THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY 2016: AN ASSESSMENT

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
Jawaharlal Nehru University

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2022

Date: 05.09.2022

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**The European Union Global Strategy 2016: An Assessment**" submitted by me for the award of degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any degree of this University or any other University.

Khushboo Sen Dhuruv

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed the examiners for evolution.

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Dedicated to

My Best Friend Bhawana

CONTENTS

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank many people who helped me in this journey to write this dissertation during the pandemic period. Without their support, this research work would not be possible.

First of all, I would like to give special thanks to my supervisor Professor Ummu Salma Bava, who has been the backbone of this research and guided me as a milestone on my research journey. I had diverse ideas and lacked coherency in research analysis, but she helped me navigate this difficulty. She helped me to outline the chapters and their engagement with the topic. During the COVID-19 period, she was very cooperative and patient toward my work. She gave me all the academic support needed for this research work. In reality, she prepared me and encouraged me to keep working on goals in the most difficult time.

I would like to thank all faculty members and staff of the Centre of the European Studies, who were very kind and helpful toward me. I would give my grateful thanks to the Rembrandt library of the Centre for European studies, Ambedkar Library of JNU and School of International Studies for providing research materials and conducting seminars/conferences for intensive dialogue to frame this research.

There are many minds and hands who supported me. Many times I felt disappointed, but my sisters (Ruchi di, Savita and Shweta) and parents motivated me to keep growing each day. Along with my family, there is only one person for whom I am very grateful and feel lucky to have such a friend in my life who helped me emotionally and financially, my friend Bhawana. I am also thankful to Abhishek, Dhriti, and Purnima for their academic advice.

Date: 5.09.22   Khushboo Sen Dhuruv
New Delhi

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS

CARD   Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CEES   Central and Eastern European Countries

CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP   Common Security and Defence Policy

EC   European Community

ECB   European Central Bank

ECSC   European Coal and Steel Community

EDC   European Defence Community

EDF   European Defence Fund

EEAS   European External and Action Service

EEC   European Economic Community

EMP   Euro- Mediterranean Policy

EMU   European Monetary Union

ENP   European Neighbourhood Policy

ESCB   European System Central Bank

ESDP   European Security and Defence Policy

ESS   European Security Strategy

EPC   European Political Cooperation

EU   European Union

EUGS   European Union Global Strategy

EUMC   European Union Military Committee

EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
HRVP	High Representative and Vice President
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MENA	Middle-East and North Africa
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation on Security and Cooperation Europe
PESCO	Permanent Structure Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UK	United Kingdom
WEU	Western European Union

Preface

This study is an Assessment about the European Union's Global Strategy 2016. It is a strategic document for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. The Global Strategy was adopted in June 2016 and replaced its predecessor European Security Strategy 2003. Therefore, the study is based on the assessment of the EUGS. The topmost priority of the Global Strategy is security of the Union and its citizens from internal challenges and external threats.

The First Chapter of this study introduces the topic. The Second Chapter analyses the changing security landscape in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The dynamic security environment in the post-Cold War order brought opportunities and challenges for Europe. During the Cold War, Europe enjoyed the longest peace for forty-five years due to bipolar word order. However, the fall of the Berlin War, Germany unification, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought the end of the Cold Era. With the emergence of unipolar world order, Europe witnessed new security threats such as, the breaking down of Yugoslavia, mass migration, organised crime and the rise of non-state actors. The hegemonic world order was shocked after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US.

The Third Chapter examines the evolution of the EU as a security actor. It describes the integration process and institutional reform from ECSC to the EU. The Treaty of Paris established the ECSC for economic integration and building peace for United Europe. Later on Treaty of Rome (EEC) and the Merger Treaty reformed the institutional structure. The European security and identity shaped by the EPC process began with Luxembourg Report, the Second report, Copenhagen Report, and London Report. The SEA amendment to the EEC and reformed in the EPC. However, at the end of the Cold War, the EPC became outdated in addressing European security concerns. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty reformed the earlier institutional setting and legally established the European Union for the CFSP and CSDP.

The Fourth Chapter of this study examines the European Union Global Strategy. In the 21st century, the world has become more fragile. The new security threats are unpredictable and unidentified. The unstable and insecure region questioned the EU's abilities. The ESS's predecessor strategy of the EUGS became old in addressing

complex, connected and contested security issues. The ESS was adopted in 2003 in the aftermath of the dramatic transatlantic rift, and division within the Member States over Iraq invasion was significant. Since then, the world has become more uncertain regarding unidentifiable security threats. The Global Strategy is a comprehensive document that addresses conventional and new security threats and enhances coherence, cooperation and connectivity within and beyond Europe. The Global Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the EU to promote common European interests.

Chapter five of this study focuses on findings of the research. It includes critical assessment and new findings of the research. The research is important and relevant in the current scenario. The study examines the EU is a normative power and a global actor in international relations. The global strategy provides strategic autonomy to promote common interests. It is based on shared interests and principles which promote peace and guarantee the security of citizens and territory. The internal security of European depends on the external region's peace and stability. Therefore, to secure European security and their interests, the strategy invests in the resilience of states and societies to East and South. It adopts an integrated approach to crisis and conflict for prevention and stabilisation. The conflict and crisis at the national, regional and global levels cannot be solved alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through deep and durable comprehensive agreements. Therefore, a cooperative regional order of regional and international partnerships can ensure peace and development in Europe. All these approaches and agreements are based on global governance in accordance with international law. To pursue all these priorities and make vision (CFSP and CSDP) into action, the EUGS invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union. Thus, assessment of the EUGS supports that EUGS has enhanced the capability and capacity of the Union as a global security actor.

FIRST CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

"Instead of ending, history returned with a vengeance in 1990/1991- like a film stopped for 45 years which then suddenly resumed"

(Joffe 1993: 40)

The history of the European continent has witnessed a range of major wars like "the Thirteen Year's War in the early seventeenth century, the Seven Year's War in mid-eighteenth century, the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of nineteenth century, and the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War in the twentieth century" (Cottey 2007: 11). The security environment in Europe in the early part of the 21st century was different from the past. The modern world was more prone towards the uncertainty of war and outbreak of conflicts at any time and at any cost. During the Cold War, world politics was in the defined security structure due to confrontation between the two hegemonic power the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Therefore, during the defined security structure, the Europeans enjoyed the longest peace within the bipolar system where security threats were identifiable and predictable (Cottey 2007)

The reason for the longest peace for the forty-five years from 1945-1990 was the absence of war in Europe. It had two primary reasons, first, the bipolar structure of world order and second, arms race of the weapon of mass destruction which prevented Europe from the war-like situation and maintained "long peace" (term coined by Gaddis 1986). The Cold War Europe was more peaceful and secure than the early 20th Century (Mearsheimer 1990: 6).

The breakdown of the Berlin Wall in 1989 reunited Germany and the collapse of the Communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe brought to end the Cold War with new opportunities and real challenges in Europe. It provided a hope to overcome from the Cold War's terrible memory of a divided continent and develop a free Europe based on shared democratic principles. According to Mearsheimer, with the end of the Cold War states "have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war, which has become an

obsolescent enterprise" (Mearsheimer 2001: 1). Whereas for Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War also brought the moment to "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1992: 4).

The Death of Bipolarity and the Return of War to Europe

The end of the Cold War changed the security landscape of Europe. Two significant developments that occurred in the internal and external area of Europe redefined and reshaped its security. Internally, the significant developments in Europe were German unification, the end of East-West division, emergence of new security challenges such as the breaking down of Yugoslavia, mass migration, organised crime and rise of non-state actors. Externally, Europe faced the end of East-West conflict, the demise of the Communist bloc, the Cold War came to end and the emergence of the US hegemony in world politics. The new world order shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. According the Krauthammer, "the post-Cold War world was a unipolar moment of centre stage of the unchallenged superpower" (Krauthammer 1991: 23). The disappearance of common threats that were perceived by both the superpowers, after emergence of the US as sole great superpower in world politics, and rise of small aggressive states, and rise of new strategic environment transformed the concept of security in the world and Europe as well.

The new security threats in new Europe were more complicated, diffusive, and unpredictable in nature and thus it was difficult to address them. "The long peace" of Europe went into crisis after the breakout of the Yugoslavian Civil war in 1992 which led to the break-up of the country in the Balkans. This division began the identity politics in Eastern and Southern Europe and resulted in a flow of refugee from the Balkans. For William Bradford, "the fall of Yugoslavia shattered the visions of a 'New World Order' and cast a 'long dark shadow' over the entire European continent" (Bradford 2000: 14).

The violent breakup of Yugoslavia brought more new tensions and complexities in the regional identity and security debate in Europe. This civil war breakup added more political instability, and extreme nationalism in the Balkans and the impact of the violence was felt in the entire continent which saw the return of intra-state war in 1991. The European Economic Community (EC) which got transformed in the EU in 1992 called the Yugoslavian war as "our crisis". The EU was a new political actor and was

not able to called end this effectively to the civil war in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the US and NATO brought the situation under control.

The Yugoslavian civil war crisis developed the collective consensus about the need for significant changes in European security cooperation (Väyrynen 1997: 5-14). The common continent security approach of Europe seemed to be profoundly problematic. Therefore, the Central-Eastern European countries became the member of NATO and the EU for their security and economics needs. The Eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO extended the borders of Europe towards Russia and this raised concerns over security issues.

Integration and Institutional Reform of the European Economic Community

The European Economic Community (EC) was built in the post-Second World. Since the creation of the EC, it has expanded its size through inclusion of more Member States. In 1952, as the Cold War was expanding, two community building approaches were launched by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) along with an idea for European Defence Community (EDC). The aim of the ECSC was to gain economic integration, whereas, EDC proposed a federalist idea of an integrated European Army. However, the idea of the EDC got defeated after two years of debate. The success of the ECSC let to the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 which created a common market of free trade with low tariffs for the Member States. The ongoing growth of the EC let to increase an external economic activities and internally created a Single Market under the provision of the SEA. The 1987 Single European Act was significant for the growth of the Union's economic policy. The Maastricht Treaty/the Treaty on European Union in 1993 created a new actor in world politics and attempts were made to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enhanced the EU's political direction for external policy. The Article of J.1 TEU stated that objectives of the CFSP was "to safeguards the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union, to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international security (in accordance of UN Charter), to promote international cooperation and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (TEU 1992: 58). The CFSP was created in Maastricht Treaty, and later on, it was reinforced by the Amsterdam

(1999) and Nice Treaty (2003). In 1994, the Central and Eastern European countries applied to join the EU and NATO. The first enlargement of the EU took place in 1995 with the addition of Sweden, Finland and Austria (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 3-5). Thus, the development of the European Union and the idea of Common Foreign and Security Policy from 1990 to 2000 was considerable as it created huge efforts towards integration at regional level, efficient decision making institutional structure and establish the EU as a global leader. With the launch of the CFSP, the EU started taking steps towards becoming a full-fledged political and security actor in Europe and in the World (Bava 2019).

Security: A Problematic Concept

The word security is the most contested concept in international relations. It lacks a coherent, systematic and general definition. In general terms, security means being secure and can be seen as "the absence of threat" or "lack of vulnerability" (Cottey 2007: 6).

In the Cold War period, the traditional concept of security was dominated the field which viewed military threats as matter of national security. During this period security was defined in the limited manner and due the presence of nuclear weapon both sides, deterrence was the tools used by the US and the Soviet Union to dominance. During the period of détente, insecurity in Europe declined and this led to non-cooperation on both sides of iron wall. However, with the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan 1979, it was end of détente and here was return of Cold War between the superpower. After the end of the Cold War era, the new world order brought dramatic shift in the concept of security.

The geopolitical landscape changed the structure of the security in the world. In the new world order, traditional security threat not remained valid after the demise of the Soviet Union because it produced more undefined and unpredictable threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, international migration and climate change which was beyond the traditional aspect of security to explain it. The concept of security became more complex to define in the Post-Cold War order.

In the Cold War era, security was in defined structure with the territorial integrity, political independence and value system of states via manoeuvring of power and force. Security was envisaged in terms of a balance of power, alliance, deterrence and defence.

However, after the end of the Cold War, the debate started over new security approach in pursuit a more comprehensive agenda of security coherence. It widened the concept of security beyond the purely state-centric military based issues to a broad range of non-traditional threats (Cottey and Averre 2002: 6-7).

New Security Agenda in Europe

A new global security agenda emerged in the 21st century and it included more specific features such as shifting a pattern of warfare from international to internal conflicts, growing role of non-state actor especially terrorist group who could use nuclear or chemical weapons of mass destruction, rising non-traditional issues like; migration, economic instability, energy security, climate change, transnational crises and technology which all posed serious challenges to human security.

A dramatic shift occurred in international politics after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the US which marked the terrorism a top priority of the global security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US changed the context of security and it shook the world. The attack posed a threat to the European security and challenges for the EU and its Member States. This attack raised an unprecedented wave of European solidarity with the US. In the view of terrorist attack, NATO invoked the article 5 which states that the attack on one member is considered as an attack on all. In response to the 9/11 attack, the US chose not to use the assistance under article 5, but launched war on terrorism in Afghanistan to seized the base of Al-Qaeda and overthrown the Taliban regime. In 2003 the US launched pre-emptive action against Iraq. The European solidarity with the US over the Iraq war created a division among the Member States of the EU. The division within the member countries of the Union challenged the idea of unity within the Union (Bava 2019). In this complex security environment, the European Union High Representative and Vice President of European Commission, Javier Solana produced a strategic document and implemented the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. The adoption of the first strategic document in the aftermath of the dramatic transatlantic rift and division within the Member States over Iraq invasion was significant. It provided the Union a first strategic vision, which assisted in restoring the inter-European Union transatlantic division. The ESS analysed the key security challenges to EU's security environment, these are "Terrorism, Proliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crimes" (ESS 2003: 30-31).

Strategy Making in the European Union

Since the post-Cold War, the discipline of international relations has majorly determined on the strategy and superpower state's behaviour in the international politics. Consequently, due to structural change in international system Europe lost its strategic importance, political influence and relative power. Therefore, the EU had needed a security strategy to regain its actorness (Hansen et al. 2009:1-5).

In order to achieve security policy goals, the EU needed to adopt a security strategy along with the effective means and methods. A security strategy should base on acceptable aims, requirements, methods, means and operational choices for the developments of crisis management capabilities. Thus, the EU required a common and shared strategy that exists within the Union between the Member States on the matter of internal and external action. The first shared strategic document the ESS was adopted by the EU for internal policies and strategies to influence the external activities. The objectives and tasks of the ESS is divided into three sections; threats, strategies and political consequences identified a first step towards grand strategy for the development of the EU's security and defence policy (Britz and Erikson in Engelbrekt and Halleneberg 2008: 62-64).

The launch of the "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World" (ESS 2003) has marked the EU as a strategic actor. It is a first strategic document has addressed the EU external role in security matters. Scholars have marked the ESS as a grand strategy, while to be known as a grand strategy needs to present the strategic thinking in the area of security and defence (Biscop 2013: 38).

The security in Europe and the neighbourhood were dependent on internal-external security nexus. In this dynamic threats' scenario, the EU adopted preventive-engagement, security building in the Eastern neighbours, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The ESS was based on effective multilateralism which provided the base for international order (ESS 2003). The ESS demonstrates "the EU's explicitly transformative zeal, putting an emphasis on spreading good governance, especially the rule of law and protecting human rights as well as democracy promotion more generally" (Mälksoo 2016: 378). Throughout the ESS, the aim was set to become a

"global power" but it had failed to provide sufficient impact on policy-making and unable to reach on clear objectives, sets of goals and structure (Toje 2005: 131).

The dynamic nature of threats and concern over security, demand was raised in the Member States to review the security strategy to address new issues. Consequently, the EU adopted a "Report on the Implementation on the European Security Strategy-Providing Security in a Changing World" to make it more constructively and effective strategy to provide security in diverse security's threats environment. The implementation report has added more new non-traditional security threats these are "Cyber Security, Energy Security, and Climate Change" (European Council 2008: 13-14).

According to Simon Duke, the Member States questioned the ESS ability to perform as a "meta-narrative" they see it merely as broad general strategy of the international system. For Duke, the concept of meta-narrative is associated with links the sub-strategies to main interest, priority and the mean and time with security strategy to gain objectives. If the ESS was formulated in the meta-narrative form, it helps the EU to "address some of the commonly shared about the direction of the Union's external actions, the nature of its international persona or its 'actorness'... engagement with the international partners that it envisages" (Duke 2016: 4-5).

Though, the ESS enhanced the Union role as a security provider in Europe while the Treaty of Lisbon shifted its role to become a global security actor. The Lisbon Treaty was adopted on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009. The treaty recognised the European Union as a legal entity in international politics. It enhanced the effectiveness of CFSP, strengthened the EU's actorness at international level and provided a better coordination of internal policy and external relation. The Treaty included a new post for High Representative and Vice President of the Commission (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The HR/VP worked for the development and implementation of strategy and played a leading role in the Council and in the Political and Security Committee. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU developed as a security actor at international scene in the 21st century which expanded and enhanced the EU actorness within and beyond Europe. Consequently, in the changing security landscape and the emergence of new threats demanded a review of the Union Security Strategy (EEAS 2015).

The Arab uprising and Ukraine crisis produced anxiety within the EU and Member States. However, the civil war in Syria and formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) posed the biggest threat to the European security and produced the massive refugee problem for Europe. These crises and conflicts "created a human exodus from the Middle East and across the Mediterranean" (Bava 2019: 50). Consequently, Europe witnessed the massive influx of refugees in the EU's countries by crossing the Mediterranean Sea entered illegally in Italy, Greece, and Spain.

