U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT : STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

This dissertation makes a study of the various developments that have taken place in the State Department in the period since the completion of the Second World War. As it is, it comprises a chapter on introduction, five substantive chapters and a chapter on conclusion. The five substantive chapters deal with the post of the Secretary of State, the relationship of the State Department vis-à-vis the Foreign Service, the institutions of national security and their impact on the State Department and the major administrative changes and developments in the State Department.

In the original plan the chapters on planning and the institutions of national security were not included. But the increasing importance of the function of planning in foreign affairs in a modern state and the particular type of relationship that the institutions of national security have with the State Department in the U.S. Governmental set-up made their inclusion in the dissertation inevitable.

I am extremely thankful to Dr Satish Kumar, Associate Professor and Head, Diplomatic Studies Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for his scholastic and expert guidance. The various suggestions that he made helped me a lot in bringing the dissertation to its present form.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
CASP	Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FAS	Foreign Affairs Specialists
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
FSO	Foreign Service Officers
FSR	Foreign Service Reserve Officers
FSRU	Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited
FSS	Foreign Service Staff officers
MEG	Management and Evaluation Group
NSC	National Security Council
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
PARA	Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation system
PB	Planning Board
PPC	Policy Planning Council
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
SIG	Senior Inter-departmental Group
S/PC	Planning and Coordination Staff.
USIA	United States Information Agency

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Chapter I

THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND ITS STRUCTURE AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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The Second World War 1939-1945 saw a transformation in America's approach to international relations. Prior to this war the nature of the American foreign policy was essentially passive. America's approach to the happenings in any part of the world was that of "an aloof spectator."[1] "Observation, not action; reportage, not maneuver; the following of day-to-day events, not the mapping of large strategy and tactics"[2] used to typify her stance overseas. As far as possible she tried to "avoid profound entanglements in diplomacy."[3]

But with the war American foreign policy underwent a revolutionary change. Her very approach to international relations changed. Having emerged out of the war as one of the two super powers, she was forced to adopt a positive and interventionist approach. No longer America was a country which only reacted to international happenings. It assumed the role of a chief actor on the international stage and as such came to shape the course of events in the international arena.

For the Department of State the period of the war had

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1 Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department (Boston, Mass., 1967), p. 2.

2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 Ibid., p. 1.

proved very disastrous. The needs of the war and the Franklin Roosevelt style of diplomacy had hit the Department of State very hard. The Department of State had in fact been driven to the wall and at the peak of the war it had even seen its nadir. The resignation of Cordell Hull in 1944 was due to the fact that he was "tired of being bypassed...tired of being relied upon in public and ignored in private...."[4] This frustration of Hull bespeaks of the low state to which the Department had fallen during the Roosevelt Administration.

In 1945 the Department of State was slowly recuperating from the shock that it had been in for a record period of twelve years. Edward Reiley Stettinius had succeeded Hull in December 1944, and Harry S. Truman had ascended the Presidency on the death of Roosevelt in early 1945. This change in the occupants of both the offices was to have a tremendous impact on the conduct of America's foreign policy as the conditions prior to 1945 were due mainly to personality conflicts. Roosevelt had a desire to conduct the foreign policy of the United States on his own as much as possible. Besides Hull also was not much interested in his job as a Secretary of State and his relationship with the President was never cordial.

The change in the manner in which the American foreign policy was conducted became quite evident after Truman became

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4 Israel, The War Diary of Breckinridge Lodge, p. 386, cited in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 87.

the President. When he succeeded to the Presidency Truman was an amateur as far as foreign affairs were concerned. He was willing to delegate this function to the Secretary of State who was the constitutional authority to advise the President on matters pertaining to foreign policy. However, Stettinius could not make a full use of this liberal approach of the new President as he retired too early. It was only James F. Byrnes who, having succeeded Stettinius as Secretary of State in July 1945, really made an optimum use of it. Thus on the eve of the beginning of peace the Secretary of State was asserting back his role as the chief adviser to the President on matters concerning foreign policy.

The Department of State in early 1945 employed about 3,700 persons. The organizational set up that was obtaining at the end of the war was based on the reorganization that Stettinius had effected in December 1944. The Secretary of State was the chief officer in the Department of State and he was to aid and advise the President in the discharge of his duties relating to foreign affairs. Immediately below the Secretary there was the Under Secretary who was the second ranking official in the Department of State. He was serving as the Secretary's deputy in all matters and, in the absence of the Secretary, as Acting Secretary. Next in the hierarchy were eight officials holding the ranks of Assistant Secretaries. They were the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for European, Far Eastern

and Near Eastern and African Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and International Conferences, the Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Organization and Security Affairs and the Legal Adviser.

Twelve Offices formed the units of administration. These Offices were allocated to six of the above mentioned officials. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs had under him three Offices - the Offices of Economic Affairs, Wartime Economic Affairs, and Transportation and Communication. The Assistant Secretary for Administration likewise had three Offices under his jurisdiction - the Offices of Foreign Service, Departmental Administration and Controls. The Assistant Secretary for European, Far Eastern, and Near Eastern and African Affairs also had three Offices - the Offices of European Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs, and Near Eastern and African Affairs. Of the remaining three Offices the Office of Public Affairs was under the charge of the Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations. The Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Organization and Security Affairs had under him the Office of Special Political Affairs. The Office of American Republic Affairs was under the charge of the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs.

In 1945 there were also two important Committees which were playing a dominant role in the Department of State above the level of Assistant Secretaries. They were the Secretary's Staff Committee and the Coordinating Committee. Composed of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, the Legal Adviser and the Special Assistant, the Secretary's Staff Committee had the task of advising and assisting the Secretary in determining current and long-range foreign policy. The Coordinating Committee presided over by the Under Secretary and composed of the Directors of the twelve Offices and the Special Assistant for Press Relations was to consider matters of policy or action and questions of inter-Office relations referred to it by the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Secretary's Staff Committee and any of the members of the Committee. The two Committees had a joint secretariat.

In 1945 the Department of State and the Foreign Service were two distinct arms of the American Government. Each of them did not have much to do with the other. The Department of State headed by the Secretary of State was concerned with the formulation of foreign policy. The Foreign Service administered by the Director General of the Foreign Service was responsible for the implementation of American foreign policy. The officer personnel of the Department mostly belonged to the Civil Service. The Foreign Service was to fill only the officer positions overseas. It had mainly representational functions to perform and hardly a few FSOs were found in Washington on active duty.

In 1945 the Department of State had to undergo the tormenting period of adjusting itself from war-time conditions to normalcy. This period proved a real ordeal in August and September 1945, when President Truman through executive orders transferred about 10,000 employees from the foreign branch of the Office of War Information, the informational and cultural units of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the lend-lease and other units of the Foreign Economic Administration and the research units of the Office of Strategic Services. To cope with this newly inducted personnel, the Department of State had to resort to various interim measures. It had to create in Washington and overseas the Interim International Information Service consisting of the personnel, records, facilities, etc. of the transferred elements of the Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs. The office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence was asked to take over the personnel inherited from the Office of Strategic Services. The office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner had to be established to settle lend-lease matters and sell war surplus equipment located overseas.

This was the picture of the State Department at the end of the Second World War. The picture so outlined shows that the Second World War had proved disastrous as far as the role of the State Department in American foreign policy was concerned. In 1945 the Department was trying hard to establish

itself as that organ of the U.S. government which was responsible for the conduct of foreign policy.

But today the Department is riding at the crest of its power. In the intervening twenty-nine years many far-reaching changes have taken place. The purpose of this dissertation is to bring out in a detailed manner the structural and functional evolution of the Department in the course of this period. In the following five chapters an attempt is made in this direction.

Chapter II

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE SINCE 1945

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Today the association of the American Secretary of State with American foreign policy has become an obvious fact. Any mention of the name of Dr Henry M. Kissinger will immediately bring back in response the comment that he is the brain behind American foreign policy. Kissinger and foreign policy of United States have become synonymous.

This is because of the fact that the Secretary of State is the constitutionally created authority to advise the President on foreign policy matters. It is obligatory on the part of the Secretary of State to give his considered views and opinions to the President on foreign affairs whenever the latter asks for it. The President has in him a person on whom he can rely for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy.

However, the conditions that were obtaining during the tenure of Cordell Hull as Secretary and in 1945 were in sharp contrast to this. During the period of the Second World War the Secretary of State was least relied upon by the President for advice on foreign policy matters. As a consequence of this the office of the Secretary of State registered an all-time low as far as power and influence with regard to foreign policy making were concerned. More than Hull, it were persons like Harry Hopkins, Sumner Welles, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Raymond Moley, etc. who counted.

For this state of affairs there were many reasons.

President Roosevelt wanted to conduct the foreign policy of America at a personal level and consequently wanted to be his own Secretary of State as much as possible. The appointment of Hull to the post of Secretaryship in 1933 had been done "almost entirely for domestic political reasons."[1] Hull "neither had the taste nor the talent for the conduct of foreign affairs."[2] The only field of foreign affairs in which he was really interested was reciprocal tariff reductions and this he pursued in all zealousness during his Secretaryship. In addition to these, Hull did not have the confidence and trust of the President which are very essential for a Secretary to be successful under the American system of government. On the other hand, the President valued the advice of persons like Hopkins, Welles, Morgenthau, Moley, etc. Welles and Moley in fact used to speak over the head of the Secretary although they were Hull's subordinates in the State Department.

Soon after his election for the fourth term of office, President Roosevelt accepted the resignation of Hull. From November 1944 to June 1945 it was the lot of Edward Reiley Stettinius Jr., to function as the Secretary of State. Though he was good as an administrator and though he did conduct himself well in the San Francisco Conference, Stettinius did not leave a lasting imprint of his personality on the office

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1 Charles W. Yost, "The Instruments of American Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 50 (1970-71), p. 50.

2 Ibid., p. 60.

of Secretary of State. During his tenure Roosevelt died and Vice President Truman took over as President. And once the San Francisco Conference was over Truman appointed James Francis Byrnes as the Secretary of State.

When the war came to an end it was Byrnes who was in office as the Secretary of State. He had inherited from Stettinius an office which had lost much of its ground during the Secretaryship of Hull. So it fell to his lot to reassert the authority of the Secretary of State.

The opportunities that were provided to Byrnes for re-establishing the authority of the Secretary of State were many. Truman gave up the Roosevelt style Presidential diplomacy. He made it quite clear that he was going to give a good amount of discretion to the Secretary of State in the discharge of his functions. In addition to these there was also the fact that Byrnes had taken over as Secretary of State with a lot of trust reposed in him by the President.

Despite these favourable circumstances Byrnes' record as a Secretary of State is not very impressive. Though he had the "courage to make decisions and toughness of fibre",[3] he had very many defects in him. He wanted to be in the limelight. He did not care much for the occupant in the White House. He did not keep the President well informed of his

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3 James L. McCamy, Conduct of the New Diplomacy (New York, N.Y., 1964), p. 231.

activities. In fact on the eve of returning from Moscow after attending a conference there, he even went to the extent of cabling Dean Acheson of his date of coming and asking him to arrange for a broadcast by him over all radio net works that very evening, even before reporting to the President. All these resulted in a rift between the President and the Secretary. Truman had been very liberal as far as his Secretary of State was concerned. He firmly believed that the "Secretary should run his own Department".[4] But Byrnes went to the extent of misusing this freedom which irritated the President who "was extremely sensitive to any encroachment"[5] of his authority. It did not take the President long to develop mistrust in his Secretary of State. Truman became extremely suspicious of Byrnes and there ensued a state of hostile relationship between the two. This was to be ended only with the resignation of Byrnes in January 1947.

This was how the office of Secretaryship fared during the tenure of Byrnes. Truman had appointed Byrnes as the Secretary of State with high hopes. He in fact had created the proper conditions for a person to be highly successful as Secretary. But Byrnes by an improper use of the wide discretion that the President had given to him lost the confidence

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4 Alexander Deconde, The American Secretary of State: An Interpretation (London, 1963), p. 120.

5 Ibid., p. 120.

that the President had reposed in him. And under the American system of Government for a Secretary of State to be successful the complete confidence of the President is a must.

During the tenure of Byrnes a major threat to the preponderance of the office of Secretary of State was overcome. When Secretary Stettinius was replaced by Byrnes the former was made the American Representative at the United Nations. When a law was being enacted to create this post a proposal came to the effect that this position of U.S. Representative at the U.N. should be made equivalent in rank to the office of the Secretary of State with a seat in the American cabinet. An acceptance of this proposal would have meant an undermining of the Secretary's authority. Besides there was also the possibility of an "infinity of trouble over who should be the President's chief adviser and Secretary on foreign policy."[6] So Byrnes on the advice of Acheson blocked this move without any public row. The act which created the post of U.S. Representative "set it up as another ambassadorial post reporting through and instructed by the Secretary of State."[7] This problem was to arise again in 1953 when Eisenhower pitted Henry Cabot Lodge for this office.

General George C. Marshall succeeded James F. Byrnes as the Secretary of State on 21 January 1947. It was under

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6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 111.

7 Ibid., p. 111.

Marshall that much of the lost ground was made up. Marshall has in fact gone down in American history as one of the greatest Secretaries of State. During his two year tenure such major policies as the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) were enunciated. The Department of State was moved to a more spacious location. The Policy Planning Staff was also established.

Truman in fact considered Marshall as his ideal Secretary. He had great admiration for him. "Regardless of contrary pressures" he "invariably followed Marshall's advice often without question."[8] He went out of his way to defend any action undertaken by his Secretary.

Marshall too on his side respected Truman and revered the Presidency. In what all he did there was no doubt as to who was the Secretary and who was the President. This presented a sharp contrast to the way Byrnes had functioned.

No doubt there were instances wherein the Secretary and the President differed. However, their "relations were never marred by fundamental disagreement or personal conflict."[9] Marshall never had any high ambitions of his own to fulfil which there would be conflict with the President's authority. His "authority stemmed mainly from the President's unbounded faith in him, not from any desire of his own to

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8 Deconde, n. 4, p. 120.

9 Ibid., p. 121.

augment his power or that of his office."[10] The President was also absolutely confident of the trustworthiness of Marshall and he always accepted the advice tended by Marshall.

Marshall was succeeded by Dean Acheson as Secretary of State on 21 January 1949. The relationship of Dean Acheson with Truman was somewhat the same as the relationship of Marshall with Truman. Consequently the influence of Acheson on foreign policy was quite considerable.

In discharging his duties as the Secretary of State Acheson knew how to conduct himself. Having worked under Byrnes he had a knowledge of what he should not do so that he would not displease the President. He had no aspirations on the Presidency. He did not desire any publicity at the cost of the President. He knew well the fact that it was Truman who was the President and that he was only the President's Secretary of State. In addition to these he also kept in mind the way Marshall had functioned with Truman. Acheson saw the President very often. In reporting to the President on all issues of foreign policy he even "went out of his way to demonstrate that he knew and respected the fact that the President and not the Secretary of State was responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs."[11]

This approach of Acheson paid very high dividends.

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10 Ibid., p. 121.

11 Ibid., p. 122.

Truman came to have absolute confidence in Acheson. Having "faith in his judgment and ability",[12] the President accepted without any second thought the counsel of his Secretary and sometimes even went to the extent of praising him without any restraint.

