income.

Cultivators are further divided into five categories, each category having two further sub-divisions viz. progressive cultivators who use improved seeds and non-progressive who do not use it. The five sub categories of cultivators are as follows:-


1. Sub marginal or Very small peasants households with holdings of not more than 5 acres.
2. Marginal or Very small peasants households with holdings of more than 5 acres but not more than 10 acres.
3. Intermediate or middle peasant households with holdings of more than 10 acres but not more than 20 acres.
4. Big peasant households with holdings of more than 20 acres but not more than 30 acres.
5. Very big peasant households with holdings of more than 30 acres

Obviously this categorization is based on the size of the net operational holding

which comprises the area owned or taken on mortgage or lease, but excluding the area given on mortgage or lease.

Naturally, the classification of agricultural labourers into Progressive and Non-progressive is meaningless. Table VII summarizes these categorizations.

TABLE VII  
CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS



Since our concern here is with the economic condition of the agricultural workers, let us first turn to cultivators and see how various categories of cultivators are affected in various regions of Harvna by Green Revolution. It has already been noted in Table III that Progressive cultivators are more than the non-progressive cultivators in all categories of landholdings in the Northern Region of Harvna.



In all other Regions non-progressive cultivators dominate the scene. Therefore, we shall concentrate more on the cultivators of Northern Region. ~~In all other regions of the state the non-progressive~~

It is true that wide disparities in the distribution of landholdings exist~~s~~ in Haryana. The category wise distribution of operational area is presented in Table VIII. The table shows that 56.6 percent of the bottom households belonging to the first two categories till only 25.7 per cent of the total area. On the other hand 17.6 percent of the landholders belonging to the Upper two categories till 43.1 percent of the land.

TABLE VIII

	Category of operational holding					
	0 - 5 acres	5 - 10 acres	10-20 acres	20-30 acres	Above 30 ac	All
Percentage of total cultivating households	27.6	29.0	25.8	11.1	6.5	100
Percentage of total cultivated area	7.6	18.1	31.1	22.3	20.8	100

However, <sup>\*</sup>Very Small Peasants derive the highest output per acre, which tends to decrease as the size of operational holding increases. But since it is not possible to make an optimum use of bullocks or other farm equipments on very small

units of cultivation, farm business income per acre on small sized farms is less than the income derived from this source by marginal or small farmers. This trend is evident from Table IX.

TABLE IX

	Category of operational holdings					
	0 -5	5 - 10	10-20	20-30	30 & more	All
Output per acre, Rs	770.29	753.34	642.71	648.94	517.92	647.88
Farm business income (NVA) per acre, Rs	429.65	503.25	442.23	470.81	378.23	445.38
Farm business income, per acre, Rs	414.10	471.45	403.68	422.17	322.13	404.58

In spite of the fact that the sub-marginal farmers are able to obtain the highest output per acre of land and their income from farm business is greater than the income derived from this source by cultivators of all other categories except that of the marginal farmers, income disparities have increased. The average annual income of a cultivator belonging to the first category is Rs 2,139.09; whereas that of the fifth category is 14,425.87. On the face of it, this difference in incomes appears to be related to the size of landholding. But a comparison of the three agro-economic regions (Table X) shows that the income derived from the same size of landholding differs from region to region.

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TABLE X

NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES IN VARIOUS  
REGIONS OF HARYANA  
(Mean values per household, Rs)

Category	North	Region Central	South
5 acres or less	2,603.00	2,088.00	1,767.82
5 to 10 acres	5,297.15	3,071.26	3,935.32
10 to 20 acres	10,377.90	5,003.68	5,272.31
20 to 30 acres	16,053.89	8,381.46	8,297.18
More than 30 ac.	22,552.90	14,098.85	8,754.59
Any size of holding	7,810.74	5,238.70	4,238.10

Table X shows that the income from all categories of land holdings in Northern Region is greater than the incomes from all categories of landholdings in Central and southern Regions. If we also keep in mind that Northern Region of the state is the Region where Green Revolution has shown its most spectacular results, we shall be forced to believe that income disparities have increased because of Green Revolution. It will also appear as if Green Revolution has benefitted only the upper strata of peasantry. Let us examine both these points in some details.

There is enough evidence to show that "Green Revolution has increased the income levels of all categories of 'adopters' irrespective of the size of their operational units".

Table XI shows that per capita income for each category of progressive cultivators is higher than the per capita income of the corresponding categories of non-progressive cultivators. The Table leaves no doubt that gains in per capita income are not confined to the upper strata of the rural society.

TABLE XI  
PROGRESSIVE AND NON-PROGRESSIVE CULTIVATORS AND THEIR  
INCOME GAINS

Per capita income of-- (in Rs.)	Category of operational holding (acres)					Average
	5 or less	5 -10	10-20	20-30	Above30	
Progressive cultivators	437.55	850.10	1086.03	1351.77	1800.84	990.30
Non-progre- ssive cult- ivators	316.70	446.90	616.70	1011.59	1098.60	597.88

However, the percentage of 'adopters' in the first category is the smallest. The percentage of 'adopters' in the upper two categories is the highest. Therefore, most of those who belong to the upper two categories appear to be better off and most of those in the lowest category appear to be deteriorating. The gap between the income levels of the non-progressive cultivator of the lowest category and the progressive category has obviously widened. But this is not because of the Green Revolution. Green Revolution has neither

led to the deterioration in the income level of the non-progressive cultivators in the lowest category of cultivators nor has it blocked the avenues of development for these cultivators. It has not only increased the income level of the cultivators in the highest categories but also that of those ~~who are in the lowest category of cultivators~~ who are in the lowest categories of cultivators.

This is an important fact. It is important because it shows that even now there is tremendous potential of development in agriculture. <sup>\*</sup>Cultivators in the first category are unable to invest in land improvement and modern technology because of their inability to save. Sooner or later, these cultivators shall have to either sell off their landholdings altogether or to work elsewhere simultaneously in order to make additional money. In either case, industrial sector of Haryana ~~is~~ is there to deliver the goods. <sup>\*</sup>By buying small pieces of land, the industrialists and others are increasing the level of food production in the state. This will continue to happen as long as the cultivators in the first category do not either take to progressive farming or sell off their land. In the latter instance, urban industrial sector can absorb the dispossessed cultivator.

The point not<sup>to</sup> be missed in any case is that Green Revolution is not directly responsible for the growing disparity in income. As a matter of fact, Green Revolution has tended to reduce rather than aggravate income disparities amongst the adopters. If a majority of cultivators in the first category have not taken to modern means of cultivation, it is certainly not because of the Green Revolution. The reasons for that have to be looked for elsewhere. If we look at the history of the preceding institutional changes we will find that whatever changes occurred prior to the advent of the era of Green Revolution, did not help the sub-marginal farmer accumulate capital for investment on his land holdings. Institutional changes were brought about to provide credit facilities to the sub-marginal farmers, but these facilities were inadequate. It is mainly because of this inadequacy that an inadequate proportion of the class of sub-marginal farmers has taken to modern means of cultivation. Cultivators in this category will 'adopt' only if credit facilities are expanded. The state government is aware of this and is taking steps in this direction. This clearly shows that Green Revolution has not exhausted its potential of development but it is checked only by institutional and structural constraints.

different categories of cultivators are affected differently by the increasing income disparities. Cultivators in the lowest category, in all Regions, both progressive and non-progressive (although the income level of the progressive cultivators has increased) have no savings. Table XII gives an over all view of the savings of various categories of cultivators in the three agro-economic regions and in the state as a whole, bringing out the difference between the progressive and the non-progressive cultivators.

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TABLE XII

SUMMARY OF SAVINGS OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CULTIVATORS  
IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF HARYANA AND IN THE STATE ITSELF

(Mean values per household, Rs.)

Category	Haryana		North	Central	South
	Total	Pr. NPr.			
5 acres or less	-737.57	-779.54	-357.73	-681.90	-1,111.97
5 to 10 acres	29.87	-1057.55	972.04	-778.52	-304.13
10 to 20 acres	1421.79	72.88	4763.74	-94.11	-108.46
20 to 30 acres	3973.03	2664.88	8372.42	-330.98	3076.70
More than 30 acres	3908.03	4174.18	10533.90	2695.42	1357.00
Any size of holding	866.40	35.23	2829.94	-121.93	-124.90

It is evident from the first row of this table that cultivators who own land upto 5 acres are not able to save. Nearly 25 percent of cultivators belong to this category of cultivators. \*This means that about one fourth of the total cultivators in Haryana are being kept below the poverty line by the circumstances.

This is an important consequence of the era of Green Revolution. It cannot be said decisively but it is likely that, had adequate (and not merely barely minimum) conditions been created for Green Revolution, such consequences would not have followed. Various institutional/structural measures could have been taken. For example, small landholdings could have been grouped together to make them economically viable. A piece of legislation would have served the purpose. Credit facilities could have been expanded. But all this did not take place either because of the lack of resources or because of the inability to carry forward such drastic land reforms in the face of organized opposition from vested interests or, may be, because of the lack of will on the part of the ruling party to do so. In this way, the widening of gulf between the 25 percent of the cultivators in the state who live on or below the poverty line and those 20 percent of cultivators who have taken



to the modern means of cultivation and increased their income, is because of the inability of the policy makers to prepare the conditions in which Green Revolution could penetrate the rural community fully. Crystallization of this class of relatively unaffected cultivators is an important feature of the class composition of the state of Haryana after the sixties.

In the beginning we had subdivided agricultural workers into two categories viz., cultivators and agricultural labourers. We have already discussed the impact of Green Revolution on the different categories of cultivators. Or, to put it more precisely, we have tried to see what is the economic condition of different categories of cultivators in Haryana after the era of Green Revolution. What we have studied boils down to this:

\*Polarization is clearly taking place among the class of cultivators. The sub-marginal farmers and to a very large extent the sub-marginal farmers as well as the marginal farmers in Regions B and C, who jointly account for 57 per cent of the total cultivators, are living at or below poverty line. They are at one end of a scale, on the other end of which are the Big and the Very big cultivators who account for only 18 percent of the total cultivating households. Somewhere between these

two ends on the scale are the middle peasants who account for 25 percent of the total cultivating households, so far as their interests are concerned, they support the upper strata of the cultivators. This gives the impression that 56 percent of the cultivators are poised against 44 percent of the cultivators. But even this simple equation gets <sup>\*</sup>disturbed when we remember that 29 per cent of the cultivators belong to the category of marginal farmers and their interests keep on fluctuating. At least in Northern Region, where they have made gains, their interests coincide with the interests of the other three upper categories of cultivators taken together. This is an important consequence whose political implications we shall discuss in the next section.

One more important point must be mentioned before we turn to the agricultural labourers in Haryana. It must be noted that 87.52 percent of the total cultivated area is under self-cultivation; land held under share renting system of tenure forms 8.21 percent of the total operated area while 4.27 percent of the area is held under cash and kind renting system of tenure. Thus self-cultivation dominates. The self-cultivators outnumber those who operate land but do not own it.

Let us now turn to the other category of agricultural workers viz., the agricultural labourers. Table XIII gives an over all picture of the number of landless agricultural labourers in the three agro-economic regions in Haryana. This data relate to a specific point in time. Our task to study the impact of Green Revolution on these agricultural labourers in different regions of the state would have been easier if we had time-series data. But that is not available. Thus, as Bhalla points out, "The only feasible comparison can be on a regional basis between the living conditions of landless labourers in regions where the Green Revolution is more advanced with those where it is still relatively backward".

TABLE XIII  
DISTRIBUTION OF LANDLESS AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS AND CULTIVATORS IN THE THREE REGIONS OF HARYANA

	Cultivators	Agricultural Labourers	Total agricultural workers	Agr.lab. as a % of agr. workers
North	449,678	191,211	640,889	29.8
Central	419,181	133,348	552,527	24.1
South	433,831	104,448	538,279	19.4
Haryana	1,302,640	429,007	1,731,695	24.7

It must be noted, however, that two factors influence such comparison. In the first place, the proportion of agricultural labourers to total agricultural workers differs from region to region. Secondly, part of agricultural labour force also belongs to the Very small peasant category of cultivators. Even after making allowance for the fluctuations caused by these factors the results of the comparison are both revealing and suggestive.

We propose to compare the incomes of ~~landless labourers in all the three~~ of landless labourers in all the three agro-economic regions of the state with the incomes of the Very small peasants or sub-marginal peasants in the corresponding region. We shall also compare the consumption and savings levels of landless agricultural labourers and the lowest category of cultivators in all the three regions of the state. Table XIV summarizes the data regarding income, consumption and savings of Very small peasants and landless labourers in the three Regions.