In the face of the existential nature of crisis in Europe, the EU tried to address the problem and overcome from the crisis. The year 2016 is marked as the most critical and challenging one for Europe. It was termed as the '*annus horribilis*' for the EU. The UK referendum to leave the EU, massive influx of refugee and division among the Member States over migration issues, terrorist attacks in Berlin, Nice and Brussels, and the rise of far-right populist party created crisis like situation in Europe and threaten to "democracy, human rights and rule of law within and outside of Union" (Novotná 2017: 177). These existing crises challenged the European Union's actorness capacity and capability to provide security in the region. The scholars like Pishchikova and Piras, have claimed that the EU has lacked in strategic thinking in "foreign and security policy" which has threatened "the Union's ability to act in the international arena" (Pishchikova and Piras 2017: 103).

"The old default strategy of muddling through crises or lurching from one calamity has 'damaged the credibility' of the Union" (Matthijs and Kelemen 2015 in Duke 2017: 4). In the era of geopolitical shift and power distributions in world, the concepts of security become more complex and contested. The European themselves felt the need for a new strategy that could explain and define the current environment and address the issues more strategically. Therefore the HR/VP in June 2015 reviewed the strategy and declared that the Union need "for a common, comprehensive and consistent global strategy" for external action and internal developments (EEAS 2015: 3).

Thus, the dynamic security environment provided a purpose to adopt a new security strategy in the EU. The HR/VP the European Commission Federica Mogherini presented "the European Union Global Strategy" on June 29, 2016. It has been the most crucial document of the Union, and it talked about the shared interests and principles of external action with priorities. It is divided into three broad sections and with the five

significant priorities namely; Strategic Autonomy, Resilience, Principled Pragmatism, Integrated Approach, and Global Order based security approach filling the gap within and outside of Europe to respond collectively towards the crises and conflicts.

The European Union's Global Strategy has capabilities to change vision into action; therefore, the EU is collectively investing to become more credible, responsive and a joined-up Union. Moreover, the EUGS has achieved a lot after its implementation. For some academician the EUGS presented a realpolitik strategy of the EU in the internal-external security dimensions and balanced approach in defence. Even it has aspired to enhance the strategic thinking and restructure the EU role at the international level. Simultaneously it can address the security threats and challenges in the changing security environment. The EUGS can help "the Union to re-discover its identity and its soul". Thus, it "appears as a survial stategy for the EU as security actor and contributing to global security in a particular way" (Mälksoo 2016: 376).

The European Union Global Strategy was a second security strategy document for Union's foreign and security policy after the European Security Strategy of 2003. Nevertheless, from the drafting process to objectives, all things were different in the EUGS. The Lisbon Treaty has created a vast difference between both strategies. The scholars and academician have analysed the sixty pages' comprehensive document of the Global Strategy and conclude that it enhanced the EU's capability and capacity as a diplomatic, strategic, defence and security, multilateral, and global security actor in the international system.

The year 2016 was very challenging for entire Europe. The EUGS was drafted during the high peak of the refugee/migration crisis, the emergence of the populist parties in Europe, terrorist attacks and just a day after the UK decision to leave the EU. As Mogherini pointed that in challenging times, "Union needs a strategy for shared vision and common action" (EUGS 2016: 3). Thus, the adoption of EUGS, "it could be read as a severe case of denial and exemplary show-off of the EU's ability to thrive in crisis and keep searching for its lost soul in its midst" (Mälksoo 2016: 375).

In regarding the EUGS crucial to understand that the strategies are essential to define the clear objectives and goals in the security. On the other hands, strategies are realistic, based on a set of objectives to achieve. Thus, in the context of the EUGS, security and strategy are interrelated and interconnected to Europe's their own security with secure.

The EUGS was adopted in the complex strategic environment, and therefore the aim of the strategy to establish its principle, priorities and interests in a coherent way. All the set priorities of the EUGS present to fulfil the goals through a "collectively invest in a credible, responsive and Joined-up Union" (EUGS 2016: 10). Thus, the aim of the EU Global Strategy is to provide strategic coordination with European foreign policy in the midst of political turmoil.

Research Framework

This research examined the European Union Global Strategy, 2016. The priorities of the EUGS, such as Resilience, Strategic Autonomy, Principle Pragmatism, Integrated Approach and Global Order based strategy in Europe and immediate and extended neighbours have strengthened the EU as a global security actor enhanced the capability and capacity to provide security within and beyond Europe from the internal and external conflicts and crises.

This research examined the following research questions. What is the concept of security and how it has changed after the end of the Cold War? How has the security landscape in Europe changed after the end of the Cold War? How has the dynamic security environment helped to shape the EU to emerge as a security actor and shaped its strategies? What kind of shift has happened in the EU actorness from the regional to the global level post-Lisbon Treaty? What is the European Union Global strategy? How has the implementation of the EUGS enhanced the foreign and security policy of the Union? Has the EUGS's shared vision and common action got successful in achieving a stronger Europe and secure world?

Hypothesis of the research is that the European Union Global Strategy has enhanced the capability and capacity of the Union as a global security actor. The research adopted a deductive approach and it used a realist framework. The research has based on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included the EU official documents, Council and Commissions reports, speeches and treaties such are The steel and Coal community, Treaty of Maastricht, The Treaty of Lisbon, The European Security Strategy, An Implementation report on ESS, and European Union Global Strategy and secondary sources included research and journal articles, unpublished desertions and papers, newspaper articles, articles in magazines, and interviews.

The thesis is divided into five chapters includes introduction and conclusion.

The first chapter introduced the topic and situates the study. The second chapter examined the changing security landscape in the post-Cold War era, which transformed the world order from bipolar to the unipolar. The concept of security became uncertain and ambiguous to define in this period.

The third chapter examined the evolution of the European Union as a security actor. After the end of the Cold War, the changing world order presented an opportunity for the emergence of the European Union as a global actor in world politics. From Maastricht to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was established as a legal and global actor.

The fourth chapter on the European Union Global Strategy analysed the augmentation of the European Union as a global security actor from the ESS to the EUGS. It has enhanced the capability and capacity of the EU as a global actor in security. The chapter has analysed some external and internal events to see the growth of the EU. External events included some major international events such as 9/11 Terrorist attack and the 2003 Iraq war and internal events included 2003 ESS, 2004 Central and Eastern Europe enlargement, the refugee crisis and Brexit. These events have helped the Union to adopt the European Union Global Strategy for a stronger Europe and a secure world by the shared vision and common action. The fifth chapter based on a comprehensive assessment of the EUGS and provided a summary of the finding of the study.

SECOND CHAPTER

THE CHANGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

"The Cold War may have ended but beneath all of the rhetoric of a new European order, the pursuit of power and national security remain as important as ever"

(Baylis 1998: 14)

Background

In the Cold War period, Europe remained a major hotspot of superpower military confrontation between America and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical structure of world order shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. The European security landscape has also been transformed in the post-Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Warsaw Pact being disbanded and NATO redefine its role, and redefining the role of Union which produced challenges and opportunities for Europe. The German unification brought an end to the Cold War however, the breakup of Yugoslavia in the Balkans brought tensions and conflict within Europe.

During the Cold War, Europe enjoyed the longest peace for Forty-five years due to the bipolar structure. However, the end of bipolar structure breached the long peace in Europe, and also the direct threats were vanished after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The structure of world politics produced different security debates and security agenda on behalf of new challenges and opportunities. The prominent scholars of the security studies such as Alfred Wolfers (1952), Barry Buzan (1991), David Baldwin (1995) and many others tried to conceptualise the notion of security coherently and systematically.

Notion of Security

For Arnold Wolfers, "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1962: 150).

According to Walter Lippmann, "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if

challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Lippmann 1943 in Wolfers 1962: 150).

In the views of Ian Bellany, "Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur" (Bellany 1981: 102).

For Barry Buzan, "In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of the states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity" (Buzan 2008: 37).

The interwar period (1945-1955) was an initial phase for the development of security studies. Nevertheless, during this period security studies were not preoccupied with nuclear weaponry and deterrence as it became later in the Cold War period. The Cold War world order was dominated by the idea of national security and a purely military-based conventional approach of security. In this period, war, conflict and struggle for power were seen as major features of inter-state relations. The idea of traditional approach of security was to protect from external military threat and the survival of nation-state. Due to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the state remained the most powerful actor in the international system. For the classical realists, Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr who developed the realist school of thought in international relations focused on national interests and self-help of the state, and they considered it as national security of state.

The Cold War concept of security was criticised for being an orthodox concept and based on national security and military means (Buzan 1983: 5). For the neo-realists Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer international structure of "system is anarchic", means there is no central authority to control states' behaviour which leads to a lack of trust among states and also insecurity in national security. Therefore, to protect their independence and sovereignty in the system, "maximisation of power" is significant for survival of state (Mearsheimer 1990: 12). Consequently, the self-help environment for national security produced a "security dilemma". Why, because "a structural nation in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend regardless of intentions to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening" (Herz 1950: 157).

For Realist school of thought, the definition of "security as freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system" (Sulovic, 2010: nd). Stephen Walt defined the security studies "the studies of the threat, use and control of military force" (Walt 1991: 212). For Arnold Wolfers the concept of security has been remained neglected. For him "National security as an ambiguous symbol" if "used without specification it leaves room for more confusion" (Wolfers 1962: 149).

Barry Buzan criticised the concept of security being too vague, biased and complex to understand absolute definition of security. Moreover, Buzan suggested five possible explanations of security considered as underdevelopment and neglected concept. First, the conceptual understanding of security is challenging. Second, security is an overlapping concept between security and power. Third, the various criticisms did by realism on security; therefore, there is a lack of interest. Fourth, scholars and academicians of security studies are busy too much in the new development in technology and policy, and they give low priority to conceptual issues. And the fifth, the concept of security, has lacked a conceptual definition; therefore, policy-makers find the ambiguity in national security (Buzan 1991: 7-11).

In the concept of security, Hafterndorn argued that "it suffers from the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are" (Haftendorn 1991: 15). She asked whether security "is it a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline?" (Haftendron 1991: 3). According to Ken Booth, "to achieve real and stable security can only be possible by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it; this can be achieved if security is concerned as a process of emancipation. Emancipation, theoretically, is security" (Booth 1991: 319).

In the changing global order, there were growing tensions, and complexities were increasing due to the rise of economic and environmental challenges. The rise of transnational and diverse security threats and the emergence of new security actors in international relations failed to predict the future of international politics. Several contemporary writers criticised the state-centric approach of security, and therefore, they tried to redefine and extend the agenda of security by shifting the attention away from the states. The experts of security studies and academicians started to participate in the debate of "broadening the concept of security from military to non-military

collective threats" and deepening the security concern from state to human security and from traditional to non-traditional concepts of security (Krahmann 2008: 125).

Krahmann described three types of mechanism of security which prevailed during the Cold War period, "Prevention (Absence of threat), Deterrence (suspension of threat), and Protection (survival of threat)" (Krahmann 2008: 127). Thus, the traditional concept of security became extensively narrow. After the post-Cold War, experts and academicians of security studies participated in the debate of broadening the concept of security. There was a shared consent among security studies scholars to update the definition of security from the pre-dominant definition of security to redefine in the new security environment.

Therefore, it expressed a need to broaden, deepen and updated the concept of security and shift the greater awareness towards harmful damages, which have emerged from new security challenges like political oppression and economic instability, the rise of radical Islamist groups, non-state actor (transnational terrorism), climate change and energy security (Booth 1991: 318). Moreover, the debate between the traditionalist and wideners over security within security studies started in the 21st century (Sulovic 2010: 1-7). The new security approach majorly focuses on human security, which is based on all types of security. "human security is like sustainable development; everyone is for it" (Paris 2001: 88-100).

Figure 1. Matrix of Security Studies

What is the Source of the Security Threat?

Security for Whom?	Military	Military, Nonmilitary or Both
States	**Cell 1** National Security (conventional realist approach to security studies)	**Cell (2)** Redefined security (e.g., environmental and economic security)
Societies, Groups, and Individuals	**Cell (3)** Intrastate security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict and democide)	**Cell (4)** Human security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies groups, and individuals)

Source (Paris 2001: 98-100)

The Human Development Report (1994), published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) states that "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat nuclear holocaust... forgotten were the legitimate concerns or ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives" (UNDP 1994: 22).

The non-traditional concept of security emphasises human security. What is meant by the term human security? It was first elaborated in the UN Development Programme 1994 report that proposed a new concept of security "Human security can be said to have main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994: 22). The report has identified seven specific elements that compromise "Human security; Economic security, Food security, Health security, Environmental security, Personal security, Community security and Political security" (UNDP 1994). Thus, the field of human security is very vast and broad in terms and interconnected in every means.

The new world order was beyond of the academicians of international relations to predict the nature of security threats. It also shifted the perspective of security from a narrow to a broader concept of security. In the broader context of security, it is "about the pursuit of freedom from threats and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity in the international system" (Buzan 1991: 432). However, for Baylis, in general consensus, "freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups) but there is a major disagreement about whether the main focus of enquiry should be on 'individual', 'national' or 'international' security" (Baylis, 2014). Thus, "the absence of a clear concept of security led to societal paralysis" (Marsh and Rees 2012: 1).

Architecture of European Security: Before and During the Cold War

From 1914 to 1945, Europe witnessed the devastation and horrifying experience of the Two World Wars. For Alfred Zimmern, the First World War was seen as a period of transition in which conventional power politics transformed in support of cooperation and responsibility. For him, "the League of Nations in harmony with the historic nature

of things (which)… in the long or short run… would prevail" (Zimmern 1936: 288). At the end of 1930, after the failure of the League of Nations, realist scholars such as E.H. Carr highlighted the relevance of "realist thinking", which "emphasised the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendency" (Carr 1983: 11).

The transition of world order including the Two World Wars with other tumultuous interwar periods brought the end of many authoritarian ideologies and the failure of utopianism. The structure of European security in the Cold War period was based on the "balance of power" in the bipolar world order (Carr 1983). The balance of terror between the two different sets of blocs were created, and then it became global. The great power conflict was not just a struggle for security, but it was a competition between the two irreconcilable social and economic systems (Hettne 1991: 281).

The Cold War period was not static. It vacillated in a short period of détente between the late 50s and 70s renewed rivalry between the East and West in the 80s. In 1989, the fall of the German wall brought the end of the Communist regime in East Germany. In 1990 the Soviet Union collapsed, followed with the disbanded of Warsaw Pact, and the antagonism between the East-West came to an end (Baylis 1998: 14-20).

Security is a different concept and has many meanings. As a concept, it can be divided into state and human security. During the Cold War period, the conventional concept of security was dominant. In the Second World War, the security studies significantly improved. The earlier concept of security was seen as important in some specified time and space. However, it was not considered as a primary goal. The national security was a high priority to pursue the nation's goals, and therefore military and non-military tactics of statecraft were eligible but mostly for national security, military power prevailed.

The interwar period in international politics revealed a dreadful experience against the stability and peace of Europe. But the Cold War produced a distinct environment in Europe by creating a division between the East and West. During this period, there was no major war fought between the superpower in Europe only two minor dispute took place in Hungary 1956 (the Soviet intervention) and in Cyprus 1974 (Greco-Turkish War). The confrontation and conventional conflicts between the East and West and direct threat within the bipolar structure produced less war-prone environment, which

sustained peace, stability and security. Peace was secured due the arms race on both sides that had created a large weapons base on both sides made up of conventional and nuclear weapons. The concept of nuclear deterrence meant that the superpowers who had the nuclear weapons would deter the other due to the presence of destructive weapons. Thus, in the Cold War period the threat was identifiable and predictable, and so there was a defined security architecture. The past forty-five years of Europe represents the "longest peace" in European history (Gaddies 1986). Mearsheimer also believes that the bipolar structure of world politics was much more stable and peaceful compared to the unipolar and multipolar structure. In the bipolar world order, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States had the "power to destroy each other" due to their "military power" and "nuclear weapons" (Mearsheimer 1990: 11).

Therefore, instead of going into direct war, they preferred to commence the massive arms and weapons to threaten the opposition power. Both the superpower had followed the four dominant approaches of security, deterrence, containment, bipolar world order and balance of power. The conceptual understanding of balance of power in international relations is "the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system" (Deutsch and Singer 1964: 390).

The United States chose the strategy of containment to defend itself against the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union was expanding ideology in Eastern Europe. The Cold War was mostly about national security, and both the superpower the Soviet Union and the US were maximising their power, expanding alliances and strategic boundaries to feel secure. During the Cold War period, Europe got divided into East and West and was under the influence of the Soviet Union and the US responsibility. As a consequence, the two sides developed politically into very different system.

The Different Actors on the European Union Security Landscape

The European Union

The European Community was created by the process of the regional integration from ECSE (European Coal and Steel Economic Community) 1952. It transformed into the European Economic Community in 1957, and later merged in European Community which successfully created a Common Market through the Single European Act. Later, by the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union was established in 1992. The EU is a

special economic and political integration model consisting 27 countries. The EU follows the common principles and values of freedom, democracy and rules of law and respect of human rights. Thus, the objective of the EU is to promote peace and stability.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 in against of emerging communist threat in Europe. The dissolution of the Soviet Union suspended the Warsaw Pact. However, NATO existed and continued to play primarily role as a safeguard of European security and stability. NATO has changed its functional position in the new security landscape. The direct military threat from the Communist bloc had disappeared therefore, NATO stand-alone for European security and started to play a crisis management role. To strengthen relationship with the Central and Eastern European Countries, NATO expanded its membership through enlargement process for security and stability in the CEE countries.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation on Europe

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation on Europe (OSCE) was formed in 1975 as multilateral forum for discussion and negation between East and West Europe. It provided an opportunity to the Union to expand its capabilities and policies in the realm of soft security and soft power activities such as conflict prevention, human rights promotion and comprehensive approach to human security. The OSCE seemed to meet with all the requirements were needed in the Post-Cold War Europe. It ideally suited to confront the new challenges likely to face by European stability.

The EC/EU and OSCE are based on non-use of force framework, whereas the NATO was created for collective defence. Therefore, instability and tension within EU, the confrontation between Member States and crisis and challenges in Europe needed a strong defence policy and capacity to control situation underhand. A British Diplomat Robert Cooper wrote about the end of Cold War order, that 'What came to an end in 1989, was not just the Cold War or even the Second World War'. 'What came to an end in Europe, the political systems of three centuries: the balance of power and the imperial urge' (Cooper 2003 in Krastev 2008: 1).

