

JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT

(With Special Reference to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)



KONSAM IBG SINGH

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
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
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This is to certify that the dissertation, entitled
JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT (with special reference to Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty), submitted by Konsam Ibo Singh
in fulfilment of six credits out of total requirements of
twenty-four credits for the Degree of Master of Philosophy
(M.Phil) of the University, is his original work according
to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the
examiners for evaluation.


Chairman


Supervisor

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Preface


The spread of nuclear weapons, in this age, has posed a threat to the existence of mankind. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is considered to be a major endeavour to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the success of the NPT would enhance the progress of nuclear disarmament.

Till today, Japan is the only country which had the traumatic experience of atomic bombing during the Second World War. Because of this experience Japan's role in disarmament, in this nuclear age, is unique and seems to be exceptionally significant and cannot easily be neglected.

Despite her nuclear allergy, Japan has not been blind to the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. She has, in fact, made spectacular advance in the field of nuclear technology. At the same time Japan has been a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament. In all international forums, she has spoken against nuclear arms race. It is interesting to note that Japan, a champion of the cause of disarmament, should find herself in a delicate position in regard to her attitude towards the NPT. Japan which has shown deep interest in the NPT since 1965 has still not ratified it, and ratification of the NPT has been a subject of great controversy in Japan.

This short dissertation examines Japan's role in nuclear disarmament with a particular reference to the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty which is one of the most important and controversial aspects of nuclear disarmament today.



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Chapter I

Introduction

JAPAN AND DISAMMENT DURING THE PRE-SECOND
WORLD WAR PERIOD

Chapter I

JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT DURING THE PRE- SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD

Disarmament, during the Post-Second World War years has mean predominantly nuclear disarmament, though it has not left out restrictions on conventional armament. But during the pre-Second World War years, it was concerned only with restricting conventional armament. Many attempts were made during the Pre-Second World War years to bring about a marked reduction in conventional armament. Japan being an important military power was also associated with all these measures of disarmament. In the following pages, a very brief reference is made to Japan's role in such disarmament measures in the belief that it can serve as a backdrop to our study.

In 1868, when Japan ended her long history of feudalism and seclusion, it was realized that unless Japan modernized herself quickly, she would not be able to withstand the pressures of the external forces. The Meiji leaders therefore sought to strengthen their country internally by a series of measures. They adopted a strong centralized administrative machinery. They organized a military system on Russian model. Conscription was introduced. A new educational system was adopted and it sought to inculcate discipline among the people and to cultivate reverence for the emperor. Attempts were

made to increase agricultural and industrial production. Thanks to all these measures, by 1894-95, Japan had emerged as a strong nation both economically and militarily. This was clearly demonstrated in Japan's victory over China in 1895. This victory further stimulated the growth of Japan industrially and militarily. In the war that broke out in 1904-05 with Russia, Japan once again emerged victorious and earned the reputation of an Asian country defeating, for the first time, a European Giant.

The First World War also heralded the military strength of Japan. The Japanese Government took advantage of the global war and overran, in no time, the entire German territories in the Pacific. Furthermore, Japan also used the global situation to tighten her hold over China. After the end of the First World War, the Western Powers especially the United States and the United Kingdom realized that steps must be taken to curb the military strength of Japan in order to forestall ^{her} ~~its~~ expansion both in China and Southeast Asia. The result was the calling of a conference in Washington.

The primary aim of the United States and the United Kingdom was to reduce the naval strength of Japan as far as possible. Because at the close of the First World War, Japan became the dominant naval power in the Pacific and her position was only next to those of the United States and the United

Kingdom. This was a result of her naval expansion programme carried out during the 1910's. The so called 'eight-eight (eight battleships and eight cruisers) Programme' had been the national ambition since the end of the Russo-Japanese War. However, it was only in the year 1920 that the 'eight-eight Programme' received the Diet approval. The programme was designed to meet the American naval building plans announced by President Wilson.¹ In 1922, 58 per cent of the total budget was asked for naval expenditure. This plan was regarded as "an extraordinary ambitious plan for a country which had limited resources compared to (her) naval competitors".² Navy Minister Kato Tomasaburo was one who encouraged the construction of the largest types of battleships to keep up the parity with other maritime Powers. This naval expansion programme in Japan was highly disquieting particularly to the Americans.³

In 1921, the Hara Government accepted the invitation of the proposed conference to be held in Washington. The acceptance of the invitation by the Japanese Government was highly influenced by her economic condition. Kato later on admitted that "Japan was unable for financial and technical reasons

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1. Ian Hish, Japan and Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference in W.G. Beasley, Ed. Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, (London, 1975), p. 64.
 2. Ibid. p. 69.
 3. E.H. Carr, International Relations between the Two World Wars: 1919-1939 (New York, 1967).

to equal the achievements of the leading maritime Powers."⁴

Washington Conference (1921-22)

At the Washington Conference three treaties were signed: (a) The Four-Power Treaty; (b) The Five Power Treaty and; (c) The Nine-Power Treaty. The Five-Power Treaty is considered as the most important disarmament treaty of the Post-Second World War period.⁵ The Treaty fixed the strength of Japanese as 60 per cent of the British and American capital ships. Though earlier Japan had insisted on a ratio of 10:10:7, she ultimately accepted the 60 per cent ratio. The Treaty also dealt with scrapping and retention of some particular ships⁶ of the contracting parties. However, it did place no limitation on light cruisers, destroyers, submarines or other auxiliary craft. The Powers also agreed for a ten-year 'naval construction holiday'. The tonnage for capital ships was limited to 35,000 tons, and 27,000 tons for aircraft carriers and for gun calibres to 16 to 18 inches respectively. The Treaty also mentioned the names of the capital ships which were to be maintained by each party.

4. Quoted in Ian Hish, n. 1., p. 69.

5. Ibid., p. 79.

6. For details see British and Foreign State Papers 1923, Part 1, vol. 117 (London, 1926), p.455.

The Geneva Disarmament Conference (1927); and
the Pact of Paris (1928).

The Washington Conference had excluded certain classes of vessels without placing any limitation or reduction. The Geneva Conference which met in 1927 was considered to supplement the Washington Conference. However, on account of a difference between the United States and the United Kingdom over a limitation figure for cruisers, the conference ended without any achievement.

The unsuccessful Geneva Disarmament Conference was again followed by a more important treaty: The Pact of Paris (1928). Japan as one of the fifteen signatories to the Pact; renounced war as 'an instrument of national policy'. However, at home, there was a strong protest from the Henseito Party against the Government's signature to the Pact 'in the names of the respective peoples'. They regarded the signature as a violation of 'emperor's prerogatives'.⁷ On 27 June 1929 Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi ultimately announced that the 'phrase' in the names of the respective peoples would not be applied in case of Japan. This was a clear sign of the rise of ultra nationalism and militarism in Japan.

The London Naval Treaty (1930)

The Geneva Disarmament Conference ended with a 'confession of failure'. However, attempts were made by the Western Powers

7. Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (London, 1949), p.463.

once again to supplement the Washington Conference.

The objective of the London Naval Disarmament Conference was similar to that of the unsuccessful Geneva Disarmament Conference i.e. to reduce and limit certain classes of vessels of ships which were not covered at Washington. This time the Japanese Admiralty drew up certain instructions to be strictly followed by the Japanese representatives at the Conference. Essential features of the instructions were: (a) to demand 70 per cent ratio of either of the United States or of the United Kingdom for 10,000 ton 8-inch gun cruisers; (b) 70 per cent in all auxiliary craft; (c) a parity in submarines either with the United States or the United Kingdom. These 'three fundamental claims' were deemed to be essential for her security and must be achieved. These proposals had the approval of the Japanese Government.

In the course of the conference there ensued a deadlock over the Japanese demand for their ratio of ships. For a satisfactory outcome of the conference, the so-called 'Reed-Matsudaira' compromise was reached. According to this compromise Japan was to accept 60 per cent in tonnage for auxiliary craft. But the Admiralty referred to recognize

8. Takuechi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (London, 1931) p. 288.

it as it did not meet the 'three-fundamental claims'. The 'Reed-Matsudaira' compromise became a real source of controversy. The Admiralty and the Foreign Ministry were irreconcilably divided. However, the treaty was concluded and ratified in the teeth of a strong opposition from the Admiralty. Ultimately the treaty divided them and their rivalry sharpened.

The London Disarmament conference is considered to be the 'last feeble effort of the movement for disarmament' and a great achievement of the civilian government. But six weeks after his victory on the treaty Prime Minister Hamaguchi-Yuko, the prime mover of the Treaty was assassinated. After this, the Japanese Government increasingly came under the influence of the militarists and nationalists, and Japan moved in the direction of a global disaster.

The Post Second World War disarmament efforts mainly aimed at the reduction and limitation of conventional arms. The emergence of Japan as a maritime power was regarded as a threat particularly to the Americans. That was why the Americans took keen interest in calling the disarmament conferences. On the other hand, the civilian Government was largely responsible for Japan's participation in these disarmament conferences. However, the militarists and ultra-nationalists violated all these agreements and plunged into a global war.

Chapter II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN

Before we examine Japan's stand on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it would be useful for our study to have an idea about the advance Japan has made in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. An understanding of Japan's progress in nuclear technology would enable us to grasp the relevance of the NPT to that country.

As Frank Barnaby, Director of SIPRI writes, "There is a direct link between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." He further says that "the most controversial of all the peaceful applications of nuclear energy is the widespread use of nuclear power reactors to generate electricity."¹ So, in the following pages, an attempt has been made to examine the progress of the development of nuclear energy in Japan during the post war period.

Nuclear research was conducted on a very small scale during the ^{Second} World War ~~II~~ under the military sponsorship. But after the war, the Allied occupation authorities completely destroyed it.² Restrictions were placed on the study of

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1. Frank Barnaby, The Nuclear Age (SIPRI, Stockholm, 1974), p.1.
 2. Tuge Hideomi, Historical Development of Science and Technology in Japan (Tokyo, 1961), p.146.

atomic nucleus, atomic energy and radioactivity. Thus, ^{as} one writer says, Until 1952 nuclear research was "a dead issue" ³ in Japan.

The Japan Science Congress at its general meeting in 1951 expressed its anxiety that the forthcoming peace treaty should not prohibit Japan in the development of nuclear energy so that "the way may be left open for its application for peaceful purposes." ⁴

The visit of the President of the Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO), Iehikawa Ichiro in January 1954, to the United States was a landmark in the development of the idea of peaceful uses of atomic energy. He had the opportunity to visit United States Atomic Energy Commission's research facilities at the University of California. After his return to his own country, he became the "staunchest advocate of atoms for peace and converted other business leaders to his point of view." ⁵

For the first time appropriations for the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses were included in the 1954 budget. The task for the formation of a basic policy on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was given to the Economic Planning Agency. The main architect of the atomic energy

3. Imai Ryukichi, "Japan and the Nuclear Age", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 26, no. 6, June 1970, pp.35-39.

