

STATE RESPONSES TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF INDIA, ISRAEL AND SRI LANKA

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CERTIFICATE

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
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CONTENTS

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CHAPTERS

I	INTRODUCTION	1-32
II	UNDERSTANDING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS	33-65
III	CASE STUDIES	66-97
IV	STATES RESPONSES TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE	98-133
V	CONCLUSION	134-142
APPENDIX 1	SIGNIFICANT ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS	143-144
APPENDIX 2	TOOLS AND TACTICS	145
APPENDIX 3	STATE RESPONSES	146-149
BIOGRAPHY		150- 160

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to understand current trends in asymmetric warfare between a state actor and a non-state actor. It uses case studies to understand and analyse state response to various tools and tactics used by an asymmetric actor. The three main cases examined here are India and Kashmir militancy, Israel and Hamas, and Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The history of strategic ideas and the classical understanding of warfare since World War I were largely built on the assumption that wars would take place among state actors. A new entity, the non-state actor, brought to the centre-stage by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has challenged the state's authority and sovereignty much more seriously than ever before. This unexpected terrorist assault on the United States can be considered to be the beginning of the end of Clausewitz's theory of wars between the states and the concept of the conventional adversary's "centre of gravity".¹ This incident can be viewed as an example of a non-state actor's 'victory' over a superpower.

Historically, weak powers have sought to avoid an opponent's strengths and instead attempted to exploit the latter's weaknesses. But the application of hitherto unexplored and innovative means for attacking an adversary's weaknesses is termed as "asymmetric warfare". In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all wars. But in the modern context, asymmetric warfare emphasises what is popularly perceived as unconventional or non-traditional methodologies.²

The absence of any detailed study analysing the asymmetry between the state and non-state actor, as well as the state's reaction to such asymmetric threats is the primary rationale for this thesis. The objective is to contribute to the understanding of how states react to the threat posed by non-state actors, including the various tools and tactics used for meeting such asymmetric threats. It is also hoped that this study

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 133-147.

² Lt Gen M. Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead", Statement For the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 28 January 1998, USA, Director, Defence Intelligence Agency <http://www.infowar.com/civil_dc/civil_022798a.html-ssi>, accessed on 10 September 2003.

will provide insights into the concerns of the modern world about asymmetric warfare.

Concept of Asymmetric Warfare

War can be said to be as old as human society and it certainly features prominently in the recorded histories of state-cultures. But it is a complex issue and war seems to be changing more quickly than ever before.³ There is great debate over why wars happen, even when most people do not want them to; the definition of war; and the types of warfare. Representatives of many different academic disciplines have separately attempted to answer these questions.

War is defined as an armed conflict between two or more governments or states. Clausewitz defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”.⁴ Michael Walzer, the author of the book, *Just and Unjust Wars*, defines war as a “legal condition, which equally permits two or more groups to carry on a conflict by armed forces”.⁵ When such conflicts assume global proportions, they are known as world wars. War between different parts or factions within the same nation is called civil war. Conflicts or wars in which major powers purposely refrain from employing all their armed strength are often known as limited wars.⁶ Inter-state wars are generally terminated by treaty and civil wars by a peace proclamation.

The methods and practice of war, or warfare, can be broadly divided into various types based on periods of time (like prehistoric warfare, ancient warfare, modern warfare); by theatre, meaning where it is being fought (land warfare, naval warfare, air warfare); by type of weapons used (submarine warfare, chemical warfare, nuclear warfare); by the peoples involved (Roman warfare, Chinese warfare, Arab warfare) or by tactics used (like guerrilla warfare, siege warfare, asymmetric warfare).⁷

Despite these various manifestations of warfare, the early years of the 21st century seem to have become dominated by asymmetric warfare. Asymmetry means

³ Chris Hables Gray, *Postmodern War*, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 21.

⁴ Clausewitz, n. 1, p. 75.

⁵ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (Book News, Inc: Portland, 2000), p. 41.

⁶ Swaran Singh, *Limited War*, (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1995), p. 55 and <http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761568576/War.html>, accessed on 17 November 2004.

the absence of a common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operational terms, a capability. All conflicts are asymmetric to some extent and the clever combatant has always exploited this quality. The nature of asymmetric warfare being dynamic, asymmetry can be categorised differently under different situations.

In broad terms, asymmetric warfare can be said to comprise three main types, namely strategic asymmetry, tactical asymmetry and war by proxy.⁸

In the case of 'strategic asymmetric warfare', belligerents begin by deploying forces of a similar type, with the outcome being determined by the quality and quantity of the opposing forces. Often when belligerents deploy forces of a similar type, the outcome of a battle and/or campaign is determined by the numerical advantage enjoyed or better command and control exercised by one side.

In 'tactical asymmetric warfare', one side enjoys a technological advantage that can even outweigh the numerical advantage of the enemy. Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome much larger forces. If the inferior power is in a position of self-defence; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles to exploit the weaknesses of the superior power, as an effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. Lastly, in case of 'war by proxy', asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by non-governmental actors who are connected to or are sympathetic to a particular nation's (the state actor's) interest. That is, a non-state actor serves as a proxy of the state actor.

In his typology of asymmetry, Kenneth McKenzie has identified six main types of potential asymmetric threats: nuclear, chemical, biological, information operations, operational concepts and terrorism.⁹ From the US point of view, types of asymmetric threats have been identified to include attacks by WMD, regional military threats and asymmetric threats in which state and non-state adversaries avoid direct

⁷ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla History*, (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1975) and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_warfare>, accessed on 15 April 2004 and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 14.

⁸ J.A. Khan, *Probing War and Warfare*, (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing House, 2005), p. 145 and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare>, accessed on 19 May 2005.

⁹ Kenneth McKenzie, "The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Warfare Threats and Next QDR", *McNair Paper 62*, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2000), p. 19.

engagement but device strategies, tactics and weapons to minimise US strengths and exploit its weaknesses.¹⁰

In the post-modern warfare era, the character and nature of war is being altered by technological, social and cultural advances. At the same time, it has been observed that warfare is beginning to be dominated by unconventional tactics. War and warfare has been transformed from state centricity to a condition where reason of state no longer drives belligerency.¹¹ Thus, war in the post-modern era is experiencing two entirely different types of philosophies. One is based on technological advancements and is state-centric in character, while the other is based on usage of unconventional tools and tactics, and is more synonymous with non-state entities. At present, the act of a non-state actor against a state is being loosely termed as an act of asymmetric warfare. It is perceived that such warfare is threatening to occupy the leading edge of strategic potency, much as revolutionary and nuclear warfare occupied the third quarter of the twentieth century. In this context, the term asymmetry encompasses various tactics of war-fighting like guerrilla warfare, terrorism, irregular warfare, etc. These wars originate from conflicts over scarce resources, ethnic and religious issues, transnational crime (with its linkage to terrorism and insurgency), migration and illegal immigration, border disputes, famine and state collapse.¹²

However, asymmetric warfare is not a new concept; it dates back to the Roman occupation of Spain. Practitioners of the asymmetric approach concentrate limited attacks against regular military forces' critical vulnerabilities by using treachery to undermine the overmatch of technology and aggregate forces of their adversaries.¹³ Indirect references to asymmetry can also be found in the writings of ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu. In his famous book, *Art of War*, he discusses subjects like unorthodox and orthodox tactics. Here, unorthodox tactics are described as tactics that are primarily realised through employing forces, especially

¹⁰ Ibid and Kristin K. Kolet, "Asymmetric Threats to the United States", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July/September 2001, pp. 277-292.

¹¹ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press: New York, 1991), p. 212.

¹² W Mendel, "New Forces for Engagement Policy", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 1995-96, p. 25.

¹³ Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry," *Military Review*, Vol. 81, No. 23, July-August 2001, p. 25.

flexible ones, in imaginative, unconventional, unexpected ways.¹⁴ In the recent past, the first reference to asymmetric conflict was in an article on the US experience in Vietnam by Andrew Mack.¹⁵

The term asymmetry has multiple dimensions. Over the last few years, the words 'asymmetry' and 'asymmetric' have come into vogue in strategic studies and political science discourses. Wars, enemies, battles, strategies, approaches, options, challenges and many other phenomena related to armed conflict have all been labelled asymmetric. Given this multiplicity of dimensions, it is evident that using this concept to describe only threats may create confusion in the minds of commanders. Hence, asymmetry must mean more than "simply making maximum use of one's advantage" or fighting differently.¹⁶

An elaboration of the concept of asymmetric challenges to national security is found in the US document, *Joint Strategy 1999*:¹⁷

"Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States' expected method of operations... These generally seek a major psychological impact such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent's initiative, freedom of action or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of the opponent's vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare, strategic, operational and tactical and across the spectrum of military operations".¹⁸

Another interpretation of asymmetrical warfare is that of irregular warfare or unconventional warfare as defined by Robert J Bunker.¹⁹ He defines unconventional warfare as a form of conflict, other than conventional wars, waged by the army of a nation-state. In this view, asymmetric warfare is mostly covert war, waged at low

¹⁴ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc, 1994), p. 147.

¹⁵ Andrew Mack, *The Concept of Power and its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict* (London: Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, 1974) and Robert M. Cassidy, "Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight", *Military Review*, Vol. 83, No. 4, July-August 2003.

¹⁶ Stephen Blank, "Rethinking the Concept of Asymmetric Threats in U.S. Strategy", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 23, 2004, pp. 345-346.

¹⁷ Government of the United States (1999), *Joint Strategy Review 1999*, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, p. 2.

¹⁸ Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry", *Military Review* Vol. 81, No. 4, July-Aug 2001, p. 34 and Rahul Bhonsle, *India's National Security The Asymmetrical Challenges*, (New Delhi: USI-Knowledge World, 2004), p. 96.

¹⁹ Robert J Bunker, "Unconventional Warfare Philosophers", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, Winter 1999, p. 136.

intensity by guerrilla groups, religious cults, drug cartels and even special force components of regular armed forces. Thus, amongst the practitioners and propagators of asymmetric/unconventional war are Sun Tzu, Lettow, TE Lawrence, Lenin, Mao, and modern guerrilla leaders like Che Guevara and Marighella.²⁰

Also, over the years, some attempts have been made to systematically analyse the outcome of asymmetric conflicts and a few have seen the asymmetries, which characterise the conflict as being critical to an understanding of the outcome. Rosen²¹ considers asymmetry in power and “willingness to suffer costs”; Katzenbach²² examines the asymmetry in “tangible” and “intangible resources”; Galtung distinguishes between “social” and “territorial defence” (asymmetry in goals); Kissinger²³ mentions asymmetry in overall strategy (physical versus psychological attrition); and Kraemer²⁴ distinguishes “colonial” versus “non-colonial” guerrilla wars.²⁵

Successful asymmetric tactics used by non-state actors in the last few decades have proved that asymmetric war is a contest of will. Psychological defeat is often much more damaging and longer lasting than battlefield reverses. Arguably, the easiest way to achieve this is to attack the enemy where it feels most comfortable and confident.²⁶

Today, leading thinkers assert that we have witnessed a revolution in political affairs, with the major powers now unlikely to go to war with each other. Rather, they are more likely to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists.²⁷ This theory holds well, not only for major powers, but also for some developing powers that understand the limitations of wars in conflict resolution. At the same time, in a few cases, some weak states have challenged the state’s

²⁰ Ibid, p. 141 and Rahul Bhonsle, *India’s National Security The Asymmetrical Challenges*, (New Delhi: USI-Knowledge World, 2004), p. 96-97.

²¹ Steven Rosen, “War Power and the Willingness to Suffer”, in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972).

²² E.L. Katzenbach, “Time, Space and Will: Politico-Military Strategy of Mao Tse-tung,” in Lt. Col. T. N. Green, ed., *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him* (New York: Frederick A Praeger Inc, 1962).

²³ Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No.2, January 1969, p.214.

²⁴ Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Loose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2, January 1975, p. 188.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Vincent J. Goulding Jr, “Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare”, *Parameters*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, pp. 21-30.

²⁷ Lawrence Freedman, “The Revolution in Strategic Affairs”, *Adelphi Paper 318* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Abstract.

authority and succeeded. The most well-known example is the Vietnam-America war. During the last few decades, however, a new phenomenon has been observed wherein some weak powers/ failing states have started challenging the authority of strong powers by covertly supporting non-state actors.

Asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with terrorism. The current literature liberally uses terminologies like asymmetric actor and terrorist interchangeably. However, in pre-empting the terrorist are we really dealing with asymmetry, or is something else at work? Thinking of the threat as only asymmetric misses the mark, especially if we have got the concept wrong. The combination of asymmetry and the terrorists' ability continually to devise idiosyncratic approaches presents the real challenge. Assessing the distinction and interrelationship between these two factors provides us with the initial understanding required to tackle the resultant operational challenges.

Terrorism is a part of a tactic used by the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict. But, at times, it is also called asymmetric warfare by advocates for partisans using terrorist methods to avoid any pejorative connotations; likewise, occupying powers often label partisans as "terrorists" as part of propaganda campaigns to maintain support in their home country and to win over the occupied people so as to cut off the partisans' principal support base. This is the root of the phrase "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter".²⁸

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the Americas²⁹ states: "Asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat." Similarly, asymmetric warfare has been described as war between two sides with very dissimilar goals,³⁰ which makes the fight inherently asymmetrical from the start. The term "non-traditional" is also used to define asymmetric warfare because it employs methods that do not fit into our traditional picture of warfare—big armies pitted against each other on the battlefield, using similar strategy, tactics and weapons. Asymmetric warfare has also been called

²⁸ < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare>, accessed on 11 November 2004.

²⁹ Mark A. Alred, "Analysis Of Joint Doctrine: Should It Remain Directive?", <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/AMA.htm>>, accessed on 24 August 2005.

³⁰ Martin C. Libicki, *Defending Cyberspace, and Other Metaphors*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 37.

"...using new technology to 'defeat the superior with the inferior'".³¹ In broad terms asymmetric warfare is defined as warfare that involves attacking an adversary's weaknesses with unexpected or innovative means while avoiding his strengths.³²

Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the 'target' (victim) or capitalise on the victim's limited preparation against any threat. These strategies rely (primarily, but not exclusively) on concepts of operations that are fundamentally different from the victim's and/or from those of recent history. They often employ new or different weapons. Additionally, they can serve political or strategic objectives that are not the same as those the victim pursues.³³

All these "definitions" are acceptable, in turn suggesting that asymmetric warfare is a combination of all of them. However, regardless of any "definition," the bottomline is that asymmetric warfare encompasses anything—strategy, tactics, weapons and personnel—that alters the battlefield to negate the other's advantages. However, in order to identify the exact nature of asymmetry in a particular type of conflict/war, it is essential to narrow down its focus. This is essential because the existing definitions, while narrowly accurate, seem insufficient in explaining asymmetry in respect of conflicts between states and non-state actors. In view of this, there is a need to establish a working definition of asymmetric warfare.

Definition

The purpose of this thesis is to understand and analyse the nature of state responses to asymmetric warfare in the backdrop of such conflict being between a state and a non-state actor. From this point of view, asymmetric warfare be defined as: "a form of a warfare in which a non-state actor uses unconventional tools and tactics against a state's vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect, undermining the state's will to achieve its strategic objectives". The methodologies adopted by non-state actors to wage war are essentially tactics that our political, strategic and military cultures regard as unusual.

³¹ Michael Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 213-219.

³² Hughes, n. 2.

³³ Bruce W. Bennett, et al., *What Are Asymmetric Strategies?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1998), p. 3.

History

The concept of asymmetric warfare is as old as warfare itself. In broad terms, asymmetric warfare involves attacking an adversary's weaknesses with unexpected or innovative means while avoiding his strengths.³⁴ Asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture and definition; the implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare deals with the unknown(s), with surprise in terms of ends, ways and means.³⁵ Some examples may be illustrative.

The history of Rome extends from 753 BC. Rome's political growth followed a line of development similar to that of the Greek city-states: limited monarchy of sorts. Rome fought a few battles for its survival. Post 270 BC, Carthage (what is today Tunisia³⁶) was Rome's main rival in the West, as it was concentrating upon enlarging its empire in Spain. This led to the greatest and most difficult war in Roman history, the second Punic War, which can be termed as a classic case of asymmetric warfare.

The war has its origins in the attack by the young Carthaginian general, Hannibal, on Saguntum, a Spanish town, claimed by Rome as an ally. Rome declared war. Seizing the initiative, Hannibal, in an unconventional move in 218 BC, speed-marched an army of about 40,000 men, 9000 cavalry troops and even a detachment of African elephants across the Alps into Italy in 14 days, something not attempted before. The crossing cost him nearly half of his men and almost all the elephants. But, his tactics yielded results: Hannibal defeated the Romans, a superior power with higher degree of war waging machinery, three times in three years. Numerically, Hannibal's forces never matched those that the Romans had. At Cannae, for example, where Hannibal won his greatest victory, some 70,000 Romans were wiped out by just 50,000 Carthaginians.³⁷ Hannibal's unconventional tactics, using raids and threats to contest a big and well-equipped Roman force, paid off.

Again, in the 1960s, the Americans chose Vietnam as a place to draw the line for communist expansionism. In August 1964, a presumed North Vietnamese attack

³⁴ Hughes, n. 2.

³⁵ Colonel Clinton J. Ancker & Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Burke, "Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare", *Military Review*, Vol.83, No.4, July -August 2003, <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/download/english/JulAug03/ancker.pdf>>, accessed on 20 November 2004.

³⁶ <<http://www.carthage.edu/dept/outis/carthage.html>>, accessed on 27 April 2004.

on the cruiser Maddox led to an American retaliatory strike. In February 1965, an attack on the American advisers' barracks in the Central Highland city of Pleiku triggered a retaliatory raid. By July 1965, the US combat units were fully committed and their troop presence began to grow, reaching 543,000 by early 1969.³⁸ Nearly 60,000 Americans were killed and hundreds of thousands came home wounded, either physically or mentally.³⁹ This war, which nearly lasted for more than a decade, can be referred to as a classic case of asymmetric warfare in the recent times. In this conflict, the US forces were superior in every important department, from firepower to manpower. What cost them dearly was their complete underestimation of the opponent. What North Vietnam lacked in technology and financial resources, they more than made up with their tenacity and commitment. They were willing to pay any price to achieve their goals.⁴⁰

Even the Persian Gulf War in 1991 saw asymmetric warfare.⁴¹ Iraq launched Scud missiles and the coalition used Stealth aircraft to fire precision weapons against the Iraqis. American air strikes on mobile Scud launchers during this war were aimed at wrecking Iraq's tactical capability to launch ballistic missiles. Here, airpower helped achieve the stated American goals of "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait" and "restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government".⁴² This war proved that it is not always the weaker power that gains victory due to asymmetry but occasionally, the stronger power too can gain victory because of its asymmetrical advantage in respect of technology and firepower. As these examples show, asymmetric warfare is using something extraordinary or never seen before to gain advantage.⁴³

But they also raise the basic question: how do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of

³⁷ Gerard Chaliand, *The Art of War in World History*, (London: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 119-124 and <<http://www.emayzine.com/lectures/noteson%20Rome.htm>>, accessed on 17 November 2002.

³⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 629.

³⁹ Richard A. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War* (London: M.E.Sharp, 2005) and <http://www.onethreemarines.com/VN_History3.htm>, accessed on 6 March 2004. <http://www.onethreemarines.com/VN_History3.htm>*, accessed on 6 March 2004.

⁴¹ Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1994), p. 14.

⁴² Mark Clodfelter, "Airpower versus Asymmetric Enemies", *Air and Space Power Journal*, Fall 2002, <<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/clodfelter.html>>, accessed on 6 March 2004.

⁴³ Robert H. Allen, "Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready?", <<http://amsportal.belvoir.army.mil/articles/97-3/1allen.htm>>, accessed on 12 April 2004.

the strategies the weak and strong actors use. Independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favours the strong actors while opposite strategic approaches favour the weak.⁴⁴

At the beginning of the 21st century, more than 60 low and medium-intensity wars were raging around the planet—roughly double the average number during the Cold War period. Concurrently, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), multiplying acts of terrorism and increasing numbers of “rogue” or “failed” states (which may possess or pursue weapons of mass destruction and / or support terrorists) have redefined both the nature of war and the concept of security.

Debate

International stability and national security has been challenged in the past as well. But in the last few decades, a new phenomenon has emerged where explosion of domestic conflict is challenging the stability and even the existence of a state. Most of these domestic conflicts have an ethnic dimension and a few of them had been previously subdued by authoritarian state-centres. But, over time, these conflicts took on a different shape, with the emergence of non-state actors. This is because this entity became powerful to challenge the state’s authority by using asymmetric tactics.

The emergence of well-established, well-connected and well-armed non-state actors has made intra-state conflicts bloodier. Understanding the connotation of present day asymmetry between a state and a non-state actor in the backdrop of intra-state conflicts is relevant for studying asymmetric warfare of the 21st century.

Intra-state conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Since 1945, they have been more frequent and more violent than inter-state warfare.⁴⁵ With the end of the Cold War, these tendencies increased, following the lines of ethno-national and separatist-armed conflicts, bringing a significant shift in the perception of security issues and alternative approaches to tackle them, specially in Europe. In particular, the changing dialogue of sovereignty, identity and security, and international responsibility appears

⁴⁴ A new approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts is put forth in the forthcoming book by Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, and these inputs are available at <<http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521548691>>, accessed on 22 March 2004.

to have become increasingly significant. Considering that the propositions in international relations depend on both empirical validity and logical soundness, a theoretical exercise on the case of intra-state conflicts questions the validity of the traditional state-developed concept of security. The path is open to new interpretations and understanding of normative, operational and structural issues.

The lessons from earlier intra-state conflicts reveal that the traditional schools of international relations do not provide satisfactory tools for the understanding of "the current status of war and peace in the international system".⁴⁶ They reveal that intra-state conflicts are no longer only a state affair. The distinction between inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts is getting muddled, and it depends from which point of view is one looking at the conflict. So, "if a province, an integrated portion of a state's territory, or a fraction of the population refuses to submit to the centralised power and undertakes an armed struggle, the conflict, though a civil war with regard to international war, will be considered a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the expression of an existing or nascent nation."⁴⁷

Nevertheless, not all internal conflicts can break out into asymmetric war. Intra-state conflicts erupt in a violent manner and become separatist movements when they "involve an armed confrontation between a sovereign independent state and a regionally-based movement, seeking to break away or seeking an extended form of internal territorial self-rule".⁴⁸ Hence, within an intra-state conflict, when a group challenges state authority in a violent manner, that group is generally referred to as a non-state actor.

Non-state actors also break another state monopoly—the monopoly on the use of force. While states are accountable to other states in the United Nations system in terms of international law and to their own citizens (at least in democratically-governed countries) in terms of domestic law and values, violent non-state actors appear subject to no laws. The classic violent non-state actors include terrorist groups, insurgent armed militias and organised crime networks.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Enika Abazi, "Intrastate Conflicts, International Interventions and their Implications on Security Issues, Case of Kosovo", <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/abe01/abe01.pdf>>, accessed on 15 December 2004.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ <<http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/forum/display-message.asp?F=11&M=141&P=1>>, accessed on 10 November 2004.

These trends pose very real threats to the future of both developing and industrialised societies. Conventional armed conflicts—which are primarily intra-state in scope and geographically limited to developing regions—damage the environment, disrupt economies and shatter societies. However, civilians suffer more drastically from current forms of warfare, which may include ethnic expulsions and even genocide as deliberate strategies.

Asymmetric conflict also causes destruction of the financial, information and technological infrastructures that underpin modern societies. Whereas previous wars were between armies and nations, and largely fought over spheres of influence, the wars of the 21st century are likely to involve more shadowy players with very different motives. Driven by a growing rich-poor divide, environmental scarcity and the increasing susceptibility to disruption on the part of technologically advanced societies, future conflicts may pit not only nations against each other, but also marginalised groups within the nation against its elite.

Paramilitary “resistance” groups—religiously and ethnically different, or not—may strike out against those they see, internally or externally, as threatening their cultural, economic or political agendas. Paramilitary “security forces” will intervene to protect the elite and maintain the status quo. And highly organised “gangs” may fight to control trafficking in drugs, human beings or commodities.

While ostensibly opposed, these groups may at times ally with each other to achieve specific objectives. Their tactics may include pre-emptive or retaliatory assassinations and massacres, and their targets may include individuals, government entities, civil institutions and infrastructure, and corporations. In an increasingly chaotic world, it will be very difficult to tell the “good guys” from the “bad guys”.⁵⁰

State support or sponsorship of insurgencies was common during the Cold War era, as the United States, the Soviet Union, and various regional powers backed their favoured proxies, often transforming local quarrels into international contests. Today, states such as Iran, Rwanda, Angola and Pakistan, as well as various types of non-state supporters, play a major role in creating or sustaining insurgencies by offering fighters, training or other important forms of support.⁵¹

⁵⁰ <http://www.global-issues.net/In_Depth/conflict1.htm>, accessed on 2 November 2002.

⁵¹ “The Role of External Support in Insurgent Conflicts, News From RAND”, <<http://www.rand.org/publications/news/releases/insurgent.html>>, accessed on 17 May 2003.

Considerable debate is ongoing within the political and military communities as to the kind of responses (military or otherwise) that should be developed to meet the challenges of asymmetric threat posed by such non-state actors. Part of the debate centres on addressing the root cause of the problem while the other part concentrates on the improvisation of military techniques. Many argue that lack of socio-economic progress in certain parts of the world is the reason for the emergence of the non-state actor. However, unable to bear the cost of asymmetric war, particularly the human cost, state actors are attempting to incorporate rapid technological changes into their war fighting mechanisms.

Despite the technical and military supremacy enjoyed by state-actors, the future does not appear to lack potential threats. The growing gap between the have and have-nots, religious tensions and lack of resources will fuel terrorists and extremists. There is also a danger that criminal elements, drug cartels and mercenaries or terrorists will join hands to create a enemy (the transnational threat), which will shun the battlefield and fight by means that will nullify the military superiority of conventional forces. The main tactic of such forces will be to exploit "asymmetries", using the weaknesses inherent in a technological force with stand-off weaponry.⁵² The non-state actor, motivated purely by hatred, revenge or religious fervour, today represents the greatest danger to society. There is even the distinct possibility that non-state actors will wage war by using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The American invasion of Iraq represents a dilemma. The US military defeated the Saddam regime and its military component with ease, but is finding it extremely difficult to defeat the non-state actors through conventional war fighting mechanisms. The US' weaknesses stem principally from its over-reliance on technical solutions, ill-preparedness for an urban battleground and failure to fully appreciate the human dimension of the problem.

Asymmetric warfare in case of a state-non-state conflict envisages engaging the adversary (state) by using different tools and tactics. The choice of such tools and tactics depends on the perceptions of the non-state actor. While known tools like terror, blackmail or bargain are frequently used, on occasions, the non-state actor has tried to bring in the element of surprise by using different techniques. Under this

⁵² Captain (N) D.W. Craig, "Asymmetrical Warfare and the Transnational Threat: Relearning the Lessons from Vietnam", <<http://198.231.69.12/papers/amsc1/006.html>>, accessed on 24 July 2003.

backdrop, the concept of asymmetry gets modified depending on the nature of the non-state actor.

Till date, a few studies have been carried out in the areas of asymmetric warfare, specifically those analysing the reasons behind militarily and economically less powerful states initiating war against relatively strong states. These studies have focused on the strategic and political considerations, and the domestic and international compulsions that influence the weaker state to launch war against its more powerful adversary. These studies, in a way, have challenged the key argument of the deterrence theory that the military superiority of the *status quo* power coupled with a credible retaliatory threat will prevent attack by challengers.⁵³

The nature of warfare has been rapidly changing in the last few decades. It is expected that in coming decades, “brush fire” wars are likely to increase. The recent history of warfare is being written more by counter-insurgency campaigns, hostage rescue operations, drug wars, low intensity conflicts, urban combat, etc.⁵⁴ In all these cases, the attacker is not a state power and methods of combat used by the attacker are mostly unconventional. This is rapidly changing the concept of asymmetry that was essentially restricted to a conflict between two state powers. While the war between the US and Vietnam is considered the best example of asymmetric war, in the post-Cold War context, the last such war was the one that took place against the Iraqi army in Kuwait and Iraq.⁵⁵

In Gulf War I (1991), two state powers fought against each other. Here, both the warring nations were answerable to an international system and in a way had parity in philosophy, attitude, values and beliefs. The asymmetric aspect lay in the differing warfighting capabilities and military hardware of the two sides. If one applies the same analogy, then almost all wars in the world have been asymmetric, as will be all future wars between two state actors.

But in the present era, when a non-state actor is challenging state authority, it is operating outside international norms and value systems. It is initiating a war that has no rules. It is bringing out many extraneous factors to make the fight unequal.

⁵³ T V Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁵⁴ Clark L. Staten, *Asymmetric warfare. the Evolution and Development of Terrorism: The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces*, <<http://www.cmergency.com/asymetric.htm>>, accessed on 16 August 2002.

⁵⁵ Marwan Bishara, “The Israelisation of America’s war”, <<http://www.mediamonitors.net/bishara3.html>>, accessed on 11 December 2002.

This emergence of the non-state actor has brought forward different dimensions of “asymmetry” on the strategic calculus of global geopolitics.

No single theory can be sufficient to explain this new form of “asymmetry”. The non-state actor has brought in a strange form of warfare, one where, for example, military force plays a much smaller (though still critical) role, often supporting initiatives that are more political, diplomatic and economic. This strangeness is blurring the distinction between war and peace. Some analysts are predicting that the resultant non-linearity may lead to the disappearance of definable battlefields or fronts, and even the distinction between the ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear.⁵⁶

While earlier asymmetry was more of a ‘di-symmetry’, meaning a quantitative difference in firepower and force, a strong state against a weak one (America against Vietnam or Iraq), today asymmetry can be viewed as more of a qualitative difference in the means, values and style of the new enemies.⁵⁷ This brings in the need to enlarge the scope of assessment of asymmetrical warfare. It demands the examination of asymmetric warfare, beyond the consideration of war as a technological or engineering problem. It also demands the assessment of asymmetric warfare from the point of view of the culturally distinct perspective of enemies. Such wars are struggles of psyches and wills. In such wars, the enemy understands that it is not possible to physically defeat the military forces of the state authority. Hence, the non-state actor challenges the state by using new and innovative ways.⁵⁸

There is a need to address this changing concept of asymmetry by looking at the system in its totality rather than dissecting the parts and studying in isolation various dimensions like terrorism, guerrilla warfare and urban warfare. Also, as this threat is both developing and evolving, the nature of state’s defence thinking, training, weapons, equipment, intelligence operations and national emergency response systems need to be redefined and redirected.⁵⁹ There is a need to analyse the nature

⁵⁶ <http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm>, accessed on 26 December 2002.

⁵⁷ Marwan Bishara, “An Enemy With No Forwarding”, <<http://www.chirstusrex.org/www1/icons/bishara.html>>, accessed on 25 December 2002.

⁵⁸ Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset”, presented to The Role of Naval Forces in the 21st Century Operations Conference, Fletcher school of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts University, Cambridge MA, 20 Nov 1997.

⁵⁹ Clark L. Staten, “Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces”, <<http://www.emergency.com/asymetric.htm>>, accessed on 10 September 2003.

and impact of various tools and tactics used by non-state actors in order to decide the state's responses.

The concept of asymmetric challenges in case of non-state actors is an emerging concept. The absence of a detailed study analysing state responses to this threat has prompted this thesis. The objective here is to contribute to the understanding of various states responses and their efficacy to this challenge. It is also hoped that this study will provide insights for the broader formulation of the doctrines for state responses.

The responses of the state towards asymmetric threat are not consistent and have varied from regime to regime. The basis for this study springs from a realisation that these responses largely depend on the pattern and causes of the asymmetric threat. The responses can be dependent on the state's policies towards finding solutions to tackling the threat.

Why have non-state actors engaged in wars against stronger adversaries? Is it because it is possible to circumvent an opponent's advantage by avoiding its strengths and exploiting its weaknesses? Or are there some other reasons? It is important to understand how states have responded to the threat posed by non-state actors and the changing dimensions of the quality of their responses. This study aims at a macro analysis of a few selective state and non-state conflicts. Its scope is restricted to examining global trends in asymmetric warfare, and it is these that are as backdrop to examining the tools and tactics used by non-state actors and the state's response.

Review of Literature

The literature relevant to this study can broadly be classified into two major categories. First, there are documents related to thematic concept of asymmetric warfare, tracing intellectual progression and giving the synthesis of conventional and unconventional perceptions on the subject. These materials also include the recent major debates on the subject. Secondly, there are writings on the genesis of the problem, examining the consequences of state responses related to specific case studies. They also include inputs obtained from official government documents, media reports and non-governmental writings.

Current literature supports the notion that the nature of threat posed by non-state actors has an influence on the state's policies. Various dimensions of asymmetric warfare by non-state actors and state's response have been broadly studied at the

popular level; however, few book length studies, directly dealing with the subject are also available. Also, very little information is available on the trends on state responses in terms of asymmetric warfare strategy and various tools and tactics used by non-state actors, which remains a precondition for evolving appropriate state responses.

Conceptual Studies

Makers of Modern Strategy,⁶⁰ edited by Edward Mead Earle debates the impact of strategy and war on the society. While introducing the theme of the book, Earle explains that until about the end of eighteenth century, strategy consisted of a body of stratagems and tricks, by which a general sought to deceive the enemy and win victory. But, as war and society become more complicated—and war, it must be remembered, as an inherent part of society-strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of non-military factors, including those that are economic, psychological, moral, political and technological—strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of state-craft at all times.

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,⁶¹ edited by Peter Paret, is a classic collection of essays by various leading military historians. This anthology demonstrates the complexity of strategy and the importance of it being closely integrated with politics.

In *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*,⁶² Robert Endicott Osgood argues that military power should serve as a controllable and predictable instrument of national policy, but sometimes this power actually translates into national insecurity when it is employed without proper regard for its non-military objectives and consequences. He further argues that in a nation's utilisation of military power, military means should be subordinated to the ends of national policy through an objective calculation of the most effective methods of attaining concrete, limited and attainable security objectives.

⁶⁰ Edward Mead Earle (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (New York : Antheneum, , 1966).

⁶¹ Peter Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

⁶² Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).

TV Paul's book, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*,⁶³ analyses why weaker powers have repeatedly engaged themselves in wars against stronger adversaries. Paul argues that a state, inferior in overall power capabilities, even after assessing its disadvantages vis-à-vis the opponent, may still go to war against a stronger adversary by making choices that are within the realm of rational calculations. These choices depend largely on the particular strategy, greater power alliance support that the weaker state holds and domestic configurations in these states before war is initiated. This contention is examined in the light of several historic cases and by looking at the decision-making process before the outbreak of war.

