




DECLARATION

Certified that the material presented in this dissertation has not been submitted for any other diploma or degree of this or any other University.


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NEW DELHI-

THE CONGRESS PARTY
IN
UTTAR PRADESH

Sudha Baliga
(1975)

P R E F A C E

"The Congress Party In Uttar Pradesh" is a dissertation written in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Philosophy of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The Centre for Political Studies of the School of Social Sciences under whose auspices this was carried out has tried to encourage work on new areas of Indian Politics which have not been touched so far. For this reason, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn in this study are at best tentative, until further research is carried out in this field. State Politics is an area on which very few studies have been conducted. Most studies on Indian Politics tend to focus on the national scene and political activity at the level of the central government. However, the most important and interesting developments in India today, are taking place at the State level. The continuance and success of the Democratic order in India is largely dependent on the Indian states attaining political maturity, and economic self-sufficiency. Keeping this view point in mind, this study was undertaken.

This project would not have been possible without the able guidance of my advisor Professor Rasheeduddin Khan. I am grateful to him for his advice, patience and untiring guidance at all times.

.....

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Brief Introduction Of The Theme

A significant feature of the Indian political system has been the dominant position occupied by the Indian National Congress Party both within the party system in India, and within the political system as a whole. Because of its large size and heterogenous composition, factional politics have always played an important role within the Congress party from the very beginning. Even before independence the Congress was a party divided into a number of groups all held together by the charismatic leadership of Gandhi, and the common desire to attain national independence. The existence of a large number of factions within the party has had a profound effect on its internal structure, the nature and composition of its membership, its functioning, and in fact has generated a distinct style of political behaviour which permeates Indian politics today. In spite of its dominant position, however, the party has been the principal agent of political processes that can be negatively described as non-totalitarian, or positively described as involving, a degree of personal liberty and democratic articulation. This is because democratic intervention between opposing viewpoints and interests have been institutionalised in a party system, which, while subject to some non-democratic currents, has provided a degree of stability and flexibility. One set of writers such as Selig Harrison, have argued in the past, that India must either develop a multi-party system, or face

the consequences of totalitarian rule. Such an analysis of the functioning of the Congress tends to focus on the structural requisites of a democratic party system, its outward forms, without giving proper attention to the internal functional operation of the system. The particular institutional arrangements of parties seem to be less important than the manner in which they function, and the bases which support the particular style which has developed. It can be argued, as it will be in the course of this work, that given a political system in which one-party is dominant, factionalism becomes the nexus of the political system to, or from which, all politics must relate and hence is a key element in analysis. Factionalism which in India has often been considered a negative term connoting internal dissension and self-seeking at the expense of the larger body will be considered in terms of its deeper ramifications. In this study an attempt will be made to examine the working of the Congress party in U.P. between 1967 and 1974 by focusing attention on the role of factions within it.

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CHAPTER 1

Factions: A Conceptual Analysis And Western Experiment.

In a large number of the countries of Asia and Africa, undergoing modernization and political development, and where a single dominant party has emerged, factional politics have come to play an important role. In most of these countries, as in India, factional strife has been specially marked within the ruling party. A number of reasons have been advanced for the existence of this phenomena. Many writers have held, that the process of the transformation of a heterogeneous national movement into a single coherent party after Independence, has led to a process of both integration and disintegration during which time internal strife is inevitable. These divisions it is pointed out, have occurred for a variety of reasons - the distribution of power and status in the government, economic development, foreign policy etc. Some writers in fact have interpreted factional behaviour in Indian politics as inevitable¹. Factions have been viewed as the principle structural media through which the political process is modulated in systems of one-party variety². Or again by another writer factional activity is seen as a reflection of the attempt to

1. Mary C. Carras, Dynamics of Indian Political Factions. A Study Of District Councils In the State Of Maharashtra (Bombay: Cambridge University Press, 1972)

2. Ibid., 1

adopt party organisation to the traditional society for the faction it is held, belongs to the traditional order³. Factions in fact, have largely been viewed as a part of the growing pains of modernization which will disappear with the development of a full-fledged multi-party system.

However, factions are found in such highly developed party systems as Britain and U.S.A. Factionalism is a phenomena that in differing degrees - plays an important role in the internal structure of all modern political parties. Even totalitarian systems like the USSR are prone to groupism though, such strife is usually explained in terms of a power struggle within the party. It is important to remember that the Congress party, is a party of patronage. It must be viewed as a political organisation whose leadership is concerned with providing material and status satisfaction to its members rather than an ideological party faced with the problem of reconciling diverse intellectual positions. In U.P. factions have played an important role in the economic life of the State. They have been responsible not only for the rise and fall of governments, but have determined by their activity the nature of the policies adopted by the Government. Hence factions it will be argued are basically and ultimately, a

3. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics In An Indian State: The Congress Party In Uttar Pradesh (Bombay; Oxford University Press 1966):2

faction of economic interest. The case studies on sugar and land levy undertaken are merely examples of such activity which pervades almost all spheres of government.

The term 'faction' has been used ⁱⁿ by different ways hence it is necessary first to understand what we mean by the phenomena of factionalism, and to explain why the study of factional behaviour has become so important today. Moreover, factions are found in all political parties though the nature and extent of factional activity may differ. Factions are found in such widely divergent party systems as Britain which has a two-party system and Italy which has a multi-party system. Hence a brief survey of the party systems of some of the Western countries, and their experience with this phenomena would give us a better understanding of the various forms of factional activity. This will provide us a theoretical framework with which we can analyse the working of factional politics in the Congress party in general, and in U.P. in particular.

Factionalism is a specific aspect of political behaviour manifested by rival groups within a political party. Factions have always existed within political parties, when governments were mostly monarchical, political factions consisted either of two groups vying for the royal favour or of supporters of the king and his opponents. Eventually it was out of

-4-

factions that parties emerged. The two terms were used synonymously for sometime and it has taken 'party' a long time to rid itself of the connotation of the faction. Parties have acquired a respectable position, but factions have not been so successful. It was partly for this reason that for a long time political scientists devoted very little attention to the analysis of factional behaviour. Traditionally most studies of political parties were based on this erroneous assumption that parties are and must primarily be, doctrinal bodies. This tendency was due to the prevailing liberal conception which views the party primarily as an ideological group, and has given rise to many interesting works which belong rather to the history of political ideas than sociological analysis. Hence very little importance was attached to the internal structure and functioning of parties. In recent years, however, a greater emphasis is being placed on the study of the informal groupings which exist within it. Present day parties moreover are distinguished far more by their program or, the class of their members than by their ideology. The party of "notables" has given way to the recognition that a party is a, "community with a particular structure."⁴ Modern parties are characterised primarily by their autonomy. The protozoa of the former periods have

4. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation And Activity In The Modern State (London: Methuen & Co. 1969): XV.

been succeeded by the 20th century party with its complicated and differentiated organism. Hence we find use of the word "party machine".

The importance of the internal party organization was first recognised by writers such as, Ostrogorski⁵ and later Michels⁶. For long the study of the sociology of political parties was dominated by Michels, Iron Law of Oligarchical tendencies which he applied to the internal functioning of political parties. It was believed that Oligarchs and Oligarchical patterns develop in all parties and most of the decisions are made by a few men at the top. However, today it is not easy to believe that the many members of a party - even if we think only of the activists - can be united on a significant ideology under a dominant leadership. A political party is, as Samuel Beer has said of the British Labour Party, "a coalition embracing many interests and points of view"⁷.

Such a change in the western world is mainly due to the rise in this century of three main broad currents of political thought: pluralist theory, elitist theory and irrationalist theory. Pluralism in the guise of group theory, raised doubts about the socialist conception of the party's purpose, and suggested rather that the party is essentially a coalition

5. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy And Organisation Of Political Parties (London: 1902)

6. Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological Study Of The Oligarchical Tendencies Of Modern Democracy (Leipzig: 1925)

7. Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics. A Study Of Parties And Pressure Groups (London: Faber & Faber 1969): 105

of groups each with its distinctive aim or goal, and that in consequence, any action of the party as a whole can be understood by analysing it into the action of these component groups. Leaders of the party it held function as brokers mediating between groups trying to combine the demands of various groups with compromise, ambiguity, and gloss of principle as they find necessary and effective. The critical and most suggestive assertion was that the component groups have different goals, and the equally important assertion that all groups do not share the same goal. Following this line of pluralist thinking Bernard Crick defined the Labour Party as " a coalition of diverse class, union, regional, ideological and even ethnic interest"⁸.

The central proposition of elitist theory has been that in such a massive political formation as a modern political party, the initiative and certainly the decisive power must be exercised by the leadership. This leadership in traditional group theory was a single unified elite dictating to the rest of the society. It is possible and more likely, however, that instead of a single elite, or leadership group, we should find circles or echelons of influential persons at various level from the rank and file to the top chiefs.

Irrationalist theory proposed that leaders do not win and exercise influence on the party by purely

⁸. Bernard Crick, "Britain's Democratic Party, "The Nation C x CI (December 10, 1960)12:453

rational persuasion, and appeal to ideology . Rather in the absence of a unified image of party ideology, the influence of leaders is founded upon reliance on demagogic manipulation of sentiments, charismatic appeals and skillfully "manufacturing" the opinion of groups, and imposing it on its followers.

Due to these theories a large number of multi-factored determinants within the internal party organisation are being studied which can help define the complex nature of political parties today. One of these determinants which helps us to understand internal party structure is factionalism.

In sociological analysis, the term faction can be used in one of two senses⁹. Objectively it may denote, a certain condition without implying a value judgement. This condition occurs when a sub-group is formed from members of a larger group and they separate themselves from the rest.

The components of a faction are (a) definite personnel the leaders at least should be clearly known even if the boundaries of the membership are blurred (b) Enough organisation to provide the sub-group with the rudiments of structure and cohesion (c) a common interest which brings them together initially (d) common objectives to keep them together, for outside that they are identified as having these relationships (f) an opponent or opponents (e.g. a rival faction)

9. Leslie Lipson, cited in Julius Gould & William L.Kolb (ed) Dictionary Of Social Sciences (USA: Tavistock Publications 1964). 255-6.

regarded as competitors.

Or, the word faction may also signify in addition to the objective conditions set forth above, an attitude towards them. Until comparatively recent times, this was unfavourable. It is expressed or implied the feeling that forming factions is bad and they put asunder those who ought to be united. Hence all aspects of factions - their membership, aims, strategies and tactics have been under general condemnation.

Today, however, the term faction is employed more sparingly and accurately than in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. It is used today (a) in communities with well developed party systems to refer to struggles over leadership and policy that go on between sub-groups within the party (b) in communities where a party system has not yet developed and it describes the clusters of persons from which parties may develop later.

In our study of factionalism it is necessary to distinguish factions from other groups which may exist within a political party. In our study of the congress this is needed because of the large number of groups that co-exist within it. Three elements have long been of importance within parties, ^{factions} and ~~clarity~~ tendencies, and non-aligned partisons¹⁰.

10. Richard M Rose, Parties Factions And Tendencies In Britain cited in Roy C. Macridis (ed) Political Parties: Contemporary Trends And Ideas (Harper & Row, 1967:102-118)

A political faction may be defined, as a group of individuals based on representatives in Parliament who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organised political activity.¹¹ They are hence distinguished from all other groups by having membership in Parliament rather than in the Civil service, army or elsewhere. Moreover, as against all adhoc groups, factions exist through time and are fairly stable. Factions may be distinguished from exponents of a political tendency because factions are self consciously organised as a body with a measure of discipline, commitment to a common set of policies, and cohesion thus resulting. In contrast, a political tendency is a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians. It may be broadly defined as a body of attitudes expressed in Parliament about a broad range of problems, the attitudes are held together by a more or less coherent political ideology, and all parties develop right or left wing tendencies. Political tendencies, unlike factions are fluid, unorganised and have no fixed personnel. Tendencies may form factions in time, but it is not necessary. Parties with internal factions tend to have more clearly defined tendencies. Non-alignment is identification with positions supported by the whole electoral party, rather than with factions

11. Ibid., 106

and tendencies. Non-alignment may result from an active concern with only the gross differences between political parties, from a passive attitude towards policy issues; or from a calculated desire to avoid identification with particular tendencies in order to gain popularity in the party as a whole. Within the party system in India such partisans are the so-called "Independents", who often contest elections on an independent ticket but who return to their party when offered a ministership, or when their own bargaining positions are strong. During periods of intense factionalism, non-aligned partisans represent the resources which disputants attempt to mobilize on their side. Both political tendencies and non-aligned partisans interact with factions to create the internal power patterns of a political party.

Finally, factions may be distinguished from pressure groups because the former are concerned with a wide range of political issues including foreign affairs and defence as well as economic and social welfare. Both are organised groups and represent an aspect of group behaviour; both of them organise sectional interests and represent such interests. However, the distinction between the two lies in the fact that while pressure groups perform these functions for a whole society, factions are sub-systems within a party and hence cater only to the personnel of that party.

In the study of party politics, Britain is often cited as the leading example of a homogenous two-party

system. However, it is not correct to label the whole party system by merely referring to the electoral position and role of the parties concerned. If we distinguish between parties as "electoral institutions" and as "policy institutions" we realise that within each party in Britain there are a number of groups which may from an electoral point of view belong to the same party, but from the view-point of policy decisions are sharply divided. Behind the facade of unity maintained by the conventions of Parliamentary government, M.Ps. and Ministers can differ radically with each other, and conflicts in personalities, party principles etc. can give rise to conflict. Hence parties in Britain as elsewhere are instruments of factions, vehicles of men seeking power and status, centres of social activities and so on. As Richard Rose has pointed out, within each "electoral party" there are a number of "policy parties", and so it is necessary to ask not only which electoral party has a Parliamentary majority but also which "policy party" predominates in the victorious "electoral party"¹². The difference is important because often general elections may not result in a formal change in party government, but in a confirmation, or removal of the combination in office. Policy parties (factions) emerge between elections and contrary to general belief play an important role within the Parliamentary system. (1) They act as a counter weight against

¹². Rose n. 10, 105

pressure groups acting on the Cabinet (2) A united Cabinet can fend off criticism from the opposition party indefinitely, but the protest of a policy party within a governing party is immediately felt, and has often given rise to upsets and defeat in Parliament (3) The need to balance factions, tendencies and individuals one against another is a major restraint upon the power of the P.M. who traditionally has been looked upon as all-powerful once in power (4) Policy divisions help to maintain flexibility and diversity in a political system in which outwardly a grant of power is made to one party for a long period of time. Thus we see that factions in Britain play an important role within the political system as a whole. As in India a single party may remain in power for a long time, but the surface cohesion of British parties reflects an equilibrium between forces pulling in different directions.

Factional behaviour in France provides a very different example of factionalism, thus proving that the nature of factionalism is dependent on various factors. The Fourth Republic of France was perhaps the era when factional politics permeated a multi-party system, inspite of the existence of a strong totalitarian party at the Right and an authoritarian party at the Left. Successive coalition governments proved unstable due to the fact that parties which joined in a coalition could not satisfy all sections

of their membership regarding relations with other parties and on policy issues. Each group pulled the party in different directions making coalitions between heterogenous parties unstable. However, underlying the weak structure and discipline of the party system, lies the fact that factions during this period in reality mirrored the lack of consensus over ideological issues in French society. Hence factional behaviour was complex and must be viewed in the light of the total political situation. But instability did not mean total discontinuity. The centre coalition remained in power and Cabinet reshuffles or even change in government merely meant bringing in or dropping members of powerful factions which had either currently gained the upper hand or been defeated on some issue. For e.g. Robert Schumann & Georges Bidault, until 1954 between them monopolized the foreign Ministry (in different coalitions) bringing continuity in French foreign policy. The best example of a faction ridden party was the French Radical Party which prided itself on representing basic national characteristics and was as deeply divided into groups, as French society itself. In the eyes of many members it was more than a party: it was a "microcosm of France itself"¹³. The groups within it ranged from Classical Radicals, Liberal Radicals, Capatalist Radical to the Reactionary and the New Radicals.¹⁴. However, inspite of the

13. Francis De Tarr, The French Radical Party (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 239

14. Ibid., XVI

groupism with the party, the Radical party played an important role on the French political scene during the post-war years. In a very real sense, its ideological confusions were a major source of strength, and with the aid of its internal divisions it was able to represent a large fraction of French opinion. Hence while factionalism may on the one hand produce instability, its positive role must be noted. In pluralistic society factions provide representation to a larger section of society than parties can.

