

A STUDY OF SEPARATIST MUSLIM POLITICS IN INDIA :

Rise and fall of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

SHABI AHABAD

**Dissertation submitted to the Centre for the Study of
Political Development of the School of Social
Sciences, JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of M. Phil.
in Political Science**


oooo
1972

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT.

TELEPHONE :
NEW MEHRAULI
NEW DELHI.


DECLARATION

CERTIFIED that the material in this disse
has not been previously submitted for any other d
of this or any other University.




(Imtiaz Ahmed)

ADVISOR



(Shabi Ahmad)



(Rasheeduddin Khan)

CHAIRMAN

P R E F A C E

The rise and fall of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat was equally spectacular. The organisation came into the picture as a vital political platform for Indian Muslims in 1954, reached its highest momentum during the 4th. General Election, and saw its virtual fall subsequently after that. Obviously, this short but spectacular career of the organisation is interesting both for academic purposes and political understanding.

The present study is, therefore, concerned with an analysis of A.I.M.M. (All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat) as a manifestation of conservative Muslim politics in India. The study is divided into five chapters. The first and the Introduction traces the development of Muslim politics before partition and the situation imposed upon the community and its politics by the fact of Independence. The second chapter outlines the birth, organisational set up, and ideology of the organisation concerned. In third and fourth chapters special attention has been given to its approach towards communalism, its involvement in Aligarh Issue and its style of participation in the 4th. General Election, particularly because of its claim of being a non Political Organisation.

This study is based largely on secondary resources and party documents. However, a few interviews with the activists of the organisation were also undertaken to supplement the data. Grateful thanks are due to them for agreeing to share their information with me. The

study has benifitted from a year's teaching programme in the Centre for the Study of Political Development, Jawahar Lal Nehru University and interactions with its faculty. I am specially grateful to Dr. Rashad-uddin Khan, my research supervisor for his opinion, help, and guidance in the preparation of this dissertation. Thanks are also due to Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed who has devoted a lot of time and energies. However, the deficiencies and weaknesses are mine.


Shabi Ahmad.

C O N T E N T S

- I. Introduction.
- II. Mushawarat : Establishment and Organisation.
- III. Strategy and Development of the Mushawarat :
 - (I) Mushawarat and Communalism.
 - (II) Mushawarat and the Aligarh Issue.
- IV. Mushawarat and its Electoral Politics.
- V. Mushawarat : An assessment.
- Bibliography.

I st.

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

1st.

If one single event that has largely determined the Muslim community's responses and reflexes and in free India is to be identified, it is indeed the movement for Pakistan resulting in the partition of the subcontinent. The movement was by and large the result of certain misconceived notions and short ^{sighted} sided political calculations of the dominant Muslim leadership, particularly that of the erstwhile All India Muslim League presided over by Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

The movement for Pakistan was based upon the assumption that Muslims were a separate nation by all canons of distinguishing a nation¹. They persuaded themselves into believing that Islam recognised no distinction between religion and politics. Such assumption led to the inevitable conclusion that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, having very little in common in the spheres of social, political and economic aspects of life. This notion was strengthened by a misapprehension about the very role and character of Indian National Congress; the major movement for national Independence. The vocal section of Muslim leadership ^{thought} that the Congress was working merely for the protection and promotion of Hindu interest². While it is true that some communal elements had always been attached with the Congress, and that they were more akin to Hindu

chauvinism, but that was in a sense a consequence of the All India nature of the organisation. The Congress always represented the whole of India and therefore all aspects of national character were reflected in it. To assume that it represented merely the consolidation of Hindus would be a grievous error of judgment. This was the major fallacy of the Muslim League leadership. The same mistake is occasionally repeated by certain sections of the Muslim leadership in free India.

The Pakistan movement became effective largely because of the fact that the interest of the dominant elements in the Muslim League was not in tune with the semi-socialistic and progressive policies of the Congress. Many of their leaders belonged to the feudal class and were largely aberrant in their outlook. They, therefore, organised their own separate movement and worked for a polity wherein their separate interests could be adequately safeguarded. The heartlands of this Muslim leadership were the Indo-Gangetic plains and the Hindu landlord controlled areas of East Bengal.

On the basis of their particular interests and illusory calculations the Indian subcontinent was divided into three geographical and two political units in 1947. How unnatural this division was can be judged from the fact that within a short spell of twenty-five years Pakistan witnessed its breakup into two pieces. It can now be asserted without fear of contradiction that far from doing any real good to the Muslim community, partition has only added to their problems.⁵

But while the consequences of partition were inimical to the entire community the greatest sufferers have been those Indian Muslims who, instead of migrating to their dreamland 'PAKISTAN' decided to stay on here amidst the Hindus, in 'Secular-India.' Undoubtedly, it was the most horrible situation which the Muslims faced after the 1857 debacle. It is also an irony of history that those very people who were in the forefront of the Pakistan movement - the Muslims of Bihar and U.P. now stayed back in India. Thus in the words of Mr. N.C. Smith, in the name of Muslim consolidation, the whole community was divided into two (and now into three) separate parts.⁶

To say that the creation of Pakistan has proved futile for the Muslims of the sub continent, is to imply that all those fears and suspicions which were at the root of the movement are still hanging over the heads of Indian Muslims in Free India. The areas that eventually formed the mainland of Pakistan were predominantly Muslim areas and there was hardly any occasion or justification for their fear of Hindu dominance, or any threat to the so called separate Muslim culture and values in those areas. Such fears and apprehensions could have some meaning in the so called 'Muslim Minority' areas, but when the creation of Pakistan did come about all such areas were left in India. The psychological effect of being left in the midst of a Hindu majority apart, the inevitable result of partition was that Indian Muslims who had already lagged behind their Hindu counterparts in modern education and economic progress further lost the ground.

While the relatively affluent and prosperous elements of the community particularly from the Gangetic plains migrated to Pakistan, those who stayed back in India were the artisans and middle class people. They naturally were forced to feel shy of their past commitment and were uncertain about their future. Some of them even persisted in their emotional attachment with the idea of Pakistan. This situation was frequently exploited by the Hindu reactionaries. The result was that on the one hand, the Muslims were put to a disadvantage in matters of educational and technological pursuits in free India, on the other hand they perpetually suffered from a fear complex lest they be branded as Pro-Pakistanis.

It can easily be said that even after twenty-five years of Independence a large number of Muslims in this country have not relieved themselves of the false fears aroused by the prepartition Muslim leadership, that their religion and culture would be trampled in free India dominated by the Hindu majority. This fear complex manifested itself in the most unmistakable terms during the recent agitation against Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Bill. The same type of fears boiled up when the Congress went ahead with its programme of Zamindari Abolition in U.P. and Bihar soon after Independence. These, it may be recalled, are the areas, where the Pakistan movement had become most popular previously, and later on Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (1964) also got great popularity. The Zamindari Abolition Act not only hurt the economic privileges of certain sections of the society but also strengthened their apprehensions of Hindu design as against them.⁷

Another psychological crisis with which considerable section of the Muslim community in India is confronted, is their emotional attachment to Islam. After Independence, efforts were made to give the secular unitar orientation to the Indian society.⁸ Secularism and socialism were designed to serve as the two main pillars of Indian Democracy. Regardless of whether or not India is successful in her attempt to create a common national outlook, this was a real source of mental conflict for many of the Indian Muslims. To accept these tenets whole heartedly would have amounted to subvert their earlier concept of a Muslim nationalism. Therefore most of them refused to acknowledge the secular orientations in their common life. This is clearly revealed by their attitude towards social legislation and reforms.

If one thinks that Islam is in itself a complete system, with its own code of conduct, social regulations, administrative principle and legal institutions which are sacrosanct and can only be formulated, interpreted and charged by the scholars of Shariah (Ulema)⁹, the situation becomes more complex and complicated. Thus in free India the Muslims are confronted with a situation in which the law is framed by a man made institution, predominated by non Muslim legislators. Even the few Muslims that are made to participate in law-making are either wholly ignorant of, or not fully equipped with the knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and Quranic interpretations. To overcome this situation, a large section of the Muslim community is insisting on retaining the Muslim Personal Law. This would imply that no man-made

law has a right to interfere in the affairs special to the Muslim community. This particular attitude thwarts the intentions of the constitution makers, who had set before themselves the goal of giving, in due course of time, a uniform civil code to the various sections of the society in the country. Barring a few enlightened individuals, almost the entire Muslim leadership consider the passage of uniform Civil Code as a life and death issue for the community.¹⁰ To them any change in the Personal Law amounts to a direct interference in their religion. It is probably for this reason that the issue was hardly ever glossed over in all the meetings of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

In contrast to this obstructionist approach, some of the progressive Muslims tried, soon after Independence, to adjust themselves under the belief that, like others, the Muslims are also an integral part of the unified Indian community living under the same type of arrangement as the one entered into by the Holy Prophet with the Jews of his time. This arrangement is a sort of social contract to ensure the security of each community.¹¹ The most vocal exponent of the theory was Maulana Azad, aided and supported by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama; a semi-religio-political pressure group of Indian Muslims.¹² The Jamiat-ul-Ulama, contrary to the general body of Muslims had worked for Hindu Muslim Unity and supported the Congress during its struggle for Independence. The late Dr. Zakir Husain, who became the third President of India, while representing the same idea, had remarked that in their entire history, Muslims had either been rulers or the ruled but now in free India, they are the co-rulers.¹³

Thus, it can be concluded that the trend of Muslim politics in India is largely the result of their past mistakes and present complexities. They are thus living under a constant fear of the Hindu majority on one hand, and on other hand their voice is largely lost in the din of numerical Hindu superiority - a situation almost inevitable in a democracy.¹⁴ Hence the Muslim leadership is always seen struggling for the retention of their independent identity. While the history of their downfall in Spain, Greece and France constantly reminds them of the fact of their liquidation as a power, the downfall of Jainism and Buddhism also encourages them to think that the ultimate aim of Hinduism is nothing short of exodus of Islam from the Sub-continent.¹⁵

Besides, an unending chain of anti Muslim riots, the other obvious factor, responsible for their misapprehensions is the presence and strength of Hindu Chauvinism, which often puts on the garb of Hindu nationalism. The concept was basically started with the avowed purpose of reviving Hindu religion and evolution of Indian Nationalism, but ultimately found expression in the form of some militant, semi militant and strategically anti-Muslim movements. In this context one can recall the activities of the Shudhi Sangathan, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the R.S.S. Their entire ideology is based upon the myth of Hindu Nationalism and the slogan of Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan. They always dream for an Akhand Bharat. According to them Muslims are to be treated either as Invaders or Aliens, rather than citizens of this country and sons of the soil.¹⁶ Besides Guru Golwalkar, another vocal exponent of this ideology is Mr. Balraj Madhok - who always keeps sermonising to the Muslims to Indianize themselves.

As far as the complexity of their situation is concerned, they are the members of a large world religious community as well as the citizen of secular Indian polity. Both these aspects are equally significant to them. For instance, as far as their links with the Muslims outside this country are concerned, they are the followers of a faith whose adherents inhabit the entire globe but at the same time in their customs and traditions they are different from other Muslim groups except perhaps in Pakistan and Bangla Desh. This means that they cannot be anything else except being the Indian Muslims.¹⁷ However not withstanding their divergent linguistic, economic and regional complexions, their spokesmen have continuously tried to project themselves as a single political entity. Since Independence, their so called leadership has tried not to let this feeling of a united minority diminish from their hearts. It has always injected the fears of threats to their world reputed institutions like Aligarh Muslim University, Darul Uloom Deoband, Madwat-ul-Uloom, Lucknow, Damania University, Hyderabad, Darul Musānifin Azamgarh and Jamia Millia Islamia of New Delhi. The existence of these institutions was considered threatened in a Hindu dominated India. Contrary to these fears, however, these institutions are flourishing in free India and paradoxically have been proved as the cradle for some of the best brains among the Indian Muslims. The Muslims in free India are thus confronted with a complex situation.¹⁸ They are a numerical minority but still constitute the second largest majority of sixty millions. Again, their rich legacy of past achievements and distinctive features of religion are enough to give them a sense of superiority, but the threat of Hindu

dominance arouses their worst suspicions. This contradictory perspective has been a major barrier in adjustment to the contemporary Indian Policy.

At the eve of Independence two divergent political trends were present amongst the Indian Muslims, as revealed by the character of their leadership. On the one hand, there was a group of Nationalist Muslims led by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama. The members of this group had supported the Congress throughout the Nationalist movement and their past political orientations naturally afforded them a place in the future. The Jamiat, though religious in character, had very little roots among the masses, however its total affiliation with the Congress made them suspect in the eyes of the Muslims. The other group consisted of those Muslims who had their earlier associations with the Muslim League. Incidentally, they were socially liberal and educationally modern men, but due to their past political activities, they had no alternatives except to rest in silence at least for some time to come. Many of them changed over to Congress overnight.

Thus, when Muslims awakened in New India, they were moving in a political vacuum. The vacuum was largely filled up by the other brand of leader's represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami; an organisation far more conservative even than the Jamiat-ul-Ulama. Although the Jamaat had started functioning before partition, it had failed to steal the hearts of the Muslims on account of its ideological opposition to the slogans of Muslim Nationalism and creation of Pakistan, for which Muslims felt an emotional attachment. The Jamaat continued its activities even after the departure of its parent organisation and the chief ideologue; Maulana Maudoodi to Pakistan. Though the sacred duty of Jamaat is to realise a purely Islamic state in the World, in free

India, it contented itself with the plantation and nourishment (Aqasat-e-Din) of Islam. As far as its area of approach is concerned, it gained much popularity in cosmopolitan areas and among the half educated section of the community,¹⁹ especially because of its ideological richness of the programme and intellectual competence of its leadership. Jamaat-e-Islami believes that the concepts of nationalism, secularism and modern democracy have no place in true Islam. They therefore oppose the idea of Muslim participation in secular democratic activities of the country. This attitude which tried to keep the Muslims aloof from parliamentary politics only resulted in Muslim exclusivism.

In a democratic political system, a minority community like the Muslims can participate in politics through one of the following three ways²⁰ :-

- 1) To join various political parties of national character, keeping in view their approach towards the Muslim problems.
- 2) A total alliance with the Congress, or to exist as an effective pressure group within the Organisation.
- 3) Formation of a separate All India Muslim Party, or to evolve a confederation of various regional Muslim parties.

The Azad convention (1947) had advised Muslims to follow the first alternative. This was probably because of his disillusionment with the Congress. There are also some indications that he was thinking in terms of another All India Party, with Muslims in the forefront.²¹ He would obviously have been the fittest person to organise such a party, but he was so far advanced in his political journey along with the Congress that he found it absolutely impossible to retrace his

steps without loss of face and prestige. Therefore, the Muslims in free India opted for the second alternative. They supported the Congress enbloc until 1962²² despite of an unending chain of communal riots and lack of due sympathy from the party towards their grievances.