Two things are obvious from Table XIV. In the first place, the condition of landless labourer is very bad all over the state. He cannot meet his requirements. Therefore, borrowing money from private money-lenders (since loans and credits for personal consumption purposes are not made available by institutions) is a common practice. Naturally, the rates

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TABLE XIV

COMPARATIVE DATA ON INCOME, ETC. OF LANDLESS LABOUR AND VERY SMALL PEASANTS IN HARYANA  
(Per household data)

ITEM	NORTH		CENTRE		SOUTH		HARYANA	
	LABOUR	CULTIVATOR	LABOUR	CULTIVATOR	LABOUR	CULTIVATOR	LABOUR	CULTIVATOR
Income, Rs.	2097.63	2603.00	2411.83	2088.85	1864.13	1767.82	2110.01	2139.09
Consumption, Rs.	2334.73	2960.73	2883.43	2770.76	2373.82	2879.80	2477.48	2876.67
Deficit, Rs.	237.10	357.73	471.60	681.90	509.65	1111.97	367.47	737.57
Borrowing, Rs.	381.63	509.28	211.60	96.61	362.16	260.07	335.40	298.53
Investment, Rs.	19.18	746.00	122.50	383.08	104.80	599.62	67.26	588.61
Unexplained surplus, Rs.	+125.35	-594.44	-382.50	-968.37	-252.29	-1451.52	-99.33	-1027.65
Family size	5.30	6.43	6.17	5.84	5.32	5.95	5.51	6.08
Per capita income, Rs.	395.78	404.80	390.90	357.68	350.41	297.11	382.94	351.03
Per capita consumption, Rs.	440.51	466.04	467.33	474.04	446.20	474.44	449.63	473.00
Average propensity to consume	1.11	1.14	1.20	1.32	1.27	1.62	1.17	1.34

of interests are exorbitant. The agricultural labourers, whether they are permanent or casual labourers, are tied in a vicious circle of indebtedness.<sup>13</sup>

\*The irony of capitalist mode of production in agrarian sector is that while on the one hand it gives rise to the class of wage earners, on the other hand, it denies them the opportunity to earn wages. The producer wants to maximize the profit by employing as less labour as possible. Aggarwal and Bhalla have shown that the demand for human labour has not declined with the increase in mechanization.<sup>14</sup>

As already noted, even the progressive farmers do not use highly sophisticated mechanical devices for cultivation. Bhalla observes, "The progressive cultivators' demand for hired labour is also substantially more than that of the non-progressive ones, indicating that the Green Revolution had led to enlarged employment of labour. Unlike many other technological changes, Green Revolution is - at the moment, in any case - both capital and labour-intensive. But there are pressures at work which are leading towards use of labour-saving machinery, particularly at the time of harvesting. This indicates that the employment generating potentialities of the Green Revolution are not limitless and are being gradually exhausted".<sup>15</sup>

It is, therefore, logical to assume that as farming gets more mechanized, the demand for labour would decrease. Bhalla warns, \* "In absolute terms the daily wages of the labourers might have increased in the past few years but the fact remains that because of the rise in the cost of living and declining demand for wage labour resulting from increase in mechanization, the relative condition of the wage earners has <sup>16</sup> deteriorated".

If we compare the two classes of ~~agricultural workers, viz., the agricultural labourers~~ agricultural workers, viz., the agricultural labourers

*Politics* and cultivators, we find that they have certain characteristics in common. First, \* both these categories of workers are unable to save. Secondly, as a result of the inability to save, they have to resort to borrowing at phenomenal rates of interests. Thirdly, both these categories of agricultural workers have a chance of improving their lot, only if adequate *(not out)* measures are taken. <sup>17</sup> Fourthly, both these categories of agricultural workers coexist in rural areas or even overlap each other in those cases where the cultivators of the lowest category also hire-out labour in order to make additional money. Fifthly, agricultural workers in these two categories are relatively more independent of feudal and semi-feudal ties than they earlier had been.

Thus the sub-marginal peasants and the agricultural labourers in all Regions of Haryana can be grouped together in one class and expected to behave in almost similar manner. Their attitude towards politics being determined by the common characteristics that they have and which have been discussed in the preceeding paragraph.

There is another important conclusion that could be drawn from Table XIV. The per capita income of landless labourer in Northern Region is the highest which shows that Green Revolution has improved the comparative levels of living of landless labourers in these regions. In spite of the fact that supply of labour is the maximum in Northern Region where labour-saving mechanization is supposed to have taken place because of the success of Green Revolution, per capita income of the labourers still remain the highest. However, the per capita income of agricultural labourers in Northern Region is slightly lower than the per capita income of the sub-marginal farmers in that Region. This shows that whereas both categories of agricultural workers have benefitted from Green Revolution, cultivators in the lowest category have benefitted more than the agricultural labourers. In the Central Region per capita income of the agricultural labourer is higher than the per capita income of the sub-marginal farmer. It may be because of the non-expansion of Green Revolution



in this Region or lesser supply of agricultural force in this Region, or because of both the reasons.

This conclusion also proves the point that we made earlier viz., the economic condition of both - the cultivators of the lowest category and the agricultural labourers - has improved because of the success of Green Revolution. Yet, they form a class by themselves because of the characteristics that they have in common.

Apart from these consequences, there are important side effects of the Green Revolution. One such side effect is the proliferation of other sources of income. Of course, we do not have any data (time-series) to establish this relationship. But whatever data <sup>is</sup> available suggests that in the state of Haryana as a whole, quite a substantial (almost 1/3rd) part of the income of the cultivators is derived from three major sources apart from cultivation. Table XV shows the percentage of income derived from various sources by different categories of cultivators in the state as a whole. It is evident from this Table that only sub-marginal farmers have tried to take out additional income from various other sources. Therefore, it is but natural to suppose that potential did exist, and continues to exist, in other fields, which could be exploited in order to raise additional income.

TABLE XV

## PERCENTAGE OF INCOME DERIVED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES

Item	Category of operational holding (acres)					Average
	5 or less	5-10	10-20	20-30	Above 30	
Farm Business income*	66.8	87.7	89.5	93.7	90.3	87.8
Income from hiring out of human labour	12.3	1.8	1.1	0.0	0.0	2.0
Income from hiring out of agricultural equipment	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.4
Income from dairying	10.3	7.3	5.5	4.2	4.5	5.9
Income from home produce of fuel and light	1.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.8
Income from miscellaneous sources**	8.9	2.0	2.5	1.0	4.5	3.1

\* Farm business income is defined as total farm output minus all material and paid out labour costs. No value is imputed to family labour employed on the farms and no depreciation is deducted from this income.

\*\*These sources include salaries, pensions, remittances, rent, interest, dividends, commercial ventures, small-scale industry, sale of manure, fertilizers and seeds, poultry-keeping, horticulture and hiring out of bullock cart etc.

It is true that certain 'other' sources of income are not open to all. For example, any willing peasant cannot raise his income by arranging for a monthly pension. But there are certain 'other' sources of income which are open to all. For example, horticulture and sale of manures etc. are possible sources of income. It is surprising, but Table XVI shows that these 'other' sources of income have not been tapped by the sub-marginal farmers in the Northern Region.

\* It may be because of the fact that the Green Revolution has anyway increased the farm input and the farmers prefer to concentrate more on land than on other sources of income.

One important conclusion that we draw from the comparison of figures in Table XVI is that cultivators in the first three categories in the Green belt of Haryana tend to ignore other sources of income, although they can earn more from these sources, as shown by the corresponding figures in the Central and Southern Regions. These cultivators are primarily concerned with agriculture. "The reason why this group still insists on continuing to be in business can only be explained in terms of non-economic and sociological factors.

\* The fact of owning land, howsoever small, gives them greater prestige in the community and provides security in bad times".<sup>20</sup> 19

TABLE XVI<sup>20</sup>

INCOME OF CULTIVATORS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS FROM  
FARM BUSINESS AND VARIOUS OTHER SOURCES, in Rs.

Category of operational holding	R e g i o n		
	Northern	Central	Southern
5 acres or* less - FBI**	1,991.15	1,205.81	1,095.75
- OS	611.84	833.04	672.07
5 - 10 acres			
- FBI	4,923.69	2,581.13	3,256.95
- OS	373.45	490.12	678.37
10 - 20 acres			
- FBI	9,883.54	4,371.48	4,298.18
- OS	494.35	632.19	974.12
20 - 30 acres			
- FBI	15,451.51	7,696.25	7,399.29
- OS	602.32	685.20	906.88
Above 30 acres			
- FBI	21,134.93	12,823.63	7,106.04
- OS	1,417.96	1,275.22	1,648.90

\* FBI means Farm Business Income

\*\* OS means income from various other sources

With the change in the outlook of the cultivators they might resort to subsidiary activities. Thus Green Revolution has not exhausted the sources of income or deprived the small peasants of the opportunity to earn more, but, by increasing the hope of earning more through cultivation, it has localized the concentration of the cultivator on cultivation alone, it has made the cultivator ignore other avenues of income which were anyhow not too appealing to the cultivator because of his psychological attachment to land, born out of a long tradition of agricultural vocation.

The second important side effect of the Green Revolution has been an increase in subsidiary economic activities in other spheres. In the first place, Green Revolution reinforced those economic activities which had initially prepared the necessary conditions for the spread of Green Revolution. Such economic activities are mainly restricted to the sphere of industry, ~~essentially~~ electrification, road-construction etc. But the most important of them is in the field of industry. Secondly, Green Revolution encouraged such developmental projects as promised jobs to the jobless population of Haryana. The resultant economic activity helped in stabilizing the economy of the state. We shall study its full impact later while discussing the political consequences of the Green Revolution. Table XVIII gives an over all view of industry and other spheres. It is evident from this table that extensive developmental work has been undertaken which must have provided jobs to a substantial number of people. Construction of hospital buildings, school buildings, tourist complexes etc. require labour force, doctors, nurses, teachers and so many other types of personnel. Obviously, all these requirements have been met by the population of Haryana itself; only a part of it being outsiders.

TABLE XVII<sup>21</sup>

<b>INDUSTRIES</b>			
1.	No. of small scale units	1966 5,247	1966 17,670
2.	Exports by small scale industries and export corporations.	Rs. 4.50 crores	Rs. 34 cr.
3.	Loans distributed by Haryana Finance Corp.	Rs. 15 cr.	Rs. 27 cr.
<b>HEALTH</b>			
1.	Hospitals	30 (1968)	47
2.	Per capita allocation on health and medical facilities	Rs. 4.60 (1968-69)	Rs. 10.79
3.	Per capita expenditure on medicine	Rs. 0.21 (1968-69)	Rs. 0.99
<b>EDUCATION</b>			
1.	Primary Schools	4,346	5,149
2.	Middle Schools	747	774
3.	High/Higher Secondary Schools	713	1,106
4.	Colleges	48	117
5.	Total number of students	1.2 mil.	1.7 mil.
6.	Number of teachers	35,358	51,988
<b>TRANSPORT</b>			
1.	Fleet strength of Haryana Roadways	567	1,852
2.	Operated kilometrage (daily)	1.1 mil.	4.6 mil.
3.	Passengers carried (daily)	1.1 mil.	5.6 mil.
<b>ANIMAL HUSBANDRY</b>			
1.	Intensive cattle development projects	2	6
<b>DRINKING WATER SUPPLY</b>			
1.	Villages covered	203	878
<b>HOUSING</b>			
1.	House sites allotted to Harijans and backward classes	nil	2,15,092
<b>LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT</b>			
1.	Number of employment Exchanges	19	36
2.	Persons provided employment	216,000	398,000
<b>WELFARE</b>			
1.	Old age pension scheme	nil	7,194
<b>SPORTS</b>			
1.	Sports stadia	2	7
<b>TOURISM</b>			
1.	Number of tourist complexes	1	19

It has not been possible to work out how many people were provided jobs by these projects and programmes and extension services but even in the absence of the data, the point is self evident. Thus, Green Revolution has brought economic benefit not only to those who are engaged in agricultural pursuits but also to those who depend upon non-agricultural means of livelihood.

To sum up, the whole class composition of the state of Haryana has changed in the post-Green Revolution era, if that is how the late sixties and seventies may be called. It is difficult to characterize the mode of production in agriculture at present. May be it is in a transient period.<sup>22</sup> Lenin wrote, "There are various kinds of capitalism - the ~~exists, at the~~ semi-feudal capitalism of the landowners with its host of residual privileges, which is the most reactionary and causes the masses the greatest sufferings; there is also the capitalism of the free-farmers, which is the most ~~democratic~~ democratic, causes the masses less suffering and has fewer residual privileges".<sup>23</sup> It is perhaps the second type of capitalism that has been taking shape in Indian agriculture, particularly in the state of Haryana.

The process of polarization of classes has been aggravated of late. On the one hand, there are the sub-marginal farmers and the landless labourers who share many common characteristics to become a cohesive class. On the other hand, there are big and very big cultivators whose income has increased tremendously. In between these two poles comes the large class of middle-range cultivators who have the tendency to be pulled towards both the ends of the scale. This class overlaps with the lower as well as the upper class of the rural hierarchy in the state of Haryana. A majority of cultivators in all the three classes own land and cultivate it themselves. This is an important fact which must be kept in mind.

It is true that practically all the categories of cultivators have benefitted from the success of Green Revolution, but the extent of benefit for the upper strata is higher. This is not because of any so called 'inherent weakness' of Green Revolution but because of the inadequate conditions in which Green Revolution came to the state. This means that Green Revolution has increased the hope of those who have not benefitted at all and also of those who have benefitted less than the others. There is tremendous potential of agricultural development in the Central and Southern Regions.



Next, although Green Revolution so far has not decreased the demand for human labour, its job providing potential is limited. This has been realized very well. However, increased agricultural production boosts other non-agricultural economic activities with new job opportunities. Thus, just as it keeps on exhausting the job potential in its own field, Green Revolution keeps on increasing, albeit indirectly, job potential in other fields which get a boost because of the success of Green Revolution. Thus, directly or indirectly, Green Revolution has increased both - the hopes and the job opportunities - for atleast the lower section of the society.