Paul has also hypothesised on the relationship between war initiation and four variables: strategic calculations of the belligerents, changes in short term offensive capability, great power alliance relationships and a domestic power structure. Based on these factors, he has tried to build a causal connection between the choices for war by states that hold inferior aggregate capacity vis-à-vis their opponents.

In a case study that is of greater importance to South Asia, he concludes that Pakistan initiated the war in 1965 because it had limited aims and had acquired sufficient short-term offensive capability for a short war. Also, Pakistan expected China to back it, the Americans to remain neutral, Kashmir was witnessing civil unrest and India's deterrence threats were not credible.

AS Cordesman's *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare And Weapons Of Mass Destruction*,⁶⁴ is also on this subject. Here, the author describes the changing face of asymmetric warfare and terrorism based on empirical data. Cordesman tries to bring out the conceptual gap in the United States homeland defence regarding the threats posed by covert attacks using ballistic missiles, asymmetric warfare and terrorism. He emphasises the need for formulating the basis for resolving asymmetric warfare. The book deals in detail with the need of risk assessment and threat prioritisation. Daniel Gressang also expresses similar views in his paper titled *Terrorism in the 21st Century: Reassessing the Emerging Threat*.⁶⁵ He also touches on current issues like WMD and their impact on asymmetry.

⁶³ Paul, n. 53.

⁶⁴ A. S. Cordesman, *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare And Weapons Of Mass Destruction*, (Washington DC: Praeger Publishers, 2002).

⁶⁵ Daniel Gressang, *Terrorism in the 21st Century: Reassessing the Emerging Threat* Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. II, No 2, (London, Autumn 2000).

Terrorism, as a form of asymmetric warfare, has attracted scholarly and government attention. Omar Malik's *Enough of The Definition of Terrorism*⁶⁶ deals with understanding terrorism and formulating a proper response. He argues that in the context of liberal states, terrorism is not a distinct form of political violence, but is serious violence conducted against or within it. He further argues that most nations, including the great liberal democracies, are products of violence, whether the victory of one group or nation over another, or of muscular federalism. In such a backdrop, Malik evaluates two propositions. First, a state may be described as liberal despite the fact that a minority may question its legitimacy. Second, liberal states should agree that the absence of the measure by which the rights of self-determination can be decided does not constitute a bellum for terrorism. Malik expects terrorism to be defined under the ambit of these two propositions.

*The Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*⁶⁷ deals with historical and modern background of terrorism and focuses on key areas like state versus non-state terrorism, the mind set of terrorists, state-sponsored terrorism and the changing face of terrorism, etc.

Marwan Bishara's article on *The Israelisation of America's War*⁶⁸ holds that asymmetry must be distinguished from di-symmetry, which means a quantitative difference in firepower and force, a strong state against a weak one (such as US against Iraq). According to Bishara, this difference must be clearly understood, otherwise, most of the wars fought in the past can be termed to be asymmetric wars in which one state always had superiority over the other in terms of conventional weapons. In modern day asymmetric wars, the disadvantaged enemies resort to unconventional means, considering the enemy's strength and concentrating on its vulnerabilities.

However, existing literature only touches upon the concept of asymmetry and no separate distinction is drawn between its qualitative and quantitative differences. The emphasis generally is on identifying and describing various types of asymmetry: between two state actors or between state and non-state actors. In the history of warfare, Iran's pursuit of nuclear and missile technologies is considered asymmetric as is Iraq's wartime tactic of locating its military equipment in the immediate vicinity

⁶⁶ Omar Malik, *Enough of The Definition of Terrorism*, (London: Rusy, 2000).

⁶⁷ *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, (New York: M E Sharpe, 1997).

⁶⁸ Bishara, n. 55.

of cultural and archaeological sites. A hypothesis has also been promulgated that the Vietnam War proves that asymmetric war against a superpower can be won with the support of the masses. The war between Afghan Mujahidin and the Soviet Army (1979-89) has again been identified as a classic example of "asymmetric warfare". The freedom struggles in Palestine and Chechnya are also been described as asymmetric conflicts.

Winn Schwartzau in *Orbis*⁶⁹ argues that the best way to appreciate perfect symmetry in a conflict situation is to contrast the typical board game with real world warfare. In games like chess and poker, for instance, the outcome is determined by the players' skills. By and large, both sides possess the same equipment and play by the same rules, but in asymmetric conflict, this is absent. Scahwartau further argues that war has rules and those rules are set by the Western countries. Hence, asymmetry gives non-state actors their strength. They operate outside international behaviour and value systems set up by the West or even Russia.

Although Scahwartau never mentions the term di-symmetry, he goes very close to the hypothesis formulated by Marwan Bishara. According to him, asymmetrical adversaries thrive on simplicity, not complexity. One tends to miscalculate the real ability of the opponents to devise low-cost, low-tech methods to offset capabilities of technologically superior adversaries.

Robinder Sachdev, in his article *Imagination is Everything*,⁷⁰ argues that asymmetry of present conflicts pits the state against a dispersed network of shadowy figures. According to him, asymmetry exists with respect to structural disadvantages that the state finds itself in when combating a flat network of unidentified scope and loose structure across global communities.

Many authors describe characteristics of asymmetry based on various dimensions of non-state threats. The commonalties in the arguments put forth by Colin Gray (*Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror*),⁷¹ Robert David Steele (*The*

⁶⁹ Winn Schwartzau, "Asymmetrical Adversaries", *Orbis*, (Spring 2000), <<http://www.findarticles.com>>, <<http://www.mediamonitors.net/bishara3.html>>, accessed on 7 December 2002.

⁷⁰ Sachdev Robinder, "Imagination is Everything", <<http://www.techcentralstation.com/083004y.html>>, <<http://www.mediamonitors.net/bishara3.html>>, accessed on 19 April 2003.

⁷¹ Colin Gray, "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror", *Parameters*, Spring 2002, pp. 5-14.

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Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate),⁷² Mark Perry (*The Politics of Asymmetric War*)⁷³ and Robert Pfaltzgraff (*The Spectrum of Conflict: Symmetrical or Asymmetrical Challenge*)⁷⁴ are summarised below:

- The existing political, economic and technological climate favours an increase in terrorism and asymmetric attacks.
- Vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack are largely in the civil sector and include bridges, dams, power and telephone networks; and downlinks for the intelligence community and operational commands. Most vulnerable of all is the data managed by banks and major logistics elements, including fuel suppliers.
- The computer systems in most developed and developing nations are open to hacking, inadvertent destruction of data, inside abuse and outside attack despite various security measures. Information age enables the enemy to use any kind of information virus.
- The future enemies are likely to choose carefully between stand-off, indirect and hands-on attacks.
- The age-old criteria for victory, i.e. decisive victory, limited casualties, capture of land, fruitful negotiations, as an aftermath of war, etc., are impossible to achieve.
- The existing force structure of many countries is vulnerable to superior asymmetric manoeuvring in time, space and material.
- Nations are vulnerable to well-informed campaigns to manipulate the international media and dominate public's perceptions, especially with regard to atrocities and casualties.
- The non-state actors can exploit the dependence of defence industries on civilian contractors essential for the maintenance of complex technologies beyond the abilities of uniformed personnel.
- Cultural, ethnic, political and social differences exist in the thinking of various state and sub-state components of the society.

⁷² Robert David Steele, "The Asymmetric threat: Listening to the Debate", *JFQ Autumn/Winter*, 1998-99, pp. 78-84.

⁷³ Mark Perry, "The politics of asymmetric war" <<http://www.jmcc.org/media/report/2000>>, <<http://www.mediamonitors.net/bishara3.html>>, accessed on 3 January 2003.

⁷⁴ Robert Pfaltzgraff, *The Spectrum of Conflict: Symmetrical or Asymmetrical Challenge, Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations*, (Washington DC: Brassey, 2000) pp. 9-27.

Empirical Studies

Case study specific literature is available in the form of books, research papers, Internet databases and government and media reports. The following paragraphs essentially deal with the literature available in form of books. The other forms of literature are mainly informative in nature, reporting event occurrence, etc., and are referred to directly while discussing actual cases.

During the last few years, non-state actors are using various conventional and non-conventional tools and tactics to wage a war against state actors. Many articles are available on the internet that describe in detail the use of various tactics by non-state actors, and these include hijacking, suicide terrorism and many other unconventional means. There is a very valuable article written by Rohan Gunaratna on *The Asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism*,⁷⁵ where he describes various tactics and technologies used by terrorist groups to carry out maritime terrorism. Gunaratna also provides valuable data on terrorism, giving details of terrorist groups that have conducted maritime attacks during the last two decades.

In western literature, many authors have dealt extensively on the asymmetric threats to the United States. A common opinion is reflected in the paper, *Asymmetric Threats to the United States*,⁷⁶ by Kristin Kolet. This concludes that in post-Cold War conflicts, many adversaries have pursued asymmetric strategies against the US. They have tried to exploit the US reliance on domestic and coalition support, technology, economic concerns and cultural preferences. Weak powers have found that working to push these limits is often the most effective strategy for deterring, coercing or defeating the US. The operations in Iraq, the aborted operation in Somalia, interventions in the former Yugoslavia, the bombing of US embassies, and the attack on USS Cole in Yemen demonstrate that by circumventing or undermining US military strength through asymmetric strategies, the US can be denied a clear-cut military or political victory.

In nonwestern literature a meaningful perspective about the usage of asymmetric warfare is given by the Chinese authors in a book *Unrestricted Warfare*:

⁷⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, "The Asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism", *Jane's Navy International*, Vol. 106, No. 8, Oct 2001, pp. 25-29.

⁷⁶ Kristin K. Kolet, "Asymmetric Threats to the United States", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July/Sept. 2001, pp. 277-292.

*China's Master Plan to destroy America.*⁷⁷ This book was published in Chinese language three years before the September 11, 2001 attacks. The authors argue that the majority of the development plans for present United States military are focused upon dealing with conventional enemy. If the US encounters an enemy with low-level technology then the US will find it extremely difficult to handle the situation arising out of the conflict. He further argues that the US administration have never taken into consideration the means that are contrary to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means.

South Asia has seen asymmetrical warfare for more than a decade. The continued presence and involvement of non-state actors in the conflict, diverse politico-strategic agendas of two traditional rivals and the indecisive nature of their conventional war fighting capabilities are some of the factors that have led to and will continue to make asymmetrical warfare a possibility in the region.

The violent conflict in Kashmir has been on for almost two decades now. The nature of terrorism has changed colour during the last few years, with home-grown terrorism having been almost taken over by terrorist outfits from outside the valley. The tools and tactics used by sub-state actor involved in this terrorism are changing with time and the prevailing geopolitical situation, and are clearly bringing more of asymmetry into the conflict.

Kashmir is arguably one of the most contentious and complex issues in South Asia. It has persisted for more than 50 years despite wars, summits and declarations. Even though the role of non-state actor has become noteworthy only during last two decades, it still is essential to analyse the genesis of the problem to put the current asymmetric conflict in the correct perspective. The most insightful starter for such an understanding is *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir*, a book by C Dasgupta.⁷⁸ It discusses the evolution of Kashmir policy on Pakistan and the role played by the western powers in the Security Council. Dasgupta argues that Mountbatten's role has been much-misunderstood in Pakistan as well as India. The book underlines the fact that for Mountbatten, as the Governor General of India, British interests were always the first priority. He manoeuvred himself into a position from where he could directly influence government policy, where possible, or undermine it, where necessary. He

⁷⁷ Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangusi, *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*, (Panama City: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002)

⁷⁸ C Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Sage, 2002).

restrained Indian military initiatives on more than one occasion. The book further explains how Mountbatten used and abused his authority to ensure that the Kashmir issue did not escalate into a full-scale inter-dominion war.

Lars Blinkenberg's work in two volumes, titled *India-Pakistan: The history of unresolved conflicts*,⁷⁹ is a comprehensive historical-cum-political science related study. It carries an analysis of many structural factors and political actors involved in shaping the India-Pakistan security paradigm. The book covers a wider canvas than only dealing with the Kashmir problem even as it sets the background for understanding of one of the most persistent conflicts since World War II. The author argues that one of the characteristics of this conflict has been the fact that Pakistan's all-round attitude towards India and Kashmir has remained a constant factor. India's position, on the contrary, has undergone changes, because policies generally only remain unaltered for only a limited period.

Kashmir Sold and Resold, by S M Jaffar,⁸⁰ give a Pakistan-centric view of the conflict and argues that worse degree of repression and barbarism has been let loose on the Muslims of Kashmir valley and projects the picture that the Indian Army is all-out to crush the Kashmiri movement with tyranny and repression. The book also presents the 'world view' of many countries on the issue, which are more or less repetitive, and demands a peaceful solution to the problem and greater role for the United Nations. Another book projecting Pakistan's view on the issue of Kargil conflict is by Shireen Mazari,⁸¹ titled *The Kargil Conflict 1999*. She highlights that the damaging result of Kargil has been the use of the Pakistani military as a scapegoat not only by Indian and American analysts, but also by elements within Pakistan's political elite and civil society. She emphasises that this conflict has revealed the US position in a Pakistan-India conflict. Here, Pakistan's decision to sustain the tactical operation was not acceptable to the US and for future, Pakistan should factor such dimensions during planning.

Books like *Political Awakening in Kashmir*, by Narinder Singh,⁸² and *Lest We Forget*, by Amarinder Singh,⁸³ give a comprehensive analysis of the party system in

⁷⁹ Lars Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan: The History of Unresolved conflicts*, (Odense M : Odense University Press, 1998).

⁸⁰ S. M. Jaffar, *Kashmir Sold and Resold*, (Lahore :Book Traders, 1996).

⁸¹ Shireen Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999*, (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003).

⁸² Narinder Singh, *Political Awakening in Kashmir*, (Delhi, H.K. Publications, 1992).

general and working of parties having right leanings in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in particular. They also, give the record of wars fought by Indian armed forces in the Kashmir valley. These books are not directly related to the topic of the thesis but they set a background towards its larger understanding.

Sumantra Bose captures the complexity of Kashmir issue in his book, titled *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*.⁸⁴ The book emphasises that the contemporary Kashmir problem can be best understood by focusing beyond the inter-state territorial dispute and taking into account the great diversity and complexity of society and politics within Jammu and Kashmir. He stresses that the roots of the crises that erupted in 1989-1990 lie in a post-1947 history of denial of democratic rights and institutions to the people of Kashmir. He feels that achieving a lasting democratic solution is difficult. He also criticises official Indian ideology that its identity of an inclusive secular state will be grievously damaged without Kashmir. The book further stresses that the configuration of Kashmir problem—a sovereignty dispute between two states over a territory whose population is itself fractured in its political preferences—is not unique and both the countries should look for a solution in the cases with similar configurations.

A report by Anthony Cordesman⁸⁵ on *The India-Pakistan Military Balance* covers a wide variety of issues. It mentions that Kashmir offers Pakistan a number of advantages in asymmetric warfare. The terrain makes it extremely difficult to seal off borders and conduct counter-insurgency operations. The population is divided but generally favours the Pakistanis and Islamists. Artillery duels accomplish little, and limited Indian advances across the Line of Control simply place it in the same difficult tactical position in a different place. Pakistan can deploy a holding force and support insurgents at a far lower cost than India must pay to deploy the forces necessary to occupy Kashmir and defend the dividing line. Moreover, Pakistan can always back away from confrontation or fighting and then resume the struggle on equally advantageous terms, even as India cannot significantly reduce its troop presence in the area. Logistics and lines of communication do not really favour

⁸³ Amarinder Singh, *Lest We Forget*, (Patiala: Regiment of Ludhiana Welfare Association, 1999).

⁸⁴ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁸⁵ A.S. Cordesman, *The India-Pakistan Military Balance*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002).

anyone, but India must rely heavily on a single road to the area near the Line of Control. India has little to gain from a direct frontal advance on Pakistani forces, which has excellent defensive positions. India can launch air raids against training camps and military facilities, but the camps can easily be rebuilt and many Pakistani facilities are already sheltered to deal with artillery attacks.

The Palestinian Hamas is the co-authored book by Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela.⁸⁶ Based on the scrutiny of Hamas' roots and its records since its establishment in 1987, they claim that it is essentially a social movement with wide popular support and a public image as a standard bearer of Palestinian national values. The book discusses the main issues and dilemmas that Hamas has confronted during its existence. It also highlights the world of contradictions in which Hamas has been caught—between theory and practice, ideology and political reality, rhetoric and decision-making, and commitment to its constituency versus its religious militant doctrine. The book explains that for Hamas, military activity is a permanent strategy that will not change. However, application of asymmetric strategy depends on cost-benefit analysis. Hamas is ready to change its modus operandi and tactics from time to time to cause heaviest damage to the enemy under given circumstances.

Khaled Hroub's book, *Hamas: Political thoughts and Practice*,⁸⁷ provides a balanced picture of Hamas by highlighting the various functions and roles that the movement plays. It examines the role of Hamas as a resistance organisation as well as its political and social roles, by delving into its ideology and actual practice. He examines the intellectual, philosophical and ideological aspects of Hamas and argues that its methods of controlled violence and strategic decision-making should be looked into in the backdrop of its existence as a social movement.

Island of Blood by Anita Pratap is based on her field trips during 1980s and 1990s to Sri Lanka, her visits to LTTE camps and interviews with LTTE cadres, particularly its chief Prabhakaran. She juxtaposes her experiences as war correspondent on the historical realities of the conflict. The book is very rich in facts.

Rohan Gunaratna, in his book *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, highlights covert designs of India's external intelligence agencies and provides insights into its

⁸⁶ Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, violence and Coexistence*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

⁸⁷ Khaled Hroub's, *Hamas: Political thoughts and Practice* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000).

manipulative and dangerous relationship with Tamil militants (LTTE). The book also deals with Indo-Lanka 1987 accord and subsequent LTTE-IPKF war. The author also describes that how New Delhi used a militant factor to pressurise Colombo to change Sri Lanka's foreign policy. In his opinion, India succeeded in systemically destabilising Sri Lanka.

Tigers of Lanka, by MR Narayan Swami, is an account of how a Tamil militant campaign for a homeland called Eelam has gone awry after many spectacular victories scored in the battles against Sri Lankan forces. The book also takes a sweep at the murky world of the Tamil guerrillas and their internal conflicts. It delves into the secret deals that culminated in the India-Sri Lanka accord of July 1987.

A recent work that resembles very closely with the idea behind this thesis is *Crafting Peace in Kashmir* by Verghese Koithara.⁸⁸ Its format is close to that of this thesis; varying only in the treatment given to the concept. The book looks more holistically at various conflicts while the thesis underlines the importance of various tools and tactics adopted by non-state actors to wage an asymmetric war and its impact on states policies to address this issue.

The author argues that perceptions and emotions are the prime drivers behind the India-Pakistan conflict. In today's context, the 'structure' of the conflict is more resolvable than what is commonly portrayed. Protracted, violent conflicts elsewhere can provide a useful perspective to understand how conflict dynamics work and how conflict conclusion can be more realistically sought through peace rather than through war strategy. He analyses the conflicts of Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Israel with this view. According to him, Northern Ireland provides an illuminating example of using a well-crafted internal settlement to end a wider conflict. A study of the Israel-Palestine conflict indicates how different are the structures of the two conflicts and how much more tractable the India-Pakistan conflict is.

Tara Kartha⁸⁹ carries out an objective analysis of various tools of terrors used in conventional and sub-conventional wars in her book, *Tools of Terror*. It empirically examines the spread of the tools of terror in the Sri Lankan and Pakistan theatres. She essentially deals with the spread of light weapons, drugs and other weapons used for crime/terrorism.

⁸⁸ Verghese Koithara, *Crafting Peace in Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004).

⁸⁹ Tara Kartha, *Tools of Terror*, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999).

The books written by JR Thackrah, Pettiford and Harding, and W Laquer,⁹⁰ cover a wide spectrum of tactics, like assassinations, bombings, hijackings, diplomatic kidnappings, etc., used by non-state actors in various conflicts the world over. They give details about the terrorist organisations and various forms of violence adopted by them. They also discuss the most infamous acts of terror carried out in various parts of the globe.

The absence of a detailed study analysing the asymmetry between state and non-state actors, and the state's reaction to the threat posed by non-state actor has prompted this thesis. The objective is to contribute to the understanding of how states react to the threat posed by non-state actors by using various tools and tactics. It is also hoped that this study will provide insights into the concerns of the modern world about asymmetric warfare.

Focus of Study

The study aims to provide an analytical framework to examine the concept of asymmetric warfare by looking at specific cases of state versus non-state conflicts. Here, the entire gamut of asymmetric warfare is not seen as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle because of the nature of actors involved and the unconventional nature of tools and tactics used by them to wage a war.

The study also focuses on the analysis of various tools and tactics used by the asymmetric actor to wage war against a state and subsequently even as counter-measures to the technological advantages of the state. It further tries to understand the implications of such wars on the states' overall security.

The most difficult issue in case of asymmetric warfare is that of threat identification and even response development. A problem with efforts to define an asymmetric threat is that they imply strongly that the universe of threats divides neatly into symmetric and asymmetric. It is difficult to qualify or quantify asymmetric threat if one extrapolates the argument "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" to "one culture's asymmetric threat is another culture's standard *modus operandi*".⁹¹ Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, the approach towards analysing

⁹⁰ J R Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, (London: Routledge, 2004) and Lloyd Pettiford & David Harding, *Terrorism The New World War*, (London: Arcturus, 2003) and Walter Laquer, *A History of Terrorism*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

⁹¹ Gray, n.5, p. 5.

asymmetric threats is not based on any perfect definition (as such it does not exist) but is rather based on the principal characteristics of the asymmetry.

Research Questions

The study attempts to answer the following critical questions:

1. What are the political and military considerations of non-state actors that make asymmetric warfare a potent weapon against a more powerful adversary?
2. How do states typically respond to threats posed by asymmetric actors?
3. Have there been any internal changes in such state responses?
4. What is the nature of pattern emerging out of asymmetric conflicts fought in India, Israel and Sri Lanka?
5. What are the new tools and tactics used by asymmetric actors to circumvent a state's advantage in capabilities by avoiding its strengths and exploiting its weaknesses?
6. What are the common features of responses by these states against the various tools and tactics used by asymmetric actors?
7. What are the lessons that can be learnt from evolving state responses to deal with future threats from asymmetric warfare?

Hypothesis

The research hypothesis for the study is as follows:

State responses in terms of conventional military tactics to challenge the asymmetric warfare put forth by non-state actors have proved inadequate.

Methodology and Sources

The methodology adopted to accomplish this study is mainly analytical in nature. The analysis is carried out based on survey of literature available and accessible to the researcher and some active interviews. The published materials relating to the subject were located and identified in various libraries in New Delhi and on the Internet.

The technical journals and other leading periodicals and articles therein by eminent specialists were reviewed and their opinions have been incorporated in the respective chapters. Other study materials directly or indirectly related to this study, which include books, magazines, newspapers and Internet-based articles and

commentaries, were also reviewed in the course of research. These materials have formed the basis of this study. This information and data from the literature survey and interviews have been carefully analysed and synthesised. Inferences and conclusions have been drawn based on this analysis and suggestions have been made accordingly.

The primary sources for the study include the doctrines and war college studies of various states that are fighting the asymmetric enemy. They also include reports based on empirical data analysis carried out by various state departments and independent think-tanks to identify the patterns of global and regional terrorism. However, most of these reports only reflect the facts. Therefore, it sometimes becomes difficult to appreciate the motives of non-state actors to indulge into asymmetric tactics and state responses to these tactics. In addition to secondary sources, consisting of books and research articles. I have also resorted to analysing the tools and tactics used by various state actors, a few technical journals, whose inputs were incorporated in the respective chapters.

Internet has been a major source of information for this thesis. Normally, plentiful usage of Internet sources is viewed against basic scholarly practices because such sources lack academic rigour and authenticity. However, the peculiar nature of the subject on occasions has limited the choice for non-Internet sources. Hence, on occasions official and reorganised websites of state as well as non-state actors are referred to. Care has been taken in choosing the other websites and mostly reputed sites have been consulted. Also, many reputed publishing houses are making their journals/books available on the cyberspace and on occasions they were consulted from the Internet instead of their print versions.

Brief Summary of Chapters

This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter I gives basic introduction of the subject covering nature of asymmetric warfare, qualitative and quantitative differences between conventional and asymmetric warfare, and nature of state response to asymmetric threats from non-state actors. It covers the concept, the history and the ongoing debate on the subject. It also carries out a survey of the literature directly and indirectly related to the subject. The chapter also formulates the hypothesis for the said research and raises questions.

Chapter II, titled *Understanding Global Asymmetric Conflicts*, deals with the current global trends in asymmetric warfare and states' responses to it. It scrutinises contemporary trends in asymmetric warfare in the backdrop of a macro analysis carried out for few existing trends in the context of threats posed by a non-state actor to a state actor. The chapter also gives a comparative tabular representation of various current major global asymmetric conflicts.

Chapter III on *Case Studies* gives a brief description about political, social and military background of Kashmiri militant groups, the LTTE and Hamas threats. It further describes and analyses the tools and tactics used by these non-state actors. The chapter further attempts to identify the patterns and success of such tools and tactics. In the end, it furnishes a tabular representation of the various tools and tactics used by these asymmetric actors.

The responses of the Indian, Sri Lankan and Israeli governments at various levels (national and international, military and political) to these challenges are discussed in the penultimate chapter titled *State Responses to Asymmetric Warfare*. The chapter essentially discusses the responses by the state against the tools and tactics used by the asymmetric actors. However, it is not possible to delineate the responses for individual tools and tactics adopted by the asymmetric actor. Hence, the chapter discusses the broader security frameworks adopted by the state to tackle this threat. A comparative diagram of the state responses to various tools and tactics is attached at the end.

Finally, the last chapter summarises the main argument of the thesis and offers some broad observations on the commonalities of state responses to these threats and the impact of the responses towards nullifying the threats.

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

This chapter examines current trends in asymmetric warfare and state responses to it. Historically, the concept of asymmetric warfare has gone through several phases of transformation. However, the scope of this chapter is restricted towards studying contemporary trends in asymmetric warfare. Hence, this chapter is organised in four sections, giving a macro view of the current threat. The first section attempts to broadly delineate the origin of the debate. The second section deals with the few existing trends in asymmetric warfare in the context of a threat posed by a non-state actor to a state actor. The third deals with state responses to this threat and the final section presents the conclusion.

1. The Origins

Asymmetric warfare may appear to be a modern construct but it is as old as warfare itself. The idea of mismatched forces seeking to achieve comparative advantage has been around for a very long time indeed—since the Biblical tale of David and Goliath, and as a recurring theme in the writings of Sun Tzu.¹ Over 2,500 years ago, this Chinese strategist wrote: “To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up a calm and confident array—this is art of studying circumstances. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.”²

Debates regarding the origins of asymmetric warfare date back much before World War I. In the battle of Agincourt in 1415, English infantry, armed with longbows, crushed shining French knights on horseback. According to Phillip Wilkinson, excluding the shared American and Soviet Cold War concept of MAD—mutually assured destruction—all warfare has been asymmetric.³ Asymmetry means the absence of a common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operational

¹ Wing Commander J. G. Eaton, “The Beauty of Asymmetry: An Examination of the Context and Practice of Asymmetric and Unconventional Warfare from a Western/Centrist Perspective”, *Defence Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 51.

² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated by James Clavell (New York: Dell Publishing, 1983) p. 34.

³ Richard Norton-Taylor, “Asymmetric Warfare”, *The Guardian*, 03 October 2001.

terms, a capability. In most of the wars, there has always been asymmetry in the military capability of the two warring nations.

The best way to appreciate perfect symmetry in a conflict situation is to contrast the typical board game with real world warfare. In games such as chess, Chinese checkers, or the Japanese pebble game, two opposing forces begin in mirror-image positions with identical resources and the outcome of the game is determined by the players' skill alone. In backgammon, by contrast, the rolling of dice introduces an element of luck to an otherwise symmetrical conflict, just as in real war many extraneous factors such as weather, topography and morale can render an otherwise "fair fight" unequal. But both the sides possess roughly the same equipment and play by the same rules.⁴

Traditional military analysis has tended to be symmetrical. For example, analysts have examined tanks versus tanks or fighters versus fighters, either in static or engagement analysis. Recent military discussions have described several alternative future battlefields. Russian writings have focused on a high-tech, symmetrical development along the lines of what the US achieved in Operation Desert Storm and what it is seeking with further developments of military technologies.⁵

In World War I, the Germans broke (or rewrote) the rules when they employed mustard gas; similarly, weaker opponents in imperial conflicts, such as the Boer War, Cuban insurrection and Filipino War against the US, resorted to guerrilla tactics. But the weapons and 'game pieces'—cannons, rifles and soldiers—remained largely symmetrical.⁶

The 20th century is replete with campaigns won by forces with similar capabilities, though different by degree, to those of their opponents. True examples of operational and strategic asymmetry are relatively rare. Technological, operational and tactical innovations combine to create them. As a basis for measuring technological innovation today, many cite the German offensive into France in 1940,

⁴ Winn Schwartz, "Asymmetrical Adversaries", *Orbis*, Spring 2000, <<http://www.findarticles.com>>, accessed on 14 March 2003.

⁵ Bruce W. Bennett et al, *Theater Analysis and Modeling in an Era of Uncertainty: The Present and Future of Warfare*, (Washington DC: Rand, 1994), p. xix.

⁶ Schwartz, n. 4.

the so-called blitzkrieg, as asymmetric warfare. In this war, differences in degree of capability existed between French and German units at the tactical level as well.⁷

Britain has more experience than most in dealing with asymmetric threats. Its colonial past can be viewed as a laboratory of unconventional warfare. The experience of the Special Air Service (SAS) during the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s, in Oman during 1960s and 1970s was of unique nature. These operations involved not only shooting the enemy, but part of the strategy was psychological—a battle for ‘hearts and minds’.⁸

A few historical as well as modern conflicts indicate that there can be a very thin line between an asymmetric or unconventional threat and a conventional threat. The victorious Continental Army of 1781, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army of 1948, the Viet Minh of 1954 and the North Vietnamese of 1975 had all originated as ragged militias, but used foreign support to become better at conventional conflict than their enemies. Also, some others saw asymmetric warfare as not a stage in conflict but as its end. Che Guevara became the theorist of Marxist-Leninist asymmetric warfare; believing conventional warfare to be unnecessary, as capitalist states worldwide were ripe for defeat. Che’s lack of success and ultimate demise underlines the difficulty of implementing asymmetric strategies.

Osama bin Laden tried to apply Che’s tactics to an Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Bin Laden did not bring down his enemies, but instead provoked retaliation that probably defeated his own Al Qaeda and its sympathisers in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Yemen and elsewhere.⁹

The US campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 is the best recent example of asymmetry where a stronger state power defeated a weaker power because of the operational asymmetry between them. The US forces entered the fray with technological superiority in sensors and space-based communications, and the ability to deliver precision weapons from aircraft. Based on training, initiative and field-craft, they possessed the ability to knit together new tactical techniques integrating air operation and Special Forces with an indigenous formation, the Northern Alliance. This combination, developed after forces were engaged, created a unique operational advantage. Once the ground formations of the Northern Alliance were linked by

⁷ Montgomery Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare”, *Parameters*, Summer 2003, pp. 4-18.

⁸ Norton-Taylor, n. 3.

Special Forces' teams, providing precise and timely targeting data to attacking aircraft, this resulting asymmetry denied Taliban forces the ability to control or defend key terrain. By exacting a great price from the Taliban for any massing of forces to defend or counterattack, the asymmetrical advantage of the US ground-based targeting and air attack made the ground forces of the Northern Alliance unstoppable. The Taliban and Al Qaeda had nothing of comparable capability with which to oppose the US advantage.¹⁰

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq is also a classic case of asymmetry where both the warring factions have gained something from asymmetric advantages. It is too early to tell how long urban/guerrilla warfare in Iraq will continue but after a great military victory, the US still stands as a loser.¹¹ Because of operational asymmetry, the US easily won the tactical dimension of the battle. However, in the post-Saddam phase, the enemy, with an unknown face, has succeeded in disturbing the US plans by using asymmetric tactics.

This war demonstrates that it is not only the superior power that can always derive benefits from operational asymmetry. Al Qaeda's true operational asymmetry comes from its ability to change its operational system at will in response to the methods needed to approach and attack each new target. Al Qaeda adapted a new form of organisation in each case, a structure optimised for the differing environments of the separate targets.¹²

From a state's point of view, asymmetric enemies do not fight fair; their strategy, in a globalised world, uses all possible sophisticated modern means: communication, transportation, information, psychological terror, international media and the Internet. In their arsenal, they have low-tech weapons, which work. Such asymmetric enemies have a common interest in weakening state sovereignties.

During the last decade, the failure of nation-states under varying constraints has also given a boost to the debate on asymmetric warfare. Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy and the very nature of a particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a

⁹ David Isby, "Asymmetric Warfare and Iraq", *Washington Times*, 04 November 2002.

¹⁰ Meigs, n. 7.

¹¹ <http://www.csis.org/press/pr03_45.htm>, accessed on 22 May 2004.

modern era when nation-states constitute the building blocks of a legitimate world order, the violent disintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic and Latin American states threaten the very foundation of that system.¹³

Nation-states fail or become weak due to various reasons like misrule by politicians, internal conflicts, economic failures, natural disasters and foreign involvements. Covert political and military challenges thrown by other state actors are also one of the major reasons for failure or weakening of some nation-states.

The history of asymmetric warfare is thus a saga of contrasts. The meaning of asymmetry changes with the change in context. The above discussion deals with few contemporary issues and conflicts that have dominated the debate on asymmetric warfare. However, this thesis deals with the issues of asymmetry only between a state actor and a non-state actor.

2. Existing Trends

In the recent past, it has been observed that in an intense rivalry between a state authority and non-state actor, a motivated weak adversary (non-state) can employ asymmetric tactics if its key decision-makers and supporters perceive that they can achieve their objectives in an asymmetric conflict. This is despite the possession of superior gross military and economic power capability by the defending state authority. The significance of these limitations is that they occur even when the non-state actor knows that the balance of overall capability favours the defender.

Asymmetric assault is a strategy that makes sense to non-state actors because they cannot compete under the traditional rules. This form of warfare is generally associated with low technology. However, the easy availability of technology today has increased substantially and today's non-state actor is taking help of technological advancements to wage unconventional war.