Such a pattern of politics, in which Muslim concentrate as one group can not but be branded as communal, for the very simple reason that in such a pattern religion continues to be the most important single factor. It was primarily this trend which did not allow the growing vacuum in the Muslim leadership to be filled. Consequently, the conservative minds had a sway over the Muslim community. It also allowed them to be taken for granted by the political parties in general and Congress in particular. No serious efforts were ever made to remove the obstacles in the way of their economic, social and educational progress. The entire Muslim politics continued to hinge upon the subjects like the status of Aligarh Muslim University, Muslim Personal Law, communal riots and future of Urdu - coloured occasionally by the modulations in Indo-Pak relations.

The period after 1962 has witnessed a shift in Muslim politics towards the third alternative. On the one hand, several Muslim Organisations on regional level have come up in different states, on the other hand there has emerged an avowedly non-political, All India Organisation, namely the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat. Apart from Kashmir, where the problems of Muslims are somewhat different from the rest of the country, there has been a general swing towards separate regional Organisations. A number of such Organisations as the Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimin and Tameer-e-Millat in Hyderabad, All India Muslim League in Kerala and Muslim Majlis in Northern India have

gained sufficient grounds in their respective regions. Besides, the Muslim League has also come out of its sheltered nest and started to invade the North; its past heartland.

The idea behind this course of action is to regard all Muslim interest all over the country as similar and therefore to organise them in the name of Muslim brotherhood. As is evident from several statements of the many master minds of this old strategy, it reflects largely their disillusionment with the Congress and their apprehensions about the future.²³ It also negates the policy that was once responsible for putting all the Muslim eggs in the Congress basket. The present study is concerned with the analysis of the rise, development and fall of one Organisational expression of such tendency, namely, the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

NOTES

1. "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation" - said Mr. Jinnah, in his presidential address delivered at Lahore Session of A.I.M.L.
2. Dr. Rajender Prasad: Hindustan Ka Mustaqbil (Urdu), PP (30-40)
For details see, the Meaning of Pakistan, by Durrani, F.K. and "Pakistan a Nation" by Alhamza.
3. Husain, A: The Destiny of Indian Muslims, P 101.
4. Tariq Ali : Military Rule or Political Power in Pakistan PP (26-27)
5. Azad A.K. : Indian Wins Freedom. pp. (206-207)
6. Smith W.C.: Islam in Modern History. p.256
7. See the Editorial of Aljamiat, Delhi : 2nd August 1965.
8. Has Indian Secularism been a successful experiment ? Scholarly opinion varies upon this issue. On the one end of the scale is D.E. Smith's highly optimistic study, and on the other end is the gloomy assessment of Selig S. Harrison. For details see their respective works; i.e. India as a Secular State (Princeton : 1963) PP.40,501 and 'Troubled India and Her Neighbours, Foreign Affairs (N.York : January 1965) Vol. 43, No. 11 : pp.317-318
9. Smith D.E.: Op cit, pp. (36-40)
10. The only issue upon which the whole conservative Muslim leadership is unanimous. It is also evident from the reaching of the various organs like DAWAT, ZINDAGI and RADIANCE of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Aljamiat of Jamiat-ul-Ulama and the several other Urdu papers, like Rehnumai Deccan from Hyderabad, Nasheman from Bangalore and Ghamkhwar from Patna that they regard Muslim Personal law, as Sacrosant, unalterable and beyond the state jurisdiction.
11. Khan, Rasheed Uddin : The development of Muslim National consciousness in India, a paper, presented in the

Seminar on Communal problem in India, March 24/26,
1971: pp. 14.

12. Ibid: p. 15, and also see the presidential address read out in 23rd. Session of Jamiat-ul-Ulama, held in May, 1972.
13. Khan, Rasheed Uddin: Problems and prospects of Muslim Modernization in India, Seminar, Ho June-68, P 28
14. Smith W.C.: Opcit. P.275.
15. Khan, Rasheed Uddin : "Modernization", opcit, P.30
16. Golwalker, Bunch of Thought, PP (127-128)
17. "Politically the situation of Indian Muslims is unique. Of there four major communities (but now as five; Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and newly borned Bangla Desh) have the form of Independent Nations States in the modern Western sence. The Indians and the Arabs are the exceptions, though each in a distinct way. The Arabs, unlike the Indians, though self consciously bond together by language and culture, are politically disunited. The Indian Muslims some what diverse in language somewhat integrated in culture, and highly self conscious, are of course citizens of one State." (W.C. Smith, opcit) pp. (262-263).
18. Smith : Opcit, p.263.
19. Malik. H : "Islamic Political Parties," Islam in Modern Age, May 72, P.49
20. Gopal Krishna : Muslim politics, Seminars May 1972, P.19
21. Editorial, Burhan, September, 1970.
22. Intiaz Ahmed ; "Secularization", Seminar : August 71, P.24
23. See the ~~Alidai~~ Millat, January 3rd, 1971.

II nd.

M U S H A W A R A T :

1
1
1
1
1

ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION.

Ind.

In spite of the fact that a large bulk of the Muslim electorate continued to give their support to the Congress till the third General Elections 1962, yet a vocal section of Muslim leadership had started to feel dissatisfied with the Congress since the early days of sixties. The first direct expression of their disillusionment, which was to grow later, was the holding of the first All India Muslim's Political Convention of 1961. There was a general feeling there that the Congress had failed to do any thing positive for the good of the Muslim community.¹ The convention was called by persons of eminence like the late Maulana Hifzur Rahman and Dr. Syed Mahmood. Sources² close to the late Maulana Hifzur Rahman have disclosed that the Maulana originally wanted to have an All Muslim parties conference, including the Jammat-e-Islami and Muslim League. A considerable section of the Muslim leadership who were very enthusiastic for such a meeting had an eye upon the coming General Elections, and were interested in utilising this situation in order to wean away the Muslims from the Congress. But their hopes were largely frustrated because of Nehru's tough resistance for such a gathering.³

The convention was called without an invitation to, or the presence of the Muslim League and Jammat-e-Islami. Even so the Jammat-e-Islami continued to give its support to such a move and made silent prayers for the success of the convention.⁴ The convention listed a large number of grievances against the Congress. Besides the

virus of communalism the other problems that disturbed the mind of Muslim community, were their inadequate proportion in services, microscopic representation in legislative bodies, denial of proper status to Urdu even in its homeland, fears of abolishing the minority character of the Aligarh Muslim University and a threat to the maintenance of Muslim Personal Law.

As will be discussed in the ensuing pages, some of the claims were no doubt justified but others were quite illusory and artificial, and the result of the conservation of the Muslim leadership. The fact, however, remains that the Congress did nothing, or very little, to allay the fears or redress the grievances of the community. Any talk of Muslim interest was dubbed as communal, not only by Hindu fanatics, but also by the so called liberal and secular congressites. Most of them often forgot the fact, that Muslim of being a minority, who had ruled the country for more than one thousand years, would naturally be suspicious and apprehensive of the intentions of the majority.

This suspicion found an expression in the establishment of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat. Its birth reflected a sort of compromise between their earlier commitment to the Congress and the desire for a separate Muslim Organisation as it developed in Kerala in the form of Muslim League. For some, it was a pressure group of Indian Muslims. But the matter is not so simple, particularly because of the lack of unanimity over the presence of pressure groups in Indian politics.⁵ Whether such groups exist or not, is a matter

for academic debate. It is a fact, however, that pressure groups are yet to be effective in Indian politics, in the manner in which they operate in the U.S.A. Hence the Mushawrat is not a pressure group, because it is neither a homogenous group, nor does it have an impressive force behind it. On the contrary various heterogeneous elements were yoked together for political expediency. It is better to call the Mushawrat a loose type of confederation of heterogeneous elements amongst the Muslims, of a kind of confluence of different political attitudes, in which there is hardly anything in common, except the dream of Muslim unity. It is difficult to study its attitude as a whole without breaking it into its constituent parts, and going into the inner conflicts amongst them.

Apart from its place in political ^{phraseology} phenomenology, the Mushawrat articulated some peripheral interests of the Muslim community, which had always been present in the minds of the leadership. As one of them⁶ told me in the course of a conversation, "although Muslims of different regions and from different strata of the society have some occasional temporal clashes of interest, their very existence as Muslims, their belief in one God, one Quran and following of one Prophet ultimately gives them a sense of a highly unified, homogenous character." It was this approach that was responsible for overcoming of petty differences and uniting the Muslims on a single platform.

As one goes through all the literature and deliberations of the establishment of the Mushawrat, he finds that the main factor exercising the minds of the leadership was disunity among the community and a desire to bring about an allround unity at all costs.⁷ In fact, their call

for the unity of the Muslims symbolised a long cherished desire to rescue India from the supposed threat to its existence and integrity in secular Indian politics which were dominated by the majority community.

The inevitable result of such an attitude would have been nothing short of a total consolidation in the form of a separate Muslim political Organisation. A similar political experiment can be seen in Kerala in the form of the All India Muslim League.⁸ Their efforts were however largely frustrated by the counter measures adopted by such forces as the Jamiat-ul-Uloom and the Congressite-Nationalists. They easily argued that such a regimentation could be counter-productive in the form of Hindu consolidation. As a result, what they could achieve was a sort of compromise in the name of Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat; a sort of Muslim consultative committee representing a handful of Muslim political and social political parties i.e. ~~Muslim~~ Jamiat-ul-Uloom (one wing) Muslim League, Jamaat-e-Islami and Khilafat Committee etc. Later Tanzeem-ul-Millat and Ittehadul Muslimin of Hyderabad and Majlis-e-Isaarat-e-Shariat from Bihar and Orissa also joined their fold.

The Mushawarat, as was natural, evolved a policy of Maximum Cooperation for a minimum programme of action, in all matters that were the common concern of the whole community.⁹ Mr. I.M. Quraishi, perhaps missed the point when he categorised it as a composition of three major segments of the Muslim Political process.¹⁰ Basically the Mushawarat was the result of some individual efforts and the desire for having a common strategy against the evil of communal riots. Incidentally, many of these individuals were also linked with one or the other political organisation. In this context another responsible person told me in

in a private discussion¹¹ that Jamiat-ul-Ulama, as a body, was not willing to cooperate with the idea of Mushawarat and Maulana Asad Madani, General Secretary of the Organisation, took the initiative only in his individual capacity. He was persuaded only after assurances were given to him by Maulana Abdul Lais, the then Chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Mr. M. Ismail the then President of the Muslim League. Both of them expressed their faith in the Indian constitution and the concept of secularism as enshrined in the Indian system.¹² The late Dr. Mahmood became active mainly due to the efforts and persuasion of Maulana Manzoor Nomani and the keen interest taken by men like Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi and Mufti Ateequr Rahman.¹³ These people were successful in persuading Dr. Syed Mahmood in accepting the presidentship of the Organisation. His very presence and his past services as a staunch Congressite were considered enough to remove the suspicions about the character of the Organisation in the eyes of Government, and to make an impression upon the public opinion. But actually it had very little influence because by that time Dr. Mahmood himself had lost his close relationship with the Congress umbrella.¹⁴

Several meetings of these people were held in Delhi, and then it was finally decided to have an All India Consultative convention at Lucknow; a place of historical importance. It is clear from the following extracts from Radiance that they tried to give representation to all sects and shades of Muslim opinion except Communists, so-called Nationalist and Ultra Secularists.

*It was truly a representative gathering of the Indian Muslims,

whose leaders of every shade of opinion, except the communists could be seen rubbing shoulders with each other - All the sects and Shades of the community seemed to have determined to bury their internal dissensions, to show how they can unite when the occasion demands.¹⁵


Both before and during the convention, many myths were raised in the Muslim mind. As a result, some sort of remanent attitude was imposed by the leadership and the press as well. It had always been a common phenomenon in the history of Muslim political movements. As one goes through the literature of those days, one finds a lot of material in support of this hypothesis :

1) The consultative meeting of Muslim leaders - to be held at Lucknow, must go beyond mere conciliations. It should concentrate upon co-ordination, co-operation and consolidation. They should device ways and means to rescue them from a further drift towards defection and demoralisation.¹⁶

2) It is the duty of all religious, social and political leaders of the Muslims to set aside their personal interest, give right guidance to the Muslims and prevent this suppressed community from being thrown into the dark pit of destruction.¹⁷

3) It is time now to come to the only conclusion that whether Muslims are to live in the loud cries of Jai Bajrang Bali ki - or not. Who ever oppose this convention is a traitor not only to the Muslims, but to the country as a whole.¹⁸

It was regarded as the most urgent religious duty of every Indian Muslim to co-operate with this convention as long as it served the basic call of the Quran for mutual consultation among themselves, which



was also the practice of Prophet and his Caliphs. The Radiance editorially declared that "The Consultative meeting currently taking place at Lucknow is, in our opinion, not only an urgent need of the hour, but a religious duty - since Muslims have been specially ordained by the Quran to decide all their issues after consultation among themselves - differences between them should not stand in the way of progress. They have to show the world that Muslims, despite of all their differences, have enough in common to unite them, and to prove their claim that World can bring unity under the banner of Islam - for submission to God? (Editorial Radiance 9th. August 1964)

In spite of the soft corner for Congress leadership in the heart of Dr. Syed Mahmood; its president, many other speakers usually accused the Congress and Nationalist Muslims from its platform. For many of them, it was a God-sent opportunity to realise Muslims political consolidation through a cultural-cum-religious forum. In their opinion, it was the only way to restore the lost position of Muslims in India. There was general consensus that the advice which Maulana Azad gave to the Muslim community in 1947 was based upon his unrealistic speculation. According to them this decision proved futile and actually scattered the community, and resulted in a vacuum in the leadership which was consequently followed up by the disunity of the Muslims. For them, the time had come, to turn the tables to make the destiny of Indian Muslims, by making themselves self sufficient and independent, because the Quran clearly said that even God helps those who help themselves. ¹⁹ For most of the delegates, the convention was an attempt to regain the lost dreams of Sir Syed and Iqbal, which unfortunately

became shattered due to the horrible consequences of the partition movement. As one of the master minds of the movement disclosed in the course of his interview, many people regarded the Mushawarat as a device to fill the vacuum of Muslim leadership in India.²⁰

In this atmosphere of political cum religious bargaining, a resolution (No.9) was adopted by this representative meeting of 82 Muslims from "every nook and corner of India and all shades of opinion."²¹

According to this resolution : "This representative meeting of Muslims of India resolves to constitute a consultative committee for the purpose of implementing the resolutions passed at this meeting and to take suitable measures on emergent problems after mutual consultation."²²

It was decided that this proposed committee would consist of 27 members, nominated by Dr. Syed Mahmood, its president, after having consultation with following nine founders.²³

1. Mufti Ateequr Rahman (Acting President of Jamiat-ul-Ulama at that time and now the President of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.)
2. Maulana Asad Khan Madni (General Secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulama).
3. Mr. M. Iqbal, M.P. (late) Ex-President of Muslim League.
4. Mr. Ibrahim Sulaiman Seth (General Secretary of Muslim League)
5. Maulana Abul Lais (Co-Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami at that time)
6. Maulana Mohd. Muslim (Editor of Daily Dawat, an official organ of Jamaat-e-Islami)
7. Mulla Jan Mohammed (Chairman, Khilafat Committee, Calcutta)^(late)
8. Maulana Manzoor Noonani.
9. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi.