Lastly, the phenomenon of Green Revolution has been mainly restricted to Region A or the Northern Region of the state. The Southern Region is hardly touched by Green Revolution. Therefore, its impact on the political behaviour of the population in Northern Region will be greater and more pronounced as compared to other regions. It is on the basis of this that we shall be generalizing for the whole state.

#### 4. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

This section shall be concerned with two things. First, we shall point out some consequences which one would have expected to follow from the economic changes we noted in the foregoing section. For this, we shall rely mainly on the thesis of 'proletarianization of the peasantry'. This thesis is based on the observation of similar phenomena in other parts of the world. Second, we shall try to test these theories against the facts of Green Revolution in Haryana. Since the facts do not seem to confirm the thesis, we shall try to give an explanation as to why things have not happened in a sequence in which the theories predict they should.

To put it in simple words, our objective in this section is to counterpose the actual political situation against the expected political situation to see in what respects the actual political situation falls short of, or, exceeds the expected political situation. We shall take up the issue of expected political situation first and the actual political situation subsequently.

It is generally argued that Green Revolution has limited job-providing potential. Greater the mechanization, lesser the need for labour power. Thus the number of agricultural labourers

rendered jobless keeps on increasing with the increase in mechanization. Not only this. Sub-marginal peasants in particular and marginal peasants in general are forced to sell off their landholdings to big landholders because of the economic unviability of their landholding. Thus, they too are rendered landless agricultural labourers and thus enter the competitive market, where jobs are already scarce. Even if they do not sell off their land, their interests coincide with the interests of the landless agricultural labourers. They form a new economic class and a new social force.

The contradiction between the lower class and the rural rich or the kulaks starts because of the limited resources. The kulaks, having control over the state apparatus, can monopolize the resources. And since resources in a given situation are always limited, the lower section of the peasantry is unable to get the due share out of these resources. The contradiction starts and takes the form of class contradiction. The first sign of this class contradiction is the increasing 'politicization of the peasantry'. Politicization of the peasantry can be explained in terms of the radical tendencies of the peasantry. There are many indices of this. Formation of peasant associations, agitations, strikes, inclination

towards radical ideologies, shift in the voting behaviour etc. all indicate the radical tendencies of the peasantry which is a sign of growing politicization of the peasantry.

One crucial manifestation of this politicization is the migration of unemployed agricultural labourers to the neighbouring towns where they swell the size of the lumpenproletariat class and provide the most pleasant and convenient hunting ground for the political parties of the left. The revolutionary/radical potential of the peasantry takes concrete forms only in the urban areas where so many other factors help the peasantry develop and actualize its potential. These factors relate to the problem of political organization, political allies etc. History is a testimony to this fact. In 1789, the dissatisfied peasantry came to Paris (and to other urban centres) and formed the Parisian mob which played such an important role throughout the French Revolution. It happened in Hungary in 1848. Instances can be multiplied. However, the underlying important fact is that villages are too small to stage a spectacular and impressive joint action. In any case such sporadic expressions of dissatisfaction in terms of radical actions can be easily tackled with by the local authorities themselves. Otherwise,

the state is everready to tackle such delicate issues. Besides, in case of India, there is an additional factor. No political party, except the Congress Party has an institutional base in the rural area throughout the length and breadth of the country. It may be, as indeed it is, because of the role it played during the freedom struggle and the way it developed during that period, reaching down to the masses at grass root level. However, the fact remains that in the presence of an unit of the Congress Party at the village level, it becomes difficult for other parties to operate at that level.

*Non-sense - what about  
B.L.D.?*

Thus, towns and cities, and not the villages become the seats of joint radical action of the enlarged lumpenproletariat class, migration of the landless labour class from the villages to the towns and cities accounting for this enlargement.

One point must be clarified at this stage. All through the preceding argument we have been presupposing that the lumpenproletariat will take to radical politics. The question that arises is: why should this class of lumpenproletariat, which has a predominant element of the landless agricultural labourers not take to non-radical politics? Reactionary and conservative ideologies do attract a population, or atleast a part of it.

Why not the class of the lumpenproletariat? The answer is simple and has a psychological and empirical basis. In the first place, no where in the world, under similar circumstances, the lumpenproletariat has been observed to stick to reactionary or conservative ideologies. They are slow in adopting radical ideologies but they do not certainly defend the stand of reactionary and conservative ideologies fanatically. Thus, the tendency has been observed to be towards radical ideologies. Secondly, the illiterate lumpenproletariat is always carried away by the promises of a better future. His hopes are frustrated in the regimes governed by reactionary and conservative ideologies. Radical ideologies of the left political parties, by standing in opposition to the frustrating conservative and reactionary regimes, appeal instantly to the frustrated lumpenproletariat. Moreover, the organized political parties of the left with an elaborate system of pamphleteering and propoganda are certainly more successful in creating hopes which are quantitatively as well as qualitatively far superior to those that had ever been raised by any other party. Thus, these parties are more effective in making the lumpenproletariat incline towards radical ideologies. Writing about the politicization of the peasantry along radical lines

in the late fifties, Sharma observes, "By this time, they (the poorer sections of the rural society) also fully realized that they had been cheated and that there was no possible solution to their miseries within the given framework. Increasing politicization and militancy of the poorer peasantry in these conditions were hardly surprising".<sup>1</sup>

So we come back to the problem of the lumpenproletariat class which is inclined towards radical ideologies. Johnson warns, "India cannot afford the displacement of her rural population through mechanization of agriculture or amalgamation of holdings at rate which exceed the ability of the urban centers to absorb the inflow".<sup>2</sup> The reason why he voices this warning is simple. Such a situation is most conducive to the politicization of peasantry along radical lines. Sharma warns, "... the Green Revolution has definitely accentuated the circumstances that led to the politicization of the peasantry".<sup>3</sup>

What is the net result of this politicization? In a paper, David Hardiman points out that there is a definite correlation between the politicization of peasantry and the emergence of agitations. He observes, "In districts, in which farming was on the whole carried out by the rich

peasants and landless labourers, factional politics were likely to rule the roost, ... . In areas, in which farming was on the whole carried out by small holding middle peasants, the political awakening had a better chance of coming by way of agitations. If the middle peasants owned their farms, ... , the agitators were likely to support law and remain non-violent. If they did not, ... , the agitators were likely to become non-violent with little provocation".<sup>4</sup>

The second possible result of the politicization of the peasantry along radical lines can be an increase in the popularity of radical political parties. Very often, the political parties of the left concern themselves with the analysis of the situation in the countryside. Vast literature is available on the agrarian problems. In a country of India's magnitude, no social upheaval is possible without the involvement of the peasantry. However, the whole peasantry is not expected to involve itself in the task of any social transformation.

What is the role of the different categories of peasants? Hamza Alvi raises this question.<sup>5</sup> According to him, the 'poor peasants are initially the least militant class of the peasantry'.



There are psychological as well as sociological and economic factors which explain the morbidity of the peasants, "... servile habits (are) ingrained in the peasant mind over the centuries ...". On socio-economic frontier the peasant is so completely dependant upon his master for his livelihood that he dare not rise against him. These are two reasons why peasants have stuck to land in most of the areas.

First, insufficient industrialization created excessive pressure of population on land because there are not enough jobs for those who are rendered landless because of mechanization or who cannot get enough from their meagre landholdings.<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, as a corollary to the first point, competition among the landless to get jobs suffices to make them stick to land at whatever low wage they get for their work, provided that the facilities for migration are low.

Both these factors at the same time create an army of landless workers and check their revolutionary potential.

Writing about the middle peasants  
<sup>7</sup>  
 Hamza Alvi holds, "The middle peasants, ..., are initially the most militant element of the peasantry and they can be powerful ally of the proletarian movement in the countryside". And he concludes, "It is not the poor peasants who are initially the

leading and the main force of the peasant revolution, with the middle peasantry coming in only later when the success of the movement is guaranteed, but precisely the reverse".

It follows from this that political parties of the left can strengthen their position in the countryside only if (i) the middle peasant is inclined towards radical politics; (ii) there is a strong proletariat in the urban centres; and, (iii) both these classes are dissatisfied with the existing political system. <sup>8</sup> Small peasants are not expected to take any initiative towards participating in radical politics, even if they are independent of the feudal ties. For one thing, complete independence of the small peasants is a myth. Village is too small and compact a unit to give rise to impersonal relations which characterize an urban community in a capitalist state. Moreover, small peasants remain economically dependent upon the middle and big peasants. If nothing else, political control of the middle peasants over the small peasants is always present. In India this control is institutionalized. Gram Panchayats are powerful organs of control in the villages. These are invariably dominated by big and middle peasants. The presence of these organs of state power in the villages checks the free expression of the political attitude of the small peasants who stick to land in the villages and of the agricultural

*Middle class  
and not  
to peasants*

labourers who do not migrate to towns and cities. Small peasants have a free chance to participate in radical politics only if they alienate their landholdings and join the select band of agricultural labourers who migrate to towns. And since Green Revolution is supposed to have aggravated such tendency, we should normally expect the political parties of the left to gain in strength in the towns.

We have been overemphasizing on the increasing strength of political parties of the left as the function of increasing politicization of the peasantry along radical lines, only because all other manifestations of radical tendencies viz., shift in voting pattern, agitations, strikes, formation of peasant societies etc. are secondary to the infiltration of the political party of the left into Green Revolution areas. This is not to suggest, however, that agitations and strikes will not take place and peasant associations will not be formed if a political party of the left is not present in the area. Indeed, many an agitation take place spontaneously. Strikes are held without the support of any political party, be that of left or right. These things are certainly not dependent upon a party organization. However, we are giving importance to the issue of a political party of left because of two main reasons. In the first place, we

are presuming that left political parties, like any other political party, try to broaden their base. Theoretically speaking, Green Revolution areas should favour the expansion of left political parties. It was expected, so to say, that political parties of the left would avail of every possible opportunity to penetrate the state of Haryana - a state where situation is so conducive to radical ideologies because of the success of the Green Revolution. This expectation rises high in the light of the fact that practically all the factions of Indian left have settled down to constitutionalism as the best and most convenient method of bringing about social transformation.

The other reason why we have been emphasizing the issue of a political party of left is concerned with our convenience. No doubt, several indices of 'politicization of the peasantry along radical lines' can be evolved but that would give rise to further problems. In the first place, sufficient data do not seem to be available on even those variables that we have tentatively mentioned in the beginning of this section. We do not have any account of the number of peasant societies and other information concerning those associations. Nothing is known about the number and nature of agitations in the towns. Besides, the time factor is so important that it is not possible to collect data on these variables.

It is because of these reasons that we are taking political party of the left as a function of politicization of peasantry along radical lines. Even here, we have to face a difficulty which is again connected with non-availability of data. We have no information about the strength of various political parties in the state. We do not know how many votes each party polled in different elections at lower levels; whether there has been an increase in the number of votes they polled or not. We cannot go into that detail. Therefore, we shall base our analysis on the basis of the seats that each party obtained in Haryana Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha and the number of votes polled in these elections. This method may be inadequate but it will definitely show the trend.

Having discussed the expected political consequences of the economic changes brought about by the Green Revolution, we shall now turn our attention to the actual political condition in the state of Haryana.

As noted above, we shall take the position of different political parties in two levels of elections viz., elections to the Legislative Assembly or the Vidhan Sabha and elections to the Lok Sabha. The first election to the Lok Sabha of the state was held in 1967. The same year, Haryana also went to polls for electing the members of the

Lok Sabha. However, the ministry soon fell. Mid term polls were held in 1968 for the Legislative Assembly. The House was once again dissolved on 21st of January 1972 and fresh elections were held to the state Legislative Assembly. In 1971, the second election to the Lok Sabha from the state of Haryana was held. Thus, there have been three elections to the state Legislative Assembly and two elections to the Lok Sabha from the state of Haryana.

We propose to compare the party positions in these elections and comment on the data. Let us take up the elections to the Lok Sabha first. Table XVIII sums up the results of the 1967 General elections to the Lok Sabha from the state of Haryana.

TABLE XVIII<sup>10</sup>

LOK SABHA RESULTS FROM HARYANA - FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS  
 No. of seats - 9      No. of electorate 4,382,855  
 No. of valid votes polled: 3,052,295      Percentage of Valid votes: 69.6

Party	Total votes polled	Percentage of votes polled	Seats contested	Seats Won	Lost deposit
Congress	1,344,830	44.1	9	7	nil
J n Sangh	605,838	19.8	7	1	2
Swatantra	170,951	5.6	2	x	1
SSP	167,973	5.5	5	x	4
PSP	10,905	0.4	1	x	1
CPI	51,758	1.7	3	x	3
CPI (M)	25,479	0.8	2	x	2
RPI	70,920	2.3	2	x	2
Ind. & others	603,641	19.8	8	1	34

Following conclusions can be drawn from Table XVIII.

In the first place, the Indian National Congress secured 7 seats out of a total of 9 and this was the only party whose candidates - not even a single one - lost security deposit. Candidates belonging to other parties lost security deposits. In all 49 out of 67 candidates who fought the election lost security deposits. (36 independent and other candidates fought for 8 seats). The Congress Party polled 44.1 percent of the total valid votes which is more than the percentage of valid votes polled by the Jan Singh and other independent candidates - the two categories which returned one candidate each.

