

# THE EMERGENCE OF THE WARSAW PACT

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## PREFACE

In the post-World War II period the nations of the world did not rely on the United Nations alone for their security, but deemed it necessary to establish various collective self-defence organizations. The Warsaw Pact is one of them.

The Warsaw Treaty has and continues to play an important role <sup>in the foreign policies</sup> of the USSR and the people's democracies of East Europe. These countries consider it an important bulwark for safeguarding their security, particularly against the resurgence of German threat. The present study examines primarily the origin of the Warsaw Pact and the various factors and considerations that had gone into the making of this defence organization.

The first chapter gives the historical background and the Cold War situation in the immediate post-World War period which affected the Soviet perception of security. The evolution of Soviet security - the creation of a network of bilateral alliances between the East European countries - is examined in the next chapter. The third chapter is concerned about the Soviet appraisal of the growing strength of NATO, particularly the inclusion of West Germany in the Atlantic Alliance, and other factors which contributed to the emergence of the Warsaw Pact. The Moscow and the Warsaw Conferences, in which the idea of multilateral security

arrangement was mooted and finalized, are dealt with in the fourth chapter. A perusal of the nature and significance of the Warsaw Pact is contained in the fifth chapter, while the last chapter is conclusion.

To the completion of the present work I owe immeasurably to Dr J. P. Jain, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for his kind supervision and cooperation in the various stages of the work. My special thanks are due to Mr Jayshekar for his constant encouragement. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr M. S. Venkataramani for his useful suggestions and to Dr T. T. Poulouse for his help during the initial stages of this work.

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**Chapter I**

**INTRODUCTION**

## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

The problem of preserving security is one of the central problems of international relations. It [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may be the security of a nation, an alliance or an international political system as a whole. Europe had faced acute security problems. Within a generation Europe had been the scene of two world wars which soon spread to other parts of the world. After the Second World War Europe was one of the focal points of the two big powers' rivalry - namely the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which emerged on the scene. Europe is the arena where the two powers maintain major commitments of forces outside their borders. Both the super powers consider Europe vital to their security interests.

#### Historical Background

Threats to Russian security has mostly come from the European powers, who had launched their attacks on Russia through East Europe, which had never been strong enough to resist any such attempts. Ever since Napoleon's invasion, Russia had been anxious to prevent similar occurrence. The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by its

efforts to gain some control over East Europe. The Treaty of San Stefano March 1878 which inter alia provided for creation of a big autonomous Bulgaria under Russian influence and to be garrisoned by Russian troops for two years was aimed at partial fulfilment of that desire. But the Congress of Berlin, June 1878, undid it by once again establishing Turkish influence and increasing that of Austria. This resulted in a clash of Russian, Austrian and Turkish interests in the East and Southeastern Europe. And all these powers vied with each other for exercising control over the area. To a certain extent, Russia succeeded in establishing its influence in the region, viz. in Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Poland, etc. In 1892, Russia concluded a military pact with France with the object of enlisting French assistance in the event of an attack on its territory. In spite of these efforts Russia was invaded through the East Europe during World War I.

After the First World War, Russia was subjected to the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and had to face intervention at the hands of Allied powers. For long, the USSR was not admitted in the League of Nations.

In order to safeguard its security interests and with a view to break through its political isolation, the USSR concluded military alliances with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935 and treaties of non-aggression with its



immediate western neighbours, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland. Despite these efforts, the USSR had to face the German invasion during the Second World War. The East European countries - Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria - themselves joined hands with the aggressor and sent their military divisions to invade the USSR. The other countries were too weak to resist the aggression. Czechoslovakia was occupied in the very beginning of the war - in fact even before the war virtually began - and so was Poland. Yugoslavia and Greece too fell victim to Nazi aggression. As there was no barrier left to check the Germans, they kept advancing towards east, inside the USSR. By the time, this invasion was checked and driven back, Russian losses were quite heavy - some twenty million of its people dead and all her industries devastated. One Soviet writer has remarked:

Nazism is a terrible word. It brings to mind innumerable atrocities, sufferings and privations and the unspeakable toll in blood which mankind paid for Nazi crimes. Soviet people cannot and will not forget all that they had lived through. (1)

During the Second World War the two ideologically rival systems - Capitalism and Communism - joined hands together in order to face the common enemy, Nazism and Fascism.

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1 P. Zilin, They Sealed Their Own Doom (Moscow, 1970), p. 252.

To safeguard its interests, the USSR signed treaties with the Allied governments, especially a twenty year treaty of alliance with Britain (26 May 1942) and the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post War Cooperation with the Czechoslovak Government in exile, London, (12 December 1943). The latter proved to be the nucleus of the Soviet system of bilateral alliances in Eastern Europe.

In the post-World War II period Eastern Europe had occupied a prominent place in Soviet foreign policy.

#### THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE

##### Economic

Compared with other European countries, the USSR emerged after the Second World War as the most powerful country on the continent both militarily and politically. But her economy was shattered by the war and the USA was in a much stronger position in that regard. In the atmosphere of US-USSR political confrontation,<sup>as</sup> Moscow could not expect to obtain economic assistance from Washington, the Soviet Union had to fall back on its own resources and that of East Europe. As Brzezinski puts it, the main objective of the Soviet Union in Eastern European countries was:

to use the area for purposes of Soviet economic recovery. The war damages inflicted on the USSR by the Germans could be healed much more rapidly by extracting capital from East Central Europe through removal of enterprises and resources. Not only from Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, even from the Allied powers - Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia USSR extracted economic advantage. (2)

### Military Objectives

After the War, the USSR wanted to have Eastern Europe countries as a cordon sanitaire. In view of several military defeats and the political humiliations in the past, this desire was quite understandable. In 1943 the American ambassador in Moscow wrote: "In 1918 Western Europe attempted to set up a cordon sanitaire to protect it from the influence of Bolshevism. Might not now the Kremlin envisage the formation of a belt of pro-Soviet states to protect it from the influence of the West?"<sup>3</sup>

The USSR anticipated two major gains in having control over the East European area. Firstly, aware of its handicap in nuclear power in the face of U.S. monopoly, the only course left to the USSR was to take recourse to strengthening

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2 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, 1960), p. 5.

3 Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, "Origins of Cold War", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 46, 1967, p. 31.

of its conventional forces. It is true that the Soviet superiority in this respect in comparison to other European nations was indisputable, yet it was felt that the control over the Eastern Europe would provide an added advantage to the USSR. This would put an end to the Soviet western borders being directly exposed to any foreign attacks as had always been the case in history. Instead, the East European countries would serve as buffer and the USSR would get sufficient time to boost up its defence system before its own boundary could actually be invaded.

Secondly, the USSR could augment its military resources by utilizing the forces of East European states. Emphasizing the military significance of the region for the Soviet Union, Morgenthau has stated:

The interest of Russia in the domination of Eastern Europe has been perennial, regardless of drastic changes in the personnel, philosophy and structure of government. The weakening of that interest cannot be foreseen short of a revolution in military technology that would make the control of outlying territory irrelevant. (4)

### Political Objectives

The political, military, and other Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe were all complementary in nature. Perhaps

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4 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice", in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 290-91.

without the political influence USSR could not have had the military or economic advantages from these countries. During the war the USSR was determined to have friendly governments in these countries even at the cost of strained relations with the USA and Britain, and friendly governments could be none others but only Communist ones. The political objectives of the USSR in the Eastern Europe can be listed as follows:

As Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the vanguard of the Communist parties all over the world, the governments of East European countries led by communists, automatically came under the Soviet control and supervision. This would ensure Moscow's control over their national policies.

Secondly, the Soviet Union could be sure that the capitalist west would be unable to plot hostile designs against the Soviet Union if surrounded by friendly communist regimes. In Brezezinski's words the purpose was "to deny the area to the capitalist world since it was likely to plot hostile moves against the USSR."<sup>5</sup>

Ideologically too, the Soviet Union was satisfied that by establishing the peoples democracies it was furthering the cause of communism. After all the peoples democracies were

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5 Brezezinski, n. 2, p. 5.

considered only a stage in the final journey towards communism.

Most important of all, the Soviet political influence in East Europe was expected to fulfil its basic objective that of ensuring its security. Only when there was a perfect identity of interests and cooperation between the USSR and East European countries, an effective defence could be expected in case of another German or even Western attack. One western writer has observed:

For the Russians the nature of the regimes in Eastern Europe - and in Germany - was of crucial importance in providing the Soviet Union with defense against attacks from the West, a much more compelling motive for security than a generalized opposition to war. It was clearly in the Russian interest to be able to create a cordon sanitaire in reverse, giving the Soviet Union a sure defense that the diplomacy of the 1920s and 1930s had not provided. (6)

#### EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS - IN THE POWER POLITICS

The war-time alliances could hold the Allied nations together only while the war passed through critical period for the Allies. As the war approached its concluding phase, signs of rift among them became visible. Conferences like Yalta and Potsdam could not restore the war-time trust and confidence among the allies. Instead they were replaced by

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6 Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (London, 1969), p. 14.

apprehensions, distrusts and suspicions in each other's intentions and designs. One of the important point of disagreement was the question of the future governments of the East European nations. In 1944 Britain and USSR had reached an understanding that in the post-war period Britain would have Greece as her sphere of influence, while the other East European countries would be under the USSR influence.<sup>7</sup> However, as the war was approaching its end, the Western countries, especially the USA found the idea of Eastern Europe under exclusive Soviet influence or control difficult to reconcile with. Main argument advanced in that regard was that "if the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has right to penetrate her immediate neighbours for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbours becomes at a certain time equally logical."<sup>8</sup>

If war with the USSR was inevitable then it was thought that it would be better to fight out the USSR in the Eastern part of Europe rather than allow Moscow to occupy or control the Eastern part and thus endanger the security of Western Europe. It was felt that once the USSR established

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7 British predominance in Greece was 90%, USSR's in Rumania was 90%, in Bulgaria and Hungary 80% and 50-50 in Yugoslavia. See Schlesinger, n. 3, p. 35.

8. Harriman, quoted in Schlesinger, n. 3, p. 39.

control over the Eastern Europe, it would surely try to expand its influence in the western part also. The Second World War, on the other hand, made the USSR more determined than ever to control the East European region.