In spite of the existence of a two party system in America, the nature of factional activity is different from that of Britain. This is because of a few main factors - (a) America has a Presidential system of government, and factionalism within legislative parties does not lead to governmental instability, rather it gives more room for groupism (b) America has a federal system of government because

of which parties operate at three levels - district, state and national levels. The interest of party members at these levels may not coincide (c) In America, the party machine has come to the forefront. Over the past fifty years, tightly managed party organisation has been replaced by a "nameless - faceless" machine which is highly fractionalised leaving room for groups at every level.

Factionalism is found at all levels beginning from the districts, but it is at the State level that this phenomena is particularly seen and is relevant, in our study of State politics in India. The American states provide an interesting example of how deceptive the working of a party system can be unless we take into consideration the factional activity going on with the parties. Although, it is held that the American states have a two-party system, only in a dozen states do two major parties compete on fairly even basis. In the remainder of the States, overwhelming attachment to one or other party leads to a bewildering variety of factions. The

great functions of parties - nomination of candidates, conduct of government etc. - is carried on by competing factions. For purposes of analysis we can place these States on a sliding scale¹⁵. At the centre of the scale, the Democratic and Republican parties compete for control of the State Government in the fashion of the national parties. As one moves from this central point in one direction or other, the functions of parties are performed by factions within the electorally dominant party. Towards the two extremes of the scale, parties simply do not function in the sense of providing alternative choices to the electorate. In these States, elections mean nothing, the essential decisions are made in the nomination process of the dominant party by factions. The system of primaries meant to reduce party politics has in reality encouraged factional fights. Thus in America, the party nationally tends to be an allegiance of state, district, city, and town leaders who work together during a general election because of the need of the hour. The national convention of the party is a gathering of sovereigns, rather than subordinates under a Chairman. The party hence is not a disciplined army rather, it consists of centres of power.

Socialist parties are usually characterised by

15. V.O. Key. Jr. Parties Politics And Pressure Groups
(New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1958): 318

tight party discipline, a cadre-type organisation, and an elite leadership which leaves very little room for groupism. However, the working of the Italian socialist part (PSI) in the 1950^s affords an example of a socialist party affected by factional strife¹⁶. Like France, Italy has a multi-party system, the PSI is one of the three major groupings consisting of the Social Democrats, the Socialists and Communists, that have cultivated the ground to the left of the Centre in Italian politics since world war II. The reasons underlying factionalism in the PSI are very different from those which give rise to this phenomena in Britain, France and America.

Factional groups in the Socialist party were basically divided over their party's relationship with the Communists¹⁷. Till 1952, the PSI appeared to have been inextricably linked with the communists, but from 1952 onwards some groups came up which tried to support a left-centre coalition made up of the Social democrats, Christian Democrats and Republicans. They upheld the possibility of a "socialist alternative" to the communists around which the bulk of Italian electorate could be gathered. Hence 'pro' and 'anti' communist factions proliferated and they have been sensitive to political changes in International Communism and European Communist countries. The PSI

16. Raphael Zariski "The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study In Factional Conflict" American Political Science Review II (June 1962) 5:372-391

17. Ibid., 373

factions hence are an example of factions originating and reacting to international movements, situations and their party's attitude towards them. Such factors as, Italy's close alignment with the west and its entry into NATO and the Common Market, the rapid economic growth in the country, Stalin's death and Soviet policy - these and other considerations, more than internal ones - had an impact on intraparty conflict.

Keeping in mind these examples of factional behaviour we can come to a few general conclusions regarding factionalism as a facet of political behaviour (a) Modern political parties are not dominated by a single ruling elite rather, they are made up of centres of power; a widely dispersed and democratic machine has replaced the older hierarchical structure and is run by leaders found at various levels and geographical points. The individual party forms a "system" within which sub-systems (factions) operate and clash in order to gain control over the entire structure. To this extent all modern parties are prone to factionalism (b) Factions are found both in two party and multi party systems. A two-party system as in Britain or in the American States does not consist of two homogenous parties, and when for a long time a single party dominates as in some American States all political conflicts may take place within

the ruling party (c) Factional politics affect legislative activity in both Parliamentary and Presidential systems. In fact in Britain as we saw, they have affected the position of the Cabinet, the P.M. the opposition etc. (d) The formation of coalitions when the dominant party loses its majority does not put an end to in-groupism. In spite of its weaker position and awareness of internal pressure, as in the PSI in Italy, factional politics continue. It is important to remember this, because if we look at the political scene in U.P. from 1967 onwards we find that the Congress party failed to gain a majority and had to enter into coalitions with other parties thus losing its dominant position until 1974. But factional strife did not cease, it continued as before.

Hence factionalism is a complex phenomena and the nature of factional activity is dependent upon a variety of factors. It is determined mainly by the prevailing ideas and values in society which form as it were, a political environment within which factions grow and develop, and secondly by the nature of the party system which provides the immediate setting within which factions operate. Keeping these theoretical considerations in mind we now turn first, to an examination of the nature of the congress party in India at the Central and State levels, to discover the nature of factionalism within it.

The Factional Nature of the Congress Party

The factional nature of the Congress party can be understood only within the wider context of Indian Society as a whole. It has long been recognised that political parties do not function in a vacuum. In every society, the nature of the prevailing political parties, their structure mode of functioning, and style of performance are all determined and conditioned by the social system within which they operate. The interaction between the "political" and the "social" creates the existing political culture and ideology. This is more significant in transitional societies such as India, undergoing modernization and rapid social change, where the line of differentiation between traditional (kinship and community structures) and modern structures (parties, bureacracies) is still not very clear. In such societies reference merely to the outwards s structure of parties is not enough. Hence in order to understand the nature of the Congress party a few basic determinants have been adopted here which will enable us to understand the deeper-lying causes of factionalism - a phenomena very often explained merely in terms of personality struggles, or ministerial versus organisational fights within the Congress. These are :-

(a) The "Socio-political environment" within which the party as a whole functions, and with which it interacts. The Congress has both been fashioned by this environment, and has itself helped to create it. This environment has fostered the growth of factional politics in all political parties in India.

(b) The "immediate environment" within which factions grew and operate, that is the internal structure and pattern of the Congress party. Certain structural features of the Congress have also allowed factional politics to exist.

(c) The role of second parties and group not aggregated by the dominant party, which act as pressure groups on the dominant party and government, and serve as an outlet for dissidents and as initiators of new ideas.

If we examine Indian society we find that it is in every sense a "plural society"¹. The ramifications of its plurality extend to so many sectors of collective life that one might as well say that India is plural in the most comprehensive sense of the word. Ethnically, India is a laboratory of many races and their inter-mixing. Sociologically, today it has different stratas of people living as contemporaries with totally different value-structures, norms and behaviour, yet co-existing within the same political society. Culturally and linguistically, there are well-marked, regions and sub-regions, where people speak different, highly developed languages, retain a separate culture and distinct heritage, which generates the twin sentiments of alliance and discord with other contiguous regions. In terms of religions communities it includes seven major segments. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Budhists, Jainists and Parsees. In its occupation structure and economy, India reflects a society fragmented at its base by antagonistic class divisions maintained by profound disparities in income levels. The syndrome of political

includes all the major contemporary schools of political

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'isms' of both the extreme Right and extreme Left. Hence India today, is distinctively "federal" in its socio-cultural ecology.² It is hence a classic example of a polity that has been universally recognised as "unity in diversity"³.

Another marked feature of Indian society is the absence of a consensus on basic values. Fundamental disagreement in society over the kind of state India ought to have, the functions of such a state are divisive factors. Differences of opinion exist in all societies but in countries such as Britain, they are not fundamental differences. In a society where values are in the process of rapid change, a sense of insecurity about ones beliefs is unavoidable.

Hence, for a continental policy like India segmented into different groups, it is not surprising that the prevalent political structuring is in the form of factions based either on caste interest, or leadership consideration, or a mixture of these factors rather than that which is based on parties which in terms of their political ambitions have to be at least state or region focussed, and in the nature of things have to be aggregative and integrative. Parties in India have acquired a heterogeneity of character, composed as they are of myriad groups and interests that constantly compete in the intra-party struggle; on the other hand, a faction is closer knit homogenous entity promoting specific common interests and owing allegiance to a common leader. While the party provides the structure and an ideological

2. Ibid, 20

3. Rasheeddudin Khan, "The Regional Dimension" seminar 164 (April 1973) 4:33-45

base to institutionalized public opinion, factions give interest-orientation to intra-party politics and thereby provide party politics with realism.⁴

Moreover, certain sociological factors operating within Indian society encourage the formation of factions. A person who joins a political party in India becomes a member of a faction - apparently he feels the need to be a member of tightly knit face-to-face group. This need in fact, is not confined to parties, in India nearly every high school, college, office, etc., contains "cliques". These are closed to outsiders and have their own social life and their own leaders. Such cliques exist in most western countries among students, but after they enter the job market, these cliques break up and business and family groups take their place. In Asia where the break between old and new generation is severe these cliques often continue. Even villages have factions. Because of the fact that role differentiation has not taken place in these societies, each member spends considerable time in factional activity. Indian parties have full, or nearly full time members, these groups may communicate with each other, but very little with the outside world. The member who joins a faction also gets a secure position, status, a leader and a sense of belonging necessary in a society undergoing rapid social change. A number of reasons keep the various factions together within the same party⁵

(1) There is first the unique role of the leader who stands above all factions, in whose actions and judgment all members

4. Rasheeddudin Khan "The Indian Political Landscape", India Quarterly XXIV(October-December, 1968) 4:301-10.

5. Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India, The Development Of A Multy-Party System: (New Jersey:Princeton University Press 1957):237-47

have full confidence, and who seems detached from the formal organisation of the party (e.g. Nehru). The leader is the compriiser of the factional disputes, the source of prestige to the party, and the absolute source for the articulation of the values held by the group (ii) A second major factor is the level of toleration which one group has for the other, and has been the major source of strength of the congress. Many factors unify the congress - (a) It is the governing party, a faction which breaks off has to start building anew (b) Those who wish to win power through the electoral system prefer to keep within the congress rather than join the opposition (c) As a result of having been a collection of diverse factions for so many decades the congress party has built up an effective machinery for conflict resolution by which disciplinary powers can be used. The tolerance level in the congress is higher than in other parties which are hence prone to splits. (iii) A third unifying factor is that the Indian opposition party is generally united by a consensus on the basic party thesis which cuts across factions. As long as such unity continue, the factions are likely to remain with the party. But such a split is usually unavoidable once disagreement over party issues arises. It has been a source of strength to the Congress that factional disputes within the party do not coincide with ideological disputes.

The immediate environment within which factions function the party structure - is the result of both historical growth and certain contemporary factors prevalent in India today. It is important to remember that the Congress took root and came to power, not a political party but as a movement for Independence. The Indian National Congress has been one of the world's most

outstanding and successful prototypes of a movement which unified all sections of a diverse people, and their groups, and segments and fused them into a collective whole that struggled for Independence. Once Independence came, the political context had qualitatively changed. In this milieu, the Congress or any other organisation could remain, or aspire to remain, a movement only if it remained outside the institutions of power and the organs of government. This is a vital distinction. Political movements after capturing power normally get transformed into a power structure that recruits leadership cadres to run that power structure.⁶

The Congress has always been too amorphous a body to get reduced to the size of a coherent party. The real dilemma facing the Congress is that it has ceased to be a 'movement' without really becoming a 'party'.⁷ It has all the inherited attributes of a movement - organisational amorphousness, heterogeneity of membership composition, an all-inclusiveness in terms of divergent ideological accommodation, capacity to internalize conflict, etc., but it does not have its clear direction, and unified and dedicated commitment to a single objective. Hence today, the Congress is prone to factions because it represents by itself an "autonomous political system"⁸ made up of various groups.

(After Independence the Congress as the dominant party within the Indian political system, had to begin the task of nation building. Political organisation is important in the

6. Rasheeduddin Khan, "Checking The Drift" Seminar 121 (September, 1969) 9:30-40.

7. Ibid, 32

8. Ibid, 32

process of development. Huntington speaks of the need for a modernizing process to develop, "the capacity to assimilate into the system the social forces which result from modernization"⁹. Lucian Pye too notes that "political development is related to an increased ability to organise associations of people and to manage complex structures"¹⁰. The party at this stage had no time to reorganise its own internal structure it had to try and accommodate and satisfy a wide variety of groups and interests in the name of national integration. It remained stable because it has always attempted to adept, and not change.]

The Congress has continued as a faction - ridden party because its organisation revealed an in-built hospitality for power seeking parasites and political vagabonds.¹¹ (As the dominant party the congress was interested in inducting social groups and strata which had witherto remained de-politicized in order to widen its mass base, and on the other hand ambitious congregations eager to share power were keen to enter the congress by wearing "white caps" and chanting current political mantras. With this a new pattern of demography has emerged, which in terms of composition and ideals, is a clean break from the past. The continuity of the congress for eighty-four years, emphasised for the courtesy of history, is for contemporary politics a "notional" factor. To these new congressmen, the pre-independence phase

9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies (mimeograph) cited in Myron Weiner, Party Building In A New Nation (Chicago: University of California Press, 1967); 3.

10. Lucian Pye, Aspects Of Modernization (New York : Little Brown & Co., 1966) : 100

11. Khan 0.6, 34

of the congress has not much emotive reliance. Hence, ever more since independence the Congress has come to represent a "macro-political system"¹², a sort of a federal arrangement, holding together micro sub-system - the factions, forums, lobbies, cotteries etc. which constantly interact on the political process of the congress. This vast infrastructure based on consideration of caste, interest, region, and personality and reflecting in politics the divisions in society, has been maintained by the new elite which finds it of distinct advantage.]

Factions find it ^{and} easy to operate within the congress because, although it is a dominant party, it also offers within itself a wide range of alternation and competition for groups aspiring to control the party executive. Hence it is essential to examine the relationship between dominance, alternation, and competition.¹³ If we mean by competitive politics some form of alternation between parties, it is too narrow a use of term. In fact competition without alternation is possible, though under special conditions. Between the two extremes of dominance and alternation, competition can mean the presence in a political system of opportunities for open and effective dissent.] This must be seen as occupying one position on a matrix of variables. On one side, the scale runs from single to dominant to alternating parties, on the other, are placed "degrees of openness", both in the internal structure of parties as well as their inter-relationship. There can be various kinds of combinations,

12. Ibid, 34

13. W.H.Morris-Jones "Dominance & Dissent", Government And Opposition I (July-September, 1966) 3:451-67

which can be regarded as yielding a politics of 'Dissent',¹⁴. Hence far from competitive politics being a peculiarity of only alternating system, it can also characterize dominant parties of open structures, such as the congress. This openness of structure allows factions freedom of activity within the party. This shows that the function of politics to offer a choice between alternative sets of policies and personnel may be a gross over-simplification.

It is precisely due to the open structure of the congress that the role of second parties and groups becomes important in our study of factionalism. Just as interaction with the political environment as whole has shaped the congress party, so interaction and interpenetration with other parties has created a distinct style of factionalism. This aspect of factional activity is important where the role of the congress party at the level of the States is concerned because in many cases alternation with the opposition has become necessary. The congress party is characterised by openness of three distinct kinds.¹⁵ (i) The party itself is open; movement in and out of the organisation is fairly free, competition for power within the party is vigorous and knowledge of these inner shifts and struggles is quite open to the public (ii) It is open to other parties to enter into competition for power, though they may not find it easy to do so. (iii) Finally, there is a most important openness in the relations between the congress and other parties: not merely is there an absence of barriers but there is positive

14. Ibid, 452

15. Ibid.

communication between them. The opposition parties may not alternate with the Congress at the centre, but they address not so much the electorate; but like-minded groups in the dominant party. These parties function on the margin of the dominant party, and this marginal pressure is significant. Inside the margin are various factions within the major party, outside the margin are opposition groups whose role is to constantly criticise, pressurize, censure and influence it by influencing opinion and interests within the margin; and above all, exert the threat, that if the ruling party strays away too far from the balance of public opinion, and if the factional system within it is not mobilized to restore the balance, it will be displaced from power by opposition groups. Both the built-in corrective through factionalism, and the idea of a latent threat from outside, are parties of the congress system. Hence factionalism provides a comprehensive mechanism of change, a system of conflict articulation and resolution, and a system of communications between society and politics. This aspect of factional activity will be further developed in the next chapter in dealing with factionalism within the congress party in U.P.