Secondly, the political parties of the left - of all shades - ranging from SSP to CPI(M) and also including RPI (Republican Party of India) fielded 13 candidates in all out of which 12 candidates lost security deposits. The only candidate not to have lost security deposit belonged to SSP which, in any case, it does not represent too radical a stand.

As a matter of fact ideological polarization <sup>level</sup> did not start taking place at all. Cow slaughter and souring prices were the two important election issues.<sup>11</sup> Of course, these issues had a greater impact on the state Legislative Assembly elections but the stand that different parties took on these

issues also affected the attitude of the population towards these parties.

What was the attitude of the lumpenproletariat towards these elections? It cannot be said decisively in the absence of relevant data, but the election results show that this class did not vote for the opposition parties in a big way. In any case, these votes were not polled heavily in favour of the two main radical parties viz., the CPI and the CPI(M) or even in favour of PSP and SSP. The percentage of votes polled in favour of CPI and CPI(M) put together was 2.5 as against 44.1 per cent polled in favour of ~~CPI~~ the Congress. We do not have data to substantiate this, but it can be said without much hesitation that those votes must have been polled mainly in the Faridabad constituency and some other areas where peasants have been affected by the political activity of the neighbouring areas.

A glance at the election manifestoes shows that the stand taken by different political parties was more or less the same. All political parties showed concern over the problems of irrigation, ceiling, ownership of land, price fixation, setting up of co-op-ratives etc. to finance the peasants (except for Swatantra Party) and other similar problems.<sup>13</sup> None of them had any special appeal to the peasantry. Even otherwise



election manifestoes do not play any important role in a society which is marked by a high level of illiteracy and various types of factionalism.

"The two Communist Parties of India stood for 'drastic' land legislation, ceilings at a lower figure, expropriation of land-lords and distribution of land among the landless and the smaller peasants. They promised drastic revision of land taxation, fixation of prices profitable to the producer and levy of food only from the big land-lords".<sup>14</sup> Except for the programme of levying food from the big landlords, all other programmes of these two Communist parties reflected the programmes of ~~these two communist~~ other political parties. In contrast with this the Congress Party promised to launch minor irrigation projects and to effect modernization of agriculture by making adequate provisions for fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, credit and improved tools and implements. The Congress Party advocated cooperatives for making the cultivator free from the money lender by providing him credit more easily than before.

It is evident from this that it is not in the ideological stands taken by different political parties that we may find an explanation of the party positions in the elections. The reasons have to be sought for elsewhere. Gradual increase in

the number of votes polled in each election is certainly increasing. In the case of 1967 General elections to the Lok Sabha from the state of Haryana, the voting percentage was as high as 69.6 for the whole state. This is certainly an indication of the increasing politicization of the peasantry (since peasantry forms the bulk of the population in the state), but the pattern of voting and the distribution of votes among various political parties do not suggest that this politicization is 'along radical lines'.

The trend in politicization is set by so many external factors. We shall deal with all these factors in the next section when we discuss the causes of the non-radicalization of peasantry in the state of Haryana, much against the expectations of the observers of the Green Revolution.

The trend that the Fourth General Election set in Haryana in 1967 continues unabated. Table XIX shows the party position in the Fifth General Elections to the Lok Sabha from the state of Haryana, held in 1971. The Congress Party retained 7 seats as it held in the previous elections. Jan Sangh was also able to retain 1 seat. The ninth seat went to the newly formed Vishal Haryana Party, which was far from being a radical party in any sense of the word.

15  
TABLE XIX

PARTY POSITION IN LOK SABHA II HARYANA 1971

Electorate 47,68,032                      Votes polled 30,68,699  
Percentage of votes polled 64. 3

Party	Votes polled	Percentage of total valid votes	Seats cont. ested	Seats Won
Congress (R)	15,72,929	52.73	9	7
Congress (O)	3,39,213	11.37	4	x
Jan Sangh	3,34,830	11.22	3	1
Vishal Haryana Party	2,74,091	9.19	3	1
BKN	16,978	0.56	2	x
CPI (M)	3,917	0.13	1	x
SSP	86,510	2.90	1	x
PSP	5,942	0.19	2	x
Forward Bloc	18,702	0.63	2	x
Arya Sabha	13,077	0.44	1	x
Proutist	3,108	0.10	1	x
RPI	14,665	0.49	3	x
Akali Dal	--	--	1	x
Independants	2,99,169	10.05	30	x

It is interesting to note the following things if we compare Table XVIII and Table XIX.

In the first place, Congress has retained the same number of seats, as we have already noted. Secondly, the percentage of voting in the state

as a whole has gone down to 64.3 percent in 1971 from 69.6 percent in the previous General Election. However, interestingly enough the percentage of votes polled by the Congress (R) Party despite the split in the Party in 1969 has gone up. It was 44.1 percent in 1967; in 1971 it was 52.73 percent. Even Congress (O) managed to get 11.37 percent of the total votes, leaving Jan Sangh behind (11.22%). Thirdly, except for the Congress (R) Party, all other political parties which contested in 1967 General Elections lost their strength. Jan Sangh, for example, declined from 19.8 percent to 11.22 percent between the two General Elections. Fourthly, the loss in strength of these parties must have contributed to the growth of two other parties viz., Congress (O) and Vishal Harvana Party, none of which belongs to the left of the center. Fifthly, left of the center parties lost further prestige. CPI was routed altogether. CPI (M) polled a total number of 3,917 votes which was 809 votes more than a non-entity party called Proutist Party. In 1971 CPI (M) got one eighth of the total number of votes it polled in 1967. In terms of percentages, it fell down to 0.13 from 0.80.

All these conclusions go in to prove our basic understanding. The politicization of the peasantry (because the majority of the population in the state is rural) is certainly taking place but not along radical lines. However, it must be noted here that the decline in the percentage of total votes polled in the two elections (69.9 percent in 1969 and 64.3 percent in 1971) should not be taken as an indication of anything like 'depoliticization'. If participation in elections is any indicator, even villages in Haryana have been quite active in the year 1971. "The Fourth General Elections to Gram Panchayats commenced on 28th June, 1971 and the election of panches was completed by the 11th July 1971. In these elections 39 lakh voters of rural areas elected more than 28,000 panches out of which 5,332 panches belong to Scheduled Castes. The election of panchayats was complete in 4,945 panchayats covering all the villages in the state. The election of Sarpanches were also completed in the month of December, 1971. General Elections to Panchayat Samitis were also held in 1972 in which 1,328 primary members, 166 members representing the Market committees were returned to these bodies".<sup>16</sup> If this is an indication the rural population has been most active during that period. And since more politiking takes place in the towns and cities, urban population should have been more active at that time. The reasons for this decline have to be looked for elsewhere.

Thus, a comparative study of the 1967 and 1971 elections, which we consider to coincide with pre-Green Revolution and Post-Green Revolution era, reveal that politicization of the peasantry has not been taking place along radical lines. Put in other words it means that, as expected, Green Revolution has not resulted in the radicalization of peasantry. At least that is what the results of the two General Elections to the Lok Sabha held before or just on the eve of, and, the other one just after the agricultural boom in the state, tend to confirm.

But we must also look at the results of the three elections held to the State Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) and see whether they confirm our findings or not. Let us now turn to these elections.

There are 81 seats in the Legislative Assembly of the state of Haryana. Table XXI shows the district wise break-up of these seats in the state. Besides the seven national political parties recognized by the Election Commission of India, there are several other political parties that have been operating in the state since 1952. They include Vishal Haryana Party, Bhartiya Kranti Dal, Bhartiya Jan Sangh, Arya Sabha, Socialist Unity Centre, Republican Party of India and the United Front. Writing about the role of the political parties

Shiv Lal observes, "The difference among the new Congress, the old Congress, the Vishal Harvana Party and the Jan Singh were based more on the clash of personalities and postures than on distinctions in their economic beliefs and objectives".<sup>17</sup>

The first elections to the state Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) were held in 1967. Table XX shows the results of the first election to the Vidhan Sabha of the state.

TABLE XX<sup>18</sup>

Population 75,99,759                      Electorate 4,370,723  
 Votes polled 3,020,115                      No. of seats 81

Party	Votes polled	Percentage of votes polled	Seats cont-est <sup>a</sup>	Seats Won	Lost	Security deposit
Congress	1,250,468	41.40	81	48	nil	
Swatantra	96,416	3.19	12	3	7	
CPI	30,295	1.00	13	x	12	
CPI (M)	13,332	0.40	7	x	7	
Jan Singh	436,130	14.44	48	12	22	
PSP	6,477	0.36	3	x	3	
SSP	104,796	3.47	23	x	18	
RPI	88,231	2.92	25	2	21	
Independents & others	993,980	32.92	78	16	not known	
	<del>2,922,115</del> x	<del>100</del> x	<del>290</del> x	<del>81</del> x		
Total	3,020,115	100	290	81	-	

Table XX also shows the same trends which we witnessed in the elections for the Lok Sabha seats from the state. In fact, the results of the state assembly elections emphatically prove our point. While Congress Party polled 41.40 percent of the total votes, no other party except Jan Sangh polled more than 10 percent of the total votes. None of the 81 Congress candidates lost security deposit. On the other hand, the two political parties of the left viz., the CPI and the CPI(M) together polled 1.4 percent of the total valid votes. Both these parties fielded 20 candidates in all (13+7) out of which 19 lost security deposit. This is a measure of the unpopularity of the Communist Parties in the state. If we also keep in mind that majority of the population of the state is rural, we can deduce that the Communist parties are not very popular among the rural population of the state. In the words of B. S. Khanna and Satva Deva, "In Harvana, the chief contestants were the Congress Party, the Jan Sangh and the independent candidates. Other political parties in the arena were of minor importance".<sup>19</sup>

District wise break-up of poll results shows that in those districts which are supposed to be the pockets of Green Revolution in the state, a majority of seats had been shared by



Congress and Jan Sangh, which are not radical parties. Table XXI summarizes the district wise break-up of the 1967 election results.

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TABLE XXI  
DISTRICT WISE BREAK UP OF POLL RESULTS, VIDHAN SABHA ELECTIONS  
HARYANA 1967

District	Total seats	Congress	Jan Sangh	Swat antra	RPI	Ind.
Ambala	9	5	2	x	1	1
Karnal	16	10	4	1	x	1
Jind	5	3	x	1	x	x
Rohtak	15	9	2	x	x	4
Gurgaon	13	5	1	1	x	6
Mahendragarh	6	2	1	x	x	3
Hissar	17	14	2	x	x	1
TOTAL	81	48	12	3	2	16

In Karnal district, for example, out of the 16 seats, Congress bagged 10, Jan Sangh 4 and swatantra 1. Therefore, there was a clean sweep by the right of the center parties. And this is supposed to be the district most favourably affected by the Green Revolution ! And it is here only that the rural population is most averse to radical politics and to the radical political parties and favourably inclined towards the right of the center political parties. This is a serious blow to our expectation of 'politicization of the peasantry along the radical lines' as a result of the Green Revolution.

Soon after the 1967 elections, problems started. Defections led to the dissolution of the Vidhan Sabha in 1968 and mid term polls were conducted. In spite of this, the Congress Party increased its strength by 2.5 percent in 1968 mid term polls (Table XXII). The other political party to increase its share of votes was Swatantra Party - the Party of landlords and princes. Even Jan Sangh's strength declined. Both the Communist Parties put together bagged .4 percent of the votes whereas in 1967 State Legislative Assembly Elections they had bagged 1.4 percent. While the lone CPI (M) candidate lost security deposit, two out of the three candidates fielded by CPI did not lose security deposit. But then, in a state where semi-feudal social relations still exist, personalities count more than ideologies and programmes. In any case this cannot be taken as a sign of growing politicization of peasantry along radical lines. Table XXII shows the results of the mid term polls to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana. It is evident from this table that 5 out of 31 candidates fielded by Swatantra Party and 27 out of 44 fielded by Jan Sangh and 7 out of 39 fielded by Vishal Haryana Party lost security deposits. This shows that the candidates of these parties were in the effective contests. All of these parties belong to the right of the center.

This means that the tussle was among the right of the center parties in the state. Parties like the SSP, PSP and more radical parties like CPI and CPI (M) were non-entity political parties in the state.

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TABLE XXII  
RESULT OF THE MID TERM POLL FOR HARYANA VIJAY SARVA 1968

Party	Seats cont. ested	Seats Won	Percentage of the votes polled	Lost security deposit
Congress	81	48	43.8	x
Swatantra	31	2	8.1	5
Jan sangh	44	7	10.5	27
SSP	7	x	0.9	5
PSP	2	x	0.1	2
CPI	3	x	0.3	1
CPI (M)	1	x	0.1	1
VHP	39	16	14.8	7
RPI	18	1	1.7	8
Independents	161 cand.	6	17.2	148
Others	11	1	2.5	not known
TOTAL	398	81	100	-

The district wise break up of the mid term poll further confirms our belief. Table XXIII summarizes the district wise break up of the results.