In 1953 there was a change in the Presidency. Eisenhower succeeded Truman in the month of January of that year. He appointed John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. The period of the Secretaryship of Dulles was another landmark for the office of the Secretary of State. From 1953 till his retirement due to ~~the~~ illness in 1959 American foreign policy came to be associated with Dulles. No doubt in the first two years the influence of Eisenhower was considerable. But thereafter for various reasons the role that the President played in foreign affairs declined drastically. Consequently "Dulles' domination of the situation during this period became more complete."[13]

Eisenhower was heavily dependent on his Secretary of State. During his period Dulles in fact nearly became the President's exclusive adviser on foreign policy instead of playing the usual role of being the chief adviser. Some critics have even gone to the extent of saying that "the President abrogated his constitutional responsibilities by

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12 Ibid., p. 123.

13 Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), p. 71.

delegating too much of his authority to his Secretary."[14]

To explain this unusual dominance of the Secretary of State in American foreign policy we will have to go into the nature of the relationship that these two persons had between them and the nature of the personality of Dulles and his attitude towards the Presidency.

Dulles' relationship with President Eisenhower was "unusually close, sincere and important."[15] Also

> Dulles was above all absolutely loyal to the President in everything he said and did. This loyalty, even if it sprang from a shrewd understanding of the American Constitution, developed into a two way affair. And Dulles on his side went to very great trouble to see that nothing spoilt it. He always cleared everything with the President first. No major speech, no major move, no major contact with a foreign statesman was made without the White House knowing about it first. Dulles carefully kept Eisenhower informed of every development that he thought the President ought to be aware of. (16)

Added to all these was the fact that he never coveted the Presidency. His life-time ambition was in fact to become the Secretary of State and this he realized in 1953.

As for Eisenhower's attitude towards Dulles, Dulles

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14 William P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Analysis (New York, N.Y., 1962), p. 62.

15 Goold-Adams, n. 13, p. 69.

16 Ibid., p. 70.

to him was in fact "the greatest Secretary of State in American history."[17] He had absolute confidence in him. He did not even resent "John Foster Dulles' effort to capture attention."[18] Such was in fact the trust placed by Eisenhower in Dulles that there is full justification in a statement of Goold-Adams to the effect that "the President came to see the world through Dulles' own spectacles."[19]

The only defect that Dulles had was his inability to place any trust in his subordinates. As a consequence of this Dulles did most of the important functions of the Department. Even the role of the Under Secretary was that of a second man in a one-man show. The various subordinates did not have much to do. The net "result was that the Department's role declined as the Secretary assumed staggering responsibilities while relying relatively little on career officers of the Department."[20]

Dulles resigned due to illness on 15 April 1959. He was succeeded by Christian A. Herter, the then Under Secretary of State.

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17 George W. Ball, "United States Foreign Relations: Policy and Process", in James A. Stagenga, ed., Toward A Wiser Colossus: Reviewing and Recasting United States Foreign Policy (Lafayette, Ind., 1972), p. 15.

18 Deconde, n. 4, p. 126.

19 Goold-Adams, n. 13, p. 70.

20 Gerberding, n. 14, p. 62.

On the eve of the resignation of Dulles the office of Secretary of State had assumed all paramountcy. Even the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947 had not affected it much. This was because of the fact that during the period between 1945 and 1959 the office of the Secretary of State was occupied by very competent persons. Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson and Dulles were all very capable people and each one of them excelled in his own way. And of these, the latter three had even the unbounded confidence of the President.

But with the succession of Herter in 1959 a period of decline in the importance of the office of the Secretary of State started. This state of affairs was to continue till September 1973 when Henry M. Kissinger took charge as the Secretary of State.

Herter was in office for twenty-one months only. During his period the era of Presidental involvement in foreign affairs started again. Eisenhower started taking initiative in foreign policy again and consequently the Secretary of State became less influential as far as foreign policy making was concerned. Herter only took "information to the President."[21] "The policies and decisions were all up to the White House."[22]

In January 1961 the Eisenhower Administration gave way to the Kennedy Administration. Dean Rusk succeeded Herter as

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21 Stan Opotowsky, The Kennedy Government (London, 1961), p. 50.

22 Ibid., p. 50.

Secretary of State on 21 January 1961. Dean Rusk was to officiate as the Secretary of State for a period of eight years spanning two administrations.

Dean Rusk, though a competent man, had to work under two powerful Presidents. As a consequence of this, Rusk's influence on foreign policy was comparatively less. In the tradition of Presidential diplomacy both Kennedy and Johnson personalized foreign policy. They never left the ultimate decision to Rusk. Rusk was at best one of those select men with whom the President conferred prior to a decision.

In the discharge of his duties as Secretary of State, Rusk, besides coping with a strong President, had to meet with the strong challenges of Robert McNamara, the Secretary for Defence, McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General. The influence of all these three officials on the President was quite considerable and their views on foreign policy carried much weight.

Rusk placed a good amount of trust in the officials of the Department of State. As a result of this, unlike Byrnes and Dulles, Rusk came to have the confidence and respect of the Department of State.

What is commendable of Rusk is that he fared comparatively well as an adviser to the President on foreign policy. Despite the earlier mentioned challenge that the Secretary faced, his influence was greater than the one exerted by

either his immediate predecessor or his immediate successor. No doubt in comparison to Marshall, Acheson and Dulles, the impact of Rusk was not much. But compared to Herter and Rogers, Rusk's influence on foreign policy was quite considerable.

Speaking comparatively, the influence of Rusk during Johnson's tenure was even less than what it was during Kennedy's. During Johnson's tenure Rusk fared somewhat in the same manner as Cordell Hull had fared during Roosevelt's tenure. The President was interested in conducting the foreign policy of America by himself. So Rusk's voice was listened to only when it was similar to the one of the President. Again, as in the times of Hull, the views and opinions of the other Departmental officials were also not heard much. Johnson "distrusted professional advice, and seemed honestly to believe that high-flown rhetoric was a decent substitute for cool headed calculations of the nation's interests."[23]

Despite this dismal performance of the Secretary of State during the Johnson Administration an event of great importance to the office of the Secretary of State occurred. In March 1966, President Johnson made the Secretary of State the President's agent to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-departmental activities of United States Government overseas.

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23 John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York, N.Y., 1971), p. 71.

In 1969 President Richard M. Nixon appointed William P. Rogers as the Secretary of State and there ensued a period of further dwindling of the authority of the Secretary. The challenge offered by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with his competent staff housed in the White House basement proved too much for Rogers, who, unlike Rusk, was very new to the field of foreign affairs. The impact of the office of Special Assistant on the role and authority of the Secretary is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Here it would suffice to say that during the four and a half years' Secretaryship of Rogers advice to the President on foreign policy matters nearly became the domain of the White House National Security Staff. This unfortunate state of affairs was put to an end by the assumption of Secretaryship on 22 September 1973, by Henry M. Kissinger, the then Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Kissinger was to officiate both as the Secretary of State and as national security adviser to the President.

The succession of Gerald R. Ford to the Presidency on 9 August 1974 after the resignation of Richard M. Nixon is likely to further expand the role of the Secretary of State in American foreign policy. President Ford is not much conversant with foreign affairs and he has given a free hand to his Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger who made a name as Secretary even under the strong Presidency of Nixon is certainly going to dominate the field of foreign affairs. In the

foreseeable future the emergence of Kissinger as almost the sole architect of America's foreign policy in the post-Nixon era is going to be a certainty.

This analysis of how the various Secretaries of State fared in the post-war period shows that for a Secretary to be consequential in foreign policy two conditions need to be fulfilled. First there should be a willingness on the part of the President to give to the Secretary of State wide discretion as far as the conduct of American foreign policy is concerned. He should not impose upon himself the task of being his own Secretary of State as well. Presidential diplomacy is the one single factor which can reduce the office of the Secretary of State to nothing.

However, the mere willingness on the part of the President to give his Secretary of State a good amount of discretion is not enough. There must be a strong and capable Secretary also to accept the challenge. Herter did not rise up to this challenge. Though the Secretary of State can at best be what the President wants him to be, there are instances of a Secretary of State not reaching up to the expectations of the President. Not only Presidents like Truman and Eisenhower are needed, but there should also be Secretaries like Marshall, Acheson and Dulles. At the same time Dean Rusk though highly competent did not have that much of freedom to assert his personality. Christian A. Herter provides an example of a Secretary who was unable to come up to the expectations of

the President. As for Byrnes he wanted himself to be more than what the President wanted him to be and this proved suicidal. Rogers, of course, was not only incompetent, but at the same time he had to serve under Nixon who was keen on conducting Presidential diplomacy. Kissinger, the present Secretary of State, provides an example in the line of Marshall, Acheson and Dulles. He has stood up to the demands of the President and has made a very good job of his office.

A perusal of the functions performed by the Secretary of State suggests that they have undergone a metomorphic change. The functions that the Secretary of State performs today are more numerous and more time consuming. In 1945 the Secretary of State was acting mainly as the chief adviser to the President on foreign policy. But today advice to the President is only one of the many important functions performed by the Secretary. He has many other equally important duties to discharge. The Secretary of State in the post-war period has become an "adviser, negotiator, reporter of trouble, spokesman, manager and coordinator."[24] He is the head of a Department with a largely staffed personnel. He is the "ranking diplomat at large for sensitive negotiations just short of summit."[25] The peripatetic diplomacy of the Secretary of

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24 Senator Henry M. Jackson, ed., The Secretary of State and the Ambassador: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (New York, N.Y., 1964), p. 40.

25 Ibid., p. 106.

State has in fact become an accepted fact. Last but not the least is the fact that he is the one man on whom the President relies very often in dealing with national security questions.

Chapter III

THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

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One of the major problems that confronted the Department of State at the end of the war was the question pertaining to the type of personnel which should fill the various positions in the State Department. In 1945 the Foreign Service and the State Department were two distinct organs of the American Government and the Foreign Service had nothing to do as far as the manning of the various offices in the State Department was concerned. The Foreign Service Officers were there as a class of personnel who were to fill in the various officer positions overseas. Their sphere of activity lay in the various embassies and consulates of the United States all over the world.

As a result of this dichotomy the arrangement obtaining at the end of the war was that almost all the officer positions in the State Department were occupied by the Civil Service personnel. Only a handful of Foreign Service Officers were on duty in Washington. Against this almost all the officer positions overseas were occupied by the Foreign Service personnel and the number of persons from the Civil Service abroad was even less than the number of FSOs in Washington.

But this system was fraught with a grave danger. There was the possibility of policies being framed in Washington without even the slightest regard for reality. This was because of the fact that the Civil Service officers in the State

Department would never have the field experience and the FSOs working in the various embassies and consulates abroad would never be destined to work in such large number in Washington as to be of some consequence at the place from where all policies originated.

To overcome this intricate problem there was only one alternative. The conflict between what the personnel in Washington would decide and what the personnel in the field could implement could easily be reconciled by allowing the FSOs to fill the officer positions in both the State Department and overseas. This would help in the mobility of personnel between Washington and the field thereby facilitating the association of field experience in the formulation of foreign policy. The net result of this would be that the policies framed in Washington would not be devoid of reality and hence would not be beyond the effort of the personnel in the field.

Besides this, there were also other advantages. Among other things, this action would overcome the class consciousness of the Foreign Service personnel vis-à-vis the Civil Service personnel in the State Department. It would also facilitate a single personnel system for all the officers of the State Department and its various embassies and consulates abroad.

Due to these advantages the effort in the post-war period was directed at the evolution of a Foreign Service, the personnel of which would man the officer positions in both the

State Department and abroad.

The first report in the line favouring the integration of the Civil Service personnel in the State Department with the Foreign Service was made in August 1945 by the Director of the Bureau of Budget. The Chapin-Foster Report of September 1945 also outlined a plan for the consolidation of Foreign Service and certain areas of the Department of State. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government in its report to the Congress made in February 1949 subscribed to the view that amalgamation of the Civil Service personnel in the State Department above certain levels with the Foreign Service into a Foreign Affairs Service in the course of a few years is a must. It even favoured the abolition of the post of the Director General of the Foreign Service which had till then stood for the independent authority of the Foreign Service. The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel 1950 held the view that there should be a single personnel system applicable to all persons under the direct administrative control of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel 1954 favoured the integration of the personnel of the Department with the Foreign Service where their official functions converged. The Herter Committee of 1962 recommended that the Civil Service personnel in the "foreign affairs agencies" should be redesignated as "foreign affairs officers". The last report in the line is the State Department's "Diplomacy for the 70's: A

Program of Management Reform for the Department of State" of 1970. According to it all officer positions in the Department of State should be either classed as FSO or non-FSO positions with the former filled by personnel belonging to the Foreign Service and the latter by personnel belonging to the Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited cadre.

The details of the recommendations of these various reports and the action taken by the U.S. Government on them are as follows:

The Report of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, August 1945

One of the first acts that James F. Byrnes did after assuming office as Secretary of State was to request the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to make recommendations to him on the organization and administration of the Department of State. The report entitled "The Organization and Administration of the Department of State" was submitted in August 1945.[1] On the issue of a unified foreign personnel the report, noting the sharp cleavage existing due to "the division between the Departmental Service in Washington, staffed by Civil Service employees, and the Foreign Service, administered separately under a distinctly different personnel system,"[2] recommended

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1 This report is unpublished.

2 Arthur G. Jones, The Evolution of Personnel Systems for U.S. Foreign Affairs: A History of Reform Efforts (New York, N.Y., 1965), p. 35.

a study into the "entire problem of barriers between the two services".[3] In the meantime the Secretary was "to achieve unity in operations by consolidating the managerial and staff facilities of the Department and by launching a unified program of personnel management."[4] The separate offices for Departmental and Foreign Service administration were to be abolished.

Chapin-Foster Report, October 1945

When the Director of the Bureau of the Budget submitted his report to the Secretary there was another report that had reached the stage of completion. Within two months of the first report came the Chapin-Foster Report of October 1945.[5] The report was made by two FSOs, Mr Seldon Chapin and Mr Andrew Foster. In the report they outlined a plan for the consolidation of Foreign Service and certain areas of the Department of State. The details of the programme ran thus:

> The members of the consolidated service would be obligated to serve at home and abroad and would constitute an Executive Branch of general officers and a Staff Branch of specialists and support personnel. Assignment of the personnel would

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3 Ibid., p. 36.

4 The Organization and Administration of the Department of State: A Report Submitted at the request of the Secretary of State by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, August 1945, p. 7. Cited in Jones, n. 2, p. 36. Stress inserted.

5 [Unpublished].

> be flexible, some serving most of their careers in Washington and others primarily overseas. Persons employed only for duty in Washington would constitute a Departmental Branch. 6

An implementation of this plan would have at least started the process of unifying the personnel in Washington and the personnel abroad. But it was decided to proceed with draft legislation limited to improvements in the Foreign Service itself. The outcome of this was the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

The Foreign Service Act 1946

The Foreign Service Act of 13 August 1946 needs a special mention because it is the very basis of the post-war Foreign Service personnel administration. The most important provision which is relevant in the context of integration is the section pertaining to the establishment of Foreign Service Reserve Corps. Under the terms of the FSR the Department was rendered capable of recruiting specialist officer personnel with needed skills for temporary periods. An FSR was "recruited to serve up to two consecutive five years periods renewable for two more such periods following at least a year's break in service after the first two."[7] The establishment of the Foreign Affairs Specialists corps as a sister corps to the

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6 Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, Personnel for the New Diplomacy (Washington, D.C., 1962), Appendix B, p. 143. Stress inserted.