After the Second World War the balance of power, structure in Europe was completely changed. Great Britain and France, once important pillars of European power politics, had fallen, while the United States of America and the USSR, had emerged as great powers and the medium and small nations showed a tendency to gravitate towards them. This proved the beginning of bipolarism.

The question of establishment of government in Poland gave rise to serious divergence of viewpoints between the two power blocs. The Yalta agreement had stated that the three governments would jointly "act to assure" free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people" in East Europe.<sup>9</sup> However, relying more on its agreement with Churchill, reached in 1944 Moscow thought that just as it had agreed not to interfere in the affairs of Greece, a country so close to it, the USA would also not interfere in Eastern Europe which was geographically so far off from the USA and where it had no direct interest involved as those of the USSR. Accordingly, when Kremlin found the USA and the UK insisting on the free elections in Poland, it naturally got alarmed. Replying to

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9 Schlesinger, n. 3, p. 42.



to Western Powers contention that the Polish question was a question of honour for them, Stalin observed: "It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death... Throughout history Poland had been the corri-<sup>10</sup> dor for attack on Russia."

The nuclear monopoly of the USA and her decision to keep it a secret as long as possible, was another factor which contributed in making the USSR skeptical about the Western intentions. There were some other events which took place in a quick succession during the last phase of the war and immediately after it, which destroyed whatever trust and cooperation was left between the Allies.

In January 1945, the USSR requested the USA about six billion dollars credit for post-war reconstruction, but the request was never acceded to in spite of the Soviet reminders. In July of the same<sup>year</sup>, the lend-lease agreement with the USSR was terminated. The denial of credit and annulment of the lend-lease agreement was viewed by Moscow as an attempt on the part of the USA to put economic pressure on the USSR. If it was "designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up", observed Stalin, "then<sup>11</sup> it was a fundamental mistake."

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10 Ibid., p. 33.

11 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 44.

On 5 March 1946 Churchill, in his Fulton speech, called for an Anglo-American alliance in view of the Soviet violations of the Yalta agreement and continued Soviet efforts of expansion. He said that a "tragedy on a prodigious scale is unfolding itself behind the iron curtain which divides Europe in twain."<sup>12</sup> He also gave a call for liberating The Eastern Europe. The speech during which President Truman was also present, aroused serious misgivings in the Soviet mind. The US proposal of a four power treaty of guarantee, including demilitarization of Germany and its exclusion from all the alliances, could not allay Soviet apprehensions. Similar treaties were offered to France and a number of other countries after the First World War, but they proved utterly useless. A world war did break out for a second time and France became one of its first victims. D. Fleming has rightly pointed out:

In 1945, it was a clever gesture to make the same proposition to the Russians in lieu of the territorial and political moves in Eastern Europe which they wished to make, but it was only a gesture....There was not a chance of Russians accepting it. (13)

In 1947 when Greece was faced with Communist led civil

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12 Quoted in Luard Evan, ed., The Cold War: A Reappraisal (London, 1964), p. 53.

13 D. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origin 1917-50 (London, 1961), p. 275.

war, Washington responded by propounding Truman Doctrine to help "free peoples...resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures...."<sup>14</sup> According to President Truman security of Greece against communism was vital for the entire region. If Greece turned communist, he feared other countries of the region would also go communist. Turkey was similarly given help towards preventing expansion of communism, in other words, the Soviet influence. George F. Kennan considered the main element of U.S. policy to be one of "a long term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies". (15) He suggested that the USSR should be viewed as a political rival and not a partner of the USA, keeping in mind the dangers to the West from its Marxist-Leninist theory of eventual fall of capitalist system. Kennan would not rest with the containment of Soviet influence alone. He wanted "to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection" and "to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power".<sup>16</sup>

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14 President Harry S. Truman's message to Congress, quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy in the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1948), pp. 727-28.

15 X., pseud., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 25, July 1947, p. 575.

16 Ibid., p. 582.

The US policy of containment and talk of liberation of Eastern Europe was considered by Moscow as a threat both to its international influence and its national security. The USSR accused USA of setting up a big spy and saboteurs ring in East European countries with a view to topple the communist governments there. Kremlin also criticized USA of giving undue importance and encouragement to the emigrants from these countries. These acts were regarded by the USSR as clear examples of western interference in its sphere of influence which was considered most vital to its security interests.

Marshall Plan instituted to help the economic recovery of western Europe was considered not only an obstacle in the expansion of communist influence but also an attempt on the part of USA to control the political and economic life of European nations. Poland and Czechoslovakia were not allowed to accept the American aid under that plan, in spite of their inclinations to do so. The U.S. refusal to grant credit to the USSR, the termination of the lend lease and the initiation of Marshall Plan led the USSR believe that the United States was not only attempting to prevent Soviet economic recovery from war ravages but that Washington was trying to mask its expansionist designs by its talk of "pacific intentions" and offers of "aid" etc.

### US Military Bases

The setting up of a ring of military bases on the periphery of the USSR and the peoples democracies of Eastern Europe was viewed with concern. Even after World War II, the USA continued acquiring the new military bases while retaining the old ones. Thus the Americans sought to build bases in Spain and Portugal, besides the existing ones in Tripoli, Cyprus, Greece and Middle East, which were being strengthened. It also wanted to have bases at Sicily since the Mediterranean was strategic heart of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. A Soviet author remarked: "Although America's frontiers lie a long way from the Mediterranean American bases are being built practically along the whole of Mediterranean coast."<sup>17</sup> After NATO came into being, the USA gained control over many a bases on the Europe continent.

These moves were naturally viewed by the USSR as aimed at encircling her and against her interests. It was unable to see any defensive purpose behind these bases. A Soviet journal observed:

And indeed, what use is the British bridgehead for the defense of America? And who after all, is threatening the US? Everyone knows that since the demolition of Hitler Germany and imperial Japan, the security of the American continent is beyond doubt. (18)

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17 E. Varga, "American Plan for the Enthrollment of Europe", New Times (Moscow), no. 48, 1947, p. 9.

18 A. Inzov, "American Military Bases Threat to Peace", New Times, 23 February 1949, p. 8.

Thus, in the immediate post-war period the USSR had been much concerned about its security. The policy of containment followed by Washington, the interest shown by the Western Powers in the establishment of governments in the East European countries favourably inclined to them and the setting up of military bases in the close proximity of the USSR were all perceived as a grave threat to Soviet security. Moscow, therefore, deemed it necessary to take certain measures to safeguard its security interests.

## Chapter II

### EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEM : THE BILATERAL ALLIANCES

## Chapter II

### EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEM THE BILATERAL ALLIANCES

The quest for security occupied an important place in the Soviet foreign policy in the post World War II period. Security was "the only aim which over-rides all others" observed D. Fleming.<sup>1</sup> The one and foremost objective of her foreign and defence policies was the formation of a strong dependable security system. The conclusion of bilateral system of alliances in the Eastern Europe was the main feature of the new Soviet security system. In fact alliances always had an important place in the Russian foreign and defence policies. Speaking of alliances, Morgenthau has observed as follows:

Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of powers operating within a multiple-state system. Nations A and B, competing with each other have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative powers positions. (1) They can increase their own power, (2) they can add to their own power the power of other nations, (3) or they can withhold the powers of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armament race when they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances. (2)

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- 1 D. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origin, 1917-1950 (London, 1961), p. 255.
  - 2 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice" in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1969), p. 185.



The USSR adopted all the three ways: (1) The cold war had a tendency to increase the arms race. As far as the conventional forces were concerned, the Second World War had proved the USSR supremacy beyond doubts. In fact the European nations were in such a shattered condition that they could not think of competing with the USSR. It was the USA with which the USSR had to match its forces. The US case was different. It never had a war on its own soil. Unlike other nations, it emerged from the war stronger and more powerful. The war had greatly boosted up its war industries. Above all, Washington had the monopoly of nuclear weapons.

Ever since the Revolution of 1917 the USSR was in search of military doctrine of its own. Subsequently, when the Soviet military doctrine was formulated, it laid emphasis on the ground forces and in that too on the infantry. The purpose of naval and air forces was said to be only to assist the ground forces. This basic concept was confirmed by the Soviet victories in the Second World War. But the bombing of Japan made a world of difference to the entire concept of military warfare. The newly emerged Super Power possessed a weapon for which the USSR had no deterrence. The strategic requirement "to annihilate or to neutralize a power beyond the reach of Soviet infantry, tanks, artillery and tactical air forces was completely

unprecedented in Soviet experience."<sup>3</sup>

The USSR continued its efforts to become a nuclear power while keeping in mind Lenin's teachings that a "truly strong well organized homeland, and a well armed, well provided army are essential for the conduct of war."<sup>4</sup> Efforts were made to strengthen the armies of the Soviet Union as well as those of the East European countries.

It was anticipated that in spite of the nuclear age, the future war would be prolonged and highly mobile, requiring mass armies and placing the utmost strain on the economic and organizational resources of each nation and that the victory could not be achieved by one blow. What Lenin had said after the First World War, still held true, that in modern war "...he who has the best equipment, organization, discipline, and machinery will triumph...it is impossible to exist in modern society without machines and without discipline; one must either master advanced technology or be crushed."

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3 Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1958), p. 11.

4 V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 229.

5 Ibid., p. 229.

While continuing its efforts to become a nuclear power, the USSR also followed a policy of alliances in order to add<sup>to</sup> its power, power of other countries and also withhold that power from adversary. Morgenthau correctly says: "Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliance is, then not a matter of principle but expediency".<sup>6</sup>

According to another author, alliances can be of three types - three ways in which a nation can enlist the cooperation of another country, in order to secure itself against a potential aggressor.

1. Method of counterpoise, i.e. to get the other to join in a common front against the aggressor;

2. Method of Neutralization, i.e. to get the other not to join the aggressor; and

3. Method of transcendence to get the other to join in a general organization for keeping the peace which the aggressor is also free to join, e.g. United Nations.<sup>7</sup>

The Soviet Union followed all the three methods. In the second category comes her treaties with Afghanistan and Iran. The most important is the first category under which comes the mutual aid arrangements. The Soviet Union had nine such bilateral treaties, seven of which were with

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6 Morgenthau, n. 2, p. 185.

