UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS CHINA 1969-1972

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PREFACE

In the present work, I have tried to analyze how within the first four years of Nixon Administration the United States, the world's most powerful state, moved towards a rapprochement with China, the world's most populous state. The Sino-US reconciliation can undoubtedly be characterized as a historic event of the present decade which modified the structure of power in the world.

This study has been divided in five main chapters. In the first chapter, an effort has been made to trace the outlines of the evolution of US China policy since the communist takeover of the Chinese mainland in October 1949. The chapter highlights the diverse elements of China policy which was being pursued by the United States before Richard M. Nixon became the President of the United States in January 1969. The chapter also discusses various proposals which were made for the modification of the China policy. In the second chapter, the writer has tried to examine the American motivation for a change in policy towards China. The third chapter discusses step by step relaxation of restrictions against communications and trade with China. These finally culminated in President Nixon's visit to China. The fourth chapter analyzes President Nixon's visit, his various meetings with the Chinese leaders and the joint communique signed by the two sides. In the fifth chapter, an attempt has been made to make an assessment of the reactions of various countries affected

by US rapprochement with China. Finally, on the basis of the developments and analyses in these chapters I have drawn some general inferences.

Although the subject of this thesis is quite recent due to its importance, considerable amount of materials are available. I have tried to use as many of the available sources as was possible for me to do in the short period of time for completing this work. I hope to make my study more comprehensive in the course of further research. The present work should be, therefore, viewed as an exercise towards that end.

This dissertation was prepared under the supervision of Dr B. K. Shrivastava, Associate Professor in the American Studies Division of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor for his constant guidance and unfailing help through all stages of the preparation of this work and but for his guidance I would not have been able to do justice to the subject. I express my sincere gratitude to Dr M. S. Venkataramani for his keen interest in this study. I am thankful for the assistance rendered by the staff of the Sapru House Library and the staff of the United States Information Service, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, and of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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Chapter I

EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES' CHINA POLICY

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On 1 October 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China and celebrated the departure of America's last Ambassador with his bitter article: "Farewell, Leighton Stuart", the American public suffered an intense emotional shock.[1] With the establishment of a hostile regime in China, the United States faced a grim situation. Nevertheless, the US policy makers had recognized the inevitability of a Communist takeover in China since the mid-1949 and accordingly, had pursued a policy of disengagement from the Chinese Civil War especially since July 1949, when the end of the Chinese civil war on the mainland had appeared imminent.

The Department of State had issued the White Paper on 5 August 1949, declaring that nothing that the United States had done or left undone could have changed the situation in China.[2]

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1 Ross Terill, "John Carter Vincent and the American Loss of China", in Bruce Douglass and Ross Terill, eds., China and Ourselves: Explorations and Revisions by a New Generation (Boston, 1967), p. 122.

John Leighton Stuart was born in China in 1876. He served as US missionary in China from 1905 to 1919, when he became the President of Yenching University in Peking. On 11 July 1946, he was named as US Ambassador to China, a position which he held until 2 August 1949. Mao Tse-tung wrote an article on Stuart's departure after his failure to negotiate a political settlement with the Chinese Communists, which indicated the growing hostility of the Communists towards the US. For Mao Tse-tung's article, see Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1967), vol. IV, pp. 433-40.

2 Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago, 1963), pp. 507-8.

After the Communist takeover of the mainland, the United States was apparently leaning towards the recognition of the Communist regime.[3] According to the Times (London), when countries like Great Britain, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland decided to recognize the Peking regime, the US Department of State intended to follow suit. Quoting Benjamin Wells, an American correspondent's report dated 17 May 1949, it wrote that the American and British Governments had agreed to coordinate their policies towards eventual recognition of the Communist regime as early as May 1949.

In October 1949, a three-day Conference on the Far East was held under the auspices of the Department of State. It discussed not the question of whether the Communist Government should be accorded American recognition but when such a recognition should be granted. Lawrence R. Rosinger, a member on the panel of the Conference, urged the Truman Administration to pursue a policy of "gradual disentanglement" from the Nationalist regime and to grant recognition to the Communist regime.[4] The policy of recognition of the new Communist regime enjoyed

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3 The Times (London), 15 October 1951.

4 Anthony Kubek, How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-49 (Chicago, 1963), pp. 415-16. For details regarding the Conference on the Far East see, Department of State, Transcript of Proceedings: Conference on Problems of United States Policy in China (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 98-99.

the support even of John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican leader at that time, who wrote in his book War or Peace that "if the Communist Government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations." Dulles suggested, however, that it would be wise to establish relations with the new Government after its stability had been tested over a reasonable period of time.[5]

Subsequent events indicated that the United States was pursuing a policy of disengagement from the Nationalist regime and was simultaneously preparing the ground for recognition of the Communist regime. For instance, on 23 December, the Department of State sent a memorandum to its foreign personnel all over the world, playing down the importance of Formosa. The memorandum stated that "its control by the Communist forces would not imperil our position in the Far East."[6] President Truman also seemed to have concluded that the Communist takeover of China was not against the vital interests of the United States. The President refused to yield to the demands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of those who proposed military

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5 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 190; A new China Policy: Some Quaker Proposals, A Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee (London, 1965), pp. 7-8.

6 US Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), Part 5, p. 3589.

intervention to prevent the total annihilation of the Chiang's regime. He announced on 30 December that "United States occupation of Formosa was not desirable."[7] On 5 January 1950, President affirmed support of the United States to the Cairo and Potsdam declarations,[8] which had promised Taiwan to China. Holding that the policy of involvement was against the US interests, President categorically stated on the same day, "...The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China..."[9] On 12 January 1950, Dean Acheson in an address[10] at the National Press Club in Washington, omitted Formosa and Korea from the perimeter of United States strategic defense in the Pacific.[11] This exclusion of Taiwan from the defense perimeter of the United States

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7 Time (Chicago, Ill.), 2 January 1950, pp. 11-12.

8 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 22, 16 January 1950, p. 19.

9 A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (Washington, D.C., 1950), p. 728.

The Administration's pursuing a policy of non-involvement was confirmed by Dean Acheson later on. While defending American policy towards China before a joint Senate Committee, composed of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Acheson stated on 4 June 1951: "It was believed that United States' involvement in Chinese civil war under the existing conditions would be clearly contrary to American interests." Edward O. Guerrant, Modern American Diplomacy (Albuquerque, 1954), pp. 282-83.

10 For Dean Acheson's statement see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 23 January 1950, pp. 111-18.

11 Acheson's omission of Formosa and Korea from a list of areas vital to the United States security in the Pacific

(Contd. on next page)

came only thirteen days after Acheson had issued his directive to abandon Formosa. It seems thus clear that President Truman and his advisers were apparently waiting for the domestic opposition to the recognition to decline substantially before taking the plunge. The United States thus seemed to be on the verge of openly advocating recognition.

In January 1950, the Peking Government seized American Consular property in China which, according to Washington, was "in violation of treaty rights and the most elementary standards of international usage and conduct."[12] Consequently, the United States was forced to recall all American official personnel from Communist China on 14 January 1950. Later, Secretary Acheson expressed regret over the fact that the US officials were forced to leave China and remarked, "...We regret this leaving of our people, but our Chinese friends will understand again where the responsibility lies."[13]

Despite Chinese hostility, the United States still seemed prepared to recognize the Communist regime. Regarding

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became a major controversy when the war in Korea broke out. Critics of Acheson called it a "diplomatic blunder" and asserted that his speech had invited the Communists for a takeover of South Korea. Anthony Kubek, n. 4, pp. 424-28 and Edward O. Guerrant, n. 9, pp. 272-73.

12 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 23 January 1950, p. 119; Anthony Kubek, n. 4, pp. 415-16.

13 For Acheson's speech at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco on 5 March 1950 see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 27 March 1950, p. 469.

the question of Peking's admission to the United Nations, it announced its willingness to abide by the verdict of the Security Council. It is thus clear that the United States was not wholly devoid of some hope of gaining an understanding with the Communist regime in the future.[14]

However, after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Straits. But significantly enough, the US attitude towards China did not harden. Even at this stage, the President left the question of the future of Taiwan to "the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations."[15]

China's intervention and the subsequent stalemate in the Korean war accounted for the total failure of the Administration's policy of disengagement. It brought about a reversal of US policy towards China. President Truman warned the Communists in no uncertain terms that any attack upon Formosa would be regarded as a direct attack on the security of the United States. Both the houses of the Congress as well as the State Department advocated the policy of keeping the belligerent Communist regime out of the United Nations. Besides, the US

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14 Tang Tsou, n. 2, pp. 494-551.

15 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 3 July 1950, p. 5.

Government imposed an embargo on all trade with mainland China.[16]

The containment of Chinese Communism became the central purpose of American policy in Asia. The American refusal to recognize the Government of Communist China and opposition to the seating of that Government in the United Nations were two aspects of the same policy.[17] The policy of containment which emerged as a result of the Cold War was further strengthened during the Eisenhower Administration.

One of the first official acts of President Eisenhower upon assuming office was to issue instructions in February 1953 that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. The President categorically declared that the United States had "no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced in April 1953 that besides stationing of an ambassador at Taipei, the United States was speeding up its military assistance to the Nationalist regime.[18]

Besides taking the political and economic steps against China, the Eisenhower Administration continued and intensified

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16 Anthony Kubek, n. 4, p. 431. Harley Fransworth McNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations (New York, 1950), pp. 638-42; Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 3 July 1950, p. 5.

17 Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), p. 481.

18 Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York, 1956), pp. 124-56.

the military encirclement of China by establishing American bases on the periphery of China. Within less than five years after the North Korean attack, a framework for the policy of containment in Asia was erected. To the alliance structure created by the Truman Administration's treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Newzealand, the Eisenhower Administration added commitments to South Korea, Pakistan and the Philippines. It also sought the collaboration of its important western allies like Great Britain, France, Australia and Newzealand by signing South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty. All of these Western powers had stakes in the security of Asia. During the first offshore island crisis in 1954, the United States formalized its defense commitments to the Republic of China by signing with it a defense pact on 2 December 1954.[19] During the second offshore islands crisis of 1958, the US Seventh Fleet not only escorted the Nationalist supply ships but also helped them to break the Communist blockade. The Nationalist air force, equipped by the United States with air-to-air missiles, defeated the Communist's attempt to establish supremacy on the islands.[20]

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19 Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1971), pp. 215-17; Ralph N. Clough, "East Asia: The Policy of Containment", in Henry Owen, ed., The Next Phase in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 49-50.

20 John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1966), p. 117. For details see Julius W. Pratt, n. 17, p. 482.

The basic presumption of Eisenhower's China policy was that the Communist regime in China was a passing phenomenon.[21] In 1958, Secretary of State Dulles remarked that by withholding recognition from China it sought to hasten that passing.[22] After the Korean truce in July 1953, he firmly asserted that even an armistice could not end the US embargo on strategic goods to Red China or lead to the acceptance of Communist China in the United Nations.[23]

Thus in 1953, it did not appear that the Eisenhower Administration was ready to come to grips with the reality of Communist China. But after the Korean truce of 1953, President Eisenhower gave an indication that he had by then come to realize that the Communist regime on the mainland was not of a transitory character. After returning from Korea in 1953, he publicly stated in New York that the United States faced an enemy whom "we cannot hope to impress by words, however eloquent. But only by deeds - executed under circumstances of our own choosing."[24] The President's statement seemed to favour a greater use of force against the Communists, but at the

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21 In 1958, the Department of State in a memorandum sent to its missions abroad declared "the United States holds the view that Communism's rule in China is not permanent and that it one day will pass." Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 8 September 1958, p. 389.

22 A New China Policy, n. 5, p. 23.

23 Norman A. Graebner, n. 18, p. 153.

24 Ibid.

same time, he seemed to have realized the strength of China's growing hostility and power. Later, the President readily admitted to newsmen that the United States could not eliminate the Communist regime and therefore had to seek the means of living with it peacefully. Nevertheless in his diplomacy, the President preferred to keep China issue in "limbo",[25] and showed no intention to bring about any change in the Truman-Acheson policy of containment.

President John F. Kennedy showed greater interest than his predecessors in adopting the policy of peaceful coexistence as the basic framework of American foreign policy. Kennedy and most of his principal foreign policy advisers recognized that the United States should move towards some sort of diplomatic contact with China and stop seeking its isolation from the international community. They realized that the Chinese Communist regime was of permanent nature.

Six months before his election, Kennedy in a speech in the Senate had questioned the validity of United States China policy and called for its reassessment.[26] According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Kennedy's biographer, President viewed the China policy as "irrational" and did not consider a policy

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25 Ibid., pp. 124-56.

26 For Kennedy's speech dated 14 June 1960, see Kennedy: A Compilation of Statements and Speeches made during his Service in the United States Senate and House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1964), pp. 932-33.

change as being out of the question.[27] During the testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for his confirmation on 19 January 1961, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles called the past US policies as "negative and narrow". Suggesting formulation of "positive" policy, Bowles laid stress on United States recognition of China's growing immense role in Asian and world affairs.[28]

However, Kennedy quickly realized the strong domestic pressures against any policy shift towards China. The China Lobby was still active and popular and Kennedy felt helpless in the face of the right-wing pressures. Concerns regarding any change in China policy were expressed during the period of transition from one Administration to the other by both Eisenhower and Nixon. Eisenhower expressed his readiness to support Kennedy on foreign policy matters but warned that he would feel obliged to lead the opposition if the President took any step towards diplomatic relations or UN membership for Peking.[29]

Max Frankel, a columnist in the New York Times, in his brief account of the US China policy stated that Kennedy regarded the policy to have the Nationalist Government on Taiwan

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27 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (London, 1965), pp. 423-24 and 427.

28 New York Times, 9 March 1961.

29 Schlesinger, n. 27, p. 423.

represent China in the world organization as unsound. But in view of domestic pressures, he instructed Adlai E. Stevenson, his representative at the United Nations, to block at all costs any change regarding China's membership in the United Nations. Max Frankel quoted Kennedy as saying "If Red China comes into the U.N. during our first year in town, your first year and mine, they will run us both out."[30] Towards the fall of 1961, when Kennedy expressed his willingness to recognize Outer Mongolia, a territory claimed by the Nationalists, he was forced to abandon the contemplated move in the face of severe criticism by the supporters of Taiwan in the United States. In 1962, President instructed Chester Bowles to explore the possibility of sending wheat to the mainland which was having scarcity. But opposition and caution inside the Government frustrated Kennedy's desire to do so. Besides, his experience in Laos led him to believe in the toughness of Chinese and he gave up the contemplated move. By 1963, President Kennedy had come to accept the Soviet view of Communist China and regarded it as extremely belligerent.[31] In 1961, the Chinese had already turned down Kennedy's first request to have some kind of contact by an exchange of Press correspondents.[32] Kennedy's biographer, Theodore Sorenson, gave an

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30 New York Times, 14 April 1971.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 9 March 1961.

account of President's growing awareness of the Chinese belligerence. The President is quoted to have said in an off-the-record statement "These Chinese are tough... They are in the Stalinist phase, believe in class war and the use of force and seem prepared to sacrifice 300 million people if necessary to dominate Asia."[33]

Under Kennedy however, US China policy assumed a different dimension. The policy of differentiating between the two types of Communism, the Chinese and the Russian, closely paralleled the Administration's policy of viewing China in power rather than ideological terms. President Kennedy characterized China in terms of its "700,000,000 people", "nuclear power", "Stalinist Government", and "Government determined on war as a means of bringing about its ultimate success."[34] President's statements indicated a clear recognition of Communist China as a power and therefore as a potential threat to the United States.

It can be thus seen that instead of Kennedy's initial willingness to arrive at some understanding with the Chinese, the policy of isolation and containment remained a cardinal doctrine of American foreign policy.

During the Johnson Administration the domestic political

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33 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London, 1965), p. 663.

34 Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American East Asian Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 313-14.

pressures were reinforced by the war in Vietnam. The Administration painted the struggle in Indochina as necessary for the containment of the Communist China. Viewing the war in Vietnam as a Maoist version of the "war of national liberation", Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, laid stress on the policy of isolation and containment. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman emphasized that since "Vietnam straddled one route from China to India", its control had to be denied to the Chinese for geopolitical reasons.[35]

According to available off-the-record evidence, President Johnson wanted to seek a normalization in relations with Peking and intended to establish contacts with its regime. At the annual Conference of the American Society of International Law, held on 30 April 1971 and presided over by Dean Rusk, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Johnson Administration, William P. Bundy, made a significant disclosure. According to him, the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966 and 1967 caused the Johnson Administration to abandon its "behind-the-scenes" activities to improve relations with China and to make its entry into the United Nations easier.[36] While analyzing the shift in US policy towards China in the New York Times, Max Frankel quoted President Johnson as having remarked to a reporter after

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35 Warner I. Cohen, n. 19, pp. 215-22.

36 New York Times, 30 April 1971.

his massive intervention in Vietnam in 1965, that he wanted to "reestablish relations with a quarter of the human race - and ain't nobody gonna call me an appeaser!"[37]

However, no official statement or action came as proof of the Johnson Administration's willingness to seek normalization in relations with Peking. Viewing his Administration's stand towards the China in a speech on nuclear control in New York on 20 April 1964, President Johnson said, "...So long as the Communist Chinese pursue aggression, so long as the Communist Chinese preach violence, there can be and will be no easing of relationships..."[38]

Evolution of a Change in US China Policy 1959-1968

Although the United States continued to follow the policy of isolation and containment of China after the end of the Korean war, some sentiment in favour of modification of this policy began to be expressed during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration. While the United States was engaged in improving its relations with the Soviet Union, it would have appeared rather odd that no steps were being taken to improve relations with China. There were several influential Senators who demanded a change in the China policy in 1959. For instance,

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37 Max Frankel, n. 30.