The factional nature of the congress has been expressed outwardly in three major forms since Independence (a) Conflicts have arisen from the growth of two wings in the party - the "governmental and the organisational wing". However the two are not sharp divisions and overlap each other in terms of membership composition and function, hence the use of this terminology is not really speaking accurate (b) Conflicts have arisen from the need to balance a number of competing

factions centering on individuals ideologies and major issues. Within the Congress, Right and Left wings groups have always existed, come into conflict, yet tolerated each other (c) Conflicts have arisen of an intra-organisational nature between the congress and its many auxiliaries, such as the Trade union or Student wing. All these structural conflicts have ^{been} dealt with in detail for long and hence will not be taken up here. Moreover, they are only outward symptoms of the internal problems of the party. ¹⁶

A survey of factionalism within the congress party would not be complete without a brief look at the functioning of the party at the State level because it here, rather than at the central level that factional activity is centered.

Important changes have accrued in the relationship between one level of the party and another since Independence. Before Independence, a handful of men at the national level such the Congress President, the CWC, and Gandhi, determined the overall congress policies. Ministers were determined and controlled by them. But at the same time, the Central leaders always depended on the State level workers for support. Men such as Govind Vallabh Pant in U.P. and Patel in Gujarat were indispensable to the Congress party. Since independence, a new class of leaders have come up at the State level, because of the federal nature of our constitution. In theory the congress is a centralised party, but State party organisations are now financially and politically autonomous. The State leaders have

16. Stanley A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics Of One Party Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968)

W.J. Morris-Jones Government And Politics In India (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1964)

Myron Weiner, p. 5, To mention only a few.

access to patronage for their membership and their influence over State and local administration makes it possible for them to "Service" voters. According to the party constitution the Central Election Commission under the CWC determines who will receive Parliamentary and State Assembly election tickets. In practice, the Election Commission now merely accepts the recommendation of the State Party organisation. To refuse, in fact, without cause would result in a conflict between Central and State organisation, which the central organisation would not welcome, as it may not always win. The State level leaders moreover exercise a lot of patronage at the national level. It is unlikely that a P.M. could be selected without the approval of the State Chief Ministers. In fact it has now become customary for the CWC to invite Congress Chief Ministers who are not members of the CWC, when any question of national importance is discussed. After Nehru's death, e.g. the Congress C.Ms. were called to discuss the problem of a successor. In 1959, there was a proposal that all Congress C.Ms. should be included in the CWC as sitting members during their term. A congress reorganisation committee in 1960 rejected this proposal which might have brought a radical change in the federal power structure of the party, specially after the death of the Tall leaders. Even before Nehru's death, the importance of the rising congress elite was realised. The Kamraj Plan ostensibly meant to send top leaders to the people, was really a hurdle for Nehru to purge the party both at the centre and the States of irksome faction leaders and contenders of power.

Factional activity at the State level is different from that at the central level. This is natural because while at the centre, the issues are of national importance both in the context for leadership and party policy, at the state level, the issues are regional and local. The State level party organisation must be seen as standing between the Central and the district level organisations. Hence its position, inter-relationship with other levels, is important and determines to a large extent factional activity at the State level. Once we leave the rarefied atmosphere of Parliament, Central bureaucracy and CWC and go down to the State and lower levels, although the formal procedures find close resemblance to those found in the higher level, the actual process of decision-making differs.

If we go down to the Mandal level and proceed upwards we find a number of levels all interacting with each other. Factions at the local level are based on caste, kinship and personal loyalties, the last being the most important. Dominant personalities provide the rallying points of opposing factions, but kin and caste ties are brought in play to impart stability to merely personal followings. These are further reinforced by the dispensation of patronage and the personality of the leader. The result is clear divisions that are openly avowed and that give rise to constant conflicts and adjustments. A miniature party system has emerged within the congress in many localities. Members of the mandal committee, although they have no party organisation at the village level maintain contact through the local board, District Development

Committees, Panchayats, etc. The village is the starting point, the cock-pit of local factions whose leaders are often Mandal Committee members. The Mandal level factions are linked with important groups in the DCC and PCC. The system of communications between the various levels are complex and important, each level is self contained, though leaders may come from above to settle disputes. To complete the picture, the strength of the State factions depends on the weight they carry with the High Command and Union government. The process is similar to that in the DCC & PCC but is, as we shall see in the next chapter in dealing with U.P., of greater importance as it affects the incidence of political mortality in the States.

The factional system has hence got aggregated at the State level where it has been operated through two new tiers of political organisation, a managerial class of politicians occupying critical organisational positions in the State and District Congresses, and a class of "Link-men" in the field through whom they operate. While at the village and Mandal level personality and caste may be important factors, at the State level, considerations of policy and economic interest are more important, as important decisions are made at this level. The patronage system, which allows factions to become a function of interest seeps from the State level downwards to the "firing level" where the development plans are really put into action.

The basis for this competitiveness are different in different States, and its impact on the governmental

performance and development of the State varies, but the institutional forms it takes on, are very similar. Congress dissidents form a faction and attempt to gain control of the party organisation, specially the PCC and the Cabinet which determine party nominations and finances on the one hand, and economic policies on the other. Intra-party competitiveness is hence manifested by a struggle for control over the P.C.C. and then between the P.C.C. and the government. The politically most successful and durable Chief Ministers are those who have retained control over the party organisation. Among the most skilled Chief Ministers and therefore, the most stable states past and present (in terms of office) - have been from for e.g. Madras (Kamraj), Rajasthan (Sukhadia), Maharashtra (Chavan and later V.P.Naik). In U.P. since the 1974 elections H.N. Bahuguna has been successful because he has control over both wings. In a few states no Chief Minister in recent times has been able to retain effective control leading to factionalism and instability. Electoral defeat for the congress at the State level has been associated with internal party factionalism. There is hence, a relationship between a low congress vote, ensuring instability and factionalism. *The single and most significant variable then, in this establishment of stable governments has been the political skill of the congress leadership - the skill to build coalitions of factions or to place their own faction in a dominating position in the government and in the congress party simultaneously. No other variable therefore - degree of urbanization, literacy, the patterns of social organisation,

or for that matter, the speed of economic growth - correlate with the stability of government¹⁷. Hence the operative political categories in the States are the political factions within the congress. These factions have their own structure and lines of communication and constitute an intricate system of decision-making in India. They can with some intensive study be as precisely located as the more formal institutions.

Confronted by contending groups within the party, some Chief Ministers have followed the strategy of attempting to achieve a balanced government in which all groups are represented, or one in which only his own faction is represented, thus attempting to dissolve the other by denying them patronage powers. Often the Chief Minister is forced to retain under his own personal control some of the politically most sensitive portfolios such as Home. These problems have arisen largely because it has been the practice to prohibit Chief Ministers from being President of the P.C.C. at the same time. Finally the central leadership has been able to play a considerable role in the rivalries between rival congress factions, and in fact often encouraged it by supporting one faction against another. The C.P.B. and the C.W.C. has ample powers to interfere in the working of the P.C.Cs, and much advantage has been taken of this fact. Direct intervention of the High Command has often taken place too.

17. Myron Weiner, State Politics in India
(New Jersey ; Princeton University Press, 1968) : 54

In order to understand the role of factionalism at the State level, it is necessary not merely to refer to the internal structure of the party. A number of socio-economic variables must be borne in mind.¹⁸ It is because of them that the various faction-ridden states exhibit factional politics of differing varieties. These factors both directly and indirectly influence the system of factionalism prevailing in the State. These are worthy of mention because they have often been forgotten. Factional politics must be studied in their wider ramifications.

It is necessary to enquire firstly, into the historical identity of a State under study. While India as a nation has a sense of historical identity of its own, each of the States have their respective identities as well. The various States as constituted at present often consist of several historical identities which inspite of merger still retain a sense of individual identification. States like Andhra, made up of Telengana and Andhra, Rajasthan made up of several ex-princely States, Madhya Pradesh consisting of tribal areas as well as parts of Madhokosal etc. all experience internal tension. Linguistic and regional tensions of this type are mirrored within the factional system of the congress in such States, e.g. Jats and Rajputs in Rajasthan, Andhras and Telenganities etc. Moreover, it is equally pertinent to see whether a particular State or a part of it was under British rule or the erstwhile princely states, because this provides an

18 Iqbal Narain, State Politics In India (ed) Meerut: Meenakshi Publications 1967 : Introduction.

insight into the level of political consciousness and patterns of political leadership. U.P. for example had a highly developed leadership long before independence whereas, States like Rajasthan again were subject to feudal rule and leadership and experienced relatively less political development. It is also relevant to ask how far reorganisation has promoted political integration in the various states. The size of a State is also important, because that leads to diversity and distance among people living in far lying areas.

Economic development is a crucial factor. The pace of industrial and agricultural development, and the general level of economic growth in a State, may go a long way in shaping the form of its politics and its relationship vis-a-vis the centre. In a large State, some areas may be highly developed whereas some may be very backward, this would create tension among politicians coming from these respective areas. This tension is seen in, Bihar, U.P., M.P. and Rajasthan. Moreover the rural-urban dichotomy in development is important and create divisions among congressmen belonging to the rural areas and urban towns. Their class interests also clash when one section supports the landed gentry in the rural areas, whereas the other insists on land reform and land ceilings.

Infra-structure which manifests itself in the social pluralism of the country is another important aspect. Caste and religion besides class form, "the key board of State politics"¹⁹. In Bihar Rajputs and Bhumihars, in Andhra Kammas and Reddis, in Mysore the Vokkaligas and Lingayats, in Rajasthan

~~18. Ibid.~~

19. Ibid

Jats and Rajputs, in U.P. Brahmin and Kayasthas etc. have all contributed to cleavages within society, and within the congress party in these States.

Thus we see that factional politics have played a central role within the congress party. The continued existence of the congress as an amorphous and heterogenous organisation, and environmental factors such as the political traditions and values, the divisive and heterogenous nature of Indian society, have all contributed to the continued existence of factional politics. The congress party has enjoyed a majority at the Central level since 1947, and hence the intraparty struggles within it have had an important effect on the Indian political system.²⁰ Factions have had an important role to play (i) They have prevented the rise of a monolithic state and in the absence of outside opposition by providing a built-in one (ii) Within the party too they have allowed readjustments modifying the law of oligarchy found in many parties of the third world(iii) They have provided a channel for constant interaction between opposing interests and lent flexibility to the political process. In short, they have made "politics of discussion"²¹ both possible and necessary.]

In the context of State politics factionalism has determined the stability of congress governments. Where factionalism has been rampant and beyond control it has led to frequent change of governments, resulting in poor administration and low economic development. Hence it is at the State level that the role of factionalism in political development needs to be studied. With this background of the factional nature of the congress we turn now to a consideration of factionalism in U.P.

20. Rajni Kothari, "Party Politics In India-V" Economic Weekly XIII (June 13, 1961) 22:847-55

21. Ibid. 849

CHAPTER - 3

Factional Politics in U.P. (1967-74)

Factional politics have played an important role in most of the Indian States where the Congress party has been in power, but nowhere has factionalism been as rampant, as in U.P. In no other State, except perhaps Bihar, have factions determined the life and stability of successive governments, affected the rate of economic growth, the proper running of the administrative machinery of the government, and the rise and fall of leaders as in U.P. Politically U.P. has always been one of the most important States within the Indian union. Before independence, most of the important leaders of the national movement such as the Nehrus (Motilal and Jawaharlal), Govind Vallabh Pant, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Purshottam Das Tandon among many others, came from U.P. Since independence U.P. has provided us with three Prime Ministers, and it sends the largest number of M.Ps. (83) to the Central Parliament. Because of all these factors, U.P. has always enjoyed a predominant position in all-India, and specially, in Congress politics. Successive Congress leaders, beginning from Nehru have always been very active in the internal affairs of U.P., and specially before a general election it has received very close attention because of the large continent of M.Ps. it sends. Yet paradoxically it has remained economically neglected and backward.

Factionalism, it is true, is a form of political activity, but social scientists are today aware that political action does not take place in a vacuum. Geography, demography, social and economic conditions of a State profoundly influence the political attitudes and behaviour of people. Since the 1950^s, U.P. has been passing through almost an endless period of crisis and although the present government is stable, yet such outward stability may be deceptive. A number of factors have conditioned U.P. politics from the very beginning.

Geographically, U.P. is one of the biggest states in Indian union. There are, broadly speaking, three major geographical areas in U.P.¹ - northern mountains, the central plains and the southern hills. The central plains area of U.P. forms part of the Gangetic plain, but it can again be divided into two important areas - the upper Ganges Plain, comprising of all the Western and Central plains districts, the middle Ganges plain made up of the eastern districts of the State and more like the plains of Bihar. Because of climatic differences, the eastern and western districts of U.P. are economically, socially and culturally very diverse. Each of these three areas are themselves quite large and can be sub-divided into regions such as the Doab,

1. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics In An Indian State: The Congress Party In Uttar Pradesh (Bombay Oxford University Press, 1966):6

Rohilkhand, Oudh, Gorakhpur and Banaras, Each of these regions are geographically separate and have a distinct personality of their own.

It is not merely the sheer size of the State but also certain historical factors, which have contributed to make the political system as it exists today. Situated on the Gangetic Plain, it has been the "heartland" of India where successive invaders have settled giving it a broad outlook. At no time before the British occupation was it governed from one seat of power, rather it was ruled in different fragments. It is essentially an artifact put together by the British gradually by conquest and later reconstituted in independent India. Hence U.P., as it stands today has no historical background. The result from the political point of view is significant² while people consider themselves still as belonging to Oudh and Agra, they have no history to bind them as a unit. U.P. has never had a distinct personality like Tamilnadu, Bengal or even Punjab and it is not linguistically or culturally homogenous. Thus while the rest of the provincial people could be described as Bengalis, Punjabis, etc., there is no provincial name for "Upites", except perhaps Hindusthani which could as well mean Indian. Hence, the

2. K.V. Rao & L. Venkatraman, U.P. Politics: A Socio-Political Interpretation, cited in Iqbal Narain, State Politics In India (ed) (Meerut: Meenakshi Publications, 1967):286-91.

common man identifies himself either with his narrow locality, or with the whole of India - there ^{are} is no national or regional loyalties which could overcome the divisions responsible for the fragmentation of politics. The differences between regions are mere shadings not sharp distinctions. The virulent anti-Brahminism of South India, the Kamma - Reddi friction in Andhra and the hill-versus-plains friction in Orissa present tensions of ^a type which are almost negligible in U.P. In most other States, major issues, concerning State boundaries and language have aroused emotions, but in U.P. these factors have not played a major role. In the near absence of cataslysmic issues which might prove a threat to a ruling dominant party when taken up by opposition parties, factionalism withⁿ the Congress party has continued undisturbed since 1947.

(In U.P., there is no "dominant caste " as in some of the States such as Andhra (Kammas and Reddis), Gujrat (Patidars) and Kerala (Nayars)³. In the Himalayan hill districts, the thakurs constitute locally a dominant caste, but elsewhere there are no castes with more than 25% of a district's population. The numerically larger castes moreover - Brahmins, Yadavs, Chamars and Thakurs - tend to be state-wide rather than regional in distribution. However, Caste,

3. Angela Burger, Opposition In A Dominant Prty System (Bombay: Oxford University Press, University of California, 1969): 25

Hindus, who are numerically smaller, are concentrated in the western region. For a long time, political and economic leadership was left with the west, while of late, the backward castes are organising themselves. This conflict between the upper and lower castes, and consequent shift in leadership means not only a dissension among classes, but a pull from western towards eastern U.P. This has introduced its own convulsions.

Economically, U.P. has always been poor, and between the Eastern and Western districts there is a large amount of economic disparity which has produced political tension. The eastern districts are among the most poverty-stricken in India and have a higher population density, and a higher proportion of persons engaged in agriculture, together with average rural land holdings of smaller size and a lower degree of urbanization than the western districts⁴. The more industrialised and urbanized western districts are economically better off, although some of them are undergoing development, and some others are in a state of decline.

When the socio-economic indices are viewed together, it becomes obvious that boundaries do not accumulate in U.P. Regional boundaries are loose, and there is no regional identification, language divisions are modified by caste distributions and caste is divided by economic indices and so forth. All this indicates that U.P. as a separate sub-system within the Indian union

4. Ibid., 22

lacks political integration. Political intetegration has been defined as a "relationship of community among people within the same political entity", who are held together by "mutual ties which give the group a feeling of identity and awareness."⁵ ^{Several} General factors have been suggested as empirical measures of political integration⁶. Among them some of which may be applied to U.P. are (1) Homogeneity (2) Mutuality of interests, (3) Shared functional interests and (4) the "Motive pattern of a group". The last three are in fact measures of homogeneity itself.

Social, economic and political characteristics of the environment provide the indicators of homogeneity. Common distinctive features in any society provide a basis of common political action, and conversely, socio-economic heterogeneity among two or more groups provides the setting for political conflict. In U.P., although sharp cleavages do not exist, a number of environmental factors such as geographical distance, caste, economic disparity, religious differences, difference in education, the rural - urban complex etc., have provided a setting for political conflict within the congress party (as within all other parties) such conflict takes the form of factionalism or intra-party quarrels. Hence Congress party in U.P. has had to perform two major

5. Philip E. Jacob & Henry Jeune, The Integration Process, cited in Philip E. Jacob & James V. Toscano (ed) The Integration Of Political Communities (Philadelphia: 1964): 4.