TABLE XXIII<sup>22</sup>

## DISTRICT WISE BREAK UP OF MID TERM POLLS TO HARYANA VIJIAN SABHA

District	Congress	Swat.	Jan Sangh	VHP	RPI	BKN	IND
Ambala	7	x	2	x	x	x	x
Karnal	9	x	2	x	1	x	4
Jind	3	1	x	1	x	x	x
Rohtak	9	x	3	2	x	x	1
Gurgaon	7	x	x	5	x	x	1
Hissar	11	1	x	1	x	1	3
Mehendragarh	2	x	x	4	x	x	x
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>

NB: Three independent candidates joined VHP, increasing the strength of the party to 16 and reducing the strength of the independents to 6.

It is clear from this table that even the pockets of Green Revolution like the Karnal district are not quite susceptible to radicalization of peasantry.

Defections occurred once again and on 21st of January, 1972, when the assembly was dissolved for the second time in five years or so, the party position in the assembly was as follows:<sup>23</sup>

1. Indian National Congress	55	48 in 1968
2. Indian National Congress (O)	5	- in 1968
3. Bhartiya Jan Sangh	7	4 in 1968
4. Swatantra Party	-	2 in 1968
5. Vishal Haryana Party	9	16 in 1968
6. Akali Dal	1	- in 1968
7. Republican Party of India	-	1 in 1968
8. Bhartiya Kranti Dal	-	1 in 1968
9. Independents	4	6 in 1968
10. Vacant	3	- in 1968

Total

81

81

The parties to loose were the Jan sangh, Swatantra, Vishal Haryana Party, Republican Party, Bhartiya Krenti nal and the Independents. The gainers were the two factions of Congress. The conclusion that we draw from this is that even at the elite level the tendency has been to incline towards the Center. The Communist parties stand apart from this factional top level politics.

The last elections to the State Legislative Assembly were held in 1972. Table XXIV summarizes the result of this election. These elections further confirm the view that the right of the Center parties have been gaining more in strength than the left of the center parties. In any case the Congress Party (R) as well as the Congress (O) seem to have a solid basis in the state which is an indication of the political attitude or, at least the voting behaviour of the population of Haryana.

In the last election to the State Legislative Assembly there were 81 seats as before. The total electorate was 50,91,207 and 35,87,032 votes were polled. Out of these 92,234 votes were rejected. Thus, the number of valid votes polled was 34,94,789.

TABLE XXIV<sup>24</sup>

## RESULTS OF THE 1972 ELECTIONS TO VIDHAN SABHA IN HARYANA

Party	Seats cont-ested	Seats won	Votes polled	Percentage of votes polled
Congress-s	81	52	16,38,912	46.90
Congress (O)	24	12	3,77,427	10.80
Jan Sangh	19	2	2,28,761	6.55
Socialists	9	x	8,933	0.25
CPI	9	x	69,935	2.00
CPI (M)	4	x	12,617	0.36
VHP	15	3	2,42,444	6.94
Arya Sabha	5	1	77,734	2.22
Socialist Unity Centre	1	x	2,640	0.07
RPI	3	x	6,864	0.20
RPI-K	3	x	3,636	0.10
BKN	1	x	1,486	0.04
Independents	210	11	<del>24,94,728</del> 8,23,408	<del>100.00</del> 23.57
TOTAL	384	81	34,94,798	100.00

Writing about this new Assembly, Shiv Lal observes, "The new assembly had a really new look for 52 out of the 81 were new comers. Even Congress could retain control over only 26 out of 48 constituencies it won in the 1967 elections. The rest were wrested from the others. Similarly, the Jan Sangh lost 10 out of 13 constituencies it had won in the last elections.

It won four new seats. None of the 16 independents elected to the 1968 assembly was returned. These constituencies were held by political parties, which in turn had surrendered nine other seats to the independents. The Republicans lost both the seats they had, but captured a new one. The Swatantra lost three seats and won two new ones".<sup>25</sup>

This shows that lot of shuffling took place in the 1972 Vidhan Sabha elections in Haryana. Congress lost where it had won earlier and won where it had earlier lost. However, no political party of the left was a beneficiary of this shuffling.

The latest party position in Haryana Vidhan Sabha is as follows:<sup>26</sup>

1. Indian National Congress	52
2. Independents	16
3. Bhartiya Kranti Dal	4
4. Vishal Haryana Party	3
5. Indian National Congress (O)	3
6. Jan Sangh	2
7. Progressive Independent Party	1

Out of 16 Independent candidates, 9 have joined the Indian National Congress.

Thus, even after ten years of the formation of Haryana and a long history of Green Revolution in the state, no radicalization seems to have taken place as reflected in the election returns. The political parties of the left have not been able to organize the peasantry, and especially the landless agricultural labourers, as expected on

the eve of Green Revolution, for any joint and articulated action. One immediate result should have been an increase in the number of votes polled by the left radical parties, if not outright victory in elections. This fact assumes greater importance in the light of the fact that the two important radical parties of the left have settled down to constitutionalism as a means of social transformation. To put it laconically, facts indicate that eventhough politicization has taken place in the state yet it has not taken place along radical lines, as had been expected prior to the success of Green Revolution in the state.

In the preceeding pages we have tried to prove, through the various electi n results, that political parties of the left have not been quite successful in making any headway in the state of Haryana - the hotbed of Green Revolution. Not only have these political parties failed to get any seat either in the three legislative assemblies that have been formed in the state since 1967 or in the Lok Sabha, to which elections were held in 1967 and 1971. In the districts of Region A, right of the Center parties have been more powerful alongwith the Congress Party. Besides faring badly at the elections, the Communist Parties have managed to get an extremely low percentage of the total votes polled. The number of communist candidates who lost their security deposit



in these elections is almost equal to the number of candidates fielded by this party. This shows that communist candidates have been no where in the effective competition. In all the elections, Congress has got the highest percentage of total votes polled. No Congress candidate has ever lost his security deposit. If we look at these two facts along with the generally held view that Congress Party has a strong rural base, we shall automatically come to the conclusion that Congress Party is more popular in the rural areas than any other political party. Even if we reject the view that the Congress Party has a strong rural base, we cannot avoid reaching at the same conclusion. Only the argument will have to be different. It is simple. Majority of the population of the state is rural and since the Congress Party along with the Jan Sangh and some other right of the Center parties like the Congress (O) and the Swatantra accounts for more than 75 percent of the total votes polled, it can be said that the rural population of the state is supporting the Center and the right of the Center parties and not the radical parties at all.

Election to local bodies like the municipal committees and panchayats are of no great importance from this point of view. So far as elections to the Gram Panchayats and other higher

bodies is concerned, party politics is hardly present. It is more an issue of prestige and personality. This very factor plays an important role in the municipal committee elections also. Party politics also plays a role but that is always secondary to the personal factors. Municipal committee elections are hardly, if ever, fought on the basis of ideological issues. Therefore, these elections are of minor importance and have not been discussed here.

We have shown the tendency of the rural population in Marvana <sup>crap</sup> to avoid politics, but our generalization is based on the study of a sample which coincides with the total electorate in the state and, therefore, also includes an important and potent class of lumpenproletariats. We have already discussed in the previous section the process of the formation of this class in the urban areas. Sub-marginal and marginal peasants who are forced to sell off their inadequate landholdings and join the landless agricultural labourers and under certain circumstances<sup>27</sup> migrate to nearby towns, thereby swelling the size of the class of industrial workers who are already looking for jobs in the towns. This amalgamation of the affected population is most susceptible to radical forces in the towns. Given that the Communist Parties strive to capture such susceptible pockets, it is, or better still, it

was quite logical to expect that atleast this class of lumpenproletariat would get radicalized. Trade unionism was expected to expand in those areas. Strikes, agitations, processions etc. should have been a more frequent phenomenon, for the radical parties in particular believe in these methods of pressurizing the authorities and wresting from them whatever concessions they want. For, by doing so, they would not be transgressing the limits of constitutionalism - a framework within which the radical parties of India have resolved to operate. Let us have a brief look at this class of lumpenproletariat.

Our presumption here is that the members of this class of lumpenproletariat would seek jobs primarily in the industrial sector in the towns, particularly because industrial sector is expanding very fast in the state. Therefore, the activities of the factory-workers in Harvana will partly reflect the attitude of the lumpenproletariat class. In the absence of the other relevant data, we are forced to generalize on this basis only. In any case, the members of this lumpenproletariat class do not get easily absorbed by other sectors in the towns. Let us first look at the percentage of workers of different kinds in towns of different categories. Only then we can proceed further.

According to the 1971 Census Reports, there are 65 towns of different categories in the state of Haryana. The number of towns falling in each class is given below:<sup>28</sup>

Class of Town	Number of Towns
I. 100,000 and over	2
II. 50,000 to 99,999	9
III. 20,000 to 49,999	14
IV. 10,000 to 19,999	15
V. 5,000 to 9,999	20
VI. Less than 5,000	5

NB: The towns with population of 100,000 and over (Class I) are also termed as cities.

It is apparent that out of 65 towns, 54 towns do not have a population which exceeds 49,999, which is by no standard a big population, especially for an industrial area. Even Faridabad - the most advanced industrial area of the state is a class IV town according to 1971 Census Reports. Moreover, between 1961 and 1971, only four new non-towns increased their population so much that in 1971 Census they had to be included in the list of the towns. They were Naraingarh, Jagadhri Workshop Railway Colony, Ganaur and Tosham. According to 1971 Census reports, they are all Class V towns. The district wise break up of the towns in 1961 and 1971 is as follows:<sup>29</sup>

District	1961	1971
Ambala	8	10
Karnal	11	11
Rohtak	7	8
Gurgaon	14	14
Mahendragarh	5	5
Hissar	11	12
Jind	5	5

This shows that two towns have sprang up to that status in Ambala district and one each in Rohtak and Hissar district. No new town was recorded in Karnal district where, atleast theoretically, lumpenproletariat should have concentrated in the urban centre. For the town of Karnal itself, the percentage of decadal variation in population is \* +28.67. Its population in 1961 was 72,109; in 1971, it was 92,784 - an increase of 20,675.<sup>30</sup> However, this increase was mainly due to changes in the jurisdiction. Its area in 1961 was 9.84 sq.km.; in 1971 it was 18.57 sq.km.<sup>31</sup>

If we look at figures we will find that changes in the population of all important urban centres of Haryana between 1961 and 1971 were due to changes in the jurisdiction. They include Yamunanagar in Ambala district; Pehowa, Gharaunda and Karnal itself in Karnal district; Sonapat in Rohtak district; Sohna and Gurgaon itself in Gurgaon district; Mendi Bahwali, Tohana, Bhiwani and Hissar itself in Hissar district; and, Narwana in Jind district.<sup>32</sup> The area of practically all the towns changed drastically between 1961 and 1971 because of the reorganization

of the composite state of the Punjab in 1966. Now, this clearly shows that there was no tremendous exodus of landless agricultural labourers and other categories of cultivators towards the urban centres in Haryana.

the Census reports of 1971 do not mention the functional categories of the new towns, but we have some knowledge about them. Two of the four new towns are in Ambala District. Jagadhri Railway Workshop Colony is an entirely industrial area where only one industry exists. The other town i.e. Mehendragarh manufactures gur (jaggery), leather footwear (desi juti) and hukka.<sup>33</sup> None of these industries either require large labour force or has the capacity to absorb a large labour force. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that industries should have attracted migrants from the villages.

All this shows that no major industrial centres are coming up all over the state i.e. there is no agglomeration of industry in a few pockets. Industry is not facilitating or accentuating mass inflow of labour force from the villages or conversely, migration of rural population is not encouraging heavy industry.

Yet industrialization is taking place in the state and landless labourers have certainly migrated to cities whatever be their number.<sup>34</sup>

These migrants have added to the size of the proletariat class in the towns. There is a large class of lumpenproletariat in the towns. We grant all this, but then what? Has this class taken to radical politics? Do the members of this class indulge in show of strength through organizing strikes and arranging processions etc. with the help of trade unions or other political parties? In simple words, has this class of lumpenproletariat, which is composed of the rural migrants, has politicized along radical lines?

To find out an answer to this problem we shall do the following things. First we shall see which district has the maximum number of urban workers who are involved in the following four types of activities:-

- a) Household industrial activity;
- b) other than household industrial activity;
- c) trade and commerce; and,
- d) transport, storage and communications.

We have picked up these four types of activities because, in the first place, these are some of the categories into which the Census reports have divided the workers. Therefore, it is easy to

collect data on these variables. Secondly, these are the activities which the lumpenproletariat class is most likely to undertake in the urban centers.

Next, we shall see which district had the maximum number of disputes raised by the trade unions and which district has the maximum number of trade unions. We are taking 1966-67 as the year for studying this.

It is by finding out the relationship between these two that we hope to find out relevant conclusions.

On the basis of the calculations made separately, the number of workers involved in the four above-mentioned activities is as follows:

TABLE XXV

State of Haryana	269,297
Distt. Ambala	57,296
Distt. Karnal	46,941
Distt. Rohtak	37,202
Distt. Gurgaon	54,194
Distt. Mahendragarh	8,420
Distt. Hissar	53,818
Distt. Jind	11,426

District Ambala has the maximum number of urban workers who are involved in these four types of activities. Gurgaon comes second and the richest district of Karnal comes the third followed by the district of Rohtak.

Data regarding the number of disputes, number of workers involved, number of man-hours lost,



number of lock-outs and strikes and number of trade unions is summarized below in Table XXVI.<sup>35</sup>

This data is for the year 1971.