38 Chang Hsin-hai, America and China: A New Approach to Asia (New York, 1965), p. 72.

Senator Clair Engle (Rep., Calif.), asked that "a new and more conciliatory approach" towards China should be adopted. The Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate prepared a report which suggested alternatives to the existing China policy. This sentiment was also shared by the Liberal establishment which advocated a change in China policy. The Rockefeller Fund brought out a report advocating a policy change. The Council on Foreign Relations published a comprehensive study by an eminent American Sinologist, A Doak Barnett, suggesting possible approaches to China.[39] Many Liberal Democrats like Averell Harriman, Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles, had been arguing since the end of the Korean war that the policy of containment and isolation of China did not serve the American national interest. In 1960 these Liberal Democrats gained positions of influence in the Kennedy Administration. Chester Bowles, a staunch critic of US military assistance became the Under Secretary of State. Adlai Stevenson, two time democratic standard bearer in presidential elections became the chief US delegate to the United Nations. John Kenneth Galbraith was posted to India as US Ambassador and Edwin O. Reischauer was sent to Tokyo. In the emergence of new attitude towards China all these Liberals made significant contribution. However, on the other hand, within the State Department, there was

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39 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York, 1960).

significant opposition to any change in US policy towards China. Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (renamed later in the decade as the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), which was primarily responsible for formulating China policy strongly supported the old policy. Earlier Bureau had been the target of McCarthyism and therefore had become averse to change which would give the impression of being soft towards communism. Besides, in the aftermath of the depradations caused by McCarthyism, the Bureau probably had come under the domination of the "Cold Warriors".[40] Thus, there were currents and undercurrents in the corridors of power. The evolution of a new China policy depended to a great extent on the course of external events.

In 1959, academic specialists on China had already started questioning the thesis of China's "satellite status". They wondered whether in the context of Sino-Soviet rift, China could be regarded as a permanent member of Soviet bloc.[41]

In early 1961 a comprehensive document, classified as "think" paper and prepared by Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Council (S/P), a veteran Foreign Service officer and China specialist, was submitted in the office of Chester Bowles, who was then Under Secretary of State. The Rice Paper was an

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40 James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", China Quarterly (London), April/June 1972, pp. 221-22.

41 Ibid., p. 221.

extraordinary document insofar as it made an attempt to extend the thaw in the Russian-American relations to the Sino-US relations. It coincided with the first phase of the Kennedy Administration when it was feeling its way towards a new China policy. The document suggested a long list of initiatives, including moves towards lifting of the passport ban, removal of the ban on trade with China in non-strategic goods, arms control and disarmament discussions, more productive use of the ambassadorial talks at Warsaw, some form of representation for Peking in the United Nations, Nationalist evacuation of the offshore islands and United States recognition of Mongolia. Nevertheless, Kennedy and Chester Bowles decided to move at least on one of its recommendations, the matter of Mongolia's recognition. But the move had to be cancelled in the face of severe protest by Taiwan and the US Congress in July 1961.[42]

In 1962, the Kennedy Administration tried to communicate signs of flexibility in policy while exploring the possibility of sending food shipments to China which was an adequate proof of its softening attitude towards China. Furthermore, when the Chinese Nationalists talked about their impending invasion of the mainland in 1962, the United States informed China through Warsaw channel that it did not support any Chinese Nationalist effort to reinvade the mainland.[43]

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42 Ibid., pp. 223-24.

43 Ibid., pp. 227-28.

In 1963, Averell Harriman, President Kennedy's roving Ambassador called for the opening of a "debate" on US China policy, and held that the existing policy could lead "only to a dead end."[44] A few months later, Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, delivered a speech in San Francisco in which he acknowledged the permanent nature of the regime on the mainland and suggested possible accommodation with it. He said:

> We are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change, and not to slam it shut against any developments which might advance our national good, serve the free world and benefit the people of China.... We believe that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate will best promote the changes.... 45

The speech was delivered two weeks after Kennedy's assassination but Hilsman possibly would have got it cleared with the President as well as the State Department. It was the first major speech by an important functionary of the State Department.

The dual intent of Hilsman's speech was to test the American domestic political opinion and to give indications of a changing US attitude towards China. He expressed hope

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44 Harriman's statement is quoted in a leading article entitled "The Thaw", in The Progressive (Madison, Wis.), vol. 28, May 1964, p. 3.

45 Text of the speech in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 50, 6 January 1964, pp. 11-17; Akira Iriye, n. 34, pp. 316-17.

that lower echelons in Peking Government in another ten or fifteen years could assume power positions in China and help bringing about a shift in existing policies.[46] Significantly, the press and Congressional response to the speech was more favourable than had been expected by Hilsman.[47]

The next plea for a reassessment of China policy after Hilsman's "open door" speech, came from Senator James William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In a speech delivered in the Senate on 25 March 1964, the Senator urged that the Americans discard "old myths" and embrace "new reality."[48] Firmly rejecting a two-China thesis, Fulbright emphasized on seeking normalization in relations with China. Suggesting a "flexible policy" towards China, the Senator said:

> It is not impossible that in our time our relations with China will change again - if not to friendship then perhaps to 'competitive coexistence'. It would therefore be extremely useful if we could introduce an element of flexibility into our relations with Communist China. 49

Senator Fulbright's speech was enthusiastically hailed by the

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46 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 50, 6 January 1964, pp. 11-17.

47 Chang Hsin-hai, n. 38, p. 73; and James C. Thomson, Jr., n. 40, p. 230.

48 James William Fulbright, "Foreign Policy: Old Myths and New Reality", Vital Speeches of the Day (Palham, N.Y.), vol. 30, pp. 388-94.

49 A New China Policy, n. 5, p. 21.

press. Commenting on the policy shift The Progressive wrote: "all this was unthinkable a little more than a year ago when a brainwashed nation blindly adhered to the inflexible dogmas of the cold war."[50] American leaders and scholars continued to speak in favour of a modification of their country's policy towards China. In mid-1964, the Council on Foreign Relations of New York published first volume in a series by veteran reporter, A.T. Steele. He concluded his book by stating that "if there is to be a re-examination of our China policy, those Americans who want it will have to make themselves heared in stronger, clearer and more insistent tones."[51] In October 1964, former Press Secretary of President Kennedy and then a Senator from California, Pierre Salinger, urged in an article in the Outlook magazine that there should be an exchange of news correspondents with China in order to establish communication links between the two countries.[52]

In May 1965, a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Clement J. Zablocki (Dem., Wisconsin), during its hearings on Sino-Soviet conflict touched on US-China

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50 From the leading article entitled "The Thaw" in The Progressive, vol. 28, May 1964, p. 3. For the comments of other leading magazines on Fulbright's speech, see Time, vol. 83, 3 April 1964, p. 9. "We and They", New Republic (New York), vol. 150, 18 April 1964, pp. 3-4; New York Times, 14 December 1963.

51 A.T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966), p. 250.

52 The Times (London), 6 October 1964.

relations as one aspect of the subject. The Zablocki Subcommittee recommended that the United States "should give consideration to the initiation of limited but direct contact with Red China through cultural exchange activities with emphasis on scholars and journalists."[53] Consequently, on 11 December 1965, the United States modified the ban on travel to China.[54] This was a significant move.

In March 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held extended hearings on US policy towards Mainland China. While the discussions earlier had been limited to a narrow circle, the hearing brought the issue of change in United States' China policy before the public. Although a small number of witnesses expressed themselves in favour of the continuation of the old policy, well known American Sinologists like Prof. John K. Fairbank of Harvard University, Prof. A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, Alexander Eckstein of Michigan University and several others argued that the old policy had failed and there was certainly a need for revision of US China policy. Some of them suggested that China as a power could no more be treated as a non-entity and non-nation. The Americans must come to grips, they argued, with the reality

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53 US House, 89 Cong, 1 Sess., Subcommittee on Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings and Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 21.

54 James C. Thomson, Jr., n. 40, pp. 232-33.

of China and try to cope with the China question realistically and prudently. Barnett suggested an alteration of US policy from "containment plus isolation" to "containment without isolation."[55]

In the aftermath of the Fulbright hearings, Press Secretary in Johnson Administration Bill D. Moyers encouraged Gallup and Harris to take polls on US policy towards China. The polls were aimed at testing public attitudes on the China question - travel, trade, UN representation and cultural exchanges.[56]

On 12 July 1966, in a nationwide televised address, which marked the end of Johnson Administration's belief in containment policy against China, the President spoke of the Peking regime in conciliatory terms. Setting the concept of "reconciliation" as the central objective in US-China relations, Johnson called for a policy of "cooperation and not hostility."[57] The awareness that the old policy of containment and isolation had failed and a new one was required continued to grow. However, the US involvement in Vietnam made any conciliation with China more difficult. Yet, as far as the United States was concerned it was necessary that nothing should be done to

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55 US Senate, 89 Cong., 2 Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 13; Akira Iriye, n. 34, pp. 323-24.

56 James C. Thomson, Jr., n. 40, p. 239.

57 Ibid., p. 241.

antagonize China. That's why these conciliatory speeches were given. The US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, a staunch advocate of a tough US policy towards the Communists, in his speech in Montreal on 19 May 1966, had already suggested "bridge-building" between the United States and China.[58]

With increasing involvement in Vietnam, the issue of modification of China policy began to get lesser attention. Further, the upheavals caused by the Cultural Revolution during 1966-69 also influenced American thinking. It was not a very propitious time to initiate new moves. Under the impact of the Cultural Revolution China had turned inward, recalled large number of its ambassadors and reduced its contacts with the outside world. International support for Peking's admission to the United Nations had also gradually receded due to this reason. Despite the inauspicious climate, important elements within the Government voiced optimistic notes regarding a major change in the US attitude. Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State in the Johnson Administration, in November 1967 argued for a modification of the total ban on US trade with the mainland.[59]

After an initial period of vacillation after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the United States

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58 New York Times, 12 November 1964.

59 James C. Thomson, Jr., n. 40, p. 242.

adopted the policy of isolation and containment towards China. By the end of Eisenhower Administration, many important and influential American public figures and scholars had concluded that the US policy towards China had failed and needed to be modified. But the Cold War had created a domestic and external foreign policy environment which resisted change. Since 1959, one after another suggestion for change was advocated but modifications were not easy to make. For varying reasons these suggestions were rejected. In a decade, the domestic and international foreign policy environment of the United States which was not conducive to change was eroded, and it became easier for the Nixon Administration to take decisive steps in the direction of normalization of relations with China.

Chapter II

FACTORS LEADING TO THE RAPPROCHEMENT

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Throughout the 'fifties, the United States demonstrated its hostility to China by refusing to grant it diplomatic recognition, blocking its membership in the United Nations, isolating it diplomatically and economically, encouraging its "passing away", and supporting its rival regime on Taiwan. After nearly two decades of unbridled antagonism, the Nixon Administration decided to seek normalization of relations with China.

As the effects of the Korean war and the McCarthy period wore off, the emotional attitudes that had shaped the policy towards China began to change gradually. Beginning with the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, the desire for improved relations with the Communist world began to manifest itself at various levels. Consequently, it became possible for the United States to examine its China policy more objectively and realistically.

Why the change was deemed necessary and what led President Nixon to end nearly two decades of hostility against China? Several factors which contributed to this change in policy can easily be identified, i.e. - Sino-Soviet split, a nuclear armed China; change in the Asian and Pacific balance of power; need of a honourable exit from Vietnam; desire of achieving favourable economic and trade balance for the United States; and finally, a desire to establish a global structure of power.

(1) Sino-Soviet Split

The first significant factor which had a profound impact on the American thinking was the growing rift between the two giants of the Communist world. Although, much less was known about it in the earlier phase of the conflict but by the mid sixties, the Sino-Soviet rift had grown in intensity. This represented a fundamental change from the situation which had prevailed in the 'fifties, when in spite of their bilateral differences both the countries had maintained friendly ties.

When China recovered from the upheavals of the cultural Revolution (1966-69), the threat of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike was already looming large in the minds of the Chinese leaders. Mindful of Moscow's 1968 actions in Czechoslovakia, they were deeply alarmed by Russia's million-man build up on their northern borders. They were also aware of the Soviet efforts to create a "collective security" arrangement that could stretch from India across North Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin. The Chinese leaders viewed it as a military and political "ring" that aimed at isolating, encircling and containing China inside the Asian mainland.[1]

On their part, the Soviet leaders had decided to turn a political-ideological rivalry into a political-military

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1 Time (Chicago, Ill.), 21 February 1972, pp. 27-28; U.S. News & World Report (Washington, D.C.), 14 February 1972, p. 24.

confrontation. A policy of "containing" China was actively being pursued and militarily the 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet frontier was getting top priority.[2] According to Robert E. Osgood, a well known American authority on US foreign policy, "in the absence of the threat posed to China by Soviet forces, the limited success of Washington's rapprochement with Peking is difficult to imagine."[3] It can be thus seen that the new US policy towards China was largely conditioned by the intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

M.S.N. Menon, a veteran journalist, has observed that the United States had as far back as 1964 realized that the Sino-Soviet split could provide it with an opportunity for initiation of a new China policy. George Kenan, a well known author and American diplomat, also agreed with this assessment. Commenting on the Sino-Soviet split on 22 November 1964, he was reported to have said that the "most encouraging fact" for the United States during the past twenty years was the anti-Sovietism of Mao and his followers. Therefore, it would have been "foolish" for the US policy-makers to sit on their hands ignoring China's conflict with the Soviet Union and not "to use the favourable oppotunities it may afford."[4]

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2 U.S. News & World Report, 6 March 1972, pp. 14-16.

3 Robert E. Osgood, Retreat From Empire: The First Nixon Administration (Baltimore, 1973), p. 53.

4 M.S.N. Menon, "Ping-Pong Diplomacy Before and Beyond", Mainstream (New Delhi), May 1971, pp. 32-33.

During a speech at the 65th Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association on 5 September 1969, Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, in one of the most explicit public statements on the Administration's position regarding the rift between Moscow and Peking, said:

> We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are not our affair. The conflict between Communist China and the Soviet Union would not deter the United States from striving to improve relations with China. 5

Richardson's professions might be true but nonetheless it was equally true that the United States saw an opportunity in the Sino-Soviet rift. Realizing the significance of political constraints of the split on China and the need to check the Russian power, the Nixon Administration moved towards normalization of relations with China.

2) China As a Nuclear Power

Communist China's rapid progress in the nuclear and missile technology was the second factor in American calculations. In a statement on US foreign policy, Secretary of State William Rogers highlighted the concern of the United States regarding China's growing nuclear capability. The section of the report, which was prepared for delivery before the Senate

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5 New York Times, 6 September 1969.

Committee on Foreign Relations on 27 March 1969, stated, "...With its vast population, great potential, and developing nuclear capability, China is of course, a matter of major concern to us...."[6]

The US policy-makers and military specialists had been carefully observing Communist China's rapid progress in the nuclear field. The US Atomic Energy Commission had reported China's first explosion, which had probably taken place in the desert area of Sinkiang Province on 16 October 1964. It was followed by others on 14 May 1965 and 8 May 1966. The last of these was estimated to have been of 300 kilo tons potency, fifteen times the strength of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. On 27 October 1966, according to the US Atomic Energy Commission, China entered the IRBM class. By the end of September 1969, it had exploded at least ten atomic or thermonuclear devices and was on its way to ICBM capability. Making an assessment of China's nuclear strength, the US specialists concluded that by the end of 1970s, the Chinese force of ICBM's could be large enough to pose a real threat to the present nuclear super powers. According to the New York Times, the two close allies of the United States, Japan and Taiwan also reported China's nuclear activities in manufacturing of "b-class" submarines at the Dairen and Shanghai dockyards and equipping the 12,000-ton

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6 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 60, 14 April 1969, p. 312.

freighter 'Hsian yang Hang' in a shipyard near Canton with space tracking and telemetry devices.[7] A major breakthrough in weapon production and general progress in nuclear and missile technology illustrated Communist China's determination to pursue the status of a major military power.

This was highlighted by the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green. In a statement before the Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 October 1970, Green said:

> ...Peking has given high priority to acquiring strategic weapons as a deterrent against attack as well as for the political leverage they afford. Achieving a nuclear capability will not make the Chinese more aggressive. I believe that they will continue to be deterred by overwhelming US and Soviet power... But the fact is that the world is now faced with a nuclear China which is determined that its voice be heared.... [8]

Though the existing nuclear power of China did not pose an immediate threat to the United States, it could pose serious challenge in the future.

In the first place, a nuclear China could serve its

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7 New York Times, 5 October 1969; U.S. News & World Report, 6 March 1972, p. 10; New York Times, 31 May 1971.

Henry Owen, The Next Phase in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 141; Current History, September 1971, pp. 158-59; U.S. News & World Report, 28 February 1972, p. 17.

8 "US Policy Toward China", text of a statement by Marshall Green, Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 2, April 1971, p. 615.

interests by attempting a crude nuclear "blackmail" in the Far East and South and Southeast Asia. The nuclear strength, achieved at such a great cost, could be used by China in exerting pressure on the allies of the United States and by prying loose the nations surrounding it from the orbit of the United States.[9]

In the second place, China's growing nuclear strength could lead to another unpleasant development. Japan could react to China's increasing nuclear strength by developing its own nuclear capability. This was a possibility which neither the United States, nor the China, nor the Soviet Union could view with equanimity.

In the third place, the existence of a nuclear armed China was viewed by the US policy-makers as the dominant problem of the next decade, because the solution of almost any security problem had to take into account Chinese nuclear capability and responses to it by other states.[10] It had been pointed out earlier by persons like Adlai Stevenson, two time presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, that no effort at disarmament could succeed by excluding China. The argument was still valid in the context of nuclear disarmament. Any

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9 Takehiko Yoshihashi, "The Far East" in Abdul A. Said, ed., America's World Role in the 1970's (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), pp. 121-22.

10 Amos A. Jordon, Jr., Issues of National Security in the 1970's (New York, 1967), pp. 104-5.

effort was bound to be futile if it left out China.[11]

Fourthly, connected with China's growing nuclear power was the problem of the overall development of strategic arms technology. An overall development in nuclear capability including that of China's could lead to the prospect of expanding uncertainities in strategic decision-making. Discussing the "doctrine of strategic sufficiency", President Nixon in his report to the Congress on foreign policy on 25 February 1971, expressed his concern by saying that possession of nuclear weapons by China was an additional source of uncertainty for the United States.[12]

Besides, the above mentioned immediate concerns, a China determined on achieving a nuclear power status could pose a threat to the United States in the long run. President Nixon noted that "China continues to work on strategic ballistic missiles and, by the late 1970's can be expected to have operational ICBM's, capable of reaching the US.... Finally, before this decade is over, the Chinese will have the capability to threaten some of our major population centres."[13] Thus, besides causing certain immediate concerns, a nuclear armed China could pose a threat to the US in the long run.

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11 Adlai E. Stevenson, Putting First Things First: A Democratic View (New York, 1960), p. 20.

12 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 64, 22 March 1971, pp. 407-10.