V, 44, 48(Q, 7) N 6 F-27208

Miss L2

As one look at the above list, one is bound to see that the whole structure of the Mushawarat was based upon not only loose foundation, but even divergent and opposing ideologies, if these people had any ideology at all. All of them were and still are at logger heads with each other.²⁴

Besides this important resolution, related to the organisational aspect, Dr. Mahmood, with some other colleagues became successful in passing another resolution in the context of communal harmony. It was decided that the Muslims should extend an invitation of love, brotherhood, tolerance and unity amongst all communities inhabiting India and should particularly appeal to the majority community to fully implement the noble ideals of secularism enshrined in our great democratic and secular constitution. This resolution was adopted unanimously. According to that resolution the newly created Majlis-e-Aamla was supposed to formulate policies and suitable programme in the light of the above resolution.²⁵

Dr. Mahmood, in his presidential address, particularly emphasised the need for such a resolution. He said, in a firm voice, that "Unfortunately and ^{un}expectedly the majority is completely unsuccessful in bringing communal harmony, love and integrity to the nation. Now it is the duty of the Muslims to take the burden upon their own shoulders. It is their religious duty imposed by the Quran itself." In the opinion of Dr. Mahmood, it was a clear departure from the earlier attitude of Muslim community.²⁶

Here it would not be unnecessary to take a cursory glance at the constitution, and the structure of the organisation, as visualised by

the fathers of the constitution for All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat. As we had pointed out earlier, the All India convention, according to its 9th resolution empowered the president to nominate a consultative committee, after having consultations with all the founder members. This consultative committee drafted a loose type of constitution in the light of the following aims and objects.²⁷

- 1) To bring about better understanding and to promote unity among the various religious communities.
- 2) To endeavour and to bring nearer all the Muslim Organisations working for the betterment of the community.
- 3) To bring to the notice of the government and the people, the grievances of the Indian Muslims.
- 4) To secure Islamic ideals in the life of Muslims and to ensure their due share in all spheres of community's life.
- 5) To see that no Indian Muslim is forcibly evicted out of India, specially from Assam, Tripura and other border areas.
- 6) To safeguard all religious, educational, economic and cultural interests of the Muslims of India by peaceful means.
- 7) To survey periodically, the economic conditions of the Indian Muslims and to suggest ways and means for their betterment.
- 8) To promote unity and brotherhood among all Muslims and to take all such steps as would ensure an honourable life for the Muslim inhabitants of India, and to create confidence in them and to work for full recognition of full rights of citizenship not only in precept but in practice as well.
- 9) To organise branches of Baitul Mal as a Muslim Welfare Fund.

10) To Organise branches of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat in various parts of India for the achievements of above objects.

MEMBERSHIP : The main drawback in the way of the Mushawarat becoming as an effective political party was that its membership was not voluntary. It was the sole discretion of its central leadership to confer its membership in any person. In another words membership was imposed from above, instead of coming from within the community. The main criterion for confirmation of the membership being the material status and religious particularism of the person concern.

FUNDS : Every member was supposed to contribute his one days average income per annum to the funds of the organisation. In this context, I came to know through a reliable person that the organisation had always faced irregularities in financial matters²⁸. It was always in a crisis. Procedurally speaking the members of district committees were authorised to collect funds and ordained to send 50% of the funds to the State Majlis-e-Aamla, out of which the state would send half the amount to the national Majlis-e-Aamla. They would also send half of their own collections to the national Majlis-e-Aamla.

ORGANISATION : According to the provisions of the constitution, the organisation would operate on three levels, i.e., National level, State level & District level.

1. At All India Level: All India Majlis-e-Mushawarat, was the combination of two bodies:-

- i) National Majlis-e-Mushawarat (Central Consultative Committee)
- ii) National Majlis-e-Aamla (Central Working Committee)

1) NATIONAL MAJLIS-E-MUSHAWARAT :- The National Majlis-e-Mushawarat (Central Consultative Committee) is a combined body of National Majlis-e-Aamia (Central Working Committee) and all state Majlis-e-Mushawarats. It is supposed to meet at least once in every two years at such a time and place as may be fixed by the Majlis-e-Aamia. Majlis-e-Aamia is empowered to call a special conference of the Majlis-e-Mushawarat, if necessary.

The Majlis-e-Mushawarat is , supposed to discuss the problems facing the country in the light of the objectives and aims set for the above, to consider the report of Secretary General, and to approve the accounts.

ii) NATIONAL MAJLIS-E-AAMIA :- It is stated in the constitution that the National Majlis-e-Aamia shall consist of 21 members nominated by the President. It is to hold its meeting whenever necessary, but not less than twice a year. As it is the key point of the Organisation, it has to do some prima facie functions:-

(1) To invite the names from each state Mushawarat for considering the name for Presidency of the ensuing term, at least two months in advance of the prescribed date of the terminal Session and from amongst those names and such other names as it may deem fair to consider, to select and announce the name of the President, and to select other office bearers as Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer and Joint Secretaries among its members.

(2) To work for achieving the objectives mentioned above.

(3) To give effect to the decisions of the National Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

4) To Coordinate, organise and supervise the work of all branches of the Mushawarat.

5) To look after the finances of the Organisation.

(II) STATE MAJLIS-E-MUSHAWARAT : The constitutional draft also provided a structure at State level. It has consultative Committee, consisting of not more than 17 members, nominated by the President of National Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

1) It has to meet as often as necessary.

2) It shall have the following ~~xxxxxx~~ powers:-

- i) To discuss problems facing the State in general and to lay down the programme for the ensuing year, according to the policy and aims of All India Organisation.
- ii) To implement the programme of Central Organisation.
- iii) To consider the report of the Secretary, subject to the approval of President, National Majlis-e-Aamla.
- iv) Select a new Chairman for each ensuing term.
- v) All the members of the National Majlis-e-Aamla will be its ~~xxxxxx~~ ex-officio members.
- vi) It shall work under the guidance and supervision of the National Majlis-e-Aamla.
- vii) To select among its members a Vice-Chairman, Secretary and a Treasurer.
- viii) To organise district units and to coordinate and supervise their functions.

III. District MAJLIS-E-MUSHAWARAT : Not much attention had been paid to give the Mushawarat an effective organisation at district level,

although that is the most vital point for the development of any political party. The root cause for the continuing success of the Congress party in India is its grass-roots organisation not only at the district, but also at Panchayat levels. The Mushawarat has hardly any movement at the district levels, except in some U.P. Districts and particularly in big cities like Lucknow, Rampur, Azamgarh, Moradabad etc. The Constitution empowered the Chairmen of the State Mushawarat to nominate members from the district Mushawarat; 11 in number including office bearers i.e. one President, one secretary and a treasurer. In all matters of policy formulation, the District Majlis has little to say, and is merely to implement the programme and policies sorted out by National Organisation, and State Majlis.

Ideology and attitude of the Organisation : It is doubtful if the Mushawarat has any ideology at all. What it has is a strategy. Any claim to an ideology, was imparted from the Jamaat-e-Islami, one of few major segments of the Mushawarat appeared as the embodiment of the political frustration²⁹ which the Muslim leadership had accumulated in the course of last two and half decades.³⁰ Barring a few, related with Jamaat-e-Islami,³¹ there was a general lack of organisational skill and ideological competence amongst its cadres. It gathered only a group of some scattered politicians, who from the outset had an eye upon the coming Election of 1957.³² Most of them were either namely supporters or the rank and file of the pre-partition Muslim League.³³ They had, for a certain time, come under the umbrella of the Congress for the sake of their political protection, more as a matter of expediency than for ideological commitment. Now, when the chain of communal riots

had become the order of the day, they regarded it as a God sent opportunity, to change their feather's. They reopened their political shop in the name of Muslim interests. Some individuals styling themselves as pillar's of the religion also joined hands with them. To them the new wave of socialism, urbanisation and industrial progress threatened the very existance of the distinctive identity of the Muslims and the fate of Islam as a religion.³⁴

This, however, does not imply that the Mushawarat symbolised a confluence of Muslim Political opinion, or gave birth to a new electoral force such as would have to be reckoned with for eliciting Muslim votes.³⁵

But it is a fact that the emergence of the Muslim Majlis and Muslim League in Northern India was a natural corollary of the rises and eclipse of the Mushawarat.

Apart from the role of the Mushawarat as a political hijacker - as they claimed in the democratic course of politics in free India,³⁶ it also modified the political sensibility of the Muslims and moulded their behaviour. This can be substantiated by the following facts:

Although Muslims in free India, are numerically the largest single minority, next only to the majority, they had all along suffered from a strong minority complex³⁷ and felt shy of their pre-partition commitments. Consequently they never came to the forefront of any national movement aimed at fighting the forces of evil in the country. Now under the strategy of Mushawarat, they decided to take initiative for eradicating communalism out of country and to promote Hindu-Muslim Unity.

The Mushawarat leadership showed full belief in the Indian constitution and in the democratic process of the country. They also pledged their trust to the majority as a whole.

A transformation is also evident in the style of formulating demands and definition of objectives. In its inaugural conference for example, the Mushawarat adopted a resolution on the need for national integration. Again, instead of demanding reservation for Muslim, it called upon both the communities to work hand in hand for the progress and betterment of the country.

But its outlook was by no means wholly secular as it continued to make a plea for the special interests of the Muslims. By and large the demands, which they formulated and the grievances which they highlighted were only of concern to the Muslims. They were based upon the simple plea that the Muslims as a whole constituted a distinctive separate identity in India.³⁸ They also moved on the prefixed premises that the Muslims in India were as a community the only victims of communalism, false secularism and being taken for granted.

To conclude one can say that the Mushawarat appeared, if not to revive the Muslim League then at least to provide a suitable background for making any easy entry for the latter in the political arena of the Northern Provinces, on the basis of the following issues:-

- a) A need to protect the Muslim religion and culture.
- b) Fighting against the anti-Muslim forces, and saving them from the holocaust of communal riots.
- c) Ensuring adequate representation of Muslims in all the political, educational, commercial and Economic fields of Life.

In order to achieve the aforesaid objectives, the Mushawarat adopted the following measures:-

- a) To start an uncompromising battle against the all communal forces.
- b) To work for reention of the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University and to safeguard the interests and character of other Muslim institutions.
- c) To copedinate the activities of the various organisation of the Muslim community.
- d) To guard the Muslim Personal Law against any possible enchrachment at any level.
- e) To carry on the battle in support of Urdu with a view to securing a status of second regional language at least in U.P. and Bihar.
- f) To ensure the management of Muslim endowments by Muslim themselves for the Muslim interest.
- g) To frustrate the efforts of anti secular forces, that tried to discriminate against the Muslims.
- h) To consolidate the economic interest of the community.

To achieve all these objectives the Mushawarat tried to unite all the Muslims on a single platform, and adopted a strategy of pressuising the government for redressel of the Muslim grievences. For these reasons it passed various resolutions and took various steps.

N O T E S.

1. See the Resolutions of All India Muslim Political Convention of 1961. It was this occasion when Dr. Mahmood, the President of the Convention openly charged the Congress for treating Indian Muslim as not more than Second class citizens.
2. Statement of Maulana Muslim, the Editor DAWAT (Urdu) Daily.
3. See the ALJAMIAT's Special Number in the Memory of late Maulana Hifzur Rahman : March 1963.
4. Maulana Muslim.
5. An opinion expressed by Prof. Rasheeduddin Khan.
6. Maulana Muslim.
7. Maulana Muslim.
8. For details see Theodore P. Wright : Muslim League in India, profile of a minority elite, Journal of Asian Studies (Feb.1964)
9. Maulana Muslim.
10. Z.M. Quraishi, Asian Survey, December 1968 : P.976
11. Ziaul Hasan Farooqi, Principal Jamia College.
12. Dr. Mahmood, in AZAIM (Urdu) Lucknow, of 3rd. May, 1970.
13. Dr. Mahmood, ALJAMIAT, Opcit.
14. An opinion expressed by Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, of which evidence can be seen in article of Dr. Mahmood himself - Aljamiat Weekly. Opcit.
15. See the Radiance : August 9th, 1964.
16. See the Radiance : August 2nd., 1964.
17. See the Editorial in Radiance ; August 9th., 1964.
18. See the Reporting in SANGAM (Patna).
19. See A pamphlet, HAMARA RASTA (Urdu).
20. Maulana Ali Mian, Nida-i-Millat, February 21, 1971 (Lucknow).
- 21/23. Radiance, August 16th., 1964.
24. The Clash of between Jamiat-ul-Ulama and Jamaat-e-Islami during Aligarh Agitation (1965) is an evidence.
25. See the Aljamiat Weekly, Opcit.
26. Dr. Mahmood, See the Special Issue in memory of Dr. S. Mahmood, Darul Musannefin (Azamgarh).
27. The first ever draft of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat Constitution was drafted in 1965, then it was modified on November 1968.
28. Abdul Majeed.
29. See the Roodad, 1st. Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat Conference held at Rampur (U.P.) on 9-10th Sept. 1967 : P-7
30. Z.M. Quraishi, Emergence and Eclipse of Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, as an Special Article in Economic & Political Weekly, June 19, 1971 (P-1230)
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. See a Pamphlet - HAMARA RASTA - Opcit. P-34
35. Z.M. Quraishi, Opcit, Economic & Political Weekly . P-1230
36. See a Pamphlet, IJTAMAI QAYADAT (Urdu) P-2
37. See W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India. P-157.
38. Maulana Muslim.
39. Z.M. Quraishi - Opcit P-1230
40. Ibid.

III rd.

=====

STRATEGY AND DEVELOPMENT

+++++

+

+

+++++

OF THE MUSHAWARAT.

=====

IIIrd.

I - MUSHAWARAT AND COMMUNALISM.

Generally speaking the Muslim leadership in free India tried to gain influence by raising imaginary issues, although it did occasionally deal with some genuine problem.¹ The Mushawarat is also no exception to this generalisation. Their only genuine issue is that of communal riots which is in the forefront of their programme. These riots often served to shake their confidence in secularism and democracy and persuaded them into thinking that a fanatic section amongst the Hindus is not prepared to tolerate their existence in India.² It was this sense of insecurity, common to the community and its leadership which convinced them of the need for Mushawarat.³

The Mushawarat started its political activity by taking all possible measures to fight the evil of communalism which put the whole future of the community at stake.⁴ But inspite of its brave efforts to project its image as a non-sectarian and non-communal organisation, in some quarters it continued to be branded as communal.⁵

Traced to its historical origin, communalism is in fact an old Indian problem, that time has done little to solve.⁶ Any one who has clearly observed recent political developments will immediately recognise the truth of this statement. Official statistics indicate that there are on an average, more than one hundred communal clashes every year in India.⁷ These frequent out breaks of communal violence, not only cause a great loss of human life and property, but also give a lie to our claims of India being a secular state. It also beliees the

hope of the minority that they can live in peace and security, and shakes the faith of the progressive and liberal sections of the society in India's capacity to emerge as a secular country in the community of nations.⁸

The distressing features of all this, however, is that the horror of the situation is not fully recognised by the people of this country. The responsibility is to be equally shared by the government as well as the political parties because none of them have tried to see the problem in its right perspective. The typical response of the government to this malady is to try to put all the rotten eggs in the basket of communal parties.⁹ The communal parties are allowed to arouse at will, communal feelings and generate tensions. The prevailing social climate of the country favoured such a strategy.⁹

Whatever be the reason, it is undeniable fact that the Congress, despite its proclaimed stand against communalism, miserably failed on this front. Communalism exists amongst both the majority and the minority communities. The only difference being that while the communalism of the majority is aggressive, that of the minority is defensive in nature.