TABLE XXVI<sup>36</sup>

INFORMATION REGARDING WORKERS' JOINT ACTIVITIES IN HARYANA  
1971 - 72

District	No. of disputes	No. of strikes and lock-outs	Workers involved	Man-days lost	Number of trade unions
Hisar	96	81	726	2,904	45
Rohatak	152	2	135	1,350	33
Gurgaon	1,084	39	10,345	96,840	96
Karnal	128	9	377	3,607	37
Ambala	214	x	x	x	72
Jind	1	x	x	x	10
Mahendragarh	13	x	x	x	1
TOTAL	1,688	51	11,583	1,04,701	294

A comparison of Table XXV and Table XXVI shows that in Ambala district, where the number of workers involved in earlier mentioned activities (hereafter called the lumpenproletariat) is the highest, the number of trade unions is 72 which is 24 less than the number of trade unions in Gurgaon district where the number of lumpenproletariat is less than the number of lumpenproletariat in the Ambala district. Interestingly enough there was no incident of strike or lock-out in the Ambala district in 1971-72 whereas in Gurgaon

district there were 39 such incidents. In Karnal there were only 9; in Rohtak 2 and in Hisar only 1. No other district had any incident of that sort inspite of the presence of the lumpenproletariat and a number of trade unions. The activities of the lumpenproletariat of Karnal district are negligible when compared with the activities of the lumpenproletariat of the Gurgaon district. In Karnal only 128 disputes arose; in Gurgaon the number was 1,084. In Karnal the number of trade unions was 37; in Gurgaon 96. In Karnal there were only 9 incidents of strike and lock out; in Gurgaon 39. Thus it was Gurgaon district and not the Karnal district where the urban proletariat had been most active in 1971-72.

What accounts for this hectic activity in the Gurgaon district? Let us look at some facts first. There are 14 towns in the district out of which 2 towns - Faridabad Township and Gurgaon - are class II towns. According to the Census Reports the Faridabad Township comes in the functional category of Industrial and Gurgaon in the category of service. The respective population of these two towns is 85,762 and 57,151. Their distance from Delhi is 30 and 32 km. respectively. For 12 out of the 14 towns of the district, Delhi is the nearest city. Only for Hodal and Mathura is the nearest city and lies at a distance of 55 kms.; and, for Rewari, Rohtak is the nearest city which lies at a distance of 56 kms. Faridabad Township and Gurgaon are treated as the extension of the Capital. Radical political ~~activists~~ activists find it more comfortable

to operate in these areas for they are so close to the nerve center of the country which they would not like to leave under any circumstances. However, this point should not be overemphasized. The fact remains that there is a large class of lumpenproletariat in these areas which is involved in activities which smacks of radicalism, but this lumpenproletariat class does not consist of those who have been forced to migrate to these places from the neighbouring villages; migration, according to the theory that we discussed in the first part of this section, should have occurred in Karnal district and not in Faridabad Township. If it has occurred in Faridabad, it is not because Green Revolution has forced the landless labourers to migrate to towns (for Green Revolution is comparatively less successful in the Gurgaon district), but simply because industrial sector provides them better opportunities. Thus, it was by option and not compulsion that the migration, if it has taken place, did take place at all.

This is a conclusion which does not prove our contention that Green Revolution has led to the politicization of peasantry (in this case that part of the peasantry which has migrated to the towns and formed a part of the lumpenproletariat class), along radical lines. Radicalization of the peasantry (lumpenproletariat) has occurred along radical lines but not in the Green Revolution belts (Karnal district), but in those areas where industry has left agriculture behind (Gurgaon district).

In this situation that we face when we compare the actual political situation of the state with the expected political situation, Green Revolution should have resulted in the politicization of the peasantry, especially that part of the peasantry which is turned into the class of lumpenproletariat, along radical lines, atleast in those areas where Green Revolution has yielded most favourable results ( district Karnal, for example). But what do we find in actual practice? Politicization of the peasantry, which might have turned into the class of lumpenproletariats, has certainly taken place to some extent along radical lines, as shown by trade union activities, but this has not happened in Karnal district. It has happened in Gurgaon district. It poses a problem: why has the peasantry not politicized along radical lines in the Green Revolution areas as expected by the observers?

## 6. NON RADICALIZATION OF THE PEASANTRY

In the preceding section we dealt with the expected political consequences of the Green Revolution and the actual political situation in the state. To put it laconically, our contention has been that whereas the Green Revolution should have resulted in the radicalization of the peasantry along radical lines and thereby incline the peasantry towards militancy, in reality, nothing of that sort has happened. The radical political parties like the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxists) have been operating on the periphery. Other, more radical parties like CPI (ML) have never been active in the state politics. Trade unions have mostly been controlled by the Indian National Trade Union Congress, which is affiliated to the Indian National Congress. Of course, other trade unions which are affiliated to the Indian Trade Union Congress (affiliated to CPI) have proliferated lately in the state, but their proliferation can be explained more in the form of personal factors rather than in terms of ideological distinctions. The leadership of these trade unions is more or less in the hands of individuals who are either INTUC dissidents or adventurists. Their links with CPI (which in any case is very weak in the state) appear to be very feeble. That they are radicalizing the peasantry - at least that part which has turned into

lumpenproletariat - appears to be an exaggeration of their role in the state. So far as their strategy and tactics are concerned they are not very different from the tactics used by other trade unions. The members of those trade unions often depend upon the established leaders of other trade unions to do their work. The peasant organizations are non-existent in the state. Peasants mostly operate through the agency of political parties or ad hoc alliances.<sup>1</sup> On the whole, the picture is not that of a radicalized peasantry or a militant lumpenproletariat.

The question is: why this radicalization has not taken place in the state? The answer is as follows. In the first place, the peasantry that was dispossessed of land because of Green Revolution got immediate relief through various developmental programmes that were undertaken by the state of Haryana, immediately after the formation of the state in 1966, but these ~~kansars~~ - labour-intensive developmental projects must sooner or later, exhaust their job providing potentialities. Therefore, this immediate relief mechanism was supplemented by long-term relief projects comprising industrial expansion. Of course, it was not capital-intensive heavy industry, but labour-intensive industry which promised absorption of those who could no longer find jobs in the developmental projects and thus into lumpenproletariat. Johnson warned, "India cannot

afford the displacement of her rural population through the mechanization of agriculture or amalgamation of holdings at a rate which exceeds the ability of the urban centers to absorb the inflow".<sup>2</sup> At least, the state of Haryana appears to have taken this warning seriously.

Let us deal with those programmes first which gave the immediate relief to the displaced peasantry in the state of Haryana. We shall also try to see what effect these programmes had had on the behaviour of the displaced peasantry, with a view to evolving a pattern of behaviour of the peasantry in Haryana and subsequently make some projection into future.

In the state of Haryana, the immediate burden of employment caused by the sudden spurt in the agricultural production was borne by several developmental programmes, which were initiated by the state government itself. Between May 1968 and April 1975, 8360 kms. of metalled road was constructed to connect 2860 villages with the nearest towns. During the year 1971-72, construction of new State Highway was completed. Ghaghar bridge on the state Highway was completed in a record period of seven months with a cost of 55 lakh rupees. Simultaneously with this, 14 major bridges costing almost about the same amount were completed in a record

time. An over bridge at Hisar was constructed, while two other over bridges were in progress elsewhere in the state. Considerable emphasis was laid on widening of the state Highways. Five major state Highways were widened while widening of three more Highways is in progress.<sup>3</sup>

The State had been badly lacking in availability of proper accommodation for health services, tourism, education, agriculture, housing and office accommodation. Developmental programmes in all these fields were executed with haste and efficiency by the state government, in the first five to ten years of the formation of the state.

It is not possible to give the details of the programmes that have been implemented in Haryana. Nor is that necessary. The important point is that the state government ~~which~~ did embark upon several programmes involving crores of rupees that would keep the poorest section of the society engaged and provide them opportunity to earn, albeit a meagre amount and in a hard manner.

Perhaps, a statistically inclined scholar could undertake the task of calculating the manhour consumption of these programmes and compare it with the manhour requirements of the farms. There is no conclusive proof, but observation indicates that these development programmes are good substitutes for the jobs on the farms in the terms of their capacity to engage human labour.



We believe that the manhour consumption of these developmental projects is not significantly lower than the manhour consumption of the farms before the advent of the Green Revolution in the state. Thus, the Green Revolution does not appear to have lowered the over all manhour requirements of the state. At the most, the decline in the consuming capacity of our sector has been accomplished by an increase in the consuming capacity of another sector.

This is not to suggest that these developmental programmes were initiated by the state government only because they were expected to increase the job opportunities for the landless labourers or the displaced peasantry. In fact, these results could just have been incidental. The primary intention must have been to promote and defend the interest and cause of the beneficiaries of the Green Revolution who control the state government through their lobbies. The gains of the Green Revolution had to be consolidated. This could be done only by:

- a) controlling the decision making machinery of the state, and if possible that of the centre and,
- b) further developing the infrastructure that would facilitate expansion and consolidation of the Green Revolution in the state.

This point is well proved by the intra-state differences that exist between the Northern and the southern regions of the state. In Mahendragarh district, for example, the Green Revolution has not been able to make much impact. Introduction of these programmes in this district led to some strain on the economy as well as the social tranquility. The opposition of the disgruntled landlords, who were able to win over the lower section of the rural peasantry by appealing to caste sentiments, led to the formation of the Vishal Karyana Party. The peasantry could make a little, if any, headway in the central and the northern regions of the state. These developmental projects succeeded in the state because of many particular reasons. In the first place, these programmes enjoyed the favour of the rural population. The rich peasants were happy because these developmental programmes strengthened the infrastructure, thereby increasing the chances of further prosperity. The landless labourer was happy because these projects provided semi-permanent, almost year round jobs which were not frequent on land.<sup>4</sup> In any case, because of the active support and tacit approval of the landowners and the landless agricultural labourers, funds could be raised locally for the implementation of such programmes and labour was available in plenty. These programmes had additional benefits. They became

a token of government's concern for the upliftment of the rural poor by providing them jobs and establishing various services and providing various facilities (like water supply and electricity) - all for the benefit of the rural poor. That they were not in a position to avail of these opportunities is a different matter.

There is another factor which contributed to the success of these developmental programmes in the state. Generally, "... a high degree of scepticism exists among bureaucrats regarding the effectiveness of the rural public works. They believe, with some reason, that resources allocated to the rural public works will disappear in the coffers of the local politicians and enlarge the scale of public patronage".<sup>5</sup> It did not happen in Haryana. It was mainly because the state bureaucracy draws heavily from the rural upper class or the urban middle and upper classes who have their own interest in land either because of their direct ownership of land or because of their ownership of industries which have to fall back upon agricultural production. Local politicians could also do no harm because either they too have direct interest in land or industry or because they were dependent upon the support of those who had interest in land or industry or both. The net result of all this was that the bureaucracy did not hinder the implementation of these

programmes because of internal pressures. After all, it was the same bureaucracy that was responsible, albeit partly, for the formulation of these developmental policies.

Thus, the successful implementation of those programmes and subsequent benefits that these programmes brought to different sections of society - big benefits or marginal benefits - boosted the image of the party in power i.e. the Congress Party. On the other hand, so far as the Communist Party of India is concerned it remained as ineffective as ever, if not more. This was also partly because of other factors. Sharma holds that the CPI "remained both discredited and ineffective - discredited because of the support it had extended, against the predominant national sentiment, to the allied forces in the Second World War, and ineffective because of the abrupt withdrawal in 1951 of its support to the massive peasant uprising in Telengana and it had more or less settled down, under directions of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, for constitutionalism as means of peaceful transformation to socialism".<sup>6</sup>

All these developmental programmes expanded rural employment and bore the immediate burden of displaced peasants, the state government took care not to allow other policies to throw additional burden on land. Harvna Legislative Assembly passed laws that provided protection to

the tenants from eviction by avaricious landowners.<sup>7</sup> Not only the state legislative assembly, but the parliament has also been taking steps to perpetuate the gains of the past few years. A recent bill of the parliament has put all state legislative measures taken in the past regarding land reforms out of the orbit of judicial review.<sup>8</sup> The chances of more bills like that coming before the parliament have brightened because of the inclusion of chief ministers of Haryana and Punjab in the CWC this year.

The effect of all these legislative measures of the Centre and the state is that they prevent the ~~sustain~~ creation of additional pressure on land and thereby do not undermine the immediate relief providing mechanism.

Increase in the agricultural production coupled with the proliferation of the developmental programmes has its impact upon the politics of the state. The landowners are not induced to oppose the government in power ( especially if the political party that controls the state government also controls the government at the national level ) because the opportunities for development do exist within the same political framework. Groups of the landowners are more likely to take recourse to the pressure politics rather than to militant politics because of the fruitful nature of the former technique and self-defeating nature of the latter techniques.