6. Ibid., 4

functions⁷ - (a) maintain internal cohesion and (b) operate in an environment of conflict. We turn now to a consideration of how far it has been successful and the methods it has adopted.

Factional quarrels took place within the Congress party in U.P., as elsewhere, even before independence but internal quarrels were at that time subordinated to the major goal of achieving independence. Since independence, this uniting factor has disappeared, and factionalism has been a persistent problem within the Congress in U.P.

In this study of factionalism in U.P. 1967 has been chosen as a starting point because, that year saw a number of important political developments in U.P. and in other States. After twenty years of unbroken Congress rule, the Congress party for the first time failed to win a majority of seats in the Legislative assembly. The opposition parties had for the first time been able to combine their efforts and take advantage of the growing popular discontent and anti-congressism in the State. A number of political commentators felt that with the rise of this outside threat to the hitherto ruling and dominant party, factionalism would cease and the various faction leaders would unite together in an attempt to vitalise the party. However, this has not proved true in U.P. Factionalism has continued unabated, and in fact

7. Myron Weiner, "Traditional Role Performance And The Development Of Modern Political Parties", Journal Of Politics XXVI (November, 1964)4:830-50

has often been (as well shall see) at its height during non-Congress rule.

A brief survey, however, of the pre-1967 era is necessary, as factions in U.P. develop over time and these earlier factions have also played an important role in the post 1967 period. This earlier period has been dealt with at length elsewhere and will be dealt with very briefly now⁸.

The 1950^s were largely a period of political transition which saw a change in the context of the political debate, and the character of political leadership in U.P. The content of political debate changed from an internal discussion of language and culture in the modern State, to the role of party and government in the prevailing political system. Political leadership passed from the hands of first rank leaders who moved to the centre to the second rank leaders whose positions depended less on personal esteem than the patronage they distributed. After Govind Vallabh Pant's departure to the centre in 1955, factional politics which he had managed to contain, came to the forefront during the tenure of Sampurnanand, C.B. Gupta and Mrs. Sucheta Kriplani the next three C.Ms. till 1967. During Pant's regime, two congressmen C.B. Gupta and Mohan Lal Gautam had come up as important party organisers, Cabinet members, and second rank

8. Brass, n. 1.

leaders with a large following. The rivalry between them split the party into two groups each supporting one of these leaders. Sampurnanand as C.M. could not control these two men and he was soon replaced by Gupta, inspite of the latters defeat in the 1957 elections. Gupta came to power through the usual channel by acquiring control over the party organisation and becoming President of the UPCC, and due to the support of the centre leadership which thought, that as leader of the dominant faction he would be able to keep the party together. In 1963, Gupta was one of the Chief Ministers who resigned under the Kamraj Plan. Unhappy over this move, which he construed as an attempt by Nehru to remove those state leaders who were becoming too powerful, Gupta was yet able to make his own nominee Mrs. Sucheta Kriplani the C.M. This was resented by another leader Kamlapathi Tripathi of Varanasi who came into prominence at this time. Tripathi after Sampurnanand's departure from the U.P. scene in 1962 took over the leadership of his group. After Gupta's resignation, on not being made the next C.M. Tripathi left the Cabinet, and got himself elected as the President of the UPCC. Hence by 1967, the stage was set for the later struggle between C.B. Gupta and Kamlapati Tripathi.

Mrs. Kriplani with no roots in U.P., did not take much part in these factional wranglings, her knowledge of internal party matters was limited and she could not contain factionalism. During her term, a

second line of factional leaders such as Govind Sahai, Ajit Prasad Jain and Genda Singh etc. came up who were later to play an important role. Her term in office was marked by strikes, police firing in Banda, high price of foodgrains in U.P.⁹ etc. which all contributed to anti congressism in U.P. on the eve of the 1967 elections. /

In the 1967 elections, the congress party gained only 198 seats in the assembly out of 423.¹⁰ Important congressmen such as M.M. Verma (Speaker), H.L. Agarwala (Deputy Speaker), Kamalapati Tripathi (President of the UPCC) were defeated. Out of the 15 ministers, 5 Deputy Ministers and 6 Parliamentary Secretaries of Mrs. Kripalani's Cabinet, one died and 2 did not contest. Out of the 12 contesting ministers, 4 were defeated, out of the 3 contesting deputy ministers only 1 could succeed, and out of the 4 contesting Parliamentary Secretaries, only 1 could win¹¹. This shows the gravity of the congress defeat. No party could gain a clear majority.

Soon after the elections C.B. Gupta was able to form a government with the help of some defectors and independents. However, this government lasted only eighteen days due to the defection of an important congress leader Charan Singh and his faction to the opposition. Choudhary Charan Singh, an important Jat leader

9. M.S. Verma, Coalition Government U.P.'s First Experiment (New Delhi: IBH Publishing Co. 1971):4

10. Ibid., 7

11. Ibid., 10 - 13

with a substantial following of Jat M.L.As. had earlier tried to contest the election against C.B. Gupta for the post of Chief Minister. His supporters pointed out that in the 1967 elections, while important congressmen had lost, Charan Singh had enhanced his reputation by winning by a margin of 52,200 votes over his nearest rival in a quadrangular contest¹². The central leadership had expressed a desire for unity and felt that Gupta with a personal following of 66 congressmen¹³, and general support in the party would be able to maintain unity. Charan Singh on the other hand felt that State parties were free to chose their own leader. Kamlapati Tripathi too supported Charan Singh's claim at that time as he was against Gupta becoming the Chief Minister. However, due to Central interference, Charan Singh withdrew his claim and Gupta was unanimously elected. Eighteen days later, not satisfied with the Cabinet which Gupta had formed - in which very few of Charan Singh's supporters were included - Charan Singh and his group left the congress to form the B.K.D. (Bhartiya Kranti Dal). On 18th February, a coalition government was formed by all the opposition parties under the leadership of Charan Singh who was made Chief Minister¹⁴. This coalition was called the Sanyukta Vidhayak Dal (S.V.D.) and was the first coalition government formed

12. Ibid., 9

13. Statesman, Delhi, 5 March 1967.

14. Verma, n. 10,31

in U.P. since 1947.

The 1967 elections hence mark the transfer of power from the congress party to the various opposition parties in U.P. This was part of an All-India pattern, not an isolated phenomena. In the states where the congress failed to get a majority two types of state parties emerged¹⁵ - (a) Linguistic - Cultural parties like the D.M.K. and the APHLC and (b) groups deriving largely from a priori existence as dissidents with the congress party. The B.K.D. in U.P. is one such "dissident party". These state parties may in time become full fledged regional parties (as the D.M.K. has) or may again merge into the congress (as some portions of the B.K.D. have). The formation of a non-congress coalition government in U.P. affected the nature and style of factionalism within the congress party, it did not put an end to it.

This was largely because, inspite of the fact that it had lost its earlier majority in the legislature, the congress continued to enjoy a significant position. It is important to remember that the dominant party - a term used first by Maurice Duverger - is not necessarily a majority party though it would larger than any other - it is a party whose influence dominates the political atmosphere. Such a party even while entering into a coalition in a multi party system, can yet occupy a predominant position. It can be the

15. Paul Wallace "Dispeysion of Political Power In India", Asian Survey VIII (February, 1968):2:87-97

determining factor in party politics. This was the position of the Congress party in U.P. from 1967 to 1974.

An organisation, including a political party can be viewed as a coalition of individuals, groups and interests. Defining organisation as , " a system of transaction" between people, for more readily allows for conflict of interest than as a "System of specific cooperation"¹⁶. Viewed thus the politics of coalition pervaded even the single-party dominance system of congress, in that, the various intra-party factions interacted in order to bargain for the satisfaction of their specific needs. With the replacement of the dominant party system by a multi-party system, the intra-party coalition (tacit or implied) was replaced by an intra-party coalition (express or formal). However, in both types of coalition systems, the process of bargaining operated to determine the values, goals, and policies in such a way that while major partners exercised a heavier role, the hand of the minor parties could not be dismissed as quite insignificant. The element of consensus existed in both the tacit and express model, with the difference that while in the former it tended to become the accepted method of conflict resolution under the leadership of unified command, in the later it was

16. B.L. Maheshwari, "Politics Of Coalitions" Economic And Political Weekly V (Annual No. January 1970):3 117-129.

based on much heavier stress of collateral relationships¹⁷.

If we attempt to find out the difference between the pre-and post - 1967 coalition system we see that the congress party in U.P. continued to occupy a central position in the predominant model. The line^{of} difference lies in the point that many ad hoc groups which once prospered at the absorptive capacity of the amorphous congress organisation, now proliferated and emerged on the map of state politics to stake their claims for the share of power like potential alliance partners. The new elite that formed the government (B.K.D. and other party leaders) had been socialised within the dominant party and were found to carry on both the programmatic consensus reached before the transfer of power, and even the 'idiom' and 'style' of coalition - making learnt during that period. Thus the Indian Party System has its own peculiar process of communication and elite socialisation¹⁸, it has inspite of its fantastic diversity its own system of alternation¹⁹. While the congress party controlled the government, the alternation was between the ministerial and organisational

17. Ibid., 118

18. Rajni Kothari (ed) Context of Electoral Change In India (New Delhi: Academic Books, 1969):VIII

19. The Process Of Alternation In The Congress Party has been discussed in Chapter - 2.

wings of the party, after 1967 it was between the Congress party and all other parties (including congress 'dissident groups'). In this process of elite turnover, the symbolism of the government plays an important role²⁰. Hence from 1967 to 1974 - when the congress party again gained a majority in the legislative assembly - factionalism within the congress continued.

The major process of interaction was not between the factions led by Gupta and Tripathi alone, but also the one led by Charan Singh. The process of factionalism within the party was affected by its contact with the other parties, since it was no longer in power. The content of factionalism too changed from ministerialist versus organisational wings. Hence the 1967 elections brought a change in the pattern of power within the congress party.

The period from 1967 to 1974 can be roughly divided into 3 phases from the point of view of the type and intensity of factionalism within the congress party. They also illustrate the changing power patterns within the congress party in U.P.

I. The first phase is from March 1967 to February 1970, that is, the period from 1967 elections to the fall of the Congress government headed by C.B. Gupta after the congress split. This period saw the rise of a set of younger leaders within the UPOC corresponding to the rise of the Young Turks at the centre. It was

20. Ibid

a time of intense intra-party conflict inspite of the fact that except for a brief spell (March 1969-October 1970) the Congress was not in power, and the State power was in the hands of the SVD.

This was largely due to the reverses suffered by the party in the 4th general elections. Many of the younger leaders attributed the defeat of the Congress party to the failure of the leadership to maintain party discipline, and implement the party programme. While the S.V.D. remained in power and during the period of Presidents rule, both C.B. Gupta and Kamalapati Tripathi remained united. The situation within the party had undergone a marked change, and amongst the top leadership there was a sense of unity as both were out of power. Hence this phase of congress politics is one of revolt from below leading to the formation of new groups within the congress, all attempting to overthrow the leadership.

Two dissident congressmen who played an important role in bringing together the party rebels were Chaturbhuj Sharma, one of the Vice Presidents of the UPOC, and Ajit Prasad Jain, a close associate of Mrs. Gandhi. On 23rd June, they called a meeting of dissidents which was attended by about '40' rebel congressmen from about half a dozen districts²¹, Young Turks and leaders such as M.D. Upadhyaya and Jagan

21. Northern India Patrika, Delhi, 25 June 1968

Prasad Rawat and Beni Singh, both ex-ministers. The members who spoke at this meeting complained that the State Congress had become a monopoly in the hands of a few men and decided to challenge them at the forthcoming session of the UPCC in July 1968²². With the approaching mid term elections in 1969, the question of the distribution of party tickets exercised their minds and 25 "Young congressmen" representing eighteen districts drafted a program calling upon the leadership to mention in their election manifesto radical land reforms, urban property ceiling, and to refuse tickets to defeated Congressmen²³. The dissidents were keen to get as many tickets as possible for themselves, while Gupta and Tripathi saw in this process an opportunity to bring the rebels in line.

In the 1969 elections no party gained a clear majority but with the help of some independents and 'rebels' Gupta was able to form a government. Although he tried to satisfy all sections of the congress, he failed to do so. The post-election scene was marked by intense bargaining among groups and a struggle for power which showed that inspite of sitting in the opposition for 3 years, the congress was still a "patch work of factions"²⁴. The power struggle was not between Gupta and Tripathi alone but among factions which had

22. Ibid

23. Ibid

24. Patriot, Delhi, 25 February, 1969

developed. Three main groups²⁵ could be identified in the party at this time. The strongest group consisted of the Zamindars, who had a lobby of over 20 members, and who had been ignored by Gupta in his attempt to bring in fresh blood to quell the rebellion from below. There was also a group of ex-P.S.P. members under Ashok Mehta who also felt neglected. Lastly there were those young congress members who had been left out by Gupta in a bid to pacify his own followers. This group criticised Gupta's government openly in the legislature during the budget session specially in the matter of sugarcane prices and potatoes - two important issues at that time²⁶.

The leadership of Gupta was finally undermined by the Congress split which, while it affected the Congress party in all States, due to certain reasons had a profound effect on the U.P. Congress. U.P. being the P.Ms. home State, she was keen to install a government sympathetic to her policies and most of the Young Turks who came into prominence at the centre in mid - 1969 such as H.N. Bahuguna, Charanjit Yadav, Chandrashekhar etc. were from U.P. They regarded Gupta as a right wing reactionary, a supporter of the old Guard such as Morarji, and an old critic of Mrs. Gandhi. Tripathi on

25. Patriot, Delhi, 28 March 1969

26. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 3 April 1969

the other hand hailing from Allahabad had been a staunch supporter of Nehru family, and these personal loyalties now determined the course of U.P. politics. The Young Turks joined hands with Tripathi and by February 1970 succeeded in removing Gupta from power. This was achieved in the traditional manner with Tripathi resigning from the Cabinet in November 1969 but continuing as the President of the UPCC which enabled him to retain control of the party machine²⁷. With his withdrawal from the Cabinet other Young Congress members also resigned, and after many attempts to form a coliation with the BKD, Gupta resigned²⁸. Thus the Congress became divided into the pro-P.M. group and the pro-syndicate group. Because of the split, "Mr. Gupta ceased to be leader of the State Congress. He is now at the head of a faction"²⁹. The departure of Gupta from the main portion of the party marks the end of the 1st phase - the rivalry between Gupta and Tripathi within the congress.

The second phase, lasting from February 1970 to March 1971, is the period after the Congress split to the fall of T.N. Singh's government in March 1971. This brief period saw the formation of two types of coalition governments between the B.K.D. and the New Congress, and

27. Times of India, Delhi, 20 November 1969

28. Times ^{of India}, Delhi, 11 February 1970

29. Times ^{of India}, Delhi, 18 November 1969

the Old Congress and other opposition parties.

It illustrates how two contending congress factions in a bid to keep each other out of power interacted with a third party the B.K.D. (itself a splinter party). The Congress split left Charan Singh holding the balance between them, and the contest assuming a triangular form with Charan Singh very often determining the flow of events. After the split, both Congress groups tried to enter into an agreement with Charan Singh. Since C.B.Gupta was not prepared to allow Charan Singh to be the Chief Minister in any alliance among their groups, the latter entered into an agreement with the New Congress. Since the major objective was to keep out the pro-syndicate group Tripathi agreed to the Prime Minister's proposal to allow Charan Singh to be the Chief Minister³⁰. In this way among the three leaders, a tacit understanding was reached. Gupta remained in opposition, Tripathi's group entered the coalition, he himself remaining outside it, and Charan Singh formed a government with more Congress ministers than B.K.D.

This coalition lasted a little over 8 months. During this time factional quarrels were constant and they led to its downfall since it was not a coalition of like-minded parties but among erstwhile factions

30. Times of India, Delhi, 15 February 1970

which still retained their old loyalties and rivalries. Factional conflict was of two varieties - that is between Charan Singh and ~~the rank and file~~, and intra-party, that between Tripathi and the rank and file of the New Congress which finally led in 1973 to Tripathi's removal to the Centre. Each of these two quarrels was influenced by, and often the cause of the other.