To arouse anti-Muslim feelings, generally the Hindu extremists considered the Muslims solely responsible for the partition of the country and often doubted their loyalties. These fanatics always accused the Congress for spreading communalism in the country, and for giving extra privileges to the Muslims, who are according to them yet to be Indianised. The Congress, both at the party level and the government level, always opposed such slogans.

At the minority level too communalism is operative. For many Muslims, there is no distinction between the interests of the Muslim, Islam and Pakistan. One could see it unmistakably in the attitude of some Indian Muslims towards the Bengla Desh crisis. Communalism at the minority level is basically defensive in character and largely penetrates through conservative ways. It results in the isolation of the minority from the mainstream.

The chauvenism of the majority on the one hand and the exclusivism of the minority on other has only served to divide Indian society on a religious basis, whilst at the same time largely obscuring the real issues that the Muslims needed to take note of. This made the Muslims unsure of their future and encouraged them to think in terms of independent political consolidation.

Undoubtedly, this state of affairs greatly tarnished the image of the Congress as a secular party. The wave of riots that swept the Eastern regions of the country in 1963 proved to be the last straw on the camel's back. Baffled and disheartened by these riots, many muslims of these regions decided to migrate to Pakistan.¹⁰

However ironic it might seem, it is an uncontrovertable fact, that of all the Muslims organisations, it was the Mushawarat that came to the rescue of the Muslims. It gave them the necessary reassurance and persuaded them to cast their lot with India at all costs and in any event.

Viewed from an objective view point, the task that the Mushawarat set before itself as well as the strategy adopted by it for banishing communalism from the country, would appear to be quite commendable.

They (Mushawarat leadership) tried to understand the problem with clarity and insight and took positive steps to fight communalism. The best guide to this would be the text of a speech by its president, Dr. S. Mahmood, which he delivered in the very first session of the Lucknow Convention held in 1964.¹¹

"The expectation that our brethren, who were already far advanced in education and prosperity would try to banish the evil barriers of Caste and communalism have proved futile. As such it has now to be done by the minority. We are not new for it, our saints and mystics have already achieved it."

The above words later formed the body and soul of Resolution No. 11 adopted by the convention. The resolution won admiration and applause of all right thinking sections of society. Dr. Mahmood himself referred to it as being loftier than Qutub Minar....¹²

The above resolution was passed unanimously. As a matter of fact it marked a clear departure in the policy of the Indian Muslims towards communalism. It was perhaps for the first time that they intended to contribute something to the country, instead of expecting favour from others.¹³ The executive body of the Mushawarat was commissioned to take effective steps against the causes which widened the gap between the two communities. It also asserted its faith in the existence and effectiveness of right thinking members amongst the majority community.¹⁴ Resolution No.6 embodied this faith and it was stated in it that not all the Hindus are in favour of communal violence, and therefore, we should also seek their cooperation and support.

A programme was chalked out for visiting the areas effected by communal tensions and appealing to the noble sensibilities of the common people without any distinction of cast, colour, and creed.¹⁵ Their programme met with an unprecedented success. They attracted huge crowds every where and preached the lessons of Hindu-Muslim Unity, and National integration, and tried to rekindle in the heart of the common man the message preached by saints like Khwaja Ajmeri and Nizamuddin Aulia.¹⁶

Unfortunately, the so called national press did not take much note of these healthy and remained as indifferent and sceptical as ever.¹⁷ The exceptions to the general indifference understandably were some Urdu paper's controlled by Muslims and the Radiance, a semiofficial organ of the Jamaat-e-Islami. A peculiar feature of their approach was to usually choose non-Muslims as presidents for many of their public meetings that attracted huge crowds.¹⁸ The Mushawarat made strenuous efforts to save the programme from political bargaining and personal jealousies. It was for this reason that they did not take any exception to any political party, including the Jan Sangh.¹⁹ No less a person than Maulana Muslim told the writer that Dr. Mahmood himself went to attend a meeting of the Jan Sangh held near the Mushawarat gathering.

By and large, the programme of these meetings generated good will in the riot torn areas. In Ranchi, one of the worst hit areas at that time, as many as 30 thousand people turned out to welcome these Messiahs of peace.²⁰ Some leaders like Pandit Sunder Lal also accompanied them to these meetings. The late Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Prime

Minister of India, also applauded the efforts of these peace makers when a delegation of the Mushawarat went to see him.²¹

These meetings might have achieved some positive results, but unfortunately all their attempts to keep the Organisation out of political jealousies proved futile. The programme ran into heavy waters partly because of the Sectarian outlook of the Jamaat-e-Islami and partly as a aftermath of the Indp-Pak conflict in 1965. Also the deep involvement of Mushawarat in the Aligarh Muslim University affairs was a contributing factor. Though Jamaat-e-Islami continued to cooperate with the programme of the Mushawarat, it also started feeling uncomfortable with regard to the liberal outlook of some of its leader's and became critical of the utterance and speeches of Dr. S. Mahmood which has an extra-secular bias. Some sections could not tolerate the presence of some non-Muslim leaders like Pandit Sunder Lal on the platform of the Mushawarat.²³

Inspite of its tall claims, the Mushawarat failed to evolve any progressive policy which would serve the interests of the country as one nation. Consequently, they failed to deliver the goods to the Muslims as a community. Some of its leader's adopted what may be regarded as a sectarian or lopsided view in national politics. In this connection the stance taken by Dr. A.J. Faridi in his pamphlet : Taskent Declaration and Indo-Pak minorities, was most unhelpful. It was published just after the Tashkent Agreement. In that intriguing article, he rejected outright India's claim as a single unified nation. He expressed the view that both India and Pakistan are made up of several nations with diverse problems of religion and culture. He

expressed the firm view that communalism has become a part of our national life and a permanent threat to the life, property and culture of the Indian Muslims. He further argued, in this regard, that communalism should not be treated as merely a law and order problem of the country, but should be solved by a mutual agreement on bilateral level, between Indian and Pakistan.²⁴

However, this kind of unhealthy attitude is not peculiar to one individual. It often finds expression in the ^{columns} columns of the Urdu press, controlled by the Muslims,²⁵ although it does not represent the attitude of the entire Muslim community under normal conditions. Dr. Faridi, himself had viewed the problem in a somewhat different manner in his earlier article; 'The communalism; cause and remedies' (1961). At that time he had regarded the problem as a direct result of the economic imbalances, wide spread unemployment, the prejudices based upon community, caste, language and provincial distinctions, and mainly because of vested political interest. He had accused the Hindu fanatics and the government in such activity alike. The following are the steps he had suggested to remedy the evil.²⁶ :-

- i) Appointment of Committee, nominated by Legislative Assemblies, to visit all the effective areas.
- ii) Preference for Muslims in some areas of services, as Police, intelligence, and so on.
- iii) Banning of some communal parties, like R.S.S., Hindu Maha Sabha, ^{the} Jan Sangh and Muslim League.
- iv) Taking effective steps for the isolation of politics from religion.

- v) Taking special measures to promote National integration through the programmes of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

A study of the aforesaid suggestions would appear to be of particular significance and interest, because more or less the same approach was reflected in the earlier resolutions of the Mushawarat. No one would deny the rationality of these suggestions, but unfortunately this trend could not continue for long. The Mushawarat changed its tune and increasingly moved towards a communal approach as the virus of communalism raised its head and the communal riots became more and more frequent in places like Ranchi, Nagpur, Meerut, Ahmedabad and Dhiwandi etc. These recurring outbursts of communal violence shooked their faith in secularism, democracy and the governments impartiality. Any regular reader of the Urdu Press can mark this trend as a recurring theme of these papers. In many instances, the character of the government was openly suspected.²⁷

The executive committee of the Mushawarat passed a resolution against communalism on September 12, 1967. It was said in that resolution that recent communal riots had injured the very sentiments of the minority, and had taught them a lesson to rely upon the policy of self defence, which is the birth right of every individual.²⁸ Even a man like Dr. Mahmood spoke in the same vein. In the course of an interview, he said, "Despite all efforts on our part, to convince the government that the Muslims are basically loyal to the nation, a wide conspiracy is going on against the Muslims. They will face it at all costs. The anti social elements are not the only people responsible for it, the police is an equal partner in it."²⁹

Subsequently, another meeting was held on April 21, 1968, at Lucknow. There was a general consensus at the meeting that it was an immediate necessity to make an effective law against communal riots and moral corruption. In its resolution of October 4, 1969, the Mushawarat adopted a particular approach against communal riots and informed the government that the challenge of communalism must be met on a War footing. It was said in this resolution that the problem is not merely of law and order, but an offence of the same nature as a revolt against the government. It therefore suggested the following steps to be taken immediately.³⁰

- i) The government should regard the problem as a national issue, and should create special cells of antiriot police force, consisting of at least 50% Muslims in its personnel.
- ii) An anti-riot intelligence force should also be created under the command of the Prime Minister, herself, with an effective representation of Muslims.
- iii) All the District Officer's who have been found guilty of inactivity should be suspended immediately.
- iv) All the victims of the riots should be duly compensated.
- v) A minority council should also be created under the chairmanship of Prime Minister with adequate representation of all the minorities.

By May 20, 1970, the tone of Mushawarat became even sharper as reflected in the Resolution of the same date. The Resolution characterised the phenomenon of the riots as deliberate conspiracy against the Muslims. It reminded the government that as signatory to the charter

of United Nations, the Government was the custodian of all fundamental rights of all sections of Society, and was duty bound to implement all the provisions of the Human right commission in letter and spirit. On the other hand the resolution also appealed to the Muslim Community to observe an anti communalism week.³¹

To conclude here, one can say that the line of action which the Mushawarat adopted in its earlier phase was nearer to reality and was based upon a positive approach of mutual love and trust. The attempt had been to evolve the Mushawarat more as an effective platform against communalism than as a political party. But later on it succumbed to parochial trends and involved itself in issues like the Aligarh Muslim University agitation and Election of 1967. In doing so it failed to realise that the approach which it had adopted on those issues would only lead to widening the gap between the two communities. And now it can be said that the direction they have taken in politics leads only to mutual mistrust and regimentation on communal lines.

II - MUSHAWARAT AND THE ISSUE OF ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY.

The recent agitation against the Muslim University (Amendment) Bill, May 1972, again turned a new leaf in the course of Muslim politics in India. It is the same problem on the basis of which the Mushawarat had thrived in 1965, when the organisation was in its infancy.

The Mushawarat, like any other Muslim Organisations had always exploited Muslim sentiments over the issue of the Muslim University. It always tried to give to this problem a political colour and linked it with the fate of the Indian Muslims in general. The story goes back to the year 1951, when the Indian Parliament passed a Bill and declared the University a National Central Institution, because of its strategic importance. The structure of the court and the executive council was changed and nominees of the Ministry of education were also included in it. The Muslims regarded this Bill as an act of humiliation, but were unable to do anything because they were still smarting under the shock of partition and its aftermath.³²

The Subsequent events convinced many that the University court had virtually been depowered, and in almost all important matters it was the will of the Vice-Chancellor that prevailed over any thing else. For instance, Mr. Badruddin Tayabji the then Vice-Chancellor succeeded in changing the statutes to provide for 75 percent reservation for its internal candidates, in Medical and Engineering faculties. This was undoubtedly an undemocratic step.

In March 1965, a crisis boiled up when Nawab Ali Yawar Jung, the then Vice-Chancellor, tried to reduce the reservation quota to 50%.³³ The students, mainly the Muslims, manhandled the Vice-Chancellor and

some of his colleagues. This proved to be a God sent opportunity for the Government, which hastened to take over the university Administration by means of a Presidential Ordinance.

The Muslim leadership on the other hand, used this opportunity to launch an agitation against the Government. Mr. Chagla, the then Minister of Education, who had piloted the new ordinance, obviously became the target of the Muslim leadership. Muslim students and the leadership tried to justify their claims for the exclusive control of the university by Muslims, on the plea that the doors of education and Employment were virtually closed to the members of the Minority community, particularly in the areas of the Hindi-belt.³⁴ That is why the most agitated people were understandably the Muslims of U.P. The Mushawarat became the mouth piece of all such forces. This was one of the reasons why the Mushawarat succeeded in establishing its roots quite deep in U.P. and Bihar.

It convened a meeting in June 1965, and made a plea, among other things for the repeal of the Ordinance. The other demands were as follows:-

- 1) Mr. M.C. Chagla should immediately resign.
- 2) The University administration should be restored to the hands of the Muslims alone.
- 3) The principle of Muslim's majority among the staff and the students should be recognised.
- 4) All the atheist and anti-religious elements should be turned out of the key posts in the University.
- 5) Study of Islamic-Studies should be made compulsory for all the Muslim Students.

- 6) The minority character of the university must be restored at all costs.

Apart from this, the Mushawarat also appealed to the entire Muslim community of India to observe 16th. July 1965 (Friday) as the day for prayers on the subject.³⁵

Subsequently it was decided to hand over the issue to the 'Aligarh Old Boys Convention'. This convention was organised with the blessings of the Mushawarat in order to formulate a firm and united strategy against the ordinance. The convention's approach was similar to that of the Mushawarat and of the Jamaat-e-Islami. It reiterated the same arguments in its meeting of August 14, 1966, held at Lucknow, as were put forward by Mushawarat in its Delhi meeting. It also made an appeal for the release of the students accused in the episode of April 25th.

Since then the Mushawarat has never forgotten to include a Resolution concerning the Minority-character of the university in its meetings. A meeting of the executive committee of the Mushawarat was convened on May 20-21st, 1970 under the Chairmanship of its President, Mufti Ateequr Rahman. It urged the Government to introduce the proposed university (Amendment) Bill in the next session of Parliament, which should be based upon following basic points³⁶ :-

- 1) The denomination of the word 'MUSLIM' from the University should not be changed.
- 2) The minority character of the university should be restored and 65:35 ratio of Muslim and Non-Muslim as recommended by Chatterji Committee be ensured.

- 3) No affiliation of the local colleges to the University should be allowed in order to save the special residential character of the University.