Just as it increases the hopes of further benefits for the landowners, this situation also increases the hopes of the landless labourers. As we have already noted, it is the lower section of the rural population which is engaged in these developmental projects. The displaced peasants are always hopeful of finding jobs in these developmental projects. Of course, these hopes are contingent upon the opportunities of migration. If the opportunities of migration are high and the expectation of getting a job is also high, the labour tends to migrate rather than to stick to land or to take to militancy. This is well proved by the district of Ambala where militancy has shown the least impact, as already explained in the preceding section. Here the hopes of landless workers increased all the more because of the proximity of the towns to the villages. 48 percent of the villages in Ambala district lie within a distance of less than 10 km. from the nearest town. 45 percent of the villages lie within a distance of less than 25 kms. Therefore, 93 percent of the total villages lie within a distance of less than 25 kms. Only 90 villages i.e. 7 percent of the total villages in the district lie at a distance of more than 25 kms. Thus, migration, in many cases, did not mean more than a daily travel to a nearby town. However, there were other workers also who left their villages in order to live at the site as long as the project was not completed.

Thus, these developmental projects not only increased the hopes for the landowners as well as the landless labourers but also rendered the task of political organization more difficult.

\* The nature of such jobs requires continuous shifting from one place to another. Generally labourers working on a project live at one place near the site of the construction, but they move to a different location as soon as the site of construction is changed. In the process of this shifting, many labourers leave their jobs either because they do not want to migrate to a new location or because they have in the meanwhile, managed to get a better job elsewhere. Thus many old workers leave the group and new labourers join in. Because of this continuous shuffling of the population, the task of organization becomes very difficult. Usually the workers live at one place. It is not always possible to penetrate those dwellings because of the protection that they enjoy from the official quarters. Moreover, it is not always possible to get them at one place at one time. These workers work in different shifts, so that a part of the total labour force working on a site is always absent from the residential area.

With the mass media at its disposal, the ruling party is always favourably placed vis-a-vis the opposition political parties at the time of the

elections. The ruling party can boast of the fact that it provided employment to the poor and that it would continue to do so only if the latter would support the party. All election manifestoes of the ruling party start with an elaborate statements of the achievements made by the party through the agency of the government. Propaganda plays an important role in the elections. The poorer section of the society have a tendency to go for immediate gains even if they are marginal rather than think of long term benefits. Therefore, the poorer sections of society incline to support the party in power for it is this party alone which, according to their own assessment of the situation, can bring them prosperity in a shorter period than the other parties which have not been get hold of political power. Harvans government has not been spending considerable amount on the development of public relations and cultural affairs for nothing.

While these short term programmes are provided immediate relief, long-term measures were also taken. \*Manufacturing and service industries must be the principal long run source of expanded employment. The rapidly rising incomes of agriculturists can facilitate accelerated growth in industrial employment through increased demand for industrial consumer goods and greater savings for investment in those industries".<sup>10</sup>



The tendency to emphasize industrialization at the expense of agriculture loomed large in the first three Five Year Plans. The basic premise of our Five Year Plans, especially the second and the third was, "development along socialist lines to secure economic growth and expansion of employment, reduction of disparities in income and wealth and prevention of concentration of economic power and creation of values and attitudes of a free and equal society."<sup>11</sup>

The strategy adopted to achieve those aims was slightly defective. No major steps were taken to alter property relations. The aims of the Plan were sought to be achieved not through redistribution of property and wealth but through other means. "building of economic and social overheads, exploration and development of minerals and promotion of basic industries like steel, machine building, coal and heavy electricals". Development of industries that make industries was considered crucial for economic development.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, heavy investment was made on technological improvement of the industries. On the other hand, in the field of agriculture outmoded modes of production persisted. It led to the difference between the output of an industrial worker and an agricultural worker. Because of these low levels of productivity of land and the consequent inability of the farmers to produce above the level of consumption,

the agricultural ~~population~~ <sup>population</sup> lacked the purchasing power for the products of the industries. Thus the capacity of the home market to absorb the products of the domestic industry was ~~slightly~~ strictly limited. At the same time, the industrial production of the country was unable to compete in the world market. Thus, the capacity for industrial growth was contingent upon increased productivity on land.

This situation did not arise in those areas which now comprise the state of Haryana. Under the composite state of Punjab, most of those areas which lie in the jurisdiction of Haryana now were neglected by the government in power. Such neglect was inevitable. Within any state it is impossible to have some kind of industries in all the districts of the state. Therefore, it was impossible to set up industries in all the districts of the composite state of Punjab, because of the possibility of expanding other sectors in those areas, heavy industry was not set up there.

At the same time, agriculture too did not get much attention from the government. Neglect of agriculture reflected the policy of the Centre to give attention to heavy industry at the cost of agriculture. Thus in Haryana, neither industry nor agriculture developed out of proportion.

In 1966, Prof. D. R. Gadgil, observed the following failures in the preceding Five Year Plans:

1. Failure of the tax system as means of restraining consumption and, of promoting equality; and
2. Failure of rural industrialization and the consequent accentuation of employment problem.<sup>13</sup>

In the Fourth Plan, attention was given to the control of large scale industry.<sup>14</sup> It was felt that the situation of stagnation in Indian economy could be averted only by embarking upon a crash programme for increasing food production which would suffice for those workers who are engaged in non-agricultural activities. It had already been noticed that a programme for development of agriculture throughout the length and breadth of the country would not produce immediate results. Selected districts were chosen for the purpose of introducing crash programmes. High hopes were placed on Haryana and Punjab. It was under these circumstances that the Green Revolution was initiated in the states of Haryana and Punjab.

Inception of such programmes in the selected districts of Haryana coincided with the formation of the state of Haryana. At the time of its formation, Haryana did not have much heavy industry. Its industrial development did not go far ahead of agricultural development. Subsequent development of industry and agriculture was simultaneous. The two sectors of economy got integrated in the process. All this has been shown to make the point

that the state of Haryana did not start from the disadvantage of being at a stage where agriculture and industry are not in tandem. As a matter of fact, the subsequent history of the state shows that industrial and agricultural policies were so intelligently handled as to keep both these sectors in tandem and to see to it that both these sectors complement and supplement each other.

We have already seen in the preceding section how the agricultural policies were controlled and how did agriculture develop in the state of Haryana. Let us now look at the industrial sector, and the ways in which it has strengthened the gains of the Green Revolution, thereby keeping the peasantry away from militant politics.

Heavy industrialization is not conducive to the situation created by Green Revolution. Establishment of capital-intensive industry is harmful because of the:

- a) lack of cadre of managers and professional workers capable of managing such enterprises;
- b) necessity of considerable amount of investment which might also at times necessitate foreign loans and technical assistance;
- c) inability to furnish any solution to the central problems of the developing countries - the provisions of employment for the ever increasing labour force and

the improvement of the standard of living.<sup>15</sup>

Large scale industrialization based on heavy sophisticated technology requires an army of highly skilled workers - each one being a specialist in one particular branch of work. The labour force which is thrown in the market because of the spurt in agricultural production and subsequent displacement of workers from land, is not skilled labour. That these workers will be able to handle sophisticated machinery is to expect too much from them, unless of course a special training is given to them. Therefore, most of these workers remain either out of job or if they get it they are likely to spoil the machinery - in either case the purpose is defeated. Industrialization in Haryana did not produce these problems. The nature of the industries set up in the state do not demand a highly skilled labour force. Therefore, the local labourers have been able to get these jobs. Even the white collar jobs in these industries are being taken up by the local people. An additional benefit accrues from this. There appears to be considerable reduction in the cases of labour-management disputes; the industries function smoothly. Of course, employer-employee disputes continue to take place.

Capital-intensive industries are particularly unsuitable for rural areas. Large factories should be located in large urban centres. "The report on the issuance of licenses for the creation of large

industrial installations in India for the years 1961 through 1965 indicates that out of 918 such installations, only 145 were constructed outside the big cities because their need for local raw material left their ~~foundations~~ founders no alternative. Of the remaining 773, over 600 were built in large or medium size urban centres. Unfortunately, the same pattern prevailed for small industrial installations, even though they need not be located in large urban centers. The report on the national Small Industries Corporation of India for 1964 shows that no less than 45 percent of the total industrial equipment supplied by the corporation was concentrated in the four biggest cities and a further twenty percent was located in 7 other cities. Thus, nearly 75 percent of the development effort for Small Scale Industry in India was devoted to only 11 cities".<sup>16</sup>

Even if the policy makers wanted, such a situation could not arise in Haryana. There are 65 towns in the state out of which 54 towns have a population less than 49,999. 40 towns have a population less than 19,999. Therefore, the industries were inevitably set up in or around those small towns, though some of them were set up in Rohtak and Ambala ~~districts~~ Cantonment Area too - the only two class I towns in the state. Only 1 out of these two class I towns in the state comes in the category of services-cum-industrial-cum-Trade and commercial towns. 31 out of the remaining 63 towns have industries.<sup>17</sup>

The result was that the unemployed labourers did not get concentrated in big towns. quite on the contrary, they found better prospects of getting absorbed in industrial sector at smaller towns. Therefore, even the labourers in the state got diffused to various towns.

The impact it had on the labour force was almost the same as that of developmental projects. The only difference was that whereas the relief that developmental projects provided was temporary whereas the relief that industrial sector provided was of much longer lasting nature. In the first place, it increased the 'hopes' of the lumpenproletariat, particularly because the opportunities of migration were high - thus dissuading the lumpenproletariat from adopting militancy. Secondly, the peculiar situation as it obtained in the state, made the task of political organization more difficult.

The hopes of the lumpenproletariat increased because of the expansion of small-scale industry and various incentives for cottage-industry. The total number of loans distributed by the Finance Corporation in the state in the year 1966-67 were only 32, involving 16,619,000 rupees. In 1971-72 loans were given to 384 applicants and the amount involved was to the tune of Rs 43,750,000.<sup>18</sup> The amount disbursed did not rise much but the number of individuals in Harvana who got the loans increased by almost 12 times. This makes it clear that smaller amounts were

disbursed to a greater number of people to set up small-scale and medium scale industries. With the ever expanding small-scale and medium-scale industry, the lower classes and the middle classes remain hopeful of getting the benefit. Middle classes are hopeful of getting loans; lower classes are hopeful of getting the jobs.

The second effect of the peculiar condition of the affected class in Haryana is felt by the political parties. The task of political organization has been rendered difficult because of the peculiar condition of the lumpenproletariat class. It is easier to work among the labourers if they are concentrated in big urban centres. First, migration to big urban centers dilutes their conservatism as they come into contacts with the modern way of life in the towns and cities. Secondly, such a community is always on the defensive. If the migrants hail from the same place and live in one place in the new town to which they have migrated they tend to develop a high level of solidarity. It is easier to win the support of the whole group for political action, if one can do it. Group leaders play an important role here. But, quite often these groups do not wish to participate in such activities which might bring them and their families unhappiness or discomfort of any sort.



This happens if the group gets employment in the new town. As a matter of fact, the groups migrate to towns only when they have prior assurance of jobs. Otherwise, the migration is individual. However, if the migrants do not get absorbed in the factories or elsewhere, their solidarity can be channelized for militant political actions. In fact, this has happened on several occasions, but not in Haryana. As a matter of fact, the labourers did not even have to leave their villages in search of jobs for the towns were not situated too far away from the town villages. Daily travel of these people from the village and their return to their villages in the evenings further frustrates the task of political parties. In the evenings these workers are away from the towns. Most of the political functions and meetings take place in the towns after dusk. At this time, these workers are not present in the towns. Therefore, they cannot participate in these meetings and functions. Over the last ten years, Jagadhri town in the Ambala district of the state has witnessed only one procession consisting mainly of rural workers.

Under such circumstances solidarity does not appear in these peasant groups. This solidarity is further weakened because of the irregular hours of work. Because of the scarcity of electricity, working hours of the factories are irregular. While some

factories run from 5 o'clock in the morning to 2 P.M., other factories run from 8 P.M. to 5 o'clock in the morning. Moreover, people from different villages work at one place. They are not well known to each other and are usually suspicious of each other. All this adds to the problem of organization and the mobilization of labour force for any collective action.

What we have been saying in the preceding pages is that there has been quite a satisfactory coordination between agriculture and industry in the state. This resulted in the creation of jobs for the lumpenproletariat and increased their 'hopes', particularly because the opportunities for migration were high in the state. This coordination sets a self-propelling economic cycle in motion. According to Weitz, "The presence of industrial worker within the rural area creates a local market for agricultural produce, especially perishables that cannot be transported great distances in the absence of the infrastructure needed for this purpose. As such products normally offer a high return per workday, the existence of a local market is likely to encourage the farmer to cultivate them for the market, and thus to raise the level of his income. The processing of agricultural raw material within the rural area reduces transport expenses and leaves a greater part of the final profit in the hands of the farmer. This share becomes even greater if the

farmer shares in the ownership of the processing plants.<sup>19</sup>

Initial expansion of industrial sector in small towns of the state resulted in the creation of a local market. This increased the demand in the urban centers for more agricultural produce. Increased demand served as an incentive to the farmer to diversify production. The money that the farmers got for the surplus products was used to acquire industrial goods both for home and for the development of the farms. The growing demands for industrial goods increased the opportunities for absorbing workers in industrial enterprises. This led to a rise in the standard of living of industrial workers (most of them being rural), and thus created a demand for high quality food. As a result of this the farmers get a better return for their efforts. Thus a process of mutual stimulation has set in.

While this process of mutual stimulation keeps the hopes alive and opportunities open, it also frustrates the task of political organization both among the landless labourers in the villages and those who have migrated to the villages and joined the class of lumpenproletariat.

The task of organizing the landless labourers and the lumpenproletariat for any collective

radical action has become difficult not merely because of the hope-opportunity mechanism but because of many other constraints which are themselves an off-spring of the Green Revolution.