The New Congress members felt that although they had been given 14 portfolios in the 25-man ministry, all key charges had been kept in the hands of the B.K.D.³¹. The New Congress Ministers were also critical of Charan Singh's policies, and alleged that he was acting alone and without consulting them³². All attempts to form a coordination committee failed and these two problems created bitterness.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the New Congress faction itself was not united. The exit of Gupta had not substantially altered the internal power situation. The younger members of the party were as much against Tripathi whom they considered a part of the earlier older leadership³³. Very soon

31. Times of India, Delhi, 9 April 1970

32. Sunday Standard, Delhi, 9 August 1970

33. It was sheer convenience, not ideological leanings that had brought them together during the split. The Congress split neither at the centre nor the States led to ideological polarization.

inspite of their own delicate position within the coalition they began a move to remove Tripathi from U.P. politics. This group was led by G.P. Bajpai and others who claimed to have a strength of 60 in the legislature.³⁴ They complained of the "bossism of a coterie"³⁵ in the State party and Bajpai led a delegation of 11 M.L.As. to see the Prime Minister³⁶. They demanded democratisation of the State leadership. They held that Tripathi had failed to negotiate properly with Charan Singh and very few Cabinet posts had gone to the younger group. The group led by Tripathi too was dissatisfied. Tripathi and his supporters had not entered the ministry at the Prime Minister's request, but it had been understood that the B.K.D. would merge with the new congress and at that time the question of leadership could be reopened. However, on becoming Chief Minister, Charan Singh did not prove to be very eager and the question of merger was postponed.

The New Congress legislative party was divided into 3 factions regarding its relationship with the coalition.³⁷ - (a) "Hawks" - blind followers of Tripathi who wished to leave the coalition and thus end it, since they had not been included in the cabinet (2) The 2nd group was indifferent to the issue of the coalition,

34. Assam ^{Tribune} Turbine, Delhi, 8 May 1970

35. Ibid

36. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 24 May 1970

37. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Delhi, 23 August 1970

they merely wished to avoid another mid-term poll

(c) The last group, which was against Tripathi, favoured remaining within the coalition and setting all problems through internal negotiations with the B.K.D. This group consisted of congress ministers in the coalition who did not wish to give up power. They were close to the Prime Minister and felt that Tripathi and his group were needlessly wrecking the coalition. They felt that the coalition was working well and J.P.Rawat asserted that the postponement^e of sugar nationalisation had been avoided by the cabinet as a whole not the B.K.D. alone³⁸. This view was supported by Chaturbhuj Sharma and some other ^{New} Congress ~~(P)~~ ministers. The Tripathi group criticised them for joining hands with the B.K.D.

~~The~~ The central leadership tried to solve the problem by asking Tripathi to become the President of the Congress party at the centre but Tripathi was reluctant to do so since he had a large following in U.P. (145 MLAs)³⁹. The situation was complicated by frequent "feelers" between the two Congress sections for a merger at the State level. Opposition leader Girdhari Lal of the old Congress told Newsmen that the two congress groups could unite and break-off from their parent bodies at the centre⁴⁰. Although Tripathi

38. Times, ^{of India} Delhi, 14 August 1970

39. Indian Express, Delhi, 2 July 1970

40. Northern India Patrika, Delhi, 23 August 1970

continually denied reports of such "talks" it was fear of this factor that prevented the Prime Minister from pressurizing him to shift to the centre.

Thus the New Congress was in a dilemma. Most of the members wished to withdraw from the coalition because of Charan Singh's policies, but they were aware that if they withdrew Charan Singh would try to enter into a coalition with the Old Congress faction. The coalition broke up in September when the New Congress formally withdrew its support⁴¹.

With the promulgation of President's rule, in October, there began a period of frantic political activity with both the congress factions doing their best to increase their support within the assembly⁴². The Old Congress claimed the support of 221 M.L.As. The New Congress in an attempt to keep out the Old Congress offered Jairam Verma, B.K.D., the Chief Ministership in the hope of joining another alliance with the B.K.D. But the opposition parties succeeded in forming a coalition headed by I.N. Singh of the Old Congress. It was on the surface, the culmination of the "grand alliance idea", but in reality it was merely, "factional politics under new ^{labels} levels"⁴³. The real leader of the coalition was Gupta, and the old rivalry between him and Charan Singh

41. Times, ^{of India} Delhi, 25 September 1970

42. Times, ^{of India} Delhi, 7 October 1970

43. Hamdi Bey, Statesman, Delhi 2 November 1970

and among the various constituent units came to the surface very soon. The defeat of Chief Minister, T.N. Singh in the Maniram by-elections to the assembly in January, 1971, led to a demand for his resignation.

Within the ranks of the New Congress too there was a renewed demand for a new leader. The members feared that T.N. Singh would mobilise the support of the Kayasthas, Rajputs and thakurs, the Jan Sangh the caste Hindus, the Old Congress the Banias, Brahmins and Harijans and the B.K.D. the Jats, Kurmis and Yadavs, and they could all become a real political force in the State⁴⁴.

However, the fortunes of both factions in U.P. underwent a drastic change after the mid-term elections held at the centre in February, 1971. Mrs. Gandhi was returned to power with a much larger majority, thus making her the undisputed leader of the Congress. This led to large scale ~~of~~ defections from the Old Congress to the New Congress in U.P. By the end of March New Congress had a clear majority⁴⁵ and in April, T.N. Singh's Government fell.

The third phase saw the re-establishment of Congress rule in U.P. under Kamalapati Tripathi. It was the first time that the Congress party had a majority since the 1967 elections. Ironically, however, the New

44. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 19 October, 1970

45. Times ^{of India}, Delhi, 28 March 1971

Congress in U.P. was far from being a unified party, it had in fact, more factions than ever before⁴⁶. Once the radical exuberance of the split subsided, new factions sprouted, centering around personalities and castes. A new danger was the large number of defectors, or rather groups of defectors from various parties who had flocked to the New Congress after its victory in the mid-term poll at the centre. These defectors now formed new factions within the party and were labelled by their old party affiliations. These factions met often and were very keen to maintain their separate identity which would give them more weightage in collective bargaining with the ruling leadership.⁴⁷.

Among the three main factions, the ex-B.K.D. M.L.As numbering about 30, constituted the largest group and the most potent threat to the leadership⁴⁸. Another new faction was made up of about 25 former Old Congress M.L.As. who had now joined the ranks of the New Congress. The last group was comprised of about nine S.S.P., M.L.As. who though small were well organised⁴⁹. These groups were very dissatisfied over the allocation of Cabinet seats and portfolios specially the 'B.K.D.' group which alleged that the 'S.S.P' group

46. Hindu, Delhi, 15 June, 1971

47. Ibid

48. Ibid

49. Ibid

were given three ministerships while the B.K.D. group, though numerically larger, was given only one⁵⁰. Since Mrs. Gandhi had asked Tripathi not to include well-known defectors, the hopes of a number of "fair-weather birds" were belied. Tripathi excluded those Congressmen too who had in the past been vocal in their demand for his removal to the centre - such as Chaturbhuj Sharma, Jagan Prasad Rawat and Raj Mangal Pandey; the nominees of both Bahuguna and Dinesh Singh were also excluded. 'Leftists' of all 'Shades' within the party such as Chandrajit Yadav, Chandrashekhar (both ex-CPI), too came together because for them Tripathi represented the rightist faction within the party.

The major problem facing the party was the choice of new UPCC President, as Tripathi had resigned on becoming the Chief Minister. Both major factions, the Tripathi group and the younger leaders were keen to appoint a nominee of their own and a contest seemed inevitable. However, a compromise was reached and Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai was nominated by the Prime Minister and Tripathi⁵¹. At 46, Mrs. Bajpai was the youngest President of the UPCC to be appointed and her appointment satisfied both groups⁵²

50. National Herald, Delhi 22 June 1971

51. National Herald, Delhi 19 July 1972

52. Ibid.

However, Mrs. Bajpai was not able to unite the two wings of the Congress as the Central leaders had hoped. Mrs. Bajpai had been chosen by Tripathi because he had thought that she would be amenable to his influence. But Mrs. Bajpai, on her appointment, regarding herself as a free agent had begun to form a faction on her own within the organisation which would give her a sound base in U.P. politics in the future. Hence there began a feud between the two.

Mrs. Bajpai filled the organisational wing with her own nominees and very soon Tripathi^{who} had for long enjoyed a predominant position in party councils found his supporters in a minority⁵³. Two of her main supporters Ramendra Verma and Agha Zaidi were appointed general Secretaries of the UPOC and they began a campaign against Tripathi within the party. They held that he had appointed corrupt ministers and was not implementing the economic programme of the party⁵⁴. The situation became more difficult for Tripathi when a section of his Cabinet Ministers began a campaign to remove him. These dissidents, who were part of the Younger group were led by Saligram Jaiswal who complained that some of the ministers were very inefficient and corrupt⁵⁵. Deputations to Delhi to complain about

53. Patriot, Delhi 23 August 1972

54. National Herald, Delhi 1 July 1972

55. Ibid

misgovernment in U.P. became common and were often led by ministers. Mrs. Bajpai herself complained to the Prime Minister that a section of the party were unhappy over the policies of the Tripathi Government⁵⁶.

Matters became worse when Mrs. Bajpai served notice on 14 M.L.As. led by Jaiswal who had publicly criticised Tripathi in the assembly, but she took no action against her two general secretaries⁵⁷. This created an uproar within the Parliamentary party which finally led to changes in the UPCC leadership. Agha Zaidi submitted his resignation⁵⁸ and in the UPCC Elections in December 1972, Mr. Baijnath Kureel, a nominee of the centre was elected President of the UPCC⁵⁹, inspite of much opposition from the faction led by Mrs. Bajpai.

The fend between Mrs. Bajpai and Mr. Tripathi was not really a ministerialists versus organisational quarrel, it was more a personal quarrel but with wider ramifications. The ministerialist wing was itself divided into a number of factions, some of which supported Mrs. Bajpai. The conflict between the two was part of a larger conflict between groups led by Chandrajit Yadav and Jagjivan Ram at the Centre⁶⁰. Mrs. Bajpai appointed soon after the materialisation of the split at the centre,

56. Hindustan Times, Delhi 23 August, 1971.

57. Motherland, Delhi 6 Sept. 1972

58. Statesman, Delhi 2 October 1972

59. Statesman, Delhi 24 December 1972

60. Times, Delhi 21 October 1972

and finding a growing number of Young Congress leaders in U.P. felt that the Congress was moving to a left of the centre position. Hence she moved closer to C. Yadav and his followers. Whereas Jagjivan Ram was against the extension of the leftist influence which Yadav had brought into the congress and hence he supported Tripathi in U.P.⁶¹.

The appointment of Baijnath Kureel as UPCC President did not improve matters. Kureel with no base of his own in U.P., acted under the guidance of Tripathi⁶². The younger faction within the party wished to remove Tripathi, and finally due to pressure from the Central level on 13th June, 1973 Tripathi resigned and Presidents rule was promulgated⁶³. However, the campaign to remove Tripathi from U.P. merely gained in strength because a number of congressmen wanted a fresh leader in U.P. after the polls. Four major groups were finally responsible for the final withdrawal of Tripathi to Central Government.

- (a) A number of M.Ps. led by Triloki Singh hailing from U.P. were keen to improve the party image before the elections
- (b) The faction led by Mrs. Bajpai who hoped to make her Chief Minister after the elections
- (c) A number of M.L.C from U.P. led by Jaiswal who were prepared to leave the issue of a new leader to the Prime Minister
- (d) A small group with the UPCC led by Subedar Singh who

61. Times, ^{of India} Delhi 21 October 1972
62. Hindustan Times, Delhi 18 August 1973
63. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 14, 1973

attempted a signature campaign in U.P. In November 1973 after a long period of negotiations, Tripathi joined the Central Cabinet and H.N. Bahuguna was appointed Chief Minister on November 10, 1973⁶⁴.

The appointment of new leader and the subsequent majority gained by the congress party in the 1974 elections have led many observers⁶⁵ to the conclusion that the U.P. congress has passed its critical phase and that the State will at last be governed by a united party. To a large extent this is true, but a number of important factors must be kept in mind in present day U.P. politics.

Tripathi was removed from U.P. politics with great difficulty. A large number of M.L.As. and M.Ps. were constantly calling on the Prime Minister to pledge their support to Tripathi⁶⁶, and it was only the combined efforts of all the above named factions which finally dislodged him. However, the legislative assembly and the party still has a number of his supporters who could prove troublesome to the present leadership. Moreover, Mrs. Bajpai, at present minister for Food and Civil Supplies, has a large following in the U.P. Congress. After Tripathi's resignation, she had

64. National Herald, Delhi 2 November 1973

65. Statesman, Delhi 17 October 1973

66. Ibid.

clearly indicated that she did not want Bahuguna to become the Chief Minister⁶⁷ and had in fact come to an understanding with Tripathi. Her opposition to Mr. Bahuguna goes back to the time when they were both active in the Allahabad city congress in the 1950^s68. However, Bahuguna inspite of being appointed by the Prime Minister, is a leader in his own right, having established a reputation both at the centre and in U.P. and may be able to keep the various factions united.

Keeping the above described political events in mind, it is possible to construct a model showing the manner in which factionalism operates within the congress party in U.P. With some modifications, this could be extended to other States such as Bihar and Rajasthan where the congress has also been the dominant party over a long period of time. This framework, is however, tentative untill more data can be collected.

Factional activity is a continual phenomena in the congress party in U.P. but there are certain periods or occasions when factionalism becomes most intense. These then are the major "incentives" internal and external to factional politics in U.P. They also serve as political indicators of the intensity of factional activity within the State.

a) Elections to the State assembly give rise to intense factional activity, though the factions formed are very short-lived and may disappear and new ones may appear after the elections, depending on the results. The distribution of party tickets invariably leads to

67. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 12 October, 1973

68. Hindustan Standard (Calcutta) 26 August, 1971

discontent within the rank and file because although rules exist according to which tickets have to be distributed after a proper survey of the State has been made by specially appointed "observers", these rules are rarely observed. Tickets are distributed on a 'group' basis after intense bargaining, the ruling faction normally gaining the largest number of tickets. The type of groups formed at this juncture are really speaking "splinter parties". The word 'party' is used because these groups often unhappy over being excluded from the congress list, often declare their intention of leaving the party, and put up their own candidates against the "official candidates". Mostly they quietly rejoin the party after elections. This is a "seasonal phenomena" often seen in U.P., a fertile state for political mushroom growth⁶⁹. The "socialist congress", one of the many splinter parties formed on the eve of the 1969 elections by Shibhan Lal Saxena and a 150 congressmen is a good example⁷⁰. Saxena alleged that tickets were given only to sitting congress M.L.As., to those 'rebels' who had joined the party after the 1967 elections enabling Gupta to form a government, and to those who had lost by a margin of 1000 votes in 1967⁷¹. This group set up over 12 'candidates' of its own⁷². After the 1969

69 Patriot, New Delhi, 24 July 1969

70. Hindustan Times, Delhi 5 December, 1968

71. Patriot, New Delhi 24 July 1969

72. Assam Tribune, Delhi 6 December 1968

elections a large number of "independents" were congress 'rebels' who later returned to its ranks. This type of intra-party factionalism has been largely responsible for the decreasing number of seats gained by the congress in successive elections. (b) Ministry-making after the elections is another occasion which provides an incentive to factionalism of a different variety. In both the 1967 and 1969 elections the congress party failed to gain a majority in the legislative assembly, but it was able to form a government initially. This was possible because a number of 'rebel' congressmen on each occasion rejoined the party in the hope of becoming ministers. The promise of a ministerial post is the easiest way to bring a recalcitrant faction or a set of party defectors back into the major ruling faction. For e.g. in 1969, Ram Gopal, a B.K.D. member alleged that one 'independent' member had joined the congress in return for which Swami Prasad Singh, a close relative of his (the independent members) was made a minister.⁷³. Thus after every election there are a number of ministrables" available in the State Capital both within the party and outside, and it is they who determine the life and stability of congress governments not the opposition parties.

There is also a positive correlation between the size of the Cabinet and factionalism within a state. A

73. Hindustan Times, Delhi 3 March, 1969

glance at Table 1 will show that states such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and West Bengal which are traditionally faction-ridden states have large Cabinets. Moreover, they are states which have 3 or even 4 'types' or levels of ministers (cabinet rank, Minister of State, Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries). In U.P. too, as Table 2 will show, Cabinets have tended to be large, Cabinets have increased in size because they are coalitions of factions within the ruling party, and most ministers continue to act primarily as factional leaders⁷⁴. The Cabinet is an arena for political fights not a forum for political governance.