7 Ibid.

the East European nations.

These bilateral alliances between the USSR and the East European countries themselves formed the main part of the new Soviet security system. Important factor was that besides the Soviet prodding, these countries themselves were interested in having some security arrangement because like the USSR, they had all been victims of Nazi invasion. This was a favourable factor for the making of alliance system. Morgenthau states:

An alliance requires of necessity a community of interests for its foundation. Thucydides said that 'identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals, and in the 19th century Lord Salisbury put the same thought in the negative by stating that the only bond of union that endures among nations is the absence of 'clashing interests'." (8)

The Soviet Union and the people's democracies of Eastern Europe had a identity of interest in aligning themselves against future German attack.

The system of these alliances had somehow begun well before the World War II came to an end. It was initiated by the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post War Collaboration signed on 12 December 1943. In this treaty "the high contracting parties having mutually agreed to unite in the policy of continuous friendship and friendly collaboration after the war, as well as of

8 Ibid.

<sup>The 8's</sup>  
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mutual assistance", undertook to render each other "military and other assistance and support of all kind in the present war against Germany and all those states which are associated with her acts of aggression in Europe."

(Article I) They also undertook that "if either of them should find itself in the post-war period involved in hostilities with Germany which would resume her 'Drang nach Osten' policy or with any other state which would unite with Germany directly or in any other form in such a war, the other high contracting party will immediately render the contracting party thus involved in hostilities every military and other support and assistance within its disposal."

<sup>9</sup>  
(Article 3).

Thus began, the network of bilateral alliances of Eastern Europe which was completed in 1949 with the signing of treaties by USSR with all East European countries except Albania and also among East European countries themselves. Though the texts of all these treaties were more or less identical, there are certain differences in the casus foederis and the motivating force behind the treaties which make a distinction between them. According to a Western author, the period of concluding alliances can be

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9 Margaret Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946 (London, 1954), pp. 319-20.

divided into four different stages.<sup>10</sup>

The first stage comprises the period from December 1943 to March 1947. During this period, in all seven treaties were signed.<sup>11</sup> The noteworthy aspect of these treaties was that they were all concluded between those countries which had been victims of German aggression. In all these treaty texts, casus foederis arises if any co-signatory is attacked by Germany or its allies. For example, the Article 2 of the GDR-Czechoslovak Treaty provided "High contracting parties undertake to carry out in mutual agreement all measures within their power to obviate any threat of further aggression by Germany or any other state associated with Germany for that purpose either directly or in any other way."<sup>12</sup> (Article 2)

The second stage in the East European alliances system, according to the same author began with the signing of a

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10 P. S. Wandycz, "Soviet System of Alliances in East Central Europe", Journal of Central European Affairs, 16 July 1958, p. 178.

11 Soviet-Czechoslovak, 12 December 1943; Soviet-Yugoslavia, 11 April 1945; Soviet Poland, 24 April 1945- Poland-Yugoslavia, 19 March 1946; Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia, 9 May 1946; Albania-Yugoslavia, 2 July 1946; and Czechoslovakia-Poland, 10 March 1947.

12 Wandycz, n. 10, p. 288.

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in November 1947. In all six treaties were signed between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Albania, during this period from November 1947 to January 1948.<sup>13</sup> The distinctive feature of these treaties is that all of these were between Eastern Central European countries. The Soviet Union was not a party to a single treaty and the initiative was taken, instead of Stalin, by Tito and Dimitrov, premiers of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria respectively. The whole affair began when the two premiers held a meeting in Bled in July-August 1947. In this meeting - the Bled Protocol - they decided about the customs Union of the Balkan countries and thus prepared the way for Balkan Union. The plan was to include Albania and later the other Balkan countries, with the apparent objective of providing the small countries of Eastern Europe a greater manoeuvrability vis-a-vis the USSR. The two leaders started an extensive tour of the capitals of these countries.

In January 1948 a Bulgarian Government delegation headed by premier M. Dimitrov arrived in Bucharest. More important than signing the usual treaty of friendship and mutual assistance - with an ex-enemy state - was what he spoke in a press conference there. He talked of the possibility of an eventual federation of East European nations

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13 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria, 27 November 1947; Yugoslavia-Hungary, 8 December 1947; Albania-Bulgaria, 16 December 1947; Yugoslavia-Rumania, 19 December 1947; Rumania-Bulgaria, 16 January 1948 and Hungary-Rumania, 24 January 1948.

allied to Russia. Saying that such a federation was premature at the moment, he declared that the first step would be a Customs Union between these countries, adding that "when the time is ripe...the peoples of the popular democracies...will decide whether it shall be a federation of states."<sup>14</sup> He said that it would fully co-operate with Russia and if possible would seek trade relations with America, Britain and France on the principle of complete equality.

These plans were viewed with concern by the USSR, as it regarded an absolute control over the policies of these countries as essential for its security. The USSR thought that those plans might go against the Soviet interests as the objectives of the Soviet and Balkan leaders seemed to be moving in different directions. Stalin's objective in concluding the bilateral agreements was to consolidate and secure the predominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern Central Europe. Tito and Dimitrov, on the other hand, regarded them as "union agreements which would first of all unite the Balkans and later the entire area lying between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Adriatic into a federative unit."<sup>15</sup> In this connection

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14 Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 6, 1946-48, p. 9118.

15 Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union's Bilateral Pact System in Eastern Europe", in Kurt London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition (Baltimore, 1966), p. 238.



Brzezinski has remarked as follows:

Whatever the motives, in late 1947 the two leaders - Tito and Dimitrov - were furthering the union not only in response to Soviet prodding but with an increment of personal enthusiasm, which rapidly transformed the venture into their own private little enterprise. (16)

On 28 January 1948, Pravda, in its editorial, strongly condemned the idea of European federation, including a customs union. It asserted that these countries do not need a problematic and artificial federation or customs union.

What they do need is the consolidation and protection of their independence and sovereignty through the mobilization and organization of domestic popular democratic forces, as has been correctly stated in the declaration of the Cominform. (17)

Immediately thereafter Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency published Dimitrov's statement denying that he had ever advocated a regional union and that the question of confederation was hypothetical. No more bilateral alliance agreement of that sort was signed after this episode.

Wandycz observes:

Thus the second phase which was the only one during which the alliance system grew without a clear Russian directive and was in a sense strengthened in spite of Kremlin, at this juncture came to an end. (18)

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16 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, 1960), p. 57.

17 Ibid., p. 57.

18 Wandycz, n. 10, p. 179.

The Soviet Union once again took the initiative. While in the first phase all the treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and Allied countries, the third phase treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and the ex-enemy states, viz., Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.<sup>19</sup> During the second phase, Yugoslavia had concluded pacts with ex-enemy states, namely, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. The USSR too realized that even if during the Second World War these countries were allied to Germany and fought against the USSR, alliances with them were equally important. It is also possible that the Soviet Union intended to isolate Yugoslavia by establishing closer contacts with the ex-enemy states, with whom Yugoslavia had concluded the alliances during November 1947-January 1948. It might be recalled that by the beginning of 1948, the differences between the USSR and Yugoslavia were quite obvious. As Kurt London put it:

By concluding treaties of alliances with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria (1948) Stalin endeavoured to strengthen the ties between these former enemy countries and the Soviet Union and to isolate Yugoslavia in the Balkans. (20)

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19        USSR-Romania, 4 February 1948; USSR-Hungary, 18 February 1948; USSR-Bulgaria; 18 March 1948; and USSR-Finland, 6 April 1948.

20        Meissner, n. 15, p. 240.

Throughout the rest of 1948 and 1949, Soviet alliance system was completed by a series of treaties signed among the East European countries themselves, viz., Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia.<sup>21</sup>

There was a marked difference in the wordings of the treaties of the second and first and third phases. According to the treaty texts of all other phases, except the second one, the casus foederis was confined to aggression initiated by Germany or by a state directly or in any other form allied with Germany in its policy of aggression. But in the treaties of the second phase (1947 November to January 1948) the casus foederis was wide enough to cover aggression by any third state. Accordingly, if one goes strictly by treaty provisions, Rumania would have been obliged to give assistance to Hungary against the military intervention of the Soviet Union in 1956. The same obligation would arise for Hungary and Bulgaria,"should the Soviet Soviet Union go to length of attacking Rumania".<sup>22</sup>

While these treaties were signed, efforts continued, on the part of the USSR to bring Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in

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21 Bulgaria-Czechoslovakia, 23 April 1948; Poland-Bulgaria, 29 May 1948; Poland-Hungary, 18 June 1948; Hungary-Bulgaria, 19 July 1948; Czechoslovakia-Rumania, 21 July 1948; Poland-Rumania, 21 January 1949; and Czechoslovakia-Hungary, 16 April 1949.

22 Meissner, n. 15, pp. 245-46.

line with the other countries. Dimitrov of course denounced all the plans for federation in a statement issued in response to the criticism in Pravda during his visit to Moscow in 1948. Yugoslavia under Tito, however, proved adamant to change its attitude. Rift between USSR and Yugoslavia kept on widening. In 1949 ultimately the Soviet Union and other East European countries broke off all relations with Yugoslavia. The economic and cultural relations were the first to be severed after which these countries annulled the political alliances unilaterally. Tito too was expelled from the Cominform.

Until then, East Germany (German Democratic Republic) had been left out of the alliance system. But in 1950 treaties were signed with GDR also. However, since GDR was still demilitarized, these treaties were called 'treaties of friendship'<sup>23</sup> and not of mutual assistance. The USSR herself did not sign any treaty with the G.D.R.

Thus, the system of bilateral alliances was completed in Eastern Europe. Except the ones signed during the second (November 1947 to January 1948) and the fourth (June to August 1950), phases, the text of the treaties followed a set pattern. First they bound the co-signatories in the defence alliance

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23 Poland signed such treaty with GDR on 5 June 1950; Czechoslovakia on 23 June 1950; Hungary on 26 June 1950; Rumania on 22 August 1950 and Bulgaria on 25 August 1950.

prohibiting them from entering into any coalitions against the interests of one of the signatories. Secondly, they bound the signatories to render assistance in all efforts to protect the peace and oppose any and all aggressive designs on the part of a rearmed Germany and other states allied with her directly or in any other form - thus implying the entire West. Thirdly they made clear the positive qualities of the friendship existing between the signatories by emphasizing mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and equality in their relations. Fourthly, provisions for economic and cultural cooperation were also included.