The meeting also expressed the determination of the Muslims to fight any move to the contrary by the Government. After that, we notice a sort of an interlude in the activities of the Mushawarat on any large scale and on any major issue, not excluding the university question.

Suddenly it sprang into activity once again in early 1972 and convened a convention on 16th February in Lucknow. In that convention the Mushawarat passed a resolution, which was criticised all over India. In that resolution the Mushawarat expressed its solidarity with the contents of the Memorandums, presented to the Prime Minister by the Aligarh Old Boys Association in May 1966 and in May 1971. The said Resolution also warned the Government against any measures contrary to the wishes of the Muslim community.

The long awaited Bill came before the Parliament on 26th May, 1972. It could not come earlier because of certain political expediencies. The Government hussled through the measure and got the Bill passed by both houses of Parliament in less than one week in the dying days of the Summer Session.

It is neither possible nor desirable to discuss at length the contents of the Bill and its implications. It must however be admitted that, by and large, it failed to satisfy the hopes and aspirations of the large section of the community. While it retained the word 'MUSLIM' in its denomination and safeguarded the special residential character of the University, the Bill makes no provision for the retention of the

so-called "minority character" of the University.³⁷

To reaction to the passage of the Bill by Parliament was sharp and prompt. It started an unending chain of rallies, demonstrations, processions and meetings at various places in the country, where Muslims were in sizeable number. The Government tried to treat this problem as a law and order question and efforts were made, specially in U.P. to suppress the movement by the use of force, if necessary. This naturally led to some unhappy clashes and anti-police-cur-Hindu-Muslim riots in Aligarh, Ferozabad and Varanasi.

Subsequently an Aligarh action committee was constituted, consisting of members from various Muslim organisations, including the Bushawarat.³⁸ They held a convention on 24-25th June 1972 in Delhi. The convention decided to resume its agitation after the Simla Summit, which was to be held in the end of June to early July.

Some sources close to the committee have informed us that the general consensus of the Muslim participants of the convention was that, in their view, a time had come when they must wage an all out war against the Congress. To achieve this end they expressed their willingness to seek the support of as many opposition parties as possible, because in their view, the country was heading towards a communist brand of dictatorship.³⁹ This policy is by all standards essentially negative in character and reflects the political immaturity of the group concerned.

1. Kuldip Nayar: Statesman, Delhi; July 3rd, 1968
2. Ibid.
3. Maulana Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Nidai Millat, Lucknow; February 21st 1971.
4. See, Dr. Mahmood; in Aljamiat : 2nd July 1971.
5. In both the Congress and as well as Jan Sanghi Camps, it was taken for granted that the rise of Mushawarat was nothing but re-emergence of communalism. For details see, the Radiance, 16th. August, 1964.
6. E. Thompson and Garret: Rise and fulfilment of British Rule in India; (Allahabad 1966) P.623
7. Y.B. Chavan, the then Home Minister stated it in Lok Sabha - see, the Hindustan Times, June 12, 1968.
8. Dr. Intiaz Ahmad, opcit P-1
9. Ibid P-1
10. Dr. Mahmood. For details see, The Awami Manshoor of the Mushawarat P.3
11. From Aljamiat : opcit. also see The Radiance: 16th, August 64.
12. Ibid.
13. Maulana Muslim told me in course of an interview.
14. See the Aljamiat OpCit, and Azaim, Lucknow: 3rd May 1970.
15. Maulana Muslim.
16. Maulana Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, in a Reception address delivered at Lucknow Convention, 1964.
17. Mufti Ateequr Rahman, President of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat criticised Vehemently the attitude of press towards Muslim happenings in course of an interview with me. Also see his statement in the Radiance : July 25, 1965.
18. Radiance : 27th October, 1964.
19. Maulana Muslim
20. Radiance : September 27, 1964.
21. Ibid.
22. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi criticised Dr. Mahmood for his extra ordinary Gandhism, see Nidai Millat - opcit

23. See, S. Hasnain, Indian Muslims, P.80 and Karandhikar, P.350-351. They have quoted some extracts from the Margdip, a Marathi spokesman of Jammāt-e-Islami views. Recently as I had gone through the Correspondence between Qayumme Jammāt-e-Islami and Dr.Sunder Lal (13 August 69) this charge had been proved baseless. Dr.Sunder Lal had no hesitation to say that the allegations were absolutely wrong
24. For details see, Dr. A.J.Faridi, Tashkent Declaration and Problems of Indo-Park Minorities P.44
25. The papers like 'Nashaiman' from Bangalore, 'Gankhawar' and Sangam from Patna, and Jamiat times from Delhi always aroused such type of sentiments. Even a paper like Aljamiat, commonly known as Nationalist paper is not an exception to it. For instance see its Editorials of 19th July 65, August 3, 1965, July 1, 1968 & July 15, 1968 etc.
26. Dr.A.J.Faridi, Communalism : Causes and remedies 1961.
27. For instance, see, the editorial of the daily Aljamiat, Delhi July 1 and 15th 1968.
28. For details, see the Mushawarat Resolutions of September 12, 1967.
29. S. Hasnain : Op cit P.135
30. For details, see the Resolution of Mushawarat of April 21, 1968.
31. For details, see the Resolution of Mushawarat of May 20, 1970.
32. See the DAWAT Delhi : September, 7, 1972 (Page -4)
33. See, the Aljamiat Delhi: 2nd July 1965, Editorial.
34. A.D.Verghese, The Muslims in India, The Times of India, Bombay August 12, 1968 P. 8.
35. Hafiz Malik, Muslims in India since 1947, op cit. Also see the relevant Resolution of the Mushawarat, passed in its Delhi meeting held in June 1965.
36. For details, see the Mushawarat Resolution of May 20, 1970.
37. For details, see the Aligarh University (Amendment) Bill 1972
38. See the Jamiat Times, Delhi: 1st July 1972 Special Number of Aligarh University.
39. Maulana Muslim disclosed me in course of an interview.

IV th.

MUSHAWARAT AND ITS ELECTORAL POLITICS

IV th.

By participating in the election of 1967 the Mushawarat not only subjected the Muslims to mental and intellectual dis-integration but also brought them to the verge of political doom from which the community is finding it difficult to escape. It will not be unfounded to say that Muslim politics is essentially experimental in nature. The reason for their doom was the inherent conflict of their leaders who were pulling the community in diverse directions. In the entire process of their Election participation, we can discern^{yn} three ~~diff~~ different groups working with three distinct ideologies in three divergent directions.

1) The Jamaat-e-Islami Group: It can be said without any fear of contradiction that the Jamaat-e-Islami has not reconciled itself to the democratic system prevailing in India.¹ Although Maulana Muslim is largely responsible for drawing up the Manifesto of the Mushawarat, which affirms its faith in democratic traditions, yet it is obvious that this was only done under the compulsion of projecting an image of solidarity among the Indian Muslims. In fact the men of Jamaat-e-Islami made themselves inactive during the election.² Their intellectuals in fact lamented action on second thoughts.

2) DELHI GROUP : Despite its ideological apathy towards Jamaat-e-Islami, this second group was also interested in seeing

the Mushawarat as basically a non-political entity. This approach was being advocated by Dr. Mahmood, the then President of the Organisation who was confirmed Congressite. He also had the support of some other leaders attached either to the Congress or Jamiat-ul-Ulama or simultaneously with both. In spite of holding many grievances against the Congress in their hearts, they were not inimical to the Congress. Their chief mission was to root out communalism from the country and provide a healthy leadership to the Indian Muslims under the banner of the Mushawarat.³ The pious words of the Mushawarat manifesto released on 22nd. July 1966 represent in fact the views of this group.

3) Lucknow Group : Parallel to the Delhi Group there was another coterie of leaders which played a very active role in the setting up of the Mushawarat from the very outset; namely the Lucknow Group. The real brains masterminding the strategy were those of Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi and Dr. A.J. Faridi. Quite a few members of the group were old Muslim leaguers who had their eyes on the coming elections from the very beginning.⁴ To them the failure to organise the Muslims on one platform and bringing them to the fold of the Congress was tantamount to exposing a defenseless minority to the vagaries of a ruthless majority. In their speeches, the members of this group never missed an opportunity to criticise the Congress. Dr. Faridi's main complaint against Dr. Mahmood was that the latter never toed the line followed by this rabidly anti-congress group.⁵ Thus it is evident that when the Mushawarat decided to participate in the Election it was already a divided house and the

state unit of Uttar Pradesh. The latter was of the opinion that because of its inherent weakness the central leadership was out to destroy the organisation. Even the slightest concession to the Congress according to them could at best be in the personal interest of Dr. S. Mahmood but not of the community as a whole, because the Congress had neither pledged its support to the Mushawarat manifesto nor had shown any sympathy for it.⁶

The above mentioned facts are enough to pinpoint the differences which existed at the top level of the Mushawarat leadership when it decided to participate in the election. The whole strategy can be divided under three major headings:-

- 1) A study of the Manifesto.
- 2) The style of selection of the candidates.
- 3) The consequences of participation.

...

4) A study of the Manifesto : The Mushawarat manifesto is a reflection of the immaturity and political hollowness of which it had given ample demonstration by claiming to be a non-political party and yet participating in the politics. Dr. Mahmood himself had to say that on the one hand he personally was not in favour of the Mushawarat participation in the elections but on the other the Muslims could not be deprived of their democratic rights.⁷ Another factor contributing to this situation was that many persons in the Mushawarat were also the members of some other parties, and they were subject to party discipline. Besides it should not be forgotten that the leadership

of the Mushawarat was drawn from diametrically opposed sections of the communities-political groups, so that inspite of all the beautiful pharasiology and the pious intentions the manifesto remained basically negative in character. No solid concrete results have been expected from it. The manifesto was adopted in the meeting of its executive Council held from 21st. to 23rd. July 1956.

Although the manifesto, like many other resolutions of the Mushawarat was adopted unanimously, there was a lot of behind the scenes fighting between the men of Delhi group and Lucknow group. By Dr. Mahmood's own confession; there was initially much emphasis placed on the need for National integration, but after a good deal of heated discussion, a page was added which expressed the grievances of the Muslim community against the Congress.⁸ Although there was much talk of high ideals and values in the manifesto, its main plank was that the muslims had not sold their destinies to any single party. Dr. Mahmood's words were widely quoted saying that the Muslims had not signed an instrument of slavery in favour of any political party.⁹ Thus it became clear that the Mushawarat would only cooperate with a party that pledged its support to its nine points charter of demands contained in the Awami Manshoor. It was mentioned in their Manifesto that just as political parties give shape to their programme in their manifestos, ~~similarly the people parties give shape to their programme in their manifestoes, similarly the people too have a right to~~ formulate their demands in the shape of a mandate. The mandate prepared by the Mushawarat comprises the following nine points:-

- (1) Reform in the educational system of the country.
- (2) Change needed in the Election system.
- (3) Maintaining a real Welfare State.
- (4) Safeguarding the Personal Law.
- (5) Preservation of the Mother Tongue.
- (6) Establishment of a Minority Board.
- (7) Preservation of the basic character of the educational institutions founded by any group or community.
- (8) Management of Religious Trust.
- (9) Social Reforms.

The aforesaid nine points were based upon the following three

Directive Principles¹⁰ -

- 1) The status of Indian Muslims, although it may have been reduced in practice to that of second class citizens, is still, in law and under the constitution, that of equal partners in the Government of the country.
- 2) Whatever decision the Muslims take must be in full conformity with their claim to being Khair-e-Ummat. They should also try to find a penacea for their own troubles and misfortunes but should ~~also~~ also try to heal the wounded hearts of the millions of suffering humanity in the country.
- 3) Muslims should never forget the fact that there is a considerable lack of mutual confidence between the majority and the minority communities. Therefore, no step can be

successful unless it finds response in the preponderant section of the majority community.

A meeting of the Majlis-e-Aamla of the Mushawarat was held on 13th. December 1966 at Delhi, which released a 'Historic Decision' in regard to the strategy to be adopted during the Elections. It was decided there that Muslims would support those candidates, irrespective of religion, caste or community and without any consideration of their party alliances, who possess the following qualifications: ¹¹ -

- 1) They must be liberal minded, free from religious, communal, provincial and linguistic narrow mindedness.
- 2) Their political ideas and character must conform to the basic principles of the ideals of peace, democracy and secularism.
- 3) They should consider every citizen of the country as a brother, irrespective of religion or community, caste or creed. They should conform to the people's manifesto to a greater extent and obey its spirit.

It was the consensus of the meeting that such candidates would be fully entitled to the votes of the Muslims and the Majlis-e-Mushawarat would not set up any candidate against them; nor should stand as a candidate on behalf of the Mushawarat, and if any office-bearer of the Majlis did stand as a candidate, he would have to resign from the office. The members of the Mushawarat got the permission of the top leadership to oppose any candidate or party who rejected the aforesaid objectives, not only on a policy basis but also because of the candidate's attachment

with a particular political party.

Undoubtedly, the views mentioned above and the policies decided by the Central leadership of the Mushawarat speak for the broad outlook of the organisation, but as has been said earlier, a parallel line of thinking had already developed which was purely negative in character and was based upon an anti-Congress phobia. This section had totally flouted the above spirit at least in U.P., particularly because of Dr. Mahmood's inherent politeness and the fear of seeing further divisions in any already cracking Muslim leadership¹². Dr. Faridi was fully in agreement with this negative strategy and particularly after the meeting of December 13, 1966 he actively advocated this strategy.

Such a line of action had bogged the Mushawarat down with controversy, and the stand of Mushawarat was openly questioned. For removing the emerging doubts, Dr. Mahmood first wrote a letter to Dr. Faridi, and then released an urgent statement to the press (National Herald 30th. December, 1966) of which extracts are given below:-

"It is true that the Majlis has very strong grievances against the Congress for a number of things it has done or not done during these nineteen years But at the same time the Majlis had ^{also} admitted that in view of the past history and ideology of the Congress, it alone could be looked forward to for the realisation of the principles of good government the Majlis believed in. In these circumstances the total opposition to the candidates set up by the Congress could be thought of had the Majlis indicated its preference for some other party

against it The candidates that are going to be set up by the Congress also can not be excluded from its application and they cannot be denied the support (of Mushawarat) as a rule.

'Anyhow, as the president of All India Majlis-e-Mushawarat cannot allow any state Majlis to violate the direction of the Central Majlis or to pursue a different course¹⁴."