Cabinet expansions too are an indication of increased factional activity. When a Chief Minister feels that his position is threatened by a hostile faction, he includes a representative of that faction in his cabinet, and conversely, factions which are ignored at the time of ministry formation are the source of greatest political danger. In March 1967, Charan Singh left congress because his group of Jats had been ignored by Gupta the Chief Minister. After the congress split, C.B. Gupta sought to retain his hold over the party by repeated cabinet expansions. For e.g. in November 1969, 6 Cabinet Ministers, 11 Ministers of State and 12 Deputy Ministers were sworn in,

74. Duncan B. Forrester, "State Ministers And Their Roles", Asian Survey X (June 1970) 6:472-483

making the total number of ministers 36 -- an expansion wholly unjustifiable on administrative grounds⁷⁵. It was by this means that he continued in office till February 1970.

c) Another major but "external" incentive to factionalism is central intervention. In order to understand this aspect of factional activity a number of factors must be kept in mind. Within the Indian Constitution the States are not given a totally independent position comparable to that of the American States. In many ways, the states are dependent on the centre and closely related to it⁷⁶. Moreover the Congress party is federally organised, and its constituent state units are independent, yet it is a highly centralised party. The power of decision-making in major spheres rests with a small group at the centre, the congress High Command. The Congress High Command, has always played an active role in the internal affairs of the party units at the State level. In the case of U.P. this interest has been more pronounced because U.P. has always been the Prime Ministers "home-State". Central intervention occurs because central and state congress politics are, in such a situation not separate but interwined. Faction leaders at the state level belong to a particular faction, and pay allegiance to a particular leader at the centre. Hence

75. National Herald, 24 November 1969

76. For example Presidents Rule is really speaking imposed by the Centre, the Governor being a nominee of the Centre.

all their political decisions, at the State level are determined by decisions made at the central level.

Central intervention may take many forms. The most common form is that of a 'mediator' between warring factions at the State level, who, when they wish to remove a leader, always appeal to the centre. The decision of the centre is always taken as final and binding. The State congressmen look upon the leadership as standing above, and apart from factional fights and hence appeal to it. For e.g. after Tripathi formed a government in April 1971, there was a continual stream of deputations to the centre in August. The most important ones were led by Saligram Jaiswal a dissident congressman⁷⁷, and the supporters of Mrs. Bajpai. The rank and file took upon this method as an effective way of pressurising the centre. The departure of both Gupta and Tripathi was to some extent brought about by such tactics. Very often the centre privately encourages such deputations if it wishes to remove the incumbent Chief Minister as after the Congress split. Another occasion which gives the centre a chance to intervene in State Congress politics is the UPCC Elections. Open contests between candidates are rare, in most cases, a person is nominated by the centre and then unanimously 'elected' by the State Congress. The election of UPCC President Baijnath Kureel in December 1972 is a good example. A large number of

77. Patriot, Delhi, 23 August 1971

the rank-and-file felt he was being imposed on them. Often a candidate is put up by the State party members against the 'official' candidate. Another important occasion is the election of the leader of the legislative wing who also becomes the State Chief Minister. All the Chief Ministers in U.P. from 1950 onwards have been nominees of the centre. It is due to this that no new set of leaders have emerged in U.P. from the "grass-roots". In recent years, however, the rank and file have been bitter over this. As some M.L.As. said in October 1973 when the Prime Minister had not yet announced her choice of the new Congress Chief Minister for the State. "who are we to voice our views in public over such delicate matters as the choice of our leader? We can only whisper our wishes in Tripathi's ears, who can in turn pass them on secretly to the Prime Minister. It is her prerogative to name the leader, and it is our duty to elect him"⁷⁸. However, the State leaders have never rebelled openly against the centre's decision. For example, after the split, if the old and new congress factions disregarding the views of their central leaders had joined together they could have formed a strong government in the State⁷⁹. But the State leadership has itself been so divided that it has fallen prey to the machinations of the centre. Hence the observation often

78. Statesman, Delhi, 18th October 1973

79 Some New and Old Congress M.L.As. were prepared to do so.

made by writers that the 1967 elections marked the transfer of power from the Centre to the States is not wholly true, at least in the case of U.P. it ignores the internal structural links within the congress system.

(d) Factionalism is responsible for another interesting phenomena which is seen not only in U.P., but is a feature of the congress system as a whole. This is the frequent habit of faction leaders, of utilizing the opportunity of every public pronouncement to further their own factional interests. If we look at successive meetings of the U.P. congress party, we will find that speeches made by various faction leaders are really directed against the ruling faction, and are meant to increase their own stature and support within the party. Such occasions and speeches are indicators of factional strife which is often otherwise not visible. The best example of such behaviour is the "cold war" between Tripathi and Gupta before the split of the party in U.P. Criticism against the opposite faction is not made 'openly' but often particular economic or political issues are used to embarrass the ruling faction. For example, the issue of sugar nationalisation, cane and potato prices, were some of the issues that figured in party speeches at that time⁸⁰.

^{of India}
80. Times, Delhi, 17 September, 1969

Thus party meetings are not used to discuss the programme and policy of the government but rather serve as a forum for intra-party warfare, or a trial of strength. Often statements are made which are meant to increase support, such as an announcement of Cabinet expansion, or change in government policy. In February 1970, Mohanlal Gautam told newsmen that he knew from reliable sources that Mrs. Gandhi would make Charan Singh and not Tripathi, the Chief Minister after Gupta's removal. This was an attempt by Gautam who supported the syndicate faction to stem the flow of defectors towards Tripathi's group. The press is used by Congressmen as a 'Sounding-board'. It is for this reason that there is a gap between pronouncements made in public and actual action taken afterwards. The language of the political elite in India is hence worthy of consideration.

(e) Moreover, it is often said that the Congress is a "Consensus party". Factional battles are fought but never to the finish, at the last moment a "unanimous" resolution expressing "party unity" is passed at the next party meeting. These resolutions, vaguely worded, are no indication of political trends within the party. Party elections too, are not contested and there is no open competition which is so characteristic of American political parties. This is because the congress party is in reality a coalition of factions all struggling for power, but at the same time not wanting to leave the party.

(f) Finally in U.P. factional activity is not confined within the structure of the congress party alone but is influenced by, and often determined by, its interaction with opposition parties many of which were earlier factions within the party. The margin of pressure exerted by outside parties on the Congress is continual and strong and there is constant inter-penetration between the two. This proves that factional activity has not ceased with the rise of opposition parties, which have successfully challenged the power of the congress and formed a government, it has merely taken a different form.

Thus we see that factional politics plays a central role in U.P. Factions have given rise to governmental instability and created a weak political party. However, so far we have only traced the rise and formation of the major factional patterns in U.P. It is essential to establish what are the underlying motives and purposes of factional behaviour. Factions as we shall see, are basically a function of interest. Keeping the various major factions, and the conclusions drawn in mind, we turn now to a consideration of this aspect of factionalism in U.P.

Table - 1

State	Number of Cabinet Ministers	Number of Ministers of State	Number of Deputy Ministers	Number of Parliamentary Secretaries
Andhra	15	3	-	-
Bihar	22	20	4	-
Assam				
Gujarat				
Jammu & Kashmir	5	4	-	-
Kerala	13	-	-	-
Madhya Pradesh	11	8	7	-
Madras	15	-	-	-
Maharashtra	12	8	1	-
Mysore	13	6	-	-
Orissa	Presidents Rule Declared on 3rd March 1973			
Punjab	6	9	2	1
Rajasthan	8	7	-	-
Uttar Pradesh	15	11	9	-
West Bengal	14	9	3	-
Haryana	10	5	-	-
Himanchal Pradesh	4	3	-	-
Manipur	Presidents Rule on 28 March 1973			
Nagaland	6	5	2	-
Arunachal	High Commissioner's Rule			
Goa	3	-	-	-
Mizoram	4	-	1	-

Ref: Reference
Annual of India
1973.

CHAPTER - 4

A CASE STUDY OF SUGAR AND THE LAND LEVY PROBLEM AS ASPECTS OF FACTIONALISM IN U.P.

In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to examine the factional nature of the Congress party in general, and to identify the various factions that were active in U.P. during the period under study. Factions as we have seen within the Indian context have been attributed by different writers to different sociological and political phenomena within our political system. While it is undeniably true that factors such as caste, personal rivalry among leaders, existence of village clans and traditional groups have all played an important role in the rise and development of the factional system in U.P. and elsewhere, they have obscured the fact that factions are basically a function of economic interest. Within a political party, a faction may be formed by a group of individuals who belong to the same caste, community, region, or who speak the same language, etc. However, what holds such a faction together, is an underlying common interest. For example a faction based on caste may have as its binding interest, the uplift of its community; a local faction - the improvement of its own area; or a linguistic faction the propagation of its own language within a certain region, and so on.

The faction forms a common focus, a nuclei of common interest within the larger party which consists of diverse

individuals with equally diverse interests. Modern political parties as Key has said, are no longer based on ideology they are rather "brokers" of interest. A person who joins a faction gains personal satisfaction by being a member of a small inner group, but he also hopes to gain some advantage. In this sense, factions play the same role within a political party that pressure groups play within the social system as a whole. Each faction tries to pressurize the party to follow its line of thinking because it would ensure protection of its own interests.

Political parties in India as elsewhere, specially the Congress are never tired of proclaiming their faith in ideologies. Political battles are fought on "ideological stances"¹, however ideology is not a determining factor. Maurice Duverger² accepts that there are three Chief factors common to all countries, socio-economic, ideological and technical, and holds that the first is undoubtedly the most important. Ideologies he points out to a certain extent also correspond to class attitudes. Since ideology serves class interests we should examine the class or social base of political parties and understand their ideology on the basis of their stand on major socio-economic issues such as land reform,

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1. C.P. Bhambhri, "Ideology and Political Parties in India," Economic and Political Weekly III (April 29, 1968) 16:643-46
 2. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties : Their Organisation and Activity In The Modern State. (London: Methuen & Company 1969) cited in Bhambhri n.l, 643

wealth and income distribution, etc. An examination of the "interest groups" represented and supported by groups within a party such as peasant associations, trade unions, etc., shows how different factions may support different interests regardless of the ideology of the party as a whole. This is specially true in the case of the congress party which is, "a coalition of classes under the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie"³. The result of this is that, inspite of the socialistic utterances of the party, it has served the interests of property owners. The concentration of wealth and class disparities have increased during the period of socialistic planning. This has been established by the "Committee on Distribution of National Income and Wealth" and by R.K.Hazari's Report on "Industrial Licensing and Planning Policy."⁴ To keep together the various factions within its fold it has tried to reconcile the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, with that of the workers and peasants. This dilemma is responsible for its lack of ideological clarity and confusion.

This aspect of factionalism is more important in developing countries such as India, rather than developed countries such as the U.S.A., where economic issues may not be of major importance within the political sphere. The governments of underdeveloped countries by their plans for

3. Bhambhəri, n. 1, 644

4. Ibid.

development which determine the allocation of resources, by their own direct investment in particular sectors of the economy, are deeply engaged in economic life.⁵ Thus development plans become the very stuff of politics, with decisions being determined by political action, and the effects of these decisions having profound consequences for the ruling party and various social classes. Hence in our study of factionalism we must recognise the potential sources of group political conflict over economic development.

U.P. is one of the most backward states in the Indian union, hence the problem of the allocation of scarce resources among the various regions, and social classes has always been a source of conflict leading to factionalism within the congress party. Since U.P. is primarily an agricultural state, most of this conflict has centred round issues dealing with land and agricultural development. Perhaps no other area of decision making reflects so well the inner conflicts within the party, and the shift in political power between the various groups within the party since Independence. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to examine the politics surrounding two major issues - land levy and sugar Nationalisation which are part of the larger field of agricultural development as a whole, and which have long been important issues in U.P.

5. George Rosen, Democracy And Economic Change In India (California : University of California Press, 1966):4

If we look at the manner in which factions operate in U.P., we find that they operate in two major ways in order to maintain their interests. (1) There is an attempt by a faction, when it assumes the position of a "ruling faction" to increase its own mass support and popularity. It hence tries to bring in measures which would make it popular among the people, thus ensuring its own continued stability in office. The best example of this in U.P., which has been taken up here, is the issue of land levy. Successive ruling factions in an attempt to woo the rural electorate and gain votes from the peasantry, have attempted to abolish land revenue. (2) There is also the attempt by factions to try and favour their own followers, and their own social class with a view to maintaining their support. The example taken up here is the politics of the Sugar Industry which has proved to be a source of patronage, one part of the party supporting the sugar magnates, the other part the cane-growers.

A - "Sugar Politics"

In order to understand the politics of sugar within U.P., and its importance in factional politics it is necessary to grasp a few basic facts regarding the sugar industry in the country as a whole and, in U.P. in particular.

Sugar, as a cash crop has been grown in India for a very long time. Today India is the 4th largest sugar producing

country in the world.⁶ The modern sugar industry came to be established at the turn of the century when the first factory was erected in 1900⁷. Before World War-I, progress was slow, but production was stimulated when prices of sugar touched a new high in 1920. By 1930-31 there were 31 factories producing 160,525 tonnes of sugar a year.⁸ Protection was granted in 1932 and continued till 1949. Due to fresh incentives, after independence, from almost total dependence for imports of sugar from Java, India has not only become self sufficient but started exporting sugar since 1960-61 to earn precious foreign exchange.⁹ This shows the importance of the sugar industry in the Indian economy, and the political system. Today, the industry is spread over both the tropical and sub-tropical regions. In the tropical south comprising Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala Tamilnadu and Mysore, due to better irrigation facilities, the yield is higher than in the north where lies 76% of the total area under sugarcane.¹⁰ In the sub-tropical belt comprising Punjab, Rajasthan, U.P., Bihar, M.P., Orissa, Assam and West Bengal, climatic variations are pronounced, and the most favourable season for sugar-cane growing is restricted to a brief 3-4 months. Moreover, poor irrigation facilities make matters worse. Because of these conditions

6. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics In An Indian State: The Congress Party In Uttar Pradesh (Bombay:Oxford University Press, 1966):119

7. United New of India, "Backgrounders"(Pamphlet) VI (Delhi: August 15, 1974) 33:1

8. Ibid

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

the yield in the sub-tropical belt is about half of that in the tropical belt.¹¹

The total licensed capacity by the end of 1971-72 was estimated by the Development Council of the Industry at 5.3 million tonnes. The number of sugar units has gone up from 32 before protection in 1931-32 to 238 at the end of 1973.¹² A significant feature of the sugar industry in India has been that although the area under sugarcane cultivation has increased, neither the yield per acre (36 tonnes) has the sugar content in the cane (about 12 %) has shown any appreciable increase - a factor to be remembered when dealing with the "politics" of sugar in U.P. and elsewhere.

While sugarcane is grown over a considerable portion of the country and the sugar industry has a national dimension, certain conditions - economic, political and geographic have contributed to the special position enjoyed by the sugar industry in U.P. Out of an All-India total of 2418.0 hectares (including U.P.) of land devoted to cane cultivation, 1,274.1 hectares, or roughly half the amount, is in U.P.¹³ To understand the simple importance of this fact, it is essential to remember that the sugar industry is an agro-industry. A sugar manufacturing plant is merely a unit that extracts the sucrose found in sugar-cane, and the cane accounts

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Times of India, Year Book
(Delhi : 1973) : 100

for 2/3rd of the total manufacturing cost.¹⁴ The factories therefore have to be located close to the source of the raw material supply. Hence, out of the ten largest sugar producing units in the country, five are situated in U.P., which also has 73 factories out of an All-India total of 219 (including U.P.).¹⁵

The importance of the sugar industry within the entire social and political system of U.P. can further be understood when we view it against the prevailing economic backwardness of U.P. Whereas in states such as Maharashtra (which has 42 sugar factories) or Mysore (which has 13 sugar factories)¹⁶ there are a number of industries, in U.P. the sugar industry is one of the few. This has enhanced its importance creating a large "sugar Lobby". While in Maharashtra it may be the Industrialists Association or Chamber of Commerce as a whole which may try to influence the Government, in U.P. it is the sugar man^yates, or cane-growing Zamindars who do so. Moreover, U.P. is largely an agricultural State - successive State Governments have made little effort to start new industries. Sugarcane is grown all over U.P. except perhaps on the black soil cotton-growing areas in Jhansi, Hamirpur and Banda. It is hence the small farmers biggest source of money to buy what he wants. The sugar industry is the only source of income in villages of over 24 districts. This is specially true in Eastern U.P. where large number of people live on the borderline between extreme poverty and outright starvation,

14. United News of India, n. 7, 2

15. Times of India, n. 13

16. Ibid.

sugar is the only cash crop and the factories provide the only source of industrial employment to those pushed off the land. It is for this reason that the life of the districts revolve around sugar, and sugar politics is important in U.P. The politics and economics of the sugar industry are among the most complex problems in U.P. today.