4. Yanaga Chitoshi, Big Business in Japan (Yale University, 1968), pp.178-79.

5. Ibid., p. 179.

policy, Dr. Sugimoto Tomoo pointed out the importance of atomic energy and its enormous utility, particularly, for power generation in fuel-scarce Japan.

In May 1954, a preparatory council for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was established in the Cabinet "to study the problems and ways and means of developing atomic energy"⁶ and Deputy Prime Minister Ogata Taketora was made its Chairman. Included in it were Mr. Aichi Kiichi, Director of the Economic Planning Agency, Ishikawa Ichiro, President of the Federation of Economic Organizations and Professors Kaya Seiji and Fujioka Yoshio from the academic community to determine "how the first atomic energy budget was to be expended."⁷ The Japan Science Congress later criticized the government on the ground that the government "had allowed the inclusion of atomic energy appropriations in the budget without making adequate preparations for their expenditure."⁸ In a statement issued by them, they outlined "three basic principles" for an independent nuclear research, the results of which must be (a) 'open and available', (b) 'democratically administered' and (c) 'independent of any external influence or pressure'.⁹

^{As} A nuclear allergy was quite intense in Japan, it needed

6. Ibid., p. 180.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 181.

9. Ibid., pp. 181-82.

9.

utmost efforts to convince the people about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this Yomiuri Shimbun played a vital role in moulding public opinion, and its President Mr. Shoriki Matsutaro became the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan.

In December 1954, the Preparatory Council for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, financed partly by the government and partly by the private organizations, sent a fourteen-member team on a three-month fact-finding tour of twelve nations¹⁰ to inspect atomic energy installations and to observe particularly the advances that had been made in research, development, and application of atomic energy for peaceful uses.¹¹ After their inspection tour, discussions on Japan's future energy sources were started. At the end of these discussions, Sasaki Tadashi, Director of the Economic Planning Agency made it clear that "Japan had no alternative but to enter the atomic energy field."¹² Fuel Policy Committee Chairman Ohya Shinzo

9. Ibid., pp. 131-32.

10. The twelve nations are Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

11. Yanaga, n. 4, pp. 182-83.

12. Ibid., p. 183.

also expressed that "Japan's energy sources would reach an impasse unless atomic energy could be used for generating electricity."¹³

In April 1955, the Council for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was formed composed of nearly a hundred businessmen, scientists and others. Shoriki Matsutaro, President of the Yomiuri who had undertaken the real task of the formation of the council said in a statement:

Whether we like it or not the world has already plunged into the atomic age. It has now become clear that nuclear energy, which was once used against us as a terrible weapon of destruction, can be used as a mighty power to banish wars from the earth and liberate humanity from poverty and disease. It is natural for human beings who hate war and fear destruction to rise up and launch a movement against atom and hydrogen bombs with a view to banning them. However, even though we as a nation have gone through the haptism of fiery devastation to merely shout that they be banned would constitute a negative and one-sided attitude. Instead, it would be really meaningful and constructive if we were to choose to use this opportunity to liberate mankind from poverty and disease and to eliminate the causes of cold wars and achieve constructive peace.

Our country lacks coal and petroleum resources among other things, and, even in the development of hydroelectric power, a

13. Ibid.

saturation point appears to have been reached. We cannot help but feel a deep concern for the future of the nation's energy sources. Atomic Energy is therefore necessary as an energy for Japan, which has the capacity for achieving notable results through its use.

In a nation suffering from population pressure, loss of territory, and paucity of natural resources, and in need of speedy improvements in industrial technology, agriculture, and medicine, and in promotion and expansion of new industries, the time has come for the whole nation to forge ahead without any hesitation whatsoever. 14

At this time, the U.S. was quite willing to supply nuclear fuel to Japan. But opinion was divided among the Japanese scientists about the acceptance of US offer of fissionable materials. The Japanese Government was willing to accept it and was ready even for construction of an atomic reactor. The Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy under (FED) organized public lectures in which well-known scientists¹⁵ and responsible persons spoke on the problems and uses of atomic energy. Then again, Ishikawa Ichiro, President of the Federation of Economic Organizations visited the United States "to study management and operational problems." Professor Fushimi Yachiro of Osaka University, too, strongly supported the case

14. Ibid., pp. 183-84.

15. John J. Hopkins, Chairman, General Dynamics Corporation, USA, Dr. Laurence R. Stofstadt, Head of the Atomic Energy Department of the Chase National Bank" were main speakers.

for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and pressed to frame a national policy for its industrial applications.¹⁶

In August 1955, in an opinion poll, conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 51 per cent of the people were found really concerned with the problem of peaceful uses of atomic energy in which again 44 per cent were mostly interested in its power generation.¹⁷ Ishikawa upon his return from the United States "warned that if Japan was left behind in atomic research, she would regret it forever."¹⁸

In August 1955, the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held and Japan was represented by a number of her scientists, businessmen, government officials, and members belonging to different political parties. The conference was immediately followed by the formulation of a basic atomic energy law in December 1955. The purpose of the law was "to promote research, development, and use of atomic energy to ensure the nation's energy source and contribute to national prosperity through the development of industry." It further aimed at "the limitation of atomic energy to peaceful uses, the promotion of free research among scientists and international cooperation."¹⁹ The Prime Minister was to bear responsibility in the formulation of these policies with the advice of

16. Yanaga, n. 4, p. 186.

17. About the poll result see Ibid., pp. 186-87.

18. Ibid., p. 187.

19. Ibid., pp. 188-89.

an Atomic Energy Commission, to be set up at the former's office. An Atomic Energy Research Institute also was to be established "to carry on research and development work and the training of research scientists."²⁰

In October 1955, the Atomic Research Institute was established. President Ishikawa of FED became its first Chairman. The Managing Director of the Tokyo Electric Power Company became the Managing Director of the Institute. Of the 9 directors 5 were professors and 4 were businessmen. The government gave 64 million Yen, and a sum of 20 million Yen was financed by private sources.

During this initial stage of the development, the United States played a very important part. On 14 November 1955 the United States-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement was signed in Washington. The United States Information Service in collaboration with the Yomiuri Shimbun organized a six-week exhibition in Tokyo to inculcate the idea of atom for peace in the minds of the people and its uses in various fields.²¹ The exhibition created a deep impression in the minds of the people about the potentialities of nuclear energy.

On 1 January 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission came into being under the chairmanship of former Yomiuri President

20. Ibid., p. 189.

21. Ibid., p. 192.

Shoriki, now Minister of State for Atomic Energy. The members of the Commission consisted of one business representative, two scientists from the academic community, and one representative from labour. The members were appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet. The Chairman was to be a member of the cabinet. The commission was to be the highest body in matters relating to the nation's atomic energy policy.

The establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission was soon followed by the birth of yet another important organization - the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum. Shoriki summed up the need of the application of atomic energy for the generation of electric power and urged cooperation between industry and government in adopting a policy that would reflect the collective will of industry. The Forum was to comprise only 250 members. But there was a tremendous response from the industrial circles, and 330 enterprises joined it. A year later the number rose to 700.

The aims of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum were "to maintain close liaison and cooperation among members, among various Japanese organizations in foreign countries through participation in international meetings. The Forum also aimed to make its views known by submitting reports and recommendations to the Government when requested - or on its own initiative - to accept requests for consultations, to consider research grants relating to the development and application

of atomic energy, and to promote education and dissemination of information on atomic energy through study groups and publications.²² Committees also were set up by the Forum to study problems relating to various industrial applications, legislation, and social and economic consequences of atomic energy.

In the same year (1956) the Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), the Atomic Fuel Corporation and the Composite Research Institute for Radioactive Medicine were established. The Atomic Energy, Electric Power Generation Corporation was founded in September 1957.

Since 1956, Japan has made tremendous progress in the development of her nuclear programme. Nuclear development in Japan falls under two periods. During 1956-67, a number of experiments were conducted in the construction of atomic reactors and generation of atomic energy. This period was largely one of experimentation. But since 1967, there has been a rapid expansion of civilian nuclear programmes in Japan.²³

In 1961, Japan encouraged by her recent economic recovery Atomic Energy Commission formulated a new development plan. The programme, a part of Kishi's income doubling plan, was designed to meet the future energy demands which were likely to multiply

22. Ibid., pp. 196-97.

23. K.V. Kesavan, "Nuclear Development in Japan: A Survey of Civilian Programme", Bulletin of the Association of Japanese Studies in India (New Delhi), vol.2, no.4, October-December 1975, pp.142-52.

many times.

In 1967, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission launched a new, long and comprehensive programme to be undertaken in about twenty years. It included the construction of a large number of nuclear reactors, policies to be undertaken for fuel supply, the expansion with of the generation of energy for commercial use, etc. In the same year, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Corporation (PFC) came into being to look into various problems relating to nuclear fuels and other connected problems.

In 1959, the construction of a nuclear reactor at Tokai, a place about 100 miles from Tokyo, was started and it began to supply nuclear powered electricity for the first time in November 1965. In the nineteen sixties, the construction of at least seven nuclear reactors was started. In 1974 Japan had ten power reactors and twenty-one research reactors. The percentage of domestic equipment used in the construction of these reactors was very high. More than 90 per cent of the equipment was manufactured at home.²⁴ By March 1976, 13 nuclear reactors were in operation or being in test run for the supply of electricity and 14 reactors²⁵ were under construction.

24. See Table No.3, pp. 28-29.

25. Japan Times Weekly, 6 March 1976.

Nuclear Energy for the Generation
of Electricity

Japan is devoid of oil, but it is the real source of energy, supplying 73 per cent of the total energy consumption.²⁶ More than 99 per cent of the consumption is imported and 25 per cent of the total foreign exchange resources of Japan have to be spent on it.²⁷ Again, more than 80 per cent of the oil comes from the politically unstable Middle East through the strategic Malacca Strait. Suspension of the supply of oil for about a week is said more than enough to paralyse the country's entire industries. It is partly because of this that Japan takes keen interest in the Soviet-Japanese cooperation in Siberia and also in a deal with the People's Republic of China for the extraction of oil. At the same time, Japan is always keen to tap alternative sources of energy, and it is here that nuclear energy holds up high prospects.