7 W. Wendell Blancke, The Foreign Service of the United States (New York, N.Y., 1969), p. 36.

Foreign Service Officer corps in February 1971 was rendered possible only because of this FSR provision as amended in August 1968 which authorized the Department of State and the United States Information Agency to appoint FSRs with "unlimited tenure" or career status (FSRUs).

Hoover Commission Report, 1949

The principle of integration was accepted by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, more popularly known as the First Hoover Commission, named after its chairman Herbert Hoover. The Commission in its Report on foreign affairs to the Congress submitted in February 1949 recommended thus:

> The personnel in the permanent State Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single Foreign Affairs Service obligated to serve at home or overseas and constituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service. 8

Speaking of the defects inherent in the then prevailing system the Commission said:

> This division of forces between a Foreign Service centering on a separate corps of officers, mostly stationed abroad but partly in key positions in Washington, and a group of

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8 Foreign Affairs: A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, February 1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 61-62. Stress added.

> employees who work chiefly at home is a source of serious friction and increasing inefficiency. 9
>
> The division leads to jealousies and to inequality of compensation among people doing much the same work. The Foreign Service, through long periods of service abroad, undoubtedly loses contact with American domestic conditions. The Civil Service employees, who seldom or never serve abroad for any long period, fail often to understand other nations and appreciate foreign conditions. 10

And

> The present conditions also lead to the existence of two administrative offices, one for each body of public servants, but both in the same household and dealing frequently with the same personnel questions. The Foreign Service is in law and practice largely self-administered and is to some degree even independent of the Secretary of State. 11

The Commission also lists a good number of the general principles that should guide the consolidation.[12] All the members of the new single "Foreign Affairs Service" should pledge to serve at home or abroad. The consolidation should be mandatory, but gradual, spread over a short period of years. Almost all the officer level positions should be included in the consolidation. The Secretary and the Under Secretary should keep an eye on the programme and the Deputy Under

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9 Ibid., p. 62.

10 Ibid., p. 63.

11 Ibid., p. 63.

12 Ibid., pp. 64-68.

Secretary for Administration should be entrusted with the duty of implementing the programme. The admission of the Civil Service personnel should be through application and oral examination. Those personnel of the Civil Service who are unwilling to enter the new Service but who are qualified for their present duties should be continued in their present posts on some special "limited service" basis or should be given opportunities elsewhere in the Government. All members of the consolidated Service of the same grade should have equal status in every respect, including compensation and retirement rights. And lastly the consolidated Service should not be self-administered but subject to direction and inspection of the Secretary.

In recommending the unification of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service in the State Department into a single "Foreign Affairs Service" the Commission also stated that "for the present the consolidated service should be separate from the general Civil Service."[13] This was to prevent the possibility of the occurrence of any unnecessary complication as both the Civil Service and the Foreign Service were to undergo metamorphic changes under the recommendations of the Commission.

The Commission also favoured the abolition of the post of the Director General of the Foreign Service which had till

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13 Ibid., p. 63.

then represented the independent authority of the Foreign Service.

As far as the implementation of these recommendations are concerned, the U.S. Government did not go much far. The consolidated "Foreign Affairs Service" never materialized as "the Foreign Service Officers did not wish to give up their exclusive status, nor serve over much time in Washington, while many Civil Service Officers had no wish to go overseas for protracted periods or be subjected to the more exacting Foreign Service promotion system."[14] The post of the Director General was not abolished. It was made subordinate to the Secretary of State. Only the separate Office of Foreign Service was abolished. It was incorporated into the newly created Office of Personnel. The Foreign Service was to be administered by the Director General under the authority of the Secretary of State.

The Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, August 1950

In December 1949 Secretary Acheson appointed a three-man committee to advise him on the need for basic changes in the personnel systems and relationships of the Department and the Foreign Service. This committee, known as the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, was headed by James H. Rowe, a former member of the Hoover Commission, and consisted of two

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14 Blancké, n. 7, pp. 26-27.

other members, Robert Ramspeck, a former member of the Congress, and William E. Decourcy, a career FSO. The Committee submitted its report in August 1950.

On the issue of the integration of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service personnel in the State Department the recommendation of the Rowe-Ramspeck-DeCourcy Committee was thus:

> There should be a single personnel system applicable to all people under the direct administrative control of the Secretary of State. Such a system would provide a unified flexible group recruited and administered under a common set of policies. Employees would be assigned at home and abroad as the needs of the service might require. The requirements of serving at home and abroad, as a condition of employment, should be applied to those positions and organizational areas where it is necessary for satisfactory performance of duties. Because of the distinctive characteristics of the conduct of foreign affairs and the fact that many of the people concerned serve abroad, the system should be established initially outside the regular Civil Service. This recommendation is made without prejudice to the possibility of eventual development and improvement of the Civil Service system that might result in making it suitable for all civilian employees of the Government. The integrated personnel system must take into account the interest of other Federal agencies concerned with foreign affairs. 15

Thus this Committee in its recommendation on integration

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15 Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs, Report to the Secretary of State, August 1950, p. 11. Stress inserted.

See Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, n. 6, Appendix B, p. 144.

went a step further than the Hoover Commission. According to this Committee the employees under the direct administrative control of the Secretary should come under a "single personnel system" outside the Civil Service. However, the Committee was not that rigid as far as the requirement of the personnel of the Foreign Service serving at home or abroad was concerned. The prescription of service at home or abroad was to be applied only to the extent necessary. There was the realization to the effect that "a single service and a unified personnel system were predicated on broader considerations than overseas requirements."[16] Many positions in Washington, according to this Committee, should be filled by persons not required or expected to serve overseas.

The Committee envisaged a foreign affairs personnel act to give effect to its important recommendations. The legislation was to permit the Secretary to prescribe the details of the personnel system. The consolidation was to be mandatory, but the Department was to proceed in a gradual manner so that it would not deprive the Secretary of the services of useful employees. There was to be no time limit for this amalgamation.

As an immediate step in this line of unification the Committee recommended lateral entry into the FSO from the Civil Service, the FSR and the FSS personnel on a spontaneous basis. They were to be recruited under the lateral entry provisions of

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16 Jones, n. 2, p. 63.

the Foreign Service Act of 1946 by examination.

The Department announced the course of action that it was going to take on this recommendation of the Rowe Committee for a unified Foreign Service in March 1951. The programme was outlined in a directive from the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to the Director of Personnel. The directive did not accept the concept of a single foreign affairs personnel system applicable to all the employees. Against this it proposed integrating "the Department and Foreign Service to the extent the common conditions of service might logically apply to members of an integrated service."[17] The lateral entry provisions were to be liberalized so that more non-FSO personnel could join the FSO ranks on their own volition by passing the prescribed examination in the coming three years. There was also to be an appreciable increase in the number of exchange assignments. Departmental officers occupying positions in Washington for which overseas experience was needed were to be given a temporary assignment abroad.

Legislation on this aspect was to follow only if the effort in these two fields failed.

In accordance with the directive, the Department went ahead with a more intensive exchange programme and a more liberal lateral entry into the FSO cadre. Many positions in Washington were identified as "exchange-type" positions. An

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17 Ibid., p. 70.

interchange Committee was set up in the Office of Personnel to co-ordinate exchange assignments between the two services. In 1952 the number of Departmental officers assigned overseas rose to 124 as against 31 in 1949. The number of FSOs assigned to Washington rose from 173 in 1950 to 272 in 1952.

As far as the lateral entry was concerned the programme was announced in April 1951. By 1 November 1951, the closing date, 2,150 candidates had filed applications. But then the programme got bogged down. The Department could not obtain the necessary legislation authorizing it to make appointments above the starting salary rate of the various grades. The high standards expected of the applicants and the various pre-requisites disqualified many. 410 applicants even withdrew by 5 February 1954. Many who took the examination were either turned down or were offered appointments involving a lower grade and a drastic decrease in salary. By 5 February 1954 the applications of only 499 candidates had been examined and of them hardly 179 had been certified for appointment. Even in these 179 only 25 persons were on service by that date. Of the rest, 6 had declined the offer, 40 others had requested deferral and 108 were awaiting processing of their papers. There were still 1,291 candidates to be examined.[18]

This was how the programme of 1951 fared. As for the causes of the failure of this programme:

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18 For the statistics see ibid., pp. 71-73.

> The personnel improvement programme of 1951 failed for a variety of reasons. The advances were at best limited. Failure to obtain the necessary legislation, together with restrictive lateral entry standards, blunted the integration effort. The movement lacked a sense of urgency and determination to achieve its stated objectives. 19

Wriston Committee Report of June 1954

The failure in implementing the programme of 1951 and the setbacks that the Department recieved with the establishment of the United States Information Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration, which not only curtailed the operational role of the Department of State, but also dwindled the specialist Reserve corps by a half, made the Secretary of State Dulles appoint the Public Committee on Personnel under the chairmanship of Henry M. Wriston, the President of Brownlow University. The task that was entrusted to the Committee was to recommend:

> measures necessary to strengthen the effectiveness of the professional service to a standard consistent with the vastly increased responsibilities in the field of foreign policy which have devolved upon the President and the Secretary. 20

After going through the whole problem, the Committee's recommendation to the Secretary on the question of integration was

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19 Ibid., p. 74. Stress inserted.

20 Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, Toward A Stronger Foreign Service (Washington, D.C., June 1954), Appendix 1, p. 59.

thus:

> To integrate the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, where their official functions converge, into a single administrative system, thus putting an end to the institutional separateness of these main functioning arms of United States diplomacy. 21

To achieve this integration the Committee suggested three actions:[22]

> Action One: Formal confirmation of those positions in the Department's domestic organization, the incumbents of which should have both foreign and domestic experience. These positions should be redesignated as "Foreign Service" positions to distinguish them from other Departmental jobs in which foreign experience is not necessary and which therefore logically should continue to be staffed from the Civil Service.
>
> Action Two: Establishment of qualifications standards to require foreign experience for the positions thus designated - this action to be taken in cooperation with the Civil Service Commission.
>
> Action Three: Within the limits of feasibility incorporate the incumbents of the newly designated "Foreign Service" positions into the Foreign Service and install an effective system of rotation.

The Committee felt that the problem of identifying the "Foreign Service" positions should not take more than six weeks. There were to be around 1,440 "Foreign Service" positions in Washington. In 1954 the number of FSOs in Washington

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21 Ibid., p. iii. Stress inserted.

22 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

was only 119. In total, when the programme was to be implemented completely, there were to be around 3,900 FSOs - 1,440 in Washington, 2,250 abroad and the rest on leave or training or awaiting appointment. This goal of 3,900 was thrice the strength of the Foreign Service in 1954. The whole programme was to be completed within two years.

In the programme there was also a provision for retaining certain officers whose duties did not require service abroad.

The transfer from the Civil Service to the Foreign Service was to be voluntary under a revised lateral entry scheme.

The Department was also to see that henceforth no personnel in the Foreign Service would be allowed to stay overseas for a period longer than six years on the average. For this a policy of periodic rotation between Washington and overseas posts was to be instituted.

As for the advantages that would accrue by an implementation of this programme the Committee's verdict was:[23]

> The immediate advantage accruing from integration along these lines is that the <u>now disparate and rigidly compartmentalized</u> functions of the home and overseas organizations of the Department of State would be welded, where their functions converge, into a <u>single instrumentality</u> for the conduct of American foreign policy.

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23 Ibid., pp. 34-35. Emphasis inserted.

> Ready interchangeability of personnel between foreign and home posts should enable the Secretary of State to man these posts, for the first time, from a greatly enlarged pool of talents united in a common endeavour and, as time goes on, a shared experience. This will also produce a much larger reservoir of trained and maturing officers from which to draw candidates for the highest positions in the Service.

The programme was to be given effect to within the framework of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. However, there were to be one or two legislations also. New legislation was needed to enable Foreign Service Officers to be appointed at any of the salary scales of the applicable class rather than only at the minimum scale, and also to allow the Secretary to extend tours of duty for the FSOs in Washington beyond a four-year period.

The recommendations of the Wriston Committee were approved with minor exceptions by Dulles who asked for its immediate implementation. Charles Saltzman, a member of the Wriston Committee, was appointed as Under Secretary for Administration to spearhead the effort. A special planning unit was set up to co-ordinate work on the many legislative and administrative aspects of the Committee's proposals.

As for the implementation of the programme:[24] 1,362

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24 For most of the facts and figures given here see Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the United States, A Staff Study Prepared by the Department of State to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 11-14. As for the rest see Jones, n. 2, pp. 112-16.

positions in the Department of State and 2,609 positions at overseas posts were designated as 'Foreign Service' positions. By 1957 about 1,400 were laterally admitted into the Foreign Service. For this, changes in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 were needed. By Public Law 759 approved on August 31, 1954 the Department was rendered competent to recruit officers to the Foreign Service, at levels above the bottom class, at any one of the salary scales prescribed for each class rather than only at the minimum scale as provided by law. This was however subject to three limits. A maximum of only 500 officers could be recruited. The authority was to lapse on 31 March 1955. Also the appointments were limited to persons serving in the classified Civil Service or in the Foreign Service Reserve or the Foreign Service Staff.

By Public Law 22 of 5 April 1955 the ceiling of 500 was increased to 1,250. Besides not more than 40 officers could also be recruited from personnel who were not employed in the Department of State, including the Foreign Service Reserve and Foreign Service Staff.

Public Law 828 of 28 July 1956 further increased the scope for lateral entry. By this law the number of persons who could be inducted to the Foreign Service from outside the Department of State was raised from 40 to 165. In addition, the recruitment of persons from the FSR with a minimum of three years service was to be exempted from the ceiling of 1,250 lateral entrants from the Department of State.

The integration programme was formally terminated on 1 August 1956. By then 585 Civil Service officers in Washington and 737 Staff and Reserve personnel had been certified for appointment. Of this, 1,147 had in fact been appointed by that date.

To know the reaction of the Foreign Service officers on the issue of integration Secretary Dulles had asked Senator Alexander Wiley to go into the attitudes of the FSOs on integration and report to him. The Senator gave his report in December 1954. The verdict of the report was that the majority of FSOs were not against integration.

The integration programme did cause unhappiness to a considerable number of people. Wristonization--the process of integration adopted on the basis of the Wriston Report--and Wristonees - the non-FSO personnel who were admitted into the FSO ranks through the process of Wristonization - were both looked down upon by a good number of the older FSOs. Many of the Civil Servants did not feel at home in the newly integrated personnel system. "Eventually some 300 Departmental positions in certain categories were redesignated as non-Foreign Service, so that the incumbents need not serve overseas. Conversely, a number of other positions, including many newly created, were designated as Foreign Service."[25]

By 1960 however the integration had become an accepted

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25 Blancke, n. 7, p. 28.

fact and the Wristonees were no longer a set of second class Foreign Service Officers in the FSO ranks. The immediate problems that this Wristonization had given rise to were on the wane. Such was in fact the state of affairs that Public Law 86 of 8 September 1960 removed all quota limitations, making eligible for lateral appointment any person having prior service in a position of responsibility in a government agency or agencies.

To complete the study of the evolution of the relationship between the Department of State and the Foreign Service right uptil the present day two more reports will have to be analyzed along with the action taken by the Government on them. The two reports are the Herter Committee Report of 1962 and the Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's" of 1970.