13 Ibid.

3) The Change in Asian Power-Balance

Another major factor leading to a re-examination of US policy towards China was the growing recognition that the pattern of big power relations in Asia had undergone a profound change. During the decade of the 'fifties, a bipolar confrontation between the Communist and non-Communist nations governed the structure of relationship in Asia. After the Sino-Soviet split, the deep schism between the two Communist giants basically changed the Asian balance of power, turning the relationship into a triangular one. The resurgence of Japan as a fourth major power in Asia led to a new quadilateral balance involving a complicated four-power relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. Though this multipolarity reduced the chances of big power military confrontation, it made their relations more complex. Each power had to carry out policy adjustments in its relations with the others.

Under the changed circumstances, both the United States and China began to operate under new pressures. The change in balance of power in Asia in its turn exerted pressures for change in US-Chinese relations. Neither Washington nor Peking was exclusively preoccupied with the presumed threats posed by the other. In the context of the new overall balance, both the countries saw advantages in improving their bilateral relations.[14]

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14 Henry Owen, n. 7, p. 141.

A dramatic change in the rest of Asia further enforced the need for a change in China policy of the United States. Describing other nations of Asia in the context of changed Asian situation before the Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 October 1970, Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said:

> ...Much of the rest of Asia, meanwhile has made remarkable progress in stability and prosperity, as well as in self defense... The prosperity and relative stability of the rest of Asia is in marked contrast to the demoralization, fear and hopelessness of the early 1950's. Furthermore, in recent years growing regional cooperation in many fields among the non-Communist nations of Asia seems to portend an acceleration in the evolving stability of the region... 15

The US policy-makers thus realized that smaller Asian nations, now more stable and capable of their self-defense, were likely to assume greater responsibility for their own security, and the US military role in the region could be reduced.

Since the World War II, the United States had paid a high price in human lives and financial resources - in attempts that could not prove successful in shaping Asia in an image that Washington desired. In two major wars - in Korea and Vietnam - 79, 279 Americans had been killed and 406,064 wounded. The cost of waging those wars had exceeded 138 billion dollars.

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15 "US Policy Toward China", n. 8, p. 615.

Behind the American search for a rapprochement with Peking was its hope that in the new Asia the danger of future wars involving the United States could be lessened. The US policy-makers also realized that the vital American interests in Asia could be preserved at far less cost and with much less intense commitment, financially and militarily.[16]

Besides the dramatic changes in the Asian power balance, was the factor of Soviet Russia's drive to gain a dominant position on China's borders. The Russian ambition to gain a predominant position was a major concern of the United States' Asian policy. Despite important strategic accommodations with the Soviet Union on the issues like the status of Berlin and the handling of nuclear capability, the Nixon Administration realized that the growth of Soviet power in Asia represented a more serious threat to the US security and interests in Asia than China. The President was convinced that the key to peace in Asia lay in an understanding with China.[17]

4) Reassessment of US Interests in the Pacific

The fourth factor promoting change in the US China policy was the reassessment of the United States interests in the Pacific. Since 1969, the United States policy reflected a change of emphasis from a multiplicity of commitments to greater

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16 U.S. News & World Report, 6 March 1972, p. 14.

17 Newsweek (New York), 21 February 1972, pp. 28-29.

freedom of choice between engagement and disengagement. The United States also declared that in future it will not carry a burden for others.[18]

This major policy shift was expressed in a variety of statements and policies by the Administration. The new policy clearly implied that Washington was much less interested in the affairs of small powers, and paid more attention to the great power balance. Maintaining an equilibrium in the Pacific, which was one of the main objectives of this major policy shift seemed not only difficult but impossible in the presence of a nuclear armed China hostile to the United States. The Nixon Administration realized that such an objective could be achieved by seeking normalization of relations with Peking, particularly when US Pacific strategy in a changing Pacific equilibrium demanded so.

In a news conference on 18 April 1969, President Nixon spoke of China's great potential and significant nuclear capability which could render US diplomacy incredible in the Pacific against "nuclear blackmail" unless the United States moved towards seeking normalization of relations with Peking.[19]

Again, in an address to the Associated Press annual meeting at New York on 21 April 1969, Secretary of State

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18 Harry G. Gelber, "Peking, Washington and the Pacific Balance of Power", Pacific Community, vol. 3, October 1971, pp. 53-54.

19 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 60, 5 May 1969, pp. 378-79.

William P. Rogers stated, "one cannot speak of a future Pacific Community without reference to China... We know that by virtue of its size, population, and the talents of its people, mainland China is bound to play an important role in East Asian and Pacific Affairs..."[20]

Summing up the American need for the application of a new Pacific strategy, the New York Times commented:

> ...Washington undoubtedly needs China's acceptance, if not endorsement, of a Vietnam peace... American Pacific strategy is based on island positions extending from Japan through Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines down to Australia. Mainland garrisons in Korea and Vietnam developed almost by accident. In other words, Peking is being offered a division of spheres of influence which would make 'continental Southeast Asia' its bailiwick and leave the Pacific island barrier to the US.... 21

It was apparent that a stable Pacific balance of power which at the same time would safeguard the interests of the United States in that area, could not be achieved, without a change in policy towards China.

5) Exit from Vietnam

Yet another important motive that led to the new US policy posture was to get help from the Chinese for an honourable exit from Vietnam. Though China could not extract concessions from Hanoi, but the initiative towards Peking could be

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20 Ibid., 12 May 1969, pp. 398-99.

21 New York Times, 31 January 1969.

used to cloak the US retreat with the new policy of establishing a new relationship with entire Asia,[22] symbolized by the US rapprochement with China. The United States had been involved in the Vietnam conflict for a decade. The financial and manpower burdens of the Vietnam war were heavy on the Americans who on their home-front were facing economic depression, social confusion, youth degeneration, and divided public opinion, which, in general was hostile towards the US involvement in Vietnam. Most Americans attributed their unhappy condition to the long US involvement in Indochina. To quote the Far Eastern Economic Review, "Nixon stands to gain at least a temporary immunity from anti-war criticism at home by offering such a demonstrative Olive branch to Peking, and to distract attention from his evident problems in withdrawing from South Vietnam..."[23] The desire to placate a rising domestic revolution against American military over-involvement in the world in general and in Vietnam in particular exerted pressures that made a policy change inevitable.

Another major objective of President Nixon in dealing with Vietnam was to make it less prominent by directing attention to other aspects and objectives of American foreign policy. Hence the efforts of the Nixon Administration to "normalize"

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22 Newsweek, 21 February 1972, p. 18.

23 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 31 July 1971, p. 6.

relations with China were no doubt aimed at decreasing the intensity of Vietnam issue in American politics.[24]

6) Economic Balance

In his remarks before news media executives from the thirteen Mid-Western States in Kansas city (Missouri), on 6 July 1971, President Nixon underlined two objectives of new American policy towards China. First, ending the isolation of mainland China so that it would come into economic interaction with the rest of the world, and second, establishing communication and interchange of ideas that inevitably would leave 800 million Chinese open to the world, growing as an economic force in the world of enormous potential.

The United States also sought normalization of its relations with China due to its declining predominance in the economy of the world. There was a time after the World War II, when the United States had, as Nixon described, "all the chips and had to spread a few around so that others could play." The situation was different now. In the past two decades, Western Europe and Japan had emerged as economic super powers. The US was having an adverse balance of trade. In many markets, Western Europe and Japan were its competitors as they had comparable technology. If the United States wanted to maintain its dominant position in the world economy, it could do so, only by

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24 Robert E. Osgood, n. 3, p. 85.

initiating new moves. In a new emerging economic structure of power, it was China of the future with which President Nixon was concerned - the nation he described as potentially one of the world's five great economic Superpowers.[25]

Explaining as to why the change was deemed necessary the President said, "800 million Chinese are going to be, inevitably, an enormous economic power... That is the reason why I felt that it was essential for this administration to take the first steps towards ending the isolation of mainland China from the world community..."[26]

6) Global Structure of Power

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger's desire to introduce a new diplomatic approach to world politics, which has been termed as balance of power or global diplomacy, was another significant factor leading to a policy change. This aimed at first, evolving a pattern of political relationships involving five major power centers: The United States, Russia,

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25 President Nixon's first adumbration of this concept in remarks before news media executives in Kansas, Missouri, on 6 July 1971, described the emerging structure of power in economic terms. "What we see as we look ahead 5, 10, and perhaps 15 years, we see five great economic superpowers. The United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, mainland China and, of course, Japan. ...these are the five that will determine the economic future..." Department of State Bulletin, vol. 65, 26 July 1971, p. 95; [illegible] Osgood, n. 3, p. 6.

26 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 65, 26 July 1971, pp. 95-96.

China, Japan, and, eventually, Western Europe (including Britain) and second, ending the cold war and the confrontation politics of the two superpowers, that characterized the post II World War era. Consequently, this was designed to lead to a pentagonal world wherein each power center would be constrained by the others.

Articulating his vision of a concert of great powers that resembled in some respects the balance of power in Europe during much of the nineteenth century, President Nixon said:

> ...The only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power... I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan - each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance. 27

Such an international order which the President strived to seek could simply not be possible with a quarter of the human race outside the order and hostile towards it. The impact of Kissinger's thinking on President Nixon is visibly clear. The US Secretary of State was a firm believer in the concept of global balance of forces.

In his report to the Congress on the US foreign policy on 25 February 1971, to which reference has already been made, President Nixon said,

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27 Ibid.

> It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile towards it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community... For the United States the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade. 28

Hence the Administration's desire to seek a global structure of power which could also guarantee a security for the United States and its interests, worked as a motivating factor for a new United States policy towards China. What the United States could not achieve by military means, could be attained - as the Nixon Administration viewed it - by diplomatic means. The United States was moved by several considerations and all of these pointed in the direction of a rapprochement with China. The Nixon Administration carved out a path for normalization of relations with Peking by taking a series of steps and it was the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger which finally brought it about. He was one of those who saw that the time had finally arrived when both the powers desired an improvement in relations, though for different reasons.

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28 Ibid., vol. 64, 22 March 1971, pp. 382-84.

Chapter III

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

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The beginning of a new United States policy towards China may be regarded as one of the most significant developments of the present decade. It was all the more remarkable because it took place while the war in Vietnam still raged and while a deep gulf of mistrust still separated the two countries, which had remained adversaries for nearly two decades.[1] President Nixon entered office convinced that a new policy towards China was an essential component of a new American foreign policy. In his inaugural address on 20 January 1969, Nixon defined the approach of the United States to all potential adversaries - with China very much in mind,

> After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our line of communication will be open.
>
> We seek an open world - open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people - a world in which no people, great or small will live in angry isolation.
>
> We can not expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy. 2

As far back as October 1967, President Nixon had written in the prestigeous journal Foreign Affairs that "any American

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1 New York Times, 28 December 1969.

2 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 66, 13 March 1972, p. 331.

policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China", while pointing out at the same time that bold new initiatives without adequate preparation were inappropriate.[3]

When President Nixon assumed office in January 1969, there was only one means of contact between the United States and the mainland China, - the sterile talks in Geneva and Warsaw which had dragged on intermittently since 1955. The new Administration faced two major questions in devising a rapprochement with Peking. First was how to convey the desire to improve relations to the authorities in Peking? Second, what public steps could demonstrate the willingness of the United States to move in a new direction.[4]

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, communication links between the US and China had been severed. However, they had at times communicated indirectly or through the mediation of the third countries. To convey to China its keen desire to open a genuine dialogue, the Administration needed the help of an intermediary which had the full trust of both the nations and could be relied upon to promote the dialogue with discretion, restraint, and diplomatic skill.

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3 Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 46, October 1967, pp. 111-25.

4 For details see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, 3 March 1972, pp. 325-31.

On assuming office, one of Richard Nixon's first acts was to instruct his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger to let some third-country sources know that Washington was seriously interested in working towards normalization of relations with Peking. Any number of foreign Governments could have been approached to serve as a diplomatic channel but the Nixon Administration singled out Rumania for carrying the US signals to Peking. The position of Rumania was unusual among East European nations in so far as it maintained ties with China. Rumania agreed to serve as a diplomatic channel to Peking for the United States after a White House Conference on 26 October 1970 between President Nixon and the Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. The Rumanian Deputy Premier Gogu Radulescu conveyed the American hopes for improved Sino-US relations when he met with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking in November 1970 and again on 22 March 1971.[5]

Another prime prospect as a communication link between Washington and Peking was France. During his first trip to Europe which began in late February 1969, President Nixon confided his desire for better relations with Peking to Charles de Gaulle which was subsequently conveyed to Premier Chou En-lai

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5 New York Times, 27 April 1971. The disclosure of the new Rumanian role in the delicate and hitherto secret United States diplomatic approaches to Peking came after the State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray, declining to identify the Governments acknowledged that, "a number of other Governments had relayed to China President Nixon's hopes for a better relationship". It was on 26 April 1971, that the Administration disclosed Rumania's role.

by Etienne Manach, the French Ambassador in Peking.[6] Edgar Snow in an article in Life magazine in May 1971 noted that two key figures in the de Gaulle Government, Andre Bettencourt and Maurice Couve de Murville were in China in 1970 to make plans for a visit to Peking by the General in 1971 but de Gaulle's death resulted in the cancellation of this visit.[7] On the second front, the United States began to implement "a phased sequence of unilateral measures" which continued from 1969 to 1971, indicating the direction in which the Administration was prepared to move to reach a rapprochement with China.

On 21 July 1969, the Nixon Administration took two symbolic steps: First, it allowed non-commercial purchase of Chinese goods without special authorization. The Department of State announced new regulations which permitted American tourists and residents abroad to purchase limited quantities of goods (worth $100) originating in China. This modification made by the Treasury Department in its Foreign Assets Control Regulations, reduced the inconvenience caused to American traders, desiring to purchase Chinese goods for non-commercial purposes. Earlier to this, import of anything that originated in China, except for printed matter, was forbidden.

Secondly, the US Government broadened the categories of

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6 Frank Van der Linden, Nixon's Quest For Peace (New York, 1972), p. 140.

7 Newsweek (New York), 10 May 1971, p. 43.

US citizens whose passports could be validated automatically for travel to China. In order to reduce restrictions on such American citizen's activities abroad, the Department of State authorized automatic validations of passports for travel to China for the following categories of persons: (1) Members of Congress; (2) journalists; (3) members of the teaching profession; (4) Scholars with Post Graduate degrees and students currently enrolled in colleges and universities; (5) Scientists and medical doctors; and (6) Representatives of the American Red Cross.[8]

After a thorough review of the China policy by the staff of the National Security Council, certain modifications were announced in the nineteen year old embargo against trade and travel to China. Announcing these concessions the State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said,

> Both of these measures are consistent with the Administration's desire to relax tensions and facilitate the development of peaceful contacts between the people of the United States and Communist China. We have no hostile intensions against Communist China and we hope that Peking will come to realize the fact... 9

These new measures became effective on 23 July 1969, the day President Nixon began his trip that took him to five Asian countries and to Rumania. During his trip, President Nixon

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8 New York Times, 22 July 1969.

9 Ibid.

enunciated the "Nixon Doctrine" (also known as Guam Doctrine) in Guam in the Philippines in July 1969. The Doctrine projected the partial disengagement of American military personnel from Asia in the near future, including troop withdrawals not only from Vietnam but from other countries as well. Besides advocating a "low American profile" in Asia, it laid stress on Asian self help - that "Asian hands must shape the Asian future".[10] Combined with American overtures, the Guam Doctrine could assure the Chinese of American sincerity in seeking normalization of relations with their regime, in the context of a changed US Asian policy. Thus, President Nixon made gestures to reassure Peking that the American objective was accommodation rather than confrontation.

In an announcement resulting from a policy decision approved by President Nixon, on 19 December 1969, the State Department permitted subsidiaries and affliates of United States Corporations abroad to sell nonstrategic goods to China and buy Chinese products for resale on foreign markets.[11] In consequence, following changes were brought:

First, for foreign subsidiaries of US firms, most Foreign Assets Control (FAC) restrictions on transactions with China regarded as non-strategic by COCOM [Coordinating Committee on

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10 John Dewer, "Ten Points of Note: Asia and the Nixon Doctrine" in Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., The Great Nixon Turnaround (New York, 1973), pp. 125-26.

11 New York Times, 20 December 1969.

Export Controls (Paris)_7 were removed. This was intended to permit subsidiaries, insofar as FAC restrictions were concerned, to engage in trade with China under regulations applicable to other firms in countries in which they operated. This step also removed restrictions which such countries viewed as interference in their domestic affairs. But it did not, however, affect Commerce Department's Controls on export or re-export of goods of US origin or of unpublished American technology.

Second, the existing restrictions on US business participation in third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods were eliminated. This was to permit American firms (including banking, insurance, transport and trading) to purchase and ship to third countries, commodities of presumptive Chinese origin that they were able to ship to the United States under "certificates-of-origin procedures". The change was made in response to urgent requests of the foreign branches of US firms, and it was expected to improve the competitive position of American business concerns overseas.

Thirdly, the $100 ceiling on commercial purchases of Chinese Communist goods by Americans were removed as was the requirement that non-commercial imports from China enter the United States as "accompanied baggage". This was intended to further relieve administrative difficulties of American tourists, collectors, museums, and universities to import Chinese products for their own purpose.[12]

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12 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 62, 12 January 1970, pp. 31-32; New York Times, 20 December 1969.

These significant changes constituted a partial lifting of an embargo imposed in December 1950 during the Korean war, shortly after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into North Korea to fight against the United States forces there. Easing of American restrictions on trade with Communist China could prove a useful and welcome step towards improvement in relations with Peking. The Chinese could possibly interpret this as an indication that further bilateral talks and negotiations could lead to other similar changes in Washington's economic and political policy. Particularly as the changes came soon after the resumption of formal Sino-American ambassadorial talks on 13 December 1969 between the American Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel and Chinese charge d' Affairs Lei Yang in Warsaw.

Giving reasons for easing restrictions, Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey stated, "these changes bear out the previous remarks by Secretary Rogers that we planned to take other steps which we hope would improve relations with Communist China."[13]

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13 New York Times, 20 December 1969; Department of State Bulletin, vol. 62, 12 January 1970, pp. 31-32.

McCloskey was referring to the speech of Secretary Rogers on 22 April 1969 wherein he said, "Communist China is in trouble domestically and externally. But the Nixon administration's policy is to take whatever initiatives we can to establish normal relations with Communist China..." New York Times, 22 April 1969.