Currently, asymmetric war occupies a central place in the strategic debate all over the world. The Cold War ended over a decade back and the Warsaw Pact no longer exists. NATO is expanding and the arms race is not touching the unprecedented 'Cold War era' dimensions. However, this does not mean an end of large-scale conventional warfare. The 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 1.

have shown that state powers are still using large ground, air and sea forces to fight a war. The Afghanistan conflict (2001) has demonstrated that the state powers will use conventional tactics to gain an asymmetric advantage vis-à-vis the non-state actors. Such tactics have not always proved useful. The following paragraphs discuss few recent and ongoing cases of asymmetric warfare between a state actor and a non-state actor in various parts of the globe.

Global Asymmetric War Scenarios

At present, various regions of the world are facing challenges posed by non-state actors. In the Asia-Pacific, non-state actors are challenging states like Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Nepal, India and China. In the present context, the West Asia and Israel theatres can be viewed as the prime laboratory for studying asymmetric conflicts. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York changed the dynamics of global politics, leading to an international fight against terrorism. Today, the global superpower, the US, faces the greatest challenge of the 21st century from an asymmetric threat. In Latin America, two guerrilla groups pose a challenge to the state of Colombia. Europe and Eurasia are also not free from this threat, with Northern Ireland and Russia being the victims of a bloody asymmetric conflict. While a major threat in one of the most economically poor continents of the world, Africa, is non-military, that is AIDS, states like Ethiopia are also facing military threats from non-state actors.

In order to get a global picture of the current trends in asymmetric warfare and state response to it, the following paragraphs undertake a macro analysis of some of the above-mentioned cases. The cases covering problems in India, Israel and Sri Lanka are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Asymmetric War in Colombia

Colombia gained full independence in 1813 and in 1819, the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed. Colombia began as a weak state and little was done for most of the first 138 years since independence to change that sense of insufficiency. However, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Colombia maintained a tradition of civilian government, holding regular and free elections. Notwithstanding the country's commitment to democratic institutions, Colombia's history has also been characterised by widespread, violent conflict between the

government and paramilitary groups. Two civil wars– the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) claimed an estimated 100,000 lives and La Violencia (1946-1957) cost another 300,000 Colombians lives–were the result of bitter rivalry between the Conservative and Liberal parties.¹⁴

Currently, Colombia's complicated internal conflict is causing problems across international borders. Long-term government failures to provide lawful environment have led to large-scale criminal activity across the country and narco-guerrillas pose a direct challenge to Colombian democracy. In the 20th century, Colombia was the Cold War target for international communist expansion. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba supported insurgencies intended to spread communist influence throughout the region.¹⁵ Two guerrilla groups, namely ELN-Army of National Liberation (1962) and FARC-Armed Forces of the Colombian Revolution (1966), continue to be in the country, with a mass support base. ELN is a direct product of Cuban socialist internationalism while the FARC is an offshoot of various paramilitary groups. In the 1970s, with the growth of the FARC and its hostility toward the civilian population (especially ranchers and large farmers, who could pay protection money), those with traditional political affiliations adopted a self-defence structure to repel guerrilla attacks. Such self-defence groups had their genesis in the constant demands of the guerrillas and the failure of the government to protect the honour, life and property of the people.

During the period 1960s to 1980s, three new groups provided novel challenges to the government by setting up *de facto* governments in parts of the country. They included guerrilla groups, paramilitary squads and drug dealers. The guerrilla groups were formed under the influence of Marxist revolutionary groups. These pro-Castro, pro-Chinese groups adopted a prolonged peoples' war strategy, with the stated aim of starting from a small area, growing militarily and ultimately governing in a way that favoured the interests of the common people. The last such group ended up accepting a peace proposal and became a legal political party in 1989.¹⁶

However, such truce never brought peace to the state. During the 1970s and 1980s, the paramilitary groups belonged to those who produced legal agriculture products. However, as the drug lords become wealthy, they bought more land and

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 161-179.

¹⁵ William Mendel, "Colombia's Threat to Regional Security", *Military Review*, May-June 2001, Vol. 81, No.3, p. 2.

invested their money in paramilitary squads.¹⁷ Drugs, organised crime and the accompanying money and firearms—added the final ingredient to the deadly Colombian cocktail. Initially, this threat was not considered very significant but now these groups are so powerful that any politician, judge, or journalist opposing them can be bought over or killed. The murder rate in the state at 86 per 100,000 inhabitants during the 1990s, the highest in the world. Between 1995 and 2000, some 16,500 kidnappings took place. Recent figures show that every month violence claims the same number of victims in Colombia as those who died in the September 11 attacks in New York.¹⁸ There is a huge amount of money in the drug business. The drug dealers have since entered politics and can influence the presidency. Also, there exists an unofficial connection between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups.¹⁹

The main tools and tactics used by these asymmetric actors in Colombia are narco-trafficking, gun-running, ambushes, bombings, kidnapping, extortion and other forms of pseudo-insurgent terrorism. As a part of guerrilla warfare during the Cold War, these groups used to extort money from leading producers of cattle, coffee, coal, emeralds, oil and bananas. International support provided them with war material, training and sanctuary. But post-Cold War, the lack of communist material support saw many guerrillas abandon the communist ideology and turn to drugs for financing their activities.²⁰

Today, the FARC is the centre of gravity in Colombia's narco-insurgent war, with drug production being an important source of FARC strength. FARC depends on the local workforce to produce drug products and sustain its soldiers. Also, FARC works in collaboration with other neighbouring narco-trafficking groups and purchases weapons with their help, using the river corridors on the Brazilian-Colombian border to receive supplies. FARC imports AK-47s, HK.91 (G3s), A-3s, ArmaLite-15s, Dragunov sniper rifles, Galil rifles, .50-calibre machine guns, 40mm grenade launchers and C-90 grenades. Recently, FARC has added man-portable,

¹⁶ Rotberg, n. 13.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Eduardo Posada-Carbo, "Colombia's Resilient Democracy", *Current History*, Vol. 103, No. 670, February 2004, pp. 69-70.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Mendel, n. 15, p. 3.

ground-to-air missiles, such as SA-14s and SA-16s from Russia and US Redeye and Stinger missiles from Syria to its arsenal.²¹

The effect of Colombia's internal conflict on each of its neighbours is significant. Throughout Colombia's history of internal war, Venezuela has been a constant, if not always reliable, pipeline for arms and other contraband. Networks in countries like Venezuela as also the Colombian kidnapping industry that extends beyond its borders helps to sustain insurgency in the state.²²

No single explanation fully addresses the deep roots of Colombia's present-day troubles, but they include limited government presence in large areas of the interior, the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, endemic violence and social inequities.

Asymmetric War in Nepal

In Nepal, the Maoists, under the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), have been waging an asymmetric war since 1996. They are advocating the replacement of the constitutional monarchy in Nepal with a communist republic. For many decades, Nepal was ruled by a strong monarchy. As the demand for democracy and constitutional reforms gained strength, the 1962 constitutional amendment established a party-less Panchayat system, which continued for the next 30 years. These years were characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions in political as well as economic sectors. Because of severe domestic pressures in 1990, the party-less Panchayat system was finally abolished and a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, based on the multi-party system, established.²³

However, the democratic process could never get consolidated. In a period of just 10 years, the country saw eight different Prime Ministers. Politicians failed to implement many aspects of the constitution. Corruption and selfishness of the politicians, and traditional ways of thinking have substantially damaged the state's image and increased political unrest, boosting the communist movement. In November 1995, the Nepalese government launched 'Operation Romeo' against

²¹ "FARC: Finance Comes Full Circle for Bartering Revolutionaries", *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 16 January 2001, <<http://www.prairienet.org/clm>>, accessed on 14 March 2003.

²² Scott Wilson, "Influx Burdens Venezuela", *The Washington Post*, 01 October 2000.

²³ Fahmida Ashraf, "Maoist Uprising In Nepal", *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, No.2, Summer 2002, pp. 61-62.

communists under which the police created a reign of terror and arrested thousands. In reaction, the 'People's War' was formally announced on February 13, 1996.²⁴

For the last eight years, a bloody war has been continuing in Nepal. Maoists have modelled their struggle on Peru's Shining Path movement. The Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), an international communist umbrella organisation, is supporting their struggle.²⁵ They have actively sought to establish relationships with external groups to build political, military and financial linkages for gaining international recognition and access to arms. The stated aim of the Maoists is to bring about an agricultural revolution, attain power and declare Nepal a communist state. During the last four to five years, insurgency is threatening the political stability of the country and it is estimated that more than 2,000 people have died.²⁶

The Maoists in Nepal have two organisational structures, one political and the other military. It has around 5,000-armed personnel, including the militia.²⁷ The Himalayan terrain of the region gives the Maoist guerrillas an advantage. They essentially use small arms as tools for mounting offensives. The main source of weapons for the Maoist insurgents has been through raids on police stations. Another source is the illegal arms markets. Other than firearms, the Maoist rebels have used improvised explosive devices made from gelignite and locally manufactured grenades. In a couple of instances, they have used landmines. There is speculation that the Maoists have been trained by retired Gorkha soldiers of both the British and Indian Armies, who belong to areas that are today under Maoist control. The Maoists have raised funds largely through bank robberies, tax collection, voluntary donation and extortion from rich businessmen.²⁸

To launch daytime attacks, the Maoist attack units carry small arms that can be concealed or discarded easily if they encounter the police. At night, they transport explosives and long barrel guns, and move in units of 35-40. Today, their weaponry includes muzzle-loading guns, twelve bore guns, home-made pistols, hand bombs, pressure cooker bombs and pipe bombs. They have also made repeated, although so far unsuccessful, attempts to take a remote airstrip. They have also attacked

²⁴ Bertill Lintner, "Nepal struggles to cope with diehard Maoist violence", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1999, p. 43.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 44, and Rohan Gunaratna, "Nepal's Insurgents balance politics and violence", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, October 2001, p. 33.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 34.

²⁷ Ashraf, n. 23, p. 68.

²⁸ Deepak Thapa, "Day of the Maoist", *Himal*, May 2001, p. 14.

international NGOs, foreign-aided project works and sometimes even foreign nationals.

Their tactics also include creation of political push for legitimacy. They are fighting human rights cases, legally and openly. They often conceal their fighting units and operate politically through front and sympathetic organisations in Nepal and beyond. The porous borders allow them to use Indian territory as a safe haven. The Maoists also control the Nepalese diaspora and migrant organisations in India.²⁹

Asymmetric War in Russia

Chechnya is one of the regions of the erstwhile Soviet Union, which seized the opportunity to take a more independent stance during the 1990 'war of laws': a power struggle in which the Soviet authorities in Moscow attempted with ever-decreasing success to re-establish their formal control over peripheral areas of the country, whose leaders were determined that they be given greater day-to-day authority over their own affairs.³⁰ The Chechens, who are Muslim, have broad public support in Turkey and the Middle East. Russia faced the humiliation of the complete loss of authority over Chechnya, with the situation there posing definitive threats: first, it threatened the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, second, the threat of illegality, crime, and a general lack of order and creation of a centre for illicit weapons and drugs, and lastly, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.³¹

During the last decade, Chechnya region has faced two bloody wars killing almost 70,000 people, mostly innocent civilians. The 1994-96 Chechen war in Russia was an armed rebellion against a state by one of its ethno-territorial autonomies, which in 1991 unilaterally proclaimed its secession from the Russian Federation to form an independent state.³² This 22-month war led to Russian withdrawal and unrecognised Chechen independence.

The Russian Army was numerically far more superior (1:15). However, the Chechen forces were well trained in guerrilla warfare, having received training for months in the remote mountainous border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They used various conventional and unconventional tools and tactics to launch an

²⁹ Lintner and Gunaratna, n. 25.

³⁰ Jennifer Mathers, "The Lessons of Chechnya: Russia's Forgotten War?", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 102.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 103.

assault. Chechen forces had learned the techniques of using different weapons, laying mines and planning ambushes. The volunteers operated mostly from the vicinity of a home village. A handful of women also served in the combat units, which mostly operated as 'hunter killer groups' consisting of 10 to 12 soldiers. They were armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), sniper rifles and large calibre machine-guns. The Chechens also had control over five to six artillery parks, 12 to 15 tanks, some ACPs, and truck-mounted anti aircraft guns.³³ Chechen forces used a few unconventional tactics, ranging from bus hijackings in Southern Russia to creation of 'civilian human shields' in front of advancing Russian troops.³⁴

After the 1994-96 war, the two sides reached a number of agreements, the first was signed in August 1996 and the second in May 1997. But peace never lasted for long and a new war started in less than three years.

One main reason for the Russian stand on Chechnya is that Russia can not overlook the region's strategic importance. A major pipeline carries oil from fields in Baku on the Caspian Sea and Chechnya towards Ukraine. Grozny has a major oil refinery along this pipeline. For Russia, the control of the oil pipelines and routes is of foremost importance.³⁵

Russia entered Chechnya in 1999 after numerous terrorist attacks on Moscow as part of the "war on terrorism". It began its campaign against the Chechen rebels in the second half of 1999, first in the eastern region of Dagestan and then in Chechnya with widespread public support. The Russians were well prepared this time and had learnt from previous mistakes. Today, Russia claims control of Grozny, but rebel units and snipers continue to fight on inside the city as the war turns to the countryside. The war now is moving into a rural guerrilla conflict. Russian losses continue to grow as they pursue the Chechen forces into the mountainous regions to the south. Also, areas that Russia claims are pacified periodically erupt due to hit-and-run ambushes of Russian troops. No immediate end is in sight to the war for Chechnya.³⁶

³² Valery Tishkov, "Ethnic Conflicts in the former USSR. The Use and Misuse of Typology and Data", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 5, September 1999, pp. 571-592.

³³ Dodge Billingsley, "Chechnya sizes independence but unity still beyond its reach", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1999, pp. 14-16.

³⁴ Mathers, n. 30, pp. 103-104.

³⁵ <<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp>>, accessed on 19 March 2003.

³⁶ <http://www.historyguy.com/chechen_war_two.html#chechencauses>, accessed on 14 March 2003.

Asymmetric War in China

Xinjiang is an autonomous region of China, geographically lying on the crossroads between the Chinese, Turkic and Russian regions. Xinjiang is divided between Muslims, most of whom speak Turkic languages, and non-Muslim Han Chinese immigrants. The Muslims are in a majority, but they do not constitute a single solid block against the Chinese because they are also divided linguistically and ethnically. For a long time, a resistance movement has existed in the region against Chinese rule, which was established on October 1, 1955, with the creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.³⁷ To split Xinjiang from China and bring it under their domination, some old colonialists gave Xinjiang the name “East Turkistan” (correspondingly, they called the countries in Central Asia “West Turkistan”), fabricating the fallacy that Xinjiang was the home of “East Turkistan”.³⁸

The first major incident of resistance to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over Xinjiang is generally acknowledged to have been the Khotan rising of December 1954 in southern Xinjiang by a Pan-Turkic organisation, known to the Chinese authorities as the Amin group. The Chinese authorities managed to contain the rebellion by 1957. By 1967-68, however, another major resistance organisation, East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party (ETPRP), started showing its presence. This was even as China was going through the most chaotic phase of its contemporary history: the Cultural Revolution. Also, apart from the ETPRP, there were a number of other different groups operating in various parts of Xinjiang. In fact, it is this pattern of one major outfit and a number of smaller outfits that has marked the resistance movement in China throughout the 20th century. On its part, the ETPRP had plans to rob banks, shops, grain stores and warehouses to raise funds for its activities while the smaller groups planned to seize weapons from local military and mass organisations. However, the group’s planned rising on August 20, 1969, was effectively crushed by the Chinese authorities even before it began. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities claimed that they had successfully destroyed the ETPRP network.

³⁷ Xinjiang has a long history of oppression. Beijing’s rule there has been harsh for many years and the detail analysis on the subject is available at Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang-China’s Muslim Far Northwest*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003)

³⁸ *Ibid* and The Chinese State Council Report (2002) “East Turkistan terrorist Forces cannot get away with impunity”, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 45, No. 5, 31 January 2002, p. 15.

In June 1980, the Xinjiang Islamic Association, which had been suspended during the Cultural Revolution, was re-established, ostensibly to promote, but also to control, Islam in the region. Rioting took place during Uyghurs celebrations of 1980 Lunar New Year. Uyghur opposition to Chinese rule gradually became more overtly nationalist during the 1980s as the repressive atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution began to fade. However, the Chinese authorities dealt with the situation with an iron hand and the few ringleaders that were there were sentenced to life imprisonment in the late 1980s.

Since the 1990s, East Turkistan forces inside and outside Chinese territory have planned and organised a series of violent incidents in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The crucial events, which have hastened the region's slide into conflict and violence, were the riots at the height of the spring ploughing season at Baren in the southern part of Xinjiang in April 1990. The local population was not happy with the CPP's policies towards ethnic minorities, including birth control, nuclear weapons testing, and export of Xinjiang's resources to 'inland China'.

In the last decade, the activities of non-state actors challenging the Chinese authorities demanding the formation of the East Turkistan state have become more organised. According to Chinese sources, since the 1990s, part of the East Turkistan forces inside and outside Chinese territory, under the influence of extremism, separatism and international terrorism, have turned to violence as the main means, even brazenly declaring that they would achieve their aim by the means of terrorist violence.³⁹

The tools and tactics used by non-state actors include explosions, assassinations, arsons, poisonings and assaults, with objective of founding a so-called state of East Turkistan. These incidents have seriously undermined the lives and property of people of all ethnic groups as also the security and social stability of the region.⁴⁰

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party started recruiting members in the early 1990s for an armed uprising to create an Eastern Turkistan Republic. The party started collecting money, arms and ammunition, and started military training for its members. Chinese authorities claim that they have dealt with these people and no uprising of

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ V.D. Chopra (ed.), *Global Challenge of Terrorism*, (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2002), p. 269.

any substance exists. However, accurate information on clandestine organisations operating inside Xinjiang is difficult to obtain.

But, inputs corroborated from various sources indicate that the asymmetric conflict is still on. In the early 1990s, the non-state actors used religion and propaganda as their main tools for garnering public support. These Muslim separatist groups carried out bomb attacks on buses and government buildings during 1993. In 1995, armed attacks were carried out on local government stores. These militant groups have never tolerated the views of pro-China Muslims. In 1996, an Imam was killed because of his being a 'patriotic religious figure' and for his associations with the Chinese government. Similarly, some politically motivated armed robberies have been carried out by 'masked men'. A number of other attacks on the police and other symbols of Chinese authority have also been reported. Also, in a few cases, the volunteers of the pro-independence organisations have responded to harsh measures (like secret executions) adopted by the Chinese authorities.

Currently, the separatists are trying to establish an urban guerrilla force. The victories of the Afghan mujahideen over the Red Army and, with the break-up of Soviet Union, the independence of Central Asian Republics have galvanised Uyghur separatism. For many militant groups, the emergence of national states as homelands for the other large Turkic populations of Central Asia justifies their own aspirations for independence.⁴¹ These events have given them new hopes of drawing support from beyond their own borders, particularly from the countries with whom they can culturally and religiously identify with.

Some scholars say that the violence in Xinjiang is likely to continue because it is the result of Beijing's inconsistent policies toward Islam and its support for the Afghan mujahideen—a political ploy that continues to backfire.⁴²

Asymmetric War in Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland conflict is a classic case of an internal conflict that has also been a significant success story of conflict abatement. Many British people

⁴¹ Remi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows", *China Perspectives*, No. 49, October 2003, p. 35.

⁴² Ahmad Lutfi, "Blowback: China and Afghan Arabs", *Issue & Studies*, No. 37, January/February 2001, p. 161.

migrated to Ireland during the 12th century. This did not create any problem.⁴³ The trouble started during the 16th/17th century, when a new wave of British settlers settled in Ireland and projected themselves as distinct and superior to the native Irish population. Until the end of the 16th century, Ulster was the centre of the most intransigent resistance to English rule. In 1608, the plantation of Ulster began with Protestant settlers from the Scottish lowlands and England expelling the native Catholic and Gaelic-speaking people to the poorer lands of the South and West.⁴⁴ There were two major Irish military campaigns to dislodge the British, in the 1640s and from 1689 to 1691. Both ended in decisive victories for the British. In 1720, the British parliament declared its right to legislate directly for Ireland, and the Irish executive became British appointed.

In the late 19th century, Irish resistance to British colonial rule began to gather momentum. However, in 1920, Britain passed the Government of Ireland Act, partitioning the 32 county island into Southern Ireland, with 26 counties (83 per cent of the area), and Northern Ireland, with six counties out of the nine in the Ulster province. Two of these counties had Catholic majorities but overall, Protestants outnumbered the Catholics two to one.⁴⁵

The conflict in Northern Ireland is usually explained in terms of the different constitutional aspirations of the two main sections of the population in the region. Many Catholics consider themselves to be Irish and are nationalists in their political outlook, that is, they would like to see the whole (nation) island of Ireland reunited (and independent of Britain). Most Protestants consider themselves to be British and are Unionist in their political outlook, that is, they want Northern Ireland to remain part of the (union of the) United Kingdom of Britain. The inequalities between the two sections of the population persisted until the late 1960s and were the main cause of the civil rights movement that eventually led to the re-emergence of violent conflict.⁴⁶

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed in 1919 as a commando unit opposed to the British. After the Irish Free State was established in 1922, the organisation split. But although many remained disaffected by the continued rule from London, political violence was rare. The 1960s changed this. This struggle for

⁴³ Verghese Koithara, *Crafting Peace in Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004), pp. 144-146.

⁴⁴ J R Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 140.

⁴⁵ Koithara, n. 43.

political control of Northern Ireland's future has come with a significant human cost. In this struggle, more than 3,500 people have been killed and 30,000 injured. This is a disproportionately large number because only a little over 1.6 million people live in Northern Ireland.⁴⁷ Interestingly, apart from being a non-state actor taking on the administration militarily, the IRA always had its own political wing for establishing popular support for their cause. Sinn Fein (SF) is a political party that represents the view of many Republicans in Northern Ireland. The party is dedicated to the achievement of a united Ireland. SF supports the IRA and is viewed as latter's political wing. The party has consistently refused to condemn the use of force by the IRA, but has on occasion said that it regretted the loss of innocent lives that occurred in some attacks.⁴⁸ In January 1970, the IRA's inability to protect the Catholics led to both the Sinn Fein and the IRA breaking up into moderate 'official' and extremist 'provisional' groups. The 'official' groups soon faded and the 'provisionals' came to be known as Sinn Fein and the IRA.⁴⁹

By 1969, a new kind of radicalism was rife, and a committed desire among many to try and shape the destiny of Northern Ireland themselves became apparent. Left wing in origin, the IRA was intent on getting British troops out of Northern Ireland. The tools and tactics used were bombings, both in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion and robberies.

Targets generally included senior British government officials, British military and police in Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the UVF. Bombing campaigns have been conducted against economic targets and a British military facility on the continent.⁵⁰

The major terror tactic used by the IRA was bombing. During the 1970s to 1980s, the IRA organised car bomb explosions, attacks and blasts using remotely controlled devices. They targeted British soldiers with some success. On February 4, 1974, and August 27, 1979, major bomb attacks were launched on British soldiers killing 9 and 18 soldiers, respectively.⁵¹

⁴⁶ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/faq/faq2.htm#end>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

⁴⁷ Lloyd Pettiford & David Harding, *Terrorism: The New World War*, (London: Arcturus, 2003), pp. 88-89.

⁴⁸ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/sorgan.htm#sf>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

⁴⁹ Koithara, n. 43, p. 149.

⁵⁰ Pettiford & Harding, n. 47, p. 88.

⁵¹ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/majinc.htm>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

In the early 1970s, secret negotiations were held with the IRA in London but the talks broke down and subsequently the IRA launched a major terror attack. 'Bloody Friday', the name given to this attack, occurred in Belfast on July 21, 1972. On this day, the IRA planted and exploded 22 bombs in Belfast, which in the space of 75 minutes killed 9 people and seriously injured 130. In addition, there were numerous hoax warnings about other explosive devices, adding to the chaos in the streets of Belfast that afternoon. These hoax warnings were deliberately used to reduce the effectiveness of the security forces in dealing with the actual bombs.⁵²

The IRA has always been of the opinion that one terror attack in London is worth 10 in Belfast. The timeline of bomb attacks in London indicates that since 1978, IRA has conducted over 15 attacks killing many people, using conventional bombs, rocket launchers, truck bombs, mortar attacks, indiscriminate firing, and assassinations.⁵³

The IRA's campaign forced politicians in London to agree to negotiations. The last two decades have seen a substantial decrease in violence. The first talks led to a ceasefire that lasted between September 1994 and February 1996, ending with the bombing of the Canary Wharf. The second ceasefire has been in existence since July 1997.⁵⁴

In November 1997, after the second ceasefire was announced, a splinter group of the IRA calling itself the 'real IRA' was formed. This 'real IRA', comprising of former members of the IRA, opposed the peace process and the political leadership of Sinn Fein. During the next one-year, they carried out many significant bomb attacks, claiming responsibility for the Omagh bomb blast on August 15, 1998. This was the single worst incident in the conflict in Northern Ireland, with 29 people being killed and hundreds injured. Three days later, the 'real IRA' announced a suspension of its activities. However, the organisation subsequently reverted to violence with occasional attacks in Northern Ireland and England. Many say it was responsible for the London blast on March 4, 2001.⁵⁵

However, most people believe that the current phase of violent conflict in Northern Ireland is (almost) at an end. However, Northern Ireland in recent years has

⁵² <<http://www.upmj.co.uk/bloody%20friday%20bloody%20sunday.htm>>, accessed on 12 May 2004.

⁵³ "Timeline: London bomb attacks", *BBC News*, 15 April 2001.

⁵⁴ Pettiford & Harding, n. 47, pp. 88-90.

⁵⁵ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/rorgan.htm#rira>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

experienced continuing violence not only from those paramilitary organisations, which are 'active' (that is, did not declare a ceasefire, like the 'real IRA'), but also from some organisations which agreed to a ceasefire (IRA).⁵⁶ Thus, the current period of 'peace' that began with the ceasefire can be said to be an imperfect one, with the conflict today being in a dormant phase.

Asymmetric War by Al-Qaeda

To the West, particularly the United States, the term 'holy war' was redefined on September 11, 2001. In a meticulously devised operation, involving sleeper cells, trained pilots and years of intelligence gathering and intensive planning on a global scale, Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network triumphed—it brought jihad to the heart of the United States. As against its partial success in New York City in 1993, the worst terrorist attack in history on 9/11 saw each element of operation meticulously planned, avoiding the mistakes of previous strikes.⁵⁷

Al-Qaeda emerged from the Makhtab al Khidemat (MAK), the Afghan mujahideen 'service office', around 1989. It today serves as a global asymmetric actor (international terrorist network) heavily funded and led by its 'prince', Osama bin Laden. This loosely knit network comprises of various terrorist organisations, such as the Egyptian al-Jihad. Al-Qaeda serves as an informal organisational structure for extremist Arab-Afghans, along with thousands of new recruits and supporters in some 55 countries. It is now spreading jihad to all corners of the globe.⁵⁸

The Al-Qaeda network has been linked to various asymmetric operations even before September 11, 2001. The major assaults carried out by it include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa and the attack on USS Cole, the US naval ship, in Aden, Yemen, in 2000. The organisation opposes all nations and institutions not governed in a manner consistent with the group's particular extremist interpretation of Islam. It also opposes the continued presence of the US military in West Asia, particularly after the 1991 Gulf War.⁵⁹ Al-Qaeda's stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the

⁵⁶ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/faq/faq2.htm#end>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

⁵⁷ Samul Katz, *Relentless Pursuit*, (New York: A Tom Doherty Associates Book, 2002), p. 277.

⁵⁸ Yonah Alexander and Michael Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2001), pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

rule of the Caliphs".⁶⁰ In the recent past, the group has been found mostly active against the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. However, its area of operations is vast and not limited to a specific area. It has attacked targets in parts of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Al-Qaeda's tactics include bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination and suicide attacks. Reportedly, the group is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Al-Qaeda has been linked to the production of the chemical VX in Sudan and the production of the biological agent ricin. On several occasions, the group has tried to obtain enriched uranium.⁶¹

Experts in guerrilla warfare, sabotage and covert operations are learnt to have trained Al-Qaeda recruits in the use of sophisticated weapons, among others. Even today, Al-Qaeda has an arsenal of high-tech weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.⁶² Most importantly, they use innovative and asymmetric tools and tactics, like using airborne transport aircraft as a missile for the September 11 attacks or the suicide attack on USS Cole, using only a dingy boat filled with explosives.

Al-Qaeda's ideology is puritanical. But the tools and tactics used by it are modern. It exploits up-to-date technology for its own ends. It relies on satellite phones, laptop computers and encrypted communications websites for hiding messages and the like. Its modes of attack range from low-tech assassinations, bombings and ambushes to experiments with explosive-laden gliders and helicopters, and crop-spraying aircraft adapted to disperse highly potent agents. It is also seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction.⁶³

Today, Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda is a formidable world menace because it has tapped into the emotive springs of fundamental religious belief and linked them with the other things that are fundamental in a different sense, that is, political imperatives coloured by the hunger for power and food.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ US Department of State, Fact Sheet: The Charges Against International Terrorist Osama bin Laden, <<http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/af1/www0001.html>>, accessed on 08 March 2003.

⁶¹ Dillon, n. 37, p. 32.

⁶² David Whittaker (ed), *The Terrorism Reader*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 42.

⁶³ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 11.

⁶⁴ Lutfi, n. 42, p. 44.

3. State Responses

Asymmetric approaches adopted by any non-state actor are attempts to circumvent or undermine the state's strengths while exploiting its weaknesses. Such approaches generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or perplexity that affects an opponent's initiative, freedom of action, or resolve. Asymmetric tactics demand an appreciation of an opponent's vulnerabilities' they often employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied during any situation, war or no war.

There is no textbook response to an asymmetric threat. A state reacts differently deciding on the circumstances. It uses military or non-military techniques. However, at times, its response becomes a vicious circle: a harsh military response produces additional threats and vulnerabilities in the form of counter reaction. No state will ever be fully able to protect against an asymmetric attack, as there are limited resources and an almost infinite number of scenarios to be considered. This section analyses the responses by state actors to asymmetric tactics used by non-state actors in case of the conflicts discussed earlier.

State Response to Asymmetry

By the beginning of the 21st century, Colombia had become an example of the new world 'disorder'. The state was powerless in the face of ever-rising lawlessness. FARC and ELN had achieved the breakdown of the state's political institutions, its loss of legitimacy among significant parts of the population, contradictions within its armed apparatus, and complete physical absence in certain parts of the country.

Colombia has historically been a weak state. Governments have failed in the state-building processes even as drugs have brought in vast amounts of money to the country. It was slow to react to the security threats that began to mount in the 1970s.⁶⁵ Till the 1990s, investments in the country's armed forces were sporadic. In the rural areas, a system of private protection existed amid the absence of the state. This created a sense of vacuum and made the drug mafia very powerful. In 1984, the Minister of Justice was assassinated indicating the helplessness of the state.

Various administrations pursued efforts to negotiate with guerrilla groups. These dialogues did not have any clear success in reducing violence. However, by

⁶⁵ Posada-Carbo, n. 18, p. 70.

1991, the main terrorist groups like M19 were demobilised and incorporated into the democratic process. This was after over 500 guerrillas belonging to different groups gave up their weapons. . But in 1994, when the scam about the then Presidential election campaign being funded by the drug cartel became public, the country sank into an unprecedented crisis.

FARC, which is the conflict's centre of gravity, is still active and is a very strong force to reckon with while the ELN also continues to dominate in its strongholds. Colombia's army of 121,000 is too small strategically. Desperate for a peace agreement, the government in 1998 vacated 42,000 sq. km of key terrain in Southern Colombia, giving the FARC both sanctuary and positional advantage.⁶⁶ Today, from their proto-sovereign country within a country, the guerrillas engage government forces in conventional combat, attempting to seize strategically key terrain. The guerrillas have continually restated their goal of assuming power in Colombia and turning it into a socialist state-by force, if necessary.

Drug production is an important FARC strength and despite American supplemental aid, the government has not been successful in carrying out a counter-drug campaign even though it understands that drug eradication may give them long-term results.⁶⁷

All along, the government has been negotiating with the guerrilla groups and conducting indirect negotiations and plea-bargaining with drug dealers and members of paramilitary groups. In 1991, the country's constituent assembly proclaimed a new constitution, with the aim of opening up the political system to marginalise guerrilla activities and to create a more efficient judicial system. The government is also believed to be involved in political violence, and has been accused of political assassinations. The security forces, paramilitary and other armed groups have been accused of torture..⁶⁸

On the political front, the state in 1999 offered major social-economic packages for the region with American support under what is known as 'Plan Colombia'. The primary objectives of 'Plan Colombia' are to promote peace, combat

⁶⁶ Rotberg, n. 13, pp. 161-179.

⁶⁷ Mendel, n. 15.

⁶⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1995) *United Nations Human Rights Report* No.E/CN.4/1995/111 dated 16 January 1995, <<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/4ac369c06b3ac64a802566a9005b0b86?OpenDocument>>, accessed on 18 September 2004.

the narcotics industry, revive the Colombian economy, improve respect for human rights and strengthen the democratic and social institutions. However, the FARC has shown little interest in real peace or serious negotiations.⁶⁹ This was mainly because 'Plan Colombia' aimed to fight the drug trade, a major funding source for the guerrillas and paramilitaries forces⁷⁰ and was perceived to be more of military option by non-state actors. The aid package was also used for spray planes to fumigate coca fields. Thus, despite the US Congress providing hundreds of millions of dollars every year, the policy objectives have not been met. Over the past 15 years, successive administrations in Colombia have chosen "counter-narcotics" as the principal means in dealing with the insurgency problem. In fact, from the "war on drugs" to Plan Colombia, most US assistance has fallen under this rubric, making Colombia, the third largest recipient of US aid by the year 2000.⁷¹

The increasingly hardline approach has been found to be ineffective, indicating that there is no quick fix for the complex challenges facing Colombia.⁷² The May 2002 election of Alvaro Uribe only appears to have exacerbated the situation as he has promised a much more confrontational approach with the insurgency. His regime has proved that confrontation alone provokes further descent into anarchic violence.⁷³

US aid to Colombia also does not appear to have been well spent. A counter-narcotics strategy has three principal tools at its disposal: eradication (usually linked with crop substitution incentives), interdiction and education. Drug eradication, the focus of US efforts in Colombia, has failed, with coca cultivation there now more than what it was in 2000.⁷⁴ Interdiction is a false hope; the US, with its long borders and

⁶⁹ Lino Gutierrez, "Peace and Security in Colombia", <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/11297.htm>>, accessed on 14 May 2003.