Herter Committee Report of December 1962

The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel was appointed by Secretary Rusk in 1961 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was chaired by Christian A. Herter, the previous Secretary of State. The Committee submitted its report in December 1962. Its recommendation on the issue of integration was thus:

> The personnel of the foreign affairs agencies in the United States who are now in the Civil Service system should be redesignated as foreign affairs officers and employees and should be brought within the structure of foreign affairs services. These employees should not be obligated to serve as a

> consequence of this redesignation. Future recruitment should, however, stress availability for overseas service, and the long-range goal should be to increase the proportion of personnel available for service at home and abroad. The agencies and the Civil Service Commission should reach appropriate agreements to issue harmonious and mutually beneficial personnel relationships. 26

An implementation of this programme would have meant the establishment of a distinct category of "foreign affairs services" filled by "foreign affairs officers". But the American government did not take any action in this line.

Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's"

The last major phase in this evolution of the relationship between the Foreign Service and the State Department was begun with the submission of the Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the

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26 Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, n. 6, pp. 30-31. Recommendation No. 8. Stresses inserted. The use of words "foreign affairs officers" in the quotation instead of FSOs is because the Committee envisaged in the field of foreign affairs a group of compatible foreign services which would be called "foreign affairs services". The three services it recommended were the Foreign Service of the State Department, the Foreign Information Service of the USIA and the Foreign Development Service of the AID. These compatible services were to be governed by uniform statutory provisions regarding personnel management. Among these services there was to be a systematic interchange of personnel and provision for lateral transfer. In addition, in filling the top posts in foreign affairs the senior personnel of all the three services were to be considered. The officer personnel in these three services were to be referred to as "foreign affairs officers".

Department of State" to the Secretary of State in November 1970. It consisted of over six hundred recommendations made by thirteen Task Forces with a view to improve the management and administration of the Department of State. On the problem of the relationship between the Department of State and the Foreign Service the views of the Task Forces were briefly thus.[27]

All officers in the Department of State and overseas were to be under a single personnel authority - the Authority of the Foreign Service Act. The various officer positions in the Department and overseas were to be classified into two categories - FSO positions and non-FSO positions. The FSO positions were to be manned by personnel belonging to the FSO and the non-FSO positions by personnel belonging to the FSRU cadre. Foreign Service Staff Officers corps was to be done away with as a distinct category of officers. The officers belonging to this corps were to be assimilated into the ranks of the FSO and the FSRU. The presence of officers belonging to the Civil Service in the State Department was also to be discontinued. The officers belonging to the Civil Service in the State Department had the options of either joining the FSO or the FSRU, if they qualified, or reverting back to the

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27 For details see Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State (Washington, D.C., December 1970), pp. 97-105.

Civil Service.[28]

The Department accepted all these recommendations. Even its programme of implementation was very much in line with the one suggested by the Task Forces. All the officer positions in the Department and overseas were to be classed as FSO and FSRU positions. There was to be a liberalized management reform lateral entry into the FSO. A new Foreign Affairs Specialists Corps (FAS) was to be established to fill the various FSRU positions.[29]

The Department of State took upon the implementation of this programme of unified personnel for the State Department with all zeal. With the exception of non-career positions and those exempted by statute all the officer positions in the Department and overseas were designated either as FSO or FSRU. A programme of liberal lateral entry into the FSO was adopted. Conversion to the FSO was to be from the non-FSO personnel in the State Department. Foreign Affairs Specialists Corps was also established. Recruitment to FAS was to be done from the officers belonging to the Civil Service, the FSO, the FSRU and

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28 For details pertaining to the views of the State Department on these recommendations and its programme of action to give effect to them see Department of State, News Letter (Washington, D.C.), no. 116 (December 1970), no. 117 (January 1971) and no. 119 (March 1971), pp. 20-21, 23-24 and 12-13 respectively.

29 This corps was to be established under the provisions of Public Law 494, 90th Congress, approved 20 August 1968. This law authorized the appointment of Foreign Service Reserve Officers with "unlimited" tenure i.e. with career status.

the FSS. For conversion to the FAS a good number of incentives were also offered.[30]

As of today the phase of management reform lateral entry into the FSO has ended. This programme was terminated on 31 December 1973. By then 371 persons had been certified for appointment into the FSO. In all a total of 661 non-FSOs applied for incorporation into the FSO and of them 522 were found eligible and examined. Out of these 522 applicants, 411 were recommended for appointment. Of the not appointed 40 officers, as on 31 December 1973, 13 had withdrawn and the applications of remaining 27 were still being processed.[31]

As for conversion into the FAS is concerned it is still going on. But now the conversion is only from among those who have put in at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the FSR. This is in accordance with the decision of the District Court of the District of Columbia.

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30 Some of the incentives were thus. If the converts were not subject to service abroad at the time of their conversion or were aged fifty or above, service abroad, though encouraged, was not to be compulsory. Career officers converting to FAS from categories in which the principle of elimination from service for unsatisfactory performance was not followed were to continue to have that privilege for a period equal to the maximum time-in-class applicable to their FAS appointment class and specialty or for ten years whichever was less. This privilege was to cease on the first promotion. Besides converts from the Civil Service who were under the Civil Service Retirement System at the time of conversion were to be eligible for earlier retirement at a slightly higher annuity under the Foreign Service Retirement System.

31 For the source of these statistics see New Letter, no. 154, March 1974, p. 18.

On 12 June 1973 this Court passed a verdict to the effect that for conversion into the FSRU a person should have at least put in three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the FSR.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE INTEGRATION PROGRAMME

The programme of integration in the post-war period has gone through three distinct periods. In the first period, which can be called the pre-Wristonization period, and which spans from 1945 to the submission of Wriston Committee Report in June 1954, the Department of State was not that serious as far as the question of integration was concerned. The Report of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the Secretary of State, the Chapin-Foster Report and the Hoover Commission Report were ignored as far as the issue of integration was concerned. The Department was only half decided when it agreed to implement a good number of the suggestions made by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, 1950.

The second period which can be called the Wristonization period started with the submission of the Wriston Committee Report in June 1954. The immediate cause for the appointment of this Committee was the curtailment of the operational role of the State Department by the establishment of the USIA and the FOA and the consequent loss of a good number of personnel from the FSR ranks. The period extends

uptil 1 August 1956 when the programme was officially terminated. In the intervening period the relationship of the Department with the Foreign Service underwent drastic changes. At the end of this period the number of Civil Service personnel in the State Department had been reduced considerably.

The third and last period which can be termed as the post-Wristonization period started from 1 August 1956 and its life span is continuing even today. This period has been marked by a process of further consolidation and the establishment of a parallel and alternate Foreign Service in the FAS. Today not many Civil Service officers are in the State Department. The State Department is mainly staffed by the FSO and the FAS personnel.

Thus the past twenty-nine years have seen a drastic change in the relationship between the Department of State and the Foreign Service. In 1945 the Department and the Foreign Service were two distinct arms of the U.S. Government. Almost all the officer posts in the Department were occupied by the personnel belonging to the Civil Service. The Foreign Service had only representational functions to perform. The personnel of the Foreign Service were to occupy the various officer posts in the American embassies and consulates abroad. The number of FSOs on duty in Washington was very little and the number of Civil Service Officers on duty abroad was even less.

But today the picture is entirely different. There are

hardly a few Civil Service officers in the State Department. Almost all of the officer positions in the Department and overseas are filled by the personnel belonging to the two services that are established under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act - the personnel of the FSO and the FAS. The personnel in the State Department are under the direct authority of the Secretary of State and they are distinct from the general Civil Service. The days of the Department and the Foreign Service being two distinct and separate arms of the American Government are thus gone. The Foreign Service today is subordinate to and functions in the Department of State.

Chapter IV

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

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In this chapter an examination will be made of the two important institutions concerned with national security - the National Security Council and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - and their impact on the role and functioning of the State Department. The section on National Security Council (NSC) will also include a brief reference to the very many institutions that worked under it over the years such as the Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Review Group, etc. A mention of the Central Intelligence Agency which works within the framework of the NSC system will also be made.

Prior to a detailed study of the NSC and the office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a few words may be said about the impact of national security on questions of foreign policy in recent years. In the post-war period nothing has curtailed the freedom of action of the State Department in matters of foreign policy so much as pretexts of national security. Under the garb of national security questions pertaining to foreign policy have come to be discussed and decided upon by agencies outside the State Department. Such is in fact the impact of national security on foreign policy that a Staff Report of the Sub-Committee on National Policy Machinery, 1960, said as follows with reference to the NSC: "The main work of the NSC has centered around the consideration of foreign-policy questions,

rather than national security problems in their full contemporary sense."[1] This clearly bespeaks of the impact of national security on foreign policy.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The plan of this section is as follows. At the outset the creation of the NSC and its working mechanism is dealt with. This is followed by a historical study of how the NSC functioned under the various Presidents. The last part concerns itself with the role played by the Department of State in the NSC mechanism and the impact of the NSC mechanism on the role of the Department of State.

The National Security Council was created by the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 27 July 1947) which also established a unified Defence Department under the Secretary of Defence. The function of the NSC according to the Act was:

> to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. 2

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1 "A Staff Report of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery 12 December 1960", Senator Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy Making at the Presidential Level (New York, N.Y., 1965), p. 33. Emphasis in the original.

2 Section 101 (a) Public Law 253, 80th Congress, approved on 27 July 1947.

The initiative for the establishment of the NSC came from the Navy Department. Secretary of Navy James Forrestal, during his tenure of office, had asked Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former vice-chairman of the War Production Board, to go into the question of the unification of the War and Navy Departments and post-war reorganization for national security. The report was submitted to the Secretary on 25 September 1945.

On the issue of national security the report favoured the establishment of a National Security Council to "afford a permanent vehicle for maintaining active, close, and continuous contact between the departments and agencies"[3] of the American Government responsible for her foreign and military policies and their implementation. This NSC was to be a "policy-forming and advisory, not an executive body."[4] It was to be the keystone of the U.S. organizational structure. Its membership was to consist of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Air and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The President was to have the power of making additions to the membership. The President was to be its Chairman. It was to have a permanent secretariat with a full-time executive. The Central Intelligence Agency was to be a part of the NSC. The Council was to "be charged with the duty (1) of formulating and coordinating overall policies in the political and military

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3 Jackson, n. 1; see the Section on Official Documents, p. 293.

4 Ibid., p. 293.

fields, (2) of assessing and appraising our foreign objectives, commitments and risks, and (3) of keeping these in balance with our military power, in being and potential."[5]

It was on the basis of this Eberstadt report that the National Security Act of 1947 was passed.

Membership of the National Security Council was initially prescribed to include the President, the Secretaries of State, Defence, War, Navy and Air and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. In 1949 the representation for the Defence Department was reduced to one, instead of four and the Vice-President was also made a statutory member of the Council. Today the statutory membership of the Council consists of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Defence and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.[6]

The Council was to be assisted by a permanent staff headed by a full-time civilian Executive Secretary. This Executive Secretary was to have the power to appoint the other personnel on the staff. The President was to preside over the

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5 Ibid., p. 293.

6 The Office of Emergency Preparedness, so designated by Act of 21 October 1968, is a redesignation of the Office of Emergency Planning which was created in 1961 as the successor to the Office of Civil and Defence Mobilization. Its involvement in the NSC mechanism can be explained by the fact that it is entrusted with the task of assisting and advising the President in the coordination and determination of policy for all emergency preparedness activities.

meetings and in cases of his inability to attend the NSC meetings he was authorized to designate a member of the Council to preside over its meetings.

The National Security Act of 1947 envisaged the duties of the NSC thus:

> In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council -
>
> 1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
>
> 2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. 7

Besides establishing the National Security Council, the National Security Act of 1947 also established the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency was to be the successor to National Intelligence Authority and was to function under the overall supervision of the NSC. The Act envisaged the functions of the CIA as follows:

> For the purpose of co-ordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the NSC -

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7 Section 101 (b) Public Law 253, 80th Congress approved 27 July 1947.

1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities...;

4) to perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. 8

For the exact nature and functioning of the NSC much depends on the attitude of the President towards the NSC and his conception of its proper role in decision-making. The earlier mentioned Staff study says that there are broadly two approaches which a President can adopt as regards the National Security Council. They are:

1) He can use the Council as an intimate forum where he joins with his chief advisers in searching discussion and debate of a limited number of critical problems involving major long-term strategic choices or demanding immediate action. 9

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8 Section 102 (d) Public Law 253, 80th Congress approved 27 July 1947.

9 Jackson, n. 1, p. 32.

> 2) The President can view the Council as the apex of a comprehensive and highly institutionalized system for generating policy proposals and following through on Presidentially approved decisions. Seen in this light, the Council itself sits at the top of what has been called "Policy Hill." Policy papers are supposed to travel through interdepartmental committees up one side of the hill. They are considered in the Council. If approved by the President, they travel down the opposite side of the hill, through other interdepartmental mechanisms, to the operating departments and agencies. 10

The National Security Council during the Eisenhower Administration functioned on the basis of the second approach whereas during the Administrations of Truman, Kennedy and Johnson it functioned broadly on the basis of the first approach. Under Nixon though there were a few committees to supplement and complement the NSC, the working of the Council was more based on the first approach. So far this has been true of the Presidency of Gerald Ford also.

The NSC mechanism under Truman was a very simple mechanism with limited membership. From 1949, based on the recommendations of the Hoover Commission, the Department of Defence came to have only one representative on the Council. The Vice-President was also made a statutory member of the Council in that year. As for its functioning the NSC under Truman concentrated on a few major crisis situations. It worked only in an advisory capacity and it was not obligatory on the part of

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10 Ibid., p. 32.

the President to accept the advice of the Council. The heads of the various departments were having the dominant say as far as the affairs of their departments were concerned. George Marshall and Dean Acheson of the Department of State and James Forrestal, Louis Johnson, George Marshall and Robert Lovett of the Department of Defence were the chief advisers to the President as far as the affairs of the State and Defence Departments were concerned respectively.

Under the Eisenhower Administration the NSC underwent a metamorphic change. During his tenure it got itself converted into a highly formalized mechanism with a wide number of subsidiary agencies flourishing around it. The NSC came to be supplemented by the Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the office of the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.

The function of the Planning Board was to prepare the policy papers for the NSC and the President. This Planning Board was the successor to the Senior Staff which had made its appearance in 1950 under Truman. It was to be presided over by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, an office created in 1953. Each member of the NSC was represented on the Planning Board by one of his departmental officials, usually belonging to the rank of an Assistant Secretary. In the hey day of the Planning Board these officials in

turn had relied upon their subordinates known as Planning Board Assistants to do much of the detailed drafting of the papers. Soon after assumption of office President Kennedy abolished this Planning Board.

The Operations Coordinating Board was established in 1953. As created in 1953 it was to be a part of the national security organization in the White House. However in 1957 it was made a part of the National Security Council. Its function was to spell out the policies established by the NSC in terms of more detailed agency programmes and to see that they were implemented to the fullest benefit. Kennedy abolished this also in 1961.

The office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was created by Eisenhower in 1953 as a part of his own immediate staff. The Assistant was to play a key role in the work and meetings of the NSC. He was also to be the Chairman of the Planning Board meetings, a function previously performed by the Executive Secretary of the NSC staff. In addition, he was also a member of the OCB, and became its Chairman in 1960. However, the importance of this office during Eisenhower Administration was not that much compared to its importance in the succeeding years.