Throughout 1969, these unilateral steps accompanied a series of significant public statements which delineated the general attitude of the Administration. Describing the Administration's position, on the issue of China's admission to the United Nations in his first news conference on 28 January 1969, President Nixon said that "his administration will continue United States opposition to Communist China's admission to the United Nations, but looks forward to meeting with Peking's negotiators in Warsaw on February 20 to see whether new changes of attitude on their part on major substantive issues may have occured."[14] But Peking cancelled the long-awaited meeting on 18 February. It charged that the Nixon Administration by granting political asylum to a high ranking Peking diplomat Liao Ho-shu had merely "inherited the mantle of the preceding United States Governments in flagrantly making itself the enemy of the 700 million Chinese people." Secretary of State Rogers expressed his deep disappointment with the Chinese action and stated that the Administration had intended to make "specific constructive" proposals at the Ambassadorial meeting towards improving relations with China.[15] A statement distributed by the State Department indicated these steps as:

Firstly, the United States had planned to accept Peking's suggestion that the two countries discuss the conclusion of an

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14 New York Times, 28 January 1969.

15 Ibid., 19 February 1969.

agreement setting forth principles of peaceful coexistence.[16] Secondly, the Administration intended to renew previous offers to exchange newsmen, scholars, scientists and scientific information. Finally, the United States representative Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. had been instructed to propose a settlement of pending postal and tele-communication problems.[17]

Use of the defection as a reason for the cancellation of the forthcoming talks seemed to be a pretext on the part of the Chinese leaders to discourage US overtures. Besides, it showed that the two sides were still too widely separated in their attitude to make a meeting worth while.

Coincidentally with the convening of the 9th Party Congress by the Chinese Communists on 1 April 1969, the United

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16 The Chinese handed a note to the United States Embassy in Warsaw on 26 November 1968, proposing the 20 February 1969 date for 135th meeting between United States and Chinese ambassadors and calling on the US to "dismantle all its military installations" on Taiwan. The note had proposed that efforts be made towards an agreement between the two countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence. New York Times, 1 January, 25 January 1969.

17 Peking severed all telephone and telegraph circuits with the United States in November 1968 by refusing to accept payment of about $600,000 from the Radio Corporation of America and three other Communications Companies. The RCA had been authorized by the Treasury Department to pay the amount, but after rejecting the US offer of payment for telecommunication facilities China had refused to accept any telephone calls from the United States by any route. Had the Chinese accepted, the transfer would have been the largest dollar payment to Peking since the 1950 assets control embargo which forbade transfer of US funds to China without specific licences. New York Times, 1 January, 19 February 1969.

States officials disclosed that the National Security Council Staff was canvassing appropriate Executive Departments about steps that might be taken to end the estrangement of two decades between the US and China. The major policy review involving the governmental agencies like State, Defense and Treasury Department was conducted under the direction of the President's National Security aide, Henry A. Kissinger. It included consideration on such significant steps as the relaxation of the ban on travel by American citizens to the Chinese mainland and relaxation of trade embargo that dated from 1949. Liberals in the Senate and academic community pressed for more sweeping changes, including Senator Kennedy's suggestion for the establishment of US consulates on the mainland, and the closing of United States military facilities on Taiwan.[18]

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18 New York Times, 2 April 1969. On 21 March 1969, Senator Edward M. Kennedy called on the Nixon Administration for a sweeping overhaul of US policy towards China - the withdrawal of military forces from Taiwan and the establishment of Consular missions on the mainland, as a prelude to eventual recognition. The Senator's speech at a two-day conference, concluded with a seven-point proposal for a new China policy. The conference was sponsored by the National Committee on US-China Relations - a nonpartisan educational organization founded in June 1966, and financed by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Held under the chairmanship of Prof. Edwin Reischauer of Harvard University and Prof. A. Doak Barnett of Columbia, the conference had drawn nearly 2,500 persons at the New York Hilton. New York Times, 21 March, 22 March 1969. For details on the conference see, ibid., 25 January, 2 February and 23 March 1969. For excerpts from the address by Kennedy see, ibid., 21 March 1969.

In a speech at the Associated Press Luncheon in New York on 22 April, Secretary Rogers said, "...The Nixon administration's policy was to "take whatever initiatives we can to re-establish more normal relations with Communist China, and we shall remain responsive to any indications of less hostile attitudes on their side."[19] A couple of months later on 31 July, at a joint news conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kiichi Aichi in Tokyo, Secretary Rogers again demanded "reciprocity" from the Peking regime.[20] The principles enunciated by the President during his visit to Rumania revealed that Washington wanted to improve non-existent relations with Peking as much as strengthening Rumanian-American ties. Rumania as already mentioned, had special significance for the US policy-makers as it was one of the few friends China had.

Secretary Rogers in his speech in Canberra, Australia on 8 August 1969, noted that China in the past had been isolated. The United States therefore desired to open communications with it. Relaxations had been made by the United States, Rogers said, with a view to "remove irritants in our relations and to help remind people in mainland China of our historic friendship for them".[21] Secretary Roger's speech further

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19 Ibid., 22 April 1969.

20 Ibid., 1 August 1969.

21 Ibid., 8 August 1969.

underlined conciliatory attitude of the United States in seeking a reduction of tensions and its willingness to resume talks with China. The speech was followed by another significant move. On the same day, speaking at the annual meeting of the Anzus Treaty Council in Canberra, in one of the most explicit statements by a member of the Administration regarding China, Rogers stated, "We recognize, of course, that the Republic of China on Taiwan and Communist China on the mainland are facts of life..."[22] In the joint communique issued at the end of the Anzus Treaty Council meeting the same position was reiterated. The statement constituted one of the clearest definition so far of United States' position on "two-Chinas." This implied abandonment of the US concept that the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan was the true Government, though dispossessed, of all China.

By the end of his Pacific tour on 9 August, which took him to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, Secretary Rogers had successfully conveyed a different policy and style of US diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific. The new attitude manifested two remarkable shifts in US policy, first, a vigorous approach to China to obtain more conciliatory relations with Peking regime; and second, the acceptance that Washington was coming around to a "two-China" policy.

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22 Ibid., 9 August 1969.

In an address to the 24th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September, President said that he was ready to talk with the leaders of Communist China whenever they choose to abandon their self-imposed isolation".[23]

After a series of unilateral steps and public statements throughout the year by the Nixon Administration, Peking began to show signs of its willingness to respond. The United States received solid indications of interest if not actual encouragement from Peking through reliable diplomatic channels. On 8 October, Nixon Administration officials indicated that they had received apparent signals from Peking of a softening in its long-standing hostility to the United States. Two Western Governments (later identified as France and Rumania) passed on to the US their assessment of conversations with Chinese officials, as marked by "a striking absence of the anti-American invective that the Chinese have routinely used."[24] On 4 December 1969, the US Ambassador to Poland, Walter J. Stoessel and Chinese Communist Charge d' Affairs, Lei Yang met at a diplomatic reception at Yogoslav Embassy in Warsaw for the first time. The substance of the discussion at the reception was not disclosed and the State Department spokesman John King characterized the meeting as "a few words at a social event". This

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23 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 61, 6 October 1969, p. 300; New York Times, 29 September 1969.

24 New York Times, 9 October 1969.

led to another 75-minute secret meeting, meant to discuss resumption of formal ambassadorial talks between the representatives of the two countries on 12 December. The talks were held in the Chinese Embassy. This represented one of the rare cases since the Communist take over of the mainland in 1949 that an American ambassador had been received in the Chinese Embassy.[25] The Warsaw meeting finally ended the prolonged paralysis of the Peking-Washington dialogue and led the United States on 20 December 1969 to ease curbs imposed in 1950 on the Chinese trade.

Carefully using the official title of the Peking Government - People's Republic of China - rather than referring to it as the "Communist China", the Department of State announced the resumption of 135th formal ambassadorial level meeting. The meeting was held on 20 January 1970 in Warsaw. The talks were officially described as "useful" and "businesslike" and Stoessel disclosed that they discussed "a number of matters of mutual interest." Again on 4 February 1970, the State Department announced agreement to hold the 136th meeting on 20 February 1970 which was conducted in the US embassy for the first time in the 15-year old ambassadorial talks. Ambassador Stoessel characterized the meeting as "business like" and expressed hope that such meetings would prove useful for both

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25 Ibid., 5 December 1969 and 13 December 1969.

the US and China.[26]

Resumption of the talks represented the fruition of a year long effort by the Nixon Administration to begin a dialogue with Peking Government. Nevertheless, these sessions clearly brought out the handicaps of formal discourse. The representatives of the two sides had minimum flexibility as they could do little more than read prepared statements and refer back to their capitals for instructions. This cumbersome exchange between the two countries reinforced the need for a more vigorous approach by the US if it was seriously interested in a rapprochement with China.[27]

On 16 March 1970, the Administration took more steps towards relaxation of restrictions on travel and trade with China. It announced that US passports would be validated for travel to mainland China "for any legitimate purpose". In April 1970, the United States authorized selective licensing of non-strategic American goods for export to mainland China. In August 1970, it lifted certain restrictions on American Oil Companies operating abroad so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities on trips to and from mainland Chinese ports.[28]

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26 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 62, 26 January 1970; New York Times, 21 January, 5 February, 21 February 1970.

27 New York Times, 21 January 1970.

28 Ibid., 17 March, 13 April, 21 August 1970.

To further convince Peking of its sincerity in desiring improved relations, the Nixon Administration combined constructive official statements with unilateral moves to remove obstacles to Sino-American rapprochement. On 12 March, the State Department shifted to a neutral position on a proposed congressional repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution, proposed by Senator Charles McC Mathias, Jr. (Rep., Maryland). In a nine-page letter to Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Department confirmed altering the Administration's stand on the resolution. It stated that it neither advocated nor opposed repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolutions as the crisis under which they were adopted has since passed. The Department's stand implied a major shift in the US policy.[29]

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29 Ibid., 13 March 1970. The repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution was a part of a proposal offered by Senator Mathias, tending to repeal three similar resolutions in December 1970. President Lyndon B. Johnson used the resolution to justify the bombing of North Vietnam and the commitment of United States soldiers to combat in South Vietnam. The Mathias proposal also aimed at repealing resolutions backing President's Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy in crisis involving Taiwan, the Middle East and Cuba. ...The resolution voted at the request of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955, authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States to defend offshore islands if that was deemed necessary to assure the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. These were regarded as important outposts for the defense of Taiwan and important links to the mainland over which the Nationalists claimed sovereignty. The United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores by a mutual defense treaty concluded with Nationalist Government in late 1954 and ratified by Congress in 1955. New York Times, 10 March, 13 March 1970.

On 9 July 1970, in Tokyo, Secretary Rogers addressed an appeal to China to abandon its "belligerent attitude." Describing China as the key to the future of Indochina, Secretary stated, "...If the Communist Chinese have an interest in becoming a part of the international Community, if they want to deal with other nations as the international Community deal with itself, on a sensible basis without threats and so forth, if it is willing to undertake its international obligations, to be peaceful and not to threaten other nations near by, then we would have no difficulty in improving our relations with Communist China."[30]

On 13 October 1970, Canada established diplomatic relations with China. The United States expressed concern over Canada's recognition of Peking regime saying that Ottawa's move would have an adverse effect on the international position of Nationalist China - a responsible and cooperative member of

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30 Ibid., 10 July 1970. Secretary Roger's comment was more or less a response to China's two hostile acts. On 19 May, Peking suddenly cancelled the long-awaited meeting scheduled for 20 May in Warsaw. Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist Press agency, reported that "in view of the increasingly grave situation created by the U.S. Government, which has brazenly sent troops to invade Cambodia and expanded the war in Indochina, the Chinese Government deems it no longer suitable for the 137th meeting of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks to be held on 20 May as originally scheduled." On the same day, Chairman Mao Tse-tung in one of his rare public pronouncements issued a personal call for world revolution against "United States imperialism and its lackeys." The declaration was reinforced on 20 May at a mass rally in Peking's Tienanmen Square where Chairman Mao appeared along with other Chinese leaders and deposed chief of State of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. New York Times, 19 May, 21 May 1970.

international Community. Beyond this official expression of concern, however, the Administration appeared to accept the Canada's decision of recognizing Peking as "sole legal" Government.[31]

In a toast to visiting President Ceausescu of Rumania on 26 October 1970, President Nixon deliberately used Peking's official title "The People's Republic of China" - as the Department had done earlier in January 1970. However, it was for the first time that the President had done so. On 12 November 1970, the United States which had long pursued a policy of all-out opposition to Communist China, argued instead against the expulsion of Nationalist China in twenty-fifth plenary session of the UN General Assembly. Refraining from saying anything that could be construed as an argument against the admission of Peking, Christopher H. Phillips, the Deputy Permanent representative of the United States said,

> ...Representatives of my Government have met with representatives of the People's Republic of China twice this year. And would have met more often had Peking been willing to do so. And my Government has taken a number of concrete actions for which we neither proposed nor anticipated a 'quid pro quo' to ease relations between us. The fact of the matter is that the United States is as interested as any in

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31 Ottawa recognized Peking as "sole legal" regime but not its claim to the surrounding islands like Quemoy, Matsu, Pescadores. After twenty months of negotiations, Canada established diplomatic relations with Peking and broke relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan.

> this room to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role among the family of nations. All of us are mindful of the industry, talents and achievements of the great people who live in that cradle of civilization... The United States agrees with those who said that Communist China is a reality that can not be ignored. 32

Phillip's statement indicated that for the first time the United States was edging towards the endorsement of the two-China thesis which holds that Communist and Nationalist regimes both should be represented in the United Nations.

In response to America's efforts to normalize relations, Peking regime took three significant steps. First, it released Bishop James E. Walsh who walked to freedom in Hong Kong on 10 July almost after 12 years of imprisonment.[33] Second, it conveyed through friendly diplomats on 24 July that China is prepared to upgrade its diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Thus China restored top level diplomatic representation in the Polish Capital for the first time since 1967, by sending new Ambassador Yao Kuang to replace the Charge d'Affairs Lei Yang on 24 August.[34] Thirdly, it asked on 29 July an Italian manufacturer to use American engines and spare parts in a shipment of trucks for China.[35]

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32 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 63, 14 December 1970, pp. 720-21; New York Times, 13 November 1970.

33 New York Times, 11 July 1970. For a statement by the Department of State on Bishop Walsh's release, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 63, 27 July 1970, p. 114.

34 New York Times, 25 July 1970.

35 Ibid., 30 July 1970. This was the first significant

(Contd. on next page)

By the fall of 1970, much of the emotion and domestic political peril seemed to be drained out of the issue of relations with Communist China. Thus in the beginning of 1971, the Nixon Administration which had already taken significant steps throughout the 1969-70 towards normalization of its relations with Peking was looking for a major breakthrough. The last remaining restrictions on travel to mainland China, further modifications of trade controls, new approach to the troublesome question of Peking's admission to the United Nations and other broader aspect of relations with China were being examined by the National Security Council. These changes were being examined as part of the major policy review that officials described as 'most comprehensive in nearly a decade'.[36] An attempt to re-examine these major aspects of US-China relations clearly underlined the Administration's desire to adopt a flexible attitude towards recognition of China and other

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sale of American-made industrial equipment or parts to China since the United States eased restrictions on trade with Peking on 19 December 1969. Before December, US Treasury and Commerce Department regulations would have prohibited such an arrangement. The State Department decision permitted American Corporations and subsidiaries to sell non-strategic items to China and purchase Chinese products for resale on foreign markets. The $4.2 million deal involved the sale of 80 Italian-made dump trucks by the Roberto Perlini Company. The Commerce Department which had already approved the American commercial participation informed General Motors, the American engine manufactures. The General Motors engines and spare parts were valued at $400,000 of the $2.4 million deal.

36 Ibid., 10 March 1971.

relevant issues. The changing American posture towards the world's most populous nation was reflected in yet another move.

On 15 March 1971, the United States announced that the US passports no longer needed special validation for travel to mainland China.[37] On 6 April 1971, the Chinese table tennis team extended invitation to the US table tennis team competing in the world championship, to visit mainland China. The US accepted the invitation on the following day.[38] Hailing the invitation as an "encouraging development", the State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray remarked that the US would "envisage no difficulty" in granting visas to a Chinese team.[39]

The invitation came as a manifestation of China's changing amd more flexible attitude towards the United States. It was an encouraging step and pointed to Peking's way of indirectly welcoming the American overtures. On 10 April, 15-men

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37 Peking had granted only three visas to Americans from September 1969 to March 1971, whereas the passports of nearly one thousand Americans were validated for travel to China for purposes the US Government had termed "legitimate" during the same period. New York Times, 15 March 1971.

38 New York Times, 7 April 1971. The invitation was extended near the close of the 31st world table tennis tournament in Nagoya, Japan which began on March 28 and ended on April 7. The Chinese delegation had returned to world championship competition after an absence of six years. The invitation - "to visit China for friendly matches" - was extended to Rufford Harrison, leader of the American team and the acceptance of invitation was announced by Graham B. Steenhover, President of the US Table Tennis Association on 8 April.

39 Ibid., 8 April 1971.

US table tennis team crossed into China from Hong Kong. The first sizable group of Americans to visit China since the middle of nineteen-fifties, was accorded cordial welcome by the Chinese officials, representatives of Hasinhua, the Chinese Communist Press agency and the Chinese Travel Service. The American team travelled extensively and was received by Premier Chou En-lai on 14 April who said that "their trip to China had opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people."[40]

The Chinese Government seemed to lay stress on people-to-people relations than on Government-to-Government relations with the United States. A report from Peking on 8 April said that the Chinese invitation to an American table tennis team was aimed more at building friendship between the two people's than at improving relations between their Governments. But Chinese Premier's statement made while talking to the US team could also imply indirect reference to the lack of Government-to-Government relations.[41]

In another surprise move, China departed from its long-standing policy of excluding American journalists since the Communist takeover of 1949. On 10 April, it granted permission to three American correspondents for a visit to the mainland.

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40 Ibid., 10 April 1971 and 15 April 1971. For details regarding Premier Chou En-lai's meeting with the US table tennis team by Tim Boggan, see ibid., 15 April 1971.

41 Ibid., 9 April 1971.

In another friendly gesture on 13 April, Tillman Durdin, the columnist of the New York Times, was authorized a visa.[42] He was the fourth American correspondent to be accorded this privilege.

The US officials interpreted these moves as more significant than the invitation of the table tennis players. It was viewed as an apparent sign that China was moving cautiously out of its self imposed isolation.[43]

On 14 April, the Administration decided to take certain significant measures which had been under its study since December 1970. Certain changes were announced by the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and Transportation on 7 May 1971 regarding regulations on trade with China.