⁷⁰ "Plan Colombia: The Roadmap for Peace", <<http://www.colombiaemb.org/opencms/opencms/plancolombia/>>, accessed on 24 February 2005.

⁷¹ Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, "Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy," Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 19.

⁷² Peter Clark, "Failed 'Plan' in Colombia", *The Nation*, 31 July 2003, <<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030818&s=clark>>, accessed on 23 September 2004.

⁷³ "All Bush's Horses and All Bush's Men: How Far Should The U.S. Go To Help Put Colombia Back Together Again?", A National War College Paper available at www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n035602a.pdf accessed on 30 September 2006.

⁷⁴ Julia E. Sweig, "What Kind of War for Colombia?," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, p. 2.

thousands of miles of coastline, can never stop more than a small percentage of the drugs flowing into the country. Education can be a long-term solution, but it requires greater political will.

No single explanation fully addresses the deep roots of Colombia's present-day troubles, but they include limited government presence in large areas, the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, endemic violence and social inequities. Colombia has historically been a weak state and recent governments have also failed in the state-building processes. Drugs have brought in vast amounts of money to the country, with the guerrilla groups needing little from the government.

In the case of Nepal, it can be argued that the Nepalese government does not have a clear view on the Maoist People's War. Some leaders consider this group as a terrorist group and the problem as one of law and order. However, others feel that this is a political problem and should be solved politically. Essentially, the unacceptability of constitutional monarchy by the Maoist group appears to be the root cause of the problem.

Over the last eight years, the government has constantly rejected the main demands of the Maoist seeking the formation of a republic, an interim government and constitutional assembly.⁷⁵ Today, this political threat has manifested mainly into an armed threat. The Nepalese police are ill-equipped to tackle this threat. However, using the regular army has been an extremely costly option and politically counter-productive. In fact, till late 2000, the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) had not taken any part in the war against the Maoists but was involved only in training and arming the police with self-loading rifles. An all-out war with government troops ramping through remote villages—where the population is already hostile to the central authorities—has only exacerbated the kind of resentment on which the Maoists thrive. Also, the 47,000-strong Nepalese army has little experience in combating insurgents, and its few transport aircraft have not been enough to send troops and equipment to remote areas and provide logistical support for sustained operations.⁷⁶ Because of these reasons the government was always against using army to address this threat. Post-1999, the government made some attempts towards strengthening the security apparatus and correcting its human rights record. Counter-insurgency initiatives were associated with encouraging the active participation of local political party leaders to

⁷⁵ Ashraf, n. 23, pp. 75-76.

counter the public support for Maoists, constitution of civil protection committees and persuading the Maoists to surrender.⁷⁷ However, it was seen that the government was almost devoid of intelligence and was always reacting to the situations. Also, there were cases of human rights violation and policemen had let loose a reign of terror, which, in turn, made the local population anti-government. Interestingly, the Maoists have managed to exploit nationalist feelings and publicise their cause through information warfare.

Because of these failures, the monarchy finally endorsed the establishment of an armed police force in January 2001. The Maoists agreed to peace talks for the first time in August 2001 but broke away unilaterally in November 2001 just before they conducted their first attack on army garrisons. The attack forced the government to declare a state of emergency and mobilise the army.

At present, the total strength of the Royal Nepalese Army is 72,000. After relentless military, political, and international pressure, the Maoist declared a ceasefire on January 29, 2003, and agreed to holding peace talks. After three rounds of peace talks, on August 27, 2003, they once again broke away, resuming their violent activities, targeting senior political, security forces and other government officials.⁷⁸

Today, the people's war continues as the Nepalese government and monarchy have failed to present any substantial socio-economic package to the rural masses. The government has also failed to create a law enforcement system capable of addressing reports of human rights violations with greater transparency and accountability.⁷⁹

Chechnya is a unique case where a non-state actor was successful in defeating the more powerful state. During 1995-96, the Chechens confounded the stereotype of guerrilla warfare by standing and fighting. It was the Russians who used evasive tactics (such as putting pressure on local populations to drive out the separatist forces)

⁷⁶ Lintner, n. 24, pp. 42, 46.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 35.

⁷⁸ S. Chandrasekharan, "Nepal: The King makes yet another move to get the political parties together", <<http://www.saag.org/notes3/note210.html>>, accessed on 15 April 2004 and brief to Christina Rocca, US Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs, in Nepal in the third week of December 2003, South Asia Analysis Group; 23 January 2004, <<http://www.yomari.com/p-review/2004/01/29012004/nepal.html>>, accessed on 07 May 2004.

⁷⁹ Amnesty International and United Nations (2002), Report on the human rights situation in Nepal, "Nepal: A spiralling human rights crisis" No. AI Index: ASA 31/016/2002,

and lost, while the Chechens sought out opportunities for pitched battles that they won.⁸⁰ The Russian Army was a disjointed force following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 'contract service' volunteers within the army were the least employable elements of the Russian youth. Also, the Russian army was less in number and ill-prepared for local conflicts. The soldiers were not motivated because they had not been paid for months.⁸¹ Most importantly, the state's response on the political front was incorrect because it used extra-constitutional means to solve a domestic political issue that could have been solved by addressing civil, political or constitutional concerns.⁸²

While the Russian government lost the propaganda war in 1995, it was more prepared during the second Chechen conflict (2000). This time, it made every effort to control the media and ensure that its view of the war dominated public opinion. Reports of Russian military successes fuelled support for military activities among the populace. This was even though some military spokesmen altered the facts and limited independent reporting.

Russian operations in Grozny used 'salami tactics', by dividing the city into sectors; the sectors into sub-sectors; and then slicing them piece-by-piece. The force was much better prepared eventually to enter the city, since the planners had painstakingly studied the streets and the routes of approach, fully prepared to fight an urban war. The psychological factor also remained an important aspect of city combat. Using leaflets, Russian forces tried to convince the civilian population in Grozny to leave. The Russians used loudspeakers to regularly appeal for surrender and attempted to establish an assembly area for Chechen fighters who wanted to surrender.⁸³ The Russians and Chechens ran several reflexive control operations (a type of psychological activity that resembles perception management) against each other.⁸⁴

<<http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/nepal/document.do?id=8154D3CC49BA7CB480256B76004C6D5D>>, accessed on 18 October 2004.

⁸⁰ Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1998), pp. 4-5, 130.

⁸¹ Mathers, n. 30, pp. 101-113.

⁸² William Hayden, "The Political Genesis of the Conflict in Chechnya, 1990-1994", *Civil Wars*, Vol.2, No.4, Winter 1999, p. 50.

⁸³ Timothy L. Thomas, "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned", *Military Review*, Vol.80, No.4, July-August 2000, pp. 50-58.

⁸⁴ Moscow NTV, 0700 GMT, Translated by FBIS, 23 January 2000.

Also, Russian air strikes systematically destroyed Chechen communications and infrastructure while ground troops entered from the North indicating that Russia was reasserting its military and political authority in the region.⁸⁵

Simultaneously, Russia attempted to rehabilitate the Chechen economy, increasing the spending on the infrastructure in the region, in an effort to create conditions for the return of refugees. The government also stepped up compensation payments to locals for lost property and housing.⁸⁶ Today, there is a proposal to set up special economic zones in the region to create favourable conditions for Chechen businessmen and entrepreneurs from other regions and attract investment projects, privatisation programmes and new avenues for small business in agricultural processing.⁸⁷

The war destroyed all Chechen industries, with the exception of the oil-processing complex. But at the same time, Chechnya, with its war-damaged economy, wants to develop by limiting Russian influence.⁸⁸ The peace agreement and other Russian-Chechen documents open broad possibilities for Chechen development. However, they in turn have little impact on the basic claim of the conflict, which demands recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic. It is becoming very difficult for any development model to work in Chechnya because of the mistrust the Chechens have in Russian authorities.

The Russian-Chechen secession emerges in today's world as one of the most extreme cases of the complex and painful process of secession. It represents a complicated process of negotiations, tackling many undefined obstacles on the levels of politics and legitimacy.

As a state policy, since the beginning China has adopted harsh methods (CCP's policy of authoritarian crackdown) to curb the threat in Xinjiang. Since 1990, Chinese authorities have seen the emergence of repressive climate that engendered powerful frustrations and resentment. Post 1990, the nature of threat has changed substantially. China has combined its policy of speeding up the region's economic development with strengthening of its security collaboration with its neighbours,

⁸⁵ Sarah K. Miller, "Russia vs. Chechnya: Round Two: The crisis moves west" <<http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnya1.html>>, accessed on 17 March 2004.

⁸⁶ <<http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/05/17/53962.html>>, accessed on 6 January 2005.

⁸⁷ <http://www.russiannewsroom.com/content.aspx?id=2381_Economics&date=2004-12-4>, accessed on 06 January 2005.

⁸⁸ Lyoma Usmanov, "The Political Economy of Chechnya's Secession", 19 December 1999, <http://www.chechenworld.com/article/pol_econ.html>, accessed on 30 January 2003.

pursuing demographic colonisation and stiffening its repression of political activities it considers unlawful.⁸⁹

China is also espousing proactive measures on the international front to address the issue in a calculated manner. It has persuaded the Central Asian Republics to ban Uyghur organisations in their territories, and to extradite militants who have taken refuge there. Most importantly after September 11, 2001, the Chinese regime has tried included its repression of Uyghur opposition within the international dynamics of the struggle against Islamic terrorist networks. In fact, in August 2002, China succeeded in including East Turkistan Islamic Movements (ETIM) name in the UN Security Council's list of Al-Qaeda linked organisations.⁹⁰

On the domestic front, in the mid 1990s, the Chinese authorities launched a great national campaign against crime called 'Strike Hard' (April 1996). The Permanent committee of the CCP Politburo issued an exhaustive list of strict directives aimed at tightening control over Xinjiang and eradicating potentially subversive activities. As a part of same campaign, many strong-arm police operations were mounted. China is more concerned about the threat in Xinjiang because the party appears to have lost control of many grassroots organisations in rural Xinjiang to separatist and Islamist groups. Most importantly, the authorities in Xinjiang sector are trying to clamp down on the asymmetric activities because they see parallels of these activities in Chechen struggle.⁹¹

Although Xinjiang, comprising one-sixth the land area of the People's Republic of China, is rich in oil and other natural resources and produces high-quality cotton, fruit, wool and mutton, it has failed to meet its expectations for economic development mainly because the central government had shown more interest in social control than the economic growth.⁹²

China's war against non-state actors and its crackdown in Xinjiang has been going on with a vengeance since at least 1996. However, Beijing has at the same time used 'affirmative action' type economic rewards, believing that economic development can undermine Uyghur calls for independence and solve Xinjiang's

⁸⁹ Remi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows", *China Perspectives*, No. 49, October 2003, p. 35.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.44.

⁹¹ Dillon, n. 37, pp. 84-85.

⁹² June Teufel Dreyer, "Ethnicity and Economic Development in Xinjiang", *Inner Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2000, pp. 137-154, <<http://www.ericademon.co.uk/IA/IA207.html>>, accessed on 23 September 2003.

problems.⁹³ But, the local population continues to be unhappy with such measures and feels that these have not helped improve their social status.

Keeping in view the strategic importance of the province, Beijing has combined its policy of forced assimilation of the Uyghurs with greater attention to the economic development of the province and its trade links with the neighbouring Central Asian Republics (CARs). In 1996, US\$1.5 billion was earmarked for infrastructure development. A railway line linking Urumqi with Almaty in Kazakhstan, whose construction had started in 1956, was completed and opened to traffic in June 1992. A two-track railway line connecting Urumqi with the rest of China is under construction. In 1996, the total value of foreign investment proposals approved in the province came to about US\$120 million. Most of it came from overseas Chinese. However, the benefit of this economic development has mainly gone to the Han settlers, thereby aggravating the feelings of alienation of the Uyghurs.⁹⁴ The Uyghurs are under pressure on another front also. They face an epidemic chain of infection, devastation, and disintegration as the number of new HIV cases grows exponentially each year. Public health systems are poorly positioned. There are no hospitals in Xinjiang prepared to treat patients with full-blown AIDS. Testing is prohibitively expensive. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang is perhaps a more pressing concern as a security issue than as a humanitarian one.⁹⁵

The fundamental conflict in Northern Ireland is between the Protestants and Catholics, with Britain, as the state authority, suffering many losses because of the asymmetric threat posed by IRA. London's position on the conflict has changed considerably over the years and as a state they have adopted various political and military strategies.

Britain introduced tough anti-terrorist laws beginning 1971, allowing suspects to be interned without trial and normal rules of evidence suspended. But, despite harsh laws and deployment of over 17,000 regular troops and substantial local paramilitary forces, as well as highly advanced intelligence capabilities, Britain has

⁹³ Justin Rudelson, "Xinjiang's Uyghurs in the ensuing US-China Partnership", *Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, Uyghur Panel, 10 June 2002, <<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/061002/rudelsonStatement.php>>, accessed on 06 January 2005.

⁹⁴ <http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/world/w_1999_03_14.html>, accessed on 22 December 2004.

⁹⁵ <<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/061002/rudelsonStatement.php>>, accessed on 22 December 2004.

not been able to break the IRA (whose core strength has never exceeded 250). This is because the IRA enjoys substantial popular support among the Catholics, with whom Britain had little leverage.⁹⁶

In general, the group's struggle forced the politicians in London to conduct negotiations, either in secret or openly with the IRA. During last three decades, there have been a number of significant events and developments where apart from routine military and policing actions, Britain has engaged the IRA in a dialogue. The peace attempts continued even during the 1970s, and includes the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, under which Britain agreed to grant full powers to the Northern Ireland Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly as soon as possible. But this power-sharing executive formula was destroyed by the actions of Loyalist paramilitaries.⁹⁷ Subsequently, a few other major peace initiatives⁹⁸ like ceasefire between September 1994 and February 1996, second ceasefire since July 1997, Good Friday Agreement⁹⁹ (April 10, 1998) have come into force.

However, conflict (in the form of political conflict, economic conflict, etc.) between the two main communities has a long history, spanning almost 400 years. There have been many bouts of violent conflict in the past and there is no guarantee that people will not resort to violence in the future. Simply on the basis of previous experience, one can say that another period of violence is a possibility. In the meantime, Northern Ireland is likely to continue to experience an imperfect peace. It will require a fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship between unionists and nationalists in the region for violence to be avoided in the future.¹⁰⁰

Al Qaeda is the first multinational terrorist group of 21st century and many affected states are confronting it at the regional as well as at the global level. Post-September 11, a global network of states has been formed to tackle terrorism in general and Al Qaeda in particular. The US being the most affected and the most resourceful state has taken a major initiative to tackle this threat.

Many states are tackling this threat on their own on issue- and region-specific requirements. The destruction of Al Qaeda and Taliban infrastructure in Afghanistan has been pivotal to threat reduction. However, currently the Al Qaeda has tactically

⁹⁶ Koithara, n. 43, p. 161.

⁹⁷ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm>>, accessed on 26 January 2005.

⁹⁸ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/faq/faq2.htm#end>>, 17 October 2004.

⁹⁹ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm>>, accessed on 26 January 2005.

¹⁰⁰ <<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/faq/faq2.htm#end>>, accessed on 17 October 2004.

repositioned its cadres along the Afghan-Pakistan border and is preparing to wage a protracted guerrilla campaign that might last at least a decade.¹⁰¹

Till date, the response by the state to Al Qaeda's terror network has been mostly on military level. A few states are trying to dismantle financial network. Also, states, which were covertly helping the Al Qaeda for their regional gains, have come under international pressure. Hence, covert state support to the Al Qaeda has decreased substantially.

Appendix I gives the details of significant state versus non-state conflicts in a tabular form.

4. Conclusion

The responses indicate that states are mostly using military tactics to win this asymmetric war. At the tactical level, conflicts in various states differ substantially from each other; however, at the strategic level, the *modus operandi* by asymmetric actors are more or less similar and so is the state response.

In the case of Colombia, it is observed that urbanisation has brought many problems from the countryside to the cities. Here, narcotics and money are the major driving forces. The decreasing influence of the Roman Catholic Church, greater educational awareness, impact of the media, and neighbouring states' interests, could be some of the socio-political reasons for escalation of the conflict.

Russia's success in the second Chechen War implies that in the first war the forces were not prepared. They lacked the weapons incorporating the most recent technological developments. The use of advanced weapons could also have enabled the Russians to make better use of surprise strikes against the Chechen fighters.¹⁰² A similar situation is seen in Nepal. Their police force was not trained and equipped to fight the unconventional war and is still finding it difficult to tackle the threat.

Nepal's case makes a very strong argument that military solutions to such problems are not possible. The Maoists are open to the idea of a multiparty system with a new constitution.¹⁰³ This implies that political solutions are possible may be with varying degrees of difficulty.

¹⁰¹ Ed Blanche, "The Egyptians Around Bin Laden", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 2001, p. 20.

¹⁰² Mathers, n. 30, p. 109.

¹⁰³ S.D. Muni, *India-Nepal Relations: The Challenge Ahead*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2004), p. 103.

In most cases, it appears that the political appreciation of the situation was misjudged by the states during the early phases of the conflict. Most of the problems were initially treated as law and order problems, with the states failing to realise the gravity of the situation. Also, during subsequent military actions, adequate precautions were not taken to avoid civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. This, in turn, further turned public opinion against the state.

Stability parameters have not played any significant role in state responses against non-state actors. Weak states and developed states have responded generally in the same manner; militarily. Even for political responses, states have not shown an accommodative attitude and have not deviated much from the maximalist position. A few states are found taking some substantial social and economic measures to appease the disgruntled population. Also, states are found taking advantage of international events to suit their political agenda. A case in point is China, which lost no time in declaring violence in Xinjiang as an anti-national activity and the people involved in it as terrorists post-September 11.

The tools and tactics used by various non-state actors show major similarities. Guerrilla warfare, assassination, kidnapping, bombing, use of small arms and explosives are found to be commonly used tools and tactics. In few cases, the non-state actors are found involved in criminal activities like drug trafficking, bank robberies and looting, essentially for generating funds for their struggle.

The non-state actors have not shown much flexibility in their approach. Non-state actors do not take peace attempts through a process of dialogue seriously and ceasefire periods are found normally being utilised for regrouping and acquiring arms. This has particularly become evident in the case of the Maoist insurgents operating in Nepal. However, in a few cases like that of the IRA, the dialogue process has at least helped in temporarily stopping the violence if not in bringing the conflict to its logical conclusion.

In all these conflicts, the states have not shown a major focus towards finding long-term solutions. No major efforts were found to be undertaken towards initiating developmental activities in order to provide a new socio-economic regime. Generally, it has been observed that there is a need to revise policy towards greater support for the state's judicial system and other civilian institutions, the rule of law, and social and economic development.

By and large, these cases indicate that asymmetric warfare by a non-state actor (particularly in its intensity and nature of violence) is relatively a new phenomenon. During the last few years, this threat is increasing substantially all over the world. These local conflicts impose a different set of requirements on a state's armed forces, especially when the state has traditionally devoted most of its attention to planning for conventional wars, waged against other states with large standing armies. However, there exists a need to tackle the root cause of the problem and look beyond military solutions for permanent settlement of such conflicts.

This chapter has done a macro-level analysis of a few important 'state versus non-state' conflicts from the point of view of various tools and tactics used by the non-state actors and the states' response to such threats. It depicts a broad pattern, indicating that states are not looking beyond conventional methods of conflict resolution to tackle the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors. Also, states are finding it difficult to tackle militarily the threat posed by the usage of unconventional and covert methods of war waging. The next two chapters undertake a micro-level study of the various tools and tactics used by non-state actors, namely the various Kashmiri militant groups, Hamas and LTTE, and state response to such tactics.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDIES

This chapter describes and analyses the tools and tactics used by non-state actors that permit the continuation of asymmetric conflict. It attempts to identify the patterns and success of various tools and tactics used by asymmetric actors in states like India, Israel and Sri Lanka. The study undertakes the process of focussed and controlled analysis by systematically differentiating between various tools and tactics, and their overall impact. These cases have been chosen because they have a powerful contemporary resonance in the post-Cold War and post-September 11, 2001, eras, where the renewed potency of nationalism and ethnicity are transforming the international security agenda.

Every case has got varying compulsions of history, geography, culture and political and military obligations. Hence, the philosophy and methodology of tools and tactics used vary in each case. Due to this limitation, no structured method for the analysis has been devised. Instead, a more deductive and quantitative approach is adopted. The format for presenting facts follows the conventional descriptive approach.

In all the three cases described below, the threat posed by the non-state actor is examined in the backdrop of political and ethnic violence, and the methods used in this regard. For the purpose of this study, political violence is understood as pre-planned threats and armed attacks carried out by a non-state actor to capture political power or alter political authority in a domestic political system. Similarly, ethnic violence is understood to be disputes based on group identity, whether defined by language, race, religion, ethnic origin, caste, class, clan, or a combination of some or all of these. For discussion purposes, each case study is sub-divided into two parts. The first gives a broad overview of the conflict and the second explains the character of non-state actor/actors and the tools and tactics used by them to wage war against the state.

India

Overview of the conflict

India gained independence on August 15, 1947. However, the then ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, had not made up his mind regarding accession. On October 22, 1947, Pakistan violated the 'Standstill Agreement' by preventing essential supplies from reaching the State. This was followed by the entry of armed Pakistani tribesmen into Kashmir. They were essentially Punjabi and North-West Frontier Pakistani tribal non-state actors. Subsequently, on October 26, 1947, Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession with the Indian government. The accession of Kashmir was accepted by the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten. The next day the first Indian forces arrived in Kashmir to defend against Pakistani troops. Strenuous efforts were made, first by Governor-General Lord Mountbatten, and subsequently by the United Nations Security Council, to settle the dispute by arbitration. In due course, these resulted in a cease-fire agreement along a UN-demarcated line. But that was in January 1949. Since then, no further progress has been made and indeed constitutional changes since 1952 have tended to give the cease-fire line the status of an international frontier.¹

Since Independence, Kashmir has figured in most India-Pakistan crises, including the 1965 war and the mini-war in Kargil in 1999.² In 1966, both the countries negotiated a cease-fire during the Tashkent peace talks. In 1971, war again broke out in Kashmir as part of a larger India-Pakistan conflict. The 1972 Simla Agreement established the current boundary and committed India and Pakistan to resolving their disputes, including the Kashmir issue, bilaterally.³ Through all these wars, Pakistan attempted to pressurise India through subversion but without little

¹ Ian Copland, "The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the Crisis of 1947" in D.A. Low (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 218-219, <http://www.kashmir-information.com/chronology.html> and http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html accessed on 10 October 2006. Stand Still Agreement: under the 'India Independence Act-1947', all Indian Princely States had the option either to declare themselves independent or to merge with either of the two dominions—India or Pakistan. Maharaja of Kashmir could not take an immediate decision in this regard and needed more time. Therefore, he sent a proposal to the governments of India and Pakistan, for a 'stand-still agreement' with them. In effect it meant that till such time, the Maharaja takes a decision in this regard, the two countries will maintain status quo. Pakistan responded positively and signed the 'stand-still agreement' with the Maharaja.

² Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 6.

³ <http://www.terrorismanswers.org/policy/kashmir.html>, accessed on 14 January 2004.

success. For Pakistan, these attempts proved costly and infructuous.⁴ Relations between both these countries have remained complex or strained, with a crisis level having been reached in recent years over Kashmir (Kashmir here implies the state of Jammu and Kashmir), the bone of contention between the two.

In 1989, a violent separatist movement erupted in Kashmir. Several months of sporadic strikes, demonstrations and other anti-government activities peaked in December 1989, with the kidnapping of the daughter of Indian Minister for Home Affairs. The secessionist agenda that a small coterie of underground organisations had been promoting for decades suddenly seemed to evoke widespread popular support. Buoyed by the anti-government sentiment that had been building over the latter half of the 1980s, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and other, less organised secessionist groups mounted a campaign of violence against the Indian state.⁵

For several years in the 1990s, the Indian government imposed direct rule on Kashmir and fought pro-independence groups such as the JKLF as well as Islamist militants who wanted Kashmir to join Pakistan. These militants include Pakistanis, Afghans and Arab veterans of the 1979-89 Afghan wars against Soviet occupation. Today, mostly Islamists from outside Kashmir affiliated with groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba are fighting a grim battle against the Indian state. Such groups are supported by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). They use US equipment, originally sent to Pakistan's ISI for use in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.⁶

While most countries acknowledge Pakistan's interference and support to secessionist forces in Jammu and Kashmir, they do not accept the Indian view that the problem had arisen only because of Pakistan's political and material support to such forces and to foreign mercenaries. In their perception, the agitation in Kashmir has also been sparked off by the social and economic frustration, and alienation of substantive segments of the population.⁷

An interesting shift has taken in Pakistani policies on the Kashmir since 1991. Realising that the strategy of detaching Kashmir from India on the basis of an ethno-

⁴ Selig S. Harrison et al (ed.), *India and Pakistan: The first fifty years*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), p. 184.

⁵ Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1.

⁶ John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars*, (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 233.

religious argument will not find acceptance in the international community, Pakistan advocated the separation of Kashmir from India on the grounds of upholding the principles of self-determination. Such separation was offered as a remedy to the violations of human rights in the state. Pakistan claimed that the accession of the state to India had been organised by spurious means, which contradicted the provisions of the political and legislative decisions meant to govern the determination of the people's will at the time of partition.⁸

However, irrespective of the rationale behind Pakistan's support for the separatist movement in Kashmir, the nature of conflict still remains violent. For the last two decades, Pakistan's direct and indirect support for Kashmiri-related groups that have attacked innocent civilians is on the rise. To compound the problem, terrorism has a domestic face in Pakistan. Many of the terrorist groups have factions operating in Kashmir/India and Afghanistan, and a number of them also have ties with various Pakistani parties, Islamabad's intelligence services, or the army.⁹ Pakistan has taken a decision to support the Kashmir uprising, short of direct involvement. They understand that it is important to avoid war with India. Under such circumstances, they intend to keep the struggle confined territorially to occupied Kashmir.¹⁰

Currently, various non-state actors are operational in Kashmir (some sponsored by a state authority and some operating independently) and are challenging the Indian political and security apparatus by using various unconventional tools and tactics. Over last two decades, the Indian government has been fighting this threat based on its own strategic calculus. Some analysts view the Kashmir problem as a lethal combination of Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan's political adventurism. They feel that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda of partition, and the outcome of the two-nation theory.¹¹

Since 1989, armed encounters involving Indian security forces, Kashmiri separatist and pro-Pakistan groups, and foreign Islamist militants have led to at least 35,000 deaths.¹² Kashmir, the oldest and most sensitive issue between India and

⁷ J. N. Dixit, *India-Pakistan in War & Peace*, (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002), p. 310.

⁸ Ibid, p. 311.

⁹ Cohen, n. 2, p. 310.

¹⁰ S.M. Koreshi, *Contemporary Power Politics and Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991), p. 126.

¹¹ M.G.Chitkara, *Indo-Pak Relations Challenges Before New Millennium*, (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2001), p. 99.

¹² <<http://www.terrorismanswers.org/policy/kashmir.html>>, accessed on 14 January 2004.

Pakistan, has assumed greater global importance since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998.

The proposed period of study is 1987 to 2003. The main tools of non-state actors in Kashmir have been hide and kill (ambush), hijacking/kidnapping, fidayeen attacks, IED (improvised explosive devices), landmines, involvement of foreign mercenaries, extortion and remote controlled UAV's (unmanned aerial vehicles).

Tools and Tactics

Kashmir has in the recent past witnessed one of the most difficult periods in its long and eventful history of over two millennia. It defies any classical definition of conflict. It is not a rebellion or a revolt, militancy or terrorism, protest or alienation, insurgency or insurrection, a rising or an uprising. It is a mix of all these and has a few precedents.

During the last two decades, various non-state actors have been found to be active in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, at least 44 terrorist organisations were operating in the Kashmir valley.¹³ Also, many terrorist organisations were operating from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan itself.¹⁴ It has been observed that no single group has succeeded in establishing its dominance in J&K. The following paragraphs discuss a few significant non-state actors operational in J&K and the tools and tactics used by them. These actors, either jointly or individually, pose an asymmetric threat to the Indian state.

The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was the oldest and most powerful terrorist organisation during the initial phases of militancy (post-1987). Its roots and militant activities date as far back as 1977.¹⁵ The organisation aims at liberation and formation of an independent J&K through an armed struggle. The Pakistan state, ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) and the government of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) all sponsor the JKLF. Active mainly between 1988 and 1993, JKLF's main tools and tactics were kidnapping and killing. On a few

¹³ Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Allied publishers Limited, 1994), p. 373.

¹⁴ KPS Gill and Ajai Sahni, "The J & K Peace Process: Chasing the Chimera", *Faultlines*, No. 8, April 2001, p. 14.

¹⁵ Ibid.

occasions, it was also involved in bank robberies and rocket attacks, and few bomb blasts.¹⁶

The bomb blast on March 31, 1988, inside a telegraph office in downtown Srinagar¹⁷ carried out by the JKLF, is considered to be the beginning of the violent conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. The very next year the JKLF was successful in attracting world attention by successful kidnapping Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Indian Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. Her release in exchange for jailed JKLF members (terrorists) is generally construed to be an event that marked the emergence of serious complexities in the internal security dynamics of the region.¹⁸ However, the organisation faced the biggest setback in October 1993, when their month-long occupancy of the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar was foiled by the security forces, which forced the terrorists to surrender. This was a serious setback to the image of JKLF; a fact which was exploited not only by the government of India but also by other non-state actors operating in the area. Subsequent intra and inter-organisational differences and its leaders' decision to formulate a new political platform saw the further decline of the JKLF. Also, the organisation remained consistent on its demand for an independent Kashmir despite pressure from Pakistan and pro-Pakistan groups. This further eroded their support from Pakistan. Currently, the activities of JKLF have reduced considerably and many a time the Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference (KJFC) carries out activities on its behalf. The present arms stock of JKLF is estimated to include AK series rifles, rocket launchers and possibly M-72 anti-armour weapons.¹⁹

The Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HUM) is one of the major non-state actors operating in J&K since 1989. The objectives of this organisation are secession of J&K through an armed struggle and merger with Pakistan. The organisation is a militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and was set up at the prodding of ISI as an Islamic counter to the JKLF.²⁰ The main tools and tactics used by this group are killing and kidnapping.

¹⁶ K.Santhanam et al, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Sage, 2003), pp. 159-174.

¹⁷ Manoj Joshi, *The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 23.

¹⁸ Sudhir Bloeria, "The J & K 'Peace Process' Imperatives of a Strategic Vision", *Faultlines*, No. 9 July 2001, p. 69.

¹⁹ Santhanam, n. 16, pp. 171, 218.

²⁰ Praveen Swami, "Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice", *India Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 2003, p. 59.

Also, there have been isolated cases of mass killing and rapes by members of this outfit.²¹

Recruits to this group are provided with specialised arms training and supply by Pakistan. The initial batch of HUM volunteers was trained in the use of arms and ammunition, and explosives in training camps in Pakista province of Afghanistan. Subsequently, it set up its own training camps in Afghanistan close to the NWFP border.²² In the late 1990s, HUM cadres accounted for 65 per cent of the violence in the valley. Interestingly, they have killed people of all religions—Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Also, the mass killings (around 25 people at a time) carried out by this organisation threatened much of the local Kashmiri Pandits into leaving the state.²³ Because of its ISI linkages, the organisation is self-sufficient in terms of arms holding and firepower to undertake operations. In 2003, the organisation was estimated to have an impressive inventory of approximately 2,000 arms, including around 1,550 AK series rifles, 55 LMG/UMG/SMG, 162 machine guns, 1,000 small arms, 90 rocket launchers, 2,000 hand grenades, 500 mines, assorted ammunition and explosives, and sniper rifles.²⁴

Today, it appears that the group's activities have weakened considerably following the killing of its deputy chief commander in August 1998. Currently, the organisation operates under different banners/names in different districts. The financial health of the organisation is very poor because the ISI has stopped funding it and is instead giving preference to Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA). Some analysts, however, say that HUA is the new name of HUM.²⁵

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is another important non-state actor operating in Kashmir that has considerably influenced the asymmetric war being fought over since the year 2000. The Pakistan ISI sponsors this group and its objective, like that of the HUM, is secession of J&K and merger with Pakistan. Its weapons inventory includes LMGs, HMGs, assault rifles, mortars, IEDs and rocket grenades. This organisation has also shown a change in philosophy as compared to other organisations towards the usage of different tools and tactics. JEM carried out the first human bomb (it was the first to introduce suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks) attack outside the Indian

²¹ Praveen Swami, "The Kot Charwal carnage", *Frontline*, Vol.18, Issue 5, March 2001.

²² B. Raman, *A Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally*, (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2002), p. 23.

²³ "Killer of 23 Pandits shot dead", *The Tribune*, Mar 15, 2002 and Praveen Swami, "The Nadimarg Outrage", *Frontline*, 25 April 2003.

²⁴ Santhanam, n.16, p. 118.

Army's 15 Corps Headquarters in Srinagar. Other tools and tactics used by this group include using urban warfare/guerrilla tactics. It carried out a major attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, probably to hold Members of Parliament as hostages but were unsuccessful. JEM also specialises in grenade attacks and has successfully planted bombs at various sites.²⁶

Another major group that is functional in Kashmir valley since 1993 is the Lasker-e-Toiba (LET). A relatively small but strong group, it includes Pakistan/Afghanistan trained militants. Its objective is the merger of J&K with Pakistan and establishment of the rule of Allah throughout the world. The main tools and tactics used by the LET are mass killings (massacre). Post-1996, the LET has carried out many massacres of Hindus and on March 20, 2002, it massacred 35 Sikhs in the valley. This organisation has massacred 35 labourers in Himachal Pradesh. Other tools and tactics used by the LET include fidayeen attacks. LET trains its militants in two stages: the first stage includes basic training and the second guerrilla training. The organisation has also carried out a few major attacks in collaboration with HUM. The group has launched several fidayeen attacks on security forces.²⁷

In this asymmetric conflict in Kashmir, most of the non-state actors have used small arms, IEDs and landmines as their main tools and tactics to challenge the state. The impact of a few incidents of shootouts in public places in 1989 virtually forced the state machinery to come to a halt, a situation that further degenerated as the weapons induction by the group increased rapidly. In fact, the weaponry supplied to the group soon became what even the paramilitary forces were able to bring to bear, forcing the state to call upon the Army for assistance.²⁸

For any non-state actor, getting weapons into Kashmir has not apparently been much of a problem, given the cover provided by Pakistan. Initially, the militants used Chinese and Russian make assault rifles. Subsequently, however, the non-state actors progressed from Kalashnikovs to Chinese and West German grenades and pistols as well as rocket launchers. The rocket launchers were used against government buildings and hardened non-military targets. However, they were found unsuitable because of their poor accuracy and unsuitability against soft targets..