The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of new European order. However, "the essence of this order is the gradual transformation of the traditional European nation-

state into an EU member state or an EU-compatible state" (Cooper 2003 in Krastev 2008: 1-2).

Security Challenges in Europe in the Post-Cold War Order

The Cold War came to an end after the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989. The German reunification took place and brought the end of the bipolar division in Europe. The new world order emerged with sole power of the United States. Under the unipolarity, the hegemony of America prevailed. It brought an end of a military standoff between the East-West, which had dominated the security structure in Europe for four decades. The foundation of conflict between the Soviet Union East (East) and US (West) was established on the balance of terror (both conventional and nuclear capacity of terror), which provided confined conflict at the political level. The growth of democracies in the CEECs who declared their independence from Moscow control after the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolised a brief period of hope for peace in Europe. However, security challenges were not disappeared from Europe. The outbreak of ethnic, national and civil war and crisis after a long peace provided many security challenges for Europe and replaced defined threats into the undefined and diffusive threats. Moreover, it did not completely eliminate other sources of conflict and instability within Europe. Europe's borders after 1992 within the EU started fading their significance and outside border of Europe became the hotspot zone of growing contestation. The breakup of Yugoslavia and civil war in the Balkans was a result of the Cold War which breached the peace and returned the instability and tension in Europe again. But very soon hopes for peaceful Europe turned into a disturbance. With the end of the Cold War, Europe was searching for the answer of the question on how to revise the European political and security institutions in order to confront the new challenges (Bava 2017: 28).

The Yugoslavia Crisis and the Return of Conflict to Europe

The Balkan crisis exploded when Slovenia and Croatia decided to assert their independence from the Yugoslavian federation in June 1991. The Yugoslav crisis led to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and drew attention to 'the changing nature of security and non-traditional security threats in Europe'. Balkans also has witnessed intensifying tension between Turkey and Bulgaria; Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (over Macedonia); and Albania and Yugoslavia in connection with Kosovo. The crises were moving "from inter-state to intra-state", which raised enormous "questions about

sovereignty and the ability of the institution" to respond in crisis like situation (Bava 2019: 44). The central part of the crisis was surrounded in Slovenia, which sought to assert control of its international border crossing, and led to armed clashes with the Federal Army. The ranges of predicament raised the alarm throughout Europe, and many efforts were taken by European institutions to diffuse the catastrophe, become paralysed to handle the situation. The EU was not in a position to deal with a civil war crisis in the neighbourhood and it was fully unprepared to respond towards the crisis in the Balkans (Steinberg 1992: 11).

The peace and stability of European security was breached and went into crisis after the Yugoslavian civil war. The eruption of civil war in Balkan became a NATO matter, not a European matter. The absence of European initiatives and disputes within and between the Member States gave full opportunity to the US and NATO to play a lead role in the Balkans. Besides this, the US and NATO used this opportunity to control the situation in a conflict zone and prevailed peace and stability in the region which increased their influence in the Central and Eastern European countries. Despite the Union ability, Europeans were dependent on the US for their hard power security. The new world order produced more ethnic conflicts and civil war in the neighbourhood, international terrorism, cyber warfare and maritime piracy. Hence, the European Union realised their weakness and expressed strong determination to modernise its security structure to acquire the ability to be independent.

The major concern within the EU was the creation of a new European security structure for stability, security, peace and development of effective role in the world order. Therefore, the grave concern for new European security architecture was how to organise the new European security regime. The collective defence model of balance of power did not remain reliable, and collective security model had collapsed during the Cold War. Therefore, there was the only way left to pursue a new European security order through the cooperative security regime. The security framework of the Union was established on cooperation. And to handle the risk and manage the security challenges, the cooperation was based on the three levels: at transatlantic level, at European level and Pan-European security order (Hatjiadoniu 1998: 3-5).

Before 1989, the EC had to deal with policies in Western Europe, but in the after of the breakdown of the Berlin wall had to tack care of post-Communist Eastern Europe as

well. The EU aimed to promote political stability in Central and Eastern Europe to ensure protection from the negative spill over consequences of instability. The Treaty on European Union/ Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992. The aim of the treaty to create closer cooperation within the EU and in Europe and also consisting of solidarity relations between the member countries. For the promotion of balanced and sustainable progress in the economic and social sphere the Union it gave attention in the "creation of an area without internal borders" (Woyke 2014: 305) for broader connectivity and cohesion. To make a striking image at the international scene, the EU focused on the proposal of a Common Foreign and Security Policy with a Common Defence Policy to achieve the goal of Common Defence and Security Policy (European Communities 1992: 1-9).

In the changing security landscape, the emerging EU had to fulfil all the promises made in the earlier period and geopolitical circumstances and allowed the CEECs to be in the European Union. Some scholars and academicians believed, the efforts were made by the European Economic Community in the Yugoslav crisis was a test of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and to strengthen their force ability and modernisation in deployment was an experiment of Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). Due to the weakness of the "young EU" and lack of trust and unity within the Member States were unable to respond in a crisis, while CFSP remained incapable of addressing the problem. Besides the weakness of the EU and the CFSP, still, the Union and CFSP engender another sort of governance and decision making process towards the "regional integration", "multi-level decision-making in the EU with the CFSP" and process of "a new identity building for a new political, security and normative actor in Europe and world" (Bava 2019: 45).

Europe did not receive any kind of direct threat from the former Soviet Union, while the new Russia was not in the position to challenge the security of European countries. The unipolar order of world politics was under the hegemony of America created unquestionable and undoubted power. The CEECs started to join the EU and NATO for their security and strategic interests. By the joining of the CEE countries, the EU and NATO were in the most challenging process of political and economic transition in these countries and creating more connected institutions. The weak Europeans and Russian criticised the Eastward enlargement of NATO significantly, called it an American expansion (Waltz 2000: 23).

The unipolar world structure changed the security landscape in Europe, and for Mearsheimer, anyone could predict the "Future of Europe" with three sets of arguments. First, peace and stability would sustain; second, the spread of democracy and democratisation of Eastern Europe would make war less likely because democracy does not fight with democracies and third, after witnessing the horrible experience of war in Europe would not support conventional or nuclear based option for security (Mearsheimer 1990: 8). However, when the Cold War came to an end, no existing theories of international relations were able to describe the world order. The new security threats were different than the conventional security threat. Undefined and diffusive nature of threats in the 20th century, made the concept of security extremely vague to specifying the "security for whom", "security for which values", "how much security", security "from what threats", "by what means", "at what cost" and "in what time period" (Baldwin 1997: 12-17).

9/11 and the Rise of Non-Traditional Security Threats

The peace, stability and security in Europe was already breached after the Yugoslavian crisis. The September 2001 terrorist attack on the US gave a shock to the world. The hegemony of the superpower in the world was challenged for the first time by non-state actors. It was a profound shock for the unipolar world order. The terrorist attack on the US has revived the biggest question in the field of security. After 2001, it was complicated to understand the pattern of threat and their sources. The threat became more diffusive and complicated in behaviour to address them.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack dramatically changed the nature of threat and transformed security debate in world politics. The 9/11 event raised an unprecedented wave of European solidarity with the US "*Nous Sommes Tous Américains*" (we all are Americans) published in the Le Monde newspaper (French) two days after the attack. The article 5 was invoked in the history of NATO, which considered an attack on one as an attack on all. To fight back against terrorism, the United States launched the war on terror in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaida. The EU and its Member States expressed solidarity in favour of the US. Suddenly, this unity of solidarity broke and created a split division among the Member States and transatlantic rift in relations when the US launched a pre-emptive action against Iraq in 2003. It created a discord and political division within the EU. While Spain and the UK supported the US's decision while, the

Germans and the France refused to support the American action. The division between the Member States breached the idea of collective security and unity within the Union. The Union was more concerned about their accountability and responsibility to continue its effective role in the world order. The European Commission asked to the Javier Solana (former High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy) to draw security strategy for the Union (Bava 2019: 46-47).

The year 2003- 2004 was considered as a transformative period in Europe. The Union endeavoured to enhance the actorness capacity and capability. The major decision had taken after the 1998 Saint Malo Treaty to enhance security capability of the Union. This dream came into reality in December 2003 when the European Security Strategy (ESS) was launched to address new security threats for a secure Europe. The document of ESS identified the new security threats "that are dynamic, more diverse, less visible and less predictable in nature". The security strategy marked the five security threats such are "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime" (ESS 2003: 30-32).

The strategy provided a consistent reply to the new and non-conventional security threats in the changing security dynamics within and beyond Europe. In the new security threat environment, the requirement of a new policy and operational mechanisms to address the issues forced the European Union for new agencies such as "Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Schengen Information System has been created to monitor the EU's internal and external security concerns" (Bava 2019: 48). It requires more cooperation and coordination between Member States along with other countries to identify and address the new security threats. The security mechanism was adopted, it seemed necessary for Europe. The changes in security threats require a new security mechanism and policy to address the challenges. And it also required an operational outlook in diplomacy, political, economic, humanitarian and military essence (Bava 2019).

The Union's role in security is demoted as normative power because the EU power derives from its values and norms. However, in the changing security landscape, to be a security actor requires taking both civilian and military crisis missions. The EU redefined its goals and objectives to enhance the operational capacity of the strategy in the new security environment. In order to address new global threats, and protect peace,

security and prosperity of Europe and the world, the ESS emphasised dependency of "effective multilateralism and work closely with the United Nations (ESS 2003: 36-38). Thus, the document of ESS indicated a transition in role of the EU in addressing the security challenges in Europe and outside Europe.

The end of the Cold War era decreased direct conventional threat, which benefited the EU to adopt and formulate security interests to develop a decision-making procedures and create an institutionalised security domain. Similarly, through the ESS, the Union has developed a unique kind of capacity building process which increased the area in European security, freedom and justice. The new Member States from CEE Countries were attracted to new image of the Union and its increasing role in world security. These countries joined the EU and simultaneously joined NATO for their core economic and security interests. Thus, the 2004 enlargement process of the EU is known as a big bang enlargement.

The Enlargement of the European Union

In December 2002, the Copenhagen summit declared that ten CEE countries about to join the EU. These ten countries were Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary Estonia, Czech Republic, and Cyprus applied for the European Union's membership and brought the Union borders closer to more opportunities but also towards crises and conflicts in the East and South. The enlargement of the CEECs became the modus operandi of European integration, including institutional expansion, the transformation of democracy and stabilisation of the regional system. The eastward enlargement was composed of complex multidimensional process which was based on three elements, first "accession of countries from Central-Eastern Europe and continued geographic expansion", second, "long-term integration strategy toward the Western Balkans" and third, "gradual development of a European Neighbourhood Policy contributing to the democratisation, openness, and political stabilisation of countries in the periphery of the Wider Europe" (Stefanova 2005: 51).

The eastward enlargement of the Union has covered another third of the European continent. After joining by the ten countries, the EU became twenty-five members who produced a more united Europe by following the deepening and widening of the Union's integration (European Commission 2004: 2-6). The 2004 enlargement has extended stability and prosperity, and consolidated the political and economic growth

of CEECs since 1989. Thus, the enlargement process has enhanced the Union's strength, cohesion and influence worldwide. The primary purpose of the enlargement was to heal the division of Europe's division and create a closer Union of its people. After the eastward enlargement, the EU developed a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It created "a ring of allies with the countries that share borders with the EU" (Kourtelis 2015: 1). In the Southern region, the EU adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), for bilateral talk to develop strong connection with the region. The objectives of ENP were "to share the benefits of enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all" (Kourtelis 2015: 2-3). The eastern enlargement has presented new challenges as well. Each membership changed the power structure and the sharing cost and benefits of membership, and economic challenges for the EU. The CEE countries have produced heterogeneity within the EU which increased trouble in decision making and decreased the chances of getting collective consent on one issue. (Narang 2006: 155-159).

The year 2004 was the biggest enlargement in the history of Europe. It produced challenges for the EU, especially regarding the growth of the CFSP. The spill over effect besides the Economic integration of the EU, led to political integration. Therefore, the Member States started to cooperate informally for foreign and security policy. The Treaty on European Union presented a second pillar of the EU apart from the European Community pillar. The second pillar of the Union was based on the intergovernmental procedures, which were later expanded by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice (Gover 2006: 194-200). The new threats in new world order gave a reason to the Union to think about the new goals related to its foreign and security policy. The security role of the EU developed at the level CFSP, external role incontinent and hard power capacity. The various studies showed that the European Union is a prominent security actor. However, the EU and its Member States are still dependent on NATO's security umbrella (Stefanova 2005: 52).

Europe witnessed spreading range of terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Brussels, Paris, Nice, and Berlin, which drew attention towards this rising threat on the continent. Thus, it is growing vulnerability, growth of asymmetric crisis, rise of non-state actors and increasing support for far-rights political parties led to a political polarisation within Europe. Consequently, increasing the hybrid threats and organised crime is the result of incoming refugees in Europe, and therefore, addressing these threats at the

individual level is not possible. Thus, it required proper coordination, cooperation, policies and strategy to understand the nature of threats and come up with appropriate solutions.

Conclusion

The changing geopolitical environment in the Post-Cold War era produced distinctive scenario in Europe which defined heterogeneous security threat were diverse in approach. The Cold War era had defined security structure. The unipolar world order under the hegemony of America was different. Transition in security started after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US which shifted the notion of security in Europe and the world. The 9/11 attack shocked the world order and the rise of non-state actor turned into most frightening threat to security of any country. The US decision to go the global war on terror in Afghanistan and pre-emptive action in Iraq led to division in the EU's Member States. The divide among the Member States expanded disputes and debates on the EU's potential to act as leader. To mend this split and regain the confidence and trust among the Member States, the EU adopted the ESS. The adoption of its first strategy document, the EU tried to addressed the dynamic threat to European security and its people. The strategy transformed the EU as active leader in addressing security issues and also strengthened the integration process and institutional reforms in the Union.

THIRD CHAPTER

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR

"To a significant extent actorness is constructed through the interplay of internal political factors and the perceptions and expectations of outsiders."

(Bretherton and Volger 1999: 1)

Background

The foundation of the EU dates backs to the 1950s, with the establishment of the Economic Community with the Six Member States. Since the 1950s and 1960s, the European Community had established foreign relations with their former imperial colonies of third world countries such as Africa and Asia for their international trade negotiations. From 1960 to 1980, the European political institutions were shaped, and under the new leadership of the Member States the decision-making process changed the structure of the Community. Between 1980 and 1990 was counted as a crucial period in Europe. The ongoing Cold War established the debate over the common foreign and defence policies within the Community. Similarly, the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union came to an end and brought peace in Europe in 1990. Since 1991 the changing security landscape in Europe forced to the EEC to adopt a common policy that can addresses the challenges and opportunity at the global level. Therefore, the European Union was adopted formally in 1992. In the new security environment, the new problems were more diverse but also provided a more important platform for the EU to extend its leadership qualities within and beyond Europe. Membership of the Union expanded from six to twenty-eight and the role of the EU has evolved gradually as where the security matter is concerned. The European Union is largest unified trading partner and biggest in economic and political relations with every country globally. The EU has sent its military and civilian missions in many countries across the three continents Asia, Africa and Europe.

The internal policies of the Union have affected the other international actors in various ways. The Union always has lacked and limited capability to shift its presence (acquired by its internal development) into actorness. An actorness capability requires coherent policy objectives with pursuing objectives in the effective means. To be a representative

to deal with the external action, the Union and its member countries must be responsible for maintaining those positions and manipulating those resources in objective to pursue their goals. The unity among the Countries of the EU did not remain the same, it has divided numerous times on several issues, for instance, Iraq War. Nevertheless, the Member States trying to improve their procedures to reach an agreement to strengthen the institutions and their respective positions to implement a collective, and common policies to foster the EU leadership in international politics.

Conceptual Understanding of Actors and Actorness

In the literature of international relations, the European Union role in the world politics has been underestimated. The international relations structure is based on the narrow state centric approach, where state has a significant role in international politics and influences the decision-making structure of the system. However, "the EU is not an intergovernmental organisation as traditionally understood and nor it is a partially formed state. While it is clearly a regional organisation its degree of integration, and the range of policy competences and instruments it possesses" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 1). Thus, the EU is a sui generis actor. The limited involvement in external activities and policies considered it least effective to be an actor (Milward and Sorensen 1993:1-7). The evolution of the EU, the development of its institutions, and dealing with internal and external affairs made it a separate and unique organisation from the existing organisations. The debate has prevailed over the EU whether it is an international organisation or integrated organisation? International organisations operate independently and they do not intervene in the decision making of the member states. While, within the supranational organisation, member states handover some power to the organisation and the organisation has sovereignty to enforce restriction on members, in case if they break the agreement. Therefore, the supranational organisation has some key advantages such as it is irreversible, exclusiveness and law binding in nature (Dedman 2010: 8). However, the EU is a unique supranational actor relating to its character, identity, institutional framework and external activities, which evolved the Union as multi-actor capability and capacity in the global system. The external activity relies on the ability and willingness of the actor to provide direction in external policy. The EU has developed foreign policy capabilities, defence policies in crisis management and influential leadership in national and international security played a significant role regionally and globally (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 12).

Since the establishment of the European Community (EC 1957) continued expansion by joining the member countries for economic integration under the community umbrella, widened and deepened the institution process. The EC was a civilian body, assigned economic external relation by creating common market to build a custom union, minimise common trade tariff and encourage free trade in the region. Later, the emergence of Single Economic Act (SEA) the EC became an economic actor in international trade. The shift from the economic integration to political union under the European Political Community (EPC) enhanced the role of the EU in foreign policy along with the member countries and with their former colonies. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) led to develop the CFSP for external activities of the EU. Undoubtedly, the TEU under the three pillar structure, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), established the Union's identity in international politics (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 2-5).