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42 Three American correspondents with broad experience in Far Eastern Affairs, John Roderick of the Associated Press and John Rich and Jack Reynolds of the National Broadcasting Company along with Hiromasa Yamanaka and Masaaki Shiihara, Japanese television technicians employed by NBC - were permitted to enter China as part of a group of seven men who were allowed to cover the tour of American table tennis team. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stipulated that the correspondents were being allowed in "only to cover the tour of the U.S. table tennis team."

Tillman Durdin, the Chief of the Hong Kong Bureau of the New York Times had reported from Asia and the Far East for nearly fourty years. He lived through the Chinese-Japanese war of 1937 and joined the Times as a correspondent at the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese war. Durdin is the author of the "Rape of Nanking" by the Japanese army, which is a 6,000-word dispatch and has been included in anthologies of reporting on the Far East. New York Times, 11 April, 14 April 1971.

43 Ibid., 11 April 1971.

First of these changes was concerned with the use of dollars except those in blocked accounts. An announcement of the Treasury Department permitted the issuing of a general license which removed all controls on the use of dollars or dollar instruments in transactions with China and its nationals. Effective May 7, the new general license replaced the previous specific licensing procedure which had been in effect since December 1950. Closely linked with this was an amendment in the Treasury's Foreign Assets Control Regulations which removed the prohibition against American-controlled foreign-flag vessels calling at ports in Mainland China. The amendment also authorized American Oil Companies abroad to sell fuel or bunker vessels owned or controlled by China, except vessels going to or from North Korea, North Vietnam, or Cuba. Secondly, changes were made regarding the fueling of Chinese vessels except those bound to or from North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba. The Department of Commerce announced that validated licenses were no longer required for bunkering and other servicing of carriers of China or of the Eastern European countries, nor for vessels and aircraft on route to and from China. Thirdly changes were made regarding the controls on US carriers taking Chinese cargoes to the United States or third-country ports. The US carriers were permitted to transport commodities authorized for consignment to the PRC or to non-PRC ports. This change did not however, apply to North Korea or to the Communist-controlled

area of Vietnam.[44] Thus the Administration formally cleared the way for the resumption of direct trade with China. The new measures were the most sweeping in the Administration's continuing effort to improve relations with China.

On 10 June 1971, the President announced the end of the twenty-one year old embargo on trade with China. A general export license for a long list of non-strategic items for China was issued which designated other items to be considered on a case-by-case basis.[45]

A series of these orchestrated steps set the stage for Kissinger's secret visit to Peking. From July 9 to July 11, Kissinger held very extensive and important discussions with Premier Chou En-lai. It was agreed that President Nixon would visit China before May 1972. The announcement of forthcoming Presidential visit was made on 15 July by the President. In his third annual foreign policy report to the Congress on 9 February 1972, President observed: "Few events can be called historic. The announcement which I read on July 15 merits that term."[46] And he was entirely correct in his statement.

President Nixon said on 15 July that it was in view of his expressed desire to visit mainland China that the Chinese

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44 For details see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 64, 31 May 1971, pp. 702-4 and New York Times, 8 May 1971.

45 New York Times, 11 June 1971. For details see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 64, 28 June 1971, pp. 815-16.

46 For text of the announcement see New York Times, 16 July 1971.

Premier had extended an invitation to him to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. The President remarked that the meeting between the leaders of China and the United States would seek the normalization of relations and also exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.[47]

Announcing US policy on Chinese representation in the United Nations on 2 August, Secretary Rogers told the news correspondents that, the United States would support proposal for seating China in the UN General Assembly.[48] On 4 October 1971, in his address before the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, Secretary Rogers stated, "The United States wants to see the People's Republic of China come to this Assembly, take its seat, and participate. We want to see it assume as a permanent member of the Security Council the rights and responsibilities which go with that status...[49]

This statement of Secretary of State reflected the United States' totally altered stand on the China issue in the United

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47 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, 13 March 1972, pp. 325-26. It had not been known that Kissinger was in China at all during his "fact-finding" trip that took him to several countries. With other three members of his staff - John Holdridge, Winston Lord and Richard Smyster, Kissinger arrived in Peking at noon on 9 July. They flew from Islamabad, Pakistan, one of the scheduled stops during his trip. The President said Kissinger and Premier Chou conferred in Peking from July 9 to 11. That was when he was reported to be in Pakistan temporarily incapacitated by a stomach ailment. New York Times, 16 July 1971.

48 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 65, 23 August 1971, pp. 193-94.

49 Ibid., vol. 65, 25 October 1971, pp. 439-40.

Nations. The United States endorsed the seating of Peking but attempted at the same time to preserve a seat for Taiwan under a "dual representation" formula. When the attempt to preserve Taiwan's seat failed and Peking was seated in Taiwan's place, Washington acquiesced and accepted the new situation.

From 20 October to 26 October, Kissinger again visited Peking for the second time to reach agreements and make "concrete arrangements" for the President's visit to Peking. Further lengthy talks with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials produced the basic framework for President Nixon's meeting with the leaders of China - including the 21 February 1972 date. On 27 October, a joint announcement issued simultaneously at Washington and Peking and read by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President Nixon, confirmed the date of forthcoming Presidential visit in February 1972[50] which proved to be the culmination of three years of Washington's efforts to re-establish links with China.

Responding to the US overtures on 13 December 1971, China commuted the life sentence of an American prisoner and released two others whom it had been holding prisoners.[51] This

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50 New York Times, 6 October 1971, and Department of State Bulletin, vol. 65, 29 November 1971, p. 627.

51 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, 10 January 1972, p. 31. The prisoners were John T. Downey, whose life sentence was commuted to one of five more years, Richard G. Fecteau and Miss Mary Ann Harbert, who were released - the former was released prior to the completion of his sentence.

conciliatory gesture came after Kissinger had transmitted President Nixon's personal concern about the prisoners during his visits to Peking.

While tracing the evolution of US China policy, President Nixon in his third annual foreign policy report to the Congress on 9 February 1972 stated:

> We have ended a 25-year period of implacable hostility, mutually embraced as a central feature of national policy.
>
> This initiative was the fruit of almost three years of the most painstaking, meticulous, and necessarily discreet preparation... 52

The ground work had been laid carefully. The area of agreement had been explored. The world waited with expectations and hope for the summit talks which were to take place between the leaders of the world's "most powerful" and "most populous" states.

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52 Ibid., vol. 66, 13 March 1972, p. 315. For details regarding the section of the report dealing with China, see pp. 325-31.

Chapter IV

THE VISIT TO PEKING

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At a news conference in the White House on 10 February 1972, President Nixon observed about his forthcoming trip to Peking that it should neither be the cause of "great optimism" nor "very great pessism". He reminded that twenty years of hostility and non-communication could not be swept away by one week of discussions. What the trip denoted was that an era had come to an end. His trip, the President said, was going to form the "watershed" in the relation between the two countries. He further expressed the hope that the new chapter in Sino-US relations will be marked by the absence of armed conflict and negotiation rather than confrontation.[1]

On 12 February, the names of the members of the official party accompanying President Nixon to China were announced by the White House from Key Biscayne, Florida. The White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler declared that members constituted "only a small working party" including official and unofficial members. The thirteen official members included: Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Henry A. Kissinger, the President's National Security Adviser; H.R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President; Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House Press Secretary; Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, military assistant to President; and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Others included in the official

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1 New York Times, 11 February 1972.

party were, Dwight L. Chapin, Deputy Assistant to the President; John A. Scali, special consultant to the President; Patrick J. Buchanan, Special Assistant to the President; Rose Mary Woods, Personal Secretary to the President; Alfred L. Jenkins, the State Department Director for Asian Communist affairs; John Holdridge, a staff member of the National Security Council and Winston Lord, special assistant to Kissinger.[2]

The unofficial party consisted of approximately twenty-one members and included Gerald L. Warren, deputy White House Press Secretary; Big. Gen. Walter R. Tkach, the President's physician; Ronald Walker, a staff assistant to the President; Timothy Elbourne, a press aide and staff, and Secretarial personnel from the National Security Council and Chapin's staff. Ziegler declined to list all those in the unofficial party as they fell into the area of Secretarial assistants. Besides, three interpreters from the State Department, the total press contingent consisted of 168, out of which eighty-seven were members of the press, 13 satellite ground station technicians and 68 other communication and technical personnel.[3] The large contingent showed the importance which the Administration attached to the President's visit. Steps had been taken to assure that the visit would get proper publicity in and outside

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2 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 65, 6 March 1972, p. 293.

3 New York Times, 13 February 1972.

the United States.

President Nixon left for his eight-day visit to China on 17 February 1972. More than 8,000 persons including Congressmen and Senators from both political parties, members of the Cabinet, and representatives of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff saw off President from the South Lawn of the White House. In his departure statement, President reiterated that his trip to Peking "would be a journey for Peace" and the fact that the United States and the People's Republic of China were separated by a vast ocean and great differences in philosophy "should not prevent the two countries from finding common ground."[4]

President Nixon and Mrs. Nixon, leading an official party of 15 but a total contingent of more than 300 members stopped on 17 and 18 February at the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii. The party then flew to Guam, crossing the international dateline and made a last overnight stay on 20 February there. The presidential plane, the Spirit of '76, landed at Shanghai's Hung Chiao airport on 21 February.[5]

The President arrived in Peking on 21 February 1972. On hand to greet the American visitors were Premier Chou En-lai, several other Chinese dignitaries and a 500-man military honour guard. There were no crowds of citizens, farmers or school

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4 Ibid., 18 February 1972.

5 Ibid., 21 February 1972.

children assembled for the welcome as in case of other foreign dignitaries on good terms with the People's Republic of China.[6]

The President received what the New York Times designated as "a studiously correct but minimal official welcome" and called it as the tribute due to a chief of state whose Government "still did not officially recognize the People's Republic of China." It further wrote:

> His (Chou En-lai's) handshake symbolized the end of American ostracism of his Communist Government. Mr. Nixon grasped the hand that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spurned at the Geneva Conference in 1954, when the memoirs (SIC) of conflict between China and the United States in Korea were still raw and their contest over Indochina had just been joined. 7

On the day of his arrival, President Nixon held a surprise

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6 The Chinese Government issued a formal list of 42 persons who constituted the official greeting party at Peking airport. Besides Premier Chou En-lai, only two politburo members were present. They were Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the military commission and an old Marshall who was present at all the preliminary meetings between Premier Chou and Henry Kissinger, and Li Hsien-nien, a Deputy Premier. Other officials included Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chi Peng-fei, the Foreign Minister and his wife; Wu Teh, identified by Peking as acting chairman of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Pai Hsiang-kuo, the Minister of Foreign trade; Hsiao Ching-kuang, the Deputy Defence Minister and Commander of the Navy, and Li Chen, Deputy Minister of Public Security. J.F. terHorst, a member of the American Press Corps commented that "the absence of the crowds seemed to signal that the leaders of China had determined to be icily correct about his visit." New York Times, 21 February, 22 February 1972.

7 New York Times, 21 February 1972.

meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung which took place at Mao's residence somewhere in the Old Forbidden City. The meeting with the Chairman lasted an hour -- and both sides described it as "frank and serious." Spokesmen for both sides declined to say what had been discussed.

Commenting on the spokesmen's statement, The New York Times wrote, "in Communist parlance, serious and frank discussion means more than courteous conversation, but it also means that the talk was punctuated by disagreement."[8] In this meeting, President Nixon was accompanied by Henry Kissinger, the President's adviser for national security and Chairman Mao was accompanied in his talks by Premier Chou, Wang Hai-jung, the Deputy Director of Protocol and Miss Tang Wensheng (Nancy Tang), an interpreter. The White House did not explain the absence of Secretary Rogers.[9] In a remarkable banquet on 21 February

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8 Ibid., 22 February 1972.

9 Ibid. The meeting with Chairman Mao appeared to have been included hurriedly in Nixon's schedule on his first afternoon in Peking on 21 February. The meeting was held in high secrecy and the White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler refused to explain how the talk went or give any description of Chairman Mao's House or its location. The New York Times of 22 February 1972 stated that the meeting took place in Chairman's home which it described as a "graceful, old one-storey residence in the old Imperial City". This and other similar descriptions of the US Press regarding the location of the meeting was more or less based on the statement of a member of Kissinger's staff who suggested the description which the late Edgar Snow, long-time American friend of Mao, gave of latter's home after his meeting with the Chairman which took place sometime in January 1965. For details see Edgar Snow, Interview With Mao, New Republic, vol. 152, 27 February 1965, pp. 17-23.

1972, Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon exchanged toasts in the Great Hall of the People, wherein they underlined their willingness to have contacts and further normalization in relations between their countries. In his toast, Premier Chou appreciated Nixon's visit as a "positive move", providing the leaders of the two countries with an opportunity to seek normalization of relations and to exchange views on questions of concern to both. Laying emphasis on five principles of mutual co-existence, the Chinese Premier expressed his satisfaction with the common Sino-US efforts that had finally led to the establishment of friendly contacts. Tracing the reasons of Sino-US estrangement, he however, concluded that Sino-US contacts had been suspended "owing to reasons known to all".[10]

Premier Chou En-lai pointedly referred to American support for an independent Taiwan. His statement also implied that Taiwan was the only obstacle in the way of normalization of relations between the US and China. Since the US had already abandoned its policy of supporting Taiwan as the sole legal Government of all China, Chinese leaders felt no inhibitions in agreeing on a few steps towards normalization of relations between the two countries. The Premier's stress on the five principle's on which mutual relations should be based, indicated that China viewed this as a predominant factor in future

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10 For the transcript of the toasts by Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon, see New York Times, 22 February 1972.

Sino-US relations.

President Nixon responded by stating that the chances for world peace could immeasurably increase if the US and China could find common ground to work together. President observed that the common interests of the two countries had transcended differences of the past and helped in bringing the two nations together. The President argued that since the two countries had neither any ambition nor design either against one another or any other country of the world, they should start "a long march together".[11] He declared that securing of a world structure of peace in which all nations could determine their own form of Government without interference from the others was the main objective of his trip. He asserted the significance of Sino-US reconciliation and said that "it was time to seize the day and to seize the hour" for two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which could build a new world order.[12] President Nixon frequently disclaimed any design or ambition in regard either to China or any other country. Like the Chinese Premier, the US President laid emphasis on mutual

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11 New York Times, 22 February 1972. President Nixon referred to the legendary Long March of 1934-35, in which Mao's army broke through an encirclement by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and travelled some 6,000 miles from their base in Kiangsi province to the caves of Yenan, in Shensi province, where they lived for more than a decade.

12 Ibid. Also see for the texts of official statements, The President's Trip to China (New York, 1972), pp. 149-51. The quotation from Mao Tse-tung used by Nixon in his toast at the banquet - Ten thousand years is too long,

(Contd. on next page)

co-existence as the basis of good relations. He repeatedly referred to the Long March and quoted from Chairman Mao's poems, probably to show his appreciation of Chinese civilization and to foster good will. And, there is no doubt that he succeeded in it.

On 23 February 1972, President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai met for four hours of policy discussions at the Great Hall of the People. Accompanying the President were Kissinger, John H. Holdridge and Winston Lord of the National Security Council. The members attending the meeting with Chou were: Yeh Chien-ying, Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party Central Committee's military Commission; Li Hsien-nien, a Deputy Premier; Wang Hai-jung; Chia Kuan hua, a Deputy Foreign Minister; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the European, American and Australian section at the Foreign Ministry, who also happened to be a US specialist. The other members of the official delegations, led by Secretary of States William P. Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, held a separate conference at the same time. Nothing was disclosed about the details of these meetings.[13]

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we must seize the day - came from the last poem dated 9 January 1963, in the officially published collection of Chairman Mao's poems. For the published translation of the poem in part which differs slightly from President's version, see New York Times, 22 February 1972.

13 Ibid., 23 February 1972. The New York Times does not refer to first three members of Premier Chou's group as mentioned above instead it observes the "peculiarly significant" presence of Chao Kuan-hua, the Deputy

(Contd. on next page)

On the same day President Nixon held four more hours of talks with Premier Chou En-lai. The meeting was the second in two days of such length and intensity aimed at establishing contacts in different fields between the two countries.[14]

On 24 February 1972, President Nixon made excursions to the Great Wall of China, a fortification built in prechristian times to keep out the barbarian invaders, and to the Ming Tombs, constructed by a dynasty that ruled China from the 14th to the 17th centuries.

Speaking informally to newsmen for the first time during his visit of the Wall and Ming Tombs, President Nixon remarked that one result of his trip "may be that walls erected - whether like this physical wall or other walls, ideological and philosophical - will not divide People's of the world, that peoples regardless of differences in philosophy and background will have an opportunity to communicate with each other and know

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Foreign Minister and the leader of China's delegation to the United Nations in the fall of 1971 who, it stated, had been present on every occasion when Chou pressed the policy of "Coexistence" in international forums - at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina in 1954; at the Conference of non-aligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia in 1965 and at the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-62.

14 Ibid. Although the US Press viewed this meeting as being held for the establishment of contacts in different fields such as, cultural, trade and diplomatic, but the US officials declined to disclose the details of the talks, which were held in secrecy as usual.

each other...."[15] Using the symbolism of the Great Wall, the President hinted that inspite of vast differences in ideology, communication links could be established between the US and China. He expressed the hope that his visit might lead to such a development.

According to the Washington Post, on his way to the Ming Tombs, President remarked that one outcome of his talks with Chou might be that "apart from relations between Governments people will be able to come here and that, of course, Chinese people would be able to come to the US".[16] This indicated that besides the Government to Government relations, people to people relations had been a subject matter of discussions during their meetings.

On the evening of 24 February 1972, the talks were again held between the President and the Premier at former's guest house for three hours and then later for another two hours at a private dinner for the large US delegations. The following day, the President held another conference with Premier Chou which lasted for one hour.[17]

It is not known what was discussed at these meetings. However, some light was thrown on the outcome of these meetings at another banquet on 25 February, when Premier Chou En-lai

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15 New York Times, 24 February 1972.