However, all these political sermons of Dr. Mahmood remained ineffective, and a general trend of anti-Congressism emerged, particularly in U.P. Both Dr. Faridi and Ali Mian were in favour of teaching a lesson to the Congress, and to convince the country that though Muslims were not in a position to form a government of their own choice, they could certainly disturb the balance of any particular party.¹⁵ It was this attitude, which was interpreted by Theodore, P. Wright in the following words:-

"As the general trend was to oppose the Congress in 1967, Muslims also made their choice in the same direction, what was novel about their political behaviour, and in their campaign, was the first organised attempt by some Muslim leaders to bargain with the various parties and to deliver the vote, to whichever candidate promised the most, on the assumption that the minority which is taken for granted is likely to be neglected."¹⁶

It is evident on an objective analysis of the Mashhoor that the Mushawarat was trying to make its presence felt in the form of a pressure group of Indian Muslims within the frame work of Indian politics. This might have been a successful attempt if only the positive aspect of the

Manshoor was implemented by its leadership but the anti-Congress line of thinking actually sabotaged the whole process. Another healthy factor present in the Manshoor was an affirmative belief in the Indian Constitution and the system of Government as well as a basic agreement with the concepts of secularism and democracy. Instead of fighting for reservations they appealed to the Muslim Community for taking an equal part in the life of the nation. They tried their best to relate the exclusive Muslim problems with the common problems of all the weaker sections, particularly the minorities.¹⁷

Apart from this, they advocated the necessity of creating a common minorities. Board to solve some special problems of the minorities. Instead of the single ballot they made a plea for the proportional representation system.

The same type of demands were often made by Dr. Faridi and his other socialist associates in the recent past.* They demanded that the simple majority system of election must be replaced in the proportional representation system. Elections in India, they argued, should be contested by the parties, and not by individuals. Proportional representation, with a party list in a multi-member constituencies should be adopted, as it is practiced in some forty countries of the world. Under this system a voter is bound to vote for a programme even though he may not like a certain candidate of a particular party.¹⁸

* *A proportional representation, with a party list in multimember constituencies. In this type of election every party submit a list of candidates in each of the multimember constituencies. The voting is by joint electorate and adult franchise. The vote is given to the whole list and not to (individual candidates on the list. Each party or group of people can submit a list for contesting all the seats in the constituency. The votes polled by each list are then totalled up and divided amongst the candidates proportionately according to a set formula.*

II - Selection of Candidates.

The Mushawarat entered the election arena with high hopes of Muslim support, tall claims of an unbiased strategy along with it came the inevitable differences in its rank and file. A central committee for selecting suitable candidates was appointed, which remained almost ineffective mainly because of the fact that state units of the Mushawarat had all along enjoyed a near absolute autonomy. The state units selected the candidate according to their own whims, expediencies, and to suit their personal affiliations. Although the district committees were also appointed to recommend the names of suitable candidates, the final choice remained in the hands of the state leadership. Therefore it is difficult to find out a uniform pattern in the entire process of selecting the candidates and the support extended to them on behalf of the Mushawarat.²⁰

The leadership of the Mushawarat had always emphasised the All India character of the organisation but this superficial posture got into serious trouble when the Mushawarat completely neglected certain states like Kashmir, the only Urdu state with Muslims in the majority and Assam; where the proportion of the Muslim population is higher than in any other state (23%). The small rich pockets of the Muslim population in Kerala and Madras were left to the Muslim League - a constituent party of the Mushawarat. Thus it is clear that the Mushawarat was set up only for those areas, where the Muslims were in disarray, frustrated and which had been the heart-land of the prepartition Muslim League.

The Mushawarat got its biggest momentum in U.P. during the

election days. Dr. Faridi, had a complete sway over the Mushawarat in this area. His past associations with the socialist parties and his extreme anti-Congressism could have resulted in nothing but sizeable support to the socialist candidates on behalf of the Mushawarat. Here a tough position was taken against the Congress candidates, and no Congress candidate for Parliament got the support of the Mushawarat except Mrs. Subhadara Joshi. Even in her case the support ~~was~~ ~~Mushawarat~~ half-hearted. The general tendency was to show disapproval of Congress policies. Yet the some personal factor played in the favour of Old Congressites like C.B. Gupta and Muzaffar Husain who were not opposed by the Mushawarat.²¹

Contrary to the U.P. strategy, the other states did not adopt such a tough line of action against the Congress. As a result in Bihar as many as 14 Congress candidates got the support of the Mushawarat for elections to Parliament. Similarly for the state Assembly it supported 53 Congressites. The Congress was supported in almost all the states except U.P., West Bengal and Maharashtra at the Assembly levels. (See Table No.1) In Maharashtra the choice fell on the Republican party, with which talks of a minorities confederation were often repeated. The Muslims Jamaat established by Rahat Maulai had already merged into it.²² Because of this equation its 4 (1) candidates for Parliamentary seats and 6 (4) for Assembly seats were supported by the Mushawarat. In West Bengal the approach of the Mushawarat was similar to that of U.P. Here the state unit generally boycotted the Congress and made an alliance with the United Peoples left Front.

The brain behind this strategy was Mr. ^{Huwayn} ~~Huwayn~~ Kabir, who was a Muslim Nationalist, and had served in many top positions in the Central Government. It was very difficult to doubt his secular credentials. At that time he had already left the Congress, and his mind was working on lines not different from those of Dr. Faridi.²³ Here the Mushawarat supported enblock the Bangla Congress and its other partners, the C.B.I. The C.P.I. received support from the Mushawarat in all other states except in Mysore. The lack of Mushawarat political maturity is evident from the fact that the C.P.M. which has all along been regarded as the traditional rival of the C.P.I. also got a handful candidates supported by the Mushawarat in Mysore, apart from isolated cases in U.P., Bihar and Maharashtra. Even a Jan Sangh candidate was supported in Rajasthan at the Assembly level.

As said earlier the parties which took advantage of Muslims disillusionment from the Congress, particularly in U.P. and Bihar were the P.S.P., the S.P. and the Swatantra. Although the Swatantra party already had an open alliance with the Jan Sangh in Rajasthan and was notorious for its pro-Israel leaning,²⁴ the Mushawarat courted it by supporting its 17 (4) candidates for Parliament and 69(15) for Assembly seats. However, this ^{unconvenient} ~~convenient~~ honeymoon was disturbed soon when the Swatantra party openly took a position against the Arabs during the June 1967 conflict.

Another unhealthy spot in the Mushawarat strategy was its encouragement to independent candidates. In a country like India, where the trend of Aya Ram And Gaya Ram is well grounded, the existence of

Independents is an undemocratic phenomenon. The Mushawarat supported 20 (3) such independent candidates at the Parliamentary level and 139 (20) at all Assembly levels. (See the Table No. 2)

On the basis of the above facts and figures, it is not correct to say that the Mushawarat isolated the Muslims totally from the Congress in 1967. This happened only in U.P. and West Bengal. In these states the Mushawarat generally followed the 'Congress Hatao' policy and played to the tune of other opposition parties. However in other states the Congress candidates share of Mushawarat support was 15.5% at Parliamentary level and 21.5 at Assembly levels. (See table No. 2) Of course it was not commensurate with a party of the gignatic size of the Congress.

III - "THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION, AND THE
FALL OF MUSHAWARAT."

The Mushawarat was set up primarily to root out communalism from the country. It got such popularity by indulging itself into Aligarh events of 1965, and reached the highest pinnacle in popularity during the 1967 elections. Unfortunately the last event proved a turning point from where it started to see its virtual fall. The election results largely frustrated the high hopes of the Muslim leadership, which they had entertained before participation in the elections. The signs of this frustration could be seen in the speeches made from the platform of the first ever conference of the U.P. State Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat held in Rampur in August 1967. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, who masterminded the anti-Congress strategy in U.P. was reflective of the Mushawarat as sense of failure but expressed a sort of negative satisfaction that they had taught a lesson to the Congress.²⁵ However, it is an incontrovertible fact that Mushawarat had done no good either to the Muslim community or to itself by deciding to participate in the General Election.

Some temporary gains in the form of a handful of seats are not the real sources of benefit or pleasure to the community. It left the Muslims where they were with no clear line of action for the future. In that respect, the Mushawarat experiment ~~was~~ was a total failure. It neither gave them a permanent line of action for the future nor did it solve any of their problems. Even in terms of its election gains its success was not significant. The

Mushawarat had supported 135 (21) candidates for election to Parliament, out of them 42 (7) could enter the Parliament. (See table No.3)

The U.P. Unit made a lot of ado about its marginal success in the election on the plea that 11 out of the 38 candidates supported by it had won the Parliament Election.²⁶ However, it was by no means a significant achievement in a large state like U.P. Although it succeeded in its efforts to wean away the Muslim vote from the Congress at some places, it did not effect the position or the plight of the community. Even the total number of Muslim Legislators could not go beyond 26 of which as many as 8 were Congressites while the number was 27 after the third General Election without the holy services of the Mushawarat.²⁷ (See Table 5) Their experiment in Rajasthan, where the Mushawarat unit supported Congress candidates in order to oppose Jan Sangh - Swatantra alliances, provided better results in the form of first ever victory of four Congress men and 2 non-Congress Muslims M.L.A's to Rajasthan Assembly. The other state which excelled the U.P. unit in performance was Bihar, where out of 30 candidates, who were seeking election to Parliament with Mushawarat support, as many as 10 became successful. In ^{Maharashtra} Mushawarat too, the anti-Congress strategy resulted in nothing, but a near total ruin of the Mushawarat candidates, as only one such candidate could be returned to the Assembly. Even in U.P. the rout of Congress was not solely because of the Muslims alienation from it. The Congress lost 79 seats out of 134, where the Mushawarat was directly involved, while it also lost 146 seats out of 289 in other constituencies where the Mushawarat was not involved. In this way the proportion of Congress losses due to the so called Mushawarat campaigning was not more than 8.28 per cent.²⁸ The Congress in fact started losing its grip right

after the Military set back at the hands of ~~China~~ China in 1962. It suffered its unexpected defeats at some places like Amroha, Farrukhabad and Rajkot in 1963. The ever increasing corruption, rising prices and Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 were the factors which helped in creating an anti-Congress atmosphere in the country.²⁹

As stated earlier, Mushawarat was set up with the avowed intension of eradicating communalism from the country, but because of its anti-Congress posture, it indirectly encouraged the communal elements in the sense that in some cases Muslim's opposition to the Congress helped the parties like Jan Sangh to grow particularly in U.P. and Bihar. For instance it happened in Doodhri Ganj constituency where Adool Abbasi, a Congress Candidate was defeated by his Jan Sangh rival because the Mushawarat was busy there in supporting a Swatantra party candidate.³⁰

Thus, it is clear that the Mushawarat wittingly or unwittingly made the matters easy for the Jan Sangh, which emerged as the second largest party after the Congress in the U.P. Assembly after the Election. The Muslim leadership realised its mistake when the Jan Sangh had ~~unmasked~~ ^{unmasked} its real character after coming into the power in S.V.D.'s Government. Besides, their many members who owed their victory in the Election went back their pledges given to the Mushawarat. The disappointment at this turn of events was expressed by no less a person than Dr. Fazlul Haque in his Presidential address in the U.P. State Muslim Majlis-o-Mushawarat Conference, Rampur, in the following words:-

*It is also a pity that even the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat supported member's, numbering 37, including 8 members (Muslims) are not raising their voice against the high handedness of the Jan Sangh. On the contrary they are weakly submitting to the threats. These selfish people are afraid of a mid-term election, and keen to remain M.L.A's or Ministers at all costs for as long as possible they can. At that time we were not free in matters of selecting the candidates but in future we will select according to our own will.

The Mushawarat leadership failed to make Mushawarat as the sole spokesman or representative organ of the Muslim community. Although one can not scientifically demonstrate the impact of Mushawarat on the Muslim mind, it must be admitted that it had broken some ice in U.P. and Bihar. In these areas a major section of the community said goodbye to their earlier practice of voting enblock in the favour of the Congress. Although in the 4th. General Election the Congress blessed 31 Muslim candidates for Parliamentary Election, only 14 became successful while after 1962, they were 17 out of 27 ticket holders. It shows a some slight change in the thinking of Muslim community. However the support which Mushawarat received from the Muslims in 1967 was not as whole-hearted as the support received by the Muslim League in pre-partition India. Undoubtedly, the Mushawarat found itself unable to convince the minds of the younger generation of the community, and did not provide an adequate answer to their problems.³³

Many factors were responsible for the doom of Mushawarat in its electoral strategy. One factor contributing to the failure of the Mushawarat according to Maulana Muslim was that of withdrawal of Jamaat-e-Islami, which was comparatively most organised segment with an appeal to a sizeable section of the Muslim community, the otherwise non-committed and self interested person's came forth and exploited the opportunity provided by the Elections, and subsequently harmed the spirit and the character of the organisation,³⁴ in the eyes of Maulana Abul Hasan Nadwi. Dr. Mahmood and his incapability as a leader coupled with his failed physique and strong pro-congressionism were the other reasons which brought about the fall of the Mushawarat. He also disagreed with those who regarded the collective leadership of the Mushawarat as an alternative to the unavailability of an individual charismatic leadership.³⁵ According to Maulana Ali Mian Mushawarat was not true to the ideal. In the eyes of Delhi group, it was none but Dr. Faridi, who ruined the prospects of the Manshoor of the Mushawarat. Later on Maulana Manzoor Noonani viewed the same. An open rift had come to the surface in the meeting held after the elections. According to Dr. Mahmood the majority of the members were in favour of expelling Dr. Faridi from the organisation but Ali Mian convinced Dr. Mahmood about unquestionable loyalty of Dr. Faridi to the organisation. The men like Dr. Mahmood were fully convinced that the negative strategy adopted by the Lucknow group had defeated the very purpose of the Mushawarat's establishment. On the other hand ^{it} diminished the chances of victory of some non-Muslim sympathisers of the Muslim community. Apart from

it, it had created a permanent gulf between the Delhi group and Lucknow group of the leadership. This could be perceived in the absence of important personalities like Dr. Mahmood, and Mufti Ateequr Rahman from the first conference of U.P. State Majlis-e-Mushawarat, held in August 1967. Not many days passed after that when Dr. Mahmood found himself nowhere and sent his resignation. But the resignation was not published, and it was made out that his absence was due to his physical inability. According to Dr. Mahmood himself he had become a silent spectator, just to save the organisation from breaking into pieces. More or less the same line was adopted by the men of Jamaat-e-Islami and men like Manzoor Noonani who had at one time been the heart and soul of the Mushawarat.

The attitude of Dr. Faridi brought about the Mushawarat at a point where it should have either become a veritable political party or to see its disintegration in two pieces. The first course was against the spirit of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Delhi group while the other was against the very objectives of the organisation, as the Mushawarat was set up to unite the Indian Muslims on single platform. According to Maulana Ali Mian a mid way was adopted and it was decided to transform the U.P. State unit into a separate political party under the name of U.P. Muslim Majlis, as a constituent part of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.³⁹

This decision was an emulation of the pattern of Muslim League leadership in Northern India. Dr. Faridi expressed it very clearly in inaugural session of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat when he said that only the political tactics could solve the problems of the community.