Japan is, fully aware of the enormous role that nuclear

26. See Table No.1.

For Japan and oil, see also Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis (Penguin, 1974), pp. 123-36; see also Japan Institute of International Affairs, The Oil Crisis: Its Impact on Japan and Asia (Tokyo, n.d.).

27 Ryukichi Imai, n. 3, p. 38.

But according to the Government's forecast for fiscal 1974, it was estimated that the trade surplus would drop by \$3,400 million, and amount of payment for imported crude oil would be \$15,000 million i.e. a little less than 45 per cent. For this forecast see Takeo Tomitate, "The Oil Crisis and Japan's Energy Problem", The Oil Crisis: Its Impact on Japan and Asia (Japan Institute of International Affairs, (Tokyo, n.d.) pp.5-19.

energy can play for peaceful purposes. The development of nuclear energy has been accepted as a possible answer to the present oil crisis. As Yanaga writes, "It is not an exaggeration to say that in no other instance has there been such an exemplary working relationship between organized business, governmental, political parties, academic, and mass media. In short, Japan's 'atoms for peace' programme gained the wholehearted support of the entire nation."²⁸

Table No. 1.

Structure of Primary Energy Sources

	Fiscal 1966	Fiscal 1971	Fiscal 1975
Petroleum	58.4	73.5	73.0
Coal	27.3	17.5	18.1
Hydropower	11.3	6.7	4.5
Nuclear power	--	0.6	2.2
Others	3.0	1.7	2.2
Ratio of Imported Primary energy sources	66.2	84.9	87.4

Source: "Nuclear Power Generation", Fuji Bank Bulletin (Tokyo, vol. 25, no. 2, February 1974, p.23).


28. Yanaga, n. 4, p. 177.

The development of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity is a long term plan to meet the country's future energy shortage. Till now the power supplied by nuclear energy is relatively negligible but its total power output in terms of Megawatts is next only to those of the United States and the United Kingdom.²⁹ Japan hopes to produce about 8,752 Megawatts (10.2 per cent) by 1975 and this will be increased to 32,000 Megawatts by 1980, 60,000 Megawatts by 1985, and by 2000 A.D. it is estimated that more than half of the supply of power will be taken care of by nuclear reactors. The budget expenditure³⁰ on the development of nuclear energy has been increasing by leaps and bounds. Japan is also hoping to put into operation fast breeders which would generate more power at a significantly low rate of consumption of nuclear fuel.

29. See Table No.2, col. No.6.

The United States produces 40,400 Megawatts, the United Kingdom 5,790 Megawatts and Federal Republic of Germany produces 4,000 Megawatts which immediately follows Japan's 5,000 Megawatt output.

30. Budget amount for the development of nuclear energy is as follows:



1955	¥ 360 million
1956	¥ 3.6 billion
1957	¥ 9.0 billion
1960	¥ 7.7 billion
1968	¥ 11.9 billion
1969	¥ 29.9 billion

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Source: Yanaga Chitoshi, Big Business in Japanese Politics (London, 1968) p. 200

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Problems in the Development
of Nuclear Energy

Development of nuclear technology has also given rise to a number of problems in Japan. The Japanese people fear the high rate of pollution caused by the reactors. They have made no secret of their resentment at the increasing number of nuclear reactors all over the country. The Government finds it really a difficult task to select the locations or the sites. As one writer says, "Nuclear power stations have become main targets of attacks from the local residents and environmentalists." Administration of nuclear energy has still not attained a high degree of efficiency. The problem connected with disposal of nuclear waste has aroused the anger of the people throughout Japan. Similarly, leakage of radio-active rays from the nuclear ship Mitsu also led to an agitation of considerable magnitude to Japanese fishermen. The nuclear ship today is unable to find a port for berthing.

Another basic problem faced by the Japanese nuclear development relates to ~~the~~ total dependence on external sources for ~~the~~ nuclear fuels. The bulk of ~~its~~ needs comes from the U.S.

31. Yukihiro Ikenaga, "Nobody wants Nuclear Power next Door", Japan Times Weekly (Tokyo), 18 January 1975, p.10; see also Ibid., 25 January 1975. Views opposed to the development of nuclear energy is vividly exposed in Uchiyama Takuro, "The Current Status of Nuclear Power Development in Japan", AIEA (Tokyo), vol. 17, no. 1, Winter 1975.

United States, Canada and Britain have also supported Japan with nuclear fuel. Further, Japan is still not in position to enrich uranium at home, and it hopes to have enriching processes only by 1985.

Thus, Japan has made considerable advance in the utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The current energy crisis is also a compelling factor for Japan to tap the nuclear energy as much as possible. But the multiplication of nuclear reactors has also given rise to a number of problems like pollution of air and seawater by radio-active rays, and accumulation of enormous nuclear wastes. Furthermore, the nuclear allergy of the Japanese people though softened has not ceased.

24
Table - 2

Nuclear Status of some Countries

Country	Year of Operation- of First Research Reactor	No. of Research Reactors in Opera- tion, 1974	Year of Opera- tion of First power Reactor	No. of power Reactors, 1974.	Total Output of power Reactors (net Mwe 1974	No. of power React- ors 1980	Total Out- put of power Reactors (net Mwe 1980)	NPT Status
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Argentina	1958	5	1974	1	320	2	920	Not a Member
Brazil	1957	3	1976	-	-	1	600	Not a Member
Canada	1947	8	1962	7	2,510	12	6,120	Ratified
People's Republic of China	--	-	--	Nuclear Power	--	-	--	Not a Member
Czechoslo- vakia	1957	3	1972	1	110	5	1,760	Ratified
France	1948	23	1958	-	2,870	23	15,170	Not a Member
Federal Republic of Germany	1957	33	1965	10	4,000	28	21,600	Signed but not ratified
India	1956	4	1969	4	780	8	1,580	Not a member
Italy	1959	16	1962	3	610	7	3,380	Signed but not ratified

(contd.)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Japan	1960	21	1965	10	5,000	29	19,400	Signed but not ratified
Netherlands	1959	6	1968	2	530	2	530	Signed but not ratified
South Africa	--	-	1965	2	-	-	-	Not a Member
Sweden	1960	3	1974	4	2,600	-	8,300	Ratified
Switzerland	1957	6	1969	3	1,000	8	5,700	Signed but not ratified
U.K.	1947	24	1956	31	5,790	39	10,740	Ratified
U.S.A.	1950	117	1957	60	40,4,000	156	1,37,800	Ratified
U.S.S.R.	1949	26	1958	16	3,370	24	10,000	Ratified

Source: Frank Barnaby, The Nuclear Age (SIPRI, Stockholm, 1974), pp.63-74.

Table - 3

Nuclear power plants in Japan in Operation
or being Test Run

Enterprise in Operation	Station Sector	Type	Capacity 1,000 KW	Start of Construc- tion	Start of Opera- tion	Construc- tion Costs ¥ billion	Primer Contractor	Ratio of domestic equipment %
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Japan Atomic Power Co.	Tsuruga	BWR	357	April 1966	March 1970	32.3	General Electric Co. (Britain)	55
Tokyo Electric Power Co.	Fukushima I	BWR	460	Dec. 1966	March 1971	42.2	"	56
Kansai Electric Power Co.	Mihama I	PWR	340	Dec. 1966	Nov. 1970	29.8	Primary System Westing House Secondary System Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries	59
"	Mihama II	PWR	500	May 1968	July 1972	36.0	Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries	72
Tokyo Electric Power Co.	Fukushima II	BWR	784	March 1968	July 1974	57.7	General Electric Co.	51
Chugoku Electric Power Co.	Shimane	BWR	460	Feb. 1970	March 1974	35.0	Hitachi Ltd.	90
Japan Atomic Power Co.	Tokai II	BWR	1,100	March 1973	--	93.9	General Electric Co.	51

(contd.)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Tokyo Electric Power Co.	Fukushima III	BWR	784	Jan. 1970	Dec. 1974	53.1	Tokyo Shibaura Electric	90
Kansai Electric Power Co.	Takahama I	PWR	826	Oct. 1969	Aug. 1974	66.0	Primary System Westing House Secondary system Mitsubishi Corporation	62
Kansai Electric Power Co.	Takahama II	PWR	826	Feb. 1971	July 1975	55.0	Mitsubishi Corporation	89
Kyushu Electric Power Co.	Genkal	PWR	559	March 1971	July 1975	41.7	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co.	87
Chubu Electric Power Co.	Hamaoka I	BWR	540	Feb. 1971	Nov. 1974	44.6	Tokyo Shibaura	90
	Mihama III	----	826	--	--	--	---	--

Table - 4

Nuclear power plants in Japan
Under Construction

Enterprise in Operation	Station Sector	Type	Capacity 1,000 KW	Start of Construction	Start of Operation	Construction costs ¥ billion	Prime Contractor	Ratio of domestic equipment %
Japan Atomic Power Co.	Tokai I	GCR	166	Dec. 1959	July 1966	46.5	General Electric Co. (Britain)	35
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.	Gnagawa	BWR	524	Aug. 1971	March 1977	37.2	Tokyo Shihabaura Electric	Over 90
Tokyo Electric Power Co.	Fukushima IV	BWR	784	May 1972	Aug. 1976	51.0	Hitachi Ltd.	91
"	Fukushima V	BWR	784	Dec. 1971	Dec. 1975	59.4	Tokyo Shihabaura	93
"	Fukushima VI	BWR	1,100	Mar. 1973	Oct. 1976	92.5	General Electric	--
Kansai Electric Power Co.	Ooi I	PWR	1,175	Oct. 1972	April 1977	107.0	Primary system Westing House Secondary system Mitsubishi Corporation	67
Shikoku Electric Power Co.	Ikata I	PWR	566	Mar. 1973	April 1977	48.2	--	--

(contd.)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kansai Electric Power Co.	Ooi II	PWR	1,175	Nov. 1972	Oct. 1977	20.0	--	74
Chubu Electric Power Co.	Hamaoka II	BWR	240	Aug. 1973	July 1977	60.5	--	--
_____	No. 2 Fukushima I	BWR	1,100	--	--	--	--	--
_____	No. 2 Fukushima II	BWR	1,100	--	--	--	--	--
_____	Ikata II	PWR	566	--	--	--	--	--
_____	Genkai	PWR	559	--	--	--	--	--
_____	Kashiwazaki	BWR	1,100	--	--	--	--	--

Source: Fuji Bank Bulletin (Tokyo), vol. 25, no. 2, 27 February 1974, p. 24. Supplement A from a latest figure published in The Japan Times Weekly (Tokyo), 6 March 1976, p.10.