²⁵ Raman, n.22, p. 24.

²⁶ Santhanam, n.16, pp. 196-201.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 224-230.

²⁸ Tara Kartha, *Tools of Terror*, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), p. 236.

Sniper weapons, like the Dragunov, were also used in 1990. But, their use did not spread because these are specialist weapons and difficult to procure. Thus, such weapons as also the AK-74s were mainly seen in the hands of the top militant leadership. The change in nature of weapon supply became evident by 1993-94, when the first long-range weapons like mortars and grenade launchers started showing their presence. Most of the weapons found in the hands of the non-state groups showed a clear requirement-based schedule. This supply of high calibre 'lethal' weaponry forced the Indian armed forces to pay more attention to this threat. By 1997, the possibility of induction of Indian Air Force to handle this threat had increased considerably. During the same period, the first anti-aircraft guns and Chinese-make HY-2 shoulder-fired missiles were seized by Indian security forces.²⁹

Till date, the Kashmir conflict has by and large followed the path of conventional terrorism. There have been no incidences of the usage of any weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, one recent report indicates that few groups are adventuring towards the use of different tools and tactics, and may even opt for WMDs in the near future. On July 21, 2003, the LET is learnt to have killed a woman in Poonch district by injecting poison.³⁰

So far in this conflict, it has been observed that the range of tools and tactics used by various non-state actors depend on the covert support given by Pakistan/ISI. And a major tactic that the non-state actor and its state supporter have concentrated on is the creation of 'communal fissures'.³¹ Currently, the non-state actors are at their lowest ebb because of international pressure on Pakistan and the success of the policies of the Indian state. However, the end to the conflict is still not in sight and terrorist groups are still active and trying to seek to reassert their influence over civil society.

Also, Pakistan will continue to support this conflict as long as it believes in the ideology of the two-nation theory.³² This ideology is contradictory to that of Indian thinking. Pakistan is a theocratic state with one religion, one language and one mind. The divergence between two countries is of a fundamental and multiple nature and

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 209-214.

³⁰ Discussions with J & K Police officials at Srinagar on 16 July 2004.

³¹ Praveen Swami, "J & K after 9/11 More of the same", *Faultlines*, No. 11, April 2002, p. 45.

³² L K Choudhary, "Cross Border Terrorism: Pakistan's Compulsions, Constraints and Stakes", *India Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 2, April-June 2001, p. 43.

Pakistan's support to the asymmetric war has outstripped any prospects of convergence in the near future.

Israel

Overview of the conflict

In many ways, Israel can be viewed as the prime laboratory for studying asymmetric conflicts. The conflict here is the result of a unique history of immigration of two groups of people with very distinct religious and cultural traditions. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the area known as Palestine was ruled by a succession of Muslim rulers. Towards the end of the 19th century, Jews began to immigrate to Palestine in response to a Zionist campaign launched by influential Jewish Europeans. After the end of World War II, the future of Palestine came under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, which in a historic vote, accepted the concept of partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish sectors, thus creating the Jewish country of Israel.

At the conclusion of the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Israel's boundaries considerably extended beyond the area originally identified in the UN partition.³³ It resulted in Israel taking control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The war had a significant implication beyond the Middle East because it resulted in the closure until 1975 of the Suez Canal. Israel's control of areas primarily populated by Palestinians has been the major source of unrest and conflict since the 1967 war. Over the years, many groups from Palestine side have become in the fight against Israel. The principal ones among them are PLO, Hamas and the Hezbollah.

Hamas (acronym for the Islamic Resistance movement—Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya) is a radical Islamic organisation, which became active in the early stages of the Intifada (the mainstream Palestinian resistance movement that began in 1987). It operates primarily in the Gaza Strip but is also active in the West Bank. Hamas has played a major role in violent fundamentalist subversion and radical terrorist operations against both Israelis and Arabs. Hamas is committed to a "holy war" for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic Palestine "from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River". Given its active role in street

³³ Scott Bidstrup, "Conflict in the Middle East: The Untold History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", <http://www.bidstrup.com/zionism.htm> and Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*:

violence and murder, it boosted its appeal in the eyes of the Palestinians, further enhancing its growth potential and enabling it to play a central role in the Intifada. As a result of its subversive and terrorist activity, Hamas was outlawed in September 1989. After the Gulf War, Hamas has become the leading perpetrator of terrorist activity throughout the territories as well as inside Israel.

Activities of Hamas mainly came to the forefront when it started opposing the 1993 Oslo peace accord between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Compared to Hamas, PLO is not a fundamentalist group but the main secular, nationalist organisation of Palestinian politics. However, during the last 20 years, Israel has been forced to deal with PLO as well as Hamas mainly because of the asymmetric threat posed by the latter. Over the years, Hamas supporters have had a love-hate relationship with the Palestinian national authority, which was founded by Yasser Arafat after the 1993 peace accord.³⁴

The Israel-Palestine conflict is not showing any signs of abating. In the year 2002, the US came out with a 'road map' towards the conflict resolution. However, both the parties have not shown any genuine concern towards finding a peaceful solution.

The period of study for this case is from 1988 to 2003. The main tools and tactics used by Hamas are suicide terrorism, urban warfare, small arms, IED and civilian targets.

Tools and Tactics

Hamas was founded on the very day the Intifada broke up. Its members came from the Muslim brotherhood cadres in the occupied territories. As opposed to the PLO which tried to lead the Palestinians from outside, the entire Hamas leadership started the resistance from inside.³⁵ During its initial years, Hamas towed the line of Palestinian Intifada. It was engaged in all forms of civil protests—throwing stones, petrol bombs, etc.—on Israeli forces.³⁶

The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, (Cambridge, South End Press Classics 1999), et passium.

³⁴ <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/plo.htm>>, accessed on 14 August 2003.

³⁵ Pinilas Inbari, *The Palestinians between terrorism and statehood*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996), p. 45.

³⁶ Raja Mustafa Ali, "Hamas: Case Study of an Armed Resistance Movement", *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 20, No.2-3, Spring-Summer 2000, p. 145.

Hamas claims that the Quran is its constitution. The organisation, therefore, has interpreted Quranic ideas in order to clarify its position in the present struggle.³⁷ Hamas also challenged the PLO's claim to be the exclusive political centre of the Palestinian people and offered the masses an alternative religious narrative. It infused religion with nationalism, thus implying a claim for the Islamisation of the Palestinian society and state. As per Hamas ideology, the envisaged Palestine state will come into being through a holy war (jihad), encompass all of Palestine and implement Islamic law (shariat).³⁸

However, the importance of Hamas goes beyond the acts of terrorism. It is not merely an armed resistance movement. Hamas commands mass appeal amongst the local population because of its commitment to the cause and also because of the social work carried out by the organisation in the fields of health, education and even governance. In August 1988, Hamas published the Islamic Covenant—its ideological credo, which presented its policy on all levels of the struggle, both against Israel and the national movement of the PLO. The Hamas Covenant challenged the PLO and its claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but it did not call for its elimination.

Hamas has used mosques to spread its influence among the masses. For them, the mosques were the first steps on the road to civil rebellion. Simultaneously, Hamas leaders have worked at setting up various apparatuses of the movement. In the tradition of the Muslim brotherhood, its founder leader, Sheikh Yassin, built Hamas as an underground movement, keeping different apparatuses and area activists separate.³⁹

The militant apparatus was called Mujahidin. At first, the leadership did not strive for large numbers of activists. The aim of the founders was to set up instruments of activity that would rely on a small number of central activists. But over a period of time and following the emergence of the new generation of street leaders, the military arm of the organisation has gained in strength. However, the broad conceptualisation of the military arm with stated aims of the organisation continue to be as they originally conceived..

³⁷ Andrea Nusse, *Muslim Palestine The Ideology of Hamas*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 4.

³⁸ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 15.

From the outset, alongside the 'popular' Intifada-related violence on the street level, Hamas has run a military-terrorist arm, composed of two groups:⁴⁰

- (a) The Palestinian Holy Fighters (Al-Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun), a military apparatus for terrorist attacks, especially against Israeli targets. Before the break up of the Intifada, it was primarily engaged in the preparation of the infrastructure necessary for its activities.
- (b) The Security Section (Jehaz Aman), which gathers information on suspected collaborators with Israel and other local elements, with the intention of punishing them by the use of violence, including murder. For this purpose, units were formed within the framework of the Majmouath Jihad u-Dawa (Holy War and Sermonising Group), which was in effect its violent operational arm.

During the last decade in the course of the Intifada, these groups have taken on various forms. At the beginning of 1991, the Hamas in Gaza set up the first squads of the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam battalions. Initially, these terrorist squads kidnapped and executed people suspected of cooperating with Israel. The murder of the Kfar Darom resident, Doron Shorshan, in December 1991 was the first killing of an Israeli citizen by the Hamas militant squad and it marked the change in Hamas' modus operandi.

Every non-state actor uses various tools and tactics to wage war against stronger adversaries. Most of the time, the tools and tactics depend on the ideology of the non-state actor. Also, there is a tendency to copy the methodologies used by other non-state actors globally. One of the major terror tactics used by Hamas in this conflict is suicide terrorism. Hamas has a suicide unit known as Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam squad that essentially operates in Israel with the aim of destruction of Israel and establishment of Palestine. Since 1993, they have carried out many successful suicide attacks, using suitcases, body suits, cars and animals. For carrying out suicide attacks, Hamas units receive external support from the Palestine diaspora, Iran, some Arab states and some Islamic NGOs.⁴¹

The suicide attacks carried out by Hamas are generally in agreement with the global trends. Along with other groups like the LTTE and the Hezbollah, the Hamas

³⁹ Database of International Terrorism <<http://www.adl.org/ict/hamas.asp>>, accessed on 14 June 2003.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

was also instrumental in institutionalising indoctrination and physical training of volunteers in order to enhance the efficiency of the bomber.⁴² Globally, a marked increase in suicide operations was seen between 1980s and the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed major suicide strikes by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad in Israel. The Hamas commenced its suicide bomb campaign in Israel in October 1993 after an abortive attack in June 1988.

Hamas was inspired and assisted for carrying out such operations mainly by Hezbollah, the non-state actor active in Lebanon. The relationship between Hamas with Hezbollah gained momentum after Israel deported a few hundred operatives to Lebanon in 1992. There they established a close liaison with Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and learned suicide techniques. Hamas focused their initial suicide attacks on military targets in the “territories” but quite rapidly shifted their attacks to civilians in central cities and crowded areas. Another influential factor has been the frequency of the attacks; sometimes they were a weekly occurrence. The suicide factor in the Palestinian terror campaign thus has had strategic ramifications on the Israel-Palestinian peace-process.⁴³

The Hamas has carried out two major suicide attacks in Tel-Aviv. The first on a public bus in 1994 killed 21 Israelis and a tourist. In 2001, a suicide bomber killed 20 and injured 120 while successfully targeting a night-club. Over the last decade, Hamas has also carried out four to five major attacks on Jerusalem, mainly its public transport systems (buses), pizza restaurants and market places (malls). In each attack, they have succeeded in killing 15 to 25 people and injuring more than 100.⁴⁴ As per the Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) terror database, during the period November 2001 to November 2002,⁴⁵ Hamas carried out 12 bomb attacks. Of them, in only four cases did the suicide bomber blow himself up; in the remaining cases, the bombers detonated powerful bombs in buses or public places.

⁴¹ N Manoharan, “Outfits of Suicide Terror: A Ready Reckoner”, *Peace & Conflict*, Vol. 6, No. 6, 2003, p. 4.

⁴² Rohan Gunaratna, *Frontline*, 18 February 2000, pp. 106-109. Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 5-18.

⁴³ Yoram Schweitzer, *Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics*, 21 April 2000, <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=112>>, accessed on 09 February 2004.

⁴⁴ International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, “Major Terrorist Activities of Palestinian Hamas” <<http://www.newsbatch.com/ishamas.html>>, accessed on 10 February 2003.

⁴⁵ International Terrorism, ICT terror database at <http://www.ict.org.il/inter_/attackresults.cfm>, accessed on 12 September 2003.

Apart from suicide bombing, another frequently used tactic by Hamas is firing in public places. Between November 2001 and November 2002, Hamas carried out 16 such attacks. In these attacks, gunmen opened fire in public places and on a few occasions they also threw grenades. In some cases, Hamas activists concealed time bombs in hotels and other public places.

In December 1992, after two armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli border policeman, the group made one of its most daring assaults. On December 12, Hamas abducted an Israeli soldier, Sgt-Major Nissim Toledano, from the town of Lod. Hamas then sought the release of Sheikh Yasin in return for freeing Toledano. Since the Government refused to hand over Sheikh Yasin, Hamas killed the soldier.⁴⁶

Hamas has also been engaging the Israelis in urban warfare too. They have succeeded on a few occasions to hold back the modern and well-equipped Israeli Army. Hamas guerrilla fighters are intimately familiar with local terrain, which gives them an advantage.

The Battle of Jenin,⁴⁷ which was fought between the Israeli armed forces and Hamas, can be considered to be one of the most significant campaigns in urban warfare in the Israel theatre. This battle in the West Bank refugee camp in Jenin lasted for almost 12 days in April 2002. The media was prevented from entering Jenin, hence many conflicting reports exist on the conflict. According to the UN, 54 Palestinians were confirmed dead and an additional 49 reported missing in the battle.

The battle saw a modern, well-equipped army take on an armed and prepared group of guerrilla fighters, intimately familiar with the local terrain. The streets were booby trapped, ready to be triggered off if an Israeli foot or vehicle snagged the tripwire. Some of the bombs were huge—as much as 250 pounds of explosives, compared with the 25 a typical suicide bomber uses. In the camp, explosive charges were even more densely packed and tunnels had been dug between houses so that Palestinian fighters could move around without exposing themselves. The battle took shape in an environment that soldiers like the least while guerrilla fighters like the

⁴⁶ Mustafa Ali, n. 40, p. 152-153.

⁴⁷ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502-03.htm#P160_23215>, accessed on 17 January 2004 and Matt Ress, "The Battle of Jenin", *Time*, 13 May 2002 and Justin Huggler, "Israelis trained US troops in Jenin-style urban warfare" *Independent*, 29 March 2003.

most: in and around pinched alleys and houses, with ample hiding places and sniper positions.

The Palestinians who defended the city were armed only with assault rifles and crude, home-made booby-traps and pipe bombs. The guerrilla fighters held out for 11 days, and managed to kill 23 Israeli soldiers, 13 of them in one ambush. When the Palestinians ran out of ammunition, they started throwing stones at the Israeli soldiers. In this battle, Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade groups supported Hamas.

To undertake such type of activities and for the continuation of the conflict, Hamas needs a continuous supply of arms and ammunition. Hence, procurement and production of arms and ammunitions is one of the major activities of Hamas. However, indigenous production and smuggling in of arms and ammunitions is carried out not only by Hamas but also by other groups like PA. While it is difficult to comment about the capabilities of any one group in this regard, it is certain that Hamas is more involved than any other group. There have been reports about Hamas operatives being caught while receiving funding and technical assistance from Saudi Arabia for establishing rocket production plants in Gaza and the West Bank. Also, Hamas has been involved in production of Katyusha rockets.⁴⁸

In the mould of Hezbollah's Katyusha rockets, Hamas has developed weapons of attrition in the Qassam I, II and III short-range rockets. With ranges varying from 1.5 to 12 km, these rockets are reportedly based on North Korean design, which Hamas bomb-makers reverse engineered, obtaining the original samples from Hezbollah. Hamas reportedly sought expert advice from Hezbollah on the development of Qassam III rockets with a range of up to 12 km, funding for which it obtained sources in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹

Hamas has used Qassam rockets to hit Israeli towns in the Negev, such as Sderot, a city in the south districts of Israel. The Qassam rockets have enabled Hamas to attack large Israeli cities such as Ashkelon, causing great concern to the Israeli

⁴⁸ Gal Luft, "Arms with legs", *The Review*, February 2002, <<http://www.ajiac.org.au/review/2002/272/karine1.html>>, accessed on 14 January 2003.

⁴⁹ Matthew Levitt, "Hamas: Toward a Lebanese-Style War of Attrition?" *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism* 27 February 2002, <<http://www.ict.org.il>>, accessed on 22 March 2003.

populace and forced the Israeli military to take measures to prevent their proliferation and use.⁵⁰

Over the years, it has become clear that Hamas functions with a vision and alters its tools and tactics as per the situation. Along with asymmetric warfare capabilities, the group has also shown interest in developing conventional capabilities in recent years. Since mid-2002, Hamas has been building a conventional army known as the 'Popular Army'. Many youth have been integrated into this new organisation. Its establishment will enable Hamas to challenge the Palestinian Authority for physical control of Gaza, should Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon go ahead with his plan to unilaterally evacuate all Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and Jewish residents from the strip. The 'Popular Army' operatives have been given small arms, machine guns, hand grenades, anti tank missile launchers, mortar bombs, Qassam rockets and different kinds of explosives, some of which weigh up to 200 kg and are intended for use against Israeli tanks.⁵¹

Till date, Hamas has not used any weapons of mass destruction. However, there are reports indicating that the group has shown interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. A manual published on the official Hamas website, titled: "*The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook*," clearly mentions the procedures for the production of various poisons and gases, and other deadly materials for use in terrorist attacks against the Israelis.⁵² According to the Pentagon, the group has been conducting research in the use of chemical weapons for suicide bombers. They could have obtained the help of countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria for exploring ways to utilise WMDs.⁵³

Hamas believes that no amount of peace talks will do any good. Also, Hamas is not ready for any compromise and finds it difficult to coexist with the enemy in the region. It feels that asymmetric weapons, such as suicide bombings are the F-16s of

⁵⁰ "Palestine-Israel 101",
<<http://www.americantaskforce.org>>, accessed on 15 July 2003 and <<http://www.fact-index.com/h/ha/hamas.htm>>, accessed on 25 January 2003.

⁵¹ "Hamas building army for Gaza takeover", *Jerusalem Newswire*, 08 March 2004,
<http://www.jnewswire.com/news_archive/04/03/040308_hamas.asp>, accessed on 24 October 2003.

⁵² <<http://www.israelnewsagency.com/terrorismchemicalgasweapons.html>>, accessed on 18 August 2003.

⁵³ "Pentagon: Hamas experimenting with chemical weapons", *World Tribune.com*, 31 July 2002,
<http://216.26.163.62/2002/ss_terrorism_07_31.html>, accessed on 24 October 2003.

the Palestinian people and will help them to win.⁵⁴ Hamas has proved its military and technical ability to undertake tactically complicated operations against Israel. It has also shown that it has a ready supply of volunteers willing to carry out missions in which they will be killed. Today, Hamas is the biggest security threat to the Israelis.⁵⁵

Sri Lanka

Overview of the conflict

The security and stability of Sri Lanka has been seriously threatened due to continued violent and separatist ethnic conflict. For over three decades now, a bitter civil war arising out of ethnic tensions has scarred the island. The island has a long-established Tamil minority in the north and east. Due to varying regional variations and socio-economic inequalities, the dispute started in the early seventies by various Tamil groups still remains unresolved for want of an agreeable solution. During this period, various Tamil organisations have emerged to challenge the Sri Lankan government.⁵⁶ However, only few of them have survived because of varying reasons. The *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE), which was founded in 1976, is one such organisation that has survived against heavy odds and still continues its struggle for independent Tamil land. The last three decades of this asymmetric conflict is a story of few successes and many failures.

In a way, 1983 was a critical year for Sri Lanka. In early July that year, 13 (Sinhala) soldiers were killed in an ambush in the North Sri Lanka, presumably by the LTTE. When the bodies were brought back to Colombo, an anti-Tamil agitation broke out. It resulted in 2,000-3,000 deaths.⁵⁷ Thousands fled to Jafîna or went abroad to North America (US, and Canada), South India and Europe. This seriously aggravated an already existing conflict and threw Sri Lanka into a severe political crisis. The crisis deepened further, when the then Sri Lankan President, J R Jayawardena in 1987 had to accept the arrival of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

Recently, the LTTE changed its stance and is now talking in terms of only autonomy leaving aside its demand for independence. This brings an interesting dimension of this conflict into the forefront. LTTE leader V Prabhakaran and then

⁵⁴ Terrorism: Questions and Answers, Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad", <<http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/hamas.html>>, accessed on 24 October 2003.

⁵⁵ Mustafa Ali, n. 40, p. 161.

⁵⁶ For details of Sri Lankan politics and Tamil problem during late 1970s and early 1980s refer Alan J. Bullion, *India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994*, (London: Pinter, 1995)

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe signed the Norwegian brokered memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the permanent cessation of hostilities, on February 22, 2002. Till 2003, six round of peace talks have taken place at various places like Thailand, Oslo, Berlin and Hakone.⁵⁸ But analysts believe that Prabhakaran would never give up the demand for separate Tamil Eelam. As he has done in the past, he may use the current situation to regroup his forces. The asymmetry between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government still remains contentious. The reasons are self-evident: Sri Lanka has militarily failed to tackle the different tools and tactics adopted by the LTTE and politically no permanent solution has been found yet.

Sri Lanka is a unique case where a state actor has taken the maximum beating from a non-state actor. Even though the LTTE was founded in 1976, it gained prominence only during the early 1980s. The period of study for this case is chosen to be from 1983 to 2003.

Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has been confronted with internal political violence. Left-wing insurrection along with guerrilla warfare and political terrorism has dominated Sri Lankan politics since the early 1970s.⁵⁹ The Sri Lankan population consists of four major ethnic groups: Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Moors/Muslims. Out of these, the Sinhalese constitute more than 70 per cent of the population and Sri Lankan Tamils about 11 per cent. The current ethnic strife is a violent separatist conflict that mainly involves Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese. The Tamils are seeking political autonomy of some type for the eastern and northern provinces as a Tamil homeland, a drive opposed by the numerically and politically dominant Sinhalese.⁶⁰

The 1956 decision of naming Sinhala as the country's official language was the major trigger for the start of the crises. In the early 70s, the Sinhalese dominated government set quotas on the number of Sri Lankan Tamils who could be admitted to universities or hold government jobs. In 1974, in response to Tamil exclusion from the Sinhalese dominated society, the Tamils demanded a separate Sri Lankan Tamil state. In 1978, Tamil was designated as a national language. But in the absence of any

⁵⁷ M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2002), p.90.

⁵⁸ <http://www.tchr.net/reports_commission_2003.htm>, accessed on 26 February 2004.

⁵⁹ Gamini Samaranayake, "Patterns of Political Violence and responses of the Government in Sri Lanka, 1971-1996", *Terrorism and political Violence*, Spring 1999, p. 110.

⁶⁰ David Levinson, "Ethnic Relations-A Cross Cultural Encyclopedia", (Oxford: ABC-CLIO Inc, 1994), pp. 214-215.

response to autonomy, violence erupted. The conflict has been violent since the early 80s, with occasional periods of short-lived peace.⁶¹

Various Tamil groups have been involved in this struggle for the last two to three decades. Many of these groups have enjoyed political patronage given by various political parties from India's Tamil Nadu state. Also, the Indian government was initially actively involved in covertly supporting this separatist movement. Finally after the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the Indian government sent in the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to help the Sri Lankan government tackle this problem. However, the Indian forces returned after four years because of domestic political compulsions in Sri Lanka at that time.

Throughout this entire conflict, one non-state actor that has emerged as a major player is the LTTE. This organisation has not only put up a very strong resistance against the Sri Lankan government but has also successfully emerged as the only organisation capable of fighting for the Tamil struggle by systematically eradicating other Tamil organisations.

Tools and Tactics

The LTTE is led by one of the world's most ruthless separatist leaders, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Since 1983, he has lorded over a secessionist movement that has led to at least a dozen cold-blooded political assassinations, several murders, tens of suicide bombings and over 60,000 deaths. The LTTE has perhaps the world's most well oiled fighting apparatus that could qualify as a de facto army anywhere.⁶² He believes that multi-party democracy has no meaning and only one party rule will help develop Eelam. His organisation has used various asymmetric tactics since its inception with some success. They are guerrilla warfare, suicide terrorism, cyanide capsules, child terrorists, IEDs, small arms, drugs/narcotics, conventional warfare and chemical weapons.

The strength of the LTTE is difficult to assess given its secretive operations. Operationally, it is run on the cell system and cadres in one cell have no knowledge of those in any other cell. This egalitarian structure means they do not even know their own rank. As per some estimates, at the peak of LTTE activity between 1994 and

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² MR Narayan Swamy, *Inside An Elusive Mind*, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2003), et passim

1996, there could have been 10,000 to 12,000 fully armed and trained soldier cadres spread between the east and the north. Although numerically small, these cadres are often devastatingly effective.⁶³ Also, it should be noted that the concept of guerrilla warfare is based on popular support of masses. Along with its dedicated cadre strength, the LTTE has thrived on the support of local population.

The LTTE represents the separatist insurrection in Sri Lanka. Ideologically, the group is committed to ethno-nationalism. The group exhibits strong elements of various interpretations of Marxism but is an action-oriented than theoretical-oriented organisation. The strategy of the group is based on a mixture of Che Guevara's model of rural guerrilla warfare and Carlos Marighella's model of urban guerrilla warfare.⁶⁴ Consequently, the strategy and tactics over all these years have emerged as the mixture of urban and rural guerrilla warfare.

The guerrilla war waged by the LTTE since mid-1970s illustrates the ethnic or separatist character of political violence in Sri Lanka. Initially, five major groups spearheaded the secessionist guerrilla war. Of them, the LTTE achieved dominance over the other guerrilla groups.⁶⁵ The LTTE started getting a foothold post-1983 and started using irregular troops to carry out guerrilla activities. Its tactics were based on surprise, mobility and dispersion of forces like any other conventional guerrilla operations. Some of its operations were successful because the group used terrain and topography of the region to its advantage even as it had the advantage of a sympathetic populace, which it had won over by propaganda, reform and sometimes threats.

According to LTTE chief Prabhakaran, the group started its guerrilla activities initially by using tactics like hit and run.⁶⁶ But subsequently, it started using several other tactics. LTTE has often used certain classical guerrilla tactics like giving up territory and conserving forces to fight another day. They did this successfully in 1995 when they conducted a tactical withdrawal from Jaffna.⁶⁷ Even when the IPKF was

⁶³ Harris Paul, "Tamil Tigers Intensify War to Establish Homeland", *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 1996, p. 58.

⁶⁴ Gamini Samaranayake, "Patterns of Political Violence and responses of the Government in Sri Lanka", 1971-1996, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 114.

⁶⁵ The other four groups are the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) *Frontline*, 30 December 1985, p. 37.

⁶⁷ Rohan Gunasekera, "Sri Lanka: on the trail of the Tigers", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 20, 1995, p. 28.

there, the LTTE troubled the Indian Army with classical guerrilla tactics like lightning ambushes, booby traps and minefields.⁶⁸ The LTTE snipers perched on palmyrah trees, on Chinese-made chairs nailed to trunks, picked out and killed many IPKF personnel. Also, LTTE fighters often cut-off one column from another, breaking supply and strategic links. Along with guerrilla techniques, the LTTE stunned the IPKF with its improvisation and expert handling of weaponry, chiefly mines which took the maximum toll. LTTE mainly used claymore mines, a deadly combination of explosives and thick slabs of rusted nails. Its techniques of using explosives were very advanced. By using battery-operated devices, it carried out detonation of plastic explosives at the most unlikely of places. Also, scores of abandoned houses had explosives connected to the electric mains. This deadly contraption was so effective that exasperated Indians cut off electricity supply to Jaffna for many days.⁶⁹

During this prolonged conflict of two decades, the LTTE has fought many ferocious battles, losing some and winning several. LTTE's corps consists of many men and women, who do not hesitate to die while eliminating individuals seen as impediments in their struggle for an independent Tamil homeland. They are the LTTE's feared suicide bombers or Black Tigers.⁷⁰ Till date, LTTE has carried out many suicide raids.

The LTTE began carrying out suicide bombings in 1987 and has since perpetrated over 200 such attacks. These bombings were particularly lethal and caused hundreds of casualties. Their targets are usually senior political and military officials in Sri Lanka. The LTTE is the only organisation in the world to succeed in assassinating two heads of state by suicide bombings. One suicide attack killed former India Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi while he was on an election campaign tour in Sriperumbadur (near Chennai) on 21 May 1991. Exactly two years later, a suicide attacker killed President Premadasa of Sri Lanka. On December 17, 1999, the organisation also attempted to assassinate Chandrika Kumaratunga, the then President of Sri Lanka, using a female suicide bomber, who blew herself up at an election rally. The President was wounded but survived the attack.

The LTTE has also targeted politicians from the Sinhalese majority, pragmatic politicians from the Tamil minority, and senior military officers, as well as military

⁶⁸ Anita Pratap, *Island of blood*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 90.

⁶⁹ Swamy, n. 62, p. 272.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. X

and civil infrastructure like boats, command centres and economic installations, such as fuel depots. The organisation has never been particularly mindful of the safety of passers-by, caring little about innocent bystanders who happened to be in the vicinity of their attacks. The LTTE suicide squads draw inspiration from a combination of a strong nationalistic motive and the charismatic leadership of the head of the organisation, Prabhakaran.⁷¹

Among the contemporary terrorist groups engaged in suicide attacks, the LTTE has conducted the largest number of such attacks. LTTE claims that between 1987 and 1999, it conducted 147 suicide operations. However, this number does not include the suicide attacks carried out on non-military targets. The LTTE code prevents it from claiming responsibility for attacks on non-military persons. By adopting such a position, the LTTE seeks to project to the international community that it is a liberation movement that targets only military personnel, and hence should not be identified as a terrorist group.

The first LTTE suicide operation was conducted on July 5, 1987, to stall the advance of the Sri Lankan military to Jaffna town. It was not an LTTE cadre wearing a suicide body suit, but a vehicle laden with explosives, driven by an LTTE volunteer. The attack killed 40 soldiers. Probably, this act alone frustrated the Sri Lankan government's intentions of recapturing Jaffna. The suicide bomb threat from the LTTE has not remained confined to Sri Lanka alone. In fact, the LTTE's first suicide attack using a suicide body suit took place in India.

The LTTE undertakes the business of suicide terrorism very seriously and trains its cadres systematically. It has institutionalised indoctrination and physical training of volunteers in order to enhance their efficiency.⁷² Interestingly, women have perpetrated most LTTE suicide attacks, as they are better able to avoid early detection. LTTE suicide attacks are carried out more towards targeting particular individuals than for creating mass terror or general panic.⁷³

The suicide attacks have helped the LTTE to carry forward its agenda. In a few cases, even a single attack has made long-term strategic contributions towards its cause. In the Sri Lankan context, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination pre-empted the re-

⁷¹ Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Bombings: The Ultimate Weapon?"

<<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=373>>, accessed on 9 February 2004.

⁷² Rohan Gunaratna, "The LTTE and suicide terrorism", *Frontline*, 18 February, 2000, pp. 106-109

introduction of the IPKF.⁷⁴ The attack had a profound impact on the entire spectrum of conflict in terms of both political and military initiatives. It almost stopped the Indian peace initiative with Sri Lanka. Interestingly, the LTTE did not conduct any suicide operations during the entire IPKF operations period either in Sri Lanka or outside.

Along with suicide terrorism, the LTTE has employed several other tools and tactics to wear down the morale of the Sri Lankan government. During last two decades of its violent existence, the LTTE has always tried to maintain secrecy about its organisational network and future plans. To stop the harassment of their rank and files if caught by the opposing forces, the LTTE has adopted a novel but brutal concept of cyanide capsule, which they swallow if caught alive. This is a special method employed by the Tamil rebel group to prevent the enemy, the Sri Lanka Army from getting any information. Not many militant organisations are known to carry forward this philosophy. This tactic can be termed to be a passive tactic because it is not used for damaging the state per se but for preventing the state from getting any information.

Prabhakaran is the world's best-known advocate of the cyanide capsule. Each LTTE fighter, including Prabhakaran, wears a special amulet holding a cyanide capsule and is bound by oath to swallow it in the face of unavoidable danger from the enemy.⁷⁵ However, the willingness of the operatives to die by consuming cyanide capsule is not the forte of LTTE men alone. The cyanide culture in Sri Lanka started on June 5, 1974, when an operative of the Tamil Students League swallowed a cyanide capsule to avoid police torture.⁷⁶ Post 1983, many LTTE operatives have committed suicide by using the same technique to avoid police capture, the most notable among them being the operatives involved in the Rajiv Gandhi killing, particularly the one-eyed mastermind Sivarasan who consumed cyanide on August 20, 1991.

The same trend is still continuing and on June 11, 2003, an LTTE cadre in Colombo consumed a pill when nabbed during random police checking.⁷⁷ The LTTE

⁷³ Mia M. Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 77.

⁷⁴ Gunaratna, n. 72, p. 109.

⁷⁵ Iype George, "What game is he playing now?"

<<http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/apr/11spec.htm>>, accessed on 12 March 2003.

⁷⁶ Swamy, n. 57, p. 29.

⁷⁷ *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 11 June 2003.

is not ready to give up this philosophy even now. This became evident recently when the LTTE named the poisonous glory lily as their “national flower”. LTTE authorities have asked residents in rebel-held areas of Northeast Sri Lanka to grow the Kathigai Vine (glory lily) in their homes, public places, business premises and educational institutions. Ingesting any part of the vine or the flower is poisonous and its roots are used to commit suicide.⁷⁸

However, Prabhakaran’s technique of using cyanide capsule has not worked effectively with his brigade of child soldiers. Like other guerrillas, the child soldiers are also ordered to wear cyanide capsules around their necks. But from LTTE's baby brigades, some often run away from their LTTE captors while others surrender despite specific instructions to commit suicide in case of arrest by the Sri Lanka army.⁷⁹ Interestingly, even though more than a 1,000 tigers have consumed cyanide, these LTTE cadres are unlikely to have known much about the organisation’s infrastructure and future plans because of the LTTE’s policy of need to know basis.⁸⁰

Like any other guerrilla group, guns and conventional explosives have remained the weapons of choice for LTTE cadres since the start of insurgency. For years, they have used these tools of terror successfully. During the initial stages of the conflict, small arms/light weapons and ammunition were the oxygen for the LTTE’s survival and furtherance of guerrilla warfare. India supplied some arms to them but it was always with some preconditions. Naturally, the LTTE looked more towards other sources for steady supply of arms, including from the international black market. Prior to training in India, the LTTE had, to a limited extent, received training from Lebanese militants and Palestinian groups. As per few analysts, Mossad provided them with a variety of military equipment, including refurbished Soviet made mines, Uzi sub-machine guns, Galil assault rifles, Light Machine Guns (LMGs), shoulder carried field missiles, Eagle pistols, rubber boats, and water resistant pouches for underwater sabotage.⁸¹

LTTE also purchased shoulder-launched weapons (possibly SAM-7s) either from the black market or from the Israelis. From 1985, the LTTE began to network

⁷⁸ *Times of India*, New Delhi, 15 April 2004.