16 The Washington Post, 25 February 1972.

17 New York Times, 25 February 1972 and The President's Trip to China, n. 12, p. 24.

and President Nixon exchanged toasts. Both the leaders, frankly admitted again that great differences of principle existed between the two sides. Nixon reiterated his belief in peace and in building a new world order. Chou En-lai described the discussions between himself and President as "earnest and frank", and claimed that a clear knowledge of each other's positions had been gained. While the President stressed his desire for more unofficial contacts between the two people, Premier Chou emphasized a prior interest in normal state relations. Significantly enough, while referring to the talks, the President said nothing about the prospects of future contacts.[18]

The remarks of the two leaders clearly indicated that major differences remained unreconciled during their discussions. The Chinese Premier's stress on seeking normal state relations implied a suggestion that the US should accord due recognition to Peking and drop its patronage over Taiwan. The Chinese leaders seemed to view the normal-state relations as more important than the establishment of Sino-US unofficial contacts. President's avoidance of any reference to such contacts as a subject of discussion during his meetings with the Premier, confirmed that differences prevailed on this issue as well.

The President and his party left for Hangchow on 26 February 1972. A meeting was held at Peking Airport lasting for one hour. On the same day, the White House announced that

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18 New York Times, 25 February 1972.

President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai had reached an accord on the "basic agreement" that were to be enunciated in a communique, to be written and published in Shanghai on 27 February 1972.[19] President's Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler gave no details on the nature of the agreements reached on the subjects that the communique covered.

On 27 February, the Nixon's Party flew to Shanghai and were greeted by Chang Chun-chiao, the Chairman of the City's Revolutionary Committee and five Deputy Chairmen of the Committee.[20] The Nixon-Chou communique was released on the same day. It was reported that the agreement on the 18,000-word communique had been reached after two nights of intensive bargaining. It was divided into five separate but unmarked sections.

The first section of the communique was a general account of President's sojourn in China and his meetings with Premier Chou and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The communique stated that the President and the Chairman had a serious and frank exchange of

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19 Ibid. Besides formal talks with the Chinese Premier there were many other occasions of informal talks. The final one took place the morning Nixon left Shanghai to return to Washington, 23 February 1972, when Nixon and Chou talked for one hour. The White House staff implied that some of the other time - in automible rides and at dinners and cultural events - was also given to serious conversations.

20 Ibid., 27 February 1972. Chang Chun-chiao gave banquet in honour of President Nixon on his last night in China. For the text of Nixon's toast at Shanghai dinner, see New York Times, 28 February 1972.

views on Sino-US relations and other problems of the world.[21] It described the discussions held by President Nixon and Premier Chou as "extensive, earnest and frank". Summing up briefly President's and his party's visits to cultural, industrial and agricultural sites in Peking, Hangchow and Shanghai, it further noted that Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the "same spirit".[22]

The Second section of the communique contained long and separate statements by the two sides of their divergent views on Indochina, Korea, Japan and South Asia. The communique stated that in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the US envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all its forces from Indo-China, consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indo-China. The US reiterated its intention of maintaining close ties with the Republic of South Korea. It also endorsed South Korea's efforts to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean Peninsula. The United States stated that it highly valued friendly relations with Japan and reaffirmed its intention to continue to develop the existing close bonds with that country. Consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution of 21 December 1971, the US

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21 Kissinger later on declared that the one-hour talk with Mao had been general and not "merely philosophical" and that the American delegation had reason to believe that the Chairman was consulted by the Premier "at every step along the way". New York Times, 28 February 1972.

22 New York Times, 28 February 1972.

asked for the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and withdrawal of their military forces to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. It supported the right of the People's of South Asia to shape their future in peace and free of military threat, without letting the area become the subject of great power rivalry.[23]

On its part, the Chinese side announced its firm support for the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal. Further, it declared its support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the joint declaration of the Summit Conference of the IndoChinese people and to the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea, forwarded by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 April 1971. It also favoured the latter's stand for the abolition of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Finally, it opposed the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism.[24]

While the United States stressed the need for relaxation of tensions and China stressed the aim of unification of Korea, neither side mentioned its respective military defense commitments in Korea, where the two countries had fought their only war twenty years ago. Whereas Washington expressed its

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23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

pre-eminent desire for friendly relations with Japan, its close ally, the Chinese leaders showed their high concern about Japanese militarism. In their divergent statements on Indochina, the two sides offered their support for the rival positions of Hanoi and Saigon in the deadlocked negotiations for a settlement in Vietnam. The communique reaffirmed their separate but overlapping policies in South Asia. For instance, both countries agreed on the need of a withdrawal by India and Pakistan to the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. The first part of the Chinese statement on the India-Pakistan dispute was virtually identical to that of the US, but Peking emphasized that it firmly supported the Government and people of Pakistan in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.[25]

The third section of the communique pointed out that although there were essential differences in the social systems and foreign policies of the US and China, the two sides agreed on general rules of international relations. For instance both of them agreed on the principle that countries should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful

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25 Ibid.

coexistence.[26] These principles had been enunciated by Chou En-lai as early as 1955 at the Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations.

The parties affirmed their belief that progress towards the normalization of relations between them was in the interests of all countries. Both the countries expressed their eagerness to reduce the danger of international military conflict, renounced their attempts or "any other country's" ambitions to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally both sides held that an attempt by any major country to divide up the world into spheres of interest was against the interests of the people's of the world.[27]

The denunciation of "any country's" efforts to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region clearly reflected the doubts and fear that both the countries, particularly China, entertained in regard to Russian ambitions and possibly against Japan's growing power and militarism. Their criticism of "major country's" attempts at the creation of spheres of interests constituted a hint that the Soviet Union should also give up its efforts to create such spheres to evolve a better and peaceful world.

Though Chou accepted an American statement that international disputes should be settled without use or a threat to

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26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

use force, but this did not amount to a renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan, which Peking considered as a part of China and accordingly a strictly internal affair.

In the fourth section, both sides reviewed what the communique stated as "the long-standing" serious disputes between the two signatories. Separate Chinese and American statements were made concerning Taiwan.

The Chinese declared that the Taiwan question was the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between Washington and Peking. Reaffirming its traditional claims to the island, it emphasized that the liberation of Taiwan was China's internal affair. The communique said: "The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two Governments", "two China's" and "independent Taiwan" or advocated that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."[28]

This was a clear Chinese denunciation of long-standing American policy of supporting Taiwan. The United States had continued its policy of supporting Chiang's regime, the rival of the Peking Government on Taiwan, in one or the other way under all such policy titles which the Chinese side mentioned above.

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28 Ibid. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, The Far East (New York, 1973), pp. 776-77.

The United States said:

> The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. 29

This statement on Taiwan clearly implied that at long last the US had abandoned its support of the position that the government on Taiwan was the sole legal government of China. However, the communique did not mention the US treaty with Nationalist China signed in 1954 which committed the US to defend Taiwan, in the event of an attack by the troops from the mainland. It appeared that both the sides deliberately avoided this issue.

In the communique's final section both sides declared that they had discussed joint contacts in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, and that they planned to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges. The desirability of increasing "bilateral trade" was also stressed. It was agreed to send a

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29 New York Times, 28 February 1972, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 65, 20 March 1972, p. 437.

senior US representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries, and to exchange views on issues of common interest.[30] In fact, President Nixon had laid stress on the establishment of such "unofficial" contacts from the very beginning of his term as was manifested through the unilateral steps which the Administration took in 1969-71. In the banquet of 25 February 1972, the President had underlined his willingness and desire to have "more" unofficial contacts between the US and People's Republic of China.

Commenting on the progress in the normalization of Sino-American relations as a result of the Peking Summit, Henry Kissinger in his Press conference at Shanghai on 27 February 1972, observed, "...At the time of the first Ping-Pong exchange...the position of the People's Republic of China was that some very low level people-to-people exchanges would occur - but...in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it (the Peking trip) went obviously beyond what had been discussed in my visits and beyond our expectations."[31]

After returning home, in a nationally televised address, the President described the Shanghai communique as unique in honestly setting forth differences rather than trying to cover

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30 New York Times, 28 February 1972.

31 For the transcript of the conference as supplied by the White House see New York Times, 28 February 1972.

them up with diplomatic double talk.[32] The differences were too fundamental, reflecting the basic position of the two sides. It was not easy to gloss over them for that would have undermined their credibility. However, the communique did attempt to by pass some of the more complex problems, US commitment to Japan was a case in point.

President further noted in his address that his visit should not be a cause of unnecessary optimism among his countrymen. They should not give up their efforts to maintain their strength in order to remain free.[33] President's remarks again revealed the persistence of disagreements on several subjects of concern. Nevertheless the President claimed that US had achieved some of its main objectives as a result of the Peking summit. During the past 30 years in Asia and the Pacific the United States suffered serious losses in men and resources. The President claimed that Sino-US rapprochement would possibly prevent in future another war. Establishment of communication links with the People's Republic of China was the primary objective of his trip to Peking and that had been achieved.[34]

President Nixon's Peking trip and the Shanghai communique

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32 For the transcripts of the President's speech on his return to home, see New York Times, 29 February 1972.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

signed at the conclusion of the trip drew criticism as well as appreciation from the country's press, public and the Congress. Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew welcomed President's visit to Peking. He stated that Americans had reasons to feel easier because of the trip he had taken.[35] The opinions of the Senators, were divided. President Nixon was sharply criticized for the United States' implied withdrawal from Taiwan by conservative Republicans. They also viewed with disfavour the lack of any mention of the mutual defence pact signed with the Nationalists in 1954.

Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative Republican N.Y.) viewed the communique as signalling the ultimate abandonment of Taiwan by the United States. Criticizing the Peking trip on 29 February as a "disastrous adventure in American diplomacy" and the communique as inflicting enormous damage to American credibility, the Senator remarked, "If we permit doubts about our intentions to persist with respect to our security agreement with Taiwan, we will undercut the credibility of our arrangements with Japan, South Korea and our other Asian allies as well". John M. Ashbrook (Rep., Ohio) in his campaign against Nixon called the Taiwan aspect of the communique as a "sell-out of principle". He expressed his shock at President's decision to accept communist China's 22 year old demand of

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35 Ibid., 28 February 1972.

unilateral withdrawal of all US forces from Taiwan. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) on 28 February commented that Nixon had made concessions but the Chinese had not. Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem., Wash.) on the same day remarked, "it appears that we are doing the withdrawing and they are doing the staying...that does not strike me as a good horse trade."[36] The Communist Party of the United States, which is oriented towards the Soviet Union, criticized the Peking summit and the signing of the communique as a Sino-American attempt to weaken the Soviet Union.[37]

While a small section of opinion in the Congress was critical of President Nixon's failure, a large segment of opinion endorsed his trip and efforts to seek a rapprochement with China. The Republican establishment in the Congress took the lead in praising the Administration's achievement. It strongly contented that no serious change in US policy towards Taiwan was implied. Senator Hugh Scott (Rep., Pa) said that by their visit, the United States had in no way altered its treaty commitments to Korea, Taiwan or Japan. Reassuring statements that the President had not changed the basic attitude of the United States towards Taiwan were issued on 1 March 1972 by Senators Barry M. Goldwater (Rep., Ariz) and Gordon Allott (Rep., Colo.). Goldwater expressed his satisfaction by

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36 Ibid., 29 February 1972.

37 Ibid.

saying that "we have not given away one single thing to the Red Chinese". Senator Allott, who was also the Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, viewed no basic change in policy regarding Taiwan was involved in the joint communique. Liberal Democrats supported the new US stance, as they themselves had been advocating modification in the existing China policy. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), on 28 February called the Shanghai Communique as "one of the most progressive documents" in the history of American diplomacy.[38]

The US press was divided along the same line. A section of the press viewed the 'sell out' of Taiwan as a price which President Nixon paid in order to gain an agreement with China. The Taiwan section of the communique was viewed as a blunder and betrayal by the United States of its commitments to the Taiwan regime. The Chicago Tribune, for instance, commented that Nixon had sacrificed Taiwan "merely as payment for Peking's agreement to anything at all."[39] The Pittsburg Press charged that "in light of the 1,800-word communique the United States did not come off too well."[40] Criticizing the Peking agreement as a "sell-out of Taiwan", The Miami News called it as

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38 Ibid.

39 The Chicago Tribune (Chicago, Ill.), 29 February 1972 in Editorials On File (New York), vol. 3, 16-29 February 1972, p. 187.

40 The Pittsburg Press (Pittsburg, Pa.), 28 February 1972 in ibid., p. 180.

"inconsistent" with the United States' past support of Chiang Kai-shek.[41]

The San Diego Union charged that the US conceded more than did China.[42] The Courier-Journal remarked that "the sophisticated and sagacious Chou En-lai got everything he wanted and gave nothing of consequence in return."[43] The Winston-Salem Journal voiced its apprehension of United States' loosing its allies like South Korea, Japan and Thailand and charged the Government for being responsible for such a loss.[44]

The Peking trip was also viewed as President Nixon's effort to win a second term in the White House. Some major newspapers charged that the Nixon Administration's overtures to China constituted a mere election strategy to win the next term and offered no real solution to the US problems.

According to the Daily Chicago Defender, "There was no other way to turn or to carve out an issue that might insure his election...the China trip became a useful...strategy on Nixon's political chess board."[45] The New York Times was also

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41 The Miami News (Miami, Fla.), 29 February 1972 in ibid., p. 194.

42 The San Diego Union (San Diego, Calif.), 29 February 1972 in ibid., p. 193.

43 The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY.), 28 February 1972 in ibid., p. 181.

44 Winston-Salem Journal (Winston, Salem, N.C.) in ibid., p. 187.

45 The Daily Chicago Defender (Chicago, Ill.), 28 February 1972 in ibid., p. 195.

of the same opinion. It concluded, "Neither side would have been willing to risk a train wreck with the American voter and the Kremlin looking on."[46]

A large section of the press viewed the visit as something more than a mere election gimmick. It welcomed it as "a historic visit" and as a major step towards the peace. The Atlanta Constitution described it as "a grand and glorious experience".[47] The Washington Post wrote that "The President is entitled to great credit for it was a bold stroke." It also expressed its hope that a Sino-US rapprochement could lead to US disengagement from Vietnam.[48] The Philadelphia Inquirer called the trip as the Administration's efforts to make history of dynamic relations.[49] The Des Moines welcomed the de-emphasis of the US defense commitments.[50]

Hailing the US policy vis-a-vis Taiwan, a section of the US Press considered the Shanghai agreement not a "sell-out" but a recognition of the objective reality that Taiwan was

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46 New York Times, 29 February 1972.

47 The Atlanta Constitution (Atlanta, Ga.), 29 February 1972 in Editorials on File (New York), vol. 3, 16-29 February 1972, p. 184.

48 The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), 28 February 1972 in ibid., p. 182.

49 The Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, Pa.), 29 February 1972 in ibid., p. 184.

50 The Des Moines (Iowa), 29 February 1972 in ibid., p. 186.

not the sole legal Government representing all China.

The Blade viewed the trip as "an important step toward approaching the problems on the basis of facts rather than the fantasies of nearly a quarter century past."[51] Calling the concessions to the Chinese as a "heavy" but not "unreasonable" price, The Washington Post wrote, "the US had to pay the price for the "excesses of the American foreign policy in the post-war years".[52]

The Peking trip of the American President and the Shanghai communique strove not only to put an end to the era of confrontation but also helped to establish at least working relations with Communist China. An analysis of the communique would reveal that in formalization of exchanges between the two countries, the establishment of a diplomatic channel for continued contact, the opening of trade relations, the joint statements of some general principles regarding international situation, the US took several steps forward in improving its relations with Peking.

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51 The Blade (Teledo, Ohio), 29 February 1972 in ibid., p. 181.

52 The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), 28 February 1972 in ibid., p. 182.

Chapter V

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW POLICY

Chapter V

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW POLICY

The United States' search for a rapprochement with China had profound implications for the rest of the world. The new US posture had not been taken in consultation with its allies and therefore its announcement came as a surprise to some and shock to others. The US' allies like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan for more than two decades had proceeded on the assumption of continued hostile Sino-US relations. Things suddenly seemed to be different. The need to re-examine their own foreign policy was not only felt by countries which had been directly affected but also by countries like India and Western Europe. Outwardly, almost every one welcomed the relaxation of tensions and the end of the Cold War but all of them tensely watched the gradual unfolding of the Sino-US rapprochement.

JAPAN

The postwar policy of Japan towards China for the first time stood in shambles as a result of President Nixon's decision to visit Peking without prior consultations with Japan. The announcement of the Peking trip came as a surprise to the Japanese who called it as the "first shock" or "Nixon shock". Concern was heightened when a month later the United States took the unilateral decision to impose a ten per cent excise tax on imports and to suspend trading in gold. These US moves

could seriously damage Japan's trade with the United States, particularly as the latter declared that a sum of nearly eight million dollars was involved with a large surplus in favour of Japan. The unilateral decisions to take these new financial measures, immediately following the China shock, were viewed as "second Nixon shock" by the Sato regime.[1]

However, despite these shocks, the Japanese Government soon reconciled itself to the American initiatives to China by describing the announcement as a "contribution to the lessening of world tensions and especially of Asian tensions."[2] President Nixon in his annual foreign policy report to the US Congress in 1972 acknowledged that these actions were shocks and called them regrettably "unavoidable". However, he declared that they "only accelerated an evolution in US-Japanese relations that was in any event overdue, unavoidable and in the long run, desirable."[3]

Nixon might have thought these moves as unavoidable but the Japanese Government faced many grave problems as a result of Sino-US rapprochement. In the first place, American overtures to China without prior consultations with Japan made a

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1 Roderick McFarquhar, Sino-American Relations, 1949-71 (New York, 1972), pp. 11-13; Robert E. Osgood, Retreat From Empire (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 196-97; Mihailo Saranovic, "Sino-American Dialogue", Review of International Affairs (Yogoslavia), vol. 22, 20 September 1971, p. 20.

2 New York Times, 17 July 1971.

3 Osgood, n. 1, p. 197.

mockery of the policy of coordination between the US and Japan. The two countries had pursued in the past identical policies towards China - regarding its membership in the United Nations and its recognition. To understand the grave problems which Japan faced as a result of President Nixon's decision to seek a rapprochement with China, it is necessary to briefly consider two things; first, the state of American-Japanese relations and second, the importance of the China issue in Japan's domestic politics.

Before the Second World War, Japan had faced United States opposition to its own China policy which was mainly aimed at the exploitation of China. However, it was not the China issue but the United States policy of blocking Japan's access to the natural resources of the countries South of China, which led to the outbreak of war between the US and China. Japan had decided to go to war with the United States as it expected a victory. What it aimed to gain was freedom of action with regard to China. But instead of driving out the US influence, Japan only succeeded in further involving the United States in the Far East. Ironically enough, Japan had not only to ask for American military presence for defense purposes but further had to pay price for the war with the United States. In 1952, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida that unless the Japanese Government agreed to have relations with

the Nationalist rather than with Communist China, the US Senate could not ratify the Peace Treaty, which would have ended the American occupation of Japan.[4] Consequently, the Japanese government yielded to the American pressure, and opened negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. On 28 April 1952, it signed a peace treaty with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.[5] Thus by signing the Peace Treaty of 1952, the Japanese Government had committed itself to full cooperation with the United States in its China policy. As a result, the relations with China had been a critical aspect of Japan's relations with the United States since the early 1950s.