Notes: I) Construction costs do not include initial fuel supply.
 II) BWR stands for light water moderated and cooled reactor, PWR for pressurized light water moderated and cooled reactor and GCR for gas cooled graphite moderated reactor.

Chapter III

JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT: 1945-1964

Chapter III

JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT

(1945-1964)

An attempt has been made in the previous chapter to examine Japan's progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is now necessary to note the efforts made by Japan to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament. Before the question of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty became a subject of animated discussion, Japan made significant efforts to have a treaty banning nuclear tests. During 1956-64, Japanese interest was mainly confined to this question. An understanding of Japan's attitude towards nuclear tests is important before we consider Tokyo's stand on the NPT.

At the end of the Second World War, Japan was a prostrate nation both militarily and economically. Japan was put under Allied Occupation soon after its defeat, and the Occupation authorities lost no time in adopting a policy of disarmament and democratisation in Japan. Several measures were undertaken to effect disarmament. Japan's military forces were disbanded. A large number of aircraft and naval ships were scrapped. An international military tribunal was set up to try war criminals. A 'purge' of militarists and ultra-nationalists was carried out.

As part of the policy of democratisation, a new constitution was promulgated, and the new constitution emphasised concepts like individual liberty, constitutionalism, supremacy

of parliament, judiciary, etc. A new educational system was also introduced. Franchise was given to all people above 21 irrespective of the conditions of sex, or other distinctions. Land reforms were widely carried out. Above all, Article 9 of the Constitution stated that Japan had renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation. Further, in the pursuance of the above, Japan also said that she would not maintain military forces.

During the initial years of the occupation, the Allied policy could be regarded as punitive. That is to say, the occupation authorities were anxious to keep Japan under heavy surveillance. But after 1949, a significant change occurred in the Allied policy. This change was governed by economic and strategic considerations. First, in 1949, the Americans were keen to cut down the expenditure incurred on the occupation of Japan. Secondly, developments like the success of the communists in China (1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950) convinced the Americans that the situation in the Far East had changed and that Japan should therefore be seen in the light of these changes. After 1950, the United States Government considered Japan more as an ally and less as an enemy. Washington also thought that it was absolutely necessary to make Japan a free country and incorporate it as an active member of the Western Bloc. Steps were also taken to rearm Japan.

The National Reserve Police was created officially on 11 August 1950 and a code name "Juniper" was given to it. Most of the newly enlisted personnel was drawn from the 'purge bands'. This small 75,000-man ground force was converted into the National Safety Reserve in 1952. In late April of the same year, Prime Minister Yoshida announced the reorganization of the National Police Reserve into two forces; National Safety Force, composed of 100,000-man; and a 8,900-man Maritime Safety Force. These forces gradually took the responsibility of defence for the country and during 1952-53, the U.S. forces¹ were replaced by them in Hokkaido.

Augmentation in the strength of armed forces seemed to be an utmost necessity, mainly to expand the country's defence. In the summer of 1954, after a long debate in the Diet, Yoshida won the approval of the former for the reorganization of Japan's armed forces under the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defence Forces Law. Under these laws, Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces were created with a total strength of 152,110 men "to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression, and when necessary, to maintain public order."² These Self-Defence Forces were expanded gradually.

The postwar Japanese Government favoured this nominal rearmament only for self-defence purposes. There was formidable

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1. The United States' Seventh Cavalry Division.
 2. Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defence Policy: 1947-1967, (New York and London, 1971), p. 76.

opposition even to this nominal rearmament. The intense pacifism of the Japanese people was one such obstacle.

Secondly, economically, there was a great limitation to a rapid expansion of military forces.³ Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru speaking before the Diet on 23 January 1952, expressed his desire to cooperate whole-heartedly in all U.N. measures for peace.⁴ In the same year, on 28 April the Japanese House of Councillors resolved to "contribute to maintenance of world peace and furtherance of the welfare of mankind..."⁵ Thus the Japanese Government had clearly stated its firm adherence to a peaceful policy in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

Japan considered disarmament as one of the surest ways to ensure peace in the world. Among the people too, strong ideas to ban nuclear weapons tests and nuclear arms were developed. Prior to her admission to the United Nations, the anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council (Gensuikyo) was founded.

(3) Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida said in the Diet on 26 January 1951: "Our discussions on rearmament have already caused needless misgivings at home and abroad, and moreover... any adequate rearming is an economic impossibility for defeated Japan." See Japanese Association of International Law, Japan and the United Nations (New York, 1953), p. 76.

(4) Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 82.

(5) Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 90.

In 1954, the Fukurya Maru incident aroused one of the most important movements in Japan against nuclear tests. However, Japan's role in disarmament may be said to have significantly started with her admission to the United Nations.

Japan and Nuclear Tests

Japan became a member of the United Nations only on 18 December 1956, more than eleven years after the inception of the world body. Since then, she has been taking keen interest in disarmament discussions.

Japan has always been opposed to nuclear arms competition among the nuclear powers. She does not consider arms race exclusively a super power concern but a threat equally aimed at the entire human race. Considering universal disarmament an absolute necessity, Fujiyama said in his speech at the U.N. on 17 September 1959:

The arms race... intensifies distrust, creating a vicious circle which knows no end. Such an arms competition not only result in a meaningless waste of valuable human and economic resources, but also increases the possibilities of miscalculation which may well result in war. I cannot help but, for today military science has so advanced as to produce nuclear weapons with the awesome capability of bringing swift and general destruction to mankind and civilization itself. 6

Time and again, Japanese representatives warned the world about

6. Speech of Fujiyama Aichiro, GAOR, Session 14, 797th plen. mtg., September 17, 1959, pp. 17-18.

a possible future nuclear war of mass destruction and the total annihilation of mankind.⁷

Japan believed that since nuclear tests were the starting point of nuclear weapons development, efforts must be taken to ban such tests. She considered the suspension of nuclear tests by all nuclear powers as the first step towards the progress of disarmament. On several occasions she insisted on separating the problem of suspension of nuclear weapons tests as a separate issue from all other issues of disarmament, so that progress could be made towards its achievement. During 1957-63, Japan made several appeals for bringing about a treaty on banning nuclear tests. As early as 1957, Sawada Ranzo, the Japanese representative called upon the U.N. to make vigorous efforts for the suspension of nuclear tests. Japan continued these appeals as a 'prior step'⁸ towards the solution of disarmament problems.

The reason for giving priority to the suspension of nuclear tests was twofold. Firstly, Japan pointed out the harmful effects of the radio-active fall-out and the ultimate contamination of the environment which deprived of the lives of men or

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7. See for example speech of Matsudaira Koto, *ibid.*, Session 14, 1st Committee, 1032nd mtg., October 23, 1959, p.33; See also speech of Kosaka Zentaro, *ibid.*, Session 15, 263th plen. mtg., September 22, 1960, p. 57.
8. See speeches of Fujiyama Aichiro, *ibid.*, Session 12, 680th plen. mtg., September 12, 1957, p. 24; Also Ohira Masajoshi, *ibid.*, Session 17, 1126th plen. mtg., September 21, 1962, p. 30.

their hopeful future. In this regard she was also reminded of the agonies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not the least, she also consistently pointed out the case of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5.⁹ Her representatives recalled the U.S. nuclear test at Bikini Atoll in 1954, in which one member of the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel died, though it was 19 miles away from the danger zone. The other members of the crew were incapacitated by the test. They were no longer capable of working as fishermen. Moreover, fish caught there even after many months were found contaminated by radio-active fall-out.

Secondly, Japan thought that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests would only intensify the race for nuclear arms and stockpiles.¹⁰ She believed that it would continue threatening peace and security of mankind leading to wastage of human resources. Japan, therefore, expressed her opposition to any form of nuclear test by any country. But despite the opposition of Japan and many other countries, nuclear tests were conducted by the Big Powers.

In January 1957, Japan strongly criticized 'the unilateral decision' of the United States to carry out a series of nuclear tests in Nevada. By 10 November 1959, she again had the painful

9. For this incident see Kosaka Zentaro, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons Tests", Contemporary Japan (Tokyo), vol. 27, no. 2, March 1962, p. 199-208.

10. Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentaro said at the UN General Assembly: "... the resumption of nuclear testing will mean competition in the manufacture of nuclear weapons." See GAOR, Session 16, 1011th plen. mtg., September 22, 1961, p. 37.

duty in expressing her 'disapproval' of the nuclear tests to be carried out by France in the Sahara and warned about the harmful effects of the explosions to the neighbouring areas." Japan regarded the test as one which 'would undermine the negotiations'¹¹ at Geneva, which, by then, were approaching towards a successful agreement on the suspension of tests. When China also detonated a nuclear device in the atmosphere in October 1964, Japan expressed her 'deep concern' as a neighbouring country. At the same time, she expressed her opposition as the Chinese test was carried out in 'total indifference of the existence of the particular Test Ban Treaty'. She also regarded the Chinese act as 'an open betrayal of the earnest hope and desire for peace expressed by the millions....'¹² By October 1961, the number of times that Japan had lodged ~~credit~~ against the four Nuclear Powers was as follows: four times to France, six times to the United Kingdom, twelve times to the United States and eleven times to the Soviet Union. In short, Japan maintained a unique, firm and strongly determined stand to oppose any kind of nuclear testing by any power.

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11. Speech of Matsudaira Koto *ibid.*, Session 14, 1st Committee 1043th mtg., November 10, 1959, p. 119.
 12. Speech of Foreign Minister Shigena Ebuchihoro, *ibid.*, Session 19, 1290th plcn. mtg., December 4, 1964, p. 1.

Japan expressed her gratification and happiness when all the nuclear powers of the time: the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1958 to start negotiations in Geneva for the conclusion of an accord on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the establishment of an international control system. However, the conference did not go on smoothly. Eisenhower's intention to resume nuclear weapons testing with a prior notice - was met with a counter announcement of Mr. Khrushchev. Again the conference of 6 May 1960 was cancelled because of the U-2 aircraft incident. Moreover, France, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became a nuclear power by exploding a nuclear device in February of the same year. The Soviet Union regarded the French act as an improvement of NATO's existing nuclear weapon system threatening the possibility of concluding an agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests.¹³ By 30 August 1961 "faced with the increasing aggressiveness of the NATO military bloc and its war preparations...."¹⁴ the Soviet Union announced to resume nuclear weapons tests. The United States too followed suit. The Geneva Conference ended in a deadlock.