The changing trend of the bilateral alliances reflected the relationship between the USSR and the East European countries. The period between November 1947 onwards represented the slackening of the USSR control over Yugoslavia, which could be compared to the USSR-Rumanian relations at present. In the 1960s, the bilateral treaties were renewed even months before their expiry date with the exception of Rumania.<sup>24</sup> The renewal of the bilateral treaties also confirmed the importance the bilateral alliances had for the USSR security system. Even after the Warsaw Pact had

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24 Rumanian-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was due for renewal in 1968 but was renewed in 1970 in Bucharest.

come into being, Moscow did not abandon the bilateral network of its alliance system. While the USSR keeps on talking about the all European collective security and dissolution of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it has never committed itself to the dissolution of the bilateral alliances. For if the plan of collective security in Europe materialised, it would, while depriving the West of its powerful military organization, still preserve the system of the interlocking bilateral alliances in East Europe.

Thus, in the early post-World War II period the chief concern of the USSR had been the preservation of her national security. In view of the threats of that period, as perceived by the USSR, a security system was evolved which covered the friendly governments of Eastern Europe linking all of them in an interlocking system of bilateral alliances.

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**Chapter III**

**SOVIET APPRAISAL OF NATO AND FACTORS RESPONSIBLE  
FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE PACT**

## Chapter III

### SOVIET APPRAISAL OF NATO AND FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE PACT

The post-war period in Europe, like the inter-war period, was not devoid of a sense of marked insecurity on the part of concerned states. The USA and the Western Europe on the one hand and the USSR and the People's Democracies on the other engaged themselves in making regional arrangements and blocs. The Cold War beginning soon after the World War II, shattered all hopes for the formation of a kind of a United States of Europe and finally resulted in the division of Europe - the Eastern and the Western. The efforts for integration on the Western side resulted in the formation of quite a few unions and organizations.<sup>1</sup> Except for the Brussels Treaty and the Council of Europe, the others were constituted primarily for economic reasons.

The Brussels Treaty, signed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries, in 1948, provided for all types of assistance including military, in case of an attack on any one of the contracting parties. In the prevailing condition of European weaknesses, economic and military - and in the absence of any U.S. assistance the Treaty was not considered

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1 The Customs Union of Benelux countries came into being in 1948, the Brussels Treaty in 1948; Council of Europe in 1949 and the European Coal and Steel Community in 1949.



an effective guarantee for the defence of West Europe and necessitated the formation of NATO in April 1949. It was signed by twelve European and American countries, namely, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S.A. Greece and Turkey acceded to it in 1952 although they are situated no where near the north Atlantic shores.

The Treaty apart from affirming the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter provided for a highly developed regional defence arrangement. Article five essentially focussing on military assistance read as follows:

...an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties. Such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (2)

The Soviet Union felt concerned about the formation of NATO and Moscow sent memoranda to the various governments concerned maintaining that the Treaty was essentially directed

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2 Facts About NATO, published by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service, Paris (Utrecht, Netherlands, 1959), Annex B, p.1.

against the USSR. It argued:

...since, of the great powers in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, only the USSR is not taking part in the Treaty, it should be regarded as a treaty directed against one of the principal allies of the United States, Great Britain and France in the last war - against the USSR. (3)

Convinced that the Treaty was directed against the Soviet Union, more so in the absence of any mention of the possibility of a German attack, the Kremlin was not inclined to accept the NATO powers contention that NATO was formed to meet the threat to their security and that the military measures envisaged in the Treaty were merely for self-defence. The memorandum stated:

...The implementation by the United States, in cooperation with Great Britain and France in the present peace time circumstances, of broad military measures, including an increase in all kinds of armed forces, the drafting of a plan for the employment of atomic weapons, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, which are a purely offensive weapon, and the construction of a net work of air and naval bases etc. has by no means defensive character. (4)

Maintenance of U.S. military bases in the member states of the NATO was viewed as posing a serious danger to the

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3 Memorandum from USSR Government on the North Atlantic Treaty. Current Digest of Soviet Press, 49-II Quarter 1-14, p. 31.

4 Ibid.

Soviet security. These bases not only helped Washington in providing quick, effective and substantial assistance to its NATO partners, but also offered a distinct advantage in launching attack on the Soviet territory. At a time when the inter-continental ballistic missiles had not made their appearance these bases in such close proximity to the Soviet Union, provided a convenient springboard for launching even nuclear attack. Explaining the American motive in getting Norway into the NATO, one Soviet author pointed out that "...Norway's territory could be used for the building of American naval and air bases at the very door of the Soviet Union."<sup>5</sup>

These fears were not wholly unfounded. Irrespective of its economic and military potentials, the USSR could not expect to have access to such military bases near the territory of the USA. Such fears were openly confirmed even by American sources. As one American author then said:

The US and Soviet Union have been approaching "atomic parity" in terms of their capacity to inflict punishment on each other. Soon the principal advantage which the US and its allies may still enjoy will be the geographical one of being able, in

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5 A. Inzov, "American Military Bases Threat to Peace", New Times (Moscow), no. 9, 23 February 1949, p. 9.

case of Soviet attack, to effect or threaten convergent retaliation from many directions. (6)

Moreover, the memorandum, referred to earlier, also contended that the treaty could not be considered regional in nature for it included states from both the hemispheres of the world and did not serve the purpose of settling any regional disputes.

It was stressed in that memorandum that in the absence of a threat of aggression to any of the member states, the Treaty could not be justified on the grounds of individual and collective self-defence as per Article 51 of the UN Charter. Again, the provision in Article 5 of the Treaty to report to the Security Council after any action had been taken was in clear violation of Article 53 of the UN Charter which required prior authorisation from the Security Council for any enforcement action, the Soviet memorandum added.

Ideologically too, the USSR could not reconcile to such peace time treaties and blocs as NATO, for Lenin has said:

Peaceful alliances prepare the grounds for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars, the one conditions the other giving rise to

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6 Philip E. Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United States: Problems and Prospects", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 303-308, 1956, pp. 195-96.

alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle out of one and the same basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economy and world politics. (7)

Refuting the allegation that the NATO was in response to the Soviet network of alliances, The Soviet memorandum pointed out:

All the Soviet Union's treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the countries of peoples democracies have a bilateral character and are aimed only against the possibility of a repetition of German aggression... Moreover, the USSR has the same treaties against the repetition of German aggression, not only with the countries of peoples' democracies, but also with Great Britain and France. (8)

In marked contrast to bilateral alliances, the NATO was a multilateral treaty forming a close group of states headed by the USA. The USSR even alleged that the Treaty was seen as a step towards the US efforts at world domination. Refusal of NATO states to allow USSR to join their Atlantic Pact seemed to confirm for Kremlin the anti-Soviet character of NATO as also the desire of the USA at world domination. The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement asserted:

It is clear from all this that the purpose of the North Atlantic Pact is to put the reins of as many states as possible in

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7 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, 1953), p. 193.

8 See n. 3, p. 31.

hands of US and British ruling circles, depriving the states of the opportunity, to conduct an independent foreign and domestic policy and employing these states as auxiliary means for realization of aggressive plans aimed at the establishment of Anglo-American world hegemony. (9)

Although Moscow was very critical of NATO and indeed quite vocal in attacking its formation, it did not deem it necessary to take any countervailing measures such as the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for about six years. The primary reason was in its initial years, the NATO was not as strong as it became during 1954-55. During this period its military potential had increased manifold. Between 1950 and 1955 the number of NATO airfields has<sup>d</sup> increased from ten to 142, which the USA could always use against the USSR in case of any emergency. A fifteen-fold increase in the number of war planes and an eight-fold increase in the number of divisions was no less alarming.<sup>10</sup> In addition the NATO was constructing vast pipeline systems<sup>11</sup> running over 4000 miles for oil supply to these bases. The

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9 Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of USSR on North Atlantic Pact, n. 3, I Quarter, 1: 5, p. 13.

10 In 1955 NATO had the capacity to raise 100 divisions and had 6000 planes.

11 See J. P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact (New Delhi, 1973), p. 2.

construction of airfields around the socialist countries was of enormous strategic advantage to the USA - for nearer the bases were located, lesser was the time required for destroying enemy with fewer losses. Obviously, Moscow could not remain indifferent to the presence of a ring of military bases near its borders, as that was a constant threat to the security of the socialist states and a jumping board for the US aggression. "The principal aim of the Soviet leaders, now as under Stalin", observed Philip E. Mosley, "is to eliminate the system of bases which in case of conflict, might support American pressure against the Soviet Union." <sup>12</sup> In that connection, J. P. Jain has remarked as follows:

To the Soviet Union, however, the ring of airfields, which could not be attacked simultaneously, probably caused the greatest anxiety in field of strategy. Marshal G. K. Zhukov told the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union in 1956. 'Never before has the task of defending the interior of our country been so vital a matter as it is today'. (13)

Apart from the apprehensions the USSR nurtured against NATO, in view of considerable increase in its military

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12 Mosely, n. 6, p. 195.

13 Jain, n. 11.

potential, a number of other factors played an important part in the setting up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The internal political condition of the USSR could be said one of them. The death of Stalin in 1953 had created a vacuum in the USSR politics. He had been one of the most autocratic dictators controlling the entire socialist bloc affairs allegedly by keeping it isolated from the rest of the world. Although there had been some signs of cleavage in the system, he managed it with his own skill and ruthlessness. After Stalin's death, there emerged no such strong and powerful leader in the USSR. Various nationalistic tendencies that were submerged till Stalin, began to assert themselves.<sup>14</sup> As one western writer put it, the question faced by Stalin's successors was to satisfy the urges of East European countries in regard to their following more nationalistic course of action especially in their domestic policies but at the same time keep them firmly tied to Moscow,<sup>15</sup> since it was a matter of vital importance for Soviet security. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, which helped in the co-ordination of the policies of East European countries and sought to ensure intra-bloc unity a vital

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14 Sonnenfeldt Helmut, "Foreign Policy from Malenkov to Khrushchev", Problems of Communism, vol. 12, no. 2, 1963, p. 12.