Un

undoubtedly, such an approach was against the very spirit of the Mushawarat as spelt out in 1964. The story does not end here, the Muslim League also forced its entry into the north and decided to participate in the Election of 1971. Although the decision was contrary to their earlier promises. It was not unpolitical mainly because of the basic similarity of approach between Muslim League and Muslim Majlis, except some personal clashes in their leadership. All these sorry happenings added no feathers to the cap of Muslim leadership but only divided its ranks, and marked the fall of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat. How ineffective the Mushawarat has become in its action is evident from the fact that despite many efforts it has miserably failed to bridge up the gulf between the Muslim League and Muslim Majlis, although both are the equal partners in the strategy symbolised by All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat. The organisation is actually now shrunken into the personality of Mufti Ataequr Rahman in Delhi. Its other constituents are not more enthusiastic to cooperate with each other. In U.P. it has almost become a dead horse because of the setting up of Muslim Majlis, as a separate Organisation has been built on the ashes of the erstwhile U.P. Unit of All India Majlis-e-Mushawarat. In Andhra Pradesh too both Jameer-e-Millat and Ittihadul Muslimin were at logger heads against each other during the last Elections. Thus it can be said that the participation of the Mushawarat in 1967 Elections was a grievous mistake and has only resulted in reducing the Mushawarat to the status of a paper tiger.

TABLE I* Analysis by states of candidates supported by All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.

for (i) Lok Sabha.

States	Total No. of seats	Supported by Mushawarat	Cong	Swat	CPI	CPI (M)	SSP	PSP	RPI	Others	Independents.
A.P.	41	6(2)	3(1)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1(1)
Bihar	53	30(6)	14(2)	1	4(1)	-	1(1)	2(2)	-	16+5 ^k	2
M.P.	37	7(1)	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	4(1)
Maharashtra.	45	10	-	-	2	-	1	1	4	1a	1
Vidarbha		5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
Mysore	27	14(3)	-	4(1)	-	1	1	2(2)	4	-	5
Rajasthan	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.P.	85	38(7)	1	19(3)	1(1)	3	9	3(1)	4(1)	-	7(1)
W.Bengal	40	25(2)	-	-	11(1)	-	-	-	-	14+2 ^b	-

(a: PWP) (b. Forward Block), Figures in paranthesis () indicates the Muslim candidates.

* All the tables except No. 2 are taken from Asian Survey: December, 68 tabulated by Dr. Quraishi, Z.M. However, the table No.2 is tabulated by me.

for (ii) State Assemblies:

States	Total No. of seats	Supported by Kasha varat.	Cong	Swat	CPI	CPI (m)	SSP	PSP	RPI JKD	Others	Independ- ents	
A.P.	287	35(6)	13(2)	8(2)	2(1)	-	1	-	-	1(1) ^c	10	
Bihar	318	161(38)	53(10)	8(2)	20(7)	4	23(4)	11(1)	-	29(6) 2 ^d	12(8)	
M.P.	296	32(8)	5(1)	-	5(2)	-	3(2)	7	-	2 ^e	10(3)	
Mahara- shtra	270	34(1)	2	-	5	1	2	3	2	-	7 ^f	12(1)
Vidarbha		24	-	-	1	1	1	-	13	-	7 ^f	1
Mysore	216	107(6)	7	22(2)	-	15(1)	5	5(1)	-	-	53(2) ^g	
Rajasthan	184	16(7)	7(2)	1(1)	2(1)	-	2(1)	-	-	-	2 ^h	2(2)
U.P.	425	134(29)	-	30(8)	6(1)	2	41(2)	19(5)	6(4)	-	30(9)	
W. Bengal	280	184(12)	-	-	60(1)	-	-	-	-	-	115(8) ⁱ	9(3)

Figures in Parenthesis () indicates Muslim Candidates.

(a: Peasants and Workers party), (k : Bhadkhand)

(b: 6 forward block, & 8(1) Bangla Congress)

(c: Hithahdul Muslimin)

(d: 1 Forward Block & 1 R.S.P. (e: 1 Jan Congress, 1 Ram Raj Parishad)

(f: 1 Forward Block, 3 Peasants and Workers Party)

(g: the joint front)

(h: Jan Party ; 1 Jan Sangh)

(i: 38 Forward Block, 77(8) Bangla Congress.

TABLE NO. 2

Analysis of Percentage of the candidates supported by the
Kushawarat, in terms of their party and other affiliations during
the 4th General Elections of 1967.

	Total No. of candi dates supported by Kusha warat	Number of Congress candidates	Swatantra	C.P.I.	C.P.I.(M)	Socialists		Republi cons	Indep- dents	No. of Eugli candi date
						SSP	RSP			
Parlia- mentary Level	135	21 (15.5%)	17 (12.5%)	19 (13.3%)	4 (2.9%)	12 + = 21 (15.5%)	9	14 (10.4%)	20 15%	21 (15.5)
Assembly Level	727	157 (21.5%)	69 (9.4%)	101 (13.8%)	23 (3.1%)	78 + = 123 (16%)	45	21 (3.0%)	139 (21.1%)	107 (14.7)

TABLE 3 Performance of Majlis supported candidates in Lok Sabha Elections.

States	Supported candidates	Elected members	Sitting Members	New Members	Sitting members unsuccessful.
A.P.	6(2)	3(1)	2(1)	1	1
Bihar	30(5)	10(1)	6(1)	4	6(1)
H.P.	7(1)	1	-	1	-
Maharashtra	15	1	-	1	-
Mysore	14(5)	3(1)	-	3(1)	-
U.P.	38(7)	12(3)	5	7(3)	7
W. Bengal	25(2)	12(1)	5(1)	7	3(1)
	155(21)	42(7)	18(3)	24(9)	19(2)

TABLE 4 Analysis of Muslim members of Lok Sabha, by party from the States where Majlis participated.

States	Muslims % of population	1952		1957		1962		1967		Total	% of seats
		Cong	Non-Cong	Cong	Non-Cong	Cong	Non-Cong	Cong	Non-Cong		
A.P.	7.55	2	-	2	-	3	-	2	-	2	4.88
Bihar	12.45	3	-	3	-	2	-	2	-	2	3.77
M.P.	4.03	3	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	0.00
Maharashtra	7.67	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	2	4.4
Mysore	9.87	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	3	11.11
Rajasthan	6.52	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
U.P.	14.63	7	-	6	-	5	-	1	4	5	5.88
W. Bengal	20.00	2	-	3	-	1	2	1	3	4	10.00
		18		17	1	14	2	11	8	19	
				18		16					

(M)

**TABLE 5 CONGRESS AND NON CONGRESS MUSLIM LEGISLATORS
IN THE MAJLIS INVOLVED STATES in 1962 and 1967.**

States	1962			1967			% of change
	Cong.	Non Cong.	Total	Cong.	Non Cong.	Total	
A.P.	6	2	8	6	4	8	-
Bihar	17	5	22	8	10	18	-18.18
M.P.	7	1	8	1	2	3	-62.50
Maharashtra	11	-	11	6	2	8	-27.27
Mysore	6	-	6	4	1	5	-16.66
Rajasthan	1	1	2	4	2	6	+2.00
U.P.	18	9	27	18	8	26	-3.70
W. Bengal	19	9	28	19	19	38	+35.71
	95	26	121	64	48	112	-7.44

NOTES

1. Said Maulana Muslim in course of an interview.
2. -do-
3. Said Mufti Ateequr Rahman
4. Z.M. Quraishi, Economic & Political Weekly, 19 June 1971 P.1229
5. A letter of Dr.Faridi to Dr.Mahmood, 27th December 1966.
6. Ibid.
7. A special pamphlet on Dr. Mahmood Published by Darul Mussanefin-Azamgarh.
8. Dr.Mahmood, Aljamiat : 2nd July 1971 and Azam: 30 September 1970
9. Maulana Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Nidai Millat : 21st February 1971.
10. The Manifesto of the Mushawarat, P.9
11. A statement of Dr.Mahmood, released in National Herald: Friday December 30, 1966.
12. Dr. Mahmood, Aljamiat : 2nd July 1971.
13. Dr. Faridi, at a Press Conference 20th December, 1966.
14. Dr. Mahmood, National Herald, opcit.
15. Ali Mian, Nidai Millat; opat.
16. Theodore P.Wright (Jr) 4th General Elections in India, Vol. 2 Edited by Iqbal Narain and others Pp (207-208)
17. A Historic decision of Mushawarat.
18. Maulana Muslim.
19. Z.M. Quraishi, Asian Survey, December 1968, Vol. VIII, No.12 P.978
20. Ibid. P.978
21. Ibid. P.981
22. Ibid. P.981

23. Theodore, P. Wright, Opcit. P. 213
24. National Herald, February 5, 1967.
25. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Roodad Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat
U.P. P.-9
26. Dr. Faridi, Presidential Address of U.P. State Muslim Majlis-e-
Mushawarat Conference, Rampur, held in August 1967.
27. A communique released from the Office of U.P. State Muslim
Majlis-e-Mushawarat, on 2.3.1967.
28. Ibid.
29. A Survey of 4th General Election, introduction, opcit.
30. Theodore, P. Wright, Opcit. P.212.
31. Dr. Faridi, Presidential address, Opcit, P.9
32. Ibid.
33. Z.N. Quraishi, Asian Survey, Opcit. P.982
34. Maulana Muslim
35. Ali Mian, Nidai Millat, Opcit.
36. Dr. Mahmood, Aljamiat, Opcit.
37. Ibid.
38. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Nidai Millat, February 21, 1971.

V th.

M U S H A W A R A T :

AN ASSESSMENT

The setting up of the Mushawarat in 1964, was a very significant event in the politics of Indian Muslims. To say this is not to imply that it marked any revolution in the political thinking of Indian Muslims, or that they made a complete break with their past in politics. Surely the Muslim politics still hinges around the same old principles which characterised their attitude before the birth of the Mushawarat. Muslim politics is still uncertain, suspicious, and moves here and there in their course of making a political choice.

It can, however, be said that in respect of its composition, and political back-ground the rise of the Mushawarat was qualitatively different from their past experiments. Although Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind had always existed even before the partition and still does operate as a pressure group in free India, it is basically different from the Mushawarat in the sense that the former is primarily a religious organisation, which in politics has no existence without the Congress. Even though the Mushawarat also based its strategy upon the same issues which were always raised by Jamiat-ul-Ulama, but unlike the Jamiat, the Mushawarat made Congress, their main whipping stick as being responsible for Muslim grievances. This was the main reason why a large section of Jamiat could not persuade itself to cooperate with the Mushawarat because in its existence and growth they saw their own decline and death. Even men like Asad Madni,

withdrew their association with the Mushawarat as soon as they realised the supposed dicotomy between the two. There is no doubt that the Adad group unfoundly levelled the charge of the predominance of Jamaat-e-Islami over the Mushawarat. Atleast in numerical terms it was wrong, although correct to some extent on the question of having ideological control. For instance when the Jamiat staged its withdrawal from the Mushawarat, out of twentyseven members in the Executive Council there were as many as seven from the Jamiat and four from the Congress, whilst the jamaat-e-Islami had only a meagre representation of two².

Another pointer to the Jamiat's hostility towards the Mushawarat is seen in the fact that after their withdrawal from the Mushawarat, ~~from the Mushawarat~~, they forbade any member of the Jamiat, to have any association with the Mushawarat even in his individual capacity. This is inspite of the fact that the Jamiat has no claims to being a political party and its member's are allowed to join any political party of their choice. This stance of the Jamiat gave rise to serious differences in its ranks, and consequently an important section of it under the leadership of Mufti Abesqueer Rahman continued with their alliances with the Mushawarat.

The aforesaid rift between the Jamiat and the Mushawarat was not based upon ideological principles but on rivalries generated by power politics. This ideological heterogeneity, as has already been said was ~~absent~~ ^{inherent in} the very composition of the organisation, and what now came to the force was an inevitable result of these rivalries.

In the foregoing chapter, we have seen how the two of the pillars of the Mushawarat, namely; Dr. Mahmood and Dr. Faridi were poles apart in their thinking. The fact of these differences cropping up at this stage confirms only the hollowness of the image of unity struck by the Mushawarat at the time of its birth in 1953.

The Mushawarat was doubtless abroth prepared with the labour of so many hooks. At a time when the very existence of the Muslim Community was threatened by the frequent out breaks of communal riots in the country these heterogeneous group had entered into what may be called a marriage of convenience prompted by certain immediate needs. But these divergent group could never forget their respective political interests. A foretaste of these differences could be heard even in its inaugural session at Lucknow. The whole edifice of the Mushawarat was founded on the bricks of religion and faith in God. There were some who suspected that Dr. Mahmood was being dictated to by Maulana Aeed Madni, while the Maulana himself complained that Dr. Saheb had been playing in to the hands of the Jamaat-e-Islami.⁴

The failure of the Mushawarat has proved beyond all doubts that an alliance forged by parties with diverse interests for a superficial gain can never produce some positive results. The birth of the Mushawarat was doubtless a glaring failure of Nationalist Muslims in India, who were often branded as official Muslims. For it was a blow to their declared policy formulated in the Lucknow Convention of 1947, namely that Muslims would thence forth participate in the national politics, not through exclusive but joint national parties. Although the Mushawarat leadership took special care not to call it a separate political organisation,⁵ yet a feeling grew among many of them that the Lucknow convention⁽¹⁹⁴⁷⁾ had done more harm to the interest of the

Muslim community as a whole, and served only the interest of few Muslim individuals. There is no point ⁱⁿ saying that withdrawal from party politics, by the Muslim organisation rendered them ineffective even in other fields - social, economic, educational.⁶ They generally had nothing fruitful to do except to vest their energies in faction fighting. All that they have tried to do, during this entire period has been an endeavour to accuse the administration when any communal riot occurred and to contribute some relief and rehabilitation work in the effected areas. There is generally a lack of mass politicization and vacuum of political leadership in the community.

The mushawarat was set up with the avowed intention to fill this vacuum. But because of inherent hollowness in its very texture it was already on its way to facing into obscurity.⁷ Assessing its performance in recent year's that its entire achievement is limited to meeting once a year, anywhere in the country and voiced its criticism upon the government in the ^{oft repeated} ~~of repeated~~ language and phraseology on set issues. To say that the Mushawarat's birth was a political set back to the nationalist Muslims is not to imply that it gave a new lease of life to the Muslim League as is sometimes ^{presumed} ~~presumed~~ in certain quarters.⁸ It nevertheless is a fact that the line of thinking of a certain section in it was similar to, at time identical with, the Muslim League. This perhaps why the Muslim League has always been and still is a partner in the confederation.

In the political idiom, the Mushawarat can only be described as a common platform for the various Muslim parties, to forge a superficial alliance by appealing to the emotions of the community, but

without any sound guidance and constitutional programme of action. As a whole the Mushawarat was ^{opposed to} ~~opposed~~ to the idea of an exclusive party of Muslims on All India Level. It was partly because of pertinent fear of clash between its various constituent parts of different regional levels, and partly out of fear of reprisal from the majority as a whole.⁹ Thus it can be concluded that the Mushawarat was not established on a firm foundation, and instead of the quality of self confidence and assurance, its leader's were victims of a fear complex and uncertainty.