The Soviet announcement to resume nuclear tests included a 50-megaton bomb. Mr. Okazaki Katsuo appealing to the United

13. United Nations, United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations, New York, 1970), p. 216.

14. Ibid., p. 161.

Nations for a 'fresh start' of the Geneva Talks strongly criticised the Soviet Union. He said that the Japanese people had indignation and disillusionment at the 'resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, whose Government had stated on more than one occasion that she would never be the first to resume. He deeply deplored the Soviet Union's action in exploding a 50-megaton bomb in utter disregard of a solemn appeal by the General Assembly and of world public opinion. He hoped that the Soviet Union would act to restore belief in ^{her} its good faith by immediately halting further nuclear tests and resuming the Geneva negotiations with renewed vigour. 15

When the Soviet delegation made an allegation saying "the Japanese Government had agreed to a certain extent on the resumption of the United States atmospheric tests.", The Japanese representative clarified:

Needless to say, this is an unwarranted distortion of the position of my Government. The Government of Japan has continually expressed its categorical opposition to any nuclear weapons tests by whatever country they might be carried out. This position does remain unchanged. 16

From the foregoing discussion, Japan's opposition to any form of nuclear test is clear. Then, what were her

15. Speech of Okazaki Katsuo, GAOR, Session 16, 1st Committee, 1181st mtg., October 31, 1961, p. 103.

16. Speech of Okazaki Katsuo, ibid., Session 16, 1049th plen. mtg., November 8, 1961, p. 602.

suggestions towards the solution of disarmament problems?

As already mentioned Japan considered the suspension of nuclear tests as the first step towards disarmament. Secondly, she saw a necessity for the establishment of an effective international control and inspection system for the prohibition¹⁷ of nuclear tests, manufacture of nuclear weapons etc. Thirdly, she believed that Nuclear Powers should have a free and frank talk. Japan regarded the system of international control as 'an indispensable minimum condition'. She also recognized the impracticability of the prohibition of the production and the use of nuclear weapons in the absence of a proper scientific method of detection of these weapons.

Though there was no proper system of detection which would help detection and prohibition of these destructive weapons, "Progress on disarmament depended essentially on full agreement and mutual confidence among a very small number of major powers."¹⁸ Japan wanted these Nuclear Powers to "talk more frankly and constructively than ever." At the same time Japan supported the idea to promote scientific study and research in the field. Further, she insisted that disarmament should cover both conventional armaments and nuclear weapons.

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17. See speech of Matsudaira Koto *ibid.*, Session 14, 1st Committee, 1048th mtg., November 10, 1959, p. 119. See also speech of Kosaka Kentaro, *ibid.*, Session 16, 1011th plen. mtg., September 22, 1961, p. 37.
18. Speech of Sawada Ranzo, *ibid.*, Session 11, 1st Committee 823rd mtg., January 10, 1957, p. 53. See also speech of Matsudaira Koto, *ibid.*, Session 14, 1st Committee, 1048th mtg., November 10, 1959, p. 119.

Japan also requested the General Assembly to take more initiative than the Disarmament Committee, and suggested for a joint study by scientists on the questions to deal with the problems of detection and verification of underground tests. Though she even spoke of an international police order for the achievement of disarmament, she also realized the shortcomings of such a system, since such a police order "would also have to command the confidence and respect of all peoples."¹⁹

Tests, Drafts and Japan

Japan's interest in Disarmament did not manifest itself merely in her strong protests against and deep regrets for the resumption and conduct of nuclear tests. She took an active part in the United Nations discussions by either submitting draft resolutions or co-sponsoring resolutions also with other countries.

In January 1957, Japan was one of the three powers²⁰ which submitted a draft resolution proposing a system of advance registration of all nuclear tests and international supervision under the aegis of the United Nations. The three-power²¹ draft was adopted unanimously by the First Committee of the

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19. Speech of Matsudaira Koto, *Ibid.*, Session 14, 1st Committee, 1032nd mtg., October 23, 1956, p. 33.
20. The other two powers were Canada and Norway.
21. UN Document A/C. 1/L. 162 of January 13, 1957.

General Assembly. Japan called the draft resolution 'a provisional proposal pending an overall agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons' and regarded it as a moderate one - acceptable to all nations.

In April 1957 Japan as an observer of the London Disarmament Talks, submitted proposals in an effort to narrow the differences of the Nuclear powers. These proposals suggested for an advance registration of nuclear tests 'in order to restrict such tests to a minimum' until the international detection machinery worked feasible method (a) of detection.²²

Again, in September 1957, Japan submitted a draft resolution²³ in the General Assembly of the United Nations expressing a desire for the suspension of nuclear tests. It^{she} also requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its subcommittee at^{an} early date to find out feasible means for the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the use of fissionable materials only for peaceful purposes. It^{she} further suggested "to reach an agreement on the prompt installation of supervision and inspection system necessary to verify the suspension of tests." However, the draft resolution was defeated²⁴ and Japan was 'perplexed but not dismayed'.

22. DC/112

23. UN Document A/C. I/L.174. of 23 September 1957.

24. Speech of Matsudaira Koto, *ibid.*, Session 12, 716th plen. mtg., November 14, 1957, p.468.

Japan thus throughout the course of the debates maintained her firm stand that suspension of nuclear tests should not be made conditional on any other disarmament agreement. Because of this she expressed her preference of the Yugoslav draft resolution²⁵ of November 1957. The Yugoslav draft resolution called for an immediate agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests together with a system of inspection and control. It also called for a reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditures, and above all the utilization of fissionable materials for non-military purposes. She also welcomed the basic attitude of the Indian draft of 1st November 1957.²⁶ This draft appealed to suspend all nuclear and thermo nuclear weapons tests without any delay and suggested for the nomination of a scientific-technical commission, consisting of scientific-technical experts which would recommend to the Disarmament Commission for an adequate system of inspection arrangements to maintain control and suspension of these tests.

During the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, she, in the hope of an early and satisfactory solution of nuclear tests, supported two draft resolutions: a twenty-four-power draft resolution, and a three-power draft resolution. The former was sub-

26. UN Document A/C. 1/L. 176/Rev. 4 and A/C. 1/L. 178/Rev.2.

mitted by India along with twenty-three powers requesting the nuclear powers to continue their voluntary suspension of nuclear tests and the other States 'to desist from such tests'. The draft resolution was mainly concerned with the French announcement of a nuclear test. Japan, along with Austria and Sweden also submitted a draft resolution requesting the powers to continue their voluntary suspension of nuclear tests. Both drafts were adopted by the General Assembly on 21st November 1959 as resolution 1402 (XIV). The former was adopted by a vote of 60 to 1 with 20 abstentions and the three-power draft by a vote of 78 to 0 with 2 abstentions.

After the French nuclear tests in the Sahara in February 1960, the Soviet Union also announced ~~its~~ intention to conduct a series of nuclear tests including a 50-megaton bomb. Japan along with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Iran, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution ²⁷ requesting the General Assembly to appeal to the Soviet Union to refrain from the tests. The General Assembly approved it on 27 October 1961 by 87 votes to 11 with 1 abstention, as resolution 1632 (XVI). However, the Soviet Union carried out ~~its~~ tests in Novaya Zemlya on 30 October. Japan was really shocked by the Soviet act. It was during this time in the United Nations' General Assembly the Japanese

27. UN Document A/C. 1/L. 288.

representative strongly criticized the Soviet stand for turning the clock back and compared it with the earlier stand of the Western Powers.

During 1962, certain developments took place in the direction of the conclusion of a test ban treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom expressed their willingness for the conclusion of either a comprehensive test ban treaty in all environments or a test ban in the three non-controversial environments: in the atmosphere, in the outer space and underwater without international verification. The Soviet Union also was not opposed to discuss the non-controversial three-environment test ban proposal provided underground tests were voluntarily suspended until a final agreement was reached.

Japan's opinion was in favour of the above US-UK proposal which according to her 'met the position of her delegation and regarded it as 'pure and simple' and 'not inconsistent'. On the other hand, Japan also paid particular attention to the Brazilian and Swedish proposals which sought the conclusion of a test ban treaty in the same three non-controversial environments.

Test Ban Treaty and Japan

The long awaited treaty for the suspension of nuclear tests was signed on 5th August 1963 by the three nuclear powers. However, underground tests were excluded. The Japanese Foreign Minister on 20 September 1963 said in the General Assembly:

This treaty, of course, is only a partial test ban treaty. It does not include underground testing. Neither does it provide for nuclear disarmament in the true sense of the term. We, Japanese who have directly experienced the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are naturally opposed to nuclear war weapons testing by any country, because it increases the danger of nuclear war. We believe that it is our bounden duty to mankind to appeal ceaselessly and vigorously, in the name of human dignity and human existence, for a complete ban, at the earliest possible moment, on all nuclear weapons testing. It goes without saying that the recent treaty does not give us complete satisfaction, for it is no more than a first step in what is a long process that still lies ahead. Yet, it is a significant milestone - significant in the very fact that, so long as they are governed by reason and respect for mankind, it could well serve as an important spring-board for further progress. It is because Japan recognizes this significance that it has joined many other countries in supporting and acceding to the treaty. 28

Matsui also said that the treaty "had not fully met the world's aspirations" and he further hoped for a comprehensive treaty to ban the underground tests for which efforts of effective control must be continued. While lending the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), he also reminded the Nuclear powers "to remain mindful of heavy responsibility still resting upon them..." 29

28. Speech of Ohira Masayoshi, *ibid.*, Session 18, plen. 1209th mtg., September 20, 1963, p. 1-2.

29. Speech of Matsui Akira, *ibid.*, Session 18, 18 Committee, 1315th mtg., October 22, 1963, p. 27.

Japan signed the Treaty on 15 August 1963, and ratified it in June 1964. The Treaty was welcomed by all the political parties, more or less, as a step towards disarmament. But the Japan Communist Party surprisingly accused the United States for utilizing the partial test ban treaty to conceal America's further development of nuclear weapons and nuclear armament. It also further said that the treaty would have a positive meaning only if it led to the conclusion of a total nuclear ban and total disarmament.

After this, Japan continued to demand for the conclusion of a 'comprehensive test ban treaty' which would include underground tests. At the same time she also continuously appealed to both China and France to adhere to the test ban treaty. She was really dissatisfied firstly with the exclusion of the ban on underground tests and secondly, with the unwillingness of China and France to adhere to the treaty.

Since her ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, Japan's contribution towards the solution of disarmament problems was far reaching. She was one of the countries which actively participated in the so called 'Nuclear Detection Club' to find out a comprehensive means to ban underground tests. Moreover, her role in overall disarmament measures including the prohibition

30. Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (Berkeley, California, 1967), pp. 161-62.

of chemical and biological weapons and the abolition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed became popular. Japan also expressed to ban all these highly destructive weapons and even demanded to close down all the manufacturing centres. Realizing her role in Disarmament, she was proposed by the Powers in 1969 to become a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Japan subsequently became a member in 1969.