15 Ibid., p. 13.



security issues, was devised to meet the challenge of the time.

The conclusion of London and Paris Agreements in 1954 had also an important bearing on the Soviet decision to set the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Those agreements provided for:

Restoration of full sovereignty to West Germany, its remilitarization and entry into NATO.

Expansion of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 by including Western Germany and Italy and renaming it as Western European Union.

Amendments in the provisions of arms production and armed forces control in W. Germany.

The important fact was that West Germany was not only granted full sovereignty but also was to be remilitarized and to join the West European military blocs. As one Soviet author put it:

The London and Paris Agreements pave the way to West Germany's conversion into a military state, with the resultant reappearance of a centre of revanchism and aggression in the heart of Europe. Therein lies their danger to European peace. (16)

In order to make room for West German entry into the Western European Union (the old Brussels Treaty), the officially proclaimed purpose of the Brussels Treaty had to be amended. The provision "to take such steps as may be held

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16 V. Korovin, "West European Union Menace to European Peace", New Times, no. 47, 1954, p. 6.

necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" was amended to read "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe." (Article 2 Protocol 1).<sup>17</sup>

What sounded ironical in the amendment was the fact that the organization was taking in its fold the very country against which it was originally formed. Referring to the amended article of WEU, one Soviet author comments sarcastically: "Such unity and integration are to be achieved through West European Union, an alliance of seven countries including a remilitarized Western Germany".<sup>18</sup>

The German remilitarization alarmed the USSR and the Eastern European countries alike. For it was too soon to forget the German invasion and the atrocities of the Second World War.

The numerical strength of the West German army was fixed at 520000 instead of 500000. It was also to have strong air units and its old military staffs. In this connection it is worth recalling that the number of the entire German armed forces was restricted to 100,000 men after First World War.<sup>19</sup>

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17 Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, 1952-54, p. 13813.

18 Korovin, n. 16.

19 Ibid.

The USSR visualized the main threat to its security from the USA and accordingly the remilitarization of West Germany was seen by Moscow in that context. It was also assumed that once the West Germany was permitted to rearm itself, there would not be a way out to check it. Although supposedly some sanctions were provided in the Western European Union in case West Germany should cross the prescribed limits, the USSR felt them grossly inadequate. In case the Western Germany should decide to defy the restrictions imposed, there was no definite procedure or method to prevent it from so doing. The only check provided was that the Agency for the control of armaments would report such violations to the Brussels Council which would take its decisions by majority vote. Besides, these limits could always be modified on the recommendation of the NATO Supreme Commander by a majority vote.

As the military powers of the Western European Union were conferred upon and exercised by the NATO Supreme Commander, which was an American General, Moscow felt all the more concerned about the developments. The Soviet commentator Korovin observed:

A number of new powers are conferred on the NATO Supreme Commander in other words, the American army chief; he may determine 'requirements for the provision of logistic resources' (necessary for sustained military operations) and their geographical distribution; determine the order of formation, equipment and maintenance of military units; ...call for reports from individual WEU members regarding the level and effectiveness of their armed forces,

their equipment and supplies, and regarding the organization and distribution of logistic resources, supervise the training of officers and other personnel; make field inspections and so on and so forth.

He further stated:

The power of NATO Supreme Commander in Europe (an American) have been thus extended with the basic purpose of enabling the German militarists, with American support to flout even the nominal restrictions imposed upon Western Germany by the agreements as they now stand. (20)

The Western Powers maintained that Moscow need not have any fear from Western Germany as it has fully agreed to the limits imposed under the Paris agreements. The German Chancellor declared:

...that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons...

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraph IV and V of the attached list. (21)

In this list were included such weapons as long range missiles guided missiles and influence mines; naval vessels other than minor defensive craft.

Although the assurances seemed quite adequate from the point of Western Powers, the Soviet Union remained skeptical

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20 Ibid., p. 5.

21 Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, 1952-54, p. 13811.

about them. It was difficult for them to believe a nation, which within the short span of forty years had twice unleashed world wars, breaking all her previous treaties and agreements. The Soviet fears of West Germany seemed to be confirmed by such remarks of West German spokesmen as: "We will prove that, in the last analysis, the decisive thing is not the provisions of treaties and agreements but the actual correlation of forces".<sup>22</sup>

The USSR could not ignore the above statement and pin its faith in the repeated assurances of the West German Chancellor and the WEU countries. The Soviet doubts were reflected even in the New York Times comment given below:

The new controls provided by the new Treaties are more of an irritant than an insurance. They cannot prevent the emergence of West Germany as the first military power in Western Europe, and they probably will not prevent the re-emergence of a type of German general staff, with the subsequent danger of chauvinism. (23)

The West Germany's inclusion in the NATO was taken as a further proof by the USSR that the western military bloc was directed against the Soviet Union. As West German borders

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22 Herr Neumeier, West German Minister of Justice, quoted in A. Kurov, "The London Conference", New Times, no. 41, 1954, p. 12.

23 Quoted in Korovin, n. 15, p. 5.

were contiguous to the socialist states, the threat emanating from NATO appeared all the more alarming.

Another factor which could be said to influence the Soviet decision to organize the Warsaw Pact was the agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty.<sup>24</sup> Since the end of the Second World War, Austria, like Germany, had been occupied by the Four Allied Powers although ruled by an Austrian Government. In order to maintain supply and communication channels with the Soviet forces in the Soviet zone of Austria, the USSR had stationed her troops in Rumania and Hungary. Once the Treaty was signed with Austria, there could not have been any ostensible ground for the USSR to keep her forces in those countries which it considered vital for her security. The Soviet leadership after Stalin, therefore, thought of finding some justification for maintaining Russian forces in the East European countries. The Warsaw Pact provided a convenient basis for that and Soviets continued to station its forces in those countries. In the wake of the Hungarian crisis the status of forces, agreements were concluded taking Warsaw Pact provisions as the basis.<sup>25</sup>

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24 Question may arise that if the Austrian State Treaty was causing concern, why should the USSR agree for it at all. It could have refused it as it had done in the past. The answer lies in the fact that the USSR had expected two distinct advantages: 1) Knowing well that they could not postpone the treaty indefinitely and that they hoped to get some propaganda value out of signing it; secondly and more important still, they might have hoped that Germany could also be tempted to become an independent unified Germany at the cost of neutralization by agreeing to a similar agreement.

25 For text of the Status of Forces Treaties concluded

It is, thus, clear that the Soviet concern for security was the prime motivating force for the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact. Although conceived six years ago, the NATO became a powerful organ only by 1954-55. Furthermore the German inclusion in it and in the WEU heightened Soviet fears about its security. Besides the history of Germany twice invading their territories, the ratification of the Paris agreements in effect made the boundaries of the socialist states contiguous with that of the NATO and WEU through Western Germany.

It is often argued that the Warsaw Pact was motivated by the need to camouflage the USSR control over the Eastern Europe. That Stalin's death had brought to an end the system which had held together the Eastern European countries under the strict control of the USSR. So the new leadership required institutionalization of the USSR-socialist countries relations and thus maintain the USSR influence in East Europe, which in turn was necessary from the Soviet point of view for obvious security considerations. The agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty made the need of some such arrangement as the Warsaw Treaty more urgent and thus hastened the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact.

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(previous footnote contd.)

between USSR-Poland, December 1956; USSR-GDR, March 1957; USSR-Rumania, April 1957; USSR-Hungary, May 1957. See J.P. Jain, n. 11, pp. 220, 237, 247, 255. See also Richard F. Staar, The Communist Regimes of Eastern Europe: An Introduction (Stanford, Calif., 1967), p. 260.

Chapter IV

THE MOSCOW AND WARSAW CONFERENCES



## Chapter IV

### THE MOSCOW AND WARSAW CONFERENCES

The Moscow Conference for safeguarding European Peace and Security (29 November-2 December 1954) was jointly convened by the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to examine a plan of collective security system for Europe. It was necessitated, according to the delegates to the Conference, by the changing situation in Europe, mainly the anticipated ratification of the Paris agreements. Though all the European countries and the USA were invited,<sup>1</sup> the Conference was attended only by eight East European countries, viz. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. The USA, the UK and France, in their identical replies, advanced the following reason for their non-participation in the Conference: (1) That the USSR note of 13 November 1954 did not contain any proposition which had not been already discussed by the big four powers; (2) The USSR reference to German elections without any further clarification as to how it proposed to conduct it, was nothing new; (3) The Conference was aimed at preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements while the United States Government on its part was resolved to bring the Paris agreements into force as soon as possible and they did not intend to be deflected from that course.<sup>2</sup> Similar

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1 For the Soviet invitation see "Note of the Soviet Government to the Governments of Europe and the U.S.A.", New Times (Moscow), no. 46, Supplement, 13 November 1954, pp. 2-4.

2 Reply from the Three Western Powers, 29 November 1954, Documents on International Affairs 1954 (London, 1957), p. 62.

response was made by other western countries. In the prevailing cold war situation, the West was as obsessed of the expansion of communism as the USSR was of western imperialism. The statements of the socialist states ignored the western arguments and found no justification for the Western contention that the Moscow Conference was convened at a very short notice.<sup>2A</sup>

The conference was inaugurated by the Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. In his speech he apprised the international situation arising out of the anticipated ratification of the Paris agreements. He recalled the pre-Second World War events to draw attention to the aggressive German nature. After the First World War various restrictions were imposed on the German forces and arms production; guarantees were given by Britain and France to a number of nations of Eastern Europe against a German attack, yet Germany did commence the war and invaded the East European countries. Molotov further stated that while talks of West German remilitarisation were going on, Adenauer, the West German Chancellor had begun speaking like Hitler. In 1952, he held that rearmament of West Germany must be a preparatory step to the establishment of a new order in

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2A V. M. Molotov, "Statement", New Times (Moscow), no. 9, Supplement, 4 December 1954, p. 15.