Furthermore, China policy had been an important issue in Japan's domestic politics. The important elements within the ruling party, political opponents of the Government, major newspapers, and an influential section of the financial and business community, had been demanding a normalization in relations with Peking. The political opponents of the Sato regime had already been warning against having lively trade and strained political relations simultaneously with China. The American overtures to China proved correct the forecasts of the critics of Japan's China policy who had charged the

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4 Roderick McFarquhar, n. 1, p. 11.

5 Savitri Vishvanath, "Japan's China Policy: Difficult Tasks Ahead", China Report (New Delhi), vol. 7, pp. 11-13; Roderick McFarquhar, n. 1, pp. 11-13.

Sato Administration with failure to take any major initiative on the China issue out of its undue subservience to the US.[6]

Besides the above mentioned shocks and domestic political opposition, the Sino-US rapprochement had profound implications for Japan's entire foreign policy. In the first place, Japan's foreign policy had to undergo a profound change as a basic shift in American policy towards China took place. Commenting on this, the Far Eastern Economic Review wrote,... "To change diplomatic horses now would inevitably revive charges of "blind obedience" to Washington, yet to remain on the old track will further cut Japan adrift from the mainstream of world politics..."[7]

Secondly, the Sino-US rapprochement necessitated a review of Japan's relations with the United States. The basis of their close relations was the treaty of 1952, which provided security to Japan and served as the foundation on which their common Pacific policy was based. In the new context, the treaty appeared to have lost its raison d'etre. Could Japan continue to have its relation with the United States on the same basis when the US policy appeared to be changing course? If Japan too decided to change its policy what options it had? These were some of the hard questions which the Japanese

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6 Roderich McFarquhar, n. 1, pp. 11, 12.

7 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 73, 24 July 1971, p. 7.

leaders faced.[8]

The basic fear of Japan was in regard to its position in Asia. The Japanese Government had to change its Asian policy, which while toeing US policy line, had been primarily based on "anti-Peking, Pro-Taiwan stance". A fundamental shift in United States' Asian policy practically left Japan's policy in confusion with regard to Asia.. So long as the United States and Japan, the only two Governments to keep two China gimmick alive, had pursued a policy of containment and isolation of China, Japan had enjoyed much safer position in Asia. A nuclear armed China unresisted by the United States was sure to exert more influence not only in Asia but on a global scale than Japan as a growing economic power. In the long run, the Sino-US rapprochement was likely to undermine Japan's influence as an economic power in the world and particularly in Asia.[9] The American overtures to China raised doubts regarding the sincerity of the United States in treating Japan as a major ally and a full partner in East Asia. The Sato regime apprehended that in devising a rapprochement with China, the United States might regard its defense and other commitments to Japan as of minor significance.[10]

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8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

A change in the United States China policy necessarily implied a change in its policy towards Taiwan. Japan had not only considered Taiwan as the sole legal Government of all China, but had also maintained trade and economic interests in that island. The US policy shift towards Taiwan was a more serious problem for Japan as its economic involvements in the former were far greater than that of the United States.[11]

Japan's trade relations with China were also likely to be adversely affected by the improvement in United States relations with China. The United States had clearly indicated its intention of establishing trade and economic relations with China. The President himself had stated that he wanted China to grow "as an economic force in the world of enormous potential." Such a development could only undermine the Japanese economic predominance in the region.[12]

Japan, though following US policy towards China had not discouraged the growing trade between "friendly firms" and China. Most of these firms were dummy firms set up by big companies, which did not want to risk endangering relations with their American associates by directly trading with China. Therefore, the Japanese Government had started a channel of semi-official trade. While having sterile political relations

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11 Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (London, 1973), p. 198.

12 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 65, 26 July 1971, p. 95; Osgood, n. 1, p. 6.

with China, it justified its trade policies as Seiki Burni (separation of economic from politics). Japan's China trade had expanded considerably and by 1969-70 had reached such a level where further expansion could not be made without the grant of deferred payment terms. With the beginning of its fourth five-year plan in 1971, China began to approach the West European nations for capital on long-term credit.[13] Chinese approach to the Western European countries induced the business and financial circles in Japan to put pressure on the Government for recognition of China so that they may be able to compete with the European countries in this regard. The relaxation of trade and travel curbs by the United States to China gave impetus to demands for early normalization of relations with China. The United States decision to seek rapprochement with China without consulting Japan not only gave a setback to Japan's trade with China but inevitably led to apprehensions that in the event of the rapprochment materializing, Japan's trade interests could possibly be ignored and neglected.[14]

On the other hand, the Sino-US rapprochement led Japan to adopt, perhaps for the first time during post Second World War period, a foreign policy free from the United States' influence. It took several moves to strengthen its own position

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13 Savitri Vishvanath, n. 5, pp. 12-13.

14 Ibid.

by carrying out an autonomous diplomacy. As a result, the relations between Tokyo and Moscow grew warmer. The Newsweek called Japan's efforts to befriend the Soviet Union as "classical example of geopolitical manoeuvre" and an attempt to "redress the balance".[15] The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Japan in February 1971. The two Governments announced plans to begin negotiations on a treaty to end the state of war that had technically existed between them since the Second World War. They declared that negotiations had been initiated regarding the territorial disputes over the Russian-held Kurile islands. In the first week of March 1971, a 38-man Soviet economic delegation held talks lasting four days regarding a $2.5 billion Russo-Japanese pipeline project that could link the vast Siberian Oil fields at Tyumen with the Soviet port of Nakhodka, more than 4,000 miles away on the sea of Japan.[16]

Similarly, other Japanese initiatives in Asia involved significant diplomatic steps. In March 1972, Tokyo sent an official trade delegation to Hanoi, - the first formal contact between the two Governments. Both sides expressed the desire to maintain active diplomatic contacts. In another move to demonstrate its independence, the Japanese Government without

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15 Newsweek (New York), 6 March 1972, p. 22.

16 Ibid.

informing the United States recognized the new nation of Bangla Desh, to which the former had studiously denied recognition. Still another move with the same purpose in mind was the Sato Administration's announcement that it had decided to establish formal relations with Communist Mongolia. More significant was its move towards North Korea. Japan sent a parliamentary delegation headed by a leading member of Sato's Liberal Democratic Party to Pyongyang to conclude a written agreement on promoting trade.[17]

Nevertheless, the tension in relations between the US and Japan did not take a serious turn because of several factors. In the first place, the US did not desire its relations with Japan to deteriorate. The latter still occupied a very significant place in United States Asian policy. Japan's continued role as an ally was particularly essential once the US was only politically and not militarily present in Asia, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine which advocated a lower Asian profile for the US.[18] Perhaps, for the same reason, and in order to implement the Nixon Doctrine's strategy in the Far East, the US advocated the devolution of its regional security role to Japan.[19] However, there is no doubt that the United States

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17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 For details on devolution of America's regional security role to Japan, see Osgood, n. 1, pp. 193-205.

wanted partly to curb Japan's economic drive by increasing its own business involvements with China. That the United States was highly concerned about Japan's growing economic strength was evident from a speech delivered by Orville Freeman, the former US Secretary of Agriculture in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations for eight years. Addressing an American Chamber of Commerce meeting in Hong Kong in May 1971, Freeman said: "The technological progress in Japan is as good as in the United States. This is what worries the Americans and forces them to settle with China - the world's largest consumer market."[20]

As far as Japan was concerned, it had many positive reasons for not breaking ranks with the United States. The Newsweek commenting on Japan's options, wrote that Japan could not realistically afford to turn its back on the United States, as the latter was not only its largest trading partner but the "bearer of its all important nuclear umbrella". It viewed any such attempt as a "foolhardly indulgence for Japan".[21] In view of its defense vulnerability, Japan could not afford a continued deterioration of relations with the United States. Perhaps, it might have also realized that its options in the new four-power balance in Asia were going to be more circumscribed after the

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20 Commerce (Bombay), 26 June 1971, p. 1182.

21 Newsweek, 6 March 1972, p. 22.

Sino-US rapprochement.[22]

THE SOVIET UNION

The Sino-US rapprochement was a disturbing development for the Soviet Union which denounced President Nixon's visit to Peking on 21 February 1972 as "one more piece of evidence of an emerging American-Chinese deal to split the Communist world".[23] The Government newspaper Izvestia on 21 February 1972, very briefly described the President's trip to China, while it devoted considerable space to the Congress of the American Communist Party, which had vehemently criticized the Peking summit.[24] The official Soviet news agency Tass discussed the Nixon-Chou Communique at length on 28 February and noted with approval Peking's support for the Viet Cong peace proposal. It also commented that the Shanghai communique had stressed "essential differences" between the United States and China.[25]

The Soviet Union was convinced that a common hostility to it had brought the two countries together. The trade union newspaper Trud declared on 29 February that the Chinese leaders had "broken all records to curry favour", with the United States.

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22 Ibid.

23 New York Times, 21 and 22 February 1972.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 28 and 29 February 1972.

The Trud denounced the "Maoists" for having entered "a dangerous plot with the ruling circles of the United States". The Soviet Defense Ministry's statements appearing in the armed forces newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda also voiced its disfavour with the Sino-American summit.[26]

Perhaps, the United States approach to China through an intermediary like Rumania only helped to strengthen such convictions of the Soviet Union. The latter's role probably raised Russian doubts that the United States sought reconciliation with China as part of a general move against the Soviet position.[27]

The Sino-American reconciliation raised apprehensions in the minds of the Soviet leadership. The existing military or even potential power of China was not a matter of much concern for the Soviet Union. It rather feared that China might permit the use of its territory for its encirclement by the United States. Though China had been talking more about Japan's militarism as its major concern, the Russians knew that their immense nuclear strength and their forces on China's borders were more serious threat to China. The Soviet leadership also realized that China's fear of the Soviet Union was one of the factors which had moved China nearer to the United

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26 Ibid., 29 February 1972.

27 Wilson Carry McWilliams, "The Path to Peking", Commonweal (New York), vol. 94, 6 August 1971, p. 397.

States.[28]

The Sino-American rapprochement was, therefore, seen by the Soviet Union as China's attempt to counterbalance Russian military threat posed by the massing of the troops on the China's borders. In a parallel fashion, the United States efforts in devising a rapprochement with China was viewed as an American attempt to face the Soviet Union with better bargaining position. This understanding inclined the Soviet policy-makers to the possibilities of coming to terms with the United States over the reduction of troops in Europe, nuclear arms control, SALT talks and many other issues.[29]

One of the main Soviet fears was that the United States and China might try to undermine Soviet influence on a global scale. There were many reasons for such an apprehension. There were certain regions like the Middle East where in spite of fierce competition for power and influence, direct confrontation had been avoided by the two Super Powers. Nevertheless, there were other areas of competition and conflict where the Sino-American power combination could lead to serious complications for the Soviet Union. In Asia, the Russian involvement had considerably grown in the past decade. Compared to the USSR, the United States enjoyed more financial power and

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28 Ibid.

29 Dev Murarka, "The Ping-Pong Game: If only Moscow could Play the Referee", Commerce, vol. 122, 1 May 1971, p. 795.

leverage and China more geographical advantages in Asia. A Sino-American power combination could lead to the strengthening of the American hand against Russia.[30]

Some other existing realities and indirect statements only helped to strengthen these apprehensions. For instance, one day before the announcement of Peking trip was made, then Australian Labour Party leader Gough Whitlam disclosed an important statement made to him by Chou En-lai. The Chinese Premier had noted that China was at last willing to take part in a new Geneva Conference on Indochina, provided the Russo-British co-chairmanship (instituted in 1954) was ended, and the conference was given more "Asian character". The Chinese Premier's statement perhaps revealed a clear Chinese intention of excluding Russia from the Indochina stage.[31]

Besides these concerns, the Sino-US rapprochement presented Russia with the problems of strategy and tactics in diplomacy. However, Russia's room for manoeuvre, was limited as the only viable alternative left was to seek further understanding with the United States. The Sino-US rapprochement left Russia in a relatively weaker position as it could not seek reconciliation with a hostile China.[32] According to the

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30 Ibid.

31 "From Ping-Pong to Mah Jong", The Economist (London), vol. 240, 24 July 1971, pp. 16-17.

32 Dev Murarka, n. 29, p. 795.

Economist,

> ...Moscow is reduced to framing predictable sneers about American insincerity and China's betrayal of its own revolutionary principles. It can hardly even achieve much in the way of 'overtaking China on the left' and posing as the only surviving champion for all true revolutionaries, when it has already shown such eagerness to engage America in manifold negotiations itself. 33

Partly as a consequence of the rapprochement and especially in order to reaffirm its position, the Soviet Union tried to further befriend many countries. In October 1971, President Nikolai V. Podgorny visited North Vietnam and at the conclusion of five-day visit, the decision to establish long-term economic, cultural, scientific and technological relations was taken. Attempts were made to further strengthen the relations with Japan.[34] The United States rapprochement with China was soon followed by a detente with Russia. Though the ground for Moscow Summit had already been laid, the Soviet policy-makers showed more eagerness in holding the summit after the Peking trip took place. It became important for the Soviet leaders to demonstrate that the relationship between the two

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33 The Economist, n. 31, pp. 16-17. On 17 March 1970, an article in Pravda conveyed Soviet irritation with the resumption of talks between Washington and Peking, which it linked to "imperialist" efforts to split the Communist camp further. The Pravda also accused China of playing into the United States hands. Bernard Goverts-man in New York Times, 20 March 1970.

34 See p. 107.

Super Powers was more important in an altered global balance of power than between the United States and China. The same spirit was displayed in holding negotiations on SALT. The Sino-US rapprochement convinced the Soviet leaders that the balance of power in the seventies would be a three-cornered game.

TAIWAN

The favourable turn in Sino-US relations came as a profound shock to Taiwan. The Nationalists reacted to the United States' announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking initially with disbelief, than with dismay. Expressing the shock of his Government in a statement, Nationalist Premier C.K. Yen remarked, "This could lead to a tragedy far more serious than that involved in the fall of the Chinese mainland to the Communists in 1949."[35]

The Sino-US rapprochement had serious implications for Taiwan, as the United States had been associated with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan since the Korean War of 1950. An essential part of United States policy in its containment of the Communist China had been its continued support of Taiwan as the sole legal representatives of the Chinese people.

In order to consider the grave consequences of Sino-US dialogue for Taiwan, the state of American-Taiwan relations

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35 New York Times, 17 July 1971.

should be viewed first. The Korean War left American policy towards China in an uncompromising position. At the end of the war, the United Nations embargo against China was followed by US Congressional legislation prohibiting all trade with China. It also threatened sanctions against nations who violated it. At the same time, Dean Rusk then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, stated America's China policy. He said:

> We do not recognize the authorities in Peking for what they pretend to be... We recognize the national [SIC] Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory of its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. 36

Further, a defence pact was signed between Washington and Taipei late in 1954, which authorized the Eisenhower Administration to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The Treaty was approved by the US Senate in 1955.[37] One month before the treaty was passed, the Eisenhower Administration had concluded an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek which had formally declared American

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36 Quoted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Communist China (London, 1967), p. 293.

37 Bozidar Durica, "Taiwan in American-Chinese Relations", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, 20 April 1971, p. 17.

patronage over Taiwan and the surrounding islands.

The ties of common hostility to China had bound the two countries together. That hostility was nearing its end. Despite President Nixon's assurances that the relationship with China was not to be at the expense of old friends, the Taiwanese were upset over these developments. Peking's growing friendship with the outside world and specially with its hitherto arch-enemy, the United States, threatened the very existence of Taiwan which China had pledged to regain at any cost.

The gradual unfolding of a new US-China policy through significant steps was already pointing to the process which the Nationalists viewed as a "trend away from support of their regime." During his visit to Taipei in August 1969, Secretary William P. Rogers was closely questioned by the Nationalist leaders on the relaxation of travel and trade curbs to China. The Secretary assured the Nationalists that the "gestures fell into the context of President's promise to seek improved relations with all Governments."[38]

But further steps by the Nixon Administration to improve United States' relations with China only heightened the suspicions of the Nationalists. The reduction of America's commitments to the Republic of China was foreshadowed by a number of events. In November 1969, the US Seventh Fleet

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38 New York Times, 3 August 1969.

quietly terminated its two-destroyer patrol in the Taiwan Strait.[39] This move probably construed an apparent signal to Peking of United States' gradually changing stance. It underlined the latter's desire to move in the direction of normalization of relations with China in advance of the resumption of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks which were held in Warsaw in January 1970. The Department of State declared on 12 March 1970 that it no longer opposed repeal of congressional resolutions supporting freedom of action by the President in certain military situations abroad - including resolution dealing with United States defense of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.[40] The blow was one in a series of repeated diplomatic shocks like the opening of the Warsaw talks with the Communist China, the elimination of regular United States Navy patrols in the Taiwan Strait, the softening of the trade embargo against Communist China and Nationalist, failure to get phantom jets.[41]

In late October 1970, President Nixon assured Nationalist China's Premier C.K. Yen that "the U.S. would continue to

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39 Osgood, n. 1, p. 193.

40 New York Times, 13 and 19 March 1970.

41 In January 1970, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers introduced a bill, recommending to place a squadron of F-4D Phantom jets in the hands of the Nationalist Government. This was rejected by the House of Representatives in view of a growing Sino-US thaw. New York Times, 20 March 1970.

support Taiwan in maintaining its membership in the United Nations and that relations with Communist China in no way implied a reduction in Washington's support for the Nationalists militarily or politically."[42] But only a month later the US abandoned its long held policy of opposition to China's entry into the UN and argued instead against the expulsion of Taiwan. In July 1971, the Nixon Administration disclosed that nuclear weapons on Okinawa would not be moved to Taiwan after Okinawa's reversion to Japan. In the same month, the Administration announced the ending of US air reconaissance missions over mainland China from Taiwan.[43]

On 9 April 1971, Wei yu-sen, spokesman for the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry, characterized the invitation to the American table tennis team to visit mainland China as a "political plot", against the interests of Taiwan.[44]

The Nationalist Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 28 February denouncing the Sino-US communique. It declared that Taiwan would consider "null and void" any agreement which had been reached between the US and the "Chinese Communist regime", involving the rights and interests of the Government and people of the Republic of China. The Taiwan Press strongly condemned the Chou-Nixon communique. The Daily

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42 New York Times, 26 October 1970.