Chapter IV -

JAPAN AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Chapter IV

JAPAN AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

As we have seen in the previous chapter, during 1957-64, Japan's interest in disarmament was primarily confined to suspension of nuclear tests. At the same time, Japan also extended her support to the wider question of the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. As Japan entered Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) only in the year 1969, she used the United Nations as a forum to put across her views on the question.

In 1959, Ireland requested the General Assembly to discuss the question of the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. On 28 October of the same year, she submitted a draft resolution calling upon the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference to conclude an international agreement on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. On 20 November 1959, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 68 to none with 12 abstentions as resolution 1380 (XIV). Japan also voted in favour of the resolution.

In 1960, Japan became a co-sponsor of another revised Irish draft along with Ghana, Mexico and Morocco.¹ The draft resolution called upon the Nuclear Powers to conclude an

1. United Nations, United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970 (New York, 1970) p. 260.

agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. It further demanded the Nuclear Powers not to deliver nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations and also not to manufacture these weapons. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1960 by a vote of 68 to none with 26 abstentions. Two years later, on 18 November, 1962, the Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo reiterated in the Assembly that the Nuclear Powers should do what they could to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.²

Except on these rare occasions Japan's views on disarmament as already said, mostly confined to the suspension of nuclear tests. But beginning with the year 1965, following the successive nuclear tests by France and China, Japan became increasingly concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons, and was keen to work towards a halt to the proliferation of these weapons. By 27 September 1965 the Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo called for a comprehensive test ban treaty and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons. He regarded them as the most urgent task of the world and demanded the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests to achieve non-proliferation.³ Matsui Akira, the Japanese representative^{to} urged the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of

2. Speech of Okazaki Katsuo, GAOR, Session 17, 1st Committee, 1220th mtg., November 19, 1962, p. 162.
3. Speech of Shiina Etsusaburo, Ibid., Session 20, 1339th plen. mtg., September 28, 1965, p.10.

nuclear weapons as soon as possible.⁴ In the Japanese view there was a close relationship between a total ban of nuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. Further Japan thought that the existing Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 did not forbid all kinds of nuclear testing which might indirectly encourage the countries with a nuclear capability to develop their own devices by testing.⁵

After 1964 the question of non-proliferation became a dominant issue in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. However, as Japan was not a member she made known her views through other forums. During the Disarmament Commission meeting held in Geneva during April-June 1965, Japan expressed her views and wanted that the treaty should be based on these views. She said that the treaty should maintain the world balance of power, respected by all near-nuclear countries. Further, it was to be accompanied by a comprehensive test ban treaty and also by an inspection and control system under the IAEA.⁶ This was one of the earliest occasions when Japan participated in discussing the question of non-proliferation.

In the years, immediately followed the EDC discussed

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4. Speech of Matsui Akira *Ibid.*, Session 21, 1st Committee, 1434th mtg., October 28, 1966, p.33.
 5. Speech of Matsui Akira, *Ibid.*, Session 20, 1st Committee, 1326th mtg., November 26, 1965., p.187.
 6. K.V. Kesavan, Japan and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India Quarterly, (New Delhi) vol. 32, no. 1, January-March, 1976, pp. 6-16.

the question of non-proliferation and in August 1967, the two Super powers submitted a joint draft. Japan again expressed her views through the IAEA. She strongly desired the incorporation of three principles in the Treaty. They were: (a) international safeguard and inspection; (b) no discrimination about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and research; and (c) equal distribution of nuclear technology to member States.⁷

In February 1968, a revised version of the joint US-Soviet draft was discussed in the INDC. The General Assembly, during the twenty second session, adopted it as resolution 2373 (XXII) on 12 June 1968 by 95 votes to 4, with 21 abstentions. Japan was one of the 95 countries which favoured its adoption.

In order to know her views and basic stand, we are required to examine and analyse some of the speeches of Japanese representatives. Because it has a relevance to her problem of ratification.

The Japanese representative Teruzōka Senjin while subscribing to the spirit of the Treaty expressed the need for a careful consideration of several aspects of the draft treaty. His argument was mainly focussed on the General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX): "The Treaty should embody

7. Ibid.

8. See speech of Teruzōka Senjin, GAOR, Session 22, 1st Committee, 1565th mtg., May 10, 1968, pp. 7-9.

an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers". Teruzuka pointed out four questions which should be considered with regard to the above 'acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations'. They were (a) the question of security of states; (b) the question of nuclear disarmament; (c) the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (d) review conferences. He also viewed the treaty as one which lacked such a balance and demanded an agreement in a realistic and practical manner'.

Discussing the first question: the security of states, Teruzuka pointed out that under the draft treaty, the Nuclear Weapon States would be allowed to continue to manufacture nuclear weapons whereas the ^{Non-}Nuclear powers would be restricted to do so for at least a period of twenty-five years. The more serious matter was about the uncertainty of the Nuclear powers and near-nuclear powers to become a party to the Treaty. Considering these factors Teruzuka told that the security of the member states which would renounce their nuclear option must be assured by the Nuclear Weapon States. Otherwise, he said, the fears of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States could not be removed. In this regard he also spoke in favour of a security assurance to be undertaken by the United Nations. He believed that the fulfilment of the condition would have a direct

bearing on the ^{rule} member of States adhering to the Treaty.⁹

Coming to the second question; the question of nuclear disarmament, he particularly pointed that the new Treaty would legalize the distinction between the five Nuclear Weapon States and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. According to him, Japan believed that this distinction could be removed only when all the nuclear weapons were eliminated from the national arsenals.¹⁰ He also stressed the moral responsibilities and obligations of the Nuclear Powers to negotiate in good faith for the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and under strict and effective international control. Japan

9. Ibid. In relation to the above Japanese opinion of security of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, we are again reminded by a speech of Japanese representative Matsui Akiva. On 28 October 1968 Matsui said that the word 'proliferation' should not be interpreted "to prevent Non-Nuclear States from taking measures they deemed necessary in order to afford their security against possible nuclear attack or the threat of such attack." The Non-Nuclear Powers must be allowed to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with a Nuclear State, provided that such agreements did not entail the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

10. Ibid.

was aware of the present nuclear monopoly of the Nuclear Powers and he (Tsuruoka) appealed to them not to assist, encourage or induce others to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. During the 'transitional period', all Nuclear Powers should be urged to refrain from using, or threatening to use, their nuclear weapons in any manner inconsistent with the principles in the Charter of the United Nations^a.

Regarding the third question, Tsuruoka said that the Japanese Government would urge to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through international cooperation. In order to achieve the purpose, he believed that there should be no discrimination in the safeguard system. The international safeguards must be applicable to both nuclear and non-nuclear states for which he appealed to the Powers to accept the application of the IAEA safeguard system. Regional safeguard system must be subject to the international safeguard system. Tsuruoka thought that unless the Nuclear Powers accepted the same safeguard system they would not understand the national interests of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

Tsuruoka also touched upon ^{the} definition of explosive nuclear devices. According to him a nuclear explosive device was one 'designed to release, in microseconds, a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves'.

Accordingly, fast critical assemblies and thermonuclear fusion which were under a controlled process were not to be regarded as explosive devices. He also agreed to support the restrictions concerning the nuclear explosive devices contained in the draft treaty on NRT until a scientific advancement made such a distinction. Not the least he also appealed for a 'simplified' safeguard measure and demanded¹¹ for a freedom of nuclear research and development.

Lastly, he referred to the importance of review conferences at 'fairly frequent intervals'. As the Treaty dealt with the modern scientific weapons and problems, he believed that it was bound to make changes with the advancement of science. He said "The international situation is subject to change, unforeseen developments may occur in the field of science and technology. That is why we think it most important to make full use of the review conference procedure to ensure the effective and adequate operation of the treaty."¹²

After its adoption on 12 June 1968, the draft was submitted to the Security Council. The same was approved by the Security Council on 19 June by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions. The Treaty became open for signature on 1 July.

11. Speech of Tsuruoka Senjin, GAOR, Session 22, 1st Committee, 1565th mtg., May 10, 1968, pp. 7-9.

12. Ibid.

However, Japan was not in a hurry to sign it. She wanted to see the outcome of the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States which was to meet at Geneva during August-September 1968. She also watched the response of some near nuclear powers, particularly West Germany.

The Conference of the Non-Nuclear powers was convened under the auspices of the United Nations. The Conference was held from 29 August to 28 September 1968, in Geneva to consider three important questions concerned with the interests of the Non-Nuclear powers: (a) the assurance of the security of Non-Nuclear States; (b) the number of Non-Nuclear powers to co-operate in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (c) the use of nuclear devices exclusively for peaceful purposes.¹³ Japan attached great importance to the Conference and participated in it as a member state among the ninety-two Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

The Conference realized the danger of a nuclear war and destruction, and in particular stressed that the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States could be maintained only through general and complete disarmament by which all weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear would eventually be abolished.¹⁴

13. United Nations, Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (New York, 1968). p. 1.

14. Ibid., Resolution A. p. 4.

Stressing the total stoppage of arms race, the Non-Nuclear States demanded the "non-use of force and the prohibition of the threat of force in relations between States by employing nuclear or non-nuclear weapons...."¹⁵ and also called upon the Nuclear Powers "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against contracting parties to the treaty"¹⁶. They demanded information, scientific knowledge and advanced nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis. Most of the demands of Non-Nuclear Powers coincided with those of Japan.

The Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States met under the shadow of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. In Japan, the Russian intervention was considered as a violation of Czechoslovakia's freedom and aroused deep misgivings about the conduct of Nuclear Powers.¹⁷

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. p. 6.

17. For Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Problem of Signing of the Treaty see

(a) The Conference of Non-Nuclear Countries and Japan, Sankei 9 September 1968;

(b) Government may postpone Ratification of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Tokyo Shinbun, 16 September 1968;

(c) Non-Nuclear Power Conference and World Security, Nihon Keizai, 17 September 1968;

In the face of these developments there was much commotion in Japan on the question and the Japanese newspapers strongly urged their Government to reconsider the question of signing the Treaty. Interestingly enough, at that time, two near-nuclear powers: West Germany and Italy were also not in a mood to sign the Treaty and they followed a policy of utmost caution. In most of the popular newspapers in Japan, there was a strong appeal not to sign the Treaty. It was the belief of these newspapers that the postponement in signing the Treaty was regarded as one to enhance the progress of disarmament. The reluctance of West Germany, Italy, India and Japan to sign the Treaty was regarded as a proper move to check the high handedness of the Big powers. They were of the opinion that without the adherence of these near-nuclear powers, the Treaty would be meaningless.