Eastern Europe. Molotov viewed this as an indication of aggressive designs of West German leadership, for, the 'new order' in Eastern Europe merely meant the German domination. Molotov concluded his speech by asking the participating peace-loving countries to take adequate measures should the Paris agreements be ratified. He said:

If their security is to be firmly guaranteed, the peaceful European states must cement their forces and strengthen them considerably in the event of the Paris agreements being ratified and implemented. For this they must duly prepare to adopt such measures for strengthening their defensive power as the present situation calls for. (3)

Molotov's speech was followed by statements from various representatives of the other participating countries. Unfailingly all of them agreed to what Molotov had said regarding the international situation and the threats posed by West German remilitarization and its entry into NATO and WEU.

The delegates invariably criticized ineffectiveness of the guarantee system, which according to some had rather encouraged Germany by providing it with more time, to proceed in her aggrandizement plans at the cost of the East European countries. Very often the guarantors could not be depended upon. The Czech delegate aptly observed: "The

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3      Ibid., p. 15.

West European guarantors did not lift a finger when in March 1939 their Munich partner unceremoniously swallowed up what remained of the Czechoslovak Republic"<sup>4</sup>.

Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, G.D.R., Hungary, Poland and Rumania, all these countries recalled the history to describe their political and economic exploitation in the past by Germany. Chivu Stoica, the Rumanian Premier explained as to how the German-Rumanian economic agreement of 1939 turned the latter into a supplier of essential raw materials, oil and grains which Germany utilized in the Second World War. The damage resulting from the Nazi domination ran in 10,000 million lei - the equivalent of twelve annual Rumanian budgets.<sup>5</sup> Hungary complained that Germany with the co-operation of the fascist regime in Hungary monopolised its foreign trade especially the most important raw materials, like bauxite - 96% of which was exported to Germany. During the German occupation and the war, 40.2% of Hungary's national wealth was destroyed. The war losses equalled seven years national income.<sup>6</sup> Similar grievances were expressed by other countries too.<sup>7</sup> The Polish premier

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4 Viliam Sisoky, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 30.

5 Chivu Stoica, 'Statement, *ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

6 Andras Hegedus, 'Statement', *ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

7 For Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, see *ibid.*, pp. 44, 60 and 26 respectively.

reflected the views of all other delegates when he recalled the devastation suffered by his country in the Second World War when he remarked:

We paid with six years of suffering with six million dead, with the devastation of our country and destruction of its towns and villages. Can anyone permit of the possibility of that situation being repeated? (8)

The participants in the conference were against any such repetition and in favour of strong measures being taken to avoid any such possibility.

Discussing the crucial question dealing with the Paris agreements, it was felt that the remilitarization of Western Germany and its incorporation into military alliances like WEU and NATO not only posed a serious threat to peace and security of the European nations but also rendered the reunification of Germany difficult. In the words of the Polish Premier:-

First, Germany would remain divided. And the continued division of Germany is bound to aggravate international relations in Europe and consequently, heighten the dangers of war. Second, ratification of the Paris agreements would mean the establishment of a new military alignment of several countries pitted against other European countries, Poland among them. This would bring on the division of Europe. (9)

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8 Jozef Cyrankiewicz, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 19.

9 *Ibid.*, p.21..

Apart from the above mentioned grievances and apprehensions, GDR and Czechoslovakia had other reasons to be concerned about the remilitarization of West Germany. By virtue of their geographical situation, their western borders were contiguous with that of the Western Germany, making their position more vulnerable to a West German attack. These countries feared that the West and mainly the USA would make use of Western Germany and West Berlin as a base against them. As the Czechoslovak Premier put it:

The hostile activities organized from West German territory against our Republic would undoubtedly be intensified if the Paris agreements were implemented and West Germany remilitarized and made a party to aggressive blocs. (10)

In addition, the GDR Premier Grotewohl thought that ratification of Paris agreements would prejudice the case for German reunification and endeavoured to dissuade FRG from joining the Western defence arrangements. He cited the following clauses of the Paris agreements in that connection:

The Federal Republic agrees that, from the entry into force of the arrangement for the German defense contribution, forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic (Article 4).

In view of the international situation ...the three powers retain the rights and

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10      Viliam Siroky, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 29.

responsibilities theretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. (Article 2). (11)

Grotewohl used the above mentioned argument to prove that the Paris agreements were not in consonance with the sovereign status of West Germany. There would remain foreign forces on the land for fifty more years to come. Still worse "...would rob the German people of the right to work out the reunification of their country themselves.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, it was obvious that all the East European countries represented at the Moscow conference took a grim view of the Paris agreements and had grave apprehensions about their security interests. They were not satisfied with the various controls and restrictions suggested in the agreements against the resurgence of the German militarism. They could not obviously ignore the events of pre-Second World War period except to their own peril.

A declaration issued at the end of the conference, besides summing up the various views expressed therein regarding the dangers and threats implicit in the Paris agreements, also emphasized the decision of the participating

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11 Ibid., p. 38.

12 Ibid., p. 38.

countries to take precautionary measures should the Paris agreements were ratified.

### The Warsaw Conference

Soon after the ratification of the Paris Agreements the participants in the Moscow conference met again in Warsaw from 11 May to 14 May 1955. The East European countries gathered in Warsaw in order to formalize their multilateral arrangement since they had failed to dissuade the West to give up its plans of strengthening NATO by inclusion of FRG.

Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in his statement described the threats inherent in the Paris agreements to the peace and security of the socialist bloc in particular and Europe in general. He told the conference that Britain and France had aligned themselves with the militarist Germany in contradiction to their war time agreements with the USSR. Therefore the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed decrees on 7 May annulling them.

The USSR believed that the international security could not be achieved so long as international tensions and arms race continued. In order to reduce the international tensions, outstanding issues such as those of Austria and

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13 The Paris agreements came into force on 5 May 1955.



Germany should be decided by peaceful negotiations. Austrian<sup>14</sup> question was expected to be decided soon. The question of Germany was more complicated. Remilitarization and inclusion of western Germany in WEU and North Atlantic bloc, he observed, would prove to be a chief obstacle in the reunification of Germany. On the other hand, division of Germany, Bulganin argued, would inevitably aggravate international tension, accelerate the already rapid arms race and thus jeopardize the European peace. The only way to avert such consequences was to build an all European Collective Security System. Faced with the ratification of Paris agreements and the refusal of the West European countries to accept an all European collective security system, the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies was seen as a direct threat to their security. The multilateral arrangement devised at the Warsaw Conference, the Warsaw Pact was said not to prejudice the idea of collective security in Europe. Bulganin explained:

...the conclusion of such a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance would not imply that the parties to the treaty would relinquish further attempts to create an all European Collective Security System... its parties will continue to strive unflaggingly for the establishment of an all-European Collective Security System. (15)

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- 14 Austrian State Treaty was signed in Vienna on 15 May 1955.
- 15 N. A. Bulganin, New Times, 21 May 1955, no. 21, Supplement, p. 15.

From the above statement it appeared that while establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union was not inclined to give up its insistence on the European Collective Security System. By laying emphasis on it the USSR thought of keeping the USA out from European affairs, thereby strengthening its own power position in the continent. It also enabled Moscow to preserve its diplomatic initiative towards weakening the Western alliance system.

Another important feature of Bulganin's speech was his reference to arms control. On 10 May 1955 Moscow had made a proposal of gradual reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. The proposal provided for a programme of two years in two stages of one year each. It suggested a control system too. Bulganin concluded his statement by expressing the USSR desire for peace and security in Europe and, while maintaining that the USSR did not believe in the policy of strength, warned the western countries: "the positions of strength policy is a double-edged weapon. If one side builds up strength, the other side is compelled to do likewise."<sup>16</sup>

The delegates of all the other countries participating in the Warsaw Conference agreed with Bulganin that the situation was taking turn exactly the way the Moscow conference had anticipated. Therefore, they all affirmed that some effective measures must be taken in the face of

the new challenging situation. While accusing the Western Powers, especially the USA, of pursuing an anti-Polish policy the Polish delegate maintained that they were supporting the reactionary and revisionist elements in West Germany. Instead of working for German re-unification and co-operation in international relations, he observed:

...they /the Western Powers/ are enmeshing Western Europe in a net work of military bases, firing ranges, airfields and munitions depots. More the United States has supplied its troops in Western Germany with atomic weapons and is working to build up a system of strategic bases directed against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally. (17)

He believed that it would have been better if the West too, instead of making the militarized West Germany an ally, joined hands with the Eastern Europe in order to keep the German militarism in check. In that case, he asserted, either Germany would not be allowed to remilitarize or effective controls and limitations would have been imposed on its military might. He quoted Stalin in support of his argument:

There can be no doubt that if this barrier in the East is supplemented by a barrier in the West, that is by an alliance between our countries and our allies in the West, it may be boldly asserted that German aggression will be curbed, and it will not be easy to run riot. (18)

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17 Jozef Cyrankiewicz, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 26.

18 Stalin, quoted by Cyrankiewicz, *ibid.*, p. 29.

Attempts were also made to dissuade FRG from going along with the Paris agreements. The GDR Premier maintained that the agreements only talked about rendering FRG sovereign. But, "its 'sovereignty' is limited to the right to arm and to be brought into NATO, that tool of America's plans for winning world supremacy."<sup>19</sup>

According to Grotewohl Prime Minister of GDR all talk of Germany's sovereignty was a hoax. In support he narrated a story about Dulles. Asked about guarantees against FRG entering into negotiations for reunification, Dulles replied in the Senate that under the Paris agreements the Western Powers could simply forbid any such negotiations. Grotewohl accused the West German rulers for selling the nation to the USA for the next fifty years and thus spoiling all possibilities of reunification. He placed before the German people a clear choice of peaceful reunion or re-militarization and division.<sup>20</sup> Obviously with the Paris agreements, the rulers of Western Germany had chosen the latter, i.e. division, although, Grotewohl maintained, the German people were against it.

Explaining the essential characteristics of the Warsaw Treaty he stated:

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19 Otto Grotewohl, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 33.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

The Paris agreements deprive the Germans in the Western part of our country of the right to work for peaceful democratic reunification. In contrast the Warsaw Treaty...leaves the GDR complete freedom to negotiate for peaceful reunification. (21)

Other delegates too voiced similar sentiments.