⁷⁹ Walter Jayawardhana, “Medical Experts Discover Tamil Tigers who Abduct Children Also Teach Them Methods Of Suicide In Case They Are Captured”, at <<http://www.go2lanka.com>>, accessed on 15 February 2003 and <http://www.spur.asn.au/News_2002_May_15_to_16.htm>, accessed on 14 July 2003.

⁸⁰ Pratap, n. 68, p. 98.

⁸¹ Kartha, n.28, p.149.

into the arms market of Singapore, using quiet ports and jetties in Myanmar as transit areas. Through all these contacts, the LTTE's arms inventory swelled to include M-16s, Chinese AK56, LMGs, heavy machine guns, Singapore assault rifles and 25-inch mortars. Indian supplied SLRs and .303s were also part of their armoury.⁸²

The Tamil Tigers have used all these arms to carry out their guerrilla activities as well as for launching a few major attacks on the Sri Lankan Army. Normally, guerrilla groups are considered to be incapable of engaging in conventional war. However, the Tamil tigers have repeatedly demonstrated their capabilities in conventional warfare by engaging the Sri Lankan Armed forces effectively.⁸³ Analysts feel that in close quarter combat, the LTTE units were better armed and better trained than the Sri Lankan Army. Currently, there is no guerrilla group in the world with stand-off capability equal to that of the LTTE. This stand-off capability has enabled the LTTE to hold ground and fight like a conventional force.⁸⁴ The group possesses rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), armour piercing light anti-tank weapons (LAWs) and surface to air missiles (SAMs). The LTTE's high and low trajectory weapons include mortars, artillery and, multi-barrel rocket launchers.

It has been generally observed that LTTE always attacked police and the military establishments with one of the aims being of capturing arms and ammunition. It has even attacked the army's armouries in a few cases for seizing arms and ammunition. Interestingly, following changed political equations in the country, during one of the phases of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government too supplied arms to the LTTE to fight the IPKF. The Sri Lankan government had supplied 400 new Chinese made T-81s and 11 lorry loads of ammunition. Also, police equipment like batons, air guns, communication equipment were supplied. Probably, 2,000 T-56 rifles and around 200,000 rounds of ammunition were supplied.⁸⁵

On July 18, 1996, the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan army base in Mulathivu. Here, they managed to seize arms and ammunition worth US\$70 million. In this raid, LTTE seized two 122mm Howitzers with 903 shells. Also boats, land vehicles,

⁸²

Ibid.

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Manik De Silva, "Sri Lanka's civil war", *Current History*, Vol. 98, No. 632, December 1999, p. 429.

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Rohan Gunaratna, "LTTE adopts heavy artillery", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 6, Jun 2001, pp. 23-27.

⁸⁵

Kartha, n. 28, p. 152.

outboard motors and a large quantity of small arms and light weapons were stolen. This seizure increased the LTTE's mobility and firepower considerably.⁸⁶

In 1997, the LTTE hijacked a vessel carrying 34,500 81mm mortar shells from the LBG military supplies of Israel, a sub-contractor of Zimbabwe defence industries that was an arms supplier to the Sri Lankan Government. Also, LTTE procured multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) through its international network. Surprisingly, the LTTE is able to maintain and replenish its artillery equipment under its own engineering regiment.⁸⁷

During the last decade, the LTTE has been successful in building up an extraordinary fighting capability through the acquisition of 60 tonnes of high explosives from the Rubezone Chemical plant in Ukraine; microlights, fixed wing aircraft and mini helicopters from Australia, and surface-to-air missiles from Bulgaria.⁸⁸ In totality, the LTTE firepower, despite it being a non-state actor, has been sufficient to challenge the Sri Lankan government militarily using conventional tactics.

The LTTE's tactics have, at times, been extraordinary even by standards of a normally resourceful guerrilla movement. Not only has the LTTE proved to be adept at shooting down Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) aircraft, but it has taken on the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) with unprecedented success, interrupting the naval bridge between Jaffna and the eastern port of Trincomalee. From April 1995 to April 1996, the SLN lost seven vessels to LTTE action, including three Israeli-built Dvora fast attack craft and a supply ship lost to underwater attack. One of the vessels was destroyed by suicide bombers who rammed the vessel.⁸⁹ The LTTE has also used surface-to-air missiles to shoot down two of the SLAF's five HS-748 transport aircraft and one of its four Pucara fighters. The use of the missiles marked a major escalation in Tamil technological capability.⁹⁰ In general, the LTTE has shown remarkable innovativeness with weaponry and has even manufactured hand grenades, claymore mines, improvised explosive devices and mortars. In fact, the IPKF is learnt to have captured the LTTE built aircraft and a glider.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Gunaratna, n. 84, pp. 23-27.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Paul, n. 63.

⁹⁰ Gunasekera, n. 67, p. 28.

⁹¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention In Sri Lanka*, (Colombo: Guarantee Offset, 1993), p. 249.

During the early 1990s, very unlike a guerrilla force, the LTTE also had four ships. Registered mostly in South and Central America, they used to ply under various flags and various names, and were used for gun-running operations. The LTTE had two methods of bringing supplies ashore from these ships. First, a special unit called 'Sea Tigers' operating in speedboats, used to meet these ships and bring ashore weapons and other supplies. Secondly, close to the Indian coast, these ships used to hand over cargo to the LTTE with the help of Indian smugglers and fishermen.⁹² Even today, the LTTE Navy remains active despite the ongoing talks with the Sri Lankan government. On June 14, 2003, the LTTE oil tanker, Shoshin, was blown by the Tigers after the Sri Lankan Navy challenged it. The non-state actor is also known to be in possession of stealth speedboats.⁹³

The LTTE uses conventional as well as guerrilla tactics as per tactical requirements. The advantage of guerrilla warfare is that it becomes difficult for the state authorities to distinguish between civilian non-combatants and militants. This leads to killing of innocent civilians. LTTE has made use of these compulsions to its advantage. As compared to any other guerrilla group, the LTTE has used civilian population more effectively as a human shield. Particularly, it has exploited the youth and the children in the role of 'child soldiers'. It has used child soldiers as spies, couriers and suppliers as well as frontline soldiers.⁹⁴ Since April 1995, 60 per cent of LTTE casualties have been under the age of 18.⁹⁵ However, it has been observed that the induction of child soldiers was not done with the consent of the parents in most of the cases. Recruitment is done forcibly in the schools and this has led many Tamil families to pull their children out of schools to avoid them being recruited or kidnapped by the LTTE. Many parents worry that their rations will be cut if they do not allow their children to be recruited.

The LTTE has a long record of recruiting children for combat. Irrespective of gender, children as young as nine years have been conscripted, mostly by coercion. The average child recruitment age, however, is between 14 and 17. Though the exact number of child soldiers with the LTTE is not available, there are nearly 700

⁹² Ibid, pp. 413-414.

⁹³ Vijay Sakhuja, "Will LTTE Give Peace a Chance?", http://www.ipcs.org/Terrorism_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1077&status=article&mod=a accessed on 20 August 2005.

⁹⁴ Bloom, n. 73, p. 69.

⁹⁵ Chris Smith, 'South Asia's Enduring war' in Robert I. Rotberg, *Creating Peace In Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1999), p. 36.

complaints pending with the UNICEF on forced recruitment. The actual figure, however, could be 10 times higher, given the fact that majority of the people do not complain. In the year 2002 alone, nearly 300 children were roped in by the Tigers to augment strength.

Known as *Sirasu Puli* ('Leopard Brigade'), the baby brigades are one of the LTTE's most fierce fighting forces. The child recruitment system of the Tigers is sophisticated, using prominent places of congregation—schools, health campaigns, immunisation sites, festivals or religious or social gatherings—for propaganda or enticement. The 'cult of martyrdom' is emphasised among the children in general and each family is encouraged to contribute one child. Attention is drawn prominently to verses from the ancient Tamil literary collection, *Puranaanooru* (400 poems of war and wisdom) that romanticises mothers' pride in anointing their sons and sending them to win glory or honourable death in war. Abduction is resorted to if the families fail to contribute.

Initially, the children are used as guards, cooks and helpers, and then as messengers and spies. Gradually, they are inducted into the fighting forces, firstly in battlefield support functions and later in active combat. The children are given education in 'special schools' aimed at indoctrinating them. Children are a preferred choice for soldiering "so as to make them better defenders of Eelam in the future".⁹⁶

However, bowing to international pressures the LTTE has at least officially decided not to use child soldiers any more. Since November 2001, the LTTE has returned over 350 children to their parents—but UNICEF says many more under-age fighters are still under its command.⁹⁷

The LTTE also boasts of a well-organised women cadre. Since it began its armed struggle, it has begun proliferating a new generation of women. The female LTTE cadres having been instructed to embrace androgyny, replacing the traditional dress code of Tamil women with combat fatigues and boots to present an unostentatious disposition, heightened in its paradox by the killer cyanide capsule. Undoubtedly, the enrolling of females into the fighting force has resulted in a drastic metamorphosis with regard to the symbolic representation of women in Tamil society.

⁹⁶ N Manoharan, "Child Soldiers – III: 'Baby Brigades' of the LTTE", <<http://www.ipcs.org/kashmirLevel3.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1184&subCatID=null&mod=null>>, accessed on 20 October 2004.

⁹⁷ Story from BBC NEWS: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/3159412.stm>, accessed on 20 October 2004.

The LTTE women cadres have two classifications as far as the role of women in the 'cause' is concerned—the militant mother and the armed virgin. The ideal of the armed virgin is considered purely as an innovation by the LTTE. The female cadres, who are not heavily involved in the military, are entrusted with administrative work at various girls' hostels and camps.⁹⁸ As mentioned earlier, the women cadre is involved in all types of terrorist activities, particularly in acts like suicide terrorism.

So far, the fears that the LTTE may be in a possession of WMDs have been unfounded, but the LTTE is suspected of having chemical weapons and some Sri Lankan troops have been issued chemical warfare masks and trained to survive such attacks.⁹⁹

Appendix 2 gives the details about tools and tactics used by the non-state actors in a tabular form.

Conclusion

The philosophy and methodology of usage of various tools and tactics by non-state actors depends much on factors like history of the conflict, geographical location and political and military obligations. It also depends on the non-state actor's perceived thinking about the 'endgame'.

In the three conflicts discussed above, it has been observed that the non-state actors have used a wide variety of tools and tactics to wage war against the state. Generally, it has been seen that the tools and tactics used do not differ much in philosophy but do so at the execution stage depending upon the policies of the group. The most common tools and tactics used are kidnapping, ambush, suicide attacks, using improvised explosive devices (IED), etc. It has also been observed that there is a tendency amongst the non-state actors to copy the techniques used by other non-state actors.

However, a critical analysis that the core support system for the continuation of the conflict, directly or indirectly, dictates the methodologies of spreading terror. Only in the case of non-state actors active in Kashmir valley does one see some involvement of foreign mercenaries. They are generally from Pakistan/Afghanistan.

⁹⁸ Frances Bulathsinghala, "Armed Virgins Getting ready to celebrate life", *Sunday Observer*, 23 April 2002.

⁹⁹ Gunasekera, n.67, p. 28.

This involvement of foreigners implies that more than the ideology, the conflict is sustained by the support structure provided by Pakistan. Also, this conflict is different from the other two conflicts since it uses religious places as a tool of terror.

Hamas and LTTE command mass appeal amongst the local population because of their commitment to the cause, which is not exactly the case with the Kashmiri groups. To an extent, the importance of Hamas and LTTE goes beyond the acts of terror because of their involvement in running local administrations. At the same time, both these groups are ruthless in their activities. Hamas squads have kidnapped and executed their own people suspected of cooperation with Israel. This tendency is not found in other cases. The LTTE became the main non-state actor after it had waged bloody wars with other separatist Tamil groups in what was mainly a struggle for power.

Guerrilla warfare and urban warfare are part and parcel of all the three conflicts but with different degrees of significance. LTTE follows the strategy of a mixture of rural guerrilla warfare and urban guerrilla warfare. It has achieved major successes while fighting guerrilla wars. Hamas is engaging Israelis mainly in urban warfare. In the Kashmir valley, no classical guerrilla warfare has taken place, but a few attacks have been launched by using guerrilla tactics, both rural and urban in nature.

The type of weapons used by the non-state actors, particularly small arms, are generally found to be of similar nature; what varies is the manufacturer of the weapon depending on the source of acquisition. However, the LTTE is found to be way ahead of the others in respect of heavy weapon capability. In the Kashmir valley, other than AK-47, sniper weapons like the Dragunov have also been found. Also, rocket launchers have been used against government buildings. Non-state actors have also invested in anti-aircraft guns and Chinese made, HY-2 shoulder fired missiles. Hamas has developed a weapon of attrition in the Qassam I, II, and III short-range rockets. With ranges varying from 1.5 to 12 km, the rockets are reportedly modelled on a North Korean design. Otherwise, Hamas has mainly used suitcases, body suits, cars and buses as instruments for attacks. The LTTE uses many conventional weapons that are normally part of developed armies. Today, there is no guerrilla group in the world with stand-off capability equal to that of the LTTE.

The LTTE soldiers have been found to be well-equipped and better trained than even the Sri Lankan Army, and were found to be proficient in using all

conventional warfare tactics. Hamas has engaged the Israelis with some success in urban warfare. They have built a conventional army known as a 'Popular Army'. The various groups operating in the Kashmir valley are not found to be as organised as the LTTE or Hamas. However, all of groups in Kashmir are fighting for their cause on their own terms and not much of a power struggle is seen amongst themselves, as in case of the LTTE with other Tamil militant groups and the Hamas with the PLO.

LTTE is the only non-state actor found using human resources to the fullest. Women have perpetrated most LTTE suicide attacks. The LTTE has also raised baby brigades where child soldiers are tasked to undertake violent activities. LTTE is the only organisation that uses novel but brutal ways of stopping their soldiers from getting caught by Sri Lankan authorities. The cyanide capsule technique is used not as an offensive but as a defensive tool to avoid torture and leakage of secrets.

Suicide terrorism is one of the most effective tactics used by all non-state actors. In all the three cases, non-state actors have used this technique with some success. However, each non-state actor has used this technique differently: the methodology of attack and choice of target varies in every case.

Till date, none of these non-state actors have succeeded in using any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There are reports indicating interest shown by Hamas in acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. In the Kashmir valley, an isolated case was reported on the use usage of cyanide injection. However, in general, it can be argued that non-state actors have not shown much interest towards procurement of WMDs.

CHAPTER IV

STATE RESPONSES TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

This chapter examines state responses at various levels (national and international) to the challenges posed by non-state actors (as discussed in Chapter 3) during various stages of a conflict. It is in three sections, each dealing with an individual case.

The cases discussed in the previous chapter have several shades of ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, political and economic motivations. Currently, the states discussed in those cases are experiencing varying degrees of religious, ethnic and other internal conflicts, with an increasing number of separatist movements. All these conflicts are aimed at carving the state into smaller and more tightly focused ethnic areas. Mostly, these conflicts are rooted in history and have been the cause of fighting for many years. However, the increase in intensity of violence is of recent origin and could be the result of ethnic discrimination, demographic shifts, changing political regimes, or religious/ideological shifts and economic compulsions.

The concerned states are trying to address this problem at political, social and military levels. In each case, the issue has manifested into a severe crisis only during the last decade. The non-state actors have posed a great challenge to the state authorities by using innovative tools and tactics. During the initial phase, the states perceived the nature of threat to be more of a law and order problem. Hence, the threat was dealt militarily. However, over a period of time, states have realised that military response alone is inadequate and today the problem is being addressed at various social, political and international levels.

Simultaneously, the nature of tools and tactics used by non-state actors has shown a varying tendency during the last decade and naturally the response by the states also has undergone a change in philosophy. However, the state's response has not significantly changed with introduction of every new tool, evident from the consistent political and military reactions that the acts of non-state actors spawn.

Militarily, these asymmetric threats can be addressed through effective intelligence, interdiction and certain conventional counter-terrorism measures. But the roots of asymmetry are mainly political. Hence, managing the asymmetric problem is as much a political issue as a security issue. Also, working towards solutions to such asymmetric conflicts requires not only military and political efforts, but also clear historical understanding of the roots and origins of the problem.

Indian Response to threat posed by various militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir

In Kashmir, the state's response to tackle asymmetric threats posed by various militant groups can be looked at more appropriately in the backdrop of India's overall Kashmir policy. The Indian state finds itself in a unique situation, where a conflict that was initially between two states took on an additional dimension post-1988, with the major involvement of non-state actors.

This section attempts to analyse the Indian response to the asymmetric threat in Kashmir. However, the roots of the threat go back much before 1987 and hence the response is studied by giving due credence to the history of the conflict. The early 1980s marked the beginning of new era of asymmetric threat. The movement launched by the JKLF in the early 1980s demanding independence was hijacked by Pakistan's ISI and transformed into a campaign of terror. The external agencies created a reign of terror by employing force both on moral and physical planes. Gradually, the movement was taken over by Pakistan-sponsored radical Islamist groups, which made terrorism, insurgency and ethnic cleansing its main weapons.¹

In Kashmir, the issue of sovereignty exists at a plurality of levels—local claims, historical and religion-based claims, and state-level claims of India and Pakistan. These claims consist of political, legal and moral arguments.² The non-state actors have exploited such arguments effectively by using fundamentalist tactics. They are getting support from Pakistan and other global non-state actors. During last two decades, the Union of India has tried to address the threat at political, military and social levels. In the

¹ Afsir Karim, "Global Jihidi Movement in Dagestan and Kashmir", *Aakrosh*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1999, p. 7.

² Damoder R. Sardesai, "The Origins of Kashmir's International and Legal Status", in Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.), *Perspectives on Kashmir*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 81.

case of Kashmir, India relies on a singular document to serve as a valid political contract. This is the '1947 Instrument of Accession' treaty signed by Maharaja Hari Singh with the Government of India. Certain Kashmiri groups contest this document. This document was superseded by the state constitution that represents the current state of political organisation—Article 370 of the Indian Constitution for Jammu & Kashmir.³ The Indian position on Kashmir has remained consistent since the beginning. As per the Government of India, 'the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir took place as per the provisions of the India Independence Act and is final and legal and cannot be disputed. The states that acceded to Pakistan did so in the same manner and the rulers' decisions were accepted. Pakistan made no attempt to ascertain the will of the people of these states. If there is any "unfinished" business of partition, it is the requirement that Pakistan relinquish control of that part of Jammu and Kashmir that it illegally occupies.'⁴

However, over time, the Indian response towards the asymmetric threat has shown a gradual change from a rigid bias to unconditional negotiations. In fact, one of the main characteristics of this conflict has been Pakistan's all-round attitude towards India, with the Kashmir issue being a constant factor in this. Against this, India's approach has undergone some changes, without any compromises being made on basic policies.⁵ The last 15-16 years of the asymmetric conflict can broadly be divided into three phases for analysing the state's response. The first phase covers the period of indigenous movement, which was mainly led by JKLF, say from 1987 to 1990. The second phase covers the period when Pakistan/ISI took over the movement and the dominant non-state actor was mainly the HUM. During this phase, terrorists from Afghanistan started operating in the valley. Major events like Hazratbal shrine siege in October 1993 and the Charar-e-Sharif incident of March 1995 took place. The beginning of the third phase (which is still continuing) was around the late 1990s, with the LeT

³ Carole McGranhan, "The Kashmir and Tibet: A comparison", *India Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 153-154.

⁴ <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/Kashmir_MEA/Indian_Position.html>, accessed on 20 May 2004.

⁵ Lars Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts*, Vol.1, (Denmark: The Odense University Press, 1998), p. 18.

becoming operational in the valley. The Kandahar hijacking and attack on Indian Parliament can be associated with this phase.

The following analysis of India's response to this threat is done in the backdrop of above-mentioned segments of asymmetric conflict. However, it has not been an endeavour here to stick to rigid compartments of the defined phases. On the political front, the state's response is analysed in two parts, the first being Indo-Pak dialogue and the second being the Union of India's political investment in the Kashmir valley. The military response to the various tools and tactics used by non-state actor comes as a last part of the discussion; however, it must be remembered here that the military response has always been a part of the larger political process.

On the political front, the negotiations have broadly shown relative continuity in the dealings, irrespective of the party in power either in New Delhi or in Srinagar. It appears that initially the state failed to judge the violent intentions and sustenance capability of the non-state actor. During all these years of conflict, the Union of India has never abandoned the path of negotiation and mediation.

During the initial phases of conflict, India was reluctant to directly factor Pakistan into negotiations and tried to resolve the issue more as a law and order problem. But, over the last few years, there is unanimity across political faultlines on the need for Pakistan's involvement.⁶

The Kashmir conflict is peculiar in the sense that even though the global community understands that Pakistan is covertly supporting the non-state actor, not many accept this fact openly. However, particularly post-9/11 attacks, a perceptible change is being observed in their outlook. Before 9/11, on the global level, note of this problem was taken during Kargil crisis. In fact, Kargil was an attempt by Pakistani authorities towards internationalisation of this problem but strategically India gained much from this conflict.

⁶ "Valley's left and right, all say talk to Pakistan: You have to involve them. Say parties from National Conference to Congress, even BJP", *Indian Express*, 09 December 2000, New Delhi.

The Union of India understands that diplomacy has a role to play in all situations affecting a country's vital interests in the international arena. Such a role becomes all the more important when major powers are vitally interested and have the capacity to influence events. Kargil is a typical example and the war here was of concern to major powers, particularly because it involved their own interests.⁷ As a part of state's official policy, India has always taken a consistent stand that Kashmir is a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan. But, simultaneously India has always drawn the attention of the international community to highlight Pakistani intentions. Hence, as part of state's policy towards tackling this asymmetric threat, India raised its ante on terrorism on various international forums during the last decade or so and drew attention to the incontrovertible and irrefutable fact that Pakistan has consistently supported non-state entities as an instrument of state policy against India.

On the political level, no talks of significance took place between India and Pakistan on the issue of the continuing asymmetric war in Kashmir theatre in the first phase of the conflict. Both the states essentially addressed domestic population and followed a more inward looking policy. Following increasing terrorist violence and Pakistan's attempts to highlight the Kashmir dispute, both houses of the Indian Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution on February 22, 1994, emphasising that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India, and that Pakistan must vacate parts of the state under its occupation.⁸

An approach towards adopting more proactive measures became visible when Prime Minister AB Vajpayee visited Pakistan in 1999. During the visit, it was agreed that the respective governments would intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs and intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.⁹

⁷ Muchkund Dubey, "Kargil Crises: Limits of Diplomacy", *Mainstream*, Vol. 37, No. 30, 17 July 1999, pp. 7-8 and 30.

⁸ <<http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/ParliamentRes.html> >, accessed on 20 May 2004.

⁹ From the text of the Lahore Declaration signed by the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on 21 February 1999.

Before this visit, discussions were already on at the official level. During such meetings, the Indian government always made sure that they would interact with their Pakistani counterparts armed with facts and figures proving the latter's support to various non-state actors against Indian interests. In one such meeting, the Indian side pointed out that Pakistan's sponsorship and instigation of terrorism included recruiting, training, financing, arming, infiltrating and controlling terrorists, foreign mercenaries and assorted underworld criminal elements, with a view to using them in every way possible for destabilising the Indian state.

The Pakistani delegation tried to deny its involvement in state-sponsorship of terrorism on the plea that it was only giving moral support to the so-called freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. It was pointed out to Pakistani side that terrorism could not and should not be justified by any civilised society on the basis of such definitional quibbles. Pakistan's pretence of only providing moral support to terrorists in J&K was also exposed by the fact that as many as 243 Pakistani and 48 residents of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, belonging to various fundamentalist/terrorist organisations, have been killed by Indian security forces in the last few years, and as many as 91 Pakistani and 34 residents of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir are in Indian jails in connection with terrorist crimes. Further, recoveries of over 47,000 sophisticated firearms and over 30,000 kg of high explosives from Pakistan-trained militants also indicates Pakistan's involvement in sponsoring terrorist activities in India. Lionisation in Pakistan of mercenaries killed in Jammu & Kashmir by organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al Badr, etc., is further proof of Pakistan's involvement.

Accordingly, the Indian delegation proposed the following steps to be taken by Pakistan.

- (1) Abandon the policy of state sponsorship of terrorism and totally dismantle the infrastructure existing in Pakistan for indoctrinating, recruiting, training, arming, financing and infiltrating militants for the purpose of terrorist violence in India.
- (2) Close down more than 30 training camps for terrorists functioning in PoK/Pakistan.

(3) Immediately hand over to India terrorists and underworld operators of Indian origin currently sheltered in Pakistan and against whom international warrants of arrest have been issued by Interpol.

(4) To deny use of its territory or other facilities to fundamentalist and militant organisations who have been propagating the cult of religious violence, training militants and raising funds for 'Jehad'.¹⁰

A few months after the Lahore declaration, the Kargil conflict took place and this led to breakdown of the peace talks. The Agra Summit was the first significant security initiative post the Kargil conflict. This summit concluded without any joint statement, but as per Mr. Vajpayee, both the parties did achieve a degree of understanding on the issue.¹¹

To stop this asymmetric conflict, the Indian government has also adopted a policy of involving local Kashmiri population in the process of governance. In the recent past, the Union of India has tried to concentrate more towards the establishment of people's empowerment at Kashmir, based on people's mandate. This has led to elections at various levels. However, the government of India has had a bad record in holding free and fair elections in the valley.

The process of liberal democracy in Jammu and Kashmir has always been marked by public cynicism about politicians and the political process. There have been elections in 1951, 1957, 1962, 1972, 1977, 1983, 1987 and 1996, yet the dispute continues on the question of the 'transfer of the free will' of the people. Of all these elections, only the 1977 elections were free and fair, with there being a proper contest. There was a total boycott of the Lok Sabha elections in 1989. The voting percentage in subsequent elections was very low. All elections conducted post-1987 were always under the threat of terrorism; still people understood the fact that the only way to stop insurgency was a

¹⁰ Statement by Home Secretary on India-Pakistan talks on Terrorism and Drug trafficking, New Delhi, 12 November 1998, <<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/documents/papers/nov121998.htm>>, accessed on 15 July 2004.

¹¹ Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee made a statement on 24 July 2001 in both houses of Parliament on the July 2001 Indo-Pak summit held at Agra. Also refers the excerpts from the opening statement made by

peaceful democratic solution and voting in the elections was the first step in that direction. Hence, since 1989, the local populace has rejected the suggestion for a boycott of elections by the non-state actors. On August 15, 2001, the Indian Prime Minister assured that forthcoming J&K state assembly elections would be conducted in a free and fair manner.¹² Still, the Kashmiri leaders were not much convinced because they had seen the large-scale rigging during the 1987 elections.¹³ However, the Indian state gained much credibility in 2002 by conducting free and fair elections, which were also certified by all neutral and international observers as being absolutely free and fair, without a trace of fraud or coercion.¹⁴ This people's restoration of faith in democracy was a major setback to the non-state actors.

The first phase of the conflict (1987-90) was marked by three major events, which encouraged and gave credence to militancy. One was the kidnapping of Rubaiyya Sayeed, the then Home Minister's daughter. The second was the killing of Mirwaiz Maulana Mohammed Farook, Chairman of Awami Action Committee (March 24, 1990) by the terrorists and firing during his funeral procession by CRPF personnel in which 57 civilians were killed. The third was Farooq Abdullah's resignation provoked by the appointment of Mr. Jagmohan as the Governor of J&K. During the same period, mass Kashmiri Pandit migration started to other Indian states.¹⁵

In the initial phases, the problem was mainly tackled by the government in power in J&K because the militancy was restricted to a limited portion of Kashmir valley. Also, the nature of violence was not so bloody. The Union of India became directly involved

the Prime Minister during the summit, *Press Information Bureau*, <<http://www.pib.nic.in>>, accessed on 27 May 2003.

¹² Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani, "A Case of Elections or No Elections in Kashmir", <<http://www.kashmir-her.net/mainfile.php/articles/178/>>, accessed on 22 June 2005 and Partha S. Ghosh, "From Legalism to Realism in Kashmir: Internationalising the Line of Control", Working Paper No. 7 *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, September 2002, p. 29.

¹³ Muhammad Farooq Rehmani, "Farce of Elections in Kashmir", <http://www.kashmiris.org/articles/articles-english/farce_of_%20elections_in_%20Kashmir.htm>, accessed on 20 May 2004.

¹⁴ Sreeram Chaulia, "Two Elections: Two Misnomers", *Kashmir Herald*, Volume 2, No. 6 - November 2002, <<http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/twoelectionstwomisnomers.html>>, accessed on 26 July 2003.

¹⁵ V.K. Nayar, "Low Intensity Conflict: Jammu and Kashmir", *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. 126, No. 533, July-September, 1998, pp. 412-413.

during 1990,¹⁶ following events like the kidnapping of Rubaiyya Sayeed, mass migration of Pandits, etc. Till March 1990, the Army was manning the Line of Control (LoC) only against armed military intrusions and overt Pakistani action. On July 5, 1990, the Valley and a 20-km belt in Rajouri and Poonch areas were declared as disturbed areas. The years 1991-92 saw an escalation in militant activities and intensification of counter-insurgency operations by the security forces. The Army tightened the anti-infiltration and exfiltration measures along the LoC. This changed configuration of the LoC and involvement of more troops resulted in the killing of militants in increasing numbers and capture of large quantity of arms and militants.

During this period, while military responses to meet the situation were being built up, the civil administration took further beating due to a strike by government employees. The government functioning was disrupted and the public distribution system and civic services and other Government infrastructure broke down.¹⁷ In a way, the military gains were washed away by political ineptness. This is said to have resulted in an increase in domestic support for militancy.

Initially, the Indian state responded to the sub-conventional war with conventional means. The state was aware of dealing with militancy because of its Punjab experience. But, still India was seen as unable to contain Pakistan's successful and calibrated use of cross-border networks through its internal security mechanisms. This was considered very surprising given the backdrop of a ruthless but very effective police campaign run by the Indian state in Punjab until 1992. The crucial element of this campaign was that it responded to a sub-conventional war with creative and fluid sub-conventional military means, using covert offensive capabilities like infiltration and operations by irregular groups to considerable effect. In J&K, while the state attempted to use similar tactics, their scale, however, has been limited, possibly in response to human rights concerns. Also, India has been reluctant to extend such tactics across the Line of Control to the

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 413.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 411-415.

source of its military problems—the terrorist training camps in Pakistan. This was perhaps because of India's concerns about international opinion.¹⁸

The kidnapping of Rubaiyya Sayeed on December 8, 1989, and the subsequent Indian response gave a major boost to JKLF activities in the Valley. It also motivated militants towards adopting kidnapping as a tool for engaging the state. The JKLF made conditional her Rubaiyya Sayeed's release on the release of five JKLF terrorists.

Despite the J&K government's insistence that if the Government accepted the JKLF's terms, the country would suffer as "it would open the floodgates for the future and provide a boost to anti-national activities of trying to separate Kashmir from India," her father, the then Union Home Minister, was not convinced. And so, five days after she was kidnapped, the Central Government directed the state to secure her release by freeing the five JKLF terrorists. Rubaiyya was freed unharmed, and the five militants were released and taken out in a procession in Srinagar before slipping across the Line of Control. The kidnapping of Dr. Rubaiyya Sayeed was indeed the turning point. JKLF had succeeded in using terror to disrupt the lives of innocent people, depriving them of their fundamental rights to live peacefully and seek prosperity.¹⁹

However, there was the general suspicion that Rubaiyya's kidnapping was a pre-arranged affair. It was later established that it was a probing action of agents of Pakistan. It was neither a surprise for Rubaiyya, or perhaps for her father. There was no danger to her life that perhaps explains why all plans to free her by trained commando were vetoed.²⁰

The Kandhahar hijacking was also dealt by the Government of India in a similar fashion. The entire hijacking episode indicated that the state had set for itself clear priorities. These were: (1) the earliest termination of the hijacking; (2) the safe return of the passengers, crew and aircraft; and (3) safeguarding national security.

¹⁸ Praveen Swami, "Failed Threats and Flawed Fence: India's Military Response to Pakistan's Proxy War", *Indian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2004, p. 166.

¹⁹ V.P. Bhatia, "Mufti's Politics Spell Danger for Jammu", *Organiser*, New Delhi, 22 December 2002.

²⁰ Balraj Madhok, *Kashmir: The Storm Centre of the World*, (Houston: A Ghosh Publishers, 1992), et passium.

Direct discussions between the hijackers and Indian officials took place between December 27 and December 31, 1999. The hijackers initially demanded the release of Masood Azhar in return for 10 Indians, five foreigners and some other passengers. This piece-meal approach was rejected by the Government. Both the Taliban and the hijackers were informed that until there was a formal, full and unambiguous detailing of demands, there could be no talks. The demands were (a) release of 36 terrorists in Indian custody, including Masood Azhar; (b) the coffin of Sajad Afghani and (c) payment of US \$200 million. These demands were made public by Indian officials. Subsequently, the Taliban advised the hijackers that their demands for money and the coffin were un-Islamic. These were, therefore, dropped. In the end, the Government of India released three terrorists: Masood Azhar, Mustaq Zargar and Omar Sheikh.²¹

Apart from kidnapping and hijacking, another effective tool used by non-state actors for confronting the Indian Government has been the forceful seizure of religious shrines. Here, essentially the philosophy of the militant groups was that no government would allow its forces to enter the religious place due to the fear of popular backlash and the non-state actor could convert the shrine into a hideout or put its sanctity to risk. During last decade, three major attempts have been made to use shrines as a terror tool and subsequent platforms for bargaining. The Indian state has received mixed success in tackling these problems.