The Japanese Government watched the attitude of other countries carefully. More than 60 nations came out to sign the Treaty. However, the reluctance of West Germany naturally drew the attention of Japan. Japan and Germany had many things in common. These former allies had attained tremendous progress in the field of nuclear technology, for the generation of electricity. They wanted guarantees of the Nuclear powers

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- (d) Clarify Reasons for Restudy of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty - Tokyo Shimbun, 18 September 1968;
 - (e) Careful View is Required, Komei Shimbun, 21 September 1968. in Daily Summary of Japanese Press (U.S. Embassy in Japan), September, 1968.

not to curb the peaceful use of nuclear energy and demanded for more simplified system of safeguards.

The signing of the Treaty happened to be a real and grave concern to both countries. The Japanese Foreign Minister Aiki Takeo visited the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1968. And, in return, Chancellor Kiesinger paid an official visit to Japan in May 1969 for a mutual discussion. Sato and Kiesinger agreed to closely 'consult with each other in handling the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty'. According to Japan Times Daily,¹⁸ the Chancellor hoped to seek 'some additional arrangement to ensure that peaceful utilization of nuclear energy would not be hampered by political pressures'.¹⁹

The Sato-Kiesinger meeting was said to have centred around two things: (a) effectiveness of the Treaty without the signature of the People's Republic of China; and (b) international inspection.²⁰ By November 1969, Germany's stand on signing the Treaty became clear. On 28 November 1969, Japan was somewhat reassured by the German announcement to sign the Treaty.

In addition to Germany's decision to sign the Treaty, the question concerning the reversion of Okinawa to Japan also

18. Japan Times Daily (Tokyo) 21 May, 1969.

19. Ibid., 20 May 1969.

20. Ibid.

had a bearing on Tokyo's stand on signing. ²¹ The Ryukyu Islands of which Okinawa was one of them had been under the US administration since the end of the Second World War. The inhabitants were mostly Japanese and it was quite natural for them to desire to revert to the Japanese mainland. A movement had started even in the 1950's and it had become quite intense during 1968-69. The problem posed a real threat to US-Japan relations and it needed a solution. Sato visited Washington in November 1969, and as a result of his talks with the United States leaders, an amicable settlement was arrived at by which the Americans would return the Island to Japan by May 1972, though they would continue to maintain military bases there on par with the mainland basis. At that time, there were reports that the United States was keen to make a bargain out of Okinawa. She wanted Japan to sign the NPT in return for Okinawa's reversion. It is difficult to prove or disprove these reports, but the fact that Japan signed the Treaty on 3 February 1970, so soon after Sato's visit to the United States only showed her keenness to please Washington.

✓ Japan signed the Treaty on 3 February, 1970 after a long delay of about eighteen months. Even then she hesitated

21. Shelton L. Williams, Nuclear Non-proliferation in International Politics: The Japanese Case (Denver, 1972), p.45.

about the future consequences of her adherence to the Treaty. Because of this she issued a long statement of her reservations²² which were to be fulfilled to create a congenial atmosphere for her ratification. The signing of the Treaty did not simply mean that she would ratify the Treaty. Her government made a clear distinction between signing and ratification. She clarified that ratification would depend upon the fulfilment of certain basic positions. She demanded the adherence of the people's Republic of China and France to the Treaty 'at an early date' and wanted them to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. She also said that the discrimination between the 'nuclear haves' and 'have-nots' must be made to disappear 'through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the Nuclear Weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time the Nuclear Weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.' Japan was to pay 'particular attention to the developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States....'²³

22. See for a full text of the Government's statement on Nuclear Pact, Ibid., 4 February 1970 or Annexure II of this dissertation.

23. Ibid.

The agreement to be concluded between Japan and the IAEA in accordance with Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation, must not be such (which) ^would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other States conclude with the same agency..." There should not be any 'discriminatory treatment in research development or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy...²⁴ Japan hoped to decide her ratification of the Treaty after the fulfilment of these prior conditions.

Attitudes of the Political Parties,
Press and the Business Circles

Though public opinion was strongly in favour of disarmament, unfortunately the NPT was engulfed in a political controversy from the very beginning. All the opposition parties objected to Japan's signature in some way or the other.²⁵ The business circles, too, joined them.

Ishibashi Masahi, Director of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) International Bureau charged the Government and the LDP that the Japanese people had been completely ignored in deciding the signing of the Treaty. The leading opposition

(24) Ibid.

(25) For the attitudes of these political parties, press, business organizations see Japan Times Daily (Tokyo), 4 February, 1970.

party also said that those prerequisite conditions for ratification were nothing more than "an easy way out to elude popular criticism". If the Government was in favour of nuclear disarmament, the party said, it should have issued a non-nuclear armament declaration and pledged for a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons and for the destruction of nuclear stockpiles.

The other opposition parties also joined to criticise the Government's decision. The Komeito party expressed its regret for the Government's hasty action, the consequences of which might be 'bad' for Japan's future and world peace. It further said that it would strive to build up public opinion against ratification which it regarded as a problem of crucial importance affecting Japan's nuclear policy.²⁶ The Japan Communist Party (JCP) expressed its strong opposition as it felt that the Treaty "helps the US policy for nuclear warfare". The party also regarded the Treaty as something which would make Japan an entire dependent on the US in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for a long period of twenty-five years.²⁷

The stand of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) seemed to be more inclined towards the Government's decision.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

The Party considered that the Government "was forced to sign the Treaty". But the Party demanded not to ratify unless "assurances of equality in inspection procedures and the protection of commercial secrets were obtained."

More or less, the Japanese Press also expressed the same view as the DSP. However, they changed their earlier stand and supported the Government when the latter decided to accede to the Treaty. At the same time, it also urged for national systems of control over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as far as possible.²⁸

But the business circles, connected especially with the Atomic Energy Industries, were very much unsatisfied with the Government's decision. They also expressed the disadvantages in the event of Japan's ratification of the Treaty. They regarded the Treaty as "uneven", because it would place Japan under strict international inspection for a long period of twenty-five years. They pointed out that Japan would suffer from two main problems: (a) the leakage of technological secrets through the international inspection; and (b) a more stringent inspection than that of West Germany. Shinojima Hiroyo, President of the Mitsubishi Chemical Industries Company, keeping these things in mind, called the Treaty

28. Ibid.

as "one of inequality". Because of the possibility of the leakage of industrial secrets, he warned the Government not to join the pact. In short almost all the opposition parties, business circles objected to the signing of the Treaty.

The Problem of Ratification

It is more than five years since the Treaty was signed and yet it has not yet been ratified. Since 1970, the LDR has however been making efforts in the direction of ratification. But Prime Minister Sato could not push through ratification as he had to tackle a number of serious problems following Nixon's shocks and Sino-American rapprochement. Tanaka Kakuei who succeeded Sato was very much overburdened with the problems of normalising relations with the Peoples' Republic of China. Later, he was involved in personal controversy which prevented him from taking up question of ratification.

It was only with the succession of Miki Takeo in December 1974 that efforts were resumed for its ratification. Interestingly enough it was Miki who as Foreign Minister had earlier prepared the ground for Japan's signing of the NPT. Because of this he took a particular interest in ratification too. Moreover, the review conference of the Treaty was scheduled to be held from 5 May 1975. After having a satisfactory agreement with the IAEA, Miki hoped to ratify the Treaty during

the Winter Session of 1974-1975. However, he failed.

Japan's failure to ratify the Treaty during 1975 forms an interesting study. Though the LDP which has got an overwhelming majority in the Diet is sharply divided over the issue of ratification. Opponents of ratification within the Party were found in the right wing faction, which could be called as 'cautious group'. The present LDP General Secretary Nakasone Yasuhiro, Moriyama Kinji, a leading member of the Party are the ones who think that three prior conditions had not been fulfilled except the assurance of equality in inspection. Asita Kiichi, an advocate of the 'cautious group' and Chairman of the LDP Security Council said, "it is necessary to have the remaining two conditions ^{fulfilled} ~~ratified~~. In particular the problem of security should be made clear." The nationalist group in the LDP e.g. ^{circa} ~~Suikaku~~ feared that the ratification of the Treaty would unnecessarily close Japan's nuclear options for more than twenty years. This 'cautious group' has been the main opponent in ratifying the Treaty within the LDP.

The 'cautious group' paid particular attention to the conditions which were to be fulfilled prior to Japan's ratification. It thought that the question of disarmament, and security had not been solved. As for the safeguard system, Japan concluded an agreement with the IAEA in February 1975 which put Japan on a par with ^REUATOM countries in regard to inspection. This agreement more or less fulfilled Japan's

condition on inspection.²⁹ Therefore, the problem of ratification depended particularly on the remaining two conditions.

The 'cautious group' agreed that Japan did not see any sign of progress towards disarmament after the signing of the Treaty. It can be justified by three examples: (a) the continuous nuclear tests by France and China; (b) the failure of US-Soviet agreement on SALT (II); (c) India's nuclear test followed by those of other powers.

Considering the first problem, Japan had repeatedly asked the People's Republic of China and France to become signatories to the NPT. On several occasions she had appealed to these two powers to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty. China and France were unmoved and continued with their nuclear policies. But Japan thought that their adherence to the Treaty was a prerequisite condition for her ratification.

Here one interesting thing is that Japan never suggested the participation of these two Nuclear powers in concluding the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The two treaties were, more or less, a product of only three Nuclear powers: The United States, the United Kingdom

29. For this opinion, see for instance B. M. Kaushik, "Japan and the Non-proliferation Treaty," News-Review on Japan, South East-Asia and Australia (Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi) March 1975, pp.171-73.

and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the interests of these two nuclear powers seem~~g~~ to have partly been ignored. No doubt, these two powers became nuclear powers at a later stage. But Japan never paid any attention to these powers. There were negotiations among these three Nuclear powers. There was a Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon states to consider their interests. But even in one instance, it is not found Japan speaking and suggesting the participation of these Powers in the negotiations of the Nuclear powers. But their adherence to the Treaty was a prior condition for her ratification. It seems to be highly unsound and a gross mistake.