For instance, the Bulgarian representative remarked:

Though the Paris agreements have complicated the task of unifying Germany and building a collective security system, that task remains the most important of all, and we must never relax our efforts to accomplish it. (22)

The Polish Premier sought to make the system of all-European collective security look more attractive. He said:

A system ... which enables every country to make its contribution, commensurate with its strength and potentialities to the safeguarding of peace. An organization which is not directed against any country, in which no one is discriminated against, which unites rather than divides the nations and which affords a rightful place the whole German nation...." (23)

All the delegates repeated what they had already stated in the Moscow conference about the threats emanating from the Paris agreements to their security and peace. Bulgaria made special mention of its geographical situation

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21 Ibid., p. 38.

22 Vylko Chervenkov, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 57.

23 Cyrankiewicz, *ibid.*, p. 25.

of being near Greece and Turkey - both members of NATO.

Vylko Chervenkov represented the views of all the delegates when he said:

It is now more imperative than ever for the European countries to unite, strengthen their forces, heighten their vigilance and work out the most effective methods of opposing the implementation of the Paris agreements. (24)

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Treaty) was signed on 14 May 1955 by the participants in the Warsaw Conference and a joint command of the treaty states was also established.

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24 Chervenkov, 'Statement', *ibid.*, p. 57.

**Chapter V**

**THE WARSAW TREATY - ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE**

## Chapter V

### THE WARSAW TREATY - ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The aim of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, more commonly known as the Warsaw Pact, the contracting parties to the Treaty assert, is to safeguard the peace and security in Europe, the inviolability of their territories and the interests of the peaceful labours of their people. Although the Western opinion regards that Treaty as a tool of Soviet diplomacy, it can be said that it plays an important role in the Soviet foreign policy.

The preamble of the Treaty takes note of the situation created in Europe through the ratification of the Paris agreements, remilitarization of Western Germany and its inclusion in the WEU and in the NATO, which, it is stated, constitutes a threat to the national security of the "peaceable states", i.e. the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. The preamble also affirms its faith in the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter.<sup>1</sup>

The Treaty organization at the initial stage consisted of two main bodies: (1) the Political Consultative Committee and (2) the Joint Command of Pact Armed Forces. The Politi-

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<sup>1</sup> Preamble of the Treaty. See Appendix.



cal Consultative Committee<sup>2</sup> in which all the member states were to be represented by "a member of its government or another specifically appointed representative" for that purpose, was to co-ordinate all activities of the Pact except purely military matters. It was to meet twice a year and discuss all international affairs of interest. It was further authorized to set up such auxiliary bodies as it deemed necessary.

The Joint Command of the Pact Forces provided under Article 5 of the Treaty filled up a much desired gap. It may be regarded as one of the most important clauses of the Treaty. It was by virtue of this clause that the parties were obliged to strengthen their defensive power, render collective assistance in the event of an armed attack and also provide "defence against possible aggression." As the Joint Command was expected to be invariably under a Soviet General, it enabled Moscow to exercise supervision over the military and defence policies of the East European states.

Article 3 provides for mutual consultations in case of a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Contracting Parties, while Article 4 spoke of individual and collective self-defence in the event of an actual armed

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2 See Appendix, Article 6.

attack. Article 4 reads:

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security. (3)

Thus, an attack on one party is considered as an attack on all the parties. The Article also provides that any enforcement action so taken shall be reported to the Security Council of the UNO. Mention may at this stage be made of the marked difference between the Warsaw Treaty and other bilateral alliances. While six of these bilateral alliances<sup>4</sup> contained a provision for mutual assistance in case of an armed attack by any state, the rest of them were restricted to mutual assistance only in case of an attack by Federal

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3 See para 2 of the Article 4. Appendix.

4 Treaties between Yugoslavia-Bulgaria, 27 November 1947; Yugoslavia-Hungary, 8 December 1947; Albania-Bulgaria, 19 December 1947; Romania-Bulgaria, 16 January 1948; and Hungary-Romania, 24 January 1948.

Republic of Germany or by a state or group of states in alliance with F.R.G. The Warsaw Treaty on the other hand, provided for immediate assistance in the event of an armed attack in Europe by any state or group of states. Secondly in spite of the interlocking nature of these alliances, co-ordination of the assistance under them was beset with practical difficulties. In order to overcome these shortcomings, Article 5 of the Treaty provided for the establishment of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, by which collective assistance in the event of an armed attack was given a practical shape.

The Warsaw Treaty was thus a step towards ensuring security not only of the East European countries, but also that of the USSR. The USSR could now think of defending its own territory and indeed other East European countries more effectively in the event of an external invasion.

Article 8 of the Treaty speaks of the maintenance of friendly relations and co-operation in economic and cultural relations, respect for independence and sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of any state. Commenting on it, one Soviet writer has remarked: "...the Treaty is imbued from beginning to end with respect for the sovereignty and independence for its parties and rules out all interference in their internal affairs." <sup>5</sup> Jozef Cyrankiewicz,

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5 V. Berezhkov, "At the Warsaw Conference," New Times, no. 20, 14 May 1955, p. 10.

Premier of Poland observed: "This Treaty will protect our sovereign rights and will be their effective guarantee. It will ensure their mutual defense of the sovereignty of all its signatories."<sup>6</sup>

The principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference were further reaffirmed in the Soviet Declaration of 30 October 1956 which stated:

United as they are by the common ideals of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of this great Commonwealth of socialist nations can build their relations with one another only on a basis of full equality, respect for each other's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. (7)

The above mentioned precepts were not actually followed in actual practice. The Soviet action during the Hungarian crisis in 1956 and the intervention of five Warsaw Pact States (excluding Romania and Albania) in Czechoslovakia in 1968, amounted to violation of the noble principles of respect for sovereignty, equality and non-intervention enshrined in the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty as also the Soviet Declaration of 30 October 1956.

The intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the

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6 Jozef Cyrankiewicz, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 10.

7 J. P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact (New Delhi, 1973), p. 168.

five Warsaw Pact forces has been much criticized. Even among the bloc nations the USSR could not get support of all of them. Rumania not only did not associate itself with the action taken in Czechoslovakia but its President Ceausescu even observed:

The Warsaw Pact was conceived of at its creation, as a tool for the collective defense of the member nations against imperialist attack and aggression. Not for a moment did we think of the Warsaw Pact as a reason to justify interference in the internal affairs of other nations. (8)

However, the USSR sought to defend its action with the help of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine" of "limited sovereignty," enunciated by the Soviet leaders at the fifth Congress of the Polish Communist Party in November 1968. According to that concept the socialist countries were justified in taking "direct action" against another socialist country in the case of actions threatening the common interests of the Socialist camp.

By virtue of the Article 9, the Treaty is accessible to all states, which wish to join and express their willingness to assist in uniting their efforts for the maintenance of peace and security. Emphasizing the importance of this clause one writer has pointed out:

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8 Ceausescu, quoted in Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance", Survey, no. 70-71, Winter-Spring, 1969, p. 96.

This [Article 9] is a sharp contrast to the Western military alliances, which fence themselves off from other countries by ideological economic and similar barriers. The formation of such exclusive alliances is in itself a hostile act towards 'other minded' states. These western military blocs are pitted against other nations, and therefore bar the way to a system of collective security. (9)

Another writer has remarked:

The essence of military blocs lies in their exclusive character. The exclusive bloc is directed inevitably against those who are not allowed to take part in it. The essence of peaceful treaty is defined by its open character, by its being open to any other state expressing readiness to cooperate with its participants for peace.... (10)

Further commending the Warsaw Treaty, he says:

The Warsaw Treaty is a Treaty of altogether different type. Like all the peaceful alliances to which the USSR is a party - the alliances which are confronted with aggressive groupings... it's an alliance of forces of peace and progress, functioning in the interest of the independence and freedom of each of the countries taking part in it. (11)

Furthermore, it is asserted that the Warsaw Treaty is merely meant to serve as a stop-gap arrangement. This is clarified in Article 11 which in the first instance

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9 Bereztkov, n. 5, p. 10.

10 M. Lachs, "Warsaw Agreement and Question of Collective Security", International Affairs, October 1955, pp. 57-58.

11 Ibid.

provides a tenure of twenty years for the Treaty and thereafter provides that:

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose for which contracting parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force. (12)

Although it is maintained that the Warsaw Treaty is quite different from the aggressive NATO bloc, a close comparison of the two treaties reveals certain similarities:

Both the treaties affirm the principles of the UN Charter. Identical provisions are found for mutual consultation in case of a threat of an armed attack.<sup>13</sup>

Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact and the Article 5 of the NATO provide for all possible assistance including the use of armed forces by the other member countries in case of an attack on one or more of the parties to the Treaty. Similarly under Article 7 and Article 8 of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO respectively, the Contracting Parties declare that they would refrain from undertaking any obligations conflicting with the treaties and also state that their existing commitments do not conflict with the respective treaty provisions. A tenure of twenty years is provided for in both the treaties.

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12 Article 11, para 2, See Appendix.

13 Article 3 of the Warsaw Pact and Article 4 of the NATO.

While the Warsaw Treaty proposed its dissolution in the event of an establishment of an All-European Collective Security System, the NATO did not contain any such provision. The Warsaw Treaty states further emphasize the marked difference between the two, and in particular its openness as compared with the NATO which is regarded as a restricted organization of states with similar political and social structures. It is argued that:

The Warsaw Treaty is clearly not to the taste of bourgeois press, which tried to present it as a 'double of NATO'. Imperialist propaganda did that in an attempt to justify the existence of its aggressive blocs making them out to be defensive ones. But the eight nation treaty has nothing in common with such restricted military alignments as North Atlantic bloc and WEU. (14)

Commenting on the contribution which the Warsaw Pact was expected to make to the security of the USSR and other East European countries and stressing the defensive and peaceable nature of the Warsaw Treaty, one Soviet writer had observed:

The Warsaw Treaty is not meant to continue the arms race. But strength cannot be a Western monopoly. The defensive measures worked out at Warsaw must induce any would be aggressor to reflect. The imperialist has no reason to reckon that they can achieve superiority in strength over the

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14 M. Slavyanov, "Firm Foundation of European and Universal Security", International Affairs (Moscow) June 1955, p. 21.



peace-loving countries. The relation of the forces of peace and of aggression is increasingly changing to the disadvantage of the instigators of a new war. The economic and defensive might of the Socialist camp is steadily rising. (15)

It was hoped that the Treaty would prove a great warning to the German militarists and their patrons against repeating military adventures in Europe.