In the politics of sugar in U.P. three major groups are involved and can be clearly identified. (1) The cane growers (2) the sugar manufacturers and, (3) the government. The interests of the three are bound to conflict, and it is this factor that has led to groupism within the congress party, different groups supporting different interests. The cane growers, once unorganised, are now organised into 134 Cooperatives which are affiliated to a State level federation. These Cooperatives dominated by the big cane growers are among the most powerful of local institutions in U.P., and are in fact semi-official agencies representing the cane growers to the sugar factories. Those who grow cane are more dependent upon the government and upon the market economy than other peasants, since the government sets the price of cane to be paid by the factories. Hence political issues are more important to peasants growing cane than to other peasants. The sugar magnates too are organised and have traditionally enjoyed the support of a large portion of the congress party. The Opposition leaders in U.P. have long claimed that the industrialists have made contributions to the State Congress election funds and in return, the congress when in power has been lenient in the collection of tax

arrears due from them.¹⁷ The role of the government too in the politics of the sugar industry is important and determines the interaction between the other two groups. Certain measures have been adopted by the government which have determined the course of sugar politics.¹⁸ (i) Fixation of a minimum sugar price to be paid by sugar factories to the growers, (ii) Licensing of capacity to regulate the expansion of existing sugar factories and establishment of new ones (iii) fixation of ex-factory prices of sugar (iv) distribution of sugar for domestic consumption and export, etc. Of these, for our purposes, the first measure is very important.

The Central Sugarcane Act of 1934 had empowered the state governments to fix minimum prices for sugarcane to be paid by the sugar factories. It was a measure intended to ensure the small farmer a fair and reasonable price for his cane. In 1950, as different States were fixing different cane prices, the Central Government assumed the power to prescribe every year the minimum price of sugarcane on an All-India basis. The cane-growers have been constantly demanding a higher price, while the sugar manufacturers have felt that the government in order to appease the farmer has fixed the price too high. As the price of cane is fixed by the Centre, the Central Government too, and Congress leaders at the Centre, have also played a role in the politics of sugar in U.P.

17. Brass n. 6, 120

18. United News of India n.7

The issue of nationalisation of the sugar industry has been taken up here because during the period under study it was the single most important demand made in connection with the sugar industry. Moreover, it is a major issue involving the Central and State governments, and the congress party as whole, making it easier to identify the various factions and interests involved.

The demand for the nationalisation of the sugar industry has been there in U.P. for some time. While it is true that this demand came to the forefront during the congress split, it is wrong to look upon it as a purely "political weapon" used by the "Young Turks" in U.P. to embarrass the government of C.B.Gupta. In fact certain changes which have been taking place both within the rural countryside, and within the sugar industry had generated this demand much earlier. These changes had affected the nature and composition of the rank and file of the congress party in U.P.^o

In U.P. in the initial stages the leadership of the national movement was provided by the urbanised middle-caste professional classes. But soon the movement went to the villages and took up the cause of the peasantry, and threw up a peasant based rural leadership in the districts. This happened in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁹ The rule within the congress party in U.P., that no person could be elected to

19. Girish Mathur, "Casteism And Polarization Trends In U.P. And Bihar," Patriot, New Delhi, 25 October, 1970

the post of the UPCC President for a second term, and the creation of 4-5 Vice-Presidents, gave the district leaders an opportunity to rise to the provincial level, and a number of leaders almost equal to Nehru in stature developed. Nehru also allowed free discussion within the UPCC - a circumstance which did not exist elsewhere. As a result, the U.P. congress provided all-India leaders to different trends of thought, and it is out of these trends that the different political parties have developed. This upward mobility of leadership generated a rural/urban hiatus in the congress, and also division between the comparatively more developed western, and the backward eastern districts - two divisions which have persisted. After independence, however, the upward mobility of leadership stopped and with the exit of the left groups the ideological debate in its ranks came to an end. The new industrial and business community was interested in stabilising the existing leadership, while the land reforms created a new class of Kulaks who in turn sought to stabilise district leadership. Divisions in the ruling party were now based on loyalty to one of the existing leaders in the struggle for power within a small group. This loyalty was based on the caste of the leader. Thus Brahmin, Bania, and Rajput groups developed. If bossism, corruption by the business community, and the growth of vote banks, helped in stabilising upper caste leadership they also helped generate factionalism within all parties. Within the congress party it helped generate the pro and anti Gupta factions which were to play an important role in the coming

years. Gupta, a "Banias" by caste, was looked upon as the leader and supporter of the new rising industrial class in U.P.²⁰ His major opponent Mohan Lal Gautam, on the other hand was a Brahmin, and had worked closely with Tandon in the peasant movement in U.P. in the early 1930s.²¹ These are the socio-economic reasons underlying the rise of groupism, not so much the personal differences between various leaders. The revolt of the exploited classes in such a situation could only take form in an upsurge of backward castes against upper caste domination. This is a feature seen in the neighbouring states of Bihar, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh also, and has taken different forms. In U.P. the leadership of this upsurge went into the hands of a farming community - the Jats - symbolising the rise of the agricultural community. The Jats organised themselves into a faction led by Charan Singh within the congress. But in February 1967 finding themselves and their demands ignored by C.B.Gupta, left the party and formed the B.K.D. The hard core of the B.K.D. consists of the Jats of Doab and Bruj (Mathura and Agra district).²² The Jats moved into western U.P. early in the 18th century after successive famines and Deccan warfare, had made the Rajputs move South. As immigrants, the Jats aspired to a higher caste position, than they had in their homeland in Punjab, but till recently

20. Brass n.6, 43

21. Ibid, 44

22. Statesman, Delhi, 22 September, 1970

they remained backward. Now ofcourse the Jat community hopes to improve its status by aspiring to political power. The B.K.D. however, due to its close links and dependency on the former Raja of Bharatpur and former rulers of Rajasthan, M.P. and Bundelkhand is pressed to the right much against the wishes of some of its leaders.²³ Hence in U.P. there has been a "polarization based on economic interests."²⁴

Corresponding to these changes taking place in the 1950s and 1960s, certain changes have taken place within the Sugar industry in U.P. One of the first few industries to be established in U.P. today, it is suffering from lack of funds, neglect, lack of repair and in the case of some mills, old age. In fact the sugar industry enjoys the unavoidable distinction of being ridden with "Chronic sickness".²⁵ The industrialists feel that their problems have arisen due to cane shortage and the high price of cane in recent years. The cane-growers, and their supporters point out on the other hand, that many factories had neither paid their dues to the cane-growers, nor their tax arrears to the government. There has also been a standing complaint that the private sector has not cared to plough back some parts of their profit into modernisation of their old factories, rather they have diverted them to more profitable channels. This is specially true of East U.P. which has among the

23. Ibid.

24. Girish Mathur n.19

25. National Herald, Delhi, 12 June, 1967.

oldest existing sugar factories in India and cannot complete with more modern factories in Punjab and the South. These factors have also lent support to the demand for Nationalization.

When in March, 1967, Charan Singh became the Chief Minister, and the BKD came to power after a long period of congress rule, the industrialists found themselves out of sympathy with the new government. In June, Mr Jai Ram Verma, Minister for Agriculture warned sugar mill owners to expedite payment of dues of cane price to farmers failing which the government would take strong action against them.²⁶ He said that the sugar magnates had not executed the task of carrying out cane development in their respective factory area, or repairing their units. According to the Development Council for the Sugar Industry the minimum economic production per unit per day ought to be 2000 tonnes of sugar. In U P as many as 60-72 % mills were producing below this level and they suffered from inefficient management. The Chief Minister too warned the sugar magnates against resorting to such means as delaying crushing during the season. Addressing the 22nd Annual Session of the Western U.P. Chamber of Commerce he disclosed that Rs 45 crores was yet to be recovered by the government as tax arrears from them.²⁷ He said the government would take over such mills. The B.K.D. also appealed to the Centre to fix a higher price for cane, thus showing clearly where their sympathy lay.²⁸

26. Ibid.

27. Times of India, Delhi, 31 October, 1967 .

28. Statesman, Delhi, 25 November, 1967

With the return to power of the Congress party in 1969 under C.B.Gupta it seemed for a time that the whole issue of a higher price for farmers and the improvement of the sugar industry by the mill owners so actively taken up by the SVD government would be pushed into the background. However, during the time of the congress split, the sugar nationalization question figured prominently specially where U.P.was concerned. The Young Turks faction led by congressmen such as Chandrashekhar, Bahuguna, Tripathi and other local congress leaders began to demand nationalization of the sugar industry as a part of their larger socialistic programme. This demand was supported by as many as 130 M.L.As of Congress, led by Tripathi.²⁹ It was finally one of the issues which led to the fall of the government led by C.B.Gupta.

Many old Congress leaders in U.P. held that this demand was a clever device to embarrass the Gupta government. However, the sugar lobby in U.P. had itself begun to ask for Nationalization due to the changed social and economic situation discussed earlier. The sugar lobby had a number of politicians in it.³⁰ The politician member of the lobby was also a public relations man for the factory within his constituency. He was also a member, if not a director, of the cooperative feeding the mill with cane. The industry hence as a whole did not hire its political advocates but

29. Hamdi Bey, National Herald, Delhi, 15 September, 1970

30. Ibid.

each mill did, with the result, that the millowner and his political agent, succeeded the Zamindar as a rural potentate with fading authority. The politician satisfied his client mainly by securing reprieve from government action on tax arrears, permits and licenses. The demand for Nationalization was now pressed by these political agents because of certain changes in the rural countryside. Since they were directors or members of the cooperatives supplying cane to the factories, they now aspired to run the factories just as they ran the cooperatives. They hoped to get a better price for the cane if they ran the mills themselves. Moreover, controlling the mills would mean an increase in the amount of patronage, as they could appoint their own nominees and supporters to jobs. Having eclipsed the Zamindar, they wanted to eclipse or replace the mill owner. The cane growers organised into these cooperatives had not asked for nationalization. The congressmen of both the old and the New factions enjoyed most of the executive posts on these cane cooperatives. In the eastern districts some SSP M.L.As, and in the western, some BKD M.L.As had taken them over.³¹ This was the sectional interest behind the demand for nationalization. The question of whether the State Government is competent or not to nationalize was the least part of the story.

After the Congress split the BKD under Charan Singh was able to form a government with the help of the New

31. Ibid.

Congress faction. It was now felt that steps would be taken to nationalise the sugar industry. The BKD at that time was divided into various groups where the sugar industry was concerned. A section of the BKD who sympathised with the old congress, and who had supported C.B.Gupta in the past were against the nationalization of the sugar industry. Another group led by Charan Singh wanted to nationalise the sugar industry. In March 1970, 19 sugar mills were "taken-over" by the government of Charan Singh for non-payment of cess and purchase tax, and cane-price. Charan Singh said that after payment of compensation to millowners in bonds he proposed to hand over the mills to the cane-growers. He was not willing to use the word nationalisation, he rather called his action "socialization". In spite of a large amount of criticism from opposition leaders, however, Charan Singh did not nationalise the industry as a whole.

Within the New congress too certain groups were demanding nationalization. Genda Singh, a leader of the cane-growers of eastern U.P. headed a section of rural legislators, while Bahuguna and Prem Chand Sharma headed another group. A number of M.L.As under Ram Chandra Vikal, leader of the KMP were also pressurising the government to nationalize. Except for the Swatantra party, groups within most of the opposition parties were also calling for nationalization. Hence this issue cut across party lines within the assembly. It was this factor that finally led a break between the New Congress and the B.K.D.

The position adopted by the Central Government at this time served to further aggravate the situation. The U.P. government held that it was not competent to nationalize the sugar industry within U.P. since it was part of an all-India complex.³² It hence called upon the Central Government to evolve an all-India policy and take steps to nationalize the industry as a whole. The Central Government on the other hand held that the U.P. government was fully competent to nationalise any industry within its jurisdiction.³³ Thus, inspite of socialistic programmes no government was prepared to jeopardise the traditional single largest source of electoral funds in U.P., each took shelter behind legal technicalities. On September 28, 1970, due to repeated demands, the Central government set up a Sugar Inquiry Commission headed by Mr Justice Vashist Bhargava, former Judge of the Supreme Court to look into the entire question of a total take-over of the entire sugar industry.³⁴ Its term of reference included sugar-cane price, and measures to improve the industry. Important leaders representing the industry, one M.P., one INTUC leader and others were members of the commission. The report of the Commission has not yet been officially published, but the press has reported that the members of the commission are sharply divided over the issue of nationalization.

32. Times of India, Delhi, 30 August, 1970

33. Times of India, Delhi, 1 August, 1970

34. United News of India, n. 7

In October, 1970, the B.K.D. was again able to form a government with the old Congress headed by T.N. Singh, T.N.Singh himself took over the industries portfolio so as to keep the sugar industry under his direct command. While T.N.Singh and the Old Congress were not prepared to nationalise the sugar industry, realising the importance of subject, he took a number of steps to improve the existing industry. He held that a Cooperative Sugar Research Institute should be established and called upon industrialists to evolve methods for optimum utilization of the by-products of the industry. During the short tenure of T.N.Singh's ministry, demands for nationalization of the sugar industry continued. They were mainly put forward by the New Congress faction to trouble the government. However, prominent leaders of the cane-growers specially in East U.P. such as Narsingh Rao Pandey asked for nationalization.³⁵ He said that more than 50 crores was outstanding in the form of sugar cane price to growers, and sales-tax to the government. He pointed out that the worst conditions existed in the eastern areas such as Gorakhpur where Rs 1.25 crores was outstanding from one of the sugar mills there. Pandey urged the government to order realisation of sugarcane price from mill owners as land revenue as provided in the sugar cane Purchase Regulation Act.³⁶

In 1971 with the defeat of the government headed by T.N.Singh, the congress returned to power. After a long

35. Times of India, New Delhi, 16 April, 1971

36. Ibid.

spell of instability and coalition governments the congress party returned to power. However, neither the government led by Tripathi earlier, nor the present government headed by Bahuguna has nationalized the sugar industry, though a Sugar Corporation has been set up in the State. Certain groups within the congress and the opposition parties have continued their demands, but the issue has been pushed into the background. This shows that the split within the congress has not led to any ideological polarization. The interests and background of the rank-and-file has remained the same. A large part of the party is still aligned to the sugar magnates.

B - LAND LEVY

The subject of land revenue has long been a source of controversy in U.P. The total abolition of land revenue had been part of the congress policy for fifteen years, but it had not been implemented. Within the S.V.D. government which first attempted it in 1967, all the various political parties were in favour of this step, as a means to gain popularity and keep the congress out of power.

Land revenue looked upon by government in developed countries as a part of the economic and taxation policy of the government has acquired in U.P. political overtones for a number of reasons. The consideration of policy relating to land revenue requires an examination of it within the framework of an integrated land policy in relation to

economic growth. To be brief, it must be viewed in the light of the role of land in a developing economy. Normally, in a developing economy the relative role of land declines, but the absolute role increases. In our peculiar case, with a predominantly agrarian character of the State economy and scarcity of land, the role of land revenue assumes greater significance. Besides the importance of land revenue must be seen in relation to the total tax structure in the State, that is the burden shared by different sections of the community. In U.P. land revenue (in 1967) formed roughly 15 % of the total revenue receipts, and slightly less than 1/3rd of the total tax receipts.³⁷ (The exact proportion varies yearly but even today the situation remains more or less the same). In absolute terms it was about Rs 22 crores annually and a substantial part was contributed by small holders³⁸.

U.P. is primarily an agricultural State and the chances of a substantial industrial complex developing in the near future are little. This means that it is the rural countryside that provides the single largest source of income to the government. It is in order to gain the support of the agricultural community which forms a substantial part of the total population, that the congress and other parties have adopted the policy of total abolition of land revenue. It is a purely political gesture, meant to gain votes from the peasantry. Economists and experts are not found wanting who point out that such a step would liberate the small farmer

37. Searchlight, Delhi, 24 June, 1967

38. Ibid.

from a burden allowing him to plough back a larger part of his income into the land. Politicians have long stressed on "distributive justice"³⁹ and its democratic value. However, there is no doubt of the fact that such a step would be disastrous for the economy of U.P. Most of the socialistic thinking of our politicians has developed ^{under} our conditions of mass poverty and is characterized by reactionary overtones. Such measures are convenient and easy and thus have wider appeal, and this is characteristic of mass psychology at a low level of the economy. But the easiest course is not always the best.