43 Osgood, n. 1, p. 193.

44 New York Times, 10 April 1971.

newspaper Chung-Kuo Shih Pao said that President Nixon "gained nothing from China. The largest paper on the island, Lien Ho Pao, said that the Nixon journey had been a "complete failure".[45]

The Sino-US thaw led not only to the expulsion of Taiwan from the world body but also gave a rude jolt to its economic position. Japan was a bigger investor in Taiwan than the United States. It was feared that Japan might change its policy in view of the changed status of Taiwan. Besides Japan, other countries which held trade relationship with Taiwan were likely to change their policies with a change in United States Taiwan policy. The most serious impact of Sino-US thaw was the loss of American support for the two-China thesis, which ultimately led to the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971.

INDIA

Like many countries, India was surprised at President Nixon's decision to visit China. The Indian Government officially welcomed the Sino-US reconciliation, expressing hopes that it would be outside the "power context". Nevertheless, the announcement of President's Peking visit, coming after a steady improvement in Sino-US relations, was bound to lead to anxious rethinking about the delicate balance of the country's

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45 Ibid., 29 February 1972.

relations with the major powers. The discovery that the United States had sought Pakistan's help in arranging Henry Kissinger's secret mission to Peking in July 1971, only helped to raise India's suspicions. In the event of any major clash with India, Pakistan could seek help of China, now uninhibited by the fear of a strong American response.

The Sino-American rapprochement also highlighted the immense potentialities of a Sino-US combination in Asia. The Indian Subcontinent was an area where the United States and China could supplement each other's efforts to limit Soviet influence as well as Indian power, and where the convergence of their interests could make it easier for them to pursue parallel policies.[46]

A change in overall Asian balance of power had many grave implications for India. A tripolar balance in Asia between the United States, China and the Soviet Union, that had come into existence as a result of United States' rapprochement could profoundly influence the international status of middle powers like India. For the new power balance to become functionally stable, each super power had to recognize the interests of the other two. Identification of these vital interests was itself going to be a very complex exercise.

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46 Sisir Gupta, "Sino-U.S. Detente and India", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 27, January-March 1971, pp. 182-84.

Carving out of spheres of influence had to revolve round the respective vital interests of the three powers. The security of small nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Burma and the Philippines could be ensured, though their independence of policy could get curtailed. In such an event, the consequences for middle powers like India and Japan could be more serious. India could not ignore the fact that the new international structure of power was unlikely to produce a reliable system of security for it.[47]

India also feared that Asia might become the testing ground for the conflicts of the triangular power struggle. It could also lead to other disturbing factors for India, in view of over all Asian situation. There was also a possibility of realignment of political forces in Asia. Most of the countries of this region had to reexamine their defined and undefined alignments with the United States which could possibly aggravate regional instability.[48]

In view of such grave consequences, to which the Sino-US power combination could lead, the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi remarked, "India will not allow China and America to decide what should happen in Asia."[49] Sino-US

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47 Savitri Vishvanath, n. 5, p. 26.

48 Rajan, "China, America and Asia", China Report (New Delhi), vol. 7, July/August 1971, p. 24.

49 U.S. News & World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 72, 6 March 1972, p. 16.

reconciliation was probably one of the factors which brought India closer to the Soviet Union as the former felt isolated and vulnerable. India signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in August 1971, which further consolidated its ties with the Soviet Union.

WESTERN EUROPE

The Sino-US rapprochement could also lead to a deterioration in the United States' alliance with Western Europe. Such a possibility became more apparent when President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, pre-occupied with seeking the rapprochement with China and detente with Russia, had little time, except during the dollar crisis after 15 August 1971, to think about future economic, financial, military and nuclear relations with their European allies. West European countries suspected that they did not matter much in the balance of power manoeuvres in which the US was engaged. Primarily because Western Europe was not a great power. To quote Henry Brandon:

> ...in order to gain a freer hand for this great-power diplomacy, the Nixon administration tended to behave like a mother bird towards its allies and friends to make them more aware of the future need to fly on their own wings. They wondered whether the Gaullist view - that it was interests, not friends, that mattered - had come to inspire American diplomacy. 50

As a result allied relationships had been unnecessarily hurt.

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50 Henry Brandon, n. 11, pp. 350, 351.

OTHER COUNTRIES

The Sino-US rapprochement had similar implications for other Governments and countries which were either ideologically allied to Peking or were supported and protected by the financial and military power of the United States. South Korea officially welcomed the American President's visit to Peking but there was a concern that the United States might make a deal resulting in removal of US military forces which were helping protect that country.[51] However, such apprehensions soon disappeared after the conclusion of the Peking trip and the Shanghai Communique. Foreign Minister of South Korea Kim Yong Shik, speaking to the newsmen on 28 February welcomed the efforts of President Nixon in seeking reconciliation with China. Kim said that the South Koreans regarded the Shanghai communique as "reaffirmation of the US pledge to stand with us for the defence of our nation."[52]

North Korea officially endorsed China's political move and assessed the forthcoming talks as proof of the defeat of American imperialism. After the US announcement of the Peking visit, in a statement on 6 August 1971 the North Korean Premier, Kim II Sung, called the visit "not a march of a victor but a trip of the defeated".[53] North Korean's verbal expression

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51 U.S. News & World Report, 6 March 1972, pp. 14-16.

52 New York Times, 29 February 1972.

53 Ibid., 17 August 1971.

of support was followed afterwards by some "minor" steps and initiatives on the part of the Democratic Republic of Korea in relation to the regime in South Korea. A programme of "three possibilities" was drawn up suggesting a confederation, economic and other exchanges, and mutual visit or at least an exchange of letters between divided families. Soon after this, the first direct meeting in twenty years of North and South Korean representatives of the Red Cross took place. The possibility of further contacts was discussed.[54]

South Vietnam's first official comment on President Nixon's visit to China came on 1 March 1972. Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam said that the South Vietnamese were not upset regarding the issue of ultimate withdrawal of United States' forces from Indochina. He further remarked, "we fully approve of Mr. Nixon's trip... The United States has been very correct and faithful in its commitments to Vietnam, and we especially appreciate the mention of our eight-point peace proposal."[55]

North Vietnam initially seemed to be worried about the Sino-American thaw. The Government voiced its apprehension that Nixon trip to Peking intended "to drive a wedge between communist countries". At the conclusion of Soviet visit to

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54 Mihailo Saranovic, "Sino-American Dialogue", Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, 20 September 1971, pp. 20-22.

55 New York Times, 29 February 1972.

Hanoi in October 1971, a joint statement was issued. The statement denounced the President's trip by saying, "the reactionary imperialist forces are trying to sow division within the anti-imperialist front and among the Socialist countries."[56] A feeling seemed to be growing in Hanoi that China no longer wanted North Vietnam to win a military victory - that it would like to have Indochina "Balkanized", rather than see it ruled by a Hanoi regime that was linked closely to Moscow.[57] But this fear seemed to be disappearing gradually, as China declared its intention officially that it had no wish or intention to be a mediator between the United States and North Vietnam on the issue of ending the Indo-China conflict.[58] Expressions of welcome for the Sino-US rapprochement came also from the New Zealand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand hoped that Peking's desire for better relations could mean reduced Chinese help to Thai insurgents but feared that it could weaken American commitments to Bangkok. In Australia, the China question was expected to

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56 Ibid., 10 October 1971.

57 US News & World Report, 6 March 1972, pp. 14-16.

58 Mihailo Saranovic, n. 54, pp. 20-22. North and South Vietnam, had long been holding talks with the United States in Paris regarding a political settlement in Vietnam. North Vietnam had always upheld its stand of being an independent entity in the solving of the Vietnam problem and had declared that no other country including China, could conclude peace or suggest solutions to the Vietnam conflict on its behalf.

be a primary issue in national elections in 1972, therefore far-reaching domestic consequences of the Presidential trip were also expected in Australia.[59] The Pakistan press hailed the Sino-US rapprochement and the Pakistan Foreign Ministry expressed the hope that normalization of relations between the US and China would lead to the possibility for resolution of many of the problems in the world and especially in Asian region.[60]

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59 Ibid.

60 New York Times, 29 February 1972.

CONCLUSION

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A few months before the final victory of the Communists in China in October 1949, the United States gave up its effort to back up the Chinese Nationalists and became reconciled to a Communist regime on the mainland. However, the establishment of the People's Republic of China came as a shock to a very large number of Americans. The Truman Administration regarded the Soviet Union as the main opponent of the United States and China as a mere pliant tool in its hands. However, it initially hoped to wean China away from the influence of the Soviet Union by making conciliatory gestures. It is evident from the record that on the issue of recognition and the seating of China in the United Nations, the United States adopted a soft approach. But the Chinese Communists were not interested. By seizing American consular property and launching the "hate America" campaign, they spurned the American gestures. Their actions led to a hardening of the American attitude. Eventually the Chinese intervention in the Korean war brought about a complete reversal of the American policy. The United States became committed to a policy of containment and isolation of China, which led to a series of political, economic and military moves against the mainland. Denying diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime, blocking its membership in the United Nations, encouraging its "withering away", supporting its rival regime on Taiwan as the sole legitimate Government of whole China, imposing a total embargo on all American trade with China and

encirclement of the mainland with American military bases were different aspects of the same policy. The policy remained in existence for nearly two decades and was the predominant element of US policy in Asia.

Since the beginning of the sixties, the American enthusiasm for the policy of "isolation and containment" began to decline. Doubts began to be expressed whether the policy of isolating China was succeeding at all. China was able to obtain critical and strategic raw materials for its economic and industrial development despite American embargo against trade with itself. To its own mortification, the United States discovered that many of its western allies were reaping the benefits of trade with China. Similarly, there were doubts whether the policy of containment had any relevance in the Asian context. Many asked whether China could be contained by a policy of leading an alliance of smaller states or by fighting a war on its periphery. Gradually opinion began to veer round the view in the United States that the China policy required to be modified. But as a result of the anti-communist and anti-China rhetoric there had come into existence a strong body of opinion which resisted change. A lobby operating in favour of the "Nationalist" China aided and abetted the opposition to change.

The China policy of the United States was viewed from a new perspective under the Nixon Administration. Nevertheless, the seeds of a shift in policy had been sown in the previous

decade. Although no bold initiatives had been taken in view of possible domestic opposition, both President Kennedy and Johnson had come to regard the policy of containment of China as unrealistic. During the period from 1959 to 1969, several moves -- such as Roger Hilsman's "open door" speech of 13 December 1963, Senator Fulbright's plea for a reassessment of China policy on 25 March 1964, extended hearings on mainland China held by Representative Zablocki's Far East Sub-Committee in May 1965 and Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1966 -- indicated that modifications in China policy were being seriously considered by important sections within the US Government. Curiously enough, it was during this period that a specific change regarding ban against travel to China was announced on 11 December 1965.[1] During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations new liberal elements, sympathetic to change in US China policy, had gradually replaced old "Cold Warriors" who had earlier dominated the State Department. The demands for a new China policy by American scholars on China and other "opinion makers" had drastically changed the rhetorical foundations of US China policy. Their serious arguments and sober reasonings helped in the modification of the attitude of the Americans towards accommodation with China.

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1 James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of US-China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics" China Quarterly (London), April/June 1972, pp. 232-33.

It would perhaps be more accurate to say that a changed US stance towards China was a legacy which President Nixon inherited from Kennedy and Johnson. Besides the above mentioned initiatives and a liberal China bureaucracy, the legacy consisted of reports and documents, like the Rice Paper, which had been produced from time to time, suggesting possible US initiatives towards China. President Nixon came into office at a time when it was widely acknowledged that change in United States' China policy was long overdue and when the domestic political opposition to a change had been eroded to the extent that it had become comparatively easier for him to move towards normalization in relations with China.

The Sino-US rapprochement would not have been possible without certain changes in the attitudes prevailing in both the United States and China. After the upheavals caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), China once again began to exhibit its keen interest in international political and economic activities. Its immense potentialities were reflected in the rapid growth of its industry, agriculture and trade. As Newsweek observed, Chinese leaders were acting in international politics more as "Masters of Real Politik than of World Revolution".[2] Chinese embassies were restaffed. This was in a striking contrast with the year 1967-68 when there was only one Chinese ambassador abroad. Despite its expanded interests

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2 Newsweek, 21 February 1972, pp. 30-31.

in world affairs, China appeared to be less of a threat to the United States than it had been during the days when China had appeared as a part of "Communist monolith". With the decline in American power as a result of involvement in the war in Indo-China, the policy of "containment" of China no longer appeared as credible. On the contrary, the United States hoped to get out of its predicament in Vietnam with the Chinese help. As a powerful nation, China could certainly play a significant role in preserving a balance of power in Asia, which could help the United States as well. President Nixon entered the office at the right moment in history when a change in American public opinion coincided with China's changed world view.

Certain motivating factors like accentuation of the Sino-Soviet split; a realistic view of China's nuclear power; assessment of United States interests in emerging quadrilateral balance of power in Asia and the Pacific; desire to gain a respectable withdrawal from Vietnam, to safeguard United States economic and trade interests, and finally, to secure a stable world structure of power, led to the Sino-US rapprochement. President Nixon not only realized the need for changes in US policy to bring it in line with the changed realities but he also cleverly manipulated various factors to his advantage. The Nixon Administration took pains to assert that improvement in relations with China was not aimed at exploiting the rift between the two communist giants nor disrupting the already

improving relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it desired to induce the Soviet Union to take a more conciliatory posture over issues relating to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Middle East, Berlin, and to seek its cooperation in the consolidation of a stable world structure of power. To put it in simple words, the rapprochement with China constituted a brilliant diplomatic coup vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Besides, removing the long term and the immediate nuclear threat posed by China to itself and its allies, Nixon seized the opportunity of bringing China into general arms limitation negotiations.

Another significant gain which President Nixon sought was to enlist China's cooperation in seeking an honourable withdrawal from Vietnam. There was an urgent need to seek a retreat from the tragic US involvement on the Asian mainland and particularly from Vietnam. The involvement in Vietnam had not only thrown national priorities of the United States in disorder but had largely alienated the American public opinion from Governments' war policy. By its search of rapprochement with China, enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine (which advocated a lower Asian profile for the United States), and the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Administration tried to establish new relations with all of Asia including China. Reconciliation with the latter was also viewed as essential by the Nixon Administration, in order to attain the prime objective of ensuring a global balance of power which in turn could safeguard the US interests. The new approach to world politics, introduced

by Henry Kissinger, aimed at securing a stable structure of relationship between five major power centers. This was intended not only to put an end to the Cold War of nearly two decades since the Second World War but also to the creation of a pentagonal world, wherein power centers could check each other and none could gain a unilateral advantage at the expense of another. The Nixon Administration assigned a key role to China in this.

Besides, change in the domestic political environment and change in Peking's world view, there were several other developments which influenced the American attitude. When things began to return to normalcy after the Cultural Revolution had spent its fury, many of the allies of the United States broke rank with it and proceeded to recognize the People's Republic of China. This implied de-recognition of Taiwan. Each country did this on its own without taking the views of the United States into consideration. Beginning with Canada in October 1970, other countries like Italy, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chile, Kuwait, Cameroon, San Marno, Equatorial Guinea and Australia accorded recognition to the Communist regime. Significant changes were foreseen within the United Nations itself. It was becoming clear to the US policy-makers that soon those who supported the seating of China would be in a majority and the US-led opposition would be reduced to a minority. In November 1970, the supporters of China in the United Nations got an actual majority of those voting, 51 to 49.

Only the fact that the General Assembly under United States pressure declared the issue "as an important question" requiring a two-third majority delayed a change that year.[3] According to a report in the U.S. News & World Report, demands were made within the United Nations for the dismissal of the Nationalist Chinese employed in services of the United Nations. The UN Secretariat authorities were reported as contemplating the steps towards making the Chinese an official language and of according the People's Republic parity with the United States and the Soviet Union in distribution of major jobs.[4] A majority of smaller countries, which had helped the United States in blocking China's entry into the UN under the heavy US pressure, seemed to be looking to their own future and own interests which required normalization of their relations with Peking. After all, how could these countries support the United States when the latter itself appeared to be swiftly moving towards a rapprochement with the Chinese. As it can be clearly seen that the main reason for the abundance by the United States of its two-China thesis was its awareness that it would serve the American national interest much more, if China would play a more active role in international politics. According to the United States, one of the ways of ensuring this was to get

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3 U.S. News & World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 71, 16 August, 1971, pp. 20, 21.

4 Ibid.

Peking into the world body. The President's Commission for the observance of the 25th Anniversary, of the United Nations headed by former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, in a report submitted on 26 April 1971, recommended that the US seek "as early as practicable" admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, but without the expulsion of the Nationalist China. The report further added: "However, difficult the People's Republic of China's membership in the UN might become, the Commission believes there is more hope for peace in its interaction in the organization than in its continued isolation from the UN and from the United States".[5] The report was an expression of the growing official view that in spite of strenuous US efforts to contain China, it had already achieved a "diplomatic breakout". The United States realization of this stark reality led to Sino-US reconciliation as well as to US support of seating China in the UN in 1971.

The United States new relations with its former adversary had profound implications for countries like Soviet Union, Japan, Western Europe, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand. As regards Japan and other major Western European allies of the United States, the Sino-US reconciliation made them free to pursue their own national interests without the constraint of having to follow the US line in respect to China. Now they could shape their relations with China in freedom.

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5 New York Times, 27 April 1971; Newsweek (New York), 10 May 1971, p. 43.

The Sino-US rapprochement by establishing communications between the two countries made the multilateral balance more real. It contributed to the ending of the Cold War atmosphere of last two and a half decades and opened the possibility of reduction in the arms race. Above all, it freed the United States to carry on its dialogue with the Soviet Union from a comparatively better bargaining position. The United States now was in a position where it could have a dialogue with China as well as the Soviet Union, an advantage which none of the other two powers in the triangular relationship enjoyed.

Although President Nixon's Peking visit and Shanghai Communique resulted in effective restoration of direct links between the two countries, certain fundamental issues like Taiwan, diplomatic relations, recognition of Peking regime, remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration had finally succeeded in normalizing the relations between the two countries which had been locked in hostile immobility for nearly two decades.

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