During 1993, the Government of India had put a siege for almost a month around the holy shrine of Hazratbal, which was occupied by militants. The Government tackled this problem effectively. Through skilful negotiations, most of the Government's objectives were achieved. The shrine emerged unscathed and free of any desecration. No life was lost. Its successful conclusion is widely perceived as being a turning point in the thrust of Kashmir insurgency. The authorities succeeded in forcing the militants to surrender with their weapons, which included 15 AK-56s, a Dragunov sniper rifle, one universal machine gun and a rocket-propelled grenade with one rocket. The terrorists were mainly Indians, with two civilians from Pakistan held Kashmir. As per the

²¹Suo Moto Statement by the Minister of External Affairs in both Houses of Parliament on 28 February 2000 on the Hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814.

negotiations, the Government was committed to let the terrorists go free. There was a criticism from few quarters that the terrorists were given VIP treatment.²²

However, the Government's response in the Charar-e-Sharif (1995) incidence can be termed to be a failure. This shrine is located near Shopian in Budgam district in South Kashmir. Based on the inputs about the presence of foreign terrorists in the township, the Indian security forces laid siege to the entire town. Despite attempted negotiations and even an offer of free passage to the militants, no solution could be reached. Here, as compared to Hazratbal, the military deployment was massive. Two divisions of the Army and the BSF placed the entire town under siege. The siege concluded violently with the loss of 23 lives. The shrine was burnt to the ground. The leader of the militants, Mast Gul, escaped with his entire band to Pakistan and was feted there as a war hero. This siege was conducted entirely by the security forces, the army, the paramilitary, and the police, with little civilian participation. Also, the mode of negotiation was inappropriate with the involvement of only junior officers.²³ Here, probably the government failed because of non-involvement of civilian population and lack of understanding of local situation and ground realities.

The end of the siege of a mosque in Tarzoo, Sopore, in North Kashmir on February 4, 2002, is also a success story of effective negotiations like Hazratbal. Here, the success was achieved with minimum damage to the mosque and the militants were successfully persuaded by the concerned Deputy Commissioner to surrender.²⁴ These three cases indicate that the state's policy of initiating a dialogue with the terror group, readiness to make compromises and involving local leadership in the process of negotiations have yielded mixed dividends.

Probably, the Indian government understands that the military solution to the threat from non-state actors has limited implications. Such measures are more directed towards curbing the militancy and have greater tactical significance. Infiltration across the Indo-Pak border is the root cause for increment in terrorist activities. In view of this,

²² Wajahat Habibullah, "Siege: Hazratbal, Kashmir, 1993", *India Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 2002, pp. 90-91.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 91-92

the Indian Army engages the Pakistan Army on the border to stop the infiltration of arms, ammunition and foreign mercenaries. However, the porous nature of the border does allow this infiltration to take place.

To stop these infiltrations, other than military means, the Government of India is also attempting to fence the border. The cessation of violence in Punjab coincided with the completion of an ambitious fencing project running across India's western frontier. The fencing now runs from Rajasthan, at the southern end of India-Pakistan border, to the southern parts of Jammu province. The extension of the fence along the line of control is of top priority for the Indian state. Budgeted to cost Rs.1.74 billion, the multi-layer fence, complete with electronic sensors will cover 580 km of the 788 km Line of Control. Indian planners believe that fencing will prove to be an effective defence against infiltration.²⁵

On November 19, 2000, then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee made a unilateral offer of 'non-initiation of combat operations' against terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir. The offer was initially made for a period of one month and was co-terminus with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. What has later come to be termed as 'ceasefire' was subsequently extended thrice and lasted six months. On May 23, the Union Government announced its decision to terminate the ceasefire and invite Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf to New Delhi for talks on the Kashmir issue.

During this phase, it was expected that various terrorist groups and organisations, mostly foreign would see reason and recognising the imperatives of peace, dialogue and cooperation, shun violence. Regrettably, they did not. A gratifying feature of these relaxations has been relative peace along the LoC on account of restraint exercised by both sides. There has also been considerable lowering of exchange of fire across the LoC.²⁶

²⁴ Ibid, p. 92.

²⁵ Praveen Swami, "Failed Threats and Flawed Fence: India's Military Response to Pakistan's Proxy War", *Indian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2004, p. 163.

²⁶ Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting presided over by Prime Minister Vajpayee. From the Text of the Government Statement issued consequent to the CCS meeting and Press Trust of India, 23 May 2001.

The government of India's response to tackle terrorism has always been a two-pronged strategy, with political and military means applied simultaneously. But despite continuous casualties–fatalities in J&K between January 1988 and December 19, 2001, totalled 30,517—the Indian response has vacillated between alternating phases of police and military action. The Indian reaction to the attack on Parliament has, however, been qualitatively different from anything in the past. Even the October 1 attack on the J&K Assembly, which left 39 dead, did not significantly alter perceptions.²⁷

Over the years, structures of conflict have evolved. India's conventional armed forces in Kashmir are locked in an uncomfortable stalemate with the armed forces of Pakistan. The tactics for both armies are often quite similar—artillery duels, occasional skirmishes, vigilance against enemy incursions and attempts to score marginal territorial gains along the line of control.²⁸

The Kargil intrusions demonstrated the nature of Pakistan's covert support to non-state actors in Kashmir theatre. Kargil happened to revive the insurgency in Kashmir. The Indian state had no choice but to react to the situation militarily. The Kargil conflict falls in the grey zone between low intensity conflict and full-scale war. The combat was limited to a small geographical area, but in terms of the quantity of forces involved, the duration of fighting, and the type of weaponry used, it had all the characteristics of a conventional war. The Indian state gained a major victory in this war and was also able to establish the direct involvement of Pakistan army in the conflict. The Indian state suffered a few human losses during the war but overall gained much, both militarily and politically. Also, the conflict showed to the world that Pakistan was supporting insurgency in India and could go to any level to increase its degree.

Analysts like Peter Lavoy observed that, according to Western scholars, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a region of conflict is supposed to lead to avoidance of military escalation and thus produce caution among decision-makers that the opposing sides in a crisis will curtail their coercive behaviour. He argued that Pakistan's defiance of

²⁷ Ajai Sahni, "Security Repercussions to Attack on Parliament", <<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/pink211201.htm>>, accessed on 12 June 2004.

²⁸ Jonah Blank, "Kashmir: All Tactics, No Strategy", *India Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 2003, p. 181.

this logic led to the Kargil conflict. In fact, the calculations of Pakistani military planners seemed to follow the logic of the "stability-instability paradox," under which the side that is willing to run greater risks is able to use military force for territorial or political gains, thereby placing the pressure on the other side to escalate to the nuclear or near-nuclear level, which, the logic goes, it will refrain from doing.

However, a full-scale India-Pakistan war was prevented through a combination of factors such as India's eventual battlefield successes, Pakistan's decision not to support its fighters (or perhaps they were not in a position to provide this support), official and back channel diplomacy, and international mediation under the aegis of the United States.

Lavoy further argued that Pakistan's decision-makers apparently perceived Kargil as mainly a tactical military operation, launched by a small group of army leaders under the guise of ongoing militancy in Kashmir. Pakistan's strategy was based on the premise that due to the new nuclear factor, international pressure would force the cessation of hostilities, leaving Pakistan in an advantageous position on the ground. Based on this premise, the Pakistan government approached China and then the US for support after the fighting started. China adopted a neutral posture, whereas the US government gave a conditional commitment for mediation after Pakistan withdrew to its side of the line of control. However, Pakistan's military behaviour and its diplomatic efforts were sometimes contradictory and inconsistent, and in the end ineffective. India, against this, managed to combine effective military measures involving all three armed services, with consistent and coherent diplomacy.²⁹

The Kargil conflict demonstrated the dangers of this asymmetric warfare, leading to a situation that could take a limited or sub-conventional conflict towards a general war. However, India moved very close to a full-scale war in response to the non-state actor's attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. This was qualitatively a very different response from the Indian authorities, where it had held Pakistan directly responsible for the non-state actor's activities and carried out unprecedented mobilisation

²⁹ "Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil", Conference Report of the conference conducted by Center For Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, CA, 29 May - 01Jun, 2002.

of Indian Armed forces along the Indo-Pak border as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

There are differences in perceptions about the success of this act. This troop mobilisation was codenamed 'Operation Parakram' and was the longest-ever military stand-off against Pakistan. It was designed for raising both the costs and risks for Pakistan in pursuing terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Even though Operation Parakram retained the full range of escalatory options, war was never a viable option. The immediate payoff in terms of a decrease in infiltration was not observed but some reduction in *fidayeen* (suicide) attacks was observed.³⁰ Importantly, the Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram helped towards removing Pakistan's mask of immunity in waging terrorism by supporting non-state actors.

Some analysts say the Indian threat of war was an empty boast, the Indian armed forces had neither any effective plans nor the wherewithal to punish Pakistan. After the terrorist attack on Parliament, the Cabinet asked the forces to act against Pakistan. There was just one condition—action must be immediate and should not go beyond two weeks. Confronted by the Cabinet mandate, the armed forces wanted a month's timeframe, a window that was simply not available.³¹ However, given the political and geo-strategic dynamics of nuclear Pakistan, it becomes difficult to assess what could have happened if war had actually taken place. In the end, due to the threat of war and increasing US pressure, Pakistan has at least started de-linking itself from terrorist groups. India and Pakistan are now involved in confidence building measures (CBM). While no roadmap is available yet for solving the Kashmir problem, at least some decrease in support to non-state actors is taking place.

There is little scope of the options of 'hot pursuit' or any other cross-border engagement by India in the foreseeable future. Delhi is by and large preparing for a 'diplomatic winter' during which it will campaign internationally to expose terrorist

³⁰ Ashok K Mehta, "Op Parakram: the balance shifts", <http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/08ashok.htm>, accessed on 18 May 2005.

³¹ Manoj Joshi, "Modernising the Military More Bark and More Bite", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 15 November 2003.

networks and secure a greater delegitimation of Pakistan-based terrorism.³² It appears that conventional tactics and current military preparedness are irrelevant in dealing with such asymmetric threats. Military solutions will not be permanent solutions, but till political solutions are found, the military will have to adopt new strategies to tackle this problem.

Israeli Response to threat posed by Hamas

Israel is the only country that applies its declared harsh policy and retaliates openly against non-state actors. This policy was established in 1953 by Ben-Gurion and has been practised ever since by the Israeli defence forces (IDF).³³ The methods of such retaliatory operations vary, depending upon the target and political compulsions at that point. Probably, Israel works on philosophy that if you raise the costs and risks for terrorists, you reduce their gains and benefits. With ruthless Hamas attacks, the Israeli response also has been consistent with its harsh approach over the years.

Israeli military doctrine for most of the state's history called for pre-emption and the use of technological superiority and training as force multipliers to offset the superior numbers of a conventional enemy force. Israel is using similar tactics to deal with the threat posed by the Hamas. But in this asymmetric conflict, this inferior non-state enemy is not getting easily defeated with such techniques.

Hamas is known more as a religious organisation and interestingly Israeli policies are also based on religious philosophy. The Israeli army uses military tactics taught by the Torah, such as expulsion, destruction of houses and the policy of scorched earth. The sabbath rules are observed throughout the country. Hence, no Israeli military strike has ever started on a Saturday.³⁴

So far, Israel has not found a perfect way to respond to the suicide bombings, sniper attacks and other irregular operations being conducted against it. A full

³² Ajai Sahni, "Security Repercussions to Attack on Parliament", <<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/pink211201.htm>>, accessed on 20 August 2005.

³³ The various details about Israeli thinkings on this issue are available at Naeim Giladi, *Ben Gurion's Scandals*, (New York: Gilit Publishing Co., 1992)

conventional military response—occupying land, defeating military formations in a conventional battle—is hard to apply in this case. A limited, lower-level conventional response is also hard to apply. The mismatch of tactics has been so extreme at times that Israel has used its F-16s to bomb Palestinian police posts and other infrastructure, and Hamas hideouts.³⁵ Today, Israel is changing its tactics to address this asymmetric threat and now Israeli forces primarily use assault helicopters because of their ability to pick, choose and attack targets precisely.

In the initial stages of the conflict, Hamas was involved in activities like street violence, which were limited to particular areas, and the government dealt with them accordingly. With the subsequent increase in subversive and terrorist activities, Hamas was outlawed in September 1989. Further, the major involvement of rural Palestine in the intifada has ensured its widespread effectiveness. Towards the end of the intifada in 1991, the Israeli army resorted to an economic clampdown on villages, cutting of electricity and water, and preventing olive-picking during the height of the season.³⁶

Israeli dealings with Hamas during the early phases of conflict were not militarily as harsh as is the practice today. This could be because they themselves were responsible towards the growth of this organisation and were probably still hopeful of engaging it in a limited manner. One of the early significant measures taken against Hamas dates back to December 1992, when following the murder of a kidnapped paramilitary border guard, Israel expelled 415 Palestinians (associated with Hamas) to South Lebanon. After this incident, it appeared that Israel might use such arbitrary mass deportation techniques as an official state policy. With US backing, it interpreted these tactics successfully and even convinced the UN about its usefulness. However, subsequently domestic and international pressure forced it to allow the return of a few deportees. Also, it understood that such policies are affecting the process of peace talks with the Palestinian negotiating camp.³⁷

³⁴ Andrea Nusse, *Muslim Palestine The Ideology of Hamas*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 30-32.

³⁵ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), et passium.

³⁶ Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*, (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 237.

³⁷ Nusse, n. 34, pp. 141-144.

Hamas' efforts to secure a dominant position through violence against Israel have led to a predicament. This was sharply aggravated by the signing of the September 1993 Israel-PLO Oslo accord³⁸ and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho in June 1994. By signing this accord, the Israeli authorities exploited the Hamas' relative weakness compared with the Fatah (Yasser Arafat's faction in the PLO). Israel used this peace accord to undermine Hamas' presence and influence in the Palestinian population. More than a year before the 1993 accord, Hamas had been considering unofficially joining the political process; however, by signing this accord with the PA, Israel saw to it that Hamas was politically alienated.

At the end of August 1993, an intensive "back channel diplomacy" between the PLO and the Israeli government was unveiled. This was independent of the official peace process in Washington under US sponsorship. On September 10, 1993, the PLO and the state of Israel recognised each other officially. A "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" was signed in the White House on September 13, 1993. These moves strengthened the PLO's position and legitimacy as representative of the Palestinians at the cost of other groups inside the territories like Hamas.³⁹

However, the Palestinians strategic prospects remained bleak even after the Oslo accord in the Sharon era. His governments' policies added a dangerously destabilising factor in the region. His deliberate dismantling of the political, institutional and security framework established by the 1993 Oslo Accord encouraged the Israeli right's hopes of preventing Palestinian statehood, greatly complicating the task of resuming the peace process within the foreseeable future. No less significant was his insistence on regaining total physical control over West Bank and Gaza, and expanding Jewish settlements. This placed Palestinian statehood in serious doubt.⁴⁰

As a state policy post the Oslo accord, Israel constantly exploited the unhealthy relationship between Hamas and the PA. During 1997-98, with the help of the PA, the Israeli authorities were successful in busting one of the most dangerous Hamas infrastructures, a large bomb factory. The catch was worth 700 kg of explosives, dozens

³⁸ US Department of State, *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 4, September 1993, p. 3.

³⁹ Nusse, n. 34, pp. 145-147.

⁴⁰ Yezid Sayigh, "The Palestinian Strategic Impasse", *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002-03, p. 7.

of plastic containers full of an unidentified liquid, in addition to 10 plastic containers containing gas mask kits, and bomb-making chemicals such as acetone, alcohol and hydrogen peroxide. Israeli and Palestinian agents detained also more than 40 suspects.⁴¹ PA police also helped Israel by catching some of the most-wanted Hamas criminals.⁴² In parts, the Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation has given good pay-offs to Israel during the 1990s.⁴³

Since the beginning, Israel has always been careful while dealing with PLO and its leader, Arafat. On many occasions, Arafat has played double games with Israel. He has followed a policy of prevention of terrorism against Israel from within areas under his control, while enabling and even encouraging terrorist attacks in territory jointly administered by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and those in Israel. It appears that despite these limitations, Israel followed the policy of collaborating with the PA, probably because that was the best option to curtail Hamas' activities without raising international furore and showing to the world that it was the Palestinians who were attacking fellow Palestinians because of their terrorist activities.

During the last decade, Hamas has carried out many suicide attacks on Israeli civilian targets, particularly to thwart any peace process in West Asia. As a state policy, Israel has never tried to regulate the environmental factors and group dynamics behind such attacks. Till date, Israel responds reactively to the effects of suicide terrorism by destroying the homes of suicide bombers and prosecuting potential suicide bombers.⁴⁴

In its fight against Hamas, Israel is receiving major support at the international level from the US. The US has contributed much towards designing various peace accords. At the same time, the Americans have also taken precautions to ensure that no support goes to Hamas from the US soil. In the year 1998, US Law enforcement officials seized \$1.4 million in cash and property belonging to a Chicago man linked to Hamas

⁴¹"The Rift Widens Between Hamas and PA", 13 April 1998, <<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=47> and <http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=12>>, accessed on 25 September 2003.

⁴²<<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=268>>, accessed on 08 March 2003.

⁴³<<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=302>>, accessed on 08 March 2003.

⁴⁴Rohan Gunaratna, "The LTTE and suicide terrorism", *Frontline*, 18 February 2000, p. 109.

fund-raising activities. This was the first time the US Justice Department had used civil forfeiture laws against supporters of terrorism abroad. Justice department officials said the assets seized were going to be used to finance Hamas activities in Israel, including the purchase of weapons, extortion, kidnapping and murder. The action was intended to stop the flow of money through US financial institutions in support of terrorist activity abroad.⁴⁵ Subsequently, similar actions were taken by freezing assets of a few other Hamas-linked groups. The assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, a Texas organisation that called itself as the largest Muslim charity in the US were frozen in the year 2001. Also, FBI raided offices of InfoCom, an internet company, and the Islamic Association for Palestine.⁴⁶

The September 11 terrorist attacks on the US have had an indirect impact on Hamas' activities. Hamas leaders also never wanted to be associated with Al Qaeda. Immediately after these attacks, the US added Hamas to the list of 'foreign terrorist organisations'. Post September 11, an unofficial ban on all suicide bomb attacks inside Israel was imposed by Hamas.⁴⁷ But this ban lasted for some time only and Hamas resumed its activities within a few months.

A suicide bomber killed 28 people and injured more than 200 at a popular seaside hotel, at the start of the Jewish religious holiday of Passover in March 2002.⁴⁸ In response, Israeli forces launched Operation Defensive Shield. According to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the stated goals of the operation were to "enter cities and villages which have become havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and, primarily, their dispatchers and those who finance and support them; to confiscate weapons intended to be used against Israeli citizens; to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, laboratories, weapons production factories and secret installations. The orders are clear: target and paralyse anyone who takes up weapons and tries to oppose our troops, resists them or endangers them—and to avoid harming the civilian population."

⁴⁵ "U.S. Seizes Assets Linked to Hamas", 10 June 1998 <<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=94>>, accessed on 24 January 2003.

⁴⁶ "United States Freezes Assets of Hamas-Linked Groups", 04 December 2001, <<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=715>>, accessed on 20 October 2003.

⁴⁷ "What next for Hamas?", *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, 08 November 2001.

⁴⁸ <<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/27/mideast/>>, accessed on 20 April 2003.

The major points of conflict were: Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jenin. The end result of the mission was that many suspected Palestinian militants were arrested, weapons seized, bomb labs destroyed, suicide bombings stopped and documents found. Also, the evidence that emerged showed that Yasser Arafat was knowingly funding various terrorist groups.⁴⁹

During last many years, Israel has been carrying out targeted killings (or assassinations) of terror leaders as a state policy. The most important and successful targeted killing carried was in March 2004 when Hamas founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed in a missile attack. Israel has succeeded on a few other fronts by implementing this policy.⁵⁰ The Yassin killing was Israel's most significant political assassination since the killing of Khalil al Wazir (Abu Jihad) in Tunis in May 1988. Wazir was the PLO's second in command, described by some as the main strategist behind the mass popular uprising then raging in the Occupied Territories.⁵¹ With the targeted killings, Israel has been able to drive a wedge between Hamas and the PA. Hamas terrorists are now in hiding, rather than openly organising more bombings of Israeli buses and restaurants, and on occasions, Hamas has also demanded a tactical ceasefire to stop such attacks, indicating the drop of morale in its rank and files.

Alongside the military and political solutions, Israel has come out with another innovative solution towards ending conflict, particularly stopping Hamas activists from attempting suicide attacks on Israeli territory. In the year 2002, the Israeli cabinet decided to build a wall along the Green Line (the border between Israel and Palestinian territories). But in order to include Israeli settlements built outside it, the wall is being built around a bigger area. The Israeli state is receiving a lot of flak for this but it is going ahead with its plan.⁵² On completion, the wall is expected to leave 54 per cent of West

⁴⁹ <http://www.fact-index.com/o/op/operation_defensive_shield.html>, accessed on 5 March 2003. and Matt Rees, "The Battle of Jenin", *Time*, 13 May 2002.

⁵⁰ "Targeted Killings: Are They Effective?"

<[http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/critiques/Targeted_Killings_Are_They_Effective\\$.asp](http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/critiques/Targeted_Killings_Are_They_Effective$.asp)>, accessed on 26 January 2004.

⁵¹ Graham Usher, "The assassination of Shaykh Yasin", *Middle East International*, No. 722, 02 April 2004, p. 4.

⁵² Walid El-Batrawi, "Palestinians Walled In and Walled Out", 04 July 2004,

<<http://www.aljazeera.info/Opinion%20editorials/2004%20opinions/July/4%20o/Palestinians%20Walled>

Bank territory inside Israel. The wall will also bring a large share of West Bank's water resources and agricultural land inside Israel territory.⁵³

The plans for a unilateral physical separation between areas settled by Jews and Arabs were actually made long before the second Intifada began in October 2000. The subject of fencing the territory was raised by the Israeli government as early as in March 1995, when a suicide bomber killed 21 Israeli soldiers at a bus stop near Netanya. The aim was to drastically limit the entry of Palestinians into Israel. The then minister of internal security, Moshe Shahal, suggested the construction of a 300-mile, electronically controlled barrier, with seven to eight crossing points. But the governments of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres (who succeeded Rabin after his assassination in November 1995) were not yet ready to give up on the dream of "a new Middle East", in which emphasis was placed on integration, not separation. Both refused to let violence deter progress towards peace and stuck to the slogan "We must fight terror as if there are no hopes for peace and we must strive for peace as if there is no terror".

When Sharon became the Prime Minister, succeeding Ehud Barak in early 2001, he advocated a policy very different from the Labor Party's: no negotiations without a total cessation of violence first. Under Sharon's policy, a single act of violence perpetrated by marginal group could block peace for an unlimited period. Given last few years of extreme violence between the Jews and the Arabs, it has become clear to both sides that a "cooling off" period is urgently needed. This is precisely what a fence will provide. Total physical separation may actually enable more effective international mediation that might eventually lead to a final peace agreement.⁵⁴

The state of Israel is encountering various difficulties in addressing the threats posed by Hamas. This is because it also has to deal with the PA. However, the PLO is no longer overtly using terrorism as an instrument for its nationalist struggle. But at the same time, organisations like Hamas have acquired greater freedom of action under the PA than under Israeli military occupation. The PA is reluctant to eradicate armed opposition,

[%20In%20and%20Walled%20Out%20By%20Walid%20El-Batrawi.htm](#)>, accessed on 20 September 2004.

⁵³ John Tordai, "Palestinians behind the Wall", *Middle East International*, No. 725, 14 May 2004, p. 4.

which could turn into a civil war, yet it still values organisations like Hamas as a tool to pressure Israel to make additional concessions.⁵⁵

Also, Hamas understands the importance of PA for its existence and hence has been engaging the PA for last decade or so. Hamas leader Imad al Faluji has emphasised that Hamas has tried hard to avoid confronting the PA, because “we are well aware that any efforts to embarrass and frustrate the PA will result in the return of Israeli occupation troops, which we deem undesirable”. This statement was issued after the confrontation between the Palestinian police and the public at Filastin Mosque in Gaza on November 18, 1994, in which 13 Palestinians were killed and about 200 wounded.⁵⁶

Currently, the fundamental asymmetry between Palestinian and Israeli positions is apparent at every stage of the negotiating process. In reality, Hamas is not directly involved. But at the same time, the influence of Hamas on the overall conflict is not diminishing despite Israel’s heavy-handed response to the various tools and tactics used by Hamas. In view of this, the following political certainties emerge:⁵⁷

- (1) The nature of any peace agreement between Israel and Palestine will be one-sided, accurately reflecting the imbalance of power between the two parties.
- (2) Social turmoil is expected in Palestine, increase in tension and other forms of political violence are also likely.
- (3) The need by the Palestine regime to clamp down on social unrest in combination with the distributive nature of Palestine’s political enemy will produce the third certainty: authoritarianism, not democracy.

Israel has been partly successful in keeping this problem away from international political pressures, mainly because of overt and covert US backing. Recently, a road map has been drawn up by the quartet comprising the US, European Union, Russian Federation and the United Nations. It probably represents a viable option for achieving a peaceful settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict and for the realisation of the two-state vision.

⁵⁴ Yuval Elizuv, “Israel banks on a fence”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2, March/April 2003, pp. 106-119.

⁵⁵ Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, “The risks of Palestinian Statehood”, *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 33.

⁵⁶ Naomi Weinberger, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 25-26.

Sri Lankan Response to threat posed by LTTE

The civil war in Sri Lanka has lasted for more than 20 years, with no immediate solution in sight. Since 1983, more than 64,000 lives have been lost and more than million people have been internally displaced.⁵⁸ Till date, no solution has been found because of the unwillingness on the part of the LTTE to accept anything less than full statehood.⁵⁹

However, the current situation is not as critical as it was in the 80s and 90s. There appears to be a shift in state policy as well as keenness on part of the LTTE to negotiate. But, LTTE's changed stance of accepting only autonomy raises suspicion given its dubious past record.

The responses of successive governments have been vital in the context of settlement of the problem of political violence in Sri Lanka. Such responses have not been consistent and have varied from regime to regime, and insurrection to insurrection. It is also evident that there is no common national policy to address the many aspects of political violence in Sri Lanka. The strategies are invariably *ad hoc* and issue specific.

The responses of the Sri Lankan government can broadly be divided into two aspects—coercive and legal measures, and non-military measures. These measures have been conditional upon the political will of the government, strength and competence of the armed forces, availability of foreign military aid, ideological orientation of the government's domestic and foreign policies, and the nature and the pattern of the insurrection. In addition to military measures to counter LTTE violence, the government has adopted non-military measures in addressing the grievances of the Tamil people.⁶⁰ During the last two decades of violence in Sri Lanka, the political establishments have undergone a few changes in philosophy and leadership, depending upon the results of the elections. The approach of the government has shown some changes based on the political positions taken by the parties in power. However, the opposition parties have also played a role, but unfortunately this has been more dependent on power politics rather than the overall interest of the state.

⁵⁷ Glenn E. Robinson, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 90.

⁵⁸ < http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/1_21.htm >, accessed on 26 December 2004.

⁵⁹ Purnaka L. de Silva, 'Sri Lanka: futures beyond conflict', *Futures*, Vol. 29, No. 10, 1997, p. 978.

In the past, no 'accord agreements' succeeded because of the radical 'outbidding' by opposition parties. The parties played the role of negotiator or outbidder depending on their status as being either in the government or the opposition. This dynamic can be best described by using the theory of institutional underdevelopment, which states that institutionalised domination of one group by another becomes inflexible and leaves those institutions unable to effectively deal with political mobilisation for redress by the dominant group.⁶¹

LTTE is still in a position to continue the classical type of long-term guerrilla warfare and terrorism. This conflict does not belong to the category of zero-sum situation (winner and loser) but a win-win situation or no win situation. As a result, no government in power is able to arrive at a lasting solution through a military campaign alone.⁶²

As a state authority, the Sri Lankan government initially depended on military tactics than on non-military tactics, at least during the early stages of the conflict. This becomes evident from the statements of the then President JR Jayewardene in 1985.

(1) "It is essential to completely destroy the militant movement...like destroying the breeding places of mosquitoes to wipe them out, we should find where the militants are and destroy them".

(2) "The Tamil problem is more a military problem and any military problem has to be tackled militarily".⁶³

The Sri Lankan military spending also increased substantially to tackle this threat more effectively. Sri Lanka spends between 5 to 6 per cent of its GDP on the war with the Tigers, and the strength of its security forces has increased from 10,000 in 1983 to 120,000 in 1999.⁶⁴

Over the years, Sri Lankan armed forces have also increased their arsenal. They have equipped their platoons, companies and battalions with ultramodern weapons. The Sri Lankan armour comprises of medium and light tanks while artillery comprises of field

⁶⁰ Gamini Samaranyake, Patterns of Political Violence and responses of the Government in Sri Lanka, 1971-1996, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Spring 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 117.

⁶¹ Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele Mac Iver, "The evolution of protracted ethnic conflict: group dominance and political underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23, No.3, 1991, p. 128.

⁶² Samaranyake, n. 60, p 118.

⁶³ M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd,2002), p. 167.

⁶⁴ Manik De Silva, "Sri Lanka's Civil War", *Current History*, Vol. 98, No. 632, December 1999, p. 430.

and medium guns. They have invested in a philosophy of greater sophistication in weaponry to save manpower, particularly in the areas related to communication systems, night-fighting sights and equipment, and the creation of an army aviation component. However, the Sri Lankan authorities have always been short of funds for their modernisation plans.⁶⁵ As a result, they have not been successful in carrying out all aspects of modernisation as envisaged.

During the initial phase of the conflict, LTTE supremo Prabhakaran had decided to eliminate the other four major Tamil resistance groups. The Sri Lankan government saw this as an opportunity and thought it wise to remain aloof. Over a period of time Prabhakaran succeeded in eliminating all his rivals.⁶⁶ However, in the same period, the LTTE was successful in becoming a simultaneous threat to the state of Sri Lanka. The state's calculations about the disintegration of all non-state organisations due to an internal power struggle amongst themselves failed and at the end of intra-fighting amongst the groups, the LTTE emerged as the most powerful torchbearer for the Tamil cause.

The last two decades of this bloody conflict has seen numerous occasions of official declarations of ceasefire on both the sides. However, militancy has always resumed mainly because the LTTE uses the ceasefire period for providing rest to its guerrilla forces and to replenish its equipment and stock.

The nature of tools and tactics used by the LTTE to wage war has become a major challenge to the Sri Lankan government. The unconventional nature of the conflict has successfully challenged the state's security apparatus. The most interesting aspect of this asymmetric warfare is the non-state actor's ability to confront the state even in conventional combat.

An awesome ability to carry out terrorist strikes anywhere within Sri Lanka has been a potent weapon in the LTTE armoury. Although the security forces continue to enjoy a monopoly on air-power, the Tigers in recent years have acquired an anti-aircraft

⁶⁵ Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt Gen Rohan Daluwatte spoke to Iqbal Athas, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 15, 15 October 1997.

⁶⁶ Mia M. Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka", *Civil Wars* Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 71.

capability and have shot down several government aircraft.⁶⁷ So in a way, the state's military apparatus is finding it difficult to tackle the Tigers even though it holds superiority in the air.

Suicide terrorism has been one of LTTE's most successfully used tools of spreading terror. The first LTTE suicide operation was conducted on July 5, 1987. The LTTE suicide bomber is motivated by his/her politico-social environment as well as by the indoctrination carried out by the organisation. The Sri Lankan authorities are finding it extremely difficult to handle this threat, both militarily and politically. Suicide terrorism is the most violent form of expression. Even for states with sophisticated military and intelligence apparatus, suicide terrorism is hard to combat. Suicide terrorism is different from high-risk military operations where death is not certain.⁶⁸ It is very difficult to stop somebody who is determined to die. During the last 15 years, the Sri Lankan authorities have failed to prevent most of the suicide attacks, with most of their efforts being defensive in nature. The military responses have mainly concentrated towards "hardening" likely targets by stepping up protection. They have undertaken measures of threat analyses based on potential bombers, nature of suicide devices, logistics and support network and modus operandi.⁶⁹

Terrorist groups learn from one another, but states facing terrorism do not. In fact, before September 11, there was either a lack of cooperation or no cooperation at all between the affected countries, possibly due to the need to preserve counter-terrorism technologies or political rivalry.

An example of how lack of cooperation between the VIP security divisions of India and Sri Lanka affected security was the failure of the Sri Lankan Presidential security division to estimate the kill radius of a suicide device. In India, over 18 metres kill radius is maintained between a political VIP and the public. The distance between an LTTE female suicide bomber and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge, who was partially blinded by an explosion in December 1999, was less than 12 metres.⁷⁰ The

⁶⁷ De Silva, n. 64.

⁶⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, "The LTTE and suicide terrorism", *Frontline*, 18 February, 2000, p. 106.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 109.

⁷⁰ Rohan Gunaratna, "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat",
<<http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/srilanka/globalthreat.html>>, accessed on 24 July 2004.

Sri Lankan authorities have undertaken a few preventive measures against suicide terrorism like international propaganda but to little effect because the LTTE as a policy does not accept the responsibility for political killings. Also, it is very difficult for the Sri Lankan authorities to infiltrate a cohesive group driven by ethnic nationalism like the LTTE. Hence, Sri Lanka is only a mute spectator, trying to defeat the threat of suicide killing at the peripheral level.

The non-military responses of the state to this conflict include various accords. In the initial phases, the government of India played a dual role: that of a mediator and of a supporter of the non-state actors. The Sri Lankan government had officially taken Indian help as a mediator in the conflict since 1985. In fact, in 1985, the then Indian foreign secretary, Romesh Bhandari, had virtually forced the various Tamil militant leaders into indirectly negotiating with the Sri Lankan government. Secret talks took place between Tamil groups and Sri Lankan delegation at Thimpu.⁷¹

This was the best opportunity for the Sri Lankan government to evolve a lasting solution to the problem. At the time of the Thimpu talks, the LTTE was part of a larger group, the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). There were indications that the ENLF would have agreed to an arrangement where the Tamil region got similar powers in all aspects as a state gets under the Indian Constitution. The Sri Lankan Government knew this but all it offered was District Pradesiya Sabhas, which was rejected outright not only by the militant groups but also by moderate political leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).⁷²

According to AP Venkateswaran, a former foreign secretary of India, the Sri Lankan delegation came to Thimpu conference with two purposes: first, it wanted to know the mind of the Government of India, and second, it wanted to divide the militants. The conference gave confidence to Sri Lanka that India was on its side even as it ensured unity among the Tamil militant groups in their stand against the Sri Lankan government.

⁷¹ C. Joshua Thomas, *Sri Lanka's Turmoil and Indian Government*, (New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1995), p. 140.

⁷² Sri Lanka: Update No.18 – “Can India manage a ceasefire?”, <<http://www.saag.org/notes/note92.html>>, accessed on 26 May 2003.