The United States and the Soviet Union played a leading role in ^{draw}clearing up the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Non-Nuclear powers believed that the legalization of five Nuclear powers to retain their nuclear monopoly would threaten their own security. That was one of the reasons why they urged a guarantee for security. Nonetheless, the Nuclear Powers (The United Kingdom, The United States and the Soviet Union) agreed to negotiate for the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date. The negotiation had started long back between the Soviet Union and the United

30. See Article VI of the Treaty, Annexure II of this dissertation.

States and their failure to reach an agreement discouraged the interests of some near-nuclear Powers e.g. West Germany, Italy, Japan etc. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II which would supplement the Treaty and would enhance the success of nuclear disarmament were deadlocked.³¹ Till April 1976, there was no concrete and formal agreement, i.e. after nearly seven years the signing of the Treaty. Therefore, it is quite natural for the Non-Nuclear Powers to watch their promises fulfilled.

India's Nuclear Explosion and its Impact

In the midst of this unfavourable atmosphere, India also joined the nuclear club by conducting a nuclear explosion on 18 May, 1974. All the Japanese political parties adopted a unanimous resolution in the Japanese Diet to protest against India's test. The Mayor and President of the Assembly of Nagasaki protested to the Indian Embassy, and Hiroshima municipality despatched a telegram strongly criticising

31. See for a similar opinion and changes in U.S.-Japan relations after the success of SALT.

Walter C. Clumens Jr. SALT, The NPT and the US-Japanese Security Relations, Asian Survey (California) vol. 10, no. 12, December 1970, pp. 1037-1045, and for relevance to Japanese ratification and the SALT II see Statesman (New Delhi), 3 May 1976.

India's act. Above all a more drastic step was the decision in 1974 of the Japanese Foreign Ministry not to increase any amount in aid given to Aid India Consortium.

India's detonation which was regarded for peaceful purposes only was soon followed by a series of French, Chinese and British tests. The Japanese thought that India's explosion had set in unhealthy winds for a series of tests. India's test hardened the Japanese stand on ratification.

Japan's reluctance or delay in ratifying the Treaty was also closely connected with her own security. The 'cautious group' gave topmost priority to it. According to this group adherence to the Treaty would close Japan's nuclear option. The group linked ratification of the NPT with the continuance of the US-Japan Security Pact. The group grimly noted that the alliance between Washington and Tokyo could be terminated by one year's notice by either of the parties. They feared that if the U.S. were to terminate the alliance suddenly then Japan's adherence to the NPT would certainly expose ^{her} it to external nuclear threat. The group therefore wanted positive assurances from the U.S. that ^{she} it would not take any hasty action leading to the termination of the alliance.

The visit of Foreign Minister Miyarawa Kiichi to the U.S. in April 1975 was intended only to obtain categorical

assurances from the United States on the continuation of the alliance.³² Moreover, the 'cautious group' also wanted to interpret 'prior consultation' clause of the Security Treaty to include facilities to bring nuclear weapons into the country in times of emergency.

The LDP executive started a negotiation with this group to come to a compromise and the former also agreed to consider the entry of the US nuclear weapons into Japan whenever the situation demanded. Though by 25 April, 1975 a broad agreement was reached between the party executive and the right-wing group, it was already late to have the Treaty ratified by the Diet.

On the other hand the Government, particularly the pro-ratification group said that any further delay in ratification would arouse the suspicion of the outside world in regard to Japan's commitment to international treaties, which would be contrary to Japan's national interest. In this regard the former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and former Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio organised a league to promote an early ratification. Thus within the ruling LDP there was a sharp division over the issue of its ratification.

Here it would be relevant to note the attitudes of

32. Kawan, n. 7.

other parties. One significant development after the signing of the Treaty was seen in Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Though the party opposed its signing on the ground that it would support the nuclear monopoly of the Big powers, a section of the party expressed its support to its ratification. The pro-Soviet faction, Shikaishingī Kyokai supported its early ratification whereas the pro-Chinese faction led by Sasaki Kozo opposed it. The former group asked, "Do the opponents of the ratification think that the cause of nuclear disarmament can be advanced if this nation does not ratify the Treaty?"³³ The pro-Chinese faction criticised, based on the U.S. opportunities to bring in nuclear weapons into Japan.

About the other opposition parties - the Japan Communist Party (JCP) strongly opposed the ratification whereas the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party supported it conditionally.

Thus Japan could not ratify the NPT by May 1975. It therefore attended the review conference in May 1975 as an observer without having any voting right.

33. Japan Times Weekly, 5 April 1975.

Japan's postponement of ratification has greatly increased the suspicion of other powers and peoples whether she would go nuclear.³⁴ Their suspicion seems to be quite sound and logical because of her highly developed nuclear technology, widespread use of nuclear reactors for the generation of electricity and expansion of defence under the Fourth Defence Plan (1972-76).

But it should be remembered that non-ratification of the NPT would not substantially alter Japan's position vis-a-vis her nuclear options as long as she depends upon outside sources for her basic nuclear fuels. It seems that ratification of the NPT would ensure a smooth flow of nuclear fuels.³⁵ There is a lot of validity in the belief that Japan cannot have nuclear options outside the N-T framework.

34. For discussion on whether Japan will rearm with nuclear weapons. See

Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (Penguin, 1973), pp. 165-68.

also Bullard, Montan R., "Japan's Nuclear Choice", Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 9, September 1974, pp. 845-53.

T.J. Kempell, "Japan's Nuclear Allergy," Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 68, no. 404, April 1975, pp. 169-173.

also John K. Emerson and Leonard A. Humphrey, Will Japan Rearm? (Hoover Institute, California, 1973) etc.

35. The Statesman (New Delhi), 20 April 1976.

There are also other factors which do not point to the possibility of Japan going nuclear. The pacifism of the Japanese people is still very strong and it manifested itself in a violent form recently following Vice-Admiral R. La Roque's statement in September 1974 that American nuclear ships "do not offload them (nuclear weapons) when they go into foreign ports such as of Japan or other countries"³⁶. The difficulty of Mutsu, Japan's first nuclear ship to get a home port is also a case in point. Furthermore, the Japanese people resent the construction of nuclear reactors and power stations on the ground that they pollute the environment. All these have a bearing on the ratification of the NPT. As of the end of April 1976, the NPT is still under consideration in the Japanese Diet. It remains to be seen whether the 1976 Winter Session will ratify it.

36. Quoted in Seki Hirohuru, "Nuclear Proliferation and our Option," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), vol. 22, no. 1, January-March 1975, pp. 13-21.

Chapter V

C_ONCLUSION

Chapter V

Conclusion

From the foregoing chapters, we know that Japan has an earnest wish to eliminate nuclear weapons. This has been mainly due to her experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan does not want to see the repetition of such an atomic holocaust in the future. Therefore, she has been appealing to the Powers to limit, reduce and eliminate the highly destructive nuclear weapons from their nuclear arsenals.

Japan is in favour of utilising nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and has already made tremendous progress in the development of nuclear technology. The production of nuclear bombs lies within her technical and scientific competence. The soundness of her economy moreover makes it easier. But it remains to be seen whether Japan will make a political decision to produce bombs.

Despite her technical advancement and economic prosperity, there are certain geographical and psychological reasons inhibiting Japan from going nuclear. She is a very small country, and in the event of a nuclear war, it will be difficult for her to have a second-striking power. Moreover, as has been stated earlier, the psychological effect of Hiroshima and Nagasaki lingers on still in the minds of the Japanese. The so called 'nuclear allergy' may continue for an indefinite period.

Though there has been a fine degree of national consensus on Japan's policy, it is interesting to note that the NPT itself has been a subject of considerable controversy in Japanese politics. After a lot of vacillation, Japan signed the NPT in February 1970. At the time of signing it, Japan however laid down that certain conditions have to be fulfilled before she could ratify the Treaty. Those conditions were: (a) adherence of China and France to the Treaty; (b) general improvement in the disarmament negotiations and (c) a simple and more equal inspection system.

Since 1970, Japan has been working at two levels to push through ratification. First, she has sought to educate the people about the implications of the Treaty. Second, she also worked vigorously to achieve the maximum in terms of inspection system, and security. Soon after signing, Japan started negotiations with the IAEA on inspection measures, and after many ups and downs, an agreement was reached only in February 1975 by which Japan would be subject to the same inspection measures as the ECATOM countries. This removed one of the obstacles to ratification.

Security has also been a matter of great importance to Japan. Until now, Japan has pursued a non-nuclear policy while depending upon the American nuclear deterrent power. What will be the future of America's deterrent power? Conservative

ections within the ruling LDP have persistently asked whether the United States will maintain her alliance with Japan until 1995 when the NPT expires. Their fear is: If Japan's ratification of the NPT is followed by a sudden termination of Tokyo-Washington alliance, Japan will then be exposed to nuclear threats from outside. Hence they would like to have positive assurances from the United States for an indefinite continuance of the security alliance. In other words, ratification of the NPT would seem to still further strengthen Japan's ties with the United States. This is precisely the ground on which some of the opposition political parties also criticised ratification.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that non-ratification of the NPT is not going to improve Japan's position vis-a-vis her nuclear options as long as she depends upon outside sources of nuclear fuel. If outside nations like the United States, Canada or the United Kingdom threaten to stop the supply of nuclear fuel, Japan's position will become truly delicate. Because of this, it seems, Japan's nuclear options lie within the framework of the NPT. On the other words, it is more practical for Japan to remain a first class non-nuclear country with nuclear-weapon capability.

A P P E N D I C E S

Appendix I

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available

for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from

the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty,

and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of

-equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic

Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. -Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

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Appendix II

Statement of the Government of Japan on the
Occasion of the Signing of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty,
February 3, 1970

The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favor of the spirit underlying this treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.

The Government of Japan is signing this treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.

The Government of Japan is convinced that this treaty will serve as a first step toward nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many states as possible will adhere to this treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this treaty.

This treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon states to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon states from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon states should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.

The prohibition under this treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this treaty must in no way restrict nonnuclear-weapon states in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.

The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.

This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the treaty.

I: DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each state party undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to

nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon states should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.

2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the treaty there is a provision stating that "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." It also wishes to emphasize that the nuclear-weapon states must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states.

3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any nonnuclear-weapon state, party to the treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-

weapon states will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of nonnuclear-weapon states.

4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the security of nonnuclear-weapon states and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.

5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that: "Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

II. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other states parties conclude with the same agency, either individually or together with other states. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before

taking steps to ratify the treaty.

2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this treaty, the declarations of the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon states will take similar action.

3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the states concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.

4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair bur-

-den in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the nonnuclear-weapon states to which such safeguards are to be applied.

5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the treaty relating to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in nonnuclear-weapon states shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment, or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to nonnuclear-weapon states, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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