The position of the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination was established in 1957 with the view of ensuring coordination in security operations. He was to be the Vice-Chairman of the OCB and also attended the meetings of the NSC and the Planning Board. This post was

subordinate to the post of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Kennedy abolished this office also during his tenure in the White House.

As for the manner in which the NSC functioned under Eisenhower, the Council under Eisenhower was a very powerful institution. President Eisenhower followed a very highly formalized approach to decision-making which resulted in giving a good amount of prominence to the NSC. The role played by the NSC in the decision-making process in the United States came to be somewhat analogous to the one played by the cabinet in a parliamentary system of government. As an adviser to the President, it even surpassed the various heads of the Departments. As to how exactly policy under Eisenhower was made, Hilsman writes thus:

> ...policy in the Eisenhower administration was made by a hierarchy of interdepartmental committees, proceeding step by step up the ladder until it arrived at the NSC itself, which met weekly with the President as chairman. Then, after a formal decision, the Operations Coordinating Board took over with monthly, quarterly, and annual reviews, including mountains of follow-up memoranda, to ensure that each department and agency carried out the approved policy. 11

With the advent of Kennedy to the Presidency many changes took place in the nature and role of the NSC as a policy-making unit. President Kennedy, being skeptical about the usefulness of large, formal and regularized committees,

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11 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), p. 19.

did away with the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. His approach to decision-making was "less formalized and more ad hoc."[12] He relied on the Departmental heads for advice. The NSC was used mainly as an instrument to inform the various departmental heads of the decisions taken by him on the advice of the concerned Secretary.

The role of the NSC suffered a further setback during the Presidency of Johnson. Johnson's approach to policy-making was even less formalized than that of Kennedy. He adopted the very informal method of conversation to frame high level policies. Many of his policies were made at his famous Tuesday luncheons.

Commenting on the functioning of the NSC under Kennedy and Johnson George W. Ball writes:

> Thus, when President Kennedy and Johnson held formal meetings of the NSC, it was not with the thought that those meetings would contribute to the making of other than quite minor decisions. When major decisions were to be made, each President consulted discreetly and selectively with those individuals whom he deemed best informed and whose judgment he most valued on the specific issue; then, having more often than not already made up his mind, he called a meeting of the National Security Council to inform the other members of his government, give them the feeling that they had had their day in court, and make sure that they accepted the decision

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12 Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 76.

> and would close ranks once they knew it had been made.[13]

And this, the same writer says, is the "only way a formally prescribed instrument such as the National Security Council can be intelligently used".[14]

With the advent of the Nixon Administration there was again a slight change in the nature and role of the NSC. Nixon neither desired the all powerful NSC system of Eisenhower nor, at the same time, wanted the powerless and informal NSCs of Kennedy and Johnson. He wanted an NSC which would be "more supple than the old NSC structure"[15] of Eisenhower. But he also desired it to be "more precise in its procedures than the informal conversational method which Lyndon Johnson employed to make high national policy at his famous Tuesday luncheon."[16] Nixon's desire was thus to strike a balance between the NSC system of Eisenhower and the NSC system of Johnson. And in the end a golden mean was struck between these two extremes. The NSC was to be utilized in a manner which would justify its existence. It was to be made the principal forum for the

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13 George W. Ball, "United States Foreign Relations: Policy and Process", James A. Stagenga, ed., Toward a Wiser Colossus: Reviewing and Recasting United States Foreign Policy (Lafayette, Ind., 1972), p. 25.

14 Ibid., p. 25.

15 Rowland Evans Jr., and Robert D. Novack, Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power (New York, N.Y., 1972), p. 78.

16 Ibid., p. 78.

consideration of policy issues concerning national security on which the President had to act. A few committees like the NSC Review Group and the NSC Interdepartmental Group were also constituted to cater to the needs of the NSC.[17]

As for the way the NSC is functioning under President Gerald Ford nothing much can be said. President Ford seems to have persisted with the arrangement that existed under Nixon. National Security Council is an important decision-making unit in the American policy making apparatus. But it no more has the claim to be the deciding factor.

Coming now to the role of the Department in the NSC mechanism, the Department has played an important role in the NSC mechanism eversince the time of its establishment. The Secretary of State is a statutory member of the Council. The State Department plays a vital role in the servicing of the NSC machinery. The State Department has been represented on all the committees that have functioned under the NSC system.

Against this the impact of the NSC on the State Department has also been quite considerable. If a President starts using the NSC as a sort of cabinet to decide policies the role of the Secretary of State as the chief adviser on foreign policy is curtailed. This in fact should have been the

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17 The establishment of these committees, however, did not revive the old formalized NSC mechanism that was in existence during the Presidency of Eisenhower. None of these committees have so far risen to the heights to which the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board rose.

case during the Eisenhower Administration. The Department of State was saved from being reduced to nothing only due to the domineering personality of John Foster Dulles. As for the other Administrations, the various Presidents did not view the NSC in the manner in which Eisenhower did. So one may conclude by saying that if a President is desirous of involving the NSC as a major organ in policy-making and if the Secretary is not a man of real stature, there is every possibility of the NSC taking over full responsibility for foreign affairs under the pretext of national security.

The NSC as it is today is not a major institution in the American decision-making set-up. President Ford is placing more trust in the various Secretaries. On matters of national security the Secretaries of Defence and State have a more decisive say than the National Security Council itself. The part played by Schlesinger and Kissinger in the American national security policy-making is much more than the one played by the NSC.

THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Prior to the appointment of Dr Henry M. Kissinger as the Secretary of State in 1973, there was a real doubt in Washington as to who was the chief adviser to the President on foreign policy matters. This doubt had arisen due to the fact that though the Secretary of State was the constitutional

authority to advise the President on foreign policy matters, during the years 1969-73, more than the Secretary, it was the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who mattered as far as advice to the President on foreign policy was concerned. The Secretary of State William Rogers had been relegated to a secondary position. This bespeaks of the momentous impact that the office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has had on the State Department in recent times.

Though this post of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been in prominence eversince 1961, its establishment dates back to the early days of the Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower created this office in 1953 as a part of his own immediate staff for national security affairs. This Assistant was also to play a key role in the work and meetings of the NSC. He was also to be the Chairman of the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. But during the Eisenhower Administration the office was not that important as it was to be afterwards. This is despite the fact that this office, during this period, was occupied by three very competent men - Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson and Gordon Gray.

The emergence into prominence of this office during the Presidency of Kennedy was due to a few very important reasons. Not believing in the formalistic structure and functioning of the NSC, Kennedy, soon after his coming to power in 1961,

relegated the NSC to a secondary position as far as policy-making on security matters was concerned. He also did away with the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Besides these two negative reasons there was also a positive one. Kennedy allowed Bundy, whom he had just then appointed as the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to acquire a very capable staff in the White House to assist the latter in the discharge of of his functions with a proper allocation of work to the staff. This facilitated Bundy in operating his office broadly on the lines of the State Department. The White House basement national security staff came to act as a competitive and miniature State Department.

However, under Bundy and his successor Walt W. Rostow the curtailment of the freedom of the State Department in foreign affairs was not much. This was because Bundy and Rostow regarded foreign affairs as the domain of the State Department and dealt with matters pertaining to foreign policy only when it became inevitable.

But with the assumption of the Presidential office by Nixon there was a change in the occupants of the positions of the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant. Dean Rusk made way for William Rogers and Kissinger succeeded Rostow. And from then till 1973 it was a period of complete domination of the White House staff headed by the Special Assistant over the State Department as far as policy decisions on foreign affairs were concerned. This state of affairs was ended only

with the assumption of both the offices of Secretary of State and the Special Assistant by the same person. Dr Kissinger, the then Special Assistant, was also made the Secretary of State in August 1973.

This analysis of the impact of the office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs reveals that in the post-war period no other institution has eroded the authority of the State Department and its Secretary of State to the extent the Special Assistant and his staff have done. As said earlier the dominance of the White House staff and its head, the Special Assistant, was complete during the period 1969-73. During this period Kissinger in fact functioned as if he were the Secretary of State. The Department of State during the period 1969-73 underwent an eclipse. It lost initiative in foreign affairs to the White House staff. Such was in fact the state of affairs that Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State, wrote of late that he would "have hated to have had to adjust"[18] himself to such a change. The adviser was having all the powers of the Secretary of State without the corresponding responsibilities.

Today with the two offices combined in one person, the Department of State is heaving sighs of relief. After an ordeal of thirteen years in which it and its Secretary were on the

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18 Dean Acheson, This Vast External Realm (New York, N.Y., 1973), see the chapter entitled "The Responsibility for Decision in Foreign Policy", p. 297.

losing side, the Department is trying to make up for the lost ground. In 1973 a catastrophe was in fact averted by the unification of the two offices in one person. If only the then state of affairs had continued for a few more years the Department of State would have been on the verge of completely losing its importance.

Now it is up to the Department of State to make full use of the present opportunity and assert back completely its primacy in foreign affairs. If necessary it can even go to the extent of demanding a permanent fusion of the posts of the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant. A separate Assistant to the President on security matters will always be an eye sore to the Secretary of State and the Department of State.

We have discussed the impact that the National Security Council and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs have had on the State Department. These two institutions, especially the latter, affected the Department of State in a disastrous manner. However the State Department has come through the ordeal without any real loss. The NSC of today is not the same as it was in the fifties. So is the case with the office of the Special Assistant. It is not the one that it was during the years 1969-73. Today the threat that a separate White House staff posed is not there. For the State Department, the present state of affairs is ideal. The NSC is resorted to only when it is absolutely necessary.

Normally the Departmental heads are relied upon for advice. The office of the Special Assistant is no longer eroding the influence of the State Department and its Secretary.

Chapter V

POLICY PLANNING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

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A major development in the field of foreign affairs in the post-war period has been the institutionalization of the planning function. Commenting on the establishment of the Policy Planning Staff by General Marshall in May 1947, Christian A. Herter, one of Marshall's successors as the Secretary of State, once said thus: "Had the Policy Planning Staff not been created by General Marshall it would certainly have had to be invented by one of his successors."[1] This bespeaks of the inevitable need of an institutional apparatus to cope with the needs of planning in foreign affairs in the present day world.

There are people who in fact doubt the very relevance of planning in foreign affairs. To them foreign policy is for good or bad made in current decisions and the only thing predictable about foreign affairs is its unpredictability. Consequently planning in foreign affairs is a big farce.

But this is a very partial opinion. No doubt the scope for planning and prediction in foreign affairs is comparatively less. But this does not mean that there is no room for planning at all. On the contrary an analysis of the history of planning in foreign affairs in any country in recent years

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1 This remark is cited in Rear Admiral Richard G. Colbert & Colonel Robert N. Ginsburg, "The Policy Planning Council", The Department of State, News Letter (Washington, D.C.), no. 61, May 1966, p. 22.

shows that the planning function is a vital function as far as foreign affairs is concerned. This in fact is made quite evident in this study of the planning function in the State Department in the post-war period.

At the end of the Second World War there was no institutional unit in the State Department to deal with the planning function. Planning was done haphazardly by the operational offices.

For the establishment of an organic unit to deal with the planning function in the State Department full credit must be given to General Marshall. It was he who established the Policy Planning Staff in May 1947 in the Secretary's office with George F. Kennan as the Director. Speaking of the reasons for the establishment of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Kennan says that Marshall probably wanted a planning unit "to fill at least in part the place of the Division of Plans and Operations to which he was accustomed in the War Department."[2]

The history of planning in foreign affairs in the United States will include a discussion of the Policy Planning Staff and the Planning and Co-ordination Staff. The former was in existence during the period 1947-1969.[3] The latter was created

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2 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, Mass., 1967), p. 313.

3 In 1961 the name of the Policy Planning Staff was changed into Policy Planning Council (PPC). As a result during the years 1961-69 this PPS functioned under the new name of Policy Planning Council.

in 1969. Today the function of planning in the State Department is discharged by this Planning and Co-ordination Staff.[3A]

The five major functions of the PPS, according to the Departmental Order No. 393 of 8 May 1947, were as follows:

1. formulating and developing, for the consideration and approval of appropriate officials of the Department, long-term programs for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives;

2. anticipating problems which the Department may encounter in the discharge of its mission;

3. undertaking studies and preparing reports on broad politico-military matters;

4. examining problems and developments affecting U.S. foreign policy in order to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and making advisory recommendations on them; and

5. co-ordinating planning activities in the Department of State.[4]

But broadly speaking we can say that the Staff in 1947 had two main functions:

1. to act as policy adviser to Secretary; and

2. to engage in long-range consideration and analysis of policy problems.

With the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) the Staff also came to have the added responsibility of servicing the participation of the Department of State in the NSC and its allied mechanism.

3A Due to paucity of source materials the study of the function of planning in foreign affairs does not cover the year 1974. For the same reason the study of Planning and Co-ordination Staff is also brief.

4/ See Robert Elsworth Elder, The Policy Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy (Syracuse, N.Y., 1960), p. 72.

In 1955 the rank of the Director of the PPS was made equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary of State. Henceforth, the Director of the PPS was also to be the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning.

In 1961 the Policy Planning Staff was renamed as Policy Planning Council (PPC). Also, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff came to be designated as the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. This Chairman was to continue to have the rank of an Assistant Secretary of State. However, as Sapin puts it, "These changes in nomenclature were apparently not accompanied by significant changes in the functions performed by the group."[5]

In July 1969 the Policy Planning Council stopped functioning as an independent unit. It was incorporated into the then newly established Planning and Co-ordinating Staff (S/PC). Headed by a Director of the rank of an Assistant Secretary, the Planning and Co-ordination Staff was entrusted with the two fold function of planning in foreign affairs and the ensuring of the most effective and coordinated interagency participation of the Department on foreign policy matters.[6]

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5 Burton M. Sapin, The Making of the United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 113.

6 The Foreign Affairs Manual Circular which established the S/PC stated its functions as follows:

- To provide substantive staff analysis and advice on broader and longer range implications of important policy issues of interest to, and as directed by, the Secretary and his principal associates.

(Contd. on next page)

Coming back to the Policy Planning Staff, Marshall's idea in establishing it "was to set up a long-range planning staff as an advisory group to co-ordinate State Department thinking on major foreign policy problems."[7] It was not to have any operational responsibility though it was to work in close co-operation with the operational units. Besides, the

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- To assist in the Department's participation in the NSC system by: (1) maintaining close contact with the geographic and functional bureaus in the development of substantive positions on policy issues under examination in the NSC system; (2) providing substantive and staff support for the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee; (3) supporting the Director as the joint representative of the Department of State on the NSC Review Group; (4) monitoring the follow-up of NSC decisions; and (5) organizing or staffing special ad hoc studies as directed by the Secretary and his principal associates.

- To promote coordinated policy formulation and implementation.

- To undertake and encourage policy planning and program analysis, to seek to anticipate new problem areas and to identify emerging situations likely to require policy attention, and to propose ways of meeting these new requirements.

- To represent the Department in bilateral and multilateral policy planning discussions with other countries, and in the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.

- To develop and maintain relations with the academic community and with other outside sources of foreign affairs expertise, directly and through supporting policy consultant and policy-oriented research arrangements.

- To encourage and support the Open Forum Panel and similar volunteer efforts to develop participation and innovation in the foreign affairs community.

See News Letter, no. 102, October 1969, p. 21.