A backward State such as U.P. cannot afford to loose its largest source of income. It has been a common complaint that the centre has not been providing U.P. with enough capital for the five year plans. In fact it is the state government that has failed to make a bold effort for the development of the State. The centre has incurred an expenditure of about Rs 100 Crores in U.P. during 1956-69 on schemes of national importance.⁴⁰ For the 4th Plan, U.P. received its share of Rs 727 crores for centrally sponsored schemes. While the State Government has raised only about Rs 582 crores upto 1970, ^{while} for its plans the centre has contributed about Rs 823 crores.⁴¹ The successive ruling factions in U.P. have done nothing to tax the "new rich" within the countryside and mop up the surplus created by planned development. Small

39. Indian Express, Delhi, 28 June, 1967

40. S. Usman, "State Government to Blame For U.Ps Backwardness, "Patriot, February 10, 1970

41. Ibid.

farmers in U.P. have never asked for remission of land revenue. They had in fact adjusted themselves to it because of higher output and higher prices of farm produce, and looked on it as no burden. The tax rate could have been greater for bhumidhars and less for sirdars. The trouble however has been that in the village community the Kulak is also the main "vote-getter", indeed he is the local political boss and cannot be displeased. The reluctance to mobilise resources is evident from a comparison of Punjab and U.P. which started their projects for economic development from the same base. At the end of the 3rd Plan the per capita income in the Punjab was the highest while in U.P. it was about the lowest. While in Punjab it has risen, in U.P. it has steadily fallen. The reluctance to mobilise resources is not confined to U.P., but is part of an almost all-India pattern. Nor is this something confined to land revenue alone. In fact, it has been held that for all the increase that has taken place over the plan periods states taxes, "are not emerging as the prima donnas in the overall scheme of State finances."⁴² Between 1951-52 and 1971-72 State taxes increased seven-fold, but the total revenue budget of the States increased more than nine-fold. No doubt every tax has grown over the period, but some more slowly than others. Land revenue among others, has grown at a pace less than the average between 1951-52 and 1971-72.⁴³

42. L. Venkatraman, "Twenty Years of State Taxation", Indian Journal of Public Administration XVIII (July-September 1972) 3: 395 - 413

43. Ibid, 399

Nor was U.P. the only State to attempt abolition of land revenue. In fact during the 1960s specially after the 4th general elections, there seemed to be a link between establishment of non-Congress governments, and legislation to abolish or lessen land revenue. In Bihar there were no taxation proposals for three years from 1966-67 to 1969-70, and in 1970-71 there were actually tax concessions in regard to land revenue to the extent of Rs 24 crores per annum.⁴⁴ All unirrigated holdings upto 5 acres, and irrigated holdings upto 2½ acres were exempted from land revenue. Between 1966-67 and 1971-72 West Bengal proposed no taxation through in 1972-73 Rs 10 Crores per annum was imposed.⁴⁵ - Mysore had no taxation proposal between 1966-67 and 1969-70, and only in 1970-71, it proposed additional taxation measures. Moreover in some states where taxes were levied, different methods were used to collect surplus agricultural profit without a direct land tax. The diversity of measures by which the taxation of land is sought to be increased is, at once a measure of the possibilities and the reluctance of the state governments to go in boldly for greater taxation of land. Hence if we look at Table II we find that while from 1951 to the end of the third plan, revenue gained from the land rose steadily, in 1966-67 there was a sharp decline from 114 crores in the 3rd Plan to 90 Crores in 1966-67, and it rose slowly after 1967. Such a sudden drop in the amount of land revenue levied on an all-India basis can only be explained by the reluctance of the non-Congress

44. Ibid. 403

45. Ibid.

ministers in many states to tax the rural sector. Most of these new ministries were made up of groups which had attained political power for the first time, and were keen to gain popular support from the electorate.

A study of the revenue policy adopted by successive groups in U.P. between 1967 and 1974 shows how different political parties on coming to power vied with each other to gain mass support to improve their political position.

The SVD Government under Charan Singh was not only the first non-congress government in U.P., but it was made up largely of defectors from the ranks of the congress. Unsure of themselves and realising the need for mass support, one of the first few decisions of the new government was the abolition of land revenue over a period of five years.⁴⁶ Charan Singh in the assembly held that it was the opinion of his ministry that land revenue was retrogressive as it did not take into account the farmers income and was based on a particular area of land. Charan Singh himself was not in favour of the measure, but yielded to the pressure exerted on him by the other parties in the coalition. The SSP however was not satisfied with his decision, and wanted all land levy to be abolished immediately and not over a length of time. The state unit of the SSP even carried on an agitation throughout October in the districts to resist the collection of land revenue, and the SSP ministers threatened to resign.⁴⁷ Finally Charan

46. Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 June, 1967

47. Hindustan Times, Delhi, 14 October, 1967

Singh agreed to the abolition of land revenue upto Rs 2 on small holdings.⁴⁸ The levy on holdings upto 6.25 acres he said would be reduced to half. Charan Singh and his group had to agree to the demands of the SSP, because the former had the support of the CPI, Swatantra, and the Jan Sangh, and these parties with their combined strength could remove the SVD government. Thus this compromise was not on economic grounds. It was the result of the first wave of non-congressism, and attempt to gain popularity. Thus all the political parties constituting the SVD were eager to abolish land revenue so as to gain the support of the peasant class.

The desire to gain popular support led the SVD to abolish not only the agricultural land revenue but the urban land and House Tax also. This further cut the States revenue by nearly Rs 2 crores per annum.⁴⁹ This was also a part of the 19 point programme. At the same time, increased Dearness Allowance was granted to all State Employees creating a further loss of Rs 10 Crores.⁵⁰ This meant a total loss of Rs 12 crores annually, or Rs 48 Crores over the remaining 4th Plan period. In 1968, the SVD abolished the Sales Tax on Cane Seeds to promote cane cultivation in the State creating a fresh loss to the already depleted exchequer.⁵¹

48. Times of India, Delhi, 27 October, 1967

49. Statesman, Delhi, 5 May, 1967

50. Ibid.

51. National Herald, Delhi, 29 January, 1968.

During the period of Presidents rule that followed the fall of the SVD government, the Central government set up a Taxation Enquiry Committee to look into ways and means to raise fresh revenue. However since the commission could only recommend, it was merely a gesture on the part of the Centre.

When the congress returned to power in 1969, Gupta as the Chief Minister promised fresh taxes, specially on land. However, this did not happen. Rather in January, 1970 the government issued an ordinance exempting holdings upto 6.25 acres from land revenue.⁵² As Chief Minister earlier in 1967 Gupta had opposed abolition of land revenue and had it removed from the congress manifesto prior to the 1969 elections. Hence in 1970, the abolition of land revenue was obviously a political gesture, an attempt to remain in power after the congress split. By abolishing land revenue Gupta hoped to win support of the Jan Sangh and to build a popular image in U.P. as against that of the Young Turks.

Inspite of the fact that the New Congress and Charan Singh had criticised Gupta's attempt to abolish land revenue, when they formed a coalition government in February 1970, this was one of their first actions.⁵³ The two factions came to an agreement to abolish revenue on holdings upto 3.125 acres. The size of the exempted holding was fixed at 3.125, a figure considerably less than the 6.25 acres suggested by Gupta, so as to improve the image of the New congress and the B.K.D. as against that of the old congress.

However in October, 1970, the government led by Charan

52. National Herald, Delhi, January 2, 1970

53. Times of India, Delhi, 26 February, 1970

Singh fell. When in December, a bill seeking to exempt holdings upto 3.125 was introduced, the opposition parties led by the SSP persuaded T.N.Singh the Chief Minister to raise the size of the exempted holdings to 6.25 acres.⁵⁴ With the 1971 parliamentary elections drawing close, almost all the parties supported this demand. More than 70 % of the States 12 million peasant families stood to gain from this, and in the 1971 elections the opposition parties were keen to keep the congress from gaining a majority.

Thus we see that the two SVD governments tried to use their terms in office as if they were interim regimes in a period of political changes. They did not consider themselves as alternatives in a stable political system to the main ruling party. They paid less attention to husbanding their resources than to dramatic exhibition of pro-people sentiments. There seemed to be in fact an "unusual consensus" among the Chief Ministers during this period to avoid fresh taxes. The reasons for this are obvious. Political prudence specially when elections were very close was clearly required. The ruling party's behaviour is less easy to understand specially after its return to power in 1971 with a stable majority. Hence it has been remarked that for the various faction leaders, "the state is an imposition on a society organised on the basis of the caste system,

54. Patrika, Delhi, 17 December, 1970

55. Hamdi Bey, "Reluctance To Tax", Statesman (Delhi: 27 July, 1971)

and the corporate village. Hence there is little realization of its utility as a means for economic development."⁵⁵

After the 1971 elections, when the congress returned to power it was hoped that the new government would make an attempt to impose new taxes. Kamalapati Tripathi promised a "heavy dose of taxation."⁵⁶ When he came to power, the deficit was over Rs 37.20 crores out of which 16 crores was due to the exemption of landholdings upto 6.25 acres from revenue.⁵⁷ The budget presented both in 1971 and 1972 by the New Congress government betrayed a reluctance to restore the taxes abolished by the SVD government. Hence the hope that the congress will restore economic order proved incorrect. In 1972 the assembly elections in other States and by-elections in U.P. were over by the time the budget was presented. With relative political stability restored and elections not due till 1974 the congress government could have raised more resources. Rather the 1972 budget contained a massive deficit of Rs 61 crores.⁵⁸ The financial indiscipline in the party and the mere desire to keep the popular image of the party was seen in the statement of the Finance Minister that he, "was not presenting any proposals at present to cover this deficit."⁵⁹ In 1973 also no new taxes were imposed by the congress government. In the condition of backwardness, this can only be seen as a demonstration of unwillingness to make a serious

55. Hamdi Bey, "Reluctance To Tax", Statesman (Delhi: 27 July 1971).

56. Motherland, Delhi, 12 July, 1971

57. Ibid.

58. National Herald, Delhi, 25 March 1972.

59. Ibid.

attempt to mobilise resources for fear of political consequences.

Thus we see that in U.P., factions have played an important role in the economic life of the State. They have been responsible not only for the rise and fall of government, but have determined by their activity the nature of the policies adopted by successive governments. The issue of sugar and land levy, are merely examples of such activity which pervades almost all spheres of governmental action. The congress party therefore must be viewed as a political organisation whose leadership is concerned with providing material and status satisfactions to its members rather than an ideological party faced with the problem of reconciling diverse intellectual positions.

TABLE II

Revenue Head	Percentage of State Tax Revenue	1951-52 Average.	Average of			1966-67 average.	1971-72 average.	Percentage of State Tax Revenue
			1st Plan	2nd Plan	3rd Plan			
Land Revenue (In Rs Crore)	21	48	65	91	114	90	101	6

INDIVIDUAL STATE TAXES, LAND REVENUE - ALL INDIA AVERAGE.

Ref : L.Venkatraman n. 400, Table IV

CHAPTER - 5

Conclusion

Our study of factional activity within the congress party of U.P. shows that factions play an important part in the social, political and economic processes operating within a society. In Indian politics, for long the term faction has been viewed in a negative light mainly - for many it carries connotations signifying a sore on the body politic that requires ruthless surgical intervention. Their concern about factionalism stems from its supposedly dysfunctional and disintegrative role in the political system, and its normative undertones which imply the predominance in the political realm of narrow parochial loyalties as against loyalty to a broader political community. However, factions must be viewed, as an integral part of a complete social system, and not apart from it, as merely groups operating within a political party. The phenomena of factionalism must be seen in terms of a structural response of society to the process of authoritative allocation of values. It is only when we view particular responses to its environmental pressures - we will be able to grasp the role of factions. Parties, as Samuel Eldersveld has observed, are merely a structural response to the needs of a social and political system in a particular milieu. It is not implied here that, the existence of factions within a party such as the Congress is correct, but that, as we have seen in the case of U.P., factions merely grow and respond to

their environment. In this light, a few general conclusions can be attempted.

Socially, factions in U.P. still belong to the traditional social order. They are merely an extension into the political sphere of group behaviour found at all levels in Indian society from the village upwards. At the village, Mandal and often even the district level, caste and personality are often the determining factors in the formation, and functioning of factions. However, at the state level where the legislative assembly and executive of the party is involved, caste is no longer the determining factor. The case studies on sugar and land politics show, that at this level, where important ^{decisions} ~~divisions~~ have to be made factions become a function of interest. At lower levels such ^{decisions} ~~divisions~~ are merely transmitted and implemented. Hence the nature of factional activity is determined by the level at which it occurs in the social system. This does not mean that factional behaviour at the State level is more sophisticated. The manner in which factions settle disputes, personalities clash, and ^{decisions} ~~divisions~~ are made, are more or less the same.

Politically, factions are the means whereby the Congress party has been able to keep a heterogenous following together, whether in U.P. or elsewhere. In politics the congress acquired a character analogous to Hinduism in the realm of faith. Factions are the

counterpart of jatis and like them have regional variations¹. Both contain the "conflict" within confines, one of the belief pattern, and the other of the party structure supported by the existence of a wide range of demand inputs, and fragmented interests seeking reconciliation. Factions within the congress party in U.P. have affected the political system as a whole. They have perpetrated a style of political functioning which has been followed by all other opposition parties as well. Most of the opposition parties in U.P. are not parties which have not come up as successful opponents of a dominant party. Rather they originated as groups within the ruling party, and later separated from it, carrying ^{over} ~~ones~~ a method of political functioning learnt within it.

However, it is in the economic sphere that factions have had an impact on the social system of U.P. The intimate, and direct relationship between economic and political power in the Indian political system is too evident to be emphasised. The private sector of the economy, the big business being the biggest beneficiary of the mixed economy pattern unfolded in two decades of political liberalism, has acquired such a social base in parties factions and elite groups that any serious move to abridge its economically detrimental "privileges" and socially injurious "rights"

1. Rasheeddudin Khan "The Indian Political Landscape," India Quarterly XXIV (October-December, 1968) 4:306

meets with a furore. Factions in U.P. are largely responsible- together with pressure - groups - for the phenomena of the interaction and inter-penetration of organised economic interests and political parties. If political^s means, "striving to share power, or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states, or among groups in a state"² then both parties and business groups are bound to influence one another. A serious study of the phenomena of India politics from this standpoint shows, that there is a great deal of difference between the policies of "developed" and "developing" countries. Interests remain relatively unorganised in traditional societies, and develop gradually with increasing industrialization. Hence in India, we find the growing process of the inter-action and inter-penetration of organised business in politics of the country - not ensuing in having a party of its own - but operating with the framework of political party congenial to the cause of interest aggregation.

The growth of the economic power of the industrial bourgeoisie of India is hence the result of basic political process operating in the country. An analysis of the position of the sugar magnates in U.P. politics,

2. Maxweber, "Politics of Vocation, "cited in Girth & Mills (ed): From Maxweber: Essays In Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946):78

immediately highlights the nature of the linkages that exist between the corporate sector, and the decision-making agencies in the government. The sugar magnates have managed to establish various contact points with multiple political agencies established for the regulation and direction of economic activity in the State. This inter-actional model of "business and government" suggests that the causes for the growth of economic power have to be searched for in the process of politics³.

Finally by their combined activities, factions have affected the nature and internal structure of the congress party. The congress has been one of the most successful movements among the third world countries of Asia and Africa. In spite of its many failings, since Independence, it has helped the Indian political system to survive and operate. In most of the developing countries undergoing modernization and development, the political system has not been able to survive the accompanying political tension and strains, and there has been in many cases reversion to military rule, or some form of dictatorship. The congress has been successful largely because it has been able to tolerate a number of diverse factional groupings in it. Factions have become to a large extent, a part of the

3. C.P. Bhambhri, "Industrial Bourgeoisie And the Indian Political System" Journal Of The Indian Institute Of Public Administration XX (July-September, 1974)3:576

congress, and the Indian political system. The party has become in India as elsewhere, "a note mobiliser"⁴ made up of an "alliance of interests"⁵. As David Truman suggests, what activities are implied by the designation (political party) "depends upon the time, place, level of government and section of country involved"⁶.

4. Pendleton Herring, Politics of Democracy (New York, Rhinehart & Company, 1940):55

5. Ibid

6. David Truman, Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A Kropf, 1953):282

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Note Due to the fact that there are very few published books or articles on the role of the Congress Party In U.P. between 1967-74, a large amount of the source material is taken from Newspapers. The theoretical expositions attempted in Chapter 1 and 2 are largely based on secondary sources, that is, published books and articles; while the studies undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4 on the actual role of the party are based on primary sources, that is news papers which are mentioned later in the Bibliography. The primary sources are taken from the Newspaper files maintained by the Sapru House Library of the Indian Council of World Affairs and I would like to acknowledge their kind help in allowing me to use them.

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