### Significance

According to Professor Korbonski, the Warsaw Pact had four possible uses for the USSR:<sup>16</sup>

- A) As a mutual defense organization strengthening the area militarily against West Germany and the NATO;
- B) as a legal tool enabling Soviet troops to be stationed in the territories of its East European allies;
- C) as a tool of Soviet diplomacy, especially as a counterbalance to NATO in East-West negotiations; and
- D) as a formal bond linking the USSR to the rest of the bloc and replacing the discredited Stalinist control devices.

The USSR and the peoples democracies of Europe already had an organization in the shape of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) since 1949 for intra-bloc economic

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15 Ibid., p. 23.

16 Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact", International Conciliation, no. 573, May 1969, p. 23.

and trade relations. But despite the bilateral alliances, these countries lacked a common defence organization. The Warsaw Treaty facilitated the coordination of the defence and political policies of the socialist states of Europe. It greatly increased the defensive might of the Contracting Parties. The people's democracies, one Soviet commentary observed, "will be able to utilize the wealth of experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces and up-to-date military equipment."<sup>17</sup> The USSR derived substantial advantages from the pact namely, if there was an attack by conventional force in Europe, it could fight out the enemy on its front line much far off from its own borders. Moreover:

The difficulty of deploying substantial reinforcements from the USSR, in the event of nuclear war makes an effective Warsaw Pact force, already in place close to the arena of European conflict, a highly attractive project. (18)

The stationing of Soviet troops in some of the East European countries, which had been important in both military and political context, was much facilitated by the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact. It was on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty

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17 Editorial, International Affairs (Moscow), 19 May 1955, p. 10.

18 The Warsaw Pact, Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs, A Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd session, p. 11.

that the subsequent bilateral status of forces agreements were entered into. Commenting on this aspect, one western writer has remarked:

The stationing of Russian troops in Eastern European countries, notably in Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Eastern Germany which until then /I.e. till the conclusion of Austrian State Treaty/ had been justified by the need to maintain communications with the Russian occupation zones in Germany and Austria, was now guaranteed by bilateral treaties. (19)

Although the Warsaw Treaty nowhere expressly provided for the stationing of the Soviet troops in any of the East European countries, it nevertheless served as a pretext for the USSR to justify the presence of its forces in other East European countries in the name of that Treaty and for safeguarding the security of the contracting parties. Politically too the stationing of troops helped to enhance the Soviet influence in the countries concerned. The forces stationed in those countries proved extremely useful during the Hungarian and Polish crises in 1956.

However in the wake of the Hungarian crisis Moscow deemed it necessary to conclude specific status of forces agreements with Poland, Hungary, Rumania and GDR.

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19 Felix Gilbert, (History of Modern Europe) The End of the European Era 1890 to the Present (London, 1971), p. 354. By the term 'bilateral treaties' the author here means the status of forces agreements.

Thirdly, the Warsaw Pact greatly facilitated the coordination of the foreign policies of the East European countries and strengthened the Soviet hands in any bargaining process with the West. Thus, in the formation of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty states got parity with NATO Powers - each accounting for half of the membership of that Committee. Moreover, the dissolution of NATO along with the Warsaw Pact held special attraction for the USSR. In that eventually, while the Western Powers would lose their most important military organization in Europe, the USSR would have retained its bilateral alliances. The anticipated withdrawal of the U.S. forces and influence from Europe with the dissolution of these military organizations and coming into being of an all-European Collective Security System, was bound to add to the Soviet strength and serve its interests.

The fourth possible use of the Warsaw Pact, according to Korbonski was to provide a convenient arrangement to take the place of crude Stalinist methods of controlling East European states. A US Senate Committee Report has commented as follows in this regard:

The establishment of the pact was in part an outgrowth of the desire of Russia's post-Stalin leadership to replace the methods of Stalin, which were no longer practicable, with a new mechanism for maintaining its position as the supreme arbiter of Soviet bloc affairs. (20)

The new leadership after Stalin realized the necessity of taking into account the views and susceptibilities of the leadership of the East European countries. Khrushchov conceded that there could be different ways and means to achieve socialism depending on historical and national features. The provision about joint consultation on all major issues signified that "the Stalinist technique of bilateralism", as Brzezinski pointed out, was abandoned.<sup>21</sup>

It is worth mentioning here that while the USSR benefited from the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, the interests of the East European countries were not completely overlooked. All these states had a growing fear of German militarism and felt concerned about the rearming of West Germany. Remembering their suffering at the hands of Hitler during the Second World War, all of them felt the need of taking some reassuring measures. The Western Power policies, in the atmosphere of Cold War, were not less disturbing to the socialist countries of East Europe. Therefore, it is not quite off the mark to <sup>conclude</sup> [ ] that the Warsaw Pact was essentially based on "mutual self-interest", to use the words of Brzezinski, of the Contracting Parties.

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21 Brzezinski Zbigniew, Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, 1960), p. 171.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

## Chapter VI

### CONCLUSION

The dangers to the Russian security had largely come from the European powers, who, launched attacks on the Soviet territory more than once, through the East European countries. The East European nations had never been strong enough to resist any such attempt on the part of the aggressors. Russia sought to safeguard its security interests by insulating East Europe from hostile influences. Still it had to face the attack by Hitler Germany. After the World War II, however, the USSR got an opportunity to establish and consolidate its influence in the eastern part of Europe and thereby ensure its security in a more effective way.

In the immediate post World War II period, the US had monopoly of nuclear weapons and had propounded the policy of 'containment' of communism and Soviet influence. Washington had also established a large number of military bases on the periphery of the USSR and people's democracies of Europe. All this was interpreted as a threat to Soviet security.

As a result of the communist governments, which Moscow succeeded in establishing in East European countries, the USSR was able to conclude a series of bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance

with those friendly states. With the help of these interlocking treaties, all the countries of Eastern Europe came to be closely linked with one another. These treaties, however, confined every military and other assistance to other contracting party, only in case, an attack was launched by Germany or any other state allied to Germany - directly or in any other form.

The West on its part felt concerned about the expansion of communism and the fast growing Soviet influence in Europe. Even in some of the West European nations, such as France and Italy, the communist parties wielded considerable influence. The Czechoslovak communist coup of March 1948 particularly alarmed the Western Powers, who reacted to it by concluding Brussels Treaty. The U.K., France and the Benelux countries were its members but without the participation of the United States that arrangement was not considered enough in the prevailing situation. This led to the formation of North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), in which the USA occupied a prominent place. Under the NATO provision, an attack on any one of the Contracting Parties was considered an attack on all; and in such situation the parties were obliged to take immediate action in the matter. Yet NATO in the beginning was not quite strong, hence it did not present any direct threat to the security of the Soviet Union or its allies. Gradually, however, it grew



stronger and stronger with the building up of a large number of airfields around the Soviet Union and the construction of a vast pipe line system, etc. Yet in view of conventional superiority enjoyed by the USSR, it was considered necessary by the Western Powers to enlist the manpower strength of, and base facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The earlier attempts to induct West Germany into NATO proved abortive with the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954. But the ratification of the Paris agreements on 5 May 1955 made possible the remilitarization of Germany and its integration and admission within the powerful NATO.

The Soviet Union would not remain unconcerned about these developments. The rearmament of West Germany and Bonn's adhesion to NATO, observed Warsaw Treaty text, not only increased "the danger of another war" but also "constituted a threat to the national security of the peaceable states."<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the bilateral system of alliances of the late forties was considered inadequate and the socialist states of East Europe, who had all suffered terribly at the hands of the Nazi Germany, deemed it necessary to conclude a multilateral pact, known as the Warsaw Treaty

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1 See Appendix I.

Organization, on 14 May 1955, just 9 days after the ratification of the Paris agreements.

A number of other factors speeded up the process of the formation of the Warsaw Pact. One of these was the realization by the new leadership that came into power in the Kremlin after Stalin's death that the earlier Stalinist crude methods of controlling East European countries were outworn and that what was required under the new circumstances was the devising of new methods to influence and coordinate the policies of the friendly east European socialist states. Another important factor in the making of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was the agreement to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty, after which it became difficult for the USSR to maintain its troops in Hungary and Romania.

There was no specific provision in the Warsaw Treaty about the stationing of the Soviet troops on the territory of the signatory states. The Joint Command was no doubt established but the disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the contracting parties was subject to "agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence."<sup>2</sup> However, in the

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2 See Appendix II.

wake of the Hungarian crisis, when the Soviet Union concluded various agreements on the status of Soviet forces on the territories of the signatory states, Moscow based those agreements on the Warsaw Treaty.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact had considerably helped in augmenting the military strength of the east European states, given them confidence against the growing German danger and has served the mutual interests of the signatory states. The Soviet Union derived many benefits out of the Warsaw Treaty. Besides facilitating the stationing of Soviet troops in the territories of East European states, the Warsaw Pact helped Kremlin to strengthen and consolidate its influence in East Europe by more sophisticated methods and to secure a better bargaining position in the East-West negotiations. It is no wonder that the Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech at the CPSU Congress on 30 March 1971, had observed that the Warsaw Pact had been and still remained "the main centre of co-ordinating the fraternal countries' foreign policies."<sup>3</sup>

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3 Quoted in Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, 1971), p. 165.

APPENDIXES

## Appendix I

### THE WARSAW TREATY

The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic 14 May 1955\*

The Contracting Parties,

reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe;

mindful, at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western European Union", with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs,

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

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\* New Times (Moscow), no. 21, May 1955, supplement, pp. 65-67.

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic;

the President of the German Democratic Republic: Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic;

the State Council of the Polish People's Republic: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian Peoples Republic: Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.;

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic,

who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

#### Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the

adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

### Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

### Article 4

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

### Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

## Article 6

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

## Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

## Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the other and non-interference in their internal affairs.

## Article 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

## Article 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.



The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

#### Article 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

## Appendix II

### Establishment of a Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance 14 May 1955\*

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to establish a Joint Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defence or other military leaders of the signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.

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\* New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, supplement, p. 68.

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