7 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 22.

long-term focusing on problems was also not to be focusing on the problems of a very distant future. The PPS "was to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the changing form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them."[8] In the process of doing this, however, the Staff was also expected to reappraise what was being done.

The Staff was not to have a membership of more than eighteen. The members were selected "solely on the basis of their previously demonstrated competence in their various fields."[9] In its latter days the Council included, besides members from the Foreign Service, persons belonging to the academic community, private life, other governmental agencies, Civil Service and military personnel. However, there is the accusation that the Staff was dominated by the Foreign Service Officers. But this accusation is true only to the extent that the number of FSOs in the Council was quite numerous as compared to the number of persons from the other walks of life.

At any one time in its life span the effectiveness of the PPS depended on three factors: (1) the quality of the personnel; (2) the Director's conception of the mission; and

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8 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 214.

9 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 22.

(3) the Director's relationship with the Secretary of State.[10]

Throughout its existence the PPS was manned by highly competent people. As a result the two variant factors in the role of the PPS in the State Department during the course of the former's existence from 1947 to 1969 were the changing conceptions of the Staff's mission by the Director and the changing relationship of the Secretary with the Director and consequently with the PPS.

Given below is a historical sketch of the Policy Planning Staff.

George F. Kennan was handpicked by General Marshall as the first Director of the PPS. Kennan had then risen into limelight as the FSO who had sent penetrating despatches from Moscow in 1946. He was then currently lecturing in the War College. Once appointed as the Director, Kennan's conception of the role of the Staff influenced to a large extent its functioning in the policy apparatus. He viewed the staff as "an advisory body which was not to get entangled in execution."[11] So in all the problems that he dealt with he considered his job as "finished once he had forwarded his recommendations to the Secretary,"[12] and at that point "he would withdraw and proceed to the consideration of other problems."

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10 Colbert and Ginsburg in their article (n. 1, p.22) and Elder in his book (n. 4, p. 89) subscribe to this view.

11 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 23.

12 Ibid., p. 23.

13 Ibid., p. 23.

Consequently "during his tenure the Policy Planning Staff was not involved in the execution of policy to the same degree as in later periods."[14]

During Kennan's tenture the PPS handled such major questions as the European Recovery Programme, German Unification, the concept of a Japanese Peace Treaty, etc. During his tenure Kennan had to serve two Secretaries of State - Marshall and Acheson. Under Marshall the Staff was probably at its best as a planning agency. Not only was the PPS not involved in current decisions but also it did not concern itself with trivial matters. During his tenure, with Kennan as the Director, the PPS "sought to add perspective to foreign policy, to eliminate inconsistencies, to develop a broad regional and even a global view."[15] However, the gradual involvement of the PPS in current problems started during the Secretaryship of Acheson. No doubt Acheson also held the PPS in high esteem and took seriously the views and opinions of its Director and the members. He had "used the Policy Planning Staff members as personal consultants and enjoyed participating in their free-wheeling discussion of world affairs."[16] But these did not prevent him from entrusting the PPS with additional functions which "lessened its freedom of action"[17] considerably.

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14 Ibid., p. 23.

15 Elder, n. 4, p. 73.

16 Ibid., p. 85.

17 Ibid., p. 85.

Kennan was succeeded by Paul Nitze in 1950. There was no change in the Secretaryship as Acheson continued to be the Secretary of State. The PPS reached its peak strength of eighteen under Nitze. During his tenure as Director the Staff functioned as a "congenial and tightly knit group which met virtually every day."[18] The meetings of the Staff took place normally immediately after the Secretary's staff meeting which Nitze was regularly attending. The Staff during his tenure started working directly with the regional Bureaus of the Department also. Nitze attended, along with the Counselor of the Department, the meetings of the NSC senior group, the forerunner of the NSC Planning Board. He also attended the meetings of the National Security Council and was one of the representatives of the State Department in the regular meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was during Nitze's tenure that the involvement of the Staff in current policy problems became explicit. However in the tradition of planning "Nitze made it a practice of speaking to the long-term implications of the issues."[19] The chief problems that were dealt with by the Staff during Nitze's Directorship included questions of overall U.S. military and economic strength, Korean War, German rearmament, German reunification, the Iranian oil dispute, the implication of thermo-nuclear weapons, problems of air defence and

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18 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 23.

19 Ibid., p. 23.

periodic foreign exchange crises.[20]

With the change of administration in 1953 there was a change in the occupants of both the offices of Secretary of State and the Director of the Staff. John Foster Dulles succeeded Acheson and Robert Bowie succeeded Nitze. "Bowie functioned as a close personal staff officer and adviser to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his work was focused in large measure on the Secretary."[21] Bowie in fact used to see the Secretary several times a day and he travelled with him in almost every trip of his.

Dulles' view of the PPS is well evident from this statement of Simpson:

> The Planning Staff's great efforts to think ahead tapered off under Dulles, who, like most career officers, was highly individualistic and an improviser par excellence. He gave the planners a deluge of daily chores, including the drafting of speeches, and drew upon their director for assistance on so many immediate problems, entailing such prolonged absence abroad that the painstaking business of basic planning atrophied. 22

Bowie continued to represent the Department of State in the NSC Planning Board which had replaced the NSC senior group. The Staff was to service the NSC also in the drafting of basic national security policy. During Bowie's tenure the Staff dealt with such "issues as development of a more flexible

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20 Listed in ibid., p. 23.

21 Ibid., p. 23.

22 Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department (Boston, Mass., 1967), p. 24.

military posture, creation of the Development Loan Fund, whose establishment in 1957 was in large part the result of Bowie's initiative, establishment of an arms control and disarmament office and preparation of comprehensive U.S. proposals for disarmament."[23]

During Bowie's Directorship an important change occurred. In 1955 the Director of the PPS was also made the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning. This change did not contribute anything positively to the PPS. Rather the "additional title for its Director tended to move the PPS from a position as a close personal staff attached to the office of the Secretary to one among a number of competing areas and bureaus."[24]

Gerard Smith succeeded Robert Bowie as the Director of the PPS in 1957. As Smith also functioned in somewhat in the same manner as Bowie did and as there was no change in the office of the Secretary not much change was visible as far as the role and functioning of the PPS was concerned. However once Dulles resigned due to illness and was succeeded by Herter there was a perceptible change. As the Department became more decentralized under Herter the Policy Planning Staff also had to deal more directly with the bureaus.

During Smith's Directorship the staff concerned itself with such topics as the "Hot Line", the 1960 U.S. programme

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23 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 23.

24 Elder, n. 4, p. 86.

of aid to Latin America, disarmament, Middle-Eastern policy, a new sea-level Panama Canal, Berlin contingency planning, NATO strategy, and Multilateral Force.

When Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as President in 1961 the name of the Policy Planning Staff was changed into Policy Planning Council (PPC). The Director of the PPS was to be henceforth known as the Chairman of the PPC. This Chairman who was to retain the rank of an Assistant Secretary was to combine in him the office of Counselor of the Department.

The new incumbent in the office of the Chairman in the Kennedy Administration was George McGhee. McGhee occupied this office for a comparatively short duration. The major problems dealt with by the PPC during his tenure included the issues of Berlin, NATO and Germany. His method of operation consisted in "working directly with the Regional Bureaus as well as Secretary Dean Rusk."[25]

McGhee was succeeded by Walt W. Rostow in 1962. The one major programme undertaken during his tenure was the much known National Policy Papers pertaining to various nations of the world. This programme probably represented "the most formalized of the various planning techniques used by the Council."[26] They were papers which represented the considered national policies of the American Government towards particular countries setting out courses of action to be pursued over

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25 Colbert and Ginsburg, n. 1, p. 23.

26 Ibid., p. 24.

a period of time by all the agencies of the Government.

In April 1966 Rostow went over to the White House as Special Assistant to the President. Following his exit from the State Department, the two offices of the Chairman of the PPC and the Counselor of the Department were divided again.[27] Henry D. Owen was appointed as the Chairman of the PPC in June 1966. Robert R. Bowie succeeded Rostow as Counselor of the Department in July 1966.

With the advent of the Nixon Administration in 1969 policy planning in foreign affairs as the function of a separate organizational unit was done away with. Policy Planning Council, after a separate and independent existence for twenty-two years, was incorporated into the then newly established Planning and Co-ordinating Staff (S/PC). This S/PC which was to be headed by a Director of the rank of an Assistant Secretary was to have broadly two functions. It was to be responsible for "Policy Planning in the Department's policy formulation process."[28] In so doing it was to "make directly available to the Secretary and his principal associates staff analysis and

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27 The earlier instance of the separation of these two offices was in 1950. Kennan was the Director of the PPS during the years 1947-50. In 1949 he had also been made the Counselor which office he held till 1951. In the meantime when Paul Nitze succeeded Kennan as Director of the PPS in 1950 the informal consolidation that had been effected between the two offices of the Counselor and the Director of the PPS came to an end.

28 News Letter, no. 102, October 1969, p. 21.

advice particularly focusing on the world-wide and long-range implications of important policy issues."[29] The other function consisted in "assuring the coordinated and most effective inter-agency participation of the Department on foreign policy matters."[30]

Details of the organization of the S/PC are as follows. The S/PC was to be composed of a staff of not more than twenty of the highest qualifications. This staff was to have "both general and specialized competence and wide diversity of experience."[31] There were to be two Deputy Directors. One was to be the Deputy Director for Planning and the other was to be the Deputy Director for Co-ordination of the Staff. The function of planning in the State Department was to be discharged by the Deputy Director for Planning.

In the years since the establishment of the S/PC no substantive change has taken place in this arrangement. So today planning in foreign affairs in the State Department is one of the major functions of an important organic unit. The S/PC, among other things, is concerned with policy planning in the State Department. However, from 1947 to 1969 there was a

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29 Ibid., p. 21.

30 Ibid., p. 21.

31 News Letter, no. 99, July 1969, p. 2.

The requisites stated in the quotation were to be met by recruiting the staff not only from the Foreign Service, "but also from other Federal Agencies, the academic community, and elsewhere outside the Government."

separate institution to deal with this aspect of foreign policy. Policy Planning Council had the sole function of planning in foreign affairs during the period 1947-69.

Coming to an evaluation of planning in the State Department, the existence of a separate planning unit to deal with policy planning can be completely justified during the tenure of Kennan, especially when Marshall was there as the Secretary. This is because of the fact that it was only during these three years that the PPS concerned itself completely with what it was supposed to. Kennan never got himself involved in operational duties and never did Marshall entrust him with operational responsibilities. The job of the PPS was over once a proposal was submitted to the Secretary. Beyond it, it was the function of the Secretary and the operational Offices to see that that goal was achieved.

However, the PPS which took off with a good start did not continue at the same pace. "The PPS never again attained the status and influence that it had under Kennan."[32] This was because of the fact that "Marshall's successors never conceived the role of the Policy Planning Staff in the way in which he did."[33] During the tenure of Acheson as Secretary the gradual involvement of the PPS in the operational problems of the State Department started. And as the years passed "the PPS was increasingly dominated by the operators' ethos. Its members

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32 Robert L. Rothstein, Planning, Prediction and Policy Making in Foreign Affairs: Theory and Practice (Boston, Mass., 1972), p. 55.

33 Ibid., p. 52.

tended to become - or tried to become - free lance operators, always seeking to be actively involved in the most immediate issues."[34] As a result "Planning, prediction, and a concern for the significance of long-range developments were honoured rhetorically and ignored in practice."[35]

Such was in fact the state of affairs that hardly a few tears were shed over the abolition of the PPC in 1969. No doubt PPC had continued to do some important functions throughout the period from 1950 to 1969. But as Rothstein well puts it: "Operators disguised as planners may perform some important functions, but we need not assume they have much to do with a properly conceived planning role."[36] Besides, "in Washington status and success are defined by presumed influence over a paramount decision-maker."[37] As a consequence, the Council was a success not because it did "much planning or merchandised any unusual ideas,"[38] but because it had "the ear of the Secretary of State."[39]

As a conclusion, a case can be made out for the recreation of the Policy Planning Council as an independent unit in

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34 Ibid., p. 55.

35 Ibid., p. 55.

36 Ibid., p. 88.

37 Ibid., p. 51.

38 Ibid., p. 51.

39 Ibid., p. 51.

the State Department. If planning in foreign affairs in 1947 was of such importance as to necessitate the creation of a separate organic unit in the State Department, the case for such a unit today is even stronger. Consequently what was needed in 1969 was not the abolition of the PPC but its reform. The purpose of planning in foreign affairs today will be better served by entrusting the planning function of the Planning and Co-ordination Staff to a separate unit. Policy Planning Council needs to be recreated and in the process of its recreation all its previous drawbacks must be set right. "Planning, prediction, and a concern for the significance of long-range development"[40] should be the functions of the recreated PPC both in theory and practice.

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40 Ibid., p. 55.

Chapter VI

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES AND REFORMS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

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Administratively the Department of State has undergone very many changes in the post-war period. From a mere conglomeration of Offices in 1945, the Department of State today has become a vast administrative apparatus composed of a good number of interconnected Bureaus. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the major changes that have taken place in the administrative set up of the State Department in the post-war period. In so doing, the recommendations of the Hoover Commission Report of 1949 and the Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State" of 1970 are also dealt with in a brief manner as a good number of changes were effected on the basis of these recommendations. As for a detailed analysis, the changes mainly at or above the level of Assistant Secretary are dealt with. These changes are listed chronologically.

The administrative set up of the Department of State as it obtained in 1945 has already been brought out in the first chapter. Broadly speaking the Department of State was composed of a good number Offices. Officials of the rank of Assistant Secretaries supervised one, two or even three of these Offices.

In 1946, during the Secretaryship of Byrnes, three important new appointments were made. They were the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, Special Assistant to the

Secretary for Intelligence and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas was to co-ordinate policy pertaining to occupation matters. He was also to act as liaison at a high rank with War and Navy Departments on matters pertaining to occupation. The Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence was appointed at the level of Assistant Secretary to head the Offices of Intelligence and Dissemination and Intelligence Coordination and Liaison which were composed mainly of the transferred research personnel from the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of Inter American Affairs.[1] As for the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, the office was created by an act of the Congress in August 1946 on a temporary basis for a period of two years. This Under Secretary was to be the third man in the Department, next to the Secretary and the Under Secretary. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was made directly responsible to him. When Marshall assumed office in 1947 he allowed this office to lapse.[2]

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1 However, the intelligence activities of the State Department were to be decentralized. Each regional Office of the Department was to have its own intelligence unit responsible to the officers within that Office. This arrangement was based on the Russell Plan according to which each of the four geographical Offices were to have a research wing of their own to collect intelligence from the areas within their sphere of action. Loud criticisms of this arrangement on the ground that the intelligence analysts were less likely to be objective when working under the thumb of policy-makers led to its abandonment in 1947 when Marshall assumed office as Secretary of State.

2 The creation of the post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs bespeaks of the increasing importance of economics

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Marshall succeeded Byrnes as Secretary of State on 21 January 1947. During the tenure of Marshall a good number of important changes took place which changed the nature of the Department considerably.

Firstly Marshall gave orders for the shifting of the Department from its location near the White House to the New War Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue. The old State Department building had become very small in terms of office accommodation. The Department of State due to its increasing functions had been forced to have a good number of annexes all over Washington. To have an integrated office Marshall thought it wiser to shift to the Foggy Bottom, the place where the New War Building had been located. The new premises allowed a considerable scope for expansion. The first unit of the Department moved to the new location on 22 January 1947. The complete complex of the State Department at Foggy Bottom started functioning during the tenure of Christian A. Herter.