Collective actions are not taken in a political vacuum. Such movements take place in a particular environment which has its effect on the movement itself. At times it is the anticipated response of the environment that leads to the growth of a movement or checks it before it takes shape. It need not be repeated here that the Green Revolution and the accompanying industrial expansion has inclined the beneficiaries of the changes, to take recourse to pressure politics rather than militant politics in order to get a ~~desirable~~ desirable share of the limited resources that the state government possesses. This inclination gets strengthened because the same political party is in power both at the Centre and the State levels. Thus, an extra channel of influencing the Centre can be tapped by supporting the ruling party in the state. It was mainly because of the pressure exerted by the vested interests in the states of Haryana and Punjab that the proposed increase in the procurement prices of wheat could not be implemented in 1967, although it was a part of the policy of the Central Government.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the environment is unlikely to support any collective radical action by the landless labourers and the industrial workers in the state. Quite on the contrary, they might even support the ruling party.

This situation deprives the potential force of the labourers of its second important pre-requisite of collective action. Protective linkages or alliances with other groups in the society become impossible under the circumstances that prevail in the state.

Thirdly, no movement of collective action can succeed without proper leadership. Perhaps charismatic leadership is as indispensable to a revolutionary movement as ideology and organization are. Presence of veteran leaders in the state and their age old linkages with the Congress Party checks the emergence of any new charismatic leadership in the state.

Lastly, it is the mutual interdependence of the industrial bourgeoisie and the agricultural bourgeoisie which has resulted in the formation of a powerful elite at the top of the hierarchy in Haryana. It is in the common interest of both to maintain hegemonic influence over the society. It is not always so easy for iconoclastic movements to break down the hegemonic influence of the powerful elite.

The foregoing account is an explanation of why the adversely affected population of the state did not get radicalized. At least that is what the facts and evidences suggest. We must frankly admit that these reasons, that we have put forth by way of an ~~explanation~~ explanation, are not based on an empirical study. They do not stem from any body of collected data. Rather, on the contrary, they are the product of observation and scrutiny of the available material on the state politics. It is proposed to verify the hypothesis that we have evolved by further research with the help of empirical data.

## 7. THE HYPOTHESIS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Modernization that results from the increased agricultural and industrial production also brings in its train changes in the values and the attitude of the people who are affected favourably or adversely by the process of modernization.

Changes in the values and beliefs lead to a change in the wants, aspirations and desires of the people. The stage of development in the developing countries and many a political and social constraints do not let these aspirations be fulfilled. The gap between the aspirations and the reality leads to a serious frustration among the population which is adversely affected by the whole process. This also sets the stage for the birth of a new social force comprising the landless agricultural workers and the lumpenproletariat.<sup>1</sup>

The growth of this social force is dependent upon two factors - a) capacity of the community; and, b) opportunity that is available to the community. Let us explain these variables.

We differentiate between the potentiality of a community and its capacity. Radical potential is inherent in such adversely affected communities, but these communities do not possess the 'capacity' to recognize and utilize this potential and the 'opportunity' to actualize it. Thus the capacity of a community comprises its ability to be politically

active either as a result of political consciousness or because of the leadership of any kind. There are various factors which increase or decrease the capacity of the groups. "Formal education; work outside the village (especially in mines and industry where labour mines exist); membership in formal organizations (federations, councils, syndicates, schools, committees, cooperatives); travel (especially when this is facilitated by the existence of urban peasant colonies); contact with modernizing politicians; and, experience with a money economy" are some of the factors that affect the capacity of a group.<sup>2</sup>

However, there is a methodological problem involved in taking these variables as indices of capacity. We cannot take exact measurements with the help of these indices. It is, therefore, very difficult to measure the exact capacity of a group. One might agree that a certain group possesses some amount of capacity, but exactly how much capacity does the group possess remains a matter of subjective evaluation, rather than of any objective analysis.

Now, given that a community possesses some amount of capacity, this capacity must also be exercised in order to give rise to any collective action. Exercise of capacity is directly related to the variable of 'opportunity'. How and why this new social force becomes violent depends upon the 'opportunities'.



Various factors increase or decrease the opportunity of a given group. Presence of a political organization and the strength of the political organization; avenues of political participation and redress of grievances; social and political cleavages; the political environment; and, such other factors influence and condition the opportunity of a given group.

The interaction between the two variables of 'capacity' and 'opportunity' lead the community to a stage from where the action starts. The concept that we have been using for this stage is 'hope' and 'expectation'. It is from this stage that the action starts. What form the action would take depends upon three other factors. They are:

- a) opportunities for migration;
- b) community's perception of future opportunities for getting jobs;
- c) the political environment.

With the help of these concepts and this model we would try to summarize the situation in Haryana as follows:-

Moderate capacity of the new social groups in Haryana coupled with high opportunities produced a state where the groups developed high hopes. Further still, since the opportunities for migration were high and the community's perception of the future opportunities was also high and the political environment was not conducive to militancy, this state

of mind, which we have described as that of 'hope' did get channelized into active 'hopeful resignation' rather than 'hopeless frustration'. The result was that these groups supported the party in power rather than getting involved in militant politics which would have been the result of 'hopeless frustration'. This situation is likely to prevail as long as the pattern in which all these variables are inter-related do not change.

In simple words it means that the class of landless agricultural labourers and the lumpenproletariat did not get too politicized. Lack of proper political organizations; presence of various formal avenues of political participation and redress of grievances etc. served as a check upon the capacity of the groups. As a result of this the social groups reached a stage of hopeful resignation. And since the opportunities of migration were high; community's perception of future job prospects were high (because of the expansion of industrial sector); and, the political environment was dominated by a powerful elite, this hopeful resignation took the form of active support to the party in power which was most likely to maintain the equilibrium.

This situation is likely to prevail as long as the factors that are involved in this pattern do not change. We believe that the first factor to change would be the perception of the community

regarding future job prospects. The trends show that the job-providing potential of Green Revolution and the industrial sector is limited. The complex pattern will start changing as soon as this potential is exhausted thereby bringing about a change in the political attitude and voting preferences of the affected groups.

Our main objective was to study the impact of Green Revolution in the state of Haryana. We have tried to achieve an objective through various stages.

In the first stage, we have tried to show that Green Revolution is not merely a revolution in the means and methods of cultivation. It is a more deep-rooted phenomenon. As a matter of fact, certain changes had been taking place at the national level which facilitated the expansion of Green Revolution in the state. The international factor is concerned with the discovery and success of High yielding Variety of seed in Mexico and the subsequent willingness of the American Government to export this seed and technology.

The national factor is related to the policy of the Government to emphasize agricultural development and small-scale and medium-scale industry. It was a part of this policy to hurry through land reform legislation - both at the Central and State level. This created the situation that was most conducive to the

expansion of Green Revolution in the state. We have referred to these changes as the pre-requisites, for, without them the things could have been different. Consolidation of landholding, better facilities of irrigation, mechanization of the farms and various other changes provided the required infrastructure.

These changes were themselves, albeit partly, the result of an incidental factor - the formation of the state of Madhya Pradesh. It was because of the formation of the state that due attention could be given to the different regions of the state which would have been impossible in a larger state. Again, it was because of the formation of the state that the powerful elite of the state comprising the industrial as well as agricultural bourgeoisie could find an opportunity to control the levers of power and to maintain its hegemony.

The peculiar nature of the population of the state was responsible for the rural bias of not only the government but also that of the bureaucracy. We have already noted the effects of a bureaucracy having rural-bias.

We have also discussed at some length the formation of a class of entrepreneurs who were ready to invest in land. Zamindari system, in its most dreadful nature, did not prevail in the state to check the growth of commercial farming.

Moreover, the soil of the state was most conducive to the cultivation of cash crops like wheat and rice.

All these factors changed the nature of farming in the state of Marvna. subsistence farming gave way to commercial farming. Peasants turned into farming. As the incentive from farming increased, many landlords resumed land for self-cultivation; joint families broke down. Many erstwhile tenants were thrown out of jobs; many more were thrown out because of mechanization of farms. Thus many erstwhile peasants joined the army of landless agricultural labourers. In a nut shell, capitalistic trends penetrated the agricultural sector.

Therefore, whatever changes took place subsequently should be seen in the light of the preceding changes. They should be taken as a sequel in the logical sequence of the changes. Thus the explosive situation that prevailed in early 1970s was not the result of the introduction of High yielding Varieties of seeds and modern technology alone. That situation prevailed because of all other factors that we have already enumerated.

The new situation was explosive because the displaced peasantry and the frustrated landless labourers are expected to migrate to the nearby towns, swell the size of the lumpenproletariat class and take to militant politics. Ideally speaking, therefore, these changes should have issued in the growth of a trend of politicization along radical lines. But, in the state of Marvna, it did not happen like that.

In order to establish that politicization of this class did not take place along radical lines in Harvna we have examined the results of the three elections held to the state Legislative Assembly and two to the Lok Sabha. We have based our judgement on the percentage of votes polled rather than the number of seats won by different political parties. We observed that the Communist Parties have been faring badly at the elections and that the Congress Party has been sitting strong in the saddle. As a matter of fact, it has increased its strength. Thus, the ruling party rather than the left radical parties has been strengthening its position in the post-Green Revolution era.

We have tried to explain this difference between the expected results and the actual situation by dividing the causal factors into two groups.

In the first place, there were certain factors which provided immediate relief to the already adversely affected population in the state. Proliferation of developmental projects and various other labour-consuming programmes, especially in those areas where Green Revolution had made a greater impact, provided immediate relief to the labour force and kept them away from militant politics by a) raising their hopes and expectation of better future prospects; and, b) by making the task of political organization more difficult in the areas where this labour force was concentrated.

The second set of factors is related to the long-term measures aimed at providing permanent or semi-permanent jobs to the labour force. This further dissuaded the labour force from becoming militant by a) increasing and further strengthening their hopes of a better future; and, b) by making the task of political organization difficult amongst the class of lumpenproletariat. We have already discussed how these two results have followed the proliferation of developmental projects and expansion of small-scale and medium-scale industry in the state.

To put it briefly, the explosive situation was averted because of the integration of the two crucial sectors of economy - the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. There was proportional development of and coordination between the two sectors.

We have already noted the effect of this inter sectoral coordination upon the lower section of the society, but it had its repercussions also upon the higher sections of society. One such result was complete identification of the interests of the industrial and agricultural bourgeoisie. This class failed to provide leadership to any radical movement without which the lower section is unable to rise. On the contrary, this class indulged in pressure politics and remained satisfied with wresting concessions from the government. Obviously, the beneficiary was the ruling party i.e. the Congress Party. This pro-ruling party trend was strengthened because

of the fact that the same party was in power also at the national level.

We are using this understanding to make a few projections. We believe, assuming that our understanding of the situation is correct, that this state of affairs is likely to continue as long as the hopes of both - the middle classes and the lower classes - <sup>are</sup> is not frustrated and, as long as the task of political organization does not become easier. Hopes of the middle classes are not likely to get frustrated as long as the possibilities of developing the agricultural sector and the industrial sector are not exhausted. The lower classes are likely to remain away from a state of hopelessness as long as there are possibilities of getting jobs in the factories are not exhausted.

As soon as these hopes, whether they are based on a real understanding of the situation or they have been created by the propoganda machinery, are shattered, the task of political organization will itself become easier. It is for the middle classes to get radicalized first and give the lead. And that is what is likely to happen when this class does not find it possible any more to control the levers of government and wrest concession from it.

Of course, it is difficult to lay down any temporal limit for this transition to take place, but the principle can be established i.e. the optimum utilization and exploitation of the industrial and agricultural sectors.



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## Section 3

1. Bhalla, G.S., op.cit., pp.17-18.
2. ibid., p.27
3. ibid., p.219
4. ibid., p.21
5. ibid., p.41
6. ibid., p.46
7. ibid., p.47
8. ibid., pp.19, 31, 39.
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12. ibid., p.90
13. Causes of this new form of indebtedness of the agricultural labourers in Haryana have been explained by Sheila Bhalla in "New Relations of Production in Haryana", New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru University, (Unpublished).
14. Refer to studies by Bhalla, G.S. and Aggarwal, P.C., op.cit.
15. Bhalla, G.S., op.cit., pp 87-88
16. ibid.
17. We have deduced this from the following facts:
  - (i) the income of adopting cultivators in the lowest category has risen which means that income of 'non-adopters' in all categories can rise if they too 'adopt'; and
  - (ii) simultaneous expansion of industry will open new job

opportunities for the labour force, atleast in the non-harvesting seasons. Even now the per capita income of a labourer in the Northern Region is the highest. We shall discuss this at some length in section 4.

18. Bhalla, G.S., op.cit., p.21
19. ibid., pp.33, 35, 37.
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13. ibid., p. 13-14
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23. ibid.
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27. We shall discuss this in the next section while discussing the causes of the non-radicalization of peasantry.
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#### Section 5

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2. Johnson, Stanley, op. cit., p. 184.
3. Haryana 1968-75, op. cit.
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compensation is given for the work performed by the bonded labourers on land, bonded labourers are more like slaves. In any case, now that bonded labour has been declared illegal, those who have been set free from the yoke of this menace are likely to come in the category of landless agricultural labourers. Therefore, we have not treated them separately-

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Section 6

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