Actorness in International Law

Undoubtedly the conceptual understanding of actor and actorness presents numerous challenges. Modern international law is rooted in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The state is a traditional actor, and only it has the right to make treaties could join international organisations because the state is a legal actor. Therefore, it gives the right to participate that also to be held accountable and responsible by the other state actors. The laws of Westphalia were challenged after the establishment of the League of Nations (1919). The decision to form the International Court of Justice (1945) provided legal status to the United Nations. The EC got a legal personality and is entitled to act only in areas of legally established competence. The TEU made many efforts to develop the Union's role as a global actor. Therefore, it promoted a balanced economic and social progress with the development of an arena removing internal frontier and strengthening social cohesion and economic cooperation (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 13-17).

Actor and Actorness in International Relations

In international relations, "an actor is an individual or a collective entity capable of devising a personal strategy and acting autonomously in order to achieve certain objective" (Crozier 1992 in Richard and Hamme 2013: 15). According to realist

approach of international relations, the state is the primary actor. Over time, it included other actors those are not in the category of state, but involved in transnational activity (for instance international organisation and non-governmental organisation) (Richard and Hamme 2013: 16). "An actor in international relations should have the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system" (Sjostedt 1977 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 16). The EU aimed to formulate a common concept of community/union, and foreign and security policy among the member countries to achieve their sets of priorities. According to Jupille and Caporaso, any actor in international relations can be identified by the four features of actorness, cohesion, authority, autonomy and recognition. The concept of cohesion in actorness means the actor should have a collective approach in internal values and norms, and consistent in policy formulation. Authority feature of actorness requires a legal status of the actor' action (especially in sanction) in international system. The autonomy of an actor separates its identity and interests from other actors and act independently from the other actors. The recognition of an actor requires acceptance and interaction with other actors in international relations (Jupille and Caporaso 1998: 214).

Over the period, new dimensions of actorness are addressed in the context of the EU. It can be described in three categories: opportunity, presence and capacity as given by Bretherton and Vogler. An actor's actorness shapes by the events that occur at the international level, therefore actor cannot be entirely independent. Each and every action of the actor affects and implement external context that enables actorness. The EU as an actor has the ability to exert influence the other actors beyond its borders which shaped the formulation of policies and strategies to change the perception of their partners by using methods of power. The EU has internal power to influence and respond effectively towards external expectations and opportunities. In international relations the CFSP provided a direction towards external policies and activities to maintain Union identity globally. According to the behavioural criteria of actorness, "The actor would be an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decision making and engaging in some kind of purposive action" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:15). The Amsterdam Treaty enhanced the capability and developed some capacity of the Union to secure the EU and its citizens from the immediate and extended threat and ensure security and peace in and outside Europe. It enhanced consistency, coherence and capability of the Union to be a legal actor and actorness in behaviour.

The Evolution - From ECSC to the EC

In the Second World War, Germany was defeated, and was divided into East and West Germany. The East part of Germany allied to the Eastern bloc and the West part of Germany allied to the Western bloc. West Germany agreed to integrate into both the cooperation framework, the European and Atlantic cooperation. On 17 March 1948 an agreement on the Treaty of Brussels was signed by the Six Member States including the United Kingdom, Netherland, Luxembourg, West Germany, France and Belgium. It was created for economic cooperation and especially for collective self defence alliance. The alliance between the Member States were not in position to counter the threat without the help of the US. The Brussels Treaty led to the formation of NATO in May 1949. The US signed the NATO alliance with Canada and including other ten Member States while excluding West Germany. Similarly, the Brussels Pact led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) to establish a defence union similar to NATO but without including the US and Canada. The WEU aim was to cooperate with the US's security mechanism for western European security. Despite the WEU, the NATO role prevailed in the security of Western Europe. Over time, the role of the WEU was expanded in defence and peacekeeping operations (Brussels Pact 1948). While, France was in support of United Europe, therefore, favoured West Germany to integrate into European cooperation framework. The European leaders needed a strategy for a dream of United Europe which can come true.

The Robert Schuman, then a French Foreign Minister purposed a plan in May 1950 included "the French-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common higher authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of other countries of Europe" (Schuman Declaration 1950). The Schuman Declaration was prepared by Jean Monnet (former French Commissioner) and announced a formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Robert Schuman stated that, "by pooling basic production and by instituting a new high authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace" (Schuman Declaration 1950). The six founding Member States Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland and Luxembourg favoured Schuman Plan and officially established the ECSC in the Paris Treaty of 1952 with the goal of economic integration and building peace for United

Europe. The Treaty of Paris had formulated the political and economic institution for European integration (ECSC Treaty 1952).

The Strasbourg Meeting held in August 1950, and for the first time, West Germany was present in the meeting as an associated member. Until now, no discussion was consulted with the Member States that west Germany will be part of European defence. However, following the Korean War established the threat of Communist bloc in Western Europe. The board member of the ECSC asked to draw a sketch of European defence. At the same moment, the US insisted on including rearmed West Germany in the Army to prepare for a counter invasion against the Soviet bloc. Under the Pleven Plan with support of the US and agreement with Six Member States the document on the European Defence Community (EDC) was adopted. Much time was assigned for debate and discussion, but it always lacked consent on common European foreign policy and economic and military policy. It was unable to reach a common agreement on integrated defence. In the end, the French national assembly refused to ratify the EDC; hence, the idea of common European defence declined for forever (HGL 1952: 236-248).

The US continued to force the rearming of Germany to join the NATO. In between the British government came up with a better proposal in favour of the French problem. In October 1954, the Western European Union was reformed the 1948 Brussels Treaty. Later, Italy and Germany joined the WEU. The WEU was never able to fulfil its dream as a defence organisation. Earlier, the process of European integration was limited to the economic realm. Later to redefine the process of European integrations, Member States presented together in the conference of Messina for further extension of economic integration. The Treaty of Rome included European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) which was signed in March 1957.

The EEC was established for the common market by creating customs union for free movement of people, goods, services and capital. The primary goal was to create a single and legal common economic market with common rules for leverages in tariffs, quotas and free trade without any barriers between the member countries. Beside it was working in the process of European integration by creating unified European economies to create a single market. The EEC was above the agreement based Treaty. Realistically, it was an endeavour of European member countries for collaborative

development on economic relations and expansion in the stability of standard of living and mutual connections between the states (Treaty of Rome 1957: 4-22).

The Treaty of Rome represented a unique idea of integration in the European history of community building. It analysed the previous cautions and avoided the political mistrust which was seen in the EDC. It tried to revive and broaden the cooperation in economic field within the Member States. The Treaty of Rome was a significant treaty for the European integration consisting of two communities EURATOM and EEC. The three were separate but interlocking supranational organisations (ECSC, EEC and EURATOM) operating in Western Europe with own constitutive treaty with its own distinct institutions. The former ECSC did not work as it was expected; therefore, the Merger Treaty was adopted. The 1965 Merger Treaty was significant in reform in the economic and political institutions and integration process. The three separate institutions had separated executives; in the ECSC high authority was ruled while the EEC and EURATOM came under the commission. In all of them had an individual councils of minister and it was decided that they will share the European Court of Justice and Parliamentary assembly together. The Merger Treaty was signed at the Intergovernmental Conference took place on 8 April 1965, established a single council and single commission in the European Community. It reformed the Treaty of Brussels 1957 and unified the three existing institutions and their rules into the single European Community(EC). The EC was legally independent body worked with independent executive bodies. The Treaty of Merger was considered as the first treaty of reform for the European integration. Those new Member States who were applied for the European Membership in 1961 got chance to get membership in the European integration procedure. The number of the Member States extended from six to thirteen after joining by the UK in 1973 followed by Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Greece joined the EC in 1981, while Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 (Merger Treaty 1965).

The failure of EDC brought a deep friction between the Member States over the political issue. The supranational approach to foreign was not acceptable by the Member States. The French President Charles de Gaulle made an attempt to revoke the discussion on political union. In the 1969, under the new French President Georges Pompidou with the Member States of the EC, reopened the discussion on political union. December 1969, Hague Summit summoned a conference of the head of states to debate on the matter of completion, consolidation and enlargement of the European

Community. In other words, the Summit of Hague brought broad attention to weakness of the EC suffered especially in the sphere of deepening, widening and strengthening within the existing communities. Therefore, the European Political Cooperation was adopted to enhance the EC role in the foreign and security issues among the Member States.

The Shaping of European Security

Luxembourg Report

The European Political Co-operation (EPC) process began in the 1970s. It was a separate and an alternative framework of cooperation among the nine Member States of the EC. From 1970 to 1988, the framework of EPC consolidated in the many phases. In the first phase, the 1970s Luxembourg Report framed cooperation on foreign policy within the structure of the EPC. The Luxembourg Report vision was focused on the long term objectives to shape the political unification with the pragmatic approach of foreign policy. The Luxembourg Report created broad guidelines for the establishment of a united Europe in the promotion to ease of internal tension to preserve peace (Luxembourg Report 1970: 2).

Second Report

The second phase of the Luxembourg Report known as the Second Report, was adopted for the assessment of the first phase of Luxembourg Report. The 1973 Second Report praised the Luxembourg Report for its broad objectives for being flexible and effective in progress. The 1973 report gave attention to procedural improvement to establish a profound relation within the member countries and with the third world countries to become a significant leader in international relations. The report reflected the progress in foreign policy and promoted the development in the communities which helped to achieve shared responsibility for united Europe (Second Report 1973:2-3).

The year 1973 was crucial for European Identity. The changing scenario in Europe and beyond raised concerns on security matters. Outside of Europe, the October War in the Middle East brought attention to draw the European identity to strengthen the relations with third countries. The intention of united Europe and strong relations with other countries realised that Europe is moving towards to influence international relations. It was being recognised that "Europe now needs to establish its position in the world as a

distinct entity, especially in international negotiations which are likely to have a decisive influence on the international equilibrium and on the future of the European Community" (Fitzgerald 1976: 28).

Copenhagen Report

Therefore, on 14 December 1973, the Copenhagen Report came into force for a purpose to adopt a document on European Identity. The aim was to realise the Member States responsibility to make better relations with other countries. The objectives of the EPC to developed a European identity in external relations with other countries to strengthen unity and the formation of European foreign policy for the construction of United Europe in the dynamic nature of communities (Copenhagen Report 1973: 2-4).

London Report

The crisis at the global level including Soviet annexation of Afghanistan, Iran war and confrontation in East-West relations motivated the foreign ministers to adopt an another report. As a result, the London Report on the EPC was framed on 13 October 1981. In the London Report analysed the improvement in the development of the EPC. The report gave attention to a procedure for political cooperation with third countries. Consequently, the rule was set up as the regular meeting for sharing information, and their coordination of views and participation of the head mission in the discussion of political cooperation. Also, it set up rules for the presidency of the third country, their relationship with the European Parliament and activities in political cooperation and European Community. Thus. the coherent and united approach within the Member States for flexible and pragmatic approach with the third countries in foreign policies were accepted in predecessor report proved the effectiveness of political cooperation of the European communities in international affairs (London Report 1981: 2-6).

The EPC never discussed the defence issues, therefore NATO remained sole leader to deal with security and defence matters. The Western European Member States were concerned for security and wanted to cooperate in security and defence, however; without the US presence. The Member States organised a meeting outside the EPC and revived the Western European Union. The WEU was reactivated in 1984, in which foreign and defence ministers agreed to meet regularly to discuss defence issues. In 1984 Schengen Cooperation was organised by the Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in June 1984. The five countries singed the Schengen agreement for free

movement of person and gradually abolition of check on sharing borders. The goal was to loosen internal border and safeguards internal security through strengthening external borders.

Single European Act

The most essential treaty which reformed the role of European Political Community was the Treaty of Single European Act 1987. The SEA brought institutional reform, provided a concept of European Security and developed a permanent Political Secretariat in Brussels. The SEA established a European area without internal boundaries to envisaged a "single market for free movement of goods and services" (SEA 1987).

In 1981 Germany and Italy proposed a "European Act" to making a progress towards the European Union. This plan linked with the EC and EPC to empower the European Council to establish political unification within the members of the European Community. The plan was discussed with ten Member State, after negotiation a declaration on European Union was signed by the head of Government of European Council on 19 June 1981 to establish political unification of Europe. In 1985, "the European Council organised an intergovernmental conference mandated to achieve concrete progress on European Union". After the intensive negotiations between members, the "Single European Act" was signed by the Member States in February 1986 and which was ratified by all the Member States on 1 July 1987 (EPC 1988: 16-17).

The SEA was seen as a set of an amendment to the EEC treaty and reform in the EPC procedure to contribute to European unification. The preamble of the Treaty states that "the implementation of European Union, communities need to operate in accordance with their own rule and European cooperation among the members in the sphere of foreign policy and to invest this Union with the necessary means of action". The primary aim of Europe is to achieve economic integration and political cooperation among Member States. Therefore, its Europe responsibility to speak with one voice and act with consistency and solidarity to protect its common interests and independence (Preamble SEA 1987).

The SEA clearly separates the EPC functions from the EEC. The European Community, which is founded on the establishing treaties of the ECSE, EEC, EURATOM and

subsequent treaties exercised their powers and jurisdiction under the Community structure. Whereas the EPC was established after the agrees with reports of Luxembourg, Copenhagen, London, Solemn Declaration and subsequent treaties and act exercised their powers and jurisdictions laid down in title III under intergovernmental structure (Article 1 and Article 3 in Title 1 SEA). Under the III title "European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy governed to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" (SEA 1987:1009-1051).

The EPC structure and methods were different from Community, but despite these differences, both worked together to maximise the power in international relations through a consistent approach towards the European unity and identity in the supranational framework of the Community. In the begging, the development of the EPC was considered a threat against to the achievement of the EC, but later it was regarded as the second phase of European integration and reconstruction of European identity in the outside world. Many times it reformed and shaped by internal and external treaties, conferences, and acts; however, it did not suffer any institutional crisis.

The European Single Act (SEA), created a legal platform for the EPC. The primary goals of both institutions to address the challenges and problems between the Member States and form consent based mechanism to work for European unification. Thus, it enhanced the collaboration among the Member States to establish the identity of the EC in world affairs. The SEA removed all the trade barriers and restrictions in the law in term of private and public enterprise. The central aim of the SEA was to establish a single internal market by the end of 1992.The first stage of Economic integration came into effect in July 1990 (Laursen 1991: 21-24). Economic integration strengthened the internal efficiency and effectiveness to the European economy, implicitly the individual Member States interest. It offered many opportunities for economic stability, advance growth and create more jobs benefits to the community citizens.

The late 80s and early 90s were a significant era for Europe. In the middle of the Cold War, new Member States joined the EC, and it almost doubled the members. They worked together to increase the network of intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy. The end of the Cold War provided opportunities and challenges to the European institutions and integration process. The political landscape changed in Europe after

1989. The Gulf War provided an opportunity to Europe to rethink its independence in their defence structure. Therefore, the WEU was reactivated to play a major role in response to events in the Gulf. The Iraq war at the end of the Cold War, and unfolding crisis in the Balkan raised a concern towards security and defence mechanism for Europe. The Internal problem of European integration and external problems ranging from East-West Conflict, Germany unification, Abolition of Warsaw Pact, and Gulf crisis it forced to rethink EC's external role to enhance its position.

Reforms in the 1990s: Three Pillars of the EU as a Community of Security

The confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States defined the Cold War period. The Cold War period also shaped the international structure. However, in Europe, it influenced the integration process. Late 1989 period was very critical for Europe, the growing political instability in Eastern Europe, breakdown of the Berlin Wall, and German unification created a chaotic environment. However, after the post-Cold War politically divided Europe remained incapable of addressing the other issues. Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War also offered more opportunity to increase the Community role in external and internal realms to influence the international system. The prolonged integration process was looking forward to enhancing the field of European foreign policy. The EPC was considered as an outdated process for the further development of the EC. Therefore, in front of new challenges and opportunities, the Europeans wanted to address the area of foreign and defence policy. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty legally established the European Union on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty engaged with internal question of supranationality, democratic legitimacy, enlargement and decision making in order to impact on external development of Europe.

The national security always has been a question of external security for nation states. In the starting, Danish and France's citizens were not in favour to transfer sovereign power into the EU. But later, after intensive and acrimonious debate, all three got successes to gain majority approval and finally they ratified the Treaty. The UK Spain and Germany followed simultaneously with other Member States to ratify the Treaty. From 1 November 1993 onwards it came into force (Kugelmann 1994: 335-339).

The Maastricht Treaty provided a new stage to create a closer EU among the people of Europe. It supported a sustainable and balanced approach in social and economic to

strengthen the unity through single currency under the Economic and Monetary Union. The aim of the Treaty was to be aware of the new external challenges of the Community and maintain its identity at global level by a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and protect the citizenship rights by developing closer cooperation on JHA. The Maastricht Treaty was constructed on pillar structure. The economy was created on the Community pillar, the Common CFSP, was built upon intergovernmental structure and the JHA was under the supranational framework (TEU 1992: 4). The existing treaties on European integration such as EEC, EURATOM and ECSC were merged and remained in the Community Pillar.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: New Actor

Intensive dialogue and deliberation took place for shaping the CFSP and institutional procedures to strengthen the European leadership on security issues and also establish a shared defence mechanism for internal security of Europe. The WEU became an integral part of European defence and together it enhanced their relationships with the NATO and the EU. The Maastricht Summit to the EU and the components of the CFSP created a new move away from the EPC. It was implemented with the inclusion of Community and intergovernmental approach (Duke 2000: 82- 98).

The Treaty also laid down some common provision to establish and implement the CFSP. These provisions mentioned that "to safeguard of the common values, fundamental interests and independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter". "To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter". "To promote international cooperation to develop consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". "To pursue these objectives, the Union had to established systematic cooperation and implementation of joint action in areas of common interest of Member States". In regard, the Member States coordinated with the Union's external and security policy to enhance mutual solidarity and increased the Union effectiveness in international affairs. The CFSP was pursued through common objectives and joint actions (TEU 1992: 123-129).