The second major change that Marshall brought about was the regrouping of the four regional Offices that were under

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in the field of foreign affairs. To start with in the State Department there was only an Economic Adviser to deal with economic problems. It was later raised to the level of Assistant Secretary and in 1946 it was raised to the level of Under Secretaryship. Though the office lapsed when Marshall assumed office as Secretary it was again to be revived in 1958 and since then the appointment of an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs has become more and more frequent.

two Assistant Secretaries during the tenure of Byrnes. Marshall placed all the four regional Offices under the charge of one Assistant Secretary who was to be known as Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs.

The third major measure of Marshall was the establishment of the Executive Secretariat under a Director. It was formed by amalgamating all the coordinating and administrative bodies in the Department into a single unit. The function of the Executive Secretariat was to render the necessary staff service to both the Secretary and the Under Secretary in the discharge of their duties.

Marshall also was responsible for the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary for Transport and Communication to cope with the increasing problems concerning aviation, shipping and telecommunication. During the tenure of Acheson this post was allowed to lapse. The Office of Transport and Communications was entrusted to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

The fifth major administrative change of Marshall was the undoing of the mistake of the Russell Plan. The Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence was made responsible for collecting intelligence from all the regions. The various regional Offices in the State Department were thus deprived of their independent and exclusive authority of collecting intelligence from the regions of their concern.

The last major change that Marshall brought about

pertained to the establishment of the Policy Planning Staff to deal with the function of planning in foreign affairs. The impact of the establishment of the Policy Planning Staff has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

In January 1949 Acheson succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State. In February 1949 the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) submitted its Report on Foreign Affairs to the Congress. Following the submission of the Report a good number of drastic changes were made in the administrative organization of the Department of State.[3] Some of the important changes envisaged by the Hoover Commission to improve the organizational efficiency of the Department of State were as follows:

The Secretary and the Under Secretary level was to be strengthened "by the addition of two Deputy Under Secretaries,

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3 The Organization of the Department of State on the eve of the submission of the Hoover Commission Report was thus. At the top there was the Secretary of State and below him was the Under Secretary. At the next level there were a group of officers of the rank of Assistant Secretary. They included the six Assistant Secretaries for Political Affairs, Occupied Areas, Economic Affairs, Transport and Communications, Public Affairs, and Administration, the Legal Adviser, the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, the Special Assistant for Press Relations, and the Counselor. Eighteen Offices allocated to these officers formed the units of administration. The Directors of these Offices were reporting to the Secretary and the Under Secretary through them. (The Office of the United Nations Affairs was an exception to this. Being placed directly under the Secretary, the Director of this Office was reporting to the Secretary and the Under Secretary directly).

the one to act in matters of substance, and the other, as 'general manager', to administer the Department and the overseas service."[4] They were to be of the rank of Assistant Secretaries. Responsibility for action was to be fixed "in five line units under five Assistant Secretaries."[5] Four of these were to "head up regional units, with the responsibility for the four traditional geographical segments of the world."[6] The fifth Assistant Secretary was to be "in charge of relationships with international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations."[7] There were also to be three more Assistant Secretaries in charge of Economic and Social Affairs, Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs. Besides these eight Assistant Secretaries there were to be three officials of the rank of Assistant Secretary. They were the Legal Adviser, the Special Assistant for Intelligence and

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4 Foreign Affairs, A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, February 1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 40.

5 Ibid., p. 40. These five Assistant Secretaries "would at the action level be responsible for and be equipped, in terms of personnel to deal with not solely 'political' aspects of foreign affairs, as is the basic conception of the duties of the existing geographic office directors, but for all aspects, whether they be political, economic, public opinion, intelligence or administration."

6 Ibid., p. 40. The four traditional geographical segments were: (1) Europe; (2) Far East; (3) Near East and Africa; and (4) America.

7 Ibid., p. 40.

the Planning Adviser.[8]

In recommending this structure for the Department, the Commission envisaged the abolition of the posts of the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Counselor, the Special Assistant for Press Relations, the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas and the Assistant Secretary for Transport and Communications. The functions of the Director General of the Foreign Service were to be entrusted to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

These recommendations of the Commission were submitted to the Congress in February 1949. Thereafter the American Government took upon itself the task of implementing the various recommendations that the Commission had made. The major administrative changes made following the submission of the Report may be briefly brought out thus:

The Congress authorized the appointment of ten Assistant Secretaries (two of whom were to be appointed as Deputy Under Secretaries). It also "clarified and strengthened the administrative responsibility of the Secretary of State with respect to both the Departmental and Foreign Service operations."[9]

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8 A Planning Adviser at the Assistant Secretary level meant a raise in the status of the head of the planning staff in the State Department. The status of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in 1949 was equivalent to that of the head of an Office.

9 "Reorganizing the Department of State: Implementing the Recommendations of the Hoover Commission," Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 24, 1951, p. 37.

All authority which had till then been vested in subordinate officers, either in the Departmental or Foreign Service, came to be vested in the Secretary of State, who was given complete authority for the administration of the Foreign Service.[10] The administrative area of the Department, including the consular activities, was reorganized.[11] The four regional geographical Offices gave way to four Bureaus under a broader concept of operations. "Each of the bureaus was given responsibility for all operating actions affecting countries under its jurisdiction."[12] The Office of the United Nations was

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10 Responsibility for the administration of the Foreign Service till then was in the hands of the Director General of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service and the Director General were functioning under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and as such were not subject to the authority of the Secretary of State. One of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission was that the Foreign Service should also be brought within the purview of the Department of State and the Secretary of State. The post of the Director General of the Foreign Service which had stood for an independent and self-administered Foreign Service was to be done away with.

11 Prior to the reorganization there were four Offices under the Assistant Secretary for Administration. They were the Offices of the Foreign Service, Budget and Planning, Departmental Administration, and Control. During the reorganization there was the dissolution of the Office of Foreign Service and the pairing of its administrative activities with the parallel Departmental activities. This was done to bring about a functional distribution of the administrative activities of the Department. Consequent to this reorganization four new Offices emerged based on a functional allotment of duties. The four Offices were the Office of Personnel, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Operating Facilities and the Office of Consular Affairs.

12 Department of State Bulletin, n. 9, p. 39.

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replaced by the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was extended by the transfer of the Office of Transport and Communications which was till then under a separate Assistant Secretary.

As for those recommendations of the Hoover Commission which were not accepted by the U.S. Government, the important ones pertained to the abolition of the posts of Director General of the Foreign Service, the Special Assistant for Press Relations and the Counselor of the Department, the integration of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service and the appointment of a Planning Adviser of the rank of Assistant Secretary.[13]

The organization of the Department of State as on 1 January 1951, following the implementation of the various accepted recommendations of the Hoover Commission, was as

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Also, "Provision was made for the transfer to the regional geographic bureaus of public affairs, economic, and administrative personnel in order to assure that the bureau will be technically equipped to handle all matters within its scope. In addition, the bureaus were authorized to employ advisers on intelligence and on international organization matters who would also assure proper integration of the activities of the regional bureaus with those of our (American) intelligence area and the newly created Bureau of United Nations Affairs." (p. 37)

13 The recommendation pertaining to the integration of the Departmental Service and the Foreign Service is dealt with in the third chapter. The Commission recommended the amalgamation of the two services above certain levels. Action on this recommendation was to follow only after the submission of the Wriston Committee Report in 1954.

follows.

At the head of the Department of State was the Secretary of State. This Secretary of State was the repository of all the powers of the Department of State. Even the Foreign Service and its Director General derived their authority from him. Under him was the Under Secretary. Below the Under Secretary were the two newly created posts of the Deputy Under Secretaries of State. One was in charge of administration. His sphere of activity comprehended the administrative activities of the Department of State which also included the administration of the Foreign Service. The Office of Consular Affairs was also under his jurisdiction. The Deputy Under Secretary for substantive matters was to help the Secretary and the Under Secretary on policy and coordination matters. He was also to act as the chief liaison officer between the Departments of State and Defence.

Besides these two Deputy Under Secretaries, there were another fourteen officials in the Department of State of the rank of Assistant Secretary of State. They included the five Assistant Secretaries of the Bureaus of European Affairs, Near East and African Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs and United Nations Affairs, the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the Special Assistant for Intelligence, the Special Assistant for Press Relations, the Legal

Adviser, the Director for Mutual Security Assistance and the Counselor.[14] Excluding the Counselor all these officials were in charge of office units either of the Bureau or Office level.[15]

In 1953 the Congress authorized the establishment of the post of Under Secretary for Administration which was to lapse on 31 December 1954. The creation of this post had the aim of giving "high policy direction to the administration and management of the Department and the Foreign Service, especially in relation to any needed reorganization."[16] This Under Secretary had under him the Assistant Secretary for Administration. On the lapse of this post, the post of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration was revived.

In 1954 the Bureau of United Nations Affairs was renamed

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14 The Bureau of German Affairs did not figure in the recommendations of the Hoover Commission. It was created mainly with a view to tackle the varied issues pertaining to Germany. This Bureau proved temporary. Likewise the Director for Mutual Security Assistance did not figure in the Hoover Commission Report. Created in 1949, this Office got separated from the Department in late 1951 when the Mutual Security Act established a Mutual Security Agency outside the Department of State.

15 The administrative organization of the Department today does not differ much from the administrative organization that was obtained in 1951. Hoover Commission recommendations still form the basis of the organization of the Department. The only major change that has taken place over the years has been the increasing number of Bureaus.

16 "The Department of State, 1930-1955: Expanding Functions and Responsibilities", The Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 1955, p. 47.

as the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. This new name gave a better description of its sphere of activity.

In 1955 four important changes took place. First, the level of Deputy Under Secretary was recognized as a higher level than that of the Assistant Secretary of State. Its place in the hierarchy was to be in between the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries. Secondly, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff was also made the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning.[17] The third change pertained to the establishment of the post of Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.[18] In 1958 it gave way to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. And the last change pertained to the establishment of the International Cooperation Administration. Established by delegation of authority by the State Department on 30 June 1955 under authority of Mutual Security Act of 1954 and pursuant to Executive Order 10610 of 9 May 1955, the International Cooperation Administration had responsibility for the conduct of mutual security programmes, except those

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17 This in effect realized one of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission. The Commission wanted the head of the 'Planning Staff' who was to be known as the "Planning Adviser", equivalent in rank to an Assistant Secretary.

18 Eversince Marshall allowed the post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs to lapse in 1947 economic units of the Department had been headed by Assistant Secretaries only. The establishment of the post of Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs rekindled the hope of a higher official heading the Bureau of Economic Affairs. This materialized in 1958 when the post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs was recreated.

providing military assistance, those concerning refugees and escapees and those involving contributions to international organizations. It was abolished by Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.[19]

In 1958 besides the recreation of the post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, a new Bureau was also established. The Bureau of African Affairs was established by dividing the Bureau of Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs into the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and African Affairs.[20] This raised the number of

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19 Between the years 1945 and 1955, there was only one such instance of an independent agency functioning under the authority of the Secretary of State. It was the Technical Cooperation Administration which was created in 1950 to plan, implement and manage the technical cooperation (Point 4) programmes. It was transferred to the Mutual Security Agency in 1953.

Also we must make a distinction here between two types of agencies functioning in the international arena on behalf of the U.S. Government. One set of them function under the authority delegated to them by the Department of State. They are integral parts of the Department of State and are responsible to the Secretary of State. International Cooperation Administration and the Technical Cooperation Administration belonged to this category. The other set of agencies function outside the perview of the Department of State. They are neither parts of the Department nor are they responsible to the Secretary of State. The now abolished Mutual Security Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration and the present day's United States Information Agency belong to this category. Our scope of study, however, does not extend to this second category.

20 Here it may be noted that in 1956 a Deputy Assistant Secretary had been appointed to be in charge of the Office of African Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

regional bureaus to five.

The year 1959 saw two important new additions being made to the structure of the Department of State. Firstly, a new post of Under Secretary for Political Affairs was created to cope with the increasing functions of the Secretary and the Under Secretary. The second addition pertained to the establishment of a new Bureau - the Bureau of International Cultural Relations. This Bureau was established in recognition of the need for greater emphasis on the international cultural relations of the United States. It was to be under the Special Assistant to the Secretary for the Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations. The Bureau was renamed in 1960 as the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

In 1961, during the first year of Kennedy's Presidency, four important additions were made to the organization of the Department of State. One was the establishment of the Operations Center in the Executive Secretariat. The other three pertained to the creation of the Peace Corps, Agency for International Development and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Operations Center is entrusted with the task of following the various developments all over the world which are reported to the Department. In so doing it is to anticipate trouble and analyse possible options in good time. The necessity for its establishment was felt after the ill-fated

invasion of the Bay of Pigs. Composed of a highly competent personnel, the chief merit of the Operations Center is that it provides for round the clock and round the year service.

The Peace Corps was established by an Executive Order on 1 March 1961. Today it functions under the authority of the Peace Corps Act of 22 September 1961 as amended. This organization works under and is responsible to the Secretary of State. Its main purpose is to promote world peace and friendship. It makes available to "interested countries and areas men and women of the United States qualified for service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions of hardship if necessary, to help the people of such countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained manpower and help promote a better understanding of the American people."[21]

The Agency for International Development was established in the Department of State on 3 November 1961.[22] It had responsibility for carrying out the non-military U.S. foreign assistance programmes and for continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance programmes undertaken under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.[23]

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21 Peace Corps Act of 22 September 1961.

22 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 621) authorized the President of the United States to exercise his functions under that act through such agency as he might direct. So authorized, the President by an Executive Order directed the Secretary of State to establish the AID (Executive Order 10973 of 3 November 1961).

23 Thus the functions of the International Cooperation Administration which was abolished in early 1961 by this Foreign Assistance Act came to be entrusted to the AID.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established by an act of the Congress. Established within the Department and headed by a Director, the function of the Agency was to advise the President and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament policy. The Director was also to serve as a representative of the U.S. on international disarmament negotiations.[24]

In March 1966 the post of Country Director was established in the various regional Bureaus. According to this scheme each and every regional Bureau was to be composed of a few Country Directorates headed by Country Directors. A Country Director was to be in charge of a particular country or a group of countries and he was to serve as the single focus of responsibility for leadership and coordination of departmental and interdepartmental activities in the area under his charge. Formerly the Office Directors who headed the various subregional units in these regional Bureaus did not have the sort of a clear-cut mandate to regulate the departmental and interdepartmental affairs concerning their area.

Again in March 1966 was also established the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). The creation of the SIG needs

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24 Though located in the Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is a separate agency. Its Director reports directly to the Secretary and acts in an advisory capacity to both the President and the Secretary on arms control and disarmament policy. However, unlike the AID, this Agency does not have any operational tasks. Its staff is confined to the State Department.

a special mention here because of the fact that the State Department was to play the dominant role in it. The SIG was a permanent inter-departmental committee with the Under Secretary of State as the Executive Chairman.[25] The other members of the SIG were the Deputy Secretary of Defence, the Administrator of AID, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the USIA and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The SIG was to "function as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas interdepartmental matters,"[26] which were "referred to it by the Secretary of State or by an Assistant Secretary or raised by the action of an individual member."[27] Any Department or Agency which was not a member of the SIG was also authorized to raise matters for action by the Group.