Thus, it was after Thimpu that the militants and the Indian government started drifting apart in their stand on the conflict. Also, the Government of India did not succeed in its attempt in persuading the LTTE to accept either the proposals offered by it or the Sri Lankan government.⁷³

Despite the failure of the Thimpu talks, the Sri Lankan government again sought Indian help in 1987. In July 1987, the President Jayewardene, in an extraordinary move invited Indian High commissioner. JN Dixit to discuss proposals to solve the ethnic problem. This was the point from when the government of India's role in the conflict started changing from that of mere mediator to that of a guarantor.⁷⁴ The Indo-Sri Lankan 1987 accord is an important phase in the history of this ethnic conflict. It was the first time the Sri Lankan state had taken the help of any other state, both politically and militarily for conflict resolution. In the initial phases of this accord, the settlement between Sinhalese and Tamils came closest to resolving the conflict, or at least stopping the fighting. The accord was designed to preserve Sri Lankan sovereignty while simultaneously giving the Tamils a measure of autonomy. As a guarantor, the Indian government sent in its peacekeeping force (IPKF) to keep order and ensure that Tamil insurgents turned over their arms and abided by the agreement.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, this accord failed because of errors in implementation, broken guarantees, partisan sentiments of India and, most importantly, domestic politics in Sri Lanka. The effects of this failed accord continue to reverberate through this conflict and its prospects for resolution.⁷⁶ This phase represents a classic case in the Sri Lankan conflict, where the state response failed because of power politics at various stages, including the compulsions of the non-state actor, the state actor and the third party mediator.

While tackling the threat by military means, Sri Lanka did gain some successes, particularly at the tactical level. One of the biggest tactical success stories is the post-1990 victory in Jaffna lagoon, when in what is commonly known as the 'Elephant Pass

⁷³ Thomas, n. 71, p. 141.

⁷⁴ Ravikant Dubey, *Indo Srilankan Relations*, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1993), pp. 114-115 and Appendix X.

⁷⁵ US House of Representatives, "The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement: hearing before the subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs": Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1987, p. 6.

debacle', Sri Lankan forces defeated LTTE in a conventional battle because of sheer asymmetry of assets. Here, the Tigers fought only a ground war (not a guerrilla war) while the navy and air force supported the Sri Lankan ground forces. The battle saw the LTTE lose nearly 600 Tigers.⁷⁷

The fall of Jaffna in 1995 was one of the biggest military success for the Sri Lankan government. It had far-reaching strategic implications on the overall conflict. This defeat was a terrible blow to the LTTE and rudely shattered its carefully cultivated image of invincibility. Within just 50 days of fighting, the Sri Lankan military overran Jaffna after storming through vast areas of Tiger territory and raised the country's national flag on what remains of the 16th century Dutch-built Jaffna Fort, the traditional seat of military supremacy.⁷⁸ For Sri Lanka, it was also the biggest moral victory because they had recaptured Jaffna after a gap of 12 years. The Sri Lankan government undertook this military action because of the failures in addressing the problem at the political level. The peace talks between the People's Alliance government and the LTTE in early 1995 had collapsed and fighting had restarted on April 19, 1995, when the Tigers broke the ceasefire by sinking two naval vessels in Trincomalee harbour.

In 1996, however, the LTTE dealt a major blow to the Sri Lankan government by overrunning a sprawling military garrison, killing nearly 1,200 soldiers and policemen at Mullaitivu. Subsequently, in May 1997, the Sri Lankan forces launched an offensive, which turned out to be its longest, biggest and bloodiest but unfortunately not so successful operation. The aim was to seize and open up a 75-km stretch from Vavuniya to Killinochchi. The operation involved nearly 30,000 soldiers backed by heavy artillery and air support. After 18 months of severe fighting, Colombo abandoned 'Operation Jayasikuru', having only won tenuous control of about 50 km of the road.⁷⁹

The military means adopted by the Sri Lankan government failed miserably in the following years. In 1999, the LTTE managed a collapse of Vanni and in 2000, it captured

⁷⁶ Landon E. Hancock, "The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord: An Analysis of Conflict Termination", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 83-105.

⁷⁷ Anita Pratap, 'Island of blood', (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2001), pp. 90-91, and V.S.Sambandan, "The fall of Elephant Pass", *Frontline*, 29 April-12 May 2000.

⁷⁸ Narayan Swamy, n. 63, p. 340.

the Elephant Pass garrison⁸⁰ thereby avenging the 10-year-old back defeat. This forced the Sri Lankan government to think that LTTE would not stop till it recaptures Jaffna. Realising that it was very difficult to defeat the LTTE militarily, the Sri Lankan government then started working towards finding a credible political solution to the Tamil problem.

In 1999, Kumaratunga decided to allow Norway to act as a facilitator between the LTTE and Sri Lanka, after having repeatedly rejected offers of mediation by several other countries. Also, the events of September 11 appear to have forced the LTTE to accept the three-party talks since it would have risked being isolated as a terrorist organisation if it had continued fighting. The organisation had already been banned in the UK and the flow of funds from abroad (mainly from Tamils living abroad) had increasingly begun to dry up.

Because of Norway's involvement, the Sri Lankan government has succeeded to an extent in stopping the violence. In August 2002 in Oslo, the LTTE finally stated its readiness to enter into formal peace talks. The talks started in Thailand⁸¹ in September 2002. They successfully concluded in Oslo, indicating that both parties were genuinely striving to advance the negotiations.

The second round of negotiations (October 31 to November 3, 2002) between government representatives and the LTTE also concluded successfully. A formal "breakthrough" was finally achieved at the third official round of negotiations, which took place in Oslo from December 2-5, 2002. The two parties agreed in principle on the structures for a federal model in Sri Lanka.⁸² However, despite the successful conclusion of the talks, fighting does not appear to have stopped.. The LTTE has not completely stopped its terrorist activities and the Sri Lankan government is reacting militarily to these activities. The power struggle within the Sri Lankan political parties is driving the

⁷⁹ Ibid, pp. 352-353.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 355.

⁸¹ V.S. Sambandan, "Talking to the Tigers, finally", *Frontline*, Vol. 20, No. 18, 13 September 2002, pp. 54-55.

⁸² Austrian Foreign Ministry, <http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=66&LNG=en>, accessed on 28 July 2004.

process of conflict resolution and government positions are changing as per the vision of political parties in the power.

At the politico-military level, Sri Lankan government has always been careful to avoid giving any official recognition to the LTTE's cause. Particularly, the Sri Lankan navy has been very careful in this regard and has undertaken many operations in the sea by attacking the LTTE's navy. This is mainly because it does not want to give the LTTE Navy a formal recognition that it was trying for by putting up a set of proposals to Scandinavian-staffed Sri Lanka (Ceasefire) Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to prevent clashes at sea. The Sea Tigers, the maritime wing of LTTE, was trying to get indirect recognition by asking for an agreement based on 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of Sea III, which is only applicable to state navies. The Sri Lankan Navy launched Operation Waruna Kirana (Coloured Rays) in May 2001 as an offensive to block LTTE's sea-lanes.⁸³ On July 2003, the LTTE oil tanker Shoshin was sunk by the Sri Lankan Navy.⁸⁴ Such attacks were undertaken to prove the government stand that any ceasefire agreement at sea does not affect the Navy's duty to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

Japan is also playing a supplementary role in the process of conflict resolution. Currently, the talks have almost reached a deadlock and the Norwegian-facilitated Sri Lankan peace process is facing a critical test. After six rounds of talks, followed by LTTE's exclusion from the Washington Seminar (April 14, 2003) and its boycott of the Tokyo Donors Conference (9-10 June 2003), the question arises now how the peace talks will move forward. One of the fallouts of the LTTE's temporary withdrawal from the peace process is that it is articulating the need for direct talks between it and Sri Lankan government, and it is distrustful of the international community. It claims that the increasing involvement of international players exerts pressure on the freedom of choice of the Tamil people to determine their own future.⁸⁵

⁸³ <<http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items03/190403-1.html>>, accessed on 06 March 2004 and "LTTE withdraw from talks" at <<http://brcsproject.gn.apc.org/slmonitor/April2003/withdraw.html>>, accessed on 20 September 2003.

⁸⁴ Vijay Sakhuja, Will LTTE Give Peace a Chance? *Peace & Conflict*, Vol. 6, No. 8, 2003, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁵ Ram Kumar, "Sri Lankan Peace Process: Tough Road Ahead", *Peace & Conflict*, Vol. 6, No. 8, 2003, p. 3.

Appendix 3 gives the details of state responses to the threat posed by non-state actors.

Conclusion

The state responses to various tools and tactics used by non-state actors are found varying in each case, depending on the nature of the conflict and more importantly on the state's attitude towards addressing such issues. Over the years, these responses are found to be contentious. However, most of the efforts of the states and the partial success achieved by them in resolving many complex problems imply that these issues can be resolved.

In all the three cases, the states initially responded by using policing/ military solutions, based on the premise that problems were related to law and order. Subsequently, over a period of time, when the non-state actors began using various innovative tools and tactics, and increased the intensity of violence, the states understood the severity of the conflict and the non-state actors' resolve to take the struggle to a logical conclusion. Following this, the states started looking for 'non-military' solutions.

The Indian response towards this asymmetric threat has shown a major political shift from a rigid bias to unconditional negotiations. The Sri Lankan state is seeking help from Norway to negotiate with the LTTE. 'The Quartet', a group of four nations, is working towards implementing a roadmap for Palestinian statehood. All these three cases are distinctive in nature and their responses to the asymmetric threats have commonalities as well as differences in the approach. For India, a state actor covertly supports the opposing non-state actor while the state of Israel is itself supported covertly by another state actor. It has been observed that states' responses to various tools and tactics used by non-state actors should be viewed in the backdrop of global geopolitical realities.

India's response to various tools and tactics used by non-state actors has been found to be generally a broadbased one. It appears that during the initial phase of the conflict, India responded by following a 'case by case' approach. Also, the non-state actors had probably perplexed the Indian state with their unconventional approaches. The state's meek response to Dr Rubaiyya Sayeed's kidnapping gave the non-state actor a morale boost. This one act demonstrated the lack of resolve on the part of the Indian state

to respond decisively to the threat posed by the non-state actor. Such a stance taken by India during the initial phases of the conflict appears to have left a great impact on the outcome of this asymmetric conflict.

At the same time, it has been observed that Indian state has never compromised on the 'human face' in dealing with such threats. It appears that the state has invested much in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people than opting for hardcore military solutions. India has also raised its ante on terrorism on various international forums and has drawn global attention to the fact that Pakistan has always covertly supported non-state actors. In the last few years, India's approach has been more towards finding a political solution. However, there is no solution in sight yet. India is currently trying to take advantage of changed global perceptions on terrorism and is engaging Pakistan in a diplomatic offensive. It can also be inferred that India is probably playing a wait and watch game because it feels that the non-state actor is losing patience and the government can wear it out in this conflict.

The state of Israel is also adopting an approach of finding a politico-military solution to the threat posed by Hamas. However, Israel is seen investing more in its military options than the political options. It is carrying out targeted killings of Hamas cadres/sympathisers on a regular basis. It has also killed many of Hamas' spiritual and military leaders in the hope that wiping out its leadership would bring an end to the conflict, but unfortunately this has not happened. However, this offensive approach is linked more to the current Sharon regime. In the past few years, other Prime Ministers had adopted policies of finding solution through peaceful negotiations. The current administration is also evaluating options of making a few political compromises but has failed in correctly balancing the politico-military solution because of its over-dependence on military options.

The LTTE used various tools and tactics with some success in its conflict against the Sri Lankan government. The state of Sri Lanka was mostly found struggling for an effective response to the threat posed by LTTE. Differences in political perceptions also had an adverse impact on a possible amicable solution. The threat posed by the LTTE was so severe that the Sri Lankan Army has failed to restrain it. Interestingly, the Sri

Lankan government was forced to take military help from India, the country which had once covertly supported the conflict. In the recent past, Norway's intervention has raised some hopes of a peaceful solution and currently, the LTTE has almost stopped its anti-establishment activities.

No immediate solutions to these conflicts are on offer. It appears that none of these states are capable of finding acceptable answers on their own. The solutions may only be found if both parties are ready to give up their respective maximalist positions. Global interventions may also help in finding satisfactory solutions.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has analysed state responses to asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors. The study, while trying to determine the extent of threat posed by non-state actors, has concentrated on analysing the various tools and tactics used to introduce an element of asymmetry in the conflict. It has further examined state response on the political, military, social and economic front.

The study argues that states' conventional military responses have proved inadequate to tackle asymmetric threats. It concludes that the responses of the states lack broader vision and understanding about the root cause of the problem.

An analysis of the various tools and tactics used by asymmetric actors indicates that states are yet to find definitive solutions to tackle this threat effectively. Each particular threat has its own tenet, hence expecting a universal solution is farfetched. The study also observes that there are no specific responses to a wide range of tools and tactics used by non-state actors. The states adhere to straitjacketed solutions, mainly because it is difficult for them to find individual solutions for each and every tactic.

States are found to have military superiority over non-state actors in terms of technology and military hardware. They also have an information edge over non-state actors. However, the asymmetric tools and tactics used by the non-state actor renders the state's military superiority ineffective.

The macro analysis carried out in this thesis regarding state versus non-state conflicts in various parts of the world suggest that most have essentially started as political problems and only subsequently gathered the character of an armed threat. During the initial stages, in most of the cases, governments have generally viewed the problem as one of law and order, with state authorities trying to suppress it through policing and military tactics. The states failed to envisage that if not dealt effectively, these could transform into major violent conflicts with serious security ramifications.

During the last few decades, asymmetric warfare has essentially dealt with unknown threats, unexpected and sudden in most of the occasions in terms of ways,

means and ends. The different tools and tactics used by asymmetric actors have caught states napping. However, over a period of time, a broad pattern is emerging in the usage of different tools and tactics adopted by the asymmetric actor.

Conceptually, weapons are not the essence of asymmetry but the study observed that when it comes to the actual methodology of spreading terror, then an analysis of various tools and tactics used for this purpose becomes important. During the last few decades, non-state actors are using improvised explosive devices (IED), car and truck bombs, kidnappings, hijackings and suicide attacks. Also, most terrorist groups have used weapons like LMGs, HMGs, assault rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars, weapons which are of Chinese, Russian or German origin.

It has been found that LTTE has used guerrilla warfare with considerable success. Based on local support, a well-knit organisational structure and dedicated followers, the LTTE has thwarted and consistently frustrated the Sri Lankan forces. The study reasons that the LTTE is a unique organisation where a transition of a guerrilla outfit into a conventional force has taken place. The local support, oppressed population and good propaganda tactics have helped the LTTE build and develop an underground resistance movement. Over time, the organisation has graduated from engineering sabotage, civil unrest and attacks on the armed forces and defence establishments to full-fledged guerrilla warfare. However, the LTTE has conducted guerrilla warfare in concert with other forms of warfare and it is today the only non-state actor that has established its own conventional army and navy units.

The study observes that the topography and terrain of the region and local geography plays a vital role towards deciding the nature of tools and tactics used by the non-state actor. While topography and terrain helped LTTE cadres to fight guerrilla warfare with some success, the roots of the Hamas movement can be traced to urban warfare. In fact, the Hamas has fought a few classical urban wars where it engaged the conventional well-equipped army with small-armed groups, employing techniques like human shields, engaging the enemy in and around pinched alleys and houses, with ample hiding places and sniper positions. In the Kashmir valley, no classical guerrilla warfare has been fought but some attacks have been launched, taking advantage of dense forests and mountainous regions.

Terror tools like hijacking and kidnapping are found to be more commonly associated with the Kashmir conflict. Non-state actors have achieved good results by using these tools particularly in the initial stages of the conflict, when the state was

not fully aware about how it should respond. The Indian government was found buckling to popular sentiment and media pressure during such crises. Also, the government was found less equipped in terms of legislation. In Columbia, non-state actors have used kidnapping as a terror tool with great success.

The study concludes that soft and weak states have given in to the demands of non-state actors. Selecting targets, such as places of worship, for carrying out anti-establishment activities in Kashmir is a stand-alone tactic not generally found in other theatres of asymmetric conflict. Interestingly, warring Muslim factions adopted similar techniques in the Iraq conflict post-2003 US invasion. Mass casualty terrorism, which involves holding of a large population as hostages or killing many people in a single attack, has never featured in the main cases studied in this thesis. However, it is a phenomenon seen commonly in Chechnya. The killing of 35 Sikhs on March 20, 2000, in the Kashmir valley may be considered to resemble mass casualty terrorism.

The study observes that suicide terrorism is one of the most effective tactics used by non-state actors, especially in West Asia and South Asia. The technique was more prevalent in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and subsequently spread to India and Israel in the 1990s. The numbers of suicide bombers in a single attack varies, with the LTTE and Hamas using more than one in a number of cases. In Kashmir, the attacks are found to be mostly fidayeen in nature, implying that the attackers are willing to die if need be, but are using weapons and grenades to carry out their attack and are not converting themselves into a human bomb. The targets for suicide and fidayeen attacks have been both static and mobile, against infrastructure and humans. Suicide bombers have destroyed various targets, including military, political, and economic. They have been instrumental in attacks on innocent civilians in buses, crowded places and in buildings.

The LTTE has conducted many suicide operations and now Hamas is following suit. The LTTE is a peculiar non-state actor, in that it has conducted suicide operations outside its own 'conflict zone' (assassination of Rajiv Gandhi). This group has used female cadres as human bombs. The selection of targets has been found to be different in the case of LTTE and Hamas. The LTTE has mainly targeted individuals while Hamas has carried out attacks mainly to attract attention or to take revenge. For Hamas, making an impact is more important than selecting any particular individual as a target. This was also the case with groups like Al Qaeda, 9/11 was more symbolic

in nature and individuals didn't matter much. In Kashmir, Indian army or paramilitary forces are found to be the main targets.

The modus operandi of launching attacks also varies among different non-state actors. The Hamas mainly depends on cars and suitcases while LTTE uses the body suit (human bomb) technique. In the Kashmir valley, suicide attacks are generally launched by using truck/car bombs; however in few cases, the drivers of the vehicles were even not aware of the 'actual' missions. The study establishes that suicide attacks take place in situations where the conflict is protracted and violent. The actors involved have generally reached the level of desperation and have effectively used religion (not in the case of the LTTE) to motivate the agents. Also, non-state actors have shown a copycat syndrome in carrying out suicide attacks.

It is perceived that religion plays a dominant role in motivating an asymmetric actor and gathering popular support for his movement. The case studies imply that religion is important but need not necessarily be the central figure. The analysis also indicates that ethnicity plays a vital role in deciding popular support to the conflict. One of the fiercest conflicts of current era is the one being fought in Sri Lanka; it is a classic case of 'secular conflict'. It has been observed that the LTTE has never made the conflict about religion, unlike in Palestine where the ideology is of 'war of all against all'.

A pertinent assessment and reassessment is that non-state actors do not work in isolation. They have well-established networks and are technology savvy, financed by various sources. Some of them have taken to narco-trafficking and organised crimes as a source of funding. They find asymmetric techniques more useful and effective to challenge the state's strategy, operations and force structuring.

It is seen that normally asymmetric actors look for 'conventional asymmetry'. They depend largely on tools and tactics like using small arms and guerrilla methods. Suicide terrorism is a phenomenon observed mainly during last two/three decades. Non-state actors like the Hamas and the LTTE have used this tool very effectively. The case studies indicate that during the initial stages of the conflict, militancy is limited to the villages and targets are essentially military or political in nature, but over a period of time the centre of gravity shifts to small towns and cities. Today, the targets even include innocent civilians and foreigners.

The study finds that the tools and tactics used by non-state actors are helpful to attract the attention of the state in particular and the global community in general. No

conflict can survive without the 'oxygen', i.e. financial support. It has been observed that the diaspora contributes substantially towards the cause, enabling the non-state actor to invest in different tools and tactics. However, all these tools and tactics have limited importance; in none of these conflicts, can they be considered as an end in itself. Despite some successes, tactically they have failed to give the desired end results.

The state response to these asymmetric threats has been found to be two-fold. First, states have tried to solve the problem by using policing techniques and when the severity increased, they employed the armed forces. Second, they have searched for a political solution. However, both approaches failed to give the desired success. States understand that the military solution is not a permanent one, but have been forced to adopt such techniques because of the violent nature of the conflict. This is despite the negative impact of such action amongst the local populace, which adversely affected public opinion. In fact, in the case of Kashmir and Palestine, it has been observed that on various occasions, the local population has got attracted towards the non-state actor not because of the ideology but because of their anger and resentment against the establishment.

The case studies indicate that the states initially tried to use brute military superiority to tackle the problem without understanding the requirement of specific solutions for specific cases of violence. The best example here is the use of F-16 fighter planes by Israel to tackle insurgency.

On the political front, the states had initially taken a stance that they would not engage non-state actors in a dialogue because they have challenged their sovereignty. However, over a period of time, states have understood that such policies are unproductive. Hence, they are now engaging non-state actors in a composite dialogue, involving the global community, directly or indirectly, in the role of negotiators. These conflicts have also had a significant impact on the state's economy. India and Israel are progressive states and their economy is still in a position to absorb the harsh realities of asymmetric conflict. However, with every passing day, they are incurring more costs. Sri Lanka's state machinery almost collapsed because of the impact of asymmetric war but Norway's intervention has raised considerable hope of finding a peaceful solution.

It has been observed that non-state actors operating in India and Sri Lanka have realised that it will be very difficult to achieve their stated maximalist positions,

hence they have given some indications of agreeing to a solution short of the desired position. Israel's case is unique and does not follow any global pattern in respect of its response to the non-state actor. Here, the stated aim clearly appears to be the use of offensive and proactive military tactics to tackle the non-state actor. In the case of India and Sri Lanka, the military tactics are generally reactive in nature.

Strategic and tactical countermeasures used by states against suicide operations have been mostly preventive and reactive. Preventive measures were essentially propaganda oriented and have been used mostly in Sri Lanka. Reactive measures include methods like hardening of targets, using dummy cars to protect VIPs, etc. In India, during public meetings of important political figures, adequate distance is kept between the dais and the general public so as to avoid any human bomb.

It is observed that the cooperation amongst the states affected by suicide terrorism is limited. This can probably be attributed to the differing nature of targets in each state as well as their philosophy in addressing such problems. Israel responds reactively to suicide terrorism by destroying the homes of suicide bombers, sometimes in the bargain killing their relatives and prosecuting probable attackers. While it uses such tactics as deterrence, it is difficult to judge exactly how many suicide attacks it has thwarted as Hamas continues to undertake daring suicide attacks.

As suicide attacks are planned and executed by compartmentalised cells, even a pragmatic military response, such as infiltration or "hardening" probable targets by enhancing protection, fails to guarantee security and offers no long-term solution. Security agencies agree that suicide terrorism is hard to fight because if an assassin is willing to die, it is impossible to protect the victim.

Historically, states have failed to defeat the invisible enemy fighting a guerrilla war. In order to control the alienation of the rural and illiterate population and to stop their support to the non-state actors, states have adopted various techniques. In Kashmir, India has undertaken many programmes, including free health check ups, education, employment generation, etc. The Israeli army resorts to an economic clampdown on villages as a last resort, cutting of electricity and water, and preventing olive picking during the height of the season to dissuade people from helping Hamas.

The study observes that states have gradually understood the futility of full-scale conventional military response. One cannot have a precise military response for

every tool and tactic used by a non-state actor. Only Israel is of the firm opinion that military response is the best solution in an asymmetric warfare. It has carried out targeted killings on regular basis. The killing in March 2004 of Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin implies that Israel considers this option to be a viable one. Israel also subsequently killed Yassin's successor. As a counter, Hamas did not announce the name of the succeeding leader. Clearly, Israel's response worked to an extent that it deterred Hamas from officially announcing the name of a new religious leader who in turn could have been used as a spiritual rallying point.

However, it will be wrong to conclude that Israel has always looked for only a military solution. Its offensive mindset is more associated with the current Sharon regime. In the past, Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres have had a dream of "a New West Asia", where the emphasis was on integration, not separation. This implies that the states' response to asymmetric warfare is also 'ruler dependent'. Similar fluctuations are also seen in the case of Sri Lanka. Here, there have been ideological differences amongst political parties about the role of the IPKF. In India, however, no major differences have been seen in the political perceptions of major political parties.

Non-military responses of states include various peace accords. However, an analysis of the case studies indicates that such peace accords have a flip side too. The Sri Lankan government was crippled because of the ceasefire declared after peace negotiations. This was because the LTTE used the ceasefire periods for providing rest to its guerrilla forces. Fencing the border is another technique used by states like India and Israel to stop infiltration by the terrorists/suicide bombers. However, Israel's action of building of the wall has rejuvenated the militancy because of the unhealthy practices of the seizure of territory, capture of cultivable and natural resources rich land, etc.

Politically, Israel is trying to make Hamas irrelevant by engaging the Palestine Authority (PA). India is also trying to engage selected groups in the Kashmir valley for dialogue. This 'divide and rule' policy may not prove fruitful in the long run.

It is also observed that the India's response to asymmetric warfare cannot be compared with other states because it is fighting with two entities—one, the group of asymmetric actors operating in the Kashmir valley, and two the covert supporter, Pakistan. During the initial stages of the conflict the policies of the Indian state

were responsible for eruption, spread, decline and renewal of insurgency. Throughout the conflict, the Pakistani state's covert and overt interventions have also had an important effect.

One of the most difficult tasks faced by the Indian state during the last three decades has been the Kargil conflict. India was attacked by another state actor's armed forces, which claimed that these were non-state actors. After successfully evicting the intruders, India instituted various doctrinal responses to asymmetric warfare: for example, changes in higher defence management, operational deployments in Kashmir, and a nuclear command and control structure. Post the December 13, 2001, Parliament attack, the Indian government response became radically different. India threatened the covert supporter—Pakistan—with full-scale war by deploying its armed forces on the border.

It is concluded that the 'most violent periods' of many of the conflicts studied are a thing of the past. Non-state actors in India and in Sri Lanka are probably redefining their maximalist positions. War weariness has crept in. The most dreaded non-state actor like the LTTE is ready for regional autonomy. Pakistan and the various militant groups in Kashmir are not averse to negotiations, signalling that they are ready for a compromise on their maximalist position. However, the situation in Israel still remains debatable. Probably, targeted killings on both sides are choking the atmosphere of peace and stability, a prerequisite for healthy negotiations. At the same time, the situation in Kashmir and Sri Lanka should not be misconstrued as a movement towards peace. Non-state actors in both these theatres of conflict have a history of backtracking and taking recourse to violence while simultaneously talking peace.

One probable reason for the overall reduction in violence in these asymmetric conflicts can be attributed to the squeeze in funding for such operations. Another is the changed nature of global geopolitics post-9/11. Justifying the existence of non-state actors as freedom fighters in the post-9/11 era is increasingly becoming unjustifiable. Also, states sponsoring the causes of such actors are getting isolated.

The study finds that states will continue to employ the military as an important instrument to check violence. Unfortunately, for a long period of time, these states employed conventional military tactics to fight an unconventional threat. A need exists for these states to grow beyond conventional military wisdom. In the days to

come, the states should opt for highly accurate weapons, incorporating the most recent technological developments so that they can inflict surgical strikes on selected targets, thus preventing civilian casualties and excessive damage to infrastructure. In all these zones of asymmetry, the military approach adopted till date has not thwarted or deterred acts of violence. It implies that military solutions have inherent limitations.

No immediate solutions to these conflicts are in the offing. In all, the internal and international dimensions are inextricably linked. It is difficult to comprehend the problems of insurgency and terrorism without attempting to resolve the bigger issues that fuel asymmetric conflicts. Addressing the more fundamental causes is a crucial step in achieving and safeguarding security.

In the case of India and Sri Lanka, it is evident that there is no room for either an egalitarian socialist state or a separate state. Devolution of power can be reasoned as a possible solution. However, devolution of power through constitutional means may not be a lasting solution. Potent conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary to strengthen these processes. For Israel, there is a need to review the entire process of state responses, which have been essentially military based. There is a need for all the three states to undertake socio-economic and political reforms to address the grievances of the non-state actors, which have contributed to the conflict.

Also, there is a need for these states to look for more democratic and human solutions. At the same time, there are no exclusive political solutions to these problems. Terror should be defeated at all times. Hence, there is a need to look for a combination of politico-military solutions. Only then, the ability of non-state actors to defeat the state by using asymmetric tactics will dissipate.

The thesis sets out to prove that: state responses, in terms of conventional military tactics, to challenge asymmetric warfare by non-state actors have proved inadequate. The hypothesis based on research carried out in previous chapters stands tested and proven correct.

SIGNIFICANT ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

Theater of conflict	State Actor	Non-state actor	Current status of conflict	Aim/Demand
Indian held Kashmir	India	Various militant groups	Active but violence has decreased	Independent Kashmir or merger with Pakistan
Gaza strip	Israel	Hamas	Active and violent	Formation of state of Palestine
Tamil Elam	Sri Lanka	LTTE	Norway is doing mediation	Separate Tamil Elam or greater autonomy
Chechnya	Russia	Chechen forces	Active and violent	Independence for Chechnya
Colombia	Colombia	Armed forces of Colombian revolution (FARC) and Army of national liberation (ELN)	Active and violent	Control of the state
Nepal	Nepal	Communist party of Nepal (Maoists)	Active and violent	Change in governance
Mainly American and friendly states assets in the world	America and few other nations	Al Qaeda	Active and violent	Create troubles for Americans, Larger interests in West Asian Politics
Ireland	United Kingdom	Irish Republic Army (IRA)	Dormant	Unification of Ireland
Xinjiang Uyghur region	China	East Turkistan Islamic party	Active	Founding of state East Turkistan
Philippines	Philippines	Aby Sayyaf	Active	Independent Islamic state in Southern Philippines
Ache Province	Indonesia	Free Ache Movement/GAM	Active	Separatism

Ogaden Region in Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front	Active	Eastern Ethiopia as independent state
Basque region/Northern Spain/Southwestern France	Spain	Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)	Active	Establishing independent homeland in the region of conflict
Algeria	Algeria	Number of indigenous Islamic militant groups	Active	Establishment of Islamic state
Lebanon, West Europe, Armenia	Armenia	3 rd October Organisation	Dormant	Compel Turkish government to cede territory for an Armenian homeland.

TOOLS AND TACTICS OF ASYMMETRY

Non-state actor	Tools and Tactics	Frequency
Various non-state groups	Hide and Kill (ambush) Hijacking Kidnapping/ Extortion Fidayeen attack Using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Landmines Involvement of foreign mercenaries Using remote controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)	Often Once Not very often Recent phenomenon Often Not much Rarely
Hamas	Suicide Terrorism Urban warfare Small arms, IED Hitting civilian targets	Very often At times Often Occasionally
LTTE	Guerilla Warfare Suicide Terrorism, Cyanide capsule Child terrorists IED, Small arms Drugs/Narcotics Conventional warfare	Often Often Prevalent Often Finance generation as required Whenever challenged by state forces

STATE RESPONSES

State Actor: India

Political Responses:

- Less enthusiastic for international mediation.
- Relative continuity in dealings irrespective of the party in power.
- Initially addressed the problem as a law and order problem.
- Attempting to draw international attention to cross border terrorism.
- Engaged Pakistan in a political dialogue with Lahore summit and Agra summit.
- Gave in to non-state actors demands during kidnapping and hijacking crises.
- Adhered to democratic processes like conducting elections, however, the elections were always not conducted in free and fair atmosphere. During the year 2002 conducted free and fair elections and succeeded to an extent towards restoring people's faith in democracy.
- During the year 2002 for the first time attempted coercive diplomacy.

Military Responses:

- Essentially supported the political process.
- Mainly engaged Pakistan on the borders to stop the cross border terrorism.
- Restrained from using brute force and tried to avoid collateral damage.
- Artillery, tanks and air power not used.
- Few reported cases of extrajudicial killings.

Social Responses:

- Failed in providing proper governance during the early phases of the conflict with disruptions in public distribution system, civic services etc.
- No concrete attempts were made towards winning the hearts and minds of the people.
- With apt handling of sensitive incidences like forceful seizure of holy shrines successfully controlled the religious emotions of the masses.

Economic Responses:

- Offered development oriented economic packages.
- Started the work on establishing road linkages and 287km railway line project.
- Could not stop corruption which in turn damaged the reputation of the successive local governments.

State Actor: Israel

Political Responses:

- Tried to engage Palestine Authority to isolate Hamas.
- Attempted tools of diplomacy like 1993 Oslo accord. Also have agreed in principle to recognize 2002 Quartet Road Map.
- Particularly because of American support did not yield to international pressures.
- Named Hamas as a terrorist group and managed international sanction to it.
- Shift in state policies: Depending more on military solutions than political solutions which was the case in the past.

Military Responses:

- Policy of pre-emption and usage of technical superiority is a part of a military doctrine and used these guidelines to fullest of their potential to deal with the non-state actor.
- Full conventional military response to various tools and tactics used by the non-state actor.
- Usage of airpower.

Economic Responses:

- On occasions Palestine has made demands for monetary help to Israeli government to tackle with the Hamas threat. However, Israeli government who themselves have destroyed Palestine Authorities security apparatus put more restrictions on the PA. Without Israeli approval, PA cannot purchase new equipments like rifles and vehicles.

Social Responses:

- Made no concrete attempts to stop increase in social turmoil.
- Ill-treat the relatives of suicide terrorists implying that the state is interested more in creating terror than addressing problem at human level.
- Poor record on human rights.
- While construction of 'security wall' made no efforts to save Palestinian water and agriculture resources.

State Actor: Sri Lanka

Political Responses:

- Unable to solve the problem on their own and depends much on international community. Took even help from countries like India which was initially the covert supporter of the non-state actor.
- No common national policy to address the many aspects of political violence.
- At the same time succeeded in bringing LTTE to negotiating table with pruned demands. (with international help)
- Managed many official declarations of the ceasefires.
- Held unofficial negotiations with the non-state actor in Thimpu conference.
- The peace initiative started by Norway appears to be working.

Military Responses:

- Unable to handle on its own military strength.
- Strength of security forces has increased from 10,000 in 1983 to 120,000 in 1999.
- Usage of airpower.
- Took help of Indian defence forces.

Economic Responses:

- Mostly tried to do economic blocked of the LTTE dominated areas for many years.
- Post start up of peace process trying to improve the living conditions of the region by officering some economic measures.

Social Responses:

- Put restrictions on international groups to operate in the internally displaced refugee centres that harmed state's image.
- Withheld food and medical supplies from LTTE controlled areas, again a socially incorrect response.
- Concepts like establishment of an interim administration at the disputed areas are well received.

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