Table-1 Treaties and Events that Shaped the EU develop as a Global Security Actor

Year	Treaty/Event	Outcome
1992	Maastricht Treaty	Foundation of the European Union
1993	Single Market	Free of Movement of People, Goods, Service and Money within the EU
1997	Treaty of Amsterdam	Reform of the European Union Institutions
1998	Saint-Malo Declaration	Reform in the EU's foreign, defence and security policy
2001	9/11 Terrorist attack in the US	Impact of Non-State Actor Changed Security Landscape in Europe
2003	Treaty of Nice	Reform of the European Union Institutions
2003	European Security Strategy	First Security Strategy of the EU, based on Three Strategic Objectives: Addressing the Threat, Building Security in Neighbourhood, and Global Order Based on Effective Multilateralism
2004	Enlargement Process	10 Eastern European Countries Joined the Membership of the EU
2004	Neighbourhood Policy	To Build Effective Partnership and Cooperation with Neighbourhood
2008	Global Economic Crisis	Financial Crisis in Europe
2009	Lisbon Treaty	Provide legal status to Union and reformed and amend institution process
2010	Arab Uprising	Civil War and Instability in the MENA Region
2015	Refugee and migration Crisis in Europe	Rise of Populism and Breakdown of Solidarity
2016	European Union Global Strategy	Comprehensive Strategy of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy
2020	Brexit	UK left the EU
2022	European Strategic Compass	Common vision to Secure Europe and its People

Common Defence: Aftermath of the TEU

The outbreak of civil wars in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995, exposed the weakness and limitations of the EU's diplomacy to respond in crisis torn environment. The EU had lacked a crisis management structure capacity to addresses the problem that occurred during the War. Interference of NATO and the US in wars questioned the EU legitimacy. Europeans were ready to work for their diplomacy for foreign and security policy, therefore, enacted the Amsterdam Treaty. In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty reformed the institutional framework of CFSP and added alternative institution; a new policy planning and early warning unit and a post of High Representative for the CFSP. Javier Solana was appointed to the position of High representative played a supporting role in draft, formulation, Preparation and implementation of policy decision in international representation (Amsterdam Treaty 1999: 9-16). In the security dimension, the Member States of the Union argued that the

CFSP needs a military mechanism. The US started to withdraw its force from Europe when Europeans were expecting to participate to the international peace mission. The Member States were divided over the European defence structure. Member States were against the NATO's presence in European security umbrella and also against the EU to join any non-European body for European defence and security. They agreed to revive the WEU, however, in the current situation it was seen as difficult. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not substantially reform the Maastricht Treaty; it just added an alternative provision on CFSP. The Treaty also codified the WEU's Petersberg Tasks. Under these tasks, the Union handles humanitarian and rescue operations, combat forces, peacekeeping and peace-making mission in crisis.

The evolution of new provision on the CFSP raised unnecessary debate and a demand picked up to reinforced security and defence system of Europe to manage the situation. The Treaty of Amsterdam was essential to reform for political direction and enhanced effectiveness and visibility of CFSP. However, it also required collective defence management and immediate solution through military intervention in the region to address the problem effectively.

The problem of the EU did not solve yet. The Kosovo war emerged in 1998 present numerous challenges against the EU. The EU tried to ease hostilities between Serbia and Albanians. But again the EU failed to respond effectively and by the NATO' airstrike on Serbia brought to end of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Once again, the Kosovo war exposed the inadequacy of resources and capabilities to conduct its own forces and strikes equivalent to NATO and the US.

The Saint Malo Treaty was significant in the history of the EU. It was adopted in December 1998 in St. Malo. It was assumed to make changes in existing foreign policy and shape the EU defence and security policy (St. Malo Treaty 1998). It was framed by the Atlanticists (led by form the British side) and Eurpeanists (led by the French side). The Treaty provided opportunity to the Union to develop an autonomous policy for military capability. The European countries were profoundly dependent on NATO. NATO's presence in the Kosovo crisis became crucial for European Security. The Kosovo crisis displayed the EU's limited resources to protect their citizens and weakness from securing Europe from outside threat. Inability to protect, secure and enforce peace raised questions against the Union's eligibility as a security leader. The

Franco-British collaboration considered developing the EU capability of military missions and actions to respond in crisis and for that it was needed limit the dependency on NATO. Consequently, a submit was held on a joint declaration on European Defence in December 1998. The major idea was to implement European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). The Franco-British Declaration or famously known as St. Malo declaration was signed by the member countries and agreed to establish the ESDP. The Declaration stated that the Amsterdam Treaty has provided an essential basis for EU action to implement and achieve CFSP goals and provisions described in the Treaty. It provided the capability to take autonomous action and credible military forces in the military missions to respond in international crisis. "Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology". The cohesion between Member States and within the EU enabled the Union to achieve the EDSP's objectives to form a common defence and security policy in future (Ginsberg and Penska 2012: 21).

The Cologne European Council on 3-4 June 1999 sought to strengthen the Common European policy on Security and Defence, under the birth of ESDP. It initiated the new decision making structure "the Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS)". The Council launched Nice Treaty to reform and amend the TEU for future development in the security matters. The Treaty came into effect in 2003, codified provisions under a new intergovernmental structure. The PSC was composed by the Brussels based representative to meet twice in a week to define the central role and follow to Union response in a crisis. It gave direction to the EU's role in a crisis of political control and strategic direction of the military intervention. The PSC takes suggestions from the EUMC, which gives neutral advises to the presidency in the setting of political direction. The EUMS is a subordinate body but works as a real business to conduct military policy to provide early warning, assessment of the situation and strategic planning in a crisis. In the review of the EU military structure, the ESDP was chosen "as an integral part of the CFSP" (European Parliament 1999a).

The Helsinki European Council was very crucial for European defence. It took place in December 1999 and launched the CSDP. It incorporated the ESDP for military and non-military crisis management capability of the EU to strengthen Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP was chosen as an autonomous body to take decision in security and defence matter of Europe to launch and conduct military operations in response towards international crisis where NATO is not engaged. Through the CSDP, cooperation and transparency have development between the EU, NATO and its Member States. It had set headlines goals that: By 2003 "the Member States must be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1-year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks" (European Parliament 1999b).

The institutions of the CSDP were established in the 2000s. It was decided to incorporate the WEU into the EU. The relationship between the European Union and NATO enhanced after the Berlin Plus cooperation to the lunch of the CSDP missions in 2002. Antiterrorism was added in the CSDP missions. According to the Council, the Union has achieved the capability to conduct crisis management operations, especially after the 9/11. It showed that the EU was ready to face any kind of crisis management situation.

In November 2001, the Laekan European Council was held in the assessment of the Union's crisis management capability. It declared the EU needs to be more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. The Council was decided to hold next IGC on Future of Europe. The conference summoned in 2002-03 to draft the constitution for Europe. In the following year members were agreed on a "Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe'. The referendum held in 2005 on the treaty but the French and Dutch rejected it. In 2007 members were agree to include most of the provision of the draft constitution in new treaty. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty was signed, it approved in October 2008 and finally came into force on 1 December 2009. In the Treaty new institutions were created, and old institutions were reformed (European Parliament 2001).

By the following reform, Treaty eliminated the third pillar (JHA), and it remained into supranational first pillar. The EU became the institution with international legal personality and the EC delegation transformed into the EU delegations. The new Treaty altered the role of council presidency by giving equal rights to all states to hold presidency on the serious matter. The Lisbon Treaty created a permanent post of "the European Council and a high representative of the European Union in foreign affairs

and security policy". Both have played a crucial role in representing the EU in international affairs. The HRVP constructed a new body 'European External Action Service' to work in external affairs in foreign and security policy. The EEAS has made efforts to bridge gaps between both pillar divided and division between the EU and national levels of foreign policy making. The Treaty reformed decision making procedures for CFSP through common strategies to fulfil the EU objectives. The tasks of Petersberg have expanded and it includes conflict prevention and post conflict stabilisation, military advice and assistance, joint disarmament operations, and assistance to third country in combating terrorism. The Treaty enhanced cooperation to allow close cooperation among Member States to increase defence capabilities. Therefore, Treaty introduced a European defence agency to enhance capacity to deploy battle groups under permanent structured defence cooperation (Smith 2014: 37-42).

Thus, the era of the 1990s produced uncertainty, ambiguity and unpredictablity for the EU, NATO and WEU to rethink to redefine themselves in the changing security environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War. The triangle relationships between the EU, NATO and the WEU have been complicated in term of bilateral relations of the EU with the non-EU member.

Conclusion

The EU has been regarded as a civilian power actor. However, the attempts were made to adopt hard power/military power capacity during the European integration process. The Union visibility at international sphere grew substantially after the Single European Act, and signing of the TEU. The Maastricht Treaty defined the foreign and security policy role of the EU to be a leader in foreign and security issues. The CFSP was launched to improve the capability of their civilian missions through normative power in the region. The internal-external events strengthened the Union's capability to act as a security actor. The formal establishment of the EU as a leader has proved its leadership growth in economic, political, social and cultural relations and security provider in the region.

The EU has developed the crisis management capability to developed military and civilian forces to formulate the policy and lunch the missions. The EU has gained the capability by developing foreign and security policies; however, without organising capacity, it is worthless. The capability requires political will and capacity to formulate

policy to developed security strategies. From the EC to the EU, it enhanced capabilities by creating the Economic Community, European Political Cooperation, Single European Act and Treaty on European Union (EMU, CFSP/ESDP and JHA). The EU actorness is under construction. The EU's growth in internal and external relations and external role capacity established after the European Security Strategy, Big Bang Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, the Lisbon Treaty, and the European Union Global Strategy. International events, internal-external relation, security strategies and policies have worked back the EU to enhance its leadership quality in security matter within and beyond Europe.

FOURTH CHAPTER

THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY

"We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union... we will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested, and complex world by our shared interests, principle and priorities"

(EUGS 2016: 7)

Background

The European Union has always been criticised for lacking effective strategic thinking in foreign and security policy, which reduced its ability to act in the international arena. Five years after the first European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), the geopolitical order changed the environment into most contested and complex threats. In front of external threats and internal weakness pressurised the EU to respond in the crisis. The internal security from the external threats became the chief goals of the EU to protect itself. The ESS was considered as an outdated strategy to address the new threats. Subsequently, the European Council asked the newly appointed of the European Commission Federica Mogherini to present a new strategy in changing world. In response, the HR/VP produced a document on the European Union Global Strategy on 29 June 2016 and which state that "this is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a strategy for a shared vision, and common action" (EUGS 2016: 3).

Sixty page's comprehensive document became the most crucial strategy of the EU to share interest and principles towards the Union external action with set priorities in foreign and security policy. The EUGS is established on sets of priorities the security of the Union, provide stability in the neighbourhood, stable regional orders across world, deal with war and crisis, and effective global governance. Moreover, the EUGS has achieved a lot after its implementation. The Global Strategy pushed the EU's security and defence counterpart with NATO and cooperation with other countries on the matters of burden-sharing and security for all. The global strategy has become a reminder of the EU's "strategic interest in the cooperative world order". By following the mantra of being united and building a strong alliance against the problems, strategy increasing the credibility and reliability of the EU as a global power and among other

international actors as a strong security provider in "peace, security and human development worldwide" (EEAS 2017: 6).

The European Security Strategy presented the EU as a security actor in Europe. The inauguration of a new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) on foreign and security policy conceived as a promise to work together under the unity to "contribute to global security in a particular way" (Mälksoo 2016: 374).

A Security Strategy for The European Union

The word strategy derives from the ancient Greek term "strategos," which means generalship (Horwath 2020). In a narrow sense, it relates to the military force and objectives of war. It was draw in a broader concept, associated with power and process in the formulation of strategy. Nevertheless, the meaning of strategy is relatively more expansive instead of wars and military tools. The traditional military concept of strategy is based on the use of force to fulfil policy ends through military power and political purpose. "It is an instrument of peacetime and wartime application. Strategy embodies more than just the study of wars and military campaigns. Strategy is the application of military power to achieve political objectives" (Baylis and Wirtz 2007:3) or "more specifically the theory of and practice of the use, and threat of use, or organised force for political purposes" (Gray 1999 in Baylis and Wirtz 2007:3). A better understanding and coordination between both means and ends lead to policy objectives to achieve goals.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, "strategy is the use of engagements for the object of war" (Clausewitz 1976:133). For Von Moltke, strategy is "the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in war" (Moltke in Hart 1991: 320). Similarly, Liddell Hart describes strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy" (Hart 1991: 321).

Thus, strategy is pragmatic and practical in approach. This concept of strategy is based on the realist interpretation of international relations. In the most general sense, "strategy is the art or science of shaping means to promote ends in any field of conflict" to attain given objective in policy (Bull 1968: 593). "strategy involves the actual use or the threat of the use of force in international relations. Therefore, strategic study is about how the instruments of force influence relations between states" (Synder 1999:4). In reality, strategy is a "plan of action" that organises efforts to "achieve an objective".

Therefore, it is "a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (national objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends" (Drew and Snow 2006: 13-14).

Looking from this broad understanding of strategy and coming to the EU, it did not have any such challenging document when it was created in 1992. It was only a decade later that the for the first time it articulated its first security strategy. The defence policy is the source of the EU security, which is related with "self defence against acts of aggression". Whereas, "a strategy is a policy making took which, on the basis of the values and interest of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end" (Biscop 2005:1). The policy making in the transnational threat environment requires attention to develop civilian-military capabilities for strategic objectives.

The strategic thinking in the context of the EU drawn from the Maastricht Treaty, which set the comprehensive strategic guidelines for foreign and security policy. However, the lack of establishing political and legal strategic priorities in the CFSP forced the Union to revise its foreign and security strategy. The Treaty of Amsterdam bridged the political and legal strategic gap by introducing the common strategies for foreign and security policy by including defence matter. Three common strategies were issued on Mediterranean, Ukraine and Russia and the last one on Western Balkans (it dropped before adoption). None of these three common strategies released any joint action plan. Common strategies always have showed the weakness while implementing them because it lacked the specific guideline on how to work towards it and therefore never success to provide full views on Union's foreign policy. It was only limited to regional security (Missiroli 2015: 9).

The Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty formulated the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). The institution of European security became more complicated after the establishment of three pillars structure of European foreign policy and subjected to the guidance of Javier Solana (Then the Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for CFSP). The implementation of European Security Strategy (ESS) under the new post of High Representative for the CFSP over the combined connection between the new challenging environment and sets of goals and guidelines for European integration (Missiroli 2015: 10).

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new institutional amendment in the policy-making structure in the EU. It added the post of the "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President (HR/VP)" and created "the European External Action Service (EEAS)" (autonomous body under HRVP) to imposed some limits on the Member States' interference in foreign and security policy and supported the Brussels based tasks in external action. The Lisbon Treaty consolidated the CFSP as important policy in external action. The Treaty enhanced the coherence of the EU in international relations and external action through the CFSP and CSDP (Morillas 2019: 25).

New Security Problems in Europe

The newly formed European Union as an international entity faced numerous challenges including changed security landscape. These security threats questioned the Union's capability to provide security to its Member States. From 2000 to 2003 significant events occurred in Europe and at the international level that shaped the European security structure.

The most profound external events that happened at the global level was the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. On 11 September 2001, a terrorist attack on America changed the global context in term of transnational threat and security. The terrorist attack shocked the US power and its hegemony in the uncertain global order. The terrorist attack on the US marked the new beginning of a new era in international relations. For Europe and the EU, it was a warning towards its own independent security and defence power. Many questions were raised against the Union credibility to maintain security in the EU. From 9/11 onwards, the idea of threat perception changed and it transformed the world politics into more uncertainty.

The Iraq war posed more enormous security challenges and created division in the European Union. The US decision to go on a pre-emptive attack on Iraq led to deep divisions among the EU Member States between those who supported the US in waging war and others who were not in favour of this decision. The split within the Member States challenged the idea of collective security and unity within the Union.

The Iraq war paralysed the ESDP to address new security matter and mend the transatlantic rift and intra-European divide. Thus, in December 2003, the Secretary-General/ High Representative Javier Solana was asked to draw up a security strategy

for the EU. The first strategic plan was released in the European Council on 19-20 June 2003. A document was adopted on 12 December 2004 in the European Council leading to launch of "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World" (ESS). The ESS presented fundamental security task and identified the core features of the changing security environment of the Union. The ESS document provided an agreed platform for the Member States in formulation of shared policies and to mend the divide among them and between the EU and the US which were created over the issue of invasion in Iraq (Toje 2005: 120).

A Secure Europe in a better World- European Security Strategy

"This is a world of new danger but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities" (ESS 2003: 43).

The ESS was appeared as a precise security strategy document in the development of CFSP. The strategy was concerned to develop self-consciousness and aspirations of the Union in world politics. Moreover, the ESS was produced "as an appendix for ease of reference" (Bailes 2005). The ESS document was not legally binding therefore, it gained majority support from the Member States. Politically, it was more in support of unity building for all member countries within their comfort zone to present their agendas related to it. The ESS, in some sense, was "inspirational" in nature to create an environment to acquire common consensus among the Member States on decision-making process on foreign and security policy (Bailes 2005: 14).

The ESS states that, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and nor so free" (ESS 2003: 27). It stated that the dominance of the US has been critical for European integration and European security realm. No single country is capable of addressing the complicated situation alone. Although the EU is "global player" but to be a more credible and effective leader in global affairs need to increase European interests and enhance and strengthen the mutual solidarity among the European and neighbourhood countries (ESS 2003: 28).

To confront the security threat environment, Europe has to take responsibility for global security to build a better world. Therefore, the European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a better world" was issued by the European Council in December 2003. It was the first strategic document adopted to implement a new security approach to

address the dynamic threat scenario in the post-Cold War circumstances (ESS 2003: 29-32).

The European Security Strategy was mainly based on three themes: the analysis of security environment, strategic objectives and policy implication for Europe to ensure international security with four core terms in the security strategy, effective multilateralism, preventive engagement, failed states and strategic culture (ESS 2003).

The Security Environment

The ESS deals with the complex, multidimensional and more dangerous security threats in the 21st century produced in a globalised world. The era of globalisation minimised the territorial barriers and increased communication awareness. However, on the other side, global challenges increased the burden and dependency on others; such as interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and so on. Globalisation removed the internal and external barriers and make it global (ESS 2003:29).

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), transnational terrorist activity, and organised crimes lead to complex security environment. The failed state considered as a primary threat to security, it supports organised crimes and terrorism, which leads to regional instability. Terrorism is a transnational security threat to Europe after witnessing the terrorist attacks in the region. Terrorism is linked with violent religious extremism has become more complex and international in nature, having adequate resources and digital connection has increased the tactics and the intensity to use unlimited violence. The proliferation of WMD "is potentially the greatest threat to European security". The regional conflicts such as in Middle East, Korean Peninsula and Kashmir threaten regional stability". "the regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD" (ESS 2003: 31-32).

Therefore, "to defend its security and promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives: addressing the threats, building security in neighbourhood and an international order based on effective multilateralism" (ESS 2003: 33-36).

Strategic objectives

These strategic objectives define the key security threats and Union's active participation in addressing the threats. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Union adopted "a European arrest warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on

mutual legal assistance with the US". The EU followed policies again non-proliferation "to measures to tighten exports controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement". The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts" and to put failed stated back on their feet including in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo" (ESS 2003: 33-34).

The new security threats are dynamic and growing risk of proliferation and terrorist networks. "State failure and organised crimes can spread if they are neglected" (ESS 2003: 34). Therefore, the Union realised a need to act before a crisis took place. To confront these security threats required a combined and balanced approach of civilian and military instruments to respond to the multi-faceted situation.

The second strategic objective of the ESS based on the building of security in the neighbourhood. The geopolitical location of the country and their neighbourhood are matters where security is concerned. Crisis and conflict in the neighbourhood country flourished the organised crimes, instability in region and fled of people in Europe border has posed security challenges to European security. The core objective of the strategy to the establishment of "an international order based on effective multilateralism" and "development of a strong international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order" functioning under the United Nations Law (ESS 2003: 36-38). For the ESS, the problem cannot be resolved by using military force alone which is the last tool for security restoration. However, before hard security, it should prevail through discussion, deliberation, diplomatic and humanitarian measures (Bails 2008: 118).

Policy implications for Europe

In the new security environment, the Union wanted to be "more active, more capable and more coherent" in foreign policy and effective crisis management (ESS 2003: 39-41). The aim was to pursue its strategic objectives in foreign policy by using effective crisis management and conflict prevention to counter the new threats. Consequently, the ESS concentrated on to "develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention" (ESS 2003: 39). Strategic culture is essential for long term objectives in security and defence policy which depends on a common way of thinking. The lack of strategic coherence disabled the EU to identify the threats before it turned into crisis (Meyer 2006: 3). Thus, to pursue strategic objectives, the

ESS has given more attention to working with global key partners through multilateral cooperation in an international organisation for the close partnership with Asia, Latin America and Africa. The adoption of a strategic document covers security policy along with the whole of EU foreign policy builds on comprehensive approach across the pillar "from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military" (Biscop 2005: 1).

The ESS was the first appraisal of security and foreign policy of the EU interests. It provided an agreed platform in the formulation of security and collective consensus between Member States on foreign policy to mobilise the EU resources to influence their neighbours to show the Union's power (Toje 2005)

The ESS was adopted in a most challenging time when the deep division was drafted between the Member States surfaced over the launch of Iraq war by the US. It seems reasonable to some extent for the Union capacity to bridging the gap between the Member States. However, others criticised that, the ESS was an end of the Cold War strategy document. It was unable to solve the EU's problems and the transatlantic relationship. The primary way of the ESS to address the threats were based on multilateralism (cooperation with strategic partners). The use of force was the last and least option if non-military technics do not work. From the launch of the ESS, the Union handled many responsibilities to provide security to their people and protect European integration. The EDSP was limited to crisis management and conflict prevention. As security of Europe was concerned only possible by getting a collective approval on shared defence. Still, majority of the Member States preferred the NATO defence structure for European security. In a result, the ESS failed to enhance the ESDP project on the real ground. It was failed to implement strategic objectives in reality. It remained limited in many sense and remained only on paper, not on the ground (Balla 2017: 402-404).

In the complex international system with dynamic and multi-faceted security threats in the twenty-first century the ESS was unable to address the threat environment with the traditional sense of strategy. As the ESS was immediately produced in the post-Cold war world order and written in a short period; therefore, it lacked to frame clear objectives. It created difficulties to gather others opinion and understanding to adopt alternative ways in implementation of strategy (Toje 2005: 131).

The strategy must indeed be dynamic in the changing environment; one strategy is not enough to get the sets objectives. The ESS approach was more coherent in policies, brought different institutions such as "aid, military capabilities, environmental policies" and so on but "the ESS did not set out clear priorities, link specific resources to the fulfilment of specific objectives, or provide for regular assessment of its implementation" (Smith 2017: 9).

After the five years, the international order changed, and the EU's strategic position in global politics changed too. In changing global situation world became more uncertain in the rise of new security threats. The appearance of more vulnerable security threats such as political instability, extremism and violent conflict, terrorism, humanitarian crisis, organised crimes, illegal-migration, cyber-crime, piracy, energy security and environment degradation increased insecurity in whole world, raised the demand to the EU to revise its ESS. After realising the need of the revised strategy, the EU adopted an Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy (2008) to make more constructively and effective strategy to provide security in diverse security's threats environment. The revised strategy added more security threats challenges such as the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organised crime, cyber-security, energy security and climate change" (European Council 2008: 26). It has set out vision how to be "fairer, safer and more united" and "must do more to shape events" to build a secure Europe in a better world (European Council 2008: 12).

The revised ESS focused on all existing strategies and created explicit sub-strategies on varies issues and regions to makes European security strategy more coherent and useful to get its objectives. For Javier Solana, "a lot has been achieved in a short period of time. But there is not for room for complacency. We continue to face many complex challenges in a world that is changing fast" (European Council 2008). Therefore, to ensure security of the EU and its citizens, need to become "more strategic in thinking, more effective and visible around the world" (European Council 2008: 8). The EU ambition to become a great power in international politics remained a dream. The ESS failed to deliver states policy objectives. The behavioural pattern of strategy was drawn as small power capacity building overlap with other small power. The security strategy did not help the EU to emerged as a strategic actor as a great power such China, Russia, while the EU emerged as strategic actor like small power such as Sweden (Toje 2010: 43).

Although the ESS did not emerge as an effective strategy, yet it helped the EU to appear as a regional actor in European security. The EU is considerably increasing its regional power in the internal and external Europe. The concept of regional leadership is based on ability of an actor to influence definite featured of the global affairs or internal performance of an actor in its neighbourhood. There are some crucial determinants to be a regional actor such as; the willingness and the capacity (hard power and soft power) of an actor to act as a leader and the acceptance of the leadership action within and beyond the region. These determinants somehow matched with the EU actorness as regional leader in the area of peace and security field (Zwartjes et al. 2012: 393).

By the making of the ESS, the EU has shown its ambitions to connect with neighbours to pursue their national interest in security and foreign policy. The EU is a normative power and depends on values, norms and ideational resources to influence the other international actors. Under the ESS, the EU intervened in regional conflicts by deploying civilian and military missions to restore peace, and order. The civilian instruments have been used to address the regional conflicts and political solution to tackle the crisis. The EU's effectiveness in foreign and security policy and defence policy a goal ahead for CFSP has enhanced the Union leadership in internal and external policy to impact on international relations. Others international actor has accepted that the European Union is a normative leader in world politics which has a dream towards a secure and united world. Thus, the EU's regional actorness in global affairs identified the security threats issues within and beyond Europe and addressed the conflict by using the civilian means to tackle the crisis to secure its people (Zwartjes et al. 2012).

The signing of the Lisbon Treaty traced another important goal in the integration of Europe, improve coherence in its external actions and enhance its accountability towards European citizens. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, marked as a shift in the Union's actorness from regional to global level. The pillar structure disappeared in the Lisbon Treaty, and the treaty turned the Union into an entirely legal personality (Treaty of Lisbon 2009).

Coherence is the necessary condition in the foreign policy of the EU and any international actor. The EU has maintained better coordination within the Union and between the Member States on foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon presented a vertical and horizontal coherence on foreign policy of the EU (Koehler 2010: 57-58).

According to article 21(3) of consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty showed the horizontal coherence in foreign policy, "the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external and between these and other policies" (TEU 2012: 29). The Article 24 (3) of the Lisbon Treaty showed vertical coherence in foreign policy. It stated that "the member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's actions in this area" and "the member states shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations" (TEU 2012: 30-31). Vertical coherence always remained a priority of the EU; therefore, the Council and the High Representative both are responsible for complying with it. These efforts and innovation enhanced Union commitment in improving its efficiency and coherence in the EU and at international level (TEU 2012).

The CFSP and CSDP both remained as an intergovernmental part of the Lisbon Treaty. The supranational external relations continued in foreign policy to extend its international security policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty provided "a legally binding document" which focused on coherence to rise above "the intergovernmental-*communautaire* dualism of the foreign policy", increase the ability to enhance the vertical coherence on external foreign policy (Gaspers 2008: 37-38).

The Lisbon Treaty brought changes in CFSP which enhanced the coherence in the EU foreign policy. The provisions on CSDP reflect the resolution on discouraging the member state's national foreign policy to give more attention to foreign policy and external action. Thus, Treaty of Lisbon made a remarkable shift in the EU actorness from regional to a global actor in foreign and security policy. After established as a legal entity, the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the EU's capability to handle the relations and responsibility of other states in competences of its political, foreign and security domain. The question arises why should the EU be strongly represented in the international arena? Because the world is changing dramatically and the EU and its member countries need to be very cooperative to be an actor in world affairs (Emerson et al. 2011).

The Need for a New Strategy for the EU

The ESS was based on preventive engagement and it focused on those threat issues that was the outcome of the end of the Cold War setting. The world order after the Post-Lisbon Treaty was different. The internal-external conflicts and crises produced severe instability in entire Europe. The world was changed more robustly than earlier. The spill over effect on the EU from internal instability and external crises questioned the identity of the EU as an actor in the region and international order. World criticised the EU lacking in ability of as credible actor to response effectively toward crises. The lack of well-defined priorities and effective strategy, the foreign and security policy of the EU seemed irresponsible.

The geopolitical shift transformed the international system which become more critical and crisis-torn. The new institutional framework EEAS was struggling to find its existence and while the HRVP struggled to find its role and voice in Europe. Internationally, the EU has been concerned towards the rise of new global power (China and Russia), new strategic partnership (India, Brazil and US) and growing relations with international organisations (NATO and UN). Internally, the enlargement expanded the membership strength of the Union. Therefore, there was a need for a new strategy that reinforced the EU actions and determinations in the acute crises and minimised the fear of threat. There was aim that new strategy should be based on consideration and appropriate reflection of the current crisis (Anderson et al. 2017: 5-17).

Europe faced contemporary security challenges that are inter-sectoral and trans-border in nature like terrorist attacks, global warming, financial crisis, mass migration, and increasing fear of actions of Russia. The ESS did not remain effective to address the new security threats and reaching towards the set of objectives and. Therefore, the EU needed to formulate a new strategy that should be global in approach to deal with the current crises (Kettle 2015: 3).

The Europeans declared the ESS as an old-fashioned strategy. It did not "connect threats, ends and means and it too vague on common interests and the EU's ambitions" (Drent and Landman 2012: 1-2). The EU has a responsibility to secure its neighbourhood through interaction with third world countries and other international actors to tackle the security related issues. Therefore, the adoption of a new strategy should reflect the strictness. Furthermore, it should be based on proper guidelines to

strengthen the civilian and military capacities and capabilities of the EU. Thus, "a new strategy must review threats, assess and prioritise, and translate them to capability needs and planning" (Drent and Landman 2012: 3). Thus, "the EU needs much greater strategic thinking- especially in terms of the applications of means to large ends" (Howorth 2010: 463).

Growing instability outside Europe- Arab Uprising, Russia annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian crisis and war in Syria denoted a geopolitical transition. If the EU want to continue its role as a security provider requires a strategy that confidently set out on a positive agenda to achieve their goals by external action across the world. Increasing transnational crimes, terrorist attacks (France, Berlin and UK) and illegal human forced trafficking realised the Union to rethink over a new global strategy to maintain internal stability by addressing the external crisis. Consequently, Federica Mogherini (HRVP) in June 2015 to draft a strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy with the support of the Member States (Buitelaar et al. 2016: 5).

In 2015, HRVP presented an analysis report of "the European Union in a changing global environment a more connected, contested and complex world". Globalisation produced a more connected world, but despite it, the world turned out more contested and complex. The EU must have seen both challenges and opportunities in the changing environment. Instability from East to South Europe and also in Asia made the world more contested. Due to the shift in emerging global powers and the diffusion of powers among actors' world became more complex. The changing security environment required a new strategy to address the key issues in the direction of external engagement, flexibility (to enhance effectiveness in cooperation and humanitarian assistance), leverages (in trade and tariff, coordination for collective action), and capabilities to tackle root cause problems by its foreign and defence policy. Therefore, world required "a common, comprehensive and consistent European Union Global Strategy" for "a stronger Europe" (Mogherini 2015). There were high expectations that the EUGS would focused on other rising powers such as China and Russia for better influence in international relations to develop a coherent geopolitical vision (Wijk 2016: nd).

A year-long process, the HRVP produced a draft of the "Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A

Stronger Europe", wad adopted by the European Council on 28 June 2016. The EUGS was presented in the midst of the refugee crisis, the rise of national populism, and a day after the UK referendum to exit the EU. The EUGS followed its predecessor strategy, compared it with new Global Strategy and found that the "world has become more unstable and unpredictable" since then. The emergence of enormous challenges and divides within the EU has weaken the foreign policy system. It has reduced the Union capability to act strategically in world affairs. The difference was created by the Treaty of Lisbon shifted "political context within the EU" (Pishchikova and Piras 2017: 103-105).

The European Union Global Strategy

The "Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy: A shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe" (EUGS 2016) it aims to build a stronger Union to play a collective role in the world to resist the internal and external threats to secure Europe. The EUGS presented a conceptual framework for CFSP and called upon the operational role for CSDP. The Global Strategy is parted in three sections; first a "global strategy to promote shared interests and principles", second "the priorities of the EU's external actions" and third "from vision to action" (EUGS 2016: 10). The second section of priorities are based on five major approach of security in the EU.

The EUGS' s Interests and Principles

The EU Global Strategy started by defining the four interests in foreign and security policy; "peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rule-based global order" (EUGS 2016: 14-15). The EUGS promoted security and prosperity of its people and region. The internal and external security are interconnected together, hence, a secure neighbour can promise the security in Europe. The resilience of democracies and promotion of a rule-based global order within multilateralism order to fulfil the Union interests and values (values are embedded in interests) in external action. The Global Strategy states that "our interests and values go hand in hand" (EUGS 2016:14). The Global Strategy described the Union's four principles in external action on the basis of the "principled pragmatism" approach (norms and values). The four principles are "Unity" (coordination between national and European Interests), "Engagement" (co-shape global rules and manage interdependence), "Responsibility" (to tackle conflict

and crises) and "Partnership" (share responsibility with regional bodies and international organisations) (EUGS 2016: 13-18).

The EUGS has suggested the Union's engagement with the wider world by being responsive towards the problems. A responsible engagement demand unity within the EU and partnership with the outside world (Tocci 2017: 60-64). The principled pragmatism represented a revisit "realpolitik vision from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic ambition" towards a better world. 'A vision of the future', 'to achieve those ideals in a realistic way' (Bew 2016 in Biscop 2016: 1).

The Priorities of the EUGS

The EUGS described the set of five priorities such as "the Security of the Union, State and Societal Resilience to East and South, An Integrated Approach to Conflicts, Cooperative Regional Orders and Global governance for Twenty-First Century" (EUGS 2016: 18-39).

The first priority of the EUGS defined the security of the European Union. The Global Strategy ensures that European security starts from Europe and it goes to the global level. In other words, the EUGS gives foremost priority to its own security. The main focus has given to improve the security and defence capacities to deter, respond and protect European people and its territory from external threats. The most dangerous threats in united Europe such are terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy insecurity. A concern towards European security suggested the EU take a step for strategic autonomy "to respond to external crisis and assist in developing partner's security and defence capacities to carrying out these tasks in cooperation with others". "Alongside external crisis management and capacity building and assist in protecting its Members upon their request" (EUGS 2016:19). Therefore, Europeans need cooperation on defence and security to gain, expand and uphold the capability for secure Europe. Therefore, the EU has to strengthen as a security community to act autonomously and cooperation with NATO (collective defence) for "counter-terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic instability and energy security" which prevail strong connection between internal and external security (EUGS 2016: 20-23).

Second priority described the "States and Societal Resilience to East and South". It has been confirmed that the EU interests and security dependents on peace and stability of its neighbourhood. Therefore, the EU will "promote resilience in its surrounding regions" (EUGS 2016: 23). The responsibility of the CFSP to address the fragility and stabilised the region through resilience, sustainable development and effective migration policy. Therefore, the EUGS reinforced the resilience approach which brings the security community and development community to become more pragmatic. The term resilience means "ability to absorb, react, and respond to crises" and promote reforms in surrounding states and societies to recover from internal and external crises (Tocci 2017: 71). The Arab uprising, escalating conflict and instability in the Middle East exposed the urgency of "resilient state and society to be secure". It required a resilient approach to "be inclusive, well established, developed, cohesive and sustainable" (Tocci 2017: 69-71). However, the resilience of states and societies stretched from East into Central Asia to South into Central Asia to support the stability of "economic, societal and climate instabilities" and "develop more effective migration policies with origin and transit countries of refugees and migrants" (EUGS 2016: 24-27).

The third priority of the EUGS is based on "An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises" which states that "the EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating its efforts in surrounding region to the East and South" (EUGS 2016: 28). Thus, establishing an integrated approach along with implementing "a multidimensional approach" of policies and instrument in "conflict prevention, management and resolution", "a multi-phased approach for all stages of conflict cycle" (EUGS 2016:28), "a multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global level" and "a multilateral approach in collaboration with all regional and global actors present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution" (EUGS 2016: 29). This priority emphasised on the pre-emptive peace, security and stabilisation, conflict resolution and political economy for peace to foster human security (EUGS 2016: 29-30).

The fourth priority defined "Cooperative Regional Orders" to promote peace, security and development. The cooperative regional orders "compromise a mix of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional relations". It also "features the role of global player interlinked with regionally-owned cooperative efforts" (EUGS 2016: 32). To address

transnational conflicts, challenges and opportunities" the EU "invest in cooperative relationship to spur shared global responsibilities" (EUGS 2016: 32).

"The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes are key elements of the European security order" (EUGS 2016: 33). The peace and stability in Europe challenged by the Russia's illegal invasion on Crimea and Ukraine. The turmoil in Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa increasing threat of terrorism and migration crisis. The EU "stand united in upholding international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country's right to choose its future freely" (EUGS 2016: 33). The EU does not recognise Russia's illegal annexation which is violation of international law, and therefore, the EU focused on enhance the resilience in eastern neighbourhood and engage in pragmatic relationship with Russia. The EU supported its "cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa and the Middle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in the region" (EUGS 2016: 34). The EU is also working on strong bonds across the Atlantic for solid transatlantic partnership, a connected Asia for European prosperity and Asian security, a cooperative Arctic for environment research and cooperation with states, institution, indigenous peoples and local communities (EUGS 2016:37- 39).

The fifth priority described "Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century". The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons" (EUGS 2016: 39). The EUGS analyse that not just only enough to preserve the existing system, even also need to transform or reform the existing system such as Security Council of the UN) to increase visibility and cohesion. The strategy emphasised on to "reforming" in global governance to support UN's "peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions", "implementing global governance in the areas of sustainable development and climate", deepening and widening global governance through bilateral and multilateral trade" and "developing security and sustainable access" (EUGS 2016: 39-43). In brief, EUGS tried to make the EU a more proactive and transformational to fulfil its designated goals.

The EUGS: From Vision to Action

In order to convert vision into action, the EU worked on collective investment "in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union" (EUGS 2016: 44-49). A credible Union for responding to external crises and build a strong partnership to protect Europe (EUGS 2016: 44-51). The EU credibility can enhance through security and defence capabilities and defence cooperation (with and between member states and NATO's) with autonomy in decision and action (EUGS). A more "responsive Union" can become through "diplomatic action" and security and development tools such as CSDP (civilian and military structure and mission compliance with the UN charter) and development (security and defence) that are based on previous knowledge of external action with strategic priorities. The Joined Up Union established on institutional and innovation policy comprise the EEAS (Frontini 2016: nd). The implementation of the EUGS shows that it "has to be translated into action" (Zandee 2016: 29). Through the Global Strategy, the EU has made efforts to come closer to work together on foreign and security policy.

The EUGS was implemented at the time of uncertainties of the internal and external dimension of security in Europe. Internally, the rise of Eurosceptic populism, the US election, and Brexit escalated the tension in the EU and between the Member States. Moreover, external conflict, crises and instability in the Middle-East region due to Arab spring and chaos across the Mediterranean by the flow of refugee and migration in Europe. Globally, transnational terrorist attacks and emerging Russia provided complex and challenging tasks to the EU to secure its own security first than international security.

The development of the EUGS was a most needed strategic document with grwoing turmoil in the world. It was established as a bottom-up approach. It's shared interests and values in the field of foreign and security policy to achieve the EU and its Member State's objectives and priorities. The core features of the EUGS significantly focused on principled-pragmatism, resilience and strategic autonomy (act or decide autonomously).

In the deteriorated threat environment, the EUGS presented a realistic, modest and more cooperative and flexible approach in its foreign and security policy and security and defence polity to secure internal security of Europe in the fragile world. Because the

internal and external security is interlinked, therefore, European security start from "home" involves a similar interest for peace in extended and immediate regions. The EUGS was not legally binding document; however, it was discussed between all the delegates, diplomats and foreign and security policy advisors. The EUGS was implemented after consent within the EU and its Member States, between the Member States and the EU's institution's and after intensive discussion and negotiations over the last two years from all the 27 Member States (Tocci 2016: 1-6).

The EUGS gives more push towards the EU's foreign and security policy and also restore the basics of the European project by giving priority to its own security to fulfil all other goals. It was based on global resilience, ambitious diplomacy and defence that was the core of the EU leadership to go forward (Coelmont 2016: 9-11).

There is a sharp contrast between the ESS and EUGS. Both were adopted in different time framework and different content. The ESS was the result of division between the Member States and split transatlantic relations in the EU over the Iraq war. The ESS war more favour in unity and integration within the EU and respond to international crises through its soft approach, which was based on preventive approach and effective multilateralism. The ESS was "an attractive narrative" (Coelmont 2012), and "bold, confident and even occasionally hubristic" (Howorth 2016).

The EUGS is presented in geopolitical turmoil at the peak of refugee crises, terrorist attacks and day after Brexit. The world was more torn and fragile than 2003; strategic and political landscape changed the notion of security in the context of internal-external nexus. Therefore, the EUGS reads as, "We live in time of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Out Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned" (EUGS 2016: 13). Framing the EUGS in the contested world transformed the EU vision into" the politicisation of foreign policy" (Barbe and Morillas 2019).

The EUGS moved to a new foreign policy approach by principled pragmatism in the form of resilience-building. The "principled pragmatism means the EU should act in accordance with universal values denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories" (Juncos 2016: 2). The Global Strategy has marked a clear attempt for foreign and security policy to increase the EU leadership in external action within and

beyond Europe. It has provided emancipation and evolution of the CFSP and promotion of CSDP capability to its strategic priorities.

The EUGS presents as indispensable strategy to address the crises and conflicts in the complex and contested world with civilian and military powers. The EUGS provides an understanding of security for whom and remarkably separates it from self and other. The "self-survival" depends on "other-acts" (Korosteleva 201: 307-308). Therefore, security of Europe depends on the stability, peace and security beyond Europe. The EU's external action depends on security of the surrounding regions for internal security of Europe. In other words, perhaps is correct to say in the context of Europe's security that it is a "complex interdependency" (Keohane and Nye 1977) in the 21st century world.

The lacks of strategic thinking and policy making in the EU never paid attention towards how to deal with a particular problem with specific policy. The EU has been criticised to unable to produce a proper strategy to define the EU's long terms goals and its position in the world. The EU has produced many regional strategies, strategic partnership with countries for strategic purpose. However, the EUGS has presented as an updated version (addressing all the strategic issues as well as its predecessor strategy ESS) for whole foreign and security policy of the EU.

The EUGS is different from the ESS in many ways, as the Lisbon Treaty marked the vast differences. The Lisbon Treaty provided "a more holistic approach to researching the international security policy" or "consistent international security policy of the EU" (Zwolski 2012: 79). The reforms were adopted in the Lisbon Treaty forced the EU to develop more clearly strategic goals in a coherent way. A strategy that defines clear objectives and priorities with systematic analysis of it purposes.

In the contested environment, the making of the EUGS was far relevant and seemed necessary in time. Challenges and problems did not stop after putting the Strategy (ESS and EUGS), but at last, the Member States were united on common objectives and how to seek those objectives. The EUGS brought major reform in foreign relations and defence policy. It presented as a new strategy on the EU's foreign and security policy and a coherent approach in the EU external action on security and non-security matters. The EUGS's priorities are visions of the EU, which can achieve through its action. For

it, the EU need to become more credible (consistent), responsive (CSDP: Civilian and Military) and joined Up (internal-external policies) (EUGS 2016: 10-11).

The EUGS set out extensive mutual interests and visions. The EUGS focused upon the Union security and felt a need to shift the civilian power into the much more significant military capabilities. However, it was sure that foreign policy goals could not depend alone on the military power; therefore, the EUGS brings a balanced approach of both the power (Civilian and Military) in the policy instruments. It is more strategic approach in strengthening unity and creating a realist foreign policy around the world (Smith 2017: 1-22).

Civilian and Military Missions in the EUGS

The Security strategy on foreign policy has strengthened the Union's capability and capacity through the CDSP's civilian and military missions. The CSDP is an essential part of the CFSP. The principal objective of the CSDP to boost the operational capacity of the Union for negotiations and arbitration for peace by the missions and operations to prevent and strength international security by following the principles of the United Nations Law. Since starting, the EU has been considered as a civilian actor based on soft power security approach. The lack of commitment among the Member States, the failure of ESDP and the high hopes for CSDP compelled the EU to become an actor of military power in international security. After the Global Strategy and the implementation plan on security and defence has established the new goals and objectives for defence and security structure for Europe. Under the EUGS, the CSDP role became more important to respond in external conflict and crises, construct the capacities of partners and secure the EU and its people. The CSDP's civilian and military missions and operations task included crises management, joint stabilisation operations and civilian and military rapid response (Fiott and Bund 2018: 135).

The CSDP missions and operations have continued to deploy civilian and military mission since 2003. The civilian mission of CSDP considered as a miniature version of European security by creating an integrated, cooperative and multilateral approach in external conflict and crises to secure internal security of Europe. Changes in the geopolitical environment led to a shift in security context occurred profound changed in civilian missions. Therefore, the EU has joined its civilian tasks with its interests in European security by enhancing capacity in external security. For instance, civilian

security missions such as "EULEX Kosovo and EUBAM Rafah" (in organised crime and border management), "EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali" (for illegal immigration), "EUPOL Afghanistan and EUCAP Sahel Niger" (for counter-terrorism) and "EUCAP Nestor/Somalia" (for anti-piracy) are keep on track (Juncos 2020: 74-78).

The military missions are conducted at the operational level to justify the EU's foreign policy in international security. The CDSP military missions organised on utility-based and valued-based conception of security to broader its foreign policy strategy for consistency and coherence in objectives, means and procedures with other countries to sustain peace, promote stability and development for human security (Palm and Crum 2019: 518-520). The Global Strategy focused on implementation of the civilian and military missions and the EU strategic autonomy in security and defence. The CSDP is based on the operational capacity of the Union to deploy civilian and military missions in a foreign country. The task of the missions set out in EU treaties which "ranging from conflict prevention and peacekeeping, crisis management, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks to humanitarian and rescue action and post-conflict stabilisation" (EEAS 2020: 1).

The first civilian policing mission was launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and similarly, the first military mission was launched in Macedonia (Operation Concordia) in 2003. Since 2003, the EU has been conducted thirty-six missions and operations, and currently, seventeen missions and operation are ongoing included 6 military missions and 11 civilian missions in the countries of three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe (see figure 2). The debate on the Union's capability and capacity as an autonomous security and defence actor reappeared after the EUGS. The EUGS work on CFSP and CDSP for security and defence policy for a strong relationship in and outside of Europe and crisis management capacity to secure Europe from the fragile world by the civilian and military mission. For some, the EU has become a credible actor in global security. Since the deployment of its first mission, the Union has improved the structure, mechanism and instruments to promote stability and security in global security to secure Europe (EEAS 2020).

Figure 2. Ongoing Civilian and Military Missions 2020

Source-https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

The ongoing EU missions and operations are being conducted under integrated approach, and around 5000 EU personnel deployed worldwide. The objectives of these missions are to restore peace and security by addressing conflict and crises under the UN values and engagement with multilateral forum through its resilience approach at the global level (EEAS 2019). The EU's thirty-six missions and operations have been adopted under "its own autonomous decision-making bodies" and in its own resources. The EU has focused on comprehensive approach for defence and security by using its military and civilian instruments to shows Union as an effective strategic actor against instability (Fiott 2020: 7-8). The adoption of the EUGS and new structure and capacities enhanced the EU role in global security. After the three years of EUGS, the HR/VP presented three implementation Reports in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively for the assessment of the Global Strategy's vision into action.

The first year Implementation Report analysed that the EU Global Strategy has increased participation in stronger Europe through coherence and cooperation of the Union with its Members and partner countries. The report also examined that EUGS

has increased the security and defence structure through its internal cooperation. By its nuclear non-proliferation agreement with Iran, promoted stability in Western Balkans and intensive engagement with surrounding regions have strengthened the global governance and shared approach to tackle the common problems together (EEAS 2017).

The second year Implementation Report of the EU Global Strategy guided the EU to invest more in credible power to become a reliable actor in world security politics. The EUGS realised that for more credibility, defence is most necessary filed for internal and external security nexus and however, to build capabilities requires a collective approach to act together in global peace and security. Consequently, the EU launched the PESCO, EDF and profound their relationship with NATO and the UN (EEAS 2018).

The third year Implementation Report on Global Strategy presented a collective and significant evolution of the EUGS by merging all the past years' implementation reports to observe the overall achievements. In the concerned of European security and defence, the Global Strategy established "Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)", in which three missions are ongoing in Central African Republic, Somalia, and Mali. The Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) on defence was launched in December 2017 to strengthen defence cooperation with 25 member states to join forces on a joint project and provide troops and assets on common missions and operations. The European Defence Fund (EDF) separated European budget on defence to create efficiency and proper record of defence spending at European level to develop European defence capabilities (EEAS 2018: 6-8). Additionally, the European Peace Facility has proposed a new off-budget fund outside the EU fund to increase the Union finance effectiveness in deploying military missions and operations. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was adopted so that member states share defence spending plans so they can be more effective in their defence spending and savings. The creation of new civilian CDSP to invest in civilian mission binds the member states within a commitment to develop and improve the civilian capabilities. Simultaneously, the EU deepened its cooperation with NATO in the areas of common action to address the hybrid threats, increase cyber security and develop defence capabilities (EEAS 2019a: 34-37).

The Global Strategy believed that building peace and security which goes beyond the defence and military dimensions. The EUGS proposed resilience "states and societies and an integrated approach to conflicts and crises in surrounding regions in East and South". The EUGS has enhanced the resilience in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Sahel, Iraq and Syria to promote "democracy, human rights, and the rule of law", as well as sustainable developments and peace through its integrated approach to recover and prevent the states and societies from the shocks and crises. The EUGS principled pragmatism approach promotes human security through its humanitarian aid towards conflict and crises. Similarly, the EU external investment plan was launched to promote sustainable developments growth in the broken regions. After the EUGS, the EU made the largest investment (conflict resolution) in Ukraine and increased closer partnership with Sahel on humanitarian assistance and security cooperation to improve the livelihoods. The Union also supported the peace process in Colombia (EEAS 2019b:38-45).

The cooperative regional order ensures stability and security at the global level. While multilateral order believes in common problems that can be solves if work together. Therefore, the EUGS sees multilateral global governance as a strategic priority in cooperation with international organisations (EU-UN), regional organisations (EU-AU), third countries (Asia, Central Asia and Latin America), and non-state actors (EEAS 2019b: 46-53). Cooperative regional orders are an integral part of multilateralism worldwide. The EU has deepened its relationship with the United Nations and supported its reform to preserve and reinforce the Union credibility to be more effective to endure priorities in foreign policy (UNSC 2020). The EU has set a new generation of trade and political agreement with Canada, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore help in support of human rights and good governance. The EU committed to standing by the "Joint Comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA)" to preserve the nuclear deal with Iran. The global nuclear non-proliferation deal is crucial for Europe security and Middle East peace process and beyond. For the sustainable development and climate change, the EU implemented SDGs and the Paris agreement to support growth and development and climate diplomacy (EEAS 2018: 9-12)

Thus, the EUGS being adopted in the changing global order. The competition between other international actors such as pivot of America (America first Policy), emerging Russia and rising china have increased the tension against the defence of the EU and

member countries. External challenges have escalated mote uncertainty in internal growth of the EU. The polarisation of political parties, the emergence of right-wing parties, migration crisis and the Brexit questioned the EU military capability and forced the EU to look for effective policy implication in defence and security. The EUGS was the only strategy to the EU to formulate unity within the Member States and defence and security structure in the Union. In the "time of crisis," the EUGS adopted CARD for development capability of the Member States, and Defence Action Plan in EDF for an open market, integrated and effective defence market in the competitive defence industry. The PESCO provided a binding commitment for a joint project to develop defence capabilities and operational mechanism. The core of the CSDP is capacity building and crisis management skills to deploy civilian and military mission to guarantee global peace and stability. The internal-external nexus being followed to protect the EU and its citizens by sharing the information to address the hybrid threats. All this possible to enhance the defence cooperation with NATO and foreign and security relations in near abroad (Creutz et al. 2019: 65-83).

These defence initiatives have enabled the EU to adopt strategic autonomy in decision making and external action. The EU civilian and military missions acquired an appropriate level of strategic autonomy in capacity and capability building in global security. The EUGS operational tools have been in balanced in last the three years to achieve the desired goals. Although it is true, the EUGS did not proceed to achieve all the set objectives. However, it permitted the Member States to collaborate on defence cooperation and work on capabilities and improvement through PESCO. The EU has become stronger enough to implement joined-up internal and external policies to maintain its status-quo (Ferreira 2020).

The EUGS has attempted to capture the challenges and external crises and address them by external policy, while security the Union interests. With a coherent vision and balanced ambitions level, the EUGS did a great job and hold up very well on their priorities in world affairs. The EUGS has accurately depicted the world scenario and accepted that the EU is under threat. It has established a connection in Europe and abroad to confront the security threat crises. The Member States of the EU are indeed divided on many issues. However, the EUGS continuously worked in the EU institutions to address the challenges in foreign policy. In the end, despite the harsh realities and good ambitions, the Global Strategy is the comprehensive document to

describe the challenges, work on external crises and conflict through collective approach (Grand 2016: 19-21).

For the HR/VP, the EUGS was prepared for better unity in the CFSP, defence policy and security relations with NATO. The CFSP has worked towards to improve the EU security and defence capabilities through strategic communication. It has worked to strengthen the CFSP as more resilience and comprehensive in approach to enforced stability and profound regional and international partnership for peace and integration. The Global Strategy supported the reform process of global governance based on international law for sustainable development and respect for human rights. The EUGS responded toward Europe's political situation by enhancing the effectiveness of political action for security.

However, there is also some criticism that the adopted approach like principled pragmatism showed the way for implementation of strategy without defining it specifically. Similarly, the term resilience used in strategy is unclear in the concept of action. The objectives of strategy tangled with the interests, even the EU itself has not clearly defined the interests. The strategic autonomy (political objectives) seems inefficient without defining the inclusive European foreign and security policy. Thus, approaches in the EUGS is filled with vagueness and doubts (Bendiek 2016: 1-4).

What is missing in the strategy was the participation of "highest political level" (Sus 2016: 347). The EUGS was quite an acronym in terms of using in the ways of European integration between European institution and Member States governments. The EUGS never considered handling the legitimacy and credibility problems which Europe has faced not only in abroad even in Europe itself. The EUGS failed to set responsibilities and resources to achieve all those shared interests and principles were set in the priorities. The EUGS did not offer a real sense of strategy. It failed to identify what are the real priorities and how to get them strategically (Maull 2016: 34-35). Indeed, the EUGS is a remarkable and aspiring document for geographical scope and thematic priorities. Nevertheless, it gave too much attention to "generalities" and less connecting to get a true sense of priorities (Smith 2016: 446-449).

A post-Brexit the Global Strategy gave a rational scope for the EU to focus more on security and defence matters but also address the ground realities in world politics. The EUGS indeed adopted amid the most turmoil environment and at most needed period

in Europe; terrorist attacks, the rising populism, mass migration, failed states and Brexit. These issues could leave a lasting impact on European citizens and security (Dassù and Menotti 2016: 15-16). The EUGS is more modest in approach and equally challenging to transform the EU position in the world to provide an integrated vision to address the problems. The Global Strategy helped the EU to emerge as an inclusive and influencing power politically, economically and strategically for Europe security. In international threats environment, the EUGS provided greater cooperation and comprehensiveness to reinforced the EU effectiveness as a global actor in the most contested and fragmented world (Sidiropoulos 2016: 37-39). Thus, the EUGS laid down a pragmatic and supporting outline for the EU to build up a clear strategic aims to look ahead. The EUGS tried to adopt a balanced approach between civilian and military power for foreign and security policy to support strategically defined geopolitical goals.

The EU tried to evolve as a strategic actor after establishing the Global Strategy. It can be a "Grand Strategy" (Howorth 2010) of the EU in the field of foreign and security policy. The EUGS has substantial inference for the Union diplomacy. In terms of goals and means, the global strategy is the most important document for the Union and Member States to reach at agreed goals and priorities to protect Europe from the outside world. It has renewed the EU strength in the already existing activities and added more responsibility and vision to achieve them with consensus and cooperation at the international level. The EUGS seems as a "meta-narrative strategic approach that combines realistic assessment and idealistic aspiration" in foreign and security policy (Cross 2016: 6). It has based on sharp and specific priorities about the foreign and security objectives. Therefore, it has given extensive attention on security and defence matters by addressing the transnational terroris m, energy security, cyber security and strategic communication with Member States and neighbour countries. For the CSDP, Global Strategy has focused on peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East, Mediterranean Africa, enhanced transatlantic alliance and strong relations with Asia. It balanced in civilian and military power to diplomacy in practical means. However, the re-assessment of the strategy on time to time is necessary for relevance and influence of the EU in world (Cross 2017).

The ESS and EUGS both presented as a "strategy" and a "meta-narrative" (Duke 2017: 7) approach in the foreign and security policy, external relations and actions under the

framework of the European Council, European Commission and EEAS. However, the EUGS seems like a postmodern approach to merge "sub-strategies" including the ESS (Morillas 2017: 78). The concept of Grand strategy is based on strategy of selective engagement. To formulate a grand strategy requires primary goals (interests) and accurate means (military power) to achieve the objectives (Art 1999: 79). The EUGS is a strategic document and perceived it similar to the traditional grand strategy. It became the most crucial document in global shift in the EU's external environment, which developed the defence mechanism in foreign and security policy. The EUGS has advanced the strategic actorness of the EU by merging the national interest of the Member States with a common interest of the Union, and strengthen the CSDP under the comprehensive approach of foreign and security policy (Sus 2017).

In contrast, the ESS, the EUGS choose a distinct path to offering the strategy. Besides mentioning the global threats and challenges, it also set common interests, principles and priorities to accomplish the objectives. The EUGS expresses from "inside out" and whereas, the ESS uncovered from "outside in" (Žutić and Vukadinović 2017: 103).

The EUGS's resilience approach seen "as the perfect middle ground between over ambitious liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective of stability" (Wagner and Anholt 2016: 415). The EUGS is a more integrated approach to deal with internal and external conflicts and crises by protection, respond in crises and build capacity. The civilian and military missions enhanced the capability of the Union by strategic autonomy and cooperation with partners (Keohane 2016: 31-33).

The adoption of the EUGS document after the UK withdrawal from the European Union showed remarkable realisation in the EU to formulate security and defence as the most significant structure in an existential crisis environment. By the help of the EUGS, the Union has achieved modest and tangible opportunity to become more resilient, autonomous and multilateral order to protect Europe from external threats. It produced a bottom-Up approach in national interests as well as collective and common goals and visions in security defence by confronting spill over effect from the neighbourhood to Europe security (Bilcík 2016: 11-13).

Conclusion

The EUGS has improved the EU's potential power to overcome the concept of small power. After the implementation of the Global Strategy has focused many security areas and cooperation through its preventive action, resilience and joined-up approach to become more credible and legitimate to develop capability and translate its vision into action.

Nevertheless, the primary goal of the EUGS provided a framework for policy-making and increased the openness of CFSP/CSDP, which can convert the EU into an effective international actor. The Global Strategy seeks to contribute to global security keep developing its ambitions to strengthen security worldwide. Thus, the Global Strategy has increased the Union actorness in many fields such as economic, political and security. The EU is known as a diplomatic actor, strategic actor, regional security actor, multilateral and overall it considered as a global actor in international security.

FIFTH CHAPTER

CONCLUSION

The study has examined the European Union Global Strategy 2016 for the foreign and security policy, published in June 2016. The research analysed the EUGS as the Union global strategy for stronger Europe to address the challenges and issues within and beyond its borders. The implementation of the EUGS for the European Union's foreign and security policy has defined the it actorness capability in international security. The EUGS has been marked as the most crucial strategy of the EU in the most connected, contested, and complex environment for a shared vision and common action internal and external Europe security. The EUGS provided a balanced approach in defence, clearly defined the interests and objective in sets priorities.

European Security

Security remained most disputed to define as a concept of security and actors feel secure in the absence of threat. The geopolitical security landscape at the end of the Cold-War era changed the aspect of security and European security context in the world order. In the post-Cold War, the world order has experienced a range of new security threats. The dynamic geopolitical landscape has produced instability in Europe. Europe has witnessed the horrifying experiences of the First-World War and Second-World War. However, Europe has also enjoyed the most prolonged peace for forty-five years from 1945-1990. Both types of experiences have enriched the European Union strategic thinking to formulate a strategy policy for common security and defence policy. The Post-Cold War order presented a transition shift in international politics. The world order shifted into unipolarity from the bipolarity. The events such as German reunification and decline of the Soviet Union brought the new security challenges to Europe. The Yugoslavia crises returned the conflict to Europe. The civil war in the Balkans, instability in the Central and Eastern Europe and 9/11 terrorist attack on the USA challenged the EU ability as an actor in global politics. These internal and external events at regional and global lever increased the more destructive security threats in Europe.

The EU has been regarded as an actor with normative power. The lack of strategic autonomy in decision-making, fragmented Member States and lack of a common agreement on a particular policy, treaty and strategy have created ambiguity in the institutional process of the EU. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU became a formal actor in international affairs. The Treaty separated the community security role of the EU from the foreign and security policy. Under the three-pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP was launched at the intergovernmental structure to enhance the leadership in the foreign security matters and strengthen defence mechanism for internal growth of Europe. Thus, the circumstances of changing security environment helped in the EU evolution to emerge as an actor in international politics. After the Maastricht Treaty, the EU became an official actor who earned its own place, presence and resources in the international system.

The actorness capability of an actor requires coherent policy objectives to fulfils these goals by effective means. The emergence of the EU as an actor was different from the other actors in international relations. The EU's role was limited in the participation of external security. However, the growth of the EU in the institution process, membership extension and separation of internal and external security affairs created its unique actor in international organisations. The foreign policy, crises management capability and influential leadership in Europe and beyond Europe played a significant role in regional security. The CFSP framework in the EU shaped the institutional process and leadership in foreign and security matters.

However, the outbreak of civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina unveiled the EU limitation of diplomacy and weakness of crises management capability to respond in the conflict and crises beyond the borders. The Kosovo war exposed the reality of the EU's effective actorness ability which lacked the incompetency of resources and capability to conduct the mission and deploy forces comparatively with NATO. It has also shown the EU's inability to protect Europe from outside threats. In the turmoil environment, the Saint-Malo Declaration has shown a very significant establishment of the ESDP. The ESDP was adopted as an integral part of the CFSP to review the military structure to define the EU response in a crisis.

The end of the Cold War order produced diverse and indistinct security threat challenges to the idea of unity and integration process of the Union. The sharp division

was created between the member states over the Iraq issue. The changing geopolitical landscape challenged the collective idea of integration in the newly established actor in global politics. Therefore, there was an urgent demand to remove this division and work together in the institutional structure for policy-making. The General Secretary/High Representative Javier Solana drew the first strategic document ESS in 2003 to bridge the gaps between the Member States and addressed the conflict and crises to European security.

First Security Strategy of the EU

The analysis of the ESS showed, the strategy was adopted as a saviour to maintain the identity of the EU's integration process. The ESS was marked as the first precise strategic security document in the development of the CFSP. The strategy focused upon a collaboration of European foreign policy interests with strategic objectives. It has developed multilateralism means to address the threats and crises. It supported the balanced approach in the launch of civilian and military means in the multi-faceted situation. The ESS did not use hard power security approach until other means of sources not capable to enforced the guarantee of peace. The first strategic document the ESS developed the Union's role as a regional security actor in Europe.

The enlargement process of the EU transformed the Union's strength, its integration process and institutional reform for more responsible and accountable towards European security. The Lisbon Treaty marked as a most major Treaty for Europe's integration process. It reformed the Union three-pillar structure and amended the institutional structure of the Union related to foreign policy by adding a new post of the president of the European Council, reinterpret position of HRVP within the new body of EEAS. The Treaty merged the EU's foreign policy and external relations into a single mechanism of external action. The Lisbon treaty shifted the EU's regional leader into a global actor in security.

The security order has been continuously changing after the first strategic document. The EU has witnessed more complicated and complex threats in a dynamic geopolitical environment. The range of terrorist attacks in Europe escalated the division among the Member States and in the EU. The rise of right-wing populist parties, increasing Euroscepticism, the emergence of hybrid threats and keep growing non-state actor activities polarised the Member States over national and European interests. It

converted Europe in the most contention hotspot zone of crises and instability. The Arab uprising, civil wars, failed states and conflict and crises in near abroad posed challenges to Europe's security and identity of its citizens. After witnessing the influx of refugee in Europe, questioned the Union's ability to act as an actor and its response to the crisis. The referendum of the UK decision to leave the EU raised the biggest question on threat to its defence capability and capacity in global security.

The security landscape in Europe was also linked to other developments both within and outsider. The ESS became an outdated strategy to address the security challenges and tackle the problem. Europe was in crises. Therefore, there was an urgent requirement for a new strategy to come with a proper mechanism and structure to provide an accurate response to crises. The year 2016 was marked as the most critical and crucial year in the history of the EU. In the midst of the turmoil period, the EU adopted a new Europe Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to protect Europe from outside world. Based on five major priorities, the EUGS has done a great job to identify the internal and external crises and address them with proper means. The EUGS combined the national interest of the Member States with a common objective of the EU to achieve the goals within the set of priorities. The EU has enhanced the foreign and security policy focusing on the internal security of Europe, which is depended on external conditions. The EUGS is down-words to up-words approach in nature. It has given foremost attention to European security to protect its citizens by confronting the conflict and crises in the world. The EUGS provided a clear vision for CFSP and CSDP role in the whole Europe.

EU's Global Strategy

In the changing world, the Global Strategy has strengthened the strategic autonomy of the EU to enhance its response in external crises, increased capacity building and protect Europe from the outside threats. The EUGS adopted a more pragmatic approach to promote peace and stability in near abroad. The integrated approach succeeded to promise the security in Europe through preventive means to maintain peace, stability and resolution of the conflict through adopting a balance approach in civilian and military security activities. A secure global order is necessary to safeguard the European security. Therefore, the Global Strategy's cooperative regional orders approach enhanced the shared responsibility to address transnational threats and their sources to

tackle them with effective means. It aspired to be a realistic strategy to achieve its idealistic goals. Brexit meant the second largest contributor in defence decided to leave the EU and breaking up from the Member States over their national interests in foreign and security policy surprised the world leaders. However, for the EU Global Strategy became a most reunited strategy to find its lost soul to restore unity over the security interest through the common objectives.

The EUGS has set its vision to translate into action. It adopted a more comprehensive approach for foreign and security relations with the world. Through operational defence management, the Global Strategy has shown the capability of the EU to act as a security actor. The seventeen ongoing civilian and military missions are working in the fragile and war-torn countries to promote stability, support peace, restore democracy, the rule of law and provide humanitarian assistance for peace-making, peace enforcement and respect of human rights to protect human security. The civilian and military missions and the launching peace projects are working at the ground to prepare a safety valve before crises occurred. The CSDP's civilian and military missions under the willingness in foreign policy and the operational defence management capability for security, defined the EU as a global actor. The EUGS transformed the EU into a more credible and responsive Union to work together with the Member States to establish a secure Europe to protect their citizens. Furthermore, the global strategy provided more functional and broader platform to connect with third world country and rebuild the EU concerns towards the neighbourhood. The Global Strategy redefining the EU relationship with Russia, rethinking the EU approach in Middle-East and North Africa and reviving Atlantic partnership for a more cooperative and connected world to address the problem together.

EU as a Global Security Actor

The EUGS enabled the Union to be more focused on European security by addressing the distinct security concerns at the global level. The EUGS strengthened the Union ability to act as a strategic actor by defining strategic partnership with emerging power, as a diplomatic actor by gaining the collective consent on security, and as a regional security actor by ensuring the European values and principle interests to play leading role in world politics. The CFSP and CDSP showed the capability of the EU as a capacity to act in international relations with other actors in global security. The

research on the EUGS assessment has shown that global strategy enhanced the capability and capacity of the EU to act as a global security actor in global politics. The EU emerged as a coherent actor in decision making and common action in the international system by favouring the international values, supporting international interests and gaining common external goals. The EU has become a stronger actor in international security. The concept of strategy is based on the use of all the means to get the sets objectives. In the EUGS, security and strategy are interrelated for Europe security with secure neighbours and connected and the cooperative world for stronger Europe in global affairs. Thus, the EUGS has presented a principled pragmatism approach in the complex, connected and contested world to hold the responsibility to promote resilience in the surrounding region through an integrated approach to deal with crises and conflict with the cooperative regional order in the global order, based on international law.

The EUGS is translating its vision into action through the allocation of separate budget on security and defence matter, strategic engagement partnership with neighbours' countries, emerging powers and other third world countries political, economic and security issues. The collective and comprehensive approach in internal-external nexus on development and security policy offered the new parameters in foreign relations. Successively, the Global Strategy emerged as an imperative strategy for a vision of united Europe and multilateral Europe to deal with conflicts in near abroad. It has given intensive attention on the Union willingness to act as an actor to deal with the conflict and crises with the EU and Member States resources. The EU Global Strategy accomplished the Union leadership characteristic to play an autonomous role in the policy decision on the deployment of the forces in military missions to expand the potential power to develop more defensive capabilities to confront the crises and seize the opportunities.

The finding of the study has shown the EUGS remained relevant and important for the EU's greater capacity and consistent to be a stronger global actor to engage with other international players. A comprehensive, coherent and united Union can guarantee multilateralism in the international order. It can promote more cooperative regional orders and support to connect to all this to ensure prosperity and security of the Union. To emerge as an effective global player in world security, the Union needs to become more strategic and act independently with other partners and alone if necessary. For

being a reliable and efficient global security player, the EU must improve cooperative engagement with all types of power in the world system and support a consolidated method of multilateralism worldwide.

Overall, an assessment on the EUGS has shown that in the dynamic geopolitical world, the EU Global Strategy seems very realistic to achieve all those promised objectives and visions defined under the priorities. The substantial part of the Global Strategy has been remained in the period and context it was framed. The Global Strategy is keep working on to develop collaboration between internal and external security policies to strengthen CSDP for European security and external action. The EUGS did not limit itself with the united Europe, it connecting with the world in global based order for human security. Thus, the EUGS's astonishing approach and vision defined the EU as an actor in the global security.

Russia-Ukraine war has returned the war in Europe and embarked on a geopolitical shift in global order challenging the EU's ability to promote its vision and defend its interests. Therefore, the European Strategic Compass began in March 2022 as an attempt to bring together the EU defence and security goals among its 27 Member States. It works towards a common vision to secure Europe and be a defence actor to analyse threats at the global, regional and EU levels. The strategy provides four core priorities to act in a crisis, secure its people, invest in capabilities to protect the EU's values and interests and its role in defence and enhance partnership to address common threats and challenges.

As compared to the EUGS, the European Strategic Compass came just after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It's war time strategy to protect its citizens and prepare its Member States. In comparison, the 2016 European Union Global Strategy is a comprehensive strategy that addresses common security threats faced worldwide. The EUGS is based on an integrated approach for conflict management and pre-emptive peace, and it provides strategic autonomy for a credible and responsive Union to engage with the world and address the threats. Thus, the Global Strategy has enhanced the capability and capacity of the EU as a global security actor.

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