As far as the performance is concerned the SIG was not a big success. As a consequence of this one of the first acts of Nixon was to abolish the SIG.

When Nixon assumed office as President in January 1969, besides doing away with the SIG, he also did away with the Policy Planning Council. The policy planning function in the

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25 He was designated as Executive Chairman because he had the authority and responsibility to decide all matters coming before the SIG subject to the right of any member to appeal from his decision to higher authority.

26 Department of State News Letter (Washington, D.C.), no. 59, March 1966, p. 1.

27 Ibid., p. 1.

Department was entrusted to a new organization known as the Planning and Coordinating Staff headed by a Director having the rank of an Assistant Secretary. The Planning and Coordination Staff was also in charge of coordination of the various activities in the field of foreign affairs. The PPC and the S/PC have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

In June 1969 was established the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under an Assistant Secretary. Besides dealing with matters pertaining to military strength and foreign policy, this Bureau had the onerous task of acting as the liaison between the State Department and Defence Department.

The last major series of changes took place soon after the submission of the Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State"in November 1970. The 'Diplomacy for the 70's' was a series of recommendations made by the thirteen Task Forces that had been appointed by the Secretary to go into the organization and functioning of the State Department. It contained about six hundred recommendations. The more important ones of these recommendations are those on stimulating creativity in the Department, the role of the Country Director, the establishment of a Management Evaluation System and the staffing of the various officer positions in the Department and overseas by the FSO and FSRU personnel. Of these, the recommendations pertaining to the last aspect have already been discussed in the third chapter.

To stimulate creativity in the Department the Task Forces made a good number of recommendations. According to them the top leadership of the foreign affairs community was to assign a high priority to and sustain an active interest in stimulating creativity in the Department and the Foreign Service. The Planning and Coordination Staff was to devote more attention to the production and transmission of new ideas. To serve the same purpose a small Policy Planning and Review Group under a Deputy Assistant Secretary was to be established in all the regional Bureaus. Performance evaluation was also to be suitably changed to give greater recognition to creative performance. In addition to all these, a number of challenging and responsible posts were to be made open to officers below the senior ranks.

As for the role of the Country Director the recommendations of the Task Forces were thus. The Country Director was to have sufficient authority on inter-agency matters. He was to have sufficient backing of the higher officials. Country Directorates were to be reconstituted on a more rational basis. The Assistant Secretaries heading each of the five regional Bureaus were to be in frequent contact with their Country Directors and assume exclusive responsibility for their guidance. Deputy Assistant Secretaries were not to be used as "second bosses" for Directors. Regional staffs and Country Directorates were to have a good division of labour with the former concentrating on multilateral problems and the latter on bilateral problems.

As far as management evaluation is concerned the Task Forces recommended the establishment of a new organization headed by an Inspector General under the Under Secretary. It was to be known as the Management and Evaluation Group. It was to be composed of four types of staffs, an Inspection Corps, an Audit Staff, a Management Staff and a Policy and Programme Evaluation Staff. The MEG was to inspect and evaluate posts overseas and at home. The continual evaluation of the management and organization of the Department and overseas posts was also to be done by this Group.

The Task Forces also favoured the evolution of management centres at the two key decision-making levels in the Department - the office of the Secretary and the offices of the Assistant Secretaries. These centres were to be designed to bring responsibility for policy analysis and decision-making on the one hand, and resources allocation, on the other, under unified control thereby ending the separation between policy formulation and resource management. To assist the management in acquiring unified control over the two functions, of decision-making and resource allocation a Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation System (PARA) at the levels of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries was to be established. PARA at the Assistant Secretary level was to permit country-by-country and function-by-function analysis of American interests and the way in which these interests may be affected by events over a period of two or four years ahead. At the Secretary

level, the PARA was to permit a parallel analysis on a global scale. For the detailed functioning of the PARA the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs was to be taken as the guideline.[28]

The Department of State accepted most of the recommendations of the Task Forces. To give effect to the recommendations pertaining to the establishment of a sister Foreign Service to the FSO, the Department of State created the Foreign Affairs Specialists corps under the provisions of the Foreign Service Reserve unlimited. This has already been discussed in detail in the third chapter.

To enhance creativity in the Department, Planning and Coordination Staff was asked to devote more attention to the production and transmission of new ideas. The leadership of the foreign affairs community was also to assign a high priority to and sustain an active interest in the stimulation of creativity in the Department and the Foreign Service.

Most of the recommendations pertaining to the Country Director were also accepted. The Deputy Assistant Secretary, in a Bureau was not to be used as a layer of 'second boss' to the Country Directors. Organization of Country Directorates was to follow the pattern that was recommended by the Task Forces.

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28 CASP is a detailed statement of American objectives in a given country and the implications of these objectives for agency programs. It was evolved by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

There was to be one Country Director for each major country. There was to be a Country Director for each high priority country. There was also to be a Country Director for one, two, three, four, five or even six small and intermediate countries. And for the remaining states the nature of the organizational unit was to be left to the discretion of the Bureau. Each Country Director was to have an important say on bilateral issues and he was to have the authority to sign all telegrams of bilateral nature. The words "Country Director" were to be retained as a generic name and each Country Director was to be addressed as "Director for...Affairs." In carrying out his responsibilities of coordinating interagency matters he was to be in active touch with the functional bureaus in the Department.

The Department of State accepted the recommendations of the Task Forces as far as the evaluation of management and the evolution of two management centres were concerned also. The Management and Evaluation Group was to be created and it was to consist of the Inspection Corps, the Audit Staff, the Management Staff and Policy and Programme Evaluation Staff. Young FSOs were to be included in the MEG. The MEG was to undertake a continuing review of the role and functions of American missions. It was also to undertake management evaluations of all Country Directorates once at least in every two years. Management centres at both the Secretary level and the Assistant Secretary level were also to be evolved with the help

of the PARA and the CASP.

The Department of State underwent a metamorphic change following the acceptance of the reports of the various Task Forces. Foreign Affairs Specialists corps has been established to fill the various non-FSO positions in the Department. PARA system has been adopted throughout the Department. The Office of Inspector General has in it the staff that the Task Forces recommended for the Management and Evaluation Group. Country Directorates have also been reorganized. A new concept of team work is operating among the seventh floor principal officers which affords increased control of the Department's planning, decision-making and allocation of resources.

Besides these changes that have been made on the basis of the recommendations of the "Diplomacy for the 70's", two other important changes have taken place in the seventies. The first is the establishment in April 1972 of a new post of Under Secretary of State for coordinating security assistance programmes.[29] The second pertains to the renaming of the number two post in the Department of State. In 1972 this office came to be designated as Deputy Secretary. Henceforth below

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29 The creation of this post was in accordance with the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 226, 92nd Congress approved on 7 February 1971). This act authorized the appointment of a senior official to supervise military grant-in-aid programmes, sales of military equipment and economic supporting assistance. This official was to ensure that all forms of military equipment to foreign countries conform to the Administration's foreign policy.

the Secretary there was to be the Deputy Secretary and next in level were the three Under Secretaries with their particular fields of operation.

The Department of State as it is today is mainly based on the Hoover Commission Report of 1949 and the Department of State's "Diplomacy for the 70's" of 1970. For a broad outline the origin has to be traced to the Hoover Commission, though for the minute organization and functioning it is to the various Task Forces' reports that we have to look to.

The top level organization of the Department of State today is thus. There is a Secretary at the top. Below him is the Deputy Secretary who is the number two man in the Department. Next in the hierarchy are three Under Secretaries - the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, Economic Affairs and Security Assistance.[30] Below these Under Secretaries is the Deputy Under Secretary for Management who is in charge of the personnel and budgetary problems of the Department. Geographical and functional Bureaus headed by officials of the rank of Assistant Secretaries form the units of administration. There are five geographical Bureaus - the Bureaus of African Affairs, European Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The functional Bureaus are eight in number - the

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30 The Post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs is remaining vacant.

Bureaus of Congressional Relations, Public Affairs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, Economic and Business Affairs, Intelligence and Research, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Security and Consular Affairs and Politico-Military Affairs. There is also the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. In addition to these there are a few important staff elements as the Bureau of Administration, the Legal Adviser, the Counselor and the Planning and Co-ordination Staff.

Thus in this chapter we have seen the various administrative changes that have taken place in the Department of State in the post-war period. The Department of State, as is evident from this analysis, has undergone a metamorphic transformation as a result of these changes. From a conglomeration of Offices haphazardly managed, the Department today has become a scientifically organized and administered unit.

At the end mention must be made of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. This Commission headed by Robert Murphy has been created in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 and is to submit its report by 30 June 1975. It is to "study and investigate the organization, methods of operation and powers of all Departments, agencies, independent establishments and instrumentalities of the United States Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign

policy."[31] It is hoped that the Commission will make a good number of recommendations

> with respect to the reorganization of the departments and agencies, more effective arrangements between executive branch and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies, the abolition of services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy, and 'other measures to promote peace, economy, efficiency and improved administration of foreign policy.' 32

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31 Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (Public Law 352, 92nd Congress).

32 Department of State News Letter, no. 153, February 1974, p. 6.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

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In the years soon after the war America's approach to international relations changed drastically. The Second World War had proved fatal to the isolationist policy that America had followed eversince the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Unlike as at the end of the First World War, there was no going back to isolationism in 1945. The conditions of 1945 were such that a basic change in the very approach of America towards international relations had become inevitable. The Fascist threat to the world peace had been successfully overcome. But to preserve this hard won peace an active participation on the part of the United States in international affairs had become a necessity. The United States took this challenge with a zeal. At the end of the war she had in fact emerged as one of the two major powers. With Germany, Italy and Japan vanquished, with Britain and France no longer the old powers that they were, and with the U.S.S.R. on the defensive, it was but natural that the United States should play the leading role on the international scene. Even today, despite the fact that the world is no longer bipolar or even tripolar, but multi-polar, the role that is being played by the United States in shaping the course of international events is considerable.

These developments have had their impact on the evolution of the State Department. A comparison of the Department

of State as it was in 1945 with the Department of State as it is today brings out very clearly the extent of this impact.

The Department of State in 1945, to recount what was told earlier in the first chapter, was in a very sorry state of affairs. Its standing as the organization responsible for the formulation and execution of America's foreign policy was very low. More than the Department of State it were the Departments of War, Navy and Air and certain other influential Secretaries and advisers who mattered in America's foreign policy. The long tenure of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State had brought much dishonour and disrespect to the Department of State. The only redeeming feature of the whole situation had been the appointment of James F. Byrnes as the Secretary of State in July 1945. On the morrow of peace, with the amount of influence that Byrnes had on President Truman and with the amount of trust that President Truman had in Byrnes, there was a possibility of a retrieval of the lost ground.

Organizationally the Department of State was not yet that vast and complex as it came to be a few years afterwards. Twelve Offices formed the units of administration. These Offices were under the charge of five Assistant Secretaries and a Special Assistant to the Secretary.[1] There were also the Legal Adviser and the Assistant Secretary for Congressional

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1 For a detailed description of the organization of the Department of State in 1945 see Chapter 1.

Relations and International Conferences. Between the Secretary and the various officials holding the ranks of Assistant Secretaries there was only one intermediary level - the level of Under Secretary. This Under Secretary was serving as the Secretary's deputy in all matters and, in the absence of the Secretary, as Acting Secretary of State. The Department employed about 3,700 persons. The Foreign Service was not a part of the Department of State and its administration was in the hands of the Director General of the Foreign Service who functioned independent of the authority of the Secretary of State.

But the Department of State as it is today is a very complex organization. Headed by the Secretary of State it is broadly composed of various geographic and functional Bureaus, each under the charge of an officer of the rank of Assistant Secretary.[2] There are also a few servicing or staff elements which include the Legal Adviser, the Counselor, the Planning and Coordination Staff, and the Assistant Secretary for Administration whose Bureau handles operations, communications and foreign physical facilities. Between the ranks of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries there are the three levels of Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary, in that descending order. There is one Deputy Secretary. He is the second most important man in the Department and during the absence of the Secretary serves as Acting Secretary. The

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2 For a mention of the various Bureaus that are in existence today see chapter VI.

level of Under Secretary is immediately below that of the Deputy Secretary. Today there is provision for the appointment of three Under Secretaries - Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, Economic Affairs and Security Assistance.[3] At the level of Deputy Under Secretary, there is the Deputy Under Secretary for Management who is in charge of the personnel and budgetary problems of the Department. The Department employs about 13,600 Americans at home and abroad and 11,350 foreign nationals all over the world.[4] The Foreign Service is an integral part of the Department of State. Also functioning within the Department of State are such agencies as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps.

Functionally the role played by the Department of State in shaping the course of American foreign policy is very great today. Under the Secretaryship of Kissinger the views of the Department of State are regarded as of paramount importance on all matters pertaining to foreign policy. Today Kissinger has in fact come to be identified with the foreign policy of the United States.

However, the period of transition during the intervening twenty-nine years was not a very smooth one. The process

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3 The post of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs is remaining vacant.

4 See United States Government Organizational Marshal 1970/71 (Revised up to 1 July 1970) (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 88.

of evolution saw many ups and downs. The only consolation was that it never slid back to the low point that it was at during the tenure of Hull.

The major structural and functional developments that have taken place during these years have been noted in the previous five chapters. They may be summed up as follows:

The primacy of the Department of State as the organization responsible for the formulation and execution of America's foreign policy has been asserted. Today the Secretary of State is the chief adviser to the President on foreign policy matters. Over the years the challenges offered by the NSC and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs have been successfully overcome.

The unusual arrangement of a separate Foreign Service administered by an independent Director General being responsible for the implementation of the Department of State's policies has been discarded. In 1949 the Director General of the Foreign Service was made responsible to the Secretary of State.

The practice of the Civil Service officers filling the various officer positions in the Department of State has nearly been given up. Today almost all the officer positions in both Washington and abroad are manned by either the FSO personnel or the FAS personnel.

The function of planning has been institutionalized. During the years 1947-69 it was performed by the Policy

Planning Council. Today it is being performed by the Planning and Coordination Staff.

Bureau has come to stay as the unit of administration. In 1945 the Department of State was a composite of twelve Offices. Today, though there are about seventy-five Offices, most of these Offices are organized into Bureaus. The Department of State is essentially a composite of Bureaus.

The preponderance of the five regional Bureaus together with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs over the functional Bureaus has been asserted. This has been the case eversince the Department was reorganized on the basis of the Hoover Commission recommendations. The establishment of the Country Directorates in these various regional Bureaus in 1966 and their consolidation in the seventies have further strengthened this preponderance.

Three levels of officials have come to stay between the ranks of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary. In 1945 it was only one. The three levels are those of the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary in that descending order. The one level that was in existence in 1945 was the level of Under Secretary.

In 1945 the organization of the Department of State was haphazard and unsystematic. The Hoover Commission Report on Foreign Affairs and the Department of State's 'Diplomacy for the 70's' have streamlined the organization of the Department. They have made it a systematically organized and scientifically functioning Department.

One can conclude this dissertation by saying that the situation obtaining in 1974 is an ideal one for the Department of State. Though one cannot rule out a decline in the status of the Department of State and its Secretary in the near or distant future, one can assert that for the efficient conduct of American foreign relations the present arrangement is the best. Any deviation from this resulting in a lesser role of the Secretary and the Department in American foreign policy would only have harmful consequences as far as the national interests of America are concerned.

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