Thus it is clear that it was not the idea of setting up on the Mushawarat, which was wrong, but the issues in which it got into involve itself, and the clash of interests in its constituent parts, which wrought it doom. Instead of trying to serve the educational and political-economic interests of the community in a country like India, rapidly heading towards Industrialization, they fell an easy victim to conservatism and political orthodoxy. Although styling itself as a non-political organisation, it stubbornly participated in politics. On the top of all this they plunged into the Election arena of 1967, without politicising or educating the Muslim masses properly. As a result of such participation; on the one hand, their faith in their own capabilities staggered, and on the other hand they made their credentials suspect in the eyes of the majority. The Congress took the organisation as its political rival, but the Hindu extremists reacted it more sharply and vehemently.¹⁰

The Mushawarat always side-tracked the questions of modernisation and of contemporary relevance. It never chalked out a programme of

action for the community to meet the pertinent challenges imposed by modern, technical set up of the country. Instead of it the Mushawarat always highlighted those issues, which were concerned more with the emotions of the Muslim community. This the Mushawarat can best be described as a total expression of Muslim conservatism. The ever present issues on its agenda were generally the communal riots, Muslim personal law, Urdu and Aligarh Muslim University. One should not forget the fact, that these very issues are the breath and soul of conservative organisations like Jemiat-e-Islami and Jamiat-ulUlema. By and large these issues are concerned with the emotions of the Muslims. The same type of emotionalism is reflected in the phraseology of the Resolutions, passed by the Mushawarat during the Bangla Desh crisis.¹¹ Although much of the criticism appearing in the National Press was ill founded yet it can not be denied that the Mushawarat avoided using the term 'Bangla Desh', and described the disputed territory as East Pakistan. Apart from it, the Resolution largely reflected the desire of a vast majority of Indian Muslims, who did not want to see the skatknaykdi- integration or bifurcation of Pakistan. Even so it should not be understand as an antinational stance, particularly because since the region in dispute was not till then, recognised by India itself. Same can also be said with regard to the Muslim Personal Law, a change in which would mean, to many, a change from orthodoxy to modernity. The Mushawarat, however, always held Personal Law as sacrosant like the cardinal principle of the religion. In many resolutions of the Mushawarat, any move to liberalise Islam was considered blasphemous or kufr.¹²

Similar^y the Mushawarat's demand for proportional representation, in spite of being democratic, loses its meaning and utility in the context of its politics. It might have reduced the chance of regimentation of votes on the basis of castes, region and other perocial considerations, but at the same time it was calculated to boost Muslim conservatism, should they choose to rally a round an organisation like the Mushawarat.

The ultra Nationalists and secular elements of the country branded the Mushawarat as a ¹³ communal organisation, as did the Hindu reactionaries against it. The judgement of this sort is surely one sided. There would have been no Mushawarat, had there not been an ~~end~~-ending chain of anti Muslim riots in the country. We must accept without any reservations, that there are certain problems faced by the Muslim community in the country. They are not the equal partners in the progress and prosperity of free India; and since they are a part of this country as such their poverty is the poverty of the nation. The Congress miserably failed to understand their multiple difficulties. If the Muslim voiced their grievances, as they ~~a~~ have a right to, this does not make them communalists. Of course, to exploit their grievances for political gains, however, is certainly condemnable. Communalism can be practiced both by an individual and a party. Thus it will be wrong to presume that the Mushawarat was communal in its essence. However, its own clashes of interests, and a peculiar line of thinking working under ~~in~~ its banner did gave rise to the possibility of a communal approach. That exclusivism subsequently found expressions in the form of the emergence of the Muslim Majlis and the entry of Muslim League

in Northern India.

In fact any talk of rallying the voters of one community round any single organisation can only give birth to communalism and sectarian out look.¹⁴ The Mushawarat also ran into the risk of communalism the moment it tried to project the ~~grievances~~ ^{grievances} and problems of only one community - the Muslims, and inspite of multifarious diversities and differences tried to strike the image of Muslims as one unified community. It was in persuance of this policy that it based its entire strategy in fourth General Elections on the basis of 'Muslim Interest' only. But it was nothing new or unknown in the Indian politics, the Mushawarat was the only but one of such organisation as had all along been exploiting the sentiments of a particular section of society.

It is again incorrect to accuse the Mushawarat in 1964, of separating the Muslims from the National mainstream. In a country with diverse castes, communities, regions and pockets of culture, where every district is composite unit of a culture and a world in itself, it is futile to talk about one single mainstream. The Mushawarat also pleaded in vain in justification of its stand that it stood for the problems of all minorities in India,¹⁵ for the issues they took up were exclusively of interest to the obscurantist elements in the Muslim community. It was inconceivable that other communities or organisations would lend their support to ~~the Mushawarat's~~ ^{the Mushawarat's} ~~in dealing with these problems in the way that it wanted the~~ undue sentimentalism in dealing with these problems landed the Muslims deep in the abyss of isolation and provided other with an opportunity to accuse the Muslims

of being separatists. The reason for such a situation is the predominance of obscurantist elements in the Muslim leadership, and the failure of the liberal sections to rise to the situation and guide the community for reasons of its own.

The failure of the Mushawarat to deliver the goods to the community or the country added one more instance in the experimental politics of the Muslim community in India, which is still in transition. This not only generated frustration in the mind of the common Muslim but also ruined the prospects of a promising organisation, because of the conflict of vested interests and petty politics among the different constitutional groups inside the Organisation.

o o o
o
o

NOTES

1. See the Presidential address of Dr. Mahmood in Delhi Convention of 1961.
2. The Radiance, Weekly : October 10, 1965.
3. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, stated it in a course of an interview, published in Nidai Millat, Lucknow : February 21, 1971.
4. The Aljamiat Weekly : 2nd July 1971, Mushawarat, Tasses Aur Siyasi Pas-e-Manzar - Dr. Mahmood.
5. The Radiance, Weekly Delhi : August 28, 1966 P.1
6. Nidai-e-Millat, Lucknow : 3rd January 1971 - An Statement of Mr. Zulfiqar Ullah, Vice-Chairman of U.F.Muslim Majlis.
7. Dr. Mahmood, Risala-e-Dwan, June-July 1971, Page 8
8. Z.M. Qureshi, opcit.
9. Said Mufti Ateequr Rahman, the President of the Mushawarat.
10. Dr. Mahmood, Risala Dawam, opcit, and special issue of Darul Musanifin Azamgarh on Dr. Mahmood.
11. Mufti Ateequr Rahman, said it in an interview, published in the Nidai-Millat, Lucknow, September 12, 1971. For details, see the Resolution passed in the meeting of the Mushawarat, held in February, 1971.
12. This type of approach is reflected by each and every resolution of the Mushawarat regarding Muslim Personal Law. For instance, see its Resolutions of 20-21st May, 1970. It was demanded that the Personal Law of different Communities

should be safeguarded, recommending that if necessary the Constitution should also be amended. In fact the question of Personal Law was the one which had led to the first major stir in the Muslim Community.

13. Hasnain, S.E. : Indian Muslims, P.138
14. Theodore, P. Wright : "Muslim as candidates and voters in 1967, 4th General Election, edited by Iqbal Narain and others, Vol. 2, 1970.
15. See, the Mushawarat Manifesto, 1966 P.

Bibliography(A) Party Documents

1. A 'Historic Decision' of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, released on 13th December, 1966.
2. An enquiry Committee Report (1961) on the Aligarh Muslim University.
3. Aljamiat (Urdu) , An special Number in the memory of the late Maulana Hifzur Rahman : March 1963.
4. Darul Mussanefin (Azamgarh) : A special Number in the memory (Urdu) of Dr. S. Mahmood.
5. Dawam (Urdu), a special number on Dr. S. Mahmood; June-July 1971.
6. Delhi Se Gaya Tak (Urdu), A special Report about the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind : May 1972.
7. Faridi, Dr. A.J.; Firqa Wariyat : Aebab Aur Ilaj (Urdu), May, 1961.
8. ; Reception address delivered at Deeni Talimi Conference, Lucknow held on 4-5th June, 1961.
9. ; Reception address delivered at All India Socialist Unity Conference, 1st. June, 1963.
10. ; Presidential address, delivered at District Conference - Deeni Talimi Council, held on March, 21, 1965.
11. ; A pamphlet; Taskant Declaration and Problems of Indo-Pak Minorities, 1966

12. Faridi, Dr. A.J. ; Chand Zaroori Baton (Urdu); An speech delivered at the meeting of U.P. State Majlis Conference held on 15-16th August, 1967, at Rampur.
13. -- ; Presidential address, delivered at the above mentioned conference.
14. ; A confidential letter to Dr. S. Mahmood (27.12.1966)
15. Ibtedai Report (Urdu), State Conference, U.P. held in August 1967.
16. Ijtamai Qayadat (Urdu), a pamphlet, released from the office of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, Lucknow, U.P. at the eve of Election of 1967.
17. Khan, Zulfiqarullahi; Receptional address delivered at All India Muslim Political Convention, 1970.
18. Khurshad Alam; "Namara Rasta" (Urdu), a pamphlet.
19. Nadvi, A.H.A ; Reception address delivered at Muslim Convention, Lucknow, 1964.
20. ; Inaugural address delivered at All India Muslim Political Convention, Delhi, 1970
21. Syed Mahmood, Dr.; A statement, published in National Herald; December 30, 1966
22. The Constitution of the All India Muslims Majlis-e-Mushawarat.
23. The Election Results and the Mushawarat, an office communique released from the U.P. Branch of the All India Muslims Majlis-e-Mushawarat.
24. The Peoples Manifesto; released from the Central Office of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, 231-Basti Nizamuddin, New Delhi, on 22.7.1966
25. The 'Roodad'(Urdu); First State Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat Conference, held at Rampur on 9-10th Sept. 1967.
26. The Resolution passed at first All India Muslim Political Convention, 1961.
27. Proceedings of the various Meetings of All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, i.e.

(111)

- i) 17-18th March, 1966, Delhi.
- ii) February 1967, Delhi.
- iii) 3-4-5th October 1969, Delhi.
- iv) 20-21st. May, 1970, Delhi.
- v) 18-21st. December, 1970, Delhi.
- vi) March 1971, Delhi.
- vii) 16th. February 1972, Lucknow.

II. BOOKS AND ARTICLES:

- i. Azad, A.K. : India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman (1959)
- ii. Golwalkar Gurus: Bunch of Thought, Bangalore (1966)
- iii. Gopal Krishna : Muslim Politics, Seminar : May 1972 No.153
- iv. Hafeez Malik, Muslims in India since 1947; a mimeograph, presented in the Annual Meeting of American Association of Asian Studies, New York, republished in the Muslim World, LVI, No. 4, 1966.
- v. : Islamic Political Parties and Mass-Politicization; Islam and the Modern Age, Vol. III, No.2
- vi. Hasnain, S. : Indian Muslims, Bombay
- vii. Hussain, S.A. : The Destiny of Indian Muslims, Bombay: 1965.
- viii. Imtiaz Ahmad : Secularism and Communalism, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. IV, Nos 28-30, Special Number July 69.
- ix. : Muslim Politics in India : A Revaluation; Islam and the Modern Age, Vol. II, No. 4, November 1971, New Delhi.
- x. : "Secularisation", Seminar, No. 144: August 1971 Delhi.
- xi. : "The Changing Patterns of Indian Nationalism", Secular Democracy, Annual Number, January 1971 Delhi.
- xii. Iqbal Narain: Fourth General Elections in India Vol. 2 & Verma (Ed): Orient Longmans, India 1970.
- xiii. Jamālud-din Ahmad (Ed): Recent writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah, Lahore 1943.
- xiv. Karandhikar K: Islam in India's Transition to Modernity Delhi, 1969.

- xv. Khan, Rasheeduddin: "Development of National Consciousness among Indian Muslims" a paper presented in the Seminar on Communal Problem in India, held on 24-25 March, 1971.
- xvi. : "National Integration, Seminar, No.128 April, 1970.
- xvii. : "Self View", Seminar, No. 132: August 1970.
- xviii. : "Modernization, ~~Islamic~~ Problems and Prospects before Indian Muslims, Seminar, June 1968.
- xix. : "The Minorities: Problems and Prospects: Independence Day supplement to the Times of India : Aug 15, 1972.
- xx. Nadvi A.H.A. : Muslims in India, Lucknow: 1961
- xxi. Nayar Kuldip : "A wise leadership Can allay the fear's of the Minorities," The Statesman, Delhi July 3rd, 1968.
- xxii. Quraishi, Z.M. : "Electoral Stretagey of a Minority Pressure Group", ~~Asian Survey~~, Cali fornia, Vol. VIII, No.12: Dec. 1968.
- xxiii. : Emergence and Eclipse of Muslim Majlis e-Mushawarat" an special Article, in Economic and Political Weekly" 19th June, 1971 (PP (1229-1233)
- xxiv. Rajendra Prasad : Hindustan Ka Mustabil (Urdu), Delhi 1947.
- xxv. Smith D.E. : India as a Secular State, Princeton, New York : 1963

- xxvi. Smith D.E. (Ed): South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton
New York : 1966.
- xxvii. Smith W.C. : Islam in Modern History, New York, 1950
- xxviii. : Modern Islam in India, Lahore, 1943
- xxix. Shakir Hain : Muslim Politics after Independence, The
Hindustan Times: July 20, 1969, Delhi.
- xxx. : Muslims in Free India, Delhi, 1972.
- xxxi. Tariq Ali : Pakistan Military rule or Political Power
in Pakistan, Delhi, 1970.
- xxxii. Theodore P. Wright (Jr) : "Muslims as candidates and Voters in 1967.
General Election", 4th General Election in
India, Vol. 2 (opcit).
- xxxiii. : "Muslim League in India, Profile of a
Minority Elite, Journal of Asian Studies,
XXII, 21 February, 1964.

xxx. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

III. GENERALS AND NEWSPAPERS

- i. ALFRUQAN (Urdu), Lucknow.
- ii. ALJAMIAT, daily (Urdu), Delhi.
- iii. ALJAMIAT (Urdu) Weekly, Delhi.
- iv. ASIAN SURVEY, California.
- v. AZAIN Weekly (Urdu), Lucknow.
- vi. BURHAN (Urdu), Delhi
- vii. DAWAT (Urdu) Daily, Delhi
- viii. Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay.
- ix. Islam and the Modern Age, Quarterly, New Delhi
- x. JAMIAT TIMES (Urdu) Weekly, Delhi
- xi. Journal of ASIAN STUDIES, University of Michigan.
- xii. MAINSTREAM, Delhi.
- xiii. MUSLIM WORLD
- xiv. HASHEEMAN (Urdu) Weekly, Bangalore.
- xv. NIDAI MILLAT (Urdu) Weekly, Lucknow.
- xvi. ORGANIZER (English) ~~xxxx~~ Delhi
- xvii. RADIANCE (Weekly) Delhi
- xviii. SECULAR DEMOCRACY, Delhi
- xix. SEMINAR, New Delhi.
- xx. NEWS PAPERS (DAILY) INDIAN EXPRESS, NEW DELHI
- xxi. NATIONAL HERALD, NEW DELHI
- xxii. THE TIMES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI